The Military Balance-2018 PDF

Editor’s Introduction
Western technology edge erodes further

Defence policymakers worldwide remain challenged by a changing threat perceptions. China’s defence spending,
complex and fractured security environment, marked by however, has continued to rise. After years of double-digit
increased uncertainty in relations between states and the growth, China’s increases have since 2016 been aligned with
proliferation of advanced military capabilities. Attacks in GDP growth at 6–7%. However, the downturn in spending
2017 highlighted the continuing threat from transnational by some of the top defence-spending states, including Russia
terrorists. Persistent conflicts and insecurity in parts of Africa and Saudi Arabia, meant that in real terms, global defence
meant that the continent still demanded the deployment of spending effectively stagnated in 2017.
significant combat forces by African and external powers. In
the Middle East, the war against ISIS, the civil war in Syria, China
the destructive conflict in Yemen and Iran’s destabilising There has been no slackening in the pace of China’s military
activities dominated the regional security environment. In modernisation. Its progress in defence aerospace remains
Europe, low-level conflict persisted in eastern Ukraine, with remarkable. Indeed, China looks on track to field before 2020
Russia reinforcing its military posture across the border and its first front-line unit equipped with the Chengdu J-20 low-
its military capabilities preoccupying European NATO states. observable combat aircraft. If so, the US could soon lose its
In Asia, North Korea tested its first intercontinental ballistic monopoly on operational stealthy combat aircraft. China also
missile. Pyongyang’s provocations may be an immediate continues to develop an array of advanced guided-weapons
threat, but there was also an increasingly pervasive concern projects. The IISS now assesses that the latest in China’s
over China’s military programmes and activities. In 2017 expanding missile line-up – the PL-15 extended range AAM
Beijing introduced yet more advanced military systems, and – could enter service as soon as 2018. This weapon appears
deployed elements of its armed forces further afield. to be equipped with an active electronically scanned array
radar, indicating that China has joined the few nations able to
Defence spending integrate this capability on an AAM.
Though much talk in early 2017 was of possible retrench- These are all part of the air force’s goal of being able to
ment, the United States has so far doubled-down on its challenge any opponent in the air domain. For the past three
commitment to European defence. Funding for the European decades, the ability to operate uncontested in the air has been
Deterrence Initiative has risen, and the US is deploying – a key advantage for the US and its allies. This can no longer
and looking to sell – more equipment to Europe. So, in July be assumed. China is pursuing similar ambitions at sea. The
2018, when President Donald Trump arrives in Brussels for launch of the first Type-055 cruiser presages the Chinese navy
the NATO Summit, the US, having increased its own effort, closing another gap in its developing blue-water capabilities.
will be looking for additional signs that European leaders More broadly, the PLA’s suite of increasingly capable military
are boosting their own defence funding. In early 2017, NATO systems points to the growing development of land-, air- and
states redoubled their commitment to boost spending. IISS sea-based anti-access/area-denial capabilities to complement
figures show that the rising trend observed in Europe since its growing power-projection capacity. But using these capa-
2014–15 has continued; real-terms annual growth in defence bilities to best effect requires that China makes similar progress
spending reached 3.6% in 2017. Some of this may have in improved training, doctrine and tactics.
resulted from US exhortations, but mostly it stemmed from China’s progress in military research and development
changing threat perceptions among European states. meant it had already become the single most important
Indeed, in 2017, Europe was the fastest-growing region external influence on the trajectory of US defence develop-
when it came to real-terms defence spending. Taken together, ments. Not only has China’s defence industry maintained
northern and central European states increased defence its relentless development tempo, it has also continued to
spending in real terms by 4.8% in 2017. However, more NATO pursue advanced technologies, including extremely high-
states claiming that they will reach the target of spending 2% performance computing and quantum communications.
of GDP on defence is not necessarily the best outcome, and China’s emerging weapons developments and broader
there could more usefully be greater focus on output in terms defence-technological progress are designed to further its
of combat capability instead of financial targets. transition from ‘catching up’ with the West, to becoming
Although the overall balance of global military spending a global defence innovator: in some areas of defence tech-
continues to shift towards Asia, the growth in Asian defence nology, China has already achieved its goal. China’s will-
spending slowed in 2017, reflecting factors including reduced ingness to export military equipment – including advanced
economic growth in some states. In turn, this indicated that missiles and armed UAVs – means that Western defence
the upwards trend in regional spending of recent years may planners will have to take account of a more complex and
have owed as much to strong economic growth as it did to contested future threat environment.
6 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2018
Russia member states in 2017 finally took steps towards perma-

Russia remains the principal security concern for states in nent structured defence cooperation, and the European
eastern and northern Europe. Moscow has continued to Commission established a European Defence Fund. Both
deploy advanced military equipment, including S-400 air- developments have the potential to deliver financial benefits
defence systems and 500km-range Iskander ballistic missiles, by reducing duplication in defence spending.
in the Western Military District. Though Russia’s armed forces
continue to introduce new equipment, the heralded genera- Challenges to the West
tional shift in military materiel is taking place more slowly than Increasingly fast, precise and technologically sophisticated
first anticipated. Russia is experiencing further funding and military systems are being developed by non-Western coun-
industrial shortcomings and will likely further slow or delay tries, particularly China and Russia, and militarily useful
the delivery of some systems in its 2018–27 State Armament technologies are increasingly accessible at relatively low cost.
Programme. While advanced systems such as the Su-57 combat In response, Western states will look to ‘leap-ahead’ technolo-
aircraft and the T-14 main battle tank will eventually see service, gies to maintain an edge. This will require greater agility, and
their numbers will likely be fewer than initially thought. This greater acceptance of development risks by governments and
problem is even more pronounced for Russia’s navy, but the defence and technology sectors. Success is by no means
Moscow is seeking to offset the impact of its sclerotic large assured. The growing democratisation of technology will
surface-ship construction by continuing to distribute high-preci- make it harder still.
sion weapons systems to smaller, more varied vessel classes. The integration of accelerating technical developments
Continuing allegations of Russian interference in Western into defence organisations could offer transformative capabil-
electoral processes again indicate that Moscow views its ities. New information-processing technologies will improve
modernising armed forces as just one aspect of the capabili- military systems. Indeed, the speed and scope of some
ties it can employ to realise strategic goals. Cyber capability modern sensor systems already surpass human processing
should now be seen as a key aspect of some states’ coer- capability. Greater use will likely be made of artificial intel-
cive power, giving them the chance to wage covert digital ligence and machine learning, as states look to develop auto-
campaigns. This might be an adjunct to military power, or mated decision-making to augment human capacities, boost
employed in its place, in order to accomplish traditional objec- weapons capabilities and gain early advantage, including
tives. This has driven some European states to re-examine through the use of economic and political levers and cyber-
their industrial, political, social and economic vulnerabili- enabled information and influence tools.
ties, influence operations and information warfare, as well as For all the transformative potential of these technolo-
more traditional areas of military power. gies, continuities in conflict will persist – certainly in terms
of the nature of war fighting. These would be recogni-
Europe sable to the founders of the IISS in 1958, who had just 13
One aspect of the response to this has been greater cooperation years before emerged from the Second World War. Other
between the EU and NATO over so-called ‘hybrid’ threats. aspects of today’s military-security environment would
Russia’s activities have also spurred some European states also be familiar, including tensions over nuclear weapons.
to enhance their military inventories. Russia’s rocket artil- Persistent allegations that Russia has deployed ground-
lery, and its combat-aviation and precision-missile systems, launched cruise missiles and discussions over nuclear
are generating greater attention on air and missile defence in weapons on the Korean Peninsula raise the spectre that
Europe, notably in the east and north. Some states are eyeing states could again conceive of theatre nuclear weapons as
Patriot and other ground-based air-defence systems, boosting military complements to increasingly modernised strategic
armoured vehicle fleets, rebuilding fixed-wing combat nuclear systems.
airpower and developing air-launched stand-off strike power. Using new technical processing capabilities to augment
It seems as if, finally, some European states are looking to military systems will compress response times, and may
rebuild a credible conventional deterrent capability. drive more automation in defences in order to minimise an
Improving the quality of their military systems is one adversary’s first-strike advantage. This increases the risk of
answer; so too is enabling mobility, so that military capabili- miscalculation in response and may drive other nations to
ties can be rapidly brought to bear. Serious thought is now seek such technologies. This is worrisome in the strategic-
being given to how to make this easier at the bureaucratic weapons arena, which relies on a degree of transparency and
level. Discussions in late 2017 examined how to ease the shared situational awareness. Combined, these developments
movement of military materiel across Europe. These moves should place a premium on more measured and smarter
were given impetus by stronger US pressure on European diplomacy, improved military-to-military ties and emphasis
states to do more for their own defence. Without this effort, on confidence- and security-building measures. Furthermore,
the Trump administration claimed, Washington might at a time when bonds forged during the Cold War are under
‘moderate’ its support for Europe. continued stress, they should mean that states sharpen their
These concerns led some in Europe to question the degree focus on the benefits to be gained from alliances or other
to which they could rely on external assistance. Also, EU cooperative relationships.
Chapter One
Chinese and Russian air-launched
weapons
: a test for Western air dominance
Since the end of the Cold War, the air domain has ures to degrade an opponent’s networked environ-
been one of assured superiority for the United States ment. With regard to air-to-air systems, this will likely
and its allies. This dominance, however, rests on include off-board targeting at extended launch ranges,
weapons and technologies that China and Russia where another platform (i.e. not the aircraft carrying
are increasingly attaining as part of a broader effort the missile) would identify and provide the target
to counter US capabilities, and to deny US and allied location and in-flight updates to the missile.
forces unimpeded control of the air.
These two nations – emerging and resurgent air Chinese progress
powers, respectively – are developing their own The extent of Chinese progress in the air-to-air
‘fifth-generation’ combat aircraft with the requisite guided-weapons arena was apparent with the intro-
low-observable characteristics. In parallel, they are duction of the PL-10 AAM. This weapon provided
pursuing air-launched weapons to complement these a marked improvement in performance over the
projects, and at the same time are recapitalising their previous generation of short-range missiles operated
weapons inventories with missiles that will enhance by the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF),
their ability to contest control of the air. Some of these and its development has placed China among the
weapons are now appearing on the export market. handful of nations with a defence-industrial base
In 2015–16, Beijing brought into service the PL-10 capable of producing such a weapon. The PL-10
imaging infrared air-to-air missile (AAM). In 2018, it uses aerodynamic and thrust-vector control, but the
may well introduce the PL-15. These missiles mark- PLAAF will require an advanced helmet-mounted
edly improve the combat air capability of its air cueing system in order to exploit the manoeuvrability
forces. Meanwhile, Russia has brought into service the weapon offers. During 2018, a missile designated
two upgraded versions of existing weapons, along PL-15 may also begin to enter front-line service. The
with a new long-range AAM, and this pace of devel- PL-15 is an extended-range active radar-guided AAM
opment may continue. Indeed, Moscow is looking to and, when in service, would be the most capable
further exploit a range of advanced technologies that AAM in the PLAAF inventory. Significantly, in late
are appropriate to guided weapons. This trend is, if 2015, it was identified as a weapon of concern by
anything, more pronounced in Beijing. For example, General Hawk Carlisle, then head of the United States
China has already started to use active electronically Air Force (USAF) Air Combat Command.
scanned array radars for missile applications. It is also However, the PL-10 and the PL-15 are not the only
developing dual-mode guidance seekers; working on systems with which the US and its allies are having to
increasing the average speed of weapons; boosting come to terms. China is also developing a very-long-
the manoeuvrability of its missiles; and, at the same range AAM intended to be used to attack high-value
time, improving on-board processing in order to targets such as tanker, airborne early-warning, and
enhance missile performance. Although Russia is intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)
also working on some of these areas, China’s efforts aircraft. Furthermore, Beijing appears to be pursuing
are better resourced. two or more configurations of rocket-ramjet AAMs.
Presently, air combat is increasingly enabled by By the early to mid-2020s, China will clearly have
accelerating technology developments in communica- a broader – and far more capable – range of air-to-
tions and on-board processing power that enable faster air weapons to complement the combat aircraft that
and more coordinated activity between dispersed are now in development. These will likely force the
platforms. As such, and as part of the modernisation US and its regional allies to re-examine not only their
of its air-combat capabilities, China is also seeking the tactics, techniques and procedures, but also the direc-
ability to create and exploit friendly digital networks, tion of their own combat-aerospace development
while developing the tactics, techniques and proced programmes.
Russian resurgence produced an inferior weapon. Today, however,

Meanwhile, Russia has also begun to recapitalise Beijing is no longer reliant on Russian missile-tech-
its air-to-air-weapons inventory, after funding cuts nology assistance; it is now at least Moscow’s equal,
forced a two-decades-long lull in procurement and, perhaps in some areas, it is now in the lead.
activity. For example, some 30 years after it was first
test fired, the air force has now introduced a version Going electronic
of the Vympel R-77 (AA-12A Adder) medium-range China appears to be one of the few nations to have
active radar-guided missile into service. The R-77 used an active electronically scanned array (AESA)
entered production in the 1990s to meet export orders, radar on an AAM, rather than a traditional mechani-
with the export variant publicly called the RVV-AE. cally scanned planar array. The PL-15 has been widely
However, only test rounds of the baseline version reported as using an AESA. Meanwhile, Japan’s
were procured by the Russian Air Force. It took AAM-4B AAM is also fitted with an AESA seeker,
until 2015 for the air force to introduce into service while there is speculation that the US AIM-120D
a variant of the R-77 – the improved and upgraded variant of the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range
R-77-1 (AA-12B). This was first deployed operation- Air-to-Air Missile also uses an AESA rather than a
ally in late 2015, when Su-35S aircraft operating from mechanically scanned seeker.
Khmeimim air base in Syria were shown carrying the AESA technology is increasingly being used as the
weapon. primary sensor for combat aircraft, with mechanic
Along with the R-77-1, the air force has also begun ally scanned array radars replaced by either fixed
to take delivery of an improved version of the short- or moveable electronically scanned arrays. These
range R-73 (AA-11 Archer) – the R-74M (AA-11B) offer a number of advantages, including better detec-
likely entered the front-line inventory around the tion performance in terms of range and against
same time as the R-77-1. The R-74M has a greater low-observable targets, greater resistance to coun-
maximum range than the R-74 and is fitted with an termeasures, a reduced probability of intercept and
improved seeker. Also noteworthy was the introduc- improved reliability. However, the high cost of intro-
tion into service of the R-37M (AA-13 Axehead) active ducing these systems (the transmit–receive modules
radar-guided long-range AAM in 2015–16. This that are the building blocks of AESA technology are
missile is the primary armament of the MiG-31BM comparatively expensive to produce) has, until now,
Foxhound interceptor. This weapon can also trace its acted as a brake on their introduction, particularly on
design origins to the late 1980s. single-use weapons such as missiles.
At least some of the renewed stimulus in Russian Several performance factors have likely contrib-
guided-weapons development has been provided uted to these countries’ decisions to overcome the
by China, partly as a potential customer and partly cost barriers relating to AESA technology on AAMs.
as an increasingly credible export rival. The R-37M is In the case of China, where weapons research and
being offered as a candidate weapon for the Sukhoi acquisition is less constrained by funding restrictions,
Su-35 Flanker, which China has already purchased, these factors likely included these systems’ improved
and the missile may be part of the aircraft’s weapons performance against low-observable targets and
package. Meanwhile, China’s PL-10 AAM is already greater resistance to countermeasures on target
being offered for export, as is the active radar-guided aircraft, such as radio-frequency jammers.
medium-range PL-12. The high-agility imaging The inherent flexibility of AESA technology, in
infrared PL-10 is significantly more capable than terms of its frequency agility, makes these seekers
Russia’s R-74/R-74M, while the baseline PL-12 more difficult to counter by jamming. In contrast,
appears to have a better performance than that of the traditional radar countermeasures involve ident
R-77 (AA-12A). ifying the frequency on which the threat system is
The PL-12 programme – which started in the late operating, and then generating a jamming signal on
1980s – benefited greatly from Russian technology. the same frequency.
The original version of the missile uses a radar seeker Efforts are also under way in Russia to develop
designed by the Russian firm Agat, with several other AESA seekers for air-to-air applications, including
components also provided by Moscow. Without the Izdeliye (Article) 180/K-77M, a development of
Russian support, the PL-12 programme would, in the R-77, and a new design known as Izdeliye-270.
all likelihood, have taken considerably longer and However, some Russian seeker designers remain
Chinese and Russian air-launched weapons 9
unconvinced of the value of moving from a mechanic the radome could accommodate a large antenna, with
ally scanned system to electronically scanned arrays. this providing a detection range of perhaps 40–50km
There have also been indications that the Russian or more against a target with a large radar cross-
microelectronics sector has struggled to produce section, such as a tanker or airborne early-warning
transmit–receive modules to the required reliability aircraft. The infrared or imaging infrared adjunct
and cost targets. seeker could be used for terminal aim-point selec-
tion to try to ensure maximum damage or as an alter
Long- and very-long-range engagement native primary seeker were the missile’s radar seeker
In the late 1980s, Soviet guided-weapons designers to be jammed.
were considering the development of long-range
AAMs to be used against high-value airborne plat- A challenging future environment
forms, such as tanker and ISR aircraft, which tradi- China’s very-long-range weapon will, when it begins
tionally remain far behind the forward edge of any air to enter service in the next few years, provide the
battle. The Novator KS-172 design, for instance, was PLAAF with the ability to threaten high-value air
intended to be used at ranges of up to 300 kilometres. targets at extended ranges. This will likely influence
However, it languished with little or no state support how potential opponents consider their own future
throughout the 1990s and beyond, before losing out operations. Coupling the J-16’s operational radius
in a 2009 competition with the Vympel Izdeliye-810 with a 400km-range AAM would, for instance, be a
long-range missile. The latter is based to some extent forcing factor for an opponent’s planning of its tanker-
on the long-range R-37M but it has an airframe modi- refuelling tracks or large-platform ISR missions. It
fied for carriage in internal weapons bays, including is perhaps no coincidence that the USAF is increas-
on the fifth-generation Sukhoi Su-57 combat aircraft ingly interested in a low-observable tanker-aircraft
(the prototype is known as the Sukhoi T-50). design. Yet more concerning from a US perspective
It is apparent that China has also decided to pursue is the fact that this development is only one aspect
a long-range AAM capability, quite possibly tracking of the PLAAF’s effort to recapitalise its AAM inven-
Russian developments. Images of a large, long-range tory with more capable systems, including the PL-10,
missile being carried by a PLAAF Shenyang J-16 PL-15 and the rocket-ramjet-powered AAMs that
combat aircraft appeared on the internet in late 2016. offer far greater engagement options. These develop-
The weapon is estimated to be about six metres long; ments are themselves nested within a combat-aircraft
by comparison, the R-37M is just over four metres upgrade and re-equipment programme.
long. The design only had four control surfaces at China’s progress will also continue to spur
the tail, with no mid-body wing, suggesting a missile missile-technology developments in Russia, while
design not intended for high manoeuvrability. The collaboration between the two countries, at least at
missile is well into development. Along with an esti- the subsystems level, remains a possibility; indeed,
mated maximum range of greater than 400km, it Russian industrialists have suggested that this is
probably also uses dual-mode guidance. The images already taking place. With the PL-10 and the PL-12
appeared to show that as well as an active radar already on offer for export, and the possibility that
seeker, the weapon was also fitted with an infrared further upgrades might appear on the export market,
adjunct seeker. The use of dual-mode guidance Western air forces will have to take account of a more
would make the missile more resistant to counter- complicated future threat environment. However,
measures, and improve aim-point selection. although technology might be a central element of air
In a very-long-range engagement scenario, off- power, it needs to be used appropriately if best advan-
board sensors – those on the launch aircraft – would tage is to be gained. The PLAAF is moving towards
provide initial targeting information and mid-course more demanding and realistic training scenarios, but
updates during the missile’s flight. A lofted trajectory these developments will need to continue – and the
would also be used, potentially at altitudes in excess lessons fully integrated into doctrine, training and
of 30,000 metres, in order to minimise airframe drag. tactics – if it is to take full advantage of the weapon
Given the considerable diameter of the missile’s body, systems now entering its inventory.
Big data, artificial intelligence
and defence
Big-data analysis, machine learning and artifi- objective is to reduce the ‘human-factors burden’,
cial intelligence (AI) are points along a continuum increase actionable intelligence and enhance military
that will progressively remove human beings from decision-making.
complex decision-making. The automation of induc- Other armed forces appear equally interested in
tive ‘reasoning’ and empirical modelling allows for the potential of AI and are inclined towards similar
improved pattern recognition of all sorts, ranging potential uses. In 2017, the UK’s Defence Science
from identifying similar targets to predicting and Technology Laboratory launched a challenge
correlated behaviour. Currently, however, these that included developing an automated system to
largely involve algorithmic models operating on identify and classify vehicles from satellite imagery.
extremely large data sets rather than genuine cogni- Meanwhile, NATO’s Science and Technology
tion or abstract decision-making capabilities that Organization has scheduled a ‘specialists’ meeting’
would resemble human intelligence. Although the in France on big data and AI for military decision-
current position on this technological continuum making at the end of May 2018, and the UN has
may be debatable, these technologies are starting to announced that it is opening a new office in The
have a transformative effect on defence capability. As Hague to monitor the development of AI and robotics.
in every other aspect of modern economies and soci- Beyond Europe, China is applying facial-rec-
eties, automated algorithms are being leveraged to ognition algorithms to the domestic video footage
collect, compile, structure, process, analyse, transmit collected by closed-circuit television cameras in
and act upon increasingly large data sets. In the mili- order, it says, to boost public safety. It is also placing
tary context, the opportunities for remote-sensing, more emphasis on big data and AI for air-force opera-
situational-awareness, battlefield-manoeuvre and tions. Beijing’s state council has set a target output of
other AI applications seem promising. It remains RMB1 trillion (US$147.1 billion) for Chinese AI indus-
unclear, however, whether these new technical capa- tries by the year 2030, asserting that ‘breakthroughs
bilities will ultimately shift the balance in favour of should be made in basic theories of AI, such as big
offensive or defensive actions. data intelligence, multimedia aware computing,
human–machine hybrid intelligence, swarm intel-
Military applications ligence and automated decision-making’. In 2017,
On 11 May 2017, Dan Coats, the director of US National the Russian news agency TASS reported that the
Intelligence, delivered testimony to the US Congress Kalashnikov Group has developed an AI-controlled
on his annual Worldwide Threat Assessment. In the combat module that can independently identify and
publicly released document, he said that ‘Artificial engage targets, and that radio-electronic technologies
intelligence (AI) is advancing computational capabil firm KRET was working on unmanned systems with
ities that benefit the economy, yet those advances also swarming and independent decision-making capa-
enable new military capabilities for our adversaries’. bilities. Those are but a few of the initiatives under
At the same time, the US Department of Defense way; the full range of military applications for AI is
(DoD) is working on such systems. Project Maven, certainly expansive.
for instance, also known as the Algorithmic Warfare
Cross-Functional Team (AWCFT), is designed to accel- From tactical to operational
erate the integration of big data, machine learning Even though technological innovation has not
and AI into US military capabilities. While the initial yet replicated human reasoning in independent
focus of AWCFT is on computer-vision algorithms for machines, AI portends significant changes at all
object detection and classification, it will consolidate levels of military doctrine and practice. The UK’s
all existing algorithm-based-technology initiatives Royal Navy, for example, is pursuing Project Nelson
associated with US defence intelligence. The overall to exploit and enable developments in AI across the
Big data, artificial intelligence and defence 11
‘whole naval enterprise’. AI systems will be intro- certainly engender new operational opportunities.
duced to provide ‘cognitive support to operators and China’s defence sector has made breakthroughs in
users’, playing a part in mitigating data overload in UAV ‘swarming’ technology, including a demon-
today’s complex sensor- and data-rich operational stration of 1,000 EHang UAVs flying in formation at
environment. Military services also emphasise the the Guangzhou air show in February 2017. Potential
relevance of these new capabilities to enabling func- scenarios could include competing UAV swarms
tions, such as logistics, as much as to their use in trying to impede each other’s C4ISR network, while
front-line combat roles; they are about the future, but simultaneously engaging kinetic targets.
also about helping today, UK officials have said. As the European Council on Foreign Relations
But immediate gains from AI are also being said, ‘AI will be part of the future of warfare,
realised in the tactical realm. Command, control, initially through autonomous weapons that can
communications, computers, intelligence, surveil- find and engage targets independently and operate
lance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) are reaching new in swarms’. The shift to coordinated networks of
heights of efficiency that enable data collection and smaller, unmanned platforms will pose operational
processing at unprecedented scale and speed. When challenges for the large, centralised weapons systems
the pattern-recognition algorithms being developed that dominated twentieth-century warfare. This will
in China, Russia, the UK, the US and elsewhere are also have implications for military doctrine, defence
coupled with precise weapons systems, they will procurement and combatant commanders – espe-
further increase the tactical advantage of unmanned cially as the reduced human and financial cost per
aerial vehicles (UAVs) and other remotely oper- unit of such UAVs renders them more expendable in
ated platforms. According to the DoD, however, combat scenarios.
the ‘deep learning’ software being integrated into More AI applications for weapons systems of
those systems is meant to complement, not replace, tactical and/or operational significance in the land,
the human operator. Instead, it serves to reduce the sea, air and space domains can be readily envisioned,
required reaction time and augments the effective- but the biggest impact of machine learning may be on
ness of munitions packages. military decision-making itself. In 2017, the Innovate
For purely computational tasks, big-data analysis UK initiative announced £6 million (US$7.7m) in
and machine learning can now supersede human Ministry of Defence funding for ‘new technologies,
capabilities. For example, one June 2016 report stated processes and ways of operating that improve the
that a US company had developed an AI system ability of defence staff to analyse and exploit data
(called ‘ALPHA’) that prevailed in combat simula- in decision-making’. Machine learning will soon be
tions against an air-force veteran. In an interview, employed not only to process sensor data and engage
ALPHA’s developer explained that it can process military assets, but also in an attempt to ‘outwit’
enormous amounts of sensor data and uses math- human opponents. Indeed, predictive analytics for
ematical modelling to determine tactical responses. adversary behaviour is a key objective of operational
However, it utilises an approach called ‘fuzzy logic’ AI in the long term.
(akin to industrial control-system applications that
act on sensor inputs), rather than a neural-networking Strategic advantage
approach, which would seek to emulate the human US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General
brain. As such, today’s tactical advantage stems from Joseph Dunford stated in early 2017 that ‘information
much greater data-processing capabilities, rather operations, space and cyber capabilities and ballistic
than ‘smart’ machines per se. missile technology have accelerated the speed of war,
Through its ‘capability technology’ research making conflict today faster and more complex than
agenda, the European Defence Agency (EDA) is also at any point in history’. Nations have less time to
exploring big data in defence modelling and simula- marshal their resources in response to security chal-
tion environments. In addition to enhancing combat lenges than in the past, Dunford said. Because of this,
efficiency, research and development (R&D) in mili- and in order to stay ahead of the accelerating speed
tary AI applications will create new adaptive meth- of war, automated decision-making will increasingly
odologies for training personnel (such as fighter be relied upon by military forces. That is particularly
pilots). Furthermore, massive processing capabil true regarding strategic C4ISR assets and nuclear-
ities available for C4ISR information will almost deterrent capabilities, whose disruption or destruc-
tion could pose an existential threat. Smarter offensive permitted to make life and death decisions received
weapons will drive an ‘arms race’ for more automa- much media attention during 2017. In August, over
tion in defences in order to minimise any first-strike 100 prominent science and technology leaders joined
advantage. Yet the strategic balance surrounding Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk and others who
nuclear security relies on, and clearly encourages, had already warned the United Nations two years
some degree of transparency and common situational earlier about the risks of so-called ‘killer robots’.
awareness. Substantially raising uncertainty in the Nonetheless, several countries continue to develop
nuclear arena could threaten instability and have a LAWS that would be capable of completely inde-
mutually deleterious effect. pendent operation if desired. For his part, the vice-
Meanwhile, integrating capacities, such as AI, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Air Force
that greatly enhance the capability of conventional General Paul Selva, has argued that humans should
systems could risk undermining the measures of be kept in the decision-making loop. As of 2015, the
transparency and predictability around military-plat- UK’s foreign office did not support an explicit prohi-
form capability that underpin confidence and secur bition on the use of LAWS, because it felt interna-
ity-building measures and treaty regimes. It could tional humanitarian law (IHL) provided sufficient
also fundamentally alter threat perceptions around regulation. The UK armed forces, however, only
the deployment of ostensibly traditional systems by operate weapons systems that are subject to human
adversaries. Additionally, in conventional military oversight and control.
conflict or in peacetime, AI could be utilised to inten- There is a clear distinction between applying
tionally distort information resources or destabilise IHL or specific rules of engagement to LAWS in the
the existing state of affairs. field and ‘hard wiring’ those ethical limitations into
Russia’s President Vladimir Putin said that AI the systems themselves. In that respect, the military
raises both ‘colossal opportunities and threats that are considerations are analogous to the current debates
difficult to predict now’. Although he was speaking regarding how to programme driverless cars to
in a non-military context, his claim holds true in the respond in worst-case scenarios – including choosing
military realm too. It is too early to judge whether AI between different potentially fatal options. Except in
is predominantly an offensive or defensive tool. In the defence sector, it is presumed that the AI guide-
fact, the strategic balance may simply tip in favour lines would be set by national military authorities
of the party with the superior military AI algo- and not by private companies.
rithms, since they could enhance nearly every type
of weapon system. Or essentially, as Putin further 2018 and beyond
stated, whoever leads in developing AI will become A July 2017 study conducted on behalf of the US
dominant. Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity
The real strategic impact of AI will concern its highlighted that advances in AI are occurring much
ability to impair or delay decision-making by mili- faster than originally anticipated. The report also
tary and political leaders. As in the operational placed AI on a par with aircraft and nuclear weapons
realm, human processes will be targeted because they as a transformative national-security technology.
remain susceptible to manipulation by AI in a big- Accordingly, it will likely warrant new strategic
data environment. Recent elections have shown that thought to reveal its full implications and create
automated efforts can influence social-media percep- doctrinal models. As such, AI will need its counter-
tions and even temporarily create competing ‘factual’ parts to Billy Mitchell and Giulio Douhet, or Thomas
accounts. There is an inherent conservativism to Schelling and Herman Kahn.
modern military theory, which seeks to avoid poten- China’s Next Generation Artificial Intelligence
tially catastrophic conflicts; reduced levels of confi- Development Plan may be the beginning of that
dence in the accuracy of information would delay process. Released in July 2017, it lays out a holistic
defensive decision-making, potentially to the benefit national strategy for R&D, economic development
of the aggressor. and national security pertaining to AI. This includes
strengthening integration between the military
Ethical considerations and civilian sectors, reflective of the fact that AI is a
The ethical question of whether or not lethal dual-use technology whose fundamental principles
autonomous-weapons systems (LAWS) should be have applicability well beyond the military domain.
Big data, artificial intelligence and defence 13
Indeed, this makes both constraining its development sensor data – to introduce strategic uncertainty into
and regulating its proliferation nearly impossible. an adversary’s decision-making processes.
With Chinese, European, Russian and US leaders all Big-data analysis and machine-learning algorithms
publicly declaring that AI represents the future of are already available and vastly expand information-
national power, there will undoubtedly be large-scale processing capabilities; the defence sector is certain
investment and concomitant advances in military AI to capitalise on those innovations. Moreover, mili-
applications around the world. tary applications will go far beyond improvements to
Algorithmic warfare will change battlefield specific weapons systems, and qualitative changes to
armaments, tactics and operations. Effective missile tactics and operations will mandate revisions in stra-
defences enabled by swarming interceptors would tegic doctrine. Automated decision-making will play
also affect the existing strategic dynamic relating to an increased role at every level of the command-and-
nuclear weapons. But if recent experience with cyber control process, from swarming miniature UAVs to
operations is any indicator, then the most potent mili- the national command authority. Genuine AI in the
tarily relevant applications of AI technology may, in scientific sense (i.e. truly independent logic systems
the near term, be to manipulate civilian infrastruc- that can indistinguishably mirror human thought
tures for coercive objectives and to conduct influence processes and in turn create their own machine-
operations during peacetime. From 2018 onwards, learning algorithms) may still be years away, but it
there will likely be further automated social-media is not too early to begin establishing normative limits
campaigns and machine-learning tools employed to for LAWS through IHL and military rules of engage-
detect and/or interdict them. Indeed, by 2020, one ment, in anticipation of this eventuality. Some tech-
may see complex AI-based perception-management nologists consider that these decisions will need to be
operations – perhaps even falsifying or spoofing addressed much sooner than we think.
Russia: strategic-force modernisation
Nuclear weapons have long played a fundamental legacy systems continued with the support of defence
role in Russia’s national-security strategy. Moscow enterprises in Ukraine).
sees them as an essential aspect of strategic deter- These efforts allowed Russia to bring together
rence – which also comprises conventional and key elements of the Soviet-era military-indus-
non-military capabilities – enabling it to maintain trial infrastructure, and to preserve a significant
strategic stability and prevent military conflict. This number of military research and design institutions
suggests that Russia does not consider its nuclear involved in the development of advanced mili-
capability in narrowly military terms, but rather tary systems. In this period, Moscow also devel-
relies on this to position itself as one of the guaran- oped a broad outline of its nuclear-modernisation
tors of a stable international system. programme that helped it maintain its strategic
This does not mean, however, that nuclear forces with the limited financial resources that
weapons do not have a military role. Russia’s mili- were available. As more funds became available in
tary doctrine, last updated in 2014, states that the the 2000s, the modernisation effort was intensified
country reserves the right to use its nuclear capa- and subsequently expanded to include a number of
bility in response to the use of nuclear weapons – or new programmes. To a large extent, this expansion
other weapons of mass destruction – against Russia was driven by the defence industry, although the
or its allies, and in circumstances where aggres- factors that helped justify the modernisation effort
sion with conventional weapons would put at risk included the need to maintain numerical parity
the very existence of the state. While this language with the United States and to counter US missile-
indicates that the range of conditions for the use of defence developments.
Russia’s nuclear weapons is relatively constrained, Today, key enterprises involved in the devel-
it is nuanced enough to allow Moscow to suggest opment and production of Russia’s strategic
that it can resort to nuclear weapons in a number systems include the Moscow Institute of Thermal
of scenarios. While the Russian political and mili- Technology, which leads the development of land-
tary leadership clearly understands the catastrophic and sea-based solid-propellant ballistic missiles
consequences of a large-scale nuclear exchange, (RS-12M2 Topol-M (SS-27 mod 1), RS-24 Yars (SS-27
Moscow appears to be maintaining a degree of ambi- mod 2) and Bulava), and the Votkinsk Machine
guity about its intentions and capabilities that makes Building Plant, which produces the missiles. The
it very difficult to completely rule out the possibility Makeyev State Rocket Center is the lead developer
of a limited use of nuclear weapons in some even- of liquid-fuel missiles, including modifications
tualities. Indeed, in its military exercises, Russia of the R-29RM Sineva (SS-N-23 Skiff) submarine-
has practised scenarios that involve the use of such launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and the new silo-
weapons. based Sarmat. These missiles are produced at the
Krasnoyarsk Machine Building Plant. The Tupolev
Defence industry Design Bureau is the main contractor for work on
Given the role that nuclear weapons play in its the current range of strategic bombers. Upgrades
national-security strategy, it is unsurprising that to old bombers are carried out at several plants,
Russia devotes substantial resources to the mainten but it is planned that new aircraft production will
ance and modernisation of its nuclear forces. During be concentrated at the Gorbunov Aviation Plant in
the financially lean years of the 1990s, Russia focused Kazan.
on maintaining the core components of its strategic Analysts have questioned the demographic
arsenal, preserving key defence-industrial enter- profile of the workforce within Russia’s defence
prises, and consolidating development and produc- industries, and the need to make the industry an
tion in Russia (although the maintenance of some attractive career option for young engineers. While
Russia: strategic-force modernisation 15
defence enterprises might be seen as a reliable career The other, the heavy R-36M2 (SS-18 Satan mod
path in a period of broader economic difficulty, 5), is currently deployed with two missile divisions.
these industries now have to compete for talent. This With each missile carrying ten warheads, 46 ICBMs
was reflected in the pay rises noted in recent years. of this type account for 460 deployed warheads.
And although Russia’s strategic-defence enterprises These missiles are expected to stay in service until
appear to have preserved some of their expertise, about 2020. After that they will be replaced by
problems remain, for example, in transferring the Sarmat, a new silo-based liquid-fuel ICBM that is
necessary skill sets and experience to the younger currently under development. Sarmat, however,
generation of engineers. is not necessarily an adequate replacement for its
Meanwhile, the Bulava missile programme heavy predecessor, as its characteristics are closer
encountered some difficulties at the development to those of the UR-100NUTTH (SS-19); this stems,
and serial-production stages; development of the analysts maintain, from the fact that the R-36M2
Sarmat missile is now several years behind schedule; was built in Ukraine and that as a consequence
and the industry still has to demonstrate that it Sarmat is, in effect, the heaviest missile that Russia
can resume the production of strategic bombers. can currently produce. With a launch weight of
However, while economic challenges may be about half that of the R-36M2, Sarmat is likely to
holding at risk some elements of Russia’s broader have smaller throw-weight and might carry fewer
military-modernisation drive, and while time than ten warheads.
frames might slip, the intention is likely to complete Although most Sarmat missiles are expected to
the strategic-modernisation programmes currently carry nuclear warheads, it also appears to be the
under way. launcher of choice for Russia’s developmental hyper-
sonic glide vehicle (HGV), which is often referred
Strategic forces to as Project 4202 or Yu-71. The Yu-71 vehicle is
Land-based systems currently undergoing flight tests, which may lead to
Land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) an initial deployment in the 2020s. The boost-glide
constitute the main pillar of the Russian strategic HGV will not necessarily be nuclear-armed.
nuclear triad. Russia is carrying out an active ICBM Although the deployment of a MIRVed, silo-
modernisation programme, which has accelerated in based ICBM is often considered a politically desta-
recent years. The missile system at the centre of this bilising move, Russia appears to believe that Sarmat
modernisation is the single-warhead Topol-M (SS-27 is essential for countering US missile defences.
mod 1), which was deployed in 1997–2009, when Its calculation is that even if only a small number
Russia was constrained from deploying a multiple- of these missiles can survive an attack, they could
warhead version of that missile by the Strategic Arms provide an adequate retaliatory response. The
Reduction Treaty (START). When START expired in hypersonic vehicle also appears to have the penetra-
2009, Russia switched to deployment of the RS-24 tion of missile defences as its primary mission.
Yars (SS-27 mod 2), which is a version of the Topol-M In addition to the two main ICBM development
(probably somewhat upgraded) that uses multiple programmes – Yars and Sarmat – Russia is working
independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). to revive the idea of building a rail-mobile ICBM.
Both of these missiles are deployed in silos as well as Even though the project, known as Barguzin, was not
on road-mobile launchers. As of early 2017, Russia included in the earlier State Armament Programme,
was estimated to have 78 single-warhead Topol-M development is under way and the first missile ejec-
missiles and 96 multiple-warhead Yars ICBMs. The tion test took place in November 2016.
deployment of Yars missiles is expected to continue Another missile under development, known as
as part of the modernisation process. the RS-26 Rubezh, is nominally considered an ICBM,
The relatively new Topol-M and Yars missiles since it demonstrated a range of more than 5,500km in
carry about half of all the ICBM warheads in Russia’s one of its flight tests. Rubezh, however, is believed to
inventory. The other half are deployed with the older be an intermediate-range missile that is based on the
ICBMs that were introduced in the early 1980s. One first two stages of Yars. Russia completed flight tests
of these missiles, the UR-100NUTTH (SS-19 mod of the missile in 2014 and initially planned to begin
3), is in the process of being withdrawn from active deployment in 2015 to missile units near Irkutsk and
service. at Edrovo/Vypolzovo. However, the deployment was
postponed and is not expected to begin until at least developing a new liquid-fuel SLBM, which would
mid-2018. It is possible that it will be deployed with require a different development line; while industry
missile divisions that operate the Yars ICBM, perhaps may favour this option, the navy is believed to be
reflecting the judgement that Rubezh may comprise more cautious. However, no decision about the direc-
two Yars stages; if this is the case, co-deploying two tion of the SLBM programme is understood to have
different missiles would make more sense as there been taken at the time of writing.
may be commonalities in terms of training, main
tenance and logistics support. Strategic aviation
Until recently, Russia’s strategic fleet included 16
Maritime systems Tu-160 Blackjack and over 50 Tu-95MS Bear bombers.
In 2014 the Russian Navy received the third Project These aircraft were originally built as strategic-
955 Borey-class ballistic-missile submarine. This weapons platforms, with the Kh-55 (AS-15) nuclear-
delivery was part of Moscow’s strategic fleet capable air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) as
modernisation programme, which calls for the their principal armament. The recent overhaul and
construction of eight submarines of this class. The modernisation of the Tu-160 fleet has given these
fourth submarine, which is expected to join the fleet aircraft the capability to use conventional weapons
in 2019 – and subsequent boats that are currently as well. Both aircraft can carry the Kh-555 ALCM,
at various stages of construction – appears to be which is a conventional version of the Kh-55. They
an upgraded design, called Project 955A Borey-A. can also carry the new conventional Kh-101 ALCM,
Each submarine carries 16 Bulava solid-propellant and its nuclear version, which is known as Kh-102.
SLBMs, with up to six warheads on each missile. The capability of the Tu-160 and Tu-95MS to use
This construction programme is now expected to be conventional ALCMs (Kh-555 as well as Kh-101) was
completed in 2021. first demonstrated in 2015, when these aircraft were
In the meantime, Russia continues to maintain used to attack targets in Syria.
and operate ballistic-missile submarines of Project Modernisation plans for Russia’s strategic avi
667BDR (Delta III) and Project 667BDRM (Delta IV) ation currently include two main projects: the devel-
types. These submarines were built in the 1970s opment of a new long-range bomber, known as
and 1980s and are kept in service by regular over- PAK-DA, and revived production of the Tu-160;
hauls and repairs. Both classes carry liquid-fuel these newly produced versions are designated
SLBMs. The three Delta-III submarines that are Tu-160M2. PAK-DA, meanwhile, is reported to be a
currently in service rely on the supply of R-29R subsonic flying-wing aircraft, although there is only
(SS-N-18) missiles that were built in the 1980s. To scant information on the project. In order to allow
equip submarines of the Delta-IV class, Russia has its bombers to conduct stand-off operations, Russia
relaunched a production line for R-29RMU2 Sineva is reportedly working on a new ALCM, known as
(SS-N-23) SLBMs and developed an upgraded Kh-BD, with a range that will be considerably greater
version of that missile, known as the R-29RMU2.1 than that reported for the Kh-101/-102. PAK-DA may
Layner. This latter missile, accepted for service in conduct its first flight in the 2020s. Once in service,
2014, is said to be capable of carrying up to ten it will replace the old Tu-95MS bombers, although
warheads, although it is perhaps deployed with the air force has not yet indicated how many new
only four, like Sineva. bombers it would like to procure. The first Tu-160M2
It seems likely that Delta-III submarines will be is also expected to be ready in 2019, with serial pro-
withdrawn from service when they are replaced by duction starting in 2021, and the air force is consid-
the new Project 955 Borey, although Delta-IV-class ering an order of up to 50 of the aircraft.
boats will probably remain in service for some time
after 2025. However, the plans for future submarine Early warning and missile defence
construction are not clear. Most likely, Russia will In addition to modernising all elements of its stra-
continue the Project 955 line along with the devel- tegic triad, Russia is upgrading its early-warning
opment of a new submarine with a solid-propel- system and working on the upgrade of its strategic-
lant missile. Given Bulava’s patchy test record, it is missile defences. The country’s network of early-
possible that the missile will be new as well. At the warning radars has undergone a complete overhaul
same time, some reports suggest that Russia may be with the construction of a series of new-generation
Russia: strategic-force modernisation 17
radars, known as Voronezh-M, Voronezh-DM and all Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons are kept
Voronezh-SM. The construction of the first of these in centralised storage facilities. However, Russia has
began in 2005 and it became operational a few years never clarified which facilities this definition covers.
afterwards. In 2017 Russia announced that it had Currently, Russia maintains at least 12 national-level
complete radar coverage of all approaches to its storage sites and an estimated 35 base-level facili-
territory. ties that can be used to store and maintain nuclear
In 2015, it launched the first Tundra satellite, part weapons for extended periods of time. With the
of a new space-based early-warning system, known exception of ICBMs and SLBMs (and possibly some
as EKS. This was followed by a second launch in cruise missiles), nuclear weapons are not deployed
mid-2017. These satellites are deployed on highly on their delivery vehicles and are stored at some
elliptical orbits and can provide partial coverage distance from operational bases.
of potential ballistic-missile launch areas. When The development and deployment of new
complete, the system will include as many as ten nuclear-capable delivery systems is clearly under
satellites on highly elliptical orbits, as well as geosta- way, although most of the new systems are
tionary satellites. The current plans call for ten new designed to be dual-capable. One major project
early-warning satellite launches by 2020. However, it in this area is the development of the Iskander-M
is a new system, so Moscow might be waiting to see system, which includes a short-range ballistic
how the first satellites function, while there are also missile and a short-range cruise missile. The
likely issues relating to manufacturing capacity, to system is widely believed to be nuclear-capable
say nothing of the challenge in launching eight more and has apparently been used in some exercises to
satellites before 2020. simulate nuclear strikes. Russia will soon complete
Russia is also modernising the missile-defence the deployment of Iskander-M in all 12 army and
system deployed around Moscow. The new system, navy missile brigades, where they are replacing
sometimes referred to as A-235 or Samolyot-M, older Tochka-U missiles.
appears to be a modest upgrade of the current A-135 Another important programme is the develop-
system, which includes the Don-2N battle-management of a family of long-range cruise missiles that
ment radar and 68 short-range 53T6 Amur (SH-8 can be deployed on submarines, surface ships and
Gazelle) interceptors. The system is known to be potentially on land-based launchers. This family
nuclear, although it is possible that Russia might look includes the long-range missile known as the 3M14,
to deploy a successor without nuclear warheads. In a land-attack cruise missile (LACM) that is part of
2017 Russia conducted a test of what appeared to be the Kalibr weapon system. Starting in 2015, Russia
a modified 53T6 interceptor, although it is not known repeatedly demonstrated the capability of this
whether this test was part of the A-235 development missile in attacks against targets in Syria. Kalibr
programme. missiles were launched from surface ships deployed
Another significant project is the development of in the Caspian Sea as well as from submarines
what has been claimed to be an anti-satellite system, deployed in the Mediterranean Sea. Russia has
known as Nudol. Russia has been conducting tests of announced a plan to deploy Kalibr missiles on a
the launcher since 2014, and this programme may range of surface ships and submarines. The first
also be part of the A-235 missile-defence project. multipurpose submarine of the Project 885 Yasen-
class, Severodvinsk, has demonstrated the capability
Non-strategic nuclear weapons to launch Kalibr missiles as part of its test regime.
Russia maintains a substantial non-strategic nuclear Older types of submarine are being modified to carry
force that includes a variety of delivery systems. these missiles in their torpedo compartments; Yasen,
These include bombers, short-range ballistic and in contrast, is believed to have a mix of vertical-
cruise missiles used by ground forces, air-defence launch tubes and missile-capable torpedo tubes.
systems, cruise missiles and torpedoes used by The Kalibr missile may be at the centre of the alle-
the navy, and weapons operated by naval-avi gations of non-compliance with the Intermediate-
ation and coastal-defence forces. It is estimated Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty levelled against
that Russia’s current active arsenal includes about Russia by Washington in 2014. According to
2,000 nuclear warheads assigned to non-strategic Washington, Russia has tested, produced and begun
delivery systems. According to official statements, to deploy a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)
with a range between 500km and 5,500km, in viola- a wheeled ground launcher and therefore may have
tion of its obligations under the INF Treaty, which developed a GLCM that is very similar to Kalibr. If
Moscow denies. Although the US has not disclosed that is the case, this deployment constitutes a viola-
details of the alleged violation, it is possible that tion of the INF Treaty; so far, diplomatic attempts to
Russia did adapt the submarine-launched LACM to resolve the issue have been unsuccessful.
Chapter Two
Comparative defence statistics
Top 15 defence budgets 2017† US$bn
1. United States US$bn
2. China
3. Saudi Arabia 4. Russiaa
700
600
76.7 61.2 500

150.5
5. India 6. United Kingdom 7. France 400
300
52.5 50.7 48.6 200

8. Japan 9. Germany 10. South Korea
602.8
100
46.0 41.7 35.7 0

11. Brazil 12. Australia 13. Italy 14. Israelb 15. Iraq United Other Rest
States top 15 of the
countries world
29.4 25.0 22.9 21.6 19.4

a
Under NATO defence-spending definition; b Includes US Foreign Military Assistance
Note: US dollar totals are calculated using average market exchange rates for 2017, derived using IMF data. The relative position of countries will vary not only as a result of actual adjustments in defence-spending
levels, but also due to exchange-rate fluctuations between domestic currencies and the US dollar. The use of average exchange rates reduces these fluctuations, but the effects of such movements can be significant
in a number of cases. ©IISS
2017 top 15 defence and security budgets as a % of GDP*

Oman Saudi Afghanistan Iraq Israel Republic Algeria Jordan Kuwait Bahrain Mali Russia Azerbaijan Armenia Iran
Arabia of Congo
12.1% 11.3% 10.3% 10.1% 6.2% 6.2% 5.7% 4.9% 4.8% 4.4% 4.3% 4.2% 4.0% 3.9% 3.7%
* Analysis only includes countries for which sufficient comparable data is available. Notable exceptions include Cuba, Eritrea, Libya, North Korea, Qatar, Syria and the UAE ©IISS
Planned global defence expenditure by region 2017† Planned defence expenditure by country 2017†
Latin America and Latin America
the Caribbean Sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean, 4.0%
4.0% 1.1% Other Middle East
and North Africa, 6.0% Sub-Saharan Africa
Middle East and 1.1%
Saudi Arabia, 4.9%
North Africa
10.9% North America Other Eurasia, 0.4%
39.3% Russia, 3.9%
United States
Other Asia, 6.0% 38.2%
Asia and
South Korea, 2.3%
Australasia
24.0% India, 3.3%
Japan, 2.9%
China, 9.5% United Kingdom, 3.2%

Russia and Eurasia
4.3% Europe Non-NATO Europe, 1.2% France, 3.1%
16.3%
Other NATO Germany
7.2% 2.6%
†
Figures do not sum due to rounding effects ©IISS
† At current prices and exchange rates
Real global defence-spending changes by region 2015–17

16
2015
12 2016
2017
8
%
4 * Excludes states for which sufficient
data is unavailable (Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan)
** Excludes states for which sufficient
0 data is unavailable
-4
-8
North Europe Russia and Asia Latin Sub-Saharan Global**
America Eurasia* America and Africa
the Caribbean
Selected European defence research and development (R&D) budgets in 2017

and planned European Union defence R&D spending
6 12.4 12
11.4
R&D US$bn % of R&D in total budget

5 10
% of R&D in total defence spending

In June 2017, the European Commission announced the creation of
a European Defence Fund (EDF). This package includes a
R&D budget, current US$bn
8.0 ‘research window’ which, if voted for, is expected to begin

post-2020 through a dedicated EU programme under the next
4 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). The estimated budget
8
will be €500m (US$564m) per annum throughout the MFF covering
the years 2021–27. If this plan is implemented, the European
Commission will become the fourth-biggest defence R&D spender
3 5.2 in Europe, after France, the United Kingdom and Germany. 6
2 4
3.1
1 1.5 1.4 2
0.9 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7
0.2 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0
Slo y ( 0
Cz No nd
Be lic
Bu um
Au ia
Ro tria
De nia
EU erm t.)
kia .)
Sw S t.)
the Po t.)
ly .)
Es rk
Fin t.)
do st.)
a
Gr us
po any
en n
nd d
h R ay
Hu nia
xe Po ary
Cr rg (e l
Ire e
Lit tvia
M a
Cy t.)
tia .)
ou uga
rke 02
va est
Ita (est
lan
alt
ed pai
rla lan
i
oa st
G (es
(es
(es
(es
a
ub
an
(es
la
lga
pr
ec rw
ma
ee
lgi
ing e (e
nm
s
Tu st-2
to
ng
La
ep
mb rt
hu
m
s
dK c
ite ran
Un F
Ne
Lu
Composition of real defence-spending increases Composition of real defence-spending reductions

2016–17‡ 2016–17‡
Middle East and Eurasia, 0.47% Sub-Saharan Africa, 5.77%
North Africa, 0.94% Sub-Saharan Africa, 1.79% Europe, 1.49%
Other Latin America, 3.44% Other Asia, 5.24%
China, 24.8%
Brazil, 10.1% Afghanistan, 2.2%
Saudi Arabia,
Malaysia, 2.9% 34.3%
Other Latin America, 2.33%
Other Europe &
Canada, 11.1% Mexico, 3.1%
Total increases Total reductions
2016–17:‡ United States, 3.2% 2016–17:‡
Indonesia,
US$25.4bn 5.8% US$26.1bn
France, 2.4% Other Eurasia,
0.79%
Netherlands, Japan, 3.6%
3.1%
India, 2.4% Russia, 14.7%
Romania,
4.8% Other Asia, Israel, 8.4%
Spain, 5.5% Other MENA, 3.63%
Algeria, 4.8%
8.4% Germany, 11.3% Kuwait, 2.5% Oman,
4.6%
©IISS
† At current prices and exchange rates. ‡ At constant 2010 prices and exchange rates.
In recent years, armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have proliferated, despite US efforts to limit their sale. Domestic developments, and imports, have provided
an increasing number of countries with the ability to operate weaponised systems. The most significant producers of armed UAVs are the US and China. The US,
however, has so far pursued a cautious approach to the export of armed systems, while China has been less restrained. The US has supplied the armed variant of the
MQ-9 Reaper to the United Kingdom, a close ally, but declined to do so to other partners such as Saudi Arabia. China has grasped this opportunity, and has now
supplied armed UAVs to a number of countries, including Egypt, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, among others. The increased interest
in such systems has also led other states to pursue their own programmes (Russia, Iran, India and South Africa, for example) or to consider arming systems already in
service. Israel operates a variety of armed UAVs, but as yet there are no identified exports of such systems, although Israel has widely exported intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance UAVs.
Russia: Inokhodets
Prime developer:
Kronstadt Technologies
US
CHINA
India: Rustom
Armed UAV sales
Armed unmanned aerial vehicles: production and procurement
Prime developer:
Defence Research and UAVs approved to be
armed after delivery
Development
Organisation (DRDO) States currently producing and
South Africa: operating armed UAVs: China, Iran,
Seeker 400 Israel, Turkey, United States
Prime developer: States that have acquired armed
Denel UAVs: Egypt, Iraq, Kazakhstan,
Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi
Selected combat-capable UAVs and manufacturers Arabia, Turkmenistan, United Arab
Emirates, United Kingdom
CH-3 – China Aerospace CH-4 - China Aerospace Science Shahed 129 – Aerospace MQ-9 Reaper – General States that have acquired US UAVs
Science and Technology and Technology Industries Atomics Aeronautical and have been given US approval to
Corp. (CASC) Corp. (CASC) Organization Systems Inc. arm them: France, Italy
(GA-ASI) States that currently have

development programmes for armed
UAVs: India, Russia, South Africa
21
© IISS
Key defence statistics
ICBM (Launchers) (25 per unit) Bomber aircraft (25 per unit)
70 162
313 139 2
400 157
1
Ballistic-missile nuclear-powered submarines (10 per unit)
4 4 13 4 14
Active personnel (100,000 per unit) Reserve personnel (100,000 per unit)
510,000
202,700 2,035,000 32,300
1,395,100 1,155,000
900,000
2,000,000
150,250 82,650
2
1,348,400 857,950
6
1
Armoured infantry fighting vehicles Main battle tanks
(1,000 per unit) (1,000 per unit)
5
3,860
6,740
629 200
2,500 3,097
6,160 3,090 H
623 227
3,336 2,831
Artillery (1,000 per unit) Attack/guided missile submarines

(25 per unit) 84
13,420 57
262
6
9,684
14 Airborn
5,293
49
637 6
6,894 54
Aircraft carriers (10 per unit)

27 7
1 1 1 1 11
Comparative defence statistics 23
China France India Russia UK US
Cruisers, destroyers and frigates Principal amphibious ships

162 (25 per unit) (25 per unit)
82
4
139 22
3
27
157 33 1
19 6
96
31
Tactical aircraft (500 per unit)

unit)
1,966 1,112
272 198
0
785 3,424
2,000,000
Attack helicopters Heavy/medium transport helicopters
246 (250 per unit) 383 (500 per unit)
62 168
19 67
376 375
50 108 2,645
6,740 793
Heavy/medium transport aircraft Tanker and multi-role tanker/transport aircraft

(100 per unit) (100 per unit)
submarines
18 14 6 15 14
) 84 46 36 177 44
530
57 658
Airborne early-warning and control aircraft Heavy unmanned aerial vehicles

(100 per unit) (50 per unit)
15 10 13 Some 10
54
27 7 4 18 6 111
628
© IISS
24
Although Russia and the United States both maintain substantial numbers of main PLA main battle tank fleet, 1997–2017
battle tanks in store, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) currently has the
world’s largest active-service tank fleet. The volume and cost involved in producing 8,000
sufficient modern tank designs to equip this force has, however, proved to be a
7,000 1,600 510 1,280
significant challenge for the PLA, and it is only recently that the percentage of the 2,300
tank force so-equipped has risen above 50%. 6,000
The original ZTZ-59 remains in service with a significant proportion of the PLA, 1,500 1,300
3,390
despite being effectively obsolete, even in its upgraded forms. Early indigenous 5,000 800
Chinese tank designs, such as the ZTZ-79 and ZTZ-88, had limited production runs
and are now only in the inventory of a small number of units in northern and 4,000
500
western China. The reorganisation of PLA manoeuvre units into combined-arms 6,200
brigades in 2017 may result in these second-generation designs being removed from 3,000
5,000 5,000 4,600
THE MILITARY BALANCE 2018
service altogether as the overall size of the PLA’s tank fleet shrinks again.
2,000 2,850
The latest ZTZ-99A appears to have been produced in relatively small numbers,
and issued to strategic-reserve units near Beijing, possibly because of its relatively 1,000
high cost. The majority of China’s third-generation tanks are still versions of the late
1990s ZTZ-96 design. The PLA’s new ‘light’ tank, believed to have entered 0
production with the ZTQ-15 designation, weighs almost as much as a ZTZ-59, but 1997 2002 2007 2012 2017
may nonetheless help fill the requirement for modern armour in southern China,
First generation Second generation Third generation
where the terrain is not suitable for heavier modern designs such as the ZTZ-99.
For the purposes of this analysis, generational status of each design is as below.
First generation Second generation Third generation

China: People’s Liberation Army main battle tanks
ZTZ-99
ZTZ-99A
ZTZ-59/ZTZ-59-II/ZTZ-59D ZTZ-79 ZTZ-88A/ZTZ-88B ZTZ-96/ZTZ-96A ZTZ-99/ZTZ-99A

• License built T-54 design • In production 1978–80s • In production 1988–90s • In production 1997–2005 • Currently in production
• In production 1958–78 • 105mm rifled main gun • 105mm rifled main gun • 125mm smoothbore main gun • 125mm smoothbore main gun
• Upgraded versions developed in • 37 tonnes combat weight • 38 tonnes combat weight • 42+ tonnes combat weight • 50+ tonnes combat weight
the 1980s
• Steel armour • Steel armour • Steel/composite armour • Steel/composite/reactive
• 100mm smoothbore main gun (reactive 96A) armour
(105mm rifled in 59-II and 59D) • Stabilised sights
• Stabilised sights • Stabilised sights
• 36 tonnes combat weight
• Steel armour (reactive 59D only) • Reportedly being upgraded to • Computer fire-control system
ZTZ-96B standard from 2017 • Active-protection system (99A)
• Computer fire-control (59D only)
© IISS
In 2015, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) introduced the PL-10 imaging infrared-guided short-range air-to-air missile (AAM) into service. It could be
followed in 2018 by the PL-15 extended-range active radar-guided missile. Furthermore China may have at least three other medium and very-long-range AAMs in
various stages of development. China is in the midst of a near-unprecedented scale and pace of development that will improve considerably its air-to-air weapons
inventory, and provide the defence industry with increasingly credible products for the export market. The PL-10 was advertised for export very shortly after its entry
into service with the PLAAF.
Length: c. 3 metres Maximum notional engagement ranges
PL-10 imaging infrared (IIR) AAM PL-XX very-long-range AAM

In-service date: c2015 400km+
Associated aircraft: Large, non-manoeuvring targets
J-10A/B/C, J-11B, J-16, J-20
PL-15 and PL-XX ramjet-powered
active-radar AAMs
China: air-to-air missile progress
Length: c. 3.8 metres

150km
PL-12 active radar-guided AAM All targets
In-service date: 2007
Associated aircraft:
PL-12 active-radar AAM
J-8, J-10A/B, J-11B 70km
All targets
Length: c. 4 metres
PL-15 extended-range active

radar-guided AAM PL-10 IIR AAM
In-service date: 2018+ 30km
Associated aircraft:
All targets
J-10C, J-16, J-20
Length: Notional PL-XX very-long-range AAM engagement

c. 6 metres
PL-XX active radar and infrared-guided

Possible mid-course updates
very-long-range AAM 100,000ft during missile fly-out
In-service date: 2020+
Associated aircraft: J-16
PL-XX Ramjet A* 50,000ft
PL-XX Ramjet B* Terminal-engagement

seeker:
Initial target-track Active radar: 40km
Length: 25,000ft data and updates via KJ-2000 AWACS aircraft Infrared: 10–20km
c. 4 metres
PL-XX maximum kinematic range potentially 400km+

*In development
25
© IISS
26
China’s naval-shipbuilding output since 2000 has been remarkable both for its scale and breadth, with an industrial base centred on seven major shipyards. For some time,
it has been engaged in considerable series production of large and small surface combatants. In the sub-surface arena, the production of a total of 38 new units, including
ballistic-missile submarines, is also significant. In terms of submarine, destroyer, frigate and corvee production, China has either exceeded or nearly matched the
RUSSIA
collective outputs of the next three principal regional navies, whose own naval programmes have themselves been significant by global standards. China has also produced
nine new under-way-replenishment vessels and it has launched its first home-built aircraft carrier and first modern cruiser, filling two major capability gaps. Over the time
period, the United States has built more carriers (3), nuclear-aack submarines (14), destroyers (33) and large amphibious ships (15) than China, but not as many small
surface combatants. There is still uncertainty over how robust Chinese warship designs are relative to their competitors, as well as their systems integration and weapons
performance. The critical issue now is China’s ability to sustain this level of output and address weaknesses, such as in submarine design and amphibious capacity.
No. Shipyard Type Launched Approximate full load displacement (tonnes) of selected launched naval vessels
(2000–Aug 2017) 400,000
Bohai Shipbuilding SSBN 4 Japan US

Heavy Industry SSN 6 350,000 South Korea China
Dalian Shipbuilding CV 1 300,000 India
Industry Company DD 5
250,000
Dalian Liaoning FS 9
Shipyard 200,000
Jiangnan Shipyard SSK 4 150,000
C 1
NORTH
DD 18 100,000
KOREA
Hudong-Zhonghua FF 14 50,000
Shipbuilding FS 12
LPD 5 0
2000–02 2003–05 2006–08 2009–11 2012–14 2015–17 SOUTH
AORH 2 JAPAN
KOREA
Wuchang Shipbuilding SSK 24
Industry Group FS 9
Huangpu Wenchong FF 17
Shipbuilding FS 13
AOEH 1
AORH 6 CHINA
SSBN = 4 CV = 1 FF = 31 AOEH = 1
SSN = 6 C = 1 FS = 43 AORH = 8
Selected Chinese and Asia-Pacific regional naval shipbuilding since 2000
SSK = 28 DD = 23 LPD = 5
INDIA
Country Type Launched Country Type Launched Country Type Launched

(2000–Aug 2017) (2000–Aug 2017) (2000–Aug 2017)
TAIWAN
India SSBN 1 Korea, SSK 9 Japan SSK 16
SSK 2 Republic of C 3 CV 4
CV 1 DD 6 C 2
DD 8 FF 10 DD 12
FF 10 FS 17 LHD 2
FS 1 LPD 4 AOE 2
AORH 2 AOEH 1
© IISS
Chapter Three
North America
North America
UNITED STATES support. A key milestone came on 21 August 2017,
when the president announced his decision to send
On 20 January 2017, Donald Trump became the 45th additional troops to Afghanistan, although their role
President of the United States. The administration in the country is expected to be less expansive than
quickly moved to take action on the issues Trump in the past: ‘We are not nation building again’, said
had emphasised in his campaign, including tackling Trump, ‘we are killing terrorists’.
perceived disparities over burden-sharing within the Afghanistan is only one of the security challenges
transatlantic alliance. In the campaign, Trump had facing the US, its allies and partners. As Mattis noted
questioned the relevance of NATO. During a May in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services
2017 speech in Brussels, the president returned to the Committee in June 2017, these fall into four main
theme, chiding the Alliance’s European members for areas: ‘filling in the holes from trade-offs made
not spending enough on defence. Meanwhile, issues during 16 years of war … the worsening security
including ongoing investigations into ties with Russia environment, contested operations in multiple
during the 2016 presidential campaign, White House domains, and the rapid pace of technological change’.
staff turnover, and delays in naming senior and Mattis also stressed that it is a ‘more volatile security
mid-level national-security officials all played a part environment than any I have experienced during my
in a troubled start for the administration. four decades of military service’.
That said, some coherence in national-security
policy had begun to emerge by late August. In China and Russia
addition to Secretary of Defense James Mattis and It has become increasingly apparent that the period
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, the shuffling of key of uncontested US strategic primacy is over. In its
players (Lt.-Gen. H.R. McMaster for Michael Flynn early days in office, the Obama administration sought
as National Security Advisor; John F. Kelly for Reince cooperation with China and a ‘reset’ with Russia. But
Priebus as White House Chief of Staff) provided by the time Obama left office, policymakers were
for experienced advice regarding national-security openly talking about an era characterised by great-
priorities and introduced greater process into the power competition. Indeed, for the first time in
administration’s national-security decision-making. decades, in China and Russia Washington faces states
Nonetheless, the president’s proclivity to comment on that can contest the employment of US military power
policy matters on social media, at times contradicting in their respective regions. Moreover, both China and
existing policy (such as on the issue of transgender Russia are active beyond their home territories.
service members), played a part in unsettling his China’s military modernisation has been
own appointees, not to mention allies and partners. proceeding for some time, while its growing reach has
In addition, key positions in the departments of also been increasingly apparent, most notably in the
defense and state (and elsewhere) were only slowly activation of its first military base abroad, in Djibouti in
being filled, with the result that career civil servants, 2017, and growing numbers of naval patrols. In some
and military officers in the case of the Department of areas, China’s defence-technology developments are
Defense (DoD), still occupied many of these posts. seen as the ‘pacing threat’ for US defence planners.
Although debates within the administration persist At the same time, Russia’s military modernisation
regarding what should be expected of the United continues, albeit with relatively fewer resources.
States’ allies, Trump has moderated his criticism and Overall, Russia intends to generate more usable
increasingly adopted policies similar to those of past military forces held at higher states of readiness, and
administrations. The European Reassurance Initiative there is particular focus on modernising its strategic,
continues, with a funding increase under the Fiscal ground and air forces, and its electronic-warfare and
Year (FY) 2018 budget, and in June 2017 Trump precision-strike capabilities, including those from
delivered a speech in Warsaw assuring Poland of US maritime platforms. Perhaps most worryingly for
the US, Beijing and Moscow do not appear averse required to preserve – or in some cases restore – our
to cooperation (see p. 9). Russia’s arms sales to competitive advantage’. He continued by saying that
China continue, and the countries’ navies held joint the US military ‘requires a balanced inventory of
exercises in September 2017. advanced capabilities and sufficient capacity to act
US policymakers developing the new National decisively across the range of military operations’.
Defense Strategy and conducting the Nuclear Posture Furthermore, the US could not ‘choose between a force
Review find themselves increasingly thinking about that can address … Violent Extremist Organisations,
the requirements of deterring China and Russia and one that can deter and defeat state actors with a
with both conventional and nuclear capabilities. The full range of capabilities’.
DoD is also considering the requirements of military The war against extremist organisations has
competition, short of the use of force. Defence planners accelerated during the Trump administration, most
must increasingly think about the requirements of a notably against the Islamic State, otherwise known
conflict with China or Russia. Though still unlikely, as ISIS or ISIL. During their operations against ISIS,
it is perhaps a less remote prospect than it appeared Iraq’s security forces benefited from military advisers
several years ago. and capabilities from the US and other nations –
most notably air, artillery and intelligence. US forces
Multiple concurrent challenges remain engaged in training operations in Iraq.
Aside from growing competition with China and At the same time, the Trump administration is
Russia, the US faces a range of other demands. extremely wary of Iran and came into office vowing
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph to overturn the Obama administration’s deal, which
Dunford, reinforcing Mattis’s statements in his own aims to keep Tehran from obtaining a nuclear
testimony before Congress, explained that China and weapon. Countering Iran was one of the objectives
Russia were two of the five challenges facing the DoD; of the president’s trip to Saudi Arabia in May 2017,
also on the list were ‘Iran, North Korea, and Violent while he also hailed the total of US$110 billion in
Extremist Organisations [VEOs]’. These issues arms deals with Riyadh, although this included
‘most clearly represent the challenges facing the US previously approved sales agreed under the Obama
military. They serve as a benchmark for our global administration (see p. 320). Meanwhile, although
posture, the size of the force, capability development, US forces remain in Syria, tackling ISIS and training
and risk management.’ members of the Syrian Democratic Forces, US policy
A belligerent North Korea, intent on further towards the Assad regime is no longer an unequivocal
developing intercontinental ballistic missiles and ‘Assad must go’.
nuclear-weapons capability; a still-revolutionary Perhaps the most vexing near-term challenge
Iranian regime pursuing regional hegemony and facing US policymakers, however, is North Korea.
destabilising its neighbours; an unstable Afghanistan; The prospect of a nuclear-armed North Korea, with
and the spread of extremist ideologies in Europe, the ability to hit the US mainland, looms large and
Africa and Asia would individually place significant the Kim regime is no longer just a regional threat.
demands on the DoD. Their concurrence, however, Escalating rhetoric from the White House and
combined with challenges from China and Russia, Pyongyang caused increasing concern but was
have placed significant strain on resources. accompanied by more measured responses. In a
Confronting these multiple challenges is becoming joint press conference with US ambassador to the
increasingly difficult, given the growing capability UN Nikki Haley on 15 September, McMaster called
of potential adversaries, as well as the effects of for international support for new United Nations
the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011 (see p. 38). sanctions to curb North Korea’s provocations
These issues are exacerbated by the fact that, for and nuclear ambitions. He stressed that, although
many years, the US defence budget has operated Washington prefers a diplomatic solution to end
on the basis of ‘continuing resolutions’, which make North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, the US possesses
long-term investment difficult and increase costs. military options.
Consequently, Dunford stressed that, ‘as a result of Finally, in August 2017, Trump directed the
sustained operational tempo and budget instability, elevation of US Cyber Command to a unified
today the military is challenged to meet operational combatant command, reflecting the growing
requirements and sustain investment in capabilities importance of defensive and offensive cyber
North America 29
activities in military operations, as well as the measure of shared interests and values, argued for
requirements in the FY2017 National Defense continuity.
North America
Authorization Act. The new command will, like Both Australia and Japan were already increasing
other combatant commands, report directly to their defence expenditures before Trump assumed
the secretary of defense and be better positioned office, as were some European NATO members,
to advocate for investments and resources. The in response to the growing threat from Russia,
remaining question is when Cyber Command will revelations of deep deficiencies among NATO armed
be separated from the National Security Agency forces and previous encouragement from the US.
(NSA). Congress has dictated that the separation Nonetheless, many of Washington’s allies face real
can only take place when the secretary of defense long-term constraints on their defence capacity due
certifies that Cyber Command is ready to operate to limited economic growth.
independently. A key argument for this separation
was voiced by Eric Rosenbach, chief of staff to Readiness issues
former secretary of defense Ashton Carter, who Readiness continues to be a concern for all the US
remarked that the separation would enable Cyber military services. The high tempo of global operations
Command to generate its own capabilities and in recent years – with ongoing deployments to
‘gain independence from NSA so that it’s a true Afghanistan and Iraq; counter-terrorism operations;
warfighting command and not an organisation humanitarian and disaster-relief missions; heightened
subservient to the intelligence community’. At the deployments to South Korea; and increased activity
time of writing, Admiral Michael Rogers remained to reassure allies, partners and friends in the face
in charge of both organisations. of greater competition with China and Russia – has
resulted in a dilemma, according to former army vice
Alliance relationships chief of staff General Dan Allyn, whereby the services
Alliance relationships have been central to post- are ‘consuming readiness as fast as we build it’. The
Second World War US national-security strategy. two separate accidents involving the destroyers
However, recent years have seen growing criticism USS Fitzgerald and USS John S. McCain, which left 17
of allies’ lack of willingness to more fully contribute sailors dead, were stark evidence of these stresses on
to their own security in an increasingly dangerous the armed forces.
security environment. The degree of burden-sharing Mattis emphasised the problem in remarks to the
by Washington’s European NATO allies has been Senate Armed Services Committee:
central to this discourse, but criticism has not been
limited to Europe. President Barack Obama voiced Worn equipment and constrained supplies have
frustration over this issue during the latter years forced our personnel to work overtime while
of his term, while Trump’s statements during the deployed or preparing to deploy. That too has
2016 presidential campaign and his early months in placed an added burden on the men and women
office sharpened these criticisms. As he argued in his who serve and on their families. This further
inaugural visit to Europe in May 2017 (referencing degrades readiness in a negative spiral, for those
NATO’s account of states meeting the target to not in the fight are at a standstill, unable to train
spend 2% of GDP on defence), ‘23 of the 28 member as their equipment is sent forward to cover
nations are still not paying what they should be shortfalls or returned for extensive rework.
paying and what they’re supposed to be paying for
their defense’. Readiness challenges are also exacerbated by
The health of Washington’s alliance relationships budget uncertainty and funding reliant on the
varied in the initial months of the Trump passage of continuing resolutions. There is some
administration. Accounts of a tense telephone call relief in the FY2017 budget, with modest increases
between Trump and Australian Prime Minister in funding and end-strength in all the services (see
Malcolm Turnbull briefly cast a pall over an important pp. 35–9). A broader question posed by the funding
defence relationship in the Asia-Pacific, in contrast to challenges and the diverse range of current and
the close relationship with Japanese Prime Minister emerging security problems revolves around what
Shinzo Abe. In both cases, however, the high degree kind of armed forces, postured against which threats,
of institutionalisation in the alliances, and the large are required.
Table 1 US Army Armored Brigade Combat Team deployments, 2014–18

Division Bde 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
1st Armored 2nd Army Evaluation Task Force KWT
3rd KWT KWT
1st Cavalry 1st EUR* ROK EUR
2nd ROK ROK
3rd KWT
1st Infantry 1st KWT ROK ROK
2nd KWT EUR
2nd Infantry 1st ROK Inactivated
3rd Infantry 1st EUR* EUR* EUR ROK
2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team
4th Infantry 2nd KWT Inactivated
3rd KWT EUR
*Only part of the brigade deployed on these occasions EUR – Europe, KWT – Kuwait, ROK – South Korea
After a protracted focus on counter-insurgency and aggression and reassurance to allies. The ability to
stabilisation operations, much investment in the past reinforce or deploy in times of crisis is increasingly
decade has been in training, organising, equipping problematic, given Russian anti-access/area-denial
and sustaining these missions. Furthermore, a capabilities. Therefore, a debate has begun about
generation of US military officers has been immersed whether or not more US forces should be forward-
in wars against insurgents and terrorists and have deployed to Europe to provide constant capabilities
not been trained to fight competent, well-armed state and deterrence.
actors. At the same time, much of the equipment in
many of the services is either ageing or inadequate Modernisation challenges
for future challenges, such as against peer adversaries The US needs to redress current readiness shortfalls
(for example, the army’s mine-resistant anti-ambush while modernising an ageing force. This feat would
protected (MRAP) vehicles). be challenging even without the financial constraints
In addition, much of the current US force structure noted above. As a result, the US and, increasingly,
dates back to the military build-up initiated during its allies are placing greater emphasis on military
the Cold War. The outlook is perhaps most positive innovation and high-leverage capabilities. The ‘third
for aviation, with the air force fielding the F-35A offset strategy’, which had been championed by
Lightning II and development of the B-21 Raider former deputy defence secretary Robert Work, seeks
bomber proceeding. That said, as Air Force Secretary to sustain the United States’ advantage through the
Heather Wilson noted: ‘While we continue to extend pursuit of new technology and military doctrine.
the life of old aircraft, materials suffer fatigue and Indeed, innovation is all the more important in an era
maintaining old equipment is time consuming and in which the US margin of superiority is narrowing.
expensive.’ The navy’s most recent Force Structure The DoD is increasing its investment in new space
Assessment calls for a fleet of 355 ships by 2030, capabilities; advanced sensors, communications
which will require sustained effort and resources to and munitions for power projection in contested
achieve. Meanwhile, key ground-combat systems are environments; missile defence and cyber capabilities.
all modernised versions of designs from the 1980s or The department is also investing in new technologies
earlier. Indeed, a constant refrain from US military such as unmanned undersea vehicles, advanced
leaders is that US dominance in all of the domains sea mines, high-speed strike weapons, advanced
(land, air, sea, space and cyber) is now contested and, aeronautics, autonomous systems, electromagnetic
in some areas, overmatched. railguns and high-energy lasers. Some of these
Finally, the armed forces are based mainly in the technologies could have a profound effect, although
continental US. In Eastern Europe, there is only one many of them have yet to prove themselves in an
rotational armoured brigade combat team (BCT) operational setting and are unlikely to be deployed
to provide deterrence against possible Russian before the 2020s, at the earliest.
North America 31
US Army To better meet this ongoing demand, the army is

The US Army has arguably been the service most creating six Security Force Assistance Brigades
North America
affected by the past 16 years of war. Understandably, (SFABs) and establishing a training school for these
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were the focus of at the Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning,
army training, equipping and organising. These Georgia. These units are smaller than normal BCTs,
demands remain, albeit on a smaller scale than and are mainly composed of officers and senior
during the troop surges in Iraq and Afghanistan. non-commissioned officers. As well as providing the
Nevertheless, they create a constant requirement army with units focused on training and advising, the
for BCTs and headquarters units. In their testimony SFABs make a cadre available that can be expanded in
before the Senate Armed Services Committee in May the event that the army needs to grow rapidly.
2017, Acting Secretary of the Army Robert Speer The army is also investing in Europe. It has
and Army Chief of Staff Mark Milley described the accelerated the growth of pre-positioned stocks to
scale of the Army’s commitments: ‘Today, the United provide equipment for a division headquarters,
States Army assigns or allocates over 187,000 Soldiers two armoured BCTs, one field-artillery brigade and
to meet combatant commanders’ needs.’ support units. One armoured BCT is now always
Indeed, maintaining army readiness in the face deployed to Europe, increasing the total to three,
of recurring deployments, budget uncertainty and including a Stryker BCT in Germany and an airborne-
decreasing end-strength has been a challenge for infantry BCT in Italy. Additionally, the Stryker BCT’s
several years. Declining end-strength (the army vehicles are being enhanced with 30mm cannons
reduced by 100,000 soldiers and 15 BCTs during the and Javelin anti-tank missiles. However, despite this
Obama administration), continuing resolutions and renewed emphasis on Europe, a recent after-action
the constraints of the BCA 2011 have required the review following a deployment of the Italy-based
army ‘to pay short-term bills at the expense of long- 173rd Airborne BCT into Eastern Europe revealed
term commitments’. As a consequence, the two army significant problems.
leaders stressed that the service has underfunded Equipment modernisation is also one of the army’s
modernisation efforts, resulting in ‘an Army biggest challenges. It still relies for its principal
potentially outgunned, outranged, and outdated on a combat capabilities on upgraded versions of the
future battlefield with near-peer competitors’. Other ‘Big 5’ systems procured in the 1980s: the Abrams
senior army officers echoed this assessment, adding main battle tank, the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle
that the ‘continued failure to fund modernization will (IFV), the Apache attack helicopter and Black Hawk
leave the US with a 20th century Army to handle the medium transport helicopter, and the Patriot surface-
geostrategic environment of the 21st century’. to-air missile system. Investments in the past decade
However, the army’s end-strength picture have focused on counter-insurgency and counter-
has improved in the FY2017 National Defense terrorism operations, and resulted in large purchases
Authorization Act (NDAA), with an increase in of MRAPs, more medevac Black Hawks and more
personnel numbers to 1,018,000 (476,000 active; personal-protection equipment for soldiers. The army
343,000 National Guard; 199,000 reserve), up from has identified gaps in ten areas, realised through
a planned 980,000. As with everything else in the a new Strategic Portfolio Analysis Review (SPAR),
NDAA, these numbers are contingent on avoiding that must be closed to regain the overmatch required
sequestration cuts. If those are enacted in FY2018 and to deter and defeat near-peer adversaries: air and
beyond, the army’s end-strength will drop to 920,000. missile defence; long-range fires; munitions; BCT
At the same time, the army’s first priority is mobility, lethality and protection; air and ground
to restore readiness for combat with near-peer active protection systems; assured position,
competitors. To this end, unit rotations to the navigation and timing; electronic warfare; offensive
National Training Center, and home-station training, and defensive cyber; assured communications; and
are now better resourced. The army also began an vertical lift.
Associated Units Pilot Programme that is teaming These modernisation priorities compete with
active, national-guard and reserve-army-aviation readiness and manpower. Indeed, readiness is
units in order to enhance training. the army’s first priority and accounts for 24% of
Meanwhile, the mission to support train-and- its budget, while the FY2017 president’s budget
advise missions in Afghanistan and Iraq continues. allocates nearly 60% to manpower. This leaves
only 16% of funding available to close significant focused almost exclusively on NATO, it is now
capability gaps. Consequently, the army has opted to focused on providing forces and capabilities across
equip for the near term and restore readiness at the the range of military operations, as shown by its
expense of preparing for the future. It has increased creation of SFABs. However, the central challenge
its investment in science and technology, but much of for the army – as well as the other services – is how
the modernisation funding is directed at improving to meet increased demands within existing resource
the Abrams tank, the Bradley IFV, the Stryker armoured constraints.
vehicle, the Paladin howitzer, the guided multiple-
launch rocket system and the existing aviation US Air Force
fleet. New programmes will only begin if needed to Although the United States Air Force (USAF) remains
address extremely high-risk capability gaps. the world’s most capable air arm, able to conduct
Accordingly, the army is attempting to accelerate operations at global reach, it continues to be affected
efforts in the ten capability areas identified by SPAR. by significant challenges. It retains too many ageing
It has also slowed the procurement of new systems aircraft in its inventory and does not have enough
in order to keep existing production lines open in the air and ground crew to operate and maintain them,
event of increased funding. However, in the absence nor does it have enough guided munitions to meet
of additional resources, the army’s combat-vehicle inventory needs.
modernisation strategy faces a 30-year initial-fielding The USAF has been involved in sustained combat
timeline. Aviation modernisation is a good example of operations since 2001, and during 2016 and 2017
these trade-offs in practice. In its January 2016 report, undertook the majority of the air missions against ISIS
the National Commission on the Future of the Army in Iraq and Syria. However, the continuing tempo of
recommended retaining 24 Apache attack-helicopter operations impacts the service life of the aircraft, and
units, but to meet this target the army is slowing sometimes the personnel, being employed. Indeed,
Black Hawk modernisation. The timeline for Apache repeated operational deployment is inevitably a factor
modernisation has also lengthened from FY2026 to in the decision by some personnel to leave the armed
FY2028, and for Black Hawks from FY2028 to FY2030. forces. Nearly US$1bn per annum is reportedly being
Meanwhile, the army established the Rapid spent by the air force to retain personnel, including
Capabilities Office in 2016 to address critical mid-term incentive pay and bonuses. As of mid-2017, the air
capability gaps. This office works with selected force was said to be 3,000 personnel below strength in
industry partners to acquire equipment and services terms of aircraft-maintenance staff, and around 1,200
quickly and at less cost in areas such as positioning, short of tactical-combat-aircraft pilots.
navigation and timing; electronic warfare; counter- Although the air force is buying the F-35A
electronic warfare; automation; and cyber. To support Lightning II at a lower annual rate than it would like,
its programmes, the army requested a base budget of the type is now at least in the inventory. The USAF
US$137.2bn for FY2018, an increase of 5.3% compared deployed the aircraft to Europe for the first time
to the FY2017 request of US$130.3bn. in April 2017, with eight aircraft landing at RAF
In February 2017, the army and Marine Corps Lakenheath in the United Kingdom; two F-35As were
jointly published the ‘Multi-Domain Battle: then flown on a training mission to Amari air base in
Combined Arms for the 21st Century’ white paper. Estonia. However, managing its legacy fighter fleets
This paper ‘describes an approach for ground combat to eke out as much remaining service life as possible
operations against a sophisticated peer enemy threat is still an issue for the air force. In April 2017 the USAF
in the 2025–2040 timeframe’. It forms the basis for signed off on a service-life-extension programme for
much of the war-gaming and concept-development the F-16 Fighting Falcon, increasing its service life from
work undertaken by the US Army Training and 8,000 to 12,000 hours. This would, notionally at least,
Doctrine Command, based on the assessment that allow the aircraft to remain in the inventory until
‘US ground combat forces, operating as part of ... 2048. Planned production rates for the F-35 mean the
joint, interorganizational, and multinational teams, air force will likely not receive the last of the 1,763
are currently not sufficiently trained, organized, aircraft it wants to order until after 2040. At the same
equipped, nor postured to deter or defeat highly time, a decision was pending on which bidder would
capable peer enemies to win in future war’. win the air force’s T-X competition for an advanced
Importantly, unlike after Vietnam when the army jet fighter-trainer to replace the T-38 Talon.
North America 33
Having awarded the B-21 bomber programme Yet doubts have been expressed as to whether the
to Northrop Grumman in late 2015, the air force navy can fund, build or even crew such a force, and
North America
picked Lockheed Martin and Raytheon for the the FY2018 navy budget request made little provision
competitive design and development phase of a key for extra shipbuilding. The navy leadership, however,
complementary weapon: the Long-Range Standoff continued to press the case for restoring the readiness
(LRSO) cruise missile. The two companies were each of the existing fleet and also for rapidly augmenting
awarded US$900 million design-maturation and risk- the force with additional construction over the next
reduction contracts lasting 54 months. The LRSO is seven years, as well as possibly retaining older ships
intended to replace the AGM-86B nuclear-armed in service for longer.
air-launched cruise missile, and is planned to enter At the same time, the growing Littoral Combat
the inventory in the late 2020s; but, as of the fourth Ship (LCS) force was reorganised, with new crewing
quarter of 2017, there was scant information on the arrangements, to improve forward-deployment
design options the two winning companies would operations. LCS plans for 2018 include two
pursue. The AGM-86B is a subsonic design, but it simultaneous deployments in Singapore and, for
remained unclear whether a very-low-observable the first time, one in Bahrain. However, the navy
subsonic option for the LRSO was preferred, or signalled how its thinking on its future small surface
whether a high-speed version was still being explored. combatant had further evolved from the troubled LCS
programme. In July it issued a request for information
US Navy and US Coast Guard to industry for a more capable guided-missile frigate,
A series of collisions and a grounding over a period dubbed FFG(X), with plans for a first production
of months in 2017 involving major US Navy surface order in 2020, with the competition potentially open
combatants in the western Pacific fuelled concerns to foreign designs.
that the high tempo of operations was adversely As a further sign of the navy’s response to the
affecting the navy’s effectiveness and training. challenge of a more contested maritime environment,
Seventeen US sailors died in two of the incidents, it enshrined its concept of ‘distributed lethality’, to
and two ballistic-missile-defence-equipped Arleigh spread more offensive capabilities throughout the
Burke-class destroyers were severely damaged, taking fleet, in a new surface-force strategy entitled ‘Back to
them out of service for a considerable period of time. Sea Control’. But efforts to procure a new over-the-
In response, the chief of naval operations launched horizon anti-ship missile for its future LCS/frigate
a number of investigations, including into whether force appeared to have been hampered when most
systemic failings were contributory factors. He also potential bidders withdrew from the competition.
announced a brief global stand-down to take stock. Despite these challenges, the US Navy still
To underscore the sense of overstretch, there demonstrated that it retains a unique ability to mount
was a further gap in aircraft-carrier presence in the operations on a global scale. In April, two destroyers
Gulf at the end of 2016 and into the early weeks of launched 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles at a Syrian air
2017. In congressional testimony in April, the Pacific base following a suspected chemical attack by the
Command commander noted that he receives only regime against a rebel-held town. And, in May, after
about half the number of submarines he requests. what appeared to be a pause, it resumed freedom-of-
Meanwhile, the debate over the future size of navigation operations in the South China Sea.
the navy has changed significantly. The Trump Furthermore, in August, the navy re-designated
administration came to office on the back of a the Expeditionary Mobile Base support ship, USNS
campaign for a 350-ship fleet, while in December 2016 Lewis B. Puller, which was formerly operated by the
the navy released its own new target of 355 ships, Military Sealift Command. The vessel deployed
up from the previous target of 308 (and the current to the US 5th Fleet’s area of responsibility. Now
level of some 279). This new goal is clearly driven by the USS Lewis B. Puller, the vessel has replaced
the navy’s desire to restore its ability to maintain its the USS Ponce in the Gulf, and the navy intends to
global presence in the face of increased competition operate the vessel flexibly, particularly in mine-
from countries such as China and Russia. The plan countermeasures and special-operations missions.
included an additional aircraft carrier, 16 further large The USS Ponce decommissioned in 2017, but the USS
surface combatants and, perhaps most significantly, a Lewis B. Puller will not inherit its Laser Weapons
further 18 attack submarines. System.
34
The design evolution of the Virginia-class submarine reflects the United States’ requirement to provide an increasingly flexible strike capability, as well as the need to
keep platforms in service for longer. Originally designed to replace the Los Angeles class, 14 have been commissioned with procurement budgeted for a further 12. The US
requirement to sustain 48 attack submarines (and a recent aspiration to raise this to 66) forecasts additional production into the 2040s. This projected lifecycle requires
platform evolution, with the ability to integrate emerging technologies and adapt to new operational requirements. Enabled by modern manufacturing techniques, each
‘block’ incorporates improvements in construction and maintenance cycles. This design evolution also reflects the need for a multi-mission platform capable beyond the
traditional anti-submarine-warfare and anti-surface-warfare roles. This includes improved capacity for special-forces insertion and the future operation of unmanned
underwater vehicles (UUVs) and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The design also reaffirms the ongoing importance of conventional land-attack capability. Dedicated
vertical-launch-system (VLS) tubes have been included from the outset, enabling increased land-attack cruise-missile (LACM) capacity, without compromising
torpedo-tube availability. The US Navy has led development of such VLS capabilities to enable land-attack from the sea. VLS now features in the latest Russian Yasen and
possibly the Chinese Type-93A Shang II attack submarines, and is projected to feature in the South Korean KSS-III. The VLS design in later Virginia blocks provides
greater payload flexibility and the capacity to respond to projected future requirements.
Pump-jet propulsor Special operations Photo-optical masts

Filling the SSGN gap  Large internal lockout chambers  Remote sensing enables
In 2003–08, the US converted four Ohio-class  Dry-deck-shelter compatibility relocation of control room to
ballistic-missile submarines into guided-missile  Reconfigurable torpedo room more spacious lower decks
(SSGN) submarines. Their Trident missiles were  Flexible VPM and VPT payload options
replaced with the VLS capacity for 154 conventional
Tomahawk LACMs. However, all four are planned to
decommission in 2026–28, resulting in the loss of
approximately 60% of the US submarine fleet’s VLS
capacity. The Virginia class has been identified as a
solution to this, as plans to insert a ‘Virginia Payload Towed arrays
Module’ (VPM) into the second Block-V would
reduce this to only a 37% fall in capacity. The
procurement of 20 vessels fitted with VPMs would
in effect renew this capacity within the subsequent Flank
decade. sonar arrays
1,400 VLS launchers

Virginia
1,200 Payload
Module Torpedo
1,000 tubes (4 total)
Virginia
800 Ohio SSGN VPM Payload Tubes Bow sonar
600
BLOCK I & II BLOCK III onwards BLOCK V onwards
400  12 x single VLS tubes Virginia Payload Tubes (VPT) Virginia Payload Module (VPM)
VLS Los Angeles/Virginia  Tomahawk LACM only  2 x Multiple All-up Round Canisters (MAC)  c.25 metre hull insert
200  Similar configuration to replaces 12 x single VLS tubes  4 x septuplet VLS launchers
Figure 1 US Virginia-class nuclear-powered guided-missile submarine: design evolution
later Los Angeles class  Each MAC can carry 6 x VLS for Tomahawk LACM  Increases total Tomahawk
0  Same LACM capacity but MAC configuration LACM capacity from 12 to 40
2017 2025 2030 2035 2040 provides flexible multi-mission-payload options
(including future weapons, UAVs and UUVs)
© IISS
Source: US Department of Defense. The US Navy identifies the Virginia class as an SSN – The Military Balance applies the SSGN classification due to the presence of dedicated launch tubes for guided missiles.
North America 35
Meanwhile, the US Coast Guard (USCG) faces

a growing task list. It commissioned the sixth of its
North America
5
new National Security Cutters, USCGC Munro, in 4.20
3.79
April, is seeking to recruit an extra 5,000 personnel 4
3.46
3.25
over five years, and has also begun design work for 3.19 3.11
three new heavy and three medium icebreakers; the 3
% of GDP
hope is that the first icebreaker can be delivered in
2023. These vessels are needed to replace the one 2
(elderly) heavy and one medium icebreaker currently

1
in service, which represent a significant shortfall in
capability. The USCG commandant said that the
0
icebreaker programme could be expanded, and the 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
ships even armed, in response to increased tensions.
[1] Figures refer to the National Defense (050) Budget Function (Outlays) as a % of GDP
He also issued a new plea for US ratification of the
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea to support US
continental-shelf claims in the Arctic. Figure 2 US defence expenditure as % of GDP1
DEFENCE ECONOMICS According to Secretary of Defense James Mattis,

the first priority of the FY2018 budget is to ‘restore
FY2018 Defence Budget Request the readiness of the current force’, while the second
The president’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 budget is to increase ‘capacity and lethality’. Consequently,
(PB2018) requested a total of US$677.1 billion for the FY2018 defence budget includes large increases
national defence, including US$603bn in base on the Obama administration’s FY2017 request for
discretionary funding for national defence, US$9.7bn operation and maintenance funding (US$21.3bn,
in mandatory spending and an additional US$64.6bn or 8.5%), procurement (US$11.9bn, or 10.7%), and
in discretionary supplemental funding for ongoing research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E)
war-related spending in the Overseas Contingency (US$11.9bn, or 16.3%). However, Congress actually
Operations (OCO) accounts. If Congress were appropriated funding for the DoD at a higher level
to appropriate funding at this requested level, than the Obama administration’s FY2017 request.
estimated FY2018 national-defence outlays would Most notably, Congress funded an additional US$12bn
total US$652.57bn. The divergence between this for procurement, an increase of approximately 10%
total and the total request is due to lags between the on the FY2017 request.
appropriation, obligation and actual outlay of funds. Indeed, compared to the actual FY2017 funding
The Department of Defence (DoD) would receive levels, the PB2018 request would increase funding
US$639bn, or 95.7% of the total discretionary funding levels more modestly, growing funding for military
requested in FY2018, while US$21.5bn would go personnel by 5%, to US$146bn, for operation and
to the Department of Energy for nuclear-weapons- maintenance by 6.5%, to US$271bn, and for RDT&E
related work and the remaining US$8.3bn would by 11.3%, to US$84.9bn. The FY2018 request for
go to defence-related efforts at the Federal Bureau US$125bn for procurement is an increase of just
of Investigation and other agencies. (Discretionary US$819 million compared to the FY2017 congressional
spending is funded via annual appropriations acts, appropriation. Meanwhile, the FY2018 budget shifts
while mandatory funding is authorised by prior additional funding into munitions, parts and spares,
statutory authority and is thereby appropriated and modifications to current aircraft, when compared
automatically.) The DoD’s requested US$639bn in to the FY2018 plan in the FY2017 budget. The
discretionary funding includes US$574.5bn in the US$639bn in total discretionary funding (including
base defence budget and US$64.6bn in OCO funding. both base and OCO funding) requested for the
The total FY2018 request includes US$166bn for the DoD for FY2018 is an increase of 7% on the total of
army, US$183bn for the air force (which by tradition US$597.2bn appropriated for FY2017.
includes the DoD’s classified spending), US$180bn Additional force-structure growth and
for the navy and US$110bn for defence-wide procurement spending are expected in the FY2019
spending. defence-budget request, following the planned
Table 2 US National Defense Budget Function1 and other selected budgets2 1997, 2007–18
US$ in National Defense Atomic Other Total National Department Department Total Total Federal
billions, Budget Function Energy Defense Defense of of Federal Budget
current Defense Activities Homeland Veterans Government Surplus/
year Activities Security Affairs Outlays Deficit
dollars
FY BA Outlay BA BA BA Outlay BA BA
1997 257.9 258.3 11.3 1.1 270.4 270.5 13.2 39.9 1,601.1 -21.9
2007 603.0 528.5 17.2 5.7 625.8 551.3 39.7 79.5 2,728.7 -160.7
2008 674.7 594.6 16.6 4.9 696.2 616.1 50.6 88.4 2,982.5 -458.6
2009 667.5 636.7 23.0 7.1 697.6 661.0 46.0 96.9 3,517.7 -1,412.7
2010 695.6 666.7 18.2 7.3 721.2 693.5 45.4 124.3 3,457.1 -1,294.4
2011 691.5 678.1 18.5 7.0 717.0 705.6 41.6 122.8 3,603.1 -1,299.6
2012 655.4 650.9 18.3 7.7 681.4 677.9 45.9 124.0 3,536.9 -1,087.0
2013 585.2 607.8 17.5 7.4 610.2 633.4 61.9 136.0 3,454.6 -679.5
2014 595.7 577.9 18.4 8.2 622.3 603.5 44.1 165.7 3,506.1 -484.6
2015 570.9 562.5 19.0 8.5 598.4 589.7 45.3 160.5 3,688.4 -438.5
2016 595.7 565.4 20.1 8.3 624.1 593.4 46.0 163.3 3,852.6 -584.7
2017 est * 626.2 573.0 20.1 8.8 655.1 602.8 51.0 176.6 4,062.2 -602.5
2018 est 646.9 621.7 21.8 8.4 677.1 652.6 49.4 183.1 4,094.5 -440.2
Notes Federal Emergency Management and Selective 2
Early in each calendar year, the US govern-
* Includes March request for additional appro- Service System). It does not include funding for ment presents its defence budget to Congress
priations International Security Assistance (under Inter- for the next fiscal year, which begins on 1
FY = Fiscal Year (1 October–30 September) national Affairs), the Veterans Administration, October. The government also presents its
the US Coast Guard (Department of Homeland Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), which
1
The National Defense Budget Function sub- Security), nor for the National Aeronautics and covers the next fiscal year plus the following
sumes funding for the DoD, the Department Space Administration (NASA). Funding for civil five. Until approved by Congress, the budget
of Energy Atomic Energy Defense Activities projects administered by the DoD is excluded is called the Budget Request; after approval, it
and some smaller support agencies (including from the figures cited here. becomes the Budget Authority (BA).
completion of the National Defense Strategy and Iraq and Syria, including supporting 5,675 US troops
Nuclear Posture Review in late 2017. Anticipating the in Iraq and US$1.3bn to train and equip Iraqi forces,
FY2019 defence budget, the FY2018 budget functions as well as US$500m for vetted Syrian opposition
partially as a one-year placeholder, as it lacks the forces. The European Reassurance Initiative would
FY2019–FY2022 budgetary years that comprise the receive US$4.8bn, a US$1.4bn increase from the
Future Years Defense Program. US$3.4bn requested in FY2017, which would be
The FY2018 defence budget also includes directed to an increased US forward presence and
US$64.6bn in OCO funds. In a point of continuity the pre-positioning of an army division’s worth of
with the Obama administration, the funding equipment.
requested for each military operation aligns very Trump campaigned on a promise to make the
closely with the amounts requested in FY2017. The US armed forces ‘so big, so powerful, so strong,
FY2018 budget requests US$45.9bn for Operation that nobody – absolutely nobody – is gonna mess
Freedom’s Sentinel in Afghanistan to support a force with us’ and the administration has characterised
level of 8,448 US troops, including US$4.9bn to train the FY2018 defence-budget request as a ‘historic’
and equip Afghan security forces and US$1.3bn increase, citing the US$603bn requested in base
to support NATO-led coalition forces. The Obama discretionary national-defence funding as a US$52bn,
administration requested a total of US$46.2bn for or 9.4%, increase on the Obama administration’s
this operation in FY2017, including an additional request for US$551bn in FY2017, and as a US$54bn, or
US$3.4bn requested in November 2017 to retain 8,400 10%, increase above the US$549bn limit on national-
US troops in Afghanistan instead of the planned defence spending for FY2018 set by the amended
drawdown to 5,500. President Donald Trump’s Budget Control Act of 2011.
announcement in July that the US will increase its However, the FY2018 request is a more modest
force level in Afghanistan will likely require a similar US$18.5bn, or 3%, increase over the planned
level of additional funding. The FY2018 budget also US$584.5bn in base discretionary national-defence
requests US$13bn for Operation Inherent Resolve in spending in FY2018 that appeared in the FY2017
North America 37
North America
50 900
800
40
Total, National Defense % change 700
FY18 US$ in billions

30
600
% change
20 500
10 400
300
0
200
-10
100
-20 0
77
81
85
89
93
97
01
05
09
13
17
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
© IISS
Figure 3 US National Defense Budget Function: year-on-year changes, 1977–2017
budget request for that year. Year-on-year increases from the Obama administration, which in FY2017
in discretionary national-defence spending of 10% requested a total of US$703m in FMF for individual
or more have occurred ten times since FY1978, countries and regions, in addition to the funding for
predominantly during the FY1979–FY1985 Carter– Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Pakistan mentioned above.
Reagan Cold War build-up and the FY2001–FY2011
growth in national-defence spending relating to the Continued budget turmoil
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. As it has every year since FY2010, the DoD began
The Trump administration’s proposal for a total FY2017 on 1 October (2016) under a series of
of US$667bn in discretionary national-defence continuing resolutions, extending FY2016 funding
spending has been criticised by legislators, including levels into FY2017 with a slight adjustment for
Congressman Mac Thornberry and Senator John inflation. The first continuing resolution, from 1
McCain, Republican chairmen of the House and October to 9 December 2016, postponed a debate
Senate armed services committees respectively, about national-security and domestic funding until
as inadequate for US national-security needs in a after the congressional and presidential elections
changing international security order. Congressional in November 2016. The second resolution, running
frustration has manifested itself in higher than from 9 December 2016 through to 28 April 2017,
requested troop levels and defence spending allowed the incoming Trump administration to
in versions of the FY2018 authorisations and influence FY2017 defence-funding levels. In March
appropriations bills. The Congress and Senate passed 2017, the Trump administration submitted a request
a National Defense Authorization Act in November for an additional US$30bn in FY2017, deemed a
2017, authorising appropriations up to US$700bn. ‘readiness supplemental’. This additional request
However, the BCA would need to be lifted for it to included US$13.5bn in procurement funding,
go through. US$8.2bn in operations and maintenance, US$2bn
Meanwhile, the FY2018 State Department request for RDT&E and US$1bn for military personnel, and
for a total of US$5.1bn in Foreign Military Financing brought the total FY2017 DoD request to US$619bn,
(FMF) maintains the prior year’s request levels for including US$589bn in base-budget funding and
Israel (US$3.1bn), Egypt (US$1.3bn) and Jordan US$69.7bn in OCO funding. After a third short
(US$350m), but reduces funding for Pakistan continuing resolution, Congress passed the FY2017
(US$261m to US$100m). For other countries, the appropriations bill for the DoD on 5 May 2017, 216
FY2018 FMF request includes an unallocated pool days into the fiscal year, ending the longest stretch
of US$200m in direct FMF assistance, a reduction of of budgetary uncertainty ever faced by the DoD. The
US$593m, and instead encourages countries to apply final FY2017 appropriations level totalled US$597bn
for FMF loans. This is a sharp break in FMF policy for the DoD, complied with the congressional budget-
deal levels and included US$15.4bn of the requested the magnitude and potential duration of a defence
US$30bn in additional appropriations to ‘restore build-up, US defence spending appears to be past the
readiness’. nadir that followed the drawdowns from the wars in
The differences of opinion between and among Afghanistan and Iraq.
Republicans and Democrats in Congress over
the appropriate balance between defence and Balancing readiness, capacity and high-end
non-defence spending, the level of OCO funding and capabilities
proper military-force structure remain unresolved. Readiness has been a consistent motif in debates
Despite widespread hopes for the swift passage of a over the US defence budget and force structure
FY2018 defence-appropriations bill, and the explicit over the past few years. Many senior Pentagon and
pleas of Mattis and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of congressional officials have described a ‘readiness
Staff General James Dunford, the federal government crisis’, while Mattis testified before the Senate Armed
and DoD once again started the fiscal year under a Services Committee that he was ‘shocked’ at the
continuing resolution, which continues the FY2017 erosion of readiness since the FY2013 sequester.
funding levels through to 8 December 2017. Under this However, improving readiness has become
‘strict’ continuing resolution, the DoD is prohibited somewhat of a catch-all term for remedying training
from starting any new programmes or adjusting any and maintenance shortfalls and increasing troop
production rates, resulting in the misalignment of end-strength and ship and aircraft numbers in order
billions of dollars between the FY2017 budget levels to alleviate the strain on the force, as well as to
and the FY2018 request. support current levels of operational demand, invest
Despite a broad consensus among national-security in high-end capabilities and modernise the force
policymakers for greater national defence spending, against the prospect of a near-peer adversary.
it remains limited through to FY2021 by the caps The March 2017 supplemental request and
imposed on both national-defence and non-defence the FY2018 budget request focused on ‘restoring
discretionary government spending by the Budget readiness’, adding funding for high-end army
Control Act of 2011. Although Congress has amended training and pairing army training with partnership
the caps for each year by US$9bn–US$27bn in any one exercises with allies abroad, greater capacity for ship-
year, at the time of writing there was no deal to raise and aviation depot maintenance, adding to air-force
or eliminate them for FY2018 or beyond. Past deals pilot and maintenance-personnel numbers, and
have typically covered two fiscal years, and raised the increasing funding for installation maintenance and
caps equally for defence and non-defence spending, repairs.
parity the Democrats have said they will insist upon Growing the capacity of the armed forces has
for the FY2018 budget negotiations. The average been a major focus of the congressional defence
amount of so-called ‘sequester relief’, US$18.8bn, committees. Congress rejected the FY2017 plan to
is one-third of the US$54bn requested in the reduce the army to 450,000 active-duty soldiers,
FY2018 budget. OCO funding is not subject to these instead adding 16,000; increasing the Marine Corps
spending caps, but resistance from Republican fiscal by 3,000, to 185,000; the air force by 4,000, to 321,000;
conservatives and Democrats seeking equivalent and the reserve forces by 9,800 to a total of 813,200.
spending increases for non-defence programmes If implemented, the administration’s FY2018 request
will limit the amount of defence funding that can would grow the air force’s and navy’s active-duty
be funnelled through OCO. Increasing the Budget forces by an additional 4,000 service members
Control Act caps requires either the agreement of each, while both the House and Senate would add
eight Democrat senators, or the effective elimination additional soldiers for the army. Congress has been
of the legislative filibuster, one of the last sacred similarly proactive in adding procurement funding
cows of Senate procedure. Appropriations above the (US$12.2bn was added to the US$112.2bn FY2017
cap levels without amending the caps themselves procurement request) in order to bolster the armed
would trigger a sequester, whereby funding for all forces’ near-term force structure, particularly for
defence activities is automatically reduced by an ships and aircraft, and upgrading the army’s ground-
even proportion in order to bring total spending to combat vehicles. However, substantial increases to
the cap level. Despite the uncertain prospects for force structure require large, long-term investments.
the elimination of the Budget Control Act caps and Increasing the size of the navy to 355 ships, as called
North America 39
for in the December 2016 Force Structure Assessment, relationship with the United States, relying less on
will require substantial new funds. Estimates for the US security umbrella. For Canada, ‘doing our fair
North America
340- and 350-ship fleets range between US$23.6bn share is clearly necessary’, she said, and ‘Canadian
and US$26.6bn annually in shipbuilding funds, diplomacy and development sometimes require
depending on the fleet composition, well above the the backing of hard power’. However, having this
annual cost of US$19.7bn in the FY2017 shipbuilding capacity, Freeland continued, ‘requires substantial
plan for a 308-ship fleet. investment’.
The FY2018 budget channels additional RDT&E In the North American context, this will amount
investment towards high-end, innovative capabilities to a limited adjustment, given the intimacy of the
to meet the new challenges of great-power competition US–Canada defence relationship. Likewise, while the
with China and Russia; continuing ‘Third Offset’ defence-policy review refocused priorities in some
investments in high-speed-strike and directed-energy key areas, with a renewed emphasis on deterrence
weapons; leap-ahead improvements in turbine and NATO commitments, for example, there was
engines; electronic warfare and improved capacity also a strong emphasis on continuity, not least in
to counter anti-access/area-denial capabilities. The re-committing to some long-standing procurements.
budget also requests an additional US$2.2bn for Under the defence-policy review, the government
classified programmes, for a total of US$22.4bn, set benchmarks for the scale and type of military
or 28% of all RDT&E funding, continuing a steady operations to which Canada could commit in the future.
growth in classified RDT&E funding since FY2015. Beyond its direct national and NATO commitments,
In addition, it adds funding to spur innovation, these include: two sustained deployments of 500–1,500
requesting US$345m and US$631m for transitioning personnel, including one as lead nation; one time-
to using new technologies and advanced innovation limited (six to nine months) deployment of similar
programmes respectively, and increases funding for scale; two smaller sustained deployments of 100–500
the Strategic Capabilities Office from US$902m to personnel; two small time-limited deployments of
US$1.2bn. similar scale; a disaster-assistance mission; and a
However, the bulk of RDT&E funding is non-combat evacuation operation.
allocated to programmes currently in development While the scale of even the larger missions
or to improvements to extant systems. The longer- envisaged is relatively modest, the overall ambition
term strategic and budgetary challenge will be for Canada’s commitment to peace and stability
to incorporate new capabilities into the force in missions appears considerable. For comparison,
sufficient quantities. For example, the air force has the previous review in 2008 spoke more vaguely
revised upwards its quantity estimate for the new of a commitment to lead and/or conduct a major
low-observable bomber currently in development, international operation for an extended period, and
the B-21 Raider, from 80–100 to at least 100. These to deploy forces in response to crises elsewhere in the
anticipated investments in new high-end capabilities world for shorter periods. At the time, Canada was
will add to the procurement ‘bow wave’ of existing maintaining some 2,500 personnel on a sustained
systems being acquired, principally the F-35 Lightning basis in Afghanistan.
II, the Virginia-class attack submarine, the Arleigh It is a measure of the difficulties and delays that
Burke-class guided-missile destroyer, the KC-46A have surrounded Canada’s long-term procurement
Pegasus refuelling tanker, the F/A-18E/F Hornet combat plans that several of these projects now carry the
aircraft and Ford-class aircraft carriers – the largest description ‘interim’, in order to cover capability
procurement programmes across the next five years. gaps. Plans for an interim purchase of fighters to fill
an air-force capability gap appeared to be thrown
CANADA into disarray by a dispute between Boeing and
Ottawa, after the US firm pursued a legal complaint
Canada released its defence-policy review in June against Canadian firm Bombardier. The Canadian
2017. This was immediately preceded by a major government had seemed close to an agreement
speech by Chrystia Freeland, the foreign-affairs with Boeing to buy 18 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets to
minister, in which she signalled a somewhat more supplement the air force’s ageing CF-18 Hornets.
robust security posture, with a renewed emphasis Lockheed Martin has officially offered the F-35
on hard power. She also hinted at a slightly looser Lightning II as an alternative interim fighter. However,
Defence review
The new Liberal government came into office promising For the navy, the review firmed up the commitment
a defence-policy review to take account of the to what it called a ‘full complement’ of 15 new Canadian
requirement to reassess Canadian defence and security Surface Combatants to replace the recently retired
in a post-Afghanistan environment. The review, entitled destroyers and current frigates on a one-for-one basis. It
‘Strong. Secure. Engaged’, was published on 7 June, stated that these are ‘fully funded’. There will also be two
somewhat later than originally planned. The last such new Joint Support Ships and ‘five to six’ Arctic Offshore
review, entitled ‘Canada First’, was produced in 2008 by Patrol Ships. And there was a commitment to upgrade
the previous Conservative administration. lightweight torpedoes for surface ships, helicopters and
Both the 2008 and 2017 reviews promised a stable, maritime-patrol aircraft.
long-term programme to develop the Canadian armed The review identified a requirement for 88 advanced
forces. However, past governments have been criticised fighters for the air force, up from the 65 proposed by
for shortfalls in funding that have blighted procurement the previous government, to replace the current ageing
programmes. CF-18 Hornets, with the intention to procure a force of
The underlying theme of the review was that the global interim fighters. As well as modernising the CP-140 Aurora
security outlook has not only altered but deteriorated. The maritime-reconnaissance aircraft, a new generation of
review called for a growth in regular-forces personnel to multi-mission aircraft would be acquired in the 2030s.
71,500, and an increase in reserves by 1,500. It also called The review also spoke of acquiring space capabilities to
for growth in critical capability areas, including space, improve situational awareness and communications,
cyber, intelligence and targeting. In addition, it highlighted including throughout Canada’s Arctic region.
transnational threats from violent extremism, climate For the army, the plan is to acquire ground-based
change and increased international interest in the Arctic, air-defence systems and replace a family of armoured
with a consequent requirement for all of the services to combat-support vehicles. Special-operations forces
improve their ability to operate in the High North. The will be increased by 605 personnel, while new airborne
review also stated that Canada must balance traditional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems
relationships with a need to engage with emerging partners, will also be acquired.
particularly in the Asia–Pacific region. The review outlined a significant and ambitious
Many of the programme commitments have an air of programme, some of it meant to make up for time lost
continuity about them because they have been long- through previous delays, but also a rebalancing of focus
standing and subject to long delays and controversy. in key areas. It is a demanding programme, not least in
However, some have been significantly modified and its pledge to improve performance in the procurement
new programmes added. process.
the prospects for this and indeed the F-35’s chances of of all the ageing Iroquois-class destroyers. Canada’s 12
fulfilling Canada’s ultimate requirement for 88 new Halifax-class frigates started a modernisation and life-
combat aircraft remain uncertain. extension programme in 2010. The last of these vessels
The C$670 million (US$516m) Project Resolve to enter the programme, HMCS Toronto, completed
for an interim supply ship for the navy, based on a its refit in November 2016 and was due to return
converted merchant-ship hull, MV Asterix, is due to operational service only in early 2018. While the
to see the vessel delivered by the end of 2017. The defence-policy review made a firm commitment to
navy has been relying at various times on help 15 new Canadian Surface Combatants (the previous
from the Chilean and Spanish navies for under-way commitment had been ‘up to 15’), a succession of
replenishment since the withdrawal of HMCS slippages in the bidding deadline for the contract
Protecteur and HMCS Preserver. The new purpose- pushed back completion of the selection process
built Joint Support Ships (formerly known as the from late 2017 into 2018. However, the plan is still for
Queenston class, but now renamed the Protecteur class construction to begin ‘in the early 2020s’.
and based on the German Navy’s Berlin class) are A new focus of concern over future naval
scheduled for delivery in 2021 and 2022. capability centres on the long-term plans for Canada’s
Meanwhile, the navy’s surface fleet has been submarine force. Under the latest proposals, the
operating at reduced levels following the withdrawal intention is to continue to operate and, in the
North America 41
mid-2020s, to modernise the current four Victoria- of Oman and the Indian Ocean. Under Operation
class boats, to keep them effective until the mid-2030s. Artemis, the Canadian commitment is for up to 375
North America
Some doubt the viability of this plan, given their age personnel, a Halifax-class frigate once every two years
and chequered history. Nevertheless, the renewed and a CP-140 Aurora aircraft once per year.
strategic focus on the North Atlantic and particularly At the 2017 IISS Shangri La Dialogue, Minister
the Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom gap (for of National Defence Harjit Singh Sajjan also
which the then-Upholder-class boats were originally underscored the country’s commitment to defence
designed for the UK Royal Navy as very quiet, deep- engagement in the Asia–Pacific. This included the
water platforms) make them valuable assets for both twin deployment to the Indo-Asia–Pacific region of
Canada and NATO, despite concerns over their the frigates HMCS Winnipeg and HMCS Ottawa as
operational availability. Operation Poseidon Cutlass 17, which lasted nearly six
months. Despite the challenges facing the navy in
International commitments and terms of sustained deployments, it also carried out
engagements a presence-and-engagement mission to West Africa
Canada has been the recipient of some criticism, not involving two Kingston-class coastal-defence vessels
least from Washington, over its defence-spending – the first Canadian warship presence in the region
record, hence the emphasis on an increased for ten years.
commitment in the new review. Nonetheless, Canada
makes a significant contribution to the Alliance as one Defence economics
of the four framework nations of NATO’s Enhanced Canada has faced criticism for appearing down the
Forward Presence in the Baltic states. Canada leads league table of NATO defence spenders, at just above
the multinational battlegroup in Latvia, deploying 1% of GDP. The new government insists that it is
approximately 450 army personnel, alongside committed to raising defence spending. Even so, the
contributions from Albania, Italy, Poland, Slovenia budget is still projected to reach only 1.4% of GDP by
and Spain. In addition, Canada temporarily deployed 2024–25, still significantly below the NATO minimum
an artillery battery of 100 personnel and four M777 target of 2% (and that only because of an adjustment
howitzers to Latvia for exercises in 2017. allowing the inclusion of defence spending from
From August 2017, Canada also undertook a new other departments, in consultation with NATO).
rotational deployment as part of NATO’s air-policing The new defence review stated that the
mission, with four CF-18s and 135 air-force personnel Department of National Defence budget, excluding
based in Romania for four months, while the navy the Department of Veterans Affairs, would rise over
contributes a frigate to one of NATO’s standing the next ten years from C$17.1 billion (US$13.2bn)
maritime groups. The government also announced in 2016–17 to C$24bn (US$18.6bn) by 2026–27 on an
that it would extend its military-training and capacity- accrual basis. In cash terms, the rise would be from
building mission in Ukraine, begun in 2014, until the C$18.9bn (US$14.5bn) to C$32.7bn (US$25.2bn), or
end of March 2019. an increase of 70%, according to the government,
The government also extended Operation Impact, and some C$9.5bn (US$7.3bn) above the total budget
Canada’s contribution to the campaign against the increase planned by 2027–28, under pre-review
Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, until March proposals. However, cash spending is then expected
2019. It changed significantly in character in February to fall substantially as major projects are completed.
2016 after the Liberal administration enacted its More significant perhaps than the overall budget
pledge to end Canadian airstrikes and pull out its force forecast is the anticipated significant increase in
of CF-18s, and has become a support and training capital or procurement spending as a percentage of
mission. That said, Canadian personnel – including the budget. This was put at 10.84% in 2016–17 and
special forces – have been engaged in firefights on the was set for a significant rise to 19.42% in 2017–18,
ground, which indicates a greater combat element and then to increase further to 32.17% in 2024–25.
than the official characterisation would suggest. That level would significantly exceed the NATO
In addition, Canada has extended until the end of target of 20% of defence spending being on major
April 2021 its commitment to periodically provide equipment.
forces to the coalition maritime-security mission in If this materialises, it would represent a major
and around the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf change compared to previous procurement
commitments, but whether the defence budget and its North American Aerospace Defense Command
industrial base is ready to absorb something like commitment for mission-ready aircraft.
a trebling in the proportion of defence resources Meanwhile, in November 2016, the government
devoted to capital programmes in less than a decade announced that it had selected the Airbus C295W
is another matter. Significantly, the defence-policy to fulfil its future fixed-wing search-and-rescue
review spoke of introducing reforms to streamline requirement under a C$2.4bn (US$1.8bn) contract.
the procurement process, with the aim of reducing The continuing deferrals of the bidding deadline
departmental approval times by 50%. for the navy’s future Canadian Surface Combatant
The main procurement questions continue to came against the backdrop of a new and significantly
revolve around the centrepiece air-force and naval higher cost estimate for the programme. The budget
recapitalisation programmes. The current government was announced at C$26.2bn (US$20.2bn) in 2008.
rowed back on the previous administration’s plans However, in June 2017, the parliamentary budget
to buy 65 F-35As to replace the air force’s existing office estimated that it had risen, in 2008 dollars
CF-18s. Instead, it has pledged to hold an open adjusted for inflation, to C$61.82bn (US$47.6bn), 2.4
competition for new fighters, a requirement now put times higher than the original target (and equivalent
at 88 aircraft, although Canada has remained part of to C$40bn (US$30.8bn) in 2017 dollars), although it
the F-35 production consortium. also acknowledged that its estimates included a 20%
Meanwhile, the full implications that the trade margin of error and depended on the final size and
dispute with Boeing may have on the planned specification of the ships.
interim purchase of 18 Super Hornets appeared Among other naval programmes, the Quebec-
uncertain. Although the US State Department based shipyard Chantier Davie, responsible for
approved the potential sale in September, the deal delivering the interim replenishment ship, has
was essentially stalled by the dispute. The Canadian also submitted a proposal to meet Canada’s future
government stated in November 2016 that the age icebreaker requirement based on the conversion of
of the existing fleet meant that it was unable to meet two classes of commercial icebreaker.
North America 43
Canada CAN ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
North America
Canadian Dollar $ 2016 2017 2018 Space
GDP CS$ 2.03tr 2.13tr EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US$ 1.53tr 1.64tr SATELLITES • SPACE SURVEILLANCE 1 Sapphire
per capita US$ 42,224 44,773
Growth % 1.5 3 Army 34,800
Inflation % 1.4 1.6 FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Def exp [a] CS$ 24.1bn 27.6bn
Mechanised
US$ 18.2bn 21.2bn 1 (1st) mech bde gp (1 armd regt, 2 mech inf bn, 1 lt inf
Def bdgt [b] CS$ 21.4bn 22.1bn bn, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log bn)
US$ 16.2bn 17.0bn 2 (2nd & 5th) mech bde gp (1 armd recce regt, 2 mech
US$1= CS$ 1.33 1.30 inf bn, 1 lt inf bn, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log bn)
[a] NATO definition COMBAT SUPPORT
1 engr regt
[b] Department of National Defence and Veterans Affairs
3 MP pl
Population 35,623,680 AIR DEFENCE
1 SAM regt
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Male 7.9% 2.8% 3.3% 3.4% 23.8% 8.3% ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Female 7.5% 2.6% 3.1% 3.3% 23.5% 10.3% MBT 82: 42 Leopard 2A4 (trg role); 20 Leopard 2A4M
(being upgraded); 20 Leopard 2A6M (61 Leopard 1C2 in
Capabilities store)
RECCE ε120 LAV-25 Coyote
The government has sought to emphasise its commitments to
IFV 635: 226 LAV-III Kodiak (incl 33 RWS); 409 LAV 6.0;
NATO and North American defence, and also its enhanced
APC 443
support and training role in the coalition against ISIS fol-
APC (T) 268: 235 M113; 33 M577 (CP)
lowing Canada’s withdrawal from combat air operations. A APC (W) 175 LAV Bison (incl 10 EW, 32 amb, 32 repair,
major defence-policy review published in June 2017 prom- 64 recovery)
ised to increase regular and reserve forces. It also pledged to AUV 245: 7 Cougar; 238 TAPV
finally deliver on a range of delayed procurements aimed at ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
making the services more suitable to future operations, with AEV 8: 5 Buffalo; 3 Leopard 2 AEV
particular enhancements to cyber and intelligence capabil ARV 13: 2 BPz-3 Büffel; 11 Leopard 2 ARV
ities. The review raised the target for a new-generation fighter ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
to 88 aircraft, but a trade dispute with Boeing appeared to RCL 84mm 1,075 Carl Gustav
stall an interim buy of the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. Spending ARTILLERY 287
cuts in recent years have particularly affected the procure- TOWED 163 105mm 126: 98 C3 (M101); 28 LG1 MkII;
ment schedules of major programmes, sustainment, readi- 155mm 37 M777
ness and the maintenance of forces, but the navy moved to MOR 124: 81mm 100; SP 81mm 24 LAV Bison
fill the gap in afloat-tanker support with the expected deliv- UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Light Skylark
ery of an interim auxiliary (a converted container ship) in AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence Starburst
2018, pending the arrival of the new Protecteur class in 2021. Reserve Organisations 23,450
Repeated delays in the procurement process for the new
surface combatant, however, raised doubts about the sched- Canadian Rangers 5,000 Reservists
ule for that programme. Canada’s leadership of a NATO Provide a limited military presence in Canada’s northern,
battlegroup in Latvia, as part of NATO’s Enhanced Forward coastal and isolated areas. Sovereignty, public-safety and
Presence, to which it contributed 450 troops, underscored a surveillance roles
continuing capability to deploy medium-sized formations. FORCES BY ROLE
Canada is also sustaining a frigate deployment to NATO MANOEUVRE
maritime forces in Europe. The deployment of two frigates Other
to the Asia-Pacific region displayed an increased desire to 5 (patrol) ranger gp (187 patrols)
maintain influence there. (See pp. 39–42.) Army Reserves 18,450 Reservists
Most units have only coy-sized establishments
ACTIVE 63,000 (Army 34,800 Navy 8,300 Air Force
19,900) Paramilitary 4,500 FORCES BY ROLE
COMMAND
RESERVE 30,000 (Army 23,450 Navy 4,600 Air 1,950) 10 bde gp HQ
MANOEUVRE TRAINING
Reconnaissance 1 sqn with F/A-18A/B Hornet (CF-18AM/BM)
18 recce regt (sqn) 1 sqn with P-3 Orion (CP-140 Aurora)
Light 1 sqn with SH-3 Sea King (CH-124)
51 inf regt (coy) TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
COMBAT SUPPORT 5 sqn with Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon)
16 fd arty regt (bty) 3 (cbt spt) sqn with Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon)
3 indep fd arty bty 1 (Spec Ops) sqn with Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon –
10 cbt engr regt (coy) OPCON Canadian Special Operations Command)
1 EW regt (sqn) 1 sqn with CH-47F (CH-147F) Chinook
4 int coy EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
10 sigs regt (coy) AIRCRAFT 95 combat capable
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT FGA 77: 59 F/A-18A (CF-18AM) Hornet; 18 F/A-18B (CF-
10 log bn (coy) 18BM) Hornet
3 MP coy ASW 18 P-3 Orion (CP-140M Aurora)
TKR/TPT 7: 2 A310 MRTT (CC-150T); 5 KC-130H
TPT 59: Heavy 5 C-17A (CC-177) Globemaster III;
Royal Canadian Navy 8,300; 4,600 reserve
Medium 35: 10 C-130E (CC-130) Hercules; 6 C-130H
(12,900 total) (CC-130) Hercules; 2 C-130H-30 (CC-130) Hercules; 17
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE C-130J-30 (CC-130) Hercules; Light 10: 6 DHC-5 (CC-115)
SUBMARINES • SSK 4: Buffalo; 4 DHC-6 (CC-138) Twin Otter; PAX 9: 3 A310 (CC-
4 Victoria (ex-UK Upholder) with 6 single 533mm TT with 150 Polaris); 6 CL-600 (CC-144B/C)
Mk48 Sea Arrow HWT (3 currently non-operational) TRG 4 DHC-8 (CT-142)
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES • HELICOPTERS
FFGHM 12: ASW 37: 26 SH-3 (CH-124) Sea King; 11 CH-148 Cyclone
12 Halifax with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Block II MRH 68 Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon)
Harpoon AShM, 2 octuple Mk48 VLS with RIM-7P Sea TPT 29: Heavy 15 CH-47F (CH-147F) Chinook; Medium
Sparrow SAM/RIM-162 ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm 14 AW101 Merlin (CH-149 Cormorant)
ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 Phalanx CIWS, 1 57mm gun RADARS 53
(capacity 1 SH-3 (CH-124) Sea King ASW hel) (rolling AD RADAR • NORTH WARNING SYSTEM 47: 11 AN/
modernisation programme until 2017) FPS-117 (range 200nm); 36 AN/FPS-124 (range 80nm)
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES • STRATEGIC 6: 4 Coastal; 2 Transportable
MCO 12 Kingston AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 10 ASM AGM-65 Maverick
AGOR 1 Quest AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; SARH AIM-7M Sparrow
ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM
AX 9: AXL 8 Orca; AXS 1 Oriole
BOMBS
Reserves 4,600 reservists Laser-guided: GBU-10/GBU-12/GBU-16 Paveway II;
GBU-24 Paveway III
24 units tasked with crewing 10 of the 12 MCOs,
harbour defence & naval control of shipping
NATO Flight Training Canada
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) 19,900
AIRCRAFT
FORCES BY ROLE TRG 45: 26 T-6A Texan II (CT-156 Harvard II); 19 Hawk
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 115 (CT-155) (advanced wpns/tactics trg)
4 sqn with F/A-18A/B Hornet (CF-18AM/BM)
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE Contracted Flying Services – Southport
2 sqn with SH-3 Sea King (CH-124) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT
2 sqn with P-3 Orion (CP-140 Aurora) TPT • Light 7 Beech C90B King Air
SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT TRG 11 G-120A
4 sqn with AW101 Merlin (CH-149 Cormorant); C-130E/ HELICOPTERS
H/H-30/J-30 (CC-130) Hercules MRH 9 Bell 412 (CH-146)
1 sqn with DHC-5 (CC-115) Buffalo TPT • Light 7 Bell 206 Jet Ranger (CH-139)
TANKER/TRANSPORT
1 sqn with A310/A310 MRTT (CC-150/CC-150T) Canadian Special Operations Forces
1 sqn with KC-130H Command 1,500
TRANSPORT FORCES BY ROLE
1 sqn with C-17A (CC-177) Globemaster SPECIAL FORCES
1 sqn with CL-600 (CC-144B) 1 SF regt (Canadian Special Operations Regiment)
1 (utl) sqn with DHC-6 (CC-138) Twin Otter 1 SF unit (JTF 2)
North America 45
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ees were stood up in the new ‘cyber operator’ role; civil-
1 CBRN unit (Canadian Joint Incident Response Unit – ian recruitment will start in 2018 and reservist recruit-
North America
CJIRU) ment in 2019. Canada published a cyber-security strategy
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER in October 2010 and an action plan on implementation in
1 (spec ops) sqn, with Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon – from 2013. The Canadian Forces Network Operation Centre is
the RCAF) the ‘national operational cyber defence unit’ permanently
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE assigned to support Canadian forces’ operations. The
NBC VEHICLES 4 LAV Bison NBC armed forces’ Information Management Group (IMG) is
HELICOPTERS • MRH 10 Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon) responsible for electronic warfare and network defence.
The Canadian Force Information Operations Group, under
Canadian Forces Joint Operational Support the IMG, commands the Canadian Forces Information
Group Operations Group Headquarters; the Canadian Forces
FORCES BY ROLE Electronic Warfare Centre; the Canadian Forces Network
COMBAT SUPPORT Operation Centre, which is the ‘national operational cyber
1 engr spt coy defence unit’ permanently assigned to support Canadian
1 (close protection) MP coy Forces operations; and other units.
1 (joint) sigs regt
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 (spt) log unit
DEPLOYMENT
1 (movement) log unit ALBANIA
OSCE • Albania 1
Paramilitary 4,500
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
Canadian Coast Guard 4,500 OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 3
Incl Department of Fisheries and Oceans; all platforms
are designated as non-combatant CARIBBEAN
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Operation Caribbe 1 MCO
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 67 CYPRUS
PSOH 1 Leonard J Cowley UN • UNFICYP (Operation Snowgoose) 1
PSO 1 Sir Wilfred Grenfell (with hel landing platform)
PCO 13: 2 Cape Roger; 1 Gordon Reid; 9 Hero; 1 Tanu DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
PCC 1 Harp UN • MONUSCO (Operation Crocodile) 8
PB 51: 1 Post; 1 Quebecois; 1 Vakta; 10 Type-300A; 36
EGYPT
Type-300B; 1 S. Dudka; 1 Simmonds (on loan from
RCMP) MFO (Operation Calumet) 70; 1 MP team
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • UCAC 4 Type- IRAQ
400 Operation Inherent Resolve (Impact) 280; 1 SF trg gp; 1 med
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 43
unit; 1 hel flt with 4 Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon) hel
ABU 7
AG 4 KUWAIT
AGB 15 Operation Inherent Resolve (Impact) 1 P-3 Orion (CP-140M);
AGOR 9 (coastal and offshore fishery vessels) 1 A310 MRTT (C-150T); 1 C-130J-30 Hercules (CC-130J)
AGOS 8  
HELICOPTERS • TPT 37: Medium 1 S-61; Light 36: 3 LATVIA
Bell 206L Long Ranger; 4 Bell 212; 15 Bell 429; 14 Bo-105 NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence (Operation
Reassurance) 450; 1 mech inf bn HQ; 1 mech inf coy(+)
Royal Canadian Mounted Police
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
In addition to the below, the RCMP also operates more
than 370 small boats under 10 tonnes NATO • SNMG 1: 1 FFGHM
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE MIDDLE EAST
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 3: 1 UN • UNTSO (Operation Jade) 4 obs
Inkster; 2 Nadon
PACIFIC OCEAN
Cyber Operation Caribbe 1 MCO
In June 2017, Canada’s defence-policy review said that ROMANIA
Canada ‘will develop the capability to conduct active NATO • Air Policing 135; 4 F/A-18A Hornet (CF-18)
cyber operations focused on external threats to Canada in
the context of government-authorized military missions’. SERBIA
This was because a ‘purely defensive’ cyber posture was NATO • KFOR • Joint Enterprise (Operation Kobold) 6
‘no longer sufficient’. In November 2017, the first transfer- OSCE • Kosovo 5
SOUTH SUDAN as part of a renewed strategy. Congress backed a US$700bn

UN • UNMISS (Operation Soprano) 5; 5 obs National Defense Authorisation Act, but funding for this
remained uncertain. Readiness remains a major concern,
UKRAINE
with senior Pentagon officials warning of continuing
Operation Unifier 200 significant shortfalls in terms of being ready to engage in
OSCE • Ukraine 22 high-intensity combat against a peer competitor. The fatal
UNITED STATES collisions suffered by the US Navy in the western Pacific
Operation Renaissance 1 C-17A Globemaster III (C-177A) underscored those concerns. Readiness, retention and
equipment recapitalisation are also priorities for the army.
As of the first half of 2017, senior military officials were
FOREIGN FORCES concerned that against a peer or near-peer competitor,
United Kingdom 370; 1 trg unit; 1 hel flt with SA341 the army could soon risk being ‘outgunned, outranged
Gazelle and outdated’ unless key modernisation programmes
United States 150 are adequately funded. President Trump has also
initiated a defence-industrial-base study to identify key
United States US vulnerabilities. At the same time, while the administration’s
first defence-budget request continued the focus on
United States Dollar $ 2016 2017 2018 innovation to sustain technological advantage – a theme
GDP US$ 18.6tr 19.4tr of the previous government – there remained less clarity
on its view towards the ‘Third Offset’. The US continues
per capita US$ 57,607 59,495
active development of its defensive and offensive cyber
Growth % 1.5 2.2
capabilities. (See pp. 27–39.)
Inflation % 1.3 2.1
Def exp [a] US$ 664bn 683bn
ACTIVE 1,348,400 (Army 476,250 Navy 323,950
Air Force 322,800 US Marine Corps 184,400 US Coast
Def bdgt [b] US$ 593bn 603bn 653bn
Guard 41,000)
[a] NATO definition
[b] National Defense Budget Function (50) Outlays. Includes DoD RESERVE 857,950 (Army 537,900 Navy 100,550 Air
funding, as well as funds for nuclear-weapons-related activities Force 174,450 Marine Corps Reserve 38,700 US Coast
undertaken by the Department of Energy. Excludes some military
retirement and healthcare costs Guard 6,350)
Population 326,625,791
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 9.5% 3.3% 3.5% 3.6% 22.2% 6.9% US Strategic Command
Female 9.1% 3.2% 3.3% 3.5% 22.8% 8.7% HQ at Offutt AFB (NE). Five missions: US nuclear deterrent;
missile defence; global strike; info ops; ISR
Capabilities
US Navy
The US remains the world’s most capable military power.
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Its forces are well trained and uniquely designed for
SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC • SSBN 14 Ohio SSBN
power projection and intervention on a global scale across
with up to 24 UGM-133A Trident D-5/D-5LE nuclear
the full spectrum of operations. However, the arrival
SLBM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk48 Sea Arrow HWT
of a new administration has led to a recalibration of key
strategic directions. The Pentagon has been working on US Air Force • Global Strike Command
a new national-defence strategy that is likely to address
FORCES BY ROLE
the US global role in an era of diminishing Western
MISSILE
technological advantage. A new Nuclear Posture Review
9 sqn with LGM-30G Minuteman III
seems likely to retain the triad, but could adjust aspects
BOMBER
of the very ambitious and costly nuclear-modernisation
6 sqn (incl 1 AFRC) with B-52H Stratofortress (+1
programme. The previous administration’s plans for a
‘rebalance’ to the Asia-Pacific have continued, against AFRC sqn personnel only)
the backdrop of increased tensions over North Korea. US 2 sqn with B-2A Spirit (+1 ANG sqn personnel only)
forces have shown their power-projection capabilities on EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
a number of occasions. A ballistic-missile-defence review SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
was also under way. However, the Pentagon remains ICBM • Nuclear 400 LGM-30G Minuteman III (1
concerned with continuing global instability in the form Mk12A or Mk21 re-entry veh per missile)
of transnational, hybrid and regional insurgencies; China’s AIRCRAFT
military modernisation; increasing Russian assertiveness; BBR 90: 20 B-2A Spirit; 70 B-52H Stratofortress
and tackling ISIS in Iraq and Syria. In August, the US AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
increased its commitment of combat forces in Afghanistan ALCM • Nuclear AGM-86B
North America 47
Strategic Defenses – Early Warning SPECIAL FORCES

North American Aerospace Defense Command (see USSOCOM)
North America
(NORAD) – a combined US–CAN org MANOEUVRE
Armoured
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 (1st) armd div (2 (2nd & 3rd ABCT) armd bde (1 armd
RADAR
recce sqn, 2 armd bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1
NORTH WARNING SYSTEM 50: 14 AN/FPS-117
cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 (1st SBCT) mech bde (1 armd
(range 200nm); 36 AN/FPS-124 (range 80nm)
recce sqn, 3 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1
SOLID STATE PHASED ARRAY RADAR SYSTEM
CSS bn); 1 MRL bde HQ; 1 log bde; 1 (hy cbt avn) hel
(SSPARS) 5: 2 AN/FPS-123 Early Warning Radar
bde)
located at Cape Cod AFS (MA) and Clear AFS (AK); 3
1 (1st) cav div (3 (1st–3rd ABCT) armd bde (1 armd
AN/FPS-132 Upgraded Early Warning Radar located at
recce sqn, 2 armd bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt
Beale AFB (CA), Thule (GL) and Fylingdales Moor (UK)
engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 MRL bde (1 MRL bn); 1 log bde;
SPACETRACK SYSTEM 10: 1 AN/FPS-85 Spacetrack
1 (hy cbt avn) hel bde)
Radar at Eglin AFB (FL); 6 contributing radars at
1 (1st) inf div (2 (1st & 2nd ABCT) armd bde (1 armd
Cavalier AFS (ND), Clear (AK), Thule (GL), Fylingdales
Moor (UK), Beale AFB (CA) and Cape Cod (MA); 3
engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 log bde; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde)
Spacetrack Optical Trackers located at Socorro (NM),
1 (3rd) inf div (2 (1st & 2nd ABCT) armd bde (1 armd
Maui (HI), Diego Garcia (BIOT)
PERIMETER ACQUISITION RADAR ATTACK
engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 lt inf bn; 1 MRL bde HQ; 1 log
CHARACTERISATION SYSTEM (PARCS) 1 AN/
bde; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde)
FPQ-16 at Cavalier AFS (ND)
Mechanised
DETECTION AND TRACKING RADARS 5 located
1 (4th) inf div (1 (3rd ABCT) armd bde (1 armd recce sqn,
at Kwajalein Atoll, Ascension Island, Australia, Kaena
2 armd bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn,
Point (HI), MIT Lincoln Laboratory (MA)
1 CSS bn); 1 (1st SBCT) mech bde (1 armd recce sqn, 3
GROUND BASED ELECTRO OPTICAL DEEP
mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 (2nd
SPACE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM (GEODSS)
IBCT) lt inf bde (1 recce sqn, 3 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt
Socorro (NM), Maui (HI), Diego Garcia (BIOT)
engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 MRL bde HQ; 1 log bde; 1 (hy cbt
STRATEGIC DEFENCES – MISSILE DEFENCES
avn) hel bde)
SEA-BASED: Aegis engagement cruisers and destroyers
1 (7th) inf div (2 (1st & 2nd SBCT, 2nd ID) mech bde (1
LAND-BASED: 40 ground-based interceptors at
armd recce sqn, 3 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr
Fort Greely (AK); 4 ground-based interceptors at
bn, 1 CSS bn))
Vandenburg AFB (CA)
1 (1st SBCT, 25th ID) mech bde (1 armd recce sqn, 3
mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn)
Space 2 (2nd & 3rd CR) mech bde (1 armd recce sqn, 3 mech
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE sqn, 1 arty sqn, 1 cbt engr sqn, 1 CSS sqn)
SATELLITES 134 Light
COMMUNICATIONS 42: 3 AEHF; 6 DSCS-III; 2 1 (10th Mtn) inf div (3 (1st–3rd IBCT) lt inf bde (1 recce
Milstar-I; 3 Milstar-II; 5 MUOS; 1 PAN-1 (P360); 5 SDS-III; sqn, 3 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 log
2 SDS-IV; 6 UFO; 9 WGS SV2 bde; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde)
NAVIGATION/POSITIONING/TIMING 31: 12 1 (25th) inf div (2 (2 & 3rd IBCT) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 2
NAVSTAR Block IIF; 19 NAVSTAR Block IIR/IIRM inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 log bde; 1
METEOROLOGY/OCEANOGRAPHY 6 DMSP-5 (cbt avn) hel bde)
ISR 15: 4 FIA Radar; 5 Evolved Enhanced/Improved Crystal 1 (Sy Force Assist) inf bde(-)
(visible and infrared imagery); 2 Lacrosse (Onyx radar Air Manoeuvre
imaging satellite); 1 NRO L-76; 1 ORS-1; 1 TacSat-4; 1 1 (82nd) AB div (3 (1st–3rd AB BCT) AB bde (1 recce bn,
TacSat-6 3 para bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 (cbt
ELINT/SIGINT 27: 2 Mentor (advanced Orion); 3 avn) hel bde; 1 log bde)
Advanced Mentor; 4 Mercury; 1 NRO L-67; 1 Trumpet; 4 1 (101st) air aslt div (3 (1st–3rd AB BCT) AB bde (1 recce
Improved Trumpet; 12 SBWASS (Space Based Wide Area bn, 3 para bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1
Surveillance System; Naval Ocean Surveillance System) (cbt avn) hel bde; 1 log bde)
SPACE SURVEILLANCE 6: 4 GSSAP; 1 SBSS (Space 1 (173rd AB BCT) AB bde (1 recce bn, 2 para bn, 1 arty
Based Surveillance System); 1 ORS-5 bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn)
EARLY WARNING 7: 4 DSP; 3 SBIRS Geo-1 1 (4th AB BCT, 25th ID) AB bde (1 recce bn, 2 para bn, 1
arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn)
US Army 476,250 Other
FORCES BY ROLE 1 (11th ACR) trg armd cav regt (OPFOR) (2 armd cav
Sqn are generally bn sized and tp are generally coy sized sqn, 1 CSS bn)
COMMAND COMBAT SUPPORT
3 (I, III & XVIII AB) corps HQ 3 MRL bde (2 MRL bn)
1 (2nd) inf div HQ 1 MRL bde (4 MRL bn)
4 engr bde 3 int bde

2 EOD gp (2 EOD bn) 3 MP bde
10 int bde 1 NBC bde
2 int gp 2 (tac) sigs bde
4 MP bde 18 (Mnv Enh) cbt spt bde
1 NBC bde COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
3 (strat) sigs bde 10 log bde
4 (tac) sigs bde 17 (regional) log spt gp
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT HELICOPTER
2 log bde 8 (cbt avn) hel bde
3 med bde 5 (theatre avn) hel bde
1 tpt bde AIR DEFENCE
HELICOPTER 3 SAM bde
2 (cbt avn) hel bde
1 (cbt avn) hel bde HQ Army Reserve 194,300 reservists
AIR DEFENCE Reserve under full command of US Army. Does not have
5 SAM bde state-emergency liability of Army National Guard
FORCES BY ROLE
Reserve Organisations SPECIAL FORCES
(see USSOCOM)
Army National Guard 343,600 reservists COMBAT SUPPORT
Normally dual-funded by DoD and states. Civil- 4 engr bde
emergency responses can be mobilised by state 4 MP bde
governors. Federal government can mobilise ARNG for 2 NBC bde
major domestic emergencies and for overseas operations 2 sigs bde
FORCES BY ROLE 3 (Mnv Enh) cbt spt bde
COMMAND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
8 div HQ 9 log bde
SPECIAL FORCES 11 med bde
(see USSOCOM) HELICOPTER
MANOEUVRE 1 (theatre avn) hel bde
Reconnaissance
1 armd recce sqn Army Stand-by Reserve 700 reservists
Armoured Trained individuals for mobilisation
3 (ABCT) armd bde (1 armd recce sqn, 2 armd bn, 1 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn) ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
1 (ABCT) armd bde (1 armd recce sqn, 2 armd bn, 1 MBT 2,384: 775 M1A1 SA Abrams; 1,609 M1A2 SEPv2
SP arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn) Abrams (ε3,500 more M1A1/A2 Abrams in store)
1 (ABCT) armd bde (1 armd recce sqn, 2 armd bn, 1 ASLT 134 M1128 Stryker MGS
SP arty bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 CSS bn) RECCE 1,745: ε1,200 M3A2/A3 Bradley; 545 M1127
1 armd bn Stryker RV (ε800 more M3 Bradley in store)
Mechanised IFV 2,834: ε2,500 M2A2/A3 Bradley; 334 M7A3/SA BFIST
2 (SBCT) mech bde (1 armd recce sqn, 3 mech inf bn, 1 (OP) (ε2,000 more M2 Bradley in store)
arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn) APC 10,746
Light APC (T) ε5,000 M113A2/A3 (ε8,000 more in store)
7 (IBCT) lt inf bde (1 recce sqn, 3 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 APC (W) 2,812: 1,972 M1126 Stryker ICV; 348 M1130
cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn) Stryker CV (CP); 188 M1131 Stryker FSV (OP); 304
1 (IBCT) lt inf bde (2 recce sqn, 2 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 M1133 Stryker MEV (Amb)
cbt spt bn, 1 CSS bn) PPV 2,934: 2,633 MaxxPro Dash; 301 MaxxPro LWB
8 (IBCT) lt inf bde (1 recce sqn, 2 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 (Amb)
cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn) AUV 9,016: 2,900 M1117 ASV; 465 M1200 Armored Knight
4 (IBCT) lt inf bde (1 recce sqn, 2 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 (OP); 5,651 M-ATV
cbt spt bn, 1 CSS bn) ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
8 lt inf bn AEV 531: 113 M1 ABV; 250 M9 ACE; 168 M1132 Stryker
Air Manoeuvre ESV
1 AB bn ARV 1,110+: 360 M88A1; 750 M88A2 (ε1,000 more
COMBAT SUPPORT M88A1 in store); some M578
8 arty bde VLB 60: 20 REBS; 40 Wolverine HAB
1 SP arty bn MW 3+: Aardvark JSFU Mk4; 3+ Hydrema 910 MCV-2;
8 engr bde M58/M59 MICLIC; M139; Rhino
1 EOD regt NBC VEHICLES 234 M1135 Stryker NBCRV
North America 49
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL Naval Reserve Force (NRF). For Naval Special Warfare
SP 1,133: 133 M1134 Stryker ATGM; ε1,000 M1167 Command, see US Special Operations Command
North America
HMMWV TOW EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin SUBMARINES 68
ARTILLERY 5,393 STRATEGIC • SSBN 14 Ohio opcon US STRATCOM
SP 155mm 947: 900 M109A6; 47 M109A7 (ε500 more with up to 24 UGM-133A Trident D-5/D-5LE nuclear
M109A6 in store) SLBM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk48 Sea Arrow HWT
TOWED 1,339: 105mm 821 M119A2/3; 155mm 518 TACTICAL 54
M777A2 SSGN 47:
MRL 227mm 600: 375 M142 HIMARS; 225 M270A1 4 Ohio (mod) with total of 154 Tomahawk LACM , 4
MLRS single 533mm TT with Mk48 Sea Arrow HWT
MOR 2,507: 81mm 990 M252; 120mm 1,076 M120/ 7 Los Angeles with 1 12-cell VLS with Tomahawk
M1064A3; SP 120mm 441 M1129 Stryker MC LACM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk48 Sea Arrow
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS HWT
SRBM • Conventional MGM-140A/B ATACMS; MGM- 22 Los Angeles (Imp) with 1 12-cell VLS with
168 ATACMS (All launched from M270A1 MLRS or Tomahawk LACM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk48
M142 HIMARS MRLs) Sea Arrow HWT
RADAR • LAND 209+: 98 AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder (arty); 56 10 Virginia Flight I/II with 1 12-cell VLS with
AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder (arty); 55 AN/TPQ-53 (arty); AN/ Tomahawk LACM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk48
MLQ-40 Prophet; AN/MLQ-44 Prophet Enhanced ADCAP mod 6 HWT
AMPHIBIOUS 116 4 Virginia Flight III with 2 6-cell VLS with Tomahawk
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 8 LACM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk48 ADCAP
LSL 8 Frank Besson (capacity 15 Abrams MBT) mod 6 HWT
LANDING CRAFT 70 SSN 7:
LCU 34 LCU-2000 4 Los Angeles with 4 single 533mm TT with Mk48 Sea
LCM 36 LCM 8 (capacity either 1 MBT or 200 troops) Arrow HWT
AIRCRAFT 3 Seawolf with 8 single 660mm TT with up to 45
ISR 19: 14 RC-12X Guardrail; 5 RC-12 Guardrail (trg) Tomahawk LACM/Mk48 Sea Arrow HWT
ELINT 8: 5 EO-5C ARL-M (COMINT/ELINT); 2 EO-5B PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 107
ARL-C (COMINT); 1 TO-5C (trg) AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CVN 11
TPT 156: Light 152: 113 Beech A200 King Air (C-12 1 Gerald R. Ford with 2 octuple Mk29 mod 5 GMLS
Huron); 28 Cessna 560 Citation (UC-35A/B); 11 SA-227 with RIM-162D ESSM SAM, 2 Mk49 mod 3 GMLS
Metro (C-26B/E); PAX 4: 1 Gulfstream IV (C-20F); 2 with RIM-116 SAM, 2 Phalanx Mk15 CIWS (typical
Gulfstream V (C-37A); 1 Gulfstream G550 (C-37B) capacity 75+ F/A-18E/F Super Hornet FGA ac, F-35C
TRG 4 T-6D Texan II Lightning II FGA ac (IOC planned 08/2018), E-2D
HELICOPTERS Hawkeye AEW&C ac, EA-18G Growler EW ac, MH-
ATK 603: 400 AH-64D Apache; 203 AH-64E Apache 60R Seahawk ASW hel, MH-60S Knighthawk MRH hel)
SAR 244: 19 HH-60L Black Hawk; 225 HH-60M Black 10 Nimitz with 2–3 octuple Mk29 lnchr with RIM-7M/P
Hawk (medevac) Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 Mk49 GMLS with RIM-116
TPT 2,807: Heavy 450: 60 CH-47D Chinook; 390 CH-47F SAM, 2 Phalanx Mk15 CIWS (typical capacity 55 F/A-
Chinook; Medium 1,896: 300 UH-60A Black Hawk; 975 18 Hornet FGA ac; 4 EA-18G Growler EW ac; 4 E-2C/D
UH-60L Black Hawk; 621 UH-60M Black Hawk; Light 461: Hawkeye AEW ac; 6 H-60 Seahawk hel)
396 UH-72A Lakota; 65 UH-1H/V Iroquois CRUISERS • CGHM 23:
TRG 86 TH-67 Creek 22 Ticonderoga with Aegis Baseline 5/6/8/9 C2, 2 quad
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES 361 lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 2 61-cell Mk41
CISR • Heavy 125 MQ-1C Gray Eagle VLS with SM-2ER SAM/SM-3 SAM/SM-6 SAM/
ISR • Medium 236 RQ-7B Shadow Tomahawk LACM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46
AIR DEFENCE • SAM 1,183+ LWT, 2 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 2 127mm guns
Long-range 480 MIM-104D/E/F Patriot PAC-2 GEM/ (capacity 2 SH-60B Seahawk ASW hel)
PAC-2 GEM-T/PAC-3/PAC-3 MSE 1 Zumwalt with 20 4-cell Mk57 VLS with RIM-162
Short-range NASAMS ESSM SAM/SM-2ER SAM/ASROC ASW/Tomahawk
Point-defence 703+: FIM-92 Stinger; 703 M1097 Avenger LACM, 2 155mm guns (capacity 2 MH-60R Seahawk
MISSILE DEFENCE • Long-range 42 THAAD ASW hel or 1 MH-60R Seahawk ASW hel and 3 Fire
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES Scout UAV)
ASM AGM-114 Hellfire DESTROYERS 64 
DDGHM 36 Arleigh Burke Flight IIA with Aegis Baseline
US Navy 323,950 6/7 C2, 1 29-cell Mk41 VLS with ASROC ASW/SM-
Comprises 2 Fleet Areas, Atlantic and Pacific. 5 Fleets: 3rd 2ER SAM/SM-3 SAM/SM-6 SAM/Tomahawk LACM,
– Pacific; 4th – Caribbean, Central and South America; 5th – 1 61-cell Mk41 VLS with ASROC ASW/SM-2ER
Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, Red Sea; 6th – Mediterranean; SAM/SM-3 SAM/SM-6 SAM/Tomahawk LACM, 2
7th – W. Pacific; plus Military Sealift Command (MSC); triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 2 Phalanx Block
1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 2 SH-60B Seahawk LCM 25: 10 LCM-6; 15 LCM-8
ASW hel) LCAC 80 LCAC(L) (capacity either 1 MBT or 60 troops
DDGM 28 Arleigh Burke Flight I/II with Aegis Baseline (undergoing upgrade programme))
5/9 C2, 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 1 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 14
32-cell Mk41 VLS with ASROC ASW/SM-2ER SAM/ AFDL 1 Dynamic
SM-3 SAM/SM-6 SAM/Tomahawk LACM, 1 64- AGOR 5 (all leased out): 1 Ocean; 3 Thomas G.
cell Mk41 VLS with ASROC ASW/SM-2 ER SAM/ Thompson; 1 Kilo Moana
Tomahawk LACM, 2 Mk49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM ARD 2
SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 2 Phalanx AX 1 Prevail
Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun, 1 hel landing platform ESB 1 Lewis B. Puller (capacity 4 MH-53/MH-60 hel)
(of which two suffered major damage in collisions)  SSA 2 (for testing)
FRIGATES • FFHM 9: SSAN 1 (for propulsion plant training)
4 Freedom with 1 21-cell Mk49 lnchr with RIM-116 UUV 1 Cutthroat (for testing)
SAM, 1 57mm gun (capacity 2 MH-60R/S Seahawk
hel or 1 MH-60 with 3 MQ-8 Fire Scout UAV) Naval Reserve Forces 100,550
5 Independence with 1 11-cell SeaRAM lnchr with
RIM-116 SAM, 1 57mm gun (capacity 1 MH-
Selected Reserve 57,800
60R/S Seahawk hel and 3 MQ-8 Fire Scout UAV) (1 Individual Ready Reserve 42,750
fitted with 2 twin lnchr with RGM-84D Block 1C
Harpoon AShM for trials) Naval Inactive Fleet
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 57 Notice for reactivation:
PCFG 10 Cyclone with 1 quad Mk 208 lnchr with BGM- 60–90 days minimum (still on naval vessel register)
176B Griffin B SSM EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PCF 3 Cyclone AMPHIBIOUS 8
PBF 2 Mk VI LHA 3 Tarawa
PBR 42 LPD 5 Austin
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 11 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AOE 1 Supply
MCO 11 Avenger with 1 SLQ-48 MCM system, 1 SQQ-
32(V)3 Sonar (mine hunting) Military Sealift Command (MSC)
COMMAND SHIPS • LCC 2 Blue Ridge with 2 Phalanx
Mk15 CIWS (capacity 3 LCPL; 2 LCVP; 700 troops; 1 Fleet Oiler (PM1)
med hel) (of which 1 vessel partially crewed by Military EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Sealift Command personnel) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 15
AMPHIBIOUS AOR 15 Henry J. Kaiser with 1 hel landing
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 31 platform
LHA 1 America with 2 octuple Mk29 GMLS with RIM-
162D ESSM SAM; 2 Mk49 GMLS with RIM-116 Special Mission (PM2)
RAM SAM, 2 Phalanx Mk15 CIWS (capacity 6 F-35B EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Lightning II FGA ac; 12 MV-22B Osprey tpt ac; 4 CH- LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 24
53E Sea Stallion hel; 7 AH-1Z Viper/UH-1Y Iroquois AGM 3: 1 Howard O. Lorenzen; 1 Invincible
hel; 2 MH-60 hel) (commercial operator); 1 Sea-based X-band
LHD 8 Wasp with 2 octuple Mk29 GMLS with RIM-7M/ Radar
RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 Mk49 GMLS with RIM- AGOR 6 Pathfinder
116 RAM SAM, 2 Phalanx Mk15 CIWS (capacity: 6 AGOS 5: 1 Impeccable (commercial operator); 4
AV-8B Harrier II FGA; 4 CH-53E Sea Stallion hel; 6 Victorious
MV-22B Osprey tpt ac; 4 AH-1W/Z hel; 3 UH-1Y hel; AGS 1 Waters
3 LCAC(L); 60 tanks; 1,687 troops) AS 9 (long-term chartered, of which 1 C-Champion,
LPD 10 San Antonio with 2 21-cell Mk49 GMLS with 1 C-Commando, 1 Malama, 1 Dolores Chouest, 1
RIM-116 SAM (capacity 2 CH-53E Sea Stallion hel or Dominator, 4 Arrowhead)
2 MV-22 Osprey; 2 LCAC(L); 14 AAAV; 720 troops)
LSD 12: Prepositioning (PM3)
4 Harpers Ferry with 2 Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SAM, 2 Phalanx Mk15 CIWS, 1 hel landing platform LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 28
(capacity 2 LCAC(L); 40 tanks; 500 troops) AG 2: 1 V Adm K.R. Wheeler; 1 Fast Tempo
8 Whidbey Island with 2 Mk49 GMLS with RIM-116 AK 4: 2 LTC John U.D. Page; 1 Maj. Bernard F. Fisher;
SAM, 2 Phalanx Mk15 CIWS, 1 hel landing platform 1 CPT David I. Lyon
(capacity 4 LCAC(L); 40 tanks; 500 troops) AKEH 2 Lewis and Clark
LANDING CRAFT 245 AKR 10: 2 Bob Hope; 1 Stockham; 7 Watson
LCU 32 LCU-1600 (capacity either 2 M1 Abrams MBT AKRH 5 2nd Lt John P. Bobo
or 350 troops) AP 3: 2 Guam; 1 Westpac Express
LCP 108: 75 LCPL; 33 Utility Boat ESD 2 Montford Point
North America 51
Service Support (PM4) Island; 1 Cape Orlando; 1 Cape Race; 1 Cape Trinity; 2
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Cape Trinity; 2 Cape Victory; 2 Cape Washington
North America
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 10 AOT 1 Petersburg
ARS 2 Safeguard Augmentation Force
AH 2 Mercy with 1 hel landing platform COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
AS 2 Emory S Land 1 (active) log bn (Navy Cargo Handling)
ATF 4 Powhatan 6 (reserve) log bn (Navy Cargo Handling)
Sealift (PM5)
(At a minimum of 4 days’ readiness)
Naval Aviation 98,600
10 air wg. Average air wing comprises 8 sqns: 4 with F/A-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
18; 1 with MH-60R; 1 with EA-18G; 1 with E-2C/D; 1 with
MH-60S
AOT 6 (long-term chartered, of which 1 Empire State;
1 Galveston; 1 Lawrence H. Gianella; 1 Maersk Peary; 1 FORCES BY ROLE
SLNC Pax; 1 SLNC Goodwill) FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
AK 7: 1 Ocean Crescent; 3 Sgt Matej Kocak; 1 1st Lt 4 sqn with F/A-18C Hornet
Harry L. Martin; 1 LCpl Roy M. Wheat; 1 Sea Eagle 19 sqn with F/A-18E Super Hornet
(long-term chartered) 11 sqn with F/A-18F Super Hornet
AKR 10: 5 Bob Hope; 2 Gordon; 2 Shughart; 1 Watson ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
11 sqn with MH-60R Seahawk
Fleet Ordnance and Dry Cargo (PM6) 1 ASW/CSAR sqn with HH-60H Seahawk
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 3 ASW/ISR sqn with MH-60R Seahawk; MQ-8B Fire
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 14 Scout
AOE 2 Supply ELINT
AKEH 12 Lewis and Clark 1 sqn with EP-3E Aries II
ELINT/ELECTRONIC WARFARE
Afloat Staging Command Support (PM7) 13 sqn with EA-18G Growler
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE MARITIME PATROL
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 1 4 sqn with P-3C Orion
ARC 1 Zeus 7 sqn with P-8A Poseidon
1 sqn (forming) with P-8A Poseidon
Expeditionary Fast Transport (PM8) AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 6 sqn with E-2C Hawkeye
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8 3 sqn with E-2D Hawkeye
EPF 8 Spearhead COMMAND & CONTROL
2 sqn with E-6B Mercury
US Maritime Administration (MARAD) MINE COUNTERMEASURES
National Defense Reserve Fleet 2 sqn with MH-53E Sea Dragon
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TRANSPORT
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 20 2 sqn with C-2A Greyhound
AGOS 2 General Rudder TRAINING
AGM 2: 1 Pacific Collector; 1 Pacific Tracker 1 (FRS) sqn with EA-18G Growler
AK 7: 2 Cape Ann (breakbulk); 1 Cape Chalmers 1 (FRS) sqn with C-2A Greyhound; E-2C/D Hawkeye; TE-
(breakbulk); 2 Cape Farewell; 1 Cape Nome (breakbulk); 2C Hawkeye
1 Del Monte (breakbulk) 1 sqn with E-6B Mercury
AOT 3 Paul Buck 2 (FRS) sqn with F/A-18A/A+/B/C/D Hornet; F/A-18E/F
AP 4: 1 Empire State VI; 1 Golden Bear; 1 Kennedy; 1 Super Hornet
State of Maine 2 (FRS) sqn with F-35C Lightning II
AX 2: 1 Freedom Star; 1 Kings Pointer 1 (FRS) sqn with MH-53 Sea Dragon
2 (FRS) sqn with MH-60S Knight Hawk; HH-60H
Ready Reserve Force Seahawk
Ships at readiness up to a maximum of 30 days 2 (FRS) sqn with MH-60R Seahawk
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 sqn with P-3C Orion
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 46 1 (FRS) sqn with P-3C Orion; P-8A Poseidon
ACS 6: 2 Flickertail State; 1 Gopher State; 3 Keystone 6 sqn with T-6A/B Texan II
State 2 sqn with T-44C Pegasus
AK 4: 2 Wright (breakbulk); 2 Cape May (heavy lift) 5 sqn with T-45C Goshawk
AKR 35: 1 Adm W.M. Callaghan; 4 Algol; 4 Cape 3 hel sqn with TH-57B/C Sea Ranger
Capella; 1 Cape Decision; 4 Cape Ducato; 1 Cape Edmont; 1 (FRS) UAV sqn with MQ-8B Fire Scout; MQ-8C Fire
1 Cape Henry; 2 Cape Hudson; 2 Cape Knox; 4 Cape Scout
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

14 sqn with MH-60S Knight Hawk 1 sqn with MH-60R Seahawk
1 tpt hel/ISR sqn with MH-60S Knight Hawk; MQ-8B ELECTRONIC WARFARE
Fire Scout 1 sqn with EA-18G Growler
ISR UAV MARITIME PATROL
1 sqn with MQ-4C Triton 2 sqn with P-3C Orion
AIRCRAFT 987 combat capable 5 log spt sqn with B-737-700 (C-40A Clipper)
FGA 736: 22 F-35C Lightning II; 10 F-16A Fighting 2 log spt sqn with Gulfstream III/IV (C-20D/G);
Falcon; 4 F-16B Fighting Falcon; 10 F/A-18A/A+ Hornet; 9 Gulfstream V/G550 (C-37A/B)
F/A-18B Hornet; 90 F/A-18C Hornet; 30 F/A-18D Hornet; 4 sqn with C-130T Hercules
290 F/A-18E Super Hornet; 271 F/A-18F Super Hornet 1 sqn with KC-130T Hercules
ASW 120: 65 P-3C Orion; 55 P-8A Poseidon TRAINING
EW 131 EA-18G Growler* 2 (aggressor) sqn with F-5F/N Tiger II
ELINT 9 EP-3E Aries II 1 (aggressor) sqn with F/A-18A+ Hornet
AEW&C 80: 50 E-2C Hawkeye; 30 E-2D Hawkeye TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
C2 16 E-6B Mercury 2 sqn with HH-60H Seahawk
TKR 3: 1 KC-130R Hercules; 1 KC-130T Hercules; 1 KC-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
130J Hercules
AIRCRAFT 77 combat capable
TPT • Light 61: 4 Beech A200 King Air (C-12C Huron);
FTR 31: 2 F-5F Tiger II; 29 F-5N Tiger II
6 Beech A200 King Air (UC-12F Huron); 8 Beech A200
King Air (UC-12M Huron); 34 C-2A Greyhound; 2 DHC- FGA 29 F/A-18A+ Hornet
2 Beaver (U-6A); 7 SA-227-BC Metro III (C-26D) ASW 12 P-3C Orion
TRG 582: 44 T-6A Texan II; 232 T-6B Texan II; 7 T-38C EW 5 EA-18G Growler*
Talon; 55 T-44C Pegasus; 242 T-45C Goshawk; 2 TE-2C TKR 5 KC-130T Hercules
Hawkeye TPT 41: Medium 18 C-130T Hercules; PAX 23: 15
HELICOPTERS B-737-700 (C-40A Clipper); 1 Gulfstream III (C-20D);
ASW 225 MH-60R Seahawk 3 Gulfstream IV (C-20G); 1 Gulfstream V (C-37A); 3
MRH 271 MH-60S Knight Hawk (Multi Mission Gulfstream G550 (C-37B)
Support) HELICOPTERS
MCM 28 MH-53E Sea Dragon ASW 7 MH-60R Seahawk
ISR 3 OH-58C Kiowa MCM 7 MH-53E Sea Dragon
CSAR 11 HH-60H Seahawk CSAR 16 HH-60H Seahawk
TPT 13: Heavy 2 CH-53E Sea Stallion; Medium 3 UH-
60L Black Hawk; Light 8: 5 UH-72A Lakota; 2 UH-1N US Marine Corps 184,400
Iroquois; 1 UH-1Y Venom 3 Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF), 3 Marine
TRG 119: 43 TH-57B Sea Ranger; 76 TH-57C Sea Ranger Expeditionary Brigades (MEB), 7 Marine Expeditionary
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR 91 Units (MEU) drawn from 3 div. An MEU usually consists
Heavy 41: 1 MQ-4C Triton; 20 MQ-8B Fire Scout; 16 MQ- of a battalion landing team (1 SF coy, 1 lt armd recce coy,
8C Fire Scout; 4 RQ-4A Global Hawk (under evaluation 1 recce pl, 1 armd pl, 1 amph aslt pl, 1 inf bn, 1 arty bty,
and trials); Medium 35 RQ-2B Pioneer; Light 15 RQ- 1 cbt engr pl), an aviation combat element (1 medium-lift
21A Blackjack sqn with attached atk hel, FGA ac and AD assets) and a
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES composite log bn, with a combined total of about 2,200
AAM • IR AIM-9M Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder personnel. Composition varies with mission requirements
II; SARH AIM-7 Sparrow; ARH AIM-120C-5/C-7/D
FORCES BY ROLE
AMRAAM
SPECIAL FORCES
ASM AGM-65F Maverick; AGM-114B/K/M Hellfire
(see USSOCOM)
AShM AGM-84D Harpoon; AGM-119A Penguin 3
MANOEUVRE
ARM AGM-88B/C/E HARM/AARGM
Reconnaissance
ALCM • Conventional AGM-84E/H/K SLAM/SLAM-
ER 3 (MEF) recce coy
BOMBS Amphibious
Laser-guided: GBU-10/12/16 Paveway II; GBU-24 1 (1st) mne div (2 armd recce bn, 1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2
Paveway III mne regt (4 mne bn), 1 mne regt (3 mne bn), 1 amph
INS/GPS guided: GBU-31/32/38 JDAM; Enhanced aslt bn, 1 arty regt (3 arty bn, 1 MRL bn), 1 cbt engr
Paveway II; GBU-54 Laser JDAM; AGM-154A/C/C-1 bn, 1 EW bn, 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn)
JSOW 1 (2nd) mne div (1 armd recce bn, 1 recce bn, 1 tk bn,
3 mne regt (3 mne bn), 1 amph aslt bn, 1 arty regt (2
Naval Aviation Reserve arty bn), 1 cbt engr bn, 1 EW bn, 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn)
FORCES BY ROLE 1 (3rd) mne div (1 recce bn, 1 inf regt (3 inf bn), 1 arty
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK regt (2 arty bn), 1 cbt spt bn (1 armd recce coy, 1 amph
1 sqn with F/A-18A+ Hornet aslt coy, 1 cbt engr coy), 1 EW bn, 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn)
North America 53
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 hel sqn with CH-53E Sea Stallion

3 log gp ATTACK HELICOPTER
North America
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 3 sqn with AH-1W Cobra; UH-1Y Venom
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 4 sqn with AH-1Z Viper; UH-1Y Venom
MBT 447 M1A1 Abrams TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
IFV 502 LAV-25 8 sqn with CH-53E Sea Stallion
APC • APC (W) 207 LAV variants (66 CP; 127 log; 14 EW) 1 (VIP) sqn with MV-22B Osprey; VH-3D Sea King;
AAV 1,200 AAV-7A1 (all roles) VH-60N Presidential Hawk
AUV 2,429: 1,725 Cougar; 704 M-ATV ISR UAV
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES 2 sqn with RQ-21A Blackjack
AEV 42 M1 ABV 1 sqn with RQ-7B Shadow
ARV 185: 60 AAVRA1; 45 LAV-R; 80 M88A1/2 AIR DEFENCE
MW 38 Buffalo 2 bn with M1097 Avenger; FIM-92 Stinger (can provide
VLB 6 Joint Aslt Bridge additional heavy-calibre support weapons)
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SP 106 LAV-AT AIRCRAFT 455 combat capable
MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; FGM-172B SRAW-MPV; FGA 437: 50 F-35B Lightning II; 6 F-35C Lightning II;
TOW 45 F/A-18A++ Hornet; 7 F/A-18B Hornet; 107 F/A-18C
ARTILLERY 1,501 Hornet; 92 F/A-18D Hornet; 114 AV-8B Harrier II; 16
TOWED 812: 105mm: 331 M101A1; 155mm 481 M777A2 TAV-8B Harrier
MRL 227mm 40 M142 HIMARS EW 18 EA-6B Prowler*
MOR 649: 81mm 535 M252; SP 81mm 65 LAV-M; 120mm TKR 45 KC-130J Hercules
49 EFSS TPT 20: Light 17: 5 Beech A200/B200 King Air (UC-
RADAR • LAND 23 AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder (arty) 12F/M Huron); 5 Beech 350 King Air (C-12W Huron);
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHCILES 7 Cessna 560 Citation Ultra/Encore (UC-35C/D); PAX
ISR • Light 100 BQM-147 Exdrone 3: 2 DC-9 Skytrain (C-9B Nightingale); 1 Gulfstream IV
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger (C-20G)
TRG 3 T-34C Turbo Mentor
Marine Corps Aviation 34,700 TILTROTOR • TPT 277 MV-22B Osprey
3 active Marine Aircraft Wings (MAW) and 1 MCR MAW HELICOPTERS
Flying hours 365 hrs/yr on tpt ac; 248 hrs/yr on ac; 277 ATK 153: 77 AH-1W Cobra; 76 AH-1Z Viper
hrs/yr on hel SAR 4 HH-1N Iroquois
TPT 280: Heavy 139 CH-53E Sea Stallion; Medium 19: 8
FORCES BY ROLE
VH-60N Presidential Hawk (VIP tpt); 11 VH-3D Sea King
FIGHTER
(VIP tpt); Light 122 UH-1Y Venom
1 sqn with F/A-18A++ Hornet
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
6 sqn with F/A-18C Hornet
ISR 60: Medium 20 RQ-7B Shadow; Light 40 RQ-21A
4 sqn with F/A-18D Hornet
Blackjack
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
AIR DEFENCE
5 sqn with AV-8B Harrier II
SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger; M1097 Avenger
2 sqn with F-35B Lightning II
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
AAM • IR AIM-9M Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X
2 sqn with EA-6B Prowler
Sidewinder II; SARH AIM-7P Sparrow; ARH AIM-
COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT
120C AMRAAM
1 sqn with Beech A200/B200 King Air (UC-12F/M
ASM AGM-65E/F IR Maverick; AGM-114 Hellfire;
Huron); Beech 350 King Air (UC-12W Huron);
AGM-176 Griffin
Cessna 560 Citation Ultra/Encore (UC-35C/D); DC-9
AShM AGM-84D Harpoon
Skytrain (C-9B Nightingale); Gulfstream IV (C-20G);
ARM AGM-88 HARM
HH-1N Iroquois
LACM AGM-84E/H/K SLAM/SLAM-ER
TANKER
BOMBS
3 sqn with KC-130J Hercules
Laser-guided GBU-10/12/16 Paveway II
TRANSPORT
INS/GPS guided GBU-31 JDAM; AGM-154A/C/C-1
14 sqn with MV-22B Osprey
JSOW
2 sqn (forming) with MV-22B Osprey
TRAINING Reserve Organisations
1 sqn with AV-8B Harrier II; TAV-8B Harrier
1 sqn with F/A-18B/C/D Hornet Marine Corps Reserve 38,700
1 sqn with F-35B Lightning II FORCES BY ROLE
1 sqn with MV-22B Osprey MANOEUVRE
1 hel sqn with AH-1W Cobra; AH-1Z Viper; HH-1N Reconnaissance
Iroquois; UH-1Y Venom 2 MEF recce coy
Amphibious TPT 34: Medium 14 C-27J Spartan; Light 18 CN235-200

1 (4th) mne div (1 armd recce bn, 1 recce bn, 2 mne (HC-144A – MP role); PAX 2 Gulfstream V (C-37A)
regt (3 mne bn), 1 amph aslt bn, 1 arty regt (2 arty bn, HELICOPTERS
1 MRL bn), 1 cbt engr bn, 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn) SAR 154: 52 MH-60T Jayhawk; 102 AS366G1 (MH-
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 65C/D) Dauphin II
1 log gp
Marine Corps Aviation Reserve 12,000 reservists US Air Force (USAF) 322,800
Flying hours Ftr 160, bbr 260, tkr 300, airlift 340
FORCES BY ROLE
Almost the entire USAF (plus active force ANG and
FIGHTER
AFR) is divided into 10 Aerospace Expeditionary Forces
1 sqn with F/A-18A++ Hornet
(AEF), each on call for 120 days every 20 months. At least
TANKER
2 sqn with KC-130J/T Hercules 2 of the 10 AEFs are on call at any one time, each with
TRANSPORT 10,000–15,000 personnel, 90 multi-role ftr and bbr ac, 31
2 sqn with MV-22B Osprey intra-theatre refuelling aircraft and 13 aircraft for ISR and
TRAINING EW missions
1 sqn with F-5F/N Tiger II
ATTACK HELICOPTER
Global Strike Command (GSC)
2 sqn with AH-1W Cobra; UH-1Y Venom 2 active air forces (8th & 20th); 8 wg
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER FORCES BY ROLE
1 sqn with CH-53E Sea Stallion SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE
ISR UAV 9 ICBM sqn with LGM-30G Minuteman III
1 sqn with RQ-7B Shadow BOMBER
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 4 sqn with B-1B Lancer
AIRCRAFT 23 combat capable 2 sqn with B-2A Spirit
FTR 12: 1 F-5F Tiger II; 11 F-5N Tiger II 5 sqn (incl 1 trg) with B-52H Stratofortress
FGA 11 F/A-18A++ Hornet COMMAND & CONTROL
TKR 20: 7 KC-130J Hercules; 13 KC-130T Hercules 1 sqn with E-4B
TPT • Light 7: 2 Beech 350 King Air (UC-12W Huron); 5 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Cessna 560 Citation Ultra/Encore (UC-35C/D) 3 sqn with UH-1N Iroquois
TILTROTOR • TPT 12 MV-22B Osprey
HELICOPTERS Air Combat Command (ACC)
ATK 37 AH-1W Cobra 2 active air forces (9th & 12th); 12 wg. ACC numbered
TPT 32: Heavy 6 CH-53E Sea Stallion; Light 26 UH-1Y air forces provide the air component to CENTCOM,
Venom SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES FORCES BY ROLE
ISR • Medium 8 RQ-7B Shadow FIGHTER
Marine Stand-by Reserve 700 reservists 3 sqn with F-22A Raptor
Trained individuals available for mobilisation FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
4 sqn with F-15E Strike Eagle
US Coast Guard 41,000 (military) 8,500 (civilian) 4 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon (+6 sqn personnel
9 districts (4 Pacific, 5 Atlantic)  only)
1 sqn with F-35A Lightning II
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn with F-35A Lightning II (forming)
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 158
GROUND ATTACK
PSOH 24: 1 Alex Haley; 13 Famous; 4 Hamilton; 6 Legend
3 sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II (+1 sqn personnel
PCO 38: 14 Reliance (with 1 hel landing platform); 24
only)
Sentinel (Damen 4708)
PCC 23 Island ELECTRONIC WARFARE
PBI 73 Marine Protector 1 sqn with EA-18G Growler (personnel only – USN
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 79 aircraft)
ABU 52: 16 Juniper; 4 WLI; 14 Keeper; 18 WLR 2 sqn with EC-130H Compass Call
AG 13: 1 Cosmos; 4 Pamlico; 8 Anvil ISR
AGB 13: 9 Bay; 1 Mackinaw; 1 Healy; 2 Polar (of which one 2 sqn with E-8C J-STARS (personnel only)
in reserve) 5 sqn with OC-135/RC-135/WC-135
AXS 1 Eagle 2 sqn with U-2S
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
US Coast Guard Aviation 5 sqn with E-3B/C/G Sentry
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE
AIRCRAFT 2 sqn with HC-130J Combat King II
SAR 20: 11 HC-130H Hercules; 9 HC-130J Hercules 2 sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk
North America 55
TRAINING Air Mobility Command (AMC)

1 sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II Provides strategic and tactical airlift, air-to-air refuelling
North America
1 sqn with E-3B/C Sentry and aeromedical evacuation. 1 active air force (18th); 12
2 sqn with F-15E Strike Eagle wg and 1 gp
1 sqn with F-22A Raptor FORCES BY ROLE
1 sqn with RQ-4A Global Hawk; TU-2S TANKER
2 UAV sqn with MQ-1B Predator 4 sqn with KC-10A Extender
3 UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper 9 sqn with KC-135R/T Stratotanker (+2 sqn with
COMBAT/ISR UAV personnel only)
4 sqn with MQ-1B Predator TRANSPORT
1 sqn with MQ-1B Predator/MQ-9A Reaper 1 VIP sqn with B-737-200 (C-40B); B-757-200 (C-32A)
2 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper 1 VIP sqn with Gulfstream V (C-37A)
2 sqn with RQ-170 Sentinel 1 VIP sqn with VC-25 Air Force One
ISR UAV 2 sqn with C-5M Super Galaxy
2 sqn with EQ-4B/RQ-4B Global Hawk 8 sqn with C-17A Globemaster III (+1 sqn personnel
only)
Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) 1 sqn with C-130H Hercules (+1 sqn personnel only)
Provides the air component of PACOM, and commands 5 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules (+1 sqn personnel only)
air units based in Alaska, Hawaii, Japan and South 1 sqn with Gulfstream V (C-37A)
Korea. 3 active air forces (5th, 7th, & 11th); 8 wg 2 sqn with Learjet 35A (C-21A)
FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER Air Education and Training Command
2 sqn with F-15C/D Eagle 1 active air force (2nd), 10 active air wg and 1 gp
2 sqn with F-22A Raptor (+1 sqn personnel only) FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK TRAINING
5 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon 1 sqn with C-17A Globemaster III
GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules
1 sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II 4 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 4 sqn with F-35A Lightning II
2 sqn with E-3B/C Sentry 1 sqn with KC-46A Pegasus (forming)
COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with KC-135R Stratotanker
5 (flying trg) sqn with T-1A Jayhawk
1 sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk
10 (flying trg) sqn with T-6A Texan II
TANKER
10 (flying trg) sqn with T-38C Talon
1 sqn with KC-135R (+1 sqn personnel only)
1 UAV sqn with MQ-1B Predator
TRANSPORT
1 sqn with B-737-200 (C-40B); Gulfstream V (C-37A) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
2 sqn with C-17A Globemaster SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules ICBM • Nuclear 400 LGM-30G Minuteman III (1 Mk12A
or Mk21 re-entry veh per missile)
1 sqn with Beech 1900C (C-12J); UH-1N Huey
AIRCRAFT 1,478 combat capable
TRAINING
BBR 139: 61 B-1B Lancer; 20 B-2A Spirit; 58 B-52H
1 (aggressor) sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
Stratofortress
United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE) FTR 265: 96 F-15C Eagle; 10 F-15D Eagle; 159 F-22A
Raptor
Provides the air component to both EUCOM and
FGA 903: 211 F-15E Strike Eagle; 456 F-16C Fighting
AFRICOM. 1 active air force (3rd); 5 wg
Falcon; 114 F-16D Fighting Falcon; 122 F-35A Lightning II
FORCES BY ROLE ATK 141 A-10C Thunderbolt II
FIGHTER EW 14 EC-130H Compass Call
1 sqn with F-15C/D Eagle ISR 41: 2 E-9A; 4 E-11A; 2 OC-135B Open Skies; 27 U-2S; 4
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK TU-2S; 2 WC-135 Constant Phoenix
2 sqn with F-15E Strike Eagle ELINT 22: 8 RC-135V Rivet Joint; 9 RC-135W Rivet Joint; 3
3 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon RC-135S Cobra Ball; 2 RC-135U Combat Sent
COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE AEW&C 31: 18 E-3B Sentry; 6 E-3C Sentry; 7 E-3G Sentry
1 sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk C2 4 E-4B
TANKER TKR 156: 126 KC-135R Stratotanker; 30 KC-135T
1 sqn with KC-135R Stratotanker Stratotanker
TRANSPORT TKR/TPT 59 KC-10A Extender
1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules CSAR 15 HC-130J Combat King II
2 sqn with Gulfstream V (C-37A); Learjet 35A (C-21A); TPT 332: Heavy 197: 35 C-5M Super Galaxy; 162 C-17A
B-737-700 (C-40B) Globemaster III; Medium 87 C-130J/J-30 Hercules; Light 21:
4 Beech 1900C (C-12J); 17 Learjet 35A (C-21A); PAX 22: 4 1 sqn with C-130H/LC-130H Hercules
B-737-700 (C-40B); 4 B-757-200 (C-32A); 12 Gulfstream V 2 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules
(C-37A); 2 VC-25A Air Force One 1 sqn with Learjet 35A (C-21A)
TRG 1,129: 178 T-1A Jayhawk; 445 T-6A Texan II; 506 1 sqn with WC-130H Hercules
T-38A/C Talon TRAINING
HELICOPTERS 1 sqn with C-130H Hercules
CSAR 75 HH-60G Pave Hawk 1 sqn with F-15C/D Eagle
TPT • Light 62 UH-1N Huey 4 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES 350 1 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper
CISR • Heavy 310: 110 MQ-1B Predator (being COMBAT/ISR UAV
withdrawn); 200 MQ-9A Reaper 1 sqn with MQ-1B Predator
ISR • Heavy 42: 3 EQ-4B; 29 RQ-4B Global Hawk; ε10 RQ- 10 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper
170 Sentinel EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger AIRCRAFT 473 combat capable
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES FTR 157: 127 F-15C Eagle; 10 F-15D Eagle; 20 F-22A
AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; Raptor
SARH AIM-7M Sparrow; ARH AIM-120C/D AMRAAM FGA 354: 309 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 45 F-16D Fighting
ASM AGM-65D/G Maverick; AGM-130A; AGM-176 Falcon
Griffin ATK 86 A-10C Thunderbolt II
ALCM • Nuclear AGM-86B (ALCM); Conventional ISR 16 E-8C J-STARS
AGM-86C (CALCM); AGM-86D (penetrator); AGM-158 ELINT 11 RC-26B Metroliner
JASSM; AGM-158B JASSM-ER CSAR 6: 2 HC-130N Combat King; 3 HC-130P Combat
ARM AGM-88A/B HARM King; 1 HC-130J Combat King II
EW MALD/MALD-J TKR 172: 148 KC-135R Stratotanker; 24 KC-135T
BOMBS Stratotanker
Laser-guided GBU 10/12/16 Paveway II, GBU-24 Paveway TPT 213: Heavy 42 C-17A Globemaster III; Medium
III 166: 124 C-130H Hercules; 20 C-130J/J-30 Hercules; 10
INS/GPS guided GBU 31/32/38 JDAM; GBU-54 Laser LC-130H Hercules; 4 MC-130P Combat Shadow; 8 WC-
JDAM; GBU-15 (with BLU-109 penetrating warhead 130H Hercules; Light 2 Learjet 35A (C-21A); PAX 3
or Mk84); GBU-39B Small Diameter Bomb (250lb); B-737-700 (C-40C)
GBU-43B MOAB; GBU-57A/B MOP; Enhanced HELICOPTERS • CSAR 18 HH-60G Pave Hawk
Paveway III UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES • CISR • Heavy 70:
35 MQ-1B Predator; 35 MQ-9A Reaper
Reserve Organisations
Air Force Reserve Command 68,800 reservists
Air National Guard 105,650 reservists FORCES BY ROLE
FORCES BY ROLE BOMBER
BOMBER 1 sqn with B-52H Stratofortress (personnel only)
1 sqn with B-2A Spirit (personnel only) FIGHTER
FIGHTER 2 sqn with F-22A Raptor (personnel only)
5 sqn with F-15C/D Eagle FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
1 sqn with F-22A Raptor (+1 sqn personnel only) 2 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon (+1 sqn personnel
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK only)
11 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon 1 sqn with F-35A Lightning II (personnel only)
GROUND ATTACK GROUND ATTACK
4 sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II 1 sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II (+2 sqn personnel
ISR only)
1 sqn with E-8C J-STARS ISR
COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE 1 (Weather Recce) sqn with WC-130J Hercules
1 sqn with HC-130P/N Combat King AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
1 sqn with HC-130J Combat King II (forming) 1 sqn with E-3B/C Sentry (personnel only)
1 sqn with MC-130P Combat Shadow COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE
3 sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk 1 sqn with HC-130N Combat King
TANKER 2 sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk
17 sqn with KC-135R Stratotanker (+1 sqn personnel TANKER
only) 4 sqn with KC-10A Extender (personnel only) 
3 sqn with KC-135T Stratotanker 7 sqn with KC-135R Stratotanker (+2 sqn personnel
TRANSPORT only)
1 sqn with B-737-700 (C-40C) TRANSPORT
5 sqn with C-17A Globemaster (+2 sqn personnel only) 1 (VIP) sqn with B-737-700 (C-40C)
13 sqn with C-130H Hercules 2 sqn with C-5M Super Galaxy (+1 sqn personnel only)
North America 57
2 sqn with C-17A Globemaster (+9 sqn personnel only) 1 psyops gp (3 psyops bn)
7 sqn with C-130H Hercules 1 psyops gp (4 psyops bn)
North America
1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 (Aerial Spray) sqn with C-130H Hercules 1 (sustainment) log bde (1 sigs bn)
TRAINING HELICOPTER
1 (aggressor) sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II; F-15C/E 1 (160th SOAR) hel regt (4 hel bn)
Eagle; F-16 Fighting Falcon; F-22A Raptor (personnel EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
only) ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
1 sqn with A-10C Thuinderbolt II APC • APC (W) 12 Pandur
1 sqn with B-52H Stratofortress AUV 640 M-ATV
1 sqn with C-5M Super Galaxy HELICOPTERS
1 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon MRH 50 AH-6M/MH-6M Little Bird
5 (flying training) sqn with T-1A Jayhawk; T-6A Texan TPT 130: Heavy 68 MH-47G Chinook; Medium 62 MH-
II; T-38C Talon (personnel only) 60L/M Black Hawk
COMBAT/ISR UAV UAV
2 sqn with MQ-1B Predator/MQ-9A Reaper (personnel CISR • Heavy 12 MQ-1C Gray Eagle
only) ISR • Light 29: 15 XPV-1 Tern; 14 XPV-2 Mako
ISR UAV TPT • Heavy 28 CQ-10 Snowgoose
1 sqn with RQ-4B Global Hawk (personnel only)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Reserve Organisations
Army National Guard
BBR 18 B-52H Stratofortress
FGA 53: 49 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 4 F-16D Fighting FORCES BY ROLE
Falcon SPECIAL FORCES
ATK 55 A-10C Thunderbolt II 2 SF gp (3 SF bn)
ISR 10 WC-130J Hercules (Weather Recce) Army Reserve
CSAR 6 HC-130N Combat King
FORCES BY ROLE
TKR 70 KC-135R Stratotanker
COMBAT SUPPORT
TPT 86: Heavy 24: 6 C-5M Super Galaxy; 18 C-17A
2 psyops gp
Globemaster III; Medium 58: 48 C-130H Hercules; 10
4 civil affairs comd HQ
C-130J-30 Hercules; PAX 4 B-737-700 (C-40C)
8 civil affairs bde HQ
HELICOPTERS • CSAR 16 HH-60G Pave Hawk
32 civil affairs bn (coy)
Civil Reserve Air Fleet
Commercial ac numbers fluctuate US Navy Special Warfare Command 9,850
AIRCRAFT • TPT 517 international (391 long-range and FORCES BY ROLE
126 short-range); 36 national SPECIAL FORCES
8 SEAL team (total: 48 SF pl)
Air Force Stand-by Reserve 16,858 reservists 2 SEAL Delivery Vehicle team
Trained individuals for mobilisation
Reserve Organisations
US Special Operations Command
(USSOCOM) 63,150; 6,550 (civilian) Naval Reserve Force
Commands all active, reserve and National Guard FORCES BY ROLE
Special Operations Forces (SOF) of all services based in SPECIAL FORCES
CONUS 8 SEAL det
10 Naval Special Warfare det
Joint Special Operations Command 2 Special Boat sqn
Reported to comprise elite US SOF, including Special 2 Special Boat unit
Forces Operations Detachment Delta (‘Delta Force’), 1 SEAL Delivery Vehicle det
SEAL Team 6 and integral USAF support
US Marine Special Operations Command
US Army Special Operations Command (MARSOC) 3,000
34,100 FORCES BY ROLE
FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES
SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF regt (3 SF bn)
5 SF gp (4 SF bn, 1 spt bn) COMBAT SUPPORT
1 ranger regt (3 ranger bn; 1 cbt spt bn) 1 int bn
COMBAT SUPPORT COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 civil affairs bde (5 civil affairs bn) 1 spt gp
Air Force Special Operations Command Cyber

(AFSOC) 16,200 The Department of Defense (DoD) Cyber Strategy, released
FORCES BY ROLE in 2015, named cyber as the primary strategic threat to the
GROUND ATTACK US, ‘placing it above terrorism’ for the first time since 9/11.
1 sqn with AC-130U Spectre The US has well-developed cyber capabilities, and there
2 sqn with AC-130W Stinger II are military-cyber elements within each service branch,
TRANSPORT under US Cyber Command. Cyber Command was elevated
3 sqn with CV-22B Osprey to a unified combatant command in August 2017, and the
1 sqn with DHC-8; Do-328 (C-146A) secretary of defense directed a review into the possibility of
2 sqn with MC-130H Combat Talon splitting Cyber Command from the NSA. Cyber Command
3 sqn with MC-130J Commando II requested a budget of US$647m for FY2018, representing a
3 sqn with PC-12 (U-28A) 16% increase on the previous year. Its Cyber Mission Force
TRAINING (CMF) of 133 teams reached IOC in October 2016 and is
1 sqn with M-28 Skytruck (C-145A) expected to reach FOC in 2018. The US Air Force plans
1 sqn with CV-22A/B Osprey to merge offensive and defensive cyber operations into a
1 sqn with HC-130J Combat King II; MC-130J full-spectrum cyber capability called the Cyber Operations
Commando II Squadron by 2026. The US Army released a field manual
1 sqn with Bell 205 (TH-1H Iroquois) for cyber and electronic warfare (EW) in April 2017, and
1 sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk; UH-1N Huey announced in May that it would develop a department-
COMBAT/ISR UAV
wide EW strategy. High-level DoD cyber exercises include
2 sqn with MQ-9 Reaper
the defence-focused Cyber Flag and Cyber Guard series,
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE which involve broader actors from across government
AIRCRAFT 27 combat capable and includes critical-national-infrastructure scenarios.
ATK 27: 2 AC-130J Ghostrider; 13 AC-130U Spectre; 12 DARPA’s Plan X programme has been funding research
AC-130W Stinger II on cyber warfare since 2013 and, according to the army,
CSAR 3 HC-130J Combat King II ‘gives commanders a way to see and respond to key cyber
TPT 97: Medium 49: 14 MC-130H Combat Talon II; 35 terrain in the same way they react to actions on the physical
MC-130J Commando II; Light 48: 9 Do-328 (C-146A); 4 battlefield, and enables synchronizing cyber effects with
M-28 Skytruck (C-145A); 35 PC-12 (U-28A) key related war-fighting functions such as intelligence,
TILT-ROTOR 49 CV-22A/B Osprey signal, information operations and electronic warfare’.
HELICOPTERS In March 2017, the Defense Science Board reported that
CSAR 3 HH-60G Pave Hawk to improve cyber deterrence the DoD should conduct
TPT • Light 34: 24 Bell 205 (TH-1H Iroquois); 10 UH- tailored cyber-deterrence campaigns, boost the cyber
1N Huey resilience of select military systems to improve second-
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES • CISR • Heavy 30
strike capabilities and improve attribution capabilities
MQ-9 Reaper
across government. In October 2012, then-president Barack
Reserve Organisations Obama signed Presidential Policy Directive 20 (PPD-20),
the purpose of which was to establish clear standards for
Air National Guard US federal agencies in confronting threats in cyberspace.
FORCES BY ROLE This document was made public in the Snowden leaks. It
ELECTRONIC WARFARE is notable for the distinction it draws between defensive
1 sqn with C-130J Hercules/EC-130J Commando Solo and offensive cyber operations. According to PPD-20, the
ISR US ‘shall identify potential targets of national importance
1 sqn with Beech 350ER King Air (MC-12W Liberty) where [offensive cyber-effects operations] can offer a
TRANSPORT favorable balance of effectiveness and risk as compared
1 flt with B-737-200 (C-32B) with other instruments of national power, establish and
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE maintain [offensive cyber-effects operations] capabilities
AIRCRAFT integrated as appropriate with other US offensive
EW 3 EC-130J Commando Solo capabilities, and execute those capabilities in a manner
ISR 13 Beech 350ER King Air (MC-12W Liberty) consistent with the provisions of this directive’. PPD-20
TPT 5: Medium 3 C-130J Hercules; PAX 2 B-757-200 states that presidential approval is required for any cyber
(C-32B) operations with ‘significant consequences’. In April 2017,
government officials announced that offensive cyber
Air Force Reserve capabilities had been employed against ISIS.
FORCES BY ROLE
TRAINING DEPLOYMENT
1 sqn with AC-130U Spectre (personnel only)
1 sqn with M-28 Skytruck (C-145A) (personnel only) AFGHANISTAN
COMBAT/ISR UAV NATO • Operation Resolute Support 7,000; 1 div HQ; 1 div
1 sqn with MQ-9 Reaper (personnel only) HQ (fwd); 1 spec ops bn; 2 AB bde; 1 EOD bn; 1 cbt avn
North America 59
bde; 1 FGA sqn with F-16C Fighting Falcon; 1 ISR gp with CUBA
MC-12W US Southern Command • 950 (JTF-GTMO) at Guantánamo
North America
US Central Command • Operation Freedom’s Sentinel 8,000 Bay
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE CURACAO
F-16C Fighting Falcon; RC-12X Guardrail; EC-130H US Southern Command • 1 Forward Operating Location
Compass Call; MC-12W Liberty; C-130 Hercules; AH-64
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
Apache; CH-47 Chinook; UH-60 Black Hawk; HH-60 Pave
UN • MONUSCO 3
Hawk; RQ-7B Shadow; MQ-1 Predator; MQ-9 Reaper
ARABIAN SEA DJIBOUTI
US Central Command • Navy • 5th Fleet: 1 SSGN US Africa Command • 4,700; 1 tpt sqn with C-130H/J-30
Combined Maritime Forces • TF 53: 1 AE; 2 AKE; 1 AOH; Hercules; 1 spec ops sqn with MC-130H/J; PC-12 (U-28A); 1
3 AO CSAR sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk; 1 CISR UAV sqn with
MQ-9A Reaper; 1 naval air base
ARUBA
US Southern Command • 1 Forward Operating EGYPT
Location MFO 410; elm 1 ARNG inf bn; 1 ARNG spt bn
ASCENSION ISLAND EL SALVADOR

US Strategic Command • 1 detection and tracking radar at US Southern Command • 1 Forward Operating Location
Ascension Auxiliary Air Field (Military, DEA, USCG and Customs personnel)
ATLANTIC OCEAN GERMANY
US Northern Command • US Navy: 6 SSBN; 22 SSGN; 6 US Africa Command • 1 HQ at Stuttgart
CVN; 8 CGHM; 14 DDGHM; 10 DDGM; 2 FFHM; 3 PCFG; US European Command • 37,450; 1 Combined Service HQ
4 LHD; 4 LPD; 6 LSD (EUCOM) at Stuttgart–Vaihingen
US Army 23,000
AUSTRALIA
US Pacific Command • 1,250; 1 SEWS at Pine Gap; 1 FORCES BY ROLE
comms facility at Pine Gap; 1 SIGINT stn at Pine Gap 1 HQ (US Army Europe (USAREUR)) at Heidelberg;
US Strategic Command • 1 detection and tracking radar at 1 div HQ (fwd); 1 SF gp; 1 armd recce bn; 2 armd bn;
Naval Communication Station Harold E Holt 1 mech bde(-); 1 arty bn; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde(-); 1 (cbt
avn) hel bde HQ; 1 int bde; 1 MP bde; 1 sigs bde; 1 spt
BAHRAIN
bde; 1 (APS) armd bde eqpt set
US Central Command • 5,000; 1 HQ (5th Fleet); 2 AD bty
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
with MIM-104E/F Patriot PAC-2/3
M1 Abrams; M2/M3 Bradley; Stryker, M109; M777; AH-
BELGIUM 64D/E Apache; CH-47F Chinook; UH-60L/M Black Hawk;
US European Command • 900 HH-60M Black Hawk
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA US Navy 1,000
OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 6 USAF 12,300
FORCES BY ROLE
BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY
1 HQ (US Air Force Europe (USAFE)) at Ramstein
US Strategic Command • 300; 1 Spacetrack Optical Tracker
AB; 1 HQ (3rd Air Force) at Ramstein AB; 1 ftr wg at
at Diego Garcia; 1 ground-based electro optical deep space
Spangdahlem AB with 1 ftr sqn with 24 F-16C/D Fighting
surveillance system (GEODSS) at Diego Garcia
Falcon; 1 tpt wg at Ramstein AB with 14 C-130J-30
US Pacific Command • 1 MPS sqn (MPS-2 with equipment
Hercules; 2 Gulfstream V (C-37A); 5 Learjet 35A (C-21A);
for one MEB) at Diego Garcia with 2 AKRH; 3 AKR; 1
1 B-737-700 (C-40B)
AKEH; 1 ESD; 1 naval air base at Diego Garcia, 1 support
USMC 1,150
facility at Diego Garcia
BULGARIA GREECE
US European Command • 300; 2 armd/armd inf coy; M1 US European Command • 400; 1 naval base at Makri; 1
Abrams; M2 Bradley naval base at Soudha Bay; 1 air base at Iraklion
CAMEROON GREENLAND (DNK)

US Africa Command • 300; MQ-1C Gray Eagle US Strategic Command • 160; 1 AN/FPS-132 Upgraded Ear-
ly Warning Radar and 1 Spacetrack Radar at Thule
CANADA
US Northern Command • 150 GUAM
US Pacific Command • 6,000; 3 SSGN; 1 MPS sqn (MPS-3
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
with equipment for one MEB) with 2 AKRH; 4 AKR; 1 ESD;
UN • MINUSCA 8 1 AKEH; 1 bbr sqn with 6 B-1B Lancer; 1 tkr sqn with 12
COLOMBIA KC-135R Stratotanker; 1 tpt hel sqn with MH-60S; 1 SAM
US Southern Command • 50 bty with THAAD; 1 air base; 1 naval base
HONDURAS Hornet; 1 FGA sqn with 12 F-35B Lightning II; 1 tkr sqn
US Southern Command • 380; 1 avn bn with CH-47F with 12 KC-130J Hercules; 2 tpt sqn with 12 MV-22B
Chinook; UH-60 Black Hawk Osprey
US Strategic Command • 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at
HUNGARY
Shariki; 1 AN/TPY-2 X-Band radar at Kyogamisaki
US European Command • 100; 1 armd recce tp; M3 Bradley
JORDAN
IRAQ
US Central Command • Operation Inherent Resolve 2,500:
US Central Command • Operation Inherent Resolve 9,000;
1 FGA sqn with 12 F-15E Strike Eagle; 1 AD bty with MIM-
1 armd div HQ; 2 inf coy; 1 mne coy; 1 SP arty bty with
104E/F Patriot PAC-2/3; 6 MQ-1B Predator; 2 MQ-9A Reaper
4 M109A6; 1 fd arty bty with 4 M777A2; 1 MRL bty with
4 M142 HIMARS; 1 EOD pl; 1 atk hel sqn with AH-64D KOREA, REPUBLIC OF
Apache US Pacific Command • 28,500
US Army 19,200
ISRAEL
US Strategic Command • 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at FORCES BY ROLE
Mount Keren 1 HQ (8th Army) at Seoul; 1 div HQ (2nd Inf) located
at Tongduchon; 1 armd bde; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde; 1
ITALY MRL bde; 1 AD bde; 1 SAM bty with THAAD
US European Command • 12,050
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US Army 4.400; 1 AB IBCT(-)
M1 Abrams; M2/M3 Bradley; M109; M270 MLRS; AH-64
US Navy 3,600; 1 HQ (US Navy Europe (USNAVEUR)) at
Apache; OH-58D Kiowa Warrior; CH-47 Chinook; UH-60
Naples; 1 HQ (6th Fleet) at Gaeta; 1 MP sqn with 4 P-8A
Black Hawk; MIM-104 Patriot/FIM-92A Avenger; 1 (APS)
Poseidon at Sigonella
armd bde eqpt set
USAF 3,850; 1 ftr wg with 2 ftr sqn with 21 F-16C/D
US Navy 250
Fighting Falcon at Aviano
USAF 8,800
USMC 200
FORCES BY ROLE
JAPAN 1 (AF) HQ (7th Air Force) at Osan AB; 1 ftr wg at Osan
US Pacific Command • 39,950 AB with (1 ftr sqn with 20 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon;
US Army 2,900; 1 corps HQ (fwd); 1 SF gp; 1 avn bn; 1 1 atk sqn with 24 A-10C Thunderbolt II); 1 ftr wg at
SAM bn Kunsan AB with (2 ftr sqn with 20 F-16C/D Fighting
US Navy 11,700; 1 HQ (7th Fleet) at Yokosuka; 1 base at Falcon); 1 ISR sqn at Osan AB with U-2S
Sasebo; 1 base at Yokosuka USMC 250
FORCES BY ROLE
KUWAIT
3 FGA sqn at Atsugi with 10 F/A-18E Super Hornet;
US Central Command • 14,300; 1 armd bde; 1 ARNG (cbt
1 FGA sqn at Atsugi with 10 F/A-18F Super Hornet; 1
avn) hel bde; 1 spt bde; 1 UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper; 4
EW sqn at Atsugi with 5 EA-18G Growler; 1 AEW&C
AD bty with MIM-104E/F Patriot PAC-2/3; 1 (APS) armd
sqn at Atsugi with 5 E-2D Hawkeye; 2 ASW hel sqn at
bde set; 1 (APS) inf bde set
Atsugi with 12 MH-60R; 1 tpt hel sqn with 12 MH-60S
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LATVIA
1 CVN; 3 CGHM; 2 DDGHM; 7 DDGM (2 non-op); 1 US European Command • 60; 1 tpt hel flt; 5 UH-60M Black
LCC; 4 MCO; 1 LHD; 1 LPD; 2 LSD Hawk
USAF 11,450 LIBERIA
FORCES BY ROLE UN • UNMIL 2
1 HQ (5th Air Force) at Okinawa – Kadena AB; 1 ftr
LIBYA
wg at Misawa AB with (2 ftr sqn with 22 F-16C/D
Fighting Falcon); 1 wg at Okinawa – Kadena AB with UN • UNSMIL 1 obs
(2 ftr sqn with 27 F-15C/D Eagle; 1 FGA sqn with LITHUANIA
12 F-35A Lightning II; 1 tkr sqn with 15 KC-135R NATO • Baltic Air Policing 4 F-15C Eagle
Stratotanker; 1 AEW&C sqn with 2 E-3B/C Sentry; 1
MALI
CSAR sqn with 10 HH-60G Pave Hawk); 1 tpt wg at
Yokota AB with 10 C-130H Hercules; 3 Beech 1900C UN • MINUSMA 26
(C-12J); 1 Spec Ops gp at Okinawa – Kadena AB with MARSHALL ISLANDS
(1 sqn with 5 MC-130H Combat Talon; 1 sqn with 5 US Strategic Command • 1 detection and tracking radar
MC-130J Commando II); 1 ISR sqn with RC-135 Rivet at Kwajalein Atoll
Joint; 1 ISR UAV flt with 5 RQ-4A Global Hawk
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
USMC 13,600
US European Command • US Navy • 6th Fleet: 1 CGHM;
FORCES BY ROLE
4 DDGM; 1 LHD; 1 LPD; 1 LCC
1 mne div; 1 mne regt HQ; 1 arty regt HQ; 1 recce
bn; 1 mne bn; 1 amph aslt bn; 1 arty bn; 1 FGA sqn MIDDLE EAST
with 12 F/A-18C Hornet; 1 FGA sqn with 12 F/A-18D UN • UNTSO 2 obs
North America 61
MOLDOVA SOUTH SUDAN

OSCE • Moldova 3 UN • UNMISS 7
North America
NETHERLANDS SPAIN
US European Command • 410 US European Command • 3,200; 1 air base at Morón; 1
NIGER naval base at Rota
US Africa Command • 800 SYRIA
NORWAY US Central Command • Operation Inherent Resolve 1,700+; 1
US European Command • 330; 1 (USMC) MEU eqpt set; 1 ranger unit; 1 arty bty with M777A2; 1 MRL bty with M142
(APS) SP 155mm arty bn set HIMARS
PACIFIC OCEAN THAILAND

US Pacific Command • US Navy • 3rd Fleet: 8 SSBN; 22 US Pacific Command • 300
SSGN; 7 SSN; 4 CVN; 10 CGHM; 20 DDGHM; 8 DDGM; 7 TURKEY
FFHM; 3 MCO; 3 LHD; 4 LPD; 3 LSD US European Command • 2,700; 1 atk sqn with 12 A-10C
PERSIAN GULF Thunderbolt II; 1 tkr sqn with 14 KC-135; 1 CISR UAV sqn
US Central Command • Navy • 5th Fleet: 1 CGHM; 1 with MQ-1B Predator UAV; 1 ELINT flt with EP-3E Aries II;
LHA; 1 LPD; 1 LSD; 10 PCFG; 6 (Coast Guard) PCC 1 air base at Incirlik; 1 support facility at Ankara; 1 support
Combined Maritime Forces • CTF-152: 4 MCO; 1 ESB facility at Izmir
US Strategic Command • 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at
PHILIPPINES Kürecik
US Pacific Command • 100
UKRAINE
POLAND 310 (trg mission)
NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 850; 1 mech bn
OSCE • Ukraine 68
US European Command • 2,100; 1 armd bde HQ; 1 armd
cav sqn(-); 1 SP arty bn; M1 Abrams; M3 Bradley; M109; 1 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
atk hel flt with 4 AH-64E Apache; 1 tpt hel flt with 4 UH-60 US Central Command • 5,000: 1 ftr sqn with 6 F-22A
Black Hawk Raptor; 1 ISR sqn with 4 U-2; 1 AEW&C sqn with 4 E-3
Sentry; 1 tkr sqn with 12 KC-10A; 1 ISR UAV sqn with RQ-4
PORTUGAL
Global Hawk; 2 AD bty with MIM-104E/F Patriot PAC-2/3
US European Command • 200; 1 spt facility at Lajes
UNITED KINGDOM
QATAR
US European Command • 8,300
US Central Command • 8,000: 1 bbr sqn with 6 B-52H
Stratofortress; 1 ISR sqn with 4 RC-135 Rivet Joint; 1 ISR sqn FORCES BY ROLE
with 4 E-8C JSTARS; 1 tkr sqn with 24 KC-135R/T Straotanker; 1 ftr wg at RAF Lakenheath with 1 ftr sqn with 24
1 tpt sqn with 4 C-17A Globemaster; 4 C-130H/J-30 Hercules; F-15C/D Eagle, 2 ftr sqn with 23 F-15E Strike Eagle; 1 ISR
2 AD bty with MIM-104E/F Patriot PAC-2/3 sqn at RAF Mildenhall with OC-135/RC-135; 1 tkr wg
US Strategic Command • 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at RAF Mildenhall with 15 KC-135R/T Stratotanker; 1
CSAR sqn with 8 HH-60G Pave Hawk; 1 Spec Ops gp at
ROMANIA RAF Mildenhall with (1 sqn with 8 CV-22B Osprey; 1
US European Command • 1,000; 1 armd inf bn HQ; 1 sqn with 8 MC-130J Commando II)
armd/armd inf coy; M1 Abrams; M2 Bradley; 1 tpt hel flt US Strategic Command • 1 AN/FPS-132 Upgraded Early
with UH-60L Black Hawk Warning Radar and 1 Spacetrack Radar at Fylingdales
SAUDI ARABIA Moor
US Central Command • 500
FOREIGN FORCES
SERBIA
Canada Operation Renaissance 1 C-17A Globemaster III
NATO • KFOR • Joint Enterprise 675; elm 1 ARNG inf bde
(C-177A)
HQ; 1 ARNG inf bn; 1 hel flt with UH-60
Germany Air Force: trg units with 40 T-38 Talon; 69 T-6A
OSCE • Kosovo 5
Texan II; 24 Tornado IDS; • Missile trg at Fort Bliss (TX)
SINGAPORE Netherlands 1 hel trg sqn with AH-64D Apache; CH-47D
US Pacific Command • 220; 1 log spt sqn; 1 spt facility Chinook
SOMALIA Singapore Air Force: trg units with F-16C/D; 12 F-15SG;
US Africa Command • 500 AH-64D Apache; 6+ CH-47D Chinook hel
Arms procurements and deliveries – North America

Selected events in 2017
United Technologies agreed the purchase of Boeing and Lockheed Martin withdrew from the
avionics firm Rockwell Collins for US$30 billion. US Navy’s Over-the-Horizon Weapon System
The new venture will be known as Collins (OTH-WS) competition, leaving the Kongsberg
Aerospace Systems. and Raytheon partnership as the only industrial
team currently involved.
Boeing and Northrop Grumman each received a
US$328 million contract for the Technology Mat- The B-21 Raider bomber project completed its
uration and Risk Reduction phase of the US Air preliminary design review.
Force’s Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD)
programme to replace the Minuteman III ICBM. Northrop Grumman agreed the purchase of
aerospace and defence company Orbital ATK for
Lockheed Martin and Boeing were each awarded US$9.2bn.
a US$900m contract to begin design and
development of options for a new Long-Range The US Army took delivery of the first of six
Standoff (LRSO) missile to replace the US Air M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams main battle tank (MBT)
Force’s AGM-86B air-launched cruise missile. prototypes from General Dynamics Land
Systems (GDLS). It is planned that all M1A2
The US Navy issued a request for information for SEPv2 MBTs will be upgraded to this standard.
its FFG(X) requirement. The navy currently has a GDLS was also awarded a contract to produce
requirement for 20 vessels and plans to award a seven SEPv4 prototypes. The SEPv4 standard is
production contract in 2020. planned to enter service in 2025.
Table 3 US FY2018 defence-budget request: top 15 equipment programmes by value

Equipment Type Quantity Value Service Prime contractor
F-35A Lightning II FGA ac 46 US$5.32bn US Air Force Lockheed Martin
Virginia class SSGN 2 US$5.22bn US Navy General Dynamics Electric Boat/

Newport News Shipbuilding
Gerald R. Ford class CVN 1 US$4.48bn US Navy Newport News Shipbuilding
Arleigh Burke class DDGHM 2 US$3.64bn US Navy General Dynamics Bath Iron
Works/Ingalls Shipbuilding
F-35B Lightning II FGA ac 20 US$2.81bn USMC Lockheed Martin
KC-46A Pegasus Tkr ac 15 US$2.54bn US Air Force Boeing
B-21 Raider Bbr R&D US$2bn US Air Force Northrop Grumman
P-8A Poseidon ASW ac 7 US$1.38bn US Navy Boeing
F/A-18E/F Super Hornet FGA ac 14 US$1.25bn US Navy Boeing
UGM-133A Trident II SLBM SLEP US$1.14bn US Navy Lockheed Martin
UH-60M Black Hawk Med tpt hel 48 US$1.02bn US Army Sikorsky
AH-64E Apache Atk hel 50 US$935m US Army Boeing

Remanufactured
F-35C Lightning II FGA ac 4 US$845m USMC/USN Lockheed Martin
Columbia class SSBN LLI US$842m US Navy General Dynamics Electric Boat
E-2D Hawkeye AEW&C ac 5 US$835m US Navy Northrop Grumman

North America 63
Table 4 US fixed-wing tactical-aircraft deliveries, 2010–November 2017
North America
Country Equipment 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Nov 2017
Australia EA-18G 12
Australia F-35A 2
Egypt F-16C/D 7 20
Indonesia F-16C/D 5 4 5 4
Iraq F-16C/D 4 10 7
Israel F-35I 2 7
Italy F-35A 6 2
Japan F-35A 1 3
Korea F-15K 2 2 3
Morocco F-16C/D 3 13 6
Netherlands F-35A 1 1
Norway F-35A 2 2 6
Pakistan F-16C/D 14 14 1
Saudi Arabia F-15SA 4 19
Singapore F-15SG 4 2 8
Turkey F-16C/D 3 11
United Arab F-16E/F 3 3 1
Emirates
United F-35B 2 1 5 5
Kingdom
Total = 242 26 35 34 22 7 10 43 65
Table 5 Selected US MRAP donations, 2013–September 2017

Country Equipment Type Quantity Delivered as Year(s) of
accepted of Sep 2017 deliveries
Afghanistan MaxxPro ARV ARV 20 20 2015
MaxxPro M1224 PPV 200 200 2015
Albania MaxxPro PLUS PPV 3 3 2017
Burundi Cougar CAT 1 A1 AUV 10 10 2014
Croatia MaxxPro PLUS PPV 32 32 2014–15
M-ATV AUV 162 162 2014
RG-33/L HAGA/HAGA CAT II PPV 110 109 2014–(ongoing)
Egypt Caiman CAT I PPV 400 92 2016–(ongoing)
MaxxPro ARV ARV 12 12 2016
RG-33 CAT II PPV 260 260 2016
Iraq Caiman PPV 267 267 2014–15
Jordan Cougar CAT II AUV 15 15 2013
Nigeria Caiman PLUS PPV 6 6 2015
Caiman PPV 10 10 2015
MaxxPro AMBULANCE PPV 2 2 2015
MaxxPro PLUS PPV 6 6 2015
Pakistan MaxxPro PPV 275 225 2015–(ongoing)
Poland M-ATV AUV 45 45 2014
Slovenia Cougar CAT II PPV 8 7 2015
Uganda RG-33L CAT II PPV 10 10 2014
Uzbekistan MaxxPro ARV ARV 20 20 2015
MaxxPro PLUS CAT I PPV 50 46 2015
Cougar CAT I A1/A2 PPV 50 50 2015
M-ATV UIK2 AUV 159 159 2015
RG-33L Cat II PPV 50 50 2015
Figure 4 Canada: Sikorsky CH-148 Cyclone multi-role helicopter
Efforts to replace Canada’s CH-124 Sea King naval A 2010 audit report found that the Canadian govern-
helicopters began in the mid-1980s. The aircraft is ment underestimated the developmental nature of
still in service 30 years later. A 1992 contract for 50 the Cyclone, with a misapprehension that the
EH-101 Merlin helicopters was cancelled in 1993 by purchase was almost off-the-shelf. This, as well as
the incoming Liberal government due to cost early problems including industrial action at the
concerns. A request for proposal for a new type was Sikorsky facility in the United States, meant that
not issued until 1996, operational requirements were successive deadlines were missed and renegotiated.
not finalised until 1999 and a production contract for Factors including cost overruns now mean that the
the multi-role CH-148 Cyclone was not signed until cost of a Cyclone is over US$100 million – more than
2004. As of late 2017, the last of the Sea Kings was not twice as much as Sikorsky’s other anti-subma-
due to retire until December 2018. rine-warfare helicopter, the MH-60R Seahawk.
Timeline
Nov 2008: Feb 2011: 2018: Blk I initial 2025: Blk II full
Deliveries Deliveries to be operating capability operating
planned to begin completed planned & Blk II first capability planned
delivery under Jun under Jun 2014
2014 restructure restructure
Planned
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
Actual
Nov 2008: Dec 2008: May 2011: Jun 2014: Jun 2015:
First helicopter First contract First test Second First six Blk I
maiden flight restructure helicopter contract helicopters
delivered restructure delivered
Programme costs (US$)

2004 contract As of Mar 2017 Prime contractor
Sikorsky (US)
US$3.2bn Selected subcontractors

US$1.8bn
L-3 MAS (CAN)
US$3.2bn US$5.8bn
General Dynamics
Canada (CAN)
Helicopter production INDAL Technologies (CAN)
20 years of maintenance and support
© IISS
Chapter Four
Europe
Throughout 2017, a diverse threat environment and larly its deteriorating relations with several other
political uncertainty about the cohesiveness of NATO European states (not least Germany) and renewed
Europe
and the European Union continued to put pressure interest in a closer relationship with Russia, exacer-
on European governments to strengthen their defence bated the uncertainty. By the end of 2017, there was
capabilities. In response to this, national governments still little clarity on how the UK’s exit from the EU
have launched a series of collaborative initiatives would affect security and defence. With ‘Brexit’ due to
and have adjusted their force postures and strategy. take effect in March 2019, government officials across
At the same time, many of these governments are EU member states were keen to ensure that it would
augmenting defence budgets that have slowly begun not negatively affect security and defence cooperation:
to recover from the extended period of cuts in the last threat assessments across the continent consistently
decade. stressed the need for cooperation to tackle contempo-
Public-opinion polling across all EU member rary challenges and risks.
states published in December 2016 by the European The inauguration of Donald Trump as president
Commission revealed that alongside unemployment of the United States left many European leaders
and social inequality, migration and terrorism were uncertain about the durability of the transatlantic
seen as the main challenges to Europe. A series of bond underpinning European security. Initially
terrorist attacks in Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, vague about NATO’s collective-defence guarantee
Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom strained (enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty),
law-enforcement agencies and the armed forces. President Trump appeared to make US commit-
In some countries, troops were deployed to assist ment contingent on increased European defence
civilian authorities with homeland-security tasks, spending, notably chiding other leaders on this topic
such as patrolling and presence missions. The attacks when he opened NATO’s new headquarters in May
also raised questions about the preparedness of civil- 2017. Nonetheless, Trump used a speech in Warsaw
emergency authorities to deal with multiple events in on 6 July to declare that the US stood ‘firmly behind
a short time frame. Migration to Europe via several Article 5’, both in terms of words and actions. Indeed,
Mediterranean routes continued, although it did not in its FY2018 budget, the US Department of Defense
reach the levels recorded in 2015. European countries increased the funding allocated to its European
continued to deploy coastguard and naval assets in Reassurance Initiative, and continued rotational troop
response, and some (including Austria, Bulgaria and deployments in NATO’s eastern member states. Even
Hungary) contemplated deploying ground troops so, Trump’s rhetoric gave NATO members pause for
to help secure their land borders. As a result of this thought.
blending of internal and external security tasks, the Following a meeting of NATO heads of state and
requirement for closer coordination between civilian government in Brussels, German Chancellor Angela
and military actors emerged as a more comprehen- Merkel had concluded on 28 May, with reference to
sive challenge for domestic security than was antici- the new US administration and Brexit, that ‘the times
pated. in which we could completely rely on others are,
Meanwhile, the challenge posed by an asser- to a certain extent, over’ and that ‘we Europeans truly
tive Russia continued to animate defence discus- have to take our fate into our own hands’. While her
sions in many EU and NATO member states. A comments were expressed during an election rally
series of exercises around and including Zapad 2017 and were therefore mostly intended for domestic
served to demonstrate a more balanced and rounded consumption, they resonated throughout the Alliance,
Russian military capability, including progress in indicating that cohesion remained fragile, despite
command and control, and the integration of increas- efforts to galvanise NATO into tackling the challenges
ingly advanced technology. Turkey’s unclear course posed by a deteriorating security environment on its
following the failed July 2016 coup attempt, particu- eastern and southern flanks.
Merkel’s comments also fed into a growing sense 19 June, in the foreword to an implementation report
of the need to strengthen the security and defence on the EU Global Strategy, High Representative of
dimension of the EU in the face of adaptation pres- the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and
sures, including the evolving external threat picture Vice-President of the European Commission Federica
and the internal perception that European cooper Mogherini argued that, in security and defence, ‘more
ation had run out of steam. Following the Brexit refer- has been achieved in the last ten months than in the
endum and several closely fought election campaigns last ten years’.
in which eurosceptic candidates posed serious chal-
lenges to more mainstream parties, several leaders Defence collaboration in the EU
– including those of the French, German and Italian Recent initiatives to strengthen the EU’s security
governments – identified security and defence as a and defence dimension have worked towards three
policy area in which closer European collaboration principal goals: developing practical proposals to
could be seen as benefiting European citizens. Indeed, encourage and enable member states to cooperate;
a reflection paper on the future of Europe released by building EU-level institutions; and making EU
the European Commission in June 2017 argued that funding available for defence purposes.
‘enhancing European security is a must. Member Some of the proposals – such as that for the
states will be in the driving seat, defining and imple- European Tactical Airlift Centre (ETAC), inaugur
menting the level of ambition, with the support of ated in the Spanish city of Zaragoza on 8 June 2017
the EU institutions. Looking to the future, they must – have been implemented without gaining much
now decide the path they want to take and speed public attention. ETAC permanently established
they want to go at to protect Europe’s citizens.’ On a programme that was initiated by the European
Internationalisation of the German armed forces

The Bundeswehr has long been involved in bilateral and and the United Kingdom have organised collaborative
multilateral cooperation. The Franco-German Brigade is initiatives under the FNC banner, although these ef-
the best-known example. Created in 1989, it brings to- forts differ in focus. The German approach has been,
gether French and German army units under a joint com- firstly, to try to organise clusters of countries around
mand. A French unit had been based in Germany, but this capability-development goals and, since 2015, to pro-
was disbanded in 2014 following French army restructur- vide large formations for NATO operations. At the time
ing. However, Germany’s 291st Light Infantry Battalion of writing, 16 European NATO nations, plus non-NATO
continues to be stationed in France, while the brigade members Austria and Finland, had joined in one format
also has a binational logistics battalion. or another.
In 1995 Germany and the Netherlands set up the 1st After the 2016 German defence white paper, and in
German–Dutch Corps. More recently, a flurry of cooper light of the deteriorating security situation in Europe, sys-
ation initiatives involving the Czech Republic, the Neth- tematic cooperation with European partners has turned
erlands and Romania have underlined the fact that the into a core planning assumption for the German armed
German armed forces are systematically strengthening forces as they try to regenerate capabilities relevant to
existing links, or creating new ties, with European part- core NATO collective-defence tasks. While some observ-
ners for the purposes of capability development and to ers assume that Berlin is pursuing a federalist European
generate formations for operations. agenda, it would be more accurate to characterise the
Other European nations are considering similar ar- use of multiple binational- and multilateral-cooperation
rangements with Germany. Indeed, plans for cooperation formats as a pragmatic approach to help Germany and
with Poland were already well developed before a new other participating countries meet relevant NATO obliga-
Polish government, elected in October 2015, decided to tions.
slow the projects. Media discourse on Germany’s initiatives often uses
The intellectual basis for these more recent initia- the term ‘integration’ to describe the subordination of
tives, even though they have not all been directly in- one nation’s unit to the command structures of another.
spired by it, is the Framework Nations Concept (FNC), a It is more accurate to describe this practice as an ‘asso-
German proposal agreed on by NATO member states at ciation’ or ‘affiliation’ of units, even though cooperation
the Alliance’s 2014 summit. Since then, Germany, Italy of this kind creates mutual dependency. While all states
Europe 67
Defence Agency (EDA) in 2011 to design and plan states and thereby create divisions within the EU.
advanced tactical-airlift-training activities. The centre Yet if the criteria were not demanding enough, any
is jointly owned by 11 nations and training will be resulting collaboration would likely be ineffec-
carried out in multiple locations. Although small in tive. Nonetheless, on 22 June, the European Council
terms of personnel numbers, and focused on a narrow agreed to launch PESCO and, in November, member
field of activity, ETAC is a good example of the use states notified the council and the high representa-
of pooled resources to address interoperability chal- tive of their intention to participate. Other challenges
lenges; indeed, the model could be expanded to other presented by the effort include how to structure
Europe
training areas. defence cooperation with EU member states that do
More wide-ranging proposals have the potential not participate in PESCO, and how to bureaucrati-
to drive future collaboration. One was the plan to cally enable multiple projects to proceed in parallel
activate Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) under the overall PESCO structure.
in defence by the end of 2017. PESCO featured in Another idea that stemmed from the EU Global
the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, but thereafter lay dormant. Strategy was the Coordinated Annual Review on
The concept envisages a group of EU member states Defence (CARD). The ultimate aim of this initiative is
pursuing far-reaching defence cooperation within to improve the harmonisation of defence planning by
the EU framework. The principal reason why PESCO establishing a voluntary exchange of information on
has lain dormant is a failure to determine how to be national defence plans and contributions to the EDA’s
inclusive and effective at the same time. Critics main- Capability Development Plan (CDP). The EDA would
tained that if the criteria governing access to PESCO then analyse the information submitted and prepare
were too demanding, it would exclude some member a report for a ‘steering board’ consisting of national
preserve their legal national sovereignty over the units operation. Nonetheless, over time, and as long as the pol
involved, their political autonomy in deployment deci- itical will exists, international cooperation like this should
sions will likely be somewhat restricted in situations improve inter-operability and, to a degree, help harmon-
where partners disagree on the wisdom of a particular ise military requirements.
Table 6 Selected German bilateral military cooperation from 2014

Partner Service Action implemented/planned Year Aim
Netherlands Army •• Association of Dutch Airmobile Brigade to German Rapid 2014 •• Interoperability
Response Forces Division •• Preserving capability through Dutch
•• Association of Dutch 43rd Mechanised Brigade to 2016 access to German main battle tanks
German 1st Armoured Division
•• Association of German 414th Armoured Battalion to
Dutch 43rd Mechanised Brigade
•• Integration of one Dutch company, using German
equipment, into German 414th Armoured Battalion
Navy •• Association of German Seebataillon to Dutch Navy 2018 •• Development of amphibious capability
•• Provision of German access to Dutch Karel Doorman Joint •• Pooled use of resources
Support Ships •• Interoperability through joint training
and development of operating
procedures
Air Force •• Project Apollo •• Ability to provide operational air- and
•• Association of German Surface to Air Missile Group 61 2018 missile-defence task force
to Dutch Ground-Based Air Defence Command •• Harmonisation of requirements to
•• Development of operating procedures, creation of bi- Ongoing enable future synergies in acquisition
national Air and Missile Defence Academy
•• Development of binational short-range air-defence Ongoing
task force
•• Assessment of potential for joint procurement Ongoing
•• Creation of binational command and control capability Ongoing
Czech Army •• Association of Czech 4th Rapid Deployment Brigade with Ongoing •• Interoperability
Republic German 10th Armoured Division •• Training and exercise opportunities
Romania Army •• Association of Romanian 81st Mechanised Brigade with Ongoing •• Interoperability
German Rapid Response Forces Division •• Training and exercise opportunities
ministers of defence. The exercise is designed to high- Lastly, the EDF’s ‘financial toolbox’ includes
light opportunities for collaboration and sharpen various mechanisms to help member states overcome
member states’ focus on capability areas included in differences in the timing of their budget and procure-
the CDP. The CARD concept is to be tested from the ment processes, and to facilitate access to finance for
end of 2017 to 2019. The potential benefits of CARD small- and medium-sized enterprises. From a political
could be bolstered by the EDA’s plan to launch a standpoint, these measures have come to symbolise
‘Cooperative Financial Mechanism’. Member states the Commission’s determination to step up its role in
endorsed this idea, in principle, in May, with a view defence. If rolled out as planned, they would position
to establishing it in 2018. Participating member states the Commission as an increasingly important player
would contribute to a fund that they could then use in Europe’s defence-industrial landscape.
to pay for research and development (R&D) or collab- The generation of EU-level institutions has proved
orative acquisition projects. The EDA would release more contentious. A Military Planning and Conduct
funds based on decisions by a steering board, while Capability (MPCC) was finally approved in June
the mechanism would provide loans to govern- 2017, one month after it had been vetoed by the UK.
ments that would otherwise struggle to join this The MPCC, which sits within the EU Military Staff
kind of cooperative effort. It would therefore make a (EUMS) and works under the direction of the EUMS
small contribution towards aligning member states’ director general, will assume strategic-level command
disparate procurement and spending cycles. of the EU’s non-executive military missions, such as
A more significant change is that Commission the training missions in the Central African Republic,
funding can now be used to finance European Mali and Somalia. It has a staff of 25, who will also
defence. The first steps in this process began with liaise with their counterparts in the Civilian Planning
small research projects in 2015 and 2016. These and Conduct Capability. At the time of writing, the
paved the way for the Preparatory Action on Defence ultimate effect of these initiatives remained uncertain,
Research (PADR), which consists of €90 million but it was clear that many ideas about closer European
(US$102m) spread over three years (2017–19) for defence cooperation, long discussed in governments
defence R&D. The third step will be to implement the and think tanks, were being put into practice at an
European Defence Fund (EDF). accelerating pace.
The EDF contains three distinct mechanisms. The
first is the ‘research window’, under which the EU NATO: settling into new realities
will ‘offer direct funding (grants) for research in inno- NATO’s southern and eastern flanks are increasingly
vative defence products and technologies’. The PADR seen as persistent sources of instability and conflict.
sets the scene for this. Full funding is expected to At its 2014 and 2016 summit meetings in Wales and
begin after 2020, through a dedicated EU programme Warsaw (see The Military Balance 2017, pp. 65–8), the
under the next Multiannual Financial Framework Alliance began to drive a fresh round of adaptation
(MFF) – the financial framework regulating the EU to these changing external circumstances. There has
budget. The estimated research budget will be €500m been a renewed focus on collective defence as the
(US$564m) annually throughout the 2021–27 MFF. Alliance’s core mission, and a particular focus on
However, only defence R&D projects involving at measures to increase capabilities in NATO’s Eastern
least three member states will be eligible for funding. European member states by way of forward presence,
Meanwhile, a ‘capability window’ will support the improved rapid-reaction capabilities and reinvest-
joint development and acquisition of defence capabil- ment in the ability to conduct rapid reinforcement
ities. Contributions will mainly come from member missions within a contested environment. Significant
states, but the Commission will co-finance some capability challenges remain, particularly in relation
development costs through the European Defence to integrated air and missile defence and interoper-
Industrial Development Programme. The capability ability. In November, NATO announced an adapted
window will initially run from 2019 to 2020, have a command structure, including a command for the
budget of €500m (US$564m) over the two years and Atlantic and a command to ‘improve the movement
accept only projects involving at least three compa- of military forces across Europe’. NATO decided on
nies from at least two member states. EU funds could 25 May 2017 to formally join the coalition fighting the
cover all the costs of projects in development, but Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, in Iraq and
only up to 20% for prototypes. Syria. Giving the organisation a seat at the table was
Europe 69
intended to improve information sharing and facili- open amid calls to rethink the wisdom of continued
tate the provision of extra flight hours for AWACS enlargement. Meanwhile, Resolute Support, NATO’s
surveillance aircraft and air-to-air refuelling assets. mission to train, advise and assist the Afghan
After 2014, NATO enlargement and the Alliance’s security forces, faced persistent challenges. In the
Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan had drawn first half of 2017, there was increasing evidence that
reduced attention, in comparison to previous years. the Taliban insurgency was gaining ground; this led
However, Montenegro officially became the 29th to NATO’s decision on 29 June to reinforce the oper
NATO member state on 5 June 2017, when the ation, particularly aircrew and special-forces training.
Europe
accession instrument was deposited with the US Media reports at the time suggested NATO wanted
Department of State. While the move was of little member states to contribute 2,000–3,000 additional
military significance, it sent an important political troops to the mission. On a visit to Afghanistan on
message that NATO’s door, in principle, remained 27–28 September 2017, NATO Secretary-General
NATO–EU relations
Since establishing a ‘strategic partnership’ arrangement For example, the EU and NATO are working on a joint in-
in 2002, the European Union and NATO have tried to give telligence assessment on aspects of hybrid challenges,
this cooperation practical meaning. However, the EU’s and have encouraged interaction between their respec-
decision to grant EU membership to Cyprus in 2004, and tive analysis cells. In addition, both the EU’s External Ac-
Turkey’s resulting decision to effectively block formal ex- tion Service and the NATO Secretariat have been involved
changes between the two organisations, put the brakes in the new Helsinki-based European Centre of Excellence
on a relationship that all major stakeholders consider, at for Countering Hybrid Threats, even though neither is a
least in principle, to be one that should be characterised formal member of the centre. Meanwhile, the organisa-
by complementarity and mutual benefit. tions’ respective cyber-emergency-response teams have
The deteriorating security environment in Europe, par- begun to develop a relationship, and are sharing cyber-
ticularly the ‘hybrid’ challenges perceived in the south security concepts. NATO and the EU are also actively look-
and east, has provided a new impulse for cooperation. ing to coordinate some of their hybrid-scenario-response
Governments are responding to the perception that exercises under the Parallel and Coordinated Exercises
tackling modern challenges requires a broad spectrum initiative.
of civilian–military instruments and that electorates are Security and defence capacity-building has been a pri-
seeking effectiveness and efficiency from national de- ority for both organisations, although in the past these
fence budgets. Against this backdrop, NATO and the EU activities have not been well coordinated and some op-
adopted a Joint Declaration at the Alliance’s 2016 Warsaw erations have even revealed a degree of residual institu-
Summit. The declaration focused on seven areas: hybrid tional competition. In the capacity-building arena, NATO
threats; cyber security and defence; security and defence and the EU decided to pursue three pilot projects in
capacity-building in partner countries; enabling defence- Bosnia-Herzegovina, Moldova and Tunisia to test mech-
industrial research activities; coordinating maritime oper- anisms for closer coordination; part of the planning for
ations and maritime situational awareness; coordinating these mechanisms involves the allocation of EU funding
exercises; and coherent and complementary defence- to NATO programmes.
capability development. In December 2016, a catalogue Overall, cooperation between NATO and the EU has
of 42 action items spanning the seven priority areas was proceeded pragmatically since mid-2016. While the struc-
presented to the staffs of both organisations to take for- tures enabling interaction between the two have grown
ward from 2017. stronger, in many cases they are still informal because the
A progress report published on 14 June 2017, and en- Cyprus question has not yet been resolved. Furthermore,
dorsed by the NATO and EU councils, suggests that ‘coop- the EU, which has a wider range of tools available for con-
eration between the two organisations is now becoming flict prevention and crisis management than does NATO,
the established norm, a daily practice, fully correspond- is still struggling with internal coherence and capacity. If
ing to the new level of ambition’ promoted by the 2016 the trajectory observed in 2017 persists, NATO–EU col-
Joint Declaration. It is premature to speak of a substantive laboration will soon come up against political limitations
breakthrough, but practical and meaningful progress has that only member states, not Brussels-based institutions,
been made since the declaration was signed in Poland. can overcome.
Jens Stoltenberg stated, ‘NATO doesn’t quit when

the going gets tough’. In November he indicated The Balkans Turkey
0.8% 3.1%
that troop numbers would rise from 13,000 to 16,000, Other Southern
Other Southeastern
Europe 1.8%
and that NATO’s financial support for Afghanistan’s Europe 1.1%
Greece 1.8%
national-security forces was secure until 2020. United Kingdom
Spain 4.7%
US pressure on European allies to spend more 19.7%
on defence intensified after President Trump took Italy 8.9%
office. During the presidential campaign, Trump Other

Northern
had expressed his frustration at what he considered Europe 3.4%
Norway
to be inadequate efforts by European governments 2.4%
to spend at least 2% of their GDP on defence – the Sweden 2.3% France
18.9%
target that NATO members agreed in 2014 to meet Other Central
Europe 4.8%
by 2024. During the NATO meeting of heads of state
Poland
and government on 25 May 2017, the first attended 3.8% Netherlands 3.9%
by Trump, all members of the Alliance agreed to Germany Other Western
16.2% Europe 2.2%
develop and submit to NATO annual national plans
detailing the measures they were taking to meet Other Western Europe – Belgium, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg
Other Central Europe – Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia,
NATO obligations on spending, troop contributions Switzerland
Other Northern Europe – Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania
and capabilities. This decision was meant to signal to Other Southern Europe – Cyprus, Malta, Portugal
the US that NATO was a serious organisation worth The Balkans – Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, FYROM,
Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia
investing in. Secretary-General Stoltenberg said that Other Southeastern Europe – Bulgaria, Romania
‘the annual national plans will help us keep up the © IISS
momentum, to invest more and better in our defence’. Figure 5 Europe defence spending by country
Trump noted that ‘we should recognize that with and sub-region, 2017
these chronic underpayments and growing threats,
even 2 percent of GDP is insufficient to close the gaps Eastern European states experienced particularly
in modernizing, readiness, and the size of forces. We strong growth in 2017, as seen in rates of 5.5% in
have to make up for the many years lost. Two percent Romania, 3.8% in Poland and 3.8% in Latvia. Some
is the bare minimum for confronting today’s very Southern European economies also performed well,
real and very vicious threats.’ While many NATO with a return to growth in Greece (1.8%) and another
member states have indeed begun to increase their year of strong growth in Spain (3.1%), albeit with Italy
defence spending, this seems to be motivated more experiencing the slowest rate this year in the euro-
by changing threat perceptions than US pressure. zone (1.5%). However, the long-term consequences
Nonetheless, the need to explain each nation’s NATO of the financial crisis are still felt in many countries.
commitments more clearly to electorates will be felt Emergency expenditure and fiscal-stimulus packages,
across Europe. adopted in response to the crisis from 2008 onwards,
have generated a legacy of high debt levels and
DEFENCE ECONOMICS fiscal imbalances. This legacy has prevented govern-
ments from significantly raising public expenditure.
A favourable economic context However, the picture is not uniform. In Northern
The macroeconomic situation continues to improve and Central Europe, the ratio of debt to GDP is lower
across Europe. In the euro area, 2017 was the than in Western and Southern Europe. For instance,
fifth consecutive year of growth. In general, the Latvia’s and Lithuania’s debt represents around 40%
continent’s economic indicators improved, with a of their GDP, similar to Denmark and Sweden. In
continued fall in unemployment and an increase in contrast, the level of debt- to-GDP is around 100% in
private consumption. These trends were enabled not Belgium, France and Spain, and even higher in Italy
only by the European Central Bank’s low-interest- (133%) and Portugal (129%).
rate policies, which favoured credit growth, but also
by increasing (though still relatively low) oil prices. Defence spending: the upturn continues
The European Commission forecast growth of 1.9% In 2017 European defence spending increased by
for EU member states in 2017 and 2018. Central and 3.6% in real terms (in constant 2010 US$). This is
Europe 71
Iceland
Finland
Norway
Sweden
Europe
Estonia
Latvia
Denmark
Lithuania
Netherlands
United Kingdom
Belgium
Ireland Poland
Germany
Luxembourg Czech Rep.

Slovakia
Austria
France Hungary
Switzerland
Slovenia Romania
Croatia
BiH Serbia
Italy Bulgaria
Montenegro FYROM
Albania
Spain
Greece Turkey
Portugal
2017 Defence Spending (US$ bn) Malta

50.72 Cyprus
48.64
41.73
Real % Change (2016–17)
More than 20% increase
22.86 Between 10% and 20% increase
Between 3% and 10% increase
10 Between 0% and 3% increase
Between 0% and 3% decrease
5 Between 3% and 10% decrease [1] Map illustrating 2017 planned defence-spending levels (in US$ at market
exchange rates) as well as the annual real percentage change in planned
2 Between 10% and 20% decrease defence spending between 2016 and 2017 (at constant 2010 prices and
1 exchange rates). Percentage changes in defence spending can vary
More than 20% decrease considerably from year to year, as states revise the level of funding allocated
.25 to defence. Changes indicated here highlight the short-term trend in planned
.05 Insufficient data defence spending between 2016 and 2017. Actual spending changes prior to
2016, and projected spending levels post-2017, are not reflected.
© IISS
Map 1 Europe regional defence spending 1
Sub-regional groupings referred to in defence economics text: Central Europe (Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Switzerland), Northern
Europe (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden), Southern Europe (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain), Southeastern Europe
(Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey), the Balkans (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, FYROM, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia) and Western Europe (Belgium, France, Iceland,
Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom).
a sustained trend, observed since 2015, and driven Nonetheless, while defence spending is rising
by economic improvements and changing threat across the continent, there are sub-regional varia-
perceptions. Real-terms defence spending increased tions. Western states aiming to play a global security
particularly in Germany (6.9%), Poland (3.2%), role are attempting to maintain these levels, despite
Romania (41.2%) and in Baltic countries. budgetary constraints. In Central and Eastern
Europe, increased budgets are allowing states to

redefine their European security roles. 2.0
In France, the new government led by Emmanuel
Macron, elected in spring 2017, announced during
1.5 1.43 1.40
the summer that it would cut the 2017 defence budget 1.35 1.37 1.33 1.35
by €850 million (US$959m), despite expectations
% of GDP
to the contrary. This decision was taken in order to 1.0
support the EU’s goal to limit public deficits to under
3% of GDP. The announced cuts will primarily affect
0.5
equipment programmes, likely delaying deliveries,
as well as ongoing projects such as modernisation of
the Mirage 2000D combat aircraft. However, in the 0.0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
wake of this announcement, the government declared
that the defence budget would grow in 2018, by
€1.8 billion (US$2bn), with the objective of reaching Figure 6 Europe regional defence expenditure
NATO’s 2% of GDP target in 2025 (one year later as % of GDP
than the target date agreed on in Wales in 2014).
Within a context of budget restraint, some media military modernisation. In its financial plan for 2017–
reports assert that Macron may be ready to reconsider 21, released in June 2017, the German government
the extent of French military engagements at home announced that military expenditure would increase
and abroad, to allow for a closer alignment between from €37bn (US$41.7bn) in 2017 to €42.4bn (US$50bn)
means and ambitions. Public-security considerations, in 2021. This would mean that defence spending
however, would likely loom large in any such deci- would reach 1.16% of GDP by 2021, according to IMF
sion. forecasts. To meet the NATO 2% goal by that date,
The UK finds itself in a similar situation as France, however, the budget would need to rise to more than
with an increase in total spending, but an apparent €70bn (US$79bn). For the time being, the extra funds
overstretch in commitments. UK defence spending are expected to support the broader modernisation of
increased from £38.8bn (US$52.6bn) in 2016 to the German armed forces. To this end, the Bundestag
£39.7bn (US$50.7bn) in 2017. This meant a nominal approved a series of defence programmes in June
growth of 2.3% but, given exchange-rate fluctuations 2017, in advance of the September elections. This
in 2017, a fall of 3.5% in current US dollars. In real included the modernisation of 104 Leopard 2 main
terms, this still represented an increase of 0.5%. While battle tanks (MBTs) and the acquisition of five K-130
the government announced a £178bn (US$228bn) frigates. There was also some focus on procurements
equipment strategy for 2016–26, including £82bn relevant to multinational cooperation, such as the
(US$105bn) for new equipment, doubts were raised life-extension programme for NATO’s AWACS
throughout 2017 about the feasibility of these plans. fleet; and Germany’s share of the European Defence
Both the National Audit Office and the House of Agency’s (EDA) Multinational Multi-Role Tanker
Commons Public Accounts Committee cautioned Transport Fleet programme, which, the EDA
that the cost of the Defence Equipment Plan had been announced, would expand its projected fleet from
underestimated. The main causes identified were the two aircraft to seven. (The aircraft will be NATO-
lack of detailed plans for savings; the fall in sterling, owned and will operate as pooled assets.) In June,
which has increased the cost of purchasing equip- Germany and Norway joined the Netherlands and
ment from the United States; and the fact that £10bn Luxembourg in the project.
(US$13bn) of headroom funds have already been allo- Although European states are primarily boosting
cated. The risk is that should new emergency require- spending due to their own threat perceptions, US
ments arise, the Ministry of Defence will have little pressure has also had an effect. The Romanian
flexibility to acquire any significant new capabilities government increased its budget, from RON11.2bn
from within its budget. (US$2.8bn) in 2016 to RON16.3bn (US$4bn) in 2017, a
While the UK and France struggle to main- nominal rise of 46%. This allows Romania to meet the
tain capabilities to match their global ambitions, NATO target in 2017, with defence spending of 2.03%
increased spending elsewhere in Europe is enabling of GDP. The Romanian government plans to increase
Europe 73
spending to RON20.3bn (US$5bn) by 2020. This carried out. Other European countries are following
shift comes with an increased focus on equipment suit. The German defence ministry intends to lease
procurement. In 2017 capital expenses took up 48.2% Heron TP UAVs from Israel; these could be armed,
of the total defence budget. Besides meeting NATO although the decision to do so was postponed
targets, Romania has sent other signals to NATO, and in June 2017. Brimstone is a potential candidate
Washington in particular. For instance, the govern- weapon. Meanwhile, summer 2017 saw the French
ment aims to purchase 36 F-16 combat aircraft from defence ministry announce that its Reapers would be
the US, having previously acquired 12 second-hand armed in the short term – potentially with Hellfire or
Europe
F-16s from Portugal. Current plans also involve the Brimstone missiles.
acquisition of the Patriot air-defence system from
Raytheon and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket Industry: manoeuvres in the naval sector
System (HIMARS) from Lockheed Martin. Europe’s shipbuilding sector showed divergent
trends in 2017. France and Italy, for instance, are
Procurement trends: modernisation under eyeing consolidation. In 2016 South Korea’s STX
way Offshore and Shipbuilding filed for bankruptcy. This
It is estimated that around US$42bn, or around 19% of company owned a 66.6% share in STX Europe, which
total EU member state defence spending (US$225bn), itself owned French shipbuilding firm STX France/
was allocated to procurement in 2016, including R&D. Chantiers de l’Atlantique, located in Saint-Nazaire.
Procurement notably increased in Eastern and The yard in Saint-Nazaire built the Mistral-class
Northern Europe, following Russia’s annexation of amphibious assault ships and is the only facility in
Crimea in 2014. Countries in these regions are trying France capable of building aircraft carriers. After the
to reduce their dependence on legacy Russian equip- bankruptcy, the only candidate to take over the French
ment in favour of Western materiel. For instance, shipyard was Italy’s Fincantieri. With the French state
Bulgaria, Poland and Slovakia still operate Russian- retaining 33.4% of the shares in STX France/Chantiers
built MiG-29 Fulcrum combat aircraft, while Croatia de l’Atlantique, the French and Italian govern-
and Romania still operate MiG-21 Fishbeds. Poland is ments agreed in April 2017 to an ownership struc-
considering the procurement of F-35 or F-16 combat ture. However, the new French government initially
aircraft, and Romania favours the F-16, while Bulgaria refused to accept this arrangement, announcing in
is going to issue another tender for its combat-aircraft July that it would temporarily nationalise STX France
requirement. Meanwhile, Croatia’s combat-aircraft to forestall potential job losses. In late September
tender was sent to Greece, Israel and the US for F-16s, 2017, Paris and Rome reached a new deal on the joint
South Korea for the FA-50 and Sweden for the Gripen. ownership of STX France, announcing a road map for
Air defence is also being addressed. Poland is buying June 2018 to discuss a future alliance between Naval
the Patriot system, while the Baltic states, constrained Group and Fincantieri that could provide a focal
by relatively small budgets, are reportedly consid- point for further efforts to consolidate Europe’s frag-
ering the joint procurement of an air-defence capa- mented shipbuilding industry.
bility. Meanwhile, the UK government sought to stimu-
As Central and Northern European countries late competition in order to sustain several domestic
look to modernise their arsenals by swapping naval shipyards, in contrast to its previous strategy
out their Russian systems, Western and Southern of consolidation, which had left BAE Systems as a
European countries are adding new capabilities. near-monopoly supplier in the UK. The thrust of
Armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are a case the UK’s National Shipbuilding Strategy, released in
in point. The UK has operated US-built weapons- September 2017, was to encourage different private
capable UAVs since 2007, with its MQ-9A Reapers. UK shipyards to bid to build the new Type-31e frigate
In late 2016, the British government announced that (perhaps in distributed blocks, which would be
these systems would be replaced by the Protector assembled in a single location). Similarly, Germany
MQ-9 variant, which would be capable of carrying ordered five Type-K130 frigates from a consortium
MBDA’s Brimstone 2 missiles and Raytheon’s of domestic shipyards (comprising Lürssen Werft &
Paveway IV guided bombs. In 2015 the US authorised Co. KG, ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems and German
Italy to arm its MQ-9 Reapers with Hellfire missiles, Naval Yards Kiel) – although it did so for legal rather
although it remains unclear whether this has been than economic reasons. This focus on competition in
Germany and the UK would seem to indicate that missile. The new M51.2 should be delivered in 2020,
naval shipbuilding in Europe will resist consolidation and the M51.3 in 2025, while research into the M51.4
in the near term, despite recent efforts in this direc- is due to start in 2022. For the air component, a mid-
tion in France and Italy. life upgrade of the current ASMPA missile, called
ASMPA-R, is planned for 2022; it is understood that
FRANCE a decision will be made in 2018 about a successor
weapon. This successor programme is currently
After winning the May presidential election, and designated ASN4G, and is planned for delivery in
with his new political party La République en Marche 2035. The design is likely to involve a choice between
victorious in the June parliamentary election, there a hypersonic platform and one incorporating stealthy
was international interest not only in Emmanuel features. While it is expected that the significant
Macron’s defence views but also the degree to which outlays associated with this modernisation will come
they would form part of his ambitious reform agenda. at the expense of conventional capabilities, at the time
However, one of the administration’s first moves was of writing no decisions on this had been announced.
to cut €850 million (US$959m) from the 2017 budget, Compounding these issues is the question of over-
thereby delaying some equipment programmes, in stretch, which has been gradually acknowledged by
order to try to comply with EU budget rules (see p. political leaders. In early September 2017, the chief
72). General Pierre de Villiers, then chief of defence of defence staff declared in Toulon at the ‘Defence
staff, voiced his opposition to the plan, arguing that Summer University’ that the French armed forces
French forces were overstretched in view of their have been used at ‘130% of their capabilities and now
operational commitments. Following a dispute need time to regenerate’. Several ongoing operations
with the administration that spilled into the public – principally, the domestic Sentinelle operation, as
domain, de Villiers resigned. In July, he was replaced well as combat missions in Mali and those against the
by General François Lecointre, former chief of the Islamic State, otherwise known as ISIS or ISIL, have
prime minister’s military cabinet. added to France’s already extensive deployments.
Nonetheless, at the same time as reducing the 2017 Sentinelle, which began after the Charlie Hebdo attacks
budget, Macron has also said that he wants France in 2015, has mobilised over 10,000 troops in France on
to reach, by 2025, the NATO target to spend 2% of surveillance and protection duties designed to prevent
GDP on defence; this would take the budget to more terrorist attacks. As the operation has been criticised
than €53 billion (US$63bn). Moreover, he announced by defence specialists (and many in the armed forces)
a defence-budget increase of €1.6bn (US$1.8bn) for draining resources, it was announced that oper
between 2018 and 2022. However, to reach this ational commitments would change at the end of
target by 2025, defence spending would then have 2017. The two other major operations are Barkhane
to increase by at least €3.5bn (US$3.9bn) each year in the Sahel and Chammal, France’s contribution to
between 2022 and 2025 (following the 2022 presiden- the anti-ISIS coalition – which involve around 4,000
tial elections). Many observers believe such sharp personnel and 1,200 personnel respectively.
increases are unlikely to occur. Immediately after his election, Macron commis-
Integral to the budget debate is not simply the sioned a strategic defence review. Completed in
cost of operations and equipment, but also the cost of early October 2017, this was a shorter and less ambi-
modernising France’s sea- and air-launched nuclear tious process than the 2008 and 2013 white books. It
weapons and related delivery systems. It is estimated maintained many of the key themes in these reports,
that the cost of this process will increase from €3.9bn and also stressed that challenges in cyberspace and
(US$4.4bn) in 2017 to €6bn (US$6.8bn) per year in from disruptive technologies meant that France had
2020–25, but decrease thereafter – with these outlays to maintain the capability for independent opposed-
likely to come at the expense of conventional procure- entry operations. In addition, it emphasised France’s
ments. commitment to NATO but also expressed support for
The capability of the new generation of French EU security tools and the EU’s Common Security and
nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines is Defence Policy.
crucial for the navy (submarine construction is In a major speech on the EU in September, Macron
supposed to begin in 2019), but so too is the capability laid out his European credentials, making reference to
of future versions of the M51 submarine-launched a ‘European autonomous capacity for action, comple-
Europe 75
mentary to NATO’, which should be in place ‘by the © IISS

Høybuktmoen
beginning of the next decade’. He went on to call for a (Border guard)
joint intervention capability, a common defence fund

and a common doctrine, with moves towards the Hammerfest Porsanger (to
creation of a ‘shared strategic culture’. Macron has FINNMARK become army base)
also called for closer cooperation between France and Tromso FINLAND
Trondenes Bardufoss
Germany in the military sphere, announcing with Setermoen
Andøya
German Chancellor Angela Merkel in July that the (due to close) Bjerkvik
Europe
two countries would explore the potential develop- Evenes (planned P-8 base and
Sortland
ment of a new combat aircraft. It was also announced (Coastguard) Ramsund F-35 forward-operating base)
that both countries would reinforce other areas of Bodo US Marine Corps Prepositioning Programme
Hammernesodden
defence cooperation, including a possible European
maritime-patrol aircraft, a medium-altitude long- NORWAY Kalvå
Bjugn
Tromsdal
endurance unmanned aerial vehicle and a joint C-130J Ørland Hammerkammen
transport-aircraft unit from 2021. Ørland (main
Trondheim Værnes
Frigård
F-35 base) Værnes
Ground equipment cave Airfield
NORWAY Trondheim Munitions cave Pier
Setnesmoen Rena
SWEDEN
Norway’s armed forces are undergoing a period of Terningmoen
Dombås
significant readjustment in order to deal with a new Sessvollmoen Gardermoen Air-force base
Oslo
security environment in which the country has to Bergenhus Huseby Naval base
Rygge Linderud Army base
balance its response to a resurgent Russia while also Bergen Lutvann Home Guard
Haakonsvern
maintaining its active international engagement. A
Stavanger Kristiansand City
long-term defence plan, approved by parliament in Capital
Sola Vatneleiren
November 2016, highlighted the need to procure new
and more advanced capabilities; improve combat Map 2 Norway: key military bases
readiness, logistics support and force protection;
and strengthen host-nation support to sustain NATO
forces. Defence funding is being increased, and it is allies decide to engage or reinforcements arrive,
planned that around 25% of the budget will be allo- supported by anti-access capabilities that effectively
cated to investments, but, without a further signifi- act as a strategic challenge to transatlantic defence.
cant increase in defence funding, the budget will not These capabilities hold at risk NATO’s ability to
reach NATO’s 2% defence-spending pledge by 2024. rapidly reinforce its eastern and northern allies, and
Nonetheless, Norway’s armed forces are on a new potentially imperil the link between North America
course, with the balance of military striking power – and Europe. One aspect that troubles Norwegian
and the core of Norway’s deterrent capacity – shifting defence officials relates to Russia’s strategies to
to the air and maritime domains. protect its nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submar
ines. In a major conflict, Russia might attempt to
Security policy defend its strategic submarines in an Arctic ‘bastion’
Russia’s assertive security and military policies, and by establishing sea control in northern waters and
the ongoing modernisation of its conventional and sea denial down to the Greenland–Iceland–United
nuclear forces, combine to make it more capable of Kingdom gap. Norway’s defence planners, including
power projection. In Europe’s High North, Russia’s its defence minister, have expressed concern that
military posture underscores the asymmetrical char- ‘Russia is revitalising the bastion-defence concept’.
acter of the Norwegian–Russian relationship. Russia’s Another capability challenge relates to the advanced
military-modernisation process has improved readi- weapons being introduced into Russian service,
ness (which would reduce warning times for its oppo- including precision-guided systems such as the
nents in any military contingency), while the country S-400 (SA-21 Growler) air-defence system, the Iskander
also has the capability to carry out covert and cyber (SS-26 Stone) short-range ballistic-missile system and
operations. In a worst-case scenario, the concern is the Kalibr (SS-N-30) and Kh-101 cruise missiles. All
that Russia could seek a fait accompli before NATO of these systems are being deployed across Russia’s
military districts, and some of them have been used Juncture exercise, the largest exercise in Norway since
on operations. Strong Resolve in 2002. It will involve around 35,000
Nonetheless, stability and cooperation remain key participants from up to 30 countries and will offer
objectives for both Norway and Russia in the north; the opportunity to test plans for reinforcements and
Norway’s policy towards Russia combines deterrence Oslo’s ‘total defence’ concept, as part of joint and
and defence with reassurance and collaboration. combined operations with allies and partners.
For instance, in peacetime, Norway does not allow While NATO remains important to Norway,
large Alliance exercises in its northernmost county, cooperation in smaller groups and strategic partner-
Finnmark, and there are limits on NATO air oper ships with selected countries is gaining momentum.
ations from Norwegian bases close to the Russian Partnership with the United States is still the ‘alli-
border. In March 2014, Norway suspended most of ance within the Alliance’ for Oslo, despite uneasi-
its bilateral military cooperation with Russia, but, ness with US policy under President Donald Trump.
within the limits set by these sanctions, the two coun- Bilateral military cooperation is being expanded in
tries continue to work together in areas such as coast- a number of fields. Intelligence and surveillance is
guard and border-guard activities, search and rescue, one key component of this relationship, based on US
and efforts to uphold the Incidents at Sea Agreement. technological and financial support for a number of
Furthermore, growing tension between Russia and signals-intelligence activities run by the Norwegian
the West has not led to a breakdown of the direct line Intelligence Service. Another important component is
between Norwegian Joint Headquarters and Russia’s the pre-positioned materiel for the US Marine Corps
Northern Fleet. in central Norway (Marine Corps Prepositioning
Program–Norway). In any conflict in Northern
NATO Europe, these assets would support a Marine
NATO remains the cornerstone of Norwegian secu- Air-Ground Task Force and, if need be, facilitate the
rity and defence policy. Over the past ten years, subsequent arrival of an expeditionary brigade. In
however, Norwegian officials have argued that the addition to the US, Germany, the Netherlands, the
Alliance has focused too narrowly on international UK, and potentially France and Poland are identified
crisis-management operations. as strategic partners.
Norway’s launch of the Core Area Initiative in Nordic defence cooperation is also growing in
2008 marked a return to traditional thinking. This significance, with NORDEFCO, established in 2009,
underlined the importance of collective defence an institutional framework for many activities in this
and a better balancing of core functions in the Euro- area. The project was initially driven by the prospect
Atlantic area with out-of-area operations. Since of financial savings through common equipment
then, Norway has worked systematically to rebuild procurement, based mostly on Swedish systems.
the credibility of Article 5 in two principal ways. Now, however, there are more dynamic develop-
The first is by stressing the need to reform NATO’s ments in operations. A web of agreements and
command structure; prepare for high-end oper arrangements between Nordic countries and with
ations; more closely bind together NATO headquar- major Western states are combining incrementally to
ters and national and multinational headquarters; prepare them to operate together in a crisis, should
and increase the Alliance’s regional focus. Secondly, respective governments decide to do so.
when preparing for NATO’s 2016 Warsaw Summit,
Norway – in cooperation with France, Iceland and Defence policy and military strategy
the UK – launched new proposals aimed at strength- The long-term defence plan for 2017–20, entitled
ening NATO’s posture and activities in the North ‘Capable and Sustainable’, prioritises readiness,
Atlantic. From Norway’s perspective, NATO needs availability and sustainability, as well as investments
to reintroduce one joint headquarters with primary in core or strategic capabilities. Three main categories
responsibility for the area. (Allied Command Atlantic, are particularly significant:
commonly known as SACLANT, was replaced in
2003 by Allied Command Transformation.) Norway Detection and identification
also feels that more extensive training and Article 5 Significant resources are being spent on improving
exercises are required. In October–November 2018, intelligence and surveillance. These include major
Norway will host the next iteration of NATO´s Trident improvements to the Norwegian Intelligence Service,
Europe 77
including the modernisation of ground-based The armed forces

listening stations and the procurement of a new and The overall peacetime strength of Norway’s armed
more capable Marjata IV intelligence-collection vessel forces, including conscripts, is approximately 24,000
for operations in the Barents Sea. Moreover, five new personnel. In addition, the Home Guard consists of
P-8A Poseidon maritime-patrol aircraft will replace approximately 38,000 high-readiness trained reserves.
Norway’s ageing P-3C Orions. Meanwhile, to enhance A key priority in the years to come is to improve
protection against digital threats, the government is combat readiness, logistics support and force protec-
considering establishing a ‘digital border defence’, tion, and to incorporate new and more advanced
Europe
designed to improve the Norwegian Intelligence capabilities. At the same time, the defence effort is
Service’s ability to monitor cable-routed signals dependent on revitalising the total defence concept,
passing Norway’s border. There will be substantial which encompasses mutual support and cooperation
procurement, maintenance and operational costs for between the armed forces and civilian authorities in
all these systems. situations ranging from peace to war; Trident Juncture
2018 will be a litmus test of this complex structure.
Strike capability The chief of defence has full command over the
Norway will soon invest heavily in combat plat- armed forces, while the chief of the joint headquar-
forms with the mobility and firepower to influence ters maintains operational command. The role of the
the strategic decisions of potential aggressors. These service-branch chiefs changed in 2017. While they
include up to 52 F-35A Lightning II combat aircraft, had earlier been responsible for force generation and
with a weapons suite that includes the Joint Strike were referred to as ‘inspector generals’, they have
Missile, developed by Norwegian defence manu- now gained additional responsibility for operational
facturer Kongsberg. Norway’s F-35s are planned to leadership at the tactical level and become chiefs of
reach initial operational capability in 2019 and full the service branches.
operational capability in 2025. Furthermore, four new Recently, three significant reforms have affected
submarines built in Germany will, in 2026–30, replace Norway’s personnel and competency struc-
the navy’s six Ula-class submarines. tures. Firstly, universal conscription was introduced
in 2015, making military service compulsory for
Enhancing defensive capability women as well as men. (In 2017 more than 25% of
The NASAMS II air-defence system will be upgraded the conscript intake was female.) Secondly, a new
and equipped with new short- and medium-range personnel structure was introduced in 2016, supple-
missiles. Norway also plans to enhance NASAMS menting the existing category of ‘officers’ with an
II by introducing longer-range missiles in 2024– ‘other ranks’ category. This reform brought the
28. They will be concentrated around the two air Norwegian armed forces in line with most other
bases at Ørland and Evenes, in order to protect NATO countries; commissioned officers will comprise
Norwegian forces ‘and the areas that will serve as 30% of overall personnel numbers. Thirdly, a reform
potential staging areas for allied reinforcements’, of defence-education structures was launched in 2017,
according to the long-term defence-plan docu- driven by the need to reduce annual costs by approxi-
ment. The concept of intertwined national and mately NOK500 million (US$59.3m) and streamline
allied defence efforts in the High North is strongly military education according to military require-
emphasised in the plan. ments. As a consequence, the current six colleges and
These capabilities amount to a fundamental the officer-training system will be merged into one
change in Norway’s military capabilities, whereby organisational structure, encompassing both the mili-
maritime and air-striking power are set to become tary’s higher academic education and its vocational
central to Norway’s force structure and at the core education.
of its deterrent. This marks a significant shift from
the Cold War, when Norway relied on a number Army
of army brigades, supported by sea and air power, The army’s principal capability rests in its three
whose main mission was to fight defensively in manoeuvre battalions, with associated combat
northern Norway until reinforced by allies. This support and combat service support, which form part
de facto conceptual change has, however, been the of Brigade North; two battalions are in the north of
subject of less debate than the size of the land forces. the country, and one in the south. The force structure
also includes His Majesty the King’s Guard (a light four, a shift that likely heralds the gradual transfer of
infantry battalion) and one light infantry battalion, this capability to autonomous systems deployed from
which patrols Norway’s border with Russia. support vessels.
The army is facing major challenges, notably due Meanwhile, the acquisition of 14 NH90 maritime
to ageing equipment and insufficient readiness and helicopters will significantly boost naval capability,
availability. In November 2016, the defence minister but this has proven to be one of the most difficult
initiated a Land Forces Study that was intended to procurements since the turn of the century, with
provide an in-depth review of the mission, concept significant supplier delays. The first eight helicopters
and structure of the land forces, within the fiscal frame- have been delivered – the last are due in 2018–19 –
work set by the long-term plan. Recommendations and all of them are expected to reach full operational
based on the study were presented to parliament in capability by 2022 or soon after.
October 2017. The mission and conceptual frame- In recent years, much of the navy has been oper-
work of the army have been clarified. Professional ating at a high tempo, which has proven challenging.
units will continue with high staffing levels, while The new long-term defence plan outlines measures
conscription and reserves will be better utilised, with to increase the responsiveness and endurance of
longer military service for the most demanding roles. Norway’s maritime forces. This includes increasing
The plans include modernising and procuring new the number of total frigate crews from three and a
CV90 armoured personnel carriers, establishing a half to five, which will allow for the continuous oper-
ground-based air-defence capability in Brigade North ation of a minimum of four vessels, in contrast to the
and procuring a new artillery system. Instead of fully original plan to operate three.
upgrading the Leopard 2A4 main battle tanks (MBTs),
Norway plans to procure new MBTs from 2025, Air force
either in the form of a newer version of the Leopard The acquisition of up to 52 F-35A combat aircraft will
or a new-generation tank that might be lighter and shape the future of the air force. With accompanying
more mobile. The new security challenges have led to reforms to the base and support structure, the new
a renewed focus on presence in Finnmark. A cavalry aircraft will serve as the catalyst for adjusting the
battalion will be formed at Porsanger. This comes entire air-force structure. The first aircraft arrived in
in addition to the earlier decision to strengthen the Norway in November 2017. The main base for the
Border Guard with a new ranger company. Also, the F-35s will be Ørland Air Station in central Norway,
Home Guard in the area will be strengthened and while a forward operating base will be established
co-located with the army under a unified Land Forces at Evenes Air Station in the north, with aircraft
Command Finnmark. assigned to NATO’s Quick Reaction Alert role. By
concentrating activity in fewer bases with enhanced
Navy protection, and improving the skills of aircrews and
The navy is modernising, and intends to build a ground crews, more resources will become avail-
fleet around fewer, more capable platforms. These able for operational activity. Yet the concentration
include five modern Fridtjof Nansen destroyers, strategy has proven controversial, especially in rela-
which entered service between 2006 and 2011; a new tion to the prospective closure of Andøya Air Station
logistics-support vessel (with replenishment-at-sea in the north, which is currently home to Norway’s
capability), which is planned to be delivered in 2018; maritime-patrol aircraft. Norway plans to co-locate
the acquisition of four new submarines to replace the the new P-8As with combat aircraft at Evenes.
Ula-class boats (for which the German-designed Type
212NG was selected in 2017); and three new seagoing Other capabilities
coastguard vessels to replace the Nordkapp class. The Home Guard forms the core of Norway’s terri-
Due to high costs, the acquisitions will be combined torial-defence structure. Its main tasks are to secure
with cuts in other areas. The six modern Skjold-class important infrastructure and other areas, support
missile-armed fast patrol boats, the last of which the main combat services and allied forces, and assist
entered service in 2013, are planned to be phased out civilian authorities in civil emergencies. Parliament
around 2025, when the navy’s F-35As will be oper decided in 2017 to reduce the number of personnel
ational. Also, Norway plans to reduce the number of in the Home Guard from approximately 45,000 to
mine-countermeasures vessels in its navy from six to 38,000 – with 3,000 held at very high readiness – and
Europe 79
to disband the Naval Home Guard. Home Guard to improve readiness, availability and sustainability.
districts and units will see more varied levels of ambi- The air force will see significantly higher growth than
tion, and there will be an increase in its presence and the other armed services because of the heavy invest-
operational capability in the north. As the Special ment in aircraft and combat bases. However, despite
Operation Forces remain important in national the increase in defence spending, the budget will
contingencies and in contributions to international remain below 1.55% of GDP in 2017, so substantial
operations, there are few changes envisaged for these additional funding will be necessary by 2024 to meet
formations. NATO’s 2% defence-spending pledge.
Europe
The government is also restructuring and In addition to increased funding, the long-term
modernising cyber and other information and plan foresees internal efficiency savings, estimated at
communications technology (ICT) entities in the NOK1.8bn (US$200m) by the end of 2020. This will
defence sector. The armed forces are increasingly allow funding to be reallocated to other high-priority
reliant on ICT, particularly the ability to maintain areas within the defence sector.
freedom of action in the cyber domain. Most ICT
entities will be unified within the framework of Defence industry
Norwegian Cyber Defence. Despite having a relatively small defence-indus-
trial base, Norway’s defence industry possesses a
DEFENCE ECONOMICS number of very advanced technologies and capabil
ities, producing several leading products and systems
Revenues from petroleum continue to form a substan- in the international market. The industry has a total
tial part of the Norwegian economy, but growth annual turnover of around NOK12bn (US$1.4bn),
in these revenues is expected to slow. Norwegian and more than 70% of its revenue is generated from
petroleum production peaked in the middle of the last customers outside Norway.
decade, and the fall in oil prices has affected revenues. The main capabilities are in the following areas:
In 2014–16, the government’s net cash flow from the • Missiles (Naval Strike Missile and Joint Strike
petroleum sector fell by more than 60%. In addition, Missile)
an ageing population will likely increase government • Ground-based air defence
spending on pensions and health services, which • Rocket motors
could further strain public finances. • Remote-weapon stations
At the same time, the continued supply of • Advanced ammunition and shoulder-
petroleum revenues will still contribute to an launched weapons
increase in the Government Pension Fund Global. • Personal reconnaissance systems (nano-
As the figures stand, the fund’s growth will provide UAVs)
a basis to increase the government’s budgets (in a • Underwater systems
normal economic situation) by between NOK3billion • Command, control and communication
(US$400m) and NOK4bn (US$500m) per year in the systems
next 10–15 years – a significant contribution, albeit • Secure information systems, including
much less than in the previous 15 years, when the cryptographic equipment
fund increased revenues by an average of NOK12bn • Soldier systems
(US$1.4bn) per year, when measured in fixed 2017
kroner. Kongsberg is Norway’s main supplier of defence
However, Norway’s long-term defence plan rests and aerospace-related systems. The Norwegian state
on a substantial increase in funding. In total, the owns a 50.001% share in the company, which in turn
government recommends additional funding over owns a 49.9% stake in Finland’s leading defence
the coming 20 years of approximately NOK180bn supplier, Patria Oyj. Kongsberg’s product and system
(US$21.3bn) , and as a part of this, a gradual increase portfolio comprises various command-and-control
over the first four years to NOK7.8bn (US$900m) by systems for land-, air- and sea-based defence; mari-
2020. Approximately 25% of the defence budget will time and land-based surveillance systems for civilian,
be allocated to investments, in order to finance the military and other public installations; and several
modernisation plans, while more resources will be types of tactical radio and other communications
allocated to alleviate shortfalls in maintenance and systems, predominantly developed and delivered
for land-based defence. It also produces the Penguin bilities had been pre-positioned on a logistics ship
anti-ship missile and the new Naval Strike Missile. in the Caribbean. British force levels in the region
One of Kongsberg’s major export successes is the were rapidly increased to some 2,000 troops, with the
Protector remote-weapon station. The firm also makes deployment of helicopters, engineers and marines by
advanced composites and other engineering products air – along with the helicopter carrier HMS Ocean, on
for the aircraft and helicopter market. what was likely its final mission.
Nammo is an international aerospace and defence
company headquartered in Norway, and the second Armed services
largest of Norway’s defence firms. The group is owned Army reorganisation continued in 2017, with the
on a 50/50 basis by the Norwegian government and Specialised Infantry Group (the new dedicated
Patria Oyj. Nammo operates from more than 30 sites capability-building formation) achieving initial oper-
and offices in 14 countries. It manufactures ammuni- ational capability. The army’s existing signal brigades
tion and rocket engines for both military and civilian are to be grouped into a single formation along with
customers, as well as shoulder-launched munitions the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
systems; military and sports ammunition; rocket brigade, and 77 Brigade, in order to better conduct
motors for military and aerospace applications; and ‘information manoeuvre’. It was announced that
demilitarisation services. MBDA’s Common Anti-air Modular Missile would
be bought to replace Rapier in the ground-based air-
UNITED KINGDOM defence role, but the requirement for a new mech
anised infantry vehicle remained unfulfilled.
In Europe, the United Kingdom is equalled only by HMS Queen Elizabeth, the first of two new aircraft
France in its ability to project credible combat power carriers, began sea trials, while work progressed
but, while its forces remain relatively well balanced, on readying the other, HMS Prince of Wales. The
many key capabilities are close to critical mass – ‘the government announced a new national shipbuilding
minimum threshold of operational effectiveness’, strategy, which included the construction of eight
according to the UK House of Commons Defence Type-26 anti-submarine frigates and five lighter
Committee. Indeed, plans to field an improved ‘Joint Type-31e general-purpose frigates, cost-capped at
Force 2025’ face considerable challenges in delivery, £250 million (US$320m) each and optimised for
not least in terms of affordability, and in sustaining export. Meanwhile, plans were announced to test a
or increasing personnel numbers. Due to these factors, laser weapon, Dragonfire, on a warship.
the ’national security capability review’, announced The Royal Air Force (RAF) marks the cente-
by the government after the June 2017 election, may nary of its foundation in 2018. In 2017, it remained
result in further reductions in military capability. heavily committed to the campaign against ISIS, and
Nonetheless, UK forces continue to be deployed on to national and NATO air policing, while delivery
global operations, playing a major role in the US-led of A400M Atlas transport aircraft continued. RAF
campaign against the Islamic State, also known as Typhoon squadrons should begin to receive the
ISIS or ISIL, and modestly increasing their pres- Meteor rocket-ramjet-powered air-to-air missile in
ence in Afghanistan. As part of NATO’s Enhanced 2018. This missile will provide considerably greater
Forward Presence, a battalion-strength UK force led a performance than the AIM-120C AMRAAM pres-
multinational battlegroup deployed to Estonia, ently fielded on the aircraft. The first of the UK’s
which incorporated a French company. In addition, F-35B Lightning II combat aircraft are due to embark
the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force was broadened on the Queen Elizabeth in 2018, and the first P-8A
beyond NATO member states to include Sweden Poseidon maritime-patrol aircraft will be delivered in
and Finland. 2019.
An increase in domestic terrorist attacks saw
special forces deployed to assist counter-terrorism Defence economics
police. Troops were rapidly mobilised to assist police The UK increased defence spending from £38.8billion
on two occasions – although in both instances they (US$52.6bn) in 2016 to £39.7bn (US$50.7bn) in 2017.
were quickly demobilised. The scale of destruction This meant a nominal 2.3% increase, but given the
in the Caribbean wrought by Hurricane Irma was fall in exchange rates in 2017, in current US dollars
unanticipated, even though some disaster-relief capa- this meant a fall of 3.5% in dollar purchasing power,
Europe 81
although in real terms (constant 2010 US dollars), this Overall, there were multiple indications that the
still meant a 0.5% increase in the budget. However, defence budget was coming under increased pres-
since the UK economy was projected to achieve sure, especially in relation to funding for personnel
growth of 1.7% in 2017, according to the IMF, this and future equipment. The government announced
meant that the country’s ratio of defence spending to that the national security capability review would
GDP was 1.98% that year. Moreover, reports by the ’include [an] examination of the policy and plans
National Audit Office and the House of Commons which support implementation of the national secu-
Public Accounts Committee pointed towards a major rity strategy, and help to ensure that the UK’s invest-
Europe
shortfall in funding for the Defence Equipment Plan, ment in national security capabilities is as joined-up,
partly resulting from the fall in the value of the effective and efficient as possible, to address current
pound. national security challenges’. Given that the 2017
The armed forces continued to be undermanned terrorist attacks highlighted pressure on police
by more than 5%, with deficiencies of 5.9% in the numbers and counter-terrorism capabilities, many
army, 5.4% in the RAF and 2.7% in the Royal Navy analysts expect that the review will examine further
(RN), particularly in the warfare, submarine, medical, reductions in armed-forces capability and personnel.
logistics and engineering trades. While the Ministry While the government announced ambitious plans
of Defence has ambitious plans to improve recruit- to sustain and increase defence cooperation with
ment and retention, these focus on the long term and Europe after leaving the EU, any economic shock
these shortages call into doubt the plans to sustain the resulting from Brexit would put public spending, and
size of the RAF and RN. therefore the defence budget, under further pressure.
COMBAT SUPPORT
Albania ALB 1 mor bty
Albanian Lek 2016 2017 2018
1 NBC coy
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
GDP lek 1.47tr 1.56tr
ARTILLERY • MOR 93: 82mm 81; 120mm 12
US$ 11.9bn 13.0bn
per capita US$ 4,126 4,520 Naval Force 650
Growth % 3.4 3.7
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Inflation % 1.3 2.1 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PBF 5
Def exp [a] lek 16.3bn 19.4bn Archangel
US$ 131m 162m
Def bdgt [b] lek 14.2bn 13.0bn 13.5bn Coast Guard
US$ 114m 109m EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FMA (US) US$ 3.4m 2.4m 0m
PB 9: 4 Iluria (Damen Stan Patrol 4207); 3 Mk3 Sea
US$1=lek 124.12 119.64
Spectre; 2 (other)
[a] NATO definition PBR 13: 4 Type-227; 1 Type-246; 1 Type-303; 7 Type-
[b] Excludes military pensions 2010
Ethnic groups: Albanian 82.6%; Greek 0.9%; Romani 0.3%;
Air Force 550
Macedonian 0.2%; other or unspecified 15.7% Flying hours at least 10–15 hrs/yr
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus HELICOPTERS
Male 9.5% 4.2% 4.9% 4.8% 20.5% 5.6% TPT 26: Medium 4 AS532AL Cougar; Light 22: 1 AW109;
Female 8.5% 3.8% 4.6% 4.6% 22.5% 6.3% 5 Bell 205 (AB-205); 7 Bell 206C (AB-206C); 8 Bo-105; 1
H145
Capabilities
Regional Support Brigade 700
Principal missions for Albania’s armed forces include
FORCES BY ROLE
territorial defence, internal-security and disaster-
COMBAT SUPPORT
relief tasks, and small-scale peacekeeping or training
1 cbt spt bde (1 engr bn, 1 (rescue) engr bn, 1 CIMIC
deployments. Limited defence modernisation is proceeding
det)
under the Long-Term Development Plan 2016–25. In late
2017, naval forces ended a year of operations with NATO’s
Standing Maritime Group Two in the Aegean Sea. Tirana Military Police
deployed a further two infantry contingents to Afghanistan FORCES BY ROLE
and contributed EOD engineers to the NATO Enhanced COMBAT SUPPORT
Forward Presence Battlegroup in Latvia in 2017. Most of 1 MP bn
the country’s Soviet-era equipment has been sold, and its EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
military capability remains limited. The small air brigade ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
has only a rotary-wing capability, while the naval element AUV IVECO LMV
has only littoral capabilities. The procurement of new
equipment has been limited to small numbers of helicopters. Logistics Brigade 1,200
However, in 2017, Albania received HMMWVs from the FORCES BY ROLE
United States as part of a US$12 million assistance package. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
ACTIVE 8,000 (Land Force 3,000 Naval Force 650 Air 1 log bde (1 tpt bn, 2 log bn)
Force 550 Other 3,800) Paramilitary 500
DEPLOYMENT
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE AFGHANISTAN
NATO • Operation Resolute Support 83
Land Force 3,000
FORCES BY ROLE BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
SPECIAL FORCES EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 1
1 SF bn LATVIA
1 cdo bn NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 18; 1 EOD pl
MANOEUVRE
Light MALI
3 lt inf bn EU • EUTM Mali 4
Europe 83
MEDITERRANEAN SEA capability indicators had fallen significantly. But the

NATO • SNMG 2: 1 PB number of soldiers deployed to international missions
remained the same, increasing strain on the force. The
SERBIA review pointed to a security environment where migration
NATO • KFOR 28 flows, international terrorism and international military
OSCE • Kosovo 3 crisis-management operations threatened to overwhelm
UKRAINE defence capacity. The initial plan called for materiel and
personnel reductions. However, the review argued that
OSCE • Ukraine 3
personnel cuts should stop and that investment be directed
towards better training and more exercises, command and
Europe
FOREIGN FORCES control, and ISR. A new defence plan (Landesverteidigung
Armenia OSCE 1 21.1) includes structural changes to the defence ministry,
Austria OSCE 1 as well as at the operational and tactical command-and-
Bosnia-Herzegovina OSCE 1 control level, from 2017. As a result, Austria plans to boost
its rapid-response capability and to stand up three new
Canada OSCE 1
Jäger battalions. In addition, army brigades will specialise
Germany OSCE 2
according to roles, such as rapid response, mechanised
Hungary OSCE 1 (heavy), air-mobile (light) and mountain warfare. Initial
Ireland OSCE 1 steps were taken in 2017. In July, Austria announced it
Italy OSCE 1 would phase out its Typhoon aircraft between 2020 and
Macedonia (FYROM) OSCE 2 2023, which would trigger a replacement procurement.
Moldova OSCE 1
ACTIVE 22,400 (Land Forces 12,200 Air 2,800
Montenegro OSCE 1
Support 7,400)
Serbia OSCE 2
Conscript liability 6 months recruit trg, 30 days reservist
Spain OSCE 1 refresher trg for volunteers; 120–150 days additional for
United Kingdom OSCE 3 officers, NCOs and specialists. Authorised maximum
wartime strength of 55,000
Austria AUT RESERVE 152,200 (Joint structured 25,500; Joint
Euro € 2016 2017 2018 unstructured 126,700)
Some 7,500 reservists a year undergo refresher trg in
GDP € 349bn 363bn
tranches
US$ 387bn 409bn
per capita US$ 44,233 46,436
Growth % 1.5 2.3
Inflation % 1.0 1.6
Land Forces 12,200
Def bdgt [a] € 2.61bn 2.65bn 2.62bn
FORCES BY ROLE
US$ 2.89bn 2.99bn
MANOEUVRE
US$1=€ 0.90 0.89 Armoured
[a] Includes military pensions 1 (4th) armd inf bde (1 recce/SP arty bn, 1 tk bn, 2 armd
Population 8,754,413 inf bn, 1 spt bn)
Mechanised
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 1 (7th) mech inf bde (1 recce/SP arty bn, 2 mech inf bn, 1
Male 7.2% 2.6% 3.1% 3.3% 24.4% 8.4% cbt engr bn, 1 spt bn)
Light
Female 6.8% 2.5% 3.0% 3.3% 24.6% 10.9%
1 (Rapid Deployment) inf comd (1 recce bn, 2 inf bn, 1
cbt engr bn, 1 MP bn, 1 CBRN bn, 1 spt bn)
Capabilities 1 mtn inf comd (1 mtn inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn)
Defence-policy objectives are based on the 2013 National 6 (regional) inf bn
Security Strategy, the 2014 Defence Strategy and the EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
2015 Military Strategy. They include the provision of ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
military capability to maintain Austria’s sovereignty and MBT 56 Leopard 2A4
territorial integrity, and enable military assistance to the AIFV 112 Ulan
civil authorities and participation in crisis-management APC • APC (W) 78 Pandur
missions abroad. The level of ambition for crisis- AUV 157: 29 Dingo 2; 128 IVECO LMV
response operations is to be able to deploy and sustain a ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
minimum (on average) of 1,100 troops. In February 2016, ARV 30: 20 4KH7FA-SB; 10 M88A1
Austria completed a review of its armed forces reform MW 6 AID2000 Trailer
programme (ÖBH 2018). The review showed that core NBC VEHICLES 12 Dingo 2 AC NBC
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Steering Group coordinates on a government level. An

MSL • MANPATS Bill 2 (PAL 2000) Austrian cyber-security law, based on the EU NIS Directive,
ARTILLERY 120 will establish structured international coordinating
SP 155mm 30 M109A5ÖE mechanisms. Operational-level coordination structures
MOR 120mm 90 sGrW 86 (10 more in store) include the Computer Security Incident Response
Capability (Federal Chancellery), the Cyber Security
Air Force 2,800 Centre (Ministry of the Interior) and the Cyber Defence
The Air Force is part of Joint Forces Comd and consists of Centre (Ministry of Defence). These structures reached IOC
2 bde; Air Support Comd and Airspace Surveillance Comd at the end of 2015 and FOC was planned for the end of 2017.
The defence ministry’s primary goal is to ensure national
Flying hours 160 hrs/yr on hel/tpt ac; 110 hrs/yr on ftr
defence in cyberspace, as well as securing ministry and
FORCES BY ROLE military ICT. A new Communication Information Systems
FIGHTER & Cyber Defence (CIS&CD) Command was effective from
2 sqn with Typhoon 1 January 2017.
ISR
1 sqn with PC-6B Turbo Porter
TRANSPORT
DEPLOYMENT
1 sqn with C-130K Hercules AFGHANISTAN
TRAINING NATO • Operation Resolute Support 9
1 trg sqn with Saab 105Oe*
ALBANIA
1 trg sqn with PC-7 Turbo Trainer
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER OSCE • Albania 2
2 sqn with Bell 212 (AB-212) BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
1 sqn with OH-58B Kiowa EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 191; 1 inf bn HQ
1 sqn with S-70A Black Hawk
2 sqn with SA316/SA319 Alouette III
AIR DEFENCE EU • EUTM RCA 3
2 bn CYPRUS
1 radar bn UN • UNFICYP 4
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
LEBANON
UN • UNIFIL 183; 1 log bn
FTR 15 Eurofighter Typhoon Tranche 1
TPT 11: Medium 3 C-130K Hercules; Light 8 PC-6B MALI
Turbo Porter EU • EUTM Mali 12
TRG 30: 12 PC-7 Turbo Trainer; 18 Saab 105Oe* UN • MINUSMA 3
HELICOPTERS
MRH 24 SA316/SA319 Alouette III MIDDLE EAST
ISR 10 OH-58B Kiowa UN • UNTSO 4 obs
TPT 32: Medium 9 S-70A Black Hawk; Light 23 Bell 212 SERBIA
(AB-212) NATO • KFOR 440; 1 recce coy; 2 mech inf coy; 1 log coy
AIR DEFENCE
SAM • Point-defence Mistral UKRAINE
GUNS 35mm 24 Z-FIAK system (6 more in store) OSCE • Ukraine 14
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IIR IRIS-T WESTERN SAHARA
UN • MINURSO 5 obs
Special Operations Forces
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
2 SF gp
1 SF gp (reserve)
Support 7,400
Support forces comprise Joint Services Support Command
and several agencies, academies and schools
Cyber
The Austrian approach to cyber security encompasses
both military and civilian assets. The 2013 National Cyber
Security Strategy was developed in conjunction with the
Austrian National Security Strategy. A Cyber Security
Europe 85
ACTIVE 28,800 (Army 10,350 Navy 1,350 Air 5,850

Belgium BEL Medical Service 1,400 Joint Service 9,850)
Euro € 2016 2017 2018
RESERVE 5,000
GDP € 422bn 436bn
US$ 467bn 492bn
per capita US$ 41,248 43,243
Growth % 1.2 1.6 Land Component 10,350
Inflation % 1.8 2.2
FORCES BY ROLE
Europe
Def exp [a] € 3.90bn 3.97bn SPECIAL FORCES
US$ 4.32bn 4.47bn 1 (lt) spec ops bde (1 SF gp, 1 cdo bn, 1 para bn)
Def bdgt [b] € 3.49bn 3.77bn 3.81bn MANOEUVRE
US$ 3.86bn 4.25bn Reconnaissance
US$1=€ 0.90 0.89 1 ISR bn (2 ISR coy, 1 surv coy)
Mechanised
[a] NATO definition
1 (med) bde (4 mech bn; 1 lt inf bn)
[b] Includes military pensions COMBAT SUPPORT
Population 11,491,346 1 arty bn (1 arty bty, 1 mor bty)
2 engr bn (1 cbt engr coy, 1 lt engr coy, 1 construction
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus coy)
Male 8.8% 2.8% 3.0% 3.3% 23.3% 8.1% 1 EOD unit
Female 8.4% 2.7% 2.9% 3.2% 23.1% 10.5% 1 CBRN coy
1 MP coy
Capabilities 3 CIS sigs gp
In July 2016, the Belgian government published its 3 log bn
strategic vision for defence, indicating the general EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
direction for Belgian defence policy until 2030. Brussels ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
intends first of all to stabilise Belgium’s defence effort and ASLT 18 Piranha III-C DF90
then to provide for growth after 2020. The plan envisages a IFV 19 Piranha III-C DF30
reduced personnel component of around 25,000. However, APC • APC (W) 120: 36 Pandur; 64 Piranha III-C; 14
a large number of impending service retirements means Piranha III-PC (CP); 6 Piranha III-C (amb)
that a gradual increase in recruitment is planned after AUV 644: 208 Dingo 2 (inc 52 CP); 436 IVECO LMV
2017 as part of the overall move towards this number. The ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
government is also keen to ensure that this reduction does AEV 8 Piranha III-C
not compromise operational capability, and so is investing ARV 13: 4 Pandur; 9 Piranha III-C
in short-term requirements related to aircraft readiness, VLB 4 Leguan
personal equipment and land-forces vehicles. Overall ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
policy priorities remain unchanged, with defence policy MSL • MANPATS Spike-MR
based on multilateral solidarity with NATO, the EU and ARTILLERY 105
the UN; attacks in 2016 have again highlighted the threat TOWED 105mm 14 LG1 MkII
from terrorism and have impelled closer counter-terror MOR 50: 81mm 18; 120mm 32
cooperation with France. Belgium is working with the
Netherlands to consider the replacement of both countries’ Naval Component 1,350
Karel Doorman (M)-class frigates. As part of the defence EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
plan, the government envisages launching five investment PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 2
projects in the short term: fighter aircraft, frigates, mine FRIGATES • FFGHM 2 Leopold I (ex-NLD Karel Doorman)
countermeasures, UAVs and land-combat vehicles. This with 2 quad lnchr with Harpoon AShM, 1 16-cell Mk48
includes plans for new light reconnaissance vehicles and VLS with RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM, 4 single Mk32
upgrades to Pandur armoured personnel carriers. The navy 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 Goalkeeper CIWS, 1
has benefited from the acquisition of two new patrol and 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel)
coastal combatants, while the air force is due to receive PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS
F-16 aircraft updates, as well as the long-awaited A400M. PCC 2 Castor
Belgium continues to pursue high readiness levels and MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES
deployable niche capabilities. Large numbers of Belgian MHC 6 Flower (Tripartite)
troops were deployed for domestic-security operations LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3
following terrorist attacks in 2016, although Belgium AGFH 1 Godetia (log spt/comd) (capacity 1 Alouette III)
maintains overseas deployments on EU and UN missions, AGOR 1 Belgica
as well as in the Middle East on missions targeting ISIS. AXS 1 Zenobe Gramme
Naval Aviation 2016–30 was published in June 2016. The armed forces’
(part of the Air Component) cyber capability falls under the military intelligence service,
including defensive and offensive cyber operations. As of
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
mid-2016, the armed forces do not have an offensive cyber
HELICOPTERS
capability. Military cyber personnel are based in the Cyber
ASW 4 NH90 NFH
Security Operations Centre.
MRH 3 SA316B Alouette III
Air Component 5,850 DEPLOYMENT

Flying hours 165 hrs/yr on cbt ac. 300 hrs/yr on tpt ac. 150 AFGHANISTAN
hrs/yr on hel; 250 hrs/yr on ERJ NATO • Operation Resolute Support 60
FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR
4 sqn with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon EU • EUTM RCA 9
SEARCH & RESCUE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
1 sqn with Sea King Mk48 UN • MONUSCO 2
TRANSPORT
1 sqn with A321; ERJ-135 LR; ERJ-145 LR; Falcon 900B ESTONIA
1 sqn with C-130H Hercules NATO • Baltic Air Policing 4 F-16AM Fighting Falcon
TRAINING FRANCE
1 OCU sqn with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon NATO • Air Component 28 Alpha Jet located at Cazaux/
1 sqn with SF-260D/M Tours
1 BEL/FRA unit with Alpha Jet*
1 OCU unit with AW109 IRAQ
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Operation Inherent Resolve (Valiant Phoenix) 30
2 sqn with AW109 (ISR) JORDAN
ISR UAV
Operation Inherent Resolve (Desert Falcon) 110; 4 F-16AM
1 sqn with RQ-5A Hunter (B-Hunter) Fighting Falcon
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 88 combat capable LEBANON
FTR 59: 49 F-16AM Fighting Falcon; 10 F-16BM Fighting UN • UNIFIL 1
Falcon LITHUANIA
TPT 17: Medium 11 C-130H Hercules; Light 4: 2 ERJ-135 NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 100; 1 tpt coy
LR; 2 ERJ-145 LR; PAX 2: 1 A321; 1 Falcon 900B
TRG 61: 29 Alpha Jet*; 9 SF-260D; 23 SF-260M MALI
HELICOPTERS EU • EUTM Mali 171
ASW 4 NH90 NFH opcon Navy UN • MINUSMA 23
MRH 3 SA316B Alouette III opcon Navy
MIDDLE EAST
SAR 3 Sea King Mk48 (to be replaced by NH90 NFH)
UN • UNTSO 2 obs
TPT 17: Medium 4 NH90 TTH; Light 13 AW109 (ISR) (7
more in store) NORTH SEA
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES NATO • SNMCMG 1: 1 MHC
ISR • Heavy 12 RQ-5A Hunter (B-Hunter) (1 more in
UKRAINE
store)
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES OSCE • Ukraine 4
AAM • IR AIM-9M Sidewinder; IRR AIM-9X Sidewinder
II; ARH AIM-120B AMRAAM FOREIGN FORCES
BOMBS United States US European Command: 900
Laser-guided: GBU-10/GBU-12 Paveway II; GBU-24
Paveway III
INS/GPS guided: GBU-31 JDAM; GBU-38 JDAM; GBU-
54 Laser JDAM (dual-mode)
Cyber
A national Cyber Security Strategy was released in 2012.
The defence ministry released a Cyber Security Strategy for
Defence in 2014, outlining three pillars of its cyber-security
capability: Cyber Defence, Cyber Intelligence and Cyber
Counter-Offensive, with ‘full operational capacity’ by 2020.
A ‘Strategic Vision for Defence’ covering the period from
Europe 87
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL
Bosnia-Herzegovina BIH SP 60: 8 9P122 Malyutka; 9 9P133 Malyutka; 32 BOV-1;
Convertible Mark 2016 2017 2018
11 M-92
MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot
GDP mark 29.3bn 30.8bn
(AT-4 Spigot); 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn); HJ-8; Milan
US$ 16.6bn 17.5bn ARTILLERY 224
per capita US$ 4,298 4,540 TOWED 122mm 100 D-30
Growth % 2.0 2.5 MRL 122mm 24 APRA-40
Inflation % -1.1 1.8 MOR 120mm 100 M-75
Europe
Def bdgt mark 291m 286m
US$ 165m 162m
Air Force and Air Defence Brigade 800
FORCES BY ROLE
FMA (US) US$ 4m 4m 0m
HELICOPTER
US$1=mark 1.77 1.76
1 sqn with Bell 205; Mi-8MTV Hip; Mi-17 Hip H
Population 3,856,181 1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; SA-342H/L Gazelle (HN-42/45M)
Ethnic groups: Bosniac 50.1%; Serb 30.7%; Croat 15.4%; other or AIR DEFENCE
unspecified 3.7% 1 AD bn
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT
Male 6.9% 2.8% 3.1% 3.7% 26.5% 5.7%
FGA (7 J-22 Orao in store)
Female 6.4% 2.7% 2.9% 3.5% 27.0% 8.8%
ATK (6 J-1 (J-21) Jastreb; 3 TJ-1(NJ-21) Jastreb all in
store)
Capabilities ISR (2 RJ-1 (IJ-21) Jastreb* in store)
In mid-2017, Bosnia-Herzegovina adopted a ‘defence TRG (1 G-4 Super Galeb (N-62)* in store)
review, development and modernisation plan’ for the HELICOPTERS
period 2017–27. The document calls for a reduction in MRH 13: 4 Mi-8MTV Hip; 1 Mi-17 Hip H; 1 SA-341H
personnel and the restructuring of the Tactical Support Gazelle (HN-42); 7 SA-342L Gazelle (HN-45M)
Brigade. According to the review, the procurement of TPT 21: Medium 8 Mi-8 Hip Light 13 Bell 205 (UH-1H
armoured vehicles and helicopters is envisaged. The Iroquois)
reforms reportedly constitute part of the country’s TRG 1 Mi-34 Hermit
effort to join NATO. Bosnia’s aspiration to join NATO’s AIR DEFENCE
membership action plan remains delayed because of an SAM
unresolved defence-property issue, including defence- Short-range 20 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful)
ministry barracks and buildings. However, an August 2017
Point-defence 7+: 6 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9 Gaskin); 9K34
constitutional court decision reportedly may help Bosnia
Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin); 1 9K35M3 Strela-10M3 (SA-
move forward in its aspiration. Bosnia contributes to NATO
13 Gopher); 9K310 (SA-16 Gimlet)
peacekeeping missions, most notably in Afghanistan.
GUNS 764
ACTIVE 10,500 (Armed Forces 10,500) SP 169: 20mm 9 BOV-3 SPAAG; 30mm 154: 38 M53;
116 M-53/59; 57mm 6 ZSU-57-2
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE TOWED 595: 20mm 468: 32 M55A2, 4 M38, 1 M55
A2B1, 293 M55A3/A4, 138 M75; 23mm 38: 29 ZU-23,
Armed Forces 10,500 9 GSh-23; 30mm 33 M-53; 37mm 7 Type-55; 40mm
1 ops comd; 1 spt comd 49: 31 L60, 16 L70, 2 M-12
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE DEPLOYMENT
Light
3 inf bde (1 recce coy, 3 inf bn, 1 arty bn) AFGHANISTAN
COMBAT SUPPORT NATO • Operation Resolute Support 55
1 cbt spt bde (1 tk bn, 1 engr bn, 1 EOD bn, 1 int bn, 1
MP bn, 1 CBRN coy, 1 sigs bn) ALBANIA
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT OSCE • Albania 1
1 log comd (5 log bn)
ARMENIA/AZERBAIJAN
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
OSCE • Minsk Conference 1
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 45 M60A3 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
APC • APC (T) 20 M113A2 UN • MONUSCO 5 obs
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
VLB MTU MALI
MW Bozena UN • MINUSMA 2
SERBIA
OSCE • Kosovo 8
Bulgaria BLG
Bulgarian Lev L 2016 2017 2018
UKRAINE
GDP L 92.6bn 97.0bn
OSCE • Ukraine 37
US$ 52.4bn 56.0bn
per capita US$ 7,377 7,924
FOREIGN FORCES Growth % 3.4 3.6
Part of EUFOR – Operation Althea unless otherwise stated Inflation % -1.3 1.1
Albania 1 Def exp [a] L 1.19bn 1.51bn
Austria 191; 1 inf bn HQ US$ 671m 870m
Def bdgt [b] L 1.19bn 1.17bn
Azerbaijan OSCE 1
US$ 671m 676m
Bulgaria 10
Canada OSCE 3
US$1=L 1.77 1.73
Chile 15 [a] NATO definition
Czech Republic 2 • OSCE 1 [b] Excludes military pensions
Finland 4 
Greece 1
Hungary 165; 1 inf coy Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Ireland 5 • OSCE 1 Male 7.5% 2.6% 2.6% 3.3% 25.2% 7.8%

Female 7.1% 2.2% 2.4% 3.1% 25.0% 11.5%
Italy 4 • OSCE 6
Macedonia (FYORM) 3 • OSCE 1
Capabilities
Netherlands OSCE 1
Despite long-term plans for reform, Bulgaria’s armed
Poland 39
forces still rely heavily on Soviet-era equipment. In
Romania 39 2015, a development plan was adopted for the period
Russia OSCE 2 until 2020. The emphasis in training is on those units
Serbia OSCE 1 intended for international operations and those with
Slovakia 41 certain readiness levels declared to NATO and the EU.
There are as-yet-unapproved plans for new or second-
Slovenia 14
hand multi-role combat aircraft to replace the ageing
Spain 2 • OSCE 1 MiG-29 fleet. Questions have reportedly been raised
Switzerland 21 over the airworthiness of older aircraft. Under NATO’s
Turkey 199; 1 inf coy assurance measures, allied aircraft were deployed to
patrol Bulgarian airspace in 2017 under the Enhanced
United Kingdom 4; • OSCE 7
Air Policing programme. Sofia aims to also acquire naval
United States OSCE 5 patrol boats and armoured vehicles, and modernise its
warships. In 2017, Bulgaria launched a tender for the
purchase of two corvettes, in an attempt to boost its
capabilities in the Black Sea. Payments for its military-
modernisation projects, when approved, are expected to
be deferred, perhaps up to 2029, in an attempt to lessen
budget impact. Bulgaria hosted the Saber Guardian 2017
multinational exercise and reaffirmed its commitment to
Afghanistan, Kosovo and the EUFOR mission in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, sending additional personnel.

Central Staff 5,850)
RESERVE 3,000 (Joint 3,000)
Army 16,300
Europe 89
FORCES BY ROLE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 3

MANOEUVRE PCFG 1 Mulnaya† (ex-FSU Tarantul II) with 2 twin lnchr
Reconnaissance with P-15M Termit-M (SS-N-2C Styx) AShM, 2 AK630M
1 recce bn CIWS, 1 76mm gun
Mechanised PCT 2 Reshitelni (ex-FSU Pauk I) with 4 single 406mm TT,
2 mech bde (4 mech inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 76mm gun
log bn, 1 SAM bn) MINE COUNTERMEASURES 6
Light MHC 1 Tsibar (Tripartite – ex-BEL Flower)
1 mtn inf regt MSC 3 Briz (ex-FSU Sonya)
COMBAT SUPPORT MSI 2 Olya (ex-FSU)
Europe
1 arty regt (1 fd arty bn, 1 MRL bn) AMPHIBIOUS 1
1 engr regt (1 cbt engr bn, 1 ptn br bn, 1 engr spt bn) LCU 1 Vydra
1 NBC bn LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8: 2 AGS; 2 AOL; 1 ARS; 2
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ATF; 1 AX
1 log regt
Naval Aviation
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
HELICOPTERS • ASW 2 AS565MB Panther
MBT 90 T-72
IFV 160: 90 BMP-1; 70 BMP-23
Air Force 6,700
APC 120
Flying hours 30–40 hrs/yr
APC (T) 100 MT-LB
APC (W) 20 BTR-60 FORCES BY ROLE
AUV 17 M1117 ASV FIGHTER/ISR
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES 1 sqn with MiG-29A/UB Fulcrum
AEV MT-LB TRANSPORT
ARV T-54/T-55; MTP-1; MT-LB 1 sqn with An-30 Clank; C-27J Spartan; L-410UVP-E;
VLB BLG67; TMM PC-12M
NBC VEHICLES Maritza NBC TRAINING
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE 1 sqn with L-39ZA Albatros*
MSL 1 sqn with PC-9M
SP 24 9P148 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel) ATTACK HELICOPTER
MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs 1 sqn with Mi-24D/V Hind D/E
(AT-5 Spandrel); (9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger) in store) TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
GUNS 126: 85mm (150 D-44 in store); 100mm 126 MT-12 1 sqn with AS532AL Cougar; Bell 206 Jet Ranger; Mi-17
Hip H
ARTILLERY 311
SP 122mm 48 2S1 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
TOWED 152mm 24 D-20 AIRCRAFT 22 combat capable
MRL 122mm 24 BM-21 FTR 16: 12 MiG-29A Fulcrum; 4 MiG-29UB Fulcrum
MOR 120mm 215 2S11 SP Tundzha (Some MiG-21bis Fishbed/MiG-21UM Mongol B in store)
RADARS • LAND GS-13 Long Eye (veh); SNAR-1 Long ISR 1 An-30 Clank
Trough (arty); SNAR-10 Big Fred (veh, arty); SNAR-2/-6 TPT 7: Medium 3 C-27J Spartan; Light 4: 1 An-2T Colt; 2
Pork Trough (arty); Small Fred/Small Yawn (veh, arty) L-410UVP-E; 1 PC-12M
AIR DEFENCE TRG 12: 6 L-39ZA Albatros*; 6 PC-9M (basic)
HELICOPTERS
SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela (SA-7 Grail)‡; 24 9K33
ATK 6 Mi-24D/V Hind D/E
Osa (SA-8 Gecko)
MRH 6 Mi-17 Hip H
GUNS 400
TPT 18: Medium 12 AS532AL Cougar; Light 6 Bell 206
SP 23mm ZSU-23-4
Jet Ranger
TOWED 23mm ZU-23; 57mm S-60; 100mm KS-19
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES • EW Yastreb-2S
AIR DEFENCE
Navy 3,450 SAM
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Long-range S-200 (SA-5 Gammon); S-300 (SA-10
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES • 4 Grumble)
FFM 3 Drazki (ex-BEL Wielingen) with 1 octuple Mk29 Medium-range S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline)
GMLS with RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 single Short-range S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa); 2K12 Kub (SA-6
533mm ASTT with L5 HWT, 1 sextuple 375mm MLE Gainful)
54 Creusot-Loire A/S mor, 1 100mm gun (Fitted for AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
but not with 2 twin lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM) AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡ R-73 (AA-11 Archer) SARH
FF 1 Smeli (ex-FSU Koni) with 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S R-27R (AA-10 Alamo A)
mor, 2 twin 76mm guns ASM Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge); Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen)
Special Forces Principal tasks for the armed forces include defending
FORCES BY ROLE national sovereignty and territorial integrity and tackling
SPECIAL FORCES terrorism. Croatia joined NATO in 2009 having reformed
1 spec ops bde (1 SF bn, 1 para bn) its armed forces to create a small professional force, with
a focus on international peacekeeping duties. Zagreb aims
to continue modernising the armed forces, but economic
DEPLOYMENT challenges have caused delays, including the replacement
AFGHANISTAN of ageing Soviet-era equipment. Modernisation objectives
NATO • Operation Resolute Support 160 include an inshore patrol vessel, a prototype of which was
BLACK SEA launched in June 2017. There are also plans to eventually
NATO • SNMCMG 2: 1 MSC replace the MiG-21 fleet; the defence ministry aims to finish
evaluating related acquisition proposals by early 2018.
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA Exports of defence equipment, including small arms, have
EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 10 risen in recent years. Croatia regularly takes part in NATO
exercises, and in late 2017 deployed an army contingent to
MALI
Poland to join the US-led NATO battlegroup there.
EU • EUTM Mali 5
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Joint 1,850) Paramilitary 3,000
NATO • SNMG 2: 1 FFM
Conscript liability Voluntary conscription, 8 weeks
SERBIA
NATO • KFOR 20 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
OSCE • Kosovo 1
UKRAINE Joint 1,850 (General Staff )
OSCE • Ukraine 35 FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
FOREIGN FORCES 1 SF bn
Italy NATO Air Policing 4 Eurofighter Typhoon Army 11,250

FORCES BY ROLE
Croatia CRO MANOEUVRE 
Armoured
Croatian Kuna k 2016 2017 2018 1 armd bde (1 tk bn, 1 armd bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty
GDP k 345bn 357bn bn, 1 ADA bn, 1 cbt engr bn)
US$ 50.7bn 53.5bn Light
per capita US$ 12,165 12,863 1 mot inf bde (2 mech inf bn, 2 mot inf bn, 1 fd arty bn, 1
ADA bn, 1 cbt engr bn)
Growth % 3.0 2.9
Other
Inflation % -1.1 1.1
1 inf trg regt
Def exp [a] k 4.24bn 4.55bn COMBAT SUPPORT
US$ 623m 682m 1 arty/MRL regt
Def bdgt k 4.02bn 4.39bn 4.58bn 1 AT regt
US$ 591m 657m 1 engr regt
1 int bn
1 MP regt
US$1=k 6.80 6.68 1 NBC bn
[a] NATO definition 1 sigs regt
Population 4,292,095 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 log regt
Ethnic groups: Croatian 90.4%; Serbian 4.3%; Bosniac 0.7%;
Italian 0.4%; Hungarian 0.3%; other or unspecified 3.9 % AIR DEFENCE
1 ADA regt
Female 6.9% 2.6% 2.9% 3.0% 24.8% 11.6% MBT 75 M-84
IFV 102 M-80
APC 222
Capabilities APC (T) 15 BTR-50
In 2017, Croatia adopted a new National Security Strategy APC (W) 150: 1 BOV-VP; 23 LOV OP; 126 Patria AMV
and a Bill on its Homeland Security System. It also (incl variants)
announced its intention to increase the military budget. PPV 57: 37 Maxxpro; 20 RG-33 HAGA (amb)
Europe 91
AUV 151+: 4 Cougar HE; IVECO LMV; 147 M-ATV Air Force and Air Defence 1,250
Flying hours 50 hrs/yr
ARV M84A1; WZT-3
VLB 3 MT-55A FORCES BY ROLE
MW Bozena; 1 Rhino FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL 1 (mixed) sqn with MiG-21bis/UMD Fishbed
SP 28 POLO BOV 83 TRANSPORT
MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot 1 sqn with An-32 Cline
(AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 TRAINING
Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn); Milan (reported) 1 sqn with PC-9M; Z-242L
Europe
ARTILLERY 217 1 hel sqn with Bell 206B Jet Ranger II
SP 10: 122mm 8 2S1; 155mm 2 PzH 2000 (4 more being TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
modified for delivery) 2 sqn with Mi-8MTV Hip H; Mi-8T Hip C; Mi-171Sh
TOWED 64: 122mm 27 D-30; 130mm 19 M-46H1; EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
155mm 18 M1H1 AIRCRAFT 11 combat capable
MRL 39: 122mm 37: 6 M91 Vulkan; 31 BM-21 Grad; FGA 11: 8 MiG-21bis Fishbed; 3 MiG-21UMD Fishbed
128mm 2 LOV RAK M91 R24
TPT • Light 2 An-32 Cline
MOR 104: 82mm 29 LMB M96; 120mm 75: 70 M-75; 5
TRG 25: 20 PC-9M; 5 Z-242L
UBM 52
HELICOPTERS
AIR DEFENCE
MRH 27: 11 Mi-8MTV Hip H; 16 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior
SAM • Point 9 Strela-10
TPT 21: Medium 13: 3 Mi-8T Hip C; 10 Mi-171Sh; Light
GUNS 96
8 Bell 206B Jet Ranger II
SP 20mm 39 BOV-3 SP
TOWED 20mm 57 M55A4
ISR • Medium Hermes 450
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
Navy 1,300
Long-range S-300 (SA-10 Grumble)
Navy HQ at Split
Point-defence 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9 Gaskin); 9K34 Strela-3
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE (SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet)
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5 RADAR • AIR 11: 5 FPS-117; 3 S-600; 3 PRV-11
PCFG 1 Končar with 2 twin lnchr with RBS-15B Mk I AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
AShM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 57mm gun AAM • IR R-3S (AA-2 Atoll)‡; R-60; R-60MK
PCG 4: (AA-8 Aphid)
2 Kralj with 4 single lnchr with RBS-15B Mk I AShM, ASM AGM-114 Hellfire
1 AK630 CIWS, 1 57mm gun (with minelaying
capability) Special Forces Command
2 Vukovar (ex-FIN Helsinki) with 4 single lnchr with
FORCES BY ROLE
RBS-15B Mk I AShM, 1 57mm gun
SPECIAL FORCES
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES •
2 SF gp
MHI 1 Korcula
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 5: EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
LCT 2 Cetina (with minelaying capability) ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
LCVP 3: 2 Type-21; 1 Type-22 APC • PPV 5 Maxxpro
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AKL 1 AUV 15 M-ATV
COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 3 RBS-15K
Paramilitary 3,000
Marines Police 3,000 armed
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Amphibious DEPLOYMENT
2 indep mne coy AFGHANISTAN
Coast Guard NATO • Operation Resolute Support 94
FORCES BY ROLE INDIA/PAKISTAN
Two divisions, headquartered in Split (1st div) and Pula UN • UNMOGIP 9 obs
(2nd div)
LEBANON
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE UN • UNIFIL 1
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 4 Mirna
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT POLAND
AKL 1 PT-71 NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 78; 1 MRL bty with
AX 2 BM-21 Grad
SERBIA MANOEUVRE
NATO • KFOR 33; 1 hel unit with Mi-8 Hip Armoured
OSCE • Kosovo 1 1 lt armd bde (2 armd bn, 1 armd inf bn)
Mechanised
UKRAINE 1 (1st) mech inf div (1 armd recce bn, 2 mech inf bn)
OSCE • Ukraine 10 1 (2nd) mech inf div (1 armd recce bn, 2 armd bn, 2
WESTERN SAHARA mech inf bn)
UN • MINURSO 7 obs Light
3 (4th, 7th & 8th) lt inf bde (2 lt inf regt)
COMBAT SUPPORT
Cyprus CYP 1 arty comd (8 arty bn)
Euro € 2016 2017 2018
1 (3rd) spt bde
GDP € 17.9bn 18.7bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US$ 19.8bn 21.1bn
per capita US$ 23,352 24,741 MBT 134: 82 T-80U; 52 AMX-30B2
Growth % 2.8 3.4 RECCE 69 EE-9 Cascavel
Inflation % -1.2 0.8 IFV 43 BMP-3
Def bdgt € 302m 352m 352m APC 294
US$ 335m 397m APC (T) 168 Leonidas
APC (W) 126 VAB (incl variants)
US$1=€ 0.90 0.89
Population 1,221,549 ARV 3: 2 AMX-30D; 1 BREM-1
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus MSL
Male 8.0% 3.1% 4.4% 4.8% 25.5% 5.2% SP 33: 15 EE-3 Jararaca with Milan; 18 VAB with HOT
Female 7.6% 2.7% 3.6% 4.0% 24.2% 6.9% MANPATS Milan
RCL 106mm 144 M40A1
Capabilities GUNS • TOWED 100mm 20 M-1944
ARTILLERY 432
Although Cyprus’ National Guard contains air, land, sea SP 155mm 24: 12 Mk F3; 12 Zuzana
and special-forces units, it is predominantly a land force. TOWED 84: 105mm 72 M-56; 155mm 12 TR-F-1
Its main objective is to deter any possible Turkish incursion, MRL 22: 122mm 4 BM-21; 128mm 18 M-63 Plamen
and to provide enough opposition until military support MOR 302: 81mm 170 E-44 (70+ M1/M9 in store); 107mm
can be provided by Greece, its primary ally. The air wing 20 M2/M30; 120mm 112 RT61
has a small number of rotary- and fixed-wing utility AIR DEFENCE
platforms, including attack helicopters, while the maritime SAM
wing is essentially a coastal-defence and constabulary force. Medium-range 4 9K37M1 Buk M1-2 (SA-11 Gadfly)
In 2017, Cyprus displayed its Buk M1-2 medium-range SAM Short-range 18: 12 Aspide; 6 9K322 Tor (SA-15 Gauntlet)
systems, which have boosted its air-defence capability. Point-defence Mistral
Having reduced conscript liability in 2016, Nicosia began GUNS • TOWED 60: 20mm 36 M-55; 35mm 24 GDF-003
recruiting additional contract-service personnel, as part
(with Skyguard)
of the effort to modernise and professionalise its forces.
Cyprus exercised with several international partners in Maritime Wing
2017. Expeditionary deployments have been limited, with
FORCES BY ROLE
some officers joining EU and UN missions.
COMBAT SUPPORT
ACTIVE 15,000 (National Guard 15,000) 1 (coastal defence) AShM bty with MM40 Exocet
Paramilitary 750 AShM
Conscript liability 14 months EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
RESERVE 50,000 (National Guard 50,000) PBF 4: 2 Rodman 55; 2 Vittoria
Reserve service to age 50 (officers dependent on rank; COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 3 MM40 Exocet
military doctors to age 60)
Air Wing
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT
National Guard 15,000 (incl conscripts) TPT • Light 1 BN-2B Islander
FORCES BY ROLE TRG 1 PC-9
SPECIAL FORCES HELICOPTERS
1 comd (regt) (1 SF bn) ATK 11 Mi-35P Hind
Europe 93
MRH 7: 3 AW139 (SAR); 4 SA342L1 Gazelle (with RESERVE 26,000 (first line 11,000; second line
HOT for anti-armour role) 10,000; third line 5,000)
TPT • Light 2 Bell 206L3 Long Ranger
Reserve liability to age 50
Paramilitary 750+
Armed Police 500+
FORCES BY ROLE
Army ε3,500
MANOEUVRE
Other FORCES BY ROLE
Europe
1 (rapid-reaction) paramilitary unit MANOEUVRE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Light
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 7 inf bn
APC • APC (W) 2 VAB VTT EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
HELICOPTERS • MRH 4: 2 AW139; 2 Bell 412SP ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL • MANPATS Milan
Maritime Police 250 RCL • 106mm 36
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARTILLERY • MOR • 120mm 73
PBF 5: 2 Poseidon; 1 Shaldag; 2 Vittoria
Paramilitary
PB 5 SAB-12
Armed Police ε150 
DEPLOYMENT FORCES BY ROLE
LEBANON SPECIAL FORCES
1 (police) SF unit
UN • UNIFIL 2
Coast Guard
FOREIGN FORCES PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6
Argentina UNFICYP 277; 2 inf coy; 1 hel flt PCC 5: 2 SG45/SG46; 1 Rauf Denktash; 2 US Mk 5
Austria UNFICYP 4 PB 1
Bangladesh UNFICYP 1
Brazil UNFICYP 1 FOREIGN FORCES
Canada UNFICYP 1
TURKEY
Chile UNFICYP 14
Army ε36,500
Greece Army: 950; ε200 (officers/NCO seconded to Greek-
Cypriot National Guard) FORCES BY ROLE
Hungary UNFICYP 77; 1 inf pl 1 corps HQ, 1 armd bde, 2 mech inf div, 1 avn comd
Paraguay UNFICYP 14 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Serbia UNFICYP 47; elm 1 inf coy ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Slovakia UNFICYP 169; elm 1 inf coy; 1 engr pl MBT 348: 8 M48A2 (trg); 340 M48A5T1/2
Ukraine UNFICYP 2 APC • APC (T) 627: 361 AAPC (incl variants); 266
United Kingdom 2,260; 2 inf bn; 1 hel sqn with 4 Bell 412 M113 (incl variants)
Twin Huey • Operation Inherent Resolve (Shader) 500: 1 FGA ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
sqn with 6 Tornado GR4; 6 Typhoon FGR4; 1 Sentinel R1; 1 MSL • MANPATS Milan; TOW
E-3D Sentry; 1 A330 MRTT Voyager KC3; 2 C-130J Hercules RCL 106mm 192 M40A1
• UNFICYP 277: 1 inf coy ARTILLERY 648
SP 155mm 90 M44T
TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT TOWED 102: 105mm 72 M101A1; 155mm 18 M114A2;
DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE 203mm 12 M115
CONTROL MRL 122mm 6 T-122
MOR 450: 81mm 175; 107mm 148 M30; 120mm 127
Data here represents the de facto situation on the northern
HY-12
section of the island. This does not imply international
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 1 PB
recognition as a sovereign state.
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 3 Cessna 185 (U-17)
HELICOPTERS • TPT 4 Medium 1 AS532UL Cougar
Capabilities Light 3 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois)
ACTIVE 3,500 (Army 3,500) Paramilitary 150 AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 20mm Rh 202;
Conscript liability 15 months 35mm 16 GDF-003; 40mm 48 M1
ACTIVE 23,200 (Army 12,250 Air 5,850 Other

Czech Republic CZE 3,650)
Czech Koruna Kc 2016 2017 2018
GDP Kc 4.77tr 4.99tr ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
US$ 195bn 210bn
per capita US$ 18,508 19,818 Army 12,250
Growth % 2.6 3.5 FORCES BY ROLE
Inflation % 0.7 2.3 MANOEUVRE
Reconnaissance
Def exp [a] Kc 45.6bn 52.5bn
1 ISR/EW regt (1 recce bn, 1 EW bn)
US$ 1.87bn 2.20bn
Armoured
Def bdgt [b] Kc 47.8bn 52.5bn 58,9bn 1 (7th) mech bde (1 tk bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 mot inf bn)
US$ 1.96bn 2.21bn Mechanised
FMA (US) US$ 0.5m 0m 0m 1 (4th) rapid reaction bde (2 mech inf bn, 1 mot inf bn,
US$1=Kc 24.44 23.82 1 AB bn)
[a] NATO definition COMBAT SUPPORT
1 (13th) arty regt (2 arty bn)
[b] Includes military pensions
1 engr regt (3 engr bn, 1 EOD bn)
Population 10,674,723 1 CBRN regt (2 CBRN bn)
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 1 log regt (2 log bn, 1 maint bn)
Male 7.8% 2.3% 2.7% 3.4% 25.2% 7.9%
Female 7.4% 2.1% 2.5% 3.2% 24.5% 11.1% Active Reserve
FORCES BY ROLE
Capabilities COMMAND
14 (territorial defence) comd
The Czech national-security strategy published in 2015 MANOEUVRE
confirms that NATO is central to national security and asserts Armoured
that stability and security in Europe have deteriorated. A 1 armd coy
direct military attack was deemed unlikely, but aggression Light
against NATO or EU member states could not be ruled 14 inf coy (1 per territorial comd) (3 inf pl, 1 cbt spt pl,
out. The Czech defence strategy, published in March 1 log pl)
2017, confirms the overall assessment, pointing to Russian EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
assertiveness, an arc of instability to the south and southeast ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
of Europe, and information warfare, including cyber MBT 30 T-72M4CZ (93 T-72 in store)
attacks, as drivers in the government’s analysis. According RECCE (34 BPzV Svatava in store)
to the Concept of the Czech Armed Forces 2025, adopted in IFV 222: 120 BMP-2; 102 Pandur II (inc variants); (98
December 2015, armed-forces restructuring will proceed in BMP-1; 65 BMP-2 all in store)
two phases, with recruitment and equipment procurement APC
the focus to 2020, shifting to the modernisation of existing APC (T) (17 OT-90 in store)
equipment and infrastructure in 2020–25. The long-term APC (W) (3 OT-64 in store)
defence-planning guidelines for 2030, published in 2015, AUV 21 Dingo 2; IVECO LMV
support an increase in active personnel to 27,000 (confirmed ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
in the 2017 defence strategy). With defence spending ARV 10 VPV-ARV (12 more in store)
on an upward trajectory since 2015, the government is VLB 3 MT-55A (3 more in store)
trying to use these additional resources to replace legacy MW UOS-155 Belarty
equipment in order to both modernise the armed forces ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
and reduce dependence on Russia for spares and services. MSL • MANPATS 9K111-1 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel);
Recruitment is also a priority. Some units are severely under Spike-LR
strength, achieving just 60% of their nominal strength. The ARTILLERY 96
government adopted an Active Reserve Law in 2016, and an SP 152mm 48 M-77 Dana (38 more in store)
increase in reserve strength is planned. In February 2017, the MOR 120mm 48: 40 M-1982; 8 SPM-85; (45 M-1982 in
Czech Republic signed a letter of intent with Germany to store)
affiliate the 4th Czech Rapid Deployment Brigade with the RADAR • LAND 3 ARTHUR
10th German Armoured Division under NATO’s Framework
Nations Concept. Training and exercise activities are set Air Force 5,850
to follow, with the aim of improving interoperability and Principal task is to secure Czech airspace. This mission is
supporting the provision of large formations for follow-on fulfilled within NATO Integrated Extended Air Defence
forces in NATO operations. System (NATINADS) and, if necessary, by means of the
Europe 95
Czech national reinforced air-defence system. The air force were subsequently established. The Cyber Security Act
also provides CAS for army SAR, and performs a tpt role entered into force in January 2015. A new National Cyber
Flying hours 120 hrs/yr cbt ac; 150 for tpt ac Security Strategy and an Action Plan for 2015–20 were
published. The former states that the country will look ‘to
FORCES BY ROLE increase national capacities for active cyber defence and
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK cyber attack countermeasures’. The National Cyber and
1 sqn with Gripen C/D Information Security Agency was established on 1 August
1 sqn with L-159 ALCA; L-159T 2017 as the central body of state administration for cyber
TRANSPORT security, including the protection of classified information
2 sqn with A319CJ; C295M; CL-601 Challenger; L-410 in the area of information and communications systems
Europe
Turbolet; Yak-40 Codling and cryptographic protection, which was previously
TRAINING the responsibility of the NSA. The defence ministry is
1 sqn with L-39ZA Albatros*; L-159 ALCA; L-159T developing its own cyber-defence capabilities according to
ATTACK HELICOPTER specific tasks based on NATO or EU documents and the
1 sqn with Mi-24/Mi-35 Hind requirements of the National Action Plan. The defence-
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER ministry security director also leads on cyber security.
1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-171Sh
1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; PZL W-3A Sokol
AIR DEFENCE DEPLOYMENT
1 (25th) SAM regt (2 AD gp) AFGHANISTAN
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE NATO • Operation Resolute Support 267
FGA 14: 12 Gripen C; 2 Gripen D BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
ATK 21: 16 L-159 ALCA; 5 L-159T EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 2
TPT 15: Light 12: 4 C295M; 6 L-410 Turbolet; 2 Yak-40 OSCE • Bosnia-Herzegovina 1
Codling; PAX 3: 2 A319CJ; 1 CL-601 Challenger
TRG 9 L-39ZA Albatros*
UN • MONUSCO 3 obs
HELICOPTERS
ATK 17: 7 Mi-24 Hind D; 10 Mi-35 Hind E EGYPT
MRH 5 Mi-17 Hip H MFO 18; 1 C295M
TPT • Medium 30: 4 Mi-8 Hip; 16 Mi-171Sh; 10 PZL W3A
Sokol IRAQ
AIR DEFENCE • SAM Operation Inherent Resolve 30
Point-defence 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher); 9K32 MALI
Strela-2‡ (SA-7 Grail) (available for trg RBS-70 gunners); EU • EUTM Mali 41
RBS-70
UN • MINUSMA 1
AAM • IR AIM-9M Sidewinder; ARH AIM-120C-5 SERBIA
AMRAAM NATO • KFOR 9
BOMBS OSCE • Kosovo 1
Laser-guided: GBU Paveway UN • UNMIK 2 obs
Other Forces SYRIA/ISRAEL

UN • UNDOF 2
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES UKRAINE
1 SF gp OSCE • Ukraine 15
MANOEUVRE
Other
1 (presidential) gd bde (2 bn)
1 (honour guard) gd bn (2 coy)
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 int gp
1 (central) MP comd
3 (regional) MP comd
1 (protection service) MP comd
Cyber
In 2011, the National Security Authority (NSA) was
established as the country’s leading cyber-security body.
The National Cyber Security Centre, government CERT
(as part of the NSA) and the Cyber Security Council
Denmark DNK ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Danish Krone kr 2016 2017 2018 Army 8,200
GDP kr 2.06tr 2.14tr Div and bde HQ are responsible for trg only; if necessary,
US$ 307bn 324bn can be transformed into operational formations
per capita US$ 53,745 56,335 FORCES BY ROLE
Growth % 1.7 1.9 COMMAND
Inflation % 0.3 1 1 div HQ
Def exp [a] kr 24.2bn 25.2bn 2 bde HQ
MANOEUVRE
US$ 3.59bn 3.81bn
Reconnaissance
Def bdgt [b] kr 23.7bn 25.2bn 24.8bn 1 recce bn
US$ 3.51bn 3.81bn 1 ISR bn
US$1=kr 6.73 6.61 Armoured
[a] NATO definition 1 tk bn  
[b] Includes military pensions Mechanised
3 mech inf bn
Population 5,605,948 2 mech inf bn(-)
Age
COMBAT SUPPORT
0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
1 SP arty bn
Male 8.4% 3.3% 3.4% 3.2% 22.3% 8.6% 1 cbt engr bn
Female 8.0% 3.1% 3.3% 3.1% 22.6% 10.6% 1 construction bn
1 EOD bn
Capabilities 1 MP bn
1 sigs regt (1 sigs bn, 1 EW coy)
Danish military capabilities remain compact but effective
despite pressures on spending and deployments. In October
1 log regt (1 spt bn, 1 log bn, 1 maint bn, 1 med bn)
2017, the government presented a new draft defence
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
agreement covering the period 2018–23. It envisages an
increase in defence spending to deal with a deteriorating
MBT 34 Leopard 2A5 (23 more in store)
security environment. In particular, it is intended to
IFV 44 CV9030 Mk II
strengthen deterrence, cyber defence and Denmark’s role in
APC 314
international operations, as well as the armed forces’ ability
APC (T) 235 M113 (incl variants); (196 more in store
to support civilian authorities in national-security tasks.
awaiting disposal)
Specifically, Denmark plans to set up a heavy brigade by
APC (W) 79 Piranha III (incl variants)
2024 with enhanced capabilities, including ground-based
AUV 84 Eagle IV
air defence, and to establish a light infantry battalion to take
on patrol and guard missions in support of the police. In
ARV 10 Bergepanzer 2
addition, a situation centre to help respond to cyber attacks
VLB 6 Biber
is planned. Improved ties to NATO, NORDEFCO and other
MW 14 910-MCV-2
regional neighbours reflect an increasing trend in this area.
Denmark has contributed to the NATO Baltic Air Policing RCL 84mm 186 Carl Gustav
mission. A defence agreement, aimed at deterring Russia, ARTILLERY 24
was signed in April 2015 between Denmark, Finland, SP 155mm 12 M109
Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Procurement of the F-35A MOR • TOWED 120mm 12 Soltam K6B1
Joint Strike Fighter as a replacement for the country’s RADAR • LAND ARTHUR
ageing F-16AM/BM fleet was confirmed in June 2016, with AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger
airframe numbers reduced to 27 for cost reasons. Industrial
support from Terma, Denmark’s largest defence company, Navy 2,000
may have been important to the decision; some key F-35
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
sub-components and composites are produced by the
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 3
firm. The MH-60R Seahawk is replacing the ageing Lynx
DESTROYERS • DDGHM 3 Iver Huitfeldt with 4 quad
helicopter fleet operating on Danish naval vessels.
lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon Block II AShM, 1 32-cell
ACTIVE 16,100 (Army 8,200 Navy 2,000 Air 2,700 Mk41 VLS with RIM-162 ESSM SAM, 2 12-cell Mk56
Joint 3,200) VLS with RIM-162 SAM, 2 twin 324mm TT with MU90
Conscript liability 4–12 months, most voluntary LWT, 1 Millennium CIWS, 2 76mm guns (capacity 1
med hel)
RESERVES 45,700 (Army 34,300 Navy 5,300 Air PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 13
Force 4,750 Service Corps 1,350) PSOH 4 Thetis 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Super Lynx Mk90B)
Europe 97
PSO 2 Knud Rasmussen with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing Special Operations Command
platform FORCES BY ROLE
PCC 7: 1 Agdlek; 6 Diana SPECIAL FORCES
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 6 1 SF unit
MCI 4 MSF MK-I 1 diving unit
MSD 2 Holm
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 13 Reserves
ABU 2 (primarily used for MARPOL duties)
AE 1 Sleipner Home Guard (Army) 34,300 reservists (to age 50)
AG 2 Absalon (flexible support ships) with 4 quad lnchr FORCES BY ROLE
Europe
with RGM-84 Block 2 Harpoon 2 AShM, 3 12-cell Mk 56 MANOEUVRE
VLS with RIM-162B Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 twin 324mm Light
TT with MU90 LWT, 2 Millennium CIWS, 1 127mm gun 2 regt cbt gp (3 mot inf bn, 1 arty bn)
(capacity 2 AW101 Merlin; 2 LCP, 7 MBT or 40 vehicles; 5 (local) def region (up to 2 mot inf bn)
130 troops)
Home Guard (Navy) 4,500 reservists (to age 50)
AGS 2 Holm
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AKL 2 Seatruck
AXL 2 Holm
PB 30: 17 MHV800; 1 MHV850; 12 MHV900
AXS 2 Svanen
Home Guard (Air Force) 4,750 reservists (to age
Air Force 2,700 50)
Home Guard (Service Corps) 1,350 reservists
Tactical Air Command
Cyber
FORCES BY ROLE
A National Strategy for Cyber and Information Security
was released in December 2014. A Centre for Cyber
2 sqn with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon
Security (CFCS) was established in 2012 within the
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
defence-intelligence service. The CFCS is Denmark’s
1 sqn with Super Lynx Mk90B
national ICT security authority with three primary
SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
responsibilities: contribute to protecting Denmark against
1 sqn with AW101 Merlin cyber threats; assist in securing a solid and robust ICT
1 sqn with AS550 Fennec (ISR) critical infrastructure in Denmark; and warn of, protect
TRANSPORT against and counter cyber attacks. In addition to existing
1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules; CL-604 Challenger (MP/ cyber-defence capabilities, Denmark is in the process of
VIP) establishing a capacity that can execute defensive and
TRAINING offensive military operations in cyberspace.
1 unit with MFI-17 Supporter (T-17)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
DEPLOYMENT
FTR 44: 34 F-16AM Fighting Falcon; 10 F-16BM Fighting AFGHANISTAN
Falcon (30 operational) NATO • Operation Resolute Support 100
TPT 8: Medium 4 C-130J-30 Hercules; PAX 4 CL-604
IRAQ
Challenger (MP/VIP)
TRG 27 MFI-17 Supporter (T-17) Operation Inherent Resolve 190; 1 SF gp; 1 trg team
HELICOPTERS KUWAIT
ASW 9: 6 Super Lynx Mk90B; 3 MH-60R Seahawk Operation Inherent Resolve 20
MRH 8 AS550 Fennec (ISR) (4 more non-operational)
TPT • Medium 13 AW101 Merlin (8 SAR; 5 Tpt) MALI
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES UN • MINUSMA 64; 1 avn unit
AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder MEDITERRANEAN SEA
II; ARH AIM-120 AMRAAM NATO • SNMG 1: 1 DDGHM; 1 AG
ASM AGM-65 Maverick
BOMBS MIDDLE EAST
Laser-guided EGBU-12/GBU-24 Paveway II/III UN • UNTSO 12 obs
INS/GPS guided GBU-31 JDAM SERBIA
NATO • KFOR 35
Control and Air Defence Group
1 Control and Reporting Centre, 1 Mobile Control and SEYCHELLES
Reporting Centre. 4 Radar sites Combined Maritime Forces • CTF-150: 1 CL-604
SOUTH SUDAN voluntary rotational basis from NATO states. Estonia is a

UN • UNMISS 9 member of the UK-led multinational Joint Expeditionary
Force.
UKRAINE
OSCE • Ukraine 4 ACTIVE 6,600 (Army 5,700 Navy 400 Air 500)
Defence League 15,800
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
Conscript liability 8 months, officers and some specialists 11
Operation Inherent Resolve 20
months (Conscripts cannot be deployed)
Estonia EST RESERVE 12,000 (Joint 12,000)

Euro € 2016 2017 2018
GDP € 21.1bn 22.8bn
US$ 23.3bn 25.7bn Army 2,500; 3,200 conscript (total 5,700)
per capita US$ 17,786 19,618 4 def region. All units except one inf bn are reserve based
Growth % 2.1 4.0 FORCES BY ROLE
Def exp [a] € 450m 478m Light
US$ 497m 539m 1 (1st) bde (1 recce coy, 3 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AD bn, 1 cbt
Def bdgt [b] € 451m 481m 528m engr bn, 1 spt bn)
US$ 498m 543m 1 (2nd) inf bde (1 inf bn, 1 spt bn)
COMBAT SUPPORT
FMA (US) US$ 1.75m 1.6m 0m
1 sigs bn
US$1=€ 0.90 0.89
[a] NATO definition 1 log bn
Defence League 15,800
15 Districts
Ethnic groups: Estonian 70%; Russian 25%; Ukranian 1.7%;
Belarusian 1%; other or unspecified 2.3% EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus IFV 14 CV9035 (incl 2 CP)
Male 8.3% 2.2% 2.4% 3.6% 23.4% 6.7% APC 158
Female 7.9% 2.1% 2.2% 3.3% 24.6% 13.1% APC (W) 151: 56 XA-180 Sisu; 80 XA-188 Sisu; 15 BTR-
80
Capabilities PPV 7 Mamba
Estonian security policy is predicated on the goals of AEV 1 Leopard 1 AEV
ensuring sovereignty and territorial integrity. These ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
aims have been thrown into sharper focus since Russia’s MSL • MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; Milan
2014 annexation of Crimea and Moscow’s continuing RCL 160+; 106mm: 30 M40A1; 84mm Carl Gustav; 90mm
support for rebel forces in eastern Ukraine. In June 2017, 130 PV-1110
the government approved the 2017–26 National Defence ARTILLERY 376
Development Plan (NDPP), succeeding the 2013–22 plan. TOWED 66: 122mm 42 D-30 (H 63); 155mm 24 FH-70
The latest document reflects the worsening security MOR 310: 81mm 131: 41 B455; 10 NM 95; 80 M252;
environment in the Baltic region, and identifies the 120mm 179: 14 2B11; 165 M/41D
need for additional armoured mobility and armoured AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence Mistral
firepower, as well as increasing stocks of munitions.
The army began to take delivery of Dutch army-surplus Navy 300; 100 conscript (total 400)
CV90 AIFVs in late 2016. Increasing the number of annual
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
conscripts to 4,000, along with growing the total number
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4
of active personnel, are also part of the new NDPP. Given
MCCS 1 Tasuja (ex-DNK Lindormen)
the small size and limited capabilities of the armed forces,
MHC 3 Admiral Cowan (ex-UK Sandown)
however, the country is reliant on NATO membership as
a security guarantor. A 1,000-strong NATO battlegroup
Air Force 500
based in Estonia became operational in mid-2017 as part of
the Alliance’s Enhanced Forward Presence. In November
2017, Estonia once again hosted NATO’s Cyber Coalition FORCES BY ROLE
exercise. The country’s Amari air base also hosts a Baltic TRANSPORT
Air Policing combat-aircraft detachment drawn on a 1 sqn with An-2 Colt
Europe 99
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER MOLDOVA

1 sqn with R-44 Raven II OSCE • Moldova 1
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE NORTH SEA
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2 An-2 Colt
NATO • SNMCMG 1: 1 MHC
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 4 R-44 Raven II
SERBIA
Special Operations Forces NATO • KFOR 2
FORCES BY ROLE UKRAINE
SPECIAL FORCES OSCE • Ukraine 5
Europe
1 spec ops bn
Paramilitary FOREIGN FORCES

All NATO Enhanced Forward Presence unless stated
Border Guard Belgium NATO Baltic Air Policing 4 F-16AM Fighting
The Estonian Border Guard is subordinate to the Ministry Falcon
of the Interior. Air support is provided by the Estonian France 300; 1 armd inf coy(+)
Border Guard Aviation Corps United Kingdom 800; 1 armd inf bn HQ; 1 armd inf coy
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE (+); 1 engr sqn
PCO 2: 1 Kati; 1 Kindral Kurvits
PCC 1 Kou (FIN Silma)
Finland FIN
PB 9: 1 Pikker; 1 Valve; 8 (other) Euro € 2016 2017 2018
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCU 3 GDP € 216bn 223bn
LOGISTICS & SUPPORT • AGF 1 Balsam US$ 239bn 251bn
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2 L-410
per capita US$ 43,482 45,693
HELICOPTERS • MRH 3 AW139
Growth % 1.9 2.8
Cyber Inflation % 0.4 0.8
Estonia adopted a national Cyber Security Strategy in Def bdgt [a] € 2.80bn 2.83bn 2.87bn
2008 and in 2009 added a Cyber Security Council to the US$ 3.10bn 3.19bn
government’s Security Committee, which supports US$1=€ 0.90 0.89
strategic-level inter-agency cooperation. Tallinn hosts the [a] Excludes military pensions
NATO Cooperative Cyber Security Centre of Excellence
and the NATO Locked Shields cyber exercise takes place
annually in Estonia, as has the Cyber Coalition exercise since Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
2013. A Cyber Security Strategy for 2014–17 advocates Male 8.4% 2.8% 3.1% 3.2% 22.6% 9.2%
greater integration of capability, saying that specialists
Female 8.0% 2.6% 2.9% 3.1% 22.2% 11.9%
from the armed forces and the Estonian Defence League
will be integral in developing military cyber-defence
capabilities. The Estonian Defence League Act explicitly
Capabilities
integrates its (voluntary) Cyber Defence Unit into the Finland’s armed forces are primarily focused on territorial
national defence system. defence. The conflict in eastern Ukraine has sharpened
the focus on defence matters, as have incursions into
Baltic states’ airspace by Russian aircraft. The country’s
DEPLOYMENT
February 2017 Defence Report argues that changes in the
AFGHANISTAN security environment have increased the demands on the
NATO • Operation Resolute Support 6 armed forces. A period of defence-budget decreases was
reversed in 2016, but the 2017 report stresses that financial
IRAQ constraints are forcing trade-offs between long-term
Operation Inherent Resolve 7 procurement plans and operational readiness. In October
2015, the air force launched the HX Fighter Programme to
LEBANON
replace Finland’s F/A-18s with a new combat aircraft. The
UN • UNIFIL 38
government sent a request for proposals (RFP) regarding
MALI weapons and equipment to seven nations in October
EU • EUTM Mali 4 2017, and will issue a request for quotations (RFQ) in
UN • MINUSMA 10 spring 2018. The RFQ for the aircraft will also be issued
in spring 2018, with the replacement aircraft to be selected
MIDDLE EAST around 2021. The programme will likely need additional
UN • UNTSO 3 obs funding beyond the current budget. The government
has also suggested that budget cuts may result in fewer COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
aircraft being procured than originally planned, whilst the Some log unit
2018 RFP is expected to reflect the need for them to work HELICOPTER
alongside unmanned systems. Under Finland’s Squadron 1 hel bn
2020 programme, which is budgeted at €1.2 billion, the EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
navy will replace four patrol boats and two minelayers
with corvette-sized vessels capable of operating in shallow
MBT 160: 100 Leopard 2A4; 60 Leopard 2A6
water and very cold weather. Construction is scheduled to
IFV 196: 94 BMP-2; 102 CV90
begin in 2019 and run until 2024, and will be undertaken
APC 613
by local firms, with weapons and sensors procured
internationally. Finland’s principal multilateral defence APC (T) 142: 40 MT-LBu; 102 MT-LBV
relationships include the EU, NATO, NORDEFCO and the APC (W) 471: 260 XA-180/185 Sisu; 101 XA-202 Sisu
Northern Group, as well as strong bilateral cooperation, (CP); 48 XA-203 Sisu; 62 AMV (XA-360)
with Sweden and the US in particular. In February 2017, ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Finland signed a cyber-defence agreement with NATO. AEV 6 Leopard 2R CEV
The February 2017 defence report announced that the ARV 27: 15 MTP-LB; 12 VT-55A
wartime strength of the Finnish armed forces, after full VLB 27: 12 BLG-60M2; 6 Leopard 2S; 9 SISU Leguan
mobilisation and including Border Guard units, would rise MW Aardvark Mk 2; KMT T-55; RA-140 DS
to 280,000 troops. ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL • MANPATS Spike-MR; Spike-LR
ACTIVE 21,500 (Army 15,300 Navy 3,500 Air 2,700)
ARTILLERY 681
Paramilitary 2,700
SP 122mm 36 2S1 Gvozdika (PsH 74)
Conscript liability 5.5–8.5–11.5 months
TOWED 324: 122mm 234 D-30 (H 63); 130mm 36 M-46
RESERVE 216,000 (Army 170,000 Navy 20,000 Air (K 54); 155mm 54 K 83/GH-52 (K 98)
26,000) Paramilitary 11,500 MRL 56: 122mm 34 RM-70; 227mm 22 M270 MLRS
18,000 reservists a year do refresher training: total obliga- MOR 279+: 81mm Krh/71; 120mm 261 Krh/92; SP 120mm
tion 80 days (150 for NCOs, 200 for officers) between con- 18 XA-361 AMOS
script service and age 50 (NCOs and officers to age 60) HELICOPTERS
MRH 7: 5 Hughes 500D; 2 Hughes 500E
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE TPT • Medium 20 NH90 TTH
Army 5,000; 10,300 conscript (total 15,300) ISR • Medium 11 ADS-95 Ranger
AIR DEFENCE
FORCES BY ROLE
SAM
Finland’s army maintains a mobilisation strength of about
Short-range 44: 20 Crotale NG (ITO 90); 24 NASAMS
285,000. In support of this requirement, two conscription
cycles, each for about 13,500 conscripts, take place each year. II FIN (ITO 12)
After conscript training, reservist commitment is to the age of Point-defence 16+: 16 ASRAD (ITO 05); FIM-92 Stinger
60. Reservists are usually assigned to units within their local (ITO 15); RBS 70 (ITO 05/05M)
geographical area. All service appointments or deployments GUNS 400+: 23mm ItK 95/ZU-23-2 (ItK 61); 35mm ItK 88;
outside Finnish borders are voluntary for all members of the SP 35mm Leopard 2 ITK Marksman
armed services. All brigades are reserve based
Navy 1,600; 1,900 conscript (total 3,500)
Reserve Organisations 170,000 FORCES BY ROLE
FORCES BY ROLE Naval Command HQ located at Turku; with two
SPECIAL FORCES subordinate Naval Commands (Gulf of Finland and
1 SF bn Archipelago Sea); 1 Naval bde; 3 spt elm (Naval Materiel
MANOEUVRE Cmd, Naval Academy, Naval Research Institute)
Armoured
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
2 armd BG (regt)
Mechanised
2 (Karelia & Pori Jaeger) mech bde PCGM 4 Hamina with 4 RBS-15SF3 (MTO-85M) AShM,
Light 1 octuple VLS with Umkhonto-IR (ITO2004) SAM, 1
3 (Jaeger) bde 57mm gun
6 lt inf bde PBF 12 Jehu (U-700) (capacity 24 troops)
COMBAT SUPPORT PBG 4 Rauma with 6 RBS-15SF3 (MTO-85M) AShM
1 arty bde MINE WARFARE 15
1 AD regt MINE COUNTERMEASURES 10
7 engr regt MCC 3 Katanpää
3 sigs bn MSI 7: 4 Kiiski; 3 Kuha
Europe 101
MINELAYERS • ML 5: FORCES BY ROLE

2 Hameenmaa with 1 octuple VLS with Umkhonto-IR MARITIME PATROL
(ITO2004) SAM, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, up to 100–120 1 sqn with Do-228 (maritime surv); AS332 Super Puma;
mines, 1 57mm gun Bell 412 (AB-412) Twin Huey; Bell 412EP (AB-412EP)
3 Pansio with 50 mines Twin Huey;AW119KE Koala
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 51
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
LCM 1 Kampela
LCP 50 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 45
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 7 PSO 1 Turva with 1 hel landing platform
AG 3: 1 Louhi; 2 Hylje PCC 3: 2 Tursas; 1 Merikarhu
Europe
AX 4: 3 Fabian Wrede; 1 Lokki PB 41
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • UCAC 6
Coastal Defence AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2 Do-228
FORCES BY ROLE HELICOPTERS
MANOEUVRE MRH 5: 3 Bell 412 (AB-412) Twin Huey; 2 Bell 412EP
Amphibious (AB-412EP) Twin Huey
1 mne bde TPT 9: Medium 5 AS332 Super Puma; Light 4
COMBAT SUPPORT AW119KE Koala
1 cbt spt bde (1 AShM bty)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Reserve 11,500 reservists on mobilisation
COASTAL DEFENCE
AShM 4 RBS-15K AShM Cyber
ARTY • 130mm 30 K-53tk (static) Finland published a national cyber-security strategy in
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE 2013. A national implementation programme for this was
MSL • MANPATS Spike (used in AShM role) published in 2014 and updated in 2017. The Implementation
Programme for 2017–20 addresses the development of
Air Force 1,950; 750 conscript (total 2,700)
cyber security encompassing the state, business and the
3 Air Comds: Satakunta (West), Karelia (East), Lapland
individual. An updated version of the Security Strategy
(North)
for Society document was due to be published in autumn
Flying hours 90–140 hrs/yr
2017. In accordance with the strategy, the Finnish Defence
FORCES BY ROLE Forces will create a comprehensive cyber-defence capacity.
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK Meanwhile, the defence forces published a Cyber Defence
3 sqn with F/A-18C/D Hornet Concept in 2016 and created an internal implementation
ISR plan, in order to generate the required capabilities.
1 (survey) sqn with Learjet 35A The national strategy and the defence forces internal
TRANSPORT
concept encompass intelligence as well as offensive and
1 flt with C295M
defensive cyber capabilities. FOC is planned by 2020. The
4 (liaison) flt with PC-12NG
cyber division is organised under the defence forces’ C5
TRAINING
1 sqn with Hawk Mk50/51A/66* (air-defence and Agency. The European Centre of Excellence for Countering
ground-attack trg) Hybrid Threats was established in Helsinki on 11 April
1 unit with L-70 Vinka 2017.
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 109 combat capable DEPLOYMENT
FGA 62: 55 F/A-18C Hornet; 7 F/A-18D Hornet
MP 1 F-27-400M AFGHANISTAN
ELINT 1 C295M NATO • Operation Resolute Support 37
TPT • Light 10: 2 C295M; 3 Learjet 35A (survey; ECM
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
trg; tgt-tow); 5 PC-12NG
TRG 76: 1 G-115EA; 31 Hawk Mk50/51A*; 16 Hawk EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 4
Mk66*; 28 L-70 Vinka IRAQ
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR AIM-9 Operation Inherent Resolve 100; 1 trg team
Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder; ARH AIM-120C
AMRAAM LEBANON
BOMBS UN • UNIFIL 301; elm 1 inf bn
INS/GPS-guided GBU-31 JDAM; AGM-154C JSOW
MALI
Paramilitary EU • EUTM Mali 1
UN • MINUSMA 6
Border Guard 2,700
Ministry of Interior. 4 Border Guard Districts and 2 Coast MIDDLE EAST
Guard Districts UN • UNTSO 19 obs
SERBIA further equipment purchases. France’s deployments

NATO • KFOR 19 abroad have demonstrated its ability to support
expeditionary forces independently; however, the
SOMALIA
more recent focus on domestic security has reduced
EU • EUTM Somalia 7 training and limited the ability to deploy additional
SYRIA/ISRAEL troops overseas. Nevertheless, in April 2017 France
UN • UNDOF 2 deployed personnel to Estonia as part of NATO’s
Enhanced Forward Presence. Troops remain
UKRAINE deployed to Djibouti and on EU anti-piracy operations
OSCE • Ukraine 17 in the Indian Ocean, while personnel and equipment
remain active in the campaign against ISIS. (See pp. 74–5.)
France FRA ACTIVE 202,700 (Army 112,500 Navy 35,550 Air
Euro € 2016 2017 2018 41,150, Other Staffs 13,500) Paramilitary 103,400
GDP € 2.23tr 2.28tr RESERVE 32,300 (Army 18,750 Navy 5,200 Air 4,800
US$ 2.47tr 2.57tr Other Staffs 3,550) Paramilitary 40,000
per capita US$ 38,178 39,673
Growth % 1.2 1.6 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Inflation % 0.3 1.2
Def exp [a] € 40.0bn 40.9bn Strategic Nuclear Forces
US$ 44.2bn 46.1bn
Def bdgt [b] € 42.3bn 43.1bn 45.0bn Navy 2,200
US$ 46.8bn 48.6bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US$1=€ 0.90 0.89 SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC • SSBN 4
1 Le Triomphant with 16 M45 SLBM with 6 TN-75
[a] NATO definition
nuclear warheads, 4 single 533mm TT with F17 Mod
[b] Includes pensions
2 HWT/SM-39 Exocet AShM (in refit until 2018/19)
Population 67,106,161 3 Le Triomphant with 16 M51 SLBM with 6 TN-75
nuclear warheads, 4 single 533mm TT with F17 Mod
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 2 HWT/SM-39 Exocet AShM
Male 9.5% 3.1% 2.9% 3.0% 22.0% 8.4% AIRCRAFT • FGA 20 Rafale M F3 with ASMP-A msl
Female 9.1% 2.9% 2.8% 2.9% 22.2% 11.1%
Air Force 1,800
Capabilities Air Strategic Forces Command
France continues to play a leading military role in the FORCES BY ROLE
EU, NATO and the UN, and maintains a full-spectrum STRIKE
war-fighting capability. The armed forces are focused 1 sqn with Mirage 2000N with ASMPA msl
on external deployments in sub-Saharan Africa and 1 sqn with Rafale B with ASMPA msl
the Middle East, and the domestic deployment on TANKER
Opération Sentinelle. A Strategic Review, released in late 1 sqn with C-135FR; KC-135 Stratotanker
2017, did not question these commitments, although EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Sentinelle will likely be revised following criticism over its AIRCRAFT 43 combat capable
effect. The high tempo of deployments has increased FGA 43: 23 Mirage 2000N; 20 Rafale B
the stress on equipment. There are also concerns about TKR/TPT 11 C-135FR
equipment availability. Allies and external contractors TKR 3 KC-135 Stratotanker
are relied on for some military air transport, raising
the costs of transporting equipment to operations. Paramilitary
France has a sophisticated defence industry, with most
procurement undertaken domestically. However, Gendarmerie 40
President Macron has called for increased European
defence cooperation. France and Germany announced Space
that they were exploring the potential development of a EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
new combat aircraft, and there are ongoing negotiations SATELLITES 9
with Italy for a rapprochement between the two COMMUNICATIONS 3: 2 Syracuse-3 (designed to inte-
countries’ main shipbuilding groups. The government grate with UK Skynet & ITA Sicral); 1 Athena-Fidus (also
has pledged to meet NATO’s 2% of GDP defence- used by ITA)
spending target in 2025 and raised the defence budget by ISR 4: 2 Helios (2A/2B); 2 Pleiades
€1.8 billion in 2018, including funds earmarked for EARLY WARNING 2 Spirale
Europe 103
Army 112,500 Special Operation Forces 2,200

Regt and BG normally bn size FORCES BY ROLE
COMMAND 2 SF regt
1 corps HQ (CRR-FR) HELICOPTER
2 div HQ 1 hel regt
MANOEUVRE
Reconnaissance Reserves 18,750 reservists
1 recce regt Reservists form 79 UIR (Reserve Intervention Units) of
Europe
Armoured about 75 to 152 troops, for ‘Proterre’ – combined land
1 (2nd) armd bde (2 tk regt, 3 armd inf regt, 1 SP arty projection forces bn, and 23 USR (Reserve Specialised
regt, 1 engr regt) Units) of about 160 troops, in specialised regt
1 (7th) armd bde (1 tk regt, 1 armd BG, 3 armd inf regt, EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 SP arty regt, 1 engr regt)  ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
1 armd BG (UAE) MBT 200 Leclerc
Mechanised ASLT 248 AMX-10RC
1 (6th) lt armd bde (2 armd cav regt, 1 armd inf regt, 1 RECCE 1,542: 80 ERC-90F4 Sagaie; 1,462 VBL/VB2L
mech inf regt, 1 mech inf regt(-), 1 SP arty regt, 1 engr IFV 629: 519 VBCI VCI; 110 VBCI VCP (CP)
regt) APC 2,342
1 (FRA/GER) mech bde (1 armd cav regt, 1 mech inf regt) APC (T) 53 BvS-10
1 mech regt (Djibouti) APC (W) 2,289: 2,200 VAB; 89 VAB VOA (OP)
Light AUV 16 Aravis
1 (27th) mtn bde (1 armd cav regt, 3 mech inf regt, 1 arty ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
regt, 1 engr regt) AEV 54 AMX-30EBG
3 inf regt (French Guiana & French West Indies) ARV 48+: 30 AMX-30D; 18 Leclerc DNG; VAB-EHC
1 inf regt (New Caledonia) VLB 67: 39 EFA; 18 PTA; 10 SPRAT
1 inf bn (Côte d’Ivoire) MW 24+: AMX-30B/B2; 4 Buffalo; 20 Minotaur
1 inf coy (Mayotte) NBC VEHICLES 40 VAB NRBC
Air Manoeuvre ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL
1 (11th) AB bde (1 armd cav regt, 4 para regt, 1 arty regt, SP 295: 110 VAB Milan; 185 VAB Eryx
1 engr regt, 1 spt regt) MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; Milan
1 AB regt (La Réunion) ARTILLERY 262+
1 AB bn (Gabon) SP 155mm 109: 32 AU-F-1; 77 CAESAR
Amphibious TOWED 155mm 12 TR-F-1
1 (9th) amph bde (2 armd cav regt, 1 armd inf regt, 2 MRL 227mm 13 M270 MLRS
mech inf regt, 1 SP arty regt, 1 engr regt) MOR 128+: 81mm LLR 81mm; 120mm 128 RT-F-1
Other RADAR • LAND 66: 10 Cobra; 56 RASIT/RATAC
4 SMA regt (French Guiana, French West Indies & In- AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 13: 5 PC-6B Turbo Porter; 5 TBM-
dian Ocean) 700; 3 TBM-700B
3 SMA coy (French Polynesia, Indian Ocean & New HELICOPTERS
Caledonia) ATK 62: 39 Tiger HAP; 23 Tiger HAD
COMBAT SUPPORT MRH 117: 18 AS555UN Fennec; 99 SA341F/342M Gazelle
1 MRL regt (all variants)
2 engr regt TPT 160: Heavy 8 H225M Caracal (CSAR); Medium 117:
2 EW regt 26 AS532UL Cougar; 23 NH90 TTH; 68 SA330 Puma;
1 int bn Light 35 H120 Colibri (leased)
1 CBRN regt UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
5 sigs regt ISR • Medium 25 SDTI (Sperwer)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence Mistral
5 tpt regt
1 log regt Navy 35,500
1 med regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
3 trg regt SUBMARINES 10
HELICOPTER STRATEGIC • SSBN 4:
1 (4th) hel bde (3 hel regt) 1 Le Triomphant opcon Strategic Nuclear Forces with 16
ISR UAV M45 SLBM with 6 TN-75 nuclear warheads, 4 single
1 UAV regt 533mm TT with F17 Mod 2 HWT/SM39 Exocet AShM
AIR DEFENCE (currently undergoing modernisation programme to
1 SAM regt install M51 SLBM; expected completion 2018/19)
3 Le Triomphant opcon Strategic Nuclear Forces with 16 AMPHIBIOUS

M51 SLBM with 6 TN-75 nuclear warheads, 4 single PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 3
533mm TT with F17 Mod 2 HWT/SM39 Exocet AShM LHD 3 Mistral with 2 twin Simbad lnchr with Mistral
TACTICAL • SSN 6: SAM (capacity up to 16 NH90/SA330 Puma/AS532
6 Rubis with 4 single 533mm TT with F17 Mod 2 HWT/ Cougar/Tiger hel; 2 LCAC or 4 LCM; 13 MBTs; 50
SM39 Exocet AShM AFVs; 450 troops)
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 23 LANDING CRAFT 38
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 1 LCT 4 EDA-R
CVN 1 Charles de Gaulle with 4 octuple VLS with LCM 9 CTM
Aster 15 SAM, 2 sextuple Sadral lnchr with Mistral LCVP 25 
SAM (capacity 35–40 Rafale M/E-2C Hawkeye/AS365
ABU 1 Telenn Mor
Dauphin) (In refit until late 2018)
AG 3 Chamois
DESTROYERS • DDGHM 11:
AGE 2: 1 Corraline; 1 Lapérouse (used as trials ships for
2 Cassard with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block
mines and divers)
2 AShM, 1 Mk13 GMLS with SM-1MR SAM, 2 AGI 1 Dupuy de Lome
sextuple Sadral lnchr with Mistral SAM, 2 single AGM 1 Monge
533mm ASTT with L5 Mod 4 HWT, 1 100mm gun AGOR 2: 1 Pourquoi pas? (used 150 days per year by
(capacity 1 AS565SA Panther ASW hel) Ministry of Defence; operated by Ministry of Research
2 Forbin with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 and Education otherwise); 1 Beautemps-beaupré
AShM, 4 8-cell Sylver A50 VLS with Aster 30 SAM, AGS 3 Lapérouse
2 8-cell Sylver A50 VLS with Aster 15 SAM, 2 twin AORH 3 Durance with 1-3 twin Simbad lnchr with Mistral
324mm ASTT with MU90, 2 76mm gun (capacity 1 SAM (capacity 1 SA319 Alouette III/AS365 Dauphin/Lynx)
NH90 TTH hel) ATF 3: 2 Malabar; 1 Revi
1 Georges Leygues with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet AXL 10: 8 Léopard; 2 Glycine
AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with Crotale SAM, , 2 sextuple AXS 4: 2 La Belle Poule; 2 other
Sadral lnchr with Mistral SAM, 2 single 533mm ASTT
with L5 HWT, 1 100mm gun (capacity 2 Lynx hel) Naval Aviation 6,500
3 Georges Leygues (mod) with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Flying hours 180–220 hrs/yr on strike/FGA ac
Exocet AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with Crotale SAM, 2 FORCES BY ROLE
twin Simbad lnchr with Mistral SAM, 2 single 324mm STRIKE/FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 100mm gun (capacity 2 2 sqn with Rafale M F3
Lynx hel) 1 sqn (forming) with Rafale M F3
3 Aquitaine with 2 8-cell Sylver A70 VLS with MdCN ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE
(SCALP Naval) LACM, 2 quad lnchr with MM40 1 sqn with AS565SA Panther
Exocet Block 3 AShM, 2 8-cell Sylver A43 VLS with ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
Aster 15 SAM, 2 twin B515 324mm ASTT with MU90 2 sqn (forming) with NH90 NFH
LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 NFH hel) 1 sqn with Lynx Mk4
FRIGATES • FFGHM 11: MARITIME PATROL
6 Floreal with 2 single lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, 2 sqn with Atlantique 2
1 sqn with Falcon 20H Gardian
1 twin Simbad lnchr with Mistral SAM, 1 100mm gun
1 sqn with Falcon 50MI
(capacity 1 AS565SA Panther hel)
5 La Fayette with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block
1 sqn with E-2C Hawkeye
3 AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with Crotale SAM (space for
SEARCH & RESCUE
fitting 2 octuple VLS lnchr for Aster 15/30), 1 100mm
1 sqn with AS365N/F Dauphin 2
gun (capacity 1 AS565SA Panther/SA321 Super Frelon TRAINING
hel) 1 sqn with EMB 121 Xingu
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 23 1 unit with SA319B Alouette III
FSM 9 D’Estienne d’Orves with 1 twin Simbad lnchr with 1 unit with Falcon 10MER
Mistral SAM, 4 single ASTT, 1 100mm gun 1 unit with CAP 10M
PSO 3 d’Entrecasteaux with 1 hel landing platform EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PCC 6: 3 L’Audacieuse (all deployed in the Pacific or AIRCRAFT 54 combat capable
Caribbean); 3 Flamant FGA 42 Rafale M F3
PCO 5: 1 La Confiance, 1 Lapérouse; 1 Le Malin; 1 Fulmar; 1 ASW 12 Atlantique 2 (10 more in store)
L’Adroit (Gowind) AEW&C 3 E-2C Hawkeye
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 18 SAR 4 Falcon 50MS
MCD 4 Vulcain TPT 26: Light 11 EMB-121 Xingu; PAX 15: 6 Falcon
MHC 3 Antarès 10MER; 5 Falcon 20H Gardian; 4 Falcon 50MI
MHO 11 Éridan TRG 7 CAP 10M
Europe 105
HELICOPTERS TANKER
ASW 34: 16 Lynx Mk4; 18 NH90 NFH 1 sqn with C-135FR; KC-135 Stratotanker
MRH 45: 9 AS365N/F/SP Dauphin 2; 2 AS365N3; 16 TANKER/TRANSPORT
AS565SA Panther; 18 SA319B Alouette III 2 sqn with C-160R Transall
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES TRANSPORT
AAM • IR R-550 Magic 2; IIR Mica IR; ARH Mica RF 1 sqn with A310-300; A330; A340-200 (on lease)
ASM AASM; AS-30L 1 sqn with A400M
AShM AM39 Exocet 2 sqn with C-130H/H-30 Hercules; C-160R Transall
LACM ASMP-A 2 sqn with CN235M
BOMBS 1 sqn with EMB-121
Europe
Laser-guided: GBU-12 Paveway II 1 sqn with Falcon 7X (VIP); Falcon 900 (VIP); Falcon 2000
3 flt with TBM-700A
Marines 2,000 1 (mixed) gp with AS532 Cougar; C-160 Transall; DHC-6-
300 Twin Otter
Commando Units 550 TRAINING
FORCES BY ROLE 1 OCU sqn with Mirage 2000D
MANOEUVRE 1 OCU sqn with Rafale B/C F3
Reconnaissance 1 OCU sqn with SA330 Puma; AS555 Fennec
1 recce gp 1 OCU unit with C-160 Transall
Amphibious 1 (aggressor) sqn with Alpha Jet*
2 aslt gp 4 sqn with Alpha Jet*
1 atk swimmer gp 3 sqn with Grob G120A-F; TB-30 Epsilon
1 raiding gp 1 OEU with Mirage 2000, Rafale, Alpha Jet*
COMBAT SUPPORT TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 cbt spt gp 2 sqn with AS555 Fennec
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 2 sqn with AS332C/L Super Puma; SA330 Puma; H225M
1 spt gp ISR UAV
1 sqn with Harfang; MQ-9A Reaper
Fusiliers-Marin 1,450 AIR DEFENCE
FORCES BY ROLE 3 sqn with Crotale NG; SAMP/T
MANOEUVRE  1 sqn with SAMP/T
Other EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
2 sy gp SATELLITES see Space
7 sy coy AIRCRAFT 294 combat capable
FTR 41: 35 Mirage 2000-5/2000C; 6 Mirage 2000B
Reserves 5,200 reservists FGA 189: 67 Mirage 2000D; 22 Mirage 2000N; 52 Rafale B;
48 Rafale C
Air Force 41,150
ELINT 2 C-160G Gabriel (ESM)
Flying hours 180 hrs/yr AEW&C 4 E-3F Sentry
FORCES BY ROLE TKR 3 KC-135 Stratotanker
STRIKE TKR/TPT 11 C-135FR
1 sqn with Mirage 2000N with ASMPA msl TPT 128: Heavy 11 A400M; Medium 35: 5 C-130H
1 sqn with Rafale B with ASMPA msl Hercules; 9 C-130H-30 Hercules; 21 C-160R Transall; Light
SPACE 70: 19 CN235M-100; 8 CN235M-300; 5 DHC-6-300 Twin
1 (satellite obs) sqn Otter; 23 EMB-121 Xingu; 15 TBM-700; PAX 12: 3 A310-
FIGHTER 300; 1 A330; 2 A340-200 (on lease); 2 Falcon 7X; 2 Falcon
1 sqn with Mirage 2000-5 900 (VIP); 2 Falcon 2000
1 sqn with Mirage 2000B/C TRG 107: 64 Alpha Jet*; 18 Grob G120A-F; 25 TB-30
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK Epsilon (incl many in storage)
3 sqn with Mirage 2000D HELICOPTERS
1 (composite) sqn with Mirage 2000-5/D (Djibouti) MRH 37 AS555 Fennec
2 sqn with Rafale B/C TPT 43: Heavy 11 H225M Caracal; Medium 32: 3
1 sqn with Rafale B/C (UAE) AS332C Super Puma; 4 AS332L Super Puma; 3 AS532UL
ELECTRONIC WARFARE Cougar (tpt/VIP); 22 SA330B Puma
1 flt with C-160G Gabriel (ESM) UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL CISR • Heavy 6 MQ-9A Reaper (unarmed)
1 (Surveillance & Control) sqn with E-3F Sentry ISR • Heavy 4 Harfang
SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT AIR DEFENCE
4 sqn with C-160R Transall; CN235M; SA330 Puma; SAM
AS555 Fennec (Djibouti, French Guiana, Gabon, Indian Long-range 9 SAMP/T; Short-range 12 Crotale NG
Ocean & New Caledonia) GUNS 20mm Cerbere 76T2
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES doctrine acknowledges the presence of a Tailored Access

AAM • IR R-550 Magic 2; IIR Mica IR; ARH Mica RF Unit, which has in fact been in existence for over 30 years
ASM AASM; AS-30L; Apache and is deployed overseas to provide covert coverage of
LACM ASMP-A; SCALP EG specific targets. The military-cyber corps personnel level is
BOMBS scheduled to rise to 2,600, supplemented by a reserve force,
Laser-guided: GBU-12 Paveway II which itself is scheduled to rise to 4,400.
Security and Intervention Brigade

DEPLOYMENT
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES ARABIAN SEA
3 SF gp Combined Maritime Forces • CTF-150: 1 DDGHM
MANOEUVRE
Other BURKINA FASO
24 protection units Operation Barkhane 250; 1 SF gp
30 (fire fighting and rescue) unit CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
EU • EUTM RCA 53
Reserves 4,800 reservists
UN • MINUSCA 91; 1 UAV unit
Paramilitary 103,400 CHAD
Gendarmerie 103,400; 40,000 reservists Operation Barkhane 1,500; 1 mech inf BG; 1 FGA det with 2
Mirage 2000D; 2 Mirage 2000N; 1 tpt det with 1 C-130H; 4
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
CN235M
ASLT 28 VBC-90 CÔTE D’IVOIRE
APC • APC (W) 153 VXB-170 (VBRG-170) 950; 1 (Marine) inf bn
ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm some
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 38 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
PB 38: 2 Athos; 4 Géranium; 24 VCSM; 8 VSMP UN • MONUSCO 2
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 60: 25 AS350BA Ecureuil; DJIBOUTI
20 H135; 15 H145 1,450; 1 (Marine) combined arms regt with (2 recce sqn, 2
inf coy, 1 arty bty, 1 engr coy); 1 hel det with 2 SA330 Puma;
Customs (Direction Générale des Douanes
1 SA342 Gazelle; 1 LCM; 1 FGA sqn with 4 Mirage 2000-5/D;
et Droits Indirects)
1 SAR/tpt sqn with 1 C-160 Transall; 2 SA330 Puma
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 20 EGYPT
PCO 3: 2 Jacques Oudart Fourmentin; 1 Jean-François MFO 1
Deniau
ESTONIA
PB 17: 7 Plascoa 2100; 7 Haize Hegoa; 1 Rafale; 1 Vent
NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 300; 1 armd inf coy(+)
d’Amont; 1 La Rance
FRENCH GUIANA
Coast Guard (Direction des Affaires 2,100: 1 (Foreign Legion) inf regt; 1 (Marine) inf regt; 1
Maritimes) SMA regt; 2 PCC; 1 tpt sqn with 3 CN235M; 5 SA330 Puma;
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 4 AS555 Fennec; 3 gendarmerie coy; 1 AS350BA Ecureuil
PCO 1 Themis FRENCH POLYNESIA
PCC 1 Iris 900: (incl Centre d’Expérimentation du Pacifique); 1 SMA
PB 23: 4 Callisto; 19 others coy; 1 naval HQ at Papeete; 1 FFGHM; 1 PSO; 1 PCO; 1
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AG 7 AFS; 3 Falcon 200 Gardian; 1 SAR/tpt sqn with 2 CN235M
FRENCH WEST INDIES
Cyber 1,000; 1 (Marine) inf regt; 2 SMA regt; 2 FFGHM; 1 LST; 1
In mid-December 2016, the French defence ministry naval base at Fort de France (Martinique); 4 gendarmerie
published a new cyber-security doctrine based on a concept coy; 2 AS350BA Ecureuil
of active defence, whereby a newly formed military-cyber
corps is authorised to pre-emptively identify, trace and GABON
track potential attackers, neutralise such attacks on a pre- 350; 1 AB bn
emptive basis and retaliate against attacks on the basis of GERMANY
an escalation model that also allows for kinetic responses.
2,000 (incl elm Eurocorps and FRA/GER bde); 1 (FRA/
Cyber defence is formally designated an art of war and is
GER) mech bde (1 armd cav regt, 1 mech inf regt)
to be taught to France’s entire officer corps. The military-
cyber corps, staffed largely by the foreign-intelligence GULF OF GUINEA
service, will report directly to the chief of general staff. The Operation Corymbe 1 LHD; 1 FSM
Europe 107
INDIAN OCEAN
1,600 (incl La Réunion and TAAF); 1 (Marine) para regt; Germany GER
1 (Foreign Legion) inf coy; 1 SMA regt ; 1 SMA coy; 2 Euro € 2016 2017 2018
FFGHM; 1 PCO; 1 LCM; 1 naval HQ at Port-des-Galets (La
GDP € 3.14tr 3.24tr
Réunion); 1 naval base at Dzaoudzi (Mayotte); 1 SAR/tpt
sqn with 2 CN235M; 5 gendarmerie coy; 1 SA319 Alouette III US$ 3.48tr 3.65tr
per capita US$ 42,177 44,184
IRAQ
Growth % 1.9 2.1
Operation Inherent Resolve (Chammal) 500; 1 SF gp; 1 trg
Inflation % 0.4 1.6
unit; 1 SP arty bty with 4 CAESAR
Europe
Def exp [a] € 37.6bn 39.5bn
JORDAN US$ 41.6bn 44.6bn
Operation Inherent Resolve (Chammal) 8 Rafale F3; 1 Def bdgt [b] € 34.3bn 37.0bn 38.5bn
Atlantique 2
US$ 37.9bn 41.7bn
LEBANON US$1=€ 0.90 0.89
UN • UNIFIL 661; 1 mech inf bn(-); 1 maint coy; VBL; [a] NATO definition
VBCI; VAB; Mistral [b] Includes military pensions
MALI Population 80,594,017
Operation Barkhane 1,750; 1 mech inf BG; 1 log bn; 1 hel unit
with 4 Tiger; 3 NH90 TTH; 6 SA330 Puma; 4 SA342 Gazelle Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
EU • EUTM Mali 13 Male 6.6% 2.5% 2.7% 3.1% 24.5% 9.7%
UN • MINUSMA 21 Female 6.2% 2.4% 2.6% 3.0% 24.3% 12.4%
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Operation Inherent Resolve (Chammal) 1 FFGHM Capabilities
EU • EU NAVFOR MED: 1 FSM The 2016 white paper on security policy and the future of
the armed forces commits Germany to a leadership role
NEW CALEDONIA
in European defence. It also emphasises the importance
1,450; 1 (Marine) mech inf regt; 1 SMA coy; 6 ERC-90F1
of NATO and the need for the armed forces to be able to
Lynx; 1 FFGHM; 1 PSO; 2 PCC; 1 base with 2 Falcon 200
contribute to collective-defence tasks. Compared to previ-
Gardian at Nouméa; 1 tpt unit with 2 CN235 MPA; 3 SA330
ous strategy documents, the white paper acknowledges
Puma; 4 gendarmerie coy; 2 AS350BA Ecureuil
the return of inter-state armed conflict and describes Rus-
NIGER sia as a challenge to European security rather than a part-
Operation Barkhane 500; 1 FGA det with 2 Mirage 2000C; ner. Germany’s Cyber Command achieved initial operat-
2 Mirage 2000D; 1 tkr/tpt det with 1 C-135FR; 1 C-160 ing capability in April 2017. The initial aim is to centralise
Transall; 1 UAV det with 5 MQ-9A Reaper responsibility for cyber, information technology, military
intelligence and electronic warfare, geographic-informa-
SENEGAL tion services and some communications tasks in one com-
350; 1 Falcon 50MI mand. In this process, Germany is expected to strengthen
its capacity for Computer Network Operations. Continu-
SOMALIA
ing the recent trend, current government budget planning
EU • EUTM Somalia 1
foresees annual defence-budget growth from 2017 to 2021.
SYRIA Budget parameters are reviewed annually by the cabinet
Operation Inherent Resolve (Chammal) 1 SF unit and rolling five-year budget plans are agreed on that basis.
Available additional funding is likely to mostly benefit the
UKRAINE army. Once agreed goals are implemented, for example to
OSCE • Ukraine 14 increase equipment levels for operational units from 70%
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES to 100%, additional modernisation steps would require yet
650: 1 armd BG (1 tk coy, 1 arty bty); Leclerc; CAESAR; • more funding. The defence ministry has also announced
Operation Inherent Resolve (Chammal); 1 FGA sqn with 6 the objective of increasing authorised active force numbers
Rafale F3; 1 C-135FR to 198,000 by 2024. Given that the Bundeswehr is already
struggling with recruitment and retention after conscrip-
WESTERN SAHARA tion was suspended in 2011, the ministry is due to recom-
UN • MINURSO 2 obs mend recruitment goals with a seven-year time horizon
and a shift towards a more flexible approach to generat-
ing the authorised personnel strength. The German armed
FOREIGN FORCES
forces are struggling to improve their readiness levels in
Belgium 28 Alpha Jet trg ac located at Cazaux/Tours light of increasing demands on NATO’s eastern flank.
Germany 400 (GER elm Eurocorps) As several reports to parliament have outlined, the bud-
Singapore 200; 1 trg sqn with 12 M-346 Master get cuts of previous years have led to a shortage of spare
parts and maintenance problems. Guidelines for the future ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Bundeswehr capability profile, initially expected for sum- AEV 42 Dachs
mer 2017, were yet to be released as of November. ARV 97: 56 ARV Leopard 1; 41 BPz-3 Büffel
VLB 47: 22 Biber; 25 M3
ACTIVE 178,600 (Army 60,900 Navy 16,300 Air
MW 15 Keiler
28,300 Joint Support Service 28,200 Joint Medical
NBC VEHICLES 8 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC
Service 19,900 Cyber 12,200; Other 12,800) ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL
Paramilitary 500 SP 102 Wiesel with TOW
Conscript liability Voluntary conscription only. Voluntary MANPATS Milan; Spike-LR (MELLS)
conscripts can serve up to 23 months ARTILLERY 214
RESERVE 27,900 (Army 6,350 Navy 1,150 Air 3,450 SP 155mm 101 PzH 2000
Joint Support Service 12,400 Joint Medical Service MRL 227mm 20 M270 MLRS
3,100 Other 1,450) MOR 120mm 93 Tampella
RADARS • LAND 82: 9 Cobra; 61 RASIT (veh, arty); 12
RATAC (veh, arty)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE HELICOPTERS
ATK 50 Tiger
Space TPT 110: Medium 55 NH90; Light 55: 41 Bell 205 (UH-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1D Iroquois); 14 H135
SATELLITES 7 UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
COMMUNICATIONS 2 COMSATBw (1 & 2) ISR 128: Medium 44 KZO; Light 84 LUNA
ISR 5 SAR-Lupe
Navy 16,300
Army 60,900 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FORCES BY ROLE SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 6:
COMMAND 6 Type-212A with 6 single 533mm TT with 12 A4 Seehecht
elm 2 (1 GNC & MNC NE) corps HQ DM2 HWT
MANOEUVRE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 14
Armoured DESTROYERS • DDGHM 7:
1 (1st) armd div (1 (9th) armd bde (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk 4 Brandenburg with 2 twin lnchr with MM38 Exocet
bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 lt inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 spt bn); AShM, 1 16-cell Mk41 VLS with RIM-7M/P, 2 Mk49
1 (21st) armd bde (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn, 1 armd GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 2 twin 324mm
inf bn, 1 mech inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 spt bn); 1 (41st)
ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 Sea
mech inf bde (1 armd recce bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 lt inf
Lynx Mk88A hel)
bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 spt bn); 1 tk bn (for NLD
3 Sachsen with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM-84F
43rd Bde); 1 SP arty bn; 1 sigs bn)
Harpoon AShM, 1 32-cell Mk41 VLS with SM-2MR/
1 (10th) armd div (1 (12th) armd bde (1 armd recce bn, 1
RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 21-cell Mk49 GMLS with
tk bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 spt bn); 1 (37th)
RIM-116 RAM SAM, 2 triple Mk32 324mm ASTT
mech inf bde (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn, 1 armd inf bn,
with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity; 2 Sea Lynx
1 mech inf bn, 1 engr bn, 1 spt bn); 1 (23rd) mtn inf
bde (1 recce bn, 3 mtn inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 spt bn); Mk88A hel)
1 SP arty bn; 1 SP arty trg bn; 2 mech inf bn (GER/ FRIGATES 7
FRA bde); 1 arty bn (GER/FRA bde); 1 cbt engr coy FFGHM 2 Bremen with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with
(GER/FRA bde); 1 spt bn (GER/FRA bde)) RGM-84A/C Harpoon AShM, 1 octuple Mk29 GMLS
Air Manoeuvre with RIM-7M/P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 Mk49 GMLS
1 (rapid reaction) AB div (1 SOF bde (2 SOF bn); 1 AB with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with
bde (2 recce coy, 2 para regt, 2 cbt engr coy); 1 atk hel Mk46 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 Sea Lynx Mk88A
regt; 2 tpt hel regt; 1 sigs coy) hel)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE FFGM 5 Braunschweig (K130) with 2 twin lnchr with
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES RBS-15 AShM, 2 Mk49 GMLS each with RIM-116
MBT 236: 217 Leopard 2A5/A6; 19 Leopard 2A7 RAM SAM, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
RECCE 182: 166 Fennek (incl 14 engr recce, 14 fires spt); MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 26
16 Wiesel MHO 12: 10 Frankenthal (2 used as diving support); 2
IFV 590: 357 Marder 1A3/A4/A5; 160 Puma; 73 Wiesel 1 Kulmbach
Mk20 (with 20mm gun) MSO 2 Ensdorf
APC 1,046 MSD 12 Seehund
APC (T) 316: 194 Bv-206D/S; 122 M113 (inc variants) AMPHIBIOUS • LCU 1 Type-520
APC (W) 730: 199 Boxer (inc CP and trg variants); 531 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 22
TPz-1 Fuchs (inc variants) AFSH 3 Berlin (Type-702) (capacity 2 Sea King Mk41 hel;
AUV 424: 202 Dingo 2; 222 Eagle IV/V 2 RAMs)
Europe 109
AG 4: 2 Schwedeneck (Type-748); 2 Stollergrund (Type-745) 1 AD trg unit located at Fort Bliss (US) with MIM-
AGI 3 Oste (Type-423) 104C/F Patriot PAC-2/3
AGOR 1 Planet (Type-751) 3 (tac air ctrl) radar gp
AOR 6 Elbe (Type-404) with 1 hel landing platform
(2 specified for PFM support; 1 specified for SSK Air Force Regiment
support; 3 specified for MHC/MSC support) FORCES BY ROLE
AOT 2 Rhön (Type-704) MANOEUVRE
APB 2: 1 Knurrhahn; 1 Ohre Other
AXS 1 Gorch Fock 1 sy regt
Europe
Naval Aviation 2,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FTR 123 Eurofighter Typhoon
ATK 68 Tornado IDS
ASW 8 AP-3C Orion
TPT • Light 2 Do-228 (pollution control) ATK/EW 20 Tornado ECR*
HELICOPTERS TKR/TPT 4 A310 MRTT
ASW 22 Lynx Mk88A TPT 55: Heavy 13 A400M; Medium 33 C-160D Transall;
SAR 21 Sea King Mk41 PAX 9: 1 A310; 2 A340 (VIP); 2 A319; 4 Global 5000
TRG 109: 69 T-6A Texan II, 40 T-38A
Naval Special Forces Command HELICOPTERS
FORCES BY ROLE MRH 15 H145M
SPECIAL FORCES TPT 73: Heavy 70 CH-53G/GA/GS/GE Stallion; Medium
1 SF coy 3 AS532U2 Cougar II (VIP)
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Heavy 8
Sea Battalion Heron 1
FORCES BY ROLE AIR DEFENCE
MANOEUVRE SAM
Amphibious Long-range 30 MIM-104C/F Patriot PAC-2/PAC-3
1 mne bn Point-defence 10 ASRAD Ozelot (with FIM-92 Stinger)
GUNS 35mm 12 C-RAM Mantis
Air Force 28,300 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
Flying hours 140 hrs/yr (plus 40 hrs high-fidelity AAM • IR AIM-9L/Li Sidewinder; IIR IRIS-T; ARH
simulator) AIM-120B AMRAAM
LACM Taurus KEPD 350
FORCES BY ROLE
ARM AGM-88B HARM
FIGHTER
3 wg (2 sqn with Eurofighter Typhoon) BOMBS
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK Laser-guided GBU-24 Paveway III, GBU-54 JDAM
1 wg (2 sqn with Tornado IDS)
1 wg (2 sqn with Eurofighter Typhoon (multi-role)) Joint Support Service 28,200
ISR FORCES BY ROLE
1 wg (1 ISR sqn with Tornado ECR/IDS; 2 UAV sqn with COMBAT SUPPORT
Heron) 3 MP regt
TANKER/TRANSPORT 2 NBC bn
1 (special air mission) wg (3 sqn with A310 MRTT; COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
A319; A340; AS532U2 Cougar II; Global 5000) 6 log bn
TRANSPORT 1 spt regt
2 wg (total: 3 sqn with C-160D Transall) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 wg (1 sqn (forming) with A400M Atlas)
TRAINING
APC • APC (W) 74 TPz-1 Fuchs (inc variants)
1 sqn located at Holloman AFB (US) with Tornado IDS
AUV 362: 168 Dingo 2; 194 Eagle IV/V
1 unit (ENJJPT) located at Sheppard AFB (US) with T-6
Texan II; T-38A
AEV 6 Dachs
1 hel unit located at Fassberg
ARV 30 BPz-3 Büffel
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 tpt hel wg (3 sqn with CH-53G/GA/GE/GS Stallion; 1 NBC VEHICLES 34 TPz-1 Fuchs A6/A7/A8 NBC
sqn with H145M)
AIR DEFENCE Joint Medical Services 19,900
1 wg (3 SAM gp) with MIM-104C/F Patriot PAC-2/3 FORCES BY ROLE
1 AD gp with ASRAD Ozelot; C-RAM Mantis and trg COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
unit 4 med regt
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE IRAQ

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 145 (trg spt)
APC • APC (W) 79: 57 Boxer (amb); 22 TPz-1 Fuchs (amb)
AUV 21 Eagle IV/V (amb) JORDAN
Operation Inherent Resolve 284; 4 Tornado ECR; 1 A310 MRTT
Cyber & Information Command 12,200 LEBANON
FORCES BY ROLE UN • UNIFIL 122; 1 FFGM
COMBAT SUPPORT
LITHUANIA
4 EW bn
6 sigs bn NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 450; 1 armd inf bn
HQ; 1 armd inf coy(+)
Paramilitary MALI
EU • EUTM Mali 83
Coast Guard 500
UN • MINUSMA 610; 1 obs; 1 int coy; 1 hel bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 9 MEDITERRANEAN SEA
PCO 4: 3 Bad Bramstedt; 1 Bredstedt EU • EU NAVFOR MED: 1 DDGHM
PB 5 Prignitz NATO • SNMG 1: 1 AOT
NATO • SNMG 2: 1 FFGHM
Cyber
NORTH SEA
Germany issued a Cyber Security Strategy in February 2011.
The National Cyber Security Council, an inter-ministerial NATO • SNMCMG 1: 1 MHO
body at state-secretary level, analyses cyber-related issues. POLAND
A National Cyber Response Centre was set up at the Federal 67 (GER elm MNC-NE)
Office for Information Security on 1 April 2011. In 2016,
Germany boosted its cyber capabilities by implementing SERBIA
far-reaching reforms. A new Directorate-General Cyber/IT NATO • KFOR 650
(CIT) was created within the Federal Ministry of Defence, OSCE • Kosovo 4
with two divisions for Cyber/IT Governance and IT
SOMALIA
Services/Information Security. The Director-General serves
as Chief Information Officer and point of contact for other
federal ministries and agencies. The Directorate-General’s SOUTH SUDAN
tasks include advancing technical cyber/IT capabilities, UN • UNMISS 5; 11 obs
and guiding cyber policies. A Cyber and Information
Space Command (KdoCIR) led by a Chief of Staff for Cyber SUDAN
and Information Space (InspCIR) was launched in April UN • UNAMID 8
2017. The overall aim of these reforms is to assign current UKRAINE
capabilities to defined responsibilities, protect Bundeswehr OSCE • Ukraine 27
and national cyber and IT infrastructure, and improve
capabilities in order to better respond to cyber attacks. UNITED STATES
Germany’s defence minister stated in April 2017 that the Trg units with 40 T-38 Talon; 69 T-6A Texan II at Goodyear
armed forces could respond with offensive cyber operations AFB (AZ)/Sheppard AFB (TX); 1 trg sqn with 14 Tornado
if its networks are attacked. IDS at Holloman AFB (NM); NAS Pensacola (FL); Fort
Rucker (AL); Missile trg at Fort Bliss (TX)
DEPLOYMENT WESTERN SAHARA
AFGHANISTAN
NATO • Operation Resolute Support 980; 1 bde HQ; 1 recce
bn; 1 UAV flt with 3 Heron 1 UAV FOREIGN FORCES
UN • UNAMA 1 obs France 2,000; 1 (FRA/GER) mech bde (1 armd cav regt, 1
mech inf regt)
ALBANIA
United Kingdom 3,750; 1 armd bde(-) (1 tk regt, 1 armd
OSCE • Albania 2 inf bn); 1 SP arty regt; 1 cbt engr regt; 1 maint regt; 1 med
ALBANIA regt
OSCE • Minsk Conference 1 United States
US Africa Command: Army; 1 HQ at Stuttgart
DJIBOUTI
US European Command: 37,450; 1 combined service HQ
EU • Operation Atalanta 1 AP-3C Orion
(EUCOM) at Stuttgart-Vaihingen
FRANCE Army 23,000; 1 HQ (US Army Europe (USAREUR) at
400 (incl GER elm Eurocorps) Heidelberg; 1 div HQ (fwd); 1 SF gp; 1 armd recce bn; 2
Europe 111
armd bn; 1 mech bde(-); 1 arty bn; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde(-); ACTIVE 141,350 (Army 93,500 Navy 16,250 Air
1 (cbt avn) hel bde HQ; 1 int bde; 1 MP bde; 1 sigs bde; 20,000 Joint 11,600) Paramilitary 4,000
1 spt bde; 1 (APS) armd bde eqpt set; M1 Abrams; M2/ Conscript liability Up to 9 months in all services
M3 Bradley; Stryker; M109; M119A2; M777; AH-64D/E
Apache; CH-47F Chinook; UH-60L/M Black Hawk; HH- RESERVE 220,500 (Army 181,500 Navy 5,000 Air
60M Black Hawk 34,000)
Navy 1,000
USAF 12,300; 1 HQ (US Airforce Europe (USAFE)) at ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Ramstein AB; 1 HQ (3rd Air Force) at Ramstein AB; 1
Europe
ftr wg at Spangdahlem AB with 1 ftr sqn with 24 F-16CJ Army 48,500; 45,000 conscripts (total 93,500)
Fighting Falcon; 1 airlift wg at Ramstein AB with 14 Units are manned at 3 different levels – Cat A 85% fully
C-130J-30 Hercules; 2 Gulfstream V (C-37A); 5 Learjet ready, Cat B 60% ready in 24 hours, Cat C 20% ready in 48
35A (C-21A); 1 B-737-700 (C-40B) hours (requiring reserve mobilisation). 3 military regions
USMC 1,150
FORCES BY ROLE
COMMAND
Greece GRC 2 corps HQ (incl NDC-GR)
1 armd div HQ
Euro € 2016 2017 2018 3 mech inf div HQ
GDP € 176bn 181bn 1 inf div HQ
US$ 195bn 204bn SPECIAL FORCES
per capita US$ 18,049 18,945 1 SF comd
1 cdo/para bde
Growth % 0.0 1.8
MANOEUVRE
Inflation % 0.0 1.2
Reconnaissance
Def exp [a] € 4.19bn 4.21bn 4 recce bn
US$ 4.64bn 4.75bn Armoured
Def bdgt [b] € 4.16bn 4.19bn 4.11bn 4 armd bde (2 armd bn, 1 mech inf bn, 1 SP arty bn)
US$ 4.60bn 4.73bn Mechanised
US$1=€ 0.90 0.89 9 mech inf bde (1 armd bn, 2 mech bn, 1 SP arty bn)
Light
[a] NATO definition
1 inf bde (1 armd bn, 3 inf regt, 1 arty regt)
Air Manoeuvre
Population 10,768,477 1 air mob bde
1 air aslt bde
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Amphibious
Male 7.1% 2.4% 2.5% 2.7% 24.9% 9.2% 1 mne bde
Female 6.7% 2.3% 2.4% 2.7% 25.3% 11.8% COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty regt (1 arty bn, 2 MRL bn)
Capabilities 3 AD bn (2 with I-Hawk, 1 with Tor M1)
3 engr regt
Principal tasks for Greece’s armed forces include ensuring 2 engr bn
territorial integrity and supporting Cyprus in the event 1 EW regt
of conflict. The armed forces have traditionally been well 10 sigs bn
funded. The general staff is aiming to produce more flexible, COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
agile and mobile forces at the tactical and operational 1 log corps HQ
levels. In 2017, there was growing cooperation with Egypt 1 log div (3 log bde)
and Israel, including joint exercises, as well as continued HELICOPTER
tensions with Turkey over airspace violations. Despite 1 hel bde (1 hel regt with (2 atk hel bn), 2 tpt hel bn, 4
challenging fiscal circumstances, Greece is modernising hel bn)
and upgrading its stored P-3B Orion aircraft in order to EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
strengthen its maritime-patrol and anti-submarine-warfare ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
capability, as well as enhancing surveillance capacity in MBT 1,341: 170 Leopard 2A6HEL; 183 Leopard 2A4; 513
the eastern Mediterranean. Greece is also bolstering its Leopard 1A4/5; 100 M60A1/A3; 375 M48A5
rotary-wing transport capability and in late 2017 the US RECCE 242 VBL
approved the upgrade of Greece’s F-16 fleet. Development IFV 398 BMP-1
of the local defence-industrial base is a priority, in order APC 2,418
to preserve local maintenance capabilities and improve APC (T) 2,407: 86 Leonidas Mk1/2; 2,108 M113A1/A2;
equipment readiness. Greece trains widely with NATO 213 M577 (CP)
allies and other partners. PPV 11 Maxxpro
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES 1 Poseidon (GER Type-209/1200) (modernised with AIP
ARV 261: 12 Büffel; 43 Leopard 1; 94 M88A1; 112 M578 technology) with 8 single 533mm TT with SUT HWT
VLB 12+: 12 Leopard 1; Leguan 3 Glavkos (GER Type-209/1100) with 8 single 533mm TT
MW Giant Viper with UGM-84C Harpoon AShM/SUT HWT
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE 4 Papanikolis (GER Type-214) with 8 single 533mm TT
MSL with UGM-84C Harpoon AShM/SUT HWT
SP 600: 196 HMMWV with 9K135 Kornet-E (AT-14 PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 13
Spriggan); 42 HMMWV with Milan; 362 M901 FRIGATES • FFGHM 13:
MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); Milan; TOW 4 Elli Batch I (ex-NLD Kortenaer Batch 2) with 2 quad
RCL 84mm Carl Gustav; 90mm EM-67; SP 106mm 581 Mk141 lnchr with RGM-84A/C Harpoon AShM, 1
M40A1
octuple Mk29 GMLS with RIM-7M/P Sea Sparrow
ARTILLERY 3,607
SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1
SP 587: 155mm 442: 418 M109A1B/A2/A3GEA1/A5; 24
Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 Bell 212 (AB-
PzH 2000; 203mm 145 M110A2
212) hel or 1 S-70B Seahawk hel)
TOWED 553: 105mm 347: 329 M101; 18 M-56; 155mm
206 M114 2 Elli Batch II (ex-NLD Kortenaer Batch 2) with 2 quad
MRL 147: 122mm 111 RM-70; 227mm 36 M270 MLRS Mk141 lnchr with RGM-84A/C Harpoon AShM, 1
MOR 2,320: 81mm 1,700; 107mm 620 M30 (incl 231 SP) octuple Mk29 GMLS with RIM-7M/P Sea Sparrow
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS  SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 2
SRBM • Conventional MGM-140A ATACMS (launched Phalanx CIWS, 2 76mm gun (capacity 2 Bell 212 (AB-
from M270 MLRS) 212) hel or 1 S-70B Seahawk hel)
RADAR • LAND 76: 3 ARTHUR; 5 AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder 3 Elli Batch III (ex-NLD Kortenaer Batch 2) with 2 quad
(arty, mor); 8 AN/TPQ-37(V)3; 40 BOR-A; 20 MARGOT Mk141 lnchr with RGM-84A/C Harpoon AShM, 1
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 18: 1 Beech 200 King Air (C-12C) octuple Mk29 lnchr with RIM-7M/P Sea Sparrow
2 Beech 200 King Air (C-12R/AP Huron); 15 Cessna 185 SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1
(U-17A/B) Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 Bell 212 (AB-
HELICOPTERS 212) hel)
ATK 28: 19 AH-64A Apache; 9 AH-64D Apache 4 Hydra (GER MEKO 200) with 2 quad lnchr with
TPT 140: Heavy 21: 15 CH-47D Chinook; 6 CH-47SD RGM-84G Harpoon AShM, 1 16-cell Mk48 Mod 5
Chinook; Medium 13 NH90 TTH; Light 106: 92 Bell 205 VLS with RIM-162 ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT
(UH-1H Iroquois); 14 Bell 206 (AB-206) Jet Ranger each with Mk46 LWT, 2 Phalanx CIWS, 1 127mm gun
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES (capacity 1 S-70B Seahawk ASW hel)
ISR • Medium 4 Sperwer PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 33
AIR DEFENCE
CORVETTES • FSGM 5 Roussen (Super Vita) with 2
SAM 155
quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 2 AShM, 1 21-cell
Medium-range 42 MIM-23B I-Hawk
Mk49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 1 76mm gun
Short-range 21 9K331 Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet)
PCFG 12:
Point-range 92+: 38 9K33 Osa-M (SA-8B Gecko); 54
2 Kavaloudis (FRA La Combattante IIIB) with 6 single
ASRAD HMMWV; FIM-92 Stinger
GUNS • TOWED 727: 20mm 204 Rh 202; 23mm 523 ZU- lnchr with RB 12 Penguin AShM, 2 single 533mm TT
23-2 with SST-4 HWT, 2 76mm gun
3 Kavaloudis (FRA La Combattante IIIB) with 2 twin lnchr
National Guard 33,000 reservists  with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 2 single 533mm TT
Internal security role with SST-4 HWT, 2 76mm gun
FORCES BY ROLE 2 Laskos (FRA La Combattante III) with 4 MM38 Exocet
MANOEUVRE AShM, 2 single 533mm TT with SST-4 HWT, 2 76mm
Light gun
1 inf div 2 Laskos (FRA La Combattante III) with 2 twin lnchr with
Air Manoeuvre RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 2 single 533mm TT with
1 para regt SST-4 HWT, 2 76mm gun
COMBAT SUPPORT 1 Votsis (ex-GER Tiger) with 2 twin Mk-141 lnchr with
8 arty bn RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 1 76mm gun  
4 AD bn 2 Votsis (ex-GER Tiger) with 2 twin MM38 Exocet
COMBAT SUPPORT AShM, 1 76mm gun
1 hel bn PCO 8:
2 Armatolos (DNK Osprey) with 1 76mm gun
Navy 14,200; 2,050 conscript (total 16,250) 2 Kasos with 1 76mm gun
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 4 Machitis with 1 76mm gun
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 11: PB 8: 4 Andromeda (NOR Nasty); 2 Stamou; 2 Tolmi
3 Poseidon (GER Type-209/1200) with 8 single 533mm TT MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4
with SUT HWT MHO 4: 2 Evropi (ex-UK Hunt); 2 Evniki (ex-US Osprey)
Europe 113
AMPHIBIOUS IIR IRIS-T; Mica IR; ARH AIM-120B/C AMRAAM;

LANDING SHIPS • LST 5: Mica RF
5 Chios (capacity 4 LCVP; 300 troops) with 1 76mm ASM AGM-65A/B/G Maverick
gun, 1 hel landing platform LACM SCALP EG
LANDING CRAFT 15 AShM AM39 Exocet
LCU 5 ARM AGM-88 HARM
LCA 7 BOMBS
LCAC 3 Kefallinia (Zubr) with 2 AK630 CIWS (capacity Electro-optical guided: GBU-8B HOBOS
either 3 MBT or 10 APC (T); 230 troops) Laser-guided: GBU-10/12/16 Paveway II; GBU-24
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 25 Paveway III; GBU-50 Enhanced Paveway II
Europe
ABU 2 INS/GPS-guided GBU-31 JDAM; AGM-154C JSOW
AG 2 Pandora
AGOR 1 Naftilos Air Defence
AGS 2: 1 Stravon; 1 Pytheas FORCES BY ROLE
AOR 2 Axios (ex-GER Luneburg) AIR DEFENCE
AORH 1 Prometheus (ITA Etna) with 1 Phalanx CIWS 6 sqn/bty with MIM-104A/B/D Patriot/Patriot PAC-1
AOT 4 Ouranos SOJC/Patriot PAC-2 GEM
AWT 6 Kerkini 2 sqn/bty with S-300PMU-1 (SA-10C Grumble)
AXS 5 12 bty with Skyguard/RIM-7 Sparrow/guns; Crotale NG/
GR; Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet)
Coastal Defence
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIR DEFENCE
COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 2 MM40 Exocet
SAM
Naval Aviation Long-range 48: 36 MIM-104A/B/D Patriot/Patriot
PAC-1 SOJC/PAC-2 GEM; 12 S-300PMU-1 (SA-10C
FORCES BY ROLE
Grumble)
Short-range 13+: 9 Crotale NG/GR; 4 9K331 Tor-M1
1 div with S-70B Seahawk; Bell 212 (AB-212) ASW
(SA-15 Gauntlet); some Skyguard/Sparrow
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
GUNS 35+ 35mm
AIRCRAFT • ASW (5 P-3B Orion in store undergoing
modernisation) Air Support Command
HELICOPTERS
FORCES BY ROLE
ASW 18: 7 Bell 212 (AB-212) ASW; 11 S-70B Seahawk
1 sqn with AS332C Super Puma (SAR/CSAR)
ASM AGM-114 Hellfire
1 sqn with AW109; Bell 205A (AB-205A) (SAR); Bell
AShM AGM-119 Penguin
212 (AB-212 - VIP, tpt)
TRANSPORT
Air Force 18,000; 2,000 conscripts (total 20,000) 1 sqn with C-27J Spartan
Tactical Air Force 1 sqn with C-130B/H Hercules
1 sqn with EMB-135BJ Legacy; ERJ-135LR; Gulfstream V
FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
3 sqn with F-16CG/DG Block 30/50 Fighting Falcon AIRCRAFT
3 sqn with F-16CG/DG Block 52+ Fighting Falcon TPT 26: Medium 23: 8 C-27J Spartan; 5 C-130B Hercules;
2 sqn with F-16C/D Block 52+ ADV Fighting Falcon 10 C-130H Hercules; Light 2: 1 EMB-135BJ Legacy; 1
1 sqn with Mirage 2000-5EG/BG Mk2 ERJ-135LR; PAX 1 Gulfstream V
1 sqn with Mirage 2000EG/BG HELICOPTERS
1 sqn with F-4E Phantom II TPT 31: Medium 12 AS332C Super Puma; Light 19: 12
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING Bell 205A (AB-205A) (SAR); 4 Bell 212 (AB-212) (VIP,
1 sqn with EMB-145H Erieye Tpt); 3 AW109
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Air Training Command
FGA 218: 20 F-4E Phantom II; 70 F-16CG/DG Block FORCES BY ROLE
30/50 Fighting Falcon; 55 F-16CG/DG Block 52+; 30 F- TRAINING
16 C/D Block 52+ ADV Fighting Falcon; 20 Mirage 2000- 2 sqn with T-2C/E Buckeye
5EG Mk2; 5 Mirage 2000-5BG Mk2; 16 Mirage 2000EG; 2 sqn with T-6A/B Texan II
2 Mirage 2000BG 1 sqn with T-41D
AEW 4 EMB-145AEW (EMB-145H) Erieye EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AIRCRAFT • TRG 93: 30 T-2C/E Buckeye; 20 T-6A Texan
AAM • IR AIM-9L/P Sidewinder; R-550 Magic 2; II; 25 T-6B Texan II; 18 T-41D
Paramilitary
Hungary HUN
Coast Guard and Customs 4,000 Hungarian Forint f 2016 2017 2018
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
GDP f 35.0tr 36.9tr
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 124:
PCC 3 US$ 124bn 132bn
PCO 1 Gavdos (Damen 5009) per capita US$ 12,652 13,460
PBF 54 Growth % 2.0 3.2
PB 66 Inflation % 0.4 2.5
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 4: 2 Cessna 172RG Cutlass; 2 Def exp [a] f 363bn 389bn
TB-20 Trinidad
US$ 1.29bn 1.39bn
HELICOPTERS
SAR: 3 AS365N3 Def bdgt [b] f 299bn 354bn 427bn
US$ 1.06bn 1.26bn
Cyber US$1=f 281.44 279.63
A new Joint Cyber Command in the Hellenic National [a] NATO definition
Defence General Staff was established in 2014, replacing the [b] Excludes military pensions
existing Cyber Defence Directorate. The National Policy on
Cyber Defence is under development and expected to be Population 9,850,845
complete by the end of 2016.
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 7.6% 2.7% 3.0% 3.2% 24.0% 7.2%
DEPLOYMENT Female 7.1% 2.5% 2.8% 3.1% 24.9% 11.9%
AFGHANISTAN
NATO • Operation Resolute Support 4 Capabilities
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA A National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military
EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 1 Strategy (NMS) were published in 2012. Territorial
defence and the ability to participate in NATO and other
CYPRUS international operations are central tenets of the NMS,
Army 950 (ELDYK army); ε200 (officers/NCO seconded to including the medium-term aim of having forces capable
Greek-Cypriot National Guard) (total 1,150); of taking part in high-intensity operations. A review of the
1 mech bde (1 armd bn, 2 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn); 61 NSS has been under way since 2016. Hungary coordinates
M48A5 MOLF MBT; 80 Leonidas APC; 12 M114 arty; 6 policy with the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia in
M110A2 arty the so-called Visegrád 4 (V4) format, including on defence.
LEBANON The V4 EU Battlegroup is scheduled to be on standby
UN • UNIFIL 49; 1 PCFG for the second time in the second half of 2019. Increasing
migration pressure has directly affected Hungary, and
MALI its armed forces have been involved in internal border-
EU • EUTM Mali 2 control operations, assisting national police forces. The
government aims to gradually increase defence spending
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
to reach NATO’s 2% of GDP benchmark by 2026, to
EU • EUNAVFOR MED 1 SSK
coincide with the completion of the Zrínyi 2026 national-
NATO • SNMG 2: 1 FSGM; 2 PCO defence and armed-forces modernisation plan announced
SERBIA in December 2016. The defence-modernisation programme
NATO • KFOR 112; 1 inf coy aims to reorganise reserve forces on a territorial basis
OSCE • Kosovo 1 with units in each district. Announced equipment-
modernisation priorities focus on individual soldier
UKRAINE equipment and fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. In 2017, the
OSCE • Ukraine 22 defence ministry established the Military Augmentation
Preparation and Training Command (MAPTC) to improve
FOREIGN FORCES recruitment, training and military education. The NCO
Academy and Ludovika Academy will be subordinated
United States US European Command: 400; 1 naval base
to the MAPTC. The defence ministry has also set up an
at Makri; 1 naval base at Soudha Bay; 1 air base at Iraklion
inter-ministerial defence-industry working group to boost
domestic capacity in the small-arms sector. Hungary hosts
the NATO Centre of Excellence for Military Medicine.
ACTIVE 27,800 (Army 10,450 Air 5,750 Joint 11,600)

Paramilitary 12,000
RESERVE 44,000 (Army 35,200 Air 8,800)
Europe 115
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE AIRCRAFT 14 combat capable
Hungary’s armed forces have reorganised into a joint force FGA 14: 12 Gripen C; 2 Gripen D
TPT • Light 4 An-26 Curl
Land Component 10,450 (incl riverine TRG 4: 2 Z-143LSi; 2 Z-242L
element) HELICOPTERS
FORCES BY ROLE ATK 11: 3 Mi-24D Hind D; 6 Mi-24V Hind E; 2 Mi-24P
SPECIAL FORCES Hind F
1 SF regt MRH 7 Mi-17 Hip H 
MANOEUVRE TPT • Medium 13 Mi-8 Hip
Europe
Mechanised AIR DEFENCE
1 (5th) mech inf bde (1 armd recce bn; 3 mech inf bn, 1 SAM • Point-defence 16 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful); Mistral
cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) RADAR 29: 3 RAT-31DL; 6 P-18; 6 SZT-68UM; 14 P-37
1 (25th) mech inf bde (1 tk bn; 2 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
AT bn, 1 log bn) AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo
COMBAT SUPPORT A); ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM
1 engr regt ASM AGM-65 Maverick; 3M11 Falanga (AT-2 Swatter);
1 EOD/rvn regt 9K114 Shturm-V (AT-6 Spiral)
1 CBRN bn BOMBS • Laser-guided Paveway II
1 sigs regt
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT Paramilitary 12,000
1 log regt
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Border Guards 12,000 (to reduce)
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Ministry of Interior
MBT 30 T-72 FORCES BY ROLE
IFV 120 BTR-80A MANOEUVRE
APC • APC (W) 260 BTR-80 Other
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES 1 (Budapest) paramilitary district (7 rapid reaction
AEV BAT-2 coy)
ARV BMP-1 VPV; T-54/T-55; VT-55A 11 (regt/district) paramilitary regt
VLB BLG-60; MTU; TMM EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
NBC VEHICLES 24+: 24 K90 CBRN Recce; PSZH-IV CBRN ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 
Recce APC • APC (W) 68 BTR-80
MSL • MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Cyber
Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel) The National Cyber Security Strategy, coordinating cyber
ARTILLERY 67 security at the governmental level, is led by the prime
TOWED 152mm 17 D-20 minister’s office. There is also a National Cyber Defence
MOR 82mm 50 Forum and a Hungarian Cyber Defence Management
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PBR 2 Authority within the National Security Authority. In 2013,
MINE COUNTERMEASURES • MSR 4 Nestin the defence ministry developed a Military Cyber Defence
concept. A Computer Incident Response Capability
Air Component 5,750 (MilCIRC) and Military Computer Emergency Response
Flying hours 50 hrs/yr Team (MilCERT) have also been established. In 2015, the
ministry launched a modernisation programme as a part
FORCES BY ROLE of Ministerial Program (2015–19), including military CIS
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK and CIS security/cyber-defence technical modernisation.
1 sqn with Gripen C/D In 2016, a Defence Sectorial Cyber Defence Centre (CDC)
TRANSPORT for security management, vulnerability assessment and
1 sqn with An-26 Curl incident handling in the defence sector was established
TRAINING within the Military National Security Service. IOC is
1 sqn with Z-143LSi; Z-242L planned for 2018.
ATTACK HELICOPTER
1 sqn with Mi-24 Hind
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER DEPLOYMENT
1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H AFGHANISTAN
AIR DEFENCE
1 SAM regt (9 bty with Mistral; 3 bty with 2K12 Kub
(SA-6 Gainful)) ALBANIA
1 radar regt OSCE • Albania 1
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA and naval task groups, as well as the Icelandic Air Policing
EU • Operation Althea 165; 1 inf coy mission. Increased Russian air and naval activities in the
Atlantic and close to NATO airspace have led to complaints
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC from Iceland that aircraft could threaten civil flights. In late
UN • MINUSCA 2; 2 obs 2016, the US Navy began operating P-8 Poseidon maritime-
CYPRUS patrol aircraft from Keflavik air base, and was reportedly
UN • UNFICYP 77; 1 inf pl upgrading hangars and other infrastructure at the site to
enable regular, rotational patrols.
IRAQ
Operation Inherent Resolve 140 ACTIVE NIL Paramilitary 250
LEBANON
UN • UNIFIL 4
MALI Paramilitary
EU • EUTM Mali 3
Iceland Coast Guard 250
MOLDOVA
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
OSCE • Moldova 1
SERBIA PSOH: 2 Aegir
NATO • KFOR 373; 1 inf coy (KTM) PSO 1 Thor
OSCE • Kosovo 1 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGS 1 Baldur
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 DHC-8-300 (MP)
SOMALIA HELICOPTERS
EU • EUTM Somalia 4 TPT • Medium 2 AS332L1 Super Puma
UKRAINE
OSCE • Ukraine 30 FOREIGN FORCES
WESTERN SAHARA Iceland Air Policing: Aircraft and personnel from various
UN • MINURSO 7 obs NATO members on a rotating basis
FOREIGN FORCES Ireland IRL

United States US European Command: 100; 1 armd recce Euro € 2016 2017 2018
tp; M3 Bradley
GDP € 275bn 289bn
US$ 304bn 326bn
Iceland ISL per capita US$ 64,782 68,604
Icelandic Krona Kr 2016 2017 2018 Growth % 5.1 4.1
GDP Kr 2.42tr 2.62tr Inflation % -0.2 0.4
US$ 20.0bn 24.8bn Def bdgt [a] € 898m 921m 946m
per capita US$ 59,629 73,092 US$ 994m 1.04bn
Growth % 7.2 5.5 US$1=€ 0.90 0.89
Inflation % 1.7 1.8 [a] Includes military pensions and capital expenditure
Sy bdgt [a] Kr 5.53bn 3.94bn 4.27bn Population 5,011,102
US$ 46m 37m
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
US$1=Kr 120.81 105.50
Male 11.0% 3.1% 2.9% 3.1% 23.8% 6.0%
[a] Coast Guard budget
Female 10.5% 3.0% 2.8% 3.1% 23.6% 7.0%
Population 339,747
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Capabilities

Male 10.4% 3.3% 3.6% 3.7% 22.4% 6.8% The armed forces’ core missions remain defending the
Female 10.0% 3.2% 3.4% 3.5% 22.1% 7.7% state against armed aggression, although a 2015 white
paper broadened the scope of the national-security risk
assessment beyond traditional military and paramilitary
Capabilities threats. It listed as priority threats inter- and intra-state
Iceland is a NATO member but maintains only a coastguard conflict, cyber attacks, terrorism, emergencies and natural
service. In 2016, the country established a National Security disasters, as well as espionage and transnational organised
Council to implement and monitor security policy. Iceland crime. October 2017 saw a major domestic military
hosts NATO and regional partners for exercises, transits operation to manage the consequences of Hurricane
Europe 117
Ophelia. Ireland continues to contribute to multinational COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

operations, principally UNDOF on the Golan Heights. 2 med det
After the white paper, Dublin identified 88 projects to 2 tpt coy
be completed over a ten-year period. Key priorities after
2017 include a mid-life upgrade for the army’s Piranha Naval Service 1,100
armoured personnel carriers and the replacement of the EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
existing maritime-patrol aircraft. The army maintains PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 8
substantial EOD capabilities. PSOH 1 Eithne with 1 57mm gun
ACTIVE 9,100 (Army 7,300 Navy 1,100 Air 700) PSO 5: 2 Roisin with 1 76mm gun; 3 Samuel Beckett with
1 76mm gun
Europe
RESERVE 2,480 (Army 2,250 Navy 200 Air 30) PCO 2 Orla (ex-UK Peacock) with 1 76mm gun
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE AXS 2
Army 7,300 Air Corps 700

FORCES BY ROLE 2 ops wg; 2 spt wg; 1 trg wg; 1 comms and info sqn
SPECIAL FORCES EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 ranger coy AIRCRAFT
MANOEUVRE MP 2 CN235 MPA
Reconnaissance TPT • Light 6: 5 Cessna FR-172H; 1 Learjet 45 (VIP)
1 armd recce sqn TRG 8 PC-9M
Mechanised HELICOPTERS:
1 mech inf coy MRH 6 AW139
Light TPT • Light 2 H135 (incl trg/medevac)
1 inf bde (1 cav recce sqn, 4 inf bn, 1 arty regt (3 fd arty
bty, 1 AD bty), 1 fd engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 MP coy, 1
tpt coy)
Cyber
1 inf bde (1 cav recce sqn, 3 inf bn, 1 arty regt (3 fd arty bty, The Department of Communications, Energy and Natural
1 AD bty), 1 fd engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 MP coy, l tpt coy) Resources has lead responsibilities relating to cyber
security, and established a National Cyber Security Centre
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
(NCSC) to assist in identifying and protecting Ireland
from cyber attacks. The department has produced a Cyber
RECCE 6 Piranha IIIH 30mm
Security Strategy 2015–17, which says that ‘the Defence
APC 99
APC (W) 74: 56 Piranha III; 18 Piranha IIIH Forces maintains a capability in the area of cyber security
PPV 25 RG-32M for the purpose of protecting its own networks and users’.
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTURCTURE
MSL • MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin DEPLOYMENT
RCL 84mm Carl Gustav
ARTILLERY 299 ALBANIA
TOWED • 105mm 24: 18 L118 Light Gun; 6 L119 Light OSCE • Albania 1
Gun
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
MOR 275: 81mm 180; 120mm 95
AIR DEFENCE EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 5
SAM • Point-defence RBS-70 OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 1
GUNS • TOWED 40mm 32 L/70 each with 8 Flycatcher DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
Reserves 2,400 reservists UN • MONUSCO 4
FORCES BY ROLE LEBANON
MANOEUVRE UN • UNIFIL 374; elm 1 mech inf bn
Reconnaissance
1 (integrated) armd recce sqn MALI
2 (integrated) cav sqn EU • EUTM Mali 20
Mechanised
MIDDLE EAST
1 (integrated) mech inf coy
Light UN • UNTSO 12 obs
14 (integrated) inf coy SERBIA
COMBAT SUPPORT NATO • KFOR 12
4 (integrated) arty bty OSCE • Kosovo 1
2 engr gp
2 MP coy SYRIA/ISRAEL
3 sigs coy UN • UNDOF 136; 1 inf coy
UKRAINE ACTIVE 174,500 (Army 102,200 Navy 30,400 Air

OSCE • Ukraine 12 41,900) Paramilitary 182,350
WESTERN SAHARA RESERVES 18,300 (Army 13,400 Navy 4,900)
Italy ITA
Euro € 2016 2017 2018
Space
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
GDP € 1.67tr 1.70tr
SATELLITES 9
US$ 1.85tr 1.92tr COMMUNICATIONS 4: 1 Athena-Fidus (also used by
per capita US$ 30,507 31,619 FRA); 3 Sicral
Growth % 0.9 1.5 ISR 5: 4 Cosmo (Skymed); 1 OPSAT-3000
Def exp [a] € 20.2bn 20.8bn Army 102,200
US$ 22.4bn 23.4bn Regt are bn sized
Def bdgt [b] € 20.0bn 20.3bn 20.1bn FORCES BY ROLE
US$ 22.1bn 22.9bn COMMAND
1 (NRDC-ITA) corps HQ (1 spt bde, 1 sigs regt, 1 spt regt)
US$1=€ 0.90 0.89
MANOEUVRE
[a] NATO definition
Mechanised
[b] Includes military pensions 1 (Friuli) div (1 (Ariete) armd bde (1 cav regt, 2 tk regt,
Population 62,137,802 1 mech inf regt, 1 SP arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log
regt); 1 (Pozzuolo del Friuli) cav bde (1 cav regt, 1 amph
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus regt, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt); 1 (Folgore)
Male 7.0% 2.4% 2.5% 2.7% 24.4% 9.3% AB bde (1 cav regt, 3 para regt, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt engr
Female 6.7% 2.3% 2.5% 2.8% 25.3% 12.3% regt, 1 log regt); 1 (Friuli) air mob bde (1 air mob regt,
1 log regt, 2 avn regt))
1 (Acqui) div (1 (Pinerolo) mech bde (3 mech inf regt, 1
Capabilities SP arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt); 1 (Granatieri) mech bde
In 2017, a defence plan covering 2017–19 and a new defence (1 cav regt, 1 mech inf regt); 1 (Garibaldi Bersaglieri)
white paper were released. These outlined the goal of re- mech bde (1 cav regt, 1 tk regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 SP
ducing personnel from 190,000 to 150,000 by 2024, with an arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt); 1 (Aosta) mech bde (1 cav
aspiration for more joint activity between the services. The regt, 3 mech inf regt, 1 SP arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt); 1
paper detailed capability-enhancement programmes in- (Sassari) lt mech bde (3 mech inf regt, 1 cbt engr regt))
cluding upgrades to main battle tanks, systems to counter Mountain
UAV operations and electronic warfare. Extra funds are to 1 (Tridentina) mtn div (2 mtn bde (1 cav regt, 3 mtn inf regt,
be allocated to continue the lease of the King Air SIGINT 1 arty regt, 1 mtn cbt engr regt, 1 spt bn, 1 log regt))
aircraft, which has been involved in surveillance oper COMBAT SUPPORT
ations along the Italian and Libyan coasts. The expected 1 arty comd (3 arty regt, 1 NBC regt)
retirement of much of the naval fleet over the next ten years 1 AD comd (2 SAM regt, 1 ADA regt)
has triggered a long-term replacement plan and, accord- 1 engr comd (2 engr regt, 1 ptn br regt, 1 CIMIC regt) 
ing to the white paper, funds have been allocated for the 1 EW/sigs comd (1 EW/ISR bde (1 EW regt, 1 int regt, 1
continuation of the FREMM frigate programme. Italy has STA regt); 1 sigs bde with (7 sigs regt))
an advanced defence industry. Leonardo is headquartered COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
there, and the country hosts Europe’s F-35 final assembly 1 log comd (2 log regt, 1 med unit)
and check-out facility at Cameri, which is also a European HELICOPTER
hub for F-35 maintenance. The air force was due to take de- 1 hel bde (3 hel regt)
livery of its first F-35B by the end of 2017. Italy continues EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
to support NATO operations in Afghanistan and Italian ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
forces contribute to Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq. Mari- MBT 160 C1 Ariete
time deployments have been aimed at countering terrorism ASLT 259 B1 Centauro
and human trafficking, as well as search and rescue in the IFV 428: 200 VCC-80 Dardo; 208 VBM 8×8 Freccia (incl 36
Mediterranean. Italy is the lead nation in the EUNAVFOR– with Spike-LR); 20 VBM 8×8 Freccia (CP)
MED force, which is headquartered in Rome, and the Ital- APC 890 
ian coastguard has been training its Libyan counterpart. APC (T) 361: 246 Bv-206; 115 M113 (incl variants)
The country takes part in NATO exercises and air-policing APC (W) 529 Puma
missions, and in early 2017 deployed to Latvia as part of AUV 10 Cougar; IVECO LMV
NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence. AAV 15: 14 AAVP-7; 1 AAVC-7
Europe 119
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES LWT, 1 127mm gun, 3 76mm guns (capacity 1 NH90
AEV 40 Leopard 1; M113 or 2 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel)
ARV 138: 137 Leopard 1; 1 AAVR-7 2 Bergamini (GP) with 2 quad lnchr with Otomat Mk2A
VLB 64 Biber AShM, 1 16-cell VLS with Aster 15/Aster 30 SAM, 2
MW 9: 6 Buffalo; 3 Miniflail triple 324mm ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 127mm gun,
NBC VEHICLES 14 VAB NRBC 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 AW101/NH90 hel)
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE 4 Bergamini (ASW) with 2 quad lnchr with Otomat
MSL • MANPATS Spike; Milan Mk2A AShM, 1 16-cell VLS with Aster 15/Aster
RCL 80mm Folgore 30 SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with MU90 LWT, 2
ARTILLERY 992 76mm gun (capacity 2 AW101/NH90 hel)
Europe
SP 155mm 192: 124 M109L; 68 PzH 2000 FRIGATES • FFGHM 8:
TOWED 155mm 163 FH-70 2 Artigliere with 8 single lnchr with Otomat Mk 2
MRL 227mm 21 MLRS AShM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr with Aspide SAM, 1
MOR 616: 81mm 270: 212 Brandt; 58 Expal 120mm 325: 127mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel)
183 Brandt; 142 RT-61 (RT-F1) SP 120mm 21 VBM 8×8 6 Maestrale with 4 single lnchr with Otomat Mk2
Freccia AShM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr with Aspide SAM, 2
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 6: 3 Do-228 (ACTL-1); 3 P-180 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 127mm gun
Avanti (capacity 1 NH90 or 2 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel)
HELICOPTERS PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 16
ATK 43 AW129CBT Mangusta CORVETTES 2
MRH 15 Bell 412 (AB-412) Twin Huey FS 2 Minerva 1 76mm gun 
TPT 131: Heavy 19: 5 CH-47C Chinook; 14 CH-47F PSOH 10:
Chinook; Medium 31 NH90 TTH; Light 81: 6 AW109; 34 4 Cassiopea with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-
Bell 205 (AB-205); 26 Bell 206 Jet Ranger (AB-206); 15 Bell 212) hel
212 (AB-212) 4 Comandante Cigala Fuligosi with 1 76mm gun (capacity
AIR DEFENCE 1 Bell 212 (AB-212)/NH90 hel)
SAM 2 Comandante Cigala Fuligosi (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-
Long-range 16 SAMP/T 212) or NH90 hel)
Short-range 32 Skyguard/Aspide PB 4 Esploratore
Point-range FIM-92 Stinger MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 10
GUNS • SP 25mm 64 SIDAM MHO 10: 8 Gaeta; 2 Lerici
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AMPHIBIOUS
ASM Spike-ER PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 3
LHD 3:
Navy 30,400 2 San Giorgio with 1 76mm gun (capacity 3-4 AW101/
NH90/Bell 212; 3 LCM 2 LCVP; 30 trucks; 36 APC
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
(T); 350 troops)
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 8:
1 San Giusto with 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 AW101
4 Pelosi (imp Sauro, 3rd and 4th series) with 6 single Merlin/ NH90/Bell 212; 3 LCM 2 LCVP; 30 trucks;
533mm TT with Type-A-184 HWT 36 APC (T); 350 troops)
4 Salvatore Todaro (Type-212A) with 6 single 533mm TT LANDING CRAFT 24: 15 LCVP; 9 LCM
with Type-A-184 Mod 3 HWT/DM2A4 HWT LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 63
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 20 ABU 5 Ponza
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CVS 2: AFD 9
1 Cavour with 4 octuple VLS with Aster 15 SAM, 2 AGE 3: 1 Leonardo (coastal); 1 Raffaele Rosseti; 1 Vincenzo
76mm guns (capacity mixed air group of 20 AV-8B Martellota
Harrier II; AW101 Merlin; NH90; Bell 212) AGI 1 Elettra
1 G. Garibaldi with 2 octuple Albatros lnchr with AGOR 1 Alliance
Aspide SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT AGS 3: 1 Ammiraglio Magnaghi with 1 hel landing
(capacity mixed air group of 18 AV-8B Harrier II; platform; 2 Aretusa (coastal)
AW101 Merlin; NH90; Bell 212) AKSL 6 Gorgona
DESTROYERS • DDGHM 10: AORH 3: 1 Etna with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 AW101/
2 Andrea Doria with 2 quad lnchr with Otomat Mk2A NH90/Bell 212 hel); 2 Stromboli with 1 76mm gun
AShM, 1 48-cell VLS with Aster 15/Aster 30 SAM, 2 (capacity 1 AW101/NH90 hel)
single 324mm ASTT with MU90 LWT, 3 76mm guns AOT 7 Depoli
(capacity 1 AW101 Merlin/NH90 hel) ARSH 1 Anteo (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel)
2 Luigi Durand de la Penne (ex-Animoso) with 2 quad ATS 6 Ciclope
lnchr with Otomat Mk 2A AShM/Milas A/S, 1 Mk13 AWT 7: 1 Bormida; 2 Simeto; 4 Panarea
GMLS with SM-1MR SAM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr AXL 3 Aragosta
with Aspide SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 AXS 8: 1 Amerigo Vespucci; 1 Palinuro; 1 Italia; 5 Caroly
Naval Aviation 2,200 TANKER/TRANSPORT

1 sqn with KC-767A
FORCES BY ROLE
COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE
1 sqn with AB-212 ICO
1 sqn with AV-8B Harrier II; TAV-8B Harrier II
SEARCH & RESCUE
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE/TRANSPORT
1 wg with AW139 (HH-139A); Bell 212 (HH-212); HH-3F
5 sqn with AW101 ASW Merlin; Bell 212 ASW (AB-
Pelican
212AS); Bell 212 (AB-212); NH90 NFH
TRANSPORT
MARITIME PATROL
2 (VIP) sqn with A319CJ; AW139 (VH-139A); Falcon 50;
1 flt with P-180
Falcon 900 Easy; Falcon 900EX; SH-3D Sea King
AIRBORNE EARLY WANRING & CONTROL
2 sqn with C-130J/C-130J-30/KC-130J Hercules
1 flt with AW101 AEW Merlin
1 sqn with C-27J Spartan
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 (calibration) sqn with P-180 Avanti
AIRCRAFT 16 combat capable TRAINING
FGA 16: 14 AV-8B Harrier II; 2 TAV-8B Harrier II 1 OCU sqn with Eurofighter Typhoon
MP 3 P-180 1 sqn with MB-339PAN (aerobatic team)
HELICOPTERS 1 sqn with MD-500D/E (NH-500D/E)
ASW 39: 10 AW101 ASW Merlin; 12 Bell 212 ASW; 17 1 OCU sqn with Tornado
NH90 NFH 1 OCU sqn with AMX-T Ghibli
AEW 4 AW101 AEW Merlin 1 sqn with MB-339A
TPT 15: Medium 9: 8 AW101 Merlin; 1 NH-90 MITT; 1 sqn with MB-339CD*
Light 6 Bell 212 (AB-212) 1 sqn with SF-260EA, 3 P2006T (T-2006A)
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ISR UAV
AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; ARH AIM-120 AMRAAM 1 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper; RQ-1B Predator
ASM AGM-65 Maverick AIR DEFENCE
AShM Marte Mk 2/S 2 bty with Spada
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Marines 3,000 AIRCRAFT 260 combat capable
FORCES BY ROLE FTR 86 Eurofighter Typhoon
MANOEUVRE FGA 78: 63 AMX Ghibli; 8 AMX-T Ghibli; 7 F-35A
Amphibious Lightning II (in test)
1 mne regt (1 SF coy, 1 mne bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 log bn) ATK 53 Tornado IDS
1 (boarding) mne regt (2 mne bn) ATK/EW 15 Tornado ECR*
1 landing craft gp MP 2 ATR-72MP (P-72A)
Other SIGINT 1 Beech 350 King Air
1 sy regt (3 sy bn) AEW&C 1 Gulfstream G550 CAEW
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TKR/TPT 6: 4 KC-767A; 2 KC-130J Hercules
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES TPT 66: Medium 31: 9 C-130J Hercules; 10 C-130J-30
APC (T) 24 VCC-1 Hercules; 12 C-27J Spartan; Light 25: 15 P-180 Avanti; 10
AAV 18: 15 AAVP-7; 3 AAVC-7 S-208 (liaison); PAX 11: 1 A340-541; 3 A319CJ; 2 Falcon 50
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES (VIP); 2 Falcon 900 Easy; 3 Falcon 900EX (VIP)
ARV 2: 1 AAV-7RAI; 1 AAVR-7 TRG 103: 3 M-346; 21 MB-339A; 28 MB-339CD*; 21 MB-
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE 339PAN (aerobatics); 30 SF-260EA
MSL• MANPATS Milan; Spike HELICOPTERS
MRH 58: 10 AW139 (HH-139A/VH-139A); 2 MD-500D
ARTILLERY
(NH-500D); 46 MD-500E (NH-500E)
MOR 23: 81mm 13 Brandt; 120mm 10 Brandt
CSAR 4 AW101 (HH-101A)
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger
SAR 12 HH-3F Pelican
TPT 31: Medium 2 SH-3D Sea King (liaison/VIP); Light
Air Force 41,900 29 Bell 212 (HH-212)/AB-212 ICO
FORCES BY ROLE UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Heavy 14: 9
FIGHTER MQ-9A Reaper; 5 RQ-1B Predator
4 sqn with Eurofighter Typhoon AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Short SPADA
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
1 sqn with AMX Ghibli AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; IIR IRIS-T; ARH AIM-
1 (SEAD/EW) sqn with Tornado ECR 120B AMRAAM
2 sqn with Tornado IDS ARM AGM-88 HARM
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR LACM SCALP EG/Storm Shadow
1 sqn with AMX Ghibli BOMBS
MARITIME PATROL Laser-guided/GPS: Enhanced Paveway II; Enhanced
1 sqn (opcon Navy) with ATR-72MP (P-72A) Paveway III
Europe 121
Joint Special Forces Command (COFS) PCF 1 Antonio Zara

PBF 146: 19 Bigliani; 24 Corrubia; 9 Mazzei; 62 V-2000;
Army 32 V-5000/V-6000
FORCES BY ROLE PB 32: 24 Buratti; 8 Meatini
SPECIAL FORCES LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AX 1 Giorgio Cini
1 SF regt (9th Assalto paracadutisti)
1 STA regt Coast Guard 10,500
1 ranger regt (4th Alpini paracadutisti) (Guardia Costiera – Capitanerie Di Porto)
COMBAT SUPPORT EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 psyops regt PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 332
Europe
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER PCO 3: 2 Dattilo; 1 Gregoretti
1 spec ops hel regt PCC 32: 3 Diciotti; 1 Saettia; 22 200-class; 6 400-class
PB 297: 21 300-class; 3 454-class; 72 500-class; 12
Navy (COMSUBIN) 600-class; 47 700-class; 94 800-class; 48 2000-class
FORCES BY ROLE AIRCRAFT • MP 6: 3 ATR-42 MP Surveyor, 1 P-180GC;
SPECIAL FORCES 2 PL-166-DL3
1 SF gp (GOI) HELICOPTERS • MRH 11: 7 AW139; 4 Bell 412SP
1 diving gp (GOS) (AB-412SP Griffin)
Air Force Cyber

FORCES BY ROLE Overall responsibility for cyber security rests with the
SPECIAL FORCES presidency of the Council of Ministers and the Inter-
1 wg (sqn) (17th Stormo Incursori) Ministerial Situation and Planning Group, which includes,
among others, representatives from the defence, interior
Paramilitary and foreign-affairs ministries. A Joint Integrated Concept
Carabinieri on Computer Network Operations was approved in 2009
and, in 2014, a Joint Interagency Concept on Cyberwarfare.
FORCES BY ROLE
The National Strategic Framework for Cyberspace Security,
SPECIAL FORCES
released in 2013, says that the defence ministry ‘plans,
1 spec ops gp (GIS)
executes and sustains Computer Network Operations
(CNO) in the cyber domain in order to prevent, localize
Paramilitary 182,350
and defend (actively and in-depth), oppose and neutralise
Carabinieri 103,750 all threats and/or hostile actions in the cyber domain’.
The Carabinieri are organisationally under the MoD.
They are a separate service in the Italian Armed Forces DEPLOYMENT
as well as a police force with judicial competence
AFGHANISTAN
Mobile and Specialised Branch NATO • Operation Resolute Support 1,037; 1 mtn inf bde
FORCES BY ROLE HQ; 1 mtn inf regt(-); 1 hel regt(-); AW129 Mangusta; CH-47;
MANOEUVRE NH90
Other
ALBANIA
1 (mobile) paramilitary div (1 bde (1st) with (1
OSCE • Albania 1
horsed cav regt, 11 mobile bn); 1 bde (2nd) with
(1 (1st) AB regt, 2 (7th & 13th) mobile regt)) BLACK SEA
HELICOPTER NATO • SNMCMG 2: 1 MHO
1 hel gp
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 4
APC • APC (T) 3 VCC-2 OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 6
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 69 BULGARIA
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light: 1 P-180 Avanti NATO • Air Policing 4 Eurofighter Typhoon
HELICOPTERS
MRH 24 Bell 412 (AB-412)   DJIBOUTI
TPT • Light 19 AW109  90
EGYPT
Customs 68,100
MFO 75; 3 PB
(Servizio Navale Guardia Di Finanza)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE GULF OF ADEN & INDIAN OCEAN
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 179 EU • Operation Atalanta 1 DDGHM
INDIAN/PAKISTAN
UN • UNMOGIP 2 obs Latvia LVA
IRAQ Euro € 2016 2017 2018
Operation Inherent Resolve (Prima Parthica) 1,220; 1 inf regt; GDP € 25.0bn 26.8bn
1 trg unit; 1 hel sqn with 4 AW129 Mangusta; 4 NH90 US$ 27.7bn 30.2bn
KUWAIT per capita US$ 14,063 15,403
Operation Inherent Resolve (Prima Parthica) 280; 4 AMX; 2 Growth % 2.0 3.8
MQ-9A Reaper; 1 KC-767A Inflation % 0.1 3.0
LATVIA Def exp [a] € 360m 448m
NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 160; 1 mech inf coy US$ 398m 506m
Def bdgt [b] € 368m 450m 570m
LEBANON
US$ 407m 507m
UN • UNIFIL 1,077; 1 AB bde HQ; 1 mech inf bn; 1 engr
coy; 1 sigs coy; 1 hel bn FMA (US) US$ 1.75m 1.5m 0m
US$1= € 0.90 0.89
LIBYA
[a] NATO definition
Operation Ippocrate 300; 1 inf coy; 1 log unit; 1 fd hospital
UN • UNSMIL 2 obs
MALI
Ethnic groups: Latvian 62%; Russian 27%; Belarusian 3%; Polish
EU • EUTM Mali 9
2.2%
UN • MINUSMA 1
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
EU • EU NAVFOR MED: 1 FFGHM Male 7.8% 2.2% 2.6% 3.7% 23.3% 6.4%
Female 7.4% 2.1% 2.4% 3.5% 25.3% 13.1%
SERBIA
NATO • KFOR 551; 1 inf BG HQ; 1 Carabinieri unit
OSCE • Kosovo 11
Capabilities
Latvia’s National Security Concept was revised in 2015,
SOMALIA
amid growing concerns over regional security. As with
the other Baltic states, central to Latvia’s security policy is
TURKEY membership of NATO. Like these countries and Poland, it
NATO • Operation Active Fence: 1 SAM bty with SAMP/T also hosts a NATO battlegroup. The battlegroup, part of
NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence, deployed in June
UKRAINE
2017 and was certified as fully operational two months
OSCE • Ukraine 19
later. Latvia is on course to meet the NATO target of
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES spending 2% of GDP on defence in 2018. This was part of
120; 1 tpt flt with 2 C-130J Hercules the country’s 2018–20 medium-term budget framework,
adopted by the government in October 2017. The defence
ministry intends to improve combat readiness as well as
FOREIGN FORCES
the equipment inventory. It is acquiring second-hand M109
United States US European Command: 12,050 self-propelled artillery pieces from Austria and has selected
Army 4,400; 1 AB IBCT(-) the Stinger man-portable air-defence system. Latvian
Navy 3,600; 1 HQ (US Navy Europe (USNAVEUR)) at forces have deployed on a range of NATO operations and
Naples; 1 HQ (6th Fleet) at Gaeta; 1 ASW Sqn with 4 exercises, and EU civilian and military missions.
P-8A Poseidon at Sigonella
USAF 3,850; 1 ftr wg with 2 ftr sqn with 21 F-16C/D ACTIVE 5,310 (Army 1,250 Navy 550 Air 310 Joint
Fighting Falcon at Aviano Staff 2,600 National Guard 600)
USMC 200
RESERVE 7,850 (National Guard 7,850)
Joint 2,600
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF unit
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 MP bn
Europe 123
Army 1,250 AIR DEFENCE

FORCES BY ROLE 1 AD bn
MANOEUVRE 1 radar sqn (radar/air ctrl)
Light AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 4 An-2 Colt
1 inf bde (2 inf bn, 1 cbt spt bn HQ, 1 CSS bn HQ) HELICOPTERS
MRH 4 Mi-17 Hip H
National Guard 600; 7,850 part-time (8,450 TPT • Light 2 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite
total) AIR DEFENCE
FORCES BY ROLE SAM • Point-defence RBS-70
Europe
MANOEUVRE GUNS • TOWED 40mm 24 L/70
Light
11 inf bn
Paramilitary
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty bn State Border Guard
1 AD bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 engr bn
1 NBC bn PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT PB 3: 1 Valpas (ex-FIN); 1 Lokki (ex-FIN); 1 Randa
3 spt bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Cyber
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES The Cyber Security Strategy of Latvia was published
MBT 3 T-55 (trg) in 2014. Latvia established a military CERT unit in early
RECCE 47+ FV107 Scimitar (incl variants) 2016. The unit cooperates closely with the national CERT,
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE participates in international exercises and increases cyber-
MANPATS Spike-LR defence capabilities. A Cyber Defence Unit has been
RCL 84mm Carl Gustav; 90mm 130 Pvpj 1110 operational in the National Guard since 2014. Its main
ARTILLERY 80 role is to ensure the formation of reserve cyber-defence
SP 155mm 4 M109A5ÖE capabilities, which could be used for both civil and military
TOWED 100mm 23 K-53
tasks.
MOR 53: 81mm 28 L16; 120mm 25 M120
Navy 550 (incl Coast Guard) DEPLOYMENT

Naval Forces Flotilla separated into an MCM squadron and
AFGHANISTAN
a patrol-boat squadron. LVA, EST and LTU have set up a
joint naval unit, BALTRON, with bases at Liepaja, Riga, NATO • Operation Resolute Support 22
Ventspils (LVA), Tallinn (EST), Klaipeda (LTU). Each nation IRAQ
contributes 1–2 MCMVs  Operation Inherent Resolve 6
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MALI
PB 5 Skrunda (GER Swath) EU • EUTM Mali 3
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 6 UN • MINUSMA 2
MHO 5 Imanta (ex-NLD Alkmaar/Tripartite) NORTH SEA
MCCS 1 Vidar (ex-NOR)
NATO • SNMCMG 1: 1 MCCS
AXL 1 Varonis (comd and spt ship, ex-NLD) UKRAINE
OSCE • Ukraine 4
Coast Guard
Under command of the Latvian Naval Forces
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE FOREIGN FORCES
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS All NATO Enhanced Forward Presence unless stated
PB 6: 1 Astra; 5 KBV 236 (ex-SWE) Albania 18; 1 EOD pl
Canada 450; 1 mech inf bn HQ; 1 mech inf coy(+)
Air Force 310
Italy 160; 1 mech inf coy
Main tasks are airspace control and defence, maritime and
land SAR and air transportation Poland 160; 1 tk coy
Slovenia 50; 1 CBRN pl(+)
FORCES BY ROLE
TRANSPORT Spain 300; 1 armd inf coy(+)
1 (mixed) tpt sqn with An-2 Colt; Mi-17 Hip H; PZL Mi-2 United States Operation Atlantic Resolve: 1 tpt hel flt; 5 UH-
Hoplite 60M Black Hawk
FORCES BY ROLE
Lithuania LTU MANOEUVRE
Mechanised
Euro € 2016 2017 2018
1 (1st) mech bde (1 recce coy, 4 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn)
GDP € 38.6bn 41.4bn Light
US$ 42.8bn 46.7bn 1 (2nd) mot inf bde (2 mot inf bn, 1 arty bn)
per capita US$ 14,893 16,443 COMBAT SUPPORT
Growth % 2.3 3.5 1 engr bn
Inflation % 0.7 3.5
1 trg regt
Def exp [a] € 575m 724m
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US$ 636m 816m
Def bdgt [b] € 575m 723m 873m
APC • APC (T) 238: 234 M113A1; 4 M577 (CP)
US$ 637m 816m ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
FMA (US) US$ 1.75m 1.5m 0m AEV 8 MT-LB
US$1=€ 0.90 0.89 ARV 6: 2 BPz-2; 4 M113
[a] NATO definition ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
[b] Includes military pensions MSL
SP 10 M1025A2 HMMWV with FGM-148 Javelin
Population 2,823,859 MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin
Ethnic groups: Lithuanian 84.2%; Polish 6.6%; Russian 5.8%; RCL 84mm Carl Gustav
Belarusian 1.2% ARTILLERY 52
SP 4 PzH 2000
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
TOWED 105mm 18 M101
Male 7.7% 2.7% 3.0% 3.4% 22.6% 6.7% MOR 120mm 30: 5 2B11; 10 M/41D; 15 M113 with
Female 7.3% 2.6% 2.8% 3.2% 25.0% 13.0% Tampella
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence GROM
Capabilities
Reserves
In January 2017, Lithuania adopted a new National
Security Strategy (NSS) intended to reflect the worsening National Defence Voluntary Forces 4,850 active
regional security environment. The NSS identified the reservists
main security threat as ‘posed by aggressive actions of FORCES BY ROLE
the Russian Federation’. Sovereignty, territorial integrity MANOEUVRE
and democratic constitutional order are the key tenets of Other
the NSS. Given Lithuania’s size and the scale of its armed 6 (territorial) def unit
forces, conventional deterrence and territorial defence
are predicated on NATO membership. Lithuania, along Navy 680
with the two other Baltic states and Poland, now hosts a LVA, EST and LTU established a joint naval unit,
multinational NATO battlegroup as part of the Alliance’s BALTRON, with bases at Liepaja, Riga, Ventpils (LVA),
Enhanced Forward Presence. The country intends to Tallinn (EST), Klaipeda (LTU)
spend a minimum of 2% of GDP on defence by 2018, with EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
further increases to follow. Improved combat readiness PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4
and the exploration of ‘universal military service’ were PCC 4 Zemaitis (ex-DNK Flyvefisken) with 1 76mm gun
also included in the strategy. The country is purchasing the MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4
MHC 3: 1 Sūduvis (ex-GER Lindau); 2 Skulvis (ex-UK
NASAMS medium-range surface-to-air missile system to
Hunt)
improve its ground-based air defences. Like the other Baltic
MCCS 1 Jotvingis (ex-NOR Vidar)
states, it is reliant on NATO’s air-policing deployment for a
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AAR 1 Šakiai
combat-aircraft capacity.
ACTIVE 18,350 (Army 11,650 Navy 700 Air 1,100 Air Force 1,100
Other 4,900) Paramilitary 11,300 Flying hours 120 hrs/yr
Conscript liability 9 months FORCES BY ROLE
AIR DEFENCE
RESERVE 6,700 (Army 6,700)
1 AD bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE AIRCRAFT
TPT 5: Medium 3 C-27J Spartan; Light 2 L-410 Turbolet
Army 6,800; 4,850 active reserves (total 11,650) TRG 1 L-39ZA Albatros
Europe 125
HELICOPTERS focus on ensuring the reliability of command-and-control

MRH 3 AS365M3 Dauphin (SAR) systems and investing in cyber-defence capabilities. The
TPT • Medium 3 Mi-8 Hip (tpt/SAR) 2017 National Security Strategy states that Lithuania will
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger; continue to develop the NCSC.
RBS-70
DEPLOYMENT
Special Operation Force
FORCES BY ROLE AFGHANISTAN
SPECIAL FORCES NATO • Operation Resolute Support 29
1 SF gp (1 CT unit; 1 Jaeger bn, 1 cbt diver unit)
Europe
Logistics Support Command 1,400 EU • EUTM RCA 1
FORCES BY ROLE MALI
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT EU • EUTM Mali 2
1 log bn UN • MINUSMA 5; 1 obs
Training and Doctrine Command 900 SERBIA

FORCES BY ROLE NATO • KFOR 1
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UKRAINE
1 trg regt OSCE • Ukraine 3
JMTG-U 16
Other Units 1,900
FORCES BY ROLE
COMBAT SUPPORT
FOREIGN FORCES
1 MP bn All NATO Enhanced Forward Presence unless stated
Belgium 100; 1 tpt coy
Paramilitary 11,300 Germany 450; 1 armd inf bn HQ; 1 armd inf coy(+)
Netherlands 250; 1 armd inf coy
Riflemen Union 7,800
Norway 200; 1 armd coy
State Border Guard Service 3,500 United States NATO Baltic Air Policing 4 F-15C Eagle
Ministry of Interior
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Luxembourg LUX
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 3: 1
Lokki (ex-FIN); 1 KBV 041 (ex-SWE); 1 KBV 101 (ex-SWE) Euro € 2016 2017 2018
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • UCAC 2 GDP € 54.2bn 57.3bn
Christina (Griffon 2000) US$ 60.0bn 63.5bn
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 Cessna 172RG per capita US$ 104,095 107,708
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 5: 1 BK-117 (SAR); 2
Growth % 4.2 3.9
H120 Colibri; 2 H135
Inflation % 0.0 1.2
Cyber Def exp [a] € 213m 256m
A law on cyber security was adopted in December 2014. US$ 236m 284m
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) is the leading national Def bdgt € 213m 265m 331m
authority on cyber-security policy formulation and imple- US$ 235m 294m
mentation. The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)
US$1=€ 0.90 0.90
under the MoD supports other national entities in their
[a] NATO definition
cyber-security activities by performing a wide range of
functions, such as setting standards and regulations, per- Population 594,130
forming network monitoring and penetration testing,
tasking national entities to improve their cyber-security Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
measures, assisting in cyber-incident detection and conse- Male 8.6% 3.0% 3.3% 3.6% 25.1% 6.7%
quence management. A national cyber-incident manage- Female 8.1% 2.9% 3.1% 3.5% 23.9% 8.3%
ment plan was approved by the government in January
2016; organisational and technical cyber-security require-
ments for critical information infrastructure and state-in-
Capabilities
formation resources were approved by the government in Luxembourg maintains limited military capabilities
April 2016; and a cyber-incident management plan for criti- in order to participate in European collective security
cal information infrastructure was approved in July 2016. and crisis management. It has contributed troops to the
The 2016 Military Strategy says that the armed forces will multinational battlegroup in Lithuania as part of NATO’s
Enhanced Forward Presence. It is also part of the European

Multi-Role Tanker Transport Fleet programme, part Macedonia, Former
funding one A330 MRTT. Delivery of an A400M medium
strategic-transport aircraft is expected in 2018–19. Personnel
Yugoslav Republic FYROM
are embedded within European military headquarters and Macedonian Denar d 2016 2017 2018
take part in the EU training mission in Mali. Luxembourg
GDP d 607bn 634bn
contributes a contractor-operated maritime-patrol aircraft
to the EU counter-human-trafficking operation in the US$ 10.9bn 11.4bn
Mediterranean. The Belgian and Dutch air forces are per capita US$ 5,264 5,500
responsible for policing Luxembourg’s airspace. Growth % 2.4 2.5
ACTIVE 900 (Army 900) Paramilitary 600
Def bdgt d 5.90bn 6.24bn
US$ 106m 112m
US$1=d 55.66 55.523
Army 900
FORCES BY ROLE Population 2,103,721
MANOEUVRE Ethnic groups: Macedonian 64.2%; Albanian 25.2%; Turkish 3.9%;
Reconnaissance Romani 2.7%; Serbian 1.8%; Bosniac 0.9%
2 recce coy (1 to Eurocorps/BEL div, 1 to NATO pool of
deployable forces) Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Male 8.9% 3.3% 3.6% 3.8% 24.5% 5.8%
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Female 8.3% 3.1% 3.4% 3.6% 24.2% 7.7%
AUV 48 Dingo 2
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Capabilities
MSL • MANPATS TOW
ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 6 The small army-focused joint force has modest maritime
and air wings, and the forces rely on ageing Soviet-era
Paramilitary 600 equipment. A 2014–23 modernisation plan is intended to
reform the armed forces and update equipment to NATO
Gendarmerie 600 standards, but to date progress has been limited. NATO’s
Membership Action Plan was joined in 1999 and in 2017
DEPLOYMENT the country became part of the NATO Program for the
Advancement of Defence Education. FYR Macedonia
AFGHANISTAN continues to deploy personnel to Operation Resolute Support
NATO • Operation Resolute Support 1 in Afghanistan. The country hosts the Balkan Medical Task
LITHUANIA Force Headquarters and has been chosen to host SEEBRIG
NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 22; 1 tpt pl headquarters in 2020–26. Exercises regularly take place
with regional states and the US.
MALI
EU • EUTM Mali 2 ACTIVE 8,000 (Army 8,000) Paramilitary 7,600
MEDITERRANEAN SEA RESERVE 4,850
EU • EUNAVFOR MED 2 Merlin IIIC (leased)
SERBIA ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
NATO • KFOR 23
Army 8,000
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF regt (1 SF bn, 1 Ranger bn)
MANOEUVRE
Mechanised
1 mech inf bde (1 tk bn, 4 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr
bn, 1 NBC coy)
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 MP bn
1 sigs bn
1 log bde (3 log bn)
Europe 127
Reserves HELICOPTERS
FORCES BY ROLE MRH 1 Bell 412EP Twin Huey
MANOEUVRE Light TPT • Light 2: 1 Bell 206B (AB-206B) Jet Ranger II; 1
1 inf bde Bell 212 (AB-212)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES DEPLOYMENT
MBT 31 T-72A
RECCE 10 BRDM-2 ALBANIA
IFV 11: 10 BMP-2; 1 BMP-2K (CP) OSCE • Albania 2
Europe
APC 202
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
APC (T) 47: 9 Leonidas; 28 M113; 10 MT-LB
APC (W) 155: 57 BTR-70; 12 BTR-80; 2 Cobra; 84 TM- EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 3
170 Hermelin OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 1
SERBIA
RCL 57mm; 82mm M60A OSCE • Kosovo 14
ARTILLERY 126 UKRAINE
TOWED 70: 105mm 14 M-56; 122mm 56 M-30 M-1938
OSCE • Ukraine 24
MRL 17: 122mm 6 BM-21; 128mm 11
MOR 39: 120mm 39
Malta MLT
Marine Wing
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Euro € 2016 2017 2018
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 2 GDP € 9.94bn 10.7bn
Botica US$ 11.0bn 12.0bn
per capita US$ 25,329 27,567
Aviation Brigade
Growth % 5.5 5.1
FORCES BY ROLE
TRAINING Inflation % 0.9 1.3
1 flt with Z-242; Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) Def bdgt [a] € 52m 57m
ATTACK HELICOPTER US$ 58m 64m
1 sqn with Mi-24K Hind G2; Mi-24V Hind E US$1= € 0.90 0.89
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER [a] Excludes military pensions
1 sqn with Mi-8MTV Hip; Mi-17 Hip H
AIR DEFENCE Population 416,338
1 AD bn
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT Male 7.7% 2.7% 3.2% 3.5% 23.9% 8.8%
TPT • Light 1 An-2 Colt Female 7.3% 2.6% 3.0% 3.3% 23.2% 10.7%
TRG 5 Z-242
HELICOPTERS Capabilities
ATK 4 Mi-24V Hind E (10: 2 Mi-24K Hind G2; 8 Mi-
24V Hind E in store) The armed forces consist of a limited number of army
MRH 6: 4 Mi-8MTV Hip; 2 Mi-17 Hip H personnel supported by small naval and air units. Principal
TPT • Light 2 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) roles are external security, civil-emergency support and
AIR DEFENCE support to the police in certain areas. Defence-spending
SAM • Point-defence 8 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher); growth has been modest; however, the European Internal
9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet) Security Fund is funding some modernisation. With the
GUNS 40mm 36 L20 addition of a third King Air maritime-patrol aircraft,
Malta can now reportedly ensure a continuous presence
Paramilitary in its airspace. The country participates in various
European training missions as well as the EUNAVFOR–
Police 7,600 (some 5,000 armed)
MED mission. The government has announced a modest
incl 2 SF units
increase in personnel and intends to increase reservist
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
numbers.
APC ACTIVE 1,950 (Armed Forces 1,950)
APC (T) M113
APC (W) BTR-80; TM-170 Heimlin RESERVE 180 (Emergency Volunteer Reserve Force
AUV Ze’ev 120 Individual Reserve 60)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Montenegro MNE

Armed Forces of Malta 1,950 Euro € 2016 2017 2018
FORCES BY ROLE GDP € 3.77bn 3.97bn
SPECIAL FORCES US$ 4.18bn 4.41bn
1 SF unit per capita US$ 6,707 7,071
MANOEUVRE  Growth % 2.5 3.0
Light
1 (1st) inf regt (3 inf coy, 1 cbt spt coy)
Def exp [a] € 56m 66m
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 (3rd) cbt spt regt (1 cbt engr sqn, 1 EOD sqn, 1 maint US$ 62m 73m
sqn) Def bdgt [b] € 62m 66m
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT US$ 68m 74m
1 (4th) CSS regt (1 CIS coy, 1 sy coy) FMA (US) US$ 1m 1m 0m
US$1=€ 0.90 0.90
Maritime Squadron [a] NATO definition
Organised into 5 divisions: offshore patrol; inshore patrol;
rapid deployment and training; marine engineering; and
logistics Population 642,550
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Ethnic groups: Montenegrian 45% Serbian 28.7% Bosniac 8.6%
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 8 Albanian 4.9% Croatian 1%
PCO 1 Emer
PCC 1 Diciotti Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
PB 6: 4 Austal 21m; 2 Marine Protector Male 7.5% 2.0% 2.3% 3.5% 28.4% 6.1%
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2 Female 7.6% 2.6% 2.7% 3.3% 24.9% 9.0%
AAR 2 Cantieri Vittoria
Capabilities
Air Wing
1 base party. 1 flt ops div; 1 maint div; 1 integrated log div; Montenegro joined NATO in 2017. The country’s armed
1 rescue section forces are small and primarily organised around the army,
with few air and naval assets. The force is supported
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT by a significant paramilitary organisation. Capability
TPT • Light 5: 3 Beech 200 King Air (maritime patrol); 2 remains focused on internal security and limited support
BN-2B Islander to international peacekeeping. Montenegrin forces have
TRG 3 Bulldog T MK1 deployed to Afghanistan with NATO, affording them
HELICOPTERS valuable experience. Reform and professionalisation of the
MRH 6: 3 AW139 (SAR); 3 SA316B Alouette III armed forces has been slow, with only a limited portion
of the defence budget spent on modernisation. Podgorica
intends to replace its ageing Soviet-era equipment
and procurement priorities include light and medium
helicopters and light armoured vehicles. NATO’s latest
Trust Fund Project in Montenegro opened in February 2017
and is expected to support the demilitarisation of more than
400 tonnes of surplus ammunition. The country’s defence
industry has sold large numbers of surplus small arms
and anti-tank weapons abroad. In 2017, Podgorica signed
a defence bilateral cooperation plan with Poland, France
and Slovenia as well as a memorandum of understanding
with the UK. Montenegro has deepened ties with NATO
partners and neighbours, including Croatia, Germany,
Serbia, Slovenia and the US, through extensive exercises.
ACTIVE 1,950 (Army 875 Navy 350 Air Force 225

Other 500) Paramilitary 10,100
Army 875
Europe 129
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
DEPLOYMENT
Reconnaissance AFGHANISTAN
1 recce coy NATO • Operation Resolute Support 18
Light
ALBANIA
1 mot inf bn
OSCE • Albania 1
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 MP coy MALI
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE EU • EUTM Mali 1
Europe
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES SERBIA
APC • APC (W) 8 BOV-VP M-86 OSCE • Kosovo 1
SP 9 BOV-1 UKRAINE
MSL • MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 OSCE • Ukraine 2
Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel) WESTERN SAHARA
ARTILLERY 135 UN • MINURSO 2 obs
TOWED 122mm 12 D-30
MRL 128mm 18 M-63/M-94 Plamen
MOR 105: 82mm 73; 120mm 32 Multinational Organisations
Navy 350 Capabilities
1 Naval Cmd HQ with 4 operational naval units (patrol The following represent shared capabilities held by
boat; coastal surveillance; maritime detachment; and SAR) contributors collectively rather than as part of national
with additional sigs, log and trg units with a separate inventories.
coastguard element. Some listed units are in the process of
decommissioning
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
NATO AEW&C Force
PSO 1 Kotor with 1 twin 76mm gun (1 further vessel in
Based at Geilenkirchen (GER). 12 original participating
reserve)
countries (BEL, CAN, DNK, GER, GRC, ITA, NLD, NOR,
PCFG 2 Rade Končar† (of which 1 in refit) with 2 single lnchr
PRT, TUR, USA) have been subsequently joined by 5 more
with P-15 Termit (SS-N-2B Styx) AShM (missiles disarmed)
(CZE, ESP, HUN, POL, ROM).
PB 2 Mirna (Type-140) (Police units)
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 1 FORCES BY ROLE
AXS 1 Jadran†
1 sqn with B-757 (trg); E-3A Sentry (NATO standard)
Air Force 225 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Golubovci (Podgorica) air base under army command AIRCRAFT
AEW&C 16 E-3A Sentry (NATO standard)
FORCES BY ROLE
TPT • PAX 1 B-757 (trg)
TRAINING
1 (mixed) sqn with G-4 Super Galeb; Utva-75 (none op-
Strategic Airlift Capability
erational)
Heavy Airlift Wing based at Papa air base (HUN). 12
participating countries (BLG, EST, FIN, HUN, LTU, NLD,
1 sqn with SA341/SA342L Gazelle
NOR, POL, ROM, SVN, SWE, USA)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT • TRG (4 G-4 Super Galeb non-operational; 4
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Heavy 3 C-17A Globemaster III
Utva-75 non-operational)
HELICOPTERS Strategic Airlift Interim Solution
MRH 13 SA341/SA342L (HN-45M) Gazelle
Intended to provide strategic-airlift capacity pending
the delivery of A400M aircraft by leasing An-124s. 14
Paramilitary ε10,100 participating countries (BEL, CZE, FIN, FRA, GER, GRC,
HUN, LUX, NOR, POL, SVK, SVN, SWE, UK)
Montenegrin Ministry of Interior Personnel
ε6,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Heavy 2 An-124-100 (4 more available
Special Police Units ε4,100 on 6–9 days’ notice)
RESERVE 4,500 (Army 4,000 Navy 80 Air 420)

Netherlands NLD Military Constabulary 160
Euro € 2016 2017 2018 Reserve liability to age 35 for soldiers/sailors, 40 for NCOs,
45 for officers
GDP € 703bn 731bn
US$ 778bn 824bn
per capita US$ 45,658 48,272
Growth % 2.2 3.1
Inflation % 0.1 1.3
Army 18,860
Def exp [a] € 8.23bn 8.69bn
FORCES BY ROLE
COMMAND
US$ 9.11bn 9.80bn
elm 1 (1 GNC) corps HQ
Def bdgt [b] € 8.24bn 8.96bn 9.20bn SPECIAL FORCES
US$ 9.12bn 10.1bn 4 SF coy
US$1=€ 0.90 0.89 MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance
[a] NATO definition 1 ISR bn (2 armd recce sqn, 1 EW coy, 2 int sqn, 1 UAV bty)
[b] Includes military pensions Mechanised
1 (43rd) mech bde (1 armd recce sqn, 2 armd inf bn, 1
Population 17,084,719 engr bn, 1 maint coy, 1 med coy)
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
1 (13th) lt mech bde (1 recce sqn, 2 lt mech inf bn, 1 engr
bn, 1 maint coy, 1 med coy)
Male 8.4% 3.1% 3.1% 3.2% 23.2% 8.5%
Air Manoeuvre
Female 8.0% 2.9% 3.0% 3.2% 23.2% 10.2% 1 (11th) air mob bde (3 air mob inf bn, 1 engr coy, 1 med
coy, 1 supply coy, 1 maint coy) 
Capabilities COMBAT SUPPORT
Dutch defence documents reflect concern over the 1 SP arty bn (3 SP arty bty)
1 AD comd (1 AD sqn; 1 AD bty)
security situation in Europe’s east and south. Defence
1 CIMIC bn
tasks include securing the integrity of Dutch territory and
1 engr bn
society; international stability and security in Europe’s
2 EOD coy 1 (CIS) sigs bn 1 CBRN coy
periphery; and security of supply routes, both physical
and technological. Dutch forces are well trained and
1 med bn
fully professional, but improving readiness is a key
5 fd hospital
concern and priority will be given to those formations 3 maint coy
needed for deployments, including rapid-reaction units. 2 tpt bn
Improvements are planned to enabling capabilities
such as intelligence, including MALE UAVs, command Reserves 2,700 reservists 
and control, and strategic transport. The Netherlands National Command
makes significant contributions to NATO and EU Cadre bde and corps tps completed by call-up of
military operations and its forces have become more reservists (incl Territorial Comd)
integrated with their NATO allies, particularly Belgium FORCES BY ROLE
and Germany. There are air-policing agreements with MANOEUVRE
France, Belgium and Luxembourg. Elements of the army Light
are increasingly cooperating with the Bundeswehr, and 3 inf bn (could be mobilised for territorial def)
its 43rd mechanised brigade and airmobile brigade are EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
associated with host German divisions. Defence-budget ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
cuts have been arrested and increased allocations will allow RECCE 196 Fennek
for the consolidation of rapid-reaction and expeditionary IFV 170 CV9035N
capabilities. The Netherlands is part of the EDA’s MMF APC • APC (W) 143 Boxer (8 driver trg; 52 amb; 60 CP;
project, which is acquiring seven A330 tankers for NATO 23 log)
use. There is a small defence industry. DutchAero, a AUV 60 Bushmaster IMV
subsidiary of KMWE, agreed with Pratt and Whitney in ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
January 2016 to manufacture engine components for the AEV 60: 50 Boxer; 10 Kodiak
F-35, while the country also worked with Germany on the ARV 25 BPz-3 Büffel
Fennek and Boxer armoured vehicles. The army continues VLB 13 Leopard 1
to replace a proportion of its tracked armoured vehicles MW Bozena
with wheeled platforms. NBC VEHICLES 6 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC
ACTIVE 35,410 (Army 18,860 Navy 8,500 Air 8,050) SP 40 Fennek MRAT
Military Constabulary 5,900 MANPATS Spike-MR (Gil)
Europe 131
ARTILLERY 119: Marines 2,650

SP 155mm 18 PzH 2000
FORCES BY ROLE
MOR 101: 81mm 83 L16/M1; 120mm 18 Brandt
SPECIAL FORCES
RADAR • LAND 6+: 6 AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder (arty, mor);
1 SF gp (1 SF sqn, 1 CT sqn)
WALS; 10 Squire
MANOEUVRE
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
Amphibious
Long-range 20 MIM-104D/F Patriot PAC-2 GEM/PAC-3
2 mne bn
(TMD capable)
1 amph aslt gp
Short-range 6 NASAMS II
Point-defence 18+: FIM-92 Stinger; 18 Fennek with FIM-
Europe
1 spt gp (coy)
92 Stinger
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Navy 8,500 (incl Marines) ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
APC • APC (T) 160: 87 Bv-206D; 73 BvS-10 Viking
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 4: ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
4 Walrus with 4 single 533mm TT with Mk48 Sea Arrow ARV 4 BvS-10; 4 Leopard 1
HWT MED 4 BvS-10
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 6 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
DESTROYERS • DDGHM 4: MSL • MANPATS Spike-MR (Gil)
3 De Zeven Provinciën with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 12 L16/M1
RGM-84F Harpoon AShM, 1 40-cell Mk41 VLS AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger
with SM-2MR/ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT
with Mk46 LWT, 1 Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 127mm gun Air Force 8,050
(capacity 1 NH90 hel) Flying hours 180 hrs/yr
1 Zeven Provinciën with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM-
FORCES BY ROLE
84F Harpoon AShM, 1 40-cell Mk41 VLS with SM-2MR/
ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 2
Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 hel)
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE/SEARCH & RESCUE
FRIGATES • FFGHM 2:
1 sqn with NH90 NFH
2 Karel Doorman with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM-
TANKER/TRANSPORT
84A/C Harpoon AShM, 1 16-cell Mk48 VLS with
1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 Hercules
RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT
1 sqn with KDC-10; Gulfstream IV
with Mk46 LWT, 1 Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 76mm gun
TRAINING
(capacity 1 NH90 hel)
1 OEU sqn with F-35A Lightning II
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS
1 sqn with PC-7 Turbo Trainer
PSOH 4 Holland with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 hel)
1 hel sqn with AH-64D Apache; CH-47D Chinook (based
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES
at Fort Hood, TX)
MHO 6 Alkmaar (Tripartite)
ATTACK HELICOPTER
AMPHIBIOUS
1 sqn with AH-64D Apache
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LPD 2:
1 Rotterdam with 2 Goalkeeper CIWS (capacity 6 NH90/ TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
AS532 Cougar hel; either 6 LCVP or 2 LCU and 3 1 sqn with AS532U2 Cougar II
LCVP; either 170 APC or 33 MBT; 538 troops) 1 sqn with CH-47D/F Chinook
1 Johan de Witt with 2 Goalkeeper CIWS (capacity 6 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
NH90 hel or 4 AS532 Cougar hel; either 6 LCVP or AIRCRAFT 63 combat capable
2 LCU and 3 LCVP; either 170 APC or 33 MBT; 700 FTR 61 F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon
troops) FGA 2 F-35A Lightning II (in test)
LANDING CRAFT 17 TKR 2 KDC-10
LCU 5 Mk9 TPT 5: Medium 4: 2 C-130H Hercules; 2 C-130H-30
LCVP 12 Mk5 Hercules; PAX 1 Gulfstream IV
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8 TRG 13 PC-7 Turbo Trainer
AFSH 1 Karel Doorman with 2 Goalkeeper CIWS (capacity HELICOPTERS
6 NH90/AS532 Cougar or 2 CH-47F Chinook hel; 2 ATK 28 AH-64D Apache
LCVP) ASW 12 NH90 NFH
AGS 2 Snellius TPT 33: Heavy 17: 11 CH-47D Chinook; 6 CH-47F Chinook;
AK 1 Pelikaan Medium 8 AS532U2 Cougar II, 8 NH90 TTH
AOT 1 Patria AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
AS 1 Mercuur AAM • IR AIM-9L/M Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X
AXL 1 Van Kingsbergen Sidewinder II; ARH AIM-120B AMRAAM
AXS 1 Urania ASM AGM-114K Hellfire; AGM-65D/G Maverick
BOMBS MALI
Laser-guided GBU-10/GBU-12 Paveway II; GBU-24 EU • EUTM Mali 1
Paveway III (all supported by LANTIRN) UN • MINUSMA 258; 1 SF coy
INS/GPS guided GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb
MIDDLE EAST
UN • UNTSO 13 obs
Paramilitary
NORTH SEA
Royal Military Constabulary 5,900 NATO • SNMCMG 1: 1 MHO
Subordinate to the Ministry of Defence, but performs
most of its work under the authority of other ministries SERBIA
OSCE • Kosovo 1
FORCES BY ROLE 
MANOEUVRE SOMALIA
Other EU • EUTM Somalia 11
5 paramilitary district (total: 28 paramilitary unit)
SOUTH SUDAN
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE UN • UNMISS 6
APC • APC (W) 24 YPR-KMar SYRIA/ISRAEL
UN • UNDOF 2
Cyber UKRAINE
The Defence Cyber Strategy was updated in early 2015. OSCE • Ukraine 4
A Defence Cyber Command (DCC) was launched in
September 2014 and became operational in early 2017. UNITED STATES
1 hel trg sqn with AH-64D Apache; CH-47D Chinook based
The DCC is situated in the army, but comprises personnel
at Fort Hood (TX)
from all the armed services. An announcement from the
Ministry of Defence in November 2016 stated the DCC
had an offensive and defensive mandate, though it had FOREIGN FORCES
not yet performed any offensive operations. According United States US European Command: 410
to the defence ministry, ‘the armed forces can attack,
manipulate and disable the digital systems of opponents.
Potential opponents might be other states, terrorist or
Norway NOR
other organisations, or hackers.’ A Joint SIGINT Cyber Norwegian Kroner kr 2016 2017 2018
Unit was stood up in 2014 under the General Intelligence GDP kr 3.11tr 3.31tr
and Security Service and the Dutch Military Intelligence
US$ 371bn 392bn
and Security Service. A defence cyber doctrine is under
per capita US$ 70,553 73,615
development.
Growth % 1.1 1.4
Inflation % 3.6 2.1
DEPLOYMENT Def exp [a] kr 50.9bn 54.3bn
AFGHANISTAN US$ 6.06bn 6.44bn
NATO • Operation Resolute Support 100 Def bdgt [b] kr 50.4bn 51.2bn 55.0bn
US$ 6.0bn 6.08bn
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
US$1=kr 8.40 8.43
OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 1
[a] NATO definition
CARIBBEAN [b] Includes military pensions
1 AFSH
GULF OF ADEN & INDIAN OCEAN
EU • Operation Atalanta 1 LPD Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 9.2% 3.1% 3.4% 3.6% 23.4% 7.7%
IRAQ
Female 8.8% 2.9% 3.2% 3.5% 22.2% 9.0%
Operation Inherent Resolve 150; 3 trg unit
JORDAN Capabilities
Operation Inherent Resolve 35 Norway sustains small but well-equipped and highly
LEBANON trained armed forces. Territorial defence is at the heart of
UN • UNIFIL 1 security policy. In June 2016, Norway published its Long
Term Defence Plan, which stated that further adjustments
LITHUANIA to the armed forces were needed to address evolving
NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 250; 1 armd inf coy security challenges at home and abroad. In October 2017,
Europe 133
the defence ministry announced a NOK3 billion increase APC 390

in defence spending and indicated that there would be a APC (T) 315 M113 (incl variants)
raft of measures to strengthen Norwegian capability in APC (W) 75 XA-186 Sisu/XA-200 Sisu
the High North, including a new Arctic Ranger company. AUV 20+: 20 Dingo 2; IVECO LMV
Equipment recapitalisation is ongoing. Norway’s first ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
F-15A arrived in late 2017 and the government earlier AEV 28: 22 Alvis; 6 CV90 STING
announced that it would procure four submarines as part ARV 9+: 3 M88A1; M578; 6 Leopard 1
of a strategic partnership with Germany. The partnership VLB 35: 26 Leguan; 9 Leopard 1
also includes an agreement to cooperate on missiles. In MW 9 910 MCV-2
March 2017, Norway ordered five P-8A Poseidon slated for NBC VEHICLES 6 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC
Europe
delivery between 2022 and 2023. Large procurement items, ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
such as the F-35A, the submarines and the P-8s, will stretch MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin
budgetary resources. According to the defence ministry, RCL 84mm Carl Gustav
the F-35 alone will take up 35% of all procurement spending ARTILLERY 212
between 2017 and 2025. At any one time, around one-third SP 155mm 18 M109A3GN
of the country’s troops are conscripts. In January 2015, MOR 194: 81mm 150 L16; SP 81mm 20: 8 CV9030; 12
Norwegian conscription became gender neutral. Around M125A2; SP 107mm 24 M106A1
one-third of conscripts in the 2016 intake were female, RADAR • LAND 12 ARTHUR
with expectations that this will rise. A US Marine Corps
contingent has been deployed to Vaernes, on a rotational Navy 2,300; 2,000 conscripts (total 4,300)
basis, since January 2017. (See pp. 75–81.) Joint Command – Norwegian National Joint Headquarters.
The Royal Norwegian Navy is organised into four elements
under the command of the chief of staff of the Navy: the
Central Support 6,150 Home Guard 550)
naval units (Kysteskadren), the schools (Sjoforsvarets Skoler),
Conscript liability 18 months maximum. Conscripts first the naval bases and the coastguard (Kystvakten)
serve 12 months from 19–21, and then up to 4–5 refresher
FORCES BY ROLE
training periods until age 35, 44, 55 or 60 depending on
MANOEUVRE
rank and function. Active numbers include conscripts on
Reconnaissance
initial service. Conscription was extended to women in
1 ISR coy (Coastal Rangers)
2015
COMBAT SUPPORT
RESERVE 38,590 (Army 270 Navy 320 Home Guard 1 EOD pl
38,000) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Readiness varies from a few hours to several days SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 6 Ula with 8 single
533mm TT with A3 Seal DM2 HWT
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 5
DESTROYERS • DDGHM 5 Fridtjof Nansen with Aegis
C2 (mod), 2 quad lnchr with NSM AShM, 1 8-cell Mk41
Army 4,350; 5,000 conscript (total 9,350) VLS with ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with Sting
The armoured infantry brigade – Brigade North – trains Ray LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 hel)
new personnel of all categories and provides units for PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 23:
international operations. At any time around one-third of PSO 1 Harstad
the brigade will be trained and ready to conduct operations. PCFG 6 Skjold with 8 single lnchr with NSM AShM, 1
The brigade includes one high-readiness armoured 76mm gun
battalion (Telemark Battalion) with combat support and PBF 16 S90N (capacity 20 troops)
combat service support units on high readiness MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 6:
FORCES BY ROLE MSC 3 Alta with 1 twin Simbad lnchr with Mistral SAM
MANOEUVRE MHC 3 Oksoy with 1 twin Simbad lnchr with Mistral SAM
Reconnaissance LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 7
1 (GSV) bn (1 (border) recce coy, 1 ranger coy, 1 spt coy, AGI 1 Marjata IV
1 trg coy) AGS 2: 1 HU Sverdrup II; 1 Marjata III with 1 hel landing
Armoured platform
1 armd inf bde (1 ISR bn, 2 armd bn, 1 lt inf bn, 1 arty ATS 1 Valkyrien
bn, 1 engr bn, 1 MP coy, 1 CIS bn, 1 spt bn, 1 med bn) AX 2 Kvarven
Light AXL 1 Reine
1 lt inf bn (His Majesty The King’s Guards)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Coast Guard
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MBT 36 Leopard 2A4 (16 more in store) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 14
RECCE 21 CV9030 PSOH 3 Nordkapp with 1 57mm gun (capacity 1 med
IFV 89: 74 CV9030N; 15 CV9030N (CP) tpt hel)
PSO 4: 3 Barentshav; 1 Svalbard with 1 57mm gun, 1 hel Home Guard 600 (45,000 reserves)
landing platform The Home Guard is a separate organisation, but closely
PCC 5 Nornen
cooperates with all services. The Home Guard can be
PCO 2: 1 Aalesund; 1 Reine
mobilised on very short notice for local security operations
Air Force 2,600 ; 1,000 conscript (total 3,600) Land Home Guard 41,150 with reserves
Joint Command – Norwegian National HQ 11 Home Guard Districts with mobile Rapid Reaction
Flying hours 180 hrs/yr Forces (3,000 troops in total) as well as reinforcements
FORCES BY ROLE and follow-on forces (38,150 troops in total)
2 sqn with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon Naval Home Guard 1,900 with reserves
MARITIME PATROL Consisting of Rapid Reaction Forces (500 troops), and 17
1 sqn with P-3C Orion; P-3N Orion (pilot trg) ‘Naval Home Guard Areas’. A number of civilian vessels
ELECTRONIC WARFARE can be requisitioned as required
1 sqn with Falcon 20C (EW, Flight Inspection Service) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SEARCH & RESCUE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 11: 4
1 sqn with Sea King Mk43B
Harek; 2 Gyda; 5 Alusafe 1290
TRANSPORT
1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules Air Home Guard 1,450 with reserves
TRAINING
Provides force protection and security detachments for
1 sqn with MFI-15 Safari
air bases
2 sqn with Bell 412SP Twin Huey
1 sqn with NH90 (forming) Cyber
AIR DEFENCE The defence ministry is responsible for defending military
1 bn with NASAMS II networks and national coordination in armed conflict. The
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 2012 Cyber Security Strategy for Norway contained cross-
AIRCRAFT 73 combat capable governmental guidelines for cyber defence. Norwegian
FTR 67: 47 F-16AM Fighting Falcon; 10 F-16BM Fighting Armed Forces Cyber Defence supports the armed forces
Falcon; 10 F-35A Lightning II (in test) with establishing, operating and protecting networks.
ASW 6: 4 P-3C Orion; 2 P-3N Orion (pilot trg) It is responsible for defending military networks against
EW 2 Falcon 20C cyber attack. It also supports the Norwegian Armed Forces
TPT • Medium 4 C-130J-30 Hercules at home and abroad with the establishment, operation,
TRG 16 MFI-15 Safari development and protection of communications systems,
HELICOPTERS and is responsible for defending military networks against
ASW 8 NH90 NFH cyber attacks as well as developing network-based defence.
SAR 12 Sea King Mk43B
MRH 18: 6 Bell 412HP; 12 Bell 412SP
AIR DEFENCE DEPLOYMENT
SAM • Short-range NASAMS II AFGHANISTAN
AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder
II; IRIS-T; ARH AIM-120B AMRAAM; AIM-120C EGYPT
AMRAAM MFO 3
BOMBS
Laser-guided EGBU-12 Paveway II IRAQ
INS/GPS guided JDAM Operation Inherent Resolve 60; 1 trg unit
JORDAN
Special Operations Command (NORSOCOM)
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES LITHUANIA
1 (armed forces) SF comd (2 SF gp) NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 200; 1 armd coy
1 (navy) SF comd (1 SF gp)
MALI
Central Support, Administration and UN • MINUSMA 16
Command 5,550; 600 conscripts (total 6,150) MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Central Support, Administration and Command includes NATO • SNMG 1: 1 DDGHM
military personnel in all joint elements and they are
responsible for logistics and CIS in support of all forces in MIDDLE EAST
Norway and abroad UN • UNTSO 13 obs
Europe 135
NORTH SEA be released at the end of 2016, Poland has instead opted
NATO • SNMCMG 1: 1 MSC to revise plans for 2017–22 within the framework of the
TMP 2013–22. In part, these revisions reflect delays caused
SERBIA by financial constraints, inefficiencies in the acquisition
NATO • KFOR 2 process and evolving requirements. Warsaw continues
OSCE • Kosovo 1 plans to strengthen its domestic defence-industrial base.
Technology transfer and international partnering are
SOUTH SUDAN
seen as mechanisms to develop domestic industry, most
UN • UNMISS 15
of which is now consolidated in the government-owned
UKRAINE holding company PGZ. Defence spending is planned to
Europe
OSCE • Ukraine 17 reach 2.5% of GDP by 2030. Poland intends to build up
its own A2/AD capacity and in its 2017 Defence Concept
expressed an interest in pursuing research in emerging
FOREIGN FORCES technologies. Warsaw has also established a fund to bolster
United States US European Command: 330; 1 (USMC) the defence-modernisation ambitions of neighbours under
MEU eqpt set; 1 (APS) 155mm SP Arty bn eqpt set the Regional Security Assistance Programme. Recruitment
for the first six brigades of a Territorial Defence Force
Poland POL is under way with the first volunteers completing basic
training in May 2017. The full force is due to be established
Polish Zloty z 2016 2017 2018 by 2019.
GDP z 1.85tr 1.95tr ACTIVE 105,000 (Army 61,200 Navy 7,400 Air Force
US$ 469bn 510bn 18,700 Special Forces 3,400 Territorial 800 Joint
per capita US$ 12,361 13,429 13,500) Paramilitary 73,400
Growth % 2.6 3.8
Inflation % -0.6 1.9 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Def exp [a] z 37.1bn 39.2bn
US$ 9.40bn 10.2bn Army 61,200
Def bdgt [b] z 35.9bn 37.7bn 41.1bn FORCES BY ROLE
FMA (US) US$ 9m 3.5m 0m elm 1 (MNC NE) corps HQ
US$1=z 3.94 3.83 MANOEUVRE
Reconnaissance
[a] NATO definition
3 recce regt
[b] Includes military pensions Armoured
Population 38,476,269 1 (11th) armd cav div (2 armd bde, 1 mech bde, 1 arty
regt)
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Mechanised
Male 7.6% 2.5% 3.0% 3.5% 25.2% 6.7% 1 (12th) div (2 mech bde, 1 (coastal) mech bde, 1 arty regt)
Female 7.2% 2.4% 2.8% 3.4% 25.7% 10.2% 1 (16th) div (2 armd bde, 2 mech bde, 1 arty regt)
1 (21st) mech bde (1 armd bn, 3 mech bn, 1 arty bn, 1
Capabilities AD bn, 1 engr bn)
Air Manoeuvre
Territorial defence and NATO membership are two central 1 (6th) air aslt bde (3 air aslt bn)
pillars of Poland’s defence policy. A classified Strategic 1 (25th) air cav bde (3 air cav bn, 2 tpt hel bn, 1 (casevac)
Defence Review was undertaken by the new government med unit)
following the October 2015 elections. A summary of this was COMBAT SUPPORT
released in May 2017 as ‘The Defence Concept of the Republic 2 engr regt
of Poland’. The primary focus of the public document, 1 ptn br regt
covering the period 2017–32, is to prepare Poland’s armed 2 chem regt
forces to provide a deterrent against Russian aggression. HELICOPTER
Russia is characterised as a direct threat to Poland and to a 1 (1st) hel bde (2 atk hel sqn with Mi-24D/V Hind D/E, 1
stable international order in general. The defence concept CSAR sqn with Mi-24V Hind E; PZL W-3PL Gluszec; 2
defines the ambition to restore divisions as tactical combat ISR hel sqn with Mi-2URP; 2 hel sqn with Mi-2)
units, rather than administrative units. Poland is moving AIR DEFENCE
once again to a service command structure, assisted by a 3 AD regt
support inspectorate. Reforms of the defence-acquisition EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
system are planned but a national armaments strategy ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
is yet to be released. While observers expected a new MBT 937: 142 Leopard 2A4; 105 Leopard 2A5; 232 PT-91
Technical Modernization Programme (TMP) for 2017–26 to Twardy; 458 T-72/T-72M1D/T-72M1
RECCE 407: 282 BRDM-2; 38 BWR; 87 WD R-5 Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm
IFV 1,636: 1,277 BMP-1; 359 Rosomak IFV gun
APC 249 MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 21
APC (W) 219: 211 Rosomak APC; 8 RAK (CP) MCCS 1 Kontradmirał Xawery Czernicki
PPV 30 Maxxpro MHO 3 Krogulec
AUV 85: 40 Cougar (on loan from US); 45 M-ATV MSI 17: 1 Gopło; 12 Gardno; 4 Mamry
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AMPHIBIOUS 8
AEV 17+: IWT; MT-LB; 17 Rosomak WRT LANDING SHIPS • LSM 5 Lublin (capacity 9 tanks; 135
ARV 56: 15 BPz-2; 15 MT-LB; 26 WZT-3M troops)
VLB 62: 4 Biber; 48 BLG67M2; 10 MS-20 Daglezja LANDING CRAFT • LCU 3 Deba (capacity 50 troops)
MW 18: 14 Bozena; 4 Kalina SUM LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 21
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE AGI 2 Moma
MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 AGS 9: 2 Heweliusz; 4 Wildcat 40; 3 (coastal)
Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); Spike-LR AORL 1 Baltyk
ARTILLERY 807 AOL 1 Moskit
SP 427: 122mm 292 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 111 M-77 Dana; ARS 4: 2 Piast; 2 Zbyszko
ATF 2
155mm 24 Krab
AX 1 Wodnik with 1 twin AK230 CIWS
MRL 122mm 180: 75 BM-21; 30 RM-70; 75 WR-40 Langusta
AXS 1 Iskra
MOR 200: 98mm 89 M-98; 120mm 95 M120; SP 120mm
COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 6+: 6 NSM; MM40 Exocet
16 RAK-A
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
RADAR • LAND 3 LIWIEC (veh, arty)
Short-range Crotale NG/GR
HELICOPTERS
ATK 28 Mi-24D/V Hind D/E Naval Aviation 1,300
MRH 64: 7 Mi-8MT Hip; 3 Mi-17 Hip H; 1 Mi-17AE Hip FORCES BY ROLE
(aeromedical); 5 Mi-17-1V Hip; 16 PZL Mi-2URP Hoplite; ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE/SEARCH & RESCUE
24 PZL W-3W/WA Sokol; 8 PZL W-3PL Gluszec (CSAR) 1 sqn with Mi-14PL Haze A; Mi-14PL/R Haze C
TPT 34: Medium 9: 7 Mi-8T Hip; 2 PZL W-3AE Sokol 1 sqn with PZL W-3RM Anakonda; SH-2G Super Sea-
(aeromedical); Light 25 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite sprite
AIR DEFENCE MARITIME PATROL
SAM 1 sqn with An-28RM; An-28E
Short-range 20 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful) TRANSPORT
Point-defence 64+: 9K32 Strela-2‡ (SA-7 Grail); 64 9K33 1 sqn with An-28TD; M-28B TD Bryza
Osa-AK (SA-8 Gecko); GROM 1 sqn with An-28TD; M-28B; Mi-17 Hip H; PZL Mi-2
GUNS 352 Hoplite; PZL W-3T; 1 PZL W-3A
SP 23mm 28: 8 ZSU-23-4; 20 ZSU-23-4MP Biala EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
TOWED 23mm 324; 252 ZU-23-2; 72 ZUR-23-2KG/PG AIRCRAFT
MP 10: 8 An-28RM Bryza; 2 An-28E Bryza
Navy 7,400 TPT • Light 4: 2 An-28TD Bryza; 2 M-28B TD Bryza
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS ASW 11: 7 Mi-14PL Haze; 4 SH-2G Super
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL 5 Seasprite
SSK 5: MRH 1 Mi-17 Hip H
4 Sokol (ex-NOR Type-207) with 8 single 533mm TT SAR 8: 2 Mi-14PL/R Haze C; 4 PZL W-3RM Anakonda; 2
1 Orzel (ex-FSU Kilo) with 6 single 533mm TT each with PZL W-3WA RM Anakonda
53-65 HWT (currently non-operational; has been in TPT • Light 7: 4 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite; 1 PZL W-3A; 2 PZL-
refit since 2014; damaged by fire in 2017) W-3T
FRIGATES • FFGHM 2 Pulaski (ex-US Oliver Hazard Air Force 18,700
Perry) with 1 Mk13 GMLS with RGM-84D/F Harpoon Flying hours 160–200 hrs/yr
AShM/SM-1MR SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with FORCES BY ROLE
MU90 LWT, 1 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 76mm gun FIGHTER
(capacity 2 SH-2G Super Seasprite ASW hel) (1 vessel 2 sqn with MiG-29A/UB Fulcrum
used as training ship) FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4 3 sqn with F-16C/D Block 52+ Fighting Falcon
CORVETTES • FSM 1 Kaszub with 2 quad lnchr with FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR
9K32 Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT 2 sqn with Su-22M-4 Fitter
with SET-53 HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1 SEARCH AND RESCUE
76mm gun 1 sqn with Mi-2; PZL W-3 Sokol
PCFGM 3: TRANSPORT
3 Orkan (ex-GDR Sassnitz) with 1 quad lnchr with RBS- 1 sqn with C-130E; PZL M-28 Bryza
15 Mk3 AShM, 1 quad lnchr (manual aiming) with 1 sqn with C-295M; PZL M-28 Bryza
Europe 137
TRAINING PBF 6: 2 Straznik; 4 IC16M

1 sqn with PZL-130 Orlik PB 10: 2 Wisloka; 2 Baltic 24; 1 Project MI-6
1 sqn with TS-11 Iskra AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • UCAC 2
1 hel sqn with SW-4 Puszczyk Griffon 2000TDX
1 (Spec Ops) sqn with Mi-17 Hip H Prevention Units (Police) 59,100
1 (VIP) sqn with Mi-8; W-3WA Sokol Anti-terrorist Operations Bureau n.k.
AIR DEFENCE Ministry of Interior
1 bde with S-125 Neva SC (SA-3 Goa); S-200C Vega (SA-5
Gammon)
Cyber
Europe
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
The National Security Bureau issued a cyber-security
doctrine in January 2015. The doctrine specifies significant
FTR 33: 26 MiG-29A Fulcrum; 7 MiG-29UB Fulcrum
FGA 66: 36 F-16C Block 52+ Fighting Falcon; 12 F-16D tasks needed in order to build national cyber-security
Block 52+ Fighting Falcon; 12 Su-22M-4 Fitter; 6 Su- capability. It was reported that the document noted the
22UM3K Fitter need to pursue ‘active cyber defence, including offensive
TPT 45: Medium 5 C-130E Hercules; Light 39: 16 C-295M; actions in cyberspace, and maintaining readiness for
23 M-28 Bryza TD; PAX 1 Gulfstream G550 cyberwar’. A draft version of a cyber-security strategy
TRG 62: 2 M-346; 28 PZL-130 Orlik; 32 TS-11 Iskra for 2018–22 emerged, noting the requirement for tools
HELICOPTERS to enable military activities in cyberspace. The defence
MRH 8 Mi-17 Hip H minister said in October 2017 that the defence ministry
TPT 69: Medium 29: 9 Mi-8 Hip; 10 PZL W-3 Sokol; 10 was to create ‘cyberspace forces’, numbering around 1,000.
PZL W-3WA Sokol (VIP); Light 40: 16 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite;
24 SW-4 Puszczyk (trg)
AIR DEFENCE • SAM DEPLOYMENT
Long-range 1 S-200C Vega (SA-5 Gammon)
AFGHANISTAN
Short-range 17 S-125 Neva SC (SA-3 Goa)
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES NATO • Operation Resolute Support 220
AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer); UN • UNAMA 1 obs
AIM-9 Sidewinder; R-27T (AA-10B Alamo); IIR AIM-9X
ARMENIA/AZERBAIJAN
Sidwinder II; ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM
ASM AGM-65J/G Maverick; Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen); Kh-29 OSCE • Minsk Conference 1
(AS-14 Kedge) BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
LACM Conventional AGM-158 JASSM
EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 39
Special Forces 3,400 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

FORCES BY ROLE EU • EUTM RCA 1
SPECIAL FORCES
3 SF units (GROM, FORMOZA & cdo)
COMBAT SUPPORT/ UN • MONUSCO 2 obs
1 cbt spt unit (AGAT) IRAQ
1 spt unit (NIL)
KUWAIT
Territorial Defence Forces 800 Operation Inherent Resolve 4 F-16C Fighting Falcon
FORCES BY ROLE
LATVIA
MANOEUVRE
Light NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 160; 1 tk coy
1 (1st) sy bde (2 sy bn) SERBIA
2 (2nd & 3rd) sy bde (1 sy bn)
NATO • KFOR 240; 1 inf coy
Paramilitary 73,400 UN • UNMIK 1 obs
SOUTH SUDAN
Border Guards 14,300
UN • UNMISS 1 obs
UKRAINE
Maritime Border Guard 3,700 OSCE • Ukraine 35
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 18 WESTERN SAHARA
PCC 2 Kaper UN • MINURSO 1 obs
FOREIGN FORCES ACTIVE 30,500 (Army 16,500 Navy 8,000 Air 6,000)
Paramilitary 44,000
All NATO Enhanced Forward Presence unless stated
Croatia 78; 1 MRL bty with BM-21 Grad RESERVE 211,950 (Army 210,000 Navy 1,250, Air
Germany MNC-NE corps HQ: 67 Force 700)
Romania 120; 1 ADA bty; 1 MP coy Reserve obligation to age 35
United Kingdom 150; 1 recce sqn
United States: 850; 1 mech bn • Operation Atlantic Resolve ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
2,100; 1 armd bde HQ; 1 armd cav sqn(-); 1 SP arty bn;
M1 Abrams; M3 Bradley; M109; 1 atk hel flt with AH-64E Army 16,500
Apache; 1 tpt hel flt with 4 UH-60 Black Hawk 5 territorial comd (2 mil region, 1 mil district, 2 mil zone)
FORCES BY ROLE
Portugal PRT SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF bn
Euro € 2016 2017 2018 MANOEUVRE
GDP € 185bn 194bn Reconnaissance
US$ 205bn 212bn 1 ISR bn
per capita US$ 19,821 20,575 Mechanised
1 mech bde (1 cav tp, 1 tk regt, 2 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn,
Growth % 1.4 2.5
1 AD bty, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 spt bn)
Inflation % 0.6 1.6 1 (intervention) bde (1 cav tp, 1 recce regt, 2 mech inf bn,
Def exp [a] € 2.36bn 2.51bn 1 arty bn, 1 AD bty, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 spt bn)
US$ 2.62bn 2.74bn Air Manoeuvre
Def bdgt € 2.21bn 2.24bn 2.18bn 1 (rapid reaction) bde (1 cav tp, 1 cdo bn, 2 para bn, 1
US$ 2.44bn 2.44bn arty bn, 1 AD bty, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 spt bn)
Other
US$1=€ 0.90 0.92
1 (Azores) inf gp (2 inf bn, 1 AD bty)
[a] NATO definition 1 (Madeira) inf gp (1 inf bn, 1 AD bty)
Population 10,839,514 COMBAT SUPPORT
1 STA bty
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 1 engr bn
Male 8.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.2% 23.8% 7.9% 1 EOD unit
Female 7.4% 2.7% 2.6% 2.8% 24.2% 11.5% 1 ptn br coy
1 EW coy
Capabilities 2 MP coy
1 CBRN coy
Principal roles for the armed forces include NATO, EU 1 psyops unit
and UN operations, homeland defence and maritime 1 CIMIC coy (joint)
security. Portugal’s military-planning law for 2015–26 set 1 sigs bn
key milestones for platform-acquisition and modernisation COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
programmes. The plan envisages a reduction in army 1 construction coy
strength and the recalibration of the forces into ‘immediate 1 maint coy
reaction forces’, ‘permanent forces for the defence of 1 log coy
national sovereignty’ and modular forces. Investment 1 tpt coy
plans support Portugal’s ambition to field rapid-reaction 1 med unit
and maritime-surveillance capabilities for territorial AIR DEFENCE
defence and multinational operations. Army-upgrade 1 AD bn
plans include enhancing the electronic-warfare capacity,
while in 2017, air defence was bolstered by government Reserves 210,000
approval for the acquisition of the SHORAD missile FORCES BY ROLE
system via the NATO Support and Procurement Agency. MANOEUVRE
The navy intends to modernise its frigates and submarines Light
and to acquire patrol vessels and a logistic-support vessel. 3 (territorial) def bde (on mobilisation)
The air force plans to modernise its remaining F-16s and EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
its P-3C Orion maritime-patrol aircraft, replace its Alouette ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
III helicopters and continue acquiring precision-guided MBT 58: 37 Leopard 2A6; 21 M60A3 TTS
munitions. In June 2017, Portugal began negotiations RECCE 48: 14 V-150 Chaimite; 34 VBL
with Brazil’s Embraer for the purchase of KC-390 tanker/ IFV 22 Pandur II MK 30mm
transport aircraft, with a planned initial operating APC 416
capability in 2021. APC (T) 255: 173 M113A1; 33 M113A2; 49 M577A2 (CP)
Europe 139
APC (W) 165: 21 V-200 Chaimite; 144 Pandur II (all MANOEUVRE

variants) Light
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES 2 lt inf bn
AEV M728 COMBAT SUPPORT
ARV 13: 6 M88A1, 7 Pandur 1 mor coy 
VLB M48 1 MP det
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MSL ARTILLERY • MOR 120mm 30
SP 20: 16 M113 with TOW; 4 M901 with TOW
MANPATS Milan; TOW Naval Aviation
Europe
RCL 236: 84mm 162 Carl Gustav; 90mm 29 M67; 106mm EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
45 M40A1 HELICOPTERS • ASW 5 Lynx Mk95 (Super Lynx)
ARTILLERY 323
SP 155mm 24: 6 M109A2; 18 M109A5 Air Force 6,000
TOWED 65: 105mm 41: 17 L119 Light Gun; 21 M101A1; 3 Flying hours 180 hrs/yr on F-16 Fighting Falcon
Model 56 pack howitzer; 155mm 24 M114A1
FORCES BY ROLE
MOR 234: 81mm 143; SP 81mm 12: 2 M125A1; 10
M125A2; 107mm 11 M30; SP 107mm 18: 3 M106A1; 15
M106A2; 120mm 50 Tampella
MARITIME PATROL
AIR DEFENCE
1 sqn with P-3C Orion
SAM • Point-defence 24+: 5 M48A2 Chaparral; 19 M48A3
ISR/TRANSPORT
Chaparral; FIM-92 Stinger
1 sqn with C295M
GUNS • TOWED 20mm 24 Rh 202
COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE
1 sqn with with AW101 Merlin
Navy 8,000 (incl 1,250 Marines) TRANSPORT
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 sqn with C-130H/C-130H-30 Hercules
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 2 Tridente (GER 1 sqn with Falcon 50
Type-214) with 8 533mm TT with Black Shark HWT TRAINING
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 5 1 sqn with Alpha Jet*
FRIGATES • FFGHM 5: 1 sqn with SA316 Alouette III
2 Bartolomeu Dias (ex-NLD Karel Doorman) with 2 quad 1 sqn with TB-30 Epsilon
Mk141 lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 1 16-cell EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Mk48 VLS with RIM-7M Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 Mk32 AIRCRAFT 41 combat capable
twin 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 Goalkeeper FTR 30: 26 F-16AM Fighting Falcon; 4 F-16BM Fighting
CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity: 1 Lynx Mk95 (Super Falcon
Lynx) hel) ASW 5 P-3C Orion
3 Vasco Da Gama with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM- ISR: 7: 5 C295M (maritime surveillance), 2 C295M (photo
84C Harpoon AShM, 1 octuple Mk 29 GMLS with recce)
RIM-7M Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 Mk32 triple 324mm TPT 13: Medium 5: 2 C-130H Hercules; 3 C-130H-30
ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 Hercules (tpt/SAR); Light 5 C295M; PAX 3 Falcon 50 (tpt/
100mm gun (capacity 2 Lynx Mk95 (Super Lynx) hel) VIP)
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 20 TRG 22: 6 Alpha Jet*; 16 TB-30 Epsilon
CORVETTES • FS 3: HELICOPTERS
1 Baptista de Andrade with 1 100mm gun, 1 hel landing MRH 6 SA316 Alouette III (trg, utl)
platform TPT • Medium 12 AW101 Merlin (6 SAR, 4 CSAR, 2
2 Joao Coutinho with 1 twin 76mm gun, 1 hel landing fishery protection)
platform AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
PSO 2 Viana do Castelo with 1 hel landing platform AAM • IR AIM-9L/I Sidewinder; ARH AIM-120C
PCC 3: 2 Cacine; 1 Tejo (ex-DNK Flyvisken) AMRAAM
PBR 12: 2 Albatroz; 5 Argos; 4 Centauro; 1 Rio Minho ASM AGM-65A Maverick
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 11 AShM AGM-84A Harpoon
AGS 4: 2 D Carlos I (ex-US Stalwart); 2 Andromeda BOMBS
AORL 1 Bérrio (ex-UK Rover) with 1 hel landing platform Laser-guided/GPS GBU-49 Enhanced Paveway II
(for medium hel) INS/GPS guided GBU-31 JDAM
AXS 6: 1 Sagres; 1 Creoula; 1 Polar; 2 Belatrix; 1 Zarco
Paramilitary 44,000
Marines 1,250
FORCES BY ROLE National Republican Guard 22,400
1 SF det PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 32
PBF 12
PB 20 Romania ROM
HELICOPTERS • MRH 7 SA315 Lama
New Lei 2016 2017 2018
Public Security Police 21,600 GDP lei 761bn 828bn
US$ 188bn 205bn
Cyber per capita US$ 9,493 10,372
The 2013 Cyber Defence Policy Guidance established Growth % 4.8 5.5
a national cyber-defence structure. Portugal released a
National Cyberspace Security Strategy in 2015, which
Def exp [a] lei 10.7bn 16.3bn
called for the country to develop a cyber-defence capacity
and consolidate the role of the National Centre for Cyber US$ 2.65bn 4.04bn
Security. The strategic-military aspects of cyber defence Def bdgt [b] lei 11.2bn 16.3bn
are the responsibility of the Council of the Chiefs of Staff. US$ 2.76bn 4.04bn
A Center for Cyber Defence, under the Directorate of FMA (US) US$ 4.4m 4.4m 0m
Communications and Information Systems of the General
US$1=lei 4.06 4.04
Staff, reached FOC in 2017. Cyber-defence units within
the three branches of the armed forces are responsible for [a] NATO definition
responding to cyber attacks. [b] Includes military pensions
DEPLOYMENT
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
AFGHANISTAN Male 7.4% 2.7% 2.8% 3.6% 25.6% 6.6%
NATO • Operation Resolute Support 10 Female 7.0% 2.5% 2.6% 3.5% 26.0% 9.8%
UN • UNAMA 2 obs
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC Capabilities
EU • EUTM RCA 11 Romania intends to modernise its forces, with ageing
UN • MINUSCA 150; 1 cdo coy Soviet-era equipment seen as a factor limiting its military
capability. According to a government strategy approved
IRAQ
in August 2017, Romania is to replace its MiG-21 fleet by
Operation Inherent Resolve 31 2020 and acquire new combat helicopters. The country
MALI is additionally seeking to procure corvettes, armoured
EU • EUTM Mali 11 vehicles and rocket artillery; the plan is to acquire US-
UN • MINUSMA 2 manufactured High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems.
Acquisition of the Patriot air-defence system was approved
MEDITERRANEAN SEA by the US State Department, and Romania signed a LoA
EU • EUNAVFOR MED 1 SSK with the US Army in November. The financing of ongoing
NATO • SNMG 1: 1 FFGHM projects and meeting critical procurement requirements are
key components of the 2017–26 defence plan. The Supreme
SERBIA
Defence Council pledged to spend 2% of GDP on defence.
NATO • KFOR 15
In 2017, Canada and the UK, in rotation, deployed forces
OSCE • Kosovo 1 to Romania as part of a NATO Air Policing Mission. The
SOMALIA Aegis Ashore ballistic-missile-defence system was activated
EU • EUTM Somalia 4 at the US Naval Support Facility Deveselu. It is expected
to become fully operational in 2018. Romania’s armed
UKRAINE forces have traditionally been structured around territorial
OSCE • Ukraine 3 defence and support to NATO, contributing to missions in
Afghanistan and Iraq during the last decade.
FOREIGN FORCES ACTIVE 69,300 (Army 36,000 Navy 6,500 Air 10,300
United States US European Command: 200; 1 spt facility Joint 16,500) Paramilitary 79,900
at Lajes
Army 36,000
Readiness is reported as 70–90% for NATO-designated
forces (1 div HQ, 1 mech bde, 1 inf bde & 1 mtn inf bde)
and 40–70% for other forces
Europe 141
FORCES BY ROLE Navy 6,600

COMMAND
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
2 div HQ (2nd & 4th)
elm 1 div HQ (MND-SE)
DESTROYERS 3
SPECIAL FORCES
DDGH 1 Marasesti with 4 twin lnchr with P-15M
1 SF bde (2 SF bn, 1 para bn, 1 log bn)
Termit-M (SS-N-2C Styx) AShM, 2 triple 533mm
MANOEUVRE
ASTT with 53–65 HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S
Reconnaissance 
mor, 2 twin 76mm guns (capacity 2 SA-316 (IAR-316)
1 recce bde
2 recce regt Alouette III hel)
Europe
Mechanised DDH 2 Regele Ferdinand (ex-UK Type-22), with 2 triple
5 mech bde (1 tk bn, 2 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AD bn, 324mm TT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 SA330 (IAR-330)
1 log bn) Puma)
Light PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 24
1 (MNB-SE) inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AD bn, 1 log bn) CORVETTES 4
2 mtn inf bde (3 mtn inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AD bn, 1 log bn) FSH 2 Tetal II with 2 twin 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000
COMBAT SUPPORT Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
1 MRL bde (3 MRL bn, 1 STA bn, 1 log bn) (capacity 1 SA316 (IAR-316) Alouette III hel)
2 arty regt  FS 2 Tetal I with 2 twin 533mm ASTT with 53-65E
1 engr bde (4 engr bn, 1 ptn br bn, 1 log bn) HWT, 2 RBU 2500 Smerch 1 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm
2 engr bn guns
3 sigs bn PCFG 3 Zborul with 2 twin lnchr with P-15M Termit-M
1 CIMIC bn (SS-N-2C Styx) AShM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
1 MP bn PCFT 3 Naluca with 4 single 533mm ASTT
3 CBRN bn PCR 8:
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 5 Brutar II with 2 BM-21 MRL, 1 100mm gun
4 spt bn 3 Kogalniceanu with 2 BM-21 MRL, 2 100mm guns
AIR DEFENCE PBR 6 VD141 (ex-MSR now used for river patrol)
3 AD regt MINE WARFARE 11
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE MINE COUNTERMEASURES 10
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MSO 4 Musca with 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 2 AK230
MBT 460: 260 T-55; 42 TR-580; 104 TR-85; 54 TR-85 M1 CIWS
IFV 124: 23 MLI-84; 101 MLI-84 JDER MSR 6 VD141
APC 1,253 MINELAYERS • ML 1 Corsar with up to 100 mines, 2
APC (T) 76 MLVM RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 57mm gun
APC (W) 643: 69 B33 TAB Zimbru; 31 Piranha III; 390 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8
TAB-71; 153 TAB-77 AE 2 Constanta with 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 2 twin 57mm
TYPE VARIANTS 474 APC guns
PPV 60 Maxxpro AGOR 1 Corsar
AUV 377 TABC-79 AGS 2: 1 Emil Racovita;1 Catuneanu
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AOL 1 Tulcea
ARV 3 BPz-2 ATF 1 Grozavu
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE AXS 1 Mircea
MSL • SP 134: 12 9P122 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 74
9P133 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 48 9P148 Konkurs (AT-5 Naval Infantry
Spandrel) FORCES BY ROLE
GUNS MANOEUVRE
SP 100mm 23 SU-100 Light
TOWED 100mm 222 M-1977 1 naval inf bn
ARTILLERY 927 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SP 122mm 24: 6 2S1; 18 Model 89 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
TOWED 449: 122mm 98 (M-30) M-1938 (A-19); 152mm AUV 14: 11 ABC-79M; 3 TABC-79M
351: 247 M-1981; 104 M-1985
MRL 122mm 188: 134 APR-40; 54 LAROM Air Force 10,300
MOR 120mm 266 M-1982
RADARS • LAND 9 SNAR-10 Big Fred
AIR DEFENCE FORCES BY ROLE
SAM • Short-range 32 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful) FIGHTER
GUNS 60 2 sqn with MiG-21 Lancer C
SP 35mm 36 Gepard FIGHTER GROUND ATTACK
TOWED 35mm 24 GDF-203 1 sqn (forming) with with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon
GROUND ATTACK military CERT (CERTMIL) and a Cyber Defence Command

1 sqn with IAR-99 Soim is expected to be established within the military command
TRANSPORT structure by 2018. Romania is the lead nation for the
1 sqn with An-30 Clank; C-27J Spartan NATO Trust Fund established to develop Ukraine’s cyber
1 sqn with C-130B/H Hercules defences.
TRAINING
1 sqn with IAR-99 Soim* DEPLOYMENT
1 sqn with SA316B Alouette III (IAR-316B); Yak-52 (Iak-
52) AFGHANISTAN
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER NATO • Operation Resolute Support 683; 1 inf bn
2 (multi-role) sqn with IAR-330 SOCAT Puma UN • UNAMA 4 obs
3 sqn with SA330 Puma (IAR-330)
AIR DEFENCE BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
1 AD bde EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 39
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
1 engr spt regt EU • EUTM RCA 9
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FTR 9: 7 F-16AM Fighting Falcon; 2 F-16BM Fighting UN • MONUSCO 17 obs
Falcon INDIA/PAKISTAN
FGA 25: 6 MiG-21 Lancer B; 19 MiG-21 Lancer C UN • UNMOGIP 2 obs
ISR 2 An-30 Clank
TPT • Medium 12: 7 C-27J Spartan; 4 C-130B Hercules; 1 IRAQ
C-130H Hercules Operation Inherent Resolve 50
TRG 33: 10 IAR-99*; 11 IAR-99C Soim*; 12 Yak-52 (Iak-52) MALI
HELICOPTERS EU • EUTM Mali 1
MRH 30: 22 IAR-330 SOCAT Puma; 8 SA316B Alouette III
UN • MINUSMA 1
(IAR-316B)
TPT • Medium 36: 21 SA330L Puma (IAR-330L); 15 POLAND
SA330M Puma (IAR-330M) NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 120; 1 ADA bty; 1
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Medium-range 14: 6 S-75M3 MP coy
Volkhov (SA-2 Guideline); 8 MIM-23 Hawk PIP III
SERBIA
NATO • KFOR 61
AAM • IR AIM-9M Sidewinder; R-73 (AA-11 Archer);
UN • UNMIK 1 obs
R-550 Magic 2; Python 3 ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM
ASM Spike-ER SOMALIA
BOMBS EU • EUTM Somalia 4
Laser-guided GBU-12 Paveway
INS/GPS guided GBU-38 JDAM SOUTH SUDAN
UN • UNMISS 2; 4 obs
Paramilitary 79,900 UKRAINE
OSCE • Ukraine 32
Border Guards 22,900 (incl conscripts)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FOREIGN FORCES
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 14 Canada NATO Air Policing: 135; 4 F/A-18A Hornet (CF-18)
PCO 1 Stefan cel Mare (Damen Stan OPV 950) United States US European Command: 1,000; 1 armd inf
PBF 1 Bigliani bn HQ; 1 armd/armd inf coy; M1 Abrams; M2 Bradley; 1 tpt
PB 12: 4 Neustadt; 3 Mai; 5 SNR-17 hel flt with 5 UH-60L Black Hawk
Gendarmerie ε57,000
Cyber
Romania’s 2013 and 2015 cyber-security strategies define
the conceptual framework, aim, objectives, priorities
and courses of action for providing cyber security at the
national level. Romania’s 2016 Military Strategy said the
country needed to develop the legal framework to conduct
operations in cyberspace. The defence ministry contains a
Europe 143
MANOEUVRE
Serbia SER Mechanised
1 (1st) bde (1 tk bn, 2 mech inf bn, 1 inf bn, 1 SP arty bn,
Serbian Dinar d 2016 2017 2018
1 MRL bn, 1 AD bn, 1 engr bn, 1 log bn)
GDP d 4.20tr 4.43tr 3 (2nd, 3rd & 4th) bde (1 tk bn, 2 mech inf bn, 2 inf bn, 1
US$ 37.7bn 39.4bn SP arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 AD bn, 1 engr bn, 1 log bn)
Growth % 2.8 3.0 1 (mixed) arty bde (4 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 spt bn)
Inflation % 1.1 3.4 2 ptn bridging bn
1 NBC bn
Europe
Def bdgt d 55.8bn 58.9bn
US$ 501m 523m
1 sigs bn
2 MP bn
US$1=d 111.28 112.62 Reserve Organisations
Population 7,111,024 FORCES BY ROLE
Ethnic groups: Serbian 83.3%; Hungarian 3.35%; Romani 2.05%; MANOEUVRE
Bosniac 2.02%; Croatian 0.8% Light
8 (territorial) inf bde
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Female 7.0% 2.6% 2.9% 3.1% 24.9% 10.8% MBT 212: 199 M-84; 13 T-72
RECCE 46 BRDM-2
Capabilities IFV 335: 323 M-80; 12 Lazar-3
Principal missions for Serbia’s armed forces include APC 71
territorial defence, internal security and limited support APC(T) 32 MT-LB (CP)
to peacekeeping missions. The forces have reduced APC (W) 39 BOV-VP M-86; some Lazar-3
in size over the last decade. Plans to acquire Western ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
military equipment have reportedly changed in favour AEV IWT
of acquiring Russian hardware. In 2017, Serbia received ARV M84A1; T-54/T-55
six disassembled Russian MiG-29 fighters (currently non- VLB MT-55; TMM
operational). As part of a military-technical agreement ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
between Russia and Serbia, Belgrade is expected to also MSL
receive a donation of T-72 main battle tanks and BRDM-2 SP 48 BOV-1 (M-83) with 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger)
reconnaissance vehicles. Serbia is also seeking to acquire MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot
S-300, improving in this way its air-defence capability. (AT-4 Spigot)
In 2017, Serbia joined the HELBROC Balkan battlegroup, RCL 90mm 6 M-79
led by Greece. The armed forces reportedly saw a 10% ARTILLERY 443
salary increase and additional recruitment of professional SP 67+: 122mm 67 2S1 Gvozdika; 155mm B-52 NORA
soldiers. The prime minister announced an intention to TOWED 132: 122mm 78 D-30; 130mm 18 M-46; 152mm
invest in the domestic defence industry, particularly to 36 M-84 NORA-A
develop new factories and overhaul existing plants. Local MRL 81: 128mm 78: 18 M-63 Plamen; 60 M-77 Organj;
production mainly focuses on missile and artillery systems, 262mm 3 M-87 Orkan
and small arms and ammunition. In 2017, Serbia took part MOR 163: 82mm 106 M-69; 120mm 57 M-74/M-75
in regional military exercises with its Balkan neighbours, AIR DEFENCE
the UK and the US, as well as with Belarus and Russia. SAM
Short-range 77 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful);
ACTIVE 28,150 (Army 13,250 Air Force and Air Point-defence 17+: 12 9K31M Strela-1M (SA-9 Gaskin);
Defence 5,100 Training Command 3,000 Guards 5 9K35M Strela-10M; 9K32M Strela-2M (SA-7 Grail)‡;
1,600 Other MoD 5,200) Paramilitary 3,700 Šilo (SA-16 Gimlet)
Conscript liability 6 months (voluntary) GUNS • TOWED 40mm 36 Bofors L/70
RESERVE 50,150 River Flotilla
The Serbian–Montenegrin navy was transferred to
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Montenegro upon independence in 2006, but the
Danube flotilla remained in Serbian control. The flotilla
Army 13,250 is subordinate to the Land Forces
FORCES BY ROLE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SPECIAL FORCES PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5
1 SF bde (1 CT bn, 1 cdo bn, 1 para bn, 1 log bn) PBR 5: 3 Type-20; 2 others
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4 GUNS • TOWED 40mm 24 Bofors L/70

MSI 4 Nestin with 1 quad lnchr with Strela 2M (SA-N- AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
5 Grail) SAM AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid)
AMPHIBOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCU 5 Type-22 ASM AGM-65 Maverick; A-77 Thunder
AGF 1 Kozara Guards 1,600
AOL 1 FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Air Force and Air Defence 5,100 Other
Flying hours: Ftr – 40 hrs/yr 1 (ceremonial) gd bde (1 gd bn, 1 MP bn, 1 spt bn)
FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER Paramilitary 3,700
1 sqn with MiG-21bis Fishbed; MiG-29 Fulcrum
Gendarmerie 3,700
1 sqn with G-4 Super Galeb*; J-22 Orao EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ISR ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
2 flt with IJ-22 Orao 1*; MiG-21R Fishbed H* APC • APC (W) 12+: some Lazar-3; 12 BOV-VP M-86
TRANSPORT AUV BOV M-16 Milos
1 sqn with An-2; An-26; Do-28; Yak-40 (Jak-40); 1 PA-34
Seneca V DEPLOYMENT
TRAINING
1 sqn with G-4 Super Galeb* (adv trg/light atk); ALBANIA
SA341/342 Gazelle; Utva-75 (basic trg)  OSCE • Albania 2
ATTACK HELICOPTER BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
1 sqn with SA341H/342L Gazelle; (HN-42/45); Mi-24 Hind OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 1
2 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-17V-5 Hip CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
AIR DEFENCE EU • EUTM RCA 7
1 bde (5 bn (2 msl, 3 SP msl) with S-125 Neva (SA-3 Goa); UN • MINUSCA 69; 1 med coy
2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful); 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail);
CYPRUS
9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet))
UN • UNFICYP 47; 1 inf pl
2 radar bn (for early warning and reporting)
COMBAT SUPPORT DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
1 sigs bn UN • MONUSCO 8
LEBANON
1 maint bn
UN • UNIFIL 174; 1 mech inf coy
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 65 combat capable LIBERIA
FTR 13+ : 2+ MiG-21bis Fishbed; 2+ MiG-21UM Mongol UN • UNMIL 1 obs
B; 4 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 3 MiG-29UB Fulcrum; 2 MiG-29S
MALI
Fulcrum C
EU • EUTM Mali 3
FGA 17 J-22 Orao 1
ISR 12: 10 IJ-22R Orao 1*; 2 MiG-21R Fishbed H* MIDDLE EAST
TPT • Light 10: 1 An-2 Colt; 4 An-26 Curl; 2 Do-28 UN • UNTSO 1 obs
Skyservant; 2 Yak-40 (Jak-40); 1 PA-34 Seneca V
SOMALIA
TRG 44: 23 G-4 Super Galeb*; 11 Utva-75; 10 Lasta 95
HELICOPTERS EU • EUTM Somalia 6
ATK 2 Mi-24 Hind UKRAINE
MRH 52: 1 Mi-17 Hip H; 2 Mi-17V-5 Hip; 2 SA341H OSCE • Ukraine 10
Gazelle (HI-42); 34 SA341H Gazelle (HN-42)/SA342L
Gazelle (HN-45); 13 SA341H Gazelle (HO-42)/SA342L1
Gazelle (HO-45)
TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT
TPT • Medium 8 Mi-8T Hip (HT-40) DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL
AIR DEFENCE Data here represents the de facto situation in Kosovo. This
SAM does not imply international recognition as a sovereign
Short-range 15: 6 S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa); 9 2K12 Kub state. In February 2008, Kosovo declared itself independent.
(SA-6 Gainful) Serbia remains opposed to this, and while Kosovo has not
Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K310 Igla- been admitted to the United Nations, a number of states
1 (SA-16 Gimlet) have recognised Kosovo’s self-declared status.
Europe 145
Kosovo Security Force 2,500; reserves 800

The Kosovo Security Force (KSF) was formed in Janu-
Slovakia SVK
ary 2009 as a non-military organisation with responsibil- Euro € 2016 2017 2018
ity for crisis response, civil protection and EOD. In 2017,
GDP € 81.0bn 84.3bn
a proposal by Kosovan leaders to establish an army was
US$ 89.5bn 95.0bn
opposed by Russia, Serbia, the US and NATO. The force
per capita US$ 16,499 17,491
is armed with small arms and light vehicles only. A July
2010 law created a reserve force. In 2017, a KSF contingent Growth % 3.3 3.3
participated in the joint exercise KFOR 23 at the Joint Mul- Inflation % -0.5 1.2
Europe
tinational Readiness Center in Germany. Def exp [a] € 907m 1.0bn
US$ 1.00bn 1.13bn
FOREIGN FORCES Def bdgt € 881m 990m 1.07bn
All under Kosovo Force (KFOR) command unless US$ 974m 1.12bn
otherwise specified US$1=€ 0.90 0.89
Albania 28 • OSCE 3 [a] NATO definition
Armenia 35 Population 5,445,829
Austria 440; 2 mech inf coy
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Bosnia-Herzegovina OSCE 8
Bulgaria 20 • OSCE 1 Male 7.8% 2.6% 3.0% 3.6% 25.5% 6.0%
Canada 6 • OSCE 5 Female 7.4% 2.5% 2.8% 3.5% 25.8% 9.4%
Croatia 33; 1 hel flt with Mi-8 • OSCE 1
Capabilities
Czech Republic 9 • OSCE 1 • UNMIK 2 obs
Denmark 35 Slovakia released a defence white paper in September 2016,
setting out its security priorities and a plan to increase
Estonia 2
defence capabilities. In 2017, the government approved
Finland 19
a new defence strategy, a new military strategy and a
Georgia OSCE 1 Long-Term Defence Development Plan, which envisages
Germany 650 • OSCE 4 spending rising to 1.6% of GDP by 2020 and 2% of GDP by
Greece 112; 1 inf coy • OSCE 1 2024. Bratislava is planning to replace its small fighter and
Hungary 373; 1 inf coy (KTM) • OSCE 1 rotary-wing transport fleets, though financial constraints
Ireland 12 • OSCE 1 will make the outright replacement of the fighter fleet
challenging. Slovakia announced in January 2017 that it
Italy 551; 1 inf BG HQ; 1 Carabinieri unit • OSCE 11
was considering several offers for the purchase or lease
Kyrgyzstan OSCE 2 of aircraft, including the Gripen-E. The Gripen is used by
Lithuania 1 the Czech Republic, with whom the Slovak government
Luxembourg 23 signed a Joint Sky agreement to facilitate air policing and
Macedonia (FYROM) OSCE 14 closer integration of air-defence capabilities. This was
Moldova 41 • OSCE 1 • UNMIK 1 obs ratified by the Czech and Slovak parliaments in summer
2017. There are also ambitions to replace land equipment
Montenegro OSCE 1
and improve the overall technology level in the armed
Netherlands OSCE 1 forces. The government stated in May 2017 that it would
Norway 2 • OSCE 1 seek to acquire a large number of 4x4 and 8x8 vehicles,
Poland 240; 1 inf coy • UNMIK 1 obs and in November it was announced that Patria would
Portugal 15 • OSCE 1 develop a prototype based on the AMVXP 8x8 chassis for
Romania 61 • UNMIK 1 obs the programme. Also in May, and after amending the law
Russia OSCE 1 on conscription, Slovakia implemented its Active Reserves
pilot project, in order to help address shortfalls in specialist
Slovenia 252; 1 mot inf coy; 1 MP unit; 1 hel unit
capacities, including in engineering.
Spain OSCE 1
Sweden 3 • OSCE 3 ACTIVE 15,850 (Army 6,250 Air 3,950 Central Staff
Switzerland 234; 1 inf coy; 1 engr pl; 1 hel flt with AS332 2,550 Support and Training 3,100)
Conscript liability 6 months
• OSCE 1
Tajikistan OSCE 1
Turkey 307; 1 inf coy • UNMIK 1 obs
Ukraine 40 • OSCE 1 • UNMIK 2 obs Central Staff 2,550
United Kingdom 29 • OSCE 7 FORCES BY ROLE
United States 675; elm 1 ARNG inf bde HQ; 1 inf bn; 1 hel SPECIAL FORCES
flt with UH-60 • OSCE 5 1 (5th) spec ops bn
Army 6,250 AIR DEFENCE

1 bde with 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful); 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7
FORCES BY ROLE
Grail); S-300 (SA-10 Grumble)
MANOEUVRE
Armoured EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 (2nd) armd bde (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 AIRCRAFT 25 combat capable
mot inf bn, 1 mixed SP arty bn) FTR 12: 10 MiG-29AS Fulcrum; 2 MiG-29UBS Fulcrum;
TPT 9: Medium 1 C-27J Spartan; Light 8: 2 L-410FG
Mechanised
Turbolet; 2 L-410T Turbolet; 4 L-410UVP Turbolet
1 (1st) mech bde (3 armd inf bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 engr bn, 1
TRG 13: 6 L-39CM Albatros*; 5 L-39ZA Albatros*; 2
NBC bn)
L-39ZAM Albatros*
COMBAT SUPPORT
HELICOPTERS
1 MP bn
ATK (15: 5 Mi-24D Hind D; 10 Mi-24V Hind E all in store)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT MRH 13 Mi-17 Hip H 
1 spt bde (2 log bn, 1 maint bn, 1 spt bn) TPT 9: Medium 3: 1 Mi-8 Hip; 2 UH-60M Black Hawk
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE  Light 6 PZL MI-2 Hoplite
ARMOURED FIGHITING VEHICLES AIR DEFENCE • SAM
MBT 30 T-72M Long-range S-300PS (SA-10B Grumble)
IFV 239: 148 BMP-1; 91 BMP-2 Short-range 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful)
APC 101+ Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
APC (T) 72 OT-90 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
APC (W) 22: 7 OT-64; 15 Tatrapan (6×6) AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer)
PPV 7+ RG-32M SARH R-27R (AA-10A Alamo)
AUV IVECO LMV ASM S5K/S5KO (57mm rockets); S8KP/S8KOM (80mm
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES rockets)
ARV MT-55; VT-55A; VT-72B; WPT-TOPAS
VLB AM-50; MT-55A DEPLOYMENT
MW Bozena; UOS-155 Belarty
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE AFGHANISTAN
SP 9S428 with Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger) on BMP-1; 9P135 NATO • Operation Resolute Support 40
Fagot (AT-4 Spigot) on BMP-2; 9P148 Konkurs (AT-5 BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
Spandrel) on BRDM-2 EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 41
MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111-1
Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel) CYPRUS
RCL 84mm Carl Gustav UN • UNFICYP 169; 1 inf coy(-); 1 engr pl
ARTILLERY 68 MIDDLE EAST
SP 19: 152mm 3 M-77 Dana; 155mm 16 M-2000 Zuzana UN • UNTSO 2 obs
TOWED 122mm 19 D-30
MRL 30: 122mm 4 RM-70; 122/227mm 26 RM-70/85 UKRAINE
MODULAR OSCE • Ukraine 10
RADAR • LAND SNAR-10 Big Fred (veh, arty)
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
Point-defence 48+: 48 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher);
9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail); 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet)
Air Force 3,950

Flying hours 90 hrs/yr for MiG-29 pilots (NATO
Integrated AD System); 90 hrs/yr for Mi-8/17
crews (reserved for EU & NATO)
FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER
1 sqn with MiG-29AS/UBS Fulcrum
TRANSPORT
1 flt with C-27J Spartan
1 flt with L-410FG/T/UVP Turbolet
1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H
1 sqn with PZL MI-2 Hoplite
TRAINING
1 sqn with L-39CM/ZA/ZAM Albatros
Europe 147
Slovenia SVN ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Euro € 2016 2017 2018 Army 7,250
GDP € 40.4bn 42.6bn FORCES BY ROLE
US$ 44.7bn 48.1bn Regt are bn sized
per capita US$ 21,668 23,277 SPECIAL FORCES
Growth % 3.1 4.0 1 SF unit (1 spec ops coy, 1 CSS coy)
MANOEUVRE
Mechanised
Europe
Def exp [a] € 406m 426m 1 (1st) mech inf bde (1 mech inf regt, 1 mtn inf regt, 1
US$ 449m 480m cbt spt bn (1 ISR coy, 1 arty bty, 1 engr coy, 1 MP coy, 1
Def bdgt [b] € 403m 420m CBRN coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 SAM bty))
US$ 446m 474m 1 (72nd) mech inf bde (2 mech inf regt, 1 cbt spt bn (1
US$1=€ 0.90 0.89 ISR coy, 1 arty bty, 1 engr coy, 1 MP coy, 1 CBRN coy, 1
[a] NATO definition
sigs coy, 1 SAM bty))
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 EW coy
Population 1,972,126 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Ethnic groups: Slovenian 83% Serbian 2% Croatian 1.8% Bosniac 1 log bde (1 log regt, 1 maint regt (1 tk coy), 1 med regt)
1% Other or unspecified 12.2%
Reserves
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus FORCES BY ROLE
Male 6.9% 2.3% 2.5% 3.0% 26.0% 8.0% MANOEUVRE
Female 6.5% 2.2% 2.4% 2.9% 25.9% 11.5% Mountain
2 inf regt (territorial – 1 allocated to each inf bde)
Capabilities EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Territorial defence and the ability to take part in peace- MBT 14 M-84 (trg role) (32 more in store)
support operations are central to Slovenia’s defence APC • APC (W) 115: 85 Pandur 6×6 (Valuk); 30 Patria 8×8
strategy. The defence ministry completed a Strategic (Svarun)
Defence Review in December 2016. Its core conclusion ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
was that the goals of the last review, conducted in 2009, ARV VT-55A
had been missed and that capability development had VLB MTU
stalled at a time when Europe’s security environment had NBC VEHICLES 10 Cobra CBRN
deteriorated. Underfunding and a bureaucratic failure ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
to implement the agreed policy guidelines were singled MSL • MANPATS Spike MR/LR
ARTILLERY 68
out as key reasons for this assessment. The ministry also
TOWED • 155mm 18 TN-90
plans to review the current military doctrine. Slovenia
MOR 120mm 50 MN-9/M-74
has launched several invitations to tender in order to
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence 9K338 Igla-S (SA-
sell off obsolete equipment to raise funds for defence 24 Grinch)
modernisation. However, given continuing resource
challenges, significant modernisation steps seem unlikely Army Maritime Element 130
during the current Medium-Term Defence Programme, FORCES BY ROLE
which runs until 2020. The main development goal to 2023 SPECIAL FORCES
has been defined as the formation and equipping of two 1 SF unit
battalion-sized battle groups. Recruitment and retention EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
continues to be a challenge and it is questionable whether PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 2
the planned target size of 10,000 active personnel for 2018 PCC 1 Triglav III (RUS Svetlyak)
can be met. Slovenia acts as the framework nation for the PBF 1 Super Dvora MkII
NATO Mountain Warfare Centre of Excellence. Its small
Air Element 610
air wing is not equipped to provide air policing; Italy and
FORCES BY ROLE
Hungary currently partner in providing this capability.
TRANSPORT
The country has contributed regularly to NATO and EU
1 sqn with Falcon 2000EX; L-410 Turbolet; PC-6B Turbo
operations. Porter;
ACTIVE 7,250 (Army 7,250) Paramilitary 5,950 TRAINING
1 unit with Bell 206 Jet Ranger (AB-206); PC-9M*;
RESERVE 1,500 (Army 1,500) Paramilitary 260 Z-143L; Z-242L
1 sqn with AS532AL Cougar; Bell 412 Twin Huey Spain ESP
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT Euro € 2016 2017 2018
1 maint sqn
GDP € 1.11tr 1.16tr
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE US$ 1.23tr 1.31tr
per capita US$ 26,565 28,212
TPT 4: Light 3: 1 L-410 Turbolet; 2 PC-6B Turbo Porter
Growth % 3.2 3.1
PAX 1 Falcon 2000EX
Inflation % -0.2 2
TRG 19: 9 PC-9M*; 2 Z-143L; 8 Z-242L
HELICOPTERS Def exp [a] € 9.01bn 10.7bn
MRH 8: 5 Bell 412EP Twin Huey; 2 Bell 412HP Twin US$ 9.97bn 12.1bn
Huey; 1 Bell 412SP Twin Huey (some armed) Def bdgt [b] € 9.01bn 10.7bn
TPT 8: Medium 4 AS532AL Cougar; Light 4 Bell 206 Jet US$ 9.97bn 12.1bn
Ranger (AB-206) US$1=€ 0.90 0.89
[a] NATO definition
Paramilitary 5,950 [b] Includes military pensions
Police 5,950; 260 reservists Population 48,958,159

Ministry of Interior (civilian; limited elements could be Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
prequalified to cooperate in military defence with the
Male 7.9% 2.5% 2.5% 2.9% 26.0% 7.7%
armed forces during state of emergency or war)
Female 7.5% 2.3% 2.3% 2.6% 25.6% 10.3%
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PBF 1
Ladse
Capabilities
HELICOPTERS
MRH 1 Bell 412 Twin Huey, The Spanish Army began a comprehensive force-structure
TPT • Light 5: 1 AW109; 2 Bell 206 (AB-206) Jet Ranger; review in 2016, which resulted in a reorganisation into
multipurpose brigades with heavy, medium and light
1 Bell 212 (AB-212); 1 H135
capabilities, optimised for deployable operations and with
a greater emphasis on mechanised formations and special-
Cyber operations forces. Local defence industry manufactures
A National Cyber Security Strategy was endorsed in across all domains and exports globally. However, the
February 2016 by the government S-80 submarine programme, undertaken by Navantia, is
significantly behind schedule. Having originally declined
DEPLOYMENT to take part in the project, Spain has reportedly expressed
interest in acquiring the F-35 to replace its ageing naval-
AFGHANISTAN aviation AV-8s. Spain has also announced that it will
NATO • Operation Resolute Support 7 participate in funding the European MALE 2020 unmanned-
aerial-vehicle project, although it has also signed a contract
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA for MQ-9 MALE UAVs. The country’s equipment and
EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 14 logistic-support capability appears to be sufficient to
meet its national commitments and contribution to NATO
IRAQ operations and exercises. Spain hosts one of NATO’s two
Operation Inherent Resolve 6 Combined Air Operations Centres, and the country’s Joint
Special Operations Command will provide the Special
LATVIA
Operations Component Command for the NATO Response
NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 50; 1 CBRN pl(+) Force in 2018. Spain retains a small contingent in Kabul as
LEBANON part of the NATO HQ.
UN • UNIFIL 15 ACTIVE 121,200 (Army 70,950 Navy 20,050 Air
19,250 Joint 10,950) Paramilitary 76,750
MALI
EU • EUTM Mali 4 RESERVE 15,450 (Army 8,800 Navy 2,750 Air 2,750
Other 1,150)
MIDDLE EAST
UN • UNTSO 3 obs
SERBIA
NATO • KFOR 252; 1 mot inf coy; 1 MP unit; 1 hel unit Space
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
UKRAINE SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS 2: 1 Spainsat; 1
OSCE • Ukraine 2 Xtar-Eur
Europe 149
Army 70,950 APC (W) 312 BMR-600/BMR-600M1

The Land Forces High Readiness HQ Spain provides one PPV 110 RG-31
NATO Rapid Deployment Corps HQ (NRDC-ESP) AUV IVECO LMV
FORCES BY ROLE
AEV 34 CZ-10/25E
COMMAND
ARV 72: 16 Leopard REC; 1 AMX-30; 3 BMR REC; 4
1 corps HQ (CGTAD/NRDC-ESP) (1 int regt, 1 MP bn)
Centauro REC; 14 Maxxpro MRV; 12 M113; 22 M47
2 div HQ
VLB 16: 1 M47; 15 M60
SPECIAL FORCES
MW 6 Husky 2G
1 comd (4 spec ops bn, 1 int coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
Europe
MANOEUVRE
MSL • MANPATS Spike-LR; TOW
Reconnaissance
ARTILLERY 1,556
1 armd cav regt (2 armd recce bn)
SP 155mm 96 M109A5
Mechanised
3 (10th, 11th & 12th) mech bde (1 armd regt (1 armd recce TOWED 281: 105mm 217: 56 L118 Light Gun; 161 Model
bn, 1 tk bn), 1 mech inf regt (1 armd inf bn, 1 mech inf 56 pack howitzer; 155mm 64 SBT 155/52 SIAC
bn), 1 lt inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 AT coy, 1 AD coy, 1 engr MOR 1,179: 81mm 777; 120mm 402
bn, 1 int coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) RADAR • LAND 6: 4 ARTHUR; 2 AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder
1 (1st) mech bde (1 armd regt (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn), COASTAL DEFENCE • ARTY 155mm 19 SBT 155/52 APU
1 mech inf regt (1 armd inf bn, 1 mech inf bn), 1 mtn SBT V07
inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 AT coy, 1 AD coy, 1 engr bn, 1 int HELICOPTERS
coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) ATK 17: 6 Tiger HAP-E; 11 Tiger HAD-E
2 (2nd/La Legion & 7th) lt mech bde (1 armd recce bn, 1 MRH 17 Bo-105 HOT†
mech inf regt (2 mech inf bn), 1 lt inf bn, 1 fd arty bn, TPT 84: Heavy 17 CH-47D Chinook (HT-17D); Medium
1 AT coy, 1 AD coy, 1 engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 40: 16 AS332B Super Puma (HU-21); 12 AS532UL Cougar; 6
sigs coy, 1 log bn) AS532AL Cougar; 6 NH90 TTH; Light 27: 6 Bell 205 (HU-
Air Manoeuvre 10B Iroquois); 5 Bell 212 (HU.18); 16 H135 (HE.26/HU.26)
1 (6th) bde (1 recce bn, 3 para bn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 AT coy, UAV • ISR • Medium 6: 2 Searcher MkII-J (PASI); 4
1 AD coy, 1 engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, Searcher MkIII (PASI)
1 log bn) AIR DEFENCE
Other SAM
1 (Canary Islands) comd (1 lt inf bde (3 lt inf regt, 1 fd Long-range 18 MIM-104C Patriot PAC-2
arty regt, 1 AT coy, 1 engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 Medium-range 38 MIM-23B I-Hawk Phase III
sigs coy, 1 log bn); 1 spt hel bn; 1 AD regt) Short-range 21: 8 NASAMS; 13 Skyguard/Aspide
1 (Balearic Islands) comd (1 inf regt) Point-defence Mistral
2 (Ceuta and Melilla) comd (1 recce regt, 2 inf bn, 1 arty GUNS • TOWED 35mm 67: 19 GDF-005; 48 GDF-007
regt, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
COMBAT SUPPORT Navy 20,050 (incl Naval Aviation and Marines)
1 arty comd (1 arty regt; 1 MRL regt; 1 coastal arty regt) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 engr comd (2 engr regt, 1 bridging regt) SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 3:
1 EW/sigs bde (1 EW regt, 3 sigs regt) 3 Galerna with 4 single 533mm TT with F17 Mod 2/L5
1 EW regt HWT
1 NBC regt PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 11
1 railway regt DESTROYERS • DDGHM 5:
1 sigs regt 5 Alvaro de Bazan with Aegis Baseline 5 C2, 2 quad Mk141
1 CIMIC bn lnchr with RGM-84F Harpoon AShM, 1 48-cell Mk41
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT VLS with SM-2MR/RIM-162B Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 twin
1 log bde (5 log regt) 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity
1 med bde (1 log unit, 2 med regt, 1 fd hospital unit) 1 SH-60B Seahawk ASW hel)
HELICOPTER FRIGATES • FFGHM 6:
1 hel comd (1 atk hel bn, 2 spt hel bn, 1 tpt hel bn, 1 sigs 6 Santa Maria with 1 Mk13 GMLS with RGM-84C
bn, 1 log unit (1 spt coy, 1 supply coy)) Harpoon AShM/SM-1MR SAM, 2 Mk32 triple 324mm
AIR DEFENCE ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 Meroka mod 2 CIWS, 1 76mm
1 AD comd (3 SAM regt, 1 sigs unit) gun (capacity 2 SH-60B Seahawk ASW hel)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AMPHIBIOUS
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 3:
MBT 331: 108 Leopard 2A4; 223 Leopard 2A5E LHD 1 Juan Carlos I (capacity 18 hel or 10 AV-8B FGA
RECCE 271: 84 B1 Centauro; 187 VEC-M1 ac; 4 LCM-1E; 42 APC; 46 MBT; 900 troops)
IFV 227: 206 Pizarro; 21 Pizarro (CP) LPD 2 Galicia (capacity 6 Bell 212 or 4 SH-3D Sea King
APC 875 hel; 4 LCM or 2 LCM & 8 AAV; 130 APC or 33 MBT;
APC (T) 453 M113 (incl variants) 540 troops)
LANDING CRAFT 14 MRH 9 Hughes 500MD

LCM 14 LCM 1E TPT • Light 7 Bell 212 (HA-18)
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
AORH 2: 1 Patino (capacity 3 Bell 212 or 2 SH-3D Sea King AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; ARH AIM-120
hel); 1 Cantabria (capacity 3 Bell 212 or 2 SH-3D Sea King hel) AMRAAM
ASM AGM-65G Maverick
Maritime Action Force AShM AGM-119 Penguin
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Marines 5,800
PSOH 4 Meteoro (Buques de Accion Maritima) with 1 FORCES BY ROLE
76mm gun SPECIAL FORCES
PSO 7: 1 spec ops bn
3 Alboran each with 1 hel landing platform MANOEUVRE
4 Descubierta with 1 76mm gun Amphibious
1 mne bde (1 recce unit, 1 mech inf bn, 2 inf bn, 1 arty
PCO 4 Serviola with 1 76mm gun
bn, 1 log bn)
PCC 3 Anaga with 1 76mm gun
Other
PB 4: 2 P-101; 2 Toralla
1 sy bde (5 mne garrison gp)
PBR 1 Cabo Fradera
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 6 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MHO 6 Segura ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 29 MBT 4 M60A3TTS
AGI 1 Alerta APC • APC (W) 34: 32 Piranha IIIC; 1 Piranha IIIC
AGOR 2 (with ice-strengthened hull, for polar research (amb); 1 Piranha IIIC EW (EW)
AAV 18: 16 AAV-7A1/AAVP-7A1; 2 AAVC-7A1 (CP)
duties in Antarctica)
AGS 3: 2 Malaspina; 1 Castor
AEV 4 Piranha IIIC
AK 2: 1 Martin Posadillo with 1 hel landing platform; 1
ARV 2: 1 AAVR-7A1; 1 Piranha IIIC
El Camino Español
ARTILLERY 30
AP 1 Contramaestre Casado with 1 hel landing platform
SP 155mm 6 M109A2
ASR 1 Neptuno
TOWED 105mm 24 Model 56 pack howitzer
ATF 3: 1 Mar Caribe; 1 Mahon; 1 La Grana
AXL 8: 4 Contramaestre; 4 Guardiamarina
MSL • MANPATS Spike-LR; TOW-2
AXS 8 AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence Mistral
Naval Aviation 850 Air Force 19,250
Flying 150 hrs/yr on AV-8B Harrier II FGA ac; 200
The Spanish Air Force is organised in 3 commands –
hours hrs/yr on hel
General Air Command, Combat Air Command and Canary
FORCES BY ROLE Islands Air Command
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK Flying hours 120 hrs/yr on hel/tpt ac; 180 hrs/yr on FGA/
1 sqn with AV-8B Harrier II Plus  ftr
1 sqn with SH-60B/F Seahawk FORCES BY ROLE
TRANSPORT FIGHTER
1 (liaison) sqn with Cessna 550 Citation II; Cessna 650 2 sqn with Eurofighter Typhoon
Citation VII FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
5 sqn with F/A-18A/B MLU Hornet (EF-18A/B MLU)
TRAINING
MARITIME PATROL
1 sqn with Hughes 500MD8
1 sqn with P-3A/M Orion
1 flt with TAV-8B Harrier
ISR
1 sqn with Beech C90 King Air
1 sqn with Bell 212 (HU-18)
1 sqn with Cessna 550 Citation V; CN235 (TR-19A)
1 sqn with SH-3D Sea King
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 sqn with C-212 Aviocar; Falcon 20D
AIRCRAFT 13 combat capable SEARCH & RESCUE
FGA 13: 8 AV-8B Harrier II Plus; 4 AV-8B Harrier II 1 sqn with AS332B/B1 Super Puma; CN235 VIGMA
(upgraded to II Plus standard); 1 TAV-8B Harrier (on 1 sqn with AS332B Super Puma; CN235 VIGMA
lease from USMC) 1 sqn with C-212 Aviocar; CN235 VIGMA
TPT • Light 4: 3 Cessna 550 Citation II; 1 Cessna 650 TANKER/TRANSPORT
Citation VII 1 sqn with KC-130H Hercules
HELICOPTERS TRANSPORT
ASW 21: 7 SH-3D Sea King (tpt); 12 SH-60B Seahawk; 2 1 VIP sqn with A310; Falcon 900
SH-60F Seahawk 1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 Hercules
Europe 151
1 sqn with C-212 Aviocar Paramilitary 89,050

2 sqn with C295
1 sqn with CN235 Guardia Civil 89,050
TRAINING 17 regions, 54 Rural Comds
1 OCU sqn with Eurofighter Typhoon
FORCES BY ROLE
1 OCU sqn with F/A-18A/B (EF-18A/B MLU) Hornet
SPECIAL FORCES
1 sqn with Beech F33C Bonanza
8 (rural) gp
2 sqn with C-101 Aviojet
MANOEUVRE
1 sqn with C-212 Aviocar
1 sqn with T-35 Pillan (E-26) Other
Europe
2 (LIFT) sqn with F-5B Freedom Fighter 15 (traffic) sy gp
1 hel sqn with H120 Colibri 1 (Special) sy bn
1 hel sqn with S-76C EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 64
1 sqn with AS332M1 Super Puma; AS532UL Cougar (VIP) PSO 1 with 1 hel landing platform
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PCC 2
AIRCRAFT 168 combat capable PBF 34
FTR 80: 61 Eurofighter Typhoon; 19 F-5B Freedom Fighter PB 27
FGA 85: 20 F/A-18A Hornet (EF-18A); 53 EF-18A MLU; AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2 CN235-300
12 EF-18B MLU HELICOPTERS
ASW 3 P-3M Orion MRH 20: 2 AS653N3 Dauphin; 18 Bo-105ATH
MP 8 CN235 VIGMA TPT • Light 21: 8 BK-117; 13 H135
ISR 2 CN235 (TR-19A)
EW 3: 1 C-212 Aviocar (TM.12D); 2 Falcon 20D Cyber
TKR 5 KC-130H Hercules
A Joint Cyber Command was set up in 2013. In 2014,
TPT 75: Heavy 1 A400M; Medium 7: 6 C-130H Hercules;
short/medium-term goals included achieving FOC on
1 C-130H-30 Hercules; Light 59: 3 Beech C90 King Air;
‘CNDefense, CNExploitation, and CNAttack’. Spain’s
22 Beech F33C Bonanza; 10 C-212 Aviocar (incl 9 trg); 13
C295; 8 CN235; 3 Cessna 550 Citation V (ISR); PAX 8: 2 intelligence CERT (CCN–CERT) coordinates CERT
A310; 1 B-707; 5 Falcon 900 (VIP) activities.
TRG 102: 65 C-101 Aviojet; 37 T-35 Pillan (E-26)
HELICOPTERS DEPLOYMENT
TPT 37: Medium 15: 9 AS332B/B1 Super Puma; 4 AS332M1
Super Puma; 2 AS532UL Cougar (VIP); Light 22: 14 H120 AFGHANISTAN
Colibri; 8 S-76C NATO • Operation Resolute Support 16
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
Short-range Skyguard/Aspide
Point-defence Mistral EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 2
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 2
AAM • IR AIM-9L/JULI Sidewinder; IIR IRIS-T; SARH
AIM-7P Sparrow; ARH AIM-120B/C AMRAAM
EU • EUTM RCA 30
ARM AGM-88B HARM
ASM AGM-65G Maverick DJIBOUTI
AShM AGM-84D Harpoon EU • Operation Atalanta 1 P-3M Orion
LACM Taurus KEPD 350
BOMBS GULF OF ADEN & INDIAN OCEAN
Laser-guided: GBU-10/12/16 Paveway II; GBU-24 EU • Operation Atalanta 1 PSOH
Paveway III; EGBU-16 Paveway II; BPG-2000
IRAQ
Emergencies Military Unit (UME) Operation Inherent Resolve 400; 2 trg unit
FORCES BY ROLE LATVIA
COMMAND NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 300; 1 armd inf
1 div HQ
coy(+)
MANOEUVRE
Other LEBANON
5 Emergency Intervention bn UN • UNIFIL 628; 1 lt inf bde HQ; 1 mech inf bn(-); 1 engr
1 Emergency Support and Intervention regt coy; 1 sigs coy
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 sigs bn MALI
HELICOPTER EU • EUTM Mali 127
1 hel bn opcon Army UN • MINUSMA 1
MEDITERRANEAN SEA Sweden intends to establish a Gotland Regiment by 2018,

NATO • SNMG 1: 1 FFGHM stationed on the island. Readiness challenges in the air
EU • EU NAVFOR MED: 1 AORH; 1 CN235 force triggered a discussion about extending the service
life of its JAS-39C Gripen Cs beyond their intended 2026
SERBIA
retirement date, not least since the air force was slated to
OSCE • Kosovo 1
receive a lower number of JAS-39Es than requested. Plans
SOMALIA to replace the C-130H Hercules fleet from 2021 have been
EU • EUTM Somalia 16 superseded by a mid-life upgrade to extend service life
to about 2030. In September 2017, Sweden conducted
TURKEY
Aurora 2017, its largest exercise in two decades. Amid
NATO • Operation Active Fence 149; 1 SAM bty with MIM-
recruitment challenges, Sweden announced in March
104C Patriot PAC-2
2017 that it would reinstate conscription from January
UKRAINE 2018. The armed-forces chief stated that the change in
OSCE • Ukraine 13 the post-Cold War landscape will mean the downgrading
of international missions in order to prioritise domestic
FOREIGN FORCES readiness.
United States US European Command: 3,200; 1 air base at ACTIVE 29,750 (Army 6,850 Navy 2,100 Air 2,700
Morón; 1 naval base at Rota Other 18,100) Paramilitary 750 Voluntary Auxiliary
Organisations 21,200
Sweden SWE
Swedish Krona Skr 2016 2017 2018 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
GDP Skr 4.38tr 4.61tr
US$ 511bn 542bn
Army 6,850
The army has been transformed to provide brigade-sized
per capita US$ 51,125 53,248
task forces depending on the operational requirement
Growth % 3.2 3.1
FORCES BY ROLE
Inflation % 1.1 1.6
COMMAND
Def bdgt Skr 49.1bn 50.7bn 53.8bn
2 bde HQ
US$ 5.74bn 5.96bn MANOEUVRE
US$1=Skr 8.56 8.51 Reconnaissance
[a] Excludes military pensions and peacekeeping expenditure 1 recce bn
Population 9,960,487 Armoured
3 armd coy
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Mechanised
Male 9.0% 2.7% 3.2% 3.6% 22.2% 9.4% 5 mech bn
Female 8.5% 2.5% 3.0% 3.5% 21.7% 10.9% Light
1 mot inf bn
Capabilities 1 lt inf bn
Air Manoeuvre
Sweden’s armed forces remain configured for territorial 1 AB bn
defence. In June 2015, a defence bill for 2016–20 was Other
adopted, which set out the aims of strengthening
1 sy bn
operational capabilities and deepening multilateral and
COMBAT SUPPORT
bilateral defence relationships. Increased cooperation
2 arty bn
with neighbours and NATO has been a prevalent theme
2 engr bn
for the last few years. In June 2016, Sweden signed
2 MP coy
a statement of intent with the US and a Programme
of Defence Cooperation with the UK. Concerns over 1 CBRN coy
readiness levels have led to greater cooperation with COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
NATO and NORDEFCO partners, as well as further 1 tpt coy
deliberation over Swedish membership of the Alliance. AIR DEFENCE
Under the auspices of NORDEFCO, Sweden is expanding 2 AD bn
its defence cooperation with Finland. In response
to security concerns, the government announced an Reserves
increase in planned defence spending, and confirmed in FORCES BY ROLE
August 2017 that spending would be put on an upward MANOEUVRE
trajectory at least until 2020. Readiness, exercises and Other
training, as well as cyber defence, are spending priorities. 40 Home Guard bn
Europe 153
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AKL 1 Loke

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES ARS 2: 1 Belos III; 1 Furusund (former ML)
MBT 129: 9 Leopard 2A4 (Strv-121); 120 Leopard 2A5 (Strv AX 5 Altair
122) AXS 2: 1 Falken; 1 Gladan
IFV 354 CV9040 (Strf 9040)
APC 1,106 Amphibious 850
APC (T) 431: 281 Pbv 302; 150 BvS10 MkII FORCES BY ROLE
APC (W) 315: 34 XA-180 Sisu (Patgb 180); 20 XA-202 MANOEUVRE
Sisu (Patgb 202); 148 XA-203 Sisu (Patgb 203); 113 Amphibious
Patria AMV (XA-360/Patgb 360) 1 amph bn
Europe
PPV 360 RG-32M
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 12 M/86
AEV 6 Kodiak
COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 8 RBS-17 Hellfire
ARV 40: 14 Bgbv 120; 26 CV90 
MW 33+: Aardvark Mk2; 33 Area Clearing System
Air Force 2,700
MSL • MANPATS RB-55 Flying hours 100–150 hrs/yr
RCL 84mm Carl Gustav FORCES BY ROLE
ARTILLERY 304 FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR
SP 155mm 8 Archer 6 sqn with JAS 39C/D Gripen
MOR 296; 81mm 212 M/86; 120mm 84 M/41D TRANSPORT/ISR/AEW&C
RADAR • LAND ARTHUR (arty) 1 sqn with C-130H Hercules (Tp-84); KC-130H Hercules
AIR DEFENCE (Tp-84); Gulfstream IV SRA-4 (S-102B); S-100B/D Argus
SAM TRAINING
Medium-range MIM-23B Hawk (RBS-97)  1 unit with Sk-60
Point-defence RBS-70 AIR DEFENCE
GUNS • SP 40mm 30 Strv 90LV 1 (fighter control and air surv) bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Navy 1,250; 850 Amphibious (total 2,100)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE FGA 97 JAS 39C/D Gripen
SUBMARINE • TACTICAL • SSK 5:
ELINT 2 Gulfstream IV SRA-4 (S-102B)
3 Gotland (AIP fitted) with 2 single 400mm TT with
AEW&C 3: 1 S-100B Argus; 2 S-100D Argus
Tp432/Tp 451, 4 single 533mm TT with Tp613/Tp62
TKR 1 KC-130H Hercules (Tp-84)
2 Sodermanland (AIP fitted) with 6 single 533mm TT
TPT 8: Medium 5 C-130H Hercules (Tp-84); Light 2 Saab
with Tp432/Tp451/Tp613/Tp62
340 (OS-100A/Tp-100C); PAX 1 Gulfstream 550 (Tp-102D)
TRG 67 Sk-60W
CORVETTES • FSG 5 Visby with 8 RBS-15 AShM, 4
single 400mm ASTT with Tp45 LWT, 1 57mm gun, 1
ISR • Medium 8 RQ-7 Shadow (AUV 3 Örnen)
hel landing platform
PCGT 4:
ASM AGM-65 Maverick (RB-75)
2 Göteborg with 4 twin lnchr with RBS-15 Mk2 AShM, 4
AShM RB-15F
single 400mm ASTT with Tp431 LWT, 4 Saab 601 A/S
AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder (RB-74); IIR IRIS-T
mor, 1 57mm gun
(RB-98); ARH AIM-120B AMRAAM (RB-99); Meteor
2 Stockholm with 4 twin lnchr with RBS-15 Mk2 AShM,
(entering service)
4 Saab 601 mortars, 4 single 400mm ASTT with
BOMBS
Tp431 LWT, 1 57mm gun (in refit)
PBF 129 Combat Boat 90E/H/HS (capacity 20 troops) Laser-Guided GBU-12 Paveway II
PB 9 Tapper INS/GPS guided GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb
Armed Forces Hel Wing
MCC 5 Koster 
MCD 2 Spårö (Styrsö mod) FORCES BY ROLE
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 11 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
LCVP 8 Trossbat 3 sqn with AW109 (Hkp 15A); AW109M (Hkp-15B);
LCAC 3 Griffon 8100TD NH90 (Hkp-14) (SAR/ASW); UH-60M Black Hawk
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 17 (Hkp-16)
AG 2: 1 Carlskrona with 2 57mm gun, 1 hel landing EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
platform (former ML); 1 Trosso (spt ship for corvettes HELICOPTERS
and patrol vessels but can also be used as HQ ship) ASW 5 NH90 ASW
AGF 2 Ledningsbåt 2000 TPT 48: Medium 28: 15 UH-60M Black Hawk (Hkp-
AGI 1 Orion 16); 13 NH90 TTH (Hkp-14); Light 20: 12 AW109
AGS 2 (Government Maritime Forces) (Hkp-15A); 8 AW109M (Hkp-15B)
Special Forces DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

FORCES BY ROLE UN • MONUSCO 2 obs
SPECIAL FORCES INDIA/PAKISTAN
1 spec ops gp UN • UNMOGIP 6 obs
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 cbt spt gp IRAQ
Other 18,100 KOREA, REPUBLIC OF
Includes staff, logisitics and intelligence personnel NNSC • 5 obs
FORCES BY ROLE MALI
COMBAT SUPPORT
EU • EUTM Mali 3
1 EW bn
UN • MINUSMA 212; 1 int coy
1 psyops unit
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT MIDDLE EAST
2 log bn UN • UNTSO 7 obs
1 maint bn
MOLDOVA
4 med coy
OSCE • Moldova 1
1 tpt coy
SERBIA
Paramilitary 750 NATO • KFOR 3
OSCE • Kosovo 3
Coast Guard 750
SOMALIA
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 25 EU • EUTM Somalia 4
PSO 3 Poseidon (Damen Multipurpose Vessel 8116) SOUTH SUDAN
PCO 1 KBV-181 (fishery protection) UN • UNMISS 2 obs
PCC 6: 2 KBV-201; 4 Sipe
UKRAINE
PB 15: 10 KBV-301; 5 KBV-312
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • UCAC 2: 1 OSCE • Ukraine 10
Griffon 2000TDX (KBV-592); 1 Griffon 2450TD WESTERN SAHARA
Air Arm
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 3 DHC-8Q-300
Switzerland CHE
Swiss Franc fr 2016 2017 2018
Cyber GDP fr 659bn 667bn
Sweden has a national CERT, is involved in informal CERT US$ 669bn 681bn
communities and is a member of the European Government
per capita US$ 80,346 80,837
CERTs group. The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency,
Growth % 1.4 1.0
which reports to the defence ministry, is in charge of
supporting and coordinating security nationwide. The
2016–20 defence bill states that ‘cyber defence capabilities Def bdgt [a] fr 4.59bn 4.74bn 4.87bn
are an important part of the Swedish Defence. […] This US$ 4.65bn 4.83bn
also requires the ability to carry out active operations in US$1=fr 0.99 0.98
the cyber domain.’ A new national cyber-security strategy [a] Includes military pensions
in June 2017 outlined six priority areas for national cyber
security, and noted that ‘an advanced cyber defence must
be in place that includes enhanced military capability to Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
respond to and handle an attack by an advanced opponent Male 7.8% 2.7% 2.9% 3.2% 24.7% 8.0%
in cyberspace’.
Female 7.4% 2.5% 2.8% 3.2% 24.6% 10.2%
DEPLOYMENT Capabilities
AFGHANISTAN The armed forces are overwhelmingly conscript-based and
NATO • Operation Resolute Support 25 are geared for territorial defence and limited participation
in international peace-support operations. Under the 2017
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC Military Doctrine, which followed the 2016 Security Policy
EU • EUTM RCA 9 Report, Switzerland judged as remote a direct military
Europe 155
threat but said that potential threats included espionage, 1 (7th) reserve inf bde (3 recce bn, 3 inf bn, 2 mtn inf
cyber attack, influence operations and sabotage, as well bn, 1 sigs bn)
as the actions of non-state groups. The Swiss government 1 (9th) mtn inf bde (5 mtn inf bn, 1 SP Arty bn, 1 sigs bn)
has begun to reduce the size of its armed forces, reflecting 1 (12th) mtn inf bde (2 inf bn, 3 mtn inf bn, 1 (fortress)
the assessment that in the militia-based system not all arty bn, 1 sigs bn)
personnel would realistically be available for active 1 (10th) reserve mtn inf bde (1 recce bn, 2 armd bn, 3
service in times of conflict. However, the smaller force inf bn, 2 mtn inf bn, 2 SP arty bn, 2 sigs bn)
is supposed to benefit from additional equipment. This Other
armed-forces development plan was approved in March 1 sy bde
2016 and emphasises improvements in readiness, training COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Europe
and equipment; implementation is due in 2018–21. 1 armd/arty trg unit
Switzerland’s approach to readiness is shifting to a more 1 inf trg unit
flexible model, in which different units would be called 1 engr rescue trg unit
up for active service gradually and on different timelines. 1 log trg unit
Plans to replace combat aircraft and ground-based air- EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
defence (GBAD) capability progressed in late 2017 with ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
the announcement that CHF8 billion would be invested in MBT 134 Leopard 2 (Pz-87 Leo)
airspace protection. Bids for new combat aircraft will be IFV 186: 154 CV9030; 32 CV9030 CP
requested in early 2018, and a decision is expected around APC 914
2020, following a possible referendum. GBAD procurement APC (T) 238 M113A2 (incl variants)
will proceed in parallel. In the meantime, the government APC (W) 676: 346 Piranha II; 330 Piranha I/II/IIIC (CP)
decided in 2017 to fund a service-life-extension programme AUV 441 Eagle II
enabling the country’s F/A-18 Hornet jets to remain in ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
service until about 2030. The defence budget is planned AEV 12 Kodiak
to increase by 1.4% per year in order to fund these new ARV 25 Büffel
airspace-protection programmes. MW 46: 26 Area Clearing System; 20 M113A2
ACTIVE 20,950 (Joint 20,950) NBC VEHICLES 12 Piranha IIIC CBRN
Conscript liability Recruit trg of 18, 21 or 25 weeks
MSL • SP 106 Piranha I TOW-2
(depending on military branch) at age 19–20, followed by
ARTILLERY 433
7, 6 or 5 refresher trg courses (3 weeks each) over a 10-year
SP 155mm 133 M109
period between ages 20 and 30
MOR • 81mm 300 Mw-72
RESERVE 144,270 (Army 93,100 Air 22,870 Armed PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PBR 11
Forces Logistic Organisation 13,700 Command Aquarius
Support Organisation 14,600) AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger
Civil Defence 74,000 (55,000 Reserve) Air Force 22,870 (incl air defence units and
military airfield guard units)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Flying hours 200–250 hrs/yr
FORCES BY ROLE
Joint 3,350 active; 17,600 conscript (20,950 FIGHTER
total) 3 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II
3 sqn with F/A-18C/D Hornet
Land Forces (Army) 93,100 on mobilisation TRANSPORT
4 Territorial Regions. With the exception of military 1 sqn with Beech 350 King Air; DHC-6 Twin Otter;
security all units are non-active PC-6 Turbo Porter; PC-12
FORCES BY ROLE 1 VIP Flt with Beech 1900D; Cessna 560XL Citation;
COMMAND Falcon 900EX
4 regional comd (2 engr bn, 1 sigs bn) TRAINING
MANOEUVRE 1 sqn with PC-7CH Turbo Trainer; PC-21
Armoured 1 sqn with PC-9 (tgt towing)
1 (1st) bde (1 recce bn, 2 armd bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 sp 1 OCU Sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II
arty bn, 2 engr bn, 1 sigs bn) TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 (11th) bde (1 recce bn, 2 armd bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 6 sqn with AS332M Super Puma; AS532UL Cougar;
inf bn, 2 SP arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs bn) H135M
Light ISR UAV
1 (2nd) inf bde (1 recce bn, 4 inf bn, 2 SP arty bn, 1 1 sqn with ADS 95 Ranger
engr bn, 1 sigs bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 (5th) inf bde (1 recce bn, 3 inf bn, 2 SP arty bn, 1 AIRCRAFT 85 combat capable
engr bn, 1 sigs bn) FTR 54: 42 F-5E Tiger II; 12 F-5F Tiger II
FGA 31: 25 F/A-18C Hornet; 6 F/A-18D Hornet INDIA/PAKISTAN

TPT 22: Light 21: 1 Beech 350 King Air; 1 Beech 1900D; UN • UNMOGIP 3 obs
1 Cessna 560XL Citation; 1 DHC-6 Twin Otter; 15 PC-6
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF
Turbo Porter; 1 PC-6 (owned by armasuisse, civil
registration); 1 PC-12 (owned by armasuisse, civil NNSC • 5 officers
registration); PAX 1 Falcon 900EX MALI
TRG 44: 28 PC-7CH Turbo Trainer; 8 PC-9; 8 PC-21 UN • MINUSMA 6
HELICOPTERS
MRH 20 H135M MIDDLE EAST
TPT • Medium 25: 14 AS332M Super Puma; 11 UN • UNTSO 12 obs
AS532UL Cougar SERBIA
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES NATO • KFOR 234 (military volunteers); 1 inf coy; 1 engr
ISR • Medium 16 ADS 95 Ranger (4 systems) pl; 1 hel flt with AS332M Super Puma
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR AIM-9P
OSCE • Kosovo 1
Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; ARH AIM-
120B/C-7 AMRAAM SOUTH SUDAN
UN • UNMISS 2
Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD)
GBAD assets can be used to form AD clusters to be UKRAINE
deployed independently as task forces within Swiss OSCE • Ukraine 11
territory WESTERN SAHARA
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE UN • MINURSO 2 obs
AIR DEFENCE
SAM • Point Rapier; FIM-92 Stinger
GUNS 35mm Some Turkey TUR
RADARS • AD RADARS Skyguard New Turkish Lira L 2016 2017 2018
Armed Forces Logistic Organisation 13,700 GDP L 2.61tr 3.03tr

on mobilisation US$ 863bn 841bn
FORCES BY ROLE per capita US$ 10,817 10,434
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT Growth % 3.2 5.1
1 log bde Inflation % 7.8 10.9
Def exp [a] L 38.1bn 44.2bn
Command Support Organisation 14,600 on
US$ 12.6bn 12.3bn
mobilisation
Def bdgt [b] L 26.2bn 28.8bn 40.5bn
FORCES BY ROLE
US$ 8.66bn 7.98bn
1 spt bde US$1=L 3.02 3.60
[a] NATO definition
Civil Defence 74,000 (55,000 Reserve) [b] Includes funding for Undersecretariat of Defence Industries.
(not part of armed forces) Excludes military procurement allocations
Cyber
Five major Swiss government organisations maintain Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
an overview of elements of cyber threats and responses: Male 12.6% 4.2% 4.0% 4.0% 22.2% 3.4%
the Federal Intelligence Service; the Military Intelligence Female 12.1% 4.0% 3.8% 3.9% 21.8% 4.2%
Service; the Command Support Organisation; Information
Security and Facility Protection; and the Federal Office for Capabilities
Civil Protection. A National Cyber Defence Strategy was
published in 2012. As cyber protection is decentralised, According to government officials, terrorism is designated
the Federal Department of Finance is in charge of as Turkey’s main security threat. The armed forces are
implementing the strategy until 2017.  capable and aim to provide a highly mobile force able
to fight across the spectrum of conflict. In 2017, Turkey
published its ‘Strategic Paper 2017–21’, which outlined
DEPLOYMENT an aspiration to improve local input into national-defence
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA programmes, and develop indigenous platforms across
EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 21 all domains. Following the failed attempt at a military
coup in July 2016, Ankara dismissed large numbers of
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO officers from its armed forces, and the loss of experienced
UN • MONUSCO 3 personnel will likely have had some impact on both
Europe 157
operational effectiveness and training levels. The armed IFV 645 ACV AIFV
forces remain engaged in ground operations in northern APC 4,138
Iraq, as well as in airstrikes against the Kurdistan Workers’ APC (T) 3,636: 823 ACV AAPC; 2,813 M113/M113A1/
Party (PKK) and the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in M113A2
both northern Iraq and Syria. In 2017, Turkey opened a APC (W) 152+: 70+ Cobra; 82 Cobra II
base in Mogadishu to train Somali forces. Turkey has also PPV 350+: 50+ Edjer Yaclin 4×4; 300+ Kirpi
dispatched personnel to Qatar. To bolster its air-defence ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
capability, Ankara signed a contract with Russia for S-400 AEV 12+: 12 M48; M113A2T2
surface-to-air missile systems. However, the extent (if any) ARV 150: 12 Leopard 1; 105 M48T5; 33 M88A1
to which Turkey can integrate the S-400 with Western air- VLB 52 Mobile Floating Assault Bridge
Europe
defence systems and NATO air defences remains open to MW Husky 2G; Tamkar
question. ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL
ACTIVE 355,200 (Army 260,200 Navy 45,600 Air SP 365 ACV TOW
50,000) Paramilitary 156,800 MANPATS 9K135 Kornet-E (AT-14 Spriggan); Cobra;
Conscript liability 15 months. Active figure reducing Eryx; Milan
RESERVE 378,700 (Army 258,700 Navy 55,000 Air RCL 3,869: 57mm 923 M18; 75mm 617; 106mm 2,329
M40A1
65,000)
ARTILLERY 7,795+
Reserve service to age 41 for all services
SP 1,076: 105mm 391: 26 M108T; 365 M52T; 155mm 430:
ε150 M44T1; ε280 T-155 Firtina (K9 Thunder); 175mm 36
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE M107; 203mm 219 M110A2
TOWED 760+: 105mm 75+ M101A1; 155mm 523: 517
Space M114A1/M114A2; 6 Panter; 203mm 162 M115
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE MRL 146+: 107mm 48; 122mm ε36 T-122; 227mm 12
SATELLITES • ISR 2 Gokturk-1/2 M270 MLRS; 302mm 50+ TR-300 Kasirga (WS-1)
MOR 5,813+
SP 1,443+: 81mm; 107mm 1,264 M106; 120mm 179
Army ε260,200 (including conscripts)
TOWED 4,370: 81mm 3,792; 120mm 578
FORCES BY ROLE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
COMMAND SRBM • Conventional MGM-140A ATACMS (launched
4 army HQ from M270 MLRS); J-600T Yildrim (B-611/CH-SS-9 mod 1)
9 corps HQ RADAR • LAND AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder; 2 Cobra
SPECIAL FORCES AIRCRAFT
4 cdo bde ISR 5 Beech 350 King Air
1 mtn cdo bde TPT • Light 8: 5 Beech 200 King Air; 3 Cessna 421
1 cdo regt TRG 49: 45 Cessna T182; 4 T-42A Cochise
MANOEUVRE HELICOPTERS
Armoured ATK 64: 18 AH-1P Cobra; 12 AH-1S Cobra; 5 AH-1W
1 (52nd) armd div (2 armd bde, 1 mech bde) Cobra; 4 TAH-1P Cobra; 9 T129A; 16 T129B
7 armd bde MRH 28 Hughes 300C
Mechanised TPT 224+: Heavy 6 CH-47F Chinook; Medium 77+: 29
2 (28th & 29th) mech div AS532UL Cougar; 48+ S-70A Black Hawk; Light 141: 12
14 mech inf bde Bell 204B (AB-204B); ε45 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 64
Light Bell 205A (AB-205A); 20 Bell 206 Jet Ranger
1 (23rd) mot inf div (3 mot inf regt) UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
11 mot inf bde CISR • Medium 26 Bayraktar TB2
COMBAT SUPPORT ISR • Heavy Falcon 600/Firebee; Medium CL-89; Gnat;
2 arty bde Light Harpy
1 trg arty bde AIR DEFENCE
6 arty regt SAM • Point-defence 148+: 70 Altigan PMADS octuple
2 engr regt Stinger lnchr, 78 Zipkin PMADS quad Stinger lnchr; FIM-
AVIATION 43 Redeye (being withdrawn); FIM-92 Stinger
4 avn regt GUNS 1,664
4 avn bn SP 40mm 262 M42A1
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TOWED 1,402: 20mm 439 GAI-D01; 35mm 120 GDF-
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 001/GDF-003; 40mm 843: 803 L/60/L/70; 40 T-1
MBT 2,485: 321 Leopard 2A4; 170 Leopard 1A4; 227 Leopard AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
1A3; 250 M60A1; 500 M60A3; 167 M60T; 850 M48A5 T1/ ASM Mizrak-U (UMTAS)
T2 (2,000 more in store) BOMBS
RECCE ε250 Akrep Laser-guided MAM-L; MAM-C
Navy ε45,000 (including conscripts) AMPHIBIOUS

LANDING SHIPS • LST 5:
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 Bayraktar with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 20
MBT; 250 troops)
4 Atilay (GER Type-209/1200) with 8 single 533mm ASTT
1 Ertugrul (ex-US Terrebonne Parish) with 3 76mm guns
with SST-4 HWT
(capacity 18 tanks; 400 troops) (with 1 hel landing
8 Preveze/Gür (GER Type-209/1400) with 8 single 533mm
platform)
ASTT with UGM-84 Harpoon AShM/Tigerfish Mk2
1 Osman Gazi with 1 Phalanx CIWS (capacity 4 LCVP;
HWT/DM2A4 HWT
17 tanks; 980 troops) (with 1 hel landing platform)
2 Sarucabey with 1 Phalanx CIWS (capacity 11 tanks;
FRIGATES • FFGHM 18:
600 troops) (with 1 hel landing platform)
2 Barbaros (mod GER MEKO 200 F244 & F245) with 2
LANDING CRAFT 30
quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 1
LCT 21: 2 C-120/130; 11 C-140; 8 C-151
octuple Mk29 lnchr with Aspide SAM, 2 Mk32 triple
LCM 9: 1 C-310; 8 C-320
324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 3 Sea Zenith CIWS, 1
127mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel)
ABU 2: 1 AG5; 1 AG6 with 1 76mm gun
2 Barbaros (mod GER MEKO 200 F246 & F247) with 2
AGS 2: 1 Cesme (ex-US Silas Bent); 1 Cubuklu
quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM,
AOR 2 Akar with 1 twin 76mm gun, 1 Phalanx CIWS, 1
1 8-cell Mk41 VLS with Aspide SAM, 2 Mk32 triple
324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 3 Sea Zenith CIWS, 1
AOT 2 Burak
127mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel) 
AOL 1 Gurcan
3 Gabya (ex-US Oliver Hazard Perry class) with 1 Mk13
AP 1 Iskenderun
GMLS with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM/SM-1MR
ASR 2: 1 Alemdar with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Isin II
SAM, 1 8-cell Mk41 VLS with RIM-162 SAM, 2 Mk32
ATF 9: 1 Akbas; 1 Degirmendere; 1 Gazal; 1 Inebolu; 5 Onder
triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 Phalanx Block
AWT 3 Sogut
1B CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 S-70B Seahawk AXL 8
ASW hel) AX 2 Pasa (ex-GER Rhein)
5 Gabya (ex-US Oliver Hazard Perry class) with 1 Mk13
GMLS with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM/SM-1MR Marines 3,000
SAM, 2 Mk32 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, FORCES BY ROLE
1 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 MANOEUVRE
S-70B Seahawk ASW hel) Amphibious
4 Yavuz (GER MEKO 200TN) with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr 1 mne bde (3 mne bn; 1 arty bn)
with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 1 octuple Mk29
GMLS with Aspide SAM, 2 Mk32 triple 324mm ASTT Naval Aviation
with Mk46 LWT, 3 Sea Zenith CIWS, 1 127mm gun FORCES BY ROLE
(capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel) ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
2 Ada with 2 quad lnchr with RCM-84C Harpoon 2 sqn with Bell 212 ASW (AB-212 ASW); S-70B
AShM, 1 Mk49 21-cell lnchr with RIM-116 SAM, 2 Seahawk
Mk32 twin 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 76mm 1 sqn with ATR-72-600; CN235M-100; TB-20 Trinidad
gun (capacity 1 S-70B Seahawk hel)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT
CORVETTES • FSGM 6:
MP 6 CN235M-100
6 Burak (ex-FRA d’Estienne d’Orves) with 2 single lnchr
TPT • Light 7: 2 ATR-72-600; 5 TB-20 Trinidad
with MM38 Exocet AShM, 4 single 324mm ASTT
HELICOPTERS
with Mk46 LWT, 1 Mk54 A/S mor, 1 100mm gun
ASW 29: 11 Bell 212 ASW (AB-212 ASW); 18 S-70B
PCFG 19:
Seahawk
4 Dogan (GER Lurssen-57) with 2 quad lnchr with
RGM-84A/C Harpoon AShM, 1 76mm gun
Air Force ε50,000
9 Kilic with 2 quad Mk 141 lnchr with RGM-84C
2 tac air forces (divided between east and west)
Harpoon AShM, 1 76mm gun
4 Rüzgar (GER Lurssen-57) with 2 quad lnchr with Flying hours 180 hrs/yr
RGM-84A/C Harpoon AShM, 1 76mm gun FORCES BY ROLE
2 Yildiz with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84A/C Harpoon FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
AShM, 1 76mm gun 1 sqn with F-4E Phantom 2020
PCC 15 Tuzla 8 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
PBFG 2 Kartal (GER Jaguar) with 4 single lnchr with RB ISR
12 Penguin AShM, 2 single 533mm TT 1 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 15: 1 unit with King Air 350
MHO 11: 5 Engin (FRA Circe); 6 Aydin AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
MSC 4 Seydi (US Adjutant) 1 sqn (forming) with B-737 AEW&C
Europe 159
EW AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
1 unit with CN235M EW AAM • IR AIM-9S Sidewinder; Shafrir 2(‡); IIR AIM-
SEARCH & RESCUE 9X Sidewinder II; SARH AIM-7E Sparrow; ARH AIM-
1 sqn with AS532AL/UL Cougar 120A/B AMRAAM
TANKER ARM AGM-88A HARM
1 sqn with KC-135R Stratotanker ASM AGM-65A/G Maverick; Popeye I
TRANSPORT LACM Coventional AGM-84K SLAM-ER
1 sqn with A400M; C-160D Transall BOMBS
1 sqn with C-130B/E/H Hercules Electro-optical guided GBU-8B HOBOS (GBU-15)
1 (VIP) sqn with Cessna 550 Citation II (UC-35); Cessna INS/GPS guided AGM-154A JSOW; AGM-154C JSOW
Europe
650 Citation VII; CN235M; Gulfstream 550 Laser-guided MAM-C; MAM-L; Paveway I; Paveway II
3 sqn with CN235M
10 (liaison) flt with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); CN235M
TRAINING
1 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon Gendarmerie 152,100
1 sqn with F-5A/B Freedom Fighter; NF-5A/B Freedom
Ministry of Interior; Ministry of Defence in war
Fighter
1 sqn with SF-260D FORCES BY ROLE
1 sqn with KT-IT SPECIAL FORCES
1 sqn with T-38A/M Talon 1 cdo bde
1 sqn with T-41D Mescalero MANOEUVRE
AIR DEFENCE Other
4 sqn with MIM-14 Nike Hercules 1 (border) paramilitary div
2 sqn with Rapier 2 paramilitary bde
8 (firing) unit with MIM-23 Hawk EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MANOEUVRE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Air Manoeuvre RECCE Akrep
1 AB bde APC • APC (W) 560: 535 BTR-60/BTR-80; 25 Condor
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT
AIRCRAFT 333 combat capable ISR Some O-1E Bird Dog
FTR 53: 18 F-5A Freedom Fighter; 8 F-5B Freedom Fighter; TPT • Light 2 Do-28D
17 NF-5A Freedom Fighter; 10 NF-5B Freedom Fighter (48 HELICOPTERS
F-5s being upgraded as LIFT) MRH 19 Mi-17 Hip H
FGA 280: 20 F-4E Phantom 2020; 27 F-16C Fighting Falcon TPT 35: Medium 12 S-70A Black Hawk; Light 23: 8 Bell
Block 30; 162 F-16C Fighting Falcon Block 50; 14 F-16C 204B (AB-204B); 6 Bell 205A (AB-205A); 8 Bell 206A
Fighting Falcon Block 50+; 8 F-16D Block 30 Fighting (AB-206A) Jet Ranger; 1 Bell 212 (AB-212)
Falcon; 33 F-16D Fighting Falcon Block 50; 16 F-16D
Fighting Falcon Block 50+
CISR • Medium 6 Bayraktar TB2
ISR 5 Beech 350 King Air
EW 2+ CN235M EW Coast Guard 4,700
AEW&C 4 B-737 AEW&C
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
TKR 7 KC-135R Stratotanker
TPT 87: Heavy 5 A400M; Medium 31: 6 C-130B Hercules;
12 C-130E Hercules; 1 C-130H Hercules; 12 C-160D Transall; PSOH 4 Dost with 1 76mm gun
Light 50: 2 Cessna 550 Citation II (UC-35 - VIP); 2 Cessna PBF 60
650 Citation VII; 46 CN235M; PAX 1 Gulfstream 550 PB 40
TRG 169: 34 SF-260D; 70 T-38A/M Talon; 25 T-41D AIRCRAFT • MP 3 CN235 MPA
Mescalero; 40 KT-IT HELICOPTERS • MRH 8 Bell 412EP (AB-412EP – SAR)
HELICOPTERS
TPT 35: Medium 20: 6 AS532AL Cougar (CSAR); 14 DEPLOYMENT
AS532UL Cougar (SAR); Light 15 Bell 205 (UH-1H
Iroquois) AFGHANISTAN
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES 27+ NATO • Operation Resolute Support 659; 1 mot inf bn(-)
CISR • Heavy some ANKA-S
ISR 27+: Heavy 9+: some ANKA; 9 Heron; Medium 18 ARABIAN SEA & GULF OF ADEN
Gnat 750 Combined Maritime Forces • CTF-151: 1 FFGHM
AIR DEFENCE BLACK SEA
SAM NATO • SNMCMG 2: 1 MHO
Long-range MIM-14 Nike Hercules
Medium-range MIM-23 Hawk BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
Point-defence Rapier EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 199; 1 inf coy
CYPRUS (NORTHERN)
ε43,000; 1 army corps HQ; 1 armd bde; 2 mech inf div; 1 United Kingdom UK
avn comd; 8 M48A2 (trg;) 340 M48A5T1/T2; 361 AAPC
British Pound £ 2016 2017 2018
(incl variants); 266 M113 (incl variants); 72 M101A1; 18
M114A2; 12 M115; 90 M44T; 6 T-122; 175 81mm mor; GDP £ 1.94tr 2.01tr
148 M30; 127 HY-12; 66 Milan; 48 TOW; 192 M40A1; Rh US$ 2.63tr 2.57tr
202; 16 GDF-003; 48 M1; 3 Cessna 185 (U-17); 1 AS532UL per capita US$ 40,050 38,847
Cougar; 3 UH-1H Iroquois; 1 PB Growth % 1.8 1.7
IRAQ Inflation % 0.7 2.6
Army: 2,000; 1 armd BG Def exp [a] £ 42.2bn 43.0bn
US$ 57.2bn 55.0bn
LEBANON
UN • UNIFIL 49; 1 PCFG Def bdgt [b] £ 38.8bn ε39.7bn
US$ 52.6bn ε50.7bn
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
US$1=£ 0.74 0.78
NATO • SNMG 2: 1 FFGHM
[a] NATO definition
QATAR [b] Includes total departmental expenditure limits; costs of
Army: 200 (trg team); 1 mech inf coy; 1 arty unit; 12+ ACV military operations; and external income earned by the MoD
AIFV/AAPC; 2 T-155 Firtina
SERBIA
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
NATO • KFOR 307; 1 inf coy
UN • UNMIK 1 obs Male 9.0% 2.8% 3.2% 3.5% 23.1% 8.1%
Female 8.5% 2.7% 3.1% 3.4% 22.5% 9.9%
SOMALIA
UN • UNSOM 1 obs
Capabilities
SYRIA
In Europe, the UK is equalled only by France in its ability
500+; 1 SF coy; 1 armd coy(+); 1 arty unit
to project credible expeditionary combat power. Its forces
UKRAINE are relatively well balanced, but many key capabilities
OSCE • Ukraine 11 are close to critical mass. The defence budget is under
pressure because of the fall in the value of the pound, the
FOREIGN FORCES cost growth of some major programmes and the difficulty
Italy Active Fence: 1 bty with SAMP/T of achieving savings targets. Plans to field an improved
Saudi Arabia Inherent Resolve: 6 F-15S Eagle ‘Future Force 2025’ by 2025 face considerable challenges in
delivery. A ‘national security capability review’, ongoing
Spain Active Fence: 149; 1 bty with MIM-104C Patriot PAC-2
in late 2017, will likely result in further changes to defence-
United States US European Command: 2,700; 1 atk sqn
with 12 A-10C Thunderbolt II; 1 tkr sqn with 14 KC-135; 1 capability plans. The defence ministry’s current top policy
CISR sqn with MQ-1B Predator UAV; 1 ELINT flt with EP- priorities are contributing to the counter-ISIS coalition in
3E Aries II; 1 spt facility at Izmir; 1 spt facility at Ankara; 1 the Middle East and being on standby to assist the police
air base at Incirlik • US Strategic Command: 1 AN/TPY-2 and security services to counter domestic terrorism. Force-
X-band radar at Kürecik modernisation continues, but it will be some time before
the forces have a credible full-spectrum combat capability
against a peer competitor such as Russia. The UK continues
to invest in special-forces, counter-terrorist and cyber
capabilities. The army is rebuilding its ability to field a full
division of three combat brigades. HMS Queen Elizabeth,
the new aircraft carrier, began sea trials, while the navy
announced it would test a laser weapon on a warship.
There has been much investment in strategic airlift.
Current lift capacity is sufficient to deploy and sustain
small- and medium-scale contingents. Expeditionary
logistic capability meets policy requirements, but
peacetime logistic support within the UK is dependent on
contractors. The sophisticated domestic defence industry
cannot meet all of the UK’s defence-industrial and logistics
requirements. The UK maintains forces in Afghanistan,
Iraq and Nigeria and in 2017 rapidly deployed a joint
force for hurricane relief in the Caribbean. The UK leads
Europe 161
a multinational battlegroup deployed to Estonia as part of & 160th) inf bde (1 lt inf bn); 1 log bde (2 log regt; 2
NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence, and deploys combat maint bn; 2 med regt))
aircraft for NATO air policing. (See pp. 80–81.) 2 lt inf bn (London)
1 (Gurkha) lt inf bn (Brunei)
ACTIVE 150,250 (Army 85,000 Navy 32,350 Air 1 (Spec Inf Gp) inf bde(-) (2 inf bn(-))
32,900)   Air Manoeuvre
RESERVE 82,650 (Regular Reserve 43,600 (Army 1 (16th) air aslt bde (1 recce pl, 2 para bn, 1 fd arty regt,
1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt, 1 med regt)
29,450, Navy 6,550, Air 7,600); Volunteer Reserve
COMBAT SUPPORT
37,000 (Army 30,500, Navy 3,650, Air 2,850); 1 arty bde (3 SP arty regt, 2 fd arty regt)
Europe
Sponsored Reserve 2,050) 2 AD regt
Includes both trained and those currently under training 1 engr bde (5 cbt engr regt, 2 EOD regt, 1 (MWD) EOD
within the Regular Forces, excluding university cadet search regt, 1 engr regt, 1 (air spt) engr regt, 1 log regt)
units 1 (geographic) engr regt
1 ISR bde (1 STA regt, 1 EW regt, 3 int bn, 1 ISR UAV regt)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 1 MP bde (3 MP regt)
1 sigs bde (7 sigs regt)
1 sigs bde (2 sigs regt; 1 (ARRC) sigs bn)
Strategic Forces 1,000
1 (77th) info ops bde (3 info ops gp, 1 spt gp, 1 engr spt/
Royal Navy log gp)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 engr spt gp
SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC • SSBN 4:
1 log bde (2 log regt)
4 Vanguard with 1 16-cell VLS with UGM-133A Trident
1 med bde (3 fd hospital)
II D-5/D-5LE nuclear SLBM, 4 533mm TT with
Spearfish HWT (each boat will not deploy with more Reserves
than 40 warheads, but each missile could carry
up to 12 MIRV; some Trident D-5 capable of being Army Reserve 30,500 reservists
configured for sub-strategic role) The Army Reserve (AR) generates individuals, sub-units
MSL • SLBM • Nuclear 48 UGM-133A Trident II D-5 and some full units. The majority of units are subordin
(fewer than 160 declared operational warheads) ate to regular formation headquarters and paired with
one or more regular units
Royal Air Force FORCES BY ROLE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE MANOEUVRE
RADAR • STRATEGIC 1 Ballistic Missile Early Warning Reconnaissance
System (BMEWS) at Fylingdales Moor 3 recce regt
Armoured
Space 1 armd regt
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Light
SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS 8: 1 NATO-4B; 3 15 lt inf bn
Air Manoeuvre
Skynet-4; 4 Skynet-5
1 para bn
COMBAT SUPPORT
Army 82,050; 2,950 Gurkhas (total 85,000) 3 arty regt
Regt normally bn size. Many cbt spt and CSS regt and bn 1 STA regt
have reservist sub-units 1 MRL regt
FORCES BY ROLE 3 engr regt
COMMAND 4 int bn
1 (ARRC) corps HQ 4 sigs regt
MANOEUVRE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Armoured 11 log regt
1 (3rd) armd div (2 (12th & 20th) armd inf bde (1 armd 6 maint regt
recce regt, 1 tk regt, 2 armd inf bn, 1 mech inf bn); 1 4 med regt
(1st) armd inf bde (1 armd recce regt, 1 tk regt, 2 armd 10 fd hospital
inf bn); 1 log bde (6 log regt; 4 maint regt; 3 med regt)) AIR DEFENCE
Light 1 AD regt
1 (1st) lt inf div (1 (4th) inf bde (1 recce regt, 1 lt mech EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
inf bn; 2 lt inf bn); 1 (7th) inf bde (1 recce regt, 3 lt ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
mech inf bn; 2 lt inf bn); 1 (11th) inf bde (1 lt mech MBT 227 Challenger 2
inf bn; 1 lt inf bn; 1 (Gurkha) lt inf bn); 1 (51st) inf RECCE 613: 197 Jackal; 110 Jackal 2; 130 Jackal 2A; 145
bde (1 recce regt; 2 lt mech inf bn; 1 lt inf bn); 2 (38th FV107 Scimitar; 31 Scimitar Mk2
IFV 623: 466 FV510 Warrior; 88 FV511 Warrior (CP); 51 Royal Navy
FV514 Warrior (OP); 18 FV515 Warrior (CP)
FORCES BY ROLE
APC 1,291
ATTACK HELICOPTER
APC (T) 895 Bulldog Mk3
1 lt sqn with AW159 Wildcat AH1
PPV 396 Mastiff (6×6)
AUV 1,238: 399 Foxhound; 252 FV103 Spartan (incl
2 sqn with AW101 Merlin HC3/3A/3i
variants); 23 Spartan Mk2 (incl variants); 396 Panther
CLV; 168 Ridgback Royal Air Force
FORCES BY ROLE
AEV 92: 60 Terrier; 32 Trojan
ARV 259: 80 Challenger ARRV; 28 FV106 Samson; 5 Samson
Mk2; 105 FV512 Warrior; 41 FV513 Warrior 3 sqn with CH-47D/SD/F Chinook HC3/4/4A/6
MW 64 Aardvark 2 sqn with SA330 Puma HC2
VLB 70: 37 M3; 33 Titan TRAINING
NBC VEHICLES 8 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC 1 OCU sqn with CH-47D/SD/F Chinook HC3/4/4A/6;
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL SA330 Puma HC2
SP Exactor (Spike NLOS) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 12: 9 BN-2T-4S Defender; 3 BN-2
ARTILLERY 598 Islander AL1
SP 155mm 89 AS90 HELICOPTERS
TOWED 105mm 114 L118 Light Gun ATK 50 AH-64D Apache
MRL 227mm 35 M270B1 MLRS MRH 81: 5 AS365N3; 34 AW159 Wildcat AH1; 8 Lynx
MOR 81mm 360 L16A1 AH9A; 34 SA341B Gazelle AH1
RADAR • LAND 150: 6 Giraffe AMB; 5 Mamba; 139 MSTAR TPT 122: Heavy 60: 38 CH-47D Chinook HC4/4A; 7 CH-
AMPHIBIOUS • LCU 3 Ramped Craft Logistic 47SD Chinook HC3; 1 CH-47SD Chinook HC5; 14 CH-47F
AIR DEFENCE • SAM Chinook HC6; Medium 48: 25 AW101 Merlin HC3/3A/3i;
Point-defence 74: 60 FV4333 Stormer with Starstreak; 14 23 SA330 Puma HC2; Light 14: 9 AS350B Ecureuil; 5 Bell
Rapier FSC; Starstreak (LML) 212
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Medium 8
Joint Helicopter Command Watchkeeper (21+ more in store)
Tri-service joint organisation including Royal Navy, Army
and RAF units Royal Navy 32,350
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Army
SUBMARINES 10
FORCES BY ROLE
STRATEGIC • SSBN 4:
ISR
4 Vanguard, opcon Strategic Forces with 1 16-cell VLS
1 regt (1 sqn with BN-2 Defender/Islander; 1 sqn with
with UGM-133A Trident II D-5/D-5LE nuclear SLBM,
SA341B Gazelle AH1)
4 single 533mm TT with Spearfish HWT (each boat
ATTACK HELICOPTER
will not deploy with more than 40 warheads, but
1 regt (2 sqn with AH-64D Apache; 1 trg sqn with AH-
each missile could carry up to 12 MIRV; some Trident
64D Apache)
D-5 capable of being configured for sub-strategic
1 regt (2 sqn with AH-64D Apache)
role)
HELICOPTER
TACTICAL • SSN 6:
1 regt (2 sqn with AW159 Wildcat AH1)
1 (spec ops) sqn with Lynx AH9A 3 Trafalgar with 5 single 533mm TT with Tomahawk
1 (spec ops) sqn with AS365N3; SA341B Gazelle AH1 LACM/Spearfish HWT
1 flt with Bell 212 (Brunei) 3 Astute with 6 single 533mm TT with Tomahawk
1 flt with SA341B Gazelle AH1 (Canada) LACM/Spearfish HWT
TRAINING PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 19
1 hel regt (1 sqn with AH-64D Apache; 1 sqn with DESTROYERS 6
AS350B Ecureuil; 1 sqn with Bell 212; Lynx AH9A; DDGHM 3 Daring (Type-45) with 2 quad lnchr with
SA341B Gazelle AH1) RGM-84C Harpoon, 1 48-cell VLS with Sea Viper SAM,
ISR UAV 2 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 114mm gun (capacity 1
1 ISR UAV regt AW159 Wildcat/AW101 Merlin hel)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT DDHM 3 Daring (Type-45) with 1 48-cell VLS with Sea
1 maint regt Viper SAM, 2 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 114mm gun
(capacity 1 AW159 Wildcat/AW101 Merlin hel)
Army Reserve FRIGATES • FFGHM 13:
FORCES BY ROLE 9 Norfolk (Type-23) with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with
HELICOPTER RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 1 32-cell VLS with Sea
1 hel regt (4 sqn personnel only) Wolf SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with Sting Ray LWT,
Europe 163
1 114mm gun (capacity either 2 AW159 Wildcat or 1 Royal Marines 6,600

AW101 Merlin hel)
FORCES BY ROLE
4 Norfolk (Type-23) with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with MANOEUVRE
RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 1 32-cell VLS with Sea Amphibious
Ceptor SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with Sting Ray 1 (3rd Cdo) mne bde (3 mne bn; 1 amph aslt sqn; 1
LWT, 1 114mm gun (capacity either 2 AW159 Wildcat (army) arty regt; 1 (army) engr regt; 1 ISR gp (1 EW
or 1 AW101 Merlin hel) sqn; 1 cbt spt sqn; 1 sigs sqn; 1 log sqn), 1 log regt)
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 21 2 landing craft sqn opcon Royal Navy
PSO 3: 2 River; 1 River (mod) with 1 hel landing platform Other
PBI 18: 16 Archer (trg); 2 Scimitar 1 (Fleet Protection) sy gp
Europe
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MCO 6 Hunt (incl 4 mod Hunt)
MHC 8 Sandown (1 decommissioned and used in trg role) 
APC (T) 99 BvS-10 Mk2 Viking
AMPHIBIOUS
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTUCTURE
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 3
MSL • MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin
LPD 2 Albion with 2 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS (capacity
ARTILLERY 39
2 med hel; 4 LCU or 2 LCAC; 4 LCVP; 6 MBT; 300
TOWED 105mm 12 L118 Light Gun
troops) (of which 1 at extended readiness)
MOR 81mm 27 L16A1
LPH 1 Ocean with 3 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS (capacity
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 2 Island
18 hel; 4 LCVP; 800 troops)
LCU 10 LCU Mk10 (capacity 4 Viking APC or 120 troops)
AGB 1 Protector with 1 hel landing platform
LCVP 16 LCVP Mk5B (capacity 35 troops)
AGS 3: 1 Scott; 2 Echo (all with 1 hel landing platform) UCAC 4 Griffon 2400TD
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence Starstreak
Royal Fleet Auxiliary
Support and miscellaneous vessels are mostly manned Royal Air Force 32,900
and maintained by the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA),
Flying hours 210 hrs/yr on fast jets; 290 on tpt ac; 240 on
a civilian fleet owned by the UK MoD, which has
hels
approximately 1,900 personnel with type comd under
CINCFLEET FORCES BY ROLE
AMPHIBIOUS • PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 3 FIGHTER
LSD 3 Bay (capacity 4 LCU; 2 LCVP; 24 CR2 Challenger 2 sqn with Typhoon FGR4/T3
2 MBT; 350 troops) FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 12 3 sqn with Typhoon FGR4/T3
AORH 4: 2 Wave; 1 Fort Victoria with 2 Phalanx CIWS; 1 1 sqn with F-35B Lightning II (forming)
Tide (capacity 1 AW159 Wildcat/AW101 Merlin hel) GROUND ATTACK
AORL 1 Rover with 1 hel landing platform 3 sqn with Tornado GR4/4A
AFSH 2 Fort Rosalie ISR
AG 1 Argus (aviation trg ship with secondary role as 1 sqn with Sentinel R1
primarily casualty-receiving ship) 1 sqn with Shadow R1
AKR 4 Point (not RFA manned) ELINT
1 sqn with RC-135W Rivet Joint
Naval Aviation (Fleet Air Arm) 4,650 AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
FORCES BY ROLE 1 sqn with E-3D Sentry
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE SEARCH & RESCUE
1 sqn with Bell 412EP Griffin HAR-2
4 sqn with AW101 ASW Merlin HM2
TANKER/TRANSPORT
2 sqn with AW159 Wildcat HMA2
2 sqn with A330 MRTT Voyager KC2/3
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING
TRANSPORT
1 sqn with Sea King AEW7
1 (comms) sqn with AW109E/SP; BAe-146; BN-2A
TRAINING 
Islander CC2
1 sqn with Beech 350ER King Air
1 sqn with A400M Atlas
1 sqn with G-115
1 sqn with C-17A Globemaster
1 sqn with Hawk T1
3 sqn with C-130J/J-30 Hercules
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TRAINING
AIRCRAFT 12 combat capable 1 OCU sqn with Typhoon
TPT • Light 4 Beech 350ER King Air (Avenger) 1 OCU sqn with E-3D Sentry; Sentinel R1
TRG 17: 5 G-115; 12 Hawk T1* 1 sqn with Beech 200 King Air
HELICOPTERS 1 sqn with EMB-312 Tucano T1
ASW 58: 28 AW159 Wildcat HMA2; 30 AW101 ASW 2 sqn with Hawk T1/1A/1W
Merlin HM2 1 sqn with Hawk T2
AEW 7 Sea King AEW7 3 sqn with Tutor
COMBAT/ISR UAV 1 (HQ augmentation) sqn

2 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper 1 (C-130 Reserve Aircrew) flt
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 258 combat capable UK Special Forces
FGA 152: 13 F-35B Lightning II (in test); 139 Typhoon FGR4/ Includes Royal Navy, Army and RAF units
T3 FORCES BY ROLE
ATK 46 Tornado GR4/GR4A SPECIAL FORCES
ISR 9: 4 Sentinel R1; 5 Shadow R1 1 (SAS) SF regt
ELINT 3 RC-135W Rivet Joint 1 (SBS) SF regt
AEW&C 6 E-3D Sentry 1 (Special Reconnaissance) SF regt
TKR/TPT 14 A330 MRTT Voyager KC2/3 1 SF BG (based on 1 para bn)
TPT 58: Heavy 24: 16 A400M Atlas; 8 C-17A Globemaster; AVIATION 
Medium 20: 6 C-130J Hercules; 14 C-130J-30 Hercules; Light 1 wg (includes assets drawn from 3 Army hel sqn, 1
10: 5 Beech 200 King Air (on lease); 2 Beech 200GT King Air RAF tpt sqn and 1 RAF hel sqn)
(on lease); 3 BN-2A Islander CC2; PAX 4 BAe-146 CC2/C3 COMBAT SUPPORT
TRG 200: 39 EMB-312 Tucano T1 (39 more in store); 101 1 sigs regt
G-115E Tutor; 28 Hawk T2*; 32 Hawk T1/1A/1W* (ε46
more in store) Reserve
HELICOPTERS FORCES BY ROLE
MRH 5: 1 AW139; 4 Bell 412EP Griffin HAR-2 SPECIAL FORCES
TPT • Light 3: 2 AW109E; 1 AW109SP 2 (SAS) SF regt
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES • CISR • Heavy 10
MQ-9A Reaper Cyber
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES The National Cyber Security Centre plays a central role
AAM • IR AIM-9L/L(I) Sidewinder; IIR ASRAAM; ARH in coordinating the UK’s cyber policy and works with
AIM-120C-5 AMRAAM ministries and agencies to implement cyber-security pro-
ASM AGM-114 Hellfire; Brimstone; Dual-Mode Brimstone; grammes. The Defence Cyber Operations Group was set
Brimstone II up in 2011 to place ‘cyber at the heart of defence opera-
ALCM Storm Shadow tions, doctrine and training’. This group was transferred to
BOMBS Joint Forces Command on the formation’s establishment in
Laser/GPS-guided GBU-10 Paveway II; GBU-24 Paveway April 2012. A Joint Forces Cyber Group was set up in 2013,
III; Enhanced Paveway II/III; Paveway IV including a Joint Cyber Reserve, providing support to two
Joint Cyber Units and other information-assurance units
Royal Air Force Regiment
across the defence establishment. Increased concern about
FORCES BY ROLE the potential of information operations in and through the
MANOEUVRE cyber domain was central to the 2015 creation of 77 Bde.
Other The 2015 SDSR designated cyber a tier-one risk and stated
6 sy sqn that the UK would respond to a cyber attack in the same
COMBAT SUPPORT way as it would an equivalent conventional attack. In Oc-
2 CBRN sqn tober 2016, the UK acknowledged publicly the use of offen-
sive cyber capabilities against ISIS. The 2016 National Cy-
Tri-Service Defence Helicopter School
ber Security Strategy outlined £1.9 billion in cyber-security
FORCES BY ROLE investments in the period up to 2021. In April 2016, it was
TRAINING announced that a Cyber Security Operations Centre would
1 hel sqn with Bell 412EP Griffin HT1 be established under the MoD and tasked with protecting
2 hel sqn with AS350B Ecureuil the MoD’s cyberspace. A Defence Cyber School was sched-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE uled to open in January 2018, bringing service cyber train-
HELICOPTERS ing together in one organisation.
MRH 11 Bell 412EP Griffin HT1
TPT • Light 27: 25 AS350B Ecureuil; 2 AW109E
DEPLOYMENT
Volunteer Reserve Air Forces AFGHANISTAN
(Royal Auxiliary Air Force/RAF Reserve) NATO • Operation Resolute Support 500; 1 inf bn(-)
MANOEUVRE
Other ALBANIA
5 sy sqn OSCE • Albania 3
COMBAT SUPPORT ARABIAN SEA & GULF OF ADEN
2 int sqn
1 FFGHM
1 med sqn ARMENIA/AZERBAIJAN
1 (air movements) sqn OSCE • Minsk Conference 1
Europe 165
ASCENSION ISLAND LIBYA

20 UN • UNSMIL 1 obs
ATLANTIC (NORTH)/CARIBBEAN MALI
Operation Ruman 1 LSD
EU • EUTM Mali 8
ATLANTIC (SOUTH) UN • MINUSMA 2
1 AORL
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
BAHRAIN
NATO • SNMG 2: 1 LPH
80; 1 naval base
Europe
MOLDOVA
BELIZE
20 OSCE • Moldova 1
BLACK SEA NEPAL

NATO • SNMCMG 2: 1 MHC; 1 AGS 60 (Gurkha trg org)
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA NIGERIA
EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 4 300 (trg teams)
OMAN
BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY
90; 1 hel flt with AW101 ASW Merlin HM2; AW159 Wildcat
40; 1 navy/marine det
HMA2
BRUNEI
1,000; 1 (Gurkha) lt inf bn; 1 jungle trg centre; 1 hel flt with PERSIAN GULF
3 Bell 212 Operation Kipion 2 MCO; 2 MHC; 1 LSD
CANADA POLAND
370; 1 trg unit; 1 hel flt with SA341 Gazelle AH1 NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 150; 1 recce sqn
CYPRUS
SERBIA
2,260; 2 inf bn; 1 SAR sqn with 4 Bell 412 Griffin HAR-2; 1
radar (on det) NATO • KFOR 29
Operation Shader 500: 1 FGA sqn with 6 Tornado GR4; 6 OSCE • Kosovo 7
Typhoon FGR4; 1 Sentinel R1; 1 E-3D Sentry; 1 A330 MRTT
SOMALIA
Voyager KC3; 2 C-130J Hercules
UN • UNFICYP 277; 1 inf coy EU • EUTM Somalia 4
UN • UNSOM 4 obs
UN • UNSOS 41
UN • MONUSCO 6
EGYPT SOUTH SUDAN
MFO 2 UN • UNMISS 373; 1 engr coy; 1 fd hospital
ESTONIA UKRAINE
NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 800; 1 armd inf bn OSCE • Ukraine 51
HQ; 1 armd inf coy(+); 1 engr sqn Operation Orbital 100 (trg team)
FALKLAND ISLANDS
1,000: 1 inf coy(+); 1 sigs unit; 1 AD det with Rapier; 1 PSO; 1
ftr flt with 4 Typhoon FGR4; 1 tkr/tpt flt with C-130J Hercules 1 tpt/tkr flt with C-17A Globemaster; C-130J Hercules; A330
MRTT Voyager
GERMANY
3,750; 1 armd inf bde(-) (1 tk regt, 1 armd inf bn); 1 SP arty
regt; 1 cbt engr regt; 1 maint regt; 1 med regt FOREIGN FORCES
GIBRALTAR United States
570 (incl Royal Gibraltar regt); 2 PB US European Command: 8,300; 1 ftr wg at RAF Lakenheath
(1 ftr sqn with 24 F-15C/D Eagle, 2 ftr sqn with 23 F-15E Strike
IRAQ
Eagle); 1 ISR sqn at RAF Mildenhall with OC-135/RC-135; 1
Operation Shader 600; 2 inf bn(-); 1 engr sqn(-)
tkr wg at RAF Mildenhall with 15 KC-135R/T Stratotanker;
KENYA 1 CSAR sqn at RAF Lakenheath with 8 HH-60G Pave Hawk:
250; 1 trg unit 1 Spec Ops gp at RAF Mildenhall (1 sqn with 8 CV-22B
KUWAIT Osprey; 1 sqn with 8 MC-130J Commando II) • US Strategic
30 (trg team) Command: 1 AN/FPS-132 Upgraded Early Warning Radar
Operation Shader MQ-9A Reaper and 1 Spacetrack radar at Fylingdales Moor
Arms procurements and deliveries – Europe

France and Germany announced that they are Shipbuilding’s majority share. France and Italy are
exploring the potential development of a new now negotiating the future of the company.
combat aircraft to be produced after Rafale and the
Typhoon. France and the UK agreed a three-year concept
phase with MBDA for a new generation of cruise
Norway selected ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems missiles. Both countries plan to ultimately replace
(TKMS) and its improved Type-212A design for its Exocet, Harpoon, SCALP and Storm Shadow. The
future submarine requirement. The new design will current ambition is for the project to result in an
be known as Type-212NG (Norway-Germany/Next operational system by the end of the 2020s.
Generation). The agreement will see both countries
purchase the same submarine design, which will Turkey rejected Otokar’s initial bid for Altay tank
be delivered in 2020–30. Norway plans to purchase series production and issued a tender for the deal.
four boats and Germany two. A production Turkish tractor firm TÜMOSAN had its contract
contract is expected in 2019. to develop a powerpack for Altay cancelled after
Austrian partner AVL withdrew due to the Turkish
BAE Systems was awarded a US$4.83 billion government’s crackdown after the coup attempt.
contract for the United Kingdom’s first three Type- It is now unclear what propulsion system a series-
26 frigates. The first is planned to enter service in production Altay would use.
the mid-2020s.
The Turkish Air Force’s ANKA-S UAV carried out its
Naval Group, formerly called DCNS, was awarded first operational weapons firings. Ten of these are
a US$4.28bn contract for the first five Frégates de to be supplied by TAI by the end of 2018.
Taille Intermédiaire frigates for the French Navy. The
first vessel is planned to enter service in 2025. Belgium issued a request for proposals for its fighter
competition. Thirty-four new aircraft are planned
France temporarily nationalised STX France after to reach initial operating capability in 2025 and full
Italian company Fincantieri was on the verge of operating capability in 2030. A decision is expected
acquiring Korean company STX Offshore and in 2018.
Figure 7 Europe: selected ongoing or completed procurement priorities in 2017
14
12 Central Europe
Number of Countries
Northern Europe
10 Southern Europe
Purchasing
Southeastern Europe
8 Balkans
Western Europe
6
4
2
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Data reflects the number of countries with equipment-procurement contracts either ongoing or completed in 2017. Data includes only procurement programmes for which a production contract
has been signed. The data does not include upgrade programmes.
*Armoured fighting vehicles not including main battle tanks **Includes combat-capable training aircraft IISS
©
Europe 167
Table 7 European armoured vehicles: selected fleet acquisitions*

Country Equipment Type Quantity Company Replacing Date of order
Austria Pandur II APC (W) 34 (AUT) GDLS – Steyr - 2016
Denmark Piranha 5 APC (W) 309 (CHE) GDLS – MOWAG M113 2015
Estonia CV9035 IFV 44 (NLD) Govt surplus - 2014
Finland Leopard 2A6 MBT 100 (NLD) Govt surplus Leopard 2A4 2014
Europe
France Jaguar Recce 20 (FRA) Nexter ERC-90F4 Sagaie 2017
(FRA) Renault Trucks Defense
(FRA) Thales
Griffon APC (W) 319 AMX10RC; VAB 2017
Germany Puma IFV 350 (GER) Rheinmetall Marder 1 2004

(GER) KMW
Latvia CVR (T) family APC (T) 123 (UK) Govt surplus - 2014
Lithuania Boxer IFV 88 (GER/NLD) ARTEC M113 2016
Netherlands Boxer APC (W) 200 (GER/NLD) ARTEC M577; YPR-765 2000
Poland Rosomak IFV & APC (W) 877 (POL) Rosomak BMP-1; BRDM-2 2003
Spain Pizarro IFV 119 (ESP) GDLS – SBS M113 2004
Turkey Cobra II APC (W) n.k. (TUR) Otokar - 2015

ZAHA AAV 27 (TUR) FNSS - 2017
UK Ajax family Recce 589 (UK) General Dynamics UK CVR (T) 2014
*Not including upgrade contracts
Figure 8 NATO Europe: ageing mine-countermeasures (MCM) vessels and current replacement
programmes
Age of in-service NATO Europe MCM vessels UK, 3
Belgium, 2
Spain, 2 Bulgaria, 2
Estonia, 2 Croatia, 1
Estonia, 1 UK, 3
Lithuania, 1 France, 2
Denmark, 2
Lithuania, 1 Poland, 8
1950s–60s 1970s
8 9 2000s
16
Poland, 3 Romania, 3 1990s Spain, 4
Turkey, 4 Turkey, 4
55
Norway, 6
Belgium, 3 Turkey, 6
UK, 8 Germany, 13
Bulgaria, 4
Estonia, 1
Latvia, 5 Greece, 2
Romania, 8 France, 15 Italy, 8
More than half of the MCM vessels operated by European NATO states
have been in service for over 30 years. Seven countries operate the 1980s-era
1980s joint Franco-Belgian-Dutch Tripartite-class minehunter. Belgium, Estonia,
75 Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden are working on the Maritime
Poland, 10 Mine Counter Measures–Next Generation (MMCM–NG) project to define op-
erational requirements, with potential for future joint procurement. France
and the UK have been cooperating on their own programme, also called
MMCM. Two autonomous unmanned-underwater-vehicle prototypes are
planned to be tested in 2019. The Anglo-French project is part of both coun-
Netherlands, 6 Germany, 13
tries’ broader programmes to renew their MCM and hydrographic capability.
Lithuania, 2 Much of NATO Europe’s MCM fleet is due to be retired from the mid-2020s
Latvia, 1 Italy, 2 Greece, 2
onwards, providing a forcing time frame for these capability projects.
NATO Europe: current ongoing MCM production contracts

Country Type Quantity Company Replacing Date of order
Poland Kormoran II 3 Remontowa Shipbuilding Krogulec class (Project 206FM) 2013

Figure 9 Submarine programmes: ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems/Fincantieri Type-212A
Timeline
2005: First 2013: Sixth 2016: Final 2019: Norwegian
Italian boat to German boat Italian boat T-212NG
2004: First enter service to enter to enter production
German boat to service service contract expected
enter service
Planned
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
Actual
Apr 1996: Italy and
1992: ARGE 212 Germany sign 2004: First 2006: First 2017: Final Italian
consortium memorandum of German boat Italian boat and sixth German
completes understanding on commissioned commissioned boat commissioned
U-212 design joint Type-212A
work development
Following tests in the late 1980s on a Type-205 boat

fitted with air-independent propulsion, Germany
decided to order the U-212 design in 1994. An
agreement in 1996 established the Type-212A joint
programme that would see Germany and Italy acquire
six and four boats respectively. Like other convention-
ally powered attack submarines, these boats are fitted
with a diesel engine and batteries for propulsion.
However, these are the only class of submarine in technology, modifications to subsequent batches and
service to use a hydrogen fuel-cell system. Whilst more budget cuts meant that the average production time
expensive and difficult to refuel than the commonly was greater than for other SSKs. Norway’s selection of
used Stirling engine system, it generates greater power the Type-212A in 2017 for its future-submarine
and has far fewer moving parts, meaning greater requirement means that production of the type will
speed and a reduced acoustic signature. Complex new almost certainly resume in the 2020s.
Type-212A production rates

Jun 2020 ITA Batch II (2,469 days avg.)
GER Batch II (2,873 days avg.)
Sep 2017
Dec 2014
Apr 2012 GER Batch I (2,107 days avg.) ITA Batch I (2,431 days avg.)
Jul 2009
Oct 2006
Jan 2004
Apr 2001
Jul 1998
Oct 1995
da re
31
32
33
34
35
36
ei
ut
To ato
irè
m
ro
U-
U-
U-
U-
U-
U-
Ro
Ve
Sc
lv
Sa
eo
ro
et
m
Pi
Ro
First steel cut Launched Commissioned

© IISS
Chapter Five
Russia and Eurasia
In 2017 Russia continued to pursue its aspiration to with precision-guided, non-nuclear and nuclear
field a more modern suite of military capabilities and weapons, funding for the navy will almost certainly
more professional armed forces held at a higher state be reduced in the new State Armament Programme
of readiness. Elements of these forces continue to (GPV) 2018–27. This makes no provision to build
maintain and sustain the deployment to Syria, where large surface combatants, such as a new aircraft
Russian combat forces remain engaged across land, carrier, cruisers and destroyers, before 2025. Despite
Russia and Eurasia

sea and air, and have proven instrumental to the this, the navy should still achieve some significant,
Assad regime’s survival in the six-year-long civil war. if more limited, ability to pose major challenges to
Meanwhile, there are further indications that potential adversaries, at least close to home waters.
Russia has moved away from important elements Overall, total spending under the period of the
of the ‘New Look’ reforms, which began in late GPV 2018–27 is planned fall from 20 to 17 trillion
2008. In March 2017 a presidential decree raised the roubles (US$318 billion to US$270bn) (see pp. 177–8).
upper limit on the total number of military personnel During this time, the aerospace forces and land forces
from one million to 1,013,628. This constituted the will be prioritised. The need to upgrade equipment
first notional increase in the size of the armed forces has led to a significant rise in costs for the land forces
for some years. Limiting the maximum numerical and the airborne troops (VDV), but it is expected that
strength of the Russian armed forces to one million the pace of rearmament will slow and there will be
had been one of the key principles of ‘New Look’, greater focus on modernisation at the expense of new
which continued a trend since the end of the Cold weapons purchases.
War of reducing personnel numbers. Indeed, in The merger of the Interior Troops and various
recent years the Russian armed forces have numbered law-enforcement agencies into the National Guard
under one million. The new requirement to increase (Rosgvardiya) was completed in 2017, bringing
personnel numbers is dictated by the accelerating the organisation’s overall personnel strength to
shift from the land forces’ ‘New Look’ brigade struc- around 340,000. The new National Guard structure
ture towards divisions and armies. In 2016 alone, is intended to tackle internal threats, but has not
one combined-arms army, four motor-rifle divisions received any additional heavy weapons except what
and one tank division were reestablished. These new had been issued to the Interior Troops (although this
divisions draw on existing brigades and equipment- in itself is significant in terms of capability).
storage bases and, as such, this transformation process Under existing legislation, the National Guard
requires substantial additional personnel strength. can be used abroad for peacekeeping operations and
At the same time, a new naval doctrine was to train foreign law-enforcement agencies. In Syria,
approved in July 2017 for the period up to 2030. It however, Russia has instead used the military police
identified among the main dangers facing Russia ‘the for work with the civilian population. New legisla-
aspiration of a number of countries, primarily the tion, which gave the military police additional func-
United States and its allies, to dominate the world’s tions, was adopted in 2015 with this purpose in mind.
oceans’. Its ambition included developing capabilities The civilian Federal Agency for Special
to act as a strategic conventional deterrent, including Construction (Spetsstroy) was disbanded by
hypersonic missiles and autonomous systems, from September 2017. Spetsstroy was responsible for the
2025, and preserving Russia’s position as the second construction of military infrastructure; however, this
global naval power. With the possible exception of its function and some of the agency’s personnel have
sub-surface capabilities, however, it would appear now been transferred to the defence ministry.
difficult for the Russian Navy fully to achieve these
ambitions. Although Russia has stated its intention to Syria
continue its submarine-construction programme, and Russia’s military intervention in Syria continued into
to develop the navy’s capability to attack land targets 2017, and there was little sign that it was causing
overstretch. The operation has not led to large-scale may have failed to demonstrate their effectiveness
strategic change in the Russian armed forces and, for under operational conditions.
the most part, remains a distant conflict involving Nonetheless, there has been progress in the minis-
limited numbers of forces and only moderate losses, try’s ability to operationally coordinate the armed
even if some of these have been high-ranking officers. services. For example, military operations in Syria
That said, the mission remains an important proving have been coordinated by the National Defence
ground for new and existing weapons, forces and Control Centre in Moscow – the first operational use
tactics. of this organisation. This experience has also led to
Russian troops have trialled over 160 models of improvements in automated command-and-control
new and modernised weapons in Syria, including systems at tactical and divisional levels; this should
experimental systems and prototypes that had not in turn improve efficiency in transmitting informa-
yet completed their normal test-cycles. The defence tion and orders.
minister said that at least ten weapons systems had The further development of reconnaissance and
been rejected and, though he did not elaborate on this strike systems, improved communications and inter-
point, it was reported separately that there had been service cooperation have been prioritised by the armed
problems with defensive systems deployed against forces as a result of its Syrian experience. Intensive work
man-portable air-defence systems and new radio- has gone into reducing the time from the detection of a
electronic equipment on Su-34 and Su-35 aircraft. In target by reconnaissance systems, including unmanned
addition, some types of precision-guided munitions aerial vehicles (UAVs) and satellites, to engagement
Russia’s military exercises

The Russian armed forces have undertaken thousands of including NATO allies in the Baltic region. Moscow has
exercises during the last decade. These have grown con- used exercises to concentrate force and apply pressure
siderably in both size and sophistication since 2010, and to neighbours, for instance, prior to the Russo-Georgian
taken a variety of forms, from the annual strategic exercis- war in 2008 and again during the escalating crisis in
es that rotate quadrennially – Kavkaz (‘Caucasus’), Tsentr Ukraine in early 2014. Weeks of exercises were conducted
(‘Centre’), Vostok (‘East’) and Zapad (‘West’) – and all the in Russia’s Western Military District, neighbouring
preparatory exercises that accompany them, to surprise Ukraine, in early 2014, for instance, allowing Russia to
combat-readiness inspections, or ‘snap exercises’, which mass forces on the border.
were reintroduced in 2013. This served to increase uncertainty and conceal inten-
A lack of transparency, combined with some defin tions, showing Moscow’s own political resolve to discour-
itional variation, has meant that the precise number of age other actors from intervening in Ukraine, while oblig-
the exercises is uncertain, and their exact size is prone to ing Ukraine to defend itself on multiple fronts, as well as
both exaggeration and understatement. But, along with distracting attention from the developments then under
other international deployments such as the resumption way in Crimea. Ukrainian officials, including President
of strategic-aviation flights and the expeditionary Petro Poroshenko, suggested that Russia sought to use
campaign in Syria, they have given the Russian authorities Zapad 2017 to similar effect, as cover for mobilisation for
a great deal of contemporary experience of operating an invasion of Ukraine, and others suggested Moscow’s
in a wide range of conditions. They both illuminate intention was either to remain in Belarus or threaten the
Moscow’s concerns about Russian security – particularly Baltic states.
about countering regime change or ‘colour revolution’- At the same time, the exercises send a range of other
type operations and anti-terrorism preparations – and signals. Russian officials emphasise that the exercises are
have helped to shape a military tool that facilitates the defensive in nature – Kavkaz 2016 was primarily about
leadership’s more assertive stance on the international territorial defence, for instance, and Zapad 2017 about
stage. defending against a ‘colour revolution’- type emergency.
The exercises serve a number of specific tasks. Such exercises are also intended, therefore, to send de-
Perhaps that which is most often highlighted by officials terrent signals to the Euro-Atlantic community by dem-
and observers in the Euro-Atlantic community is their onstrating that any intervention against Russian interests
use as a coercive tool. They are interpreted as Moscow’s would bear heavy costs. Moscow has also conducted ex-
use of military muscle to intimidate neighbours, ercises with partners, such as Tajikistan in 2016 and 2017,
Russia and Eurasia 171
by an offensive system, a process that involves the due to enter Zvezdochka Shipyard in Severodvinsk
extensive use of each service’s automated systems. for a scheduled long-term refit. This is expected to
Indeed, during the deployment of the Admiral take at least three years to complete, although at the
Kuznetsov carrier group to the eastern Mediterranean, time of writing the vessel had yet to enter the dock.
the aircraft carrier’s command centre controlled not However, the comparatively low effectiveness of
only its own air component, but also air-force Su-24 the Russian carrier group during the Syria opera-
combat aircraft based at Khmeimim air base in Syria. tion has jeopardised plans to develop new aircraft
The headquarters of the Russian forces in Syria could, carriers and, more generally, larger blue-water
in turn, control carrier-borne aircraft. However, naval vessels. This compounds the existing chal-
Russia’s use of naval aviation during the operation lenges in developing blue-water capability stem-
was not considered successful. Two combat aircraft ming from still-sclerotic surface-ship construction
from the carrier’s air component, including one of the rates.
Russia and Eurasia

newest MiG-29KRs, were lost during recovery to the Nevertheless, Russia’s use of long-range, conven-
carrier. This led to the redeployment of the air group tionally armed cruise missiles has continued to prove
from the Kuznetsov to land. Of over 360 combat sorties effective. These have been launched by submarines
flown by naval Su-33s during the deployment, just and surface ships as well as Russia’s strategic avia-
over 30 were made from the carrier. tion fleet. This success appears to have been a signifi-
The carrier group’s deployment finished ahead of cant factor in the decision to resume production of the
schedule, and, on return, the Admiral Kuznetsov was Tu-160 Blackjack strategic bomber.
in order to practise combined operations but also to sig- Secondly, the exercises are often coordinated with, or
nal reassurance and long-term commitment to them, and integrated into, other elements of Russia’s security ap-
illustrate that Russia should be their partner of choice in paratus, including interior forces, such as the newly es-
a crisis. tablished National Guard, police and other paramilitary
The exercises are also intended to deliver direct oper forces, and civil-defence capabilities. Although exercises
ational benefits for the armed forces themselves. Indeed, usually begin in one military district, they often spread
their primary purpose is internal, and they are an essen- to or include other districts: in March 2015, the armed
tial feature of the ongoing force modernisation and de- forces conducted a major snap exercise of the northern
velopment that has followed many years of underinvest- fleet and its reinforcement with elements from the Cen-
ment and decline. They are being used both to reveal and tral, Southern, Western and Eastern military districts. This
address problems and shortfalls, as well as to integrate was followed by a major policing exercise, Zaslon 2015. All
lessons learnt from the exercises themselves (and from of Russia’s armed forces, including the nuclear triad, have
experience in Ukraine and Syria) with new theories about taken part in exercises.
contemporary and future warfare. Finally, the exercises are about testing command, con-
In the wake of Russia’s post-2008 military-modernisa- trol and coordination across regions and authorities. De-
tion process, the exercises are also designed to improve fence Minister Sergei Shoigu has stated that the exercises
essential training, and are a feature of how the leadership are about checking mobilisation systems across Russia,
has sought to integrate these reforms and new structures, including coordination between civilian and military
and to ensure that the Russian armed forces develop ap- agencies at federal, regional and local levels. Exercises
propriately. have involved coordination not just with reserves, but
Three particular features stand out. Firstly, the exer- with the ministries of health, communications and trans-
cises have been about training and testing both all-arms port, for instance, as well as the Central Bank. Kavkaz
and joint operations, deploying increasingly substantial 2016 also involved the first real-time test of the Russian
forces over long distances and commanding a mix of dif- defence ministry taking direct command of regional and
ferent types of forces in different theatres. Vostok 2014 local authorities.
featured long-distance marches with heavy weapons and Weaving these threads together indicates that Russia is
subsequent regrouping, for instance, and Kavkaz 2016 preparing and testing its entire state system to cope with
deployed at-distance divisions from four armies, coord a major emergency, including transitioning from peace
inating them with command units in a new operational and deterrence, through high-intensity conventional
theatre. fighting and even escalating to nuclear deployment.
Russia’s military leadership has also spoken of the

Moscow
need to increase the role of UAVs, robotic systems and
precision weapons in the wake of operational lessons
from Syria; these will be prioritised in the new GPV. 144
Contract service BELARUS

R U S S I A
A significant development in personnel management
occurred with the long-heralded transition to a fully 856
contract-manned, non-commissioned officer (NCO) 448
corps, which was finally completed in 2017. 53 20
The continued growth in the number of contract-

752
service personnel has led to a reduction in the size of
Kiev 3
planned conscription drafts. Whereas in each spring
237
252
draft in 2014–16, 150,000 to 155,000 soldiers were
UKRAINE
called up, in the spring of 2017 just 142,000 were liable
to be conscripted. The total for both drafts in 2016 was SF 22
275,000. At the same time, the number of contract- Forces created or moved post-2014
150
service personnel continues to grow and was just Forces existing before 2014 90
short of the target (stated in 2016) of 384,000 soldiers

68
SF Special forces Motor-rifle 8
and NCOs by mid-2017; the target for the end of 2017 102
Infantry Missile
was 405,000 (which was revised down from 420,000
Tank Air defence
due to budget considerations). The overall personnel
Unit number
strength in the armed forces, comprising conscript
000
Army Division Brigade Regiment

and contract personnel, was stated as being at 93%. © IISS
Two new initiatives relating to terms of service Map 3 Russia: army units near Ukraine’s border
are intended to further boost contract-personnel
numbers. The first is the June 2017 presidential
decree that allows conscripts to immediately sign up southeastern borders of Ukraine, is still in the process
for at least two years of contract service, instead of of formation. It includes one motor-rifle division
being required to have served for at least six months (150th) and a motor-rifle brigade (20th), which might
after conscription. Other new legislation allows for also be converted into a division in the future. The
short-term contracts, of under one year in duration, formation of these new divisions and armies has
for reservists and conscripts in their final month of required an unprecedented level of infrastructure
service, in an effort to increase the flexibility and effi- development, in an area where previously almost
ciency of the manning system. Soldiers serving under no troops were based. As of late 2017, however, only
these short-term contracts can be involved in oper priority work to build housing and barracks had been
ations abroad, including on special operations. completed; the remaining infrastructure projects will
require several more years to complete.
Ukraine At the end of 2016, all ground troops stationed in
Russia’s military presence along the border with Crimea were consolidated into the 22nd Army Corps,
Ukraine continues to be reinforced with both troops subordinated to the Black Sea Fleet. There have been
and infrastructure, while the motor-rifle brigades no further increases in the numerical strength of the
redeployed there from deep inside Russia were Russian group of forces in Crimea, but the rearm
reorganised into divisions in 2016. The Western ament of naval and air-force aviation – as well as the
Military District’s 20th Combined-Arms Army, based air defences deployed there – is now a priority.
near the border with Ukraine, has also acquired two
new motor-rifle divisions (the 3rd and 144th), a tank New equipment
brigade in the process of formation, and support Land forces
units. Serial purchase of the land forces’ new generation of
Meanwhile, the Southern Military District’s new armoured vehicles, which were first displayed at the
8th Combined-Arms Army, established near the Victory Day parade on 9 May 2015, has been delayed
by several years for financial and developmental However, the initial aspiration of the 2010–20
reasons. GPV to meet the air force’s PAK-FA fifth-generation-
According to Deputy Defence Minister Yury fighter requirement by funding, as a first batch, the
Borisov, the plan is to procure just 100 T-14 Armata acquisition of 60 multi-role aircraft in 2015–20 has not
main battle tanks (MBTs) by 2020 for trials. Until been met. In 2016–17, three more PAK-FA T-50 fifth-
2022, the main effort will be directed to acquiring generation fighter prototypes were built, bringing
modernised versions of tanks already in service. In the number of airworthy prototypes to nine; the
2017, units began to take delivery of the first updated aircraft was officially designated as the Su-57 in 2017.
T-72B3 tanks with improved active-protection and In November 2016, ground tests began on the first
fire-control systems. The T-72B3 will remain the example of Izdeliye (Article)-117: an improved, more
most widely purchased MBT over the next few years, powerful engine designed for the Su-57. Flight tests
although after a pause of several years the defence for the engine are supposed to take place by the end
Russia and Eurasia

ministry signed a contract to buy more T-90 MBTs in of 2017, and by 2019 the first serial-production Su-57
August 2017. This will amount to one battalion of the is supposed to be fitted with the Izdeliye-30 follow-
new T-90M version, which has been developed based on engine. The 2018–27 GPV, which was due to be
on combat experience in Syria. released in the fourth quarter of 2017, should give a
Similar decisions have been taken with Russia’s clearer indication of the pace and scale envisaged for
light armour. A variant of the BMP-2 infantry fighting the Su-57’s introduction into service.
vehicle (IFV) with the Berezhok weapons system (a It may also provide greater clarity on the level of
new turret with anti-armour missiles) was procured, support to be provided in the near to medium term
whilst the Kurganets IFV is still in the development to meet the PAK-DA requirement for a new long-
stage. Similarly, acquisition of the BTR-82A/AM IFV range bomber. The defence ministry has approved
continues, in lieu of the new Bumerang armoured the draft design of the PAK-DA as a subsonic, low-
personnel carrier. Meanwhile, deliveries of the observable aircraft. Although this allows develop-
Koalitsiya-SV self-propelled gun are not scheduled to ment work to begin, PAK-DA is not expected to fly
start before 2020. before 2025, with service entry not before the end of
In 2016, two VDV airborne-assault divisions and the 2020s at the earliest. In the meantime, the plan is
four separate airborne-assault brigades each acquired to maintain the combat capability of the Tu-95MS Bear
a T-72B3 tank company. It is planned that three of bomber and restart production of the Tu-160 bomber
these companies will reorganise into tank battalions (as the upgraded Tu-160M2), together with renewed
in 2018; it is possible that the other three tank comp production of Tu-160 engines. The first ‘transitional’
anies could also increase in size. This move under- prototype, using parts from an unfinished Soviet-era
scores the current trend towards making Russia’s Tu-160 fuselage, is expected to fly in 2018, with a
airborne troops ‘heavier’ and transforming them into new-build airframe due to fly in 2021. Around 50
mobile and expeditionary infantry. Tu-160M2s might be purchased.
The air force is also continuing to digest lessons
Air force from its ongoing operation in Syria. However, Russia
Equipment for the Aerospace Forces (VKS) remains a has continued to rely, to a far greater extent than
priority for both the current and new GPVs, although Western air powers, on unguided air-dropped muni-
while the VKS increasingly fields upgraded models tions. The air force and Russian defence industry are
of fourth-generation combat aircraft, the transition to keen to introduce into service a range of tactical air-
fifth-generation designs remains elusive. launched guided weapons to replace ageing designs
The air force has continued to benefit from the presently in the inventory. Development of the
re-equipment programme laid down in the 2010–20 second variant of the Kh-38 family of medium-range
GPV. The delivery of new-build Su-35S and Su-30SM air-to-surface missiles was due to be complete in 2017.
multi-role combat aircraft and the Su-34 tactical The Kh-38ML semi-active laser version has already
bomber was maintained during 2017. Additional completed testing and is likely in production, while
upgraded MiG-31 Foxhound interceptors (MiG-31BM) the Kh-38MT, fitted with an electro-optical seeker,
also entered the inventory, as did a handful of was due to complete tests in 2017. Similarly, work on
modestly upgraded Tu-160 Blackjack, Tu-95 Bear and the KAB-250LG laser-guided bomb was also due to
Tu-22M Backfire bombers. finish in the same time frame. This will be the smallest
bomb in the KAB family when it is introduced into strike land targets located at a distance of up to 2,000
the air-force inventory. Additionally, a long-range kilometres from the coast. This greatly enhances the
dual-capable cruise missile, Kh-BD, is being devel- navy’s capability not just to project offensive power
oped for Russia’s strategic bombers. but also to support land operations. Indeed, the
But while its combat-aircraft inventory is in the continuing proliferation of offensive missile capacity
near term in comparatively good shape, the air among large, medium and small surface combatants
force’s tactical and heavy airlift fleets are increasingly and submarines in the Russian inventory remains
old. Upgrade and successor projects are only slowly perhaps the most significant development in Russian
progressing. naval capability, contributing to Russia’s anti-access/
Meanwhile, significant progress has been made area-denial potential and a defence-in-depth strategy.
in modernising Russia’s air-defence systems. More Russia’s shipbuilding industry continues to exper
S-400 systems are being produced each year, along ience problems concerning the construction and
with Pantsir-S units to protect them. Ten S-400 testing of major naval combatants, while issues with
battalion sets were produced in 2016 and the same the Poliment-Redut surface-to-air-missile system are
number was scheduled for 2017. However, entry into causing delays. The first and name ship of the Project
service of the system has been slower. As of October 22350 Admiral Gorshkov class of frigates was finally
2017, only three additional regiments were confirmed due to commission by the end of the year – 11 years
to have received regimental sets produced in 2016 after it was laid down. However, the construction
(the 18th, 584th and 1528th air-defence regiments). of smaller ships with a displacement of up to 1,000
Deliveries of S-400 sets produced in 2017 only began tonnes and armed with long-range cruise and anti-
in the autumn; the first regiment (511th) was expected ship missiles has accelerated significantly. In addi-
to take delivery in November. Meanwhile, testing has tion, several older vessels (frigates and a cruiser) are
begun on the Pantsir-SM, which has been developed being upgraded before being equipped with modern
based on Russia’s experiences in Syria. The system cruise-missile launchers.
has a greater detection range and the ability to engage Submarine construction is still a priority, although
high-speed ballistic targets, including multiple- the production of diesel-electric boats is proceeding
rocket-launcher munitions. A small, lightweight more smoothly than that of nuclear submarines.
missile is being developed to specifically engage this Upgrade work for the fleet of diesel-electric submar
type of target, as well as high-precision weapons and ines is under way. In 2017, the Black Sea Fleet took
UAVs. This will increase the number of missiles in a delivery of the last three of six new Project 636.3
single Pantsir loadout by up to a factor of four. improved Varshavyanka (Kilo)-class submarines armed
with Kalibr cruise missiles, in addition to torpedoes.
Navy Construction of the next batch of six Kilos has begun,
The elderly aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov made its with these planned to join the Pacific Fleet in 2019–21.
operational debut, launching missions against targets Meanwhile, work has resumed on two Project 677
in Syria in the latter part of 2016. However, the high- Lada-class torpedo- and missile-equipped submar
profile deployment to the eastern Mediterranean ines. The first Project 08851 improved Yasen-M-class
ended in January 2017, having had only limited oper- nuclear-power guided-missile attack submarine was
ational effect. A lack of trained pilots contributed to floated out in March 2017. But, again, progress on
the fact that the carrier deployed with only about a new hulls remains slow, and much effort continues
dozen fixed-wing aircraft – made up of Su-33s and, to be devoted to modernising the combat capabilities
for the first time, newer MiG-29KRs. of existing hulls.
Of greater note, in terms of the navy’s overall The deployment of large surface warships or
capability, were further sporadic strikes against targets groups centred on, or consisting of, large legacy plat-
in Syria with 3M14 Kalibr (SS-N-30) cruise missiles forms like the Kuznetsov continues to allow Moscow
fired from surface ships and a Project 636.3 improved to demonstrate force and to project status – and these
Varshavyanka (Kilo)-class submarine from the eastern platforms often pack a significant punch. Another
Mediterranean. Russia’s strategy to distribute Kalibr such naval demonstration came in July, with the
cruise missiles across the fleet, including to subma- high-profile deployments of the Kirov-class cruiser
rines and a variety of surface combatants, has given Pyotr Veliky and Typhoon-class submarine Dmitry
the Russian Navy (and air force) the capability to Donskoi (the world’s largest submarine, but recently
a missile-trials vessel), to the Baltic Sea for Navy tion and expected to be in service in 2019. A radar
Day celebrations in St Petersburg. However, this use station for Crimea has also been announced, and this
of such vessels will become increasingly difficult as is intended to be operational in 2020–21. These addi-
the prospects of sustaining, let alone replacing, these tional radars, together with the Voronezh system’s
platforms in a timely fashion seem to be reducing – in space-based sensors, should enable the detection of
large part due to renewed budgetary constraints. ICBMs at greater range and the possibility of over-the-
horizon detection for medium-range and short-range
Strategic forces ballistic-missile, and even cruise-missile, launches.
The Strategic Rocket Force (RVSN) continues to
progressively rearm, with a number of regiments DEFENCE ECONOMICS
continuing to receive new Yars missiles and launchers
in 2016. Meanwhile, tests of the heavy Sarmat liquid- Defence spending
Russia and Eurasia

fuel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) have been Although Russian defence spending appeared to
postponed several times due to technical difficulties, increase sharply in 2016, this stemmed from a one-off
and these are now expected to resume towards the settlement of debts that had been accumulated by
end of 2017. Ejection tests of the rail-mobile Barguzin defence industry under the government’s scheme of
ICBM were first carried out in November 2016, but state-guaranteed credits. If this exceptional payment
the future of the system has yet to be decided. It is not of over 790 billion roubles (US$11.8bn) is excluded,
clear whether purchases of Barguzin will be included military expenditure fell slightly in nominal terms.
in the GPV 2018–27. Spending under the ‘national defence’ budget
Although the first deliveries of the S-500 air- and chapter in the 2016 budget, comprised mainly of
missile-defence system are due to begin in 2020, so funding for defence-ministry forces, amounted to
far only individual components have been tested. The over 2.980 trillion roubles (US$44.4bn), compared to
system’s official specifications and external appear- 3.181trn roubles (US$52.2bn) in 2015. In real terms,
ance have not emerged in the public domain, which using the annual GDP deflator, this represented a
could indicate that it is not yet ready. However, it has fall of almost 10%. In the 2017 budget, spending on
been reported that the system’s interceptor missile ‘national defence’ was reduced further in nominal
has been successfully tested. It is intended that this terms, to 2.835trn roubles (US$45.02bn), although
will have the capability to engage ballistic targets in this was increased to 2.872trn roubles (US$45.6bn)
the upper atmosphere. The S-500 is planned to be when the budget was amended in July. Meanwhile,
an air-portable system that can also provide theatre defence spending relating to other budget chap-
missile defence. ters, and according to the standard NATO defin
Work is also continuing on modernising the stra- ition, meant that total military expenditure in 2016
tegic-missile-defence shield around Moscow. Tests of
interceptor missiles for the new A-235 system began
in 2014. Meanwhile, one or two test launches of the Table 8 Russian defence expenditure as % of
A-135 system currently deployed in the Moscow
GDP
Year ‘National defence’ Total military expenditure1
region, and one A-235 test launch, are performed each
Trillion As % GDP Trillion As % GDP
year at a test site in Kazakhstan. The defence ministry roubles roubles
has said that the tests will last for at least two to three 20182 2.772 2.83 3.816 3.90
years, although this timescale is considered to be 20173 2.872 3.10 3.855 4.17
optimistic. Related to this, construction work is also 2016 2.982 3.47 3.835 4.464
continuing on Russia’s network of Voronezh radar 2015 3.181 3.82 4.026 4.84
2014 2.479 3.13 3.222 4.07
stations. These are intended to form a key component
2013 2.106 2.88 2.783 3.81
of a missile-attack warning system, with detection 2012 1.812 2.66 2.482 3.64
ranges of up to 6,000km. It was reported in 2016 that 2011 1.516 2.51 2.028 3.36
all of Russia’s borders were covered by the system. 1. According to NATO definition.
2. According to the draft budget.
These radar stations will be used for both the stra- 3. Amended budget; other years actual spending.
tegic-level A-235 and the theatre-level S-500 missile- 4. Excluding a one-off payment to reduce accumulated debts of
defence-industry enterprises under the scheme of state-guaranteed
defence systems. In addition to seven radar sites credits. If this debt payment is included in GDP, share rises to 5.4%.
already operational, three more are under construc- 2010–16: actual spending; 2017: amended federal budget for 2017.
Real % Change (2016–17) 2017 Defence Spending (US$bn)

Between 0% and 3% increase 61.21
2
Between 3% and 10% decrease 1
Insufficient data .5
.01
[1] Map illustrating 2017 planned defence-spending levels (in US$ at

market exchange rates), as well as the annual real percentage
change in planned defence spending between 2016 and 2017 (at
constant 2010 prices and exchange rates). Percentage changes in
defence spending can vary considerably from year to year, as states
revise the level of funding allocated to defence. Changes indicated
Russia here highlight the short-term trend in planned defence spending
between 2016 and 2017. Actual spending changes prior to 2016, and
projected spending levels post-2017, are not reflected.
Belarus
Ukraine
Moldova
Kazakhstan
Georgia Uzbekistan
Kyrgyzstan
Armenia Azerbaijan
Turkmenistan
Tajikistan
© IISS
Map 4 Russia and Eurasia regional defence spending 1
amounted to some 3.835trn roubles (US$57.2bn), with This slower rate of military-spending growth
a modest increase to 3.855trn roubles (US$61.2bn) in should be viewed against the background of a
the amended 2017 budget. In sum, Russia’s defence faltering Russian economy, which in 2017 began to
spending has stabilised after a few years of rapid show some signs of recovery with an expected GDP
growth and, in real terms, is now falling. growth rate of 1.8%. However, the principal factor
Analysis of the scale of Russian military spending underpinning this moderated growth is that levels
has been complicated for some time by the fact of spending under the annual state defence order are
that the Federal Service for State Statistics (Rosstat)
has been transitioning from a System of National
Accounts (SNA) which adheres to the international Figure 10 Russia: estimated total military
standard of 1993, to SNA-2008. This has meant that expenditure as % of GDP
published GDP data has been frequently amended.
6
The new methodology also captures some economic
activities previously excluded from the records, 5 4.84
4.46
which has resulted in a decline in the share of GDP 4.07 4.17
3.81
allocated to defence, as shown in Table 8. According 4 3.64
to previously published data, Russian military expen-
% of GDP
3
diture peaked in 2015 at the high level of 5.5% of GDP.
But, according to the new data, the share was actu- 2
ally closer to 4.84% of GDP, falling to 4.46% in 2016
1
(excluding debt repayment) and 4.17% in 2017. This is
still a relatively high level by international standards 0
(for example, the United States spent 3.1% of GDP in 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
2017) but not as exceptional as it earlier appeared.
no longer increasing, a trend that is likely to continue analysts claim that it will be 17trn roubles (US$270bn);
into the future. In August 2017, President Vladimir this is less than the GPV 2011–20 allocation of 20trn
Putin stated firmly that military spending would fall roubles (US$318bn), but is for eight years instead of
in 2018, and a month later the ministry of finance’s the previous programme’s ten years. If confirmed,
draft federal budget for 2018–20 gave 2018 spending this will be a compromise that lands between the
on ‘national defence’ as 2.772trn roubles (US$43.1bn), 12trn roubles (US$191bn) considered affordable by
100bn roubles (US$1.6bn) less than expected spending the finance ministry and the 24trn roubles (US$381bn)
in 2017 and only 2.83% of GDP. According to the draft requested by the defence ministry.
budget, ‘national defence’ spending will thereafter Nonetheless, some features of the programme are
be held at a fairly constant rate and by 2020 will be already clear. There is likely to be more emphasis
only 2.6% of GDP. This would bring the total share on research and development; the defence ministry
of military spending to approximately 3.5% of GDP, is now taking seriously the need to strengthen its
Russia and Eurasia

bringing Russia more in line with the US. own research capability as the old Soviet-era stock
Since 2015, the defence ministry has been striving of knowledge is exhausted. In addition, some new
to optimise its spending under a programme military technologies will be prioritised, in particular
known as ‘Effective Army’. This covers many areas, robotics and unmanned vehicles, including those for
including the better use of information technology, use underwater. The ministry’s Main Research and
a reorganisation of logistics and reform of infra- Testing Centre for Robot Technology, established
structure construction. Substantial savings have following a November 2012 decision, is now seen
been claimed, amounting to almost 37bn roubles as a versatile unit that is undertaking a wide range
(US$600m) in 2016. According to Tatyana Shevtsova, of applied research on military robotics within the
deputy defence minister for economic matters, when framework of the ‘Robotizatsiya-2025’ programme.
fully implemented the programme should provide Considerable progress is being made on the develop-
annual savings of up to 47bn roubles (US$700m). If ment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) intended
so, this will, to some degree, offset the more straitened for the reconnaissance role, with much practical
defence-budget funding that is likely during the next experience gained from the intensive application of
few years. At the same time, a rigorous inter-agency such systems under combat conditions in Syria. The
system has been introduced to monitor all procure- defence ministry claims to now have at least 2,000
ment spending under the state defence order. This UAVs in its inventory. However, Russia still possesses
permits the defence ministry to intervene directly if no armed UAVs, although development work on
there is any evidence that funds are being diverted to medium and heavy systems has been under way for
other uses. Furthermore, it is claimed that corruption some time, with new propulsion units also under
in defence procurement, formerly a serious problem, development. This is likely to be a priority feature of
has been greatly reduced. There is little doubt that GPV 2018–27.
cost efficiency has improved in recent years, allowing The funding of GPV 2011–20 initially prioritised
the better use of budget funding. It is likely that the the navy but was amended over the course of its
Syria campaign has been partly funded from such implementation. The new programme will place a
savings, as well as, it has been claimed by defence- higher priority on equipping the ground forces, which
ministry representatives, by the diversion of some have been comparatively starved of new equipment
funding from military exercises and investment. in recent years, partly because of delays and the high
costs associated with the development of the new
State Armament Programme Armata, Kurganets and Bumerang armoured platforms.
As noted in The Military Balance 2017 (p. 193), in The army is now scheduled to receive a total of 100
early 2015 it became clear that the follow-on State T-14 Armata main battle tanks in the years 2019 and
Armament Programme (GPV) up to 2025 would be 2020 and then an as-yet-unknown quantity of these
delayed. It was due to have started in 2016 but will tanks by 2025. The rate of renewal of the Aerospace
now cover the years 2018–27. It was expected that the Forces’ equipment looks set to slow, although
new GPV would be signed off by the president by the the fifth-generation Su-57 combat aircraft should
end of 2017 so that it could become operational from enter ‘service’ in small numbers from 2019 until its
the beginning of 2018. While total funding under the new upgraded engine is finally available. Russia’s
new programme has not been confirmed officially, strategic nuclear forces will continue to be a high
Table 9 Russian procurement of new weapons order to maintain their levels of output and employ-
2011–16 and goals of the State Armament ment rates. For many, this has echoes of the ‘conver-
Programme 2011–20 (approximate) sion’ policy pursued by Moscow with limited success
Total Total to in the late 1980s and early 1990s. But this time it
2011–16 2020
is being underlined from the outset that defence
Intercontinental ballistic missiles 91 400+
Submarine-launched ballistic missiles c.113 100+
companies are expected to manufacture high-tech-
Military satellites c.60 c.850 nology civil and dual-use goods for domestic and
Fixed-wing aircraft 415 1,150 export markets, not simply consumer items and other
Helicopters c.700 c.330
Including combat c.170 4,000+
less demanding items. Targets have been issued for
Unmanned aerial vehicles c.860 56 an increased share of civil-goods output. Indeed,
S-400 air-defence systems (divisions) 21 8 following on from a 16.8% share of total output
Strategic nuclear submarines 4 7
Multi-role nuclear submarines 1 6–10
accounted for by civil goods in 2016, this is forecast
Diesel-electric submarines 5 50 to increase to 18.2% by 2020, and then rise to 30%
Large surface-combat shipsa 18 2,300+ by 2025 and 50% by 2030. Equipment for the energy
Main battle tanks (new) 0b 10
Iskander missile systemsc 8
sector, machine tools and other advanced production
a. Mainly corvettes, frigates and small artillery ships.
technology, medical equipment and civil electronic
b. Excluding a batch of T-14 Armata main battle tanks in trial use. Note goods will be prioritised. Meanwhile, funding at low
that the army has received many modernised T-72B3 tanks.
c. Brigades.
rates of interest will be made available through the
Fund for Industrial Development, which launched
the ‘Konversiya’ programme in June 2017.
priority, with the acquisition of new Sarmat heavy Structural changes continue in the defence
multi-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles now industry. The Rostec corporation, headed by Sergei
scheduled from 2019 and possibly also the Barguzin Chemezov, which includes 700 enterprises grouped
rail-mounted-missile system. into 15 holding companies employing more than
Meanwhile, GPV 2011–20 remains in force and the 450,000 people, has begun to implement a policy of
armed forces continue to receive significant quantities partly privatising its assets. A pioneer in this move is
of new weapons, although progress has been uneven Concern Kalashnikov, which is based in the Izhevsk
when comparing the introduction of different equip- machine-building works and is the country’s largest
ment types (see Table 9). However, the programme’s producer of small arms. This firm is now diver
main success indicator – the share of modern weapons sifying into other fields, including shipbuilding and
in the inventories of combat-ready equipment which the development and manufacture of UAVs (under
is in active use – is being met ahead of schedule. The the Zala brand). Kalashnikov is now 49% privately
original equipment-modernisation goal was to have owned and is undergoing rapid growth with a
a proportion of 30% modern equipment in the inven- widening range of civil as well as military business
tory by the end of 2015; instead, a level of 47% has activities.
been claimed by officials. The target for the end of
2017 was 62%, while it appeared that the original goal Arms exports
to have a 70% proportion of modern equipment by Two of the most important recent Russian arms deals
2020 could even be achieved by the end of 2018. are now being realised: the delivery to China of 24
Su-35 combat aircraft, the first four of which were
Defence industry transferred in December 2016, and four divisions
In 2016, defence-industrial output grew more moder- of S-400 air-defence systems. The S-400 will also be
ately, at a level of 10.7%, compared to 13% growth purchased by India, while Turkey and Russia reached
in 2015 and 15.5% in 2014. This reflected a slower agreement on a sale in November 2017. In late 2017,
rate of growth in the annual state defence order. As Indonesia and Russia were concluding the acquisi-
a result, the defence industry’s equipment output tion of 11 Su-35s.
only increased by 9.5% in 2016, compared to approxi According to the Federal Service for Military-
mately 20% in the two preceding years. This trend Technical Cooperation, the total volume of arma-
looked set to continue in 2017 and beyond. ments and military-services exports in 2016 was
As President Putin has been warning, defence- more than 914trn roubles (US$15bn) (compared with
industrial firms will have to begin diversifying in 884trn roubles (US$14.5bn) in 2015); the total was
expected to be the same in 2017. Fixed-wing aircraft 4. Establish a unified logistics- and medical-
and helicopters accounted for half of total Russian support structure that is capable of
exports, whilst ground-forces equipment accounted providing support to all components of the
for 30%. It is now expected that air-defence systems nation’s military organisation.
(with a current share of 20%) will account for an 5. Establish professional armed forces with
increasing percentage of all exports, helped by the fact contract-service personnel, and to create a
that the producer, Almaz-Antey, has introduced new reserve system.
production capacities. The use of Russian weaponry
in Syria has also undoubtedly boosted international These are each overseen by specific subcommit-
interest in Russian equipment, and this is beginning tees set up under the defence ministry’s Reform
to influence the scale and pattern of new arms orders. Committee. Civilian activists and non-governmental
According to Deputy Defence Minister Borisov, more advisory and expert groups are heavily involved in
Russia and Eurasia

than 600 different models of military hardware have the committee, and this is seen as one of the ways
been tested in Syria under combat conditions. in which Ukraine puts into practice the concept
of civilian control of the armed forces. Within the
UKRAINE: MILITARY REFORM ministry, the main thrust of reform has been to reduce
the size of the administrative apparatus, reduce the
Military reform continues in Ukraine, amid ongoing number of departments (through a process of consol-
fighting in the east of the country and deployments idation), improve the delegation of authority from
by Russian forces close to the Russian–Ukrainian the minister to deputies and department heads, and
border. The security challenge from Russia has, in increase procurement transparency through the
large measure, dictated the course of these reforms. ProZorro system.
They have led to the establishment of new military
units, improved combat capabilities for existing units Armed-forces reform
and development of the reserve system. Reform of the armed forces has centred on improving
At the same time, Ukraine is aiming to make its command and control, and reorganising and stand
armed forces interoperable with those of NATO ardising unit establishments. A priority in devel-
member states, as outlined in its 2015 military oping command and control has been to restructure
doctrine (see The Military Balance 2017, p. 196) and the Joint Operational Headquarters as an agency for
develop them to Western standards. This goal has inter-service and interdepartmental coordination
guided a key element of Ukraine’s military reform: during joint operations. At the same time, the general
the implementation of processes aimed at stand staff has also been restructured in accordance with
ardising with NATO structures, from the command- NATO standards, with departments established and
and-control system and civilian control of the armed reorganised into a Western-style J-structure (where
forces, to military medicine and tactical protocols. J-1 is the personnel function, J-2 is intelligence, J-5 is
Those units that have been trained with the help of policy and plans, etc.).
Western instructors, or are intended to participate in With regard to the armed forces’ organisational
international peacekeeping missions, have been most structure, reform efforts have been driven by the
affected by these processes. Overall, the principal requirement to increase the proportion of combat
priorities of Ukraine’s defence planning are to: personnel within overall establishment strength;
reinforce reconnaissance capabilities and firepower,
1. Establish a joint command level, in accord in the form of artillery (primarily anti-tank); and
ance with NATO standards. increase the autonomy of land-forces brigades.
2. Establish a system for planning and resource The newly established Special Operations Forces
management, again in accordance with have been further developed within the frame-
NATO standards. work of these reforms, with the 3rd and 8th Special
3. Construct a national military organisation Purpose Regiments and special-operations centres at
capable of providing guaranteed defence their core. More broadly, the influence of NATO and
against aggression and defence of the its member states on the reform process is illustrated
nation, and maintaining peace and interna- by Ukraine’s special-operations forces, particularly
tional security. the number of psychological- and information-
operations centres that have been established within of trained reservists and a rapid mobilisation system
them. are required.
Meanwhile, Ukraine’s Airborne Forces (VDV) The operational reserve (OR) is the most combat-
have been moved from the land forces and are now a capable component of the reserve system in Ukraine.
separate service arm in the military’s strategic reserve. It is subdivided into Stage One (OR-1) and Stage
This stemmed from two factors: the relative weak- Two (OR-2). OR-1 includes former service personnel
ness of Ukraine’s airlift capability, and the nature of who were mainly mobilised during the six waves of
military operations in the Donbas region. In opera- partial mobilisation and discharged after one year
tional terms, the VDV serves as a rapid-reaction unit of service. Many of these reservists have combat
designed to contain crises on the front line. It consists experience through their involvement in operations
of mobile land-force brigades, including tank units, in the Donbas region. OR-1 reservists are assigned
and in function these are closer to US Stryker brigades to specific military units (mostly those in which they
than they are to Russian VDV airborne formations. previously served) and on mobilisation they are used
In addition to the four pre-war brigades, three more to bring sub-units up to wartime strength, as attri-
VDV brigades are being formed. Overall, the large tion replacements or to create new sub-units. There
number of VDV units reflects the role assigned to are more than 100,000 OR-1 reservists in total, with
them by the Ukrainian military leadership in its oper- this number seen as sufficient to bring the armed
ational and strategic planning. forces up to wartime strength. To maintain their
professional skills, Ukraine’s general staff and its
Personnel reform subordinate structures periodically call up the OR-1
Despite the establishment of new units, the total category of reservists for exercises at brigade bases
strength of the armed forces has remained rela- and training centres.
tively constant at around 204,000 military personnel OR-2 mainly consists of those liable for mili-
and 46,000 civilians, which has led to shortages in tary service who are physically fit but have not yet
some units. The problem of undermanning has been served. This category of reservists can be used both
made worse by the decision not to proceed with the to establish new units in the regular army, primarily
seventh wave of partial mobilisation as demobilis the brigades of the 4th Reserve Corps, and to form
ation from the previous six waves was completed, Territorial Defence units, including rifle battalions,
combined with the rather modest pace at which the Territorial Defence detachments and conscription-
army is being staffed with contract-service personnel. centre guard companies. The Territorial Defence units
Because of the shortage of junior officers (at platoon- comprise more than 400,000 personnel. However,
commander and company-commander level), officer because OR-2 reservists are liable only for partial
reservists – graduates of military-training schemes mobilisation, and since conscription centres have
in civilian higher-education establishments (akin to found it difficult to find the required numbers liable
Western Officer Training Corps) – were called up for for service, the general staff’s targets for mobilised
18-month terms. personnel have been consistently missed. As a result,
This model of personnel development was chosen many notional OR-2 reservists may not be available
in the expectation that units would be brought up to or even exist. A new electronic register of those liable
establishment strength with reservists. For instance, it for military service, set up in 2017, is expected to alle-
is envisaged that the 4th Reserve Corps – with cadre viate this situation, while cross-referencing with other
brigades – would be brought up to establishment government databases should improve the effective-
strength with the announcement of mobilisation. ness of measures designed to tackle the evasion of
However, for this system to work effectively, a pool military service.
MANOEUVRE
Armenia ARM Mechanised
1 (1st) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2 MR regt, 1 maint bn)
Armenian Dram d 2016 2017 2018
1 (2nd) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2 MR regt, 1 lt inf regt,
GDP d 5.08tr 5.39tr 1 arty bn)
US$ 10.6bn 11.0bn 1 (3rd) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 4 MR regt, 1 lt inf regt,
per capita US$ 3,533 3,690 1 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 maint bn)
Growth % 0.2 3.5 1 (4th) corps (4 MR regt; 1 SP arty bn; 1 sigs bn)
Inflation % -1.4 1.9 1 (5th) corps (with 2 fortified areas) (1 MR regt)
Def bdgt [a] d 207bn 210bn Other
1 indep MR trg bde
US$ 431m 429m
COMBAT SUPPORT
FMA (US) US$ 1.4m 1m 0m
1 arty bde
US$1=d 480.49 488.80 1 MRL bde
[a] Includes imported military equipment, excludes military
Russia and Eurasia

1 AT regt
pensions
1 AD bde
Population 3,045,191 2 AD regt
2 (radiotech) AD regt
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 1 engr regt
Male 10.0% 3.1% 3.5% 4.4% 22.7% 4.5% EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Female 8.8% 2.7% 3.4% 4.5% 25.0% 6.8% ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 109: 3 T-54; 5 T-55; 101 T-72
Capabilities RECCE 12 BRM-1K (CP)
The armed forces’ main focus is territorial defence, given IFV 86: 75 BMP-1; 6 BMP-1K (CP); 5 BMP-2
continuing tensions with neighbouring Azerbaijan over APC • APC (W) 130: 8 BTR-60; 100 BTR-60 look-a-like;
Nagorno-Karabakh. Overall military doctrine remains 18 BTR-70; 4 BTR-80
influenced strongly by Russian thinking, but overseas ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
deployments, including to Afghanistan, Kosovo and AEV MT-LB
Lebanon, have enabled personnel to learn from interna- ARV BREhM-D; BREM-1
tional counterparts. The country aims to develop its peace- ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
keeping contingent into one brigade operating to NATO MSL • SP 22: 9 9P148 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 13 9P149
standards. Armenia is engaged in a NATO Individual Shturm (AT-6 Spiral)
Partnership Action Plan. Armenia is also a CSTO member ARTILLERY 232
and defence ties with Russia continue on a broad range SP 38: 122mm 10 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 28 2S3 Akatsiya
of issues. In July 2017, Moscow ratified the concept for a TOWED 131: 122mm 69 D-30; 152mm 62: 26 2A36
Joint Group of Forces with Armenia, signed in December Giatsint-B; 2 D-1; 34 D-20
2016. This grouping is intended to maintain security in MRL 51: 122mm 47 BM-21 Grad; 273mm 4 WM-80
the Caucasus. Conscription continues, but there is also MOR 120mm 12 M120
a growing cohort of professional officers. Equipment is SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
mainly of Russian origin, and agreements were reached
SRBM • Conventional 16: 8 9K72 Elbrus (SS-1C Scud B);
in recent years to purchase modern Russian systems.
4 9K79 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab); 4 9K720 Iskander-E
Serviceability and maintenance of mainly ageing aircraft
RADAR • LAND 6 SNAR-10
have been a problem for the air force. In June 2016, Armenia
ratified a joint air-defence system with Russia.
ISR • Light 15 Krunk
ACTIVE 44,800 (Army 41,850 Air/AD Aviation AIR DEFENCE
Forces (Joint) 1,100 other Air Defence Forces 1,850) SAM
Paramilitary 4,300 Medium-range 2K11 Krug (SA-4 Ganef); S-75 Dvina
Conscript liability 24 months (SA-2 Guideline)
Short-range 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful); S-125 Pechora
RESERVE (SA-3 Goa)
Some mobilisation reported, possibly 210,000 with military Point-defence 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); 9K310 Igla-1
service within 15 years (SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse); 9K333 Verba;
9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE GUNS
SP 23mm ZSU-23-4
Army 22,900; 18,950 conscripts (total 41,850) TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES Air and Air Defence Aviation Forces 1,100
1 SF bde 1 Air & AD Joint Command
FORCES BY ROLE Bosnia-Herzegovina OSCE 1

GROUND ATTACK Germany OSCE 1
1 sqn with Su-25/Su-25UBK Frogfoot Moldova OSCE 2
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Poland OSCE 1
AIRCRAFT 15 combat capable Russia 3,300: 1 mil base with (1 MR bde; 74 T-72; 80 BMP-
ATK 15: 13 Su-25 Frogfoot; 2 Su-25UBK Frogfoot 1; 80 BMP-2; 12 2S1; 12 BM-21); 1 ftr sqn with 18 MiG-29
TPT 4: Heavy 3 Il-76 Candid; PAX 1 A319CJ Fulcrum; 1 hel sqn with 8 Mi-24P Hind; 4 Mi-8MT Hip; 2
TRG 14: 4 L-39 Albatros; 10 Yak-52 SAM bty with S-300V (SA-12 Gladiator/Giant); 1 SAM bty
HELICOPTERS with 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful)
ATK 7 Mi-24P Hind United Kingdom OSCE 1
ISR 4: 2 Mi-24K Hind; 2 Mi-24R Hind (cbt spt)
MRH 10 Mi-8MT (cbt spt)
C2 2 Mi-9 Hip G (cbt spt) Azerbaijan AZE
TPT • Light 7 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite Azerbaijani New Manat m 2016 2017 2018
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Long-range S-300 (SA-10
GDP m 60.0bn 66.7bn
Grumble); S-300PM (SA-20 Gargoyle)
US$ 37.6bn 39.2bn
Paramilitary 4,300 per capita US$ 3,956.00 4,098
Growth % -3.1 -1.04
Police Inflation % 12.4 12
FORCES BY ROLE Def bdgt [a] m 2.23bn 2.64bn
MANOEUVRE
US$ 1.40bn 1.55bn
Other
4 paramilitary bn
US$1=m 1.60 1.70
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES [a] Official defence budget. Excludes a significant proportion of
procurement outlays
RECCE 5 BRM-1K (CP)
IFV 45: 44 BMP-1; 1 BMP-1K (CP) Population 9,961,396
APC • APC (W) 24 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-152
ABCV 5 BMD-1 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 12.2% 3.5% 4.3% 4.9% 21.9% 2.5%
Border Troops Female 10.7% 3.1% 3.9% 4.7% 23.8% 4.1%
Ministry of National Security
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Capabilities
The principal focus for Azerbaijan’s armed forces is
RECCE 3 BRM-1K (CP)
territorial defence, in light of continuing tensions with
IFV 35 BMP-1
neighbouring Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. The
APC • APC (W) 23: 5 BTR-60; 18 BTR-70
armed forces rely on conscription, and readiness within the
ABCV 5 BMD-1
services varies between units. The air force also suffers from
training and maintenance problems, and the armed forces
DEPLOYMENT cannot organically support external deployments. While
forces have yet to fully transition from a Soviet-era model,
AFGHANISTAN
NATO • Operation Resolute Support 121 oil revenues have in the recent past allowed an increase
in defence expenditure. A number of combat-readiness
ALBANIA exercises were held in 2017. Azerbaijan maintains a defence
OSCE • Albania 1
relationship with NATO and in 2016 the country was in
LEBANON the fourth cycle of its NATO Individual Partnership Action
UN • UNIFIL 33 Plan. Azerbaijan is looking to deepen ties with Belarus,
MALI Serbia, the UK and the US through military-cooperation
UN • MINUSMA 1 agreements. Peacekeeping deployments have included a
SERBIA small number of personnel in Afghanistan, as part of the
NATO • KFOR 35 NATO-led Resolute Support mission.
UKRAINE ACTIVE 66,950 (Army 56,850 Navy 2,200 Air 7,900)
OSCE • Ukraine 2 Paramilitary 15,000
Conscript liability 18 months (12 for graduates)
FOREIGN FORCES RESERVE 300,000
OSCE figures represent total Minsk Conference mission Some mobilisation reported; 300,000 with military service
personnel in both Armenia and Azerbaijan within 15 years
AIR DEFENCE • SAM

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Medium-range 2K11 Krug (SA-4 Ganef)
Point-defence 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); 9K35 Strela-10
Army 56,850 (SA-13 Gopher); 9K32 Strela (SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K34 Strela-3
FORCES BY ROLE (SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet); 9K338 Igla-S
COMMAND (SA-24 Grinch)
5 corps HQ
MANOEUVRE Navy 2,200 
Mechanised EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
4 MR bde PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11
Light CORVETTES • FS 1 Kusar (ex-FSU Petya II) with 2 RBU
19 MR bde 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm gun
Other PSO 1 Luga (Wodnik 2) (FSU Project 888; additional trg
1 sy bde role)
COMBAT SUPPORT PCC 3: 2 Petrushka (FSU UK-3; additional trg role); 1
Russia and Eurasia

1 arty bde Shelon (ex-FSU Project 1388M)
1 arty trg bde PB 3: 1 Araz (ex-TUR AB 25); 1 Bryza (ex-FSU Project 722);
1 MRL bde 1 Poluchat (ex-FSU Project 368)
1 AT bde PBF 3 Stenka
1 engr bde MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4
1 sigs bde MHC 4: 2 Korund (Yevgenya) (Project 1258); 2 Yakhont
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (FSU Sonya)
1 log bde AMPHIBIOUS 6
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LSM 3: 1 Polnochny A (FSU Project 770) (capacity 6 MBT;
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 180 troops); 2 Polnochny B (FSU Project 771) (capacity 6
MBT 439: 95 T-55; 244 T-72; 100 T-90S MBT; 180 troops)
RECCE 15 BRM-1 LCU 1 Vydra† (FSU) (capacity either 3 AMX-30 MBT or
IFV 181: 43 BMP-1; 33 BMP-2; 88 BMP-3; 7 BTR-80A; 10+ 200 troops)
BTR-82A LCM 2 T-4 (FSU)
APC 568 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGS 1 (FSU Project 10470)
APC (T) 336 MT-LB
APC (W) 142: 10 BTR-60; 132 BTR-70 Air Force and Air Defence 7,900 
PPV 90: 45 Marauder; 45 Matador FORCES BY ROLE
ABCV 20 BMD-1 FIGHTER
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES 1 sqn with MiG-29 Fulcrum; MiG-29UB Fulcrum
AEV MT-LB FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
MW Bozena 1 regt with Su-24 Fencer; Su-25 Frogfoot; Su-25UB Frog-
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE foot B
SP 10 9P157-2 Khrizantema-S (AT-15 Springer) TRANSPORT
MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 1 sqn with An-12 Cub; Yak-40 Codling
Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); TRAINING
9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn); Spike-LR 1 sqn with L-39 Albatros
ARTILLERY 575 ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
SP 87: 122mm 46 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 24: 6 2S3 Akatsiya; 1 regt with Ka-32 Helix C; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-24 Hind; PZL
18 2S19 Msta-S; 155mm 5 ATMOS 2000; 203mm 12 2S7 Mi-2 Hoplite
Pion EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
TOWED 207: 122mm 129 D-30; 130mm 36 M-46; 152mm AIRCRAFT 37 combat capable
42: 18 2A36 Giatsint-B; 24 D-20 FTR 16 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 2 MiG-29UB Fulcrum
GUN/MOR 120mm 36: 18 2S9 NONA-S; 18 2S31 Vena ATK 21: 2 Su-24 Fencer†; 16 Su-25 Frogfoot; 3 Su-25UB
MRL 133+: 122mm 52+: 43 BM-21 Grad; 9+ IMI Lynx; Frogfoot B
128mm 12 RAK-12; 220mm 18 TOS-1A; 300mm 30 9A52 TPT 4: Medium 1 An-12 Cub; Light 3 Yak-40 Codling
Smerch; 302mm 21 T-300 Kasirga TRG 12 L-39 Albatros
MOR 120mm 112: 5 Cardom; 107 M-1938 (PM-38) HELICOPTERS
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS ATK 26 Mi-24 Hind
SRBM • Conventional ε4 9M79 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab) MRH: 20+ Mi-17-IV Hip
RADAR • LAND SNAR-1 Long Trough/SNAR-2/-6 Pork TPT 23: Medium 16: 3 Ka-32 Helix C; 13 Mi-8 Hip Light
Trough (arty); Small Fred/Small Yawn/SNAR-10 Big Fred 7 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite
(veh, arty); GS-13 Long Eye (veh) UAV • ISR 5: Heavy 1 Heron; Medium 4 Aerostar
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AIR DEFENCE • SAM
ISR • Medium 3 Aerostar Long-range S-200 Vega (SA-5 Gammon); S-300PM/PMU2
Medium-range S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline); 9K37M

Buk-M1 (SA-11 Gadfly); Buk-MB; S-125-2TM Pechora-2TM
(SA-26) DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL
Short-range Abisr Data presented here represents an assessment of the de
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 facto situation. Nagorno-Karabakh was part of Azerbaijan,
Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer) IR/SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo) but mostly populated by ethnic Armenians. In 1988, when
inter-ethnic clashes between Armenians and Azeris erupted
Paramilitary ε15,000 in Azerbaijan, the local authorities declared their intention
to secede and join Armenia. Baku rejected this and armed
State Border Service ε5,000 conflict erupted. A ceasefire was brokered in 1994; since
Ministry of Internal Affairs then, Armenia has controlled most of Nagorno-Karabakh.
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE While Armenia provides political, economic and military
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES support to Nagorno-Karabakh, the region has declared
IFV 168 BMP-1/BMP-2 itself independent – although this has not been recognised
APC • APC (W) 19 BTR-60/70/80 by any other state, including Armenia. Azerbaijan claims,
ARTILLERY • MRL 122mm 3 T-122 and the rest of the international community generally
HELICOPTERS • ATK 24 Mi-35M Hind regards, Nagorno-Karabakh and the occupied territories as
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICULES part of Azerbaijan.
ISR • Medium Hermes 900
Nagorno-Karabakh
Coast Guard Available estimates vary with reference to military holdings
The Coast Guard was established in 2005 as part of the in Nagorno-Karabakh. Main battle tanks are usually placed
State Border Service at around 200–300 in number, with similar numbers for
other armoured combat vehicles and artillery pieces, and
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
small numbers of helicopters. Overall personnel-strength
estimates are between 18,000 and 20,000. Some of the
PCG 3 Sa’ar 62 with 1 8-cell lnchr with Spike NLOS
equipment listed may belong to Armenian forces.
SSM, 1 hel landing platform
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PBF 9: 1 Osa II (FSU Project 205); 6 Shaldag V; 2
Silver Ships 48ft
MBT T-72
PB 4: 2 Baltic 150; 1 Point (US); 1 Grif (FSU Zhuk)
RECCE BRDM-2
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • ARS 1 Iva (FSU Vikhr)
IFV BMP-1; BMP-2
Internal Troops 10,000+
MSL
Ministry of Internal Affairs
SP 9P148 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9P149 Shturm (AT-6
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Spiral)
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MANPATS 9K111-1 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel)
APC • APC (W) 7 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-80 RCL 73mm SPG-9
ARTILLERY 232
DEPLOYMENT SP 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 2S3 Akatsiya
TOWED 122mm D-30; 152mm 2A36 Giatsint-B; D-20
AFGHANISTAN MRL 122mm BM-21 Grad; 273mm WM-80
NATO • Operation Resolute Support 94 MOR 120mm M-74/M-75
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA SRBM • Conventional 9K72 Elbrus (SS-1C Scud B)
OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 1 HELICOPTERS
UKRAINE ATK 5 Mi-24 Hind
MRH 5 Mi-8MT Hip
OSCE • Ukraine 1
AIR DEFENCE
SAM
FOREIGN FORCES Medium-range 2K11 Krug (SA-4 Ganef); S-75 Dvina
OSCE figures represent total Minsk Conference mission (SA-2 Guideline)
personnel in both Armenia and Azerbaijan  Short-range 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful); S-125 Pechora
(SA-3 Goa)
Bosnia-Herzegovina OSCE 1
Point-defence 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); 9K310 Igla-1
Germany OSCE 1
(SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse)
Moldova OSCE 2 GUNS
Poland OSCE 1 SP 23mm ZSU-23-4
United Kingdom OSCE 1 TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2
Belarus BLR ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Belarusian Ruble r 2016 2017 2018 Army 16,500
GDP r 94.3bn 103bn FORCES BY ROLE
per capita US$ 4,989 5,585 2 comd HQ (West & North West)
Growth % -2.6 0.7 MANOEUVRE
Inflation % 11.8 8.0 Mechanised
2 mech bde
Def bdgt r 1.01bn 1.03bn
2 mech bde(-)
US$ 506m 528m COMBAT SUPPORT
US$1=r 1.99 1.94 4 arty bde
Population 9,549,747 3 engr bde
1 engr regt
Russia and Eurasia

Female 7.6% 2.3% 2.7% 3.7% 26.9% 10.2% MBT 532: 527 T-72; 5 T-72B3
RECCE 132 BRM-1
Capabilities IFV 932 BMP-2
APC • APC (T) 58 MT-LB
Maintaining territorial integrity is the fundamental task of AUV 5 CS/VN3B mod
the Belarusian armed forces. A new military doctrine was ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
approved in July 2016; this identified security challenges AEV MT-LB
including from ‘hybrid methods’ as well as ‘colour revolu- VLB 24: 20 MTU-20; 4 MT-55A
tions’. The defence authorities aim to have smaller, more ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL
mobile forces with improved counter-terrorism capabilities, SP 160: 75 9P148 Konkurs; 85 9P149 Shturm
driven by a need for increased territorial-defence capabil- MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs
ity. Personnel reductions are being implemented as part of (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn)
the country’s revised defence policy. Russia is the country’s ARTILLERY 583
principal defence partner, though Minsk has also looked SP 333: 122mm 125 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 208: 125 2S3
to improve defence cooperation with China and Turkey. Akatsiya; 71 2S5; 12 2S19 Msta-S
While Moscow would like to establish an air base in Belarus, TOWED 152mm 72 2A65 Msta-B
there has been little real progress in this area. Russia does, MRL 164: 122mm 128 BM-21 Grad; 220mm 36 9P140
however, deploy combat airpower to Baranovichi air Uragan
base. Most multinational training is carried out within the MOR 120mm 14 2S12
context of the CSTO. The scenario for the September 2017 RADAR • LAND GS-13 Long Eye/SNAR-1 Long Trough/
Zapad exercise was of a Russian intervention to support SNAR-2/-6 Pork Trough (arty); some Small Fred/Small Yawn/
Belarusian action against external state-sponsored mili- SNAR-10 Big Fred (veh, arty)
AIR DEFENCE
tants. The training and equipment of the territorial-defence
SAM Point-defence 2K22 Tunguska (SA-19 Grison)
troops have improved, with the aim of operating in coop-
GUNS • SP 23mm ZU-23-2 (tch)
eration with regular forces. Minsk received the final of
four second-hand S-300PS SAM systems from Russia in
mid-2016, and ordered a fifth battery of the 9K332 Tor-M2E
Air Force and Air Defence Forces 15,000
SAM system. Belarus plans to replace its Soviet-era MiG-29 Flying hours 15 hrs/yr
Fulcrum combat aircraft; a contract for Russian Su-30SMs FORCES BY ROLE
was signed in June 2017. Military pay remains low. Belarus FIGHTER
has an indigenous defence industry, manufacturing, among 2 sqn with MiG-29/S/UB Fulcrum
others, vehicles, guided weapons and electronic-warfare GROUND ATTACK
systems, while the sector also undertakes upgrades for 2 sqn with Su-25K/UBK Frogfoot A/B
foreign customers. Minsk aims to increase combat readi- TRANSPORT
ness, including through so-called readiness ‘control checks’. 1 base with An-12 Cub; An-24 Coke; An-26 Curl; Il-76
Candid; Tu-134 Crusty
ACTIVE 45,350 (Army 10,700 Air 11,750 Special TRAINING
Operations Forces 5,900 Joint 17,000) Paramilitary Some sqn with L-39 Albatros
110,000 ATTACK HELICOPTER
Conscript liability 18 months (alternative service option) Some sqn with Mi-24 Hind
RESERVE 289,500 (Joint 289,500 with mil service Some (cbt spt) sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-8MTV-5 Hip; Mi-
within last 5 years) 26 Halo
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Joint 10,500 (Centrally controlled units and

AIRCRAFT 64 combat capable MoD staff )
FTR 34: 28 MiG-29 Fulcrum/MiG-29S Fulcrum C; 6 MiG- FORCES BY ROLE
29UB Fulcrum B SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE
FGA (21 Su-27/UB Flanker B/C non-operational/stored) 2 SRBM bde
ATK 22 Su-25K/UBK Frogfoot A/B COMBAT SUPPORT
TPT 8: Heavy 2 Il-76 Candid (+9 civ Il-76 available for 1 arty gp
mil use); Light 6: 1 An-24 Coke; 4 An-26 Curl; 1 Tu-134 1 MRL bde
Crusty 2 engr bde
1 EW unit
TRG 8+: Some L-39 Albatros; 8 Yak-130 Mitten*
1 NBC regt
HELICOPTERS
1 ptn bridging regt
ATK 12 Mi-24 Hind 2 sigs bde
TPT 26: Heavy 6 Mi-26 Halo; Medium 20: 8 Mi-8 Hip; 12
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Mi-8MTV-5 Hip ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES APC • APC (T) 20 MT-LB
AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer) ARTILLERY 196
SARH R-27R (AA-10 Alamo A) SP 152mm 70 2S5 Giatsint-S
ASM Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen); Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge) TOWED 152mm 90 2A65 Msta-B
ARM Kh-58 (AS-11 Kilter) (likely WFU) MRL 300mm 40: 36 9A52 Smerch; 4 Polonez
Air Defence SRBM • Conventional 96: 36 9M79 Tochka (SS-21
AD data from Uzal Baranovichi EW radar Scarab); 60 Elbrus (SS-1C Scud B)
FORCES BY ROLE Paramilitary 110,000

AIR DEFENCE
1 bde S-300PS (SA-10B Grumble) State Border Troops 12,000
1 bde with S-300V(SA-12A Gladiator/SA-12B Giant) Ministry of Interior
1 bde with 9K37 Buk (SA-11 Gadfly)
1 bde with 9K37 Buk (SA-11 Gadfly); 9K332 Tor-M2E Militia 87,000
(SA-15 Gauntlet) Ministry of Interior
1 bde with 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko) Internal Troops 11,000
1 bde with 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); 9K332 Tor-M2E
(SA-15 Gauntlet)
DEPLOYMENT
3 regt with S-300PS (SA-10B Grumble)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LEBANON
AIR DEFENCE • SAM UN • UNIFIL 5
Long-range S-300PS (SA-10B Grumble); S-300V (SA- UKRAINE
12A Gladiator/SA-12B Giant) OSCE • Ukraine 1
Medium-range 9K37 Buk (SA-11 Gadfly)
Short-range 17 9K332 Tor-M2E (SA-15 Gauntlet)
Point-defence 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); 9K35 Strela-10
Georgia GEO
(SA-13 Gopher) Georgian Lari 2016 2017 2018
GDP lari 33.9bn 37.4bn
Special Operations Command 6,000 US$ 14.3bn 15.2bn
SPECIAL FORCES Growth % 2.7 4.0
1 SF bde
Inflation % 2.1 6.0
MANOEUVRE
Def bdgt lari 670m 743m
Mechanised
US$ 283m 303m
2 (mobile) mech bde
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US$1=lari 2.37 2.45
APC • APC (W) 192: 39 BTR-70; 153 BTR-80 Population 4,926,330
ARTILLERY • TOWED 122mm 24 D-30
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 9.5% 2.9% 3.4% 4.1% 21.6% 6.3%
MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs
(AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn) Female 8.6% 2.5% 3.2% 4.0% 24.2% 9.7%
GUNS • TOWED ε40: 85mm D-44; 100mm T-12

Capabilities ARTILLERY 240
Georgia’s main security preoccupations concern Russian SP 67: 122mm 20 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 46: 32 M-77
military deployments and the breakaway regions of Dana; 13 2S3 Akatsiya; 1 2S19 Msta-S; 203mm 1 2S7 Pion
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The armed forces continue to TOWED 71: 122mm 58 D-30; 152mm 13: 3 2A36
make efforts to address lessons from the war with Russia Giatsint-B; 10 2A65 Msta-B
in 2008, which revealed shortcomings, including in air MRL 122mm 37: 13 BM-21 Grad; 6 GradLAR; 18 RM-70
defence. A Strategic Defence Review 2017–20 was pub- MOR 120mm 65: 14 2S12 Sani; 33 M-75; 18 M120
lished in April 2017. This said that ‘Georgia must now be AIR DEFENCE • SAM
prepared for responding to the full spectrum of threats, Short-range Spyder-SR
Point-defence Grom; 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K35
including hybrid conflict scenarios’. The focus was on
Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher); 9K36 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin);
improving personnel structures, training facilities and
9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet)
equipment. A new white paper was also published in 2017.
At the NATO Wales Summit in 2014, a ‘Substantial NATO– Aviation and Air Defence Command 1,300
Georgia Package’ was approved to strengthen Georgian (incl 300 conscript)
Russia and Eurasia

military capability. As part of this, a NATO Joint Training 1 avn base, 1 hel air base
and Evaluation Centre was inaugurated near Tbilisi in
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
mid-2015. Although Georgia abolished conscription in
mid-2016, this was reinstated by a new defence minister in
ATK 3 Su-25KM Frogfoot (6 Su-25 Frogfoot in store)
early 2017. Long-standing security cooperation with the US
TPT • Light 9: 6 An-2 Colt; 1 Tu-134A Crusty (VIP); 2
includes the Georgia Defence Readiness Program, designed
Yak-40 Codling
to boost military capabilties. Georgia maintains its deploy-
TRG 9 L-29 Delfin
ment to NATO’s Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan
HELICOPTERS
and hosted the Noble Partner 2017 multinational exercise.
ATK 6 Mi-24 Hind
ACTIVE 20,650 (Army 19,050 National Guard 1,600) TPT 29: Medium 17 Mi-8T Hip; Light 12 Bell 205
Paramilitary 5,400 (UH-1H Iroquois)
Conscript liability 12 months UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
ISR • Medium 1+ Hermes 450
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Medium 9K37 Buk-M1 (SA-11 Gadfly) (1-2 bn)
Point 8 9K33 Osa AK (SA-8B Gecko) (two bty); 9K33
Army 15,000; 4,050 conscript (total 19,050) Osa AKM (6-10 updated SAM systems)
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES National Guard 1,600 active reservists opcon
1 SF bde Army
MANOEUVRE FORCES BY ROLE
Light MANOEUVRE
5 inf bde Light
Amphibious 1 inf bde
2 mne bn (1 cadre)
COMBAT SUPPORT Paramilitary 5,400
2 arty bde Border Police 5,400
1 engr bde
1 sigs bn Coast Guard
1 SIGINT bn HQ at Poti. The Navy was merged with the Coast
1 MP bn Guard in 2009 under the auspices of the Georgian
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT Border Police, within the Ministry of the Interior
1 med bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 21
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES PBF 6: 4 Ares 43m; 1 Kaan 33; 1 Kaan 20
MBT 123: 23 T-55; 100 T-72 PB 15: 1 Akhmeta; 2 Dauntless; 2 Dilos (ex-GRC);
RECCE 5: 1 BRM-1K; 4+ Didgori-2 1 Kutaisi (ex-TUR AB 25); 2 Point; 7 Zhuk (3 ex-
IFV 71: 25 BMP-1; 46 BMP-2 UKR) (up to 20 patrol launches also in service) 
APC 189+ AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCU 1 Vydra
APC (T) 69+: 3+ Lazika; 66 MT-LB (ex-BLG)
APC (W) 120+: 25 BTR-70; 19 BTR-80; 8+ Didgori-1; 3+
Didgori-3; 65 Ejder DEPLOYMENT
AUV 10 Cougar
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE AFGHANISTAN
MSL • MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 NATO • Operation Resolute Support 870; 1 lt inf bn
Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel) UN • UNAMA 2 obs
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CSTO and SCO membership, has been a key part of this
EU • EUTM RCA 35 recapitalisation process. Moscow operates a radar station
at Balkash. It has supplied Kazakhstan with five S-300PS
MALI
self-propelled surface-to-air-missile systems as part of
EU • EUTM Mali 1
a Joint Air-Defence Agreement, boosting long-range
SERBIA air-defence capability. In the army, air-mobile units are
OSCE • Kosovo 1 held at the highest level of readiness. Deployment is
concentrated in the country’s eastern regions, with almost
UKRAINE
all combat formations based in either Almaty or East
OSCE • Ukraine 12
Kazakhstan. Airlift is being improved, with joint ventures
and production envisaged with European companies for
TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT rotary-wing and medium-lift fixed-wing aircraft. However,
DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL airworthiness remains problematic. In 2016, in an effort to
Following the August 2008 war between Russia and improve training, Kazakhstan broadened the curriculum
Georgia, the areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia declared taught in military academies. Kazakhstan took part in the
themselves independent. Data presented here represents multinational Dushanbe Anti-Terror exercise in May 2017
the de facto situation and does not imply international and the CSTO KSOR counter-terror exercise in November.
recognition as sovereign states.
FOREIGN FORCES MoD 4,000) Paramilitary 31,500
Russia 7,000; 1 mil base at Gudauta (Abkhazia) with (1 MR Conscript liability 12 months (due to be abolished)
bde; 40 T-90A; 120 BTR-82A; 18 2S3; 12 2S12; 18 BM-21; some
S-300 SAM; some atk hel); 1 mil base at Djava/Tskhinvali (S. ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Ossetia) with (1 MR bde; 40 T-72; 120 BMP-2; 36 2S3; 12 2S12)
Army 20,000
Kazakhstan KAZ 4 regional comd: Astana, East, West and Southern
Kazakhstani Tenge t 2016 2017 2018 FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
GDP t 45.7tr 51.7tr
Armoured
US$ 134bn 156bn 1 tk bde
per capita US$ 7,456 8,585 Mechanised
Growth % 1.1 3.3 3 mech bde
Inflation % 14.6 7.3 Air Manoeuvre
Def bdgt t 388bn 412bn 4 air aslt bde 
COMBAT SUPPORT
US$ 1.13bn 1.25bn
3 arty bde
US$1=t 342.13 331.00 1 SSM unit
Population 18,556,698 3 cbt engr bde
Ethnic groups: Kazakk 63.3%; Russian 23.7%; Uzbek 2.8%; EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Ukraninan 2.1%; Tatars 1.3%; German 1.1%; other or non-specified ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
5.7% MBT 300 T-72BA
RECCE 100: 40 BRDM-2; 60 BRM-1
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
IFV 607: 500 BMP-2; 107 BTR-80A
Male 12.8% 3.2% 3.9% 4.5% 20.5% 2.6% APC 369+
Female 13.1% 3.1% 3.7% 4.4% 22.8% 4.9% APC (T) 150 MT-LB
APC (W) 209: 2 BTR-3E; 190 BTR-80; 17 Cobra
Capabilities PPV 10+ Arlan
In October 2017, Kazakhstan adopted a new military ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
doctrine, indicating a change in focus from countering AEV MT-LB
violent extremism towards a wider concern for border ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
security and hybrid threats to national security. In MSL
September, Kazakhstan entered a bilateral military SP 3+: 3 BMP-T; HMMWV with 9K111-1 Konkurs (AT-
agreement with Uzbekistan to cooperate on training and 5 Spandrel); 9P149 Shturm (MT-LB with AT-6 Spiral)
education, countering violent extremism and reducing MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1
militant flows. By regional standards, Kazakhstan’s armed Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn)
forces are both relatively sizeable and well equipped, GUNS 100mm 68 MT-12/T-12
following the acquisition of significant amounts of new ARTILLERY 611
and upgraded materiel in recent years. Kazakhstan’s SP 246: 122mm 126: 120 2S1 Gvozdika; 6 Semser; 152mm
close defence relationship with Russia, reinforced by 120 2S3 Akatsiya
TOWED 150: 122mm 100 D-30; 152mm 50 2A65 Msta-B 2K11 Krug (SA-4 Ganef); S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon);
(122mm up to 300 D-30 in store) 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful)
GUN/MOR 120mm 25 2S9 NONA-S EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MRL 127: 122mm 100 BM-21 Grad; 220mm 3 TOS-1A; AIRCRAFT 104 combat capable
300mm 24: 6 BM-30 Smerch; 18 IMI Lynx (with 50 msl) FTR 46: 12 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 2 MiG-29UB Fulcrum; 32
(122mm 100 BM-21 Grad; 220mm 180 9P140 Uragan all MiG-31/MiG-31BM Foxhound
in store)
FGA 44: 12 MiG-27 Flogger D; 2 MiG-23UB Flogger C; 20
MOR 63 SP 120mm 18 Cardom; 120mm 45 2B11 Sani/M120
Su-27 Flanker; 4 Su-27UB Flanker; 6 Su-30SM
ATK 14: 12 Su-25 Frogfoot; 2 Su-25UB Frogfoot
SRBM • Conventional 12 9K79 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab)
ISR 1 An-30 Clank
Navy 3,000 TPT 19: Medium 2 An-12 Cub; Light 16: 6 An-26 Curl,
2 An-72 Coaler; 6 C295; 2 Tu-134 Crusty; PAX 1 Tu-154
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Careless
TRG 18: 17 L-39 Albatros; 1 Z-242L
PCGM 2 Kazakhstan with 1 Barrier-BK lnchr with 4
Russia and Eurasia

RK-2B SSM, 1 Arbalet-K lnchr with 4 9K38 Igla (SA-18 HELICOPTERS
Grouse), 1 AK306 CIWS ATK 24: 20 Mi-24V Hind (some upgraded); 4 Mi-35M
PCC 1 Kazakhstan with 1 122mm MRL Hind
PBF 5: 2 Saygak; 3 Sea Dolphin MRH 26: 20 Mi-17V-5 Hip; 6 Mi-171Sh Hip
PB 16: 4 Almaty; 3 Archangel; 1 Dauntless; 4 Sardar; 1 Turk TPT 14: Heavy 4 Mi-26 Halo; Light 10: 4 Bell 205 (UH-
(AB 25); 2 Zhuk (of which 1 may be operational); 1 Other 1H Iroquois); 6 H145
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 1 UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
MCC 1 Alatau (Project 10750E) with 1 AK306 CIWS CISR • Heavy 2 Wing Loong (GJ-1)
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGS 1 Zhaik AIR DEFENCE • SAM
Long-range S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon); S-300 (SA-10
Coastal Defence Grumble); 40+ S-300PS (SA-10B Grumble)
FORCES BY ROLE Medium-range 2K11 Krug (SA-4 Ganef); S-75M Volkhov
MANOEUVRE (SA-2 Guideline)
Mechanised Short-range 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful); S-125 Neva (SA-3 Goa)
1 naval inf bde Point-defence 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer); IR/
IFV 70 BTR-82A SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo); SARH R-33 (AA-9 Amos);
ARH R-77 (AA-12A Adder – on MiG-31BM)
Air Force 12,000 (incl Air Defence) ASM Kh-23 (AS-7 Kerry)‡; Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen); Kh-29
Flying hours 100 hrs/yr (AS-14 Kedge)
FORCES BY ROLE ARM Kh-27 (AS-12 Kegler); Kh-58 (AS-11 Kilter)
FIGHTER
1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum Paramilitary 31,500
2 sqn with MiG-31B/MiG-31BM Foxhound
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK National Guard ε20,000
1 sqn with MiG-27 Flogger D; MiG-23UB Flogger C Ministry of Interior
1 sqn with Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker
1 sqn with Su-27/Su-30SM Flanker
State Security Service 2,500
GROUND ATTACK
Border Service ε9,000
1 sqn with Su-25 Frogfoot
TRANSPORT
1 unit with Tu-134 Crusty; Tu-154 Careless EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn with An-12 Cub, An-26 Curl, An-30 Clank, An-72 AIRCRAFT 7: Light 6: 4 An-26 Curl; 1 An-74T; 1 An-
Coaler, C295M 74TK PAX 1 SSJ-100
TRAINING HELICOPTERS • TPT • Medium 15: 1 Mi-171; 14 Mi-
1 sqn with L-39 Albatros 171Sh
ATTACK HELICOPTER
5 sqn with Mi-24V Hind DEPLOYMENT
Some sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); H145; Mi-8 WESTERN SAHARA
Hip; Mi-17V-5 Hip; Mi-171Sh Hip; Mi-26 Halo UN • MINURSO 4 obs
AIR DEFENCE
Some regt with S-75M Volkhov (SA-2 Guideline); S-125 UKRAINE
Neva (SA-3 Goa); S-300/S-300PS (SA-10/10B Grumble); OSCE • Ukraine 4
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Kyrgyzstan KGZ ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 150 T-72
Kyrgyzstani Som s 2016 2017 2018
RECCE 30 BRDM-2
GDP s 458bn 491bn IFV 320: 230 BMP-1; 90 BMP-2
US$ 6.55bn 7.06bn APC • APC (W) 55: 25 BTR-70; 20 BTR-70M; 10 BTR-80
per capita US$ 1,073 1,140 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111
Growth % 3.8 3.5
Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel)
Inflation % 0.4 3.8 RCL 73mm SPG-9
Def bdgt s n.k. n.k. GUNS 100mm 36: 18 MT-12/T-12; 18 M-1944
US$ n.k. n.k. ARTILLERY 228
US$1=s 69.92 69.56 SP 122mm 18 2S1 Gvozdika
TOWED 123: 122mm 107: 72 D-30; 35 M-30 (M-1938);
Population 5,789,122 152mm 16 D-1
Ethnic groups: Kyrgyz 71.7%; Uzbek 14.3%; Russian 7.2%; Dungan GUN/MOR 120mm 12 2S9 NONA-S
1.1%; Uygur 0.9%; other or unspecified 4.8% MRL 21: 122mm 15 BM-21; 220mm 6 9P140 Uragan
MOR 120mm 54: 6 2S12; 48 M-120
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus AIR DEFENCE
Male 15.5% 4.0% 4.5% 4.7% 18.1% 2.0% SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
Female 14.7% 3.9% 4.3% 4.7% 20.0% 3.2% GUNS 48
SP 23mm 24 ZSU-23-4
Capabilities TOWED 57mm 24 S-60
Kyrgyzstan’s armed forces generally possess ageing land Air Force 2,400
equipment and limited air capabilities. A July 2013 military FORCES BY ROLE
doctrine detailed plans to reform the armed forces, with FIGHTER
enhanced command and control, effective military 1 regt with L-39 Albatros*
logistics and a modern air-defence system. To date, there TRANSPORT
appears to have been little progress, and combat readiness 1 regt with An-2 Colt; An-26 Curl
remains low with large numbers of conscripts. Kyrgyzstan ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
maintains a close strategic relationship with Russia and is 1 regt with Mi-24 Hind; Mi-8 Hip
a member of both the CSTO and the SCO. Moscow also AIR DEFENCE
maintains a number of military bases in the country, Some regt with S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa); S-75 Dvina
including a squadron of Su-25SM ground-attack aircraft at (SA-2 Guideline); 2K11 Krug (SA-4 Ganef)
Kant air base, which it has leased since 2003. As part of EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Kyrgyzstan’s effort to counter terrorism, the government AIRCRAFT 4 combat capable
has ordered the creation of an inter-agency working TPT • Light 6: 4 An-2 Colt; 2 An-26 Curl
group to devise an anti-extremism and anti-terrorism TRG 4 L-39 Albatros*
programme. Kyrgyzstan held a joint anti-terror exercise, HELICOPTERS
Khanjar-IV, with India and participated in Dushanbe Anti- ATK 2 Mi-24 Hind
Terror 2017 exercise and the CSTO KSOR counter-terror TPT • Medium 8 Mi-8 Hip
exercise in November. AIR DEFENCE • SAM
Medium-range 2K11 Krug (SA-4 Ganef); S-75 Dvina (SA-
ACTIVE 10,900 (Army 8,500 Air 2,400) Paramilitary 2 Guideline)
9,500 Short-range S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa)
Paramilitary 9,500
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Border Guards 5,000 (KGZ conscript, RUS
officers)
Army 8,500
FORCES BY ROLE Internal Troops 3,500
SPECIAL FORCES National Guard 1,000
1 SF bde
MANOEUVRE
Mechanised DEPLOYMENT
2 MR bde SERBIA
1 (mtn) MR bde OSCE • Kosovo 2
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty bde SOUTH SUDAN
1 AD bde UN • UNMISS 2; 1 obs
SUDAN MANOEUVRE
UN • UNAMID 1 obs Light
UN • UNISFA 1 obs 3 mot inf bde
1 lt inf bn
UKRAINE Other
OSCE • Ukraine 17 1 gd bn
COMBAT SUPPORT
FOREIGN FORCES 1 arty bn
Russia ε500 Military Air Forces: 13 Su-25SM Frogfoot; 2 1 engr bn
Mi-8 Hip 1 NBC coy
1 sigs bn
Moldova MDA EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

Moldovan Leu L 2016 2017 2018 APC 163
APC (T) 69: 9 BTR-D; 60 MT-LB (variants)
Russia and Eurasia

GDP L 135bn 150bn
APC (W) 94: 13 BTR-80; 81 TAB-71
US$ 6.77bn 7.95bn ABCV 44 BMD-1
per capita US$ 1,907 2,240 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Growth % 4.3 4.0 MSL • MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1
Inflation % 6.4 6.5 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel)
RCL 73mm SPG-9
Def bdgt L 538m 554m 609m
GUNS 100mm 37 MT-12
US$ 27m 29m ARTILLERY 221
FMA (US) US$ 12.75m 12.75m 0m TOWED 69: 122mm 17 (M-30) M-1938; 152mm 52: 21
US$1=L 19.92 18.90 2A36 Giatsint-B; 31 D-20
GUN/MOR • SP 120mm 9 2S9 NONA-S
Population 3,474,121 MRL 220mm 11 9P140 Uragan
MOR 132: 82mm 75 BM-37; 120mm 57: 50 M-1989; 7
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
PM-38
Male 9.4% 2.9% 3.5% 4.2% 23.8% 4.9% RADAR • LAND 5: 2 ARK-1; 3 SNAR-10
Female 8.8% 2.7% 3.3% 3.9% 24.8% 7.7% AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 39: 23mm 28 ZU-23;
57mm 11 S-60
Capabilities
Air Force 600 (incl 250 conscripts)
The primary role of Moldova’s armed forces is to maintain
territorial integrity. The forces are constitutionally neutral. FORCES BY ROLE
In early 2017, a National Defence Strategy for 2017–21 TRANSPORT
1 sqn with An-2 Colt; Mi-8MTV-1/PS Hip; Yak-18
was approved, covering border defence, airspace control
AIR DEFENCE
and protection, and improvements to the military-training
1 regt with S-125 Neva (SA-3 Goa)
system and the national emergency-management system,
as well as modernising military equipment. The MoD was EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
also working on a military strategy. Chisinau has looked AIRCRAFT
to continue to build relations with both European states TPT • Light 3: 2 An-2 Colt; 1 Yak-18
and NATO, and signed up to the NATO Defence Capacity HELICOPTERS
Building Initiative in September 2014. The dispute over the TPT • Medium 6: 2 Mi-8PS Hip; 4 Mi-8MTV-1 Hip
separatist region of Transdniestr continues, with Russian AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Short-range 3 S-125 Neva (SA-3
forces still present there. There is concern over a ‘hybrid’ Goa)  
threat from Moscow. The services exercise with NATO
states and have deployed service members to KFOR.
Paramilitary 2,400
ACTIVE 5,150 (Army 3,250 Air 600 Logistic Support
1,300) Paramilitary 2,400 OPON 900 (riot police)
Conscript liability 12 months (3 months for university Ministry of Interior
graduates)
DEPLOYMENT
ALBANIA
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE OSCE • Albania 1
ARMENIA/AZERBAIJAN
Army 1,300; 1,950 conscript (total 3,250)
OSCE • Minsk Conference 2
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
1 SF bn OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 1
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC Plan (2018–27) was expected to be made public at the end
UN • MINUSCA 1; 2 obs of 2017 at the earliest. It was, however, widely trailed
in the Russian press from mid-year. A number of high-
LIBERIA
profile projects for the navy and aerospace forces have
UN • UNMIL 1 obs reportedly been delayed or deferred, including the new
SERBIA aircraft carrier and the Project 23560 Lider destroyer for
NATO • KFOR 41 the navy, while there is a reduced emphasis on the air
OSCE • Kosovo 1 force’s PAK-DA low-observable bomber project, and a
mooted successor to the MiG-31 Foxhound appears to have
UN • UNMIK 1 obs
been shelved. A new naval doctrine was approved but,
SOUTH SUDAN with the possible exception of sub-surface capabilities, it
UN • UNMISS 1; 3 obs would appear difficult for the navy fully to achieve the
ambitions contained in the document. Russian forces
UKRAINE
remain on operational deployment in Syria in support
OSCE • Ukraine 33
of the Assad regime, with the conflict providing a testing
ground for a variety of new or upgraded systems.
FOREIGN FORCES However, the navy’s decision to send its only aircraft
Estonia OSCE 1 carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, to take part in the Syrian
Hungary OSCE 1 campaign during the fourth quarter of 2016 seems
Russia ε1,500 (including 400 peacekeepers) 7 Mi-24 Hind/ to have not been sufficient to secure enough support
Mi-8 Hip for significant investment in a future aircraft-carrier
programme in the GPV 2018–27. While some of Russia’s
Sweden OSCE 1
more ambitious projects have likely been reined in, core
Ukraine 10 mil obs (Joint Peacekeeping Force)
equipment-acquisition programmes are still supported,
United Kingdom OSCE 1
including the army’s T-14 Armata main battle tank and
United States OSCE 3 the air force’s PAK-FA requirement for a next-generation
combat aircraft. Delivery rates and in-service dates could,
Russia RUS however, be affected further. Improving readiness also
remains a priority, with ‘no-notice’ exercises used to
Russian Rouble r 2016 2017 2018 examine this. A major event in the exercise calendar was
GDP r 86.0tr 92.5tr Zapad 2017, which took place in Belarus and the Western
US$ 1.28tr 1.47tr Military District in September. (See pp. 169–79.)
per capita US$ 8,946 10,248 ACTIVE 900,000 (Army 280,000 Navy 150,000 Air
Growth % -0.2 1.8 165,000 Strategic Rocket Force 50,000 Airborne
Inflation % 7.0 4.2 45,000 Special Operations Forces 1,000 Railway
Def exp [a] r 3.84tr 3.86tr 3.82tr Troops 29,000 Command and Support 180,000)
US$ 57.2bn 61.7bn Paramilitary 554,000
Def bdgt r 2.98tr 2.87tr 2.77tr Conscript liability 12 months (conscripts now can opt for
US$ 44.5bn 45.6bn contract service immediately, which entails a 24-month
contract)
US$1=r 67.06 62.98
[a] Calculated to be comparable with the NATO definition of RESERVE 2,000,000 (all arms)
defence expenditure Some 2,000,000 with service within last 5 years; reserve
Population 142,257,519 obligation to age 50
Ethnic groups: Tatar 3.71%; Armenian 0.8%; Bashkir 1.1%;
Chechen 1%; Chuvash 1% ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Strategic Deterrent Forces ε80,000 (incl
Male 8.8% 2.3% 2.5% 3.8% 24.3% 4.5%
personnel assigned from the Navy and
Female 8.3% 2.2% 2.4% 3.7% 27.2% 9.8%
Aerospace Forces)
Capabilities Navy
Russia continues to recapitalise both its nuclear and EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
conventional forces, though economic difficulties are SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC • SSBN 13:
affecting spending plans. The overall aspiration of 3 Kalmar (Delta III) with 16 R-29RKU-02 Statsiya-02 (SS-
Russia’s military modernisation is to field a more modern N-18 Stingray) nuclear SLBM, 2 single 400mm TT
suite of military capabilities and more professional armed with SET-72 LWT, 4 single 533mm TT with 53-65K
forces held at high readiness. The latest State Armament HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT
6 Delfin (Delta IV) with 16 R-29RMU2 Sineva/R- EARLY WARNING 2 Tundra

29RMU2.1 Layner (SS-N-23 Skiff) nuclear SLBM, 4 NAVIGATION/POSITIONING/TIMING 25
single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/ GLONASS
USET-80K Keramika HWT (of which 1 in refit) ISR 10: 2 Bars-M; 1 GEO-IK 2; 1 Kondor; 1 Kosmos-2519;
1 Akula (Typhoon)† in reserve for training with capacity 2 Persona; 3 Resurs-P
for 20 Bulava (SS-N-32) nuclear SLBM, 6 single ELINT/SIGINT 4: 3 Liana (Lotos-S); 1 Tselina-2
533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET- RADAR 12; Russia leases ground-based radar stations
80K Keramika HWT in Baranovichi (Belarus) and Balkhash (Kazakhstan).
3 Borey (Dolgorukiy) with 16 Bulava (SS-N-32) nuclear It also has radars on its own territory at Lekhtusi
SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with USET-80K Keramika (St Petersburg); Armavir (Krasnodar); Olenegorsk
HWT/UGST Fizikov HWT (Murmansk); Mishelevka (Irkuts); Kaliningrad; Pechora
(Komi); Yeniseysk (Krasnoyarsk); Baranul (Altayskiy);
Strategic Rocket Force Troops 50,000 Orsk (Orenburg) and Gorodets/Kovylkino (OTH)
3 Rocket Armies operating silo and mobile launchers
Aerospace Defence Command
Russia and Eurasia

organised in 12 divs. Regt normally with 10 silos (6 for
FORCES BY ROLE
RS-20/SS-18), or 9 mobile lnchr, and one control centre
AIR DEFENCE
FORCES BY ROLE 2 AD div HQ
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 4 SAM regt with S-300PM1/PM2 (SA-20 Gargoyle)
9 ICBM regt with RS-12M Topol (SS-25 Sickle) 5 SAM regt with S-400 (SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1
8 ICBM regt with RS-12M2 Topol-M (SS-27 mod 1) (SA-22 Greyhound)
3 ICBM regt with RS-18 (SS-19 Stiletto) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
9 ICBM regt with RS-20 (SS-18 Satan) AIR DEFENCE • SAM 222
10 ICBM regt with RS-24 Yars (SS-27 mod 2)  Long-range 186: 90 S-300PM1/PM2 (SA-20 Gargoyle);
4 ICBM regt (forming) with RS-24 Yars (SS-27 mod 2) 96 S-400 (SA-21 Growler)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Short-range 36 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS MISSILE DEFENCE 68 53T6 (ABM-3 Gazelle)
ICBM • Nuclear 313: ε63 RS-12M Topol (SS-25 Sickle) RADAR 1 ABM engagement system located at Sofrino
(mobile single warhead); 60 RS-12M2 Topol-M (SS- (Moscow)
27 mod 1) silo-based (single warhead); 18 RS-12M2
Topol-M (SS-27 mod 1) road mobile (single warhead); Army ε280,000 (incl conscripts)
30 RS-18 (SS-19 Stiletto) (mostly mod 3, 6 MIRV per msl) 4 military districts (West (HQ St Petersburg), Centre (HQ
(being withdrawn); 46 RS-20 (SS-18 Satan) (mostly mod Yekaterinburg), South (HQ Rostov-on-Don) & East (HQ
5, 10 MIRV per msl); 84 RS-24 Yars (SS-27 mod 2; ε3 Khabarovsk), each with a unified Joint Strategic Command
MIRV per msl) road mobile; 12 RS-24 Yars (SS-27 mod FORCES BY ROLE
2; ε3 MIRV per msl) silo-based COMMAND
12 army HQ
Long-Range Aviation Command 1 corps HQ
BOMBER 8 (Spetsnaz) SF bde
1 sqn with Tu-160/Tu-160M1 Blackjack 1 (Spetsnaz) SF regt
3 sqn with Tu-95MS/MS mod/MSM Bear MANOEUVRE
Reconnaissance
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
2 recce bde
AIRCRAFT
Armoured
BBR 76: 10 Tu-160 Blackjack with Kh-55/Kh-55SM
1 (4th) tk div (1 armd recce bn, 2 tk regt, 1 MR regt, 1 arty
(AS-15A/B Kent); 6 Tu-160M1 Blackjack with Kh-55/
regt, 1 AD regt)
Kh-55SM (AS-15A/B Kent)/Kh-102 nuclear LACM; 46
1 (90th) tk div (1 armd recce bn, 2 tk regt, 1 MR regt)
Tu-95MS/MS mod Bear H with Kh-55/Kh-55SM (AS- 2 tk bde (1 armd recce bn, 3 tk bn, 1 MR bn, 1 arty bn,
15A/B Kent)/Kh-102 nuclear ALCM; 14 Tu-95MSM 1 MRL bn, 2 AD bn, 1 engr bn, 1 EW coy, 1 NBC coy)
Bear H with Kh-55/Kh-55SM (AS-15A/B Kent)/Kh-102 1 (3rd) MR div (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk regt, 2 MR regt, 1
nuclear LACM arty regt)
1 (144th) MR div (1 armd recce bn, 1 MR regt, 1 arty regt)
Space Command 1 (150th) MR div (1 tk regt, 1 MR regt)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 14 (BMP) MR bde (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn, 3 armd inf
SATELLITES 99 bn, 2 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 AT bn, 2 AD bn, 1 engr bn, 1
COMMUNICATIONS 58: 1 Blagovest; 2 Garpun; 13 EW coy, 1 NBC coy)
Gonets-D/M (dual-use); 3 Mod Globus (Raduga-1M); Mechanised
4 Meridian; 3 Parus; 3 Raduga; 21 Rodnik (Strela-3M); 8 1 (2nd) MR div (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk regt, 2 MR regt, 1
Strela-3 arty regt, 1 AD regt)
1 (42nd) MR div (1 armd recce bn, 3 MR regt, 1 arty regt) GUNS • TOWED 100mm 526 MT-12 (100mm 2,000
9 (BTR/MT-LB) MR bde (1 recce bn; 1 tk bn; 3 mech inf T-12/MT-12 in store)
bn; 2 arty bn; 1 MRL bn; 1 AT bn; 2 AD bn; 1 engr bn; 1 ARTILLERY 4,328+
EW coy; 1 NBC coy) SP 1,596: 122mm 150 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 1,386: 800
2 MR bde (4–5 mech inf bn; 1 arty bn; 1 AD bn; 1 engr bn) 2S3 Akatsiya; 100 2S5 Giatsint-S; 450 2S19 Msta-S; 36 2S33
3 (lt/mtn) MR bde (1 recce bn; 2 mech inf bn; 1 arty bn) Msta-SM; 203mm 60 2S7M Malka (4,260 in store: 122mm
1 (18th) MGA div (2 MGA regt; 1 arty regt; 1 tk bn; 2 2,000 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 2,000: 1,000 2S3 Akatsiya; 850
AD bn) 2S5 Giatsint-S; 150 2S19 Msta-S; 203mm 260 2S7 Pion)
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE TOWED 150: 152mm 150 2A65 Msta-B (12,415 in store:
10 SRBM/GLCM bde with 9K720 Iskander-M (SS-26 122mm 8,150: 4,400 D-30; 3,750 M-30 (M-1938); 130mm
Stone/SSC-7) 650 M-46; 152mm 3,575: 1,100 2A36 Giatsint-B; 600 2A65
1 SRBM bde with 9K79-1 Tochka-U (SS-21B Scarab) Msta-B; 1,075 D-20; 700 D-1 (M-1943); 100 M-1937 (ML-
COMBAT SUPPORT 20); 203mm 40 B-4M)
9 arty bde GUN/MOR 180+
1 hy arty bde SP 120mm 80+: 30 2S23 NONA-SVK; 50+ 2S34
4 MRL bde TOWED 120mm 100 2B16 NONA-K
4 engr bde MRL 862+ 122mm 550 BM-21 Grad/Tornado-G; 220mm
1 MP bde 200 9P140 Uragan; some TOS-1A; 300mm 112: 100 9A52
5 NBC bde Smerch; 12 9A54 Tornado-S (3,220 in store: 122mm 2,420:
10 NBC regt 2,000 BM-21 Grad; 420 9P138; 132mm 100 BM-13; 220mm
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 700 9P140 Uragan)
10 log bde MOR 1,540+: 82mm 800+ 2B14; 120mm 700 2S12 Sani;
AIR DEFENCE 240mm 40 2S4 Tulpan (2,590 in store: 120mm 1,900: 1,000
14 AD bde 2S12 Sani; 900 M-1938 (PM-38); 160mm 300 M-160; SP
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 240mm 390 2S4 Tulpan)
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
MBT 2,780: 1,100 T-72B/BA; 800 T-72B3; 80 T-73B3 mod; SRBM 144:
450 T-80BV/U; 350 T-90/T-90A (10,200 in store: 7,000 Dual-capable 120 9K720 Iskander-M (SS-26 Stone)
T-72/T-72A/B; 3,000 T-80B/BV/U; 200 T-90) Conventional 24 9K79-1 Tochka-U (SS-21B Scarab)
RECCE 1,700: 1,000 BRDM-2/2A (1,000+ BRDM-2 in (some Scud in store)
store); 700 BRM-1K (CP) GLCM • Dual-capable Some 9M728 Iskander-K (SSC-7);
IFV 5,140: 500 BMP-1; 3,000 BMP-2; 540 BMP-3; 100 BTR- some 9M729 (SSC-8) (reported)
80A; 1,000 BTR-82A/AM (8,500 in store: 7,000 BMP-1; UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
1,500 BMP-2) ISR • Heavy Tu-143 Reys; Tu-243 Reys/Tu-243 Reys D;
APC 6,100+ Light BLA-07; Pchela-1; Pchela-2
APC (T) 3,500+: some BMO-T; 3,500 MT-LB (2,000 MT- AIR DEFENCE
LB in store) SAM 1,520+
APC (W) 2,600: 800 BTR-60 (all variants); 200 BTR-70 Long-range S-300V (SA-12 Gladiator/Giant); S-300V4
(all variants); 1,500 BTR-80; 100+ BPM-97 Dozor (4,000 (SA-23)
BTR-60/70 in store) Medium-range 360: ε200 9K37M Buk-M1-2 (SA-11
PPV Typhoon-K Gadfly); ε90 9K317 Buk-M2 (SA-17 Grizzly); ε60 Buk-M3
AUV 100+: 100+ GAZ Tigr; some IVECO LMV (SA-17 Grizzly)
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES Short-range 120+ 9K331/9K332 Tor-M/M1/M2/M2U
AEV BAT-2; IMR; IMR-2; IMR-3; IRM; MT-LB (SA-15 Gauntlet) (9M338 msl entering service)
ARV BMP-1; BREM-1/64/K/L; BTR-50PK(B); M1977; Point-defence 1,050+: 250+ 2K22M Tunguska (SA-19
MTP-LB; RM-G; T-54/55; VT-72A Grison); 400 9K33M3 Osa-AKM (SA-8B Gecko); 400
VLB KMM; MT-55A; MTU; MTU-20; MTU-72; PMM-2 9K35M3 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher); 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16
MW BMR-3M; GMX-3; MCV-2 (reported); MTK; MTK-2 Gimlet); 9K34 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin); 9K38 Igla (SA-18
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Grouse); 9K333 Verba; 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch)
MSL GUNS
SP BMP-T with 9K120 Ataka (AT-9 Spiral 2); 9P149 SP 23mm ZSU-23-4
with 9K114 Shturm (AT-6 Spiral); 9P149M with 9K132 TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm S-60
Shturm-SM (AT-9 Spiral-2); 9P157-2 with 9K123
Khrizantema (AT-15 Springer); 9K128-1 Kornet-T Reserves
MANPATS 9K111M Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Cadre formations
Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn); FORCES BY ROLE
9K115-1 Metis-M (AT-13 Saxhorn 2); 9K115-2 Metis-M1 MANOEUVRE
(AT-13 Saxhorn 2); 9K135 Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan) Mechanised
RCL 73mm SPG-9 13 MR bde
Navy ε150,000 (incl conscripts) SSK 23:

4 major fleet organisations (Northern Fleet, Pacific Fleet, 16 Paltus (Kilo) with 6 single 533mm TT with 53-65K
Baltic Fleet, Black Sea Fleet) and Caspian Sea Flotilla HWT/TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT
6 Varshavyanka (Kilo) with 6 single 533mm TT with 53-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
65K HWT/TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K Keramika
SUBMARINES 62
HWT/3M54 (SS-N-27 Sizzler) AShM/3M14 Kalibr
STRATEGIC • SSBN 13:
(SS-N-30) dual-capable LACM
3 Kalmar (Delta III) with 16 R-29RKU-02 Statsiya-02 (SS-
1 Lada (Petersburg) (AIP fitted) with 6 single 533mm
N-18 Stingray) nuclear SLBM, 2 single 400mm TT
TT with USET-80K Keramika HWT
with SET-72 LWT, 4 single 533mm TT with 53-65K
HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CV 1 Admiral Kuznetsov with
6 Delfin (Delta IV) with 16 R-29RMU2 Sineva/R-
1 12-cell VLS with 3M45 Granit (SS-N-19 Shipwreck)
29RMU2.1 Layner (SS-N-23 Skiff) nuclear SLBM, 4
AShM, 4 sextuple VLS with 3K95 Kindzhal (SA-N-9
single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/ Gauntlet) SAM, 2 RBU-12000 Udav 1 A/S mor, 8 Kortik
USET-80K Keramika HWT (of which 1 in refit) (CADS-N-1) CIWS with 3M311 (SA-N-11 Grison) SAM,
Russia and Eurasia

1 Akula (Typhoon)† in reserve for training with capacity 6 AK630 CIWS (capacity 18–24 Su-33 Flanker D Ftr ac;
for 20 Bulava (SS-N-32) nuclear SLBM, 6 single MiG-29KR FGA ac; 15 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel, 2 Ka-31R
533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET- Helix AEW hel)
80K Keramika HWT CRUISERS 5
3 Borey (Dolgorukiy) with 16 Bulava (SS-N-32) nuclear CGHMN 2:
SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with USET-80K Keramika 2 Orlan (Kirov) with 2 10-cell VLS with 3M45 Granit
HWT/UGST Fizikov HWT (SS-N-19 Shipwreck) AShM, 2 octuple VLS with
TACTICAL 49 S-300F Fort (SA-N-6 Grumble) SAM/S-300FM Fort
SSGN 9: M (SA-N-20 Gargoyle) SAM, 2 8-cell VLS with 128
8 Antyey (Oscar II) with 2 12-cell lnchr with 3M45 3S95 Kindzhal (SA-N-9 Gauntlet) SAM, 2 twin lnchr
Granit (SS-N-19 Shipwreck) AShM, 2 single 650mm with Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 quintuple
TT each with T-65 HWT/RPK-7 (SS-N-16 Stallion) 533mm ASTT with SET-65K HWT, 1 RBU 6000
ASW msl, 4 single 553mm TT with 53-65K HWT/ Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 RBU 1000 Smerch 3 A/S mor,
SET-65K HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT (of 6 Kortik (CADS-N-1) CIWS with 3M311 (SA-N-11
which 2 in refit) Grison) SAM, 1 twin 130mm gun (capacity 3 Ka-
1 Yasen (Severodvinsk) with 1 octuple VLS with 27 Helix ASW hel) (of which 1 non-operational;
3M54 (SS-N-27 Sizzler) AShM/3M55 Onyx (SS-N- undergoing extensive refit and expected to return
26 Strobile) AShM/3M14 Kalibr (SS-N-30) dual- to service in 2018)
capable LACM; 10 single 533mm TT with USET- CGHM 3:
80K Keramika HWT/UGST Fizikov HWT 3 Atlant (Slava) with 8 twin lnchr with 3M70 Vulkan
SSN 17: (SS-N-12 mod 2 Sandbox) AShM, 8 octuple VLS
9 Schuka-B (Akula I) with 4 single 533mm TT with with S-300F Fort (SA-N-6 Grumble) SAM/S-300FM
53-65K HWT/TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K Keramika Fort M (SA-N-20 Gargoyle) SAM, 2 twin lnchr with
HWT/3M10 Granat (SS-N-21 Sampson) LACM Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 quintuple 533mm
(weapons in store), 4 single 650mm TT with T-65 ASTT with SET-65K HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch
HWT/RPK-7 (SS-N-16 Stallion) ASW msl (of which 2 A/S mor, 6 AK630 CIWS, 1 twin 130mm gun
6 in refit) (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel)
2 Schuka-B (Akula II) with 4 single 533mm TT with DESTROYERS 15
53-65K HWT/TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K Keramika DDGHM 14:
HWT/3M10 Granat (SS-N-21 Sampson) LACM 5 Sarych (Sovremenny) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M80
(weapons in store), 4 single 650mm TT with T-65 Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn) AShM, 2 twin lnchr with
HWT/RPK-7 (SS-N-16 Stallion) ASW msl (of which 3K90 Uragan (SA-N-7 Gadfly) SAM, 2 twin 533mm
1 in refit) TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT, 2 RBU 1000
2 Kondor (Sierra II) with 4 single 533mm TT with Smerch 3 A/S mor, 4 AK630M CIWS, 2 twin 130mm
TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT/3M10 guns (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel) (of which
Granat (SS-N-21 Sampson) LACM (weapons in 2 in refit)
store), 4 single 650mm TT with T-65 HWT 8 Fregat (Udaloy I) with 2 quad lnchr with Rastrub
1 Barracuda (Sierra I) (in reserve) with 6 single 533mm (SS-N-14 Silex) AShM/ASW, 8 octuple VLS with
TT with TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K Keramika 3K95 Kindzhal (SA-N-9 Gauntlet) SAM, 2 quad
HWT/3M10 Granat (SS-N-21 Sampson) LACM 533mm ASTT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT,
(weapons in store) 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 4 AK630 CIWS, 2
3 Schuka (Victor III) with 4 single 533mm TT with 100mm guns (capacity 2 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel)
53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET-80K Keramika 1 Fregat (Udaloy II) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M80
HWT/3M10 Granat (SS-N-21 Sampson) LACM Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn) AShM, 8 octuple VLS
(weapons in store), 2 single 650mm TT with T-65 with 3K95 Kindzhal (SA-N-9 Gauntlet) SAM, 2
HWT Kortik (CADS-N-1) CIWS with 3M311 (SA-N-11
Grison) SAM, 2 quintuple 533mm ASTT with 53- PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 100
65K HWT/SET-65K HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch CORVETTES 48
2 A/S mor, 1 twin 130mm gun (capacity 2 Ka-27 FSGM 19
Helix ASW hel) 5 Buyan-M (Sviyazhsk) with 1 octuple VLS with 3M54
DDGM 1: (SS-N-27 Sizzler) AShM/3M14 Kalibr (SS-N-30)
1 Komsomolets Ukrainy (Kashin mod) with 2 quad dual-capable LACM, 2 sextuple lnchr with 3M47
lnchr with 3M24 Uran (SS-N-25 Switchblade) Gibka (SA-N-10 Grouse) SAM, 1 AK630-M2 CIWS,
AShM, 2 twin lnchr with Volnya (SA-N-1 Goa) 1 100mm gun
SAM, 5 single 533mm ASTT with 53-65K HWT/ 2 Sivuch (Dergach) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M80
SET-65K HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1 Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn) AShM, 1 twin lnchr with
twin 76mm gun Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1
FRIGATES 13 76mm gun
FFGHM 9: 12 Ovod (Nanuchka III) with 2 triple lnchr with P-120
2 Admiral Grigorovich (Krivak V) with 1 8-cell VLS Malakhit (SS-N-9 Siren) AShM, 1 twin lnchr with
with 3M54 (SS-N-27 Sizzler) AShM/3M55 Oniks Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1
(SS-N-26 Strobile) AShM/3M14 Kalibr (SS-N-30) 76mm gun
dual-capable LACM, 2 12-cell VLS with 9M317E FSM 29:
Shtil-1 SAM, 2 twin 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/ 2 Albatros (Grisha III) with 1 twin lnchr with Osa-M
SET-65K HWT, 1 RBU 6000 A/S mor, 2 AK630 (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU
CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1 twin 57mm gun
hel) 18 Albatros (Grisha V) with 1 twin lnchr with Osa-M
2 Jastreb (Neustrashimy) with 2 quad lnchr with (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT, 1 RBU
3M24 Uran (SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 4 octuple 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1 76mm gun
VLS with 3K95 Kindzhal (SA-N-9 Gauntlet) SAM, 3 Buyan (Astrakhan) with 1 sextuple lnchr with 3M47
Gibka (SA-N-10 Grouse) SAM, 1 A-215 Grad-M
6 single 533mm ASTT, 1 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S
122mm MRL, 2 AK306 CIWS, 1 100mm gun
mor, 2 Kortik (CADS-N-1) CIWS with 3M311 (SA-
6 Parchim II with 2 quad lnchr with Strela-2 (SA-N-
N-11 Grison) SAM, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27
5 Grail) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000
Helix ASW hel) (of which 1 in refit)
Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
1 Steregushchiy (Project 20380) with 2 quad lnchr
PCFG 21:
with 3M24 Uran (SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 2
3 Molnya (Tarantul II) with 2 twin lnchr with P-15M
quad 324mm ASTT with Paket-NK LWT, 1 Kortik
Termit (SS-N-2C/D Styx) AShM, 1 quad lnchr
(CADS-N-1) CIWS with 3M311 (SA-N-11 Grison)
(manual aiming) with Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM,
SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1
2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
Ka-27 Helix ASW hel)
18 Molnya (Tarantul III) with 2 twin lnchr with 3M80
4 Steregushchiy (Project 20380) with 2 quad lnchr
Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn) AShM, 1 quad lnchr
with 3M24 Uran (SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 1
(manual aiming) with Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM,
12-cell VLS with 3K96 Redut (SA-NX-28) SAM (in 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
test), 2 quad 324mm ASTT with Paket-NK LWT, PBM 14 Grachonok with 1 quad lnchr with 3M47 Gibka
2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 (SA-N-10 Grouse) (original design was as diving tender)
Helix ASW hel) PBF 13: 11 Raptor (capacity 20 troops); 2 Mangust
FFGM 4: PBR 4 Shmel with 1 76mm gun
1 Gepard with 2 quad lnchr with 3M24 Uran (SS-N- MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 43
25 Switchblade) AShM, 1 twin lnchr with Osa-M MCC 1 Alexandrit (Project 12700) with 1 AK306 CIWS
(SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun MHI 8: 7 Sapfir (Lida) with 1 AK306 CIWS; 1 Malakhit
1 Gepard with 1 8-cell VLS with 3M14 Kalibr (SS-N- (Olya)
30) dual capable LACM, 2 quad lnchr with 3M24 MHO 2 Rubin (Gorya) with 2 quad lnchr with Strela-2
Uran (SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 1 twin lnchr (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
with Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, MSC 22: 20 Yakhont (Sonya) with 4 AK630 CIWS (some
1 76mm gun with 2 quad lnchr with Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM); 2
1 Burevestnik (Krivak I mod)† with 1 quad lnchr with Korund-E (Yevgenya) (Project 1258E)
Rastrub (SS-N-14 Silex) AShM/ASW, 1 twin lnchr MSO 10: 9 Akvamaren (Natya); 1 Agat (Natya II) (all with
with Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 quad 533mm 2 quad lnchr (manual aiming) with Strela-2 (SA-N-5
ASTT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT, 2 RBU Grail) SAM, 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 2 twin AK230
6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm guns CIWS
1 Burevestnik M (Krivak II) with 1 quad lnchr with AMPHIBIOUS
RPK-3 Rastrub (SS-N-14 Silex) AShM/ASW, 2 twin LANDING SHIPS • LST 19:
lnchr with 10 Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko SAM), 2 quad 12 Project 775 (Ropucha I/II) with 2 twin 57mm guns
533mm ASTT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT, 2 (capacity either 10 MBT and 190 troops or 24 APC
RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 100mm guns (T) and 170 troops)
3 Project 775M (Ropucha III) with 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

76mm gun (capacity either 10 MBT and 190 troops 1 regt with MiG-29KR/KUBR Fulcrum
or 24 APC (T) and 170 troops) 1 regt with MiG-31BM Foxhound; Su-24M/M2/MR
4 Tapir (Alligator) with 2-3 twin lnchr with Strela-2 Fencer
(SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 twin 57mm guns (capacity ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE/ISR
20 tanks; 300 troops) 1 regt with Su-24M/MR Fencer; Su-30SM
LANDING CRAFT 28 1 sqn with Su-24M/MR Fencer
LCU 17: ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
5 Dyugon 3 sqn with Il-38/Il-38N May*; Il-18D; Il-20RT Coot A;
12 Project 11770 (Serna) (capacity 100 troops) Il-22 Coot B
LCM 9 Akula (Ondatra) (capacity 1 MBT) 8 sqn with Ka-27/Ka-29 Helix
LCAC 2 Pomornik (Zubr) with 2 AK630 CIWS (capacity 1 sqn with Mi-14 Haze A
230 troops; either 3 MBT or 10 APC (T) 2 sqn with Tu-142MK/MZ/MR Bear F/J*
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 265 1 unit with Ka-31R Helix
SSAN 9: 1 Orenburg (Delta III Stretch); 1 Losharik; 1 Nelma MARITIME PATROL/TRANSPORT
Russia and Eurasia

(X-Ray) (Project 1851); 2 Halibut (Paltus) (Project 18511); 1 sqn with An-26 Curl; Be-12 Mail*; Mi-8 Hip
3 Kashalot (Uniform); 1 Podmoskovye (Project 09787) SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT
SSA 1 Sarov (Project 20120) 1 sqn with An-12PS Cub; An-26 Curl; Tu-134
ABU 12: 8 Kashtan; 4 Project 419 (Sura) TRANSPORT
AE 9: 7 Muna; 1 Dubnyak; Akademik Kovalev (Project 1 sqn with An-12BK Cub; An-24RV Coke; An-26 Curl;
20181) with 1 hel landing platform An-72 Coaler; An-140
AEM 2: 1 Kalma-3 (Project 1791R); 1 Lama 2 sqn with An-26 Curl; Tu-134
AG 1 Potok TRAINING
AGB 5: 1 Dobrynya Mikitich; 1 Ilya Muromets; 2 Ivan 1 sqn with L-39 Albatros; Su-25UTG Frogfoot
Susanin; 1 Vladimir Kavraisky 1 sqn with An-140; Tu-134; Tu-154, Il-38 May
AGE 1 Tchusovoy ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
AGI 13: 2 Alpinist; 2 Dubridium (Project 1826); 1 Moma; 7 1 sqn with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip
Vishnya; 1 Yuri Ivanov TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
AGM 1 Marshal Nedelin 1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip
AGOR 8: 1 Akademik Krylov; 1 Igor Belousov; 1 Seliger; 2 AIR DEFENCE
Sibiriyakov; 2 Vinograd; 1 Yantar 1 SAM regt with S-300PM1 (SA-20 Gargoyle)
AGS 69: 8 Biya; 19 Finik; 7 Kamenka; 5 Moma; 9 Onega; 1 SAM regt with S-300PM1 (SA-20 Gargoyle); S-300PS
5 Baklan (Project 19920); 4 Baklan (Project 19920B); 2 (SA-10B Grumble)
Vaygach; 10 Yug 1 SAM regt with S-300PM1 (SA-20 Gargoyle); S-400
AGSH 1 Samara (SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)
AH 3 Ob† 1 SAM regt with S-300PS (SA-10B Grumble); S-400
AK 3: 2 Irgiz; 1 Pevek with 1 AK306 CIWS (SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)
AOL 9: 2 Dubna; 3 Uda; 4 Altay (mod) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AOR 3 Boris Chilikin AIRCRAFT 216 combat capable
AORL 2: 1 Kaliningradneft; 1 Olekma FTR 67: 12 MiG-31B/BS Foxhound; 20 MiG-31BM
AOS 2 Luza Foxhound; 17 Su-33 Flanker D; 18 Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker
AR ε7 Amur FGA 43: 19 MiG-29KR Fulcrum; 3 MiG-29KUBR
ARC 4: 3 Emba; 1 Improved Klasma Fulcrum; 21 Su-30SM
ARS 30: 1 Kommuna; 6 Goryn; 4 Mikhail Rudnitsky; 18 ATK 46: 41 Su-24M Fencer; 5 Su-25UTG Frogfoot (trg role)
Project 23040; 1 Zvezdochka (Project 20180) ASW 44: 12 Tu-142MK/MZ Bear F; 10 Tu-142MR Bear J
AS 3 Project 2020 (Malina) (comms); 15 Il-38 May; 7 Il-38N May
ASR 1 Elbrus MP 5: 4 Be-12PS Mail*; 1 Il-18D
ATF 55: 1 Okhotsk; 1 Baklan; ε3 Katun; 4 Ingul; 2 Neftegaz; ISR 12 Su-24MR Fencer E*
12 Okhtensky; 13 Prometey; 1 Prut; 4 Sliva; 14 Sorum SAR 3 An-12PS Cub
AWT 1 Manych ELINT 4: 2 Il-20RT Coot A; 2 Il-22 Coot B
AXL 10: 8 Petrushka; 2 Smolny with 2 RBU 2500 A/S mor, TPT 49: Medium 2 An-12BK Cub; Light 45: 1 An-24RV
2 twin 76mm guns Coke; 24 An-26 Curl; 6 An-72 Coaler; 4 An-140; 9 Tu-134;
1 Tu-134UBL; PAX 2 Tu-154M Careless
Naval Aviation ε31,000 TRG 4 L-39 Albatros
Flying hours 80+ hrs/yr HELICOPTERS
FORCES BY ROLE ATK 8 Mi-24P Hind
FIGHTER ASW 83: 63 Ka-27 Helix; 20 Mi-14 Haze A
1 sqn with MiG-31B/BS Foxhound EW 8 Mi-8 Hip J
1 sqn with Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker AEW 2 Ka-31R Helix
1 regt with Su-33 Flanker D; Su-25UTG Frogfoot SAR 56: 16 Ka-27PS Helix D; 40 Mi-14PS Haze C
TPT • Medium 36: 28 Ka-29 Helix; 4 Mi-8T Hip; 4 Mi- SP 120mm 42: 12 2S23 NONA-SVK; 30 2S9 NONA-S
8MT Hip TOWED 120mm 24 2B16 NONA-K
AIR DEFENCE • SAM MRL 122mm 36 BM-21 Grad
Long-range 120: 56 S-300PM1 (SA-20 Gargoyle); 40 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
S-300PS (SA-10B Grumble); 24 S-400 (SA-21 Growler) SRBM • Conventional 12 9K720 Iskander-M (SS-26
Short-range 12 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound) Stone)
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AIR DEFENCE
AAM • IR R-27T/ET (AA-10B/D Alamo); R-60 (AA-8 SAM
Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer); SARH R-27R/ER (AA- Long-range 48+: 48 S-400 (SA-21 Growler); S-300V4
10A/C Alamo); R-33 (AA-9A Amos) (SA-23)
ASM Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen); Kh-59 (AS-13 Kingbolt); Kh- Short-range 12 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)
29T Point-defence 70+: 20 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); 50
ARM Kh-25MP (AS-12 Kegler); Kh-58 (AS-11 Kilter) 9K31 Strela-1/9K35 Strela-10 (SA-9 Gaskin/SA-13
Gopher); 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch)
Naval Infantry (Marines) ε35,000 GUNS 23mm 60 ZSU-23-4
FORCES BY ROLE
COMMAND Coastal Missile and Artillery Troops 2,000
3 corps HQ FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES COASTAL DEFENCE
1 (fleet) SF bde (1 para bn, 2–3 underwater bn, 1 spt 5 AShM bde
unit) 1 AShM regt
2 (fleet) SF bde (cadre) (1 para bn, 2–3 underwater bn, EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 spt unit) COASTAL DEFENCE
MANOEUVRE ARTY • SP 130mm ε36 A-222 Bereg
Reconnaissance
AShM 76+: 36 3K60 Bal (SSC-6 Sennight); 40 3K55
1 recce bde
Bastion (SSC-5 Stooge); some 4K44 Redut (SSC-1 Sepal);
Mechanised
some 4K51 Rubezh (SSC-3 Styx)
3 MR bde
1 MR regt
6 indep naval inf bde
Aerospace Forces ε165,000 (incl conscripts)
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE Flying hours 60–100 hrs/yr (combat aircraft) 120+
(transport aircraft)
1 SRBM bde with 9K720 Iskander-M (SS-26 Stone)
COMBAT SUPPORT A joint CIS Unified Air Defence System covers RUS, ARM,
2 arty bde BLR, KAZ, KGZ, TJK, TKM and UZB
2 SAM regt with 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); Strela-1/ BOMBER
Strela-10 (SA-9 Gaskin/SA-13 Gopher) 3 regt with Tu-22M3 Backfire C
2 SAM regt with S-400 (SA-21 Growler); 96K6 3 sqn with Tu-95MS/MS mod/MSM Bear
Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound) 1 sqn with Tu-160/Tu-160M1 Blackjack
1 SAM regt with S-300V4 (SA-23) FIGHTER
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum (Armenia)
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 1 regt with MiG-29SMT/UBT Fulcrum; Su-30SM
MBT 250: 50 T-72B; 200 T-72B3 1 regt with MiG-31BM Foxhound
IFV 1,000: 400 BMP-2; 600 BTR-82A 1 regt with MiG-31B/BS/BM Foxhound
APC 400 1 regt with MiG-31B/BS/BM Foxhound; Su-27/Su-27UB
APC (T) 300 MT-LB Flanker
APC (W) 100 BTR-80 1 regt with Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker; Su-27SM Flanker;
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Su-35S Flanker
MSL 1 regt with Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker
SP 60 9P148 with 9K111-1 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 1 regt with Su-30SM
9P149 with 9K114 Shturm (AT-6 Spiral); 9P157-2 with FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
9K123 Khrisantema (AT-15 Springer) 1 regt with MiG-31BM Foxhound; Su-27SM Flanker; Su-
MANPATS 9K111-1 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K135 30M2; Su-30SM; Su-35S Flanker
Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan) 1 regt with Su-35S Flanker; Su-30SM
GUNS 100mm T-12 1 regt with Su-27SM Flanker; Su-27SM3 Flanker; Su-30M2
ARTILLERY 365 1 regt with Su-25 Frogfoot; Su-30SM
SP 163: 122mm 95 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 68: 50 2S3 GROUND ATTACK
Akatsiya; 18 2S19 Msta-S 1 regt with Su-24M/M2 Fencer; Su-34 Fullback
TOWED 152mm 100: 50 2A36 Giatsint-B; 50 2A65 1 regt with Su-24M Fencer; Su-25SM Frogfoot
Msta-B 2 sqn with Su-24M/M2 Fencer
GUN/MOR 66 3 regt with Su-25SM/SM3 Frogfoot
1 sqn with Su-25SM Frogfoot (Kyrgyzstan) ATK 265: 70 Su-24M/M2 Fencer; 40 Su-25 Frogfoot; 140 Su-
2 regt with Su-34 Fullback 25SM/SM3 Frogfoot; 15 Su-25UB Frogfoot
ELECTRONIC WARFARE ISR 87: 4 An-30 Clank; 79 Su-24MR Fencer*; 2 Tu-214ON;
1 sqn with Mi-8PPA Hip 2 Tu-214R
ISR EW 3 Il-22PP
2 regt with Su-24MR Fencer* ELINT 32: 15 Il-20M Coot A; 5 Il-22 Coot B; 12 Il-22M Coot B
2 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer* AEW&C 18: 14 A-50 Mainstay; 4 A-50U Mainstay
1 flt with An-30 Clank C2 10: 4 Il-80 Maxdome; 2 Il-82; 4 Tu-214SR
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL TKR 15: 5 Il-78 Midas; 10 Il-78M Midas
1 sqn with A-50/A-50U Mainstay TPT 428: Heavy 111: 9 An-124 Condor; 2 An-22 Cock; 100
TANKER Il-76MD Candid; Medium 65 An-12BK Cub; Light 235:
1 sqn with Il-78/Il-78M Midas 115 An-26 Curl; 25 An-72 Coaler; 5 An-140; 9 An-148-100E;
TRANSPORT 27 L-410; 54 Tu-134 Crusty; PAX 17 Tu-154 Careless
6 regt/sqn with An-12BK Cub; An-26 Curl; Tu-134 TRG 213: 120 L-39 Albatros; 93 Yak-130 Mitten*
Crusty; Tu-154 Careless; Mi-8 Hip HELICOPTERS
Russia and Eurasia

1 regt with An-124 Condor; Il-76MD Candid ATK 376+: 118 Ka-52A Hokum B; 100 Mi-24D/V/P Hind;
1 regt with An-12BK Cub; Il-76MD Candid 90+ Mi-28N Havoc B; 8 Mi-28UB Havoc; 60+ Mi-35 Hind
1 sqn with An-22 Cock EW 27: 20 Mi-8PPA Hip; 7 Mi-8MTRP-1 Hip
3 regt with Il-76MD Candid TPT 339: Heavy 33 Mi-26/Mi-26T Halo; Medium 306
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Mi-8/Mi-8MT/Mi-8AMTSh/Mi-8AMTSh-VA/Mi-8MTV-5
1 bde with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-35 Hip
Hind; Mi-26 Halo; Mi-8MTV-5 Hip TRG 64: 19 Ka-226; 45 Ansat-U
1 bde with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-26 Halo; Mi-8 Hip UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
1 bde with Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-35 Hind; Mi-26 Halo; ISR • Medium Forpost (Searcher II)
AIR DEFENCE • SAM 612:
Mi-8 Hip
Long-range 490: 180 S-300PM1/PM2 (SA-20 Gargoyle);
1 bde with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip
170 S-300PS (SA-10B Grumble); 20 S-300V (SA-12
2 regt with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-35
Gladiator/Giant); 120 S-400 (SA-21 Growler)
Hind; Mi-8 Hip
Medium-range 80 9K37M Buk-M1-2/9K317 Buk-M2 (SA-
1 regt with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-8 Hip
11 Gadfly/SA-17 Grizzly);
1 regt with Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-35 Hind; Mi-8 Hip
Short-range 42 96K6 Pantsir-S1/S2 (SA-22 Greyhound)
1 regt with Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-24P Hind; Mi-35 Hind;
Mi-8 Hip
AAM • IR R-27T/ET (AA-10B/D Alamo); R-73 (AA-11
1 regt with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip
Archer); R-60T (AA-8 Aphid); SARH R-27R/ER (AA-
2 sqn with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip 10A/C Alamo); R-33/33S (AA-9 Amos A/B); ARH R-77-1
ATTACK HELICOPTER (AA-12B Adder); R-37M (AA-13 Axehead); PRH R-27P/EP
1 sqn with Ka-52A Hokum B (AA-10E/F Alamo)
1 sqn with Mi-24P Hind ARM Kh-25MP (AS-12 Kegler); Kh-31P/PM (AS-17A
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Krypton); Kh-58 (AS-11 Kilter)
1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip ASM Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen); Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge); Kh-
AIR DEFENCE 31A/AM (AS-17B Krypton); Kh-38; Kh-59/Kh-59M (AS-13
9 AD div HQ Kingbolt/AS-18 Kazoo)
4 regt with 9K37M Buk-M1-2/9K317 Buk-M2 (SA-11 AShM Kh-22 (AS-4 Kitchen); Kh-32 (entering service);
Gadfly/SA-17 Grizzly); S-300V (SA-12 Gladiator/Giant) Kh-35U (AS-20 Kayak) (in test/entering service)
1 bde with S-300PS (SA-10B Grumble) LACM
5 regt with S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble) Nuclear Kh-55/Kh-55SM (AS-15A/B Kent); Kh-102
8 regt with S-300PM1/PM2 (SA-20 Gargoyle) Conventional Kh-101; Kh-555
7 regt with S-400 (SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA- BOMBS
22 Greyhound) Laser-guided KAB-500; KAB-1500L
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TV-guided KAB-500KR; KAB-1500KR; KAB-500OD;
AIRCRAFT 1,176 combat capable UPAB 1500
BBR 139: 61 Tu-22M3 Backfire C; 1 Tu-22M3M Backfire; 1 INS/GLONASS-guided KAB-500S
Tu-22MR Backfire (1 in overhaul); 46 Tu-95MS/MS mod
Bear; 14 Tu-95MSM Bear; 10 Tu-160 Blackjack; 6 Tu-160M1 Airborne Troops ε45,000
Blackjack FORCES BY ROLE
FTR 222: 70 MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum; 12 MiG- SPECIAL FORCES
31B/31BS Foxhound; 80 MiG-31BM Foxhound; 50 Su-27 1 (AB Recce) SF bde
Flanker; 10 Su-27UB Flanker MANOEUVRE
FGA 378: 44 MiG-29SMT Fulcrum; 6 MiG-29UBT Fulcrum; Air Manoeuvre
47 Su-27SM Flanker; 14 Su-27SM3 Flanker; 20 Su-30M2; 79 2 AB div (1 tk coy; 2 para/air aslt regt; 1 arty regt; 1 AD
Su-30SM; 98 Su-34 Fullback; 70 Su-35S Flanker regt)
2 AB div (2 para/air aslt regt; 1 arty regt; 1 AD regt) 1 tk bde

1 indep AB bde 2 MR div
3 air aslt bde Mechanised
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 MR div
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 3 MR bde
MBT 60 T-72B3 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE
IFV 20 BTR-82AM 2 SRBM/GLCM bde with Iskander-M/K
APC • APC (T) 776: 700 BTR-D; 76 BTR-MDM 1 SRBM bde with Tochka-U
AUV GAZ Tigr COMBAT SUPPORT
ABCV 1,291: 100 BMD-1; 1,000 BMD-2; 10 BMD-3; 30 2 arty bde
BMD-4; 151 BMD-4M 1 (hy) arty bde 
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES 1 MRL bde
ARV BREM-D; BREhM-D 1 engr bde
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE 1 MP bde
MSL 1 NBC bde
SP 100 BTR-RD 2 NBC regt
MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 Konkurs COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
(AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn); 9K115- 2 log bde
1 Metis-M (AT-13 Saxhorn 2); 9K135 Kornet (AT-14 AIR DEFENCE
Spriggan) 3 AD bde
RCL 73mm SPG-9
GUNS • SP 125mm 36+ 2S25 Sprut-SD Reserves
ARTILLERY 600+ FORCES BY ROLE
TOWED 122mm 150 D-30 MANOEUVRE
GUN/MOR • SP 120mm 250 2S9 NONA-S (500 in store: Mechanised
120mm 500 2S9 NONA-S) 2 MR bde
MOR • TOWED 200+ 82mm 150 2B14; 120mm 50+ 2B23
NONA-M1 Northern Fleet
AIR DEFENCE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SAM • Point-defence 30+: 30 Strela-10MN; 9K310 Igla- SUBMARINES 30
1 (SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse); 9K333 Verba; STRATEGIC 8 SSBN (of which 1 in refit and 1 in
9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch); 9K34 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin) reserve)
GUNS • SP 23mm 150 BTR-ZD TACTICAL 22: 4 SSGN; 12 SSN (of which 4 in
refit); 6 SSK (of which 1 in refit)
Special Operations Forces ε1,000 PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 10: 1 CV
FORCES BY ROLE (in refit); 2 CGHMN (of which 1 in refit); 1 CGHM;
SPECIAL FORCES 6 DDGHM
2 SF unit PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10: 2
FSGM; 6 FSM; 2 PBM
Railway Troops ε29,000 MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES
4 regional commands 10: 1 MHO; 2 MSO; 7 MSC
FORCES BY ROLE AMPHIBIOUS 6: 4 LST; 2 LCM
10 (railway) tpt bde Naval Aviation 
FORCES BY ROLE
Russian Military Districts FIGHTER
Western Military District 1 regt with Su-33 Flanker D; Su-25UTG Frogfoot
HQ at St Petersburg
1 regt with MiG-29KR/KUBR Fulcrum
Army FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR
FORCES BY ROLE 1 regt with MiG-31BM Foxhound; Su-24M/M2/MR
COMMAND Fencer
3 army HQ ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
SPECIAL FORCES 1 sqn with Il-38 May; Il-20RT Coot A; Tu-134
2 (Spetsnaz) SF bde 3 sqn with Ka-27/Ka-29 Helix
MANOEUVRE 1 sqn with Tu-142MK/MZ/MR Bear F/J
Reconnaissance AIR DEFENCE
1 recce bde 3 SAM regt with S-300PS (SA-10B Grumble); S-
Armoured 300PM (SA-20 Gargoyle); S-400 (SA-21 Growler);
1 tk div 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT AIRCRAFT
FTR 38: 20 MiG-31BM Foxhound; 18 Su-33 Flanker FTR 18 Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker
D FGA 7 Su-30SM
FGA 25: 19 MiG-29KR Fulcrum; 4 MiG-29KUBR ATK 10 Su-24M Fencer
Fulcrum; 2 Su-30SM ISR 4 Su-24MR Fencer*
ATK 18: 13 Su-24M Fencer; 5 Su-25UTG Frogfoot TPT 8: 6 An-26 Curl; 2 Tu-134 Crusty
(trg role) HELICOPTERS
ASW 21: 10 Il-38 May; 11 Tu-142MK/MZ/MR Bear ATK Mi-24P Hind
F/J ASW Ka-27 Helix
ISR 4 Su-24MR Fencer* TPT • Medium Ka-29 Helix; Mi-8 Hip
ELINT 3: 2 Il-20RT Coot A; 1 Il-22 Coot B
TPT 9: 8 An-26 Curl; 1 Tu-134 Naval Infantry
ASW Ka-27 Helix A COMMAND
Russia and Eurasia

TPT • Medium Ka-29 Helix B; Mi-8 Hip 1 corps HQ
AIR DEFENCE • SAM MANOEUVRE
Long-range S-300PS (SA-10B Grumble); S-300PM Mechanised
(SA-20 Gargoyle); S-400 (SA-21 Growler) 1 MR bde
Short-range 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound) 1 MR regt
1 naval inf bde
Naval Infantry SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE
FORCES BY ROLE 1 SRBM bde with Iskander-M/K
COMMAND COMBAT SUPPORT
1 corps HQ 1 arty bde
MANOEUVRE AIR DEFENCE
Mechanised 3 SAM regt
2 MR bde 
Coastal Artillery and Missile Troops
1 naval inf bde
FORCES BY ROLE
Coastal Artillery and Missile Troops COASTAL DEFENCE
FORCES BY ROLE 1 AShM regt
COASTAL DEFENCE
Military Air Force
1 AShM bde
6th Air Force & Air Defence Army
Baltic Fleet
FORCES BY ROLE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE FIGHTER
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 2 1 regt with MiG-29SMT Fulcrum; Su-30SM
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 8: 2 1 regt with MiG-31B/BS/BM Foxhound; Su-27 Flanker
DDGHM; 6 FFGHM 1 regt with Su-27/Su-27SM Flanker; Su-35S Flanker
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 25: 6 GROUND ATTACK
FSGM; 6 FSM; 7 PCFG; 5 PBF; 1 PBM   1 regt with Su-34 Fullback
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES ISR
12: 1 MCC; 5 MSC; 6 MHI 1 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer
AMPHIBIOUS 13: 4 LST; 6 LCU; 1 LCM; 2 LCAC 1 flt with A-30 Clank
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
Naval Aviation  1 sqn with Mi-8PPA Hip
FORCES BY ROLE TRANSPORT
FIGHTER 1 regt with An-12 Cub; An-26 Curl; Tu-134 Crusty
1 sqn with Su-27 Flanker ATTACK HELICOPTER
ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE/ISR 1 bde with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-
1 sqn with Su-24M/MR Fencer; Su-30SM 35 Hind; Mi-26 Halo; Mi-8MTV-5 Hip
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 regt with with Mi-24P/Mi-35 Hind; Mi-28N
1 sqn with Ka-27/Ka-29 Helix Havoc B; Mi-8 Hip
TRANSPORT 1 sqn with Mi-24P Hind
1 sqn with An-26 Curl; Tu-134 Crusty TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip
1 sqn with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip AIR DEFENCE
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 SAM regt with 9K37M Buk-M1-2 (SA-11 Gadfly);
1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip S-300V (SA-12 Gladiator/Giant)
5 SAM regt with S-300PM (SA-20 Gargoyle) Reserves

1 SAM regt with S-400 (SA-21 Growler); 96K6 FORCES BY ROLE
Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound) MANOEUVRE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Mechanised
AIRCRAFT 3 MR bde
FTR 61: 31 MiG-31B/BS/BM Foxhound; 30 Su-27/
Su-27UB Flanker Military Air Force
FGA 96: 28 MiG-29SMT Fulcrum; 6 MiG-29UBT 14th Air Force & Air Defence Army
Fulcrum; 12 Su-27SM Flanker; 10 Su-30SM; 24 Su-
FORCES BY ROLE
34 Fullback; 16 Su-35S Flanker
FIGHTER
ISR 19: 4 An-30 Clank; 15 Su-24MR Fencer* 1 regt with MiG-31BM Foxhound
TPT 12 An-12/An-26/Tu-134 1 regt with MiG-31B/BS/BM Foxhound
HELICOPTERS GROUND ATTACK
ATK 64+: 12 Ka-52A Hokum B; 16 Mi-24P Hind; 24 2 sqn with Su-24M Fencer
Mi-28N Havoc B; 12+ Mi-35 Hind 1 sqn with Su-25SM Frogfoot (Kyrgyzstan)
EW 10 Mi-8PPA Hip ISR
TPT • Medium 50 Mi-8 Hip 1 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer E
AIR DEFENCE • SAM TRANSPORT
Long-range S-300PM (SA-20 Gargoyle); S-300V 1 regt with An-12 Cub; An-26 Curl; Tu-134 Crusty;
(SA-12 Gladiator/Giant); S-400 (SA-21 Growler) Tu-154; Mi-8 Hip
Medium-range 9K37M Buk-M1-2 (SA-11 Gadfly) ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Short-range 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound) 1 bde with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip
1 sqn with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip (Tajikistan)
Airborne Troops AIR DEFENCE
FORCES BY ROLE 3 regt with S-300PS (SA-10B Grumble)
SPECIAL FORCES 1 bde with S-300PS (SA-10B Grumble)
1 (AB Recce) SF bde 1 regt with S-300PM (SA-20 Gargoyle)
MANOEUVRE 2 regt with S-400 (SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1
Air Manoeuvre (SA-22 Greyhound)
3 AB div EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT
Central Military District FTR 40 MiG-31B/BS/BM Foxhound
HQ at Yekaterinburg ATK 39: 26 Su-24M Fencer; 13 Su-25SM Frogfoot
ISR 9 Su-24MR Fencer E
Army TPT 36 An-12 Cub/An-26 Curl/Tu-134 Crusty/Tu-
FORCES BY ROLE 154 Careless
COMMAND HELICOPTERS
2 army HQ ATK 24 Mi-24 Hind
SPECIAL FORCES TPT 46: 6 Mi-26 Halo; 40 Mi-8 Hip
2 (Spetsnaz) SF bde AIR DEFENCE • SAM
MANOEUVRE Long-range S-300PS (SA-10B Grumble); S-300PM
Armoured (SA-20 Gargoyle); S-400 (SA-21 Growler)
1 tk div Short-range 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)
3 MR bde
Airborne Troops
Mechanised
FORCES BY ROLE
2 MR bde
MANOEUVRE
2 (lt/mtn) MR bde
Air Manoeuvre
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE
1 AB bde
2 SRBM/GLCM bde with Iskander-M/K
COMBAT SUPPORT Southern Military District
2 arty bde HQ located at Rostov-on-Don
1 MRL bde
1 engr bde Army
2 NBC bde FORCES BY ROLE
2 NBC regt COMMAND
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 3 army HQ
2 log bde SPECIAL FORCES
AIR DEFENCE 3 (Spetsnaz) SF bde
3 AD bde 1 (Spetsnaz) SF regt
MANOEUVRE Naval Infantry

Reconnaissance FORCES BY ROLE
1 recce bde COMMAND
Armoured 1 corps HQ
1 MR div MANOEUVRE
3 MR bde Mechanised
1 MR bde (Armenia) 2 naval inf bde
1 MR bde (South Ossetia) COMBAT SUPPORT
Mechanised 1 arty bde
1 MR div AIR DEFENCE
1 MR bde 1 SAM regt
1 MR bde (Abkhazia)
1 (lt/mtn) MR bde Coastal Artillery and Missile Troops
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE FORCES BY ROLE
Russia and Eurasia

2 SRBM/GLCM bde with Iskander-M/K COASTAL DEFENCE
COMBAT SUPPORT 2 AShM bde
2 arty bde
1 MRL bde Caspian Sea Flotilla
1 engr bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 NBC bde PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 2 FFGM
2 NBC regt PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12: 3
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT FSGM; 3 FSM; 1 PCFG; 1 PBM; 4 PBR
2 log bde MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 3:
2 MSC; 1 MHI
AIR DEFENCE
AMPHIBIOUS 9: 2 LCM; 7 LCU
4 AD bde
Black Sea Fleet Military Air Force

The Black Sea Fleet is primarily based in Crimea, at 4th Air Force & Air Defence Army
Sevastopol, Karantinnaya Bay and Streletskaya Bay FORCES BY ROLE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE FIGHTER
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL 7 SSK 1 regt with Su-30SM
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 6: 1 CGHM; 1 sqn with MiG-29 Fulcrum (Armenia)
1 DDGM; 2 FFGHM; 2 FFGM FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 29: 4 1 regt with Su-27 Flanker
FSGM; 6 FSM; 5 PCFG; 6 PBM; 8 PBF 1 regt with Su-27SM/SM3 Flanker; Su-30M2
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES GROUND ATTACK
10: 1 MHO; 6 MSO; 2 MSC; 1 MHI 1 regt with Su-24M Fencer; Su-25SM Frogfoot
AMPHIBIOUS 10: 7 LST; 1 LCM; 2 LCU 2 regt with Su-25SM/SM3 Frogfoot
1 regt with Su-34 Fullback
Naval Aviation ISR
FORCES BY ROLE 1 regt with Su-24MR Fencer E
FIGHTER TRANSPORT
ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE/ISR 1 regt with An-12 Cub/Mi-8 Hip
1 regt with Su-24M/MR Fencer; Su-30SM ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 bde with Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-35 Hind; Mi-8 Hip;
Mi-26 Halo
1 sqn with Ka-27 Helix
1 regt with Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-35 Hind; Mi-8 Hip
1 sqn with Mi-14 Haze 
2 regt with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-28N Havoc B;
MARITIME PATROL/TRANSPORT
Mi-35 Hind; Mi-8AMTSh Hip
1 sqn with An-26 Curl; Be-12PS Mail*; Mi-8
1 sqn with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip (Armenia)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR DEFENCE
AIRCRAFT 1 regt with 9K317 Buk-M2 (SA-17 Grizzly)
FGA 12 Su-30SM 2 regt with S-300PM (SA-20 Gargoyle)
ATK 13 Su-24M Fencer 2 regt with S-400 (SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1
ISR 4 Su-24MR Fencer E (SA-22 Greyhound)
MP 3 Be-12PS Mail* EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
TPT 6 An-26 AIRCRAFT
HELICOPTERS FTR 46: 12 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 34 Su-27 Flanker
ASW Ka-27 Helix FGA 86: 12 Su-27SM Flanker; 12 Su-27SM3
TPT • Medium Mi-8 Hip (MP/EW/Tpt) Flanker; 4 Su-30M2; 22 Su-30SM; 36 Su-34 Fullback
ATK 97: 12 Su-24M Fencer; 85 Su-25SM/SM3 TACTICAL 18: 5 SSGN (of which 2 in refit); 5 SSN
Frogfoot (of which 4 in refit); 8 SSK
ISR 24 Su-24MR Fencer* PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 8: 1 CGHM;
TPT 12 An-12 Cub 6 DDGHM (of which 2 in refit); 1 FFGHM
HELICOPTERS PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 24: 4
ATK 117: 25 Ka-52A Hokum B; 44 Mi-28N Havoc FSGM; 8 FSM; 9 PCFG; 3 PBM
B; 8 Mi-24P Hind; 40 Mi-35 Hind MINE WARFARE 8: 2 MSO; 6 MSC
TPT 72: Heavy 10 Mi-26 Halo; Medium 62 Mi-8 Hip AMPHIBIOUS 9: 4 LST; 3 LCM; 2 LCU
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
Long-range S-300PM (SA-20 Gargoyle); S-400 (SA- Naval Aviation 
21 Growler) FORCES BY ROLE
Medium-range 9K317 Buk-M2 (SA-17 Grizzly) FIGHTER
Short-range 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound) 1 sqn with MiG-31B/BS Foxhound
Airborne Troops 3 sqn with Ka-27/Ka-29 Helix
FORCES BY ROLE 2 sqn with Il-38 May*; Il-18D; Il-22 Coot B
MANOEUVRE 1 sqn with Tu-142MK/MZ/MR Bear F/J*
Air Manoeuvre TRANSPORT
1 AB div 2 sqn with An-12BK Cub; An-26 Curl; Tu-134
1 air aslt bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT
Eastern Military District FTR 12 MiG-31B/BS Foxhound
HQ located at Khabarovsk ASW 23: 11 Tu-142MK/MZ/MR Bear F/J; 12 Il-38
May
Army EW • ELINT 1 Il-22 Coot B
FORCES BY ROLE TPT 6: 2 An-12BK Cub; 3 An-26 Curl; 1 Tu-134
COMMAND HELICOPTERS
4 army HQ ASW Ka-27 Helix
SPECIAL FORCES TPT • Medium Ka-29 Helix; Mi-8 Hip
1 (Spetsnaz) SF bde
MANOEUVRE Naval Infantry
Armoured FORCES BY ROLE
1 tk bde MANOEUVRE
6 MR bde Mechanised
Mechanised 2 naval inf bde
4 MR bde AIR DEFENCE
1 MGA div 1 SAM regt
4 SRBM/GLCM bde with Iskander-M/K Coastal Artillery and Missile Troops
COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES BY ROLE
3 arty bde COASTAL DEFENCE
1 MRL bde 2 AShM bde
1 engr bde
1 NBC bde Military Air Force
4 NBC regt
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 11th Air Force & Air Defence Army
4 log bde FORCES BY ROLE
AIR DEFENCE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
4 AD bde 1 regt with MiG-31BM Foxhound; Su-27SM
Flanker; Su-30M2; Su-30SM; Su-35S Flanker
Reserves 1 regt with Su-35S Flanker; Su-30SM
FORCES BY ROLE 1 regt with Su-25 Frogfoot; Su-30SM
MANOEUVRE GROUND ATTACK
Mechanised 1 regt with Su-24M/M2 Fencer; Su-34 Fullback
8 MR bde 1 regt with Su-25SM Frogfoot
ISR
Pacific Fleet 1 regt with Su-24MR Fencer E
SUBMARINES 23 2 sqn with An-12 Cub/An-26 Curl/Tu-134 Crusty/
STRATEGIC 5 SSBN Tu-154 Careless
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 187

1 bde with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-26 Halo PSO 5: 4 Komandor; 1 Okean (Project 22100) with 1
1 regt with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-26 Halo 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
1 regt with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip PCO 22: 8 Alpinist (Project 503); 1 Sprut; 11 Okhotnik
AIR DEFENCE (Project 22460) with 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 hel landing
2 regt with 9K37M Buk-M1-2 (SA-11 Gadfly); platform; 2 Purga with 1 hel landing platform
9K317 Buk-M2 (SA-17 Grizzly); S-300V (SA-12 PCC 37: 5 Molnya II (Pauk II); 3 Svetlyak (Project 10410)
Gladiator/Giant) with 2 AK306 CIWS; 20 Svetlyak (Project 10410) with
2 regt with S-300PS (SA-10B Grumble) 1 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun; 8 Svetlyak (Project
2 regt with S-400 (SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1 10410) with 2 AK630M CIWS; 1 Yakhont with 2
(SA-22 Greyhound) AK306 CIWS
PCR 1 Slepen (Yaz) with 1 AK630 CIWS, 2 100mm
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
guns
AIRCRAFT
PBF 80: 50 Mangust; 3 Mirazh (Project 14310); 4
FTR 20 MiG-31B/BS/BM Foxhound
Mustang-2 (Project 18623); 21 Sobol; 2 Sokzhoi with 1
Russia and Eurasia

FGA 112: 23 Su-27SM Flanker; 2 Su-30M2; 29 Su-
AK306 CIWS
30SM; 24 Su-34 Fullback; 34 Su-35S Flanker PBR 30: 2 Ogonek with 1 AK306 CIWS; 2 Ogonek with
ATK 102: 20 Su-24M Fencer; 10 Su-24M2 Fencer; 72 2 AK306 CIWS; 8 Piyavka with 1 AK630 CIWS; 18
Su-25/Su-25SM Frogfoot Moskit (Vosh) with 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun
ISR 28 Su-24MR Fencer E PB 12: 2 Morzh (Project 1496M; 10 Lamantin (Project
TPT 24: 22 An-12 Cub/An-26 Curl; 1 Tu-134 1496M1)
Crusty; 1 Tu-154 Careless LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 37
HELICOPTERS AE 1 Muna
ATK 36: 24 Ka-52A Hokum B; 12 Mi-24P Hind AGB 3 Ivan Susanin (primarily used as patrol ships) with
TPT 60: Heavy 4 Mi-26 Halo; Medium 56 Mi-8 2AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
Hip AK 8 Pevek with 1 AK306 CIWS
AIR DEFENCE • SAM AKSL 5 Kanin  
Long-range S-300PS (SA-10B Grumble); S-300V AO 3: 1 Ishim (Project 15010); 2 Envoron
(SA-12 Gladiator/Giant); S-400 (SA-21 Growler) ATF 17: 16 Sorum (primarily used as patrol ships) with
Medium-range 9K317 Buk-M1-2 (SA-11 Gadfly); 2 AK230M CIWS; 1 Sorum (primarily used as patrol
9K317 Buk-M2 (SA-17 Grizzly) ship) with 2 AK306 CIWS
Short-range 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound) AIRCRAFT • TPT ε86: 70 An-24 Coke/An-26 Curl/An-72
Coaler/Il-76 Candid/Tu-134 Crusty/Yak-40 Codling; 16 SM-
Airborne Troops 92
FORCES BY ROLE HELICOPTERS: ε200 Ka-28 (Ka-27) Helix ASW/Mi-24
MANOEUVRE Hind Atk/Mi-26 Halo Spt/Mi-8 Hip Spt
Air Manoeuvre
2 air aslt bde Federal Guard Service ε40,000–50,000
Org include elm of ground forces (mech inf bde and AB
Paramilitary 554,000 regt)
FORCES BY ROLE
Border Guard Service ε160,000 MANOEUVRE
Subordinate to Federal Security Service Mechanised
FORCES BY ROLE 1 mech inf regt
10 regional directorates Air Manoeuvre
1 AB regt
MANOEUVRE
Other
Other
1 (Presidential) gd regt
7 frontier gp
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Federal Security Service Special Purpose
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Centre ε4,000
IFV/APC (W) 1,000 BMP/BTR FORCES BY ROLE
ARTILLERY 90: SPECIAL FORCES
SP 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika 2 SF unit (Alfa and Vympel units)
GUN/MOR • SP 120mm 2S9 NONA-S
MOR 120mm 2S12 Sani National Guard ε340,000
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS FORCES BY ROLE
FRIGATES • FFHM 3 Nerey (Krivak III) with 1 twin MANOEUVRE
lnchr with Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 quad Other
533mm TT lnchr, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1 10 paramilitary div
100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix A ASW hel) (2–5 paramilitary regt)
17 paramilitary bde (3 mech bn, 1 mor bn) BELARUS

36 indep paramilitary rgt 1 radar station at Baranovichi (Volga system; leased); 1
90 paramilitary bn (incl special motorised units) naval comms site
Aviation
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
8 sqn
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty regt DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE UN • MONUSCO 1; 24 obs
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES GEORGIA
RECCE some BRDM-2A 7,000; Abkhazia 1 mil base with (1 MR bde; 40 T-90A; 120
IFV/APC (W) 1,650 BMP-2/BTR-70M/BTR-80/BTR- BTR-82A; 18 2S3; 12 2S12; 18 BM-21; some S-300 SAM;
82A/BTR-82AM some atk hel); South Ossetia 1 mil base with (1 MR bde; 40
ARTILLERY 35 T-72; 120 BMP-2; 36 2S3; 12 2S12)
TOWED 122mm 20 D-30
MOR 120mm 15 M-1938 (PM-38) KAZAKHSTAN
AIRCRAFT • TPT 29: Heavy 9 Il-76 Candid; Medium 2 1 radar station at Balkash (Dnepr system; leased)
An-12 Cub; Light 12 An-26 Curl; 6 An-72 Coaler KYRGYZSTAN
HELICOPTERS • TPT 70: Heavy 10 Mi-26 Halo; ε500; 13 Su-25SM Frogfoot; 2 Mi-8 Hip spt hel
Medium 60+: 60 Mi-8 Hip; some Mi-8AMTSh Hip
LIBERIA
Cyber UN • UNMIL 1 obs
The first official doctrinal statement on the role of the MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Russian military in cyberspace, the ‘Conceptual Views 2 SSK; 1 FFGHM; 1 FFGM; 1 AGI
on the Activity of the Russian Federation Armed Forces
in Information Space’, was released at the end of 2011, MIDDLE EAST
and described cyber-force tasks with little correlation to UN • UNTSO 3 obs
those of equivalent commands in the West. In particular, MOLDOVA/TRANSDNIESTR
the document contains no mention of the possibility of ε1,500 (including 441 peacekeepers); 2 MR bn; 100 MBT/
offensive cyber activity. It is also entirely defensive in AIFV/APC; 7 Mi-24 Hind; some Mi-8 Hip
tone, and focuses on force protection and prevention of
information war, including allowing for a military role SERBIA
in negotiating international treaties governing information OSCE • Kosovo 1
security. In January 2012, then-CGS Makarov gave a SOUTH SUDAN
different picture of the three main tasks for any new UN • UNMISS 4; 2 obs
command: ‘disrupting adversary information systems,
including by introducing harmful software; defending SUDAN
our own communications and command systems’; and UN • UNISFA 1 obs
‘working on domestic and foreign public opinion using SYRIA
the media, Internet and more’. The third task is a reminder 6,000: 1 l inf BG; 4 MP bn; 1 engr unit; 7 T-90; ε20 BTR-
that, unlike some other nations with advanced cyber 82A; Typhoon-K; Tigr; 12 2A65; 4 9A52 Smerch; TOS-1A;
capabilities, Russia considers cyber warfare as an integral 9K720 Iskander-M; 4 MiG-29SMT Fulcrum; 8 Su-24M
component of information warfare. Operations in Crimea Fencer; 6 Su-25SM; 4 Su-30SM; 10 Su-34; 5 Su-35S; 1 Il-
from early 2014, in the wider information space concerning 20M; 4 Mi-28N Havoc; 4 Ka-52 Hokum B; 12 Mi-24P/Mi-
the conflict in Ukraine, and allegations of influence 35M Hind; 4 Mi-8AMTSh Hip; 3 Pantsir-S1/S2; 1 AShM bty
activity in Western countries’ elections demonstrate that with 3K55 Bastion; 1 SAM bty with S-400; 1 SAM bty with
Russian thinking and capacity has matured in these areas. S-300V4; air base at Latakia; naval facility at Tartus
In February 2017, Defence Minister Shoigu provided
the first official acknowledgement that Russia had TAJIKISTAN
formed a new information-warfare branch of the armed 5,000; 1 (201st) mil base with (40 T-72B1; 60 BMP-2; 80
forces. BTR-82A; 40 MT-LB; 18 2S1; 36 2S3; 6 2S12; 12 9P140
Uragan); 4 Mi-24P Hind; 4 Mi-8MTV Hip
DEPLOYMENT UKRAINE
Crimea: 28,000; 1 recce bde, 2 naval inf bde; 1 arty bde; 1
ARMENIA NBC regt; 40 T-72B3 MBT; 80 BMP-2 AIFV; 200 BTR-82A;
3,300: 1 mil base with (1 MR bde; 74 T-72; 80 BMP-1; 80 20 BTR-80 APC: 150 MT-LB; 18 2S1 arty; 18 2S19 arty; 12
BMP-2; 12 2S1; 12 BM-21); 1 sqn with 18 MiG-29 Fulcrum; BM-21 MRL; 1 AShM bde with 3K60 Bal; 3K55 Bastion; 1
1 sqn with 8 Mi-24P Hind; 4 Mi-8MT Hip; 2 AD bty with FGA regt with Su-24M/MR; Su-30SM; 1 FGA regt with Su-
S-300V (SA-12 Gladiator/Giant); 1 AD bty with 2K12 Kub 27SM/SM3; Su-30M2; 1 FGA regt with Su-24M/Su-25SM; 1
(SA-6 Gainful) atk/tpt hel regt; 1 ASW hel regt; 1 AD regt with S-300PM;
1 AD regt with S-400; 1 Fleet HQ located at Sevastopol; 2 FORCES BY ROLE

radar stations located at Sevastopol (Dnepr system) and MANOEUVRE
Mukachevo (Dnepr system) Mechanised
Donetsk/Luhansk: 3,000 (reported) 3 MR bde
OSCE • Ukraine 36 Air Manoeuvre
1 air aslt bde
WESTERN SAHARA COMBAT SUPPORT
UN • MINURSO 15 obs 1 arty bde
AIR DEFENCE
1 SAM regt
Tajikistan TJK EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Tajikistani Somoni Tr 2016 2017 2018 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
GDP Tr 54.5bn 62.6bn MBT 37: 30 T-72; 7 T-62
US$ 6.92bn 7.23bn IFV 23: 8 BMP-1; 15 BMP-2
Russia and Eurasia

APC • APC (W) 23 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-80
per capita US$ 800 819
ARTILLERY 23
Growth % 6.9 4.5 TOWED 122mm 10 D-30
Inflation % 5.9 8.9 MRL 122mm 3 BM-21 Grad
Def bdgt Tr 1.52bn 1.66bn MOR 120mm 10
US$ 193m 192m AIR DEFENCE • SAM
Medium-range S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline); S-125
US$1=Tr 7.87 8.66
Pechora-2M (SA-26)
Population 8,468,555 Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
Ethnic groups: Tajik 84.2%; Uzbek 12.2%; Kyrgyz 0.8%; Russian
0.5%; other or unspecified 2.3% Air Force/Air Defence 1,500
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus FORCES BY ROLE
TRANSPORT
Male 16.4% 4.8% 4.6% 4.9% 17.5% 1.4%
1 sqn with Tu-134A Crusty
Female 15.8% 4.7% 4.5% 4.8% 18.4% 1.9% ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 sqn with Mi-24 Hind; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17TM Hip H
The Tajik armed forces have little capacity to deploy other AIRCRAFT
than token forces and almost all equipment is of Soviet- TPT • Light 1 Tu-134A Crusty
era origin. Regional security and counter-terrorism is a TRG 4+: 4 L-39 Albatros; some Yak-52
concern, due to the possibility that violence could spill over HELICOPTERS
from Afghanistan, especially with the recent expansion ATK 4 Mi-24 Hind
of ISIS there. Border deployments have been stepped TPT • Medium 11 Mi-8 Hip/Mi-17TM Hip H
up in response. Tajikistan is a member of the CSTO and
a large Russian military presence remains at the 201st Paramilitary 7,500
military base. A 2014 deal on military modernisation
with Russia was followed in late 2016 by the signing of Internal Troops 3,800
a 2017 Military Cooperation Plan. Russia is training Tajik
military personnel, and Moscow indicated that Tajikistan
National Guard 1,200
was to receive military equipment, including aircraft. In Emergencies Ministry 2,500
May 2017, the US embassy in Tajikistan donated vehicles,
radios and thermal cameras to the Tajik Border Guard. The Border Guards
same month, Tajikistan hosted the Dushanbe Anti-Terror
2017 exercise, and in November the CSTO KSOR counter-
DEPLOYMENT
terror exercise. Tajikistan has also been building counter-
terrorism capability through US ties by hosting a counter- SERBIA
terrorism exercise supported by US CENTCOM. OSCE • Kosovo 1
ACTIVE 8,800 (Army 7,300 Air Force/Air Defence UKRAINE
1,500) Paramilitary 7,500 OSCE • Ukraine 14
FOREIGN FORCES
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Russia 5,000; 1 (201st) mil base with (40 T-72B1; 60 BMP-2;
80 BTR-82A; 40 MT-LB; 18 2S1; 36 2S3; 6 2S12; 12 9P140
Army 7,300 Uragan); 4 Mi-24P Hind; 4 Mi-8MTV Hip
1 (22nd) MR div (1 tk regt; 1 MR regt, 1 arty regt)

Turkmenistan TKM 4 MR bde
1 naval inf bde
Turkmen New Manat TMM 2016 2017 2018
Other
GDP TMM 127bn 146bn 1 MR trg div
US$ 36.2bn 41.7bn SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE
per capita US$ 6,622 7,522 1 SRBM bde with SS-1 Scud
Growth % 6.2 6.5 COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty bde
Inflation % 3.6 6.0
1 (mixed) arty/AT regt
Def exp TMM n.k. n.k.
1 MRL bde
US$ n.k. n.k. 1 AT regt
USD1=TMM 3.50 3.50 1 engr regt
AIR DEFENCE
2 SAM bde
Ethnic groups: Turkmen 77%; Uzbek 9%; Russian 7%; Kazak 2%
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Male 13.1% 4.3% 4.9% 4.9% 20.2% 2.0% MBT 654: 4 T-90S; 650 T-72/T-72UMG
Female 12.7% 4.2% 4.9% 4.9% 20.9% 2.6% RECCE 260+: 200 BRDM-2; 60 BRM-1; Nimr Ajban
IFV 1,038: 600 BMP-1/BMP-1M; 430 BMP-2; 4 BMP-3; 4
Capabilities BTR-80A
APC 898+
Turkmenistan declared its neutrality in 1995 and con-
firmed this commitment in its 2016 military doctrine. This APC (W) 874+: 120 BTR-60 (all variants); 300 BTR-70;
document aimed to increase defensive capability in order 450 BTR-80; 4+ Cobra
to safeguard national interests and territorial integrity. PPV 28+ Kirpi
The security situation in Afghanistan, and any possibility AUV 8 Nimr Ajban 440A
that this might affect Turkmenistan, is of interest to the ABCV 8 BMD-1
authorities. Turkmenistan is not a member of the CSTO. ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
The largely conscript-based armed forces remain reliant MSL
on Soviet-era equipment and doctrine. While the ground
SP 58+: 8 9P122 Malyutka-M (AT-3 Sagger on BRDM-2);
forces are shifting from a Soviet-era divisional structure to
8 9P133 Malyutka-P (AT-3 Sagger on BRDM-2); 2 9P148
a brigade system, progress is slow. The air force has a very
Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel on BRDM-2); 36 9P149 Shturm
modest capability; most of the aircraft are of Soviet-era ori-
(AT-6 Spiral on MT-LB); 4+ Baryer (on Karakal)
gin, have been stored or scrapped, and no significant new
procurement has occurred. The 2016 military doctrine was MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot
intended to partly redress these issues. The government (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115
has stated a requirement for equipment investment and Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn)
improvements to conditions of service. The Border Guard GUNS 100mm 60 MT-12/T-12
service will be strengthened with new equipment and fa- ARTILLERY 765
cilities. Plans to strengthen naval forces resulted in some SP 122mm 40 2S1
procurements, leading to a moderate improvement in the TOWED 457: 122mm 350 D-30; 130mm 6 M-46; 152mm
naval presence in the Caspian Sea. 101: 17 D-1; 72 D-20; 6 2A36 Giatsint-B; 6 2A65 Msta-B
ACTIVE 36,500 (Army 33,000 Navy 500 Air 3,000) GUN/MOR 120mm 17 2S9 NONA-S
Paramilitary 5,000 MRL 154+: 122mm 88: 18 9P138; 70 BM-21 Grad; RM-70;
Conscript liability 24 months 220mm 60 9P140 Uragan; 300mm 6 9A52 Smerch
MOR 97: 82mm 31; 120mm 66 M-1938 (PM-38)
SRBM • Conventional 16 SS-1 Scud
Army 33,000
CISR • Heavy CH-3A; WJ-600
5 Mil Districts
ISR • Medium Falco
FORCES BY ROLE
AIR DEFENCE
SPECIAL FORCES
1 spec ops regt SAM
MANOEUVRE Short-range: FM-90; 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful)
Armoured Point-defence 53+: 40 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); 13 9K35
1 tk bde Strela-10 mod (SA-13 Gopher); 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse);
Mechanised 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K34 Strela-3 (SA-14
1 (3rd) MR div (1 tk regt; 3 MR regt, 1 arty regt) Gremlin); Mistral (reported)
GUNS 70
SP 23mm 48 ZSU-23-4 Ukraine UKR
TOWED 22+: 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm 22 S-60 Ukrainian Hryvnia h 2016 2017 2018
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES GDP h 2.38tr 2.83tr
ASM: CM-502KG
US$ 93.3bn 104bn
Navy 500
Growth % 2.3 2.0
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 19 Inflation % 13.9 12.8
PCFGM 2 Edermen (RUS Molnya) with 4 quad lnchr Def bdgt [a] h 65.3bn 74.4bn
with 3M24E Uran-E (SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 1 US$ 2.55bn 2.73bn
quad lnchr (manual aiming) with 9K32 Strela-2 (SA- FMA (US) US$ 85m 42m 0m
N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun  USD1=h 25.55 27.22
PCC 4 Arkadag [a] Includes military pensions
Russia and Eurasia

PBF 12: 5 Grif-T; 5 Dearsan 14: 2 Sobol
PB 1 Point Population 44,033,874
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus

Air Force 3,000
Male 8.1% 2.2% 2.8% 3.7% 23.9% 5.5%
FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER Female 7.6% 2.1% 2.7% 3.6% 26.8% 10.8%
2 sqn with MiG-29 Fulcrum; MiG-29UB Fulcrum;
GROUND ATTACK Capabilities
1 sqn with Su-25 Frogfoot Ukraine was not able to offer any resistance to Russia’s
1 sqn with Su-25MK Frogfoot seizure of Crimea in March 2014, and the country’s
TRANSPORT armed forces have since been fighting Russian-supported
1 sqn with An-26 Curl; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-24 Hind separatist forces in the east, with continuing casualties.
TRAINING The security challenge from Russia has dictated the course
1 unit with L-39 Albatros of Ukraine’s military-reform process. A key goal is to
AIR DEFENCE implement processes aimed at standardising with NATO
Some sqn with S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline); S-125 Pechora structures. Indeed, NATO standards are being adopted and
(SA-3 Goa); S-125 Pechora-2M (SA-26); S-200 Angara the general staff has also been restructured in accordance
(SA-5 Gammon); FD-2000 (HQ-9); KS-1A (HQ-12) with NATO standards. The reform process has also centred
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE on improving command and control, and reorganising and
AIRCRAFT 55 combat capable standardising unit establishments. New formations have
FTR 24: 22 MiG-29A/S Fulcrum; 2 MiG-29UB Fulcrum been created, and volunteer units incorporated into the
ATK 31: 19 Su-25 Frogfoot; 12 Su-25MK Frogfoot army and the national guard. Training has been increased,
TPT • Light 3: 1 An-26 Curl; 2 An-74TK Coaler including developing a professional NCO education
TRG 2 L-39 Albatros system. Organisational reforms are driven by the need
HELICOPTERS to increase the proportion of combat personnel in the
ATK 10 Mi-24P Hind F overall establishment strength. The influence of NATO
MRH 2+ AW139 and its member states on the reform process is illustrated
TPT 11: Medium 8: 6 Mi-8 Hip; 2 Mi-17V-V Hip; Light by Ukraine’s special-operations forces and the number of
3+ AW109 specialist supporting centres that have developed within
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES them. Ukrainian defence industry was consolidated under
AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer) the state-owned Ukroboronprom organisation in 2010. It is
AIR DEFENCE • SAM able to provide almost all of the armed forces’ equipment,
Long-range S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon); FD-2000 (HQ- in particular armoured vehicles and fixed-wing transport
9) aircraft, and has even resumed delivery of export orders.
Medium-range S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline); S-125 Much of the focus of the Ukrainian defence industry in the
Pechora-2M (SA-26); KS-1A (HQ-12) past couple of years has been on repairing and modernising
Short-range S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa); S-125-2BM Pechora equipment for use by the newly expanded armed forces.
Ukraine receives training, advice and assistance from the
Paramilitary 5,000 US and other NATO countries. Ukraine has also increased
participation in multinational exercises, and hosted
Federal Border Guard Service ε5,000 the multinational Rapid Trident 2017 exercise. Aircraft
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE availability remains problematic; L-39 training aircraft
HELICOPTERS have been attached to tactical-aviation brigades in order to
MRH 2 AW139 increase flying hours for Flanker and Fulcrum pilots. The
TPT 3+: Medium some Mi-8 Hip; Light 3 AW109 limited availability of fixed-wing transport aircraft and
helicopters places restrictions on the rapid mobility of APC 338

forces. (See pp. 179–80.) APC (T) 15+: 15 BTR-D; some MT-LB
APC (W) 313: 5 BTR-60; 215 BTR-70; 93 BTR-80
ACTIVE 204,000 (Army 145,000 Navy 6,000 Air PPV 10 Kozak-2  
Force 45,000 Airborne 8,000 Special Operations ABCV 30: 15 BMD-1, 15 BMD-2
Forces n.k.) Paramilitary 88,000 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Conscript liability Army, Air Force 18 months, Navy 2 years. AEV 53 BAT-2; MT-LB
Minimum age for conscription raised from 18 to 20 in 2015 ARV BREM-1; BREM-2; BREM-64; T-54/T-55
RESERVE 900,000 (Joint 900,000)   VLB MTU-20
Military service within 5 years ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL • MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113
Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K114 Shturm (AT-6 Spiral);
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Stugna-P
GUNS 100mm ε500 MT-12/T-12
Army 145,000 ARTILLERY 1,737
4 regional HQ SP 532+: 122mm 238 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 288: 235 2S3
FORCES BY ROLE Akatsiya; 18 2S5 Giatsint-S; 35 2S19 Msta-S; 203mm 6+
MANOEUVRE 2S7 Pion (up to 90 2S7 Pion in store)
Reconnaissance TOWED 515+: 122mm 75 D-30; 152mm 440: 180 2A36
5 recce bn Giatsint-B; 130 2A65 Msta-B; 130+ D-20
Armoured GUN/MOR • 120mm • TOWED 2 2B16 NONA-K
2 tk bde MRL 348: 122mm 203: 18 9P138; 185 BM-21 Grad;
Mechanised 220mm 70 9P140 Uragan; 300mm 75 9A52 Smerch
9 mech bde MOR 120mm 340: 190 2S12 Sani; 30 M-1938 (PM-38);
2 mtn bde 120 M120-15
Light SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
4 mot inf bde SRBM • Conventional 90 9K79 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab)
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES RADAR • LAND AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder (arty); Small Fred/
1 SSM bde Small Yawn/SNAR-10 Big Fred (arty)
COMBAT SUPPORT HELICOPTERS
5 arty bde ATK ε35 Mi-24 Hind
3 MRL regt MRH 1 Lev-1
1 engr regt TPT • Medium ε24 Mi-8 Hip
1 EW regt AIR DEFENCE
1 EW bn SAM
2 EW coy Long-range (Some S-300V (SA-12 Gladiator) in store)
1 CBRN regt Point-defence 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher); 9K33
4 sigs regt Osa (SA-8 Gecko)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT GUNS
3 maint regt SP 30mm 70 2S6
1 maint coy TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm S-60
HELICOPTERS
4 avn bde Navy 6,000 (incl Naval Aviation and Naval
1 avn regt
Infantry)
AIR DEFENCE
After Russia’s annexation of Crimea, HQ shifted to Odessa.
4 AD regt
Several additional vessels remain in Russian possession in
Reserves Crimea
FORCES BY ROLE 2 Regional HQ
MANOEUVRE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Light PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 1
25+ inf bn FRIGATES • FFHM 1 Hetman Sagaidachny (RUS Krivak
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE III) with 1 twin lnchr with Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM,
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 2 quad 533mm ASTT with T-53 HWT, 1 100mm gun
MBT 832: 710 T-64/T-64BV/BM; 100 T-72AV/B1; 22 (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel)
T-80BV (10 T-84 Oplot; 100 T-80; 530 T-72; 588 T-64; 20 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10
T-55 all in store) CORVETTES • FSM 1 Grisha (II/V) with 1 twin lnchr
RECCE 548: 433 BRDM-2; 115 BRM-1K (CP) with Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT
IFV 1,087: 193 BMP-1; 890 BMP-2; 4 BMP-3; some BTR- with SAET-60 HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1
3DA; some BTR-3E1; some BTR-4E Bucephalus 76mm gun
PCFGM 1 Tarantul II (FSU Molnya) with 2 twin lnchr TRANSPORT

with P-15 Termit-R (SS-N-2D Styx) AShM; 1 quad lnchr 3 bde with An-24; An-26; An-30; Il-76 Candid; Tu-134
(manual aiming) with 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) Crusty
SAM; 1 76mm gun TRAINING
PHG 1 Matka (FSU Vekhr) with 2 single lnchr with P-15 Some sqn with L-39 Albatros
Termit-M/R (SS-N-2C/D Styx) AShM, 1 76mm gun TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
PB 1 Zhuk (FSU Grif) Some sqn with Mi-8; Mi-9; PZL Mi-2 Hoplite
PBR 6 Gyurza-M (Project 51855) with 2 Katran-M IFV AIR DEFENCE
turret with 1 twin lnchr with Baryer ATGM 6 bde with 9K37M Buk-M1 (SA-11 Gadfly); S-300P/PS/PT
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 1 (SA-10 Grumble)
MHI 1 Korund (Yevgenya) (Project 1258) 4 regt with 9K37M Buk-M1 (SA-11); S-300P/PS/PT (SA-10)
AMPHIBIOUS EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
LANDING SHIPS 2 AIRCRAFT ε125 combat capable
LST 1 Ropucha I (Project 775) FTR 71: ε37 MiG-29 Fulcrum; ε34 Su-27 Flanker
LSM 1 Polnochny C (capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops) FGA ε14 Su-24M Fencer
Russia and Eurasia

LANDING CRAFT • LCU 3 ATK ε31 Su-25 Frogfoot
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 11 ISR 12: 3 An-30 Clank; ε9 Su-24MR Fencer E*
ABU 1 Project 419 (Sura) TPT 30: Heavy 5 Il-76 Candid; Medium 1 An-70; Light
AG 1 Bereza ε24: 3 An-24 Coke; ε20 An-26 Curl; 1 Tu-134 Crusty
AGI 1 Muna TRG ε32 L-39 Albatros
AGS 1 Biya HELICOPTERS
AKL 1 C2 ε14 Mi-9
AO 2 Toplivo TPT 32: Medium ε30 Mi-8 Hip; Light 2 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite
AWT 1 Sudak AIR DEFENCE • SAM 322:
AXL 3 Petrushka Long-range 250 S-300P/PS/PT (SA-10 Grumble)
Medium-range 72 9K37M Buk-M1 (SA-11 Gadfly)
Naval Aviation ε1,000
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer)
FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT SARH R-27 (AA-10A Alamo)
ASW (2 Be-12 Mail non-operational) ASM Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen); Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge)
TPT • Light (2 An-26 Curl in store) ARM Kh-25MP (AS-12 Kegler); Kh-58 (AS-11 Kilter); Kh-
HELICOPTERS 28 (AS-9 Kyle) (likely WFU)
ASW 7+: 4+ Ka-27 Helix A; 3 Mi-14PS/PL Haze A/C
TPT • Medium 1 Ka-29 Helix-B
High-Mobility Airborne Troops ε8,000
Naval Infantry ε2,000 FORCES BY ROLE
FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE
MANOEUVRE Air Manoeuvre
Light 1 AB bde
1 nav inf bde 4 air mob bde
1 nav inf bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES IFV 75+: 30 BMD-1; 45 BMD-2; some BTR-3E1; some
MBT 31 T-80BV BTR-4 Bucephalus
IFV some BMP-1 APC 160+
APC • APC (W) some BTR-60; some BTR-80 APC (T) 25 BTR-D
ARTILLERY APC (W) 135+: 1 BTR-60; 2 BTR-70; 122 BTR-80; 10+
SP 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika Dozor-B
TOWED 152mm some 2A36 Giatsint-B ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL • MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1
Air Forces 45,000 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel)
ARTILLERY 118
TOWED • 122mm 54 D-30
3 Regional HQ GUN/MOR • SP • 120mm 40 2S9 NONA-S
FORCES BY ROLE MOR 120mm 24 2S12 Sani
FIGHTER AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • SP 23mm some ZU-23-2 (truck
4 bde with MiG-29 Fulcrum; Su-27 Flanker; L-39 Albatros mounted)
2 bde with Su-24M Fencer; Su-25 Frogfoot Special Operations Forces n.k.
ISR SPECIAL FORCES
2 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer E* 2 SF regt
Paramilitary 88,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

National Guard ε46,000 PCFT 6 Stenka with 4 single 406mm TT
Ministry of Internal Affairs; 5 territorial comd PCT 3 Pauk I with 4 single 406mm TT, 2 RBU-1200
FORCES BY ROLE A/S mor, 1 76mm gun
MANOEUVRE PHT 1 Muravey with 2 single 406mm TT, 1 76mm gun
Armoured PB 12: 11 Zhuk; 1 Orlan
Some tk bn PBR 4 Shmel
Mechanised LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGF 1
Some mech bn AIRCRAFT • TPT Medium An-8 Camp; Light An-24
Light Coke; An-26 Curl; An-72 Coaler
Some lt inf bn HELICOPTERS • ASW: Ka-27 Helix A
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Cyber
MBT T-64; T-64BV; T-64BM; T-72 Ukraine remains the target of persistent and damaging
IFV 83: BTR-3; 32+ BTR-3E1; ε50 BTR-4 Bucephalus; 1 cyber attacks, which have prompted greater state attention
BMP-2 and international support. In June 2016, a National Cyber
Security Coordination Centre was established, a year after
APC 22+
the publication of the National Cyber Security Strategy.
APC (W) BTR-70; BTR-80
This centre is an agency of the National Security and
PPV 22+: Streit Cougar; Streit Spartan; 22 Kozak-2  
Defence Council and will consist of representatives from
MoD, armed forces and the SBU (security service), among
RCL 73mm some SPG-9
others. Through a Cyber Defence Trust Fund, NATO states
ARTILLERY
are extending help to Ukraine in developing its technical
TOWED 122mm some D-30
capability to counter cyber attack. According to NATO,
MOR 120mm some
this help will include establishing an Incident Management
AIRCRAFT
Centre. Ukraine has also received assistance from a number
TPT • Light 24: 20 An-26 Curl; 2 An-72 Coaler; 2 Tu-
of member states in addressing cyber threats. In April
134 Crusty
2017, Ukroboronprom announced plans to set up a cyber-
HELICOPTERS • TPT Medium 7 Mi-8 Hip
security centre in cooperation with Turkish firm Havelsan.
AIR DEFENCE
SAM • Point-defence 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse)
GUNS • SP 23mm some ZU-23-2 (truck mounted) DEPLOYMENT
Border Guard ε42,000 AFGHANISTAN
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE CYPRUS
Light UN • UNFICYP 2
some mot inf gp
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
UN • MONUSCO 255; 9 obs; 2 atk hel sqn; 1 hel sqn
APC • PPV 17 Kozak-2 LIBERIA
UN • UNMIL 107; 1 hel sqn
Maritime Border Guard
MOLDOVA
The Maritime Border Guard is an independent
subdivision of the State Commission for Border 10 obs
Guards and is not part of the navy SERBIA
FORCES BY ROLE NATO • KFOR 40
PATROL OSCE • Kosovo 1
4 (cutter) bde UN • UNMIK 2 obs
2 rvn bde
MINE WARFARE SOUTH SUDAN
1 MCM sqn UN • UNMISS 1; 3 obs
TRANSPORT SUDAN
3 sqn UN • UNISFA 1; 3 obs
1 sqn
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT FOREIGN FORCES
1 trg div Albania OSCE 3
1 (aux ships) gp Armenia OSCE 2
Austria OSCE 14 EASTERN UKRAINE SEPARATIST FORCES

Azerbaijan OSCE 1
Belarus OSCE 1 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Belgium OSCE 4
Bosnia-Herzegovina OSCE 37 Donetsk People’s Republic ε20,000
Bulgaria OSCE 35 FORCES BY ROLE
Canada OSCE 22 • Operation Unifier 200 SPECIAL FORCES
2 (Spetsnaz) SF bn
Croatia OSCE 10
MANOEUVRE
Czech Republic OSCE 15 Reconnaissance
Denmark OSCE 4 1 recce bn
Estonia OSCE 5 Armoured
Finland OSCE 17 1 tk bn
France OSCE 14 Light
Russia and Eurasia

6 mot inf bde
Georgia OSCE 12
COMBAT SUPPORT
Germany OSCE 27
1 arty bde
Greece OSCE 22 1 engr coy
Hungary OSCE 30 1 EW coy
Ireland OSCE 12 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Italy OSCE 19 1 log bn
Kazakhstan OSCE 4 AIR DEFENCE
1 AD bn
Kyrgyzstan OSCE 17
Latvia OSCE 4 Luhansk People’s Republic ε14,000
Lithuania OSCE 3 • JMTG-U 16 FORCES BY ROLE
Macedonia (FYROM) OSCE 24 MANOEUVRE
Moldova OSCE 33 Reconnaissance
Montenegro OSCE 2 1 recce bn
Armoured
Netherlands OSCE 4
1 tk bn
Norway OSCE 17 Light
Poland OSCE 35 4 mot inf bde
Portugal OSCE 4 COMBAT SUPPORT
Romania OSCE 32 1 arty bde
Russia OSCE 36 1 engr coy
Serbia OSCE 10 1 EW coy
Slovakia OSCE 10
1 log bn
Slovenia OSCE 2 AIR DEFENCE
Spain OSCE 13 1 AD bn
Sweden OSCE 10 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Switzerland OSCE 11 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Tajikistan OSCE 14 MBT T-64BV; T-64B; T-64BM†; T-72B1; T-72BA
Turkey OSCE 11 RECCE BDRM-2
United Kingdom OSCE 51 • Operation Orbital 100 IFV BMP-1; BMP-2; BTR-4
APC
United States OSCE 68 • JMTG-U 310
APC (T) BTR-D; MT-LB; GT-MU
APC (W) BTR-60; BTR-70; BTR-80
TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT ABCV BMD-1, BMD-2
DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn); 9K135 Kornet (AT-14
CONTROL
Spriggan)
Following the overthrow of Ukraine’s President Yanukovich RCL 73mm SPG-9
in February 2014, the region of Crimea requested to join GUNS 100mm MT-12
the Russian Federation after a referendum regarded as ARTILLERY
unconstitutional by the new Ukrainian government. Data SP 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 2S3 Akatsiya; 2S19
presented here represents the de facto situation and does Msta-S†; 203mm 2S7 Pion
not imply international recognition. TOWED 122mm D-30; 152mm 2A65 Msta-B
GUN/MOR era equipment. A sizeable air capability was inherited

SP 120mm 2S9 NONA-S from the Soviet Union, but minimal recapitalisation in the
TOWED 120mm 2B16 NONA-K intervening period has substantially reduced the active
MRL 122mm BM-21 Grad inventory. However, in recent years there has been some
MOR 82mm 2B14; 120mm 2B11 Sani procurement of rotary- and fixed-wing transport assets.
AIR DEFENCE Flying hours are reported to be low, with logistical and
SAM maintenance shortcomings affecting the availability of the
Short-range 9K332 Tor-M2 (SA-15 Gauntlet) remaining aircraft.
Point-defence 2K22 Tunguska (SA-19 Grison); 9K32M
Strela-2M (SA-7B Grail); 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); 9K35 ACTIVE 48,000 (Army 24,500 Air 7,500 Joint 16,000)
Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher); 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse); Paramilitary 20,000
GROM Conscript liability 12 months
GUNS
SP 23mm ZU-23-2 (tch/on MT-LB) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-2; 57mm S-60
Army 24,500
FOREIGN FORCES 4 Mil Districts; 2 op comd; 1 Tashkent Comd
Russia Crimea: 28,000; 1 recce bde, 2 naval inf bde; 1 arty FORCES BY ROLE
bde; 1 NBC bde; 40 T-72B3 MBT; 80 BMP-2 AIFV; 200 SPECIAL FORCES
BTR-82A; 20 BTR-80 APC: 150 MT-LB; 18 2S1 arty; 18 2S19 1 SF bde
arty; 12 BM-21 MRL; 1 AShM bde with 3K60 Bal; 3K55 MANOEUVRE
Bastion; 1 FGA regt with Su-24M/MR; Su-30SM; 1 FGA Armoured
regt with Su-27SM/SM3; Su-30M2; 1 FGA regt with Su- 1 tk bde
24M/Su-25SM; 1 atk/tpt hel regt; 1 ASW hel regt; 1 AD regt Mechanised
with S-300PM; 1 AD regt with S-400; 1 Fleet HQ located at 11 MR bde
Sevastopol; 2 radar stations located at Sevastopol (Dnepr Air Manoeuvre
system) and Mukachevo (Dnepr system) 1 air aslt bde
Donetsk/Luhansk: 3,000 (reported) 1 AB bde
Mountain
Uzbekistan UZB 1 lt mtn inf bde
COMBAT SUPPORT
Uzbekistani Som s 2016 2017 2018 3 arty bde
GDP s 199tr 245tr 1 MRL bde
US$ 66.8bn 67.5bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
per capita US$ 2,133 2,128 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 340: 70 T-72; 100 T-64; 170 T-62  
Growth % 7.8 6.0
RECCE 19: 13 BRDM-2; 6 BRM-1
Inflation % 8.0 13.0
IFV 270 BMP-2
Def exp s n.k. n.k. APC 359
US$ n.k. n.k. APC (T) 50 BTR-D
FMA (US) US$ 0m 0m APC (W) 259: 24 BTR-60; 25 BTR-70; 210 BTR-80
US$1=s 2,928.90 3,635.39 PPV 50 Maxxpro+
ABCV 129: 120 BMD-1; 9 BMD-2
AUV 7 Cougar
Ethnic groups: Uzbek 73%; Russian 6%; Tajik 5%; Kazakh 4%; ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Karakalpak 2%; Tatar 2%; Korean <1%; Ukrainian <1%
ARV 20 Maxxpro ARV
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Male 12.2% 4.3% 5.1% 5.2% 20.6% 2.2%
Fagot (AT-4 Spigot)
Female 11.6% 4.1% 4.9% 5.2% 21.4% 3.0% GUNS 100mm 36 MT-12/T-12
ARTILLERY 487+
Capabilities SP 83+: 122mm 18 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 17+: 17 2S3
The security situation in neighbouring Afghanistan is Akatsiya; 2S5 Giatsint-S (reported); 203mm 48 2S7 Pion
a key concern, particularly the rise of ISIS there and the TOWED 200: 122mm 60 D-30; 152mm 140 2A36 Giatsint-B
possibility of instability spilling over Uzbekistan’s border. GUN/MOR 120mm 54 2S9 NONA-S
Although Uzbekistan is a member of the SCO, it suspended MRL 108: 122mm 60: 36 BM-21 Grad; 24 9P138; 220mm
its membership of the CSTO in mid-2012. It maintains 48 9P140 Uragan
bilateral defence ties with Moscow and uses mainly Soviet- MOR 120mm 42: 5 2B11 Sani; 19 2S12 Sani; 18 M-120
Air Force 7,500 EW/Tpt 26 An-12 Cub (med tpt)/An-12PP Cub (EW)
ELINT/Tpt 13 An-26 Curl (lt tpt)/An-26RKR Curl (ELINT)
FORCES BY ROLE
TPT 7: Heavy 1 Il-76 Candid; Light 6: 1 An-24 Coke; 4
FIGHTER
C295W; 1 Tu-134 Crusty
1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum;
TRG 14 L-39 Albatros
HELICOPTERS
ATK 29 Mi-24 Hind
1 regt with Su-24 Fencer TPT 69: Heavy 9: 8 H225M Caracal; 1 Mi-26 Halo; Medium
GROUND ATTACK 52 Mi-8 Hip; Light 8 AS350 Ecureuil
2 sqn with Su-25/Su-25BM Frogfoot AIR DEFENCE • SAM 45
ELINT/TRANSPORT Long-range S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon)
1 regt with An-12/An-12PP Cub; An-26/An-26RKR Curl Medium-range S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline)
TRANSPORT Short-range S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa)
Some sqn with An-24 Coke; C295W; Tu-134 Crusty AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
TRAINING AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer); IR/
Russia and Eurasia

1 sqn with L-39 Albatros SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo)
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER ASM Kh-23 (AS-7 Kerry); Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen)
1 regt with Mi-24 Hind; Mi-26 Halo; Mi-8 Hip; ARM Kh-25P (AS-12 Kegler); Kh-28 (AS-9 Kyle); Kh-58
1 regt with Mi-6 Hook; Mi-6AYa Hook C (AS-11 Kilter)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 45 combat capable Paramilitary up to 20,000
FTR 12 MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum (18 more in store)
FGA 13 Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker (11 more in store) (26 Su-
Internal Security Troops up to 19,000 
17M (Su-17MZ)/Su-17UM-3 (Su-17UMZ) Fitter C/G non-
operational) National Guard 1,000
ATK 20 Su-25/Su-25BM Frogfoot Ministry of Defence
Arms procurements and deliveries – Russia and Eurasia

Significant events in 2017
MiG unveiled its MiG-35 combat aircraft, which is President Vladimir Putin signed a decree approving
a further upgrade of the MiG-29 Fulcrum. An initial the transfer of defence company UralVagonZavod
batch of 24 aircraft is planned to be ordered in the to Rostec in December 2016. The process was
next State Armament Programme for 2018–27. expected to be completed by the end of 2017 or
early 2018.
Missile manufacturer KTRV announced that it

would complete development and testing of The head of Almaz-Antey was reportedly sacked
the infrared-guided Kh-38MT and Grom-1 air-to- after delays in the development of the Poliment-
surface missiles by the end of 2017. Redut and Shtil air-defence systems.
The Russian defence ministry ordered the first Russia’s deputy defence minister stated that a
pair of production-standard Mi-38T transport PAK-DA bomber prototype is now expected to
helicopters for the Aerospace Forces. undertake its maiden flight in 2025 or 2026, with
series production beginning in 2028 or 2029.
Russia’s defence industry began to deliver MiG-

29M2 fighter aircraft and Ka-52 attack helicopters Russia’s A-100 airborne early-warning-and-control
to Egypt. aircraft prototype undertook its maiden flight
in November 2017. The A-100 is based on the
Il-76MD-90A airframe and is planned to replace
Trials of the Yak-152 basic-training aircraft were Russia’s A-50 and A-50U aircraft.
due to be completed by the end of 2017.
Table 10 9K720 Iskander-M/-K (SS-26 Stone/SSC-7): brigade-set deliveries to Russia

Contract Date delivered Unit Location Military District
2010 Mid-2011 26th Missile Brigade Luga Western
Aug 2011 Jul 2013 107th Missile Brigade Birobidzhan Eastern
Aug 2011 Nov 2013 1st Missile Brigade Krasnodar Southern
Aug 2011 Jul 2014 112th Missile Brigade Shuya Western
Aug 2011 Nov 2014 92nd Missile Brigade Totskoye Vtorye Central
Aug 2011 Jul 2015 103rd Missile Brigade Ulan-Ude Eastern
Aug 2011 Nov 2015 12th Missile Brigade Mozdok Southern
Aug 2011 Jun 2016 20th Missile Brigade Ussuriysk Eastern
Aug 2011 Nov 2016 119th Missile Brigade Elanskiy Central
Aug 2011 Jun 2017 3rd Missile Brigade (new formation; Gorny Eastern
reported)
Aug 2011 Nov 2017 152nd Missile Brigade (Navy) Kaliningrad Western
Units yet to receive Iskander
Aug 2017 2018* 448th Missile Brigade Kursk Western
Aug 2017 2018* n.k. (new formation) n.k. n.k.
*Expected date of delivery
Table 11 Russia: principal surface- and sub-surface-combatant commissioning, 2012–17

With just over half of the principal surface-combatant fleet having entered service before 1991, the Russian Navy has a clear
requirement for new aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers and frigates if it is to maintain its current size. As this table illustrates,
the Russian shipbuilding industry has struggled to meet this need, with only six frigates entering service from 2012 to October
2017. Problems with the Admiral Gorshkov (Project 22350) destroyer’s Poliment-Redut (SA-NX-28) air-defence system have
prevented that class joining the fleet. It was originally planned to enter service in 2009. Other United Shipbuilding Corporation
(USC) programmes that have struggled to enter service on time or are significantly delayed include the Ivan Gren (Project 11711)
landing ships and the Alexandrit-class (Project 12700) mine-countermeasures vessels. Because of problems with USC, the Russian
government has been increasingly turning to other shipyards, such as Pella, Vympel and Zelenodolsk, to provide smaller missile
boats, often armed with the Kalibr land-attack cruise missile. One USC success story, however, has been Admiralty Shipyard’s
production of Varshavyanka (Project 636.3) conventionally powered submarines, variants of which are in service with Algeria,
China and Vietnam.
Type Class Project No. Shipyard Vessel Name ISD
FFGM Gepard 11661K Zelenodolsk Shipyard Dagestan 28 Nov 2012

FSM Buyan 21630 Almaz Shipbuilding Company Makhachkala 04 Dec 2012
Russia and Eurasia

SSBN Borey 955 Sevmash Shipyard Yuri Dolgorukiy 29 Dec 2012
FFGHM Steregushchiy 20380 Severnaya Verf Boiky 16 May 2013
SSBN Borey 955 Sevmash Shipyard Alexander Nevsky 23 Dec 2013
SSGN Yasen 885 Sevmash Shipyard Severodvinsk 17 Jun 2014
FFGHM Steregushchiy 20380 Severnaya Verf Stoiky 18 Jul 2014
FSGM Buyan-M 21631 Zelenodolsk Shipyard Grad Sviyazhsk 27 Jul 2014
FSGM Buyan-M 21631 Zelenodolsk Shipyard Uglich 27 Jul 2014
SSK Varshavyanka 636.3 Admiralty Shipyard Novorossiysk 21 Aug 2014
SSBN Borey 955 Sevmash Shipyard Vladimir Monomakh 10 Dec 2014
FSGM Buyan-M 21631 Zelenodolsk Shipyard Velikiye Ustyug 19 Dec 2014
SSK Varshavyanka 636.3 Admiralty Shipyard Rostov on Don 26 Dec 2014
SSK Varshavyanka 636.3 Admiralty Shipyard Stary Oskol 25 Jun 2015
SSK Varshavyanka 636.3 Admiralty Shipyard Krasnodar 05 Nov 2015
FSGM Buyan-M 21631 Zelenodolsk Shipyard Zeleny Dol 12 Dec 2015
FSGM Buyan-M 21631 Zelenodolsk Shipyard Serpukhov 12 Dec 2015
FFGHM Admiral Grigorovich 11356 Yantar Shipyard Admiral Grigorovich 27 May 2016
FFGHM Admiral Grigorovich 11356 Yantar Shipyard Admiral Essen 07 Jun 2016
SSK Varshavyanka 636.3 Admiralty Shipyard Veliky Novgorod 26 Oct 2016
SSK Varshavyanka 636.3 Admiralty Shipyard Kolpino 24 Nov 2016
FFGHM Steregushchiy 20380 Amur Shipbuilding Plant Sovershenny 20 Jul 2017
Figure 11 Russian Air Force: tactical-aircraft deliveries, 2010–16
70
MiG-29SMT
60 Su-35S
Su-34
50
Su-30SM
Number of aircraft
40 Su-30M2
Su-27SM3
30
20
10
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

© IISS
Timeline 2010: Series 2015/16: 2019: expected
production expected T-50 T-50 ISD (as of
planned to begin ISD (as of 2010) 2017)
Planned
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
Actual
1986: MiG is 1991: Dissolution 2002: Russia selects 2003: Sukhoi 2010: First T-50 2016 – First ground
selected to lead of the Soviet Sukhoi’s T-50 contracted to prototype makes tests on advanced
the MFI fighter Union proposal over MiG’s develop T-50 maiden flight Izdeliye-30 engine
project E-721 design
Figure 12 Russia: Sukhoi Su-57 (T-50)
T-50 (Su-57) prototypes as of September 2017

Serial Number Factory Number First Flight Notes
- T-50-0 - Static-test airframe
- T-50-KNU - Static-test airframe
051 BLUE T-50-1 29 Jan 2010
052 BLUE T-50-2 3 Mar 2011
053 BLUE T-50-3 22 Nov 2011
054 BLUE T-50-4 2 Dec 2012
In 1986, MiG was selected to lead the Soviet Union’s multi-role front-line fighter (MFI) 055 BLUE T-50-5 27 Oct 2013 & Seriously damaged by
project. This programme eventually fell into abeyance in the financially straitened 1990s, and 16 Oct 2015 fire in 2014. Testing
Russia launched a new fifth-generation-fighter programme to meet its PAK-FA requirement. resumes in 2015
The selection of Sukhoi’s T-50 design over MiG’s E-721 cemented the former as Russia’s pre- 056 BLUE* T-50-6 27 Apr 2016
eminent fighter-aircraft design bureau. (MiG now places its hopes for significant combat-
- T-50-7 - Static-test airframe
aircraft orders on the Russian defence ministry acquiring a large number of MiG-35s, the latest
version of the long-serving MiG-29 design.) Sukhoi was awarded the PAK-FA development 057 BLUE* T-50-8 17 Nov 2016
contract with an ambitious plan to begin series production of a final aircraft design in 2010. 509 BLUE* T-50-9 24 Apr 2017
As of late 2017, however, limited series production of the Su-57, as the T-50 will be known in
511 BLUE* T-50-11 6 Aug 2017
Russian service, was expected to begin in 2018. Delays in development of the new and more
powerful Izdeliye-30 engine mean that the first aircraft to be delivered will be powered by the *Built to modified design with reportedly strengthened fuselage to avoid
AL-41F1 (Izdeliye-117) engine, also used on the Su-35S. Budget pressures caused by economic cracking issues seen in previous prototypes
difficulties as well as other high-profile procurement programmes may mean that the Su-57
will be acquired in lower numbers, and at a slower pace, than previously envisaged.
© IISS
Chapter Six
Asia
In the Asia-Pacific region, the influences on defence China and member states of the Association of
policy, military spending and equipment procure- Southeast Asian Nations agreed a framework for
ment, and on the development of armed forces’ a code of conduct in the area, in May 2017. The
capabilities, were as wide-ranging as ever in 2017. reality, however, was that Beijing further strength-
However, the most important were pervasive and ened its military bases in the South China Sea, on
persistent insecurity; economic circumstances that the features it had physically expanded after 2012.
allowed for a relatively high – and in some cases At the same time, it continued to engage in coer-
increasing – allocation of national resources to the cive behaviour there. For the Chinese Communist
armed forces; and domestic political circumstances, Party and the PLA, securing greater control of South
which often helped to support ambitious defence China Sea features and surrounding waters was
programmes. evidently a strategic priority, despite the unease that
The most important factors driving the region’s Beijing’s actions were creating in Southeast Asia and
sense of insecurity were evident at the 16th IISS beyond. In July, following Hanoi’s refusal to yield
Shangri-La Dialogue. In June 2017, this annual to Chinese demands to halt drilling by a Spanish oil
Asia
event again brought together in Singapore defence company on Vanguard Bank, an area that Vietnam
ministers and other senior representatives of Asia- claimed was within its exclusive economic zone,
Pacific defence establishments. Serious concern Beijing reportedly threatened to use force against
over the security ramifications of China’s emer- a Vietnamese-occupied feature. In August, China
gence as a major strategic actor in the Asia-Pacific deployed a flotilla of fishing vessels, accompanied
and beyond was as apparent as it had been for the by PLAN and coastguard ships, close to Pagasa, the
last half-decade – particularly in terms of its mari- largest feature occupied by the Philippines in the
time assertiveness and the growing presence of the Spratly Islands.
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in regional While Southeast Asian governments emphasised
waters. Meanwhile, Australia, Japan, the Republic the importance of diplomacy in managing regional
of Korea (ROK) and other regional states had good maritime tensions, in these circumstances several
reason to view North Korea’s accelerating develop- states have continued their efforts to develop military
ment of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles capabilities that could help to deter potential future
as an acute threat. In addition, some Southeast Chinese aggression. In February, Vietnam commis-
Asian defence ministers and military chiefs viewed sioned the last two of six Project 636.1 (improved
jihadi terrorism as an increasingly important chal- Kilo-class) submarines supplied by Russia. At the
lenge, particularly as the Islamic State, also known commissioning ceremony, Prime Minister Nguyễn
as ISIS or ISIL, lost territory in the Middle East and Xuân Phúc praised the Vietnamese Navy’s will-
the risk increased that its fighters might disperse ingness to defend ‘every inch’ of national terri-
to Southeast Asia. A new concern for regional tory including territorial waters. Later in the year,
states was the uncertainty generated by the Trump Vietnam received a third Russian Gepard 3.9-class
administration, which had appeared to question frigate, with another due by year’s end. Reflecting
the importance of the United States’ alliances, and Hanoi’s increasing sense of vulnerability to Chinese
also seemed to have no clear strategy towards the pressure, Minister of National Defence Ngo Xuan
region. Lich visited Washington DC in August, where he
met US Secretary of Defense James Mattis; the two
Concerns over China sides reached an agreement on increased bilateral
Developments since the turn of 2017 only rein- naval engagement and information-sharing, and
forced these concerns. Chinese government repre- more importantly that a US aircraft carrier would
sentatives claimed that the South China Sea was visit Vietnam during 2018, the first such visit since
now ‘quiet’, particularly after senior officials from the Vietnamese communists’ victory in 1975.
Five Power Defence Arrangements

The Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) is a low- At the FPDA’s tenth defence ministers’ meeting in Sing
profile but important regional security institution estab- apore on 2 June 2017, which was timed to coincide with
lished in 1971, based on a set of bilateral agreements be- the 16th IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, ministers agreed ‘to
tween Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and continually enhance the operational value of the exer
the United Kingdom in the wake of the UK’s withdrawal cises including incorporating newer capabilities’. This ap-
of most of its military forces from ‘East of Suez’. While it parently reflected a strong feeling on the part of mem-
does not involve formal alliance relations, its members bers with more advanced capabilities, notably Australia
are committed to consult in the event – or threat – of an and the UK, that ‘high-end’ exercises, which would pro-
attack on Malaysia or Singapore, with the aim of decid- vide opportunities to deploy their latest equipment, were
ing how to respond. Originally intended to hedge against vital if their armed forces were to continue deriving value
the resurgence of an unstable and threatening Indonesia, from participation. UK officials, including Foreign Sec-
which had engaged in a politico-military campaign of retary Boris Johnson, have confirmed that the UK’s new
Konfrontasi (‘Confrontation’) against Malaysia in 1963–66, Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers will be deployed to
the FPDA also provided channels of communication on the Asia-Pacific region from the early 2020s; it is conceiv-
defence matters between Malaysia and Singapore, as able that such deployments could include participation
well as a degree of reassurance as communist victories in in FPDA exercises.
Indochina seemed ever more likely. The FPDA ministers also agreed in Singapore to en-
The subsequent transformation of Southeast Asia’s hance opportunities for non-member countries in the
strategic environment has rendered the original rationale region to observe the grouping’s exercises. Given its
for the FPDA much less compelling. However, Malaysia origins, the FPDA’s members view the involvement of
and Singapore have continued to face diverse security observers from the Indonesian armed forces as par-
challenges and, over time, the FPDA’s member govern- ticularly important. Significantly, given the start of the
ments have adapted the grouping in ways that transcend urban uprising in Marawi in the southern Philippines a
its origins. Organised from its small multinational perma- week earlier, the ministers additionally agreed to ‘share
nent headquarters, HQ Integrated Area Defence System, intelligence to deal with terrorist threats against Ma-
at Butterworth air base in Malaysia, the FPDA’s exercises laysia and Singapore’, as well as unspecified ‘further
– such as Bersama Lima in October 2016, which involved measures to strengthen counter-terrorist activities’.
more than 3,000 personnel, 71 aircraft and 12 naval ves- All the indications are that the FPDA will maintain its
sels – have evolved to reflect contemporary security con- usefulness as a security institution linking Australia,
cerns, including terrorism and humanitarian assistance New Zealand and the UK to Southeast Asian security
and disaster relief. concerns.
Meanwhile, growing concern over the chal- partners. In November 2016, Japan’s then-minister
lenge posed by China’s emergence as an assertive of defense, Tomomi Inada, highlighted Tokyo’s
major power has continued to significantly influ- commitment to regional defence cooperation when
ence Japan’s defence policy and activity. While she launched the ‘Vientiane Vision’, intended to
the Abe administration’s August 2017 defence foster Southeast Asian defence establishments’
white paper was similar in content to the previous understanding of international law, promote mari-
edition, it noted that the number of Japan Air time security and build defence capacity. From May
Self-Defense Force interceptions of Chinese mili- to August 2017, Tokyo underlined its commitment
tary aircraft close to national airspace reached to protect its maritime interests, while reinforcing
a record level during the year preceding March the maritime security of its key Southeast Asian
2017. Such Chinese missions – which Tokyo saw partners, when it deployed the Japan Maritime
as ‘provocative’ – continued during 2017 and Self-Defense Force’s helicopter carrier Izumo,
included a group of six H-6K bombers which, in together with a destroyer, to the South China Sea
late August, flew close to Japan’s southern island of and nearby waters. The ships made port calls in the
Okinawa. Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam before partici-
One aspect of Japan’s response was to strengthen pating in the Malabar exercise with the Indian and
defence and security relations with Southeast Asian US navies.
Asia 221
Korean Peninsula September, South Korea’s air force tested, for the
North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes first time, a KEPD-350 Taurus air-launched cruise
have become more pressing concerns for the US and missile, further demonstrating precision-strike capa-
its Northeast Asian allies. In response to heightened bility.
anxiety caused by this threat, in March 2017 Itsunori
Onodera (who became Japan’s defence minister in Regional insurgency and terrorism
August) and other Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) While state-based challenges have become increas-
legislators urged Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to ingly important over the last half-decade, non-
consider giving the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) state threats have also intensified. Insurgencies in
the capacity to attack enemy bases. Japan’s defence Southeast Asia have continued to tax the armed
white paper claimed that the North Korean threat forces of Myanmar, Thailand and – particularly –
had ‘entered a new stage’ following two nuclear the Philippines. Although the southern Philippines
tests and more than 20 ballistic-missile launches has for around 45 years been the locus for armed
over the previous 12 months, and that North Korea struggles by a series of rebel groups drawing
might already have acquired nuclear warheads. In support from the Moro (Muslim) population of
parliament, Onodera warned that Tokyo would Basilan, Mindanao and Sulu, the eruption of a
be within its constitutional rights if it shot down major urban conflict in the city of Marawi in late
North Korean missiles threatening its territory, May 2017 represented a new challenge for secu-
and the defence ministry ordered the deployment rity forces that had hitherto been focused on rural
of six Patriot PAC-3 surface-to-air missile batteries counter-insurgency. Even with substantial support
Asia
to southwestern Japan. Abe’s conclusive victory in from the US in the form of logistics, intelligence
the October snap general election made it likely that and special-forces advisers, it took the Philippine
the new government would seek to revise consti- armed forces and police five months to win the
tutional constraints that have limited the JSDF to battle, which resulted in the deaths of more than
defensive roles. Such a revision would allow the 900 insurgents. Those killed included members of
acquisition of the offensive capabilities favoured by the local Maute and Abu Sayyaf rebel groups, both
Onodera. of which had allied themselves with ISIS, and it
Although South Korea’s Moon administra- was significant – and worrying for regional states’
tion evidently opposed the notion of prevent ive defence establishments – that the insurgents had
war against the North, fearing the calamitous been reinforced by foreign combatants from not
impact of such a conflict on the South’s population only Indonesia and elsewhere in Southeast Asia,
and economy, its deterrent strategy nevertheless but also the Middle East. Other distinctive features
required credible capabilities for preventive attacks of the Marawi battle included the militants’ exten-
in tandem with the US. Specifically, South Korea sive use of powerful and effective weapons, partic-
attempted to strengthen its deterrence of North ularly mortars and rocket-propelled grenades.
Korea through its Korean Massive Punishment and They also employed snipers, improvised explo-
Retaliation strategy, which emphasises precise long- sive devices and tunnel networks, suggesting the
range strikes into enemy territory. In July, following transfer of operational experience from ISIS opera-
North Korea’s second test of the Hwasong-14 inter- tions in Iraq and Syria; there was also evidence of
continental ballistic missile, US forces tested ISIS direction and funding.
ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System) missiles As such, there was widespread concern among
twice, and the ROK test-fired two Hyonmu II ballistic regional states over the potential for further
missiles. Following North Korea’s nuclear test on outbreaks of jihadi rebellion supported by ISIS in
3 September, US President Donald Trump agreed Southeast Asia, and fuelled by Southeast Asian and
during a telephone conversation with President other fighters with combat experience from the
Moon Jae-in on the removal of a bilaterally agreed Middle East. This concern stimulated an intensifica-
restriction on the weight of the warheads on South tion of counter-terrorism cooperation among some
Korea’s ballistic missiles. This change would allow, Southeast Asian states, and in June 2017 Indonesia,
for example, the new 800 kilometre-range version Malaysia and the Philippines – through their new
of South Korea’s Hyonmu II missile to carry a Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement – began coord
payload weighing more than 500 kilograms. In late inated maritime patrols in the Sulu Sea. In October,
they added Trilateral Air Patrols to the arrange- currencies appreciated against the US dollar in 2017,
ment. with some exceptions (for example, the Philippines
During 2017, US allies and security partners and Vietnam).
in the Asia-Pacific were concerned over the new In addition to exports, Japan’s improved growth
US administration’s apparent lack of a coherent was due to fiscal stimulus and private consumption.
strategy towards the region, and Trump’s evident Indeed, as of the second quarter of 2017, Japan was
view of alliances and partnerships as essentially experiencing a sixth consecutive quarter of growth.
transactional. Early visits by the new administra- Growth over six consecutive quarters had not occurred
tion’s vice-president, secretary of state and secre- since mid-2006. Besides the intensification of global
tary of defense, during which they reaffirmed trade, China’s economy was driven by continuing
Washington’s commitment, did not entirely reas- high levels of public investment. Higher growth in
sure sceptical and anxious regional policymakers. China has also helped to improve other economies
However, the substance of US security cooper in the region. For instance, Indonesia’s GDP rose
ation continued uninterrupted, in terms of exer- from 5.0% in 2016 to 5.2% in 2017, Malaysia’s from
cises, such as Cobra Gold, held in Thailand from 4.2% to 5.4% and Thailand’s from 3.2% to 3.7%. The
February to March; routine deployments of ships Philippines’ slowed from 6.9% to 6.6%, but remained
and aircraft; and the intensification of links with one of the fastest-growing economies in Asia.
new security partners. In late October, the US Navy Among the economies slowing down this year
revealed that an exercise the following month was India’s. In November 2016, the Modi govern-
would involve three of its carrier strike groups – ment demonetised more than 86% of the Indian
the first exercise on such a scale since 2007 and a currency: from 8 November, all existing 500 and
clear show of resolve in the face of the continuing 1,000 rupee notes became invalid. The rationale was
crisis over North Korea. to limit shadow economic activities, but the move
It was unclear whether the Trump administra- generated disruption, constraining small businesses
tion’s muscular approach to North Korea reassured and the availability of credit. Another Indian reform
US allies and partners, though it was apparent that temporarily affected growth was the new goods
that the change of administration in Washington and services tax, introduced in mid-2017, which
had provided yet more reasons for them to take was designed to unify several taxes. Nevertheless,
provision for their own national defence even more India’s GDP grew by 6.7% in 2017, following a rate
seriously. of 7.1% in 2016, and was forecast to rise to 7.4% in
2018.
DEFENCE ECONOMICS
Figure 13 Asia defence spending by country
Macroeconomics: the world’s fastest- and sub-region, 2017
growing region
In 2017, Asia continued to be the fastest-growing Other Southeast Asia 1.6%
Australia 6.59%
region in the world in economic terms, with a rate Vietnam 1.14%
Malaysia 0.92% Other Australasia 0.7%
of 5.6%. Some of the region’s largest economies
Thailand 1.63%
also achieved stronger than expected economic Indonesia 2.37%
performances, with China realising 6.8% growth Singapore 2.7%
(0.2 percentage points higher than previously fore- Other South Asia
1.84%
cast) and Japan 1.5% (0.3 percentage points higher).
Pakistan 2.63%
However, growth in Australia and New Zealand, at
China
2.2% and 3.5% respectively, slowed in comparison to India 13.9% 39.7%
2016 levels (2.5% and 3.6%).
Such regional growth was supported by Other East Asia
0.02%
strengthened global demand in 2017, while exports,
Taiwan 2.75%
including intra-Asian trade, were a key driver of
growth. In particular, exports rebounded in the South Korea 9.41% Japan 12.1%
electronics sector, which favoured states such Note: Analysis excludes North Korea and Lao PDR due to insufficient data.
as Malaysia and Singapore. Furthermore, Asian © IISS

Asia 223
© IISS [1] Map illustrating 2017 planned defence-spending levels (in

US$ at market exchange rates), as well as the annual real
percentage change in planned defence spending between
2016 and 2017 (at constant 2010 prices and exchange rates).
Percentage changes in defence spending can vary
Mongolia considerably from year to year, as states revise the level of
funding allocated to defence. Changes indicated here highlight
the short-term trend in planned defence spending between
2016 and 2017. Actual spending changes prior to 2016, and
projected spending levels post-2017, are not reflected.
Afghanistan Japan
Pakistan South Real % Change (2016–17)
China Korea Between 10% and 20% increase
Bhutan Between 0% and 3% increase
Nepal Between 0% and 3% decrease
Laos Taiwan Between 3% and 10% decrease
India
Myanmar Between 10% and 20% decrease
More than 20% decrease
Thailand
Bangladesh Vietnam Insufficient data
Philippines
Cambodia
Brunei
Sri Lanka Malaysia
Singapore
Indonesia
Papua New Guinea
Asia
2017 Defence Spending (US$ bn) 150.46 Timor-Leste
Estimate
52.49 Fiji
46.00
35.67 Australia
30.00
20
10
5
2
1
.25 New Zealand
.05
Map 5 Asia regional defence spending1
Defence budgets and procurement: compared to 2016, when China allocated RMB955bn
responding to latent threats (US$144bn) to defence. The next-largest defence
This positive regional economic outlook did not spenders in Asia were India (R3.6trn, or US$52.5bn)
automatically translate into similar rates of defence- and Japan (¥5.13trn, or US$46bn). While India’s
spending growth. After several years of real-terms defence budget grew by 4.3% in nominal terms in
defence-spending growth above 5%, this slowed to 2017, this increase was mostly allocated to personnel
2.2% between 2016 and 2017. This did not necessarily expenses, notably pensions. Budgetary documents
reflect a shift of resources towards other outlays, as revealed that in 2016, as in previous years, the
the share of GDP dedicated to defence within the amount earmarked for procurement was under-
total regional economy remained stable (1.46% in spent. This recurring problem hampers the Indian
2016 and 1.45% in 2017). armed forces’ modernisation goals. Furthermore, as
China officially earmarked RMB1.02 trillion India’s personnel numbers are growing – unlike in
(US$150 billion) in 2017 for defence, although this China, where reforms are aimed at downsizing the
number is considered to exclude key expenses armed forces – personnel costs are likely to continue
such as research and development (R&D) and arms to overtake efforts to better fund India’s equipment
imports. This represents a nominal increase of 7.1% upgrades.
in August 2017, and an order was placed with China

2.0 in April the same year for four Littoral Mission Ships.
1.5 1.39 1.41 1.44 1.45 1.46 1.45 Arms industry: push on self-reliance and
intra-Asian arms trade
Fifteen Asian firms from five countries (Australia,
% of GDP
1.0
India, Japan, Singapore and South Korea) were
included in the Defense News ‘top 100 largest defence
0.5 companies’ list in 2016. However, the rankings
excluded China due to the lack of reliable data.
0.0
China’s NORINCO Group reported RMB403.8bn
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 (US$60.8bn) in revenue in 2016, while Aviation
Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) achieved
RMB370.6bn (US$55.8bn) in sales the same year.
Figure 14 Asia regional defence expenditure as These figures potentially place NORINCO and AVIC
% of GDP as the leading defence groups globally, ahead of
Lockheed Martin and Boeing, although the propor-
Japan’s defence budget also grew between 2016 tion of their total revenue dedicated to defence is
and 2017, although only by 1.4%. The 2018 budget unknown.
proposal plans a larger increase of 2.5%. This should Across the region, there were efforts to develop
allow the Japan Self-Defense Force to pursue several domestic defence-technology industrial bases
procurement plans geared at countering the North (DTIBs). In third-tier defence-industrial states,
Korean threat. Notably, the defence ministry intends reforms were focused on the institutional front.
to acquire a land-based Aegis Ashore missile-defence Building on existing legislation passed in 2012,
system and advanced radar systems, and plans to Indonesia adopted new laws regarding offsets
upgrade its existing air-defence-radar network. Japan in order to increase technology transfer. The
is also procuring three RQ-4 Global Hawk unmanned Philippines also looked to strengthen its offset
aerial vehicles. Facing a similar threat environment, mechanisms, with a new offset policy expected in
South Korea is also bolstering its missile-defence 2018, while Manila also overhauled its procurement
capability. Although the US deployed its Terminal processes. Similarly, Thailand is looking to amend
High-Altitude Area Defense missile system there its procurement policy, including by revising part-
in 2017, South Korea’s Mid-Term Defense Program nership requirements with foreign firms. Bangkok
2017–21 prioritises the Korea Air and Missile Defense published a ‘Defence Industry Masterplan’ intended
programme, which will include PAC-2 and PAC-3 to improve national defence-industry capabilities by
Patriot air-defence systems, L-SAM and M-SAM 2020 and seeks to create a new agency dedicated to
ground-to-air missiles and the ‘Kill Chain’ pre- defence-industrial development. Southeast Asian
emptive-strike system. states are also looking to foster cooperation in terms
Another source of concern in the region, besides of armament procurement via the ASEAN Defence
the North Korean threat, was China’s maritime Industry Collaboration plan, but this is still at an
activities, which concerned nations such as Japan. early stage.
Meanwhile, Indonesia attempted to improve its air Meanwhile, states with more advanced DTIBs
and naval capabilities, despite budgeting difficul- are also implementing reforms. Australia took
ties (a decline of 11.8% between the proposed 2018 steps to develop its domestic defence industry in
defence budget and the 2017 revised budget). Jakarta 2017, notably in the shipbuilding sector, and the
continued talks with Russia regarding the purchase government launched defence R&D initiatives. The
of 11 Su-35 combat aircraft, and in August 2017 Centre for Defence Industry and Capability is over-
commissioned its first DSME-built Type-209/1400 seeing two funding sources: the Next Generation
submarine. At the same time, Malaysia’s navy is Technologies Fund, which focuses on research,
pursuing its ‘15 to 5 Transformation Programme’, and the Defence Innovation Hub, which focuses on
under which French company Naval Group launched development. A$640 million (US$494m) will be allo-
the country’s first Gowind 2500 Littoral Combat Ship cated to the Defence Innovation Hub and A$730m
Asia 225
(US$564m) to the Next Generation Technologies Policy developments

Fund between 2017 and 2026. The range of activities observed in 2017 suggests
Under President Tsai Ing-wen’s push to develop that the PLA is on track to complete the first phase
the indigenous DTIB, Taiwan has also earmarked of its reform process by around 2020. As part of this,
funding for defence innovation. In 2017, the govern- the theatre commands are being further reorgan-
ment created a national investment company, with ised, with new commanders already replacing those
starting capital of NT$250m (US$8m) and a goal to appointed in early 2016 when the theatre commands
raise NT$10bn (US$327m). Defence is one of the five were activated. This has seen former North Sea Fleet
focus sectors for this company. Furthermore, Taiwan commander Vice Admiral Yuan Yubai appointed
is considering whether to set up a new depart- to head the Southern Theatre Command, and
ment within its defence ministry modelled on the Lieutenant General Li Qiaoming, formerly 41st
US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Group Army commander, to head the Northern
(DARPA). This comes after China announced in July Theatre Command. President Xi Jinping had earlier
2017 the creation of a body also modelled on DARPA approved multi-grade promotions, as in 2012 when
(see p. 233). General Fan Changlong rose from Jinan Military
While many Southeast Asian countries are Region commander (Grade 3) to Vice Chairman of
working to develop defence-industrial capabilities, the Central Military Commission (Grade 1). This
for the time being they still rely on arms imports. would seem to suggest that Xi is prepared to bypass
In this context, China and Japan are competing to established promotion processes, presumably in
gain regional influence through arms transfers. This favour of talented and/or loyal officers.
Asia
has accelerated since Japan relaxed its guidelines on Similar changes are already under way in terms of
arms exports in 2014. Central Military Commission (CMC) positions. The
For instance, Japan offered Malaysia some of promotion of General Li Zuocheng to head the Joint
its retired Lockheed Martin P-3 Orion anti-sub Staff Department is notable, and not only because of
marine-warfare aircraft, while China agreed to the key role that the department is likely to play in
supply Littoral Mission Ships to be built in Malaysia. the PLA. Li had previously been the inaugural head
Meanwhile, Japan agreed to provide the Philippines of the newly created PLA ground forces. His promo-
with parts for its Bell UH-1 helicopters and had tion, therefore, could be seen as underscoring the
already supplied second-hand Beechcraft TC-90 continued importance of the ground forces, despite
King Air aircraft and vessels for the Philippines’ the reorganisation’s move towards joint operations
coastguard. Tokyo provided Vietnam with six and a greater emphasis on air and naval domains.
second-hand patrol vessels in 2014 and offered six However, as one of the few remaining PLA offi-
more in early 2017. Japan has also pledged military cers to have fought in the 1979 war with Vietnam,
aid worth US$500m in 2017–19 to Southeast Asian his promotion may also be intended to provide the
countries, including Vietnam and the Philippines. Joint Staff Department with a leader who possesses
Further south, Japan is looking to strengthen ties combat experience.
with Indonesia and India, with the potential sale
of – and defence-industrial cooperation regarding – Organisational reform
US-2i amphibious search-and-rescue aircraft on the China’s modernisation efforts in 2017 have resulted
agenda. in organisational changes within the PLA, which
supplement the sweeping changes announced at the
CHINA end of 2015.
Complementing the PLA’s new emphasis on
China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continued joint operations has been the creation of a new Joint
to modernise its organisation, equipment and oper- Logistics Support Force. This appears to be a series of
ational activities throughout 2017. Its broad-based joint facilities, established across China’s new theatre
approach has resulted in significant progress towards commands. In September, President Xi presented
its goal to complete the first phase of modernisation, flags to the commanders of the new joint logistics-
to blend mechanisation and informatisation, which support base in Wuhan, and new joint logistics-
was elaborated as one of three goals at the 19th Party support centres in Guilin, Shenyang, Wuxi, Xining
Congress. and Zhengzhou.
New CMC leadership changes

At the 19th Party Congress in Beijing in late October 2017, held by land-force officers – a reflection of the increasing
the Central Military Commission (CMC) was reduced from emphasis on maritime and air capability within the PLA.
11 to seven members, with President Xi Jinping as chair- The second-ranked vice-chairman is General Zhang
man, two vice-chairmen (seen as close allies of Xi) and Youxia (also 67), who is one of the few senior military of-
four other members. Xi did not create more vice-chair ficers with combat experience. Zhang was previously the
positions, which would have reduced the total number director of the CMC’s Equipment Development Depart-
of member positions. The four members of the CMC have ment and is considered by analysts to be one of Xi’s most
strong ties to Xi, and are seen as rising stars with exper trusted allies.
ience in military modernisation and reform. Xi will also The four members of the CMC are: Chief of the Joint
have a stronger hand in disciplinary oversight through Staff Department (appointed 2017) General Li Zuocheng
the appointment of Lieutenant-General Zhang Sheng- (63), a combat veteran who is seen as a rising star after
min as secretary of the CMC Discipline Inspection Com- being named chief of the former Chengdu Military Re-
mittee. gion that borders India; Director of the Political Work
The first-ranked vice-chairman is General Xu Qiliang Department (appointed 2017) Admiral Miao Hua, for-
(aged 67). Xu worked with Xi in Fuzhou in the 1990s, after merly political commissar of the PLA Navy; Commander
he became commander of the People’s Liberation Army of the PLA Rocket Force (appointed 2012) General Wei
(PLA) Air Force’s Eighth Army in 1989 and Xi became the Fenghe (63); and Secretary of the CMC Discipline Inspec-
city’s party head in 1990. In his position as Fuzhou party tion Committee Lieutenant-General Shengmin, who has
head, Xi was also the Fuzhou military area’s first party sec- a strong reformist track record, having served in several
retary, making Xu his direct subordinate. He is the first air- PLA departments that have seen significant reform since
force general to be named vice-chairman, a post normally 2012.
One of the purposes of the new theatre signals intelligence) and 4th Department (electronic
commands, which replaced military regions in warfare). It has also apparently absorbed many of
the PLA’s 2015 reorganisation, is to effect further the space capabilities that had previously resided
‘jointness’ throughout the PLA. An example of this with the General Armaments Department, and may
came in 2017, when control of the Southern Theatre have incorporated the political-warfare force of the
Command passed to Vice Admiral Yubai; this was previous General Political Department.
the first time that a non-ground-force commander
had been appointed to lead this theatre command. Space
Given that the Southern Theatre Command’s area of The PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) is respon-
responsibility includes the South China Sea, this is sible for Chinese military space activities, as well as
also the first time that a commander from outside the electronic and network warfare. The PLASSF is argu-
ground forces will oversee some of the most sensitive ably China’s ‘information warfare’ force, responsible
developments in China’s security environment. This for attacking and defending not only cyber elements,
also perhaps reflects the greater importance of naval but the key physical infrastructure associated with
capabilities, and the maritime domain in general, in information, including space systems.
light of Beijing’s Maritime Silk Road initiative, as Specific Chinese military space programmes
well as the statement in the 2015 defence white paper remain unclear, with the PLA providing little infor-
that ‘the traditional mentality that land outweighs mation about its ambitions or current satellite
sea must be abandoned’. constellations. The 2016 Chinese space white paper,
Meanwhile, the PLA’s new Strategic Support for instance, makes almost no mention of the PLA,
Force has been steadily taking shape. Various and only obliquely references national security as a
Chinese media reports indicate that the force is motivation for space activities. However, the white
integrating elements drawn from what had previ- paper’s discussion of major tasks over the next five
ously been the General Staff Department (GSD) years provides some possible indications of where
intelligence and cyber-/network-warfare entities, the PLA is likely to develop greater capabilities.
including the GSD’s 3rd Department (responsible for That said, China’s nascent anti-satellite capability
Asia 227
has been long-studied, as has Beijing’s interest in channel, as it has the ability to provide positioning
directed-energy systems and micro-satellites. and timing information, in addition to relaying
The space white paper indicates that China will limited data and text.
develop new medium-lift launch vehicles. These
will probably supplement the new series of Long Improving infrastructure and support
March rockets, which already include the Long The space white paper also indicates that China is
March-5 (heavy), Long March-6 (light) and Long prepared to make substantial investments in space-
March-7 (medium). This recent series of rockets launch and space situational-awareness capabilities.
uses non-toxic kerosene and liquid oxygen, unlike The former presumably is focused on improving
the earlier generation, which rely on UDMH (often the new space-launch facility on Hainan Island, but
referred to as ‘hydrazine’). Solid-fuel rockets might also include additional launch sites, espe-
mentioned in the text, such as the Kuaizhou and cially for mobile solid-fuel rockets. Improvements to
Long March-11, are associated with launches of space situational awareness include a second-gener-
small satellites and the rapid replenishment of ation relay satellite system, more accurate space
various constellations. tracking, the incorporation of space-based tracking
systems and the expansion of ground-based capa-
Improving satellite networks bilities.
The space white paper also indicates that China wants
to improve its space-based remote-sensing system; Expanding international presence
satellite communications; and its position, naviga- Part of the demand for increased space support
Asia
tion and timing (PNT) satellites. Improvements to is generated by China’s growing global presence.
these would have military implications. China’s establishment of its first official overseas
Most PLA military operations in the next decade military base in Djibouti attracted significant atten-
will likely still occur near China’s shores. As such, tion, but the escalating tempo of Chinese military
the majority of China’s intelligence, surveillance exercises is also likely to be a consideration, as are
and reconnaissance (ISR) requirements can be met developments associated with the Maritime Silk
by terrestrially based systems, including manned Road project.
and unmanned aircraft and naval platforms, various Chinese naval forces have begun regular tran-
types of signals intelligence, and human intelligence. sits of the Miyako Strait separating Okinawa and
However, as China seeks to operate farther afield, the lower Ryukyus from Taiwan, involving surface
and the navy plans to meet potential adversary naval ships and, sometimes, naval-aviation assets. The
forces farther from its shores, it will increasingly aircraft carrier Liaoning took part in one of these tran-
have to call upon space-based remote-sensing plat- sits, passing through the Miyako Strait and sailing
forms to provide additional early-warning capability east of Taiwan before heading into the South China
and more precise information about force locations. Sea. China’s naval forces are now operating more
Meanwhile, the ability to gather signals intelligence routinely at a distance from the mainland. Whereas
and electronic intelligence will be enabled by more in 2000 China’s armed forces rarely operated away
space-based sensors, which are capable of moni- from its shores, as of mid-2017, it had sustained 25
toring activity on a global scale. rotations of PLA Navy (PLAN) vessels conducting
As PLA naval and air forces expand their foot- anti-piracy patrols off Somalia. During transit to
print, including operations from Djibouti, there will these six-month deployments, PLAN task forces
be more reliance on space-based communications. typically pay calls to a number of Indian Ocean ports
There has been a steady increase in Indian Ocean for ‘presence’ and liaison tasks, much like the US and
deployments, as well as the now-routine counter- other navies before them.
piracy deployments in the Gulf of Aden. If China’s China’s maritime emphasis is matched by an
forces are to regularly operate in the Mediterranean increased tempo in out-of-area operations in 2017.
and Baltic seas, the demand for greater satellite- Perhaps the most important was the formal opening
communications support will grow even faster. of the Djibouti base, the first explicitly military facility
There will be a similar demand for improved that Chinese forces have established abroad. (China
Chinese PNT support; China’s Beidou satellite did construct facilities in Namibia and the Pacific
network provides an additional communications island of Kiribati in the early 2000s, but these were
to support their manned space programme; it main- In addition to these rotations, the Chinese navy
tains similar facilities in Kenya and Pakistan.) The has begun a steady deployment of submarines and
facility in Djibouti is expected to support Chinese submarine tenders to the Indian Ocean. Indian press
anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, but will reports mentioned over a dozen Chinese warships in
also provide a replenishment facility for ships (and the Indian Ocean at a time during July, when tensions
possibly, if an airstrip is constructed, aircraft) bound rose between India and China over the Doklam
for the Mediterranean Sea and European waters. Plateau border, although this probably includes the
In 2017, Chinese naval forces conducted exer- Gulf of Aden task force.
cises for the first time in the Baltic Sea. Three PLAN All of these operations reflect not only an
warships, including its newest destroyer and frigate expanding presence in 2017, but also an indication
designs, joined ten Russian vessels in the exercise that global activity by Chinese naval forces could
Joint Sea 2017, which was directed from a Russian soon be commonplace.
facility in Kaliningrad. This was part of a trend of Meanwhile, PLA ground forces engaged in
closer cooperation between Chinese and Russian joint exercises with their Shanghai Cooperation
naval forces, which have also conducted bilat- Organisation (SCO) partners. Infantry forces from a
eral exercises in the Mediterranean and the Pacific number of countries were involved, drilling at PLA
Ocean. training facilities. In addition, the PLA dispatched a
Map 6 China: the People’s Liberation Army reorganises
Area of deployment: Area of deployment:

military district group army
Xinjiang Military 76th Group 82nd Group 81st Group Army 78th Group Army 79th Group Army
District (Urumqi) Army (Xining) Army (Baoding) (Zhangjiaokou) (Harbin) (Liaoyang)
83rd Group
Army (Xinxiang)
80th Group
BEIJING Army (Weifang)
71st Group
Army (Xuzhou)
77th Group Army
(Chongqing)
C H I N A
72nd Group
Army (Huzhou)
73rd Group
Army (Xiamen)
Xizang (Tibet) Military 75th Group Army
District (Lhasa) (Kunming) 74th Group Army
(Huizhou)
© IISS
Asia 229
special-operations-force element to Nepal in April Effectively, the manoeuvre forces of the PLA
2017, showing that Chinese interest in the subcontinent ground forces have changed from around 19 divi-
and Indian Ocean region is not only a maritime one. sions and 76 brigades at the end of 2016 to around
This pattern of PLA engagements is consistent five divisions and 81 brigades at the end of 2017.
with broader Chinese interests. The PLA is used not Allowing for the organisational and battalion-size
only to indicate a military presence (and interest), but changes, this represents only about a 10% reduc-
to reinforce certain messages. This includes China’s tion in their overall force size. This reduction has,
efforts in countering terrorism (as reflected in Gulf to some extent, been balanced by an increase in
of Aden anti-piracy operations), as well as humani- the number of special-operations and aviation/
tarian relief and international peacekeeping. At the air-assault brigades, enabling each group army, as
same time, however, the PLA is gaining valuable well as the forces in Tibet and Xinjiang, to have one
experience in undertaking and supporting longer- brigade of each.
range deployments and sustained operations. The final impact that these force-structure changes
will have on the equipment holdings of the army
People’s Liberation Army remains to be seen. Some of the older tanks and artil-
In 2017, there was a wholesale reorganisation of the lery pieces may now be surplus to requirements and
PLA ground forces. Five of the existing 18 Group therefore will be transferred to reserve units, sold or
Armies were disbanded and the remaining 13 were scrapped. Otherwise, the PLA generally continues
renumbered. Meanwhile, significant numbers of the to take delivery of the range of armoured vehicles
subordinate brigade- and divisional-level formations and artillery pieces that it has received for the past
Asia
were reorganised, moved or disbanded in order to decade.
create a form of ‘standard organisation’ for the new
armies. People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force
Each group army is now assigned six ‘combined Following its elevation to full service level, the
arms’ manoeuvre brigades: one artillery, one air- People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF)
defence, one special-operations, one aviation (or, in has issued new military-unit cover designators
the case of two of the Group Armies, air-assault), (MUCDs) to all of its subordinate formations, indi-
one engineer and chemical-defence (formed from cating that it has also undergone some internal
pre-existing regiments), and one new service- reorganisation and restructuring, The previous
support brigade. The PLA has been experimenting six missile bases (51 to 56) remain extant, but have
with combined-arms units at battalion level in exer- been reprioritised and renumbered (now 61 to 66).
cises for years, but the establishment of them as the Whilst most missile brigades remain subordinate
standard peacetime unit organisation across the to the same base as they were in 2016, several have
board represents a radical departure from previous been reassigned, and some may also have been
PLA battalion structures. The new combined rebased. The overall force size of the PLARF appears
brigades reportedly have two fewer manoeuvre largely unchanged, for now, but at least four newly
battalions than their predecessors, but the surviving issued MUCDs in the same range as the existing
battalions appear to have doubled in effective size. missile brigades suggest that an expansion might be
In the heavy brigades at least, these combined-arms planned for the near future.
battalions appear to resemble a previous mechanised Any expansion plans might be linked to the
infantry battalion supplemented by tank companies status of a number of new ballistic-missile variants
and a 122mm artillery company. (and possibly one new type altogether) currently
Most of the divisions that had survived previous in test or being deployed with the PLARF. At
waves of ‘brigadisation’ have now been folded into least one, and possibly more, new versions of the
new brigades – only the 112th Mechanised Division DF-16 short- or medium-range ballistic missile are
near Beijing remains, albeit with its subordinate now in service with the existing DF-16-equipped
battalions converted to combined-arms units. The brigades at Shaoguan, and possibly Shangrao. A
status of the non-group army-assigned formations newly modified version of the DF-31A intercon-
in Tibet and Xinjiang is currently unclear; it is prob- tinental ballistic missile (ICBM) (CH-SS-10 mod
able that some of the divisions previously based in 2), with the designation DF-31A(G), and a new
Xinjiang are also still extant. transporter-erector-launcher were seen on exer-
cise in 2017. This new missile is possibly the ‘Political Work Department’, both of which are TC
same weapon previously reported in the United deputy-leader-grade organisations. The Logistics
States as DF-31B, and is believed to have entered Department and Equipment Department, each of
service with one of the existing DF-31A brigades. which has a director and political commissar, have
The follow-on DF-41 (CH-SS-X-20) ICBM remains not changed their names and they remain corps
in test for now, although if the PLARF is indeed leader-grade organisations.
forming new missile brigades it is possible that As a general rule, with the exception of the
one of them is intended to bring this new type into General Office and the Military Theory Research
service. Department, all previous second-level administra-
tive and functional organisations (under the four
People’s Liberation Army Air Force: first-level departments) are now bureaus and retain
continuing reorganisation their division-leader grade, while all third-level
In late November 2015, at the Work Conference on bureaus have been renamed ‘divisions’, with the
Reform of the CMC, changes were announced by grade of regiment leader, or were merged or abol-
President Xi, chairman of the CMC, to the organ- ished. As a result, every first-, second- and third-
isational structure of the People’s Liberation Army level organisation has been reduced in size by up to
Air Force (PLAAF). These changes, formally imple- a half.
mented in January 2016, included reforms at PLAAF The number of deputy commanders has been
headquarters; the reduction from seven mili- reduced from five, in 2013, to three, while the number
tary regions (MRs) and military region air forces of deputy political commissars has been reduced
(MRAFs) to five theatre commands (TCs) and theatre from three to one, with the addition of a Secretary
command air forces (TCAFs); and changes at the of the Discipline Inspection Commission/Committee.
unit (corps and below) level, with particular focus In terms of responsibilities, the PLAAF headquar-
on new air brigades and the Airborne Corps. All of ters is now solely responsible for ‘pursuing the Air
these moves are linked to the overall reduction by Force’s construction’, while command responsibil
300,000 personnel (half officers and half other ranks), ities have been shifted down to the five TCAFs. In
across the whole of the PLA, that was planned to be addition, unlike his predecessors since 2004, the new
completed by the end of 2017. commander of the PLAAF, Lieutenant General Ding
Overall, the PLAAF has reorganised and down- Laihang, has not been added as a member of the
sized the PLAAF headquarters and each TCAF Central Military Commission.
headquarters. It has also upgraded several more air
regiments and all of its airborne regiments to brigades Theatre command headquarters
and abolished several air-division headquarters and Under the reorganisation, unlike the previous MR
the airborne-division headquarters. It reportedly headquarters, each TC headquarters has one PLAAF
also renamed the 15th Airborne Corps simply as the officer as a permanent deputy commander. The
PLA Airborne Corps, but it is still subordinate to the TCAF commanders, like their predecessors, serve
PLAAF. It has also created several bases from former concurrently as TC deputy commanders.
command posts that are now responsible for all of
the aviation, surface-to-air missile, anti-aircraft artil- Theatre command air force headquarters
lery and radar units in their area of responsibility On 3 February 2016, the PLAAF held an official cere-
(AOR). mony in Beijing, where then air-force commander
Ma Xiaotian inaugurated all five TCAF head-
PLAAF headquarters quarters, granting them the grade of TC deputy
The overall organisational structure of the PLAAF leader. (Ma was replaced as PLAAF commander by
headquarters, whose grade was renamed from MR Lieutenant General Ding Laihang in August 2017,
leader to TC leader, has essentially not changed. though Ma remained on the CMC until he retired
While several subordinate-organisation names and in October.) The new headquarters replace five of
sizes have changed, their grades have remained the former MRAF headquarters: Eastern TCAF is
the same. Specifically, the former Headquarters in Nanjing (formerly Nanjing MRAF headquar-
Department has become the ‘Staff Department’, ters), Southern TCAF is in Guangzhou (formerly
and the Political Department has become the Guangzhou MRAF headquarters), Western TCAF
Asia 231
is in Chengdu (formerly Chengdu MRAF head- This situation remained constant until late 2016
quarters), Northern TCAF is in Shenyang (formerly or early 2017, when the PLAAF created several
Shenyang MRAF headquarters) and Central TCAF more fighter and ground-attack brigades from
is in Beijing (formerly Beijing MRAF headquarters). existing regiments and created at least seven more
The former Jinan and Lanzhou MRAF headquar- corps deputy-leader-grade bases (Datong, Fuzhou,
ters were downsized and became corps deputy- Jinan, Kunming, Lanzhou, Lhasa and Wuhan) from
leader-grade bases in mid-2017. However, the two existing corps deputy-leader- and division-leader-
former commanders became permanent deputy grade command posts and two former MRAF
commanders of the Central and Western TCs, HQs, each of which is most likely subordinate to its
respectively. respective TC Air Force HQ. At the time of writing,
Since the new TCAF headquarters were formed, the PLAAF had not abolished its bomber divisions
each now has a Staff Department (formerly or its three transport divisions or converted their
Headquarters Department) and Political Work subordinate regiments to brigades. It is not clear
Department (formerly Political Department) with if this will happen in the future. The air force has
the grade of corps leader, a Logistics Department also apparently created at least two unmanned-
with a director and political commissar (no change) aerial-vehicle brigades, but it is not clear to whom
and an Equipment Department with a director and they are subordinate. In addition, each TC Air Force
political commissar (no change) with the grade of now has one subordinate transport and search-and-
corps deputy leader. All second-level organisa- rescue brigade to support disaster-relief efforts;
tions under the first-level departments are still divi- these brigades are equipped with Z-8 and Mi-171
Asia
sions and have retained the same grade of division helicopters, and reportedly also Y-5 and Y-7 fixed-
deputy leader, but they have been reduced in size. wing aircraft. (It is worth noting that when a regi-
Some third-level branches may exist as battalion- ment is upgraded to a brigade, every ‘commanding
leader-grade organisations, and have either been officer’ billet (i.e. all officers except staff officers) are
abolished or merged with other organisations. It also upgraded.)
is also possible that some third-level branches may
exist. Airborne Corps
In addition, each TCAF headquarters has only one In April 2017, the PLAAF reportedly held a ceremony
or two deputy commanders and one or two deputy to abolish the Airborne Corps’ three existing airborne
political commissars compared to the previous divisions (43rd, 44th and 45th) and to upgrade their
MRAFs, which had between two and five deputy six subordinate airborne regiments to brigades, and
commanders and two deputy political commissars. created a special-operations force brigade. In addi-
As in the Theatre Command headquarters, it is prob- tion, the PLAAF upgraded the corps’ existing trans-
able that one of the deputy commanders may also port regiment to a brigade. To date, it still has a single
concurrently serve as the chief of staff (e.g. director helicopter regiment; however, the regiment head-
of the Staff Department) and one deputy political quarters might be abolished and its battalion-leader-
commissar may concurrently serve as the director of grade flight groups may be subordinated under the
the Political Work Department. transport brigade.
Air brigades Other issues

In late 2011 and 2012, the PLAAF merged its existing In 2016, the PLAAF and TCAF headquarters transi-
seven division-leader-grade flight colleges into three tioned from a first-level Headquarters Department
flight colleges, upgraded them to corps deputy- and Political Department to a Staff Department
leader grade and created subordinate training and Political Work Department, respectively.
brigades out of existing regiments. It also abol- In 2017, each of the PLA’s 84 main-body corps
ished at least four air-division headquarters, created leader- and deputy-leader-grade organisations,
four corps deputy-leader-grade bases (at Dalian, including the PLAAF’s Airborne Corps and bases
Nanning, Shanghai and Urumqi) from existing noted above, also began to make the transition. As
command posts, and upgraded about 15 regiments a result, the next likely step will be to see a transi-
to brigades and subordinated them under the four tion at the division, brigade and regiment levels.
bases. When that takes place, the regiment level will have
a Political Work Division, not a Department, which tonnes is the largest yet for the PLAN, was commis-
will match the current Political Work Division at sioned. The month before, the second vessel of the
that level. class was launched.
The first of the new Type-093A Shang II-class
Hypersonic weapons and unmanned vehicles nuclear-powered attack/guided-missile submarines
The extent of Chinese research into hypersonic tech- began operating from Yalong Bay on Hainan Island
nologies has become increasingly clear. At the 21st by late 2017. However, the observed presence of all
AIAA International Space Planes and Hypersonics four Type-094 Jin-class nuclear-powered ballistic-
Technologies Conference, jointly sponsored by missile submarines (SSBNs) in port at the same base
Chinese and US institutions, it was apparent that earlier in the year suggests that the PLAN is not
China had a wide range of engineering programmes operating them on a continuous at-sea basis. It is not
examining hypersonic boost-glide vehicles and clear what production at Bohai shipyard has shifted
scramjet-engine technologies. to since the completion of the Type-093A batch. The
US Department of Defense currently expects the
People’s Liberation Army Navy next-generation SSBN (Type-096) to begin produc-
In late 2016 and early 2017, the aircraft carrier tion in the early 2020s, a view supported by the
Liaoning carried out its most extensive deployment missile-test Type-032 submarine undergoing modifi-
to date, including a first live-fire exercise in the Bohai cation work likely associated with a new submarine-
Sea and its first flying operations in the South China launched ballistic-missile programme (believed to
Sea. In April, after a rapid construction period, China be JL-3) in early 2017. Production of the convention-
launched its first indigenously built carrier at Dalian ally powered Type-039B Yuan II-class submarines
shipyard. The new vessel is an evolutionary devel- has increased, but, for now, the priority appears to
opment of the Liaoning, which was itself purchased be modernisation rather than the expansion of the
as an incomplete hull from Russia. The new vessel PLAN’s submarine force.
is believed to have larger hangar space, which might As China continues to expand the capabilities of
allow for a larger air wing, as well as more deck its coastguard with larger and more capable vessels,
space and a modified island-superstructure design. the second of its 10,000-tonne Zhaotou-class cutters
A second ship should be available for service in undertook its first official patrol in the South China
about 2020. Sea in May (the first began deploying to the East
The PLAN is moving from a situation in which its China Sea in 2015).
nascent carrier force has only a training and experi- August saw the formal opening of China’s first
mentation role, to one that yields a limited regional overseas support base, at Djibouti, with plans for
power-projection capability. This will also allow further development, including a new pier to accept
for an incremental increase in the navy’s ability vessels of up to 40,000 tonnes, also being unveiled.
to operate independently at range in the next few The PLAN also undertook its first joint exercise with
years. Russia in the Baltic Sea (although this was not the
To reinforce these developments, China launched PLAN’s first deployment to the Baltic).
its first Type-055 cruiser-size surface combatant on This ongoing effort to develop China’s maritime
28 June, with at least three more under construction. capabilities, coupled with its expanding maritime
These sophisticated vessels will further enhance operations in the Indian Ocean and elsewhere, indi-
the PLAN’s potential in task-group and long- cates that Beijing is taking seriously the idea that its
range independent operations. Likely displacing future security has a major maritime component.
over 10,000 tonnes, they are the largest warships This is consistent with past directives from leaders
(bar aircraft and helicopter carriers and amphib- such as Hu Jintao, more recently reinforced under Xi,
ious ships) launched from Asian shipyards since which have made preserving China’s maritime inter-
the Second World War. The commissioning of two ests a ‘new historic mission’ for the PLA.
Type-052D destroyers, two Type-054A frigates and
seven Type-056A corvettes continued the consoli- DEFENCE ECONOMICS
dation and modernisation of the PLAN’s surface
forces. Meanwhile, in August, the first of the new China’s defence economy flourished in President Xi
Type-901 fast-replenishment ships, which at 40,000 Jinping’s first five-year term (2012 to 2017), and its
Asia 233
prospects look similarly bright in his second term. new body is on joint development programmes
The building of defence and civil–military science, rather than the ground-forces focus of its prede-
technology and industrial capabilities intersect two cessor.
of Xi’s most prized policy priorities: strengthening A more significant overhaul has taken place
China’s defence capabilities and making innovation in the management of the R&D of more strategic,
the primary locomotive of China’s long-term devel- cutting-edge or revolutionary capabilities with the
opment. establishment of the CMC Science and Technology
In October 2017, at the 19th Chinese Communist Commission (CMC-STC), which was set up at the
Party Congress, Xi spelled out his vision and time same time as the CMC-EDD. When the CMC-STC
frame for turning China into a militarily powerful was unveiled, there was considerable speculation in
and technologically advanced country. China Chinese and foreign media that it was modelled on
should, he said, reach the first tier of the world’s the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
most innovative countries by 2035 and, at the same (DARPA). Indeed, there are similarities in the func-
time, the defence establishment would realise its tions of the CMC-STC and DARPA, for instance they
objective of becoming a fully modernised, informa- both actively engage with civilian universities to
tion-enabled force. By the middle of the century, support basic research.
China would challenge for global leadership, with However, there are also important differences
its world-class armed forces a centrepiece of the that suggest the Chinese approach in conducting
country’s national power. disruptive innovation is distinctive from the US
Xi laid out some of the key steps required to model. A key variance is that the CMC-STC is tightly
Asia
achieve these ambitious goals: ‘strengthen unified integrated into the PLA hierarchy, with a two-star
leadership, top-level design, reform, innovation, and lieutenant-general in charge, whereas DARPA
the implementation of major projects; reform the enjoys considerable autonomy by being outside of
defence science and technology industry; achieve the uniformed chain of command. A CMC science-
greater civil–military integration; and build an inte- research steering committee has also been estab-
grated national strategic system and capabilities’. lished to provide technical and strategic guidance to
Xi’s statement encapsulates many of the key initia- the CMC-STC.
tives that the defence authorities are implementing These institutional developments demonstrate a
in their efforts to transition the Chinese defence clear commitment by the Chinese military author
economy from ‘catching up’ to innovating at the ities to engage seriously in higher-end, home-grown
global frontier. innovation, research and development.
Reorganising the defence science and Implementing major projects

technology system The defence industry’s relentless pace of output was
A far-reaching reorganisation of the top echelons of maintained in 2017. Naval shipbuilders launched
the Chinese defence science and technology system, several high-profile projects including China’s first
especially the military component, has been under indigenously built aircraft carrier in April 2017, and
way since the beginning of 2016. The People’s the first Type-055 cruiser-size surface combatant in
Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) armament system has June 2017. Both ships will likely take at least another
been restructured into two distinct parts, in order two to three years to be fitted out before they are
to carry out Xi’s dual requirement of accelerating ready for operational service. Meanwhile, the avia-
the pace of development and the fielding of convention industry began low-rate production of the J-20
tional armaments, while at the same time pursuing fighter aircraft.
more advanced, higher-risk and longer-term The development pipeline for major weapons and
research and development (R&D) in next-generation dual-use projects appears to be full. This includes
technologies. a larger and more advanced aircraft carrier, a new
Reform to the acquisition system for conven- generation of nuclear submarines, ballistic-missile
tional weapons saw the PLA General Armament defence and satellite-navigation systems, next-
Department transformed into the Central Military generation exascale extremely high-performance
Commission Equipment Development Department computers and quantum-communications tech-
(CMC-EDD) in January 2016. The emphasis of the nology.
Defence-industry reform with much larger foreign firms on the global arms
The Chinese defence industry has posted robust and technology markets. The shipbuilding industry
annual growth in profits and revenues for the past 15 may be next in line for restructuring, as one of its two
years. This continued into 2017, but the government dominant conglomerates, China State Shipbuilding
is nonetheless seeking to implement major reforms to Corp., has been adversely affected by a sharp down-
overcome deep-rooted structural bottlenecks caused turn in the global civilian-shipbuilding market. The
by the industry’s central-planning legacy. company was the only one of the country’s big ten
One important reform initiative in 2017 was a defence corporations to post losses in the past couple
pilot project to overhaul the ownership structure of of years.
wholly state-owned defence-research institutes and
academies so they could list on the stock market. Civil–military integration
This would provide a lucrative source of capital since Efforts to seriously push civil–military integration
research institutes make up a significant proportion (CMI) began in 2015 when it was made a national
of defence corporations’ fixed-asset stock. Defence priority. These efforts received further impetus in
companies have been engaged in this process, known January 2017 with the formation of the Commission
as asset securitisation, since 2013 and have raised for Integrated Civilian–Military Development
more than US$30 billion from initial public offerings (CICMD). The importance of this organisation in
and other financial vehicles, which has been rein- leading CMI implementation was made clear with
vested into product development including weapons the appointment of President Xi as its chair and
activities. Forty-one research institutes were part of Premier Li Keqiang as a vice-chair. Xi presided over
the first batch to undergo ownership reform, a consid- two CICMD meetings in June and September 2017
erable number of which had come from the country’s that laid out long-term strategic guidelines and
two principal space and missile corporations (China development plans.
Aerospace Science and Technology Corp. and China At the CICMD’s June meeting, Xi said that there
Aerospace Science and Industry Corp.). was a ‘short period of strategic opportunity’ to
Another reform initiative, launched around the implement CMI, pointing out that the most fruitful
same time, was to establish a series of innovation areas included infrastructure, equipment procure-
centres located within the defence corporate-research ment, training, military logistics and defence mobil
system that would become critical centralised hubs isation. In its September meeting, the CICMD issued
to drive advanced original R&D in their indus- a series of plans and guidelines (tied to the 13th Five
trial sectors. Ten of these system-design innovation Year Plan) on CMI, defence-industrial development
centres have so far been established, the most prom and military-logistics CMI.
inent of which are in the missile, naval and aviation In the creation of a working CMI system, the
sectors. CMC-EDD is playing the lead role by setting up the
Efforts also resumed in 2017 to consolidate the critical mechanisms to allow for the two-way flow of
line-up of leading state-owned defence conglomer- goods, services and technologies between the civilian
ates with the merger of the two principal firms in and defence sectors through market competition. It
the nuclear sector: China National Nuclear Corp. announced in February 2017 that it was in the process
and China Nuclear Engineering and Construction of setting up an acquisition system that would allow
Company. Each of the six sectors that make up the for the open sharing of procurement information, a
Chinese defence industry (aviation, aerospace and robust market-pricing mechanism, an intellectual-
missiles, nuclear, shipbuilding, electronics and property protection system, a contract-fulfilment
ordnance/land equipment) is controlled by one or supervision system, and a standards system for
two of the country’s big ten state-owned defence military and civilian products. If successful, this
conglomerates. Efforts to promote competition in the CMI acquisition system would represent a major
late 1990s by dividing these monopolistic giants into improvement on the existing defence-acquisition
two competing entities failed badly because of poor system, which lacks fundamental capabilities such as
institutional design. pricing functions. The CMC-EDD said that it would
Consequently, the Chinese authorities have been solicit more than 800 research and technology devel-
examining the possibility of once again merging opment projects worth around RMB6bn (US$883
these firms, especially so that they can compete million) using this new CMI acquisition system.
Asia 235
Funding People’s Liberation Army (PLA) activity in the East

In 2017, and for the second year in a row, the offi- and South China seas.
cial Chinese defence budget received a single-digit China, which claims sovereignty over Taiwan,
increase of only 7.1%, which meant that total expend is the island nation’s sole credible external threat.
itures exceeded RMB1 trillion (US$147bn) for the first In the past year, China’s armed forces have greatly
time to reach RMB1.02trn (US$150bn). This is equiv- increased the frequency of their activity north and
alent to 1.26% of GDP, although many categories south of Taiwan, through the Miyako Strait and
of defence spending are not included in the official Bashi Channel respectively, to conduct exercises in
Chinese defence budget, such as research and devel- the western Pacific. PLA aircraft, including H-6K
opment and foreign-arms acquisitions. With the 2016 bombers, have crossed into Taiwan’s air-defence
budget increasing by 7.6% over 2015, this suggests identification zone, forcing the scramble of intercep-
that the new normal rate of Chinese defence-budget tors. China’s aircraft carrier, Liaoning, has also tran-
growth is around 7% – a marked decline from the sited the Taiwan Strait and sailed by Taiwan’s east
annual double-digit increases of the previous 25 coast. Besides exposing Taiwan to attacks on several
years. fronts, and notwithstanding the fact that such tran-
To fund the significant pick-up in the pace of sits are part of China’s ‘natural’ push beyond the
China’s defence-technological development and ‘first island chain’, this increased military activity has
industrialisation, the authorities are looking to non- allowed the PLA to familiarise itself with the envi-
government sources, especially corporate and market ronment surrounding Taiwan, which will be crucial
inputs. Besides the asset-securitisation initiative, in any Taiwan Strait military contingency.
Asia
another new fundraising channel to emerge in the As Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND)
past few years has been investment funds established stated in its 2017 Quadrennial Defense Review
by a consortium of state and private companies. Over (QDR), China’s ‘obvious improvement in mili-
the past few years, more than 30 defence- and dual- tary operational capabilities, by expediting mili-
use-related investment vehicles have been publicly tary organisational reform and maintaining R&D
established. They include the RMB150bn (US$22bn) [research and development] on advanced arms and
China Innovation Fund and RMB30bn (US$4.4bn) their conversions, is the major factor that affects secu-
Sino CMI Industry Development Fund, both led rity in the Taiwan Strait’. Following a reorganisation,
by China Aerospace Investment Holdings, one of multi-year double-digit growth in defence spending
China’s big ten defence corporations. and improved training, the PLA now possesses suffi-
cient capabilities to impose a blockade on Taiwan
TAIWAN and conduct multidimensional operations to seize
its offshore islands (Kinmen, Matsu and Penghu).
Cross-Strait relations entered a new period of uncer- Improvements to the PLA Rocket Force in terms of
tainty following the election of Tsai Ing-wen of the manoeuvrability, accuracy and lethality now give
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in January China the ability to conduct precision strikes against
2016. Despite Tsai’s commitment to maintaining the political, military and economic high-value targets
‘status quo’ in the Taiwan Strait, Beijing has regarded across Taiwan. Additionally, the PLA has deployed
her policies, particularly the refusal to acknow capabilities to achieve ‘multi-layered firepower, joint
ledge the so-called ‘1992 consensus’, as evidence of air defence, anti-missile operations’, and can now
a pro-independence agenda and therefore justifica- achieve ‘air supremacy west of the first island chain’,
tion for increasing political and military pressure on which greatly complicates Taiwan’s security envir
the island nation. All-time-low support in Taiwan onment.
for unification with China, the failure of the ‘one With some US analysts arguing that Taiwan
country, two systems’ formula in Hong Kong and an would now need to hold on for as much as a
intensifying crackdown on civil society in China have month before the US armed forces could intervene
also contributed to tensions by increasing resistance during a military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait
to China within Taiwanese society. These tensions – up from what was previously a two-day wait –
come as China, under President Xi Jinping, becomes Taipei’s security challenge has become all the more
more assertive and expansive in its territorial claims daunting. Besides making preparations for coun-
within the region, placing Taiwan amid a surge in tering limited strikes, embargoes or an amphibious
assault, Taiwan’s armed forces also play a major role high-speed minelayers, as well as automated coastal-
in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in a defence systems (the ‘Tan An’ Coastal Defense Rocket
region that is prone to typhoons and earthquakes. System and the XTR-102 system, which employs
two T-75 20mm automatic guns), which will likely
Bolstering defence capability be deployed on its outlying islands as well as on
Responding to the ‘complex regional strategic envir Taiping (Itu Aba) in the South China Sea. Taiwanese
onment and multiple security challenges’, Taiwan’s road-mobile anti-ship missiles (Hsiung Feng III) and
MND has adopted a strategy of ‘resolute defence’ land-attack cruise missiles (Hsiung Feng IIE), as well
and ‘multi-domain deterrence’ to create a military as various air-to-ground missiles procured from
force ‘capable of delivering deterrence and defence the US or produced domestically, constitute the
to keep the enemy at bay’. Overarching this is a main elements of Taiwan’s counterforce capability.
strategy built on five pillars: ‘Safeguard the Nation’, Greater emphasis is now also being placed on anti-
‘Cultivate a Professional Military’, ‘Realise Defence radiation missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles
Self-Reliance’, ‘Protect the People’s Wellbeing’ and (UAVs) – unveiled at the 2017 Taipei Aerospace &
‘Strengthen Regional Stability’. Defense Technology Exhibition and ostensibly based
As in the past, Taiwan continues to rely on the US on Israel’s IAI Harop – to target Chinese radar sites.
security umbrella, particularly the provisions of the Meanwhile, Taiwan’s first domestically produced
Taiwan Relations Act, which aims to ensure Taipei satellite, Formosat-5, was successfully launched on
has the capabilities it needs to defend itself against 24 August 2017. Developed by a consortium led by
external aggression through a foreign military sales the National Space Organisation, the satellite will
(FMS) programme. The latest US arms package for provide two-metre panchromatic and four-metre
Taiwan, announced in late June 2017 and which multispectral resolution images, which, according to
ended a period of 562 days since the last package, the government, will have a national-security appli-
included the Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) Block IIIA, cation.
MK 54 Lightweight Torpedo conversion kits, the Bringing improvements to air defence and the
MK48 Mod 6 Advanced Technology Heavyweight survivability of fixed early-warning radar systems
Torpedo, the AGM-154C Joint Standoff Weapon air- remains a priority for the Taiwanese armed forces,
to-ground missile and the AGM-88B High-Speed which currently rely on US-made Patriot PAC-2/-3
Anti-Radiation Missile. and domestically produced Tien Kung surface-to-air
Given uncertainties surrounding the future role missile systems for the first line of defence against
of the US armed forces in the region, and added to missile and air attack from China. Some US analysts
the additional challenges posed by China’s growing have begun arguing in favour of Taiwan’s procure-
anti-access/area-denial capabilities, Taiwan has taken ment of the road-mobile Terminal High-Altitude
a more proactive approach in order to bolster its Area Defense (THAAD) system deployed in South
defence self-reliance by prioritising the indigenous Korea. However, given China’s reaction to the
development of various platforms. It is also increas- deployment of this in South Korea, its possible reac-
ingly relying on an asymmetrical ‘counterforce’ capa- tion to any Taiwanese purchase is likely to weigh
bility, as well as its own area-denial capabilities in heavily on any procurement decision.
the Taiwan Strait. Although economics are undoubt- In addition to ongoing upgrades to its fleet of 145
edly a factor in this decision, uncertainty over F-16A/B fighter aircraft and mid-life upgrades to
Washington’s continued willingness to sell advanced the F-CK-1 Ching Kuo fighter/ground-attack aircraft,
weapons systems to Taiwan, and the refusal of other Taiwan has embarked on a programme to develop
states to do so, has also been a rationale for this shift. 66 new jet trainers to replace its legacy AT-3 trainer,
Taiwan has, therefore, embarked on a multi- produced by Aerospace Industrial Development
year Indigenous Defense Submarine programme, Corp. In August 2017, Taiwan also announced it
in which a total of eight diesel-electric submarines would submit a ‘Letter of Request’ to the US for the
are to be produced to supplement its two combat- F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, though the likelihood that
ready Hai Lung-class submarines, a major endeavour such a request will succeed remains slim, and Taiwan
that is likely to require assistance from other coun- will probably have to consider developing its own
tries. It is also developing and producing a variety four-and-a-half-/fifth-generation aircraft, admittedly
of fast-attack vessels, a new-generation frigate and with US assistance.
Asia 237
In light of the current geostrategic environment, could end in 2018, as planned, if the ministry succeeds
Taipei has also redoubled efforts to form closer ties in recruiting enough volunteer soldiers and officers,
with Tokyo, which is also locked in a territorial adding that recruitment had increased steadily.
dispute with Beijing in the East China Sea over the However, Taiwan’s reserve force remains under-
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. The prospect of the PLA trained, underprepared and underutilised, with
seizing control of Taiwan, and the consequences serious doubt as to its ability to muster should it
of such an outcome for Japan’s security, have also be called upon to defend the nation. Revisions to
contributed to greater willingness on the part of the reservist-mobilisation policy have been made
Shinzo Abe’s government to explore opportunities to promote voluntary short-term active duty, with
for cooperation with Taiwan. However, contact has emphasis on reservists with ‘high-demand military
largely occurred behind the scenes and cooperation occupational specialties’, and technical and combat
remains constrained by Japan’s constitution, as well skills. Reserve units of retired volunteer-service
as its need to avoid further destabilising its relations members will also now be combined with regular
with China. forces to enhance the skills base. More regular
Amid efforts to refine its force structure, Taiwan’s training is being considered, and a mobilisation-
defence ministry is now aiming for a military force information system is planned to be set up to manage
characterised by ‘organisational flexibility, flat- recall messages and quickly assemble Taiwan’s
tened command and control [and] full jointness reserve forces.
across services’. Among other things, this includes Taiwan faces a growing cyber threat from China
implementing a single chain of command for air and has for several years been a principal target of
Asia
defence and improvements in, and integration of, Chinese cyber attacks. To combat this, Taiwan’s
major command-and-control – as well as intelli- Executive Yuan upgraded its Office of Information
gence, surveillance and reconnaissance – centres. and Communication Security on 1 August 2016
Throughout, emphasis has been placed on joint and created a Department of Cyber Security (DCS).
operational training, with increased responsibility Serving as a strategic centre for national informa-
for theatres of operations to ensure operational readi- tion security, the DCS also manages cyber security
ness. throughout the government. The DCS will also
Upon entering office, President Tsai made it look to increase cooperation with the private sector,
clear that she intended to allocate a larger share of among other initiatives. Additionally, on 29 June 2017
the defence budget to improve conditions, salaries the MND launched its Information and Electronic
and benefits for members of the armed forces. Warfare Command, which will work in conjunction
Furthermore, to improve military professionalism with the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science
for the active forces, the MND has established a and Technology (NCSIST) to defend Taiwan’s digital
Graduate Institute of Chinese Military Affairs Studies territory.
and Leadership Excellence Course, and will even-
tually offer PhD courses on Strategic Security and Defence economics
Defence Management. The ministry is also seeking to As stated in the MND’s 2017 QDR, the armed forces
improve interactions between members of the armed will ‘seek to obtain a reasonable and adequate
forces and civilians by recruiting ‘specialists in defence budget appropriate to national budget allo-
defence affairs’ from the civilian sector. At the same cations, and allocate and manage these resources
time, a campaign has been launched to improve the appropriately’.
public image of the military – a long-standing hand- In August 2017, the Tsai administration announced
icap in Taiwan, in part due to its history of martial it would seek NT$331.8 billion (US$10.8bn) for
law – through stricter military discipline and more national defence for 2018, a 3.9% year-on-year
interactions with civilians. Such efforts are intended increase on the 2017 budget and the largest share of
to improve morale, which suffered under the Ma the nation’s total budget (16.71%) for any government
Ying-jeou administration; and to bolster recruitment agency. Of this amount, NT$151.8bn (US$4.9bn), or
rates, a long-term challenge since an all-volunteer- 46% of the total, will be allocated to personnel costs,
force programme was launched in 2013. Minister an increase of 5% on the previous year. Although
of National Defense Feng Shih-kuan announced in this means reductions in other areas – including
December 2016 that compulsory military service NT$7.3bn (US$238m) less for equipment acquisition
– the reallocation is intended to help remedy long- Taiwan has ‘national champions’ in the defence
standing issues relating to morale and preparedness, sector for the land, air and sea services. For the
and to help boost recruitment rates. The 2018 budget land sector, the ORDC and the Armaments Bureau
will continue to fall short of 3% of GDP, which is under the MND are the key developers of land plat-
regarded by Washington as the ‘baseline’ for Taiwan forms and ammunition for the army. The ORDC is
to demonstrate its commitment to national defence. the manufacturer of the CM-32 Yunpao armoured
The Tsai government has nevertheless indicated that vehicle, the CM-21 armoured infantry fighting
it will seek a more substantial increase for the next vehicle (an indigenous design based on the US M113
year. armoured personnel carrier) and self-propelled
Although marginal compared with China’s offi- howitzers. More recently, the ORDC has been devel-
cial defence budget, which at RNB1.022 trillion oping the M1 Cloud Leopard II armoured fighting
(US$150bn) in 2017 is in US dollars about 14 times vehicle. Besides providing ammunition to the
that of Taiwan, the Tsai government’s ability to Taiwanese armed forces, the Armaments Bureau’s
reach the 3% benchmark would nevertheless be a 205th Factory is also a major producer of ammunition
small victory given the country’s relatively slug- for the US armed forces. The ORDC and Armaments
gish economy (GDP growth for 2018 is expected Bureau rely on a number of local contractors (Chung
to be 1.9%) and other major infrastructure and Hsin Electric and Machinery Manufacturing Corp.,
social-welfare projects that require substantial Yi Rong Technology Co., Wei Shuan Co. and Chi Fu
investment. That success, which Tsai’s predecessor Industry among them) for various parts.
never achieved, is in part attributable to growing Of all three, the land sector is the one that has
consciousness among the Taiwanese public of the the least international positioning and exposure in
challenge from China. This has become less abstract Taiwan’s defence-manufacturing sector. However,
in recent years amid increased PLA activity in the as the Tsai government tries to revitalise Taiwan’s
region and growing pressure on Taiwan under defence industry, and the related private sector, some
President Xi. foreign defence manufacturers have been exploring
While personnel costs account for 46% of the the possibility of co-developing and -manufacturing
total open defence budget, military investments various land platforms, including a new main battle
(including acquisitions) account for an estimated tank, though there has been no progress so far.
30%, followed by more than 20% for operations and For the naval sector, the national champion is
maintenance. CSBC Corporation. Headquartered in Kaohsiung,
If reformers win the argument, Taiwan’s long- southern Taiwan, with shipyards in Kaohsiung and in
standing FMS procurement process with the US Keelung in northern Taiwan, CSBC Corp. is a former
could also undergo revisions, including the ‘de-pack- state-owned enterprise that develops and manufac-
aging’ of arms sales to ensure a more streamlined tures various sea vessels for civilian and military
acquisition mechanism and a more timely delivery use, including fast-attack boats, transport ships,
of necessary defence articles. support vessels, guided-missile frigates and coast-
guard ships. CSBC has been awarded the contract
Defence industry to oversee, through its Submarine Development
Despite the slightly smaller share of the defence Center, the Taiwan Indigenous Defense Submarine
budget allocated to acquisitions, local companies programme, whose success will be contingent on
are expected to benefit from the Tsai administra- collaboration with various foreign defence manu-
tion’s greater focus on the indigenous development facturers. Other smaller players include Lung Teh
and production of defence articles for Taiwan. These Shipbuilding, manufacturer of the Tuo Jiang-class
include Aerospace Industrial Development Corp., corvette, and Ching Fu Shipbuilding Co.
which is developing the new jet trainer; CSBC Corp., Taiwan’s leading aircraft designer for the mili-
which is responsible for the Indigenous Defence tary and civilian sector is the Aerospace Industrial
Submarine and a variety of surface combatants; the Development Corp. (AIDC). AIDC is the designer of
Ordnance Readiness Development Centre (ORDC), the F-CK-1 Ching Kuo combat aircraft and, through
which produces various armoured vehicles; and a memorandum of understanding with Lockheed
the semi-private NCSIST, which produces missiles, Martin, has been awarded the contract to complete
UAVs and other platforms. upgrades on Taiwan’s F-16A/Bs. It is also the devel-
Asia 239
oper of the soon-to-be-retired AT-3 trainer and has nology management mechanism’ aimed at devel-
been awarded the contract to develop a second- oping indigenous weapon systems and lifecycle
generation trainer for the Taiwan Air Force. support with ‘critical and advanced technologies’,
However, Taiwan’s real national defence-industry and by leading the development of relevant indus-
champion is the Taoyuan-based NCSIST, the state’s tries, with the purpose of ‘attaining mutual support
main defence-research institute, with facilities at between national defence and economic develop-
various locations in northern and southern parts ment’.
of the country. Among other things, the NCSIST For the information-security sector, the govern-
produces the Tien Kung (I, II and III) air-defence ment will push for R&D on new-generation technol-
system, the Tien Chien (I, II) air-to-air missile, the ogies by forming a strategic alliance with industry,
Antelope air-defence system, Hsiung Feng (I, II and III) academia and the research sector, as well as estab-
anti-ship cruise missiles, the Hsiung Feng IIE land- lishing national information-security test and training
attack cruise missile, the Wan Chien stand-off air- facilities. The Taiwanese government has also said it
to-ground cruise missile, the Ray-Ting 2000 artillery will improve counter-espionage measures to ensure
multiple-launch rocket system, UAVs and various information integrity and prevent the proliferation
automated coastal-defence systems. of dual-use technologies from its programmes. These
Under its defence-industrial development efforts will also be crucial in securing foreign partici-
strategy, Taiwan is focusing on the three key fields pation in Taiwan’s defence-related projects amid
of aerospace, shipbuilding and information secu- active attempts by China to compromise the island’s
rity. This will be accomplished by incorporating defence architecture and likely also discredit it in the
Asia
capacities in the private sector, supervised by a ‘tech- eyes of potential allies.
Afghanistan AFG ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

New Afghan Afghani Afs 2016 2017 2018 Afghan National Army (ANA) 167,00
GDP Afs 1.32tr 1.44tr 5 regional comd
US$ 19.5bn 21.1bn FORCES BY ROLE
per capita US$ 582 572 SPECIAL FORCES
Growth % 2.4 2.5 1 spec ops div (1 (National Mission) SF bde (1 SF gp; 1
Inflation % 4.4 6.0 mech inf bn (2 mech inf coy)); 2 cdo bde (1 mech inf coy,
4 cdo bn); 1 (1st MSF) mech bde (2 mech inf bn); 1 (2nd
Def bdgt [a] Afs 176bn 148bn
MSF) mech bde (3 mech inf bn))
US$ 2.59bn 2.17bn
MANOEUVRE
US$1=Afs 67.86 68.19 Light
[a] Security expenditure. Includes expenditure on Ministry of 1 (201st) corps (3 inf bde (4 inf bn, 1 sy coy, 1 cbt spt bn,
Defence, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National 1 CSS bn), 1 inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 sy coy, 1 cbt spt bn, 1
Security Council and the General Directorate of National Security.
Also includes donor funding CSS bn), 1 engr bn, 1 int bn, 2 MP coy, 1 sigs bn)
1 (203rd) corps (2 inf bde (5 inf bn, 1 sy coy, 1 cbt spt bn,
Population 34,124,811 1 CSS bn), 2 inf bde (4 inf bn, 1 sy coy, 1 cbt spt bn, 1
Ethnic groups: Pashtun 38%; Tajik 25%; Hazara 19%; Uzbek 12%; CSS bn), 1 engr bn, 1 int bn, 2 MP coy, 1 sigs bn)
Aimaq 4%; Baluchi 0.5% 1 (205th) corps (4 inf bde (4 inf bn, 1 sy coy, 1 cbt spt bn,
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
1 CSS bn), 1 engr bn, 1 int bn, 2 MP coy, 1 sigs bn)
2 (207th & 209th) corps (1 div HQ (209th only) 3 inf bde
Male 20.8% 6.0% 5.3% 4.2% 13.2% 1.2%
(4 inf bn, 1 sy coy, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 CSS bn), 1 engr bn, 1
Female 20.1% 5.8% 5.1% 4.1% 12.8% 1.4% int bn, 2 MP coy, 1 sigs bn)
1 (215th) corps (3 inf bde (4 inf bn, 1 sy coy, 1 cbt spt bn,
Capabilities 1 CSS bn), 1 inf bde (2 inf bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 CSS bn), 1
The Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) engr bn, 1 int bn, 2 MP coy, 1 sigs bn)
are still building capability to counter ISIS, the Taliban and 1 (111st Capital) div (1 inf bde (1 tk bn, 1 mech inf bn, 2
inf bn, 1 sy coy, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 CSS bn), 1 inf bde (4 inf
other insurgent and terrorist groups. The ANDSF largely
bn, 1 sy coy, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 CSS bn), 1 int bn)
succeeded in countering major insurgent attacks in 2017,
but the government lost control of some rural territory EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
and the force was tested by Taliban activity. The forces
MBT 20 T-55/T-62 (24 more in store†)
continue to suffer a high attrition rate due to casualties
APC 996
and desertions. Insurgent forces retain significant influence
APC (T) 173 M113A2†
in rural areas, also demonstrating their ability to conduct
APC (W) 623 MSFV (inc variants)
spectacular attacks in population centres. Although at the
PPV 200 Maxxpro
tactical level the Taliban has often overmatched the army ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
and police, they have eventually been able to organise ARV 20 Maxxpro ARV
tactical- and operational-level counter attacks. Army and MW Bozena
police special forces are well regarded by NATO and ARTILLERY 775
bear the brunt of intelligence-led strike operations against TOWED 109: 122mm 85 D-30†; 155mm 24 M114A1†
insurgent networks. NATO advisers remain embedded in MOR 82mm 666: 521 2B14†; 105 M-69†; 40 M252†
the defence and interior ministries, although the ANDSF
are now responsible for the majority of training, albeit Afghan Air Force (AAF) 7,300
with NATO support. Indigenous logistic support is slowly Including Special Mission Wing
improving but remains a source of weakness. Efforts are also EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
under way to improve leadership, intelligence, logistics and AIRCRAFT 19 combat capable
coordination between different service arms. An ‘ANDSF TPT 47: Medium 4 C-130H Hercules; Light 42: 24 Cessna
Road Map’ contains ambitious plans to improve capability, 208B; 18 PC-12 (Special Mission Wing); PAX 1 B-727 (2
but depends on continued international funding. In August more in store)
2017, a new US strategy for Afghanistan was announced, TRG 19 EMB-314 Super Tucano* (of which 7 in the US
which would increase US troop levels and is expected to for trg)
include additional tactical advisers and trainers and increase HELICOPTERS
air and artillery strikes. ATK 4 Mi-35 Hind
MRH 102: 3 Cheetal; 25 MD-530F (11 armed); 74 Mi-17
ACTIVE 174,300 (Army 167,000 Air Force 7,300) Hip H (incl 28 Special Mission Wing hel)
Paramilitary 148,700 TPT • Medium 4 UH-60A+ Black Hawk
Asia 241
Australia AUS
Afghan National Police 148,700 Australian Dollar A$ 2016 2017 2018
Under control of Interior Ministry. Includes Afghan
Uniformed Police (AUP), Afghan National Civil Order GDP A$ 1.70tr 1.80tr
Police (ANCOP), Afghan Border Police (ABP), Police Special US$ 1.26tr 1.39tr
Forces (GDPSU) and Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP) per capita US$ 51,737 56,135
Growth % 2.5 2.2
FOREIGN FORCES Inflation % 1.3 2.0
All Operation Resolute Support unless otherwise specified Def bdgt A$ 31.7bn 32.3bn 34.6bn
Albania 83 US$ 23.6bn 25.0bn
Armenia 121 US$1=A$ 1.34 1.30
Australia 270; 1 SF unit; 1 sy unit; 1 sigs unit Population 23,232,413
Austria 9
Azerbaijan 94 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Belgium 60 Male 9.1% 3.1% 3.5% 3.6% 23.3% 7.5%
Bosnia-Herzegovina 55 Female 8.6% 3.0% 3.3% 3.5% 22.7% 8.6%
Bulgaria 160
Croatia 94 Capabilities
Czech Republic 267; 1 sy coy; 1 MP unit Australia possesses capable, well-trained and -equipped
Denmark 100 armed forces, with strong doctrine, logistic support, C4ISR
Estonia 6 and the capacity for deployment over long distances. They
Asia
Finland 37 also have considerable recent operational experience.
Georgia 870; 1 lt inf bn • UNAMA 2 obs Canberra’s primary ally remains the United States, but it
Germany 980; 1 bde HQ; 1 recce bn; 1 hel ft with CH-53G is also forging closer defence ties with India, Japan and
Stallion; 1 ISR UAV flt with Heron UAV • UNAMA 1 obs South Korea, while remaining committed to the Five
Greece 4 Power Defence Arrangements in Southeast Asia and close
Hungary 110 defence relations with New Zealand. In March 2016, the
India Indo-Tibetan Border Police 335 (facilities protection) government published Australia’s third defence white
Italy 1,037; 1 mtn inf bde HQ; 1 mtn inf regt(-); 1 avn regt(-) paper in seven years. This identified China’s growing
with AW129 Mangusta; CH-47 Chinook; NH90 regional role, regional military modernisation and inter-
Latvia 22 state rivalry, the threat of terrorism from the Middle
East and cyber attacks as important influences shaping
Lithuania 29
Australia’s defence policy. The defence of Australia,
Luxembourg 1
securing maritime Southeast Asia and the Pacific, and
Mongolia 120 • UNAMA 1 obs
contributing to stability and the ‘rules-based order’
Montenegro 18 across the wider Indo-Pacific region are the country’s
Netherlands 100 three main ‘defence objectives’. The Australian Defence
New Zealand 10 Force (ADF) continued to be involved in the Middle
Norway 50 East training Iraq’s security forces and in the counter-
Poland 220 • UNAMA 1 obs ISIS coalition. The government has promised to increase
Portugal 10 • UNAMA 2 obs the defence budget to 2% of projected GDP by 2020–21,
Romania 683 • UNAMA 4 obs enabling the procurement of high-end equipment. The
Slovakia 40 white paper confirmed that Australia is still committed to
Slovenia 7 buying 72 F-35A Joint Strike Fighters, and that from the
Spain 16 early 2020s the air force will also acquire MQ-4C Triton
Sweden 25 unmanned aerial vehicles for maritime reconnaissance. In
Turkey 659; 1 mot inf bn(-) the meantime, deliveries of P-8A maritime-patrol aircraft
began in late 2016.
Ukraine 10
United Kingdom 500; 1 inf bn(-) ACTIVE 57,800 (Army 29,000 Navy 14,400 Air
United States 7,000; 1 div HQ; 1 div HQ (fwd); 1 spec 14,400)
ops bn; 2 AB bde; 1 EOD bn; 1 cbt avn bde; F-16C Fighting
Falcon; MC-12W Liberty; RC-12X Guardrail; EC-130H RESERVE 21,100 (Army 13,200 Navy 3,150 Air
Compass Call, C-130 Hercules, AH-64 Apache; CH-47 4,750)
Chinook; UH-60 Black Hawk; HH-60 Pave Hawk; RQ-7B Integrated units are formed from a mix of reserve and reg-
Shadow; MQ-1 Predator; MQ-9 Reaper • Operation Freedom’s ular personnel. All ADF operations are now controlled by
Sentinel 8,000 Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 6 CSS bn
Space Special Operations Command

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE FORCES BY ROLE
SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS 1 Optus C1 (dual SPECIAL FORCES
use for civil/mil comms) 1 cdo regt
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Army 29,000 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 59 M1A1 Abrams
Forces Command IFV 253 ASLAV-25 (all variants) 
FORCES BY ROLE APC • APC (T) 431 M113AS4
COMMAND AUV 1,030: 1,020 Bushmaster IMV; 10 Hawkei
1 (1st) div HQ (1 sigs regt) ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
MANOEUVRE ARV 45: 15 ASLAV-F; 17 ASLAV-R; 13 M88A2
Mechanised VLB 5 Biber
1 (1st) mech inf bde (1 armd cav regt, 1 mech inf bn, MW 20: 12 Husky; 8 MV-10
1 lt mech inf bn, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 sigs ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
regt, 1 CSS bn) MSL • MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin
2 (3rd & 7th) mech inf bde (1 armd cav regt, 2 mech RCL • 84mm Carl Gustav
inf bn, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 sigs regt, 1 CSS ARTILLERY 239
bn) TOWED 155mm 54 M777A2
Amphibious MOR 81mm 185
1 (2nd RAR) amph bn RADAR • LAND 33: 3 Giraffe; 30 LCMR
Aviation AMPHIBIOUS 15 LCM-8 (capacity either 1 MBT or 200
1 (16th) avn bde (1 regt (2 ISR hel sqn), 1 regt (3 tpt troops)
hel sqn), 1 regt (2 spec ops hel sqn, 1 avn sqn)) HELICOPTERS
COMBAT SUPPORT ATK 22 Tiger
1 (6th) cbt spt bde (1 STA regt (1 STA bty, 1 UAV bty, TPT 105: Heavy 10 CH-47F Chinook; Medium 72: 38
1 CSS bty), 1 AD/FAC regt (integrated), 1 engr regt NH90 TTH (MRH90 TTH); 34 S-70A Black Hawk; Light
(2 construction sqn, 1 EOD sqn), 1 EW regt, 1 int 23 Bell 206B1 Kiowa
bn) UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ISR • Medium 15 RQ-7B Shadow 200
1 (17th) CSS bde (3 log bn, 3 med bn, 1 MP bn) AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence RBS-70
Special Operations Command Navy 14,400
FORCES BY ROLE
Fleet Comd HQ located at Sydney. Naval Strategic Comd
SPECIAL FORCES
HQ located at Canberra
1 (SAS) SF regt
1 (SF Engr) SF regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
2 cdo regt SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 6 Collins with 6 single
COMBAT SUPPORT 533mm TT with Mk48 Sea Arrow ADCAP HWT/UGM-
3 sigs sqn (incl 1 reserve sqn) 84C Harpoon AShM
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 12
1 CSS sqn DESTROYERS • DDGHM 1 Hobart with Aegis Baseline 7.1
C2, 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84D Harpoon AShM, 6 8-cell
Reserve Organisations 13,200 reservists Mk41 VLS with SM-2 Block IIIB SAM/RIM-162 ESSM
SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 Phalanx
Force Command CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 MH-60R Seahawk)
FORCES BY ROLE FRIGATES • FFGHM 11
COMMAND 3 Adelaide (Mod) with 1 Mk13 GMLS with RGM-84C
1 (2nd) div HQ Harpoon AShM/SM-2 MR SAM, 1 8 cell Mk41 VLS
MANOEUVRE with RIM-162 ESSM SAM, 2 triple Mk32 324mm
Reconnaissance ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1
3 (regional force) surv unit (integrated) 76mm gun (capacity 2 S-70B Seahawk ASW hel/MH-
Light 60R Seahawk ASW hel))
6 inf bde (total: 3 recce regt, 3 recce sqn, 12 inf bn, 6 8 Anzac (GER MEKO 200) with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with
arty bty) RGM-84C Harpoon Block 2 AShM, 1 8 cell Mk41 VLS
COMBAT SUPPORT with RIM-162 ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with
3 cbt engr regt MU90 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 S-70B Seahawk
1 sigs regt ASW hel) (capability upgrades in progress)
Asia 243
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 14 TANKER/TRANSPORT

PCO 14: 13 Armidale (Bay mod); 1 Cape (leased) 1 sqn with A330 MRTT (KC-30A)
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES • TRANSPORT
MHO 6 Huon (of which 2 in reserve) 1 VIP sqn with B-737BBJ; CL-604 Challenger
AMPHIBIOUS 1 sqn with Beech 350 King Air
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 3 1 sqn with C-17A Globemaster III
LHD 2 Canberra (capacity 8 hel; 4 LCM; 100 veh; 1,000 1 sqn with C-27J Spartan
troops) 1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules
LSD 1 Choules (UK Bay) (capacity 1 med hel; 2 LCVP; TRAINING
24 MBT; 350 troops) 1 OCU with F/A-18A/B Hornet
LANDING CRAFT 17 1 sqn with Beech 350 King Air
LCM 12 LCM-1E 2 (LIFT) sqn with Hawk MK127*
LCVP 5 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 14 AIRCRAFT 163 combat capable
AGHS 2 Leeuwin with 1 hel landing platform FGA 98: 55 F/A-18A Hornet; 16 F/A-18B Hornet; 24 F/A-
AGS 4 Paluma 18F Super Hornet; 3 F-35A Lightning II (in test)
AORH 1 Success ASW 20: 15 AP-3C Orion; 5 P-8A Poseidon
AOR 1 Sirius EW 12 EA-18G Growler*
The following vessels are operated by a private company, AEW&C 6 B-737-700 Wedgetail (E-7A)
DMS Maritime: TKR/TPT 5 A330 MRTT (KC-30A)
ASR 2: 1 Besant; 1 Stoker TPT 49: Heavy 8 C-17A Globemaster III; Medium 20: 8 C-27J
AX 2: 1 Seahorse Horizon; 1 Seahorse Standard Spartan; 12 C-130J-30 Hercules; Light 16 Beech 300 King Air;
AXL 1 Seahorse Mercator PAX 5: 2 B-737BBJ (VIP); 3 CL-604 Challenger (VIP)
AXS 1 Young Endeavour TRG 105: 33 Hawk Mk127*; 62 PC-9/A (incl 4 PC-9/A(F)
Asia
for tgt marking); 10 PC-21
Naval Aviation 1,350 RADAR • AD RADAR 7
FORCES BY ROLE OTH-B 3 Jindalee
ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE Tactical 4 AN/TPS-77
1 sqn with NH90 (MRH90) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
1 sqn with MH-60R Seahawk AAM • IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; ASRAAM; ARH AIM-
TRAINING 120B/C-5/C-7 AMRAAM
1 OCU sqn with MH-60R Seahawk AShM AGM-84A Harpoon
1 sqn with AS350BA Ecureuil; Bell 429; H135 LACM Conventional AGM-158 JASSM
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE BOMBS
HELICOPTERS Laser-guided Paveway II/IV; Laser JDAM
ASW 24 MH-60R Seahawk INS/GPS-guided AGM-154C JSOW; JDAM; JDAM-ER
TPT 25: Medium 6 NH90 (MRH90); Light 19: 4 Bell
429; 15 H135 Paramilitary
Clearance Diving Branch Maritime Border Command
FORCES BY ROLE Has responsibility for operational coordination and
SPECIAL FORCES control of both civil and military maritime-enforcement
2 diving unit activities within Australia’s EEZ. At any one time,
between 5 and 7 Armidale-class patrol boats and 2 AP-3C
Air Force 14,400 Orion aircraft are also assigned
Flying hours 175 hrs/yr on F/A-18 Hornet EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK PSO 2: 1 Ocean Protector with 1 hel landing platform; 1
3 sqn with F/A-18A/B Hornet Ocean Shield with 1 hel landing platform
1 sqn with F/A-18F Super Hornet PCO 10: 1 Thaiyuk; 1 Triton (leased) with 1 hel landing
1 sqn (forming) with F-35A Lightning II platform; 8 Cape
ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE PCC 2 Bay
1 sqn with AP-3C Orion AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 10 DHC-8
1 sqn (forming) with P-8A Poseidon HELICOPTERS • TPT 2: Medium 1 Bell 214; Light 1
ELECTRONIC WARFARE AS350 Ecureuil
1 sqn with EA-18G Growler
ISR Cyber
1 (FAC) sqn with PC-9/A(F) The Australian Cyber Security Centre was officially
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL opened on 27 November 2014 and brings cyber-security
1 sqn with B-737-700 Wedgetail (E-7A) capabilities from across the Australian government
into a single location. On 21 April 2016, the Australian

Government Cyber Security Strategy was launched. Bangladesh BGD
During the launch, the government publicly announced Bangladeshi Taka Tk 2016 2017 2018
Australia’s offensive cyber capabilities to respond to cyber
GDP Tk 18.4tr 20.9tr
intrusions against Australian networks. This capability
is housed in the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) US$ 228bn 250bn
and this public recognition brings Australia in line with per capita US$ 1,414 1,532
international partners who have already announced their Growth % 7.2 7.1
capability. The 2016 Defence White Paper acknowledged Inflation % 5.7 5.7
the importance of cyber security to the future of Australia’s Def bdgt Tk 207bn 232bn 258bn
security environment and announced growth for the ASD’s US$ 2.56bn 2.78bn
cyber capabilities. An Information Warfare Division was
formed in July 2017, and comes under the Joint Capabilities
US$1=Tk 80.76 83.54
Group of the Australian Defence Force Headquarters. The
division consists of four separate branches: Information Population 157,826,578
Warfare Capability, C4 and Battle Management Capability, Religious groups: Muslim 90%; Hindu 9%; Buddhist 1%
Capability Support Directorate and the Joint Cyber Unit
and will be responsible for offensive and defensive cyber Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
operations. The Armed Forces are also recruiting skilled Male 14.1% 5.0% 4.6% 4.1% 18.4% 2.9%
reservists to boost ADF cyber capability. Female 13.6% 4.9% 4.7% 4.4% 19.8% 3.3%
DEPLOYMENT Capabilities
Bangladesh has a limited military capability optimised
AFGHANISTAN for border and domestic security, and its forces have
NATO • ISAF Operation Resolute Support (Highroad) 270; 1 shown themselves capable of mobilising and deploying
SF unit; 1 sy unit; 1 sigs unit quickly to tackle internal-security tasks. Autumn 2017
ARABIAN SEA saw the army deployed to the country’s eastern border
to provide humanitarian assistance to Rohingya refugees
Combined Maritime Forces • CTF-150 1 FFGHM
fleeing Myanmar. The armed forces reportedly retain
EGYPT extensive business interests, in real estate, banks and
MFO (Operation Mazurka) 25 other businesses. Counter-terrorism operations increased
following a July 2016 attack. A major naval-recapitalisation
IRAQ and expansion programme is under way, in order to protect
Operation Inherent Resolve (Okra) 380; 1 SF gp; 1 trg unit the country’s large EEZ. In the recent past, Bangladesh has
relied on Chinese and Russian aid and credit to overcome
MALAYSIA
its limited procurement funding. It has increased defence
120; 1 inf coy (on 3-month rotational tours); 2 AP-3C Orion collaboration with India. A requirement for modern
(on rotation) howitzers has been announced. Substantial efforts have
MIDDLE EAST been made to strengthen a nascent shipbuilding industry,
and work has begun on a new submarine-support facility.
UN • UNTSO 11 obs
The country has a long record of UN peacekeeping
SOUTH SUDAN deployments, with UN payments reportedly providing an
UN • UNMISS 23; 1 obs important income source.
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES ACTIVE 157,050 (Army 126,150 Navy 16,900 Air
Operation Accordion 400: 1 tpt det with 2 C-130J-30 Hercules 14,000) Paramilitary 63,900
Operation Inherent Resolve (Okra) 300; 1 FGA det with 6
F/A-18A Hornet; 1 B-737-700 Wedgetail (E-7A); 1 A330 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
MRTT (KC-30A)
Army 126,150
FOREIGN FORCES FORCES BY ROLE
COMMAND
New Zealand 9 (air navigation trg)
9 inf div HQ
Singapore 230: 1 trg sqn at Pearce with PC-21 trg ac; 1 trg
SPECIAL FORCES
sqn at Oakey with 12 AS332 Super Puma; AS532 Cougar 1 cdo bn
United States US Pacific Command: 1,250; 1 SEWS at Pine MANOEUVRE
Gap; 1 comms facility at NW Cape; 1 SIGINT stn at Pine Armoured
Gap • US Strategic Command: 1 detection and tracking 1 armd bde
radar at Naval Communication Station Harold E. Holt 3 indep armd regt
Asia 245
Light SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with A244 LWT, 1 76mm gun

23 inf bde (capacity: 1 AW109E hel)
1 (composite) bde FFG 3:
COMBAT SUPPORT 2 Abu Bakr (ex-PRC Jianghu III) with 2 twin lnchr with
9 arty bde C-802A AShM, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 2 twin 100mm
1 engr bde gun
1 sigs bde 1 Osman (ex-PRC Jianghu I) with 2 quad lnchr with
AVIATION C-802 (CH-SS-N-8 Saccade) AShM, 2 RBU 1200 A/S
1 avn regt (1 avn sqn; 1 hel sqn) mor, 2 twin 100mm gun
AIR DEFENCE FF 1 Umar Farooq† (UK Salisbury – trg role) with 3 Squid
1 AD bde A/S Mor, 1 twin 115mm gun
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 50
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES CORVETTES 6
MBT 276: 174 Type-59; 58 Type-69/Type-69G; 44 Type- FSGM 2 Shadhinota (PRC C13B) with 2 twin lnchr with
90-II (MBT-2000) C-802 AShM, 1 octuple FL-3000N lnchr with HHQ-10
LT TK 8 Type-62 SAM, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
RECCE 8+ BOV M11 FSG 4:
APC 476 2 Durjoy with 2 twin lnchr with C-704 AShM, 1 76mm
APC (T) 134 MT-LB gun
APC (W) 342: 325 BTR-80; 17 Cobra 2 Bijoy (ex-UK Castle) with 2 twin lnchr with C-704
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AShM, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
AEV MT-LB PSOH 2 Somudra Joy (ex-USCG Hero) with 1 76mm gun,
ARV 3+: T-54/T-55; Type-84; 3 Type-654
Asia
VLB MTU PCFG 4 Durdarsha (ex-PRC Huangfeng) with 4 single
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE lnchr with HY-2 (CH-SS-N-2 Safflower) AShM
MSL • MANPATS 9K115-2 Metis M1 (AT-13 Saxhorn-2)
PCO 6: 1 Madhumati (Sea Dragon) with 1 57mm gun; 5
RCL 106mm 238 M40A1
Kapatakhaya (ex-UK Island)
ARTILLERY 853+
PCC 8:
SP 155mm 12 NORA B-52
2 Meghna with 1 57mm gun (fishery protection)
TOWED 363+: 105mm 170 Model 56 pack howitzer;
1 Nirbhoy (ex-PRC Hainan) with 4 RBU 1200 A/S mor;
122mm 131: 57 Type-54/54-1 (M-30); 20 Type-83; 54
2 twin 57mm gun
Type-96 (D-30), 130mm 62 Type-59-1 (M-46)
5 Padma
MRL 122mm 6 (PRC)
PBFG 5 Durbar (PRC Hegu) with 2 single lnchr with
MOR 472: 81mm 11 M29A1; 82mm 366 Type-53/type-
SY-1 AShM
87/M-31 (M-1937); 120mm 95 AM-50/UBM 52
PBFT 4 Huchuan (PRC) with 2 single 533mm TT each
RADAR • LAND 2 SLC-2 (arty)
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 3: 1 LCT; 2 LCVP with YU-1 Type-53 HWT
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 7: 1 C295; 5 Cessna 152; 1 PA- PBF 4 Titas (ROK Sea Dolphin)
31T Cheyenne PB 11: 1 Barkat (ex-PRC Shanghai III); 2 Karnaphuli; 1
HELICOPTERS Salam (ex-PRC Huangfen); 7 Shaheed Daulat (PRC
MRH 2 AS365N3 Dauphin Shanghai II)
TPT 6: Medium 3 Mi-171Sh Light 3 Bell 206L-4 Long MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 5
Ranger MSO 5: 1 Sagar; 4 Shapla (ex-UK River)
AIR DEFENCE AMPHIBIOUS
SAM LANDING SHIPS • LSL 1
Short-range FM-90 LANDING CRAFT 14
Point-defence QW-2; HN-5A (being replaced by QW- LCT 2
2) LCU 4 (of which 2†)
GUNS • TOWED 166: 37mm 132 Type-65/74; 57mm 34 LCVP 3†
Type-59 (S-60) LCM 5 Darshak (Yuchin)
Navy 16,900 AG 1
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AGHS 2: 1 Agradoot; 1 Anushandhan
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 2 Nabajatra (ex-PRC AOR 2 (coastal)
Ming Type-035G) with 8 single 533mm TT AOT 1 Khan Jahangir Ali
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 5 AR 1†
FFGHM 1 Bangabandhu (ROK modified Ulsan) with 2 ATF 1†
twin lnchr with Otomat Mk2 AShM, 1 octuple HQ-7 AX 1 Shaheed Ruhul Amin
Naval Aviation Border Guard Bangladesh 38,000

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2 Do-228NG (MP) MANOEUVRE
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 2 AW109E Power Amphibious
1 rvn coy
Special Warfare and Diving Command 300 Other
54 paramilitary bn
Air Force 14,000
FORCES BY ROLE
Coast Guard 900
FIGHTER EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn with MiG-29B/UB Fulcrum PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 13
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK PSO 4 Syed Nazrul (ex-ITA Minerva) with 1 hel
1 sqn with F-7MB/FT-7B Airguard landing platform
1 sqn with F-7BG/FT-7BG Airguard PB 4: 1 Ruposhi Bangla; 1 Shaheed Daulat; 2 Shetgang
1 sqn with F-7BGI/FT-7BGI Airguard PBR 5 Pabna
GROUND ATTACK
1 sqn with Yak-130 Mitten* DEPLOYMENT
TRANSPORT
1 sqn with An-32 Cline
1 sqn with C-130B Hercules UN • MINUSCA 1,008; 10 obs; 1 cdo coy; 1 inf bn; 1 med
1 sqn with L-410UVP coy
TRAINING CYPRUS
1 sqn with K-8W Karakorum*; L-39ZA Albatros* UN • UNFICYP 3
1 sqn with PT-6
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
1 sqn with AW139; Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-17-1V Hip H; Mi- UN • MONUSCO 1,710; 13 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 avn
171Sh coy; 2 hel coy
1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-17-1V Hip H; Mi-171Sh LEBANON
1 sqn with Bell 212 UN • UNIFIL 275; 1 FFG; 1 FSG
1 trg sqn with Bell 206L Long Ranger; AW119 Koala
MALI
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
UN • MINUSMA 1,531; 2 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 sigs
coy; 1 tpt coy; 1 hel sqn
FTR 53: 9 F-7MB Airguard; 11 F-7BG Airguard; 12 F-7BGI
Airguard; 5 FT-7B Airguard; 4 FT-7BG Airguard; 4 FT-7BGI SOMALIA
Airguard; 6 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 2 MiG-29UB Fulcrum UN • UNSOM 1 obs
TPT 10: Medium 4 C-130B Hercules; Light 6: 3 An-32
SOUTH SUDAN
Cline†; 3 L-410UVP
UN • UNMISS 1,604; 20 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 rvn coy; 2 engr
TRG 41: 9 K-8W Karakorum*; 7 L-39ZA Albatros*; 10 PT-6;
coy
15 Yak-130 Mitten*
HELICOPTERS SUDAN
MRH 16: 2 AW139 (SAR); 12 Mi-17 Hip H; 2 Mi-17-1V UN • UNAMID 371; 8 obs; 2 inf coy
Hip H (VIP)
WESTERN SAHARA
TPT 15: Medium 7 Mi-171Sh; Light 8: 2 Bell 206L Long
UN • MINURSO 20; 8 obs; 1 fd hospital
Ranger; 4 Bell 212; 2 AW119 Koala
AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡; R-73 (AA-11 Archer); PL-5;
PL-7; SARH R-27R (AA-10A Alamo)
Paramilitary 63,900
Ansars 20,000+
Security Guards
Rapid Action Battalions 5,000

Ministry of Home Affairs
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Other
14 paramilitary bn
Asia 247
Reserves 700
Brunei BRN FORCES BY ROLE
Brunei Dollar B$ 2016 2017 2018 MANOEUVRE
GDP B$ 15.7bn 16.7bn
Light
1 inf bn
US$ 11.4bn 12.0bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
per capita US$ 26,935 27,893
Growth % -2.5 -1.3 LT TK 20 Scorpion (16 to be upgraded)
Inflation % -0.7 -0.2 APC • APC (W) 45 VAB
Def bdgt B$ 565m 452m ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
US$ 409m 324m ARV 2 Samson
US$1=B$ 1.38 1.39 ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 24
Population 443,593 Navy 1,200

Ethnic groups: Malay 65.7%; Chinese 10.3%; Indigenous 3.4%; FORCES BY ROLE
other or unspecified 23.6%
SPECIAL FORCES
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 1 SF sqn
Female 11.2% 4.0% 4.6% 4.9% 23.6% 2.5%
CORVETTES • FSG 4 Darussalam with 2 twin lnchr with
MM40 Exocet Block 2 AShM, 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing
Capabilities platform
Asia
While professional and well trained, the limited size of the PCC 4 Ijtihad
Royal Brunei Armed Forces (RBAF) means they could offer PBF 1 Mustaed
little resistance to a determined aggressor. Since 2015/16 PB 1 Perwira
(when defence spending was significantly reduced) AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCU 4: 2 Teraban;
funding shortfalls resulting primarily from the impact 2 Cheverton Loadmaster
of declining energy prices on the national budget have
challenged the RBAF’s efforts to implement its Defence Air Force 1,100
Capability Enhancement Project. The defence ministry FORCES BY ROLE
announced a preliminary study on the development of a MARITIME PATROL
defence-support industry, as part of the June 2016 Defence 1 sqn with CN235M
Science and Technology Policy Framework that is designed TRAINING
to improve performance in defence science and technology. 1 sqn with PC-7; Bell 206B Jet Ranger II
However, Brunei has always depended on external support TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
for its defence. The sultanate has long-established and close 1 sqn with Bell 214 (SAR)
defence relations with the UK, and in February 2015 the 1 sqn with Bo-105
long-standing agreement under which the sultanate hosts 1 sqn with S-70i Black Hawk
a British Army garrison, including a Gurkha battalion and AIR DEFENCE
a jungle-warfare school, was renewed for a further five 1 sqn with Rapier
years. There is also a long-term Singapore Armed Forces 1 sqn with Mistral
presence. Brunei continues to deploy small peacekeeping
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
contingents, under Malaysian command, in Lebanon
AIRCRAFT
(UNIFIL) and the southern Philippines (IMT).
MP 1 CN235M
ACTIVE 7,200 (Army 4,900 Navy 1,200 Air 1,100) TRG 4 PC-7
Paramilitary 4,900 HELICOPTERS
TPT 21: Medium 13: 1 Bell 214 (SAR); 12 S-70i Black
RESERVE 700 (Army 700) Hawk; Light 8: 2 Bell 206B Jet Ranger II; 6 Bo-105 (armed,
81mm rockets)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence Rapier; Mistral
Army 4,900 Paramilitary ε4,900

FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE Gurkha Reserve Unit 400–500
Light FORCES BY ROLE
3 inf bn MANOEUVRE
COMBAT SUPPORT Light
1 cbt spt bn (1 armd recce sqn, 1 engr sqn) 2 inf bn(-)
Royal Brunei Police 4,400 Force. In 2017, Cambodia participated in the Shanti Prayas-
III peacekeeping-training exercise. Cambodia contributes
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
personnel to UN peacekeeping missions.
Bendaharu; 7 PDB-type ACTIVE 124,300 (Army 75,000 Navy 2,800 Air 1,500
Provincial Forces 45,000) Paramilitary 67,000
DEPLOYMENT Conscript liability 18 months service authorised but not
implemented since 1993
LEBANON
UN • UNIFIL 30 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
PHILIPPINES
IMT 9
Army ε75,000
6 Military Regions (incl 1 special zone for capital)
FORCES BY ROLE
FOREIGN FORCES SPECIAL FORCES
Singapore 1 trg camp with infantry units on rotation; 1 trg 1 (911th) AB/SF Bde
school; 1 hel det with AS332 Super Puma MANOEUVRE
United Kingdom 1,000; 1 Gurkha bn; 1 jungle trg centre; 1 Light
hel flt with 3 Bell 212 2 (2nd & 3rd Intervention) inf div (3 inf bde)
5 (Intervention) indep inf bde
8 indep inf bde
Cambodia CAM Other
Cambodian Riel r
1 (70th) sy bde (4 sy bn)
2016 2017 2018
17 (border) sy bn
GDP r 81.7tr 90.3tr COMBAT SUPPORT
US$ 20.2bn 22.3bn 2 arty bn
per capita US$ 1,278 1,390 4 fd engr regt
Growth % 7.0 6.9 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 (construction) engr regt
Inflation % 3.0 3.7
2 tpt bde
Def bdgt [a] r ε2.66tr ε3.20tr AIR DEFENCE
US$ ε656m ε788m 1 AD bn
US$1=r 4,053.33 4,059.17 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 
[a] Defence and security budget ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 200+: 50 Type-59; 150+ T-54/T-55
Population 16,204,486 LT TK 20+: Type-62; 20 Type-63
Ethnic groups: Khmer 90%; Vietnamese 5%; Chinese 1% RECCE 4+ BRDM-2
IFV 70 BMP-1
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
APC 230+  
Male 15.6% 4.4% 4.7% 5.1% 17.1% 1.6% APC (T) M113
Female 15.3% 4.5% 4.8% 5.2% 18.8% 2.6% APC (W) 230: 200 BTR-60/BTR-152; 30 OT-64
Capabilities ARV T-54/T-55
MW Bozena; RA-140 DS
Despite their name, which reflects Cambodia’s formal ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
status as a constitutional monarchy – and the integration in RCL 82mm B-10; 107mm B-11
the early 1990s of two non-communist resistance armies – ARTILLERY 433+
the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) are essentially TOWED 400+ 76mm ZIS-3 (M-1942)/122mm D-30/
the modern manifestation of the armed forces of the former 122mm M-30 (M-1938)/130mm Type-59-I
People’s Republic of Kampuchea, established in 1979 MRL 33+: 107mm Type-63; 122mm 13: 8 BM-21; 5 RM-70;
following Vietnam’s invasion. In terms of organisation, 132mm BM-13-16 (BM-13); 140mm 20 BM-14-16 (BM-14)
the RCAF has an excessive number of senior officers, while MOR 82mm M-37; 120mm M-43; 160mm M-160
many formations and units appear to be of only nominal AIR DEFENCE
status. Skirmishes on the border with Thailand since 2008 SAM • Point-defence FN-6; FN-16 (reported)
provide little indication of capacity for high-intensity GUNS • TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-1/ZPU-2/ZPU-4; 37mm
combat. Cambodia’s most important international links M-1939; 57mm S-60
are with the Chinese and Vietnamese armed forces. It
was reported that an agreement was reached in late 2016 Navy ε2,800 (incl 1,500 Naval Infantry)
to increase Chinese military assistance to Cambodia. A EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
training relationship with the US was suspended in 2017, PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 14
also ending the deployment of US Naval Construction PBF 3 Stenka
Asia 249
PB 9: 4 (PRC 46m); 3 (PRC 20m); 2 Shershen

PBR 2 Kaoh Chhlam China, People’s Republic of PRC
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT
Chinese Yuan Renminbi Y 2016 2017 2018
LCU 1
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AFDL 1 GDP Y 74.6tr 81.1tr
US$ 11.2tr 11.9tr
Naval Infantry 1,500 per capita US$ 8,123 8,583
FORCES BY ROLE Growth % 6.7 6.8
MANOEUVRE Inflation % 2.0 1.8
Light
Def exp Y 1.31tr n.k.
1 (31st) nav inf bde
US$ 197bn n.k.
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty bn Def bdgt [a] Y 955bn 1.02tr
US$ 144bn 150bn
Air Force 1,500 US$1=Y 6.64 6.80
FORCES BY ROLE [a] Central Expenditure budget
ISR/TRAINING Population 1,387,096,243
1 sqn with P-92 Echo (L-39 Albatros* in store)
Ethnic groups: Han 91.5%; Zhuang 1.3%; Hui 0.8%; Manchu 0.8%;
TRANSPORT Uygur 0.7%; Tibetan 0.5%; other or unspecified 4.4%
1 VIP sqn (reporting to Council of Ministers) with An-
24RV Coke; AS350 Ecureuil; AS355F2 Ecureuil II Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
1 sqn with BN-2 Islander; Y-12 (II) Male 9.2% 3.1% 3.7% 4.5% 25.7% 5.2%
Asia
Female 7.9% 2.7% 3.3% 4.3% 24.8% 5.7%
1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-8 Hip; Z-9; (Mi-26 Halo in
store) Capabilities
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE China’s most recent defence white paper, published
AIRCRAFT in English in 2015, outlined the importance of power-
TPT • Light 12: 2 An-24RV Coke; 1 BN-2 Islander; 2 MA60; projection capabilities, emphasising the requirements
5 P-92 Echo (pilot trg/recce); 2 Y-12 (II) for offensive and defensive air operations, and ‘open
TRG (5 L-39 Albatros* in store) seas protection’. At the 19th Chinese Communist Party
HELICOPTERS National Congress, President Xi outlined a development
MRH 14: 3 Mi-17 Hip H; 11 Z-9 path for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to become a
TPT 8: Heavy (2 Mi-26 Halo in store); Medium 4 Mi-8 global ‘top tier’ military by 2050. To this end, the major
Hip; Light 4: 2 AS350 Ecureuil; 2 AS355F2 Ecureuil II restructuring of the PLA begun in late 2015 is now mostly
in effect, and will probably be complete by 2020. Whilst
Provincial Forces 45,000+ a key objective of this reform is improving the PLA’s
Reports of at least 1 inf regt per province, with varying readiness for combat operations, it remains unclear
numbers of inf bn (with lt wpn) how effective the newly established structures will be
at generating and controlling high-intensity combined-
Paramilitary arms capabilities, as efforts to improve operational
effectiveness will remain tempered by the political
Police 67,000 (including gendarmerie) requirement to maintain control. The establishment of
the Strategic Support Force underscores the importance
placed upon the further development of China’s already
DEPLOYMENT advanced cyber, space and information-dominance
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC capabilities, a key objective set by Xi for 2020. Recent deals
UN • MINUSCA 216; 6 obs; 1 engr coy for Su-35 combat aircraft and S-400 air-defence systems
demonstrate the willingness to buy limited amounts of
LEBANON foreign equipment to help develop the domestic defence
UN • UNIFIL 185; 1 engr coy industry. China is capable of indigenously producing
MALI advanced equipment across all domains, although
questions persist over quality. While a significant amount
UN • MINUSMA 304; 1 EOD coy
of old PLA equipment remains in service, the reduction
SOUTH SUDAN in overall force size as part of the restructuring process
UN • UNMISS 77; 6 obs; 1 MP unit may see outdated designs finally withdrawn over the
next few years. The armed forces have some experience
SUDAN in extended out-of-area maritime deployments, and
UN • UNAMID 2 obs China is constructing facilities in Djibouti to support
UN • UNISFA 1; 2 obs such missions. There is less experience of this in the
other services; however, incremental growth in limited Defensive

deployments to UN peacekeeping missions indicates
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
developing intent in this area. (See pp. 225–35.)
RADAR • STRATEGIC: 4+ large phased array radars;
ACTIVE 2,035,000 (Ground Forces 975,000 Navy some detection and tracking radars
240,000 Air Force 395,000 Strategic Missile Forces
100,000 Strategic Support Force 175,000 Other Space
150,000) Paramilitary 660,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Conscript liability Selective conscription; all services 2 years SATELLITES 77
COMMUNICATIONS 6 Zhongxing (dual-use telecom
RESERVE ε510,000 satellites for civ/mil comms)
NAVIGATION/POSITIONING/TIMING 23: 7 Beidou-
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 2(M); 5 Beidou-2(G); 9 Beidou-2(IGSO); 2 Beidou-3(M)
ISR 33: 32 Yaogan Weixing (remote sensing); 1 Ziyuan
Strategic Missile Forces 100,000+ (ZY-2 – remote sensing)
ELINT/SIGINT 15: 8 Shijian 6 (4 pairs – reported ELINT/
People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force SIGINT role); 7 Shijian 11 (reported ELINT/SIGINT role)
The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (formerly the
Second Artillery Force) organises and commands its own Ground Forces ε975,000
troops to launch nuclear counter-attacks with strategic In late 2015, a single, separate headquarters was established
missiles and to conduct operations with conventional
for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ground forces, in
missiles. Organised as launch bdes subordinate to 6
place of the four general departments
army-level msl bases. Org varies by msl type
FORCES BY ROLE
FORCES BY ROLE
COMMAND
13 (Group) army HQ
1 ICBM bde with DF-4
SPECIAL FORCES
2 ICBM bde with DF-5A
15 spec ops bde
1 ICBM bde with DF-5B
MANOEUVRE
1 ICBM bde with DF-31
Armoured
2 ICBM bde with DF-31A/A(G)
23 (cbd arms) armd bde
1 IRBM bde with DF-26
1 hy mech inf div (1 armd regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 arty
2 MRBM bde with DF-16
1 MRBM bde with DF-21 regt, 1 AD regt)
5 MRBM bde with DF-21A Mechanised
2 MRBM bde with DF-21C 1 (high alt) mech inf div (1 armd regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1
2 MRBM bde with DF-21D arty regt, 1 AD regt)
4 SRBM bde with DF-11A 23 (cbd arms) mech inf bde
2 SRBM bde with DF-15B Light
2 GLCM bde with CJ-10 3 (high alt) mot inf div (1 armd regt, 2 mot inf regt, 1 arty
2 SSM trg bde regt, 1 AD regt)
4+ SSM bde (forming) 27 (cbd arms) inf bde
Air Manoeuvre
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS 2 air aslt bde
ICBM • Nuclear 70: ε10 DF-4 (CH-SS-3); ε20 DF-5A/B Amphibious
(CH-SS-4 Mod 2/3); ε8 DF-31 (CH-SS-10 Mod 1); ε24 6 amph aslt bde
DF-31A (CH-SS-10 Mod 2); ε8 DF-31A(G) (CH-SS-10 Other
Mod 3) 1 (OPFOR) mech inf bde
IRBM • Dual-capable ε16 DF-26 1 mech gd div (1 armd regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 arty regt,
MRBM 146: Nuclear ε80 DF-21/DF-21A/DF-21E (CH- 1 AD regt)
SS-5 Mod 1/2/6); Conventional 66: ε24 DF-16 (CH- 1 sy gd div (4 sy regt)
SS-11 Mod 1/2); ε24 DF-21C (CH-SS-5 Mod 4); ε18 DF- 16 (border) sy bde
21D (CH-SS-5 Mod 5 – ASBM) 15 (border) sy regt
SRBM • Conventional 189: ε108 DF-11A (CH-SS-7 1 (border) sy gp
Mod 2); ε81 DF-15B (CH-SS-6 Mod 3) COMBAT SUPPORT
GLCM • Dual-capable ε54 CJ-10 14 arty bde
13 engr/NBC bde
Navy 2 engr regt
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 10 EW regt
SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC • SSBN 4: 50 sigs regt
4 Jin (Type-094) with up to 12 JL-2 (CH-SS-N-14) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
strategic SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with Yu-6 HWT 13 spt bde
Asia 251
COASTAL DEFENCE GUNS 1,788

19 coastal arty/AShM bde SP 480: 100mm 250 PTL-02; 120mm 230 PTZ-89
AVIATION TOWED • 100mm 1,308 PT-73 (T-12)/PT-86
1 mixed avn bde ARTILLERY 13,218+
HELICOPTER SP 2,320: 122mm 1,650: 700 PLZ-89; 300 PLZ-07; 150
12 hel bde PLZ-07B; 300 PLC-09; 200 PLL-09; 152mm 350 PLZ-
TRAINING 83A/B; 155mm 320 PLZ-05
4 hel trg regt TOWED 6,140: 122mm 3,800 PL-54-1 (M-1938)/PL-83/
AIR DEFENCE PL-60 (D-74)/PL-96 (D-30); 130mm 234 PL-59 (M-46)/PL-
15 AD bde 59-I; 152mm 2,106 PL-54 (D-1)/PL-66 (D-20)
GUN/MOR 120mm 300: 200 PLL-05; 100 PLZ-05A
Reserves
MRL 1,872+ 107mm 54+ PH-63; 122mm 1,643: 1,250
FORCES BY ROLE
PHL-81/PHL-90/SR4; 375 PHZ-89; 18 PHZ-10; 300mm
MANOEUVRE
175 PHL-03
Armoured
MOR 2,586: 82mm PP-53 (M-37)/PP-67/PP-82/PP-87;
2 armd regt
100mm PP-89
Light
18 inf div RADAR • LAND Cheetah; RASIT; Type-378
4 inf bde COASTAL DEFENCE
3 indep inf regt AShM HY-1 (CH-SSC-2 Silkworm); HY-2 (CH-SSC-3
COMBAT SUPPORT Seersucker); HY-4 (CH-SSC-7 Sadsack); YJ-62
3 arty div PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 25
7 arty bde PB 25: 9 Huzong; 16 Shenyang
15 engr regt AMPHIBIOUS 148+
Asia
1 ptn br bde LCM 117+: 1+ Yunnan; 100+ Yunnan II; 16+ Yupen
3 ptn br regt LCU 31+: 30 Yuwei; 1 other
10 chem regt LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 18
10 sigs regt AK 5 Leizhuang
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT AKR 1 PLA Logistics Support Vessel (capacity 1 MBT;
9 log bde 1 med hel)
1 log regt ARC 1
AIR DEFENCE AOT 8: 1 Fuzhong; 7 Fubing
17 AD div ATF 2 Huntao
8 AD bde AX 1 Haixun III
8 AD regt AIRCRAFT • TPT 9: Medium 5: 4 Y-8; 1 Y-9; Light 4 Y-7
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES ATK 240: 120 WZ-10; 120 WZ-19
MBT 6,740+: 1,600 ZTZ-59; 650 ZTZ-59-II; 600 ZTZ-59D; MRH 351: 22 Mi-17 Hip H; 3 Mi-17-1V Hip H; 38 Mi-
200 ZTZ-79; 300 ZTZ-88A/B; 1,000 ZTZ-96; 1,500 ZTZ- 17V-5 Hip H; 25 Mi-17V-7 Hip H; 8 SA342L Gazelle; 21
96A; 40 ZTZ-98A; 600 ZTZ-99; 250 ZTZ-99A; some ZTQ- Z-9A; 31 Z-9W; 10 Z-9WA; 193 Z-9WZ
15 TPT 382: Heavy 105: 9 Z-8A; 96 Z-8B; Medium 209: 50
LT TK 650: 250 ZTD-05; 250 ZTQ-62; 150 ZTS-63A
Mi-8T Hip; 140 Mi-171; 19 S-70C2 (S-70C) Black Hawk;
ASLT 400 ZTL-11
Light 68: 53 AS350 Ecureuil; 15 H120 Colibri
IFV 3,800: 400 ZBD-04; 500 ZBD-04A; 500 ZBL-08; 600
ZBD-86; 650 ZBD-86A; 550 ZSL-92; 600 ZSL-92B
ISR • Heavy BZK-005; BZK-009 (reported); Medium
APC 5,020+
BZK-006; BZK-007; BZK-008; Light Harpy (anti-radiation)
APC (T) 4,150: 2,400 ZSD-63/ZSD-63C; 1,750 ZSD-89
APC (W) 870+: 700 ZSL-92A; 120 ZBL-11; 50 ZSL-93; AIR DEFENCE
some EQ2050F SAM
AAV 300 ZBD-05 Medium-range 90: 72 HQ-16A; 18 HQ-17
AUV Tiger 4×4 Short-range 254: 24 9K331 Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet); 30
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES HQ-6D; 200 HQ-7A/B
ARV Type-73; Type-84; Type-85; Type-97; Type-654 Point-defence HN-5A/HN-5B; FN-6/QW-1/QW-2
VLB KMM; MTU; TMM; Type-84A GUNS 7,376+
MW Type-74; Type-79; Type-81-II; Type-84 SP 376: 25mm 270 PGZ-04A; 35mm 100 PGZ-07; 37mm
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE 6 PGZ-88
MSL TOWED 7,000+: 25mm PG-87; 35mm PG-99 (GDF-
SP 924: 450 HJ-8 (veh mounted); 24 HJ-10; 450 ZSL-02B 002); 37mm PG-55 (M-1939)/PG-65/PG-74; 57mm PG-
MANPATS HJ-73A/B/C; HJ-8A/C/E 59 (S-60); 100mm PG-59 (KS-19)
RCL 3,966: 75mm PF-56; 82mm PF-65 (B-10); PF-78; AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
105mm PF-75; 120mm PF-98 ASM AKD-8; AKD-9; AKD-10
Navy ε240,000 AK630 CIWS, 1 twin 130mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C/

The PLA Navy is organised into five service arms: Ka-28 Helix A hel) (of which 1 in refit)
submarine, surface, naval aviation, coastal defence and 1 Luhai (Type-051B) with 4 quad lnchr with YJ-83
marine corps, as well as other specialised units. There are AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with HHQ-7 SAM, 2 triple
324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 twin 100mm gun
three fleets: the Beihai Fleet (North Sea), Donghai Fleet
(capacity 2 Z-9C/Ka-28 Helix A hel) (in refit)
(East Sea) and Nanhai Fleet (South Sea)
2 Luhu (Type-052) with 4 quad lnchr with YJ-83 AShM,
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 octuple lnchr with HHQ-7 SAM, 2 triple 324mm
SUBMARINES 62 ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 FQF 2500 A/S mor, 2 H/PJ-
STRATEGIC • SSBN 4: 12 CIWS, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity 2 Z-9C hel)
4 Jin (Type-094) with up to 12 JL-2 (CH-SS-N-14) 2 Luyang (Type-052B) with 4 quad lnchr with YJ-83
strategic SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with Yu-6 HWT AShM, 2 single lnchr with Yezh (SA-N-12 Grizzly)
TACTICAL 58 SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 H/PJ-12
SSN 9: CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-28 Helix A hel)
3 Han (Type-091) with 6 single 533mm TT with 6 Luyang II (Type-052C) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-62
Yu-3 HWT/YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM (operational AShM, 8 sextuple VLS with HHQ-9 SAM, 2 triple
status unclear) 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 H/PJ-12 CIWS, 1
2 Shang I (Type-093) with 6 single 533mm TT with 100mm gun (capacity 2 Ka-28 Helix A hel)
Yu-3 HWT/Yu-6 HWT/YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM 6 Luyang III (Type-052D) with 8 octuple VLS with YJ-
or YJ-18 (CH-SS-N-13) AShM 18A (CH-SS-N-13) AShM/HHQ-9ER SAM/Yu-8
4 Shang II (Type-093A) with 6 single 533mm TT with A/S msl, 1 24-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 SAM, 2
Yu-3 HWT/Yu-6 HWT/YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 H/PJ-12 CIWS,
or YJ-18 (CH-SS-N-13) AShM (operational status 1 130mm gun (capacity 2 Ka-28 Helix A hel)
unclear) DDGM 2:
SSK 48: 2 Luzhou (Type-051C) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-83
4 Kilo (2 Project 877 & 2 Project 636) with 6 single AShM; 6 sextuple VLS with S-300FM (SA-N-20
533mm TT with TEST-71ME HWT/53-65KE HWT Grumble) SAM, 2 H/PJ-12 CIWS, 1 100mm gun, 1
8 Kilo (Project 636M) with 6 single 533mm TT with hel landing platform
TEST-71ME HWT/53-65KE HWT/3M54E Klub (SS- FRIGATES 59
N-27B Sizzler) AShM FFGHM 37:
11 Ming (7 Type-035(G), 4 Type-035B) with 8 single 2 Jiangkai (Type-054) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-83
533mm TT with Yu-3 HWT/Yu-4 HWT AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with HHQ-7 SAM, 2 triple
12 Song (Type-039(G)) with 6 single 533mm TT with 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor,
Yu-3 HWT/Yu-6 HWT/YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM 4 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-28
or YJ-18 (CH-SS-N-13) AShM Helix A/Z-9C hel)
4 Yuan (Type-039A) with 6 533mm TT with Yu-3 16 Jiangkai II (Type-054A) with 2 quad lnchr with
HWT/Yu-6 HWT/YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM or YJ- YJ-83 AShM, 1 32-cell VLS with Yu-8 A/S msl/
HHQ-16 SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT,
18 (CH-SS-N-13) AShM
2 FQF 2300 A/S mor, 2 H/PJ-12 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
9 Yuan II (Type-039B) with 6 533mm TT with Yu-3
(capacity 1 Ka-28 Helix A/Z-9C hel)
HWT/Yu-6 HWT/YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM or YJ-
9 Jiangkai II (Type-054A) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-
18 (CH-SS-N-13) AShM
83 AShM, 1 32-cell VLS with Yu-8 A/S msl/HHQ-
SSB 1 Qing (Type-032) (SLBM trials)
16 SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 2
FQF 2300 A/S mor, 2 H/PJ-11 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CV 1
(capacity 1 Ka-28 Helix A/Z-9C hel)
1 Liaoning (RUS Kuznetsov) with 4 18-cell GMLS with
7 Jiangwei II (Type-053H3) with 2 quad lnchr with
HHQ-10 SAM, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 3 H/PJ- YJ-83 AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with HHQ-7 SAM, 2
11 CIWS (capacity 18–24 J-15 ac; 17 Ka-28/Ka-31/Z- RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity
8S/Z-8JH/Z-8AEW hel) 2 Z-9C hel)
DESTROYERS 23 3 Jiangwei II (Type-053H3) with 2 quad lnchr with
DDGHM 21: YJ-83 AShM, 1 8-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 SAM,
2 Hangzhou (RUS Sovremenny) with 2 quad lnchr 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity
with 3M80/3M82 Moskit (SS-N-22A/B Sunburn) 2 Z-9C hel)
AShM, 2 3K90 Uragan (SA-N-7 Gadfly) SAM, 2 FFGH 1:
twin 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 1000 Smerch 3 A/S mor, 1 Jianghu IV (Type-053H1Q – trg role) with 1 triple
2 CADS-N-1 Kashtan CIWS, 2 twin 130mm gun lnchr with HY-2 (CH-SS-N-2) AShM, 4 RBU 1200
(capacity 1 Z-9C/Ka-28 Helix A hel) A/S mor, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C hel)
2 Hangzhou (RUS Sovremenny) with 2 quad lnchr FFGM 4:
with 3M80/3M82 Moskit (SS-N-22A/B Sunburn) 2 Luda IV (Type-051DT) with 4 quad lnchr with YJ-83
AShM, 2 Yezh (SA-N-12 Grizzly) SAM, 2 twin AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with HHQ-7 SAM, 2 FQF
533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 1000 Smerch 3 A/S mor, 4 2500 A/S mor, 2 130mm gun, 3 twin 57mm gun
Asia 253
2 Luda III (Type-051G) with 4 quad lnchr with YJ- 12 Yuhai (Type-074) (capacity 2 tk; 250 troops)
83 AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with HHQ-7 SAM, 2 10 Yunshu (Type-073A) (capacity 6 tk)
FQF 2500 A/S mor, 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 2 twin LST 30:
100mm gun 4 Yukan (Type-072-IIG) (capacity 2 LCVP; 10 tk; 200
FFG 17: troops)
2 Jianghu I (Type-053H) with 2 twin lnchr with 11 Yuting I (Type-072-II/III) (capacity 10 tk; 250
SY-1 (CH-SS-N-1) AShM, 4 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 2 troops; 2 hel)
100mm gun 9 Yuting II (Type-072A) (capacity 4 LCVP; 10 tk; 250
6 Jianghu II (Type-053H1) with 2 twin lnchr with troops)
HY-2 (CH-SS-N-2) AShM, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 6 Yuting III (Type-072B) (capacity 4 LCVP; 10 tk; 250
twin 100mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C hel) troops)
LANDING CRAFT 87
1 Jianghu III (Type-053H2) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-
LCU 67: 11 Yubei (Type-074A) (capacity 10 tanks or 150
83 AShM, 2 RBU 1200, 2 twin 100mm gun
troops); 56 Yunnan
6 Jianghu V (Type-053H1G) with 2 quad lnchr with
LCAC 8: 6 Yuyi; 2 Zubr
YJ-83 AShM, 2 RBU 1200, 2 twin 100mm gun
UCAC 12 Payi (Type-724)
2 Luda II (Type-051) with 2 triple lnchr with HY-2 (CH-
SS-N-2) AShM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 2 FQF 2500
ABU 5: 4 Yannan (Type-744); 1 Type-744A
A/S mor, 2 twin 130mm gun (minelaying capability)
AFS 3: 2 Dayun (Type-904); 1 Danyao (Type-904A)
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS ε206 AFSH 2 Junshanhu (Type-904B)
CORVETTES • FSGM 37: AG 5: 1 Darong; 3 Kanhai; 1 Kanwu
21 Jiangdao I (Type-056) with 2 twin lnchr with YJ-83 AGB 3: 2 Haibing (Type-272) with 1 hel landing platform;
AShM, 1 8-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 SAM, 2 triple 1 Yanha
Asia
324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel AGE 7: 2 Dahua (Type-909) with 1 hel landing platform
landing platform (weapons test platform); 1 Kantan; 2 Shupang (Type-
16 Jiangdao II (Type-056A) with 2 twin lnchr with YJ-83 636); 1 Yanqian (Type-904I); 1 Yanqian (Type-904II)
AShM, 1 8-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 SAM, 2 triple AGI 8: 1 Dadie; 1 Dongdiao (Type-815) with 1 hel landing
324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel platform; 5 Dongdiao (Type-815A) with 1 hel landing
landing platform platform; 1 Hai Yang (Type-625C)
PCFG ε65 Houbei (Type-022) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ- AGM 4 Yuan Wang (Type-718) (space and missile tracking)
83 AShM, 1 H/PJ-13 CIWS AGOR 2 Dahua
PCG 26 AGS 13: 1 Kandao; 2 Kanyang; 4 Shupang (Type-636A)
6 Houjian (Type-037-II) with 2 triple lnchr with YJ-8 with 1 hel landing platform; 2 Yanjiu; 4 Yanlai (Type-
(CH-SS-N-4) AShM, 1 76mm gun 635A/B/C)
20 Houxin (Type-037-IG) with 2 twin lnchr with YJ-8 AH 8: 5 Ankang; 1 Anwei (Type-920); 2 Qiongsha (hospital
(CH-SS-N-4) AShM conversion)
PCC 48 AK 5: 4 Hongqi; 1 Yudao
2 Haijiu (Type-037-I) with 4 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 twin AOEH 1 Type-901 with 2 H/PJ-13 CIWS
57mm gun AORH 11: 2 Fuchi (Type-903); 6 Fuchi mod (Type-903A);
30 Hainan (Type-037) with ε4 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 2 2 Fuqing (Type-905); 1 Fusu
twin 57mm gun AOT 32: 4 Fubai; 6 Fuchang; 13 Fujian (Type-632); 8 Fulin;
1 Shengli
16 Haiqing (Type-037-IS) with 2 FQF-3200 A/S mor
AP 1 Daguan
PB ε30 Shanghai III (Type-062-1)
ARC 6 Youdian (Type-991)
MINE WARFARE 42
ARS 11: 1 Dadao; 1 Dadong; 1 Dalang II (Type-922III); 3
MINE COUNTERMEASURES 42
Dalang III (Type-922IIIA); 3 Dasan; 2 Dazhou
MCO 15: 4 Wochi (Type-081); 6 Wochi mod (Type-
ASR 6: 3 Dalao (Type-926); 3 Dajiang (Type-925) (capacity
081A); 5 Wozang
2 Z-8)
MSO ε5 T-43 (Type-010/6610) ATF 33: ε17 Hujiu; ε13 Roslavl; 3 Tuqiang
MSC 16: 4 Wosao I (Type-082); 12 Wosao II (Type-082-II) AWT 14: 3 Fujian; 4 Fulin; 3 Fushi; 3 Guangzhou; 1 Jinyou
MSD 6 Wonang (Type-529) AX 4:
AMPHIBIOUS 1 Dashi (Type-0891A) with 2 hel landing platforms
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LPD 4 Yuzhao 1 Daxin with 2 FQF 1200 A/S mor, 2 Type-69 CIWS, 1
(Type-071) with 4 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 57mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
4 Yuyi LCAC plus supporting vehicles; 800 troops; 60 1 Qi Ji Guang (Type-927) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel
armoured vehs; 4 hel) landing platform
LANDING SHIPS 53 1 Yudao
LSM 23: ESD 1 Donghaidao
1 Yudeng (Type-073-II) (capacity 5 tk or 500 troops) COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 72 YJ-62 (3 regt)
Naval Aviation 26,000 AIR DEFENCE

SAM • Long-range HQ-9
FORCES BY ROLE
Naval aviation may be shifting from a division/
AAM • IR PL-5; PL-8; PL-9; R-73 (AA-11 Archer); IR/
regimental structure to a brigade-based structure
SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo); SARH PL-11; ARH R-77
BOMBER
(AA-12A Adder); PL-12
2 regt with H-6DU/G
ASM Kh-31A (AS-17B Krypton); KD-88
FIGHTER
AShM YJ-12; YJ-61; YJ-8K; YJ-83K; YJ-9
1 regt with J-8F Finback
ARM YJ-91
BOMBS
1 regt with J-10A/S Firebird
Laser-guided: LS-500J
3 regt with J-11B/BS Flanker L
TV-guided: KAB-500KR; KAB-1500KR
1 regt with J-15 Flanker
1 regt with Su-30MK2 Flanker G Marines ε15,000
ATTACK
FORCES BY ROLE
2 regt with JH-7 Flounder
MANOEUVRE
3 regt with JH-7A Flounder
Amphibious
ASW/AEW
3 mne bde (1 spec ops bn, 1 SF amph recce bn, 1 recce
1 regt (forming) with Y-8Q; KJ-500
bn, 1 tk bn, 2 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AT/AD bn, 1
ELINT/ISR/AEW
engr bn, 1 sigs bn)
1 regt with Y-8J/JB/W/X; Y-9JB
TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 regt with Y-7H; Y-8C; CRJ-200/700 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
TRAINING LT TK 73 ZTD-05
1 regt with CJ-6A ASLT 30 ZTL-11
1 regt with HY-7 IFV 60 ZBL-08
1 regt with JL-8 AAV 152 ZBD-05
1 regt with JL-8/JL-9G ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
1 regt with JL-9 MSL • MANPATS HJ-73; HJ-8
1 regt with Y-5 RCL 120mm Type-98
HELICOPTER ARTILLERY 40+
1 regt with Ka-27PS; Ka-28; Ka-31 SP 122mm 40+: 20+ PLZ-07; 20+ PLZ-89
1 regt with SH-5; A3565N; Z-9C/D; Z-8J/JH MRL 107mm PH-63
1 regt with Y-7G; Z-8; Z-8J; Z-8S; Z-9C/D MOR 82mm
AIR DEFENCE AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence HN-5
1 SAM bde with HQ-9
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Air Force 395,000
AIRCRAFT 374 combat capable Flying hours Ftr, ground attack and bbr pilots average
BBR 27 H-6G 100–150 hrs/yr. Tpt pilots average 200+
FTR 24 J-8F Finback per year. Each regt has two quotas to meet
FGA 139: 16 J-10A Firebird; 7 J-10S Firebird; 72 J-11B/BS during the year – a total number of hours,
Flanker L; 20 J-15 Flanker; 24 Su-30MK2 Flanker G and the percentage of flight time dedicated
ATK 120: 48 JH-7; 72 JH-7A Flounder to tactics trg
ASW 7+: 3 SH-5; 4+ Y-8Q FORCES BY ROLE
ELINT 7: 4 Y-8JB High New 2; 3 Y-8X Air Force fighter/ground-attack units shifting to brigade
AEW&C 17: 4 Y-8J Mask; 6 Y-8W High New 5; 4 Y-9JB; structure from 2017. Remaining J-7 and Q-5 regiments
3+ KJ-500 may be disbanded/being disbanded.
TKR 5 H-6DU BOMBER
TPT 36: Medium 6 Y-8C; Light 28: 20 Y-5; 2 Y-7G; 6 1 regt with H-6M
Y-7H; PAX 4: 2 CRJ-200; 2 CRJ-700 2 regt with H-6H
TRG 107: 38 CJ-6; 12 HY-7; 16 JL-8*; 28 JL-9*; 12 JL- 5 regt with H-6K
9GJ*; 1+ JL-10* FIGHTER
HELICOPTERS 6 regt with J-7 Fishbed
ASW 28: 14 Ka-28 Helix A; 14 Z-9C  2 regt with J-7E Fishbed
AEW 10+: 9 Ka-31; 1+ Z-18 AEW 2 bde with J-7E Fishbed
MRH 18: 7 AS365N; 11 Z-9D 3 regt with J-7G Fishbed
SAR 11: 3 Ka-27PS; 4 Z-8JH; 2 Z-8S; 2 Z-9S 1 regt with J-8B Finback
TPT 38: Heavy 30: 8 SA321 Super Frelon; 9 Z-8; 13 Z-8J; 1 bde with J-8F Finback
Medium 8 Mi-8 Hip 2 regt with J-8H Finback
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES 2 bde with J-8H Finback
ISR Heavy BZK-005; Medium BZK-007 7 bde with J-11/Su-27SK/Su-27UBK Flanker
Asia 255
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK Flanker L; 16 J-16 Flanker; 6 J-20A (in test); 73 Su-30MKK

2 regt with J-10/J-10A/J-10S Firebird Flanker; 14 Su-35 Flanker
6 bde with J-10/J-10A/J-10S Firebird ATK 240: 140 JH-7A; 100 Q-5D/E Fantan
3 bde with J-10B/S Firebird EW 13: 4 Y-8CB High New 1; 7 Y-8G High New 3; 2 Y-8XZ
1 bde with J-10C/S Firebird High New 7
3 bde with J-11B/BS Flanker L ELINT 4 Tu-154M/D Careless
1 bde with J-11/Su-35 Flanker ISR 51: 24 JZ-8 Finback*; 24 JZ-8F Finback*; 3 Y-8H1
1 bde with J-16 Flanker AEW&C 10: 4 KJ-200 Moth; 2 KJ-500; 4 KJ-2000
3 bde with Su-30MKK Flanker C2 5: 2 B-737; 3 Y-8T High New 4
GROUND ATTACK TKR 13: 10 H-6U; 3 Il-78 Midas
1 regt with JH-7A Flounder TPT 333+ Heavy 25: 20 Il-76MD/TD Candid; 5 Y-20;
5 bde with JH-7A Flounder Medium 42+: 30 Y-8; 12+ Y-9; Light 239: 170 Y-5; 41 Y-7/
3 regt with Q-5D/E Fantan Y-7H; 20 Y-11; 8 Y-12; PAX 27: 9 B-737 (VIP); 5 CRJ-200; 5
1 bde with Q-5D/E Fantan CRJ-700; 8 Tu-154M Careless
ELECTRONIC WARFARE TRG 974+: 400 CJ-6/6A/6B; 12+ H-Y7; 200 JJ-7*; 350 JL-8*;
2 regt with Y-8CB/G/XZ some JL-9*; 12+ JL-10*
ISR HELICOPTERS
1 regt with JZ-8F Finback* MRH 22: 20 Z-9; 2 Mi-17V-5 Hip H
1 bde with JZ-8F Finback* TPT 31+: Heavy 18+ Z-8; Medium 13+: 6+ AS332 Super
1 regt with Y-8H1 Puma (VIP); 3 H225 (VIP); 4+ Mi-171
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
1 regt with KJ-200 Moth; KJ-500; KJ-2000; Y-8T CISR • Heavy 12+ GJ-1
COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE ISR • Heavy 3+ EA-03
5 bde with Mi-171E; Z-8 AIR DEFENCE
Asia
SAM 600+
TANKER
Long-range 192+: 32+ HQ-9/HQ-9B; 32 S-300PMU
1 regt with H-6U
(SA-10 Grumble); 64 S-300PMU1 (SA-20 Gargoyle); 64
TRANSPORT
S-300PMU2 (SA-20 Gargoyle)
1 (VIP) regt with B-737; CRJ-200/700
Medium-range 324: 300+ HQ-2/HQ-2A/HQ-2B(A); 24
1 (VIP) regt with B-737; Tu-154M; Tu-154M/D
HQ-12 (KS-1A); HQ-22
1 regt with Il-76MD/TD Candid
Short-range 84+: 24 HQ-6D; 60+ HQ-7
1 regt with Il-76MD Candid; Il-78 Midas
GUNS 16,000 100mm/85mm
1 regt with Mi-17V-5; Y-7
1 regt with Y-5/Y-7/Z-9
AAM • IR PL-5B/C; PL-8; R-73 (AA-11 Archer); IIR PL-
1 regt with Y-5/Y-7
10; IR/SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo); SARH PL-11; ARH
3 regt with Y-7
PL-12; R-77 (AA-12A Adder)
1 regt with Y-8 ASM AKD-9; AKD-10; KD-88; Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge); Kh-
1 regt with Y-8; Y-9 31A/P (AS-17B/A Krypton); Kh-59M (AS-18 Kazoo); AKD-
TRAINING 9; AKD-10
2 regt with J-7; JJ-7 ARM YJ-91 (Domestically produced Kh-31P variant)
13 bde with CJ-6/6A/6B; H-6; HY-7; JL-8*; Y-5; Y-7; Z-9 ALCM • Conventional CJ-20; YJ(KD)-63
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER BOMBS
1 regt with AS332 Super Puma; H225 (VIP) Laser-guided: LS-500J; LT-2
ISR UAV TV-guided: KAB-500KR; KAB-1500KR
2 bde with GJ-1
AIR DEFENCE Airborne Corps
3 SAM div FORCES BY ROLE
2 mixed SAM/ADA div SPECIAL FORCES
9 SAM bde 1 spec ops bde
2 mixed SAM/ADA bde MANOEUVRE
2 ADA bde Air Manoeuvre
9 indep SAM regt 6 AB bde
1 indep ADA regt Aviation
4 indep SAM bn 1 hel regt
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
AIRCRAFT 2,397 combat capable 1 spt bde
BBR 162: ε12 H-6 (trg role); ε60 H-6H/M; ε90 H-6K TRANSPORT
FTR 819: 216 J-7 Fishbed; 192 J-7E Fishbed; 120 J-7G Fishbed; 1 bde with Y-7; Y-8
24 J-8B Finback; 24 J-8F Finback; 96 J-8H Finback; 95 J-11; 20 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Su-27SK Flanker; 32 Su-27UBK Flanker ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
FGA 566: 78 J-10 Firebird; 142 J-10A Firebird; 55+ J-10B ABCV 180 ZBD-03
Firebird; 24 J-10C Firebird; 48 J-10S Firebird; 110 J-11B/BS APC • APC (T) 4 ZZZ-03 (CP)
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Other Forces

SP some HJ-9 (1 ftr regt with J-15; 1 tpt regt with Y-7H/Y-8C/CRJ-200/
ARTILLERY 162+ CRJ-700; 1 trg regt with CJ-6A; 1 trg regt with HY-7; 1
TOWED 122mm ε54 PL-96 (D-30) trg regt with JL-8; 1 trg regt with JL-8/JL-9G; 1 trg regt
MRL 107mm ε54 PH-63 with JL-9; 1 trg regt with Y-5)
MOR 54+: 82mm some; 100mm 54
AIRCRAFT • TPT 20: Medium 6 Y-8; Light 14: 2 Y-7; Nothern Theatre Air Force
12 Y-12D 5th & 11th Attack Divisions
(2 atk regt with Q-5)
HELICOPTERS
12th & 21st Fighter Divisions
ATK 6 WZ-10
(1 ftr regt with J-7G; 1 ftr regt with J-7H; 1 ftr regt with
CSAR 8 Z-8KA
J-8B; 1 ftr regt with J-8H)
MRH 12 Z-9WZ
16th Special Mission Division
AIR DEFENCE
(1 EW regt with Y-8/Y-8CB/Y-8G; 1 ISR regt with JZ-8F;
SAM • Point-defence QW-1
1 tpt regt with Y-5/Y-7)
GUNS • TOWED 25mm 54 PG-87
Dalian Base
(1 FGA bde with J-10/J-10A; 1 ftr bde with J-8F; 1 atk
Strategic Support Force ε175,000 bde with JH-7A; 1 FGA bde with J-10B; 1 FGA bde with
At the end of 2015, a new Strategic Support Force was J-7E; 2 FGA bde with J-11B; 1 atk bde with Q-5; 1 ftr
established by drawing upon capabilities previously bde with J-7H)
exercised by the PLA’s 3rd and 4th departments and Jinan Base
other central functions. It reports to the Central Military (1 FGA bde with J-10/J-10A; 1 atk bde with JH-7A)
Commission and is believed to be responsible for the PLA’s Harbin Flying Academy
space and cyber capabilities (5 trg bde with CJ-6; H-6; H-7; JL-8; Y-5)
Other Forces
Theatre Commands (1 (mixed) SAM/ADA bde; 1 SAM bde; 4 SAM bn)
In early 2016, the previous seven military regions were
consolidated into five new theatre commands Other Forces
Marines
Northern Theatre Command (1 mne bde)
(Former Shenyang and parts of Beijing & Jinan MRs)
Central Theatre Command
Northern Theatre Ground Forces (Former Beijing & part Jinan MRs)
78th Group Army
Central Theatre Ground Forces
(1 spec ops bde, 2 armd bde, 3 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde,
81st Group Army
1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD
(1 spec ops bde, 2 armd bde, 2 mech inf bde, 1 (OPFOR)
bde)
mech inf bde, 1 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1
79th Group Army spt bde, 1 avn bde, 1 AD bde)
(1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde, 3 mech inf bde, 2 inf bde, 82nd Group Army
1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD (1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde, 3 mech bde, 1 inf bde, 1
bde) arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD
80th Group Army bde)
(1 spec ops bde, 1 mech inf bde, 5 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 83rd Group Army
engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde) (1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde, 5 mech inf bde, 1 air aslt
bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 AD bde)
North Sea Fleet Other Forces
Coastal defence from the DPRK border (Yalu River) (1 hy mech inf div, 2 (Beijing) gd div)
to south of Lianyungang (approx 35°10Ń), and to
seaward; HQ at Qingdao; support bases at Lushun, Central Theatre Air Force
Qingdao. 9 coastal-defence districts 7th & 19th Fighter Divisions
5 SSN; 15 SSK; 1 CV; 3 DDGHM; 2 DDGM; 9 FFGHM; (2 ftr regt with J-7; 1 trg regt with J-7/JJ-7)
2 FFGM; 1 FFGH; 4 FFG; 7 FSGM; ε18 PCFG/PCG; ε7 15th Fighter/Attack Division
LS; ε6 MCMV (1 FGA regt with J-10A; 1 ftr regt with J-7G)
24th Fighter Division
North Sea Fleet Naval Aviation (1 ftr regt with J-7G; 1 FGA regt with J-10/J-10A)
2nd Naval Air Division Datong Base
(2 EW/ISR/AEW regt with Y-8J/JB/W/X; Y-9JB; 1 MP/ (1 ftr bde with J-11)
hel regt with SH-5; AS365N; Ka-28; SA321; Z-8J/JH; Wuhan Base
Z-9C/D) (1 ftr bde with Su-27SK; 1 FGA bde with J-10B)
5th Naval Air Division Shijiazhuang Flying Academy
(2 FGA regt with JH-7A; 1 ftr regt with J-8F) (3 trg bde with JL-8) 
Asia 257
Other Forces 73rd Group Army

(1 Flight Test Centre; 3 SAM div; 1 (mixed) SAM/ADA (1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde, 3 inf bde, 2 amph bde, 1
div) arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD
bde)
Other Forces
34th VIP Transport Division East Sea Fleet
(1 tpt regt with B-737; CRJ200/700; 1 tpt regt with Coastal defence from south of Lianyungang to
B-737; Tu-154M; Tu-154M/D; 1 tpt regt with Y-7; 1 hel Dongshan (approx. 35°10Ń to 23°30Ń), and to
regt with AS332; H225) seaward; HQ at Ningbo; support bases at Fujian,
Western Theatre Command Zhoushan, Ningbo. 7 coastal-defence districts
(Former Lanzhou & part Chengdu MRs) 16 SSK; 9 DDGHM; 17 FFGHM; 2 FFG; 17 FSGM;
ε30 PCFG/PCG; 1 LPD; ε22 LS; ε18 MCMV
Western Theatre Ground Forces
(Command relationship between Western Theatre East Sea Fleet Naval Aviation
Command and Xinjiang/Xizang Military District 4th Naval Aviation Division
forces unclear) (1 FGA regt with Su-30MK2; 1 hel regt with Ka-27PS;
76th Group Army Ka-28; Ka-31; 1 FGA regt with J-10A)
(1 spec ops bde, 4 armd bde, 2 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 6th Naval Aviation Division
engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde) (2 FGA regt with JH-7; 1 bbr regt with H-6DU/G)
77th Group Army
(1 spec ops bde, 2 armd bde, 4 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 Eastern Theatre Air Force
engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde) 10th Bomber Division
Xinjiang Military District (1 bbr regt with H-6H; 1 bbr regt with H-6K; 1 bbr regt
Asia
(1 spec ops bde, 1 (high alt) mech div, 3 (high alt) mot with H-6M)
div, 1 arty bde, 1 AD bde, 1 engr regt, 1 EW regt, 1 hel 14th & 32nd Fighter Divisions
bde) (1 ftr regt with J-7E; 1 tpt regt with Y-5/Y-7/Z-9; 1 trg
Xizang Military District regt with J-7/JJ-7)
(1 spec ops bde; 1 (high alt) mech inf bde; 2 mtn inf 26th Special Mission Division
bde; 1 arty regt, 1 AD bde, 1 engr bde, 1 EW regt) (1 AEW&C regt with KJ-200/KJ-500/Y-8T; 1 AEW&C
regt with KJ-2000/Y-8T)
Western Theatre Air Force
28th Attack Division
4th Transport Division
(1 atk regt with JH-7A; 1 atk regt with Q-5D/E)
(1 tpt regt with Y-8/Y-9; 1 tpt regt with Y-7; 1 tpt regt
with Mi-17V-5/Y-7/Y-20) Fuzhou Base
6th & 33rd Fighter Divisions (2 ftr bde with J-11; 1 FGA bde with Su-30MKK)
(2 ftr regt with J-7E; 1 ftr regt with J-7) Shanghai Base
36th Bomber Division (1 FGA bde with J-16; 1 FGA bde with J-10/J-10A; 1
(2 bbr regt with H-6K; 1 bbr regt with H-6H) FGA bde with J-11B; 1 FGA bde with Su-30MKK; 1 atk
Lanzhou Base bde with JH-7A; 1 ftr bde with J-8H; 1 FGA bde with
(2 ftr bde with J-11) J-7E)
Urumqi Base Other Forces
(1 ftr bde with J-8H; 1 ftr bde with J-11B; 1 atk bde with (1 ISR bde with JZ-8F; 1 CSAR bde with M-171; Z-8;
JH-7A) 3 SAM bde; 1 ADA bde; 2 indep SAM regt; 1 Flight
Xi’an Flying Academy Instructor Training Base with CJ-6; JL-8)
(5 trg bde with JL-8; Y-7; Z-9)
Other Forces Southern Theatre Command
(1 surv regt with Y-8H1; 1 (mixed) SAM/ADA div; 1 (Former Guangzhou and part Chengdu MRs)
(mixed) SAM/ADA bde; 1 SAM bde; 4 indep SAM regt)
Southern Theatre Ground Forces
Eastern Theatre Command 74th Group Army
(Former Nanjing MR) (1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 2 inf bde, 2
amph bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel
Eastern Theatre Ground Forces
71st Group Army bde, 1 AD bde)
(1 spec ops bde, 4 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde, 75th Group Army
1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde regt, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, (1 spec ops bde, 3 armd bde, 2 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde,
1 AD bde) 1 air aslt bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1
72nd Group Army AD bde)
(1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 2 inf bde, Other Forces
2 amph bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 (1 (composite) inf bde (Hong Kong); 1 hel sqn (Hong
hel bde, 1 AD bde) Kong), 1 AD bn (Hong Kong))
South Sea Fleet MANOEUVRE

Coastal defence from Dongshan (approx. 23°30Ń) to Other
VNM border, and to seaward (including Paracel and 110 (border) paramilitary regt
Spratly islands); HQ at Zhanjiang; support bases at 20 (marine) paramilitary regt
Yulin, Guangzhou
4 SSBN; 4 SSN; 16 SSK; 9 DDGHM; 11 FFGHM; 2
China Coast Guard (CCG)
FFGM; 10 FFG; 13 FSGM; ε38 PCFG/PCG; 3 LPD; In March 2013, four of China's maritime law-enforce-
ε22 LS; ε18 MCMV ment agencies were unified under the State Oceanic
Administration and renamed the China Coast Guard
South Sea Fleet Naval Aviation EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
8th Naval Aviation Division PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 448
(2 FGA regt with J-11B; 1 bbr regt with H-6DU/G) PSOH 38:
9th Naval Aviation Division 2 Zhaotou with 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 med hel)
(1 FGA regt with J-11B, 1 FGA regt with JH-7A; 1 tpt/ 3 Type-818 (Type-054 mod) with 1 76mm gun
hel regt with Y-7G; Z-8; Z-8J; Z-8S; Z-9C/D; 1 ASW/ (capacity 1 med hel)
AEW&C regt with KJ-500; Y-8Q) 3 Jiangwei I (Type-053H2G) (capacity 1 med hel) (ex-
Other Forces PLAN)
1 SAM bde 4 Shuoshi II (capacity 1 med hel)
Southern Theatre Air Force 2 Shucha I (capacity 1 med hel)
2nd, 9th & 18th Fighter Divisions 10 Shucha II (capacity 1 med hel)
(2 ftr regt with J-7; 1 ftr regt with J-8H) 12 Zhaoyu (capacity 1 med hel)
8th Bomber Division 1 Zhoachang (capacity 1 med hel)
(1 tkr regt with H-6U; 2 bbr regt with H-6K) 1 Zhongyang (capacity 1 med hel)
13th Transport Division PSO 47:
(1 tpt regt with Y-8C; 1 tpt regt with Il-76MD/TD; 1 tpt 8 Type-718B with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing
regt with Il-76MD; Il-78) platform
20th Special Mission Division 1 Dalang I (Type-922) (ex-PLAN)
(1 tpt regt with Y-7; 1 EW regt with Y-8CB/G/XZ)  1 Haixun II with 1 hel landing platform
Kunming Base 1 Hai Jian 73
(1 FGA bde with J-10/J-10A; 1 FGA bde with J-10B) 1 Hai Yang (Type-625C) (ex-PLAN)
Nanning Base 1 Jianghu I (Type-053H) (ex-PLAN)
(2 FGA bde with J-10A; 1 FGA bde with J-10B; 1 FGA 1 Kanjie (Type-636A) with 1 hel landing platform (ex-
bde with J-11/Su-35; 1 FGA bde with J-7; 1 FGA bde PLAN)
with Su-30MKK; 1 atk bde with JH-7A) 6 Shusheng with 1 hel landing platform
Other Forces 3 Shuwu
(4 SAM Bde; 3 indep SAM regt; 1 ADA bde; 1 indep 1 Shuyang
ADA regt) 3 Tuzhong (ex-PLAN) 
1 Wolei (Type-918) (ex-PLAN)
Other Forces 1 Xiang Yang Hong 9 (ex-PLAN)
Marines 4 Zhaolai with 1 hel landing platform
(2 mne bde) 14 Zhaotim
Airborne Corps PCO 33: 4 Jiangdao (Type-056 mod) with 1 hel landing
(6 AB bde) platform; 1 Shuke I; 4 Shuke II; 13 Shuke III; 3 Shuyou; 1
Youdian (Type-991-II) (ex-PLAN); 4 Zhaodai; 3 Zhaoming
Paramilitary 660,000+ active PCC 130: 24 Type-618B-II; 77 Hailin I/II; 1 Shuzao II; 14
People’s Armed Police ε660,000 Shuzao III; 9 Zhongeng; 2 Zhongmel; 3 Zhongsui
PB/PBF ε200
Internal Security Forces ε400,000 AMPHIBIOUS • LST 2 Yuting I (Type-072-II) (Ex-
FORCES BY ROLE PLAN; used as hospital vessels and island supply)
MANOEUVRE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 21
Other AGB 1 Yanbing (Type-071) (ex-PLAN)
14 (mobile) paramilitary div AGOR 9: 4 Haijian; 3 Shuguang 04 (ex-PLAN); 2 Xiang
22 (mobile) indep paramilitary regt Yang Hong 9
Some (firefighting/garrison) unit ATF 11
AIRCRAFT
Border Defence Force ε260,000 MP 1+ MA60H
FORCES BY ROLE TPT • Light Y-12 (MP role)
COMMAND HELICOPTERS
30 div HQ TPT • Light Z-9
Asia 259
Maritime Militia LEBANON

Made up of full- and part-time personnel. Reports to UN • UNIFIL 413; 2 engr coy; 1 med coy
PLA command and trains to assist PLAN and CCG in LIBERIA
a variety of military roles. These include ISR, maritime
UN • UNMIL 1
law enforcement, island supply, troop transport and
supporting sovereignty claims. The Maritime Militia MALI
operates a variety of civilian vessels including fishing UN • MINUSMA 403; 1 sy coy; 1 engr coy; 1 fd hospital
boats and oil tankers.
MIDDLE EAST
Cyber UN • UNTSO 4 obs
The PLA has devoted much attention to information warfare SOUTH SUDAN
over the past decade, in terms of both battlefield electronic UN • UNMISS 1,047; 4 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 fd
warfare (EW) and wider cyber-warfare capabilities. The hospital
main doctrine is the ‘Integrated Network Electronic
Warfare’ (INEW) document, which guides PLA computer- SUDAN
network operations. PLA thinking appears to have moved UN • UNAMID 370; 1 engr coy
beyond INEW, towards a new concept of ‘information
WESTERN SAHARA
confrontation’ (xinxi duikang), which aims to integrate
both electronic and non-electronic aspects of information UN • MINURSO 12 obs
warfare within a single command authority. PLA thinking
sees warfare under informationised conditions as Fiji FJI
characterised by opposing sides using complete systems of
ground, naval, air, space and electromagnetic forces. Since Fijian Dollar F$ 2016 2017 2018
Asia
2008, major PLA military exercises have had cyber and GDP F$ 9.79bn 10.5bn
information-operations components that have been both
US$ 4.68bn 5.05bn
offensive and defensive in nature. The PLA reorganised
in 2015, and established three new support branches
including the Strategic Support Force (SSF). Although Growth % 0.4 3.8
precise responsibilities remain unclear, the SSF reportedly Inflation % 3.9 3.8
has three sections: the first dealing with intelligence and Def bdgt F$ 108m 105m
military operations in cyberspace (defensive and offensive); US$ 52m 51m
the second responsible for military space operations
US$1=F$ 2.09 2.07
(surveillance and satellite); and the third in charge of
defensive and offensive EW and electronic intelligence. In Population 920,938
March 2017, China released an International Strategy for Ethnic groups: Fijian 51%; Indian 44%; European/others 5%
Cooperation in Cyberspace, which stated that the PLA will
play an ‘important role’ in cyberspace. The strategy also Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
stated that the country would ‘expedite the development of Male 14.2% 4.0% 4.2% 4.0% 21.3% 3.0%
a cyber force and enhance capabilities in terms of situational
Female 13.5% 3.9% 4.0% 3.9% 20.4% 3.5%
awareness, cyber defense, supporting state activities and
participating in international cooperation, to prevent
major cyber crisis, safeguard cyber security and maintain
Capabilities
national security and social stability’. China is investing The Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) are an infantry-
in quantum technology, and announced in September dominated defence force with a small naval element.
2017 that it would build the largest quantum-research Work began on a National Security Strategy in February
facility in the world to support technology developments 2017, but a planned white paper had yet to be published
that can be used by the armed forces, including code- by November 2017. The main roles of the infantry
breaking capabilities and covert navigational capacities for regiment are international peacekeeping (an important
submarines. revenue source) and home defence. Peacekeeping training
has modernised with support from New Zealand. Such
DEPLOYMENT international deployments have provided the RFMF with
considerable operational experience; its professionalism
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO is widely recognised. However, the RFMF has intervened
UN • MONUSCO 220; 12 obs; 1 engr coy; 1 fd hospital heavily in domestic politics and between a third coup
in 2006 and 2014 democracy was effectively suspended,
DJIBOUTI
leading to a rift in relations with Australia and other
240; 1 mne coy(-); 1 med unit; 2 ZTL-11; 8 ZBL-08; 1 LPD;
Western states. This opened the way for China (which
1 ESD
signed a bilateral memorandum of understanding on
GULF OF ADEN defence cooperation in 2014) and Russia (which donated
1 DDGHM; 1 FFGHM; 1 AORH equipment in January 2016) to develop closer military
relations with Fiji. Nevertheless, Fiji conducts joint

maritime-surveillance patrols with the New Zealand India IND
Navy to monitor its EEZ. Indian Rupee Rs 2016 2017 2018
ACTIVE 3,500 (Army 3,200 Navy 300) GDP Rs 152tr 167tr
US$ 2.26tr 2.44tr
RESERVE ε6,000
(to age 45) per capita US$ 1,742 1,852
Growth % 7.1 6.7
Inflation % 4.5 3.8
Def bdgt [a] Rs 3.45tr 3.60tr
Army 3,200 (incl 300 recalled reserves) US$ 51.5bn 52.5bn

US$1=Rs 67.07 68.55
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES [a] Includes defence civil estimates, which include military
pensions
1 spec ops coy
MANOEUVRE Population 1,281,935,911
Light Religious groups: Hindu 80%; Muslim 14%; Christian 2%; Sikh 2%
3 inf bn
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty bty Male 14.5% 4.8% 4.7% 4.3% 20.6% 3.0%
1 engr bn Female 12.8% 4.3% 4.1% 3.9% 19.7% 3.3%
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 log bn Capabilities
Reserves 6,000 India continues to modernise its military capabilities. The
armed forces are subordinated to the civilian political
FORCES BY ROLE leadership and orientated against both China and Pakistan.
MANOEUVRE Though internal security is the responsibility of civilian
Light police at state level, large numbers of paramilitary forces
3 inf bn are employed in this role. India does not have a chief of
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE defence staff or a system of joint operational-level theatre
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES command and control (C2). A new Indian Joint Armed
AUV 10 Bushmaster IMV Forces Doctrine was issued in 2017. Much is consistent
ARTILLERY 16 with similar US and NATO doctrines. It sets out joint
TOWED 85mm 4 25-pdr (ceremonial) doctrine for Indian nuclear C2, and sees an ‘emerging
MOR 81mm 12 triad’ of space, cyber and special-operations capabilities
complementing conventional land, sea and air capabilities.
Navy 300 A defence space agency, defence cyber agency and special-
operations division are to be formed. India continues to
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
modernise its strategic forces, particularly its delivery
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 5: 3 Kula
systems. The overall capability of the army is limited by
(AUS Pacific); 2 Levuka inadequate logistics, and shortages of ammunition and
spare parts. Defence cooperation with the US continues to
DEPLOYMENT grow, with an increasing level of exercising and sales of US
equipment. Development and procurement programmes
EGYPT across the services are aimed at replacing ageing
MFO 203; elm 1 inf bn equipment, but many projects have experienced significant
delays and cost overruns, particularly indigenous
IRAQ
systems. The government’s ‘Make in India’ policy aims to
UN • UNAMI 168; 2 sy unit strengthen the defence-industrial base through measures
LEBANON including reforming the cap on foreign direct investment.
UN • UNIFIL 145; 1 inf coy Indian personnel participate in numerous bilateral and
multilateral exercises, and the country is one of the top
MIDDLE EAST troop contributors to UN peacekeeping operations.
UN • UNTSO 2 obs
ACTIVE 1,395,100 (Army 1,200,000 Navy 58,350
SOUTH SUDAN Air 127,200 Coast Guard 9,550) Paramilitary
UN • UNMISS 4: 2 obs 1,585,950
SYRIA/ISRAEL RESERVE 1,155,000 (Army 960,000 Navy 55,000 Air
UN • UNDOF 302; 1 inf bn(-) 140,000) Paramilitary 941,000
Asia 261
Army first-line reserves (300,000) within 5 years of full- 12 mtn div (3-4 mtn inf bde, 3–4 arty regt)
time service, further 500,000 have commitment to age 50 2 indep mtn bde
Air Manoeuvre
1 para bde
1 SRBM gp with Agni I
Strategic Forces Command 1 MRBM gp with Agni II
Strategic Forces Command (SFC) is a tri-service command 1 IRBM gp (reported forming) with Agni III
established in 2003. The commander-in-chief of SFC, a sen- 2 SRBM gp with SS-250 Prithvi II
ior three-star military officer, manages and administers all 3 GLCM regt with PJ-10 Brahmos
strategic forces through separate army and air-force chains COMBAT SUPPORT
of command 3 arty div (2 arty bde, 1 MRL bde)
FORCES BY ROLE 2 indep arty bde
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 4 engr bde
1 SRBM gp with Agni I HELICOPTER
1 MRBM gp with Agni II 14 hel sqn
1 IRBM gp (reported forming) with Agni III AIR DEFENCE
2 SRBM gp with SS-250 Prithvi II 8 AD bde
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS 54
ICBM • Nuclear Agni V (in test) Reserves 300,000 reservists (first-line reserve
IRBM • Nuclear Agni III (entering service); Agni IV (in within 5 years full-time service); 500,000 reservists
test) (commitment until age 50) (total 800,000)
MRBM • Nuclear ε12 Agni II
Asia
Territorial Army 160,000 reservists (only 40,000
SRBM • Nuclear 42: ε12 Agni I; ε30 SS-250 Prithvi II;
regular establishment)
some SS-350 Dhanush (naval testbed)
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES FORCES BY ROLE
ALCM • Nuclear Nirbhay (likely nuclear capable; in MANOEUVRE
development) Light
Some Indian Air Force assets (such as Mirage 2000H or Su- 42 inf bn
30MKI) may be tasked with a strategic role COMBAT SUPPORT
6 (Railway) engr regt
2 engr regt
Space
1 sigs regt
SATELLITES 12 6 ecological bn
NAVIGATION, POSITONING, TIMING: 7 IRNSS
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
COMMUNICATIONS: 2 GSAT
ISR 3: 1 Cartosat 2C; 2 RISAT
MBT 3,097+: 122 Arjun; 1,950 T-72M1; 1,025+ T-90S
(ε1,100 various models in store)
Army 1,200,000 RECCE Ferret (used for internal-security duties along
6 Regional Comd HQ (Northern, Western, Central, South- with some indigenously built armd cars)
ern, Eastern, Southwestern), 1 Training Comd (ARTRAC) IFV 2,500: 700 BMP-1; 1,800 BMP-2 Sarath (incl some
FORCES BY ROLE BMP-2K CP)
COMMAND APC 336+
4 (strike) corps HQ APC (W) 157+ OT-64
10 (holding) corps HQ PPV 179: 165 Casspir; 14+ Yukthirath MPV
SPECIAL FORCES ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
8 SF bn AEV BMP-2; FV180
MANOEUVRE ARV T-54/T-55; VT-72B; WZT-2; WZT-3
Armoured VLB AM-50; BLG-60; BLG T-72; Kartik; MTU-20; MT-55;
3 armd div (2–3 armd bde, 1 arty bde (2 arty regt)) Sarvatra
8 indep armd bde MW 24 910 MCV-2
Mechanised ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
6 (RAPID) mech inf div (1 armd bde, 2 mech inf bde, 1 MSL
arty bde) SP 110 9P148 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel)
2 indep mech bde MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger) (being
Light phased out); 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 Konkurs
15 inf div (2–5 inf bde, 1 arty bde) (AT-5 Spandrel); Milan 2  
1 inf div (forming) RCL 3,000+: 84mm Carl Gustav; 106mm 3,000+ M40A1
7 indep inf bde (10 per inf bn)
ARTILLERY 9,684+ DESTROYERS 14

TOWED 2,972+: 105mm 1,350+: 600+ IFG Mk1/Mk2/Mk3 DDGHM 9:
(being replaced); up to 700 LFG; 50 M-56; 122mm 520 3 Delhi with 4 quad lnchr with 3M24E Uran-E (SS-
D-30; 130mm ε600 M-46 (500 in store) 155mm 502: ε300 N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 2 single lnchr with 3K90
FH-77B; ε200 M-46 (mod); 2 M777 Uragan (SA-N-7 Gadfly) SAM, 4 octuple VLS with
MRL 192: 122mm ε150 BM-21/LRAR 214mm 14 Pinaka Barak-1 SAM, 5 single 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000
(non-operational) 300mm 28 9A52 Smerch A/S mor; 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity
MOR 6,520+: 81mm 5,000+ E1; 120mm ε1,500 AM-50/E1; either 2 Dhruv hel/Sea King Mk42A ASW hel)
SP 120mm E1; 160mm 20 M-58 Tampella 3 Kolkata with 2 octuple VLS with Brahmos AShM;
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS 4 octuple VLS fitted for Barak-8 SAM; 2 twin
IRBM • Nuclear some Agni-III (entering service) 533mm TT with SET-65E HWT, 2 RBU 6000
MRBM • Nuclear ε12 Agni-II Smerch 2 A/S mor, 4 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
SRBM • Nuclear 42: ε12 Agni-I; ε30 250 Prithvi II (capacity 2 Dhruv/Sea King Mk42B hel)
GLCM • Conventional 15 PJ-10 Brahmos 3 Shivalik with 1 octuple VLS with 3M54E Klub (SS-
RADAR • LAND 38+: 14 AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder; BSR Mk.2; N-27B Sizzler) AShM; Brahmos AShM, 4 octuple
24 Cymbeline; EL/M-2140; M113 A1GE Green Archer (mor); VLS with Barak-1 SAM, 1 single lnchr with 3K90
MUFAR; Stentor Uragan (SA-N-7 Gadfly) SAM, 2 triple 324mm
AMPHIBIOUS 2 LCVP ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 AK630
HELICOPTERS CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Sea King Mk42B
MRH 275+: 80 Dhruv; 12 Lancer; 3+ Rudra; 120 SA315B ASW hel)
Lama (Cheetah); 60 SA316B Alouette III (Chetak) DDGM 5:
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES 2 Rajput (FSU Kashin) with 2 twin lnchr with P-15M
ISR • Medium 25: 13 Nishant; 12 Searcher Mk I/II Termit (SS-N-2C Styx) AShM, 2 twin lnchr with
AIR DEFENCE M-1 Volna (SA-N-1 Goa) SAM, 5 single 533mm
SAM ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 AK630
Medium-range Akash CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity Ka-28 Helix A hel)
Short-range 180 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful) 1 Rajput (FSU Kashin) with 2 twin lnchr with
Point-defence 500+: 50+ 9K33 Osa (SA-8B Gecko); 200 Brahmos AShM, 2 single lnchr with P-15M Termit
9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9 Gaskin); 250 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 (SS-N-2C Styx) AShM, 2 twin lnchr with M-1
Gopher); 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail – being phased out)‡; Volna (SA-N-1 Goa) SAM, 5 single 533mm ASTT
9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse) with SET-65E HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S
GUNS 2,395+ mor, 4 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-
SP 155+: 23mm 75 ZSU-23-4; ZU-23-2 (truck-mounted); 28 Helix A hel)
30mm 20-80 2S6 Tunguska 2 Rajput (FSU Kashin) with 1 octuple VLS with
TOWED 2,240+: 20mm Oerlikon (reported); 23mm 320 Brahmos AShM, 2 twin lnchr with P-15M Termit
ZU-23-2; 40mm 1,920 L40/70 (SS-N-2C Styx) AShM, 2 octuple VLS with Barak
SAM. 1 twin lnchr with M-1 Volna (SA-N-1 Goa)
SAM, 5 single 533mm ASTT with SET-65E HWT,
Navy 58,350 (incl 7,000 Naval Avn and 1,200
2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 4 AK630 CIWS, 1
Marines)
76mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-28 Helix A hel)
Fleet HQ New Delhi. Commands located at Mumbai,
FRIGATES 13
Vishakhapatnam, Kochi & Port Blair
FFGHM 10:
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 3 Brahmaputra with 4 quad lnchr with 3M24E
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL 14 Uran-E (SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 3 octuple
SSN 1 Chakra (ex-RUS Akula II) with 4 single 533mm TT VLS with Barak-1 SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT
with 3M54E Klub (SS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM, 4 single with A244 LWT, 4 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
650mm TT with T-65 HWT (RUS lease agreement) (capacity 2 SA316B Alouette III (Chetak)/Sea King
SSK 13: Mk42 ASW hel) (of which 1 non-operational)
4 Shishumar (GER T-209/1500) with 8 single 533mm 1 Godavari with 4 single lnchr with P-15M Termit
TT with AEG SUT mod 1 HWT (SS-N-2D Styx) AShM, 1 octuple VLS with Barak-1
2 Sindhughosh (FSU Kilo) with 6 single 533mm TT with SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with A244 LWT, 4
53-65KE HWT/TEST-71ME HWT/SET-65E HWT AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 SA316B
7 Sindhughosh (FSU Kilo) with 6 single 533mm TT Alouette III (Chetak)/Sea King Mk42 ASW hel)
with 53-65KE HWT/TEST-71ME HWT/SET-65E 3 Talwar I with 1 octuple VLS with 3M54E Klub (SS-
HWT/3M54E Klub (SS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM N-27B Sizzler) AShM, 1 single lnchr with 3K90
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 28 Uragan (SA-N-7 Gadfly) SAM, 2 twin 533mm
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 1 ASTT with SET-65E HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2
CV 1 Vikramaditya (ex-FSU Kiev mod) with 3 octuple A/S mor, 2 Kashtan (CADS-N-1) CIWS, 1 100mm
VLS with Barak-1 SAM, 4 AK630 CIWS (capacity: 12 gun (capacity 1 Dhruv/Ka-28 Helix A ASW hel)
MiG-29K/KUB Fulcrum FGA ac; 6 Ka-28 Helix A ASW 3 Talwar II with 1 octuple VLS with Brahmos AShM,
hel/Ka-31 Helix B AEW hel) 1 single lnchr with 3K90 Uragan (SA-N-7 Gadfly)
Asia 263
SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT with SET-65E HWT, LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 31
2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 AGOR 1 Sagardhwani with 1 hel landing platform
100mm gun (capacity 1 Dhruv/Ka-28 Helix A ASW AGHS 7 Sandhayak
hel) AGS 1 Makar
FFH 3: AOL 7: 6 Poshak; 1 Ambika
3 Kamorta with 2 twin 533mm TT, 2 RBU 6000 AOR 1 Jyoti with 1 hel landing platform
Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun AORH 3: 1 Aditya (based on Deepak (1967) Bremer
(capacity 1 Dhruv/Ka-28 Helix A ASW hel) Vulkan design); 2 Deepak with 4 AK630 CIWS
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 108 AP 3 Nicobar with 1 hel landing platform
CORVETTES • FSGM 8: ASR 1
4 Khukri with 2 twin lnchr with P-15M Termit ATF 1
(SS-N-2C Styx) AShM, 2 twin lnchr (manual AWT 2
aiming) with 9K32M Strela-2M (SA-N-5 Grail) AX 1 Tir
SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing AXS 3
platform (for Dhruv/SA316 Alouette III (Chetak))
4 Kora with 4 quad lnchr with 3M24E Uran-E (SS- Naval Aviation 7,000
N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 1 quad lnchr (manual FORCES BY ROLE
aiming) with 9K32M Strela-2M (SA-N-5 Grail) FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing 2 sqn with MiG-29K/KUB Fulcrum
platform (for Dhruv/SA316 Alouette III (Chetak)) ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
PSOH 10: 4 Saryu with 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun 4 sqn with Ka-28 Helix A; SA316B Alouette III (Chetak);
(capacity 1 Dhruv); 6 Sukanya with 4 RBU 2500 A/S mor Sea King Mk42A/B
(capacity 1 SA316 Alouette III (Chetak)) MARITIME PATROL
PCFGM 10 2 sqn with BN-2 Islander; Do-228-101; Il-38SD
Asia
8 Veer (FSU Tarantul) with 4 single lnchr with May
P-15M Termit (SS-N-2D Styx) AShM, 2 quad lnchr 1 sqn with P-8I Neptune
(manual aiming) with 9K32M Strela-2M (SA-N-5 AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
Grail), 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun 1 sqn with Ka-31 Helix B
2 Prabal (mod Veer) each with 4 quad lnchr with SEARCH & RESCUE
3M24E Uran-E (SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 1 1 sqn with SA316B Alouette III (Chetak); Sea King
quad lnchr (manual aiming) with 9K32M Strela- Mk42C
2M (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm
1 sqn with Dhruv
gun
TRANSPORT
PCMT 3 Abhay (FSU Pauk II) with 1 quad lnchr (manual
1 sqn with HS-748M (HAL-748M)
aiming) with 9K32M Strela-2M (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2
TRAINING
twin 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 76mm gun
1 sqn with Do-228
PCC 15: 4 Bangaram; 10 Car Nicobar; 1 Trinkat (SDB Mk5)
1 sqn with HJT-16 Kiran MkI/II, Hawk Mk132
PCF 4 Tarmugli (Car Nicobar mod)
PBF 58: 9 Immediate Support Vessel (Rodman 78);
1 sqn with UH-3H Sea King
13 Immediate Support Vessel (Craftway); 15 Plascoa
ISR UAV
1300 (SPB); 5 Super Dvora; 16 Solas Marine Interceptor
1 sqn with Heron; Searcher MkII 
(additional vessels in build)
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MSO 4 Pondicherry (FSU Natya) with 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor AIRCRAFT 69 combat capable
AMPHIBIOUS FTR 45 MiG-29K/KUB Fulcrum
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS VESSELS 1 ASW 13: 5 Il-38SD May; 8 P-8I Neptune
LPD 1 Jalashwa (ex-US Austin) with 1 Phalanx CIWS MP 13 Do-228-101
(capacity up to 6 med spt hel; either 9 LCM or 4 TPT 37:
LCM and 2 LCAC; 4 LCVP; 930 troops) Light 27: 17 BN-2 Islander; 10 Do-228
LANDING SHIPS 8 PAX 10 HS-748M (HAL-748M)
LSM 3 Kumbhir (FSU Polnocny C) (capacity 5 MBT or 5 TRG 23: 6 HJT-16 Kiran MkI; 6 HJT-16 Kiran MkII; 11
APC; 160 troops) Hawk Mk132*
LST 5: HELICOPTERS
2 Magar (capacity 15 MBT or 8 APC or 10 trucks; ASW 47: 12 Ka-28 Helix A; 21 Sea King Mk42A; 14 Sea
500 troops) King Mk42B
3 Magar mod (capacity 11 MBT or 8 APC or 10 MRH 58: 10 Dhruv; 25 SA316B Alouette III (Chetak); 23
trucks; 500 troops) SA319 Alouette III
LANDING CRAFT 10 AEW 9 Ka-31 Helix B
LCM 4 LCM 8 (for use in Jalashwa) TPT
LCT 6: 2 LCU Mk-IV; 4 LCU Mk-3 (capacity 2 APC; Medium 11: 5 Sea King Mk42C; up to 6 UH-3H Sea
120 troops) King
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES MiG-21M/MF; MiG-27ML; PC-7 Turbo Trainer MkII;

ISR 10: Heavy 4 Heron; Medium 6 Searcher Mk II SA316B Alouette III (Chetak)
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ATTACK HELICOPTER
AAM • IR R-550 Magic/Magic 2; R-73 (AA-11 Archer) IR/ 2 sqn with Mi-25 Hind; Mi-35 Hind
SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo); ARH: R-77 (AA-12A Adder) TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
AShM AGM-84 Harpoon (on P-8I ac); Kh-35 (AS-20 5 sqn with Dhruv
Kayak; on Bear and May ac); Sea Eagle (service status 1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip
unclear) 7 sqn with Mi-17/Mi-17-1V Hip H
12 sqn with Mi-17V-5 Hip H
Marines ε1,200 (Additional 1,000 for SPB 2 sqn with SA316B Alouette III (Chetak)
duties) 1 flt with Mi-8 Hip
After the Mumbai attacks, the Sagar Prahari Bal (SPB), 1 flt with Mi-26 Halo
with 80 PBF, was established to protect critical maritime 2 flt with SA315B Lama (Cheetah)
infrastructure 2 flt with SA316B Alouette III (Chetak)
FORCES BY ROLE ISR UAV
SPECIAL FORCES 5 sqn with Heron; Searcher MkII
1 (marine) cdo force AIR DEFENCE
MANOEUVRE 25 sqn with S-125 Pechora (SA-3B Goa)
Amphibious 6 sqn with 9K33 Osa-AK (SA-8B Gecko)
1 amph bde 2 sqn with Akash
10 flt with 9K38 Igla-1 (SA-18 Grouse)
Air Force 127,200 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
5 regional air comds: Western (New Delhi), Southwestern AIRCRAFT 849 combat capable
(Gandhinagar), Eastern (Shillong), Central (Allahabad), FTR 62: 55 MiG-29 Fulcrum (incl 12+ MiG-29UPG); 7
Southern (Trivandrum). 2 support comds: Maintenance MiG-29UB Fulcrum
(Nagpur) and Training (Bangalore) FGA 561: 115 MiG-21 Bison; 20 MiG-21M/MF Fishbed;
Flying hours 180 hrs/yr 39 MiG-21U/UM Mongol; 65 MiG-27ML Flogger; 20
FORCES BY ROLE MiG-23UB Flogger; 40 Mirage 2000E/I (2000H); 10 Mirage
FIGHTER 2000ED/IT (2000TH); ε250 Su-30MKI Flanker; 2 Tejas
3 sqn with MiG-29 Fulcrum; MiG-29UB Fulcrum ATK 117: 28 Jaguar IB; 79 Jaguar IS; 10 Jaguar IM
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK ISR 3 Gulfstream IV SRA-4
4 sqn with Jaguar IB/IS AEW&C 4: 1 EMB-145AEW Netra (2 more in test); 3
6 sqn with MiG-21 Bison Il-76TD Phalcon
1 sqn with MiG-21M/MF Fishbed TKR 6 Il-78 Midas
4 sqn with MiG-27ML/MiG-23UB Flogger TPT 241: Heavy 27: 10 C-17A Globemaster III; 17 Il-76MD
3 sqn with Mirage 2000E/ED/I/IT (2000H/TH – Candid; Medium 9 C-130J-30 Hercules; Light 141: 57 An-
secondary ECM role) 32; 45 An-32RE Cline; 35 Do-228; 4 EMB-135BJ; PAX 64:
11 sqn with Su-30MKI Flanker 1 B-707; 4 B-737; 3 B-737BBJ; 56 HS-748
ANTI SURFACE WARFARE TRG 339: 89 Hawk Mk132*; 120 HJT-16 Kiran MkI/IA; 55
1 sqn with Jaguar IM HJT-16 Kiran MkII; 20 MiG-23UB*; 75 PC-7 Turbo Trainer
ISR MkII
1 unit with Gulfstream IV SRA-4 HELICOPTERS
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL  ATK 19 Mi-25/Mi-35 Hind
1 sqn with Il-76TD Phalcon MRH 387: 60 Dhruv; 35 Mi-17 Hip H; 45 Mi-17-1V Hip
TANKER H; 149 Mi-17V-5 Hip H; 59 SA315B Lama (Cheetah); 39
1 sqn with Il-78 Midas SA316B Alouette III (Chetak)
TRANSPORT TPT 56+: Heavy 1+ Mi-26 Halo; Medium 55+ Mi-8 Hip
1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
1 sqn with C-17A Globemaster III ISR • Heavy 9 Heron; Medium some Searcher MkII
5 sqn with An-32/An-32RE Cline AIR DEFENCE • SAM
1 (comms) sqn with B-737; B-737BBJ; EMB-135BJ   Medium-range Akash
4 sqn with Do-228; HS-748 Short-range S-125 Pechora (SA-3B Goa)
1 sqn with Il-76MD Candid Point-defence 9K33 Osa-AK (SA-8B Gecko); 9K38 Igla
1 flt with HS-748 (SA-18 Grouse)
TRAINING AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
1 OCU sqn with Su-30MKI Flanker AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer)
1 sqn (forming) with Tejas R-550 Magic; IIR Mica IR; IR/SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo);
Some units with An-32; Do-228; Hawk Mk 132*; HJT-16 SARH Super 530D ARH R-77 (AA-12A Adder); Mica RF
Kiran MkI/II; Jaguar IS/IM; MiG-21bis; MiG-21FL; AShM AGM-84 Harpoon; AM39 Exocet; Sea Eagle†
Asia 265
ASM Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge); Kh-59 (AS-13 Kingbolt); Kh- Central Industrial Security Force 144,400
59M (AS-18 Kazoo); Kh-31A (AS-17B Krypton); AS-30; (lightly armed security guards)
Kh-23 (AS-7 Kerry)‡; Popeye II (Crystal Maze)
Ministry of Home Affairs. Guards public-sector locations
ARM Kh-25MP (AS-12 Kegler); Kh-31P (AS-17A Krypton)
ALCM • Nuclear Nirbhay (likely nuclear capable; in Central Reserve Police Force 313,650
development)
Ministry of Home Affairs. Internal-security duties, only
BOMBS • Laser-guided Paveway II
lightly armed, deployable throughout the country
Coast Guard 9,550 FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 110 Other
PSOH 14: 2 Sankalp (capacity 1 Chetak/Dhruv hel); 4 236 paramilitary bn
Samar with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Chetak/Dhruv hel); 10 (rapid action force) paramilitary bn
5 Samarth; 3 Vishwast (capacity 1 Dhruv hel) 10 (CoBRA) paramilitary bn
PSO 3 Samudra Prahari with 1 hel landing platform 6 (Mahila) paramilitary bn (female)
PCO 2 Vikram with 1 hel landing platform 2 sy gp
PCC 39: 20 Aadesh; 8 Rajshree; 4 Rani Abbakka; 7 Sarojini COMBAT SUPPORT
Naidu 5 sigs bn
PBF 48: 4 C-154; 2 C-141; 11 C-143; 31 C-401
PB 4 Priyadarshini Defence Security Corps 31,000
AMPHIBIOUS Provides security at Defence Ministry sites
UCAC 18: 6 H-181 (Griffon 8000TD); 12 H-187 (Griffon
8000TD) Indo-Tibetan Border Police 89,450
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 23 Do-228 Ministry of Home Affairs. Tibetan border security SF/
Asia
HELICOPTERS • MRH 21: 4 Dhruv; 17 SA316B Alouette guerrilla-warfare and high-altitude-warfare specialists
III (Chetak) FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Paramilitary 1,585,950 Other
Rashtriya Rifles 65,000 56 paramilitary bn
Ministry of Defence. 15 sector HQ
National Security Guards 12,000
FORCES BY ROLE Anti-terrorism contingency deployment force, compris-
MANOEUVRE
ing elements of the armed forces, CRPF and Border
Other
Security Force
65 paramilitary bn
Assam Rifles 63,750 Railway Protection Forces 70,000

Ministry of Home Affairs. Security within northeastern Sashastra Seema Bal 76,350
states, mainly army-officered; better trained than BSF
Guards the borders with Nepal and Bhutan
FORCES BY ROLE
Equipped to roughly same standard as an army inf bn Special Frontier Force 10,000
COMMAND Mainly ethnic Tibetans
7 HQ
MANOEUVRE Special Protection Group 3,000
Other Protection of ministers and senior officials
46 paramilitary bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE State Armed Police 450,000
ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 252 For duty primarily in home state only, but can be moved
to other states. Some bn with GPMG and army-standard
Border Security Force 257,350 infantry weapons and equipment
Ministry of Home Affairs
FORCES BY ROLE
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
MANOEUVRE
Other
Other
144 (India Reserve Police) paramilitary bn
186 paramilitary bn
Small arms, lt arty, some anti-tank weapons
ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 942+ Civil Defence 500,000 reservists
AIRCRAFT • TPT some (air spt) Operate in 225 categorised towns in 32 states. Some units
HELICOPTERS • MRH 2 Mi-17V-5 Hip for NBC defence
Home Guard 441,000 reservists (547,000 Philippines 7 obs

authorised str) Romania 2 obs
In all states except Arunachal Pradesh and Kerala; men Sweden 6 obs
on reserve lists, no trg. Not armed in peacetime. Used Switzerland 3 obs
for civil defence, rescue and firefighting provision in Thailand 4 obs
wartime; 6 bn (created to protect tea plantations in
Uruguay 2 obs
Assam)
Cyber Indonesia IDN

National agencies include the Computer Emergency
Response Team (CERT-In), which has authorised Indonesian Rupiah Rp 2016 2017 2018
designated individuals to carry out penetration tests GDP Rp 12,407tr 13,505tr
against infrastructure. The Defence Information Assurance US$ 932bn 1.01tr
and Research Agency (DIARA) is mandated to deal with per capita US$ 3,604 3,859
cyber-security-related issues for the armed services. All
Growth % 5.0 5.2
services have their own cyber-security policies and CERT
Inflation % 3.5 4.0
teams, and headquarters maintain information-security
policies. The Indian Army raised the Army Cyber Security Def bdgt Rp 98.2tr 120tr 106tr
Establishment in 2005 and set up the Cyber Security US$ 7.38bn 8.98bn
Laboratory at the Military College of Telecommunication FMA (US) US$ 14m 10m 0m
Engineering (under the Corps of Signals) in April 2010. US$1=Rp 13,305.63 13,358.77
The services have their own cyber groups, and the defence
minister announced in July 2017 that a long-awaited Population 260,580,739
proposal to establish a tri-service command for cyberspace Ethnic groups: Jawa 40.2%; Sunda, Priangan 15.5%; Banjar,
had been approved. Melayu Banjar 4%; other or unspecified 40.5%
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus

DEPLOYMENT Male 12.7% 4.4% 4.2% 3,9% 21.6% 3.0%
AFGHANISTAN Female 12.3% 4.3% 4.1% 3.7% 21.6% 3.9%
335 (Indo-Tibetan Border Police paramilitary: facilities
protection) Capabilities
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO The Indonesian National Defence Force (TNI) has
UN • MONUSCO 2,640; 39 obs; 4 inf bn; 1 fd hospital traditionally been concerned primarily with internal
security and counter-insurgency. The army remains the
LEBANON dominant service and is deployed operationally in West
UN • UNIFIL 902; 1 inf bn; 1 med coy Papua and on counter-terrorist operations in central
MIDDLE EAST Sulawesi and elsewhere. However, the emergence of
UN • UNTSO 1 obs clearer threats to Jakarta’s extensive maritime interests
have contributed to a drive to restructure and modernise
SOUTH SUDAN the TNI. The current modernisation plan calls for
UN • UNMISS 2,373; 11 obs; 2 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 fd the establishment by 2024 of a ‘Minimum Essential
hospital Force’, including strengthened air, naval and maritime-
SUDAN paramilitary capabilities. Increased defence spending has
UN • UNISFA 3; 2 obs enabled military modernisation and restructuring, and has
allowed for significant equipment acquisitions, including
SYRIA/ISRAEL the first new Nagapasa-class attack submarine, and the
UN • UNDOF 204; 1 log bn construction of new infrastructure. However, continuing
WESTERN SAHARA budget pressures are likely to slow efforts to strengthen
UN • MINURSO 3 obs capabilities. Indonesia has bought military equipment
from diverse sources, while using technology-transfer
agreements with foreign suppliers to develop its own
FOREIGN FORCES defence industry. The TNI has contributed to international
Total numbers for UNMOGIP mission in India and peacekeeping operations, and exercises with the Australian
Pakistan and US armed forces and those of several other Southeast
Chile 2 obs Asian states. In 2017, Indonesia began trilateral joint
Croatia 9 obs maritime patrols and joint Sulu Sea air patrols with the
Italy 2 obs Philippines and Malaysia to counter movement and attacks
Korea, Republic of 7 obs by ISIS-linked militants in regional waterways.
Asia 267
ACTIVE 395,500 (Army 300,400 Navy 65,000 Air AIR DEFENCE

30,100) Paramilitary 280,000 2 AD bn
Conscription liability 2 years selective conscription EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
authorised (not required by law) ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 79: 42 Leopard 2A4; 37 Leopard 2RI
RESERVE 400,000
LT TK 350: 275 AMX-13 (partially upgraded); 15 PT-76;
Army cadre units; numerical str n.k., obligation to age 45
60 Scorpion 90
for officers
RECCE 142: 55 Ferret (13 upgraded); 69 Saladin (16
upgraded); 18 VBL
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE IFV 64: 22 Black Fox; 42 Marder 1A3
APC 584+
Army ε300,400 APC (T) 217: 75 AMX-VCI; 34 BTR-50PK; 15 FV4333
Mil Area Commands (KODAM) Stormer; 93 M113A1-B
13 comd (I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, IX, XII, XVI, XVII, Jaya & APC (W) 367+: ε150 Anoa; some Barracuda; 40 BTR-
Iskandar Muda) 40; 45 FV603 Saracen (14 upgraded); 100 LAV-150
Commando; 32 VAB-VTT
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE PPV some Casspir
Mechanised AUV 39: 14 APR-1; 3 Bushmaster; 22 Commando Ranger;
3 armd cav bn ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
5 cav bn AEV 4: 3 Leopard 2; 1 M113A1-B-GN
Light ARV 15+: 2 AMX-13; 6 AMX-VCI; 3 BREM-2; 4 Leopard 2;
1 inf bde (1 cav bn, 3 inf bn) Stormer; T-54/T-55
4 inf bde (1 cdo bn, 2 inf bn) VLB 16+: 10 AMX-13; Leguan; 4 Leopard 2; 2 Stormer
Asia
3 inf bde (3 inf bn) ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
36 indep inf bn MSL • MANPATS SS.11; Milan; 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3
15 cdo bn Sagger)
COMBAT SUPPORT RCL 90mm M67; 106mm M40A1
12 fd arty bn RL 89mm LRAC
7 cbt engr bn ARTILLERY 1,160+
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT SP 155mm 36 CAESAR
4 construction bn TOWED 133+: 105mm 110+: some KH-178; 60 M101; 50
AVIATION
M-56; 155mm 23: 5 FH-88; 18 KH-179
1 composite avn sqn
MRL 127mm 36 ASTROS II Mk6
HELICOPTER
MOR 955: 81mm 800; 120mm 155: 75 Brandt; 80 UBM 52
1 hel sqn
AMPHIBIOUS • LCU 17
AIR DEFENCE
1 AD regt (2 ADA bn, 1 SAM unit) 1 ADRI XXXII
6 ADA bn 4 ADRI XXXIII
3 SAM unit 1 ADRI XXXIX
1 ADRI XL
Special Forces Command (KOPASSUS) 3 ADRI XLI
FORCES BY ROLE 2 ADRI XLIV
SPECIAL FORCES  2 ADRI XLVI
3 SF gp (total: 2 cdo/para unit, 1 CT unit, 1 int unit) 2 ADRI XLVIII
1 ADRI L
Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD) AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 9: 1 BN-2A Islander; 6 C-212
FORCES BY ROLE Aviocar (NC-212); 2 Turbo Commander 680
COMMAND HELICOPTERS
2 div HQ
ATK 6 Mi-35P Hind
MANOEUVRE
MRH 37: 3 H125M Fennec; 17 Bell 412 Twin Huey (NB-
Armoured
412); 17 Mi-17V-5 Hip H
2 armd bn
Light TPT • Light 29: 7 Bell 205A; 20 Bo-105 (NBo-105); 2 H120
3 inf bde (total: 1 mech inf bn; 7 cdo bn) Colibri
Air Manoeuvre TRG 12 Hughes 300C
3 AB bde (3 AB bn) AIR DEFENCE
COMBAT SUPPORT SAM • Point-defence 95+: 2 Kobra (with 125 GROM-2
2 fd arty regt (1 SP arty bn; 2 arty bn) msl); TD-2000B (Giant Bow II); 51 Rapier; 42 RBS-70; QW-3
1 arty bn GUNS • TOWED 411: 20mm 121 Rh 202; 23mm Giant
2 cbt engr bn Bow; 40mm 90 L/70; 57mm 200 S-60
Navy ε65,000 (including Marines and Aviation) FS 14 Kapitan Pattimura (GDR Parchim I) with 4 single
Two fleets: East (Surabaya), West (Jakarta). It is currently 400mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1 twin
planned to change to three commands: Riau (West); Papua 57mm gun
PCFG 4 Mandau with 4 single lnchr with MM38 Exocet
(East); Makassar (Central). Two Forward Operating Bases
AShM, 1 57mm gun
at Kupang (West Timor) and Tahuna (North Sulawesi)
PCG 5:
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 3 Sampari (KCR-60M)with 2 twin lnchr for C-705 AShM
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 3: 2 Todak with 2 single lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-8
2 Cakra† (Type-209/1300) with 8 single 533mm TT with Saccade), 1 57mm gun
SUT HWT PCT 2 Singa with 2 single 533mm TT, 1 57mm gun
1 Nagapasa (Type-209/1400) with 8 single 533mm TT with PCC 11: 4 Kakap; 2 Pandrong; 3 Pari with 1 57mm gun; 2
Black Shark HWT Todak with 1 57mm gun
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 13 PBG 10:
FRIGATES 13 2 Clurit with 2 single lnchr with C-705 AShM, 1 AK630
FFGHM 8: CIWS
3 Ahmad Yani (ex-NLD Van Speijk) fitted for 2 quad 6 Clurit with 2 single lnchr with C-705 AShM
Mk 141 lnchr with RGM-84A Harpoon AShM, 2 2 Badau (ex-BRN Waspada) with 2 twin lnchr for MM38
SIMBAD twin lnchr (manual) with Mistral SAM, 2 Exocet AShM
triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 76mm gun PB 56: 9 Boa; 1 Cucut (ex-SGP Jupiter); 4 Kobra; 1 Krait; 8
(capacity 1 Bo-105 (NBo-105) hel) Sibarau; 18 Sinabang (KAL 28); 4 Tarihu; 6 Tatihu (PC-40);
1 Ahmad Yani (ex-NLD Van Speijk) with 2 twin-cell 5 Viper
VLS with 3M55E Yakhont (SS-N-26 Strobile) AShM; MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 8
MCO 2 Pulau Rengat
2 SIMBAD twin lnchr (manual) with Mistral SAM,
MSC 6 Pulau Rote (ex-GDR Wolgast)
2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 76mm
AMPHIBIOUS
gun (capacity 1 Bo-105 (NBo-105) hel)
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS VESSELS • LPD 5:
2 Ahmad Yani (ex-NLD Van Speijk) with 2 twin
1 Dr Soeharso (ex-Tanjung Dalpele; capacity 2 LCU/
lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-8 Saccade) AShM, 2
LCVP; 13 tanks; 500 troops; 2 AS332L Super Puma)
SIMBAD twin lnchr (manual) with Mistral SAM, (used in AH role)
2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 76mm 4 Makassar (capacity 2 LCU or 4 LCVP; 13 tanks; 500
gun (capacity 1 Bo-105 (NBo-105) hel) troops; 2 AS332L Super Puma)
2 R.E. Martadinata (SIGMA 10514) with 2 quad lnchr LANDING SHIPS • LST 19
with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 2 6-cell VLS 1 Teluk Amboina (capacity 16 tanks; 800 troops)
with VL-MICA SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with 1 Teluk Bintuni (capacity 10 MBT)
A244/S LWT, 1 Millennium CIWS, 1 76mm gun (1 10 Teluk Gilimanuk (ex-GDR Frosch)
med hel) 2 Teluk Langsa (capacity 16 tanks; 200 troops)
FFGM 5 Teluk Semangka (capacity 17 tanks; 200 troops)  
4 Diponegoro (SIGMA 9113) with 2 twin lnchr LANDING CRAFT 55
with MM40 Exocet Block 2 AShM, 2 quad Tetral LCM 20
lnchr with Mistral SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT LCU 5
with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing LCVP 30 
platform LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 24
FFG AGF 1 Multatuli with 1 hel landing platform
1 Hajar Dewantara (trg role) with 2 twin lnchr with AGOR 2 Rigel
MM38 Exocet AShM, 2 single 533mm ASTT with AGOS 1 Leuser
SUT HWT, 1 57mm gun (capacity 1 Bo-105 (NBo- AGHS 1
AGS 3 Pulau Rote (ex-GDR Wolgast)
105) hel)
AKSL 4
AORLH 1 Arun (ex-UK Rover)
CORVETTES 20
AOT 3: 2 Khobi; 1 Sorong
FSGM 3 Bung Tomo with 2 quad lnchr with MM40
AP 4: 1 Tanjung Kambani (troop transport) with 1 hel
Exocet Block 2 AShM, 1 18-cell VLS with Sea Wolf landing platform; 1 Tanjung Nusanive (troop transport);
SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 1 76mm gun (capacity: 2 Karang Pilang (troop transport)
1 Bo-105 hel) ATF 1
FSGH 1 Nala with 2 twin lnchr with MM38 Exocet AXS 3
AShM, 1 twin 375mm A/S mor, 1 120mm gun
(capacity 1 lt hel) Naval Aviation ε1,000
FSG 2 Fatahillah with 2 twin lnchr with MM38 Exocet EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AShM, 2 triple B515 ILAS-3/Mk32 324mm ASTT AIRCRAFT
with A244/Mk46 LWT, 1 twin 375mm A/S mor, 1 MP 26: 3 C212-200; 3 CN235 MPA; 14 N-22B
120mm gun Searchmaster B; 6 N-22SL Searchmaster L
Asia 269
TPT • Light 32: 8 Beech G36 Bonanza; 2 Beech G38 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Baron; 17 C-212-200 Aviocar; 3 TB-9 Tampico; 2 TB-10 2 sqn with H225M; AS332L Super Puma (NAS332L);
HELICOPTERS SA330J/L Puma (NAS330J/L); H120 Colibri
MRH 4 Bell 412 (NB-412) Twin Huey EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
CSAR 4 H225M Caracal Only 45% of ac op
TPT 15: Medium 3 AS332L Super Puma (NAS322L); AIRCRAFT 102 combat capable
Light 12: 3 H120 Colibri; 9 Bo-105 (NBo-105) FTR 9: 7 F-16A Fighting Falcon; 2 F-16B Fighting Falcon (8
F-5E Tiger II; 4 F-5F Tiger II non-operational)
Marines ε20,000 FGA 33: 12 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 5 F-16D Fighting Falcon;
FORCES BY ROLE 2 Su-27SK; 3 Su-27SKM; 2 Su-30MK; 9 Su-30MK2
SPECIAL FORCES MP 6: 3 B-737-200; 3 CN235M-220 MPA
1 SF bn TKR 1 KC-130B Hercules
MANOEUVRE TPT 49: Medium 16: 4 C-130B Hercules; 4 C-130H
Amphibious Hercules; 6 C-130H-30 Hercules; 2 L-100-30; Light 24: 9
2 mne gp (1 cav regt, 3 mne bn, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt spt C295; 9 C-212 Aviocar (NC-212); 5 CN235-110; 1 F-27-
regt, 1 CSS regt) 400M Troopship; PAX 9: 1 B-737-200; 3 B-737-400; 1 B-737-
1 mne bde (3 mne bn) 500; 1 B-737-800BBJ; 1 F-28-1000; 2 F-28-3000
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TRG 109: 15 EMB-314 (A-29) Super Tucano*; 18 Grob
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 120TP; 7 Hawk Mk109*; 23 Hawk Mk209*; 14 KT-1B; 10
LT TK 65: 10 AMX-10 PAC 90; 55 PT-76† SF-260M; 7 SF-260W Warrior; 15 T-50i Golden Eagle*
RECCE 21 BRDM-2 HELICOPTERS
IFV 114: 24 AMX-10P; 22 BMP-2; 54 BMP-3F; 2 BTR-4; TPT 36: Heavy 6 H225M (CSAR); Medium 18: 9 AS332
12 BTR-80A Super Puma (NAS332L) (VIP/CSAR); 1 SA330SM Puma
Asia
APC 103: • APC (T) 100 BTR-50P; APC (W) 3 BTR-4M (NAS330SM) (VIP); 4 SA330J Puma (NAS330J); 4 SA330L
AAV 10 LVTP-7A1 Puma (NAS330L); Light 12 H120 Colibri
ARTILLERY 71+ AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
TOWED 50: 105mm 22 LG1 MK II; 122mm 28 M-38 AAM • IR AIM-9P Sidewinder; R-73 (AA-11 Archer); IR/
SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo)
MRL 122mm 21: 4 PHL-90B; 9 RM-70; 8 RM-70 Vampir
ARH R-77 (AA-12A Adder)
MOR 81mm
ASM AGM-65G Maverick
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • 40mm 5 L/60/L/70; 57mm S-60
ARM Kh-31P (AS-17A Krypton)
Air Force 30,100 Special Forces (Paskhasau)
2 operational comd (East and West) plus trg comd
FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER 3 (PASKHASAU) SF wg (total: 6 spec ops sqn)
1 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II 4 indep SF coy
1 sqn with F-16A/B/C/D Fighting Falcon EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK AIR DEFENCE
1 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon SAM • Point QW-3
1 sqn with Su-27SK/SKM Flanker; Su-30MK/MK2 Flanker GUNS • TOWED 35mm 6 Oerlikon Skyshield
2 sqn with Hawk Mk109*/Mk209*
1 sqn with T-50i Golden Eagle* Paramilitary 280,000+
GROUND ATTACK
1 sqn with EMB-314 (A-29) Super Tucano* Customs
MARITIME PATROL EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn with B-737-200; CN235M-220 MPA PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 59
TANKER/TRANSPORT PCO 2 PT Dumas 60m
1 sqn with C-130B/KC-130B Hercules PCF 9 BC Speed Craft
TRANSPORT PBF 14
1 VIP sqn with B-737-200; C-130H/H-30 Hercules; L-100- PB 34
30; F-27-400M Troopship; F-28-1000/3000; AS332L
Super Puma (NAS332L); SA330SM Puma (NAS300SM) Marine Police
1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 Hercules; L-100-30 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn with C-212 Aviocar (NC-212) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 37
1 sqn with CN235M-110; C295M PSO 2 Bisma
TRAINING PCC 5
1 sqn with Grob 120TP PBF 3 Gagak
1 sqn with KT-1B PB 27: 14 Bango; 13 (various)
1 sqn with SF-260M; SF-260W Warrior LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AP 1
Police ε280,000 (including 14,000 police

‘mobile bde’ (BRIMOB) org in 56 coy, incl CT Japan JPN
unit (Gegana)) Japanese Yen ¥ 2016 2017 2018
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE GDP ¥ 537tr 544tr
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES US$ 4.94tr 4.88tr
APC (W) 34 Tactica per capita US$ 38,883 38,550
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 5: 2 Beech 18; 2 C-212 Aviocar Growth % 1.0 1.5
(NC-212); 1 Turbo Commander 680 Inflation % -0.1 0.4
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 22: 3 Bell 206 Jet Ranger; Def bdgt ¥ 5.05tr 5.13tr 5.26tr
19 Bo-105 (NBo-105) US$ 46.5bn 46.0bn
US$1=¥ 108.79 111.41
KPLP (Coast and Seaward Defence
Command) Population 126,451,398
Responsible to Military Sea Communications Agency Ethnic groups: Korean <1%
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 6.6% 2.5% 2.6% 2.5% 22.1% 12.2%
PCO 4: 2 Arda Dedali; 2 Trisula
Female 6.2% 2.3% 2.3% 2.5% 22.6% 15.7%
PB 27: 4 Golok (SAR); 5 Kujang; 3 Rantos; 15 (various)
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • ABU 1 Jadayat
Capabilities
Bakamla (Maritime Security Agency) Japan’s alliance with the United States remains the
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE cornerstone of its defence policy, reflected by continued US
basing on Honshu, Kyushu and Okinawa; the widespread
use of US equipment across all three services; and regular
PB 6 Bintang Laut (KCR-40 mod)
training with US forces. While the Self-Defense Forces’
offensive capacity remains weak, the navy has strengths
Reserve Organisations in anti-submarine warfare and air defence. As evidenced
in its 2017 defence white paper, Tokyo’s concerns over
Kamra People’s Security ε40,000 (report for
its deteriorating regional security environment have
3 weeks’ basic training each year; part-time escalated, principally relating to an emerging threat from
police auxiliary) China and an established concern over North Korea.
This has stimulated budget increases and defence-policy
DEPLOYMENT and legislative reforms to enable it to play a more active
international security role, as well as to strengthen the
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC US–Japan alliance. The country’s ongoing military-
UN • MINUSCA 207; 6 obs; 1 engr coy procurement drive has for the first time focused on power
projection, mobility and ISR, with the first domestically
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO produced F-35 combat aircraft rolled out in mid-2017. Japan
UN • MONUSCO 175; 4 obs; 1 engr coy has expressed a desire to boost its ballistic-missile-defence
capability, with reported interest in the Aegis Ashore
LEBANON
system. Japan continues plans to develop an amphibious
UN • UNIFIL 1,288; 1 mech inf bn; 1 FSGHM
force. The defence minister noted in November 2017 that
MALI the SDF was researching technologies relating to extending
UN • MINUSMA 8 the range of anti-ship missile capability ‘intended for the
defense of remote islands’, with this included in the FY2018
PHILIPPINES budget request. Japan also continues its efforts to develop a
IMT 9 more internationally focused defence industry to promote
its products in the region.
SOUTH SUDAN
UN • UNMISS 1; 2 obs ACTIVE 247,150 (Ground Self-Defense Force
150,850 Maritime Self-Defense Force 45,350 Air
SUDAN Self-Defense Force 46,950 Central Staff 4,000)
UN • UNAMID 810; 7 obs; 1 inf bn  Paramilitary 13,740
UN • UNISFA 2; 1 obs
RESERVE 56,000 (General Reserve Army (GSDF)
WESTERN SAHARA 46,000 Ready Reserve Army (GSDF) 8,100 Navy 1,100
UN • MINURSO 5 obs Air 800)
Asia 271
1 EW bn
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 5 int bn
1 MP bde
Space 1 sigs bde
SATELLITES 8 5 log unit (bde)
COMMUNICATIONS 1 Kirameki-2 5 trg bde
ISR 7 IGS HELICOPTER
1 hel bde
Ground Self-Defense Force 150,850 5 hel gp (1 atk hel bn, 1 hel bn)
FORCES BY ROLE AIR DEFENCE
COMMAND 2 AD bde
5 army HQ (regional comd) 4 AD gp
SPECIAL FORCES
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 spec ops unit (bn)
MANOEUVRE
MBT 690: 66 Type-10; 283 Type-74; 341 Type-90
Armoured
RECCE 111 Type-87
1 (7th) armd div (1 armd recce sqn, 3 tk regt, 1 armd inf
IFV 68 Type-89
regt, 1 avn sqn, 1 SP arty regt, 1 AD regt, 1 cbt engr bn,
1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt) APC 795
Mechanised APC (T) 226 Type-73
1 (2nd) inf div (1 armd recce sqn, 1 tk regt, 1 mech inf APC (W) 569: 204 Type-82; 365 Type-96
regt, 2 inf regt, 1 avn sqn, 1 SP arty regt, 1 AT coy, 1 AD AAV 4 AAV-7
AUV 4 Bushmaster
Asia
bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt)
1 (4th) inf div (1 armd recce sqn, 1 tk bn, 1 mech inf ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
regt, 2 inf regt, 1 inf coy, 1 avn sqn, 1 arty regt, 1 AT ARV 70: 4 Type-11; 36 Type-78; 30 Type-90
coy, 1 AD bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 VLB 22 Type-91
log regt) NBC VEHICLES 57: 41 Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle;
1 (9th) inf div (1 armd recce sqn, 1 tk bn, 3 mech inf regt, 16 NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle
1 avn sqn, 1 arty regt, 1 AD bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
1 NBC bn, 1 log regt) 2 (5th & 11th) inf bde (1 armd MSL
recce sqn, 1 tk bn, 3 mech inf regt, 1 avn sqn, 1 SP arty SP 37 Type-96 MPMS
bn, 1 AD coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 MANPATS Type-79 Jyu-MAT; Type-87 Chu-MAT;
log bn) Type-01 LMAT
Light RCL • 84mm Carl Gustav
1 (8th) inf div (1 recce sqn, 1 tk bn, 4 inf regt, 1 avn sqn, 1 ARTILLERY 1,774
arty regt, 1 AD bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, SP 172: 155mm 105 Type-99; 203mm 67 M110A2
1 log regt) TOWED 155mm 398 FH-70
4 (1st, 3rd, 6th & 10th) inf div (1 recce sqn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf MRL 227mm 99 M270 MLRS
regt, 1 avn sqn, 1 arty regt, 1 AD bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 MOR 1,105: 81mm 652 L16 120mm 429; SP 120mm 24
sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt)  Type-96
1 (13th) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 1 tk coy, 3 inf regt, 1 avn sqn, COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 88: 6 Type-12; 82 Type-88
1 arty bn, 1 AD coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs
AIRCRAFT
coy, 1 log bn)
TPT • Light 7 Beech 350 King Air (LR-2)
1 (14th) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 1 tk coy, 2 inf regt, 1 avn sqn,
HELICOPTERS
1 arty bn, 1 AD coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs
ATK 104: 59 AH-1S Cobra; 12 AH-64D Apache; 33 OH-1
coy, 1 log bn)
ISR 44 OH-6D
1 (15th) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 1 inf regt, 1 avn sqn, 1 AD
TPT 272: Heavy 69: 24 CH-47D Chinook (CH-47J); 45
regt, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
Air Manoeuvre CH-47JA Chinook; Medium 42: 3 H225 Super Puma MkII+
1 (1st) AB bde (3 AB bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs (VIP); 39 UH-60L Black Hawk (UH-60JA); Light 161: 131
coy, 1 log bn) Bell 205 (UH-1J); 30 Enstrom 480B (TH-480B)
1 (12th) air mob inf bde (1 recce sqn, 3 inf regt, 1 avn sqn, AIR DEFENCE
1 SP arty bn, 1 AD coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 SAM
sigs coy, 1 log bn) Medium-range 163: 43 Type-03 Chu-SAM; 120 MIM-
COMBAT SUPPORT 23B I-Hawk
1 arty bde Short-range 5 Type-11 Tan-SAM
2 arty unit (bde) Point-defence 159+: 46 Type-81 Tan-SAM; 113 Type-
4 engr bde 93 Kin-SAM; Type-91 Kei-SAM
1 engr unit GUNS • SP 35mm 52 Type-87
Maritime Self-Defense Force 45,350 1 octuple Mk112 lnchr with ASROC, 2 Phalanx
Surface units organised into 4 Escort Flotillas with a mix CIWS, 2 127mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
of 8 warships each. Bases at Yokosuka, Kure, Sasebo, 4 Kongou with Aegis Baseline 4/5 C2, 2 quad Mk141
Maizuru, Ominato. SSK organised into two flotillas with lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 1 29-cell
bases at Kure and Yokosuka Mk41 VLS with SM-2/3 SAM/ASROC, 1 61-cell
Mk41 VLS with SM-2/3 SAM/ASROC, 2 triple
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
324mm ASTT, 2 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm
gun
2 Oyashio (trg role) with 6 single 533mm TT with T-89
HWT/UGM-84C Harpoon AShM FRIGATES 9
9 Oyashio with 6 single 533mm TT with T-89 HWT/UGM- FFGHM 3 Hatsuyuki with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with
84C Harpoon AShM RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 1 octuple Mk29 lnchr
8 Soryu (AIP fitted) with 6 single 533mm TT with T-89 with RIM-7F/M Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 triple ASTT with
HWT/UGM-84C Harpoon AShM Mk46 LWT, 1 octuple Mk112 lnchr with ASROC,
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 47 2 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CVH 4: Seahawk ASW hel)
2 Hyuga with 1 16-cell Mk41 VLS with ASROC/RIM- FFG 6 Abukuma with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM-
162 ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46/ 84C Harpoon AShM, 2 triple ASTT with Mk 46 LWT,
Type-97 LWT, 2 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS (normal ac 1 octuple Mk112 lnchr with ASROC, 1 Phalanx CIWS,
capacity 3 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel; plus additional 1 76mm gun
ac embarkation up to 7 SH-60 Seahawk or 7 MCH- PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6
101) PBFG 6 Hayabusa with 4 SSM-1B AShM, 1 76mm gun
2 Izumo with 2 11-cell SeaRAM lnchr with RIM- MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 26
116 SAM, 2 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS (normal MCCS 5:
ac capacity 7 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel; plus 1 Ieshima
additional ac embarkation up to 5 SH-60 Seahawk/ 1 Uraga with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform (for
MCH-101 hel) MCH-101 hel)
CRUISERS • CGHM 2 Atago with Aegis Baseline 7 C2, 1 Uraga with 1 hel landing platform (for MCH-101)
2 quad lnchr with SSM-1B AShM, 1 64-cell Mk41 VLS 2 Uwajima
with SM-2 MR SAM/ASROC, 1 32-cell Mk41 VLS with MSC 19: 3 Hirashima; 12 Sugashima; 1 Uwajima; 3 Enoshima
SM-2 MR SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, MSO 2: 1 Awaji; 1 Yaeyama
2 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH- AMPHIBIOUS
60 Seahawk ASW hel) PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LHD 3 Osumi
DESTROYERS 32 with 2 Phalanx CIWS (capacity for 2 CH-47 hel) (capacity
DDGHM 26: 10 Type-90 MBT; 2 LCAC(L) ACV; 330 troops)
8 Asagiri with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM-84C LANDING CRAFT 8
Harpoon AShM, 1 octuple Mk29 lnchr with Sea LCU 2 Yusotei
Sparrow SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LCAC 6 LCAC(L) (capacity either 1 MBT or 60 troops)
LWT, 1 octuple Mk112 lnchr with ASROC, 2 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 21
Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 AGBH 1 Shirase (capacity 2 AW101 Merlin hel)
Seahawk ASW hel) AGEH 1 Asuka with 1 8-cell VLS (wpn trials) (capacity 1
4 Akizuki with 2 quad lnchr with SSM-1B AShM, 1 SH-60 Seahawk hel)
32-cell Mk41 VLS with ASROC/ESSM SAM, 2 AGOS 2 Hibiki with 1 hel landing platform
triple 324mm ASTT with Type-97 LWT, 2 Phalanx AGS 3: 1 Futami; 1 Nichinan; 1 Shonan
CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 Seahawk AOE 5: 2 Mashu (capacity 1 med hel); 3 Towada with 1 hel
ASW hel) landing platform
9 Murasame with 2 quad lnchr with SSM-1B AShM, 1 ARC 1 Muroto
16-cell Mk48 VLS with ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASR 2: 1 Chihaya with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Chiyoda
TT with Mk46 LWT, 1 16-cell Mk41 VLS with with 1 hel landing platform
ASROC, 2 Phalanx CIWS, 2 76mm gun (capacity 1 AX 6:
SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel) 1 Kashima with 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 1 76mm gun, 1
5 Takanami (improved Murasame) with 2 quad lnchr hel landing platform
with SSM-1B AShM, 1 32-cell Mk41 VLS with 1 Kurobe with 1 76mm gun (trg spt ship)
ASROC/RIM-7M/ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT 3 Shimayuki with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon
with Mk46 LWT, 2 Phalanx CIWS, 1 127mm gun AShM, 1 octuple Mk29 lnchr with RIM-7M Sea
(capacity 1 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel) Sparrow SAM, 1 octuple Mk112 lnchr with ASROC,
DDGM 6: 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 2 Phalanx
2 Hatakaze with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM- CIWS, 1 76mm gun
84C Harpoon AShM, 1 Mk13 GMLS with SM-1 1 Tenryu (trg spt ship); with 1 76mm gun (capacity: 1
MR SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, med hel)
Asia 273
Naval Aviation ε9,800 TRANSPORT

7 Air Groups 1 (VIP) sqn with B-747-400
2 sqn with C-1; C-2
FORCES BY ROLE
1 sqn with C-130H Hercules
ANTI SUBMARINE/SURFACE WARFARE
Some (liaison) sqn with Gulfstream IV (U-4); T-4*
5 sqn with SH-60B (SH-60J)/SH-60K Seahawk TRAINING
MARITIME PATROL 1 (aggressor) sqn with F-15J Eagle
1 sqn with P-1; P-3C Orion TEST
3 sqn with P-3C Orion 1 wg with F-15J Eagle; T-4*
ELECTRONIC WARFARE TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 sqn with EP-3 Orion 4 flt with CH-47JA Chinook
MINE COUNTERMEASURES
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn with MCH-101
SEARCH & RESCUE
FTR 189: 147 F-15J Eagle; 42 F-15DJ Eagle
1 sqn with Shin Meiwa US-1A/US-2 FGA 143: 58 F-2A; 30 F-2B; 51 F-4E Phantom II (F-4EJ); 4
2 sqn with UH-60J Black Hawk F-35A Lightning II (in test)
TRANSPORT EW 3: 1 Kawasaki EC-1; 2 YS-11EA
1 sqn with AW101 Merlin (CH-101); Beech 90 King Air ISR 17: 13 RF-4E Phantom II* (RF-4J); 4 YS-11EB
(LC-90); KC-130R Hercules AEW&C 17: 13 E-2C Hawkeye; 4 E-767
TRAINING SAR 26 U-125A Peace Krypton
1 sqn with Beech 90 King Air (TC-90) TKR 6: 2 KC-130H Hercules; 4 KC-767J
1 sqn with P-3C Orion TPT 57: Medium 16: 13 C-130H Hercules; 3 C-2; PAX 39: 2
1 sqn with T-5J B-747-400; 13 Beech T-400; 19 C-1; 5 Gulfstream IV (U-4)
1 hel sqn with H135 (TH-135); OH-6DA; SH-60B (SH- TRG 246: 197 T-4*; 49 T-7
Asia
60J) Seahawk HELICOPTERS
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SAR 36 UH-60J Black Hawk
AIRCRAFT 74 combat capable TPT • Heavy 15 CH-47JA Chinook
ASW 74: 12 P-1; 62 P-3C Orion AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
ELINT 5 EP-3C Orion AAM • IR AAM-3 (Type-90); AIM-9 Sidewinder; IIR
SAR 5: 1 Shin Meiwa US-1A; 4 Shin Meiwa US-2 AAM-5 (Type-04); SARH AIM-7 Sparrow; ARH AAM-4
TPT 27: Medium 6 C-130R Hercules; Light 21: 5 Beech (Type-99); AIM-120C5/C7 AMRAAM (limited numbers)
90 King Air (LC-90); 16 Beech 90 King Air (TC-90) ASM ASM-1 (Type-80); ASM-2 (Type-93)
TRG 30 T-5J
HELICOPTERS
Air Defence
ASW 87: 35 SH-60B Seahawk (SH-60J); 52 SH-60K Ac control and warning. 4 wg; 28 radar sites
Seahawk FORCES BY ROLE
MCM 10 MCH-101 AIR DEFENCE
SAR 15 UH-60J Black Hawk 6 SAM gp (total: 24 SAM bty with MIM-104D/F Patriot
TPT 18: Medium 3 AW101 Merlin (CH-101); Light 15 PAC-2/3)
H135 (TH-135) 1 AD gp with Type-81 Tan-SAM; M167 Vulcan
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Air Self-Defense Force 46,950 AIR DEFENCE
Flying hours 150 hrs/yr SAM
Long-range 120 MIM-104D/F Patriot PAC-2 GEM/
7 cbt wg PAC-3
FORCES BY ROLE Point-defence Type-81 Tan-SAM
FIGHTER GUNS • TOWED 20mm M167 Vulcan
7 sqn with F-15J Eagle
2 sqn with F-4EJ (F-4E) Phantom II Paramilitary 13,740
3 sqn with Mitsubishi F-2
ELECTRONIC WARFARE Coast Guard 13,740
2 sqn with Kawasaki EC-1; YS-11E Ministry of Land, Transport, Infrastructure and Tourism
ISR (no cbt role)
1 sqn with RF-4EJ (RF-4E) Phantom II* EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 367
2 sqn with E-2C Hawkeye PSOH 14: 2 Mizuho (capacity 2 hels); 2 Shikishima
1 sqn with E-767 (capacity 2 hels); 10 Soya (capacity 1 hel)
SEARCH & RESCUE PSO 43:
1 wg with U-125A Peace Krypton; UH-60J Black Hawk 3 Hida with 1 hel landing platform
TANKER 1 Izu with 1 hel landing platform
1 sqn with KC-767J 9 Hateruma with 1 hel landing platform
6 Iwami SOUTH SUDAN

1 Kojima (trg) with 1 hel landing platform UN • UNMISS 4
2 Kunigami with 1 hel landing platform
1 Miura with 1 hel landing platform
6 Ojika with 1 hel landing platform
FOREIGN FORCES
14 Taketomi with 1 hel landing platform United States
PCO 17: 3 Aso; 2 Katori; 2 Takatori; 10 Teshio US Pacific Command: 39,950
PCC 26: 4 Amami; 22 Tokara Army 2,750; 1 corps HQ (fwd); 1 SF gp; 1 avn bn; 1 SAM
PBF 47: 20 Hayagumo; 5 Mihashi; 14 Raizan; 2 Takatsuki; bn
6 Tsuruugi Navy 11,700; 1 CVN; 3 CGHM; 2 DDGHM; 7 DDGM (2
PB 52: 2 Akizuki; 4 Asogiri; 4 Hamagumo; 11 Hayanami; non-op); 1 LCC; 4 MCO; 1 LHD; 1 LPD; 2 LSD; 3 FGA
8 Katonami; 1 Matsunami; 4 Murakumo; 2 Natsugiri; 3 sqn with 10 F/A-18E Super Hornet; 1 FGA sqn with 10
Shimagiri; 3 Shimoji; 10 Yodo F/A-18F Super Hornet; 1 EW sqn with 5 EA-18G Growler;
PBI 168: 2 Hakubai; 1 Hayagiku; 163 Himegiku; 2 Nadaka 1 AEW&C sqn with 5 E-2D Hawkeye; 2 ASW hel sqn with
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 17 12 MH-60R Seahawk; 1 tpt hel sqn with MH-60S Knight
ABU 1 Teshio Hawk; 1 base at Sasebo; 1 base at Yokosuka
AGS 13: 7 Hamashio; 1 Jinbei; 2 Meiyo; 1 Shoyo; 1 Takuyo; USAF: 11,900; 1 HQ (5th Air Force) at Okinawa–
1 Tenyo Kadena AB; 1 ftr wg at Misawa AB (2 ftr sqn with 22
AX 3 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon); 1 ftr wg at Okinawa–Kadena
AIRCRAFT AB (2 ftr sqn with total of 54 F-15C/D Eagle; 1 FGA sqn
MP 2 Falcon 900 MPAT with 12 F-35A Lightning II; 1 tkr sqn with 15 KC-135R
TPT 27: Light 18: 9 Beech 350 King Air (LR-2); 9 DHC Stratotanker; 1 AEW sqn with 2 E-3B Sentry; 1 CSAR sqn
Dash-7 (Bombardier 300) (MP); PAX 9: 3 CL-300; 2 with 10 HH-60G Pave Hawk); 1 tpt wg at Yokota AB with
Gulfstream V (MP); 4 Saab 340B 5 C-130J-30 Hercules; 2 Beech 1900C (C-12J); 1 spec ops
HELICOPTERS gp at Okinawa–Kadena AB with (1 sqn with 5 MC-130H
MRH 5 Bell 412 Twin Huey Combat Talon; 1 sqn with 5 MC-130J Commando II); 1 ISR
SAR 11 S-76D sqn with RC-135 Rivet Joint; 1 ISR UAV flt with 5 RQ-4A
TPT 38: Medium 8: 3 AS332 Super Puma; 5 H225 Super Global Hawk
Puma; Light 30: 18 AW139; 3 Bell 206B Jet Ranger II; 6 USMC 20,700; 1 mne div; 1 mne regt HQ; 1 arty regt HQ;
Bell 212; 3 S-76C 1 recce bn; 1 mne bn; 1 amph aslt bn; 1 arty bn; 1 FGA sqn
at Iwakuni with 12 F/A-18D Hornet; 1 FGA sqn at Iwakuni
Cyber with 12 F/A-18C Hornet; 1 FGA sqn at Iwakuni with 12
In 2012 a ‘Cyber Planning Office’ was established in the F-35B Lightning II; 1 tkr sqn at Iwakuni with 15 KC-130J
C4 Systems Planning Division, Joint Staff Office (JSO) of Hercules; 2 tpt sqn at Futenma with 12 MV-22B Osprey
the Ministry of Defense to consolidate the cyber-planning US Strategic Command: 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at
functions of the JSO and to create a more systematic struc- Shariki; 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Kyogamisaki
ture for responding to cyber attacks. The National Defense
Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond stated that
‘Japan will build up persistent ISR [intelligence, surveil- Korea, Democratic People’s
lance and reconnaissance] capabilities to prevent any acts
that could impede efficient action by the SDF’. The 2014 Republic of DPRK
Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2014–18) said that the North Korean Won 2016 2017 2018
Self-Defense Forces would develop specialist training for
cyber personnel. The document also said that ‘through its GDP US$
efforts to secure response capabilities in cyberspace where per capita US$
attackers have an overwhelming advantage, the SDF may Def exp won
consider the acquisition of capabilities to prevent them US$
from using cyberspace’. A Cyber Defense Group, which
US$1=won
integrates the cyber-warfare functions of the three armed
services, was launched in March 2014 to respond to cyber *definitive economic data not available
threats. The group monitors defence-ministry and SDF net- Population 25,248,140
works, and provides responses to cyber attacks. A revised
Cybersecurity Strategy was developed in mid-2015. Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 10.6% 3.8% 4.0% 4.0% 22.8% 3.3%
DEPLOYMENT Female 10.2% 3.7% 3.9% 3.8% 23.3% 6.3%
DJIBOUTI Capabilities
170; 2 P-3C Orion
Despite international sanctions, North Korea continues to
GULF OF ADEN & INDIAN OCEAN define the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic
2 DDGHM missiles as central to its military power and survival. While
Asia 275
questions remain over the extent of progress in the minia- Army ε1,100,000
turisation and integration of warheads, North Korea’s mis- FORCES BY ROLE
sile programme continues apace, and the country contin- COMMAND
ues its ambition of fielding a credible operational capability 2 mech corps HQ
in the future. The higher frequency of ballistic-missile and 10 inf corps HQ
associated ground-system tests conducted in 2016 contin- 1 (Capital Defence) corps HQ
ued into 2017, revealing four new successfully tested road- MANOEUVRE
mobile systems. This includes the first testing of ICBM- Armoured
categorised systems, the Hwasong-14 and Hwasong-15. 1 armd div
However, other North Korean ICBM designs previously 15 armd bde
observed remain untested. Development of at-sea systems Mechanised
also reportedly continues, with successors to the Gorae- 4 mech div
class trial submarine and the initial Bukkeukseong-1 SLBM Light
believed to be in development. A shore-based mobile ver- 27 inf div
sion, the Bukkeukseong-2 MRBM, was also tested for the first 14 inf bde
time in 2017. Whilst North Korea has shown clear progress COMBAT SUPPORT
in developing more capable and credible delivery systems, 1 arty div
a number of technical hurdles may still exist before these 21 arty bde
systems – particularly those with a longer range – are oper- 9 MRL bde
ationally fielded. In contrast, the country’s conventional 5–8 engr river crossing/amphibious regt
1 engr river crossing bde
forces remain reliant on increasingly obsolete equipment,
with limited evidence of modernisation across the armed Special Purpose Forces Command 88,000
services. Capability is arguably more reliant on personnel
Asia
FORCES BY ROLE
strength and asymmetric warfare. Exercises are conducted
SPECIAL FORCES
regularly, but often appear staged and are not necessarily
8 (Reconnaissance General Bureau) SF bn
representative of wider operational capability. MANOEUVRE
ACTIVE 1,280,000 (Army 1,100,000 Navy 60,000 Reconnaissance
17 recce bn
Air 110,000 Strategic Forces 10,000) Paramilitary
Light
189,000
9 lt inf bde
Conscript liability Army 5–12 years, Navy 5–10 years, Air
6 sniper bde
Force 3–4 years, followed by compulsory part-time service Air Manoeuvre
to age 40. Thereafter service in the Worker/Peasant Red 3 AB bde
Guard to age 60 1 AB bn
RESERVE ε600,000 (Armed Forces ε600,000), 2 sniper bde
Amphibious
Paramilitary 5,700,000
2 sniper bde
Reservists are assigned to units (see also Paramilitary)
Reserves 600,000
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Strategic Forces ε10,000 Light
North Korea’s ballistic missiles and obsolete H-5 (Il- 40 inf div
18 inf bde
28) bombers could be used to deliver nuclear warheads
or bombs. At present, however, there is no conclusive EQUIPMENT BY TYPE (ε)
evidence to verify that North Korea has successfully ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
produced a warhead or bomb capable of being delivered MBT 3,500+ T-34/T-54/T-55/T-62/Type-59/Chonma/Pokpoong
by these systems LT TK 560+: 560 PT-76; M-1985
IFV 32 BTR-80A
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE (ε) APC 2,500+
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS APC (T) BTR-50; Type-531 (Type-63); VTT-323
ICBM 6+: Hwasong-13/Hwasong-13 mod/Hwasong-14 (in APC (W) 2,500 BTR-40/BTR-60/M-1992/1/BTR-152/M-2010
test); Hwasong-15 (in test) (6×6)/M-2010 (8×8)
IRBM Hwasong-12 (in test) ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MRBM ε10 Nodong mod 1/mod 2 (ε90+ msl); some Scud- MSL
ER; Bukkeukseong-2 (in test); Hwasong-10 (Musudan) (in SP 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger)
test) MANPATS 2K15 Shmel (AT-1 Snapper); 9K111 Fagot
SBRM 30+ Hwasong-5 (SS-1C Scud-B)/Hwasong-6 (SS-1D (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel)
Scud-C) (ε200+ msl); some Scud (mod) (in test) RCL 82mm 1,700 B-10
ARTILLERY 21,100+ PBFG 17+:

SP/TOWED 8,500: SP 122mm M-1977/M-1981/M- 4 Huangfen with 4 single lnchr with P-15 Termit (SS-N-
1985/M-1991; 130mm M-1975/M-1981/M-1991; 152mm 2) AShM, 2 twin AK230 CIWS
M-1974/M-1977; 170mm M-1978/M-1989 6 Komar with 2 single lnchr with P-15 Termit (SS-N-2)
TOWED 122mm D-30/D-74/M-1931/37; 130mm M-46; AShM
152mm M-1937/M-1938/M-1943 6 Sohung with 2 single lnchr with P-15 Termit (SS-N-2)
GUN/MOR 120mm (reported) AShM
MRL 5,100: 107mm Type-63; 122mm BM-11/M-1977 1+ Nongo with 2 twin lnchr with Kumsong-3 mod
(BM-21)/M-1985/M-1992/M-1993; 200mm BMD-20; (KN-SS-N-2 Stormpetrel) AShM, 2 30mm CIWS
240mm BM-24/M-1985/M-1989/M-1991; 300mm some (operational status unknown)
MOR 7,500: 82mm M-37; 120mm M-43; 160mm M-43 PBF 229:
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS 54 Chong-Jin with 1 85mm gun
SBRM 24 FROG-3/5/7; some Toksa (SS-21B Scarab mod) 142 Ku Song/Sin Hung/Sin Hung (mod)
AIR DEFENCE 33 Sinpo
PB 96:
SAM • Point-defence 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher);
59 Chaho
9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet); 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
6 Chong-Ju with 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 85mm gun
GUNS 11,000
13 Shanghai II
SP 14.5mm M-1984; 23mm M-1992; 37mm M-1992;
18 SO-1 with 4 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 2 twin 57mm gun
57mm M-1985
TOWED 11,000: 14.5mm ZPU-1/ZPU-2/ZPU-4; 23mm
MSC 24: 19 Yukto I; 5 Yukto II
ZU-23; 37mm M-1939; 57mm S-60; 85mm M-1939 KS-
AMPHIBIOUS
12; 100mm KS-19 LANDING SHIPS • LSM 10 Hantae (capacity 3 tanks;
350 troops)
Navy ε60,000 LANDING CRAFT 257
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LCPL 96 Nampo (capacity 35 troops)
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL 73 LCM 25
SSB 1 Gorae with 1 Bukkeukseong-1 SLBM (SLBM trials) UCAC 136 Kongbang (capacity 50 troops)
SSK 20 PRC Type-033/FSU Romeo† with 8 single 533mm LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 23:
TT with 14 SAET-60 HWT AGI 14 (converted fishing vessels)
SSC 32+: AS 8 (converted cargo ships)
ε30 Sang-O some with 2 single 533mm TT with 53–65 ASR 1 Kowan
HWT
2+ Sang-O II with 4 single 533mm TT with 53–65 HWT Coastal Defence
SSW ε20† (some Yugo some with 2 single 406mm TT; FORCES BY ROLE
some Yeono some with 2 single 533mm TT)  COASTAL DEFENCE
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 2 2 AShM regt with HY-1/Kumsong-3 (6 sites, some
FRIGATES • FFG 2: mobile launchers)
1 Najin with 2 single lnchr with P-15 Termit (SS-N-2) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AShM, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 2 100mm gun, 2 twin COASTAL DEFENCE
57mm gun ARTY 130mm M-1992; SM-4-1
1 Najin with 2 twin lnchr with Kumsong-3 mod (KN- AShM HY-1; Kumsong-3
SS-N-2 Stormpetrel) AShM, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 2 ARTILLERY • TOWED 122mm M-1931/37; 152mm
100mm gun, 2 twin 57mm gun (operational status M-1937
unclear)
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 383+ Air Force 110,000
PCG 18: 4 air divs. 1st, 2nd and 3rd Air Divs (cbt) responsible for N,
8 Osa I with 4 single lnchr with P-15 Termit (SS-N-2) E and S air-defence sectors respectively; 8th Air Div (trg)
AShM, 2 twin AK230 CIWS responsible for NE sector. The AF controls the national
10 Soju with 4 single lnchr with P-15 Termit (SS-N-2) airline
AShM Flying hours 20 hrs/yr on ac
PCO 5: FORCES BY ROLE
4 Sariwon with 2 twin 57mm gun BOMBER
1 Tral with 1 85mm gun 3 lt regt with H-5; Il-28 Beagle
PCC 18: FIGHTER
6 Hainan with 4 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 2 twin 57mm gun 1 regt with MiG-15 Fagot
7 Taechong I with 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 85mm gun, 1 6 regt with J-5; MiG-17 Fresco
twin 57mm gun 4 regt with J-6; MiG-19 Farmer
5 Taechong II with 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 100mm gun, 5 regt with J-7; MiG-21F-13/PFM Fishbed
1 twin 57mm gun 1 regt with MiG-21bis Fishbed
Asia 277
1 regt with MiG-23ML/P Flogger Worker/Peasant Red Guard ε5,700,000

1 regt with MiG-29A/S/UB Fulcrum reservists
GROUND ATTACK Org on a province/town/village basis; comd structure is
1 regt with Su-25/Su-25UBK Frogfoot bde–bn–coy–pl; small arms with some mor and AD guns
TRANSPORT (but many units unarmed)
Some regt with An-2 Colt/Y-5 (to infiltrate 2 air-force
sniper brigades deep into ROK rear areas); An-24 Coke; Cyber
Il-18 Coot; Il-62M Classic; Tu-134 Crusty; Tu-154 Careless Since the 1970s, the North Korean military (the Korean
TRAINING People’s Army or KPA) has maintained a modest electronic-
Some regt with CJ-6; FT-2; MiG-21U/UM warfare (EW) capability. As a result of strategic reviews
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER following Operation Desert Storm, the KPA established an
Some regt with Hughes 500D/E; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; information-warfare (IW) capability under the concept
Mil-26 Halo; PZL Mi-2 Hoplite; Z-5 of ‘electronic intelligence warfare’ (EIW). The two key
AIR DEFENCE organisations are the Reconnaissance General Bureau
19 bde with S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa); S-75 Dvina (SA-2 (RGB), which conducts covert operations in peacetime, and
Guideline); S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon); 9K36 Strela-3 the General Staff Department (GSD), which is responsible
(SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet); 9K32 for cyber operations in support of conventional military
Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; Pongae-5 efforts. The General Staff Department is responsible
for operational command and oversees cyber, EW and
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
psychological operations. This includes the Electronic
Warfare Bureau, which was reportedly established in the
BBR 80 Il-28 Beagle/H-5†
mid-1980s. Experts assess North Korea as conceiving of
FTR 401+: MiG-15 Fagot; 107 MiG-17 Fresco/J-5; 100 MiG-
cyber capabilities as useful tools for ‘coercive diplomacy’
19 Farmer/J-6; 120 MiG-21F-13 Fishbed/J-7; MiG-21PFM
Asia
and ‘disruptive actions’ in the South in the case of war.
Fishbed; 46 MiG-23ML Flogger; 10 MiG-23P Flogger; 18+ North Korea has launched distributed-denial-of-service
MiG-29A/S/UB Fulcrum attacks on South Korean institutions and pursues cyber
FGA 30 MiG-21bis Fishbed (18 Su-7 Fitter in store) infiltration against military and other government agencies.
ATK 34 Su-25/Su-25UBK Frogfoot The attack on Sony Pictures in 2014 was attributed to North
TPT 217+: Heavy some Il-76 (operated by state airline); Korea. The incident illustrated that while attribution of
Light 208: 6 An-24 Coke; 2 Tu-134 Crusty; ε200 An-2 North Korean activity may have been possible in this case,
Colt/Y-5; PAX 9: 2 Il-18 Coot; 2 Il-62M Classic; 4 Tu-154 the country has also invested significant capacity in cyber
Careless; 1 Tu-204-300 operations. South Korea estimates that North Korea has a
TRG 215+: 180 CJ-6; 35 FT-2; some MiG-21U/UM near 7,000-strong unit of cyber-warfare specialists.
HELICOPTERS
MRH 80 Hughes 500D/E†
TPT 206: Heavy 4 Mi-26 Halo; Medium 63: 15 Mi-8 Hip/
Korea, Republic of ROK
Mi-17 Hip H; 48 Mi-4 Hound/Z-5; Light 139 PZL Mi-2 South Korean Won 2016 2017 2018
Hoplite GDP won 1,637tr 1,739tr
US$ 1.41tr 1.53tr
ISR • Medium some (unidentified indigenous type);
per capita US$ 27,535 29,730
Light Pchela-1 (Shmel) (reported)
AIR DEFENCE • SAM Growth % 2.8 3.0
Long-range 38 S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon) Inflation % 1.0 1.9
Medium-range 179+: some Pongae-5 (status unknown); Def bdgt won 39.0tr 40.6tr 43.7tr
179+ S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline) US$ 33.6bn 35.7bn
Short-range 133 S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa) US$1=won 1,160.43 1,136.82
Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K36
Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet) Population 51,181,299
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡; R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73
Male 6.8% 3.0% 3.7% 3.5% 27.1% 6.0%
(AA-11 Archer); PL-5; PL-7; SARH R-23/24 (AA-7 Apex);
Female 6.4% 2.8% 3.2% 3.1% 26.4% 8.1%
R-27R/ER (AA-10 A/C Alamo)
ASM Kh-23 (AS-7 Kerry)‡; Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen)
Capabilities
Paramilitary 189,000 active South Korea’s primary military concern remains its
troubled relationship with North Korea. This has led to
Security Troops 189,000 (incl border guards, a defence policy aimed at recapitalising conventional
public-safety personnel) military capabilities in order to maintain Seoul’s qualitative
Ministry of Public Security edge, while simultaneously pursuing the niche capabilities
required to deter North Korea’s artillery, ballistic-missile Air Manoeuvre

and littoral-submarine threats. Military procurement 1 air aslt bde
includes new armoured vehicles and artillery, tactical and Other
tanker aircraft, UAVs, precision munitions, ballistic and 5 sy regt
cruise missiles, satellites, and cyber- and missile-defence SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE
equipment. While most acquisitions are from local defence 3 SSM bn
industry, the lengthy timelines of key programmes such as COMBAT SUPPORT
Korean Air and Missile Defence and ‘Kill Chain’ have led to 6 engr bde
the import of key items. Another strategy, ‘Korea Massive 5 engr gp
Punishment and Retaliation’, was outlined in late 2016 after 1 CBRN defence bde
the North’s fifth nuclear test. Ongoing nuclear and missile 8 sigs bde
testing by the North led to the US deployment in 2017 of COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
the THAAD missile-defence system. Also in 2017, the US 4 log spt comd
and South Korea agreed in principle to remove current HELICOPTER
warhead limitations on the South’s ballistic missiles. Japan, 1 (army avn) comd
South Korea and the US conducted missile-defence drills AIR DEFENCE
in 2017. In late 2016, Tokyo and Seoul agreed to share 1 ADA bde
intelligence on North Korea. The US alliance remains a 5 ADA bn
major element of South Korea’s defence strategy, and the
transfer of wartime operational control of forces to Seoul, Reserves
planned for the end of 2015, is now ‘conditions based’, with FORCES BY ROLE
no firm date set. COMMAND
ACTIVE 625,000 (Army 490,000 Navy 70,000 Air 1 army HQ
65,000) Paramilitary 9,000 MANOEUVRE
Conscript liability 20–24 months depending on branch Light
24 inf div
RESERVE 3,100,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Reserve obligation of three days per year. First Combat
Forces (Mobilisation Reserve Forces) or Regional Combat
MBT 2,514: 1,000 K1; 484 K1A1; 100 K2; 253 M48; 597
Forces (Homeland Defence Forces) to age 33
M48A5; 80 T-80U (400 M47 in store)
Reserve Paramilitary 3,000,000 IFV 540: ε500 K21; 40 BMP-3
Being reorganised APC 2,790
APC (T) 2,560: 300 Bv 206; 1,700 KIFV; 420 M113; 140
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE M577 (CP)
APC (W) 220; 20 BTR-80; 200 KM-900/-901 (Fiat 6614)
Army 490,000 PPV 10 MaxxPro
FORCES BY ROLE
AEV 207 M9
COMMAND
ARV 238+: 200 K1; K21 ARV; K288A1; M47; 38 M88A1
2 army HQ
VLB 56 K1
8 corps HQ
1 (Capital Defence) comd HQ
MSL • MANPATS 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn); TOW-2A
SPECIAL FORCES
RCL 57mm; 75mm; 90mm M67; 106mm M40A2
1 (Special Warfare) SF comd
6 SF bde GUNS 58
1 indep SF bn SP 90mm 50 M36
2 cdo bde TOWED 76mm 8 M18 Hellcat (AT gun)
6 cdo regt ARTILLERY 11,067+
2 indep cdo bn SP 1,353+: 155mm 1,340: ε300 K9 Thunder; 1,040 M109A2
MANOEUVRE (K55/K55A1); 175mm some M107; 203mm 13 M110
Armoured TOWED 3,500+: 105mm 1,700 M101/KH-178;
5 armd bde 155mm/203mm 1,800+ KH-179/M114/M115
3 mech inf div (1 recce bn, 1 armd bde, 2 armd inf bde, 1 MRL 214+: 130mm 156 K136 Kooryong; 227mm 58: 48
fd arty bde, 1 engr bn) M270 MLRS; 10 M270A1 MLRS; 239mm some Chunmoo
Mechanised MOR 6,000: 81mm KM29 (M29); 107mm M30
3 mech inf div (1 recce bn, 1 armd bde, 2 mech inf bde, 1 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
fd arty bde, 1 engr bn) SRBM • Conventional 30 Hyonmu I/IIA/IIB; MGM-140A
Light /B ATACMS (launched from M270/M270A1 MLRS)
16 inf div (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf regt, 1 arty regt (4 GLCM • Conventional Hyonmu III
arty bn), 1 engr bn) RADAR • LAND AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder (arty, mor); AN/
2 indep inf bde TPQ-37 Firefinder (arty); RASIT (veh, arty)
Asia 279
HELICOPTERS ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 Goalkeeper CIWS, 1

ATK 96: 60 AH-1F/J Cobra; 36 AH-64E Apache 127mm gun (capacity 1 Lynx Mk99 hel)
MRH 175: 130 Hughes 500D; 45 MD-500 6 Incheon with 2 quad lnchr with Hae Sung I AShM/
TPT 301: Heavy 37: 31 CH-47D Chinook; 6 MH-47E TSLM LACM, 1 21-cell Mk49 lnchr with RIM-116
Chinook; Medium 152: 65 KUH-1 Surion; 87 UH-60P Black SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with K745 Blue Shark
Hawk; Light 112: ε100 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 12 Bo- LWT, 1 Mk15 1B Phalanx CIWS, 1 127 mm gun
105 FFGM 7 Ulsan with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM-
AIR DEFENCE 84C Harpoon AShM, 2 triple Mk32 324mm ASTT
SAM • Point-defence Chun Ma (Pegasus); FIM-92 Stinger; with Mk46 LWT, 2 76mm gun
Javelin; Mistral; 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS ε104
GUNS 330+ CORVETTES • FSG 33:
SP 170: 20mm ε150 KIFV Vulcan SPAAG; 30mm 20 17 Gumdoksuri with 2 twin lnchr with Hae Sung I
BIHO Flying Tiger AShM, 1 76mm gun
TOWED 160: 20mm 60 M167 Vulcan; 35mm 20 GDF- 16 Po Hang with 2 twin lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon
AShM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 2
003; 40mm 80 L/60/L/70; M1
76mm gun
PBF ε71 Sea Dolphin
ASM AGM-114R1 Hellfire
MINE WARFARE 10
MINE COUNTERMEASURES 9
Navy 70,000 (incl marines) MHO 6 Kan Kyeong
Three separate fleet elements: 1st Fleet Donghae (East Sea/ MSO 3 Yang Yang
Sea of Japan); 2nd Fleet Pyeongtaek (West Sea/Yellow Sea); MINELAYERS • ML 1 Won San with 2 triple Mk32
3rd Fleet Busan (South Sea/Korea Strait); independent 324mm ASTT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
submarine command; three additional flotillas (incl SF, AMPHIBIOUS
Asia
mine warfare, amphibious and spt elements) and 1 Naval PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 3
Air Wing (3 gp plus spt gp) LHD
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 Dokdo with 1 Mk49 GMLS with RIM-116 SAM, 2
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL 24 Goalkeeper CIWS (capacity 2 LCAC; 10 tanks; 700
SSK 15: troops; 10 UH-60 hel)
6 Chang Bogo (GER Type-209/1200; KSS-1) with 8 single LPD 2:
533mm TT with SUT HWT/White Shark HWT 2 Cheonwangbong (LST-II) (capacity 2 LCM; 300
3 Chang Bogo (GER Type-209/1200; KSS-1) with 8 single troops; 2 UH-60 hel)
533mm TT with SUT HWT/White Shark HWT/UGM- LANDING SHIPS • LST 4 Go Jun Bong with 1 hel
84B Harpoon AShM landing platform (capacity 20 tanks; 300 troops)
6 Son Won-il (GER Type-214; KSS-2; AIP fitted) with 8 LANDING CRAFT 22
single 533mm TT with SUT HWT/White Shark HWT/ LCAC 5: 3 Tsaplya (capacity 1 MBT; 130 troops); 2 LSF-II
Hae Sung I AShM/Hae Sung III LACM (capacity 150 troops or 1 MBT & 24 troops)
LCM 10 LCM-8
SSC 9 Cosmos
LCT 3 Mulgae II
LCU 4 Mulgae I
CRUISERS • CGHM 3:
3 Sejong (KDD-III) with Aegis Baseline 7 C2, 2 quad
AG 1 Sunjin (trials spt)
Mk141 lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 1 48-cell
AORH 3 Chun Jee
Mk41 VLS with SM-2MR SAM, 1 32-cell Mk41 VLS
ARS 2: 1 Cheong Hae Jin; 1 Pyong Taek (ex-US Edenton)
with SM-2MR SAM, 1 Mk49 GMLS with RIM-116
ASR 1 Tongyeong
SAM, 2 triple Mk32 324mm ASTT with K745 LWT,
1 32-cell VLS with ASROC, 1 Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 Naval Aviation
127mm gun (capacity 2 Lynx Mk99 hel) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
DESTROYERS • DDGHM 6: AIRCRAFT 16 combat capable
6 Chungmugong Yi Sun-Sin (KDD-II) with 2 quad ASW 16: 8 P-3C Orion; 8 P-3CK Orion
Mk141 lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM/Hae TPT • Light 5 Cessna F406 Caravan II
Sung I AShM, 1 32-cell Mk41 VLS with SM-2MR HELICOPTERS
SAM/ASROC/Hae Sung II LACM, 1 Mk49 GMLS ASW 31: 11 Lynx Mk99; 12 Lynx Mk99A; 8 AW159 Wildcat
with RIM-116 SAM, 2 triple Mk32 324mm ASTT MRH 3 SA319B Alouette III
with Mk46 LWT, 1 Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 127mm gun TPT 15: Medium 8 UH-60P Black Hawk Light 7 Bell 205
(capacity 1 Lynx Mk99 hel) (UH-1H Iroquois)
FRIGATES 16
FFGHM 9: Marines 29,000
3 Gwanggaeto Daewang (KDD-I) with 2 quad Mk141 FORCES BY ROLE
lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 1 16 cell Mk48 SPECIAL FORCES
VLS with Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 triple Mk32 324mm 1 SF regt
MANOEUVRE ISR 24: 4 Hawker 800RA; 20 KO-1

Amphibious SIGINT 6: 4 Hawker 800SIG; 2 Falcon 2000 (COMINT/
2 mne div (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 3 mne regt, 1 amph bn, SIGINT)
1 arty regt, 1 engr bn) TPT 38: Medium 16: 8 C-130H Hercules; 4 C-
1 mne bde 130H-30 Hercules; 4 C-130J-30 Hercules; Light 20: 12
COMBAT SUPPORT CN235M-100; 8 CN235M-220 (incl 2 VIP); PAX 2: 1
Some cbt spt unit B-737-300; 1 B-747
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TRG 186: 23 Il-103; 83 KT-1; 49 T-50 Golden Eagle*; 9 T-
50B Black Eagle* (aerobatics); 22 TA-50 Golden Eagle*
HELICOPTERS
MBT 100: 50 K1A1; 50 M48
SAR 16: 5 HH-47D Chinook; 11 HH-60P Black Hawk
AAV 166 AAV-7A1
MRH 3 Bell 412EP
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTUCTURE
TPT • Medium 30: 2 AS332L Super Puma; 8 Ka-32 Helix
MSL • SP Spike NLOS
C; 3 S-92A Super Hawk; 7 UH-60P Black Hawk; 10 VH-
ARTILLERY • TOWED 105mm; 155mm
60P Black Hawk (VIP)
COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM RGM-84A Harpoon
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR 103+: Medium
(truck mounted)
3+: some Night Intruder; 3 Searcher Light 100 Harpy (anti-
Naval Special Warfare Flotilla radiation)
AIR DEFENCE • SAM 206
Long-range 48 MIM-104E Patriot PAC-2 GEM-T
Air Force 65,000
Medium-range 158 MIM-23B I-HAWK
4 Comd (Ops, Southern Combat, Logs, Trg)
FORCES BY ROLE AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II;
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK SARH AIM-7 Sparrow; ARH AIM-120B/C-5/7 AM-
2 sqn with F-4E Phantom II RAAM
6 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II ASM AGM-65A Maverick; AGM-130
3 sqn with F-15K Eagle AShM AGM-84 Harpoon; AGM-142 Popeye
10 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon (KF-16C/D) ARM AGM-88 HARM
2 sqn with FA-50 Fighting Eagle ALCM AGM-84H SLAM-ER; KEPD-350 Taurus
ISR BOMBS • Laser-guided Paveway II
1 wg with KO-1
SIGINT Paramilitary 9,000 active
1 sqn with Hawker 800RA/XP
SEARCH & RESCUE Civilian Defence Corps 3,000,000 reservists
2 sqn with AS332L Super Puma; Bell 412EP; HH-47D (to age 50)
Chinook; HH-60P Black Hawk; Ka-32 Helix C
Coast Guard 9,000
TRANSPORT
Part of the Ministry of Public Safety and Secuity. Five
1 VIP sqn with B-737-300; B-747; CN235-220; S-92A
regional headquarters and 17 coastguard stations
Superhawk; VH-60P Black Hawk (VIP)
3 sqn (incl 1 Spec Ops) with C-130H/H-30/J-30 Hercules EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
2 sqn with CN235M-100/220 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 79
TRAINING PSOH 15: 1 Lee Cheong-ho with 1 76mm gun; 1
Sambongho; 13 Tae Pung Yang with 1 med hel
2 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II
PSO 21: 3 Han Kang with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing
1 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
platform; 5 Han Kang II with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing
4 sqn with KT-1
pllatform; 12 Jaemin with 1 hel landing platform; 1
1 sqn with Il-103
Sumjinkang
3 sqn with T-50/TA-50 Golden Eagle*
PCO 15 Tae Geuk
PCC 10: 4 Bukhansan; 6 (430 tonne)
1 sqn with UH-60P Black Hawk (Spec Ops)
PB 18: 14 Hae Uri; ε4 (various)
AIR DEFENCE
AMPHIBIOUS
3 AD bde (total: 3 SAM bn with MIM-23B I-HAWK; 2 LANDING CRAFT • UCAC 8: 1 BHT-150; 4 Griffon
SAM bn with MIM-104E Patriot PAC-2 GEM-T) 470TD; 3 Griffon 8000TD
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT
AIRCRAFT 587 combat capable MP 5: 1 C-212-400 MP; 4 CN235-110 MPA
FTR 174: 142 F-5E Tiger II; 32 F-5F Tiger II TPT • PAX 1 CL-604
FGA 333: 60 F-4E Phantom II; 60 F-15K Eagle; 118 F-16C HELICOPTERS
Fighting Falcon (KF-16C); 45 F-16D Fighting Falcon (KF- MRH 7: 5 AS565MB Panther; 1 AW139; 1 Bell 412SP
16D); 50 FA-50 Fighting Eagle SAR 1 S-92
AEW&C 4 B-737 AEW TPT • Medium 8 Ka-32 Helix C
Asia 281
Cyber
The MND commands Defense Cyber Command, which
Laos LAO
was established in February 2015. (South Korea had earlier, New Lao Kip 2016 2017 2018
in 2010, established a Cyber Warfare Command Centre.) A
GDP kip 129tr 142tr
Korea–US National Cyber Defense Cooperation Working
Group shares information and enhances cooperation US$ 15.8bn 17.2bn
including over policy, strategy, doctrine and training. In per capita US$ 2,394 2,568
2015 a unit responsible for overseeing cyber operations was Growth % 7.0 6.9
established within the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the Inflation % 2.0 2.3
Chairman of the JCS was also given command and control
Def exp kip n.k. n.k.
authority for cyber operations. The Joint Cyber Operations
Manual describes the cyber-operations structure within the US$ n.k. n.k.
JCS. The defence ministry is preparing a National Defence FMA US$ 0.2m 0m 0m
Cybersecurity Strategy, and announced in April 2017 that US$1=kip 8,175.13 8,254.97
it would allocate US$218 million for spending on cyber
capabilities from 2018–22.
Ethnic groups: Lao 55%; Khmou 11%; Hmong 8%
DEPLOYMENT Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus

AFGHANISTAN Male 16.6% 5.6% 4.9% 4.5% 16.3% 1.8%
NATO • Operation Resolute Support 50 Female 16.2% 5.6% 5.1% 4.6% 16.8% 2.1%
ARABIAN SEA
Capabilities
Combined Maritime Forces • CTF-151: 1 DDGHM
Asia
The Lao People’s Armed Forces (LPAF) have considerable
INDIA/PAKISTAN military experience from the Second Indo-China War and
UN • UNMOGIP 7 obs the 1988 border war with Thailand. However, defence
LEBANON spending and military procurement have been limited for
UN • UNIFIL 332; 1 mech inf coy; 1 engr coy; 1 sigs coy; more than 20 years. The armed forces remain closely linked
1 maint coy to the ruling Communist Party, and their primary role is
internal security. Maintenance capacity is limited, reflected
SOUTH SUDAN in a support contract for a Russian firm to maintain the air
UN • UNMISS 299; 2 obs; 1 engr coy force’s Mi-17 helicopters. Contacts with the Chinese and
SUDAN Vietnamese armed forces continue. Laos participates in
ADMM–Plus military exercises, and in 2014–15 was co-
UN • UNAMID 2
chair with Japan of the ADMM–Plus expert working group
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES on HADR. However, the LPAF have made no international
139 (trg activities at UAE Spec Ops School) deployments and have little capacity for sustained high-
intensity operations.
WESTERN SAHARA
UN • MINURSO 4 obs ACTIVE 29,100 (Army 25,600 Air 3,500) Paramilitary
100,000
FOREIGN FORCES Conscript liability 18 months minimum
Sweden NNSC: 5 obs

Switzerland NNSC: 5 obs ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
United States US Pacific Command: 28,500
Army 19,200; 1 HQ (8th Army) at Seoul; 1 div HQ at Space
Tongduchon; 1 armd bde with M1 Abrams; M2/M3 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Bradley; M109; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde with AH-64 Apache; SATELLITES • ISR 1 LaoSat-1
CH-47 Chinook; UH-60 Black Hawk; 1 MRL bde with
M270A1 MLRS; 1 AD bde with MIM 104 Patriot/FIM- Army 25,600
92A Avenger; 1 SAM bty with THAAD; 1 (APS) armd FORCES BY ROLE
bde eqpt set 4 mil regions
Navy 250 MANOEUVRE
USAF 8,800; 1 HQ (7th Air Force) at Osan AB; 1 ftr Armoured
wg at Kunsan AB (2 ftr sqn with 20 F-16C/D Fighting 1 armd bn
Falcon); 1 ftr wg at Osan AB (1 ftr sqn with 20 F-16C/D Light
Fighting Falcon, 1 atk sqn with 24 A-10C Thunderbolt II); 5 inf div
1 ISR sqn at Osan AB with U-2S 7 indep inf regt
USMC 250 65 indep inf coy
COMBAT SUPPORT
5 arty bn Malaysia MYS
1 engr regt
Malaysian Ringgit RM 2016 2017 2018
2 (construction) engr regt
AIR DEFENCE GDP RM 1.23tr 1.34tr
9 ADA bn US$ 297bn 310bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE per capita US$ 9,374 9,660
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Growth % 4.2 5.4
MBT 25: 15 T-54/T-55; 10 T-34/85 Inflation % 2.1 3.8
LT TK 10 PT-76
Def bdgt RM 17.3bn 15.1bn 15.9bn
APC • APC (W) 50: 30 BTR-40/BTR-60; 20 BTR-152
AUV ZYZ-8002 (VN3) US$ 4.17bn 3.48bn
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES US$1=RM 4.15 4.33
ARV T-54/T-55
VLB MTU
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • RCL 57mm Ethnic groups: Malay 50.1%; Chinese 22.5%; Indian 6.5%; other or
unspecified 20.9%
M18/A1; 75mm M20; 106mm M40; 107mm B-11
ARTILLERY 62+ Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
TOWED 62: 105mm 20 M101; 122mm 20 D-30/M-30
Male 14.3% 4.4% 4.1% 3.9% 21.0% 2.9%
M-1938; 130mm 10 M-46; 155mm 12 M114
Female 13.5% 4.2% 4.0% 3.8% 20.5% 3.2%
MOR 81mm; 82mm; 107mm M-1938/M2A1; 120mm M-43
AIR DEFENCE
SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; 25 Capabilities
9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet) Modernisation programmes in recent decades have
GUNS developed the armed forces’ capacity for external defence,
SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 notably by strengthening air and naval capabilities and
TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-1/ZPU-4; 23mm ZU-23; 37mm moving the army’s operational focus away from counter-
M-1939; 57mm S-60 insurgency and towards conventional warfare. The 2013
armed intrusion at Lahad Datu, the aftermath of the
Army Marine Section ε600 March 2014 disappearance of MH370 and Chinese naval
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE intrusions into Malaysia’s EEZ in 2015–16 all revealed
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PBR some serious capability shortcomings, particularly in air and
AMPHIBIOUS LCM some maritime surveillance. Addressing these is a high priority,
but budgetary constraints have slowed equipment
Air Force 3,500 procurement and infrastructural improvements. In 2017,
FORCES BY ROLE the navy announced an ambitious modernisation plan to
TRANSPORT reduce the number of vessel classes from 15 to five and boost
1 regt with MA60; MA600; Mi-17 Hip H local shipbuilding. As part of this, Malaysia awarded China
a contract for four littoral-mission ships, two of which are
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
to be built in-country, despite reported misgivings by some
AIRCRAFT
officers. In 2017, Malaysia began trilateral joint maritime
TPT • Light 5: 1 An-74TK Coaler; 2 MA60; 2 MA600 
patrols and joint Sulu Sea air patrols with Indonesia and
HELICOPTERS
the Philippines to counter movements and attacks by ISIS-
MRH 15: 6 Mi-17 Hip H; 5 Mi-17V-5 Hip; 4 Z-9A
linked militants in regional waterways. Army units have
TPT 4: Medium 1 Ka-32T Helix C; Light 3 SA360
deployed on UN peacekeeping operations and the navy
Dauphin
has achieved successes with its anti-piracy patrols in the
Gulf of Aden. Malaysian forces regularly participate in
Paramilitary the Five Power Defence Arrangements, ADMM–Plus and
other exercises with regional and international partners,
Militia Self-Defence Forces 100,000+
including the US.
Village ‘home guard’ or local defence
15,000) Paramilitary 24,600
RESERVE 51,600 (Army 50,000, Navy 1,000 Air
Force 600) Paramilitary 244,700
Army 80,000 (to be 60–70,000)

2 mil region, 4 area comd (div)
Asia 283
FORCES BY ROLE ARTILLERY 424

SPECIAL FORCES TOWED 134: 105mm 100 Model 56 pack howitzer;
1 SF bde (3 SF bn) 155mm 34: 12 FH-70; 22 G-5
MANOEUVRE MRL 36 ASTROS II (equipped with 127mm SS-30)
Armoured MOR 254: 81mm 232; SP 81mm 14: 4 K281A1; 10
1 tk regt (5 armd bn) ACV300-S; SP 120mm 8 ACV-S
Mechanised AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT
5 armd regt LCA 165 Damen Assault Craft 540 (capacity 10 troops)
1 mech inf bde (3 mech bn, 1 cbt engr sqn) HELICOPTERS • TPT 12: Medium 2 S-61A-4 Nuri; Light
Light 10 AW109
1 inf bde (4 inf bn, 1 arty regt) AIR DEFENCE
5 inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 arty regt) SAM • Point-defence 15+: 15 Jernas (Rapier 2000); Anza;
2 inf bde (2 inf bn) HY-6 (FN-6); 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse); QW-1 Vanguard;
GUNS 52+
1 inf bde (2 inf bn)
SP 20mm K263
Air Manoeuvre
TOWED 52: 35mm 16 GDF-005; 40mm 36 L40/70
1 (Rapid Deployment Force) AB bde (1 lt tk sqn, 3 AB bn,
1 lt arty regt, 1 engr sqn) Reserves
Other
1 (border) sy bde (5 bn) Territorial Army
1 (border) sy bde (forming) Some paramilitary forces to be incorporated into a re-
COMBAT SUPPORT organised territorial organisation
9 arty regt FORCES BY ROLE
1 STA regt MANOEUVRE
Asia
1 MRL regt Mechanised
1 cbt engr sqn 4 armd sqn
3 fd engr regt (total: 7 cbt engr sqn, 3 engr spt sqn) Light
1 construction regt 16 inf regt (3 inf bn)
1 int unit Other
4 MP regt 5 (highway) sy bn
1 sigs regt COMBAT SUPPORT
HELICOPTER 5 arty bty
1 hel sqn 2 fd engr regt
1 tpt sqn with S-61A-4 Nuri (forming) 1 int unit
AIR DEFENCE 3 sigs sqn
COMBAT SUPPORT
3 ADA regt
4 med coy
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 5 tpt coy
MBT 48 PT-91M Twardy Navy 14,000
LT TK 21 Scorpion-90
3 Regional Commands: Kuantan (East Coast), Kinabalu
RECCE 214: 130 AML-60/90; 74 SIBMAS (some†); 10 VBL (Borneo) and Langkawi (West Coast)
IFV 71+: 31 ACV300 Adnan (25mm Bushmaster); 13
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ACV300 Adnan AGL; 27+ AV8 Gempita IFV25/IFV30
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 2 Tunku Abdul
APC 777
Rahman (FRA Scorpene) with 6 single 533mm TT with
APC (T) 265: 149 ACV300 Adnan (incl 69 variants);
WASS Black Shark HWT/SM39 Exocet AShM
13 FV4333 Stormer (upgraded); 63 K200A; 40 K200A1
APC (W) 512: 32 Anoa; 300 Condor (incl variants); 150
FRIGATES 10
LAV-150 Commando; 30 M3 Panhard FFGHM 2:
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES 2 Lekiu with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block
AEV 3 MID-M 2 AShM, 1 16-cell VLS with Sea Wolf SAM, 2 B515
ARV 47+: Condor; 15 ACV300; 4 K288A1; 22 SIBMAS; 6 ILAS-3 triple 324mm ASTT with Sting Ray LWT, 1
WZT-4 57mm gun (capacity 1 Super Lynx hel)
VLB 5+: Leguan; 5 PMCz-90 FFG 2:
NBC VEHICLES K216A1 2 Kasturi with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL 2 AShM, 1 twin 375mm A/S mor, 1 100mm gun, 1
SP 8 ACV300 Baktar Shikan 57mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
MANPATS 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn); 9K115-2 FF 6:
Metis-M (AT-13 Saxhorn 2); Eryx; Baktar Shihan (HJ-8); 6 Kedah (GER MEKO) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel
SS.11 landing platform (fitted for MM40 Exocet AShM
RCL 260: 84mm 236 Carl Gustav; 106mm 24 M40 & RAM CIWS)
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 37 TRAINING

CORVETTES • FSGM 4 Laksamana with 3 twin lnchr 1 unit with PC-7; SA316 Alouette III
with Mk 2 Otomat AShM, 1 Albatros quad lnchr with TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Aspide SAM, 1 76mm gun 4 (tpt/SAR) sqn with H225M Super Cougar; S-61A-4 Nuri;
PCFG 4 Perdana (FRA Combattante II) with 2 single lnchr S-61N; S-70A Black Hawk
with MM38 Exocet AShM, 1 57mm gun AIR DEFENCE
PBG 4 Handalan (SWE Spica-M) with 2 twin lnchr with 1 sqn with Starburst
MM38 Exocet AShM , 1 57mm gun SPECIAL FORCES
PBF 17 Tempur (SWE CB90) 1 (Air Force Commando) unit (airfield defence/SAR)
PB 8: 6 Jerong (Lurssen 45) with 1 57mm gun; 2 Sri Perlis
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MCO 4 Mahamiru (ITA Lerici) AIRCRAFT 66 combat capable
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 13 FTR 21: 8 F-5E Tiger II; 3 F-5F Tiger II; 8 MiG-29 Fulcrum
AFS 2: 1 Mahawangsa with 2 57mm guns, 1 hel landing (MiG-29N); 2 MiG-29UB Fulcrum (MIG-29NUB)
platform; 1 Sri Indera Sakti with 1 57mm gun, 1 hel FGA 26: 8 F/A-18D Hornet; 18 Su-30MKM
landing platform ISR 5: 3 Beech 200T; 2 RF-5E Tigereye*
AG 2 Bunga Mas Lima with 1 hel landing platform TKR 4 KC-130H Hercules
AGS 2: 1 Mutiara with 1 hel landing platform; 1 TPT 37: Heavy 4 A400M Atlas; Medium 10: 2 C-130H
Perantau Hercules; 8 C-130H-30 Hercules; Light 18: 9 CN235M-220
AP 2 Sri Gaya (incl 1 VIP); 9 Cessna 402B (2 modified for aerial survey);
ASR 1 Mega Bakti PAX 5: 1 A319CT; 1 B-737-700 BBJ; 1 BD700 Global Express;
ATF 1 1 F-28 Fellowship; 1 Falcon 900
AX 2: 1 Hang Tuah with 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing TRG 78: 5 Hawk Mk108*; 12 Hawk Mk208*; 7 MB-339C; 7
platform; 1 Gagah Samudera with 1 hel landing platform MD3-160 Aero Tiga; 30 PC-7; 17 PC-7 Mk II Turbo Trainer
AXS 1 HELICOPTERS
MRH 17 SA316 Alouette III
Naval Aviation 160 TPT 42: Heavy 12 H225M Super Cougar; Medium 29: 25
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE S-61A-4 Nuri; 2 S-61N; 2 S-70A Black Hawk; Light 1 AW109
HELICOPTERS UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
ASW 6 Super Lynx 300 ISR • Medium Aludra
MRH 6 AS555 Fennec
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence Starburst
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AShM Sea Skua
Special Forces AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder; R-73 (AA-11 Archer); IIR
AIM-9X Sidewinder II; IR/SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo);
FORCES BY ROLE
SARH AIM-7 Sparrow; ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM; R-77
SPECIAL FORCES
1 (mne cdo) SF unit (AA-12A Adder)
ASM AGM-65 Maverick
Air Force 15,000 AShM AGM-84D Harpoon
1 air op HQ, 2 air div, 1 trg and log comd, 1 Intergrated BOMBS • Laser-guided Paveway II
Area Def Systems HQ
Paramilitary ε24,600
FORCES BY ROLE Police–General Ops Force 18,000
FIGHTER FORCES BY ROLE
2 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum COMMAND
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 5 bde HQ
1 sqn with F/A-18D Hornet SPECIAL FORCES
1 sqn with Su-30MKM Flanker 1 spec ops bn
2 sqn with Hawk Mk108*/Mk208* MANOEUVRE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR
Other
1 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II; RF-5E Tigereye*
19 paramilitary bn
MARITIME PATROL
2 (Aboriginal) paramilitary bn
1 sqn with Beech 200T
4 indep paramilitary coy
TANKER/TRANSPORT
2 sqn with KC-130H Hercules; C-130H Hercules; EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
C-130H-30 Hercules; Cessna 402B ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
TRANSPORT RECCE 192: ε100 S52 Shorland; 92 FV701 Ferret (60
1 (VIP) sqn with A319CT; AW109; B-737-700 BBJ; BD700 mod)
Global Express; F-28 Fellowship; Falcon 900 APC • APC (W) 140 AT105 Saxon
1 sqn with CN235 AUV ε30 SB-301
Asia 285
Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency LEBANON

(MMEA) ε4,500 UN • UNIFIL 828; 1 mech inf bn
Controls 5 Maritime Regions (Northern Peninsula;
PHILIPPINES
Southern Peninsula; Eastern Peninsula; Sarawak;
Sabah), subdivided into a further 18 Maritime Districts. IMT 16
Supported by one provisional MMEA Air Unit SUDAN
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE UN • UNAMID 11
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 129 UN • UNISFA 1 obs
PSO 4: 1 Arau (ex-JPN Nojima) with 1 hel landing platform;
2 Langkawi with 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing platform; 1 WESTERN SAHARA
Pekan (ex-JPN Ojika) with 1 hel landing platform UN • MINURSO 10 obs
PCC 1 Bagan Datuk
PBF 57: 18 Penggalang 17 (TUR MRTP 16); 2 Penggalang
18; 6 Penyelamat 20; 16 Penggalang 16; 15 Tugau
FOREIGN FORCES
PB 67: 15 Gagah; 4 Malawali; 2 Nusa; 3 Nusa 28; 1 Peninjau; Australia 130; 1 inf coy (on 3-month rotational tours); 1 AP-
7 Ramunia; 2 Rhu; 4 Semilang; 8 Sipadan (ex-Kris/Sabah); 8 3C Orion on occasion
Icarus 1650; 10 Pengawal; 4 Penyelamat; 2 Perwira
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AX 1 Marlin
AIRCRAFT • MP 2 Bombardier 415MP
Mongolia MNG
HELICOPTERS • MRH 3 AS365 Dauphin Mongolian Tugrik t 2016 2017 2018
Marine Police 2,100 GDP t 23.9tr 26.8tr
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE US$ 11.0bn 10.9bn
Asia
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 132 per capita US$ 3,660 3,553
PBF 12: 6 Sangitan; 6 Stan Patrol 1500 Growth % 1.0 2.0
PB/PBR 120
Inflation % 0.6 4.4
Police Air Unit Def bdgt t 216bn 207bn 257bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE US$ 100m 84m
AIRCRAFT FMA (US) US$ 1.6m 1.6m 0m
TPT • Light 17: 4 Cessna 206 Stationair; 6 Cessna 208 US$1=t 2,165.39 2,469.92
Caravan; 7 PC-6 Turbo-Porter
HELICOPTERS Population 3,068,243
TPT • Light 2: 1 Bell 206L Long Ranger; 1 AS355F Ethnic groups: Khalkh 81.9%; Kazak 3.8%; Dorvod 2.7%; other or
Ecureuil II unspecified 11.6%
Area Security Units 3,500 reservists Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
(Auxiliary General Ops Force) Male 13.7% 3.9% 4.2% 5.1% 20.2% 1.7%
FORCES BY ROLE Female 13.2% 3.8% 4.1% 5.2% 22.1% 2.5%
MANOEUVRE
Other Capabilities
89 paramilitary unit
Mongolia pursues defence ties and bilateral training
Border Scouts 1,200 reservists with multiple regional powers, as well as the US. The
in Sabah, Sarawak country has been discussing the adoption of permanent
neutrality since 2015. The armed forces focus on
People’s Volunteer Corps 240,000 reservists peacekeeping missions and remain reliant on Soviet-
(some 17,500 armed) era equipment, although this has been supplemented by
RELA deliveries of second-hand Russian weapons, including
T-72 MBTs and BTR-70 APCs. Mongolia hosts the annual
Customs Service
Khaan Quest multinational exercise, but its main exercise
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
partners are India and Russia, with each country running
regular bilateral exercises (Nomadic Elephant and Selenga
PBF 10
respectively).
PB 13
ACTIVE 9,700 (Army 8,900 Air 800) Paramilitary
DEPLOYMENT 7,500
Conscript liability One year for males aged 18–25
UN • MONUSCO 3; 10 obs RESERVE 137,000 (Army 137,000)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Construction Troops 300
Army 5,600; 3,300 conscript (total 8,900) DEPLOYMENT

FORCES BY ROLE AFGHANISTAN
MANOEUVRE NATO • Operation Resolute Support 120
Mechanised UN • UNAMA 1 obs
1 MR bde
Light DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
1 (rapid deployment) lt inf bn (2nd bn to form) UN • MONUSCO 1 obs
Air Manoeuvre SOUTH SUDAN
1 AB bn
UN • UNMISS 866; 6 obs; 1 inf bn
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty regt SUDAN
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE UN • UNAMID 70; 1 fd hospital
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES UN • UNISFA 1; 2 obs
MBT 420: 370 T-54/T-55; 50 T-72A
WESTERN SAHARA
RECCE 120 BRDM-2
IFV 310 BMP-1
APC • APC (W) 210: 150 BTR-60; 40 BTR-70M; 20 BTR-80
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES Myanmar MMR
ARV T-54/T-55
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Myanmar Kyat K 2016 2017 2018
GUNS • TOWED 200: 85mm D-44/D-48; 100mm GDP K 81.1tr 93.2tr
M-1944/MT-12 US$ 64.4bn 67.0bn
ARTILLERY 570
TOWED ε300: 122mm D-30/M-30 (M-1938); 130mm
Growth % 6.1 7.2
M-46; 152mm ML-20 (M-1937)
MRL 122mm 130 BM-21 Inflation % 6.8 6.5
MOR 140: 120mm; 160mm; 82mm Def bdgt K 2.88tr 2.92tr
AIR DEFENCE US$ 2.28bn 2.10bn
SAM Medium-range 2+ S-125 Pechora-2M (SA-26) US$1=K 1,260.42 1,391.35
GUNS • TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2
Air Force 800 Ethnic groups: Burman 68%; Shan 9%; Karen 7%; Rakhine 4%;
Chinese 3+%; other Chin, Kachin, Kayan, Lahu, Mon, Palaung, Pao,
FORCES BY ROLE
Wa 9%
TRANSPORT
1 sqn with An-24 Coke; An-26 Curl Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Male 13.7% 4.5% 4.4% 4.0% 20.2% 2.4%
1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-171
Female 13.1% 4.4% 4,4% 4.2% 21.5% 3.1%
AIR DEFENCE
2 regt with S-60/ZPU-4/ZU-23
Capabilities
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 3: 2 An-24 Coke; 1 An-26 Curl Since the country’s independence struggle in the 1940s,
HELICOPTERS Myanmar’s large, army-dominated Tatmadaw (armed
TPT • Medium 12: 10 Mi-8 Hip; 2 Mi-171 forces) has been intimately involved in domestic politics.
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 150: 14.5mm ZPU-4; Even though the National League for Democracy
23mm ZU-23; 57mm S-60 (NLD) won the November 2015 election, the armed
forces remain politically important, with control of key
Paramilitary 7,500 active ministries (including defence) and the automatic right
to 25% of parliamentary seats. The primary focus of the
Border Guard 1,300; 4,700 conscript (total Tatmadaw has always been maintaining internal security,
6,000)  particularly in the face of one of the world’s longest-
running insurgencies. In late 2016, fighting continued
Internal Security Troops 400; 800 conscript with several ‘non-ceasefire groups’, and the armed forces
(total 1,200) were heavily criticised internationally in 2017 for their
FORCES BY ROLE military actions against the Rohingya minority. While the
MANOEUVRE army grew substantially after the military seized power
Other in 1988, its counter-insurgency focus means it remains
4 gd unit essentially a light-infantry force. Nevertheless, since the
Asia 287
1990s, the armed forces have attempted to develop limited TOWED 264+: 105mm 132: 36 M-56; 96 M101; 122mm 100
conventional-warfare capabilities and have brought into D-30; 130mm 16 M-46; 140mm; 155mm 16 Soltam M-845P
service new armoured vehicles, air-defence weapons, MRL 36+: 107mm 30 Type-63; 122mm BM-21 Grad
artillery, combat aircraft and ships procured from China, (reported); Type-81; 240mm 6+ M-1985 mod
Russia and other diverse sources. The NLD government’s MOR 80+: 82mm Type-53 (M-37); 120mm 80+: 80 Soltam;
dependence on military goodwill implies that defence Type-53 (M-1943)
spending is likely to continue increasing. However, in light SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
of the absence of a comprehensive peace settlement with SRBM • Conventional some Hwasong-6 (reported)
ethnic-minority armed groups, Western arms embargoes AIR DEFENCE
were not planned to be lifted until 2018. SAM
Medium-range 4+: 4 KS-1A (HQ-12); S-125 Pechora-2M
(SA-26); 2K12 Kvadrat-M (SA-6 Gainful)
15,000) Paramilitary 107,250 Point-defence Some 2K22 Tunguska (SA-19 Grison);
Conscript liability 24–36 months
HN-5 Hong Nu/Red Cherry (reported); 9K310 Igla-1
(SA-16 Gimlet)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE GUNS 46  SP 57mm 12 Type-80
TOWED 34: 37mm 24 Type-74; 40mm 10 M1
Army ε375,000
14 military regions, 7 regional op comd Navy ε16,000
COMMAND PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 5
20 div HQ (military op comd) FFGH 2 Kyansitthar with 2 twin lnchr with DPRK AShM
10 inf div HQ (possibly KN-SS-N-02 Storm Petrel), 4 AK630 CIWS, 1
Asia
34+ bde HQ (tactical op comd) 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel)
MANOEUVRE FFG 3:
Armoured 1 Aung Zeya with 2 twin lnchr with DPRK AShM
10 armd bn (possibly KN-SS-N-01), 4 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun,
Light 1 hel landing platform
100 inf bn (coy) 2 Mahar Bandoola (PRC Type-053H1) with 2 quad lnchr
337 inf bn (coy) (regional comd) with C-802 (CH-SS-N-8 Saccade) AShM, 2 RBU 1200
COMBAT SUPPORT A/S mor, 2 twin 100mm gun
7 arty bn PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 115
37 indep arty coy CORVETTES 3
6 cbt engr bn FSGHM 1 Tabinshwethi (Anawrahta mod) with 2 twin
54 fd engr bn lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-8 Saccade), 1 sectuple
40 int coy lnchr with unknown MANPADs, 2 RBU 1200 A/S
45 sigs bn mor, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel)
AIR DEFENCE FSG 2 Anawrahta with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CH-
7 AD bn SS-N-8 Saccade) AShM; 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE platform
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES PCG 7: 6 Houxin with 2 twin lnchr with C-801 (CH-SS-N-4
MBT 185+: 10 T-55; 50 T-72S; 25+ Type-59D; 100 Type- Sardine) AShM; 1 FAC(M) mod with 2 twin lnchr with
69-II C-802 (CH-SS-N-8 Saccade) AShM, 1 AK630 CIWS
LT TK 105 Type-63 (ε60 serviceable) PCO 2 Indaw
ASLT 24 PTL-02 mod PCC 11: 2 Admirable (ex-US); 9 Hainan with 4 RBU 1200
RECCE 87+: 12+ EE-9 Cascavel; 45 Ferret; 30 Mazda; MAV- A/S mor, 2 twin 57mm gun
1 PBG 4 Myanmar with 2 twin lnchr with C-801 (CH-
IFV 10+ BTR-3U SS-N-4 Sardine) AShM
APC 431+ PBF 1 Type-201
APC (T) 331: 26 MT-LB; 250 Type-85; 55 Type-90 PB 31: 3 PB-90; 6 PGM 401; 6 PGM 412; 13 Myanmar; 3 Swift
APC (W) 90+: 20 Hino; 40 Humber Pig; 30+ Type-92 PBR 57: 4 Sagu; 9 Y-301†; 1 Y-301 (Imp); 43 (various)
PPV 10 MPV AMPHIBIOUS • CRAFT 9: 3 LCU 6 LCM
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 20
ARV Type-72 ABU 1; AGS 1; AH 2; AK 1; AKSL 5; AP 10
VLB MT-55A
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Naval Infantry 800
RCL 1,000+: 84mm ε1,000 Carl Gustav; 106mm M40A1 FORCES BY ROLE
GUNS • TOWED 60: 57mm 6-pdr; 76mm 17-pdr MANOEUVRE
ARTILLERY 422+ Light
SP 155mm 42: 30 NORA B-52; 12 SH-1 1 inf bn
Air Force ε15,000

FORCES BY ROLE
Nepal NPL
FIGHTER Nepalese Rupee NR 2016 2017 2018
4 sqn with F-7 Airguard; FT-7; MiG-29B Fulcrum; MiG-
GDP NR 2.25tr 2.60tr
29SM Fulcrum; MiG-29UB Fulcrum
GROUND ATTACK US$ 21.1bn 24.1bn
2 sqn with A-5M Fantan per capita US$ 733 824
TRANSPORT Growth % 0.4 7.5
1 sqn with An-12 Cub; F-27 Friendship; FH-227; PC-6A/B Inflation % 9.9 4.5
Turbo Porter
Def bdgt NR 33.3bn 35.7bn 45.0bn
TRAINING
2 sqn with G-4 Super Galeb*; PC-7 Turbo Trainer*; PC-9* US$ 314m 330m
1 (trg/liaison) sqn with Cessna 550 Citation II; Cessna FMA (US) US$ 18m 1.7m 0m
180 Skywagon; K-8 Karakorum* US$1=NR 106.30 108.01
4 sqn with Bell 205; Bell 206 Jet Ranger; Mi-17 Hip H;
Mi-35P Hind; PZL Mi-2 Hoplite; PZL W-3 Sokol; SA316 Religious groups: Hindu 90%; Buddhist 5%; Muslim 3%
Alouette III
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 150 combat capable Male 15.7% 5.6% 5.4% 3.9% 15.5% 2.5%
FTR 66: 24 F-7 Airguard; 10 FT-7; 11 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 6 Female 14.5% 5.4% 5.4% 4.7% 18.6% 2.6%
MiG-29SE Fulcrum; 10 MiG-29SM Fulcrum; 5 MiG-29UB
Fulcrum Capabilities
ATK 22 A-5M Fantan
TPT 20: Medium 5: 4 Y-8D; 1 Y-8F-200W Light 16: 3 The principal role of Nepal’s armed forces is maintaining
Beech 1900D; 4 Cessna 180 Skywagon; 1 Cessna 550 territorial integrity, but they have also traditionally
Citation II; 3 F-27 Friendship; 5 PC-6A/B Turbo Porter; PAX focused on internal security and humanitarian relief.
1+ FH-227 Following a 2006 peace accord with the Maoist People’s
TRG 82: 11 G-4 Super Galeb*; 20 Grob G120; 24+ K-8 Liberation Army, Maoist personnel underwent a process
Karakorum*; 12 PC-7 Turbo Trainer*; 9 PC-9*; 6 Yak-130 of demobilisation or integration into the armed forces.
Mitten* Nepal’s logistic capability appears to be sufficient for
HELICOPTERS internal-security operations, including countering IEDs,
ATK 10 Mi-35P Hind however its contingents on UN peacekeeping operations
MRH 23: 3 AS365; 11 Mi-17 Hip H; 9 SA316 Alouette III
appear to largely depend on contracted logistic support.
TPT 45: Medium 10 PZL W-3 Sokol; Light 35: 12 Bell 205;
Gurkhas continue to be recruited by the British and Indian
6 Bell 206 Jet Ranger; 17 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite
armed forces and the Singaporean police. In 2016, India
CISR • Heavy 4 CH-3 increased the size of its Gurkha Rifles unit, comprising
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR PL-5; R-73 Gurkhas resident in India. The small air wing provides
(AA-11 Archer); IR/SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo) a limited transport and support capacity but mobility
remains a challenge, in part because of the country’s
Paramilitary 107,250 topography. This deficit was highlighted by Nepal’s
considerable dependence on foreign military assistance
People’s Police Force 72,000 following the earthquake in April 2015. Training support
People’s Militia 35,000 is provided by several countries, including China, India
and the US.
People’s Pearl and Fishery Ministry ε250
ACTIVE 96,600 (Army 96,600) Paramilitary 62,000
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PBR 6
Carpentaria ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
DEPLOYMENT Army 96,600

FORCES BY ROLE
SOUTH SUDAN
COMMAND
UN • UNMISS 2
6 inf div HQ
1 (valley) comd
SPECIAL FORCES
1 bde (1 SF bn, 1 AB bn, 1 cdo bn, 1 ranger bn, 1 mech
inf bn)
Asia 289
MANOEUVRE SOUTH SUDAN

Light UN • UNMISS 1,710; 11 obs; 2 inf bn
16 inf bde (total: 62 inf bn; 32 indep inf coy)
SUDAN
COMBAT SUPPORT
UN • UNAMID 366; 10 obs; 2 inf coy
4 arty regt
5 engr bn
AIR DEFENCE SYRIA/ISRAEL
2 AD regt UN • UNDOF 344; 1 mech inf coy; 1 inf coy
4 indep AD coy WESTERN SAHARA
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE UN • MINURSO 4 obs
RECCE 40 Ferret FOREIGN FORCES
APC 253
United Kingdom 60 (Gurkha trg org)
APC (W) 13: 8 OT-64C; 5 WZ-551
PPV 240: 90 Casspir; 150 MPV
ARTILLERY 92+ New Zealand NZL
TOWED 105mm 22: 8 L118 Light Gun; 14 pack howitzer
New Zealand Dollar NZ$ 2016 2017 2018
(6 non-operational)
MOR 70+: 81mm; 120mm 70 M-43 (est 12 op) GDP NZ$ 261bn 278bn
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 32+: 14.5mm 30 Type- US$ 182bn 201bn
56 (ZPU-4); 37mm (PRC); 40mm 2 L/60 per capita US$ 38,278 41,629
Growth % 3.6 3.5
Air Wing 320
Asia
Inflation % 0.6 2.2
Def bdgt NZ$ 3.70bn 3.49bn 3.67bn
AIRCRAFT • TPT 2: Light 2: 1 BN-2T Islander; 1 M-28
Skytruck US$ 2.58bn 2.52bn
HELICOPTERS US$1=NZ$ 1.43 1.38
MRH 12: 2 Dhruv; 2 Lancer; 3 Mi-17-1V Hip H; 2 Mi- Population 4,510,327
17V-5 Hip; 1 SA315B Lama (Cheetah); 2 SA316B Alouette
III Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
TPT 3: Medium 1 SA330J Puma; Light 2 AS350B2 Male 10.1% 3.4% 3.5% 3.4% 22.3% 7.0%
Ecureuil Female 9.6% 3.2% 3.3% 3.4% 22.6% 8.2%
Paramilitary 62,000 Capabilities

Armed Police Force 15,000 Reflecting its geographical isolation and the absence of
Ministry of Home Affairs immediate threats, limited defence spending has restricted
the size of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF).
Police Force 47,000 Nevertheless, New Zealand has a strong military tradition.
The NZDF is well trained and has operational experience,
taking part, for example, in coalition operations in
DEPLOYMENT Afghanistan and Iraq. Australia is New Zealand’s closest
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC defence partner but defence relations with the United
UN • MINUSCA 128; 3 obs; 1 MP pl States have revived since 2010. New Zealand also maintains
ties with other regional partners such as Singapore, with
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO which it conducts regular military training. The June 2016
UN • MONUSCO 1,029; 17 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy defence white paper – the first since 2010 – foresaw a
range of challenges likely to affect New Zealand’s security
IRAQ
in the period to 2040. In response, the country’s updated
UN • UNAMI 76; 1 sy unit defence policy places greater emphasis on maritime-
LEBANON domain awareness and response; New Zealand’s interests
UN • UNIFIL 869; 1 mech inf bn in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean; and the need to
maintain the international ‘rules-based order’. The white
LIBERIA paper indicated there would be future investment in
UN • UNMIL 1 obs improved maritime air-surveillance capability; new cyber-
MALI support capability for deployed operations; and additional
intelligence personnel, among others. The effect on defence
UN • MINUSMA 153; 2 obs; 1 EOD coy
policy of the 2017 change in government has yet to be
MIDDLE EAST ascertained. New Zealand has a relatively small defence
UN • UNTSO 3 obs industry, preferring to buy ‘off-the-shelf’ from international
defence companies, including a fleet-replenishment oiler AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCM 2

from Hyundai Heavy Industries. New Zealand operates a LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2  
small number of life-extended C-130H medium transport AKRH 1 Canterbury (capacity 4 NH90 tpt hel; 1 SH-
aircraft, giving it some capability to deploy abroad. Since 2G(I) Super Seasprite ASW hel; 2 LCM; 16 NZLAV; 14
2010, New Zealand has joined other Five Eyes nations on NZLAV; 20 trucks; 250 troops)
annual cyber exercises in the US. AOR 1 Endeavour with 1 hel landing platform
ACTIVE 9,000 (Army 4,500 Navy 2,050 Air 2,450)   Air Force 2,450
RESERVE 2,300 (Army 1,650 Navy 450 Air Force 200) Flying hours 190 hrs/yr
FORCES BY ROLE
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE MARITIME PATROL
1 sqn with P-3K2 Orion
Army 4,500 TRANSPORT
1 sqn with B-757-200 (upgraded); C-130H Hercules
FORCES BY ROLE
(upgraded)
SPECIAL FORCES
ANTI-SUBMARINE/SURFACE WARFARE
1 SF gp
1 (RNZAF/RNZN) sqn with SH-2G(I) Super Seasprite
MANOEUVRE
TRAINING
Light
1 sqn with T-6C Texan II
1 inf bde (1 armd recce regt, 2 lt inf bn, 1 arty regt (2 arty
1 sqn with Beech 200 King Air (leased)
bty, 1 AD tp), 1 engr regt(-), 1 MI coy, 1 MP coy, 1 sigs TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
regt, 2 log bn, 1 med bn) 1 sqn with AW109; NH90
COMBAT SUPPORT
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 EOD sqn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ASW 6 P-3K2 Orion
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES TPT 11: Medium 5 C-130H Hercules (upgraded); Light 4
IFV 93 NZLAV-25 Beech 200 King Air (leased); PAX 2 B-757-200 (upgraded)
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES TRG 11 T-6C Texan II
AEV 7 NZLAV HELICOPTERS
ARV 3 LAV-R ASW 8 SH-2G(I) Super Seasprite
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE TPT 13: Medium 8 NH90; Light 5 AW109
MSL • MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AShM AGM-119 Penguin
RCL 84mm 40 Carl Gustav Mk2 mod7
ARTILLERY 60
TOWED 105mm 24 L118 Light Gun
MOR 81mm 36
DEPLOYMENT
AFGHANISTAN
Reserves NATO • Operation Resolute Support 10
Territorial Force 1,650 reservists EGYPT
Responsible for providing trained individuals for
MFO 26; 1 trg unit; 1 tpt unit
augmenting deployed forces
FORCES BY ROLE IRAQ
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT Operation Inherent Resolve 154; 1 trg unit
3 (Territorial Force Regional) trg regt MIDDLE EAST
UN • UNTSO 6 obs
Navy 2,050
Fleet HQ at Auckland SOUTH SUDAN
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES •
FFHM 2:
2 Anzac (GER MEKO 200) with 1 octuple Mk41 VLS
with RIM-7M Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 triple Mk32 324mm
TT with Mk46 mod 5 LWT, 1 Mk15 Phalanx Block
1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-2G(I) Super
Seasprite ASW hel)
PSOH 2 Otago (capacity 1 SH-2G(I) Super Seasprite ASW
hel)
PCC 4 Lake
Asia 291
Pakistan PAK ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Pakistani Rupee Rs 2016 2017 2018 Strategic Forces
GDP Rs 29.1tr 31.9tr Operational control rests with the National Command
US$ 279bn n.k. Authority. The Strategic Plans Directorate (SPD) manages
per capita US$ 1,441 n.k. and commands all of Pakistan’s military nuclear capability.
The SPD also commands a reportedly 25,000-strong
Growth % 4.5 5.3
military security force responsible for guarding military
Inflation % 2.9 4.1 nuclear infrastructure
Def bdgt [a] Rs 959bn 1.02tr 1.11tr
US$ 9.19bn 9.72bn Army Strategic Forces Command 12,000–
15,000
FMA (US) US$ 255m 265m 100m
Commands all land-based strategic nuclear forces
US$1=Rs 104.34 105.10
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
[a] Includes defence allocations to the Public Sector Development
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS 60+
Programme (PSDP), including funding to the Defence Division
and the Defence Production Division MRBM • Nuclear ε30 Ghauri/Ghauri II (Hatf-5)/
Shaheen-2 (Hatf-6 – in test); Shaheen-3 (in test)
Population 204,924,861 SRBM • Nuclear 30+: ε30 Ghaznavi (Hatf-3 – PRC
Religious groups: Hindu less than 3% M-11)/Shaheen-1 (Hatf-4); some Abdali (Hatf-2); some
Nasr (Hatf-9)
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus GLCM • Nuclear Babur (Hatf-7); Ra’ad (Hatf-8 – in test)
Male 16.1% 5.6% 5.3% 4.8% 17.4% 2.1%
Air Force
Asia
Female 15.2% 5.2% 5.0% 4.5% 16.2% 2.4%
1–2 sqn of F-16A/B or Mirage 5 may be assigned a
nuclear-strike role
Capabilities
Pakistan’s nuclear and conventional forces have tradition- Army 560,000 
ally been oriented and structured against a prospective FORCES BY ROLE
threat from India. Since 2008, however, counter-insurgency COMMAND
and counter-terrorism have been of increasing importance 9 corps HQ
and are now the forces’ main effort. While an army-led 1 (area) comd
SPECIAL FORCES
counter-terrorism operation has improved domestic
2 SF gp (total: 4 SF bn)
security, terrorist attacks continue. As part of the China–
MANOEUVRE
Pakistan Economic Corridor initiative, the army is raising a Armoured
two-division dedicated security force to protect the project 2 armd div
and the navy has formed Task Force-88 to protect Gwadar 7 indep armd bde
Port and its sea lines of communication. China is Pakistan’s Mechanised
main defence partner, with all three services employing a 2 mech inf div
large amount of Chinese equipment. Major investment in 1 indep mech bde
military nuclear programmes continue, including the com- Light
missioning of a VLF submarine-communications facility 18 inf div
and the testing in 2017 of a submarine-launched cruise 5 indep inf bde
missile. The air force is modernising its inventory while Other
improving its precision-strike and ISR capabilities. Recent 1 sy div (1 more div forming)
COMBAT SUPPORT
and likely future naval investment in Chinese-supplied
1 arty div
frigates, missile craft and submarines could improve sea-
14 arty bde
denial capabilities. According to the minister for defence
7 engr bde
production, Pakistan has significantly reduced its reliance AVIATION
on external defence suppliers; the indigenous defence 1 VIP avn sqn
industry exports defence materiel. The army continues to 4 avn sqn
contribute to UN peacekeeping operations. The army and HELICOPTER
air force have considerable operational experience from 3 atk hel sqn
a decade of counter-insurgency operations in Pakistan’s 2 ISR hel sqn
tribal areas and the navy has consistently supported US-led 2 SAR hel sqn
maritime counter-terrorism missions. 2 tpt hel sqn
1 spec ops hel sqn
70,000) Paramilitary 282,000 1 AD comd (3 AD gp (total: 8 AD bn))
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Point-defence M113 with RBS-70; Anza Mk1/Mk2;

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES FIM-92 Stinger; HN-5A; Mistral; RBS-70
MBT 2,467+: 300 Al-Khalid (MBT 2000); 21 Al-Khalid I; GUNS • TOWED 1,933: 14.5mm 981; 35mm 248 GDF-
320 T-80UD; 51 T-54/T-55; 1,100 Type-59/Al-Zarrar; 400 002/GDF-005 (with 134 Skyguard radar units); 37mm 310
Type-69; 275+ Type-85 (270 M48A5 in store) Type-55 (M-1939)/Type-65; 40mm 50 L/60; 57mm 144
APC 1,605 Type-59 (S-60); 85mm 200 Type-72 (M-1939) KS-12
APC (T) 1,260: 1,160 M113/Talha; ε100 Type-63
APC (W) 120 BTR-70/BTR-80 Navy 23,800 (incl ε3,200 Marines and ε2,000
PPV 225 Maxxpro Maritime Security Agency (see Paramilitary))
AUV 10 Dingo 2 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES SUBMARINES • TACTICAL 8
ARV 117+: 65 Type-653; Al-Hadeed; 52 M88A1; T-54/T-55
SSK 5:
VLB M47M; M48/60
2 Hashmat (FRA Agosta 70) with 4 single 533mm ASTT
MW Aardvark Mk II
with F17P HWT/UGM-84 Harpoon AShM
3 Khalid (FRA Agosta 90B – 1 with AIP) with 4 single
MSL
533mm ASTT with F17 Mod 2 HWT/SM39 Exocet
SP M901 TOW
AShM
MANPATS HJ-8; TOW
SSI 3 MG110 (SF delivery) each with 2 single 533mm TT
RCL 75mm Type-52; 106mm M40A1  RL 89mm M20
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 10  
GUNS 85mm 200 Type-56 (D-44)
FFGHM 4 Sword (F-22P) with 2 quad lnchr with C-802A
ARTILLERY 4,472+
AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with HHQ-7 SAM, 2 triple 324mm
SP 375: 155mm 315: 200 M109A2; ε115 M109A5 203mm
ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 2 sextuple Type 87 A/S mor, 1
60 M110/M110A2
Type 730B CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C Haitun
TOWED 1,659: 105mm 329: 216 M101; 113 M-56; 122mm
hel)
570: 80 D-30 (PRC); 490 Type-54 (M-1938); 130mm 410
FFGH 3:
Type-59-I; 155mm 322: 144 M114; 148 M198; ε30 Panter;
1 Alamgir (US Oliver Hazard Perry) with 2 quad lnchr
203mm 28 M115
with RGM-84D Harpoon AShM, 2 triple 324mm
MRL 88+: 107mm Type-81; 122mm 52+: 52 Azar (Type-
83); some KRL-122; 300mm 36 A100 ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun
MOR 2,350+: 81mm; 120mm AM-50 1 Tariq (UK Amazon) with 2 twin Mk141 lnchr with
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS RGM-84D Harpoon AShM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT
MRBM • Nuclear ε30 Ghauri/Ghauri II (Hatf-5); some with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 114mm
Shaheen-2 (Hatf-6 – in test); Shaheen-3 (in test) gun (capacity 1 hel)
SRBM 135+: Nuclear 30+: ε30 Ghaznavi (Hatf-3 – PRC 1 Tariq (UK Amazon) with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with
M-11)/Shaheen-1 (Hatf-4); some Abdali (Hatf-2); some RGM-84D Harpoon AShM, 2 single 400mm TT with
Nasr (Hatf-9); Conventional 105 Hatf-1 TP 45 LWT, 1 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 114mm gun
GLCM • Nuclear some Babur (Hatf-7) (capacity 1 hel)
RADAR • LAND AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder (arty, mor); RASIT FFHM 3 Tariq (UK Amazon) with 1 sextuple lnchr with
(veh, arty); SLC-2 LY-60 (Aspide) SAM, 2 single 400mm TT with TP 45 LWT,
AIRCRAFT 1 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 114mm gun (capacity 1 hel)
TPT • Light 14: 1 Beech 200 King Air; 1 Beech 350 King PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 17
Air; 3 Cessna 208B; 1 Cessna 421; 1 Cessna 550 Citation; PCG 3:
1 Cessna 560 Citation; 2 Turbo Commander 690; 4 Y-12(II) 2 Azmat (FAC(M)) with 2 quad lnchr with C-802A AShM,
TRG 87 MFI-17B Mushshak 1 AK630 CIWS
HELICOPTERS 1 Azmat (FAC(M)) with 2 triple lnchr with C-602 AShM,
ATK 42: 38 AH-1F/S Cobra with TOW; 4 Mi-35M Hind (1 1 AK630 CIWS
Mi-24 Hind in store) PBFG 2 Zarrar (33) with 4 single lnchr each with RGM-84
MRH 115+: 10 H125M Fennec; 7 AW139; 26 Bell 412EP Harpoon AShM
Twin Huey; 38+ Mi-17 Hip H; 2 Mi-171E Hip; 12 SA315B PBG 4:
Lama; 20 SA319 Alouette III 2 Jalalat with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-8
TPT 76: Medium 36: 31 SA330 Puma; 4 Mi-171; 1 Mi- Saccade) AShM
172; Light 40: 17 H125 Ecureuil (SAR); 5 Bell 205 (UH- 2 Jurrat with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-8
1H Iroquois); 5 Bell 205A-1 (AB-205A-1); 13 Bell 206B Jet Saccade) AShM
Ranger II PBF 2 Kaan 15
TRG 10 Hughes 300C PB 6: 1 Larkana; 1 Rajshahi; 4 M16 Fast Assault Boat
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES
ISR • Light Bravo; Jasoos; Vector MCC 3 Munsif (FRA Eridan)
AIR DEFENCE AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 8
SAM LCM 2
Medium-range LY-80 LCAC 2 Griffon 8100TD
Short-range FM-90 UCAC 4 Griffon 2000
Asia 293
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 9 TANKER

AGS 1 Behr Paima 1 sqn with Il-78 Midas
AOL 2 Madagar TRANSPORT
AORH 2: 1 sqn with C-130B/E Hercules; CN235M-220; L-100-20
1 Fuqing with 1 Phalanx CIWS (capacity 1 SA319 1 VIP sqn with B-707; Cessna 560XL Citation Excel;
Alouette III hel) CN235M-220; F-27-200 Friendship; Falcon 20E;
1 Moawin with 1 Phalanx CIWS (capacity 1 Sea King Gulfstream IVSP
Mk45 ASW hel)   1 (comms) sqn with EMB-500 Phenom 100; Y-12 (II)
AOT 3: 1 Attock; 2 Gwadar TRAINING
AXS 1 1 OCU sqn with F-7P/FT-7P Skybolt
1 OCU sqn with Mirage III/Mirage 5
Marines ε3,200 1 OCU sqn with F-16A/B MLU Fighting Falcon
FORCES BY ROLE 2 sqn with K-8 Karakorum*
SPECIAL FORCES 2 sqn with MFI-17
2 sqn with T-37C Tweet
1 cdo gp
AIR DEFENCE
MANOEUVRE
1 bty with HQ-2 (SA-2 Guideline); 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16
Amphibious
Gimlet)
3 mne bn
6 bty with Crotale
AIR DEFENCE
10 bty with SPADA 2000
1 AD bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Naval Aviation  AIRCRAFT 425 combat capable
FTR 153: 46 F-7PG Airguard; 20 F-7P Skybolt; 24 F-16A
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MLU Fighting Falcon; 21 F-16B MLU Fighting Falcon; 9
Asia
F-16A ADF Fighting Falcon; 4 F-16B ADF Fighting Falcon;
ASW 7 P-3B/C Orion
21 FT-7; 6 FT-7PG; 2 Mirage IIIB
MP 6 F-27-200 MPA
FGA 224: 12 F-16C Block 52 Fighting Falcon; 6 F-16D
TPT 4: Light 3 ATR-72-500 (MP); PAX 1 Hawker
Block 52 Fighting Falcon; 49 JF-17 Thunder (FC-1 Block
850XP
1); 36 JF-17 Thunder (FC-1 Block 2); 7 Mirage IIID (Mirage
HELICOPTERS
IIIOD); 63 Mirage IIIE (IIIEP); 39 Mirage 5 (5PA)/5PA2; 2
ASW 12: 5 Sea King Mk45; 7 Z-9C Haitun Mirage 5D (5DPA)/5DPA2; 10 Mirage 5PA3 (ASuW)
MRH 6 SA319B Alouette III ISR 10 Mirage IIIR* (Mirage IIIRP)
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AShM AM39 Exocet ELINT 2 Falcon 20F
AEW&C 7: 3 Saab 2000 Erieye; 4 ZDK-03
Air Force 70,000 TKR 4 Il-78 Midas
3 regional comds: Northern (Peshawar), Central (Sargodha), TPT 35: Medium 16: 5 C-130B Hercules; 10 C-130E
Southern (Masroor). The Composite Air Tpt Wg, Combat Hercules; 1 L-100-20; Light 14: 2 Cessna 208B; 1 Cessna
Cadres School and PAF Academy are Direct Reporting 560XL Citation Excel; 4 CN235M-220; 4 EMB-500 Phenom
Units 100; 1 F-27-200 Friendship; 2 Y-12 (II); PAX 5: 1 B-707; 1
FORCES BY ROLE Falcon 20E; 2 Gulfstream IVSP; 1 Saab 2000
FIGHTER TRG 142: 38 K-8 Karakorum*; 80 MFI-17B Mushshak; 24
3 sqn with F-7PG/FT-7PG Airguard T-37C Tweet
1 sqn with F-16A/B MLU Fighting Falcon HELICOPTERS
1 sqn with F-16A/B ADF Fighting Falcon MRH 15 SA316 Alouette III
1 sqn with Mirage IIID/E (IIIOD/EP) TPT • Medium 4 Mi-171Sh
CISR • Heavy CH-3 (Burraq)
2 sqn with JF-17 Thunder
ISR • Medium Falco
2 sqn with JF-17 Thunder Block II
AIR DEFENCE • SAM 190+
1 sqn with F-16C/D Block 52 Fighting Falcon
Medium-range 6 HQ-2 (SA-2 Guideline)
3 sqn with Mirage 5 (5PA)
Short-range 184: 144 Crotale; ε40 SPADA 2000
ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE Point-defence 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet)
1 sqn with Mirage 5PA2/5PA3 with AM-39 Exocet AShM RADAR • AD 6+: 6 AR-1 (AD radar low level); some
ELECTRONIC WARFARE/ELINT Condor (AD radar high level); some FPS-89/100 (AD radar
1 sqn with Falcon 20F high level); MPDR 45/MPDR 60/MPDR 90 (AD radar low
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL level); Type-514 (AD radar high level)
1 sqn with Saab 2000; Saab 2000 Erieye AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
1 sqn with ZDK-03 AAM • IR AIM-9L/P Sidewinder; U-Darter; PL-5; SARH
SEARCH & RESCUE Super 530; ARH PL-12; AIM-120C AMRAAM
1 sqn with Mi-171Sh (SAR/liaison) ASM AGM-65 Maverick; Raptor II
6 sqn with SA316 Alouette III AShM AM39 Exocet
ARM MAR-1 WESTERN SAHARA

ALCM • Nuclear Ra’ad (in test) UN • MINURSO 14 obs
BOMBS
INS/SAT-guided FT-6 (REK) FOREIGN FORCES
Laser-guided Paveway II
Figures represent total numbers for UNMOGIP mission in
Paramilitary 282,000 active India and Pakistan
Chile 2 obs
Coast Guard Croatia 9 obs
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Italy 2 obs
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5 Korea, Republic of 7 obs
PBF 4 Philippines 7 obs
PB 1
Romania 2 obs
Frontier Corps 70,000 Sweden 6 obs
Ministry of Interior Switzerland 3 obs
FORCES BY ROLE Thailand 4 obs
MANOEUVRE Uruguay 2 obs
Reconnaissance
1 armd recce sqn
Other
Papua New Guinea PNG
11 paramilitary regt (total: 40 paramilitary bn) Papua New Guinea Kina K 2016 2017 2018
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE GDP K 63.3bn 70.6bn
US$ 20.5bn 21.8bn
APC (W) 45 UR-416
Maritime Security Agency ε2,000 Growth % 2.4 3.1
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Inflation % 6.7 5.8
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 14 Def bdgt K 256m 229m
PCC 6: 4 Barkat; 2 Hingol US$ 83m 71m
PBF 5
US$1=K 3.09 3.23
PB 3 Guns
National Guard 185,000
Incl Janbaz Force; Mujahid Force; National Cadet Corps; Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Women Guards Male 17.0% 5.3% 4.7% 4.1% 17.6% 2.1%
Female 16.4% 5.2% 4.6% 4.0% 16.6% 2.1%
Pakistan Rangers 25,000
Capabilities
DEPLOYMENT Since independence in 1975, the Papua New Guinea
Defence Force (PNGDF) has suffered from chronic
ARABIAN SEA underfunding and lack of capacity to perform its core roles.
Combined Maritime Forces • 1 FFGH Mainly for budgetary reasons, a PNGDF Reform Program
reduced personnel strength to 2,100 between 2002 and
2007. However, during the current decade, the government
UN • MINUSCA 1,126; 10 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 hel sqn has made efforts to revive PNGDF capability, increasing
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO defence spending from 2010. The 2013 defence white
UN • MONUSCO 3,447; 35 obs; 4 inf bn; 1 hel sqn paper identified core PNGDF roles, including defending
the state and civil-emergency assistance. It called for the
LIBERIA strengthening of defence capability on an ambitious scale,
UN • UNMIL 71; 1 obs; 1 fd hospital with personnel increases projected by 2017, though the
SOMALIA authorities reportedly acknowledged in late 2017 that
personnel growth remained slightly short of the planned
UN • UNSOM 1 obs
number. In the meantime, the PNGDF continues to
UN • UNSOS 1 obs
receive substantial external military assistance, not only
SOUTH SUDAN from Australia but also from China, which donated some
UN • UNMISS 1; 1 obs transport vehicles in 2015.
SUDAN ACTIVE 3,600 (Army 3,300 Maritime Element 200

UN • UNAMID 1,412; 8 obs; 1 inf bn, 1 engr coy Air 100)
Asia 295
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Philippines PHL

Philippine Peso P 2016 2017 2018
Army ε3,300
GDP P 14.5tr 15.9tr
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES US$ 305bn 321bn
1 spec ops unit per capita US$ 2,927 3,022
MANOEUVRE Growth % 6.9 6.6
Light
Inflation % 1.8 3.1
2 inf bn
Def bdgt [a] P 118bn 137bn 145bn
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 engr bn US$ 2.47bn 2.78bn
1 EOD unit FMA (US) US$ 40m 40m 0m
1 sigs sqn US$1=P 47.49 49.41
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE [a] Excludes military pensions
ARTILLERY • MOR 3+: 81mm Some; 120mm 3
Maritime Element ε200 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
1 HQ located at Port Moresby
Male 17.0% 5.1% 4.7% 4.2% 17.3% 1.8%
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Female 16.3% 4.9% 4.4% 4.0% 17.4% 2.6%
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 4 Rabaul
(Pacific)
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING SHIPS • LCT 3 Salamaua Capabilities
Asia
(ex-AUS Balikpapan) (of which 1 in trg role) Despite modest increases in defence funding, mainly in
response to rising tensions in the South China Sea, the
Air Force ε100 capabilities and procurement plans of the Armed Forces
FORCES BY ROLE of the Philippines (AFP) remain limited. The AFP has
TRANSPORT benefited from some new equipment, including delivery
1 sqn with CN235M-100; IAI-201 Arava in 2017 of its first FA-50PH fighter/ground-attack aircraft
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER and two additional landing platform docks, but the
1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois)† Philippines would still struggle to be able to provide more
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE than a token national capability to defend its maritime
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 3: 1 CN235M-100 (1 more in claims. For this reason, under the Aquino administration
store); 2 IAI-201 Arava the country relied heavily on revived alliance relations
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 3: 2 Bell 412 (leased); 1 Bell with the US for its external defence. In October 2016,
212 (leased) (2 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) non-operational) President Duterte announced a ‘separation’ from the
US and the pursuit of closer relations with China but
in September 2017 he described the US as an important
DEPLOYMENT security ally, especially in support to counter-terrorism.
SUDAN The 2014 US–Philippines Enhanced Defence Cooperation
UN • UNAMID 1; 1 obs Agreement continues, as does military training. The army
and marines continue to deploy extensively, with air-force
support, on internal-security duties in the south, where
Manila faces continuing challenges from insurgent groups.
In 2017, the Philippines began trilateral joint maritime
patrols and joint Sulu Sea air patrols with Indonesia and
Malaysia to counter movement and attacks by ISIS-linked
militants in regional waterways.

RESERVE 131,000 (Army 100,000 Navy 15,000 Air
16,000) Paramilitary 50,000 (to age 49)
Army 86,000
5 Area Unified Comd (joint service), 1 National Capital
Region Comd
FORCES BY ROLE LANDING SHIPS • LST 4:

SPECIAL FORCES 2 Bacolod City (US Besson) with 1 hel landing platform
1 spec ops comd (1 ranger regt, 1 SF regt, 1 CT regt) (capacity 32 tanks; 150 troops)
MANOEUVRE 2 LST-1/542 (ex-US) (capacity 16 tanks; 200 troops)
Mechanised LANDING CRAFT 11
1 mech inf div (2 mech bde (total: 3 lt armd sqn; 7 armd LCM 2: 1 Manobo; 1 Tagbanua (capacity 100 tons; 200
cav tp; 4 mech inf bn; 1 cbt engr coy; 1 avn bn; 1 cbt engr troops)
coy, 1 sigs coy))  LCT 5 Ivatan (ex-AUS Balikpapan)
Light LCU 4: 3 LCU Mk 6 (ex-US); 1 Mulgae I (ex-RoK)
1 div (4 inf bde; 1 arty bn, 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 6
9 div (3 inf bde; 1 arty bn, 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn) AGOR 1 Gregorio Velasquez (ex-US Melville)
Other AOL 1
1 (Presidential) gd gp AO 1 Lake Caliraya
COMBAT SUPPORT AP 1
1 arty regt HQ AWT 2
5 engr bde
Naval Aviation
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 8: 4 BN-2A Defender; 2 Cessna
LT TK 7 FV101 Scorpion
177 Cardinal; 2 Beech 90 King Air (TC-90) (leased)
IFV 54: 2 YPR-765; 34 M113A1 FSV; 18 M113A2 FSV
HELICOPTERS • TPT 13: Medium 4 Mi-171Sh; Light 9:
APC 387
3 AW109; 2 AW109E; 4 Bo-105
APC (T) 168: 6 ACV300; 42 M113A1; 120 M113A2
APC (W) 219: 73 LAV-150 Commando; 146 Simba Marines 8,300
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES FORCES BY ROLE 
ARV ACV-300; Samson; M578; 4 M113 ARV SPECIAL FORCES
ANTI-TANK-ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • RCL 75mm 1 (force recon) spec ops bn
M20; 90mm M67; 106mm M40A1 MANOEUVRE
ARTILLERY 260+ Amphibious
TOWED 220: 105mm 204 M101/M102/Model 56 pack 4 mne bde (total: 12 mne bn)
howitzer; 155mm 16: 10 M114/M-68; 6 Soltam M-71 COMBAT SUPPORT
MOR 40+: 81mm M29; 107mm 40 M30 1 CSS bde (6 CSS bn)
AIRCRAFT
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
TPT • Light 4: 1 Beech 80 Queen Air; 1 Cessna 170; 1
Cessna 172; 1 Cessna P206A
APC • APC (W) 42: 19 LAV-150 Commando; 23 LAV-
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Medium Blue
300
Horizon AAV 59: 4 LVTH-6†; 55 LVTP-7
ARTILLERY 37+
Navy 24,000 TOWED 37: 105mm 31: 23 M101; 8 M-26; 155mm 6
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Soltam M-71
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES MOR 107mm M30
FF 1 Rajah Humabon (ex-US Cannon) with 3 76mm gun
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 68 Naval Special Operations Group
PSOH 3 Gregorio del Pilar (ex-US Hamilton) with 1 76mm FORCES BY ROLE
gun (capacity 1 Bo 105) SPECIAL FORCES
PCF 1 General Mariano Alvares (ex-US Cyclone) 1 SEAL unit
PCO 11: 1 diving unit
3 Emilio Jacinto (ex-UK Peacock) with 1 76mm gun 10 naval spec ops unit
6 Miguel Malvar (ex-US) with 1 76mm gun 1 special boat unit
2 Rizal (ex-US Auk) with 2 76mm gun COMBAT SUPPORT
PBF 17: 2 Conrado Yap (ex-ROK Sea Hawk); 6 Tomas Batilo 1 EOD unit
(ex-ROK Chamsuri); 6 MPAC Mk1/2; 3 MPAC Mk3 (to be
fitted with Spike-ER SSM) Air Force 15,000
PB 31: 1 Aguinaldo; 22 Jose Andrada; 2 Kagitingan; 2 Point FORCES BY ROLE
(ex-US); 4 Swift Mk3 (ex-US) FIGHTER
PBR 6 Silver Ships 1 sqn with FA-50PH Fighting Eagle*
AMPHIBIOUS GROUND ATTACK
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 2 1 sqn with OV-10A/C Bronco*
LPD 2 Tarlac (IDN Makassar) (capacity 2 LCU; 2 hels; 13 ISR
tanks; 500 troops) 1 sqn with Turbo Commander 690A
Asia 297
SEARCH & RESCUE PB 60: 3 De Haviland; 4 Ilocos Norte; 1 Palawan; 12 PCF

4 (SAR/Comms) sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1M Iroquois); 50 (US Swift Mk1/2); 10 PCF 46; 10 PCF 65 (US Swift
AUH-76 Mk3); 4 Rodman 38; 10 Rodman 101; 6 Tubbatah
TRANSPORT PBR 11
1 sqn with C-130B/H/T Hercules; L-100-20 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • ABU 1 Corregidor
1 sqn with N-22B Nomad; N-22SL Searchmaster AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2 BN-2 Islander
1 sqn with F-27-200 MPA; F-27-500 Friendship HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 2 Bo-105
1 VIP sqn with F-28 Fellowship
TRAINING
Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units
1 sqn with SF-260F/TP
50,000 reservists
MANOEUVRE
1 sqn with T-41B/D/K Mescalero
Other 56 militia bn (part-time units which can be
ATTACK HELICOPTER
called up for extended periods)
1 sqn with MD-520MG
1 sqn with AUH-76 DEPLOYMENT
1 sqn with W-3 Sokol
INDIA/PAKISTAN
4 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois)
UN • UNMOGIP 7 obs
1 (VIP) sqn with Bell 412EP Twin Huey; S-70A Black Hawk
(S-70A-5)
AIRCRAFT 34 combat capable Brunei IMT 9
FGA 12 FA-50PH Fighting Eagle Indonesia IMT 9
MP 2: 1 F-27-200 MPA; 1 N-22SL Searchmaster Malaysia IMT 16
Asia
ISR 12: 2 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; 10 OV-10A/C United States US Pacific Command 100
Bronco*
TPT 15: Medium 6: 1 C-130B Hercules; 3 C-130H Hercules;
2 C-130T Hercules Light 6: 3 C295; 1 F-27-500 Friendship;
Singapore SGP
1 N-22B Nomad; 1 Turbo Commander 690A; PAX 1 F-28 Singapore Dollar S$ 2016 2017 2018
Fellowship (VIP)
GDP S$ 410bn 425bn
TRG 39: 12 S-211*; 7 SF-260F; 10 SF-260TP; 10 T-41B/D/K
US$ 297bn 306bn
Mescalero
HELICOPTERS per capita US$ 52,961 53,880
MRH 32: 8 W-3 Sokol; 3 AUH-76; 8 Bell 412EP Twin Growth % 2.0 2.5
Huey; 2 Bell 412HP Twin Huey; 11 MD-520MG Inflation % -0.5 0.9
TPT 34: Medium 1 S-70A Black Hawk (S-70A-5); Light Def bdgt S$ 13.8bn 14.2bn
33: 2 AW109E; 11 Bell 205 (UH-1D); 20 Bell 205 (UH-1H
US$ 10.0bn 10.2bn
Iroquois) (25 more non-operational)
US$1=S$ 1.38 1.390
ISR • Medium 2 Blue Horizon II Population 5,888,926
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES Ethnic groups: Chinese 74.1%; Malay 13.4%; Indian 9.2%; other or
AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder unspecified 3.3%
ASM AGM-65D Maverick
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Paramilitary Male 6.6% 3.5% 4.8% 5.3% 24.5% 4.4%
Female 6.3% 3.3% 5.2% 5.7% 25.4% 5.2%
Philippine National Police 40,500
Department of Interior and Local Government. 15 Capabilities
regional & 73 provincial comd. 62,000 auxiliaries
The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) are the best equipped
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE in Southeast Asia. The air force and navy are staffed mainly
AIRCRAFT by professionals while the much larger army, apart from a
TPT • Light 5: 2 BN-2; 3 Lancair 320 small regular core, is based on conscripts and reservists. It
is presumed that the SAF’s primary role is to deter attacks
Coast Guard on the city-state or interference with its vital interests –
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE particularly its sea lines of communication – by potential
Rodman 38 and Rodman 101 owned by Bureau of regional adversaries. There is an additional focus on counter-
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources terrorist operations. There is a looming personnel challenge,
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 78 with an ageing population and declining conscript cohort;
PCO 5: 4 San Juan with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Balsam and in response the SAF plans to utilise lean personnel
PCC 2 Tirad levels and more technology. Tracking its economic growth,
Singapore’s defence budget has increased to the extent that 1 int bn

the city-state spends more than any of its Southeast Asian 2 ISR bn
counterparts. Equipment modernisation continues, with 1 CBRN bn
the first of eight littoral mission vessels commissioned 3 sigs bn
and new protected patrol vehicles brought into service, as COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
well as progress on the procurement of armoured vehicles 3 med bn
and surface-to-air missiles. In March 2017, the defence 2 tpt bn
minister announced funding for two new laboratories to 3 spt bn
promote technological innovation: a robotics lab under the
Defence Science Organisation and an analytics and artificial- Reserves
intelligence laboratory set up by the Defence Science and Activated units form part of divisions and brigades listed
Technology Agency. Training is routinely carried out above; 1 op reserve div with additional inf bde; People’s
overseas, notably in Australia, Brunei, Germany, Taiwan, Defence Force Comd (homeland defence) with 12 inf bn
Thailand and the United States, as well as through the FORCES BY ROLE
Five Power Defence Arrangements and the ADMM–Plus. SPECIAL FORCES
Singaporean forces have gradually become more involved 1 cdo bn
in multinational operations. These deployments have MANOEUVRE
provided some operational experience. Training standards Reconnaissance
and operational readiness are high, but the reliance on 6 lt armd/recce bn
conscripts and reservists limits the army’s capacity for Mechanised
sustained operations away from Singapore. 6 mech inf bn
ACTIVE 72,500 (Army 50,000 Navy 9,000 Air 13,500) Light
Paramilitary 19,900 ε56 inf bn
Conscription liability 22–24 months COMBAT SUPPORT
ε12 arty bn
RESERVE 312,500 (Army 300,000 Navy 5,000 Air ε8 engr bn
7,500) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Annual trg to age 40 for army other ranks, 50 for officers ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 96 Leopard 2SG (80–100 Tempest (upgraded
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Centurion) reported in store)
LT TK 372: 22 AMX-10 PAC 90; ε350 AMX-13 SM1
Army 15,000; 35,000 conscript (total 50,000) IFV 572+: 22 AMX-10P; 250 Bionix IFV-25; 250 Bionix IFV-
40/50; 50+ M113A1/A2 (some with 40mm AGL, some
FORCES BY ROLE
with 25mm gun)
COMMAND
3 (combined arms) div HQ APC 1,576+
1 (rapid reaction) div HQ APC (T) 1,100+: 700+ M113A1/A2; 400+ ATTC Bronco
3 armd bde HQ APC (W) 415: 250 LAV-150 Commando/V-200
9 inf bde HQ Commando; 135 Terrex ICV; 30 V-100 Commando
1 air mob bde HQ PPV 61+: 6+ Belrex; 15 MaxxPro Dash; 40 Peacekeeper
1 amph bde HQ ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
SPECIAL FORCES AEV 94: 18 CET; 54 FV180; 14 Kodiak; 8 M728
1 cdo bn ARV Bionix; Büffel; LAV-150; LAV-300
MANOEUVRE VLB 72+: Bionix; LAB 30; Leguan; M2; 60 M3; 12 M60
Reconnaissance MW 910-MCV-2; Trailblazer
3 lt armd/recce bn ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Armoured MSL • MANPATS Milan; Spike-SR; Spike-MR
1 armd bn RCL 290: 84mm ε200 Carl Gustav; 106mm 90 M40A1
Mechanised ARTILLERY 798+
6 mech inf bn SP 155mm 54 SSPH-1 Primus
Light TOWED 88: 105mm (37 LG1 in store); 155mm 88: 18
2 (gds) inf bn FH-2000; ε18 Pegasus; 52 FH-88
Other MRL 227mm 18 M142 HIMARS
2 sy bn MOR 638+
COMBAT SUPPORT SP 90+: 81mm; 120mm 90: 40 on Bronco; 50 on M113
2 arty bn TOWED 548: 81mm 500 120mm 36 M-65; 160mm 12
1 STA bn M-58 Tampella
2 engr bn RADAR • LAND AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder; AN/TPQ-37
1 EOD bn Firefinder (arty, mor); 3 ARTHUR (arty)
1 ptn br bn UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Light Skylark
Asia 299
Navy 3,000; 1,000 conscript; ε5,000 active TANKER/TRANSPORT

reservists (total 9,000) 1 sqn with KC-130B/H Hercules; C-130H Hercules
TRAINING
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 (FRA-based) sqn with M-346 Master
4 (US-based) units with AH-64D Apache; CH-47D
2 Challenger (ex-SWE Sjoormen) with 2 single 400mm TT,
Chinook; F-15SG: F-16C/D
4 single 533mm TT
1 (AUS-based) sqn with PC-21
2 Archer (ex-SWE Västergötland) (AIP fitted) with 3 single
1 hel sqn with H120 Colibri
400mm TT, 6 single 533mm TT for WASS Black Shark
ATTACK HELICOPTER
HWT
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 6:
FRIGATES • FFGHM 6 Formidable with 2 quad lnchr
1 sqn with CH-47SD Super D Chinook
with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 4 octuple VLS with Aster
2 sqn with AS332M Super Puma; AS532UL Cougar
15 SAM, 2 triple B515 324mm ASTT with A244 LWT, 1
ISR UAV
76mm gun (capacity 1 S-70B Sea Hawk hel)
1 sqn with Hermes 450
1 sqn with Heron 1
CORVETTES 9
1 sqn with Searcher MkII
FSGM 6 Victory with 2 quad Mk140 lnchr with RGM-84C
AIR DEFENCE
Harpoon AShM, 2 octuple lnchr with Barak SAM, 2 triple
1 AD bn with Mistral opcon Army
B515 324mm ASTT with A244S LWT, 1 76mm gun
3 AD bn with RBS-70; 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse) opcon
FSM 3 Independence (Littoral Mission Vessel) with 1
Army
12-cell CLA VLS with VL-MICA, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel
1 ADA sqn with Oerlikon
landing platform 1 AD sqn with MIM-23 HAWK
PCO 7 Fearless with 1 76mm gun (can be fitted with 2 1 AD sqn with Spyder
Asia
sextuple Sadral lnchr with Mistral SAM) 1 radar sqn with radar (mobile)
PBF 6 1 radar sqn with LORADS
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES MANOEUVRE
MCC 4 Bedok Other
AMPHIBIOUS 4 (field def) sy sqn
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LPD 4 Endurance
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
with 2 twin lnchr with Mistral SAM, 1 76mm gun
(capacity 2 hel; 4 LCVP; 18 MBT; 350 troops)
FTR 29: 20 F-5S Tiger II; 9 F-5T Tiger II
LANDING CRAFT 23
FGA 100: 40 F-15SG Eagle; 20 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 40
LCVP 23: ε17 FCEP; 6 FCU
F-16D Fighting Falcon (incl reserves)
ATK (4 A-4SU Super Skyhawk; 10 TA-4SU Super Skyhawk
ASR 1 Swift Rescue
in store)
AX 1
MP 5 F-50 Maritime Enforcer*
Naval Diving Unit AEW&C 4 G550-AEW
TKR 5: 1 KC-130H Hercules; 4 KC-135R Stratotanker
FORCES BY ROLE
TKR/TPT 4 KC-130B Hercules
SPECIAL FORCES
TPT 9: Medium 5 C-130H Hercules (2 ELINT); PAX 4 F-50
1 SF gp
TRG 31: 12 M-346 Master; 19 PC-21
1 (diving) SF gp
HELICOPTERS
COMBAT SUPPORT
ATK 19 AH-64D Apache
1 EOD gp
ASW 10 S-70B Seahawk
TPT 51: Heavy 16: 6 CH-47D Chinook; 10 CH-47SD Super
Air Force 13,500 (incl 3,000 conscript) D Chinook; Medium 30: 18 AS332M Super Puma (incl 5
5 comds SAR); 12 AS532UL Cougar; Light 5 H120 Colibri (leased)
FORCES BY ROLE UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK ISR 37+: Heavy 8+ Heron 1; Medium 29: 9+ Hermes 450;
1 sqn with F-5S/T Tiger II 20 Searcher MkII
2 sqn with F-15SG Eagle AIR DEFENCE
3 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon (some used for ISR SAM
with pods) Medium-range MIM-23 Hawk
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE Short-range Spyder-SR
1 sqn with S-70B Seahawk Point-defence 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse) (some on
MARITIME PATROL/TRANSPORT V-200/M113); Mistral; RBS-70
1 sqn with F-50 GUNS 34
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL SP 20mm GAI-C01
1 sqn with G550-AEW TOWED 34 20mm GAI-C01; 35mm 34 GDF (with 25
TANKER 1 sqn with KC-135R Stratotanker Super-Fledermaus fire control radar)
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES FRANCE

AAM • IR AIM-9N/P Sidewinder; Python 4 (reported); 200: 1 trg sqn with 12 M-346 Master
IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; SARH AIM-7P Sparrow; ARH
KUWAIT
(AIM-120C5/7 AMRAAM in store in US)
ASM: AGM-65B/G Maverick; AGM-114 Hellfire; AGM- Operation Inherent Resolve 11
154A/C JSOW TAIWAN
AShM AGM-84 Harpoon; AM39 Exocet 3 trg camp (incl inf and arty)
ARM AGM-45 Shrike
BOMBS THAILAND
INS/GPS guided GBU-31 JDAM 1 trg camp (arty, cbt engr)
Laser-guided Paveway II UNITED STATES
Trg units with F-16C/D; 12 F-15SG; AH-64D Apache; 6+
Paramilitary 19,900 active CH-47D Chinook
Civil Defence Force 5,600 (incl conscripts);

500 auxiliaries (total 6,100) FOREIGN FORCES
United States US Pacific Command: 220; 1 naval spt
Singapore Police Force (including Coast facility at Changi naval base; 1 USAF log spt sqn at Paya
Guard) 8,500; 3,500 conscript (total 12,000) Lebar air base
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 102 Sri Lanka LKA
PBF 81: 25 Angler Ray; 2 Atlantic Ray; 1 Marlin; 11
Sailfish; 10 Shark; 32 other Sri Lankan Rupee Rs 2016 2017 2018
PB 21: 19 Amberjack; 2 Manta Ray GDP Rs 11.8tr 13.1tr
US$ 80.5bn 83.6bn
Singapore Gurkha Contingent (under
police) 1,800 per capita US$ 3,789 3,906
FORCES BY ROLE  Growth % 4.4 4.7

Other Def bdgt Rs 293bn 267bn
6 paramilitary coy US$ 1.99bn 1.70bn
FMA (US) US$ 0m 0.4m 0m
Cyber  US$1=Rs 147.04 156.73
The Singapore Ministry of Defence has long identified the
potential damage that could be caused by cyber attacks, Population 22,409,381
with this concern perhaps more acute following its
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
adoption of the Integrated Knowledge-based Command-
and-Control (IKC2) doctrine, designed to aid the transition Male 12.3% 3.7% 3.7% 3.6% 21.4% 4.1%
of Singapore’s armed forces to a ‘third-generation’ force. Female 11.8% 3.6% 3.6% 3.6% 23.0% 5.6%
In March 2017, Singapore’s defence minister announced
the country would establish a new cyber command, the Capabilities
Defence Cyber Organisation, consisting of four formations Since the defeat of the Tamil Tigers, the armed forces
and responsible for overseeing cyber policy, training and have reoriented to a peacetime internal-security role. The
defending military networks. When fully staffed DCO will army is reducing in size and there appears to have been
have 2,600 soldiers. The armed forces announced in mid- little spending on new equipment since the end of the
2017 that a C4 Command would be stood up in November civil war, although Sri Lanka is looking to begin a series
2017. C4 Command comprises a Cyber Defence Group and of procurements to fill key capability gaps. The navy’s
a C4 Operations Group. littoral capability, based on fast-attack and patrol boats,
is being strengthened with the acquisition of offshore-
DEPLOYMENT patrol vessels. Its first Vikram-class OPV entered service
in October 2017. Military support has been provided by
AUSTRALIA China, in an indication of a growing military-to-military
2 trg schools – 1 with 12 AS332 Super Puma/AS532 Cougar relationship. The US has eased its long-standing military-
(flying trg) located at Oakey; 1 with PC-21 (flying trg) trade restrictions on Sri Lanka, and US foreign-military
located at Pearce. Army: prepositioned AFVs and heavy financing is expected to rise over the coming years.
equipment at Shoalwater Bay training area Colombo is developing a national cyber-security centre.
Sri Lanka has little capacity for force projection beyond its
BRUNEI national territory, but has sent small numbers of troops on
1 trg camp with inf units on rotation; 1 hel det with AS332 UN missions. Sri Lanka hosted a multinational maritime-
Super Puma security exercise in 2017.
Asia 301
ACTIVE 243,000 (Army 200,000 Navy 15,000 Air Navy 15,000 (incl 2,400 recalled reservists)
28,000) Paramilitary 62,200 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
RESERVE 5,500 (Army 1,100 Navy 2,400 Air Force PSOH 2: 1 Sayura (IND Vigraha); 1 Sayurala (IND Samarth)
2,000) Paramilitary 30,400 PCG 2 Nandimithra (ISR Sa’ar 4) with 3 single lnchr with
Gabriel II AShM, 1 76mm gun
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE PCO 2: 1 Samadura (ex-US Reliance); 1 Sagara (IND
Vikram) with 1 hel landing platform
PCC 1 Jayesagara
Army 140,000; 60,00 active reservists (recalled)
PBF 79: 26 Colombo; 2 Dvora; 3 Killer (ROK); 6 Shaldag; 10
(total 200,000) Super Dvora MkII/III; 5 Trinity Marine; 27 Wave Rider
Regt are bn sized PB 20: 4 Cheverton; 2 Oshadi (ex-AUS Bay); 2 Prathapa
FORCES BY ROLE (PRC mod Haizhui); 3 Ranajaya (PRC Haizhui); 1 Ranarisi
COMMAND (PRC mod Shanghai II); 5 Weeraya (PRC Shanghai II); 3
7 region HQ (various)
21 div HQ PBR 26
SPECIAL FORCES AMPHIBIOUS
1 indep SF bde LANDING SHIPS • LSM 1 Shakthi (PRC Yuhai)
MANOEUVRE (capacity 2 tanks; 250 troops)
Reconnaissance LANDING CRAFT 8
3 armd recce regt LCM 2
Armoured LCP 3 Hansaya
LCU 2 Yunnan
1 armd bde(-)
Asia
UCAC 1 M 10 (capacity 56 troops)  
Mechanised
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2: 1 AP; 1 AX
1 mech inf bde
Light
Air Force 28,000 (incl SLAF Regt)
55 inf bde
FORCES BY ROLE 
1 cdo bde
FIGHTER
Air Manoeuvre
1 sqn with F-7BS/G; FT-7
1 air mob bde
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 sqn with MiG-23UB Flogger C; MiG-27M Flogger J2
7 arty regt 1 sqn with Kfir C-2/C-7/TC-2
1 MRL regt 1 sqn with K-8 Karakorum*
8 engr regt TRANSPORT
6 sigs regt 1 sqn with An-32B Cline; C-130K Hercules; Cessna 421C
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Golden Eagle
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 1 sqn with Beech B200 King Air; Y-12 (II)
MBT 62 T-55A/T-55AM2 TRAINING
RECCE 15 Saladin 1 wg with PT-6, Cessna 150L
IFV 62: 13 BMP-1; 49 BMP-2 ATTACK HELICOPTER
APC 211+ 1 sqn with Mi-24V Hind E; Mi-35P Hind
APC (T) 30+: some Type-63; 30 Type-85; some Type-89 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
APC (W) 181: 25 BTR-80/BTR-80A; 31 Buffel; 20 Type-92; 1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-171Sh
1 sqn with Bell 206A/B (incl basic trg), Bell 212
105 Unicorn
1 (VIP) sqn with Bell 212; Bell 412 Twin Huey
ISR UAV
ARV 16 VT-55
1 sqn with Blue Horizon II
VLB 2 MT-55
1 sqn with Searcher MkII
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MANOEUVRE
RCL 40: 105mm ε10 M-65; 106mm ε30 M40 Other
GUNS 85mm 8 Type-56 (D-44) 1 (SLAF) sy regt
ARTILLERY 908
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
TOWED 96: 122mm 20; 130mm 30 Type-59-I; 152mm 46 AIRCRAFT 30 combat capable
Type-66 (D-20) FTR 8: 3 F-7BS; 4 F-7GS; 1 FT-7
MRL 122mm 28: 6 KRL-122; 22 RM-70 FGA 15: 4 Kfir C-2; 2 Kfir C-7; 2 Kfir TC-2; 6 MiG-27M
MOR 784: 81mm 520; 82mm 209; 120mm 55 M-43 Flogger J2; 1 MiG-23UB Flogger C (conversion trg)
RADAR • LAND 4 AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder (arty) TPT 21: Medium 2 C-130K Hercules; Light 19: 3 An-32B
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES Cline; 6 Cessna 150L; 1 Cessna 421C Golden Eagle; 7 Y-12
ISR • Medium 1 Seeker (II); 2 Y-12 (IV)
TRG 14: 7 K-8 Karakoram*; 7 PT-6

HELICOPTERS Taiwan (Republic of China) ROC
ATK 11: 6 Mi-24P Hind; 3 Mi-24V Hind E; 2 Mi-35V Hind
New Taiwan Dollar NT$ 2016 2017 2018
MRH 18: 6 Bell 412 Twin Huey (VIP); 2 Bell 412EP (VIP);
10 Mi-17 Hip H GDP NT$ 17.1tr 17.5tr
TPT 16: Medium 4 Mi-171Sh; Light 12: 2 Bell 206A Jet US$ 530 571
Ranger; 2 Bell 206B Jet Ranger; 8 Bell 212 per capita US$ 22,497 24,227
Growth % 1.5 2.0
ISR • Medium 2+: some Blue Horizon II; 2 Searcher MkII
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 27: 40mm 24 L/40; Inflation % 1.4 1.0
94mm 3 (3.7in) Def bdgt NT$ 320bn 319bn 332bn
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES US$ 9.90bn 10.4bn
AAM • IR PL-5E US$1=NT$ 32.33 30.61
Paramilitary ε62,200 Population 23,508,428

Ethnic groups: Taiwanese 84%; mainland Chinese 14%
Home Guard 13,000
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
National Guard ε15,000 Male 6.6% 3.1% 3.5% 3.5% 26.6% 6.3%
Police Force 30,200; 1,000 (women) (total Female 6.2% 2.9% 3.4% 3.4% 27.1% 7.4%
31,200) 30,400 reservists
Capabilities
Ministry of Defence Special Task Force 3,000
Taiwan’s relationship with China and its attempts to
Anti-guerrilla unit
sustain a credible military capability dominate its security
Coast Guard n/k policy. Taiwan published a Quadrennial Defense Review
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE in March 2017, which highlighted the challenge from
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12 Beijing and saw the defence guidelines shift from ‘solid
PCO 1 Suraksha (ex-IND Vikram) with 1 hel landing defence and effective deterrence’ to ‘solid defence and
platform multi-layered deterrence’. The armed forces remain
PBF 8: 1 Dvora; 4 Super Dvora MkI; 3 Killer (ROK) well trained and exercise regularly, but China’s ongoing
PB 2 Simonneau Type-508 military recapitalisation continues to undermine Taiwan’s
PBR 1 historic qualitative military advantage over the PLA. As
a result, procurement efforts have been directed towards
DEPLOYMENT asymmetric and defensive items, such as development
programmes for indigenous anti-ship missiles and land-
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC attack cruise missiles. Despite persistent US refusal to
UN • MINUSCA 116; 5 obs; 1 avn unit sanction the transfer of new combat aircraft, Taiwan has
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO still obtained US assistance to modernise its current fleet
UN • MONUSCO 4 obs of F-16s to F-16V standard. Nevertheless, in 2017 Taipei
announced an interest in the F-35. Due to the lack of
LEBANON potential foreign equipment suppliers, Taiwan has focused
UN • UNIFIL 151; 1 inf coy on modernising its existing holdings, and refocused on
MALI developing its domestic defence-industry capabilities. The
UN • MINUSMA 7 indigenous-submarine programme was officially launched
in 2017, with the aim to locally build eight submarines.
SOUTH SUDAN
Demographic pressure has influenced plans for force
UN • UNMISS 178; 4 obs; 1 fd hospital; 1 hel sqn reductions and a shift towards an all-volunteer force. The
SUDAN current government has announced plans to terminate
UN • UNISFA 2; 5 obs conscription in 2018. (See pp. 235–39.)
WESTERN SAHARA ACTIVE 215,000 (Army 130,000 Navy 40,000 Air
UN • MINURSO 4 obs 45,000) Paramilitary 11,450
Conscript liability (19–40 years) 12 months for those
born before 1993; four months for those born after 1994
(alternative service available)
RESERVE 1,657,000 (Army 1,500,000 Navy 67,000

Air Force 90,000)
Some obligation to age 30
Asia 303
RADAR 1 AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE COASTAL DEFENCE
ARTY 54: 127mm ε50 US Mk32 (reported); 240mm 4
Army ε130,000 (incl ε10,000 MP) M1
FORCES BY ROLE AShM Ching Feng
COMMAND HELICOPTERS
3 corps HQ ATK 96: 67 AH-1W Cobra; 29 AH-64E Apache
5 defence comd HQ MRH 38 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior
SPECIAL FORCES/HELICOPTER
TPT 96: Heavy 8 CH-47SD Super D Chinook; Medium 12
1 SF/hel comd (2 spec ops gp, 2 hel bde)
UH-60M Black Hawk; Light 76 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois)
MANOEUVRE
Armoured TRG 29 TH-67 Creek
4 armd bde UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
Mechanised ISR • Light Mastiff III
3 mech inf bde AIR DEFENCE
Light SAM • Point-defence 76: 74 M1097 Avenger; 2 M48
6 inf bde Chaparral; FIM-92 Stinger
COMBAT SUPPORT GUNS 400
3 arty gp SP 40mm M42
3 engr gp TOWED 20: 35mm 20 GDF-001 (30 systems with 20
3 CBRN gp guns) 40mm L/70
3 sigs gp
COASTAL DEFENCE Navy 40,000
1 AShM bn
3 district; 1 (ASW) HQ located at Hualien; 1 Fleet HQ
Asia
Reserves located at Tsoying; 1 New East Coast Fleet
MANOEUVRE SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 4:
Light 2 Hai Lung with 6 single 533mm TT with SUT HWT/
21 inf bde UGM-84L Harpoon AShM
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 2 Hai Shih† (ex-US Guppy II – trg role) with 10 single
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 533mm TT (6 fwd, 4 aft) with SUT HWT
MBT 565: 200 M60A3; 100 M48A5; 265 M48H Brave Tiger PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 24
LT TK 625 M41/Type-64 (230 M24 Chaffee (90mm gun) CRUISERS • CGHM 4 Keelung (ex-US Kidd) with 1 quad
in store)
lnchr with RGM-84L Harpoon AShM, 2 twin Mk26
IFV 225 CM-25 (M113 with 20–30mm cannon)
lnchr with SM-2MR SAM, 2 triple Mk32 324mm ASTT
APC 1,220
with Mk46 LWT, 2 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 2 127mm
APC (T) 650 M113
APC (W) 570: ε270 CM-32 Yunpao; 300 LAV-150 gun (capacity 1 S-70 ASW hel)
Commando FRIGATES 20
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES FFGHM 19:
AEV 18 M9 8 Cheng Kung with 2 quad lnchr with Hsiung Feng
ARV CM-27/A1; 37 M88A1 II/III AShM, 1 Mk13 GMLS with SM-1MR SAM,
VLB 22 M3; M48A5 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Phalanx
NBC VEHICLES 48+: BIDS; 48 K216A1; KM453 Block 1B CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 S-70C
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE ASW hel)
MSL 5 Chin Yang (ex-US Knox) with 1 octuple Mk16 lnchr
SP TOW with ASROC/RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 2 triple
MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; TOW lnchr with SM-1MR SAM, 2 twin lnchr with SM-
RCL 500+: 90mm M67; 106mm 500+: 500 M40A1; Type-51 1MR SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT,
ARTILLERY 2,200 1 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity
SP 488: 105mm 100 M108; 155mm 318: 225 M109A2/A5;
1 MD-500 hel)
48 M44T; 45 T-69; 203mm 70 M110
6 Kang Ding with 2 quad lnchr with Hsiung Feng
TOWED 1,060+: 105mm 650 T-64 (M101); 155mm 340+:
II AShM, 1 quad lnchr with Sea Chaparral SAM,
90 M59; 250 T-65 (M114); M44; XT-69; 203mm 70 M115
MRL 330: 117mm 120 Kung Feng VI; 126mm 210: 60 Kung 2 Mk32 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1
Feng III/Kung Feng IV; 150 RT 2000 Thunder (KF towed Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1
and SP) S-70C ASW hel)
MOR 322+ FFGH • 1 Chin Yang (ex-US Knox) with 1 octuple
SP 162+: 81mm 72+: M29; 72 M125; 107mm 90 M106A2 Mk112 lnchr with ASROC/RGM-84C Harpoon AShM,
TOWED 81mm 160 M29; T-75; 107mm M30; 120mm 2 twin 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Phalanx Block
K5; XT-86 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 MD-500 hel)
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 43 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

CORVETTES • FSG 1 Tuo Jiang (Hsun Hai) with 4 twin HELICOPTERS
lnchr with Hsiung Feng II AShM, 4 twin lnchr with ASW 20 S-70C Seahawk (S-70C Defender)
Hisung Feng III AShM, 1 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS; 1 MRH 10 MD-500 Defender
76mm gun
PCG 11: Air Force 45,000
1 Jin Chiang with 1 quad lnchr with Hsiung Feng II Flying hours 180 hrs/yr
AShM
4 Jin Chiang with 2 twin lnchr with Hsiung Feng II FORCES BY ROLE
AShM, 1 76mm gun FIGHTER
6 Jin Chiang with 1 quad lnchr with Hsiung Feng III 3 sqn with Mirage 2000-5E/D (2000-5EI/DI)
AShM, 1 76mm gun FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
PCC 1 Jin Chiang (test platform) 3 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II
PBG 31 Kwang Hua with 2 twin lnchr with Hsiung Feng 6 sqn with F-16A/B Fighting Falcon
II AShM 5 sqn with F-CK-1A/B/C/D Ching Kuo
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 10 ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
MHC 6: 4 Yung Feng; 2 Yung Jin (ex-US Osprey) 1 sqn with P-3C Orion
MSO 4 Yung Yang (ex-US Aggressive) ELECTRONIC WARFARE
COMMAND SHIPS • LCC 1 Kao Hsiung 1 sqn with C-130HE Tien Gian
AMPHIBIOUS ISR
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LSD 1 Shiu Hai 1 sqn with RF-5E Tigereye
(ex-US Anchorage) with 2 Phalanx CIWS, 1 hel landing AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
platform (capacity either 2 LCU or 18 LCM; 360 troops) 1 sqn with E-2T Hawkeye
LANDING SHIPS SEARCH & RESCUE
LST 8: 1 sqn with H225; S-70C Black Hawk
6 Chung Hai (capacity 16 tanks; 200 troops) TRANSPORT
2 Chung Ho (ex-US Newport) with 1 Phalanx CIWS , 1 2 sqn with C-130H Hercules
hel landing platform (capacity 3 LCVP, 400 troops) 1 (VIP) sqn with B-727-100; B-737-800; Beech 1900; F-50;
LANDING CRAFT • LCU 12 LCU 1610 (capacity 2 S-70C Black Hawk
M60A3 or 400 troops) (minelaying capability) TRAINING
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 10 1 sqn with AT-3A/B Tzu-Chung*
AGOR 1 Ta Kuan 1 sqn with Beech 1900
AK 1 Wu Kang with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 1 (basic) sqn with T-34C Turbo Mentor
1,400 troops) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AOEH 1 Panshih with 1 quad lnchr with Sea Chaparral AIRCRAFT 481 combat capable
SAM, 2 Phalanx CIWS (capacity 3 med hel) FTR 286: 87 F-5E/F Tiger II (some in store); 144 F-16A/B
AOE 1 Wu Yi with 1 quad lnchr with Sea Chaparral SAM, Fighting Falcon; 9 Mirage 2000-5D (2000-5DI); 46 Mirage
1 hel landing platform 2000-5E (2000-5EI)
ARS 6 FGA 128: 57 F-CK-1A/B Ching Kuo; 71 F-CK-1C/D Ching
Kuo
Marines 10,000 ASW 12 P-3C Orion
FORCES BY ROLE EW 1 C-130HE Tien Gian
MANOEUVRE ISR 7 RF-5E Tigereye
Amphibious AEW&C 6 E-2T Hawkeye
3 mne bde TPT 33: Medium 19 C-130H Hercules; Light 10 Beech
COMBAT SUPPORT 1900; PAX 4: 1 B-737-800; 3 F-50
Some cbt spt unit TRG 97: 55 AT-3A/B Tzu-Chung*; 42 T-34C Turbo Mentor
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS
ARMOURED FIGHITNG VEHICLES TPT • Medium 19: 3 H225; 16 S-70C Black Hawk
AAV 202: 52 AAV-7A1; 150 LVTP-5A1 AIR DEFENCE
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES SAM • Point-defence Antelope
ARV 2 AAVR-7 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
ANIT-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE AAM • IR AIM-9J/P Sidewinder; R-550 Magic 2; Shafrir;
RCL 106mm Sky Sword I; IR/ARH Mica; ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM;
ARTILLERY • TOWED 105mm; 155mm Sky Sword II
ASM AGM-65A Maverick
Naval Aviation AShM AGM-84 Harpoon
FORCES BY ROLE ARM Sky Sword IIA
ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE LACM Conventional Wan Chien
2 sqn with S-70C Seahawk (S-70C Defender) BOMBS • Laser-guided Paveway II
1 sqn with MD-500 Defender
Asia 305
Air Defence and Missile Command

FORCES BY ROLE
Thailand THA
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE Thai Baht b 2016 2017 2018
3 SSM bty with Hsiung Feng IIE GDP b 14.4tr 15.2tr
AIR DEFENCE US$ 407bn 438bn
2 AD/SAM gp (total: 13 bty with MIM-23 HAWK; per capita US$ 5,902 6,336
4 bty with MIM-104F Patriot PAC-3; 6 bty with Tien
Growth % 3.2 3.7
Kung I Sky Bow/Tien Kung II Sky Bow)
Inflation % 0.2 0.6
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Def bdgt b 205bn 214bn 222bn
US$ 5.82bn 6.16bn
GLCM • Conventional ε12 Hsiung Feng IIE
US$1=b 35.29 34.65
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Medium-range 600+: 100 MIM-
23 HAWK; ε500 Tien Kung I Sky Bow/Tien Kung II Sky Bow Population 68,414,135
MISSILE DEFENCE • Medium-range 24+ MIM-104F Ethnic and religious groups: Thai 75%; Chinese 14%; Muslim 4%
Patriot PAC-3
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Paramilitary 11,450 Male 8.7% 3.4% 3.8% 3.7% 24.8% 4.7%
Female 8.3% 3.2% 3.7% 3.6% 26.2% 5.9%
Coast Guard 11,450
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 161 Thailand has large, well-funded armed forces. In particular,
PSOH 4: 2 Tainan; 2 Yilan its air force is one of the best equipped and trained in
Asia
PSO 6: 4 Miaoli with 1 hel landing platform; 2 Ho Hsing Southeast Asia: the introduction into service of Gripen
PCO 13: 2 Kinmen; 2 Mou Hsing; 3 Shun Hu 7; 4 combat aircraft and Saab 340 airborne early-warning
Taichung; 2 Taipei platforms has boosted the effectiveness of Thailand’s
airpower. However, despite the fact that they have benefited
PBF ε56 (various)
from substantially increased budgets during the present
PB 82: 1 Shun Hu 6; ε81 (various)
decade and from engagement in bilateral and multinational
exercises with regional partners and the US, the armed
Directorate General (Customs)
forces remain army-dominated. In early 2017, the armed
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE forces approved a ten-year modernisation programme
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 9 called ‘Vision 2026’, which is understood to include
PCO 1 Yun Hsing plans for restructuring and increased defence spending.
PB 8: 4 Hai Cheng; 4 Hai Ying The armed forces’ involvement in domestic politics has
often overshadowed efforts to sustain and modernise
Cyber operational capability. The May 2014 coup again brought
the armed forces into a central political role, undermining
Although Taiwan has a highly developed civilian IT sector,
Thailand’s defence relations with the US, which reduced its
the Taiwanese government has been relatively slow to
participation in the annual exercise Cobra Gold in 2015 and
exploit this advantage for national-defence purposes. But 2016. However, defence relations with Beijing have warmed
for the past decade, Taipei has worked on its Po Sheng and, in 2017, Thailand signed a contract for the acquisition
– Broad Victory – C4ISR programme, an all-hazards- of a first Chinese S26T submarine.
defence system with a significant defence component. The
main focus of the military component of this programme
is countering PLA IW and EW attacks. The authorities
Conscription liability 2 years
responsible for cyber activity include the National Security
Bureau (NSB), the defence ministry, and the Research, RESERVE 200,000 Paramilitary 45,000
Development and Evaluation Commission (RDEC). In 2015
a Defence Policy Paper recommended that an independent ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
fourth service branch combining cyber and electronic-
warfare capabilities should be established. The Information Army 130,000; ε115,000 conscript (total 245,000)
and Electronic Warfare Command was established in mid- FORCES BY ROLE
2017 and is responsible for coordinating cyber defence and COMMAND
directing R&D efforts in cyber and EW. 4 (regional) army HQ
3 corps HQ
SPECIAL FORCES
FOREIGN FORCES 1 SF div
Singapore 3 trg camp (incl inf and arty) 1 SF regt
MANOEUVRE TPT 210: Heavy 5 CH-47D Chinook; Medium 12: 9 UH-

Armoured 60L Black Hawk; 3 UH-60M Black Hawk; Light 193: 93 Bell
3 cav div (1 recce bn; 3 tk regt (3 tk bn); 1 indep tk bn; 1 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 27 Bell 206 Jet Ranger; 52 Bell 212
sigs bn; 1 maint bn; 1 hel sqn) (AB-212); 16 Enstrom 480B; 5 UH-72A Lakota
Mechanised TRG 53 Hughes 300C
1 mech inf div (1 recce coy; 1 recce sqn; 1 tk bn; 1 inf UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
regt (4 inf bn); 3 inf regt; 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn) ISR • Medium Searcher; Searcher II
Light AIR DEFENCE
8 inf div (1 recce sqn; 3 inf regt (3 inf bn); 1 engr bn; 1 SAM
sigs bn) Short-range Aspide
COMBAT SUPPORT Point-defence 8+: 8 Starstreak; 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24
1 arty div Grinch)
1 engr div GUNS 184
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT SP 54: 20mm 24 M163 Vulcan; 40mm 30 M1/M42 SP
4 economic development div TOWED 130: 20mm 24 M167 Vulcan; 37mm 52 Type-
HELICOPTER 74; 40mm 48 L/70; 57mm ε6 Type-59 (S-60) (18+ more
Some hel flt non-operational)
AIR DEFENCE
1 ADA div (6 bn) Reserves
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLE COMMAND
MBT 318: 53 M60A1; 125 M60A3; (50 Type-69 in store); 1 inf div HQ
105 M48A5; 25 T-84 Oplot; 10 VT-4
LT TK 194: 24 M41; 104 Scorpion (50 in store); 66 Stingray Navy 44,000 (incl Naval Aviation, Marines,
RECCE 32 S52 Shorland Coastal Defence); 25,850 conscript (total
IFV 168 BTR-3E1 69,850)
APC 1,140
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
APC (T) 880: Bronco; 430 M113A1/A3; 450 Type-85
APC (W) 160: 9 BTR-3K (CP); 6 BTR-3C (amb); 18
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CVH 1:
Condor; 142 LAV-150 Commando
1 Chakri Naruebet with 2 sextuple Sadral lnchr with
PPV 100 REVA
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES Mistral SAM (capacity 6 S-70B Seahawk ASW hel)
ARV 56: 13 BTR-3BR; 22 M88A1; 6 M88A2; 10 M113; 5 FRIGATES 8
Type-653; WZT-4 FFGHM 2:
VLB Type-84 2 Naresuan with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM-84A
MW Bozena; Giant Viper Harpoon AShM, 1 8 cell Mk41 VLS with RIM-7M
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 triple Mk32 324mm TT, 1
MSL 127mm gun (capacity 1 Super Lynx 300 hel)
SP 30+: 18+ M901A5 (TOW); 12 BTR-3RK FFGM 4:
MANPATS M47 Dragon 2 Chao Phraya (trg role) with 4 twin lnchr with
RCL 180: 75mm 30 M20; 106mm 150 M40 C-802A AShM, 2 twin lnchr with HHQ-61 (CH-
ARTILLERY 2,643 SA-N-2) SAM (non-operational), 2 RBU 1200 A/S
SP 155mm 32: 6 ATMOS-2000; 6 CAESAR; 20 M109A5 mor, 2 twin 100mm gun
TOWED 617: 105mm 340: 24 LG1 MkII; 12 M-56; 200 2 Kraburi with 4 twin lnchr with C-802A AShM,
M101/M425; 12 M102; 32 M618A2; 60 L119 Light Gun; 2 twin lnchr with HHQ-61 (CH-SA-N-2) SAM,
155mm 277: 90 GHN-45 A1; 48 M114; 118 M198; 21 M-71 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 twin 100mm gun, 1 hel
MRL 68: 122mm 4 SR-4; 130mm 60 PHZ-85; 302mm 4: 1 landing platform
DTI-1 (WS-1B); 3 DTI-1G (WS-32) FF 2:
MOR 1,926+: SP 81mm 39: 18 BTR-3M1; 21 M125A3; SP 1 Makut Rajakumarn with 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 2
107mm M106A3; SP 120mm 20: 8 BTR-3M2; 12 M1064A3; 114mm gun
1,867 81mm/107mm/120mm 1 Pin Klao (ex-US Cannon) (trg role) with 6 single
RADAR • LAND AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder (arty, mor); RASIT 324mm ASTT, 3 76mm gun
(veh, arty) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 95
AIRCRAFT CORVETTES 7
TPT • Light 20: 2 Beech 200 King Air; 2 Beech 1900C; 1 FSGM 2 Rattanakosin with 2 twin Mk140 lnchr with
C-212 Aviocar; 1 C295W; 10 Cessna A185E (U-17B); 2 ERJ- RGM-84A Harpoon AShM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr
135LR; 2 Jetstream 41 with Aspide SAM, 2 triple Mk32 324mm ASTT with
TRG 33: 11 MX-7-235 Star Rocket; 22 T-41B Mescalero Stingray LWT, 1 76mm gun
HELICOPTERS FS 5:
ATK 7 AH-1F Cobra 3 Khamronsin with 2 triple 324mm ASTT with
MRH 15: 8 AS550 Fennec; 2 AW139; 5 Mi-17V-5 Hip H Stingray LWT, 1 76mm gun
Asia 307
2 Tapi with 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 Marines 23,000
76mm gun FORCES BY ROLE
PSO 1 Krabi (UK River mod) with 1 76mm gun COMMAND
PCFG 6: 1 mne div HQ
3 Prabparapak with 2 single lnchr with Gabriel I AShM, 1 MANOEUVRE
triple lnchr with Gabriel I AShM, 1 57mm gun Reconnaissance
3 Ratcharit with 2 twin lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, 1 recce bn
1 76mm gun Light
PCOH 2 Pattani (1 in trg role) with 1 76mm gun 2 inf regt (total: 6 bn)
PCO 4: 3 Hua Hin with 1 76mm gun; 1 M58 Patrol Gun Amphibious
Boat with 1 76mm gun 1 amph aslt bn
PCC 9: 3 Chon Buri with 2 76mm gun; 6 Sattahip with 1 COMBAT SUPPORT
76mm gun 1 arty regt (3 fd arty bn, 1 ADA bn)
PBF 4 M18 Fast Assault Craft (capacity 18 troops) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PB 62: 7 T-11; 4 Swift; 3 T-81; 9 T-91; 3 M36 Patrol Boat; ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
3 T-210; 13 T-213; 1 T-227; 13 M21 Patrol Boat; 3 T-991; IFV 14 BTR-3E1
3 T-994 APC (W) 24 LAV-150 Commando
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 17 AAV 33 LVTP-7
MCCS 1 Thalang ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
MCO 2 Lat Ya ARV 1 AAVR-7
MCC 2 Bang Rachan ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL
MSR 12: 7 T1; 5 T6 SP 10 M1045A2 HMMWV with TOW
AMPHIBIOUS MANPATS M47 Dragon; TOW
Asia
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 1 ARTILLERY • TOWED 48: 105mm 36 (reported);
LPD 1 Anthong (SGP Endurance) with 1 76mm gun 155mm 12 GC-45
(capacity 2 hel; 19 MBT; 500 troops) AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 12.7mm 14
LANDING SHIPS 2
LST 2 Sichang with 2 hel landing platform (capacity 14 Naval Special Warfare Command
MBT; 300 troops)
LANDING CRAFT 14 Air Force ε46,000
LCU 9: 3 Man Nok; 2 Mataphun (capacity either 3–4 4 air divs, one flying trg school
MBT or 250 troops); 4 Thong Kaeo Flying hours 100 hrs/yr
LCM 2
FORCES BY ROLE
UCAC 3 Griffon 1000TD
FIGHTER
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 13 
2 sqn with F-5E/5F Tiger II
ABU 1 Suriya
3 sqn with F-16A/B Fighting Falcon
AGOR 1 Sok FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
AGS 2 1 sqn with Gripen C/D
AOL 6: 1 Matra with 1 hel landing platform; 3 Proet; 1 GROUND ATTACK
Prong; 1 Samui 1 sqn with Alpha Jet*  
AOR 1 Chula 1 sqn with AU-23A Peacemaker
AORH 1 Similan (capacity 1 hel) 1 sqn with L-39ZA Albatros*
AWT 1 ELINT/ISR
1 sqn with DA42 MPP Guardian
Naval Aviation 1,200 AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 sqn with Saab 340B; Saab 340 Erieye
AIRCRAFT 3 combat capable TRANSPORT
ASW 2 P-3A Orion (P-3T) 1 (Royal Flight) sqn with A319CJ; A340-500; B-737-800
ISR 9 Sentry O-2-337 1 sqn with ATR-72; BAe-748
MP 1 F-27-200 MPA* 1 sqn with BT-67
TPT • Light 15: 7 Do-228-212; 2 ERJ-135LR; 2 F-27-400M 1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 Hercules
Troopship; 3 N-24A Searchmaster; 1 UP-3A Orion (UP-3T) TRAINING
HELICOPTERS 1 sqn with L-39ZA Albatros*
ASW 8: 6 S-70B Seahawk; 2 Super Lynx 300 1 sqn with CT-4A/B Airtrainer; T-41D Mescalero
MRH 2 MH-60S Knight Hawk 1 sqn with CT-4E Airtrainer
TPT 15: Medium 2 Bell 214ST (AB-214ST); Light 13: 6 1 sqn with PC-9
Bell 212 (AB-212); 2 H145M; 5 S-76B TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AShM AGM-84 1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois)
Harpoon 1 sqn with Bell 412 Twin Huey; S-92A
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Thahan Phran (Hunter Soldiers) 21,000

AIRCRAFT 149 combat capable Volunteer irregular force
FTR 78: 1 F-5B Freedom Fighter; 21 F-5E Tiger II; 3 F-5F FORCES BY ROLE 
Tiger II (F-5E/F being upgraded); 38 F-16A Fighting MANOEUVRE
Falcon; 15 F-16B Fighting Falcon Other
FGA 11: 7 Gripen C; 4 Gripen D 22 paramilitary regt (total: 275 paramilitary coy)
ATK 17 AU-23A Peacemaker
ISR 5 DA42 MPP Guardian
DEPLOYMENT
AEW&C 2 Saab 340 Erieye
ELINT 2 Saab 340 Erieye (COMINT/ELINT) INDIA/PAKISTAN
TPT 43: Medium 14: 6 C-130H Hercules; 6 C-130H-30 UN • UNMOGIP 4 obs
Hercules; 2 Saab 340B; Light 21: 3 ATR-72; 3 Beech 200
SUDAN
King Air; 8 BT-67; 1 Commander 690; 6 DA42M; PAX 8:
UN • UNAMID 10; 4 obs
1 A319CJ; 1 A320CJ; 1 A340-500; 1 B-737-800; 2 SSJ-100-
95LR (1 A310-324 in store)
TRG 110: 16 Alpha Jet*; 13 CT-4A Airtrainer; 6 CT-4B FOREIGN FORCES
Airtrainer; 20 CT-4E Airtrainer; 27 L-39ZA Albatros*; 21 United States US Pacific Command: 300
PC-9; 7 T-41D Mescalero
HELICOPTERS Timor-Leste TLS
MRH 11: 2 Bell 412 Twin Huey; 2 Bell 412SP Twin Huey; 1
Bell 412HP Twin Huey; 6 Bell 412EP Twin Huey US$ 2016 2017 2018
CSAR 4 H225M Super Cougar GDP US$ 2.70bn 2.72bn
TPT 20: Medium 3 S-92A Super Hawk; Light 17 Bell 205 per capita US$ 2,230 2,190
(UH-1H Iroquois)
Growth % 5.0 4.0
AAM • IR AIM-9P/S Sidewinder; Python 3; ARH AIM-120
AMRAAM Def bdgt US$ 26m 25m
ASM AGM-65 Maverick Population 1,291,358
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Paramilitary ε93,700 Male 21.0% 5.8% 4.5% 3.7% 13.2% 1.8%
Female 19.8% 5.5% 4.5% 3.9% 14.1% 2.0%
Border Patrol Police 20,000
Capabilities
Marine Police 2,200
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE The Timor-Leste Defence Force (F-FDTL) has been affect-
ed by funding, personnel and morale challenges since it
was established in 2001. It is responsible for external de-
PCO 1 Srinakrin
fence, but the parallel internal-security role has sometimes
PCC 2 Hameln
brought it into conflict with the national police force. The
PB 44: 2 Chasanyabadee; 3 Cutlass; 2 Ratayapibanbancha F-FDTL has been reconstituted with outside help, mainly
(Reef Ranger); 1 Sriyanont; 36 (various) from Australia and Portugal, but is still a long way from
PBR 46 meeting the force-structure goals set out in the Force 2020
plan published in 2007. The origins of the F-FDTL in the
National Security Volunteer Corps 45,000 – Falintil national resistance force and continued training
Reserves and doctrinal emphasis on low-intensity infantry tactics
mean that the force provides a deterrent to invasion. In
Police Aviation 500
2014 and 2016, Australia offered to boost the F-FDTL na-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE val component’s capability by providing ‘a complete pa-
AIRCRAFT 6 combat capable trol boat capability’, though this offer was not taken up.
ATK 6 AU-23A Peacemaker Australian forces still support F-FDTL force development,
TPT 16: Light 15: 2 CN235; 8 PC-6 Turbo-Porter; 3 SC-7 including by support to exercises.
3M Skyvan; 2 Short 330UTT; PAX 1 F-50
HELICOPTERS ACTIVE 1,330 (Army 1,250 Naval Element 80)
MRH 12: 6 Bell 412 Twin Huey; 6 Bell 429
TPT • Light 61: 27 Bell 205A; 14 Bell 206 Jet Ranger; 20 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Bell 212 (AB-212)
Army 1,250
Provincial Police 50,000 (incl ε500 Special Training began in January 2001 with the aim of deploying
Action Force) 1,500 full-time personnel and 1,500 reservists. Authorities
Asia 309
are engaged in developing security structures with on both sides have meant that US–Vietnam defence rela-
international assistance tions have been slow to develop, although the ‘joint vision
FORCES BY ROLE statement’ of June 2015 declared the intent to expand de-
MANOEUVRE fence trade and to strengthen maritime-security collabor
Light ation.
2 inf bn ACTIVE 482,000 (Army 412,000 Navy 40,000 Air
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 MP pl Conscript liability 2 years army and air defence, 3 years air
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT force and navy, specialists 3 years, some ethnic minorities
1 log spt coy 2 years
Naval Element 80 RESERVES Paramilitary 5,000,000
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
PB 7: 2 Albatros; 2 Dili (ex-ROK); 2 Shanghai II; 1
Kamenassa (ex-ROK Chamsuri)
Space
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Vietnam VNM SATELLITES • ISR 1 VNREDSat
Vietnamese Dong d 2016 2017 2018 Army ε412,000

GDP d 4,503tr 4,965tr 8 Mil Regions (incl capital)
US$ 201bn 216bn FORCES BY ROLE
per capita US$ 2,172 2,306 COMMAND
Asia
Growth % 6.2 6.3 4 corps HQ
SPECIAL FORCES
Inflation % 2.7 4.4
1 SF bde (1 AB bde, 1 demolition engr regt)
Def bdgt d ε91.1tr ε99.3tr MANOEUVRE
US$ ε4.07bn ε4.32bn Armoured
FMA (US) US$ 12m 10m 0m 6 armd bde
US$1=d 22,367.27 22,991.82 3 armd regt
Mechanised
Population 96,160,163 2 mech inf div 
Ethnic groups: Kinh 85.7%; Tay 1.9%; Thai 1.8%; Khome 1.4%; Light
Hmong 1.3%; other or unspecified 7.1% 23 inf div
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
1 SRBM bde
Male 12.4% 4.0% 4.4% 4.8% 21.1% 2.4% COMBAT SUPPORT 
Female 11.2% 3.7% 4.1% 4.5% 22.6% 3.7% 13 arty bde
1 arty regt
Capabilities 10 engr bde
1 engr regt
Vietnam has a stronger military tradition and its armed 1 EW unit
forces have more operational experience than any of its 3 sigs bde
Southeast Asian neighbours. Its defence efforts and con- 2 sigs regt
script-based armed forces also benefit from broad popu- COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
lar support, particularly in the context of current tensions 9 economic construction div
with China over conflicting claims in the South China Sea. 1 log regt
With rapid economic growth over the last decade, de- 1 med unit
fence spending has increased and particular efforts have 1 trg regt
been made to re-equip the navy and air force, mainly with AIR DEFENCE
a view to deterring Chinese military pressure in the dis- 11 AD bde
puted Spratly Islands. While Hanoi cannot hope to balance
China’s power on its own, the recent development of a sub- Reserve
marine capability, based on six improved Kilo-class boats, MANOEUVRE
and the procurement of additional Su-30MK2 combat air- Light
craft and new air-defence capabilities would complicate 9 inf div
Beijing’s military options. Improved relations with India, EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Japan and Russia are a stated priority for Vietnam, which ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
has signed a series of cooperation agreements with these MBT 1,270: 70 T-62; 350 Type-59; 850 T-54/T-55 (45 T-34†
countries. However, residual sensitivities and restrictions in store)
LT TK 620: 300 PT-76; 320 Type-62/Type-63 PCFGM 12:

RECCE 100 BRDM-1/BRDM-2 4 Tarantul (FSU) with 2 twin lnchr with P-15 Termit (SS-
IFV 300 BMP-1/BMP-2 N-2D Styx) AShM, 1 quad lnchr with 9K32 Strela-2M
APC 1,380+ (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM (manually operated), 2 AK630
APC (T) 280+: Some BTR-50; 200 M113 (to be CIWS, 1 76mm gun 
upgraded); 80 Type-63   8 Tarantul V with 4 quad lnchr with 3M24E Uran-E
APC (W) 1,100 BTR-40/BTR-60/BTR-152 (SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM; 1 quad lnchr with 9K32
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Strela-2M (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM (manually operated),
MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger) 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
RCL 75mm Type-56; 82mm Type-65 (B-10); 87mm Type- PCO 5: 1 Project FC264; 4 TT-400TP with 2 AK630 CIWS,
51 1 76mm gun
GUNS PCC 6 Svetlyak with 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
PBFG 8 Osa II with 4 single lnchr with P-15 Termit AShM
SP 100mm SU-100; 122mm SU-122
PBFT 2 Shershen† (FSU) with 4 single 533mm TT
TOWED 100mm T-12 (arty); M-1944
PH 2 Turya† with 1 twin 57mm gun
ARTILLERY 3,040+
PHT 3 Turya† with 4 single 533mm TT, 1 twin 57mm gun
SP 30+: 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 30 2S3 Akatsiya;
PB 20: 14 Zhuk†; 4 Zhuk (mod); 2 TP-01
175mm M107
PBR 4 Stolkraft
TOWED 2,300: 105mm M101/M102; 122mm D-30/Type-
54 (M-1938)/Type-60 (D-74); 130mm M-46; 152mm D-20; MSO 2 Yurka
155mm M114 MSC 4 Sonya
MRL 710+: 107mm 360 Type-63; 122mm 350 BM-21 Grad; MHI 2 Korund (Yevgenya) (Project 1258)
140mm BM-14 MSR 5 K-8  
MOR 82mm; 120mm M-1943; 160mm M-1943 AMPHIBIOUS
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS LANDING SHIPS 7
SRBM • Coventional Scud-B/C LSM 5:
AIR DEFENCE 1 Polnochny A (capacity 6 Lt Tk/APC; 200 troops)
SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K310 2 Polnochny B (capacity 6 Lt Tk/APC; 200 troops)
Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse) 2 Nau Dinh
GUNS 12,000 LST 2 Tran Khanh Du (ex-US LST 542) with 1 hel
SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 landing platform (capacity 16 Lt Tk/APC; 140 troops)
TOWED 14.5mm/30mm/37mm/57mm/85mm/100mm LANDING CRAFT • LCM 12
8 LCM 6 (capacity 1 Lt Tk or 80 troops)
Navy ε40,000 (incl ε27,000 Naval Infantry) 4 LCM 8 (capacity 1 MBT or 200 troops)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 27
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL 8 AFD 2
AGS 1 Tran Dai Nia (Damen Research Vessel 6613)
SSK 6 Hanoi (RUS Varshavyanka) with 6 533mm TT with
AGSH 1
53-65KE HWT/TEST-71ME HWT/3M54E Klub (SS-N-27B
AKSL 18
Sizzler) AShM
AP 1 Truong Sa
SSI 2 Yugo (DPRK)
AT 2
AWT 1
FRIGATES • FFGM 2
AXS 1 Le Quy Don
2 Dinh Tien Hoang (RUS Gepard 3.9) with 2 quad lnchr COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 4K44 Redut (SSC-1B Sepal);
with 3M24E Uran-E (SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 1 4K51 Rubezh (SS-C-3 Styx); K-300P Bastion-P (SSC-5 Stooge)
Palma lnchr with Sosna-R SAM, 1 RBU 6000 Smerch 2
A/S mor, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing Naval Infantry ε27,000
platform EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 68 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
CORVETTES 6: LT TK PT-76; Type-63
FSGM 1 BPS-500 with 2 quad lnchr with 3M24E APC • APC (W) BTR-60
Uran-E (SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 9K32 Strela-2M ARTILLERY • MRL 306mm EXTRA
(SA-N-5 Grail) SAM (manually operated), 2 twin
533mm TT, 1 RBU-1600 A/S mor, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 Navy Air Wing
76mm gun FORCES BY ROLE
FS 5: ASW/SAR
3 Petya II (FSU) with 1 quintuple 406mm ASTT, 4 1 regt with H225; Ka-28 (Ka-27PL) Helix A; Ka-32
RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm gun Helix C
2 Petya III (FSU) with 1 triple 533mm ASTT with SET- EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
53ME HWT, 4 RBU 2500 Smerch 1 A/S mor, 2 twin AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 6 DHC-6-400 Twin Otter
76mm gun HELICOPTERS
Asia 311
ASW 10 Ka-28 Helix A AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

TPT • Medium 4: 2 H225; 2 Ka-32 Helix C AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡; R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73
(AA-11 Archer); IR/SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo); ARH
Air Force 30,000 R-77 (AA-12 Adder)
3 air div, 1 tpt bde ASM Kh-29L/T (AS-14 Kedge); Kh-31A (AS-17B Krypton);
FORCES BY ROLE Kh-59M (AS-18 Kazoo)
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK ARM Kh-28 (AS-9 Kyle); Kh-31P (AS-17A Krypton)
1 regt with Su-22M3/M4/UM Fitter (some ISR)
1 regt with Su-27SK/Su-27UBK Flanker Paramilitary 40,000+ active
1 regt with Su-27SK/Su-27UBK Flanker; Su-30MK2
1 regt with Su-30MK2
Border Defence Corps ε40,000
TRANSPORT Coast Guard
2 regt with An-2 Colt; An-26 Curl; Bell 205 (UH-1H
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Iroquois); Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; M-28 Bryza
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 69+
TRAINING
PSO 4 DN2000 (Damen 9014)
1 regt with L-39 Albatros
PCO 13+: 1 Mazinger (ex-ROK); 9 TT-400; 3+ other
1 regt with Yak-52
PBF 24: 22 MS-50S; 2 Shershen
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
PB 28: 2 Hae Uri (ex-ROK); 1 MS-50; 12 TT-200; 13 TT-
2 regt with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-171; Mi-24 Hind
120
AIR DEFENCE
4 ADA bde
AFS 1
Some (People’s Regional) force (total: ε1,000 AD unit, 6
ATF 4 Damen Salvage Tug
radar bde with 100 radar stn)
AIRCRAFT • MP 3 C-212-400 MPA
Asia
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 74 combat capable Fisheries Surveillance Force
FGA 74: 28 Su-22M3/M4/UM Fitter (some ISR); 6 Su- EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
27SK Flanker; 5 Su-27UBK Flanker; 35 Su-30MK2 Flanker PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 32
TPT • Light 23: 6 An-2 Colt; 12 An-26 Curl; 3 C-295M; 1 PSO 3 DN2000 (Damen 9014)
M-28 Bryza PCO 2: 1 Hayato (ex-JPN); 1 Yuhzan Maru (ex-JPN)
TRG 47: 17 L-39 Albatros; 30 Yak-52 PB ε27
HELICOPTERS
ATK 26 Mi-24 Hind Local Forces ε5,000,000 reservists
MRH 6 Mi-17 Hip H Incl People’s Self-Defence Force (urban units) and
TPT 28: Medium 17: 14 Mi-8 Hip; 3 Mi-171; Light 11 Bell People’s Militia (rural units); comprises static and mobile
205 (UH-1H Iroquois) cbt units, log spt and village protection pl; some arty,
AIR DEFENCE mor and AD guns; acts as reserve
SAM 12+:
Long-range 12 S-300PMU1 (SA-20 Gargoyle)
Medium-range S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline); S-125- DEPLOYMENT
2TM Pechora (SA-26), Spyder-MR CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Short-range 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful);
UN • MINUSCA 4; 1 obs
Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K310 Igla-1
(SA-16 Gimlet) SOUTH SUDAN
GUNS 37mm; 57mm; 85mm; 100mm; 130mm UN • UNMISS 2 obs
Arms procurements and deliveries – Asia

Australia issued a tender to three shortlisted Taiwan launched its Indigenous Defense
shipyards to provide final designs for its Future Submarine programme. Taiwan plans to design
Frigate programme. The three yards and designs and build eight boats with the first entering service
were: in 2027.
(ESP) Navantia – F100 mod
(ITA) Fincantieri – FREMM Malaysian company Boustead and Germany’s
(UK) BAE Systems – Type-26 Rheinmetall formed a joint venture called BHIC
Defence Technologies. The company will offer
project management and other services to the
China launched the first Type-055 cruiser. A Malaysian defence industry. This is Rheinmetall’s
total of four are currently under construction second joint venture with Boustead.
at two shipyards. China also launched its first
indigenously built aircraft carrier. India reportedly issued a request for information
(RFI) for six locally built conventionally powered
submarines for its Project 75(I) programme. An
China announced that the J-20 twin-engined
RFI was first issued for this programme in 2010.
fighter has entered service with the People’s
However, at that time, it was envisaged that two of
Liberation Army Air Force. Chinese company
the boats would be built abroad.
Chengdu Aerospace Corporation had been
working on designs for an aircraft of this type since
Malaysia’s Multi-Role Combat Aircraft programme
the 1990s.
to acquire a new fighter aircraft has reportedly
been suspended as the country looks to
South Korea fast-tracked a number of naval-vessel prioritise the acquisition of airborne intelligence,
orders to assist its shipbuilding industry. The sector surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities
has suffered a downturn in recent years. instead.
Figure 15 Asia: selected ongoing or completed procurement priorities in 2017
Australasia
14 South Asia
Southeast Asia – Peninsular and Archipelagic
12 Southeast Asia – Continental
Number of Countries
East Asia
10
Purchasing
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Asia 313
Table 12 Asia: ongoing submarine procurements

Country Class Type Quantity Value Shipyard(s) First First of class Notes
order entered/
date planned to
enter service
Australia Shortfin SSK 12 εUS$37.4bn (FRA) Naval Group 2016 Early 2030s Design contract
Barracuda (total (formerly DCNS)
lifetime (AUS) ASC
costs)
China Shang II (Type- SSN 4 n.k. (PRC) BSHIC n.k. n.k. Four boats built.
093A) Operational status
unclear
Yuan I/II (Type- SSK ε16 n.k. (PRC) WSIC n.k. 2006
039A/B) (PRC) Jiangnan
Shipyard
India Arihant SSBN ε3 εUS$4.96bn (IND) DRDO n.k. n.k. First of class in trials.
(IND) Visakhapatnam Status unclear
Dockyard
Kalvari SSK 6 US$2.94bn (FRA) Naval Group 2005 2017/18
(Scorpene) (IND) Mazagon Dock
Limited
Indonesia Nagapasa SSK 3 US$1.1bn (ROK) DSME 2012 2017 Third boat to be
(Type- (IDN) PT PAL built in Indonesia
209/1400)
Asia
Japan Soryu SSK 13 US$7.37bn (JPN) MHI 2004 2009
(JPN) KHI
Korea, KSS-III SSG 3 US$2.06bn (ROK) DSME 2012 2020
Republic of (ROK) HHI
Son Won-il SSK 9 εUS$4.5bn (ROK) DSME 2000 2007
(Type-214) (ROK) HHI
Pakistan S20 (Type-039 SSK 8 n.k. (PRC) CSIC 2015 2022 Four to be built in
mod) (PAK) KSEW Pakistan
Singapore Type-218SG SSK 4 n.k. (GER) TKMS 2013 2020 Two more ordered
in 2017
Taiwan Indigenous SSK t.b.d. n.k. (ROC) CSBC 2017 2027 Development
Defense contract
Submarine
Thailand S26T (Type-039 SSK 1 US$386.27m (PRC) CSIC 2017 2023
mod)
Table 13 Japan FY2018 defence-budget request: top ten equipment-procurement programmes

by value
Equipment Type Quantity Value (JPY) Value (US$) Prime Contractor(s)
3,900t Escort Vessel with MCM FFGHM 2 96.4bn 865.31m (JPN) MHI & MES
capability
F-35A Lightning II FGA ac 6 88.1bn 790.81m (USA) Lockheed Martin
(JPN) MHI
X-Band Comms Satellite Comms Satellite 1 73bn 655.27m (JPN) DSN Corporation
Soryu class SSK 1 71.5bn 589.74m (JPN) KHI & MHI
SM-3 Block IIA & SM-3 Block IB Ship-launched SAM n.k. 65.7bn 589.74m (USA) Raytheon
E-2D Hawkeye AEW&C ac 2 49.1bn 440.73m (USA) Northrop Grumman
V-22 Osprey Tilt-rotor ac 4 45.7bn 410.21m (USA) Bell Helicopter
(USA) Boeing
C-2 Hy Tpt ac 2 45bn 403.93m (JPN) KHI
KC-46A Pegasus Tkr ac 1 27.7bn 248.64m (USA) Boeing
Patriot PAC-3MSE Long-range SAM n.k. 20.5bn 184.01m (USA) Lockheed Martin
Figure 16 Australia: AWD Alliance Hobart-class Air Warfare Destroyer
surface-naval-vessel design to a foreign shipyard before

and the buyer, ASC, had never built a complex warship
before. The design was still being modified by ASC and
Navantia after the first of class had been laid down.
Australian shipbuilding productivity has been lower
than anticipated and errors in the construction of vessel
blocks have resulted in higher costs. However, some risk
was avoided by acquiring the long-serving and proven
The Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) project is the second- US Aegis combat system. Development and upgrades of
largest procurement programme the Australian defence this system will be largely paid for by the United States
department has ever conducted and also one of the itself which Australia can then buy into. With other very
most complex. It has involved the modification of an large naval shipbuilding programmes about to begin,
acquired design with construction distributed among recommendations have been made in government audit
several companies. A 2014 national audit report on the reports, such as involving industry more in the design
programme stated that risks in design and construction stage to mitigate risks. Despite the delays, the Hobart class
were underestimated. For example, the report said the is likely to be one of the most capable naval vessels in the
designer, Spanish company Navantia, had never sold a region into the near future.
Timeline Original planned 2012 Revised planned 2015 Revised planned

delivery dates: delivery dates: delivery dates:
Ship 1: Dec 2014 Ship 1: Mar 2016 Ship 1: Jun 2017
Ship 2: Mar 2015 Ship 2: Sep 2017 Ship 2: Sep 2018
Ship 3: Jun 2017 Ship 3: Mar 2019 Ship 3: Mar 2020
Planned
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Actual
2000: Australian 2004: Aegis selected as Oct 2007: Jun 2017: Sep 2017:
Defence White preferred combat Three vessels First of class First of class
Paper identifies system and tender ordered delivered commissioned
maritime air-defence released for Australian-
vessel requirement based shipbuilder
Programme costs Prime contractor

AWD Alliance (US)
Selected subcontractors
Navantia (ESP)
AUD7.21 billion AUD9.12 billion
BAE Systems Australia (AUS)
(US$6.05bn) (US$6.78bn)
Forgacs (AUS)
Raytheon Australia (AUS)
Lockheed Martin (US)
General Electric (US)
Raytheon (US)
2007 Original Programme budget
BAE Systems Inc. (US)
programme budget as of Jun 2016
Vessel name Pennant Laid down Launched Original planned Delivered Commissioned
number delivery
Hobart 39 06 Sep 2012 23 May 2015 Dec 2014 16 Jun 2017 23 Sep 2017
Brisbane 41 02 Mar 2014 15 Dec 2016 Mar 2015
Sydney 42 19 Nov 2015 Jun 2017
© IISS
Chapter Seven
Middle East and North Africa
The region remains dominated by the ongoing deployed ground-targeting units, as well as special-
conflicts in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, while regional operations forces. The SDF, meanwhile, sought to
governments also have to address threats from trans- enrol more local people to provide security as a core
national terror groups. At the same time, states in the of Kurdish and Arab fighters. As US-backed forces
Gulf are increasingly concerned by Iran, particularly advanced, the US built forward-operating bases and
its support for Houthi forces in Yemen, and also its airstrips, providing better support to ground-combat
destabilising activities in the region more broadly, operations and also decreasing reliance on its base at
to say nothing of its continuing effort to develop Incirlik in Turkey.
its ballistic-missile capability. The fight against the Consequently, ISIS has suffered significantly
Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, accelerated in the ongoing military campaign to oust it from
considerably during 2017, as various forces concen- territory in Iraq and Syria. The near-consecutive
trated their assault on the jihadi organisation in both US-backed campaigns in the cities of Mosul (which
Iraq and Syria. These efforts, supported by coalition took nine months) and Raqqa (which lasted less than
airpower, special-forces activity and other military five months) overwhelmed the group. While eastern
support, resulted in the territorial contraction and Mosul was liberated relatively quickly, the more
military attrition of the caliphate. densely populated western part of the city witnessed
intense, devastating combat. Iraq’s Counter-Terrorism
Countering ISIS Service spearheaded the ground-combat operation. It
and North Africa

Principal local actors in the fight against ISIS in Syria fielded battle-hardened, well-equipped troops and
Middle East
have included Assad-regime forces (with deployed deployed light and heavy armour to enter the city’s
Russian forces playing a significant role) in addi- narrow streets (also deploying armoured construc-
tion to some Syrian opposition groups. In Iraq, the tion vehicles in order to build fortifications against car
armed forces, particularly Iraq’s Counter-Terrorism bombs as its troops moved forward) but suffered high
Service (also known as the Golden Division, which casualties. Western special forces played a discreet yet
has suffered heavy casualties in the campaign), have active role, while US targeting was essential in both
engaged ISIS. the Mosul and Raqqa battles.
In both countries, Kurdish groups have been ISIS fiercely defended these cities, aided by the
heavily involved in combat, fighting ISIS in the north length of time the group had had to construct fortifi-
of both Iraq and Syria from 2014. After Iraq’s armed cations and work on defensive plans during its occu-
forces collapsed in the north, Kurdish fighters were for pation. It was no longer able to field large units or
a time the main bulwark against further ISIS expan- conduct stealthy operations to outflank enemy forces,
sion. For the United States, the major dilemma in instead resorting to snipers, improvised explosive
Syria was whether to rely increasingly on forces oper- devices (IEDs), vehicle-borne IEDs, unmanned aerial
ating under the umbrella of the Kurdistan Workers’ vehicles and other asymmetric tactics. In Mosul and
Party (PKK)-linked People’s Protection Units (YPG), Raqqa, ISIS also deployed civilians as human shields,
which could jeopardise the relationship with Turkey, contributing to the considerable death toll among
a NATO ally. After internal deliberation, the Trump the civilian population. This slowed the coalition’s
administration chose to continue the Obama admin- advances and increased its reliance on airpower.
istration’s military strategy, which relied on the Meanwhile, the end of major combat operations
YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and against rebel factions allowed the Syrian regime and
US airpower to liberate the city of Raqqa and defeat its Iranian and Russian supporters to redirect their
ISIS along the Euphrates river valley, although the firepower against ISIS. Together, they retook signifi-
rules of engagement were relaxed and the tempo of cant ISIS-controlled areas and cities, including Deir
operations increased. The US provided light vehi- ez-Zor, Mayadin and other towns on the border with
cles, weapons and other equipment to the SDF and Iraq. Foreign Shia militiamen and Russian fighters,
both military and contractors, played a pivotal break pockets of resistance. In support of this strategy,
combat role, which served to expose the Assad Russia has continued to deploy combat airpower,
regime’s enduring personnel shortfall. despite announcements of de-escalation zones. The
It became clear that the fight against ISIS was at the Assad regime has tried to use this position of relative
same time a race to secure influence over former ISIS- dominance to rebuild some of its military institutions.
held territory by various local and regional forces For instance, it has attempted to impose government
in the theatre. As ISIS-controlled territory shrank authority on the various pro-regime militias that
and combatant forces operated closer to each other, emerged after 2012. Many National Defence Forces,
their plans and strategies were tested. This led to which served as auxiliary forces, have progressively
small-scale skirmishes and subsequent attempts to been brought under military command. At the same
control escalation. For example, in June, US aircraft time, Russia has attempted to form a new Syrian Army
shot down a Syrian combat aircraft after it targeted corps, as part of a strategy of reforming and building
US-backed personnel in northern Syria. Deconfliction up the country’s conventional forces. A continuing
mechanisms to secure zones of control were also challenge for Assad-regime forces is not just organisa-
tested. Over the summer and autumn, as regime and tion (and equipment) deficiencies after years of war,
Russian forces moved to seize Deir ez-Zor, the US but rebuilding personnel strength. Indeed, personnel
expected them to stay east of the Euphrates River. has remained a major concern, as demonstrated by
However, they subsequently crossed the river and mandatory conscription and the forced recruitment
sought to secure oilfields and territory there. of former rebels into military ranks.
By October 2017, ISIS-held territory had shrunk Although the war between the regime and the
considerably; the group had no territorial control mainstream rebellion has largely subsided, other
over any major city or town, except for Abu Kamal fronts remain active. Israel conducted several strikes
in Syria. But the group, and its ideology, had not against Hizbullah targets and weapons shipments
been totally eradicated. The expectation was that from Iran throughout 2017, destroying a suspected
ISIS would transform into a lethal rural insurgency rocket factory in northern Syria in September. There
in its former heartland, while ISIS ‘provinces’ in was no Syrian or Iranian retaliation, perhaps in part
Afghanistan, Libya, the Philippines and elsewhere for fear of further escalation, but also because both
would attempt to expand. remained focused on rebel and ISIS threats. US mili-
tary forces conducted precision strikes on Shayrat air
The war in Syria base using cruise missiles in April 2017, in response
The capture of eastern Aleppo by the Assad regime, to an airborne chemical attack (using sarin) by the
backed by Iran and Russia, was the culmination of regime against the town of Khan Sheikhoun. The
a year of setbacks for the rebel forces. It heralded a strikes destroyed some targets but in effect consti-
new phase of the Syrian conflict, characterised by tuted a punitive operation that was not a prelude to
the US focus on fighting ISIS, Russian management any US escalation in Syria; as such it did not affect the
of the Syrian battlefield, regime advances and rebel overall trajectory of the conflict.
disarray. As ground combat against ISIS entered its final
The loss of Aleppo debilitated the mainstream phase in the region, attention shifted to the al-Qaeda
rebellion, which effectively transformed into a rebel affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra, which rebranded itself as
insurgency. It also led the rebels’ patrons to recon- Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in early 2017. HTS’s
sider their objectives, commitment and the resources defeat of rebel rivals owed much to the committed
dedicated to the conflict. As a consequence, financial and organised fighters in its ranks. The group was
and material support for the rebellion has decreased, effectively in control of much of Idlib province,
as evidenced by the reduced availability of quality where more than two million residents and intern
munitions, such as TOW anti-armour weapons, and ally displaced people lived. The presence of this
the overall weakening of the rebellion. In summer jihadi statelet close to Europe posed a dilemma for
2017, meanwhile, the US announced that it would all actors. Idlib borders Turkey, which was concerned
discontinue its training and support for mainstream that a combined Russia–Assad-regime push to recon-
rebels, except those fighting ISIS. quer the province, or any US move to destroy the
Regime forces have recaptured significant terri- group, would result in large numbers of refugees
tory, using sieges and offers of local ceasefires to and increase the terrorist threat. By the end of the
Middle East and North Africa 317
TURKEY
Qamishli
Al-Rai
Izaz Manbij
Hassakeh
Al-Bab
Aleppo
Idlib Raqqa
Al-Thawrah
Latakia
SYRIA
Deir ez-Zor
Hama
Tartus
Homs
Palmyra Abu Kamal
LEBANON
Ad Nabk
Douma IRAQ
and North Africa

Middle East
Damascus
Quneitra
Regime (Russian/Iranian support) Foreign forces reported
Golan
Heights PYD/Syrian Democratic Forces Iran
ISRAEL (US-led coalition support)
Russia
Deraa
Other opposition groups
Turkey
(Turkish support)
US-led coalition
Other opposition groups
JORDAN ISIS Note: Locations are approximate; information as at
September 2017; basing ranges from large-scale
Israel permanent to smaller expeditionary sites; Russian and
Iranian basing is likely more extensive than reported.
© IISS
Map 7 Syria: foreign military influence and reported operating locations, September 2017
year, Idlib was effectively besieged, starving HTS of a military presence alongside allied rebel groups in
resources. a small pocket north of Aleppo, where it sponsored
Meanwhile, Iran and Russia have either estab- and trained local forces, and assisted Russia in estab-
lished or extended their military facilities in Syria. lishing ceasefire zones in Syria.
These facilities, combined with land lines of supply
from Iran to Lebanon, and transnational Shia militias Yemen
operating under Iranian command, have changed Three years after the fighting began in Yemen, the
the military and strategic landscape in the northern war remains in a stalemate. The Saudi-led coalition,
Middle East. At the same time, Moscow continues to comprising forces from the internationally recognised
deploy advanced military systems to Syria, testing but beleaguered government of President Abd Rabbo
and showcasing these on the battlefield. In northern Mansour Hadi, failed to significantly advance the
Syria, Turkey sought to contain Kurdish ambitions front lines or deliver fatal blows to Houthi rebel forces
and minimise its losses there. To enable this, it built that had allied with former president Ali Abdullah
Saleh. Instead, the conflict evolved into a war of attri- of ongoing conflicts in Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen.
tion, causing considerable material destruction to the Regional growth fell from 5.0% in 2016 to 2.6% in
country and a humanitarian crisis, with starvation 2017 (the IMF includes extra-regional countries in its
affecting millions and a cholera epidemic rapidly analysis of this region, including Afghanistan, Djibouti,
spreading. Pakistan, Somalia and Sudan, but excludes Israel).
The campaign has highlighted the strategic and Oil prices have not risen as expected in the wake
operational differences between Saudi Arabia and of OPEC’s November 2016 agreement to reduce
the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The challenge for production, which was extended in May 2017.
the UAE, which is the dominant element of the coali- Additionally, production cuts implemented by oil
tion force in southern Yemen, has been threefold: to providers weighed on their growth. Between January
stabilise the area, manage secessionist aspirations and and August 2017, the average oil price per barrel was
fight al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. For Riyadh, US$49.4. For 2018, the IMF forecasts that oil prices
the fight against the Houthi insurgency remained a will average US$50.17 a barrel. This is slightly higher
priority in 2017, not least as Houthi forces continued than the average 2016 price (US$43.3 per barrel) but
to issue threats and fire missiles towards Saudi terri- still significantly below Gulf Cooperation Council
tory. However, Saudi defence planners struggled to (GCC) states’ average fiscal break-even point, which
devise a strategy to besiege Sanaa, the capital, or – is estimated at US$70–80 per barrel. Stronger US
before the latter’s death – benefit from the rift between shale production, and stronger recovery in Libya
the Houthis and Saleh. Meanwhile, a proposed oper- and Nigeria (these countries were not bound by the
ation to seize the port of Hudaydah (the main entry OPEC agreement), helped to explain the lower-than-
point for goods into blockaded Yemen) met with expected price.
international criticism and demands that Riyadh lifts Oil exporters experienced low GDP growth in
constraints on UN humanitarian deliveries. 2017, at 1.7%, down from 5.6% in 2016. Within this
group, Saudi Arabia slowed from 1.7% in 2016 to
Qatar crisis and regional defence 0.1% in 2017. Iran also drove the slowdown, with
The boycott of Qatar by a powerful coalition of coun- growth declining from 12.5% in 2016 to 3.5% in
tries led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE threatened to 2017. As a consequence, most oil-exporting states in
end the already dim prospect of Gulf Cooperation the region continued to pursue fiscal-consolidation
Council (GCC) military cooperation and integra- programmes to adjust to the environment of low oil
tion. The boycott ended all political, diplomatic and prices. In Saudi Arabia, for instance, the government
military relations with Qatar and weakened the role launched the Vision 2030 plan in 2016. The plan has,
of the GCC. At the same time, the crisis complicated
US-led military efforts in the region in terms of mari- Figure 17 North Africa defence expenditure
time security, missile defence and joint exercises. 2017: sub-regional breakdown
Qatar used defence diplomacy to ward off any
military intervention. It conducted high-profile joint Tunisia, 4.7%
exercises with US and United Kingdom forces, and

announced its intention to purchase 24 Typhoon
Algeria, 54.2%
combat aircraft from the UK and F-15QA combat Morocco,
18.9%
aircraft from the US, naval vessels from Italy and
other US weaponry. Qatar also sought and obtained
Mauritania,
an increase in the number of Turkish troops at a base 0.8%
in the country, although Saudi Arabia and the UAE
in turn demanded the dismantling of this facility and
the departure of Turkish forces.
DEFENCE ECONOMICS Egypt, 21.5%
Economic outlook: uncertain times

The economic outlook for the region remained unset- Note: Analysis excludes Libya due to insufficient data availability.
tled in 2017, caused by lower oil prices and the impact © IISS
© IISS
Lebanon Syria
Tunisia
Morocco Israel
Jordan Iraq
Iran
Algeria Kuwait
Libya Qatar
Egypt Bahrain
Saudi UAE
Arabia
Oman
Mauritania
Yemen
2017 Defence Spending (US$bn)
76.68
20 Between 0% and 3% increase
15 Between 0% and 3% decrease
10 [1] Map illustrating 2017 planned defence-spending levels (in US$ at market exchange rates),
5 Between 3% and 10% decrease as well as the annual real percentage change in planned defence spending between 2016 and
2017 (at constant 2010 prices and exchange rates). Percentage changes in defence spending
1 Between 10% and 20% decrease can vary considerably from year to year, as states revise the level of funding allocated to
defence. Changes indicated here highlight the short-term trend in planned defence spending
0.5
Insufficient data between 2016 and 2017. Actual spending changes prior to 2016, and projected spending levels
Estimate post-2017, are not reflected.
Map 8 Middle East and North Africa regional defence spending1
however, already hit some roadblocks: the adminis- defence budget between 2015 and 2016. However,
tration reinstated benefits to civil servants and mili- 2016 defence spending was revised upwards in
and North Africa

tary personnel that were cut the previous year as part subsequent official data releases. While there was a
Middle East
of an austerity agenda. fall in defence spending, this was at an incremental
Conversely, the GDP of regional oil importers pace: R307 billion (US$81.9bn) in 2015, R305.7bn
grew from 3.6% in 2016 to 4.3% in 2017. In line with (US$81.5bn) in 2016 and R287.5bn (US$76.7bn) in
this trend, Egypt’s growth was strong in 2017 at 4.1%, 2017.
but the country’s underlying economic structures Given the arms procurements announced by
remained fragile. In November 2016, in exchange for Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), these
an IMF loan, the government applied tough reforms: countries are very likely the region’s other top
the currency was devalued, subsidies were cut and spenders, besides Israel. However, the lack of reliable
new taxes implemented. While these measures began information makes this conclusion difficult to vali-
to reassure international investors and to increase date. Meanwhile, smaller countries in the Gulf signal
exports, they also pushed up inflation (23.5% in a downward trend. In Oman, defence and security
2017). Among oil importers, Morocco in particular expenditures declined from R3.5bn (US$9.1bn) in
rebounded, from 1.2% GDP growth in 2016 to 4.8% in 2016 to R3.34bn (US$8.69bn) in 2017. However, this
2017, after a year of drought. However, challenges for does not include procurement spending. Bahrain’s
countries within this group are tied to concerns over defence budget was also set to decline from D573
ongoing conflict-related instability, with a consequent million (US$1.53bn) in 2016 to D557m (US$1.49bn) in
decline in tourism and disruption to trade routes. 2017, and should remain stable in 2018 also at D557m
(estimated at US$1.48bn), but, like for Oman, this
Defence spending: opacity prevails figure is likely to include current expenditures only.
Problems in obtaining accurate defence-spending On the other side of the Gulf, Iran’s nominal
data mean it is not possible to provide a figure for total defence spending rose from an estimated r499 tril-
regional defence spending. Nonetheless, key states lion (US$15.9bn) in 2016 to r544trn (US$16bn) in 2017,
provide clues about defence-spending trends, partic- although this still meant a slight decline of 1.2% in
ularly Saudi Arabia, which has the largest defence real terms. However, total military-related expend
budget in the region. Financial documents published iture is unknown. For instance, the parliament in
in 2016 announced cuts of 30.5% to the Kingdom’s 2017 reportedly approved additional funding of
2017 resulted in the proclamation of a ‘historic’ arms

15 deal; agreements were announced with a total value
12.51 12.61 of US$110bn. This included sales approved under
11.30
12
10.68 the Obama administration, such as US$11.25bn for
8.98 multi-mission surface combatant ships; US$1.15bn
9 7.71 for more M1A2S Abrams main battle tanks and other
% of GDP
vehicles; and US$3.5bn for CH-47F Chinook helicop-

6
ters. Intentions for potential contracts were expressed
for (among others): US$15bn for seven Terminal
3
High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries;
US$4.46bn for 104,000 air-to-ground munitions;
0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 US$6.65bn for enhancements to the Patriot air-defence
system; and US$6bn for four frigates. However, at the
time of writing, these remain letters of intent only,
Figure 18 Saudi Arabia defence expenditure as as the State Department and Congress first need to
% of GDP authorise those purchases. At the same time, Saudi
Arabia began to turn to Russia. In October 2017, the
US$609m, in part to boost the country’s ballistic- Kingdom was talking to Moscow about the possible
missile programme. procurement of S-400 air-defence systems. Should
Egypt’s budget increased slightly between 2016 the deal come through, this would be a breakthrough
and 2017, from E£43.2bn (US$5.3bn) to E£47.1bn for Russia, which has never exported major conven-
(US$2.7bn), excluding US Foreign Military Assistance. tional weapons systems to Riyadh. The next day, the
However, given currency devaluation, this meant a US State Department’s Defense Security Cooperation
significant drop in US dollar terms (-50%). It is diffi- Agency cleared the sale of seven THAAD batteries –
cult to assess whether this actually was detrimental although this still needs to be approved by Congress.
to the Egyptian armed forces: since President Abdel Qatar also looked to diversify its suppliers in 2017.
Fattah Al-Sisi seized power, the role of the military Since the GCC crisis broke out in June 2017, Qatar
in Egypt’s economy has strengthened. It is deeply has signed defence contracts with Italy’s Fincantieri
involved in key sectors such as food, energy and and Leonardo for four corvettes, two offshore-patrol
construction, and may derive additional funding vessels and one landing platform dock, estimated at
from such activities. US$5.91bn (including the weapons package). It has
also signed a letter of intent to procure 24 Typhoon
Defence procurement and industry combat aircraft from BAE Systems, after moving to
There are modernisation and recapitalisation needs purchase 72 F-15QA fighter aircraft from Boeing for
throughout the region, as Gulf states aim to boost US$21.1bn in late 2016. A deal to buy 24 Rafale fighter
their military capability and enhance their strategic aircraft from Dassault Aviation for US$7.48bn was
autonomy. Areas of focus include improved intel- signed in 2015. These various procurements reflect
ligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and Qatar’s traditional strategy of gaining security guar-
command-and-control resources, and precision- antees through arms deals with Western powers.
guided munitions. The desire to reduce reliance on However, Qatar, like Saudi Arabia, signed a memo-
external support can also be seen in regional powers’ randum of understanding with Russia for ‘air defence
diversification strategy regarding their arms imports. and military supplies’ in October 2017.
Even those who traditionally looked to Western Beyond the Gulf, 2017 was a crucial year for Egypt,
suppliers are now also looking to suppliers such as which has received significant equipment deliveries,
China and Russia. in particular for the navy. In April, the first German
Saudi Arabia exemplified this diversification Type-209/1400 submarine, out of an order of four, was
strategy in 2017, using military procurement both commissioned by the Egyptian Navy. The previous
as political leverage and as a way to further its own year, two French Mistral-class amphibious-assault
defence-industry ambitions. Ties with the United ships had been commissioned. In mid-2017, Egypt
States were reaffirmed after Donald Trump’s inaug received the first delivery of Russian Ka-52A attack
uration as president. His visit to Riyadh in May helicopters. Another order is expected for the Ka-52K
naval version, to be deployed on the Mistral-class Kuwait. NIMR, a vehicle manufacturer, signed an
vessels. These deliveries highlight the government’s agreement with a Czech firm in 2017 for the sale of its
plan to reinforce its strength in the Red Sea, in order products to Central and Eastern Europe. The UAE has
to protect the Suez Canal. Meanwhile, the air force also begun to offer licenced-production agreements
accepted a first batch of MiG-29M/M2 fighter aircraft to its customers, as evidenced by the NIMR produc-
in 2016 and continued to receive deliveries of Rafale tion line that was set up in Algeria. Furthermore, like
combat aircraft. As of October 2017, the Egyptian Air traditional Western arms suppliers, the UAE is also
Force had received 11 out of 24 Rafales. using the arms trade in support of its political goals:
While Egypt and most regional states depend on Abu Dhabi reportedly donated M1248 Caiman vehi-
external suppliers, efforts to develop local defence cles to the Libyan National Army and other military
firms have increased due to the fall in oil prices and vehicles to Iraqi Kurds.
requirements to diversify the economy. In 2017, Saudi
Arabia met important milestones towards its goal to QATAR
develop a domestic defence-industrial base, in rela-
tion to the Vision 2030 plan. In May, the Kingdom Qatar gained independence from the United Kingdom
established a national company for defence-equip- in 1971, the same year as Bahrain and the United Arab
ment development and manufacturing, the Saudi Emirates (UAE). Geopolitically, like Oman, Qatar is
Arabian Military Industries (SAMI), to be led by a removed from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
former Airbus and Rheinmetall executive. SAMI is mainstream. In 2014, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the
tied to the Public Investment Fund, the state’s sover- UAE withdrew their ambassadors from Doha in
eign fund, chaired by Crown Prince Mohammed bin protest at alleged Qatari ‘meddling in their internal
Salman. In the medium term, the new entity will likely affairs’, its alleged support to certain Islamist groups
oversee or regroup existing Saudi Arabian defence and its ‘allowing’ the Qatar-based Al-Jazeera media
groups such as Taqnia and the Military Industries network to be used as a mouthpiece for these groups.
and North Africa

Corporation. In August, the government announced Kuwait and, eventually, King Salman of Saudi Arabia
Middle East
the creation of a new procurement body, the General later brokered a deal that outwardly demonstrated
Authority of Military Industries. It will be in charge of unity.
defence procurement, research and development, the In early June 2017, Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia
expansion of the local defence-technology industrial and the UAE imposed a ‘blockade’ on Qatar, with
base (DTIB) and, relatedly, offsets. This organisation extensive bans on a broad range of vital services,
will also be headed by the Crown Prince. including air movement, and the closure of the land
Saudi Arabia’s new defence-industrial strategy has border with Saudi Arabia. At the time of writing, the
interested defence manufacturers around the world. blockade had no military element; however, it comes at
Key emerging partners, besides the Kingdom’s trad a time when the Qatari armed forces (QAF) are still in
itional Western partners, include Ukraine and South ‘catch-up’ mode in comparison with their neighbours
Africa. A number of partnerships were signed with – especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE – in terms of
Asian countries, including Indonesia, India and military capability. There is an extensive procurement
Pakistan, in 2017, while South Korean companies drive in place across all the military domains and a
are looking to open local joint ventures. Cooperation commensurate increase in cooperation with Turkey.
has also advanced with China. Not only has Saudi Since its independence Qatar, like other
Arabia procured Chinese-built CH-4 and Wing-Loong Gulf states, has also participated to some degree in
1 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), but it has also regional military activities, for example, coalition
signed partnerships with China Aerospace Science operations in Kuwait during the First Gulf War (1991)
and Technology Corporation to develop the local and the conflict in Yemen (2016), as well as, more
manufacture of armed UAVs. controversially, deploying air elements to Libya and
To develop its own DTIB, Saudi Arabia is following training Libyan personnel. With the possible excep-
the path of the UAE, which is at a more advanced tion of the Kuwait campaign, where a Qatari AMX-30
stage in this process. Not only is the UAE producing tank battalion was primarily manned by Pakistani
weapons for its own armed forces, but it is starting to personnel, the Qatari military commitment to each of
export as well. For instance, Abu Dhabi Ship Building these endeavours has been modest, reflecting the size,
Company is providing landing craft to Oman and experience and capability of the QAF and its ability
to operate outside its own territorial boundaries. In and interior ministries. In common with other GCC
addition to operational deployments, the Qatar Emiri countries, Qatar also possesses a ‘third force’: the
Navy (QEN) has also made small periodic contribu- Emiri Guard.
tions to the US-led Combined Maritime Forces.
Armed forces
Defence policy Qatar has one of the smallest armed forces by overall
Qatar has not published any defence-policy goals, size in the Gulf region, although GCC countries
although the following are understood to feature in rarely publish official personnel figures. The armed
its thinking: firstly, to protect Qatari territorial integ- forces include a sizeable Emiri Guard force and there
rity, including its exclusive economic zone and oil is also an Internal Security Force of some 5,000 para-
and gas infrastructure, from internal and external military personnel separate from the armed forces.
threats; secondly, to participate in the defence of GCC It is estimated that less than 30% of QAF personnel
member states, as necessary; thirdly, to contribute to are native Qataris, mainly officers. Among this officer
coalition operations to maintain peace and security in corps, there are thought to be in excess of 350 brig-
accordance with the provisions of international law; adiers/officers of one-star rank (considerably more
and fourthly, to provide international humanitarian than the United States and UK armed forces). This
aid in times of disaster. has resulted in outsourcing some elements of the
In common with its GCC neighbours, Qatar also defence ministry.
has no published defence budget. The UK Defence Structurally, Qatar has a conventional defence-
and Security Organisation assesses that Qatar was ministry headquarters, with three individual domain
the world’s third-largest importer of defence items headquarters and associated forces: the Qatar Emiri
between 2007 and 2016, behind India and Saudi Land Forces (QELF), the Qatar Emiri Air Forces
Arabia – a position that predates a recent Eurofighter (QEAF) and the QEN, with a special-forces group and
Typhoon combat-aircraft letter of intent. Some esti- a border guard/frontier force. A chief of staff looks
mates state that Qatar spent US$4.4 billion on defence after the defence-ministry staff, advises the defence
materiel in 2016, and was expected to spend US$7bn minister, and is responsible for the preparation and
by 2020, although these forecasts may now be affected readiness of units, but the individual services report
by the present regional crisis. That said, the figures directly to the minister. A joint headquarters coor-
are less important than the significant challenges that dinates defence-ministry capabilities and also has
the country will face in generating capability from its liaison cells with the interior ministry, the Emiri
impressive future equipment inventory. Guard and major gas companies.
Until May 2017, Qatar participated in collective-
defence discussions and initiatives with, and made Air forces
a small contribution to, the GCC military secretariat The QEAF is estimated to comprise some 2,000
in Riyadh. It has also taken part in the periodic GCC personnel at two main bases, Doha Airport and Al
set-piece collective-defence exercises, although the Udeid, with the present capability built around an
QAF was absent from the large exercise Saif Abdullah ageing squadron of 12 French Mirage 2000 combat
in 2014. In common with all other Gulf states, except aircraft. In 2015 an order was placed with Dassault
Saudi Arabia, Qatar is also home to substantial for 24 Rafales (18 single and six twin seaters) that
external armed forces – in this case, the US CENTCOM are reportedly due to enter service from 2018. The
forward HQ, its Air Operations Center and a major US US Congress cleared the sale of up to 72 F-15 Eagle
air base at Al Udeid, as well as a significant US Army aircraft in 2016, and in September 2017 a letter of
base at Al Sayliyah. Since 2016, Qatar has also hosted intent was signed with BAE Systems for the poten-
an increasing number of Turkish forces, primarily tial purchase of 24 Eurofighter Typhoons. This future
land and naval, which is an element in the dispute air-force inventory presents significant challenges for
with Qatar’s neighbours. Qatar has also taken a more Qatar, especially given its personnel shortages.
open approach to dealing with Iran, and has rein- Early indications from the Rafale purchase, the
stated full diplomatic relations at a time when Saudi most advanced of these procurements, is that training
Arabia, in particular, is minimising Saudi–Iranian ties. will be a major challenge, with early batches of poten-
Internally, considerable overlaps remain between tial pilots below the required standard. The QEAF
the perceived roles and responsibilities of the defence has not invested in training with other air forces to
the same extent as the Saudi and Emirati air arms; late the specialist training and experience that will
it lacks not only pilots, but also other essential be required to operate the navy’s new ships to their
supporting capabilities that make modern air plat- full capability. As such, the QEN will likely need
forms effective. The experience required to deliver to approach other nations for training support and
such vital supporting capabilities cannot be created personnel. A new base is due to be built for the QEN
quickly; it usually takes years to develop. as part of the port development project to the south
The QEAF also operates the armed forces’ rotary- of Doha.
wing capability, which is undergoing a significant
upgrade programme. AH-64E Apache attack heli- Land forces
copters are joining a number of AW139 utility and The QLF is the largest service component, and is
medevac helicopters, and an ageing fleet of Gazelles undertaking a major equipment-modernisation pro
and Sea Kings. Meanwhile, a letter of intent has been gramme, primarily through the purchase of Leopard
issued for NH90 transport helicopters. The combat air 2A7 main battle tanks and PzH 2000 self-propelled
and aviation fleet is supported by C-17A Globemaster artillery pieces from Germany. Leopard deliveries are
III heavy transport aircraft, while a contract has been under way, and are due to be complete in 2018. This
signed for three US airborne early-warning aircraft is being used to equip the tank battalion in the Jassim
(based on the Boeing 737 airframe). In 2014, Airbus Bin Mohammed Brigade and the independent artil-
announced that Qatar had selected its A330 Multi lery battalion.
Role Tanker Transport. Qatar’s combat inventory (which includes a
Underpinning these acquisitions are discussions modest special-forces group) also requires a wide
about the construction of a new military air base at range of supporting capabilities that will be essential
Dhukan on the western coast. At a conservative esti- for it to be militarily effective, not least a fully inte-
mate of 1.5 pilots trained per aircraft, this will mean grated command-and-control system, and training,
that, in due course, the QEAF will need a minimum maintenance and logistics requirements.
and North Africa

steady state of over 300 trained pilots, plus the requi-
Middle East
site engineers, weapons experts and other personnel, Defence and security cooperation
which will likely prove a significant challenge. Qatar has not made the same investment in coali-
At the same time, Qatar’s air-defence capability tion training as its neighbours, notably the UAE but
sits within the QEAF and comprises US Patriot also increasingly Saudi Arabia, despite a substantial
and French Roland systems. The US approved the US presence in-country. This is most notable in the
Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense system for air domain, where Saudi Arabia and the UAE regu-
sale to Qatar in 2012, but the deal has yet to be final- larly exercise with the UK, the US and sometimes
ised. Given the country’s limited size, any response NATO. The QAF has participated in GCC exercises,
to a direct threat will probably rely heavily on the but these tend to be time-limited showpiece events,
US systems that protect Al Udeid air base, where a with little real substance or military value. The QEN
substantial number of aircraft are based. has made occasional contributions to the Combined
Maritime Forces, but these too have been small and
Navy time-limited. There is little real internal cooperation
The QEN is estimated to possesses some 2,500 between the services, not least because this would
personnel, including coastguard personnel. It too highlight the considerable duplication of roles and
is entering a period of change, updating its ageing capabilities between elements of the defence and
fleet of fast-attack craft and patrol boats with a recent interior ministries and the Emiri Guard.
agreement to buy a landing platform dock, four In contrast to Oman, Saudi Arabia and the UAE,
corvettes and two offshore-patrol vessels from Italian where extensive relationships with foreign armed
company Fincantieri. This programme will give the forces, and military and ex-military advisers, are
navy the platforms necessary to operate a full littoral employed, as well as links with international training
navy. However, in common with the challenges facing academies, Qatar has employed modest numbers of
the air force, bringing these vessels into service and individual contract officers, including from France,
crewing them effectively will be difficult. the UK and the US, and operated a short-lived
Qatar lacks its own naval academy, and even if it commercially run staff-college programme with UK
had one, officers would be hard pressed to assimi- defence-ministry support.
Operational experience backed by the UK Ministry of Defence, only lasted

Qatar has contributed military forces to a small three years before the QAF took it back in house.
number of operations in the region, notably with Qatar’s in-house replacement is, according to experts,
other Gulf allies at Khafji in 1991, where an AMX-30 suffering from a lack of experienced staff.
tank battalion participated, and in the Yemen Nevertheless, training will be at the heart of
campaign; Qatar is presently ‘suspended’ although assimilating and integrating Qatar’s new capabilities
its contribution was very small. Qatar was involved over the coming years. The present regional dispute
in the conflict in Libya in 2011, where it contributed could work in favour of the armed forces, if suffi-
six Mirage fighters and two C-17A transport aircraft cient pride in military service can be generated in
to coalition no-fly-zone enforcement efforts. At later order to drive a process of improvement. However,
stages in the operation, Qatari special forces assisted Qatar’s small population will likely result in more
in the training of the Tripoli Brigade and rebel forces foreign nationals (such as Pakistanis, Palestinians and
in Benghazi and the Nafusa mountains. In addition, Syrians) bolstering the QAF ranks.
it also brought small groups of Libyans to Qatar for
small-unit leadership training in preparation for the Defence economics and industry
rebel advance on Tripoli in August 2011. Unseen Qatar’s defence procurement in the past five years has
funding and influence activities may also have had been considerable, and while not all of the agreements
more effect than the overt military contributions. and negotiations have yet to translate into contracts,
it indicates that the government has allocated signifi
Personnel and training cant sums for defence. However, as in some other
Personnel costs constitute a significant part of Qatar’s regional states, obtaining accurate figures on defence
commitment to military spending. Overall, the disbursements is extremely difficult. Some measure
priority will be to man and sustain the new equip- can be obtained by looking at signed contracts, though
ment that is being delivered, taking it from initial a contract value is not given in all cases. At the same
operating capability to full operating capability, and time, some of the significant costs will fall outside
maintaining it through-life, which will be upwards these parameters, namely personnel costs and neces-
of 20 years in many cases. However, scant attention sary sums for training and maintenance contracts.
appears to have been paid to looking at all of the Qatar has no indigenous defence industry, nor are
defence lines of development. This UK term describes there any indications that the government intends
a way of coordinating the elements needed to generate to develop one. As such, it is reliant on original
military capability (training, equipment, personnel, equipment manufacturers and other contractors for
information, concepts and doctrine, organisation, defence-equipment support; there is not the same
infrastructure and logistics) for individual platforms pressure to industrialise as in Qatar’s neighbours, or
or collective activity. to employ Qatari nationals in manufacturing jobs.
However, retrospective measures are being taken, Indeed, the size of the population – and even the
such as the introduction of a national military-service most optimistic of growth forecasts – mean that there
programme (including three to four months of is little prospect of Qatar ever needing to develop an
training) and employing small numbers of military indigenous defence-industrial capability to meet any
contract officers. A remaining challenge is to convey need for job creation; national-security or security-of-
a sense that the armed forces can constitute a profes- supply requirements would be the likely prompts for
sion for Qatari citizens. Indeed, the expectation that any moves in this direction.
others will provide security is no longer sustainable, Taken together, the individual challenges of lower
and much needs to be done to professionalise the gas prices, the regional dispute with its neighbours,
services. Given the country’s national personnel limi- a changing defence posture and lessons from Yemen
tations, a review of duplicated capabilities, including will impose huge demands on a relatively inexperi-
transferring personnel back into front-line posts, may enced defence ministry. These factors highlight the
be necessary. need for significant defence reform, including outside
There have also been small positive steps in help to resolve major equipment-integration chal-
terms of force development, but these have not been lenges. Harnessing coherent and considered external
sustained. For instance, the standing up in 2013 of a assistance is likely to be the best way to address this
joint staff college course by a private UK company, challenge.
Light
Algeria ALG 2 indep mot bde
Air Manoeuvre
Algerian Dinar D 2016 2017 2018
1 AB div (4 para regt; 1 SF regt)
GDP D 17.4tr 19.6tr COMBAT SUPPORT
US$ 159bn 175bn 2 arty bn
per capita US$ 3,902 4,225 4 engr bn
Growth % 3.3 1.5 AIR DEFENCE
7 AD bn
Inflation % 6.4 5.5
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Def bdgt D 1.12tr 1.12tr
US$ 10.2bn 10.0bn MBT 1,295: 400 T-90SA; 325 T-72; 300 T-62; 270 T-54/T-55
US$1=D 109.45 111.63 RECCE 134: 44 AML-60; 26 BRDM-2; 64 BRDM-2M with
Population 40,969,443 9M133 Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan)
IFV 1,089: 685 BMP-1; 304 BMP-2M with 9M133 Kornet
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus (AT-14 Spriggan); 100 BMP-3
Male 15.0% 3.6% 4.2% 4.5% 20.7% 2.6%
APC 883+
APC (W) 881+: 250 BTR-60; 150 BTR-80; 150 OT-64; 55
Female 14.3% 3.4% 4.0% 4.3% 20.3% 3.0%
M3 Panhard; 176+ Fuchs 2; 100 Fahd
PPV 2 Marauder
Capabilities ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Territorial integrity, internal security and regional stability MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111
are the primary roles of the Algerian armed forces. Islamist Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel);
extremism continues to be an internal and a regional 9K115-2 Metis-M1 (AT-13 Saxhorn-2); 9K135 Kornet-E
security issue. The armed forces train regularly, including (AT-14 Spriggan); Milan
on combined-operations exercises, have substantial RCL 180: 82mm 120 B-10; 107mm 60 B-11
counter-insurgency experience and in 2013 took on the task GUNS 250: 57mm 160 ZIS-2 (M-1943); 85mm 80 D-44;
of counter narcotics trafficking. Algeria is part of the African 100mm 10 T-12
and North Africa

Union’s North African Regional Capability Standby Force, ARTILLERY 1,091
Middle East
hosting the force’s logistics base in Algiers. Its forces are SP 224: 122mm 140 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 30 2S3 Akatsiya;
the best equipped in northern Africa, following a period 155mm ε54 PLZ-45
of recapitalisation, with much equipment sourced from TOWED 393: 122mm 345: 160 D-30; 25 D-74; 100
Russia. Recent deliveries include the Iskander-E short-range M-1931/37; 60 M-30; 130mm 10 M-46; 152mm 20 M-1937
ballistic-missile system, which will improve the army’s (ML-20); 155mm 18 Type-88 (PLL-01)
deep-strike capacity. The Buk-M2E medium-range surface- MRL 144: 122mm 48 BM-21 Grad; 140mm 48 BM-14;
to-air-missile system was also introduced into the inventory. 240mm 30 BM-24; 300mm 18 9A52 Smerch
China has also been a source of some equipment, including MOR 330: 82mm 150 M-37; 120mm 120 M-1943; 160mm
self-propelled artillery. The security of its border with Libya 60 M-1943
remained a concern throughout 2017, with a large number SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
of army and gendarmerie personnel deployed in this area. SRBM 4 Iskander-E
AIR DEFENCE
ACTIVE 130,000 (Army 110,000 Navy 6,000 Air SAM 106+
14,000) Paramilitary 187,200 Short-range 38 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)
Conscript liability 18 months, only in the army (6 months basic, Point-defence 68+: ε48 9K33M Osa (SA-8B Gecko); ε20
12 months with regular army often involving civil projects) 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9 Gaskin); 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7A/B
Grail)‡
RESERVE 150,000 (Army 150,000) to age 50 GUNS ε830
SP 23mm ε225 ZSU-23-4
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE TOWED ε605: 14.5mm 100: 60 ZPU-2; 40 ZPU-4; 23mm
100 ZU-23; 37mm ε150 M-1939; 57mm 75 S-60; 85mm
Army 35,000; 75,000 conscript (total 110,000) 20 M-1939 (KS-12); 100mm 150 KS-19; 130mm 10 KS-30
FORCES BY ROLE
6 Mil Regions Navy ε6,000
MANOEUVRE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Armoured SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 4:
2 (1st & 8th) armd div (3 tk regt; 1 mech regt, 1 arty gp) 2 Kilo (FSU Paltus) with 6 single 533mm TT with Test-
1 indep armd bde 71ME HWT/3M54E Klub-S (SS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM
Mechanised 2 Improved Kilo (RUS Varshavyanka) with 6 single 533mm
2 (12th & 40th) mech div (1 tk regt; 3 mech regt, 1 arty gp) TT with Test-71ME HWT/3M54E Klub-S (SS-N-27B)
3 indep mech bde AShM
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 8 Coast Guard ε500

FFGHM 5:
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
3 Adhafer (C28A) with 2 quad lnchr with C-802A AShM, 1
FM-90 lnchr with HHQ-7 SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT,
PBF 6 Baglietto 20
2 Type-730B CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 hel)
PB 49: 6 Baglietto Mangusta; 12 Jebel Antar; 21 Deneb; 4
2 Erradii (MEKO 200AN) with 2 octuple lnchrs with RBS-
El Mounkid; 6 Kebir with 1 76mm gun
15 Mk3 AShM, 4 8-cell VLS with Umkhonto-IR SAM,
2 twin 324mm TT with MU90 LWT, 1 127mm gun
AR 1 El Mourafek
(capacity 1 Super Lynx 300)
ARS 3 El Moundjid
FF 3 Mourad Rais (FSU Koni) with 2 twin 533mm TT, 2
AXL 5 El Mouderrib (PRC Chui-E) (2 more in
RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm gun
reserve†)
CORVETTES 7
FSGM 3 Rais Hamidou (FSU Nanuchka II) with up to 4
Air Force 14,000
twin lnchr with 3M24E Uran-E (SS-N-25 Switchblade) Flying hours 150 hrs/yr
AShM, 1 twin lnchr with 9M33 Osa-M (SA-N-4 FORCES BY ROLE
Gecko) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 twin 57mm gun FIGHTER
FSG 4: 1 sqn with MiG-25PDS/RU Foxbat
3 Djebel Chenoua with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CH- 4 sqn with MiG-29C/UB Fulcrum
SS-N-8 Saccade) AShM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
1 Rais Hassen Barbiar (Djebel Chenoua mod) with 2 3 sqn with Su-30MKA Flanker
twin lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-8 Saccade) AShM, 1 GROUND ATTACK
Type-730 CIWS, 1 76mm gun 2 sqn with Su-24M/MK Fencer D
PBFG 9 Osa II (3†) with 4 single lnchr with P-15 Termit ELINT
(SS-N-2B Styx) AShM 1 sqn with Beech 1900D
PB 9 Kebir with 1 76mm gun MARITIME PATROL
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 1 2 sqn with Beech 200T/300 King Air
MCC 1 El-Kasseh (ITA Gaeta mod) ISR
1 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer E*; MiG-25RBSh
AMPHIBIOUS 7
Foxbat D*
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LHD 1 Kalaat
TANKER
Beni Abbes with 1 8-cell A50 VLS with Aster-15 SAM, 1
1 sqn with Il-78 Midas
76mm gun (capacity 5 med hel; 3 LCVP; 15 MBT; 350
TRANSPORT
troops)
1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 Hercules; L-100-30
LANDING SHIPS 3:
1 sqn with C-295M
LSM 1 Polnochny B with 1 twin AK230 CIWS (capacity 1 sqn with Gulfstream IV-SP; Gulfstream V
6 MBT; 180 troops) 1 sqn with Il-76MD/TD Candid
LST 2 Kalaat beni Hammad (capacity 7 MBT; 240 troops) TRAINING
with 1 med hel landing platform 2 sqn with Z-142
LANDING CRAFT • LCVP 3 1 sqn with Yak-130 Mitten*
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3 2 sqn with L-39C/ZA Albatros
AGS 1 El Idrissi 1 hel sqn with PZL Mi-2 Hoplite
AX 1 Daxin with 2 twin AK230 CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel ATTACK HELICOPTER
landing platform 3 sqn with Mi-24 Hind (one re-equipping with Mi-28NE
AXS 1 El Mellah Havoc)
Naval Infantry 1 sqn with AS355 Ecureuil
FORCES BY ROLE 5 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H
MANOEUVRE 1 sqn with Ka-27PS Helix D; Ka-32T Helix
Amphibious ISR UAV
1 naval inf bn 1 sqn with Seeker II
AIR DEFENCE
Naval Aviation 3 ADA bde
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 3 SAM regt with S-125 Neva (SA-3 Goa); 2K12 Kub (SA-6
HELICOPTERS Gainful); S-300PMU2 (SA-20 Gargoyle)
MRH 9: 3 AW139 (SAR); 6 Super Lynx 300 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SAR 9: 5 AW101 SAR; 4 Super Lynx Mk130 AIRCRAFT 135 combat capable
FTR 34: 11 MiG-25PDS/RU Foxbat; 23 MiG-29C/UB
Coastal Defence Fulcrum
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE FGA 44 Su-30MKA
COASTAL DEFENCE ATK 33 Su-24M/MK Fencer D
AShM 4K51 Rubezh (SSC-3 Styx) ISR 8: 4 MiG-25RBSh Foxbat D*; 4 Su-24MR Fencer E*
TKR 6 Il-78 Midas

TPT 67: Heavy 12: 3 Il-76MD Candid B; 9 Il-76TD Candid; Bahrain BHR
Medium 17: 9 C-130H Hercules; 6 C-130H-30 Hercules; 2 Bahraini Dinar D 2016 2017 2018
L-100-30; Light 32: 3 Beech C90B King Air; 5 Beech 200T
GDP D 12.0bn 12.7bn
King Air; 6 Beech 300 King Air; 12 Beech 1900D (electronic
surv); 5 C-295M; 1 F-27 Friendship; PAX 6: 1 A340; 4 US$ 31.9bn 33.9bn
Gulfstream IV-SP; 1 Gulfstream V per capita US$ 24,146 25,170
TRG 99: 36 L-39ZA Albatros; 7 L-39C Albatros; 16 Yak-130 Growth % 3.0 2.5
Mitten*; 40 Z-142 Inflation % 2.8 0.9
HELICOPTERS
Def bdgt [a] D 573m 557m 557m
ATK 37: 31 Mi-24 Hind; 6 Mi-28NE Havoc
SAR 3 Ka-27PS Helix D US$ 1.52bn 1.48bn
MRH 11: 8 AW139 (SAR); 3 Bell 412EP FMA (US) US$ 7.5m 5m 0m
MRH/TPT 74 Mi-8 Hip (med tpt)/Mi-17 Hip H US$1=D 0.38 0.38
TPT 48: Heavy 8 Mi-26T2 Halo; Medium 4 Ka-32T Helix; [a] Excludes funds allocated to the Ministry of the Interior
Light 36: 8 AW119KE Koala; 8 AS355 Ecureuil; 28 PZL
Mi-2 Hoplite Population 1,410,942
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES Ethnic groups: Nationals 46%; Asian 45.5%; African 1.5%; other or
ISR • Medium Seeker II unspecified 7%
AIR DEFENCE
Long-range S-300PMU2 (SA-20 Gargoyle) Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Medium-range 9K317 Buk-M2E (SA-17 Grizzly); S-125 Male 9.7% 3.8% 5.1% 6.2% 34.3% 1.4%
Pechora-M (SA-3 Goa) Female 9.4% 3.2% 3.6% 3.8% 17.8% 1.5%
Short-range 2K12 Kvadrat (SA-6 Gainful)
GUNS 725 100mm/130mm/85mm Capabilities
AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (A-11 Archer); IR/ Bahrain has small but comparatively well-equipped and
SARH R-40/46 (AA-6 Acrid); R-23/24 (AA-7 Apex); R-27 -trained armed forces. The core role of the military is to
protect territorial integrity, although this is fundamentally
and North Africa

(AA-10 Alamo); ARH R-77 (AA-12A Adder);
Middle East
ASM Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen); Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge); underpinned by the presence of the US 5th Fleet and
Kh-31P/A (AS-17A/B Krypton); Kh-59ME (AS-18 Kazoo); Bahrain’s membership of the Gulf Cooperation Council
ZT-35 Ingwe (GCC). It has contributed both ground and air units to the
ARM Kh-25MP (AS-12 Kegler) Saudi-led coalition of GCC states that intervened in Yemen
in 2015 to counter the Houthi-led insurgency – notably
Paramilitary ε187,200 units from the Royal Guard. Bahraini forces have suffered
combat losses during the operation. The navy has in the
Gendarmerie 20,000 past also assisted in the naval blockade. The Royal Bahrain
Ministry of Defence control; 6 regions Air Force has also supported the air campaign against
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ISIS in Syria. As part of a major air-force modernisation,
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Bahrain announced in late 2017 an intention to buy 16
RECCE AML-60 F-16V fighters and to upgrade its existing F-16C/Ds to that
APC • APC (W) 210: 100 TH-390 Fahd; 110 Panhard M3 configuration. Upgrade work approved by the US DoD
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 12+: 12 AW109; Some includes the sale of active electronically scanned array
PZL Mi-2 Hoplite radars and SNIPER targeting pods, which should enhance
its tactical-combat capabilities. In a major enhancement
National Security Forces 16,000
to Bahrain’s air mobility, it has bought two ex-UK C-130J
Directorate of National Security. Small arms
transport aircraft. In late 2017, Bahrain assumed command
Republican Guard 1,200 of CTF-151, marking, according to Combined Maritime
Forces command, the first time that a GCC nation has
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
assumed command of a CTF outside the Arabian Gulf.
RECCE AML-60 ACTIVE 8,200 (Army 6,000 Navy 700 Air 1,500)
APC • APC (T) M3 half-track Paramilitary 11,260
Legitimate Defence Groups ε150,000
Self-defence militia, communal guards (60,000) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

FORCES BY ROLE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO SPECIAL FORCES
UN • MONUSCO 5 obs 1 SF bn
MANOEUVRE PCFG 4 Ahmed el Fateh (GER Lurssen 45m) with 2 twin

Armoured lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun
1 armd bde(-) (1 recce bn, 2 armd bn) PB 4: 2 Al Jarim (US Swift FPB-20); 2 Al Riffa (GER Lurssen
Mechanised 38m)
1 inf bde (2 mech bn, 1 mot bn) PBF 2 Mk V SOC
Light AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 9
1 (Amiri) gd bn LCU 7: 1 Loadmaster; 4 Mashtan; 2 Dinar (ADSB 42m)
COMBAT SUPPORT LCVP 2 Sea Keeper
1 arty bde (1 hvy arty bty, 2 med arty bty, 1 lt arty bty,
1 MRL bty) Naval Aviation
1 engr coy EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 2 Bo-105
1 log coy
1 tpt coy Air Force 1,500
1 med coy
FORCES BY ROLE
AIR DEFENCE
1 AD bn (1 ADA bty, 2 SAM bty) FIGHTER
2 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MBT 180 M60A3
TRANSPORT
RECCE 22 AML-90
IFV 67: 25 YPR-765 PRI; 42 AIFV-B-C25 1 (Royal) flt with B-727; B-747; BAe-146; Gulfstream II;
APC 203+ Gulfstream IV; Gulfstream 450; Gulfstream 550; S-92A
APC (T) 203: 200 M113A2; 3 AIFV-B TRAINING
APC (W) Arma 6×6 1 sqn with Hawk Mk129*
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES 1 sqn with T-67M Firefly
ARV 53 Fahd 240 ATTACK HELICOPTER
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE 2 sqn with AH-1E/F Cobra; TAH-1P Cobra
MSL TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
SP 5 AIFV-B-Milan; HMMWV with BGM-71A TOW 1 sqn with Bell 212 (AB-212)
MANPATS BGM-71A TOW 1 sqn with UH-60M Black Hawk
RCL 31: 106mm 25 M40A1; 120mm 6 MOBAT 1 (VIP) sqn with Bo-105; S-70A Black Hawk; UH-60L
ARTILLERY 161 Black Hawk
SP 82: 155mm 20 M109A5; 203mm 62 M110A2 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
TOWED 36: 105mm 8 L118 Light Gun; 155mm 28 M198 AIRCRAFT 38 combat capable
MRL 13: 122mm 4 SR5; 227mm 9 M270 MLRS
FTR 12: 8 F-5E Tiger II; 4 F-5F Tiger II
MOR 30: 81mm 18: 12 L16; 6 EIMOS; SP 120mm 12
FGA 20: 16 F-16C Block 40 Fighting Falcon; 4 F-16D Block
M113A2
40 Fighting Falcon
TPT • PAX 10: 1 B-727; 2 B-747; 1 Gulfstream II; 1
SRBM • Conventional MGM-140A ATACMS (launched
from M270 MLRS) Gulfstream IV; 1 Gulfstream 450; 1 Gulfstream 550; 3
AIR DEFENCE BAe-146
SAM TRG 9: 6 Hawk Mk129*; 3 T-67M Firefly
Medium-range 6 MIM-23B I-Hawk HELICOPTERS
Short-range 7 Crotale ATK 28: 16 AH-1E Cobra; 12 AH-1F Cobra
Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger; RBS-70 TPT 27: Medium 13: 3 S-70A Black Hawk; 1 S-92A (VIP);
GUNS 24: 35mm 12 Oerlikon; 40mm 12 L/70 1 UH-60L Black Hawk; 8 UH-60M Black Hawk; Light 14: 11
Bell 212 (AB-212); 3 Bo-105
Navy 700 TRG 6 TAH-1P Cobra
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 1 AAM • IR AIM-9P Sidewinder; SARH AIM-7 Sparrow;
FRIGATES • FFGHM 1 Sabha (ex-US Oliver Hazard ARH AIM-120B/C AMRAAM
Perry) with 1 Mk13 GMLS with SM-1MR SAM/RGM- ASM AGM-65D/G Maverick; some TOW
84C Harpoon AShM, 2 triple 324mm Mk32 ASTT with BOMBS
Mk46 LWT, 1 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 76mm gun Laser-guided GBU-10/12 Paveway II
(capacity 1 Bo-105 hel)
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12 Paramilitary ε11,260
CORVETTES • FSG 2 Al Manama (GER Lurssen 62m)
with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 2 76mm Police 9,000
guns, 1 hel landing platform Ministry of Interior
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Egypt EGY
RECCE 8 S52 Shorland Egyptian Pound E£ 2016 2017 2018
APC • APC (W) Otokar ISV; Cobra
HELICOPTERS GDP Ε£ 2.71tr 3.47tr
MRH 2 Bell 412 Twin Huey US$ 332bn n.k.
ISR 2 Hughes 500 per capita US$ 3,685 n.k.
TPT • Light 1 Bo-105 Growth % 4.3 4.1
National Guard ε2,000 Inflation % 10.2 23.5
FORCES BY ROLE Def bdgt Ε£ 43.2bn 47.1bn 51.9bn

MANOEUVRE US$ 5.30bn 2.67bn
Other FMA (US) US$ 1.3bn 1.3bn 1.3bn
3 paramilitary bn US$1=E£ 8.15 17.65
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
APC • APC (W) Arma 6×6; Cobra Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Coast Guard ε260 Male 17.2% 4.8% 4.8% 4.8% 17.2% 2.0%
Ministry of Interior Female 16.0% 4.5% 4.6% 4.6% 16.8% 2.1%
PBF 23: 2 Ares 18; 4 Jaris; 6 Saham; 6 Fajr; 5 Jarada Capabilities
PB 29: 6 Haris; 1 Al Muharraq; 10 Deraa (of which 4
Territorial integrity and internal security are the two
Halmatic 20, 2 Souter 20, 4 Rodman 20); 10 Saif (of which
principal tasks for the Egyptian armed forces, although
4 Fairey Sword, 6 Halmatic 160); 2 Hawar
emphasis has recently been on the latter: the armed
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCU 1 Load-
forces have been fighting ISIS-affiliated groups in the
master II
northern Sinai for several years. Notwithstanding this, the
military is also undertaking an equipment-recapitalisation
DEPLOYMENT
and North Africa

programme, significant elements of which have been
Middle East
sourced from Russia. Deliveries of the MiG-29M/M2 multi-
PERSIAN GULF
role fighter aircraft, the Ka-52 attack helicopter and the
Combined Maritime Forces • CTF-152: 1 PCFG
S-300V4 SAM system began in 2017. Deliveries of the Rafale
SAUDI ARABIA to the air force continued, while Egypt and France appeared
Operation Restoring Hope 250; 1 SF gp; 6 F-16C Fighting close to concluding a deal for a further 12 aircraft in late
Falcon 2017. Egypt also hosted its first joint exercise with Russia
in 2016, followed by a comparatively large-scale joint
FOREIGN FORCES airborne exercise in 2017. The re-equipment programme
has reportedly been characterised by President Al-Sisi as
Saudi Arabia GCC (SANG): Peninsula Shield ε1,500
allowing the country to be able to address regional security
United Kingdom Air Force 80: 1 naval base issues. Egypt regularly exercises its two new Mistral-class
United States US Central Command 5,000; 1 HQ (5th amphibious-assault vessels. These have the potential
Fleet); 2 AD bty with MIM-104E/F Patriot PAC-2/3 to support future regional deployments, though as yet
neither vessel has integrated defences or a dedicated air
wing. The delivery of the first two of four Type-209/1400
submarines from Germany serves to further highlight the
range of Egypt’s ongoing naval recapitalisation.
30,000 Air Defence Command 80,000) Paramilitary
397,000
Conscription liability 12 months–3 years (followed by
refresher training over a period of up to 9 years)
RESERVE 479,000 (Army 375,000 Navy 14,000 Air
20,000 Air Defence 70,000)
Army 90,000–120,000; 190,000–220,000
conscript (total 310,000)
FORCES BY ROLE TOWED 962: 122mm 526: 190 D-30M; 36 M-1931/37; 300
SPECIAL FORCES M-30; 130mm 420 M-46; 155mm 16 GH-52
5 cdo gp MRL 450: 122mm 356: 96 BM-11; 60 BM-21; 50 Sakr-10; 50
1 counter-terrorist unit Sakr-18; 100 Sakr-36; 130mm 36 K136 Kooryong; 140mm
MANOEUVRE 32 BM-14; 227mm 26 M270 MLRS; 240mm (48 BM-24 in
Armoured store)
4 armd div (2 armd bde, 1 mech bde, 1 arty bde) MOR 2,564: 81mm 50 M125A2; 82mm 500; SP 107mm
4 indep armd bde 100: 65 M106A1; 35 M106A2; 120mm 1,848: 1,800 M-1943;
1 Republican Guard bde 48 Brandt; SP 120mm 36 M1064A3; 160mm 30 M-160
Mechanised SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
8 mech div (1 armd bde, 2 mech bde, 1 arty bde) SRBM • Conventional 42+: 9 FROG-7; 24 Sakr-80; 9
4 indep mech bde Scud-B
Light
RADAR • LAND AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder; AN/TPQ-37
1 inf div
Firefinder (arty/mor)
2 indep inf bde
Air Manoeuvre
ISR • Medium R4E-50 Skyeye; ASN-209
2 air mob bde
AIR DEFENCE
1 para bde
SAM
1 SRBM bde with FROG-7 Point-defence 96+: 50 M1097 Avenger; 26 M48
1 SRBM bde with Scud-B Chaparral; 20 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9 Gaskin); Ayn al-Saqr;
COMBAT SUPPORT 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; FIM-92 Stinger; 9K38 Igla
15 arty bde (SA-18 Grouse)
6 engr bde (3 engr bn) GUNS
2 spec ops engr bn SP 205: 23mm 165: 45 Sinai-23; 120 ZSU-23-4; 57mm 40
6 salvage engr bn ZSU-57-2
24 MP bn TOWED 700: 14.5mm 300 ZPU-4; 23mm 200 ZU-23-2;
18 sigs bn 57mm 200 S-60
36 log bn Navy ε8,500 (incl 2,000 Coast Guard); 10,000
27 med bn conscript (total 18,500)
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 6
MBT 2,460: 1,110 M1A1 Abrams; 300 M60A1; 850 M60A3; 4 Romeo† (PRC Type-033) with 8 single 533mm TT with
200 T-62 (260 Ramses II (mod T-54/55); 840 T-54/T-55; 300 UGM-84C Harpoon AShM/Mk37 HWT (being replaced
T-62 all in store) by Type-209/1400)
RECCE 412: 300 BRDM-2; 112 Commando Scout 2 Type-209/1400 with 8 single 533mm TT with DM2A4/
IFV 405+: 390 YPR-765 25mm; 15+ BMP-1 (205 BMP-1 in SeaHake Mod 4 HWT
store) PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 9
APC 4,701+ DESTROYERS • DDGHM 1 Tahya Misr (FRA Aquitaine)
APC (T) 2,700: 2,000 M113A2/YPR-765 (incl variants); with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 2
500 BTR-50; 200 OT-62
octuple A43 VLS with Aster 15 SAM, 2 twin B515 324mm
APC (W) 1,560: 250 BMR-600P; 250 BTR-60; 410 Fahd-
ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel)
30/TH 390 Fahd; 650 Walid
FRIGATES 9
PPV 441+: 92 Caiman; some REVA III; some REVA V
FFGHM 5:
LWB; 349 RG-33L (incl 89 amb)
4 Alexandria (ex-US Oliver Hazard Perry) with 1 Mk13
AUV Panthera T6; Sherpa Light Scout
GMLS with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM/SM-1MP
ARV 607+: Fahd 240; BMR 3560.55; 12 Maxxpro ARV; 220 SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1
M88A1; 90 M88A2; M113 ARV; 45 M578; T-54/55 ARV Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 SH-2G
VLB KMM; MTU; MTU-20 Super Seasprite ASW hel)
MW Aardvark JFSU Mk4 1 El Fateh (Gowind 2500) with 2 quad lnchrs with
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL MM40 Exocet Blk 3 AShM, 1 16-cell VLS with VL-
SP 352+: 52 M901, 300 YPR-765 PRAT; HMMWV with MICA SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with MU90
TOW-2 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel)
MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger) (incl BRDM-2); FFGH 2 Damyat (ex-US Knox) with 1 octuple Mk16
HJ-73; Milan; TOW-2 GMLS with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM/ASROC, 2
ARTILLERY 4,468 twin 324mm Mk 32 TT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Phalanx
SP 492+: 122mm 124+: 124 SP 122; D-30 mod; 130mm CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-2G Super
M-46 mod; 155mm 368: 164 M109A2; 204 M109A5 Seasprite ASW hel)
FFG 2 Najim Al Zaffer (PRC Jianghu I) with 2 twin lnchr LCU 9 Vydra (FSU) (capacity either 3 AMX-30 MBT or
with HY-2 (CH-SS-N-2 Safflower) AShM, 4 RBU 1200 100 troops)
A/S mor, 2 twin 57mm guns LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 24
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 61 AOT 7 Ayeda (FSU Toplivo – 1 additional in reserve)
CORVETTES 3 AE 1 Halaib (ex-GER Westerwald-class)
FSGM 2 Abu Qir (ESP Descubierta – 1†) with 2 quad AKR 3 Al Hurreya
Mk141 lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 1 AR 1 Shaledin (ex-GER Luneberg-class)
octuple Albatros lnchr with Aspide SAM, 2 triple ARS 2 Al Areesh
Mk32 324mm ASTT with Sting Ray LWT, 1 twin ATF 5 Al Maks† (FSU Okhtensky)
375mm A/S mor, 1 76mm gun AX 5: 1 El Fateh† (ex-UK ‘Z’ class); 1 El Horriya (also used
FS 1 Shabab Misr (ex-RoK Po Hang) with 2 76mm guns as the presidential yacht); 1 Al Kousser; 1 Intishat; 1
PCFGM 4: other
4 Ezzat (US Ambassador IV) with 2 quad lnchr with
RGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM, 1 21-cell Mk49 Coastal Defence
lnchr with RAM Block 1A SAM, 1 Mk15 Mod 21 Army tps, Navy control
Block 1B Phalanx CIWS 1 76mm gun EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PCFG 12: COASTAL DEFENCE
1 Molnya (RUS Tarantul IV) with 2 twin lnchr with ARTY 100mm; 130mm SM-4-1; 152mm
3M80E Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn), 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 AShM 4K87 (SS-C-2B Samlet); Otomat MkII
76mm gun
6 Ramadan with 4 single lnchr with Otomat MkII AShM, Naval Aviation
1 76mm gun All aircraft operated by Air Force
5 Tiger with 2 twin lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, 1 AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 4 Beech 1900C (maritime
76mm gun surveillance)
PCC 5: HELICOPTERS
5 Al-Nour (ex-PRC Hainan – 3 more in reserve†) with 2 ASW 10 SH-2G Super Seasprite with Mk 46 LWT
triple 324mm TT, 4 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 2 twin 57mm MRH 5 SA342L Gazelle
guns UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
and North Africa

PBFG 17: ISR • Light 2 Camcopter 5.1
Middle East
4 Hegu (PRC – Komar type) with 2 single lnchr with
SY-1 AShM (2 additional vessels in reserve) Coast Guard 2,000
5 October (FSU Komar – 1†) with 2 single lnchr with EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Otomat MkII AShM (1 additional vessel in reserve) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 79
8 Osa I (ex-YUG – 3†) with 1 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-N-5 PBF 14: 6 Crestitalia; 5 Swift Protector; 3 Peterson
Grail) SAM (manual aiming), 4 single lnchr with PB 65: 5 Nisr; 12 Sea Spectre MkIII; 15 Swiftships; 21
P-15 Termit (SS-N-2A Styx) AShM Timsah; 3 Type-83; 9 Peterson
PBFM 4:
4 Shershen (FSU) with 1 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) Air Force 30,000 (incl 10,000 conscript)
SAM (manual aiming), 1 12-tube BM-24 MRL FORCES BY ROLE
PBF 10: FIGHTER
6 Kaan 20 (TUR MRTP 20) 1 sqn with F-16A/B Fighting Falcon
4 Osa II (ex-FIN) 8 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
PB 6: 1 sqn with J-7
4 Shanghai II (PRC) 3 sqn with MiG-21 Fishbed/MiG-21U Mongol A
2 Shershen (FSU – 1†) with 4 single 533mm TT, 1 8-tube 2 sqn with Mirage 5D/E
BM-21 MRL 1 sqn with Mirage 2000B/C
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 14 FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
MHC 5: 2 Al Siddiq (ex-US Osprey); 3 Dat Assawari (US 1 sqn with Mirage 5E2
Swiftships) 1 sqn (forming) with Rafale DM
MSI 2 Safaga (US Swiftships) 1 sqn (forming) with MiG-29M/M2 Fulcrum
MSO 7: 3 Assiout (FSU T-43 class); 4 Aswan (FSU Yurka) ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
AMPHIBIOUS 20 1 sqn with SH-2G Super Seasprite
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LHD 2 Gamal MARITIME PATROL
Abdel Nasser (FRA Mistral) (capacity 16 med hel; 2 LCT 1 sqn with Beech 1900C
or 4 LCM; 13 MBTs; 50 AFVs; 450 troops) ELECTRONIC WARFARE
LANDING SHIPS • LSM 3 Polnochny A (FSU) (capacity 1 sqn with Beech 1900 (ELINT); Commando Mk2E (ECM)
6 MBT; 180 troops) ELECTRONIC WARFARE/TRANSPORT
LANDING CRAFT 15: 1 sqn with C-130H/VC-130H Hercules
LCM 4 CTM NG AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING
LCT 2 EDA-R 1 sqn with E-2C Hawkeye
SEARCH & RESCUE ISR • Medium R4E-50 Skyeye

1 unit with AW139 AIR LAUNCHED MISSILES
TRANSPORT AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡; AIM-9M/P Sidewinder;
1 sqn with An-74TK-200A R-550 Magic; IIR Mica IR; ARH Mica RF; SARH AIM-
1 sqn with C-130H/C-130H-30 Hercules 7E/F/M Sparrow; R-530
1 sqn with C295M ASM AGM-65A/D/F/G Maverick; AGM-114F/K Hellfire;
1 sqn with DHC-5D Buffalo AS-30L; HOT
1 sqn with B-707-366C; B-737-100; Beech 200 Super AShM AGM-84 Harpoon; AM39 Exocet;
King Air; Falcon 20; Gulfstream III; Gulfstream IV; ARM Armat; Kh-25MP (AS-12 Kegler)
Gulfstream IV-SP BOMBS
TRAINING Laser-guided GBU-10/12 Paveway II
1 sqn with Alpha Jet*
1 sqn with DHC-5 Buffalo Air Defence Command 80,000 conscript;
3 sqn with EMB-312 Tucano 70,000 reservists (total 150,000)
1 sqn with Grob 115EG FORCES BY ROLE
ε6 sqn with K-8 Karakorum* AIR DEFENCE
1 sqn with L-39 Albatros; L-59E Albatros* 5 AD div (geographically based) (total: 12 SAM bty with
ATTACK HELICOPTER M48 Chaparral, 12 radar bn, 12 ADA bde (total: 100
ADA bn), 12 SAM bty with MIM-23B I-Hawk, 14 SAM
2 sqn with SA-342K Gazelle (with HOT)
bty with Crotale, 18 AD bn with RIM-7M Sea Sparrow
1 sqn with SA-342L Gazelle
with Skyguard/GDF-003 with Skyguard, 110 SAM bn
with S-125 Pechora-M (SA-3A Goa); 2K12 Kub (SA-6
1 sqn with CH-47C/D Chinook
Gainful); S-75M Volkhov (SA-2 Guideline))
1 sqn with Mi-8
1 sqn with Mi-8/Mi-17-V1 Hip EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn with S-70 Black Hawk; UH-60A/L Black Hawk AIR DEFENCE
UAV SAM 812+
Some sqn with R4E-50 Skyeye; Teledyne-Ryan 324 Long-range S-300V4 (SA-23)
Scarab; Wing Loong (GJ-1)* Medium-range 612+: 40+ Buk-M1-2/M2E (SA-11/SA-
17); 78+ MIM-23B I-Hawk; 282 S-75M Volkhov (SA-2
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 557 combat capable Guideline); 212+ S-125 Pechora-M (SA-3A Goa)
FTR 62: 26 F-16A Fighting Falcon; 6 F-16B Fighting Short-range 150+: 56+ 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful); 10
Falcon; ε30 J-7 9K331M Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet); 24+ Crotale; 80 RIM-
FGA 298+: 139 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 37 F-16D Fighting 7M Sea Sparrow with Skyguard
Falcon; 3 Mirage 2000B; 15 Mirage 2000C; 36 Mirage 5D/E; Point-defence 50+ M48 Chaparral
12 Mirage 5E2; ε40 MiG-21 Fishbed/MiG-21U Mongol A; GUNS 1,646+
4+ MiG-29M/M2 Fulcrum; 6 Rafale DM; 5 Rafale EM SP • 23mm 266+: 36+ Sinai-23 with Ayn al-Saqr
ELINT 2 VC-130H Hercules MANPAD; 230 ZSU-23-4
ISR 6 Mirage 5R (5SDR)* TOWED 1,380: 35mm 80 GDF-003 with Skyguard;
AEW&C 7 E-2C Hawkeye 57mm 600 S-60; 85mm 400 M-1939 (KS-12); 100mm
TPT 77: Medium 24: 21 C-130H Hercules; 3 C-130H-30 300 KS-19
Hercules; Light 42: 3 An-74TK-200A; 1 Beech 200 King
Air; 4 Beech 1900 (ELINT); 4 Beech 1900C; 21 C295M; Paramilitary ε397,000 active
9 DHC-5D Buffalo (being withdrawn) PAX 11: 1 B-707-
Central Security Forces ε325,000
366C; 3 Falcon 20; 2 Gulfstream III; 1 Gulfstream IV; 4
Ministry of Interior; includes conscripts
Gulfstream IV-SP
TRG 329: 36 Alpha Jet*; 54 EMB-312 Tucano; 74 Grob ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
115EG; 120 K-8 Karakorum*; 10 L-39 Albatros; 35 L-59E* APC • APC (W) Walid
HELICOPTERS National Guard ε60,000
ATK 48: 45 AH-64D Apache; 3 Ka-52A Hokum B
Lt wpns only
ASW 10 SH-2G Super Seasprite (opcon Navy)
ELINT 4 Commando Mk2E (ECM) FORCES BY ROLE
MRH 72: 2 AW139 (SAR); 65 SA342K Gazelle (some with MANOEUVRE
HOT); 5 SA342L Gazelle (opcon Navy) Other
TPT 96: Heavy 19: 3 CH-47C Chinook; 16 CH-47D 8 paramilitary bde (cadre) (3 paramilitary bn)
Chinook; Medium 77: 2 AS-61; 24 Commando (of which EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
3 VIP); 40 Mi-8T Hip; 3 Mi-17-1V Hip; 4 S-70 Black Hawk ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES APC • APC
(VIP); 4 UH-60L Black Hawk (VIP) (W) 250 Walid
TRG 17 UH-12E
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES Border Guard Forces ε12,000
CISR • Heavy 4+ Wing Loong (GJ-1) Ministry of Interior; lt wpns only
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE Iran IRN
Other
Iranian Rial r 2016 2017 2018
18 Border Guard regt
GDP r 12,723tr 14,522tr
US$ 404bn 428bn
DEPLOYMENT
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC Growth % 12.5 3.5
UN • MINUSCA 1,014; 5 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 tpt coy Inflation % 9.0 10.5
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO Def bdgt r ε499tr ε544tr
UN • MONUSCO 154; 19 obs; 1 SF coy US$ ε15.9bn ε16.0
LIBERIA US$1=r 31,457.39 33,955.668
UN • UNMIL 2 obs Population 82,021,564
MALI Ethnic groups: Persian 51%; Azeri 24%; Gilaki/Mazandarani 8%;
UN • MINUSMA 74; 3 obs; 1 MP coy Kurdish 7%; Arab 3%; Lur 2%; Baloch 2%; Turkmen 2%
SOUTH SUDAN Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus

UN • UNMISS 1; 3 obs Male 12.4% 3.5% 4.0% 5.4% 22.9% 2.5%
SUDAN Female 11.8% 3.3% 4.8% 5.1% 22.4% 2.8%
UN • UNAMID 847; 18 obs; 1 inf bn
Capabilities
Iran continues to rely on a mix of ageing combat equipment,
Operation Restoring Hope 6 F-16C Fighting Falcon
reasonably well-trained regular and Islamic Revolutionary
WESTERN SAHARA Guard Corps (IRGC) forces, and its ballistic-missile inventory
UN • MINURSO 23 obs to underpin the security of the regime. The IRGC, including
senior military leaders, has been increasingly involved in
and North Africa

FOREIGN FORCES the civil war in Syria, supporting President Assad’s regular
Middle East
and irregular forces. It was first deployed to Syria in an
Australia MFO (Operation Mazurka) 25
‘advisory’ role in 2012; deployments of the army began
Canada MFO 70 in 2016. Iran’s role in Syria escalated with ballistic-missile
Colombia MFO 354; 1 inf bn strikes in June, in response to attacks on sites in Tehran
Czech Republic MFO 18; 1 C295M claimed by ISIS. Further development activity in this area
Fiji MFO 203; elm 1 inf bn was highlighted by tests of a missile and launch vehicle, as
France MFO 1 well as the parading in September of the new 2,000km-range
Italy MFO 75; 3 PB Khorramshahr missile. The IRGC’s Quds Force is a principal
New Zealand MFO 26; 1 trg unit; 1 tpt unit element of Iran’s military power abroad, while elements of
Norway MFO 3 the Basij militia also play a foreign role (as well as operating
United Kingdom MFO 2 domestically) – as do Iranian-supported contingents of
United States MFO 410; elm 1 ARNG inf bn; 1 ARNG spt other nationalities. The armed forces continue to struggle
bn (1 EOD coy, 1 medical coy, 1 hel coy) with an ageing inventory of primary combat equipment
Uruguay MFO 58 1 engr/tpt unit that ingenuity and asymmetric-warfare techniques can only
partially offset. In regional terms, Iran has a well-developed
defence-industrial base, which has displayed the capacity to
support and sustain equipment when access to the original
manufacturer is blocked. Key sectors continue to develop,
including missiles and guided weapons, but Iran’s defence
industry is still incapable of meeting the armed forces’ need
for modern weapons systems. Iran will increasingly seek
these through imports; co-development and technology
transfer will likely also feature in major deals. Although
the Trump administration decertified Iranian compliance
with the 2015 nuclear agreement with the P5+1 and the
European Union, for now the agreement still opens the
way for Iran to revamp its equipment inventory. China
and Russia are potentially major suppliers, although sales
of conventional systems remain embargoed for a five-year
period after the agreement’s ‘adoption day’. Following the
nuclear agreement, Tehran and Moscow re-engaged on
the sale of a version of the S-300 long-range surface-to-air ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
missile system; what is believed to be the S-300PMU2 (SA- ARV 20+: BREM-1 reported; 20 Chieftain ARV; M578;
20 Gargoyle) variant has now been introduced into service. T-54/55 ARV reported
VLB 15: 15 Chieftain AVLB MW Taftan 1
ACTIVE 523,000 (Army 350,000 Islamic ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Revolutionary Guard Corps 125,000 Navy 18,000 Air MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger/I-
30,000) Paramilitary 40,000 Raad); 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (AT-5
Armed Forces General Staff coordinates two parallel Spandrel/Towsan-1); Saeqhe 1; Saeqhe 2; Toophan; Toophan 2
organisations: the regular armed forces and the Islamic RCL 200+: 75mm M20; 82mm B-10; 106mm ε200 M40;
Revolutionary Guard Corps 107mm B-11
ARTILLERY 6,798+
Conscript liability 21 months (reported, with variations
SP 292+: 122mm 60+: 60 2S1 Gvozdika; Raad-1 (Thunder 1);
depending on location in which service is performed)
155mm 150+: 150 M109; Raad-2 (Thunder 2); 170mm 30
RESERVE 350,000 (Army 350,000, ex-service M-1978; 175mm 22 M107; 203mm 30 M110
volunteers) TOWED 2,030+; 105mm 150: 130 M101A1; 20 M-56;
122mm 640: 540 D-30; 100 Type-54 (M-30); 130mm 985
M-46; 152mm 30 D-20; 155mm 205: 120 GHN-45; 70
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE M114; 15 Type-88 WAC-21; 203mm 20 M115
MRL 1,476+: 107mm 1,300: 700 Type-63; 600 HASEB
Army 130,000; 220,000 conscript (total 350,000) Fadjr 1; 122mm 157: 7 BM-11; 100 BM-21 Grad; 50 Arash/
FORCES BY ROLE Hadid/Noor; 240mm 19+: ε10 Fadjr 3; 9 M-1985; 330mm
5 corps-level regional HQ Fadjr 5
COMMAND MOR 3,000: 81mm; 82mm; 107mm M30; 120mm M-65
1 cdo div HQ SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
4 armd div HQ SRBM • Conventional ε30 CH-SS-8 (175 msl); Shahin-1/
2 mech div HQ Shahin-2; Nazeat; Oghab
4 inf div HQ AIRCRAFT • TPT 17 Light 16: 10 Cessna 185; 2 F-27
SPECIAL FORCES Friendship; 4 Turbo Commander 690; PAX 1 Falcon 20
1 cdo div (3 cdo bde) HELICOPTERS
6 cdo bde ATK 50 AH-1J Cobra
1 SF bde TPT 167: Heavy 20 CH-47C Chinook; Medium 69: 49 Bell
MANOEUVRE 214; 20 Mi-171; Light 78: 68 Bell 205A (AB-205A); 10 Bell
Armoured 206 Jet Ranger (AB-206)
8 armd bde UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
Mechanised CISR • Medium Shahed 129
14 mech bde ISR • Medium Mohajer 3/4; Light Mohajer 2; Ababil
Light AIR DEFENCE
12 inf bde SAM
Air Manoeuvre Short-range FM-80
Point-defence 9K36 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin); 9K32
1 AB bde
Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; Misaq 1 (QW-1 Vanguard); Misaq
Aviation
2 (QW-18); 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch) (reported);
Some avn gp
HN-5A
COMBAT SUPPORT
GUNS 1,122
5 arty gp
SP 180: 23mm 100 ZSU-23-4; 57mm 80 ZSU-57-2
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TOWED 942+: 14.5mm ZPU-2; ZPU-4; 23mm 300 ZU-
Totals incl those held by IRGC Ground Forces. Some 23-2; 35mm 92 Skyguard; 37mm M-1939; 40mm 50 L/70;
equipment serviceability in doubt 57mm 200 S-60; 85mm 300 M-1939
MBT 1,513+: 480 T-72S; 150 M60A1; 75+ T-62; 100 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 125,000+
Chieftain Mk3/Mk5; 540 T-54/T-55/Type-59/Safir-74; 168
M47/M48; Zulfiqar Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Ground
LT TK 80+: 80 Scorpion; Towsan Forces 100,000+
RECCE 35 EE-9 Cascavel Controls Basij paramilitary forces. Lightly manned in
IFV 610+: 210 BMP-1; 400 BMP-2 with 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 peacetime. Primary role: internal security; secondary
Spigot); BMT-2 Cobra role: external defence, in conjunction with regular armed
APC 640+ forces
APC (T) 340: 140 Boragh with 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 FORCES BY ROLE
Spigot); 200 M113 COMMAND
APC (W) 300+: 300 BTR-50/BTR-60; Rakhsh 31 provincial corps HQ (2 in Tehran)
SPECIAL FORCES Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Air Force

3 spec ops div Controls Iran’s strategic-missile force
MANOEUVRE
FORCES BY ROLE
Armoured
MISSILE
2 armd div
ε1 bde with Shahab-1/2
3 armd bde
ε1 bn with Shahab-3; Ghadr-1; Sajjil-2 (in devt)
Light
8+ inf div EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
5+ inf bde SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
Air Manoeuvre MRBM • Conventional 22+: 12+ Shahab-3/Ghadr-1
1 AB bde (mobile); 10 Shahab-3/Ghadr-1 (silo); some Sajjil-2 (in
devt)
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Naval SRBM • Conventional 18+: some Fateh 110; 12–18
Forces 20,000+ (incl 5,000 Marines) Shahab-1/2 (ε200–300 msl); some Zelzal
FORCES BY ROLE UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
COMBAT SUPPORT CISR • Medium Shahed 129
Some arty bty
Some AShM bty with HY-2 (CH-SSC-3 Seersucker) Navy 18,000
AShM HQ at Bandar Abbas
In addition to the vessels listed, the IRGC operates a In addition to the vessels listed, the Iranian Navy operates
substantial number of patrol boats with a full-load dis- a substantial number of patrol boats with a full-load dis-
placement below 10 tonnes, including ε40 Boghammar- placement below 10 tonnes
class vessels and small Bavar-class wing-in-ground effect SUBMARINES 21
air vehicles TACTICAL 21
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 126 SSK 3 Taregh (RUS Paltus Project-877EKM) with 6
PBFG 56: single 533mm TT
5 C14 with 2 twin lnchr with C-701 (Kosar)/C-704 SSC 1 Fateh (in trials)
and North Africa

(Nasr) AShM SSW 17: 16 Qadir with 2 single 533mm TT with Valfajar
Middle East
10 Mk13 with 2 single lnchr with C-704 (Nasr) AShM, HWT (additional vessels in build); 1 Nahang
2 single 324mm TT PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 67 (+ε50 small
10 Thondor (PRC Houdong) with 2 twin lnchr with craft under 10 tonnes)
C-802A (Ghader) AShM, 2 twin AK230 CIWS CORVETTES 7
25 Peykaap II (IPS-16 mod) with 2 single lnchr with FSGM 2 Jamaran (UK Vosper Mk 5 derivative – 1
C-701 (Kosar) AShM/C-704 (Nasr), 2 single 324mm more undergoing sea trials) with 2 twin lnchr with
TT C-802 (Noor) (CH-SS-N-8 Saccade) AShM, 2 single
6 Zolfaghar (Peykaap III/IPS-16 mod) with 2 single lnchr with SM-1 SAM, 2 triple 324mm Mk32 ASTT, 1
lnchr with C-701 (Kosar)/C-704 (Nasr) AShM 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
PBFT 15 Peykaap I (IPS -16) with 2 single 324mm TT FSG 5:
PBF 35: 15 Kashdom II; 10 Tir (IPS-18); ε10 Pashe 3 Alvand (UK Vosper Mk 5) with 2 twin lnchr with
(MIG-G-1900) C-802 (CH-SS-N-8 Saccade) AShM, 2 triple Mk32
PB ε20 Ghaem 324mm ASTT, 1 114mm gun
AMPHIBIOUS 2 Bayandor (US PF-103) with 2 twin lnchr with C-802
LANDING SHIPS • LST 3 Hormuz 24 (Hejaz design (CH-SS-N-8 Saccade) AShM, 2 triple 324mm Mk32
for commercial use) ASTT, 1 76mm gun
LANDING CRAFT • LCT 2 Hormuz 21 (minelaying PCFG 13 Kaman (FRA Combattante II) with 1–2 twin lnchr
capacity) with C-802 (Noor) (CH-SS-N-8 Saccade) AShM, 1 76mm
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AP 3 Naser gun
COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM C-701 (Kosar); C-704 PBG 9:
(Nasr); C-802; HY-2 (CH-SSC-3 Seersucker) 3 Hendijan with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (Noor) (CH-
HELICOPTERS SS-N-8 Saccade) AShM
TPT 5+: Medium 5 Mi-171 Hip; Light some Bell 206 (AB- 3 Kayvan with 2 single lnchr with C-704 (Nasr)
206) Jet Ranger AShM
3 Parvin with 2 single lnchr with C-704 (Nasr) AShM
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Marines PBFT 3 Kajami (semi-submersible) with 2 324mm TT
5,000+ PBF 1 MIL55
FORCES BY ROLE PB 34: 9 C14; 9 Hendijan; 6 MkII; 10 MkIII
MANOEUVRE AMPHIBIOUS
Amphibious LANDING SHIPS 12
1 marine bde LSM 3 Farsi (ROK) (capacity 9 tanks; 140 troops)
LST 3 Hengam with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 9 TANKER/TRANSPORT

tanks; 225 troops) 1 sqn with B-707; B-747; B-747F
LSL 6 Fouque TRANSPORT
LANDING CRAFT 11 1 sqn with B-707; Falcon 50; L-1329 Jetstar; Bell 412
LCT 2 2 sqn with C-130E/H Hercules
LCU 1 Liyan 110 1 sqn with F-27 Friendship; Falcon 20
UCAC 8: 2 Wellington Mk 4; 4 Wellington Mk 5; 2 Tondar 1 sqn with Il-76 Candid; An-140 (Iran-140 Faraz)
(UK Winchester) TRAINING
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 18 1 sqn with Beech F33A/C Bonanza
AE 2 Delvar 1 sqn with F-5B Freedom Fighter
AFD 2 Dolphin 1 sqn with PC-6
AG 1 Hamzah with 2 single lnchr with C-802 (Noor) (CH- 1 sqn with PC-7 Turbo Trainer
55-N-8 Saccade) AShM Some units with EMB-312 Tucano; MFI-17 Mushshak; TB-
AK 3 Delvar 21 Trinidad; TB-200 Tobago
AORH 3: 2 Bandar Abbas; 1 Kharg with 1 76mm gun TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
AWT 5: 4 Kangan; 1 Delvar 1 sqn with CH-47 Chinook
AX 2 Kialas Some units with Bell 206A Jet Ranger (AB-206A);
COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM C-701 (Kosar); C-704 (Nasr); Shabaviz 2-75; Shabaviz 2061
C-802 (Noor); C-802A (Ghader); Ra’ad (reported) AIR DEFENCE
16 bn with MIM-23B I-Hawk/Shahin
Marines 2,600 4 bn with S-300PMU2 (SA-20 Gargoyle)
FORCES BY ROLE 5 sqn with FM-80 (Crotale); Rapier; Tigercat; S-75M
MANOEUVRE Volkhov (SA-2 Guideline); S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon);
Amphibious FIM-92A Stinger; 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K331
2 marine bde Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet) (reported)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Naval Aviation 2,600 AIRCRAFT 334 combat capable
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE FTR 184+: 20 F-5B Freedom Fighter; 55+ F-5E/F Tiger II
AIRCRAFT 3 combat capable 24 F-7M Airguard; 43 F-14 Tomcat; 36 MiG-29A/U/UB
ASW 3 P-3F Orion Fulcrum; up to 6 Azarakhsh (reported)
TPT 16: Light 13: 5 Do-228; 4 F-27 Friendship; 4 Turbo FGA 85: 64 F-4D/E Phantom II; 10 Mirage F-1E; up to 6
Commander 680; PAX 3 Falcon 20 (ELINT) Saegheh (reported); 3 Su-22M4 Fitter K; 2 Su-22UM-3K
HELICOPTERS Fitter G
ASW ε10 SH-3D Sea King ATK 39: 29 Su-24MK Fencer D; 7 Su-25K Frogfoot (status
MCM 3 RH-53D Sea Stallion unknown); 3 Su-25UBK Frogfoot (status unknown)
TPT • Light 17: 5 Bell 205A (AB-205A); 2 Bell 206 Jet ASW 5 P-3MP Orion
Ranger (AB-206); 10 Bell 212 (AB-212) ISR: 6+ RF-4E Phantom II*
TKR/TPT 3: ε1 B-707; ε2 B-747
TPT 117: Heavy 12 Il-76 Candid; Medium ε19 C-130E/H
Air Force 30,000 (incl 12,000 Air Defence)
Hercules; Light 75: 11 An-74TK-200; 5 An-140 (Iran-140
FORCES BY ROLE Faraz) (45 projected); 10 F-27 Friendship; 1 L-1329 Jetstar;
Serviceability probably about 60% for US ac types and about 10 PC-6B Turbo Porter; 8 TB-21 Trinidad; 4 TB-200 Tobago;
80% for PRC/Russian ac. Includes IRGC AF equipment 3 Turbo Commander 680; 14 Y-7; 9 Y-12; PAX 11: 2 B-707; 1
FIGHTER B-747; 4 B-747F; 1 Falcon 20; 3 Falcon 50
1 sqn with F-7M Airguard; JJ-7* TRG 151: 25 Beech F33A/C Bonanza; 15 EMB-312 Tucano;
2 sqn with F-14 Tomcat 15 JJ-7*; 25 MFI-17 Mushshak; 12 Parastu; 15 PC-6; 35 PC-7
2 sqn with MiG-29A/UB Fulcrum Turbo Trainer; 9 T-33
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK HELICOPTERS
1 sqn with Mirage F-1E; F-5E/F Tiger II MRH 2 Bell 412
5 sqn with F-4D/E Phantom II TPT 34+: Heavy 2+ CH-47 Chinook; Medium 30 Bell 214C
3 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II (AB-214C); Light 2+: 2 Bell 206A Jet Ranger (AB-206A);
1 sqn (forming) with Su-22M4 Fitter K; Su-22UM-3K some Shabaviz 2-75 (indigenous versions in production);
Fitter G some Shabaviz 2061
GROUND ATTACK AIR DEFENCE •
1 sqn with Su-24MK Fencer D SAM 514+:
MARITIME PATROL Long-range 10 S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon); 32
1 sqn with P-3MP Orion* S-300PMU2 (SA-20 Gargoyle)
ISR Medium-range 195+: 150+ MIM-23B I-Hawk/Shahin; 45
1 (det) sqn with RF-4E Phantom II* S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline);
SEARCH & RESCUE Short-range 279: 250 FM-80 (Crotale); 29 9K331 Tor-M1
Some flt with Bell 214C (AB-214C) (SA-15 Gauntlet) (reported)
Point-defence 30+: 30 Rapier; FIM-92 Stinger; 9K32 à-vis its neighbours and the US. Reports in 2017 alleged
Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡ that a series of targeted cyber attacks, including against
GUNS • TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2; 35mm Oerlikon the UK Parliament and companies in Saudi Arabia and
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES the US, originated in Iran. But Iran also remains aware
AAM • IR PL-2A‡; PL-7; R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA- of its own potential vulnerabilities, not least in terms of
11 Archer); AIM-9 Sidewinder; IR/SARH R-27 (AA-10 infrastructure protection: it was reported in May that a
Alamo); SARH AIM-7 Sparrow; ARH AIM-54 Phoenix† senior official was advising that Iran should identify ‘vital
ASM AGM-65A Maverick; Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen); Kh-29 points’ in infrastructure so as to boost passive defences,
(AS-14 Kedge) while another reportedly said in February that Iran should
AShM C-801K ‘adopt a pre-emptive approach towards future cyber risks’.
ARM Kh-58 (AS-11 Kilter)
Air Defence Command DEPLOYMENT

Established to coordinate army, air-force and IRGC air- GULF OF ADEN AND SOMALI BASIN
defence assets. Precise composition unclear Navy: 1 FSG; 1 AORH
Paramilitary 40,000–60,000 SUDAN

UN • UNAMID 1 obs
Law-Enforcement Forces 40,000–60,000
(border and security troops); 450,000 on SYRIA
mobilisation (incl conscripts) 5,000 (incl up to 2,000 IRGC)
Part of armed forces in wartime
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Iraq IRQ
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB ε90
Iraqi Dinar D 2016 2017 2018
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2+: 2 An-140; some Cessna
185/Cessna 310 GDP D 20.0tr 22.8tr
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light ε24 AB-205 (Bell 205)/ US$ 172bn 193bn
AB-206 (Bell 206) Jet Ranger per capita US$ 4,533 4,958
and North Africa

Basij Resistance Force up to ε1,000,000 on Growth % 11.0 -0.4
Middle East
mobilisation Inflation % 0.4 2.0
Paramilitary militia with claimed membership of 12.6 Def bdgt [a] D 20.0tr 22.8tr
million; perhaps 1 million combat capable; in the process US$ 17.0bn 19.3bn
of closer integration with IRGC Ground Forces
FMA (US$) US$ 250m 150m 0m
FORCES BY ROLE
US$1=D 1,180.17 1,182.00
MANOEUVRE
[a] Defence and security budget
Other
2,500 militia bn(-) (claimed, limited permanent mem- Population 39,192,111
bership) Ethnic and religious groups: Arab 75–80% (of which Shia Muslim
55%, Sunni Muslim 45%); Kurdish 20–25%
Cyber
Iran has a well-developed capacity for cyber operations. Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
It has a well-educated and computer-literate young Male 20.1% 5.3% 4.4% 3.8% 15.1% 1.5%
population. In September 2015, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei Female 19.3% 5.1% 4.3% 3.7% 15.0% 1.9%
appointed members to a Supreme Council for Cyberspace,
reportedly a policymaking and supervisory body. The Capabilities
Stuxnet incident in 2010 is reported to have been a turning
point in Iran’s approach to cyber capabilities. In 2011–12, Army capabilities and morale have improved since the
Tehran established a Joint Chiefs of Staff Cyber Command collapse of several divisions in the face of the ISIS advance
with emphasis on thwarting attacks against Iranian nuclear in the north in 2014. The recapture of Mosul in October
facilities and coordinating national cyber warfare and 2017 demonstrated the incremental growth in capability,
information security. The IRGC has its own Cyber Defence in terms of both combat power and tactics, as the force
Command; IRGC civilian business interests will aid its adapted to fight ISIS’s asymmetric tactics in urban areas.
activities in this area. The precise relationship of groups However, the level of attrition among Iraqi forces caused
such as the ‘Iranian Cyber Army’ to regime and military concern, particularly that of the Counter Terrorist Service,
organisations is unclear, but the former has launched which was often used as a spearhead force. There was also
hacking attacks against a number of foreign organisations. improved inter-service coordination. After defeating ISIS in
There are continued reports of increasing investment Mosul, and amid a broader rollback of ISIS forces, questions
in cyber capabilities, used not only for propaganda and arose as to the place of Kurdish forces within the Iraqi state,
intelligence exploitation but also as a means for Iran to and their relationship with Iraq’s military, as reports of
attempt to offset its conventional military weakness vis- friction persisted. The Iraqi Army continues to benefit from
training and equipment support from Western supporters, IFV 240: ε80 BMP-1; ε60 BTR-4 (inc variants); 100 BTR-
as does the air force, which is being rebuilt, primarily for the 80A
counter-insurgency role. F-16 deliveries continued during APC 2,102+
2017, marking a notable capability improvement for the air APC (T) 900: ε500 M113A2/Talha; ε400 MT-LB
force. The campaign to retake Mosul and other northern APC (W) 10 Cobra
areas benefited from US air and intelligence support, PPV 1,192+: 12 Barracuda; 250 Caiman; ε500 Dzik-3; ε400
suggesting continuing capability limitations within the ILAV Badger; Mamba; 30 Maxxpro
Iraqi armed forces in these areas. AUV M-ATV
ACTIVE 64,000 (Army 54,000 Navy 3,000 Air 4,000 ARV 215+: 180 BREM; 35+ M88A1/2; T-54/55 ARV; Type-
Air Defence 3,000) Paramilitary 145,000 653; VT-55A
NBC VEHICLES 20 Fuchs NBC
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL • MANPATS 9K135 Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan) (reported)
ARTILLERY 1,085+
Army 54,000
SP 72+: 152mm 18+ Type-83; 155mm 30: 6 M109A1; 24
Due to ongoing conflict with ISIS insurgents, there have
M109A5
been significant personnel and equipment losses in the
TOWED 60+: 130mm M-46/Type-59; 152mm D-20; Type-
Iraqi Army. Many formations are now under-strength.
83; 155mm ε60 M198
Military capability has been bolstered by the activity of
MRL 3+: 122mm some BM-21 Grad; 220mm 3+ TOS-1A
Shia militias and Kurdish Peshmerga forces
MOR 950+: 81mm ε500 M252; 120mm ε450 M120;
FORCES BY ROLE 240mm M-240
SPECIAL FORCES HELICOPTERS
2 SF bde ATK 28: 11 Mi-28NE Havoc; 4 Mi-28UB Havoc; 13 Mi-35M
MANOEUVRE Hind
Armoured MRH 51+: 4+ SA342 Gazelle; 24 Bell IA407; 23 H135M
1 armd div (2 armd bde, 2 mech bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs MRH/TPT ε19 Mi-17 Hip H/Mi-171Sh
regt, 1 log bde) ISR 10 OH-58C Kiowa
Mechanised TPT • Light 44: 16 Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II); 10 Bell
2 mech div (4 mech inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log 206B3 Jet Ranger; ε18 Bell T407
bde) UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES • CISR Heavy CH-4
1 mech div (3 mech inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASM 9K114 Shturm (AT-6
bde) Spiral); AR-1; Ingwe
1 mech div (2 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs
regt, 1 log bde) Navy 3,000
Light EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 mot div (1 mech bde, 3 mot inf bde, 2 inf bde, 1 engr PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 32+
bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log bde) PCO 2 Al Basra (US River Hawk)
1 mot div (2 mot inf bde, 3 inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, PCC 4 Fateh (ITA Diciotti)
1 log bde) PB 20: 12 Swiftships 35; 5 Predator (PRC 27m); 3 Al Faw
1 inf div (4 lt inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log bde) PBR 6: 2 Type-200; 4 Type-2010
1 inf div (3 inf bde)
1 inf div (2 inf bde) Marines 1,000
1 inf div (1 inf bde) FORCES BY ROLE
1 cdo div (5 lt inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log bde) MANOEUVRE
1 inf bde Amphibious
Aviation 2 mne bn
1 atk hel sqn with Mi-28NE Havoc
1 atk hel sqn with Mi-35M Hind Air Force ε4,000
1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II) FORCES BY ROLE
3 atk hel sqn with Bell T407; H135M FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
3 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-171Sh 1 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
1 ISR sqn with SA342M Gazelle GROUND ATTACK
2 trg sqn with Bell 206; OH-58C Kiowa 1 sqn with Su-25/Su-25K/Su-25UBK Frogfoot
1 trg sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II) 1 sqn with L-159
1 trg sqn with Mi-17 Hip ISR
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 sqn with CH-2000 Sama; SB7L-360 Seeker
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 1 sqn with Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; Cessna AC-208B
MBT 318+: ε100 M1A1 Abrams; 168+ T-72; ε50 T-55; Combat Caravan*
RECCE 435: ε400 Akrep; 18 BRDM 2; 35 EE-9 Cascavel; 1 sqn with Beech 350 King Air
TRANSPORT Fiji UNAMI 168; 2 sy unit

1 sqn with An-32B Cline Finland Operation Inherent Resolve 100; 1 trg unit
1 sqn with C-130E/J-30 Hercules France Operation Inherent Resolve (Chammal) 500; 1 SF gp; 1
TRAINING trg unit; 1 SP arty bty with 4 CAESAR
1 sqn with Cessna 172, Cessna 208B Germany Operation Inherent Resolve 145; some trg unit
1 sqn with Lasta-95 Hungary Operation Inherent Resolve 140
1 sqn with T-6A
Italy Operation Inherent Resolve (Prima Parthica) 1,220; 1 inf
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE regt; 1 trg unit; 1 hel sqn with 4 AW129 Mangusta; 4 NH90
AIRCRAFT 60 combat capable Latvia Operation Inherent Resolve 6
FGA 27: 18 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 3 F-16D Fighting Falcon; Nepal UNAMI 76; 1 sy unit
6 T-50IQ
Netherlands Operation Inherent Resolve 150; 3 trg units
ATK 29: 10 L-159; ε19 Su-25/Su-25K/Su-25UBK Frogfoot
New Zealand Operation Inherent Resolve 154; 1 trg unit
ISR 10: 2 Cessna AC-208B Combat Caravan*; 2 SB7L-360
Seeker; 6 Beech 350ER King Air Norway Operation Inherent Resolve 60; 1 trg unit
TPT 29: Medium 15: 3 C-130E Hercules; 6 C-130J-30 Poland Operation Inherent Resolve 60
Hercules; 6 An-32B Cline (of which 2 combat capable); Portugal Operation Inherent Resolve 31
Light 17: 1 Beech 350 King Air; 5 Cessna 208B Grand Romania Operation Inherent Resolve 50
Caravan; 8 Cessna 172 Slovenia Operation Inherent Resolve 6
TRG 33+: 8 CH-2000 Sama; 10+ Lasta-95; 15 T-6A Spain Operation Inherent Resolve 400; 2 trg units
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES Sweden Operation Inherent Resolve 70
AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; AIM-9M Sidewinder Turkey Army 2,000; 1 armd BG
ASM AGM-114 Hellfire United Kingdom Operation Inherent Resolve (Shader) 600; 2
BOMBS • Laser-Guided GBU-12 Paveway II inf bn(-); 1 engr sqn(-)
United States Operation Inherent Resolve 9,000; 1 armd div
Air Defence Command ε3,000 HQ; 2 inf coy; 1 mne coy; 1 EOD pl; 1 SP arty bty with 4
FORCES BY ROLE M109A6; 1 fd arty bty with 4 M777A2; 1 MRL bty with 4
AIR DEFENCE M142 HIMARS; 1 atk hel sqn with AH-64D Apache
1 bn with 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)
and North Africa

1 bn with M1097 Avenger
Israel ISR
Middle East
1 bn with 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch)
1 bn with ZU-23-2; S-60 New Israeli Shekel NS 2016 2017 2018
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE GDP NS 1.2tr 1.26tr
AIR DEFENCE
US$ 318bn 348bn
SAM
Short-range 24 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound) per capita US$ 37,192 39,974
Point-defence M1097 Avenger; 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Growth % 4.0 3.1
Grinch) Inflation % -0.5 0.2
GUNS • TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm S-60 Def bdgt NS 76.3bn 67.3bn
US$ 19.9bn 18.5bn
FMA (US) US$ 3.1bn 3.1bn 3.1bn
Iraqi Federal Police ε36,000 US$1=NS 3.84 3.63
Border Enforcement ε9,000 Population 8,299,706
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus

Militias ε100,000
Popular Mobilisation Forces include: Kata’ib Sayyid Male 14.0% 4.1% 3.8% 3.6% 19.5% 5.0%
al-Shuhada Brigade; Kata’ib Hizbullah; Badr Brigades; Female 13.4% 3.9% 3.6% 3.4% 19.0% 6.2%
Peace Brigades and Imam Ali Battalions
Capabilities
FOREIGN FORCES The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) remain the most capable
Australia Operation Inherent Resolve (Okra) 380 military forces in the region, with the motivation, equipment
and training to considerably overmatch the conventional
Belgium Operation Inherent Resolve (Valiant Phoenix) 30
capability of other regional armed forces. Israel’s defence
Canada Operation Inherent Resolve (Impact) 280; 1 SF gp; 1 policy prioritises homeland defence but with the ability
med unit; 1 hel flt with 4 Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon) to intervene in Lebanon and Syria. The requirement for
Czech Republic Operation Inherent Resolve 30 power projection further afield appears limited to ISR,
Denmark Operation Inherent Resolve 190; 1 SF gp; 1 trg precision strikes and special-forces operations as far
team away as Iran. Training and readiness are priority areas.
Estonia Operation Inherent Resolve 7 Currently preoccupied by threats posed by Hamas,
Hizbullah and Iran’s proxies in Syria, the IDF retains the 17 bty with MIM-23B I-Hawk
capability to launch strikes in Syria. Israel must also be 6 bty with MIM-104C Patriot PAC-2
assumed to have the military capability for a unilateral
attack on Iran. There is an emphasis on maintaining Space
Israel’s regional technological superiority, especially in EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
missile-defence, intelligence-gathering, precision-weapons SATELLITES 9
and cyber capabilities. Israel continues to improve its air- COMMUNICATIONS 3 Amos
defence network, with the David’s Sling medium-range ISR 6: 1 EROS; 4 Ofeq (7, 9, 10 & 11); 1 TecSAR-1 (Polaris)
SAM system declared operational in 2017. In 2016, the IDF
started to implement its five-year ‘Gideon’ modernisation Army 26,000; 107,000 conscript (total 133,000)
plan to improve combat capability and administrative
Organisation and structure of formations may vary
efficiency, while reducing costs and overheads. To date,
according to op situations. Equipment includes that
this has included removing two army divisions, and the
required for reserve forces on mobilisation
retirement of F-16A/B combat aircraft as more F-35s are
delivered. The plan also calls for career-soldier numbers to FORCES BY ROLE
COMMAND
reduce to 40,000; in 2015, the length of compulsory service
3 (regional comd) corps HQ
for men was reduced from 36 to 32 months. A new artillery
2 armd div HQ
doctrine focused on swift precision strikes was introduced
5 (territorial) inf div HQ
in 2016 and a new artillery brigade has been formed, as
1 (home defence) comd HQ
well as an improved network for the coordination of air,
SPECIAL FORCES
land and sea attack. Logistics capability appears adequate
3 SF bn
to support military operations and plans. Israel has a
1 spec ops bde (4 spec ops unit)
capable defence industry, with aerospace, ISR, missile
MANOEUVRE
and armoured-vehicle sectors particular strengths, as are
Reconnaissance
counter-rocket systems and active-protection systems for
1 indep recce bn
armoured vehicles. A major exercise in late 2017 focused on Armoured
defeating an attack by Hizbullah, and service- and reserve- 3 armd bde (1 armd recce coy, 3 armd bn, 1 AT coy, 1 cbt
force integration. engr bn)
ACTIVE 176,500 (Army 133,000 Navy 9,500 Air Mechanised
34,000) Paramilitary 8,000 3 mech inf bde (3 mech inf bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 sigs coy)
Conscript liability Officers 48 months, other ranks 32 months, 1 mech inf bde (5 mech inf bn)
1 indep mech inf bn
women 24 months (Jews and Druze only; Christians,
Light
Circassians and Muslims may volunteer)
2 indep inf bn
RESERVE 465,000 (Army 400,000 Navy 10,000 Air Air Manoeuvre
55,000) 1 para bde (3 para bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 sigs coy)
Annual trg as cbt reservists to age 40 (some specialists to Other
age 54) for male other ranks, 38 (or marriage/pregnancy) 1 armd trg bde (3 armd bn)
for women COMBAT SUPPORT
3 arty bde
3 engr bn
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 1 EOD coy
1 CBRN bn
Strategic Forces 1 int bde (3 int bn)
Israel is widely believed to have a nuclear capability – 1 SIGINT unit
delivery means include F-15I and F-16I ac, Jericho 2 IRBM 2 MP bn
and, reportedly, Dolphin/Tanin-class SSKs with LACM
Reserves 400,000+ on mobilisation
FORCES BY ROLE
FORCES BY ROLE
COMMAND
3 IRBM sqn with Jericho 2
3 armd div HQ
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 AB div HQ
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS MANOEUVRE
IRBM • Nuclear: ε24 Jericho 2 Armoured
9 armd bde
Strategic Defences Mechanised
FORCES BY ROLE 8 mech inf bde
AIR DEFENCE Light
3 bty with Arrow 2 ATBM with Green Pine/Super Green 16 (territorial/regional) inf bde
Pine radar and Citrus Tree command post Air Manoeuvre
10 bty with Iron Dome (incl reserve bty) 4 para bde
Mountain 46 LWT, 1 Sea Vulcan CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1

1 mtn inf bn AS565SA Panther ASW hel)
COMBAT SUPPORT 1 Eilat (Sa’ar 5) with 2 quad Mk140 lnchr with RGM-
5 arty bde 84C Harpoon AShM, 2 32-cell VLS with Barak-8 SAM, 2
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT triple 324mm TT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Sea Vulcan CIWS,
6 log unit 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 AS565SA Panther ASW hel)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PCGM 8 Hetz (Sa’ar 4.5) with 6 single lnchr with Gabriel
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES II AShM, 2 twin Mk140 lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon
MBT 460: ε160 Merkava MkIII; ε300 Merkava MkIV (ε370 AShM, 2 8-cell Mk56 VLS with Barak-1 SAM, 1 Vulcan
Merkava MkII; ε570 Merkava MkIII; ε180 Merkava MkIV CIWS, 1 Typhoon CIWS, 1 76mm gun
all in store) PBF 34: 5 Shaldag with 1 Typhoon CIWS; 3 Stingray; 9
RECCE ε300 RBY-1 RAMTA Super Dvora Mk I (SSM & TT may be fitted); 4 Super
APC • APC (T) 1,200: ε100 Namer; ε200 Achzarit Dvora Mk II (SSM & TT may be fitted); 6 Super Dvora
(modified T-55 chassis); 500 M113A2; ε400 Nagmachon Mk II-I (SSM & TT may be fitted); 4 Super Dvora Mk III
(Centurion chassis); Nakpadon (5,000 M113A1/A2 in store) (SSM & TT may be fitted); 3 Super Dvora Mk III with 1
AUV 100 Ze’ev Typhoon CIWS (SSM may be fitted)
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCVP 2 Manta
AEV D9R; Puma LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3
ARV Centurion Mk2; Eyal; Merkava; M88A1; M113 ARV AG 2 Bat Yam (ex-GER Type-745)
VLB Alligator MAB; M48/60; MTU AX 1 Queshet
NBC VEHICLES ε8 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL Naval Commandos ε300
SP M113 with Spike; Tamuz (Spike NLOS); Magach mod FORCES BY ROLE
with Spike SPECIAL FORCES
MANPATS IMI MAPATS; Spike MR/LR/ER 1 cdo unit
ARTILLERY 530
SP 250: 155mm 250 M109A5 (155mm 148 Soltam L-33; Air Force 34,000
30 M109A1; 50 M-50; 175mm 36 M107; 203mm 36 M110 Responsible for Air and Space Coordination
and North Africa

all in store) FORCES BY ROLE
Middle East
TOWED (122mm 5 D-30; 130mm 100 M-46; 155mm 171: FIGHTER & FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
40 M-46 mod; 50 M-68/M-71; 81 M-839P/M-845P all in 1 sqn with F-15A/B/D Eagle
store) 1 sqn with F-15B/C/D Eagle
MRL 30: 227mm 30 M270 MLRS (122mm 58 BM-21 Grad; 1 sqn with F-15I Ra’am
160mm 50 LAR-160; 227mm 18 M270 MLRS; 240mm 36 6 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
BM-24; 290mm 20 LAR-290 all in store) 4 sqn with F-16I Sufa
MOR 250: 81mm 250 (81mm 1,100; 120mm 650; 160mm 1 sqn (forming) with F-35I Adir
18 Soltam M-66 all in store) ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS 1 sqn with AS565SA Panther (missions flown by IAF but
IRBM • Nuclear ε24 Jericho 2 with non-rated aircrew)
SRBM • Dual-capable (7 Lance in store) ELECTRONIC WARFARE
RADAR • LAND AN/PPS-15 (arty); AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder 2 sqn with RC-12D Guardrail; Beech A36 Bonanza (Hofit);
(arty); EL/M-2140 (veh) Beech 200 King Air; Beech 200T King Air; Beech 200CT
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence 20 Machbet; FIM- King Air
92 Stinger AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
1 sqn with Gulfstream G550 Eitam; Gulfstream G550
Navy 7,000; 2,500 conscript (total 9,500) Shavit
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TANKER/TRANSPORT
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL 1 sqn with C-130E/H Hercules; KC-130H Hercules
SSK 5: 1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules
3 Dolphin (GER HDW design) with 6 single 533mm TT 1 sqn with KC-707
with DM2A3/4 HWT/UGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 4 TRAINING
single 650mm TT 1 OPFOR sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
2 Tanin (GER HDW design with AIP) with 6 single 1 sqn with M-346 Master (Lavi)
533mm TT with DM2A3/4 HWT/UGM-84C Harpoon ATTACK HELICOPTER
AShM, 4 single 650mm TT 1 sqn with AH-64A Apache
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 45 1 sqn with AH-64D Apache
CORVETTES • FSGHM 3: TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
2 Eilat (Sa’ar 5) with 2 quad Mk140 lnchr with RGM-84C 2 sqn with CH-53D Sea Stallion
Harpoon AShM, 2 32-cell VLS with Barak-1 SAM (being 2 sqn with S-70A Black Hawk; UH-60A Black Hawk
upgraded to Barak-8), 2 triple 324mm TT with Mk 1 medevac unit with CH-53D Sea Stallion
UAV Airfield Defence 3,000 active (15,000

1 ISR sqn with Hermes 450 reservists)
1 ISR sqn with Heron (Shoval); Heron TP (Eitan)
1 ISR sqn with Heron (Shoval) (MP role) Paramilitary ε8,000
AIR DEFENCE
3 bty with Arrow 2 Border Police ε8,000
10 bty with Iron Dome
15 bty with MIM-23 I-Hawk Cyber
6 bty with MIM-104C Patriot PAC-2
Israel has a substantial capacity for cyber operations. In
2 bty with David’s Sling
early 2012, the National Cyber Bureau (NCB) was created
SPECIAL FORCES
in the prime minister’s office to develop technology, human
1 SF unit
1 spec ops unit resources and international collaboration. It is reported
that the IDF’s ‘Unit 8200’ is responsible for ELINT and
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
some cyber operations. In 2012, according to the IDF, the
C4I Directorate and Unit 8200 were combined into a new
FTR 58: 16 F-15A Eagle; 6 F-15B Eagle; 17 F-15C Eagle; 19
task force ‘tasked with developing offensive capabilities
F-15D Eagle
FGA 259: 25 F-15I Ra’am; 78 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 49 and operations’. Specialist training courses exist, including
F-16D Fighting Falcon; 98 F-16I Sufa; 9 F-35I Adir the four-month ‘Cyber Shield’ activity. In April 2016,
ISR 6 RC-12D Guardrail the National Cyber Defense Authority was created,
ELINT 4: 1 EC-707; 3 Gulfstream G550 Shavit consolidating cyber defences into one body. Although the
AEW 4: 2 B-707 Phalcon; 2 Gulfstream G550 Eitam (1 more IDF’s Gideon plan called for a Joint Cyber Command, in
on order) January 2017 the IDF announced it would not take this
TKR/TPT 11: 4 KC-130H Hercules; 7 KC-707 step. The cyber-defence unit of the C4I Directorate will
TPT 62: Medium 15: 5 C-130E Hercules; 6 C-130H reportedly be turned into an operational command in late
Hercules; 4 C-130J-30 Hercules; Light 47: 3 AT-802 Air 2017, and Unit 8200 will retain its remit.
Tractor; 9 Beech 200 King Air; 8 Beech 200T King Air; 5
Beech 200CT King Air; 22 Beech A36 Bonanza (Hofit)
TRG 67: 17 Grob G-120; 30 M-346 Master (Lavi)*; 20 T-6A
FOREIGN FORCES
HELICOPTERS UNTSO unless specified. UNTSO figures represent total
ATK 43: 26 AH-64A Apache; 17 AH-64D Apache (Sarat) numbers for mission.
ASW 7 AS565SA Panther (missions flown by IAF but Argentina 3 obs
with non-rated aircrew) Australia 11 obs 
ISR 12 OH-58B Kiowa Austria 4 obs
TPT 81: Heavy 26 CH-53D Sea Stallion; Medium 49: 39
Belgium 2 obs
S-70A Black Hawk; 10 UH-60A Black Hawk; Light 6 Bell
206 Jet Ranger Bhutan 2 obs • UNDOF 3
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES Canada 4 obs
ISR 3+: Heavy 3+: Heron (Shoval); 3 Heron TP (Eitan); RQ- Chile 3 obs
5A Hunter; Medium Hermes 450; Hermes 900 (22+ Searcher China 4 obs
MkII in store); Light Harpy (anti-radiation UAV) Czech Republic UNDOF 2
AIR DEFENCE
Denmark 12 obs
SAM 54+:
Long-range MIM-104C Patriot PAC-2; Medium-range Estonia 3 obs 
24 Arrow 2; some MIM-23B I-Hawk; some David’s Sling; Fiji 2 obs • UNDOF 302; 1 inf bn(-)
Short-range ε30 Iron Dome Finland 19 obs • UNDOF 2
GUNS 920 India 1 obs • UNDOF 204; 1 log bn
SP 165: 20mm 105 M163 Machbet Vulcan; 23mm 60 Ireland 12 obs • UNDOF 136; 1 inf coy
ZSU-23-4 Nepal 3 obs • UNDOF 344; 1 mech inf coy; 1 inf coy
TOWED 755: 23mm 150 ZU-23-2; 20mm/37mm 455
Netherlands 13 obs • UNDOF 2
M167 Vulcan towed 20mm/M-1939 towed 37mm/TCM-
20 towed 20mm; 40mm 150 L/70 New Zealand 6 obs
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES Norway 13 obs
AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder; Python 4; IIR Python 5; Russia 3 obs
ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM Serbia 1 obs
ASM AGM-114 Hellfire; AGM-62B Walleye; AGM-65 Slovakia 2 obs
Maverick; Delilah AL; Popeye I/Popeye II; Spike NLOS
Slovenia 3 obs 
BOMBS
IIR guided Opher Sweden 7 obs
Laser-guided Griffin; Lizard; Paveway II Switzerland 12 obs 
INS/GPS guided GBU-31 JDAM; GBU-39 Small United States 2 obs • US Strategic Command; 1 AN/TPY-
Diameter Bomb (Barad Had); Spice 2 X-band radar at Mount Keren
Jordan JOR ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Jordanian Dinar D 2016 2017 2018 Army 74,000
GDP D 27.4bn 28.7bn FORCES BY ROLE
US$ 38.7bn 40.5bn MANOEUVRE
per capita US$ 5,549 5,678 Armoured
Growth % 2.0 2.3 1 (strategic reserve) armd div (3 armd bde, 1 arty bde, 1
AD bde)
1 armd bde
Def bdgt [a] D 1.04bn 1.16bn
Mechanised
US$ 1.47bn 1.63bn 5 mech bde
FMA (US) US$ 450m 350m 350m Light
US$1=D 0.71 0.71 3 lt inf bde
[a] Excludes expenditure on public order and safety COMBAT SUPPORT
3 arty bde
3 AD bde
Ethnic groups: Palestinian ε50–60%
1 MRL bn
Male 17.8% 5.5% 5.5% 4.7% 17.8% 1.7%
MBT 572: 390 FV4034 Challenger 1 (Al Hussein); 182 M60
Female 16.8% 4.8% 4.4% 3.9% 15.3% 1.7%
Phoenix (274 FV4030/2 Khalid in store)
LT TK (19 FV101 Scorpion in store)
Capabilities ASLT 141 B1 Centauro
Jordan’s armed forces benefit from a fairly high level of RECCE 153: 103 FV107 Scimitar; 50 FV701 Ferret
defence spending relative to GDP, and strong defence IFV 717: 13 AIFV-B-C25; 31 BMP-2; 16 Marder 1A3; 321
relationships with the UK and the US that have boosted Ratel-20; 336 YPR-765 PRI
and North Africa

training. The main roles of the fully professional armed APC 879+
Middle East
forces are border and internal security. The services are APC (T) 729+: 370 M113A1/A2 Mk1J; 269 M577A2
combat capable and have contributed to international (CP); some Temsah; 87 YPR-765 PRCO (CP); 3 AIFV-B
expeditionary operations. Security preoccupations PPV 150: 25 Marauder; 25 Matador; 100 MaxxPro
include the threat from ISIS, conflict in Syria and Iraq, AUV 35 Cougar
and resulting refugee flows. In 2016 a new Quick Reaction ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Force was formed to support activity by Jordanian special ARV 155+: Al Monjed; 55 Chieftain ARV; Centurion Mk2;
forces. Most military equipment is externally supplied, 20 M47; 32 M88A1; 30 M578; 18 YPR-806
and a batch of Marder IFVs was received from Germany MW 12 Aardvark Mk2
in late 2016. However, state-owned KADDB produces ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL
some light armoured vehicles and reportedly tested a SP 115: 70 M901; 45 AIFV-B-Milan
new 8x8 wheeled AFV in 2017. Personnel are well trained, MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; TOW/TOW-2A; 9K135
particularly aircrew and special forces, who are highly Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan)
regarded and have served alongside ISAF in Afghanistan ARTILLERY 1,429+
SP 574: 105mm 48: 30 M52; 18 MOBAT; 155mm 78: 358
and participated in UN missions. The country has
M109A1/A2; 20 M44; 203mm 148 M110A2
developed a bespoke special-forces training centre, which
TOWED 82: 105mm 54 M102; 155mm 28: 10 M1/M59; 18
regularly plays host to various special-forces contingents
M114; 203mm (4 M115 in store)
and continues to host annual exercise Eager Lion. UK
MRL 14+: 227mm 12 M142 HIMARS; 273mm 2+ WM-80
and US forces also regularly exercise in the country, and
MOR 759: 81mm 359; SP 81mm 50; 107mm 50 M30;
Syrian opposition groups have been trained in-country.
120mm 300 Brandt
Jordan has significantly stepped up border security in
RADAR • LAND 7 AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder/AN/TPQ-37
light of ISIS activity on its periphery, including a complex
Firefinder (arty, mor)
border-security project funded by the US, which includes a
AIR DEFENCE
communications, command and control package, sensors,
SAM • Point-defence 140+: 92 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13
watchtowers and a command centre.
Gopher); 48 9K33 Osa-M (SA-8 Gecko); 9K32M Strela-2M
ACTIVE 100,500 (Army 74,000 Navy 500 Air 12,000 (SA-7B Grail)‡; 9K36 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-
Special Operations 14,000) Paramilitary 15,000 1 (SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse)
GUNS • SP 416: 20mm 100 M163 Vulcan; 23mm 40 ZSU-
RESERVE 65,000 (Army 60,000 Joint 5,000) 23-4; 35mm 60 Cheetah (Gepard); 40mm 216 M42 (not all
Paramilitary 35,000 op)
Navy ε500 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

AAM • IR AIM-9J/N/P Sidewinder; SARH AIM-7
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Sparrow; ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM
ASM AGM-65D/G Maverick; BGM-71 TOW
PB 7: 3 Al Hussein (UK Vosper 30m); 4 Abdullah (US
Dauntless) BOMBS
Laser-guided GBU-10/12 Paveway II
Air Force 12,000 Joint Special Operations Command 14,000
Flying hours 180 hrs/yr FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 (Royal Guard) SF bde (1 SF regt, 2 SF bn, 1 CT bn)
2 sqn with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon 1 ranger bde (1 SF bn, 3 ranger bn)
GROUND ATTACK MANOEUVRE
1 sqn with AC-235 Air Manoeuvre
ISR 1 AB bde (2 SF bn, 2 AB bn, 1 AB arty bn, 1 psyops unit)
1 sqn with AT-802U Air Tractor; Cessna 208B ISR
TRANSPORT 1 sqn with AT-802U Air Tractor
1 sqn with C-130E/H Hercules TRANSPORT
1 unit with Il-76MF Candid 1 sqn with An-32B
TRAINING TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 OCU with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon 1 sqn with MD-530F
1 OCU with Hawk Mk63 1 sqn with UH-60L Black Hawk
1 sqn with C-101 Aviojet EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn with T-67M Firefly AIRCRAFT
1 hel sqn with AS350B3; Hughes 500 ISR 10 AT-802U Air Tractor
ATTACK HELICOPTER TPT Light 3 An-32B Cline
2 sqn with AH-1F Cobra (with TOW) HELICOPTERS
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER MRH 6 MD-530F
1 sqn with AS332M Super Puma TPT • Medium 8 UH-60L Black Hawk
1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); UH-60A Black
Hawk Paramilitary ε15,000 active
1 sqn with H135M (Tpt/SAR)
1 (Royal) flt with S-70A Black Hawk; UH-60L/M Black Gendarmerie ε15,000 active
Hawk; AW139 3 regional comd
2 bde with MIM-104C Patriot PAC-2; MIM-23B Phase III SPECIAL FORCES
I-Hawk 2 SF unit
AIRCRAFT 67 combat capable Other
FGA 47: 33 F-16AM Fighting Falcon; 14 F-16BM Fighting 10 sy bn
Falcon EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ATK 2 AC235 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
ISR 6 AT-802U Air Tractor* APC • APC (W) 25+: AT105 Saxon (reported); 25+
TPT 21: Heavy 2 Il-76MF Candid; Medium 7: 3 C-130E EE-11 Urutu
Hercules; 4 C-130H Hercules; Light 6: 5 Cessna 208B; 1 AUV AB2 Al-Jawad
M-28 Skytruck (2 C295M in store being converted into
gunships) Reserve Organisations ε35,000 reservists
TRG 40+: 12 Hawk Mk63*: 14 T-67M Firefly; 10 C-101
Aviojet; 4+ PC-21 Civil Militia ‘People’s Army’ ε35,000 reservists
HELICOPTERS Men 16–65, women 16–45
ATK 24+ AH-1F Cobra
MRH 14: 3 AW139; 11 H135M (Tpt/SAR) DEPLOYMENT
TPT 45: Medium 35: 10 AS332M Super Puma; 25 S-70A/
UH-60A/UH-60L/VH-60M Black Hawk; Light 10: 4+ Bell CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 6 AS350B3; 8 R-44 Raven II UN • MINUSCA 7; 3 obs
ISR • Light some Falco; S-100 Camcopter
UN • MONUSCO 9; 13 obs
Long-range 40 MIM-104C Patriot PAC-2 MALI
Medium-range 24 MIM-23B Phase III I-Hawk UN • MINUSMA 4; 1 obs
SOUTH SUDAN 2016 regarding the recapitalisation of its combat aircraft

UN • UNMISS 2 saw the country select the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and
the Typhoon, while the focus in 2017 shifted toward land
SUDAN
systems. The army intends to upgrade its M1A2 main
UN • UNAMID 17; 7 obs battle tanks, while it was reported that discussions
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES continued regarding the possible purchase of Russian
Operation Restoring Hope 6 F-16C Fighting Falcon T-90MS tanks.

FOREIGN FORCES Paramilitary 7,100
Belgium Operation Inherent Resovle (Desert Falcon) 110: 4 RESERVE 23,700 (Joint 23,700)
F-16AM Fighting Falcon Reserve obligation to age 40; 1 month annual trg
France Operation Inherent Resolve (Chammal) 8 Rafale F3; 1
Atlantique 2
Germany Operation Inherent Resolve 284; 4 Tornado ECR; 1
A310 MRTT
Netherlands Operation Inherent Resolve 35 Army 11,000
Norway Operation Inherent Resolve 60 FORCES BY ROLE
United States Central Command: Operation Inherent SPECIAL FORCES
Resolve 2,000; 1 FGA sqn with 12 F-15E Strike Eagle; 1 AD 1 SF unit (forming)
bty with MIM-104E/F Patriot PAC-2/3; MQ-9A; MQ-1B MANOEUVRE
Reconnaissance
1 mech/recce bde
Kuwait KWT Armoured
3 armd bde
Kuwaiti Dinar D 2016 2017 2018
Mechanised
GDP D 33.5bn 36.2bn 2 mech inf bde
US$ 111bn 118bn Light
and North Africa

per capita US$ 26,245 27,237 1 cdo bn
Middle East
Other
Growth % 2.5 -2.1
1 (Amiri) gd bde
Inflation % 3.5 2.5
COMBAT SUPPORT
Def bdgt D 1.74bn 1.75bn 1 arty bde
US$ 5.74bn 5.71bn 1 engr bde
US$1=D 0.30 0.31 1 MP bn
1 log gp
Ethnic groups: Nationals 35.5%; other non-Arab Asian countries 1 fd hospital 
37.7%; other Arab countries 17.5%; other or unspecified 9.3%
Reserve
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
FORCES BY ROLE
Male 13.0% 3.2% 5.1% 7.2% 28.6% 1.2%
MANOEUVRE
Female 12.0% 2.9% 3.8% 4.3% 17.1% 1.4% Mechanised
1 bde
The armed forces’ primary role is ensuring the territorial ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
integrity of the state, although in practice the limited size MBT 293: 218 M1A2 Abrams; 75 M-84 (75 more in store)
of the country, and of the armed forces, would make this IFV 465: 76 BMP-2; 153 BMP-3; 236 Desert Warrior† (incl
task a challenge in the face of a larger committed aggressor. variants)
With this in mind, Kuwait has sought security through a APC 260
close relationship with the US and its membership of the APC (T) 260: 230 M113A2; 30 M577 (CP)
Gulf Cooperation Council. A range of US equipment is APC (W) (40 TH 390 Fahd in store)
prepositioned in the country, including armoured vehicles. ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
The second US–Kuwait Strategic Dialogue, in September ARV 24+: 24 M88A1/2; Type-653A; Warrior
2017, included an agreement to modernise military facilities MW Aardvark Mk2
in Kuwait. The tenth UK–Kuwait Joint Steering Group, NBC VEHICLES 11 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC
meeting in July, noted deepening defence cooperation, ARTY 211
and reiterated a commitment to ‘refresh the Defence SP 155mm 106: 37 M109A3; 18 Mk F3; 51 PLZ-45 (18 AU-
Cooperation Accord’ between the two states. Regular F-1 in store)
exercises continue, including with US forces. Decisions in MRL 300mm 27 9A52 Smerch
MOR 78: 81mm 60; 107mm 6 M30; 120mm ε12 RT-F1 Air Defence Command
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE FORCES BY ROLE
MSL AIR DEFENCE
SP 74: 66 HMMWV TOW; 8 M901 1 SAM bde (7 SAM bty with MIM-104D Patriot PAC-2
MANPATS TOW-2; M47 Dragon GEM)
RCL 84mm ε200 Carl Gustav 1 SAM bde (6 SAM bty with Skyguard/Aspide)
AIR DEFENCE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SAM
Short-range 12 Aspide
Long-range 40 MIM-104D Patriot PAC-2 GEM
Point-defence Starburst; FIM-92 Stinger
Short-range 12 Skyguard/Aspide
GUNS • TOWED 35mm 12+ Oerlikon
Paramilitary ε7,100 active
Navy ε2,000 (incl 500 Coast Guard)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE National Guard ε6,600 active
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 20 FORCES BY ROLE
PCFG 2: SPECIAL FORCES
1 Al Sanbouk (GER Lurssen TNC-45) with 2 twin lnchr 1 SF bn
with MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun MANOEUVRE
1 Istiqlal (GER Lurssen FPB-57) with 2 twin lnchr with Reconnaissance
MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun 1 armd car bn
PBF 10 Al Nokatha (US Mk V Pegasus) Other
PBG 8 Um Almaradim (FRA P-37 BRL) with 2 twin lnchr 3 security bn
with Sea Skua AShM COMBAT SUPPORT
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AG 1 Sawahil with 1 hel 1 MP bn
landing platform EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Air Force 2,500 RECCE 20 VBL
Flying hours 210 hrs/yr APC • APC (W) 97+: 5+ Desert Chameleon; 70 Pandur;
22 S600 (incl variants)
FORCES BY ROLE
ARV Pandur
2 sqn with F/A-18C/D Hornet
TRANSPORT Coast Guard 500
1 sqn with C-17A Globemaster III; KC-130J Hercules; EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
L-100-30 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 32
TRAINING PBF 12 Manta
1 unit with EMB-312 Tucano*; Hawk Mk64* PB 20: 3 Al Shaheed; 4 Inttisar (Austal 31.5m); 3 Kassir
ATTACK HELICOPTER (Austal 22m); 10 Subahi
1 sqn with AH-64D Apache AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCU 4: 2 Al
1 atk/trg sqn with SA342 Gazelle with HOT Tahaddy; 1 Saffar; 1 other
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AG 1 Sawahil
1 sqn with AS532 Cougar; SA330 Puma; S-92
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE DEPLOYMENT
FGA 39: 31 F/A-18C Hornet; 8 F/A-18D Hornet SAUDI ARABIA
TKR 3 KC-130J Hercules Operation Restoring Hope 4 F/A-18A Hornet
TPT 5: Heavy 2 C-17A Globemaster III; Medium 3 L-100-
30
FOREIGN FORCES
TRG 27: 11 Hawk Mk64*; 16 EMB-312 Tucano*
HELICOPTERS Canada Operation Inherent Resolve (Impact) 1 P-3 Orion
ATK 16 AH-64D Apache (CP-140); 1 A310 MRTT (C-150T); 1 C-130J-30 Hercules
MRH 13 SA342 Gazelle with HOT (CC-130J)
TPT • Medium 13: 3 AS532 Cougar; 7 SA330 Puma; 3 Denmark Operation Inherent Resolve 20
S-92 Italy Operation Inherent Resolve (Prima Parthica) 280; 4
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AMX; 2 MQ-9A Reaper; 1 KC-767A
AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; R-550 Magic; SARH Poland Operation Inherent Resolve 4 F-16C Fighting Falcon
AIM-7F Sparrow; ARH AIM-120C7 AMRAAM Singapore Operation Inherent Resolve 11
ASM AGM-65G Maverick; AGM-114K Hellfire United Kingdom 30 (trg team) • Operation Inherent Resolve
AShM AGM-84A Harpoon (Shader) MQ-9A Reaper
United States Central Command: 14,300; 1 armd bde; 1 agreements to support border security and train Land
ARNG cbt avn bde; 1 spt bde; 4 AD bty with MIM-104E/F Border regiments. These deliveries are aimed at boosting
Patriot PAC-2/3; 1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper; 1 firepower and counter-insurgency capabilities in order to
(APS) armd bde eqpt set; 1 (APS) inf bde eqpt set better tackle militants and improve border security.

Lebanon LBN Paramilitary 20,000
Lebanese Pound LP 2016 2017 2018
GDP LP 76.1tr 79.4tr
US$ 50.5bn 52.7bn
Army 56,600
per capita US$ 11,295 11,684
FORCES BY ROLE
Growth % 1.0 1.5
5 regional comd (Beirut, Bekaa Valley, Mount Lebanon,
Inflation % -0.8 3.1 North, South)
Def bdgt LP 2.62tr ε2.81tr SPECIAL FORCES
US$ 1.74bn ε1.87bn 1 cdo regt
FMA (US) US$ 86m 105m 0m MANOEUVRE
Armoured
US$1=LP 1,507.49 1,507.50
1 armd regt
Population 6,229,794 Mechanised
Ethnic and religious groups: Christian 30%; Druze 6%; Armenian 11 mech inf bde
4%, excl ε300,000 Syrians and ε350,000 Palestinian refugees Air Manoeuvre
1 AB regt
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Amphibious
Male 12.3% 4.2% 4.2% 4.4% 21.9% 2.8% 1 mne cdo regt
Female 11.7% 3.9% 4.0% 4.2% 22.0% 3.8% Other
1 Presidential Guard bde
Capabilities 6 intervention regt
and North Africa

4 border sy regt
Middle East
The destabilising effects of the complex war in Syria have COMBAT SUPPORT
seen the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) increasingly tested 2 arty regt
in their principal roles of internal and border security. 1 cbt spt bde (1 engr regt, 1 AT regt, 1 sigs regt; 1 log bn)
Hizbullah plays a key role in Lebanese politics and operates 1 MP gp
throughout southern and eastern Lebanon; the group has COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
also been involved in pro-regime military operations in Syria 1 log bde
since 2013. In 2016 and 2017, ISIS and other jihadi groups 1 med gp
mounted attacks along the eastern border. In summer 2017, 1 construction regt
the LAF conducted large-scale operations there to expel EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ISIS. Due to Western and Arab concerns about Hizbullah, MBT 324: 92 M48A1/A5; 185 T-54; 47 T-55
these were conducted separately from (but deconflicted RECCE 55 AML
with) Hizbullah operations against ISIS and other militant IFV 24: 16 AIFV-B-C25; 8 M2A2 Bradley
groups in the border area. Despite the sensitivities arising APC 1,370
from Hizbullah’s role in complimentary operations, LAF APC (T) 1,274 M113A1/A2 (incl variants)
operations against ISIS have demonstrated improved APC (W) 96: 86 VAB VCT; 10 VBPT-MR Guarani
capability. This included the ability to conduct complex ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
combined-arms operations led by relatively well-equipped ARV M113 ARV; T-54/55 ARV reported 
special-operations forces, benefiting from the training VLB MTU-72 reported
and support of Western partners. The Lebanese Army has MW Bozena
traditionally been stretched by internal-security operations ARTILLERY 571
and has had to rely on outdated equipment. Modernisation SP 155mm 12 M109
efforts are under way but funding is a challenge. Though TOWED 313: 105mm 13 M101A1; 122mm 35: 9 D-30;
Saudi Arabia cancelled a military-aid package in 2016, 26 M-30; 130mm 15 M-46; 155mm 250: 18 M114A1; 218
some deliveries of French equipment had already taken M198; 14 Model-50
place and, in 2017, France donated 15 VAB armoured MRL 122mm 11 BM-21
vehicles with HOT anti-tank guided missiles. Separately, MOR 275: 81mm 134; 82mm 112; 120mm 29 Brandt
in 2017 the US delivered the first eight of 32 M2A2 Bradley ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
APCs, on top of earlier deliveries including artillery MSL
and C-208B aircraft. The UK has pledged assistance for SP 15 VAB with HOT
training, communications equipment, light vehicles and MANPATS Milan; TOW
body armour, and in January 2017 updated and developed RCL 106mm 113 M40A1
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES Customs

ISR • Medium 8 Mohajer 4 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIR DEFENCE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7
SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2/2M (SA-7A Grail/ PB 7: 5 Aztec; 2 Tracker
SA-7B Grail)‡
GUNS • TOWED 77: 20mm 20; 23mm 57 ZU-23-2 FOREIGN FORCES
Unless specified, figures refer to UNTSO and represent
Navy 1,800 total numbers for the mission
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Argentina 3 obs
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 13 Armenia UNIFIL 33
PCC 1 Trablous Australia 11 obs
PB 11: 1 Aamchit (ex-GER Bremen); 1 Al Kalamoun (ex-FRA Austria 4 obs • UNIFIL 183: 1 log coy
Avel Gwarlarn); 7 Tripoli (ex-UK Attacker/Tracker Mk 2); Bangladesh UNIFIL 275: 1 FFG; 1 FSG
1 Naquora (ex-GER Bremen); 1 Tabarja (ex-GER Bergen) Belarus UNIFIL 5
PBF 1 Belgium 2 obs • UNIFIL 1
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCT 2 Sour (ex- Bhutan 2 obs 
FRA EDIC – capacity 8 APC; 96 troops) Brazil UNIFIL 207: 1 FFGH
Brunei UNIFIL 30
Air Force 1,600 Cambodia UNIFIL 185: 1 engr coy
4 air bases Canada 4 obs (Operation Jade)
FORCES BY ROLE Chile 3 obs
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK China, People’s Republic of 4 obs • UNIFIL 413: 1 engr coy
1 sqn with Cessna AC-208 Combat Caravan* Colombia UNIFIL 1
ATTACK HELICOPTER Croatia UNIFIL 1
1 sqn with SA342L Gazelle Cyprus UNIFIL 2
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Denmark 12 obs
4 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H) El Salvador UNIFIL 52: 1 inf pl
1 sqn with SA330/IAR330SM Puma Estonia 3 obs • UNIFIL 38
1 trg sqn with R-44 Raven II Fiji 2 obs • UNIFIL 145; 1 inf coy
Finland 19 obs • UNIFIL 301; elm 1 inf bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
France UNIFIL 661: 1 mech inf bn(-); VBL; VBCI; VAB;
Mistral
ISR 3 Cessna AC-208 Combat Caravan*
Germany UNIFIL 122: 1 FFGM
TRG 5: 3 Bulldog; 2 A-29 Super Tucano*
Ghana UNIFIL 870: 1 mech inf bn
HELICOPTERS
Greece UNIFIL 49: 1 PCFG
MRH 9: 1 AW139; 8 SA342L Gazelle (5 SA342L Gazelle;
Guatemala UNIFIL 2
5 SA316 Alouette III; 1 SA318 Alouette II all non-
Hungary UNIFIL 4
operational)
India 1 obs • UNIFIL 902: 1 inf bn; 1 med coy
TPT 38: Medium 13: 3 S-61N (fire fighting); 10 SA330/
Indonesia UNIFIL 1,288: 1 mech inf bn; 1 FSGHM
IAR330 Puma; Light 25: 18 Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey); 3 Bell
Ireland 12 obs • UNIFIL 374: elm 1 inf bn
205 (UH-1H Huey II); 4 R-44 Raven II (basic trg) (11 Bell
Italy UNIFIL 1,077: 1 AB bde HQ; 1 mech inf bn; 1 engr
205; 7 Bell 212 all non-operational) coy; 1 sigs coy; 1 hel bn
Kenya UNIFIL 1
Paramilitary ε20,000 active Korea, Republic of UNIFIL 332: 1 mech inf coy; 1 engr
coy; 1 sigs coy; 1 maint coy
Internal Security Force ε20,000
Malaysia UNIFIL 828: 1 mech inf bn
Nepal 3 obs • UNIFIL 869: 1 mech inf bn
FORCES BY ROLE Netherlands 13 obs • UNIFIL 1
Other Combat Forces New Zealand 6 obs 
1 (police) judicial unit Norway 13 obs
1 regional sy coy Qatar UNIFIL 2
1 (Beirut Gendarmerie) sy coy Russia 3 obs
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Serbia 1 obs • UNIFIL 174; 1 mech inf coy
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Sierra Leone UNIFIL 3
APC • APC (W) 60 V-200 Chaimite Slovakia 2 obs
Slovenia 3 obs • UNIFIL 15 IFV BMP-2

Spain UNIFIL 628: 1 lt inf bde HQ; 1 mech inf bn(-); 1 APC • APC (T) 4K-7FA Steyr
engr coy; 1 sigs coy AUV Nimr Ajban
Sri Lanka UNIFIL 151: 1 inf coy ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Sweden 7 obs ARV Centurion 105 AVRE
Switzerland 12 obs ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Tanzania UNIFIL 157: 2 MP coy MSL • SP 9P157-2 Khrizantema-S (AT-15 Springer)
Turkey UNIFIL 49: 1 PCFG ARTILLERY
United States 2 obs SP 155mm Palmaria
TOWED 122mm D-30
Libya LBY
Navy n.k.
Libyan Dinar D 2016 2017 2018
A number of intact naval vessels remain in Tripoli,
GDP D 28.4bn 46.2bn although serviceability is questionable
US$ 20.5bn 33.3bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
per capita US$ 3,205 5,166 PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 1
Growth % -3.0 55.1 FRIGATES • FFGM 1 Al Hani (FSU Koni) (in Italy for
Inflation % 27.1 32.8 refit since 2013) with 2 twin lnchr with P-15 Termit-M
Def exp D n.k. n.k. (SS-N-2C Styx) AShM, 1 twin lnchr with 9K33 Osa-M
US$ n.k. n.k. (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 twin 406mm ASTT with USET-
US$1=D 1.39 1.39 95 Type-40 LWT, 1 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 twin
76mm gun†
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus PBFG 1 Sharaba (FRA Combattante II) with 4 single lnchr
Male 13.2% 4.4% 4.4% 4.7% 22.8% 2.1% with Otomat Mk2 AShM, 1 76mm gun†
PB 2+ PV30
and North Africa

Female 12.6% 4.2% 4.1% 4.3% 20.8% 2.2%
Middle East
AMPHIBIOUS
Capabilities LANDING SHIPS • LST 1 Ibn Harissa with 3 twin 40mm
DARDO CIWS† (capacity 1 hel; 11 MBT; 240 troops)
Two rival administrations and their respective military
forces continued to struggle for supremacy in Libya. The LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2
internationally recognised Tripoli-based Government of AFD 1
National Accord and the Tobruk-headquartered House of ARS 1 Al Munjed (YUG Spasilac)†
Representatives agreed to a conditional ceasefire in July
2017, in part to allow them to focus on fighting ISIS and other Air Force n.k.
Islamist extremist groups. However, the ceasefire has been EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
breached repeatedly. The forces of the rival governments
AIRCRAFT 14+ combat capable
have limited capabilities. While each faction’s military
FGA 2 MiG-23BN
arm has a small number of combat aircraft, availability
is an issue, as is attrition, with pilot readiness a concern. ATK 1 J-21 Jastreb†
Although reportedly in receipt of foreign assistance, the TRG 11+: 3 G-2 Galeb*; up to 8 L-39ZO*; some SF-260
forces remain dependent on the arms stockpiles of the HELICOPTERS
former Gadhafi regime. The EUNAVFOR naval mission ATK Mi-24 Hind
has provided training for the Libyan coastguard and the TPT • Medium Mi-17 Hip
navy in an effort to stem the flow of refugees from the AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2
Libyan coast. Atoll)‡; R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-24 (AA-7 Apex)
Forces loyal to the Government of National
Accord (Tripoli-based) Paramilitary n.k.
ACTIVE n.k. Coast Guard n.k.

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7+
PCC Damen Stan 2909 (YTB armed with with 14.5mm
Ground Forces n.k. ZSU-2 AD GUNS and 122mm MRL)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PBF 4 Bigliani
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES PB 3: 1 Burdi (Damen Stan 1605); 1 Hamelin; 1 Ikrimah
MBT T-55; T-72 (FRA RPB 20)
TERRITORY WHERE THE RECOGNISED FOREIGN FORCES

AUTHORITY DOES NOT EXERCISE Italy Operation Ippocrate 300; 1 inf coy; 1 log unit; 1 fd
EFFECTIVE CONTROL hospital • UNSMIL 2 obs
Data here represents the de facto situation. This does not United Arab Emirates 6 AT-802; 2 UH-60M; 2 Wing Loong
imply international recognition I (GJ-1) UAV
United Kingdom UNSMIL 1 obs
ACTIVE n.k. United States UNSMIL 1 obs
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Mauritania MRT

Libya National Army n.k. Mauritanian Ouguiya OM 2016 2017 2018
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE GDP OM 1.66tr 1.81tr
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES US$ 4.73bn 4.99bn
MBT T-55; T-72 per capita US$ 1,247 1,284
RECCE BRDM-2; EE-9 Cascavel
Growth % 1.7 3.8
IFV BMP-1; Ratel-20
APC Inflation % 1.5 2.1
APC (T) M113 Def bdgt OM 48.4bn 51.6bn
APC (W) BTR-60PB; Puma US$ 138m 142m
PPV Caiman; Streit Typhoon US$1=OM 351.53 362.51
AUV Panthera T6
MSL
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
SP 10 9P157-2 Khryzantema-S (status unknown)
MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot Male 19.4% 5.2% 4.5% 3.9% 13.6% 1.6%
(AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); Milan Female 19.2% 5.3% 4.8% 4.3% 16.1% 2.2%
RCL some: 106mm M40A1; 84mm Carl Gustav
ARTILLERY Capabilities
TOWED 122mm D-30
The country’s small and modestly equipped military is
MRL 107mm Type-63; 122mm BM-21 Grad
tasked with territorial integrity and internal security. Its
MOR M106
ability to execute these tasks is challenged by a limited and
AIR DEFENCE
ageing equipment inventory and a lack of adequate train-
SAM • Point-defence 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch)
ing. Due to Mauritania’s position in the fight against ISIS
GUNS • SP 14.5mm ZPU-2 (on tch); 23mm ZSU-23-4
and other Islamist extremists in the region, the training
Shilka; ZU-23-2 (on tch)
requirement has been recognised by the US, NATO and,
most recently, Morocco. In early 2017, Mauritania again
Navy n.k.
took part in the US-led special-operations Flintlock train-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ing exercise, while in September Morocco offered training
support to all of the G5 Sahel states. The G5 Sahel agreed in
PB: 7+: 1 Burdi (Damen Stan 1605) with 1 23mm gun;
2017 to form a regional force to operate with French troops
1 Burdi (Damen Stan 1605) with 1 76mm gun; 1 Burdi
in countering Islamist terrorists in the region, which could
(Damen Stan 1605); 2 Ikrimah (FRA RPB20); 1 Hamelin;
provide the Mauritanian military with further valuable
1+ PV30
experience of operating alongside capable and operation-
ally experienced armed forces. In July 2017, Mauritania
AFD 1
declared the country’s northeastern border region with
Algeria a ‘no-go’ zone for civilians as it attempted to tackle
Air Force n.k.
terrorism and drug smuggling there.
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 5+ combat capable ACTIVE 15,850 (Army 15,000 Navy 600 Air 250)
FTR MiG-23 Flogger Paramilitary 5,000
FGA 5+: 3+ MiG-21bis/MF Fishbed; 1 Mirage F-1ED; 1 Conscript liability 24 months authorised
Su-22UM-3K Fitter
TRG 1+ MiG-21UM Mongol B
HELICOPTERS
ATK Mi-24/35 Hind
TPT Medium Mi-8/Mi-17 Hip Army 15,000
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 FORCES BY ROLE
Atoll)‡; R-60 (AA-8 Aphid) 6 mil regions
MANOEUVRE Paramilitary ε5,000 active

Reconnaissance
1 armd recce sqn Gendarmerie ε3,000
Armoured Ministry of Interior
1 armd bn FORCES BY ROLE
Light MANOEUVRE
7 mot inf bn Other
8 (garrison) inf bn 6 regional sy coy
Air Manoeuvre EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 cdo/para bn ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Other APC • APC (W) 12 Cobra
2 (camel corps) bn PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • 2 Rodman
1 gd bn 55M
COMBAT SUPPORT
3 arty bn National Guard 2,000
4 ADA bty Ministry of Interior
1 engr coy
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Customs
MBT 35 T-54/T-55 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 2: 1
RECCE 70: 20 AML-60; 40 AML-90; 10 Saladin Dah Ould Bah (FRA Amgram 14); 1 Yaboub Ould Rajel (FRA
APC • APC (W) 37: 12 Cobra; 5 FV603 Saracen; ε20 RPB18)
Panhard M3
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES DEPLOYMENT
ARV T-54/55 ARV reported
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
MSL • MANPATS Milan UN • MINUSCA 754; 9 obs; 1 inf bn
RCL 114: 75mm ε24 M20; 106mm ε90 M40A1 MALI
and North Africa

ARTILLERY 180
Middle East
UN • MINUSMA 5
TOWED 80: 105mm 36 HM-2/M101A1; 122mm 44: 20
D-30; 24 D-74 MAURITANIA
MRL 10: 107mm 4 Type-63; 122mm 6 Type-81 UN • UNSOS 1 obs
MOR 90: 81mm 60; 120mm 30 Brandt
AIR DEFENCE Morocco MOR
SAM • Point-defence ε4 SA-9 Gaskin (reported); 9K32
Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡ Moroccan Dirham D 2016 2017 2018
GUNS • TOWED 82: 14.5mm 28: 16 ZPU-2; 12 ZPU- GDP D 1.02tr 1.07tr
4; 23mm 20 ZU-23-2; 37mm 10 M-1939; 57mm 12 S-60;
US$ 104bn 111bn
100mm 12 KS-19
Navy ε600 Growth % 1.2 4.8

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 17 Def bdgt D 32.6bn 33.8bn
PCO 1 Voum-Legleita US$ 3.33bn 3.49bn
PCC 7: 1 Abourbekr Ben Amer (FRA OPV 54); 1 Arguin; 2 FMA (US) US$ 10m 5m 0m
Conejera; 1 Limam El Hidrami (PRC); 2 Timbédra (PRC US$1=D 9.81 9.70
Huangpu Mod)
PB 9: 1 El Nasr† (FRA Patra); 4 Mandovi; 2 Saeta-12; 2 Population 33,986,655
Megsem Bakkar (FRA RPB20 – for SAR duties)
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Air Force 250 Male 13.1% 4.3% 4.2% 4.1% 20.4% 3.0%
Female 12.7% 4.3% 4.3% 4.3% 21.7% 3.7%
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ISR 2 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan
Capabilities
TPT 8: Light 7: 2 BN-2 Defender; 1 C-212; 2 PA-31T Regional security challenges will rank highly for Morocco’s
Cheyenne II; 2 Y-12(II); PAX 1 BT-67 (with sensor turret) armed forces, though they have also been deployed on
TRG 11: 3 EMB-312 Tucano; 4 EMB-314 Super Tucano*; 4 missions abroad. The armed forces have gained extensive
SF-260E experience in operations in Western Sahara, and have
HELICOPTERS • MRH 3: 1 SA313B Alouette II; 2 Z-9 deployed overseas in peacekeeping roles. In 2015, Morocco
deployed forces overseas in a combat role, with the dispatch Royal Guard 1,500
of F-16s to operate as part of the Saudi-led coalition during FORCES BY ROLE
the conflict in Yemen. The defence budget continues to rise MANOEUVRE
in order to modernise and re-equip the services, partly Other
in response to regional security contingencies; orders for 1 gd bn
US Army surplus M1A1 Abrams MBTs, refurbished to SA 2 cav sqn
standard, were placed in 2015 and deliveries continue. Air-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
force equipment is ageing overall, bar the delivery of F-16s
in 2012. Significant investment in the navy is now taking
MBT 407: 27+ M1A1SA Abrams; 220 M60A1 Patton; 120
place. Moroccan troops took part in the US-led Flintlock 2017
M60A3 Patton; 40 T-72 (ε200 M48A5 Patton in store)
special-forces exercise, training alongside over 20 African
LT TK 116: 5 AMX-13; 111 SK-105 Kuerassier
and European states. In December 2015, it was reported
ASLT 80 AMX-10RC
that Saudi Arabia had pledged US$22bn of financing over
RECCE 284: 38 AML-60-7; 190 AML-90; 40 EBR-75; 16
2015–19 to develop Morocco’s defence industry, as well
Eland
as to provide training and exercises. Western defence
IFV 135: 10 AMX-10P; 30 Ratel Mk3-20; 30 Ratel Mk3-90;
companies such as Airbus and Thales have a presence in
45 VAB VCI
the country. In early 2016, the Moroccan armed forces were
APC 808
incorporated into NATO’s Interoperability Platform, in APC (T) 488: 400 M113A1/A2; 2+ M113A3; 86 M577A2
order to strengthen Morocco’s defence and security sectors (CP)
and to bring its forces up to NATO standard. November APC (W) 320 VAB VTT
2017 saw Arianespace launch the Mohammed VI Earth- ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
observation satellite for Morocco. ARV 48+: 10 Greif; 18 M88A1; M578; 20 VAB-ECH
ACTIVE 195,800 (Army 175,000 Navy 7,800 Air ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
13,000) Paramilitary 50,000 MSL
Conscript liability 18 months authorised; most enlisted SP 80 M901
MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); M47 Dragon;
personnel are volunteers
Milan; TOW
RESERVE 150,000 (Army 150,000) RCL 106mm 350 M40A1
Reserve obligation to age 50 RL 89mm 200 M20
GUNS • SP 36: 90mm 28 M56; 100mm 8 SU-100
ARTILLERY 2,306
SP 357: 105mm 5 AMX Mk 61; 155mm 292: 84 M109A1/
A1B; 43 M109A2; 4 M109A3; 1 M109A4; 70 M109A5; 90
Army ε75,000; 100,000 conscript (total Mk F3; 203mm 60 M110
175,000) TOWED 118: 105mm 50: 30 L118 Light Gun; 20 M101;
FORCES BY ROLE 130mm 18 M-46; 155mm 50: 30 FH-70; 20 M114
2 comd (Northern Zone, Southern Zone) MRL 122mm 35 BM-21 Grad
MANOEUVRE MOR 1,796: 81mm 1,100 Expal model LN; SP 107mm 36
Armoured M106A2; 120mm 550 Brandt; SP 120mm 110: 20 (VAB
1 armd bde APC); 90 M1064A3
11 armd bn RADAR • LAND RASIT (veh, arty)
Mechanised UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
3 mech inf bde ISR • Medium R4E-50 Skyeye
Mechanised/Light AIR DEFENCE
8 mech/mot inf regt (2–3 bn) SAM
Light Point-defence 49+: 12 2K22M Tunguska-M (SA-19
1 lt sy bde Grison); 37 M48 Chaparral; 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
3 (camel corps) mot inf bn GUNS 407
35 lt inf bn SP 20mm 60 M163 Vulcan
4 cdo unit TOWED 347: 14.5mm 200: 150–180 ZPU-2; 20 ZPU-4;
Air Manoeuvre 20mm 40 M167 Vulcan; 23mm 75–90 ZU-23-2; 100mm
2 para bde 17 KS-19
2 AB bn
Mountain Navy 7,800 (incl 1,500 Marines)
1 mtn inf bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
COMBAT SUPPORT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 6
11 arty bn DESTROYERS 1
7 engr bn DDGHM 1 Mohammed VI-class (FRA FREMM) with
AIR DEFENCE 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM,
1 AD bn 2 octuple A43 VLS with Aster 15 SAM, 2 triple
B515 324mm ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun 3 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
(capacity 1 AS565SA Panther) 1 sqn with Mirage F-1C (F-1CH)
FRIGATES 5 1 sqn with Mirage F-1E (F-1EH)
FFGHM 3 Tarik ben Ziyad (NLD SIGMA 9813/10513) ELECTRONIC WARFARE
with 4 single lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 2/3 1 sqn with EC-130H Hercules; Falcon 20 (ELINT)
AShM, 2 6-cell VLS with VL-MICA SAM, 2 triple MARITIME PATROL
324mm ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun 1 flt with Do-28
(capacity 1 AS565SA Panther) TANKER/TRANSPORT
FFGH 2 Mohammed V (FRA Floreal) with 2 single lnchr 1 sqn with C-130/KC-130H Hercules
with MM38 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun (can be fitted TRANSPORT
with Simbad SAM) (capacity 1 AS565SA Panther) 1 sqn with CN235
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 50 1 VIP sqn with B-737BBJ; Beech 200/300 King Air; Falcon
CORVETTES • FSGM 1 50; Gulfstream II/III/V-SP/G550
1 Lt Col Errhamani (ESP Descubierto) with 2 twin lnchr TRAINING
with MM38 Exocet AShM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr 1 sqn with Alpha Jet*
with Aspide SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 1 sqn T-6C
LWT, 1 76mm gun ATTACK HELICOPTER
PSO 1 Bin an Zaran (OPV 70) with 1 76mm gun
1 sqn with SA342L Gazelle (some with HOT)
PCG 4 Cdt El Khattabi (ESP Lazaga 58m) with 4 single
lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun
1 sqn with Bell 205A (AB-205A); Bell 206 Jet Ranger (AB-
PCO 5 Rais Bargach (under control of fisheries dept)
206); Bell 212 (AB-212)
PCC 12:
1 sqn with CH-47D Chinook
4 El Hahiq (DNK Osprey 55, incl 2 with customs)
1 sqn with SA330 Puma
6 LV Rabhi (ESP 58m B-200D)
2 Okba (FRA PR-72) each with 1 76mm gun EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PB 27: 6 El Wacil (FRA P-32); 10 VCSM (RPB 20); 10 AIRCRAFT 90 combat capable
Rodman 101; 1 other (UK Bird) FTR 22: 19 F-5E Tiger II; 3 F-5F Tiger II
AMPHIBIOUS 5 FGA 49: 15 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 8 F-16D Fighting Falcon;
15 Mirage F-1C (F-1CH); 11 Mirage F-1E (F-1EH)
and North Africa

LANDING SHIPS 4:
Middle East
LSM 3 Ben Aicha (FRA Champlain BATRAL) (capacity 7 ELINT 1 EC-130H Hercules
tanks; 140 troops) TKR/TPT 2 KC-130H Hercules
LST 1 Sidi Mohammed Ben Abdallah (US Newport) TPT 47: Medium 17: 4 C-27J Spartan; 13 C-130H Hercules;
(capacity 3 LCVP; 400 troops) Light 19: 4 Beech 100 King Air; 2 Beech 200 King Air; 1
LANDING CRAFT 2: Beech 200C King Air; 2 Beech 300 King Air; 3 Beech 350
LCM 1 CTM (FRA CTM-5) King Air; 5 CN235; 2 Do-28; PAX 11: 1 B-737BBJ; 2 Falcon
LCT 1 Sidi Ifni 20; 2 Falcon 20 (ELINT); 1 Falcon 50 (VIP); 1 Gulfstream II
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8 (VIP); 1 Gulfstream III; 1 Gulfstream V-SP; 2 Gulfstream
AG 1 Damen 3011 G550
AGOR 1 Abou Barakat Albarbari† (ex-US Robert D. Conrad) TRG 80: 12 AS-202 Bravo; 19 Alpha Jet*; 2 CAP-10; 24 T-6C
AGS 1 Stan 1504 Texan; 9 T-34C Turbo Mentor; 14 T-37B Tweet
AK 2 FF 4 CL-415
AX 1 Essaouira HELICOPTERS
AXS 2 MRH 19 SA342L Gazelle (7 with HOT, 12 with cannon)
TPT 77: Heavy 10 CH-47D Chinook; Medium 24 SA330
Marines 1,500 Puma; Light 43: 25 Bell 205A (AB-205A); 11 Bell 206 Jet
FORCES BY ROLE Ranger (AB-206); 3 Bell 212 (AB-212); 4 Bell 429
MANOEUVRE AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
Amphibious AAM • IR AIM-9J Sidewinder; R-550 Magic; IIR AIM-9X
2 naval inf bn Sidewinder II; SARH R-530; ARH AIM-120C7 AMRAAM
ASM AASM; AGM-65 Maverick; HOT
Naval Aviation
ARM AGM-88B HARM
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
HELICOPTERS • ASW/ASUW 3 AS565SA Panther
Paramilitary 50,000 active
Air Force 13,000
Flying hours 100 hrs/yr on Mirage F-1/F-5E/F Tiger II/F- Gendarmerie Royale 20,000
16C/D Fighting Falcon FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK Air Manoeuvre
2 sqn with F-5E/F-5F Tiger II 1 para sqn
Other (GCC) and ties with the UK and the US are also intended
1 paramilitary bde to act as security guarantors. The forces are in the process
4 (mobile) paramilitary gp of recapitalising core inventory elements with air- and
1 coast guard unit naval-systems purchases. The air force has taken delivery
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER of the last of a batch of F-16 Block 40s that have replaced the
1 sqn Jaguar, and received the first of eight Hawk and 12 Typhoon
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE aircraft. Naval recapitalisation is also under way, with the
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 15 delivery in 2016 of patrol and high-speed support vessels.
Arcor 53 Oman is making a significant investment in infrastructure,
AIRCRAFT • TRG 2 R-235 Guerrier such as at the port of Duqm. In August 2017, the UK and
Oman signed a memorandum of understanding over use
HELICOPTERS
of the port, and its strategic importance will deepen the
MRH 14: 3 SA315B Lama; 2 SA316 Alouette III; 3 SA318
interest of other navies. The US Navy has already carried
Alouette II; 6 SA342K Gazelle
out extensive examination of the facilities. Although a
TPT 8: Medium 6 SA330 Puma; Light 2 SA360
GCC member, Oman has not contributed any forces to the
Dauphin
Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen.
Force Auxiliaire 30,000 (incl 5,000 Mobile ACTIVE 42,600 (Army 25,000 Navy 4,200 Air
Intervention Corps) 5,000 Foreign Forces 2,000 Royal Household 6,400)
Customs/Coast Guard Paramilitary 4,400
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 36: 4 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Erraid; 18 Arcor 46; 14 (other SAR craft)
Army 25,000
DEPLOYMENT FORCES BY ROLE
(Regt are bn size)
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC MANOEUVRE
UN • MINUSCA 765; 2 obs; 1 inf bn Armoured
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO 1 armd bde (2 armd regt, 1 recce regt)
UN • MONUSCO 836; 3 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 fd hospital Light
1 inf bde (5 inf regt, 1 arty regt, 1 fd engr regt, 1 engr
regt, 1 sigs regt)
Operation Restoring Hope 6 F-16C Fighting Falcon 1 inf bde (3 inf regt, 2 arty regt)
1 indep inf coy (Musandam Security Force)
Oman OMN Air Manoeuvre
1 AB regt
Omani Rial R 2016 2017 2018 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
GDP R 25.5bn 27.7bn 1 tpt regt
AIR DEFENCE
US$ 66.3bn 71.9bn
1 ADA regt (2 ADA bty)
per capita US$ 16,535 17,406
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Growth % 3.0 0.0
Inflation % 1.1 3.2 MBT 117: 38 Challenger 2; 6 M60A1 Patton; 73 M60A3
Def bdgt R 3.50bn 3.34bn Patton
US$ 9.10bn 8.69bn LT TK 37 FV101 Scorpion  
FMA (US) US$ 2m 0m 0m RECCE 137: 13 FV105 Sultan (CP); 124 VBL
IFV some Pars III 8×8 (reported)
US$1=R 0.38 0.38
APC 200
Population 3,424,386 APC (T) 10 FV4333 Stormer
Expatriates: 27% APC (W) 190: 175 Piranha (incl variants); 15 AT-105
Saxon
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus AUV 6 FV103 Spartan
Male 15.4% 4.5% 5.2% 5.9% 21.4% 1.7% ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
ARV 11: 4 Challenger; 2 M88A1; 2 Piranha;
Female 14.6% 4.3% 4.6% 4.6% 15.7% 1.7%
3 Samson
ARTILLERY 233
Capabilities SP 155mm 24 G-6
Oman supports small but well-trained and -equipped TOWED 108: 105mm 42 L118 Light Gun; 122mm 30
armed forces whose principal task is ensuring territorial D-30; 130mm 24: 12 M-46; 12 Type-59-I; 155mm 12 FH-
integrity. Membership of the Gulf Cooperation Council 70
MOR 101: 81mm 69; 107mm 20 M30; 120mm 12 Brandt FGA 30: 18 F-16C Block 50 Fighting Falcon; 6 F-16D Block
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL 50 Fighting Falcon; 6 Typhoon
SP 8 VBL with TOW MP 4 C295MPA
MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; Milan; TOW/TOW-2A TPT 20: Medium 6: 3 C-130H Hercules; 2 C-130J Hercules;
AIR DEFENCE 1 C-130J-30 Hercules (VIP); Light 12: 5 C295M; 7 SC.7 3M
SAM • Point-defence 8 Mistral 2; FGM-148 Javelin; 9K32 Skyvan (radar-equipped, for MP); PAX 2 A320-300
Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡ TRG 40: 4 Hawk Mk103*; 4 Hawk Mk166; 12 Hawk
GUNS 26: 23mm 4 ZU-23-2; 35mm 10 GDF-005 (with Mk203*; 8 MFI-17B Mushshak; 12 PC-9*
Skyguard); 40mm 12 L/60 (Towed) HELICOPTERS
MRH 15 Super Lynx Mk300 (maritime/SAR)
Navy 4,200 TPT 36+ Medium 20 NH90 TTH; Light 6: 3 Bell 206 (AB-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 206) Jet Ranger; 3 Bell 212 (AB-212)
PRIMARY SURFACE COMBATANTS 3 AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence 40 Rapier
FFGHM 3 Al-Shamikh with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 RADAR • AIR DEFENCE 6+: 6 Blindfire; S713 Martello
Exocet Block 3 AShM, 2 6-cell VLS with VL-MICA MSL
SAM, 1 76mm gun AAM • IR AIM-9/M/P Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12 II; ARH AIM-120C7 AMRAAM
CORVETTES • FSGM 2: ASM AGM-65D/G Maverick
2 Qahir Al Amwaj with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM AGM-84D Harpoon
AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with Crotale SAM, 1 76mm BOMBS
gun, 1 hel landing platform Laser-guided EGBU-10 Paveway II; EGBU-12 Paveway II
PCFG 3 Dhofar with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet INS/GPS guided GBU-31 JDAM
AShM, 1 76mm gun
PCO 4 Al Ofouq with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform Royal Household 6,400
PCC 3 Al Bushra (FRA P-400) with 1 76mm gun
(incl HQ staff)
AMPHIBIOUS 6
LANDING SHIPS • LST 1 Nasr el Bahr with 1 hel FORCES BY ROLE 
landing platform (capacity 7 tanks; 240 troops) SPECIAL FORCES
and North Africa

LANDING CRAFT 5: 1 LCU; 3 LCM; 1 LCT 2 SF regt
Middle East
Royal Guard Brigade 5,000
AGS 1 Al Makhirah
AK 1 Al Sultana FORCES BY ROLE
AP 2 Shinas (commercial tpt – auxiliary military role MANOEUVRE
only) (capacity 56 veh; 200 tps) Other
AXS 1 Shabab Oman II 1 gd bde (1 armd sqn, 2 gd regt, 1 cbt spt bn)
EPF 2 Al Mubshir (High Speed Support Vessel 72) with 1 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
hel landing platform (capacity 260 troops) ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
ASLT 9 Centauro MGS (9 VBC-90 in store)
Air Force 5,000 IFV 14 VAB VCI
FORCES BY ROLE APC • APC (W) ε50 Type-92
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
2 sqn with F-16C/D Block 50 Fighting Falcon MSL • MANPATS Milan
1 sqn with Hawk Mk103; Hawk Mk203 ARTILLERY • MRL 122mm 6 Type-90A
1 sqn (forming) with Typhoon AIR DEFENCE
MARITIME PATROL SAM • Point-defence 14 Javelin
1 sqn with C295MPA; SC.7 3M Skyvan GUNS • SP 9: 20mm 9 VAB VDAA
TRANSPORT
1 sqn with C-130H/J/J-30 Hercules Royal Yacht Squadron 150
1 sqn with C295M EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
TRAINING LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3
1 sqn with MFI-17B Mushshak; PC-9*; Bell 206 (AB-206) AP 1 Fulk Al Salamah (also veh tpt) with up to 2 AS332
Jet Ranger Super Puma hel
4 (med) sqn; Bell 212 (AB-212); NH-90; Super Lynx Royal Flight 250
Mk300 (maritime/SAR) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIR DEFENCE AIRCRAFT • TPT • PAX 5: 2 B-747SP; 1 DC-8-73CF; 2
2 sqn with Rapier; Blindfire; S713 Martello Gulfstream IV
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS • TPT • Medium 6: 3 SA330 (AS330)
AIRCRAFT 58 combat capable Puma; 2 AS332F Super Puma; 1 AS332L Super Puma
Paramilitary 4,400 active in Gaza announced a new maritime-police force, separate

from other security forces in Gaza, to enhance coastal
Tribal Home Guard 4,000 security. Full security coordination between Israel and the
org in teams of ε100 Palestinian Authority resumed in late 2017. International
partners remain engaged in support and development of
Police Coast Guard 400 the security sector; the EU, for instance, has maintained a
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE police-support mission headquartered in Ramallah since
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 33 2006.
PCO 2 Haras
ACTIVE 0 Paramilitary n.k.
PBF 3 Haras (US Mk V Pegasus)
Precise personnel-strength figures for the various
PB 27: 3 Rodman 101; 1 Haras (SWE CG27); 3 Haras
Palestinian groups are not known
(SWE CG29); 14 Rodman 58; 1 D59116; 5 Zahra
Police Air Wing ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
There is little available data on the status of the
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 4: 1 BN-2T Turbine Islander; 2
organisations mentioned below. Following internal
CN235M; 1 Do-228
fighting in June 2007, Gaza has been under the de facto
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 5: 2 Bell 205A; 3 Bell
control of Hamas, while the West Bank is controlled by the
214ST (AB-214ST) Palestinian Authority. In October 2017, both sides agreed a
preliminary reconciliation deal on control of Gaza.
FOREIGN FORCES
United Kingdom 90; 1 hel flt with AW101 ASW Merlin Paramilitary
HM2; AW159 Wildcat HMA2
Palestinian Authority n.k.
Palestinian Territories PT Presidential Security ε3,000
New Israeli Shekel NS 2016 2017 2018

Special Forces ε1,200
GDP US$ Police ε9,000
per capita US$ National Security Force ε10,000
Growth % FORCES BY ROLE
Inflation % MANOEUVRE
US$1=NS Other
*definitive economic data unavailable 9 paramilitary bn
Population 4,543,126 Preventative Security ε4,000

Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Civil Defence ε1,000
Male 20.4% 5.7% 5.1% 4.3% 13.7% 1.4% The al-Aqsa Brigades n.k.
Female 19.3% 5.5% 4.9% 4.2% 13.5% 1.6% Profess loyalty to the Fatah group that dominates the
Palestinian Authority
Capabilities
Hamas n.k.
The Palestinian Authority’s National Security Force (NSF)
is a paramilitary organisation designed to provide internal- Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades ε15,000–20,000
security support within Gaza and the West Bank. The NSF FORCES BY ROLE
only has real authority within the West Bank, where it has COMMAND
generally proved capable of maintaining internal security. 6 bde HQ (regional)
In October 2017, Hamas and Fatah reached agreement to MANOEUVRE
hand administrative control of Gaza to a Fatah-backed Other
unity government; since 2007, Hamas had controlled Gaza. 1 cdo unit (Nukhba)
The agreement did not address the fate of Hamas’s military 27 paramilitary bn
wing, which has a strong, well-developed rocket-artillery 100 paramilitary coy
capability. Hamas brigades also engage in innovative COMBAT SUPPORT
asymmetric attacks. Israel’s military actions in recent years Some engr units
have periodically degraded the command and control COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
of, as well as the physical infrastructure used by, Hamas Some log units
forces, but have seemingly had little effect on the long-term EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ability of the brigades to produce, import, store and launch ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL •
rockets. In late 2016, the then-Hamas-led administration MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger) (reported)
ARTILLERY contract to install an AN/FPS-132 early-warning radar. (See

MRL • Qassam rockets (multiple calibres); 122mm pp. 321–24.)
Grad
MOR some (multiple calibres) ACTIVE 11,800 (Army 8,500 Navy 1,800 Air 1,500)
Paramilitary up to 5,000
Martime Police ε600 Conscript liability 4 months national service for those
aged 18–35; reduced to 3 months for graduates. Reserve
Qatar QTR commitment for 10 years or to age 40
Qatari Riyal R 2016 2017 2018

GDP R 567bn 606bn
US$ 156bn 166bn Army 12,000 (including Emiri Guard)
per capita US$ 59,514 60,812 FORCES BY ROLE
Growth % 2.2 2.5 SPECIAL FORCES
Inflation % 2.7 0.9 1 SF coy
Def exp R n.k. n.k. MANOEUVRE
Armoured
US$ n.k. n.k.
1 armd bde (1 tk bn, 1 mech inf bn, 1 mor sqn, 1 AT bn)
US$1=R 3.64 3.64 Mechanised
Population 2,314,307 3 mech inf bn
Ethnic groups: Nationals 25%; expatriates 75% of which Indian Light
18%; Iranian 10%; Pakistani 18% 1 (Emiri Guard) bde (3 inf regt)
COMBAT SUPPORT
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 1 fd arty bn
Female 6.2% 1.5% 1.9% 2.8% 9.8% 0.3% ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 73: 30 AMX-30; 43 Leopard 2A7
Capabilities
and North Africa

ASLT 48: 12 AMX-10RC; 36 Piranha II 90mm
Middle East
RECCE 44: 20 EE-9 Cascavel; 8 V-150 Chaimite; 16 VBL
The diplomatic crisis between Qatar and several of its
IFV 40 AMX-10P
neighbours raises questions about the emirate’s future
APC 190
cooperation and integration with the rest of the Gulf
APC (T) 30 AMX-VCI
Cooperation Council (GCC). But it seems to have brought
APC (W) 160 VAB
Qatar and Turkey closer together in their limited but
significant defence cooperation, which includes a small
ARV 3: 1 AMX-30D; 2 Piranha
Turkish military presence in-country. Neither the crisis,
nor Washington’s response to it, appear to have affected
MSL
the significant Qatar–US military relationship, including
SP 24 VAB VCAC HOT
the presence of forces from the US and other Western
MANPATS Milan
states at Al-Udeid air base. Qatar continues its ambitious
RCL 84mm ε40 Carl Gustav
re-equipment and expansion programme and has procured,
or plans to procure, platforms with potentially significant ARTILLERY 115+
power-projection capability. With the delivery of C-17A SP 155mm 52: 28 Mk F3; 24 PzH 2000
Globemasters complete, only the UAE has a larger strategic- TOWED 155mm 12 G-5
transport fleet in the GCC. Following approval for the sale MRL 6+: 122mm 2+ (30-tube); 127mm 4 ASTROS II Mk3
of F-15QA aircraft in late 2016, Qatar signed an agreement MOR 45: 81mm 26 L16; SP 81mm 4 VAB VPM 81;
with the US in June 2017 towards the purchase of a batch 120mm 15 Brandt
of 36, while a letter of intent for Typhoon aircraft was signed
with the UK in September. Both of these agreements Navy 2,500 (incl Coast Guard)
follow the signing of a contract in 2015 for Rafale aircraft EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
from France. These procurements would, when combined, PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11
dramatically increase the size of the air force; this raises PCFGM 4 Barzan (UK Vita) with 2 quad lnchr with MM40
questions about Qatar’s ability to procure the necessary Exocet Block 3 AShM, 1 sextuple lnchr with Mistral SAM,
infrastructure, maintenance and personnel. Contracts are 1 Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 76mm gun 
also proceeding for naval expansion, after four corvettes, PCFG 3 Damsah (FRA Combattante III) with 2 quad lnchr
two offshore-patrol vessels and an amphibious platform with MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun
were ordered from Italy in June 2016. Marte ER and Exocet PBF 3 MRTP 16
MM40 Block 3 missiles are being acquired for coastal PB 1 MRTP 34
defence, which will provide a layered engagement field out AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCT 1 Rabha
to 200km. In March, Raytheon was awarded a US$1.07bn (capacity 3 MBT; 110 troops)
Coast Guard FOREIGN FORCES

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Turkey 150 (trg team)
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12 United States US Central Command: 8,000; USAF CAOC;
PBF 4 DV 15 1 bbr sqn with 6 B-52H Stratofortress; 1 ISR sqn with 4
PB 8: 4 Crestitalia MV-45; 3 Halmatic M160; 1 other RC-135 Rivet Joint; 1 ISR sqn with 4 E-8C JSTARS; 1 tkr
sqn with 24 KC-135R/T Straotanker; 1 tpt sqn with 4 C-17A
Coastal Defence Globemaster; 4 C-130H/J-30 Hercules; 2 AD bty with MIM-
FORCES BY ROLE 104E/F Patriot PAC-2/3 • US Strategic Command: 1 AN/
COASTAL DEFENCE TPY-2 X-band radar
1 bty with 3 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 12 MM40 Exocet
Saudi Arabia SAU
AShM Saudi Riyal R 2016 2017 2018
GDP R 2.42tr 2.54tr
Air Force 2,000 US$ 646bn 679bn
Growth % 1.7 0.1
1 sqn with Alpha Jet*
1 sqn with Mirage 2000ED; Mirage 2000D Inflation % 3.5 -0.2
TRANSPORT Def exp R 306bn 288bn
1 sqn with C-17A Globemaster III; C-130J-30 Hercules US$ 81.5bn 76.7bn
1 sqn with A340; B-707; B-727; Falcon 900 US$1=R 3.75 3.75
ATTACK HELICOPTER
1 ASuW sqn with Commando Mk3 with Exocet
1 sqn with SA341 Gazelle; SA342L Gazelle with HOT Ethnic groups: Nationals 73%, of which Bedouin up to 10%, Shia
6%; expatriates 27% of which Asian 20%, Arab 6%, African 1%,
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER European <1%
1 sqn with Commando Mk2A; Commando Mk2C
1 sqn with AW139 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
AIRCRAFT 18 combat capable Female 12.7% 4.2% 4.4% 4.6% 18.1% 1.7%
FGA 12: 9 Mirage 2000ED; 3 Mirage 2000D
TPT 18: Heavy 8 C-17A Globemaster III; Medium 4 Capabilities
C-130J-30 Hercules; PAX 6: 1 A340; 2 B-707; 1 B-727; 2
Saudi Arabia retains the region’s best-equipped military
Falcon 900
forces, with the exception of Israel. Principal roles are
TRG 27: 6 Alpha Jet*; 21 PC-21
securing territorial integrity, internal security and regional
HELICOPTERS
stability. Its armed forces are continuing to gain combat
ASuW 8 Commando Mk3 experience in its war with the Houthi and allied Saleh-
MRH 34: 21 AW139 (incl 3 for medevac); 2 SA341 Gazelle; loyalist opposition in Yemen, although the operation, begun
11 SA342L Gazelle in 2015, has also exposed areas of comparative weakness
TPT • Medium 4: 3 Commando Mk2A; 1 Commando Mk2C and capability gaps. The fourth quarter of 2017 saw a series
AIR DEFENCE • SAM of leadership changes initiated by King Salman and Crown
Long-Range MIM-104E Patriot PAC-2 GEM-T Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the defence minister, which
Short-Range 9 Roland II included the replacement of National Guard (SANG)
Point-defence Mistral; Blowpipe; FIM-92 Stinger; 9K32 commander Prince Miteb with Prince Khaled bin Ayyaf,
Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡ who has long experience with the SANG. The fighting
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES in Yemen continued to see Houthi forces fire Scud-based
AAM • IR R-550 Magic 2; ARH Mica RF ballistic missiles at Saudi Arabia, with the Kingdom’s
ASM Apache; HOT Patriot PAC-2/PAC-3 batteries being used to intercept
AShM AM39 Exocet them. A diplomatic row involving Saudi Arabia and Qatar
has stymied, for the moment at least, aspirations for closer
Paramilitary up to 5,000 active defence ties among GCC states, particularly in the area of
missile defence. The UK and the US remain the country’s
Internal Security Force up to 5,000 two main sources of advanced military equipment and will
be a focus of defence-industrial support as Riyadh attempts
DEPLOYMENT to implement elements of the Vision 2030 programme,
which aims to diversify the Saudi economy and reduce
LEBANON the country’s reliance on hydrocarbons. The UK and Saudi
UN • UNIFIL 2 Arabia signed a new Military and Security Cooperation
Agreement in September 2017. During President Trump’s RADAR • LAND AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder/AN/TPQ-37
visit to Riyadh in May, the two countries agreed to establish Firefinder (arty, mor)
a Strategic Joint Consultative Group, and furthered existing HELICOPTERS
defence and security cooperation. ATK 35: 11 AH-64D Apache; 24 AH-64E Apache
MRH 21: 6 AS365N Dauphin 2 (medevac); 15 Bell 406CS
ACTIVE 227,000 (Army 75,000 Navy 13,500 Air Combat Scout
20,000 Air Defence 16,000 Strategic Missile Forces TPT • Medium 58: 12 S-70A1 Desert Hawk; 22 UH-60A
2,500 National Guard 100,000) Paramilitary 24,500 Black Hawk (4 medevac); 24 UH-60L Black Hawk
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Short-range Crotale
Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger
Army 75,000
Navy 13,500
FORCES BY ROLE
Navy HQ at Riyadh; Eastern Fleet HQ at Jubail; Western
MANOEUVRE
Fleet HQ at Jeddah
Armoured
4 armd bde (1 recce coy, 3 tk bn, 1 mech bn, 1 fd arty bn, EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 AD bn, 1 AT bn, 1 engr coy, 1 log bn, 1 maint coy, 1 PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 7
med coy) DESTROYERS • DDGHM 3 Al Riyadh (FRA La Fayette
Mechanised mod) with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 2
5 mech bde (1 recce coy, 1 tk bn, 3 mech bn, 1 fd arty bn, AShM, 2 8-cell A43 VLS with Aster 15 SAM, 4 single
1 AD bn, 1 AT bn, 1 engr coy, 1 log bn, 1 maint coy, 1 533mm TT with F17P HWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1
med coy) AS365N Dauphin 2 hel)
Light FRIGATES • FFGHM 4 Madina (FRA F-2000) with 2
2 lt inf bde quad lnchr with Otomat Mk2 AShM, 1 octuple lnchr
1 (Royal Guard) regt (3 lt inf bn) with Crotale SAM, 4 single 533mm TT with F17P HWT,
Air Manoeuvre 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 AS365N Dauphin 2 hel)
1 AB bde (2 AB bn, 3 SF coy) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 30
Aviation CORVETTES • FSG 4 Badr (US Tacoma) with 2 quad
and North Africa

1 comd (3 hel gp) Mk140 lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 2 triple
Middle East
COMBAT SUPPORT 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Phalanx CIWS, 1
3 arty bde 76mm gun
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PCFG 9 Al Siddiq (US 58m) with 2 twin Mk140 lnchr with
MBT 900: 140 AMX-30; 370 M1A2/A2S Abrams; 390 RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 1 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun
M60A3 Patton PB 17 (US Halter Marine)
RECCE 300 AML-60/AML-90 MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 3
IFV 765: 380 AMX-10P; 385 M2A2 Bradley MHC 3 Al Jawf (UK Sandown)
APC 1,573 AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 5 
APC (T) 1,190 M113A1/A2/A3 (incl variants) LCM 3 LCM 6 (capacity 80 troops)
APC (W) 150 Panhard M3 (ε40 AF-40-8-1 Al-Fahd in LCU ε2 Al Qiaq (US LCU 1610) (capacity 120 troops)
store) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2
AUV 233: 73 Aravis; 160 M-ATV AORH 2 Boraida (mod FRA Durance) (capacity either 2
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AS365F Dauphin 2 hel or 1 AS332C Super Puma)  
AEV 15 M728
ARV 278+: 8 ACV ARV; AMX-10EHC; 55 AMX-30D;
Naval Aviation
Leclerc ARV; 125 M88A1; 90 M578 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
VLB 10 AMX-30 HELICOPTERS
MW Aardvark Mk2 MRH 34: 6 AS365N Dauphin 2; 15 AS565; 13 Bell 406CS
NBC VEHICLES 10 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC Combat Scout
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE TPT • Medium 12 AS332B/F Super Puma
MSL AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
SP 290+: 90+ AMX-10P (HOT); 200 VCC-1 ITOW AShM AM39 Exocet; AS-15TT
MANPATS M47 Dragon; TOW-2A
RCL 84mm Carl Gustav; 90mm M67; 106mm M40A1
Marines 3,000
ARTILLERY 761 FORCES BY ROLE
SP 155mm 224: 60 AU-F-1; 110 M109A1B/A2; 54 PLZ-45 SPECIAL FORCES
TOWED 110: 105mm (100 M101/M102 in store); 155mm 1 spec ops regt with (2 spec ops bn)
110: 50 M114; 60 M198; 203mm (8 M115 in store) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MRL 127mm 60 ASTROS II Mk3 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MOR 367: SP 81mm 70; SP 107mm 150 M30; 120mm 147: RECCE Bastion Patsas
110 Brandt; 37 M12-1535 APC • APC (W) 140 BMR-600P
Air Force 20,000 ASM AGM-65 Maverick; AR-1

AShM Sea Eagle
FORCES BY ROLE
ARM ALARM
FIGHTER
ALCM Storm Shadow
4 sqn with F-15C/D Eagle
BOMBS
Laser-guided GBU-10/12 Paveway II; Paveway IV
2 sqn with F-15S Eagle
INS/GPS-guided GBU-31 JDAM; FT-9
3 sqn with Typhoon
GROUND ATTACK Royal Flt
3 sqn with Tornado IDS; Tornado GR1A
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT • TPT 24: Medium 8: 5 C-130H Hercules; 3
1 sqn with E-3A Sentry
L-100-30; Light 3: 1 Cessna 310; 2 Learjet 35; PAX 13: 1
1 sqn with Saab 2000 Erieye
A340; 1 B-737-200; 2 B-737BBJ; 2 B-747SP; 4 BAe-125-800;
ELINT
2 Gulfstream III; 1 Gulfstream IV
1 sqn with RE-3A/B; Beech 350ER King Air
HELICOPTERS • TPT 3+: Medium 3: 2 AS-61; 1 S-70
TANKER
Black Hawk; Light some Bell 212 (AB-212)
1 sqn with KE-3A
TANKER/TRANSPORT
1 sqn with KC-130H/J Hercules
Air Defence Forces 16,000
1 sqn with A330 MRTT FORCES BY ROLE
TRANSPORT AIR DEFENCE
3 sqn with C-130H Hercules; C-130H-30 Hercules; CN- 6 bn with MIM-104D/F Patriot PAC-2 GEM/PAC-3
235; L-100-30HS (hospital ac) 17 bty with Shahine/AMX-30SA
2 sqn with Beech 350 King Air (forming) 16 bty with MIM-23B I-Hawk
TRAINING  73 units (static defence) with Crotale/Shahine
1 OCU sqn with F-15SA Eagle EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
3 sqn with Hawk Mk65*; Hawk Mk65A*; Hawk Mk165* AIR DEFENCE
1 sqn with Jetstream Mk31 SAM
1 sqn with MFI-17 Mushshak; SR22T Long-range 108 MIM-104D/F Patriot PAC-2 GEM/
2 sqn with PC-9; PC-21 PAC-3
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Medium-range 128 MIM-23B I-Hawk
4 sqn with AS532 Cougar (CSAR); Bell 212 (AB-212); Bell Short-range 181: 40 Crotale; 73 Shahine; 68 Crotale/
412 (AB-412) Twin Huey (SAR) Shahine
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Point-defence 400+: 400 M1097 Avenger; Mistral
AIRCRAFT 365 combat capable GUNS 1,070
FTR 81: 56 F-15C Eagle; 25 F-15D Eagle SP 942: 20mm 92 M163 Vulcan; 30mm 850 AMX-30SA
FGA 161: 67 F-15S Eagle; 23 F-15SA Eagle; 71 Typhoon TOWED 128: 35mm 128 GDF Oerlikon; 40mm (150
ATK 69 Tornado IDS L/70 in store)
ISR 14+: 12 Tornado GR1A*; 2+ Beech 350ER King Air RADARS • AIR DEFENCE 80: 17 AN/FPS-117; 28 AN/
TPS-43; AN/TPS-59; 35 AN/TPS-63; AN/TPS-70
AEW&C 7: 5 E-3A Sentry; 2 Saab 2000 Erieye
ELINT 2: 1 RE-3A; 1 RE-3B
TKR/TPT 15: 6 A330 MRTT; 7 KC-130H Hercules; 2 KC- Strategic Missile Forces 2,500
130J Hercules EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
TKR 7 KE-3A MSL • TACTICAL
TPT 51+: Medium 36: 30 C-130H Hercules; 3 C-130H-30 IRBM 10+ DF-3 (CH-SS-2) (service status unclear)
Hercules; 3 L-100-30; Light 15+: 10+ Beech 350 King Air; 1 MRBM Some DF-21 (CH-SS-5 – variant unclear)
Jetstream Mk31 (reported)
TRG 161: 24 Hawk Mk65* (incl aerobatic team); 16 Hawk
Mk65A*; 2 Hawk Mk165*; 20 MFI-17 Mushshak; 20 PC-9; National Guard 73,000 active; 27,000 (tribal
55 PC-21; 24 SR22T levies) (total 100,000)
MRH 15 Bell 412 (AB-412) Twin Huey (SAR) MANOEUVRE
TPT 30: Medium 10 AS532 Cougar (CSAR); Light 20 Bell Mechanised
212 (AB-212) 5 mech bde (1 recce coy, 3 mech inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
CISR • Heavy some Wing Loong 1 (GJ-1) (reported); Light
some CH-4 5 inf bde (3 combined arms bn, 1 arty bn, 1 log bn)
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES 3 indep lt inf bn
AAM • IR AIM-9P/L Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder Other
II; IRIS-T; SARH AIM-7 Sparrow; AIM-7M Sparrow; ARH 1 (Special Security) sy bde (3 sy bn)
AIM-120C AMRAAM 1 (ceremonial) cav sqn
COMBAT SUPPORT Facilities Security Force 9,000+

1 MP bn Subordinate to Ministry of Interior
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES General Civil Defence Administration Units
ASLT 214 LAV-AG (90mm) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
IFV 647 LAV-25 HELICOPTERS • TPT • Medium 10 Boeing Vertol 107
APC • APC (W) 808: 119 LAV-A; 30 LAV-AC; 296 LAV-
CC; 73 LAV-PC; 290 V-150 Commando (810 in store) Special Security Force 500
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AEV 58 LAV-E ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
ARV 111 LAV-R; V-150 ARV APC • APC (W) UR-416
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE AUV Gurkha LAPV
MSL
SP 183 LAV-AT DEPLOYMENT
MANPATS TOW-2A; M47 Dragon
RCL • 106mm M40A1 BAHRAIN
ARTILLERY 359+ GCC • Peninsula Shield ε1,500 (National Guard)
SP 155mm 132 CAESAR TURKEY
TOWED 108: 105mm 50 M102; 155mm 58 M198 Operation Inherent Resolve 6 F-15S Eagle
MOR 119+: 81mm some; 120mm 119 LAV-M
HELICOPTERS YEMEN
ATK 12 AH-64E Apache Operation Restoring Hope 750; M-ATV; 2+ MIM-104D/F
MRH 6 AH-6i Little Bird Patriot PAC-2/3
TPT • Medium 23 UH-60M Black Hawk
TRG 12 MD530F FOREIGN FORCES
AIR DEFENCE Bahrain Operation Restoring Hope 250; 1 SF gp; 6 F-16C
GUNS • TOWED 160: 20mm 30 M167 Vulcan; 90mm 130 Fighting Falcon
M2
and North Africa

Kuwait Operation Restoring Hope 4 F/A-18A Hornet
Middle East
Sudan Operation Restoring Hope 3 Su-24 Fencer
ASM AGM-114R Hellfire II
United Arab Emirates Operation Restoring Hope 12 F-16E
Fighting Falcon
Paramilitary 24,500+ active
United States US Central Command: 500
Border Guard 10,500
FORCES BY ROLE Syria SYR
Subordinate to Ministry of Interior. HQ in Riyadh. 9
subordinate regional commands Syrian Pound S£ 2016 2017 2018
MANOEUVRE GDP S£
Other US$
Some mobile def (long-range patrol/spt) units
per capita US$
2 border def (patrol) units
Growth %
12 infrastructure def units
18 harbour def units Inflation %
Some coastal def units Def exp S£
COMBAT SUPPORT US$
Some MP units US$1=S£
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE *definitive economic data unavailable
APC • PPV Caprivi Mk3 Population 18,028,549
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus

Coast Guard 4,500
Male 16.2% 4.7% 4.7% 4.5% 17.7% 1.9%
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 17+ Female 15.4% 5.0% 4.6% 4.5% 17.8% 2.3%
PCC 3 CSB 40
PBF 6+: 4 Al Jouf; 2 Sea Guard; some Plascoa FIC 1650
Capabilities
PB 8: 6 Damen Stan Patrol 2606; 2 Al Jubatel After over six years of war, government forces have
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 8: 5 UCAC Griffon suffered considerable attrition. The army is short of
8000; 3 other personnel, resulting in increased efforts to conscript young
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 4: 1 AXL; 3 AO men, many of whom try to avoid service. In many areas,
conventional forces have been supplanted by or work COMBAT SUPPORT

alongside militias over which the government often has 2 arty bde
varying levels of control. In 2017, the regime had some 2 AT bde
success in increasing its control of militias and building 1 SSM bde (3 SSM bn with FROG-7)
up its own forces, including through the formation, in late 1 SSM bde (3 SSM bn with SS-21)
2016, of the ‘Fifth Assault Corps’, a volunteer organisation EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 
that recruits new members as well as integrating existing Attrition during the civil war has severely reduced equip-
fighters into the army command structure. The corps has ment numbers for almost all types. It is unclear how much
been involved in operations in Palmyra and west Hama. remains available for operations
During 2017, de-escalation zones were set up between ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
regime and opposition forces across Syria after Russian- MBT T-55A; T-55AM; T-55AMV; T-62; T-62M; T-72;
backed talks in Astana. Freezing the fighting has allowed T-72AV; T-72B; T-72M1; T-90
regime forces, with support from Lebanese Hizbullah, Iran RECCE BRDM-2
and Russia, to make significant gains in the east, especially IFV BMP-1; BMP-2; BTR-82A
in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor governorates. Iran and Russia APC
have provided financial as well as materiel support, whilst APC (T) BTR-50
Hizbullah and Iran have helped field militia forces. Russian APC (W) BTR-152; BTR-60; BTR-70; BTR-80
airstrikes have been decisive in reversing rebel momentum APC IVECO LMV
and ending their threat to the regime. Both Iran and Russia ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
have assisted with fixed- and rotary-wing airlift. Most ARV BREM-1 reported; T-54/55
army formations are believed to be under-strength. Their VLB MTU; MTU-20
ability to coordinate operations has been greatly improved MW UR-77
by Russian advisers. (See pp. 316–17.) ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL
ACTIVE 142,500 (Army 105,000 Navy 2,500 Air SP 9P133 Malyutka-P (BRDM-2 with AT-3C Sagger);
9P148 Konkurs (BRDM-2 with AT-5 Spandrel)
15,000 Air Defence 20,000) Paramilitary 150,000
Conscript liability 30 months (there is widespread MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs
avoidance of military service) (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn); 9K115-2
Metis-M (AT-13 Saxhorn 2); 9K116-1 Bastion (AT-10
Stabber); 9K135 Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan); Milan
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE ARTILLERY
SP 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika; D-30 (mounted on T34/85 chassis);
Army ε105,000 130mm M-46 (truck–mounted); 152mm 2S3 Akatsiya
FORCES BY ROLE TOWED 122mm D-30; M-30 (M1938); 130mm M-46;
The Syrian Arab Army is a heterogeneous force, combin- 152mm D-20; ML-20 (M-1937); 180mm S-23
ing conventional formations, special forces and auxiliary GUN/MOR 120mm 2S9 NONA-S
militias. The main fighting units are the 4th Armoured MRL 107mm Type-63; 122mm BM-21 Grad; 140mm BM-
Division, the Republican Guard, the paratroopers and 14; 220mm 9P140 Uragan; 300mm 9A52 Smerch; 330mm
the Special Forces (including Tiger Forces); they receive some (also improvised systems of various calibres)
the most attention and training. Much of the remainder MOR 82mm some; 120mm M-1943; 160mm M-160;
performs static functions across regime-held areas. Many 240mm M-240
formations are under-strength, at an estimated 500–1,000 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
personnel in brigades and regiments. SRBM • Conventional Scud-B/C/D; Scud look-a-like;
COMMAND 9K79 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab); Fateh-110/M-600
4 corps HQ UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
1 (5th Assault) corps HQ ISR • Medium Mohajer 3/4; Light Ababil
SPECIAL FORCES AIR DEFENCE
2 SF div (total: 11 SF regt; 1 tk regt) SAM
MANOEUVRE Medium-range 9K37 Buk (SA-11 Gadfly); 9K317
Armoured Buk-M2 (SA-17 Grizzly)
1 (4th) armd div (1 SF regt, 2 armd bde, 2 mech bde, 1 Short-range 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)
arty regt, 1 SSM bde (3 SSM bn with Scud-B/C)) Point-defence 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9 Gaskin); 9K33 Osa
5 armd div(-) (SA-8 Gecko); 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher); 9K32
Mechanised Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse); 9K36
1 (Republican Guard) mech div (3 mech bde, 2 sy regt, Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin); 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch)
1 arty regt) GUNS
3 mech div(-) SP 23mm ZSU-23-4; 57mm ZSU-57-2; S-60 (on 2K12
2 indep inf bde(-) chassis)
Amphibious TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2; 37mm M-1939; 57mm S-60;
1 mne unit 100mm KS-19
Navy ε4,000 ATTACK HELICOPTER

Some personnel are likely to have been drafted into other 3 sqn with Mi-25 Hind D
services 2 sqn with SA342L Gazelle
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 6 sqn with Mi-8 Hip/Mi-17 Hip H
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 32†:
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
CORVETTES • FS 2 Petya III (1†) with 1 triple 533mm
Heavy use of both fixed- and rotary-wing assets has likely
ASTT with SAET-60 HWT, 4 RBU 2500 Smerch 1† A/S
reduced readiness and availability to very low levels. It is
mor, 2 twin 76mm gun
estimated that no more than 30–40% of the inventory is op-
PBFG 22: erational
16 Osa I/II with 4 single lnchr with P-15M Termit-M AIRCRAFT
(SS-N-2C Styx) AShM FTR 70: 34 MiG-23MF/ML/UM Flogger; 30 MiG-29A/SM/
6 Tir with 2 single lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-8 UB Fulcrum
Saccade) AShM FGA 128: 68 MiG-21MF/bis Fishbed; 9 MiG-21U Mongol
PB 8 Zhuk† A; 41 MiG-23BN/UB Flogger;
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 7 ATK 39: 28 Su-22 Fitter D; 11 Su-24 Fencer
MHC 1 Sonya with 2 quad lnchr with 9K32 Strela-2 (SA- TPT 23: Heavy 3 Il-76 Candid; Light 13: 1 An-24 Coke; 6
N-5 Grail)‡ SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS An-26 Curl; 2 PA-31 Navajo; 4 Yak-40 Codling; PAX 7: 2
MSO 1 Natya with 2 quad lnchr with 9K32 Strela-2 (SA- Falcon 20; 1 Falcon 900; 4 Tu-134B-3
N-5 Grail)‡ SAM TRG 15 L-39 Albatros*
MSI 5 Korund (Yevgenya) (Project 1258) HELICOPTERS
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING SHIPS • LSM 3 Polnochny B ATK 24 Mi-25 Hind D
(capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops) MRH 54: 26 Mi-17 Hip H; 28 SA342L Gazelle
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AX 1 Al Assad TPT • Medium 27 Mi-8 Hip
Coastal Defence AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡; R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73
FORCES BY ROLE (AA-11 Archer); IR/SARH; R-23/24 (AA-7 Apex); R-27
COASTAL DEFENCE (AA-10 Alamo); ARH; R-77 (AA-12A Adder) reported
and North Africa

1 AShM bde with P-35 (SSC-1B Sepal); P-15M Termit-R ASM Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen); Kh-29T/L (AS-14 Kedge) HOT
Middle East
(SSC-3 Styx); C-802; K-300P Bastion (SSC-5 Stooge) ARM Kh-31P (AS-17A Krypton)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Air Defence Command ε20,000 (-)
COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM P-35 (SSC-1B Sepal);
FORCES BY ROLE
P-15M Termit-R (SSC-3 Styx); C-802; K-300P Bastion (SSC-
AIR DEFENCE
5 Stooge)
4 AD div with S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa); 2K12 Kub (SA-6
Naval Aviation Gainful); S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline)
3 AD regt with S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon)
All possibly non-operational after vacating base for Rus-
sian deployment EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Long-range S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon)
HELICOPTERS • ASW 10: 4 Ka-28 Helix A; 6 Mi-14 Medium-range S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline)
Haze Short-range 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful); S-125 Pechora (SA-
3 Goa)
Air Force ε15,000(-) Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2/2M (SA-7A/B Grail)‡  
FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER Paramilitary ε150,000
2 sqn with MiG-23 MF/ML/UM Flogger
2 sqn with MiG-29A/U Fulcrum National Defence Force ε100,000
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK An umbrella of disparate regime militias performing a
4 sqn with MiG-21MF/bis Fishbed; MiG-21U Mongol A variety of roles, including territorial control
2 sqn with MiG-23BN/UB Flogger Other Militias ε50,000
GROUND ATTACK
Numerous military groups fighting for the Assad
4 sqn with Su-22 Fitter D regime, including Afghan, Iraqi, Pakistani and sectarian
1 sqn with Su-24 Fencer organisations. Some receive significant Iranian support
1 sqn with L-39 Albatros*
TRANSPORT Coast Guard
1 sqn with An-24 Coke; An-26 Curl; Il-76 Candid EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn with Falcon 20; Falcon 900 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6
1 sqn with Tu-134B-3 PBF 2 Mawani
1 sqn with Yak-40 Codling PB 4
AIR DEFENCE
TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT SAM
DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
CONTROL GUNS
Data here represents the de facto situation for selected SP 14.5mm ZPU-2 (tch); 23mm ZU-23-2 (tch); ZSU-23-4
armed opposition groups and their observed equipment
Syrian Democratic Forces (Coalition) ε50,000
Free Syrian Army (Coalition) ε35,000 The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) benefit from
The Free Syrian Army (FSA) is a coalition that includes all considerable US and coalition air support as well as
FSA affiliates not associated with the FSA Southern Front. weaponry. Embedded US special-operations forces train,
The FSA is a broad anti-regime grouping comprising local assist and even fight alongside the SDF. Kurdish forces
defence forces, anti-regime militias, moderate and hardline from the YPG/J (People’s Protection Units/Women’s
Islamists, secularists and others. Protection Units) provide military leadership and main
combat power. Arab forces complement these units, often
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
at the insistence of the US to promote a cross-ethnic image.
In 2017, the SDF made gains against ISIS in Raqqa and Deir
MBT T-55; T-62; T-72AV
ez-Zor provinces, coming into close rivalry with regime
IFV BMP-1
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE forces in the area of Deir ez-Zor City.
MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
9K115-2 Metis-M (AT-13 Saxhorn 2); 9K135 Kornet (AT-14 MBT T-55; T-72 (reported)
Spriggan); BGM-71 TOW; Milan IFV BMP-1
ARTILLERY APC • PPV Guardian
TOWED 122mm D-30 AUV M-ATV
MRL 107mm Type-63; 122mm BM-21 Grad; Grad (6-tube ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
tech) MSL • MANPATS 9K111-1 Konkurs
MOR 82mm some RCL 73mm SPG-9; 90mm M-79 Osa
AIR DEFENCE ARTILLERY
SAM MRL 122mm BM-21 Grad; 9K132 Grad-P
Point-defence MANPADS some MOR 82mm 82-BM-37; M-1938; 120mm M-1943;
GUNS improvised mortars of varying calibre
SP 14.5mm ZPU-1; ZPU-2 23mm ZU-23-2; ZSU-23-4 AIR DEFENCE • GUNS
Shilka SP 14.5mm ZPU-4 (tch); ZPU-2 (tch); ZPU-1 (tch); 1
ZPU-2 (tch/on T-55); 23mm ZSU-23-4 Shilka; ZU-23-2
Free Syrian Army – Southern Front (tch); 57mm AZP S-60
(Coalition) 25,000+ TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-2; ZPU-1; 23mm ZU-23-2
The FSA Southern Front is a capable coalition almost
entirely concentrated in the provinces of Daraa and Euphrates Shield Forces ε10,000
Quneitra, south of Damascus. The coalition includes These rebel factions (including the Syrian Turkmen
mainstream Islamist factions as well as tribal forces. It Brigades) operate under Turkish command in the
was reported in July 2017 that the US-funded provision northwestern area that Turkey has controlled since 2016.
of weapons and training to moderate rebel groups had EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
stopped; this will affect FSA capabilities. ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE MBT T-54; T-55; T-62
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES IFV BMP-1
MBT T-55; T-54B/M; T-54-3; T-72AV ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
IFV BMP-1 MSL • MANPATS BGM-71 TOW; 9K115 Metis (AT-7
APC • APC(W) OT-64 Saxhorn)
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE RCL 73mm SPG-9; 82mm B-10
MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 ARTILLERY
Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K115-2 Metis-M (AT-13 Saxhorn 2); MRL 107mm Type-63; 122mm 9K132 Grad-P
BGM-71 TOW MOR 82mm 2B9 Vasilek; improvised mortars of varying
RCL 106mm M40 calibre
ARTILLERY AIR DEFENCE • GUNS
SP 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika SP 14.5mm ZPU-4 (tch); ZPU-2 (tch); ZPU-1 (tch);
TOWED 122mm D-30 23mm ZU-23-2 (tch); 57mm AZP S-60
MOR 120mm some; others of varying calibre TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-1; ZPU-2; ZPU-4; 23mm ZU-23-2
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) ε20,000 withdrew from strategic locations in Idlib near the Turkish
HTS was formed by Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly known border.
as Jabhat al-Nusra) in January 2017 by absorbing other EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
hardline groups. HTS has been one of the most effective ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
and capable rebel groups; it is designated a terrorist MBT T-55
organisation by the US for its links to al-Qaeda. It is IFV BMP-1
active throughout Syria, particularly in the north. It made ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
significant gains against rival group Ahrar al-Sham in Idlib MSL • MANPATS 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel);
province. HTS remains opposed to all de-escalation efforts, 9K115-2 Metis-M (AT-13 Saxhorn 2); 9K135 Kornet (AT-14
thereby appealing to rebel fighters seeking to continue the Spriggan)
fight against the regime. RCL 106mm M40
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARTILLERY
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES SP 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika
MBT T-55; T-62; T-72; T-72AV TOWED 130mm some M-46
IFV BMP-1 MRL 107mm 5+ Type-63
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MOR improvised mortars of varying calibre
Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115-2 Metis-M (AT-13 FOREIGN FORCES
Saxhorn 2); 9K135 Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan)
RCL 73mm SPG-9; 106mm M-40 France Operation Inherent Resolve (Chammal) 1 SF unit
ARTILLERY Hizbullah 7,000–8,000
SP 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika Iran 5,000 (incl 2,000 IRGC)
TOWED 122mm D-30; 130mm M-46 Russia 6,000: 1 inf BG; 4 MP bn; 1 engr unit; 7 T-90;
MRL 107mm Type-63 ε20 BTR-82A; 12 2A65; 4 9A52 Smerch; TOS-1A; 9K720
MOR 120mm some; improvised mortars of varying Iskander-M; 4 MiG-29SMT Fulcrum; 8 Su-24M Fencer; 6
calibres Su-25SM; 4 Su-30SM; 10 Su-34; 4 Su-35S; 1 Il-20M; 4 Mi-
AIR DEFENCE 28N Havoc; 4 Ka-52 Hokum B; 12 Mi-24P/Mi-35M Hind;
SAM 4 Mi-8AMTSh Hip; 3 Pantsir-S1/S2; 1 AShM bty with
and North Africa

Point-defence 9K37 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡ 3K55 Bastion (SSC-5 Stooge); 1 SAM bty with S-400 (SA-
Middle East
GUNS 21 Growler); 1 SAM bty with S-300V4 (SA-23); air base at
SP 14.5mm ZPU-1; ZPU-2; 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm AZP Latakia; naval facility at Tartus
S-60 Turkey 500+; 1 SF coy; 1 armd coy(+); 1 arty unit
United States Operation Inherent Resolve 1,700+; 1 ranger
Jaysh al-Islam ε10,000 unit; 1 arty bty with M777A2; 1 MRL bty with M142
Jaysh al-Islam is one of the few remaining significant HIMARS
independent Islamist groups. The bulk of its forces
are thought to be based in the East Ghouta suburbs of
Damascus. Recently its Northern Sector transferred Tunisia TUN
allegiance to Ahrar al-Sham. Tunisian Dinar D 2016 2017 2018
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
GDP D 90.4bn 97.4bn
MBT T-72; T-55 US$ 42.1bn 39.9bn
IFV BMP-1 per capita US$ 3,749 3,518
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Growth % 1.0 2.3
MSL • MANPATS 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel) Inflation % 3.7 4.5
RCL 106mm M-40
Def bgt D 2.09bn 2.02bn 2.33bn
ARTILLERY
SP 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika US$ 975m 826m
MRL 107mm Type-63; 122mm BM-21 Grad FMA (US) US$ 65m 45m 0m
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS US$1=D 2.15 2.44
SRBM Zelzal-2
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
Point-defence 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko) Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 12.9% 3.4% 3.7% 4.0% 21.9% 3.7%
Ahrar al-Sham ε15,000
Female 12.1% 3.2% 3.7% 4.2% 22.8% 4.2%
Ahrar al-Sham was once considered one of the strongest
Salafist organisations in Syria, but it has been in increasing
rivalry with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Ahrar sought to build a
Capabilities
rival front, appealing to other Islamist factions. Following Territorial sovereignty and internal security are the main
conflict with HTS over the summer, Ahrar al-Sham tasks of the Tunisian armed forces. During 2017, the
government and armed forces worked on a revised defence GUNS 127

and security policy for a yet to be published ‘white book’. SP 40mm 12 M42
The civil war in neighbouring Libya and Islamist terrorist TOWED 115: 20mm 100 M-55; 37mm 15 Type-55 (M-
groups operating from this territory continue to loom large 1939)/Type-65
as a security concern. Tunisian forces have been working
with and have benefited from training from Algeria as Navy ε4,800
part of their counter-terrorism efforts. The country’s
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
overall military capability is limited by its comparatively
aged inventory of equipment, although it has been the
PCFG 3 La Galite (FRA Combattante III) with 2 quad
recipient of surplus US systems, including the OH-58D
Mk140 lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun
Kiowa Warrior armed utility helicopter, delivery of which
PCG 3 Bizerte (FRA P-48) with 8 SS 12M AShM
began in early 2017. This acquisition reflects wider and
PCF 6 Albatros (GER Type-143B) with 2 single 533mm TT,
closer military relations between Tunisia and the US. In
May 2017, the government deployed the armed forces to 2 76mm guns
protect oil-, gas- and phosphate-production sites in the face PBF 2 20m Fast Patrol Boat
of industrial unrest. PB 15: 1 Istiklal; 3 Utique (mod PRC Haizhui II); 5
Joumhouria; 6 V Series
ACTIVE 35,800 (Army 27,000 Navy 4,800 Air 4,000) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 7:
Paramilitary 12,000 ABU 3: 2 Tabarka (ex-US White Sumac); 1 Sisi Bou Said
Conscript liability 12 months selective AGE 1 Hannibal
AGS 1 Khaireddine (ex-US Wilkes)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE AWT 1 Ain Zaghouan (ex-ITA Simeto)
AX 1 Salambo (ex-US Conrad, survey)
Army 5,000; 22,000 conscript (total 27,000)
FORCES BY ROLE
Air Force 4,000
SPECIAL FORCES FORCES BY ROLE
1 SF bde FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
1 (Sahara) SF bde 1 sqn with F-5E/F-5F Tiger II
MANOEUVRE TRANSPORT
Reconnaissance 1 sqn with C-130B/H/J-30 Hercules; G.222; L-410 Turbolet
1 recce regt 1 liaison unit with S-208A
Mechanised TRAINING
3 mech bde (1 armd regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 arty regt, 1 2 sqn with L-59 Albatros*; MB-326B; SF-260
AD regt, 1 engr regt, 1 sigs regt, 1 log gp) 1 sqn with MB-326K; MB-326L
COMBAT SUPPORT TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 engr regt 2 sqn with AS350B Ecureuil; AS365 Dauphin 2; AB-205
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE (Bell 205); SA313; SA316 Alouette III; UH-1H Iroquois;
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES UH-1N Iroquois
MBT 84: 30 M60A1; 54 M60A3 1 sqn with HH-3E
LT TK 48 SK-105 Kuerassier EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
RECCE 60: 40 AML-90; 20 FV601 Saladin AIRCRAFT 24 combat capable
APC 350
FTR 12: 10 F-5E Tiger II; 2 F-5F Tiger II
APC (T) 140 M113A1/A2
ATK 3 MB-326K
APC (W) 110 Fiat 6614
ISR 12 Maule MX-7-180B
PPV 100+: Ejder Yalcin; 100+ Kirpi
TPT 18: Medium 13: 5 C-130B Hercules; 1 C-130H
Hercules; 2 C-130J-30 Hercules; 5 G.222; Light 5: 3 L-410
AEV 2 Greif
Turbolet; 2 S-208A
ARV 3 Greif; 6 M88A1
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL TRG 30: 9 L-59 Albatros*; 4 MB-326B; 3 MB-326L; 14
SP 35 M901 ITV TOW SF-260
MANPATS Milan; TOW HELICOPTERS
ARTILLERY 276 MRH 16: 1 AS365 Dauphin 2; 6 SA313; 3 SA316 Alouette
TOWED 115: 105mm 48 M101A1/A2; 155mm 67: 12 III; 6 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior
M114A1; 55 M198 SAR 11 HH-3E
MOR 161: 81mm 95; SP 107mm 48 M106; 120mm 18 TPT • Light 31: 6 AS350B Ecureuil; 15 Bell 205 (AB-205);
Brandt 8 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 2 Bell 212 (UH-1N Iroquois)
RADAR • LAND RASIT (veh, arty) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
AIR DEFENCE AAM • IR AIM-9P Sidewinder
SAM • Point-defence 26 M48 Chaparral; RBS-70 ASM AGM-114R Hellfire
Paramilitary 12,000 coastal-defence missiles, after an Emirati vessel was hit

by an anti-ship missile in late 2016. A request in May for
National Guard 12,000 additional Patriot air-defence missiles is an indicator of a
Ministry of Interior high use rate. The UAE is reportedly developing a number
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE of regional staging posts in Eritrea, Somaliland and in the
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Bab al-Mandab to support the Yemen operation. This also
ASLT 2 EE-11 Urutu FSV demonstrated the country’s developing approach to the
APC • APC (W) 16 EE-11 Urutu (anti-riot); VAB Mk3 use of force and there are signs of an acceptance of military
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 24 risk. The UAE has deployed armour during the campaign
PCC 6 Rais el Blais (ex-GDR Kondor I) and demonstrated the use of a range of air munitions,
PBF 7: 4 Gabes; 3 Patrouiller including precision-guidance kits. Efforts to purchase a
PB 11: 5 Breitla (ex-GDR Bremse); 4 Rodman 38; 2 successor to the Mirage 2000 aircraft have slowed, although
Socomena the French Rafale is the preferred option. In 2016, the UAE
HELICOPTERS began to receive US-manufactured THAAD ballistic-
MRH 8 SA318 Alouette II/SA319 Alouette III missile-defence batteries. The UAE continues to develop its
defence-industrial base to maintain and support military
equipment; parent company EDIC oversees a variety of
DEPLOYMENT subsidiaries, including in the UAV, support, munitions,
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO guided-weapons and defence-electronic sectors. The UAE
remains reliant, however, on external providers for major
weapons systems.
United Arab Emirates UAE ACTIVE 63,000 (Army 44,000 Navy 2,500 Air 4,500
Presidential Guard 12,000)
Emirati Dirham D 2016 2017 2018 Conscript liability 2 years National Service for men aged
GDP D 1.28tr 1.39tr 18–30; reduced to 9 months for those completing secondary
US$ 349bn 379bn school. Voluntary 9 months service for women
per capita US$ 35,384 37,346
and North Africa

Middle East
Growth % 3.0 1.3
Inflation % 1.8 2.1
Def exp D n.k. n.k.
Space
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US$ n.k. n.k.
SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS 2 Yahsat
US$1=D 3.67 3.67
Population 6,072,475 Army 44,000
Ethnic groups: Nationals 24%; expatriates 76% of which Indian FORCES BY ROLE
30%, Pakistani 20%; other Arab 12%; other Asian 10%; UK 2%; MANOEUVRE
other European 1%
Armoured
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 2 armd bde
Mechanised
Male 10.7% 2.8% 5.2% 10.5% 38.5% 0.6%
2 mech bde
Female 10.2% 2.3% 3.1% 3.9% 11.4% 0.4% Light
1 inf bde
Capabilities COMBAT SUPPORT
The UAE’s armed forces are arguably the best trained 1 arty bde (3 SP arty regt)
and most capable among the GCC states. In recent years, 1 engr gp
the UAE has shown a growing willingness to take part EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
in operations, including sending an F-16 detachment to ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Afghanistan, and participating in the air campaign in MBT 421: 45 AMX-30; 340 Leclerc; 36 OF-40 Mk2 (Lion)
Libya, the counter-ISIS air campaign and the Saudi-led LT TK 76 FV101 Scorpion
effort to defeat Houthi rebels in Yemen. In the case of RECCE 73: 49 AML-90; 24 VBL (20 FV701 Ferret in store;
Yemen, the UAE has committed air and ground forces, 20 FV601 Saladin in store)
particularly but not exclusively the presidential guard, IFV 405: 15 AMX-10P; 390 BMP-3
and has incurred significant casualties. In part as a APC 1,245+
reflection of these activities, the US and the UAE signed APC (T) 136 AAPC (incl 53 engr plus other variants)
a new defence agreement in May designed to deepen APC (W) 630: 40 AMV 8×8; 120 EE-11 Urutu; 370
military-to-military cooperation. The UAE’s involvement Panhard M3; 80 VCR (incl variants); 20 VAB
in the Yemen campaign is also offering combat lessons, PPV 479+: 450+ Caiman; 29 Maxxpro LWB
not least of all in littoral operations and the threat from AUV 750 M-ATV; Nimr
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 2

AEV 53 ACV-AESV MHO 2 Al Murjan (ex-GER Frankenthal-class Type-332)
ARV 143: 8 ACV-AESV Recovery; 4 AMX-30D; 85 AMPHIBIOUS 29
BREM-L; 46 Leclerc ARV LANDING SHIPS • LST 2 Alquwaisat with 1 hel
NBC VEHICLES 32 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC landing platform
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE LANDING CRAFT 16
MSL LCP 4 Fast Supply Vessel (multipurpose)
SP 20 HOT LCU 5: 3 Al Feyi (capacity 56 troops); 2 (capacity 40
MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; Milan; TOW; (Vigilant in troops and additional vehicles)
store) LCT 7
RCL 262: 84mm 250 Carl Gustav; 106mm 12 M40 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2:
ARTILLERY 600+ AFS 2 Rmah with 4 single 533mm TT
SP 155mm 181: 78 G-6; 85 M109A3; 18 Mk F3
TOWED 93: 105mm 73 L118 Light Gun; 130mm 20 Type- Air Force 4,500
59-I Flying hours 110 hrs/yr
MRL 75+: 122mm 48+: 48 Firos-25 (est 24 op); Type-90 FORCES BY ROLE
(reported); 227mm 21+ M142 HIMARS; 300mm 6 9A52 FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
Smerch 3 sqn with F-16E/F Block 60 Fighting Falcon
MOR 251: 81mm 134: 20 Brandt; 114 L16; 120mm 21 3 sqn with Mirage 2000-9DAD/EAD/RAD
Brandt; SP 120mm 96 RG-31 MMP Agrab Mk2 AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING AND CONTROL
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS 1 flt with Saab 340 Erieye
SRBM • Conventional 6 Scud-B (up to 20 msl); MGM- SEARCH & RESCUE
140A/B ATACMS (launched from M142 HIMARS) 2 flt with AW109K2; AW139
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES TANKER
ISR • Medium Seeker II 1 flt with A330 MRTT
AIR DEFENCE TRANSPORT
SAM • Point-defence Blowpipe; Mistral 1 sqn with C-17A Globemaster
GUNS 62 1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 Hercules; L-100-30
SP 20mm 42 M3 VDAA 1 sqn with CN235M-100
TOWED 30mm 20 GCF-BM2 TRAINING
1 sqn with Grob 115TA
Navy 2,500 1 sqn with Hawk Mk102*
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 sqn with PC-7 Turbo Trainer
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 1 1 sqn with PC-21
FRIGATES • FFGH 1 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 Abu Dhabi with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet 1 sqn with Bell 412 Twin Huey
Block 3 AShM, 1 76mm gun EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 42 AIRCRAFT 156 combat capable
CORVETTES 10 FGA 137: 54 F-16E Block 60 Fighting Falcon (Desert
FSGHM 6: Eagle); 24 F-16F Block 60 Fighting Falcon (13 to remain in
6 Baynunah with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet US for trg); 15 Mirage 2000-9DAD; 44 Mirage 2000-9EAD
Block 3 AShM, 1 8-cell Mk56 VLS with RIM-162 ISR 7 Mirage 2000 RAD*
ESSM SAM, 1 21-cell Mk49 GMLS with RIM-116B AEW&C 2 Saab 340 Erieye
SAM, 1 76mm gun TPT/TKR 3 A330 MRTT
FSGM 4: TPT 23: Heavy 7 C-17 Globemaster III; Medium 6: 3
2 Muray Jib (GER Lurssen 62m) with 2 quad lnchr C-130H Hercules; 1 C-130H-30 Hercules; 2 L-100-30; Light
with MM40 Exocet Block 2 AShM, 1 octuple lnchr 10: 6 CN235; 4 DHC-8 Dash 8 (MP)
with Crotale SAM, 1 Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 76mm gun, TRG 79: 12 Grob 115TA; 12 Hawk Mk102*; 30 PC-7 Turbo
1 hel landing platform Trainer; 25 PC-21
2 Ganthoot with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet HELICOPTERS
Block 3 AShM, 2 3-cell VLS with VL-MICA SAM, 1 MRH 21: 12 AW139; 9 Bell 412 Twin Huey
76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform TPT • Light 4: 3 AW109K2; 1 Bell 407
PCFGM 2 Mubarraz (GER Lurssen 45m) with 2 twin UNMANNED AERIAL VEHCILES
lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 sextuple lnchr with CISR • Heavy Wing Loong 1 (GJ-1)
Mistral SAM, 1 76mm gun AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
PCFG 6 Ban Yas (GER Lurssen TNC-45) with 2 twin lnchr AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; R-550 Magic; IIR AIM-
with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 1 76mm gun 9X Sidewinder II; IIR/ARH Mica; ARH AIM-120B/C
PBFG 12 Butinah (Ghannatha mod) with 4 single lncher AMRAAM
with Marte Mk2/N AShM  ASM AGM-65G Maverick; Hakeem 1/2/3 (A/B)
PBF 12: 6 Ghannatha with 120mm mor (capacity 42 ARM AGM-88C HARM
troops); 6 Ghannatha (capacity 42 troops) ALCM Black Shaheen (Storm Shadow/SCALP EG variant)
BOMBS ASW 7 AS332F Super Puma (5 in ASuW role)

INS/SAT guided Al Tariq MRH 55: 4 AS365F Dauphin 2 (VIP); 18 H125M Fennec; 7
Laser-guided GBU-12/58 Paveway II AS565 Panther; 3 AW139 (VIP); 20 Bell 407MRH; 4 SA316
Alouette III
Air Defence TPT 63+: Heavy 22 CH-47F Chinook; Medium 41+: 11
FORCES BY ROLE UH-60L Black Hawk; 29+ UH-60M Black Hawk
AIR DEFENCE AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
2 AD bde (3 bn with MIM-23B I-Hawk; MIM-104F ASM AGM-114 Hellfire; Cirit (reported); Hydra-70; HOT
Patriot PAC-3) AShM AS-15TT; AM39 Exocet
3 (short range) AD bn with Crotale; Mistral; Rapier; RB-
70; Javelin; 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse); 96K6 Pantsir-S1 Paramilitary
1 SAM bty with THAAD
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Coast Guard
AIR DEFENCE • SAM Ministry of Interior
Medium-range MIM-23B I-Hawk; MIM-104F Patriot EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PAC-3 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 112
Short-range Crotale; 50 96K6 Pantsir-S1 PSO 1 Al Watid
Point-defence RBS-70; Rapier; Javelin; 9K38 Igla (SA-18 PBF 58: 6 Baglietto GC23; 3 Baglietto 59; 15 DV-15; 34
Grouse); Mistral MRTP 16
MISSILE DEFENCE 6+ THAAD PB 53: 2 Protector; 16 (US Camcraft 65); 5 (US
Camcraft 77); 6 Watercraft 45; 12 Halmatic Work; 12
Presidential Guard Command 12,000 Al Saber
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE DEPLOYMENT
Reconaissance
1 recce sqn ERITREA
Mechanised Operation Restoring Hope 1,000; 1 armd BG; Leclerc; BMP-3;
1 mech bde (1 tk bn, 4 mech inf bn, 1 AT coy, 1 cbt engr G-6; Agrab Mk2; 2 Archangel; 3 AH-64D Apache; 2 CH-47F
and North Africa

coy, 1 CSS bn) Chinook; 4 UH-60M Black Hawk; Wing Loong 1 (GJ-1) UAV;
Middle East
Amphibious 4 MIM-104F Patriot PAC-3
1 mne bn
LIBYA
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
6 AT-802; 2 UH-60M; 2 Wing Loong 1 (GJ-1) UAV
MBT 50 Leclerc SAUDI ARABIA
IFV 290: 200 BMP-3; 90 BTR-3U Guardian Operation Restoring Hope 12 F-16E Fighting
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Falcon
MSL • SP HMMWV with 9M133 Kornet
YEMEN
Joint Aviation Command Operation Restoring Hope 3,000 1 bde HQ; 2 armd BG;
FORCES BY ROLE Leclerc; BMP-3; M-ATV; G-6; M109A3; Agrab Mk2; 4 AH-
GROUND ATTACK 64D Apache; 2 CH-47F Chinook; 4 UH-60M Black Hawk;
1 sqn with Archangel; AT802 Air Tractor 96K6 Pantsir-S1; 4 MIM-104F Patriot PAC-3
ANTI-SURFACE/ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
1 sqn with AS332F Super Puma; AS565 Panther FOREIGN FORCES
TRANSPORT Australia 700; 1 FGA det with 6 F/A-18A Hornet; 1 B-737-
1 (Spec Ops) gp with AS365F Dauphin 2; H125M Fennec; 700 Wedgetail (E-7A); 1 A330 MRTT (KC-30A); 1 tpt det
AW139; Bell 407MRH; Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; with 2 C-130J-30 Hercules
CH-47C/F Chinook; DHC-6-300/400 Twin Otter; UH-
Denmark Operation Inherent Resolve 20
60L/M Black Hawk
Egypt Operation Restoring Hope 6 F-16C Fighting Falcon
ATTACK HELICOPTER
1 gp with AH-64D Apache France 650: 1 armd BG (1 tk sqn, 1 aty bty); Leclerc; VBCI;
CASEAR; 6 Rafale, 1 C-135FR
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Italy 120; 1 tpt flt with 2 C-130J Hercules
ATK 23 Archangel Jordan Operation Restoring Hope 6 F-16C Fighting Falcon
ISR 8 AT802 Air Tractor* Korea, Republic of: 139 (trg activities at UAE Spec Ops
TPT • Light 15: 2 Beech 350 King Air; 8 Cessna 208B School)
Grand Caravan*; 1 DHC-6-300 Twin Otter; 4 DHC-6-400 Morocco Operation Restoring Hope 6 F-16C Fighting Falcon
Twin Otter United Kingdom 1 tkr/tpt flt with C-17A Globemaster;
HELICOPTERS C-130J Hercules; A330 MRTT Voyager
ATK 28 AH-64D Apache United States: 5,000; 1 ftr sqn with 6 F-22A Raptor; 1 ISR
sqn with 4 U-2; 1 AEW&C sqn with 4 E-3 Sentry; 1 tkr sqn coalition forces. The air force has effectively ceased to
with 12 KC-10A; 1 ISR UAV sqn with RQ-4 Global Hawk; 2 function, except for a small number of aircraft apparently
AD bty with MIM-104E/F Patriot PAC-2/3 stored at Al-Anad Air Base and AT-802 aircraft provided
by the UAE.
Yemen, Republic of YEM ACTIVE 10,000–20,000 (Army 10,000–20,000 Navy
n.k. Air Force n.k., Air Defence n.k.) Paramilitary n.k.
Yemeni Rial R 2016 2017 2018
GDP R 7.65tr 8.99tr
US$ 27.3bn 25.7bn
Army 10,000–20,000 (incl militia)
Growth % -9.8 -2.0
FORCES BY ROLE
Def bdgt R n.k. n.k. Mechanised
US$ n.k. n.k. up to 10 bde(-)
US$1=R 280.00 349.99 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MBT Some M60A1; T-34†; T-54/55; T-62; T-72
Ethnic groups: Majority Arab, some African and South Asian RECCE some BRDM-2
APC • APC (W) BTR-60
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 20.3% 5.7% 5.0% 4.4% 13.9% 1.2% MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); M47
Female 19.6% 5.6% 4.8% 4.3% 13.6% 1.5% Dragon; TOW
GUNS • SP 100mm SU-100†
Capabilities ARTILLERY • SP 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika
AIR DEFENCE • SAM systems heavily degraded during
The civil war in Yemen continued unabated with Houthi
coalition air attacks
rebels and Saleh-loyalist troops continuing to fight the
armed forces of President Hadi’s government, allied
militias and the Saudi-led coalition supporting his regime.
Navy n.k.
Cholera outbreaks have exacerbated a humanitarian Yemen’s naval forces have no operational capability
situation where, according to the UN, ‘17 million Yemenis
are hungry, nearly seven million facing famine, and about Air Force n.k.
16 million lack access to water or sanitation’. Opposition The air force has no operational capability, and most of its
forces remained strongest in the northwest of the country, aircraft appear to have been destroyed. Coalition forces
while the government controlled the central and eastern have provided the AT-802s and training for Yemeni pilots
areas of Yemen. Al-Qaeda affiliates were active in the EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 14 combat capable
central and southern regions. Insurgent activities include AIRCRAFT
the use of targeted IED attacks. The Saudi-led coalition FTR/FGA 8: 6 MiG-21 Fishbed; 2 Su-22 Fitter
continued to provide ground and air support for the Hadi ISR 6 AT-802 Air Tractor*
government. Greater use is reportedly being made of TRG 3 L-39C Albatros
strategies designed to secure the allegiance of local militias
and tribal groupings, which reportedly helped the ejection TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT
of al-Qaeda-affiliated groups from the eastern port town
of Mukalla in 2016. Government troops and local affiliated
DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL
forces, reportedly backed by the UAE and US, continued
to target al-Qaeda in Shabwa governorate in late 2017. Insurgent forces 20,000 (incl Republican
Civilian casualties resulting from coalition air and artillery Guard, Houthi and tribes)
strikes remain an area subject to international attention FORCES BY ROLE
and concern. The insurgents appear to retain the majority MANOEUVRE
of the more capable heavy armour and armoured fighting Mechanised
vehicles, although the effect of the apparent Houthi split up to 20 bde(-)
with Saleh-loyalist forces, and his death in late 2017, EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
remained uncertain. Insurgent forces have maintained ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
their ability to launch surface-to-air missiles at Saudi MBT Some T-72; T-55; T-80
Arabia. With regard to this capability, and other insurgent IFV BTR-80A; Ratel
military capabilities, international and regional states APC • APC (W) Some BTR-40; BTR-60
continue to allege direct involvement by Iran in supplying ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
weaponry to the rebels. Yemeni special forces have been MSL • MANPATS M47 Dragon; 9K111-1 Konkurs (AT-5B
deployed in the current campaign, operating closely with Spandrel/Towsan-1); 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn)
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS SUDAN

SRBM • Conventional (most fired or destroyed) 9K79 UN • UNAMID 3; 3 obs
Tochka (SS-21 Scarab); Scud-B/Hwasong-5; Borkan-1
(possible extended-range Scud derivative); Qaher-1 WESTERN SAHARA
(possible Tondar-69 derivative) UN • MINURSO 6 obs
COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM some C-801/C-802
(reported)
FOREIGN FORCES
DEPLOYMENT All Operation Restoring Hope unless stated
Saudi Arabia 750; M-ATV; AH-64 Apache; 2+ MIM-104D/F
Patriot PAC-2/3
UN • MINUSCA 5 obs
Sudan 950; 1 mech BG; T-72AV; BTR-70M Kobra 2
MALI
United Arab Emirates 3,000 1 bde HQ; 2 armd BG; Leclerc;
UN • MINUSMA 4
BMP-3; M-ATV; G-6; M109A3; Agrab Mk2; 4 AH-64D
SOUTH SUDAN Apache; 2 CH-47F Chinook; 4 UH-60M Black Hawk; 96K6
UN • UNMISS 3; 2 obs Pantsir-S1; 4 MIM-104F Patriot PAC-3
and North Africa

Middle East
Arms procurements and deliveries – Middle East and

North Africa
Israel began tests of an upgraded infantry fighting Saudi Arabia formed the General Authority of
vehicle variant of its Namer armoured vehicle. The Military Industries (GAMI) to oversee areas such as
prototype has an unmanned turret with a 30mm defence procurement, research and development,
gun. The vehicle will also be fitted with the Trophy and the local defence industry. GAMI is headed by
active protection system. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman al Saud.
Germany approved the sale of three more Israel signed an agreement with Indian companies
submarines to Israel. The deal had been delayed by Dynamatic Technologies and Elcom Systems
a corruption investigation in Germany. These will concerning the transfer of unmanned-aerial-
replace the Dolphin-class boats delivered to Israel vehicle technology to India.
in 1999 and 2000.
Saudi Arabia’s KACST signed an agreement with

Deliveries of Typhoon fighter aircraft from the China’s China Aerospace Science and Technology
United Kingdom to Saudi Arabia, under the 2005 Corporation to build a ‘CH’ UAV series-production
Project Salam deal, were completed. line in the country.
Figure 19 Middle East and North Africa: selected ongoing or completed procurement priorities in
2017
16
14
Number of Countries
12 North Africa
Purchasing
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10
Gulf and Yemen
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Over the past five years, Qatar has signed contracts with a deal with Dassault for 24 Rafales in 2015 that would
Western defence companies for new equipment worth double its fleet size. If more contracts are signed, either
over US$20 billion and has signed initial agreements, the for 24 Typhoons or a large number of F-15QA fighter
majority with the United States, on well over US$30bn aircraft, it is unclear from where the Qataris would
of other equipment. Noteworthy quantities of high- secure and train the personnel to operate and maintain
quality equipment are being acquired at significant cost. them, only having a population of 2.2 million and an air
For example, the order of 62 Leopard 2A7 main battle force of around 2,000 personnel. The tensions in Qatar–
tanks (MBTs) is double that of Qatar’s current AMX-30 Gulf Cooperation Council relations may well drive Qatar
MBT inventory. As intriguing are the agreements made to finalise more of the pending deals listed below as it
concerning fighter aircraft. Qatar currently operates a seeks to broaden its defence ties with nations outside the
squadron of 12 Mirage 2000 fighter aircraft and signed region.
Table 14 Qatar: selected ongoing defence contracts

Order Date Equipment Type Quantity Value Contractor(s) Notes
Apr 2013 Leopard 2A7 MBT 62 US$2.21bn (GER) KMW

PzH 2000 155mm SP Arty 24
Mar 2014 B-737 AEW AEW&C ac 3 n.k. (US) Boeing
Dec 2014 MIM-104F Patriot PAC-3 Long-range SAM 10 Fire Units US$2.4bn (US) Raytheon
May 2015 Rafale FGA ac 24 US$7.48bn (FRA) Dassault Aviation
Jun 2016 AH-64E Apache Guardian ATK hel 24 US$667.52m (US) Boeing
Jun 2016 Exocet MM40 Block 3 AShM n.k. US$1.12bn (Int’l) MBDA For navy
Aster Block 1 SAM corvettes
VL MICA SAM
Sep 2016 Marte-ER Ground-launched AShM n.k. εUS$714.54m (Int’l) MBDA
Exocet MM40 Block 3
Feb 2017 AN/FPS-132 Upgraded Ballistic Missile Early 1 US$1.07bn (US) Raytheon
and North Africa

Middle East
Early Warning Radar Warning Radar
Aug 2017 Corvette FSGHM 4 US$4.47bn (ITA) Fincantieri Agreed
OPV PSO 2 (ITA) Leonardo Jun 2016;
LPD LPD 1 finalised
in 2017
Total εUS$20.13bn+
Table 15 Qatar: selected defence-equipment procurements pending contract signature

Date Equipment Type Quantity Est. value Contractor(s) Notes
Sep 2011 MH-60R Seahawk ASW hel 6 US$750m (US) Sikorsky Approved by US State
Dept
Jun 2012 UH-60M Black Med Tpt hel 12 US$1.11bn (US) Sikorsky Approved by US State
Hawk Dept
Nov 2012 THAAD SAM 2 fire units US$6.5bn (US) Lockheed Martin Approved by US State
Dept
Mar 2013 Javelin MANPATS 50 lnchrs & 500 US$122m (US) Lockheed Martin Approved by US State
msls (US) Raytheon Dept; LoA signed Jul
2014
Mar 2014 A330 MRTT Tkr/Tpt ac 2 n.k. (Int’l) Airbus Defence and Selected in 2014
Space
Mar 2014 NH90 TTH Med Tpt hel 12 US$2.8bn (Int’l) NH Industries LoI signed in 2014
NH90 NFH ASW hel 10
May 2016 Javelin MANPATS 10 lnchrs & 50 US$20m (US) Lockheed Martin Approved by US State
msls (US) Raytheon Dept
Nov 2016 F-15QA FGA ac 72 US$21.1bn (US) Boeing Approved by US State
Dept; LoA signed Jun
2017
Sep 2017 Typhoon FGA ac 24 n.k. (Int’l) Eurofighter LoI signed with UK
Total US$32.4bn+
Over the past decade, several North African nations corvettes operate Russian systems. It is not yet clear
have established substantial surface and sub-surface how the Algerian Navy will handle the logistics and
fleets, largely sourced from European shipyards. maintenance for these different types of systems. Both
Morocco began by acquiring several SIGMA frigates Algeria and Egypt have each bought a large amphibious-
from the Netherlands before becoming the first export assault vessel, suggesting that these countries may want
customer of the Franco-Italian FREMM. Prior to this to project power further from their coastlines in the
acquisition, the Moroccan Navy had operated a small future. Meanwhile, a first pair of Varshavyanka-class
number of light frigates and a corvette. Egypt also submarines from Russia arrived in Algeria in 2009. They
bought a FREMM destroyer from France, as well as will be followed by a second batch to replace the two
four Gowind 2500 frigates. Three are to be built in Egypt, Kilos acquired in the 1980s. The two batches will lead to
giving the country a new industrial capability. Algeria an Algerian submarine fleet twice the size of ten years
has acquired two classes of frigates from China and ago. Egypt is replacing its Chinese-origin Romeos with
Germany, with different anti-ship missiles, surface- German Type-209/1400 submarines.
to-air missiles and naval guns. Furthermore, Algeria’s
Table 16 North Africa: selected naval deliveries since 2011

Country Class Type Shipyard Vessel name Pennant ISD
number
Algeria El-Kasseh 1 (ITA Gaeta mod) MCC (ITA) Intermarine El-Kasseh 1 501 Sep 2017
Rais Hassen Barbiar FSG (ALG) ECRN Rais Hassen Barbiar 807 Aug 2017
(Djebel Chenoua mod)
Erraddii (MEKO 200AN) FFGHM (GER) TKMS El Moudamir 911 May 2017
Adhafer (C28A) FFGHM (PRC) Hudong-Zhonghua Ezzadjer 922 Aug 2016
Shipbuilding
Erraddii (MEKO 200AN) FFGHM (GER) TKMS Erraddii 910 Apr 2016
Adhafer (C28A) FFGHM (PRC) Hudong-Zhonghua El Fateh 921 Mar 2016
Shipbuilding
Adhafer (C28A) FFGHM (PRC) Hudong-Zhonghua Adhafer 920 Nov 2015
Shipbuilding
Kalaat Beni Abbes LHD (ITA) Fincantieri Kalaat Beni Abbes 474 Mar 2015
Egypt El Fateh (Gowind 2500) FFGHM (FRA) Naval Group El Fateh 971 Oct 2017
(Formerly DCNS)
Type-209/1400 SSK (GER) TKMS S42 862 Oct 2017
Type-209/1400 SSK (GER) TKMS S41 861 Apr 2017
Gamal Abdel Nasser LHD (FRA) DCNS Anwar Sadat 1020 Sep 2016
(FRA Mistral)
Gamal Abdel Nasser LHD (FRA) DCNS Gamal Abdel Nasser 1010 Jun 2016
(FRA Mistral)
Tahya Misr (FREMM) DDGHM (FRA) DCNS Tahya Misr 1001 Jun 2015
Morocco Mohammed VI (FREMM) DDGHM (FRA) DCNS Mohammed VI 701 Jan 2014
Tarik Ben Ziyad (SIGMA 9813) FFGHM (NLD) Damen Schelde Allal Ben Abdellah 615 Sep 2012
Tarik Ben Ziyad (SIGMA 9813) FFGHM (NLD) Damen Schelde Sultan Moulay Ismail 614 Mar 2012
Tarik Ben Ziyad (SIGMA FFGHM (NLD) Damen Schelde Tarik Ben Ziyad 613 Sep 2011
10513)
Table 17 North Africa: selected future naval deliveries

Country Class Type Shipyard Vessel name Pennant Likely ISD
number
Algeria Kilo (Pr. 636.1) SSK (RUS) Admiralty Shipyards n.k. n.k. 2018
Kilo (Pr. 636.1) SSK (RUS) Admiralty Shipyards n.k. n.k. 2018
Egypt Type-209/1400 SSK (GER) TKMS S43 863 2019
Type-209/1400 SSK (GER) TKMS S44 864 2020
El Fateh (Gowind 2500) FFGHM (EGY) Alexandria Shipyard n.k. 972 n.k.
Chapter Eight
Latin America and the Caribbean
The increasingly unstable political, economic and distanced itself – as did a number of other regional
social situation in Venezuela has highlighted not just governments – from US President Donald Trump’s
the domestic actions of the government’s secur ity comments that he would not rule out military action
and armed forces, and militias, but also tensions against Venezuela.
with neighbouring countries, such as Colombia and
Guyana. For some states, worries about the situation Central America and the role of the armed
in Venezuela were prompted not just by the domestic forces
problems there, and the outflow into neighbouring Central American armed forces remain, for the most
states of some Venezuelan citizens fleeing the country, part, significantly involved in operations to counter
but also the activities of the Venezuelan armed forces organised crime and narco-trafficking.
and militias, which included military deployments to In 2017, Honduras stood up an additional two
the country’s border areas. These issues added to the 500-strong Military Police battalions. These units are
enduring security challenges facing regional govern- specifically tasked with supporting law-enforcement
ments, such as the threat from narco-trafficking and operations. The government has also announced an
organised crime, and the requirement for humani- objective to establish a 10,000-strong military-police
tarian assistance and disaster-relief tasks; across the corps that is specifically designated to internal-security
region, armed forces remain centrally involved in tasks. At the same time, Honduras is also expanding
such missions. its marine-infantry force, with a second 250-strong
In May 2017, Venezuela announced that it would unit stood up during 2017 and a third planned for
deploy 2,000 members of the Venezuelan National 2018. Meanwhile, the air force is looking to overhaul
Guard (National Bolivarian Guard, GNB) and and repair its fleet of F-5 Tiger II and A-37B Dragonfly
600 regular troops to the border with Colombia, fighter/ground-attack aircraft and EMB-312 Tucano
Latin America and

and a month later it announced the delivery of armed trainers, and it was announced that a US$200
the Caribbean
NORINCO Lynx 8x8 all-terrain vehicles to equip its million contract was being negotiated with Israel to
marine-infantry forces deployed along the border this end. Maintaining cooperation with its southern
with Brazil. Venezuela criticised the presence of neighbour Nicaragua, Honduran and Nicaraguan
Colombian armoured units close to its border and, armed forces continued joint border-security patrols
while Colombia acknowledged that such units were under Operation Morazan-Sandino. This cooperation
deployed to its La Guajira region, it said that these has been pursued intermittently for three years.
were deployed there in 2015 and that the units were Additionally, Honduras expects to procure between
located 11 kilometres from the border. two and six unmanned aerial vehicles for border
Meanwhile, Colombia’s government has raised surveillance and internal-security operations.
concerns over the militarisation of Venezuelan Costa Rica has focused on continued expan-
society, including President Nicolás Maduro’s call sion of its National Coast Guard (SNG) and plans to
to boost the GNB militia by an additional 500,000 increase personnel by up to 25% during 2018. The
armed personnel. On 9 August, Venezuelan Defence US announced in 2016 that two former US Coast
Minister Vladimir Padrino Lopez participated in a Guard cutters would be transferred to the SNG,
ceremony to commemorate the 30th anniversary of and it is anticipated that these will be delivered in
the 1987 ‘Corvette Crisis’, when a Colombian corvette 2018. Meanwhile, US SOUTHCOM has approved
crossed into maritime territory disputed with a US$30m budget to continue supporting the SNG.
Venezuela, and announced that the armed forces El Salvador announced that in 2017 it had allocated
were ready to respond if Colombian forces ventured 13,000 troops to support the National Police in opera-
into Venezuelan territory. While tensions may have tions against organised crime. This is an increase from
increased, however, the Colombian government the previous reported figure of 10,400, and confirms
the upwards trend in the armed forces’ contribution plans to switch construction to the OPV-93C, a vessel
to internal security. The Salvadorean Air Force also designed in Colombia. COTECMAR is emerging
expects to take delivery of four UH-1H helicopters as a regional supplier, having closed contracts with
donated by Taiwan and plans to convert up to ten of Honduras and Panama to build logistics vessels. The
its existing fleet of UH-1Hs to the Huey-II standard. Colombian Air Force (FAC) announced in 2017 the
Taiwan has also provided financing for an addi- procurement of two Kfir TC12 two-seater combat-
tional Damen Interceptor 1102 for Panama’s aero- capable trainers as attrition replacements; this was
naval service; this would bring the number of boats an interim measure pending the selection of a new-
in service to eight, three of which have been financed generation fighter, which is currently scheduled to
by Taiwan. Guatemala’s armed forces are changing take place in 2019. The FAC took delivery in 2017
roles and missions, focusing on border surveillance of the first TADER tactical air-defence radar indig-
and a new role supporting national development proj- enously developed by the defence-ministry-run
ects, including the repair and reconstruction of public CODALTEC.
infrastructure. This shift seeks to refocus the armed
forces, ahead of a potential move by the government Military developments in Mexico
to withdraw them from internal-security roles in 2018. It is likely that Mexico’s armed forces will, for the
foreseeable future, continue to deploy in the internal-
Post-FARC Colombia security role.
Colombia’s armed forces have begun a signifi- The army has begun to expand its Military Police
cant transformation process to a post-conflict Corps, with a 4th brigade formed in 2016 and a new
military force. The objective is to move from a counter- brigade forming in Guanajuato from 2017. The plan is
insurgency focus towards a multi-mission force; this to reach a strength of 12 brigades, one for each military
transition will include changes to organisation and region, composed of three infantry and one special-
equipment. As part of this long-term transformation forces battalion. These units are being equipped with
process, Colombia concluded an individual partner- SandCat light combat vehicles, as well as the locally
ship agreement with NATO in May 2017. Negotiations manufactured DN-XI protected patrol vehicle.
on the agreement began in 2013. It is meant to Regular army (and marine) units continue to
foster Colombia’s participation in a broad range of receive HMMWV light vehicles, part of an order for
defence and security matters with the Alliance. The over 3,300, and the army has launched a programme
Colombian Army has established the Comando de to procure new armoured vehicles and light artillery.
Transformación Ejército del Futuro (COTEF), or The Mexican Air Force placed orders for 12 Beechcraft
Future Army Transformation Command, to guide T-6C+ turboprop armed trainers, raising total T-6C+
its transformation, laying out three distinct phases procurement to 60, plus a single King Air 350i and three
towards 2030. Phase 1, from 2014 to 2018, has been S-45 Baalam tactical unmanned aerial vehicles during
focused on supporting the peace process and envis- 2017. It also launched a programme to procure a new
ages the army providing stabilisation operations. early-warning-radar system for the northwest of the
Operational capabilities will be strengthened under country. Notwithstanding political rhetoric, tension
Phase 2, from 2018 to 2022, while in Phase 3 – planned and threats from Trump to end the North American
to begin in 2023 – the army will consolidate its skills Free Trade Agreement, the military-to-military rela-
in order to become a multi-mission force capable of tionship has grown closer, with more joint exercises.
deploying both inside Colombia and externally. The Mexican Navy decommissioned one of its
Meanwhile, the navy is pressing ahead with plans four Allende-class frigates (formerly US Knox class)
to procure four new-generation frigates under the and both former Israeli Sa’ar-class missile boats, and
Strategic Surface Platform programme; these are due as part of the country’s decades-old ongoing naval-
to join the fleet in the early 2020s. The programme shipbuilding project announced a programme to
has attracted significant attention, with multiple begin the replacement of its surface-warfare fleet.
international firms offering production licences and The navy has selected the Damen 10514 light frigate;
technology transfer. The ships will be built locally the keel was laid on the first vessel in June 2017 in
by COTECMAR. The company launched the third the Netherlands, and the vessel will be completed
licence-built OPV-80-class ocean-patrol vessel (OPV) in Mexico. It expects to launch the first of eight frig-
in 2017, which entered service in July, and announced ates from its shipyards in Salina Cruz in December
Latin America and the Caribbean 377
2018. Naval construction continues at a steady pace, In early 2017, Chile selected Lockheed Martin
including the launch of the tenth Damen Stan Patrol Canada to modernise its three former UK Type-23
4207-class coastal-patrol craft and the seventh Oaxaca- frigates and will in August 2018 begin to take delivery
class OPV. The navy also boosted its aviation capacity of six S-70i Black Hawks procured from Sikorsky’s
in 2017, with the delivery of five AS565MBe Panther PZL Mielec production line in Poland. However,
helicopters, more UH-60M Black Hawks, a single the defence ministry is yet to make a decision on
maritime-surveillance-configured King Air 350 and several pending requirements. The Chilean Navy
seven T-6C+ aircraft configured for close-air support, has announced that it will transfer three Cessna
after which it was able to retire the last of its L-90TP O-2A Skymaster search-and-rescue and maritime-
Redigo armed trainers. patrol aircraft to Uruguay as part of a government-
to-government project that will support Uruguay’s
Other developments naval-surveillance requirements. Uruguay’s air force
There are few large defence-procurement pro retired its last IA-58 Pucara attack aircraft in early
grammes under way in the region, principally as a 2017, with the outcome that its air-combat capability
result of economic challenges. For example, Brazil has now lies in a small number of A-37B Dragonflys.
been hit by a deteriorating financial situation, which
led Michel Temer’s administration to apply various DEFENCE ECONOMICS
measures including cutting military-procurement
spending by about 30%. This resulted in the cancel- Macroeconomics: a modest recovery
lation or delay of multiple programmes. Nonetheless, After a year of contraction, the region returned to
initial deliveries of the Gripen-E/-F fighter and KC-390 growth in 2017. This modest recovery – the growth
cargo/tanker aircraft are expected in 2019. The navy rate was 1.1% – was particularly welcome in South
has postponed its new surface-ship programme America, where there had been two years of negative
PROSUPER, which originally called for five 6,000- growth (-1.2% in 2015 and -2.6% in 2016). Conversely,
tonne frigates, five 1,800-tonne OPVs and a single Central American and Caribbean states fared better
replenishment ship, and is currently reassessing in recent years. The highest growth rates in 2017 were
its requirements. Its short-term focus has shifted to in Central America, with Panama reaching 5.3%, the
procuring four Tamandaré-class corvettes. The army, Dominican Republic 4.8% and Nicaragua 4.5%. The
meanwhile, has turned to second-hand opportunity success story in South America was Bolivia, where
Latin America and

buys, including M113 armoured personnel carriers, the economy grew by 4.2%.
the Caribbean
M109A5 self-propelled guns and C-23B Sherpa short- The region benefited from the upturn in global
take-off-and-landing transports from US Army stocks. trade in 2017, which bolstered Latin American
Argentina selected the T-6C+ Texan and placed an
initial order for four of the 12 aircraft making up the Figure 20 Latin America and the Caribbean
requirement. Deliveries began in 2017, but the fact that defence spending by country and sub-region
the air force has not yet been able to secure funding
Panama 1.2% Other Central America 1.8%
for a next-generation fighter to replace either its now-
Other South America 2.2% The Caribbean 2.2%
retired Mirage-III fleet or its A-4AR Fighting Hawks
Ecuador 2.5%
represents a broader challenge. Recent administra- Peru 3.3%
tions have reportedly explored a number of possible
Chile 6.2%
replacements since 2013. Reconstituting Argentina’s
fast-jet air-combat capabilities will rely as much on
retaining and growing its cadre of fast-jet pilots as it Argentina
Brazil
9.7%
will on procuring new equipment. Meanwhile, roll- 46.3%
out of the upgraded IA-63 Pampa III advanced jet Venezuela
trainer took place in 2017, with three expected to join 1.8%
the air force. The navy has now prioritised the long-
Mexico 7.1%
awaited procurement of four or five OPVs; funding
for this was approved in 2017. The navy came under
renewed scrutiny in late year with the loss of the Colombia 15.8%
submarine ARA San Juan while on exercise. Note: Analysis excludes Cuba and Suriname due to insufficient data availability. © IISS
and Caribbean exports. Additionally, the increase economic performance. Political uncertainties remain,
in raw-materials prices during the year bene- mainly because of pending decisions from the Trump
fited commodity exporters in the region; that administration about the possible renegotiation of
said, commodity prices remain low compared to trade agreements, including the North American
previous years. Inflation rates have also eased in Free Trade Agreement. This uncertainty has weighed
many countries, except for Venezuela, where it is heavily on the Mexican economy in particular. For
above 650%. In the Caribbean, tourism continued instance, after Trump’s election, Mexico’s exchange
to support growth, including in Belize and Jamaica, rate depreciated significantly. Other uncertainties
although the costs of recovery after Hurricane Irma involve upcoming elections, in Argentina and Chile
in September will have hit sub-regional finances and in late 2017 and in Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela in
projected tourism revenues. 2018. These could alter current economic trajectories.
Despite this improved outlook, there are still impor- Commodity exporters, despite the modest
tant negative trends and risks concerning regional recovery, still need to respond to the consequences of
Map 9 Latin America and the Caribbean regional defence spending1

© IISS
Bahamas
Mexico Cuba Haiti

Puerto Rico
Jamaica
Belize Dominican Rep. Antigua and Barbuda
Honduras
Guatemala Nicaragua
Barbados
El Salvador Panama Trinidad and Tobago
Costa Rica
Venezuela Guyana
Fr. Guiana
Colombia
Suriname
Ecuador
Peru
Brazil

Between 10% and 20% increase Bolivia
Between 0% and 3% decrease Paraguay
More than 20% decrease Argentina
Insufficient data
Uruguay
2017 Defence Spending (US$ bn) Chile
29.41
10
7 [1] Map illustrating 2017 planned defence-spending levels (in US$ at
market exchange rates), as well as the annual real percentage change
5 in planned defence spending between 2016 and 2017 (at constant 2010
3 prices and exchange rates). Percentage changes in defence spending
can vary considerably from year to year, as states revise the level of
1 funding allocated to defence. Changes indicated here highlight the
short-term trend in planned defence spending between 2016 and 2017.
.25 Actual spending changes prior to 2016, and projected spending levels
.05 post-2017, are not reflected.
the drop in commodity prices. In Ecuador, fiscal space

remains limited and in Venezuela in particular the fall 1.5
in oil prices has contributed to an economic and polit- 1.27 1.26 1.22 1.17 1.13 1.16
ical crisis. Venezuela’s GDP is expected to contract by 1.2
12% in 2017, after falling by 16% in 2016. According
to a survey conducted by a Venezuelan foundation 0.9
% of GDP
(Fundación Bengoa para la Alimentación y Nutrición),
0.6
poverty has increased significantly in recent years. In
2014, 48% of Venezuelan households lived in poverty,
0.3
but this number had risen to 81.8% in 2016.
0.0
Defence spending and procurement: budget 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
constraints limit modernisation
After contracting in real terms by 4.7% in 2015 and
5.1% in 2016, the trend in Latin American defence Figure 21 Latin America and the Caribbean
spending reversed, increasing by 3.2% in 2017 (in regional defence expenditure as % of GDP
real terms, in constant 2010 US$). Although still a
reduction compared to 2015, this figure seems to return to nominal defence-budget growth following
reflect the region’s slow macroeconomic improve- the election of President Mauricio Macri in 2015
ment. The lack of significant external threats also (US$5.2bn in 2016 and US$6.1bn (actual spending)
contributes to lower defence spending than in other in 2017), military budgets remain constrained. In
regions. However, the overall regional total is still an 2018 the proposed budget will actually decline in
estimate, as some major countries purchase equip- US dollar terms to US$5.9bn, which will hinder any
ment using off-budget funding mechanisms. This is new procurement planning, such as a replacement for
the case in Chile, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. In Argentina’s fast-jet combat-aircraft fleet.
2017, in current dollar terms, the region’s top defence Similarly, in Brazil, even though the budget
spenders were Brazil (US$29.4 billion), Colombia increased in 2017 (from US$23.6bn in 2016 to US$29.4bn
(US$10bn) and Argentina (US$6.1bn). Two regional in 2017), the armed forces will still feel the effects of
states spent more than 2% of GDP on defence in 2017: previous years of restricted funding. For 2018, the
Latin America and

Colombia (3.26%) and Trinidad and Tobago (2.93%). budget proposal foresees a slight decline compared to
the Caribbean
Defence investments (including procurement 2017 (US$29bn). As a consequence, the defence budget
and maintenance) were estimated to comprise only in 2018 will still be lower than that in 2010, measured
9% of regional defence budgets in 2016. This figure either in current or real terms (see Table 18).
is low in light of the modernisation requirements of Brazil’s budget constraints have affected
Latin American armed forces. As there are no major important programmes, such as PROSUB (the
external threats to the region, and no major inter-state ongoing programme to build four conventional
conflicts, domestic challenges are driving military submarines and one nuclear-powered boat), which
procurement needs. Principally these relate to threats has suffered delays. Initially, the first of class was
from organised crime, narco-trafficking, and poten- supposed to enter service in 2017. But by late 2016
tial insurgent or guerrilla groups, as well as tasks the launch of this conventional boat had been pushed
relating to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief back to July 2018, the second to September 2020, the
or support to police forces. third to December 2021 and the fourth to December
Procurements in Argentina and Brazil illustrate 2022. It has been reported that the nuclear-submarine
how, despite small steps towards recovery, defence programme may also be postponed. Meanwhile,
spending in these two countries will likely remain the army cancelled negotiations for 12 Pantsir S-1
limited in coming years. In Argentina, despite a air-defence systems, while in late 2016 the air force
Table 18 Brazil: defence spending, 2010–18 (US$bn)

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
US$ billion current 33.9 36.0 33.2 31.4 31.0 23.7 23.6 29.4 29.0
US$ billion constant 33.9 31.6 31.5 30.7 30.6 30.6 29.4 32.0 30.3
suspended the procurement of two second-hand parts and broader technical maintenance deficiencies
Boeing 767-300ER transport/tanker aircraft. within the FANB. In addition, there are only minimum
levels of fuel stocks and other basic supplies needed
VENEZUELA to sustain military operations, perhaps reflective of
the broader crisis affecting the country.
Venezuela’s late president Hugo Chávez dreamed of In this context, one of the main security risks is
transforming Venezuela into a major military power, access to some of the key assets of the FANB equip-
but instead the Bolivarian National Armed Forces ment inventory, notably the almost 2,000 KBM 9K338
(FANB) face tough prospects in the near term due Igla-S man-portable air-defence systems acquired from
to two crucial factors: its increasing involvement Russia. Given the level of corruption alleged in the
in politics and an abrupt decline in its operational Venezuelan military system, there is fear over the possi-
capabilities. bility of an illegal transfer of these weapons to criminal
The country’s political and economic crisis has groups. As such, after years of efforts to modernise the
prompted President Nicolás Maduro to expand the country’s defence apparatus, the main threat posed by
scope of the armed forces’ influence in order to ensure the Venezuelan armed forces might not be related to
continued control, leading to increased military their strength but instead to their decline.
involvement in the government. Venezuela has close
to 200 generals, many of whom are managing public Command and control
companies in strategic sectors. Meanwhile, 37.5% of Venezuela’s defence system has a dual command
the executive branch is under military control – 12 structure. The defence ministry is the administra-
of 32 ministries – and a significant number of state tive body responsible for formulating policies and
governors are active or retired officers. managing resources, while the Operational Strategic
Although Maduro has tried to prevent direct Command of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces
military involvement in suppressing opposition (CEOFANB) is in charge of the operational direction
protests, in order not to fuel discontent among the and control of the armed forces through a chain of
military, this could be unavoidable if the political and subordinate territorial commands. These include
economic situation continues to deteriorate. Indeed, the Strategic Integral Defence Regions, the Integral
the armed forces have already taken part in some Defence Operational Zones and the Integral Defence
activities against opposition-inspired protests. Since Areas. However, the defence minister sometimes
July 2017, 600 special-operations troops have been makes operational decisions (theoretically an exclu-
deployed in the border state of Táchira to strengthen sive responsibility of the CEOFANB).
control over a region where anti-regime protests have The Venezuelan defence ministry also has admin-
been particularly violent. istrative control over the FANB and the Bolivarian
Under these circumstances, there is an increasing Militia. The FANB comprises the three traditional
risk of fragmentation within the armed forces. By armed services – army, navy and air force – as well
July 2017, the security forces had detained more than as the National Guard, a paramilitary force respon-
100 FANB personnel on charges of treason, rebel- sible for internal security and border protection. The
lion, theft, desertion and insubordination. At the Bolivarian Militia has a large number of territorial
same time, there have been several cases of dissent units distributed throughout the country.
within the armed forces. Significant examples include The security establishment also includes the corps
the attack on the Supreme Court of Justice and the of the Bolivarian National Police, which is commanded
Ministry of the Interior by an army officer using a by the interior ministry, and state- and municipal-level
Judicial Police helicopter in June 2017 and an assault police forces. Given that the armed forces, the National
on the base of the 41st Armoured Brigade, at Fuerte Guard, the Bolivarian Militia and police forces all have
Paramacay, by a group of military rebels in August. some responsibility for maintaining public order, the
Meanwhile, the conventional capabilities of the division of roles is unclear and there are problems of
FANB are rapidly deteriorating because of a combi- inter-service friction and rivalry.
nation of mismanagement, corruption and the The Bolivarian Militia was created in 2007, and
parlous state of Venezuela’s economy. Many of the after this Venezuela’s security apparatus became one
sophisticated weapon systems acquired from China of the largest in the region. Although the FANB is
and Russia have low readiness due to a lack of spare around 123,000 strong, the total number of personnel
Air base (35/36 Naval base Mariscal Air and naval base Independent Bolivarian Aviation
fighter sqns) Crisostomo Falcón Navy and naval- Service (SAFAV)
HQ II Air Zone aviation HQ Palo Negro air base (special-operation
Patrol Squadron HQ
electronic-warfare and transport sqns)
HQ III Air Zone
Punto Fijo
See inset
Fuerte Mara
CENTRAL Puerto CAPITAL
Cabello Naval Coordination
1st Division HQ Maracaibo Caracas Puerto de la Cruz Unit (UCOCAR)
Maracay
Barquisimeto Aragua Barcelona
Air base (special OCCIDENTAL MARITIMA INSULAR
operations) ORIENTAL
4th Division HQ
HQ Air Zone 1 Merida Air base (131/132
Ciudad
LOS ANDES Bolívar fighter sqns)
San Fernando
HQ IV Air Zone
2nd Division HQ San Cristobal
LOS LANOS 9th Motorised
Cavalry 5th Jungle
Venezuelan Vehicle Company Division HQ
Naval Academy Coastguard Division HQ
(EMSOVEN)
Meseta de Mamo HQ
Venezuelan Military Industries GUAYANA
Naval Infantry HQ Company Ltd (CAVIM) GUYANA
Puerto de
Bolivarian National Armed VENEZUELA
Catia la Mar la Guaira
Forces Agricultural Company
Fuerte Tiuna Caracas (AGROFANB)
3rd Division HQ Tiuna Industrial Complex
6th Corps of Engineers HQ
Caracas air base
Military Company of (transport/helicopter base) Guyanese territory
Mining, Oil and Gas MILITARY REGIONS
HQ V Air Zone claimed by Venezuela
Industries Ltd (CAMIMPEG)
Map 10 Venezuela: principal military bases and defence industries
within the security forces has increased exponentially guaranteeing national security and enabling the
with the incorporation of more than 220,000 militia. success of the Bolivarian revolution.
Although this number is. far below the goal of 500,000 Under this new concept, the Chavista regime
Latin America and

militia members that was established by the Bolivarian implemented three key changes. Firstly, the armed
the Caribbean
regime, it places the total size of Venezuela’s mili- forces were strengthened by increasing their size and
tary personnel close to 345,000. However, the oper modernising their equipment. Secondly, in a move
ational relevance of the militia force is undermined by to extend the military’s influence into the political
minimal investment in equipment and training, and sphere, high-ranking officers were appointed to
questionable levels of morale. key positions in the civilian public administration.
Thirdly, popular participation in national defence
Defence-doctrine changes was encouraged, based on the idea that it was the
Under the Chavista regime, now headed by Maduro, joint responsibility of civil society and the FANB.
the force structure of the FANB has remained funda- The regime launched an effort to improve the
mentally unchanged. However, Venezuela’s security conventional defence capabilities of the FANB.
apparatus has been subject to radical changes in However, the policies and rhetoric of the administra-
terms of doctrine and equipment. tion increased tensions with Western governments,
In the 1970s, the focus of the Venezuelan armed which progressively blocked access to their weapons
forces shifted from counter-insurgency to deterrence manufacturers, forcing Caracas to find alternative
(vis-à-vis Colombia), oil-infrastructure protection sources. Consequently, Western manufacturers with
and power-projection in the Caribbean. However, a long tradition of cooperation with Venezuela, such
when Hugo Chávez came to power in 1998 he began as Israel and the United States, were replaced by
a process of military transformation. This included suppliers in countries such as Belarus, China, Cuba,
implementing the so-called ‘Doctrine of Integral Iran and Russia.
Defense’, which defined the relationship between the At the same time, and as a part of its national-
FANB and Venezuelan society as the crucial factor istic ideology, the regime emphasised the need to
build an independent defence posture. This stim- Economic crisis and defence acquisitions
ulated cooper ation with partners closely aligned Venezuela’s economic crisis has seriously affected the
with Venezuela’s political position, and who were government’s ability to sustain its military expend
willing to take part in joint ventures and tech- iture. However, due to low levels of transparency, it
nology-transfer schemes. The result was a set of joint is difficult to estimate the total amount of resources
defence projects aimed at increasing the capabilities allocated to the armed forces and how it is spent.
of the Venezuelan national defence industry. For This problem is compounded by the fact that funds
example, memoranda of understanding were signed allocated to military procurement are not managed
with Russia to build a factory for the production of by the defence ministry or the FANB, but by a set of
AK-103 assault rifles and to establish a maintenance state-owned companies (such as Veximca) and finan-
centre for Mi-17 helicopters. This policy also trig- cial funds such as FONDEN, which do not make their
gered the production of a coastal-patrol vessel by records public and lack clear accounting systems.
state-owned shipyard DIANCA as part of the 2005 Nevertheless, even with the limited information
agreement with Spanish shipbuilder Navantia to available, it is possible to confirm two key trends.
acquire eight patrol vessels. Firstly, there has been a sweeping reduction in the
However, this new twin-track procurement amount of money allocated for the acquisition of new
strategy has failed overall to deliver comprehensive weapons. According to the Venezuelan non-govern-
capability development. The introduction of new mental organisation Control Ciudadano, Caracas
Belarusian, Chinese and Russian equipment has reduced its arms and equipment purchases by 90%
caused serious difficulties, as both operators and between 2013–14 and 2015–16. This has been caused
maintenance technicians lack experience in these largely by factors such as the fall in global oil prices,
weapons systems. At the same time, the regime’s which affected Venezuela significantly. Meanwhile,
attempts to increase indigenous capacity for weapons the country is also experiencing broader financial
production were derailed by corruption (such as in instability. For instance, Venezuela has experienced
the case of the Russian-made assault-rifle factory) high inflation rates (of over 250% in 2016 and 650%
or technical problems (as happened with the plan to in 2017, according to the IMF) and currency depreci
build the Mi-17 helicopter-maintenance plant). These ation (in 2013, one US dollar was exchanged for less
difficulties are among the key factors hampering than ten bolivars; in 2017, one US dollar was worth
Venezuelan military capabilities. more than 900 bolivars).
Meanwhile, in conjunction with the plans to Secondly, equipment procurement has shifted from
modernise the FANB’s conventional capabilities, the conventional weapons to riot-control and internal-
Venezuelan regime formed the Bolivarian Militia security equipment, given the increase in protests and
in order to try and politically mobilise the popula- riots driven by the dire economic situation and the
tion, maintain internal security and sustain a guer- regime’s authoritarianism. Consequently, in recent
rilla campaign in case of foreign invasion. Inspired years, the National Guard and the Bolivarian National
by the model of the Cuban Territorial Militia Troops, Police have been the main beneficiaries of Caracas’s
it comprises armed civilians who receive periodic military-procurement policy. Both organisations have
training in exchange for a small stipend. The regime received large numbers of crowd-control vehicles and
planned to equip it with heavy weapons and trans- significant amounts of personal equipment.
form it into a powerful armed force to balance the Outside such internal-security purchases, the
influence of the regular armed forces. However, air force has acquired nine Chinese Hongdu K-8W
mismanagement, a lack of resources and army Karakorum light attack/training aircraft. At the same
misgivings have prevented this from happening. time, the Venezuelan Marines have incorporated
Consequently, the Bolivarian Militia has become a a number of Chinese armoured vehicles into their
collection of undisciplined and poorly trained units inventory, including the NORINCO VN1, VN18 and
with very limited military value. However, it has VN16. However, the military acquisitions made by
played a critical role in repressing the political oppos Maduro look modest in comparison to those of his
ition. It has been used to organise and arm gangs of predecessor. Under Chávez, Venezuela acquired
radical Chavista militants known as colectivos. These Russian Su-30MKV Flanker fighter/ground-attack
groups use violence to suppress anti-government aircraft and T-72M main battle tanks, as well as a
marches and are accused of human-rights violations. large number of air-defence systems.
Antigua and Barbuda ATG Argentina ARG

East Caribbean Dollar EC$ 2016 2017 2018 Argentine Peso P 2016 2017 2018
GDP EC$ 3.94bn 4.15bn GDP P 8.05tr 10.3tr
US$ 1.46bn 1.54bn US$ 545bn 620bn
per capita US$ 16,176 16,826 per capita US$ 12,494 14,062
Growth % 5.3 2.7 Growth % -2.2 2.5
Inflation % -0.5 2.4 Inflation % n.k. 26.9
Def bdgt [a] EC$ 71m 73m Def bdgt P 76.9bn 102bn 116bn
US$ 26m 27m US$ 5.20bn 6.13bn
US$1=EC$ 2.70 2.70 US$1=P 14.78 16.68
[a] Budget for the Ministry of Legal Affairs, Public Safety,
Immigration and Labour
Population 94,731 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 12.6% 3.9% 3.8% 3.8% 20.2% 4.8%
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Female 11.9% 3.8% 3.7% 3.7% 20.6% 6.7%
Male 11.7% 4.3% 4.1% 3.5% 20.2% 3.4%
Female 11.3% 4.3% 4.1% 3.8% 24.4% 4.6% Capabilities
Capabilities Argentina’s armed forces principally focus on border se-
curity, surveillance and counter-narcotics operations, in
The damage caused by Hurricane Irma, particularly to part due to the increase in drug-trafficking activity in and
Barbuda, has tested the small Antigua and Barbuda Defence
around the country. Buenos Aires cooperates with Bolivia
Force’s (ABDF’s) disaster-response capacity, practised in
and Paraguay on border-security and counter-narcotics op-
the 2017 iteration of the annual Tradewinds exercise series.
erations. Argentina’s equipment inventory is increasingly
Personnel have also been deployed to nearby Dominica
obsolete, with modernisation hampered by limited fund-
to assist other Caribbean states in relief efforts there after
Hurricane Maria. The ABDF also provides internal-security ing. According to the 2016 defence-spending review and
support and takes part in regional cooperation efforts to 2017 projections, most of the budget will be allocated to
counter the trade in illicit narcotics. aircraft maintenance and modernisation and for the pro-
curement of new types. Air-force capability has been in ser
ACTIVE 180 (Army 130 Coast Guard 50) ious decline, with the entire A-4 Skyhawk fleet essentially
(all services form combined Antigua and Barbuda Defence non-operational, although the purchase of five ex-French
Latin America and

Force) Dassault Super Etandard Modernisée could allow the regen-
the Caribbean
RESERVE 80 (Joint 80) eration of Argentina’s own Super Etendards. The air force
has begun receiving the first of a dozen Beechcraft Texan II
trainers as another part of the effort to regain air capability.
The naval fleet has also seen its capability decline in areas
such as anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare and airborne
Army 130 early warning. The loss of the submarine ARA San Juan
FORCES BY ROLE highlighted challenges for Argentina’s naval operations.
MANOEUVRE
The return to sea of the icebreaker ARA Almirante Irizar
Light after ten years of repairs should improve Argentina’s abil-
1 inf bn HQ
ity to support operations in Antarctica. Argentina relies on
1 inf coy
foreign suppliers for most of its equipment. Aviation firm
FAdeA conducts some aircraft maintenance, but faces re-
1 spt gp (1 engr unit, 1 med unit)
structuring as it has struggled to manufacture and win or-
Coast Guard 50 ders for aircraft beyond the domestic market, itself starved
of resources. The armed forces train with Brazil and Chile
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
and participate in UN peacekeeping missions. A ‘state
Dauntless; 1 Swift partnership’ agreement was signed with the US Georgia
National Guard in late 2016; this military-to-military rela-
tionship will include sharing expertise in enhancing readi-
ness as well as in disaster-response, border-security and
peacekeeping missions.


ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE ARV Greif
Army 42,800; 7,000 civilian MSL • SP 3 M1025 HMMWV with TOW-2A
Regt and gp are usually bn-sized RCL 105mm 150 M-1968
FORCES BY ROLE ARTILLERY 1,085
SPECIAL FORCES SP 155mm 19 VCA 155 Palmaria
1 SF gp TOWED 172: 105mm 64 Model 56 pack howitzer; 155mm
MANOEUVRE 108: 28 CITEFA M-77/CITEFA M-81; 80 SOFMA L-33
Mechanised MRL 8: 105mm 4 SLAM Pampero; 127mm 4 CP-30
1 (1st) div (1 armd bde (4 tk regt, 1 mech inf regt, 1 SP MOR 886: 81mm 492; SP 107mm 25 M106A2; 120mm
arty gp, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy), 330 Brandt; SP 120mm 39 TAM-VCTM
1 (3rd) jungle bde (2 jungle inf regt, 1 arty gp, 1 engr RADAR • LAND 18+: M113A1GE Green Archer (mor); 18
bn, 1 int coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy, 1 med coy); 1 (12th) RATRAS (veh, arty)
jungle bde (3 jungle inf regt, 1 arty gp, 1 engr bn, 1 int AIRCRAFT
coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy, 1 med coy), 2 engr bn, 1 sigs TPT • Light 17: 1 Beech 80 Queen Air; 3 C-212-200
bn, 1 log coy) Aviocar; 3 Cessna 207 Stationair; 2 Cessna 208EX Grand
Caravan; 1 Cessna 500 Citation (survey); 1 Cessna 550
1 (3rd) div (1 mech bde (1 armd recce regt, 1 tk regt, 2
Citation Bravo; 3 DA42 (to be converted to ISR role); 2
mech inf regt, 1 SP arty gp, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 int coy, 1
DHC-6 Twin Otter; 1 Sabreliner 75A (Gaviao 75A)
sigs coy, 1 log coy), 1 mech bde (1 armd recce tp, 1 tk
TRG 5 T-41 Mescalero
regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 SP arty gp, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 int
HELICOPTERS
coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy), 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 log coy)
MRH 5: 4 SA315B Lama; 1 Z-11
1 (Rapid Deployment) force (1 armd bde (1 recce sqn, 3
TPT 67: Medium 3 AS332B Super Puma; Light 64: 1 Bell
tk regt, 1 mech inf regt, 1 SP arty gp, 1 cbt engr coy,
212; 25 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois – 6 armed); 5 Bell 206B3;
1 int coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy), 1 mech bde (1 armd
13 UH-1H-II Huey II; 20 AB206B1
recce regt, 3 mech inf regt, 1 arty gp, 1 cbt engr coy,
AIR DEFENCE
1 int coy, 1 sigs coy,1 log coy), 1 AB bde (1 recce tp,
SAM • Point-defence RBS-70
2 para regt, 1 arty gp, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log
GUNS • TOWED 229: 20mm 200 GAI-B01; 30mm 21 HS
coy), 1 AD gp (2 AD bn)) L81; 35mm 8 GDF Oerlikon (Skyguard fire control)
Light RADAR • AIR DEFENCE 11: 5 Cardion AN/TPS-44;
1 (2nd) mtn inf div (2 mtn inf bde (1 armd recce regt, 3 6 Skyguard
mtn inf regt, 2 arty gp, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 log
coy), 1 mtn inf bde (1 armd recce bn, 2 mtn inf regt, Navy 18,500; 7,200 civilian
1 jungle inf regt, 2 arty gp, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 Commands: Surface Fleet, Submarines, Naval Avn,
construction coy, 1 log coy), 1 AD gp, 1 sigs bn) Marines
1 mot cav regt (presidential escort)
FORCES BY ROLE
Air Manoeuvre
SPECIAL FORCES
1 air aslt regt
1 (diver) SF gp
COMBAT SUPPORT
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 arty gp (bn)
1 engr bn
1 Salta (GER T-209/1100) with 8 single 533mm TT with
1 sigs gp (1 EW bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 maint bn)
Mk 37/SST-4 HWT
1 sigs bn
1 Santa Cruz (GER TR-1700) with 6 single 533mm TT
1 sigs coy
with SST-4 HWT (undergoing MLU)
5 maint bn
DESTROYERS • DDH 1 Hercules (UK Type-42 –
HELICOPTER
utilised as a fast troop-transport ship), with 1 114mm
1 avn gp (bde) (1 avn bn, 1 hel bn)
gun (capacity 2 SH-3H Sea King hel)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE FRIGATES • FFGHM 10:
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 4 Almirante Brown (GER MEKO 360) with 2 quad
MBT 231: 225 TAM, 6 TAM S21 lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 octuple Albatros
LT TK 117: 107 SK-105A1 Kuerassier; 6 SK-105A2 lnchr with Aspide SAM, 2 triple B515 ILAS-3 324mm
Kuerassier; 4 Patagón TT with A244 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 AS555
RECCE 47 AML-90 Fennec hel)
IFV 232: 118 VCTP (incl variants); 114 M113A2 (20mm 6 Espora (GER MEKO 140) with 2 twin lnchr with
cannon) MM38 Exocet AShM, 2 triple B515 ILAS-3 324mm
APC 278 ASTT with A244 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1
APC (T) 274: 70 M113A1-ACAV; 204 M113A2 AS555 Fennec hel) (1 vessel damaged in 2016, in
APC (W) 4 WZ-551B1 repair)
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 16 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE

CORVETTES • FSG 3 Drummond (FRA A-69) with 2 RCL 105mm 30 M-1974 FMK-1
twin lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, 2 triple Mk32 ARTILLERY 89
324mm ASTT with A244 LWT, 1 100mm gun TOWED 19: 105mm 13 Model 56 pack howitzer;
PSO 3: 155mm 6 M114
2 Irigoyen (ex-US Cherokee) MOR 70: 81mm 58; 120mm 12
1 Teniente Olivieri (ex-US oilfield tug) AIR DEFENCE
PCO 2: SAM • Point-defence RBS-70
1 Murature (ex-US King – trg/river patrol role) with 3 GUNS 40mm 4 Bofors 40L
105mm gun
1 Sobral (ex-US Sotoyomo) Air Force 12,900; 6,900 civilian
PCGT 1 Intrepida (GER Lurssen 45m) with 2 single lnchr 4 Major Comds – Air Operations, Personnel, Air Regions,
with MM38 Exocet AShM, 2 single 533mm TT with Logistics, 8 air bde
SST-4 HWT, 1 76mm gun
PCC 1 Intrepida (GER Lurssen 45m) with 1 76mm gun Air Operations Command
PB 6: 4 Baradero (Dabur); 2 Point FORCES BY ROLE
AMPHIBIOUS 6 LCVP GROUND ATTACK
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 18 2 sqn with A-4/OA-4 (A-4AR/OA-4AR) Skyhawk
ABU 3 Red 2 (tac air) sqn with IA-58 Pucara; EMB-312 Tucano (on
AFS 4 Puerto Argentina (ex-RUS Neftegaz) loan for border surv/interdiction)
AGB 1 Almirante Irizar (damaged by fire in 2007; ISR
returned to service in mid-2017) 1 sqn with Learjet 35A
AGHS 3: 1 Austral; 1 Cormoran; 1 Puerto Deseado (ice- SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
breaking capability, used for polar research) 2 sqn with Bell 212; Bell 212 (UH-1N); Mi-171, SA-
AGOR 1 Commodoro Rivadavia 315B Lama
AK 3 Costa Sur (capacity 4 LCVP) TANKER/TRANSPORT
AOR 1 Patagonia (FRA Durance) with 1 hel platform 1 sqn with C-130H Hercules; KC-130H Hercules; L-100-30
AORL 1 Ingeniero Julio Krause TRANSPORT
AXS 1 Libertad 1 sqn with B-707
1 sqn with DHC-6 Twin Otter; Saab 340
Naval Aviation 2,000 1 sqn with F-27 Friendship
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 sqn with F-28 Fellowship; Learjet 60
AIRCRAFT 20 combat capable 1 (Pres) flt with B-757-23ER; S-70A Black Hawk, S-76B
FGA 2 Super Etendard (9 more in store) TRAINING
ATK 1 AU-23 Turbo Porter 1 sqn with AT-63 Pampa
Latin America and

ASW 7: 3 S-2T Tracker†; 4 P-3B Orion 1 sqn with EMB-312 Tucano
the Caribbean
TPT • Light 7 Beech 200F/M King Air 1 sqn with Grob 120TP
TRG 10 T-34C Turbo Mentor* 1 hel sqn with Hughes 369; SA-315B Lama
HELICOPTERS TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
ASW 2 SH-3H (ASH-3H) Sea King 1 sqn with Hughes 369; MD-500; MD500D
MRH 4 AS555 Fennec EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
TPT • Medium 4 UH-3H Sea King AIRCRAFT 72 combat capable
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ATK 52: 20 A-4 (A-4AR) Skyhawk†; 2 OA-4 (OA-4AR)
AAM • IR R-550 Magic Skyhawk†; 21 IA-58 Pucara; 9 IA-58M Pucara
AShM AM39 Exocet ELINT 1 Cessna 210
TKR 2 KC-130H Hercules
Marines 2,500 TPT 27: Medium 4: 3 C-130H Hercules; 1 L-100-30;
FORCES BY ROLE Light 16: 1 Cessna 310; 6 DHC-6 Twin Otter; 4 Learjet
MANOEUVRE 35A (test and calibration); 1 Learjet 60 (VIP); 4 Saab
Amphibious 340; PAX 7: 1 B-737; 1 B-757-23ER; 5 F-28 Fellowship
1 (fleet) force (1 cdo gp, 1 (AAV) amph bn, 1 mne bn, 1 TRG 57: 20 AT-63 Pampa* (LIFT); 19 EMB-312 Tucano; 8
arty bn, 1 ADA bn) Grob 120TP; 6 P2002JF Sierra; 4 T-6C Texan II
1 (fleet) force (2 mne bn, 2 navy det) HELICOPTERS
1 force (1 mne bn) MRH 25: 2 Bell 412EP; 11 Hughes 369; 3 MD-500; 4
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE MD-500D; 5 SA315B Lama
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES TPT 12: Medium 3: 2 Mi-171E; 1 S-70A Black Hawk;
RECCE 12 ERC-90F Sagaie Light 9: 7 Bell 212; 2 S-76B (VIP)
APC • APC (W) 31 VCR AIR DEFENCE
AAV 24: 13 LARC-5; 11 LVTP-7 GUNS 88: 20mm: 86 Oerlikon/Rh-202 with 9 Elta
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES EL/M-2106 radar; 35mm: 2 Oerlikon GDF-001 with
ARV AAVR 7 Skyguard radar
RADAR • AIR DEFENCE 6: 5 AN/TPS-43; 1 BPS-1000 DEPLOYMENT

AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; R-550 Magic; Shafrir 2‡ CYPRUS
UN • UNFICYP 277; 2 inf coy; 1 hel flt; 2 Bell 212
Paramilitary 31,250 MIDDLE EAST
Gendarmerie 18,000 UN • UNTSO 3 obs
Ministry of Security WESTERN SAHARA
FORCES BY ROLE UN • MINURSO 3 obs
COMMAND
7 regional comd
SPECIAL FORCES Bahamas BHS
1 SF unit
Bahamian Dollar B$ 2016 2017 2018
MANOEUVRE
Other GDP B$ 8.72bn 9.13bn
17 paramilitary bn US$ 8.72bn 9.13bn
Aviation per capita US$ 23,671 24,516
1 (mixed) avn bn Growth % -0.3 1.8
Def bdgt B$ 121m 99m 91m
RECCE S52 Shorland
US$ 121m 99m
APC (W) 87: 47 Grenadier; 40 UR-416
ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm US$1=B$ 1.00 1.00
AIRCRAFT Population 329,988
TPT • Light 12: 3 Cessna 152; 3 Cessna 206; 1 Cessna
336; 1 PA-28 Cherokee; 2 PC-6B Turbo Porter; 2 PC-12 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
HELICOPTERS Male 11.4% 4.0% 4.3% 4.1% 22.1% 2.9%
MRH 2 MD-500C
Female 11.1% 3.9% 4.2% 4.0% 23.0% 4.7%
TPT • Light 16: 5 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 7 AS350
Ecureuil; 1 H135; 3 R-44 Raven II
TRG 1 S-300C
Capabilities
In addition to the disaster-relief capacity demonstrated
Prefectura Naval (Coast Guard) 13,250 in the aftermath of Hurricane Irma, the Royal Bahamas
Ministry of Security Defence Force (RBDF) is primarily tasked with maritime
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE security and countering narcotics trafficking. The second
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 67 phase of the Sandy Bottom Project was completed in April
PCO 7: 1 Correa Falcon; 1 Delfin; 5 Mantilla (F30 Halcón 2017; the final phase of the project will now see further
– undergoing modernisation) infrastructure improvements and an increase in RBDF
PCC 1 Mariano Moreno personnel numbers. The final vessel acquired under the
PB 58: 1 Dorado; 25 Estrellemar; 2 Lynch (US Cape); 18 project, HMBS Madeira, is undergoing renovation work,
Mar del Plata (Z-28); 1 Surel; 8 Damen Stan 2200; 3 Stan after being rammed by a Dominican-flagged fishing vessel
Tender 1750 in 2016, whilst both Bahamas-class patrol vessels have now
PBR 1 Tonina completed refits with the support of Damen Group, one in
LOGISTICS & SUPPORT 11 the Netherlands and the other locally. A new permanent
AAR 1 Tango naval base on Grand Bahama is also currently under
AFS 1 Prefecto Garcia discussion to bolster the RBDF’s counter-narcotics work.
AG 2 The country is a regular participant in the Tradewinds
ARS 1 Prefecto Mansilla exercise series and has a training relationship with the US
AX 5: 1 Mandubi; 4 other armed forces.
AXS 1 Dr Bernardo Houssay
AIRCRAFT
ACTIVE 1,300
MP 1 Beech 350ER King Air
TPT • Light 6: 5 C-212 Aviocar; 1 Beech 350ER King Air ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
TRG 2 Piper PA-28 Archer III
HELICOPTERS Royal Bahamian Defence Force 1,300
SAR 3 AS565MA Panther FORCES BY ROLE
MRH 1 AS365 Dauphin 2 MANOEUVRE
TPT 5: Medium 3: 1 H225 Puma; 2 SA330L (AS330L) Amphibious
Puma; Light 2 AS355 Ecureuil II 1 mne coy (incl marines with internal- and base-security
TRG 4 S-300C duties)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

PCC 2 Bahamas Army 500
PBF 6 Nor-Tech
FORCES BY ROLE
PB 15: 4 Arthur Dion Hanna; 2 Dauntless; 1 Eleuthera; 3 MANOEUVRE
Lignum Vitae (Damen 3007); 1 Protector; 2 Sea Ark 12m; Light
2 Sea Ark 15m
1 inf bn (cadre)
LOGISTICS & SUPPORT 1
AKR 1 Lawrence Major (Damen 5612) Coast Guard 110
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 3: 1 Beech A350 King Air; 1 HQ located at HMBS Pelican, Spring Garden
Cessna 208 Caravan; 1 P-68 Observer
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 6:
FOREIGN FORCES 1 Dauntless; 2 Enterprise (Damen Stan 1204); 3 Trident
Guyana Navy: Base located at New Providence Island (Damen Stan Patrol 4207)
LOGISTICS & SUPPORT • AX 1
Barbados BRB Belize BLZ

Barbados Dollar B$ 2016 2017 2018
Belize Dollar BZ$ 2016 2017 2018
GDP B$ 9.10bn 9.64bn
GDP BZ$ 3.48bn 3.64bn
US$ 4.55bn 4.82bn
US$ 1.74bn 1.82bn
per capita US$ 16,237 17,159
Growth % 1.6 0.9
Growth % -0.8 2.5
Inflation % 1.3 5.0
Inflation % 0.6 1.8
Def bdgt [a] B$ 78m 76m
Def bdgt [a] BZ$ 42m 46m
US$ 39m 38m
US$ 21m 23m
US$1=B$ 2.00 2.00
[a] Defence and security expenditure
US$1=BZ$ 2.00 2.00
Population 292,336 [a] Excludes funds allocated to Coast Guard and Police Service
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Population 360,346

Male 8.9% 3.1% 3.2% 3.6% 24.7% 4.7%
Latin America and

Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
the Caribbean
Female 8.9% 3.1% 3.2% 3.5% 25.7% 7.0%
Male 17.3% 5.4% 5.1% 4.6% 16.4% 1.8%
Female 16.6% 5.2% 4.9% 4.4% 16.1% 2.0%
Capabilities
Maritime security and resource protection are the main Capabilities
tasks of the Barbados Defence Force (BDF), but it also has The principal task for Belize’s small armed forces is
a secondary public-safety role in support of the Royal Bar- territorial defence, particularly along the border with
bados Police Force. Both the coastguard and the Barbados Guatemala, where security incidents continued in 2017.
Regiment have been active in counter-narcotics work in Recent activity has focused on countering narcotics
recent years, and the latter may in future be tasked with smuggling, although this is hampered by insufficient
law-enforcement patrols. In 2017, the BDF participated in maritime-patrol or aerial-surveillance and interdiction
regional disaster-relief efforts in the northern Caribbean in capacity. The first pilots for the air wing’s newly acquired
the wake of hurricanes Irma and Maria, and hosted the an- UH-1H helicopters completed conversion training in 2017;
with these helicopters now in service, the defence force’s
nual iteration of the Tradewinds exercise series. Barbados
ability to deploy and operate in the country’s jungles has
hosts the headquarters of the Regional Security System
seen a significant boost. An update of the national defence
(RSS), a grouping of Caribbean nations’ police and secu-
and security strategy was planned for 2016, but it is not
rity forces – and military capabilities – that can be called clear if this process has concluded. There are established
on to address threats to regional security and to undertake training relationships with the UK, the US (including
counter-narcotics and disaster-relief tasks. The US, in col- maintenance support) and regional states. There are plans
laboration with Canada, recently overhauled the RSS’s two to invite foreign states to carry out jungle training with the
maritime-patrol aircraft. defence force.
ACTIVE 610 (Army 500 Coast Guard 110) ACTIVE 1,500 (Army 1,500) Paramilitary 150
RESERVE 430 (Joint 430) RESERVE 700 (Joint 700)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE programmes are intended to improve the services’ ability to

undertake these roles. In June 2017, Bolivia introduced a new
Army ε1,500 military-volunteer initiative, aimed in part at improving the
FORCES BY ROLE gender balance within the armed forces. In August 2017,
MANOEUVRE Bolivia and Russia agreed to expand a 2016 agreement
on defence-technology collaboration following a Bolivian
Light
2 inf bn (3 inf coy) defence-delegation visit to Moscow, but China remains a
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT significant supplier of military materiel. Airspace control
1 spt gp is an emerging strategic priority, and construction began in
September 2017 on the first of 13 civilian and military radars
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
that Bolivia is acquiring to help address this requirement.
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • RCL 84mm
There is also increasing cooperation with Peru on border
8 Carl Gustav
security and countering narcotics trafficking, while exercises
ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 6
in this area have taken place with Argentina’s air force.
Air Wing There is some local maintenance capacity for the services,
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE with refurbished aircraft delivered in late 2016. Bolivian
AIRCRAFT personnel deploy on UN peacekeeping missions.
TPT • Light 3: 1 BN-2A Defender; 1 BN-2B Defender; 1
Cessna 182 Skylane
Paramilitary 37,100
TRG 1 T-67M-200 Firefly
Conscript liability 12 months (18–22 years of age)
HELICOPTERS
TPT • Light 3: 2 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 1 Bell 407
Reserve
FORCES BY ROLE Army 9,800; 13,000 conscript (total 22,800)
MANOEUVRE
FORCES BY ROLE
Light
COMMAND
1 inf bn (3 inf coy)
6 mil region HQ
Paramilitary 150 10 div HQ
SPECIAL FORCES
Coast Guard 150 3 SF regt
All operational patrol vessels under 10t FLD Reconnaissance
1 mot cav gp
FOREIGN FORCES Armoured
United Kingdom Army 20 1 armd bn
Mechanised
1 mech cav regt
Bolivia BOL 2 mech inf regt
Light
Bolivian Boliviano B 2016 2017 2018
1 (aslt) cav gp
GDP B 234bn 259bn 5 (horsed) cav gp
US$ 34.1bn 37.8bn 3 mot inf regt
per capita US$ 3,125 3,412 21 inf regt
Growth % 4.3 4.2 Air Manoeuvre
2 AB regt (bn) 
Inflation % 3.6 3.2
Other
Def bdgt B 3.04bn 3.73bn 1 (Presidential Guard) inf regt
US$ 442m 543m COMBAT SUPPORT
US$1=B 6.86 6.86 6 arty regt (bn)
6 engr bn
1 int coy
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 1 MP bn
1 sigs bn
Male 16.2% 5.1% 4.7% 4.4% 16.6% 2.3%
Female 15.6% 4.9% 4.6% 4.4% 17.9% 2.9%
2 log bn
AVIATION
Capabilities 2 avn coy
Counter-narcotics and internal and border security are AIR DEFENCE
the main tasks of the armed forces. Modest procurement 1 ADA regt

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 1 sqn with BAe-146-100; CV-580; MA60
LT TK 54: 36 SK-105A1 Kuerassier; 18 SK-105A2 Kuerassier 1 (TAB) sqn with C-130A Hercules; MD-10-30F
RECCE 24 EE-9 Cascavel 1 sqn with C-130B/H Hercules
APC 148+ 1 sqn with F-27-400M Troopship
APC (T) 87+: 50+ M113, 37 M9 half-track 1 (VIP) sqn with Beech 90 King Air; Beech 200 King Air
APC (W) 61: 24 EE-11 Urutu; 22 MOWAG Roland; 15 Beech 1900; Falcon 900EX; Sabreliner 60
V-100 Commando 6 sqn with Cessna 152/206; IAI-201 Arava; PA-32
AUV 19 Tiger 4×4 Saratoga; PA-34 Seneca
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES TRAINING
1 sqn with DA40; T-25
ARV 4 Greif; M578 LARV
1 sqn with Cessna 152/172
1 sqn with PC-7 Turbo Trainer
MSL
1 hel sqn with R-44 Raven II
SP 2 Koyak with HJ-8
MANPATS HJ-8
1 (anti-drug) sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois)
RCL 90mm M67; 106mm M40A1 AIR DEFENCE
ARTILLERY 311+ 1 regt with Oerlikon; Type-65
TOWED 61: 105mm 25 M101A1; 122mm 36 M-30 (M-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1938)
MOR 250+: 81mm 250 M29; Type-W87; 107mm M30;
TPT 85: Heavy 1 MD-10-30F; Medium 4: 1 C-130A
120mm M120
Hercules; 2 C-130B Hercules; 1 C-130H Hercules; Light
AIRCRAFT
70: 1 Aero Commander 690; 3 Beech 90 King Air; 2 Beech
TPT • Light 4: 1 Fokker F-27-200; 1 Beech 90 King Air; 1
200 King Air; 1 Beech 1900; 5 C-212-100; 10 Cessna 152;
C-212 Aviocar; 1 Cessna 210 Centurion 2 Cessna 172; 19 Cessna 206; 1 Cessna 402; 1 CV-580; 9
HELICOPTERS DA40; 3 F-27-400M Troopship; 4 IAI-201 Arava; 2 Learjet
MRH 6 H425 25B/D; 2 MA60†; 1 PA-32 Saratoga; 3 PA-34 Seneca; 1
TRG 1 Robinson R55 Sabreliner 60; PAX 10: 1 B-727; 3 B-737-200; 5 BAe-146-
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 37mm 18 Type-65 100; 1 Falcon 900EX (VIP)
TRG 30: 6 K-8WB Karakorum*; 6 T-25; 16 PC-7 Turbo
Navy 4,800 Trainer*; 2 Z-242L
Organised into six naval districts with HQ located at HELICOPTERS
Puerto Guayaramerín MRH 1 SA316 Alouette III
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TPT 35: Medium 6 H215 Super Puma; Light 29: 2 H125
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PBR 3: 1 Ecureuil; 19 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 2 H145; 6 R-44
Latin America and

Santa Cruz; 2 others Raven II
the Caribbean
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3 AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 18+: 20mm Oerlikon; 37mm 18
AG 1 Type-65
AH 2
Paramilitary 37,100+
Marines 1,700 (incl 1,000 Naval Military
Police) National Police 31,100+
FORCES BY ROLE
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
MANOEUVRE
Other
Mechanised
27 frontier sy unit
1 mech inf bn
9 paramilitary bde
Amphibious
2 (rapid action) paramilitary regt
6 mne bn (1 in each Naval District)
COMBAT SUPPORT Narcotics Police 6,000+
4 (naval) MP bn FOE (700) – Special Operations Forces
Air Force 6,500 (incl conscripts) DEPLOYMENT

FORCES BY ROLE
GROUND ATTACK CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
1 sqn with K-8WB Karakorum UN • MINUSCA 1; 3 obs
ISR
1 sqn with Cessna 206; Cessna 402; Learjet 25B/25D
(secondary VIP role)
SEARCH & RESCUE SOUTH SUDAN
1 sqn with AS332B Super Puma; H125 Ecureuil; H145 UN • UNMISS 1; 3 obs
SPECIAL FORCES
Brazil BRZ 1 SF bde (1 SF bn, 1 cdo bn)
1 SF coy
Brazilian Real R 2016 2017 2018
MANOEUVRE
GDP R 6.27tr 6.60tr Reconnaissance
US$ 1.80tr 2.08tr 3 mech cav regt
per capita US$ 8,727 10,020 Armoured
Growth % -3.6 0.7
1 (5th) armd bde (1 mech cav sqn, 2 armd bn, 2 armd inf
bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
Inflation % 8.7 3.7
1 (6th) armd bde (1 mech cav sqn, 2 armd bn, 2 armd
Def bdgt [a] R 82.1bn 93.3bn 92.6bn inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 AD bty, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1
US$ 23.6bn 29.4bn log bn)
US$1=R 3.48 3.17 Mechanised
[a] Includes military pensions
3 (1st, 2nd & 4th) mech cav bde (1 armd cav bn, 3 mech
cav bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
Population 207,353,391 1 (3rd) mech cav bde (1 armd cav bn, 2 mech cav bn, 1
arty bn, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
1 (15th) mech inf bde (3 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr
Male 11.4% 4.2% 4.0% 4.0% 22.0% 3.5% coy, 1 log bn)
Female 10.9% 4.1% 3.9% 3.9% 22.9% 4.7% Light
1 (3rd) mot inf bde (1 mech cav sqn, 2 mot inf bn, 1 inf
Capabilities bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
1 (4th) mot inf bde (1 mech cav sqn, 1 mot inf bn, 1 inf
Brazil still wishes to enhance power-projection capabilities,
bn, 1 mtn inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
boost surveillance of the Amazon region and coastal
1 (7th) mot inf bde (3 mot inf bn, 1 arty bn)
waters, and further develop its defence industry. However,
1 (8th) mot inf bde (1 mech cav sqn, 3 mot inf bn, 1 arty
economic difficulties continue to affect its ability to
bn, 1 log bn)
develop these ambitions; procurements have decreased
1 (10th) mot inf bde (1 mech cav sqn, 4 mot inf bn, 1 inf
and modernisation plans have slowed. Funding and
coy, 1 arty bn, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy)
internal deployments associated with the major sporting
1 (13th) mot inf bde (1 mot inf bn, 2 inf bn, 1 inf coy, 1
events of recent years have also had a budgetary impact.
arty bn)
Key programmes, including KC-390, FX-2, SISFRON and
1 (14th) mot inf bde (1 mech cav sqn, 3 inf bn, 1 arty bn)
PROSUB, have all suffered funding challenges. Brazil has
1 (11th) lt inf bde (1 mech cav regt, 3 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1
a well-developed defence-industrial base, across the land,
engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 MP coy, 1 log bn)
sea and air domains. It is looking to further its capabilities 11 inf bn
in terms of aerospace manufacturing and shipbuilding 1 (1st) jungle inf bde (1 mech cav sqn, 2 jungle inf bn, 1
through the Gripen combat-aircraft procurement and arty bn)
the PROSUB programme, which is intended to lead to 3 (2nd, 16th & 17th) jungle inf bde (3 jungle inf bn)
the construction in Brazil of nuclear- and conventionally 1 (23rd) jungle inf bde (1 cav sqn, 4 jungle inf bn, 1 arty
powered submarines. The air force saw organisational bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
change in 2017, with new wings and squadrons created and 2 jungle inf bn
two commands deactivated. The armed forces continue Air Manoeuvre
to work towards a national cyber-defence capability 1 AB bde (1 cav sqn, 3 AB bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr coy, 1
and regularly participate in domestic and international sigs coy, 1 log bn)
exercises; its deployment to Haiti concluded with the end 1 (12th) air mob bde (1 cav sqn, 3 air mob bn, 1 arty bn,
of the UN MINUSTAH mission. 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
ACTIVE 334,500 (Army 198,000 Navy 69,000 Air Other
1 (9th) mot trg bde (3 mot inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 log bn)
1 (18th) sy bde (2 sy bn, 2 sy coy)
Conscript liability 12 months (can go to 18; often waived)
1 sy bn
RESERVE 1,340,000 7 sy coy
3 gd cav regt
1 gd inf bn
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE COMBAT SUPPORT
3 SP arty bn
Army 128,000; 70,000 conscript (total 198,000) 6 fd arty bn
FORCES BY ROLE 1 MRL bn
COMMAND 1 STA bty
8 mil comd HQ 6 engr bn
12 mil region HQ 1 engr gp (1 engr bn, 4 construction bn)
7 div HQ (2 with regional HQ) 1 engr gp (4 construction bn, 1 construction coy)
2 construction bn Navy 69,000

1 EW coy Organised into 9 districts with HQ I Rio de Janeiro, HQ II
1 int coy Salvador, HQ III Natal, HQ IV Belém, HQ V Rio Grande,
6 MP bn HQ VI Ladario, HQ VII Brasilia, HQ VIII Sao Paulo, HQ
3 MP coy IX Manaus
4 sigs bn FORCES BY ROLE
2 sigs coy SPECIAL FORCES
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 (diver) SF gp
5 log bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 tpt bn
4 spt bn
4 Tupi (GER T-209/1400) with 8 single 533mm TT with
HELICOPTER
Mk48 HWT
1 avn bde (3 hel bn, 1 maint bn)
1 Tikuna with 8 single 533mm TT with Mk48 HWT
1 hel bn PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 11
AIR DEFENCE DESTROYERS • DDGHM 2:
1 ADA bde (5 ADA bn) 1 Greenhalgh (ex-UK Broadsword) with 4 single lnchr
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE with MM38 Exocet AShM, 2 sextuple lnchr with Sea
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Wolf SAM, 6 single STWS Mk2 324mm ASTT with
MBT 393: 128 Leopard 1A1BE; 220 Leopard 1A5BR; 45 Mk 46 LWT (capacity 2 Super Lynx Mk21A hel)
M60A3/TTS 1 Greenhalgh (ex-UK Broadsword) with 4 single lnchr
LT TK 50 M41C with MM40 Exocet Block 2 AShM, 2 sextuple lnchr
RECCE 408 EE-9 Cascavel with Sea Wolf SAM, 6 single STWS Mk2 324mm ASTT
IFV 6 VBTP-MR Guarani 30mm with Mk 46 LWT (capacity 2 Super Lynx Mk21A hel)
APC 1,013 FRIGATES 9
APC (T) 630: 584 M113; 12 M113A2; 34 M577A2 FFGHM 6 Niterói with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet
APC (W) 383: 223 EE-11 Urutu; 160 VBTP-MR Guarani Block 2 AShM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr with Aspide
6×6 SAM, 2 triple Mk32 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT,
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES 1 twin 375mm A/S mor, 2 Sea Trinity Mk3 CIWS, 1
AEV 4+: Greif; HART; 4+ Leopard 1 115mm gun (capacity 1 Super Lynx Mk21A hel)
ARV 4+: Leopard 1; 4 M88A1; M578 LARV FFGH 3:
VLB 4+: XLP-10; 4 Leopard 1 2 Inhaúma with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE 2 AShM, 2 triple Mk32 324mm ASTT with Mk 46
MSL • MANPATS Eryx; Milan; MSS-1.2 AC LWT, 1 115mm gun (1 Super Lynx Mk21A hel)
RCL 343: 84mm 149 Carl Gustav; 106mm 194 M40A1 1 Barroso with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block
2 AShM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1
Latin America and

ARTILLERY 1,855
the Caribbean
Sea Trinity CIWS, 1 115mm gun (capacity 1 Super
SP 149: 105mm 72 M7/108; 155mm 77: 37 M109A3; 40
Lynx Mk21A hel)
M109A5/A5+
TOWED 431
PSO 3 Amazonas with 1 hel landing platform
105mm 336: 233 M101/M102; 40 L118 Light Gun; 63
PCO 6: 4 Bracui (ex-UK River); 1 Imperial Marinheiro with
Model 56 pack howitzer
1 76mm gun; 1 Parnaiba with 1 hel landing platform
155mm 95 M114
PCC 2 Macaé
MRL 127mm 30: 18 ASTROS II Mk3M; 12 ASTROS II
PCR 5: 2 Pedro Teixeira with 1 hel landing platform; 3
Mk6
Roraima
MOR 1,245: 81mm 1,168: 453 L16, 715 M936 AGR; PB 24: 12 Grajau; 6 Marlim; 6 Piratini (US PGM)
120mm 77 M2 PBR 4 LPR-40
HELICOPTERS MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES •
MRH 51: 29 AS565 Panther (HM-1); 5 AS565 K2 Panther MSC 4 Aratu (GER Schutze)
(HM-1); 17 AS550U2 Fennec (HA-1 – armed) AMPHIBIOUS
TPT 36: Heavy 9 H225M Caracal (HM-4); Medium 12: PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LPD 1 Bahia (ex-
8 AS532 Cougar (HM-3); 4 S-70A-36 Black Hawk (HM-2); FRA Foudre) (capacity 4 hels; 8 LCM, 450 troops)
Light 15 AS350L1 Ecureuil (HA-1) LANDING SHIPS 3
AIR DEFENCE LST 1 Mattoso Maia (ex-US Newport) with 1 Phalanx
SAM • Point-defence RBS-70; 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse); CIWS (capacity 3 LCVP; 1 LCPL; 400 troops)
9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch) LSLH 2: 1 Garcia D’Avila (ex-UK Sir Galahad) (capacity
GUNS 100: 1 hel; 16 MBT; 340 troops); 1 Almirante Saboia (ex-UK
SP 35mm 34 Gepard 1A2 Sir Bedivere) (capacity 1 med hel; 18 MBT; 340 troops)
TOWED 66: 35mm 39 GDF-001 towed (some with LANDING CRAFT 16:
Super Fledermaus radar); 40mm 27 L/70 (some with LCM 12: 10 EDVM-25; 2 Icarai (ex-FRA CTM)
BOFI) LCT 1 Marambaia (ex-FRA CDIC)
RADAR • AIR DEFENCE 5 SABER M60 LCU 3 Guarapari (LCU 1610)
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 44 MANOEUVRE

ABU 5: 4 Comandante Varella; 1 Faroleiro Mario Seixas Amphibious
ABUH 1 Almirante Graca Aranah (lighthouse tender) 1 amph div (1 lt armd bn, 3 mne bn, 1 arty bn)
AFS 1 Potengi 1 amph aslt bn
AGHS 5: 1 Caravelas (riverine); 4 Rio Tocantin 7 (regional) mne gp
AGOS 2: 1 Ary Rongel with 1 hel landing platform; 1 1 rvn bn
Almirante Maximiano (capacity 2 AS350/AS355 Ecureuil COMBAT SUPPORT
hel) 1 engr bn
AGS 8: 1 Aspirante Moura; 1 Cruzeiro do Sul; 1 Antares; 3 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Amorim do Valle (ex-UK Rover); 1 Rio Branco; 1 Vital de 1 log bn
Oliveira
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AGSH 1 Sirius
AH 5: 2 Oswaldo Cruz with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Dr
LT TK 18 SK-105 Kuerassier
Montenegro; 1 Tenente Maximianol with 1 hel landing
platform; 1 Soares de Meirelles APC 60
AOR 2: 1 Almirante Gastão Motta; 1 Marajó APC (T) 30 M113A1 (incl variants)
AP 3: 1 Almirante Leverger; 1 Paraguassu; 1 Pará (all river APC (W) 30 Piranha IIIC
transports) AAV 27: 13 AAV-7A1; 1 AAV-7A1 RAM/RS; 1 AAV-
ASR 1 Felinto Perry (NOR Wildrake) with 1 hel landing 7A1 RAM/RS; 12 LVTP-7
platform ENGINEERING VEHICLES • ARV 1 AAVR-7
ATF 5: 3 Triunfo; 2 Almirante Guihem ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
AX 1 Brasil (Niterói mod) with 1 hel landing platform MSL• MANPATS RB-56 Bill; MSS-1.2 AC
AXL 3 Nascimento ARTILLERY 65
AXS 1 Cisne Barco TOWED 41: 105mm 33: 18 L118 Light Gun; 15 M101;
155mm 8 M114
Naval Aviation 2,100 MRL 127mm 6 ASTROS II Mk6
FORCES BY ROLE MOR 81mm 18 M29
GROUND ATTACK AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 40mm 6 L/70 (with BOFI)
1 sqn with A-4/4M (AF-1) Skyhawk; TA-4/4M (AF-1A)
Skyhawk Air Force 67,500
ANTI SURFACE WARFARE Brazilian airspace is divided into 7 air regions, each of
1 sqn with Super Lynx Mk21A which is responsible for its designated air bases. Air assets
ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE are divided among 4 designated air forces (I, II, III & V) for
1 sqn with S-70B Seahawk (MH-16) operations (IV Air Force temporarily deactivated)
TRAINING
FORCES BY ROLE
1 sqn with Bell 206B3 Jet Ranger III
FIGHTER
4 sqn with F-5EM/FM Tiger II
1 sqn with AS332 Super Puma; AS532 Cougar
1 sqn with AS350 Ecureuil (armed); AS355 Ecureuil II
2 sqn with AMX (A-1A/B)
(armed); H225M Caracal (UH-15A)
GROUND ATTACK/ISR
3 sqn with AS350 Ecureuil (armed); AS355 Ecureuil II
(armed) 4 sqn with EMB-314 Super Tucano (A-29A/B)*
MARITIME PATROL
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn with P-3AM Orion
2 sqn with EMB-111 (P-95A/B/M)
ATK 11: 8 A-4/4M (AF-1/1B) Skyhawk; 3 TA-4/4M (AF-
ISR
1A) Skyhawk
1 sqn with AMX-R (RA-1)*
HELICOPTERS
ASW 18: 11 Super Lynx Mk21A; 1 Super Lynx Mk21B; 1 sqn with Learjet 35 (R-35A); EMB-110B (R-95)
6 S-70B Seahawk (MH-16) AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
CSAR 2 H225M Caracal (UH-15A) 1 sqn with EMB-145RS (R-99); EMB-145SA (E-99)
TPT 52: Heavy 7 H225M Caracal (UH-15); Medium 7: TANKER/TRANSPORT
5 AS332 Super Puma; 2 AS532 Cougar (UH-14); Light 1 sqn with C-130H/KC-130H Hercules
38: 15 AS350 Ecureuil (armed); 8 AS355 Ecureuil II TRANSPORT
(armed); 15 Bell 206B3 Jet Ranger III (IH-6B) 1 VIP sqn with A319 (VC-1A); EMB-190 (VC-2); AS355
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AShM: AM39 Exocet; Ecureuil II (VH-55); H135M (VH-35); H225M Caracal
Sea Skua; AGM-119 Penguin (VH-36)
1 VIP sqn with EMB-135BJ (VC-99B); ERJ-135LR (VC-
Marines 16,000 99C); ERJ-145LR (VC-99A); Learjet 35A (VU-35);
FORCES BY ROLE Learjet 55C (VU-55C)
SPECIAL FORCES 2 sqn with C-130E/H Hercules
1 SF bn 2 sqn with C295M (C-105A)
7 (regional) sqn with Cessna 208/208B (C-98); Cessna Paramilitary 395,000 opcon Army
208-G1000 (C-98A); EMB-110 (C-95); EMB-120 (C-97)
1 sqn with ERJ-145 (C-99A) Public Security Forces 395,000
1 sqn with EMB-120RT (VC-97), EMB-121 (VU-9) State police organisation technically under army control.
TRAINING However, military control is reducing, with authority
1 sqn with EMB-110 (C-95) reverting to individual states
2 sqn with EMB-312 Tucano (T-27) (incl 1 air show sqn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn with T-25A/C UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
ATTACK HELICOPTER ISR • Heavy 3 Heron (deployed by Federal Police for
1 sqn with Mi-35M Hind (AH-2) Amazon and border patrols)
1 sqn with H225M Caracal (H-36) Cyber
1 sqn with AS350B Ecureuil (H-50); AS355 Ecureuil II (H-55) Cyber was a key component of the 2008 National Defence
1 sqn with Bell 205 (H-1H); H225M Caracal (H-36) Strategy and the July 2012 Defence White Paper. In 2011,
2 sqn with UH-60L Black Hawk (H-60L) the army inaugurated Brazil’s cyber-defence centre
(CDCiber) to coordinate existing army, navy and air-force
ISR UAV
activities. There is an active training programme, run by
1 sqn with Hermes 450/900
the Institute of Cyber Defence among others, and a Cyber
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Operations Simulator (SIMOC) was set up in 2013, within
AIRCRAFT 202 combat capable the Integrated Electronic Warfare Centre. In July 2015, the
FTR 47: 43 F-5EM Tiger II; 4 F-5FM Tiger II army activiated two provisional cyber-defence units under
FGA 49: 38 AMX (A-1); 11 AMX-T (A-1B) CDCiber, a cyber-defence command and a national school
ASW 9 P-3AM Orion of cyber defence. In December 2016, the army approved
MP 19: 10 EMB-111 (P-95A Bandeirulha)*; 9 EMB-111 the establishment of a permanent cyber-defence command
(P-95BM Bandeirulha)* (ComDCiber), reporting to the Department of Science and
ISR: 8: 4 AMX-R (RA-1)*; 4 EMB-110B (R-95) Technology.
ELINT 6: 3 EMB-145RS (R-99); 3 Learjet 35A (R-35A)
AEW&C 5 EMB-145SA (E-99) DEPLOYMENT
SAR 7: 1 C295M Amazonas (SC-105); 4 EMB-110 (SC-95B),
1 SC-130E Hercules CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
TKR/TPT 2 KC-130H UN • MINUSCA 2; 4 obs
TPT 198: Medium 20: 4 C-130E Hercules; 16 C-130H CYPRUS
Hercules; Light 170: 11 C295M (C-105A); 7 Cessna 208 (C- UN • UNFICYP 2
98); 9 Cessna 208B (C-98); 13 Cessna 208-G1000 (C-98A);
LEBANON
Latin America and

52 EMB-110 (C-95A/B/C/M); 16 EMB-120 (C-97); 4 EMB-
the Caribbean
120RT (VC-97); 5 EMB-121 (VU-9); 7 EMB-135BJ (VC- UN • UNIFIL 207; 1 FFGH
99B); 3 EMB-201R Ipanema (G-19); 2 EMB-202A Ipanema LIBERIA
(G-19A); 2 ERJ-135LR (VC-99C); 7 ERJ-145 (C-99A); 1 UN • UNMIL 1; 1 obs
ERJ-145LR (VC-99A); 9 Learjet 35A (VU-35); 1 Learjet
55C (VU-55); 9 PA-34 Seneca (U-7); 12 U-42 Regente; PAX SOUTH SUDAN
8: 1 A319 (VC-1A); 3 EMB-190 (VC-2); 4 Hawker 800XP UN • UNMISS 6; 5 obs
(EU-93A – calibration) SUDAN
TRG 264: 100 EMB-312 Tucano (T-27); 39 EMB-314 Super UN • UNAMID 3 obs
Tucano (A-29A)*; 44 EMB-314 Super Tucano (A-29B)*; 81 UN • UNISFA 2 obs
T-25A/C
HELICOPTERS WESTERN SAHARA
ATK 12 Mi-35M Hind (AH-2) UN • MINURSO 10 obs
MRH 2 H135M (VH-35)
TPT 81: Heavy 13 H225M Caracal (11 H-36 & 2 VH-36);
Medium 16 UH-60L Black Hawk (H-60L); Light 52: 24
AS350B Ecureuil (H-50); 4 AS355 Ecureuil II (H-55/VH-
55); 24 Bell 205 (H-1H)
ISR • Medium 5: 4 Hermes 450; 1 Hermes 900
AAM • IR MAA-1 Piranha; R-550 Magic 2; Python 3; IIR
Python 4; SARH Super 530F; ARH Derby
AShM AM39 Exocet
ARM MAR-1 (in development)
Army 46,350
Chile CHL 6 military administrative regions
Chilean Peso pCh 2016 2017 2018 FORCES BY ROLE
GDP pCh 167tr 174tr Currently being reorganised into 1 SF bde, 4 armd bde, 1
armd det, 3 mot bde, 2 mot det, 4 mtn det and 1 avn bde
US$ 247bn 263bn
COMMAND
per capita US$ 13,576 14,315 6 div HQ
Growth % 1.6 1.4 SPECIAL FORCES
Inflation % 3.8 2.3 1 SF bde (1 SF bn, 1 (mtn) SF gp, 1 para bn, 3 cdo coy, 1
Def bdgt [a] pCh 2.33tr 2.60tr log coy)
MANOEUVRE
US$ 3.44bn 3.93bn
Reconnaissance
US$1=pCh 676.94 661.907 4 cav sqn
[a] Includes military pensions 2 recce sqn
Population 17,789,267 2 recce pl
Armoured
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 3 (1st, 2nd & 3rd) armd bde (1 armd recce pl, 1 armd
Male 10.2% 3.6% 4.0% 4.2% 22.5% 4.5% cav gp, 1 mech inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 AT coy, 1 engr coy,
1 sigs coy)
Female 9.8% 3.5% 3.8% 4.0% 23.3% 6.2%
1 (4th) armd bde (1 armd recce pl, 1 armd cav gp, 1
mech inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 engr coy)
Capabilities
1 (5th) armd det (1 armd cav gp, 1 mech inf coy, 1 arty
Assuring sovereignty, territorial integrity and internal gp)
security remain core roles for the armed forces, which Mechanised
have spent the past decade recapitalising the inventories 1 (1st) mech inf regt
of all three services with second-hand US and European Light
equipment. However, there is an increasing focus on non- 1 (1st) mot inf bde (1 recce coy, 1 mot inf bn, 1 arty gp, 3
traditional military roles, such as disaster relief, illustrated AT coy, 1 engr bn)
by deployments in response to flooding and an earthquake 1 (4th) mot inf bde (1 mot inf bn, 1 MRL gp, 2 AT coy, 1
in 2015. A new defence white paper was scheduled for 2017 engr bn)
but it had not been released by November. Procurement 1 (24th) mot inf bde (1 mot inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 AT coy)
priorities have changed to reflect the new focus on littoral 1 (6th) reinforced regt (1 mot inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 sigs coy)
and blue-water surveillance capabilities and helicopters, 1 (10th) reinforced regt (1 mot inf bn, 2 AT coy, 1 engr
although slower economic growth may delay or reduce bn)
the scope of some of these plans. Chile has a developed 1 (11th) mot inf det (1 inf bn, 1 arty gp)
defence-industrial base, with ENAER conducting aircraft 1 (14th) mot inf det (1 mot inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 sigs coy,
maintenance. ASMAR and FAMAE are key industries in 1 AT coy)
the maritime and land sectors respectively, with the former 7 mot inf regt
completing four OPVs for the navy, and set to begin full 1 (3rd) mtn det (1 mtn inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 engr coy)
construction on a new icebreaker in 2018 that will enhance 1 (9th) mtn det (1 mtn inf bn, 1 engr coy, 1 construction
Chile’s ability to support operations in Antarctica. Training bn)
takes place regularly on a national basis, and the armed 2 (8th & 17th) mtn det (1 mtn inf bn, 1 arty coy)
forces routinely participate in exercises with international COMBAT SUPPORT
and regional partners. Santiago is looking to increase its 1 arty regt
contributions to international peace operations following 1 engr regt
the end of the UN MINUSTAH mission in Haiti. 4 sigs bn
ACTIVE 77,200 (Army 46,350 Navy 19,800 Air 1 sigs coy
11,050) Paramilitary 44,700 2 int regt
Conscript liability Army 1 year; Navy 18 months; Air Force 1 MP regt
12 months. Legally, conscription can last for 2 years COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 log div (2 log regt)
RESERVE 40,000 (Army 40,000) 4 log regt
6 log coy
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 1 maint div (1 maint regt)
AVIATION
Space 1 avn bde (1 tpt avn bn, 1 hel bn, 1 spt bn)
SATELLITES ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
ISR 1 SSOT (Sistema Satelital del la Observación de la MBT 246: 115 Leopard 1; 131 Leopard 2A4
Tierra) IFV 191: 173 Marder 1A3; 18 YPR-765 PRI
APC 548 1 32-cell VLS with Sea Wolf SAM, 2 twin 324mm
APC (T) 369 M113A1/A2 ASTT with Mk46 Mod 2 LWT, 1 114mm gun
APC (W) 179 Piranha (capacity 1 AS-532SC Cougar)
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES 2 Almirante Riveros (NLD Karel Doorman-class) with
AEV 9 Leopard 1 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 1
ARV 35 Leopard 1 octuple Mk48 lnchr with RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM,
VLB 16 Leopard 1 4 single Mk32 Mod 9 324mm ASTT with Mk46 Mod
MW 3 Leopard 1 5 HWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 AS532SC Cougar)
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE FFGM 2:
MSL • MANPATS Spike-LR; Spike-ER 2 Almirante Lattore (NLD Jacob Van Heemskerck-class)
RCL 84mm Carl Gustav; 106mm 213 M40A1 with 2 twin Mk141 lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon
ARTILLERY 1,407 AShM, 1 Mk13 GMLS with SM-1MR SAM, 1
SP 155mm 48: 24 M109A3; 24 M109A5+ octuple Mk48 lnchr with RIM-7P Sea Sparrow
TOWED 240: 105mm 192: 88 M101; 104 Model 56 pack SAM, 2 twin Mk32 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT,
howitzer; 155mm 48 M-68 1 Goalkeeper CIWS
MRL 160mm 12 LAR-160 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 14
MOR 1,107: 81mm 743: 303 ECIA L65/81; 175 FAMAE; PSOH 4: 2 Piloto Pardo; 2 Piloto Pardo with 1 76mm gun
265 Soltam; 120mm 293: 173 ECIA L65/120; 17 FAMAE; (ice-strengthened hull)
93 M-65; SP 120mm 71: 35 FAMAE (on Piranha 6x6); 36 PCG 5:
Soltam (on M113A2) 3 Casma (ISR Sa’ar 4) with 4 GI Gabriel I AShM, 2 76mm
AIRCRAFT guns
TPT • Light 8: 2 C-212-300 Aviocar; 3 Cessna 208 2 Tiger (GER Type-148) with 4 single lnchr with MM38
Caravan; 3 CN235 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun
HELICOPTERS PCO 5 Micalvi
ISR 9 MD-530F Lifter (armed) AMPHIBIOUS
TPT 17: Medium 12: 8 AS532AL Cougar; 2 AS532ALe PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS
Cougar; 2 SA330 Puma; Light 5: 4 H125 Ecureuil; 1 LPD 1 Sargento Aldea (FRA Foudre) with 3 twin Simbad
AS355F Ecureuil II lnchr with Mistral SAM (capacity 4 med hel; 1 LCT; 2
AIR DEFENCE LCM; 22 tanks; 470 troops)
SAM • Point-defence Mistral LANDING SHIPS 3
GUNS 41: LSM 1 Elicura
SP 20mm 17 Piranha/TCM-20 LST 2 Maipo (FRA Batral) with 1 hel landing platform
TOWED 20mm 24 TCM-20 (capacity 7 tanks; 140 troops)
LANDING CRAFT 3
Navy 19,800 LCT 1 CDIC (for use in Sargento Aldea)
Latin America and

LCM 2 (for use in Sargento Aldea)
the Caribbean
5 Naval Zones; 1st Naval Zone and main HQ at Valparaiso;
2nd Naval Zone at Talcahuano; 3rd Naval Zone at Punta
ABU 1 George Slight Marshall with 1 hel landing platform
Arenas; 4th Naval Zone at Iquique; 5th Naval Zone at
AFD 3
Puerto Montt
AG 1 Almirante Jose Toribio Merino Castro (also used as
FORCES BY ROLE general spt ship) with 1 hel landing platform
SPECIAL FORCES AGOR 1 Cabo de Hornos
1 (diver) SF comd AGHS 1 Micalvi
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AGS 1 Type-1200 (ice-strengthened hull, ex-CAN) with
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 4: 1 hel landing platform
2 O’Higgins (Scorpene) with 6 single 533mm TT with AOR 2: 1 Almirante Montt with 1 hel landing platform;
A-184 Black Shark HWT/SUT HWT/SM39 Exocet Block 1 Araucano
2 AShM (1 currently in repair) AP 1 Aguiles (1 hel landing platform)
2 Thomson (GER T-209/1400) with 8 single 533mm TT ATF 2 Veritas
A-184 Black Shark HWT/SUT HWT/SM39 Exocet Block AXS 1 Esmeralda
2 AShM
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 8 Naval Aviation 600
DESTROYERS • DDGHM 1 Almirante Williams (ex-UK EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Broadsword Type-22) with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with AIRCRAFT 14 combat capable
RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 2 octuple VLS with Barak ASW 4: 2 C295ASW Persuader; 2 P-3ACH Orion
SAM; 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 76mm MP 4: 1 C295MPA Persuader; 3 EMB-111 Bandeirante* 
gun (capacity 1 AS532SC Cougar) ISR 7 P-68
FRIGATES 7: TRG 7 PC-7 Turbo Trainer*
FFGHM 5: HELICOPTERS
3 Almirante Cochrane (ex-UK Duke Type-23) with 2 ASW 5 AS532SC Cougar
quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, MRH 8 AS365 Dauphin
TPT • Light 7: 3 Bell 206 Jet Ranger; 4 Bo-105S EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AShM AM39 Exocet AIRCRAFT 79 combat capable
FTR 48: 10 F-5E Tigre III+; 2 F-5F Tigre III+; 29 F-16AM
Marines 3,600 Fighting Falcon; 7 F-16BM Fighting Falcon
FORCES BY ROLE FGA 10: 6 F-16C Block 50 Fighting Falcon; 4 F-16D Block
MANOEUVRE 50 Fighting Falcon
Amphibious ATK 9 C-101CC Aviojet (A-36 Halcón)
1 amph bde (2 mne bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 log bn) ISR 3 Cessna O-2A
2 coastal def unit AEW&C 1 B-707 Phalcon
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TKR 5: 2 KC-130R Hercules: 3 KC-135 Stratotanker
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES TPT 37: Medium 3: 1 C-130B Hercules; 2 C-130H
LT TK 15 FV101 Scorpion Hercules; Light 29: 2 C-212-200 Aviocar; 1 C-212-300
APC • APC (W) 25 MOWAG Roland Aviocar; 4 Cessna 525 Citation CJ1; 3 DHC-6-100 Twin
AAV 12 AAV-7 Otter; 7 DHC-6-300 Twin Otter; 2 Learjet 35A; 10 PA-28-
ARTILLERY 39 236 Dakota; PAX 5: 1 B-737-300; 1 B-737-500; 1 B-767-
TOWED 23: 105mm 7 KH-178; 155mm 16 M-71 300ER; 2 Gulfstream IV
MOR 81mm 16 TRG 45: 4 Cirrus SR-22T; 12 EMB-314 Super Tucano*; 29
COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM MM38 Exocet T-35A/B Pillan
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence 14: 4 M998 HELICOPTERS
Avenger; 10 M1097 Avenger MRH 12 Bell 412EP Twin Huey
TPT 22: Medium 1 S-70A Black Hawk; Light 21: 13 Bell
Coast Guard 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 5 Bell 206B (trg); 2 BK-117; 1 Bo-
Integral part of the Navy 105CBS-4
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 55 ISR • Medium 3 Hermes 900
PBF 26 Archangel AIR DEFENCE
PB 29: 18 Alacalufe (Protector-class); 4 Grumete Diaz SAM
(Dabor-class); 6 Pelluhue; 1 Ona Short-range 5 Crotale
Point-defence Mistral (including some Mygale/Aspic)
GUNS • TOWED 20mm M163/M167 Vulcan; 35mm
Air Force 11,050
Oerlikon GDF-005
Flying hours 100 hrs/yr AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
FORCES BY ROLE AAM • IR AIM-9J/M Sidewinder; Python 3; Shafrir‡; IIR
FIGHTER Python 4; ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM; Derby
1 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger III+ ASM AGM-65G Maverick
2 sqn with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon BOMBS
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK Laser-guided Paveway II
1 sqn with F-16C/D Block 50 Fighting Falcon (Puma) INS/GPS guided JDAM
ISR
1 (photo) flt with; DHC-6-300 Twin Otter; Learjet 35A Paramilitary 44,700
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING
1 flt with B-707 Phalcon Carabineros 44,700
TANKER/TRANSPORT Ministry of Interior; 15 zones, 36 districts, 179 comisaria
1 sqn with B-737-300; C-130B/H Hercules; KC-130R EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Hercules; KC-135 Stratotanker ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
TRANSPORT APC • APC (W) 20 MOWAG Roland  
3 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); C-212-200/300 ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm
Aviocar; Cessna O-2A; Cessna 525 Citation CJ1; DHC- AIRCRAFT
6-100/300 Twin Otter; PA-28-236 Dakota; Bell 205 (UH- TPT • Light 4: 1 Beech 200 King Air; 1 Cessna 208; 1
1H Iroquois) Cessna 550 Citation V; 1 PA-31T Cheyenne II
1 VIP flt with B-737-500 (VIP); Gulfstream IV HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 15: 5 AW109E Power; 1
TRAINING Bell 206 Jet Ranger; 2 BK-117; 5 Bo-105; 2 H135
1 sqn with EMB-314 Super Tucano*
1 sqn with PA-28-236 Dakota; T-35A/B Pillan Cyber
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER The Joint Staff coordinates cyber-security policies for the
1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); Bell 206B (trg); Bell Ministry of National Defence and the armed forces. Each
412 Twin Huey; Bo-105CBS-4; S-70A Black Hawk service has a cyber-security organisation. The Ministry
AIR DEFENCE of Interior and Public Security (Internal Affairs) released
1 AD regt (5 AD sqn) with Crotale; Mistral; M163/M167 a National Cyber Security Strategy in 2017. This states
Vulcan; Oerlikon GDF-005 that the Ministry of National Defence will be responsible
for developing cyber-security policy to protect military interior ministry. Colombia’s armed forces have in recent
networks and information systems and will establish its years been planning for new security roles, and new
own CSIRT. organisational structures for the post-FARC era. The
army’s ‘Damascus’ doctrine emphasises roles such as
DEPLOYMENT disaster relief and assistance to rural communities, but
a strong focus on combat capabilities remains. The navy
Legal provisions for foreign deployment:
has increased its international activities, but it will likely
Constitution: Constitution (1980, since amended)
see its marine forces reduced as part of the transformation
Decision on deployment of troops abroad: Article 63,
plans. The air force is due to undergo organisational
number 13 of the constitution, concerning matters of law,
change, and three new commands will likely be created.
states that the procedures for foreign deployment are a
Colombia has a defence industry active across all domains,
matter that must be established by law by congress. Law
with COTECMAR building vessels including amphibious
Number 19.067 regulates matters concerning the foreign
ships and patrol boats, CIAC active in the aerospace sector
deployment of Chilean troops and deployment of foreign
troops in Chile. It states that the government needs to as a maintenance and manufacturing firm, and INDUMIL
request congressional approval fabricating arms and ammunition. The strong relationship
with the US continues and has been particularly valuable
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA in terms of training and equipment support, although this
EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 15 has reduced in recent years due to the improved security
situation.
UN • MINUSCA 4 ACTIVE 293,200 (Army 223,150, Navy 56,400 Air
CYPRUS 13,650) Paramilitary 187,900
UN • UNFICYP 14 RESERVE 34,950 (Army 25,050 Navy 6,500 Air
INDIA/PAKISTAN 3,400)
UN • UNMOGIP 2 obs
MIDDLE EAST ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
UN • UNTSO 3 obs
Army 223,150
Colombia COL FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
Colombian Peso pC 2016 2017 2018 1 SF div (3 SF regt)
1 (anti-terrorist) SF bn
GDP pC 863tr 921tr
MANOEUVRE
US$ 282bn 307bn
Latin America and

Mechanised
the Caribbean
per capita US$ 5,792 6,238 1 (1st) div (1 (2nd) mech bde (2 mech inf bn, 1 mtn inf
Growth % 2.0 1.7 bn, 1 engr bn, 1 MP bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 log bn, 1 Gaula
Inflation % 7.5 4.3 anti-kidnap gp); 1 (10th) mech bde (1 armd recce bn,
Def bdgt [a] pC 28.1tr 30.0tr 32.4tr
1 mech cav bn, 1 mech inf bn, 1 mtn inf bn, 2 sy bn, 2
arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 2 Gaula anti-kidnap
US$ 9.20bn 10.0bn
gp); 2 sy bn; 1 log bn)
FMA (US) US$ 27m 38.5m 0m Light
US$1=pC 3,055.26 2,996.035 1 (2nd) div (1 (5th) lt inf bde (2 lt inf bn, 1 jungle inf bn,
[a] Includes defence and security 1 sy bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AD bn, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1
Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1 (30th) lt inf bde (1 cav recce
bn, 2 lt inf bn, 1 sy bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt spt
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus bn, 1 log bn); 1 rapid reaction force (3 mobile sy bde))
1 (3rd) div (1 (3rd) lt inf bde (2 lt inf bn, 1 mtn inf bn, 1
Male 12.4% 4.3% 4.4% 4.3% 20.8% 3.1%
COIN bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 MP bn,
Female 11.8% 4.1% 4.3% 4.2% 21.7% 4.3% 1 log bn, 1 Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1 (23rd) lt inf bde
(1 cav gp, 1 lt inf bn, 1 jungle inf bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 log
Capabilities bn); 1 (29th) mtn bde (1 mtn inf bn, 1 lt inf bn, 2 COIN
Colombia’s security and defence requirements continue bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 log bn); 2 rapid reaction force (total:
to be dominated by counter-insurgency and counter- 7 mobile sy bde))
narcotics operations. Demobilising and reintegrating 1 (4th) div (1 (7th) air mob bde (2 air mob inf bn, 1 lt
former FARC combatants remains a significant challenge. inf bn, 1 COIN bn, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 log bn, 1
The government reached a ceasefire with ELN guerrillas Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1 (22nd) jungle bde (1 air mob
in September 2017. This period of transformation will inf bn, 1 lt inf bn, 1 jungle inf bn, 1 COIN bn, 1 cbt spt
see a reduction in personnel and likely also see the bn, 1 log bn); 1 (31st) jungle bde (1 lt inf bn, 1 jungle
police transferring from the defence ministry to the inf bn))
1 (5th) div (1 (6th) lt inf bde (2 lt inf bn,1 mtn inf bn, 2 MANPATS TOW; Spike-ER
COIN bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 log bn, 1 Gaula anti-kidnap RCL 106mm 73 M40A1
gp); 1 (8th) lt inf bde (1 lt inf bn, 1 mtn inf bn, 1 arty ARTILLERY 1,796
bn, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1 TOWED 120: 105mm 107: 22 LG1 MkIII; 85 M101;
(9th) lt inf bde (1 SF bn, 2 lt inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 COIN 155mm 13 155/52 APU SBT-1
bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 sy bn, 1 log bn, 1 Gaula anti-kidnap MOR 1,676: 81mm 1,507; 120mm 169
gp); 1 (13th) lt inf bde (2 cav recce bn, 1 airmob inf AIRCRAFT
bn, 3 lt inf bn, 1 COIN bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt ELINT 3: 2 Beech B200 King Air; 1 Beech 350 King Air
spt bn, 2 MP bn, 1 log bn, 2 Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1 TPT • Light 22: 2 An-32B; 2 Beech B200 King Air; 3
rapid reaction force (3 mobile sy bde)) Beech 350 King Air; 1 Beech C90 King Air; 2 C-212 Aviocar
1 (6th) div (1 (12th) lt inf bde (2 lt inf bn, 2 jungle inf bn, (Medevac); 7 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; 1 Cessna 208B-
1 COIN bn, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 Gaula anti-kid- EX Grand Caravan; 4 Turbo Commander 695A
nap gp); 1 (13th) mobile sy bde (4 COIN bn); 1 (26th)
HELICOPTERS
jungle bde (1 lt jungle inf bn, 1 COIN bn, 1 cbt spt bn);
MRH 18: 7 Mi-17-1V Hip; 6 Mi-17MD; 5 Mi-17V-5 Hip
1 (27th) lt inf bde (2 lt inf bn, 1 jungle inf bn, 1 sy bn, 1
TPT 93: Medium 54: 47 UH-60L Black Hawk; 7 S-70i Black
arty bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 log bn))
Hawk; Light 39: 24 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 15 Bell 212
1 (7th) div (1 (4th) lt inf bde (1 (urban) spec ops bn; 1
(UH-1N Twin Huey)
cav recce bn, 3 lt inf bn, 1 sy bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr bn,
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 40mm 4 M1A1
1 MP bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 log bn); 1 (11th) lt inf bde (2 lt
inf bn, 1 sy bn, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn); 1 (14th) lt inf
bde (3 lt inf bn, 1 sy bn, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 log Navy 56,400 (incl 12,100 conscript)
bn); 1 (15th) jungle bde (1 lt inf bn, 1 COIN bn, 1 engr HQ located at Puerto Carreño
bn, 1 log bn); 1 (17th) lt inf bde (2 lt inf bn, 1 COIN bn, EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 log bn); 1 rapid reaction force SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 4:
(1 (11th) mobile sy bde (3 COIN bn))) 2 Pijao (GER T-209/1200) each with 8 single 533mm TT
1 (8th) div (1 (16th) lt inf bde (1 mech cav recce bn, 1 lt each with HWT
inf bn, 1 log bn, 1 Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1 (18th) lt inf 2 Intrepido (GER T-206A) each with 8 single 533mm TT
bde (1 air mob gp, 1 sy bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt each with HWT
spt bn, 1 log bn); 1 (28th) jungle bde (2 inf, 2 COIN, PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 4
1 cbt spt bn); 1 rapid reaction force (1 (5th) mobile sy FRIGATES • FFGHM 4 Almirante Padilla with 2 twin
bde (3 COIN bn); 1 (31st) mobile sy bde (5 COIN bn))) lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 2 twin Simbad lnchr
3 COIN mobile bde (each: 4 COIN bn, 1 cbt spt bn) with Mistral SAM, 2 triple B515 ILAS-3 324mm ASTT
Other each with A244 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Bo-105/
1 indep rapid reaction force (1 SF bde, 3 mobile sy bde) AS555SN Fennec hel)
COMBAT SUPPORT PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 59
1 cbt engr bde (1 SF engr bn, 1 (emergency response)
CORVETTES • FS 1 Narino (ex-ROK Dong Hae) with 2
engr bn, 1 EOD bn, 1 construction bn, 1 demining bn,
triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 76mm gun
1 maint bn)
PSOH 3 20 de Julio
1 int bde (2 SIGINT bn, 1 log bn, 1 maint bn)
PCO 2: 1 Valle del Cauca Durable (ex-US Reliance) with 1
hel landing platform; 1 San Andres (ex-US Balsam)
2 spt/log bde (each: 1 spt bn, 1 maint bn, 1 supply bn, 1
PCC 3 Punta Espada (CPV-46)
tpt bn, 1 medical bn, 1 log bn)
AVIATION PCR 10: 2 Arauca with 2 76mm guns; 8 Nodriza (PAF-II)
1 air aslt div (1 counter-narcotics bde (3 counter- with hel landing platform
narcotics bn, 1 spt bn); 1 (25th) avn bde (4 hel bn; 5 PB 12: 1 11 de Noviembre (CPV-40) with 1 Typhoon CIWS;
avn bn; 1 avn log bn); 1 (32nd) avn bde (1 avn bn, 2 2 Castillo y Rada (Swiftships 105); 2 Jaime Gomez; 1 José
maint bn, 1 trg bn, 1 spt bn); 1 SF avn bn) Maria Palas (Swiftships 110); 4 Point; 2 Toledo
PBR 31: 6 Diligente; 7 LPR-40; 3 Swiftships; 9 Tenerife; 2
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES PAF-L; 4 others
RECCE 121 EE-9 Cascavel AMPHIBIOUS 22
IFV 60: 28 Commando Advanced; 32 LAV III LCM 3 LCM-8
APC 114 LCU 11: 4 Golfo de Tribuga; 7 Morrosquillo (LCU 1466)
APC (T) 54: 28 M113A1 (TPM-113A1); 26 M113A2 UCAC 8 Griffon 2000TD
(TPM-113A2) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8
APC (W) 56 EE-11 Urutu ABU 1 Quindio
PPV 4 RG-31 Nyala AG 3: 1 Inirida; 2 Luneburg (ex-GER, depot ship for
AUV 38 M1117 Guardian patrol vessels)
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE AGOR 2 Providencia
MSL AGS 1 Gorgona
SP 77 Nimrod AXS 1 Gloria
Naval Aviation 150 1 sqn with Hughes 500M

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H)
AIRCRAFT 1 sqn with Bell 212
MP 3 CN235 MPA Persuader EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ISR 1 PA-31 Navajo (upgraded for ISR) AIRCRAFT 72 combat capable
TPT • Light 11: 1 C-212 (Medevac); 4 Cessna 206; 3 FGA 22: 10 Kfir C-10; 9 Kfir C-12; 3 Kfir TC-12
Cessna 208 Caravan; 1 PA-31 Navajo; 1 PA-34 Seneca; 1 ATK 12: 6 A-37B/OA-37B Dragonfly; 6 AC-47T Spooky
Beech 350 King Air (Fantasma)
HELICOPTERS ISR 13: 1 Beech C90 King Air; 1 C-26B Metroliner; 5
MRH 8: 1 AS555SN Fennec; 3 Bell 412 Twin Huey; 4 Cessna 560 Citation II; 6 SA 2-37
Bell 412EP Twin Huey ELINT 13: 4 Beech 350 King Air; 6 Cessna 208 Grand
TPT • Light 9: 1 Bell 212; 5 Bell 212 (UH-1N); 1 BK- Caravan; 2 Cessna 337G; 1 Turbo Commander 695
117; 2 Bo-105 TKR/TPT 1 KC-767
Marines 22,250 TPT 64: Medium 7: 3 C-130B Hercules (3 more in store);
3 C-130H Hercules; 1 B-737F; Light 49: 10 ATR-42; 2
FORCES BY ROLE
Beech 300 King Air; 2 Beech 350C King Air; 1 Beech 350i
SPECIAL FORCES
King Air (VIP); 4 Beech C90 King Air; 4 C-212; 6 C295M;
1 SF bde (4 SF bn)
MANOEUVRE 1 Cessna 182R; 12 Cessna 208B (medevac); 1 Cessna 550;
Amphibious 2 CN235M; 2 EMB-110P1 (C-95); 1 EMB-170-100LR; 1
1 mne bde (1 SF (Gaula) bn, 5 mne bn, 2 rvn bn, 1 spt IAI-201 Arava; PAX 8: 2 B-727; 1 B-737-400; 1 B-737BBJ;
bn) 1 EMB-600 Legacy; 1 F-28-1000 Fellowship; 1 F-28-3000
1 mne bde (1 SF bn, 2 mne bn, 2 rvn bn, 1 spt bn) Fellowship; 1 Learjet 60
1 rvn bde (1 SF bn, 1 mne bn, 2 rvn bn, 1 spt bn) TRG 78: 14 EMB-312 Tucano*; 24 EMB-314 Super Tucano
1 rvn bde (4 rvn bn) (A-29)*; 23 Lancair Synergy (T-90 Calima); 17 T-37B
1 rvn bde (3 rvn bn) HELICOPTERS
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT MRH 18: 6 AH-60L Arpia III; 8 AH-60L Arpia IV; 2 Bell
1 log bde (6 spt bn) 412EP Twin Huey (VIP); 2 Hughes 500M
1 trg bde (7 trg bn, 1 spt bn) TPT 48: Medium 13 UH-60L Black Hawk (incl 1 VIP hel);
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Light 35: 12 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 12 Bell 206B3 Jet
ARTILLERY • MOR 82: 81mm 74; 120mm 8 Ranger III; 11 Bell 212
AIR DEFENCE • SAM Point-defence Mistral TRG 30 TH-67
UNAMMED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Medium 8: 6
Air Force 13,650 Hermes 450; 2 Hermes 900
Latin America and

FORCES BY ROLE AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
the Caribbean
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK AAM • IR Python 3; IIR Python 4; Python 5; ARH Derby;
2 sqn with Kfir C-10/C-12/TC-12 I-Derby ER (reported)
GROUND ATTACK/ISR ASM Spike-ER; Spike-NLOS
1 sqn with A-37B/OA-37B Dragonfly BOMBS
1 sqn with AC-47T Laser-guided Paveway II
1 sqn with EMB-312 Tucano* INS/GPS guided Spice
2 sqn with EMB-314 Super Tucano* (A-29)
EW/ELINT Paramilitary 187,900
2 sqn with Beech 350 King Air; Cessna 208; Cessna 560;
C-26B Metroliner; SA 2-37; 1 Turbo Commander 695 National Police Force 187,900
TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 (Presidential) sqn with B-737BBJ; EMB-600 Legacy; Bell
AIRCRAFT
412EP; F-28 Fellowship; UH-60L Black Hawk
ELINT 5 C-26B Metroliner
1 sqn with B-727; B-737-400; C-130B/H Hercules; C-212;
TPT • Light 40: 3 ATR-42; 3 Beech 200 King Air; 2
C295M; CN235M; ; IAI Arava; KC-767
Beech 300 King Air; 2 Beech 1900; 1 Beech C99; 4
1 sqn with Beech C90 King Air; Beech 350C King Air;
Cessna 208B; Cessna 550; EMB-110P1 (C-95) BT-67; 2 C-26 Metroliner; 3 Cessna 152; 3 Cessna 172;
TRAINING 9 Cessna 206; 2 Cessna 208 Caravan; 2 DHC-6 Twin
1 sqn with Lancair Synergy (T-90 Calima) Otter; 1 DHC-8; 3 PA-31 Navajo
1 sqn with T-37B HELICOPTERS
1 hel sqn with Bell 206B3 MRH 3: 1 Bell 412EP; 2 MD-500D
1 hel sqn with TH-67 TPT 72: Medium 14: 5 UH-60A Black Hawk; 9 UH-60L
HELICOPTER Black Hawk; Light 58: 34 Bell 205 (UH-1H-II Huey II);
1 sqn with AH-60L Arpia III 6 Bell 206B; 5 Bell 206L/L3/L4 Long Ranger; 8 Bell 212;
1 sqn with UH-60L Black Hawk (CSAR) 5 Bell 407
Cyber (known as OPMAT) to improve cooperation between the

Colombia publicised policy guidelines for cyber Public Force, Coast Guard and Air Surveillance Unit. Some
security and cyber defence in 2011. There are three main elements, such as the Special Intervention Unit (UEI), have
organisations: the CERT team (colCERT); the Police Cyber received training from non-regional states, including the
Centre; and the armed forces’ Joint Cyber Command. US. The UEI has also conducted small-scale training with
The defence ministry is the coordinating body for regional allies. The air wing is relatively well equipped
cyber defence, and Colombia has an active training and with light aircraft. Coast Guard vessels have a relatively
simulation programme in cyber defence, with the Higher limited range, impeding operations at reach. Both the
War College also organising courses in cyber warfare for Public Force and the Coast Guard have plans to expand
military (a staff course) and civil personnel. The armed personnel numbers in the near future and the delivery of
forces are reported to be in the process of devolving cyber two ex-US Coast Guard patrol boats, expected in 2018,
capability to the tactical level. An initial cyber cell was will significantly increase the Coast Guard’s operational
formed by linking the Joint Cyber Command, the National capability.
Police Cyber Center and the MoD’s CERT team.
PARAMILITARY 9,800
DEPLOYMENT
UN • MINUSCA 2 obs Paramilitary 9,800
EGYPT
MFO 354; 1 inf bn
Special Intervention Unit
FORCES BY ROLE
LEBANON SPECIAL FORCES
UN • UNIFIL 1 1 spec ops unit
FOREIGN FORCES Public Force 9,000

11 regional directorates
United States US Southern Command: 50
Coast Guard Unit 400
Costa Rica CRI EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Costa Rican Colon C 2016 2017 2018
PB 8: 2 Cabo Blanco (US Swift 65); 1 Isla del Coco (US
GDP C 31.3tr 33.3tr Swift 105); 3 Point; 1 Primera Dama (US Swift 42); 1
US$ 58.1bn 58.9bn Puerto Quebos (US Swift 36)
per capita US$ 11,836 11,857
Air Surveillance Unit 400
Growth % 4.3 3.8
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Inflation % 0 1.7
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 17: 4 Cessna T210 Centurion;
Sy bdgt [a] C 220bn 220bn 259bn 4 Cessna U206G Stationair; 1 DHC-7 Caribou; 2 PA-31
US$ 409m 389m Navajo; 2 PA-34 Seneca; 1 Piper PA-23 Aztec; 1 Cessna
FMA (US) US$ 1.4m 1.4m 0m 182RG; 2 Y-12E
US$1=C 538.43 564.62 HELICOPTERS • MRH 3: 2 MD-500E; 1 MD-600N
[a] Paramilitary budget
Population 4,930,258 Cuba CUB

Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Cuban Peso P 2016 2017 2018
Male 11.5% 4.0% 4.3% 4.4% 22.2% 3.6% GDP P

Female 11.0% 3.8% 4.1% 4.3% 22.3% 4.2% per capita US$
Def bdgt P
Capabilities US$
Costa Rica’s armed forces were constitutionally abolished US$1=P
in 1949, and the country relies on paramilitary-type police *definitive economic data unavailable
organisations for internal-security, counter-narcotics
and counter-criminal tasks, as well as participation in
regional peacekeeping operations. More recently, Costa Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Rica has utilised these organisations to counter illegal
Male 8.5% 3.2% 3.1% 3.7% 24.4% 6.8%
immigration on its southern border with Panama. In
May 2014 the country launched a joint-services initiative Female 8.0% 2.9% 2.9% 3.4% 24.7% 8.1%
AIFV ε50 BMP-1/1P

Capabilities APC ε500 BTR-152/BTR-50/BTR-60
Cuba’s defence forces are principally focused on protecting ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
territorial integrity, with a strategy of mass mobilisation. MSL
They are hampered by an ageing and predominantly SP 2K16 Shmel (AT-1 Snapper)
Soviet-era equipment inventory and by a reliance on MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger)
continual maintenance instead of modernisation. The GUNS 600+: 57mm 600 ZIS-2 (M-1943); 85mm D-44
US has imposed new restrictions on trade and travel, ARTILLERY 1,715+
particularly directed at the armed forces’ business SP 40+: 100mm AAPMP-100; CATAP-100; 122mm 2S1
interests, which include ports, hotels and restaurants. Gvozdika; AAP-T-122; AAP-BMP-122; Jupiter III; Jupiter
Cuba maintains military ties with China and Russia, and IV; 130mm AAP-T-130; Jupiter V; 152mm 2S3 Akatsiya
the latter has stepped in to supply oil and diesel fuel to TOWED 500: 122mm D-30; M-30 (M-1938); 130mm
Cuba following the economic collapse in Venezuela. It M-46; 152mm D-1; M-1937 (ML-20)
is unlikely that Havana will be in a position to finance MRL • SP 175: 122mm BM-21 Grad; 140mm BM-14
significant equipment recapitalisation in the near term. In MOR 1,000: 82mm M-41; 82mm M-43; 120mm M-43;
tough economic conditions, desertion reportedly remains a M-38
problem for the largely conscript-based forces. AIR DEFENCE
SAM
ACTIVE 49,000 (Army 38,000 Navy 3,000 Air 8,000) Short-range 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful)
Paramilitary 26,500 Pont-defence 200+: 200 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher);
Conscript liability 3 years (or 2 if studying for a profession) 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9 Gaskin);
RESERVE 39,000 (Army 39,000) Paramilitary 9K36 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16
1,120,000 Gimlet); 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
Ready Reserves (serve 45 days per year) to fill out Active GUNS 400
and Reserve units; see also Paramilitary SP 23mm ZSU-23-4; 30mm BTR-60P SP; 57mm ZSU-
57-2
TOWED 100mm KS-19/M-1939/85mm KS-12/57mm
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE S-60/37mm M-1939/30mm M-53/23mm ZU-23
Army ε38,000 Navy ε3,000

FORCES BY ROLE Western Comd HQ at Cabanas; Eastern Comd HQ at
COMMAND Holquin
3 regional comd HQ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
3 army comd HQ PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 8
COMMAND
Latin America and

PSO 1 Rio Damuji with two single P-15M Termit (SS-N-
the Caribbean
3 SF regt 2C Styx) AShM, 2 57mm guns, 1 hel landing platform
MANOEUVRE PCM 1 Pauk II† (FSU) with 1 quad lnchr (manual
Armoured aiming) with 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 4
1 tk div (3 tk bde) single ASTT, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 76mm gun
Mechanised PBF 6 Osa II† (FSU) each with 4 single lnchr (for P-15
2 (mixed) mech bde Termit (SS-N-2B Styx) AShM – missiles removed to
Light coastal-defence units)
2 (frontier) bde MINE WARFARE AND MINE COUNTERMEASURES 5
Air Manoeuvre MHI 3 Korund (Yevgenya) (Project 1258)†
1 AB bde MSC 2 Sonya† (FSU)
AIR DEFENCE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2
1 ADA regt ABU 1
1 SAM bde AX 1
Reserves 39,000 Coastal Defence
FORCES BY ROLE ARTILLERY • TOWED 122mm M-1931/37; 130mm
MANOEUVRE M-46; 152mm M-1937
Light COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 4+: Bandera IV
14 inf bde (reported); 4 4K51 Rubezh (SSC-3 Styx)
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Naval Infantry 550+
MBT ε900 T-34/T-54/T-55/T-62 FORCES BY ROLE
LT TK PT-76 MANOEUVRE
ASLT BTR-60 100mm Amphibious
RECCE BRDM-2; 2 amph aslt bn
Anti-aircraft Defence and Revolutionary Air Civil Defence Force 50,000 reservists
Force ε8,000 (incl conscripts)
Air assets divided between Western Air Zone and Eastern Territorial Militia ε1,000,000 reservists
Air Zone
Flying hours 50 hrs/yr FOREIGN FORCES
FORCES BY ROLE  United States US Southern Command: 950 (JTF-GTMO) at
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK Guantanamo Bay
3 sqn with MiG-21ML Fishbed; MiG-23ML/MF/UM Flog-
ger; MiG-29A/UB Fulcrum
TRANSPORT
Dominican Republic DOM
1 (VIP) tpt sqn with An-24 Coke; Mi-8P Hip; Yak-40 Dominican Peso pRD 2016 2017 2018
ATTACK HELICOPTER
GDP pRD 3.30tr 356tr
2 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-35 Hind
TRAINING US$ 71.7bn 74.9bn
2 (tac trg) sqn with L-39C Albatros (basic); Z-142 (pri- per capita US$ 7,114 7,361
mary) Growth % 6.6 4.8
AIRCRAFT 45 combat capable Def bdgt pRD 21.1bn 23.5bn
FTR 33: 16 MiG-23ML Flogger; 4 MiG-23MF Flogger;
US$ 458m 496m
4 MiG-23U Flogger; 4 MiG-23UM Flogger; 2 MiG-29A
Fulcrum; 3 MiG-29UB Fulcrum (6 MiG-15UTI Midget; US$1=pRD 46.02 47.52
4+ MiG-17 Fresco; 4 MiG-23MF Flogger; 6 MiG-23ML Population 10,734,247
Flogger; 2 MiG-23UM Flogger; 2 MiG-29 Fulcrum in store)
FGA 12: 4 MiG-21ML Fishbed; 8 MiG-21U Mongol A (up Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
to 70 MiG-21bis Fishbed; 30 MiG-21F Fishbed; 28 MiG- Male 13.5% 4.7% 4.5% 4.2% 20.0% 3.5%
21PFM Fishbed; 7 MiG-21UM Fishbed; 20 MiG-23BN Female 13.1% 4.5% 4.3% 4.0% 19.2% 4.1%
Flogger in store)
ISR 1 An-30 Clank Capabilities
TPT 11: Heavy 2 Il-76 Candid; Light 9: 1 An-2 Colt; 3 An-
24 Coke; 2 An-32 Cline; 3 Yak-40 (8 An-2 Colt; 17 An-26 The principal tasks for the Dominican armed forces include
Curl in store) internal- and border-security missions, as well as disaster
TRG 45: 25 L-39 Albatros; 20 Z-326 Trener Master relief. Training and operations increasingly focus on
HELICOPTERS counter-narcotics, and include collaboration with the police
ATK 4 Mi-35 Hind (8 more in store) in an inter-agency task force. The army has strengthened
ASW (5 Mi-14 in store) its presence along the border with Haiti, establishing
MRH 8 Mi-17 Hip H (12 more in store) new surveillance posts and increasing its monitoring
TPT • Medium 2 Mi-8P Hip activities. The US continues to send training teams to the
AIR DEFENCE • SAM country under the terms of the 2015 military-partnership
Medium-range S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline); S-75 Dvina agreement. The armed forces continue regional military
mod (SA-2 Guideline – on T-55 chassis) and security cooperation, including with Colombia in the
Short-range S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa); S-125 Pechora mod Caribe VI air-force exercise. Personnel challenges continue,
(SA-3 Goa – on T-55 chassis)
however, with reports of around 1,000 troops deserting in
2015 and 2016, including several officers.
AAM • IR R-3‡ (AA-2 Atoll); R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73
(AA-11 Archer); IR/SARH R-23/24‡ (AA-7 Apex); R-27 ACTIVE 56,050 (Army 28,750 Navy 11,200 Air
(AA-10 Alamo)   16,100) Paramilitary 15,000
ASM Kh-23‡ (AS-7 Kerry)
Paramilitary 26,500 active ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

State Security 20,000 Army 28,750
Ministry of Interior 5 Defence Zones
Border Guards 6,500 FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 20 3 SF bn
PCC 2 Stenka MANOEUVRE
PB 18 Zhuk Light
4 (1st, 2nd, 3rd & 4th) inf bde (3 inf bn)
Youth Labour Army 70,000 reservists 2 (5th & 6th) inf bde (2 inf bn)
Air Manoeuvre ISR 1 AMT-200 Super Ximango

1 air cav bde (1 cdo bn, 1 (6th) mtn bn, 1 hel sqn with TPT • Light 13: 3 C-212-400 Aviocar; 1 Cessna 172; 1
Bell 205 (op by Air Force); OH-58 Kiowa; R-22; R-44 Cessna 182; 1 Cessna 206; 1 Cessna 207; 1 Commander
Raven II) 690; 3 EA-100; 1 PA-31 Navajo; 1 P2006T
Other TRG 13: 8 EMB-314 Super Tucano*; 5 T-35B Pillan
1 (Presidential Guard) gd regt HELICOPTERS
1 (MoD) sy bn ISR 9 OH-58 Kiowa (CH-136)
COMBAT SUPPORT TPT • Light 16: 8 Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II); 5 Bell 205
1 cbt spt bde (1 lt armd bn; 1 arty bn; 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn) (UH-1H Iroquois); 1 H155 (VIP); 2 S-333
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 20mm 4
LT TK 12 M41B (76mm) Paramilitary 15,000
APC • APC (W) 8 LAV-150 Commando
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE National Police 15,000
RCL 106mm 20 M40A1
GUNS 37mm 20 M3
ARTILLERY 104 Ecuador ECU
TOWED 105mm 16: 4 M101; 12 Reinosa 105/26
United States Dollar $ 2016 2017 2018
MOR 88: 81mm 60 M1; 107mm 4 M30; 120mm 24 Expal
Model L GDP US$ 97.8bn 98.6bn
ISR 8: 4 OH-58A Kiowa; 4 OH-58C Kiowa Growth % -1.5 0.2
TPT • Light 6: 4 R-22; 2 R-44 Raven II Inflation % 1.7 0.7
Def bdgt US$ 1.57bn 1.57bn
Navy 11,200
HQ located at Santo Domingo Population 16,290,913
FORCES BY ROLE
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
SPECIAL FORCES
1 (SEAL) SF unit Male 13.8% 4.7% 4.6% 4.2% 18.8% 3.5%
MANOEUVRE Female 13.3% 4.5% 4.4% 4.2% 19.9% 3.9%
Amphibious
1 mne sy unit Capabilities
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Defence policy is aimed at guaranteeing sovereignty
and territorial integrity, and allows the armed forces to
Latin America and

PCO 1 Almirante Didiez Burgos (ex-US Balsam)
the Caribbean
participate in international peacekeeping operations.
PCC 2 Tortuguero (ex-US White Sumac)
In 2015, the armed forces’ role was expanded to include
PB 14: 2 Altair (Swiftships 35m); 4 Bellatrix (US Sewart
Seacraft); 2 Canopus (Swiftships 101); 3 Hamal (Damen law-enforcement support. Border security has long been a
Stan 1505); 3 Point priority but there has been a growing emphasis on maritime
AMPHIBIOUS • LCU 1 Neyba (ex-US LCU 1675) security in recent years, although there remains little
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8 capacity for sustained power projection beyond national
AG 8 borders. An earthquake in April 2016 devastated areas on
Ecuador’s Pacific coast, and prompted a large-scale HADR
Air Force 16,100 response from Ecuador and regional states. Extra-regional
Flying hours 60 hrs/yr states including China also provided assistance. China
and Ecuador signed a defence-cooperation agreement
FORCES BY ROLE
in November 2016. Major equipment maintenance is
GROUND ATTACK
outsourced, but some low-level upgrades can be conducted
in-country. The defence ministry announced that an
SEARCH & RESCUE
integrated radar system was due to go into service in 2016,
1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II); Bell 205 (UH-1H
and that Ecuador was making progress in the field of cyber
Iroquois); Bell 430 (VIP); OH-58 Kiowa (CH-136); S-333
TRANSPORT defence. The services take part in regular exercises, both
1 sqn with C-212-400 Aviocar; PA-31 Navajo domestically and with international partners.
TRAINING ACTIVE 40,250 (Army 24,750 Navy 9,100 Air 6,400)
1 sqn with T-35B Pillan
Paramilitary 500
AIR DEFENCE
Conscript liability Voluntary conscription
1 ADA bn with 20mm guns
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE RESERVE 118,000 (Joint 118,000)
AIRCRAFT 8 combat capable Ages 18–55
MRL 122mm 24: 18 BM-21 Grad; 6 RM-70

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE MOR 412+: 81mm 400 M29; 107mm M30; 160mm 12
M-66
Army 24,750 AIRCRAFT
FORCES BY ROLE TPT • Light 14: 1 Beech 200 King Air; 2 C-212; 1 CN235;
gp are bn sized 4 Cessna 172; 2 Cessna 206; 1 Cessna 500 Citation I; 3 IAI-
COMMAND 201 Arava
4 div HQ  TRG 6: 2 MX-7-235 Star Rocket; 2 T-41D Mescalero; 2 CJ-
SPECIAL FORCES 6A
1 (9th) SF bde (3 SF gp, 1 SF sqn, 1 para bn, 1 sigs sqn, 1 HELICOPTERS
log comd) MRH 33: 7 H125M Fennec; 6 Mi-17-1V Hip; 2 SA315B
MANOEUVRE Lama; 18 SA342L Gazelle (13 with HOT for anti-armour
Mechanised role)
1 (11th) armd cav bde (3 armd cav gp, 1 mech inf bn, 1 TPT 13: Medium 7: 5 AS332B Super Puma; 2 Mi-171E;
SP arty gp, 1 engr gp) (3 SA330 Puma in store); Light 6: 2 AS350B Ecureuil; 4
1 (5th) inf bde (1 SF sqn, 2 mech cav gp, 2 inf bn, 1 cbt AS350B2 Ecureuil
engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy) AIR DEFENCE
Light SAM • Point-defence Blowpipe; 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7
1 (1st) inf bde (1 SF sqn, 1 armd cav gp, 1 armd recce Grail)‡; 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse)
sqn, 3 inf bn, 1 med coy) GUNS 240
1 (3rd) inf bde (1 SF gp, 1 mech cav gp, 1 inf bn, 1 arty SP 20mm 44 M163 Vulcan
gp, 1 hvy mor coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log TOWED 196: 14.5mm 128 ZPU-1/-2; 20mm 38: 28
coy) M-1935, 10 M167 Vulcan; 40mm 30 L/70/M1A1
1 (7th) inf bde (1 SF sqn, 1 armd recce sqn, 1 mech cav
gp, 3 inf bn, 1 jungle bn, 1 arty gp, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 Navy 9,100 (incl Naval Aviation, Marines and
sigs coy, 1 log coy, 1 med coy) Coast Guard)
1 (13th) inf bde (1 SF sqn, 1 armd recce sqn, 1 mot cav EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
gp, 3 inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 hvy mor coy, 1 cbt engr coy, SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 2:
1sigs coy, 1 log coy) 2 Shyri (GER T-209/1300) with 8 single 533mm TT each
2 (17th & 21st) jungle bde (3 jungle bn, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 with SUT HWT (1 undergoing refit in Chile)
sigs coy, 1 log coy) PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 1
1 (19th) jungle bde (3 jungle bn, 1 jungle trg bn, 1 cbt FFGHM 1 Moran Valverde† (ex-UK Leander batch II) with
engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy) 4 single lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 3 twin lnchr
COMBAT SUPPORT with Mistral SAM, 1 Phalanx CIWS, 1 twin 114mm gun
1 (27th) arty bde (1 SP arty gp, 1 MRL gp, 1 ADA gp, 1 (capacity 1 Bell 206B Jet Ranger II hel)
cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 9
1 (23rd) engr bde (3 engr bn) CORVETTES • FSGM 6 Esmeraldas (3†) with 2 triple
2 indep MP coy lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 quad Albatros lnchr
1 indep sigs coy with Aspide SAM, 2 triple B515 ILAS-3 324mm ASTT
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT with A244 LWT (removed from two vessels), 1 76mm
1 (25th) log bde gun, 1 hel landing platform (upgrade programme
2 log bn ongoing)
2 indep med coy PCFG 3 Quito (GER Lurssen TNC-45 45m) with 4 single
AVIATION lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun (upgrade
1 (15th) avn bde (2 tpt avn gp, 2 hel gp, 1 mixed avn gp) programme ongoing)
AIR DEFENCE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8
1 ADA gp AE 1 Calicuchima
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AGOS 1 Orion with 1 hel landing platform
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES AGS 1 Sirius
LT TK 24 AMX-13 AK 1 Galapagos
RECCE 67: 25 AML-90; 10 EE-3 Jararaca; 32 EE-9 Cascavel ATF 1
APC 123 AWT 2: 1 Quisquis; 1 Atahualpa
APC (T) 95: 80 AMX-VCI; 15 M113 AXS 1 Guayas
APC (W) 28: 18 EE-11 Urutu; 10 UR-416
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Naval Aviation 380
RCL 404: 90mm 380 M67; 106mm 24 M40A1 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARTILLERY 541+ AIRCRAFT
SP 155mm 5 Mk F3 MP 1 CN235-300M
TOWED 100: 105mm 78: 30 M101; 24 M2A2; 24 Model 56 ISR 3: 2 Beech 200T King Air; 1 Beech 300 Catpass King
pack howitzer; 155mm 22: 12 M114; 10 M198 Air
TPT • Light 3: 1 Beech 200 King Air; 1 Beech 300 King AIR DEFENCE
Air; 1 CN235-100 SAM • Point-defence 13+: 6 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); 7
TRG 6: 2 T-34C Turbo Mentor; 4 T-35B Pillan M48 Chaparral; Blowpipe; 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡;
HELICOPTERS 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse)
TPT • Light 9: 3 Bell 206A; 3 Bell 206B; 1 Bell 230; 2 GUNS
Bell 430 SP 20mm 28 M35
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES TOWED 64: 23mm 34 ZU-23; 35mm 30 GDF-002
ISR 5: Heavy 2 Heron; Medium 3 Searcher Mk.II (twin)
RADAR • AIR DEFENCE 2 CFTC gap fillers; 2 CETC 2D
Marines 2,150
FORCES BY ROLE Paramilitary 500
SPECIAL FORCES All police forces; 39,500
1 cdo unit
Police Air Service
MANOEUVRE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Amphibious
HELICOPTERS
5 mne bn (on garrison duties)
ISR 3 MD-530F Lifter
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TPT • Light 6: 2 AS350B Ecureuil; 1 Bell 206B Jet
ARTILLERY • MOR 32+ 60mm/81mm/120mm Ranger; 3 R-44
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence Mistral; 9K38
Igla (SA-18 Grouse) Coast Guard 500
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Air Force 6,400 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 21
PCC 4: 3 Isla Fernandina (Vigilante); 1 Isla San Cristóbal
Operational Command (Damen Stan Patrol 5009)
FORCES BY ROLE PB 14: 1 10 de Agosto; 2 Espada; 2 Manta (GER Lurssen
FIGHTER 36m); 1 Point; 4 Rio Coca; 4 Isla Santa Cruz (Damen
1 sqn with Cheetah C/D Stan 2606)
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK PBR 3: 2 Río Esmeraldas; 1 Rio Puyango
1 sqn with Kfir C-10 (CE); Kfir C-2; Kfir TC-2 DEPLOYMENT
Military Air Transport Group SUDAN
FORCES BY ROLE UN • UNAMID 1; 3 obs
Latin America and

SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER UN • UNISFA 1; 1 obs
the Caribbean
1 sqn with Bell 206B Jet Ranger II 
WESTERN SAHARA
1 sqn with PA-34 Seneca
UN • MIUNRSO 4 obs
TRANSPORT
1 sqn with C-130/H Hercules; L-100-30
1 sqn with HS-748 El Salvador SLV
1 sqn with DHC-6-300 Twin Otter
United States Dollar $ 2016 2017 2018
1 sqn with B-727; EMB-135BJ Legacy 600; Sabreliner 40
TRAINING GDP US$ 26.8bn 27.4bn
1 sqn with Cessna 206; DA20-C1; MXP-650; T-34C per capita US$ 4,227 4,303
Turbo Mentor Growth % 2.4 2.3
AIRCRAFT 42 combat capable Def bdgt US$ 146m 146m
FGA 25: 10 Cheetah C; 2 Cheetah D; 4 Kfir C-2; 7 Kfir C-10 FMA (US) US$ 2m 2m 0m
(CE); 2 Kfir TC-2
TPT 29: Medium 4: 2 C-130B Hercules; 1 C-130H Hercules; Population 6,172,011
1 L-100-30; Light 15: 1 Beech E90 King Air; 3 C295M; 1
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Cessna 206; 3 DHC-6 Twin Otter; 1 EMB-135BJ Legacy 600;
Male 13.3% 5.2% 5.0% 4.3% 17.0% 3.3%
2 EMB-170; 2 EMB-190; 1 MXP-650; 1 PA-34 Seneca; PAX
10: 2 A320; 2 B-727; 1 Gulfstream G-1159; 5 HS-748 Female 12.6% 5.0% 5.0% 4.5% 20.6% 4.2%
TRG 39: 11 DA20-C1; 17 EMB-314 Super Tucano*; 11
T-34C Turbo Mentor Capabilities
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 7 Bell 206B Jet Ranger II Principal roles for El Salvador’s armed forces include
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR Python 3; R-550 territorial defence, support to civilian authorities,
Magic; Shafrir‡; IIR Python 4; SARH Super 530 disaster relief and combating non-traditional threats.
Current challenges include boosting professionalisation – Naval Inf (SF Commandos) 90

conscription accounts for a little under half of all recruits
FORCES BY ROLE
– and tackling organised crime and narcotics trafficking.
SPECIAL FORCES
The army deploys in support of National Civil Police
1 SF coy
security operations, particularly in San Salvador. In
2016, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras signed a
memorandum of understanding to increase cooperation
Air Force 2,000
in counter-gang operations, and the three countries Flying hours 90 hrs/yr on A-37 Dragonfly
participate in a tri-national border task force. The FORCES BY ROLE
armed forces have long-standing training programmes, FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR
including with regional states and with the US. While the
1 sqn with A-37B/OA-37B Dragonfly; O-2A/B Skymaster*
Salvadorean forces are reasonably well equipped, there is
TRANSPORT
a desire to upgrade equipment, including that held by the
1 sqn with BT-67; Cessna 210 Centurion; Cessna 337G;
small (self-sustaining) contingent to the UN’s MINUSMA
Commander 114; IAI-202 Arava; SA-226T Merlin IIIB
mission in Mali.
TRAINING
ACTIVE 24,500 (Army 20,500 Navy 2,000 Air 2,000) 1 sqn with R-235GT Guerrier; T-35 Pillan; T-41D
Paramilitary 17,000 Mescalero; TH-300
Conscript liability 12 months (selective); 11 months for TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
officers and NCOs 1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); Bell 407; Bell
RESERVE 9,900 (Joint 9,900) 412EP Twin Huey; MD-500E; UH-1M Iroquois
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ATK 14 A-37B Dragonfly
ISR 11: 6 O-2A/B Skymaster*; 5 OA-37B Dragonfly*
Army 20,500
TPT • Light 10: 2 BT-67; 2 Cessna 210 Centurion; 1
FORCES BY ROLE
Cessna 337G Skymaster; 1 Commander 114; 3 IAI-201
SPECIAL FORCES
Arava; 1 SA-226T Merlin IIIB
1 spec ops gp (1 SF coy, 1 para bn, 1 (naval inf) coy)
MANOEUVRE TRG 11: 5 R-235GT Guerrier; 5 T-35 Pillan; 1 T-41D
Reconnaissance Mescalero
1 armd cav regt (2 armd cav bn) HELICOPTERS
Light MRH 14: 4 Bell 412EP Twin Huey; 8 MD-500E; 2 UH-1M
6 inf bde (3 inf bn) Iroquois
Other TPT• Light 9: 8 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 1 Bell 407
1 (special) sy bde (2 border gd bn, 2 MP bn) (VIP tpt, govt owned)
COMBAT SUPPORT TRG 5 TH-300
1 arty bde (2 fd arty bn, 1 AD bn) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR Shafrir‡
1 engr comd (2 engr bn)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Paramilitary 17,000
RECCE 5 AML-90 (4 more in store) National Civilian Police 17,000
APC • APC (W) 38: 30 VAL Cashuat (mod); 8 UR-416 Ministry of Public Security
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE AIRCRAFT
RCL 399: 106mm 20 M40A1 (incl 16 SP); 90mm 379 ISR 1 O-2A Skymaster
M67 TPT • Light 1 Cessna 310
ARTILLERY 217+ HELICOPTERS
TOWED 105mm 54: 36 M102; 18 M-56 (FRY) MRH 2 MD-520N
MOR 163+: 81mm 151 M29; 120mm 12+: 12 UBM 52; TPT • Light 3: 1 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 2 R-44
(some M-74 in store) Raven II
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 35: 20mm 31 M-55; 4 TCM-20
Navy 2,000 DEPLOYMENT

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LEBANON
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10 UN • UNIFIL 52; 1 inf pl
PB 10: 3 Camcraft (30m); 1 Point; 1 Swiftships 77; 1
Swiftships 65; 4 Type-44 (ex-USCG) MALI
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCM 4 UN • MINUSMA 104; 1 hel sqn
SOUTH SUDAN
WESTERN SAHARA Army 15,550
UN • MINURSO 3 obs 15 Military Zones
FORCES BY ROLE
FOREIGN FORCES SPECIAL FORCES
United States US Southern Command: 1 Forward 1 SF bde (1 SF bn, 1 trg bn)
Operating Location (Military, DEA, USCG and Customs 1 SF bde (1 SF coy, 1 ranger bn)
personnel) 1 SF mtn bde
MANOEUVRE
Light
Guatemala GUA 1 (strategic reserve) mech bde (1 inf bn, 1 cav regt, 1 log
coy)
Guatemalan Quetzal q 2016 2017 2018
GDP q 523bn 559bn Air Manoeuvre
US$ 67.5bn 70.8bn 1 AB bde with (2 AB bn)
per capita US$ 4,070 4,185 Amphibious
Growth % 3.1 3.2 1 mne bde
Other
Inflation % 4.4 4.4
1 (Presidential) gd bde (1 gd bn, 1 MP bn, 1 CSS coy)
Def bdgt q 2.19bn 1.91bn 2.25bn COMBAT SUPPORT
US$ 283m 242m 1 engr comd (1 engr bn, 1 construction bn)
FMA (US) US$ 2m 2m 0m 2 MP bde with (1 MP bn)
US$1=q 7.74 7.89
Reserves
Population 15,460,732 FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Age 0–14 15 –19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Light
Male 17.6% 5.5% 5.3% 4.5% 14.2% 2.1% ε19 inf bn
Female 16.9% 5.4% 5.3% 4.6% 15.9% 2.4% EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Capabilities RECCE (7 M8 in store)
The primary task of Guatemala’s armed forces is territorial APC 47
Latin America and

APC (T) 10 M113 (5 more in store)
the Caribbean
defence, though they retain limited capability to participate
in international operations and disaster-relief tasks. By the APC (W) 37: 30 Armadillo; 7 V-100 Commando
beginning of 2018 the army plans to draw back from internal- ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
security tasks, handing responsibility for operations against RCL 120+: 75mm M20; 105mm 64 M-1974 FMK-1
organised crime back to the National Civil Police. This (ARG); 106mm 56 M40A1
ARTILLERY 149
move is intended to allow the armed forces to devote more
TOWED 105mm 76: 12 M101; 8 M102; 56 M-56
resources to border security, as part of a wider interagency
MOR 73: 81mm 55 M1; 107mm (12 M30 in store);
effort called Plan Fortaleza. As part of this endeavour,
120mm 18 ECIA
Guatemala already maintains a tri-national border task
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 32: 20mm 16
force with neighbouring El Salvador and Honduras.
GAI-D01; 16 M-55
The army has recently trained with US SOUTHCOM
and regional partners, including Brazil, Colombia and
Navy 1,500
the Dominican Republic. Equipment recapitalisation
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
is expected to be a focus of the 2018 budget, after a long
hiatus, and requirements include aerial-surveillance radars
PB 10: 6 Cutlass; 1 Dauntless; 1 Kukulkan (US Broadsword
and coastal-patrol craft to monitor littoral waters, light
32m); 2 Utatlan (US Sewart)
armoured vehicles and light attack/training aircraft.
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCP 2 Machete
ACTIVE 18,050 (Army 15,550 Navy 1,500 Air 1,000) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AXS 3
Paramilitary 25,000
Marines 650 reservists
RESERVE 63,850 (Navy 650 Air 900 Armed Forces FORCES BY ROLE
62,300) MANOEUVRE
(National Armed Forces are combined; the army provides Amphibious
log spt for navy and air force) 2 mne bn(-)
Air Force 1,000

2 air comd
Guyana GUY
FORCES BY ROLE Guyanese Dollar G$ 2016 2017 2018
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR GDP G$ 710bn 755bn
1 sqn with A-37B Dragonfly US$ 3.44bn 3.59bn
1 sqn with PC-7 Turbo Trainer*
TRANSPORT
Growth % 3.3 3.5
1 sqn with BT-67; Beech 90/100/200/300 King Air; IAI-201
Arava Inflation % 0.8 2.3
1 (tactical support) sqn with Cessna 206; PA-31 Navajo Def bdgt G$ 10.6bn 11.8bn
TRAINING US$ 51m 56m
1 sqn with Cessna R172K Hawk XP; T-35B Pillan US$1=G$ 206.48 210.27
Population 737,718
1 sqn with Bell 206 Jet Ranger; Bell 212 (armed); Bell 412
Twin Huey (armed); UH-1H Iroquois Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Serviceability of ac is less than 50% Female 12.8% 5.5% 4.9% 3.8% 18.7% 3.6%
ATK 2 A-37B Dragonfly Capabilities
TPT • Light 27: 5 Beech 90 King Air; 1 Beech 100 King
Air; 2 Beech 200 King Air; 2 Beech 300 King Air; 4 BT-67; The Guyana Defence Force (GDF) has minimal military
2 Cessna 206; 1 Cessna 208B; 5 Cessna R172K Hawk XP; 4 capability and its activities are limited to border control
IAI-201 Arava; 1 PA-31 Navajo and support for law-enforcement operations. It also as-
TRG 11: 7 PC-7 Turbo Trainer*; 4 T-35B Pillan sists the civilian authorities and contributes to economic
development. Guyana has close ties with Brazil, with
HELICOPTERS
whom it cooperates on safeguarding the security of the
MRH 2 Bell 412 Twin Huey (armed)
shared border via the annual military regional exchange
TPT • Light 17: 2 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 8 Bell 206 Jet
meeting. The country also has bilateral agreements with
Ranger; 7 Bell 212 (armed)
France and China, who provide military training and
Tactical Security Group equipment. Guyana is also part of the Caribbean Basin
Air Military Police Security Initiative. The defence ministry plans to make
increasing use of reservists in order to bolster the GDF
Paramilitary 25,000 and increase its ability to patrol Guyana’s territory.
The GDF took part in the US-led Tradewinds exercise in
National Civil Police 25,000 2017 and Integración 2017 in Chile, which drew together
FORCES BY ROLE a number of regional armed forces in a HADR exercise
SPECIAL FORCES scenario.
1 SF bn ACTIVE 3,400 (Army 3,000 Navy 200 Air 200)
MANOEUVRE Active numbers combined Guyana Defence Force
Other
1 (integrated task force) paramilitary unit (incl mil RESERVE 670 (Army 500 Navy 170)
and treasury police)
DEPLOYMENT
Army 3,000
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO 1 SF coy
UN • MONUSCO 152; 1 obs; 1 SF coy MANOUEVRE
Light
LEBANON 1 inf bn
UN • UNIFIL 2 Other
SOUTH SUDAN 1 (Presidential) gd bn
UN • UNMISS 4; 3 obs COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty coy
SUDAN 1 (spt wpn) cbt spt coy
UN • UNISFA 1; 2 obs 1 engr coy
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ACTIVE 150 (Army 150) Paramilitary 50

RECCE 9: 6 EE-9 Cascavel (reported); 3 S52 Shorland
ARTILLERY 54 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
TOWED 130mm 6 M-46†
MOR 48: 81mm 12 L16A1; 82mm 18 M-43; 120mm 18 Army 150
M-43
Paramilitary 50
Navy 200
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Coast Guard ε50
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PCO 1 Essequibo (ex-UK River) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 8: 5
PB 4 Barracuda (ex-US Type-44) Dauntless; 3 3812-VCF
Air Force 200

FORCES BY ROLE
Honduras HND
TRANSPORT Honduran Lempira L 2016 2017 2018
1 unit with Bell 206; Cessna 206; Y-12 (II)
GDP L 491bn 541bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US$ 21.4bn 22.7bn
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2: 1 Cessna 206; 1 Y-12 (II)
MRH 1 Bell 412 Twin Huey† Growth % 3.6 4.0
TPT • Light 2 Bell 206 Inflation % 2.7 4.0
Def bdgt [a] L 6.78bn 6.28bn
Haiti HTI US$ 295m 263m
Haitian Gourde G 2016 2017 2018
US$1=L 23.00 23.86
GDP G 484bn 548bn
[a] Defence and national-security budget
US$ 8.23bn 8.36bn
per capita US$ 759 761 Population 9,038,741
Growth % 1.4 1.0 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Inflation % 13.4 14.7 Male 16.8% 5.5% 5.1% 4.6% 16.3% 1.8%
Def bdgt G 420m 435m
Latin America and

Female 16.1% 5.3% 4.9% 4.4% 16.3% 2.4%
the Caribbean
US$ 7m 7m
FMA (US) US$ 1.2m 1.2m 0m Capabilities
US$1=G 58.84 65.54
Honduras retains a broad range of capabilities, but in
Population 10,646,714 many cases equipment is old, with serviceability in doubt.
An agreement signed with Israel in late 2016 is expected
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
to modernise the ageing air-force inventory, and supply
Male 16.3% 5.4% 5.2% 4.5% 16.1% 1.8%
new equipment for the Public Order Military Police
Female 16.4% 5.4% 5.2% 4.5% 16.6% 2.3% (PMOP) and a new offshore patrol vessel for the navy. In
2011, the armed forces began to deploy in a paramilitary
Capabilities role, in conjunction with the police, to combat organised
The embryonic army is focused on providing an crime and narcotics trafficking. The PMOP, the primary
engineering capability for disaster-relief tasks. Plans force involved in this role, completed the raising of two
for military expansion were outlined in the 2015 White additional battalions in 2017. The Honduran Navy is
Paper on Security and Defence. A road map for the re- also active in counter-narcotics activities and operates
establishment of the Haitian armed forces was distributed in coordination with Colombia on Operation Swordfish,
to ministers in early 2017. It is not clear, however, whether
among other multilateral security initiatives. The navy’s
the current modest budgetary provision for the new armed
small marine contingent added a second battalion in 2017,
forces will be sufficient to fund the level of capability
required. The military component of the UN MINUSTAH and has plans for a third. In 2016, El Salvador, Guatemala
mission completed its departure in October 2017. Although and Honduras signed a memorandum of understanding
a new UN police mission (MINUJUSTH) remains, the to increase cooperation in counter-gang operations, and
MINUSTAH withdrawal, combined with the nascent the three countries participate in a tri-national border task
nature of the Haitian armed forces, has raised concerns of a force. Honduras has also now established a similar task
security vacuum within the country. force with its southern neighbour, Nicaragua.
ACTIVE 14,950 (Army 7,300 Navy 1,350 Air 2,300 Air Force 2,300
Military Police 4,000) Paramilitary 8,000 FORCES BY ROLE
RESERVE 60,000 (Joint 60,000; Ex-servicemen FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
1 sqn with A-37B Dragonfly
registered)
GROUND ATTACK/ISR/TRAINING
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 1 unit with Cessna 182 Skylane; EMB-312 Tucano; MXT-
7-180 Star Rocket
Army 7,300 TRANSPORT
FORCES BY ROLE 1 sqn with Beech 200 King Air; C-130A Hercules; Cessna
SPECIAL FORCES 185/210; IAI-201 Arava; PA-42 Cheyenne; Turbo
1 (special tac) spec ops gp (2 spec ops bn, 1 inf bn; 1 AB Commander 690
bn; 1 arty bn) 1 VIP flt with PA-31 Navajo; Bell 412EP/SP Twin Huey
MANOUEVRE TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Mechanised 1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); Bell 412SP Twin
1 inf bde (1 mech cav regt, 1 inf bn, 1 arty bn)
Huey
Light
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 arty bn)
3 inf bde (2 inf bn) AIRCRAFT 17 combat capable
1 indep inf bn FTR 11: 9 F-5E Tiger II†; 2 F-5F Tiger II†
Other ATK 6 A-37B Dragonfly
1 (Presidential) gd coy TPT 17: Medium 1 C-130A Hercules; Light 16: 1 Beech
COMBAT SUPPORT 200 King Air; 2 Cessna 172 Skyhawk; 2 Cessna 182
1 engr bn Skylane; 1 Cessna 185; 2 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; 2
1 sigs bn Cessna 210; 1 EMB-135 Legacy 600; 1 IAI-201 Arava; 1
AIR DEFENCE L-410 (leased); 1 PA-31 Navajo; 1 PA-42 Cheyenne; 1 Turbo
1 ADA bn Commander 690
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TRG 16: 9 EMB-312 Tucano; 7 MXT-7-180 Star Rocket
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES HELICOPTERS
LT TK 12 FV101 Scorpion MRH 8: 1 Bell 412EP Twin Huey (VIP); 5 Bell 412SP Twin
RECCE 57: 1 FV105 Sultan (CP); 3 FV107 Scimitar; 40 Huey; 2 Hughes 500
FV601 Saladin; 13 RBY-1 TPT • Light 7: 6 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 1 H125
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Ecureuil
RCL 170: 84mm 120 Carl Gustav; 106mm 50 M40A1 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR Shafrir‡
ARTILLERY 118+
TOWED 28: 105mm: 24 M102; 155mm: 4 M198 Military Police 4,000
MOR 90+: 81mm; 120mm 60 FMK-2; 160mm 30 M-66 FORCES BY ROLE
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 20mm 48: 24 M-55A2; 24 TCM-20 MANOUEVRE
Other
Navy 1,350 8 sy bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 17 Paramilitary 8,000
PB 17: 2 Lempira (Damen Stan Patrol 4207 – leased); 1
Chamelecon (Swiftships 85); 1 Tegucilgalpa (US Guardian Public Security Forces 8,000
32m); 4 Guanaja (ex-US Type-44); 3 Guaymuras (Swiftships Ministry of Public Security and Defence; 11 regional
105); 5 Nacaome (Swiftships 65); 1 Rio Coco (US PB Mk III) comd
LCU 2: 1 Gracias a Dios (COL Golfo de Tribuga); 1 Punta
DEPLOYMENT
Caxinas
LCM 2 LCM 8 WESTERN SAHARA
Marines 1,000
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
FOREIGN FORCES
Amphibious United States US Southern Command: 380; 1 avn bn with
2 mne bn CH-47F Chinook; UH-60 Black Hawk
Reserves
Jamaica JAM FORCES BY ROLE
Jamaican Dollar J$ 2016 2017 2018 MANOEUVRE
Light
GDP J$ 1.75tr 1.86tr
1 inf bn
US$ 14.0bn 14.3bn
per capita US$ 4,934 5,024 Coast Guard 300
Growth % 1.3 1.7 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Inflation % 2.3 3.4 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10
Def bdgt J$ 17.5bn 15.6bn PBF 3
US$ 139m 120m PB 7: 2 County (Damen Stan Patrol 4207); 4 Dauntless; 1
Paul Bogle (US 31m)
US$1=J$ 125.58 130.247
Population 2,990,561 Air Wing 250

Plus National Reserve
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
FORCES BY ROLE
Male 13.8% 5.1% 5.3% 4.8% 16.8% 3.6%
MARITIME PATROL/TRANSPORT
Female 13.3% 5.0% 5.3% 4.9% 17.4% 4.4% 1 flt with BN-2A Defender; Cessna 210M Centurion
Capabilities 1 flt with Bell 407
The Jamaican Defence Force is focused principally on 1 flt with Bell 412EP
its maritime-security and internal-security capability, TRAINING
including support to police operations. Although Jamaica 1 unit with Bell 206B3; DA40-180FP Diamond Star
maintains relatively small military forces, these benefit EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
from training with larger armed services, including those AIRCRAFT
of Canada, the UK and the US. The Coast Guard and Air TPT • Light 4: 1 BN-2A Defender; 1 Cessna 210M
Wing have received additional funding in the 2017 budget Centurion; 2 DA40-180FP Diamond Star
to improve airborne-surveillance and coastal-patrol HELICOPTERS
capabilities. As part of a fleet-modernisation programme, MRH 2 Bell 412EP
two new Damen 4207 patrol vessels were acquired in TPT • Light 5: 2 Bell 206B3 Jet Ranger; 3 Bell 407
early 2017 to replace the three older 4207 boats in service.
Increased funding will also allow for the procurement of a
maritime-patrol aircraft. The armed forces plan to recruit
Mexico MEX
Latin America and

250 personnel per year in 2017 and 2018 in order to support Mexican Peso NP 2016 2017 2018
the Caribbean
a planned new battalion-sized deployment in western GDP NP 19.5tr 21.8tr
Jamaica.
US$ 1.05tr 1.14tr
ACTIVE 3,950 (Army 3,400 Coast Guard 300 Air 250) per capita US$ 8,562 9,249
(combined Jamaican Defence Force) Growth % 2.3 2.1
RESERVE 980 (Army 900 Coast Guard 60 Air 20) Inflation % 2.8 5.9
Def bdgt [a] NP 91.8bn 86.4bn 102bn
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE US$ 4.92bn 4.53bn
Army 3,400 US$1=NP 18.66 19.08
FORCES BY ROLE [a] National-security expenditure
MANOUEVRE
Mechanised Population 124,574,795
1 (PMV) lt mech inf coy
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Light
2 inf bn Male 13.7% 4.5% 4.4% 4.2% 19.0% 3.2%
COMBAT SUPPORT Female 13.1% 4.3% 4.3% 4.2% 21.0% 3.9%
1 engr regt (4 engr sqn)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT Capabilities
1 spt bn (1 MP coy, 1 med coy, 1 log coy, 1 tpt coy) Mexico has the most capable armed forces in Central
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE America. They are tasked with defending state sovereignty
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES and territorial integrity, internal security and extending aid
AUV 12 Bushmaster to civilian authorities. Operations against drug cartels and
ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 12 L16A1 other organised crime remain the army’s primary activity,
and the Military Police Corps has been significantly IFV 390 DNC-1 (mod AMX-VCI)
expanded in recent years to allow it to take on a wider APC 309
role as part of this tasking. The navy retains well-equipped APC (T) 73: 40 HWK-11; 33 M5A1 half-track
frigates, but the majority of its forces are dedicated to APC (W) 236: 95 BDX; 16 DN-4; 2 DN-6; 28 LAV-100
maritime security, though there are plans to reorganise the (Pantera); 26 LAV-150 ST; 25 MOWAG Roland; 44 VCR
navy into coastal and blue-water forces. Both the air force (3 amb; 5 cmd post)
and naval aviation have devoted substantial resources to ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
the recapitalisation of their light attack-, surveillance- and ARV 7: 3 M32 Recovery Sherman; 4 VCR ARV
training-aircraft fleets, and their transport helicopters, ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
principally sourced from the US. The retirement of the MSL • SP 8 VBL with Milan
air force’s remaining F-5 fighter aircraft in late 2016 has, RCL • 106mm 1,187+ M40A1 (incl some SP)
however, left the country without any airborne air-defence GUNS 37mm 30 M3
capability. ARTILLERY 1,390
TOWED 123: 105mm 123: 40 M101; 40 M-56; 16 M2A1, 14
M3; 13 NORINCO M90
MOR 1,267: 81mm 1,100: 400 M1; 400 Brandt; 300 SB
RESERVE 81,500 (National Military Service) 120mm 167: 75 Brandt; 60 M-65; 32 RT-61
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 80: 12.7mm 40 M55;
20mm 40 GAI-B01
Navy 60,300
Space Two Fleet Commands: Gulf (6 zones), Pacific (11 zones)
SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS 2 Mexsat PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 5
FRIGATES 5
Army 208,350 FFGHM 3 Allende (ex-US Knox) with 1 octuple Mk16
12 regions (total: 46 army zones) lnchr with ASROC/RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 1
FORCES BY ROLE Mk25 GMLS with RIM-7 Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 twin
SPECIAL FORCES Mk32 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 127mm gun
1 (1st) SF bde (5 SF bn) (capacity 1 MD-902 hel)
1 (2nd) SF bde (7 SF bn) FF 2 Bravo (ex-US Bronstein) with 1 octuple Mk112
1 (3rd) SF bde (4 SF bn) lnchr with ASROC†, 2 triple Mk32 324mm ASTT with
MANOEUVRE Mk46 LWT, 1 twin 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
Reconnaissance PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 125
3 (2nd, 3rd & 4th Armd) mech bde (2 armd recce bn, 2 lt PSOH 5:
mech bn, 1 arty bn, 1 (Canon) AT gp) 4 Oaxaca with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 AS565MB
25 mot recce regt Panther hel)
Light 1 Oaxaca (mod) with 1 57mm gun (capacity 1 AS565MB
1 (1st) inf corps (1 (1st Armd) mech bde (2 armd recce Panther hel)
bn, 2 lt mech bn, 1 arty bn, 1 (Canon) AT gp), 3 (2nd, PCOH 16:
3rd & 6th) inf bde (each: 3 inf bn, 1 arty regt, 1 (Can- 4 Durango with 1 57mm gun (capacity 1 Bo-105 hel)
on) AT gp), 1 cbt engr bde (3 engr bn)) 4 Holzinger (capacity 1 MD-902 Explorer)
3 (1st, 4th & 5th) indep lt inf bde (2 lt inf bn, 1 (Canon) 3 Sierra with 1 57mm gun (capacity 1 MD-902 Explorer)
AT gp) 5 Uribe (ESP Halcon) (capacity 1 Bo-105 hel)
92 indep inf bn PCO 10 Leandro Valle (US Auk MSF) with 1 76mm gun
25 indep inf coy PCG 2 Huracan (ISR Aliya) with 4 single lnchr with
Air Manoeuvre Gabriel II AShM, 1 Phalanx CIWS
1 para bde with (1 (GAFE) SF gp, 3 bn, 1 (Canon) AT gp) PCC 2 Democrata
Other PBF 73: 6 Acuario; 2 Acuario B; 48 Polaris (SWE CB90); 17
1 (Presidential) gd corps (1 SF gp, 1 mech inf bde (2 inf Polaris II (SWE IC 16M)
bn, 1 aslt bn), 1 mne bn (Navy), 1 cbt engr bn, 1 MP PB 17: 3 Azteca; 3 Cabo (US Cape Higgon); 2 Punta (US
bde (3 bn, 1 special ops anti-riot coy)) Point); 9 Tenochtitlan (Damen Stan Patrol 4207)
COMBAT SUPPORT AMPHIBIOUS • LS • LST 4: 2 Monte Azules with 1 hel
1 indep arty regt landing platform; 2 Papaloapan (US Newport) with 4
7 MP bde (3 MP bn) 76mm guns, 1 hel landing platform
2 MP bde (forming) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 23
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AG 2
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES AGOR 3: 2 Altair (ex-US Robert D. Conrad); 1 Humboldt
RECCE 255: 19 DN-5 Toro; 127 ERC-90F1 Lynx (7 trg); 40 AGS 8: 4 Arrecife; 1 Onjuku; 1 Rio Hondo; 1 Rio Tuxpan; 1
M8; 37 MAC-1; 32 VBL Moctezuma II (also used as AXS)
AK 2: 1 Tarasco; 1 Rio Suchiate EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AP 1 Isla Maria Madre (Damen Fast Crew Supplier 5009) ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
ATF 4 Otomi with 1 76mm gun APC • APC (W) 29: 3 BTR-60 (APC-60); 26 BTR-70
AX 2 Huasteco (also serve as troop transport, supply and (APC-70)
hospital ships)  ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
AXS 1 Cuauhtemoc with 2 65mm saluting guns RCL 106mm M40A1
ARTILLERY 22+
Naval Aviation 1,250 TOWED 105mm 16 M-56
FORCES BY ROLE MRL 122mm 6 Firos-25
MARITIME PATROL MOR 81mm some
5 sqn with Cessna 404 Titan; MX-7 Star Rocket; Lancair AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence 9K38 Igla (SA-
IV-P; T-6C+ Texan II 18 Grouse)
1 sqn with Beech 350ER King Air; C-212PM Aviocar;
CN235-300 MPA Persuader Air Force 8,500
1 sqn with L-90 Redigo FORCES BY ROLE
TRANSPORT GROUND ATTACK/ISR
1 sqn with An-32B Cline 4 sqn with T-6C+ Texan II
1 (VIP) sqn with DHC-8 Dash 8; Learjet 24; Turbo 1 sqn with PC-7/PC-9M
Commander 1000 ISR/AEW
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 sqn with Beech 350ER King Air; EMB-145AEW Erieye;
2 sqn with AS555 Fennec; AS565MB/AS565MBe EMB-145RS; SA-2-37B; SA-227-BC Metro III (C-26B)
Panther; MD-902 TRANSPORT
2 sqn with Bo-105 CBS-5 1 sqn with C295M; PC-6B
5 sqn with Mi-17-1V/V-5 Hip 1 sqn with B-737; Beech 90
TRAINING 1 sqn with C-27J Spartan; C-130E/K-30 Hercules; L-100-30
1 sqn with Z-242L 5 (liaison) sqn with Cessna 182/206
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 (anti-narcotic spraying) sqn with Bell 206; Cessna
AIRCRAFT 3 combat capable T206H;
MP 6 CN235-300 MPA Persuader 1 (Presidential) gp with AS332L Super Puma; AW109SP;
ISR 2 C-212PM Aviocar B-737; B-757; B-787; Gulfstream 150/450/550; H225;
TPT 29: Light 27: 5 Beech 350ER King Air (4 used for Learjet 35A; Learjet 36; Turbo Commander 680
ISR); 4 C295M; 2 C295W; 1 Cessna 404 Titan; 1 DHC-8 1 (VIP) gp with B-737; Beech 200 King Air; Beech 350i
Dash 8; 6 Lancair IV-P; 3 Learjet 24; 5 Turbo Commander King Air; Cessna 501/680 Citation; CL-605 Challenger;
1000; PAX 2: 1 CL-605 Challenger; 1 Gulfstream 550 Gulfstream 550; Learjet 35A; Learjet 45; S-70A-24
Latin America and

TRG 47: 3 L-90TP Redigo*; 4 MX-7 Star Rocket; 13 T-6C+ TRAINING
the Caribbean
Texan II; 27 Z-242L 1 sqn with Cessna 182
HELICOPTERS 1 sqn with PC-7; T-6C+ Texan II
MRH 29: 2 AS555 Fennec; 4 MD-500E; 19 Mi-17-1V Hip; 1 sqn with Beech F33C Bonanza; Grob G120TP; SF-
4 Mi-17V-5 Hip 260EU
SAR 10: 4 AS565MB Panther; 6 AS565MBe Panther TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
TPT 39: Heavy 3 H225M Caracal; Medium 9 UH-60M 4 sqn with Bell 206B; Bell 212; Bell 407GX
Black Hawk; Light 27: 1 AW109SP; 11 Bo-105 CBS-5; 5 1 sqn with MD-530MF/MG
MD-902 (SAR role); 10 S-333 1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip
TRG 4 Schweizer 300C 1 sqn with H225M Caracal; Bell 412EP Twin Huey;
S-70A-24 Black Hawk
Marines 21,500 (Expanding to 26,560) 1 sqn with UH-60M Black Hawk
FORCES BY ROLE ISR UAV
SPECIAL FORCES 1 unit with Hermes 450; S4 Ehécatl
3 SF unit EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MANOEUVRE AIRCRAFT 57 combat capable
Light ISR 8: 2 Cessna 501 Citation; 2 SA-2-37A; 4 SA-227-BC
32 inf bn(-) Metro III (C-26B)
Air Manoeuvre ELINT 8: 6 Beech 350ER King Air; 2 EMB-145RS
1 AB bn AEW&C 1 EMB-145AEW Erieye
Amphibious TPT 112: Medium 9: 4 C-27J Spartan; 2 C-130E Hercules;
2 amph bde (4 inf bn, 1 amph bn, 1 arty gp) 2 C-130K-30 Hercules; 1 L-100-30; Light 90: 2 Beech 90
Other King Air; 1 Beech 200 King Air; 1 Beech 350i King Air; 6
1 (Presidential) gd bn (included in army above) C295M; 59 Cessna 182; 3 Cessna 206; 8 Cessna T206H;
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 Cessna 501 Citation; 1 Cessna 680 Citation; 2 Learjet
2 spt bn 35A; 1 Learjet 36; 1 Learjet 45XP; 3 PC-6B; 1 Turbo
Commander 680; PAX 13: 6 B-737; 1 B-757; 1 B-787; 1 CL- reported that a Center for Cyber Security and Cyber Defense
605 Challenger; 2 Gulfstream 150; 1 Gulfstream 450; 1 Control would be created within naval intelligence.
Gulfstream 550
TRG 145: 4 Beech F33C Bonanza; 25 Grob G120TP; 20 DEPLOYMENT
PC-7* (30 more possibly in store); 1 PC-9M*; 4 PT-17; 25
SF-260EU; 36 T-6C+ Texan II* CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
HELICOPTERS UN • MINUSCA 1
MRH 44: 15 Bell 407GXP; 11 Bell 412EP Twin Huey; 18
Mi-17 Hip H WESTERN SAHARA
ISR 13: 4 MD-530MF; 9 MD-530MG UN • MINURSO 4 obs
TPT 125: Heavy 11 H225M Caracal; Medium 31: 3 AS332L
Super Puma (VIP); 2 H225 (VIP); 2 Mi-8T Hip; 6 S-70A-24 Nicaragua NIC
Black Hawk; 18 UH-60M Black Hawk Light 83: 5 AW109SP;
Nicaraguan Gold Cordoba
45 Bell 206; 13 Bell 206B Jet Ranger II; 7 Bell 206L; 13 Bell Co
2016 2017 2018
212 GDP Co 379bn 411bn
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR 8: Medium 3
US$ 13.2bn 13.7bn
Hermes 450; Light 5 S4 Ehécatl
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR AIM-9J per capita US$ 2,151 2,201
Sidewinder Growth % 4.7 4.5
Inflation % 3.5 4.0
Paramilitary 62,900 Def bdgt Co 2.08bn 2.51bn 2.58bn
US$ 73m 84m
Federal Police 41,000 (Incl 5,000
Gendarmerie) US$1=Co 28.62 30.05
Public Security Secretariat Population 6,025,951
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
TPT 13: Light 7: 2 CN235M; 2 Cessna 182 Skylane; 1 Male 13.9% 5.2% 5.5% 4.7% 17.1% 2.3%
Cessna 500 Citation; 2 Turbo Commander 695; PAX 6: 4 Female 13.7% 5.1% 5.5% 4.9% 19.4% 2.9%
B-727; 1 Falcon 20; 1 Gulfstream II
HELICOPTERS Capabilities
MRH 3 Mi-17 Hip H
Nicaragua’s armed forces provide assistance to border-
TPT 27: Medium 13: 1 SA330J Puma; 6 UH-60L Black
and internal-security operations, with a central reserve
Hawk; 6 UH-60M Black Hawk; Light 14: 2 AS350B
based around a single mechanised brigade, although there
Ecureuil; 1 AS355 Ecureuil II; 6 Bell 206B; 5 H120 Colibri
is increasing focus on disaster-relief, coastal-security and
counter-narcotics activities. Most equipment is of Cold
ISR 12: Medium 2 Hermes 900; Light 10 S4 Ehécatl
War-era vintage and the government has approached
Federal Ministerial Police 4,500 Russia for equipment support and recapitalisation, which
has led to the supply of refurbished main battle tanks
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
and armoured personnel carriers. Despite speculation,
HELICOPTERS however, there do not currently appear to be any definite
TPT • Light 25: 18 Bell 205 (UH-1H); 7 Bell 212 procurement plans for broader assets such as fixed- and
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES rotary-wing aircraft and coastal-patrol vessels suitable for
ISR • Heavy 2 Dominator XP the border- and maritime-security roles. Nicaragua has
training relationships with both Russia and the US, as well
Rural Defense Militia 17,400 as with neighbouring and regional states, including Cuba
FORCES BY ROLE and Venezuela.
MANOEUVRE
Light ACTIVE 12,000 (Army 10,000 Navy 800 Air 1,200)
13 inf unit
13 (horsed) cav unit ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Cyber Army ε10,000
It was announced that two Cyberspace Operations centres FORCES BY ROLE
would be created by 2018, one for the army and one for SPECIAL FORCES
the navy, to address and better coordinate defence work 1 SF bde (2 SF bn)
on cyber security and in cyberspace. Key documentation MANOEUVRE
includes the 2013–18 National Defence Sector Programme, Mechanised
the 2013–18 National Development Programme and the 1 mech inf bde (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn, 1 mech inf bn,
2014–18 National Security Programme. In 2013 it was 1 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 AT coy)
Light TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 regional comd (3 lt inf bn) 1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H (armed)
1 regional comd (2 lt inf bn; 1 arty bn) AIR DEFENCE
3 regional comd (2 lt inf bn) 1 gp with ZU-23
2 indep lt inf bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Other
AIRCRAFT
1 comd regt (1 inf bn, 1 sy bn, 1 int unit, 1 sigs bn)
1 (ecological) sy bn TPT • Light 9: 3 An-26 Curl; 1 Beech 90 King Air; 1
COMBAT SUPPORT Cessna 172; 1 Cessna U206; 1 Cessna 404 Titan (VIP); 2
1 engr bn PA-28 Cherokee
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT TRG 2 PA-18 Super Cub
1 med bn HELICOPTERS
1 tpt regt MRH 7 Mi-17 Hip H (armed)†
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TPT • Medium 2 Mi-171E
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 23mm 18 ZU-23
MBT 82: 62 T-55 (65 more in store); 20 T-72B1 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASM 9M17 Skorpion (AT-
LT TK (10 PT-76 in store) 2 Swatter)
RECCE 20 BRDM-2
IFV 17+ BMP-1
APC • APC (W) 90+: 41 BTR-152 (61 more in store); 45 Panama PAN
BTR-60 (15 more in store); 4+ BTR-70M
Panamanian Balboa B 2016 2017 2018
AEV T-54/T-55 GDP B 55.2bn 59.1bn
VLB TMM-3 US$ 55.2bn 59.1bn
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE per capita US$ 13,670 14,409
MSL Growth % 4.9 5.3
SP 12 9P133 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger)
Inflation % 0.7 1.6
MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger)
RCL 82mm B-10 Def bdgt [a] B 751m 746m
GUNS 281: 57mm 174 ZIS-2; (90 more in store); 76mm 83 US$ 751m 746m
ZIS-3; 100mm 24 M-1944 FMA (US) US$ 2m 2m 0m
ARTILLERY 766 US$1=B 1.00 1.00
TOWED 12: 122mm 12 D-30; (152mm 30 D-20 in store)
[a] Public-security expenditure
MRL 151: 107mm 33 Type-63: 122mm 118: 18 BM-21
Grad; 100 Grad 1P (BM-21P) (single-tube rocket launcher, Population 3,753,142
Latin America and

the Caribbean
man portable)
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
MOR 603: 82mm 579; 120mm 24 M-43; (160mm 4 M-160
in store) Male 13.5% 4.4% 4.2% 4.0% 20.3% 3.8%
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence 9K36 Strela-3 (SA- Female 12.9% 4.2% 4.1% 3.8% 20.0% 4.5%
14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet); 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-
7 Grail)‡ Capabilities
Navy ε800 Panama’s armed forces were abolished in 1990; however,
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE a border service, police force and an air/maritime
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 8: 3 organisation were retained for low-level security activities.
Dabur; 4 Rodman 101, 1 Zhuk Disaster relief, internal security and combating narcotics
trafficking and other transnational organised crime are
Marines key priorities. The border service is principally deployed
FORCES BY ROLE along the country’s southern border, and has trained with
MANOEUVRE both Colombian and US personnel. Colombia and Panama
Amphibious reached an agreement to activate a number of new border
1 mne bn posts in early 2018 to strengthen mutual control of crossing
points. After a clash between the border service and Costa
Air Force 1,200 Rican police, Panama has also resumed mutual training
FORCES BY ROLE and security operations with its northern neighbour. In
TRANSPORT 2017, the National Aeronaval Service received equipment
1 sqn with An-26 Curl; Beech 90 King Air; Cessna U206; donations from the US to bolster its maritime-surveillance
Cessna 404 Titan (VIP) capabilities, including two small interceptor boats.
TRAINING
1 unit with Cessna 172; PA-18 Super Cub; PA-28 Cherokee Paramilitary 22,050
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Paraguay PRY

Paramilitary 22,050 Paraguayan Guarani Pg 2016 2017 2018
GDP Pg 156tr 167tr
National Border Service 3,600 US$ 27.4bn 28.8bn
SPECIAL FORCES
Growth % 4.1 3.9
1 SF gp
Other Def bdgt Pg 1.52tr 1.53tr 1.78tr
1 sy bde (5 sy bn(-)) US$ 268m 264m
1 indep sy bn US$1=Pg 5,670.44 5,797.70
National Police Force 16,150 Population 6,943,739
No hvy mil eqpt, small arms only
FORCES BY ROLE Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
SPECIAL FORCES Male 12.5% 4.6% 5.1% 4.6% 19.9% 3.3%
1 SF unit Female 12.1% 4.5% 5.0% 4.6% 19.7% 3.7%
MANOEUVRE
Other Capabilities
1 (presidential) gd bn(-)
The armed forces are small by regional standards and the
National Aeronaval Service ε2,300 equipment inventory for all services is ageing and largely
FORCES BY ROLE obsolete. They have been mainly involved in internal-
TRANSPORT security operations and humanitarian peacekeeping
1 sqn with C-212M Aviocar; Cessna 210; PA-31 Navajo; missions. The country faces growing internal challenges
PA-34 Seneca from insurgency and transnational organised crime, chiefly
1 (Presidential) flt with ERJ-135BJ; S-76C drug trafficking. Although landlocked, Paraguay supports
TRAINING a small force of river-patrol craft, reflecting the importance
1 unit with Cessna 152; Cessna 172; T-35D Pillan of its riverine systems, and the navy has also contributed
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER a small force – alongside army personnel and troops from
1 sqn with AW139; Bell 205; Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); the air force’s airborne formation – to the National Anti-
Bell 212; Bell 407; Bell 412EP; H145; MD-500E Drug Secretariat’s Joint Special Forces Battalion, a unit
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE organised for counter-narcotics missions. The US has
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 17 trained Paraguayan troops since 2001 as part of the State
PCO 1 Independencia (ex-US Balsam) Partnership Program, and continued to send instructors in
PCC 2 Saettia 2017, but Paraguayan hopes for greater cooperation with
PB 14: 1 Cocle; 1 Chiriqui (ex-US PB MkIV); 2 Panquiaco the US remained unfulfilled. Paraguay has had a consistent
(UK Vosper 31.5m); 5 3 De Noviembre (ex-US Point), 1 if limited tradition of contributing to UN peacekeeping
Taboga; 4 Type-200 operations since 2001.
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCU 1 General ACTIVE 10,650 (Army 7,600 Navy 1,950 Air 1,100)
Estaban Huertas
Paramilitary 14,800
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AG 2
AIRCRAFT
TPT • Light 10: 3 C-212M Aviocar; 1 Cessna 152, 1 RESERVE 164,500 (Joint 164,500)
Cessna 172; 1 Cessna 210; 1 ERJ-135BJ; 1 PA-31 Navajo;
2 PA-34 Seneca
TRG 6 T-35D Pillan
HELICOPTERS
MRH 8: 6 AW139; 1 Bell 412EP; 1 MD-500E Army 6,100; 1,500 conscript (total 7,600)
TPT • Light 21: 2 Bell 205; 13 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); Much of the Paraguayan army is maintained in a cadre
2 Bell 212; 2 Bell 407; 1 H145; 1 S-76C state during peacetime; the nominal inf and cav divs are
effectively only at coy strength. Active gp/regt are usually
coy sized
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Light
3 inf corps (total: 6 inf div(-), 3 cav div(-), 6 arty bty)
Other
1 (Presidential) gd regt (1 SF bn, 1 inf bn, 1 sy bn, 1 log gp)
COMBAT SUPPORT Centurion; Cessna 402B; PA-32R Saratoga (EMB-721C

1 arty bde with (2 arty gp, 1 ADA gp) Sertanejo); PZL-104 Wilga 80
1 engr bde with (1 engr regt, 3 construction regt) TRAINING
1 sigs bn 1 sqn with T-25 Universal; T-35A/B Pillan
Reserves 1 gp with AS350 Ecureuil (HB350 Esquilo); Bell 205 (UH-
FORCES BY ROLE 1H Iroquois)
MANOEUVRE MANOEUVRE
Light Air Manoeuvre
14 inf regt (cadre) 1 AB bde
4 cav regt (cadre)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 6 combat capable
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES TPT • Light 18: 1 Beech 58 Baron; 4 C-212-200 Aviocar;
MBT 3 M4A3 Sherman 1 C-212-400 Aviocar; 2 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; 1
RECCE 28 EE-9 Cascavel Cessna 210 Centurion; 1 Cessna 310; 2 Cessna 402B; 2
APC • APC (W) 12 EE-11 Urutu Cessna U206 Stationair; 1 DHC-6 Twin Otter; 1 PA-32R
ARTILLERY 99 Saratoga (EMB-721C Sertanejo); 2 PZL-104 Wilga 80
TOWED 105mm 19 M101 TRG 21: 6 EMB-312 Tucano*; 6 T-25 Universal; 6 T-35A
MOR 81mm 80
Pillan; 3 T-35B Pillan
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 22:
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 9: 3 AS350 Ecureuil (HB350
SP 20mm 3 M9 half track
Esquilo); 5 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 1 Bell 427 (VIP)
TOWED 19: 40mm 13 M1A1, 6 L/60
Navy 1,100; 850 conscript (total 1,950) Paramilitary 14,800

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Special Police Service 10,800; 4,000 conscript
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 22 (total 14,800)
PCR 3: 1 Itaipú; 1 Nanawa†; 1 Paraguay† with 2 twin
120mm gun, 3 76mm gun
PBR 19: 1 Capitan Cabral; 2 Capitan Ortiz (ROC Hai Ou);
DEPLOYMENT
2 Novatec; 6 Type-701; 3 Croq 15; 5 others CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCVP 3 UN • MINUSCA 2; 1 obs
Naval Aviation 100 CYPRUS
FORCES BY ROLE UN • UNFICYP 14
TRANSPORT
Latin America and

the Caribbean
1 (liaison) sqn with Cessna 150; Cessna 210 Centurion;
Cessna 310; Cessna 401 UN • MONUSCO 14 obs
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER SOUTH SUDAN
1 sqn with AS350 Ecureuil (HB350 Esquilo) UN • UNMISS 2 obs
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 6: 2 Cessna 150; 1 Cessna 210
Centurion; 2 Cessna 310; 1 Cessna 401 Peru PER
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 2 AS350 Ecureuil (HB350
Peruvian Nuevo Sol NS 2016 2017 2018
Esquilo)
GDP NS 659bn 708bn
Marines 700; 200 conscript (total 900) US$ 195bn 210bn
MANOEUVRE Growth % 4.0 2.7
Amphibious
Inflation % 3.6 3.2
3 mne bn(-)
ARTILLERY • TOWED 105mm 2 M101 Def bdgt NS 7.51bn 7.06bn 7.51bn
US$ 2.22bn 2.10bn
Air Force 900; 200 conscript (total 1,100) FMA (US) US$ 1m 1m 0m
FORCES BY ROLE US$1=NS 3.38 3.37
GROUND ATTACK/ISR
1 sqn with EMB-312 Tucano*
TRANSPORT Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
1 gp with C-212-200/400 Aviocar; DHC-6 Twin Otter
Male 13.4% 4.5% 4.7% 4.3% 18.8% 3.5%
1 VIP gp with Beech 58 Baron; Bell 427; Cessna U206
Stationair; Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; Cessna 210 Female 12.9% 4.4% 4.7% 4.1% 20.5% 3.9%
Light
Capabilities 2 (2nd & 31st) mot inf bde (3 mot inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 MP
The armed forces remain primarily orientated towards coy, 1 log bn)
internal-security tasks, undertaking operations against 3 (1st, 7th & 32nd) inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 MP coy, 1 cbt spt bn)
guerrillas and narcotics traffickers, as well as tackling 1 (4th) mtn bde (1 armd regt, 3 mot inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1
other challenges, such as illegal mining. As part of the fight MP coy, 1 cbt spt bn)
against drug trafficking, the defence ministry is planning 1 (5th) mtn bde (1 armd regt, 2 mot inf bn, 3 jungle coy,
to improve military bases in the VRAEM region, which 1 arty gp, 1 MP coy, 1 cbt spt bn)
encompasses the Apurimac, Ene and Mantaro rivers and is 1 (5th) jungle inf bde (1 SF gp, 3 jungle bn, 3 jungle coy,
associated with coca production. The SIVAN monitoring- 1 jungle arty gp, 1 AT coy, 1 AD gp, 1 jungle engr bn)
and-surveillance system, intended to cover Peru’s Amazon 1 (6th) jungle inf bde (4 jungle bn, 1 engr bn, 1 MP coy,
border regions, received government approval in late 2014; 1 cbt spt bn)
Peru’s Earth-observation satellite (PERÚSAT-1) success- Other
fully launched in September 2016. Some modernisation of 1 (18th) armd trg bde (1 mech cav regt, 1 armd regt, 2 tk
conventional equipment has been possible in recent years, bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 engr bn, 1 MP coy, 1 cbt spt bn)
but a substantial proportion of the inventories of all three COMBAT SUPPORT
services remain unmodernised. No replacement has been 1 (1st) arty bde (4 arty gp, 2 AD gp, 1 sigs gp)
selected so far for the army’s ageing T-55 main battle tanks 1 (3rd) arty bde (4 arty gp, 1 AD gp, 1 sigs gp)
and armoured fighting vehicles, although a number of plat- 1 (22nd) engr bde (3 engr bn, 1 demining coy)
forms were being assessed in late 2016. A naval-moderni- AVIATION
sation programme is under way, including the construc- 1 (1st) avn bde (1 atk hel/recce hel bn, 1 avn bn, 2 aslt
tion of landing-platform-dock vessels. Peru is looking to hel/tpt hel bn)
improve its maintenance capabilities. A new army-aviation AIR DEFENCE
maintenance facility is scheduled to be fully operational by 1 AD gp (regional troops)
March 2018; a helicopter-maintenance centre was due to be
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
operational from October 2017. In cooperation with Korean
Aerospace Industries, Peru manufactures the KT-1 turbo-
MBT 165 T-55; (75† in store)
prop aircraft at its Las Palmas facility; South Korea is also
LT TK 96 AMX-13
interested in marketing its FA-50 combat aircraft to Peru.
RECCE 95: 30 BRDM-2; 15 Fiat 6616; 50 M9A1
The armed forces continue to train regularly, and partici-
APC 295
pate in multinational exercises and UN deployments.
APC (T) 120 M113A1
ACTIVE 81,000 (Army 47,500 Navy 24,000 Air 9,500) APC (W) 175: 150 UR-416; 25 Fiat 6614
Paramilitary 77,000 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
ARV M578
RESERVE 188,000 (Army 188,000) ANTI-TANK-ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE SP 22 M1165A2 HMMWV with 9K135 Kornet E (AT-14
Spriggan)
Space MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); HJ-73C;
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 9K135 Kornet E (AT-14 Spriggan); Spike-ER
SATELLITES • ISR PERÚSAT-1 RCL 106mm M40A1
ARTILLERY 1,011
Army 47,500 SP 155mm 12 M109A2
4 mil region TOWED 290: 105mm 152: 44 M101; 24 M2A1; 60 M-56;
FORCES BY ROLE 24 Model 56 pack howitzer; 122mm; 36 D-30; 130mm 36
SPECIAL FORCES M-46; 155mm 66: 36 M114, 30 Model 50
1 (1st) SF bde (4 cdo bn, 1 airmob arty gp, 1 MP Coy, 1 MRL 122mm 35: 22 BM-21 Grad; 13 Type-90B
cbt spt bn) MOR 674+: 81mm/107mm 350; SP 107mm 24 M106A1;
1 (3rd) SF bde (3 cdo bn, 1 airmob arty gp, 1 MP coy) 120mm 300+ Brandt/Expal Model L
1 SF gp (regional troops) AIRCRAFT
MANOEUVRE TPT • Light 16: 2 An-28 Cash; 3 An-32B Cline; 1 Beech
Armoured 350 King Air; 1 Beech 1900D; 4 Cessna 152; 1 Cessna 208
1 (3rd) armd bde (2 tk bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 AT Caravan I; 2 Cessna U206 Stationair; 1 PA-31T Cheyenne II;
coy, 1 AD gp, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn) 1 PA-34 Seneca
1 (9th) armd bde (2 tk bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty gp, 1 TRG 4 IL-103
ADA gp) HELICOPTERS
Mechanised MRH 7 Mi-17 Hip H
1 (3rd) armd cav bde (3 mech cav bn, 1 mot inf bn, 1 TPT 36: Heavy (3 Mi-26T Halo in store); Medium 23 Mi-
arty gp, 1 AD gp, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn) 171Sh; Light 13: 2 AW109K2; 9 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite; 2 R-44
1 (1st) cav bde (4 mech cav bn, 1 MP coy, 1 cbt spt bn) TRG 5 F-28F
AIR DEFENCE Naval Aviation ε800

SAM • Point-defence 9K36 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin);
FORCES BY ROLE
9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet); 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
MARITIME PATROL
GUNS 165
1 sqn with Beech 200T; Bell 212 ASW (AB-212 ASW);
SP 23mm 35 ZSU-23-4
F-27 Friendship; Fokker 60; SH-3D Sea King
TOWED 23mm 130: 80 ZU-23-2; 50 ZU-23
TRANSPORT
1 flt with An-32B Cline; Cessna 206; Fokker 50
Navy 24,000 (incl 1,000 Coast Guard) TRAINING
Commands: Pacific, Lake Titicaca, Amazon River 1 sqn with F-28F; T-34C Turbo Mentor
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 6: 1 (liaison) sqn with Bell 206B Jet Ranger II; Mi-8 Hip
4 Angamos (GER T-209/1200) with 8 single 533mm TT EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
with AEG SST-4 HWT AIRCRAFT
2 Islay (GER T-209/1100) with 8 single 533mm TT with MP 8: 4 Beech 200T; 4 Fokker 60
AEG SUT-264 HWT ELINT 1 F-27 Friendship
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 7 TPT • Light 6: 3 An-32B Cline; 1 Cessna 206; 2 Fokker 50
FRIGATES 7 TRG 5 T-34C Turbo Mentor
FFGHM 6: HELICOPTERS
3 Aguirre (ex-ITA Lupo) with 8 single lnchr with Otomat ASW 5: 2 Bell 212 ASW (AB-212 ASW); 3 SH-3D Sea King
Mk2 AShM, 1 octuple Mk29 lnchr with RIM-7P Sea MRH 3 Bell 412SP
Sparrow SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with A244 LWT, TPT 11: Medium 8: 2 Mi-8 Hip; 6 UH-3H Sea King;
1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212)/SH-3D Light 3 Bell 206B Jet Ranger II
Sea King) TRG 5 F-28F
3 Carvajal (mod ITA Lupo) with 8 single lnchr with MSL • AShM AM39 Exocet
Otomat Mk2 AShM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr with
Aspide SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with A244 LWT, Marines 4,000
1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212)/SH-3D FORCES BY ROLE
Sea King) SPECIAL FORCES
FFHM 1:
3 cdo gp
1 Aguirre (ex-ITA Lupo) with 1 octuple Mk29 lnchr with
MANOEUVRE
RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with
Light
A244 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-
2 inf bn
212)/SH-3D Sea King) (is being fit with MM40 Exocet
1 inf gp
Block 3)
Amphibious
Latin America and

1 mne bde (1 SF gp, 1 recce bn, 2 inf bn, 1 amph bn, 1
the Caribbean
CORVETTES • FSG 6 Velarde (FRA PR-72 64m) with 4
arty gp)
single lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun
Jungle
PCR 6:
1 jungle inf bn
2 Amazonas with 1 76mm gun
2 Manuel Clavero EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
2 Marañon with 2 76mm guns ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
AMPHIBIOUS APC • APC (W) 47+: 32 LAV II; V-100 Commando; 15
LANDING SHIPS • LST 2 Paita (capacity 395 troops) V-200 Chaimite
(US Terrebonne Parish) ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
LANDING CRAFT • UCAC 7 Griffon 2000TD (capacity RCL 84mm Carl Gustav; 106mm M40A1
22 troops) ARTILLERY 18+
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 25 TOWED 122mm D-30
AG 4 Rio Napo MOR 18+: 81mm some; 120mm ε18
AGOR 1 Humboldt AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 20mm SP (twin)
AGORH 1 Carrasco
AGS 5: 1 Carrasco (ex-NLD Dokkum); 2 Van Straelen; 1 La Air Force 9,500
Macha, 1 Stiglich (river survey vessel for the upper Amazon) Divided into five regions – North, Lima, South, Central and
AH 4 (river hospital craft) Amazon
AO 2 Noguera FORCES BY ROLE
AOR 1 Mollendo FIGHTER
AORH 1 Tacna (ex-NLD Amsterdam) 1 sqn with MiG-29S/SE Fulcrum C; MiG-29UB Fulcrum B
AOT 2 Bayovar FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
ATF 1 1 sqn with Mirage 2000E/ED (2000P/DP)
AWT 1 Caloyeras 2 sqn with A-37B Dragonfly
AXS 2: 1 Marte; 1 Union 1 sqn with Su-25A Frogfoot A†; Su-25UB Frogfoot B†
ISR General Police 43,000

1 (photo-survey) sqn with Learjet 36A; SA-227-BC Metro
III (C-26B) Security Police 21,000
TRANSPORT
1 sqn with B-737; An-32 Cline Technical Police 13,000
1 sqn with DHC-6 Twin Otter; DHC-6-400 Twin Otter;
PC-6 Turbo Porter Coast Guard 1,000
1 sqn with L-100-20 Personnel included as part of Navy
TRAINING EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
2 (drug interdiction) sqn with EMB-312 Tucano PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 38
1 sqn with MB-339A* PSOH 1 Carvajal (mod ITA Lupo) with 1 127mm gun
1 sqn with Z-242 (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212)/SH-3D Sea King)
1 hel sqn with Schweizer 300C PCC 8: 1 Ferré (ex-ROK Po Hang) with 1 76mm gun; 2
ATTACK HELICOPTER Río Cañete (ROK Tae Geuk); 5 Rio Nepena
1 sqn with Mi-25/Mi-35P Hind
PB 10: 6 Chicama (US Dauntless); 1 Río Chira; 3 Río
Santa
1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H
PBR 19: 1 Río Viru; 8 Parachique; 10 Zorritos
1 sqn with Bell 206 Jet Ranger; Bell 212 (AB-212); Bell 412
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AH 1 Puno
Twin Huey
1 sqn with Bo-105C/LS AIRCRAFT
AIR DEFENCE TPT • Light 3: 1 DHC-6 Twin Otter; 2 F-27 Friendship
6 bn with S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa)
Rondas Campesinas
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Peasant self-defence force. Perhaps 7,000 rondas ‘gp’, up
to pl strength, some with small arms. Deployed mainly
FTR 20: 9 MiG-29S Fulcrum C; 3 MiG-29SE Fulcrum C; 6
MiG-29SMP Fulcrum; 2 MiG-29UBM Fulcrum B in emergency zone
FGA 12: 2 Mirage 2000ED (2000DP); 10 Mirage 2000E
(2000P) (some†) DEPLOYMENT
ATK 36: 18 A-37B Dragonfly; 10 Su-25A Frogfoot A†; 8 Su-
25UB Frogfoot B† CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
ISR 6: 2 Learjet 36A; 4 SA-227-BC Metro III (C-26B) UN • MINUSCA 209; 5 obs; 1 engr coy
TPT 36: Medium 5: 3 C-27J Spartan; 2 L-100-20; Light 27:
4 An-32 Cline; 7 Cessna 172 Skyhawk; 3 DHC-6 Twin Otter;
12 DHC-6-400 Twin Otter; 1 PC-6 Turbo-Porter; PAX 4 B-737 UN • MONUSCO 1; 11 obs
TRG 68: 19 EMB-312 Tucano; 20 KT-1P; 10 MB-339A*; 6 SOUTH SUDAN
T-41A/D Mescalero; 13 Z-242 UN • UNMISS 1; 2 obs
HELICOPTERS
ATK 18: 16 Mi-25 Hind D; 2 Mi-35P Hind E SUDAN
MRH 20: 2 Bell 412 Twin Huey; 18 Mi-17 Hip H UN • UNAMID 1; 1 obs
TPT 28: Medium 7 Mi-171Sh; Light 21: 8 Bell 206 Jet UN • UNISFA 2 obs
Ranger; 6 Bell 212 (AB-212); 1 Bo-105C; 6 Bo-105LS
TRG 4 Schweizer 300C
AIR DEFENCE • SAM Suriname SUR
Short-range S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa)
Suriname Dollar srd 2016 2017 2018
Point-defence Javelin
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES GDP srd 22.6bn 27.5bn
AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡; R-60 (AA-8 Aphid)‡; R-73 US$ 3.63bn 3.67bn
(AA-11 Archer); R-550 Magic; IR/SARH R-27 (AA-10 per capita US$ 6,430 6,416
Alamo); ARH R-77 (AA-12 Adder)
Growth % -10.5 -1.2
ASM AS-30; Kh-29L (AS-14A Kedge)
ARM Kh-58 (AS-11 Kilter)
Def exp srd n.k. n.k.
Paramilitary 77,000 US$ n.k. n.k.
US$1=srd 6.23 7.51
National Police 77,000 (100,000 reported)
Population 591,919
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
APC (W) 120: 20 BMR-600; 100 MOWAG Roland
Male 12.9% 4.7% 4.2% 4.2% 22.1% 2.6%
HELICOPTERS
Female 12.1% 4.5% 4.0% 4.0% 21.6% 3.4%
MRH 1 Mi-17 Hip H
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Capabilities PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 3: 1
The armed forces are principally intended to assure OCEA FPB 98; 2 OCEA FPB 72 MkII
sovereignty and territorial integrity, but in practice their
main activities are related to border security and tackling Trinidad and Tobago TTO
transnational criminal and terrorist activity. They have
Trinidad and Tobago
no ability to project power beyond the country’s borders. Dollar TT$
2016 2017 2018
Suriname has bilateral agreements with the US and other GDP TT$ 141bn 139bn
regional and extra-regional states regarding maritime
US$ 21.1bn 20.3bn
counter-narcotics activities. Ties with larger countries,
particularly Brazil, China and India, have been crucial per capita US$ 15,459 14,784
to the supply of more costly equipment, including a Growth % -5.4 -3.2
limited number of armoured vehicles and helicopters, Inflation % 3.1 3.2
as well as training activity. Training is also delivered Def bdgt TT$ 4.04bn 4.09bn 6.24bn
through participation in multinational exercises such as
US$ 605m 596m
the Tradewinds series, in which Suriname participated in
2017. Suriname is also part of the US-led Caribbean Basin US$1=TT$ 6.67 6.87
Security Initiative. Population 1,218,208
ACTIVE 1,840 (Army 1,400 Navy 240 Air 200) Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Paramilitary 100 Male 9.8% 3.1% 3.1% 3.8% 26.2% 4.6%
(All services form part of the army)
Female 9.5% 2.8% 2.8% 3.5% 24.6% 6.0%
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Capabilities

The Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force (TTDF) focuses
Army 1,400
on border protection and maritime security, as well as
FORCES BY ROLE counter-narcotics tasks. A larger role in law-enforcement
MANOEUVRE support is planned for the army. A new national-security
Mechanised
policy for 2018–23 has been prepared for submission to the
1 mech cav sqn
National Security Council. TTDF personnel and vessels
Light
were deployed to Dominica in late 2017 to assist in disaster-
1 inf bn (4 coy)
relief efforts in the aftermath of Hurricane Maria, including
COMBAT SUPPORT
two coastguard vessels ordered from Damen in 2015. The
1 MP bn (coy)
majority of these have now been delivered, bolstering
Latin America and

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE maritime-security capacity. Trinidad and Tobago was one
the Caribbean
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES of the first Caribbean states to publish a cyber strategy, in
RECCE 6 EE-9 Cascavel 2012, which noted potential defence vulnerabilities arising
APC • APC (W) 15 EE-11 Urutu from compromised critical national infrastructure.
RCL 106mm M40A1 ACTIVE 4,050 (Army 3,000 Coast Guard 1,050)
ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 6 (All services form the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force)
Navy ε240 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10  PB 5: 3
Army ε3,000
Rodman 101†; 2 others
PBR 5 Rodman 55 FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
Air Force ε200 1 SF unit
MANOEUVRE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Light
2 inf bn
TPT • Light 2: 1 BN-2 Defender*; 1 Cessna 182
COMBAT SUPPORT
TRG 1 PC-7 Turbo Trainer*
1 engr bn
HELICOPTERS • MRH 3 SA316B Alouette III (Chetak)
1 log bn
Paramilitary ε100
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Coast Guard ε100 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Formed in November 2013; 3 Coast Guard stations to be RCL 84mm ε24 Carl Gustav
formed; HQ at Paramaribo ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 6 L16A1
Coast Guard 1,050 participate in multinational exercises and deployments,

notably on UN missions.
FORCES BY ROLE
COMMAND ACTIVE 24,650 (Army 16,250 Navy 5,400 Air 3,000)
1 mne HQ Paramilitary 800
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PCO 1 Nelson II (ex-PRC)
PCC 6: 2 Point Lisas (Damen Fast Crew Supplier 5009); 4
Speyside (Damen Stan Patrol 5009)
Army 16,250
Uruguayan units are substandard size, mostly around
PB 19: 2 Gasper Grande; 1 Matelot; 4 Plymouth; 4 Point; 6
30%. Div are at most bde size, while bn are of reinforced
Scarlet Ibis (Austal 30m); 2 Wasp; (1 Cascadura (SWE
coy strength. Regts are also coy size, some bn size, with the
Karlskrona 40m) non-operational)
largest formation being the 2nd armd cav regt
Air Wing 50 FORCES BY ROLE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE COMMAND
AIRCRAFT 4 mil region/div HQ
TPT • Light 2 SA-227 Metro III (C-26) MANOEUVRE
HELICOPTERS Mechanised
MRH 2 AW139 2 armd regt
TPT • Light 1 S-76 1 armd cav regt
5 mech cav regt
8 mech inf regt
Uruguay URY Light
1 mot inf bn
Uruguayan Peso pU 2016 2017 2018
5 inf bn
GDP pU 1.58tr 1.73tr Air Manoeuvre
US$ 52.4bn 60.3bn 1 para bn
Growth % 1.5 3.5 1 (strategic reserve) arty regt
5 fd arty gp
Inflation % 9.6 6.1
1 (1st) engr bde (2 engr bn)
Def bdgt pU 14.8bn 14.8bn 14.8bn
4 cbt engr bn
US$ 489m 513m AIR DEFENCE
US$1=pU 30.16 28.78 1 AD gp
Population 3,360,148 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus MBT 15 Tiran-5
Male 10.3% 3.9% 4.0% 3.8% 20.6% 5.7% LT TK 38: 16 M24 Chaffee; 22 M41A1UR
Female 9.9% 3.8% 3.9% 3.7% 21.7% 8.5% RECCE 15 EE-9 Cascavel
IFV 18 BMP-1
Capabilities APC 376
APC (T) 27: 24 M113A1UR; 3 MT-LB
While the principal tasks for the armed forces are assuring APC (W) 349: 54 Condor; 48 GAZ-39371 Vodnik; 53 OT-
sovereignty and territorial integrity, troops have in recent 64; 47 OT-93; 147 Piranha
years deployed on peacekeeping missions, most notably in ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Haiti, as well as on domestic disaster-relief missions. Much AEV MT-LB
of the equipment inventory is second-hand, which increases ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
the maintenance burden, and there is little capacity for MSL • MANPATS Milan
independent power projection. Much maintenance work is RCL 69: 106mm 69 M40A1
outsourced to foreign companies, such as Chile’s ENAER. ARTILLERY 185
The air force is focused on the counter-insurgency role, SP 122mm 6 2S1 Gvozdika
but ambitions to purchase a light fighter aircraft remain TOWED 44: 105mm 36: 28 M101A1; 8 M102; 155mm 8
hampered by funding problems. In March 2017, Uruguay M114A1
retired all its ageing Pucara attack aircraft, resulting in even MOR 135: 81mm 91: 35 M1, 56 Expal Model LN; 120mm
more limited combat power. While the acquisition of air- 44 Model SL
defence radars may have improved the military’s ability UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Light 1
to monitor domestic airspace, the lack of interdiction Charrua
capability will continue to limit the capacity to respond AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 14: 20mm 14: 6 M167
to contingencies. The armed forces train regularly and Vulcan; 8 TCM-20 (w/Elta M-2106 radar)
Navy 5,400 (incl 1,800 Prefectura Naval Coast TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

Guard) 1 sqn with AS365 Dauphin; Bell 205 (UH–1H Iroquois);
HQ at Montevideo Bell 212
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 2 AIRCRAFT 13 combat capable
FF 2 Uruguay (PRT Joao Belo) with 2 triple Mk32 324mm ATK 12 A-37B Dragonfly
ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 2 100mm gun ISR 1 EMB-110 Bandeirante*
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 15 TPT 23: Medium 2 C-130B Hercules; Light 21: 2 Beech 58
PB 15: 2 Colonia (US Cape); 1 Paysandu; 9 Type-44 (coast Baron (UB-58); 6 C-212 Aviocar; 9 Cessna 206H; 1 Cessna
guard); 3 PS (coast guard) 210; 2 EMB-110C Bandeirante; 1 EMB-120 Brasilia
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 3 TRG 21: 5 PC-7U Turbo Trainer; 12 SF-260EU; 4 T-41D
MSO 3 Temerario (Kondor II)
Mescalero
AMPHIBIOUS 3: 2 LCVP; 1 LCM
HELICOPTERS
MRH 2 AS365N2 Dauphin II
ABU 2
AG 2: 1 Artigas (GER Freiburg, general spt ship with TPT • Light 9: 5 Bell 205 (UH–1H Iroquois); 4 Bell 212
replenishment capabilities); 1 Maldonado (also used as
patrol craft) Paramilitary 800
AGS 2: 1 Helgoland; 1 Trieste
ARS 1 Vanguardia Guardia de Coraceros 350 (under Interior
AXS 2: 1 Capitan Miranda; 1 Bonanza Ministry)
Naval Aviation 210 Guardia de Granaderos 450
FORCES BY ROLE
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE DEPLOYMENT
1 flt with Beech 200T*; Jetstream Mk2
SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
1 sqn with AS350B2 Ecureuil (Esquilo); Bo-105M UN • MINUSCA 1
TRANSPORT/TRAINING
1 flt with T-34C Turbo Mentor
UN • MONUSCO 1,165; 12 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 mne coy(-); 1
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 2 combat capable engr coy; 1 hel flt
MP 2 Jetstream Mk2 EGYPT
ISR 2 Beech 200T* MFO 58; 1 engr/tpt unit
Latin America and

TRG 2 T-34C Turbo Mentor
the Caribbean
HELICOPTERS INDIA/PAKISTAN
MRH 6 Bo-105M UN • UNMOGIP 2 obs
TPT • Light 1 AS350B2 Ecureuil (Esquilo)
Naval Infantry 450 Venezuela VEN

FORCES BY ROLE Venezuelan Bolivar Fuerte
MANOEUVRE 2016 2017 2018
Bs
Amphibious GDP Bs 23.8tr 199tr
1 mne bn(-) US$ 236bn 215bn
Air Force 3,000
Growth % -16.5 -12.0
Inflation % 254 653
FORCES BY ROLE
Def bdgt Bs 128bn 1.03tr
1 sqn with A-37B Dragonfly US$ [a] 1.28bn 1.12bn
ISR US$1=Bs 100.45 923.36
1 flt with EMB-110 Bandeirante [a] US dollar figures should be treated with caution due to high
TRANSPORT levels of currency volatility as well as wide differentials between
1 sqn with C-130B Hercules; C-212 Aviocar; EMB–110C official and parallel exchange rates
Bandeirante; EMB-120 Brasilia Population 31,304,016
1 (liaison) sqn with Cessna 206H; T-41D
1 (liaison) flt with Cessna 206H Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
TRAINING
Male 14.0% 4.3% 4.3% 4.2% 19.7% 3.2%
1 sqn with PC-7U Turbo Trainer
1 sqn with Beech 58 Baron (UB-58); SF-260EU Female 13.3% 4.2% 4.3% 4.2% 20.4% 3.8%
AVIATION
Capabilities 1 avn comd (1 tpt avn bn, 1 atk hel bn, 1 ISR avn bn)
The armed forces, including the National Guard, are tasked
with protecting the sovereignty of the state, assuring ter- Reserve Organisations 8,000
ritorial integrity and assisting with internal-security and FORCES BY ROLE
counter-narcotics operations. The National Guard has seen MANOEUVRE
its resources grow as it has become more involved in inter- Armoured
nal-security and counter-narcotics operations. In 2016, by 1 armd bn
presidential decree, the government initiated a process of Light
formally giving public-order roles to paramilitary groups. 4 inf bn
In April 2017, after having declared a state of emergency, 1 ranger bn
the government implemented Plan Zamora, which led to COMBAT SUPPORT
an increased military presence across the country, and has 1 arty bn
afforded the armed forces direct control over the distribu- 2 engr regt
tion of some essential goods. Increased funds have in re- EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
cent years been allocated to strengthen the National Guard ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
and military capabilities amid broader economic difficul- MBT 173: 81 AMX-30V; 92 T-72B1
ties that have seen inflation rise significantly. Despite these LT TK 109: 31 AMX-13; 78 Scorpion-90
serious economic problems, the armed and security forces RECCE 121: 42 Dragoon 300 LFV2; 79 V-100/V-150
continue to receive significant funding, due to their role in IFV 237: 123 BMP-3 (incl variants); 114 BTR-80A (incl
regime protection and in helping suppress anti-govern- variants)
ment protests. A series of contracts with China and Russia APC 81
have overhauled ageing army, marine and air-force inven- APC (T) 45: 25 AMX-VCI; 12 AMX-PC (CP); 8 AMX-
tories and are crucial for training as well as procurement; VCTB (Amb)
Venezuela possesses one of the region’s most capable air APC (W) 36 Dragoon 300
and air-defence structures. (See pp. 380–82.) ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
ARV 5: 3 AMX-30D; BREM-1; 2 Dragoon 300RV; Samson
ACTIVE 123,000 (Army 63,000 Navy 25,500 Air VLB Leguan
11,500 National Guard 23,000) Paramilitary 220,000 NBC VEHICLES 10 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC
Conscript liability 30 months selective, varies by region for ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
all services MSL • MANPATS IMI MAPATS
RCL 106mm 175 M40A1
RESERVE 8,000 (Army 8,000)
GUNS • SP 76mm 75 M18 Hellcat
ARTILLERY 515+
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE SP 60: 152mm 48 2S19 Msta-S (replacing Mk F3s); 155mm
12 Mk F3
Space TOWED 92: 105mm 80: 40 M101A1; 40 Model 56 pack
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE howitzer; 155mm 12 M114A1
SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS 1 Venesat-1 MRL 56: 122mm 24 BM-21 Grad; 160mm 20 LAR SP
(LAR-160); 300mm 12 9A52 Smerch
Army ε63,000 GUN/MOR 120mm 13 2S23 NONA-SVK
FORCES BY ROLE MOR 294+: 81mm 165; SP 81mm 21 Dragoon 300PM;
MANOEUVRE AMX-VTT; 120mm 108: 60 Brandt; 48 2S12
Armoured RADAR • LAND RASIT (veh, arty)
1 (4th) armd div (1 armd bde, 1 lt armd bde, 1 AB bde, AIRCRAFT
1 arty bde) TPT • Light 28: 1 Beech 90 King Air; 1 Beech 200 King Air;
Mechanised 1 Beech 300 King Air; 1 Cessna 172; 6 Cessna 182 Skylane;
1 (9th) mot cav div (1 mot cav bde, 1 ranger bde, 1 sy bde) 2 Cessna 206; 2 Cessna 207 Stationair; 1 IAI-201 Arava; 2
Light IAI-202 Arava; 11 M-28 Skytruck
1 (1st) inf div (1 SF bn, 1 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 1 HELICOPTERS
ranger bde, 1 inf bde, 1 arty unit, 1 spt unit) ATK 10 Mi-35M2 Hind
1 (2nd) inf div (1 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde, 1 mtn inf bde) MRH 32: 10 Bell 412EP; 2 Bell 412SP; 20 Mi-17V-5 Hip H
1 (3rd) inf div (1 inf bde, 1 ranger bde, 1 sigs bde, 1 MP TPT 9: Heavy 3 Mi-26T2 Halo; Medium 2 AS-61D; Light
bde) 4: 3 Bell 206B Jet Ranger, 1 Bell 206L3 Long Ranger II
1 (5th) inf div (1 SF bn, 1 cav sqn, 2 jungle inf bde, 1
engr bn) Navy ε22,300; ε3,200 conscript (total ε25,500)
COMBAT SUPPORT EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 cbt engr corps (3 engr regt) SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 2:
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 2 Sabalo (GER T-209/1300) with 8 single 533mm TT with
1 log comd (2 log regt) SST-4 HWT
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 6 COMBAT SUPPORT

FFGHM 6 Mariscal Sucre (ITA mod Lupo) with 8 single 1 cbt engr bn
lnchr with Otomat Mk2 AShM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr 1 MP bde
with Aspide SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with A244 1 sigs bn
LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10 1 log bn
PSOH 3 Guaiqueri with 1 Millennium CIWS, 1 76mm gun EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
(1 damaged in explosion in 2016) ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
PBG 3 Federación (UK Vosper 37m) with 2 single lnchr LT TK 10 VN-16
with Otomat Mk2 AShM IFV 21: 11 VN-1; 10 VN-18
PB 3 Constitucion (UK Vosper 37m) with 1 76mm gun; 1 APC • APC (W) 37 EE-11 Urutu
Fernando Gomez de Saa (Damen 4207) AAV 11 LVTP-7
AMPHIBIOUS ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
LANDING SHIPS • LST 4 Capana (capacity 12 tanks; ARV 1 VN-16 ARV
200 troops) (FSU Alligator) AEV 1 AAVR7
LANDING CRAFT 3: ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
LCU 2 Margarita (river comd) RCL 84mm Carl Gustav; 106mm M40A1
UCAC 1 Griffon 2000TD ARTILLERY 30
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 10 TOWED 105mm 18 M-56
AGOR 1 Punta Brava MOR 120mm 12 Brandt
AGS 2 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PBR 23:
AKL 4 Los Frailes 18 Constancia; 2 Manaure; 3 Terepaima (Cougar)
AORH 1 Ciudad Bolivar AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • 1 LCM; 1 LCU;
ATF 1 12 LCVP
AXS 1 Simon Bolivar
Coast Guard 1,000
Naval Aviation 500
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE PSO 3 Guaicamacuto with 1 Millennium CIWS, 1 76 mm
1 sqn with Bell 212 (AB-212) gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel) (1 additional
MARITIME PATROL vessel in build)
1 flt with C-212-200 MPA PB 19: 12 Gavion; 1 Pagalo (Damen Stan 2606); 4 Petrel
TRANSPORT (US Point); 2 Protector
1 sqn with Beech 200 King Air; C-212 Aviocar; Turbo
Commander 980C
AG 2 Los Tanques (salvage ship)
Latin America and

TRAINING
the Caribbean
AKSL 1
1 hel sqn with Bell 206B Jet Ranger II; TH-57A Sea Ranger
AP 2
1 sqn with Bell 412EP Twin Huey; Mi-17V-5 Hip H
Air Force 11,500
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MP 2 C-212-200 MPA* FORCES BY ROLE
TPT • Light 7: 1 Beech C90 King Air; 1 Beech 200 King FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
Air; 4 C-212 Aviocar; 1 Turbo Commander 980C 1 sqn with F-5 Freedom Fighter (VF-5)
HELICOPTERS 2 sqn with F-16A/B Fighting Falcon
ASW 5 Bell 212 ASW (AB-212 ASW) 4 sqn with Su-30MKV
MRH 12: 6 Bell 412EP Twin Huey; 6 Mi-17V-5 Hip 2 sqn with K-8W Karakorum*
TPT • Light 1 Bell 206B Jet Ranger II (trg) GROUND ATTACK/ISR
TRG 1 TH-57A Sea Ranger 1 sqn with EMB-312 Tucano*; OV-10A Bronco
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
Marines ε15,000 1 sqn with Falcon 20DC; SA-227 Metro III (C-26B)
FORCES BY ROLE TRANSPORT
COMMAND 1 sqn with Y-8; C-130H Hercules; KC-137
1 div HQ 1 sqn with A319CJ; B-737
SPECIAL FORCES 4 sqn with Cessna T206H; Cessna 750
1 spec ops bde 1 sqn with Cessna 500/550/551; Falcon 20F; Falcon 900
MANOEUVRE 1 sqn with G-222; Short 360 Sherpa
Amphibious TRAINING
1 amph aslt bde 1 sqn with Cessna 182N; SF-260E
3 mne bde 2 sqn with DA40NG; DA42VI
3 (rvn) mne bde 1 sqn with EMB-312 Tucano*
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 VIP sqn with AS532UL Cougar; Mi-172 1 log bde (5 log gp)
3 sqn with AS332B Super Puma; AS532 Cougar EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
2 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H AIR DEFENCE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SAM
AIRCRAFT 93 combat capable Long-range S-300VM
FTR 21: 17 F-16A Fighting Falcon; 4 F-16B Fighting Falcon Medium-range 9K317M2 Buk-M2E (SA-17 Grizzly);
FGA 23 Su-30MKV S-125 Pechora-2M (SA-26)
ATK 7 OV-10A Bronco Point-defence 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch); ADAMS;
EW 4: 2 Falcon 20DC; 2 SA-227 Metro III (C-26B) Mistral; RBS-70
TKR 1 KC-137 GUNS 440+
TPT 75: Medium 14: 5 C-130H Hercules (some in store); 1 SP 40mm 12+: 6+ AMX-13 Rafaga; 6 M42
G-222; 8 Y-8; Light 56: 6 Beech 200 King Air; 2 Beech 350 TOWED 428+: 20mm: 114 TCM-20; 23mm ε200 ZU-23-
King Air; 10 Cessna 182N Skylane; 12 Cessna 206 Stationair; 2; 35mm; 40mm 114+: 114+ L/70; Some M1
4 Cessna 208B Caravan; 1 Cessna 500 Citation I; 3 Cessna RADARS • AIR DEFENCE Flycatcher
550 Citation II; 1 Cessna 551; 1 Cessna 750 Citation X; 2
Do-228-212; 1 Do-228-212NG; 11 Quad City Challenger II; National Guard (Fuerzas Armadas de
2 Short 360 Sherpa; PAX 5: 1 A319CJ; 1 B-737; 1 Falcon 20F; Cooperacion) 23,000
2 Falcon 900 (Internal sy, customs) 9 regional comd
TRG 84: 24 DA40NG; 6 DA42VI; 18 EMB-312 Tucano*; 24 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
K-8W Karakorum*; 12 SF-260E ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
HELICOPTERS APC • APC (W) 44: 24 Fiat 6614; 20 UR-416
MRH 8 Mi-17 (Mi-17VS) Hip H ARTILLERY • MOR 50 81mm
TPT • Medium 15: 3 AS332B Super Puma; 8 AS532 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 34: 12
Cougar; 2 AS532UL Cougar; 2 Mi-172 (VIP) Protector; 12 Punta; 10 Rio Orinoco II
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AIRCRAFT
AAM • IR AIM-9L/P Sidewinder; R-73 (AA-11 Archer); TPT • Light 34: 1 Beech 55 Baron; 1 Beech 80 Queen Air;
PL-5E; R-27T/ET (AA-10B/D Alamo); IIR Python 4; SARH 1 Beech 90 King Air; 1 Beech 200C King Air; 3 Cessna 152
R-27R/ER (AA-10A/C Alamo); ARH R-77 (AA-12 Adder) Aerobat; 2 Cessna 172; 2 Cessna 402C; 4 Cessna U206
ASM Kh-29L/T (AS-14A/B Kedge); Kh-31A (AS-17B Stationair; 6 DA42 MPP; 1 IAI-201 Arava; 12 M-28 Skytruck
Krypton); Kh-59M (AS-18 Kazoo) TRG 3: 1 PZL 106 Kruk; 2 PLZ M2-6 Isquierka
AShM AM39 Exocet HELICOPTERS
ARM Kh-31P (AS-17A Krypton) MRH 13: 8 Bell 412EP; 5 Mi-17V-5 Hip H
TPT • Light 19: 9 AS355F Ecureuil II; 4 AW109; 5 Bell
Air Defence Command (CODAI) 206B/L Jet Ranger/Long Ranger; 1 Bell 212 (AB 212);
Joint service command with personnel drawn from other TRG 5 F-280C
services
FORCES BY ROLE Paramilitary ε220,000
AIR DEFENCE
5 AD bde
Bolivarian National Militia ε220,000
Arms procurements and deliveries – Latin America and the

Caribbean
Fábrica Argentina de Aviones (FAdeA) rolled out Brazil’s KC-390 programme gained its first
the first series production IA-63 Pampa III light international customer after the Portuguese
attack aircraft destined for the Argentine Air Force. government authorised the purchase of at least
five of the aircraft to replace the C-130H Hercules.
Argentina signed for and took delivery of four

Brazilian Army Aviation announced plans for the
T-6C+ Texan II training aircraft from US company
future procurement of light transport aircraft,
Beechcraft. The US approved the sale of 24 aircraft
utility helicopters and attack helicopters. The
for US$300 million in 2016, but Argentina now
Brazilian Army has not had fixed-wing transport
plans to only purchase a total of 12.
capability in over 70 years.
Argentina and France agreed the sale of five Mexico purchased a new SIGMA 10514 frigate for
Super Etendard Modernisé fighter/ground-attack ocean surveillance. The final stage of construction,
aircraft. Argentina will use some of these to repair before launch, is planned to be carried out at a yet-
and return to service some of its inactive Super to-be-chosen Mexican shipyard.
Etendard aircraft.
Venezuela signed a deal with China to arm its two
operational Guaiqueri-class OPVs with C-802A (CH-
Brazil and Indonesia signed an agreement to
SS-N-8 Saccade) anti-ship missiles. The vessels were
enhance defence-industry support for Indonesian-
originally to be armed as corvettes but the ships
operated military equipment supplied by Brazil.
were delivered unarmed.
Latin America and

the Caribbean
Figure 22 Latin America and the Caribbean: selected ongoing or completed procurement
priorities in 2017
12
10
Number of Countries
The Caribbean
Mexico and Central America
8
Purchasing
Western South America

Southern South America
6 Northern South America
0
s
ol s
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He Sub iles
ter ines
s
rs
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itim ixed W A sels
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ole Atta ort kers
ium elic rs
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Data reflects the number of countries with equipment-procurement contracts with either ongoing or completed in 2017. Data includes only procurement programmes for which a production contract
©
Table 19 Patrol vessels in Latin America: selected completed and ongoing contracts
Country Class Type Quantity Contract value Shipyard(s) Order date
Recently completed
Chile Piloto Pardo (OPV-80) PSOH 4 n.k. (CHL) ASMAR 2005
Colombia 20 de Julio (OPV-80) PSOH 3 n.k. (COL) COTECMAR 2008
Peru Río Cañete PCO 5 US$50m (ROK) STX Offshore & 2013
Shipbuilding
(PER) SIMA
Ongoing
Argentina Shaldag PB 4 US$49m (ISR) Israel Shipyards Dec 2016
Chile n.k. AGB 1 US$217m (CHL) ASMAR 2016
Costa Rica n.k. (ex-US Island) PB 2 Donation (US) Govt surplus 2016
Ecuador Damen Stan Patrol 5009 PCC 2 n.k. (ECU) ASTINAVE Aug 2014
Mexico SIGMA 10514 FFHM 1 n.k. (NLD) Damen Schelde 2017
(MEX) t.b.d.
Oaxaca PSOH 4 n.k. (MEX) ASTIMAR 2014
Tenochtitlan (Damen Stan Patrol PB 10 n.k. (MEX) ASTIMAR n.k.
4207)
Venezuela Guaicamacuto PSO 4 n.k. (NLD) Damen Schelde Nov 2005
(VEN) DIANCA
TN Fernando Gómez de Saa (Damen PB 8 n.k. (NLD) Damen Schelde Mar 2014
Stan Patrol 4207) (CUB) DAMEX
(VNM) Song Thu Shipyard
(VEN) UCOCAR
Table 20 Transport helicopters in Latin America: selected completed and ongoing contracts
Country Equipment Type Quantity Contract value Contractor(s) Order date Service
Recently completed
Bolivia H425 MRH 6 n.k. (PRC) HAIG 2011 Army
H215 Med Tpt hel 6 n.k. (Int’l) Airbus Helicopters 2014 Air force
Chile H215M Med Tpt hel 10 n.k. (Int’l) Airbus Helicopters 2008 Army
Colombia Bell 412EP Twin Huey MRH 4 US$120m (US) Bell Helicopter 2013 Navy
Mexico UH-60M Black Hawk Med Tpt hel 3 US$83.9m (US) Sikorsky 2010 Navy
Peru Mi-171Sh Terminator MRH 24 US$528m (RUS) Ulan-Ude Aviation 2011 Army, air
Plant force
Ongoing
Argentina H225 Hvy Tpt hel 2 n.k. (Int’l) Airbus Helicopters 2013 Coastguard
AB-206B1 Lt Tpt hel 20 US$2.9m (ITA) Govt surplus 2016 Army
Bolivia MD-530F MRH 2 n.k. (US) MD Helicopters 2014 Police
Brazil H225M Hvy Tpt hel 50 US$2.72bn (Int’l) Airbus Helicopters Dec 2008 Army, navy
(BRZ) Helibras and air force
Chile S-70i Black Hawk Med Tpt hel 6 US$180m (US) Sikorsky Dec 2016 Air force
(POL) PZL Mielec
Colombia UH-60A Black Hawk Med Tpt hel 10 Donation (US) Govt surplus Apr 2017 Police
Mexico UH-60M Black Hawk Med Tpt hel 18 US$462.2m (US) Sikorsky Jul 2014 Air force
UH-60M Black Hawk Med Tpt hel 7 US$163.6m (US) Sikorsky Aug 2014 Navy
AS565MBe Panther SAR hel 10 US$433m (Int’l) Airbus Helicopters Jun 2014 Navy
Chapter Nine
Sub-Saharan Africa
Conflict and instability across parts of sub-Saharan Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the
Africa still constitute significant challenges to regional Lord’s Resistance Army saw its mandate renewed
governments. A problem for regional states is that until 22 May 2018. However, the deployment has
the requirement to deal with current threats risks changed: Uganda withdrew its troops in mid-2017
absorbing the attention of defence establishments, and the US drew down its special-forces contribution,
possibly forestalling the defence-reform processes saying that the LRA had been ‘dramatically
that might make responses to continental security weakened in numbers and overall effectiveness’.
threats more efficient. International involvement Nonetheless, the US has said that it will still support
in these reform processes is important in terms of regional forces tackling the LRA with intelligence
funding and organisational support. and training. LRA leader Joseph Kony, however, has
Meanwhile, the fact that some of the continent’s yet to be apprehended and some analysts fear that
security challenges are transnational in cause and effect his reduced band of followers could cause further
means that international attention remains focused trouble across Central Africa should they regroup
on the continent. This focus is not just in terms of sufficiently. Meanwhile, the Central African Republic
generating diplomatic support and helping to enable (CAR) – one of the countries where the LRA is still
conflict and dispute resolution; it involves continuing active – continues to be wracked by violence, and the
material assistance to African nations and regional government remains weakened.
multilateral institutions, as they look to develop A key driver for the continuing conflict in the CAR
domestic capacity to tackle these crises. The move is the general lack of progress in the disarmament,
to develop such local capacity has been under way demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of the
for some time, driven in large part by regional states non-state groups that proliferate there. While the
and organisations such as the African Union (AU). anti-LRA initiative did succeed in tamping down
However, defence spending across the region declined the activity of that group regionally and in the CAR,
in real terms between 2016 and 2017. The risk is that broader challenges there to the state and continuing
this downward trend could affect more than just the capacity deficits risked undermining progress. It was
money available for reforms and modernisation plans. feared that the withdrawal of the Ugandan and US
Given the draws on government finances required by contingents would leave a security vacuum ripe for
other sectors, and in light of the greater activism that exploitation by non-state actors.
some states have demonstrated in recent years, it could
Sub-Saharan
also affect their broader will and capacity to act. Somalia
Africa
Another example of the ad hoc nature of integrated
Regional approaches responses to continental security challenges is the
These financial challenges emphasise the potential AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Although
benefits of more closely integrating responses to the militant attacks continue, aimed at destabilising the
continent’s security challenges. Improving African Somali government and targeting the security forces,
states’ ability to respond rapidly to crises is central AMISOM and the Somali National Army made
to the African Standby Force (ASF) and African progress in the south against al-Shabaab.
Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises initiatives. Forces deployed to AMISOM have been learning
However, ad hoc responses have overall proven more under fire for many years. The troops have developed
practical, and perhaps more successful. their ability to live in the field, as well as their
soldiering skills such as patrolling and explosive-
Tackling the Lord’s Resistance Army ordnance disposal. A number of nations, both
One example is the initiative to tackle the Lord’s local and international, have conducted AMISOM
Resistance Army (LRA). The AU-authorised Regional pre-deployment training and delivered broader
assistance, such as in mobility support. This training concern’ by international organisations, particularly
and cumulative operational experience has led to the Economic Community of West African States
capability benefits for the deployed forces, despite (ECOWAS), and the incumbent president’s refusal
that fact that the mission has borne significant to stand down, military forces from ECOWAS states
casualties. In time, this should make local forces more intervened on 19 January. Constituting the ECOWAS
capable of addressing wider national and regional Mission in Gambia (ECOMIG), troops from Ghana,
security challenges, should states wish to do so and Nigeria and Senegal secured key infrastructure in
if necessary. The main training effort, focused on the Gambia, and the former president soon left. Although
Somali forces, remains well supported internationally the force wound down in early 2017, its mandate was
by the European Union and, most recently, Turkey. extended until mid-2018.
Meanwhile, the international military support
effort to tackle al-Shabaab has seen more US The Sahel
involvement. One characteristic of this has been Facing continued insurgent activity, states of the
support to AMISOM and troop-contributing G5 Sahel grouping (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali,
countries. In early 2017, it was announced that US Mauritania and Niger) decided in mid-2017 to deploy
President Donald Trump had ‘approved a Department a force to tackle mainly Islamist insurgent groups.
of Defense proposal to provide additional precision The operation had been authorised by these regional
fires in support of [AMISOM] and Somali security states two years previously and is due to grow to
forces operations to defeat al-Shabaab in Somalia’. around 5,000 military and police personnel. With an
Secretary of Defense James Mattis said in May 2017 operational headquarters in Mali, the force reportedly
that US assistance to AMISOM had now been ‘joined began operations in late October 2017.
by training for select Somali soldiers, the provision of The force will coordinate with the UN Mission in
basic equipment to the Somalia National Army, and Mali (MINUSMA), and with French forces engaged
capacity-building so that [the] army can better sustain in Operation Barkhane. These are deployed at a range
its forces in the field’. of bases across the Sahel in order to tackle insurgent
and terrorist activity there, while also training
Tackling Boko Haram partner forces, such as those from the G5 Sahel. The
US assistance has continued to boost the capability of US supports the G5 Sahel initiative, and the security
local forces to tackle the Boko Haram terror group; in capacities of each state, through funding assistance,
August 2017 the US announced the possible sale of 12 training, equipment and intelligence support.
Super Tucano aircraft to Nigeria (yet to be approved by Some sub-Saharan African states are
Congress). Boko Haram continues to not only mount demonstrating greater activism in tackling
attacks inside Nigeria, but also absorb the security these security challenges. While local forces are
attention of neighbouring states. In early 2015 this led improving their capabilities to undertake these
the AU to mandate the Lake Chad Basin Commission missions, international support remains vital. Most
(which comprises regional states) plan to reinvigorate procurement needs derive more from the everyday
the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) concept. challenges of insurgency, terrorism and criminality
International assistance has included some funding. than the potential demands of inter-state warfare (see
While the MNJTF has had an effect on degrading pp. 432–34). At the same time, measures to improve
Boko Haram’s operations, the group remains highly local military institutions and personnel quality
dangerous. Nonetheless, regional forces are working remain important, as does security-sector reform
together to tackle a common adversary, which and post-conflict-related DDR. Over time, progress
means that this may in effect constitute a confidence- in these areas may increase the chance of developing
and security-building mechanism, augmenting the accountable and resilient armed and security forces
improvements that the mission brings to national- to match the development in military will now
defence capabilities and bilateral military-to-military exhibited by some states. Such forces may be able
ties. to exert greater control over ungoverned spaces or,
at a minimum, extend governance to reassure and
Gambia support vulnerable populations. Achieving these
In Gambia, the December 2016 presidential election outcomes will, for the foreseeable future, require
led to a stalemate. Following expressions of ‘deep long-term international engagement and support.
Sub-Saharan Africa 431
DEFENCE ECONOMICS Meanwhile, Mali’s economy grew by 5.3% and Niger’s

by 4.2%, supported by strong public investment and
Macroeconomic trends agricultural output. Ethiopia, however, experienced
Sub-Saharan African economic growth accelerated in the region’s strongest growth in 2017. At 8.5%, this
2017 to reach 2.6%, up from 1.4% in 2016. However, was a further increase on the 8.0% achieved in 2016.
this regional figure masked significant disparities While Kenya decelerated from 5.8% in 2016 to 5.0% in
between slower-growing economies in larger states, 2017, it remained one of sub-Saharan Africa’s fastest-
and more dynamic growth observed in smaller growing economies. The same was true for Tanzania,
nations. which saw 6.5% GDP growth in 2017. But conflict,
Indeed, growth in the three largest economies was insecurity and development challenges continue to
slower than in the region as a whole: Nigeria emerged act as a brake on economic development in many
from recession to reach 0.8% GDP growth in 2017 (up areas. Indeed, famine was declared in South Sudan,
from -1.6%), while South Africa’s GDP grew by 0.7% and could reach northeastern parts of Nigeria.
(up from 0.3%) and Angola’s by 1.5% (up from -0.7%). South Africa’s still-limited growth was caused
The positive outcome was that Angola and Nigeria, mainly by internal political factors, with high levels
the region’s two principal oil exporters, continued of uncertainty undermining overall confidence in
their climb out of the economic difficulties that had the economy. In April, President Jacob Zuma sacked
been compounded by the fall in global oil prices. finance minister Pravin Gordhan, in a dispute over
However, these two states apart, other regional oil the management of public spending. The value of the
exporters found themselves in a difficult position. Rand fell shortly thereafter, and South Africa’s credit
For instance, after a severe recession in 2016 (when rating was reduced by credit-rating agencies, further
the country’s GDP declined by 6.4%), Chad posted eroding confidence in the country’s economy.
a figure of 0.6% in 2017. For the Republic of Congo, Nevertheless, although growth was slow in South
2017 (with a figure of -3.6%) was even worse than Africa, the country still has firm underlying economic
2016 (-2.8%). foundations. In contrast, Zimbabwe – which, at 2.8%
Still-low oil prices meant that fiscal balances in 2017, posted a higher growth rate than Nigeria and
continued to worsen in oil-exporting countries in South Africa – has continued to de-industrialise. The
2017, while fiscal deficits in oil-importing states economy is more reliant on commodity production
remained broadly stable. Oil prices have slightly and exports and has become dominated by the
rebounded since OPEC’s November 2016 agreement informal sector. Indeed, informal employment is
to cut production rates, but not by as much as believed to have grown by 30% between 2011 and
expected. The IMF forecasted an average of US$50.17 2014, constituting up to 94.5% of total employment.
per barrel for oil prices for 2018. Besides oil, other key A shortage of hard currency also hit the country in
commodity prices for sub-Saharan African economies late 2017. Meanwhile, Chad, where the government
experienced differing trends in 2017. Metal prices
surged during the year: in the third quarter, zinc Figure 23 Sub-Saharan Africa regional defence
Sub-Saharan
and nickel rose by 14%, iron ore by 13% and copper expenditure as % of GDP
Africa
by 12%. Zimbabwe and South Africa are among the
world’s top exporters of nickel ore, while South Africa 1.5
1.34
is the third-biggest exporter of iron ore. However, 1.27 1.26
1.18
agricultural prices declined, due to improved food 1.2
1.16
1.09
production in 2017. For example, cocoa prices were
expected to decline by 30% by the end of 2017. 0.9
% of GDP
Smaller, non-oil-dependent economies

experienced dynamic growth in 2017. Lower cocoa 0.6
prices had a limited effect on Côte d’Ivoire, whose
growth dipped only slightly, from 7.7% in 2016 to 0.3
7.6% in 2017. In Senegal, growth reached 6.8%, in
part due to the implementation of the 20-year ‘Plan 0.0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Sénégal Emergent’, an economic-modernisation
plan that is being enacted in five-year increments.
Niger
Mali Chad
Cape Verde Senegal Sudan
Eritrea
Burkina Faso
Gambia
Guinea-Bissau Djibouti
Guinea Côte Ethiopia
d’Ivoire Nigeria
Sierra Leone Central South Sudan
African Rep.
Liberia Somalia
Ghana Benin Cameroon
Togo Uganda
Real % Change (2016–17) Equatorial Guinea Kenya

Rwanda
More than 20% increase Congo
Gabon
Between 10% and 20% increase Democratic Burundi
Between 3% and 10% increase Rep. of the Congo
Seychelles
Tanzania
No change
Angola
Between 3% and 10% decrease Malawi
More than 20% decrease Zambia Mozambique
Insufficient data Madagascar
Zimbabwe
Botswana
2017 Defence Spending (US$m) [1] Map illustrating 2017 planned defence-
spending levels (in US$ at market exchange Namibia Mauritius
rates), as well as the annual real percentage
3,629 change in planned defence spending between
3,233 2016 and 2017 (at constant 2010 prices and Swaziland
exchange rates). Percentage changes in
1,530 defence spending can vary considerably from South Africa
year to year, as states revise the level of
1,000 funding allocated to defence. Changes Lesotho
500 indicated here highlight the short-term trend in
planned defence spending between 2016 and
100 2017. Actual spending changes prior to 2016,
50 and projected spending levels post-2017, are
not reflected.
© IISS
Map 11 Sub-Saharan Africa regional defence spending 1
derives most of its revenue from oil, also found itself by 23.2% in real terms and inflation reached 41.7%.
in a difficult situation due to still-low oil prices. Overall, defence spending across the region mirrored
Austerity measures have been implemented, such as broader economic conditions, with larger countries
reductions to civil-service pay. This has led to greater experiencing budget problems and delays to defence
reliance on international assistance in order to fulfil programmes, notwithstanding their allocation of
budgetary priorities. Defence spending, however, has increased nominal funds to defence, while smaller
been ring-fenced, given Chad’s defence priorities and countries progressed with modernisation plans.
commitments, which include regional deployments. Significantly, regional modernisation efforts focused
Indeed, in current terms, its defence spending on air-force recapitalisation.
increased by 3.6% between 2016 (US$160 million) and Botswana, with defence spending of US$492m
2017 (US$165m). in 2017, placing it tenth in sub-Saharan Africa’s
defence-budget league table, made progress with
Defence budgets and procurement: air-force its requirement to replace ageing F-5 fighter aircraft,
recapitalisation with the Saab Gripen being a likely candidate.
Total defence spending across sub-Saharan Africa The evolution of Botswana’s defence-budget
declined by 5.2%, in real terms, between 2016 and breakdown shows an increasing share dedicated to
2017. This was driven by strong reductions in ‘development’, overtaking ‘recurrent’ expenses (such
Angola (-15.1%), where inflation reached more than as salaries) in 2016 (see Figure 24). Botswana has also
30% in 2017; Kenya, where spending fell by 7.7% procured VL-MICA surface-to-air missile systems
and inflation reached 8.0%; and the Democratic and missiles for Mistral MANPADs from MBDA for
Republic of the Congo, where defence spending fell €304.2m (US$343.1m).
100
80
60
%
40
20
0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Recurrent
% Development
%
Source: Budget tables 2017/2018. Functional classification of expenditure and net lending © IISS
Figure 24 Botswana: defence-budget breakdown, 2010–17
Burkina Faso, which has a more modest budget this deal remains subject to US congressional
(US$189m in 2017), expanded its rotary-wing fleet authorisation.
in 2017, thanks to Taiwan’s donation of two second- Nevertheless, the modernisation of Nigeria’s
hand UH-1H helicopters, worth an estimated US$8m. armed forces has been hindered by institutional
In addition, Burkina Faso signed agreements in 2017 failings. For instance, there remain allegations of
with Russia for two Mi-171Sh transport helicopters, corruption. Transparency International reported
to be delivered in 2018. When these four aircraft enter in 2017 that former military leaders are suspected
service, they will increase Burkina Faso’s air-force of stealing up to US$15 billion from military-
holdings by over 15% (from 24 fixed- and rotary-wing procurement programmes between 2007 and 2015.
platforms to 28). Côte d’Ivoire also acquired two An ongoing investigation, opened in 2015 and led
Mi-24s from Russia in 2017. French forces destroyed by the country’s Economic and Financial Crimes
most air-force equipment during the civil war in 2004, Commission, has charged more than 300 individuals
and since then the country had been subject to an arms and companies with corruption. They are suspected of
embargo. Prior to these new arrivals, the air force had funnelling substantial funds from fake procurement
operated only one Boeing-727 transport aircraft, and orders to the then-ruling People’s Democratic Party.
three SA330L Puma transport helicopters. In South Africa, the armed forces have been
Sub-Saharan
The Nigerian Air Force (NAF) saw new equipment battling real-term defence-spending declines for
Africa
delivered in 2017, particularly relating to training years, although the budget may have nominally
capability. The purchase of ten Super Mushshak increased. South African defence spending decreased
trainers was earmarked in the 2016 budget, and by 2.5% between 2016 and 2017, and is expected to
receipt of the first five will reportedly allow NAF decline by another 1.3% between 2017 and 2018.
cadets to graduate in flight training from the Kaduna Accordingly, the share of defence spending as a
Defence Academy for the first time in 30 years, percentage of South Africa’s GDP is on a downward
before commissioning as officers. NAF strength was trajectory, from 1.13% in 2014 to 1.05% in 2017; the
modestly bolstered in 2017 by the receipt of two new figure is projected to fall to 1.03% in 2018 (see Figure
Mi-35M attack helicopters and the refurbishment of 25).
two transport aircraft. In addition, the United States’ In 2017, personnel costs constituted 80% of total
Defense Security Cooperation Agency approved the South African defence spending. As the defence
sale to Nigeria of 12 A-29/EMB-314 Super Tucano ministry seeks to reduce expenses related to the
light attack aircraft in a US$593m package including ‘compensation of employees’, it foresees a reduction
training, munitions and related support. However, in military personnel to 66,016 by 2019. Some
4.70 1.14
4.65
1.12
Defence spending (2010 US$bn)
4.60
1.10
Defence spending as % of GDP

4.55
1.08
4.50
1.06
4.45
1.04
4.40
4.35 1.02
4.30 1.00
4.25 0.98
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
© IISS
Figure 25 South Africa: defence spending in (constant 2010) US$ and as share of GDP
procurement programmes have also been delayed; For the United States, Djibouti is a crucial ally in
for example, the acquisition of precision-guided the Horn of Africa. In 2002, the US established the
air munitions has been postponed from 2018 to Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF–
2019. However, the procurement for the navy of a HOA) at Camp Lemonnier (formerly a French
hydrographic vessel and patrol vessels was brought facility), for which it signed a new 20-year lease in
forward to 2017 and 2018 respectively, reflecting the 2014. Lemonnier houses around 5,000 personnel, from
increased prioritisation of maritime assets in defence CJTF–HOA and other units. The annual rent for this
planning. facility could be as high as US$63 million, according
to experts. France retains facilities in Djibouti and
DJIBOUTI uses the country as a power-projection base for its
military activities in East Africa and further afield
In 1977, France deployed an unprecedented air– (such as Mali), as well as a training ground for desert
sea task force off the coast of Djibouti to ensure the combat. France is estimated to pay in the region of
territorial integrity of this newly independent state. US$40m per year.
Previously, it had been a French Overseas Territory. The EU has a small presence in the country under
The fear of invasion by Ethiopia or Somalia, which the framework of the European Union military
both had expansionist designs on the nascent country, counter-piracy operation Atalanta and civil training
became a determinant of Djibouti’s defence policy, operation EUCAP Nestor, using Djibouti to support
and 40 years later, Djibouti remains under the French its operations. Germany and Spain, meanwhile, are
defence umbrella. Yet over the past 15 years, Djibouti among the countries that station maritime-patrol
has begun to redefine its foreign-policy outlook by aircraft (MPA) there. (NATO did have a presence,
diversifying its security partners. although its Ocean Shield counter-piracy mission
was wound up in December 2016.) Japan also
Foreign basing maintains an MPA contingent in the country, and is
Djibouti generates significant income from several understood to pay significant sums to use Djibouti’s
foreign military bases in its territory. These have military facilities. Meanwhile, Djibouti and China
increased in number since 2001. Indeed, the global signed a ‘security and defence strategic partnership’
‘war on terror’ and the fight against maritime piracy in agreement in 2014, which led to the establishment in
and around the Gulf of Aden have raised demand for 2017 of China’s first overseas support base, near the
access to facilities in Djibouti and, for the government, new Doraleh Multi-Purpose Port. It has also been
provided opportunities for new funding. reported that Saudi Arabia might establish a facility
in the country, in the wake of Djibouti’s commitment The success of the modernisation plan will depend
to the Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism. on how Djibouti manages its external-debt levels;
Commenting on this trend of foreign basing, these reached an all-time high of 87% of GDP in 2017
Djibouti’s President Ismail Omar Guelleh recently (increasing from 85% of GDP in 2016 and 70% in 2015).
claimed that: ‘The principle of military base Djibouti may be forced to confront the challenges of
concessions to foreign powers [should be seen] not debt sustainability in the short term, which may come
as the chosen process to earn foreign currencies, but at the expense of longer-term investment in the armed
rather as a way to render the country more visible at forces, let alone broader areas of government spending.
the international level.’
SUDAN
Military capability
The main responsibilities of Djibouti’s armed forces, Sudan’s national-security policy is driven by one
gendarmerie and republican guard are to defend overriding objective: to maintain the rule of the
against external aggression and illicit trafficking; Islamist/National Congress Party (NCP) regime.
to ensure civilian security in non-military crisis The NCP has existed in various guises since 1989.
situations (for example, humanitarian disasters); and Linked to this is the determination of President
to participate in peace operations, including those in Omar al-Bashir to avoid trial for his two war-crimes
Somalia. indictments by the International Criminal Court.
In order to achieve these objectives, the president, He was first indicted in Darfur in 2009, and then for
who is also commander-in-chief of the armed forces, genocide in 2010.
has initiated a major modernisation process. A White The regime faces internal security threats from
Paper on Defence and National Security was published ongoing insurgencies at the country’s periphery, in
in June 2017 to coincide with the 40th anniversary of Darfur, and in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile.
the establishment of the armed forces. This document These are linked to external security challenges
sets operational and financial objectives for the next on Sudan’s borders with Chad, Libya and South
three years (2017–20), including the modernisation Sudan. There are also periodic disagreements over
of intelligence, command, air, maritime and land the border with Egypt. Migrants from other parts of
capabilities. Africa seeking to reach Libya and the Mediterranean
Two battalions are deployed to the African Union route to Europe present another range of challenges,
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), an operation that particularly on the borders with Eritrea and Libya.
is being led by Lieutenant-General Osman Nour However, Sudan’s policy on all these issues is driven
Soubagleh of Djibouti from 2016–18. Two thousand by how Khartoum perceives that they will affect the
personnel from Djibouti’s armed forces are engaged in regime’s chances of survival.
the operation, with another 1,000 held in reserve; this
equates to approximately 33–34% of army strength. Regime survival
In recognition of the strain that this deployment The roots of the NCP regime lie in the military coup
Sub-Saharan
could cause in the long run, the effort is backed by of 1989. This was instigated by an alliance of Islamist-
Africa
a recruitment policy that seeks to increase personnel oriented army officers, led by current President
numbers from 8,000 to 15,000. Bashir and current first Vice-President and Prime
Investments are needed in equipment, operational Minister Bakri Hassan Saleh, and the Sudanese
readiness and infrastructure. The armed forces Muslim Brotherhood/National Islamic Front, whose
operate mostly with equipment donated by foreign chief ideologue was Hassan Turabi. In the 1990s,
states. As such, the wide variety of equipment the regime’s foreign and security policies reflected
in the inventory presents challenges in terms of Turabi’s inclinations: a close relationship with Iran;
maintenance and interoperability. In addition, more a bloody and ultimately unsuccessful ‘jihad’ against
than one-third of Djibouti’s equipment has been Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) rebels in the
deployed in Somalia since December 2011, which south; hostility towards the secular regime in Egypt,
will again lead to a heavy maintenance requirement. leading to the involvement of Sudanese intelligence
Meanwhile, an overarching concept for military officers in an attempt to assassinate President Hosni
operations is lacking, which impedes operational Mubarak in 1995; and hosting international terrorists,
readiness. including Osama bin Laden. As a result of these issues,
River Nile
Wadi Seidna
Air Force HQ EGYPT
Kerari Military College
Safat Aviation complex Red Sea
Joint Staff College
El Zargha
LIBYAengineering complex
Omdurman
Khartoum North
Halaib (disputed
with Egypt)
Army HQ
Khartoum
Shajera ammunition
factory
Yarmouk Port Sudan
Industrial Centre
Blue Nile
White Nile
Oil pipeline
GIAD industrial city SUDAN
See inset map ERITREA

for details
Khartoum
DARFUR
(UNAMID area
of operation)
CHAD
Oil pipeline
Oil pipeline
Abyei Blue
(UNISFA area Nile
South ETHIOPIA
of operation)
Kordofan
SOUTH SUDAN
© IISS
Map 12 Sudan: military facilities and areas of principal security concern
and human-rights concerns, in 1997 Washington which ended the war in the south by providing
imposed comprehensive economic sanctions on for an independence referendum and for the
Khartoum. Following the terrorist attacks on the democratisation of the whole of Sudan. Although
United States’ embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in the Sudan National Intelligence and Security
1998, the US responded by launching cruise-missile Service (NISS) began providing counter-terrorism
strikes on a pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum information to Western intelligence agencies,
North, alleged by US intelligence at the time to have the prospects for a fuller accommodation with
been linked to bin Laden and to the processing of VX the US and European Union were undermined
nerve agent. These developments led Bashir and a by the regime’s brutal handling of the Darfur
group of pragmatists to conclude that Turabi’s policies uprising, which started in 2003. This produced
were threatening the regime’s existence; Turabi was an international outcry and led to the indictment
ejected from all his official positions in 1999. The NCP of Bashir and senior figures in the regime and its
began a policy of ending the war in the south and associated militias. Even though the south was
seeking engagement with the West. able to vote for and gain independence in 2011,
This more collaborative approach led to the US sanctions remained in place and were in effect
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005, extended, which made it impossible for European
banks and companies with interests in the US to Meanwhile, as migration became an increasingly
do business with Sudan. crucial issue for the EU, Sudan undertook to provide
The regime relied mainly on Chinese intelligence on people-smuggling gangs and to
petrochemical companies for the exploitation of stem the flow of migrants from Eritrea and other
Sudan’s oil reserves, which came on stream in 1999. countries in the Horn of Africa towards Libya and the
Meanwhile, Sudan became increasingly dependent Mediterranean. The EU pledged a US$100 million aid
on China, and to a lesser extent Iran, for weapons, package to help reduce the refugee flow as part of the
trade and infrastructure investment, and the EU–Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative, which
development of the country’s nascent arms industry. became known as the ‘Khartoum Process’.
Sudan’s continuing links with Iran and, in particular, At the same time, Sudan has managed to stay
its supply of weapons to Hamas led to a presumed neutral in the dispute between Saudi Arabia, the
Israeli airstrike on the Yarmouk arms factory near UAE and other Gulf states, and Qatar. It has no
Khartoum in 2012. interest in upsetting its new allies, but also wants to
However, there has been a significant shift in maintain good relations with Qatar, which played an
Sudan’s alliance relationships since 2014. As the loss important role in trying to end the Darfur conflict and
of oil revenues from South Sudan began to bite, and has long provided substantial development aid and
with poor economic conditions sparking serious riots investment.
in Khartoum and other cities in 2013, the regime
began to pivot towards Saudi Arabia and the United Regional relations
Arab Emirates (UAE) for financial support to ensure Relations with South Sudan have been tense since the
its survival. This meant breaking with Tehran. Iranian latter’s independence in 2011. This is partly because
cultural centres in Sudan were closed in 2014, and of the unresolved border issue of Abyei, an area
in September 2015 Sudan committed forces to the close to important oil fields and a flashpoint between
Saudi-led Operation Decisive Storm against the Iranian- northern Misseriya nomads and southern Ngok
backed Houthi rebels in Yemen. In early 2016, Sudan Dinka. Abyei essentially remains a frozen conflict,
broke off diplomatic relations with Iran, following the with the area under de facto control of the government
ransacking of the Saudi embassy in Tehran. in Khartoum, and a United Nations force (UNISFA)
This shift enabled the regime to renew its efforts providing security. It is also partly a result of disputes
to reach an accommodation with the EU and the US. over revenues from South Sudan’s oil, which has to
The NISS intensified its cooperation with Western be pumped up the 1,400-kilometre pipeline to Port
intelligence agencies, reportedly providing useful Sudan in the north for export. Sudan has also accused
information on groups linked to the Islamic State, South Sudan of supporting their former comrades-in-
also known as ISIS or ISIL, and al-Qaeda in the arms of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–
Islamic Maghreb. As the rebellions in Darfur and in North (SPLM–N) in the ongoing conflict in Southern
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile began to falter, Kordofan and Blue Nile, while South Sudan has
the regime signed an African Union (AU)-sponsored accused the north of supporting the rebel Lord’s
Sub-Saharan
road-map agreement in 2016, leading to a ceasefire Resistance Army (LRA), which has a long history
Africa
in these conflicts (not always honoured in full). The of committing atrocities in the south. When South
US began to loosen its sanctions in 2016, leading Sudan descended into full-scale civil war in 2013,
to their suspension in January 2017 and lifting in the NISS began supplying weapons to the SPLM–
October 2017. The US asserted that the regime was Internal Opposition (SPLM–IO). However, the US
broadly adhering to its main conditions, including made it clear that cooperation on finding a solution
working towards a permanent ceasefire in Darfur and in South Sudan was crucial for lifting sanctions, and
in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile; maintaining Sudan appears to have cut off the supply of arms to
improved humanitarian access to the conflict zones; the SPLM–IO.
cooperating to find a solution to the internal conflict in Historically, Sudan’s strategic importance has
South Sudan and other regional conflicts; cooperating stemmed from its control of the Nile waters flowing
on counter-terrorism; respecting freedom of religion; into Egypt. Egypt’s regional significance has
and ending links with North Korea. The United meant that most governments in Khartoum have
Kingdom started ‘phased engagement’ talks with the regarded it as essential to maintain good bilateral
regime in March 2016. relations. However, the NCP’s sympathy for the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has created a difficult economically deprived areas of the south and Darfur.
relationship with Cairo, except for the brief period Officers have tended to come from the riverain tribes
of the Morsi government in 2012–13. The present north of Khartoum, who have generally dominated
government accuses Sudan of harbouring Egyptian Sudanese political life, while a number also come from
Muslim Brotherhood extremists. In addition, there Kordofan in the west. However, reports suggest that
are disputes over the construction of dams on the the ethnic balance in the SAF is changing, especially
Nile; Sudan intermittently raises the question of the with the secession of the south reducing the number
Halaib Triangle, a disputed border area under de of southern troops.
facto Egyptian control; and Khartoum has accused Before 1989, the SAF was generally regarded as a
Egypt of arming Darfur rebels that conducted an professional force in which promotion was on merit
incursion from Libya in May 2017. and tribal influences minimised. It was proud of the
The Sudanese regime also periodically sees Eritrea role it had played in siding with the people in the
as a threat. At various points in the past, Eritrea has uprisings that overthrew the Abboud and Nimeiri
supported the SPLA, and the Darfur and Eastern regimes in 1964 and 1985 respectively. Under the
Front rebels. However, since 2012 the relationship has NCP regime, though, officers who do not pay lip
been more amicable. The main issue on the border service to its Islamist agenda have been removed.
is now people smuggling – principally of Eritreans There are reports of Islamist ‘Saihun’ officers, who
heading across Sudan to Libya and Europe. This is were prominent in the 1990s ‘jihad’ in the south,
largely controlled by the well-armed Rashaida tribe, receiving preferment in recent years. Senior officers
who formed part of the Eastern Front rebellion until have benefited from regime privileges to the extent
2006 and are seen as a potential threat by the NCP that many observers question whether the SAF
regime. Reports that the Sudan government might would side with the people if popular uprisings like
use its Rapid Support Forces, made up of Darfur those in 1964 and 1985 were to occur. Nevertheless,
tribesmen, to interdict irregular migration across the the SAF generally remained uninvolved during the
frontier from Eritrea have not so far materialised. violent suppression of protests in 2013. The current
The porous border between Chad and Sudan has chief of staff, General Imad Adawi, is regarded by
also been a major source of instability. Relations were some analysts as an outward-looking professional
tense between 2006 and 2009, when Chad supported officer. He has publicly criticised the effects of
the Darfur rebels and Sudan backed insurgents tribalism on the army’s coherence.
fighting against the regime of President Idriss Déby. Basic military training takes place at the Kerari
Following mediation by the UAE, Sudan and Chad Military College at Wadi Seidna, north of Khartoum.
reconciled and established joint border patrols, which There is a Joint Staff College and Higher Academy
now appear to be effective in controlling this remote in Omdurman. Recently, considerable resources
frontier where there is potential for militant Islamist have been devoted to an English-language training
infiltration from West Africa. programme delivered through the British Council. At
the strategic level there is a defence college containing
Armed forces a war college and a research-studies centre.
The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) comprise an army, Accurate information on SAF platforms and
navy and air force. Personnel numbers are not equipment is scarce. The Sudanese Military Industrial
published, but it is estimated that the regular army Corporation (MIC) claims to locally produce
has in excess of 100,000 soldiers, the navy about ZTZ-85-II (Al-Bashir), T-54/T-55 (Digna), T-72AV
1,300 sailors and the air force some 3,000 personnel. (Al-Zubair 1) and ZTZ-59D (Al-Zubair 2) main battle
The army contains at least 20 divisions: 15 infantry tanks. The MIC catalogue also advertises locally
plus armoured, mechanised, artillery, engineering produced BTR-80A (Shareef 1), WZ-523 (Shareef 2)
and marine units. There are also presidential guard, and BMP-2 (Khatim 2) armoured vehicles, amongst
special-forces, air-assault and counter-terrorism others, plus ZFB-05 (Amir 1) and BRDM-2 (Amir 2)
formations. reconnaissance vehicles. Whilst Sudan has imported
In theory, men and women aged between 18 varying quantities of all of these vehicles at some
and 33 are conscripted for one to two years, but point in its history, it is unclear if the MIC has ever
implementation of this is haphazard. There is a produced any of these designs, or how many remain
core of volunteer soldiers, traditionally from the operational with the SAF.
The Sudanese Navy is mainly focused on Darfur as ‘police soldiers’. When the removal of fuel
interdicting smuggling on the Red Sea coast and is subsidies led to protests in Khartoum and other cities
equipped with around 11 patrol boats. The air force in 2013, police soldiers directed by the NISS were
has Russian Su-24 and Su-25 attack aircraft (three accused of killing 200 demonstrators.
Su-24s are deployed in Yemen) obtained from Belarus. Shortly afterwards, elements of the border guard
It also has a number of MiG-29SE fighters, but many and the Central Reserve Police appear to have been
of these appear to be grounded for lack of spare parts. amalgamated by the NISS into the Rapid Support
It is equipped with Antonov transport aircraft, which Forces (RSF), which operated against the Darfur rebel
were reportedly improvised to conduct bombing movements and the SPLM–N in Southern Kordofan
missions during the Darfur conflict. The air force is and Blue Nile. The RSF seem to have made a major
reported to possess more than 50 Russian attack and contribution alongside the SAF to the significant
30 transport helicopters. degrading of the rebel effort since 2014. The RSF,
The NCP regime relies for its security on a range believed to number more than 10,000, are also used
of forces in addition to the SAF. These include the to patrol the border with Libya, in order to reduce the
NISS and various local and tribal militias. The use flow of migrants under the Khartoum Process. There
of tribal militias by the government in the conflicts are reports, denied by the Sudan government, that
in southern and western Sudan stretches back to the the RSF are deployed as part of Sudan’s contribution
democratic government of Sadiq al-Mahdi in 1986– to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. There have been
89. In part, it stems from fears in Khartoum that the numerous reports of RSF brutality and indiscipline,
large number of ordinary SAF soldiers from Darfur including clashes with the SAF. In January 2017, the
and the south might not be prepared to fire on Sudanese parliament passed legislation removing
their own people. After 1989, the Islamist/military the RSF from NISS control and integrating them
regime established the Popular Defence Forces into the SAF, but as a semi-autonomous force under
(PDF). These were militias of Muslim Brotherhood- a commander appointed by the president. There is
oriented civilians, given military training to protect now an official budget line for the RSF. Recently the
the regime against uprisings. PDF units served government has embarked on a weapons-collection
alongside the SAF in the south in the 1990s and in operation, ostensibly to reduce insecurity in Darfur.
Darfur after 2003. In theory, the PDF still exist in In reality, this appears to be designed to reduce the
most towns and villages as a vanguard to protect number of weapons in the hands of the remaining
the regime. Their numbers are estimated at 20,000– border guards and tribal militias, thereby further
40,000, but, in practice, they have been eclipsed by strengthening the hand of the RSF. The weapons-
other irregular forces. collection programme is opposed by those former
During the war in the south in the 1990s, the Janjaweed commanders who did not join the RSF.
Sudanese regime backed breakaway groups from The regime’s overall strategy in Darfur,
the SPLA, which were brought together under the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile appears to be to
umbrella of the Southern Sudan Defence Force. express support for the AU road-map agreement
Sub-Saharan
The regime also supported the LRA, who attacked while blaming divisions among the rebels for its
Africa
the south from bases in the Democratic Republic non-implementation; to maintain the temporary
of the Congo and Uganda. Even recently, the ceasefire while using force to deny the armed
South Sudanese government has accused Sudan of movements control of any more territory; and, where
supporting the LRA. When war broke out in Darfur possible, to win over rebel soldiers with offers of
in 2003, Khartoum supported ‘Janjaweed’ militias salaries and food, with the ultimate objective of
from the nomadic pastoralist Arab tribes, who were integrating them into the SAF.
encouraged to seize land from the Fur and other Very little detail is known about Sudan’s
settled non-Arab tribes regarded as sympathetic to contribution to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen
the rebels of the Sudan Liberation Movement and the beyond the provision of several hundred ground
Justice and Equality Movement. From about 2006, troops and three Su-24 aircraft. Some analysts believe
some of the Janjaweed were moved by SAF military that Sudan’s involvement is greater than generally
intelligence into the more formal structure of the acknowledged, in part because Sudanese troops
border guard. Other Janjaweed were recruited by have more combat experience than those from other
the NISS into the Central Reserve Police, known in countries in the coalition.
Defence economics and industry obtain, although some analysts believe that as well as
Funding for Sudan’s extensive defence and security specific government disbursements, the defence and
structures is set against a complex and uncertain security establishment likely receives funding from
economic background. Traditionally, Sudan’s off-budget sources.
economy was based on agriculture, livestock and Since 1989, with Chinese, Iranian and, initially,
related agribusiness, such as sugar production. But it Bulgarian help, Sudan has developed the third-
has an enormous external-debt overhang from over- largest defence industry in Africa (after Egypt and
ambitious projects in the 1970s, totalling up to US$50 South Africa). Its impressive and relatively low-cost
billion, equivalent to 61% of GDP (and 84% of it is items were on display at IDEX in Abu Dhabi in
in arrears). Furthermore, Sudan was subject to US February 2017. The industry is coordinated by the
sanctions from 1997 to 2017. Separate US and EU MIC, but some plants are ‘privately’ owned (possibly
embargoes on arms sales to Sudan have been in force by the NISS). The Yarmouk Industrial Centre
since 1993–94. produces rockets, heavy artillery, machine guns and
Sudanese oil production commenced in 1999, light weapons. It was rebuilt with Iranian assistance
prompting a mini-boom in Khartoum. Oil revenues after being bombed by Israel in 2012. The Safat
averaged nearly US$5bn a year between 2004 and Aviation Complex maintains aircraft and helicopters,
2008. However, with the independence of South while the Al Zarqa Engineering Complex produces
Sudan in 2011, Sudan lost 75% of its oil reserves and communications equipment. The large GIAD plant,
50% of its oil revenues. Under the CPA, South Sudan located 50km south of Khartoum, produces tanks,
is supposed to pay Sudan transit fees for use of the armoured personnel carriers and self-propelled guns,
pipeline to Port Sudan, plus transitional payments as well as assembling civilian vehicles.
linked to its loss of oil wells. But, initially, South A number of civilian companies are believed to be
Sudan made no payments, leading to a damaging strongly linked to the armed forces, notably Danfodio
closure of the pipeline. Although production resumed (construction, furniture), Al Hiloul al Mutakamila
in 2013, the drop in global oil prices and the civil war (restaurants, media) and Alaia Pharmacology
in South Sudan have kept revenues for Sudan low (medicines). The regime ensures the continuing
(under US$400m in 2017). Khartoum failed to use oil loyalty of former SAF and NISS officers by awarding
revenues to invest in agriculture, instead selling off them lucrative positions in the MIC and its associated
tracts of land to Gulf investors who then employed companies.
small numbers of Sudanese workers. It hopes to
replace some of the oil revenues it used to receive with UGANDA
earnings from gold production, which has increased
significantly in recent years. However, this sector is Uganda’s national-security policy is determined by
not well regulated and the revenues are considerably broader regional security dynamics. Its geographical
less than those from oil in the boom years (under position in a continually fragile setting means that
US$1.5bn in 2016). Uganda needs to be able to respond to border threats
In 2016, Sudan’s balance-of-payments deficit and internal issues caused by regional instability.
amounted to US$5.1bn. Some of this has been made Furthermore, as a small, landlocked country, it
up by undisclosed bailouts from Saudi Arabia and the risks pressures from its larger regional neighbours,
UAE, a reward for the regime’s break with Iran and including the Democratic Republic of the Congo
participation in the war in Yemen. However, Sudan (DRC), Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Tanzania. In
cannot rely on Gulf handouts indefinitely. Inflation addition, Uganda contains multiple ethnic groups,
was 30.5% in 2016 and 21% in 2017, and the value of which straddle its borders with fragile neighbours,
the Sudanese pound has dropped significantly over and the country now hosts Africa’s largest refugee
time (from 2.67 Sudanese pounds to one US dollar population at over 1.2 million people, including
in 2011, to 6.48 in 2017). The situation is complicated 950,000 from South Sudan, 227,000 from the DRC and
by the existence of official, parallel and black-market 45,000 from Burundi.
exchange rates, with members of the defence and The last decade has seen a proliferation of defence
security establishment apparently benefiting from agreements between Uganda and its neighbours
trading between the different rates. Information on and more distant allies. These include Rwanda in
Sudan’s defence and security budgeting is difficult to 2012 and 2014, Kenya in 2014, South Sudan in 2014,
Ethiopia in 2015, Qatar in 2017 and a still-to-be- Somalia. It maintains a 530-strong UN guard unit in
signed agreement with Tanzania in 2017. In addition, Somalia, essentially based at Mogadishu airport and
Uganda has a well-developed security relationship mandated to protect UN personnel and installations.
with Djibouti and Somalia, through their engagement The other UPDF UN peacekeeping contingent is in
in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). UNMISS, again highlighting the now local focus of
Uganda’s leading role in AMISOM means that the UPDF operations.
country has received extensive external assistance,
notably from the United States through the Africa Internal threats
Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Amongst Uganda’s internal security threats, the
(ACOTA) programme, from the United Kingdom rebel Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rank highest.
through the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (now This group was formerly based in western Uganda,
renamed the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund and is now largely in the eastern DRC, particularly
(CSSF)) and from the European Union through the North Kivu. It was reported in April 2013 that
EU Training Mission (EUTM) for Somalia, which was the ADF had started a recruitment campaign in
based at Bihanga Camp in Uganda before it moved Kampala and other parts of the country. The DRC
to the Somali capital, Mogadishu. In addition, like government, citing civil-society groups in North
many of its neighbours, Uganda has become a major Kivu, has claimed that al-Shabaab fighters from
customer for Chinese defence sales. Somalia are collaborating with the ADF. Given
the Islamist nature of the ADF and al-Shabaab’s
Regional deployments focus on Uganda, as a result of UPDF operations
The ongoing civil war in South Sudan prompted an in Somalia, this is a plausible link. Similar claims of
early response from Uganda, with the deployment al-Shabaab links with Boko Haram have been made
of troops to Bor in 2013–14 in order to prevent the and substantiated in the past.
collapse of the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation In August 2016, Ugandan President Yoweri
Movement (SPLM). Whether this was done to protect Museveni and DRC President Joseph Kabila
Ugandan nationals in South Sudan, or to preserve announced a coordinated military strategy against the
political and personal relationships between the two ADF. The UPDF continues to closely coordinate with
regimes and leaders, it had the effect of keeping the the DRC armed forces on their side of the border, but,
SPLM in power in South Sudan. as of summer 2017, UPDF operations appeared to be
However, steadily increasing foreign and regional limited to liaison and security duties in the border
security engagement through the United Nations areas. Should the ADF present a significant threat
Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and, from summer or target in the future, relations between the DRC
2017, the first deployment of the long-awaited and Uganda are such that some form of coordinated
Intergovernmental Authority on Development response is possible, but a major cross-border
(IGAD) Regional Protection Force (comprising operation between the two seems unlikely.
Ethiopia, Kenya and Rwanda) has limited Uganda’s
Sub-Saharan
military freedom of action in South Sudan. Operational capability
Africa
Up to 2,000 Uganda People’s Defence Force Uganda’s purchase of six Su-30 Flanker fighter
(UPDF) troops from the African Union Regional aircraft from Russia in 2011–12, at a cost of US$740m,
Cooperation Initiative against the Lord’s Resistance reflects Uganda’s need to be able to influence the
Army (RCI–LRA) have been withdrawn. The move security situation around its new oil-exploration and
was carried out in concert with the withdrawal of -exploitation activities in the Lake Albert region. The
US special forces that had been deployed under purchase is said by Uganda to be a purely defensive
Operation Observant Compass, established by the acquisition, but its newly enhanced ability to project
Obama administration in 2013. This withdrawal power on and across its eastern border with the
followed the decision by South Sudan to stop hosting DRC may have been a factor in Kinshasa’s recent
the headquarters of the RCI. The move again limited acquisition of 25 modernised T-64BV-1 main battle
the UPDF’s external operations, leaving the focus of tanks from Ukraine. It is unclear where else the DRC
these on the UPDF’s AMISOM contributions. would need to deploy such assets.
The UPDF has withdrawn almost all its troops The political and defence commitment to engaging
from UN operations, except missions related to in Somalia has also brought a number of significant
SOUTH SUDAN
KENYA
HQ 4 HQ 5 HQ 3
Division Division Division
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO Gulu
Moroto
• Recruit Training
Lira • Motor infantry brigade
School
• Air Defence and
• Special Forces
Lake Albert Artillery School
School UGANDA
• Oliver Tambo
Leadership School • Air-force base
Nakasongola • Air Force Academy
Singo Peace Support

• Engineering College and
Training Centre and
University of Military
Urban Warfare
Science and Technology
School
• Signals School
Mubende
Armoured Warfare • Senior Command
Kampala and Staff College
Training School
Entebbe • Junior Staff College
• NCO Academy
Military
Academy Masaka
Lake Victoria
Mbarara
Bihanga Military
Training School
HQ 2 Armoured Marines Air-force

Division brigade base
© IISS
Map 13 Uganda: military facilities
improvements in UPDF equipment and capabilities that improvements could in time have an effect
from international partners, in particular in areas throughout the force.
that have relevance to the UPDF’s internal-security For the Ugandan Army and the Marines – the latter
and border-protection roles. A case in point is the US a small, 400-strong capability based on Lake Victoria
Army’s provision of five Bell Huey II helicopters, in a but deployed in Somalia since 2008 – training such
programme valued at US$35m. (These aircraft were as that provided by the US ACOTA programme, the
due to be delivered by the end of 2017.) The UPDF US AFRICOM Cutlass Express and Flintlock exercises,
currently has only limited helicopter assets for a the UK CSSF and the EUTM assistance to Uganda
country in which military deployment by road can in training the Somali National Army has changed
be slow and dangerous. Although these helicopters the nature of service in the UPDF. Every UPDF
are intended to improve the delivery of supplies and soldier is familiar with engaging and training with
personnel to Uganda’s operations in Somalia, their international partners and allies in the fight against
presence will have a knock-on effect throughout the extremism. Although focused on Somalia, this
UPDF system, maturing and enhancing capabilities professionalisation of training has become the norm
such as air-force maintenance and servicing. The within the Ugandan system. A very comprehensive
air force’s small size and the central location of its series of military schools, largely based on the UK
main base at Nakasongola, north of Kampala, mean model, has been established and is functioning well.
The leaderships of the principal schools, for example country has experienced a drought, leading to lower
the Senior and Junior Staff Colleges and the Military agricultural output. In response, the IMF revised
Academy, have been selected for their extensive its 2017 growth estimate downwards, from 5.0% to
command and staff experience in AMISOM and 4.4%.
with the UN. This has resulted in a well-developed In the next ten years, oil revenues and taxes are
system of training and education, which has itself had expected to become a larger source of government
an effect upon recruitment and retention and on the funding. However, lower oil prices, combined with
standing of the UPDF as a national institution. protracted negotiations and legal disputes between
The past ten years of operations in Somalia have the Ugandan government and oil companies, may
brought a maturity and a level of international prove a stumbling block to further exploration and
experience to the UPDF that is unusual in an African development. In addition, instability in South Sudan
setting for such a small army (only 45,000 strong). has led to a sharp increase in Sudanese refugees and
Continuous international support to the UPDF, has disrupted Uganda’s main export market.
support that is improving in quantity and quality, Uganda’s budget is dominated by energy- and
has seen the UPDF develop into one of Africa’s most road-infrastructure spending, while relying on
capable forces, particularly on land. Operations in donor support for long-term drivers of growth,
Somalia have taught the UPDF the value of night- including agriculture, health and education. The
vision aids, body armour, mine-protected vehicles, largest infrastructure projects are externally financed
counter-improvised-explosive-device systems and through low-interest concessional loans; debt
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The provision of servicing for these loans is expected to increase and to
these items has come in tandem with training in their absorb an increasing proportion of available foreign
use, both in terms of doctrine, tactics, techniques and exchange in the coming five years.
procedures, and in planning and conducting effective, In this increasingly unfavourable economic
intelligence-led counter-insurgency operations. The outlook, defence expenditure declined from Ush1.64
UPDF is now the key driver of the AU’s AMISOM trillion (US$478m) in 2016 to Ush1.58trn (US$436m)
lessons-identified/-learned process. Given the in 2017. The government planned a further decline
international reliance on Uganda as the backbone of in 2018 to Ush1.12trn (estimated at US$299m). The
AMISOM, the UPDF and its international partners defence budget is expected to rise again only in 2019,
probably assimilate and act on the lessons from to Ush1.29trn (estimated at US$336m).
Somalia better than any other AMISOM contributor. While the bulk of the UPDF is relatively cheap to
This ten-year period of development and accommodate, pay, train and equip, the increasing
maturation has put Uganda in an advantageous appetite and need for sophisticated capabilities,
position for future engagement in international highlighted by the lessons learned from AMISOM,
missions, when the UPDF’s commitment to and developments and acquisitions by regional
Somalia is reduced. These operations may come competitors such as the DRC, Ethiopia and Kenya,
under the auspices of the African Union under its will continue. Some of this will be met by donors and
Sub-Saharan
African Standby Force structure, such as the Rapid allies in the context of AMISOM/Somalia, as shown
Africa
Deployment Capability in the regional Eastern by the US provision of armoured personnel carriers,
African Standby Force, or the stopgap African helicopters and UAVs, while others, such as new
Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises initiated aircraft not committed to operations in Somalia, will
in 2013, of which Uganda was a founding member. have to be funded from the domestic defence budget.
Or they may come under the UN or in coalitions of Engagement in UN peacekeeping operations
the willing, perhaps even outside Africa. It remains normally brings considerable revenues directly into
to be seen how the AU, EU and UN intend to draw the national defence budget. However, relatively few
down the AMISOM/Somalia operations, but one Ugandan troops are paid via this income stream.
of their legacies will be to leave a deployable and Meanwhile, 80% of the EU’s reimbursement for
effective regional capability in the form of the UPDF. AMISOM operations, through the EU’s Africa Peace
Facility, goes directly to the troops, without passing
Defence economics through the national defence budget. This may be
According to the IMF, Uganda’s economy grew good for recruitment and retention, but allows little
at a rate of 2.3% in 2016. However, since then the flexibility for the UPDF.
Defence industry Of the NEC’s subsidiaries, Luwero Industries,

Uganda’s defence industry, in the form of the National established in 1992, is the most important provider of
Enterprise Corporation (NEC), was established in domestic defence production and repair. The factory at
1989 to serve as the industrial and commercial arm of Nakasongola produces ammunition and low-velocity
the defence ministry and the UPDF, and to produce armour-piercing and anti-personnel grenades, and
goods and services beneficial to the defence forces reportedly has the capacity to rebuild 60 varying types
and the general public. In this regard, it was similar of infantry fighting vehicles, 200 soft-skin vehicles,
to the Ethiopian Defence Industry Sector established 20,000 small-calibre rifles and 300 large-calibre
in the same period, and has to an extent developed weapons per year. Luwero Industries is the main
in the same way as a national industry serving not manufacturer of spare parts for UPDF equipment.
only defence but also a wider civil requirement. In Given that the local defence sector lacks
the Ugandan case in particular, this framework was technologically advanced capabilities, Ugandan
intended to directly support the UPDF with a view to defence exports will remain negligible, and virtually
redeploying and providing employment to soldiers all new Ugandan defence procurements will continue
who were involved in the 1978–79 liberation war, to be sourced from abroad. However, Uganda sees
and to produce goods and services for the army, with Luwero Industries as a centre of excellence in the East
profits being used to improve the welfare of soldiers. African Community, and it has established regional
In 1995, the Ugandan parliament mandated the partnerships with defence industries in other IGAD
NEC to produce goods and services for the UPDF’s member states. Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan, when
consumption. political conditions permit, offer opportunities for
The corporation now consists of five subsidiaries: regional defence-industry cooperation. For example,
NEC Construction Works and Engineering, Luwero Ethiopia has undertaken servicing work on Ugandan
Industries, NEC Tractor Hire Scheme and NEC aircraft and refurbished Ugandan large-calibre
Farm Katonga, plus a new subsidiary, NEC Uzima ammunition in the past.
Ltd, involved in the production of mineral water Given the economic constraints outlined above,
in a factory located in Kakiri barracks, Wakiso Uganda’s defence industry is likely to grow
district. In addition, the NEC has developed two only slowly in the coming five years. However,
joint ventures with foreign companies, including regional defence industries, when taken as a whole,
UgIran Company Limited, which was founded are beginning to amount to a considerable and
in 2008 in Kampala (and is 60% Iranian- and 40% comprehensive, if not yet technologically leading-
Ugandan-owned) to manufacture and assemble edge, capability. IGAD nations should be expected
tractors using licensed design kits delivered from to continue to build on the synergy offered by this
the Iran Tractor Manufacturing Company’s Iranian cluster, and to fulfil each other’s niche requirements
factories. when possible.
1 (2nd) div (3 mot inf bde, 3 inf bde, 1 arty regt)

Angola ANG 1 (3rd) div (2 mot inf bde, 3 inf bde)
New Angolan Kwanza 1 (4th) div (1 tk regt, 5 mot inf bde, 2 inf bde, 1 engr bde)
2016 2017 2018
AOA 1 (5th) div (2 inf bde)
GDP AOA 15.6tr 20.6tr 1 (6th) div (1 mot inf bde, 2 inf bde, 1 engr bde)
US$ 95.3bn 124bn COMBAT SUPPORT
per capita US$ 3,485 4,401 Some engr units
Growth % -0.7 1.5 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Inflation % 32.4 30.9 Some log units
Def bdgt AOA 486bn 536bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†
US$ 2.97bn 3.23bn
MBT 300: ε200 T-54/T-55; 50 T-62; 50 T-72
USD1=AOA 163.59 165.89
LT TK 10 PT-76
Population 29,310,273 ASLT 3+ PTL-02 Assaulter
Ethnic groups: Ovimbundu 37%; Kimbundu 25%; Bakongo 13% RECCE 600 BRDM-2
IFV 250 BMP-1/BMP-2
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus APC 246
Male 23.0% 4.9% 4.0% 3.3% 11.5% 1.0% APC (T) 31 MT-LB
Female 24.2% 5.1% 4.3% 3.7% 12.7% 1.4% APC (W) 170+: ε170 BTR-152/BTR-60/BTR-80; WZ-551
(CP)
Capabilities PPV 45 Casspir NG2000
ABCV BMD-3
The armed forces’ role is to ensure sovereignty and territo- ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
rial integrity, while maritime security and the protection ARV T-54/T-55
of offshore resources is an increasing focus. Angola held MW Bozena
defence discussions with South Korea in late 2016, with ARTILLERY 1,408+
the focus on the potential for naval cooperation. A main
SP 16+: 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 4 2S3 Akatsiya;
security concern comes from secessionists in the Cabinda
203mm 12 2S7 Pion
enclave. Force health and education have been investment
TOWED 552: 122mm 500 D-30; 130mm 48 M-46; 152mm
priorities. Improving the military-logistics system has also
4 D-20
been identified as a key requirement; however, it is not clear
MRL 90+: 122mm 90: 50 BM-21 Grad; 40 RM-70; 240mm
that significant improvements have been made. The armed
BM-24
forces train regularly and in the past year have participated
MOR 750: 82mm 250; 120mm 500
in multinational exercises with the US and others, includ-
ing Obangame Express 2017. Angola also participated in the ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Utulivu Africa III with the ACIRC. On paper, the army and MSL • MANPATS 9K11 (AT-3 Sagger)
air force constitute a significant force, but equipment avail- RCL 500: 400 82mm B-10/107mm B-11†; 106mm 100†
ability and serviceability remain questionable; nonetheless, GUNS • SP 100mm SU-100†
Angola is the only state in the region with strategic-airlift AIR DEFENCE
capacity in the form of Il-76s. In September 2017 it began to SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K36
take delivery of the first of 12 second-hand Su-30K Flanker Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet)
fighter aircraft, which will improve its multi-role air cap GUNS
Sub-Saharan
ability. There are plans to modernise equipment, particu- SP 23mm ZSU-23-4
Africa
larly that associated with the maritime-security capability, TOWED 450+: 14.5mm ZPU-4; 23mm ZU-23-2; 37mm
in light of security concerns in the Gulf of Guinea, but these M-1939; 57mm S-60
ambitions have been hit by the fall in oil prices.
Navy ε1,000
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PCO 2 Ngola Kiluange with 1 hel landing platform
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE (Ministry of Fisheries)
PCC 5 Rei Bula Matadi (Ministry of Fisheries)
Army 100,000 PBF 5 PVC-170
FORCES BY ROLE PB 9: 4 Mandume; 5 Comandante Imperial Santana
MANOEUVRE (Ministry of Fisheries)
Armoured
1 tk bde Coastal Defence
Light EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 SF bde COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 4K44 Utyos (SS-C-1B
1 (1st) div (1 mot inf bde, 2 inf bde) Sepal – at Luanda)
Air Force/Air Defence 6,000 Short-range 37: 25 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful); 12 S-125
FORCES BY ROLE Pechora (SA-3 Goa)
FIGHTER Point-defence 45: 10 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher)†; 15
1 sqn with MiG-21bis/MF Fishbed 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); 20 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9 Gaskin)
1 sqn with Su-27/Su-27UB/Su-30K Flanker AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡; R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73
1 sqn with MiG-23BN/ML/UB Flogger (AA-11 Archer); IR/SARH R-23/24 (AA-7 Apex)‡; R-27
1 sqn with Su-22 Fitter D (AA-10 Alamo)
1 sqn with Su-25 Frogfoot ASM AT-2 Swatter; HOT
MARITIME PATROL ARM Kh-28 (AS-9 Kyle)
1 sqn with F-27-200 MPA; C-212 Aviocar
TRANSPORT Paramilitary 10,000
3 sqn with An-12 Cub; An-26 Curl; An-32 Cline; An-
72 Coaler; BN-2A Islander; C-212 Aviocar; Do-28D Rapid-Reaction Police 10,000
Skyservant; EMB-135BJ Legacy 600 (VIP); Il-76TD Candid
TRAINING
1 sqn with Cessna 172K/R
Benin BEN
1 sqn with EMB-312 Tucano CFA Franc BCEAO fr 2016 2017 2018
1 sqn with L-29 Delfin; L-39 Albatros GDP fr 5.08tr 5.47tr
1 sqn with PC-7 Turbo Trainer; PC-9*
US$ 8.58bn 9.41bn
1 sqn with Z-142
ATTACK HELICOPTER per capita US$ 771 826
2 sqn with Mi-24/Mi-35 Hind; SA342M Gazelle (with Growth % 4.0 5.4
HOT) Inflation % -0.8 2.0
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Def bdgt fr 58.2bn 67.9bn
2 sqn with AS565; SA316 Alouette III (IAR-316) (trg) US$ 98m 117m
1 sqn with Bell 212
US$1=fr 592.73 581.55
1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H
1 sqn with Mi-171Sh Population 11,038,805
AIR DEFENCE
5 bn/10 bty with S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa); 9K35 Strela-10 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
(SA-13 Gopher)†; 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful); 9K33 Osa Male 21.8% 5.6% 4.7% 3.8% 13.0% 1.1%
(SA-8 Gecko); 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9 Gaskin); S-75M Female 20.8% 5.4% 4.6% 3.8% 13.3% 1.7%
Volkhov (SA-2 Guideline)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† Capabilities
The country’s small armed forces mainly focus on border
FTR 26: 6 Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker; 2 Su-30K Flanker; 18
and internal security, as well as combating illicit trafficking.
MiG-23ML Flogger
Benin took steps to increase border patrols and security, fol-
FGA 42+: 20 MiG-21bis/MF Fishbed; 8 MiG-23BN/UB
lowing increased concern over the threat from Boko Haram
Flogger; 13 Su-22 Fitter D; 1+ Su-24 Fencer
ATK 10: 8 Su-25 Frogfoot; 2 Su-25UB Frogfoot and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Maritime security is a
ELINT 1 B-707 priority in light of continuing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.
TPT 56: Heavy 4 Il-76TD Candid; Medium 6 An-12 Cub; Benin’s small navy has been trying to bolster its anti-pira-
Light 46: 12 An-26 Curl; 2 An-32 Cline; 8 An-72 Coaler; 8 cy capability by acquiring high-speed craft. The air force
BN-2A Islander; 2 C-212; 5 Cessna 172K; 6 Cessna 172R; is developing a surveillance role. The army and national
1 Do-28D Skyservant; 1 EMB-135BJ Legacy 600 (VIP); 1 police have received training from the US to boost border-
Yak-40 surveillance capacity, while French forces based in Senegal
TRG 42: 13 EMB-312 Tucano; 6 EMB-314 Super Tucano*; are also heavily involved in similar assistance. As part of
6 L-29 Delfin; 2 L-39C Albatros; 5 PC-7 Turbo Trainer; 4 the France–Benin military-cooperation agreement, France
PC-9*; 6 Z-142 trained personnel from the Military Engineering corps in
HELICOPTERS 2017. Benin contributes 750 troops to the Multi-National
ATK 56: 34 Mi-24 Hind; 22 Mi-35 Hind Joint Task Force fighting Boko Haram. In April 2017, Benin
MRH 25: 8 AS565 Panther; 9 SA316 Alouette III (IAR-316) joined the counter-Boko Haram Unified Focus tabletop ex-
(incl trg); 8 SA342M Gazelle ercise. The government is looking to merge the police and
MRH/TPT 35: 27 Mi-8 Hip/Mi-17 Hip H; 8 Mi-171Sh gendarmerie in 2018.
Terminator
TPT • Light 8 Bell 212 ACTIVE 7,250 (Army 6,500 Navy 500 Air 250)
AIR DEFENCE • SAM 122 Paramilitary 2,500
Medium-range 40 S-75M Volkhov (SA-2 Guideline)‡ Conscript liability 18 months (selective)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE CHAD

Lake Chad Basin Commission • MNJTF 150
Army 6,500 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
FORCES BY ROLE UN • MONUSCO 453; 5 obs; 1 inf bn(-)
MANOEUVRE
LIBERIA
Armoured
UN • UNMIL 1 obs
2 armd sqn
Light MALI
1 (rapid reaction) mot inf bn UN • MINUSMA 260; 2 obs; 1 mech inf coy(+)
8 inf bn
SOUTH SUDAN
Air Manoeuvre
1 AB bn
COMBAT SUPPORT SUDAN
2 arty bn UN • UNISFA 2 obs
1 engr bn
1 sigs bn
Botswana BWA
1 log bn Botswana Pula P 2016 2017 2018
1 spt bn GDP P 170bn 180bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE US$ 15.6bn 16.7bn
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES per capita US$ 7,227 7,674
LT TK 18 PT-76†
Growth % 4.3 4.5
RECCE 34: 3 AML-90; 14 BRDM-2; 7 M8; 10 VBL
Inflation % 2.8 3.7
APC 34
APC (T) 22 M113 Def bdgt [a] P 6.11bn 5.30bn
PPV 12: 2 Bastion APC; 10 Casspir NG US$ 561m 492m
ARTILLERY 16+ US$1=P 10.90 10.78
TOWED 105mm 16: 12 L118 Light Gun; 4 M101 [a] Defence, justice and security budget
MOR 81mm some; 120mm some
Navy ε500 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Male 16.1% 4.7% 4.6% 4.1% 16.3% 2.3%
Female 15.8% 4.8% 4.7% 4.5% 18.9% 3.0%
PB 6: 2 Matelot Brice Kpomasse (ex-PRC); 3 FPB 98; 1 27m
(PRC)
Capabilities
Air Force 250 Key tasks for the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) include
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ensuring territorial integrity, coupled with domestic tasks
AIRCRAFT such as anti-poaching, and there is a history of involve-
TPT 3: Light 1 DHC-6 Twin Otter†; PAX 2: 1 B-727; 1 ment in peacekeeping operations. Botswana has a good
Sub-Saharan
relationship with the US and regularly sends its officers
HS-748†
Africa
to train there. Military forces also train with other African
TRG 2 LH-10 Ellipse
nations, including taking part in the Blue Kunene 2017 hu-
HELICOPTERS
manitarian-aid and disaster-relief exercise. The air force is
TPT • Light 5: 4 AW109BA; 1 AS350B Ecureuil†
looking to replace its ageing F-5 fighter aircraft, with the
Swedish Gripen and South Korean FA-50 reportedly being
Paramilitary 2,500 considered. In January 2017, Botswana and South Korea
signed a military-cooperation umbrella agreement. Deliv-
Gendarmerie 2,500
ery of short-range ground-based air-defence systems from
FORCES BY ROLE MBDA may also have begun during 2017. The replacement
MANOEUVRE of the F-5, when combined with improved ground-based
Other air defences, would enhance Botswana’s ability to defend
4 (mobile) paramilitary coy its own air space. The latest BDF commander, when ap-
pointed in September 2016, identified priorities including
DEPLOYMENT improving conditions of service, a focus on overhauling
retirement ages and boosting capability. The BDF has also
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC been working on a doctrine that is believed to be heav-
UN • MINUSCA 5; 3 obs ily influenced by US concepts and practice. Local reports
suggest a limited capacity in armoured-vehicle mainte- TRANSPORT

nance. Growing relations with Beijing have seen some mili- 2 sqn with BD-700 Global Express; BN-2A/B Defender*;
tary personnel travel to China for training. The operations Beech 200 Super King Air (VIP); C-130B Hercules;
centre for the SADC Standby Force is located in Gaborone. C-212-300 Aviocar; CN-235M-100; Do-328-110 (VIP)
Botswana holds biannual exercises with Namibia; the most TRAINING
recent was in August 2016 and practised joint peacekeep- 1 sqn with PC-7 MkII Turbo Trainer*
ing missions and other support operations for the SADC. TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 sqn with AS350B Ecureuil; Bell 412EP/SP Twin Huey;
ACTIVE 9,000 (Army 8,500 Air 500) EC225LP Super Puma
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FTR 14: 9 F-5A Freedom Fighter; 5 F-5D Tiger II
Army 8,500 ISR 5 O-2 Skymaster
TPT 19: Medium 3 C-130B Hercules; Light 15: 4 BN-2
FORCES BY ROLE
Defender*; 6 BN-2B Defender*; 1 Beech 200 King Air (VIP);
MANOEUVRE
1 C-212-300 Aviocar; 2 CN-235M-100; 1 Do-328-110
Armoured
(VIP); PAX 1 BD700 Global Express
1 armd bde(-) TRG 5 PC-7 MkII Turbo Trainer*
Light HELICOPTERS
2 inf bde (1 armd recce regt, 4 inf bn, 1 cdo unit, 1 engr MRH 7: 2 Bell 412EP Twin Huey; 5 Bell 412SP Twin Huey
regt, 1 log bn, 2 ADA regt) TPT 9: Medium 1 EC225LP Super Puma; Light 8 AS350B
COMBAT SUPPORT Ecureuil
1 arty bde
1 engr coy
1 sigs coy Burkina Faso BFA
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT CFA Franc BCEAO fr 2016 2017 2018
1 log gp
GDP fr 7.19tr 7.80tr
AIR DEFENCE
1 AD bde(-) US$ 12.1bn 13.2bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE per capita US$ 658 696
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Growth % 5.9 6.4
LT TK 45: ε20 SK-105 Kuerassier; 25 FV101 Scorpion Inflation % -0.2 1.5
RECCE 72+: RAM-V-1; ε8 RAM-V-2; 64 VBL Def bdgt fr 88.6bn 112bn
APC • APC (W) 145: 50 BTR-60; 50 LAV-150 Commando
US$ 150m 189m
(some with 90mm gun); 45 MOWAG Piranha III
US$1=fr 592.73 591.28
AUV 6 FV103 Spartan
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES Population 20,107,509
ARV 2 Greif; M578
MW Aardvark Mk2 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Male 22.5% 5.4% 4.6% 3.8% 12.5% 0.9%
MSL Female 22.4% 5.4% 4.6% 3.8% 12.5% 1.5%
SP V-150 TOW
MANPATS TOW Capabilities
In August 2017, a terrorist attack in Ouagadougou under-
ARTILLERY 78
scored the country’s continuing security challenges, with
TOWED 30: 105mm 18: 12 L118 Light Gun; 6 Model 56
the conflict in Mali spilling out into Burkina Faso. The coun-
pack howitzer; 155mm 12 Soltam
try is participating in the G-5 Sahel initiative supported by
MRL 122mm 20 APRA-40
European countries, notably France and Germany. As part
MOR 28: 81mm 22; 120mm 6 M-43
of this, France has supplied armed pick-up trucks. The al-
AIR DEFENCE Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb threat has led Ouagadougou
SAM • Point-defence Javelin; 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 to refocus its military efforts to the north. There is coopera-
Gimlet); 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡ tion with France and Mali aimed at tackling the Islamist
GUNS • TOWED 20mm 7 M167 Vulcan threat, as seen in Operation Panga in April 2017, in the area
straddling the border shared by Burkina Faso and Mali.
Air Wing 500 President Kaboré has stated that overhauling the army is
FORCES BY ROLE a priority, in order to ensure that it is independent, apo-
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK litical and more effective, particularly in the counter-terror-
1 sqn with F-5A Freedom Fighter; F-5D Tiger II ism role. However, the armed forces have struggled with
ISR funding issues, which is reflected in the equipment inven-
1 sqn with O-2 Skymaster tory. Air-force rotary-wing capacity is developing, with the
arrival of ex-Taiwanese UH-1 helicopters, for which the EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

US is providing training, and an order for Mi-171Sh heli- AIRCRAFT 5 combat capable
copters from Russia. The army has deployed personnel ISR 1 DA42M (reported)
on a range of UN peacekeeping operations, including in TPT 9: Light 8: 1 AT-802 Air Tractor; 2 Beech 200 King
Mali. But in order to help deal with domestic-security chal- Air; 1 CN235-220; 1 PA-34 Seneca; 3 Tetras; PAX 1 B-727
lenges, in 2017 Burkina Faso began to withdraw its forces (VIP)
deployed to the UN mission in Darfur. TRG 5: 3 EMB-314 Super Tucano*; 2 SF-260WL Warrior*
HELICOPTERS
ACTIVE 11,200 (Army 6,400 Air 600 Gendarmerie
ATK 2 Mi-35 Hind
4,200) Paramilitary 250
MRH 3: 2 Mi-17 Hip H; 1 AW139
TPT 4: Medium 1 Mi-8 Hip; Light 3: 1 AS350 Ecureuil; 2
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE UH-1H Huey
Army 6,400 Gendarmerie 4,200

Three military regions. In 2011, several regiments were
disbanded and merged into other formations, including Paramilitary 250
the new 24th and 34th régiments interarmes
FORCES BY ROLE People’s Militia (R) 45,000 reservists (trained)
MANOEUVRE
Security Company 250
Mechanised
1 cbd arms regt
Light DEPLOYMENT
1 cbd arms regt
6 inf regt
Air Manoeuvre
1 AB regt (1 CT coy) DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
COMBAT SUPPORT UN • MONUSCO 7 obs
1 arty bn (2 arty tp)
1 engr bn MALI
UN • MINUSMA 1,716; 2 inf bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES SUDAN
RECCE 91+: 19 AML-60/AML-90; 8+ Bastion Patsas; 24 UN • UNAMID 73; 4 obs
EE-9 Cascavel; 30 Ferret; 2 M20; 8 M8 UN • UNISFA 1 obs
APC 44+
APC (W) 13+: 13 Panhard M3; Some Bastion APC
PPV 31 Puma M26-15 FOREIGN FORCES
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE France Operation Barkhane 250; 1 SF gp
RCL 75mm Type-52 (M20); 84mm Carl Gustav
ARTILLERY 50+
TOWED 14: 105mm 8 M101; 122mm 6
Burundi BDI
Sub-Saharan
MRL 9: 107mm ε4 Type-63; 122mm 5 APR-40 Burundi Franc fr 2016 2017 2018
Africa
MOR 27+: 81mm Brandt; 82mm 15; 120mm 12
AIR DEFENCE
US$ 3.14bn 3.39bn
SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
GUNS • TOWED 42: 14.5mm 30 ZPU; 20mm 12 TCM-20 per capita US$ 325 343
Growth % -1.04 0.0
Air Force 600 Inflation % 5.5 18.0
FORCES BY ROLE Def bdgt fr 110bn 110bn
GROUND ATTACK/TRAINING US$ 66m 63m
1 sqn with SF-260WL Warrior*; Embraer EMB-314 Super US$1=fr 1,654.66 1,730.71
Tucano*
TRANSPORT
1 sqn with AT-802 Air Tractor; B-727 (VIP); Beech 200 Ethnic groups: Hutu 85%; Tutsi 14%
King Air; CN235-220; PA-34 Seneca
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 22.9% 5.2% 4.3% 3.7% 12.4% 1.1%
1 sqn with AS350 Ecureuil; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-35
Hind Female 22.6% 5.2% 4.4% 3.7% 12.7% 1.5%
APC 82
Capabilities APC (W) 60: 20 BTR-40; 10 BTR-80; 9 Panhard M3; 15
Burundi’s armed forces retain a limited capability to deploy Type-92; 6 Walid
externally, and maintain a deployment to the AMISOM PPV 34: 12 Casspir; 12 RG-31 Nyala; 10 RG-33L
mission in Somalia. In 2015, the cohesiveness of the armed AUV 15 Cougar 4×4
forces and the wider security and intelligence machinery ARTILLERY 120
was tested by the attempted coup against incumbent TOWED 122mm 18 D-30
President Nkurunziza. Previous military training activity MRL 122mm 12 BM-21 Grad
with international partners largely stalled in 2015 as a MOR 90: 82mm 15 M-43; 120mm ε75
result of this situation. Intermittent violence, and targeted ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL • MANPATS Milan (reported)
attacks, continue in the country, particularly in urban areas,
RCL 75mm Type-52 (M20)
and refugee flows continue to neighbouring countries.
AIR DEFENCE
Notwithstanding the effect on the armed forces of the coup
attempt and its aftermath, they have benefited from this
GUNS • TOWED 150+: 14.5mm 15 ZPU-4; 135+ 23mm
training support as well as from their recent deployments,
ZU-23/37mm Type-55 (M-1939)
including to the UN mission in the CAR and to AMISOM,
where they have gained valuable combat experience and
Navy 50
specialist military skills. Burundi suffered combat losses
in Somalia in 2017, and rotated a new battalion into the EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AMISOM deployment in August. A dispute over funding PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 4
AMPHIBIOUS • LCT 2
for Burundi’s AMISOM mission (where EU concern over
human-rights issues meant that Brussels reportedly routed Air Wing 200
these payments through the AU) was seemingly resolved in
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
early 2017, with the EU now disbursing funds to a private
bank in Burundi. Other foreign donors have curtailed or
TPT 2: Light 2 Cessna 150L†
cut aid following the 2015 election result.
TRG 1 SF-260W Warrior*
ACTIVE 30,050 (Army 30,000 Navy 50) Paramilitary HELICOPTERS
21,000 ATK 2 Mi-24 Hind
DDR efforts continue, while activities directed at profes- MRH 2 SA342L Gazelle
sionalising the security forces have taken place, some spon- TPT • Medium (2 Mi-8 Hip non-op)
sored by BNUB, the UN mission
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE General Administration of State Security
ε1,000
Army 30,000
Imbonerakure ε20,000
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Mechanised DEPLOYMENT
2 lt armd bn (sqn)
Light
UN • MINUSCA 761; 8 obs; 1 inf bn
7 inf bn
Some indep inf coy SOMALIA
COMBAT SUPPORT AU • AMISOM 5,432; 6 inf bn
1 arty bn UN • UNSOM 1 obs
1 engr bn
SUDAN
AIR DEFENCE
1 AD bn
UN • UNISFA 2 obs
Reserves
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Light
10 inf bn (reported)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
RECCE 55: 6 AML-60; 12 AML-90; 30 BRDM-2; 7 S52
Shorland
Air Manoeuvre
Cameroon CMR 1 cdo/AB bn
CFA Franc BEAC fr 2016 2017 2018 Other
1 (Presidential Guard) gd bn
COMBAT SUPPORT
US$ 29.3bn 30.7bn 1 arty regt (5 arty bty)
per capita US$ 1,238 1,263 3 engr regt
Growth % 4.7 4.0 AIR DEFENCE
Inflation % 0.9 0.7 1 AD regt (6 AD bty)
Def bdgt fr 230bn 239bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US$ 388m 404m ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
US$1=fr 592.71 591.27
ASLT 18: 6 AMX-10RC; ε12 PTL-02 mod (Cara 105)
RECCE 64: 31 AML-90; 15 Ferret; 8 M8; 5 RAM Mk3; 5
Population 24,994,885 VBL
IFV 42: 8 LAV-150 Commando with 20mm gun; 14 LAV-
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
150 Commando with 90mm gun; 12 Ratel-20 (Engr); ε8
Male 21.3% 5.3% 4.5% 4.0% 13.4% 1.5% Type-07P
Female 21.0% 5.2% 4.5% 3.9% 13.4% 1.7% APC 49
APC (T) 12 M3 half-track
Capabilities APC (W) 21 LAV-150 Commando
Although internal stability has long been a focus for PPV 16 Gaia Thunder
Cameroon’s armed forces, the threat from Boko Haram AUV 6 Cougar 4×4
has generated a significant response, particularly in the ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
northern area of the country bordering Nigeria. Many ele- ARV WZ-551 ARV
ments of Cameroon’s equipment inventory are ageing, but ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
infantry fighting vehicles and other armour were in recent MSL
years acquired from China and South Africa. Improving SP 24 TOW (on Jeeps)
ISR capability is a priority that the government is hoping MANPATS Milan
to address by buying aircraft and UAVs. The government RCL 53: 75mm 13 Type-52 (M20); 106mm 40 M40A2
is looking to increase the size of its armed forces by over ARTILLERY 106+
1,000 personnel in order to intensify the fight against Boko SP 155mm 18 ATMOS 2000
Haram. France, the US and others continue to provide sup- TOWED 52: 105mm 20 M101; 130mm 24: 12 M-1982
port and training for the armed forces and gendarmerie. (reported); 12 Type-59 (M-46); 155mm 8 M-71
The US has also trained naval personnel as part of the Africa MRL 122mm 20 BM-21 Grad
Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership. In 2017, three MOR 16+: 81mm (some SP); 120mm 16 Brandt
coastal-surveillance centres supported by US AFRICOM AIR DEFENCE • GUNS
were opened, which will contribute to Cameroon’s efforts SP 20mm RBY-1 with TCM-20
to secure its maritime environment. In 2017, Cameroon TOWED 54: 14.5mm 18 Type-58 (ZPU-2); 35mm 18
hosted the Unified Focus Multi-National Joint Task Force GDF-002; 37mm 18 Type-63
table-top exercise. The army has contributed personnel to
UN peacekeeping operations and in 2017 strengthened its Navy ε1,500
Sub-Saharan
participation to deployments in the CAR. HQ located at Douala
Africa
ACTIVE 14,400 (Army 12,500 Navy 1,500 Air 400) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Paramilitary 9,000 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 17
PCC 4: 1 Bakassi (FRA P-48); 1 Dipikar (ex-FRA Flamant);
2 Le Ntem (PRC Limam El Hidrami) with 1 76mm gun
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE PB 11: 2 Aresa 2400; 2 Aresa 3200; 2 Rodman 101; 4
Rodman 46; 1 Quartier Maître Alfred Motto
Army 12,500 PBR 2 Swift-38
3 Mil Regions AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 4
FORCES BY ROLE LCM 2: 1 Aresa 2300; 1 Le Moungo
MANOEUVRE LCU 2 Yunnan
Light
1 rapid reaction bde (1 armd recce bn, 1 AB bn, 1 amph Fusiliers Marin
bn) FORCES BY ROLE
3 mot inf bde (3 mot inf bn, 1 spt bn) MANOEUVRE
1 mot inf bde (2 mot inf bn, 1 spt bn) Amphibious
3 (rapid reaction) inf bn 3 mne bn
Air Force 300–400 Cape Verde CPV

FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK Cape Verde Escudo E 2016 2017 2018
1 sqn with MB-326K; Alpha Jet*† GDP Ε 163bn 172bn
TRANSPORT US$ 1.64bn 1.73bn
1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 Hercules; DHC-4 Caribou; DHC-
5D Buffalo; IAI-201 Arava; PA-23 Aztec
Growth % 3.8 4.0
1 VIP unit with AS332 Super Puma; AS365 Dauphin 2;
Bell 206B Jet Ranger; Gulfstream III Inflation % -1.4 1.0
TRAINING Def bdgt Ε 1.05bn 954m
1 unit with Tetras US$ 11m 10m
ATTACK HELICOPTER US$1=E 99.62 99.40
1 sqn with SA342 Gazelle (with HOT); Mi-24 Hind
Population 560,899
1 sqn with Bell 206L-3; Bell 412; SA319 Alouette III Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
AIRCRAFT 9 combat capable Female 14.5% 5.0% 5.0% 4.8% 18.8% 3.2%
ATK 5: 1 MB-326K Impala I; 4 MB-326K Impala II
TPT 18: Medium 3: 2 C-130H Hercules; 1 C-130H-30 Capabilities
Hercules; Light 14: 1 CN235; 1 IAI-201 Arava (in store);
2 J.300 Joker; 1 MA60; 2 PA-23 Aztec; 7 Tetras; PAX 1 In its Legislative Programme for 2016–21, the government
Gulfstream III outlined the priorities for Cape Verde’s defence forces, in-
TRG 4 Alpha Jet*† cluding territorial defence and maritime security, EEZ and
HELICOPTERS airspace protection. Although the armed forces are small
ATK 2 Mi-24 Hind and presently have limited capability, the government has
MRH 13: 1 AS365 Dauphin 2; 1 Bell 412 Twin Huey; 2 suggested reorganising around marines and engineering
Mi-17 Hip H; 2 SA319 Alouette III; 4 SA342 Gazelle (with and paramilitary national-guard units. The government
HOT); 3 Z-9 is interested in greater regional and international defence
TPT 7: Medium 4: 2 AS332 Super Puma; 2 SA330J Puma; engagement; some maritime-security training support is
Light 3: 2 Bell 206B Jet Ranger; 1 Bell 206L3 Long Ranger provided by international partners. The armed forces take
part in multinational regional exercises, including in 2017
Fusiliers de l’Air the US AFRICOM-led Flintlock and Obangame Express.
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
ACTIVE 1,200 (Army 1,000 Coast Guard 100 Air 100)
Conscript liability Selective conscription (14 months)
Other
1 sy bn
Paramilitary 9,000
Army 1,000
Gendarmerie 9,000 FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE Light
Reconnaissance 2 inf bn (gp)
3 (regional spt) paramilitary gp COMBAT SUPPORT
1 engr bn
DEPLOYMENT EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
RECCE 10 BRDM-2
UN • MINUSCA 777; 1 obs; 1 inf bn
ARTILLERY • MOR 18: 82mm 12; 120mm 6 M-1943
MALI AIR DEFENCE
UN • MINUSMA 2; 1 obs SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela (SA-7 Grail)‡
GUNS • TOWED 30: 14.5mm 18 ZPU-1; 23mm 12 ZU-23
UN • MONUSCO 1; 4 obs Coast Guard ε100
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FOREIGN FORCES PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5
United States 300; MQ-1C Gray Eagle PCC 2: 1 Guardião; 1 Kondor I
PB 2: 1 Espadarte; 1 Tainha (PRC-27m) FORCES BY ROLE

PBF 1 Archangel MANOEUVRE
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 Do-228 Light
1 inf bn
Air Force up to 100 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FORCES BY ROLE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MARITIME PATROL MBT 3 T-55†
1 sqn with An-26 Curl RECCE 9: 8 Ferret†; 1 BRDM-2
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE IFV 18 Ratel
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 3 An-26 Curl† APC • APC (W) 14+: 4 BTR-152†; 10+ VAB†
ARTILLERY • MOR 12+: 81mm†; 120mm 12 M-1943†
Central African Republic CAR RCL 106mm 14 M40†
CFA Franc BEAC fr 2016 2017 2018 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PBR 9†
fr 1.04tr 1.15tr
GDP Air Force 150
US$ 1.78bn 1.99bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
per capita US$ 364 400 AIRCRAFT • TPT 7: Medium 1 C-130A Hercules; Light 6:
Growth % 4.5 4.7 3 BN-2 Islander; 1 Cessna 172RJ Skyhawk; 2 J.300 Joker
Inflation % 4.6 3.8 HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 1 AS350 Ecureuil
Def exp fr 15.9bn 17.7bn
US$ 27m 31m FOREIGN FORCES
US$1=fr 585.05 578.12 MINUSCA unless stated
Population
Austria EUTM RCA 3
5,625,118
Bangladesh 1,008; 10 obs; 1 cdo coy; 1 inf bn; 1 med coy
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Belgium EUTM RCA 9
Male 20.1% 5.3% 4.7% 4.2% 13.9% 1.3% Benin 5; 3 obs
Female 19.9% 5.2% 4.6% 4.2% 14.2% 2.1% Bhutan 2; 1 obs
Bolivia 1; 3 obs
Capabilities Bosnia-Herzegovina EUTM RCA 2
Effective military and security organisations still remain Brazil 2; 4 obs
largely absent in the wake of the violence in 2013. Instability Burkina Faso 7; 1 obs
continues to affect the country and – due to refugee flows Burundi 761; 8 obs; 1 inf bn
– neighbouring states. Some military equipment remains Cambodia 216; 6 obs; 1 engr coy
held by government military forces, but inventory num- Cameroon 777; 1 obs; 1 inf bn
bers are difficult to verify. The May 2015 Bangui Forum on Chile 4
National Reconciliation agreed principles governing DDR. Colombia 2
Under the National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan
Congo 19; 3 obs
2017–21, written by CAR officials with support from the
Egypt 1,014; 5 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 tpt coy
EU, UN and World Bank, steps to improve security would
Sub-Saharan
focus on DDR, SSR, justice reforms, broader reconcilia- France 91; 1 UAV unit • EUTM RCA 53
Africa
tion and improving social cohesion. A National Superior Gabon 445; 1 inf bn(-)
Council on Security would be set up to oversee the over- Gambia 2; 2 obs
all reform process. The UN’s MINUSCA mission remains Georgia EUTM RCA 35
the principal security provider in the country, and the UN Ghana 4; 3 obs
secretary-general in 2017 asked for additional capacity. Guatemala 2; 2 obs
The EU released fresh development funding in late 2017, Hungary 2; 2 obs
on top of international pledges made in December 2016 at
Indonesia 207; 6 obs; 1 engr coy
the Brussels International Conference for the CAR.
Jordan 7; 3 obs
ACTIVE 7,150 (Army 7,000 Air 150) Paramilitary Kenya 8; 6 obs
1,000 Lithuania EUTM RCA 1
Conscript liability Selective conscription 2 years; reserve Mauritania 754; 9 obs; 1 inf bn
obligation thereafter, term n.k. Mexico 1 obs
Moldova 1; 2 obs
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Morocco 765; 2 obs; 1 inf bn
Nepal 128; 3 obs; 1 MP pl
Army ε7,000 Niger 130; 4 obs; 1 sigs coy
Nigeria 2 der area with Libya, which will affect the combat capability
Pakistan 1,126; 10 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 hel sqn of forces ranged against insurgents in Niger.
Paraguay 2; 1 obs ACTIVE 30,350 (Army 25,000 Air 350 Republican
Peru 209; 5 obs; 1 engr coy Guard 5,000) Paramilitary 9,500
Poland EUTM RCA 1 Conscript liability Conscription authorised
Portugal 150; 1 cdo coy • EUTM RCA 11
Romania EUTM RCA 9 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Rwanda 977; 11 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 fd hospital
Senegal 114; 1 atk hel sqn Army ε25,000
Serbia 69; 1 med coy • EUTM RCA 7 7 Mil Regions
Spain EUTM RCA 30 FORCES BY ROLE
Sri Lanka 116; 5 obs; 1 avn unit MANOEUVRE
Sweden EUTM RCA 9 Armoured
Tanzania 201; 1 inf bn(-) 1 armd bn
Togo 6; 4 obs Light
United States 8 7 inf bn
COMBAT SUPPORT
Uruguay 1
1 arty bn
Vietnam 4; 1 obs
1 engr bn
Zambia 943; 7 obs; 1 inf bn 1 sigs bn
Chad CHA 1 log gp
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
CFA Franc BEAC fr 2016 2017 2018 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
GDP fr 5.98tr 6.02tr MBT 60 T-55
US$ 10.1bn 9.74bn ASLT 30 PTL-02 Assaulter
RECCE 309+: 132 AML-60/AML-90; 22 Bastion Patsas;
ε100 BRDM-2; 20 EE-9 Cascavel; 4 ERC-90F Sagaie; 31+
Growth % -6.4 0.6 RAM Mk3
Inflation % -1.1 0.2 IFV 131: 80 BMP-1; 42 BMP-1U; 9 LAV-150 Commando
Def bdgt fr 94.6bn 102bn with 90mm gun
US$ 160m 165m APC • APC (W) 99: 24 BTR-80; 12 BTR-3E; ε20 BTR-60;
ε10 Black Scorpion; 25 VAB-VTT; 8 WZ-523
US$1=fr 592.72 618.42
ARTILLERY 26+
Population 12,075,985 SP 122mm 10 2S1 Gvozdika
TOWED 105mm 5 M2
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus MRL 11+: 107mm some Type-63; 122mm 11: 6 BM-21
Male 21.8% 5.9% 4.6% 3.7% 11.1% 1.2% Grad; 5 Type-81
Female 21.2% 5.9% 4.9% 4.1% 13.6% 1.7% MOR 81mm some; 120mm AM-50
Capabilities MSL • MANPATS Eryx; Milan
RCL 106mm M40A1
Chad’s most pressing security concerns are instability AIR DEFENCE
in West Africa and the Sahel and the need to prosecute SAM
counter-insurgency operations against Boko Haram. Chad Short-range 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful)
engaged in extensive joint operations with Niger and Ni- Point-defence 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet)
geria against Boko Haram in 2016. The country is one of GUNS • TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-1/ZPU-2/ZPU-4; 23mm
the G-5 Sahel nations, and has encouraged African armed ZU-23
forces to take greater ownership of regional security. The
country’s ISR capability should be improved by the re- Air Force 350
ceipt of aircraft from the US, coming after improvements FORCES BY ROLE
in ground-attack and medium-airlift capability. However, GROUND ATTACK
in mid-2017, Chad’s air force suffered from the effects of 1 unit with PC-7; PC-9*; SF-260WL Warrior*; Su-25
a storm, which damaged aircraft at N’Djamena air base. Frogfoot
Chad’s ground forces have recent combat experience in TRANSPORT
Mali in 2013, and as part of more recent operations against 1 sqn with An-26 Curl; C-130H-30 Hercules; Mi-17 Hip
Boko Haram. France’s Operation Barkhane is headquartered H; Mi-171
in N’Djamena. In October 2017, Chad reportedly rede- 1 (Presidential) Flt with B-737BBJ; Beech 1900; DC-9-87;
ployed troops previously in Niger to Chad’s northern bor- Gulfstream II
ATTACK HELICOPTER ing civil war in the late 1990s. The troop contingent deployed
1 sqn with AS550C Fennec; Mi-24V Hind; SA316 Alouette to the CAR was withdrawn by the government in mid-2017,
III amid allegations of indiscipline levelled against the troops.
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Though the defence budget is not small in relation to those
AIRCRAFT 14 combat capable of its neighbours, the air force is effectively grounded for
FTR 1 MiG-29 Fulcrum lack of spares and serviceable equipment. The navy is little
ATK 10: 8 Su-25 Frogfoot; 2 Su-25UB Frogfoot B more than a riverine force, despite the need for maritime se-
TPT 10: Medium 3: 2 C-27J Spartan; 1 C-130H-30 curity on the country’s small coastline. France provides de-
Hercules; Light 4: 3 An-26 Curl; 1 Beech 1900; PAX 3: 1 fence and security support in the form of advisory assistance
B-737BBJ; 1 DC-9-87; 1 Gulfstream II and capacity building in areas including administration and
TRG 4: 2 PC-7 (only 1*); 1 PC-9 Turbo Trainer*; 1 SF- accounting, as well as military and police capability. Reports
260WL Warrior* in late 2017 also indicated Chinese security assistance in the
HELICOPTERS form of communications equipment.
ATK 5 Mi-24V Hind ACTIVE 10,000 (Army 8,000 Navy 800 Air 1,200)
MRH 8: 3 AS550C Fennec; 3 Mi-17 Hip H; 2 SA316
Paramilitary 2,000
Alouette III
TPT • Medium 2 Mi-171
Army 8,000
State Security Service General Direction FORCES BY ROLE
(DGSSIE) 5,000  MANOEUVRE
Armoured
Gendarmerie 4,500 2 armd bn
Light
DEPLOYMENT 2 inf bn (gp) each with (1 lt tk tp, 1 arty bty)
1 inf bn
MALI Air Manoeuvre
UN • MINUSMA 1,398; 2 obs; 1 SF coy; 2 inf bn 1 cdo/AB bn
COMBAT SUPPORT
FOREIGN FORCES 1 arty gp (with MRL)
1 engr bn
Benin MNJTF 150
France Operation Barkhane 1,500; 1 mech inf BG; 1 FGA
det with 2 Mirage 2000D; 2 Mirage 2000N; 1 tpt det with 1
MBT 40: 25 T-54/T-55; 15 Type-59; (some T-34 in store)
C-130H; 2 CN-235M LT TK 13: 3 PT-76; 10 Type-62
RECCE 25 BRDM-1/BRDM-2
Congo, Republic of COG APC 133+
APC (W) 78+: 28 AT-105 Saxon; 20 BTR-152; 30 BTR-60;
CFA Franc BEAC fr 2016 2017 2018 Panhard M3
fr 4.66tr 4.61tr
PPV 55: 18 Mamba; 37 Marauder
GDP ARTILLERY 56+
US$ 7.87bn 7.80bn
SP 122mm 3 2S1 Gvozdika
Sub-Saharan
per capita US$ 1,855 1,794 TOWED 15+: 122mm 10 D-30; 130mm 5 M-46; 152mm
Africa
Growth % -2.8 -3.6 D-20 
% 3.6 -0.5 MRL 10+: 122mm 10 BM-21 Grad; 140mm BM-14;
Inflation
140mm BM-16
Def bdgt fr 333bn 284bn
MOR 28+: 82mm; 120mm 28 M-43
US$ 562m 481m ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
US$1=fr 592.73 591.25 RCL 57mm M18
GUNS 15: 57mm 5 ZIS-2 (M-1943); 100mm 10 M-1944
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus SP 23mm ZSU-23-4
TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-2/ZPU-4; 37mm 28 M-1939;
Male 21.0% 4.5% 4.1% 3.6% 15.6% 1.3%
57mm S-60; 100mm KS-19
Female 20.6% 4.4% 4.1% 3.8% 15.1% 1.7%
Navy ε800 
Congo’s armed forces are small, utilise aged equipment, and PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 8
have low levels of training and limited overall capability. PCC 4 Février
They have struggled to recover from the brief but devastat- PBR 4
Air Force 1,200 Capabilities

FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK The armed forces are still undergoing reconstruction, and
SSR initiatives remain in place. A law on the defence forces’
1 sqn with Mirage F-1AZ
organisation was enacted in 2015. This detailed defence
TRANSPORT
zones and military regions, the creation of a general staff
1 sqn with An-24 Coke; An-32 Cline; CN235M-100
and general inspectorate for the armed forces, and stressed
the armed forces’ role in assisting Ivorian society. In 2016
1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-35P Hind
a Military Programme Law for 2016–20 was adopted, plan-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† ning for an incremental reduction in military strength up
AIRCRAFT to 2020, to enable an increase in the gendarmerie. In April
FGA 2 Mirage F-1AZ 2016, the United Nations lifted the arms embargo that had
TPT • Light 4: 1 An-24 Coke; 2 An-32 Cline; previously been imposed on the country. This allowed
1 CN235M-100 Côte d’Ivoire to start recapitalising its air force, notably
HELICOPTERS† with the delivery of Mi-24 helicopters from Russia. As part
ATK (2 Mi-35P Hind in store) of the SSR process, an aviation academy was established in
TPT • Medium (3 Mi-8 Hip in store) Abidjan, with limited rotary-wing pilot and maintenance
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 training. The latter is also an issue for the small naval unit.
Atoll)‡ The administration has moved to regulate promotion
and salary structures to aid professionalisation, and also
Paramilitary 2,000 active improve military infrastructure. France has a significant
training mission in the country, and trained Ivorian naval
Gendarmerie 2,000 personnel in October 2017. France increased its personnel
FORCES BY ROLE presence in 2016. The UN peacekeeping mission, UNOCI,
MANOEUVRE ended in June 2017.
Other ACTIVE 25,400 (Army 23,000 Navy 1,000 Air 1,400)
20 paramilitary coy Paramilitary n.k.
Presidential Guard some Moves to restructure and reform the armed forces continue
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Other
1 paramilitary bn Army ε23,000
FORCES BY ROLE
DEPLOYMENT MANOEUVRE
Armoured
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 1 armd bn
UN • MINUSCA 19; 3 obs Light
4 inf bn
Air Manoeuvre
Côte d’Ivoire CIV 1 cdo/AB bn
COMBAT SUPPORT
CFA Franc BCEAO fr 2016 2017 2018
1 arty bn
GDP fr 21.1tr 23.2tr 1 engr bn
US$ 35.7bn 39.9bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
US$ 1,466 1,599 1 log bn
per capita
AIR DEFENCE
Growth % 7.7 7.6
1 AD bn
Inflation % 0.7 1.0
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Def bdgt [a] fr 448bn 482bn
US$ 755m 829m MBT 10 T-55†
US$1=fr 592.77 581.55 LT TK 5 AMX-13
[a] Defence, order and security expenses RECCE 34: 15 AML-60/AML-90; 13 BRDM-2; 6 ERC-
90F4 Sagaie
IFV 10 BMP-1/BMP-2†
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus APC • APC (W) 31: 12 Panhard M3; 13 VAB;
6 BTR-80
Male 18.6% 5.6% 4.9% 4.5% 15.2% 1.6%
Female 18.3% 5.5% 4.8% 4.4% 14.5% 1.8%
VLB MTU
MSL • MANPATS 9K111-1 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel) Democratic Republic of the
(reported); 9K135 Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan) (reported)
RCL 106mm ε12 M40A1
Congo DRC
ARTILLERY 36+ Congolese Franc fr 2016 2017 2018
TOWED 4+: 105mm 4 M-1950; 122mm (reported)
MRL 122mm 6 BM-21
MOR 26+: 81mm; 82mm 10 M-37; 120mm 16 AM-50 US$ 39.3bn 40.4bn
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Medium 1 An-12 Cub† per capita US$ 467 466
AIR DEFENCE Growth % 2.4 2.8
SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡ Inflation % 18.2 41.7
(reported)
Def bdgt fr 817bn 890bn
GUNS 21+
SP 20mm 6 M3 VDAA US$ 762m 586m
TOWED 15+: 20mm 10; 23mm ZU-23-2; 40mm 5 L/60 US$1=fr 1,072.14 1,518.95
Navy ε1,000
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7 Male 21.0% 5.7% 5.0% 4.1% 12.8% 1.1%
PB 5: 3 L’Emergence; 1 Intrepide† (FRA Patra); 1 27m Female 20.7% 5.6% 5.0% 4.1% 13.1% 1.5%
(PRC)
PBR 2 Rodman (fishery-protection duties) Capabilities
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCM 2 Aby†
On paper, the DRC has the largest armed forces in Cen-
tral Africa. However, given the country’s size and the poor
Air Force ε1,400
levels of training, morale and equipment, the armed forces
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† are unable to provide security throughout the country. The
AIRCRAFT DRC has suffered the most protracted conflict since the end
TPT • PAX 1 B-727 of the Cold War. Much military equipment is in poor re-
HELICOPTERS pair and the armed forces, which have since incorporated a
ATK 1 Mi-24 number of non-state armed groups, struggle with conflict-
TPT • Medium 2 SA330L Puma (IAR-330L) ing loyalties. The mandate of the UN mission was renewed
in March for another 12 months. The UN’s Force Interven-
Paramilitary n.k. tion Brigade (FIB) remains active in the east of the country.
Training will have improved for units operating with the
Republican Guard n.k. FIB, while external-partner training and capacity-building
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† assistance is also commonplace. However, the 13-year-
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES long defence relationship with Belgium ended in July 2017,
APC • APC (W) 4 Mamba a period in which Belgian troops had trained three DRC
rapid-intervention battalions, among other units. When
Gendarmerie n.k. conflict finally abates in the east, significant attention to
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† wide-ranging DDR and SSR will be required, to continue
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES the work intermittently undertaken over the past decade.
Sub-Saharan
APC • APC (W) some VAB
ACTIVE ε134,250 (Central Staffs ε14,000, Army
Africa
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 1 Bian
103,000 Republican Guard 8,000 Navy 6,700 Air 2,550)
DEPLOYMENT
MALI
UN • MINUSMA 150; 1 obs; 1 sy coy Army (Forces du Terre) ε103,000
The DRC has 11 Military Regions. In 2011, all brigades in
FOREIGN FORCES North and South Kivu provinces were consolidated into 27
new regiments, the latest in a sequence of reorganisations
France 950; 1 (Marine) inf bn designed to integrate non-state armed groups. The actual
combat effectiveness of many formations is doubtful
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Light
6 (integrated) inf bde
ε3 inf bde (non-integrated)
27+ inf regt
COMBAT SUPPORT Paramilitary

1 arty regt
1 MP bn National Police Force
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† Incl Rapid Intervention Police (National and Provincial
(includes Republican Guard eqpt) forces)
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES People’s Defence Force
MBT 174: 12–17 Type-59†; 32 T-55; 25 T-64BV-1; 100
T-72AV
LT TK 40: 10 PT-76; 30 Type-62† (reportedly being FOREIGN FORCES
refurbished) All part of MONUSCO unless otherwise specified
RECCE up to 52: up to 17 AML-60; 14 AML-90; 19 EE-9 Algeria 5 obs
Cascavel; 2 RAM-V-2 Bangladesh 1,710; 13 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 avn coy;
IFV 20 BMP-1 2 hel coy
APC 144: Belgium 2
APC (T) 9: 3 BTR-50; 6 MT-LB Benin 453; 5 obs; 1 inf bn(-)
APC (W) 135: 30-70 BTR-60PB; 58 Panhard M3†; 7 TH Bhutan 1 obs
390 Fahd
Bolivia 7 obs
Bosnia-Herzegovina 5 obs
RCL 57mm M18; 73mm; 75mm M20; 106mm M40A1
GUNS 85mm 10 Type-56 (D-44) Burkina Faso 7 obs
ARTILLERY 726+ Cameroon 1; 4 obs
SP 16: 122mm 6 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 10 2S3 Akatsiya Canada (Operation Crocodile) 8
TOWED 125: 122mm 77 M-30 (M-1938)/D-30/Type-60; China, People’s Republic of 220; 12 obs; 1 engr coy; 1 fd
130mm 42 Type-59 (M-46)/Type-59-I; 152mm 6 D-20 hospital
(reported) Czech Republic 3 obs
MRL 57+: 107mm 12 Type-63; 122mm 24+: 24 BM-21 Egypt 154; 19 obs; 1 SF coy
Grad; some RM-70; 128mm 6 M-51; 130mm 3 Type-82; France 2
132mm 12 Ghana 463; 21 obs; 1 mech inf bn(-)
MOR 528+: 81mm 100; 82mm 400; 107mm M30; 120mm Guatemala 152; 1 obs; 1 SF coy
28: 10 Brandt; 18 other
India 2,640; 39 obs; 4 inf bn; 1 med coy
AIR DEFENCE
Indonesia 175; 4 obs; 1 engr coy
GUNS • TOWED 114: 14.5mm 12 ZPU-4; 37mm 52 Ireland 4
M-1939 Jordan 9; 13 obs
Kenya 13; 9 obs
Republican Guard 8,000 Malawi 855; 2 obs; 1 inf bn
FORCES BY ROLE Malaysia 3; 10 obs
MANOEUVRE Mali 1 obs
Armoured Mongolia 1 obs
1 armd regt Morocco 836; 3 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 fd hospital
Light Nepal 1,029; 17 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy
3 gd bde Niger 4; 12 obs
COMBAT SUPPORT Nigeria 1; 15 obs
1 arty regt Pakistan 3,447; 35 obs; 4 inf bn; 1 hel sqn
Paraguay 14 obs
Navy 6,700 (incl infantry and marines)
Peru 1; 11 obs
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Poland 2 obs
Romania 17 obs
PB 16: 1 Shanghai II; ε15 various (all under 15m)
Russia 1; 24 obs
Air Force 2,550 Senegal 2; 2 obs
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Serbia 8
AIRCRAFT 4 combat capable South Africa (Operation Mistral) 1,358; 4 obs; 1 inf bn; 1
engr coy; 1 atk hel sqn; 1 hel sqn
ATK 4 Su-25 Frogfoot
TPT 5: Medium 1 C-130H Hercules; Light 2 An-26 Curl; Sri Lanka 4 obs
PAX 2 B-727 Sweden 2 obs
HELICOPTERS Switzerland 3
ATK 7: 4 Mi-24 Hind; 3 Mi-24V Hind Tanzania 1,266; 1 SF coy; 1 inf bn
TPT • Medium 3: 1 AS332L Super Puma; 2 Mi-8 Hip Tunisia 1; 31 obs
Ukraine 255: 9 obs; 2 atk hel sqn; 1 hel sqn ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
United Kingdom 6
United States 3 Army ε8,000
Uruguay 1,165; 12 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 mne coy(-); 1 engr coy; FORCES BY ROLE
1 hel sqn 4 military districts (Tadjourah, Dikhil, Ali-Sabieh and Obock)
Zambia 2; 17 obs MANOEUVRE
Mechanised
1 armd regt (1 recce sqn, 3 armd sqn, 1 (anti-smuggling)
Djibouti DJB sy coy)
Light
Djiboutian Franc fr 2016 2017 2018 4 inf regt (3-4 inf coy, 1 spt coy)
GDP fr 336bn 370bn 1 rapid reaction regt (4 inf coy, 1 spt coy)
US$ 1.89bn 2.08bn Other
per capita US$ 1,903 2,040 1 (Republican Guard) gd regt (1 sy sqn, 1 (close
Growth % 6.5 7.0 protection) sy sqn, 1 cbt spt sqn (1 recce pl, 1 armd pl,
1 arty pl), 1 spt sqn)
Inflation % 2.7 3.0
COMBAT SUPPORT
Def exp fr n.k n.k
1 arty regt
US$ n.k n.k 1 demining coy
FMA (US) US$ 0.6m 0.5m 0m 1 sigs regt
US$1=fr 177.70 177.68 1 CIS sect
Population 865,267 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 log regt
Ethnic groups: Somali 60%; Afar 35%
1 maint coy
Female 15.5% 5.4% 5.8% 5.8% 19.5% 2.0% ASLT 1 PTL-02 Assaulter
RECCE 36: 4 AML-60†; 17 AML-90; 15 VBL
IFV 28: 8 BTR-80A; 16-20 Ratel
Capabilities APC 40
Djibouti’s small armed forces are almost entirely domi- APC (W) 27+: 12 BTR-60†; 4+ AT-105 Saxon; 11 Puma
nated by the army. Their main responsibility is secur- PPV 13: 3 Casspir; 10 RG-33L
ing sovereignty, combating trafficking, HADR missions AUV 22: 10 Cougar 4×4 (one with 90mm gun); 12 PKSV
and international peacekeeping operations, including to ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
AMISOM. A defence white paper was published in June RCL 106mm 16 M40A1
2017, which outlined the need to modernise key capabili- ARTILLERY 73
SP 155mm 10 M109L
ties, including intelligence and command. However, high
TOWED 122mm 6 D-30
debt levels are likely to hamper equipment procurements.
MRL 12: 107mm 2 PH-63; 122mm 10: 6 (6-tube Toyota
Recent ground-forces acquisitions have focused on mobil-
Land Cruiser 70 series); 2 (30-tube Iveco 110-16); 2 (30-
ity and artillery, but armoured-warfare capability remains tube)
Sub-Saharan
limited. A border dispute with Eritrea continues. Djibouti’s MOR 45: 81mm 25; 120mm 20 Brandt
Africa
strategic position and relative stability have made it an ap- AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 15+
pealing location for foreign-military basing. Training sup- SP 20mm 5 M693
port and external security are bolstered by the presence of TOWED 10: 23mm 5 ZU-23-2; 40mm 5 L/70
the US Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa at Camp
Lemonnier, as well as a French base with air-combat and Navy ε200
transport assets. Some states participating in counter-pir EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 
acy missions base their forces in Djibouti, including Japan. PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12
The EU and NATO have at various times also maintained PBF 2 Battalion-17 
a presence in Djibouti to support their counter-piracy op- PB 10: 1 Plascoa†; 2 Sea Ark 1739; 1 Swari†; 6 others
erations. China’s first overseas logistics base was officially AMPHIBIOUS • LCT 1 EDIC 700
opened in Djibouti in 2017, while Saudi Arabia has report-
edly discussed establishing a base in the country. (See pp. Air Force 250
434–35.) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT
ACTIVE 10,450 (Army 8,000 Navy 200 Air 250 TPT • Light 6: 1 Cessna U206G Stationair; 1 Cessna 208
Gendarmerie 2,000) Paramilitary 2,650 Caravan; 2 Y-12E; 1 L-410UVP Turbolet; 1 MA60
HELICOPTERS
ATK (2 Mi-35 Hind in store) Equatorial Guinea EQG
MRH 5: 1 Mi-17 Hip H; 4 AS365 Dauphin
CFA Franc BEAC fr 2016 2017 2018
TPT 3: Medium 1 Mi-8T Hip; Light 2 AS355F Ecureuil II
Gendarmerie 2,000+ US$ 10.2bn 10.1bn
Ministry of Defence per capita US$ 12,399 11,948
FORCES BY ROLE  Growth % -9.7 -7.4
MANOEUVRE
Inflation % 1.4 1.7
Other
1 paramilitary bn Def exp fr n.k n.k
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE US$ n.k n.k

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 1 PB US$1=fr 593.01 581.54
Population 778,358
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
National Police Force ε2,500 Male 20.2% 5.2% 4.5% 3.7% 13.9% 1.6%
Female 19.9% 5.3% 4.6% 3.8% 14.8% 2.3%
Coast Guard 150
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11 The armed forces are dominated by the army, the
PB 11: 2 Khor Angar; 9 other principal role of which is internal security; there is only
limited capability for power projection. There has been
DEPLOYMENT significant naval investment in recent years, including in
both equipment and onshore infrastructure at Bata and
SOMALIA
Malabo, although naval capabilities still remain limited in
AU • AMISOM 1,850; 2 inf bn scope. Maritime-security concerns in the Gulf of Guinea
WESTERN SAHARA have resulted in an increased emphasis on bolstering
UN • MINURSO 2 obs the country’s coastal-patrol capacity. France maintains a
military-cooperation detachment in Malabo, advising on
FOREIGN FORCES institutional issues such as administration and finance and
providing capacity-building support through the naval-
China 240: 1 mne coy(-); 1 med unit; 2 ZTL-11; 8 ZBL-08; focused regional vocational school at Tica, as well as some
1 LPD; 1 ESD training activities with French forces based in Gabon.
France 1,450: 1 (Marine) combined arms regt (2 recce sqn,
2 inf coy, 1 arty bty, 1 engr coy); 1 hel det with 2 SA330 ACTIVE 1,450 (Army 1,100 Navy 250 Air 100)
Puma; 1 SA342 Gazelle; 1 LCM; 1 air sqn with 4 Mirage
2000-5/D; 1 C-160 Transall; 2 SA330 Puma ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Germany Operation Atalanta 1 AP-3C Orion
Italy 90 Army 1,100
Japan 170; 2 P-3C Orion
FORCES BY ROLE
New Zealand 1 P-3K2 Orion
MANOEUVRE
Spain Operation Atalanta 1 P-3A Orion
Light
United States US Africa Command: 4,700; 1 tpt sqn with 3 inf bn(-)
C-130H/J-30 Hercules; 1 spec ops sqn with MC-130H; PC-
12 (U-28A); 1 CSAR sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk; 1 CISR EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
sqn with MQ-9A Reaper; 1 naval air base ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 3 T-55
RECCE 6 BRDM-2
IFV 20 BMP-1
APC 35
APC (W) 10 BTR-152
PPV 25 Reva (reported)
Navy ε250
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PSO 2:
1 Bata with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
1 Wele Nzas with 2 AK630M CIWS, 2 76mm gun, 1 hel choose to flee the country rather than serve, or evade ser-
landing platform vice in other ways, which may have some effect on military
PCC 2 OPV 62 cohesion and effectiveness. An ongoing UN arms embargo
PBF 2 Shaldag II will have contributed to the inventory being dominated
PB 5: 1 Daphne; 2 Estuario de Muni; 2 Zhuk by outdated platforms, and it is likely that many will be
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT slowly cannibalised for parts. Reported acquisitions from
AKRH 1 Capitan David Eyama Angue Osa with 1 76mm North Korea have also led to the US imposing sanctions
gun on the Eritrean Navy. Air-force investments have been
designed to produce a regionally capable fighter wing,
Air Force 100 though it lacks experienced trained pilots; the navy, mean-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE while, remains capable of only limited coastal-patrol and
AIRCRAFT 4 combat capable interception operations. Port and airfield facilities at Assab
ATK 4: 2 Su-25 Frogfoot; 2 Su-25UB Frogfoot B have been refurbished under an agreement with those Gulf
TPT 4: Light 3: 1 An-32B Cline; 2 An-72 Coaler; PAX 1 states participating in military operations in Yemen. This
Falcon 900 (VIP) included deployments of aircraft to Eritrea, including fast
jets from the UAE.
TRG 2 L-39C Albatros
HELICOPTERS ACTIVE 201,750 (Army 200,000 Navy 1,400 Air 350)
ATK 5 Mi-24P/V Hind Conscript liability 18 months (4 months mil trg) between
MRH 1 Mi-17 Hip H ages 18 and 40
TPT 4: Heavy 1 Mi-26 Halo; Medium 1 Ka-29 Helix;
Light 2 Enstrom 480 RESERVE 120,000 (Army ε120,000)
Paramilitary ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Guardia Civil Army ε200,000
FORCES BY ROLE
Heavily cadreised
MANOEUVRE
Other FORCES BY ROLE
2 paramilitary coy COMMAND
4 corps HQ
Coast Guard n.k. MANOEUVRE
Mechanised
1 mech bde
Eritrea ERI Light
Eritrean Nakfa ERN 2016 2017 2018 19 inf div
1 cdo div
GDP ΕRN 82.3bn 93.0bn
US$ 5.35bn 6.05bn Reserve ε120,000
per capita US$ 823 901 FORCES BY ROLE
Growth % 3.7 3.3 MANOEUVRE
Light
Inflation % 9.0 9.0
1 inf div
Sub-Saharan
Def exp ΕRN n.k n.k
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Africa
US$ n.k n.k
USD1=ERN 15.37 15.37 MBT 270 T-54/T-55
Population 5,869,869 RECCE 40 BRDM-1/BRDM-2
Ethnic groups: Tigrinya 50%; Tigre and Kunama 40%; Afar; Saho
IFV 15 BMP-1
3% APC 35
APC (T) 10 MT-LB†
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus APC (W) 25 BTR-152/BTR-60
Male 20.2% 5.4% 4.6% 3.9% 14.0% 1.6% ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
ARV T-54/T-55 reported
Female 19.5% 5.2% 4.4% 3.8% 14.7% 2.3%
VLB MTU reported
Capabilities MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111-
Eritrea maintains a large, mostly conscript, standing army. 1 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel)
Its primary task is to defend the border with Ethiopia. GUNS 85mm D-44
Eritrea also has a territorial dispute with neighbour Dji- ARTILLERY 258
bouti. Many troops are also used for civilian development SP 45: 122mm 32 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 13 2S5 Giatsint-S
and construction tasks. Significant numbers of conscripts TOWED 19+: 122mm D-30; 130mm 19 M-46
MRL 44: 122mm 35 BM-21 Grad; 220mm 9 9P140 Uragan

MOR 150+: 82mm 50+; 120mm/160mm 100+ Ethiopia ETH
AIR DEFENCE Ethiopian Birr EB 2016 2017 2018
GUNS 70+ GDP ΕB 1.53tr 1.78tr
SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 US$ 72.5bn 79.7bn
TOWED 23mm ZU-23 per capita US$ 795 861
Growth % 8.0 8.5
Navy 1,400 Inflation % 7.3 8.1
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Def bdgt ΕB 9.5bn 11.0bn 12.0bn
PBF 9: 5 Battalion-17; 4 Super Dvora US$ 451m 492m
PB 3 Swiftships FMA (US) US$ 0.6m 0.5m 0m
AMPHIBIOUS 3 US$1=EB 21.07 22.34
LS • LST 2: 1 Chamo† (Ministry of Transport); 1 Ashdod†
LC • LCU 1 T-4† (in harbour service)
Ethnic groups: Oromo 34.4%; Amhara 27%; Somali 6.2%; Tigray
6.1%; Sidama 4%; Guragie 2.5%; other or unspecified 19.2%
Air Force ε350
FORCES BY ROLE Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK Male 21.8% 5.4% 4.5% 3.8% 12.7% 1.3%
1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29SE/MiG-29UB Fulcrum
Female 21.7% 5.5% 4.6% 3.9% 13.0% 1.6%
1 sqn with Su-27/Su-27UBK Flanker
TRANSPORT
1 sqn with Y-12(II)
Capabilities
TRAINING Ethiopia’s principal security concerns relate to Eritrea and
1 sqn with L-90 Redigo the activities of Somalia-based group al-Shabaab. Intern
1 sqn with MB-339CE* al security remains a focus for the armed forces, although
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER a ten-month state of emergency was lifted in August 2017.
1 sqn with Bell 412 Twin Huey Ethiopia maintains one of the region’s most effective armed
1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H forces, battle-hardened and experienced following a history
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE of combat operations. The country has been engaged on a
AIRCRAFT 16 combat capable ten-year (2005–15) modernisation plan, designed to create
FTR 8: 4 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 2 MiG-29UB Fulcrum; 1 Su-27 flexible armed forces able to respond to regional contingen-
Flanker; 1 Su-27UBK Flanker cies. It has enough deployable capability to make significant
FGA 2 MiG-29SE Fulcrum contributions to the UN missions in Darfur and South Sudan.
TPT • Light 5: 1 Beech 200 King Air; 4 Y-12(II) Ethiopia is also a key contributor to UNISFA, as well as the
TRG 12: 8 L-90 Redigo; 4 MB-339CE*  AMISOM mission in Somalia, although this – combined with
HELICOPTERS standing deployments on the Eritrean border – has meant
MRH 8: 4 Bell 412 Twin Huey (AB-412); 4 Mi-17 Hip H that it has had to develop while on operations. As of August
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES 2017, Ethiopia was also the largest overall troop contributor
AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer); IR/ to UN peacekeeping missions. The country’s inventory con-
SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo) tains mostly Soviet-era equipment. There is adequate main-
tenance capability within the local defence industry, but only
a limited capacity to support more advanced platforms.
FOREIGN FORCES
United Arab Emirates Operation Restoring Hope 1,000; 1 ACTIVE 138,000 (Army 135,000 Air 3,000)
armd BG; Leclerc; BMP-3; G-6; Agrab Mk2; 2 Archangel; 3
AH-64D Apache; 2 CH-47F Chinook; 4 UH-60M Black Hawk; ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Wing Loong I (GJ-1) UAV; 4 MIM-104F Patriot PAC-3
Army 135,000
4 Mil Regional Commands (Northern, Western, Central
and Eastern) each acting as corps HQ
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Light
1 (Agazi Cdo) SF comd
1 (Northern) corps (1 mech div, 4 inf div)
1 (Western) corps (1 mech div, 3 inf div)
1 (Central) corps (1 mech div, 5 inf div)
1 (Eastern) corps (1 mech div, 5 inf div)

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡; R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73
MBT 461+: 246+ T-54/T-55/T-62; 215 T-72 (AA-11 Archer); IR/SARH R-23/R-24 (AA-7 Apex); R-27
RECCE ε100 BRDM-1/BRDM-2 (AA-10 Alamo)
IFV ε20 BMP-1
APC 300+ DEPLOYMENT
APC (T) some Type-89
APC (W) 300+: ε300 BTR-60/BTR-152; some Type-92 MALI
AUV some Ze’ev UN • MINUSMA 1
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES SOMALIA
ARV T-54/T-55 reported; 4 BTS-5B AU • AMISOM 4,395; 6 inf bn
VLB MTU reported
MW Bozena SOUTH SUDAN
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE UN • UNMISS 1,261; 11 obs; 2 inf bn
MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 SUDAN
Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K135 Kornet-E (AT-14 Spriggan)
UN • UNAMID 2,419; 11 obs; 3 inf bn
RCL 82mm B-10; 107mm B-11
UN • UNISFA 4,366; 78 obs; 4 armd pl; 3 inf bn; 2 arty
GUNS 85mm D-44
coy; 1 engr coy; 1 sigs coy; 1 fd hospital; 1 hel sqn
ARTILLERY 524+
SP 10+: 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 10 2S19 Msta-S
TOWED 464+: 122mm 464 D-30/M-30 (M-1938); 130mm Gabon GAB
M-46; 155mm AH2
MRL 122mm ε50 BM-21 Grad CFA Franc BEAC fr 2016 2017 2018
MOR 81mm M1/M29; 82mm M-1937; 120mm M-1944 GDP fr 8.31tr 8.41tr
AIR DEFENCE US$ 14.0bn 14.5bn
SAM per capita US$ 7,453 7,584
Medium-range S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline)
Growth % 2.1 1.0
Short-range S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa)
Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡ Inflation % 2.1 2.5
GUNS Def bdgt [a] fr 120bn 175bn
SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 US$ 203m 302m
TOWED 23mm ZU-23; 37mm M-1939; 57mm S-60 US$1=fr 592.73 581.53
[a] Includes funds allocated to Republican Guard
Air Force 3,000
FORCES BY ROLE Population 1,772,255
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
1 sqn with MiG-23ML Flogger G/MiG-23UB Flogger C
Male 21.0% 5.5% 4.7% 4.1% 12.8% 1.6%
TRANSPORT Female 20.8% 5.5% 4.7% 4.0% 12.9% 2.1%
1 sqn with An-12 Cub; An-26 Curl; An-32 Cline; C-130B
Hercules; DHC-6 Twin Otter; L-100-30; Yak-40 Codling Capabilities
(VIP) Gabon’s small armed forces retain sufficient airlift to ensure
Sub-Saharan
TRAINING mobility within the country and even a limited capability to
Africa
1 sqn with L-39 Albatros project power by sea and air. The country has benefited from
1 sqn with SF-260 the long-term presence of French troops acting as a security
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER guarantor, while oil revenues have allowed the government
2 sqn with Mi-24/Mi-35 Hind; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; to support, in regional terms, capable armed forces. There
SA316 Alouette III is regular training with international partners, as well as
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE locally based French forces. Gabonese military medicine
AIRCRAFT 19 combat capable is well regarded. Gabonese and US medical personnel
FTR 11: 8 Su-27 Flanker; 3 Su-27UB Flanker exercised together in mid-2017 during the US Army Africa-
FGA 8 MiG-23ML/UB Flogger G/C led Medical Readiness Training Exercise 17-4, in Libreville.
TPT 12: Medium 8: 3 An-12 Cub; 2 C-130B Hercules; 1
ACTIVE 4,700 (Army 3,200 Navy 500 Air 1,000)
C-130E Hercules; 2 L-100-30; Light 4: 1 An-26 Curl; 1 An-
Paramilitary 2,000
32 Cline; 1 DHC-6 Twin Otter; 1 Yak-40 Codling (VIP)
TRG 16: 12 L-39 Albatros; 4 SF-260
HELICOPTERS ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
ATK 18: 15 Mi-24 Hind; 3 Mi-35 Hind
MRH 7: 1 AW139; 6 SA316 Alouette III Army 3,200
MRH/TPT 12 Mi-8 Hip/Mi-17 Hip H Republican Guard under direct presidential control
FORCES BY ROLE MP (1 EMB-111* in store)

MANOEUVRE TPT 6: Medium 1 C-130H Hercules; (1 L-100-30 in store);
Light Light 2: 1 ATR-42F; 1 CN-235M-100; PAX 3: 1 Falcon 900;
1 (Republican Guard) gd gp (bn) 1 Gulfstream IV-SP; 1 Gulfstream G650ER
(1 armd/recce coy, 3 inf coy, 1 arty bty, 1 ADA bty) TRG (4 CM-170 Magister in store)  
8 inf coy HELICOPTERS
Air Manoeuvre MRH 2: 1 Bell 412 Twin Huey (AB-412); 1 SA342M
1 cdo/AB coy Gazelle; (2 SA342L Gazelle in store)
COMBAT SUPPORT TPT 7: Medium 4: 1 AS332 Super Puma; 3 SA330C/H
1 engr coy Puma; Light 3: 2 H120 Colibri; 1 H135
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE  AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR U-Darter
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES (reported)
RECCE 77: 24 AML-60/AML-90; 12 EE-3 Jararaca; 14
EE-9 Cascavel; 6 ERC-90F4 Sagaie; 7 RAM V-2; 14 VBL
Paramilitary 2,000
IFV 12 EE-11 Urutu (with 20mm gun) Gendarmerie 2,000
APC 64
FORCES BY ROLE
APC (W) 30: 9 LAV-150 Commando; 5 Bastion APC; 3
MANOEUVRE
WZ-523; 12 VXB-170; 1 Pandur
Armoured
PPV 34 Ashok Leyland MPV
2 armd sqn
AUV 12 Aravis
Other
3 paramilitary bde 
11 paramilitary coy
RCL 106mm M40A1 Aviation
ARTILLERY 67 1 unit with AS350 Ecureuil; AS355 Ecureuil II
TOWED 105mm 4 M101
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MRL 24: 107mm 16 PH-63; 140mm 8 Teruel
MOR 39: 81mm 35; 120mm 4 Brandt HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 4: 2 AS350 Ecureuil; 2
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 41 AS355 Ecureuil II
SP 20mm 4 ERC-20
TOWED 37+: 14.5mm ZPU-4; 23mm 24 ZU-23-2; 37mm DEPLOYMENT
10 M-1939; 40mm 3 L/70
Navy ε500 UN • MINUSCA 445; 1 inf bn(-)
HQ located at Port Gentil
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11 France 450; 1 AB bn
PCC 2 General Ba’Oumar (FRA P-400) with 1 57mm gun
PBG 1 Patra with 4 SS 12M AShM
PB 8: 4 Port Gentil (FRA VCSM); 4 Rodman 66 Gambia GAM
AMPHIBIOUS 14 Gambian Dalasi D 2016 2017 2018
LANDING SHIPS • LST 1 President Omar Bongo (FRA
Batral) (capacity 1 LCVP; 7 MBT; 140 troops) with 1 hel GDP D 42.3bn 47.1bn
landing platform  LANDING CRAFT 13 US$ 1.0 1.0
LCU 1 Mk 9 (ex-UK) per capita US$ 469 488
LCVP 12 Growth % 2.2 3.0
Inflation % 7.2 8.3
Air Force 1,000
Def bdgt D n.k n.k
FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK US$ n.k n.k
1 sqn with Mirage F-1AZ US$1=D 43.78 45.41
TRANSPORT
1 (Republican Guard) sqn with AS332 Super Puma; ATR-
42F; Falcon 900; Gulfstream IV-SP/G650ER Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
1 sqn with C-130H Hercules; CN-235M-100
Male 18.8% 5.2% 4.8% 4.3% 14.5% 1.6%
1 sqn with Bell 412 Twin Huey (AB-412); SA330C/H Female 18.6% 5.3% 5.0% 4.5% 15.2% 1.8%
Puma; SA342M Gazelle
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Capabilities
AIRCRAFT 8 combat capable A political crisis in late 2016 and early 2017 led to the
FGA 6 Mirage F-1AZ departure of long-serving President Jammeh; subsequently,
ATK 2 MB-326 Impala I there has been a focus on clarifying political–military
relations. Several senior officers and the head of the armed

forces were dismissed, while members of the former Ghana GHA
State Guard Battalion have been redeployed to other
Ghanaian New Cedi C 2016 2017 2018
units. Defence cooperation with France will look to train
the country’s security forces, as part of moves to reform GDP C 167bn 202bn
security structures. The ECOWAS mission, Operation US$ 42.8bn 45.5bn
Restore Democracy, extended its mandate for another year. per capita US$ 1,551 1,608
Gambian forces have traditionally focused on maritime Growth % 3.5 5.9
security and countering human trafficking. A National Inflation % 17.5 11.8
Maritime Security Committee was inaugurated in 2015.
Def bdgt C 761m 822m 925m
Gambia is expected to receive assistance in safeguarding its
US$ 195m 185m
EEZ in the form of aerial surveillance and patrol boats. The
country’s small armed forces have deployed in support of FMA (US) US$ 0.3m 0.3m 0m
UN missions, and in the past received training assistance US$1=C 3.91 4.45
from the US. Population 27,499,924
ACTIVE 800 (Army 800) Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 19.1% 4.9% 4.3% 3.8% 15.1% 1.9%
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Female 18.9% 5.0% 4.3% 4.0% 16.1% 2.3%
Gambian National Army 800 Capabilities

FORCES BY ROLE
Ghana’s armed forces are among the most capable in the
MANOEUVRE
region, with a long-term development plan covering both
Light the current and the next decade. The ability to control its
2 inf bn maritime EEZ is of increasing importance to Ghana be-
COMBAT SUPPORT cause of growing piracy and resource exploitation, and
1 engr sqn this underpins the navy’s expansion ambitions. Internal
and maritime security are the forces’ central roles, along
Marine Unit ε300 with participation in peacekeeping missions. Ghanaian
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE and US units conduct joint maritime-law-enforcement
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 9 and interoperability activities as part of the Africa Mari-
PBF 4: 2 Rodman 55; 2 Fatimah I time Law Enforcement Partnership, while Ghana receives
PB 5: 1 Bolong Kanta†; 4 Taipei (ROC Hai Ou) (of which US assistance as part of the African Peacekeeping Rapid
one damaged and in reserve) Response Partnership programme. There is also signifi-
cant defence engagement with the UK. Air-force training,
Air Wing close-air-support and airlift capabilities have developed
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE in recent years. Ghana hosts the Kofi Annan International
AIRCRAFT Peacekeeping Training Centre. The army is a regular con-
TPT 5: Light 2 AT-802A Air Tractor; PAX 3: 1 B-727; 1 tributor to UN peacekeeping operations. It has pledged to
CL-601; 1 Il-62M Classic (VIP) maintain 1,000 personnel in readiness for missions, includ-
ing a mechanised infantry battalion, a level-two hospital, a
Sub-Saharan
signals company, an aviation unit and a riverine unit.
DEPLOYMENT
Africa
LIBERIA
UN • UNMIL 1 obs Army 11,500
MALI FORCES BY ROLE
UN • MINUSMA 3; 1 obs COMMAND
2 comd HQ
SUDAN MANOEUVRE
UN • UNAMID 211; 1 inf coy Reconnaissance
1 armd recce regt (3 recce sqn)
FOREIGN FORCES Light
1 (rapid reaction) mot inf bn
Ghana ECOMIG 50 6 inf bn
Nigeria ECOMIG 200 Air Manoeuvre
Senegal ECOMIG 250 2 AB coy
COMBAT SUPPORT HELICOPTERS

1 arty regt (1 arty bty, 2 mor bty) MRH 10: 1 Bell 412SP Twin Huey; 3 Mi-17V-5 Hip H; 2
1 fd engr regt (bn) SA319 Alouette III; 4 Z-9EH
1 sigs regt TPT 6: Medium 4 Mi-171Sh; Light 2 AW109A
1 sigs sqn
1 log gp DEPLOYMENT
1 tpt coy
2 maint coy
1 med coy UN • MINUSCA 4; 3 obs
1 trg bn DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE UN • MONUSCO 463; 21 obs; 1 inf bn(-)
RECCE 3 EE-9 Cascavel GAMBIA
IFV 48: 24 Ratel-90; 15 Ratel-20; 4 Piranha 25mm; 5+ ECOWAS • ECOMIG 50
Type-05P 25mm
APC 105 LEBANON
APC (W) 55+: 46 Piranha; 9+ Type-05P UN • UNIFIL 870; 1 mech inf bn
PPV 50 Streit Typhoon LIBERIA
ARTILLERY 87+
TOWED 122mm 6 D-30 UN • UNMIL 1; 1 obs
MRL 3+: 107mm Type-63; 122mm 3 Type-81 MALI
MOR 78: 81mm 50; 120mm 28 Tampella UN • MINUSMA 218; 3 obs; 1 engr coy; 1 avn flt
AEV 1 Type-05P AEV SOMALIA
ARV Piranha reported UN • UNSOS 2 obs
RCL 84mm Carl Gustav SOUTH SUDAN
AIR DEFENCE UN • UNMISS 716; 11 obs; 1 inf bn
GUNS • TOWED 8+: 14.5mm 4+: 4 ZPU-2; ZPU-4; SUDAN
23mm 4 ZU-23-2 UN • UNAMID 19; 4 obs
Navy 2,000
WESTERN SAHARA
Naval HQ located at Accra; Western HQ located at
Sekondi; Eastern HQ located at Tema UN • MINURSO 8; 8 obs
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 14 Guinea GUI
PCO 2 Anzone (US)
PCC 10: 2 Achimota (GER Lurssen 57m) with 1 76mm Guinean Franc fr 2016 2017 2018
gun; 2 Dzata (GER Lurssen 45m); 2 Warrior (GER GDP fr 75.9tr 87.4tr
Gepard); 4 Snake (PRC 47m)
US$ 8.48bn 9.18bn
PBF 1 Stephen Otu (ROK Sea Dolphin)
PB 1 David Hansen (US) per capita US$ 670 708
Growth % 6.6 6.7
Air Force 2,000 Inflation % 8.2 8.5
FORCES BY ROLE Def exp fr 1.45tr 1.57tr
GROUND ATTACK
US$ 162m 164m
1 sqn with K-8 Karakorum*; L-39ZO*; MB-339A*
ISR US$1=fr 8,959.81 9,512.67
1 unit with DA-42 Population 12,413,867
TRANSPORT
1 sqn with BN-2 Defender; C295; Cessna 172 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 21.0% 5.4% 4.6% 3.8% 13.7% 1.6%
1 sqn with AW109A; Bell 412SP Twin Huey; Mi-17V-5
Hip H; SA319 Alouette III; Z-9EH Female 20.5% 5.3% 4.5% 3.7% 13.8% 2.0%
Capabilities
ATK (3 MB-326K in store) Much of the country’s military equipment is ageing and of
TPT 10: Light 10: 1 BN-2 Defender; 3 C295; 3 Cessna 172; Soviet-era vintage; serviceability will be questionable for
3 DA42; (PAX 1 F-28 Fellowship (VIP) in store) some types. A military-programming law for 2015–20 is
TRG 8: 4 K-8 Karakorum*; 2 L-39ZO*; 2 MB-339A* reportedly examining operational capacities. There is very
limited fixed- and rotary-wing airlift capacity. China in the Air Force 800
past donated a small amount of non-lethal military and ci- EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†
vilian equipment. The EU has engaged in police training AIRCRAFT
within the context of a broader SSR process. FGA (3 MiG-21 Fishbed non-op)
ACTIVE 9,700 (Army 8,500 Navy 400 Air 800) TPT • Light 4: 2 An-2 Colt; 2 Tetras
Paramilitary 2,600 HELICOPTERS
Conscript liability 2 years ATK 4 Mi-24 Hind
MRH 5: 2 MD-500MD; 2 Mi-17-1V Hip H; 1 SA342K
Gazelle
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE TPT 2: Medium 1 SA330 Puma; Light 1 AS350B Ecureuil
Army 8,500 AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE Paramilitary 2,600 active
Armoured
1 armd bn
Gendarmerie 1,000
Light Republican Guard 1,600
1 SF bn
5 inf bn People’s Militia 7,000 reservists
1 ranger bn
1 cdo bn
DEPLOYMENT
Air Manoeuvre
1 air mob bn MALI
Other UN • MINUSMA 860; 3 obs; 1 inf bn
1 (Presidential Guard) gd bn
COMBAT SUPPORT SOUTH SUDAN
1 arty bn UN • UNMISS 1
1 AD bn SUDAN
1 engr bn UN • UNISFA 1
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
WESTERN SAHARA
MBT 38: 30 T-34; 8 T-54 UN • MINURSO 5 obs
LT TK 15 PT-76
RECCE 27: 2 AML-90; 25 BRDM-1/BRDM-2 Guinea-Bissau GNB
IFV 2 BMP-1
APC 59 CFA Franc BCEAO fr 2016 2017 2018
APC (T) 10 BTR-50 GDP fr 683bn 753bn
APC (W) 30: 16 BTR-40; 8 BTR-60; 6 BTR-152 US$ 1.15bn 1.30bn
PPV 19: 10 Mamba†; 9 Puma M36
ARV T-54/T-55 reported Growth % 5.1 5.0
Sub-Saharan
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Inflation % 1.5 2.8
Africa
MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111- Def exp fr n.k n.k
1 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel) US$ n.k n.k
RCL 82mm B-10 US$1=fr 592.81 581.40
GUNS 6+: 57mm ZIS-2 (M-1943); 85mm 6 D-44
ARTILLERY 47+ Population 1,792,338
TOWED 24: 122mm 12 M-1931/37; 130mm 12 M-46
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
MRL 220mm 3 9P140 Uragan
MOR 20+: 82mm M-43; 120mm 20 M-1938/M-1943 Male 19.5% 5.3% 4.7% 4.1% 14.0% 1.3%
AIR DEFENCE Female 19.5% 5.4% 4.8% 4.2% 15.0% 2.2%
GUNS • TOWED 24+: 30mm M-53 (twin); 37mm 8 Capabilities
M-1939; 57mm 12 Type-59 (S-60); 100mm 4 KS-19 ECOWAS mediation in 2016, amid domestic political strife,
led to a six-point road map. Among other areas, this includ-
Navy ε400 ed SSR and the demobilisation of ECOMIB, six months after
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE a suitable national force can take over its mandate. Political
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 4: 1 disputes, however, have restricted progress on these areas
Swiftships†; 3 RPB 20 and still hinder foreign investment and economic assistance.
In 2016, UNIOGBIS updated a ten-year-old document on FOREIGN FORCES

restructuring and modernising the security sector, but prog-
Nigeria ECOMIB 100
ress is dependent on local political stability. China has do-
nated some non-lethal military and civilian equipment, but
much of the country’s military equipment is ageing and of Kenya KEN
Soviet-era vintage; serviceability will be questionable for
Kenyan Shilling sh 2016 2017 2018
some types.
GDP sh 7.16tr 8.14tr
ACTIVE 4,450 (Army 4,000 Navy 350 Air 100) US$ 70.5bn 78.4bn
Conscript liability Selective conscription
Manpower and eqpt totals should be treated with caution.
Growth % 5.8 5.0
A number of draft laws to restructure the armed services
and police have been produced Inflation % 6.3 8..0
Def bdgt [a] sh 124bn 124bn 130bn
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE  US$ 1.22bn 1.19bn
Army ε4,000 (numbers reducing) US$1=sh 101.50 103.86
FORCES BY ROLE [a] Includes national-intelligence funding
MANOEUVRE
Reconnaissance
1 recce coy Ethnic groups: Kikuyu ε22–32%
Armoured Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
1 armd bn (sqn)
Male 20.1% 5.2% 4.3% 4.2% 14.8% 1.3%
Light
5 inf bn Female 19.9% 5.2% 4.4% 4.2% 14.7% 1.7%
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty bn Capabilities
1 engr coy Kenya remains a key contributor to AMISOM in Somalia
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE and continues to conduct key operations against al-Sha-
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES baab, as well as being a leading element in the East African
MBT 10 T-34 Standby Force. Experience in Somalia has demonstrated
LT TK 15 PT-76 some limited ability to project power outside its territory
RECCE 10 BRDM-2 and regular deployment rotations have boosted the con-
APC • APC (W) 55: 35 BTR-40/BTR-60; 20 Type-56 (BTR- fidence and capability of Kenya’s forces. The threat posed
by al-Shabaab remains a significant security concern. The
152)
armed forces regularly train with UK troops in Kenya (a
new defence-cooperation agreement was signed with the
RCL 75mm Type-52 (M20); 82mm B-10
UK in September 2016) and take part in international exer-
GUNS 85mm 8 D-44
cises in Africa. There are also significant defence ties with
ARTILLERY 26+ the US and developing relationships with the Chinese and
TOWED 122mm 18 D-30/M-30 (M-1938) Jordanian armed forces. Modernisation is focused on heli-
MOR 8+: 82mm M-43; 120mm 8 M-1943 copters, armoured vehicles, UAVs and border-surveillance
AIR DEFENCE equipment. The navy undertakes coastguard and counter-
SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡ piracy roles. Kenya regularly participates in multinational
GUNS • TOWED 34: 23mm 18 ZU-23; 37mm 6 M-1939; and regional exercises, including the Cutlass Express 2017
57mm 10 S-60 maritime-security exercise.
Navy ε350 ACTIVE 24,100 (Army 20,000 Navy 1,600 Air 2,500)
PB 4: 2 Alfeite†; 2 Rodman 55M ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Air Force 100 Army 20,000
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 Cessna 208B MANOEUVRE
Armoured
DEPLOYMENT 1 armd bde (1 armd recce bn, 2 armd bn)
Light
MALI 1 spec ops bn
UN • MINUSMA 1 1 ranger bn
1 inf bde (3 inf bn) FTR 22: 18 F-5E Tiger II; 4 F-5F Tiger II
1 inf bde (2 inf bn) TPT 17 Light 16: 4 DHC-5D Buffalo†; 3 DHC-8†; 9
1 indep inf bn Y-12(II)†; (6 Do-28D-2† in store); PAX 1 F-70 (VIP)
Air Manoeuvre TRG 30: 8 Bulldog 103/127†; 11 EMB-312 Tucano†*; 6
1 air cav bn Grob 120A; 5 Hawk Mk52†*
1 AB bn HELICOPTERS
COMBAT SUPPORT ATK 3 AH-1F Cobra
1 arty bde (2 arty bn, 1 mor bty) TPT 20: Medium 12: 2 Mi-171; 10 SA330 Puma†; Light 8
1 ADA bn Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II)
1 engr bde (2 engr bn) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ASM AGM-65 Maverick
MBT 78 Vickers Mk 3 Paramilitary 5,000
RECCE 92: 72 AML-60/AML-90; 12 Ferret; 8 S52 Shorland
APC 189 Police General Service Unit 5,000
APC (W) 84: 52 UR-416; 32 Type-92; (10 M3 Panhard in EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
store) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 5 (2
PPV 105 Puma M26-15 on Lake Victoria)
ARV 7 Vickers ARV Air Wing
MW Bozena EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARTILLERY 112 AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 6: 2 Cessna 208B Grand
SP 155mm 2+ Nora B-52 Caravan; 3 Cessna 310; 1 Cessna 402
TOWED 105mm 48: 40 L118 Light Gun; 8 Model 56 pack HELICOPTERS
howitzer MRH 3 Mi-17 Hip H
MOR 62: 81mm 50; 120mm 12 Brandt TPT 3: Medium 1 Mi-17V-5; Light 2: 1 Bell 206L
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Long Ranger; 1 Bo-105
MSL • MANPATS Milan TRG 1 Bell 47G
RCL 84mm 80 Carl Gustav
HELICOPTERS
MRH 37: 2 Hughes 500D†; 12 Hughes 500M†; 10 Hughes DEPLOYMENT
500MD Scout Defender† (with TOW); 10 Hughes 500ME†; CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
3 Z-9W
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 94: 20mm 81: 11
Oerlikon; ε70 TCM-20; 40mm 13 L/70 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASM TOW UN • MONUSCO 13; 9 obs
Navy 1,600 (incl 120 marines) LEBANON

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE UN • UNIFIL 1
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7 MALI
PCO 1 Jasiri with 1 76mm gun
UN • MINUSMA 7; 2 obs
PCF 2 Nyayo
PCC 3: 1 Harambee II (ex-FRA P400); 2 Shujaa with 1 SOMALIA
Sub-Saharan
76mm gun AU • AMISOM 3,664: 3 inf bn
PBF 1 Archangel
Africa
AMPHIBIOUS • LCM 2 Galana SUDAN
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AP 2 UN • UNAMID 113; 3 obs; 1 MP coy
Air Force 2,500 FOREIGN FORCES

FORCES BY ROLE
United Kingdom Army 250; 1 trg unit
TRANSPORT
Some sqn with DHC-5D Buffalo†; DHC-8†; F-70† (VIP);
Y-12(II)†
TRAINING
Some sqn with Bulldog 103/Bulldog 127†; EMB-312
Tucano†*; Hawk Mk52†*; Hughes 500D†
1 sqn with SA330 Puma†
Lesotho LSO RCL 106mm 6 M40
Lesotho Loti M
ARTILLERY 12
2016 2017 2018
TOWED 105mm 2
GDP M 33.3bn 37.3bn MOR 81mm 10
US$ 2.26bn 2.72bn
per capita US$ 1,179 1,414 Air Wing 110
AIRCRAFT
Growth % 2.4 4.6
TPT • Light 3: 2 C-212-300 Aviocar; 1 GA-8 Airvan
Inflation % 6.4 6.6 HELICOPTERS
Def bdgt M 624m 723m MRH 3: 1 Bell 412 Twin Huey; 2 Bell 412EP Twin Huey
US$ 42m 53m TPT • Light 1 Bell 206 Jet Ranger
US$1=M 14.71 13.70
Population 1,958,042 Liberia LBR

Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Liberian Dollar L$ 2016 2017 2018
Male 16.1% 4.8% 4.4% 4.4% 16.8% 2.8% GDP L$ 2.10bn 2.14bn
Female 15.9% 5.1% 5.0% 5.2% 16.5% 2.7% US$ 2.10bn 2.14bn
Capabilities Growth % -1.6 2.6
Lesotho’s small armed forces are charged with protecting Inflation % 8.8 12.8
territorial integrity and sovereignty. Internal instability, Def bdgt L$ 13m 14m 13m
however, is the country’s most pressing concern. Military
US$ 13m 14m
cohesion has suffered for a number of years after a coup at-
tempt in 2014 and instability that continued in 2015. Hopes FMA (US) US$ 2.5m 2.5m 0m
that the June 2017 general election would lead to greater US$1=L$ 1.00 1.00
stability have so far failed to materialise. The country con- Population 4,689,021
tains significant water resources, which form a significant
Ethnic groups: Americo-Liberians 5%
portion of its foreign trade. SADC held a summit as a re-
sult of the killing of the army chief – reportedly by officers Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
from a rival faction – in September 2017, and a decision
was taken to deploy a contingent force of military, security Male 22.1% 5.5% 4.2% 3.6% 13.1% 1.4%
and intelligence personnel to Lesotho to support the gov- Female 21.2% 5.5% 4.3% 3.8% 13.3% 1.4%
ernment. Despite recommendations from the SADC at the
end of 2015 for Lesotho to make constitutional and security Capabilities
reforms, these have yet to be realised. The need to imple- The development of the Liberian armed forces has been
ment the reforms was again highlighted at the September underpinned by US support for almost the past decade.
2017 SADC summit.
France has also provided military-training support. A new
ACTIVE 2,000 (Army 2,000) national-security strategy is under development and the
UN reports that a public-expenditure review of the justice
and security sectors will end in May 2018. In July 2016, the
Liberian security forces took over full responsibility for se-
curity from the UN peacekeeping mission, UNMIL, after
Army ε2,000
13 years. UNMIL reverted to a support role, though the
FORCES BY ROLE mission has been extended to March 2018. In May 2016, the
MANOEUVRE UN Security Council voted to lift sanctions and the arms
Reconnaissance
embargo against Liberia. There is still no indigenous air-
1 recce coy
lift capacity, which hindered movements during the Ebola
Light
outbreak.
7 inf coy
Aviation ACTIVE 2,100 (Army 2,000, Coast Guard 100)
1 sqn
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty bty(-)
1 spt coy (with mor)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Army 2,000
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES FORCES BY ROLE
MBT 1 T-55 MANOEUVRE
RECCE 30: 4 AML-90; 2 BRDM-2†; 6 RAM Mk3; 10 Light
RBY-1; 8 S52 Shorland 1 (23rd) inf bde with (2 inf bn, 1 engr coy, 1 MP coy)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT in the US AFRICOM-sponsored Cutlass Express 2017,

1 trg unit (forming) designed to improve regional maritime security and
related cooperation. Much of its remaining air inventory
Coast Guard 100 is likely non-operational. Moves towards security-sector
All operational patrol vessels under 10t FLD reform (SSR) have begun, with an African Union mission
conducted in late 2015, designed to ‘sensitise senior
officials and civil society’ on SSR.
DEPLOYMENT
ACTIVE 13,500 (Army 12,500 Navy 500 Air 500)
MALI
Paramilitary 8,100
UN • MINUSMA 73; 1 inf coy(-)
Conscript liability 18 months (incl for civil purposes)
FOREIGN FORCES ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

All under UNMIL comd unless otherwise specified
Benin 1 obs Army 12,500+
China, People’s Republic of 1 FORCES BY ROLE
Egypt 2 obs MANOEUVRE
Gambia 1 obs Light
Ghana 1; 1 obs 2 (intervention) inf regt
Nepal 1 obs 10 (regional) inf regt
Nigeria 234; 3 obs; 1 inf coy COMBAT SUPPORT
Pakistan 71; 1 obs; 1 fd hospital 1 arty regt
Russia 1 obs 3 engr regt
1 sigs regt
Senegal 1
Serbia 1 obs
1 log regt
Togo 1
AIR DEFENCE
Ukraine 107; 1 hel sqn 1 ADA regt
United States 2
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Zambia 1 obs ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
LT TK 12 PT-76
Madagascar MDG RECCE 73: ε35 BRDM-2; 10 FV701 Ferret; ε20 M3A1; 8
M8
Malagsy Ariary fr 2016 2017 2018 APC • APC (T) ε30 M3A1 half-track
GDP fr 31.8tr 35.7tr ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
RCL 106mm M40A1
US$ 10.0bn 10.6bn
ARTILLERY 25+
TOWED 17: 105mm 5 M101; 122mm 12 D-30
Growth % 4.2 4.3 MOR 8+: 82mm M-37; 120mm 8 M-43
Inflation % 6.7 7.8 AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 70: 14.5mm 50 ZPU-
Def bdgt fr 189bn 209bn 4; 37mm 20 PG-55 (M-1939)
Sub-Saharan
US$ 59m 62m
Navy 500 (incl some 100 Marines)
Africa
US$1=fr 3,176.60 3,384.556
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Population 25,054,161 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 8
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
PCC 1 Trozona
PB 7 (ex-US CG MLB)
Male 20.1% 5.4% 4.8% 4.1% 14.1% 1.5%
AMPHIBIOUS • LCT 1 (ex-FRA EDIC)
Female 19.7% 5.3% 4.8% 4.1% 14.2% 1.8%
Air Force 500
Capabilities FORCES BY ROLE
The armed forces have played a significant role in the TRANSPORT
island’s recent political instability, with some elements 1 sqn with An-26 Curl; Yak-40 Codling (VIP)
involved in an abortive coup attempt in 2010 and a mutiny 1 (liaison) sqn with Cessna 310; Cessna 337 Skymaster;
in 2012. In mid-2016 there was a terrorist attack allegedly PA-23 Aztec
carried out by opponents of the current president. The TRAINING
army is the dominant force, but the state has no power- 1 sqn with Cessna 172; J.300 Joker; Tetras
projection capability. As an island state, maritime security TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
is an issue, as reflected in the country’s participation 1 sqn with SA318C Alouette II
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Air Manoeuvre

AIRCRAFT • TPT 16: Light 14: 1 An-26 Curl; 4 Cessna 1 para bn
172; 1 Cessna 310; 2 Cessna 337 Skymaster; 2 J.300 Joker; COMBAT SUPPORT
1 PA-23 Aztec; 1 Tetras; 2 Yak-40 Codling (VIP); PAX 2 B-737 3 lt arty bty
HELICOPTERS • MRH 4 SA318C Alouette II 1 engr bn
Paramilitary 8,100 12 log coy
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Gendarmerie 8,100 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
RECCE 66: 30 Eland-90; 8 FV701 Ferret; 20 FV721 Fox; 8
RAM Mk3
Malawi MWI APC • PPV 31: 14 Casspir; 9 Marauder; 8 Puma M26-15
ARTILLERY 107
Malawian Kwacha K 2016 2017 2018 TOWED 105mm 9 L118 Light Gun
GDP K 3.92tr 4.60tr MOR 81mm 98: 82 L16A1; 16 M3
US$ 5.49bn 6.26bn AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 72: 12.7mm 32;
per capita US$ 295 327 14.5mm 40 ZPU-4
Growth % 2.3 4.5 Navy 220
Inflation % 21.7 13.0 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Def bdgt K 20.7bn 27.6bn 37.1bn PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 1
US$ 29m 38m PB 1 Kasungu (ex-FRA Antares)
US$1=K 714.05 734.00 Air Wing 200
Population 19,196,246 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 Do-228
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus HELICOPTERS • TPT 8: Medium 3: 1 AS532UL
Male 23.1% 5.6% 4.6% 3.7% 11.4% 1.2% Cougar; 1 SA330H Puma; 1 H215 Super Puma Light 5: 1
Female 23.3% 5.7% 4.7% 3.7% 11.7% 1.5% AS350L Ecureuil; 4 SA341B Gazelle
Capabilities Paramilitary 4,200

The armed forces’ role is to ensure the sovereignty and Police Mobile Service 4,200
territorial integrity of the state. The army is the largest EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
force, consisting mainly of infantry units supported by ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
light armoured vehicles. The air wing and the naval unit RECCE 8 S52 Shorland
are much smaller supporting services, for which counter- AIRCRAFT
trafficking is one role. Army units were deployed in TPT • Light 4: 3 BN-2T Defender (border patrol); 1
March 2017 to tackle cross-border smuggling. The army SC.7 3M Skyvan
participates in and hosts multinational exercises, and is HELICOPTERS • MRH 2 AS365 Dauphin 2
involved in supporting UN missions. The defence force
is unable to deploy outside Malawi’s borders without
DEPLOYMENT
external assistance, although it has dispatched troops to
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, among other UN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
operations, to take part in tasks assigned to the Force UN • MONUSCO 855; 2 obs; 1 inf bn
Intervention Brigade. US AFRICOM’s senior-leader
meeting, Africa Endeavor 2017, was held in Malawi, with a SUDAN
focus on cyber security and other ICTs. UN • UNISFA 1
ACTIVE 10,700 (Army 10,700) Paramilitary 4,200 WESTERN SAHARA

Army 10,700
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Mechanised
1 mech bn
Light
COMBAT SUPPORT
Mali MLI 1 engr bn
1 med unit
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US$ 14.0bn 15.0bn ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
per capita US$ 768 794 RECCE BRDM-2†
Growth % 5.8 5.3 APC • APC (W) 22+: 3+ Bastion APC; 10+ BTR-60PB; 9
Inflation % -1.8 0.2 BTR-70 
ARTILLERY 30+
Def bdgt [a] fr 324bn 381bn 403bn
TOWED 122mm D-30
US$ 546m 644m MRL 122mm 30+ BM-21 Grad
US$1=fr 592.72 591.28
[a] Defence and interior-security budget
Air Force
FORCES BY ROLE
Population 17,885,245 TRANSPORT
Ethnic groups: Tuareg 6–10% 1 sqn with BT-67; C295W; Y-12E
TRAINING
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 1 sqn with Tetras
Male 24.2% 5.1% 3.8% 2.9% 11.0% 1.5% TRANSPORT/ATTACK HELICOPTER
Female 23.9% 5.3% 4.4% 3.7% 12.2% 1.5% 1 sqn with H215; Mi-24D Hind; Mi-35M Hind
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Capabilities AIRCRAFT
TPT • Light 11: 1 BT-67; 1 C295W; 7 Tetras; 2 Y-12E (1
Mali’s armed forces rely on France and the UN for training,
An-24 Coke; 2 An-26 Curl; 2 BN-2 Islander all in store)
logistical and aviation support. The shortcomings of the
TRG (6 L-29 Delfin; 2 SF-260WL Warrior* all in store)
armed forces were exposed by their inability to deal with
HELICOPTERS
Islamist and Tuareg insurgents in 2013, with the latter
ATK 4: 2 Mi-24D Hind; 2 Mi-35M Hind
leading to French military intervention. Tranches of the
MRH (1 Z-9 in store)
reconstituted armed forces have been trained by an EU
TPT • Medium 2 H215; (1 Mi-8 Hip in store); Light (1
Training Mission (EUTM). The mission has been extended
AS350 Ecureuil in store)
until May 2018. To date, more than 10,000 soldiers have
received training – many at the Koulikoro training centre. Paramilitary 7,800 active
The EUTM has also trained the air force, with a focus on
mobility. German security-sector assistance has included Gendarmerie 1,800
the construction of ammunition bunkers. France maintains FORCES BY ROLE
bases, personnel and equipment in Mali as part of Operation MANOEUVRE
Barkhane, which is intended to tackle Islamist radicals and Other
terrorists in Mali and the broader Sahel region. For the 8 paramilitary coy
first time, in 2017 the G5-Sahel force launched a military
operation in Mali near the border with Niger and Burkina National Guard 2,000
Faso. In September 2017, a peace and reconciliation
agreement was signed between some parties to the conflict National Police 1,000
Sub-Saharan
in Mali, yet several areas remain unresolved, including SSR Militia 3,000
Africa
and the DDR process.
ACTIVE 10,000 (Army 10,000) Paramilitary 7,800 DEPLOYMENT

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE UN • MONUSCO 1 obs
Army ε10,000 FOREIGN FORCES

FORCES BY ROLE
All under MINUSMA comd unless otherwise specified
The remnants of the pre-conflict Malian army are being
Albania EUTM Mali 4
reformed into new combined-arms battle groups, each of
which comprise one lt mech coy, three mot inf coy, one arty Armenia 1
bty and additional recce, cdo and cbt spt elms Austria 3 • EUTM Mali 12
MANOEUVRE Bangladesh 1,531; 2 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 sigs coy; 1
Light tpt coy; 1 hel sqn
8 mot inf BG Belgium 23 • EUTM Mali 171
Air Manoeuvre Benin 260; 2 obs; 1 mech inf coy
1 para bn Bhutan 3
Bosnia-Herzegovina 2
Bulgaria EUTM Mali 5
Mauritius MUS
Burkina Faso 1,716; 2 inf bn Mauritian Rupee R 2016 2017 2018
Cambodia 304; 1 EOD coy GDP R 432bn 453bn
Cameroon 2; 1 obs
US$ 12.2bn 12.3bn
Chad 1,398; 2 obs; 1 SF coy; 2 inf bn
China 403; 1 sy coy; 1 engr coy; 1 fd hospital
Growth % 3.9 3.9
Côte d’Ivoire 150; 1 obs; 1 sy coy
Czech Republic 1 • EUTM Mali 41 Inflation % 1.0 4.2
Denmark 64; 1 avn unit Def bdgt [a] R 7.66bn 8.06bn 8.63bn
Egypt 74; 3 obs; 1 MP coy US$ 215m 218m
El Salvador 104; 1 hel sqn US$1=R 35.54 36.92
Estonia 10 • EUTM Mali 4 [a] Police-service budget
Ethiopia 1
Finland 6 • EUTM Mali 1
France 21 • Operation Barkhane 1,750; 1 mech inf BG; 1 log Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
bn; 1 hel unit with 4 Tiger; 3 NH90 TTH; 6 SA330 Puma; 4 Male 10.3% 3.6% 3.8% 3.9% 23.5% 3.9%
SA342 Gazelle • EUTM Mali 13 Female 9.8% 3.5% 3.8% 3.7% 24.1% 5.7%
Gambia 3; 1 obs
Georgia EUTM Mali 1 Capabilities
Germany 610; 1 obs; 1 int coy; 1 hel bn • EUTM Mali 83
The country has no standing armed forces, but the Special
Ghana 218; 3 obs; 1 engr coy; 1 avn flt
Mobile Force (part of the police force) is tasked with pro-
Greece EUTM Mali 2 viding internal and external security. The coastguard is
Guinea 860; 3 obs; 1 inf bn currently in the process of increasing its ability to patrol the
Guinea-Bissau 1 country’s large EEZ and several orders with India resulted
Hungary EUTM Mali 3 in the delivery of maritime-focused capabilities in 2016 and
Indonesia 7; 1 obs 2017, including the second of two fast patrol boats in April
Ireland EUTM Mali 20 2017. There are close ties with the Indian Navy, and there
are plans for India to locate a coastal-surveillance radar in
Italy 1 • EUTM Mali 9
Mauritius. The country was one of the two host nations for
Jordan 4; 1 obs the Cutlass Express 2017 maritime-security exercise.
Kenya 7; 2 obs
Latvia 2 • EUTM Mali 3 ACTIVE NIL Paramilitary 2,550
Liberia 73; 1 inf coy(-)
Lithuania 5; 1 obs • EUTM Mali 2
Luxembourg EUTM Mali 2 Paramilitary 2,550
Mauritania 5
Montenegro EUTM Mali 1 Special Mobile Force ε1,750
Nepal 153; 2 obs; 1 EOD coy FORCES BY ROLE
Netherlands 258; 1 SF coy • EUTM Mali 1 MANOEUVRE
Reconnaissance
Niger 859; 3 obs; 1 inf bn
2 recce coy
Nigeria 83; 4 obs; 1 fd hospital Light
Norway 16 5 (rifle) mot inf coy
Portugal 2 • EUTM Mali 11 COMBAT SUPPORT
Romania 1 • EUTM Mali 1 1 engr sqn
Senegal 828; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 spt pl
Serbia EUTM Mali 3
Sierra Leone 7; 2 obs EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Slovenia EUTM Mali 4
RECCE 4 S52 Shorland
Spain 1 • EUTM Mali 127 IFV 2 VAB with 20mm gun
Sri Lanka 7 APC • APC (W) 16: 7 Tactica; 9 VAB
Sweden 212; 1 int coy • EUTM Mali 3 ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 2
Switzerland 6
Coast Guard ε800
Togo 939; 2 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 fd hospital
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
United Kingdom 2 • EUTM Mali 8
United States 26 PCC 2 Victory (IND Sarojini Naidu)
Yemen 4 PCO 1 Barracuda with 1 hel landing platform
PB 14: 10 (IND Fast Interceptor Boat); 1 P-2000; 1 SDB- FORCES BY ROLE

Mk3; 2 Rescuer (FSU Zhuk) SPECIAL FORCES
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3 SF bn
AGS 1 Pathfinder MANOEUVRE
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 4: 1 BN-2T Defender; 3 Do- Light
228-101 7 inf bn
COMBAT SUPPORT
Police Air Wing 2-3 arty bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 2 engr bn
HELICOPTERS COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
MRH 9: 1 H125 (AS555) Fennec; 2 Dhruv; 1 SA315B 1 log bn
Lama (Cheetah); 5 SA316 Alouette III (Chetak)
Equipment estimated at 10% or less serviceability
Mozambique MOZ ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Mozambique New Metical MBT 60+ T-54
2016 2017 2018
M RECCE 30 BRDM-1/BRDM-2
GDP M 689bn 809bn IFV 40 BMP-1
US$ 11.3bn 12.3bn APC 326
per capita US$ 392 418 APC (T) 30 FV430
Growth % 3.8 4.7
APC (W) 285: 160 BTR-60; 100 BTR-152; 25 AT-105 Saxon
PPV 11 Casspir
Def bdgt M 6.45bn 5.97bn MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111
US$ 106m 91m Fagot (AT-4 Spigot)
US$1=M 61.14 65.50 RCL 75mm; 82mm B-10; 107mm 24 B-12
GUNS 85mm 18: 6 D-48; 12 PT-56 (D-44)
ARTILLERY 126
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus TOWED 62: 100mm 20 M-1944; 105mm 12 M101;
122mm 12 D-30; 130mm 6 M-46; 152mm 12 D-1
Male 22.5% 5.8% 4.8% 3.6% 10.8% 1.3%
MRL 122mm 12 BM-21 Grad
Female 22.3% 5.8% 5.1% 4.1% 12.1% 1.7%
MOR 52: 82mm 40 M-43; 120mm 12 M-43
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 290+
Capabilities SP 57mm 20 ZSU-57-2
The armed forces are tasked with ensuring territorial integ- TOWED 270+: 20mm M-55; 23mm 120 ZU-23-2; 37mm
rity and internal security, as well as tackling piracy and hu- 90 M-1939; (10 M-1939 in store); 57mm 60 S-60; (30 S-60
man trafficking. Following a peace deal in 2014, RENAMO in store)
rebels declared an indefinite extension to the cessation of
hostilities in May 2017. Senior RENAMO leaders reported- Navy ε200
ly want their personnel to be given positions in the armed EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
forces as part of any overall peace agreement. Strong eco- PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6
nomic growth was tempered in 2016 by the discovery of
PBF 5: 2 DV 15; 3 HSI 32
previously undisclosed debt, although the exploitation of
Sub-Saharan
PB 1 Pebane (ex-ESP Conejera)
gas reserves may allow increased defence budgeting in the
Africa
future. An agreement on defence cooperation with China
signed in August 2016 included plans for bilateral train-
Air Force 1,000
ing. Patrol craft on order from France began to be deliv- FORCES BY ROLE
ered in 2016. Russia and Mozambique reportedly signed FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
a defence-cooperation agreement that came into effect in 1 sqn with MiG-21bis Fishbed; MiG-21UM Mongol B
mid-2016. Equipment serviceability levels remain unclear, TRANSPORT
but cooperative anti-piracy patrols with South Africa have 1 sqn with An-26 Curl; FTB-337G Milirole; Cessna 150B;
provided Mozambique’s forces with experience, albeit in Cessna 172; PA-34 Seneca
a supporting role. The armed forces have no capacity to ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
deploy beyond Mozambique’s borders without assistance. 1 sqn with Mi-24 Hind†
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ACTIVE 11,200 (Army 10,000 Navy 200 Air 1,000)
AIRCRAFT
Conscript liability 2 years
FGA 8: 6 MiG-21bis Fishbed; 2 MiG-21UM Mongol B
ISR 2 FTB-337G Milirole
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE TPT 6: Light 5: 1 An-26 Curl; 2 Cessna 150B; 1 Cessna
172; 1 PA-34 Seneca; (4 PA-32 Cherokee non-op); PAX 1
Army ε9,000–10,000 Hawker 850XP

ATK 2 Mi-24 Hind† MANOEUVRE
TPT • Medium (2 Mi-8 Hip non-op) Reconnaissance
AD • SAM • TOWED: (S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline) non- 1 recce regt
op‡; S-125 Pechora SA-3 Goa non-op‡) Light
3 inf bde (total: 6 inf bn)
Other
Namibia NAM 1 (Presidential Guard) gd bn
COMBAT SUPPORT
Namibian Dollar N$ 2016 2017 2018
1 arty bde with (1 arty regt)
GDP N$ 161bn 172bn 1 AT regt
US$ 10.9bn 12.6bn 1 engr regt
per capita US$ 4,709 5,358 1 sigs regt
Growth % 1.1 0.8
1 log bn
Inflation % 6.7 6.0 AIR DEFENCE
Def bdgt N$ 5.95bn 5.68bn 1 AD regt
US$ 404m 415m EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US$1=N$ 14.71 13.70 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT T-54/T-55†; T-34†
RECCE 12 BRDM-2
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus IFV 7: 5 Type-05P mod (with BMP-1 turret); 2 Wolf
Turbo 2 mod (with BMP-1 turret)
Male 18.6% 5.3% 4.9% 4.2% 14.2% 1.7% APC 61
Female 18.3% 5.3% 4.9% 4.4% 15.9% 2.3% APC (W) 41: 10 BTR-60; 3 Type-05P; 28 Wolf Turbo 2
PPV 20 Casspir
Capabilities ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
The armed forces’ primary mission is territorial defence;
secondary roles include assisting the AU and SADC, as
RCL 82mm B-10
well as supporting UN missions. The defence ministry is GUNS 12+: 57mm; 76mm 12 ZIS-3
following the Namibian Defence Force Development Strat- ARTILLERY 72
egy 2012–22, which, among other points, said that army TOWED 140mm 24 G-2
force design should be based on a conventional force with MRL 122mm 8: 5 BM-21 Grad; 3 PHL-81
strategic force-projection capability. Surveillance tasks are MOR 40: 81mm; 82mm
among those noted for both the air force and navy. The AIR DEFENCE
navy augments civilian offshore-patrol forces, including SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
on anti-piracy taskings. With an eye to naval-modernisa- GUNS 65
tion requirements, the government has stressed that ‘scarce SP 23mm 15 Zumlac
resources’ need to be prioritised. Namibia has deployed on TOWED 50+: 14.5mm 50 ZPU-4; 57mm S-60
AU and UN missions and takes part in multinational exer-
cises, including with regional states. In 2017, the country Navy ε900
hosted regional forces for the Blue Kunene SADC Standby EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Force HADR exercise. The navy also exercises with the PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6
SADC as part of its Standing Maritime Committee. In re- PSO 1 Elephant with 1 hel landing platform
cent years, the defence ministry established an Air Force PCC 2 Daures (ex-PRC Haiqing (Type-037-IS))
Technical Training Centre and a School for Airpower Stud- PB 3: 1 Brendan Simbwaye (BRZ Grajaú); 2 Terrace Bay
ies. China donated equipment, including two coastal patrol (BRZ Marlim)
craft, in 2017, and the local industry has also supplied some AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 F406 Caravan II
basic equipment. The country is funding the renovation of HELICOPTERS • TPT • Medium 1 S-61L
existing and the construction of new infrastructure for the Marines ε700
army and the air force. There is a very limited capacity for
independent power projection. Air Force
ACTIVE 9,900 (Army 9,000 Navy 900) Paramilitary FORCES BY ROLE
6,000 FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
1 sqn with F-7 (F-7NM); FT-7 (FT-7NG)
ISR
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 1 sqn with O-2A Skymaster
TRANSPORT
Army 9,000 Some sqn with An-26 Curl; Falcon 900; Learjet 36; Y-12
TRAINING
1 sqn with K-8 Karakorum* Capabilities
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Internal and border security are key roles for the armed
1 sqn with H425; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-25 Hind D; SA315 Lama forces, in light of the regional threat from Islamist groups.
(Cheetah); SA316B Alouette III (Chetak) The country is a member of the G5-Sahel group aimed at
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE improving the ability to counter AQIM and ISIS-affiliated
AIRCRAFT 12 combat capable jihadists in the region; in 2017, Boko Haram also mounted
FTR 8: 6 F-7NM; 2 FT-7 (FT-7NG) attacks in the country. However, the armed forces remain
ISR 5 Cessna O-2A Skymaster under-equipped and lack the resources to fully meet these
TPT 6: Light 5: 2 An-26 Curl; 1 Learjet 36; 2 Y-12; PAX 1 challenges. Niger provides UAV basing for the US: the first
Falcon 900 site is at Niamey (which also has a French presence), while
TRG 4+ K-8 Karakorum* the second site is being built in Agadez. Both France and
HELICOPTERS the US have been providing equipment for surveillance
ATK 2 Mi-25 Hind D tasks, including Cessna 208Bs from the US and Gazelle heli-
MRH 5: 1 H425; 1 SA315 Lama (Cheetah); 3 SA316B copters from France. France has also conducted joint coun-
Alouette III (Chetak) ter-terrorism operations with Niger’s armed forces, while
TPT • Medium 1 Mi-8 Hip Germany has developed an air-transport base at Niamey to
supply its troops in neighbouring Mali. Berlin has also sup-
Paramilitary 6,000 plied logistics vehicles and communications equipment to
the Nigerien military and gendarmerie.
Police Force • Special Field Force 6,000 (incl
Border Guard and Special Reserve Force) ACTIVE 5,300 (Army 5,200 Air 100) Paramilitary
5,400
Ministry of Fisheries Conscript liability Selective conscription, 2 years
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PCO 3: 2 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Nathanael Maxwilili with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Tobias
Hainyenko Army 5,200
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 1 3 Mil Districts
AGOS 1 Mirabilis FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
DEPLOYMENT Reconnaissance
4 armd recce sqn
SOUTH SUDAN Light
UN • UNMISS 1; 1 obs 7 inf coy
Air Manoeuvre
SUDAN
2 AB coy
UN • UNAMID 4; 2 obs COMBAT SUPPORT
UN • UNISFA 2; 2 obs 1 engr coy
Niger NER 1 log gp
AIR DEFENCE
Sub-Saharan
CFA Franc BCEAO fr 2016 2017 2018 1 AD coy
Africa
GDP fr 4.44tr 4.67tr EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US$ 7.49bn 7.89bn ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
RECCE 132: 35 AML-20/AML-60; 90 AML-90; 7 VBL
APC 45
Growth % 5.0 4.2
APC (W) 24: 22 Panhard M3; 2 WZ-523
Inflation % 0.3 1.0 PPV 21 Puma M26-15
Def exp fr 98.6bn 100bn ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
US$ 166m 169m RCL 14: 75mm 6 M20; 106mm 8 M40
US$1=fr 592.70 591.30 ARTILLERY • MOR 40: 81mm 19 Brandt; 82mm 17;
120mm 4 Brandt
Population 19,245,344 AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 39
Ethnic groups: Gourma 55.3%; Djerma Sonrai 21%; Touareg 9.3%; SP 20mm 10 Panhard M3 VDAA
Peuhl 8.5%; Kanouri Manga 4.6%; other or unspecified 1.3% TOWED 20mm 29
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Air Force 100
Male 24.7% 5.3% 4.0% 3.2% 11.5% 1.3%
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Female 24.3% 5.4% 4.2% 3.4% 11.2% 1.3% AIRCRAFT 2 combat capable
ATK 2 Su-25 Frogfoot comparatively well-equipped and -trained armed forces,

ISR 6: 4 Cessna 208 Caravan; 2 DA42 MPP Twin Star with countering piracy, and border and maritime security,
TPT 7: Medium 1 C-130H Hercules; Light 5: 1 An-26 also vital tasks. There have been reports that the difficulty
Curl; 2 Cessna 208 Caravan; 1 Do-28 Skyservant; 1 Do- in defeating the insurgents had been adversely affecting
228-201; PAX 1 B-737-700 (VIP) morale, even with training support from the US and other
HELICOPTERS countries. Despite the presence of the Multi-National Joint
ATK 2 Mi-35P Hind Task Force, the Boko Haram threat continues, as evidenced
MRH 5: 2 Mi-17 Hip; 3 SA342 Gazelle by an attack in mid-2017 against an oil-exploration team.
The armed forces have been attempting to adopt COIN
Paramilitary 5,400 tactics, and looking to establish forward-operating bases
and quick-reaction groups. In 2017, efforts were made to
Gendarmerie 1,400
improve training, notably in the air force, with the estab-
Republican Guard 2,500 lishment of Air Training Command and Ground Training
Command and new training aircraft from Pakistan. The
National Police 1,500 army stood up a new division (6th) in 2017, with the aim
of increasing the military presence in the Delta area and
DEPLOYMENT around oil infrastructure. In response to the continuing in-
surgency, equipment has been brought out of storage, in-
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC cluding transport aircraft and light fighters. Maintenance
UN • MINUSCA 130; 4 obs; 1 sigs coy and serviceability has been a long-standing issue. US sup-
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO port to Nigeria’s armed forces has continued, such as with
UN • MONUSCO 4; 12 obs the move to supply A-29/EMB-314 Super Tucanos, while the
German government also intends to bolster Nigerian cap
MALI abilities to tackle Boko Haram, for instance by providing
UN • MINUSMA 859; 3 obs; 1 inf bn mobile ground-radar systems.

FOREIGN FORCES
France Opération Barkhane 500; 1 FGA det with 2 Mirage Reserves planned, none org
2000C; 2 Mirage 2000D; 1 tkr/tpt det with 1 C-135FR; 1
C-160; 1 UAV det with 5 MQ-9A Reaper
United States 800 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Army 100,000 FORCES BY ROLE
Nigeria NGA SPECIAL FORCES
1 spec ops bn
Nigerian Naira N 2016 2017 2018 3 (mobile strike team) spec ops units
GDP N 103tr 120tr 1 ranger bn
MANOEUVRE
US$ 405bn 395bn
Armoured
1 (3rd) armd div (1 armd bde, 1 arty bde)
Growth % -1.6 0.8 Mechanised
Inflation % 15.7 16.3 1 (1st) mech div (1 recce bn, 1 mech bde, 1 mot inf bde, 1
Def bdgt N 443bn 465bn arty bde, 1 engr regt)
US$ 1.75bn 1.53bn 1 (2nd) mech div (1 recce bn, 1 armd bde, 1 arty bde, 1
FMA (US) US$ 0.6m 0.5m 0m engr regt)
1 (81st) composite div (1 recce bn, 1 mech bde, 1 arty
US$1=N 253.00 304.42
bde, 1 engr regt)
Population 190,632,261 Light
Ethnic groups: North (Hausa and Fulani), Southwest (Yoruba), 1 (6th) inf div (1 amph bde, 2 inf bde)
Southeast (Ibo); these tribes make up ε65% of population 1 (7th) inf div (1 spec ops bn, 1 recce bn(-), 1 armd bde, 7
(task force) inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr regt)
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
1 (8th Task Force) inf div (2 inf bde)
Male 21.7% 5.4% 4.5% 3.9% 13.8% 1.5%
1 (82nd) composite div (1 recce bn, 3 mot inf bde, 1 arty
Female 20.7% 5.2% 4.4% 3.7% 13.2% 1.6% bde, 1 engr regt)
1 (Multi-national Joint Task Force) bde (2 inf bn(-))
Capabilities Other
Nigeria continues to face numerous internal-security chal- 1 (Presidential Guard) gd bde (4 gd bn)
lenges, including the threat from Boko Haram and from AIR DEFENCE
militants in the Delta. These remain central concerns for the 1 AD regt
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 2:

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MCC 2 Ohue† (ITA Lerici mod)
MBT 319: 176 Vickers Mk 3; 100 T-55†; 12 T-72AV; 31 AMPHIBIOUS 4
T-72M1 LC • LCVP 4 Stingray 20
LT TK 157 FV101 Scorpion LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 1
RECCE 342: 90 AML-60; 40 AML-90; 70 EE-9 Cascavel; 50 AX 1 Prosperity
FV721 Fox; 20 FV601 Saladin Mk2; 72 VBL
IFV 32: 10 BTR-4EN; 22 BVP-1 Naval Aviation
APC 646+ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
APC (T) 317: 250 4K-7FA Steyr; 67 MT-LB HELICOPTERS
APC (W) 282+: 110 Cobra; 10 FV603 Saracen; 110 AVGP MRH 2 AW139 (AB-139)
Grizzly mod/Piranha I 6x6; 47 BTR-3UN; 5 BTR-80; TPT • Light 3 AW109E Power†
some EE-11 Urutu (reported)
PPV 47+: 16 Caiman; 8 Maxxpro; 23 REVA III 4×4; Streit
Special Forces 200
Spartan; Streit Cougar (Igirigi); Streit Typhoon; Bigfoot EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES FORCES BY ROLE
ARV 17+: AVGP Husky; 2 Greif; 15 Vickers ARV SPECIAL FORCES
VLB MTU-20; VAB 1 SF unit
RCL 84mm Carl Gustav; 106mm M40A1 Air Force 10,000
ARTILLERY 517+ FORCES BY ROLE
SP 155mm 39 Palmaria Very limited op capability
TOWED 106: 105mm 50 M-56; 122mm 49 D-30/D-74; FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
130mm 7 M-46; (155mm 24 FH-77B in store) 1 sqn with F-7 (F-7NI); FT-7 (FT-7NI)
MRL 122mm 42: 10 BM-21 Grad; 25 APR-21; 7 RM-70 MARITIME PATROL
MOR 330+: 81mm 200; 82mm 100; 120mm 30+ 1 sqn with ATR-42-500 MP; Do-128D-6 Turbo SkyServant;
RADAR • LAND: some RASIT (veh, arty) Do-228-100/200
AIR DEFENCE TRANSPORT
SAM • Point-defence 16+: 16 Roland; Blowpipe; 9K32 2 sqn with C-130H Hercules; C-130H-30 Hercules; G-222
Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡ 1 (Presidential) gp with B-727; B-737BBJ; BAe-125-800;
GUNS 90+ Beech 350 King Air; Do-228-200; Falcon 7X; Falcon 900;
SP 23mm 30 ZSU-23-4 Gulfstream IV/V
TOWED 60+: 20mm 60+; 23mm ZU-23; 40mm L/70 TRAINING
1 unit with Air Beetle†
Navy 8,000 (incl Coast Guard) 1 unit with Alpha Jet*
1 unit with L-39 Albatros†*; MB-339A*
Western Comd HQ located at Apapa; Eastern Comd HQ
1 hel unit with Mi-34 Hermit (trg)
located at Calabar; Central Comd HQ located at Brass
ATTACK HELICOPTER
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 sqn with Mi-24/Mi-35 Hind†
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 1 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
FRIGATES • FFGHM 1 Aradu† (GER MEKO 360) with 1 sqn with H215 (AS332) Super Puma; (AS365N)
8 single lnchr with Otomat AShM, 1 octuple Albatros Dauphin; AW109LUH; H135
Sub-Saharan
lnchr with Aspide SAM, 2 triple STWS 1B 324mm ASTT
Africa
with A244 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 med hel) AIRCRAFT 62 combat capable
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 119 FTR 14: 11 F-7 (F-7NI); 3 FT-7 (FT-7NI)
CORVETTES • FSM 1 Enymiri† (UK Vosper Mk 9) ELINT 2 ATR-42-500 MP
with 1 triple lnchr with Seacat† SAM, 1 twin 375mm TPT 32: Medium 5: 1 C-130H Hercules (4 more in store†);
A/S mor, 1 76mm gun 1 C-130H-30 Hercules (2 more in store); 3 G.222† (2 more
PSOH 4: 2 Centenary with 1 76mm gun; 2 Thunder (ex- in store†); Light 18: 3 Beech 350 King Air; 1 Cessna 550
US Hamilton) with 1 76mm gun Citation; 8 Do-128D-6 Turbo SkyServant; 1 Do-228-100; 5
PCFG 1 Sipri† (FRA Combattante) with 2 twin lnchr with Do-228-200 (incl 2 VIP); PAX 9: 1 B-727; 1 B-737BBJ; 1
MM38 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun BAe 125-800; 2 Falcon 7X; 2 Falcon 900; 1 Gulfstream IV;
PCO 4 Kyanwa (ex-US CG Balsam) 1 Gulfstream V
PCC 2 Ekpe† (GER Lurssen 57m) with 1 76mm gun TRG 113: 58 Air Beetle† (up to 20 awaiting repair); 3 Alpha
PBF 33: 21 Manta (Suncraft 17m); 4 Manta MkII; 3 Jet A*; 10 Alpha Jet E*; 2 DA40NG; 23 L-39ZA Albatros†*;
Shaldag II; 2 Torie (Nautic Sentinel 17m); 3 Wave Rider 12 MB-339AN* (all being upgraded); 5 Super Mushshak
PB 74: 1 Andoni; 1 Dorina (FPB 98); 5 Okpoku (FPB 72); HELICOPTERS
1 Karaduwa; 1 Sagbama; 2 Sea Eagle (Suncraft 38m); 15 ATK 13: 2 Mi-24P Hind; 4 Mi-24V Hind; 3 Mi-35 Hind; 2
Stingray (Suncraft 16m); 40 Suncraft 12m; 4 Swiftships; Mi-35P Hind; 2 Mi-35M Hind
2 Town (of which one laid up); 2 Yola† MRH 10+: 6 AW109LUH; 1 Bell 412EP; 3+ SA341 Gazelle
TPT 19: Medium 10: 2 AW101; 5 H215 (AS332) Super

Puma (4 more in store); 3 AS365N Dauphin; Light 9: 4 Rwanda RWA
H125 (AS350B) Ecureuil; 1 AW109; 1 Bell 205; 3 H135 Rwandan Franc fr 2016 2017 2018
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES 1+
CISR • Heavy 1+ CH-3 GDP fr 6.62tr 7.55tr
ISR • Medium (9 Aerostar non-operational) US$ 8.41bn 8.92bn
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 per capita US$ 729 754
Atoll)‡; PL-9C Growth % 5.9 6.2
BOMBS • INS/GPS guided FT-9
Inflation % 5.7 7.1
Paramilitary ε82,000 Def bdgt fr 74.5bn 90.4bn 92.3bn
US$ 95m 107m
Nigerian Police US$1=fr 787.29 846.35
Port Authority Police ε2,000 Population 11,901,484
Security and Civil Defence Corps • Police Ethnic groups: Hutu 80%; Tutsi 19%
80,000 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Male 20.8% 5.3% 4.3% 4.4% 13.0% 0.9%
Female 20.5% 5.3% 4.4% 4.5% 15.0% 1.5%
APC 80+
APC (W) 74+: 70+ AT105 Saxon†; 4 BTR-3U; UR-
416
Capabilities
PPV 6 Springbuck 4x4 The principal missions for the armed forces are to defend
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 4: 1 Cessna 500 Citation I; 2 territorial integrity and national sovereignty. A law on
PA-31 Navajo; 1 PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain downsizing and demobilising elements of the armed forces
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 5: 2 Bell 212 (AB-212); was published in October 2015 (no. 38/2015) and there
2 Bell 222 (AB-222); 1 Bell 429 have been further official retirement ceremonies for those
reaching rank-related retirement ages, indicating attention to
force health. The country fields a comparatively large army,
DEPLOYMENT but units are lightly equipped, with little mechanisation.
The army regularly takes part in multinational exercises
and is a key contributor to the East Africa Standby Force
UN • MINUSCA 2 (EASF). In late 2017, Rwanda deployed a contingent to the
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO EASF FTX in Sudan. It is a significant contributor to UN
missions and committed forces to the African Capacity for
Immediate Response to Crises initiative. New deployments
GAMBIA and rotations continued in 2017, with increased forces
ECOWAS • ECOMIG 200 dispatched to UNMISS in South Sudan, where Rwanda
also maintains a helicopter detachment. However, the
GUINEA-BISSAU lack of fixed-wing aircraft limits the armed forces’ ability
ECOWAS • ECOMIB 100 to deploy independently overseas. International training
support comes from forces including the US, which in 2016
LIBERIA conducted civil–military cooperation training.
UN • UNMIL 234; 3 obs; 1 inf coy
ACTIVE 33,000 (Army 32,000 Air 1,000) Paramilitary
MALI 2,000
UN • MINUSMA 83; 4 obs; 1 fd hospital
SOMALIA
UN • UNSOS 1 obs Army 32,000
SOUTH SUDAN FORCES BY ROLE
UN • UNMISS 3; 6 obs MANOEUVRE
Light
SUDAN 2 cdo bn
UN • UNAMID 932; 5 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 fd hospital 4 inf div (3 inf bde)
UN • UNISFA 1; 2 obs COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty bde
WESTERN SAHARA EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
UN • MINURSO 5 obs ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 34: 24 T-54/T-55; 10 Tiran-5
RECCE 106: ε90 AML-60/AML-90; 16 VBL
FOREIGN FORCES IFV 35+: BMP; 15 Ratel-90; 20 Ratel-60
United Kingdom 300 (trg teams) APC 90+
APC (W) 50+: BTR; Buffalo (Panhard M3); 30 Cobra; 20

WZ-551 (reported) Capabilities
PPV 40 RG-31 Nyala Senegal’s armed forces deployed in neighbouring Gambia
following a constitutional crisis in early 2017. Most
personnel have now been withdrawn, but Senegal still
ARTILLERY 171+
leads the ECOWAS mission in Gambia. Traditionally,
SP 11: 122mm 6 SH-3; 155mm 5 ATMOS 2000
TOWED 35+: 105mm some; 122mm 6 D-30; 152mm 29 priorities for Senegal’s armed forces are internal and
Type-54 (D-1)† border security, including countering an insurgency in
MRL 10: 122mm 5 RM-70; 160mm 5 LAR-160 the country’s south and Islamist activity in neighbouring
MOR 115: 81mm; 82mm; 120mm states, as well as combating narcotics trafficking. The
AIR DEFENCE  SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 military has developed ties with France and the US. France
(SA-7 Grail)‡ maintains force elements in Senegal, which train local
GUNS ε150: 14.5mm; 23mm; 37mm forces. In 2017, Senegal took part in a maritime-security
exercise with the US Coast Guard. The Senegalese military
Air Force ε1,000 is engaged in an ongoing modernisation programme,
FORCES BY ROLE including the procurement in 2017 of multiple-rocket
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER launchers and armoured vehicles.
1 sqn with Mi-17/Mi-17MD/Mi-17V-5/Mi-17-1V Hip H;
Mi-24P/V Hind ACTIVE 13,600 (Army 11,900 Navy 950 Air 750)
HELICOPTERS Conscript liability Selective conscription, 2 years
ATK 5: 2 Mi-24V Hind E; 3 Mi-24P Hind
MRH 12: 1 AW139; 4 Mi-17 Hip H; 1 Mi-17MD Hip H; 1
Mi-17V-5 Hip H; 5 Mi-17-1V Hip H
TPT • Light 1 AW109S
Army 11,900 (incl conscripts)
Paramilitary 7 Mil Zone HQ
District Administration Security Support FORCES BY ROLE
Organ ε2,000 MANOEUVRE
Reconnaissance
DEPLOYMENT 4 armd recce bn
Light
UN • MINUSCA 977; 11 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 fd hospital 1 cdo bn
6 inf bn
SOUTH SUDAN Air Manoeuvre
UN • UNMISS 1,973; 14 obs; 2 inf bn; 1 hel sqn 1 AB bn
SUDAN Other
UN • UNAMID 2,446; 5 obs; 3 inf bn 1 (Presidential Guard) horse cav bn
UN • UNISFA 6; 3 obs COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty bn
Senegal SEN 1 engr bn
3 construction coy
CFA Franc BCEAO fr 2016 2017 2018 1 sigs bn
Sub-Saharan
GDP fr 8.72tr 9.49tr COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Africa
US$ 14.7bn 16.1bn 1 log bn
1 med bn
1 trg bn
Growth % 6.7 6.8
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Inflation % 0.9 2.1 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Def bdgt fr 151bn 179bn 193bn ASLT 12 PTL-02 Assaulter
US$ 254m 303m RECCE 145: 30 AML-60; 74 AML-90; 10 M8; 4 M20; 27
FMA (US) US$ 0.3m 0.3m 0m RAM Mk3
IFV 26 Ratel-20
US$1=fr 592.71 591.27
APC 78
Population 14,668,522 APC (T) 12 M3 half-track
Ethnic groups: Wolof 36%; Fulani 17%; Serer 17%; Toucouleur 9%; APC (W) 19: 2 Oncilla; 16 Panhard M3; 1 WZ-551 (CP)
Man-dingo 9%; Diola 9% (of which 30–60% in Casamance) PPV 47: 8 Casspir; 39 Puma M26-15
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus ARV 1 Puma M36
Male 20.8% 5.4% 4.7% 3.9% 12.1% 1.3% ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Female 20.7% 5.4% 4.8% 4.2% 14.9% 1.6% MSL • MANPATS Milan
ARTILLERY 82 Customs 
TOWED 20: 105mm 6 HM-2/M101; 155mm 14: ε6 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Model-50; 8 TR-F1 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 2 VCSM
MRL 122mm 6 BM-21 Grad (UKR Bastion-1 mod)
MOR 56: 81mm 24; 120mm 32
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 33: 14.5mm ZPU-4 DEPLOYMENT
(tch); 20mm 21 M693; 40mm 12 L/60
UN • MINUSCA 114; 1 atk hel sqn
Navy (incl Coast Guard) 950
FORCES BY ROLE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
SPECIAL FORCES UN • MONUSCO 2; 2 obs
1 cdo coy GAMBIA
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ECOWAS • ECOMIG 250
PCO 1 Fouladou (OPV 190 Mk II) LIBERIA
PCC 1 Njambour (FRA SFCN 59m) with 2 76mm gun UN • UNMIL 1
PBF 1 Ferlo (RPB 33) MALI
PB 2: 1 Conejera; 1 Kedougou UN • MINUSMA 828; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy
LCT 2 Edic 700 SOUTH SUDAN
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 1 UN • UNMISS 2 obs
AG 1 SUDAN
UN • UNAMID 798; 1 inf bn
Air Force 750
FORCES BY ROLE
MARITIME PATROL/SEARCH & RESCUE
FOREIGN FORCES
1 sqn with C-212 Aviocar; CN235; Bell 205 (UH-1H France 350; 1 Falcon 50MI
Iroquois)
ISR Seychelles SYC
1 unit with BN-2T Islander (anti-smuggling patrols)
TRANSPORT Seychelles Rupee SR 2016 2017 2018
1 sqn with B-727-200 (VIP); F-27-400M Troopship GDP SR 19.0bn 20.2bn
TRAINING
US$ 1.43bn 1.48bn
1 sqn with R-235 Guerrier*; TB-30 Epsilon
per capita US$ 15,234 15,658
1 sqn with AS355F Ecureuil II; Bell 206; Mi-35P Hind; Mi- Growth % 4.5 4.1
171Sh Inflation % -1.0 2.8
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Def exp SR n.k n.k
AIRCRAFT 1 combat capable US$ n.k n.k
TPT 10: Light 8: 1 BN-2T Islander (govt owned, mil op); US$1=SR 13.32 13.65
1 C-212-100 Aviocar; 2 CN235; 2 Beech B200 King Air; 2
F-27-400M Troopship (3 more in store); PAX 2: 1 A319; 1 Population 93,920
B-727-200 (VIP) Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
TRG 7: 1 R-235 Guerrier*; 6 TB-30 Epsilon
Male 10.2% 3.2% 3.7% 3.5% 27.1% 3.0%
HELICOPTERS
ATK 2 Mi-35P Hind Female 9.6% 2.9% 3.3% 3.5% 24.4% 4.6%
MRH 1 AW139
TPT 8: Medium 2 Mi-171Sh; Light 6: 1 AS355F Ecureuil II; Capabilities
1 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 2 Bell 206; 2 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite The small Seychelles People’s Defence Forces are primarily
focused on maritime security and countering piracy. In
Paramilitary 5,000 2014 the EU began basic-training activities for the air force,
in a bid to bolster maritime-surveillance capabilities. The
Gendarmerie 5,000 country hosts US military forces conducting maritime-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE patrol activities on a rotational basis, including the operation
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES of unarmed UAVs. India maintains strong defence ties with
RECCE 11 RAM Mk3 the Seychelles, donating equipment, providing maintenance
APC 29: and supporting efforts to enhance maritime-patrol
APC (W) 17: 5 EE-11 Urutu; 12 VXB-170 capability. The Seychelles continues to implement plans to
PPV 12 Gila activate a number of Indian-supplied coastal-surveillance
radars. There are ongoing plans aimed at furthering the

Seychelles’ defence cooperation with China. Capabilities
ACTIVE 420 (Land Forces 200; Coast Guard 200; Air The armed forces’ primary task is internal security and the
provision of forces for continental peacekeeping missions.
Force 20)
There has been much focus on institutional military devel-
opment, with international support. Training has been
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE provided by the UK and the US, and there are reports of
interest in greater military cooperation with China, which
People’s Defence Force provides scholarships for military education. The army has
deployed a battalion to AMISOM in Somalia.
Land Forces 200
FORCES BY ROLE ACTIVE 8,500 (Joint 8,500)
SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF unit ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
MANOEUVRE
Light Armed Forces 8,500
1 inf coy
FORCES BY ROLE
Other
MANOEUVRE
1 sy unit
Reconnaissance
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 recce unit
1 MP unit
Light
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 3 inf bde (total: 12 inf bn)
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES COMBAT SUPPORT
RECCE 6 BRDM-2† 1 engr regt
ARTILLERY• MOR 82mm 6 M-43† 1 int unit
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-2†; 1 MP unit
ZPU-4†; 37mm M-1939† 1 sigs unit
COMBAT SUPPORT
Coast Guard 200 (incl 80 Marines) 1 log unit
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 fd hospital
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PCO 3: 1 Andromache (ITA Pichiotti 42m); 2 Topaz (ex-
IND Trinkat)
APC • PPV 4: 3 Casspir; 1 Mamba Mk5
PBF 1 Hermes (ex-IND Coastal Interceptor Craft)
PB 4: 2 Le Vigilant (ex-UAE Rodman 101); 1 Etoile
(Shanghai II mod); 1 Fortune (UK Tyne)
ARTILLERY 37
Air Force 20 TOWED 122mm 6 Type-96 (D30)
MOR 31: 81mm ε27; 82mm 2; 120mm 2
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
HELICOPTERS • MRH/TPT 2 Mi-17 Hip H/Mi-8 Hip†  
AIRCRAFT
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 7: 12.7mm 4; 14.5mm 3
TPT • Light 4: 1 DHC-6-320 Twin Otter; 1 Do-228; 2 Y-12
Maritime Wing ε200
Sub-Saharan
Sierra Leone SLE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Africa
Sierra Leonean Leone L 2016 2017 2018 Shanghai III†; 1 Isle of Man
GDP L 23.8tr 29.4tr
US$ 3.72tr 3.90tr DEPLOYMENT
LEBANON
Growth % 6.1 6.0
UN • UNIFIL 3
Def bdgt L 85.7bn 86.5bn 111bn MALI
UN • MINUSMA 7; 2 obs
US$ 13m 11m
US$1=L 6,417.57 7,554.61 SOMALIA
UN • UNSOM 1 obs
UN • UNSOS 1 obs
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
SUDAN
Male 20.8% 4.8% 4.1% 3.8% 13.3% 1.5% UN • UNAMID 1; 5 obs
Female 20.9% 5.1% 4.4% 4.0% 14.6% 2.2% UN • UNISFA 2; 1 obs
APC (W) 38+: 25+ AT-105 Saxon; 13 Bastion APC; Fiat

Somalia SOM 6614
PPV 9+: Casspir; MAV-5; 9+ Mamba Mk5; RG-31 Nyala
Somali Shilling sh 2016 2017 2018 AUV 12 Tiger 4×4
GDP US$ 6.34bn 6.52bn
per capita US$ n.k. n.k. Paramilitary
Growth % 3.2 2.4 Coast Guard
Inflation % n.k. n.k. All operational patrol vessels under 10t FLD
Def bdgt US$ n.k. n.k.
US$1=sh 1.00 1.00 FOREIGN FORCES
*Definitive economic data unavailable Under UNSOM command unless stated
Population 11,031,386 Burundi 1 obs • AMISOM 5,432; 6 inf bn
Djibouti AMISOM 1,850; 2 inf bn
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Ethiopia AMISOM 4,395; 6 inf bn
Male 21.5% 5.4% 4.2% 4.0% 14.3% 0.8% Finland EUTM Somalia 7
Female 21.6% 5.4% 4.0% 3.9% 13.4% 1.3% France EUTM Somalia 1
Germany EUTM Somalia 7
Capabilities Ghana UNSOS 2 obs
Somalia’s armed forces remain focused on internal stability. Hungary EUTM Somalia 4
Despite progress by Somali and foreign forces – including Italy EUTM Somalia 112
the AMISOM deployment – al-Shabaab has demonstrated Kenya AMISOM 3,664; 3 inf bn • UNSOS 1 obs
an ongoing capability to launch attacks in Somalia and in Mauritania UNSOS 1 obs
the region; the US launched airstrikes against the group Netherlands EUTM Somalia 11
with increasing regularity in 2017. The US authorised the Nigeria UNSOS 1 obs
deployment of regular forces to Somalia for the first time
Pakistan 1 obs • UNSOS 1 obs
since 1994 to train Somali forces. Federal-government plans
Portugal EUTM Somalia 4
to professionalise and unite the loose collections of clan-
based militia groups that form the Somali National Army Romania EUTM Somalia 4
have yet to be fully realised. The country’s armed forces Serbia EUTM Somalia 6
are still reliant on international support, with AMISOM, Sierra Leone 1 obs • UNSOS 1 obs
the EU and private-security companies providing train- Spain EUTM Somalia 16
ing and other countries, including China, donating equip- Sweden EUTM Somalia 4
ment. A Turkish training base that opened in Mogadishu in Turkey 1 obs
September 2017 is intended to provide longer-term recon- Uganda 530; 1 obs; 1 sy bn • AMISOM 6,223; 7 inf bn •
struction and capacity building for the armed forces, ahead UNSOS 1 obs
of the scheduled 2020 withdrawal of AMISOM forces. United Kingdom 4 obs • UNSOS 41 • EUTM Somalia 4
Somaliland and Puntland have their own militias, while a
United States Africa Command 500
privately funded Puntland Maritime Police Force operates
a small number of rigid inflatable boats and small aircraft.
ACTIVE 19,800 (Army 19,800) DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL
Data presented here represents the de facto situation. This
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE does not imply international recognition as a sovereign state
Army 19,800 (plus further militias (to be Somaliland

integrated)) Militia-unit strengths are not known. Equipment
numbers are generalised assessments; most of this
FORCES BY ROLE equipment is in poor repair or inoperable.
COMMAND
4 div HQ Army ε12,500
MANOEUVRE
FORCES BY ROLE
Light MANOUEVRE
Some cdo bn(+) Armoured
12 inf bde (3 inf bn) 2 armd bde
2 indep inf bn Mechanised
Other 1 mech inf bde
1 gd bn Light
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 14 inf bde
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES COMBAT SUPPORT
APC 47+ 2 arty bde
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT Key recommendations included joint command and

1 spt bn control for multi-domain and joint-service operations;
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† investment in special forces; and boosting land forces’
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES deployability. Meeting these objectives, however, requires
MBT T-54/55 adequate funding. The army’s aim is to be able to field 22
RECCE Fiat 6616 companies on border-patrol tasks, but as of 2017 it was able
APC • APC(W) Fiat 6614 to equip only 15. Higher personnel spending, including on
ARTILLERY • MRL various incl BM-21 Grad pensions, has meant that maintenance and repair funds
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • 23mm ZU-23 have had to be reallocated. Meanwhile, the army ‘faces
block obsolescence of its prime mission equipment’.
Ministry of the Interior The country also sustains the continent’s most capable
Coast Guard 600 defence industry, but defence-budget cuts and reduced
procurement have increasingly required that it look to the
All operational patrol vessels under 10t FLD
export market. Crucial SANDF procurement programmes
Puntland are behind schedule, including the Badger armoured
vehicle. The government was working on a revised defence-
Army ε3,000 (to be integrated into Somali industrial strategy as of the fourth quarter of 2017, which is
National Army) intended to improve domestic-procurement practices along
with better government support. The SANDF still deploys
Maritime Police Force ε1,000 regularly on peacekeeping missions and participates in
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE national and multinational exercises. Historically, South
AIRCRAFT • TPT 4: Light 3 Ayres S2R; PAX 1 DC-3 African forces have also played a significant role in training
HELICOPTERS • MRH SA316 Alouette III and supporting other regional forces.
All operational patrol vessels under 10t FLD ACTIVE 66,350 (Army 40,200 Navy 7,550 Air 10,450
South African Military Health Service 8,150)
South Africa RSA RESERVE 15,050 (Army 12,250 Navy 850 Air 850
South African Rand R 2016 2017 2018
South African Military Health Service Reserve 1,100)
GDP R 4.34tr 4.61tr
US$ 295bn 344bn
Space
Growth % 0.3 0.7
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Inflation % 6.3 5.4
SATELLITES • ISR 1 Kondor-E
Def bdgt R 47.2bn 48.6bn 50.6bn
US$ 3.21bn 3.63bn Army 40,200
FMA (US) US$ 0.3m 0.3m 0m FORCES BY ROLE
US$1=R 14.71 13.40 Regt are bn sized. A new army structure is planned
with 3 mixed regular/reserve divisions (1 mechanised, 1
motorised and 1 contingency) comprising 12 brigades (1
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus armoured, 1 mechanised, 7 motorised, 1 airborne, 1 air-
Sub-Saharan
landed and 1 sea landed)
Africa
Male 14.1% 4.3% 4.4% 5.0% 19.2% 2.4%
COMMAND
Female 14.1% 4.3% 4.6% 5.0% 19.2% 3.3%
2 bde HQ
SPECIAL FORCES
Capabilities 2 SF regt(-)
While the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) MANOEUVRE
remains on paper the most capable force in the region, Reconnaissance
funding problems continue to erode capacity for sustained 1 armd recce regt
operations. The services also face an increasing challenge Armoured
in replacing ageing equipment; in late 2016/early 2017 1 tk regt(-)
there was little airborne maritime-surveillance capability as Mechanised
the relevant type was temporarily grounded. South Africa 2 mech inf bn
contributes to UN operations and, since its inception, has Light
been a key component of the Force Intervention Brigade 8 mot inf bn
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is also a 1 lt inf bn
proponent of the African Union’s Standby Force concept. Air Manoeuvre
The 2015 Defence Review highlighted the role that Pretoria 1 AB bn
sees itself playing in ensuring the stability of the continent. 1 air mob bn
Amphibious GUNS 76
1 amph bn SP 23mm (36 Zumlac in store)
COMBAT SUPPORT TOWED 35mm 40 GDF-002
1 arty regt RADAR • AIR DEFENCE 6: 4 ESR 220 Thutlwa; 2 Thales Page
1 engr regt
1 construction regt Navy 7,550
3 sigs regt Fleet HQ and Naval base located at Simon’s Town; Naval
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT stations located at Durban and Port Elizabeth
1 engr spt regt
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIR DEFENCE
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 3 Heroine (Type-
1 ADA regt
209/1400 mod) with 8 533mm TT with AEG SUT 264
Reserve 12,250 reservists (under-strength) HWT (of which one cyclically in reserve/refit)
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 4:
FORCES BY ROLE
FFGHM 4 Valour (MEKO A200) with 2 quad lnchr
MANOEUVRE
with MM40 Exocet Block 2 AShM (upgrade to Block
Reconnaissance
3 planned); 2 16-cell VLS with Umkhonto-IR SAM, 1
3 armd recce regt
76mm gun (capacity 1 Super Lynx 300 hel)
Armoured
4 tk regt
PCC 3: 2 Warrior (ISR Reshef) with 1 76mm gun; 1 Warrior
Mechanised
(ISR Reshef)
6 mech inf bn
PB 3 Tobie
Light
14 mot inf bn
MHC 3 River (GER Navors) (Limited operational roles;
3 lt inf bn (converting to mot inf)
training and dive support)
Air Manoeuvre
AMPHIBIOUS • LCU 2 Delta 80
1 AB bn
2 air mob bn
AORH 1 Drakensberg (capacity 2 Delta 80 LCU; 2 Oryx
Amphibious
hels; 100 troops)
1 amph bn
AGHS 1 Protea (UK Hecla) with 1 hel landing platform
COMBAT SUPPORT
7 arty regt
Maritime Reaction Squadron
2 engr regt
5 AD regt MANOEUVRE
Amphibious
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 mne patrol gp
1 diving gp
MBT 24 Olifant 2 (133 Olifant 1B in store)
1 mne boarding gp
ASLT 50 Rooikat-76 (126 in store)
IFV 534 Ratel-20/Ratel-60/Ratel-90
1 spt gp
APC • PPV 810: 370 Casspir; 440 Mamba
ARV Gemsbok
Air Force 10,450
VLB Leguan Air Force HQ, Pretoria, and 4 op gps
MW Husky Command & Control: 2 Airspace Control Sectors, 1 Mobile
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Deployment Wg, 1 Air Force Command Post
MSL FORCES BY ROLE
SP ZT-3 Swift FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
MANPATS Milan ADT/ER  1 sqn with Gripen C/D (JAS-39C/D)
RCL 106mm M40A1 (some SP) GROUND ATTACK/TRAINING
ARTILLERY 1,240 1 sqn with Hawk Mk120*
SP 155mm 2 G-6 (41 in store) TRANSPORT
TOWED 155mm 6 G-5 (66 in store) 1 (VIP) sqn with B-737 BBJ; Cessna 550 Citation II; Falcon
MRL 127mm 6 Valkiri Mk II MARS Bataleur; (26 Valkiri 50; Falcon 900
Mk I and 19 Valkiri Mk II in store) 1 sqn with C-47TP
MOR 1,226: 81mm 1,190 (incl some SP on Casspir & 2 sqn with Beech 200/300 King Air; C-130B/BZ Hercules;
Ratel); 120mm 36 C-212; Cessna 208 Caravan
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES ATTACK HELICOPTER
ISR • Light up to 4 Vulture 1 (cbt spt) sqn with AH-2 Rooivalk
AIR DEFENCE TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
SAM • Point-defence Starstreak 4 (mixed) sqn with AW109; BK-117; Oryx
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE DEPLOYMENT

FGA 26: 17 Gripen C (JAS-39C); 9 Gripen D (JAS-39D) DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
TPT 24: Medium 7: 2 C-130B Hercules; 5 C-130BZ Hercules; UN • MONUSCO • Operation Mistral 1,358; 4 obs; 1 inf
Light 13: 3 Beech 200C King Air; 1 Beech 300 King Air; bn; 1 engr coy; 1 atk hel sqn; 1 hel sqn
3 C-47TP (maritime); 2 C-212-200 Aviocar†; 1 C-212-300
Aviocar†; 2 Cessna 550 Citation II; 1 PC-12; (9 Cessna 208 MOZAMBIQUE CHANNEL
Caravan in store) PAX 4: 1 B-737BBJ; 2 Falcon 50; 1 Falcon Navy • 1 FFGHM
900 SUDAN
TRG 59: 24 Hawk Mk120*; 35 PC-7 Mk II Astra
UN • UNAMID • Operation Cordite 4; 1 obs
HELICOPTERS
ATK 11 AH-2 Rooivalk
MRH 4 Super Lynx 300 South Sudan SSD
TPT 70: Medium 36 Oryx; Light 34: 26 AW109; 8 BK-117 South Sudanese Pound
2016 2017 2018
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IIR IRIS-T ssp
BOMBS • Laser-guided GBU-12 Paveway II GDP ssp 143bn 333bn
US$ 3.06bn 2.92bn
Ground Defence per capita US$ 244 222
FORCES BY ROLE
Growth % -13.8 -6.3
MANOEUVRE
Inflation % 380 182
Other
12 sy sqn (SAAF regt) Def bdgt [a] ssp 4.58bn 11.0bn 13.0bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE US$ 98m 97m
2 radar (static) located at Ellisras and Mariepskop; 2 US$1=ssp 46.95 114.18
(mobile long-range); 4 (tactical mobile). Radar air-control [a] Security and law-enforcement spending
sectors located at Pretoria, Hoedspruit
South African Military Health Service 8,150; Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
ε1,100 reservists (total 9,300)
Male 22.6% 5.8% 4.8% 3.8% 12.3% 1.1%
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Female 21.7% 5.5% 4.3% 3.6% 13.2% 0.9%
Forestry
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Capabilities
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4 South Sudan’s civil war continues with little progress
PSO 1 Sarah Baartman with 1 hel landing platform towards implementing the 2015 peace agreement. The
PCC 3 Lilian Ngoyi May 2017 unilateral ceasefire declared by President Kiir
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGE 2: 1 Africana; 1 Ellen has not been widely respected, with clashes continuing.
Khuzwayo Future peace talks may be complicated by the emergence
of additional rebel groups. Political and ethnic factional-
Department of Environmental Affairs ism remains high, while there remain security concerns
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE stemming from the relationship with Sudan. Planned dis-
Sub-Saharan
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGOSH 1 S. A. Agulhas II armament and demobilisation remain on hold due to the
(used for Antarctic survey) (capacity 2 Oryx hels) fighting, as do longer-term aspirations for defence reform
Africa
and capability development. US sanctions and an EU arms
Cyber embargo remain in place, although a December 2016 vote
for a wider UN arms embargo was unsuccessful. In August
South Africa published a National Cybersecurity Policy
Framework in 2011. Since then, the defence-intelligence 2017, the UN bolstered its existing UNMISS deployment
branch of the Department of Defence has been tasked to with an additional 4,000-personnel regional protection
develop a comprehensive cyber-warfare strategy and a force designed, according to the UN, to allow existing
cyber-warfare implementation plan, as well as to establish UNMISS troops to be reassigned to locations outside the
a Cyber Command Centre Headquarters, intended to be capital.
fully operational by FY2018/19. A Cyber Security Incident ACTIVE 185,000 (Army 185,000)
Response Team (CSIRT) operates under the State Security
Agency. State-owned company Denel announced in
September 2016 the establishment of the Denel Tactical ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Cyber Command Centre (DTC³). According to Denel,
‘DTC³ will also provide specialist cyber security solutions Army ε185,000
and services including a defensive and offensive cyber FORCES BY ROLE
warfare capability.’ 3 military comd
MANOEUVRE Moldova 1; 3 obs

Light Mongolia 866; 6 obs; 1 inf bn
8 inf div Myanmar 2
COMBAT SUPPORT Namibia 1; 1 obs
1 engr corps
Nepal 1,710; 11 obs; 2 inf bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Netherlands 6
New Zealand 1; 3 obs
MBT 80+: some T-55†; 80 T-72AV†
Nigeria 3; 6 obs
APC • PPV Streit Typhoon; Streit Cougar; Mamba
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Norway 15
MSL • MANPATS HJ-73; 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn) Pakistan 1; 1 obs
RCL 73mm SPG-9 (with SSLA) Paraguay 2 obs
ARTILLERY 69+ Peru 1; 2 obs
SP 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 2S3 Akatsiya Poland 1 obs
TOWED 130mm Some M-46 Romania 2; 4 obs
MRL 122mm BM-21 Grad; 107mm PH-63 Russia 4; 2 obs
MOR 82mm; 120mm Type-55 look-alike
Rwanda 1,973; 14 obs; 2 inf bn; 1 hel sqn
AIR DEFENCE
Senegal 2 obs
SAM
Short-range 16 S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa) (reported) Sri Lanka 178; 4 obs; 1 fd hospital; 1 hel sqn
Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; QW-2 Sweden 2 obs
GUNS 14.5mm ZPU-4; 23mm ZU-23-2; 37mm Type-65/74 Switzerland 2
Tanzania 4; 4 obs
Air Force Togo 1
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Uganda 2
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 Beech 1900 Ukraine 1; 3 obs
HELICOPTERS United Kingdom 373; 1 engr coy; 1 fd hospital
ATK 5: 2 Mi-24V Hind; 3 Mi-24V-SMB Hind United States 7
MRH 9 Mi-17 Hip H
Vietnam 2 obs
TPT 3: Medium 1 Mi-172 (VIP); Light 2 AW109 (civ livery)
Yemen 3; 2 obs
Zambia 3; 3 obs
FOREIGN FORCES Zimbabwe 2 obs
All UNMISS, unless otherwise indicated
Australia 23; 1 obs
Bangladesh 1,604; 7 obs; 1 inf coy; 1 rvn coy; 2 engr coy
Sudan SDN
Benin 2; 1 obs Sudanese Pound sdg 2016 2017 2018
Bhutan 2; 2 obs GDP sdg 574bn 771bn
Bolivia 1; 3 obs US$ 91.2 119bn
Brazil 6; 5 obs
Cambodia 77; 6 obs; 1 MP unit
Growth % 3.1 3.7
Canada 5; 5 obs
China, People’s Republic of 1,047; 4 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 engr
coy; 1 fd hospital Def exp sdg n.k. n.k.
Denmark 9 US$ n.k. n.k.
Egypt 1; 3 obs US$1=sdg 6.29 6.48
El Salvador 1; 2 obs
Ethiopia 1,261; 11 obs; 2 inf bn
Ethnic and religious groups: Muslim 70% mainly in North;
Fiji 4; 2 obs Christian10% mainly in South; Arab 39% mainly in North
Germany 5; 11 obs
Ghana 716; 11 obs; 1 inf bn Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Guatemala 4; 3 obs Male 19.6% 5.8% 4.9% 4.0% 14.0% 1.7%
Guinea 1 Female 19.0% 5.6% 4.6% 3.9% 14.9% 1.5%
India 2,373; 11 obs; 2 inf bn; 1 sigs coy; 1 fd hospital
Indonesia 1; 2 obs Capabilities
Japan 4 Sudan’s armed forces remain focused on ongoing tensions
Jordan 2 with South Sudan and the challenge from insurgents
Korea, Republic of 299; 2 obs; 1 engr coy in the south of the country. The government also relies
Kyrgyzstan 2; 1 obs on paramilitary forces for internal security. Sudan’s
extension of a unilateral ceasefire with rebels indicates APC (W) 349+: 10 BTR-70M Kobra 2; 50–80 BTR-152; 20
progress on resolving ongoing conflicts, and has been OT-62; 50 OT-64; 3+ Rakhsh; 10 WZ-551; WZ-523; 55-80
a key contributing factor to the lifting of decades of US V-150 Commando; 96 Walid
sanctions in October 2017. By regional standards, Sudan’s ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
armed forces are relatively well equipped, with significant MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); HJ-8;
holdings of both ageing and modern systems. These are 9K135 Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan)
complemented by the local Military Industry Corporation’s RCL 106mm 40 M40A1
manufacture of ammunition, small arms and armoured GUNS 40+: 40 76mm ZIS-3/100mm M-1944; 85mm D-44
vehicles. The majority of the corporation’s products are ARTILLERY 860+
based on older Chinese and Russian systems. The armed SP 66: 122mm 56 2S1 Gvozdika; 155mm 10 Mk F3
forces’ maintenance capability focuses on ground forces’ TOWED 128+: 105mm 20 M101; 122mm 21+: 21 D-30;
equipment, but there is a limited aircraft-maintenance D-74; M-30; 130mm 75 M-46/Type-59-I; 155mm 12
capacity. Regional power-projection capability has been M114A1
demonstrated in Sudan’s contribution to the Saudi-led MRL 666+: 107mm 477 Type-63; 122mm 188: 120 BM-21
intervention in Yemen, in which it initially deployed a Grad; 50 Saqr; 18 Type-81; 302mm 1+ WS-1  MOR 81mm;
small number of ground-attack aircraft, followed by a 82mm; 120mm AM-49; M-43
ground-forces contingent. (See pp. 435–40.) RADAR • LAND RASIT (veh, arty)
SAM • Point-defence 4+: 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡;
FN-6; 4+ 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko)
Conscript liability 2 years for males aged 18–30
GUNS 966+
RESERVE NIL Paramilitary 85,000 SP 20: 20mm 8 M163 Vulcan; 12 M3 VDAA
TOWED 946+: 740+ 14.5mm ZPU-2/14.5mm ZPU-
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 4/37mm Type-63/57mm S-60/85mm M-1944; 20mm 16
M167 Vulcan; 23mm 50 ZU-23-2; 37mm 80 M-1939; (30
M-1939 unserviceable); 40mm 60
Army 100,000+
FORCES BY ROLE Navy 1,300
SPECIAL FORCES
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
5 SF coy
MANOEUVRE
PBR 4 Kurmuk
Reconnaissance
PB 7: 1 13.5m; 1 14m; 2 19m; 3 41m (PRC)
1 indep recce bde
Armoured
1 armd div LCVP 5
Mechanised LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3
1 mech inf div AG 3
1 indep mech inf bde
Light Air Force 3,000
15+ inf div FORCES BY ROLE
6 indep inf bde FIGHTER
Air Manoeuvre 2 sqn with MiG-29SE/UB Fulcrum
Sub-Saharan
1 air aslt bde GROUND ATTACK
Africa
Amphbious 1 sqn with A-5 Fantan
1 mne div 1 sqn with Su-24M Fencer
Other 1 sqn with Su-25/Su-25UB Frogfoot
1 (Border Guard) sy bde  TRANSPORT
COMBAT SUPPORT Some sqn with An-30 Clank; An-32 Cline; An-72 Coaler;
3 indep arty bde An-74TK-200/300; C-130H Hercules; Il-76 Candid; Y-8
1 engr div (9 engr bn) 1 VIP unit with Falcon 20F; Falcon 50; Falcon 900; F-27;
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Il-62M Classic
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES TRAINING
MBT 465: 20 M60A3; 60 Type-59/Type-59D; 305 1 sqn with K-8 Karakorum*
T-54/T-55; 70 T-72AV; 10 Al-Bashier (Type-85-IIM) ATTACK HELICOPTER
LT TK 115: 70 Type-62; 45 Type-63 2 sqn with Mi-24/Mi-24P/Mi-24V/Mi-35P
RECCE 206: 6 AML-90; 70 BRDM-1/2; 50–80 FV701 Hind
Ferret; 30–50 FV601 Saladin TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
IFV 152: 135 BMP-1/2; 10 BTR-3; 7 BTR-80A 2 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-171
APC 415+ AIR DEFENCE
APC (T) 66: 20-30 BTR-50; 36 M113 5 bty with S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline)‡
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Indonesia 810; 7 obs; 1 inf bn • UNISFA 2; 1 obs

AIRCRAFT 66 combat capable Iran 1 obs
FTR 22: 20 MiG-29SE Fulcrum C; 2 MiG-29UB Fulcrum B Jordan 17; 7 obs
ATK 32: 15 A-5 Fantan; 6 Su-24/M Fencer; 9 Su-25 Frogfoot; Kenya 113; 3 obs; 1 MP coy
2 Su-25UB Frogfoot B
Korea, Republic of 2
ISR 2 An-30 Clank
Kyrgyzstan 1 obs • UNISFA 1 obs
TPT 21: Heavy 1 Il-76 Candid; Medium 6: 4 C-130H
Hercules; 2 Y-8; Light 10: 2 An-32 Cline; 2 An-72 Coaler; 4 Malawi UNISFA 1
An-74TK-200; 2 An-74TK-300; PAX 4: 1 Falcon 20F (VIP); Malaysia 11 • UNISFA 1 obs
1 Falcon 50 (VIP); 1 Falcon 900; 1 Il-62M Classic Mongolia 70; 1 fd hospital • UNISFA 1; 2 obs
TRG 15: 12 K-8 Karakorum*; 3 UTVA-75 Namibia 4; 2 obs • UNISFA 2; 2 obs
HELICOPTERS Nepal 366; 10 obs; 2 inf coy • UNISFA 4; 2 obs
ATK 40: 25 Mi-24 Hind; 2 Mi-24P Hind; 7 Mi-24V Hind E; Nigeria 932; 5 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 fd hospital • UNISFA 2;
6 Mi-35P Hind 1 obs
MRH ε4 Mi-17 Hip H Pakistan 1,412; 8 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy
TPT 27: Medium 23: 21 Mi-8 Hip; 2 Mi-171; Light 4: 1 Bell Papua New Guinea 1; 1 obs
205; 3 Bo-105
Peru 1; 1 obs • UNISFA 2 obs
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Medium-range: 90 S-75 Dvina
Russia UNISFA 1 obs
(SA-2 Guideline)‡
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 Rwanda 2,446; 5 obs; 3 inf bn • UNISFA 6; 3 obs
Atoll)‡; R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer); IR/SARH Senegal 798; 1 inf bn
R-23/24 (AA-7 Apex); ARH R-77 (AA-12A Adder) Sierra Leone 1; 5 obs • UNISFA 2; 1 obs
South Africa 4; 1 obs
Paramilitary 20,000 Sri Lanka UNISFA 2; 5 obs
Tanzania 815; 11 obs; 1 inf bn • UNISFA 2 obs
Popular Defence Force 20,000 (org in bn Thailand 10; 4 obs
1,000); 85,000 reservists (total 105,000)
mil wing of National Islamic Front Togo 2 obs
Ukraine UNISFA 1; 3 obs
Yemen 3; 3 obs
DEPLOYMENT Zambia 5; 2 obs • UNISFA 1 obs
SAUDI ARABIA Zimbabwe 3; 5 obs
Operation Restoring Hope 3 Su-24 Fencer
YEMEN Tanzania TZA
Operation Restoring Hope 950; 1 mech BG; T-72AV, BTR-
Tanzanian Shilling sh 2016 2017 2018
70M Kobra 2
GDP sh 104tr 116tr
US$ 47.7bn 51.6bn
FOREIGN FORCES
per capita US$ 980 1,041
All UNAMID, unless otherwise indicated
Growth % 7.0 6.5
Bangladesh 371; 8 obs; 2 inf coy
Benin UNISFA 2 obs Inflation % 5.2 5.4
Bhutan 1; 1 obs • UNISFA 1; 1 obs  Def bdgt sh 1.14tr 1.19tr 1.73tr
Brazil 3 • UNISFA 2 obs US$ 525m 528m
Burkina Faso 73; 4 obs • UNISFA 1 obs US$1=sh 2,177.13 2,250.54
Burundi 4; 4 obs • UNISFA 2 obs Population 53,950,935
Cambodia 2 obs • UNISFA 1; 2 obs
China, People’s Republic of 370; 1 engr coy Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Ecuador 1; 3 obs; • UNISFA 1; 1 obs Male 22.1% 5.5% 4.4% 3.8% 12.7% 1.3%
Egypt 847; 18 obs; 1 inf bn  Female 21.6% 5.4% 4.5% 3.8% 13.0% 1.7%
Ethiopia 2,419; 11 obs; 3 inf bn • UNISFA 4,366; 78 obs;
4 armd pl; 3 inf bn; 2 arty coy; 1 engr coy; 1 sigs coy; 1 fd Capabilities
hospital; 1 hel sqn
Non-state actors pose the principal threat to Tanzania’s
Gambia 211; 1 inf coy
security, with terrorism, poaching and piracy of concern.
Germany 8 There was additional focus on maritime security in 2017.
Ghana 19; 4 obs • UNISFA 3; 4 obs Budget constraints have limited equipment-recapitalisation
Guatemala UNISFA 1; 2 obs ambitions, which reflects a relatively benign security envi-
Guinea UNISFA 1 ronment, although concerns remain about instability in the
India UNISFA 3; 2 obs DRC. A developing relationship with China has led to a
series of procurement programmes and training contacts. PHT 2 Huchuan each with 2 533mm ASTT
There is a limited ability to project power independently PB 6: 2 Ngunguri; 2 Shanghai II (PRC); 2 VT 23m
beyond its own territory. However, Tanzania has in recent AMPHIBIOUS 3
years regularly taken part in multinational exercises in LCU 2 Yuchin
Africa and provided some training assistance to other Afri- LCT 1 Kasa
can forces. Training relationships exist with other external
armed forces, including the US. Tanzania also receives US Air Defence Command ε3,000
support to strengthen its peacekeeping deployment capac- FORCES BY ROLE
ity under the US African Rapid Response Partnership. Tan- FIGHTER
zania’s contribution to the UN’s Force Intervention Brigade 3 sqn with F-7/FT-7; FT-5; K-8 Karakorum*
in the eastern DRC, notably its special forces, will have pro- TRANSPORT
vided many lessons for force development. 1 sqn with Cessna 404 Titan; DHC-5D Buffalo; F-28
ACTIVE 27,000 (Army 23,000 Navy 1,000 Air 3,000) Fellowship; F-50; Gulfstream G550; Y-12 (II)
Paramilitary 1,400 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 sqn with Bell 205 (AB-205); Bell 412EP Twin Huey
Conscript liability Three months basic military training
combined with social service, ages 18–23 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†
RESERVE 80,000 (Joint 80,000) FTR 11: 9 F-7TN; 2 FT-7TN
ISR 1 SB7L-360 Seeker
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE TPT 12: Medium 2 Y-8; Light 7: 2 Cessna 404 Titan; 3
DHC-5D Buffalo; 2 Y-12(II); PAX 3: 1 F-28 Fellowship; 1
Army ε23,000 F-50; 1 Gulfstream G550
TRG 9: 3 FT-5 (JJ-5); 6 K-8 Karakorum*
FORCES BY ROLE
HELICOPTERS
SPECIAL FORCES
MRH 1 Bell 412EP Twin Huey
1 SF unit
TPT • Light 1 Bell 205 (AB-205)
MANOEUVRE
AIR DEFENCE
Armoured
SAM
1 tk bde
Short-range 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful)†; S-125 Pechora
Light
(SA-3 Goa)†
5 inf bde
Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
COMBAT SUPPORT
GUNS 200
4 arty bn
TOWED 14.5mm 40 ZPU-2/ZPU-4†; 23mm 40 ZU-23;
1 mor bn
37mm 120 M-1939
2 AT bn
1 engr regt (bn)
1 log gp Police Field Force 1,400
AIR DEFENCE
18 sub-units incl Police Marine Unit
2 ADA bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† Air Wing
Sub-Saharan
MBT 45: 30 T-54/T-55; 15 Type-59G
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 Cessna U206 Stationair
Africa
LT TK 57+: 30 FV101 Scorpion; 25 Type-62; 2+ Type-63A
HELICOPTERS
RECCE 10 BRDM-2
TPT • Light 4: 2 Bell 206A Jet Ranger (AB-206A);
APC • APC (W) 14: ε10 BTR-40/BTR-152; 4 Type-92
2 Bell 206L Long Ranger
TRG 2 Bell 47G (AB-47G)/Bell 47G2
RCL 75mm Type-52 (M20)
GUNS 85mm 75 Type-56 (D-44) Marine Unit 100
ARTILLERY 344+
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
TOWED 130: 122mm 100: 20 D-30; 80 Type-54-1 (M-30);
130mm 30 Type-59-I
GUN/MOR 120mm 3+ Type-07PA
MRL 61+: 122mm 58 BM-21 Grad; 300mm 3+ A100
MOR 150: 82mm 100 M-43; 120mm 50 M-43 DEPLOYMENT
Navy ε1,000
UN • MINUSCA 201; 1 inf bn(-)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
PCC 2 Mwitongo (ex-PRC Haiqing) UN • MONUSCO 1,266; 1 SF coy; 1 inf bn
LEBANON 1 rapid reaction force

UN • UNIFIL 157; 2 MP coy  Air Manoeuvre
1 cdo/para regt (3 cdo/para coy)
SOUTH SUDAN Other
UN • UNMISS 4; 4 obs 1 (Presidential Guard) gd regt (1 gd bn, 1 cdo bn, 2
SUDAN indep gd coy)
UN • UNAMID 815; 11 obs; 1 inf bn COMBAT SUPPORT
1 cbt spt regt (1 fd arty bty, 2 ADA bty, 1 engr/log/tpt bn)
UN • UNISFA 2 obs
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Togo TGO MBT 2 T-54/T-55
LT TK 9 FV101 Scorpion
RECCE 87: 3 AML-60; 7 AML-90; 30 Bastion Patsas; 36
GDP fr 2.63tr 2.79tr EE-9 Cascavel; 6 M8; 3 M20; 2 VBL
US$ 4.43bn 4.80bn IFV 20 BMP-2
per capita US$ 590 622 APC 34
APC (T) 4 M3A1 half-track
Growth % 5.0 5.0
APC (W) 30 UR-416
Inflation % 0.9 0.8 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Def bdgt fr 48.6bn 51.9bn RCL 75mm Type-52 (M20)/Type-56; 82mm Type-65 (B-10)
US$ 82m 89m GUNS 57mm 5 ZIS-2
US$1=fr 592.69 581.56 ARTILLERY 30+
SP 122mm 6
Population 7,965,055 TOWED 105mm 4 HM-2
MRL 122mm Type-81 mod (SC6 chassis)
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
MOR 82mm 20 M-43
Male 20.2% 5.0% 4.5% 4.2% 14.1% 1.5% AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 43 14.5mm 38 ZPU-4;
Female 20.0% 5.0% 4.5% 4.2% 14.5% 1.9% 37mm 5 M-1939
Capabilities Navy ε200 (incl Marine Infantry unit)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
The Togolese armed forces are adequate for the internal-
security role, but they have limited deployment capacity.
PBF 1 Agou (RPB 33)
Togo is increasingly concerned by the piracy threat in
PB 2 Kara (FRA Esterel) 
the Gulf of Guinea, and other illegal maritime activities.
Equipment, though limited, is generally well maintained
and serviceable. There is ongoing military-training
Air Force 250
cooperation with France. In 2017, Togo’s navy took FORCES BY ROLE
part in the French-led fisheries-policing exercise African FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
NeMo. The French also provide peacekeeping training for 1 sqn with Alpha Jet*; EMB-326G*
Togolese personnel participating in MINUSMA. The US TRANSPORT
Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance 1 sqn with Beech 200 King Air
programme has also provided training to the Togolese 1 VIP unit with DC-8; F-28-1000
forces. Togo is also seeking to procure former French Army TRAINING
1 sqn with TB-30 Epsilon*
Gazelle helicopters, which would significantly enhance the
air force’s capabilities.
1 sqn with SA315 Lama; SA316 Alouette III; SA319
ACTIVE 8,550 (Army 8,100 Navy 200 Air 250) Alouette III
Paramilitary 750 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†
Conscript liability Selective conscription, 2 years AIRCRAFT 10 combat capable
TPT 5: Light 2 Beech 200 King Air; PAX 3: 1 DC-8; 2
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE F-28-1000 (VIP)
TRG 10: 3 Alpha Jet*; 4 EMB-326G *; 3 TB-30 Epsilon*
HELICOPTERS
Army 8,100+ MRH 4: 2 SA315 Lama; 1 SA316 Alouette III; 1 SA319
FORCES BY ROLE Alouette III
MANOEUVRE TPT • Medium (1 SA330 Puma in store)
Reconnaissance
1 armd recce regt Paramilitary 750
Light
2 cbd arms regt Gendarmerie 750
2 inf regt Ministry of Interior
FORCES BY ROLE training, and the country has a number of training facili-
2 reg sections ties that are used by international partners. US support to
MANOEUVRE Uganda’s forces in 2017 included the delivery of protected
Other patrol vehicles, while Ugandan force elements gained
1 (mobile) paramilitary sqn experience at the US Joint Readiness Training Center. (See
pp. 440–44.)
DEPLOYMENT ACTIVE 45,000 (Ugandan People’s Defence Force
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 45,000) Paramilitary 1,400
UN • MINUSCA 6; 4 obs RESERVE 10,000
LIBERIA
UN • UNMIL 1 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
MALI
UN • MINUSMA 939; 2 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 fd hospital Ugandan People’s Defence Force ε40,000–
45,000
SOUTH SUDAN
FORCES BY ROLE
UN • UNMISS 1
MANOEUVRE
SUDAN Armoured
UN • UNAMID 2 obs 1 armd bde
WESTERN SAHARA Light
1 cdo bn
5 inf div (total: 16 inf bde)
Other
Uganda UGA 1 (Special Forces Command) mot bde
COMBAT SUPPORT
Ugandan Shilling Ush 2016 2017 2018
1 arty bde
GDP Ush 86.6tr 95.5tr AIR DEFENCE
US$ 25.3bn 26.4bn 2 AD bn
per capita US$ 692 701 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†
Growth % 2.3 4.4 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Inflation % 5.5 5.8 MBT 239+: 185 T-54/T-55; 10 T-72; 44 T-90S; ZTZ-85-IIM
Def bdgt Ush 1.64tr 1.58tr 1.12tr LT TK ε20 PT-76
RECCE 46: 40 Eland-20; 6 FV701 Ferret
US$ 478m 436m
IFV 31 BMP-2
APC 150
US$1=Ush 3,420.21 3,619.91 APC (W) 58: 15 BTR-60; 20 Buffel; 4 OT-64; 19 Bastion
Population 39,570,125 APC
PPV 92: 42 Casspir; 40 Mamba; 10 RG-33L
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus AUV 15 Cougar
Male ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Sub-Saharan
23.9% 5.6% 4.8% 3.9% 10.5% 0.8%
Africa
Female 24.0% 5.7% 5.7% 3.9% 10.5% 1.1%
VLB MTU reported
Capabilities MW Chubby
ARTILLERY 333+
Uganda’s armed forces are relatively large and well
SP 155mm 6 ATMOS 2000
equipped. They have, in recent years, seen some advanced
capability acquisitions, boosting military capacity, par- TOWED 243+: 122mm M-30; 130mm 221; 155mm 22: 4
ticularly in the air force. Ugandan forces remain deployed G-5; 18 M-839
to Somalia as part of AMISOM, having deployed at the MRL 6+: 107mm (12-tube); 122mm 6+: BM-21 Grad; 6
mission’s inception in 2007. Some elements are combat RM-70
experienced as a result. Due to operational experience MOR 78+: 81mm L16; 82mm M-43; 120mm 78 Soltam
and training, the force has developed in areas such as AIR DEFENCE
administration and planning, as well as in tactics, such as SAM
counter-IED and urban foot patrols supported by armour. Short-range 4 S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa)
A number of years spent targeting the Lord’s Resistance Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K310 Igla-
Army has also ensured experience in more austere coun- 1 (SA-16 Gimlet)
ter-insurgency tactics. Uganda is one of the largest con- GUNS • TOWED 20+: 14.5mm ZPU-1/ZPU-2/ZPU-4;
tributors to the East Africa Standby Force. There is regular 37mm 20 M-1939
Marines ε400
Zambia ZMB
Zambian Kwacha K 2016 2017 2018
Air Wing GDP K 217bn 243bn
FORCES BY ROLE US$ 21.0bn 25.6bn
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK per capita US$ 1,257 1,484
1 sqn with MiG-21bis Fishbed; MiG-21U/UM Mongol Growth % 3.4 4.0
A/B; Su-30MK2 Inflation % 17.9 6.8
TRANSPORT Def bdgt K 3.15bn 3.20bn
1 unit with Y-12 US$ 305m 337m
1 VIP unit with Gulfstream 550; L-100-30
US$1=K 10.32 9.51
TRAINING
1 unit with L-39 Albatros†*
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
1 sqn with Bell 206 Jet Ranger; Bell 412 Twin Huey; Mi- Male 23.1% 5.4% 4.6% 3.8% 12.0% 1.0%
17 Hip H; Mi-24 Hind; Mi-172 (VIP) Female 22.9% 5.4% 4.6% 3.8% 12.0% 1.3%
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 16 combat capable Capabilities
FGA 13: 5 MiG-21bis Fishbed; 1 MiG-21U Mongol A; Ensuring territorial integrity and border security, and a
1 MiG-21UM Mongol B; 6 Su-30MK2 commitment to international peacekeeping operations, are
key tasks for the armed forces. But Zambia’s armed forces
TPT 6: Medium 1 L-100-30; Light 4: 2 Cessna 208B; 2
struggle with limited funding and the challenge of main-
Y-12; PAX 1 Gulfstream 550 taining ageing weapons systems. A new naval unit was cre-
TRG 3 L-39 Albatros†* ated in 2015 to patrol the country’s riverine borders. The air
HELICOPTERS force has limited tactical air-transport capability, although
ATK 1 Mi-24 Hind (2 more non-op) two C-27J Spartan are reportedly on order. As part of the
MRH 5: 2 Bell 412 Twin Huey; 3 Mi-17 Hip H (1 more country’s plans to boost its air assets, deliveries of China’s
L-15 Falcon trainer aircraft were completed in 2017; the con-
non-op)
tract reportedly included weapons, training and support.
TPT 4: Medium 2: 1 Mi-172 (VIP), 1 Mi-171 (VIP); However, there is currently no independent capacity for
Light 2 Bell 206A Jet Ranger significant power projection. The country has no defence-
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES manufacturing capacity, except limited ammunition pro-
AAM • IR R-73 (AA-11 Archer); SARH R-27 (AA-10 duction, though it is reported that exploratory discussions
have taken place about establishing some manufacturing
Alamo); ARH R-77 (AA-12 Adder) (reported)
capacity for military trucks. The services have participated
ARM Kh-31P (AS-17A Krypton) (reported) in exercises with international and regional partners, in-
cluding the Blue Kunene 2017 HADR exercise. Zambia’s
Paramilitary ε1,400 active largest peacekeeping contribution is to the MINUSCA op-
eration in the CAR.
Border Defence Unit ε600
Equipped with small arms only
ACTIVE 15,100 (Army 13,500 Air 1,600) Paramilitary
1,400
Police Air Wing ε800 RESERVE 3,000 (Army 3,000)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 1 Bell 206 Jet Ranger ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

FORCES BY ROLE
SOMALIA COMMAND
AU • AMISOM 6,223; 7 inf bn 3 bde HQ
SPECIAL FORCES
UN • UNSOM 530; 1 obs; 1 sy bn
1 cdo bn
UN • UNSOS 1 obs MANOEUVRE
Armoured
SOUTH SUDAN
1 armd regt (1 tk bn, 1 armd recce regt)
UN • UNMISS 2 Light
6 inf bn
COMBAT SUPPORT AIR DEFENCE

1 arty regt (2 fd arty bn, 1 MRL bn) SAM • Short-range S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa)
1 engr regt AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡; PL-2; Python 3
Some equipment† ASM 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger)
MBT 30: 20 Type-59; 10 T-55
Paramilitary 1,400
LT TK 30 PT-76 Police Mobile Unit 700
RECCE 70 BRDM-1/BRDM-2 (ε30 serviceable)
FORCES BY ROLE
IFV 23 Ratel-20 MANOEUVRE
APC • APC (W) 33: 13 BTR-60; 20 BTR-70 Other
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES 1 police bn (4 police coy)
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Police Paramilitary Unit 700
MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger) FORCES BY ROLE
RCL 12+: 57mm 12 M18; 75mm M20; 84mm Carl Gustav MANOEUVRE
ARTILLERY 182 Other
TOWED 61: 105mm 18 Model 56 pack howitzer; 122mm 1 paramilitary bn (3 paramilitary coy)
25 D-30; 130mm 18 M-46
MRL 122mm 30 BM-21 Grad (ε12 serviceable) DEPLOYMENT
MOR 91: 81mm 55; 82mm 24; 120mm 12
AIR DEFENCE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
SAM • MANPAD 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡ UN • MINUSCA 943; 7 obs; 1 inf bn
GUNS • TOWED 136: 20mm 50 M-55 (triple); 37mm 40
M-1939; 57mm ε30 S-60; 85mm 16 M-1939 KS-12 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
Reserve 3,000
LIBERIA
FORCES BY ROLE
UN • UNMIL 1 obs
MANOEUVRE
Light SOUTH SUDAN
3 inf bn UN • UNMISS 3; 3 obs
Air Force 1,600 SUDAN

FORCES BY ROLE
UN • UNISFA 1 obs
1 sqn with K-8 Karakorum*
1 sqn with L-15* Zimbabwe ZWE
TRANSPORT
1 sqn with MA60; Y-12(II); Y-12(IV); Y-12E Zimbabwe Dollar Z$ 2016 2017 2018
1 (VIP) unit with AW139; CL-604; HS-748 GDP US$ 16.1bn 17.1bn
1 (liaison) sqn with Do-28 per capita US$ 1,112 1,150
TRAINING Growth % 0.7 2.8
2 sqn with MB-326GB; MFI-15 Safari
Sub-Saharan
Africa
1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H Def bdgt US$ 394m 341m
1 (liaison) sqn with Bell 47G; Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois/ US$1=Z$ 1.00 1.00
AB-205)
AIR DEFENCE
3 bty with S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa) Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† Male 19.2% 5.5% 4.5% 4.3% 13.3% 1.8%
Very low serviceability Female 19.6% 5.6% 4.8% 4.4% 14.0% 2.6%
TPT 23: Light 21: 5 Do-28; 2 MA60; 4 Y-12(II); 5 Y-12(IV); Capabilities
5 Y-12E; PAX 2: 1 CL-604; 1 HS-748
TRG 45: 15 K-8 Karakourm*; 6 L-15*; 10 MB-326GB; 8 The armed forces’ role is to defend sovereignty and
MFI-15 Safari; 6 SF-260TW territorial integrity, although late 2017 saw the army take a
HELICOPTERS more direct role in domestic politics than they had hitherto.
MRH 5: 1 AW139; 4 Mi-17 Hip H In an overnight operation, the army secured key locations
TPT • Light 12: 9 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois/AB-205); 3 in Harare and placed President Mugabe under house arrest.
Bell 212 The future political role of the military was uncertain as of
TRG 5 Bell 47G late November, though key officers were given ministerial
positions. High inflation and economic problems continue ARTILLERY 254

to be potentially destabilising, and limit the military’s ability SP 122mm 12 2S1 Gvozdika
to recapitalise its equipment inventory. China has been the TOWED 122mm 20: 4 D-30; 16 Type-60 (D-74)
only source of defence equipment for the country’s limited MRL 76: 107mm 16 Type-63; 122mm 60 RM-70
number of procurements. Zimbabwe has enjoyed a close MOR 146: 81mm/82mm ε140; 120mm 6 M-43  
relationship with Angola since the end of that country’s civil AIR DEFENCE
war and is looking to foster bilateral military ties. Economic SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
problems make investment in new equipment and facilities GUNS • TOWED 116: 14.5mm 36 ZPU-1/ZPU-2/ZPU-4;
unlikely without novel financing options or credit provision, 23mm 45 ZU-23; 37mm 35 M-1939
despite a stated interest in a number of equipment types.
State-owned Zimbabwe Defence Industries manufactures a
Air Force 4,000
range of ammunition, however ageing machinery and non- Flying hours 100 hrs/yr
profitability mean its future is uncertain. The armed forces FORCES BY ROLE
have taken part intermittently in multinational training FIGHTER
exercises with regional states, including Amani Africa II 1 sqn with F-7 II†; FT-7†
in 2015. Both the EU and the US have arms embargoes in FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
place, which, the air-force commander acknowledged, have 1 sqn with K-8 Karakorum*
reduced air-force readiness. (1 sqn Hawker Hunter in store)
GROUND ATTACK/ISR
ACTIVE 29,000 (Army 25,000 Air 4,000) Paramilitary 1 sqn with Cessna 337/O-2A Skymaster*
21,800 ISR/TRAINING
1 sqn with SF-260F/M; SF-260TP*; SF-260W Warrior*
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE TRANSPORT
1 sqn with BN-2 Islander; CASA 212-200 Aviocar (VIP)
Army ε25,000 ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 sqn with Mi-35 Hind; Mi-35P Hind (liaison); SA316
FORCES BY ROLE
Alouette III; AS532UL Cougar (VIP)
COMMAND
1 trg sqn with Bell 412 Twin Huey, SA316 Alouette III
1 SF bde HQ
AIR DEFENCE
1 mech bde HQ
1 sqn
5 inf bde HQ
1 SF regt AIRCRAFT 45 combat capable
MANOEUVRE FTR 9: 7 F-7 II†; 2 FT-7†
Armoured ISR 2 O-2A Skymaster
1 armd sqn TPT • Light 25: 5 BN-2 Islander; 7 C-212-200 Aviocar; 13
Mechanised Cessna 337 Skymaster*; (10 C-47 Skytrain in store)
1 mech inf bn TRG 33: 10 K-8 Karakorum*; 5 SF-260M; 8 SF-260TP*; 5
Light SF-260W Warrior*; 5 SF-260F
15 inf bn HELICOPTERS
1 cdo bn ATK 6: 4 Mi-35 Hind; 2 Mi-35P Hind
Air Manoeuvre MRH 10: 8 Bell 412 Twin Huey; 2 SA316 Alouette III
1 para bn TPT • Medium 2 AS532UL Cougar (VIP)
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR PL-2; PL-5
Other
(reported)
3 gd bn
AD • GUNS 100mm (not deployed); 37mm (not
1 (Presidential Guard) gd gp
deployed); 57mm (not deployed)
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty bde 
Paramilitary 21,800
1 fd arty regt
2 engr regt Zimbabwe Republic Police Force 19,500
AIR DEFENCE incl air wg
1 AD regt
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 
Police Support Unit 2,300
MBT 40: 30 Type-59†; 10 Type-69†
RECCE 115: 20 Eland-60/90; 15 FV701 Ferret†; 80 EE-9
Cascavel (90mm) DEPLOYMENT
IFV 2+ YW307 SOUTH SUDAN
APC • APC (T) 30: 8 ZSD-85 (incl CP); 22 VTT-323
UN • UNMISS 2 obs
ARV T-54/T-55 reported; ZJX-93 ARV SUDAN
VLB MTU reported UN • UNAMID 3; 5 obs
Arms procurements and deliveries – Sub-Saharan Africa

Botswana is reportedly evaluating second- the army chief also stated that the programme is
hand fighter-aircraft options to replace its F-5s. experiencing serious delays.
Delegations from the country have visited Saab
in Sweden and KAI in South Korea in recent years,
Denel left its joint venture with VR Laser Asia and
suggesting the Gripen C/D and T-50 are being
Indian company Adani. The joint venture was
considered.
formed in 2016 with the aim of breaking into
the Indian market as well as those of other Asian
countries.
The United States government approved the sale
of 12 A-29 Super Tucano aircraft to Nigeria. The sale
has an estimated value of US$593 million. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency
approved the sale of 12 MD-530F armed multi-role
helicopters to Kenya at an estimated total cost of
The Nigerian chief of naval staff announced that US$253m.
the navy requires US$1.3 billion of investment in
new naval platforms, including a frigate, an OPV Denel and ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS)
and a submarine. signed a memorandum of understanding
concerning upgrades for South Africa’s Heroine-
class submarines and Valour-class frigates. The
Denel Land System’s CEO said the first Badger vessels are planned to be modernised in South
infantry fighting vehicles will start being delivered Africa, with TKMS providing technical and shipyard
to the South African Army in May 2019, although support.
Figure 26 Sub-Saharan Africa: selected ongoing or completed procurement priorities in 2017
8
7
Number of countries
Sub-Saharan
6
Africa
purchasing
5 East Africa
Southern Africa
4 Central Africa
West Africa
3
2
1
0
s
s
Ar *
y
ms
He Sub iles
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ole Atta ort kers
t
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an k He craf
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er
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/ P l Shi
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oy
Ta
W Com ssa MC
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M R (F t / E ) Ves
r
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ir
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o
Ca
irc
y
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vy
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oa atro
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ile
ult
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o
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©
Figure 27 Ukraine: defence exports to sub-Saharan Africa, 1996–2016
Other Angola
800 Uganda 2% 3%
Angola Kenya Chad
7%
9%
60 Chad Nigeria
700
Democratic Republic Sudan
Sudan
of the Congo (DRC) Uganda
600 21%
190 Ethiopia Other DRC
21%
500
95
400 10
31
110 Ethiopia
Nigeria
300 77 11%
12%
Kenya 10%
54
143 4
200 56 30
81
18 20
100 117 34
145 10
75
42
0 0
Main battle tank Armoured Artillery Fighter/attack Attack
fighting vehicle aircraft helicopter
Sudan Democratic Republic of the Congo
140 80
120 70
60
100
50
80
40
60
30
40
20
20 10
0 0
T-55 T-72 BMP-1 Other 2S1 BM-21 D-30 MiG-29
5
4
2
P-1
0
-LB
/3
-21
Su r
-27
/35
o
T-5
T-6
T-7
R-6
D-3
2S1
mM
AFV
-24
BM
MT
BM
BT
Mi
82m
Nigeria Ethiopia and Kenya

100 160
140
80
120
Ethiopia
60 100
Kenya
80
40 60
40
20
20
0 0
T-72 BTR-3 BTR-4 D-30 Mi-24/35 T-72 BTS-4B BM-21 82mm Mor Su-27
© IISS
Chapter Ten
Country comparisons and defence data
Maps 14–17 Selected training activity 2017 500

Table 21 International comparisons of defence expenditure and military personnel 502
comparisons
Country
Selected
Map exercises:exercises:
14 Selected Europe 2016
Europe 2016
COLD RESPONSE 2016 CYBER COALITION 2016

FTX Cyber Ex
17–28 Mar 2016 28 Nov–2 Dec 2016
BEL, CAN, DNK, ESP, FIN, Multiple NATO members
FRA, GER, LVA, NLD,
NOR, POL, SWE, UK, US SABER STRIKE 2016
FTX
11–21 Jun 2016
BALTOPS 2016 CAN, DNK, EST, FIN, FRA,
MAREX GER, LTU, LUX, LVA, NOR,
3–26 Jun 2016 POL, UK, US
BEL, CAN, DNK, ESP, FIN,
FRA, GER, LVA, NLD,
ANAKONDA 2016
NOR, POL, SWE, UK, US
Cyber Ex, EWX, FTX
1–17 Jun 2016
ALB, BLG, CAN, CRO,
OPEN SPIRIT 2016 CZE, ESP, EST, FIN,
MCMEX, NAVEX FYROM, GEO, GER, HUN,
12–27 May 2016 LTU, LVA, NLD, POL,
Multiple NATO members ROM, SVK, SWE, TUR,
UK, UKR
RAMSTEIN ALLOY 3 IRON WOLF 2016

Air Cbt Ex FTX
27–28 Sept 2016 6–19 Jun 2016
Multiple NATO members Multiple NATO members
GRIFFIN STRIKE 2016 BRILLIANT CAPABILITY

FTX, LIVEX 2016
10–22 Apr 2016 DEPEX, FTX
Multiple NATO members 29 May–3 Jun 2016
Multiple NATO members
DYNAMIC MANTA 2016 SLAVIC BROTHERHOOD

ASWEX, MARSEC 2016
22 Feb–4 Mar 2016 CTEX, FTX
ESP, FRA, GER, GRE, ITA, 5–12 Nov 2016
TUR, UK, US BLR, RUS, SER
Map 16 Selected exercises: Russia and Eurasia 2016
LADOGA 2016
FTX
21–25 Mar 2016 UNBREAKABLE
RUS BROTHERHOOD
PKO ex
23–27 Aug 2016
Russia–Belarus Joint
ARM, BLR, KAZ, KGZ,
Tactical exercise
RUS, TJK
Airborne Ex
18–20 Sep 2016
BLR, RUS RAPID TRIDENT 16
CPX, FTX, Interop ex
27 Jun–8 Jul 2016
BEL, BLG, CAN, GEO, RUSSIA
LTU, MDA, NOR, POL,
ROM, SWE, TUR, UK,
UKR, US
RUSSIA
COOPERATION 2016
CTEX, Interop ex No-notice exercise
28 Jun–14 Jul 2016 DEPEX, Interop ex
PRC, RUS 25–31 Aug 2016
RUS
PEACE MISSION 2016 INDRA-2016

CAUCASUS 2016 NOBLE PARTNER CTEX, FIREX, FTX CTEX, FTX
COSTEX, FTX FTX, Interop ex 15–20 Sep 2016 22 Sep–2 Oct 2016
5–10 Sep 2016 11–24 May 2016 KAZ, KGZ, PRC, IND, RUS
RUS GEO, UK, US RUS, TJK
Country comparisons and defence data 501
Map 15 Selected exercises: Europe 2017
AURORA 2017 RUSKA 2017

CBT trg ex, FTX ADEX, JREX
19–29 Sep 2017 9–13 Oct 2017
DNK, EST, FIN, LTU, NOR, FIN, SWE
SWE, US
SABER STRIKE 2017

TRAINING BRIDGE 17
JTFEX, FIREX
FTX
22–24 Mar 2017
1 Jan–2 Mar 2017
CZE, EST, HUN, LTU, LVA,
POL, SVK
FLAMING THUNDER 2017
CWIX 2017 ARTEX
Interop Ex 29 May–3 Jun 2017
12–29 Jun 2017 Multiple NATO members
BRAVE WARRIOR 2017

FORMIDABLE SHIELD Air Cbt Ex, C2, MRX
2017 26 Jun–23 Jul 2017
ADEX, BMD Ex Multiple NATO members
24 Sept–18 Oct 2017
SABER GUARDIAN 2017
AMPLE STRIKE 2017 CPX, FTX
Air Cbt Ex, FIREX 11–20 Jul 2017
23 Aug–12 Sept 2017 Multiple NATO members
SEA BREEZE 2017

NOBLE JUMP 2017 Interop Ex
DEPEX, MRX 10–23 Jul 2017
29 May–22 Jun 2017 Multiple NATO members
DYNAMIC MANTA 17 CAUCASIAN EAGLE 2017

ASWEX, MARSEC Interop Ex, JOINTEX
13–25 Mar 2017 5–15 Jun 2017
Multiple NATO members AZE, GEO, TUR
Map 17 Selected exercises: Russia and Eurasia 2017

MARITIME Airborne command-and-staff
COOPERATION 2017 exercise in Crimea
NAV Ex Airborne Ex, CPX
21–28 Jul 2017 20–31 Mar 2017
PRC, RUS RUS
ZAPAD 2017 FRIENDSHIP Southern Military District

Multi Mission Exercise DEFENDERS 2017 no-notice exercise
1–30 Sep 2017 Airborne Ex, CBT trg ex CBT trg ex, MRX
BLR, RUS 9–22 Sep 2017 1 Jun 2017 Russia Eastern
EGY, RUS RUS Military District
anti-aircraft exercise
ADEX
RUSSIA 3–31 Mar 2017
RUS
COMBAT
COMMONWEALTH 2017
comparisons
RUSSIA ADEX, JOINTEX

Country
4–9 Sep 2017 No-notice exercise

ARM, BLR, KAZ, KGZ, Air Cbt Ex, ADEX, MRX
RUS, TJK 7–9 Sep 2017
RUS
DUSHANBE
ANTI-TERROR 2017 Russia Eastern Military District
Russia–Belarus Joint Exercise CTEX Forces no-notice exercise
Airborne Ex, Joint Exercise 30 May–1 Jun 2017 ADEX, C2
31 Mar–6 Apr 2017 ARM, BLR, KAZ, KGZ, 1–31 Jul 2017
BLR, RUS RUS, TJK RUS
Defence Defence Defence Active Estimated Active
Spending Spending Spending Armed Forces Reservists Paramilitary
current US$ m per capita (current US$) % of GDP (000) (000) (000)
2015 2016 2017 2015 2016 2017 2015 2016 2017 2018 2018 2018
North America
Canada 16,158 16,182 17,031 460 458 478 1.04 1.06 1.04 63 30 5
United States 589,564 593,371 602,783 1,834 1,831 1,845 3.25 3.19 3.11 1,348 858 0
Total 605,722 609,553 619,814 1,699 1,696 1,711 3.08 3.02 2.95 1,411 888 5
Europe
Albania 101 114 109 33 38 36 0.89 0.96 0.84 8 0 1
Austria 2,667 2,888 2,985 308 331 341 0.71 0.75 0.73 22 152 0
Belgium 4,010 3861 4,254 354 338 370 0.88 0.83 0.87 29 0 5
Bosnia-Herzegovina 162 165 162 42 43 42 1.00 0.99 0.93 11 0 0
Bulgaria 560 671 676 78 94 95 1.12 1.28 1.21 31 3 0
Croatia 641 591 657 148 137 153 1.31 1.17 1.23 16 0 3
Cyprus 328 335 397 276 278 325 1.68 1.69 1.88 15 50 1
Czech Republic 1,780 1,955 2,205 167 183 207 0.95 1.00 1.05 23 0 0
Denmark 3,516 3,514 3,807 630 628 679 1.17 1.15 1.17 16 46 0
Estonia 467 498 543 369 396 434 2.07 2.14 2.11 6 28 0
Finland 3,074 3,100 3,191 561 564 578 1.32 1.30 1.27 22 216 3
France 46,626 46,784 48,640 701 700 725 1.92 1.90 1.89 203 32 103
Germany 36,589 37,943 41,734 453 470 518 1.08 1.09 1.14 179 28 1
Greece 4,733 4,598 4,725 439 427 439 2.43 2.36 2.31 141 221 4
Hungary 1,070 1,061 1,265 108 107 128 0.88 0.85 0.96 28 44 12
Iceland 30 46 37 91 136 110 0.18 0.23 0.15 0 0 0
Ireland 998 994 1039 204 201 207 0.34 0.33 0.32 9 2 0
Italy 21,495 22,112 22,859 348 357 368 1.18 1.19 1.19 175 18 182
Latvia 283 407 507 142 207 261 1.05 1.47 1.68 5 8 0
Lithuania 471 637 816 163 223 289 1.14 1.49 1.75 18 7 11
Luxembourg 214 235 294 375 404 494 0.37 0.39 0.46 1 0 1
Macedonia (FYROM) 102 106 112 49 50 53 1.01 0.97 0.98 8 5 8
Table 21 International comparisons of defence expenditure and military personnel
Malta 56 58 64 135 139 154 0.54 0.53 0.54 2 0 0

2015 2016 2017 2015 2016 2017 2015 2016 2017 2018 2018 2018
Montenegro 67 68 74 104 106 115 1.67 1.64 1.67 2 0 10
Netherlands 8,877 9,121 10,100 524 536 591 1.17 1.17 1.23 35 5 6
Norway 5,815 6,000 6,078 1,117 1,140 1,143 1.50 1.62 1.55 24 39 0
Poland 10,128 9,101 9,837 263 236 256 2.12 1.94 1.93 105 0 73
Portugal 2,502 2,443 2,445 231 225 226 1.26 1.19 1.15 31 212 44
Romania 2,481 2,763 4,041 115 128 188 1.40 1.47 1.97 69 50 80
Serbia 515 501 523 72 70 74 1.39 1.33 1.33 28 50 4
Slovakia 884 974 1,116 162 179 205 1.01 1.09 1.17 16 0 0
Slovenia 444 446 474 224 225 240 1.03 1.00 0.99 7 2 6
Spain 13,050 99,75 12,112 271 205 247 1.09 0.81 0.93 121 15 77
Sweden 5,723 5738 5,962 584 581 599 1.15 1.12 1.10 30 0 1
Switzerland 4,770 4,654 4,834 587 569 587 0.70 0.70 0.71 21 144 0
Turkey 8,384 8,664 7,983 106 108 99 0.98 1.00 0.95 355 379 157
United Kingdom 58,243 52,577 50,721 909 816 783 2.03 2.00 1.98 150 83 0
Total 251,855 245,698 257,377 404 393 410 1.37 1.33 1.34 1,962 1,838 791
Russia and Eurasia
Armenia 416 431 429 136 141 141 3.95 4.08 3.89 45 210 4
Azerbaijan 1,646 1,395 1,554 168 141 156 3.24 3.72 3.96 67 300 15
Belarus 556 506 528 58 53 55 0.99 1.07 1.00 45 290 110
Georgia 300 283 303 61 57 61 2.14 1.98 1.99 21 0 5
Kazakhstan 1,693 1,134 1,246 93 62 67 0.92 0.85 0.80 39 0 32
Kyrgyzstan n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 11 0 10
Moldova 24 27 29 7 8 8 0.37 0.40 0.37 5 58 2
Russia [a] 52,201 44,470 45,600 367 312 321 3.82 3.47 3.10 900 2,000 554
Tajikistan 225 193 192 27 23 23 2.87 2.79 2.65 9 0 8
Turkmenistan n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 37 0 5
Ukraine 2,664 2,555 2,734 60 58 62 2.93 2.74 2.63 204 900 88
Uzbekistan n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 48 0 20
Total** 59,726 50,996 52,616 210 179 185 3.15 2.93 2.66 1,430 3,758 853
Country
comparisons
2015 2016 2017 2015 2016 2017 2015 2016 2017 2018 2018 2018
Asia
Afghanistan 3,142 2,593 2,166 96 78 63 15.65 13.33 10.29 174 0 149
Australia 22,034 23,617 24,963 968 1,027 1,075 1.79 1.87 1.80 58 21 0
Bangladesh 2,226 2,562 2,778 14 16 18 1.08 1.12 1.11 157 0 64
Brunei 391 409 324 910 936 731 3.02 3.59 2.71 7 1 5
Cambodia* 575 656 788 37 41 49 3.17 3.26 3.54 124 0 67
China 142,409 143,668 150,458 104 104 108 1.27 1.28 1.26 2,035 510 660
Fiji 46 52 51 51 56 55 1.06 1.10 1.00 4 6 0
India 44,843 51,453 52,494 36 41 41 2.15 2.27 2.15 1,395 1,155 1,586
Indonesia 7,909 7,380 8,981 31 29 34 0.92 0.79 0.89 396 400 280
Japan 41,143 46,456 46,004 324 367 364 0.94 0.94 0.94 247 56 14
Korea, DPR of n.k n.k n.k n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k n.k n.k 1,280 600 189
Korea, Republic of 33,152 33,648 35,674 655 661 697 2.40 2.38 2.33 625 3,100 9
Laos n.k n.k n.k n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k n.k n.k 29 0 100
Malaysia 4,548 4,171 3,478 149 135 111 1.53 1.41 1.12 109 52 25
Mongolia 102 100 84 34 33 27 0.87 0.91 0.77 10 137 8
Myanmar 2,135 2,282 2,095 38 40 38 3.59 3.55 3.13 406 0 107
Nepal 336 314 330 12 11 11 1.57 1.48 1.37 97 0 62
New Zealand 2,182 2,576 2,519 492 576 558 1.26 1.42 1.25 9 2 0
Pakistan 8,805 9,188 9,720 44 45 47 3.25 3.29 3.21 654 0 282
Papua New Guinea 94 83 71 14 12 10 0.45 0.40 0.32 4 0 0
Philippines 2,196 2,475 2,782 22 24 27 0.75 0.81 0.87 125 131 41
Singapore 9,544 10,017 10,221 1,682 1,733 1,736 3.22 3.37 3.34 73 313 75
Sri Lanka 2,011 1,991 1,704 91 90 76 2.53 2.47 2.04 243 6 62
Taiwan 10,007 9,902 10,429 427 422 444 1.91 1.87 1.82 215 1,657 11
Thailand 5,634 5,820 6,163 83 85 90 1.41 1.43 1.41 361 200 94
Timor-Leste 72 26 25 59 21 20 2.33 0.97 0.94 1 0 0
Vietnam* 3,829 4,073 4,319 41 43 45 2.00 2.02 2.00 482 5,000 40

Total** 349,364 365,512 378,622 88 91 94 1.45 1.46 1.43 9,319 13,346 3,928
2015 2016 2017 2015 2016 2017 2015 2016 2017 2018 2018 2018
Middle East and North Africa
Algeria 10,407 10,218 10,018 263 254 245 6.27 6.42 5.71 130 150 187
Bahrain 1,526 1,523 1,480 1,133 1,105 1,049 4.90 4.78 4.37 8 0 11
Egypt 5,335 5,300 2,669 58 56 28 1.61 1.59 1.36 439 479 397
Iran* 14,174 15,871 16,035 173 192 195 3.78 3.92 3.75 523 350 40
Iraq 21,100 16,976 19,271 569 445 492 11.73 9.89 10.00 64 0 145
Israel 15,400 19,868 18,547 1,913 2,430 2,235 5.15 6.25 5.33 177 465 8
Jordan 1,320 1,474 1,635 163 180 160 3.51 3.81 4.04 101 65 15
Kuwait 4,313 5,743 5,710 1,547 2,027 1,986 3.76 5.18 4.83 16 24 7
Lebanon* 1,495 1,740 1,867 242 279 300 3.02 3.45 3.54 60 0 20
Libya n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k.
Mauritania 137 138 142 38 37 38 2.82 2.91 2.86 16 0 5
Morocco 3,268 3,327 3,487 98 99 103 3.23 3.21 3.15 196 150 50
Oman 9,883 9,103 8,687 3,007 2,713 2,537 14.15 13.73 12.08 43 0 4
Palestinian Territories n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 0 0 n.k.
Qatar n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 17 0 5
Saudi Arabia 81,853 81,526 76,678 2,949 2,895 2,684 12.51 12.61 11.30 227 0 25
Syria n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 158 0 150
Tunisia 979 975 826 89 88 72 2.27 2.32 2.07 36 0 12
United Arab Emirates n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 63 0 0
Yemen n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 20 0 0
Total** 171,190 173,782 167,051 409 408 388 5.64 5.73 5.40 2,290 1,683 1,081
Latin America and the Caribbean
Antigua and Barbuda 27 26 27 287 279 285 1.94 1.79 1.76 0 0 0
Argentina 6,338 5,205 6,128 146 119 138 1.00 0.96 0.99 74 0 31
Bahamas 152 121 99 468 369 299 1.72 1.39 1.08 1 0 0
Barbados 36 39 38 125 135 130 0.82 0.86 0.79 1 0 0
Belize 20 21 23 56 59 63 1.12 1.21 1.26 2 1 0

Bolivia 435 442 543 40 40 49 1.31 1.30 1.44 34 0 37
Country
comparisons
2015 2016 2017 2015 2016 2017 2015 2016 2017 2018 2018 2018
Brazil 23,659 23,551 29,408 116 114 142 1.31 1.31 1.41 335 1,340 395
Chile 3,437 3,444 3,927 196 195 221 1.42 1.39 1.49 77 40 45
Colombia 9,962 9,201 9,999 213 195 210 3.42 3.26 3.25 293 35 188
Costa Rica 450 409 389 93 84 79 0.81 0.70 0.66 0 0 10
Cuba n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k n.k n.k n.k n.k n.k 49 39 27
Dominican Republic 444 458 496 42 43 46 0.65 0.64 0.66 56 0 15
Ecuador 1,911 1,565 1,565 120 97 96 1.91 1.60 1.59 40 118 1

El Salvador 148 146 146 24 24 24 0.57 0.55 0.53 25 10 17
Guatemala 274 283 242 18 19 16 0.43 0.42 0.34 18 64 25
Guyana 46 51 56 63 69 76 1.45 1.49 1.57 3 1 0
Haiti n.k 7 7 n.k 1 1 n.k 0.09 0.08 0 0 0
Honduras 246 295 263 28 33 29 1.18 1.38 1.16 15 60 8
Jamaica 119 139 120 40 47 40 0.83 1.00 0.84 4 1 0
Mexico 6,015 4,917 4,532 49 40 36 0.52 0.47 0.40 277 82 59
Nicaragua 72 73 84 12 12 14 0.56 0.55 0.61 12 0 0
Panama 654 751 746 179 203 199 1.26 1.36 1.26 0 0 22
Paraguay 313 268 264 46 39 38 1.15 0.97 0.92 11 165 15
Peru 2,217 2,225 2,095 73 72 68 1.15 1.14 1.00 81 188 77
Suriname* n.k n.k n.k n.k n.k n.k n.k n.k n.k 2 0 0
Trinidad and Tobago 394 605 596 323 496 489 1.67 2.87 2.93 4 0 0
Uruguay 514 489 513 154 146 153 0.96 0.93 0.85 25 0 1
Venezuela 2,093 1,278 1,120 69 41 36 0.86 0.54 0.52 123 8 150
Total** 59,975 56,010 63,424 98 90 101 1.17 1.13 1.16 1,561 2,151 1,121
Sub-Saharan Africa
Angola 4,441 2,969 3,233 226 147 110 4.31 3.11 2.61 107 0 10
Benin 91 98 117 9 9 11 1.10 1.14 1.24 7 0 3
Botswana 404 561 492 185 254 222 2.80 3.60 2.94 9 0 0
Burkina Faso 148 150 189 8 8 9 1.33 1.23 1.43 11 0 0

Burundi 64 66 63 6 6 6 2.12 2.12 1.87 30 0 21
2015 2016 2017 2015 2016 2017 2015 2016 2017 2018 2018 2018
Cameroon 354 388 404 15 16 16 1.25 1.32 1.32 14 0 9
Cape Verde 10 11 10 18 19 17 0.63 0.64 0.56 1 0 0
Central African Rep* 27 27 31 5 5 5 1.69 1.53 1.54 7 0 1
Chad* 170 160 165 15 13 14 1.56 1.58 1.70 30 0 10
Congo 590 562 481 124 116 97 6.89 7.14 6.17 10 0 2
Côte d'Ivoire 844 755 829 36 32 34 2.58 2.12 2.08 25 0 n.k.
Dem Republic of the Congo 738 762 586 9 9 7 1.92 1.94 1.45 134 0 0
Djibouti n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 10 0 3
Equatorial Guinea n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 1 0 0
Eritrea n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 202 120 0
Ethiopia 399 451 492 4 4 5 0.62 0.62 0.62 138 0 0
Gabon 197 203 302 115 117 170 1.37 1.45 2.09 5 0 2
Gambia* n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 1 0 0
Ghana 237 195 185 9 7 7 0.64 0.45 0.41 16 0 0
Guinea 221 162 164 19 13 13 2.53 1.91 1.79 10 0 3
Guinea-Bissau n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 4 0 0
Kenya 927 1,222 1,194 20 26 25 1.45 1.73 1.52 24 0 5
Lesotho 44 42 53 22 22 27 1.83 1.87 1.94 2 0 0
Liberia 15 13 14 4 3 3 0.73 0.62 0.67 2 0 0
Madagascar 59 59 62 2 2 2 0.60 0.59 0.58 14 0 8
Malawi 36 29 38 2 2 2 0.56 0.53 0.60 11 0 4
Mali 467 546 644 28 31 36 3.57 3.89 4.29 10 0 8
Mauritius 240 215 218 179 160 161 2.08 1.77 1.78 0 0 3
Mozambique 132 106 91 5 4 3 0.89 0.94 0.74 11 0 0
Namibia 567 404 415 237 166 167 4.90 3.69 3.30 10 0 6
Niger* 166 166 169 9 9 9 2.30 2.22 2.15 5 0 5
Nigeria 1,948 1,751 1,529 11 9 8 0.39 0.43 0.39 118 0 82
Rwanda 89 95 107 7 7 9 1.07 1.13 1.20 33 0 2

Senegal 215 254 303 15 18 21 1.57 1.73 1.89 14 0 5
Country
comparisons
2015 2016 2017 2015 2016 2017 2015 2016 2017 2018 2018 2018
Seychelles n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 0 0 0
Sierra Leone 18 13 11 3 2 2 0.43 0.36 0.29 9 0 0
Somalia n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 20 0 0
South Africa 3,534 3,211 3,628 66 59 66 1.11 1.09 1.05 66 0 15
South Sudan 1111 98 97 92 8 7 8.90 3.19 3.32 185 0 0
Sudan n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 104 0 20
Tanzania 442 525 528 9 10 10 0.97 1.10 1.02 27 80 1

Togo 71 82 89 9 11 11 1.70 1.85 1.86 9 0 1
Uganda 358 478 436 10 12 11 1.42 1.89 1.65 45 10 1
Zambia 376 305 337 25 20 21 1.77 1.45 1.32 15 3 1
Zimbabwe 377 394 341 26 27 25 2.34 2.44 1.99 29 0 22
Total** 20,126 17,528 18,046 21 18 18 1.26 1.16 1.09 1,536 213 253
Summary
North America 605,722 609,553 619,814 1,699 1,696 1,711 3.08 3.02 2.95 1,411 888 5
Europe 251,855 245,698 257,377 404 393 410 1.37 1.33 1.34 1,962 1,838 791
Russia and Eurasia 59,726 50,996 52,616 210 179 185 3.15 2.93 2.66 1,430 3,758 853
Asia 349,364 365,512 378,622 88 91 94 1.45 1.46 1.43 9,319 13,346 3,928
Middle East and North Africa 171,190 173,782 167,051 409 408 388 5.64 5.73 5.40 2,290 1,683 1,081
Latin America and the Caribbean 59,975 56,010 63,424 98 90 101 1.17 1.13 1.16 1,561 2,151 1,121
Sub-Saharan Africa 20,126 17,528 18,046 21 18 18 1.26 1.16 1.09 1,536 213 253
Global totals 1,517,958 1,519,079 1,556,951 210 208 211 2.06 2.03 1.99 19,510 23,875 8,033
* Estimates
** Totals exclude defence-spending estimates for states where insufficient official information is
available in order to enable approximate comparisons of regional defence spending between years
[a] ‘National Defence’ budget chapter. Excludes other defence-related expenditures included under
other budget lines (e.g. pensions) – see Table 8, p.175
All defence-spending data excludes US Foreign Military Assistance
PART TWO
Explanatory Notes
The Military Balance provides an assessment of the armed

forces and defence expenditures of 171 countries and Abbreviations and Definitions
territories. Each edition contributes to the provision of a
Qualifier
unique compilation of data and information, enabling ‘At least’ Total is no less than the number given
the reader to discern trends by studying editions as far ‘Up to’ Total is at most the number given, but could
back as 1959. The data in the current edition is accurate be lower
according to IISS assessments as of November 2017, unless ‘About’ Total could be higher than given
specified. Inclusion of a territory, country or state in The ‘Some’ Precise inventory is unavailable at time of press
Military Balance does not imply legal recognition or indi- ‘In store’ Equipment held away from front-line units;
readiness and maintenance varies
cate support for any government.
Billion (bn) 1,000 million (m)
GENERAL ARRANGEMENT AND CONTENTS Trillion (tr) 1,000 billion
$ US dollars unless otherwise stated
The introduction is an assessment of global defence devel-
ε Estimated
opments and key themes in the 2018 edition. Three analyt-
* Aircraft counted by the IISS as combat capable
ical essays focus on Chinese and Russian air-launched
- Part of a unit is detached/less than
weapons; big data, articifical intelligence and defence;
+ Unit reinforced/more than
and Russian strategic-force modernisation. A graphical
† IISS assesses that the serviceability of
section follows, analysing comparative defence statistics equipment is in doubta
by domain, as well as key trends in defence economics. ‡ Equipment judged obsolete (weapons whose
Regional chapters begin with analysis of the military basic design is more than four decades old and
which have not been significantly upgraded
and security issues that drive national defence policy devel- within the past decade)a
opments, and key trends in regional defence economics. [a]
Not to be taken to imply that such equipment cannot be used
These are followed by focused analysis, for certain coun-
tries, of defence policy and capability issues, and defence
economics. Next, detailed data on regional states’ military Force-strength and equipment-inventory data is based on
forces and equipment, and defence economics, is presented the most accurate data available, or on the best estimate
in alphabetical order. Graphics assessing important regional that can be made. In estimating a country’s total capabili-
arms procurements and deliveries complete each region. ties, old equipment may be counted where it is consid-
The book closes with comparative and reference ered that it may still be deployable.
sections containing data on military exercises and compar- The data presented reflects judgements based on infor-
mation available to the IISS at the time the book is compiled.
isons of expenditure and personnel statistics.
Where information differs from previous editions, this
THE MILITARY BALANCE WALL CHART is mainly because of changes in national forces, but it is
sometimes because the IISS has reassessed the evidence
The Military Balance 2018 wall chart assesses nuclear moderni-
supporting past entries. Given this, care must be taken in
sation in China, Russia and the United States, displaying the
constructing time-series comparisons from information
numbers of land-, air- and sea-based nuclear-delivery systems
given in successive editions.
in 1987, 2017 and 2037. It provides a breakdown of systems
and associated munitions, as well as information on French
and UK systems, strategic-missile defences, and a timeline
COUNTRY ENTRIES
showing treaties, tests and key programme developments. Information on each country is shown in a standard
Reference
format, although the differing availability of information

USING THE MILITARY BALANCE and differences in nomenclature result in some variations.
The country entries assess personnel strengths, organisa- Country entries include economic, demographic and mili-
tion and equipment holdings of the world’s armed forces. tary data. Population figures are based on demographic
statistics taken from the US Census Bureau. Data on ethnic – prices. US-dollar conversions are calculated from the
and religious minorities is also provided in some country exchange rates listed in the entry.
entries. Military data includes personnel numbers, length
of conscript service where relevant, outline organisation, Definitions of terms
number of formations and units, and an inventory of the Despite efforts by NATO and the UN to develop a stan-
major equipment of each service. Details of national forces dardised definition of military expenditure, many coun-
stationed abroad and of foreign forces stationed within the tries prefer to use their own definitions (which are often
given country are also provided. not made public). In order to present a comprehensive
picture, The Military Balance lists three different measures
ARMS PROCUREMENTS AND DELIVERIES of military-related spending data.
• For most countries, an official defence-budget
A series of thematic tables, graphics and text follow the figure is provided.
regional data. These are designed to illustrate key trends, • For those countries where other military-
principal programmes and significant events in regional related outlays, over and above the defence
defence procurements. More detailed information on budget, are known or can be reasonably esti-
defence procurements, organised by country, equip- mated, an additional measurement referred to as
ment type and manufacturing company, can be found defence expenditure is also provided. Defence-
on the IISS Military Balance+ database (www.iiss.org/ expenditure figures will naturally be higher than
militarybalanceplus). The information in this section meets official budget figures, depending on the range
the threshold for a Military Balance country entry and as of additional factors included.
such does not feature information on sales of small arms • For NATO countries, a defence-budget figure, as
and light weapons. well as defence expenditure reported by NATO
in local currency terms and converted using IMF
DEFENCE ECONOMICS exchange rates, is quoted.
Country entries include defence expenditures, selected NATO’s military-expenditure definition (the most
economic-performance indicators and demographic aggre- comprehensive) is cash outlays of central or federal
gates. All country entries are subject to revision each year governments to meet the costs of national armed forces.
as new information, particularly regarding actual defence The term ‘armed forces’ includes strategic, land, naval,
expenditure, becomes available. In the ‘country compari- air, command, administration and support forces. It also
sons’ section on pp. 502–8, there are also international includes other forces if they are trained, structured and
comparisons of defence expenditure and military personnel, equipped to support defence forces and are realistically
giving expenditure figures for the past three years in per deployable. Defence expenditures are reported in four cate-
capita terms and as a % of GDP. The aim is to provide a gories: Operating Costs, Procurement and Construction,
measure of military expenditure and the allocation of Research and Development (R&D) and Other Expenditure.
economic resources to defence. Operating Costs include salaries and pensions for mili-
Individual country entries show economic perfor- tary and civilian personnel; the cost of maintaining and
mance over the past two years and current demographic training units, service organisations, headquarters and
data. Where this data is unavailable, information from support elements; and the cost of servicing and repairing
the last available year is provided. Where possible, offi- military equipment and infrastructure. Procurement and
cial defence budgets for the current and previous two Construction expenditure covers national equipment and
years are shown, as well as an estimate of actual defence infrastructure spending, as well as common infrastructure
expend itures for those countries where true defence programmes. R&D is defence expenditure up to the point
expenditure is thought to be higher than official budget at which new equipment can be put in service, regardless
figures suggest. Estimates of actual defence expenditure, of whether new equipment is actually procured. Foreign
however, are only made for those countries where there is Military Aid (FMA) contributions are also noted.
sufficient data to justify such a measurement. Therefore, For many non-NATO countries the issue of transpar-
there will be several countries listed in The Military ency in reporting military budgets is fundamental. Not
Balance for which only an official defence-budget figure is every UN member state reports defence-budget data (even
provided but where, in reality, true defence-related expen- fewer report real defence expenditures) to their electorates,
diture is almost certainly higher. the UN, the IMF or other multinational organisations. In
All financial data in the country entries is shown in both the case of governments with a proven record of transpar-
national currency and US dollars at current – not constant ency, official figures generally conform to the standardised
Explanatory Notes 511
definition of defence budgeting, as adopted by the UN, tency problems. Another problem arises with certain
and consistency problems are not usually a major issue. transitional economies whose productive capabilities
The IISS cites official defence budgets as reported by either are similar to those of developed economies, but where
national governments, the UN, the OSCE or the IMF. cost and price structures are often much lower than
For those countries where the official defence-budget world levels. No specific PPP rate exists for the military
figure is considered to be an incomplete measure of total sector, and its use for this purpose should be treated with
military-related spending, and appropriate additional data caution. Furthermore, there is no definitive guide as to
is available, the IISS will use data from a variety of sources which elements of military spending should be calcu-
to arrive at a more accurate estimate of true defence lated using the limited PPP rates available. The figures
expenditure. The most frequent instances of budgetary presented here are only intended to illustrate a range of
manipulation or falsification typically involve equipment possible outcomes depending on which input variables
procurement, R&D, defence-industrial investment, covert are used.
weapons programmes, pensions for retired military and
civilian personnel, paramilitary forces and non-budgetary GENERAL DEFENCE DATA
sources of revenue for the military arising from ownership
of industrial, property and land assets. Personnel
Percentage changes in defence spending are referred The ‘Active’ total comprises all servicemen and women on
to in either nominal or real terms. Nominal terms relate to full-time duty (including conscripts and long-term assign-
the percentage change in numerical spending figures, and ments from the Reserves). When a gendarmerie or equiva-
do not account for the impact of price changes (i.e. infla- lent is under control of the defence ministry, they may be
tion) on defence spending. By contrast, real terms account included in the active total. Only the length of conscript
for inflationary effects, and may therefore be considered a liability is shown; where service is voluntary there is no
more accurate representation of change over time. entry. ‘Reserve’ describes formations and units not fully
The principal sources for national economic statistics manned or operational in peacetime, but which can be
cited in the country entries are the IMF, the Organisation mobilised by recalling reservists in an emergency. Some
for Economic Cooperation and Development, the World countries have more than one category of reserves, often
Bank and three regional banks (the Inter-American, Asian kept at varying degrees of readiness. Where possible, these
and African Development banks). For some countries, differences are denoted using the national descriptive title,
basic economic data is difficult to obtain. Gross Domestic but always under the heading of ‘Reserves’ to distinguish
Product (GDP) figures are nominal (current) values at them from full-time active forces. All personnel figures are
market prices. GDP growth is real, not nominal growth, rounded to the nearest 50, except for organisations with
and inflation is the year-on-year change in consumer under 500 personnel, where figures are rounded to the
prices. nearest ten.
Calculating exchange rates Other forces

Typically, but not invariably, the exchange rates shown Many countries maintain forces whose training, organisa-
in the country entries are also used to calculate GDP and tion, equipment and control suggest that they may be used
defence-budget and defence-expenditure dollar conver- to support or replace regular military forces, or be used
sions. Where they are not used, it is because the use of more broadly by states to deliver militarily relevant effect;
exchange-rate dollar conversions can misrepresent both these are called ‘paramilitary’. They include some forces
GDP and defence expenditure. For some countries, PPP that may have a constabulary role. These are detailed after
rather than market exchange rates are sometimes used for the military forces of each country, but their personnel
dollar conversions of both GDP and defence expenditures. numbers are not normally included in the totals at the start
Where PPP is used, it is annotated accordingly. of each entry.
The arguments for using PPP are strongest for Russia
and China. Both the UN and the IMF have issued caveats Non-state armed groups
concerning the reliability of official economic statistics Data on selected non-state groups that are militarily signif-
on transitional economies, particularly those of Russia icant armed actors is now available in the IISS Military
and some Eastern European and Central Asian countries. Balance+ database (www.iiss.org/militarybalanceplus).
Reference
Non-reporting, lags in the publication of current statis-

tics and frequent revisions of recent data (not always Cyber
accompanied by timely revision of previously published The Military Balance includes detail on selected national
figures in the same series) pose transparency and consis- cyber capacities, particularly those under the control of,
some unit terms, such as ‘regiment’, ‘squadron’, ‘battery’

Units and formation strength and ‘troop’, can refer to significantly different unit sizes in
Company 100–200 different countries. Unless otherwise stated, these terms
should be assumed to reflect standard British usage where
Battalion 500–1,000
they occur.
Brigade 3,000–5,000
Division 15,000–20,000
NAVAL FORCES
Corps or Army 50,000–100,000
Classifying naval vessels according to role is complex.
or designed to fulfil the requirements of, defence organisa- A post-war consensus on primary surface combatants
tions. Capabilities are not assessed quantitatively. Rather, revolved around a distinction between independently
national organisations, legislation, national-security strate- operating cruisers, air-defence escorts (destroyers) and
gies, etc. are noted, where appropriate, to indicate the level anti-submarine-warfare escorts (frigates). However, new
of effort states are devoting to this area. Generally, civil ships are increasingly performing a range of roles. For
organisations are not traced here, though in some cases this reason, The Military Balance has drawn up a classifica-
these organisations could have dual civil–military roles. tion system based on full-load displacement (FLD) rather
than a role-classification system. These definitions will not
Forces by role and equipment by type necessarily conform to national designations.
Quantities are shown by function (according to each
nation’s employment) and type, and represent what are AIR FORCES
believed to be total holdings, including active and reserve
operational and training units. Inventory totals for missile Aircraft listed as combat capable are assessed as being
systems relate to launchers and not to missiles. Equipment equipped to deliver air-to-air or air-to-surface ordnance.
held ‘in store’ is not counted in the main inventory totals. The definition includes aircraft designated by type as
bomber, fighter, fighter/ground attack, ground attack and
Deployments anti-submarine warfare. Other aircraft considered to be
The Military Balance mainly lists permanent bases and oper- combat capable are marked with an asterisk (*). Operational
ational deployments, including peacekeeping operations, groupings of air forces are shown where known. Typical
which are often discussed in the regional text. Information squadron aircraft strengths can vary both between aircraft
in the country-data sections details, first, deployments of types and from country to country. When assessing missile
troops and, second, military observers and, where avail- ranges, The Military Balance uses the following range indi-
able, the role and equipment of deployed units. Personnel cators:
figures are not generally included for embassy staff, • Short-range ballistic missile (SRBM): less than 1,000km;
standing multinational headquarters, or deployments of • Medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM): 1,000–3,000km;
purely maritime and aerospace assets, such as Iceland Air • Intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM): 3,000–
Policing or anti-piracy operations. Personnel deployed 5,000km;
on OSCE missions are listed as ‘personnel’ rather than • Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM): over 5,000km.
‘observers’.
ATTRIBUTION AND
Training activity ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Selected exercises in Europe and Russia and Eurasia in
2016 and 2017 are shown on maps. They are not exhaus- The International Institute for Strategic Studies owes no
tive. This data complements the broader range of global allegiance to any government, group of governments, or
exercise data now available on the Military Balance+. any political or other organisation. Its assessments are
its own, based on the material available to it from a wide
LAND FORCES variety of sources. The cooperation of governments of
all listed countries has been sought and, in many cases,
To make international comparison easier and more consis- received. However, some data in The Military Balance is
tent, The Military Balance categorises forces by role and estimated. Care is taken to ensure that this data is as accu-
translates national military terminology for unit and rate and free from bias as possible. The Institute owes
formation sizes. Typical personnel strength, equipment a considerable debt to a number of its own members,
holdings and organisation of formations such as brigades consultants and all those who help compile and check
and divisions vary from country to country. In addition, material. The Director-General and Chief Executive
and staff of the Institute assume full responsibility for iiss.org. Copyright on all information in The Military
the data and judgements in this book. Comments and Balance belongs strictly to the IISS. Application to
suggestions on the data and textual material contained reproduce limited amounts of data may be made to the
within the book, as well as on the style and presentation publisher: Taylor & Francis, 4 Park Square, Milton Park,
of data, are welcomed and should be communicated to Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN. Email: society.permissions@
the Editor of The Military Balance at: IISS, Arundel House, tandf.co.uk. Unauthorised use of data from The Military
6 Temple Place, London, WC2R 2PG, UK, email: milbal@ Balance will be subject to legal action.
Principal land definitions
Forces by role
Command: free-standing, deployable formation headquarters (HQs).
Special Forces (SF): elite units specially trained and equipped for unconventional warfare and operations in
enemy-controlled territory. Many are employed in counter-terrorist roles.
Manoeuvre: combat units and formations capable of manoeuvring. These are subdivided as follows:
Reconnaissance: combat units and formations whose primary purpose is to gain information.
Armoured: units and formations principally equipped with main battle tanks (MBTs) and infantry fighting vehi-
cles (IFVs) to provide heavy mounted close-combat capability. Units and formations intended to provide
mounted close-combat capability with lighter armoured vehicles, such as light tanks or wheeled assault
guns, are classified as light armoured.
Mechanised: units and formations primarily equipped with lighter armoured vehicles such as armoured
personnel carriers (APCs). They have less mounted firepower and protection than their armoured equiva-
lents, but can usually deploy more infantry.
Light: units and formations whose principal combat capability is dismounted infantry, with few, if any, organic
armoured vehicles. Some may be motorised and equipped with soft-skinned vehicles.
Air Manoeuvre: units and formations trained and equipped for delivery by transport aircraft and/or helicopters.
Amphibious: amphibious forces are trained and equipped to project force from the sea.
Other Forces: includes security units such as Presidential Guards, paramilitary units such as border guards and
combat formations permanently employed in training or demonstration tasks.
Combat Support: Combat support units and formations not integral to manoeuvre formations. Includes artillery,
engineers, military intelligence, nuclear, biological and chemical defence, signals and information operations.
Combat Service Support (CSS): includes logistics, maintenance, medical, supply and transport units and forma-
tions.
Equipment by type
Light Weapons: small arms, machine guns, grenades and grenade launchers and unguided man-portable anti-
armour and support weapons have proliferated so much and are sufficiently easy to manufacture or copy that
listing them would be impractical.
Crew-Served Weapons: crew-served recoilless rifles, man-portable ATGW, MANPADs and mortars of greater than
80mm calibre are listed, but the high degree of proliferation and local manufacture of many of these weapons
means that estimates of numbers held may not be reliable.
Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFVs): armoured combat vehicles with a combat weight of at least six metric tonnes,
further subdivided as below:
Reference
Main Battle Tank (MBT): armoured, tracked combat vehicles, armed with a turret-mounted gun of at least
75mm calibre and with a combat weight of at least 25 metric tonnes.
Light Tank (LT TK): armoured, tracked combat vehicles, armed with a turret-mounted gun of at least 75mm
calibre and with a combat weight of less than 25 metric tonnes.
Wheeled Assault Gun (ASLT): armoured, wheeled combat vehicles, armed with a turret-mounted gun of at
least 75mm calibre and with a combat weight of at least 15 metric tonnes.
Armoured Reconnaissance (RECCE): armoured vehicles primarily designed for reconnaissance tasks with no
significant transport capability and either a main gun of less than 75mm calibre or a combat weight of less
than 15 metric tonnes, or both.
Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV): armoured combat vehicles designed and equipped to transport an infantry
squad and armed with a cannon of at least 20mm calibre.
Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC): lightly armoured combat vehicles designed and equipped to transport
an infantry squad but either unarmed or armed with a cannon of less than 20mm calibre.
Airborne Combat Vehicle (ABCV): armoured vehicles designed to be deployable by parachute alongside
airborne forces.
Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV): armoured vehicles designed to have an amphibious ship-to-shore capa-
bility.
Armoured Utility Vehicle (AUV): armoured vehicles not designed to transport an infantry squad, but capable
of undertaking a variety of other utility battlefield tasks, including light reconnaissance and light transport.
Specialist Variants: variants of armoured vehicles listed above that are designed to fill a specialised role, such
as command posts (CP), artillery observation posts (OP), signals (sigs) and ambulances (amb), are catego-
rised with their parent vehicles.
Engineering and Maintenance Vehicles: includes armoured engineer vehicles (AEV), armoured repair and
recovery vehicles (ARV), assault bridging (VLB) and mine warfare vehicles (MW).
Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence Vehicles (NBC): armoured vehicles principally designed to operate
in potentially contaminated terrain.
Anti-Tank/Anti-Infrastructure (AT): guns, guided weapons and recoilless rifles designed to engage armoured
vehicles and battlefield hardened targets.
Surface-to-Surface Missile Launchers (SSM): launch vehicles for transporting and firing surface-to-surface
ballistic and cruise missiles.
Artillery: weapons (including guns, howitzers, gun/howitzers, multiple-rocket launchers, mortars and gun/
mortars) with a calibre greater than 100mm for artillery pieces and 80mm and above for mortars, capable of
engaging ground targets with indirect fire.
Coastal Defence: land-based coastal artillery pieces and anti-ship-missile launchers.
Air Defence (AD): guns and surface-to-air-missile (SAM) launchers designed to engage fixed-wing, rotary-wing
and unmanned aircraft. Missiles are further classified by maximum notional engagement range: point-
defence (up to 10km); short-range (10–30km); medium-range (30–75km); and long-range (75km+). Systems
primarily intended to intercept missiles rather than aircraft are categorised separately as Missile Defence.
Principal naval definitions

To aid comparison between fleets, the following definitions, which do not conform to national definitions, are used:
Submarines: all vessels designed to operate primarily under water. Submarines with a dived displacement below
250 tonnes are classified as midget submarines (SSW); those below 500 tonnes are coastal submarines (SSC).
Principal surface combatants: all surface ships designed for combat operations on the high seas, with an FLD
above 1,500 tonnes. Aircraft carriers (CV), including helicopter carriers (CVH), are vessels with a flat deck
primarily designed to carry fixed- and/or rotary-wing aircraft, without amphibious capability. Other principal
surface combatants include cruisers (C) (with an FLD above 9,750 tonnes), destroyers (DD) (with an FLD
above 4,500 tonnes) and frigates (FF) (with an FLD above 1,500 tonnes).
Patrol and coastal combatants: surface vessels designed for coastal or inshore operations. These include
corvettes (FS), which usually have an FLD between 500 and 1,500 tonnes and are distinguished from other
patrol vessels by their heavier armaments. Also included in this category are offshore-patrol ships (PSO), with
an FLD greater than 1,500 tonnes; patrol craft (PC), which have an FLD between 250 and 1,500 tonnes; and
patrol boats (PB) with an FLD between ten and 250 tonnes. Vessels with a top speed greater than 35 knots
are designated as ‘fast’ .
Mine warfare vessels: all surface vessels configured primarily for mine laying (ML) or countermeasures.
Countermeasures vessels are either: sweepers (MS), which are designed to locate and destroy mines in an
area; hunters (MH), which are designed to locate and destroy individual mines; or countermeasures vessels
(MC), which combine both roles.
Amphibious vessels: vessels designed to transport personnel and/or equipment onto shore. These include
landing helicopter assault vessels (LHA), which can embark fixed- and/or rotary-wing air assets as well as
landing craft; landing helicopter docks (LHD), which can embark rotary-wing or VTOL assets and have a well
dock; landing platform helicopters (LPH), which have a primary role of launch and recovery platform for
rotary-wing or VTOL assets with a dock to store equipment/personnel for amphibious operations; and landing
platform docks (LPD), which do not have a through deck but do have a well dock. Landing ships (LS) are
amphibious vessels capable of ocean passage and landing craft (LC) are smaller vessels designed to transport
personnel and equipment from a larger vessel to land or across small stretches of water. Landing ships have
a hold; landing craft are open vessels. Landing craft air cushioned (LCAC) are differentiated from Utility craft
air cushioned (UCAC) in that the former have a bow ramp for the disembarkation of vehicles and personnel.
Auxiliary vessels: ocean-going surface vessels performing an auxiliary military role, supporting combat ships or
operations. These generally fulfil five roles: replenishment (such as oilers (AO) and solid stores (AKS)); logistics
(such as cargo ships (AK) and logistics ships (AFS)); maintenance (such as cable-repair ships (ARC) or buoy
tenders (ABU)); research (such as survey ships (AFS)); and special purpose (such as intelligence-collection
ships (AGI) and ocean-going tugs (ATF)).
Weapons systems: weapons are listed in the following order: land-attack cruise missiles (LACM), anti-ship
missiles (AShM), surface-to-air missiles (SAM), heavy (HWT) and lightweight (LWT) torpedos, anti-submarine
weapons (A/S), CIWS, guns and aircraft. Missiles with a range less than 5km and guns with a calibre less than
57mm are generally not included.
Organisations: naval groupings such as fleets and squadrons frequently change and are shown only where
doing so would aid qualitative judgements.
Principal aviation definitions

Bomber (Bbr): comparatively large platforms intended for the delivery of air-to-surface ordnance. Bbr units are
units equipped with bomber aircraft for the air-to-surface role.
Fighter (Ftr): aircraft designed primarily for air-to-air combat, which may also have a limited air-to-surface capa-
bility. Ftr units are equipped with aircraft intended to provide air superiority, which may have a secondary
and limited air-to-surface capability.
Fighter/Ground Attack (FGA): multi-role fighter-size platforms with significant air-to-surface capability, poten-
tially including maritime attack, and at least some air-to-air capacity. FGA units are multi-role units equipped
with aircraft capable of air-to-air and air-to-surface attack.
Ground Attack (Atk): aircraft designed solely for the air-to-surface task, with limited or no air-to-air capability.
Atk units are equipped with fixed-wing aircraft.
Reference
Attack Helicopter (Atk hel): rotary-wing platforms designed for delivery of air-to-surface weapons, and fitted
with an integrated fire-control system.
Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW): fixed- and rotary-wing platforms designed to locate and engage submarines,
many with a secondary anti-surface-warfare capability. ASW units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing
aircraft.
Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW): ASuW units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft intended for anti-
surface-warfare missions.
Maritime Patrol (MP): fixed-wing aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) intended for maritime surface
surveillance, which may possess an anti-surface-warfare capability. MP units are equipped with fixed-wing
aircraft or UAVs.
Electronic Warfare (EW): fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft and UAVs intended for electronic warfare. EW units are
equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft or UAVs.
Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance (ISR): fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft and UAVs intended to provide
radar, visible-light or infrared imagery, or a mix thereof. ISR units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing
aircraft or UAVs.
Combat/Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance (CISR): aircraft and UAVs that have the capability to
deliver air-to-surface weapons, as well as undertake ISR tasks. CISR units are equipped with armed aircraft
and/or UAVs for ISR and air-to-surface missions.
COMINT/ELINT/SIGINT: fixed- and rotary-wing platforms and UAVs capable of gathering electronic (ELINT),
communications (COMINT) or signals intelligence (SIGINT). COMINT units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-
wing aircraft or UAVs intended for the communications-intelligence task. ELINT units are equipped with
fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft or UAVs used for gathering electronic intelligence. SIGINT units are equipped
with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft or UAVs used to collect signals intelligence.
Airborne Early Warning (& Control) (AEW (&C)): fixed- and rotary-wing platforms capable of providing
airborne early warning, with a varying degree of onboard command and control depending on the
platform. AEW(&C) units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft.
Search and Rescue (SAR): units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft used to recover military
personnel or civilians.
Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR): units are equipped with armed fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft for recovery of
personnel from hostile territory.
Tanker (Tkr): fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft designed for air-to-air refuelling. Tkr units are equipped with fixed-
or rotary-wing aircraft used for air-to-air refuelling.
Tanker Transport (Tkr/Tpt): platforms capable of both air-to-air refuelling and military airlift.
Transport (Tpt): fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft intended for military airlift. Light transport aircraft are catego-
rised as having a maximum payload of up to 11,340kg; medium up to 27,215kg; and heavy above 27,215kg.
Light transport helicopters have an internal payload of up to 2,000kg; medium transport helicopters up to
4,535kg; heavy transport helicopters greater than 4,535kg. PAX aircraft are platforms generally unsuited for
transporting cargo on the main deck. Tpt units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing platforms to trans-
port personnel or cargo.
Trainer (Trg): a fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft designed primarily for the training role; some also have the
capacity to carry light to medium ordnance. Trg units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing training
aircraft intended for pilot or other aircrew training.
Multi-role helicopter (MRH): rotary-wing platforms designed to carry out a variety of military tasks including
light transport, armed reconnaissance and battlefield support.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs): remotely piloted or controlled unmanned fixed- or rotary-wing systems.
Light UAVs are those weighing 20–150kg; medium: 150–600kg; and large: more than 600kg.
Reference
Table 22 List of abbreviations for data sections

AAA anti-aircraft artillery ARG amphibious ready group coy company
AAM air-to-air missile ARH active radar homing CP command post
AAR search-and-rescue vessel ARL airborne reconnaissance low CPX command post exercise
AAV amphibious assault vehicle ARM anti-radiation missile CS combat support
AB airborne armd armoured CSAR combat search and rescue
ABM anti-ballistic missile ARS/H rescue and salvage ship/with hangar CSS combat service support
ABU/H sea-going buoy tender/with hangar arty artillery CT counter-terrorism
ABCV airborne combat vehicle ARV armoured recovery vehicle CV/H/L/N/S aircraft carrier/helicopter/light/
ac aircraft AS anti-submarine/submarine tender nuclear powered/VSTOL
ACV air-cushion vehicle/armoured combat ASBM anti-ship ballistic missile CW chemical warfare/weapons
vehicle ASCM anti-ship cruise missile DD/G/H/M destroyer/with AShM/with
ACS crane ship AShM anti-ship missile hangar/with SAM
AD air defence aslt assault DDS dry deck shelter
ADA air-defence artillery ASM air-to-surface missile def defence
ADEX air-defence exercise ASR submarine rescue craft DEPEX deployment exercise
adj adjusted ASTT anti-submarine torpedo tube det detachment
AE auxiliary, ammunition carrier ASW anti-submarine warfare div division
AEM missile support ship ASuW anti-surface warfare ECM electronic countermeasures
AEV armoured engineer vehicle AT tug/anti-tank ELINT electronic intelligence
AEW airborne early warning ATBM anti-tactical ballistic missile elm element/s
AFD/L auxiliary floating dry dock/small ATF tug, ocean going engr engineer
AFS/H logistics ship/with hangar ATGW anti-tank guided weapon EOD explosive ordnance disposal
AFSB afloat forward staging base Atk attack/ground attack EPF expeditionary fast transport vessel
AFV armoured fighting vehicle ATS tug, salvage and rescue ship eqpt equipment
AG misc auxiliary AUV armoured utility vehicle ESB expeditionary mobile base
AGB/H icebreaker/with hangar AVB aviation logistic support ship ESD expeditionary transport dock
AGE/H experimental auxiliary ship/with avn aviation EW electronic warfare
hangar AWT water tanker excl excludes/excluding
AGF/H command ship/with hangar AX/L/S training craft/light/sail exp expenditure
AGHS hydrographic survey vessel BA Budget Authority (US) FAC forward air control
AGI intelligence collection vessel Bbr bomber fd field
AGM space tracking vessel BCT brigade combat team FF/G/H/M fire-fighting/frigate/with AShM/
AGOR oceanographic research vessel with hangar/with SAM
bde brigade
AGOS oceanographic surveillance vessel FGA fighter ground attack
bdgt budget
AGS/H survey ship/with hangar FIREX firing exercise
BG battle group
AH hospital ship FLD full-load displacement
BMD ballistic-missile defence
AIP air-independent propulsion flt flight
BMEWS ballistic missile early warning system
AK/L cargo ship/light FMA Foreign Military Assistance
bn battalion/billion
aka also known as FS/G/H/M corvette/with AShM/with hangar/
bty battery
AKEH dry cargo/ammunition ship with SAM
C2 command and control
AKR/H roll-on/roll-off cargo ship/with hangar Ftr fighter
casevac casualty evacuation
AKS/L stores ship/light FTX field training exercise
cav cavalry
ALCM air-launched cruise missile FY fiscal year
cbt combat
amb ambulance GBU guided bomb unit
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological,
amph amphibious/amphibian gd guard
nuclear, explosive
AO/S oiler/small GDP gross domestic product
cdo commando
AOE fast combat support ship GLCM ground-launched cruise missile
C/G/H/M/N cruiser/with AShM/with hangar/
AOR/L/H fleet replenishment oiler with RAS with SAM/nuclear-powered GLMS Guided Missile Launching System
capability/light/with hangar CISR combat ISR gp group
AOT/L oiler transport/light CIMIC civil–military cooperation HA/DR humanitarian assistance/disaster relief
Reference
AP armour-piercing/anti-personnel/transport CIWS close-in weapons system hel helicopter

ship COIN counter-insurgency how howitzer
APB barracks ship comd command HQ headquarters
APC armoured personnel carrier COMINT communications intelligence HUMINT human intelligence
AR/C/D/L repair ship/cable/dry dock/light comms communications HWT heavyweight torpedo
hy heavy mne marine RRC/F/U rapid-reaction corps/force/unit

IBU inshore boat unit mod modified/modification RV re-entry vehicle
ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile mor mortar rvn riverine
IFV infantry fighting vehicle mot motorised/motor SAM surface-to-air missile
IIR imaging infrared MoU memorandum of understanding SAR search and rescue
IMINT imagery intelligence MP maritime patrol/military police SARH semi-active radar homing
imp improved MR maritime reconnaissance/motor rifle sat satellite
indep independent MRBM medium-range ballistic missile SDV swimmer delivery vehicles
inf infantry MRH multi-role helicopter SEAD suppression of enemy air defence
info ops information operations MRL multiple rocket launcher SF special forces
INS inertial navigation system MRX mission-rehearsal exercise SHORAD short-range air defence
int intelligence MS/A/C/D/I/O/R mine sweeper/auxiliary/ SIGINT signals intelligence
IOC Initial Operating Capability coastal/drone/inshore/ocean/river sigs signals
IR infrared msl missile SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missile mtn mountain SLCM submarine-launched cruise missile
ISD in-service date MW mine warfare SLEP service-life-extension programme
ISR intelligence, surveillance and n.a. not applicable SP self-propelled
reconnaissance n.k. not known Spec Ops special operations
ISTAR intelligence, surveillance, target NBC nuclear, biological, chemical SPAAGM self-propelled anti-aircraft gun and
acquisition and reconnaissance NCO non-commissioned officer missile system
JOINTEX joint exercise nm nautical mile spt support
LACM land-attack cruise missile nuc nuclear sqn squadron
LC/A/AC/H/M/PA/P/L/T/U/VP landing O & M operations and maintenance SRBM short-range ballistic missile
craft/assault/air cushion/heavy/medium/ obs observation/observer SS submarine
personnel air cushion/personnel/large/
OCU operational conversion unit SSA submersible auxiliary support vessel
tank/utility/vehicles and personnel
OP observation post SSAN submersible auxiliary support vessel
LCC amphibious command ship
op/ops operational/operations (nuclear)
LGB laser-guided bomb
OPFOR opposition training force SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile
LHA landing ship assault submarine
org organised/organisation
LHD amphibious assault ship SSC coastal submarine
OPV offshore patrol vessel
LIFT lead-in ftr trainer SSG guided-missile submarine
para paratroop/parachute
LKA amphibious cargo ship SSI inshore submarine
PAX passenger/passenger transport aircraft
LLI long-lead items SSGN nuclear-powered guided-missile
PB/C/F/G/I/M/R/T patrol boat/coastal/fast/
lnchr launcher submarine
with AShM/inshore/with SAM/riverine/with
LoA letter of acceptance torpedo SSK attack submarine with ASW capability
log logistic PC/C/F/G/H/I/M/O/R/T patrol craft/coastal/ (hunter-killer)
LoI letter of intent fast/guided missile/with hangar/inshore/ SSM surface-to-surface missile
LP/D/H landing platform/dock/helicopter with CIWS missile or SAM/offshore/riverine/ SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
LRIP low-rate initial production with torpedo SSW midget submarine
LS/D/L/LH/M/T landing ship/dock/logistic/ pdr pounder str strength
logistic helicopter/medium/tank pers personnel surv surveillance
lt light PG/G/GF/H patrol gunboat/guided missile/ sy security
LWT lightweight torpedo fast attack craft/hydrofoil t tonnes
maint maintenance PGM precision-guided munitions tac tactical
MANPAD man-portable air-defence system PH/G/M/T patrol hydrofoil/with AShM/with tch technical
MANPATS man-portable anti-tank system SAM/with torpedo
temp temporary
MAREX maritime exercise pl platoon
tk tank
MBT main battle tank PKO peacekeeping operations
tkr tanker
MC/C/CS/D/I/O mine countermeasure PoR programme of record
TMD theatre missile defence
coastal/command and support/diving PPP purchasing-power parity
torp torpedo
support/inshore/ocean PPV protected patrol vehicle
tpt transport
MCM mine countermeasures PRH passive radar-homing
tr trillion
MCMV mine countermeasures vessel prepo pre-positioned
trg training
MD military district PSO/H peace support operations or offshore
TRV torpedo recovery vehicle
MDT mine diving tender patrol ship/with hangar
TT torpedo tube
mech mechanised   PTF semi-submersible vessel
UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
med medium/medical ptn pontoon bridging
UCAC utility craft air cushioned
medevac medical evacuation quad quadruple
UCAV unmanned combat air vehicle
MGA machine gun artillery R&D research and development
utl utility
MH/C/D/I/O mine hunter/coastal/drone/ RCL recoilless launcher
UUV unmanned undersea vehicle
inshore/ocean recce reconnaissance
veh vehicle
mil military regt regiment
VLB vehicle launched bridge
MIRV multiple independently targetable RFI request for information
re-entry vehicle VLS vertical launch system
RFP request for proposals
mk mark (model number) VSHORAD very short-range air defence
RIB rigid inflatable boat
ML minelayer WFU withdrawn from use
RL rocket launcher
MLU mid-life update wg wing
ro-ro roll-on, roll-off
Reference 519
Table 23 Index of country/territory abbreviations
AFG.......................................................Afghanistan GAM.............................................................. Gambia NPL.................................................................... Nepal

ALB.................................................................Albania GEO............................................................... Georgia NZL......................................................New Zealand
ALG..................................................................Algeria GER..............................................................Germany OMN..................................................................Oman
ANG.................................................................Angola GF...................................................... French Guiana PT........................................ Palestinian Territories
ARG........................................................... Argentina GHA..................................................................Ghana PAN............................................................... Panama
ARM............................................................. Armenia GIB................................................................Gibraltar PAK............................................................... Pakistan
ATG..................................... Antigua and Barbuda GNB...................................................Guinea-Bissau PER....................................................................... Peru
AUS...............................................................Australia GRC................................................................. Greece PHL..........................................................Philippines
AUT.................................................................. Austria GRL........................................................... Greenland POL.................................................................. Poland
AZE...........................................................Azerbaijan GUA......................................................... Guatemala PNG......................................... Papua New Guinea
BDI................................................................. Burundi GUI...................................................................Guinea PRC...........................China, People’s Republic of
BEL.................................................................Belgium GUY................................................................Guyana PRT...............................................................Portugal
BEN.....................................................................Benin HND...........................................................Honduras PRY..............................................................Paraguay
BFA.......................................................Burkina Faso HTI........................................................................Haiti PYF.............................................. French Polynesia
BGD........................................................Bangladesh HUN..............................................................Hungary QTR.....................................................................Qatar
BHR................................................................Bahrain IDN............................................................ Indonesia ROC..........................Taiwan (Republic of China)
BHS..............................................................Bahamas IND...................................................................... India ROK...........................................Korea, Republic of
BIH.........................................Bosnia-Herzegovina IRL.................................................................... Ireland ROM............................................................ Romania
BIOT....................British Indian Ocean Territory IRN......................................................................... Iran RSA........................................................South Africa
BLG................................................................Bulgaria IRQ......................................................................... Iraq RUS....................................................................Russia
BLR..................................................................Belarus ISL....................................................................Iceland RWA..............................................................Rwanda
BLZ.................................................................... Belize ISR........................................................................Israel SAU.......................................................Saudi Arabia
BOL...................................................................Bolivia ITA..........................................................................Italy SDN.................................................................. Sudan
BRB............................................................. Barbados JAM............................................................... Jamaica SEN................................................................ Senegal
BRN.................................................................. Brunei JOR.................................................................. Jordan SER....................................................................Serbia
BRZ..................................................................... Brazil JPN.................................................................... Japan SGP............................................................Singapore
BWA...........................................................Botswana KAZ........................................................ Kazakhstan SLB................................................ Solomon Islands
CAM......................................................... Cambodia KEN....................................................................Kenya SLE........................................................ Sierra Leone
CAN................................................................Canada KGZ.......................................................... Kyrgyzstan SLV........................................................... El Salvador
CAR................................Central African Republic KWT................................................................ Kuwait SOM.............................................................. Somalia
CHA.....................................................................Chad LAO......................................................................Laos SSD...................................................... South Sudan
CHE.........................................................Switzerland LBN.............................................................. Lebanon STP...................................São Tomé and Príncipe
CHL......................................................................Chile LBR...................................................................Liberia SUR.............................................................Suriname
CIV........................................................Côte d’Ivoire LBY..................................................................... Libya SVK................................................................Slovakia
CMR.......................................................... Cameroon LKA.............................................................. Sri Lanka SVN.............................................................. Slovenia
COG..........................................Republic of Congo LSO................................................................ Lesotho SWE............................................................... Sweden
COL.............................................................Colombia LTU.............................................................. Lithuania SYC........................................................... Seychelles
CPV......................................................... Cape Verde LUX...................................................... Luxembourg SYR.......................................................................Syria
CRI.............................................................Costa Rica LVA.................................................................... Latvia TGO..................................................................... Togo
CRO.................................................................Croatia MDA.............................................................Moldova THA..............................................................Thailand
CUB.....................................................................Cuba MDG......................................................Madagascar TJK.............................................................. Tajikistan
CYP................................................................. Cyprus MEX.................................................................Mexico TKM....................................................Turkmenistan
CZE................................................ Czech Republic MHL............................................... Marshall Islands TLS......................................................... Timor-Leste
DJB................................................................Djibouti MLI.........................................................................Mali TTO.......................................Trinidad and Tobago
DNK.............................................................Denmark MLT.....................................................................Malta TUN................................................................. Tunisia
DOM......................................Dominican Republic MMR.......................................................... Myanmar TUR...................................................................Turkey
DPRK. Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of MNE .................................................... Montenegro TZA...............................................................Tanzania
DRC..........Democratic Republic of the Congo MNG...........................................................Mongolia UAE......................................United Arab Emirates
ECU................................................................Ecuador MOR.............................................................Morocco UGA............................................................... Uganda
EGY.....................................................................Egypt MOZ....................................................Mozambique UK.................................................United Kingdom
EQG.............................................Equitorial Guinea MRT......................................................... Mauritania UKR................................................................Ukraine
ERI..................................................................... Eritrea MUS............................................................ Mauritius URY...............................................................Uruguay
ESP......................................................................Spain MWI.................................................................Malawi US........................................................ United States
EST...................................................................Estonia MYS..............................................................Malaysia UZB.........................................................Uzbekistan
ETH................................................................Ethiopia NAM............................................................. Namibia VEN............................................................Venezuela
FIN.................................................................. Finland NCL..................................................New Caledonia VNM............................................................. Vietnam
Reference
FJI..............................................................................Fiji NER..................................................................... Niger YEM.........................................Yemen, Republic of

FLK................................................. Falkland Islands NGA.................................................................Nigeria ZMB................................................................Zambia
FRA...................................................................France NIC.............................................................Nicaragua ZWE..........................................................Zimbabwe
FYROM.Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic NLD.......................................................Netherlands
GAB..................................................................Gabon NOR................................................................Norway
Table 24 Index of countries and territories
Afghanistan AFG 240 Georgia GEO 186 Niger NER 477

Albania ALB 82 Germany GER 107 Nigeria NGA 478
Algeria ALG 325 Ghana GHA 465 Norway NOR 132
Angola ANG 445 Greece GRC 111 Oman OMN 354
Antigua and Barbuda ATG 383 Guatemala GUA 407 Pakistan PAK 291
Argentina ARG 383 Guinea GUI 466 Palestinian Territories PT 356
Armenia ARM 181 Guinea-Bissau GNB 467 Panama PAN 415
Australia AUS 241 Guyana GUY 408 Papua New Guinea PNG 294
Austria AUT 83 Haiti HTI 409 Paraguay PRY 416
Azerbaijan AZE 182 Honduras HND 409 Peru PER 417
Bahamas BHS 386 Hungary HUN 114 Philippines PHL 295
Bahrain BHR 327 Iceland ISL 116 Poland POL 135
Bangladesh BGD 244 India IND 260 Portugal PRT 138
Barbados BRB 387 Indonesia IDN 266 Qatar QTR 357
Belarus BLR 185 Iran IRN 333 Romania ROM 140
Belgium BEL 85 Iraq IRQ 337 Russia RUS 192
Belize BLZ 387 Ireland IRL 116 Rwanda RWA 480
Benin BEN 446 Israel ISR 339 Saudi Arabia SAU 358
Bolivia BOL 388 Italy ITA 118 Senegal SEN 481
Bosnia-Herzegovina BIH 87 Jamaica JAM 411 Serbia SER 143
Botswana BWA 447 Japan JPN 270 Seychelles SYC 482
Brazil BRZ 390 Jordan JOR 343 Sierra Leone SLE 483
Brunei BRN 247 Kazakhstan KAZ 188 Singapore SGP 297
Bulgaria BLG 88 Kenya KEN 468 Slovakia SVK 145
Burkina Faso BFA 448 Korea, Democratic People’s Slovenia SVN 147
Burundi BDI 449 Republic of DPRK 274 Somalia SOM 484
Cambodia CAM 248 Korea, Republic of ROK 277 South Africa RSA 485
Cameroon CMR 451 Kuwait KWT 345 South Sudan SSD 487
Canada CAN 43 Kyrgyzstan KGZ 190 Spain ESP 148
Cape Verde CPV 452 Laos LAO 281 Sri Lanka LKA 300
Central African Republic CAR 453 Latvia LVA 122 Sudan SDN 488
Chad CHA 454 Lebanon LBN 347 Suriname SUR 420
Chile CHL 394 Lesotho LSO 470 Sweden SWE 152
China, People’s Republic of PRC 249 Liberia LBR 470 Switzerland CHE 154
Colombia COL 397 Libya LBY 349 Syria SYR 361
Democratic Republic of the Lithuania LTU 124 Taiwan (Republic of China) ROC 302
Congo DRC 457 Luxembourg LUX 125 Tajikistan TJK 207
Congo, Republic of COG 455 Macedonia, Former Tanzania TZA 490
Costa Rica CRI 400 Yugoslav Republic FYROM 126 Thailand THA 305
Côte d’Ivoire CIV 456 Madagascar MDG 471 Timor-Leste TLS 308
Croatia CRO 90 Malawi MWI 472 Togo TGO 492
Cuba CUB 400 Malaysia MYS 282 Trinidad and Tobago TTO 421
Cyprus CYP 92 Mali MLI 473 Tunisia TUN 365
Czech Republic CZE 94 Malta MLT 127 Turkey TUR 156
Denmark DNK 96 Mauritania MRT 350 Turkmenistan TKM 208
Djibouti DJB 459 Mauritius MUS 474 Uganda UGA 493
Dominican Republic DOM 402 Mexico MEX 411 Ukraine UKR 209
Ecuador ECU 403 Moldova MDA 191 United Arab Emirates UAE 367
Egypt EGY 329 Mongolia MNG 285 United Kingdom UK 160
El Salvador SLV 405 Montenegro MNE 128 United States US 46
Equatorial Guinea EQG 460 Morocco MOR 351 Uruguay URY 422
Eritrea ERI 461 Mozambique MOZ 475 Uzbekistan UZB 214
Estonia EST 98 Multinational Organisations 129 Venezuela VEN 423
Ethiopia ETH 462 Myanmar MMR 286 Vietnam VNM 309
Fiji FJI 259 Namibia NAM 476 Yemen, Republic of YEM 370
Finland FIN 99 Nepal NPL 288 Zambia ZMB 494
France FRA 102 Netherlands NLD 130 Zimbabwe ZWE 495
Gabon GAB 463 New Zealand NZL 289
Gambia GAM 464 Nicaragua NIC 414

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Editor’s Introduction

Western technology edge erodes further

Russia member states in 2017 finally took steps towards perma-

Russian resurgence produced an inferior weapon. Today, however,

76.7 61.2 500

52.5 50.7 48.6 200

46.0 41.7 35.7 0

29.4 25.0 22.9 21.6 19.4

2017 top 15 defence and security budgets as a % of GDP*

China, 9.5% United Kingdom, 3.2%

Real global defence-spending changes by region 2015–17

Selected European defence research and development (R&D) budgets in 2017

R&D US$bn % of R&D in total budget

% of R&D in total defence spending

8.0 ‘research window’ which, if voted for, is expected to begin

Composition of real defence-spending increases Composition of real defence-spending reductions

(GA-ASI) States that currently have

Key defence statistics

202,700 2,035,000 32,300

Artillery (1,000 per unit) Attack/guided missile submarines

Aircraft carriers (10 per unit)

China France India Russia UK US

Cruisers, destroyers and frigates Principal amphibious ships

Tactical aircraft (500 per unit)

Heavy/medium transport aircraft Tanker and multi-role tanker/transport aircraft

Airborne early-warning and control aircraft Heavy unmanned aerial vehicles

First generation Second generation Third generation

ZTZ-59/ZTZ-59-II/ZTZ-59D ZTZ-79 ZTZ-88A/ZTZ-88B ZTZ-96/ZTZ-96A ZTZ-99/ZTZ-99A

Length: c. 3 metres Maximum notional engagement ranges

PL-10 imaging infrared (IIR) AAM PL-XX very-long-range AAM

Length: c. 3.8 metres

PL-15 extended-range active

Length: Notional PL-XX very-long-range AAM engagement

PL-XX active radar and infrared-guided

PL-XX Ramjet A* 50,000ft

PL-XX Ramjet B* Terminal-engagement

PL-XX maximum kinematic range potentially 400km+

Bohai Shipbuilding SSBN 4 Japan US

Country Type Launched Country Type Launched Country Type Launched

Table 1 US Army Armored Brigade Combat Team deployments, 2014–18

US Army To better meet this ongoing demand, the army is

Pump-jet propulsor Special operations Photo-optical masts

1,400 VLS launchers

Meanwhile, the US Coast Guard (USCG) faces

three new heavy and three medium icebreakers; the 3

(elderly) heavy and one medium icebreaker currently

DEFENCE ECONOMICS According to Secretary of Defense James Mattis,

FY18 US$ in billions

Figure 3 US National Defense Budget Function: year-on-year changes, 1977–2017

Canada CAN ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

SOUTH SUDAN as part of a renewed strategy. Congress backed a US$700bn

Strategic Defenses – Early Warning SPECIAL FORCES

4 engr bde 3 int bde

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 hel sqn with CH-53E Sea Stallion

Amphibious TPT 34: Medium 14 C-27J Spartan; Light 18 CN235-200

TRAINING Air Mobility Command (AMC)

Air Force Special Operations Command Cyber

ASCENSION ISLAND EL SALVADOR