Adapting  with  the  Times:  Fajia  Law  and  State  

Development  
 
 
 
 
 
 
KING,  Brandon  Russell  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A  Thesis  Submitted  in  Partial  Fulfilment  
 of  the  Requirements  for  the  Degree  of    
Doctor  of  Philosophy  
 
in  
 
Chinese  Studies  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The  Chinese  University  of  Hong  Kong  
July  2015
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 Abstract  of  thesis  entitled  
 
“Adapting  with  the  Times:  Fajia  law  and  State  Development”  
 
Submitted  by  
 
KING,  Brandon  Russell  
 
for  the  degree  of  Doctor  of  Philosophy    
 
at  The  Chinese  University  of  Hong  Kong  in  July  2015  
 
 
This   study   explores   a   significant   and   little   studied   aspect   of   the   pioneering  
doctrinal   work   of   the   Fajia   tradition,   the   Book  of  Lord  Shang   商君書   (ca.   260   B.C.   -­‐  
233   B.C.):   its   system   of   rewards.   In   contrast   with   previous   scholarship   that   has  
questioned  the  existence  of  a  coherent  Legalist  political  vision  and  even  its  idea  of  
law  fa  法  or  that  has  focused  strictly  on  penalty,  this  study  considers  Fajia  law  and  
discipline   not   only   viable   categories   for   analysis,   but   also   important   conceptual  
products   of   the   intensely   competitive,   bellicose   political   climate   of   the   Warring  
States   period.     The   central   concern   is   with   the   character   fa   法   in   Fajia   texts.    
Beginning  with  an  analysis  of  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang’s  system  of  rewards,  the  study  
then   examines   how   the   use   of   the   character   fa   法   in   this   text   distinguished   itself  
from   earlier   usages   and,   hence,   represents   an   important   distinctly   shared  
characteristic   across   Fajia   texts   generally.     This   shows   that   the   Fajia   system   of  
rewards  includes  an  important  pedagogical  aspect  that  requires  the  ruler’s  subjects  
to  develop  themselves  for  the  sake  of  state  development.    Therefore,  this  study  also  
evaluates   the   pedagogical   value   of   Fajia  rewards   based   on   social   scientific   research  
on   organismic   learning.     This   pedagogical   aspect   of   Fajia   governance,   the   study  
argues,   is   the   means   through   which   the   Fajia  notion   of   law   reinforces   its   cultural  
ideals  of  the  state.    
   

  ii  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
內容提要：本文企圖考察在商君書(ca.  260  B.C.  -­‐  233  B.C.)重要之一的方面：賞賜。
以前的研究已經質疑連貫法家的政治思想，甚至其法律觀念鮮明特點的存在，或
集中於嚴格刑罰的方面。可是這項研究認為法家的法律紀律的方面不只是可行的
類別分析，還有法治觀念是戰國時期的競爭激烈，好戰的政治氣候的重要概念產
品。最重要關注的是“法”字的意義在法家的文本。在開始本文分析商君書的獎
勵系統。然後它探討如何在商君書中使用的“法”字，從早期的用途區分，以及
它如何代表所有“法家”文本之間的一個重要的明顯特徵的共享。這表明，  “法
家”  獎勵的系統包括一個重要的教學方面。它需要統治者的臣民來發展自己，為
了國家的發展。因此，本文基於社會科學研究機體學習評估“法家”獎勵系統的
教學價值。其實上，法家政治思想有這種教學方面的證明是強化了國家的文化理
想的手段。

  iii  
 TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  
             

ABSTRACT………………………………………………………...................................ii-­‐iii  

TABLE  OF  CONTENTS……………………………………………………...………iv-­‐vii  

CHAPTERS  

I.  Introduction……………………………………………………….................................1  

Scholarly  Approaches  to  the  Fajia  tradition  and  its  Methods  of  
Governance  ………................................................................................................5  

Ideas  on  Fa  法  and  its  Significance  in  Fajia  法家  

Texts.......................................................................................................................15  

Authorship……………………………………………..……………………….…….27  

Methodology  and  Limitations………...………………………….……….…..30  

Summary  of  Contents…………………………………………………………….35  

II.  Historical  and  Textual  Clues……………………………..…………...……....42  

Transition  in  the  Eastern  Zhou……….………………………………..….....44  

Textual  Criticism  of  Shang  Yang  and  Qin…………….………………..….58  

Conclusion…………………………………………………....…………………..…...85  

III.  Underlying  Principles  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang………...............87  

“An  Order  to  Cultivate  Wastelands”:  The  Book  of  Lord  Shang  and  
its  Approach  to  Governance...………………..………………..……..…...…..87  

“The  Cultivation  of  Political  Assessment”:  A  Comprehensive  

Political  Vision………...……………………………………………….……….....102  

Conclusion……………………………………………………………………….….108  

IV.  Competition  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang………………………..……...109  

Law  and  Competition  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang………………..…..110  

  iv  
 State  Competition’s  Ideological  Background..…………………..……114  

Rewards:  The  Nucleus  of  the  Competitive  State………………..…...118  

The  Case  Against  the  “No  Rewards”  Claim……………………….…....125  

Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………..136  

V.  Fa  法  Outside  of  the  Fajia  tradition………………………..……….…...138  

Early  Uses  of  Fa  法  and  Conceptions  of  Law……………………….....138  

Conclusion………………………………………………………………………..…162  

VI.  Fa  法  in  Fajia  texts……………………………………………….……………...164  

The  “Shenzi  fragments”………………………………………………………..166  

The  “Shen  Buhai  fragments”……………….……………………….……..…173  

The  Guanzi………………………………………….…….………………………....179  

The  Hanfeizi………………………………………………………………………...189  

Li  Si  in  the  Shiji………………………………………………………………….....197  

Conclusion………………………………………………………………….……….200  

VII.  Experiencing  the  Fajia  state..................................................................205  

The  Development  of  Behavior  Analysis…...……………….............…..208  

Behavior  Analysis:  Evaluating  Punishment………….…………….….210  

Rewards  in  Behavior  Analysis..................................................................214  

Conclusion…………………………………………………………………….…….227  

VIII.  The  Fajia-­‐ification  of  the  Rujia  Political  Vision…………....…..229  

The  Wuzi……………………………………………………………………….…….231  

The  Xunzi……...……………………………………………………………….…….239  

The  Guanzi…………………………………………………………………….…….244  

  v  
 New  Ritual  for  a  “New  Day”…………...……………………………….…….249  

Conclusion…………………………………………………………………….…….253  

IX.  Fajia  Religion  and  the  Fajia  Church…………………………………….257  

The  Structure  of  Fajia  Morality…………………………………………..…258  

Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………..270  

X.  Concluding  Assertions………………………………………………………….274  

Fajia  Thought  and  its  Historical  Significance……………………...….282  

Future  Research…………………………………………………………….…….291  

Final  Remarks…………………………………………………………………..….293  

Appendix  I:  The  Book  of  Lord  Shang  and  Authenticity……...…….295  

Introduction:  Brief  Textual  Background………………………………..295  

“The  Reform  of  the  Law”………………………………………………..……..297  

“An  Order  to  Cultivate  Waste  Lands”..…………………………………...302  

“Agriculture  and  War”……………………………………….………….……...302  

“The  Elimination  of  Strength”………………………………………….…...308  

“Discussion  about  the  People”…………………………………………..….313  

“The  Calculation  of  Land”…………………………………………………..…319  

“Opening  and  Debarring”…………………………………………………..…324  

“The  Unification  of  Words”.………..……………………..……………..…...328  

“Establishing  Laws”……………………………………………………..………332  

“The  Method  of  Warfare”,  “The  Establishment  of  Fundamentals”,  

and  “Military  Defense”……………………………………………………...….334  

“Making  Orders  Strict”……………………………………………..…………..338  

“The  Cultivation  of  Political  Assessment”………………………..…….344  

  vi  
 “The  Encouragement  of  Immigration”……………………………..……350  

“Rewards  and  Punishments”………………………………………..……….355  

“Policies”……………………………………………………………………..………358  

“Within  the  Borders”…………………………………………………..………..361  

“Weakening  the  People”………………………………………………….…...366  

“External  and  Internal  Affairs”…………………………………………..….369  

“Prince  and  Minister”………………………………………………………..….373  

“Interdicts  and  Encouragements”……………………………………........378  

“Attention  to  Law”…………………………………………………………….....381  

“The  Fixing  of  Rights  and  Duties”…………………………………….……383  

Conclusion:  Questioning  “Authenticity”………………………………...386  

Appendix  II………………………………………………………………………….…...389  

Bibliography………………………………………………………………………..…...415  

  vii  
 Chapter  I  
   
Introduction  
 
This  study  will  reevaluate  the  political  vision  most  closely  associated  with  a  

philosophical   tradition   known   as   “Fajia”   法 家 1  in   ancient   Chinese   history.  

Beginning   with   Sima   Tan’s   司馬談   (d.   110   B.C.)   essay   in   the   Shiji   史記,   philosophy  

from  the  Warring  States  period  (475   B.C.  -­‐  221   B.C.)  has  generally  been  divided  into  

six  major  schools,  Yin  and  Yang  陰陽,  Ru  儒,  Mo  墨,  Ming  名,  Fa  法,  and  Daode  道德.    

Contemporary   scholarship   has   expressed   doubt   about   whether   some   of   these  

traditions   actually   possess   coherent   textual   cores   or   ideas   that   are   commonly  

shared  amongst  the  texts  within  the  tradition  and  yet  that  also  render  them  distinct  

from  other  traditions.2     The  concern  with  the  existence  of  a  textual  core  lies  at  the  

very   foundation   of   other   more   specific   issues   surrounding   the   notion   of   a   Fajia  

collective   vision.   William   Boltz   pointed   out   that   an   analysis   of   the   Fajia   tradition  

should   discuss   “the   assumption”   that   “it   can   legitimately   be   considered   a   ‘school’  

just   because   Han   texts   refer   to   them   as   a   ‘school’”.3  He   adds   that   it   is   worth  

questioning  whether  “Sima  Qian’s  identification  of  fa  jia  as  a  school  of  thought  and  

Liu  Xiang’s  application  of  the  term  to  a  body  of  writings  might  say  more  about  the  

political   and   intellectual   milieu   of   the   early   Han   than   it   does   about   society   in   the  

                                                                                                               
1  This  philosophical  tradition  is  more  frequently  referred  to  as  “Legalism”.    However,  as  the  reader  

will  soon  see,  there  is  some  debate  over  the  suitability  of  this  translation.  Therefore,  this  study  will  
simply  use  the  romanization  “Fajia”  to  refer  to  the  philosophical  tradition.  
2  See  Csikszentmihàlyi,  Mark  and  Michael  Nylan.  “Constructing  Lineages  and  Inventing  Traditions  

through  Exemplary  Figures  in  Early  China”.  T’oung  Pao  vol.  89,  Fasc.  1/3,  2003,  p.  59-­‐99.  
3  Boltz  1997:  168;  See  Boltz,  William  G.  “China’s  Legalists,  the  Earliest  Totalitarians  and  Their  Art  of  

Ruling  by  Zhengyuan  Fu”.  The  Journal  of  Asian  Studies,  vol.  56,  no.  1,  1997,  p.  168-­‐170.  

  1  
late  Warring  States  period”.4     Moreover,  it  is  important  to  evaluate  “the  suitability  

of   the   English   term   ‘Legalist’   and   the   appropriateness   of   its   connotations   as   a  

translation   for   the   phrase   fa  jia”.5     So,   for   these   reasons,   among   others,   there   is   a  

need  for  greater  clarity  about  the  Fajia  tradition’s  collective  political  vision.      

This   study   will   not   attempt   to   establish   a   litmus   test   for   determining  

whether   or   not   particular   texts   can   be   appropriately   labeled   “Fajia”.     Yet,   it   will  

focus  on  the  distinctly  shared  characteristics  in  some  of  the  important  extant  Fajia  

texts  and  how  they  can  be  understood  within  the  context  of  their  unique  political  

climate.     So,   the   “Fajia   tradition”,   as   discussed   here,   consists   of   two   components:  

time  period  and  textual  tradition.    First,  this  study  refers  to  “Fajia”  in  an  effort  to  

make   sense   of   what   this   term   may   have   meant   during   the   Warring   States   period  

(475   B.C.   –   221   B.C.).     As   any   student   of   history   understands,   with   respect   to   the  

variables  of  time  and  space,  terms  can  come  to  have  very  different  meanings  under  

different  circumstances  and  with  the  passage  of  time.    Second,  this  research  has  a  

particular  focus  on  the  ideas  within  its  extant  textual  tradition   in  an  effort  to  make  

sense   of   the   thought   that   is   representative   of   the   Fajia   philosophical   tradition.     The  

forthcoming  analysis  will  not  exhaustively  treat  the  different  variables  that  should  

define  the  Fajia  philosophical  tradition  during  the  Warring  States  period.    Rather,  

this  investigation  aims  for  a  deeper  understanding  of  Fajia’s  textual  core.    

In   course   of   unearthing   a   Fajia   textual   core,   other   issues   to   which   Boltz  

brought   attention   will   be   addressed.   Even   well   before   Boltz’s   observations,   Herrlee  

                                                                                                               
4  Boltz  1997:  168  
5  Boltz  1997:  168  

  2  
Creel,   in   his   work   on   the   “Shen   Buhai   fragments”6,   had   pointed   out   that   the   term  

“Legalism”  is  very  misleading.    More  recent  scholarship  has  provided  at  least  two  

reasons  why.    Paul  Goldin  explained  that  this  translation  is  inaccurate  because  the  

character   fa   法   could   mean   more   than   simply   “law”   and   it   “is   itself   partisan   and  

anachronistic”,   having   “less   to   do   with   evenhandedly   surveying   the   various  

Warring  States  philosophers  than  with  urging”  Sima  Tan  and  Sima  Qian’s  司馬遷  (c.  

145  –  86   B.C.)  own  “particular  brand  of  syncretism  as  the  most  versatile  worldview  

for  his  own  time”.7  Although  these  suspicions  are  certainly  valid,  this  study  is  does  

not   share   them.     The   analysis   in   the   following   chapters   will   reveal,   first,   how   the  

significance  of  the  character  fa  法  in  Fajia  texts  is  not  reducible  to  a  mere  label  that  

demonstrates   Sima   Tan’s   Han   political   agenda.     On   the   contrary,   evidence   will  

demonstrate  how  the  use  of    fa  法  in  these  texts  reflected  the  changes  in  political  

organization  and  climate  during  the  Warring  States  period;  and,  third,  a  suggested  

alternative   more   suitable   translation   for   “Fajia”   is   advanced.     Perhaps   most  

importantly,   this   study   interprets   Fajia   law   as   pedagogy,   revealing   the   moral   and  

psychological  dimensions  of  the  human  experience  within  a  Fajia  state.  

This   undertaking   comes   with   implications   for   fields   beyond   Chinese  

philosophy  and  Chinese  studies.    Indeed,  notable  non-­‐China  specialist  scholars  have  

employed  the  current  understanding  of  Fajia  thought  to  enhance  their  theorizing.  

Recently,   for   instance,   the   postmodernist   theorist   Slavoj   Žižek   has   discussed   the  

                                                                                                               
6  See  Creel,  Herrlee  G.,  Shen  Pu-­‐hai:  A  Chinese  Political  Philosopher  of  the  Fourth  Century  B.C.  Chicago:    

University  of  Chicago  Press,  1974.  

7  Goldin  2011:  94;  Goldin,  Paul  R.  “Persistent  Misconceptions  about  Chinese  ‘Legalism’”.  Journal  of  

Chinese  Philosophy,  vol.  38,  vol.  1,  2011,  p.  88-­‐104.  

  3  
clash   in   ideology   between   the   “Legalists”   and   “Confucians.     He   pointed   out   that  

Legalist   doctrine   includes   kernels   of   egalitarianism   that   are   emancipatory   from   the  

decentralized  fengjian  order  that  preceded  it.8     However,  the  egalitarian  nature  of  

Legalist  doctrine  must  be  placed  in  its  proper  pedagogical  and  cosmological  context.    

Without  it,  Žižek’s  discussion  is  unfortunately  limited  at  best.    Hence,  gaining  clarity  

on   Fajia   thought   can   contribute   to   a   more   sophisticated   academic   discussion   in  

other  academic  fields.    Second,  a  deeper  understanding  of  Fajia  thought  can  provide  

insight   into   China’s   contemporary   governance   and   international   strategy.     It   has  

been  said  that  China’s  current  president,  Xi  Jinping  has  been  rather  open  about  his  

reverence   for   Warring   States   philosophy,   particularly   Rujia   and   Fajia   thinkers.9    

Cary  Huang  in  the  South  China  Morning  Post  recently  explained  that  not  only  has  Xi  

“made   several   references   to   Han   Fei”   and   “admiringly   cited   Shang   Yang”,   he   has  

also   “repeatedly   praised   benevolent   rule   in   his   speeches,   quoting   the   Analects”.10    

This   has   prompted   some   analysts   even   to   speculate   on   how   Xi   will   successfully  

combine   Rujia 11  and   Fajia   thought   “in   modern   governance”.   Now   since   China  

continues   to   rise   in   prominence   in   international   politics,   there   is   no   reason   to  

                                                                                                               
8  See  Žižek,  Slavoj.  Living  in  the  End  Times.  London:  Verso,  2011,  p.  14-­‐16.  
9  Buckley,  Chris.  “Leader  Taps  Into  Chinese  Classics  in  Seeking  to  Cement  Power”.  New  York  Times  

12  Oct.  2014:  A15.  Print.  

10  Huang,  Cary.  “Governing  through  Two  Opposing  Schools  of  Thought”.  South  China  Morning  Post  23  

Nov.  2014:  p.  8.  Print.  

11  This  philosophical  tradition  is  more  frequently  referred  to  as  “Confucianism”.    However,  this  

study  will  simply  use  the  romanization  “Rujia”  to  refer  to  the  philosophical  tradition.    Although  this  
tradition  has  historically  been  closely  associated  with  Confucius,  the  relationship  between  Confucius  
and  the  Ru  collective  is  unclear.    Additionally,  the  Ru  tradition  included  such  a  diversity  of  thought  
that  it  is  misleading  to  insinuate  that  Confucian  virtues  were  necessarily  central  concerns  to  all  Ru  
thinkers  in  the  same  ways.    Thus,  using  the  romanization  of  the  Chinese  name,  although  not  
particularly  precise,  is  less  misleading  and  more  historically  accurate  than  the  aforementioned  
common  translation.  

  4  
believe   that   interest   in   Fajia   thought   will   not   increase   even   more   in   the   future   as  

China’s  stature  in  world  politics  continues  to  rise.    

Indeed,   the   Fajia   tradition   has   received   plenty   of   attention   in   academic  

discourse   and   is   now   gaining   popularity   in   non-­‐academic   discourse   as   well.      

However,  reviewing  all  the  works  that  mention  Fajia  thought  is  beyond  the  scope  of  

this   introduction.     The   survey   that   follows   mainly   limits   itself   to   research   that   is  

most  pertinent  to  its  examination  of  Fajia  philosophical  thought.    Therefore,  I  will  

focus   on   major   works   in   English   and   Chinese   that   have   systematically   explored  

Fajia  thought  and  devoted  serious  attention  to  evaluating  the  significance  of  fa  法  

or  the  concept  of  law  within  the  Fajia  philosophical  tradition.12    

Scholarly  Approaches  to  the  Fajia  tradition  and  its  Methods  of  
Goverance  
 
Previous  scholarly  examinations  employed  at  least  two  different  methods  of  

analysis:  a  combining-­‐features  approach  and  a  tradition-­‐contrasting  approach.    The  

first  approach  is  illustrated  by  Chen  Chi-­‐tien,  one  of  the  first  to  examine  the  Fajia  

tradition   and   its   political   vision   in   a   detailed   and   systematic   way.     He   described  

Fajia  using  four  main  criteria:  1)  the  reliance  on  laws13,  technique,  and  positional  

power;   2)   relying   on   laws   should   include   the   establishment   of   good   faith   and  

mutual   trust   with   rewards   and   enforcing   mandated   punishment;   3)   using  

technique  to  ensure  that  name  corresponds  with  reality  or  title  corresponds  with  
                                                                                                               
12  In  later  chapters,  it  will  become  clear  that  the  discussion  of  Fajia  is  definitely  not  limited  to  works  

that  systematically  explore  its  characteristics.    For  instance,  some  studies  focus  on  one  specific  Fajia  
text  and  then  extrapolate  to  make  conclusions  about  the  Fajia  tradition  more  generally.      
13  Generally,  the  character  fa  法  will  be  translated  as  “law”.    At  times,  there  will  arguably  be  more  

precise  translations  of  the  character,  especially  “standards  of  evaluation”.    However,  the  term  “law”  
will  be  used  consistently  to  refer  to  “standards  of  evaluation”  in  addition  to  an  entire  body  of  
methods,  customs,  and  practices  that  together  create  the  ruler’s  infrastructure  of  governance.    

  5  
performance;   and   4)   using   severe   punishment   to   govern   chaotic   states.14     With  

these   characterizations,   Chen   appeared   to   combine   the   important   features   of   key  

Fajia  texts  rather  than  pointing  out  features  that  are  common  to  all  Fajia  texts.    For  

instance,  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang  Shangjunshu 商君書 and  the  Hanfeizi  appear  to  be  

the   only  Fajia  texts   to   include   passages   that   insist   on   harsh   punishment   zhong  xing  

重刑.   Thus,   the   advocacy   of   harsh   punishments   is   not   necessarily   a   component   of  

all  the  various  visions  described  in  Fajia  texts.    Perhaps  Chen  meant  to  imply  that  

Fajia   punishments   should   be   understood   as   necessarily   more   severe   than   the  

punishments  described  in  texts  associated  with  other  traditions.    However,  if  this  is  

the   case,   Chen   did   not   devote   much   effort   to   proving   it   or   appeared   to   have   just  

assumed   it.     Also,   the   notion   of   name   corresponding   with   reality   or   title  

corresponding  with  performance  xing  ming  形名  is  not  included  in  the  Book  of  Lord  

Shang.     In   fact,   this   is   one   of   the   grounds   upon   which   the   Hanfeizi   criticizes   the  

political  vision  expressed  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang.  

Fu  Zhengyuan  similarly  insisted  that  “power”  shi  勢  and  “statecraft”  shu  術  

dominate  the  ideological  aspect  of  Fajia’s  approach  to  governance.15     He  explained  

that  power,  which  he  defines  as  “ability  to  impose  one’s  will  on  others  and  to  have  

one’s   command   obeyed   despite   opposition”,   is   a   “central   theme”   in   all   Fajia   texts.16    

Described   as   “the   ultimate   goal   and   value   in   the   world”17 ,   power,   Fu   argued,  

                                                                                                               
14  Chen  1970:  8;  See  Chen  Chi-­‐tien  (Chen  Qitian)  陳啓天.  Zhongguo  fajia  gai  lun  中國法家概論.  Tabei  

臺北:  Taiwan  Zhonghua  shu  ju  臺灣中華書局,  Min  guo  民國  59,  1970.  
15  See  Fu  Zhengyuan.  China’s  Legalists:  The  Earliest  Totalitarians  and  Their  Art  of  Ruling.  London,  

England:  M.E.  Sharpe  Inc.,  1996.  

16  Fu  1996:  35  
17  Fu  1996:  45  

  6  
generally   took   three   forms:   “authority   or   status   of   domination”18,   “physical   and  

human   resources”19,   and   “intelligence”20.       According   to   Fu,   Fajia   texts   viewed  

political   power   as   coercive21  and   therefore   power   as   domination   is   expressed  

through   the   ruler’s   ability   to   give   commands   and   administer   rewards   and  

punishments.    Power  also  found  expression  in  the  utilization  and  manipulation  of  

the   state’s   resources,   which   included   its   military   forces,   punishments,   and  

agricultural  production.      Finally,  power  found  expression  as  intelligence  because,  

according   to   Fu,   Fajia   texts   advocated   for   the   construction   of   a   “pervasive   informer  

network”22  that   would   allow   the   ruler   to   observe   and   evaluate   “all   corners   of  

society.”23  As  for  a  ruler’s  statecraft,  Fu  asserted  that  it  rests  on  eight  principles:  the  

monopoly   of   power, 24  considering   all   subjects   untrustworthy, 25  exercising  

statecraft   in   secret   and   practicing   the   principle   of   non-­‐interference   wuwei  無為,26  

practicing   “thought   control   and   the   suppression   of   heresy”, 27     having   social  

categories  based  on  status  determined  by  usefulness  to  the  ruler,28  eliminating  all  

“unsupervised   groups”, 29     manipulating   state   bureaucracy   through   the  

“domestication   of   officials”30  and   “restraints”31,   and   establishing   “institutions   for  

                                                                                                               
18  Fu  1996:  36  
19  Fu  1996:  38  
20  Fu  1996:  40  
21  Fu  1996:  37  
22  Fu  1996:  40  
23  Fu  1996:  41  
24  Fu  1996:  45  
25  Fu  1996:  82  
26  Fu  1996:  86  
27  Fu  1996:  89  
28  Fu  1996:  92  
29  Fu  1996:  95  
30  Fu  1996:  97  
31  Fu  1996:  100  

  7  
totalitarian  social  control”32.    Appendix  I  of  this  study  points  out  that  the  meaning  

of   what   Fu   calls   power   or   statecraft   is   unclear   in   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang.     Thus,  

whether   extant   Fajia   texts   demonstrate   any   fundamental   agreement   about   the  

meaning  of  these  aspects  of  governance  remains  an  open  question.  

Chen   Chi-­‐tien   also   employed   the   tradition-­‐contrasting   approach,   putting  

forth  more  tenets  of  Fajia  political  thought:  1)  the  foundational  unit  of  analysis  is  

the   state;   2)   it   possesses   an  active  response  towards  human  nature;  3)  it  advocates  

rule   by   law;   and   4)   it   recommends   a   method   of   governance   that   seeks   to   actively  

regulate  subject  affairs  within  the  state.33    He  asserted  that  these  characteristics  are  

in  stark  contrast  to  other  schools  of  thought  that  offered  different  political  methods.      

For  instance,  Chen  characterized  Rujia  thought  using  the  following  features:  1)  the  

foundational  unit  of  analysis  is  the  family;  2)  it  possesses  a  moderate  response  to  

human   nature;   3)   it   advocates   rule   by   man;   and   4)   it   recommends   a   method   of  

governance   that   seeks   to   transform   the   emotions   of   its   subjects   through   ritual.34  

Using  this  method,  prominent  features  of  texts  most  closely  associated  with  other  

traditions  frequently  come  to  define  the  main  characteristics  of  Fajia  texts,  simply  

because   they   are   absent   in   Fajia   texts.   Texts   most   associated   with   the   Rujia  

tradition   are   quite   notable   for   making   the   basic   unit   of   political   order   the   family.      

They   make   explicit   references   to   how   establishing   order   in   the   family   is   the  

foundation  to  order  in  the  state.    For  instance,  the  Book  of  Mencius,  in  the  chapter  

“King   Hui   of   Liang   Part   I”   states,   “Treat   the   aged   of   your   own   family   in   a   manner  

                                                                                                               
32  Fu  1996:  101  
33  Chen  1970:  10  
34  Chen  1970:  10  

  8  
befitting  their  venerable  age  and  extend  this  treatment  to  the  aged  of  other  families;  

treat  your  own  young  in  a  manner  befitting  their  tender  age  and  extend  this  to  the  

young   of   other   families,   and   you   can   roll   the   Empire   on   your   palm.   The   Odes  say,  

‘He  set  an  example  for  his  consort,  and  also  for  his  brothers,  and  so  ruled  over  the  

family  and  the  state.’”35    Therefore,  Chen  logically  assigned  having  as  a  foundational  

unit   of   analysis   the   state,   as   opposed   to   the   family,   as   a   notable   Fajia  characteristic,  

even   if   no   Fajia   texts   explicitly   mentions   this   difference   as   a   point   of   debate   with  

Rujia  figures  or  texts.  Now,  certainly,  this  study  is  not  suggesting  that  only  explicitly  

mentioned  points  of  debate  within  the  textual  tradition  should  determine  the  terms  

by   an   analysis   of   a   debate   can   proceed.     Rather,   the   point   is   that   the   tradition-­‐

contrast   method   can   imply   greater   importance   to   differences   than   the   actual  

arguments  or  positions  evident  in  the  debate  intend.    In  other  words,  Chen  analyzes  

Rujia   and   Fajia   texts   in   an   opposition   that   serves   his   purposes.     However,  evidence  

in   the   the   texts   themselves   suggests   that   the   aspects   of   opposition   to   which   Chen  

highlights  would  not  have  seemed  relevant  to  the  thinkers  in  the  respective  ancient  

Chinese  philosophical  traditions.    

Derk  Bodde  and  Clarence  Morris  engaged  in  a  similar  tradition-­‐contrasting  

method   for   much   of   their   discussion   of   “Legalism”   and   law,36  comparing   them   with  

what   they   viewed   as   the   Ruijia   tradition’s   ideals.   They   explained   that   the   Rujia  

                                                                                                               
35  Lau  1970:  11;  See  Mengzi  1A:1.  Mencius.  D.C.  Lau,  trans.  London:  Penguin  Books  Ltd.,  1970.;  老吾

老，以及人之老；幼吾幼，以及人之幼。天下可運於掌。《詩》云：刑于寡妻，至于兄弟，以御
于家邦。(Lau  and  Chen  1995:  1/5/7-­‐8);  See  Lau,  D.C.  and  Chen  Fong  Ching,  ed.  A  Concordance  of  the  
Mengzi.  Hong  Kong:  Commercial  Press,  1995.  
36  See  Bodde,  Derk  and  Clarence  Morris.  Law  in  Imperial  China:  Exemplified  by  190  Ch’ing  Dynasty  

Cases  (Translated  from  the  Hsiang-­‐an  hui-­‐lan).  Cambridge:  Harvard  University  Press,  1967,  p.  18-­‐51.  
Though  Fajia  was  not  their  main  focus,  Bodde  and  Morris  merit  attention  since  their  influential  
study  contrasts  the  Fajia  and  Rujia  traditions  on  the  issue  of  law  specifically.  

  9  
tradition  advocated  for  “government  by  moral  precept  and  example”  and  a  return  

to  “the  traditional  ‘feudal’  scale  of  values”.37      This  was  in  contrast  with  Fajia  figures  

who   were   “opposed   to   the   Confucians”   due   to   their   “ardent   advocacy   of   law”   or  

“insistence   on   law”   as   a   political   tool   “essential   for   effectively   controlling   the  

growing   populations   under   their   jurisdiction”.38     The   Rujia   tradition   insisted   that  

the   state   should   center   itself   around   ritual   li   禮,   which   will   produce   socially  

desirable   behavior   from   subjects   and   thus   eventually   reunite   the   decentralized  

fengjian   system.     So   Bodde   and   Morris   introduced   some   fundamental   differences  

between   ritual   and   law   as   a   way   of   uncovering   some   important   characteristics   of  

each   tradition’s   thought,   while   also   providing   general   counterarguments   from   each  

tradition’s   perspective.     Roger   Ames   suggested   that   this   method   of   comparison  

obscures  understanding  of  Rujia  political  visions  as  well.    Ames  pointed  out  that  the  

Bodde   and   Morris   method   both   ignores   the   very   different   conceptions   of   ritual  

found   in   the   Analects   and   the   Xunzi   and   also   inaccurately   depicts   Confucius,   as  

represented  in  the  Analects,  as  having  an  antagonistic  attitude  towards  law.39  

A   notable   and   more   recent   exception  to   the   common   view   was   an   analysis  

that   focused   on   the   Fajia   notion   of   law   to   reveal   distinctly   shared   characteristics  

written  by  Shi  Xianqun 時顯群.40     Shi  asserted  that  Fajia’s  approach  to  governance  

is   based   on   three   main   characteristics:     1)   state   and   society   should   focus   its  

                                                                                                               
37  Bodde  and  Morris  1967:  18  
38  Bodde  and  Morris  1967:  18  
39  See  Ames,  Roger  T.  “From  Confucius  to  Xunzi:  An  Ambiguity  of  Order  in  Classical  Confucianism”,  

in  Roger  T.  Ames,  Sin-­‐wai  Chan,  and  Mau-­‐sang  Ng,  eds.  Interpreting  Culture  Through  Translation.  
Hong  Kong:  Chinese  University  Press,  1991.  
40  Admittedly,  Shi’s  work  does  utilize  the  two  approaches  much  like  its  predecessors  elsewhere  in  

his  work.    However,  the  point  is  that  his  analysis  approach  is  not  nearly  as  dominated  by  these  
approaches  as  its  predecessors.  

  10  
attention   or   place   importance   on   progression,41  2)   human   nature   is   about   people  

being  fond  of  profit  and  disliking  harm,42  and  3)  advocating  a  pragmatic  utilitarian  

theory   of   value. 43     According   to   Shi,   Fajia   thought   assumed   that   people   were  

primarily   motivated   by   self-­‐interest.     So,   its   notion   of   rule   by   law   was   not   really  

about   brutality   and   harshness.     Rather,   it   was   intended   to   only   be   used  

provisionally   in   order   to   attain   lasting   peace   and   order   within   the   states   and   to  

even  potentially  reestablish  an  empire.    Thus,  Fajia  thought  marginalized  qualities  

of  the  ruler’s  subjects  that  did  not  appear  to  clearly  and  directly  contribute  to  the  

enrichment  and  strengthening  of  the  state.44    

Hence  it  comes  as  no  surprise  that  the  aforementioned  studies’  discussions  

of  Fajia  law  have  been  notably  different  from  each  other.  According  to  Bodde  and  

Morris,   the   Fajia   tradition   rejected   the   Rujia   tradition’s   advocacy   of   ritual   as   the  

foundation  of  the  ideal  approach  to  governance  for  several  reasons.    Law  acts  as  a  

check   against   selfish   human   desire,   which   is   the   primary   motivating   force   behind  

most  individual’s  behavior.    Its  universalist  approach  can  produce  a  unity  through  

its  rejection  of  privilege  and  exclusivity,  being  publicly  known  to  all  subjects  and  its  

punishments  equally  applied  to  all  subjects,  whereas  ritual  was  actually  a  marker  of  

privilege  and  exclusivity  before  the  Warring  States  period.    Since  laws  are  written  

and   publicly   known,   they   provide   a   clear   singular   model   of   conduct   that   is   not   only  

far   less   likely   to   be   arbitrarily   enforced   but   also   much   more   likely   to   reinforce  

                                                                                                               
41  Shi  2010:  108;  See  Shi  Xianqun  時顯群.  Fajia  “yifazhiguo”  sixiang  yanjiu 法家  “以法治國”思想研究.  
Beijing 北京 :  Renmin  chubanshe 人民出版社,  2010.  
42  Shi  2010:  119    
43  Shi  2010:  127  
44  See  Shi  2010:  127    

  11  
uniformity.     Moreover,   since   laws   provide   a   clear   singular   approach,   they   enable  

the   ruler   to   establish   mutual   responsibility   groups   that   extended   his   reach   and  

influence  even  further.  Laws  also  do  not  need  moral  validation  from  ancient  kings,  

which  allow  them  to  more  easily  and  more  appropriately  adapted  to  present  times  

and  circumstances.    They  are  reinforced  by  incentives  and  force  that  allow  the  ruler  

successfully  manipulate  the  behavior  of  individuals  who  are  primarily  motivated  by  

their   own   welfare,   this   thus   protects   society   from   the   potential   harm   caused   by  

errant  individual  behavior.    Lastly,  this  method  of  governance  does  not  rely  on  the  

talents  of  the  ruler  at  all.45  

In   accordance   with   the   aforementioned   principles   and   ideology,   Fu   has  

described   the   Fajia   notion   of   law   as   the   “command   of   the   ruler”   that   establishes  

uniformity  and  requires  strict  implementation46,  the  “standard  of  public  interest”47,  

the   “embodiment   of   the   ruler’s   will”48,   and   “a   penal   tool”   used   to   maintain   the  

ruler’s   “power”   and   “domination”   of   his   subjects49.     He   argued   that   Fajia  thinkers  

considered  the  law  as  the  command  of  the  ruler  because  it  is  the  tool  that  prohibits  

and  prescribes  undesirable  and  desirable  behavior  respectively,  as  defined  by  the  

ruler.50     In  fact,  he  asserted  that  the  Fajia  notion  of  law  is  “quite  egalitarian”51  in  a  

sense   because   its   standards   are   not   only   “consistent   and   uniform”52  themselves,  

                                                                                                               
45  Bodde  and  Morris  1967:  23-­‐24  
46  See  Fu  1996:  60-­‐61  
47  Fu  1996:  64  
48  Fu  1996:  66  
49  Fu  1996:  68  
50  Fu  1996:  60  
51  Fu  1996:  62  
52  Fu  1996:  61  

  12  
but   they   are   also   “equally   applied   to   all   subjects”53.     To   him,   law   represents   the  

public   interest   because   “the   Legalists   defined   the   interest   of   the   ruler   as   ‘public’  

interest”.54  Fu  also  insisted  that  the  Fajia  law  embodies  the  ruler’s  will  because  it  is  

“subject   to   change   at   his   arbitrary   discretion”55.     Finally,   Fajia  law   is   a   penal   tool   to  

maintain  the  ruler’s  power  and  domination  because  it  is  reinforced  by  rewards  and  

punishments.     Though   Fu   considered   them   to   be   “the   two   basic   instruments   for  

effecting   behavioral   conditioning” 56  and   they   are   both   important   in   pushing  

towards   compliance,   he   clearly   argues   that   punishment   is   the   more   important   of  

the   two,   since   “fear   is   a   much   stronger   motivation   than   love   and   pleasure,   and  

intimidation  is  a  more  potent  weapon  than  reward.”57    

In   contrast,   Shi   actually   primarily   describes   the   Fajia   tradition   as   the   school  

of  “rule  by  law.”58     He  explained  that  the  notion  of  rule  by  law  in  Fajia  thought  has  

four   main   axioms:   when   the   government   and   policy   are   centralized,   this   is  

beneficial   for   uniting   the   people’s   thought   and   behavior,59  when   laws   are   well-­‐

defined,   it   is   beneficial   for   the   fair   application   of   rewards   and   punishments,60  when  

methods  are  made  simple  and  clear,  it  is  beneficial  for  the  ruler’s  practice  of  non-­‐

action,61  when  the  public  is  established  and  the  private  is  abolished,  it  is  beneficial  

                                                                                                               
53  Fu  1996:  61  
54  Fu  1996:  65  
55  Fu  1996:  66  
56  Fu  1996:  70  
57  Fu  1996:  71  
58  Shi  Xianqun  時顯群.  Fajia  “yifazhiguo”  sixiang  yanjiu 法家  “以法治國”思想研究.  Beijing 北京 :  
Renmin  chubanshe 人民出版社,  2010.    
59  Shi  2010:  141  
60  Shi  2010:  142    
61  Shi  2010:  142    

  13  
for  the  prosperity  and  strength  of  the  state.62  More  specifically,  he  asserted  that  the  

Fajia   notion   of   law   has   four   main   characteristics.     They   are   the   following:   1)   a  

written   compilation   of   statutes   and   regulations63;   2)   being   promulgated   to   the  

common   people   and   publicly   known64;   3)   the   standard   for   all   under   Heaven65;   4)  

consisting   of   rewards   for   merit   and   punishment   for   offenses66.     It   is   important   to  

point   out   how   different   Shi’s   description   of   Fajia   law   is   from   those   found   in   the  

aforementioned   scholarly   works.   In   this   instance,   his   analysis   refrains   from  

contrasting  traditions  and  combining  features.    He  attempts  to  reveal  the  common  

denominators  between  Fajia  texts  in  their  conceptualization  of  law.    Using  a  similar  

approach,   this   study   will   primarily   examine   the   conception   of   law   in   the   Book   of  

Lord  Shang,  in  order  to  bring  to  light  how  the  conception  of  law  across  Fajia  texts  

consistently   acts   as   the   state-­‐specific   basis   of   evaluating   merit,   and   therefore   the  

foundation   of   organizing   state   hierarchy,   that   creates   a   structure   for   state  

orthodoxy  whose  content  should  be  solely  supplied  by  the  ruler.    

Additionally,   two   scholars   who   have   systematically   dealt   with   the   textual  

issues   of   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang   have   pointed   out   that   law   is   at   the   core   of   the  

approach  to  governance  of  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang  and  other  Fajia  doctrinal  texts.  

Cheng  Liang-­‐shu  views  the  Fajia’s  shared  characteristics  as  the  following:  having  an  

uncompromising,   fixed   attention   on   political   objectives   and   a   flexible   attitude  

                                                                                                               
62  Shi  2010:  143    
63  Shi  2010:  144  
64  Shi  2010:  145  
65  Shi  2010:  146  
66  Shi  2010:  147  

  14  
towards   the   means   with   which   political   objectives   are   achieved.67     He   points   to   the  

primacy  of  law,  its  clarity,  and  its  insistence  on  the  equality  of  all  people  before  it  as  

the  main  characteristics  the  Fajia  tradition’s  conception  of  law.    Zhang  Linxiang,  for  

his   part,   asserts   that   the   core   of   Fajia   ideology   is   ruling   by   laws.     He   adds   that   even  

though  other  texts  within  the  tradition  may  or  may  not  include  different  points  of  

emphasis  including,  agriculture  and  warfare,  circumstances  of  authority,  technique,  

these  other  points  do  not  sufficiently  capture  the  essence  of  Fajia.    Law  is  the  only  

element   that   captures   the   essence.     In   line   with   this   contention,   Zhang   he   even  

asserted  that  Shang  Yang  is  the  prototypical  Fajia  thinker.68      Since  Fajia  philosophy  

was   highly   influential   in   the   state   of   Qin’s   unification   of   China   and   the   construction  

of   its   imperial   bureaucracy,   its   ideas   undoubtedly   rest   at   the   foundation   of   Chinese  

governance   throughout   imperial   Chinese   history.   Therefore,   not   only   is   a   more  

precise  characterization  of  the  Fajia   tradition  and  its  notion  of  law  crucial  to  truly  

understanding  imperial  China’s  legal-­‐governance  tradition,  but  a  methodology  that  

uses   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang   as   its   founational   text,   unlike   Shi’s   approach,   is  

particularly  useful.    

Ideas  on    Fa  法  and  its  Significance  in  Fajia  法 家 Texts  

Other   academic   scholarly   discussion   centering   on   Fajia   has   focused  

primarily   on   the   character   fa   法   specifically.     Often   translated   as   “law”,   “method”,  

and   “model”,   this   character   represents   the   very   foundation   of   the   Fajia  vision.     If  

                                                                                                               
67  Cheng  1987:  340;  Cheng  Liang-­‐shu  (Zheng  Liangshu)  鄭良樹.  Shang  Yang  ji  qi  xue  pai  商鞅及其學

派.  Taibei  台北:  Taiwan  xue  sheng  shu  ju  臺灣學生書局,  1987.

68  Zhang  2008:  126;  See  Zhang  Linxiang  張林祥.  Shangjunshu  de  cheng  wei  yu  si  xiang  yan  jiu  商君書

的成為與思想研究.  Shanghai  上海:  Ren  Min  Chu  Ban  She  人民出版社,  2008.  

  15  
there  is  a  precise  understanding  of  the  unique  aspects  of  the  use  of  the  character   fa  

法   in   Fajia   texts,   their   distinctly   shared   characteristics   would   almost   certainly  

reveal  themselves.    In  an  effort  to  shed  light  on  this  issue,  the  core  of  the  debate  has  

concerned   whether   the   Fajia   notion   of   law   actually   represents   a   significant  

meaning  change  of  the  character  fa  法.    Building  upon  Chad  Hansen’s  analysis  of  its  

different  positions,  this  study  considers  it  essential  to  discuss  the  work  of  nine  key  

scholars   whose   works   have   marked   the   course   and   range   of   the   academic   debate  

on  character  fa  法  as  it  appeared  in   Fajia  texts.    A  brief  examination  of  the  different  

perspectives   offered   by   J.J.L.   Duyvendak69,   Herrlee   Creel70,   Chad   Hansen71,   Roger  

Ames72,   A.C.   Graham73,   Benjamin   Schwartz74,   Chen   Shengyong75,   Liang   Zhiping76,  

and  Duan  Qiuguan77  are  vital  to  illustrating  the  range  of  characterizations  of  Fajia  

as  a  distinct  school  of  thought.    

                                                                                                               
69  Duyvendak,  J.J.L.  “The  Book  of  Lord  Shang  and  the  School  of  Law”,  in  Duyvendak,  J.J.L.  The  Book  of  

Lord  Shang:  A  Classic  of  the  Chinese  School  of  Laws,  London:  Arthur  Probsthain,  1928.  
70  Creel  1974:  145;  Creel,  Herrlee  G.,  Shen  Pu-­‐hai:  A  Chinese  Political  Philosopher  of  the  Fourth  

Century  B.C.  Chicago:    University  of  Chicago  Press,  1974.  

71  Hansen,  Chad.  “Fa  (Standards,  Law)  and  Meaning  Changes  in  Chinese  Philosophy”.  Philosophy  East  

and  West,  vol.  44,  no.  3,  1994,  p.  435-­‐488.  

72  Represented  in  Roger  T.  Ames’s  “Fa  (Penal  Law)  法”  in  Ames,  Roger  T.  The  Art  of  Rulership.  See  

Ames,  Roger  T.  The  Art  of  Rulership:    A  Study  in  Ancient  Chinese  Political  Thought.  Honolulu:  
University  of  Hawaii  Press,  1983.,  with  awareness  of  Ames,  Roger  T.  “From  Confucius  to  Xunzi:  An  
Ambiguity  of  Order  in  Classical  Confucianism”,  in  Roger  T.  Ames,  Sin-­‐wai  Chan,  and  Mau-­‐sang  Ng,  
eds.  Interpreting  Culture  Through  Translation.  Hong  Kong:  Chinese  University  Press,  1991.  
73  Graham  1989:  275;  Graham,  Angus  C.  Disputers  of  the  Tao:  Philosophical  Argument  in  Ancient  

China.  La  Salle:  Open  Court,  1989.;  Boltz  identified  Graham’s  work  on  “Legalists”  to  be  “the  best  
presentation  of  Legalist  thought  in  English”.  (Boltz  1997:  168)  
74  Schwartz,  Benjamin.  The  World  of  Thought  in  Ancient  China.  Cambridge:  Harvard  University  Press,  

1985.  
75  Chen  Shengyong  .  “Fa,  li,  xing  de  shu  xing—dui  zhong  guo  “fa  lü”  shi  yan  jiu  fang  fa  lun  de  yi  ge  fa  si”  

(shang)  法，禮，刑的屬性對中國“法律”史研究方法論的一個反思  (上).    Zhe  jiang  she  hui  ke  xue,  

vol.  2,  no.  5,  2002,  p.  49-­‐60  
76  Liang  Zhiping  梁治平.  “Fa  ban”  法辦,    in  Liang  zhi  ping  zi  xuan  ji 梁治平自選集.  Guilin  桂林:  Guang  

xi  shi  fan  da  xue  chu  ban  she  廣西師範大學出版社,  1997.  

77  Duan  Qiuguan.  “An  Analysis  of  Ancient  Chinese  Law  and  the  Concept  of  Law—Including  a  

Discussion  with  Liang  Zhiping”.  Social  Sciences  in  China,  vol.  12,  no.  1,  1991,  p.  208-­‐221.  

  16  
 J.J.L   Duyvendak   was   one   of   the   first   Western   scholars   to   specifically   address  

how   the   character   fa   法   may   have   changed   upon   its   appearance   in   Fajia   texts.    

Duyvendak   essentially   argued   that   the   character   fa   法   in   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang  

replaces   ritual   as   a   set   of   rules   that   are   to   guide   individuals   toward   the   right  

conduct.     The   character   fa   法   also   does   not   experience   a   significant   meaning  

change.    He  described  the  character  fa  法’s  transition  from  Rujia  to  Fajia  texts  when  

he  stated:    

The   law,   fa,   in   this   system   does   not   comprise   much   more   than   the  
rules   for   rewards   and   punishments.     Therein   it   is   still   very   close   to  
the   old   idea   of   law,   which   was   that   of   criminal   law   only.     Whereas,  
however,  this  criminal  law  was  only  an  aid  to  secure  the  maintenance  
of   li,   the   right   conduct,   prescribed   by   natural   law,   fa,   this   system   of  
rewards  and  punishments,  for  merits  and  demerits  towards  the  state,  
now   replaces   li,   and   itself   becomes   the   right   standard   of   conduct.    
The   two   meanings,   in   which   the   word   fa   is   used,   i.e.   (1)   model   or  
standard,  and  (2)  law,  penal  law,  coalesce  completely.    The  law  of  the  
state   becomes   the   norm   of   conduct,   and   this   law   is   divested   of   its  
moral   character.     Here   is   a   complete   breach   between   law   and  
ethics.78  
 
The   character   fa   法,   upon   the   appearance   of   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang,   does   not  

experience   any   significant   meaning   change   because   it   simply   “replaces   li”.     As  

opposed   to   its   prior   use   of   securing   the   maintenance   of   Rujia   rites,   the   ideas   of  

“model”   or   “standard”   and   “penal   law”   “coalesce   completely”,   acting   “only”   as   a  

form  of  criminal  law.    The  character  fa  法 experienced  a  change  in  function  and  was  

utilized   for   different   ends.     This   explains   what   Duyvendak   considered   the   Fajia  

notion  of  law  as  a  divestment  of  any  moral  concern.    

                                                                                                               
78  Duyvendak  1928:  89  

  17  
 Creel  viewed  the  character  fa  法  as  potentially  having  a  number  of  different  

meanings  in  Western  Zhou  period  (1045  B.C.  -­‐  771  B.C.)  literature,  Spring  and  Autumn  

period  (771  B.C.  -­‐  475  B.C.)  literature,  and  even  in  Fajia  texts.    Although  he  admits  that  

the  character  fa  法  does  come  to  have  even  more  meanings  like  “method”  or  even  

“technique” 79  in   Warring   States   texts,   this   does   not   constitute   a   significant  

meaning-­‐change.     Rather   the   character   fa   法   undergoes   an   increase   in   its   scale   of  

meanings   or   in   the   number   of   possible   meanings.   He   pointed   out   that   the   “Shen  

Buhai  fragments”  use   the   character  fa  法  to  mean  “method”  or  “technique”  “three  

times  more  frequently”80  than  the  number  of  times  it  refers  to  law.    Therefore,  any  

notions  of  penal  law  inadequately  describe  what  its  use  of  law  references.    Thus,  he  

concluded   that   the   character   fa   法   has   “a   whole   series   of   meanings”81  that   are  

closely   related   to   the   Chinese   notion   of   law,   with   its   range   of   possible   meanings  

best  illustrated  in  a  scale   as  in  the  following:  model  à  method  à  technique  à  rule  

à  regulation  à  law.82  Therefore,  Sima  Tan  most  likely  named  the  school  Fajia  with  

a   reference   to   at   least   two   of   the   possible   meanings   in   the   aforementioned   scale.    

More   specifically,   Sima   Tan   most   likely   used   the   term   to   refer   to   two   different  

strands   of   the   Fajia   tradition,   one   of   laws   beginning   with   the   Book  of  Lord  Shang  

and  one  of  methods  beginning  with  the  “Shen  Buhai  fragments”.83    

                                                                                                               
79  Creel  1974:  145  
80  Creel  1974:  145  
81  Creel  1974:  147  
82  Creel  1974:  148  
83  Creel  1974:  157;  Creel  wrote,  “The  difficulties  stem,  of  course,  from  translating  Fa-­‐chia  as  ‘legalist  

school.’    It  is  unfortunate—though  it  was  probably  inevitable,  for  reasons  we  shall  consider  later—
that  the  quite  different  and  in  some  respects  opposed  schools  of  Shang  Yang  and  Shen  Pu-­‐hai  
became  confused.    Unless  one  bears  carefully  in  mind  the  fact  that  the  Fa-­‐chia  consisted  of  these  two  
wings,  it  is  quite  impossible  to  understand  some  important  aspects  of  Chinese  history.    The  wing  of  

  18  
 Hansen   essentially   rejected   all   meaning   change   claims,   suggesting   that  

considering   the   character   fa   法   to   have   a   consistent   meaning   even   after   the  

appearance  of  Fajia  texts  is  more  useful.84  He  asserted  that  a  “consistent-­‐meaning  

approach   explains   Han   Feizi’s   crucial   doctrines   better   than   a   meaning-­‐change  

analysis  does.”85  In  other  words,  the  character  fa  法  did  not  experience  a  meaning-­‐

change   upon   the   appearance   of   Fajia   texts.     However,   could   it   be   possible   that,  

although   the   character   fa   法   in   the   Hanfeizi   or   other   Fajia   texts   would   best   be  

interpreted   as   law   or,   at   the   very   least,   a   very   different   kind   of   standard?     To  

adequately   consider   this   possibility,   Hansen   argued   that   such   a   meaning-­‐change  

claim   would   need   to   accomplish   two   things:   (1)   state   the   difference   in   use   of   the  

character   fa   法,   and   explain   how   it   could   not   have   been   a   possible   interpretation   in  

earlier  texts;  (2)  identify  and  explain  the  mechanism  that  caused  the  change  to  take  

place.86     This  study  will  argue  that  the  character  fa  法 does  experience  a  meaning  

change   upon   its   appearance   in   Fajia   texts.     It   represented   a   distinct,   structurally  

competitive  state  that  uniquely  reflected  the  changes  in  political  organization  that  

had  begun  to  occur  by  the  early  part  of  the  Warring  States  period.    Therefore,  this  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
the  Fa-­‐chia  that  stemmed  from  Shen  Pu-­‐hai  was  not  in  the  least  legalist—as  we  have  seen,  some  of  
its  members  were  strongly  anti-­‐legalist.    It  is  unfortunate  that  there  is  no  convenient  name  available  
by  which  it  may  be  called.    Perhaps  the  best  we  can  do  is  call  it  the  administrative  philosophy.    Of  
course,  even  the  legalists  believed  in  administration,  but  so  did  the  school  of  Shen  Pu-­‐hai  believe  in  
law.    The  distinction  comes  in  the  point  of  stress:  the  school  of  Shang  Yang  emphasized  law,  that  of  
Shen  Pu-­‐hai  emphasized  administrative  technique.    If  one  speaks  of  both  wings  together,  the  only  
suitable  term  is  Fa-­‐chia;  the  double  sense  of  fa  is  untranslateable.    If  one  speaks  of  a  ‘Legalist  school,’  
this  term  should  be  applied  to  the  legalist  wing  of  the  Fa-­‐chia,  and  to  that  alone.    The  Fa-­‐chia  is  not  
‘the  Legalist  school.’    Shen  Pu-­‐hai  was  not  a  ‘Legalist.’”  (Creel  1974:  161-­‐162)  
84  Hansen  1994:  435  
85  Hansen  1994:  436  
86  Hansen  1994:  447  

  19  
new  concept  indicated  a  new  vision  for  an  institutional  apparatus  meant  to  develop  

the  ruler’s  ideal  subjects  and  society.  

By   contrast,   Roger   Ames 87  has   argued   that   the   character   fa   法   did  

experience  a  meaning  change.  More  specifically,  he  stated:  “First,  the  vast  majority  

of  occurrences  of  the  character  fa  法  in  early  texts  indicate  that  prior  to  the  rise  of  

the  Legalist  tradition  the  character   fa  法  was  used  to  convey  the  meaning  of  ‘model  

or  standard.’    Only  well  into  the  Warring  States  period  when  the  Legalist  theorists  

had  taken  over  this  character  and  injected  it  with  their  own  meaning  did  it  come  to  

connote  ‘penal  law’.”88     So  upon  the  appearance  of  Fajia   texts,  it  was  no  longer  the  

case  that  the  “vast  majority  of  occurrences”  of  the  character  fa  法 primarily  meant  

standards.    Due  to  the  popularity  and  rise  of  Fajia  thought,  many  occurrences  of  the  

character  fa  法  did  come  to  “encompass  the  notion  of  penal  law.”89      He  primarily  

based   his   interpretation   of   the   Fajia  conception   of   penal   law   on   the   Book  of  Lord  

Shang   and   the   Hanfeizi,   adding   that   the   Hanfeizi     “takes   over   Shang   Yang’s  

conception  of  fa  almost  entirely  intact”,90  noting  that  Fajia  thinkers  were  advocates  

of   severe   punishment   so   that   the   common   people   understand   the   “necessary  

                                                                                                               
87  Represented  in  Roger  T.  Ames’s  “Fa  (Penal  Law)  法”  in  Ames,  Roger  T.  The  Art  of  Rulership  with  

awareness  with  his  (1991)  assertions.  

88  Ames  1983:  109;  In  a  later  work,  Ames  appeared  to  amend  the  claim  of  a  meaning  injection  with  a  

new  meaning  investment.    He  stated,  “That  is,  the  vast  majority  of  occurrences  of  fa  in  the  early  
literature  would  indicate  that  prior  to  the  rise  of  the  Fajia  tradition,  this  character  was  used  to  
convey  its  primary  meaning  of  “model”  or  “standard,”  and  only  well  into  the  Warring  States  period  
when  the  Fajia  theorists  had  taken  over  this  character  and  invested  it  with  their  own  significance  
did  it  come  to  denote  penal  law.”  (Ames  in  Ames,  Chan,  Ng  1991:  8)  
89  Ames  1983:  109  
90  Ames  1983:  131  

  20  
connection   between   crime   and   punishment.” 91  He   even   proposed   ten   main  

characteristics  of  the  Fajia  notion  of  penal  law  associated  with  this  view.92  

Graham   put   forth   his   own   meaning-­‐change   hypothesis,   indicating   an   even  

greater  degree  of  meaning  change.    He  also  admitted  that  the  character  fa  法  first  

appears  in  the  Canons  “as  the  standard  for  identifying  a  circle”.93  However,  in  Fajia  

texts,   he   states   the   character   fa   法   assumed   “a   specialized   sense   as   the   standards  

enforced  by  punishments,  so  laws.”94     He  elaborated,  noting,  “The  scope  of  fa  thus  

contracts  towards  what  in  Western  terms  is  “law”;  but  even  among  those  classed  as  

Legalists  it  can  include,  for  example,  methods  of  regulating  the  bureaucracy.”95     So  

in  other  words,  the  character  fa  法  came  to  specifically  refer  to  penal  law  to  a  much  

greater  degree,  while  also  referring  to  other  aspects  of  governance.      

Graham  also  characterized  Fajia  saying  “Legalism”  is  an  “amoral  science  of  

statecraft” 96  that   found   its   common   ground   “in   the   conviction   that   good  

government   depends,   not   as   Confucians   and   Mohists   supposed   on   the   worth   of  

persons,   but   on   the   functioning   of   sound   institutions.”97  In   other   words,   Fajia  

                                                                                                               
91  Ames  1983:  129  
92  (1)  A  good  ruler  can  never  be  effective  without  good  laws,  whereas  a  good  laws  can  be  effective  

without  a  good  ruler;  (2)  the  purpose  of  laws  and  punishments  are  intimidation  and  deterrence;  (3)  
laws  must  be  clear  and  easily  understood;  (4)  penal  laws,  “divested  of  moral  significance  and  
religious  sanction”,  replace  morality  and  are  the  “exclusive  standard  of  good”;  (5)  punishments  need  
not  fit  the  crime,  rather  severe  punishments  should  always  be  applied;  (6)  equality  before  the  law;  
(7)  the  ruler  is  above  the  law,  and  he  controls  the  laws  according  to  his  interests;  (8)  laws  must  be  
constantly  assessed  and  amended;  (9)  ideally,  society  will  reach  a  point  where  law  is  “universally  
understood  and  followed”  and  “litigations  cease  to  arise”;  (10)  there  is  an  assumed  tension  between  
individual  and  collective  interests,  or  public  vs.  private.  (Ames  1983:  131-­‐132)  As  the  fourth  
characteristic  indicates,  Ames,  agrees  with  Duyvendak  in  that  the  Fajia  notion  of  law  replaced  the  
Rujia  notion  of  ritual.  
93  Graham  1989:  273  
94  Graham  1989:  270  
95  Graham  1989:  275  
96  Graham  1989:  267  
97  Graham  1989:  268  

  21  
emphasizes   the   organizational   and   structural   concerns   of   the   institutions   of  

governments   rather   than   the   quality   of   personnel,   particularly   the   ruler,   unlike  

those   in   Rujia   or   Mohist   texts.     These   characterizations   do   seem   to   be   generally  

accurate.    Even  Arthur  Waley  expresses  similar  ideas  about  the  “Legalists”  view  of  

morality  stating,  “The  people  whom  I  call  the  Realists  are  called  in  Chinese  the  Fa  

Chia,   School   of   Law,   because   they   held   that   law   should   replace   morality.” 98    

However,   this   study   would   argue   that   a   focus   on   structural   or   institutional  

concerns  does  not  necessarily  constitute  amorality.    It  is  through  this  point  that  this  

study   will   propose   a   more   specific   characterization   of   Fajia   and   its   vision   for   law  

and  governance.  

  Meanwhile,   Schwartz   argued   for   the   meaning-­‐change   hypothesis,   but   in   a  

different   way.     He   expressed   doubt   about   the   notion   that   texts   before   the  

appearance   of   Fajia   texts,   used   the   character   fa   法   to   simply   refer   to   “standards”.  

He   argued   that   “it   still   remains   possible   that   in   its   original   meaning,   the   word   fa  

may   have   referred   to   penal   law   and   it   is   often   closely   associated   with   the   more  

specific  word  hsing,  undoubtedly  meaning  ‘punishment’  or  penal  law.”99  He  added  

that  the  etymology  of  xing  刑   reveals  an  original  meaning  “to  form”.    So  due  to  the  

close   relationship   between   the   characters   xing   and   fa,   he   argued   that   the   character  

fa   could   have   had   a   meaning   “referring   to   the   reshaping   of   behavior   brought   about  

by  the  application  of  penal  law.”100  While  Rujia  or  Mohist  uses  of  the  character  fa  do  

not  have  any  connotation  of  coercion  because  they  were  “standards  or  normative  
                                                                                                               
98  Waley  1939:  199;  Waley,  Arthur,  Three  Ways  of  Thought  in  Ancient  China.  London:  George  Allen  &  

Unwin  Ltd.,  1939.  

99  Schwartz  1985:  322  
100  Schwartz  1985:  322  

  22  
patterns   to   which   noble   men   conform   themselves”,101  “with   the   rise   of   Legalism,  

with   its   orientation   toward   the   forcible   imposition   not   only   of   penal   law   but   of  

institutional   models   of   all   sorts,   it   is   possible   that   the   coercive   connotation   of   the  

word  fa  is  very  much  reinforced.”102    Therefore,  Schwartz  insists  that  the  use  of  the  

character  fa  in  Fajia  texts  undergoes  a  notable  change  in  which  the  Fajia  emphasis  

on   coercion   causes   the   connotation   of   the   character   fa   to   change   from   being   a   non-­‐

coercive  pattern  with  which  to  conform  into  a  highly  coercive  penal  law.    However,  

Schwartz   appears   to   assume   that   the   only   source   of   coercion   associated   with   the  

Fajia  notion  of  law  is  the  application  of  punishment.  This  study  will  argue  that  the  

coercive   quality   of   the   systems   of   rewards   in   Fajia   texts   serves   as   much   clearer  

evidence  of  meaning  change.  

It   should   be   also   noted   that   Chen   Shengyong   has   asserted   that   the   character  

fa   experienced   a   meaning-­‐change.     However,   he   argued   that   the   most   significant  

change   did   not   occur   upon   the   appearance   of   Fajia   texts   but   much   earlier.     Prior   to  

the  Spring  and  Autumn  period,  Chen  holds  that  the  meaning  of  the  character  fa  was  

independent  from  the  notion  of  punishment  xing.    Upon  the  beginning  of  the  Spring  

and   Autumn   period,   he   explained   that   the   character   fa   began   to   become   more  

closely   associated   with   the   notion   of   punishment.     He   added   that   before   the  

disintegration   of   the   decentralized   fengjian   system   and   the   rise   of   Fajia   texts   and  

ideology,   the   character   fa   was   also   primarily   associated   with   the   Rujia   notion   of  

ritual  li  禮.    However,  by  the  late  Warring  States  period,  he  argued  that  the  meaning  

of   the   character   fa   had   become   much   more   independent   from   the   Rujia   notion   of  
                                                                                                               
101  Schwartz  1985:  322      
102  Schwartz  1985:  322-­‐323  

  23  
ritual.    So  Chen,  like  Ames,  saw  the  use  of  the  character  fa  in  the  Fajia  tradition  as  

unique   because   its   meaning   became   notably   narrower,   mainly   referring   to   the  

connection  between  law  and  punishment,  and  on  a  much  more  frequent  basis.    This  

is  in  contrast  to  a  broader  meaning  of  the  character  fa,  which  referred  to  legal  rules  

and   other   institutions,   seen   in   texts   like   the   Zuozhuan   and   the   Mozi.103     Chen   added  

that   the   older   meaning   of   the   character   fa   法   did   not   vanish   completely.     It   was  

preserved  in  texts  like  the  Xunzi  to  a  significant  degree.104  

Without   specifically   focusing   on   the   character   fa,   Liang   Zhiping   too  

explained  that  ancient  Chinese  law  did  experience  a  bit  of  change  in  emphasis.    He  

asserts   it   had   three   main   functions   from   its   inception   through   the   Western   Zhou  

dynasty:  to  be  the  orders  and  commands  of  the  ruler,  to  prohibit  malfeasance,  and  

be  the  basis  upon  which  those  who  followed  the  ruler  are  commended  while  those  

who  do  not  are  punished.105     He  argued  that  it  was  not  until  after  the  Qin  and  Han  

dynasties   that   laws   came   to   be   primarily   thought   of   as   codes   lü   律.     However,   he  

also   claims   that   although   the   conception   of   fa   in   the   early   Spring   and   Autumn  

period   was   initially   similar   to   earlier   forms,   by   the   end   of   the   Warring   States  

period,   references   to   law   came   to   represent   its   strong   association   with  

punishment.106     Liang   notes   that   this   shift   in   emphasis   was   largely   due   to   the  

influence   of   the   Fajia   tradition.     So   according   to   him,   the   very   notion   of   law  

undergoes   two   notable   shifts.     After   the   Xia,   Shang,   and   Western   Zhou   dynasties,  

law  went  from  being  expressed  through  state  punishment  and  the  character  xing  刑
                                                                                                               
103  Chen  2002:  53.  
104  Chen  2002:  53  
105  Liang  1997:  38  (originally  1986)    
106  Liang  1997:  42  (originally  1986)  

  24  
to  representing  more  than  simply  criminal  law  (but  certainly  included  it)  and  being  

referred  to  using  the  character  法.    By  the  end  of  the  Han  dynasty,  the  conception  of  

law   shifted   again   to   where   the   notion   of   codes   lü   律   became   its   common  

meaning.107     Though  Liang  does  note  throughout  these  shifts,  punishments  are  the  

one  factor  that  remained  at  the  core  of  ancient  Chinese  law.  

Duan  Qiuguan  pointed  out  that  too  much  of  the  analysis  on  ancient  Chinese  

law   excludes   many   factors   that   have   “legal   nature   and   function”   but   “are   not   called  

by  the  words  Xing,  Lü  and  Fa”.108     He  views  this  as  one  of  the  contributing  factors  

that   lead   to   “biased   views”   that   characterized   “ancient   Chinese   legal   concepts”   as    

“too   narrow   and   limited”.109     He   does   admit   that   the   meaning   of   the   character   fa   法  

was  often  the  equivalent  to  punishment  xing  刑  before  the  Warring  States  period.    

The   Mozi,  which   generally   dates   before   that   period,   illustrates   how   the   character   fa  

法  could  refer  to  other  concepts  besides  punishment  or  penal  law,  like  the  Mandate  

of  Heaven.    Duan  explained  that  the  Mozi’s  notion  of  law,  in  its  broad  sense,  would  

“take  the  ‘will  of  Heaven’  as  the  objective  criterion  to  determine  what  is  right  and  

wrong,  and  good  and  evil  as  the  highest  standard  to  measure  words  and  actions.”110    

Generally,  he  insists  that  ancient  China  “was  inclined  to  consider  that  there  was  an  

organic  unity  between  society  and  nature,  political  power  and  religious  authority,  

                                                                                                               
107  Liang  1997:  38-­‐39  (originally  1986)  
108  Duan  1991:  210  
109  Duan  1991:  210  
110  Duan  1991:  213  

  25  
human   beings,   gods   and   ghosts,   and   the   mandate   of   monarch   and   Heaven.     Social  

phenomena,  including  law,  were  never  viewed  in  isolation.”111  

According   to   Duan,   during   the   Warring   States   period,   the   character   fa   法  

became  an  opposing  concept  to  the  character  li  禮,  representing  a  rejection  of  “the  

aristocratic   hereditary   systems   of   enfeoffment”   while   upholding   a   “system   of  

prefectures  and  counties  under  a  centralized  state  power”.112    During  this  period,  fa  

had   a   few   of   its   own   meanings,   beyond   a   “norm   of   action”113:   it   was   “used   to  

express   a   ruling   way,   political   tactics,   or   a   school   of   thought”114,   having   both   a  

broad   sense,   referring   to   all   systems   within   the   state   (i.e.   legal,   economic,   and   even  

lifestyle),   and   a   narrow   sense,   implicating   punishment.115     Although   Duan   admits  

that  the  “later  generations”  of  the  Fajia  tradition  most  often  used  the  character  fa  

法   in   the   narrow   sense,   which   explained   why   they   became   known   as   the  

“penalizers”,   it   nevertheless   included   more   than   “modern   criminal   law”,   covering  

“parts   of   modern   administrative,   civil,   and   procedural   rules”.116     To   add   to   the  

above   insights,   this   study   will   show   that   the   most   unique   qualities   of   the   Fajia  

conception   of   law   are   not   found   in   the   expressed   attitude   towards   punishments.    

Rather,  Fajia’s  unprecedented  theorizing  about  rewards  provides  the  most  insight  

about  the  use  of  fa  法  in  Fajia  texts  and  the  notion  of  law  during  the  Warring  States  

period.  

 
                                                                                                               
111  Duan  1991:  212  
112  Duan  1991:  217  
113  Duan  1991:  215  
114  Duan  1991:  216  
115  Duan  1991:  216  
116  Duan  1991:  216  

  26  
Authorship  
 
However,   before   launching   into   a   discussion   of   the   Fajia   tradition   and   its  

texts,  it  is  important  to  be  clear  about  a  number  of  undeniably  complex  issues  that  

surround   such   an   exercise.     Since   no   text   is   ever   written   in   a   vacuum,   we   must  

reflect   on   several   critical   variables   in   play   when   we   take   on   the   reading   and  

interpreting  of  Warring  States  texts.    

The   philosophical   texts   that   are   the   focus   of   this   study   represent   scholarly  

or   intellectual   traditions.     These   traditions   were   actually   organized   around   the  

transmission  of  texts  consisting  of  records  of  a  master’s  sayings,  ideas,  or  activities,  

along  with  extended  writings  like  essays,  in  accordance  with  what  was  believed  to  

be   the   master’s   ideas   or   reforms.     Since   these   texts   were   transmitted   through   time,  

none  being  composed  from  start  to  finish  by  the  same  author  or  group  of  authors,  

their  authorship  is  extremely  difficult  to  trace  back  to  a  single  origin.    These  texts  

were  transmitted  and  edited  constantly  over  numerous  generations.    As  Kern  put  it,  

transmitted  texts  are  “the  result  of  multiple  layers  of  contestation”117.    

This  is  not  to  say  that  there  is  no  sense  of  authorship.    Rather,  the  notion  of  

authorship   in   ancient   China   is   about   the   production   of   texts,   involving   a   range   of  

figures   over   time   writing   fragments   or   chapters,   editing   (even   to   the   point   of  

adding   and/or   deleting   significant   fragments   or   chapters),   revising,   narrating,  

quoting   or   recycling   passages   from   other   texts,   and   compiling   many   textual  

passages  together.    Awareness  of  all  of  this  should  be  part  of  any  understanding  of  

the   authorship   of   ancient   Chinese   texts.     Therefore,   within   these   scholarly   lineages,  

                                                                                                               
117  Kern  2002:  150  

  27  
it  is  most  likely  that  most  texts  extant  today  actually  have  a  number  of  authors  or  

contributors.     In   the   case   of   the   philosophical   schools,   these   textual   lineages  

represent  a  collection  of  thought  based  on  a  selection  of  underlying  principles  that  

were  representative  of  the  master’s  ideas  or  reforms.    

Also,  many  of  these  philosophical  texts,  Fajia  texts  included,  were  products  

of   scholarly   traditions   that   did   not   even   have   formal   “schools”   or   institutions  

supporting  them.    Even  when  they  did,  in  the  case  of  the  Rujia  tradition,  there  were  

nevertheless   relatively   strong   disagreements   over   the   interpretations   of   earlier  

texts  or  their  master’s  sayings.    So,  over  time,  expressions  of  thought  believed  to  be  

based  on  the  master’s  ideas  or  reforms  not  only  reflected  very  different  times  and  

circumstances   within   which   the   contributors   composed   their   writings,   but   they  

also   exposed   significant   differences   of   interpretation   between   intellectual  

descendants.    This,  of  course,  is  illustrated  by  the  fact  that  almost  all  of  the  extant  

philosophical  texts  contain  blatantly  contradictory  statements.  

Thus  the  analysis  of  philosophical  texts,  even  those  that  have  only  recently  

been   excavated,   encounters   significant   questions   about   textual   origin   and  

formation,   due   to   the   variety   of   possibilities.118  Since   these   texts   came   together  

over  time,  it  is  difficult  to  determine  how  many  authors  could  have  contributed  to  
                                                                                                               
118  In  China,  there  has  been  a  strong  tradition  of  using  techniques  of  modern  textual  criticism  to  

carefully  examine  ancient  texts.    Unlike  the  assertions  of  Zhu  Xi  朱熹  (1130-­‐1200)  and  Wang  
Yangming 王陽明  (1472-­‐1529)  who  were  primarily  concerned  with  discovering  universal  truths  
through  the  emphasis  on  the  external  investigation  of  things  or  an  internal  self-­‐cultivation  
respectively,  a  new  intellectual  movement  began  to  dominate  academic  discourse  by  the  early  Qing  
dynasty.    This  practice,  known  as  as  evidential  learning  kaozheng  考證,  insisted  that  Rujia  
intellectual  discourse  and  the  study  of  classical  texts  should  emphasize  empirically-­‐based  learning  
and  inquiry.    One  particularly  important  aspect  of  evidential  learning  was  the  determination  of  
authenticity  and  the  reconstruction  of  classical  texts.;  See  Elman,  Benjamin  A.  From  Philosophy  to  
Philology:  Intellectual  and  Social  Aspects  of  Change  in  Late  Imperial  China.  Cambridge:  Council  on  
East  Asian  Studies,  1984.  

  28  
their   formation.     A   lack   of   clarity   about   authorship   brings   into   question   the   very  

existence  of  a  consistent  vision.    Additionally,  this  study  reads  chapters  pian  篇  as  

concerted   attempts   at   articulating   coherent   philosophical   positions,   regardless   of  

the   number   of   authors,   that   are   individual   parts   of   a   larger   whole,   consisting   of  

congruous  underlying  principles  that  create  a  consistent  vision.    In  fact,  there  have  

been   attempts   to   discover   the   origins   of   units  smaller   than   chapters   ce   冊.119     Thus,  

if  too  inflexibly  practiced,  the  principle  of  charity120  in  the  reading  of  philosophical  

texts  can  result  in  a  very  misguided  interpretation  of  the  underlying  principles  of  

respective   texts   and   very   inaccurate   conclusions   about   their   imagined   visions,   or  

lack  thereof.    For  instance,  the  chapter  “Policies”  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang  states,  

“When  the  prince  relies  on  others,  then  all  under  Heaven  will  abandon  him.    As  for  

the  prince  who  relies  on  himself,  he  is  able  to  obtain  all  under  Heaven.    As  for  one  

who   obtains   all   under   Heaven,   he   must   first   conquer   himself.     The   prince   that   is  

able  to  have  victory  over  enemy  states  must  first  achieve  victory  over  himself.”121    

If  this  passage  is  read  without  a  proper  context  and  understanding  of  the  Book  of  

Lord   Shang’s   underlying   principles,   this   passage   could   indicate   to   a   reader   or  

analyst   that   the   ideal   ruler   in   the   Book  of  Lord  Shang   must   necessarily   engage   in  

some   kind   of   self-­‐cultivation   or   develop   some   extraordinary   knowledge   of   self   in  

                                                                                                               
119  An  example  of  this  would  be  Maeder,  Erik.  W.  “Some  Observations  on  the  Composition  of  the  

‘Core  Chapters’  of  the  Mozi.”  Early  China,  vol.  17,  1992,  p.  27-­‐82.    In  this  article  Maeder  suggests  
reading  the  Mozi  “below  the  pian  level”  (Maeder  1992:  29),  instead  making  sense  of  it  “as  isolated  
slips  and  relatively  short  ce  冊  (“bound  sets  of  bamboo  slips”  of  a  size  corresponding  to  internally  
consistent  “paragraphs”  within  a  “chapter”)”  (Maeder  1992:  28),  would  actually  “introduce  us  into”  
its  “so-­‐called  ‘oral  tradition’”  (Maeder  1992:  29).  
120  The  principle  of  charity  essentially  refers  to  a  method  of  interpretation  in  which  the  reader  

consistently  understands  the  text  in  its  most  rational  and  therefore  “stongest”  possible  way.  
121  恃天下者，天下去之；自恃者，得天下。得天下者，先自得者也。能勝強敵者，先自勝者也。

(Gao  2011:  152);  See  Gao  Heng  高亨.  Shang  chün  shu  chu  商君書注譯,  Beijing  北京:  Zhong  hua  清華
大學出版社,  2011.  

  29  
order   to   produce   an   ideal   state.     As   this   study   will   show,   the   idea   that   the   ruler  

needs   to   “obtain”,   “conquer”,   or   “have   victory   over”   himself   refers   to   a   successful  

prevention   of   his   self-­‐interest,   biases,   or   subjectivity   interfering   with   an   objective  

administration  of  the  law.  

Nevertheless,   this   study   attempts   to   bring   to   light   a   limited   but   consistent  

vision   for   both   the   Book  of  Lord  Shang  and   other   texts   within   the   Fajia  tradition.  

However,   in   an   effort   to   respect   the   variance   of   ideas   within   the   texts   while   also  

articulating   its   consistent   vision,   it   diligently   traces   its   conclusions   back   to   the  

underlying   principles   that   it   views   as   explicitly   or   implicitly   expressed   consistently  

throughout   Fajia   texts.     Even   more   specifically,   it   focuses   on   the   Fajia   tradition   and  

how  its  notion  of  fa  reflects  this  consistent  vision.    Therefore,  the  consistent  vision  

that   it   depicts   is   limited   to   that   which   is   indispensable   in   characterizing   the  

conceptualization  of  law.    As  later  chapters  will  show,  this  is  a  unique  approach  to  

characterizing   the   distinct   shared   characteristics   between   the   texts   most   closely  

associated  with  the  Fajia  tradition.  

Methodology  and  Limitations  

 
Although   this   study   will   contrast   ideas   across   traditions   at   times,   it   will  

primarily   utilize   a   different   method   as   the   foundation   and   driving   force   of   its  

analysis;  that  is,  it  will  primarily,  and  most  thoroughly  analyze  the  text  that,  in  the  

view  of  this  author,  established  the  foundation  of  Fajia  doctrine—the  Book   of   Lord  

Shang.    Though  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang  presents  several  different  political  visions,  

this  study  reveals  a  set  of  significant  underlying  principles  at  the  very  foundation  of  

Book   of   Lord   Shang   that,   in   sum,   constitute   a   consistent   vision.     Based   on   the  

  30  
analysis  of  the  Book   of   Lord   Shang,  the  study  will  examine  the  degree  to  which  the  

observations   made   about   this   text   are   unique.     This   will   be   accomplished   in   two  

steps.     The   first   will   consist   of   analyzing   earlier   texts   that   generally   pre-­‐date   the  

Book  of  Lord  Shang.    This  will  be  performed  in  an  effort  to  determine  if  this  study’s  

observations  about  the  ideas  expressed  in  Book   of   Lord   Shang   are  actually  distinct  

from  those  expressed  in  earlier  texts  most  closely  associated  with  other  traditions.  

In   the   second   step,   subsequent   chapters   will   argue   for   recognizing   a   distinctly  

shared  set  of  characteristics  within  the  Fajia  political  vision.    In  the  course  of  this  

discussion,  other  Fajia  texts  will  be  analyzed  in  order  to  determine  whether  or  not  

their  visions  are  in  accordance  or  in  violation  of  the  hypothesized  characteristics.    It  

should   be   noted   that   this   methodology   does   not   consider   the   extant   Book  of  Lord  

Shang  to  be,  in  any  sense,  the  “true”  or  originally  authentic  source  text  for  all  Fajia  

thought.    Rather,  it  selects  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang  as  a  foundational  text  because  it  

is  often  dated  as  one  of  the  earliest  of  all  the  Fajia  texts  while  arguably  devoting  the  

most   attention   to   what   appears   to   be   the   foundational   element   in   all   extant   Fajia  

texts:  law  (fa  法).    

However,   this   methodology   is   certainly   not   without   its   own   limitations.     For  

instance,  it  is  mainly  concerned  with  the  political  vision  expressed  by  the  content  of  

specific   philosophical   texts.     In   other   words,   it   focuses   on   the   ideas   expressed   in  

selected  texts.    In  the  study  of  ancient  Chinese  texts,  this  methodological  approach  

has  serious  limitations  and  can  be  potentially  problematic  in  four  major  ways.  First,  

the   texts   of   focus   in   this   study   were   almost   certainly   products   of   a   larger   oral  

tradition.    The  degree  to  which  texts  actually  relate  to  or  represent  the  larger  oral  

  31  
tradition   is   not   always   clear.     So,   it   is   not   unimportant   to   ask   if   the   texts   were  

written   and   edited   to   be   independent  representations  of  thought  from  a  larger   oral  

tradition   or   if   they   were   written   in   such   a   way   that   an   accurate   interpretation   is  

impossible   without   knowing   some   specific   context   on   which   it   depended.     If   the  

latter   is   the   case,   then   to   what   extent   can   the   ideas   thoroughly   be   understood?  

Second,   this   study   does   not   explore   the   degree   to   which   the   process   of   writing  

impacted   or   influenced   how   the   thought   in   the   oral   tradition   was   presented.     Thus,  

it   does   not   concern   itself   with   whether   or   not   its   texts   of   focus   can   be   said   to   be  

adequate   representations   of   the   larger   oral   tradition.     That   larger   oral   tradition  

could  have  involved  more  concrete  thought  than  the  abstract  thought  in  the  written  

texts   imply.   It   is   possible   that   the   textual   traditions   only   represent   a   very   small  

sample  of  a  larger  tradition  of  thought.    Third,  a  focus  on  ideas  may  unfortunately  

neglect   important   language   and   structural   considerations.     Since   ancient   Chinese  

texts   should   be   considered   as   collections   of   writing   that   have   gone   through   a  

continual  process  of  reproduction  over  very  long  periods  of  time,  not  only  could  the  

meaning  of  ideas  be  affected  by  the  context  of  the  larger  oral  tradition  but  also  the  

degree   to   which   language   was   structurally   specific.     So,   if   these   texts   were  

rearranged   (i.e.   through   the   changing   of   the   chronology   of   chapters   or   even  

sentences   and   paragraphs)   or   even   reworded   (with   adding   or   subtracting  

language),   the   interpretations   of   ideas   a   reader   may   have   in   the   present-­‐day   may  

have   little   to   do   with   the   meaning   of   those   same   ideas   in   much   earlier   periods.    

Fourth,   one   should   not   ignore   the   possibility   that   future   archeological   finds   may  

prove   that   the   extant   versions   of   Fajia   philosophical   texts   were   not   the   only  

  32  
versions.    This  potential  textual  variance  could  significantly  affect  the  way  ideas  in  

the   currently   extant   versions   are   understood.     So   if   one   version   of   a   text   is  

considerably  different  from  another  version,  the  same  character  found  in  both  texts  

could  represent  very  divergent  concepts.      

These   aforementioned   issues   highlight   why   this   study’s   methodology   is  

limited  in  its  project  to  characterize  a  tradition.    However,  it  is  also  limited  because  

it  devotes  little  attention  to  the  specific  objects  on  which  characters  were  written,  

the  material  from  which  these  objects  were  made,  tools  with  which  the  characters  

were   written,   or   even   the   specific   social   or   even   political   function   of   the   writing  

itself  and  the  ideas  within  it  may  have  had.    All  of  the  above  factors  are  important  

elements  that  deepen  the  current  understanding  of  ancient  Chinese  texts,  even  the  

Warring  States  texts  of  focus  in  the  following  chapters.  

Indeed,   the   focus   on   ideas   in   philosophical   texts   has   led   some   scholars   to  

reject  such  a  methodology.122     This  study  certainly  agrees  that  a  methodology  that  

prioritizes   ideas   and   neglects   the   “practice   of   philosophizing” 123  can   certainly  

produce  flawed  conclusions.    However,  it  does  not  follow  that  the  prioritization  of  

ideas  should  be  entirely  rejected.    In  fact,  there  are  several  important  reasons  why  

it  is  still  of  great  value.    One  is  that  the  rejection  of  the  prioritization  of  ideas  comes  

close   to   taking   for   granted   the   degree   to   which   current   scholarship   has   achieved  

clarity  on  even  the  basic  ideas  in  texts.    For  instance,  this  study  will  argue  that  the  

current   understanding   of   one   of   the   most   basic   ideas   in   extant   Fajia   texts,   its  

                                                                                                               
122  See  Meyer,  Dirk.  Philosophy  on  Bamboo:  Texts  and  the  Production  of  Meaning  in  Early  China.  

Leiden:  Brill,  2012.  

123  Meyer  2012:  246  

  33  
conception   of   law,   can   be   more   comprehensive.     Also,   even   if   the   ideas   in   texts  

hardly  serve  as  comprehensive  reflections  of  the  larger  oral  traditions  with  which  

they   are   associated,   they   can   still   reflect   how   those   traditions   were   interpreted  

throughout  imperial  Chinese  history.    For  instance,  even  if  one  were  to  argue  that  

the  notion  of  fa  in  the  Fajia  tradition  was  a  relatively  less  important  idea  within  the  

larger   oral   tradition’s   thought,   it   has   been   interpreted   throughout   traditional  

Chinese  history  as  one  of  the  most  important  ideas.    Therefore,  an  examination  of  

the   notion   of   fa   and   even   tangentially-­‐related   ideas   in   Fajia   texts   can   provide  

insight   into   how   or   why   these   texts   have   been   interpreted   as   they   have   been  

throughout  traditional  Chinese  history.      

Perhaps   more   importantly   though,   considering   an   idea   as   a   mere   “piece   of  

thought  which  in  itself  is  insufficient  for  (re)constructing  a  coherent  philosophical  

edifice”124  is   a   potentially   risky   enterprise   in   itself.     As   this   study   will   attempt   to  

show,   ideas   that   may   appear   to   be   a   mere   piece   of   the   philosophical   puzzle   can  

significantly   impact   one’s   understanding   of   the   text’s   larger   political   vision.    

Further,   this   logic   can   be   extended   to   all   of   the   ideas   expressed   in   the   texts   in  

relation  to  the  larger  oral  tradition  with  which  they  are  associated.    The  ideas  in  the  

textual   tradition   may   appear   to   be   a   mere   piece   of   a   much   larger   puzzle,   but   this  

does   not   mean   that   they   do   not   have   crucially   important   implications   for   the  

understanding  of  the  larger  oral  tradition’s  thought.    Moreover,  this  point  is  related  

to   the   first   because   even   if   the   texts   present   a   mere   piece   of   the   puzzle,   it   is  

                                                                                                               
124  Meyer  2012:  1;  his  emphasis  

  34  
important   to   be   as   precise   and   accurate   about   said   piece   in   order   to   do   so   with   the  

larger  oral  tradition  as  well.    

It   is   also   important   to   question   why   the   usefulness   of   an   examination   of  

ideas   must   be   measured   by   the   degree   to   which   it   provides   insight   into   a   larger  

tradition.     Can   the   examination   of   ideas   not   provide   insight   into   other   historical  

phenomena?     For   instance,   this   study’s   analyses   of   Fajia   ideas   contributes   to   a  

larger  historical  narrative,  made  famous  by  Hsu  Cho-­‐yun,  that  roughly  argued  that  

ancient   China   underwent   a   transition   from   the   Spring   and   Autumn   period   to   the  

Warring   States   period,   in   which   “the   transition   of   an   individual   from   one   social  

stratum  to  another  was  easier”125.  

Finally,   a   focus   on   ideas   and   “analyzing   the   practice   of   philosophizing”   can  

both   be   enhanced   by   being   in   constant   dialogue   with   one   another.     On   the   one  

hand,   analyzing   the   “practice   of   philosophizing” 126  can   deepen   this   study’s  

interpretation  of  ideas  and  its  understanding  of  the  different  visions  imagined  in  its  

selected   texts.     On   the   other   hand,   this   study’s   prioritization   of   ideas   can   uncover  

important   trends   of   thought   and   even   meaning   changes   that   provide   insight   into  

the   larger   social   and   political   realities   of   their   time,   which   largely   defined   the  

“production,  use,  and  function  of  philosophical  texts”127  in  ancient  China.    

Summary  of  Contents  

 
In   an   effort   to   provide   adequate   context   to   its   analysis   of   Fajia   texts,   this  

study  will  start  by  describing  the  historical  context  within  which  the  Book  of  Lord  
                                                                                                               
125  Hsu  1965:  1;  See  Hsu  Cho-­‐yun.  Ancient  China  in  Transition:  An  Analysis  of  Social  Mobility,  722-­‐222  

B.C.  Stanford,  CA:  Stanford  University  Press,  1965.  

126  Meyer  2012:  246  
127  Meyer  2012:  245  

  35  
Shang  was  written.    Chapter  two  goes  well  beyond  providing  historical  context.    It  

also   examines   how   the   figure   Shang   Yang   has   been   depicted   in   the   different   textual  

traditions,   providing   greater   context   for   a   deeper   understanding   of   the   texts  

attributed  to  him.    This  will  not  only  illustrate  how  this  figure  was  conceptualized  

after   his   death,   but   it   will   also   provide   insight   into   the   parameters   of   debate  

between  the  intellectual  tradition  in  which  he  is  considered  an  early  master  and  the  

Rujia  tradition.    The  debate  between  these  two  traditions  is  particularly  important  

to   capture   in   order   to   highlight   the   historical   changes   and   continuities   Fajia   texts  

arguably  reflect  or  challenge.  

Chapter   three   will   begin   the   examination   of   the   general   approach   to  

governance   expressed   in   the   Book  of  Lord  Shang.     Though   the   Book  of  Lord  Shang  

can  generally  be  said  to  be  a  product  of  a  textual  tradition  devoted  to  the  thought  or  

reforms   of   a   master,   some   analysts   speculate   that   Shang   Yang   himself   may   have  

written   some   of   the   essays. 128     Regardless   of   the   specifics   of   authorship,   this  

chapter  will  present  what  it  views  as  the  most  important  underlying  principles  that  

all   of   the   different   essays   in   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang   share.     In   addition,   it   will  

expound   on   how   these   underlying   principles   interact   with   one   another   and   how  

they   relate   to   the   time   period   within   which   they   were   composed.     It   will   become  

clear   that   these   two   variables   were   crucial   driving   forces   behind   the   creation   of  

Fajia’s  distinct  political  vision.    

                                                                                                               
128  Appendices  I  and  II  provide  a  summary  of  the  Chinese  academic  debate  on  the  authenticity  of  the  

Book  of  Lord  Shang.    It  deals  with  the  most  pertinent  issues  related  to  each  chapter  in  the  Book  of  
Lord  Shang.    This  is  useful  because  the  Chinese  debate  on  authenticity  is  a  fruitful  source  of  
comparison  between  Shang  Yang,  his  reforms,  and  the  output  of  the  textual  tradition  devoted  to  him  
and  his  reforms.      
 

  36  
 This   exercise   will   provide   a   basis   for   the   analysis   in   chapter   four,   which  will  

focus   on   what   it   views   as   the   most   underrepresented   aspect   of   the   Book   of   Lord  

Shang’s   consistent   vision:   rewards.     More   specifically,   it   will   elaborate   further   on  

the  role  of  rewards  within  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang’s  larger  political  vision.    Despite  

their  lack  of  attention,  the  role  of  rewards  has  significant  implications  not  only  for  

how   the   thought   in   the   extant   version   of   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang   should   be  

interpreted,   but   also   how   the   changes   in   political   organization   in   the   Warring  

States  were  reflected  in  Fajia  and  other  textual  traditions.    

Chapter   five   and   six   will   situate   the   analysis   of   chapter   four   within   the  

context  of  other  traditions  and  extant  Fajia  texts  and  their  use  of  the  character  fa.    

More   specifically,   they   will   attempt   to   provide   insight   into   the   academic   debate  

about   the   significance   of   the   character   fa   in   Fajia   texts.     Chapter   five   will   briefly  

discuss   the   early   usage   and   meaning   of   the   character   fa   outside   of   the   Fajia  

tradition.     Chapter   six   will   illustrate   the   change   in   usage   and   meaning   of   the  

character   fa   in   Fajia   texts.     It   will   attempt   to   demonstrate   how   the   change   in   the  

character   fa   was   a   reflection   of   the   changes   in   the   larger   social   and   political  

organization  during  the  Warring  States  period.    Even  texts  that  are  not  traditionally  

considered   to   be   associated   with   the   Fajia   tradition   incorporated   this   new  

conception   of   law   into   their   own   political   visions,   representing   a   powerful  

intellectual  victory  for  its  pioneering  methods.      

Chapter  seven  will  attempt  to  use  a  social  science  theoretical  perspective  to  

begin   to   imagine   what   subjects   of   Fajia   may   have   actually   experienced:   Behavior  

Analysis.    Examining  a  Fajia  vision  with  a  modern  social  scientific  lens  will  reveal  

  37  
some  of  the  important  educational  and  psychological  variables  at  work  within  such  

an   environment.     In   accordance   with   the   preceding   chapters,   the   focus   will   be   on  

the   experience   of   those   subjected   to   Fajia’s   system   of   rewards.     However,   its  

culture   of   punishment,   which   is   in   some   ways   inseparable   from   the   system   of  

rewards,   will   also   be   discussed   in   order   to   provide   a   more   comprehensive   and  

detailed  analysis  of  Fajia’s  configuration  of  the  ideal  state.    

Chapter   eight   and   nine   will   both   illustrate   the   Book  of  Lord  Shang   and   the  

Fajia  traditions  theoretical  general  influence.    Chapter  eight  will  specifically   show  

how   subsequent   Rujia  texts   incorporated   a   key   Fajia   conviction   to   put   forth   their  

own  political  visions.    In  addition,  the  chapter  will  point  out  how  the  Fajia  approach  

to   governance   did   not   simply   reflect   changes   in   political   organization,   but   also  

introduced   ideas   that   enabled   the   change.   Chapter   nine   will   expound   on   how  

exactly   Fajia’s   political   vision   represents   a   significant   theoretical   contribution   to  

the   expansion   of   state   ritual   which   enabled   the   Chinese   church-­‐state.     It   will  

challenge   the   notion   that   the   Fajia   political   vision   lacked   religious   and   moral  

significance,  and  demonstrate  how  Fajia  thought  can  be  understood  within  Chinese  

religious  history.  

Chapter  ten  will  put  the  account  of  Fajia  thought  into  a  larger  context.    It  will  

briefly   explain   how   Fajia   thought   remains   relevant   in   understanding   governance  

today   and   how   it   had   such   historical   significance.   Additionally,   the   chapter   will  

mention   potential   topics   for   future   research.     Since   this   study   is   by   no   means   an  

exhaustive   analysis   of   the   extant   Fajia   texts   or   the   larger   Fajia   oral   tradition,   it   will  

point  out  some  topics  that  could  potentially  build  upon  its  findings.  

  38  
 All   of   these   chapters   intend   to   prove   both   the   uniqueness   of   Fajia   thought  

and  its  powerful  legacy  in  imperial  Chinese  history.    This  study  proposes  that  the  

character   fa   法   in   Fajia   texts   were   the   “standards   of   evaluation”   for   a   results-­‐

oriented   education,   administered   by   the   ruler.     Along   with   a   culture   of   merit   and  

the   reinforcement   of   rewards,   Fajia  law   created   a   culture   of   institution-­‐facilitated  

competition,   or   structural   competition   throughout   the   entire   state.     This   was   a  

distinct   form   of   pedagogy   designed   to   develop   the   state   through   the   interiorization  

of   culture,   or   the   state’s   differentiation   between   the   desirable   behavior   and   that  

which  is  not,  within  its  subjects.    The  Fajia  approach  to  governance  was  therefore  

not  amoral  or  anti-­‐morality.    Rather,  it  emphasized  the  structure  within  which  the  

appropriate  content,  given  the  times  and  circumstances,  can  be  proselytized.      

Appendix  I  and  II  provide  an  in-­‐depth  analysis  of  the  specific  issues  in  dating  

the  Book  of  Lord  Shang.    Appendix  I  focuses  on  the  important  voices  in  the  Chinese  

debate  seeking  to  systematically  determine  when  each  chapter  was  written.    This  

analysis  will  focus  on,  but  will  not  be  limited  to,  the  work  of  five  different  Chinese  

scholars:   Chen   Chi-­‐tien129,   Rong   Zhaozu130,   Gao   Heng131,   Cheng   Liang-­‐shu132,   and  

Zhang   Linxiang133.     It   is   important   to   understand   this   textual   debate   because   it  

                                                                                                               
129  Chen  Chi-­‐tien  (Chen  Qitian)陳啟天.  Shang  Yang  ping  zhuan  商鞅評傳.  Taibei  臺北:  Tai  wan  shang  

wu  yin  shu  guan  fa  xing  臺灣商務印書館,  1967.  

130  Rong  Zhaozu  容肇祖.  “Shangjunshu  kao  zheng”  商君書考證.  Yan  Jing  Xue  Bao  燕京學報,  vol.  21,  

1937,  p.  61-­‐118.    

131  Gao  Heng  高亨.  Shang  chün  shu  chu  商君書注譯,  Beijing  北京:  Zhong  hua  清華大學出版社,  2011.  

132  Cheng  Liang-­‐shu  (Zheng  Liangshu)  鄭良樹.  Shang  Yang  ji  qi  xue  pai  商鞅及其學派.  Taibei  台北:  

Taiwan  xue  sheng  shu  ju  臺灣學生書局,  1987.  

133  Zhang  Linxiang  張林祥.  Shangjunshu  de  cheng  wei  yu  si  xiang  yan  jiu  商君書的成為與思想研究,  

Shanghai  上海:  Ren  Min  Chu  Ban  She  人民出版社,  2008.    Zhang  Linxiang  describes  the  other  four  
works  of  focus  in  this  study  as  the  works  that  with  the  most  achievement.  最有成績的  (Zhang  2008:  
67)  

  39  
provides   crucial   guidance   for   how   the   Book   of   Lord  Shang   should   be   interpreted.    

For  instance,  the  second  chapter  of  the  Book   of   Lord   Shang,  “An  Order  to  Cultivate  

Waste   Lands”,   is   considered   to   be   the   earliest   and   the   most   likely   to   have   been  

written  by  Shang  Yang  himself.    Therefore,  any  attempt  to  comprehensively  present  

the   Book   of   Lord   Shang’s   political   vision   that   is   not   consistent   with   the   thought  

expressed   in   this   chapter   deserves   suspicion.     This   does   not   mean   that   this   chapter  

should  necessarily  be  the  standard  by  which  the  authenticity  of  all  other  chapters  

should   be   evaluated.     However,   if   shared   underlying   principles   are   to   be   accurately  

identified,   then   “An   Order   to   Cultivate   Waste   Lands”   is   the   best   starting   point   for  

our  journey  through  a  deceptively  complex  political  vision.      

In   order   to   adequately   comprehend   the   textual   references   to   the   Book   of  

Lord  Shang  and   other   key   texts   with   which   it   shares   common   language   or   similar  

assertions   about   history,   Appendix   II   provides   translations   of   relevant   classical  

Chinese  passages  into  English.    In  each  discussion  about  the  dating  of  a  particular  

chapter,   Appendix   I   provides   footnotes   that   direct   the   reader   to   the   specific  

passages  being  referenced.    Therefore,  sometimes  passages  from  other  chapters  in  

the   Book   of   Lord   Shang   or   other   texts   may   be   included   in   the   list   of   translated  

passages  under  a  different  chapter’s  heading.    Appendix  II  follows  the  debate  and  

its   textual   references.     This   is   why   chapters   ten,   eleven,   and   twelve   are   grouped  

together  in  one  heading  and  why  only  chapters  one,  five,  eight,  seventeen,  eighteen,  

and   twenty-­‐three   through   twenty-­‐six   in   Appendix   II   do   not   include   passages  

outside   of   the   corresponding   chapter.     This   organizational   choice   is   solely   for   the  

  40  
reader’s   convenience,   allowing   an   easier   comparison   and   contrast   of   the   relevant  

classical  Chinese  passages  in  English.      

Since  Appendix  II  is  meant  to  accompany  the  debate  described  in  Appendix  

I,  the  reader  may  notice  that  Appendix  II  lacks  translations  for  chapters  “An  Order  

to   Cultivate   Wastelands”,   “The   Method   of   Warfare”,   “The   Cultivation   of   Political  

Assessment”,   “Within   Borders”,   and   “External   and   Internal   Affairs”   in   the   Book  of  

Lord  Shang.134    “An  Order  to  Cultivate  Waste  Lands”  translations  are  not  included  in  

Appendix  II  for  two  reasons.    The  first  is  that  there  is  strong  unanimity  about  the  

dating  and  importance  of  this  chapter.    Therefore,  there  is  very  little  disagreement  

on  which  to  elaborate.    Moreover,  chapter  three  of  this  study  provides  an  in-­‐depth  

analysis  and  translation  of  several  passages  from  both  “An  Order  to  Cultivate  Waste  

Lands”   and   “The   Cultivation   of   Political   Assessment”.     “The   Method   of   Warfare”,  

“The   Cultivation   of   Political   Assessment”,   “Within   Borders”,   and   “External   and  

Internal   Affairs”   all   have   translations   that   are   included   in   the   Appendix   I  

discussions  about  their  dating.    

Finally,   this   study   also   notes   that   these   translations   serve   more   than   one  

objective.    In  addition  to  enhancing  our  understanding  of  the  Book   of   Lord   Shang’s  

textual  issues,  Appendix  II’s  translations,  combined  with  the  translations  provided  

throughout   chapters   one   through   ten,   provide   a   substantial   portion   of   an   up-­‐to-­‐

date   English   translation.     The   last   published   complete   English   translation   of   the  

Book  of  Lord  Shang  was  in  1928,  authored  by  J.J.L  Duyvendak.  

                                                                                                               
134  It  should  also  be  pointed  out  that  chapters  sixteen  and  twenty-­‐one  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang  are  

no  longer  extant.    Therefore,  this  study  is  also  unable  to  include  translations  of  their  contents  as  
well.  

  41  
    

  42  
 Chapter  II  
   
Historical  and  Textual  Clues    
 
This   chapter   provides   both   historical   and   textual   clues   with   which   to  

understand  the  strong  advocacy  for  particular  ideas  in  the  Book   of   Lord   Shang  and  

other   Fajia   texts.     During   the   period   within   which   Fajia   rose   to   prominence,   the  

Eastern   Zhou   dynasty   (771   B.C.   -­‐   221   B.C.)   was   already   experiencing   a   significant  

change   in   political   organization.     From   a   historical   perspective,   Hsu   cho-­‐yun   and  

Mark   Edward   Lewis   have   done   the   most   extensive   work   that   focuses   on   the   key  

changes   during   the   Eastern   Zhou   period.     This   study   reads   the   Eastern   Zhou  

philosophical  texts  within  this  context.    In  other  words,  different  textual  traditions  

represent   different   responses   to   this   change.     Therefore   this   chapter   will   analyze  

critical  accounts  of  Shang  Yang  and  the  state  of  Qin  in  order  to  begin  to  shed  light  

on   important   aspects   of   the   Fajia   political   vision,   along   with   highlighting   the  

differences  between  it  and  Rujia  thought  on  governance.      

Ultimately   mining   the   early   critical   accounts   in   the   Shiji,   Xunzi,   and   the  

Hanfeizi   is   useful   because   all   three   texts   play   notable   roles   in   the   textual   debate  

over   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang’s   authenticity.     This   is   because,   if   their   general  

perception  of  Shang  Yang  and  his  policies  are  considered  accurate,  then  they  can  be  

taken  as  a  standard  for  determining  each  chapter’s  authorship,  whether  it  be  Shang  

Yang,  a  close  disciple,  or  otherwise.    Even  if  there  are  distortions  in  depicting  Shang  

Yang  and  his  policies,  they  can  still  provide  insight  into  both  how  Shang  Yang  was  

generally   thought   of   in   time   periods   much   closer   to   his   lifetime.     If   the   Book  of  Lord  

  42  
Shang  is  pseudepigraphical,  having  several  different  authors,  then  various  chapters  

may   not   be   consistent   with   others.     Therefore,   a   look   at   how   Shang   Yang   and   his  

policies  are  represented  in  other  texts  can  act  as  a  standard  that  reveals  the  degree  

to   which   an   author   in   the  Book  of  Lord  Shang   was   familiar   with   the   general   view   of  

Shang   Yang   and   his   policies,   demonstrating   the   disparity   between   how   Shang  

Yang’s  policies  were  generally  viewed  and  the  ideas  expressed  in  the  Book   of   Lord  

Shang.    Regardless  of  which  purpose  is  served,  the  information  contained  in  these  

three  texts,  among  others,  is  important  in  order  to  comprehensively  understand  the  

intellectual  vision(s)  presented  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang.      

Moreover,  specifically  in  the  case  of  the  Shiji  and  the  Xunzi,  examining  how  

Shang  Yang  is  represented  in  texts  that  are  most  associated  with  other  schools  of  

thought   can   bring   us   to   appreciate   the   general   vision   of   the   intellectual   tradition  

within   which   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang   is   most   commonly   associated:   the   Fajia  

tradition.   Understanding,   the   points   of   disagreement   between   the   Fajia  and   Rujia  

traditions   provides   a   foundation   for   identifying   the   value   system   on   which   many   of  

the  arguments  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang  and  other  Fajia  texts  are  based.      Likewise,  

the  depiction  of  Shang  Yang  and  his  policies  in  the  texts  most  commonly  associated  

with   the   Fajia   tradition,   such   as   the   Hanfeizi,   will   offer   additional   insight   into   the  

diversity   of   ideas   within   the   Fajia   tradition   while   also   beginning   to   provide   clues  

about  their  general  vision.      

The   methodology   in   this   chapter   combines   a   close   reading   of   four   ancient  

texts   with   historical   context   produced   by   Hsu   and   Lewis   to   provide   a   foundation  

upon   which   detailed   analysis   of   Fajia   texts   themselves   will   rest.   Although   the  

  43  
biased  Rujia  perspective  on  many  in  the  textual  accounts  is  noted,  the  chapter  also  

includes   the   prominent   Neo-­‐Confucian   scholar   Wang   Bangxiong’s   assessment   of  

the   Hanfeizi   and   Fajia   thought.         Despite   his   ultimate   philosophical   allegiances,  

Wang’s   analysis   of   the   Hanfeizi   represents   a   concerted   effort   to   demonstrate   the  

valuable   aspects   of   the   Hanfeizi’s   philosophy,   especially   its   conception   of   law.     This  

will   provide   a   more   balanced   assessment   of   the   Fajia   tradition   from   a  

contemporary  Rujia  perspective,  while  also  illustrating  how  his  position  still  allows  

some  aspects  of  the  classical  Rujia  bias  to  continue.    

Transition  in  the  Eastern  Zhou  

 
In   the   Spring   and   Autumn   period,   the   “rank”   within   ruling   families   was  

heavily   based   on   familial   ties.     Hsu   cho-­‐yun   explained   that   within   the   Zhou  

decentralized   fengjian   封建   system,   the   Son   of   Heaven   was   the   head   of   the   royal  

court,  the  religious  and  political  focal  point  for  the  entire  realm.    The  Son  of  Heaven  

was   also   the   ultimate   authority   for   political   appointments.     In   fact,   political  

appointments   were   generally   bestowed   on   the   basis   of   an   individual’s   proximity   to  

the  ruler  in  the  familial  bloodline.    Therefore,  Dukes  gong  公,  along  with  other  titles  

like   Marquis   hou   侯,   Earl   bo   伯,   Viscount   zi   子,   and   Baron   nan   男,   were   often   the  

paternal  or  maternal  uncles  of  the  Son  of  Heaven.        

Dukes   were   the   lords   or   nominal   heads   of   fiefs,   assigned   to   them   by   the   Son  

of  Heaven.    Though  it  should  be  noted  that  the  fiefs  assigned  to  dukes  did  not  make  

up  all  of  the  territory  of  the  realm.    The  Son  of  Heaven  did  in  fact  control  some  of  

his   realm’s   territory   himself.     The   bestowal   of   fiefs   on   dukes   was,   at   its   core,   a  

highly  practical  decision.    Rather  than  attempting  to  directly  control  all  of  his  realm,  

  44  
the   Son   of   Heaven   would   bestow   fiefs   on   dukes   (family   members)   to   essentially  

represent  the  royal  family’s  claim  and  control  over  locales  furthest  from  the  royal  

court.    As  a  result,  these  dukes  acted  as  “rulers”  over  their  assigned  fiefs.      

Second,   the   position   of   Chancellor   zaixiang   宰相   was   bestowed   on   a   brother  

or   elder   son   of   the   ruler,   the   closest   to   the   ruler   in   the   familial   bloodline.     The  

chancellor   was   the   leader   of   the   Son   of   Heaven’s   administration,   particularly   active  

in   the   state’s   most   important   political   affairs,   such   as   military   and   diplomatic  

missions,  and  in  determining  succession.    This  was  a  position  that  was  often  kept  

by   its   recipient   for   life.     Third,   the   position   of   minister   chen   臣,   along   with   other  

titles  like  Chief  Ministers  qing  卿  and  Grand  Masters  daifu  大夫,  was  subordinate  to  

the  position  of  duke.  Ministers  were  typically  enfeoffed  as  well,  though  usually  not  

on   the   same   scale   as   dukes.     Therefore   ministers   often   established   their   own   noble  

houses,   controlling   territory   assigned   to   them   by   either   the   Son   of   Heaven   or   a  

duke.     The   position   of   minister   for   the   Son   of   Heaven   was   frequently   bestowed  

upon   his   brothers   or   younger   sons.     The   position   of   minister   for   dukes   was   often  

given  to  the  sons  of  the  enfeoffed  duke.135      

Chief   ministers,   often   a   son   of   a   duke,   acted   as   the   chief   administrator   of   the  

fiefs,  usually  representing  the  strongest  noble  house.    As  for  the  position  of  Grand  

Master,  it  was  frequently  bestowed  upon  other  sons  of  the  duke  and  younger  sons  

of   Chief   Ministers.   The   younger   sons   of   Grand   Masters   were   usually   assigned   the  

positions   of   Knight   shi   士,   the   lowest   rank   within   the   noble   class,   who   served  

ministers  the  same  way  ministers  served  dukes.    Since  they  were  still  members  of  
                                                                                                               
135  Hsu  1965:  3-­‐5  

  45  
the   noble   class   and   often   had   some   notable   bloodline   connection   to   the   Son   of  

Heaven,   knights   did   participate   in   rituals,   sacrifices,   and   were   usually   quite  

educated.136  They   served   noble   houses   by   acting   as   landlords,   minor   government  

officials,  or  administrators  of  large  estates  or  fief-­‐towns.137    

  However,   over   time   the   royal   court   was   unable   to   maintain   this   fengjian  

system   based   on   familial   ties.     Its   attention   was   too   often   devoted   to   checking  

geopolitical   threats   from   the   western   frontiers,   while   dukes   were   increasingly  

preoccupied   with   maintaining   stability   within   their   own   respective   fiefs   rose   in  

prominence   to   a   more   significant   extent   because   they   became   the   actual   chief  

administrators,  leading  armies  and  having  much  more  intimate  knowledge  of  state  

resources  and  personnel  than  the  dukes  they  served.    In  his  examination  of  about  

five   hundred   and   sixteen   historical   figures   mentioned   in   both   the   Zuo  Zhuan  and  

the  History  of  the  Former  Han  Dynasty,  Hsu  pointed  out  that  “fewer  and  fewer  sons  

of  rulers  held  important  positions  in  government  as  time  went  on”138.    He  further  

notes   that   in   an   earlier   period,   what   he   terms   the   “first   stage”139  (722-­‐693   B.C.)   of  

the   Spring   and   Autumn   period,   “the   son   or   brother   of   a   ruler   might   perform   the  

most  significant  political  functions,  such  as  serving  the  ruler  as  chancellor,  leading  a  

military  expedition,  representing  the  state  on  diplomatic  missions  or  deciding  the  

success   to   the   throne”.140     However,   by   the   end   of   what   Hsu   identifies   as   the  

                                                                                                               
136  The  term  “educated”  here  refers  to  the  typical  military  training  all  noble  men  received  during  

this  time.    This  included  military  tactics,  martial  skills,  chariot  coordination,  archery,  and  hunting.  
(Lewis  1990:  105-­‐106);  See  Lewis,  Mark  Edward.  Sanctioned  Violence  in  Early  China.  Albany,  NY:  
State  University  of  New  York  Press,  1990.  
137  Hsu  1965:  7-­‐8  
138  Hsu  1965:  31  
139  Hsu  1965:  31  
140  Hsu  1965:  26  

  46  
“seventh   stage”   (542-­‐513   B.C.),   with   one   exception,   “no   ruler’s   son   served   as  

chancellor…and  no  new  noble  families  of  political  influence  were  founded  by  sons  

of   rulers   who   reigned”.141     He   concluded,   “It   seems   clear   that   sons   of   rulers   became  

less   active   as   time   went   on,   which   is   to   say   that   the   center   of   political   activity  

shifted  toward  the  ministerial  class”.142     Since  a  minister’s  primary  allegiance  was  

to   his   duke,   the   relationships   between   fiefs   quickly   began   to   unravel,   becoming  

more  and  more  contentious.      

Interestingly  though,  the  ministers  of  respective  fiefs  eventually  suffered  the  

same  significant  loss  of  power  and  influence  as  the  dukes  they  served.    The  rise  in  

power   of   the   ministers   sparked   intense   competition   between   different   noble  

houses  within  fiefs  for  influence  and  resources.    Therefore,  the  subordinates  of  the  

ministers,   the   knights,   became   vitally   important   to   any   noble   house’s   success  

because   they   had   the   most   intimate   relationship   with   the   skilled   among   the   non-­‐

noble   classes.     It   was   both   the   knights,   who   were   often   highly   skilled   militarily,   and  

the   skilled   amongst   the   non-­‐noble   classes   that   truly   determined   the   strength   and  

capabilities  of  each  respective  noble  house.    No  noble  house  was  able  to  survive  if  

another   noble   house   was   perceived   as   being   more   popular   or   a   more   gracious  

patron  and  ally.    In  fact,  Hsu  also  mentioned  that  after  the  “fourth  and  fifth  stages”  

(632-­‐573  B.C.)  of  the  Spring  and  Autumn  period,  the  “proportion  of  active  ministers”  

remains   relatively   high,   but   the   percentage   of   total   ministers   mentioned   declined  

noticeably,  indicating  a  sharp  decline  in  the  importance  of  less  active  ministers.143    

                                                                                                               
141  Hsu  1965:  31  
142  Hsu  1965:  31  
143  Hsu  1965:  32  

  47  
After   the   fourth   stage,   references   to   knight   status   figures   begin   to   increase.     Hsu  

asserted   that   the   “clear   decline   of   the   ministerial   class   during   the   very   period   of  

increasing  shih  activity  suggests  at  least  a  partial  shift  of  the  center  of  power  from  

the   ministers   to   the   shih”.144     The   knights   and   the   skilled   among   the   non-­‐noble  

classes  were  vital  to  any  noble  house’s  ability  to  compete  for  influence.  Over  time,  

the  competition  between  fiefs  and  noble  houses  resulted  in  the  destruction  of  this  

political  system,  giving  rise  to  a  new  political  structure:  the  state.      

Mark   Edward   Lewis   showed   that   the   collapse   of   the   Zhou   lineage   system,  

and   the   political   reorganization   that   followed,   can   be   even   more   specifically  

described.     In   the   Spring   and   Autumn   period,   “ritually   coded   acts   of   violence”  

through  “sacrifice,  warfare,  and  hunting”  separated  the  hereditary  elite  from  those  

outside   of   the   noble   bloodline. 145     The   ritually   coded   acts   of   violence   were  

unmistakably  linked  to  the  worship  of  ancestors.    It  was  believed  that  those  of  the  

noble  bloodline  were  endowed  with  a  special  charisma  or  power  de  德.    Offerings  at  

the   altars   of   ancestral   temples   were   even   thought   to   be   an   actual   feeding   of   the  

spirits   of   a   noble   man’s   ancestors.146     Thus,   an   individual   outside   of   the   noble  

bloodline   was   thought   to   necessarily   lack   the   special   charisma   or   power   because  

they  lacked  noble  ancestry  in  their  bloodline.    

The   political   organization   of   the   Spring   and   Autumn   period   reflected   the  

important  ancestral  distinction  between  the  elite,  or  those  who  participated  in  the  

rituals   of   ancestral   worship,   and   the   non-­‐elite,   those   who   could   not   participate   in  

                                                                                                               
144  Hsu  1965:  37  
145  Lewis  1990:  7-­‐8  
146  Lewis  1990:  17  

  48  
the   rituals   of   ancestral   worship.     The   various   ranks   of   King   or   Son   of   Heaven,   Duke,  

Minister,   and   so   forth   were   reflections   of   the   privilege   of   the   individual   in   ritual  

performance.    In  other  words,  the  closer  an  individual  was  to  the  Son  of  Heaven,  the  

greater   his   ritual   privilege   and   the   higher   his   status   was   likely   to   be   in   the   political  

organization.    Though  the  Son  of  Heaven  was  considered  to  be  the  individual  with  

the   most   authority,   the   political   organization   of   the   decentralized   fengjian   system  

caused  a  ritual  segmentation  of  sorts.    Though  the  Son  of  Heaven  was  the  nominal  

head  of  all  the  territory  in  the  middle  kingdom,  once  a  duke  was  enfeoffed,  he  was  

considered  the  ultimate  authority  of  his  territory.    Therefore,  each  fief  had  its  own  

ancestral  temple,  with  its  own  Earth  Gods  to  serve  through  sacrifices  and  rituals.      

This   ritualistic   pyramidic   structure   continued   even   further   within   fiefs.    

Dukes   would   enfeoff   their   ministers   who   would   be   considered   ultimate   authorities  

of   their   smaller   territories   within   their   duke’s   fief.     Within   these   smaller   fiefs,  

ancestral  temples  and  Earth  Gods  were  served  through  sacrifices  and  rituals.    This  

“lineage   segmentation” 147  led   to   a   fragmentation   of   authority   in   which   each  

enfeoffed  individual  had  his  own  ancestral  temples  and  armies  to  honor  and  defend  

them.     Put   another   way,   the   geographical   fragmentation   allowed   for   more   enclosed  

ritualistic  segments  within  the  Zhou  lineage,  leading  to  an  increased  estrangement  

over  time  from  the  nominal  supreme  authority,  the  Son  of  Heaven  himself.    This  is  

one   of   the   most   powerful   reasons   behind   the   aforementioned   power   shifts   from  

king  to  dukes,  then  from  dukes  to  ministers.    

                                                                                                               
147  Lewis  1990:  28  

  49  
 There  are  four  more  important  aspects  to  this  story  that  should  be  pointed  

out.    First,  in  spite  of  the  ritual  and  power  fragmentation,  Lewis  argued  that  even  

the   character   shi   士   had   a   broader   use   during   this   time,   “as   a   generic   term   for  

nobleman”148 .      Lewis  added  that  “various  stories  tell  of  nobles  who  upbraided  the  

ruler   in   public   and   spat   on   him   without   being   reprimanded   or   punished…”149     It  

should   also   not   be   surprising   that   such   behavior   was   would   be   theoretically  

impossible  without  reproach  for  those  outside  of  the  noble  bloodline.    That  is,  the  

common   people   did   not   have   the   same   entitlement   as   those   within   the   noble  

bloodline,   who   could   publicly   offend   or   shame   their   ruler.     Second,   unlike   those  

whose  rank  or  status  was  expressed  within  ritual  performance  in  the  ancestral  cult,  

those  outside  of  the  noble  bloodline  were   primarily  identified  by  their  occupations,  

mainly   consisting   of   mainly   merchants,   artisans,   and   peasants.     Interestingly  

though,   those   within   these   occupations   shared   a   notable   similarity   with   those   of  

the  noble  bloodlines  in  so  far  as  these  occupations  were  hereditary,  passed  down  

through  the  generations  or  a  given  family.    

Finally,  by  the  later  part  of  the  Spring  and  Autumn  period,  blood  covenants  

meng  盟  “came  to  play  the  key  role  in  forming  alliances  between  several  lineages,  

between   lineages   and   alien   states,   and   between   the   various   contestants   for  

supremacy   in   the   state   and   the   capital   populace”150.     These   covenants   were   not  

ordinary  oaths  used  to  solidify  terms  of  an  agreement.    In  accordance  with  the  basic  

format   of   ritual   among   those   of   the   noble   bloodline,   they   involved   the   sacrificing   of  

                                                                                                               
148  Lewis  1990:  32  
149  Lewis  1990:  33  
150  Lewis  1990:  44  

  50  
an   animal   followed   by   the   imbibing   of   its   blood,   with   ancestors   and   earth   gods  

serving  as  witnesses.    Therefore,  they  were  not  exactly  contracts  but  rather  ritually  

based  oaths  sworn  by  all  parties  involved  to  honor  the  rules  or  terms  of  behavior  

prescribed.     It   was   the   ultimate   form   of   a   binding   agreement   because   to   violate  

these   oaths   would   be   to   dishonor   ancestors,   earth   gods,   and   spirits   that   were  

thought  to  preside  over  them.  

As   is   well   known,   by   the   Warring   States   period151,   political   culture   and  

organization   underwent   significant   changes.     After   the   interlineage   conflicts   that  

resulted   in   the   formation   of   separate   independent   states,   frequent   warfare   became  

the  norm.    Success  in  warfare  required  that  the  state  place  even  more  importance  

on   the   merit   and   skills   of   individuals   they   employ.     This   meant   that   the   applicant  

pool  needed  to  be  expanded.    Hsu  pointed  out  that  “after  464  B.C.  most  historical  

figures   were   self-­‐made   men   who   rose   from   obscurity”,   not   necessarily   from   any  

noble  background.152     Thus,  he  notes,  “there  was  more  mobility  between  classes  at  

the   beginning   of   Chan   Kuo   times”.153     In   accordance   with   this   new   characteristic  

becoming   so   prominent   in   the   Warring   States   period,   Hsu   highlights   three   main  

differences   between   the   Spring   and   Autumn   and   Warring   States   periods.     In   the  

Warring   States   era,   terms   of   service   in   government   offices   were   no   longer   “for   a  

definite  period  nor  for  life”.154     Warring  States  “chancellors  were  people  of  widely  

                                                                                                               
151  Although  this  chapter  will  continue  to  mainly  rely  on  Hsu  and  Lewis’s  accounts  on  the  Warring  

State  transition,  different  perspectives  on  the  Warring  States  transition  during  the  Eastern  Zhou  
period  can  be  found  in  Yang  Kuan  楊寬.  Zhanguo  shi  戰國史.  Shanghai  上海:  Shanghai  ren  min  chu  
ban  she  上海人民出版社,  2003.  and  Li  Xueqin.  Eastern  Zhou  and  Qin  civilizations.  K.C.  Chang,  trans.  
New  Haven:  Yale  Univeristy  Press,  1985.  
152  Hsu  1965:  37  
153  Hsu  1965:  38  
154  Hsu  1965:  51  

  51  
varied   origins”.155     This   is   notable   because   since   many   of   the   important   officers  

during   this   time   were   “career   statesmen”   or   even   “princes   of   states   other   than  

those   they   served”,   the   political   climate   was   characterized   less   by   “deep-­‐seated  

ties”   to   a   single   state   and   more   by   shifting   allegiances.156     Also,   “chancellorships”  

were  typically  given  to  “the  closer  relatives  of  the  ruling  house  or  to  persons  who  

did   not   belong   to   any   big   family,   indicating   “there   was   an   essential   change   in   the  

social   structure   itself”   that   ushered   in   corresponding   changes   in   “political   and  

economic  institutions  and  ideologies”.157  

Although  shifting  allegiances  may  have  become  more  prominent  during  the  

Warring   States   period,   states   still   insisted   on   ritual   practice   being   situated   at   the  

very   foundation   of   political   organization   and   affairs.   As   a   result,   one   of   the   most  

important   changes   was   one   made   to   the   aforementioned   blood   covenants.     Lewis  

explained   that   these   covenants   became   bonds,   oaths   that   had   an   emphasis   on  

intent  more  than  sacrifice  and  they  were  used  much  more  frequently  to  reinforce  

hierarchical  or  vertical  relationships  than  horizontal  ones.158    In  other  words,  these  

oaths   were   often   used   to   bind   those   seeking   employment   within   a   state   to   their  

ruler  or  superior.    For  instance,  in  “Summary  of  Ritual  Part  II”,  the  Liji  states,  “When  

there   is   a   binding   to   mutual   faith,   it   is   called   ‘a   solemn   declaration’”.159     Lewis  

explains  that  the  compound  yuexin  約信,  to  establish  good  faith  or  mutual  trust,  is  
                                                                                                               
155  Hsu  1965:  51  
156  Hsu  1965:  51-­‐52  
157  Hsu  1965:  52  
158  Lewis  1990:  67  
159  Legge  in  Chai  and  Chai  1967:  112;  See  Chai  Chu  and  Winberg  Chai,  ed.  Li  Chi:  Book  of  Rites,  An  

Encyclopedia  of  Ancient  Ceremonial  Usages,  Religious  Creeds,  and  Social  Institutions.  James  Legge,  
trans.  (vol.  1  &  2)  New  Hyde  Park,  N.Y.:  University  Books,  1967.;  約信曰誓，蒞牲曰盟。(Lau  and  
Chen  1992:  2.15/9/4-­‐5);  See  Lau,  D.C.  and  Chen  Fong  Ching,  ed.  A  Concordance  to  the  Liji.  Hong  
Kong:  The  Commercial  Press,  1992.

  52  
an   example   of   how   the   conception   of   bonds   gradually   came   “to   signify   any  

deliberate   creation   of   links   between   men   or   objects”,   extending   the   conception   of  

bonds  to  apply  to  all  forms  of  social  relationships.160      

Therefore,   the   degree   to   which   subjects   were   of   the   relevant   familial  

bloodline   of   a   state   became   far   less   important   than   it   had   once   been.     What  

increasingly   important   was   their   allegiance   to   their   ruler   and   the   state   that  

recognized  them.    Perhaps  the  most  notable  change  was  the  expansion  of  the  state  

militaries   to   include   an   expanded   portion   of   the   state   population.     During   the  

Spring  and  Autumn  period,  warfare  was  mainly  a  noble  warrior  obligation.    Since  

the   engagement   of   warfare   was   often   in   defense   or   in   honor   of   ancestors,   armies  

were  mainly  comprised  of  knights  shi  士  battling  on  chariots.    During  the  Warring  

States  period,  in  an  effort  to  cost-­‐effectively  increase  the  size  of  armies  as  much  as  

possible,   there   was   a   notable   rise   in   the   use   of   infantry   armies   or   armies   on   foot,  

consisting  of  mostly  commoners,  rather  than  chariot.      

One   of   the   most   influential   reformist   figures   engaged   in   expanding   a   state  

military  was  Shang  Yang  商鞅  or  Wei  Yang  衛鞅 (c.  390   B.C.  -­‐  338   B.C.)  in  the  state  of  

Qin.     He   is   a   key   historical   figure   whose   reforms   represent   a   response   to   the  

changes  in  political  organization.    He  directed  his  policy  efforts  toward  mobilizing  

the  state  for  warfare  and  strengthening  the  state’s  armed  forces.  According  to  the  

Shiji,  Gongsun  Yang  公孫鞅,  also  known  as  Shang  Yang  商鞅  or  Wei  Yang  衛鞅 (d.  

338   B.C.)   was   born   into   a   noble   family   of   the   small   state   of     Wei   衛.     He   rose   to  

prominence  not  in  Wei,  but  in  the  western  state  of  Qin  秦,  where  he  is  believed  to  
                                                                                                               
160  Lewis  1990:  70-­‐71  

  53  
have   moved   around   361   B.C..     When   he   arrived,   he   supposedly   was   carrying   with  

him  a  copy  of  the  Classic  of  Law  Fajing  法經,  an  early  Chinese  legal  code  considered  

to   have   been   compiled   by   Li   Kui   李愧,   a   minister   of   the   state   of   Wei   魏   around  400  

B.C.    Shang  Yang  eventually  earned  a  high  position  in  the  Qin  state,  under  the  reign  

of   Duke   Xiao   of   Qin   (r.   361-­‐338   B.C.)   and   instituted   a   series   of   wide-­‐ranging   reforms  

to   promote   state   control,   centralization   of   power,   and   economic   and   military  

expansion.     These   reforms,   implemented   over   an   eighteen-­‐year   period,  

transformed   Qin   into   a   formidable   military   power.     As   a   reward   for   his  

accomplishments,   Shang   Yang   is   believed   to   have   been   enfeoffed   as   Lord   Shang  

around  340  B.C.161      

As  chancellor  of  the  state  of  Qin,  Shang  Yang  established  an  unprecedented  

degree   of   systematic   military   recruitment.     He   extended   the   prefectural   system,  

establishing   more   prefectures   xian   縣,   a   collection   of   towns   xiang   鄉,   districts   yi   邑,  

and   villages   ju   聚,   that   acted   as   the   administrative   centers   ultimately   responsible  

for   managing   local   governance   on   behalf   of   the   state   government.     This   was  

particularly  significant  because  it  further  centralized  the  state  government’s  reach,  

allowing   it   to   more   effectively   collect   taxes   and   monitor   its   populace.     Second,  

Shang   Yang   implemented   the   yuan   tian   爰田   or   轅田   system,   land   reforms   that  

established   the   vertical   qian   (every   one   thousand   mou   畝)   and   horizontal   mo  

                                                                                                               
161  See  Sima  Qian  司馬遷.  Shi  ji  (di  si  ce)  史記第四冊.  China  中國:  Shang  hai  qun  xue  she  上海群學社,  

1931.  and;  See  also  Sima  Qian.  The  Grand  Scribes  Records:  The  Memoirs  of  Pre-­‐Han  China  (vol.  7).  
William  H.  Nienhauser  Jr.,  ed.  and  Tsai-­‐fa  Cheng,  Lu  Zongli,  William  H.  Nienhauser,  Jr.,  Robert  
Reynolds,  and  Chiu-­‐ming  Chan,  trans.  Bloomington:  Indiana  University  Press,  1994.  

  54  
(every  one  hundred  mou  畝)  network  of  pathways  that  formed  a  rectangular  grid  

all  across  the  state  of  Qin.162      

Under  Shang  Yang’s  land  reforms,  land  could  be  privately  owned.    This  was  

significant   because   under   previous   land   reforms,   though   land   was   owned   by  

lineages,   not   all   of   it   was   used   because   land   was   not   cultivated   for   the   sake   of  

wealth   creation,   but   rather   to   produce   enough   income   for   noble   activities,   warfare,  

hunting,   ritual   performance   and   so   forth.     Lineages   would   rent   land   to   peasant  

farmers  so  that  the  farmers  could  to  sustain  themselves.  In  exchange,  the  peasant  

farmers   would   produce   crops   for   the   lineages   as   a   form   of   rent.     However,   with   the  

lineages   no   longer   having   claim   to   their   former   fiefs,   the   fact   that   land   could   be  

bought  and  sold  incentivized  all  farmers  and  landowners  to  cultivate  as  much  land  

as  possible  to  create  wealth  for  themselves.    In  addition,  Shang  Yang  established  a  

head   tax   fu   賦   in   addition   to   a   tax   on   the   production   of   crops   shui  稅;   previously  

dukes   and   kings   had   taxed   their   fiefs   based   on   the   production   of   crops.163     These  

land   reforms   were   important   for   the   expansion   of   the   Qin   military   because   it  

significantly  increased  the  tax  base  upon  which  the  state  could  extract  wealth.    This  

wealth   could   then   be   used   to   fund   military   campaigns.     Lewis   explained,   “Each  

family  received  land  of  a  size  that  a  single  adult  male  could  work.    By  distributing  

land  in  this  way,  the  state  kept  the  maximum  acreage  in  cultivation  and  made  the  

highest  possible  number  of  adult  males  eligible  for  military  service  and  taxes.    Since  
                                                                                                               
162  Yang  Kuan  in  Li  1977:  58-­‐59;  For  more  biographical  information  on  Shang  Yang,  see  Cheng  

Laing-­‐shu  (Zheng  Liangshu)  鄭良樹.  Shang  Yang  ping  zhuan  商鞅評傳.  Nanjing  南京:  Nanjing  da  xue  
chu  ban  she  南京大學出版社,  1998.;  For  an  account  focused  almost  entirely  on  his  reforms,  see  Yang  
Kuan  楊寬.  Shang  Yang  bian  fa  商鞅變法.  Shanghai  上海:  Shanghai  ren  min  chu  ban  she  上海人民出
版社,  1973.  
163  Yang  Kuan  in  Li  1977:  60-­‐61  

  55  
those  who  earned  high  rank  on  the  twenty-­‐point  scale  received  additional  land  and  

servants,  the  systematic  partition  of  the  land  provided  a  fixed  unit  for  standardized  

rewards”.164     So,   Shang   Yang’s   new   methods   of   state   taxation   not   only   increased  

military  personnel  and  funding,  but  also  formed  the  very  foundation  of  the  state  of  

Qin’s  system  of  rewards  or  recognition  of  the  ruler’s  subjects.      

Shang   Yang’s   reforms   reflected   another   important   change   during   the  

Warring   States   period,   one   in   which   the   household   became   the   basic   unit   of  

political   organization   rather   than   the   territories   of   the   noble   bloodlines.     So,   with  

the   expansion   of   military   service   and   the   household   becoming   the   basic   unit   of  

political   organization,   military   and   civil   organization   became   similarly   structured.    

As   for   the   civil   organization,   Shang   Yang   established   a   household   registry   that  

divided   the   entire   populace   in   the   state   of   Qin   into   groups   of   five,   which   not   only  

served   as   the   basis   for   military   recruitment   but   also   as   a   mutual   surveillance  

system.     Each   male   of   a   certain   age   was   obligated   to   provide   military   service   to   the  

state  and  every  unit  was  responsible  for  ensuring  that  there  was  no  violation  of  this  

law  or  any  others.165    As  a  result,  the  terms  upon  which  households  and  individuals  

were  judged  also  changed  significantly.    Lewis  also  noted:    

Shang   Yang’s   policies   established   a   uniform   administration   for   the  

entire   population,   based   on   military   service.     His   five-­‐man   squads  
were   responsible   for   enforcement   of   laws   within   their   own   units   and  
for   the   performance   of   their   units   in   battle.     Identification   of   the  
social   order   with   the   army   was   strengthened   through   a   system   of  
ranks  imposed  throughout  the  population…Anyone  who  gained  merit  
in   battle   by   slaying   enemies   or   commanding   victorious   units   was  
rewarded  with  promotion  in  a  twenty-­‐rank  hierarchy…The  hierarchy  
of   military   merit   fixed   by   these   ranks   was   intended   to   be   the   only  
                                                                                                               
164  Lewis  2007:  33  
165  Lewis  2007:  32-­‐34  

  56  
 measure  of  honor  and  distinction  in  Qin  society.    All  social  status  was  
a   direct   reflection   of   military   performance.     Even   members   of   the  
royal  family  depended  upon  merit  earned  through  military  service  to  
maintain  their  elite  status.166    
 
In   short,   individuals   and   their   status   depended   upon   military   merit   rather   than  

noble  bloodlines.      

Of  course,  as  Lewis  noted,  all  states  were  not  organized  like  the  state  of  Qin  

during   the   Warring   States   period.     Nevertheless,   generally,   a   state   consisted   of   a  

ruler  at  the  center,  who  oversaw  a  bureaucratic  structure  in  which  he  could  bring  

in   and   dismiss   ministers   and   more   minor   officials   at   will.     In   the   new   hyper-­‐

competitive  and  hyper-­‐bellicose  political  environment,  those  of  the  knight  class,  as  

the  most  experienced  and  well-­‐trained  group  of  warriors  and  officials,  were  in  even  

greater  demand  because  the  most  sought  after  subordinates  needed  to  be  men  with  

useful,   practical   abilities.     They   had   to   have   skills   in   the   military   and   agricultural  

realms,  and  be  effective  managers  that  would  enable  a  state  to  gain  a  competitive  

advantage.     It   should   come   as   no   surpise   then,   that   the   concept   of   nobility   also  

changed   significantly   during   this   time.     Due   to   the   contributions   of   figures   like  

Confucius,   Mo   Di,   Mencius,   and   Shang   Yang,   the   focus   of   the   concept   of   nobility  

came   less   to   be   on   familial   bloodlines   than   on   qualifications   for   supporting   the  

state.167     As   the   concept   of   nobility   and   the   political   climate   significantly   changes  

during  the  Warring  States  transition,  it  is  important  to  examine  in  detail  how  this  

was  reflected  in  the  time  period’s  philosophical  thought.    Shang  Yang  in  particular  

                                                                                                               
166  Lewis  2007:  32-­‐33;  See  Lewis,  Mark  Edward.  The  Early  Chinese  Empires:  Qin  and  Han.  Cambridge:  

Harvard  University  Press,  2007.  

167  For  more  basic  information  on  Shang  Yang’reforms,  see  Yang  Kuan  楊寬.  Shang  Yang  bian  fa  商鞅

變法.  Shanghai  上海:  Shanghai  ren  min  chu  ban  she  上海人民出版社,  1973.;  See  also  Li  Yuning,  ed.  
Shang  Yang’s  Reforms  and  State  Control  in  China.  White  Plains,  NY:  M.E.  Sharpe  Inc.,  1977.  

  57  
inspired  one  of  the  earlier  textual  traditions  that  expounded  on  how  to  build  a  state  

and   shape   society   in   order   to   most   effectively   respond   to   these   new   times   and  

circumstances.  

Textual  Criticism  of  Shang  Yang  and  Qin  

 
Before   an   examination   of   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang,   the   extant   product   of   a  

Shang   Yang   inspired   textual   tradition,   this   chapter   will   investigate   some   textual  

criticism   of   Shang   Yang   and   the   state   of   Qin   in   later   texts,   namely   the   Shiji,   the  

Xunzi,  and  the  Hanfeizi.    This  is  not  to  say  that  these  three  texts  necessarily  present  

historically   accurate   information   about   Shang   Yang   and   his   policies.     As   it   will   be  

shown,   these   texts   have   different   intellectual   objectives.     Hence,   they   present  

related   matters   in   very   different   ways.     Nevertheless,   understanding   how   the  

historical  figure  Shang  Yang  and  his  policies  were  viewed  in  these  three  texts  can  

provide  clues  about  what  made  Shang  Yang’s  reforms  and  the  ideas  associated  with  

his  textual  tradition  distinct.    

Authored   by   Sima   Tan   and   Sima   Qian,   two   Rujia   historians   the   Shiji168  

certainly   writes   Shang   Yang’s   biography   with   strong   classical   Confucian   bias.    

Nevertheless,   it   quickly   becomes   clear   that   Shang   Yang’s   legacy   includes   several  

different   aspects.     In   “Biography   of   Lord   Shang”,   the   earliest   account   of   Shang  

Yang’s  life,  the  Shiji  states:    

The   ordinances   having   been   drafted,   they   were   still   not   issued.  
[Yang]   feared   that   the   people   would   not   trust   him.     He   erected   a  
three-­‐chang   pole   at   the   south   gate   of   the   capital’s   market   and  
advertised  for  men  able  to  move  [the  pole]  and  set  it  up  at  the  north  
gate.     He   offered   ten   chin.     The   commoners   wondered   at   it,   and   no  
                                                                                                               
168  The  Shiji  is  one  of  the  earliest  ancient  histories  of  China,  co-­‐authored  by  Sima  Tan  and  Sima  Qian,  

that  was  completed  around  the  early  second  centrury  during  the  Han  dynasty.  

  58  
 one   dared   move   it.     Once   more   [Yang]   said,   ‘Fifty   chin   to   the   one   who  
can  move  it.”    A  man  moved  it,  and  [Yang]  immediately  gave  fifty  chin  
to   show   that   he   was   not   deceiving   them.     Finally,   he   issued   the  
ordinances.169    
   
It   is   clear   that   Shang   Yang   is   very   closely   associated   with   reforms   and   decrees.    

Even   more   importantly   though,   at   the   very   foundation   of   his   reforms   or   decrees  

was  the  notion  of  establishing  good  faith  and  mutual  trust  xin  信.    This  undoubtedly  

has  some  relation  to  the  notion  of  bonds  or  oaths,  written  texts  that  served  as  “the  

basis   of   codified,   written   law”170,   during   the   Warring   States   period.     Thus,   Shang  

Yang,   to   some   degree,   may   have   had   a   notion   of   commands,   decrees,   and   laws   as  

representations  of  the  bond  or  oath  between  a  ruler  and  his  subjects.      

Second,  the  means  by  which  Shang  Yang  achieved  the  establishment  of  good  

faith   and   mutual   trust   was   through   the   contingent   bestowal   of   a   reward,   the  

bestowal   of   a   reward   only   under   particular   circumstances.     In   this   case,   it   is  

explicitly   in   response   to   compliance   to   a   command   or   request.     This   contingent  

bestowal   was   specifically   designed   to   demonstrate   that   the   people   would   not   be  

cheated.     This   is   important   because   it   has   some   relation   to   another   historical  

phenomenon  occurring  during  the  Warring  States  period,  that  of  the  emphasis  on  

rewards   and   recognition.     As   the   aforementioned   bonds   or   oaths   were   so   often  

applied  in  hierarchical  or  vertical  relationships,  the  bonds  often  involved  a  formal  

exchange:  service  for  reward  or,  more  generally,  total  devotion  for  recognition.    In  

                                                                                                               
169  Nienhauser  1994:  90;  令既具，未布，恐民之不信，已乃立三丈之木於國都市南門，募民有能徙

置北門者，予十金。民怪之，莫敢徙。復曰「能徙者予五十金」。有一人徙之；輒予，五十金，
以明不欺。卒下令。(Sima  1931:  48);  See  Sima  Qian  司馬遷.  Shi  ji  (di  si  ce)  史記第四冊.  China  中國:  
Shang  hai  qun  xue  she  上海群學社,  1931.  
170  Lewis  1990:  68;  Recall  that  the  character  xin  信 in  its  broader  philosophical  meaning  Lewis  

explains  that  it  is  expressed  by  the  compound  yue  xin  約信.

  59  
other   words,   subordinates   would   agree   to   provide   a   service   or   even   be   totally  

devoted   to   their   superior   on   the   condition   that   they   be   rewarded   or   recognized.    

Lewis  explained,  this  new  form  of  bond  or  oath  even  led  to  the  creation  of  a  new  

elite   that   actually   celebrated   fidelity   or   utter   devotion   to   “whoever   ‘recognized  

them’  (zhi  ji  知己)”  171.      

In   the   case   of   the   aforementioned   Shiji   story,   Shang   Yang,   on   behalf   of   the  

ruler  of  the  state  of  Qin,  contingently  bestowed  a  reward  in  order  to  demonstrate  

the  moral  force  and  vigor  behind  the  bond  between  a  Qin  subject  and  the  ruler.    It  

demonstrated  that  if  a  Qin  subject  provides  a  service  or  is  totally  devoted  to  the  Qin  

state,  they  will  be  rewarded  and  recognized  handsomely.    Specifically,  the  man  in  

the   story   was   rewarded   with   gold   jin   金.    Thus  upon  this  demonstration  of  moral  

force  and  vigor,  or  fidelity  to  the  terms  of  a  bond  or  oath,  commands  to  promulgate  

new  reforms  were  sent  down  because  Shang  Yang  knew  that  the  reforms  would  at  

this  point  be  effective,  as  he  had  established  good  faith  and  mutual  trust  between  

the  ruler  and  his  subjects  in  demonstrating  that  they  would  not  be  cheated.      

Another   important   aspect   of   Shang   Yang’s   representation   in   the   Shiji  

involves  punishment.    For  instance,  in  “Biography  of  Lord  Shang”,  the  recluse  Zhao  

Liang  趙良  precedes  his  criticism  of  Lord  Shang  stating,  “If  your  Lordship  does  not  

find   fault   with   King   Wu,   I   ask   permission   to   speak   directly   all   day   without  

punishment;  may  I  do  so?”172     This  passage  could  definitely  be  an  example  of  Rujia  

partiality  in  Sima  Qian’s  biography.    Nevertheless,  it  does  illustrate  the  other  side  of  

                                                                                                               
171  Lewis  1990:  77  
172  Nienhauser  1994:  93;  君若不非武王乎？則仆請終日正言而無誅，可乎？(Sima  1931:  48)  

  60  
the   contingent   quality   with   which   Shang   Yang   is   depicted   as   having   enforced   his  

laws   and   decrees.     In   the   passage,   the   recluse   Zhao   Liang   was   clearly   aware   of   a  

connection   between   speaking   frankly   zhengyan   正言   or   without   restraint   to   a  

powerful  lord  and  being  put  to  death  zhu  誅.    Therefore,  the  bond  at  the  foundation  

of   Shang   Yang’s   laws   did   not   simply   involve   an   agreement   in   which   the   subjects  

serve   their   ruler   in   exchange   for   recognition.     It   also   included   an   agreement   in  

which  subjects  will  be  subjected  to  harsh  punishment  upon  violation  of  their  oath.    

Though  this  undoubtedly  speaks  to  the  harshness  and  brutality  with  which  Shang  

Yang  likely  enforced  his  laws,  it  also  suggests  the  severity  with  which  Shang  Yang  

viewed   a   violation   of   the   bond   or   oath   between   a   ruler   and   his   subjects.     After  

receiving   a   promise   that   he   could   speak   frankly   without   punishment,   the   recluse  

Zhao  Liang  continued  his  criticism  of  Shang  Yang:    

Now  when  Your  Lordship  gained  an  audience  with  the  King  of  Ch’in,  
it   was   through   his   favorite   Ching   Chien,   who   you   took   as   patron;   this  
is   not   how   fame   is   won.     After   you   became   Prime   Minister   of   Ch’in,  
you   did   not   concern   yourself   with   the   families   of   the   hundred  
cognomens,   but   constructed   promulgation   towers   on   a   grand   scale;  
this  is  not  how  merit  is  earned.    You  inflicted  mutilation  and  tattooing  
on   the   Heir’s   mentor   and   preceptor,   and   crippled   and   wounded   the  
commoners   with   savage   punishments;   this   is   accumulating  
resentment   and   storing   up   calamities.     Moral   instructions’   influence  
on   commoners   is   more   profound   than   decrees,   and   the   commoners  
imitation   of   their   superiors   is   swifter   than   ordinances.     Now   in  
addition,   you   establish   [yourself]   by   improper   means,   My   Lord,   and  
change  orders  as  soon  as  they  come  out;  this  is  not  how  instruction  is  
given.    Furthermore,  you  face  south  and  call  yourself  the  lonely  one,  
My   Lord,   daily   binding   the   Noble   Scions   of   Ch’in.     The   Odes   says,  
‘Look  at  the  rat—it  has  limbs;  Yet  this  man  does  not  have  propriety.    
Yet  this  man  does  not  have  propriety,  Why  does  he  not  quickly  die?’    
Judging  from  the  ode,  this  is  not  how  a  long  life  is  secured…The  Odes  
says:   ‘One   who   wins   over   the   people   prospers,   One   who   loses   the  
people   falls.     These   several   actions   are   not   how   the   people   are   won  
over’…  The  Documents   says:  ‘One  who  relies  on  virtue  prospers,  One  

  61  
 who  relies  on  force  perishes.’  My  Lord  is  as  insecure  as  the  morning  
dew;   do   you   still   hope   to   extend   your   years   and   prolong   you   life?    
Then  why  not  return  your  fifteen  towns,  tend  gardens  in  the  suburbs,  
and   advise   the   King   of   Ch’in   to   exalt   the   men   of   cliffs   and   caves,  
nourish   the   aged,   preserve   the   orphaned,   respect   his   elders,   rank   the  
meritorious,   and   honor   the   virtuous;   thus   you   may   gain   some  
peace...173  
     
The  obvious  Rujia  prejudices  aside,   we  can  still  get  a  sense  from  this  passage  of  the  

Rujia   historian   Sima   Qian’s   points   of   disagreement   with   the   person   he   depicts   as  

the   historical   figure   Lord   Shang:   how   merit   should   be   defined,   the   methods   the  

ideal  ruler  should  rely  on,  and  the  sanctity  of  nobility.      

First,   he   claims   that   it   was   favoritism   that   earned   Shang   Yang   an   audience  

with  Duke  Xiao  of  Qin  in  the  first  place.    In  addition,  he  views  Shang  Yang  as  having  

not  actually  been  a  man  of  merit.    This  interestingly  shows  that  Sima  Qian,  via  the  

recluse   Zhao   Liang,   viewed   merit   as   an   important   basis   on   which   a   ruler   should  

employ  his  subjects  and  a  subject  on  which  the  ruler  should  be  judged.    However,  

his,   seemingly   Rujia-­‐based   perspective   does   not   necessarily   take   issue   with   all  

forms   of   merit,   rather   it   takes   issue   with   what   is   viewed   as   Shang   Yang’s   definition  

of  merit.    The  notion  of  merit  advocated  in  the  above  passage  is  one  that  is  based  in  

virtue  de  德.    Sima  Qian  later  adds  further  critique  in  his  biography  when  he  depicts  

                                                                                                               
173  Nienhauser  1994:  94-­‐95;  今君之見秦王也，因嬖人景監以為主，非所以為名也。相秦不以百姓

為事，而大筑冀闕，非所以為功也。刑黥太子之師傅，殘傷民以駿刑，是積怨畜禍也。教之化民
也深於命，民之效上也捷於令。今君又左建外易，非所以為教也。君又南面而稱寡人，日繩秦之
貴公子。詩曰：相鼠有體，人而無禮，人而無禮，何不遄死。以詩觀之，非所以為壽也。。。詩
曰：得人者興，失人者崩。』此數事者，非所以得人也。。。書曰：恃德者昌，恃力者亡。君之
危若朝露，尚將欲延年益壽乎？則何不歸十五都，灌園於鄙，勸秦王顯巖穴之士，養老存孤，敬
父兄，序有功，尊有德，可以少安。。。商君弗從。(Sima  1931:  50-­‐51)  

  62  
Shang   Yang’s   demise   as   being   at   least   partly   a   result   of   his   own   laws   and   their  

contingent  reinforcement174  stating:    

The   Lord   of   Shang   did   not   heed   his   advice.     Five   months   later   (338  
B.C.),   Duke   Hsiao   of   Ch’in   expired   and   his   Heir   was   enthroned.     The  
Noble  Scion  Ch’ien’s  followers  accused  Lord  of  Shang  of  intending  to  
rebel,   and   [the   duke]   dispatched   functionaries   to   arrest   the   Lord   of  
Shang.    The  Lord  of  Shang  fled  to  the  foot  of  the  Pass.    He  sought  to  
lodge   in   the   traveler’s   lodge.     The   owner   of   the   traveler’s   lodge   did  
not   know   he   was   the   Lord   of   Shang:   “According   to   the   laws   of   the  
Lord  of  Shang,  one  who  puts  up  a  person  without  identification  will  
be  prosecuted  for  it.”    The  Lord  of  Shang  heaved  a  sigh  and  said,  “alas,  
that  the  disadvantages  of  making  laws  should  come  to  this!”175    
   
The   Shiji   clearly   warns   that   an   ideal   ruler   should   not   rely   on   laws   to   the  

degree  that  Shang  Yang  advocated.  

Second,   the   “Biography   of   Lord   Shang”   judges   what   is   presented   as   Shang  

Yang’s   excessive   reliance   on   laws   and   decrees,   along   with   their   contingent  

reinforcement,  to  be  a  less  effective  method  of  developing  the  ruler’s  subjects  than  

the   Rujia   approach.     The   recluse   Zhao   Liang   juxtaposes   Shang   Yang’s   style   of  

governance,   giving   commands,   with   teaching   and   transformation   jiaohua   教化,   a  

method  of  development  advocated  in  texts  most  associated  with  the  Rujia  tradition.    

It  is  clear  that  both  of  these  methods  seek  to  “develop”  their  subjects  because  there  

is   an   implicit   aim   to   manipulate   the   ruler’s   subjects   to   act   differently   than   they  

would   if   left   to   their   own   devices;   and   this   new   kind   of   social   behavior   and  

performance  of  state  duties  was  considered  more  desirable  for  individual  subjects  

                                                                                                               
174  The  term  “contingent  reinforcement”  is  a  term  commonly  used  in  social  psychology  that  simply  

refers  to  any  consequence  that  is  imposed  only  when  the  targeted  behavior  (or  behavior  that  
triggers  the  consequence)  is  exemplified.    These  consequences  are  specifically  designed  to  increase,  
decrease,  or  maintain  the  probability  of  the  target  behavior  from  occurring.  
175  Nienhauser  1994:  95;  後五月而秦孝公卒，太子立。公子虔之徒告商君欲反，發吏捕商君；商君

亡至關下，欲舍客舍。客人不知其是商君也，曰：「商君之法，舍人無驗者坐之。」商君喟然嘆
曰：嗟乎，為法之敝，一至此哉！(Sima  1931:  51)

  63  
and   the   state   as   a   whole.   The   recluse   Zhao   Liang   clearly   represents   Shang   Yang’s  

method   of   human   development,   shaping   society   and   mold   its   subjects   into   their  

ideal  forms,  as  coercive.    The  source  of  this  coercion  is  thought  to  be  the  established  

laws   or   commands   and   their   contingently   applied   punishments   of   tattooing,  

mutilation,  or  death.    Therefore,  in  an  effort  to  avoid  this  punishment,  subjects  are  

forced   to   comply   with   state   laws   and   commands.   On   the   other   hand,   the   recluse  

Zhao  Liang  argued  that  teaching  and  transformation  is  a  method  that  would  more  

deeply   and   quickly   develop   state   subjects   because   it   does   not   create   as   much  

resentment  and  enemies,  due  to  the  lack  of  coercion.      

Third,  the  recluse  Zhao  Liang  criticizes  Shang  Yang  for  his  disrespect  of  the  

sanctity  of  nobility.    This  is  identified  in  several  ways.    The  first  is  that  in  addition  to  

benefitting  from  the  favoritism  shown  by  Duke  Xiao’s  favorite  eunuch,  Jing,  Shang  

Yang   did   not   earn   his   position   due   to   his   name   ming   名.     This   likely   has   some  

relation   to   Spring   and   Autumn   era   political   organization   in   which   political  

appointments  were  given  on  the  basis  of  one’s  proximity  to  the  ancestral  cult  of  the  

ruling  family.    Therefore,  if  an  individual  was  not  a  part  of  the  noble  bloodline  and  

not  a  male  member  of  the  ancestral  cult,  then  they  were  not  to  take  part  in  ritual  

performance   nor   be   bestowed   a   political   appointment.     In   Shang   Yang’s   case,   he  

was  born  into  the  royal  house  of  the  state  of  Wei  衛.    So,  his  name  represented  kin  

ties  far  removed  from  the  ruling  noble  family  of  Qin.    The  recluse  Zhao  Liang  may  

then  be  declaring  this  a  serious  offence  to  the  ancestors  and  spirits  worshipped  in  

the  Qin  state  cult.    Shang  Yang’s  disrespect  for  the  sanctity  of  nobility  in  the  state  of  

Qin   is   further   exacerbated   in   his   imposition   of   state   punishments   on   members   of  

  64  
the  Qin  noble  family.      Zhao  Liang  rebukes  Shang  Yang  for  punishing  the  prince  by  

tattooing  or  mutilating  those  close  to  him,  in  lieu  of  harming  the  prince  himself.176      

This   criticism   reflects   the   early   Rujia   sentiment   expressed   in   the   Liji’s  

“Summary   of   Ritual   Part   I”   which   states,   “The   rules   of   ceremony   do   not   go   down   to  

the   common   people.     The   penal   statutes   do   not   go   up   to   great   officers”.177     This  

passage   directly   corresponds   to   both   of   the   aspects   of   disrespect   toward   the  

sanctity   of   nobility   of   which   Zhao   Liang   accused   Shang   Yang.     This   Liji   passage  

further  illustrates  how,  from  a  Rujia  perspective,  Shang  Yang  should  not  be  able  to  

take  part  in  Qin  nobility  ritual  and  ancestral  worship  and  therefore  should  not  have  

a   political   appointment,   nor   should   he   have   imposed   state   punishment   on   those  

who  are  members  of  the  Qin  ancestral  cult.    Therefore,  the  biography  of  Shang  Yang  

in  the  Shiji  describes  him  as  a  statesmen  and  reformer  most  closely  associated  with  

an  emphasis  on  laws  and  decrees  that  arguably  act  as  bonds  or  oaths  between  the  

ruler  and  his  subjects,  contingent  reinforcement  backing  state  laws  and  decrees  in  

the   form   of   both   rewards   and   punishments,   while   building   up   resentment   and  

creating  misfortune  for  himself  through  his  disrespect  for  the  sanctity  of  nobility.178  

These   three   differences   over   the   definition   of   merit,   the   reliance   on   laws,  

and   the   sanctity   of   nobility   illustrate,   as   other   scholarly   analysis   have,   how  

fundamentally   different   the   approaches   to   governance   generally   are   between   the  

Rujia  and  Fajia  traditions.  The  Rujia  tradition  insists  on  a  state  in  which  individuals  

are  judged  by  who  they  are,  the  ideal  ruler  relies  on  ritual  and  virtue  to  “educate”  

                                                                                                               
176  Nienhauser  1994:  95;  Sima  1931:  51  
177  Legge  in  Chai  and  Chai  1967:  90;  禮不下庶人，刑不上大夫。(Lau  and  Chen  1992:  1/5/24-­‐25)  

178  Nienhauser  1994:  95;  Sima  1931:  51  

  65  
his  subjects,  and  seeks  to  position  the  nobility  above  the  law.    On  the  other  hand,  

the   Fajia   tradition   envisions   an   environment   in   which   subjects   are   evaluated   by  

what   they   do,   the   ideal   ruler   relies   almost   solely   on   the   law,   and   insists   that   all  

subjects,   even   those   of   noble   birth,   be   subjected   to   the   ruler’s   standards   of  

behavior.     However,   both   traditions   nevertheless   attempt   to   develop   their   subjects.  

Therefore,   this   study   will   specifically   bring   to   light   the   nuances   of   how   the   Fajia  

tradition  attempts  to  produce  its  ideal  subjects.      

An   even   earlier   collection   of   works,   the   Xunzi179 ,   criticizes   the   state   of   Qin  

and  the  way  it  mobilizes  its  subjects  for  warfare.  “Debating  Military  Principles”  in  

the  Xunzi  provides  its  a  description  of  the  environment  Shang  Yang  and  his  military  

reforms  created.    It  states:    

Since   the   people   of   Qin   must   be   provided   a   living   within   a   narrow  

defile,  the  use  of  the  people  in  obligatory  services  is  stern  and  harsh.    
The  people  are  coerced  with  authority,  restricted  to  a  narrow  life  by  
deprivation,   urged   on   with   incentives   and   rewards,   and   intimidated  
with  punishments  and  penalties.    Persons  in  subordinate  and  humble  
positions   are   made   to   understand   that   only   by   success   in   combat   can  
they   seek   benefits   from   their   superiors.     Men   must   endure  
deprivation   before   they   are   employed,   and   some   degree   of  
accomplishment   must   be   achieved   before   benefits   are   obtained,   but  
as  accomplishments  increase  so  do  the  rewards.    Accordingly  a  man  
who   takes   the   heads   of   five   enemy   soldiers   has   five   households  
placed   under   his   supervision.     Because   of   this   policy,   soldiers   have  
become   exceedingly   numerous,   the   fighting   strength   of   the   army   is  
quite   formidable,   its   ability   to   stay   in   the   field   has   been   greatly  
extended,   and   Qin’s   territories   yielding   taxation   greatly   increased.    
Thus,  that  there  have  been  four  consecutive  generations  of  victories  
is  due  not  to  mere  chance  good  luck  but  to  method  and  calculation.180    

                                                                                                               
179  Lau,  D.C.  and  Chen  Fong  Ching,  ed.  A  Concordance  to  the  Xunzi.  Hong  Kong:  The  Commercial  

Press,  1996.    
180  Knoblock  1999:  465-­‐467;  Xunzi.  Xunzi.  John  Knoblock  (English)  and  Zhang  Jue  (Modern  Chinese),  

trans.  Hunan  and  Beijing:  Hunan  People’s  Publishing  House  and  Foreign  Languages  Press,  1999.;  秦
人，其生民也陿阸，其使民也酷烈，劫之以勢，隱之以阸，忸之以慶賞，鰌之以刑罰，使天下之

  66  
  
Particularly   of   note   in   this   passage   is   that   there   is   no   denial   of   the   effectiveness  

with  which  Shang  Yang  improved  the  Qin  state’s  military  might.    Moreover,  Shang  

Yang’s   military   reforms   are   described   as   a   multi-­‐faceted   strategy   for   increasing   the  

size  and  strength  of  the  military  and  the  tax  base  that  supported  it.      

Perhaps  more  interestingly,  this  passage  critiques  for  each  of  Shang  Yang’s  

methods   to   improve   Qin’s   military   might,   even   as   it   acknowledges   them   as   very  

comprehensive   and   deliberate,   so   consisting   of   several   steps.   Shang   Yang   first  

implemented  policies  that  prevented  Qin  subjects  from  making  a  living  outside  of  

two  occupations:  agriculture  and  warfare.    Besides  specifically  referring  to  warfare,  

the  mentioning  of  an  increased  tax  base  implies  that  some  other  occupation  must  

be  the  source  from  which  Shang  Yang  funded  Qin’s  military  campaigns.    Although  

these   reforms   effectively   employed   more   people   to   support   Qin’s   military  

objectives,   this   Xunzi   chapter   characterizes   them   as   having   made   the   lives   of   Qin  

subjects   distressing   and   difficult,   a   recipe   for   the   same   building   up   of   resentment  

and  creation  of  misfortune  described  in  the  Shiji.      

Second,  this  passage  points  to  Shang  Yang  deploying  coercive  reinforcement  

to   enrich   the   state   and   strengthen   its   military.     This   is   important   because   of   the  

insight  it  provides  into  what  the  Xunzi  chapter  views  as  Shang  Yang’s  conception  of  

the   bond   between   a   ruler   and   his   subjects.     According   to   this   text,   Shang   Yang  

insists  on  the  ruler  and  the  state’s  privilege  or  even  obligation  to  completely  dictate  

the  terms  of  a  subject’s  service.    In  other  words,  upon  swearing  an  oath  to  serve  the  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
民所以要利於上者，非鬬無由也。阸而用之，得而後功之，功賞相長也，五甲首而隸五家，是最
為眾強長久，多地以正。故四世有勝，非幸也，數也。(Lau  and  Chen  1996:  15/70/4-­‐7)

  67  
Qin  ruler,  a  Qin  subject  was  to  have  little  choice  in  the  capacity  in  which  he  would  

serve   or   devote   himself   to   the   ruler   and   the   state.     Shang   Yang’s   methods   of  

governance   are   based   on   the   idea   that   the   maintenance   of   the   bond   between   the  

ruler  and  his  subjects  is  ensured  only  when  the  ruler  asserts  his  authority  through  

demonstrating   his   ability   to   coerce   and   use   force   upon   those   who   violate   the   terms  

of  the  bond.      

So,  what  about  Shang  Yang’s  actual  military  strategy?    The  same  chapter  of  

the  Xunzi  begins  its  critique  of  Shang  Yang’s  military  strategy  stating:    

Assuredly  Tian  Dan  of  Qi,  Zhuang  Qiao  of  Chu,  Wei  Yang  of  Qin,  and  
Miao   Ji   of   Yan   have   all   been   popularly   regarded   as   accomplished   in  
the  use  of  armies.    They  were  clever  and  powerful  in  varying  degrees,  
yet   not   one   of   them   became   the   leader   over   the   rest,   for   their   way  
was   fundamentally   one,   and   none   of   them   ever   attained   an  
harmonious   and   coordinated   army.     Since   they   inhabited   and  
encouraged,   engaged   in   espionage   and   covert   schemes,   adopted  
expediency   and   opportunism   as   their   principle,   and   plotted   for  
power   and   fomented   rebellion,   they   never   ceased   to   be   bandit  
soldiers.181    
 
This   passage   primarily   identifies   Shang   Yang   as   a   military   reformer.     It  

acknowledges   that   Shang   Yang   was   clever   and,   as   a   result,   attained   power   to   a  

notable   degree.     However,   it   criticizes   Shang   Yang’s   military   methods   for   being  

excessively  reliant  on  deception  and  political  manipulation,  which  according  to  this  

Xunzi   chapter   is   a   major   misunderstanding   of   the   most   important   aspects   in  

military  success.    Specifically  it  states:    

Li   Si   questioned   Master   Xun   Qing   saying:   For   four   generations   Qin  

has   been   victorious.     Its   military   power   is   the   strongest   within   the  
Four  Seas  and  its  majestic  authority  holds  sway  over  all  the  lords  of  
                                                                                                               
181  Knoblock  1999:  469;  故齊之田單，楚之莊蹻，秦之衛鞅，燕之繆蟣，是皆世俗所謂善用兵者也

，是其巧拙強弱則未有以相君也，若其道一也，未及和齊也；掎契司詐，權謀傾覆，未免盜兵也
。(Lau  and  Chen  1996:  15/70/19-­‐21)  

  68  
 fiefs.    It  is  not  due  to  humanity  and  justice  that  it  became  so,  but  to  its  
taking   advantage   of   opportunities   and   going   along   with   the  
requirement   of   the   time   and   nothing   more.     Master   Xun   Qing   replied:  
It   is   not   as   you   understand   it.     What   you   have   described   as  
“opportunities”   are   not   real   opportunities.     The   humanity   and   justice  
of   which   I   spoke   are   real   opportunities   of   the   greatest   magnitude.    
Such   humanity   and   justice   are   the   means   whereby   to   reform   the  
government.    If  the  government  is  reformed,  then  the  people  will  feel  
kinship  with  their  superiors,  will  delight  in  their  lord,  and  will  think  
little   of   dying   for   him.     It   was   for   this   reason   that   I   said   that   as   a  
general   rule   such   matters,   in   the   case   of   a   real   lord,   are   secondary  
considerations   to   be   left   to   marshals   and   generals.     Although   for   four  
generations   Qin   has   been   victorious,   it   has   been   constantly   seized  
with   fear   and   apprehension   lest   the   whole   world   unite   together   in  
concerted   action   to   crush   Qin   with   their   collective   power.     This  
corresponds   to   what   I   have   described   as   the   armies   of   recent  
decadent   times,   for   they   have   never   possessed   the   fundamental  
principles  and  guiding  norms.182  
     
Much   as   with   the   criticism   of   Shang   Yang’s   excessive   reliance   on   laws   and   their  

reinforcement  expressed  in  the  Shiji,  this  Xunzi  chapter  does  not  take  issue  with  the  

general   notion   of   taking   advantage   of   opportunities   in   military   strategy.     Rather,  

derides  the  way  in  which  Shang  Yang  has  taken  advantage  of  his  opportunities.    In  

addition   to   capitalizing   on   an   opponent’s   weaknesses   and   engaging   in   political  

manipulation,  Shang  Yang  has  ignored  the  importance  of  benevolence  and  proper  

roles.183     This   is   evidence   of   the   Xunzi   chapter’s   criticism   of   Qin’s   military   methods:  

it  did  not  yield  as  strong  of  a  bond  between  the  Qin  ruler  and  his  subjects.  As  Shang  

Yang’s   laws   and   their   reinforcement   built   up   resentment   and   created   misfortune  

according   to   the   Shiji,   so   too   did  Qin’s  military  methods,  scheming  and  deception.    

                                                                                                               
182  Knoblock  1999:  481-­‐483;  李斯問孫卿子曰：「秦四世有勝，兵強海內，威行諸侯，非以仁義為

之也，以便從事而已。」孫卿子曰：「非汝所知也！汝所謂便者，不便之便也；吾所謂仁義者，
大便之便也。彼仁義者，所以脩政者也；政脩則民親其上，樂其君，而輕為之死。故曰：『凡在
於軍，將率，末事也。』秦四世有勝，諰諰然常恐天下之一合而軋己也，此所謂末世之兵，未有
本統也。。。」(Lau  and  Chen  1996:  15/70/19-­‐21)
183  The  importance  of  benevolence  and  proper  roles  in  the  Xunzi  are  discussed  in  a  later  chapter.    

Here,  the  focus  of  this  section  shall  remain  on  Shang  Yang.  

  69  
Why  else  would  it  fear  the  possibility  of  other  states  uniting  in  an  effort  to  subvert  

it?    However,  despite  the  Xunzi’s  disagreement  with  Shang  Yang’s  military  methods,  

there  appears  to  be  agreement  on  one  important  issue:  the  bond  between  a  ruler  

and  his  subjects  must  be  strong.    Thus,  a  foundation  for  debate  emerges,  with  the  

central  question:  how  are  bonds  best  established  and  maintained  between  a  ruler  

and   his   subjects?     Both   sides   of   the   debate   seem   to   also   agree   that   the   issue   of  

human   development   is   one   of   the   most   crucial   aspects   in   answering   the  

aforementioned  question.  This  study  will  attempt  to  highlight  this  debate,  focusing  

on  the  common  response  found  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang  and  other  Fajia  texts.  

What   about   the   criticism   within   the   Fajia   tradition?   Were   the  

aforementioned   crtiques   of   Shang   Yang   and   Qin   solely   due   to   a   classical   Rujia  bias?    

Are   their   other   grounds   on   which   later   generations,   regardless   of   intellectual  

allegiance,   took   issue?     The   Hanfeizi 184  provides   meaningful   insight   into   these  

questions.    In  “Mr.  He”,  it  states:    

Lord   Shang   taught   Duke   Hsiao   [r.   361-­‐338   B.C.]   of   Ch’in   how   to  
organize   the   people   into   groups   of   five   and   ten   families   that   would  
spy   on   each   other   and   be   corporately   responsible   for   crimes  
committed   by   their   members;   he   advised   him   to   burn   the   Book   of  
Odes  and  Book  of  Documents  and  elucidate  the  laws  and  regulations,  
to   reject   the   private   request   of   powerful   families   and   concentrate  
upon  furthering  the  interests  of  the  royal  family;  to  forbid  people  to  
wander   about   in   search   of   political   office,   and   to   glorify   the   lot   of  
those  who  devote  themselves  to  agriculture  and  warfare.    Duke  Hsiao  
put   his   suggestions   into   practice,   and   as   a   result   the   position   of   the  
ruler   became   secure   and   respected,   and   the   state   grew   rich   and  
powerful.   But   eight   years   later   Duke   Hsiao   passed   away,   and   Lord  
Shang  was  tied  to  two  chariots  and  torn  apart  by  the  men  of  Ch’in.185    
                                                                                                               
184  Lau,  D.C.  and  Chen  Fong  Ching,  ed.  A  Concordance  to  the  Hanfeizi.  Hong  Kong:  The  Commercial  

Press,  2000.  
185  Watson  1964:  82;  See  Watson,  Burton.  Han  Fei  Tzu:  Basic  Writings.  New  York:  Columbia  

University  Press,  1964.;  商君教秦孝公以連什伍，設告坐之過，燔詩書而明法令，塞私門之請而遂

  70  
    
This   Hanfeizi   passage   credits   Shang   Yang   with   some   policies   mentioned   in   the  

previously  examined  texts,  namely  the  organizing  of  the  Qin  populace  into  groups  

of   five   and   ten   for   military   purposes   and   mutual   surveillance   programs,  

emphasizing   state   performance   in   agriculture   and   war,   and   applying   laws   and  

decrees   and   their   enforcement   extending   to   even   the   imperial   family.     It   even  

provides   at   least   one   textual   source   for   the   Shiji’s   claim   that   Shang   Yang   suffered  

the  fate  of  being  torn  apart  by  chariots  chelie  車裂.      

Additionally   though,   this   Hanfeizi   passage   credits   Shang   Yang   with   a   few  

other   policies   as   well,   specifically   the   burning   of   texts   associated   with   the   Rujia  

tradition  and  the  prevention  of  the  expansion  of  the  phenomenon  of  the  itinerant  

officials.     Though   there   does   not   seem   to   be   any   other   historical   document   that  

supports   the   Hanfeizi’s   book   burning   claim,   at   the   very   least,   it   points   to   the  

ideological   struggle   between   the   historical   figure   Shang   Yang,   his   policies,   ideas,  

tradition,  and  its  texts  and  the  Rujia  tradition,  statesmen,  thinkers,  and  texts.    As  for  

the  phenomenon  of  itinerant  officials   you   huan  游宦,  it  is  well-­‐documented.    Lewis  

explained   that   the   recruitment   of   these   itinerant   officials   “played   an   increasingly  

important   role   in   the   intensifying   interlineage   battles”   and   eventually   “became   a  

general  social  trend”.186     It  is  also  in  accordance  with  Xu’s  more  general  assertion  

that   a   significant   amount   of   men   who   held   high   office   during   the   Warring   States  

period   were   “career   statesmen   who   were   employed   by   several   governments”,  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
公家之勞，禁游宦之民而顯耕戰之士。孝公行之，主以尊安，國以富強，八年而薨，商君車裂於
秦。(Lau  and  Chen  2000:  13/23/22-­‐23)  
186  Lewis  1990:  76  

  71  
having  allegiances  that  were  more  contingent  on  their  employment  as  opposed  to  

the   relatively   more   “deep-­‐seated   ties”   more   prominent   in   earlier   periods.187     In  

addition  to  these  itinerant  officials,  the  Warring  States  period  also  featured  figures  

that   were   labeled   “itinerant   swordsmen”   you   xia   游俠.     These   were   particularly  

threatening   to   those   who   did   not   employ   them   because   they   often   traveled   with  

armed  retainers,  collectively  acting  as  mercenary  armies  for  the  highest  bidder.188    

Rulers   in   various   states   competed   with   each   other   for   the   services   of   the   most  

capable  and  qualified  from  the  officials  and  swordsmen.    As  previously  mentioned,  

in  exchange  for  their  services  these  rulers  would  bestow  upon  these  officials  rank,  

status,  and/or  wealth,  demonstrating  their  desire  to  not  only  utilize  their  skills  or  

implement   their   policy   ideas   but   also   the   moral   force   and   vigor   with   which   they  

maintained  the  bonds  with  those  they  employed.      

It  should  be  noted  that  there  are  at  least  two  instances  in  the  Book  of  Lord  

Shang  in  which  these  itinerant  officials  are  mentioned,  in  “Prince  and  Minister”  and  

“External   and   Internal   Affairs”.     One   instance   focuses   on   the   influence   a   ruler   can  

have   on   the   quantity   of   itinerant   officials   coming   to   and   from   a   state.     In   another  

instance,   it   expresses   a   clearly   negative   attitude   towards   itinerant   officials,  

reinforcing   the   Hanfeizi’s   claim.     In   “Prince   and   Minister”,   the   Book  of  Lord  Shang  

states,  “As  for  people,  one  can  cause  them  to  engage  in  agriculture  and  go  out  into  

battle,   one   can   cause   them   to   be   itinerant   officials,   and   one   can   cause   them   to  

engage   in   scholarship,   this   all   depends   on   how   the   ruler   bestows   rank   and  

emoluments.    If  the  ruler,  based  on  merit,  bestows  rank  and  emoluments,  then  the  
                                                                                                               
187  Hsu  1965:  51  
188  Lewis  1990:  80  

  72  
people   will   be   engaged   in   warfare”.189     We   might   ask:   why   would   a   ruler   seek   to  

counter   these   social   trends?   Considering   his   commitment   to   the   notion   of  

establishing   good   faith   and   mutual   trust   with   the   ruler’s   subjects   through   the  

contingent   bestowal   of   rewards,   why   would   Shang   Yang   seek   to   block   itinerant  

officials   from   finding   the   best   employment?     More   specifically,   if   Shang   Yang   had  

the  conviction  of  the  methods  by  which  the  bond  between  the  ruler  and  his  subjects  

in   Qin   is   established,   why   wouldn’t   there   be   confidence   that   the   most   qualified   and  

eligible  itinerant  officials  would  wish  to  be  employed  in  Qin?      

These  officials  are  actually  a  threat  to  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang’s  notion  of  law.    

Their   mobility   forces   the   Fajia   ruler   and   his   laws   into   a   competition   with   other  

rulers   and   their   approach   to   governance.   In   the   “External   and   Internal   Affairs”  

section,  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang  states,    

As  for  the  external  affairs  of  people,  there  is  nothing  more  dangerous  
than   warfare,   so   relaxed   laws   are   unable   to   cause   the   people   to   be  
employed.    What  is  called  a  relaxed  law?    It  is  when  the  rewards  are  
few,  awesomeness  is  weak,  and  illicit  paths  are  not  blocked  up.    What  
is  called  an  illicit  path?    They  are  namely  the  highly  valuing  sophists  
and   scholars,   the   attainment   of   posts   of   itinerant   officials,   and  
praising  of  men  of  letters.    When  these  three  roads  are  not  blocked,  
the  people  will  definitely  not  engage  in  warfare,  and  a  state’s  military  
affairs   will   fail.     Because   rewards   are   few,   those   who   receive  
commands   will   not   receive   benefit.     If   awesomeness   is   weak,   then  
those  who  violate  commands  will  not  receive  harm.    If  illicit  paths  are  
open,   then   they   will   attract   the   people.     Using   relaxed   laws   can   be  
compared  to  wanting  to  catch  a  rat  and  using  a  cat  to  lure  it.    Is  that  
not  impossible?  As  a  result,  one  who  desires  to  cause  his  subjects  to  
engage   in   warfare   must   utilize   severe   laws.     When   bestowing  
rewards,   he   must   bestow   them   frequently.     His   awesomeness   [and  
therefore   his   punishments]   must   be   severe.     Paths   of   illicit   activity  
must  be  blocked.    Those  who  engage  in  lofty  language  and  knowledge  
                                                                                                               
189  故民，可令農戰，可令游宦，可令學問，在上所與。上以功勞與，則民戰。。。  (Gao  2011:  

181);  Gao  Heng  高亨.  Shang  chün  shu  chu  商君書注譯,  Beijing  北京:  Zhong  hua  清華大學出版社,  
2011.  

  73  
 must   not   be   valued.     Itinerant   officials   should   not   be   given  
responsibilities.     [Ostentatious]   scholarship   and   private   reputation  
will   not   receive   praise.     If   the   bestowal   of   rewards   is   frequent   and  
awesomeness  [and  therefore  punishments]  are  severe,  then  subjects  
will  see  that  rewards  for  warfare  are  many  and  will  forget  about  the  
threat   of   death.     If   the   people   see   the   shame   in   not   engaging   in  
warfare,   then   they   will   see   the  pain   of   that   life.     When   rewards   cause  
them   to   forget   about   the   threat   of   death,   awesomeness   [and  
therefore  punishments]  cause  them  to  see  the  pain  of  a  life  [without  
engaging  in  war],  and  paths  of  illicit  activity  are  blocked,  using  these  
[attributes   of   one’s   state]   to   meet   the   enemy   is   like   shooting   a  
floating  leaf  with  a  crossbow  at  100  shi.    How  would  it  not  penetrate  
through?190  
     
It   is   clear   that   this   chapter   in   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang   views   the   existence   of  

itinerant  scholars  as  a  product  of  “relaxed  laws”,  or  a  failure  of  government  policy.    

The  life  of  a  itinerant  official  is  considered  to  be  one  of  the  illicit  paths  yin  dao  淫道.    

In   other   words,   itinerant   scholars   are   crucial   indicators   of   a   general   condition   of  

disorder.      

Second,   itinerant   scholars   were   looked   upon   as   wasted   resources.     They  

were   not   allied   or   totally   devoted   to   any   one   state.     They   were   figures   that  

essentially   sold   their   devotion   for   the   best   opportunity.     According   to   both   Hanfeizi  

and   Book   of   Lord   Shang   chapters,   they   are   a   significant   problem   because   these  

officials   are   not   devoting   themselves   to   one   state.     Therefore,   the   state   of   Qin,   or  

any   other   state,   is   less   capable   of   dictating   the   terms   upon   which   they   create   the  

bond   between   the   ruler   and   his   subjects.     More   specifically,   itinerant   officials   could  
                                                                                                               
190  民之外事，（莫）難於戰，故輕法不可以使之。奚謂輕法？其賞少而威薄，淫道不塞之謂也。

奚謂淫道？為辯知者貴，游宦者任，文學私名顯之謂也。三者不塞，則民不戰而事失矣。故其賞
少，則聽者無利也。威薄，則犯者不害也。故開淫道以誘之。而以戰輕法戰之，是謂設鼠而餌以
狸也，亦不幾乎？故欲戰其民者，必以重法。賞則必多，威則必嚴，淫道必塞，為辯知者不貴，
游宦者不任，文學私名不顯。賞多威嚴，民見戰賞之多則忘死，見不戰之辱則苦生。賞使之忘死
，而威使之苦生，而淫道又塞，以此遇敵，是以百石之弩射飄葉也，何不陷之有哉？  (Gao  2011:  
175)
 

  74  
make   it   more   difficult   for   rulers   to   impose   other   policies   associated   with   Shang  

Yang,  like  military  taxes  and  employing  subjects  in  the  two  primary  occupations.  If  

the   means   of   making   a   living   for   a   itinerant   official   appears   to   be   viable,   then   when  

the  state  seeks  to  dictate  the  terms  of  the  bond  between  the  ruler  and  his  subjects,  

limiting  the  ways  the  subjects  can  devote  themselves  to  the  ruler  to  agriculture  and  

warfare,  subjects  who  do  not  wish  to  pursue  either  of  those  occupations  will  likely  

find   other   alternatives   in   other   states   far   more   appealing   and   thus   not   accept   Qin’s  

terms.      

Moreover,   even   if   some   subjects   do   accept   the   state’s   terms   of   devotion,  

agriculture   and   war,   the   state   needs   strong   reinforcement   to   ensure   that   its  

subjects  will  continue  to  abide  by  the  terms  of  their  bond  with  their  ruler.    This  is  

precisely   why   the   aforementioned   passage   insists   on   rewards   being   numerous   and  

punishments  being  severe  or  harsh,  in  addition  to  the  “illicit  paths”  being  closed  off.    

Rewards  create  the  condition  in  which  “those  who  receive  commands”  tingzhe  聽者

,  or  subjects  in  their  bond  with  their  ruler,  will  receive  benefit  li  利.    Awesomeness  

wei  威,  which  almost  certainly  includes  the  notion  of  punishments  xing   刑,  creates  

the   condition   in   which   “those   who   violate   commands”   fanzhe   犯者 will   receive  

harm.    In  essence,  this  principle  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang,  and  also  related  to  the  

historical   figure   Shang   Yang,   seeks   to   cause   the   ruler’s   subjects   to   connect   what  

they   do   or   how   they   behave   with   recognition   of   mutilation   and   potentially   death.    

Upon  making  this  connection,  the  subjects  will  have  no  choice  but  to  comply  with  

the  terms  of  the  bond  they  have  with  their  ruler,  being  motivated  by  rewards,  and  

fearing  the  pain  of  punishment.      

  75  
 All   the   same,   though   Hanfeizi   credits   Shang   Yang   with   several   policies   it  

viewed   positively,   it   does   offer   some   criticism   as   well.     In   “Mr.   He”,   the   Hanfeizi  

states:    

Ch’u,   failing   to   continue   the   policies   of   Wu   Ch’i,   suffered   from   foreign  

incursion   and   internal   chaos;   Ch’in,   applying   Lord   Shang’s   laws,  
became  rich  and  powerful.  Yet  though  both  men  spoke  what  was  apt  
and  true,  why  was  it  that  Wu  Ch’i  was  torn  limb  from  limb,  and  Lord  
Shang   pulled   apart   by   chariots?     Because   high   ministers   resented  
their  laws  and  the  common  people  hated  orderly  government.    And  in  
the   present   age   the   high   ministers   covet   power   and   the   common  
people   find   satisfaction   in   disorder   to   a   far   greater   degree   than   did  
the  men  of  Ch’u  and  Ch’in  in  the  times  I  have  described.    If  there  is  no  
King  Tao  or  Duke  Hsiao  to  heed  advice,  then  how  will  the  planners  of  
law   and   policy   ever   be   willing   to   risk   the   fate   of   Wu   Ch’i   and   Lord  
Shang  in  order  to  elucidate  their  laws  and  policies?    This  is  why  our  
present  age  is  in  chaos  and  lacks  a  true  dictator  or  king.191    
   
This  passage  appears  to  be  fully  in  accord  with  the  interpretation  of  Shang  Yang’s  

demise   in   the   Shiji.     Recall   that   the   recluse   Zhao   Liang   argued   that   Shang   Yang’s  

laws   built   up   resentment   and   created   misfortune,   especially   among   those   within  

the   noble   bloodline.     In   this   passage,   Shang   Yang’s   laws   are   described   in   similar  

terms,  but  not  among  the  nobility,  rather  among  the  high  officials  dachen  大臣  and  

even  amongst  the  common  people  ximin  細民  as  well.      

Though   the   Hanfeizi   and   the   Shiji   both   characterize   Shang   Yang’s  

establishment   of   laws   in   similar   terms,   one   important   difference   is   that   this  

Hanfeizi   chapter   does   not   view   the   opposition   to   Shang   Yang’s   laws   as   being  

entirely  legitimate.    Unlike  the  Shiji  which  characterized  Shang  Yang’s  attainment  of  

                                                                                                               
191  Watson  1964:  82-­‐82;  楚不用吳起而削亂，秦行商君法而富強。二子之言也已當矣，然而枝解吳

起而車裂商君者，何也？大臣苦法而細民惡治也。當今之世，大臣貪重，細民安亂，甚於秦、楚
之俗，而人主無悼王、孝公之聽，則法術之士，安能蒙二子之危也，而明己之法術哉？此世所
「以」亂無霸王也。(Lau  and  Chen  2000:  13/23/24-­‐27)  

  76  
his   position   and   his   subsequent   application   of   punishment   as   violations   of   the  

sanctity   of   nobility,   the   Hanfeizi   characterizes   the   motivation   behind   the   high  

officials’   opposition   to   Shang   Yang’s   laws   as   being   a   result   of   their   own  

extraordinary   greed   tanzhong   貪重.     This   issue   of   how   those   the   ruler   employs  

should   be   perceived   is   certainly   one   of   contention   between   the   Rujia   and   Fajia  

traditions   of   thought   in   the   Warring   States   period.     This   is   a   crucial   point   to  

understand   because   it   reiterates   one   difference   and   introduces   another   between  

the   Rujia   and   Fajia   approaches   to   development.     First,   it   reiterates   that   Fajia  

thought   refuses   to   view   those   subjects   of   nobility   or   high   achievement   as  

exceptional  enough  to  be  protected  in  any  way  from  the  law.    Second,  Fajia  thought  

consistently   makes   the   assumption   that   human   behavior   is   primarily   driven   by  

individual   self-­‐interest.     Therefore,   opposition   to   law   is   simply   evidence   that   it  

impedes  the  self-­‐interest  of  those  that  oppose  it.    

Specifically,   the   aforementioned   Hanfeizi   passage   reveals   another   important  

question:  should  all  subjects  be  subjected  to  the  same  terms,  at  least  to  a  point,  in  

their  bond  with  the  ruler?    In  other  words,  should  the  ruler  of  a  state  have  the  same  

bond   with   those   he   employs   as   he   does   with   the   common   people?     Should   there   be  

a   different   bond   for   members   of   the   noble   bloodline,   with   blood-­‐based   ritual  

privilege   within   the   ancestral   cult?     This   study   seeks   to   address   this   question,   in  

addition   to   the   questions   who   should   be   entitled   to   political   appointments   in   order  

to  facilitate  the  bond  between  a  ruler  and  his  subjects,  and  what  methods  of  human  

development   need   to   be   applied   to   establish   and   maintain   the   strongest   bond?    

Though   this   study   argues   that   there   are   some   fundamental   issues   that   do   generally  

  77  
divide   the   two   aforementioned   traditions,   it   is   important   to   point   out   there   was  

some  disagreement  within  the  tradition  with  which  Shang  Yang  is  most  associated.      

The   criticism   of   Shang   Yang   in   the   Hanfeizi   does   not   end   with   the  

aforementioned.     Perhaps   the   most   notable   criticism   of   Shang   Yang   within   the  

Hanfeizi   appears   in   “Deciding   Between   Two   Legalistic   Doctrines”.     The   Hanfeizi  

states:  

Some   inquirer   asked:   “Of   the   teachings   of   the   two   authorities,   Shen  
Pu-­‐hai   and   Kung-­‐sun   Yang,   which   is   more   urgently   needful   to   the  
state?”    In  reply  I  said:  “It  is  impossible  to  compare  them.    Man,  not  
eating  for  ten  days,  would  die,  and,  wearing  no  clothes  in  the  midst  of  
great   cold,   would   also   die.     As   to   which   is   more   urgently   needful   to  
man,   clothing   or   eating,   it   goes   without   saying   that   neither   can   be  
dispensed   with,   for   both   are   means   to   nourish   life.     Now   Shen   Pu-­‐hai  
spoke  about  the  need  of  tact  and  Kung-­‐sun  Yang  insisted  on  the  use  
of   law.     Tact   is   the   means   whereby   to   create   posts   according   to  
responsibilities,   hold   actual   services   accountable   according   to   official  
titles,   exercise   power   over   life   and   death,   and   examine   the   officials’  
abilities.     It   is   what   the   lord   of   men   has   in   his   grip.     Law   includes  
mandates   and   ordinances   that   are   manifest   in   the   official   bureau,  
penalties  that  are  definite  in  the  mind  of  the  people,  rewards  that  are  
due   to   the   careful   observers   of   laws,   and   punishments   that   are  
inflicted  on  the  offenders  against  orders.    It  is  what  the  subjects  and  
ministers   take   as   model.     If   the   ruler   is   tactless,   delusion   will   come   to  
the   superior;   if   the   subjects   and   ministers   are   lawless,   disorder   will  
appear   among   the   inferiors.     Thus,   neither   can   be   dispensed   with:  
both  are  implements  of  emperors  and  kings”.192    
   
This   chapter   in   the   Hanfeizi   clearly   views   Shang   Yang’s   notion   of   laws   as  

indispensable   to   the   governance   of   a   state,   along   with   Shen   Buhai’s   notion   of  

“technique”.      
                                                                                                               
192  Liao  1959:  212;  See  Liao,  W.K.  The  Complete  Works  of  Hanfeizi:  A  Classic  of  Chinese  Political  

Science  (vol.  1  &  2).  London:  Arthur  Probsthain,  1959.;  問者曰：「申不害、公孫鞅，此二家之言孰

急於國？」應之曰：「是不可程也。人不食十日則死，大寒之隆，不衣亦死。謂之衣食孰急於人
，則是不可一無也，皆養生之具也。今申不害言術，而公孫鞅為法。術者，因任而授官，循名而
責實，操殺生之柄，課群臣之能者也，此人主之所執也。法者，憲令著於官府，刑罰必於民心，
賞存乎慎法，而罰加乎姦令者也，此臣之所師也。君無術則弊於上，臣無法則亂於下，此不可一
無，皆帝王之具也。」(Lau  and  Chen  2000:  43/131/5-­‐11)  

  78  
 However,   implicit   in   this   passage   is   a   notable   critique   of   Shang   Yang   and   his  

notion   of   laws,   i.e.   that   they   lack   of   corresponding   “technique”.     Whether   or   not   the  

Hanfeizi   accurately   depicts   the   historical   figure   Shang   Yang’s   laws   or   not,   it   is   clear  

that   he   describes   them   as   having   fundamentally   similar   characteristics   to   the  

notion  of  law  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang.    Wang  Bangxiong  viewed  the  status  of  the  

concept  of  law  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang  as  being  much  like  self-­‐cultivation  in  the  

Rujia   tradition.     When   one   self-­‐cultivates,   there   are   standards   of   ritual   and  

rectification   that   one   must   model.     In   Fajia   thought,   the   law   is   similar   to   those  

standards  of  behavior  seen  in  the  Rujia  tradition’s  self-­‐cultivation  practices.    This  is  

precisely   why   it   is   so   important   to   the   Fajia   tradition   that   the   law   be   clearly  

published,  so  that  all  people  can  know  and  understand  the  standards  to  which  they  

must   conform.     So,   Wang   asserted   that   in   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang   the   effective  

administering   of   rewards   and   punishments   is   the   very   foundation   of   the   law’s  

ability  to  create  habitually  conforming  subjects.    Thus,  the  definition  of  goodness  in  

the  Book  of  Lord  Shang  is  being  obedient  and  not  violating  the  law.193      

Wang  also  argues  that  the  notion  of  laws  in  the   Book  of  Lord  Shang  is  very  

different  from  that  in  the  Hanfeizi’s.    He  viewed  the  Hanfeizi’s  understanding  of  law  

to   be   a   significant   progression   from   the   anti-­‐intellectual,   militarist,   and   profit-­‐

driven   laws   of   the   Book  of  Lord  Shang.     Laws   used   to   simply   enrich   the   state   and  

strengthen   the   military   are   not   sufficiently   sophisticated   by   the   standards   of   the  

Hanfeizi.    As  the  aforementioned  Hanfeizi  passage  implicitly  points  out,  the  Book  of  

                                                                                                               
193  Wang  1975:  116;  See  Wang  Bangxiong  王邦雄.  Han  Fei  zheng  zhi  zhe  xue  zhi  yan  jiu  韓非政治哲

學之研究.  Taibei  臺北:  Si  li  Zhongguo  wen  hua  xue  yuan  san  min  zhu  yi  yan  jiu  suo  私立中國文化學
院三民主義研究所,  1975.

  79  
Lord  Shang’s  concept  of  laws  has  no  mechanism  to  ensure  the  proper  organization  

of   people’s   abilities   and   talents,   especially   after   they   have   been   determined   to   be  

suitable  for  office.    Thus,  the  Hanfeizi  admits  that  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang’s  notion  of  

laws  should  be  an  element  of  governance  for  an  ideal  ruler,  but  there  must  be  the  

additional   integration   of   particular   techniques   with   those   laws.     Then,   and   only  

then,  will  the  extreme  greed  of  the  high  ministers  be  adequately  held  in  check.    In  

“Deciding   Between   Two   Legalistic   Doctrines”,   the   Hanfeizi   reinforces   this   point  

when  it  states:    

Kung-­‐sun   Yang,   while   governing   Ch’in,   established   the   system   of  

denunciation   and   implication   and   called   the   real   culprit   to   account;  
he   organized   groups   of   ten   and   five   families   and   made   members   of  
the   same   group   share   one   another’s   crime.     Rewards   were   made  
liberal   and   certain;   punishments   were   made   severe   and   definite.    
Consequently,   the   people   exerted   their   forces   laboriously   but   never  
stopped,   pursued   the   enemy   perilously   but   never   retreated.    
Therefore,  the  state  became  rich  and  the  army  strong.    However,  if  he  
had   no   tact194  whereby   to   detect   villainy,   by   enriching   the   state   and  
strengthening   the   army   he   benefited   nobody   other   than   the  
subsequent   ministers…Therefore,   whenever   the   army   wins   a   war,  
chief  vassals  are  honoured;  whenever  the  state  expands  its  territory,  
private   feuds   are   created.     So   long   as   the   sovereign   had   no   tact  
whereby  to  detect  villainy,  even  though  Lord  Shang  improved  his  law  
ten   times,   the   ministers   in   turn   utilized   the   advantages.     Therefore,  
though  he  made  use  of  resources  of  strong  Ch’in,  Ch’in  failed  to  attain  
the  status  of  an  empire  in  the  course  of  several  decades,  which  was  

                                                                                                               
194  Liao  translated  the  character  shu  術  as  “tact”.  Although  it  is  difficult  to  have  complete  certainty  

over  the  exact  meaning  of  the  shu  throughout  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang,  it  is  clear  that  it  refers  to  skills  
with  which  the  ruler  approaches  structural  his  state’s  organization,  including  structural  aspects  and  
matters  of  personnel.  This  includes  more  than  simply  “tact”,  or  the  skill  with  which  a  ruler  deals  
with  his  subjects  or  difficult  issues.  Additionally,  this  study  will  show  that  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang’s  
political  vision  consistently  places  considerable  weight  on  the  structural  aspects  of  governance.    
Therefore,  this  study  translates  the  character  shu  術  as  “technique”.;  公孫鞅之治秦也，設告相坐而
責其實，連什伍而同其罪，賞厚而信，刑重而必，是以其民用力勞而不休，逐敵危而不卻，故其
國富而兵強；然而無術以知姦，則以其富強也資人臣而已矣。。。故戰勝則大臣尊，益地則私封
立，主無術以知姦也。商君雖十飾其法，人臣反用其資。故乘強秦之資數十年而不至於帝王者，
法（不）（雖）勤飾於官，主無術於上之患也。(Lau  and  Chen  2000:  43/131/19-­‐21,  43/131/24-­‐
26)  

  80  
 the  calamity  of  the  sovereign’s  tactlessness  despite  the  officials’  strict  
observance  of  law.  195    
   
It  is  important  to  understand  then,  what  “technique”  is  exactly.    The  noted  passages  

do  provide  some  hints.    First,  the  Hanfeizi,  in  an  earlier  section,  clearly  defined  it  as  

a  process  that  organizes  office  based  on  abilities.    Second,  this   passage  describing  

the  mutual  responsibility  groups,  it  is  described  as  a  necessary  tool  in  order  to  sift  

out   perverse   behavior   or   private   scheming   amongst   a   ruler’s   ministers.     Third,   it   is  

also   evident   that   the   Hanfeizi   adapted   his   notion   of   “technique”   from   an   pre-­‐

existing  conception  known  through  the  extant  “Shen  Buhai  fragments”.      

In   the   “Shen   Buhai   fragments”,   the   concept   of   “technique”   carries   the  

meaning  of  being  specifically  designed  for  ministers  and  those  in  office.    It  is  meant  

to  ensure  that  ministers  and  lower  officials  do  not  merely  think  through  the  narrow  

lens  of  their  own  self-­‐interest,  dwell  on  activities  or  objects  of  desire,  and  are  not  

merely  concerned  with  their  own  self-­‐promotion;  the  aim  is  to  ensure  their  loyalty  

and   sincerity   at   all   times.     Perhaps   more   importantly,   however,   “technique”   is  

meant  to  control  ministers,  in  part  through  its  unknowability.    In  other  words,  the  

ruler’s  specific  methods  or  laws  are  not  published  or  made  clear  for  all  subjects  to  

know.      Wang  argued  that  one  of  the  issues  with  this  concept  of  the  unknowability  

of  “technique”  is  that  it  is  difficult  to  put  forth  new  ideas  for  state  progression.    So,  if  

ministers  are  not  given  much  direction  or  guidance  about  the  ruler’s  vision  for  the  

state,   they   become   mere   administrators   that   secure   the   past   achievements   of  

others  rather  than  actually  becoming  innovative  thinkers  for  the  state’s  future  and  

development.    When  those  employed  by  the  ruler  are  merely  relegated  to  the  duties  
                                                                                                               
195 Liao  1959:  213-­‐215  

  81  
and  responsibilities  of  their  office  at  least  two  consequences  occur:    first,  they  will  

often,  if  not  always,  merely  hide  behind  the  instructions  of  their  superiors;  second,  

they   will   rarely   propose   any   new   ideas   to   help   the   state’s   future   advancement  

because   they   will   almost   always   remain   in   the   bounds   of   the   duties   and  

responsibilities  of  their  office.196      

The   Hanfeizi’s   notion   of   “technique”   is   different.     It   integrates   the   Book   of  

Lord  Shang’s   insistence   on   clear   laws   and   expectations,  which   is  the   exact   opposite  

of   the   emphasis   on   unknowability   in   the   “Shen   Buhai   fragments”.     The   Hanfeizi  

seeks  to  use  technique  to  construct  what  the  subjects  of  the  ruler  see  and  hear.    In  

other  words,  technique  in  the  Hanfeizi  is  another  form  of  controlling  those  the  ruler  

employs  by  using  it  to  both  inform  and  motivate  them.    Thus,  when  anyone  gives  

advice  to  the  ruler,  no  one  dares  to  speak  lies,  to  seek  to  be  manipulative  for  their  

own  ends,  or  to  be  silent.      

It  is  important  to  note  as  well  that  the  Hanfeizi  also  adapts  another  notion,  

positional  power  shi  勢,  introduced  in  another  text  in  extant  form  referred  to  as  the  

“Shenzi   fragments”,   and   combines   it   with   its   laws   and   technique.     According   to  

Wang,   the   aim   of   the   “Shenzi   fragments”,   like   so   many   Fajia   texts,   was   to   develop   a  

system   that   removed   the   biases   of   human   knowledge   and   estbalished   develop  

objective   standards   that   would   unify   the   ruler’s   subjects.     In   an   effort   to  promote  

such   a   system,   the   “Shenzi   fragments”   emphasized   the   ruler’s   positional   power,  

having   the   most   authority   within   the   state   hierarchy,   believing   that   it   was   what  

truly   enabled   him   to   cause   subjects   to   comply   with   his   objective   laws.     However,  

                                                                                                               
196  See  Wang  1975:  125-­‐133  

  82  
the  ruler’s  positional  power  does  not  make  laws  obsolete.    It  is  the  ruler’s  laws  that  

actually  provide  the  model  for  which  his  subjects  abandon  their  individual  opinions  

and  biases,  causing  their  hearts  and  minds  to  be  unified.    In  other  words,  like  the  

laws  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang,  the  ruler’s  objective  laws  effectively  unite  his  state,  

enabling  a  less  talented  or  even  less  moral  ruler  to  effectively  rule  with  positional  

power.      

Also,  the  “Shenzi  fragments”,  like  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang,  advocates  that  the  

ruler   establishes   (and   changes)   his   objective   laws   based   on   what   he   perceives   as  

the   circumstances   and   the   changes   in   the   patterns   in   nature,   rather   than   simply  

outcomes   or   the   results   of   policies.     According   to   Wang,   the   “Shenzi   fragments”  did  

not   trust   the   subjectivity   of   the   human   heart,   nor   did   it   advocate   the   ruler  

implementing   his   own   personal   views   into   policy.     Thus,   the   ruler’s   positional  

power   is   not   to   be   used   to   strengthen   his   personal   power,   increase   enrich   his  

personal   wealth,   or   dominate   his   subjects.     The   ruler’s   position   is   to   unify   the   state  

by  accommodating  the  propensity  to  work  for  oneself  in  human  nature.    In  this  way,  

the   ruler’s   laws   are   actually   meant   to   accommodate   the   laws   of   human   nature.    

Thus  the  ruler’s  laws  have  their  own  position  of  influence,  separate  but  obviously  

highly  correlated  to  the  ruler.      

Wang  also  argued  that  the  essence  of  the  rule  of  law  and  rule  of  positional  

power  in  the  “Shenzi  fragments”  has  a  deeply  Daoist  influence.    He  added  that  the  

“Shenzi   fragments”   did   not   adequately   respond   to   the   Rujia   claim   that,   although  

having  a  position  of  influence  is  important,  it  cannot  be  an  emphasis  because  good  

governance  depends  on  the  quality  of  person  given  the  position  of  influence.    If  an  

  83  
individual  is  immoral,  then  their  position  of  influence  will  be  used  for  those  ends,  

inevitably   causing   a   state’s   demise.     This   is   precisely   the   issue   the   Hanfeizi   raises  

with  the  notion  of  positional  power  in  the  “Shenzi  fragments”.      

Rather  than  accepting  the  assumption  that  positional  power  in  the  “Shenzi  

fragments”   has   an   almost   natural   strength   and   capability,   separate   from   the   ruler’s  

capabilities   or   quality   of   person,   the   Hanfeizi   argues   that   the   ruler’s   positional  

power   and   laws   should   be   virtually   inseparable.     Their   inseparability   would   not  

only   still   provide   a   natural   orientation   for   the   state   but   also   allow   the   state   to   be  

less   dependent   upon   the   virtue   or   talent   of   the   ruler   himself.     When   the   ruler’s  

influence  is  bound  up  in  his  laws  then  he  can  be  a  person  of  average  talent  or  virtue  

and   still   effectively   rule   the   state.     Since   it   considered   sages   to   be   few   and   the  

wicked  to  also  be  few  in  number,  the  Hanfeizi  asserts  that  the  state  apparatus  must  

be  designed  to  accommodate  the  average  ruler.      

As   a   result,   the   Hanfeizi   changes   the   “Shenzi   fragments”   concept   of   non-­‐

action  wu-­‐wei  無為  to  having  a  state  structure  that  leaves  plenty  of  room  for  one’s  

talents,   action,   and   natural   influence   (or   the   influence   of   circumstance)   in  

combination   with   laws   to   a   ruler   holding   the   two   handles   of   rewards   and  

punishments.       In   general,   it   synthesizes   and   builds   upon   the   ideas   of   its  

predecessors.     It   incorporates   the   Book  of  Lord  Shang’s   notion   of   laws,   but   views  

the  Book   of   Lord   Shang  as  neglecting  technique  shu  術.  It  incorporates  the  reliance  

on   political   power   and   authority   in   the   “Shenzi   fragments”.     It   brings   laws   and  

positional   power   together   whereas   the   “Shenzi   fragments”   keeps   them   separated.    

It   incorporates   the   technique   in   the   “Shen   Buhai   fragments”,   but   views   the   “Shen  

  84  
Buhai   fragments”   as   not   understanding   how   to   truly   establish   laws,   as   the   ruler’s  

methods  or  standards  are  not  published.    The  Hanfeizi  does  not  simply  inherit  the  

Book  of  Lord  Shang’s  notion  of  law,  it  builds  on  it.197  

In   Wang’s   analysis   we   see   a   substantial   effort   to   make   a   very   significant  

distinction  between  Book  of  Lord  Shang  and  the  Hanfeizi.    The  Book  of  Lord  Shang  is  

characterized   as   anti-­‐intellectual,   militarist,   profit-­‐driven,   and   unsophisticated  

relative   to   the   Hanfeizi.     Yet,   at   the   same   time,   Wang   points   to   the   Hanfeizi’s   own  

criticism  of  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang  for  evidence  for  this  claim.    This  reflects  what  

Paul  Goldin  has  identified  as  a  “tendency  to  extol  Han  Fei  as  the  great  synthesizer  

and   focus   on   the   Han   Fei   Zi   at   the   expense   of   other   ancient   Chinese   political  

philosophers”  due  to  “Han  Fei’s  self-­‐serving  depiction  of  Shen  Dao,  Shen  Buhai,  and  

Gongsun   Yang”. 198     This   tendency   interestingly   perpetuates   the   classical   Rujia  

dismissal   of   the   Shang   Yang,   the   state   of   Qin,   and   the   Book  of  Lord  Shang,   especially  

since   the   Shiji   also   claims   the   Han   Fei   was   a   student   of   the   notable   Rujia   thinker  

Xunzi.  

Conclusion  

It   is   evident   that   the   reforms   and   thought   that   inspired   the   works   in   the  

Book   of   Lord   Shang   and   other   Fajia   texts   was   implemented   during   a   time   of  

significant   changes   in   political   organization.     As   as   result,   the   very   definition   of  

nobility   and,   therefore,   its   place   within   a   state   system   of   organization   sparked  

debate  between  the  Rujia  and  Fajia  philosophical  positions.    The  Shiji  and  the  Xunzi  

illustrated  how  they  fundamentally  disagreed  over  the  definition  of  merit,  the  most  
                                                                                                               
197  Wang  1975:  120;  generally,  see  Wang  1975:  109-­‐120.  
198  Goldin  2011:  95          

  85  
important   tools   of   governance,   proper   military   methods,   and   assumptions   about  

human   behavior   in   addition   to   the   status   and   privileges   of   the   nobility.    

Disagreement,  however,  was  not  limited  to  the  debate  between  traditions.    Within  

the   Fajia   tradition,   the   “Shenzi   fragments”   and   the   “Shen   Buhai   fragments”  

articulated  their  own  ideas  about  how  the  ruler  and  his  administration  of  the  law  

should   be   understood.       Also,   we   saw   that   the   Hanfeizi   branded   itself   as   the  

synthesizer   of   the   great   ideas   within   the   Fajia   tradition   and   took   issue   with   how  

Shang   Yang,   Shenzi,   and   Shen   Buhai’s   theorizing   about   law.     Particularly   it   explains  

that  Shang  Yang’s  laws  failed  to  save  him  from  greedy  high  ministers,  he  neglected  

to  utilize  “technique”  in  conjunction  with  his  laws.    However,  this  study  will  show  

that   the   Hanfeizi’s   criticism   takes   attention   away   from   the   core   of   Fajia   thought.    

The   foundational   ideas   in   the   Book  of  Lord  Shang,   shared   by   other   Fajia   texts,   mark  

the   beginning   of   a   powerful   legacy   throughout   Chinese   imperial   history.

  86  
  
Chapter  III  
 
Underlying  Principles  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang  
 
  This   chapter   will   not   be   a   comprehensive   analysis   of   the   many   different  

ideas  found  in  the  Book   of   Lord   Shang.    Rather,  it  will  focus  on  the  most  important  

underlying   princples   of   goverance,   the   springboard   from   which   many   of   the   essays  

depart.     Although   the   reader   of   the   Book  of  Lord  Shang  will   come   across   passages  

that   appear   to   blatantly   contradict   each   other,   it   is   important   to   appreciate   that  

each   essay   is,   in   effect,   a   single   branch   among   many,   all   of   which   grew   from   the  

same  conceptual  root.    In  other  words,  this  study  argues  that  the  political  vision  in  

the  Book  of  Lord  Shang  must  be  understood  as  having  different  layers.    At  the  most  

foundational  layer,  there  is  a  core  set  of  principles  that  each  section  shares.    Beyond  

this   foundational   level,   there   is   certainly   disagreement.     However,   these  

disagreements  will  not  be  the  focus  here.    This  chapter  will  attempt  to  analyze  the  

central  ideas  at  the  root  of  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang.    

“An  Order  to  Cultivate  Wastelands”:  The  Book  of  Lord  Shang  and  
its  Approach  to  Governance  
   
“An  Order  to  Cultivate  Wastelands”  presents  many  of  the  key  tenets  that  are  

generally   represented   throughout   the   Book  of  Lord  Shang.     For   instance,   it   begins  

by  stating,  “If  there  is  no  delay  in  government  affairs,  then  perverse  officials  cannot  

pursue   private   profit   at   the   expense   of   the   people   and   the   duties   of   the   one  

hundred   officials   are   not   overlapping.     If   the   duties   of   the   one   hundred   officials   are  

not  overlapping,  then  farmers  will  have  days  of  surplus.    If  perverse  officials  cannot  

  87  
pursue  private  profit  at  the  expense  of  the  people,  then  farmers  will  not  experience  

ruin.     If   farmers   do   not   experience   ruin   and   they   see   days   of   surplus,   then  

wastelands  will  necessarily  be  cultivated.”199    One  of  the  main  issues  in  this  passage  

is   preventing   the   officials’   pursuit   of   personal   profit   to   be   at   the   expense   of   the  

people.     This   is   an   indication   of   two   important   concerns   that   are   recurring  

throughout   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang.     First,   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang   consistently  

defines   perversity   in   terms   in   which   a   subject’s   activity   fails   to   positively   affect  

what  the  ruler  defines  as  the  public  welfare.200  Second,  one  of  the  most  important  

tasks   of   the   state   is   to   prevent   the   pursuit   of   “private   profit”   si   li   私利   of   the  

“perverse”  xie  邪.201    

One  of  the  main  strategies  to  prevent  the  perverse  pursuit  of  private  profit  is  

to   establish   orthodoxy;   that   is,   state   infrastructure   and   a   cultural   apparatus   that  

both   encourage   specific   conditions   within   which   subjects   pursue   private   profit   and  

discourage   all   other   conditions.   For   instance,   “An   Order   to   Cultivate   Wastelands”  

states,    

If   the   ruler,   not   based   on   any   outside   influence,   bestows   rank   and  
position,  then  the  people  will  not  value  [outside]  learning  while  not  
lightly   valuing   agricultural   matters.     If   the   people   do   not   value  

                                                                                                               
199  無宿治，則邪官不及為私利於民，而百官之情不相稽。則農有餘日。邪官不及為私利於民，則

農不敗。農不敗而有餘日，則草必墾矣。(Gao  2011:  32)  

200  For  instance,  “Policies”  states,  “The  desires  of  a  perishing  state  are  to  debase  rank,  make  light  of  

emoluments,  and  to  have  subjects  who  do  not  work  but  eat,  do  not  engage  in  warfare  but  achieve  
glory,  lack  rank  and  title  but  are  still  revered,  lack  emoluments  but  are  wealthy,  lack  official  position  
but  are  still  leaders.    These  kinds  of  people  are  called  the  perverse.” 亡國之欲，賤爵輕祿，不作而
食，不戰而榮，無爵而尊，無祿而富，無官而長，此之謂姦民。(Gao  2011:  150)  
201  In  this  instance,  the  idea  of  “private”  si  私  refers  to  the  non-­‐public  space,  including  individual  

persons  or  households.    The  term  “profit”  li  利  mainly  refers  to  material  gain.    As  we  will  see,  
throughout  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang,  the  material  gain  of  individual  persons  or  households  is  seen  as  
a  threat  to  public  welfare  unless  it  is  earned  under  certain  conditions.    The  pursuit  of  private  profit  
outside  of  the  preferred  conditions  of  the  state  is  precisely  what  defines  the  “perverse”  xie 邪.  

  88  
 [outside]  learning  (and  don’t  lightly  value  agricultural  matters),  then  
they   will   be   ignorant   [in   outside   endeavors].     If   the   people   are  
ignorant  [in  outside  endeavors],  then  there  are  no  outside  endeavors.    
If   there   are   no   outside   endeavors,   then   the   people   will   exert  
themselves   in   agriculture   and   will   not   be   lazy.   If   the   people   do   not  
lightly   value   agricultural   matters,   then   the   state   will   be   secure   and  
not   in   peril.     If   the   state   is   not   in   peril   and   the   people   exert  
themselves   in   agriculture   and   are   not   lazy,   then   wastelands   will  
necessarily  be  cultivated.202  
 
One   of   the   most   important   instruments   a   ruler   can   use   to   establish   orthodoxy   is  

rewards,  which,  in  this  passage,  specifically  refers  to  awards  of  rank  and  position.    

This  anticipates  the  fact  that  people  will  pursue  whatever  opportunities  will  allow  

them   to   obtain   private   profit.     So,   if   the   ruler   can   establish   a   condition   in   which  

those   opportunities   are   pursued   within   orthodoxy,   then   their   pursuit   of   private  

profit   can   be   manipulated   and   exploited.     Secure   control   of   his   subjects’   behavior  

allows  a  ruler  to  most  effectively  organize  his  state  to  produce  wealth  and  strength.      

One   of   the   main   threats   to   the   establishment   of   orthodoxy   is   the   state’s  

inability  to  impede  what  the  above  passage  referred  to  as  “outside  endeavors”.    The  

passage   asserts   that   subjects   will   not   value   outside   learning   only   when   they   have  

clearly  demarcated  opportunities  that  will  allow  them  to  obtain  private  profit.    This  

renders  rewards  ultimately  indispensable  to  the  thought  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang  

and   other   Fajia   texts.       This   is   likely   what   is   meant   when   the   above   passage   and  

other  chapters  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang  express  the  desire  for  the  ruler’s  subjects  

to   be   “ignorant”.     It   does   not   mean   that   the   ideal   subject   is   generally  

unknowledgable   or   incapable.     The   ideal   subject   is   someone   who   is   extraordinarily  

                                                                                                               
202  無以外權任爵與官，則民不貴學問，又不賤農。民不貴學問則愚，愚則無外交，無外交，（則

國勉農而不偷，民不賤農，則國安不殆。）「則國安不殆。民不賤農，勉農而不偷。」國安不殆，
勉農而不偷，則草必墾矣。(Gao  2011:  33)  

  89  
knowledgable  and  capable  within  the  limits  of  the  reality  presented  to  him  by  his  

ruler.     He   is   just   lacking   knowledge   in   all   opportunities   outside   of   that   which   is  

encouraged  by  the  ruler.    One  of  the  most  important  realms  in  which  the  ideal  ruler  

should   bestow   rewards   is   that   of   agricultural   production.     The   economies   of  

various  states  during  this  period  were  generally  agrarian.    As  noted,  the  historical  

figure   Shang   Yang   is   actually   quite   well-­‐known   in   traditional   Chinese   history   for  

changing  the  tax  system  in  the  Qin  state  to  one  that  taxed  families  on  the  amount  of  

landholdings   and   its   yield.203     Knowledge   and   competence   in   agriculture   had   an  

enormous   impact   on   state   welfare.     Therefore,   outside   endeavors   are   viewed   not  

simply  competing  tasks  for  the  attention  of  the  ruler’s  subjects.    They  are  a  threat  to  

state  welfare.  

  How  exactly  does  the  ruler  facilitate  ignorance  yu  愚  in  outside  endeavors?    

In   addition   to   providing   rewards   that   demarcate   what   opportunities   are  

encouraged,  the  Book   of   Lord   Shang  asserts  that  a  ruler  should  also  block  all  other  

                                                                                                               
203  Therefore,  it  is  no  surprise  that  “An  Order  to  Cultivate  Waste  Lands”  also  states,  “If  the  salaries  of  

nobility  are  large,  making  the  amount  of  taxes  received  large,  then  there  is  a  large  amount  of  
inactive  persons.    This  brings  ruin  to  agriculture.    If  the  state,  based  on  the  amount  of  inactive  
persons,  imposed  a  tax,  increasing  their  corvée  labor,  then  the  perverse  and  illicit,  along  with  the  
idle  and  lazy,  will  have  no  means  by  which  to  sustain  themselves.    If  these  people  have  no  means  by  
which  to  sustain  themselves,  then  they  must  necessarily  engage  in  agriculture.    If  they  engage  in  
agriculture,  then  waste  lands  will  necessarily  be  cultivated.” 祿厚而稅多，食口眾者，敗農者也。
則以其食口之數，賤而重使之。則辟淫游惰之民無所於食。民無所於食則必農，農則草必墾矣。
(Gao  2011:  34)  Again,  the  chapter  reiterates  the  importance  of  agriculture.    At  the  same  time,  it  also  
introduces  another  aspect  of  Shang  Yang’s  reputation  in  traditional  Chinese  history,  his  relentless  
antagonism  towards  the  privileged  status  of  the  nobility.  In  this  passage,  there  is  a  tight  association  
between  nobilities  with  large  salaries  and  those  considered  to  be  “inactive”.    Again,  this  hints  at  the  
key  framework  with  which  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang  perceives  the  ruler’s  subjects.    Are  their  pursuits  
considered  to  be  for  their  own  private  profit  and  enrichment  or  are  they  pursuing  profit  through  the  
ruler’s  provided  channels?    It  is  likely  that  the  lack  of  pursuing  private  profit  within  the  ruler’s  
provided  channels  or  the  pursuit  of  private  profit  outside  of  the  ruler’s  provided  channels  are  both  
viewed  as  inactivity.    In  this  passage  specifically,  one  who  is  not  exerting  himself  in  agriculture  is  
likely  considered  to  be  “inactive”.  

  90  
pursuits   for   private   profit   outside   of   those   provided   by   the   ruler.     For   instance,   “An  

Order  to  Cultivate  Wastelands”  states,    

Cause  merchants  to  have  no  opportunities  to  buy  grain  and  farmers  
to   have   no   opportunities   to   sell   grain.     If   farmers   have   no  
opportunities   to   sell   grain,   then   the   lazy   farmers   will   make   diligent  
efforts   in   agriculture.     If   merchants   have   no   opportunities   to   buy  
grain,  then  in  years  of  abundance  they  cannot  increase  their  leisure.    
If  they  cannot  increase  their  leisure,  then,  in  famine  years,  there  is  no  
wealth   and   profit.     If   there   is   no   wealth   and   profit,   then   merchants  
are   fearful.     If   they   are   fearful,   then   they   will   desire   to   engage   in  
agriculture.     Now,   if   the   lazy   farmers   make   an   effort   and   merchants  
desire   to   engage   in   farming,   then   wastelands   will   necessarily   be  
cultivated.204  
 
In  essence,  the  activities  of  merchants  should  be  discouraged  by  the  state  and  the  

ruler’s   policies   must   impede   the   development   of   commerce.     However,   more  

striking   than   the   anti-­‐merchant   sentiment   here   is   the   advocacy   for   closing   off  

pursuits   of   private   profit   that   the   ruler   believes   do   not   directly   contribute   to   the  

wealth  and  strength  of  the  state,  notably  agricultural  production.    This  allows  the  

ruler   to   accomplish   at   least   three   objectives.     First,   it   effectively   communicates   a  

part  of  the  ruler’s  overall  economic  and  cultural  vision  for  the  state.      Second,  and  it  

motivates   subjects   to   pursue   the   obtainment   of   profit   within   orthodoxy.     When  

alternative   paths   consist   of   policies   designed   to   substantially   limit   or   completely  

eliminate   subjects’   abilities   to   pursue   profit,   orthodoxy   becomes   the   only   viable  

alternative   to   sustain   oneself.     This   of   course   would   cause   merchants   to   lose  

interest   in   commercial   activity   and   seek   other   paths   that   will   provide   them   with  

more   opportunity   to   obtain   private   profit.     The   above   passage   argues   that   these  

                                                                                                               
204  使商無得糴，農無得糶。農無得糶，則窳惰之農勉疾。商不得糴，則多歲不加樂。多歲不加樂

，則饑歲無裕利。無裕利則商怯，商怯則欲農。窳惰之農勉疾，商欲農，則草必墾矣。(Gao  2011:  
34)  

  91  
conditions  will  also  prevents  “lazy”  farmers  from  not  fully  engaging  in  agriculture  

alone,   as   they   would   no   longer   be   able   to   avoid   an   emphasis   on   production   by  

turning  to  markets  (the  merchants).    At  the  same  time,  however,  it  will  also  prevent  

more   industrious   farmers   that   did   not   use   markets   as   an   excuse   to   farm   less   but   as  

an  opportunity  to  earn  more  from  their  production.    

It  is  important  to  note  that  both  of  these  objectives  of  that  state  described  in  

these   passages   seem   to   assume   at   least   three   characteristics   about   human  

behavior.     The   first   characteristic   is   that   human   beings   will   generally   pursue  

private  profit  and  it  is  the  primary  motivating  force  driving  their  behavior.    This  is  

illustrated  in  the  above  passage  expressing  anti-­‐commercial  sentiments.    Consider  

the  case  of  the  lazy  farmer.    The  text  assumes  that  he  is  lazy  because  his  dealings  

with   the   merchant   allow   him   to   make   significant   profits   selling   his   grain   without  

actually   producing   as   much   as   he   is   capable   of   producing.     However,   if   the   farmer’s  

total  satisfaction  when  not  harvesting  grain  is  greater  than  when  he  produces  grain  

and   yields   a   significant   profit,   then   limiting   the   profits   he   yields   from   harvesting  

grain   will   not   motivate   him   to   produce   more   grain.   Moreover,   it   should   be  

understood   that   the   laziness   of   the   farmer   is   defined   in   the   terms   of   orthodoxy.     As  

a   result,   the   very   notion   of   laziness   is   unlikely   to   be   referring   to   a   condition   in  

which  the  subject  does  not  want  to  engage  in  any  physical  activity.    Rather,  it  refers  

to   a   condition   in   which   there   is   a   lack   of   agricultural   productivity   where   the  

reasons  for  minimal  productivity  are  numerous.  

The   second   characteristic,   a   corollary   to   the   first,   is   that   deprivation,   or  

relative   deprivation   of   private   profit,   is   a   motivating   condition   for   people.     In   the  

  92  
case   of   the   lazy   farmer,   if   he   values   laziness   more   than   obtaining   profit,   then   he  

would  not  experience  any  significant  lack  or  denial  of  what  he  desires.    Therefore,  

in   order   for   the   ruler’s   barriers   to   commerce   effectively   to   motivate   human   beings,  

they  cannot  leave  subjects  resigned  to  conditions  of  (relative)  deprivation.    In  other  

words,   the   aim   is   for   the   people   to   respond   to   such   conditions   by   pursuing   new  

opportunities   that   will   allow   them   to   obtain   private   profit,   such   as   by   cultivating  

wastelands  to  seize  the  opportunity  to  attain  highers  agricultural  productivity.      

This   assumed   human   characteristic   helps   explain   the   advocacy   for   harsh  

punishments  in  “An  Order  to  Cultivate  Wastelands”  and  the  rest  of  the  Book  of  Lord  

Shang.    For  instance,  “An  Order  to  Cultivate  Wastelands”  states,  “If  punishments  are  

made   heavy   and   their   implementation   is   guided   by   the   principle   of   guilt   by  

association,  then  petty  and  irascible  people  will  not  dare  fight,  crude  and  stubborn  

people  will  not  engage  in  litigation,  lazy  people  will  not  dare  be  inactive,  those  who  

waste   their   wealth   will   not   be   prosperous,   and   the   clever,   the   flatterers,   and   the  

evil-­‐hearted   will   not   dare   deceive.     If   these   five   kinds   of   people   do   not   appear,   then  

wastelands   will   necessarily   be   cultivated.” 205     This   passage   does   not   solely  

characterize   punishment   as   a   means   by   which   a   ruler   can   eliminate   misbehaving  

subjects  in  his  state,  but  rather  also  a  way  to  reform  them.    In  fact,  punishments  are  

viewed   as   a   behavior-­‐altering   mechanism   in   a   similar   way   to   the   aforementioned  

conditions  of  (relative)  deprivation.    Punishments  are  meant  to  motivate  a  change  

in   the   way   subjects   pursue   private   profit.     So   it   is   not   enough   for   subjects   to  

associate   a   particular   crime   with   its   codified   punishment.     Nor   is   punishment  

                                                                                                               
205  重刑而連其罪，則褊急之民不斗，狠剛之民不訟，怠惰之民不游，費資之民不作，巧諛，惡心

之民無變也。五民者不生於境內，則草必墾矣。(Gao  2011:  38)  

  93  
simple  for  deterrence;  it  is  meant  to  communicate  the  ruler’s  economic  and  cultural  

vision   for   the   state   and   motivate   people   to   contribute   to   state-­‐approved   pursuits.    

Like  the  deterrence  effect,  punishment  should  not  only  motivate  the  punished,  but  

also  all  who  witness  it.    

This  may  also  explain  why  pardons  or  escaping  punishment  in  the  “An  Order  

to   Cultivate   Wastelands”   is   also   looked   upon   with   such   distaste.     It   states,   “If   the  

people  are  not  allowed  to  petition  officials  on  behalf  of  wrongdoers  or  to  provide  

them  with  food,  then  the  perverse  will  not  have  patrons.    If  the  perverse  have  no  

patrons,   then   wrongdoing   does   not   have   support.     If   wrongdoing   does   not   have  

support,  then  those  that  are  perverse  have  no  support.    If  those  that  are  perverse  

have  no  support,  farmers  will  not  suffer  harm.    If  farmers  will  not  suffer  harm,  then  

wastelands   will   necessarily   be   cultivated.” 206     If   subjects   are   able   to   escape  

punishment,   they   how   can   they   or   those   that   witness   their   punishment   be  

motivated?     Moreover,   it   is   particularly   interesting   that   wrongdoing   is   ultimately  

characterized  as  that  which  harms  farming,  the  undeniably  important  channel  for  

the  sake  of  state  development.    Hence,  another  purpose  of  punishments  is  revealed:  

subjects  are  meant  to  protect  what  the  state  holds  sacred.  They  must  support  the  

state’s  endeavors  to  maximize  its  own  development,  however  it  chooses  to  define  it.    

In  the  case  of  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang,  the  state  defines  its  development  through  its  

wealth   and   strength   富 國 強 兵 ,   through   agriculture   production   and   military  

might.207    

                                                                                                               
206  無 得為罪人請於吏而饟食之，則姦民無主。姦民無主，則為姦不勉。（農民不傷）「為姦不勉，

則」姦民無樸。姦民無樸，則農民不敗。農民不敗，則草必墾矣。(Gao  2011:  43)  

207  “The  Unification  of  Words”  explicitly  says,  “Therefore,  as  for  one  who  administers  the  state,  he  

  94  
 Hence,   rewards   and   punishments   are   inseparable.   Each   tool   depends   on   the  

other   for   the   sake   of   stimulating   state   development.   Zhengyuan   Fu’s   interpretation  

of  Fajia  governance  was  that  it  emphasized  punishments  since  it  was  described  the  

relationship  between  rewards  and  punishments  stating  “the  most  efficient  method  

to   invoke   obedience   among   the   subjects   is   to   instill   fear   in   their  hearts”.208     Though  

he   certainly   identifies   the   importance   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang   places   on  

punishments,   Fu   understates   the   role   of   rewards.     This   is   partly   due   to   the   fact   that  

Fu  cites  “obedience”  as  the  ultimate  objective  of  punishment  rather  than  enriching  

the   state   and   strengthening   its   armed   forces.     When   conceptualizing   punishment  

within   this   context,   it   not   only   becomes   clear   why   it   is   misguided   to   consider   the  

bestowal   of   rewards   as   a   mere   supplement   to   punishment,   but   we   also   can  

recognize  the  consistent  conceptual  link  to  the  case  of  the  lazy  farmer.  

It   should   also   be   mentioned   that   Fu   overlooks   the   fact   several   chapters   in  

the   Book  of  Lord  Shang   genuinely   advocate   for   large   rewards,   notably   in   the  “The  

Cultivation  of  Political  Assessment”,  “External  and  Internal  Affairs”,  and  “Rewards  

and   Punishments”.     In   fact,   Cheng   Liang-­‐shu   argued   that   originally   Shang   Yang  

advocated  harsh  punishments  and  large  rewards.    However  after  what  he  labeled  

the  first  two  phases  of  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang’s  formation,  Cheng  claims  that  some  

of  Shang  Yang’s  intellectual  descendants  began  to  advocate  for  harsh  punishments  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
consolidates  their  strength  through  enriching  the  state  and  the  strengthening  the  armed  forces.”  故
治國者，其摶力也，以富國強兵也。(Gao  2011:  93)
208  Fu  1996:  72  

  95  
and   light   rewards.209     So   the   disagreement   represents   two   different   conclusions  

reached  about  the  means  by  which  the  same  ideal  can  be  attained.210  

Merchants   who   engage   in   the   buying   and   selling   of   grain   would   be  

perverting   the   boundaries   between   farming   and   commerce.     Their   activities   are  

considered  those  that  contaminate  the  efforts  of  those  engaged  in  agriculture,  the  

primary   means   by   which   the   ruler   can   enrich   the   state   富國.     As   a   result,   the  

punishment  or  reformation  of  merchants  is  necessary.    They  may  take  the  form  of  

(relative)   deprivation   through   discouraging   policy,   which   can   include   but   is   not  

limited   to,   high   taxes,   bans,   or   other   policies   that   impede   the   obtainment   of  

relatively  high  private  profits.    They  may  also  take  the  form  of  harsh  punishment,  

which  can  include  but  is  not  limited  to,  death,  mutilation,  or  other  forms  of  violence  

that   impede   the   perversion   of   the   state-­‐constructed   channels   for   the   obtainment   of  

private  profit.211    Due  to  the  first  assumed  characteristic  of  human  behavior,  human  

                                                                                                               
209  Cheng  1987:  353;  Cheng  actually  continues  to  say  that  in  the  third  phase  of  its  formation,  

although  the  notion  of  implementing  harsh  punishments  and  small  rewards  was  generally  
preserved,  subfamilies  of  Shang  Yang’s  textual  tradition  even  began  suggesting  that  no  rewards  
should  be  bestowed.  Cheng  points  to  “Policies”  as  proof  of  the  subfamily  within  Shang  Yang’s  
intellectual  current  that  did  not  advocate  for  the  bestowal  of  rewards.    This  would  certainly  indicate  
that  rewards  should  be  considered  ancillary  measures  for  punishments.    However,  this  study  
disagrees  with  Cheng’s  interpretation  of  the  conception  of  rewards  in  “Policies”.    The  next  chapter  
will  present  the  argument  against  Cheng’s  assertion  in  more  detail.;  See  Cheng  Liang-­‐shu  (Zheng  
Liangshu)  鄭良樹.  Shang  Yang  ji  qi  xue  pai  商鞅及其學派.  Taibei  台北:  Taiwan  xue  sheng  shu  ju  臺灣
學生書局,  1987.  
210  In  other  words,  although  there  may  surely  be  multiple  strands  of  thought  evident  within  the  Book  

of  Lord  Shang,  the  various  positions  are  in  agreement  as  to  the  necessity  of  rewards.    Whatever  
method  is  chosen,  there  is  no  disagreement  that  the  space  rewards  represent  within  the  state  must  
be  protected  through  the  elimination  or  reformation  of  those  who  pervert  them.      
211  It  is  also  important  to  note  that  the  rationale  for  punishment  also  helps  to  explain  the  Book  of  

Lord  Shang’s  attitude  toward  migration,  even  domestically.    For  instance,  “An  Order  to  Cultivate  
Waste  Lands”  states,  “If  there  is  the  prohibition  of  hotels  receiving  travelers,  the  perverse,  the  
artificial,  the  cunning,  and  the  scheming,  and  those  who  confuse  the  minds  of  farmers  are  unable  to  
travel,  then  hotel-­‐keepers  will  have  no  means  to  sustain  themselves  and  will  necessarily  engage  in  
agriculture.    If  they  engage  in  agriculture,  then  waste  lands  will  necessarily  be  cultivated.”  廢逆旅，
則姦偽，躁心，私交，疑農之民不行，逆旅之民無所於食，則必農。農則草必墾矣。(Gao  2011:  
36)  Again,  hotels  that  receive  travelers  are  seen  as  aiding  and  abetting  the  confusion  of  “the  minds  

  96  
beings   will   necessarily   respond   to   the   (relative)   deprivation   or   punishment   by  

engaging  in  pursuits  that  do  not  impede  their  pursuits  of  profit  to  the  same  degree.      

Therefore,  the  third  characteristic  of  human  behavior  that  is  assumed  is  that  

human   beings   will   calculate   profit   enough   to   pursue   the   opportunities   that   will  

allow   them   to   obtain   relatively   high   amounts   of   private   profit.     People   will   be  

discriminating   enough   in   their   efforts   to   alleviate   their   (relative)   deprivation  that  

they  will  not  ultimately  choose  another  path  that  is  blocked  or  provides  them  with  

little   opportunity   to   obtain   profit.    For   example,   “An   Order   to   Cultivate   Wastelands”  

also   states,   “If   the   prices   of   wine   and   meat   are   raised   and   their   taxes   increased,  

causing  their  cost  to  increase  tenfold,  then  merchants  will  be  few  and  farmers  and  

high  ministers  will  not  be  able  to  enjoy  excessive  drinking  and  eating.    If  merchants  

are  few,  then  the  ruler  does  not  waste  his  grain.    If  the  people  are  unable  to  enjoy  

excessive  drinking,  then  they  cannot  be  lazy  in  agriculture.    If  high  ministers  are  not  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
of  farmers”.    Travelers  are  viewed  as  those  who  bring  into  question  the  demarcating  lines  provided  
by  rewards.    They  cause  farmers  to  question  the  means  by  which  they  obtain  their  private  profits.    If  
farmers  see  that  those  who  travel  from  place  to  place  can  obtain  personal  profit  while  also  not  being  
tied  down  to  a  plot  of  farmland,  then  they  may  be  inclined  to  engage  in  pursuits  outside  of  the  state’s  
established  opportunities  like  agriculture.    Moreover,  even  if  farmers  remain  in  agriculture,  but  
travel  from  plot  to  plot,  they  will  lack  the  focus  to  fully  cultivate  the  farmland. This  is  confirmed  
when  “An  Order  to  Cultivate  Waste  Lands”  also  states,  “If  people  are  not  allowed  to  freely  migrate,  
then  the  ignorant  and  ignorant  farmers  will  have  no  means  by  which  to  sustain  themselves.    
Consequently,  they  will  necessarily  turn  to  [seriously]  engaging  in  agriculture.    If  the  minds  of  the  
ignorant  people  are  united  in  purpose,  then  farmers  will  find  peace.    If  farmers  find  peace  and  
ignorant  farmers  desire  to  engage  in  agriculture,  then  waste  lands  will  necessarily  be  cultivated.” 使
民無得擅從，則誅愚亂農農民，無所於食，而必農；愚心躁欲立民壹意，則農民必靜。農靜誅愚
，則草必墾矣。(Gao  2011:  38)  In  this  passage,  a  condition  in  which  subjects  are  allowed  to  freely  
migrate  not  only  confuses  the  minds  of  farmers,  but  it  interferes  with  the  ruler’s  attempt  to  establish  
unity  in  purpose  民壹意.    This  unity  in  purpose  is  clearly  one  in  which  the  efforts  of  the  ruler’s  
subjects  are  consolidated  into  agriculture.    Upon  a  consolidation  of  the  efforts  of  the  ruler’s  subjects  
in  agriculture,  farmers  will  no  longer  be  confused  by  other  individuals  who  pursue  private  profit  
outside  of  agriculture.    Thus,  the  above  passage  describes  them  as  necessarily  finding  security  or  
peace  with  agriculture  農民必靜.    Again,  agriculture  is  a  ruler-­‐approved  channel  within  which  the  
ruler’s  subjects  are  encouraged  to  pursue  private  profit.    Therefore,  travelers  and  hotels  that  
accommodate  them  must  be  deprived  of  opportunities  to  obtain  private  profit  so  that  it  may  
motivate  travelers  and  hotelkeepers  to  change  the  channels  through  which  they  seek  to  obtain  
private  profit,  namely  agriculture.  

  97  
able  to  enjoy  excessive  drinking  and  eating,  then  state  affairs  are  not  delayed,  while  

the  ruler  is  not  erroneous  in  promotions.    If  the  ruler  does  not  waste  the  grain  and  

the   people   are   not   lazy   in   agriculture,   then   wastelands   will   necessarily   be  

cultivated.”   212  Again,   the   connection   between   merchants   and   the   lack   of  

productivity   of   farmers   is   explicitly   stated.     In   this   case,   as   opposed   to   merchants  

buying   grain   from   lazy   farmers   at   inflated   prices,   it   is   the   merchants   selling   the  

pleasures   of   meat   and   wine   that   causes   farmers   (and   even   high   ministers)   to   be  

lazy.  However,  the  above  passage  describes  how,  without  officially  meting  out  state  

punishment,   laws   and   policies   are   constructed   so   that   (relative)   deprivation   will  

inevitably   be   experienced   by   those   who   attempt   to   pursue   private   profit   outside   of  

certain   channels.     Perhaps   most   importantly,   the   passage   assumes   that   most  

merchants   will   not   continue   to   pursue   profit   through   engaging   in   commerce.    

Rather,   they   will   recognize   that,   relative   to   those   who   engage   in   agriculture,   they  

will  still  be  relatively  deprived  of  the  opportunity  to  maximize  their  obtainment  of  

private   profit.     Therefore,   laws   that   deprive   merchants   of   significant   profits   will  

necessarily  cause  them  to  choose  to  engage  in  agriculture  rather  than  engaging  in  

commerce  for  the  sake  of  profit.    State  configuration  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang,  even  

before   the   bestowal   or   rewards   and   the   application   of   punishments,   reflects   the  

ruler’s  priorities  for  state  development.  

                                                                                                               
212 貴酒肉之價，重其租，令十倍其樸，然則商估少，農不能喜酣奭，大臣不為荒飽。商估少，則
上不費粟。民不能（善）「喜」酣奭，則農不慢。大臣不荒，則國事不稽，主無過舉。上不費粟
，民不慢農，則草必墾矣。(Gao  2011:  37)  
 

  98  
 “The   Calculation   of   Land”   chapter   is,   in   many   respects,   in   accordance   with  

“An   Order   to   Cultivate   Waste   Lands”   and   the   general   tone   of   the   Book   of   Lord  

Shang,  especially  in  its  description  of  human  behavior.    It  includes  the  passage:    

Those  who  administer  the  state  are  able  to  completely  extract  profit  
from   the   Earth   and   cause   people   to   sacrifice   themselves   [for   the   sake  
of   the   court].     If   it   is   like   this,   then   fame   and   profit   will   both   arrive  
because   it   is   the   nature   of   people   to   pursue   food   when   they   are  
starving,  pursue  rest  when  they  are  tired,  pursue  pleasure  when  they  
are   suffering,   and   pursue   glory   when   they   are   shamed.     This   is   the  
nature   of   people.     People,   in   their   pursuit   of   profit,   abandon   the  
standards  of  ritual.    For  their  pursuit  of  fame,  they  violate  their  own  
natures.    How  can  we  conclude  it  is  like  this?    For  instance,  robbers  
and   thieves   violate   the   laws   of   their   prince   above   and   fail   to  
exemplify   ritual   principles   amongst   the   people   below.     Their  
reputations   are   shamed   and   their   lives   are   in   danger,   yet   they   are  
unwilling   to   give   it   up.     This   is   for   the   sake   of   profit.     As   for   the  
Knights  of  early  antiquity,  their  clothes  did  not  warm  their  skin  and  
their  food  did  not  fill  their  bellies.    In  their  hearts  they  endured  much  
pain,   while   their   four   limbs   were   weary   and   their   five   viscera  
unavoidably  malfunctioned.    Yet,  their  hearts  were  able  to  continue.    
This  is  not  due  to  their  nature,  but  rather  they  did  this  for  the  sake  of  
fame.    Therefore  it  is  said:  ‘Where  fame  and  profit  reside  is  where  the  
people  will  follow.’ If  the  ruler  grasps  the  handles  of  fame  and  profit,  
he  is  able  to  acquire  their  merit.    This  is  the  technique  of  politics.    A  
sage   carefully   examines   his   authority   in   order   to   grasp   the  
aforementioned  handles.    He  examines  technique  in  order  to  employ  
the   people.     This   technique   is   the   method   of   ministers   and   rulers   and  
the   essence   of   the   state.     As   for   a   state   of   ten   thousand   chariots  
neglecting  this  technique  and  not  being  in  danger  or  the  prince  and  
his   ministers   neglecting   their   methods   and   there   not   being   chaos,  
never   was   there   such   a   situation.     In   the   present   generation,   rulers  
desire   to   open   up   their   lands,   and   administer   the   people,   while   not  
examining   the   aforementioned   technique.     Ministers   desire   to  
complete   their   tasks,   while   not   establishing   their   technique.    
Therefore,   states   possess   disobedient   subjects,   and   the   ruler   has  
disobedient   ministers.     Therefore,   a   sage,   in   administering   a   state,  
domestically   commands   the   people   to   engage   in   agriculture.     Abroad,  
he   commands   them   to   pursue   military   merit.     As   for   engaging   in  
agriculture,   the   people   find   it   toilsome.     As   for   engaging   in   war,   the  
people   consider   it   dangerous.     People   are   willing   to   engage   in   what  
they  find  toilsome  and  do  what  they  find  to  be  dangerous  by  means  
of  calculation.    The  people,  in  their  lives,  calculate  profit  and,  in  facing  
death,  ponder  how  to  achieve  fame.    So,  the  ruler  has  no  choice  but  to  

  99  
 carefully   examine   the   channels   through   which   people   achieve   fame  
and  profit.    If  the  profit  springs  from  the  Earth,  then  the  people  will  
exhaust   their   strength   in   the   Earth.     If   fame   springs   from   warfare,  
then   the   people   will   risk   their   lives   in   warfare.     Thus,   if   the   ruler,  
domestically,  is  able  to  cause  the  people  to  exhaust  their  strength  in  
the  Earth,  then  wastelands  will  not  remain  uncultivated.    If  the  ruler,  
abroad,  is  able  to  cause  the  people  to  risk  their  lives  in  warfare,  then  
he   will   conquer   his   enemies   in   warfare.     Since   he   conquers   his  
enemies   in   warfare   and   wastelands   will   not   remain   uncultivated,  
then   the   ruler   can   sit   and   attain   the   achievements   of   wealth   and  
strength.213    
 
There   are   a   few   reasons   why  “The   Calculation   of   Land”   represents   a   notably  

more   sophisticated   rationalization   of   human   behavior   than   the   assumptions   in   “An  

Order  to  Cultivate  Waste  Lands”.    First,  this  passage  formally  categorizes  all  objects  

of   desire   or   those   that   motivate   human   behavior   into   two   categories:   profit   and  

fame.    The  pursuit  of  profit  is  considered  to  be  in  accordance  with  human  nature,  

while   the   pursuit   of   fame   is   considered   to   be   a   violation   of   human   nature.     The  

passage   does   not   describe   the   so-­‐called   “natural”   pursuit   of   profit   in   a   distinctly  

more   positive   light.     It,   like   the   pursuit   of   fame,   is   not   only   problematic   when   it  

violates   the   law   of   the   ruler,   but   also   because   it   also   creates   enemies   and   builds  

resentment   amongst   one’s   peers.     According   to   the   passage,   robbers   and   thieves   fit  

this  category  of  person.    Since  their  motivation  for  private  profit  is  so  strong  that  

                                                                                                               
213  夫治國者，能盡地利而致民死者，名與利交至。民之性，饑而求食，勞而求佚，苦則索樂，辱

則求榮，此百姓之情也。民之求利，失禮之法；求名，失性之常。奚以論其然也？今夫盜賊上犯
君上之所禁，而下失臣民之禮，故名辱而身危；猶不止者，利也。其上世之士，衣不煖膚，食不
滿腸，苦其志意，勞其四肢，傷其五臟，而益裕廣耳，非生之常，而為之者，名也。故曰：名利
之所湊，則民道之。 主操名利之柄，而能致功名者，數也。聖人審權以操柄，審數以使民。數者，
臣主之術，而國之要也。故萬乘失數而不危，臣主失術而不亂者，未之有也。今世主欲辟地治民，
而不審數；臣欲盡其事，而不立術，故國有不服之民，（生）「主」有不令之臣。 故聖人之為國
也，入令民以屬農，出令民以計戰。夫農，民之所苦；而戰，民之所危也。犯其所苦，行其所危
者，計也。故民生則計利，死則慮名。名利之所出，不可不審也。利出於地，則民盡力。名出於
戰，則民致死。入使民盡力，則草不荒。出使民致死，則勝敵。勝敵草不荒，富彊之功，可坐而
致也。(Gao  2011:  76)  

  100  
they  are  willing  to  risk  their  own  lives  in  pursuit  of  it,  the  ruler  can  not  only  prevent  

their   theft,   he   can   direct   them   to   contribute   to   state   development   by   creating   the  

same  aforementioned  infrastructure  of  governance.  

Interestingly   though,   “The   Calculation   of   Land”   adds   another   dimension   in  

its  observations  of  human  behavior.    It  acknowledges  a  notable  social  type  among  

people   that   was   not   taken   into   account   by   the   assumptions   and   strategies   in   “An  

Order   to   Cultivate   Waste   Lands”.     This   category   of   people   act   in   violation   of   their  

nature   for   the   sake   of   individual   fame.   The   above   passage   asserts   that   Knights   of  

early   antiquity   fit   this   category   of   person.     Why?   The   answer   is   in   their   response   to  

deprivation.     The   above   passage   explained   that   the   Knights   exemplified   behavior  

and  cultivated  habits  that  did  not  involve  avoiding  deprivation  or  discomfort.    Much  

like   the   danger,   enemies,   and   resentment   that   robbers   and   thieves   were   likely  

bringing  upon  themselves  due  to  their  immovable  pursuit  of  profit,  these  Knights  of  

early   antiquity   were   bringing   pain   upon   themselves   due   to   their   pursuit   of  

individual  fame.      

Recall  the  second  assumed  characteristic  of  human  behavior  in  “An  Order  to  

Cultivate  Waste  Lands”:  people,  whenever  possible,  will  seek  to  avoid  deprivation  

or   relative   deprivation.     Since   “An   Order   to   Cultivate   Waste   Lands”   is   generally  

considered  to  have  been  written  earlier,  “The  Calculation  of  Land”  chapter  indicates  

that   Shang   Yang’s   intellectual   current   eventually   recognized   the   limitations   of   the  

earlier  assumption  about  the  human  response  to  deprivation  or  discomfort.    Rather  

than   abandoning   the   assumptions   in   expressed   in   earlier   times,   “The   Calculation   of  

Land”  creates  a  whole  new  motivating  force  to  account  for  a  notable  social  category  

  101  
that   is   not   guided   by   the   avoidance   of   conditions   in   which   they   are   (relatively)  

deprived   of   profit.     In   other   words,   the   earlier   assumptions   remain   even   as   the  

discussion  shifts  to  incorporate  profit  and  fame  together.  

“The   Calculation   of   Land”   chapter   describes   the   pursuit   of   fame   to   be   an  

endeavor   that   is   just   as   self-­‐interested   as   the   pursuit   private   profit.     Therefore,   if  

the  ruler  can  create  channels  for  fame  productive  for  the  state  in  the  same  way  he  

creates   similar   productive   channels   for   profit,   then   the   behavior   of   those   who  

pursue   individual   fame   can   be   manipulated   just   like   the   behavior   of   those   who  

pursue  profit.    Hence,  if  “fame  springs  from  warfare,  then  the  people  will  risk  their  

lives   in   warfare”   名出於戰，則民致死.   Like   agriculture   in   “An   Order   to   Cultivate  

Wastelands”,   warfare   is   a   pursuit   that   simultaneously   allows   the   ruler’s   subjects   to  

obtain  individual  fame  and  contribute  to  state’s  development.    In  this  chapter,  the  

obtainment  of  fame  contributes  to  the  strengthening  of  the  state’s  armed  forces  強

兵.   If   a   ruler   successfully   channels   many   of   his   subjects   into   engaging   in   warfare,  

this  increases  the  size  of  the  state’s  armed  forces,  strengthening  the  state’s  military  

capabilities.    This  increases  the  possibilities  for  military  victories  and  the  expansion  

of   his   state’s   territory,   which   produces   more   aggregate   wealth,   further   enriching  

his   state   富國.     Therefore,   he   successfully   creates   and   protects   channels   through  

which  the  state  can  reach  its  ultimate  goals  of  development.  

“The  Cultivation  of  Political  Assessment”:  A  Comprehensive  

Political  Vision  
 
“The   Cultivation   of   Political   Assessment”   chapter   presents   a   method   of  

governance   that   assembles   the   previously   noted   assumptions   and   their  

  102  
corresponding  approach  to  governance  into  a  coherent  vision.    It  points  to  the  three  

political  tools  in  order  to  ensure  good  order:  “Orderly  government  is  brought  about  

in   a   state   by   three   things.     The   first   is   law 法,   the   second   the   establishment   of   good  

faith  and  mutual  trust 信,  and  the  third,  political  assessment 權.  The  ruler  and  his  

ministers  together  manage  the  law.    The  ruler  and  his  ministers  together  establish  

good   faith   and   mutual   trust.     Political   assessment   is   solely   regulated   by   the  

ruler.”214      As  for  law  fa  法,  “The  Cultivation  of  Political  Assessment”  clearly  explains  

its   importance   in   a   ruler’s   method   of   governance:   “As   for   not   using   laws,   while   still  

determining  and  knowing  the  able  and  worthy  from  the  unworthy,  only  Yao  [can  do  

this].    Yet  the  world  is  not  completely  made  up  of  Yaos!    For  this  reason,  the  former  

Kings   knew   that   personal   opinions   and   approval   could   not   be   the   basis   for   the  

delegation   of   responsibilities.     Therefore,   they   established   laws   and   made  

distinctions   clear.”215     The   passage   concedes   that   it   is   indeed   possible   for   a   ruler   to  

be  so  capable  that  he  can  properly  govern  the  state  without  complete  reliance  on  

laws.     However,   most   rulers   are   not   as   extraordinary   as   Yao,   being   closer   to   having  

average  capabilities  than  having  capabilities  that  match  those  of  past  sages.    Since  

this   is   the   case,   why   should   any   method   of   governance   depend   upon   the   ruler  

                                                                                                               
214  國之所以治者三：一曰法；二曰信；三曰權。法者君臣之所共操也。信者君臣之所共立也。權

者君之所獨制也。(Gao  2011:  120)  

215  不以法論知，能，賢，不肖者，惟堯；而世不盡為堯。 是故先王知自議譽私之不可任也，故立

法明分。(Gao  2011:  121-­‐122)  Moreover,  in  “The  Calculation  of  Land”,  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang  states,  
“Nowadays,  it  is  not  like  this.    What  the  rulers  of  present  times  use  to  augment  devotion  to  the  state,  
in  all  cases,  does  not  correspond  to  the  needs  of  the  state.    They  themselves  have  the  conduct  of  Yao  
and  Shun,  but  their  achievements  do  not  even  slightly  approach  that  of  Tang  and  Wu.    This  is  the  
crime  of  holding  the  handles  of  governance.” 今則不然。世主之所加務者，皆非國之急也。身有堯，
舜之行，而功不及湯，武之略者，此執柄之罪也。(Gao  2011:  78)  The  Book  of  Lord  Shang  accuses  
some  of  the  rulers  of  its  time  of  attempting  to  exemplify  moral  or  virtuous  conduct  without  giving  
proper  considerations  to  the  results  they  actually  yield.  

  103  
having   such   rare   gifts?     Why   should   a   ruler   not   simply   employ   a   method   of  

governance   that   can   enable   a   ruler   of   more   average   capabilities   to   establish   good  

order?  

Therefore,   the   law   is   meant   to   represent   the   ultimate   authority   in   the  

evaluation   of   subjects.     Of   course   the   ruler   both   informs   the   law   and   applies   its  

reinforcement.     However,   the   ruler   must   not   rely   on   his   own   subjectivities   and  

abilities   to   do   so.       Rather,   he   should   rely   on   his   architecture   of   governance,   in  

which   law   is   at   the   center,   to   make   judgments.     So   even   if   a   ruler   does   have   the  

capabilities   of   a   Yao,   he   should   still   rely   on   law   because   it   ensures   an   objectivity  

and   consistency,   minimizing   the   risk   of   human   fallacy   in   a   way   human   faculties  

cannot,  making  state  development  optimally  secure.  

As   for   the   notion   of   establishing   good   faith   and   mutual   trust   xin   信,   this  

clearly   refers   to   the   ideal   effect   of   rewards   and   punishments.     “The   Cultivation   of  

Political  Assessment”  states,  “If  the  people  feel  good  faith  and  mutual  trust  from  the  

ruler’s   rewards,   then   affairs   will   be   meritoriously   completed.     If   the   people   feel  

good  faith  and  mutual  trust  from  punishments,  then  there  is  no  source  (or  starting  

point)  of  perversion.”216    Both  rewards  and  punishments  work  together  to  establish  

good  faith  and  mutual  trust  amongst  the  ruler’s  subjects.    Rewards  cause  the  people  

to   adequately   fulfill   their   duties,   while   punishments   discourage   deviation   from  

orthodoxy.    This  is  undoubtedly  related  to  the  ideas  seen  in  “An  Order  to  Cultivate  

Waste  Lands”  and  “The  Calculation  of  Land”.    Therefore,  a  subject  with  good  faith  

and   mutual   trust   is   one   who   does   not   pursue   profit   or   fame   in   ways   that   would  

                                                                                                               
216  民信其賞則事功成；信其刑，則姦無端。(Gao  2011:  120)  

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hinder   state   development.     Instead,   they   place   their   faith   in   the   ruler’s   architecture  

of   governance.     They   place   faith   and   trust   in   the   fact   that   the   ruler   will   not   only  

provide   channels   within   which   they   can   obtain   private   profit   or   fame,   but   so   that  

the  ruler  will  also  recognize  their  productivity.    

So,   this   condition   is   one   that   is   not   simply   determined   by   the   ruler.     The  

establishment   of   good   faith   and   mutual   trust   is   an   aspect   of   governance   in   which  

the   ruler’s   subjects,   especially   the   common   people,   have   notably   active   role.    

Without   their   good   faith   and   mutual   trust,   the   efficacy   of   the   ruler’s   approach   is  

non-­‐existent.     This   notion   was   precisely   what,   we   might   say,   led   Shang   Yang   and  

Duke  Xiao  to   be  represented  as  having  “fear”  of  the  common  people  in  the  Shiji.    In  

that   account,   this   fear   even   caused   Shang   Yang   and   Duke   Xiao   to   delay   the  

promulgation  of  reforms  because  they  knew  it  was  of  no  use  if  the  people  did  not  

have   faith   or   trust   in   them   buxin   不信.     Even   in   the   above   passage   the   notion   of  

good  faith  and  mutual  trust  is  an  action  verb  performed  by  the  ruler’s  subjects.    In  

essence,   a   key   concept   to   this   ideology   even   at   the   linguistic   level   is   the   subjects  

trust  in  the  ruler’s  rewards  民信其賞  and  punishments  信其刑.      

As  previously  mentioned,  the  trust-­‐emphasis  noted  here  is  likely  a  reflection  

of  the  historical  phenomenon  of  the  formal  exchange  of  service  for  reward  or,  more  

generally,   total   devotion   for   recognition,   during   the   Warring   States   period.     If   we  

recall   that   bonds   or   oaths   were   often   applied   in   hierarchical   or   vertical  

relationships,   then   Cheng’s   view   that   good   faith   and   mutual   trust   xin   信   were  

limited  only  to  the  time  when  the  ruler’s  laws  and  orders  were  implemented  seems  

  105  
to   miss   the   deeper   point.217     Rather,   behind   this   idea   was   the   presumption   of   a  

substantial   commitment   in   the   bond   or   oath   that   imposed   an   obligation   upon   the  

ruler   to   apply   rewards   and   punishments   in   response   to   extraordinary   service   or  

violations.     It   is   through   the   fulfillment   of   this   obligation   that   the   ruler  

demonstrated   his   moral   vigor   and   force.   Rewards   and   punishments   create   a  

condition  of  good  faith  and  mutual  trust  while  also  facilitating  state  development.      

This   is   perhaps   why   it   is   so   important   that   the   ruler   regulates   political  

assessment   quan   權 alone.     Cheng   asserted   that   political   assessment   refers   to   the  

ruler’s  management  of  the  application  of  his  rewards  and  punishments,  very  unlike  

Duyvendak’s   interpretation   of   the   term   as   “the   right   standard”218.     Describing   the  

first  period  of  Shang  Yang’s  intellectual  descendants,  Cheng  writes:    

…the   prince   of   the   state   at   this   time   became   the   nucleus   of   politics,  
and   the   prince’s   handles   of   political   assessment   (quan   bing   權柄)  
became   the   focal   point   of   his   political   power.     The   chapter   “The  
Cultivation   of   Political   Assessment”   says:   ‘When   power   and   control  
rests   with   the   ruler,   then   there   is   awesomeness.’     The   prince’s  
awesomeness   resides   in   his   handles   of   authority,   so   they   are   the  
fountainhead   of   his   politics.     In   this   generation   of   Shang   Yang’s  
intellectual  descendants,  what  did  the  handles  of  authority  include  or  
refer   to?...It   is   clear   that   the   handles   of   authority   refers   to   the  
application   of   rewards   and   severe   punishments.     The   prince   must  
apply   rewards   and   severe   punishments,   and   only   then   is   he   able   to  
reveal  his  awesomeness.219  
     
Cheng   makes   a   good   point   here   in   so   far   as   he   recognizes   that   the   political  

assessment  is  described  as  that  which  the  ruler  regulates  on  his  own.220    Yet,  this  is  

                                                                                                               
217  In  Cheng’s  work,  he  implied  that  the  character  xin  信  simply  refers  to  the  need  for  compliance  

when  the  ruler’s  laws  and  orders  are  carried  out  法律推行時必須有信守，才能在政治上起作用。
(Cheng  1987:  247)  
218  Duyvendak  1928:  260  
219  Cheng  1987:  247  
220  權者君之所獨制也。(Gao  2011:  120)  

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distinctly   different   from   how   both   law   and   good   faith   and   mutual   trust   were  

described.     They   were   portrayed   as   tools   that   the   ruler   and   those   he   employs  

establish   together.221     This   is   not   to   say   that   the   roles   of   the   ruler   and   those   he  

employs   are   indistinguishable   in   the   establishment   of   laws   and   good   faith   and  

mutual   trust.     However,   the   ruler   does   need   those   he   employs   to   promulgate   his  

laws  and  enforce  the  bond  between  him  and  his  subjects.    This  is  not  the  case  in  the  

task  of  managing  rewards  and  punishments.    

 The  essence  of  this  task  is  evaluation  or  making  judgments  not  simply  about  

an   individual   subject   or   their   behavior   but   about   the   state,   its   current   conditions,  

and  its  ultimate  development.    Since  the  ruler’s  laws  are  designed  to  maximize  state  

development,   during   the   hostile   and   militant   Warring   States   period,   its   future  

survival  is  in  question  when  laws  are  violated.    Therefore,  reinforcing  laws,  or  the  

encouragement   and   discouragement   of   certain   behavior   in   relation   to   the   law,  

cannot   be   approached   in   isolation.     It   cannot   solely   consider   the   direct   harm   or  

benefit   that   was   caused   by   a   single   act.     It   must   take   into   its   calculations   past   harm  

or  benefit  to  the  state’s  development  and  the  potential  growth  or  reduction  of  the  

act   in   question   in   the   future.     Therefore,   the   management   of   rewards   and  

punishments   is   primarily   about   maintaining   the   state’s   vision   for   the   sake   of   its  

survival   and   development.     Since   this   is   the   case   and   the   ruler   is   ultimately  

responsible  for  the  development  of  his  state  and  his  subjects,  why  would  he  allow  

any  of  his  subjects  to  influence  the  development  of  the  state  when  he  is  the  ultimate  

visionary  for  the  state?    The  ruler  is  not  subject  to  evaluation  and  judgment  in  the  

                                                                                                               
221  法者君臣之所共操也。信者君臣之所共立也。(Gao  2011:  120)  

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same  way  as  his  subjects.    He  is  the  evaluator  and  the  judge.    Hence,  the  notion  of  

political  assessment  is  a  tool  that  the  ruler  must  regulate  himself.    It  is  at  the  very  

foundation  of  his  political  identity  and  position.    

Conclusion  

  We   have   seen   that   the   political   vision   in   the   Book  of  Lord  Shang   is   grounded  

in  a  specific  assumptions  about  human  behavior:  material  gain  or  social  or  political  

notoriety   are   the   primary   motivators,   deprivation   of   one   of   the   two   kinds   of   gain  

will  necessarily  cause  people  to  escape  to  more  comfortable  conditions,  and  people  

are   discriminating   enough   in   their   pursuit   of   gain   that   they   can   identify  

opportunities  that  have  the  most  potential.    Given  this  view  of  human  behavior,  the  

state   can   develop   itself   by   creating   channels   for   its   subjects’   pursuit   of   gain   from  

which   it   can   extract   its   own   gain.     In   other   words,   the   state   does   not   need   to  

attempt   to   directly   transform   each   individual   subject.     Rather,   it   only   needs   to  

accommodate   its   subjects’   predictable   and   unsophisticated   behavior   in   order   to  

develop  its  wealth  and  strength  and  shape  its  ideal  society.    Through  the  shaping  of  

society,  the  ruler  will  cause  his  subjects  to  interiorize  the  norms  that  define  an  ideal  

subject.    

 
 
   
 
 
 

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 Chapter  IV  
   
Competition  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang  
 
Can   we   be   more   specific   about   what   subjects   must   interiorize   to   be   ideal  

subjects?    Can  we  describe  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang’s  ideal  state  culture  beyond  its  

insistence  that  subjects  comply  with  state  orthodoxy?    Now  that  the  foundation  of  

the  Book  of  Lord  Shang’s  political  vision  has  been  discussed,  both  of  these  questions  

can  be  answered.    Focusing  on  rewards,  this  chapter  will  show  that  the  Fajia   state  

advocated   for   the   creation   and   facilitation   of   state-­‐wide   and   state-­‐enforced  

structural   competition.     Put   another   way,   the   state   establishes   the   conditions   in  

which  an  artificial  scarcity  produced  causes  the  success  of  one  competitive  agent  to  

necessarily   mean   a   greater   probability   of   failure   for   others   at   a   given   time.222     In  

short,   it   is   a   condition   where   not   all   individuals   or   groups   can   ultimately   be  

successful   to   the   same   degree.     Therefore,   structurally,   it   creates   a   competitive  

culture  throughout  the  state  with  winners  and  losers.    

However,   all   competition   is   not   created   equal   in   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang.    

Comeptition   specific   kinds   of   competition   must   exist   under   very   specific  

circumstances.     Moreover,   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang   requires   an   explanatory  

approach   that   appreciates   both   its   concern   for   enriching   and   strengthening   the  

state   and   its   culture-­‐shaping   mission.     Therefore,   creating   terminology   and  

referencing  theory  that  captures  the  nuances  of  the  active  aspects   of   the   Fajia  state  

apparatus,   especially   those   that   anticipate   elements   of   the   modern   nation-­‐state’s  

                                                                                                               
222  Kohn  1992:  4;  See  Kohn,  Alfie.  No  Contest.  New  York:  Houghton  Mifflin  Company,  1992.  

  109  
institutions,   is   crucial.   So   before   this   chapter’s   exploration   of   rewards   begins   an  

analysis  of  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang’s  system  of  rewards,  a  discussion  of  the  specific  

terms   that   will   be   used   to   describe   it   is   important.     Then   the   chapter   will   discuss  

the   how   the   law   and   rewards   form   the   nucleus   of   the   Fajia   state’s   structural  

competition,   along   with   how   the   Book  of  Lord  Shang   this   form   of   state   culture.     I  

will   also   present   a   counterargument   to   the   assertion   that   there   is   a   sub-­‐tradition  

within   Shang   Yang’s   intellectual   current   that   advocated   against   the   bestowal   of  

rewards,   proving   that   rewards   are   not   only   indispensable   in   the   Book   of   Lord  

Shang’s  political  vision  but  they  are  also  precisely  what  makes  it  distinct.  

Law  and  Competition  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang  

 
The   notion   of   “institution-­‐facilitated”   or   “structural   competition”,   as  

discussed   here,   is   understood   to   consist   of   three   distinct   components.   The  

“institution”   aspect   refers   to   the   idea   that   the   law   and   its   contingent   reinforcement  

serve   as   institutionalized   instruments   meant   to   establish   norms   within   an  

organization   and   culture   specific   to   the   state.     The   term   of   “structure”   references,  

first,  a  designated  site  in  which  the  competition  takes  place;  in  this  case,  this  means  

the   state.     Though   the   political   programs   discussed   in   Fajia   texts   appear   to   carry  

the  presumption  that  they  will  lead  to  the  ruler  conquering  all  under  Heaven  天下  

in   accordance   with   ancient   Chinese   political   philosophical   ideal,   the   state   as   an  

active  entity,  that  is  the  competitive  space  just  noted,  is  restricted  to  and  uniquely  

designed  for  pusuing  its  own  development  and  security.      

Although   not   completely   analogous   to   Fajia   theory,   Michel   Foucault  

eloquently   described   the   spirit   behind   the   kind   of   “structure”   to   which   this   study  

  110  
refers  when  he  described  military  camps:  “A  whole  problematic  then  develops:  that  

of  an  architecture  that  is  no  longer  built  simply  to  be  seen  (as  with  the  ostentation  

of  palaces),  or  to  observe  the  external  space  (cf.  the  geometry  of  fortresses),  but  to  

permit   an   internal,   articulated   and   detailed   control   –   to   render   visible   those   who  

are   inside   it;   in   more   general   terms,   an   architecture   that   would   operate   to  

transform  individuals:  to  act  on  those  it  shelters,  to  provide  a  hold  on  their  conduct,  

to   carry   the   effects   of   power   right   to   them,   to   make   it   possible   to   know   them,   to  

alter   them.” 223     So,   “structure”   refers   to   the   fact   that   there   is   an   architecture  

designed   to   “act   on   those   it   shelters”   while   unconcerned   with   those   it   does   not,  

making   it   state-­‐specific.   The   second   aspect   of   the   “structure”   component   of   state-­‐

specific  competition  refers  to  the  fact  that  it  is  not  intentional  competition,  or  the  

proclivities   of   the   ruler’s   subjects   themselves   to   outdo   others   that   creates   the  

competitive   environment.     Rather,   it   is   the   institutional   mechanisms   established  

and   operated   by   an   individual   that   is   not   a   competitor   (the   ruler),   who   also  

determines   winning   and   losing 224 ,   that   actually   create   the   competitive  

environment.    As  we  will  see  soon,  the  competitive  culture  also  gets  internalized  by  

the  subjects,  transforming  them  into  intentional  competitors.  

The   term   of   “competition”   here   is   primarily   characterized   by   three   main  

characteristics:   1)   more   than   one   person   strives   for   the   obtainment   of   a   reward;   2)  

rewards  are  made  artificially  scarce  so  that  all  that  strive  to  obtain  reward  cannot  

obtain   it;   3)   rules   regulate   the   behavior   of   subjects   striving   to   obtain   reward   and  

                                                                                                               
223  Foucault  1977:  172  
224  Losing  in  this  case  would  not  be  receiving  punishment.    Rather,  it  would  simply  refer  to  the  

failure  to  receive  a  reward.  

  111  
define   what   constitutes   “winning”.225     Moreover,   this   study   makes   a   distinction  

between  weak  and  strong  versions  of  structural  competition.226     A  weak  version  of  

structural  competition  occurs  when  direct  interaction  between  competitors  is  not  

necessary.    Examples  of  this  competition  might  be  taking  a  test  that  will  be  graded  

on  a  curve,  college  admissions,  bowling,  or  even  slam  poetry  or  battle  rapping.    A  

strong   version   of   structural   competition   refers   to   when   there   is   direct   contestation  

between   competitors,   as   in   war,   boxing,   mixed   martial   arts,   or   even   tennis.     The  

weak   version   of   structural   competition227  will   be   most   frequently   discussed,   as   a  

phenomenon   being   established   domestically   within   the   Qin   state.     However,   this  

was   occurring   during   Warring   States   period   within   a   context   of   fierce   inter-­‐state  

conflict  that  was  unquestionably  a  strong  version  of  structural  competition.    Third,  

the   notion   of   “competition”   refers   to   the   condition   in   which   an   individual  

participant’s   or   group   of   participants’   success   necessarily   means   the   lowering   of  

the   probability   or   the   failure   of   other   participants   in   achieving   the   same   amount   of  

success   at   the   same   time.     In   short,   it   requires   a   condition   of   “mutually   exclusive  

goal  attainment”228.      

Furthermore,   this   “competition”   is   administered   amid   two   important  

features   of   the   rewards   system.     The   first   is   what   Foucault   called   “normalizing  

judgment”229.    Laws  and  their  contingent  reinforcement,  in  the  Book   of   Lord   Shang  

                                                                                                               
225  Rich  and  Devitis  1992:  19;  See  Rich,  John  M.  and  Joseph  L.  Devitis.  Competition  in  Education.  

Springfield,  Ill.:  Charles  C  Thomas  Publisher,  1992.  

226  Inspired  by  Kohn  1992:  4  
227  In  fact,  it  was  pointed  out  earlier  that  “Policies”  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang  specifically  discourages  

a  strong  version  of  structural  competition.  

228  Kohn  1992:  4  
229  Foucault  1977:  170;  Specifically,  Foucault  sums  up  the  general  idea  behind  “normalizing  

judgment”  when  he  stated,  “It  brings  five  quite  distinct  operations  into  play:  it  refers  individual  

  112  
and   other   Fajia   texts,   are   the   tools   used   to   determine   the   development   of   each  

individual   subject   of   the   ruler.     In   accordance   with   a   subject’s   merit   gong   功,   based  

on  the  satisfactory  respect  of  the  ruler’s  laws,  there  is  the  assignment  of  a  station  in  

the   state   hierarchy.     As   merit   defines   the   degree   of   a   subject’s   development,  

theoretically,  the  individual  with  most  merit  will  be  a  chief  minister,  the  individual  

with  the  second-­‐most  merit  will  be  slightly  lower  in  the  state  hierarchy,  and  so  on.  

Therefore,   the   ruler’s   laws   are   meant   to   create   a   hierarchy,   in   which   a   subject’s  

position  or  station  is  based  on  the  comparison  of  merit  relative  to  others.    This  then  

also   makes   an   individual’s   status   or   station   public   knowledge,   which   would  

necessarily  be  a  notable  aspect  of  daily  life  from  which  interpersonal  relationships  

spring.      

The   second   feature   is   what   Foucault   called   “hierarchical   observation”230 .  

Laws   creating   state   hierarchy   enable   the   ruler   and   his   court   to   more   effectively  

build   a   surveillance   state.     This   is   because   the   ruler   no   longer   needs   to   concern  

himself  with  observing  each  individual  subject  within  his  state,  or  having  personal  

relationships   with   each   of   his   subjects.     He   only   needs   to   concern   himself   with  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
actions  to  a  whole  that  is  at  once  a  field  of  comparison,  a  space  of  differentiation  and  the  principle  of  
a  rule  to  be  followed.    It  differentiates  individuals  from  one  another,  in  terms  of  the  following  overall  
rule:  that  the  ruler  be  made  to  function  as  a  minimal  threshold,  as  an  average  to  be  respected  or  as  
an  optimum  towards  which  one  must  move.    It  measures  in  quantitative  terms  and  hierarchizes  in  
terms  of  value  the  abilities,  the  level,  the  ‘nature’  of  individuals.    It  introduces,  through  this  ‘value-­‐
giving’  measure,  the  constraint  of  a  conformity  that  must  be  achieved.    Lastly,  it  traces  the  limit  that  
will  define  difference  in  relation  to  all  other  differences,  the  external  frontier  of  the  abnormal  (the  
‘shameful’  class  of  the  École  Militaire).    The  perpetual  penality  that  traverses  all  points  and  
supervises  every  instant  in  the  disciplinary  institutions  compares,  differentiates,  hierarchizes,  
homogenizes,  excludes.    In  short,  it  normalizes.”  (Foucault  1977:  182-­‐183;  his  emphasis)  
230  Foucault  1977:  170-­‐171;  Specifically,  Foucault  described  “hierarchical  observation”  saying,  “The  

exercise  of  discipline  presupposes  a  mechanism  that  coerces  by  means  of  observation;  an  apparatus  
in  which  the  techniques  that  make  it  possible  to  see  induce  effects  of  power,  and  in  which,  
conversely,  the  means  of  coercion  make  those  on  whom  they  are  applied  clearly  visible.”  (Foucault  
1977:  170-­‐171)  

  113  
judging  his  ministers;  ministers  need  only  concern  themselves  with  judging  lower-­‐

ranking   officials,   and   so   on.     Thus,   it   is   no   surprise   that   the   policies   of   two  

prominent   Fajia   thinkers   Gongsun   Yang   公 孫 鞅   and   Guan   Zhong   管 仲   are  

sometimes   considered   ideological   ancestors   of   one   the   first   systems   of   mutual  

surveillance  baojia  保甲.    Fei-­‐ling  Wang  explains,    

In   the   middle   of   the   Warring   States   era   (5th   -­‐3rd   centuries   B.C.),   as  
part   of   the   reforms   launched   by   Lord   Shang   Yang,   the   famous  
representative   of   the   legalist   school,   the   Qin   Kingdom   in   western  
China   first   in   375   B.C.   fully   adopted   a   baojia   system   to   organize  
families   into   units   collectively   responsible   for   their   activities   to   the  
state.     The   system   also   achieved   the   objective   of   stabilizing   and  
expanding  the  taxation  basis  for  the  Qin  court.231  
     
The  observation  of  superior  and  inferior  trickles  down  from  the  ruler  and  his  court  

to   the   individual   family   unit.     However,   it   is   important   to   note   that   subjects   are   not  

just  experiencing  constant  surveillance  and  evaluation  by  their  ruler  or  immediate  

superiors  within  state  hierarchy.    They  are  observed  and  judged  by  their  peers  as  

well.    Therefore,  hierarchical  observation  is  compounded  with  a  horizontal  one  as  

well.     It   is   within   this   context   that   Fajia   law   and   rewards   shape   society   and   the  

individual  hearts  within  it.  

State  Competition’s  Ideological  Background  

 
Simply   put,   laws   are   the   ultimate   foundation   for   the   state’s   structural  

competition  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang.    In  “The  Reform  of  the  Law”,  it  states:    

Gongsun   Yang   replied:   ‘The   words   you   speak   are   that   of   the   common  
man.     Ordinary   people   always   hold   fast   to   old   customs.     Scholar  
Knights  are  restricted  by  what  they  see  and  hear.    These  two  kinds  of  
people   can   be   officials   who   uphold   the   law,   but   one   cannot   discuss  

                                                                                                               
231  Wang  2005:  34-­‐35;  see  Wang  Fei-­‐Ling.  Organizing  through  Division  and  Exclusion:    China’s  Hukou  

system.  Stanford,  CA:  Stanford  University  Press,  2005.  

  114  
 matters  outside  of  the  law  with  them.    Ritual  principles  in  the  three  
dynasties   (Xia,   Shang,   and   Zhou)   were   different,   yet   they   all   achieved  
true   Kingship.     The   laws   of   the   Five   Hegemons   (of   the   Spring   and  
Autumn   period)   were   all   different,   yet   they   all   became   Hegemons.    
Therefore,   a   wise   person   creates   laws   and   ignorant   people   are  
regulated   by   them.     Worthies   reform   ritual   principles,   and   ordinary  
people   are   restricted   by   them.     Those   who   are   restricted   by   ritual  
principles  are  not  adequate  for  the  discussion  of  affairs.    Those  who  
are   regulated   by   laws   are   not   adequate   for   the   deliberation   of   laws.    
My  Lord  need  not  be  uncertain  of  this.’232

This  passage  describes  law  (and  ritual)  as  the  demarcating  line  that  separates  the  

ruler   from   his   subjects.     Both   the   ruler   and   his   subjects   are   defined   by   their  

relationship  with  the  law.    The  law  does  not  simply,  thus,  mark  out  and  so  establish  

authority;   it   sets   the   boundary   that   separates   the   “wise”   from   the   “ignorant”,   the  

“worthy”  from  the  “unworthy”.    It  is  a  demarcating  line  that  separates  the  regulator  

from  the  regulated.    In  other  words,  all  subjects  are  equally  under  the  jurisdiction  

of  the  law.    The  ruler  however  is  above  the  law.    Those  who  are  regulated  by  the  

ruler’s  laws  are  inadequate  bu  zu  不足.    Therefore,  the  ruler  represents  a  figure  that  

is  elevated  above  his  subjects.      

All   knowledge   is   not   created   equal   in   this   system.     Yet,   the   ruler   is   not   wiser  

or   more   worthy   because   he   generally   has   more   knowledge   than   his   subjects.    

Rather,   the   passage   suggests   that   the   ruler   is   wise   and   worthy   because   he  

possesses   the   authority   to   implement   a   specific   kind   of   knowledge:   that   is,   the  

knowledge  of  what  the  state  needs   for  successful  development  in  the  present  times  

and   circumstances.     Therefore,   it   is   through   his   ability   to   adapt   to   the   times   and  

circumstances  of  the  moment  that  the  ruler  creates  an  environment  within  which  
                                                                                                               
232
公孫鞅曰：“子之所言，世俗之言也。夫常人安於故習，學者溺於所聞。此兩者所以居官而守
法，非所與論於法之外。三代不同禮而王，五霸不同法而霸。故知者作法，而愚者制焉。賢者更
禮，而不肖者拘焉。拘禮之人不足與言事，制法之人不足與論變，君無疑矣。”  (Gao  2011:  29)  

  115  
his  “inadequate”  subjects  can  transcend  their  limitations.    This  is  not  to  say  that  the  

ruler  eventually  can  elevate  his  subjects  to  a  level  where  he  can  discuss  state  affairs  

with   them.     This   is   to   say   that   the   ruler   creates   an   environment   within   which   his  

subjects   act   or   behave   as   though   they   do   understand   what   the   state   needs   in   the  

present   times   and   circumstances.   Therefore,   since   the   very   essence   of   the   ruler  

depends   on   his   ability   to   create   and   reform   laws,   it   can   be   concluded   that   the   ruler  

is   ultimately   the   sole   formulator   of   laws   and   is   the   sole   administrator   of   their  

contingent  reinforcement.  

And   yet,   how,   in   fact,   is   a   ruler   supposed   to   create   this   condition   of   his  

authority?   Given   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang’s   assumptions   about   human   behavior,  

through   the   ruler’s   establishment   and   reform   of   law,   the   ruler   can   create   and  

control  the  channels  through  which  his  subjects  pursue  the  obtainment  of  private  

profit.    In  other  words,  the  ruler  can  limit  his  subjects’  pursuit  of  private  profit  to  

channels   he   defines   as   contributing   to   state   needs   in   the   present   times   and  

circumstances.     This   becomes   increasingly   apparent   when   examining   the   Book  of  

Lord  Shang’s  notion  of  unity  yi  壹.    The  “Agriculture  and  War”  chapter  states:    

The  sage  knows  what  is  essential  in  administering  a  state.    Therefore,  
he   causes   the   people   to   devote   themselves   to   agriculture.     If   the  
people  devote  themselves  to  agriculture,  then  they  will  be  simple  and  
it  will  be  easy  to  administer  them.    They  will  be  honest  and  it  will  be  
easy   to   employ   them.     They   will   be   sincere   and   it   will   be   easy   to  
utilize   them   in   defensive   and   offensive   warfare.     When   the   people’s  
efforts   are   unified,   then   the   swindlers   decrease   and   people   feel  
secure   in   their   homes.     When   the   people’s   efforts   are   unified,   the  
ruler   can   use   rewards   and   punishments   to   supervise   and   urge   his  
subjects.     When   the   people’s   efforts   are   unified,   then   the   ruler   can  
utilize  their  strength  abroad.    Well  now,  because  every  morning  and  
night   the   people   are   engaged   in   agriculture,   they   will   love   the   ruler  
and  sacrifice  themselves  in  compliance  with  his  commands.    However,  

  116  
 if   they   see   the   lofty-­‐language-­‐using   itinerant   scholars   being   revered  
by  their  prince,  merchants  being  able  to  enrich  themselves  and  gain  
wealth  for  their  homes,  or  craftsmen  being  able  to  make  a  living  for  
themselves,   then   the   people   will   not   be   able   to   be   utilized.     If   these  
three   kinds   of   people   have   the   freedom   to   obtain   profit,   then   the  
people   will   necessarily   think   they   should   avoid   agriculture.     If   the  
people   avoid   agriculture,   then   they   will   necessarily   not   fight   for   their  
prince   in   defensive   and   offensive   warfare.     Generally,   those   who  
administer   a   state   are   concerned   about   a   scattered   populace   and  
their  ability  to  consolidate  them.    Because  of  this,  a  sage  implements  
unity  and  consolidates  them.233  
 
Thus,  the  creation  of  channels  is  precisely  how  the  ruler  creates  a  condition  of  unity  

yi   壹,   in   which   pursuits   of   private   profit   contribute   to   what   he   defines   as   state  

development.     Since   both   absolute   and   relative   deprivation   motivate   people,   the  

relationship   between   state   unity,   rewards   and   punishments,   and   progression  

becomes  even  more  important  to  understand.    This  relationship  is  expounded  upon  

in  another  part  of  the  same  chapter:    

A   prince   makes   clear   rewards   and   punishments   in   order   to   support  

state  unity.    Because  of  this,  his  teachings  are  common  practice  and  
his  government  has  success.    The  prince  who  achieves  true  Kingship  
attains  what  is  essential  in  governing  the  people.    Therefore,  he  does  
not   depend   on   the   bestowal   of   rewards   and   the   people   love   their  
ruler.    He  does  not  depend  on  rank  and  emoluments  and  the  people  
exert  themselves  in  their  work.    He  does  not  depend  on  punishments,  
and  the  people  exhaust  themselves  for  him.234    
   
This   indicates   that   a   prince   utilizes   rewards   and   punishments   in   order   to   create  

and  maintain  state  unity.    It  is  the  rewards  and  punishments  that  allow  the  prince’s  

teachings  to  become  common  practice  or  established  culture.  They  cause  subjects  
                                                                                                               
233  聖人知治國之要，故今民歸心於農。歸心於農，則民樸而可正也，紛紛則易使也，信可以守戰

也。壹則少詐而重居，壹則可以賞罰進也，壹則可以外用也。夫民之親上死制也，以其旦暮從事
於農。夫民之不可用也，見言談游士事君之可以尊身也，商賈之可以富家也，技藝之足以餬口也
。民見此三者之便且利也，則必避農。避農，則民輕其居。輕其居，則必不為上守戰也。凡治國
者，患民之散而不可搏也，是以聖人作壹，搏之也。(Gao  2011:  51)    
234  君修賞罰以輔壹教，是以其教有所常，而政有成也。王者得治民之至要，故不待賞賜而民親上

，不待爵祿而民從事，不待刑罰而民致死。(Gao  2011:  51)  

  117  
to  act  as  though  they  understand  what  the  ruler  has  identified  as  the  state’s  needs.    

So,  rewards  and  punishments  not  only  allow  the  ruler  to  unite  the  people’s  exertion  

and  strength  in  agriculture  and  war,  but  they  also  educate  his  subjects  on  how  they  

should   act   or   behave.     Therefore,   rewards   and   punishments   are   the   primary  

mechanisms   that   allow   the   ruler   to   create   a   developed   strong   and   wealthy   state  

because  they  not  only  teach  his  subjects  how  to  behave  but  they  also  direct  cause  

the   state   to   progress   and   to   the   eventual   unification   of   all   under   Heaven   tian  xia   天

下.      

Rewards:  The  Nucleus  of  the  Competitive  State    

 
Once  the  ruler  has  successfully  concentrated  his  subjects’  efforts  within  his  

desired   channels,   how   is   chaos   avoided   within   them?     In   “Establishing   Laws”,   it  

explains:  

I   have   heard   that   when   clear-­‐sighted   rulers   of   antiquity   established  

laws,   there   was   no   perversity   amongst   the   people.     When   they  
initiated   affairs,   people   of   talent   naturally   engaged   in   them.     When  
they   bestowed   rewards,   the   army   became   strong.     These   three  
actions   are   the   foundation   of   government.     When   laws   were  
established,  the  reason  there  was  no  perversity  amongst  the  people  
was   that   the   laws   were   clear   and   people   believed   they   would   profit  
from   them.     When   they   initiated   affairs,   the   reason   people   of   talent  
engaged   in   them   was   because   the   measurement   of   merit   was   clear.    
When   the   measurement   of   merit   is   clear,   then   people   will   certainly  
exhaust  their  strength.    Since  the  people  are  certain  to  exhaust  their  
strength,  people  of  talent  naturally  engage  in  it.    When  they  bestowed  
rewards,  the  reason  the  armed  forces  grew  stronger  was  because  of  
rank  and  emoluments.    Rank  and  emoluments  are  the  essence  of  the  
armed  forces  strength.    Therefore,  when  the  prince  grants  ranks  and  
emoluments,  the  Way  [of  rewards]  is  clear.    If  the  Way  [of  rewards]  is  
clear,  then  the  state  grows  stronger  daily.    If  the  Way  [of  rewards]  is  
of   secrecy   [or   private   interest],   then   the   state   grows   dismembered  
daily.     Therefore,   the   Way   of   rank   and   emoluments   is   the   key   to   a  
state’s  survival  and  death.    Now,  it  is  not  the  case  that  dismembered  
states   and   rulers   of   perishing   states   did   not   have   rank   and  

  118  
 emoluments.     It   is   the   case   that   the   channel   from   which   rank   and  
emoluments  sprung  was  wrong.    What  the  three  Kings  and  the  Five  
Hegemons   used   was   no   more   than   rank   and   emoluments.     Their  
achievements   exceeded   the   aforementioned   [form   of   statecraft]   ten  
thousand-­‐fold   precisely   because   of   their   Way   [of   rewards].     As   a  
result,   a   clear-­‐sighted   ruler   certainly   employs   his   subjects   and  
assigns   posts   to   them   based   on   their   labor,   while   rewards   are  
necessarily  conferred  based  on  their   merit.     If   merit   and   rewards   are  
clear,   then   subjects   will   compete   to   establish   merit.     If,   in  
administering   a   state,   one   is   able   to   cause   their   subjects   to   exhaust  
their   strength   and   compete   to   establish   merit,   then   the   army   will  
necessarily  be  strong.235    
   
Chaos  is  avoided  once  the  state’s  people  of  talent  are  engaged  in  state  affairs;  hence,  

the   above   passage   insists,   that   this   is   because   the   “measurement   of   merit”   is  

clear. 236     The   passage   implies   that   bestowing   rewards   based   on   merit   will  

necessarily  ensure  subjects  are  motivated  and  cause  them  to  direct  their  exertion  

and  strength  within  whatever  pusuits  will  enable  them  to  accumulate  merit.    More  

importantly,   the   classical   Chinese   explicitly   points   to   the   contingent   quality  

rewards   must   have.     In   one   compact   phrase,   “rewards   are   necessarily   conferred  

based  on  their  merit” 賞必加於其功,  we  are  reminded  of  the  Shiji’s  “Biography  of  

Lord   Shang”   in   which   laws   had   been   drafted   but   Shang   Yang   was   hesitant   to  

promulgate   them   because   he   feared   subjects   would   not   trust  信   him.   It   was   only  

                                                                                                               
235 臣聞：古之明君錯法而民無邪，舉事而材自練，賞行而兵彊，此三者治之本也。夫錯法而民無
邪者，法明而民利之也。舉事而材自練者，功分明。功分明，則民盡力。民盡力，則材自練。行
賞而兵彊者，爵祿之謂也；爵祿者兵之實也。是故人君之出爵祿也，道明。道明則國日彊；道幽
則國日削。故爵祿之所道，存亡之機也。夫削國亡主非無爵祿也，其所道過也。三王五霸，其所
道不過爵祿，而功相萬者，其所道明也。是以明君之使其臣也，用必出於其勞，賞必加於其功。
功賞明，則民競於功。為國而能使其民盡力以競於功，則兵必彊矣。(Gao  2011:  97)  
236  Let  us  recall  that  a  culture  of  merit  was  essentially  a  method  of  channeling  the  ruler’s  subjects  

culturally.    Simply  put,  when  a  subject  or  group  of  subjects  perform  an  extraordinary  act,  this  will  
necessarily  be  reinforced  with  rewards  or  punishments  depending  on  whether  the  ruler  defines  the  
act  as  having  contributed  to  state  needs  given  the  present  times  and  circumstances,  and  thus  should  
be  encouraged  or  discouraged.    Merit  itself  is  a  record  of  an  individual  subject’s  extraordinary  acts  
that  contribute  to  the  state’s  needs  as  defined  by  the  ruler.  

  119  
after  he  had  immediately  given  fifty  jin   金  to  the  man  who  successfully  moved  the  

pole,  after  having  promised  to  do  so,  did  he  feel  the  people  would  trust  him.    The  

character   for   “must”,   “have   to”,   or   as   I   have   translated   it   “necessarily”   bi   必,  

characterizes   the   relationship   between   the   subjects’   labor   and   rewards.     Rewards  

must  be  given  on  the  basis  of  merit,  which  can  only  accumulate  as  a  consequence  of  

these   subjects’   behavior   rather   than   their   speech   or   noble   bloodline.     Thus,   this  

study  agrees  with  Duyvendak’s  assertion  that  the  contingent  quality  of  rewards  are  

at   the   heart   of   the   Book  of  Lord  Shang’s   conception   of   “good   faith   and   mutual   trust”  

xin   信.     Despite   misunderstanding   of   the   ideal   government’s   attitude   towards  

morality  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang,  Duyvendak  nevertheless  wrote,  “With  regard  to  

the   publicity   and   definiteness   of   the   law,   it   should   be   noticed   that   this   government,  

which   despised   all   moral   virtue   for   the   people,   claims   one   virtue   for   itself,   in   which  

it   expects   everybody   to   believe:   good   faith,   that   is,   in   the   bestowing   of   promised  

rewards  and  the  application  of  punishments.”237     There  is  indeed  an  inseparability  

between  good  faith  and  mutual  trust,  rewards,  and  merit.      

In   fact,   all   actions   considered   in   the   text   to   be   the   foundation   of   government  

depend   on   the   contingent   bestowal   of   rewards.     Moreover,   each   of   these   three  

actions   so   identified   addresses   one   of   the   important   aspects   of   structural  

competition:   rules   (laws),   a   measure   of   merit   (the   basis   upon   which   to   bestow  

rewards),   and   the   clear   contingent   connection   between   the   merit   and   the   bestowal  

of   reward.     Thus,   the   passage   asserts   that   state-­‐specific   institution-­‐facilitated  

meritocratic   competition,   or   a   weak   version   of   structural   competition   throughout  

                                                                                                               
237  Duyvendak  1928:  89-­‐90  

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the   entire   state,   should   be   the   foundation   of   government.     This   explains   the  

argument  that  “the  Way  of  rank  and  emoluments  is  the  key  to  a  state’s  survival  and  

death”  故爵祿之所道，存亡之機也.    In  fact,  the  end  of  the  passage  states  outright,  

“If  merit  and  rewards  are  clear,  then  people  will  compete  for  merit”  功賞明，則民

競於功.     Again,   the   usage   merit   and   reward   with   such   close   proximity   strongly  

indicates   an   need   to   integrate   their   meanings.     However,   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang  

adds  another  link  in  the  chain  with  the  addition  of  competition  as  well.    Indeed,  the  

characters   merit   gong   功,   rewards   shang   賞,   and   competition   jing   競   appear  

together  in  the  same  concise  sentence,  which  suggests  that  the  effect  of  this  system  

of   rewards   was   not   lost   on   this   author   in   the   Book  of  Lord  Shang.     He   recognizes  

that  structural  competition  is  necessarily  the  result  when  rewards  are  contingently  

reinforcing  the  ruler’s  laws.      

Moreover,   the   text   presents   structural   competition   as   a   means   to   inspire  

intentional  competition,  or  an  individual  subject’s  proclivity  to  triumph  over  others  

in  an  effort  to  achieve  rewards,  among  the  ruler’s  subjects.238     This  is  intriguing,  in  

part,  due  to  its  similarity  to  the  process  of  moral  development  set  forth  in  the  Xunzi.    

The  above  passage  illustrates  that  the  ruler’s  laws  can  initiate  an  internal  process  

of  development  within  subjects,  in  which  they  internalize  the  value  and  importance  

of   being   competitive.     In   other   words,   it   is   considered   beneficial,   if   not   absolutely  

necessary,   for   the   ruler’s   laws   to   impress   upon   the   subjects   a   strong   sense   of   the  

value   of   and   appreciation   for   intentional   competition.     In   short,   through  

internalizing   a   drive   to   intentional   competition,   subjects   develop   and   arguably  

                                                                                                               
238  Kohn  1992:  5  

  121  
transform  themselves  into  individuals  with  an  enhanced  understanding  of  what  the  

ruler  has  identified  as  the  needs  of  the  state.  

Additionally,  in  “Making  Orders  Strict”  Jin   Ling  靳令,  structural  competition  

throughout  the  entire  state  is  even  more  precisely  delineated:    

If  the  state  is  poor  and  the  people  exert  themselves  in  warfare,  then  
poison   will   permeate   enemy   states,   the   state   will   lack   the   six  
parasites   and   it   will   necessarily   be   strong.     If   the   state   is   wealthy   and  
the   people   do   not   exert   themselves   in   warfare,   then   the   itinerant   and  
the   lazy   will   appear   domestically,   the   six   parasites   will   exist   in   the  
state,   and   it   will   necessarily   be   weak.     Now,   if   the   state   bestows  
rewards  based  on  the  people’s  merit,  then  this  is  called  ‘utilizing  the  
wisdom   of   the   masses   in   planning’   and   ‘utilizing   the   bravery   of   the  
masses   in   order   to   engage   in   warfare’.     If   the   state   utilizes   the  
wisdom   of   the   masses   in   planning   and   utilizes   the   bravery   of   the  
masses  in  order  to  engage  in  warfare,  then  the  state  will  necessarily  
have   no   equal.     If   the   state   bestows   rewards   based   on   the   people’s  
merit,   then   governing   is   made   simple   and   discussion   rare.     This   is  
called   ‘using   laws   to   abolish   laws’   and   using   ‘discussion   to   abolish  
discussion’.     If   the   state   bestows   rewards   based   on   the   six  
parasites239 ,   then   governing   will   be   troublesome   and   discussions   will  
arise.     This   is   called   ‘engendering   governance   with   governance’   and  
‘engendering   discussion   with   discussion’.     As   a   result,   the   prince   is  
lost   in   debate   and   discussion,   government   officials   are   confused   in  
heretical  governance,  and  perverse  ministers  will  seek  to  have  their  
own  ambitions  fulfilled  while  men  of  merit  day  by  day  get  left  behind.    
This  is  called  ‘failure’.    If  the  state  holds  fast  to  ten  guiding  principles,  
it  will  be  chaotic.    When  it  holds  fast  to  unity  as  its  guiding  principle,  
it  will  be  in  good  order.    If  the  laws  are  already  established  and  the  
court   is   fond   of   reliance   on   the   six   parasites,   then   the   state   will   be  
weak.    If  the  people  engage  completely  in  agriculture,  then  the  state  
will   be   wealthy.     If   the   state   does   not   rely   on   the   six   parasites,   then  
the  soldiers  and  the  people  will  compete  for  encouragement  and  take  
pleasure   in   being   employed   by   their   ruler.     The   people   within   their  
borders   will   view   competition   as   [a   chance   for]   glory   and   none   will  
regard  it  as  shameful.    The  next  best  case  is  one  in  which  the  people  
will  be  encouraged  by  rewards  and  restricted  by  punishments.    The  
worst  case  is  one  in  which  the  people  hate  competing  for  honor  and  
                                                                                                               
239  The  six  parasites  in  this  chapter  are  defined  as:  ritual,  music,  Book  of  Odes,  Book  of  History,  

cultivating  goodness,  filial  piety  and  brotherly  love,  sincerity  and  trustworthiness,  chastity  and  
integrity,  benevolence,  proper  roles,  lacking  military  strength,  and  being  ashamed  of  warfare.    For  
an  unknown  reason,  this  chapter  uses  the  term  “six  parasites”  to  refer  sixteen  different  things.      

  122  
 glory,   worry   about   it,   and   are   ashamed   by   it.     They   put   on   a   nice   face  
and  say  they  are  ashamed  to  eat,  offering  this  to  their  ruler  as  a  way  
of   avoiding   engaging   in   agriculture   and   warfare   and   collude   with  
outside  forces  to  bring  harm  to  the  state.    This  is  a  crisis  for  the  state.    
Some  people  would  rather  die  from  hunger  and  cold  than  engage  in  
war   in   order   to   obtain   profit   emoluments.     This   is   the   custom   of   a  
perishing  state.240  
 
This   passage   juxtaposes   two   forms   of   statecraft:   one   of   bestowing   rewards   based  

on  merit  and  another  of  the  bestowing  of  rewards  based  on  the  six  parasites.    What  

enables   rewards   to   bring   about   such   superior   characteristics   throughout   the   state?    

There  are  a  few  reasons.    First,  rewards  imply  a  culture  of  merit  in  which  subjects  

accumulate   merit   based   on   their   extraordinary   acts   or   conduct.     Second,   bestowing  

rewards   based   on   a   specifically   defined   merit,   relating   exclusively   to   military   and  

agricultural  achievement,  produces  a  condition  of  unity  yi  壹  in  which  the  pursuit  of  

private  profit  can  only  proceed  through  ruler-­‐approved  channels.    Third,  bestowing  

rewards   based   on   merit   estbalished   institution-­‐facilitated   competition   or   state-­‐

specific   structural   competition.     When   a   culture   of   merit,   a   proper   definition   of  

merit   becomes   manifested   within   ruler-­‐approved   channels,   the   fact   that   not  

everyone  can  be  rewarded  at  any  single  moment  necessarily  means  that  what  the  

ruler   defines   as   extraordinary   performance   will   be   articulated   in   relative   terms.    

Therefore,   rewards   will   be   bestowed   in   relative   terms.     Since   this   is   the   case,  

subjects,   who   are   all   pursuing   private   profit,   will   know   that   they   must   out-­‐perform  
                                                                                                               
240  國貧而務戰，毒生於敵，無六蝨，必彊。國富而不戰，偷生於內，有六蝨，必弱。國以功授官

予爵，此謂以盛知謀，以盛勇戰。以盛知謀，以盛勇戰， 其國必無敵。國以功授官予爵，則治省
言寡，此謂以法去法，以言去言。國以六蝨授官予爵，則治煩言生，此謂以治致治，以言致言。
則君務於說言，官亂於治邪。邪臣有得志，有功者日退，此謂失。守十者亂。守壹者治。法已定
矣，而好用六蝨者亡。民澤畢農則國富。六蝨不用，則兵民畢競勸，而樂為主用，其竟內之民，
爭以為榮，莫以為辱；其次，為賞勸罰沮；其下，民惡之，憂之，羞之。修容而以言恥食， 以上
交以避農戰，外交以備，國之危也。有饑寒死亡，不為利祿之故戰，此亡國之俗也。(Gao  2011:  
115)    

  123  
their   fellow   subjects   to   obtain   the   ideal   amount   of   profit.     This   advances   state-­‐

specific   structural   competition.     As   a   result,   the   above   passage   insists   that   if   the  

state   bestows   rewards   based   on   merit,   “…then   the   soldiers   and   the   people   will  

compete   for   encouragement   and   take   pleasure   in   being   employed   by   their   ruler.    

The  people  within  their  borders  will  view  competition  as  [a  chance  for]  glory  and  

none   will   regard   it   as   shameful”   則兵民畢競勸而樂為主用，其竟內之民，爭以為

榮，莫以為辱.    In  fact,  the  above  passage  describes  the  bestowal  of  rewards  based  

on  merit  as  the  ideal  way  of  administering  a  state.      

Finally,  the  passage  even  goes  so  far  as  to  present  a  three-­‐tiered  hierarchy  of  

statecraft.     Most   notably,   structural   competition   is   implicated   as   the   most  

important  element  to  the  best  form  of  statecraft.    The  passage  describes  the  lesser  

forms  of  statecraft  when  it  states  “The  next  best  case  is  one  in  which  the  people  will  

be  encouraged  by  rewards  and  restricted  by  punishments.    The  worst  case  is  one  in  

which   the   people   hate   competing   for   honor   and   glory,   worry   about   it,   and   are  

ashamed   by   it…”   其次為賞勸罰沮；其下，民惡之，憂之，羞之.     Additionally,   as  

the   passage   describes   the   lesser   forms   of   statecraft   within   the   three-­‐tiered  

hierarchy,   the   relationship   between   subjects   and   a   competitive   culture   becomes  

less   strong.     In   the   best   form   of   statecraft,   competition   is   viewed   as   a   chance   for  

glory  and  is  not  shameful.    In  the  next  best  form  of  statecraft,  though  competition  is  

still   used   as   a   form   of   encouragement   punishments   are   needed   to   restrict   some  

behavior,   implying   that   the   state’s   structural   competition   does   not   encompass   all  

pursuits   of   private   profit.     In   the   worst   form   of   statecraft,   competition   is   actually  

hated,  or  it  causes  people  to  experience  anxiety  or  even  feel  shame.  

  124  
The  Case  Against  the  “No  Rewards”  Claim  
 
One   may   be   incined   to   challenge   the   aforementioned   argument,   asserting  

that  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang  consistently  depicts  institution-­‐facilitated  competition,  

or  state-­‐specific  structural  competition,  overlooks  one  very  important  detail  about  

its   ideological   evolution.     That   is,   ther   is  a   “subfamily”   thread   within   the   text   that  

advocates   against   the   use   of   rewards.     Cheng   pointed   to   the   “Policies”   section   as  

representing   a   small   tributary   of   Shang   Yang’s   intellectual   current   that   advocated  

concentrating   on   harsh   punishments   and   no   rewards   at   all. 241     Yet,   there   is  

substantial   evidence   to   suggest   that   the   “Policies”   section   does   not   express  

opposition  to  the  bestowal  of  rewards.  

  Cheng’s  interpretation  centered  on  the  following  passage  that,  in  fact,  can  be  

read  several  different  ways:    

Therefore,  one  who  is  skilled  at  administering  the  state  only  punishes  
the   perverse   and   does   not   reward   goodness   (that   is   conditional   or  
characterized   by   a   lack   of   productivity).     So   as   a   result,   without  
applying   punishments,   the   ruler’s   subjects   [fully]   comply   with   the  
law.   The   reason   that   the   ruler   cannot   apply   punishments   and   the  
people   comply   with   the   law   is   heavy   punishment.     When  
punishments   are   heavy,   the   people   do   not   dare   transgress.     Thus,  
when  the  ruler  does  not  apply  punishments  and  the  people  dare  not  
commit   malfeasance,   this   is   the   entire   state   [fully]   complying   with  
the  law.    So  without  rewarding  those  that  [merely]  comply  with  the  
law,   the   people   are   all   compliant.     One   cannot   reward   those   that  
[merely]   comply   with   the   law   just   like   one   cannot   reward   thieves   for  
not  stealing.    Therefore,  one  who  is  skilled  at  administering  the  state  
causes  even  Robber  Zhi242  to  have  good  faith  and  mutual  trust,  more  

                                                                                                               
241  Cheng  1987:  58-­‐59  
242  A  well  known  figure  in  tradition  Chinese  history  who  the  Shiji,  in  Bo  Yi’s  memoir,  describes  as  

one  who  “killed  innocent  people  daily,  made  delicacies  of  men’s  flesh,  was  cruel  and  ruthless,  willful  
and  arrogant,  gathered  a  band  of  thousands  of  men  and  wreaked  havoc  across  the  world,  yet  finally  
died  of  old  age.盜蹠日殺不辜，肝人之肉，暴戾恣睢，聚黨數千人橫行天下，竟以壽終。
(Nienhauser  1994:  4)  Also,  as  his  moniker  implies,  he  is  also  associated  with  theft.  

  125  
 so   than   Bo   Yi243!   One   who   is   not   skilled   at   administering   the   state  
causes  even  Bo  Yi  to  have  distrust  [in  the  bond  with  his  ruler],  more  
so   than   Robber   Zhi!     If   conditions   are   such   that   the   people   cannot  
engage  in  perversity,  then  even  Robber  Zhi  will  have  good  faith  and  
mutual   trust.     If   conditions   are   such   that   people   can   engage   in  
perversity,   then   even   Bo   Yi   will   have   distrust   [in   the   bond   with   his  
ruler].244    
 
Cheng   interprets   the   opening   phrase   as   a   statement   opposing   the   bestowal   of  

rewards   on   anyone,   understanding   the   character   shan   善,   meaning   “goodness”,   to  

be   reference   to   all   subjects   who   comply   with   the   law     However,   the   notion   of  

“goodness”  shan  善  more  likely  refers  to  a  specific  category  of  subject  that  complies  

with  the  law  rather  than  all  subjects.      

The  opening  sentence  in  the  passage  features  the  character  shan  善  used  in  

four  different  ways.    It  first  simply  refers  to  the  skill  of  the  ruler  in  governing  his  

state.    Yet,  the  second,  third,  and  fourth  usage  of  the  character  shan  善  all  represent  

different  meanings  that  are  important  for  understanding  the  above  passage  and  the  

broader  ideology  expressed  in  “Policies”.    The  second  usage  of  the  character  shan  

善,  specifically  discussing  individuals  who  are  not  shan  不善,  refers  to  individuals  
                                                                                                               
243  A  well  known  figure  in  traditional  Chinese  history  who  ultimately  dies  of  starvation  in  protest  of  

the  state  of  Zhou,  led  by  King  Wu  (r.  1046-­‐1043  B.C.).    This  protest  occurred  for  mainly  two  reasons.    
First,  Bo  Yi  (and  his  brother  Shu  Qi  叔齊)  were  critical  of  what  they  viewed  as  inappropriate  actions,  
soon  after  King  Wen’s  (King  Wu’s  father)  death.    Instead  of  engaging  in  what  they  viewed  as  filial  
behavior  of  mourning,  especially  giving  his  father  a  proper  burial,  King  Wu  led  an  expedition  against  
the  Shang  dynasty  and  King  Zhou.    Moreover,  due  to  King  Wu’s  decision  to  lead  an  expedition  to  
battle  the  forces  of  the  Shang  kingdom,  both  Bo  Yi  and  Shu  Qi  viewed  King  Wu  as  violating  the  Rujia  
virtue  of  benevolence.    In  other  words,  a  vassal  should  never  think  to  engage  in  battle  against  his  
lord.    For  these  two  reasons  Bo  Yi  and  Shu  Qi,  after  King  Wu’s  victory,  clinched  by  the  extremely  
violent  and  bloody  Battle  of  Muye  (circa  1046  B.C.)  and  the  establishment  of  the  Zhou  dynasty,  they  
refused  to  accept  King  Wu  and  the  Zhou  dynasty  as  the  new  ruling  regime.    Therefore,  they  went  
into  the  mountains,  refusing  to  eat  the  grain  of  Zhou  and  only  eating  ferns.    Eventually,  they  even  
refused  to  eat  the  ferns  of  Zhou  (because  they  were  of  Zhou’s  wilderness)  and  died  of  starvation.      
244  故善治者，刑不善而不賞善，故不刑而民善。不刑而民善，刑重也。刑重者，民不敢犯，故無

刑也，而民莫敢為非，是一國皆善也。故不賞善而民善。賞善之不可也，猶賞不盜。故善治者，
使跖可信，而況伯夷乎？不能治者，使伯夷可疑，而況跖乎？勢不能為姦，雖跖可信也。勢得為
姦，雖伯夷可疑也。(Gao  2011:  149)  

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like   Robber   Zhi.     Robber   Zhi   exemplifies   an   individual   who   exhibits   the   very  

assumptions  about  human  behavior  found  in  “An  Order  to  Cultivate  Waste  Lands”  

and   “The   Calculation   of   Land”.     Recall   that   “The   Calculation   of   Land”   described  

robbers  and  thieves  as  those  who  were  willing  to  bring  shame  to  their  reputations  

and  put  their  lives  in  danger  for  the  sake  of  profit.245   Thus,  Robber  Zhi  is  the  kind  

of  person  who  clearly  is  motivated  by  profit  even  to  the  extent  that  he  is  willing  to  

endanger   himself.     Since   people   like   Robber   Zhi   refuse   to   direct   their   pursuit   of  

private   profit   within   the   boundaries   of   state   orthodoxy,   the   ruler’s   laws   will  

inevitably   eliminate   them,   using   punishment   xing  刑,   so   that   they   do   not   encourage  

others  to  also  pursue  of  private  profit  outside  of  areas  of  state  priority.  

The  third  usage  of  the  character  shan  善,  specifically  discussing  individuals  

who  are  shan  善,  refers  to  individuals  like  Bo  Yi.    He  represents  an  extraordinarily  

loyal  subject  (to  the  Shang  dynasty),  or  as  the  above  passage  would  put  it,  a  subject  

with  exceptional  good  faith  and  mutual  trust  xin  信.    Indeed,  having  good  faith  and  

mutual   trust   is   being   shan   善,   or   merely   compliant   with   the   law.     Fajia   subjects  

demonstrate   their   good   faith   and   mutual   trust   with   the   ruler   and   his   laws   by  

pursuing   their   private   profit   within   ruler-­‐approved   channels.     However,   having  

good   faith   and   mutual   trust   is   only   a   necessary   condition   to   earn   rewards   within  

the   Fajia   political   vision.     It   is   not   a   sufficient   condition   to   obtain   state   reward.    

Since   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang’s   notion   of   law   creates   and   facilitates   structural  

competition   throughout   the   entire   state,   rewards   and   recognition   are   bestowed  

upon   an   individual   subject   who   performs   extraordinarily,   in   comparison   to   their  

                                                                                                               
245  今夫盜賊上犯君上之所禁，下失臣子之禮，故名辱而身危；猶不止者，利也。(Gao  2011:  76)  

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fellow  subjects,  within  state  orthodoxy.  Therefore,  rewards  should  not  be  bestowed  

bu  shang  不賞  on  individuals  who,  even  if  devoted  to  the  bond  to  their  ruler,  merely  

comply   with   the   law   or   behave   in   ways   that   are   not   punishable   and   do   not  

contribute  to  what  the  ruler  has  defined  as  state’s  needs.    

The   notion   that   a   ruler   should   not   reward   subjects   who   are   not  

extraordinary  in  their  performance  or  behavior  within  the  state  orthodoxy  is  rather  

commonly   evident   in   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang.     We   should   keep   in   mind   that   this  

idea   is   expressed   in   “An   Order   to   Cultivate   Waste   Lands”   when   it   described   a  

problem   in   which   the   state’s   nobility   could   collect   taxes   from   those   who   farmed   on  

their   land.246 The   solution   to   this   problem   establishes   the   condition   that   rewards  

are   not   simply   supposed   to   redirect   subjects   pursuing   private   profit   outside   of  

ruler-­‐approved  channels,  they  are  also  intended  to  motivate  the  idle  and  the  lazy.    

Subjects   that   the   passage   describes   as   “lazy”,   “idle”,   or   “inactive”   have   one   crucial  

characteristic  in  common:  they  are  all  unproductive.    In  fact,  no  chapter  in  the  Book  

of   Lord   Shang   is   satisfied   with   subjects   who   minimally   pursue   profit,   even   when  

they   do   so   through   means   endorsed   by   the   state.     So   though   Bo   Yi   would   not  

necessarily   be   labeled   “lazy”,   “idle”,   or   “inactive”,   he   is   most   notable   for   his  

demonstration   of   good   faith   and   mutual   trust,   not   outstanding   performance   in  

warfare   or   agriculture.     Based   on   the   Fajia   objectives   of   enriching   and  

strengthening  the  state,  his  mere  demonstration  of  loyalty  does  not  merit  reward.    

                                                                                                               
246
祿厚而稅多，食口眾者，敗農者也。則以其食口之數，賦而重使之。則辟淫游惰之民無所於食
。民無所於食則必農，農則草必墾矣。(Gao  2011:  34)  

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Therefore,   this   “Policies”   passage   is   actually   entirely   consistent   with   the   Book   of  

Lord  Shang’s  overall  political  vision.  

Finally,  the  fourth  usage  of  the  character  shan  善,  specifically  describing  the  

quality   of   subjects’   behavior   when   “without   applying   punishments,   the   ruler’s  

subjects   [fully]   comply   with   the   law”   不刑而民善   in   the   state,   refers   to   the  

condition  in  which  there  is  full  compliance  with  the  law.    This  ideal  compliance  is  

produced   when   the   ruler’s   subjects   are   productive   and   do   not   act   based   on  

principles  of  morality  outside  of  what  the  ruler’s  laws  express.    In  other  words,  no  

individuals  like  Robber  Zhi  or  Bo  Yi  can  even  exist  within  this  system  because  the  

entire   populace   is   fully   complying   with   the   law.     This   is   precisely   why   the   above  

passage   also   says,   “When   punishments   are   heavy,   the   people   do   not   dare  

transgress.    Thus,  when  the  ruler  does  not  apply  punishments  and  the  people  dare  

not  commit  malfeasance,  this  is  the  entire  state  [fully]  complying  with  the  law.”  故

無刑也。而民莫敢為非，是一國皆善也。    

The  second  issue  of  contention  with  the  “no  rewards  assertion”  is  that  there  

is  no  evidence  that  concept  of  shan  善  in  “Policies”,  or  those  who  should  not  receive  

rewards,  includes  men  of  military  merit.    Rather,  there  is  significant  evidence  to  the  

contrary.    For  instance,  one  passage  in  “Policies”  concerning  unity  yi  壹247  defines  it  

through  the  concentration  of  the  state’s  strength  into  warfare  and  yet  does  so  in  a  

                                                                                                               
247
民勇者戰勝，民不勇者戰敗。能壹民於戰者，民勇；不能壹民於戰者，民不勇。聖王見王之致
於兵也，故興國而責之於兵。入其國，觀其治，兵用者彊。奚以知民之見用者也？民之見戰也，
如餓狼之見肉，則民用矣。凡戰者民之所惡也。能使民樂戰者王。彊國之民，父遺其子，兄遺其
弟，妻遺其夫，皆曰：“不得，無返！”又曰：“失法離令，若死，我死，鄉治之。行間無所逃
，遷徙無所入（入）。”行間之治，連以五，辨之以章，束之以令，拙無所處，罷此無所生。是
以三軍之眾，從令如流，死而不旋踵。(Gao  2011:  147);  See  [XIX.]  in  Appendix  II

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context   in   which   true   Kingship   hinges   the   state’s   military   achievement.     Thus,  

according   to   “Policies”,   the   ideal   ruler   values   military   achievement   above   all   else.    

The  passage  also  mentions  that  a  ruler  must  figure  out  a  way  to  cause  his  subjects  

to  engage  in  what  they  naturally  dislike:  war.    The  “Policies”  section  explains:    

Therefore   it   is   said:   ‘The   benevolent   are   able   to   be   benevolent  

towards  others,  but  they  are  unable  to  cause  others  to  be  benevolent.    
Those   that   exemplify   proper   roles   are   able   to   show   compassion  
towards  others,  but  are  unable  to  cause  others  to  be  compassionate  
to   each   other.     Because   of   this,   being   knowledgeable   about  
benevolence   and   righteousness   is   not   sufficient   to   govern   all   under  
Heaven.’   A   sage   has   a   quality   that   necessarily   engenders   good   faith  
and   mutual   trust,   and   he   also   has   laws   that   allow   no   choice   but   to  
have  good  faith  and  mutual  trust.248  
 
This   asserts   that   at   the   very   foundation   of   generating   a   concerted   effort   in   the  

engagement  in  war,  even  when  subjects  naturally  dislike  it,  is  the  establishment  of  

laws  that  engender  good  faith  and  mutual  trust  between  subject  and  ruler.          

The   general   tone   of   the   Book  of  Lord  Shang   suggests   that   the   ruler   clearly  

needs  something  to  reinforce  the  law  and  thus  establish  and  maintain  the  condition  

of  unity  yi  壹,  once  it  has  been  achieved.    An  examination  of  other  chapters  in  the  

Book  of  Lord  Shang  reveals  that  all  of  them  call  for  deploying  rewards  as  a  tool  to  

achieve  and/or  maintain  unity.    In  short,  rewards  are  inseparable  from  the  notion  

of   unity   yi   壹.     An   aforementioned   “Agriculture   and   War”   passage   explicitly   says,  

“When   the   people’s   pursuits   are   united,   then   [the   ruler]   can   use   rewards   and  

punishments   to   supervise   and   encourage   them” 壹 則 可 以 賞 罰 進 也 . More  

specifically,  rewards  are  meant   to   encourage   the   pursuit   of   private   profit   and  fame  

                                                                                                               
248  故曰：仁者能仁於人，而不能使人仁。義者能愛於人，而不能使人相愛。是以知仁義之不足以

治天下也。 聖人有必信之性，又有使天下不得不信之法。(Gao  2011:  153)    

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in   agriculture   and   warfare,   as   they   are   the   two   endeavors   within   which   the   ruler  

should  consolidate  his  subject’s  efforts.      “Elimination  of  Strength”,  “The  Calculation  

of   Land”,   “The   Unification   of   Words”,   “The   Establishment   of   Fundamentals”,   and  

“Making   Orders   Strict”   all   explicitly   assign   rewards   a   crucial   role   in   establishing  

unity  as  well.  

In  “Rewards  and  Punishments”,  the  relationship  between  unity  and  rewards  

could  not  more  explicit.    Its  states,  “What  is  called  unifying  rewards  is  when  profit,  

emoluments,   office,   and   rank   all   spring   from   military   merit.”249     Overall,   it   clearly  

defines   the   state’s   three   core   teachings   三教:   the   unification   of   rewards   壹賞,   the  

unification   of   punishments   壹刑,   and   the   unification   of   education   壹教.     The  

unification   of   rewards   meant   that   office,   rank,   profits,   and   emoluments   were   all  

based   on   a   conception   of   merit   that   was   exclusively   military.     The   unification   of  

punishments  meant  that  the  death  penalty  (the  most  severe  punishment)  was  the  

only  degree  or  grade  of  punishment.    Regardless  of  any  individual’s  office,  rank,  or  

past   behavior,   if   they   violated   the   ruler’s   laws,   they   should   be   put   to   death   without  

any   chance   of   pardon.     And,   the   unification   of   education   consists   of   three   main  

qualities.   Whatever   the   ruler   determines   as   not   essential,   such   as   the   Rujia  

tradition’s   culture   of   morality,   should   be   attacked   with   punishment.     Rank   and  

emoluments  are  given  based  on  merit,  even  more  specifically,  military  merit.    The  

entire   state   has   some   duty   in   warfare,   the   strong   devote   themselves   to   offensive  

warfare   and   the   old   and   feeble  to   devote   themselves   to   defensive   warfare.     Thus,   it  

should   be   clear   that   creation   and   maintenance   of   unity   is   inseparable   from   the  
                                                                                                               
249  所謂壹賞者，利祿官爵搏出於兵，無有異施也。(Gao  2011:  136)  

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bestowal   of   rewards   and   the   institution-­‐facilitation   competition   presented   in   every  

other  chapter  in  the  Book   of   Lord   Shang.    Can  “Policies”  really  be  different  because  

its  insistence  on  the  bestowal  of  rewards  is  not  less  explicit  than  other  chapters?  

A  third  point  of  contention  with  the  “no  rewards  assertion”  is  that,  later  in  

“Policies”,  both  rewards  and  punishments  are  mentioned  as  being  effective  tools  so  

long   as   the   ruler   remains   faithful   to   his   laws.     Earlier   in   “Policies”,   it   was   argued  

that  a  true  King  is  one  that  acknowledges  the  true  importance  of  the  ruler’s  laws,  

rewards  and  punishments:  the  establishment  of  uniformity  and  a  collective  cultural  

identity.     So   if   it   advocates   for   the   bestowal   of   rewards,   it   would   refer   to   some  

aspects   of   culture   closely   associated   with   rank   and   emoluments   and   a   culture   of  

merit.     If   not,   then   it   may   still   refer   to   the   perversity   of   cultures   antithetical   to   a  

culture  of  rewards.    Indeed,  “Policies”  does  both,  stating:    

Generally,   a   ruler   does   not   surpass   others   in   his   virtue,   wisdom,  

bravery,   or   strength.     Consequently,   even   though   his   subjects   have  
wisdom,   they   do   not   dare   plot   against   him.     Even   though   his   subjects  
have   bravery   and   strength,   they   do   not   dare   murder   him.     Even  
though   his   subjects   are   numerous,   they   dare   not   overtake   him.     Even  
though   his   military   personnel   reaches   hundreds   of   millions   in  
number,   they   will   dare   not   fight   each   other   upon   presentation   of  
large   rewards.     He   implements   harsh   punishments   and   his   subjects  
do  not  dare  resent  him.    The  reason  for  this  is  the  law.    In  a  disorderly  
state,  subjects  establish  their  individual  codes  of  conduct.    If  the  army  
is  weak  and  many  subjects  engage  in  private  acts  of  bravery,  then  the  
state   will   be   dismembered.     A   state   that   has   many   channels   to   obtain  
rank   and   emoluments   is   a   perishing   state.       As   for   the   desires   of   a  
perishing   state,   they   are   to   debase   rank   and   make   light   of  
emoluments,  to  have  subjects  who  do  not  work  yet  they  eat,  who  do  
not   engage   in   warfare   and   yet   have   honor   [and   high   position],   who  
lack   rank   and   are   still   respected,   who   lack   emoluments   and   still   have  
wealth,   who   lack   office   and   are   still   leaders.     There   are   what   are  
called  ‘the  perverse’.250  
                                                                                                               
250  凡人主德行非出人也，知非出人也，勇力非過人也。然民雖有聖知，弗敢我謀；勇力弗敢我殺

；雖眾不敢勝其主。雖民至民至億萬之數，懸重賞而民不敢爭，行罰而民不敢怨者，法也。國亂

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One  may  be  inclined  to  view  the  phrase  “they  will  dare  not  fight  each  other  upon  

presentation  of  large  rewards”  縣重賞而民不敢爭  as  evidence  that  “Policies”  does  

not   advocate   for   institution-­‐facilitation   competition,   especially   if   one   refers   back   to  

“Making   Orders   Strict”   where   the   phrase 爭以為榮 was   translated   as   “considering  

competition  as  [a  chance  for]  glory”.    This  inclination  though,  would  be  misguided,  

ignoring   the   context   in   which   both   phrases   are   used.     The   “Making   Orders   Strict”  

passage   in   which   the   study   translates   the   character   zheng   爭   as   “to   compete”   or  

“competition”  is  preceded  by  the  phrase  “soldiers  and  the  people  will  compete  for  

encouragement  and  take  pleasure  in  being  employed  by  their  ruler”  兵民畢競勸而

樂為主用.     In   other   words,   the   character   zheng   爭   in   the   “Making   Orders   Strict”  

phrase   is   describing   a   kind   of   competition   in   which   there   is   full   participation   in  

agriculture  and  warfare  for  private  profit  and  encouragement  quan  勸  in  the  form  

of  rewards.      

On   the   other   hand,   in   “Policies”,   the   phrase   “they   will   not   fight   each   other  

upon   presentation   of   large   rewards”   懸 重 賞 而 民 不 敢 爭   is   followed   by   the  

sentences  “If  the  army  is  weak  and  many  subjects  have  private  acts  of  bravery,  then  

the  state  will  be  dismembered.    A  state  that  has  many  channels  to  obtain  rank  and  

emoluments   is   a   perishing   state”   兵弱者，民多私勇，則削。國之所以取爵祿者多

塗，亡國.     In   these   sentences,   the   character   zheng   爭   is   presented   in   a   context   in  

which   “Policies”   insists   that   bellicosity   for   the   sake   of   private   interests   is   a   channel  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
者，民多私義，兵弱者，民多私勇。則削國之所以取爵祿者多塗。亡國人之欲，賤爵輕祿，不作
而食，不戰而榮，無爵而尊，無祿而富，無官而長，此之謂姦民。(Gao  2011:  150)  

  133  
or   way   of   pursuing   private   wealth   that   should   be   eliminated.     In   essence,   private  

acts  of  bravery  siyong  私勇  do  not  contribute  to  the  public  welfare  but  to  the  wealth  

and   strength   of   private   interests.     Therefore,   the   character   zheng   爭   must   be  

referring   to   soldiers   directing   their   bellicosity   towards   each   other   or   within   the  

state  rather  than  directing  it  abroad.    This  idea  is  expressed  in  other  chapters  in  the  

Book   of   Lord   Shang   as   well.     “Method   of   Warfare”   stated   that   a   ruler   can   only  

achieve  victory  in  warfare  if  it  establishes  its  domestic  political  welfare,  creating  a  

condition   in   which   subjects   do   not   fight   one   another   and   villages   shy   away   from  

battles   with   other   cities   within   the   state.251     The   phrase   “they   will   not   fight   each  

other   upon   presentation   of   large   rewards”   is   similarly   advocating   the   use   of   laws  

and   rewards   for   the   sake   of   a   weak   version   of   structural   competition,   through   its  

explicit   rejection   of   a   strong   version.     In   other   words,   any   bellicosity   will   not   be  

directed  internally  among  subjects  within  the  state  but  just  solely  towards  enemy  

states.      

The   final   phrase   of   the   above   passage   specifically   defines   the   perverse   or  

those   who   are   not   in   accordance   with   collective   cultural   practices   (i.e.   outside   of  

orthodoxy)  as  those  that  have  private  wealth  or  fame  without  having  earned  them  

in  accordance  with  the  specifically  defined  merit  at  the  heart  of  the  entire  Book  of  

Lord   Shang.     They   represent   a   perversion   of   how   the   state   should   accommodate  

human  nature  and  behavior.    This  explains  why  it  is  such  a  problem  that  there  are  

subjects  that  “do  not  engage  in  warfare  and  yet  have  honor  [and  high  position]”   不

                                                                                                               
251
凡戰法必本於政勝，則其民不爭，不爭則無以私意，以上為意。故王者之政，使民怯於邑鬥，
而勇於寇戰。(Gao  2011:  102)  

  134  
戰而榮.     It   not   only   implies   that   the   state   has   too   many   channels   within   which  

subjects   can   pursue   private   profit,   but   that   the   state   does   not   have   monopolistic  

control   of   them.   Since   the   passage   insists   that   it   is   perverse   to   have   honor   and   a  

high  position  without  having  engaged  in  warfare,  it  implies  that  it  is  not  perverse  to  

have  honor  and  a  high  position  if  one  has  engaged  in  warfare.    Therefore,  the  one  

channel  that  the  ruler  and  his  state  should  have  monopolistic  control  over  should  

also   be   a   channel   within   which   a   subject   can   obtain   rank,   honor,   emolument,   and  

office:   warfare.     If   the   perverse   are   those   that   “debase   rank   and   make   light   of  

emoluments”   賤爵輕祿,   what   else   could   those   antithetical   to   the   perverse   be,   other  

than   those   that   highly   value   and   seek   to   obtain   rank   and   emoluments   through  

extraordinary  military  merit?    Clearly,  “Policies”  must  facilitate  its  imagined  culture  

of  military  merit  with  the  bestowal  of  rewards.    

This  last  passage  is  even  more  powerful  when  one  considers  that  “Policies”  

views   the   figure   Bo   Yi   as   very   much   like   the   Princely   Man   in   Rujia   texts.     For  

instance,  “The  Teachings  of  the  Ru”  in  the  Xunzi  states,  “Accordingly,  although  the  

gentleman  lacks  rank,  he  is  noble;  although  he  lacks  an  emolument,  he  is  wealthy;  

although   he   does   not   speak,   he   is   trusted;   although   he   does   not   display   anger,   he   is  

awe   inspiring;   although   he   dwells   in   poverty,   he   flourishes;   and   although   he   lives  

alone,  he  is  happy—is  not  this  a  case  of  accumulating  the  essence  of  all  that  is  most  

honorable,  richest,  most  important,  and  most  majestic?”252  Like  Bo  Yi,  the  Princely  

Man  is  particularly  a  problem  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang  because  this  figure  is  not  

                                                                                                               
Knoblock  1999:  177;  故君子無爵而貴，無祿而富，不言而信，不怒而威，窮處而榮，獨居而樂
252

！豈不至尊、至富、至重、至嚴之情舉積此哉！(Lau  and  Chen  1996:  8/29/21)  

  135  
productive,   lacking   meaningful   contribution   to   the   state’s   agricultural   wealth   or  

military   strength.     Moreover,   conditions   of   (relative)   deprivation   do   not   motivate  

the   Princely   Man,   violating   one   of   the   assumptions   of   human   behavior   made  

throughout   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang.     Therefore,   the   efficacy   of   the   Book   of   Lord  

Shang’s  notion  of  law  becomes  threatened,  leaving  its  rewards  virtually  powerless.      

Conclusion  

In   addition   to   creating   a   sense   of   unity   with   distinctions,   rewards   must   be  

bestowed   contingently   based   on   a   culture   of   merit.     In   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang’s  

ideal   state,   the   outcomes   of   its   state-­‐wide   competition   are   supposed   to   be  

internalized;   meaning,   subjects   of   the   state   are   meant   to   eventually   view   their  

social  status  as  what  they  deserve.    They  are  meant  to  value  themselves  in  the  same  

terms   the   state   values   them:   according   to   their   utility   or   usefulness   to   the   state’s  

objectives.    This  is  supposed  to  create  a  sense  of  unity  in  which  individual  subjects  

enrich   and   strengthen   the   state   through   competing   as   individuals   for   glory,  

privilege,  and  status  within  state  orthodoxy.    

Given   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang’s   assumptions   about   human   behavior,  

intentional   competition   will   inevitably   destroy   a   state   if   a   weak   version   of  

structural   competition   is   not   established.   The   Book   of   Lord   Shang’s   chapter  

“Opening  and  Debarring”  states:  

The   way   of   the   people   was   to   [exclusively]   have   concern   for   their  
close   relatives   and   [exclusively]   seek   their   own   individual   personal  
gain.     Since   they   [exclusively]   had   concern   for   their   close   relatives,  
they   discriminated   between   those   who   were   close   and   distant.     Since  
they   [exclusively]   sought   their   own   individual   personal   gain,   they  
were   treacherous   toward   each   other.       As   the   population   increased,  
the   people   became   more   inclined   to   discriminate   between   those   who  

  136  
 were   close   and   distant   in   their   treachery   toward   each   other,   giving  
rise   to   chaos.     At   this   time,   people   devoted   themselves   to   defeating  
their   adversaries   and   seizing   profit   [from   others]   for   private   gain.    
They  devoted  themselves  to  defeating  their  adversaries  to  the  point  
of   waging   war   against   one   another.     They   devoted   themselves   to  
seizing  profit  [from  others]  for  private  gain  to  the  point  that  formal  
disputes   [arose].     However,   since   there   were   no   standards   for   justice  
in  these  formal  disputes,  there  were  none  whose  biased  rationalities  
came   to   fruition.     Therefore,   worthies   established   notions   of  
impartiality   and   correctness,   advocated   for   the   concern   for   more  
than  private  interests,  and,  because  of  this,  the  people  became  fond  of  
benevolence.     At   this   time,   the   people   abandoned   the   [exclusive  
quality  of]  their  concern  for  their  close  relatives  and  established  the  
custom   of   revering   the   worthy.     Generally,   those   who   were  
benevolent   took   loving   and   profiting   the   people   as   their   obligation.    
Yet,  these  worthies  took  the  way  of  competing  to  stand  out  in  relation  
to  each  other.    But  as  the  population  increased  even  more,  there  was  
no  system  and,  for  a  long  time,  worthies  took  the  way  of  competing  to  
stand   out   in   relation   to   each   other,   causing   chaos   [to   arise   once  
again].”253  
 
Though  the  worthies  established  standards  for  justice  within  human  society,  their  

benevolent   intentions   were   nevertheless   insufficient   to   contain   and   productively  

channel   their   competitive   proclivities.     In   other   words,   without   an  

institutionalization  of  standards  and  a  prince  to  govern  them  all,  the  Book  of  Lord  

Shang   argues   that   chaos   is   inevitable   because   the   competition   between   the  

worthies   to   “stand   out   in   relation   to   each   other”   would   end   up   being   a   harmful  

intentional  competition.    However,  the  Fajia  notion  of  law  creates  a  structure  that  

channels  competitive  efforts  into  pursuits  that  are  not  only  conducive  to  order  but  

also   enhance   order   through   the   development   of   the   state’s   wealth   and   strength,  

ensuring   the   survival   and   prosperity   of   all   the   subjects   of   the   state.    

                                                                                                               
253
其道親親而愛私。親親則別，愛私則險，民眾，而以別險為務，則民亂。當此時也，民務勝而
力征，務勝則爭，力征則訟，訟而無正，則莫得其性也。故賢者立中正，設無私，而民說仁。當
此時也，親親廢，上賢立矣。凡仁者以愛「利」為務，而賢者以相出為道。民眾而無制，久而相
出為道，則有亂。(Gao  2011:  84)  

  137  
 Chapter  V  
   
Fa  法 Outside  of  the  Fajia  tradition  
 
As   noted   in   the   introduction,   there   have   been   widely   different   scholarly  

perspectives   on   the   meaning   of   the   character   fa   法   upon   the   appearance   of   Fajia  

texts.     Most   scholars   have   argued   that   a   meaning-­‐change   did   occur.     This   study  

sympathizes   with   this   point   of   view   and   yet   responds   to   the   demands   for   proof  

raised   by   those   arguing   for   a   consistent-­‐meaning.     The   consistent-­‐meaning  

assertion  side  of  the  scholarly  debate  challenges  the  advocates  of  a  meaning-­‐change  

hypothesis   to   accomplish   two   things:   (1)   show   the   difference   in   the   use   of   the  

character   fa   法,   and   explain   how   it   could   not   have   been   a   possible   interpretation   in  

earlier  texts;  (2)  identify  and  explain  the  mechanism  that  caused  the  change  to  take  

place.254    Therefore,  this  chapter  will  examine  the  use  of  the  character  fa  法  and  the  

conception  of  law  in  the  Analects,  the  Mozi,  the  Book  of  Mencius,  and  the  Zuozhuan.    

It  will  argue  that  none  of  the  aforementioned  texts  contain  a  use  of  the  character   fa  

法  with  a  similar  meaning  to  that  found  in  the  Book   of   Lord   Shang’s.    As  a  result,  it  

will  aprove  that  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang’s  notion  of  law  is  distinct,  leaving  open  the  

possibility  for  a  new  meaning-­‐change  assertion.  

Early  Uses  of  Fa  法 and  Conceptions  of  Law  

 
In  the  Analects255,  in  response  to  Zi  Han,  “The  Master  said,  ‘One  cannot  but  

give   assent   to   exemplary   words,   but   what   is   important   is   that   one   should   rectify  

                                                                                                               
254  Hansen  1994:  447  
255  See  Lau.  D.C.  Confucius:  The  Analects.  Hong  Kong:  Chinese  University  of  Hong  Kong,  1992.  

  138  
oneself.’”256  This   passage   is   one   of   two   instances   in   which   the   character   fa   法   is  

used   in   the   Analects.     In   this   case,   it   is   evident   that   the   appropriate   translation   of  

the  character  fa  法  is  “standards”.    “Law”  could  be  used  here  in  the  much  broader  

sense   (i.e.   the   “laws”   or   rules   of   speech   or   grammar).     Nevertheless,   it   is  

significantly  different  from  the  aforementioned  notion  of  laws  in  Fajia  texts.  

Just   as   important,   however,   is   the   kind   of   standards   to   which   the   Analects   is  

referring.    In  the  above  passage,  the  Analects  expresses  the  idea  that  standards  are  

useful,   but   only   when   they   reform   gai   改   behavior.     The   degree   to   which   standards  

reform  behavior  is  how  they  should  be  judged.    It  is  how  they  prove  their  worth.    In  

this   way,   they   are   reminiscent   of   a   general   concept   of   law.     However,   in   this  

instance,   the   above   Analects   passage   does   not   speak   of   any   form   of   institutional  

reinforcement   of   the   law.     There   is   no   punishment   forcing   anyone   to   conform   to   or  

be   in   accordance   with   these   standards.     Therefore,   these   standards   seem   to   be  

criteria  for  speech  and  expression  (most  likely  established  by  the  elite  for  the  elite)  

meant  as  an  example  for  individuals  to  use  as  a  guide  for  their  behavior.      

In   the   other   instance   in   which   the   character   fa   法   is   used   in   the   Analects,  

there   does   seem   to   be   a   clear   reference   to   law.     The   Analects   states,   “Decide   on  

standard  weights  and  measures  after  careful  consideration,  and  re-­‐establish  official  

posts   fallen   into   disuse,   and   government   measures   will   be   enforced  

everywhere.” 257     This   passage   comes   from   the   “lower   text”   of   the   Analects,  

specifically   book   twenty.     Books   sixteen,   seventeen,   eighteen,   and   twenty   “have  

                                                                                                               
256  Lau  1992:  83;  子曰：法語之言，能無從乎？改之為貴。(Lau  and  Chen  1995:  9/22/4)  
257  Lau  1992:  31;  謹權量，審法度，修廢官，四方之政行焉。(Lau  and  Chen  1995:  20/57/6)  

  139  
been   regarded   for   several   centuries   to   be   later   and   less   authoritative   than   the  

others.”258    Book  twenty  is  thought  to  be  one  of  the  latest  additions.    Robert  Eno  has  

suggested  that  “the  celebration  of  standardization–  which  was  a  policy  of  the  post-­‐

Classical   Qin   Dynasty   (221-­‐208)   –   may   mark   this   passage   as   very   late.”259     If   we  

follow  this  division  of  the  Analects  chapters  between  an  “upper  text”  (i.e.  Books  1-­‐

10)   and   a   lower   text”   (i.e.   Books   11-­‐20)   whereby   the   upper   text   passages   have  

generally   (allowing   for   some   exceptions)   been   considered   to   have   been   written  

earlier  than  the  lower  text  passages  and  so  books  seven  through  ten  to  be  the  core  

representative  sections  of  early  Rujia  thought,  then  that  second  use  of  fa  法  in  Book  

twenty  would  fall  outside  of  our  consideration.    However,  in  response  to  those  who  

would  claim  this  passage  to  be  representative  of  a  Rujia  attitude  towards  law  that  

precedes  the  Fajia  concept,  the  response  would  have  to  be  that  it  does  not  provide  

sufficient  evidence  of  what  this  study  is  calling  a  Fajia  notion  of  law.  

It   should   also   be   pointed   out   that   the   Analects   also   includes   another   notable  

passage   in   the   lower   text   that   states,   “The   Master   said,   ‘While   the   gentleman  

cherishes   benign   rule,   the   small   man   cherishes   his   native   land.     While   the  

gentleman   cherishes   a   respect   for   the   law,   the   small   man   cherishes   generous  

treatment.”260     In   this   passage,   the   character   xing   刑   is   translated   as   “penal   law”.    

The  intimate  etymological  relationship  between  the  characters  fa  法  and  xing  刑  is  

                                                                                                               
258  Eno  2012:  V;  See  Eno,  Robert.  University  of  Indiana,  "Analects  of  Confucius."  Last  modified  2012.  

Accessed  April  6,  2014.  http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Analects_of_Confucius_(Eno-­‐2012).pdf.  

And  also  Brooks,  E.  Bruce  and  Brooks,  A.  Taeko.  The  Original  Analects.  New  York,  New  York:  
Columbia  University  Press,  1998.  
259  Eno  2012:  109  
260  Lau  1992:  31;    子曰：「君子懷德，小人懷土；君子懷刑，小人懷惠。」(Lau  and  Chen  1995:  

4/7/29)

  140  
at  the  foundation  of  this  interpretation.    The  character  fa  法 that  is  used  today  is  a  

more   simplified   form   of   the   following   character:   灋.     The   Shuowen  jiezi   說文解字  

described   this   character   as   punishment   used   to   balance   or   harmonize   the   people  

like  water,  coming  from  the  character  zhi  廌261.    The  character  zhi  廌  is  described  as  

a  mythical  sage  beast,  that  was  used  to  resolve  court  cases.    It  was  thought  that  this  

beast   could   sense   guilt   and   therefore   suspected   criminals   would   be   presented   to   it.    

If  the  beast  did  not  strike  them,  suspects  were  considered  innocent.    If  it  did  strike  

them,   they   were   considered   guilty.262     In   short,   the   character   fa   法   is   that   which  

causes   and   justifies   the   striking   down   of   criminals   to   bring   socio-­‐cultural   order.  

Originally   written   as   xing   刑,   the   Shuowen   jiezi   described   this   character   for  

punishment  as  “the  molding  tool”263  of  fa  法.    As  the  components  of  the  character  

insinuate  xing  刑  and  tu  土,  to  mold  something  from  the  earth  tu  土  is  xing  型.    In  

other   words,   in   addition   to   being   the   reinforcement   of   the   character   fa   法,  

                                                                                                               
261  灋，刑也。平之如水。从水，廌所以触不直者去之，从去。(Xu  Shen  1963:  202);  Xu  Shen  許慎,  

ed.  Shuo  wen  jie  zi  說文解字.  Beijing  北京:  Zhong  hua  shu  ju  chu  ju  中華書局出局,  1963,  p.  202.  
262  In  the  Lunheng,  of  the  mythical  sage  beast  zhi  廌,  it  states,  “…[Ru]  scholars  declare  that  the  

monoceros  is  a  goat  with  one  horn  which,  bu  instinct,  knows  the  guilty.    When  Kao  Yao,  
administering  justice,  was  doubtful  about  the  guilt  of  a  culprit,  he  ordered  this  goat  to  butt  it.    It  
would  butt  the  guilty,  but  spare  the  innocent.    Accordingly,  it  was  a  sage  animal  born  with  one  horn,  
a  most  efficient  assistant  in  judicial  proceedings.    Therefore  did  Kao  Yao  hold  it  in  high  respect,  
using  it  on  all  occasions.    Consequently,  it  belonged  to  the  class  of  supernatural  ominous  creatures.”  
(Forke  1962:  321)  儒者說云：獬豸者、一角之羊也，性知有罪。皋陶治獄，其罪疑者，令羊觸之
。有罪則觸，無罪則不觸。斯蓋天生一角聖獸，助獄為驗，故皋陶敬羊，起坐事之。此則神奇瑞
應之類也。(Lau  and  Chen  1996:  52/235/1-­‐3;  See  Lau,  D.C.  and  Chen  Fong  Ching.  A  Concordance  to  
the  Lunheng.  Hong  Kong:  The  Commercial  Press,  1996.).    It  should  also  be  noted  that  this  divine  
origin  of  the  character  fa  法  was  no  ordinary  myth  in  traditional  Chinese  history.    It  clearly  had  
notable  social  meaning  as  late  as  the  Han  dynasty.    Wang  Chong  himself  pointed  this  out  in  a  phrase  
immediately  preceding  the  aforementioned.    It  says,  “At  present,  in  the  court-­‐yards  of  public  
buildings,  Kao  Yao  and  the  monoceros  are  painted...”  (Forke  1962:  321).    The  fact  that  both  Gao  Yao  
and  the  divine  beast  were  prominently  recognized  in  law  court  suggests  that  the  very  origin  of  the  
character  with  which  the  Fajia  tradition  has  become  so  strongly  associated  had  divine  origins.    See  
also  Wang  Chong.  Lun-­‐heng.  Alfred  Forke,  trans.  New  York:  Paragon  Book  Gallery,  1962.      
263  鑄器之法也。从土刑聲。(Xu  Shen  1963:  287)  

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punishment   xing   刑   is   also   meant   to   shape   or   mold   those   subjected   to   it   in   the  

image   of   fa   法.   Therefore,   from   their   inception,   the   characters   fa   法   and   xing   刑

were   virtually  inseparable.    So  a  translation  of  “penal  law”  for  the  character  xing  刑  

in  the  aforementioned  Analects   passage  emphasizes  the  implied  law  in  a  reference  

to  “punishment  in  accordance  with  the  law”.    Nevertheless,  this  interpretation  lacks  

insistence   on   rewards   as   a   form   of   reinforcement   like   the   other   reference   to   law   in  

the  Analects.    

The   Mozi’s 264  “On   Standards   and   Rules”   provides   one   of   the   strongest  

passages   advocating   the   use   of   the   character   fa   法   when   it   states,   “Master   Mo   Zi  

said:   ‘Those   who   work   in   the   world   cannot   do   so   without   standards   and   rules.     No-­‐

ne   has   ever   been   able   to   accomplish   anything   without   standards   and   rules.     Even  

those  officers  who  are  generals  and  ministers  all  have  standards.    Even  the  hundred  

craftsmen   in   doing   their   work   all   have   standards   too.’”265     This   passage   seems   to  

clearly  be  using  the  character  fa  法  to  refer  to  “method”  or  “standard”.    What  is  of  

particular   note   in   this   usage   of   the   character   fa   法   or   concept   of   standard   is   that   all  

people   seem   to   need   standards   to   successfully   complete   their   tasks.     There   is   a  

sense   of   universality   of   standards   to   which   everyone   must   conform   or   be   in  

accordance  with  in  order  to  tend  to  their  affairs.    However,  again  it  is  also  clear  that  

these  standards  are  not  associated  with  any  form  of  institutional  reinforcement.      

                                                                                                               
264  See  Mozi.  The  Mozi:  A  Complete  Translation.  Ian  Johnston,  trans.  New  York:  Columbia  University  

Press,  2010.  
265  Johnston  2010:  25;  子墨子曰：天下從事者，不可以無法儀，無法儀而其事能成者，無有也。雖

至士之為將相者皆有法，雖至百工從事者亦皆有法。 (Lau  and  Chen  2001:  1.4/4/8-­‐9)  

  142  
 Soon   afterwards   though,   the   Mozi   expounds   on   its   conception   of   the  

character  fa  法  when  it  states:    

Nowadays,  the  greatest  [achievement]  is  to  bring  order  to  the  world  
and   the   next   greatest   is   to   bring   order   to   a   large   country,   but   to  
attempt   these   things   without   reliance   on   standards   is   to   compare  
unfavourably  in  wisdom  with  the  hundred  craftsmen.    This  being  so,  
then   what   can   be   taken   as   a   standard   for   bringing   about   order?    
Would   it   be   fitting   if   everyone   took   their   parents   as   the   standard?    
There  are  many  parents  in  the  world,  but  few  who  are   benevolent.     If  
everyone  took  their  parents  as  the  standard,  this  would  be  a  standard  
without   benevolence.     A   standard   without   benevolence   cannot   be  
taken   as   a   standard.     Would   it   be   fitting   if   everyone   took   their  
teachers   are   the   standard?     There   are   many   teachers   in   the   world,  
but   few   who   are   benevolent.     If   everyone   took   their   teacher   as   the  
standard,   this   would   be   a   standard   without   benevolence.     A   standard  
without   benevolence   cannot   be   taken   as   a   standard.     Would   it   be  
fitting   if   everyone   took   their   ruler   as   a   standard?     There   are   many  
rulers   in   the   world,   but   few   who   are   benevolent.     If   everyone   took  
their   ruler   as   the   standard,   it   would   be   a   standard   without  
benevolence.    A  standard  without  benevolence  cannot  be  taken  as  a  
standard.     Therefore   all   three—parents,   teachers   rulers—cannot   be  
taken  as  standards  for  bringing  about  order.266  
     
This  passage  illustrates  that  the  Mozi  certainly  conceived  of  standards  as  a  tool  of  

governance.    In  fact,  this  passage  implies  that  standards  play  an  important  role  in  

shaping   the   behavior   of   individual   subjects.     However,   the   ultimate   standard   to  

which  the  Mozi  refers  is  Heaven’s  standard.      

In   the   Mohist   virtuous   state,   the   populace   ideally   should   not   conform   to  

models  provided  by  their  parents,  teachers,  or  ruler.    The  ultimate  model  is  Heaven  

tian  天.    In  fact,  the  Mozi  upholds  the  concept  of  the  mandate  of  Heaven  tian  ming  

                                                                                                               
266  Johnston  2010:  25-­‐27;  今大者治天下，其次治大國，而無法所度，此不若百工辯也。然則奚以

為治法而可？當皆法其父母，奚若？天下之為父母者眾，而仁者寡，若皆法其父母，此法不仁也
。法不仁，不可以為法，當皆法其學奚若？天下之為學者眾，而仁者寡，若皆法其學，此法不仁
也。法不仁，不可以為法，當皆法其君奚若？天下之為君者眾，而仁者寡，若皆法其君，此法不
仁也。法不仁，不可以為法。故父母，學，君三者，莫可以為治法（而可）。然則奚以為治法而
可？故曰莫若法天。(Lau  and  Chen  2001:  1.4/4/11-­‐21)  

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天命.267     This   differs   from   the   Fajia  concept   of   fa   法   as   it   specifically   insists   that   the  

ruler   should   not   be   viewed   as   the   source   of   the   proper   standards   with   which   his  

subjects  should  conform.    This  means  that  the  rulers  of  states  are  subjects  within  

this  Heaven-­‐administered  structural  space  just  like  their  subjects.    Very  unlike  the  

definitions  of  the  ruler  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang,  what  makes  a  ruler  a  ruler  is  not  

his   authority   to   bestow   and   apply   rewards   and   punishments.     He   is   not  

distinguished  as  the  arbiter  of  the  space  acted  upon  within  Heaven’s  architecture.    

Therefore,  when  the  Mozi  speaks  of  contingent  reinforcement,  the  structural  space  

is   one   that   is   not   ultimately   administered   by   the   ruler   and   also   not   unique   to   a  

particular   state.     Rather,   the   space   acted   upon   within   Heaven’s   architecture   is   all  

under   Heaven.     Chen   Chi-­‐tien   agreed   when   he   explained   that   the   Mohist  

implementation  of  rewards  and  punishments  relies  on  Heaven’s  will.268      

This   is   not   to   say   that   the   ruler   does   not   administer   rewards   and  

punishments  at  all  in  the  Mohist  system.    Rather,  it  is  to  say  that  the  ruler  is  not  the  

ultimate  administrator  of  the  establishment  of  culture.    For  instance,  Ian  Johnston  

stated,  “When  it  comes  to  the  actual  means  of  ensuring  such  a  unity  of  standards,  

Mo  Zi  describes  a  five-­‐tier  structure:  village;  district;  state;  Son  of  Heaven;  Heaven.    

With   the   lowest   three   levels,   unity   is   to   be   maintained   by   a   system   of   reporting  

notable   examples   of   good   or   bad   conduct   to   those   in   charge   at   that   particular   level.    

There  is  then  implementation  of  rewards  or  punishments  accordingly,  not  only  to  

                                                                                                               
267  The  Mozi  discusses  this  idea  in  “Will  of  Heaven  II”.  
268  依天意行賞罰的天治主義。(Chen  1970:  16);  Benjamin  Schwartz  also  said,  “…the  discussion  of  

rewards  and  punishments  is  indissolubly  bound  up  with  a  deep  emphasis  on  the  moral  will  of  
Heaven  and  the  spirits  who  are  to  be  both  feared  and  loved.”  (Schwartz  1985:  329)  

  144  
encourage   proper   conduct   but   also   to   encourage   reporting   of   deviations.” 269    

Clearly,  the  ruler  is  not  the  ultimate  authority  in  the  structure  that  ensures  a  “unity  

of  standards”270.      

Indeed,   it   could   be   argued   that   one   of   the   main   subjects   of   focus   of   Heaven’s  

administering   of   rewards   and   punishments   are   the   rulers   themselves.     Rewards  

and  punishments  are  discussed  in  terms  of  the  rise  and  fall  from  positions  of  power  

based   on   how   Heaven   perceived   a   ruler’s   worthiness,   which   depended   almost  

entirely  on  whether  they  administered  benevolent  governance  to  all  under  Heaven.  

In  “Exalting  Worthiness  II”,  the  Mozi  states:    

Therefore   the   ancient   sage   kings   gave   careful   attention   to   exalting  

worthiness  and  utilizing  ability  in  the  conduct  of  government,  taking  
their   model   from   Heaven.     Heaven   does   not   discriminate   between  
rich  and  poor,  noble  and  base,  far  away  and  near  at  hand,  close  and  
distant   [relations].     Those   who   are   worthy   are   put   forward   and  
advanced   whereas   those   who   are   unworthy   are   held   back   and  
rejected.    If  this  is  so,  then  who  were  those  both  rich  and  noble  who  
became  worthy  and  so  obtained  their  reward?    I  say  that  the  former  
sage   kings   of   the   Three   Dynasties—Yao,   Shun,   Yu,   Tang,   Wen,   and  
Wu—were  such  men.    And  how  did  they  obtain  their  rewards?    I  say  
that,  in  their  governing  of  the  world,  they  were  universal  in  their  love  
for   it,   and   followed   by   benefitting   it,   and   they   also   led   the   ten  
thousand   people   of   the   world   to   revere   Heaven   and   serve   ghosts.    
That   they   loved   and   benefited   the   ten   thousand   people   is   why  
Heaven   and   ghosts   honoured   them,   establishing   them   as   Sons   of  
Heaven   and   taking   them   to   be   the   parents   of   the   people.     And   it   is  
why  the  ten  thousand  people  served  them  and  praised  them,  calling  
them  ‘sage  kings’,  as  they  still  do  to  the  present  day.    This,  then,  is  a  
case   of   the   rich   and   noble   being   worthy   and   so   obtaining   their  
reward.    So  who  were  those  who  were  rich  and  noble  but  were  evil,  
and  for  this  reason  suffered  their  punishment?    I  say  that  the  former  
cruel  kings  of  the  Three  Dynasties—Jie,  Zhou,  You  and  Li—were  such  
men.    How  do  I  know  this  to  be  so?    I  say  that,  in  their  governing  of  
the  world,  they  were  universal  in  their  hatred  for  it  and  followed  by  
                                                                                                               
269  Johnston  2010:  xli-­‐xlii;  Johnston,  Ian.  “Introduction”  in  The  Mozi:  A  Complete  Translation.  New  

York:  Columbia  University  Press,  2010.  

270  Johnston  2010:  xli  

  145  
 plundering   it,   and   they   also   led   the   people   of   the   world   to   abuse  
Heaven  and  insult  ghosts.    They  massacred  the  ten  thousand  people  
and,  for  this  reason,  Heaven  and  ghosts  punished  them,  causing  them  
to   die   and   be   desecrated,   their   sons   and   grandsons   to   be   dispersed  
and   scattered,   and   their   homes   and   houses   to   be   damaged   and  
destroyed.    So  they  were  cut  off  without  descendants  and  the  people  
went  on  to  condemn  them,  calling  them  ‘cruel  kings’,  as  they  still  do  
to  the  present  day.    This,  then,  is  a  case  of  those  who  were  rich  and  
noble  being  cruel  and  so  getting  their  punishment.271    
   
This  passage  depicts  a  very  different  space  in  which  rewards  and  punishments  are  

applied   to   what   is   conceived   of   in   the   Fajia  texts.     This   space   is   acted   upon   by   a  

Heaven-­‐administered   architecture   that   encompasses   all   under   Heaven,   while   the  

Son   of   Heaven   is   the   main   focus   of   Heaven’s   normalizing   judgment,   limiting  

Heaven’s   evaluation   of   success   to   those   who   hold   positions   of   power.     It   is  

important  to  note  that  upon  attaining  the  position  of  Son  of  Heaven,  the  ruler  needs  

to  be  successful  in  satisfying  and  being  in  accordance  with  Heaven’s  standards  but  

he   is   no   longer   in   a   competition   with   others.     Therefore,   Heaven’s   standards   are  

meant   to   motivate   the   ruler   to   succeed   in   a   cosmic   sense,   not   to   motivate   him   to  

compete   in   the   world.     These   are   two   very   different   objectives.     Success   does   not  

require  the  Son  of  Heaven  to  outdo  the  subjects  of  his  empire  in  order  to  satisfy  and  

be   in   accordance   with   Heaven’s   standards.     The   ruler   only   needs   to   govern  

benevolently.      

                                                                                                               
271  Johnston  2010:  75-­‐77;  故古聖王以審以尚賢使能為政，而取法於天。雖天亦不辯貧富貴賤，遠

邇親疏，賢者舉而尚之，不肖者抑而廢之。「然則富貴為賢以得其賞者，誰也？曰：若昔者三代
聖王堯舜禹湯文武者是也。以所得其賞何也？曰：其為政乎天下也，兼而愛之，從而利之，又率
天下之萬民以尚尊天事鬼，愛利萬民。是故天鬼賞之，立為天子，以為民父母，萬民從而譽之曰
『聖王』，至今不已。則此富貴為賢，以得其賞者也。「然則富貴為暴以得其罰者，誰也？曰：
若昔者三代暴王桀紂幽厲者是也。何以知其然也？曰：其為政乎天下也，兼而憎之，從而（賤）
「賊」之，又率天下之民以詬天侮鬼，（賊傲）「賊殺」萬民。是故天鬼罰之，使身死而為刑戮
，子孫離散，室家喪滅，絕無後嗣，萬民從而非之曰『暴王』，至今不已。則此富貴為暴而以得
其罰者也。(Lau  and  Chen  2001:  2.2/12/17-­‐28)  

  146  
 It  is  indeed  the  case  that  the  above  passage  does  seem  to  assert  that,  upon  

the   failure   of   the   Son   of   Heaven   to   satisfy   or   be   in   accordance   with   Heaven’s  

standards,   Heaven   does   seem   to   choose   a   “winner”   to   reward.     In   other   words,  

Heaven   does   choose   the   “best”   of   its   subjects   to   replace   the   failed   Son   of   Heaven.      

However,  an  examination  of  the  terms  of  “competition”  in  this  situation  reveals  that  

the   Mozi’s   Heaven-­‐administered   architecture   does   not   facilitate   competition,   but  

rather   cooperation.     For   instance,   in   “Universal   Love   III”   the   Mozi   states,   “Now  

things   like   universal   mutual   love   and   the   exchange   of   mutual   benefit   are   both  

beneficial  and  easy  to  practice  in  innumerable  ways.    I  think  it  is  only  a  matter  of  

not   having   a   ruler   who   delights   in   them,   and   that   is   all.     If   there   was   a   ruler   who  

delighted   in   these   things,   and   encouraged   people   with   rewards   and   praise,   and  

intimidates   them   with   penalties   and   punishments,   I   think   the   people   would   take   to  

universal  mutual  love  and  interchange  of  mutual  benefit  just  like  fire  goes  up  and  

water   goes   down   and   cannot   be   stopped   in   the   world.”272     It   is   the   responsibility   of  

the  Son  of  Heaven  to  implement  benevolent  governance,  defined  as  mutual  concern  

and   mutual   benefit   兼相愛交相利,   throughout   his   empire.     Therefore,   the   Mozi’s  

notion  of  laws  also  differs  from  the  notion  of  laws  in  Fajia  texts  because  of  the  basis  

on   which   the   Heaven-­‐administered   architecture   is   established.     It   does   not  

fundamentally   facilitate   competition.     It   operates   with   standards   that   are   actually  

meant  to  facilitate  cooperation.    

                                                                                                               
272  Johnston  2010:  163-­‐165;  今若夫兼相「愛」，「交相」利，此其有利且易為也，不可勝計也。

我以為則無有上說之者而已矣，苟有上說之者，勸之以賞譽，威之以刑罰，我以為人之於就兼相
愛，交相利也，譬之猶火之就上，水之就下也，不可防止於天下。(Lau  and  Chen  2001:  4.3/30/3-­‐
5)  

  147  
 One  may  be  tempted  to  argue  that  since  the  Mozi  nevertheless  does  bestow  

rewards   based   on   Heaven’s   or   the   ruler’s   desired   behavior   this   is   still   structural  

competition.    On  the  surface,  this  may  appear  to  be  the  case.    However,  it  is  not  in  

fact   so   for   at   least   two   important   reasons.   First,   Mohist   subjects   who   are   not  

necessarily   employed   by   the   ruler   can   both   significantly   limit   the   scope   of   the  

“competition”   and   prevent   an   identifiable   structure   from   forming.     Unlike   the  

notion   of   law   in   the   Book  of  Lord  Shang,   which   only   encouraged   the   reporting   of  

malfeasance  or  punishable  behavior  from  its  subjects,  the  Mozi  system  of  rewards  

depends   upon   the   recommendations   and   nominations   from   the   ruler’s   subjects.    

This  brings  further  doubt  upon  whether  or  not  the  Mohist  subject  can  necessarily  

expect   additional   merit   or   the   bestowal   of   reward   for   cooperative   behavior;   from  

the   perspective   of   the   Book  of  Lord  Shang,   of   course,   evaluation   and   judgment   of  

good  and  bad  behavior  cannot  possibly  be  consistent,  and  so  this  does  not  permit  

subjects   to   have   any   justifiable   of   rewards   or   punishments.     In   the   Book   of   Lord  

Shang,   there   is   no   instance   in   which   the   ruler   and   his   laws   would   depend   on   the  

recommendations   or   nominations   of   the   ruler’s   subjects   to   bestow   rewards.     The  

Fajia   concept   of   law   would   not   allow   those   subjected   to   the   law   to   be   evaluators  

and  judges  of  merit  or  influence  the  law’s  system  of  rewards.      

Second,   even   if   one   were   to   assume   that   all   subjects   of   the   Mohist   empire  

were   simply   engaging   in   cooperative   behavior   in   hopes   of   obtaining   individual  

reward,   it   would   be   inaccurate   to   describe   the   Mohist   approach   to   governance   as  

aiming  to  facilitate  competition.    This  is  not  only  because  the  rewards  do  not  seem  

to   be   contingently   bestowed,   but   also   because   subjects   are   required   to   engage   in  

  148  
cooperative   behavior   to   even   have   a   chance   at   reward.     Consider   a   scenario   in  

which   there   are   persons   A,   B,   and   C.     If   person   A   wants   to   achieve   his   goal   of  

obtaining   individual   reward,   then   there   must   be   the   fulfillment   of   a   sub-­‐goal   of  

demonstrating  mutual  concern  or  engaging  in  mutually  beneficial  interaction  with  

others.     Since   persons   B   and   C   necessarily   have   the   same   goal   of   obtaining  

individual  reward,  persons  A,  B,  and  C  must  show  compassion  towards  each  other  

and  interact  in  mutually  beneficial  ways  with  each  other.    Therefore,  person  A  will  

not  obtain  his  goal  (obtaining  individual  reward)  if  he  does  not  obtain  his   sub-­‐goal  

(obtaining   benefit   or   profit   li   利 in   an   extraordinary   cooperative   manner)   which  

requires  the  contribution  to  persons  B  and  C’s  sub-­‐goals  (obtaining  benefit  or  profit  

li   利   in   a   cooperative   manner)   so   that   they   may   have   a   chance   to   achieve   their  

ultimate  goal  (obtaining  individual  reward).      

Thus,   the   Mohist   environment   is   fundamentally   cooperative   because   each  

person   must   cooperate   with   others   in   order   to   obtain   their   sub-­‐goals.   Their  

obtainment   of   their   ultimate   goal   (the   obtainment   of   individual   reward)   does   not  

require  the  failure  of  others  to  obtain  the  same  goal  if  they  have  also  obtained  their  

sub-­‐goals.     This   last   point   is   particularly   salient.     Since   the   bestowal   of   reward  

depends  on  who  is  reported  to  have  obtained  their  sub-­‐goal  (obtaining  benefit  or  

profit  li   利 in  an  extraordinary  cooperative  manner),  competitive  scenarios  are  far  

less   likely.     More   concretely,   consider   a   scenario   in   which   person   A   is   the   only  

individual   reported   for   having   demonstrated   extraordinary   cooperative   behavior  

that   includes   persons   B   and   C,   and   the   ruler   only   rewards   person   A.     The   exclusion  

of   persons   B   and   C   does   not   occur   because   of   the   Mohist   ruler’s   own   imposed  

  149  
standards   and   judgment.     Rather,   their   exclusion   was   a   choice   by   the   individual  

nominating   person   A.     Also,   person   A’s   success   did   not   depend   on   the   failure   of  

persons  B  and  C.    Thus,  competition  is  not  required  in  the  achievement  of  merit  or  

the   bestowal   of   reward.     Most   importantly   for   our   discussion   considered   in  

comparison  with  law  in  Fajia  texts,  the  Mohist  notion  of  standards  specifically  does  

not  create  and  facilitate  any  form  of  competition.      

The   ideals   of   mutual   concern   and   especially   mutual   benefit   define  

rewardable   actions   in   terms   of   working   with   others   rather   than   working   against  

others,  or  succeeding  with  others  rather  than  succeeding  instead  of  others.    In  this  

cooperative   space   described   in   the   Mozi,   the   empire   is   not   simply   non-­‐competitive,  

but   individual   achievement   necessarily   involves   a   coordination   of   effort   with  

others,   in   which   one   subject   can   only   succeed   in   achieving   their   individual   goals  

through   working   with   others   to   enable   them   to   achieve   theirs.     For   instance,  

Johnston  explains  mutual  concern  jianai  兼愛  by  stating:    

If   people   could   learn   to   love   others   like   they   love   themselves   then  
they   would   no   longer   be   able   to   disadvantage   others   to   gain  
advantage   for   themselves.     This   applies   at   all   levels   of   society   from  
families   through   communities   to   states,   and   even   to   collections   of  
states…   Lack   of   mutual   love   or   loving   oneself   to   the   exclusion   of  
others,   is   at   the   root   of   all   these   problems.     Their   solution,   then,   is  
clear—everyone  must  love  others  as  they  love  themselves.273  
     
In   other   words,   rewards   and   punishments   should   be   applied   to   individuals   who  

gain  advantage  for  themselves  without  disadvantaging  others.      

Even   if   one   were   to   argue   that   the   Mozi   does   not   require   that   a   subject  

benefit   another   subject   to   have   his   actions   recognized   by   the   ruler—though   the  

                                                                                                               
273  Johnston  2010:  xliv-­‐xlv  

  150  
Mozi   clearly   views   benefitting   others   while   benefitting   oneself   as   ideal—it   does  

deem   it   necessary   that   a   subject   not   disadvantage   another   while   obtaining   benefits  

for  himself.    This  is  not  the  case  with  the   Fajia  competitive  state.    Fajia  competition  

does  not  require  mutual  benefit  when  bestowing  its  rewards  because  it  is  coupled  

with   a   culture   of   merit   that   measures   individual   agricultural   or   military  

achievement.274    To  be  clear,  this  is  not  to  say  that  harm  or  disadvantage  of  another  

subject  or  group  of  subjects  is  encouraged  or  required  to  obtain  reward  in  a  Fajia  

state.    That  would  be  a  case  of  a  strong  version  of  competition.    However,  the  Fajia  

institution-­‐facilitated   competitive   state   requires   the   ruler’s   subjects   to   have   a  

distinctly  different  focus.    As  opposed  to  the  subject  of  the  Mohist  environment  who  

must   focus   on   showing   mutual   concern   and/or   mutually   benefitting   other   subjects,  

the   subject   of   the   Fajia   state   must   focus   on   individual   achievement   that   is   largely  

defined  by  extraordinary  performance  in  the  two  most  essential  strategic  areas  of  

the   state:   agriculture   and   warfare.     Though   individual   achievement   can   consist   of   a  

subject  showing  mutual  concern  or  mutually  benefitting  another,  it  is  by  no  means  

a  criteria  considered  in  the  bestowal  of  rewards.    In  other  words,  the  Fajia  notion  of  

merit,   unlike   the   basis   upon   which   rewards   are   bestowed   in   the   Mozi,   does   not  

require   the   benefit   of   or   expression   of   love   toward   others,   allowing   for   and  

structurally   imposing   the   exclusion   of   others   in   a   subject’s   or   group   of   subjects’  

pursuit  of  obtaining  private  profit  and  accumulating  merit.      

Put  another  way,  the  Fajia  competitive  environment  ideally  seeks  to  thrive  

off   the   exclusion   or   relative   deprivation   of   those   who   do   not   receive   benefit   or  
                                                                                                               
274  It  should  be  noted  though  that  merit  can  be  given  to  a  group  at  the  same  time,  but  the  bestowal  of  

reward  is  based  on  an  individual’s  record  of  merit  which  may  or  may  not  be  the  same  as  others.  

  151  
rewards.     The   Mohist   cooperative   environment   seeks   to   eliminate   or   at   the   very  

least   limit   the   exclusion   or   relative   deprivation   that   those   who   do   not   receive  

rewards   might   experience.     As   this   study   will   show,   these   two   systems   were  

designed   to   produce   sharply   contrasting   political   environments   and   experiences  

for   those   subjected   to   them.   Additionally,   it   should   be   noted   out   that   the   Mozi’s  

advocacy   of   bestowing   rewards   based   on   good   conduct,   which   is   fundamentally  

defined   by   mutual   concern   and   mutual   benefit,   is   not   the   same   as   bestowing  

rewards  collectively.    Bestowing  collective  rewards  can  still  maintain  a  competitive  

environment,  one  in  which  the  ruler  bestows  rewards  on  a  group  of  subjects  rather  

than  individual  subjects.    It  is  simply  that  the  basic  unit  upon  which  the  competition  

is  based  is  different:  the  competitive  agent  is  a  group  rather  than  an  individual.      

The  Book  of  Mencius,  the  use  of   the  character  fa  法  entirely  unlike  its  Fajia  

meaning.    For  instance,  consider  the  following  passage:    

Mencius   said:   ‘Yao   and   Shun   had   it   as   their   nature;   T’ang   and   King  
Wu  returned  to  it.    To  be  in  accord  with  the  rites  in  every  movement  
is   the   highest   of   virtue.     When   one   mourns   sorrowfully   over   the   dead  
it   is   not   to   impress   the   living.     When   one   follows   unswervingly   the  
path  of  virtue  is  it  is  not  to  win  advancement.    When  one  invariably  
keeps  one’s  word  it  is  not  to  establish  the  rectitude  of  one’s  actions.    
A  gentleman  merely  follows  the  norm  and  awaits  his  Destiny.’275  
 
In   this   excerpt   standards   seem   to   be   incorporated   in   the   process   of   an   individual  

acting  within  whatever  is  prescribed  in  ritual   li  禮.    Since  existing  and  acting  within  

the  parameters  of  ritual  is  described  as  being  the  apex  of  virtue,  the  Princely  Man  

acting  according  to  standards  must  also  be  within  its  parameters.    Thus,  standards  

                                                                                                               
275  Lau  1970:  164-­‐165;  孟子曰：「堯舜，性者也；湯武，反之也。動容周旋中禮者，盛德之至也

；哭死而哀，非為生者也；經德不回，非以干祿也；言語必信，非以正行也。君子行法，以俟命
而已矣。」(Lau  and  Chen  1995:  14/77/5-­‐7)  

  152  
must   be   subordinate   to   ritual   principles.     This   is   the   notion   of   “law”   to   which  

Duyvendak   was   referring   when   he   described   the   “old   idea   of   law”276  that   was  

replaced  by  the  notion  of  law  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang.      

This  then  requires  us  to  ask:  how  can  ritual  principles  and  standards  coexist?    

The   answer   is   that   their   functions   are   similar.   Both   ritual   and   standards   are  

designed  to  turn  words  into  action.    Ritual  does  so  through  repetition  of  behavior.    

If   one   performs   behavior   associated   with   ritual   enough,   one   is   supposed   to  

eventually   discover   oneself   through   their   performance.     Standards,   even   those  

described   in   the   Analects   and   the   Mozi,   are   designed   to   accomplish   something  

similar.    Standards  are  laid  out  in  written  form,  while  in  accordance  with  ritual,  in  

order   to   provide   a   concrete   guide   for   an   individual’s   behavior.     If   an   individual  

attempts   to   exemplify   a   standard   long   enough,   it   will   eventually   become   habit.    

Thus,  an  individual  may  also  discover  their  “better  selves”  through  this  process.277    

Just   as   ritual   is   about   action,   standards   are   focused   on   results. They   are  

both  pragmatic.    Ritual,  though  often  mischaracterized  as  empty  and  not  practical,  

is  pragmatic  because  it  helps  produce  society  through  causing  the  people  to  change  

the  way  they  view  themselves.    Therefore,  it  is  very  useful  in  governance,  especially  

ideologically,   because   it   serves   as   a   powerful   tool   that   enables   those   in   power   to  

establish  orthodoxy  within  a  state.    Standards  are  also  practical  in  their  own  right  

because   they   are   both   public   and   intended   to   clearly   communicate   concrete  

expectations   to   those   subjected   to   them.     If   all   of   the   subjects   have   concrete  

expression   of   standards   or   expectations,   then   they   can   also   apply   these  

                                                                                                               
276  Duyvendak  1928:  89    
277  Inspired  by  Lagerwey,  class  lecture,  Febraury  8th,  2013  

  153  
expectations   to   each   other.     This   allows   for   any   subject   to   be   able   to   accurately  

predict   other   subjects’   behavior,   which   significantly   enhances   the   ability   to  

organize.278    

 Nevertheless,  despite  its  pragmatic  qualities,  the  use  of  the  character  fa  法  

in   the   Book   of   Mencius   is   very   different   from   the   aforementioned   Fajia   notion   of  

laws.     This   is   one   preeminent   reason.     The   notion   of   standards   in   the   Book   of  

Mencius   does   not   involve   any   application   of   reinforcement.     In   fact,   the   Book   of  

Mencius   specifically   argues   against   the   use   of   punishment   when   “Liang   Hui   Wang  

Part  I”  states,  “To  punish  them  after  they  have  fallen  foul  of  the  law  is  to  set  a  trap  

for  the  people.    How  can  a  benevolent  man  in  authority  allow  himself  to  set  a  trap  

for   the   people?”279     This   passage   specifically   asserts   that   if   a   ruler   knows   that   a  

subject   has   not   yet   been   transformed   or   has   yet   to   internally   develop   himself  

morally,   there   is   little   effectiveness   in   punishing   them.     In   essence,   punishments   do  

not   have   the   transformative   quality   that   ritual   does,   while   rewards   as   a   form   of  

reinforcement  for  standards  are  not  even  mentioned  in  the  entire  text  of  the  Book  

of  Mencius.    

  The  pre-­‐Fajia  figure  most  strongly  associated  with  advocating  the  use  of  law  

in   governing   a   state   is   Zi   Chan280,   a   statesman   of   the   Spring   and   Autumn   period  

                                                                                                               
278  Inspired  by  Lagerwey,  class  lecture,  Febraury  8th,  2013  
279  Lau  1970:  13;  及陷於罪，然後從而刑之，是罔民也。焉有仁人在位，罔民而可為也？(Lau  and  

Chen  1995:  1/6/20-­‐21)  

280  Gongsun  Qiao  公孫喬,  or  as  he  is  better  known,  Zi  Chan  子產,  was  one  of  the  most  famous  

statesmen  of  the  Spring  and  Autumn  period.    From  554  B.C.  until  his  death  in  522  B.C.,  his  held  high  
offices  in  Zheng.    He  is  said  to  have  led  the  political  administration  in  around  543  B.C.  Toward  the  
end  of  his  life,  his  became  well-­‐known  in  other  states  outside  of  the  state  of  Zheng.    It  is  reported  
that  Confucius  himself  “wept  for  him  like  a  brother”  and  the  people  of  his  state  “mourned  for  him  as  
if  they  had  lost  a  close  relative”.  (Walker  1953:  66);  see  Walker,  Richard  Louis.  The  Multi-­‐State  
System  of  Ancient  China.  Hamden,  CT:  The  Shoe  String  Press,  1953.  

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introduced   in   the   the   Zuozhuan281.     Although   the   surviving   record   of   Zi   Chan’s  

political  vision  is  relatively  sparse  and  vague,  it  is  still  essential  to  consider  a  few  

selections  from  the  Zuozhuan   in  this  discussion.    The  book  “Duke  Zhao”  and  “First  

Year”  section  states:    

Seu-­‐woo   Fan   of   Ch‘ing   had   a   beautiful   sister,   who   was   betrothed   to  

Kung-­‐sun   Ts’oo   (Designated   Tze-­‐nan).     Kung-­‐sun   Hih   (Tze-­‐seih),  
however,   also   sent   a   messenger   who   violently   insisted   on   leaving   a  
goose  at  the  house  (A  ceremony  of  espousal).    [Xu  Wu]  Fan  was  afraid,  
and   reported   the   matter   to   Tsze-­‐ch‘an,   who   said,   “This   is   not   your  
sorrow  [only];  it  shows  the  want  of  government  in  the  State.    Give  her  
to  which  of  them  you  please.”  Fan  then  begged  of  the  two  gentlemen  
that   they   would   allow   him   to   leave   the   choice   between   them   to   the  
lady;   and   they   agreed   to   it.   Tze-­‐seih   then   splendidly   arrayed,   entered  
the   house,   set   forth   his   offerings,   and   went   out.   Tze-­‐nan   entered   in  
his  military  dress,  shot  an  arrow  to  the  left  and  another  to  the  right,  
sprang   into   his   chariot,   and   went   out.     The   lady   saw   them   from   a  
chamber,  and  said,  “Tze-­‐seih  is  indeed  handsome,  but  Tze-­‐nan  is  my  
husband.    For  the  husband  to  be  the  husband,  and  the  wife  to  be  the  
wife,  is  what  is  called  the  natural  course.”    So  she  went  to  Tze-­‐nan’s.  
Tze-­‐seih  was  enraged,  and  by-­‐and-­‐by  went  with  his  bow-­‐case  and  in  
his  buff-­‐coat  to  see  Tze-­‐nan,  intending  to  kill  him  and  take  away  his  
wife.   Tze-­‐nan   knew   his   purpose,   seized   a   spear,   and   pursued   him.    
Coming   up   to   him   at   a   cross   road,   he   struck   him   with   the   weapon.  
Tze-­‐seih   went   home   wounded,   and   informed   the   great   officers,  
saying,   “I   went   in   friendship   to   see   him,   not   knowing   that   he   had   any  
hostile  purpose;  and  so  I  received  the  wound.”  The  great  officers  all  
consulted   about   the   case.     Tsze-­‐ch‘an   said,   “The   great   officers   all  
consulted   about   the   case.     Tsze-­‐ch‘an   said,   “There   is   a   measure   of  
right   on   both   sides;   but   as   the   younger,   and   lower   in   rank,   and  
chargeable   with   an   offence,   we   must   hold   Ts’oo   to   be   the   criminal.”    
Accordingly   he   [caused]   Tze-­‐nan   to   be   seized,   and   enumerated   his  
offences,   saying,   “There   are   the   five   great   rules   of   the   State,   all   of  
which   you   have   violated:—awe   of   the   ruler’s   majesty;   obedience   to  
the  rules  of  the  government;  honour  to  the  nobler  in  rank;  the  service  
of  elders;  and  the  kindly  cherishing  of  relatives.    These  five  things  are  
necessary  to  the  maintenance  of  the  State.    Now  you,  while  the  ruler  
was  in  the  city,  presumed  to  use  your  weapon;  —you  had  no  awe  of  
his   majesty.     You   violated   the   laws   of   the   State;   —not   obedient   to   the  
rules  of  government.  Tze-­‐seih  is  a  great  officer  of  the  1st  degree,  and  
                                                                                                               
281  Lau,  D.C.  and  Chen  Fong  Ching,  ed.  A  Concordance  to  the  Chunqiu  Zuozhuan  (vol.  1  &  2).  Hong  

Kong:  Commercial  Press,  1995.  

  155  
 you   would   acknowledge   your   inferiority;—you   have   not   honoured  
the  nobler  in  rank.    Younger  than  he,  you  showed  no  awe  of  him;  —
not   serving   your   elder.     You   lifted   your   weapon   against   your  
cousin;  —not  kindly  cherishing  your  relative.    The  ruler  says  that  he  
cannot   bear   to   put   you   to   death,   and   will   deal   gently   with   you   in  
sending   you   to   a   distance.     Make   an   effort   and   take   your   departure  
quickly,  so  as  not  to  incur  a  second  offence.”282  
 
It   should   first   be   mentioned   that   offenses   are   not   completely   defined   by   what  

seems  to  be  a  reference  to  law,  as  the  above  passage  refers  to  the  compliance  with  

government   regulation   聽其政.     Rather,   government   regulation   appears   to   be   a  

mere   subcategory   or   simply   one   aspect   within   which   a   subject   of   the   state   can  

commit  an  offense.    In  fact,  the  notion  of  an  offense  appears  to  be  largely  defined  by  

what  this  study  has  translated  as  the  five  major  strategic  areas  of  the  state  國之大

節有五.    Therefore,  according  to  Zi  Chan,  law  or  government  regulations  are  one  set  

of  rules  or  standards  that  determine  whether  an  offense  has  been  committed.      

Offenses  within  the  state  can  be  committed  by  violating  other  strategic  areas  

of   the   state   as   well.     This   point   is   reinforced   when   in   the   book   “Duke   Zhao”   and   the  

section  “Twelfth  Year”,  the  Zuozhuan  states,  “The  superior  man  will  say  that  Tsze-­‐

chan   knew   what   was   proper.     According   to   the   rules   of   propriety,   a   man   will   not  

                                                                                                               
282  Legge,  1983:  578;  See  Legge,  James.  The  Chinese  Classics:  with  a  Translation,  Critical  and  

Exegetical  Notes,  Prolegomena,  and  Copious  Indexes.  Taipei:  Southern  Materials  Center,  1983.;  鄭徐
吾犯之妹美，公孫楚聘之矣，公孫黑又使強委禽焉。犯懼，告子產。子產曰：「是國無政，非子
之患也。唯所欲與。」犯請於二子，請使女擇焉。皆許之。子皙盛飾入，布幣而出。子南戎服入
，左右射，超乘而出。女自房觀之，曰：「子皙信美矣，抑子南，夫也。夫夫婦婦，所謂順也。」
適子南氏。子皙怒，既而櫜甲以見子南，欲殺之而取其妻。子南知之，執戈逐之，及衝，擊之以
戈。子皙傷而歸，告大夫曰：「我好見之，不知其有異志也，故傷。」大夫皆謀之。子產曰：
「直鈞，幼賤有罪，罪在楚也。」乃執子南，而數之曰：「國之大節有五，女皆奸之。畏君之威
，聽其政，尊其貴，事其長，養其親，五者所以為國也。今君在國，女用兵焉，不畏威也；奸國
之紀，不聽政也；子皙，上大夫，女嬖大夫，而弗下之，不尊貴也；幼而不忌，不事長也，兵其
從兄，不養親也。君曰：「余不女忍殺，宥女以遠。」勉，速行乎！無重而罪！」(Lau  and  Chen  
1995:  B10.1.7/317/4-­‐15)  

  156  
overthrow   anything   of   another   to   establish   himself.”283     This   passage   indicates   that  

Zi   Chan   undeniably   advocates   the   use   of   ritual   in   the   governance   of   a   state.     So,  

ritual   is   not   only   likely   the   ultimate   body   of   moral   principles   or   guidelines   that  

informs  law,  but  it  is  also  likely  the  ultimate  body  of  moral  principles  that  inform  

the  other  four  major  strategic  areas  for  the  state.      

Additionally,   in   the   book   “Duke   Zhao”   and   the   section   “Twenty   Fifth   Year”,  

the  figure  Zi  Da  Shu  states:  

“…I  have  heard  our  late  great  officer  Tsze-­‐ch‘an  say,  ‘Ceremonies  [are  
founded  in]  the  regular  procedure  of  Heaven,  the  right  phenomena  of  
earth,  and  the  actions  of  men.’    Heaven  and  Earth  have  their  regular  
ways,   and   men   take   these   for   their   pattern,   imitating   the   brilliant  
bodies   of   Heaven,   and   according   with   the   natural   diversities   of   the  
Earth.   [Heaven   and   Earth]   produce   the   six   atmospheric   conditions,  
and   make   use   of   the   five   material   elements.     Those   conditions   [and  
elements]   become   the   five   tastes,   are   manifested   in   the   five   colour,  
and   displayed   in   the   five   notes.     When   these   are   in   excess,   there  
ensue   obscurity   and   confusion,   and   the   people   lose   their   [proper]  
nature.     The   rules   of   ceremony   were   therefore   framed   to   support  
[that   nature].     There   were   the   six   domestic   animals,   the   five   beasts  
[of   the   chase],   and   the   three   [classes   of]   victims,   to   maintain   the  
tastes.     There   were   the   nine   [emblematic]   ornaments   [of   robes],   with  
their   six   colours   and   five   methods   of   display,   to   maintain   the   five  
colours.     There   were   the   nine   songs,   the   eight   winds,   the   seven  
sounds,   and   the   six   pitch-­‐pipes,   to   maintain   the   five   notes.     There  
were  ruler  and  minister,  high  and  low,  in  imitation  of  the  distinctive  
characteristics  of  the  earth.    There  were  husband  and  wife,  with  the  
home   and   the   world   abroad,   the   spheres   of   their   respective   duties.    
There   were   father   and   son,   elder   and   younger   brother,   aunt   and  
sister,   maternal   uncles   and   aunts,   father-­‐in-­‐law   and   connexions   of  
one’s   children   with   other   members   of   their   mother’s   family,   and  
brothers-­‐in-­‐law,—to   resemble   the   bright   luminaries   of   heaven.    
There  were  duties  of  govt.  and  administration,  services  specially  for  
the  people,  [legislative]  vigour,  the  force  of  conduct,  and  attention  to  
what  was  required  by  the  time,—in  accordance  with  the  phenomena  
of  the  four  seasons.    There  were  punishments  and  penalties,  and  the  
terrors   of   legal   proceedings,   making   the   people   stand   in   awe,  
                                                                                                               
283  Legge  1983:  639;  君子謂子產於是乎知禮，禮無毀人，以自成也。(Lau  and  Chen  1995:  

B10.12.1/351/5-­‐6)  

  157  
 resembling   the   destructive   forces   of   thunder   and   lightning.     There  
were  mildness  and  gentleness,  kindness  and  harmony,  in  imitation  of  
the  producing  and  nourishing  action  of  Heaven.    There  were  love  and  
hatred,   pleasure   and   anger,   grief   and   joy,   produced   by   the   six  
atmospheric   conditions.     Therefore   [the   sage   kings]   carefully  
imitated   these   relations   and   analogies   [in   forming   ceremonies],   to  
regulate  those  six  impulses.    To  grief  there  belong  crying  and  tears,  to  
joy,   songs   and   dancing;   to   pleasure,   beneficence;   to   anger,   fighting  
and   struggling.     Pleasure   is   born   of   love,   and   anger   of   hatred.  
Therefore  [the  sage  kings]  were  careful  judges  of  their  conduct,  and  
sincere   in   their   orders,   appointing   misery   and   happiness,   rewards  
and  punishments,  to  regulate  the  death  and  life  [of  the  people].    Life  
is  a  good  thing;  death  is  an  evil  thing.    The  good  thing  brings  joy;  the  
evil  thing  gives  grief.    When  there  is  no  failure  in  the  joy  and  grief,  we  
have  a  state  in  harmony  with  the  nature  of  Heaven  and  Earth,  which  
consequently  can  endure  long.284  
 
Although  the  passage  appears  to  be  Zi  Da  Shu’s  expounding  on  his  memory  of  what  

Zi  Chan  said,  it  is  fairly  clear  that  it  does  not  appear  to  be  inconsistent  with  the  first  

two  Zi  Chan  passages.  Ritual  is  very  important  to  Zi  Chan,  not  simply  in  his  personal  

affairs  but  in  governing  the  state  as  well.    Yuri  Pines  points  out  that  Zi  Chan  was  a  

“steadfast   opponent   of   the   violation   of   ritual   norms” 285 ,   never   denying   the  

“existence   of   the   deities   and   spirits”286  but   being   “entirely   pragmatic”287  in   his  

approach  with  them.    Pines  even  puts  Zi  Chan’s  attitude  toward  ritual  in  a  historical  

context  when  he  added:  

                                                                                                               
284 Legge  1983:  708-­‐709;  「。。。 聞諸先大夫子產曰：『夫禮，天之經也，地之義也，民之行
也。』天地之經，而民實則之。則天之明，因地之性。。。 為君臣上下，以則地義；為夫婦外內
，以經二物；為父子，兄弟，姑姊，甥舅，昏媾，姻亞，以象天明，為政事，庸力，行務，以從
四時；為刑罰威獄，使民畏忌，以類其震曜殺戮；為溫慈惠和，以效天之生殖長育。民有好惡，
喜怒，哀樂，生于六氣，是故審則宜類，以制六志。哀有哭泣，樂有歌舞，喜有施舍，怒有戰鬥；
喜生於好，怒生於惡，是故審行信令，（行）禍「福」福賞罰，以制死生。生，好物也，死，惡
物也。好物，樂也；惡物，哀也。哀樂不失，乃能協于天地之性，是以長久。」(Lau  and  Chen  
1995:  B10.25.3/387/4-­‐5,  B10.25.3/387/8-­‐13)  
285  Pines  2002:  74;  See  Pines,  Yuri.  Foundation  of  Confucian  Thought:  Intellectual  Life  in  the  Chunqiu  

Period,  722-­‐453  B.C.E.  Honolulu:  University  of  Hawai’i  Press,  2002.  

286  Pines  2002:  75    
287  Pines  2002:  75  

  158  
 Ritualization   and   the   accompanying   bureaucratization   of   Chinese  
religious   life   began   well   into   the   Shang   period   and   was   further  
reinforced   in   the   course   of   the   Western   Zhou   ritual   reform.     In   the  
Chunqiu   period,   this   process   advanced   one   step   further;   as   political  
and   social   implications   of   established   rites   constantly   grew   in  
importance,  communicating  with  the  deities  turned  into  a  secondary  
aspect   of   ritual   practices.     Although   an   indispensable   part   of  
sacrificial   rites,   deities   were   becoming   part   of   ritual   conventions  
rather   than   active   partners   in   ritual   communication.     Xunzi’s  
statement…which   dwarfed   the   deities   to   the   position   of   mere  
symbols   of   refined   culture,   was   a   logical   outcome   of   this   centuries-­‐
old  process.288  
 
So   when   the   compliance   with   ritual   is   considered   to   be   imitating   the   regular  

patterns   of   Heaven   and   Earth,   it   is   Heaven   and   Earth   that   are   considered   the  

models  and  the  foundation  for  the  way  the  human  world  exists  and  is  organized  in  

everything   from   social   constructs   to   emotions.     However,   during   the   Spring   and  

Autumn   period   there   was,   Pines   observes,   “a   steady   decline”   in   the   belief   in   “the  

deities’  impact  on  daily  life”.289        Yet  notably,  the  passage  does  refer  to  rewards  and  

punishments,  thought,  they  are  described  as  reinforcements  for  the  ruler’s  orders  

ling  令.      

On  close  examination,  it  is  evident  that  Zi  Chan  never  advocated  a  political  

vision   consistent   with   the   institution-­‐facilitated   competition   found   later   in   Fajia  

texts.     Consider   that   a   second   important   aspect   to   the   first   Zi   Chan   passage  

describes   one   of   the   five   strategic   areas   honoring   the   nobility   (even   more  

specifically,   the   noble   of   higher   rank).     So,   though   it   may   be   an   offense   to   attack  

another   subject   of   the   state   in   general,   it   is  a   far   more   egregious   offense   to   attack   a  

noble   of   higher   rank   than   oneself.     The   general   reverence   or   concern   for   nobility  

                                                                                                               
288  Pines  2002:  75  
289  Pines  2002:  75  

  159  
reflects   the   prevailing   bloodline-­‐based   political   organization   Lewis   has  

characterized.     Therefore,   this   is   entirely   inconsistent   with   the   institution-­‐

facilitated  competition  found  in  Fajia  texts.    Zi  Chan  allows  no  potential  for  social  

mobility.    Although  there  may  be  a  culture  of  merit  within  the  hereditary  nobility,  it  

is   not   open   to   those   who   were   born   outside   of   noble   bloodlines.     Therefore,   like  

Rujia   thinkers,   Zi   Chan   advocates   for   a   privileged   category   among   the   ruler’s  

subjects   that   are   not   subjected   to   the   same   rules   in   the   same   ways   as   those   outside  

of   that   privileged   category.     For   instance,   book   “Duke   Zhao”   and   the   section  

“Sixteenth  Year”,  states:    

In   the   3d   month,   Han   K‘e   of   Tsin   went   on   a   complimentary   visit   to  

Ch‘ing,   when   the   earl   gave   him   an   entertainment.     Tsze-­‐ch‘an   had  
warned  [the  various  officers]  beforehand,  that  all  of  them  who  could  
claim   positions   in   the   court   should   behave   with   the   utmost   respect.    
K‘ung   Chang,   however,   came   late,   and   stood   among   the   visitors.    
From  that  place  the  director  [of  the  ceremonies]  made  him  remove.    
He   then   took   his   place   behind   the   visitors,   from   which   also   he   was  
removed;   and   he   [finally]   went   among   the   instruments   of   music,   —
followed  by  the  smiles  of  the  guests.    When  the  ceremony  was  over,  
Foo-­‐tsze   reproved   [Tsze-­‐ch‘an]   saying,   “With   the   officers   of   the   great  
State   we   ought   to   be   particularly   careful.     If   we   often   give   them  
occasion   to   laugh   at   us,   they   will   despise   us.     Though   we   all   of   us  
observed  the  rules  of  ceremony,  those  men  would  think  meanly  of  us;  
but  when  a  State  does  not  observe  the  rules  of  ceremony,  how  can  it  
seek  for  glory?    K‘ung  Chang’s  losing  his  place  was  a  disgrace  to  you.”    
Tsze-­‐ch‘an   replied   with   indignation,   “If   I   issued   commands   which  
were  not  proper,  gave  out  orders  without  sincerity,  took  advantage  of  
circumstances   to   be   partial   in   punishing,   allowed   litigations   to   be  
confused,  were  disrespectful  at  meetings  [of  the  States]  and  at  other  
courts,   caused   the   orders   of   the   government   to   be   disregarded,  
brought   on   us   the   contempt   of   a   great   State,   wearied   the   people  
without  accomplishing  anything,  or  allowed  crimes  to  occur  without  
taking  knowledge  of  them;—any  of  these  things  would  be  a  disgrace  
to  me.    But  K‘ung  Chang  is  the  descendant  of  Tsze-­‐k‘ung  who  was  the  
elder  brother  of  one  of  our  rulers,  [thus]  the  heir  of  a  chief  minister  
and   himself   by   inheritance   a   great   officer.     He   has   been   sent   on  
missions   to   Chow,   is   honoured   by   the   people   of   other   States   and   is  
known   to   the   princes.     He   has   had   his   place   in   our   court,   and  

  160  
 maintains  the  sacrifices  in  his  family  [temple].    He  has  endowments  
in  the  State,  and  contributes  his  levies  to  the  army.    At  funerals  and  
sacrifices  [of  our  ruling  House]  he  has  [regular]  duties;  he  receives  of  
the  sacrificial  flesh  from  our  ruler,  and  sends  of  his  own  to  him.    At  
the  sacrifices  in  our  ancestral  temple,  he  has  his  assigned  place.    He  
has  been  in  offices  under  several  rulers,  and  from  one  to  another  he  
has  kept  his  position.    Though  he  forgot  his  proper  course,  how  can  
that  be  a  disgrace  to  me?    That  prejudiced  and  corrupt  men  should  all  
lay   everything   on   me   as   minister,   is   because   the   former   kings   did   not  
appoint   sufficient   punishments   and   penalties.     You   had   better   find  
fault  with  me  for  something  else.”290  
 
Zi  Chan’s  description  here  of  Kong  Zhang’s  legitimacy  is  striking.  Zi  Chan  explains  

that   Kong   Zhang   was   a   descendant   of   Zi   Kong,   elder   brother   of   the   former   ruler,  

heir  of  a  chief  minister,  and  thus  heir  to  the  title  of  Grand  Master  君之昆孫，子孔之

後也，執政之嗣也，為嗣大夫.     This   passage   indicates   not   only   that   Kong   Zhang  

should  be  respected  because  he  is  of  the  noble  bloodline,  but  also  explicitly  points  

out   that   he   inherited   his   position   of   Grand   Master.     In   effect,   the   political  

organization   in   Zi   Chan’s   political   vision   is   one   based   on   ascription   rather   than  

achievement  or  merit.      

This   aspect   of   the   Zi   Chan   theory   runs   fully   counter   to   what   could   be  

possible  in  the  institution-­‐facilitated  competition  of  a  Fajia  state.    Theoretically  at  

least,   those   who   hold   office   in   a   Fajia   state   should   be   awarded   that   office   due   to  

their   accumulated   merit,   which   is   solely   based   on   what   they   have   done   rather   than  

                                                                                                               
290  Legge  1983:  663-­‐664;  二月，晉韓起聘于鄭，鄭伯享之。子產戒曰：「苟有位於朝，無有不共

恪！」孔張後至，立於客間，執政禦之；適客後，又禦之；適縣間。客從而笑之。事畢，富子諫
曰：「夫大國之人，不可不慎也，幾為之笑，而不陵我？我皆有禮，夫猶鄙我。國而無禮，何以
求榮？孔張失位，吾子之恥也。」子產怒曰：「發命之不衷，出令之不信，刑之頗類，獄之放紛
，會朝之不敬，使命之不聽，取陵於大國，罷民而無功，罪及而弗知，僑之恥也。孔張，君之昆
孫子孔之後也，執政之嗣也，為嗣大夫；承命以使，周於諸侯；國人所尊，諸侯所知。立於朝而
祀於家，有祿於國，有賦於軍，喪，祭有職，受脤，歸賑。其祭在廟，已有著位，在位數世，世
守其業，而忘其所，僑焉得恥之？辟邪之人而皆及執政，是先王無刑罰也。子寧以他規我。」
(Lau  and  Chen  1995:  B10.16.3/364/5-­‐13)  

  161  
who   they   are.     So,   this   passage   reveals   that   the   notion   of   ritual   that   Zi   Chan  

advocates   is   what   Yuri   Pines   has   called   a   “hereditary   hierarchical   order”,   which  

preserved   the   “essence   of  li…without   being   obliged   to   abide   by   some   of   the   more  

obsolete  ceremonial  rules”.291     Schwartz  wrote  of  Zi  Chan’s  political  vision,  “While  

the   hereditary   nobles   would   in   his   program   continue   to   act   as   functionaries,   they  

would   be   chosen   on   the   basis   of   merit   and   were   to   adhere   strictly   to   the   ruler  

governing   their   offices   and   ranks.”292     Therefore,   even   in   Zi   Chan’s   political   vision  

his   notion   of   law   does   not   create   the   universally   applied   state-­‐wide   institution-­‐

facilitated  meritocratic  competition  that  a  Fajia  state  necessarily  seeks  to  establish  

and  maintain.  

Conclusion  
 
Indeed,  the  Book   of   Lord   Shang  introduced  a  new  use  of  the  character  fa  法  

to   represent   a   conception   of   law   distinct   from   other   traditions.     In   the   Analects,   the  

character  fa  法  was  used  sparingly  and  generally  referred  to  “standards”  for  speech  

and   ritual   expression,   having   no   institutional   reinforcement.     In   the   Mozi,   its  

standards   are   not   state-­‐specific   because   Heaven   is   the   ultimate   formulator   and  

administrator  of  its  rewards  and  punishments.    Therefore,  all  under  Heaven,  not  a  

specific   state,   is   the   site   on   which   Heaven’s   standards   should   be   applied.     More  

importantly   however,   the   Mohist   state   is   not   a   competitive   one.     It   is   explicitly  

promotes   a   cooperative   culture   in   which   subjects   must   demonstrate   compassion,  

facilitate  mutual  benefit,  and  achieve  sub-­‐goals  together  in  order  to  even  be  eligible  

                                                                                                               
291  Pines  2002:  91  
292  Schwartz  1985:  325-­‐326  

  162  
for  rewards.    Additionally,  standards  in  the  Book  of  Mencius  also  lack  institutional  

reinforcement,   with   no   mention   of   rewards   in   connection   with   standards   and   an  

explicit  argument  against  the  application  of  punishment.    Finally,  in  the  Zuozhuan,  

although  Zi  Chan  clearly  advocates  for  law  as  a  mechanism  of  governance,  there  is  

no   clear   connection   between   the   character   fa   法   and   a   reference   to   law.     More  

importantly,  Zi  Chan’s  political  vision  advocated  for  a  hereditary  political  order  in  

which   law   did   not   eliminate   ascription   from   being   a   powerful   variable   in   the  

organization  of  state  hierarchy.      

However,  this  is  only  one  aspect  of  proving  meaning  change.    The  remaining  

task  is  to  show  that  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang’s  conception  of  law  is  in  fact  found  in  

other  Fajia  texts.    So  based  on  the  differences  between  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang  and  

texts  outside  of  the  Fajia  tradition  in  their  use  of  fa   法  and  conceptions  of  law,  we  

can   propose   a   hypothesis   about   the   distinctly   shared   qualities   of   Fajia   law.     This  

study  argues  that  the  Fajia  tradition’s  use  of  the  character  fa  法  signifies  conception  

of  law  that  generally  satisfies  three  main  criteria:  1)  it  must  be  a  state-­‐specific  basis  

of   evaluation,   coupled   with   a   culture   of   merit   in   which   merit   is   measured   by  

performance   (what   a   subject   does   rather   than   who   he   is),   that   is   universally  

applied  to  serve  as  the  foundation  of  a  system  that  organizes  state  hierarchy;  2)  it  

must  be  backed  by  rewards  that  create  ruler-­‐approved  channels,  without  mandated  

commitment   to   a   specific   moral   content,   to   host   its   institution-­‐facilitated  

competition  for  the  sake  of  developing  state  wealth  and  strength;  3)  and  the  ruler  is  

the   sole   and   ultimate   formulator   and   administrator   of   both   laws   and   the  

application   of   their   contingent   reinforcement.

  163  
 Chapter  VI  

Fa  法 in  Fajia  texts  
 
The   analysis   in   the   last   chapter   was   certainly   necessary   but   not   sufficient   to  

justify  an  argument  for  a  meaning-­‐change.    Therefore,  this  chapter  will  also  prove  

that  the  distinct  qualities  of    the  use  of  fa   法  and  the  concept  of  law  in  the  Book   of  

Lord  Shang   is   shared   in   all   Fajia   texts.     In   addition   to   the   Book  of  Lord  Shang,   the  

main   extant   Fajia  texts   are   the   “Shenzi   fragments”,   the   “Shen   Buhai   fragments”,   the  

Guanzi,   the   Hanfeizi.     Hence,   the   three   criteria   presented   in   the   last   chapter   will  

guide  this  chapter’s  examinations  of  them.    I  will  begin  with  the  “Shenzi  fragments”  

and   the   “Shen   Buhai   fragments”   because   they   are   attributed   to   figures   whom   are  

believed  to  be  Shang  Yang’s  contemporaries,  Shen  Dao  (c.  360   B.C.  –  275   B.C.)293  and  

Shen   Buhai   (c.   400   B.C.   -­‐337   B.C.)294.     Although   these   are   the   of   primary   source  

materials  with  the  least  amount  to  analyze,  they  are  traditionally  believed  to  have  

emphasized   different   political   instruments,   positional   power  shi  勢   and   technique  

shu  術  respectively.    This  study  argues  the  foundation  of  their  thought  remains  the  

institution-­‐facilitated   competitive   state.     The   chapter   will   then   analyze   selected  

chapters   in   the   Guanzi   and   the   Hanfeizi,   “Reliance   on   the   Law”   and   “On   Having  

Standards” 295  respectively.     Both   figures   to   whom   the   first   two   works   are  

                                                                                                               
293  See  Thompson,  Paul  M,  ed.  The  Shen  Tzu  Fragments.  Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  1979.  
294  See  See  Creel,  Herrlee  G.,  Shen  Pu-­‐hai:  A  Chinese  Political  Philosopher  of  the  Fourth  Century  B.C.  

Chicago:    University  of  Chicago  Press,  1974.  

295  Watson  translates  the  character  fa  法  as  standards  in  this  chapter,  but  I  will  interpret  the  same  

character  as  “law”  for  the  sake  of  linguistic  and,  more  impotantly,  conceptual  consistency.  

  164  
attributed,   Guan   Zhong   (c.   720   B.C.   –   645   B.C.)296,   Han   Fei   (c.   280   B.C.   –   233   B.C.)297  

respectively,   are   not   believed   to   be   contemporaries   of   Shang   Yang   at   all.  

Nevertheless,  along  with  what  is  revealed  about  Li  Si  (c.  280   B.C.  –  208   B.C.)298  in  the  

Shiji,   these   texts   to   represent   a   consistent   reflection   of   the   same   tradition   of  

thought,   Fajia,   as   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang,   the   “Shenzi   fragments”,   and   the   “Shen  

Buhai  fragments”.    One  chapter  from  each  work  is  selected  because,  as  previously  

discussed,   many   of   these   ancient   texts   have   a   pseudepigraphical   nature   and   it   is  

beyond   the   scope   of   this   chapter   to   prove   a   consistent   vision   throughout   the  

entirety   of   these   two   texts.     The   Guanzi   is   especially   well   known   to   have   many  

chapters   that   predominantly   reflect   the   thought   of   traditions   other   than   Fajia.    

Nevertheless,   this   study   intends   to   show   that   all   four   of   the   aforementioned   texts  

prove  that  there  is  in  fact  a  collective  Fajia  concept  of  law.  

Finally,   this   chapter   will   examine   the   thought   expressed   in   the   Wuzi,  

attributed   to   the   statesman   Wu   Qi   (c.   440   B.C.   –   381   B.C.)  299  who   is   also   often  

associated  with  the  Fajia  tradition.    This  is  not  to  suggest  that  the  Wuzi  should  be  

reclassified  as  a  Fajia  text.    Rather,  an  investigation  of  it  will  illuminate  the  fact  that  

texts  not  traditionally  associated  with  the   Fajia  tradition  did  begin  to  use   fa  法  to  

signify   a   similar   conception   of   law   as   well.     To   further   highlight   this   point,   this  

chapter   will   not   only   briefly   discuss   how   the   Fajia   conception   of   law   reflected   a  

                                                                                                               
296  See  Rickett,  W.  Allyn  “Reliance  on  the  Law”  in  Guanzi:  Political,  Economic,  and  Philosophical  

Essays  from  Early  China.  Boston:  Cheng  and  Tsui  Company,  2001.  
297  See  Watson,  Burton.  Han  Fei  Tzu:  Basic  Writings.  New  York:  Columbia  University  Press,  1964.  
298  See   Bodde,   Derk.   China’s   First   Unifier:     A   Study   of   the   Ch’in   Dynasty   as   Seen   in   the   Life   of   Li   Ssu.  

Hong  Kong:  Hong  Kong  University  Press,  1967.  A  native  of  Shang  Cai,  he  is  believed  to  have  arrived  
in  Qin  around  247  B.C.  (Bodde  1967:  12-­‐13)  
299  In  addition  to  the  sources  that  whose  translations  will  be  cited,  brief  biographical  sketches  of  all  

five  of  the  aforementioned  Fajia  figures  are  included  in  Fu  1996:  13-­‐21.  

  165  
changing   basis   of   political   organization,   but   also   illustrate  Fajia  influence   on   later  

texts,  such  as  the  Xunzi  and  Huang-­‐Lao  texts,  while  still  remaining  distinct.  

The  “Shenzi  fragments”300  

  The  issues  of  authorship  and  dating  of  the  “Shenzi  Fragments”  remain  open  

questions.    Together,  these  issues  are  at  the  center  of  a  debate  on  authenticity  that  

is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  study.    Paul  M.  Thompson’s  generally  concludes  that  the  

fragments   should   be   considered   authentic,   adding   that   “there   is   no   evidence,  

internal   or   external,   to   suggest   that   any   hypothesis   of   spuriousness   is   more  

probable   than   the   hypothesis   of   authenticity”.301     The   “Shenzi   Fragments”   is   a  

compilation  of  primary  source  material,  attributed  sayings,  and  secondary  accounts  

about   Shen   Dao’s   thought.     Therefore,   regardless   of   authenticity,   it   is   still  

worthwhile   to   examine   these   fragments   because   they   either   represent   the   actual  

words   and   thoughts   of   Shen   Dao   or   those   attributed   to   him   throughout   Chinese  

history.      

  In   the   “Shenzi   fragments”,   law   is   notably   described   in   the   section   “Prince  

and  Subject”:  

If   the   prince   abandons   law   and   uses   his   own   judgment   to   govern,  
then   punishments   and   rewards,   seizures   and   grants,   will   be   carried  
out   according   to   the   ruler’s   heart.     If   it’s   like   this,   then   those   who  
receive   rewards,   although   their   rewards   are   suitable,   they   will  
endlessly   hope   for   more.     As   for   those   who   receive   punishment,  
although   their   punishments   are   just,   they   will   ceaselessly   hope   for  
leniency.    If  the  ruler  abandons  laws  and  uses  his  mind  to  judge  light  
and   heavy,   then   subjects   of   the   same   merit   will   receive   different  
rewards   and   those   who   commit   the   same   offences   will   receive  
                                                                                                               
300  Lau,  D.C.  and  Chen  Feng  Ching,  ed.  A  Concordance  to  the  Shenzi,  Shizi,  Shenzi.  Hong  Kong:  The  

Commercial  Press,  2000.  

301  Thompson  1979:  173;  Thompson,  Paul  M,  ed.  The  Shen  Tzu  Fragments.  Oxford:  Oxford  University  

Press,  1979.  

  166  
 different  punishments.    As  a  result,  resentment  will  spring  from  this.    
So,  the  reason  why  those  who  divide  up  horses  use  whips  and  those  
who   divide   up   fields   use   buckles   is   not   that   buckles   and   whips  
surpass  human  wisdom.    Rather,  they  (buckles  and  whips)  are  what  
is   used   to   eliminate   private   judgment   and   prevent   resentment.    
Therefore   it   is   said:   ‘If   a   great   prince   relies   on   laws   and   does   not  
deviate,  then  tasks  will  be  evaluated  by  laws.’      What  is  conferred  by  
laws  is  that  each  subject  receives  his  due  reward  or  punishment  and  
none  has  expectations  of  the  ruler.    As  a  result,  resentment  does  not  
arise   and   the   relationship   between   superior   and   inferior   is  
harmonious.302  
 
First,   the   passage   generally   describes   the   notion   of   law   fa   法303  as   a   tool   that   the  

ruler   should   utilize   instead   of   his   own   judgment.     This   reveals   two   important  

aspects  about  the  ruler  and  the  notion  of  laws  in  the  “Shenzi  fragments”.    The  first  

is  that  the  ruler  is  the  sole  ultimate  administrator  of  the  law.    His  ultimate  authority  

in  the  administration  of  the  law  is  a  significant  part  of  why  he  is  elevated  over  his  

subjects.    For  instance,  in  the  section  “Scattered  Fragments”,  it  states,  “Those  who  

use   their   strength   to   serve   the   laws,   they   are   the   common   people.     Those   who  

preserve  the  law  to  their  death,  they  are  officeholders.    Those  who  use  the  Way  to  

change   the   law   are   the   princes   and   heads   of   state.304     The   main   idea   in   this   passage  

                                                                                                               
302  君人者舍法而以身治，則誅賞予奪從君心出「矣」。然則受賞者雖當，望多無窮； 受罰者雖當
， 望輕無已。 君舍法「而」以心裁輕重，則是同功殊賞，同罪殊罰矣，怨之所由生也。 是以分馬
「者」之用策，分田「者」之用鉤也，非以（策鉤）（鉤策）為過人智也， 所以去私塞怨也。 故
曰：「大君任法而弗躬，則事斷於法「矣」。 法之所加，各以「其」分蒙「其」賞罰，而無望於
君「也」。是以怨不生而上下和矣。(Lau  and  Chen  2000:  6/4/17-­‐22)  
303  It  will  become  clear  that  a  more  precise  translation  of  the  character  fa  法  is  “standards  of  

evaluation”.    However,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  this  study  will  more  translate  the  character  as  “law”  
in  order  to  emphasize  the  aspect  in  which  it  was  consistently  used  to  refer  to  a  particular  form  of  
political  organization.    
304  以力役法者，百姓也；以死守法者，有司也；以道變法者，君長也。(Lau  and  Chen  2000:  

8/6/30-­‐31)  This  is  fairly  clear  evidence  that  the  “Shenzi  fragments”,  relative  to  Zi  Chan’s  political  
vision  in  the  Zuozhuan,  has  a  different  political  organization  that  corresponds  to  its  notion  of  law.    In  
this  passage,  the  common  people’s  relationship  with  the  law  is  not  only  explicitly  pointed  out,  but  
the  means  by  which  they  serve  the  law  and  earn  merit  is  made  clear.    The  common  people  can  earn  
merit  through  using  their  strength.    This  is  in  contrast  to  Zi  Chan’s  political  vision  because  his  notion  
of  law  does  not  appear  to  include  pathways  within  which  the  common  people  can  be  upwardly  
mobile  within  the  state.    Moreover,  the  phenomenon  in  which  an  individual  of  non-­‐noble  birth  can  

  167  
is   fairly   clear:   the   ruler   changes   the   laws,   officeholders   uphold   the   law,   and   the  

common  people  use  their  strength  to  serve  the  law.      

  It   is   important   to   note   that   though   the   passage   does   assert   that   the   prince  

should   use   the   Way   in   order   to   change   the   law,   this   should   not   be   viewed   as   a  

superior   ideal   for   human   development,   like   the   notion   of   ritual   li   禮   in   the   Analects  

and   the   Book   of   Mencius.     Rather,   the   notion   of   the   Way   seems   to   refer   to   “that  

which   is   in   keeping   with   one’s   inner   nature.”305     In   other   words,   the   ruler   should  

follow  the  Way  of  the  essential  qualities  of  human  nature.    What  are  the  essential  

qualities   of   human   nature?     In   the   section   “Accommodation”,   the   “Shenzi  

fragments”  explains  saying:    

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
out  rank  an  individual  of  noble  birth  is  referenced  when  it  states,  “Therefore,  when  a  worthy  bows  
to  a  non-­‐worthy,  it  is  because  his  authority  is  light.”  「故賢而屈於不肖者」，「權輕也」。(Lau  
and  Chen  2000:  1/1/12-­‐13)  It  is  particularly  notable  that  this  “Shenzi  fragments”  passage  even  
imagines  a  scenario  in  which  an  individual  of  noble  birth  would  bow  to  an  individual  born  outside  of  
noble  bloodlines.  It  also  states  that  if  an  individual  is  [one  with  a  birth  status  of]  a  non-­‐worthy,  yet  
his  orders  are  carried  out,  it  is  because  he  has  obtained  the  support  of  the  masses.  「身不肖而令行
者」，「得助於眾也。」(Lau  and  Chen  2000:  1/1/16)  In  this  passage,  it  describes  a  non-­‐worthy  as  
giving  orders  that  are  carried  out.    Clearly,  the  “Shenzi  fragments”  do  refer  to  a  political  organization  
in  which  those  born  outside  of  nobility  can  become  an  important  figure  within  the  political  elite.    
Finally,  the  “Shenzi  fragments”  specifically  insist  on  the  usefulness  of  all  of  the  ruler’s  subjects  when  
they  state,  “The  people  are  in  various  circumstances,  yet  they  each  possess  abilities.    Their  abilities  
are  not  same.    This  is  the  nature  of  the  people.    A  great  prince  is  great  above  and  simultaneously  
takes  care  of  his  subjects  below.    The  abilities  of  subjects  are  different,  yet  they  all  are  of  use  to  the  
ruler.”  民雜處而各有所能，「 所能」者不同， 此民之情也。大君者，大上也，兼畜下者也。下之
所能不同，而皆上之用也。(Lau  and  Chen  2000:  3/2/22-­‐23)  Relative  to  Zi  Chan’s  political  vision,  
this  passage’s  particular  attention  to  abilities  is  striking.    Additionally,  it  points  to  the  common  
people  (or  all  of  the  ruler’s  subjects,  which  includes  the  common  people),  using  the  character  min  民,  
in  reference  to  who  is  of  use  within  a  state.    In  fact,  it  asserts  that  great  princes  and  rulers  are  ones  
who  are  able  to  utilize  the  many  talents  of  all  of  the  ruler’s  subjects,  not  simply  those  who  can  
properly  contain  and  govern  fellow  nobleman.    
305  Peerenboom  293:  1993;  To  provide  some  context,  Peerenboom  suggested  that  “there  are  many  

senses  of  natural:  (i)  that  which  conforms  to  the  laws  of  nature,  (ii)  that  which  is  in  keeping  with  
one’s  inner  nature,  (iii)  that  which  is  spontaneous,  unforced,  (iv)  the  opposite  of  artificial,  (v)  human  
behavior  or  social  practices  that  imitate  or  are  modeled  on  nonhuman  nature,  and  (vi)  human  
behavior  or  social  practices  that  instantiate  a  predetermined  role  in  the  cosmic  natural  order.”  
(Peerenboom  293;  1993);  Peerenboom,  Randall  P.  Law  and  Morality  in  Ancient  China.  New  York:  
State  University  of  New  York  Press,  1993.  

  168  
 As  for  the  Way  of  inherent  qualities,  if  there  is  accommodation,  then  
there   is   greatness.     If   there   is   an   attempt   at   [teaching   and]  
transformation,  then  results  are  miniscule.    As  for  accommodation,  it  
means   accommodating   essential   qualities.     As   for   the   people,   there  
are   none   who   do   not   act   out   of   self-­‐interest.     If   one   attempts   to  
transform  them  and  employ  them  for  their  own  interests,  then  there  
will   be   none   to   employ.     For   this   reason,   the   Former   Kings   did   not  
employ   those   who   would   not   accept   emoluments.     Those   whose  
emoluments   were   not   large   could   not   accompany   them   in   times   of  
difficulty.     If   subjects   are   unable   to   act   in   their   own   self-­‐interests,  
then  their  ruler  cannot  employ  them.    Therefore,  if  one  makes  use  of  
subjects’  pursuit  of  self-­‐interest  while  not  attempting  to  make  use  of  
subjects   for   the   sake   of   their   own   interests,   then   there   will   be   none  
who  cannot  be  employed.    This  is  called  accommodation.306  
 
It  is  particularly  interesting  that  the  passage  asserts  that  the  Former  Kings  did  not  

employ   those   who   would   not   accept   emoluments   先王不受祿者不臣.     Since   the  

obtainment  of  private  profit  is  a  primary  motivating  force  in  human  behavior,  the  

Former   Kings   refused   to   rely   on   any   subject   who   did   not   accept   private   profit   as  

compensation   for   their   efforts.     Not   accepting   private   profit   as   compensation   for  

their   efforts   made   a   subject   untrustworthy   because   they   were   perceived   to   have  

their  own  internal  source  of  motivation,  making  manipulation  by  rewards  difficult  

if   not   impossible.     This   reveals   that   the   “Shenzi   fragments”   make   similar  

assumptions   about   human   behavior   and   the   ruler’s   ideal   response   as   some   Book  of  

Lord  Shang   chapters   like   “An   Order   to   Cultivate   Waste   Lands”   and   “The   Calculation  

of   Land”.     The   assumptions   that   human   beings   will   essentially   act   for   the   sake   of  

their   own   private   interests   and   that   the   obtainment   of   private   profit   is   a   primary  

motivating   force   in   human   behavior   are   both   evident.     Therefore,   like   the   ruler   of   a  

                                                                                                               
306  天道 因則大， 化則細。因也者，因人之情也。 人莫不自為也， 化而使之為我，則莫可得而用
「矣」。 是故先王「見」不受祿者不臣，祿不厚者不與入「難」。 人不得其所以自為也，則上不
取用焉。 故用人之自為，不用人之為我，則莫不可得而用矣。此（之謂）（之謂）因。(Lau  and  
Chen  2000:  2/2/15-­‐18)  

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state   in   the   Book  of  Lord  Shang,   the   ideal   ruler   in   this   case   should   accommodate   yin  

因  this  wide-­‐spread  feature  in  human  behavior  and  create  an    that  can  benefit  from  

his  subjects’  pursuit  of  their  own  private  interests.      

  The  second  aspect  of  the  ruler’s  relationship  with  laws  is  that  laws,  though  

formulated  and  administered  by  the  ruler,  provide  an  objective  standard  by  which  

the  ruler  administer  his  state,  rather  than  relying  on  his  own  subjective  judgment.    

Laws  are  meant  to  demarcate  the  lines  between  the  public  gong  公  and  private  si  私.    

This   sentiment   is   echoed   in   other   fragments   in   the   “Shenzi   fragments”.     For  

instance,  the  section  “Scattered  Fragments”  it  states:    

As   for   the   accomplishment   of   the   law,   there   is   nothing   greater   than  

preventing   private   judgment   from   being   carried   out.     As   for   the  
accomplishment   of   the   prince,   there   is   nothing   greater   than  
preventing   conflict   amongst   the   people.   Nowadays,   there   is   the  
establishment  of  the  laws  but  also  the  application  of  private  interests,  
causing   private   interests   to   contend   with   the   law.     This   is   more  
chaotic  than  if  there  were  no  laws.    There  is  the  establishment  of  the  
prince   and   the   reverence   for   worthies,   causing   the   worthies   to  
contend  with  the  prince.    This  is  more  chaotic  than  if  there  were  no  
prince.  Therefore,  as  for  the  state  that  possesses  the  Way,  if  laws  are  
established,   then   private   acts   of   goodness   are   not   carried   out.     If   a  
prince  is  established,  then  worthies  are  not  revered.    As  for  subjects  
uniting  under  the  prince  and  tasks  being  evaluated  by  laws,  this  is  the  
great  way  of  the  state.307

Why   is   it   so   important   for   the   laws   to   protect   the   public   welfare   against   private  

interest?     According   to   the   first   “Shenzi   fragments”   passage,   if   the   ruler   uses   his  

mind   in   order   to   govern,   his   own   private   interests   will   inevitably   cause  

inconsistency  or  unfairness  in  the  administration  of  his  state.  The  law  is  compared  

                                                                                                               
307  法之功，莫大於使私不行；君之功，莫大於使民不爭。今立法而行私，是私與法爭； 其亂甚於
無法。 立君而尊賢，是賢與君爭； 其亂甚於無君。 故有道之國，法立則私議不行，君立則賢者
不尊。民一於君，事斷於法，國之大道也。(Lau  and  Chen  2000:  8/5/20-­‐23)  

  170  
to   whips   and   buckles,   or   tools   that   enable   a   human   being   to   gain   more   precision   in  

a  particular  task.    This  idea  is  also  echoed  elsewhere  in  the   “Shenzi  fragments”.  It  

notes,   “One   who   possesses   weights   and   balances   cannot   be   deceived   about   light  

and  heavy.    One  who  has  a  ruler  cannot  be  mistaken  about  long  and  short.    One  who  

has   laws   and   standards   cannot   be   tricked   by   swindlers   and   the   fakers.”308     This  

passage  compares  the  notion  of  laws  to  weights  and  balances  and  measuring  sticks.    

Clearly,  these  comparisons  are  meant  to  describe  the  notion  of  laws  as  the  basis  of  

evaluation   in   the   ideal   state   of   the   “Shenzi   fragments”,   as   the   first   and   second  

“Shenzi  fragments”  passages  describe  the  law  as  the  basis  of  evaluating  or  judging  

for  the  completion  of  tasks  事斷於法.      

  The   first   “Shenzi   fragments”   passage   also   describes   its   notion   of   law   as  

having  reinforcement.    Moreover,  the  incorrect  application  of  the  law  is  depicted  as  

one   of   the   main   consequences   of   the   ruler   relying   on   his   own   private   judgment.    

The   first   “Shenzi   fragments”   passage   argues   that   “If   the   ruler   abandons   laws   and  

uses   his   mind   to   judge   light   and   heavy,   then   subjects   of   the   same   merit   will   receive  

different   rewards   and   those   who   commit   the   same   offences   will   receive   different  

punishments.” 君舍法而以心裁輕重，則是同功殊賞，同罪殊罰也。Moreover,   the  

incorrect  application  of  the  law’s  reinforcement  is  not  simply  problematic  because  

it  drives  an  organizational  ideal  into  disorder;  rather,  the  inappropriate  bestowal  of  

rewards  would  tend  to  cast  into  disarray  any  attempt  to  establish  consistency  and  

fairness   in   administering   the   culture   of   merit   gong   功.     The   notion   is   strikingly  

                                                                                                               
308  有權衡者，不可欺以輕重；有尺寸者，不可差以長短；有法度者，不可巧以詐偽。(Lau  and  

Chen  2000:  8/5/27)  

  171  
similar   to   that   of   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang.     Therefore,   in   the   “Shenzi   fragments,”  

mismanagement   of   the   culture   of   merit   will   undermine   institution-­‐facilitated  

competition.     It   states,   “When   the   clear   sighted-­‐ruler   initiates   tasks   and   delegates  

responsibilities,   this   necessarily   springs   from   his   wisdom.     When   he   determines  

rewards   and   divides   up   wealth,   this   necessarily   springs   from   laws.     When   he  

manifests   his   virtue   or   regulates   himself   internally,   this   necessarily   springs   from  

ritual.”309     This  passage  explicitly  connects  law,  its  contingently  bestowed  rewards,  

and  the  division  of  wealth  within  the  state  fencai  分財.      

  To   be   clear,   the   passage   does   speak   of   determining   rewards   dingshang   定賞  

and   dividing   up   wealth   fencai   分財   as   separate   matters.     However,   it   should   also   be  

pointed   out   that   rewards   are   meant   to   employ   the   ruler’s   subjects   so   that   their  

pursuit  of  private  profit  and  fame  can  benefit  the  public  welfare.    For  instance,  in  

the   “Scattered   Fragments”   section   states,   “Confucius   said:   “‘The   Great   Yu   did   not  

reward   and   did   not   punish.     The   Xia   Dynasty   rewarded   but   did   not   punish.     The  

Shang  dynasty  punished  but  did  not  reward.    The  Zhou  dynasty  both  rewarded  and  

punished.    Punishments  are  used  to  prohibit.    Rewards  are  used  to  employ’.”310    The  

advocacy   for   employing   or   rewarding   subjects   based   on   merit   is   precisely   the  

condition  that  is  necessarily  for  an  structurally  competitive  Fajia  state.      

                                                                                                               
309  明君動事分功（職）「必」由慧， 定賞分財「必」由法， 行德制中「必」由禮。(Lau  and  
Chen  2000:  1/2/9,  This  reading  includes  the  additional  character  in  parenthesis)  The  “Shenzi  
fragments”  states,  “Nowadays,  the  state  lacks  a  constant  Way  [of  operation]  and  officials  lack  
constant  laws.    As  a  result,  the  state  descends  in  disarray  daily.” 今也 國無常道，官無常法， 是以國
家日繆。(Lau  and  Chen  2000:  1/1/23)  This  particular  passage  further  highlights  the  importance  of  
laws  in  the  entire  organization  and  structure  of  the  ideal  state  in  the  “Shenzi  fragments”.    
310  孔子云：有虞氏不賞不罰，夏后氏賞而不罰，殷人罰而不賞，周人賞且罰。罰，禁也；賞，使

也。(Lau  and  Chen  2000:  8/6/20-­‐21)  

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   Before   moving   on,   however,   it   is   worth   taking   note   of   Soon-­‐Ja   Yang’s   view  

that  unlike  the  method  of  “performance  and  titles”  xingming  形名  in  the  Hanfeizi  or  

the  rewards  of  rank  within  the  state  bureaucracy  found  in  the  Book   of   Lord   Shang,  

“Shen   Dao   states   that   a   ruler   should   give   jobs   to   the   people   by   using   his   hui   慧,  

which   usually   means   ‘intelligence.’   Shen   Dao   does   not   disregard   the   role   of   the  

ruler’s  personal  intelligence.  This  reveals  a  significant  difference  from  Han  Fei,  who  

argues   that   the   ruler   should   not   use   his   wisdom,   but   should   instead   adopt   the  

method  of  ‘performance  and  title’  (xingming)  in  assigning  positions  to  his  ministers.  

These  terms  do  not  play  a  critical  role  in  Shen  Dao’s  philosophy.”311     This  does  not  

contravene   the   argument   here.     The   state   competition,   administered   by   law,   still  

determines   whether   a   subject   is   eligible   for   employment.       After   the   laws   have  

solidified   the   ruler’s   employment   roster,   the   ruler’s   intelligence   influences   the  

specific  jobs  to  which  these  subjects  will  be  assigned.312  

The  “Shen  Buhai  fragments”  

  Like   the   “Shenzi   fragments”,   there   is   uncertainty   about   the   authenticity   of  

the   “Shen   Buhai   fragments”.     Although   in   Creel’s   study   of   the   “Shen   Buhai  

fragments”,  he  admits  that  “…it  seems  that  just  as  in  the  analects  there  is  included  

some  material  that  has  nothing  to  do  with  Confucius,  so  the  the  Shen-­‐tzu  there  may  

have  been  passages  that  had  nothing  to  do  with  Shen  Pu-­‐hai.”313    Neverthless,  many  

of  the  fragments  are  second  hand  accounts,  ambiguously  beginning  “Shenzi  said…”  

                                                                                                               
311  Yang  in  Goldin  2012:  50;  Yang  Soon-­‐Ja.  “Shen-­‐Dao’s  Theory  of  fa  and  His  Influence  on  Han  Fei”,  in  

Paul  R.  Golin,  ed.  A  Dao  Companion  to  the  Philosophy  of  Han  Fei,  New  York:  Springer,  2012,  p.  47-­‐63.  
312  To  crudely  put  it  an  American  football  analogy,  the  laws  determine  the  final  official  53-­‐man  

roster,  the  ruler’s  intelligence  determines  what  position  each  member  plays.  
313  Creel  1974:  36  

  173  
shenzi  yue  申子曰,  referencing  either  Shen  Buhai  himself  or  the  collection  of  works  

Shenzi  申子 that  is  either  completely  lost  or  extant  only  in  fragments.    In  any  case,  

for   our   purposes,   the   thought   the   “Shen   Buhai   fragments”   represent   suffices   to  

inform   this   study’s   conclusions   about   the   what   we   could   call   the   Fajia   tradition  

today.   This   study   argues   that   the   notion   of   law   fa   法   found   in   the   “Shen   Buhai  

fragments”   is   also   consistent   with   the   three   main   criteria   laid   out   to   describe   the  

transformation   of   the   word   within   a   particular   conceptualized   system   of  

governance.    To  begin  with,  the  “Shen  Buhai  fragments”  states:    

Yao’s   [way   of]   ruling   was   skillfully   to   make   [his]   methods   (fa   法)314  
discriminating   and   to   be   scrupulous   in   [issuing]   orders;   nothing  
more.     The   sage   ruler   depends   upon   methods,   not   on   [his]   sagacity.    
He   employs   technique,   not   theory.     The   Yellow   Emperor   ruled   by  
establishing  methods,  [which  he  did]  not  change,  causing  the  people  
to   find   security   and   pleasure   in   his   methods.     The   reason   why   a   ruler  
is  honored  is  [that  he  has  the  power  to]  command.    [But  if  he  gives]  
commands   and   they   are   not   carried   out,   there   is   [in   fact]   no   ruler.    
For   this   reason   the   intelligent   ruler   is   [very]   careful   about   [giving]  
commands.315    
   
Much  like  the  notion  of  laws  found  in  the  “Shenzi  fragments”,  the  notion  of  laws  in  

the  “Shen  Buhai  fragments”  is  also  juxtaposed  with  the  ruler’s  wisdom.    Laws  are  

again   viewed   as   the   objective   basis   of   evaluation   for   subjects   and   performance   in  

state  tasks.    This  is  echoed  in  another  fragment  in  the  “Shen  Buhai  fragments”:  “The  

                                                                                                               
314  This  study  will  refer  to  the  character  fa  法  as  “laws”,  as  opposed  to  Creel’s  translation  of  

“method”.    Creel  explained  his  decision  to  translate  the  character  fa  法  as  “methods”  instead  of  “laws”  
when  he  stated,  “If  Shen  Pu-­‐hai  had  been  asked  whether  the  methods  he  advocated  included  the  use  
of  law,  he  would  probably  have  replied,  ‘Of  course.’    The  two  ideas  were  not,  as  we  have  seen,  
divorced.    But  for  Shen  the  emphasis  was  always  on  technique.”  (Creel  1974:  150)    Again,  for  the  
sake  of  argument,  this  study  will  more  translate  the  character  as  “law”  in  order  to  emphasize  the  
aspect  in  which  it  was  consistently  used  to  refer  to  a  particular  form  of  political  organization.    
315  Creel  1974:  357-­‐358;  堯之治也，善明法察令而已。聖君任法而不任智，任數而不任說。黃帝之

治天下，置法而不變，使民安樂其法者也。  君之所以尊者，令。令之不行，是無君也，故明君慎
令。 (Lau  and  Chen  2000:  1/2/20-­‐21)  

  174  
ruler   must   have   discriminating   methods   and   correct   and   definite   principles,   just   as  

[one]  suspends  a  weight  and  balance  to  weigh  lightness  and  heaviness,  in  order  to  

unify  and  organize  [his]  ministers.”316     The  analogy  likening  “discriminating  laws”  

to   weights   and   balances   is   also   found   in   the   “Shenzi   fragments”.     Clearly,   like   the  

“buckles   and   whips”   in   the   “Shenzi   fragments”,   the   notion   of   laws   in   the   “Shen  

Buhai   fragments”   should   also   be   considered   a   instrument   that   is   not   even  

comparable   to   the   ruler’s   intelligence,   but   which   serves   to   enhance   the   ruler’s  

precision   in   his   evaluations   and   judgments.     In   the   “Shen   Buhai   fragments”,   the  

definition   of   the   ruler   substantially   rests   on   his   being   the   ultimate   administrator   of  

laws;  it  is  what  disitiguishes  the  ruler  from  his  subjects.    Another  fragment  speaks  

to   the   point   about   the   ruler   necessarily   being   elevated   above   his   subjects:   “The  

intelligent   ruler   is   like   the   torso;   the   minister   is   like   an   arm.     The   ruler   is   like   a  

shout;   the   minister   is   like   an   echo.     The   ruler   plants   the   root;   the   ministers   manage  

the  twigs.    The  ruler  controls  the  principles;  the  ministers  carry  them  out  in  detail.    

The  ruler  holds  the  controls;  the  ministers  carry  on  routine  functions.”317    The  ruler  

not   only   makes   commands,   but   he   determines   the   parameters   within   which   the  

ministers  perform  their  tasks.  

  It   should   also   be   noted   that   another   fragment   characterized   laws   as   a   tool  

that  is  a  means  of  unifying  and  organizing  the  ruler’s  state.    One  fragment  expresses  

this  point,  stating,  “In  the  past,  seventy-­‐nine  generations  of  rulers  did  not  use  the  

same   methods   and   regulations;   their   pronouncements   and   decrees   were   not   the  
                                                                                                               
316  Creel  1974:  352-­‐353;  君必明法正義，若懸權衡以稱輕重，所以一群臣也。(Lau  and  Chen  2000:  

1/2/18)  
317  Creel  1974:  347-­‐348;  明君如身，臣如手；君若號，臣如響。君設其本，臣操其末；君治其要，

臣行其詳；君操其柄，臣事其常。(Creel  1974:  346-­‐347)  

  175  
same;  and  yet  they  all  [ruled]  the  world  [as]  Kings.    How  [was  this]?    [It]  must  [be  

that]   the   state   was   rich   and   grain   was   plentiful.”318     Not   only   does   this   passage  

imply   that   an   ideal   ruler   should   govern   based   on   the   present   times   and  

circumstances,   but   it   is   also   discernable   that   the   idea   of   law   here   is   originally  

designed   to   be   unique   to   the   state.   The   text   claims   princes   of   the   past   as   having  

achieved   True   Kingship   and   ruled   all   under   Heaven   because   they   first   made   the  

state  wealthy  guo  國  and  abundant  with  grain.    This  echoes  the  view  expressed  in  

the   Book   of   Lord   Shang   that   viewed   the   development   of   state   wealth   through  

agriculture   as   one   of   its   most   important   objectives.     More   importantly   for   our  

purposes,   the   “Shen   Buhai   fragments”   specifically   asserts   that   each   generation   of  

rulers   can,   and   probably   should,   have   different   laws   in   order   to   cause   their   state   to  

prosper.    Thus,  laws  should  be  changed  for  the  sake  of  developing  the  state  in  the  

present  times  and  circumstances.      

  Additionally,  in  order  to  facilitate  the  state’s  prosperity,  the  ideal  ruler  in  the  

“Shen  Buhai  fragments”,  as  in  the  “Shenzi  fragments”,  must  accommodate  yin  因  his  

subjects.    A  fragment  states:    

[The   ruler   is   like]   a   mirror,   [which   merely]   reflects   the   light   [that  
comes   to   it,   itself]   doing   nothing,   and   yet,   [because   of   its   mere  
presence,]   beauty   and   ugliness   present   themselves   [to   view].   [He   is  
like]   a   scale,   [which   merely]   establishes   equilibrium,   [itself]   doing  
nothing;   yet   [the   mere   fact   that   it   remains   in   balance   causes]  
lightness  and  heaviness  to  discover  themselves.    [The  ruler’s]  method  
is   [that   of]   complete   acquiescence.     [He   merges   his]   personal  
[concerns]  with  the  public  [good,  so  that  as  an  individual]  he  does  not  

                                                                                                               
318  Creel  1974:  361;  昔七十九代之君，法制不一，號令不同，然而俱王天下，何也？必當國富而粟

多也。(Lau  and  Chen  2000:  1/2/23-­‐24)  

  176  
 act.     He   does   not   act,   yet   [as   a   result   of   his   non-­‐action]   the   world  
[brings]  itself  [to  a  state  of]  complete  [order].319  
     
The   idea   here   that   the   also   generally   asserts   that   a   ruler   should   engage   in   non-­‐

interference   wu  wei   無為   in   governance   does   not   suggest   that   he   ought   not   to   do  

anything   in   an   effort   to   establish   order   within   his   state.   Following   the   way   of  

accommodation  yin  zhi  dao   因之道,   the   ruler   is   able   to   give   commands   and   cause  

the  affairs  of  his  state  to  be  completed.    A  fragment  in  the  “Shen  Buhai  fragments”  

states:    

The   [sound   of   the]   drum   does   not   take   part   [as   one]   of   the   five   notes,  
and   yet   it   is   their   ruler.     One   who   has   [the   right]   method   does   not  
perform  the  functions  of  the  five  officials,  and  yet  he  is  the  master  of  
the   government.     The   ruler   understands   the   methods;   the   ministers  
understand  [the  management  of  particular]  affairs.320  
     
In   this   we   see   that   ruler   is   to   distinguish   himself   through   his   authority   to   give  

commands,  his  application  of  laws,  and  his  understanding  of  and  adherence  to  the  

Way   of   non-­‐interference.     He   utilizes   laws,   in   the   manner   noted   in   the   “Shenzi  

fragments”,   while   intimately   connected   with   the   Way   of   accommodation   through  

which   the   ruler   does   not   seek   to   transform   his   subjects,   but   instead   structurally  

designs   his   state   so   that   the   public   welfare   can   benefit   from   his   subjects’   pursuit   of  

their  own  private  interests.      

  How   does   the   “Shen   Buhai   fragments”   propose   a   ruler   accomplish   this?    

How   do   his   laws   accommodate   the   Shen   Buhai’s   assumptions   about   human  

behavior? A  fragment  in  “Shen  Buhai  fragments”  offers  some  clues:    

                                                                                                               
319  Creel  1974:  351-­‐352;  鏡設精，無為而美惡自備；衡設平，無為而輕重自得。凡因之道，身與公

無事，無事而天下自極也。(Creel  1974:  351-­‐352)  

320  Creel  1974:  350;  鼓不與於五音，而為五音主。有道者不為五官之事，而為治事治主。君知其道

也，官知其事也。十言十當，百為百富者，人臣之事也，非人君之事也。(Creel  1974:  350)  

  177  
 Marquis   Chao   of   Han   said   to   Shen-­‐tzu,   “‘Method’   is   very   difficult   to  
use.”     Shen-­‐tzu   said,   “Method’   is   to   scrutinize   achievement   and   [on  
that   ground   alone]   to   give   rewards,   and   to   bestow   office   [solely]   on  
the   basis   of   ability.     Now   [you,   my]   ruler,   set   aside   method   and  
[instead]   listen   to   the   requests   of   your   courtiers.     This   is   why   [you  
find   it]   difficult   to   practice.”     Marquis   Chao   said,   “From   this   time  
forward  I  shall  know  how  to  practice  method.    I  will  listen  to  no  one!”    
One  day  [later  on],  Shen-­‐tzu  requested  that  his  cousin  be  appointed  
to  office.    Marquis  Chao  said,  “[This  is]  not  what  I  learned  from  you.    
[Should  I]  heed  your  petition  and  violate  your  doctrine?    Or,  [should  I]  
use  [your  technique  and  reject]  your  petition?”    Shen-­‐tzu  withdrew  to  
his  residence  and  asked  to  be  punished.321    

Admittedly,   it   is   not   entirely   clear   whether   Shen   Buhai   necessarily   advocated   the  

use  of  punishment  to  reinforce  laws  in  the  same  way  as  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang.    So,  

indeed,  it  remains  unclear  whether  the  Hanfeizi  depicts  the  figure  Master  Shen  as  

asking  to  be  punished  in  order  to  reflect  Shen  Buhai’s  thought  or  Han  Fei’s  thought.    

Either   way,   there   are   two   important   aspects   of   the   thought   in   the   “Shen   Buhai  

fragments”  that  are  not  in  doubt.    First,  rewards  act  as  contingent  reinforcement  for  

laws.     Thus,   the   “Shen   Buhai   fragments”   make   similar   assumptions   about   human  

behavior   to   those   evident   in   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang   and   the   “Shenzi   fragments”.    

Since   the   fragments   insisted   that   the   ruler   adhere   to   the   Way   of   accommodation,   it  

is  clear  that  Shen  Buhai’s  ideal  ruler  must  not  attempt  to  transform  his  subjects;  he  

                                                                                                               
321  Creel  1974:  383-­‐384;  韓昭侯謂申子曰：法度甚不易行也。申子曰：法者見功而與賞，因能而受

官。今君設法度而聽左右之請，此所以難行也。昭侯曰：吾自今以來知行法矣，寡人奚聽矣。一
日，申子請仕其從兄官，昭侯曰：非所學於子也。聽子之謁敗子之道乎？亡其用子之謁。申子辟
舍請罪。(Lau  and  Chen  2000:  1/2/13-­‐14,  Creel  1974:  383-­‐384)    Additionally,  this  passage  
illustrates  that  the  “Shen  Buhai  fragments”  notion  of  law  was  not  limited  to  those  of  noble  birth  like  
Zi  Chan’s.    Not  only  does  the  passage  reject  the  notion  that  an  individual  should  be  given  office  
simply  because  of  his  familial  ties,  but  the  next  Fragment  provides  an  additional  clue.    Though  very  
similar  in  content  to  another,  this  fragment  includes  an  important  new  phrase.    Marquis  Zhao  says  
to  Shenzi,  “Formerly  you  taught  me  [to  make  appointments  to  office]  according  to  the  achievements  
[of  the  candidate  and  with  due]  regard  for  precedence”  子當教寡人循功勞視次第  (Creel  1974:  385).    
At  the  very  least,  this  additional  phrase  appears  to  further  support  the  idea  that  the  “Shen  Buhai  
fragments”  describe  a  merit-­‐based  system  of  employing  subjects,  facilitated  by  law.    Moreover,  the  
very  idea  of  the  Marquis  of  Zhao  employing  Shenzi’s  cousin  is  described  as  a  violation  or  failure  bai  
敗  of  the  Shenzi’s  aforementioned  Way  dao  道  or  method  of  administering  a  state.  

  178  
should   accommodate   their   inherent   qualities.     So,   the   ruler   must   be   anticipating  

that  he  can  create  order  in  his  state,  or  direct  and  control  his  subjects,  through  his  

bestowal   of   rewards.     Such   anticipation   indicates   an   assumed   pursuit   of   private  

profit   or   self-­‐interest   by   the   targeted   subjects.     Second,   the   “Shen   Buhai   fragments”  

base  the  bestowal  of  rewards  on  a  culture  of  merit  that  establishes  an  institution-­‐

facilitated  competition  by  which  it  employs  its  subjects.    

The  Guanzi  

  Although   it   is   generally   considered   to   be   less   ideologically   consistent   than  

other   collections   of   works   of   the   Warring   States   period,   the   Guanzi   includes   a   Fajia  

conception   of   law   in   accord   with   this   study’s   three   main   defining   criteria.     For  

instance,  the  Guanzi  includes  an  expanded  version  of  the  first  part  of  fragment  six  

of   the   “Shen   Buhai   fragments”,   in   “Reliance   on   the   Law”322.     It   first   introduces   its  

notion  of  law  with  the  following  passage:    

The   sage   prince   relies   on   established   laws,   not   on   expertise;   on  

statistical   methods,   not   on   empty   talk;   on   impartiality,   not   on   self-­‐
serving   arguments;   on   the   great   principles   of   rulership,   not   on   trivial  
                                                                                                               
322  It  would  be  well  beyond  the  scope  of  this  particular  study  to  point  to  the  notion  of  laws  in  every  

single  chapter  in  the  Guanzi.    Thus  I  have  limited  my  example  to  one  chapter  here,  mainly  to  show  
that  a  similar  notion  of  laws  that  satisfies  the  aforementioned  three  main  requirements  for  a  Fajia  
notion  of  laws  can  be  found  in  the  Guanzi.    “Reliance  on  the  Law”  is  generally  considered  to  be  one  of  
the  chapters  in  the  Guanzi  that  represents  what  is  considered  to  be  Fajia  thought.  Rickett  introduced  
the  chapter  saying,  “‘Ren  fa,’  the  first  chapter  of  the  ‘Qu  yan’  or  ‘Minor  statements’  section  of  the  
Guanzi,  is  a  straightforward  Legalist  text,  stressing  the  need  for  a  ruler  to  rely  on  objective  and  
impartial  law  rather  than  individual  expertise,  and  showing  little  sign  of  Confucian  or  Daoist  
influence.”  (Rickett  1998:  143).  Additionally,  it  is  important  to  note  that  this  particular  Guanzi  
chapter  is  consistently  dated  during  the  Warring  States  period.    Rickett  pointed  out  that  one  scholar,  
Zhou  Ying,  considered  it  the  “remnants  of  the  writings  of  Tian  Pian”  from  the  latter  half  of  the  fourth  
century  B.C.,  Luo  Genze  dates  the  chapter  around  the  middle  of  the  fourth  century  B.C.,  and  Kananya  
Osamu  dated  it  around  the  end  of  the  fourth  century  B.C.  (Rickett  1998:  143-­‐144)  It  should  be  added  
that  Hu  Jiacong  considered  “Reliance  on  the  Law”  as  one  of  the  “rule  by  law”  Fajia  chapters,  meaning  
the  ruler  administers  his  state  using  laws  and  regulations  as  the  standard.  (Hu  1995:  46-­‐47);  See  
Rickett,  W.  Allyn  “Reliance  on  the  Law”  in  Guanzi:  Political,  Economic,  and  Philosophical  Essays  from  
Early  China.  Boston:  Cheng  &  Tsui  Company,  2001.;  See  also  Hu  Jiacong  胡家聰.  Guanzi  xin  tan  管子
新探.  Beijing  北京:  Zhong  guo  she  hui  ke  xue  chu  ban  she  中國社會科學出版社,  1995.  

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 actions.    Afterward,  he  may  take  his  ease,  yet  the  empire  will  be  well  
governed.     The   prince   who   is   doomed   to   failure   is   not   like   this.     He  
pays   no   attention   to   established   laws   but   relies   on   expertise.    
Therefore   his   people   pay   no   attention   to   statistical   methods   but  
relies   on   empty   talk.     Therefore   his   people   pay   no   attention   to   reality  
but  indulge  in  empty  words.    He  pays  no  attention  to  being  impartial  
but  relies  on  self-­‐serving  arguments.    Therefore  his  people  abandon  
the   law   and   indulge   in   disorderly   conduct.     He   pays   no   attention   to  
the   great   principles   of   rulership   but   relies   on   trivial   actions.    
Therefore   their   sovereign   may   belabor   himself,   but   the   hundred  
surnames  are  simply  confused,  and  the  state  is  not  well  governed.323  
 
Again,   much   like   the   “Shenzi   fragments”   and   the   “Shen   Buhai   fragments”,   this  

chapter’s  idea  of  law  is  juxtaposed  with  the  ruler’s  wisdom.    It  is  presented  as  the  

objective   alternative   to   the   inevitable   subjectivities   that   are   involved   in   the   ruler  

utilizing   his   wisdom   zhi   智.     Additionally,   the   law   is   depicted   as   the   demarcating  

line  between  the  public  gong  公  and  the  private  si  私.    Whatever  accords  with  the  

law  is  for  the  sake  of  the  public  welfare  and  whatever  is  not  in  accordance  with  the  

law  is  for  the  sake  of  private  interests  and  should  therefore  be  eliminated.      

Moreover,  the  above  passage  also  describes  how  the  ruler  should  rely  on  the  

great  Way  rendadao  任大道  of  inherent  qualities  of  the  ruler’s  subjects  as  opposed  

to   indulging   in   small   matters   xiaowu   小物   or   dealing   with   tasks   in   isolation.     It   is  

also   clear   that   the   primary   unit   of   analysis   or   the   form   of   political   organization  

being   discussed   is   the   state.     The   above   passage   asserts   that   if   the   ruler   fails   to  

enforce   laws   according   to   the   Way   and   without   private   concern,   then   the   state   will  

be  in  disorder  國家不治.    Additionally,  “Reliance  on  the  Law”  specifically  describes  

                                                                                                               
323  Rickett  1998:  144;  聖君任法而不任智，任數而不任說，任公而不任私，任大道而不任小物，然

後身佚而天下治。失君則不然，舍法而任智，故民舍事而好譽；舍數而任說，故民舍實而好言；
舍公而好私，故民離法而妄行。舍大道而任小物，故上勞煩，百姓迷惑，而國家不治。(Lau  and  
Chen  2001:  15.4/109/29-­‐32)  

  180  
its   notion   of   laws   as   the   means   by   which   a   state   is   unified   and   organized.     For  

instance,  it  states:    

Therefore,  two  things  were  taken  as  constants  by  enlightened  kings;  
One   was   to   make   the   laws   clear   and   see   that   they   were   strictly  
observed.    The  second  was  to  prohibit  people  from  pursuing  private  
interests  so  that  they  might  be  restrained  and  employed.    These  two  
are  what  rulers  should  take  as  constants.    Now  the  law  is  the  means  
by   which   the   sovereign   unifies   his   people   and   employs   his   subjects.    
Pursuing   private   interests   is   the   means   by   which   his   subjects  
encroach  upon  the  law  and  create  disorder  for  the  ruler.    Therefore  
the   sage   princes   set   their   standards,   established   laws,   and   saw   that  
they   were   strictly   observed.     This   was   so   because   men   of   exceptional  
talent,  those  who  were  practiced  in  dealing  with  the  law,  dilettantes,  
and   those   of   wide   learning   were   not   permitted   to   disrupt   the   law;  
while   those   who   had   large   followings   and   were   strong,   those   who  
were   rich   or   high   in   status,   and   those   who   possessed   their   own  
warriors   were   unable   to   encroach   upon   it.     Confidants,   close  
associates,   relatives,   and   favorites   were   unable   to   deviate   from   it.    
Precious  curios  and  strange  objects  were  unable  to  tempt  them,  and  
nothing  that  did  not  lie  within  the  framework  of  the  law  was  able  to  
function.    Therefore  law  became  the  supreme  way  of  the  empire  and  
was  what  the  sage  princes  put  into  effect.324  
 
Particularly  of  note  is  the  fact  the  ruler  must  insist  that  the  laws  prevent  subjects  

acting  on  their  private  interests  and  employing  them  禁民私而收使之.    So,  laws  in  

“Reliance  of  the  Law”,  much  like  the  notion  of  laws  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang,  the  

“Shenzi   fragments”,   and   the   “Shen   Buhai   fragments”,   is   conceptualized   as   the   tool  

that  enables  the  ruler  to  employ  his  subjects.      

This   demands   an   investigation   into   how   the   ruler   achieves   this.     “Reliance  

on   the   Law”   most   explicitly   describes   the   ruler’s   relationship   with   his   laws   when   it  

states:  
                                                                                                               
324  Rickett  1998:  146-­‐147;  故明王之所恆者二：一曰明法而固守之，二曰禁民私而收使之，此二者

主之所恆也。夫法者，上之所以一民使下也；私者，下之所以侵法亂主也。故聖君置儀設法而固
守之，然故（諶杵）「堪材」習士，（聞）「閒」識博學之人不可亂也，眾彊富貴私勇者不能侵
也，信近親愛者不能離也，珍怪奇物不能惑也，萬物百事非在法之中者不能動也。故法者，天下
之至道也，聖君之（實） 「寶」用也。(Lau  and  Chen  2001:  15.4/110/16-­‐20)  

  181  
 In   ancient   times,   when   Yao   堯   established   order   throughout   the  
empire,  it  was  like  sticky  clay  in  a  mold  relying  on  the  potter  for  its  
shape;   like   metal   in   a   furnace   depending   on   the   founder   for   its  
casting.     When   he   pulled,   his   people   came;   when   he   pushed,   they  
went.     What   he   told   them   to   do   they   did;   what   he   told   them   not   to   do  
they   stopped.     Thus   Yao’s   rule   consisted   of   his   skill   in   clarifying   laws,  
prohibitions,  and  orders,  and  that  is  all.    When  Huang  Di  黃帝  ruled  
the  empire,  his  people  did  not  need  to  be  pulled  in  order  to  come,  nor  
pushed  in  order  to  go.    Nor  did  they  need  to  be  told  to  do  things  for  
them   to   be   done,   nor   told   not   to   do   things   for   them   to   be   stopped.  
Thus   Huang   Di’s   rule   consisted   in   establishing   laws   and   not   changing  
them,   and   making   his   people   feel   at   ease   with   his   laws.     So-­‐called  
humaneness,   sense   of   duty,   propriety,   and   music   all   stem   from   law.    
This  is  the  means  by  which  the  former  sages  united  their  people.    The  
documents   of   the   Zhou   周   state:   “If   the   laws   of   a   country   are  
inconsistent,   whoever   possesses   such   a   country   will   be   plagued   by  
misfortune.    Such  will  also  be  the  case  if  his  people  do  not  obey  the  
law,  if  his  country  changes  its  established  laws  to  control  its  people,  if  
his   ministers   do   not   utilize   concepts   of   propriety   and   duty   when  
instructing   the   masses,   and   if   his   numerous   officers   and   their  
assistants  deviate  from  the  law  in  attempting  to  establish  good  order.”    
Therefore  it  is  said:  “Law  must  remain  constant.    It  is  the  determining  
factor  as  to  whether  one  survives  or  perishes,  has  order  or  chaos.    It  
is   the   great   standard   by   which   the   sage   prince   fashions   his   empire,  
the   positions   of   the   prince   and   ministers,   superior   and   inferior,   the  
high  and  the  law,  all  being  derived  from  it.”    Therefore  it  is  called  “fa  
法.”325  
 
There   are   a   few   aspects   of   the   chapter’s   notion   of   laws   to   note.     First,   laws   are  

characterized  as  the  determining  factor  in  the  state’s  survival  while  serving  as  the  

highest  standard  for  all  under  Heaven  為天下大儀.    In  other  words,  no  other  tools  

at   the   ruler’s   disposal   are   of   greater   importance.     Ritual   li   禮   and   proper   roles   yi   義  

                                                                                                               
325  Rickett  1998:  145-­‐146;  昔者堯之治天下也，猶埴（已）「之在」埏也。唯陶之所以為。猶金之

在鑪，恣冶之所以鑄。其民引之而來，推之而往，使之而成，禁之而止，故堯之治也，善明法禁
之令而已矣。黃帝之治天下也，其民不引而來，不推而往，不使而成，不禁而止。故黃帝之治也
，置法而不變，使民安其法者也。所謂仁義禮樂者，皆出於法，此先聖之所以一民者也。《周書》
曰：「國法不一，則有國者「不」祥；民不道法，則不祥；國更立法以典民，則「不」祥，群臣
不用禮義教訓，則不祥。百官伏事者離法而治，則不祥。」故曰：法者不可恆也，存亡治亂之所
從出，聖君所以為天下大儀也。君臣上下貴賤皆發焉，故曰：「法」古之法也。。。(Lau  and  
Chen  2001:  15.4/110/5-­‐15)  

  182  
are   subordinated   to   supplementary   tools   for   teaching   and   training   the   ruler’s  

subjects.    They  are  not  moral  ideals  that  are  superior  to  the  laws.    This  is  why  the  

above   passage   asserts   that   what   are   called   benevolence,   proper   roles,   ritual,   and  

music,   all   spring   from   the   law   所謂仁義禮樂者皆出於法.     Since   there   are   no  

superior  moral  ideals  with  which  laws  must  accord,  then  it  can  also  be  said  that  law  

is   a   tool   that   is   created   by   and   ultimately   administered   by   the   ruler.     This   is  

explicitly   expressed   when   the   same   chapter   states,   “Therefore   it   is   said:   ‘There   is  

one   who   creates   laws,   there   are   those   who   see   that   they   are   observed,   and   those  

who   pattern   themselves   on   them.’     Now   the   one   who   creates   laws   is   the   prince,  

those  who  see  that  they  are  observed  are  his  ministers,  and  those  who  obey  them  

are  the  people.    When  the  prince  and  his  ministers,  superiors  and  inferiors,  the  high  

and  the  law,  all  adhere  to  the  law,  this  is  called  ‘great  government’.’”326      

Third,   law   is   also   the   basis   upon   which   the   ruler   evaluates   and   judges   his  

subjects   and   their   tasks   or   duties.     The   above   passage   is   particularly   of   note  

because   it   characterizes   two   distinct   usages   of   law,   implying   the   second’s  

superiority  in  methodology  not  results.    The  first  usage  is  represented  by  the  figure  

Yao.     Yao   is   described   has   having   been   skilled   at   making   clear   the   law’s  

expectations.     It   was   the   clarity   with   which   he   communicated   his   laws   and  

commands   that   allowed   him   to   control   his   subjects   or,   more   importantly,   employ  

them,   causing   them   to   accomplish   their   tasks.     Thus,   Yao’s   use   of   the   law   was  

                                                                                                               
326  Rickett  1998:  147;  故曰：有生法，有守法，有法於法。夫生法者，君也，守法者，臣也；法於

法者，民也，君臣上下貴賤皆從法，此謂為大治。(Lau  and  Chen  2001:  15.4/110/28-­‐30)  

  183  
exemplary   because   he   had   extraordinary   ability   to   clearly   communicate   its  

expectations.    

Distinctly  different  from  Yao  is  the  ruler  Huang  Di,  who,  it  is  suggested,  was  

able  to  achieve  the  same  results  as  Yao  without  the  same  level  of  activity.    Hence,  

Yao  is  compared  to  a  potter  and  a  blacksmith  that  shaping  the  people  who  are  like  

molded   clay   or   smelted   metal.     Yet,   Huang   Di   also   makes   it   so   his   subjects   are   at  

peace  with  his  laws  使民安其法者.    Thus,  Huang  Di  was  even  more  exemplary  in  his  

use   of   the   law   than   Yao   because   he   relied   on   the   law   rather   than   relying   on   himself  

to   shape   his   subjects.     Nevertheless,   it   is   undeniable   that   both   Yao   and   Huang   Di  

utilized  laws  to  employ  and  shape  their  subjects.      

However,   how   could   Huang   Di   rely   on   the   law   without   needing   to   rely   on  

himself?    What  was  different  about  Huang  Di’s  laws  that  allowed  for  such  inactivity  

in  his  governance  relative  to  that  of  Yao?    This  is  likely  due  to  how  he  enforced  his  

laws.     Simply   put,   the   Huang   Di   of   the   Guanzi   shaped   his   subjects   through  

contingent  reinforcement.    “Reliance  on  the  Law”  states:    

Thus   princes   fall   into   three   different   categories   in   terms   of   their  

political  methodology.    Now  those  who  do  not  privately  form  cliques  
of   people   they   like,   do   not   privately   punish   people   they   dislike,   but  
rather   set   up   standards   and   establish   laws   and   rely   on   procedures  
and   measurements   when   rendering   judgments   are   first-­‐class   rulers.    
Those  who  privately  reward  people  they  like,  privately  punish  people  
they   dislike,   go   against   their   great   ministers,   distance   themselves  
from   their   officials   of   the   left   and   right,   and   rely   solely   on   their  
feelings   when   rendering   judgments   are   second-­‐class   rulers.     Those  
who   privately   reward   people   their   ministers   like,   privately   punish  
those   their   ministers   dislike,   go   against   public   law,   undermine   their  
own   integrity,   and   listen   solely   to   their   great   ministers   are   rulers  
who  are  in  grave  danger.    Therefore  whoever  acts  as  a  ruler  of  men  
should   not   overly   like   people   or   overly   dislike   them.     Overly   liking  
people   is   called   losing   one’s   sense   of   benevolence;   overly   disliking  

  184  
 them   is   called   losing   one’s   sense   of   the   power   to   punish.     Should   a  
ruler   lose   both   his   sense   of   the   power   to   punish   and   his   sense   of  
benevolence,  he  will  be  endangered.    Therefore  the  enlightened  kings  
controlled   six   things:   letting   people   live,   executing   them,   enriching  
them,   impoverishing   them,   honoring   them,   and   humiliating   them.    
These  are  the  six  handles  on  power  that  the  ruler  controls.    There  are  
four  things  in  which  rulership  resides.    They  are:  civil  power,  military  
power,  the  power  to  punish,  and  the  power  to  be  benevolent.    These  
are  the  four  positions  in  which  the  ruler  dwells.    When  one  relies  on  
others  for  what  he  himself  should  control,  it  is  called  “being  stripped  
of  one’s  handles  on  power.”    When  one  relies  on  others  for  the  things  
in   which   rulership   resides,   it   is   called   “losing   one’s   position.”     It   is  
impossible   to   expect   to   have   orders   carried   out   if   one   has   been  
stripped  of  one’s  handles  on  power  or  has  lost  one’s  position.    Laws  
being   inequitable   and   orders   being   incomplete   are   also   ways   to   be  
stripped  of  one’s  handles  on  power  and  to  lose  one’s  position.    Now,  
the  existence  of  unjust  laws  and  faulty  order  is  prevented  by  the  sage  
prince   himself.     Thus,   those   high   in   status   are   not   able   to   threaten  
him,   the   rich   are   unable   to   bribe   him,   the   lowly   are   unable   to  
manipulate  him,  close  associates  are  unable  to  become  intimate  with  
him,   and   beautiful   women   are   unable   to   corrupt   him.     Since   the  
prince   is   firm   and   unshakable,   those   whose   behavior   is   strange   or  
depraved   are   fearful;   since   strange   behavior   is   eliminated   and  
depravity   reformed,   orders   will   hardly   have   gone   out   before   the  
people   move.     Therefore   the   sage   prince   in   establishing   procedures  
and  measurements  and  setting  up  standards  and  law  is  like  Heaven  
and  Earth  in  his  consistency,  like  the  orderly  sequence  of  stars  in  his  
stability,   like   the   sun   and   moon   in   his   brilliance,   and   like   the   four  
seasons   in   his   reliability.     This   is   so   because   his   orders   have   hardly  
gone  out  before  the  people  obey  them.327  
 
This   passage   explicitly   depicts   the   chapter’s   ideal   ruler   through   directly   presenting  

a   three-­‐tiered   hierarchy   of   statecraft.     The   highest   category   of   ruler   is   considered  

                                                                                                               
327  Rickett  1998:  147-­‐149;  故主有三術：夫愛人不私賞也，惡人不私罰也，置儀設法以度量斷者，

上主也。愛人而私賞之，惡人而私罰之。倍大臣，離左右，專以其心斷者，中主也。臣有所愛而
為私賞之，有所惡而為私罰之，倍其公法，損其正心，專聽其大臣者，危主也。故為人主者，不
重愛人，不重惡人，重愛曰失德，重惡曰失威，威德皆失，則主危也。故明王之所操者六：生之，
殺之，富之，貧之，貴之，賤之；此六柄者，主之所操也。主之所處者四：一曰文、二曰武、三
曰威、四曰德，此四位者，主之所處也。藉人以其所操，命曰奪柄。藉人以其所處，命曰失位。
奪柄失位，而求令之行，不可得也。法不平，令不全，是亦奪柄失位之道也；故有為枉法，有為
毀令，此聖君之所以自禁也。故貴不能威，富不能祿，賤不能事，近不能親，美不能淫也。植固
而不動，奇邪乃恐。奇革而邪化，令往而民移。故聖君「失」「設」度量，置儀法，如天地之堅
，如列星之固，如日月之明，如四時之信，然故令往而民從之。(Lau  and  Chen  2001:  
15.4/110/32-­‐15.4/111/1-­‐11)  

  185  
one   who   establishes   standards   and   laws   and   uses   procedures   and   measurements  

when   making   judgments   (or   evaluating   subjects   and   tasks)   置儀設法以度量斷328 ,  

while  the  second-­‐rate  rulers  “depend  on  their  own  heart  in  judging  (or  evaluating)  

tasks   專以其心斷,   and   those   of   the   worst   category   of   rulers   blindly   listen   to   their  

high  ministers  專聽其大臣.    In  short,  the  chapter’s  hierarchy  of  statecraft  is  defined  

by  the  degree  to  which  a  ruler  makes  his  evaluations  and  judgments  according  to  

his  laws.      

Interestingly,   the   above   passage   assumes   that   all   rulers   will   have   the  

subjective  tendency  to  favor  certain  individuals  over  others.    They  will  favor  certain  

different   ministers,   courtiers,   and   even   favor   beautiful   women   over   those   they  

deem   less   attractive.     What   separates   an   ideal   ruler   from   others   is   that   he   does   not  

allow   his   personal   feelings   or   private   interests   to   interfere   with   how   he   bestows  

rewards   and   applies   punishments   to   his   subjects.     If   he   does   allow   his   personal  

feelings   or   private   concerns   to   interfere   with   his   administering   of   his   laws’  

contingent   reinforcement,   then   as   the   above   passage   clarifies,   he   will   lose   the  

handles  of  power  duo  bing  奪柄  and  so  his  position  of  power  shi  wei  失位.      

Also,  the  consequence  of  the  regularity  of  the  universe  not  being  operative  

in   human   affairs   is   not   merely   disobedience.     It   is   the   inability   of   the   ruler   to  

                                                                                                               
328  This  point  is  reiterated  in  the  same  chapter  when  it  states,  “The  prince  who  maintains  good  order  

is  not  like  this.    No  matter  whether  people  are  close  or  distant,  near  or  far,  high  or  low,  beautiful  or  
ugly,  he  uses  procedures  and  measurements  when  judging  them.    When  he  executes  people,  they  
bear  no  resentment;  when  he  rewards  them,  they  have  no  feeling  of  gratitude.    By  using  the  law  to  
regulate  them,  he  becomes  like  Heaven  and  Earth  in  having  no  self-­‐interest.    For  this  reason  his  
officials  present  no  self-­‐serving  arguments,  members  of  the  gentry  offer  no  self-­‐serving  advice,  and  
the  people  present  no  self-­‐serving  talk.    All  with  open  minds  listen  to  their  superiors.    Their  
superiors  take  impartiality  as  the  basis  for  conducting  inquiries  and  the  legal  system  as  the  basis  for  
rendering  judgments.    Therefore  running  the  empire  is  not  an  onerous  task.” (Rickett  1998:  149-­‐
150)  
 

  186  
employ  or  utilize  his  subjects  effectively.    The  chapter  more  specifically  describes  

the   ruler’s   application   of   his   law’s   contingent   reinforcement   in   the   following  

passage:    

Now  the  prince  and  his  ministers  occupy  the  positions  of  Heaven  and  
Earth,   while   the   people   resemble   the   multitude   of   things.     If   each  
person  is  established  in  his  own  separate  role  and  awaits  the  orders  
of  the  prince,  how  can  he  exercise  his  mind  in  the  pursuit  of  his  own  
private   interests?     Therefore   if   people   honor   the   orders   of   their   ruler  
and  carry  them  out,  even  though  they  meet  their  failure,  there  should  
be   no   punishment.     Should   they   do   something   that   is   not   in  
accordance   with   the   ruler’s   orders,   even   though   it   may   be   to   the  
ruler’s   advantage,   they   should   be   punished   with   death.     This   is   so  
because   inferiors   in   serving   their   superiors   should   be   like   an   echo  
responding   to   a   sound;   ministers   in   serving   their   ruler   should   be   like  
a  shadow  reflecting  the  original  form.    Therefore  when  the  superior  
issues  orders,  those  below  should  respond.    When  the  ruler  acts,  his  
ministers  should  follow.    This  is  the  way  of  good  government.    Now  if  
something  is  done  that  is  not  in  accord  with  the  orders  of  the  ruler,  
but  he  rewards  it  because  it  is  of  some  advantage  to  him,  this  would  
be  to  teach  people  to  engage  in  reckless  innovation.    If  people  honor  
the   orders   of   their   ruler   but   in   carrying   them   out   meet   with   failure  
and  are  punished,  this  will  cause  people  to  become  concerned  about  
their   welfare   and   deviate   from   the   law.     If   the   ministers   and   hundred  
surnames   are   concerned   about   their   own   welfare   and   manage   things  
with   their   own   interests   in   mind,   the   legal   system   will   be   damaged  
and  orders  will  not  be  carried  out.329  
 
This   passage   reveals   four   important   aspects   of   the   ideal   way   in   which   the   ruler  

should   administer   his   institutional   enforcement   of   the   law.     First,   it   appears   to  

share  similar  assumptions  about  human  behavior  with  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang,  the  

“Shenzi  fragments”,  and  the  “Shen  Buhai  fragments”.  The  beginning  of  the  passage  

implies   that   without   the   ruler’s   laws   and   commands   and   their   obligation   to   comply  
                                                                                                               
329  Rickett  1998:  150-­‐151;  夫君臣者，天地之位也；民者，眾物之象也。各立其所職以待君令，群

臣百姓安得各用其心而立私乎？故遵主令而行之，雖有傷敗，無罰；非主令而行之，雖有功利，
罪死。然故下之事上也，如響之應聲也；臣之事主也，如影之從形也。故上令而下應，主行而臣
從，此治之道也。夫非主令而行，有功利，因賞之，是教妄舉也。主令而行之，有傷敗，而罰之
，是使民慮利害而離法也。群臣百姓人慮利害，而以其私心舉措，則法制毀而令不行矣。(Lau  
and  Chen  2001:  15.4/111/29-­‐30-­‐15.4/111/1-­‐4)  

  187  
with   them,   the   subjects   would   simply   pursue   their   own   hearts   in   pursuit   of   their  

own   private   interests   安得各用其心而立私.     At   the   each   of   the   above   passage,   it  

becomes  clear  that  one  of  the  main  consequences  of  the  ruler  not  administering  his  

law’s   contingent   reinforcement   correctly   is   that   his   subjects   will   ponder   and  

calculate   their   benefits   and   costs   and   violate   the   law   慮利害而離法.     Since   his  

subjects   are   assumed   to   act   in   their   own   self-­‐interests,   the   ruler   creates   a   state  

structure  that  does  not  allow  his  subjects’  private  interests  to  infringe  on  what  he  

has   defined   as   the   public   welfare.     So,   the   governance   structure   calculates   the  

subjects’   interests   for   them.     Second,   the   administration   of   punishments   is  

supposed   to   take   into   account   the   consideration   of   contextual   conditions.     This  

appears  to  be  a  notable  difference  between  “Reliance  of  the  Law”  and  the  Book  of  

Lord   Shang.     When   there   are   what   the   above   passage   refers   to   as   setbacks   and  

failures   you  shang  bai   有傷敗   involved,   punishment   is   not   necessarily   waaranted.    

This   illustrates   a   notable   sophistication   to   this   theory   punishment,   at   least   in  

contrast  to  that  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang  that  appears  to  insist  on  their  being  no  

reason   why   punishment   should   not   be   applied   to   a   subject   that   failed   to   comply  

with  the  law  or  failed  to  meet  the  ruler’s  expectations.    What  is  most  important  is  

whether   or   not   the   subject(s)   in   question   neglected   the   ruler’s   commands   or  

violated   the   law.     If   there   is   intentional   neglect   or   a   violation   of   the   law   in   a  

subject’s   failure   to   comply   with   the   law,   then   punishments   must   be   meted   out.    

Third,  rewards  are  bestowed  based  on  two  criteria:  the  merit  or  accomplishment  of  

the   act   and   the   benefits   it   brings   to   the   public   welfare   gong  li   功利.     This   is   only   the  

case   if   the   subject   in   question   complies   with   the   ruler’s   commands   and   laws.     As  

  188  
with  the  application  of  punishment,  no  behavior  that  is  not  in  compliance  with  the  

ruler’s   commands   and   laws   should   be   rewarded.     Hence,   the   above   passage  

asserting   that   if   there   is   deviation   from   the   ruler’s   commands,   even   though   the  

execution   may   have   merit   and   bring   benefits   to   the   public   welfare,   if   the   ruler  

rewards  it,  this  is  teaching  reckless  initiative  夫非主令，而行有功利，因賞之，是

教妄舉也.    This  clarifies  that  the  culture  of  merit,  like  everything  else  in  the  state,  

must  be  in  accordance  with  the  law.    Fourth,  since  there  is  a  culture  of  merit  and  

rewards  are  contingently  bestowed  based  on  the  culture  of  merit,  this  promotes  a  

structurally  competitive  state.    

The  Hanfeizi  

  This   study   argues   that   the   Hanfeizi330  also   includes   a   Fajia   notion   of   laws  

that   is   in   accordance   with   this   study’s   three   main   criteria.     In   “On   Having  

Standards”331,  the  Hanfeizi  states:    

In   our   present   age   he   who   can   put   an   end   to   private   scheming   and  
make   men   uphold   the   public   law   will   see   his   people   secure   and   his  
state   well   ordered;   he   who   can   block   selfish   pursuits   and   enforce   the  
public   law   will   see   his   armies   growing   stronger   and   his   enemies  
                                                                                                               
330  Translations  can  be  found  in  Watson,  Burton.  Han  Fei  Tzu:  Basic  Writings.  New  York:  Columbia  

University  Press,  1964.    

331  Although  it  appears  that  most  scholars  do  consider  much  of  the  Hanfeizi  to  have  been  written  by  

Han  Fei  himself,  it  is  important  to  note  that  there  is  doubt  about  the  authenticity  of  this  particular  
chapter.    Due  to  the  chapter  consistently  rationalizing  its  advocacy  for  the  use  of  laws  by  referencing  
the  fact  that  the  Former  Kings  xian  wang  先王  also  utilized  the  same  notion  of  laws,  unlike  chapters  
like  “Facing  South”  that  specifically  argue  against  emulating  the  past,  there  is  doubt  that  “On  Having  
Standards”  was  written  by  Han  Fei.  See  Rong  Zhaozu  容肇祖.  Hanfeizi  kaozheng  韓非子考證.  
Shanghai  上海:  Shang  wu  yin  shu  guan  商務印書館,  1936.    or  for  a  more  concise  account  of  the  
general  issues  of  authenticity,  see  the  introduction  of  Zhang  Jue  張覺.  Hanfeizi  quan  yi  韓非子全譯.    
Gui  Yang  貴陽:  Gui  zhou  ren  min  chu  ban  she  貴州人民出版社,  1992.    However,  this  study  is  mainly  
concerned  with  highlighting  the  notion  of  laws  in  the  Hanfeizi  rather  than  attempting  a  full  study  of  
Han  Fei’s  thought.    Additionally,  since  this  paper  seeks  to  characterize  the  Fajia  tradition,  examining  
a  chapter  that  appears  to  have  been  influenced  by  other  traditions  of  thought  will  illustrate  the  
variety  of  views  within  the  Fajia  tradition.    However,  this  paper  will  include  passages  from  “Two  
Handles”  whose  authenticity  is  doubted  to  a  relatively  lesser  degree.  

  189  
 weakening.     Find   men   who   have   a   clear   understanding   of   what   is  
beneficial   to   the   nation   and   a   feeling   for   the   system   of   laws   and  
regulations,  and  place  them  in  charge  of  the  lesser  officials;  then  the  
ruler   can   never   be   deceived   by   lies   and   falsehoods.     Find   men   who  
have  a  clear  understanding  of  what  is  beneficial  to  the  nation  and  the  
judgment  to  weigh  issues  properly,  and  put  them  in  charge  of  foreign  
affairs;  then  the  ruler  can  never  be  deceived  in  his  relations  with  the  
other   powers   of   the   world.     Now   if   able   men   are   selected   for  
promotion   on   the   basis   of   reputation   alone,   then   the   officials   will  
disregard  the  ruler  and  seek  only  the  good  will  of  their  associates  and  
subordinates.     If   appointments   to   office   are   controlled   by   cliques,  
then  men  will  work  only  to  establish  profitable  connections  and  will  
not   try   to   achieve   office   by   regular   routes.     In   such   case,   official   posts  
will  never  be  filled  by  able  men,  and  the  state  will  fall  into  disorder.    
If   rewards   are   handed   out   on   the   basis   of   good   report   alone,   and  
punishments   on   the   basis   of   slander,   then   men   who   covet   rewards  
and   fear   punishment   will   abandon   the   public   interest   and   pursue  
only   private   schemes,   banding   together   to   further   each   other’s  
interests.     If   men   forget   who   their   sovereign   is   and   enter   into  
association   with   foreign   powers   in   order   to   further   the   interests   of  
their   own   group,   then   subordinates   will   be   of   little   aid   to   their  
superiors.    If  the  groups  are  large  and  their  allies  numerous,  so  that  a  
single   clique   embraces   men   both   inside   and   outside   the   state,   then,  
though   its   members   commit   a   glaring   fault,   they   will   find   plentiful  
means  to  conceal  it.332  
 
A  few  aspects  to  this  passage’s  notion  of  law  appear  to  be  reminiscent  of  that  found  

in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang,  the  “Shenzi  fragments”,  the  “Shen  Buhai  fragments”,  and  

the  Guanzi.    First,  law  is  conceptualized  as  a  tool  of  governance  that  can  prevent  the  

ruler’s   subjects’   pursuit   of   their   own   private   interests   (or   other   private   interests)  

from  infringing  on  what  the  ruler  defines  as  the  public  welfare.    This  is  likely  why  

the   passage   argues   that   one   of   the   main   consequences   of   a   ruler   successfully  

upholding   the   law   while   eliminating   subjects   who   behave   for   the   sake   of   private  
                                                                                                               
332  Watson  1964:  22-­‐23;  故當今之時，能去私曲，就公法者，民安而國治；能去私行，行公法者，

則兵強而敵弱。故審得夫有法度之制者，加以群臣之上，則主不可欺以詐偽；審得夫有權衡之稱
者，以聽遠事，則主不可欺以天下之輕重。今若以譽進能，則臣離上而下比周；若以黨舉官，則
民務交而不求用於法。故官之失能者其國亂。以譽為賞，以毀為罰也，則好賞惡罰之人，釋公法，
行私術，比周以相為也。忘主外交，以進其與，則其下所以為上者薄矣。交眾與多，外內朋黨，
雖有大過，其蔽多矣。(Lau  and  Chen  2000:  6/8/1-­‐6)  

  190  
interests   去私行   is   that   the   armed   forces   will   be   strong   and   enemy   states   will   be  

weak  兵強而敵弱.    So  not  only  is  law  conceptualized  as  a  demarcating  line  between  

what   the   ruler   defines   as   public   welfare   and   private   interests,   but   it   enhances   an  

important   aspect   of   what   the   ruler   defines   as   the   public   welfare:   relative   military  

strength.     Second,   law   is   conceptualized   as   a   tool   of   unification   and   organization  

within   the   state.     The   passage   argues   that   a   consequence   of   the   ruler   not   governing  

in   accordance   with   the   law   is   chaos   within   his   state   其國亂.     Third,   the   notion   of  

law   in   the   above   passage   is   conceptualized   as   a   tool   that   enhances   the   precision  

with  which  the  ruler  measures,  evaluates,  and  judges.    The  above  passage,  like  the  

aforementioned  Fajia  texts,  employs  a  metaphor  of  weights  and  balances  quan  heng  

權衡  to  illustrate  this  point.      

Fourth,  a  corollary  to  the  second,  law  is  a  tool  that  a  ruler  must  use  to  unify  

and  organize  his  state.    It  is  clear  that  the  ruler  is  the  ultimate  administrator  of  laws  

because  the  above  passage  insists  that  the  ruler  carefully  seeks  out  those  who  act  

according  to  laws  and  measures  and  places  them  above  the  groups  of  ministers  審

得夫有法度之制者加以群臣之上,   so   that   he   is   not   deceived   by   his   subjects.    

Without  the  presence  and  proper  administration  of  the  law,  the  ruler’s  subjects  are  

likely   to   behave   in   accordance   with   private   interests   without   regard   for   what   the  

ruler   defines   as   the   public   welfare.     This   point   is   expounded   later   in   the   chapter  

when  it  states:    

Therefore   I   say:   There   are   no   men   in   the   court   of   a   doomed   state.    

When  I  say  there  are  no  men,  I  do  not  mean  that  the  actual  number  of  
men   at   court   is   any   less   than   usual.     But   the   powerful   families   seek  
only   to   benefit   each   other   and   not   to   enrich   the   state;   the   high  

  191  
 ministers   seek   only   to   honor   each   other   and   not   to   honor   their  
sovereign;  and  the  petty  officials  cling  to  their  stipends  and  work  to  
make  influential  friends  instead  of  attending  to  their  duties.    And  the  
reason   such   a   state   of   affairs   has   come   about   is   that   the   ruler   does  
not   make   important   decisions   on   the   basis   of   law,   but   puts   faith   in  
whatever  his  subordinates  do.    A  truly  enlightened  ruler  uses  the  law  
to  select  men  for  him;  he  does  not  choose  them  himself.    He  uses  the  
law   to   weigh   their   merits;   he   does   not   attempt   to   judge   them   for  
himself.     Hence   men   of   true   worth   will   not   be   able   to   hide   their  
talents,   nor   spoilers   to   gloss   over   their   faults.     Men   cannot   advance  
on   the   basis   of   praise   alone,   nor   be   driven   from   court   by   calumny.    
Then  there  will  be  a  clear  understanding  of  values  between  the  ruler  
and   his   ministers,   and   the   state   can   be   easily   governed.     But   only   if  
the  ruler  makes  use  of  law  can  he  hope  to  achieve  this.333  
 
This   passage   much   more   explicitly   explains   the   ruler’s   relationship   with   the   law  

and  how  laws  prevent  private  interests  from  infringing  upon  what  the  ruler  defines  

as  the  public  welfare.    The  passage  describes  the  condition  in  which  the  ruler  does  

not   govern   his   state   according   to   the   law   as   one   in   which   the   court   is   lacking  

subjects   廷無人者.     This   causes   the   state   to   be   unable   to   derive   benefits   or   profit  

from  them  because  the  ruler  has  no  mechanism  with  which  to  extract  benefits  from  

his   subject’s   pursuit   of   self-­‐interest.     Thus,   if   the   ruler   cannot   benefit   from   the  

private  pursuits  of  his  subjects,  few  will  be  consistently  acting  on  his  behalf.    This  is  

likely  why  the  above  passage  asserts  that  the  clear-­‐sighted  ruler  allows  the  law  to  

select  men  and  does  not  rely  on  his  own  feelings  to  promote  subjects  明主使法擇人

，不自舉也.      

Much  like  other  Fajia  texts,  this  passage  juxtaposes  the  law  with  the  ruler’s  

own   faculties.     This   is   important   to   point   out   because   this   Hanfeizi   chapter,  

                                                                                                               
333  Watson  1964:  24;  廷無人者，非朝廷之衰也。家務相益，不務厚國；大臣務相尊，而不務尊君

；小臣奉祿養交，不以官為事。此其所以然者，由主之不上斷於法，而信下為之也。故明主使法
擇人，不自舉也；使法量功，不自度也。能者不可弊，敗者不可飾，譽者不能進，非者弗能退，
則君臣之間明辨而易治，故主讎法則可也。(Lau  and  Chen  2000:  6/8/10-­‐14)  

  192  
differently   from   some   chapters   in   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang,   describes   the   ruler’s  

subjects,   particularly   his   ministers,   as   those   who   necessarily   cater   to   whatever  

mechanism   the   ruler   uses   to   evaluate   them.     For   instance,   “On   Having   Standards”  

states:  

The   law   of   the   former   kings   says,   “Ministers   shall   not   wield   the  
instruments   of   authority   nor   dispense   benefits,   but   follow   the  
commands  of  the  king;  none  shall  do  evil,  but  uphold  the  king’s  path.”    
In   antiquity   the   people   of   a   well-­‐ordered   age   upheld   the   public   law  
and   renounced   private   schemes,   concentrated   their   attention   upon  
one  goal  and  their  actions  upon  one  object,  and  together  awaited  the  
charge   that   was   laid   upon   them.     If   the   ruler   of   men   tries   to   keep   a  
personal   check   on   all   the   various   offices   of   his   government,   he   will  
find  the  day  too  short  and  his  energies  insufficient.    Moreover  if  the  
ruler   uses   his   eyes,   his   subordinates   will   try   to   prettify   what   he   sees;  
if  he  uses  his  ears,  they  will  try  to  embellish  what  he  hears;  and  if  he  
uses  his  mind,  they  will  be  at  him  with  endless  speeches.    The  former  
kings,   knowing   that   these   three   faculties   would   not   suffice,  
accordingly  set  aside  their  own  abilities;  instead  they  relied  upon  law  
and  policy,  and  took  care  to  see  that  rewards  and  punishments  were  
correctly   apportioned.     Since   they   held   fast   to   the   essential   point,  
their  legal  codes  were  simple  yet  inviolable,  and  alone  they  exercised  
control  over  all  within  the  four  seas.334  
 
In   addition   to   making   much   of   the   ruler’s   consistency   and   precision   in   his  

governance,  this  passage  asserts  that  the  ruler  ought  to  rely  on  laws  rather  than  on  

his   own   faculties   in   order   to   govern   his   state   for   at   least   two   additional   reasons.    

The   first   has   to   do   with   assumptions   about   human   behavior.     It   assumes   that   the  

ruler’s  subjects  are  primarily  motivated  by  private  recognition.    Therefore,  subjects  

of   the   ruler   will   pursue   whatever   channels   will   allow   them   to   maximize   their  

recognition.     If   these   channels   are   created   by   private   interests,   then   the   ruler’s  

                                                                                                               
334  Watson  1964:  26-­‐27;  先王之法曰：「臣毋或作威，毋或作利，從王之指；無或作惡，從王之路

。」古者世治之民，奉公法，廢私術，專意一行，具以待任。夫為人（之）主而身察百官，則日
不足，力不給。且上用目則下飾觀，上用耳則下飾聲，上用慮則下繁辭。先王以三者為不足，故
舍己能而因法數，審賞罰。先王之所守要，故法省而不侵。(Lau  and  Chen  2000:  6/8/24-­‐30)  

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subjects   will   pursue   those   channels   instead   of   those   created   by   the   ruler.     This   is  

likely  why  the  first  and  second  “On  Having  Standards”  passages  anticipated  that  the  

ruler’s   subjects   would   collude   with   each   other   and   even   create   factions   upon   the  

ruler’s   abandonment   of   the   law.     The   ruler’s   subjects   will   necessarily   tailor   their  

behavior   to   be   in   accordance   with   whatever   faculty   or   instrument   of   governance  

evaluates   them.     So,   this   is   likely   why   the   above   passage   asserts   that   they   will  

decorate  themselves  for  the  sake  of  the  ruler’s  eyes,  ears,  and  mind.    

The  second  reason  the  ruler  should  rely  on  the  law  is  that  human  ruler  has  

capacities   for   governance   that   are   unlimited.     If   the   ruler   tried   to   personally  

oversee  all  of  the  matters  within  his  state,  then  the  days  would  not  be  sufficiently  

long   and   his   strength   would   prove   insufficient   日不足，力不給.     Therefore,   the  

ruler   needs   a   mechanism   within   his   system   of   governance   that   will   allow   him   to  

observe  his  subjects  without  being  present.    He  needs  a  mechanism  that  will  extend  

the  reach  and  endurance  of  his  own  human  faculties.    Therefore,  the  ruler  must  rely  

on   the   law   in   order   to   ensure   what   Foucault   called   “hierarchical   observation”335 .    

This   is   likely   why   the   second   “On   Having   Standards”   passage   insisted   that   the   ruler  

use  the  law  to  measure  merit  and  does  not  rely  on  his  own  measures  使法量功，不

自度也.    This  also  points  to  a  culture  of  merit  within  the  state,  as  in  the  Fajia  texts.    

This   explains   why   the   first   “On   Having   Standards”   passage   described   the  

                                                                                                               
335  Foucault  1977:  170-­‐171  

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administering   of   rewards   and   punishments   based   on   reputation   and   defamation  

respectively  as  problematic336.      

When   rewards   and   punishments   are   administered   based   on   what   the  

chapter  considers  less  objective  measures,  such  as  the  ruler’s  own  faculties  or  the  

words  and  opinions  of  others,  then  the  influence  of  private  interests,  of  the  ruler’s  

or   his   subjects’,   will   infringe   upon   what   the   ruler   defines   as   the   public   welfare.    

Therefore,  the  ruler  should  administer  his  law’s  contingent  reinforcement  based  on  

an   individual   subject’s   merit.     As   such,   then   it   should   be   clear   that   this   Hanfeizi  

chapter   also   advocates   a   concept   of   law   that   fosters   the   kind   of   competition  

promoted  in  Fajia  texts.    

Although   “On   Having   Standards”   devotes   much   of   its   content   devoted   to  

ministers   in  its   discussion   of  the  ruler’s  subjects,  it  nevertheless  makes   plain   that  

all   subjects   can   achieve   merit   and   none   are   exempt   from   punishment.   “When   faults  

are   to   be   punished,   the   highest   minister   cannot   escape;   when   good   is   to   be  

                                                                                                               
336  The  importance  of  rewards  and  punishments  are  relatively  assumed  in  “On  Having  Standards”.  

The  fact  that  the  chapter  does  not  more  explicitly  articulate  the  importance  of  rewards  and  
punishments  does  not  mean  that  it  does  not  consider  them  important.    Following  “On  Having  
Standards”,  “Two  Handles”,  clearly  expounds  on  the  importance  of  rewards  and  punishments  in  the  
Hanfeizi  when  it  states,  “The  enlightened  ruler  controls  his  ministers  by  means  of  two  handles  alone.    
The  two  handles  are  punishment  and  favor.    What  do  I  mean  by  punishment  and  favor?    To  inflict  
mutilation  and  death  on  men  is  called  punishment;  to  bestow  honor  and  reward  is  called  favor.    
Those  who  act  as  ministers  fear  the  penalties  and  hope  to  profit  by  the  rewards.    Hence,  if  the  ruler  
wields  his  punishments  and  favors,  the  ministers  will  fear  his  sternness  and  flock  to  receive  his  
benefits.    But  the  evil  ministers  of  the  age  are  different.    They  cajole  the  ruler  into  letting  them  inflict  
punishment  themselves  on  men  they  hate  and  bestow  rewards  on  men  they  like.    Now  if  the  ruler  of  
men  does  not  insist  upon  reserving  to  himself  the  right  to  dispense  profit  in  the  form  of  rewards  and  
show  his  sternness  in  punishments,  but  instead  hands  them  out  on  the  advice  of  his  ministers,  then  
the  people  of  the  state  all  fear  the  ministers  and  hold  the  ruler  in  contempt,  will  flock  to  the  
ministers  and  desert  the  ruler.    This  is  the  danger  that  arises  when  the  ruler  loses  control  of  
punishments  and  favors.    The  tiger  is  able  to  overpower  the  dog  because  of  his  claws  and  teeth,  but  
if  he  discards  his  claws  and  teeth  and  lets  the  dog  use  them,  then  on  the  contrary  he  will  be  
overpowered  by  the  dog.    In  the  same  way  the  ruler  of  men  uses  punishments  and  favors  to  control  
his  ministers,  but  if  he  discards  his  punishments  and  favors  and  lets  his  ministers  employ  them,  then  
on  the  contrary  he  will  find  himself  in  the  control  of  his  ministers.” (Watson  1964:  30-­‐31)  

  195  
rewarded,  the  lowest  peasant  must  not  be  passed  over.”337     It  is  not  only  clear  that  

rewards   should   be   bestowed   based   on   merit,   but   that   no   one   in   the   state   should   be  

overlooked   because   they   are   not   of   noble   bloodlines.     The   bestowal   of   rewards  

based   on   merit   not   only   allows   the   ruler   to   channel   his   subject’s   inevitable   quest  

for  private  fame  and  profit  in  order  to  benefit  what  he  defines  as  the  public  welfare,  

but  it  also,  at  least  in  theory,  creates  opportunity  for  social  and  economic  mobility  

for  all  subjects  within  his  state.    Since  merit  is  the  determining  factor  in  whether  an  

individual   receives   reward, 338  this   produces   the   structure   for   the   competition.    

Hsieh  Shan-­‐yüan  appeared  to  have  also  identified  competition  as  a  notable  variable  

in   the   Hanfeizi’s   ideal   society   when   he   stated,   “It   is   only   in   the   Han  Fei  Tzu   that   one  

detects  an  ideal  beyond  prosperity  and  strength,  a  society  in  which  the  honorable  

and  the  mean  each  keeps  his  own  place  without  the  one  infringing  upon  the  other,  

and   in   which   all   the   people,   regardless   of   their   unequal   intellectual   endowments,  
                                                                                                               
337  Watson   1964:   28;   刑過不避大臣，賞善不遺匹夫。(Lau   and   Chen   2000:   6/9/7-­‐8)   In   this   passage,  

it  is  likely  that  the  definition  of  shan  善  is  like  the  fourth  usage  of  shan  善  in  a  previously  discussed  
passage  found  in  “Policies”  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang.    It  essentially  refers  to  individuals  that  comply  
with  the  law,  without  any  reference  to  any  moral  standards  beyond  it.  
338  It  should  be  noted  that  an  individual’s  merit  must  also  be  in  accordance  with  their  words  or  the  

articulated  level  of  performance  they  express  to  the  ruler.    “Two  Handles”  explains,  “If  the  ruler  of  
men  wishes  to  put  an  end  to  evil-­‐doing,  then  he  must  be  careful  to  match  up  names  and  results,  that  
is  to  say,  words  and  deeds.    The  ministers  come  forward  to  present  their  proposals;  the  ruler  assigns  
them  tasks  on  the  basis  of  their  words,  and  then  concentrates  on  demanding  the  accomplishment  of  
the  task.    It  the  accomplishment  fits  the  task,  and  the  task  fits  the  words,  then  he  bestows  reward;  
but  if  they  do  not  match,  he  doles  out  punishment.    Hence,  if  one  of  the  ministers  comes  forward  
with  big  words  but  produced  only  small  accomplishments,  the  ruler  punishes  him,  not  because  the  
accomplishments  are  small,  but  because  they  do  not  match  the  name  that  was  given  to  the  
undertaking.    Likewise,  if  one  of  the  ministers  comes  forward  with  small  words  but  produces  great  
accomplishments,  he  too  is  punished,  not  because  the  ruler  is  displeased  at  great  accomplishments,  
but  because  he  considers  the  discrepancy  in  the  name  given  to  the  undertaking  to  be  a  fault  too  
serious  to  be  outweighed  by  great  accomplishments.” (Watson  1964:  31-­‐32) 明主之所導制其臣者
，二柄而已矣。二柄者，刑德也。何謂刑德？曰：殺戮之謂刑，慶賞之謂德。為人臣者畏誅罰而
利慶賞，故人主自用其刑德，則群臣畏其威而歸其利矣。故世之姦臣則不然，所惡則能得之其主
而罪之，所愛則能得之其主而賞之。今人主非使賞罰之威利出於己也，聽其臣而行其賞罰，則一
國之人皆畏其臣而易其君，歸其臣而去其君矣，此人主失刑德之患也。夫虎之所以能服狗者，爪
牙也，使虎釋其爪牙而使狗用之，則虎反服「於」狗矣。人主者，以刑德制臣者也，今君人者釋
其刑德而使臣用之，則君反制於臣矣。(Lau  and  Chen  2000:  7/9/15-­‐21)  

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can   peacefully   compete   by   doing   their   best.” 339     This   study   would   add   that  

peacefully  competing  is  not  only  an  important  aspect  of  the  Hanfeizi’s  ideal  society  

and  also  an  essential  element  in  other  Fajia  texts  as  well.    

Li  Si  in  the  Shiji340

It   is   also   worth   noting   that   passages   attributed   to   Li   Si   in   the   Shiji   are  

consistent  with  this  study’s  argument,  describing  the  same  the  Fajia  notion  of  law  

that  facilitates  the  state  structural  competition.    Though  the  evidence  is  much  less  

explicit,   Li   Si’s   biography   in   the   Shiji   states,   “I   was   a   commoner   of   Shang-­‐ts’ai,   an  

ordinary   man   from   the   village.     The   Emperor   did   not   realize   that   his   nag   was  

inferior,  and  so  finally  promoted  me  to  this  (position).    Among  the  ministerial  posts  

of  the  present  time,  there  is  none  higher  then  mine,  which  may  indeed  be  called  the  

peak  of  wealth  and  honor.    But  when  things  have  reached  their  peak  of  wealth  and  

honor.    But  when  things  have  reached  their  peak  they  decline.    I  do  not  yet  know  

where   I   shall   unharness.”341       Whether   or   not   Li   Si   really   said   this,   this   passage  

implicitly   illustrates   the   opportunity   for   social   mobility   during   the   late   Warring  

States   period   and   after   the   Qin   unification   of   all   under   Heaven.     Li   Si,   despite   not  

being  born  of  noble  bloodlines,  managed  to  reach  the  position  of  Grand  Chancellor  

in  the  state  of  Qin.    Lewis  described  social  mobility  as  an  important  phenomenon,  

particularly   in   the   state   of   Qin,   writing,   “With   the   disappearance   of   hereditary  

                                                                                                               
339  Hsieh  in  Bishop  1985:  102-­‐103;  See  Xie  Shan-­‐yuan  (Hsieh  Shan-­‐yüan).  “The  Legalist  

Philosophers”,  in  Donald  H.  Bishop,  ed.  Chinese  Thought:  An  Introduction.  Delhi:  Motilal  Banarsidass,  
1985.  
340  Bodde,   Derk.   China’s  First  Unifier:  A  Study  of  the  Ch’in  Dynasty  as  Seen  in  the  Life  of  Li  Ssu.   Hong  

Kong:  Hong  Kong  University  Press,  1967.  

341  Bodde  1967:  25;  夫斯乃上蔡布衣，閭巷之黔首，上不知其駑下，遂擢至此。當今人臣之位無居

臣上者，可謂富貴極矣。 物極則衰。(Sima  1931:  208-­‐209)  

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offices,   people   from   the   lower   aristocracy   and   even   commoners   were   able   to   rise  

through   the   ranks   in   the   army   and   government,   carrying   with   them   their  

indigenous   ideas   about   music,   food   literature,   religion,   and   other   aspects   of  

life…the  life  possibilities  for  a  typical  newborn  child  in  Qin  covered   a  wide  range,  

from  servant  or  concubine,  to  local  bravo,  to  official,  to  a  high  minister  or  noble.”342    

It   would   appear   that   the   figure   Li   Si   in   the   Shiji   refers   to   such   an   unprecedented  

level  of  social  mobility.  

The   same   biography   in   the   Shiji   provides   insight   into   the   answer   to   these  

questions:  “(Chao)  Kao  replied:  ‘If  Your  Lordship  will  make  an  estimate  of  ability,  

who  compares  with  Meng  T’ien?    In  worthiness,  who  compares  with  Meng  T’ien?    In  

the  making  of  far  reaching  and  unfailing  plans,  who  compares  with  Men  T’ien?    In  

freedom   from   the   resentment   of   the   empire,   who   compares   with   Meng   T’ien?     In  

enjoying   the   intimacy   and   trust   of   the   eldest   son,   who   compares   with   Meng  

T’ien?”343     This  passage  reveals  a  few  aspects  of  the  culture  amongst  those  with  a  

close   proximity   to   power   in   the   inner   court.     First,   Zhao   Gao   asks   Li   Si   rather   direct  

questions   about   how   he   would   compare   himself   to   another   successful   man  

employed  in  Qin,  Meng  Tian,  a  notable  general  of  the  Qin  dynasty.    In  other  words,  

in  this  text,  the  state  and  empire  of  Qin  likely  established  a  culture  that  included  a  

sense   of   competition   amongst   its   subjects   in   the   inner   court,   outer   court,   and  

beyond.    

 Second,  Zhao  Gao  specifically  asks  Li  Si  to  compare  himself  to  Meng  Tian  in  

ability  and  merit.    This  implies  that  the  state  of  Qin  likely  did  establish  a  culture  of  
                                                                                                               
342  Lewis  2007:  44-­‐45  
343  Bodde  1967:  29;  高曰：「君侯自料能孰與？蒙恬，功高；孰與，蒙恬？(Sima  1931:  210)  

  198  
merit   that   not   only   assisted   the   ruler   in   creating   channels   through   which   his  

subjects  could  pursue  private  profit  but  also  a  culture  that  served  as  the  foundation  

for  the  intentional  competition  so  clearly  illustrated  in  the  above  passage.    However,  

it   should   be   clear   by   now   that   a   culture   of   merit   may   be   sufficient   to   inspire  

intentional   competition   amongst   a   ruler’s   subject   but   certainly   not   sufficient   to  

create  structural  competition.      

Nevertheless,  later  in  the  same  Shiji  biography,  a  Li  Si  memorial  states,  “Your  

servant   has   become   Grand   Councillor,   and   has   administered   the   people   for   more  

than   thirty   years…Your   servant   used   his   meager   talents   to   the   utmost,   carefully  

establishing   laws…gave   position   to   men   of   arms,   honored   meritorious   officials,  

enriched   their   ranks   and   revenues.” 344     This   passage   does   reveal   a   few   more  

aspects   to   Li   Si’s   thought   in   relation   to   the   aforementioned   Fajia   texts.     Li   Si  

certainly  viewed  himself  as  an  ideal  Grand  Chancellor  and  servant  to  the  Qin  ruler  

because  he  not  only  diligently  complied  with  the  rulers  laws  fa  法  and  decrees  ling  

令,   but   he   also   gave   office   to   fighting   Knights 官鬬士,   honored   meritorious  

ministers  尊功臣,  and  gave  rank  and  emoluments  in  abundance  盛其爵祿.    The  idea  

of   giving   office   to   fighting   Knights   or   those   of   military   merit   is   undoubtedly   similar  

to   ideas   represented   in   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang,   the   Hanfeizi,   and   the   Wuzi,   with  

rank  and  emolument  being  bestowed  as  rewards  for  their  achievements.      

Li   Si   again   reiterates   his   exemplary   achievements   as   a   Fajia   Grand  

Chancellor  later  in  the  memorial  when  he  states,  “He  honored  the  great  ministers  

                                                                                                               
344  Bodde  1967:  50;  臣為丞相治民，三十餘年矣，逮秦地之陜隘。。。臣盡薄材，謹奉法令。。。

官鬬士，尊功臣，盛其爵祿。。。(Sima  1931:  219)  

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and  enriched  their  ranks  and  positions,  so  as  to  strengthen  their  attachment.    This  

is  his  crime  number  three.”345    Out  of  context  this  passage  may  seem  as  though  Li  Si  

was  characterizing  the  aforementioned  actions  as  Grand  Chancellor  as  mistakes  or  

offenses   rather   than   achievements.     However,   throughout   the   memorial   Li   Si   is  

pleading  for  his  life  from  prison.    The  notion  of  crime  in  the  above  passage  is  meant  

to  express  the  idea  that  if  he  is  guilty  of  anything,  it  is  having  notable  achievements  

as  a  loyal  servant  to  the  Qin  state.    Derk  Bodde  described  the  memorial  saying,  “So  

as  not  to  die,  (Li)  Ssu  undertook  to  give  an  exposition  of  his  merits,  and  to  say  that  

he   was   in   truth   without   seditious   intent,   thus   hoping   that   with   good   fortune   he  

might   be   able   to   submit   a   memorial   of   self   exposition,   and   by   good   grace   Erh-­‐

Shih346  might   yet   waken   (from   his   blindness)   and   pardon   him.”347     Therefore,   since  

Li  Si  called  bestowing  rewards  on  behalf  of  the  Emperor  an  achievement,  and  it  is  

clear  that  there  is  not  only  a  culture  of  merit  but  a  contingent  bestowal  of  rewards  

based   on   the   merit,   in   the   form   of   rank   and   emoluments.     Therefore,   it   should   be  

clear  that  Li  Si  also  placed  notable  value  on  creating  the  quintessential  form  of  Fajia  

competition.      

Conclusion  

This   chapter   attempted   to   provide   some   useful   connections   between   Fajia  

texts   that   illustrate   their   distinct   political   culture.     The   character   fa   法   did  

experience   a   significant   meaning-­‐change   upon   its   use   in   texts   that   came   to   be  

classified   as   Fajia.     In   addition,   this   significant   meaning   change   is   precisely   what  

                                                                                                               
345  Bodde  1967:  50;  尊大臣，盛其爵位，以固其親。罪三矣。(Sima  1931:  219)  
346  Er  Shi  二世  refers  to  the  second  Emperor  of  the  Qin  dynasty  (r.  210-­‐207)  

347  Bodde  1967:  50  

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connects   the   various   texts   labeled   Fajia,   giving   them   a   unique   identification.   The  

conception   of   fa   法   in   Fajia   texts   indicates   a   results-­‐oriented   program   of  

development,   ultimately   administered   by   the   ruler,   used   to   measure   the  

performance   or   fulfillment   of   imposed   criteria   reinforced   by   rewards   (and  

punishments)  that  created  a  culture  of  competition.    

The   Fajia   political   organization,   in   which   the   institution-­‐facilitated  

competition  was  a  prominent  feature,  represents  a  drastic  change,  particularly  for  

those  of  noble  bloodlines.    No  longer  was  privilege  within  the  political  organization  

and   society   solely   determined   by   an   individual’s   proximity   to   power   in   the   noble  

bloodline.    As  the  passage  in  Li  Si’s  biography  in  the  Shiji  points  out,  a  commoner,  

one   that   is   not   born   to   noble   bloodlines,   could   be   socially   mobile   to   an  

unprecedented   degree,   potentially   occupying   the   position   of   Grand   Chancellor,  

second   in   command   only   to   the   Son   of   Heaven.     However,   this   did   not   eradicate  

ritual-­‐based  activity  amongst  the  political  elite.    Rather,  this  signified  a  change  from  

a   political   organization   based   on   bloodline   to   one   based   on   geographical   ties   and  

allegiances.     A   subject   is   linked   or   bonded   with   his   ruler   when   he   becomes   a  

member  of  the  ruler’s  state.    In  the  Fajia  context,  the  subject  demonstrates  his  good  

faith   and   mutual   trust   through   his   compliance   with   the   law.     The   ruler  

demonstrates   his   spiritual   authority,   or   a   superior’s   version   of   good   faith   and  

mutual  trust,  along  with  the  law’s,  through  recognizing  or  bestowing  rewards  upon  

those   who   exemplify   extraordinary   compliance   with   the   law.     In   other   words,   the  

basis  of  the  authority  of  the  elite  changed  from  one  based  on  proximity  to  power  in  

the  noble  bloodline  to  one  based  on  merit.    The  ruler’s  subjects  were  evaluated  by  

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what   they   did   rather   than   who   they   were.     More   specifically   then,   it   is   fair   to   say  

that   in   theory   Fajia   thought   sought   to   create   a   culture   in   which   what   the   ruler’s  

subjects  did  determined  their  status  and  rank  within  the  state  and  society.    

Of  course,  the  chance  of  social  mobility  is  oftentimes  an  improvement  from  

not   having   any   chance   at   social   mobility,   which   the   Rujia  thought   of   the   Spring   and  

Autumn  period  appears  to  represent.    Recall  that  in  the  Book  of  Rites,  the  “Summary  

of  Ritual  Part  I”  Qi   Li   I   曲禮上  the  Li   ji  禮記  states,  “Ritual  does  not  descend  to  the  

common  people.    Punishment  does  not  ascend  to  the  Grand  Masters.  Men  who  have  

suffered  punishment  should  not  (be  allowed  to)  be  by  the  side  of  the  ruler.”348     In  

one  of  the  Rujia’s  Five  Classics,  it  is  clear  that  elite  privilege,  more  specifically,  the  

privilege  of  those  who  were  a  part  of  the  ruler’s  court  was  an  important  aspect  of  

Rujia  political  culture.    Even  more  importantly,  there  was  a  clear  divide  in  political  

practice:     It   was   only   the   common   people   shu   ren   庶人   that   were   subjected   to   a  

culture   of   punishment.     Just   as   important   though,   the   non-­‐political   elite   were   not  

entitled  to  and  had  little  means  of  gaining  access  to  privilege  and  authority  because  

of   their   non-­‐noble   birth.     Therefore,   not   only   were   punishments   reserved   for   the  

common  people,  but  the  “rewards”  of  privilege  and  the  participation  in  ritual  were  

reserved  for  those  of  noble  birth.    It  is  no  wonder  then  that  the  Rujia  elite  or  other  

political  elites  would  not  react  well  to  Fajia’s  new  form  of  political  organization.      

In  Fajia  texts,  at  least  theoretically,  the  same  coercive  laws  were  imposed  on  

all   subjects,   formulated   by   the   ruler   of   a   particular   state.     In   fact,   in   the   Hanfeizi,  

                                                                                                               
348  Legge  in  Chai  and  Chai  1967:  90;  禮不下庶人，刑不上大夫。 刑人不在君側。(Lau  and  Chen  
1992:  1/5/24-­‐25)  

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there   is   no   mistaking   the   political   elite   for   some   sort   of   privileged   category   of  

subjects   that   were   exempt   from   having   to   earn   their   status   and   merit   through  

achieving   within   the   institution-­‐facilitated   competition   established   by   the   ruler’s  

laws.   The   Hanfeizi,   in   “On   Having   Standards”,   states,   “The   law   no   more   makes  

exceptions   for   men   of   high   station   than   the   plumb   line   bends   to   accommodate   a  

crooked  place  in  the  wood.    What  the  law  has  decreed  the  wise  man  cannot  dispute  

nor  the  brave  man  venture  to  contest.    When  faults  are  to  be  punished,  the  highest  

minister   cannot   escape;   when   good   is   to   be   rewarded,   the   lowest   peasant   must   not  

be  passed  over.”349     In  this  passage,  it  is  most  important  to  note  that  the  system  of  

rewards  does  not  exclude  the  common  people.    In  Fajia  texts,  again  in  theory,  there  

is   an   insistence   on   a   culture   of   merit   and   the   construction   and   maintenance   of  

institution-­‐facilitated   competition   specifically   for   the   state   that   is   not   found   in  

Rujia,   Mohist,   or   Daoist   texts.     The   fact   that   the   law-­‐based   institution-­‐facilitated  

competition   was   specifically   constructed   for   the   state   reinforces   Lewis’s   findings  

when   he   stated,   “This   split   between   Qin   and   the   central   states   was   written   into   Qin  

law,   as   shown   in   legal   documents   found   at   Yunmeng.     Thus,   by   the   end   of   the  

Warring  States  period,  the  idea  that  Qin  was  culturally  distinct  from  the  other  parts  

of   the   old   Zhou   realm,   as   well   as   from   the   southern   state   of   Chu,   was   not   merely  

conventionally   accepted   both   outside   and   inside   Qin   but   was   even   a   formal  

principle   in   Qin   government   practice.”350     Thus,   among   other   factors,   the   Rujia  

distaste   for   Fajia   philosophy   and   policy   was   due   to   the   change   in   political  

                                                                                                               
349  Watson  1964:  28;  法不阿貴，繩不撓曲。法之所加，智者弗能辭，勇者弗敢爭。刑過不避大臣

，賞善不遺匹夫。(Lau  and  Chen  2000:  6/9/6-­‐8)  

350  Lewis  2007:  44  

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organization   and   culture   that   converted   the   ruler’s   subjects   to   the   basic   units   of  

state  competition  to  an  unprecedented  degree.  

Thus   far   however,   our   discussion   has   been   limited   to   deciphering   textual  

meaning.     Even   though   the   textual   analysis   of   this   study   has   proven   meaning-­‐

change  and  the  reflection  of  a  new  political  organization,  it  is  important  to  further  

explore   the   experience   within   a   Fajia   competitive   state.     It   has   thus   far   been  

discussed   from   the   perspective   of   the   ruler   who   designs   the   state,   formulates  

policies,  and  shapes  society.    However,  we  must  remember  that  the  ideas  discussed  

in  these  texts  informed  political  practice  during  its  time.    Therefore,  analyzing  the  

Fajia   system   of   rewards   from   the   perspective   of   the   subject   is   also   important.    

Through  exploring  the  socio-­‐cultural  implications  of  the  Fajia  rewards  system,  we  

not   only   gain   a   more   comprehensive   understanding   of   the   broader   Fajia  political  

vision,  but  also  the  human  experience  of  those  subjected  to  it.  

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 Chapter  VII  
   
Experiencing  the  Fajia  state  
 
Thus   far,   our   discussion   has   been   limited   to   deciphering   textual   meaning.    

Even  though  our  analysis  thus  far  has  proven  meaning-­‐change  and  Fajia’s  reflection  

of   a   new   political   organization,   it   is   important   to   further   explore   the   subject  

experience   within   an   institution-­‐facilitated   competitive   state.     It   has   still   been  

discussed   from   the   perspective   of   the   ruler   who   designs   the   state,   formulates  

policies,  and  shapes  society.    However,  we  must  remember  that  the  ideas  discussed  

in  these  texts  informed  political  practice  during  its  time.    Therefore,  analyzing  the  

Fajia   system   of   rewards   from   the   perspective   of   the   subject   is   crucial.     Through  

exploring  the  socio-­‐cultural  implications  of  the  Fajia  rewards  system,  we  not  only  

gain   a   more   comprehensive   understanding   of   the   broader   Fajia  political   vision,   but  

also  the  human  experience  of  those  subjected  to  it.  

The   chapter   will   focus   on   the   research   of   organismic   learning   from   an  

important   theoretical   perspective:   behavior   analysis.     I   have   chosen   it   because   it  

has  been  one  of  the  two  of  the  strongest  voices  in  the  social  scientific  debate  on  the  

effects  of  systems  of  rewards.    Its  conclusions  about  rewards  will  bring  to  light  the  

Fajia  subject’s  experience  for  two  important  reasons.    First,  the  use  of  this  behavior  

analysis  research  will  challenge  the  traditional  interpretations  of  Fajia’s  approach  

to   governance.     Indeed,   the   notion   of   punishment   xing   刑   became   an   important  

instrument  to  reinforce  the  Fajia  notion  of  law,  especially  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang,  

which  specifically  advocated  for  harsh  punishment  being  more  frequently  applied  

  205  
than   the   bestowal   of   rewards.     However,   this   study   has   argued   that   primarily  

characterizing  Fajia   texts  as  advocates  of  punishment  is  inadequate  and  overlooks  

much  that  is  central  to  their  time  and  their  contribution  to  Chinese  thought.    Creel  

suggested   the   definition   of   “legalism”   as   “strictness,   or   the   doctrine   of   strictness,   in  

conforming   to   law”,   and   then   boldly   averred   that,   “Shen   Pu-­‐hai   was   not   a  

legalist”.351     This  is  mainly  because  Creel  determined  Shen  Buhai’s  thought  to  have  

primarily   “emphasized   administrative   technique”.352     In   addition   to   the   previous  

chapter  proving  that  the  “Shen  Buhai  Fragments”  do  share  an  insistence  on  state-­‐

specific   institution-­‐facilitated   meritocratic   competition   with   other   Fajia   texts,   this  

chapter  will  show  that  Creel’s  assertion  about  punishments  fails  to  understand  the  

subject  experience  of  the  Fajia  state.    To  put  another  way,  Creel’s  assertion  does  not  

hold  if  rewards  and  punishments  are  not  experienced  by  subjects  in  the  same  way  

the  author’s  of  Fajia  texts  anticipated.    

Second,  behavior  analysis  research  will  help  demonstrates  the  relevance  of  

Fajia   thought   to   notable   contemporary   socio-­‐political   issues,   through   illustrating  

how   instrumental   environmental   variables   are   in   explaining   human   behavior.    

While   “behaviorally-­‐oriented   psychologists” 353  acknowledge   that   interest   can  

motivate   human   beings   to   engage   in   activity354,   they   nevertheless   generally   base  

                                                                                                               
351  Creel  1974:  135  
352  Creel  1974:  162  
353  Eisenberger  and  Cameron  1996:  1156;  See  Eisenberger,  Robert  &  Judy  Cameron  “The  

Detrimental  Effects  of  Reward:  Myth  or  Reality?”.  American  Psychologist,  vol.  51,  no.  11,  1996,  p.  
1153-­‐1166.  (essentially  a  summary  of  Pierce  and  Cameron  1994);  See  also  Cameron,  Judy  and  W.  
David  Pierce.  “Reinforcement,  Reward  and  Intrinsic  Motivation:  A  meta-­‐analysis”.  Review  of  
Educational  Research,  vol.  64,  no.  3,  1994,  p.  363-­‐423.  
354  Hineline,  Phillip  N.  “Extrinsic  Reinforcers,  Intrinsic  Reinforcers,  and  Awards”.  President’s  column,  

Division  25  Recorder,  vol.  30,  no.  2,  1995,  p.  1-­‐2.;  Skinner,  B.F.  Science  and  human  behavior.  New  
York:  MacMillan,  1953.  

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their   perspective   on   what   Jeremy   Bentham,   considered   to   be   the   founder   of  

modern   utilitarianism,   called   the   “principle   of   utility” 355 .     Bentham   explained  

saying,    

Nature   has   placed   mankind   under   the   governance   of   two   sovereign  

masters,   pain   and   pleasure.     It   is   for   them   alone   to   point   out   what   we  
ought   to   do,   as   well   as   to   determine   what   we   shall   do.   On   the   one  
hand   the   standards   of   right   and   wrong,   on   the   other   the   chain   causes  
and  effects,  are  fastened  to  their  throne.    They  govern  us  in  all  we  do,  
in  all  we  say,  in  all  we  think:  every  effort  we  can  make  to  throw  off  
our   subjection,   will   serve   but   to   demonstrate   and   confirm   it.     In  
words   a   man   may   pretend   to   abjure   their   empire:   but   in   reality   he  
will   remain   subject   to   it   all   the   while.     The   principle   of   utility  
recognizes  this  subjection,  and  assumes  it  for  the  foundation  of  that  
system,   the   object   of   which   is   to   rear   the   fabric   to   felicity   by   the  
hands   of   reason   and   of   law.     Systems   which   attempt   to   question   it,  
deal   in   sounds   instead   of   sense,   in   caprice   instead   of   reason,   in  
darkness  instead  of  light.356    
     
This  passage  is  important  for  our  purposes  for  three  main  reasons.    The  first  is  that  

the   environment   within   which   human   beings   live   is   a   powerful   variable   that  

influences   subject   behavior.     The   second   is   that   Bentham’s   principle   of   utility  

makes   assumptions   about   human   behavior   that   are   very   similar   to   those   found  

underlying  Fajia  thought.    As  a  result,  using  research  from  behavior  analysis  is  not  

arbitrary   in   the   least.     It   allows   us   to   analyze   the   experience   of   the   subject   of   the  

Fajia   state   with   greater   sophistication.   The   third   is   that   a   recognition   and  

accommodation   of   the   assumption   that   human   beings   pursue   that   which   gives  

them  pleasure  and  avoid  that  which  brings  them  pain  or  at  least  a  lack  of  pleasure  

should  be  the  foundation  of  any  system  with  a  form  of  human  organization.      

                                                                                                               
355  Bentham  2000:  14;  Bentham,  Jeremy.  An  Introduction  to  the  Principles  of  Morals  and  Legislation.  

Kitchener,  Ont.:  Batoche,  2000.  (originally  1781)  

356  Bentham  2000:  14;  his  emphasis  

  207  
 Additionally,   comparisons   between   Behavior   analysis   and   Fajia   thought  

have   already   been   made   in   contemporary   studies   of   Chinese   philosophy.     For  

instance,   Schwartz   described   Fajia   as   “the   behavioral   science”357,   and   continued  

saying   Fajia   has   “behaviorist” 358  assumptions   and   methods   that   could   be  

characterized  as  “legalistic  behaviorism”359.    Fu  stated,  “For  the  Legalists,  the  whole  

country   was   like   a   gigantic   Skinner   box,   and   human   subjects   were   but   pigeons  

whose   behavior   could   be   conditioned   into   the   desired   reflex   patterns.”360     As   for  

the  characteristics  he  viewed  as  “typical  of  the  Legalist  position  on  penal  law  and  

punishments”361,   Ames   asserted,   “The   ideal   is   a   conditioned   society   in   which   law   is  

universally  understood  and  followed  to  the  extent  that  litigations  cease  to  arise”362 .    

So,  this  chapter  will  not  only  expound  on  an  already  existing  comparison  within  the  

field   of   Chinese   philosophy,   but   it   will   also   use   the   conclusions   drawn   from  

Behavior   Analysis   research   in   order   to   assess   how   subject’s   might   experience  

Fajia’s  approach  to  governance,  especially  its  rewards.  

The  Development  of  Behavior  Analysis  

The   most   notable   behavior   analysts   include   Ivan   Petrovich   Pavlov   (1849-­‐

1936),   John   Broadus   Watson   (1878-­‐1958),   Edward   Lee   Thorndike   (1874-­‐1949),  

and  Burrhus  Fredrick  Skinner  (1904-­‐1990).    Pavlov,  perhaps  most  notably,  pointed  

out   that   reflexes,   a   behavior   caused   by   a   biologically   relevant   stimulus,   can   be  

                                                                                                               
357  Schwartz  1985:  321  
358  Schwartz  1985:  328  
359  Schwartz  1985:  329  
360  Fu  1996:  71  
361  Ames  1983:  131  
362  Ames  1983:  132  

  208  
conditioned.363  Inspired   by   Pavlov’s   contributions   through   an   emphasis   on   the  

conditioned  reflex,  John  Broadus  Watson,  focused  on  a  stimulus-­‐response  approach  

which  is  especially  attentive  to  the  conditions  (stimuli)  that  induce  responses.    He  

is   credited   with   developing   the   term   “behaviorism”,364  proclaiming   it   the   “only  

consistent  logical  functionalism”365.    As  opposed  to  psychology  of  the  mind  which  

would  use  unobservable  thoughts  and  feelings  as  scientific  data,  Watson  held  that  

behaviorism   could   scientifically   reveal   the   principles   that   guide   human   behavior.  

After   Watson,   Edward   Lee   Thorndike   focused   more   on   how   success   and   failure  

affected   behavior.     The   study   of   success   and   failure’s   influence   on   behavior   led  

Thorndike   to   coin   the   term   “trial-­‐and-­‐error   learning”   to   describe   what   behavior  

analysts   today   simply   refer   to   as   “learning”,   which   refers   to   the   acquisition,  

maintenance,   and   change   of   behavior.     Perhaps   even   more   importantly   though,  

Thorndike   was   the   first   scientist   to   introduce   the   law   of   effect,   which   states   that   all  

actions  on  an  environment  in  order  to  produce  an  effect  (operants)  are  followed  by  

consequences   that   increase   or   decrease   the   probability   of   the   repeated   actions   in  

the  same  situation  (reinforcement).366      

Although,   it   was   B.F.   Skinner   that   popularized   behavior   analysis.     He  

rejected   the   idea   that   thoughts   and   feelings   explain   behavior.     Rather   it   is   the  

                                                                                                               
363  See  Pavlov,  Ivan  Petrovich.  Conditioned  reflexes:  An  Investigation  of  the  Physiological  Activity  of  

the  Cerebral  Cortex.  G.V.  Anrep,  trans.  and  ed.  New  York:  Dover  Publications,  1960.  
364  See  Watson,  John  B.  “Psychology  as  the  Behaviorist  views  it”.  Psychological  Review,  vol.  101,  no.  2,  

1994,  p.  248-­‐253.  (a  reprint  from  Psychological  Review,  vol.  20,  1913,  158-­‐177.);  for  more  on  
Watson’s  position  on  behaviorism,  also  see  Watson,  John  B.  Behaviorism.  New  York:  W.W.  Norton  &  
Company,  Inc.,  1930.  
365  Watson  1913:  166  
366  For  a  generally  brief  but  longer  discussion  of  the  history  of  behavior  analysis  and  the  major  

scholarly  contributions,  see  Pierce,  W.  David  and  Carl  D.  Cheney,  ed.  “A  Science  of  Behavior:  
Perspective,  History,  and  Assumptions”,  in  Behavior  Analysis  and  Learning.  New  York:  Psychology  
Press,  2013,  p.  1-­‐25.  

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environment  that  causes  thoughts,  feelings,  and  behavior.    Skinner  concluded  that  

by  examining  the  relationship  between  environment  and  behavior,  principles  that  

guide   human   behavior   can   be   discovered.     Since   Skinner’s   early   work,   behavior  

analysis   has   extended   its   reach   to   contribute   to   scientific   explanations   of   culture,  

interpersonal   relationships,   organizational   management,   governance,   and   of  

course,  pedagogy.367      

Behavior  Analysis:  Evaluating  Punishment  

Behavior   analysis   insists   that   not   all   control   is   coercive.     In   other   words,  

“coercion   is   a   subcategory   of   control”368.   Behavior   analysis   divides   “controlling  

relations   between   conduct   and   consequences”   into   three   categories:   “positive  

reinforcement,   negative   reinforcement,   and   punishment”369.     Generally,   behavior  

analysis   considers   “control   by   positive   reinforcement”   to   be   “noncoercive”,   while  

“coercion   enters   the   picture   when   our   actions   are   controlled   by   negative  

reinforcement  or  punishment”.370    Murray  Sidman  thus  defined  coercion  as  the  “use  

of  punishment  and  the  threat  of  punishment  to  get  others  to  act  as  we  would  like,  

and   to   our   practice   of   rewarding   people   just   by   letting   them   escape   from   our  

punishments   and   threats.”371  Generally,   behavior   analysts   advocate   for   the   use   of  

                                                                                                               
367  Again,  see  Pierce  and  Cheney  2013:  1-­‐25.  
368  Sidman  2000:  32;  Sidman,  Murray.  Coercion  and  Its  Fallout  (revised  edition).  Boston:  Authors  

Cooperative,  Inc.,  2000.  

369  Sidman  2000:  36;  Though  it  should  be  noted  that  there  are  two  kinds  of  punishment:  positive  

and  negative.  
370  Sidman  2000:  36;  Sidman  also  adds,  “Freedom,  one  of  our  most  cherished  values,  has  no  qualities  

of  its  own;  just  as  we  would  have  no  need  for  the  concept  of  plenty  were  it  not  for  our  experience  of  
deprivation,  it  is  the  absence  of  coercion  that  gives  meaning  to  freedom.”  (Sidman  2000:  26)  
371  Sidman  2000:  1  

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positive   reinforcement   as   their   “principle   of   behavior   management” 372 ,   while  

discouraging  the  use  of  negative  reinforcement  and  punishment.  

Before  a  discussion  of  Fajia  rewards,  it  is  important  to  briefly  mention  some  

problems   associated   with   the   culture   of   punishment   that   is   coupled   with   the  

culture   of   rewards   in   most   Fajia   texts.   A   culture   of   punishment   alone   is   inadequate  

for   developmental   learning   for   a   few   reasons.     First,   punishments   are   generally  

unproductive   in   producing   new   behavior   because   they   are   designed   to   prevent  

undesirable  behavior  that  has  already  occurred  from  happening  again.    Due  to  its  

primary   concern   with   suppressing   undesirable   behavior,   punishments   are   at   best  

ambiguous   about   the   definition   of   desirable   behavior.   As   Sidman   put   it,   at   most,  

punishment   only   teaches   what   not   to   do. 373  Therefore,   punishments   are   also  

limited   forms   of   establishing   justice.     They   typically   ignore   why   undesirable  

behavior  occurs.    Though  the  reasons  why  a  punishment  is  meted  out  may  be  clear,  

if   the   punishment   ignores   why   the   punishable   offense   occurred,   it   is   left   to   the  

potential   punishees   to   prevent   the   conditions   or   circumstances   that   may   have  

caused   the   punishable   behavior   to   occur.     In   short,   punishments   transfer   some   of  

the  responsibility  to  establish  justice  to  the  potential  punishees  when  they  do  not  

have  the  power  to  apply  or  prevent  the  application  of  punishment.  

 Second,  a  corollary  to  the  first,  since  a  culture  of  punishment  focuses  on  the  

suppression  of  undesirable  behavior,  then  what  subjects  view  as  desirable  behavior  

could   become   synonymous   with   behavior   that   is   not   punishable.   In   other   words,   at  

most,   a   culture   of   punishment   defines   desirable   behavior   as   that   which   is   not  

                                                                                                               
372  Sidman  2000:  6  
373  Sidman  2000:  46  

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undesirable  behavior.    Behavior  that  is  not  punishable  can  be  conceptualized  in  at  

least  two  ways.    It  can  include  all  behavior  that  is  not  punishable  according  to  the  

ruler’s   laws,   or   all   behavior   a   subject   believes   will   not   result   in   punishment.     The  

first   of   these   is   self-­‐explanatory,   but   the   second   requires   more   explanation.     The  

second   refers   to   punishable   behavior,   as   defined   by   the   ruler’s   laws,   that   is   not  

likely   to   be   discovered.     This   kind   of   behavior   is   actually   encouraged   by   cultures   of  

punishment,  creating  a  self-­‐fulfilling  prophesy  of  the  ruler’s  laws.    

This   self-­‐fulfilling   prophecy   begins   with   the   ruler’s   laws   justifying   or  

rationalizing   themselves   and   their   punishments   with   particular   assumptions   about  

human  nature,  expressed  at  length  in  “An  Order  to  Cultivate  Waste  Lands”  and  “The  

Calculation   of   Land”   in   the   Book  of  Lord  Shang.     Then,   the   culture   of   punishment  

causes   all   subjects   primarily   to   seek   to   evade   punishment.     Yet   since   subjects   are  

primarily   concerned   with   evading   punishment,   they   may   come   to   believe   that  

desirable   behavior,   or   at   least   tolerated   behavior,   is   that   which   goes   unpunished.    

This   may   encourage   certain   punishable   behaviors   because   if   subjects   feel   there   is   a  

very  low  probability  of  being  punished,  even  for  certain  punishable  behaviors,  they  

may  be  inclined  to  engage  in  such  activity,  especially  if  it  enhances  their  ability  to  

survive.    This  in  turn,  serves  as  evidence  that  the  assumptions  made  by  the  ruler’s  

laws   about   human   nature   are   correct,   further   justifying   the   need   for   a   culture   of  

punishment.      

The   Book   of   Lord   Shang   portrays   the   ruler’s   subjects   as   being   primarily  

motivated   by   the   obtainment   of   private   profit.     Even   more   specifically,   it  

characterizes  the  subjects  as  not  being  concerned  with  acting  or  behaving  in  ways  

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that   will   contribute   to   the   state’s   needs.     The   implied   assumptions   made   about  

human  behavior  suggest  that  the  subjects  are  incapable  of  concerning  themselves  

with   the   public   welfare   above   private   profit.     A   culture   of   punishment   reinforces  

concern   for   personal   survival   and   even   enhances   the   urgency   to   secure   private  

welfare   because   subjects   must   primarily   concern   themselves   with   avoiding  

punishment,   actually   detracting   from   the   development   of   concern   for   the   public  

welfare.     This   is   likely   the   concern   the   Master   expressed   in   the   Analects:   “The  

Master   said:   ‘Guide   them   by   edicts,   keep   them   in   line   with   punishments,   and   the  

common   people   will   stay   out   of   trouble   but   will   have   no   sense   of   shame.     Guide  

them   by   virtue,   keep   them   in   line   with   the   rites,   and   they   will,   besides   having   a  

sense   of   shame,   reform   themselves.’”374     The   Analects   makes   a   keen   observation  

when  it  describes  the  cause  of  having  no  sense  of  shame  as  a  potential  consequence  

of  a  culture  of  punishment.      

Third,  one  of  the  more  powerful  messages  of  a  culture  of  punishment  is  that  

exercising   power   or   force   is   how   an   individual   or   group   should   reach   solutions  

resolve  conflict.    The  coercive  quality  of  punishment  produces  a  power-­‐based  logic.  

“Policies”   notes   that   if   the   ruler   properly   establishes   law   in   his   state,   then   his  

subjects  “will  dare  not  fight  each  other  upon  presentation  of  large  rewards”  縣重賞

而民不敢爭.     Again,   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang   alludes   to   the   tendency   to   settle  

ownership   or   distribution   of   large   rewards   through   the   exertion   of   physical   and  

military  power  between  individuals  or  groups  who  have  been  presented  a  reward.    

                                                                                                               
374  Lau  1992:  83;  子曰：道之以政，齊之以刑，民免而無恥；道之以德，齊之以禮，有恥且格。

(Lau  and  Chen  1995:  2/2/29-­‐30)  

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An   important   question   to   ask   is:   if   the   subjects   in   the   above   passage   earned  

rewards,  why  would  they  be  so  combative  towards  each  other?    What  can  explain  

how  Fajia  rewards  could  possibly  fail  to  provide  the  non-­‐combative  channel  within  

which   the   ruler’s   subjects   can   both   obtain   private   profit   and   contribute   to   the  

overall   welfare   of   the   state?     These   questions   can   be   answered   through   closer  

examination  of  Fajia  rewards.  

Rewards  in  Behavior  Analysis  

Though   behavior   analysts   tend   to   strongly   support   the   use   of   positive  

reinforcement,   they   do   not   unconditionally   advocate   its   use.375     Some   uses   of  

positive   reinforcement   can   still   be   coercive.     Sidman   described   positive  

reinforcement  as  “the  practice  of  rewarding  people  not  by  letting  them  escape  from  

or   avoid   punishment   but   by   letting   them   produce   something   good.” 376     So   if  

rewards   are   closely   associated   with   punishment   or   negative   reinforcement,   then  

this  form  of  behavior  management  can  still  be  coercive.    The  mode  of  Fajia  rewards  

fit  this  description.  

First,   Fajia   rewards   appear   to   act   as   reinforcement   traps.     A   positive  

reinforcement   trap   occurs   when   “people   sacrifice   long-­‐term   welfare   for   short-­‐term  

gain”377.    For  instance,  smoking  cigarettes  can  be  considered  a  reinforcement  trap.  

In  the  short-­‐term,  to  some  people  it  offers  a  consistently  pleasurable  physiological  

experience.     However,   over   the   long-­‐term,   it   can   have   serious   deleterious   effects   to  

                                                                                                               
375  Balsam,  Peter  D.  and  Andrew  S.  Bondy.  “The  Negative  Side  Effects  of  Reward”.  Journal  of  Applied  

Behavior  Analysis,  vol.  16,  no.  3,  1983,  p.  283-­‐296.  

376  Sidman  2000:  6
377  Baum  2005:  190;  Baum,  William  M.  Understanding  Behaviorism:  Behavior,  Culture,  and  Evolution  

(second  edition).  Oxford:  Blackwell  Publishing,  2005.  

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one’s   health.     Moreover,   it   is   a   reinforcement   trap   because   it   is   addictive,   not  

allowing   the   individual   who   smokes   to   quit   easily.     If   he/she   were   to   run   out   of  

cigarettes,  this  may  cause  dismay  or  physiological  discomfort,  which  demonstrates  

the  immense  control  of  the  positive  reinforcement  of  smoking  a  cigarette  and  the  

lack  of  freedom  or  choice  that  actually  occurs  when  an  individual  smokes  them.  

However,  it  should  be  mentioned  that  positive  reinforcement  traps  occur  in  

any   instance   in   which   positive   reinforcement   causes   individuals   to   feel   as   though  

they   lack   freedom   to   choose   not   to   engage   in   the   action   that   could   potentially   yield  

them   the   positive   reinforcement.     In   the   case   of   Fajia   texts,   rewards   act   as   bonuses  

only   being   rewarded   to   those   who   perform   extraordinarily   in   agriculture   or  

warfare.    However,  the  potential  of  achieving  wealth  and  status  that  the  obtainment  

of   a   reward   provides   may   cause   those   among   the   ruler’s   subjects   who   have  

interests   outside   of   agriculture   and   war   to   feel   as   though   they   do   not   have   the  

freedom  to  engage  in  such  activities.    They  may  feel  as  though  the  activities  outside  

of   agriculture   and   warfare,   or   as   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang   refers   to   them   “outside  

endeavors”   waijiao   外交,   have   little   value   and   threaten   their   survival   in   the   “rat  

race”   or   even   their   literal   survival.     So,   to   some   subjects   “outside   endeavors”   will  

not   appear   to   be   practical   channels   for   the   pursuit   of   profit   or   overall   welfare.    

Indeed,   “outside   endeavors”   come   to   represent   punishment   themselves.     This   is  

because   they   represent   a   (relative)   deprivation   that   is   a   threat   to   survival.     As  

Sidman   put   it,   “Deprivation   of   the   opportunity   to   work   for”   positive   reinforcers  

“turns   out,   like   shock,   to   be   an   effective   punishment”. 378     That   is,   the  

                                                                                                               
378  Sidman  2000:  87  

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“unavailability”   of   positive   reinforcers   acts   as   a   “negative   reinforcer   and  

punisher”.379  

Another  way  Fajia  positive  reinforcement  acts  coercively  is  when  it  not  only  

represents  a  path  of  opportunity  to  obtain  reward,  but  it  simultaneously  represents  

an   escape   route   from   the   (relative)   deprivation,   after   experiencing   its   negative  

reinforcement.   Fajia   laws,   contingently   reinforced   by   rewards,   impose   the  

following   scenario   on   the   subject:   perform   well   within   specific   pursuits   or   risk  

(relative)  deprivation.    Thus,  rewards  create  channels  that  positively  reinforce  the  

subjects’  pursuit  of  private  profit,  but  they  also  negatively  reinforce  the  pursuit  of  

private   profit   outside   those   channels   through   the   imposition   of   (relative)  

deprivation.    So  in  short,  rewards  act  as  positive  reinforcement  and  also  facilitate  

negative  reinforcement.      

Rewards   are   reinforcements   because   they   strengthen   and   maintain   the  

subjects’   pursuit   of   private   profit   within   encouraged   occupations   (the   activity).    

The   relationship   between   the   subjects   pursuing   private   profit   in   accordance   with  

state-­‐constructed  channels  and  rewards  is  positive  because  it  makes  obtainment  of  

rewards   (the   reinforcement)   more   likely.   It   can   also   be   said   that   (relative)  

deprivation,   the   direct   consequence   of   the   subjects   not   pursuing   private   profit  

occupations   favored   by   the   state,   acts   as   negative   reinforcement.     It   supports   the  

maintenance   of   the   activity   or   even   causes   it   to   be   more   likely.     Also,   the  

relationship  between  (relative)  deprivation  and  the  activity  is  negative  because  the  

activity  makes  the  reinforcement  less  likely.      

                                                                                                               
379  Sidman  2000:  87  

  216  
 The  Book  of  Lord  Shang  is  arguably  the  most  coercive  because,  in  addition  to  

its   laws   and   rewards   creating   negative   reinforcement   when   subjects   pursue  

outside   endeavors,   it   calls   for   advocates   imposing   positive   punishment,   or   the  

production   of   an   event   that   causes   a   decrease   of   the   behavior   to   which   it  

corresponds,  on  subjects  who  pursue  personal  wealth  outside  of  the  state’s  areas  of  

priority.    Without  using  the  character  for  punishment  xing  刑,  recall  how  “An  Order  

to  Cultivate  Waste  Lands”  describes  how  a  ruler  should  raise  the  prices  and  taxes  of  

wine   and   meat.     The   expected   result   was   that   merchants,   who   are   pursuing   private  

profit   outside   of   ruler   approved   channels,   are   unable   to   obtain   enough   profit   to  

sustain  themselves,  which  would  cause  them  to  engage  in  agriculture.380     So,  in  the  

Book   of   Lord   Shang   and   arguably   in   other   Fajia   texts,   rewards   facilitate   both  

negative   reinforcement   and   positive   punishment.     Interestingly,   this   particular  

form  of  positive  punishment  is  not  even  formal  state  punishment,  represented  by  

the   character   xing   刑.     In   essence,   positive   punishment   is   the   creation   of   policies  

that  exacerbate  the  relative  deprivation  already  experienced  by  subjects  who  seek  

to   enrich   themselves   away   from   the   state’s   encouraged   pursuits.     In   short,   this  

positive  punishment  compounds  the  inevitable  negative  reinforcement.    

Although   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang   is   particularly   extreme   in   this   regard,   it  

does  suggest  that  if  a  subject  chose  not  to  pursue  wealth  in  farming  or  warfare,  they  

would   necessarily   experience   (relative)   deprivation   of   the   opportunity   to   obtain  

profit   and/or   fame.   Thus,   even   though   there   is   no   use   of   the   character   xing   刑   or  

                                                                                                               
380
貴酒肉之價，重其租，令十倍其樸，然則商賈少，農不能喜酣奭，大臣不為荒飽。商賈少，則
上不費粟。民不能（善）「喜」酣奭，則農不慢。大臣不荒，則國事不稽，主無過舉。上不費粟
，民不慢農，則草必墾矣。(Gao  2011:  37)  

  217  
any   other   character   that   refers   to   punishment   as   a   separate   entity   from   reward,  

just   as   Herrlee   Creel   speculated   there   may   not   be   in   the   “Shen   Buhai   Fragments”,   if  

subjects  do  not  satisfy  the  demands  and  expectations  of  the  ruler’s  laws,  they  will  

experience   (relative)   deprivation   as   a   direct   consequence.     So,   in   its   similar  

advocacy   of   rewards   to   other   Fajia   texts,   the   “Shen   Buhai   Fragments”   appear   to  

advocate   a   form   of   positive   reinforcement   that   also   acts   as   an   escape   route   from  

negative   reinforcement.     The   behavior   analyst   would   consider   this   fundamentally  

coercive.   Sidman   explained,   “Negative   reinforcement   generates   escape.     When   we  

encounter   a   negative   reinforcer,   we   do   whatever   we   can   do   to   turn   it   off,   to   get  

away   from   it.     If   we   encounter   it   again,   we   will   do   what   worked   before.     Also,  

negative  reinforcers  can  be  used  as  punishers.    One  way  to  punish  people  is  to  hit  

them  with  negative  reinforcers  as  a  consequence  of  something  they  have  done.”381  

The  escape  or  avoidance  of  negative  reinforcement  will  force  the  ruler’s  subjects  to  

do  things  that  they  would  not  otherwise  do.    Thus,  Fajia  rewards  generally  spring  

from  the  same  psychological  mission  as  punishment:  forcing  all  behavior  the  ruler  

does  not  consider  contributive  to  the  enrichment  and  strengthening  of  the  state  to  

be   less   likely.     Foucault   argued   a   similar   point   when   he   described   the   role   of  

rewards,   especially   when   used   to   inform   ranks   or   grades,   stating:   “The   distribution  

according   to   ranks   or   grade   has   a   double   role:   it   marks   the   gaps,   hierarchizes  

qualities,   skills   and   aptitudes;   but   it   also   punishes   and   rewards.     It   is   the   penal  

functioning   of   setting   in   order   and   the   ordinal   character   of   judging.     Discipline  

rewards   simply   by   the   play   of   awards,   thus   making   it   possible   to   attain   higher  

                                                                                                               
381  Sidman  2000:  93  

  218  
ranks  and  places;  it  punishes  by  reversing  this  process.    Rank  in  itself  serves  as  a  

reward   or   punishment”.382     Therefore,   Schwartz   and   others   were   correct   in   their  

inclination  to  claim  that  Fajia  texts  distinguish  themselves  by  their  use  of  coercion  

as   a   political   method.     However,   they   failed   to   precisely   identify   the   most  

distinguishing  source:  Fajia’s  system  of  rewards,  which  included  its  own  culture  of  

punishment.  

Escape   has   its   own   negative   side   effects   as   well.   As   previously   noted,  

behavior  analysts  generally  admit  that  punishments  do  not  teach  or  condition  new  

behavior.    Rather,  they  can  eliminate  undesirable  behavior.    For  instance,  one  study  

found   that   when   birds   received   an   abrupt   shock   (as   punishment),   even   at   a  

moderate   level   of   intensity,   the   behavior   that   was   punished   was   permanently  

suppressed.383     Sidman   added   that   the   “deprivation   of   opportunities   to   achieve  

positive   reinforcers   is   equivalent   to   unavoidable   shock”384.     So,   since   “negative  

reinforcement   generates   escape”,   this   will   create   behavior   problems   associated  

with   escape,   the   side   effect   of   negative   reinforcement   facilitated   by   rewards,   that  

would  affect  the  ruler’s  subjects’  pursuit  of  private  profit  even  in  the  ways  the  state  

prefers.    Escape  causes  coerced  subjects  to  “live  a  life  of  quiet  desperation”  where  

their   “sole   criterion   of   success”   is   their   “effectiveness   in   reducing   the   amount   of  

shock”  they  receive.385     In  other  words,  the  coercion  of  the  negative  reinforcement  

or  positive  punishment  that  is  so  closely  associated  with  Fajia  rewards  is  likely  to  

                                                                                                               
382  Foucault  1977:  181  
383  Azrin,  Nathan  H.,  William  C.  Holz,  and  Don  F.  Hake.  “Fixed-­‐ratio  Punishment”.  Journal  of  the  

Experimental  Analysis  of  Behavior,  vol.  6,  no.  2,  1963,  p.  141-­‐148.  
384  Sidman  2000:  250  
385  Sidman  2000:  95  

  219  
hinder   the   ruler’s   subjects’   motivation   to   pursue   private   profit   inside   the   pathways  

with  the  largest  potential  reward.  They  will  mainly  focus  on  successful  escape  from  

negative  reinforcement.  

For  instance,  consider  a  farmer  who  chooses  to  pursue  private  profit  outside  

of   the   channels   rewarded   by   the   state.     This   subject   will   experience   unavoidable  

shock  on  at  least  two  levels.    Given  the  assumptions  of  Fajia  human  behavior,  over  

time,  the  farmer  will  inevitably  experience  a  shock  through  the  relative  deprivation  

he  will  experience  when  he  notices  that  the  amount  of  private  profit  he  is  able  to  

obtain   is   significantly   limited   relative   to   his   fellow   subjects   that   are   pursuing  

private   profit   in   the   state’s   favored   occupations.     Moreover,   he   will   experience  

unavoidable   shock   through   positive   punishment   because   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang  

proposes   that   the   ruler   actively   create   policies   that   further   intensify   the   relative  

deprivation  a  subject  pursuing  private  wealth  outside  of  encouraged  channels  may  

experience.    Although  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang  may  be  correct  to  assume  that  such  

unavoidable   shocks   will   prevent   the   farmer   from   pursuing   wealth   outside   of   the  

state’s   preferred   means,   it   and   other   Fajia   texts   arguably   make   fallacious  

assumptions  about  how  the  famer  will  react  to  the  experience  of  shock.  

 Instead   of   devoting   the   bulk   of   his   efforts   to   obtaining   private   profit  

through   an   area   of   priority   for   the   state,   the   farmer   may   devote   the   bulk   of   his  

efforts   to   not   experiencing   shock   again.     When   this   is   the   case,   it   undermines   the  

Fajia   ideal   of   an   institution-­‐facilitated   meritocratic   competition   because   the   farmer  

will   not   be   devoting   himself   to   “winning”   more   private   wealth.     The   farmer   will   not  

concern   himself   with   being   as   competitive   as   possible.     This   means   that   the   farmer  

  220  
would   be   far   less   motivated   to   concentrate   on   maximizing   his   agricultural  

production.     So   this   phenomenon   would   diminish   the   Fajia   state’s   overall   wealth  

because  subjects  who  experience  shock  may  not  attempt  to  maximize  their  output  

upon   returning   to   pursuing   private   profit   in   accordance   with   state-­‐constructed  

pathways,   making   the   structural   shocks   counterproductive   to   the   ultimate  

objective  of  maximizing  state  wealth  (and  strength).    

Second,  escape  will  cause  the  ruler’s  subjects  to  generally  live  very  narrow  

existences.     In   other   words,   since   their   attention   will   be   so   focused   on   escaping  

punishment,  they  will  also  be  hesitant  to  explore  their  environment,  to  ensure  the  

minimization  of  potential  “shocks”.    This  may  seem  like  this  is  precisely  what  Fajia  

thinkers  would  like  to  happen.    For  instance,  the  Book   of   Lord   Shang   even  went  so  

far  as  to  ensure  that  the  ruler’s  subjects  be  ignorant  yu  愚  of  all  that  is  associated  

with   outside   endeavors   waijiao   外交.     Yet,   this   would   be   harmful   to   the   ultimate  

goals   expressed   in   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang,   and   by   extension   other   Fajia   texts,  

because   it   would   hinder   innovation.     Though   the   Fajia   notion   of   law   seeks   to  

provide   limitations   on   its   subjects’   behavior,   it   is   believed   that   limitations   will  

enhance   their   productivity,   making   the   state   richer   and   stronger.     However,  

innovation   is   a   key   component   of   the   increase   in   agricultural   production   and  

success   in   military   affairs.     According   to   the   behavior   analyst,   positive  

reinforcement   that   does   not   facilitate   coercive   negative   reinforcement   would  

actually   encourage   innovation   because   the   ruler’s   subjects   would   be   able   to   “take  

  221  
advantage   of   other   reinforcers   that   might   become   available   and   of   new  

opportunities  for  learning  that  may  arise”386.      

Third,   environments   within   which   individuals   experience   negative  

reinforcement  “become  negative  reinforcers  themselves”387.    In  the  case  of  Fajia,  if  

the   entire   state   is   viewed   as   a   coercive   environment,   then   at   best   subjects   will  

perform  the  minimal  amount  necessary  to  avoid  negative  reinforcement  or  positive  

punishment  within  the  encouraged  pursuits.    At  worst,  subjects  will  either  seek  to  

leave   the   state   and   migrate   to   another,   if   possible,   or   become   increasingly  

aggressive.     Sidman   stated   “coercion   breeds   coercion” 388  and   negative  

reinforcement  or  punishment  leads  to  the  pervasiveness  of  aggression.  One  study  

found   that   when   two   rats   are   in   the   same   environment   in   which   they   experience  

painful  shocks,  this  causes  reflexive  aggression,  resulting  in  the  two  rats  attacking  

each   other. 389     Other   studies   have   found   a   similar   phenomenon   in   human  

behavior390,  while  others  have  found  that  this  aggression  occurs  even  with  the  use  

of   different   stimuli391.     Therefore,   the   coercive   quality   of   the   Fajia   concept   of   law   is  

also  likely  to  breed  aggression  among  subjects.    This  perhaps  explains  the  concern  

expressed  in  the  Book   of   Lord   Shang,  in  “Method  of  Warfare”,  when  it  defined  true  

kingship  as  having  political  victory  in  which  “the  people  do  not  fight  one  another”  

其民不爭  and  “villages  shy  away  from  battles  between  cities”  怯於邑鬥.      
                                                                                                               
386  Sidman  2000:  95  
387  Sidman  2000:  97  
388  Sidman  2000:  209  
389  Ulrich,  Roger  E.  and  Nathan  H.  Azrin.  “Reflexive  Fighting  in  Response  to  Aversive  Stimulation”.  

Journal  of  the  Experimental  Analysis  of  Behavior,  vol.  5,  no.  4,  1962,  p.  511-­‐520.  
390  Hutchinson,  Ronald  R.  “By-­‐products  of  Aversive  Control”,  in  Werner  K.  Honig  and  John  E.R.  

Staddon,  eds.  Handbook  of  Operant  Behavior.  Englewood  Cliffs,  NJ:  Prentice-­‐Hall,  1977,  p.  415-­‐431.  
391  Azrin,  Nathan  H.,  Don  F.  Hake,  Ronald  R.  Hutchinson.  “Elicitation  of  Aggression  by  a  Physical  

Blow”.  Journal  of  the  Experimental  Analysis  of  Behavior,  vol.  8,  no.1,  1965,  p.  55-­‐57.  

  222  
 It  should  also  be  noted  that  the  effects  of  aggression,  produced  by  coercion,  

are   not   limited   to   reflexive   aggression.     Coercion   additionally   breeds   operant  

aggression,   a   response   mainly   produced   by   negative   reinforcement.     This   occurs  

when,   in   response   to   negative   reinforcement,   a   subject   aggressively   retaliates  

against   their   punisher,   seeking   to   alleviate   the   coercion   in   their   environment   by  

eliminating  the  person  responsible  for  producing  the  coercion.392     In  addition,  like  

the   phenomenon   of   coercion   breeding   coercion,   aggression   generally   breeds  

aggression.     One   study   found   that   most   people   will   respond   to   physical   attack   with  

an   even   stronger   counterattack.393     Even   verbal   attacks   can   provoke   escalating  

physical  counterattacks.394  

Interestingly,   this   discussion   only   describes   the   problems   that   can   arise  

from  subjects  attempting  to  escape.  Escape  only  occurs  when  a  negative  reinforcer  

or   punisher   has   been   experienced,   though   it   should   be   clear   its   effects   can   be  

pervasive   and   are   not   limited   to   those   who   directly   experience   it.     The   coercive  

quality   of   negative   reinforcement   and   punishment   also   produce   avoidance:   the  

perpetual   effort   to   stay   away   from   any   situation   that   may   cause   them   to   be  

subjected   to   coercion.     Similar   to   one   of   the   effects   of   escape,   avoidance   of   negative  

reinforcement   or   punishment   causes   subjects   to   live   extremely   safe   but   narrow  

existences.    However,  unlike  the  phenomenon  of  escape,  this  kind  of  behavior  will  

not   just   characterize   those   who   have   experienced   deprivation   or   punishment   but  

                                                                                                               
392  See  Azrin,  Nathan  H.  and  William  C.  Holz.  “Punishment”,  in  Werner  K.  Honig,  ed.  Operant  

Behavior:  Areas  of  Research  and  Application.  New  York:  Appleton-­‐Century-­‐Crofts,  1966,  p.  380-­‐447.  
393  Borden,  Richard  J.,  Ray  Bowen,  &  Stuart  P.  Taylor.  “Shock  Setting  Behavior  as  a  Function  of  

Physical  Attack  and  Extrinsic  Reward”.  Perceptual  and  Motor  Skills,  vol.  33,  no.  2,  1971,  p.  563-­‐568.  
394  Geen,  Russell  G.  “Effects  of  Frustration,  Attack,  and  Prior  Training  in  Aggressiveness  upon  

Aggressive  Behavior”.  Journal  of  Personality  and  Social  Psychology,  vol.  9,  no.  4,  1968,  p.  316-­‐321.  

  223  
also  those  who  have  never  even  experienced  them.    This  would  even  include  those  

who   actually   do   accumulate   extraordinary   amounts   of   merit   and   rewards.     The  

Fajia   notion   of   law   is   likely   to   cause   them   to   mainly   learn   the   art   of   avoidance.    

They  learn  exactly  what  they  need  to  do  to  be  predictably  safe  while  never  learning  

to  explore  other  opportunities  of  learning  and  development,  even  those  that  could  

increase   their   performance   within   Fajia’s   institution-­‐facilitated   meritocratic  

competition.     As   Sidman   put   it,   “Productivity   becomes   secondary   to   safety.”395    

“People  hemmed  in”  to  this  kind  of  coercion  “only  learn  to  survive”.396     That  which  

is   innovative   and   constructive   to   the   individual   subject’s   life   but   also   the  

strengthening  and  enriching  for  the  state  will  likely  be  viewed  as  similarly  heretical  

as   punishable   behavior.     Therefore,   the   Fajia   notion   of   law   is   likely   to   discourage  

innovation,   fail   to   maximize   agricultural   production,   military   prowess,   and   any  

other  kind  of  performance.397  

Additionally,   avoidance   is   actually   a   very   weak   form   of   learning.     Sidman  

said,  “…the  very  success  of  avoidance  guarantees  that  it  will  eventually  weaken  and  

cease.    It  takes  punishment  to  get  us  avoiding  in  the  first  place,  and  later,  it  takes  an  

occasional  lapse,  with  a  resumption  of  punishment,  to  keep  avoidance  going.    This  

built-­‐in   seed   of   its   own   destruction   has   been   called   the   avoidance   paradox.”398  So  

though   subjects   may   initially   learn   to   avoid   certain   behaviors   that   could   bring  

about  negative  reinforcement  or  punishment,  it  can  only  become  stronger  or  more  
                                                                                                               
395  Sidman  2000:  137    
396  Sidman  2000:  137  
397  As  the  Xunzi  and  other  texts  admit,  the  state  of  Qin  did  achieve  a  notable  degree  of  success,  

especially  in  warfare,  for  centuries.  However,  the  aforementioned  evidence  suggests  that  Qin’s  
success  could  have  been  even  greater  had  it  figured  out  a  way  to  effectively  mobilize  its  state  for  
warfare  in  a  less  coercive  way.  
398  Sidman  2000:  145  

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powerful   with   the   experience   of   more   coercion.     In   short,   avoidance   needs   to   fail  

occasionally  to  justify  itself.    Sidman  elaborated  saying,  “If  the  only  reason  a  student  

studies   is   to   keep   from   failing,   an   occasional   failure   or   near-­‐failure   will   be  

necessary  to  keep  the  studying  going.”399  Moreover,  since  avoidance  is  initially  an  

effect   of   the   awareness   of,   not   yet   the   experience   of,   coercion,   then   coercion  

actually   justifies   itself   as   well.     Coercion   is   necessary   to   both   create   the  

phenomenon  of  avoidance  and  it  is  necessary  to  perpetuate  it.      

Finally,   and   perhaps   most   interestingly,   behavior   analysts   argue   that  

avoidance  can  be  the  root  cause  of  superstitions,  instances  where  a  subject  falsely  

believes  that  performing  certain  behaviors  will  yield  their  desired  outcomes.  Since  

successful   avoidance   often   times   does   not   bring   about   an   immediate   effect,   a  

subject   can   often   become   uncertain   about   which   behaviors   help   them   avoid  

coercion.     Therefore,   due   to   the   inability   to   properly   differentiate   between  

behaviors   that   bring   about   negative   reinforcement   or   punishment   and   those   that  

do   not   and   seeking   to   avoid   subjecting   themselves   to   coercion   (their   desired  

outcome),   a   subject   may   well   do   everything   they   think   will   avoid   coercion.     This  

ends  up  creating  superstitions  that  can  continuously  build  on  each  other,  resulting  

in   a   pervasive   culture   of   superstition,   which   would   certainly   interfere   with   the  

objectives  of  Fajia’s  notion  of  law:  concentrating  authority  at  the  top  of  government  

bureaucracy,   eliminating   all   other   competition   for   the   influence   of   the   ruler’s  

subjects’  behavior.      

                                                                                                               
399  Sidman  2000:  145  

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 On   top   of   the   effects   of   escape   and   avoidance,   behavior   analysis   would  

consider   the   Fajia   system   of   rewards   (positive   reinforcement)   coercive   because  

undesirable  behavior  results  in  the  withholding  positive  reinforcement  previously  

bestowed.     For   instance,   in   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang,   “Within   the   Borders”   states,  

“For   criminal   cases   before   the   law,   those   of   higher   rank   investigate   and   examine  

the   merit   [good   and   bad]   of   those   of   lower   ranks.     If   a   man   of   high   rank   is   removed  

from  his  office,  then  he  cannot  be  given  as  a  slave  to  men  of  rank.    If  those  holding  a  

second  rank  or  higher  are  found  to  have  committed  a  punishable  offense,  then  they  

are   demoted.     If   those   holding   a   rank   of   the   first   degree   or   lower   are   found   to   have  

committed  a  punishable  offense,  their  rank  is  nullified.”400     This  passage  stipulates  

that   the   use   of   positive   reinforcement   involves   the   removal   of   it   in   any   case   in  

which   infractions   are   committed.     This   is   a   “misuse   of   deprivation”,   a   kind   of  

deprivation  that  does  not  enhance  positive  reinforcement,  that  Sidman  considered  

“completely  coercive”.401     If  such  a  technique  of  positive  reinforcement  is  adopted,  

then   it   makes   the   aforementioned   problems   of   escape   and   avoidance   even   more  

acute.     The   rewards,   rank   and   emoluments,   cease   to   be   positive   reinforcements  

because   their   possession   is   transient   and   can   at   any   time   turn   into   negative  

punishers.     Additionally,   possessing   them   is   contingent   upon   successful   escape   or  

avoidance   from   that   negative   punishment.     The   taking   away   of   rank   (and   therefore  

                                                                                                               
400  其獄法，高爵訾下爵級。高爵能，無給有爵人隸僕。爵自二級以上，有刑罪則貶。爵自一級以

下，有刑罪則已。小（失）「夫」死，以上至大夫，其官級一等，其墓樹級一樹。(Gao  2011:  
161-­‐162)  This  is  not  to  imply  that  demotion  should  never  occur  under  any  circumstance.    Rather,  
demotions  should  not  be  so  frequent  and/or  severe  to  where  the  achievement  of  higher  rank  is  
transient,  without  any  reasonable  amount  of  security.    If  these  conditions  do  exist,  then  rewards  
come  to  represent  little  more  than  a  delay  before  an  inevitable  punishment.    Seen  only  as  detours  
before  a  dreaded  destination,  rewards  or  promotions  will  fail  to  motivate  subjects.
401  Sidman  2000:  256  

  226  
emolument)   is   a   form   of   negative   punishment   because   it   removes   an   appetitive  

stimulus,  designed  to  suppress,  or  make  less  likely,  behavior  the  ruler  classifies  as  

undesirable   or   a   punishable   offense.     This   is   particularly   important   because   the  

passage  does  not  use  the  character  for  punishment  xing  刑.    So  again,  the  absence  of  

a   specific   character   to   refer   to   punishment   does   not   mean   various   forms   of  

coercion,  in  this  case  negative  punishment,  are  not  advocated.  

Conclusion  

Behavior   analysis   research   further   supports   the   conclusions   drawn   from  

this   study’s   textual   analysis   of   Fajia   texts.     This   chapter   has   shown   that   Fajia  

rewards,  not  just  their  punishments,  can  be  considered  coercive  because  they  act  as  

reinforcement   traps,   escape   routes   from   negative   reinforcement,   and   shelters   of  

avoidance.     This   also   reveals   that   Creel   failed   to   seriously   engage   with   the  

psychological   ramifications   of   the   rewards   system   in   the   “Shen   Buhai   fragments”.    

Lewis’s  assertions  also  support  the  conclusion  that  Fajia  rewards  are  coercive.    He  

claimed   that   there   were   at   least   four   uses   of   sanctioned   violence   found   in   early  

China,  two  of  which  were:  “violence  as  compelling  force,  as  the  decisive  element  of  

the   political   order”   and   “violence   as   a   definer   and   creator   of   social   groupings”.402    

This   study   argues   that   the   Fajia   notion   of   law   was   the   vessel   through   which   the  

ruler   could   systematically   impose   both   of   those   kinds   of   sanctioned   violence.     Even  

more   specifically,   it   could   be   argued   that   the   Book  of  Lord  Shang   and   other   Fajia  

texts   viewed   the   use   of   punishments   (those   expressed   by   the   character   xing   刑   and  

others   that   were   by-­‐products   of   coercion)   as   the   ruler’s   method   to   impose  

                                                                                                               
402  Lewis  1990:  1  

  227  
compelling   force,   while   the   use   of   rewards   served   as   his   way   of   creating   social  

groupings  and  state  hierarchy.      

However,  to  limit  our  conclusions  about  Fajia’s  approach  to  governance  to  a  

simple   disapproval   of   its   coercive   quality   would   be   unfair.     Indeed,   Fajia   thought  

has   forth   several   ideas   worth   revisiting   for   fresh   perspectives   on   contemporary  

problems.    Excess  aside,  the  Fajia  meritocratic  vision  did  identify  the  advantages  of  

an   egalitarian   standardization.   Institutional   standardization   allowed   the   ruler   to  

govern   and   influence   growing   populations   easier,   quantify   and   track   merit   and  

developmental   progress   respectively,   and   evaluate   state   matters   with   less  

subjective   and   potentially   fallacious   judgment.   Although   it   underappreciated   the  

value  of  a  cooperative  society,  it  nevertheless  pointed  out  that  competition  can  and  

should   play   an   important   role   in   the   development   of   a   state   and   its   society.   Still,  

this  study  argues  that  the  remarkable  aspect  of  Fajia  thought  is  its  key  discovery  of  

how   culture   can   be   created   and   maintained   in   the   new,   large   organized   political  

communities  guo  國  that  needed  to  be  mobilized  for  warfare.    Indeed,  as  the  next  

chapter  will  show,  the  Rujia  tradition  also  recognized  the  immense  value  of  this  key  

Fajia  discovery.  

 
   

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 Chapter  VIII  
 
The  Fajia-­‐ification  of  the  Rujia  Political  Vision    
 
There  has  been  discussion  of  the  phenomenon  called  the  “Confucianization  

of   the   law”403,   first   introduced   by   Ch’ü   T’ung-­‐tsu.     Ch’ü’s   use   of   the   term   can   be  

characterized   as   including   two   main   tenets   pointed   out   by   Paul   Goldin:   “(I)   the  

purpose  of  law  is  moral  instruction;  and  (2)  the  textual  foundation  of  law  must  be  

the  Confucian  canons  (which  hence  override  any  conceivable  statute  of  decree).”404    

Goldin   actually   suggests   that,   as   an   alternative,   the   “Confucianization   of   the   law”  

should   refer   to   “principles   of   legal   interpretation   and   legal   theorizing”   that   were  

required   to   “uphold   proper   interactions   among   people,   in   accordance   with   their  

respective   relationships,   in   order   to   bring   about   an   orderly   society”.405     In   both  

cases,  the  term  points  to  the  fact  that  Rujia  state  ideology  permeated  the  Han  legal  

code  and  was  undeniably  at  the  very  foundation  of  legal  culture  in  imperial  China  

through   the   Tang   dynasty.     However,   this   study   will   assert   that   one   of   the   most  

important  aspects  of  Fajia  law  was  appropriated  by  and  became  a  fundamental  part  

of   Rujia   virtue   long   before   the   Han   dynasty:   the   reliance   on   state   institutions   to  
                                                                                                               
403  See  Ch’ü  T’ung-­‐tsu  (Qu  Tongzu).  Law  and  Society  in  Traditional  China.  Paris:  Mouton  &  Co.,  1965,  

p.  267-­‐279.    Ch’ü  explained,  “…it  is  evident  that  the  fundamental  argument  between  the  two  schools  
revolved  around  the  problem  of  the  modes  of  behavior  to  be  maintained,  and  not  around  the  
problem  of  whether  moral  influence  or  punishment  should  be  used,  for  the  same  norm  could  be  
enforced  by  different  agents.    If  the  differentiated  modes  of  behavior  advocated  by  the  Confucianists  
could  be  enforced  by  legal  sanction  rather  than  by  moral  influence,  the  same  end  could  be  attained,  
and  no  objections  would  be  raised  by  the  Confucianists.    Thus  when  the  law,  which  was  formulated  
by  the  Legalists,  was  actually  adopted  by  the  government,  the  Confucianists  ceased  spending  their  
energies  on  vain  arguments  and  fought  for  practical  and  achievable  goals.    When  the  situation  was  
critical  they  did  not  argue  against  the  value  of  the  law.    Instead  they  tried  to  introduce  into  the  code  
the  principles  and  spirit  of  the  li  together  with  its  concrete  rules  of  behavior  and  enforce  them  by  
legal  sanction.”  (Ch’ü  1965:  274)  
404  Goldin  2011:  4;  See  Goldin,  Paul  R.  “Han  Law  and  the  Regulation  of  Interpersonal  Relations:  ‘The  

Confucianization  of  the  Law’  Revisited”.  Asia  Major,  vol.  25,  no.  1,  2011,  p.  1-­‐31.  
405  Goldin  2011:  4  

  229  
develop   and   shape   society.     This   should   be   considered   the   Fajia-­‐ification   of   Rujia  

virtue,   providing   a   framework   within   which   its   content   could   be   institutionalized  

and  more  effectively  propagated  throughout  its  ideal  state.  

This   chapter   will   argue   that   the   influence   of   Shang   Yang’s   notion   of   law   was  

not   limited   to   the   Fajia  tradition.     In   response   to   the   institutional   emphasis   in   Fajia  

texts,   Rujia   texts   incorporated   this   key   aspect   of   Fajia   thought   into   their   own  

political  visions.    This  will  be  shown  using  three  texts:  the  Wuzi,  the  Xunzi,  and  the  

Guanzi’s  “Prince  and  Minister  Part  I”  chapter406.    Indeed,  there  are  other  later  texts  

that  generally  receive  more  attention  than  the  Wuzi   and  “Prince  and  Minister   Part  

I”  chapters.    However,  I  have  chosen  these  three  texts  for  two  main  reasons:  their  

dating   and   range.     All   three   of   these   texts   are   generally   dated   late   in   the   Warring  

States  period.    Therefore,  they  represent  three  of  the  earliest  responses  to  the  Book  

of  Lord  Shang’s  innovative  use  of  the  character  fa  法  and  its  concept  of  law.    Second,  

they  represent  three  different  ways  in  which  the  Rujia-­‐virtue  based  political  visions  

responded  to  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang’s  important  insight.    As  we  shall  see,  the  Wuzi,  

the   Xunzi,   and   “Prince   and   Minister   Part   I”   all   appear   to   attempt   to   find   middle  

ground   between   the   Fajia   notion   of   law   and   elite   resistance   to   its   universal  

application,   while   affirming   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang’s   observation   that   state  

institutions  can  be  powerful  instruments  for  moral  education  and  cultural  change.    

These   institutions   were   the   key   in   the   general   expansion   of   state   ritual   practice,  

from   one   that   was   based   on   blood   ties   that   excluded   all   subjects   outside   of   noble  

bloodlines  to  one  based  on  land  ties  that  included  all  subjects  in  the  state.    
                                                                                                               
406  From  this  point  forward,  I  will  use  the  term  “GPM  chapters”  to  collectively  reference  the  two  

Guanzi  chapters,  “Prince  and  Minister”  Parts  I  &  II”.  

  230  
The  Wuzi407  

  The  Wuzi  places  emphasis  on  Rujia  virtues  and  means  of  governance  in  its  

statecraft   and   has   not   been   traditionally   classified   as   Fajia.     However,   its   use   of   the  

character   fa   法   nevertheless   formulates   Fajia-­‐like   competition   for   the   state’s  

military   affairs.     So   even   this   Bingjia   text,   rooted   in   Rujia   virtues,   attempts   to  

include  its  own  version  of  the  notion  of  law  akin  to  that  of  Fajia  texts.  Ralph  Sawyer  

explains,  “…the  philosophical  content  reflects  the  integration  of  the  Confucian  and  

Legalist  perspectives—the  Confucian  humanistic  values  and  the  Legalist  emphasis  

on   the   unremitting,   equitable   implementation   of   rewards   and   punishments   that  

developed   in   the   Warring   States   period   and   found   expression   especially   in   the  

military   writings.”408     In   its   first   section,   “Planning   for   the   State”,   which   primarily  

discusses  military  affairs  within  the  context  of  its  ideals  for  the  state,  Rujia  virtues  

have  a  dominant  role  while  the  notion  of  law  fa  法  is  not  even  mentioned  once.    For  

instance,  in  the  section  “Planning  for  the  State”,  the  Wuzi  states:  

Wu-­‐tzu   said:   “Now   the   Way   [Tao]   is   the   means   by   which   one   turns  
back  to  the  foundation  and  returns  to  the  beginning.    Righteousness  
is   the   means   by   which   to   put   affairs   into   action   and   realize  
                                                                                                               
407  See  Lau,  D.C.  and  Chen  Fong  Ching,  ed.  A  Concordance  to  the  Militarists  (Sunzi,  Yuliaozi,  Wuzi,  

Simafa).  Hong  Kong:  Commercial  Press,  1992.;  This  text  is  attributed  to  the  statesmen  of  the  state  of  
Chu,  Wu  Qi  (circa  440-­‐361  B.C.),  a  native  of  the  state  of  Wei  衛.    As  for  textual  concerns,  Ralph  
Sawyer  stated,  “…The  Wu-­‐tzu  prominently  discusses  employing  the  cavalry  and  refers  to  a  cavalry  
force  of  three  thousand.    This  indicates  that  one  of  the  authors  lived  not  only  after  the  cavalry’s  
appearance  but  also  after  it  had  become  at  least  a  supplementary  force.    The  first  mention  of  cavalry  
has  previously  been  attributed  to  Sun  Pin’s  book,  and  supposedly  the  cavalry  did  not  become  an  
active  military  element  until  the  end  of  the  Warring  States  period.    Therefore,  if  the  authenticity  of  
the  Wu-­‐tzu  is  accepted  and  its  main  authorship  is  attributed  to  Wu  Ch’i—albeit  revised  by  his  
disciples—use  of  the  cavalry  dates  to  after  300  B.C.,  then  at  least  parts  of  the  Wu-­‐tzu  are  later  
accretions  or  the  entire  text  is  a  late  Warring  States  or  Han  dynasty  creation…Kuo  Mo-­‐jo  concludes  
that  the  original  Wu-­‐tzu  has  been  lost  and  that  the  extant  work  is  a  later,  probably  Former  Han  
forgery.”  (Sawyer  1993:  454-­‐455);  Translations  from  Sawyer,  Ralph  D.  The  Seven  Military  Classics  of  
Ancient  China.  Boulder:  Westview  Press,  1993.  
408  Sawyer  1993:  454  

  231  
 accomplishments.     Plans   are   the   means   by   which   to   keep   harm  
distant   and   gain   profit.     The   essence   [provides   the   constraints]   by  
which   to   preserve   duty   and   conserve   achievements.     Now   if   behavior  
does  not  accord  with  the  Way  [Tao],  and  actions  do  not  accord  with  
righteousness,   but   instead   one   dwells   in   magnificence   and   enjoys  
nobility,  disaster  will  inevitably  befall  him.    “For  this  reason  the  Sage  
rests   the   people   in   the   Way   [Tao],   orders   them   with   righteousness,  
moves  them  with  the  forms  of  propriety  [li],  and  consoles  them  with  
benevolence.     Cultivate   these   four   virtues   and   you   will   flourish.    
Neglect  them  and  you  will  decline.409  
 
This   passage   quite   clearly   illustrates   a   Rujia   cosmological   foundation   in   which  

Heaven’s   order   is   the   Way   or   the   Dao   道.   So,   the   prince   then   must   model   himself  

after   the   Way   through   exemplifying   the   rites   li   禮   in   his   behavior   and   using   Rujia  

ritual   to   inform   the   standards   of   his   state.     Hierarchy   and   difference   in   rank   is   then  

modeled  after  the  natural  order  of  things  in  the  universe  li  理  through  a  system  of  

organization  called  proper  roles  yi  義.  

Yet,   the   Wuzi   also   “equally   stressed   military   strength   and   preparation”410  

and  it  is  here  where  the  Wuzi’s  notion  of  law  assumes  a  prominent  role.    It  does  not  

refer  to  objective  discovery  of  a  predetermined  natural  order,  unlike  more  Daojia  

influenced   military   texts   and   Huang-­‐lao   texts.     A   Rujia   infrastructure   of   governance  

targets  a  space  that  is  supposed  to  facilitate,  in  Peerenboom’s  phrase,  “the  highest  

quality   of   harmony   out   of   the   particulars   at   hand”411.     In   other   words,   it   is   the  

interpretation   of   ritual   according   to   “culture-­‐   and   context-­‐specific”412  rather   than  

                                                                                                               
409  Sawyer  1993:  454; 吳子曰：「夫道者，所以反本復始。義者，所以行事立功。謀者，所以違害
就利。要者，所以保業守成。若行不合道，舉不合義，而處大居貴，患必及之。是以聖人綏之以
道，理之以義，動之以禮，撫之以仁。此四德者，修之則興，廢之則衰。」(Lau  and  Chen  1992:  
C1/36/19-­‐22).  
410  Sawyer  1993:  202  
411  Peerenboom  1993:  126  
412  Peerenboom  1993:  126  

  232  
“universal   and   immutable   principles”413  that   creates   the   notion   of   law   seen   in   the  

Wuzi.      

Nevertheless,   even   within   a   Rujia   cosmology,   the   Wuzi’s   notion   of   the   law   in  

the   state’s   military   affairs   closely   resembles   that   of   the   Fajia   texts.     The   above  

passage   provides   a   clue   to   this   fact   when   it   asserts   that   accomplishing   tasks  

establishes   a   subject’s   merit.     In   fact,   fulfilling   one’s   proper   role   is   defined   as   the  

virtue   that   is   used   to   establish   merit   義者，所以行事立功.   This   implies   that   a  

culture  of  merit  exists  within  the  Wuzi’s  state.  It  begins  to  explain  how  its  culture  of  

merit  works  in  the  section  “Commanding  the  Army”:    

Marquis  Wu  asked:  “What  measures  will  ensure  the  soldiers  will  be  
victorious?”     Wu   Ch’i   replied:   “Control   is   foremost.”     Marquis   Wu  
again   asked:   “It   is   not   large   numbers?”     “If   the   laws   and   orders   are  
not  clear,  rewards  and  punishments  are  not  trusted;  when  sounding  
the  gongs  will  not  cause  them  to  halt  or  beating  the  drum  to  advance,  
then   even   if   you   had   one   million   men,   of   what   use   would   they   be?    
What   is   meant   by   control   is   that   when   stationary   [in   camp]   they  
observe   the   forms   of   propriety   [li]   and   when   in   action   they   are  
awesome.”414  
 
This  passage  reveals  two  aspects  of  the  Wuzi’s  notion  of  law.    The  first  is  that  the  

Wuzi’s   notion   of   law   must   be   an   expression   of   proper   roles   yi   義   which   is  

inseparable   from   ritual   li   禮.     Recall   that   the   “Planning   for   the   State”   passage  

described   proper   roles   as   what   the   ruler   used   to   accomplish   tasks   and   establish  

                                                                                                               
413  Peerenboom  1993:  126;  Put  in  simpler  terms,  Peerenboom  considered  Confucius  and  

Confucianism  or  Rujia  thought  as  “more  akin  to  pragmatism”  (Peerenboom  1993:  105)  than  the  
“foundationalism”  (Peerenboom  1993:  105)  expressed  in  Huang-­‐Lao  thought.    He  elaborated  saying,  
“Thus  a  pragmatist  would  argue,  contra  (his  emphasis)  Huang-­‐Lao,  that  we  cannot  become  purely  
unbiased,  objective  observers  of  the  Way.    It  makes  no  sense  to  speak  of  totally  overcoming  
subjectivity  because  we  inevitably  experience,  interpret,  and  think  from  within  and  through  our  
personal,  communal,  human  perspectives.”  (Peerenboom  1993:  109)  
414  Sawyer  1993:  214;  武侯問曰：「兵何以為勝？」 起對曰：「以治為勝。」 又問曰：「不在眾

寡？」 對曰：「若法令不明，賞罰不信，金之不止，鼓之不進，雖有百萬，何益於用。所謂治者
，居則有禮，動則有威。。。(Lau  and  Chen  1992:  C3/39/18-­‐25)  

  233  
merit  所以行事立功.    So,  if  laws  and  orders  are  supposed  to  guide  the  armed  forces  

in  their  task,  then  they  too  must  necessarily  be  in  accordance  with  proper  roles.    

Second,   the   Wuzi   does   call   for   the   enforcement   of   laws   and   orders   with  

rewards  and  punishments.    Laws  and  their  reinforcement  are  in  fact  considered  to  

be  an  important  part  of  the  ruler  establishing  what  the  Wuzi  styles  good  order  to  

ensure   victory   in   battle   以治為勝.     So,   reminiscent   of   Fajia   texts,   the   above   passage  

insists  that  laws  must  establish  good  faith  and  mutual  trust  in  the  armed  forces.    If  

it  does  not,  then  the  army  cannot  be  considered  to  be  in  good  order.    Laws  not  only  

need   to   establish   good   faith   and   mutual   trust   just   to   establish   good   order,   they  

must   also   facilitate   a   strong   culture   of   merit   within   the   state.     In   the   section  

“Evaluating   the   Enemy”,   the   Wuzi   points   out   the   importance   of   the   ruler  

contingently  reinforcing  his  laws  and  a  strong  culture  of  merit:    

There  are  six  circumstances  in  which,  without  performing  divination,  

you  should  avoid  conflict.    First,  the  land  is  broad  and  vast,  the  people  
wealthy   and   numerous.     Second,   the   government   loves   the   people,  
the   ruler’s   beneficence   extends   and   flows   [to   all   of   them].     Third,  
rewards   are   trusted,   punishments   based   on   investigation,   and   both  
are   invariably   implemented   in   a   timely   fashion.     Fourth,   people   are  
ranked   according   to   their   military   accomplishments;   they   award  
official   positions   to   the   Worthy   and   employ   the   able.     Fifth,   their  
forces   are   massive,   and   their   weapons   and   armor   are   all   first-­‐rate.    
Sixth,  they  have  the  assistance  of  all  their  neighbors  and  the  support  
of  a  powerful  state.    In  general  in  these  situations  you  are  not  a  match  
for  the  enemy,  so  without  doubt  avoid  them.    This  is  what  is  meant  by  
‘seeing   the   possibility   and   advancing,   knowing   difficulty   and  
withdrawing.  415  
 

                                                                                                               
415  Sawyer  1993:  212;  有不占而避之者六：一曰土地廣大，人民富眾；二曰上愛其下，惠施流布；

三曰賞信刑察，發必得時；四曰陳功居列，任賢使能；五曰師徒之眾，兵甲之精；六曰四鄰之助
，大國之援。凡此不如敵人，避之勿疑。所謂見可而進，知難而退也。」(Lau  and  Chen  1992:  
C2/38/22-­‐24)  

  234  
Situations   three   and   four   make   it   amply   clear   that   contingently   reinforcing   laws  

and  a  vigorous  culture  of  merit  are  both  crucial  elements  in  the  strength  of  a  state.      

Third,  laws,  the  text  relates,  are  meant  to  enhance  the  ruler’s  ability  to  judge  

and  evaluate  military  merit  and  achievement.    This  becomes  clear  when  earlier  in  

the  same  section,  the  Wuzi  states:  

Within   the   army   you   must   have   soldiers   with   the   courage   of   tigers,  
the   strength   to   easily   lift   tripods,   and   the   fleetness   of   barbarian  
horses.    To  attack  their  flags  and  seize  their  generals  you  must  have  
men   with   such   abilities.     If   you   have   men   such   as   these,   select   and  
segregate  them  [into  special  units];  favor  and  honor  them.    They  are  
referred   to   as   the   ‘army’s   fate.’     Those   who   are   expert   in   the   use   of  
the   five   weapons,   who   are   strong   and   quick   and   are   intent   on  
swallowing  the  enemy  should  be  given  rank  and  prominence  for  they  
can   make   victory   decisive.     If   you   are   generous   to   their   parents,  
wives,   and   children;   encourage   them   with   rewards;   and   awe   them  
with   punishments,   these   strong   soldiers,   when   in   formation,   will  
solidly   hold   their   positions   for   a   long   time.     If   you   can   discern   and  
evaluate   men   such   as   these,   you   can   attack   a   force   double   your  
strength.416  
 
Thus,   ultimately   the   ruler   honors   and   increases   the   rank   of   men   of   merit   as   the  

ultimate   administrator   of   rewards   and   punishments.     In   addition   to   the   second  

situation   mentioned   in   the   first   “Evaluating   the   Enemy”   passage,   this   section  

explicitly   asserts   that   the   ruler   should   cherish   and   honor   愛而貴之   men   of  

extraordinary   military   achievement.     Their   adherence   to   proper   roles   is   through  

their  ability  and  successful  capturing  of  enemy  flags  and  chopping  off  of  the  heads  

of  generals  of  enemy  states  搴旗斬將,  thus  accumulating  their  merit.    

                                                                                                               
416  Sawyer  1993:  211;  「然則一軍之中，必有虎賁之士；力輕扛鼎，足輕戎馬，搴旗斬將，必有能

者。若此之等，選而別之，愛而貴之，是謂軍命。其有工用五兵，材力健疾，志在吞敵者，必加
其爵列，可以決勝。厚其父母妻子，勸賞畏罰，此堅陳之士，可與持久。能審料此，可以擊倍。
」(Lau  and  Chen  1992:  C2/38/8-­‐11)  

  235  
 However,   Sawyer   believed   the   Wuzi   illustrates   a   somewhat   different  

attitude  towards  rewards  and  punishments  than  Fajia  texts,  arguing,  “In  contrast  to  

the   famous   Legalist   thinkers   of   the   Warring   States   period,   Wu-­‐tzu   felt…Excessive  

rewards  could  easily  prove  counterproductive,  encouraging  individual  rather  then  

coherent   unit   action,   stimulating   the   soldiers   to   break   ranks   in   their   personal  

quests   for   glory   and   profit.”417     While   there   is   much   to   Sawyer’s   observation,   the  

contention  here  is  that  the  Wuzi  makes  one  of  the  stronger  arguments  for  the  Fajia-­‐

influenced  competition  in  its  final  section  “Stimulating  the  Officers”  when  it  states:  

Marquis   Wu   asked:   “Is   making   punishments   severe   and   rewards  

clear  adequate  for  victory?”    Wu  Ch’i  replied:  “As  to  these  matters  of  
severity  and  clarity  I  do  not  have  all  the  answers.    Even  so,  they  are  
not   what   can   be   relied   on.     Now   if   when   you   issue   commands   and  
promulgate   orders   the   people   take   pleasure   in   hearing   them;   when  
you   raise   the   army   and   mobilize   the   masses   the   people   take   pleasure  
in   battle;   and   when   the   weapons   clash   and   blades   cross   the   people  
take  pleasure  in  death,  then  these  three  are  what  a  ruler  of  men  can  
rely  on.”    Marquis  Wu  asked:  “How  does  one  attain  this  result?”    Wu  
Ch’i  answered:  “You  identify  men  of  accomplishment  and  honor  them  
with   a   grand   feast   while   also   stimulating   those   who   failed   to  
accomplish   anything   notable.”     Thereupon   Marquis   Wu   had   sitting  
mats  set  out  in  the  ancestral  temple  hall,  arrayed  into  three  rows,  and  
held  a  feast  for  the  officers  and  chief  officials.    Those  distinguished  by  
their   achievements   sat   in   the   front   row   and   were   feasted   with   the  
finest   foods   together   with   three   meats   served   on   the   most   valuable  
dishes.    Those  who  ranked  next  in  accomplishment  sat  in  the  middle  
row   and   were   feasted   with   fine   food   served   on   less   lavish   vessels.    
Those   who   had   not   accomplished   anything   noteworthy   sat   in   the   last  
row   and   were   feasted   with   fine   food   served   on   ordinary   utensils.    
When   the   feast   was   over   and   they   came   out,   he   also   honored   the  
parents  and  families  of  the  meritorious  outside  the  temple  gate,  again  
according  to  their  accomplishments.    He  annually  sent  emissaries  to  
call   on   the   families   of   those   who   had   died   in   the   service   of   the  
country,  bestowing  aid  on  their  parents.    By  so  doing  he  shows  that  
they  would  not  be  forgotten.418  
                                                                                                               
417  Sawyer  1993:  204  
418  Sawyer  1993:  223;  武侯問曰：「嚴刑明賞，足以勝乎？」起對曰：「嚴明之事，臣不能悉。雖

然，非所恃也。夫發號布令而人樂聞，興師動眾而人樂戰，交兵接刃而人樂死。此三者，人主之

  236  
  
First,   it   should   be   noted   that   though   they   may   advocate   for   a   very   distinctly  

different  political  organization,  Fajia  texts  in  no  way  reject  the  idea  of  ritual.    The  

above   passage   presents   the   most   striking   clarification   on   this   point,   as   the   ruler  

holds   his   banquet   for   his   soldiers   in   the   ancestral   temple   and   feeds   the   soldiers  

sacrificial  meat.    There  is  evidence  of  ritual  in  Fajia  texts  as  well.    For  instance,  in  

“Within  Borders”,  a  chapter  believed  to  have  possibly  been  written  by  Shang  Yang  

himself,  we  find  a  passage,  “From  the  position  of  xiao  fu  to  da  fu,  upon  their  death,  

for  each  degree  of  rank,  a  tree  should  be  planted  on  top  of  his  grave.”419  

Perhaps   the   most   forceful   statement   in   the   passage   is   Wu   Qi’s   assertion   that  

if   the   prince   promotes   men   of   merit,   and   holds   magnificent   banquets   to   receive  

them,  then  those  without  merit  will  be  urged  to  achieve  君舉有功而進饗之，無功

而勵之.     So,   not   only   does   the   Wuzi   promote   a   weak   version   of   structural  

competition,   but   it   clearly   views   it   as   a   mechanism   to   motivate   the   entire   armed  

forces.     Those   without   merit   or   with   merit   to   a   lesser   degree   than   those   with   the  

most  merit  are  supposed  to  be  motivated  by  their  deprivation,  relative  to  soldiers  

with   the   most   merit,   to   achieve   more   merit.     As   in   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang,  

deprivation  and  relative  deprivation  are  explicitly  referenced  as  motivating  forces  

for   human   behavior.     The   Wuzi,   like   Fajia   texts,   proceeds   from   the   assumption   that  

private   profit   and   fame   are   the   primary   motivating   forces   in   human   behavior.    

Therefore,   upon   seeing   other   soldiers   with   higher   quality   vessels   and   utensils  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
所恃也。」武侯曰：「致之奈何？」對曰：「君舉有功而進饗之，無功而勵之。」於是武侯設坐
廟廷為三行饗士大夫。上功坐前行，餚席兼重器，上牢。次功坐中行，餚席器差減。無功坐後行
，餚席無重器。饗畢而出，又頒賜有功者父母妻子於廟門外，亦以功為差。有死事之家，歲被使
者勞賜其父母，著不忘於心。(Lau  and  Chen  1992:  C6/43/30-­‐C6/44/1-­‐10)  
419  小（失）「夫」死，以上至大夫，其官級一等，其墓樹級一樹。(Gao  2011:  162)  

  237  
during  banquets  and  watching  their  families  receive  larger  rewards  than  their  own,  

soldiers   without   merit   or   with   merit   to   a   lesser   degree   than   those   with   the   most  

merit   will   undoubtedly   be   urged   to   perform   better   in   an   effort   to   accumulate   more  

merit.     This   is   likely   why,   as   Sawyer   pointed   out,   the   Wuzi   argues   that   rewards   and  

punishments   are   inadequate   on   their   own.     Rewards   and   punishments   must  

construct  a  competitive  culture  in  which  soldiers  are  enthusiastic  about  engaging  in  

warfare 人樂戰 and   take   pleasure   in   fighting   to   the   death   人樂死.     In   effect,   the  

ruler’s   rewards   and   punishments   should   not   simply   motivate   subjects,   but   they  

should   cause   subjects   to   find   joy   in   activities   that   would   not   necessarily   interest  

them  otherwise.      

In   addition,   since   the   soldiers   who   achieve   the   most   merit   not   only   earn  

rewards   for   themselves   but   also   for   their   family   members,   this   will   certainly  

motivate  families  within  the  state  to  raise  the  finest  soldiers  they  possibly  can.    This  

is  a  way  to  cultivate  a  bellicose  culture  within  the  state,  described  in  “Policies”  in  

the   Book   of   Lord   Shang,   where   the   families   of   soldiers   insist   on   pursuing  

achievement   of   military   merit.     The   soldier’s   failure   meant   their   families’  

punishment,   and   the   soldiers’   success   brought   their   families’   success   as   well.    

However,   as   Sawyer   notes,   the   Wuzi   prudently   comments   that   their   institution-­‐

facilitated  competition  can  cause,  perpetuate,  or  exacerbate  the  subject’s  inherent  

concern  for  their  own  private  interests.    This  can  be  seen  in  the  Wuzi  criticism  of  

the  state  of  Qin in  the  section  “Evaluating  the  Enemy”:    

Ch’in’s   character   is   strong,   the   land   treacherous,   and   the   government  

severe.    Their  rewards  and  punishments  are  believed  in;  the  people  
never   yield   but   instead   are   all   fiery   and   contentious.     Thus   they  

  238  
 scatter  and  individually  engage  in  combat.    The  Way  [Tao]  to  attack  
them  is  to  first  entice  them  with  profits  for  their  soldiers  are  greedy  
and  will  abandon  their  generals  to  pursue  them.    Capitalizing  on  their  
misjudgment   you   can   hunt   down   their   scattered   ranks,   establish  
ambushes,   take   advantage   of   the   moment,   and   then   their   generals  
can  be  captured.420    
 
So,   rewards   must   be   bestowed   not   on   individuals   but   on   units   within   the  

armed  forces  so  that  individual  soldiers  are  not  incentivized  to  prioritize  the  

pursuit   of   their   own   private   profit   or   fame   over   the   welfare   of   their   military  

units,   potentially   implying   a   bestowal   of   collective   rewards   versus   the  

bestowal  of  rewards  on  individuals.    However,  it  still  remains  that  rewards  

and   the   competition   they   create   must   motivate   soldiers   enough   to   devote  

themselves   to   accumulating   merit.     Thus,   the   Wuzi   serves   as   a   compelling  

example  written   after   the   Fajia  tradition’s  introduction  of  its  concept  of  law,  

incorporating  institution-­‐facilitated  competition  into  its  military  affairs.      

The  Xunzi    

The   thought   expressed   in   the   Xunzi   is   of   course   based   on   the   same  

cosmology  as  that  already  discussed  in  the  Wuzi.    Therefore,  the  Xunzi’s  concept  of  

law  does  not  satisfy  this  study’s  first  criterion  of  the  Fajia  notion  of  law:  it  is  not  a  

basis   of   evaluation   that   is   universally   applied   to   all   of   the   ruler’s   subjects   and   its  

culture  of  merit  seems  to  measure  who  an  individual  is  just  as  much  as  what  they  

do.    In  the  Book   of   Lord   Shang  and  other  Fajia  texts,  there  is  no  special  category  of  

subjects  that  are  excluded  from  a  culture  of  punishment  or  state  competition.  This  

is   not   the   case   in   the   Xunzi.     In   fact,   the   Xunzi   specifically   argues   that   subjecting  
                                                                                                               
420  Sawyer  1993:  210-­‐211;  秦性強，其地險，其政嚴，其賞罰信，其人不讓，皆有鬭心，故散而自

戰。擊此之道，必先示之以利而引去之，士貪於得而離其將，乘乖獵散，設伏投機，其將可取。
(Lau  and  Chen  1992:  C2/37/29-­‐31)  

  239  
ministers  and  high-­‐ranking  officials  to  its  notion  of  law  can  hinder  their  ability  to  

properly   govern   and   guide   the   moral   development   of   the   rest   of   the   ruler’s  

subjects.    For  instance,  “Enriching  the  State”  states:    

It   is   the   meaning   of   ritual   principles   that   there   should   be   rankings  

according  to  nobility  or  baseness,  disparities  between  the  privileges  
of  old  and  young,  and  modes  to  match  these  with  poverty  and  wealth,  
insignificance  and  importance.    Hence,  the  Son  of  Heaven  wears  the  
dragon   robe   of   royal   red   with   its   ceremonial   cap,   the   lords   of   fiefs  
wear   the   black   dragon   robe   with   its   ceremonial   cap,   the   grand  
officers   wear   a   skirt   with   an   ornamented   border   at   the   bottom   and  
the   appropriate   cap,   knights   wear   a   hat   of   skin   with   their   clothes.    
The  inner  power  of  the  person  must  match  his  position;  his  position  
must  match  his  emolument;  his  emolument  must  match  his  services  
to   the   state.     From   the   position   of   the   knight   up   to   the   supreme  
position,   all   must   be   moderated   through   ritual   and   music.     The  
ordinary  masses,  the  Hundred  Clans,  must  be  controlled  by  law  and  
norms  of  behavior.    To  found  states  one  surveys  the  earth;  to  support  
the   population   one   calculates   the   profits   derived   from   the   earth;   to  
assign  tasks  and  duties  one  measures  the  people’s  strength.    Employ  
the   people   so   that   they   are   certain   to   succeed   in   their   assigned   tasks;  
make  certain  that  the  profits  from  their  assigned  tasks  are  sufficient  
to   provide   a   means   of   living   for   them.     In   all   these   to   cause   income   to  
match   outgo   in   regard   to   clothing,   food,   and   the   hundred   other  
necessities   of   life   so   that   with   certainty   the   harvest   surplus   will   be  
stored   up   at   the   proper   season   is   called   the   ‘art   of   calculating   what  
fits  each  respective  station’.421  
 
Though   the   Xunzi   incorporates   Fajia   ideas,   especially   those   associated   with   its  

notion   of   law,   the   passage   articulates   a   resistance   that   reflects   a   fundamental  

difference   between   the   two   traditions   of   thought   on   the   issue   of   universally  

applying   the   law.     The   text   explicitly   states   that   those   who   are   in   the   position   of  

Knight  and  above  all  must  be  moderated  by  ritual  and  music  由士以上則必以禮樂

                                                                                                               
421  Knoblock  1999:  269-­‐271;  禮者，貴賤有等；長幼有差，貧富輕重皆有稱者也。故天子袾裷衣冕

，諸侯玄裷衣冕，大夫裨冕，士皮弁服。德必稱位，位必稱祿，祿必稱用，由士以上則必以禮樂
節之，眾庶百姓則必以法數制之。量地而立國，計利而畜民，度人力而授事，使民必勝事，事必
出利，利足以生民，皆使衣食百用出入相揜，必時臧餘，謂之稱數。(Lau  and  Chen  1996:  
10/43/1-­‐7)  

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節之.    This  is  in  accordance  with  the  aforementioned  tradition  found  in  the  Liji  in  

which   rites   li  禮   did   not   descend   to   the   common   people,   preserving   the   importance  

of  what  Yuri  Pines  referred  to  as  the  “political  and  social  implications  of  established  

rites”422  through  the  exclusion  of  individuals  whose  social  status  was  too  low.    

Yet,  it  is  not  just  the  highly  ranked  amongst  those  the  ruler  employs  who  are  

exempt   from   the   application   of   law   in   the   Xunzi.     In   the   Xunzi’s   ideal   vision,   the  

petty   man   should   not   be   eligible   to   receive   reward   and   the   Princely   Man   should   be  

exempt  from  punishment.    In  “On  Attracting  Scholars”,  the  last  passage  states,  “In  

rewarding,   one   should   not   wish   to   confer   more   than   what   is   warranted;   in  

punishing,   one   should   not   wish   to   go   to   wrongful   excess.     If   one   regards   beyond  

what   is   proper,   then   the   benefits   may   extend   to   petty   men.     If   one   punishes   with  

excess,   the   injury   may   reach   the   gentleman.     If   unfortunately   transgressions   are  

unavoidable,  then  it  is  better  to  confer  rewards  beyond  what  is  warranted  and  not  

to   punish   to   wrongful   excess.     Compared   with   harming   the   good,   benefiting   the  

wayward   is   minor.”423     The   approach   to   governance   described   in   this   passage   is  

remarkably   different   from   that   found   in   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang   and   other   Fajia  

texts.     The   Book   of   Lord   Shang   explicitly   stated   that   a   ruler   should   ideally   not  

reward  individuals  like  Bo  Yi  or  Princely  Men  who  were  unproductive  within  state-­‐

supported  channels.424     Fajia  state  orthodoxy  required  subjects  to  be  productive  in  

                                                                                                               
422  Pines  2002:  75  
423 Knoblock  1999:  449-­‐451;  賞不欲僭，刑不欲濫。賞僭則利及小人，刑濫則害及君子。若不幸而
過，寧僭無濫。與其害善，不若利淫。(Lau  and  Chen  1996:  14/67/24-­‐25)  
424  Recall  that  “The  Teachings  of  the  Ru”  states,  “Accordingly,  although  the  gentleman  lacks  rank,  he  

is  noble;  although  he  lacks  an  emolument,  he  is  wealthy;  although  he  does  not  speak,  he  is  trusted;  
although  he  does  not  display  anger,  he  is  awe  inspiring;  although  he  dwells  in  poverty,  he  flourishes;  
and  although  he  lives  alone,  he  is  happy—is  not  this  a  case  of  accumulating  the  essence  of  all  that  is  

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agriculture   and   warfare   in   order   to   enrich   the   state   and   strengthen   its   army.   So  

individuals   like   Bo   Yi   and   figures   like   the   Princely   Man   are   not   to   be   rewarded   and  

are   considered   perverse,   due   to   their   moral   commitments   outside   of   state  

orthodoxy.    

By   contrast,   under   the   Xunzi’s   notion   of   law,   individuals   like   Bo   Yi   and   the  

Princely  Men  are  to  be  admired  and  modeled  after  for  such  exemplary  commitment  

to   ritual   principles   and   the   development   of   morality.     Also,   according   to   David  

Wong,425  the   Xunzi   assumes   that   human   beings   naturally   have   a   sense   of   moral  

duty   that   lacks   specific   content.     It   is   the   socialization   process   that   informs   the  

moral  content  of  the  ruler’s  subject’s  sense  of  moral  duty.    Since  law  is  an  important  

part   of   the   socialization   process   in   the   Xunzi,   it   is   not   unfair   to   conclude   that   an  

important   part   of   the   Xunzi’s   notion   of   law   is   providing   moral   content   for   the  

ruler’s   subject’s   innate   sense   of   moral   duty.     Thus,   the   Xunzi’s   notion   of   law   is   at  

least   partly,   but   nevertheless   importantly   so,   intended   to   be   a   tool   to   inform   and  

develop  moral  inclination,  providing  a  moral  education  for  the  ruler’s  subjects.    

On   the   one   hand,   this   bears   little   resemblance   to   the   Fajia   concept   of   law.    

Law   serves   a   fundamentally   different   purpose.     It   is   not   designed   to   grow   and  

develop  any  natural  inclinations  of  moral  duty  that  the  ruler’s  subjects  may  have.    

Since  the  ruler’s  subjects  are  thought  to  have  no  inclinations  toward  moral  duty  for  

which   to   provide   direction,   the   Fajia   notion   of   law   is   a   tool   meant   to   produce  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
most  honorable,  richest,  most  important,  and  most  majestic?”  (Knoblock  1999:  177) 故君子無爵而
貴，無祿而富，不言而信，不怒而威，窮處而榮，獨居而樂！豈不至尊，至富，至重，至嚴之情
舉積此哉！(Lau  and  Chen  1996:  8/29/21)  
425  See  Wong,  David.  “Xunzi  on  Moral  Motivation”,  in  Thorton  C.  Kline  III  and  Phillip  Ivanhoe,  ed.  

Virtue,  Nature,  and  Moral  Agency  in  the  Xunzi.  Indianapolis,  IN:  Hackett  Publishing,  2000.  

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behavior   that   does   not   have   specific   moral   requirements   beyond   what   the   law  

demands.     Natural   moral   inclinations   within   an   individual   are   not   seen   as   assets   to  

incorporate  into  state  culture.    Rather,  they  are,  at  best,  irrelevant  or  superfluous,  

never  meriting  reward.    At  worst,  they  are  potentially  harmful  to  state  development,  

and   deserving   of   punishment.     As   explained,   private   learning   and   teachings   or  

activities   that   could   be   labeled   “outside   endeavors”   were   viewed   as   antagonistic  

forces   to   the   ruler’s   vision.     So,   in   Fajia   texts,  morality   is   an   element   that   may   or  

may   not   largely   define   what   the   ruler   believes   to   be   his   state’s   needs.     Thus,   the  

Fajia   notion   of   law   is   not   even   partly   a   tool   of   informing   and   developing   moral  

inclination.  

On   the   other   hand,   the   refusal   to   bestow   rewards   on   those   who   are  

considered  petty  men  reveals  how  the  Xunzi’s  political  vision  also  creates  its  own  

state-­‐endorsed  pursuits,  like  those  found  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang  and  other  Fajia  

texts,  the  nature  of  which  are  distinct.    The  Xunzi  and  the  Book   of   Lord   Shang  both  

create  channels  based  on  what  the  ruler  defines  as  state  needs,  the  Xunzi’s  channels  

are   specifically   designed   to   consolidate   the   ruler’s   subjects’   efforts   into  Rujia   moral  

cultivation.     In   other   words,   not   only   are   the   Xunzi’s   channels   based   on   specific  

moral   content,   but   they   indicate   that   the   subject   of   a   Xunzian   state   must   fulfill  

moral   requirements   to   even   be   eligible   for   rewards.     Unlike   the   Book   of   Lord  

Shang’s  attempt  to  accommodate  or  acquiesce  to  what  it  believes  naturally  exists  in  

human   behavior,   the   Xunzian   government   requires   its   subjects   to   undertake   an  

intensive   moral   education,   occurring   internally   and   externally,   in   order   to   obtain  

reward.     Although,   this   is   not   the   case   in   Fajia   texts,   the   Xunzi’s   political   vision  

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nevertheless   consists   of   a   state   with   an   infrastructure   that   establishes   an  

orthodoxy  based  on  a   specific  body  of  moral  principles,  rites  li  禮  and  proper  roles  

yi   義,   to   not   only   guide   the   highly-­‐ranked   but   even   the   ruler   himself.     Although  

there   is   a   mandated   moral   commitment   for   the   Xunzian   state,   it   still   relies   on  

institutions  to  create  its  culture  and  shape  society.      

The  Guanzi  

The  Guanzi   chapter  “Prince  and  Minister   Part  I”   is  a  particularly  interesting  

case   because   it   appears   to   pay   homage   to   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang.426     One   of   the  

                                                                                                               
426  Though  Rickett  does  not  engage  in  a  systematic  attempt  to  date  either  of  the  two  chapters,  he  

does  speculate  that  the  chapters  were  written  around  the  third  and  fourth  century  B.C.  by  two  
different  authors.  (Rickett  2001:  402)    Luo  Genze  more  specifically  dates  the  GPM  chapters  as  
having  been  written  toward  the  end  of  the  Warring  States  period  for  a  few  reasons:  the  use  of  
characters  such  as  zhu  主  or  ren  zhu  人主  to  refer  to  the  ruler  which  did  not  occur  until  after  the  
middle  of  the  Warring  States  period,  use  of  the  character  xiang  相,  generally  having  the  meaning  of  
“to  assist”  but  often  more  specifically  referencing  the  ruler’s  chief  minister,  and  the  assumption  that  
most  of  the  common  people  were  ignorant  or  stupid,  as  a  result  of  little  opportunity  to  educate  
themselves  which,  according  to  Luo,  indicates  that  the  thought  expressed  was  that  an  official,  or  
those  the  ruler  employs,  must  educate  and  transform  the  ruler’s  subjects.  (Luo  1958:  332-­‐334);  See  
Luo  Genze  羅跟澤.  “Guan  zi  tan  yuan”  管子探源  in  Zhu  zi  kao  suo  諸子考索,  Shanghai  上海:  Shang  hai  
gu  ji  chu  ban  she  上海古籍出版社,  1958,  p.  285-­‐368.;  Even  more  recently,  Hu  Jiacong  systematically  
dates  the  two  GPM  chapters  as  having  been  written  late  in  the  Warring  States  period  for  two  main  
reasons.    The  first  is  that  the  language  of  the  chapters  are  of  the  Warring  States  period.    The  
chapters  use  language  like  “王天下”,  “君一國”,  wai  kou  外寇,  and  wei  jun  危君.    Also,  in  terms  of  its  
content,  Hu  argues  that  this  chapter  not  only  represents  an  elaboration  of  the  Fajia  tradition’s  
general  conception  of  the  division  of  labor  between  a  ruler  and  his  ministers,  but  it  also  expounds  
upon  the  notion  that  a  proper  division  of  labor  between  the  ruler  and  his  ministers  will  result  in  
proper  governance,  found  in  the  Guanzi’s  “Clarifying  Laws”  明法  chapter  which  Hu  dates  around  the  
mid-­‐Warring  States  period.    Therefore,  Hu  argues  that  these  chapters  must  have  been  written  after  
them,  while  still  having  been  written  during  the  Warring  States  period.    Also,  Hu  argues  that  both  
chapters  were  written  by  the  same  author  because  not  only  is  the  style  of  writing  consistent  but  the  
thesis  is  lengthy  and  spread  out.    Both  GPM  chapters  deal  with  a  number  of  issues  between  the  ruler  
and  those  he  employs.    Both  chapters  remained  theoretical,  not  referencing  historical  facts.    Both  
GPM  chapters  express  thought  in  accordance  with  the  late  Warring  States  Fajia  thought,  with  
apparent  influence  from  the  Fajia,  Rujia,  and  Daojia  traditions.    Both  GPM  chapters  write  about  
political  approaches  in  a  relatively  sophisticated  manner,  and  Hu  even  views  the  author  of  this  
chapter  as  an  intellectual  descendant  of  Guan  Zhong’s  intellectual  current.    In  other  words,  Hu  finds  
it  difficult  to  make  divisions  within  the  writings  of  both  chapters  to  definitively  say  that  the  chapters  
have  two  different  authors.    Hu  adds  that  the  Xunzi  includes  two  chapters  “The  Way  of  the  Prince”  君
道  and  “The  Way  of  the  Minister”  臣道,  but  compared  to  the  GPM  chapters,  they  do  not  have  nearly  
the  same  cohesiveness  in  content.  Hu  1995:  288-­‐289;  Hu,  Jiacong  胡家聰.  Guanzi  xin  tan  管子新探.  

  244  
most   obvious   pieces   of   evidence   is   its   title:   “Prince   and   Minister”   junchen   君臣.      

This   is   identical   to   a   chapter   in   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang’s   twenty-­‐third   chapter  

“Prince  and  Minister”  junchen  君臣.    Despite  its  appreciation  for  the  thought  in  the  

Book  of  Lord  Shang,   it   still   shares   a   Rujia   cosmological   foundation   with   the   Xunzi  

and  the  Wuzi.  For  instance,  in   the  chapter  “Prince  and  Minister  Part  I”,  the  Guanzi  

writes,  “Heaven  has  its  constant  representations,  Earth  has  its  constant  form,  and  

man   has   its   constant   rules   of   propriety,   which,   once   established,   never   change.    

These  are  called  the  three  constants.    Uniting  them  together  into  one  is  the  way  of  

the   prince.     Maintaining   distinctions   and   performing   his   tasks   is   the   duty   of   the  

minister.”427     In   this   passage,   first   we   see   that   Heaven   is   the   most   powerful   and  

supreme   force   in   the   cosmic   universe.     Man   responds   to   Heaven.   Heaven   and   its  

activities  do  not  respond  to  the  actions  of  Man.    In  fact,  Earth  responds  to  Heaven  

because  the  Earth  is  manipulated  by  the  activities  of  Heaven.    The  arability  of  soil,  

the   abundance   of   vegetation,   even   the   quality   of   water   can   all   be   affected   and  

manipulated  by  Heaven.    

Second,  within  the  cosmological  order,  Man  must  appropriately  respond  to  

the  activities  of  Heaven  in  order  for  human  society  to  achieve  order.    Moreover,  the  

collective  action  of  Man  is  expressed  in  the  operations  of  government.    This  is  why  

it  is  so  important  that  government,  more  importantly,  the  ruler  seeks  to  develop  his  

subjects.     Subjects   must   develop   to   understand   the   Way   and   virtuous   conduct   so  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Beijing  北京:  Zhong  guo  she  hui  ke  xue  chu  ban  she  中國社會科學出版社,  1995.;  Whether  the  
chapters  actually  represent  a  consistent  political  vision  is  not  a  concern  in  this  section.  However,  the  
chapter  “Prince  and  Minister  Part  I”  will  be  the  focus  of  this  section’s  investigation.  
427  Rickett  2001:  404;  天有常象，地有常形，人有常禮，一設而不更，此謂三常；兼而一之，人君

之道也；分而職之，人臣之事也。  (Lau  and  Chen  2001:  10.5/78/26-­‐27)  

  245  
that  all  of  Man  is  able  to  be  in  accordance  with  the  other  two  important  elements  in  

the  triadic  cosmos,  Heaven  and  Earth.    Third,  the  ruler’s  primary  responsibility  is  to  

lead   Man’s   collective   contribution   to   Heaven.     The   ruler   accomplishes   this   by  

establishing   the   rites   li   禮   throughout   his   state   and   therefore   its   laws   are  

subordinate  to  them.  For  instance,  the  chapter  “Prince  and  Minister  Part  I”  states,  

“Thus   to   differentiate   relationships   and   correctly   maintain   social   distinctions   is  

called  establishing  order.    To  accord  with  order  and  not  neglect  it  is  called  having  

the   proper   way.     When   the   proper   way   and   virtue   are   fixed,   the   people   will   have  

rules.     The   prince   who   possesses   the   proper   way   is   one   who   is   skilled   in   stabling  

clear   laws   and   does   not   violate   them   for   reasons   of   self-­‐interest.”428     This   chapter’s  

law,  of  course,  violates  this  study’s  second  criterion  of  Fajia  law  because  the  rites  

are   a   mandated   moral   content.   However,   these   laws   still   establish   this   Guanzi  

chapter’s   orthodoxy.     For   those   who   follow   them,   laws   represent   the   successful  

modeling  of  the  natural  order  of  things,  the  fulfillment  of  rites  and  proper  roles,  and  

progression  towards  the  attainment  of  the  Way.  In  short,  compliance  with  the  law  

largely   defines   the   individual   contribution   to   state   welfare.     This   is   why   actions  

outside   of   adhering   to   the   laws   of   the   rites   are   considered   private   私.     Therefore,  

one   of   the   important   means   through   which   the   ruler   morally   educates   subjects   is  

law,   acting   as   the   boundary   between   actions   that   contribute   to   public   公   welfare  

and  those  that  do  not.    

                                                                                                               
428  Rickett  2001:  408;  是故別交正分之謂理，順理而不失之謂道。道德定而民有軌矣。有道之君者

，善明設法而不以私防者也。(Lau  and  Chen  2001:  10.5/79/26-­‐28)  

  246  
   What  is  particularly  unique  about   the  chapter  “Prince  and  Minister  Part  I”  is  

how  it  too  designates  a  special  category  of  subject.  It  is  consistent  with  other  Rujia  

texts   appearing   after   the   appearance   of   Fajia   texts   that   typically   insist   on   the  

exceptionalism  of  the  elite  of  the  ruler’s  subjects,  saying:    

The   sefu   in   charge   of   civil   functionaries   is   responsible   for   official  

matters.     The   sefu  in   charge   of   people   is   responsible   for   education.    
He   conducts   education   among   the   hundred   surnames,   judges   the  
recalcitrant,   and   issues   rewards   to   the   trustworthy   and   sincere.    
Since  being  made  to  feel  as  one  with  the  prince  and  ministers  is  the  
cause   of   their   sincerity,   they   can   be   used   in   both   defensive   and  
offensive   warfare.     When   such   is   the   case,   the   work   of   the   sefu   in  
charge   of   people   is   complete.   [The   sefu   in   charge   of   civil  
functionaries   is   responsible   for   official   matters.]     He   adheres  
completely   to   the   prescribed   rules   and   conducts   his   affairs   in  
accordance   with   the   statutes.     When   judging   cases   involving   laws  
and  punishments  or  weights  and  measures,  he  states  the  charges  in  
writing  and  avoids  self-­‐interest  when  rendering  judgment,  relying  on  
the   facts   as   proof.     When   such   is   the   case,   the   work   of   the   sefu   in  
charge  of  civil  functionaries  is  complete.    After  the  sefu  in  charge  of  
people  has  been  successful  in  educating  the  hundred  surnames  and  
the  sefu  in  charge  of  civil  functionaries  has  been  successful  in  making  
them  adhere  to  the  statutes,  even  persons  who  are  sincere,  upright,  
loyal,   and   trustworthy   will   not   be   considered   especially   good,   and  
even  persons  who  are  pleasure-­‐seeking,  self-­‐indulgent,  lazy,  arrogant  
will   be   unable   to   cause   failure.     When   such   is   the   case,   the   work   of  
the  prince  is  complete.    Therefore  the  prince  relies  on  the  activities  
of   the   sefu   and   takes   advantage   of   their   work   to   examine   his   officials  
in   accordance   with   proper   procedures.     Those   who   do   well,   he  
rewards   with   the   honors   of   ranks   and   titles.     However,   if   the   fields  
are  rich  but  the  people  are  disaffected,  he  punishes  those  who  have  
gone   to   excess   with   the   shame   of   dismissal   or   death   so   his   people  
will   not   be   oppressed.     Whether   he   kills   them   or   lets   them   live,   the  
prince   does   not   violate   proper   procedures   so   no   one   among   the  
people  abandons  his  allegiance  to  him.    This  is  precisely  because  the  
sovereign   has   clear   laws   and   his   subjects   have   their   constant  
work.”429      
                                                                                                               
429  Rickett   2001:   403-­‐404;   吏嗇夫任事，（人）「民」嗇夫任教。教在百姓，論在不撓。賞在信誠，

體之以君臣，其誠也以守戰。如此，則（人）「民」嗇夫之事究矣。吏嗇夫盡有訾程事律，論法
辟，衡權，斗斛，文（劾）不以私論，而以事為正。如此，則吏嗇夫之事究矣。（人）「民」嗇
夫成教，吏嗇夫成律之後，則雖有敦愨忠信者不得善也，而戲豫怠傲者，不得敗也。如此，則人
君之事究矣。是故為人君者因其業，乘其事，而稽之以度。有善者，賞之以列爵之尊，田地之厚

  247  
  
In  this  passage,  rewards  and  punishments  are  bestowed  by  two  different  kinds  of  

sefu  嗇夫—rewards  are  bestowed  by  the  people’s  sefu 人嗇夫  and  punishments  are  

applied  by  the  civil  sefu  吏嗇夫.    These  two  sefu  are  separate  but  integrated.    They  

are   separate   in   that   two   different   officials   are   performing   the   implementation   of  

rewards   and   punishments   respectively.     They   are   integrated   because   both   rewards  

and   punishments   are   crucial   to   the   very   definition   of   the   ruler.     Thus,   an   important  

way   the   ruler   administers   his   rewards   and   punishments   is   through   his   disciplining  

of   both   sefu.   In   this   sense,   the   ruler   acts   as   an   example   that   reverberates  

throughout   his   state.     Through   the   ruler’s   “teaching”,   both   sefu   receive   a   moral  

education   that   they   then   can   impart   to   the   rest   of   the   ruler’s   state.     However,  

privilege  and  authority  to  apply  rewards  and  punishments  to  other  subjects  given  

to  the  sefu  clearly  violates  this  study’s  third  criterion  of  Fajia  law.      

Nevertheless,   the   chapter   “Prince   and   Minister   Part   I”   recognizes   the  

inadequacy  of  a  reliance  on  the  Rujia  alone.    Even  though  it  insists  that  the  rites  are  

the  principal  means  through  which  Man  makes  his  contribution  to  the  cosmos,  the  

chapter   acknowledges   that,   if   its   rites   are   not   institutionalized,   they   will   not   be  

established   as   cultural   norms.     Only   through   institutions   can   the   Rujia   moral  

content   effectively   reach   and   transform   the   ruler’s   subjects.     Hence,   it   too  

recognized  that  a  reliance  on  state  institutions  in  no  way  suggests  a  lack  of  concern  

for  morality.    On  the  contrary,  a  reliance  on  institutions  is  what  allows  the  ruler  to  

be   like   Heaven.   Within   the   human   realm,   the   ruler   develops   his   subjects   like  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
，而民不慕也。有過者，罰之以廢亡之辱，僇死之刑，而民不疾也。殺生不違，而民莫遺其親者
，此唯上有明法，而下有常事也。(Lau  and  Chen  2001:  10.5/78/18-­‐24)  

  248  
Heaven   develops   the   natural   resources   on   the   Earth   that   nourish   human   life.    

Without   institutions,   social   distinctions   that   are   the   foundation   of   the   behavioral  

ideals  in  the  rites,  cannot  be  maintained;  and    that,  according  to  the  Guanzi,  would  

bring  about  danger  of  “cosmic”  proportions.      

New  Ritual  for  a  “New  Day”  

The   three   Rujia-­‐virtue   based   political   visions   also   demonstrate   the  

importance   of   a   culture   of   merit   gong   功 in   Fajia  texts,   defined   by   what   subjects   do  

rather  than  who  they  are.    This  culture  of  merit  was  at  the  foundation  of  the  Fajia  

state’s  creation  of  unity  while  also  making  distinctions  within  it.    It  highlights  the  

change   in   political   organization   between   the   Spring   and   Autumn   period   and  

Warring  States  period  described  by  both  Hsu  and  Lewis  because  Chinese  political  

organization  used  blood-­‐based  ritual  to  create  unity  and  make  distinctions  before  

the   appearance   of   Fajia   texts.     In   the   earlier   periods   of   the   Zhou,   unity   and  

distinctions   were   based   on   the   proximity   to   the   Son   of   Heaven   within   the   noble  

bloodline.      

Jean  Levi  illustrated  this  point  in  his  description  of  the  Zhou  royal  sacrifice  

to  Heaven,  followed  by  distribution  of  the  sacrificial  meat.    Levi  explained  that  two  

bullocks  are  involved  in  the  ritual.    One  bullock  is  burned  as  a  sacrifice  to  Heaven.    

The   other   bullock   is   eaten   in   a   “cascade”430  format,   where   the   Son   of   Heaven   and  

those  belonging  to  the  eldest  lineage  eat  first.    Their  leftovers  are  given  in  turn  to  

the   next   eldest   lineage,   and   this   process   continues   until   the   meat   is   completely  
                                                                                                               
430  Levi  in  Lagerwey  and  Kalinowski  2011:  648;  Levi,  Jean.  “The  Rite,  The  Norm  and  The  Dao:  

Philosophy  of  Sacrifice  and  Transcendence  of  Power  in  Ancient  China”,  John  Lagerwey,  trans.,  in  
John  Lagerwey  and  Marc  Kalinowski,  ed.  Early  Chinese  Religion,  Part  One:  Shang  through  Han  (1250  
B.C  .-­‐  220  A.D.).  Leiden:  Brill,  2011.  

  249  
eaten.   This   cascade,   Levi   explains,   “creates   solidarity   and   marks   distinctions,   in  

such   a   manner   as   to   furnish   the   model   for   both   the   cosmic   order   and   the  

functioning   of   society.” 431     It   is   important   to   note   that   this   meat-­‐eating   ritual  

reflects   the   political   organization   based   on   proximity   to   power   within   noble  

bloodlines.    The  Fajia  texts  and  others  that  incorporated  their  use  of  the  character  

fa  法   clearly   reflect   a   different   basis   of   political   organization,   one   in   which   merit,  

not   bloodline,   is   at   the   foundation   of   the   system   of   organization.     Revisiting   the  

Wuzi’s  ritual  banquet  not  only  reveals  how  the  undeniable  importance  of  ritual  is  

sustained   in   both   kinds   of   political   organizations,   but   also   how   the   basis   of   unity  

and  distinction  in  ritual  shifted.  

In   the   Wuzi,   there   was   a   clear   expression   of   unity   and   distinction   when  

Marquis   Wu   honors   and   rewards   soldiers   at   his   banquet   in   the   ancestral   temple  

and  their  family  members  outside  of  the  ancestral  temple  gates.    In  the  case  of  the  

latter,   it   illustrates   that   the   families   of   the   soldiers   are   considered   to   be   an   integral  

part   of   the   soldier’s   identity,   from   the   perspective   of   the   ruler   and   the   state.    

Therefore,   families   of   soldiers   in   the   armed   forces   are   united   with   them.     This   is  

likely  an  important  reason  why  family  members  are  rewarded  whenever  a  soldier  

from   their   family   is   honored.     However,   distinctions   are   also   made   among   the  

families.    Recall  that  the  Wuzi  stated  how  after  the  banquet,  rewards  are  bestowed  

on   the   parents,   wives   and   children   of   the   soldiers   with   merit   outside   of   the  

ancestral   temple.     The   rewards   they   were   bestowed   also   depended   on   the   merit  

achieved  by  the  soldier  饗畢而出，又頒賜有功者父母妻子於廟門外，亦以功為差.    

                                                                                                               
431  Levi  in  Lagerwey  and  Kalinowski  2011:  655  

  250  
 First,   the   Wuzi   shows   that   the   figure   Marquis   Wu   met   family   members  

outside  of  the  ancestral  temple  gates.  Those  that  did  not  serve  in  the  armed  forces  

directly   may   not   have   been   allowed   to   enter   the   grounds   of   the   ancestral   cult.     This  

would   explain   why   they   also   do   not   take   part   in   the   banquet   or   share   in   its  

sacrificial  meat  in  the  temple.  So,  though  there  are  distinctions  made,  on  the  basis  

of   merit,   between   soldiers,   they   are   nevertheless   unified   within   this   new  

distinction:  those  who  fight  for  the  state  and  those  who  support  those  who  fight  for  

the   state.   In   other   words,   there   appears   to   have   been   privileges   for   those   who  

fought  for  the  state’s  armed  forces  that  were  not  available  to  those  who  did  not.        

Second,   another   distinction   is   made   when   families   of   the   soldiers   who  

attended  the  banquet  are  not  all  honored  and  rewarded  equally.    Thus,  a  separate  

distinction   is   made   distinguishing   family   members   of   soldiers   with   the   highest  

degree   of   merit   from   those   with   a   lesser   degree   of   merit   and   from   those   with   no  

merit.     They   were   honored   and   rewarded   to   the   degree   that   the   soldier   to   whom  

they   are   related   was   honored   and   rewarded.     Therefore,   some   families   received  

more   honors   and   rewards   than   others,   while   other   families   were   not   honored   or  

rewarded   at   all.     They   are   all   unified   by   the   fact   that   all   families   have   the  

opportunity   to   obtain   rewards   and   be   recognized   by   the   Marquis,   based   on   their  

representative’s  performance.    

So  in  a  comparison  to  the  Zhou  royal  ritual  noted  above,  rather  than  meat,  

rewards,  like  seating  arrangement  and  valuable  vessels  and  utensils,  were  meant  to  

distinguish   groups   of   subjects   and   their   families   within   a   unified   body.     In   a  

comparison  of  the  basis  of  political  organization,  merit,  rather  than  noble  bloodline,  

  251  
is   the   foundation   upon   which   the   ruler   and   the   state   distinguish   groups   of   subjects  

and  their  families.    From  a  Fajia  perspective,  this  is  an  important  distinction  for  two  

reasons.    The  first  is  that  when  noble  bloodlines  are  the  foundation  upon  which  a  

subject’s   privileges   and   positions   are   determined,   this   does   not   allow   for   the  

account   of   ascendancy   described   in   the   noted   Li   Si   passage.     Nobody,   of   course,  

chooses   the   family   into   which   they   are   born.     Yet,   when   merit   is   the   foundation  

upon   which   subject’s   or   groups   of   subjects’   privileges   and   positions   are  

determined,  this  does  allow  for  the  sort  of  rise  to  lofty  heights  as  in  the  case  of  Li  Si.    

Thus,  the  individual  subject  has  a  chance  to  affect  an  improvement  in  his  status  in  

this  new  form  of  political  organization.    The  second  is  that  state  ritual  ceases  to  be  

an  exclusionary  royal  activity.  Instead  of  leftovers  of  sacrificial  meat  being  passed  

down  to  members  of  the  mobility  because  of  who  they  are,  rewards  are  bestowed  

to  those  among  the  ruler’s  subjects  because  of  what  they  have  done.  The  sanctity  of  

state   ritual   is   expanded   to   include   all   of   the   ruler’s   subjects   within   orthodoxy.    

Therefore,   Fajia   thought   represents   more   than   a   rejection   of   an   older   aristocratic  

system  that  enabled  the  domination  of  the  nobility  within  a  fief.    At  the  same  time,  

Fajia   competition   is   not   a   rejection   of   privilege   and   hierarchy   in   and   of   itself,   but  

rather   a   rejection   of   the   basis   upon   and   the   scope   within   which   privilege   and  

hierarchy   were   determined.     In   this   sense,   Fajia   thought   revitalized   Rujia   virtue,  

and   the   moral   content   of   other   traditions   during   its   time,   because   it   provided   an  

institutional  blueprint  with  which  they  could  spread  their  respective  gospels.  

  252  
Conclusion  

  This   chapter   has   illustrated   three   different   Rujia   responses   to   the   Fajia  

concept   of   law.     Although   there   was   a   clear   commitment   to   a   Rujia   anatomy   of  

virtue   at   the   foundation   of   the   state,   the   Wuzi,   the   Xunzi,   and   the   Guanzi   all  

incorporated   the   most   remarkable   aspect   of   Fajia   thought:   its   convictions   in  

institutions   as   agents   of   change.     In   the   Wuzi,   the   use   of   the   character   fa   法   was  

considered  to  be  an  expression  of  Rujia   proper  roles  yi   義.    Nevertheless,  the  Fajia  

notion   of   law   was   the   primary   means   by   which   it   commanded   its   army.     In   the  

Xunzi,  the  use  of  the  character  fa  法  was  a  concrete  expression  of  Rujia  rites  li  禮,  

thus   having   a   mandated   Rujia   moral   content.     Additionally,   these   laws   were   not  

supposed   to   be   the   basis   of   evaluation   for   political   elites   or   those   who  

“productively”  demonstrated  Rujia   virtue.    However,  the  Xunzi,  like  Fajia  texts,  did  

rely  on  institutions  to  be  the  basis  of  evaluation  and  agent  of  transformation  for  the  

common  people  or  non-­‐political  elites.    In  the  Guanzi  chapter,  not  only  were  Rujia  

rites   li   禮   at   the   foundation   of   state   activity,   but   they   also   allowed   some   of   the  

ruler’s  subjects  to  implement  their  own  rewards  and  punishments  on  subordinates.    

Still,  they  explicitly  acknowledge  that  the  rites  could  not  adequately  influence  and  

morally   educate   the   ruler’s   subjects   without   law,   rewards,   and   punishments   to  

reinforce  them.    Therefore,  the  concept  of  law  in  Shang  Yang’s  intellectual  tradition,  

theoretically,  fundamentally  changed  Rujia  virtue  because  it  came  to  be  measured  

in  the  same  economic  terms  that  determined  subject  productivity  in  a  Fajia  state.    

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An  equity  principle432  becomes  central  in  defining  the  worth  of  the  Rujia  subject.    In  

other  words,  the  Rujia  state  generally  takes  the  following  moral  stance:  one’s  status  

in  society  is  a  product  of  what  he  cultivates.    This  is  particularly  interesting  because  

Mark   Csikszentmihàlyi   explained   that   discourse   on   material   virtue   in   the   Rujia  

tradition,   beginning   with   the   Xunzi,   was   a   response   “to   address   a   set   of   external  

critiques   made   by   writers   working   from   the   perspective   of   other   theories   of  

value”. 433     This   study   adds   that   the   incorporation   of   Fajia   law   imposed   two  

requirements   on   the   internal   process   of   cultivating   virtue   found   in   the   Xunzi   and  

other   Rujia   texts.     They   of   course   had   to   accept   Fajia   assumptions   of   human  

behavior.     As   a   result,   this   necessitated   an   admission   that   Rujia   moral   education  

was   at   odds   with   what   feels   “natural”   to   most   human   beings.       Second   and   more  

importantly,   cultivated   virtue   had   to   be   explicitly   connected   to  social   status.     Any  

incongruency   between   the   two   variables   would   delegitimize   state   morality.    

Therefore,  by  the  middle  of  the  Warring  States  period,  Fajia  law  had  permeated  and  

                                                                                                               
432  One  of  the  first  thinkers  in  Equity  theory  was  George  Homans.    Homans  asserted  that  

interpersonal  relationships  could  be  explained  by  this  equation:  profit/investments.    Thus,  if  two  or  
more  people  have  equal  ratios  of  profit/investments,  then  the  relationship  is  equitable.    Since  the  
ratio  determines  equity,  Homans  did  not  insist  that  all  parties  are  entitled  to  benefit  from  
relationships  equally.    For  instance,  in  an  employer-­‐employee  relationship,  the  employer  would  be  
considered  to  have  invested  more  into  the  relationship.    Therefore,  the  employer  should  be  entitled  
to  a  greater  share  of  the  profit,  in  proportion  with  his  investment.  Thus,  Homans  pointed  out  that  
inequity  is  suffered  when  parties  experience  relative  advantage  or  relative  deprivation.;  See  
Homans,  George  C.  Social  Behavior:  Its  Elementary  Forms.  New  York:  Harcourt  Brace  World,  1961.  
Homans  refers  to  the  concept  of  relative  deprivation  expounded  in  Merton,  Robert  K.  “Contributions  
to  the  theory  of  reference  group  behavior”,  in  Social  Theory  and  Social  Structure.  New  York:  Free  
Press,  1968.  (originally  1957)    Homans  used  the  term  relative  deprivation  to  refer  to  a  situation  of  
injustice  (or  feeling  of  unfairness)  in  which  an  individual  obtains  less  reward  than  he/she  expects.    
So,  relative  deprivation  or  the  injustice  felt  in  consequence  is  primarily  based  on  an  individual  or  
group’s  perception.  
433  Csikszentmihàlyi  2004:  9;  Csikszentmihàlyi,  Mark.  Material  Virtue:  Ethics  and  the  Body  in  Early  

China.  Leiden:  E.J.  Brill,  2004.  

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reconfigured  Rujia  virtue  and  its  state-­‐administered  moral  education,  providing  the  

foundation  for  material  virtue  discourse.      

  Despite   this   influence,   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang   and   other   Fajia   texts   have  

traditionally   been   considered   amoral   or   anti-­‐morality.434     Although   Fajia   texts   do  

not   devote   much   attention   to   the   specifics   of   their   moral   content,   this   study   has  

shown   that   the   Fajia   notion   of   law   nevertheless   concerned   itself   with   human  

development,   seeking   to   elevate   the   ruler’s   subjects   to   behave   in   ways   that  

contribute  to  state  needs.    Simply  put,  behavior  that  contributed  to  state  needs  was  

considered   ideal   or   “right”.     This   kind   of   behavior   was   rewarded   if   it   was  

extraordinary   enough.     Behavior   that   was   not   viewed   as   a   contribution   to   state  

development   was   considered   “wrong”   or   perverse.     If   this   kind   of   behavior   was  

extraordinarily   perverse   enough,   it   was   punished.   There   are   even   some   textual  

cases   where   education   is   considered   an   important   variable   in   the   Fajia   state’s  

development  of  its  subjects.    Recall  that  the  chapter  “Rewards  and  Punishments”  in  

the   Book   of   Lord   Shang   noted   that   the   results   of   the   “sage”   unifying   education   is  

that   “inferiors   will   listen   to   and   obey   superiors”   and   any   disparity   between   state  

law   and   societal   custom   vanishes.  435     Despite   listing   rewards,   punishments,   and  

education   separately,   this   chapter   clearly   identified   rewards   and   punishments   as  

powerful   instruments   of   state   education,   referring   to   them   as   two   of   the   three  

aspects  of  state  teachings  三教.    This  is  evidence  that   the  Book  of  Lord  Shang  did  in  

                                                                                                               
434  Recall  Graham’s  assertions  that  the  Fajia  approach  to  governance  is  amoral  (Graham  1989:  267)  

and  Duyvendak’s  characterization  of  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang  as  anti-­‐morality  (Duyvendak  1928:  89-­‐
90).  
435 聖人之為國也，壹賞，壹刑，壹教。壹賞則兵無敵。壹刑則令行。壹教則下聽上。夫明賞不費

，明刑不戮，明教不變，而民知於民務，國無異俗。明賞之猶至於無賞也。明刑之猶至於無刑也。
明教之猶至於無教也。(Gao  2011:  135)  

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fact  conceptualize  education  as  a  social  process  or  a  key  method  of  building  an  ideal  

state   and   society.     John   Dewey   defined   education   in   this   way   as   well   when   he  

stated,    

I   believe   that   all   education   proceeds   by   the   participation   of   the  

individual   in   the   social   consciousness   of   the   race.     This   process  
begins   unconsciously   almost   at   birth,   and   is   continually   shaping   the  
individual’s   powers,   saturating   his   consciousness,   forming   his   habits,  
training  his  ideas,  and  arousing  his  feelings  and  emotions.    Through  
this  unconscious  education  the  individual  gradually  comes  to  share  in  
the  intellectual  and  moral  resources  which  humanity  has  succeeded  
in  getting  together.    He  becomes  an  inheritor  of  the  funded  capital  of  
civilization.436  
 
Therefore,   in   order   to   complete   our   understanding   of   Fajia’s   approach   to  

governance,  we  must  discuss  how  it  constructed  the  boundaries  of  ritual  orthodoxy  

from   which   societal   “intellectual   and   moral   resources”   predominantly   sprung.     The  

next  chapter  will  show  that  although  the  various  political  visions  within  the   Rujia  

tradition  did  manipulate  Fajia  ideas  for  their  own  purposes,  these  changes  should  

not  be  viewed  as  fundamental.    In  fact,  the  theoretical  Fajia  expansion  of  state  ritual  

and  cultural  unity  was  such  a  significant  contribution  that  this  study  suggests  that  

Fajia  is  a  religion  that  built  the  state  church.  

                                                                                                               
436  Dewey  1998:  229;  See  Dewey,  John.  The  Essential  Dewey:  Pragmatism,  Education,  Democracy  (vol.  

1).  Larry  A.  Hickman  &  Thomas  M.  Alexander,  eds.  Bloomington:  Indiana  University  Press,  1998.  

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 Chapter  IX  
 
Fajia  Religion  and  the  Fajia  Church  
 

Much   of   this   study   has   focused   on   how   the   Fajia   political   vision   reflected  

significant  changes  in  political  organization  during  its  time  and  even  promoted  its  

ideas  for  development  in  the  future.    However,  what  about  its  continuity?    Ancient  

China   is   known   to   have   been   a   highly   ritualistic   state   culture.   Can   this   fact   be  

reconciled  with  our  depiction  of  Fajia  institution-­‐facilitated  competitive  state?    

Throughout   this   study,   Fajia   governance,   particularly   its   law,   rewards,   and  

punishments,   have   been   interpreted   as   pedagogy,   or   a   means   by   which   the   ruler  

develops   his   subjects.     So   unlike   Kenneth   Winston’s   analysis437,   this   chapter   will  

describe   how   Fajia’s   institutions   create   the   ruler’s   desired   culture,   arguing   that  

Fajia   and   its   ideal   state   can   be   viewed   as   a   religion   and   church   respectively.    

Connecting  this  study’s  interpretation  of  Fajia  governance  with  the  thesis  advanced  

by  John  Lagerwey438,  this  chapter  will  show  that  the  Fajia  approach  to  governance  

is   not   amoral   or   anti-­‐morality;   rather,   it   emphasizes   the   structure   through   which  

morality,  the  differentiation  between  ideal  behavior  and  that  which  is  not,  becomes  

interiorized.     This   does   not   mean   that   the   content   of   morality   is   irrelevant   or  
                                                                                                               
437  This  chapter  distinguishes  itself  from  the  analysis  found  in  Kenneth  Winston.  “The  Internal  

Morality  of  Chinese  Legalism”.  Singapore  Journal  of  Legal  Studies,  December  2005,  p.  313-­‐347  in  at  
least  three  important  ways.    First,  Winston’s  analysis  failed  to  appreciate  the  importance  of  Book  of  
Lord  Shang’s  foundational  ideas  of  law  and  their  immense  influence  on  the  Hanfeizi’s  conception  of  
law.    His  work  additionally  mischaracterized  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang’s  attitude  toward  authority  and  
its  differences  with  that  found  in  the  Hanfeizi.    Second,  Winston’s  argument  failed  to  appreciate  the  
pedagogical  implications  of  the  boundaries  of  law,  which  are  demarcated  by  the  rewards  and  
punishments  themselves  that  facilitate  the  ideal  social  organization.  More  importantly,  it  ignored  
the  pedagogical  value  of  rewards  (and  punishments)  themselves.    Third,  in  addition  to  overstating  
the  morality  of  making  law  public  and  easily  understood,  Winston  minimized  Fajia  law’s  
contribution  to  state  moral  (and  religious)  education.  
438  See  Lagerwey,  John.  China:  A  Religious  State.  Hong  Kong:  Hong  Kong  University  Press,  2010.  

  257  
unimportant.        However,  the  content  of  morality  is,  like  the  Fajia   ruler,  secondary  

to   a   well-­‐functioning   state   apparatus   that   shapes   society.     The   ruler   and   his   chosen  

content   of   morality   must   suitably   respond   to   the   times   and   circumstances,   while  

subjects  must  then  reflect  that  content.      

The  Structure  of  Fajia  Morality  

It  is  clear  that  the  very  idea  of  associating  moral  development  with  a  Fajia  

political  vision  is  controversial.    As  previously  mentioned,  Graham  went  so  far  as  to  

label   a   Fajia   political   vision   as   one   that   consists   of   an   “amoral   science   of  

statecraft”439.     However,   this   study   insists   that   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang   and   other  

Fajia  texts  advocating  for  a  method  of  governance  that  positively  reinforced  some  

behavior  and  punished  others  is  moral  coding  in  itself.    This  study  argues  further  

that   this   moral   coding   is   at   the   heart   of   the   great   genius   of   Fajia   thought,   unlike  

what   Vandermeersch   has   called   a   “pseudo-­‐law”   that   “had   nothing   to   do   with   the  

idea   of   right”   and   was   “formulated   purely   and   simply   as   an   instrument   of  

government”.440     The   way   the   Fajia  state’s   infrastructure   of   governance   is   designed  

to   provide   a   moral   coding   for   its   subjects   reveals   the   astounding   clarity   with   which  

Fajia  thinkers  understood  the  common  human  experience.    

Émile  Durkheim  claimed  that  social  structure  actually  shapes  the  taxonomy  

or  classification  of  things  in  the  human  mind.441    He  asserted,    

                                                                                                               
439  Graham  1989:  267  
440  Vandermeersch  in  Schram  1985:  14;  See  Vandermeersch,  Leon.  “An  Enquiry  into  the  Chinese  

Conception  of  the  Law,”  in  Stuart  R.  Schram,  ed.  The  Scope  of  State  Power  in  China.  Hong  Kong  and  
London:  The  Chinese  University  Press  and  School  of  Asian  and  Oriental  Studies,  University  of  
London,  1985,  p.  3-­‐25.  
441  It  should  be  mentioned  that  Durkheim  does  not  insist  that  taxonomy  is  socially  produced  under  

all  circumstances.    Upon  a  given  population  increasing  to  a  large  enough  degree,  Durkheim  admits  
that  individual  taxonomy  eventually  becomes  autonomous  from  social  organization.    More  

  258  
 …society  is  not  at  all  the  illogical  or  a-­‐logical,  incoherent  and  fantastic  
being  which  it  has  too  often  been  considered.    Quite  on  the  contrary,  
the   collective   consciousness   is   the   highest   form   of   the   psychic   life,  
since  it  is  the  consciousness  of  the  consciousness…  at  every  moment  
of  time,  it  embraces  all  known  reality;  that  is  why  it  alone  can  furnish  
the   mind   with   the   moulds   which   are   applicable   to   the   totality   of  
things  and  which  make  it  possible  to  think  of  them.442  
 
Although   Durkheim   focused   his   analysis   of   taxonomies   on   religious   communities,  

this   study   argues   that   his   insight   can   be   extended   to   ancient   China   or,   more  

specifically,  a  Fajia  political  vision.    Most  appropriate  for  the  purpose  of  this  study  

are  his  notions  of  the  sacred  and  profane:443    

In  all  the  history  of  human  thought  there  exists  no  other  example  of  
two   categories   of   things   so   profoundly   differentiated   or   so   radically  
opposed  to  one  another.    The  traditional  opposition  of  good  and  bad  
is  nothing  beside  this;  for  the  good  and  the  bad  are  only  two  opposed  
species  of  the  same  class,  namely  morals,  just  as  sickness  and  health  
are   two   different   aspects   of   the   same   order   of   facts,   life,   while   the  
sacred  and  the  profane  have  always  and  everywhere  been  conceived  
by   the   human   mind   as   two   distinct   classes,   as   two   worlds   between  
which  there  is  nothing  in  common.444  
 
In   addition   to   insisting   on   the   fact   that   the   sacred   and   profane   “presuppose   a  

classification  of  all  the  things,  real  and  ideal,  of  which  men  think”445,  Durkheim  also  

believed   that   they   provide   a   foundation   for   the   morals   of   society   as   well.     The  

sacred   is   “naturally   considered   superior   in   dignity   and   power   to   profane   things,  

and   particularly   to   man,   when   he   is   only   a   man   and   has   nothing   sacred   about  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
specifically,  he  said,  “As  it  extends,  the  collective  horizon  enlarges;  the  society  ceases  to  appear  as  
the  only  whole,  to  become  a  part  of  a  much  vaster  one,  with  indetermined  frontiers,  which  is  
susceptible  of  advancing  indefinitely.    Consequently  things  can  no  longer  be  contained  in  the  social  
moulds  according  to  which  they  were  primitively  classified;  they  must  be  organized  according  to  
principles  which  are  their  own,  so  logical  organization  differentiates  itself  from  the  social  
organization  and  becomes  autonomous.”  (Durkheim  1915:  1071);  Émile  Durkheim.  Elementary  
Forms  of  Religious  Life.  Joseph  Ward  Swain,  trans.  London:  George  Allen  and  Unwin  Ltd.,  1915.  
(Project  Gutenberg.  Web.  November  13,  2012.)    
442  Durkheim  1915:  1068  
443  Durkheim  1915:  116-­‐117  
444  Durkheim  1915:  121-­‐122  
445  Durkheim  1915:  116  

  259  
him” 446 .     Durkheim   continues   to   explain   that   man   often   thinks   of   himself   as  

“occupying   an   inferior   and   dependent   position   in   relation”447  to   that   which   is  

sacred.     Thus,   the   profane   could   crudely   be   considered   that   which   is   not   sacred,  

since   “the   sacred   thing   is   par  excellence   that   which   the   profane   should   not   touch,  

and  cannot  touch  with  impunity.”448    

  So  if  one  defines  religion  as  the  “representations  which  express  the  nature  of  

sacred  things  and  the  relations  which  they  sustain,  either  with  each  other  or  with  

profane  things”449  while  defining  rites  as  “rules  of  conduct  which  prescribe  how  a  

man   should   comport   himself   in   the   presence   of   these   sacred   objects”450,   then   the  

distinction   between   the   sacred   and   profane   not   only   serves   as   the   foundation   of  

morality   but   the   foundation   of   religious   expression   as   well.       Since   this   study  

extends  Durkheim’s  characterization  of  a  religious  community  to  ancient  China  and  

its   interpretation   of   a   Fajia   political   vision,   then   the   distinction   between   the   sacred  

and   the   profane   become   the   very   foundation   of   the   vertical   classification,   or   the  

hierarchical   ordering   of   things,   in   the   state’s   collective   consciousness.     This   being  

the   case,   a   Fajia-­‐inspired  state   is   essentially   what   Durkheim   defined   as   a   church.    

He  stated,  “A  society  whose  members  are  united  by  the  fact  that  they  think  in  the  

same   way   in   regard   to   the   sacred   world   and   its   relations   with   the   profane   world,  

and  by  the  fact  that  they  translate  these  common  ideas  into  common  practices,  is  

what   is   called   a   Church.”451     So,   “religion…is   inseparable   from   the   idea   of   the  

                                                                                                               
446  Durkheim  1915:  118-­‐119  
447  Durkheim  1915:  119  
448  Durkheim  1915:  125;  his  emphasis  
449  Durkheim  1915:  126  
450  Durkheim  1915:  127  
451  Durkheim  1915:  134  

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church”452.     Therefore,   Durkheim   concluded   that   “a   religion   is   a   unified   system   of  

beliefs   and   practices   relative   to   sacred   things” 453 ;   and   when   those   “beliefs   and  

practices”454  come  to  “unite  into  one  single  moral  community”455  this  forms  a  church.    

Therefore,  if  the  Fajia  state  can  be  thought  of  as  a  community  that  is  unified  by  a  

system   of   beliefs   and   practices   relative   to   the   sacred   and   its   distinction   from   the  

profane,  then  it  would  be  appropriate  to  conceptualize  Fajia  beliefs  and  practices  as  

a  religion  and  the  Fajia  state  as  a  church.    

So,  this  leads  to  an  important  question:  Is  the  distinction  between  the  sacred  

and   the   profane   a   unifying   force   within   a   Fajia   state?     To   answer   this   question,   one  

must   understand   the   “organic   asymmetry” 456  within   Robert   Hertz’s   lateral  

classification.     Hertz   observed   that,   within   many   societies,   there   was   a   “religious  

polarity”   that   upheld   “the   pre-­‐eminence   of   the   right   hand”.457     Hertz,   a   student   of  

Durkheim,  applied  his  teacher’s  distinction  between  the  sacred  and  the  profane  to  

his  analysis  of  the  right  and  the  left.    Like  Durkheim,  Hertz  considered  the  sacred  

and  profane  to  be  complementary  in  addition  to  being  in  opposition  to  each  other.    

This  is  how  “rigid  hierarchical  structures”  with  “classes  or  castes”  develop.458     One  

stratum,   “at   the   summit”,   is   considered   “sacred,   noble,   and   devoted   to   superior  

works,   while   another,   at   the   bottom,   is   profane   or   unclean   and   engaged   in   base  

                                                                                                               
452  Durkheim  1915:  137  
453  Durkheim  1915:  142  
454  Durkheim  1915:  142  
455  Durkheim  1915:  142;  his  emphasis  
456  Hertz  in  Needham  1973:  3;  See  Hertz,  Robert.  “Pre-­‐eminence  of  the  Right  Hand:  A  Study  in  

Religious  Polarity”,  in  Rodney  Needham,  ed.  Right  and  Left:  Essays  on  Dual  Symbolic  Classification.  
Chicago:  The  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1973.  
457  Hertz  in  Needham  1973:  3  
458  Hertz  in  Needham  1973:  8  

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tasks”. 459     So,   “social   polarity”   becomes   a   “reflection”   of   “religious   polarity”.460    

Therefore,   Hertz   considered   the   asymmetry   between   the   right   and   the   left   to   be   an  

expression   of   the   polarity   and   hierarchy   between   the   sacred   and   the   profane.     So  

Hertz   proclaimed,   “What   resemblance   more   perfect   than   that   between   our   two  

hands!     And   yet   what   a   striking   inequality   there   is!     To   the   right   hand   go   honors,  

flattering  designations,  prerogatives:  it  acts,  orders,  and  takes.    The  left  hand,  on  the  

contrary,  is  despised  and  reduced  to  the  role  of  a  humble  auxiliary:  by  itself  it  can  

do  nothing;  it  helps,  it  supports,  it  holds.    The  right  hand  is  the  symbol  and  model  of  

all  aristocracies,  the  left  hand  of  all  plebians.    What  are  the  titles  of  nobility  of  the  

right  hand?    And  whence  comes  the  servitude?”461  

However,   Marcel   Granet   explained   that   “whereas   the   Chinese   are   right-­‐

handed,  the  honorable  side  for  them  is  the  left”.462    Granet  also  warned  that  “the  right  

is   not   absolutely   inauspicious,   nor   is   the   left   always   auspicious”,   since   “the   Chinese  

attribute   values   to   left   and   right   which   are   unequal,   and   relative   to   the  

circumstances,   but   are   always   comparable”. 463     Granet   also   illustrated   how  

“etiquette”   or   ritual   reveals   how   “everything   is   a   matter   of   convention,   because  

everything   is   a   matter   of   what   is   fitting”.464     In   one   example,   Granet   pointed   out  

ritual  oaths  for  “conjugal  or  military  companionship”  concluded  with  the  “clasping  

                                                                                                               
459  Hertz  in  Needham  1973:  8  
460  Hertz  in  Needham  1973:  8  
461  Hertz  in  Needham  1973:  3  
462  Granet  in  Needham  1973:  44;  his  emphasis;  Granet,  Marcel.  “Right  and  Left  in  China”,  in  Rodney  

Needham,  ed.  Right  and  Left:  Essays  on  Dual  Symbolic  Classification.  Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  
Press,  1973.  
463  Granet  in  Needham  1973:  44  
464  Granet  in  Needham  1973:  44;  his  emphasis  

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of   right   hands”   and   a   “blood-­‐pact”   where   blood   is   “taken   from   the   right   arm”.465    

While   in   a   “solemn   oath”,   “one   that   is   binding   in   law”   and   “sworn   under   the   eyes   of  

the  gods”,  blood  is  taken  from  the  victim’s  left  ear.466    Granet  explained  that  in  these  

solemn   oaths,   blood   is   taken   from   the   victim’s   left   ear   in   order   to   consume   its  

breath   qi   氣.467     Thus,   Granet   pointed   out   that   though   there   is   a   “pre-­‐eminence   of  

the   right   when   the   hands   are   involved”,   there   is   “a   pre-­‐eminence   of   the   left   when   it  

is   the   ears”.468     Interestingly,   Granet   pointed   out   that   this   illustrated   the   opposition  

between   the   “upper   part   of   the   body   and   the   lower   part”.469     In   other   words,   the  

upper  part  of  the  body  is  sacred  relative  to  the  lower  part,  just  as  the  left  part  of  the  

body   is   sacred   relative   to   the   right   part.     Therefore   it   should   be   no   surprise   that  

Granet   also   explained   that,   in   the   relationship   between   “chief   and   vassal”470,   “the  

chief   is   associated   with   the   south”471  and   “the   vassal   with   the   north”472  so   that   “the  

chief,   who   stands   with   his   face   to   the   south,   has   the   east   to   his   left”473  while   the  

vassal  faces  the  north  with  the  west  to  his  left.    Therefore,  “there   is   an   equivalence  

between   west   and   right,   and   between   east   and   left”474  and   Granet   asserted   that  

“these  are  absolute  equivalences  which  are  always  valid”475.  

                                                                                                               
465  Granet  in  Needham  1973:  46  
466  Granet  in  Needham  1973:  46  
467  Granet  in  Needham  1973:  46-­‐47  
468  Granet  in  Needham  1973:  47  
469  Granet  in  Needham  1973:  47  
470  Granet  in  Needham  1973:  50  
471  Granet  in  Needham  1973:  50  
472  Granet  in  Needham  1973:  50  
473  Granet  in  Needham  1973:  50;  his  emphasis  
474  Granet  in  Needham  1973:  48;  his  emphasis  
475  Granet  in  Needham  1973:  50  

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 Granet’s  analysis  is  reinforced  by  Lagerwey’s  chart,  inspired  by  the  Rites  of  

Zhou  周禮,  in  which  he  introduced  the  “larger  picture”476  of  Chinese  religion.    It  was  

presented  as  the  following477:  

Right/West   Center   Left/East  

Earth  god  altar  社   Palace  宮   Ancestral  Temple  
廟  
Territory  地緣     Lineage  血緣  
Yin  陰     Yang  陽  
Tomb     Ancestor  hall  
Military  武     Civil  文  
Red  rites    紅事     White  rites  白事  
 

The  Book   of   Lord   Shang  describes  the  rewards  as  the  civil  and  punishments  as  the  

martial   aspects   of   state   ritual.   More   specifically,   “The   Cultivation   of   Political  

Assessment”  asserts:  “Rewards  are  the  ‘Civil’.    Punishments  are  the  ‘Martial’.    The  

‘Civil’   and   ‘Martial’   are   the   essential   outline   of   law.     Therefore,   a   clear-­‐sighted   ruler  

relies   on   laws.”478   So,   this   study   argues   that   the   Fajia   notion   of   law   and   its  

reinforcements  were  not  conceived  in  a  way  that  would  violate  the  aforementioned  

ritual  absolutes  pointed  out  by  Granet  and  Lagerwey.    Therefore,  the  Fajia  notion  of  

law  would  consist  of  a  ritualistic  anatomy  like  the  following:  

Right/West   Center   Left/East  

Punishment/Deprivation   Law  法   Reward/positive  
reinforcement  
Military  武     Civil  文  
Crime  罪     Merit  功  
Private  私     Public  公  
Death  死     Life  生  
Yin  陰     Yang  陽  

                                                                                                               
476  Lagerwey  2010:  7  
477  The  chart  can  also  be  found  in  Lagerwey  2010:  7  
478凡賞者文也。刑者武也。文武者法之約也。故明主任法。  (Gao  2011:  120)  

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Immoral     Moral  
Failure  in  Competition     Success  in  
Competition    
Quality  of  Baseness     Quality  of  Nobility  
Downward  mobility     Upward  mobility  
 

So  generally,  on  the  one  hand,  there  are  rewards,  on  the  left/east,  that  essentially  

characterize  the  sacred,  the  public,  the  honorable,  and  life,  especially  when  it  is  an  

expression   of   success   in   warfare.     On   the   other   hand,   punishments,   on   the  

right/west,  that  essentially  characterize  the  profane,  the  private,  the  criminal,  and  

death,   especially   when   it   is   an   expression   of   failure   in   warfare.     The   law,   occupying  

the   same   position   of   the   ruler   and   his   palace   in   the   Rites   of   Zhou   chart,  

fundamentally   serves   to   protect   and   isolate   that   which   is   sacred   from   that   which   is  

profane.    This  again  highlights  how  in  the  Fajia  state,  after  the  ruler  has  established  

them,  the  law  should  be  the  ultimate  grounds  for  evaluation  and  judgment.    The  law  

establishes   structural   competition,   domestically,   that   defines   who   is   noble   and  

upwardly  mobile.    More  specifically,  the  Guanzi  provides  evidence  of  the  congruity  

between  the  Fajia  notion  of  law  and  the  aforementioned  ritualistic  absolutes.  “Ban  

Fa”  and  “Ban  Fa  Jie”479  in  the  Guanzi  state:      

[BF]   In   the   establishment   of   all   affairs,   correct   them   according   to  

Heaven’s   order.   [BFJ]   Law   models   the   positions   of   Heaven   and   Earth.    
It   imitates   the   movements   of   the   four   seasons   in   order   to   properly  
govern  all  under  Heaven.    As  for  the  movements  of  the  four  seasons,  
they   bring   cold   and   heat.     The   sage   ruler   models   them,   thereby  
establishing   civil   and   military   functions   and   rituals.     As   for   the  
positions  of  Heaven  and  Earth,  there  is  the  front  and  the  back,  the  left  

                                                                                                               
479  I  have  abbreviated  “Ban  Fa”  版法  to  “[BF]”  and  “Ban  Fa  Jie”  版法解  to  “[BFJ]”.    I  only  mention  the  

“Ban  Fa  Jie”  版法解  to  lead  in  to  the  quote  because  the  “Ban  Fa”  版法  portion  of  the  cited  quote  is  
reiterated  in  the  “Ban  Fa  Jie”  版法解.    I  do  the  same  for  “On  Conditions  and  Circumstances”  and  
“Explaining  ‘On  Conditions  and  Circumstances’”.  

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 and   the   right.     The   sage   ruler   models   them   in   order   to   establish  
standards  and  rules.480  
 
Explicitly   connecting   rewards   and   punishments   with   yin   and   yang,   the   Guanzi  

chapters   “On   Conditions   and   Circumstances”   and   “Explaining   ‘On   Conditions   and  

Circumstances’”  also  states:    

[XS]  As  for  spring,  autumn,  winter,  and  summer,  they  do  not  vary  in  
their  seasonal  activity.    From  antiquity  to  the  present  day,  they  have  
remained   consistent.     [XSJ]   In   the   spring,   the   yang’s   vital   force   begins  
to   rise.     Therefore,   the   ten   thousand   things   are   produced.     In   the  
summer,   the   yang’s   vital   force   reaches   its   peak.     Therefore,   the   ten  
thousand   things   reach   their   maturity.     In   the   autumn,   the   yin’s   vital  
force   begins   to   descend.     Therefore,   the   ten   thousand   things   are  
harvested.     In   the   winter,   the   yin’s   vital   force   reaches   its   trough.    
Therefore,  the  ten  thousand  things  are  stored  away.    Therefore,  in  the  
spring  and  summer,  there  is  production  and  maturity.    In  the  autumn  
and  winter,  there  is  harvesting  and  storage.    These  are  the  activities  
of   the   four   seasons.     As   for   bestowing   rewards   and   meting   out  
punishments,  these  are  the  activities  of  the  ruler.    Never  once  do  the  
four   seasons   fail   to   produce   life   and   death.     Never   once   should   the  
ruler   fail   to   administer   rewards   and   punishments.     Therefore,   it   is  
said:  “As  for  spring,  autumn,  winter,  and  summer,  they  do  not  vary  in  
their   seasonal   activity.”     Heaven   envelops   the   ten   thousand   things  
and   regulates   them.     Earth   supports   the   ten   thousand   things   and  
nourishes   them.     As   for   the   four   seasons   causing   the   ten   thousand  
things  to  reach  maturity,  harvesting,  and  storing  them,  from  antiquity  
to  the  present,  never  did  their  Way  vary.    Therefore  it  is  said:  “From  
antiquity  to  the  present  day,  they  have  remained  consistent”.481  
 
These  passages  show  how  the  very  essence  of  law,  its  reinforcement,  and  the  ruler  

himself  in  the  Guanzi  must  imitate  the  movements  of  the  four  seasons  in  order  to  

properly   establish   the   civil   and   martial   ritual   within   the   state.     More   importantly  
                                                                                                               
480  [BF]凡將立事，正彼天植。(Lau  and  Chen  2001:  2.2/16/27)  [BFJ]（版）法者，法天地之位，象

四時之行，以治天下。四時之行，有寒有暑，聖人法之，故有文有武。天地之位，有前有後，有
左有右，聖人法之，以建經紀。(Lau  and  Chen  2001:  21.2/151/27)      
481  [XS]  春秋冬夏，不更其節，古今一也。(Lau  and  Chen  2001:  1.2/3/1)  [XSJ] 春者，陽氣始上，

故萬物生。夏者，陽氣畢上，故萬物長。秋者，陰氣始下，故萬物收。冬者，陰氣畢下，故萬物
藏；故春夏生長，秋冬收藏，四時之節也。賞賜刑罰，主之節也。四時未嘗不生殺也，主未嘗不
賞罰也；故曰：「春秋冬夏，不更其節也。」天覆萬物而制之，地載萬物而養之，四時生長萬物
而收藏之，古以至今，不更其道，故曰：「古今一也。」(Lau  and  Chen  2001:  20.1/140/7-­‐12)  

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though,  it  illustrates  how  the  Fajia  notion  of  law  was  likely  conceptualized  to  be  the  

primary   means   through   which   the   ruler   and   his   state   established   the   civil   and  

military   functions   and   rituals   that   were   so   important   in   state   activity   in   ancient  

China.     This   may   be   the   one   reason   why   the   Fajia   notion   of   law   was   so   easily  

incorporated  into  other  traditions  of  thought  later  in  the  Warring  States  period,  the  

Han  dynasty,  and  beyond.    

In  short,  the  Fajia  notion  of  law  is  the  foundation  of  the  state’s  configuration  

that   imposes   a   binary   moral   coding   that   is   supported   and   strengthened   by   positive  

reinforcement   and   deprivation.     More   simply   put,   the   way   a   Fajia   state  

communicates   what   is   and   is   not   desirable   behavior   is   through   a   psychological  

“classificatory   symbolism”482.     This   is   associated   with   the   sacred   and   the   profane  

that   is   defined   by   the   Son   of   Heaven   tianzi   天子483  or   the   ruler   of   a   Fajia   state.     Due  

to   his   semi-­‐divine   position,   acting   as   the   intermediary   between   the   human   world  

and   the   extra-­‐human   realm,   he   represents   the   sacred.   Since   Durkheim   has  

informed  us  that  rites  are  how  Fajia  subjects  should  behave  in  the  presence  of  the  

sacred  (their  ruler),  then  Fajia  law  prescribes  the  network  of  rites  through  which  

Fajia   subjects   understand   the   demanded   underlying   values   of   their   state’s  

“collective  consciousness”484.    In  other  words,  the  law  is  the  vehicle  through  which  

the   Fajia   subject   morally   integrates   into   the   state   because   moral   lessons   are   drawn  

from  the  degree  to  which  the  subject  feels  membership  with  the  collective.    So  the  

                                                                                                               
482  Schwartz  1981:  14;  See  Schwartz,  Barry.  Vertical  Classification.  Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  

Press,  1981.  
483  The  term  “Son  of  Heaven”  is  used  four  times  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang’s  last  chapter,  “The  Fixing  

of  Rights  and  Duties”.  

484  Hertz  1973:  21  

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rites   prescribed   by   the   law   are   the   basis   on   which   subjects   value   their   own  

behavior,  as  right  or  wrong.    This  is  a  crucial  element  in  how  a  moral  community,  or  

the  state  church,  forms.    A  Fajia  subject  becomes  unified  with  other  members  in  the  

state,  thereby  becoming  eligible  for  rewards,  through  the  system  of  values,  beliefs,  

and   practices   in   relation   to   the   sacred.     Therefore,   Fajia   law   and   its   rewards   and  

punishments  represent  an  emphasis  on  the  structure  of  morality  much  more  than  

the  actual  content.    This  explains  why  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang  and  other  Fajia  texts  

consistently  argue  that  the  ideal  ruler  must  govern  in  accordance  with  the  present  

times   and   circumstances.     So   then   it   should   be   no   surprise   that   the   Book  of  Lord  

Shang  asserts,  “The  prince  (and  the  people)  possesses  likes  and  dislikes.    Therefore,  

the   people   can   be   governed.     The   prince   cannot   not   examine   [their]   likes   and  

dislikes.     As   for   [these]   likes   and   dislikes,   they   are   the   foundation   of   rewards   and  

punishments.”485  This   form   of   communication   strikes   at   the   very   heart   of   how  

human   beings   almost   universally   come   to   understand   the   world   around   them.   This  

is   precisely   why   it   is   almost   impossible   that   the   subjects   of   a   Fajia   state   did   not  

come  to  associate  that  which  is  moral  with  that  which  is  rewarded  and  vice  versa.    

Foucault  explicitly  pointed  to  the  connection  between  the  mechanisms  of  discipline  

and   the   establishment   of   a   value   system   at   the   level   of   the   individual   when   he  

stated:  

In   discipline,   punishment   is   only   one   element   of   a   double   system:  

gratification-­‐punishment.     And   it   is   this   system   that   operates   in   the  
process   of   training   and   correction…This   mechanism   with   two  
elements   makes   possible   a   number   of   operations   characteristic   of  
disciplinary   penality.     First,   the   definition   of   behaviour   and  
performance  on  the  basis  of  the  two  opposed  values  of  good  and  evil;  
                                                                                                               
485  人君而有好惡；故民可治也。人君不可以不審好惡。好惡者，賞罰之本也。(Gao  2011:  98)  

  268  
 instead  of  the  simple  division  of  the  prohibition,  as  practiced  in  penal  
justice,  we  have  a  distribution  between  a  positive  pole  and  a  negative  
pole;   all   behaviour   falls   in   the   field   between   good   and   bad   marks,  
good   and   bad   points.     Moreover,   it   is   possible   to   quantify   this   field  
and   work   out   an   arithmetical   economy   based   on   it.     A   penal  
accountancy,   constantly   brought   up   to   date,   makes   it   possible   to  
obtain  the  punitive  balance  sheet  of  each  individual.486  
 
Although   the   focus   of   Foucault’s   emphasis   was   clearly   on   the   punishment   aspect   of  

what   he   called   a   “double   system”   of   “gratification-­‐punishment”,   he   nevertheless  

points   to   the   clear   binary   moral   coding   that   establishes   “good   and   evil”   or   “a  

positive  pole  and  a  negative  pole”.    This  study  has  demonstrated  that  the  Fajia  state  

can  be  thought  of  as  a  community  that  is  unified  by  a  system  of  beliefs  and  practices  

about   the   sacred   and   its   distinction   from   the   profane.     So   it   can   be   said   that   Fajia   is  

a  religion  and  the  Fajia  state  is  a  church.      

  This   is   sub-­‐category   within   Lagerwey’s   thesis:   “…China   is   a   religious   state  

and  Chinese  society  is  a  religious  society”487.    He  explained,  “‘China’  is  but  ‘all  under  

Heaven’   (tianxia   天下),   and   it   is   encapsulated   in   the   vast   sacred   body   of   the  

universe,   which   includes   Heaven   and   Earth   and   the   Yin   and   the   Yang,   two   energies  

in   perpetual   embrace   whose   waxings   and   wanings   determine   the   agricultural  

season   and   the   ritual   calendar   not   only   of   the   Son   of   Heaven,   but   of   the   peasants   as  

well”.488     Since   “all   space   in   China   is   conceived   of   as   sacred”489,   the   “law   is   itself   but  

the   social   version”490  of   this   natural   law   that   informs   ritual   expression.     In   other  

words,   to   be   extraordinarily   productive   in   accordance   with   Fajia   law   cannot   be  

                                                                                                               
486  Foucault  1977:  180  
487  Lagerwey  2010:  17  
488  Lagerwey  2010:  16  
489  Lagerwey  2010:  17  
490  Lagerwey  2010:  23  

  269  
minimized   to   mere   compliance.     Nor   can   it   be   reduced   to   a   preoccupation   with  

material   welfare.     Instead,   it   must   be   viewed   as   the   ultimate   recognition   of   the  

“divine  energies”491  that  pervade  throughout  the  “continent  of  spirits”492.    Through  

this  recognition,  the  individual  plays  his  role  in  ensuring  not  only  his  own  but  also  

his   state’s   survival   and   material   prosperity.     In   the   Fajia   tradition,   there   is   no   more  

moral   pursuit   than   this.   Therefore,   it,   and   particularly   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang,  

represents  a  crucial  breakthrough  in  what  Lagerwey  has  concluded  about  imperial  

Chinese   history.     It   not   only   provides   the   ideological   foundation   for   bureaucratic  

structure   in   imperial   Chinese   history,   but   it   more   importantly   initiates   the  

remarkably  sophisticated  operational  approach  by  which  the  Chinese  “church-­‐state”  

proselytized  its  religion(s).      

Conclusion  

This   chapter   has   suggested   that   the   Fajia   approach   to   governance   does  

demonstrate   a   concern   for   morality.     Its   concern   however   is   just   not   expressed  

through   a   commitment   to   a   specific   anatomy   of   virtue,   differing   from   the   Rujia  

tradition.     Instead,   the   institutional   infrastructure   of   its   state   is   designed   to   do  

educate  its  subjects  with  whatever  content  the  ruler  defines  as  appropriate  to  the  

times   and   cirucmstances.     This   recognition   of   the   psychological   power   and  

behavioral   influence   of   a   human   being’s   environment   is   arguably   the   most  

impressive  achievement  of  Fajia  thought.    In  a  trailblazing  step  forward  in  ancient  

Chinese  political  thought,  its  rewards  and  punishments  represented  a  sophisticated  

                                                                                                               
491  Lagerwey  2010:  17  
492  Lagerwey  2010:  17  

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institutional  response  to  the  hierarchized  dualistic  thought  that  is  nearly  universal  

in  human  thought.      

In   response   to   Lévi-­‐Straussian   assertions 493  about   the   sociology   of  

knowledge,   Barry   Schwartz   argued   that   “vertical   opposition   provides   an   analogy  

not  only  for  a  contrast  in  social  relations  (superordination  and  subordination)  but  

also   for   contrasts   which   define   grander   themes:   extraordinary   and   routine,   good  

and  evil,  sacred  and  profane”494.    Yet,  an  important  question  still  remains:  how  do  

the  aforementioned  “grander  themes”  develop?    How  do  meanings  get  assigned  to  

the  “vertical  opposition”  in  social  relations  like  “superordination  and  subordination”  

and  noble  and  base?    Schwartz  asserted  that  meanings  are  assigned  as  a  result  of  

our  very  first  experiences  in  the  world.    More  specifically,  he  argued  that  the  “direct  

interchange  between  a  parent  and  infant  takes  place  within  a  context  of  unilateral  

dependency”495.    Almost  universally,  the  first  meaningful  interactions  in  the  world  

for   individuals   are   those   they   have   with   their   mothers   (or,   of   course,   fathers)   as  

babies.     It   is   within   the   “unilateral   dependency”   between   baby   and   caretaker   that  

“the   contrast   up/down   is   equated   to   the   contrast   reward/deprivation” 496  in   a  

baby’s   mind.     Schwartz   explained,   “Given   the   gratification   associated   with   being  

‘lifted  up,’  to  be  ‘put  down’  must  be  interpreted  by  the  child  as  a  mode  of  rejection  

which   might,   for   all   the   child   knows,   be   permanent   and   therefore   is   feared   by  

                                                                                                               
493  See   Lévi-­‐Strauss,   Claude.   Structural  Anthropology.   Jacobson,   Claire   and   Brooke   Grundfest   Schoepf,  

trans.  Garden  City,  NY:  Doubleday  &  Company,  Inc./Anchor  Books,  1967.;  See  also  Lévi-­‐Strauss,  
Claude.  Totemism.  Rodney  Needham,  trans.  Harmondsworth,  UK:  Penguin  Books,  1969.  
494  Schwartz  1981:  80;  See  Schwartz,  Barry.  Vertical  Classification.  Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  

Press,  1981.  
495  Schwartz  1981:  102  
496  Schwartz  1981:  102  

  271  
him.”497     In   other   words,   reinforcement   is   naturally   associated   with   the   dominant  

spatial   relationship   in   infancy.     Babies   experience   the   positive   reinforcement   of  

emotional  intimacy,  food,  and  attention  after  they  are  picked  up.    They  experience  

the   deprivation   of   emotional   distance,   hunger,   and   isolation   when   babies   are   put  

down.     Therefore,   based   on   their   own   experiences,   babies   begin   to   strongly  

associate   meaning,   “good”   and   “bad”,   with   the   experiences   that   provide   positive  

reinforcement  or  impose  deprivation.      Moreover,  the  “ecology  of  the  parent-­‐child  

relationship”,  especially  when  it  corresponds  with  linguistic  and  perceptual  forms  

of  vertical  classification,  can  then  serve  “as  a  prototype  for  the  vertical  mapping  of  

social  inequalities  prior  to  and  independently  of  our  appreciation  of  nature”.498      

Though   eventually,   the   unilateral   dependency   that   Schwartz   described  

begins   to   change.     As   infants   develop,   they   recognize   their   own   ability   or   agency   to  

experience   positive   reinforcement,   especially   that   which   enables   them   to   survive  

and  prosper,  and  avoid  deprivation,  especially  that  which  does  not  enable  them  to  

survive   and   prosper.     This   is   particularly   important   in   understanding   the   Fajia  

notion   of   fa,   because   it   is   designed   to   accommodate   this   nearly   universal   human  

cognizance.    On  the  one  hand,  it  offers  rewards  that  represent  the  ruler’s  subjects’  

opportunities   to   maximize   the   resources   necessary   to   ensure   their   survival   and  

prosperity.     On   the   other   hand,   it   imposes   deprivation   and   punishments   that  

represent   conditions   that   make   survival   or   prosperity   less   likely.     However,   the  

Fajia   notion   of   law   represents   more   than   opportunity   or   the   lack   thereof.     It   insists  

on   the   inseparability   between   opportunity   to   survive   and   prosper   and   what   the  
                                                                                                               
497  Schwartz  1981:  103  
498  Schwartz  1981:  118  

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ruler  defines  as  the  sacred,  or  desirable  behavior,  and  the  profane,  or  behavior  not  

considered  desirable.  

  273  
 Chapter  X  
 
 Concluding  Assertions  
 
This   study   demonstrates   that   the   prioritization   of   ideas   as   a   methodology  

remains   useful   when   applied   to   Warring   States   period   texts.     It   is   important   to  

continue  to  explore  the  ideas  in  texts  because  their  relationship  with  their  context  

is   symbiotic.     Of   course,   ideas   certainly   depend   on   their   social   and   political   context,  

or  on  a  larger  oral  tradition  to  be  appropriately  understood.    However,  an  adequate  

understanding  of  such  a  context  depends  at  least  in  part  on  the  depth  and  accuracy  

with   which   we   can   understand   the   ideas   in   extant   texts.     Of   course,   the   degree   to  

which   ideas   deepen   the   understanding   of   their   context   will   differ.     In   this   work,   the  

examination   of   ideas   in   this   study   provided   insight   into   questions   of   linguistic,  

historical,  and  pedagogical  importance.    

This   study   also   shows   that   Warring   States   thinkers   generally   shared   a  

common   foundation   for   their   debate:   a   concern   with   human   development.     Yuri  

Pines  hinted  at  this  idea  when  he  stated,    

‘People-­‐bashers’   like   Shang   Yang   and   ‘people-­‐lovers’   like   Mengzi  

agreed   on   the   most   basic   point:   the   people   are   the   only   true   end   of  
political   action.     This   conviction,   even   before   we   discuss   its   actual  
impact   on   everyday   political   life,   can   be   singled   out   as   one   of   the  
most  important  peculiarities  of  Zhanguo  political  thought.499      
 
Pines’  “people-­‐bashers”  and  “people  lovers”  dichotomy  lacks  precision.    Indeed,  the  

notion  that  “people”  were  “the  only  true  end  of  political  action”  can  be  even  more  

specific.     This   study   argues   that   the   ultimate   objective   of   thinkers   in   the   Warring  

                                                                                                               
499  Pines  2009:  203;  See  Pines,  Yuri.  Envisioning  Eternal  Empire:  Chinese  Political  Thought  of  the  

Warring  States  Era.  Honolulu:  University  of  Hawai‘i  Press,  2009.  

  274  
States   period   was   the   achievement   of   what   they   viewed   as   the   overall   welfare   of  

the   human   condition.     They   also   recognized   that   the   achievement   of   this   ultimate  

objective   could   only   occur   through   the   successful   developing   of   people.     Therefore,  

the   above   passage   describing   Shang   Yang   as   a   “people-­‐basher”   is   misleading  

because  it  obscures  the  fact  that  the  ultimate  objective  of  the  Fajia  state  requires  a  

minimal  concern  for  the  welfare  of  the  ruler’s  subjects.    More  specifically,  there  is  a  

sub-­‐goal  of  human  development  that  must  be  achieved  in  order  for  the  Fajia   state  

to  enrich  and  strengthen  itself.    This  is  the  indispensable  pedagogical  aspect  of  the  

law,   albeit   coercive   and   described   with   “alienating   rhetoric”500,   in   the   political  

vision  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang  and  other  Fajia  texts.    As  this  conclusion  will  later  

illustrate,  the  characteristics  of  the  Fajia  notion  of  law  are  in  accordance  with  a  long  

tradition   of   state   ritual   in   which   religious   and   spiritual   significance   dominated  

political  practice.  

In  addition,  this  study  highlights  the  fact  that  the   Fajia  notion  of  law,  within  

the  Warring  States  textual  traditions,  was  conceptualized  to  be  much  more  than  the  

“official   law”   of   state   or   empire   with   two   main   components   “penal   law   and  

administrative   law”.501     It   shares   powerful   similarities   with   what   Foucault   called  

“the  examination”502 .    Foucault  elaborated  saying:  

                                                                                                               
500  Pines  2012:  79  
501  MacCormack  1996:  18;  See  MacCormack,  Geoffrey.  The  Spirit  of  Traditional  Chinese  Law.  Athens:  

University  of  Georgia  Press,  1996.;  See  also  Metzger,  Thomas  A.  The  Internal  Organization  of  Ch’ing  
Bureaucracy:  Legal,  Normative,  and  Communication  Aspects.  Cambridge:  Harvard  University  Press,  
1973.  In  his  explanation  of  administrative  law,  Metzger  referred  to  the  fact  that  imperial  Chinese  
law  had  an  “internal”  aspect  that  “largely  concerned  conditions  of  cooperation  between  the  
bureaucrats  and  the  emperor  rather  than  bureaucratic  activities  directly  affecting  the  social  world  
outside  the  bureaucracy”.  (Metzger  1973:  1)      
502  Foucault  1977:  184  

  275  
 The  examination  combines  the  techniques  of  an  observing  hierarchy  
and   those   of   a   normalizing   judgment.     It   is   a   normalizing   gaze,   a  
surveillance   that   makes   it   possible   to   qualify,   to   classify   and   to  
punish.     It   establishes   over   individuals   a   visibility   through   which   one  
differentiates   them   and   judges   them.     That   is   why,   in   all   the  
mechanisms   of   discipline,   the   examination   is   highly   ritualized.     In   it  
are   combined   the   ceremony   of   power   and   the   form   of   the  
experiment,  the  deployment  of  force  and  the  establishment  of  truth.    
At   the   heart   of   the   procedures   of   discipline,   it   manifests   the  
subjection   of   those   who   are   perceived   as   objects   and   the  
objectification  of  those  who  are  subjected.  
 
This   is   what   I   have   argued   about   the   Fajia   notion   of   law.   It   is   more   than   an  

instrument   of   governance.   It   is   a   disciplinary   mechanism   meant   to   develop   the  

ruler’s  subjects  in  accordance  with  its  established  truth.    Unlike  Cheng’s  description  

of  the  Fajia  notion  of  law  as  a  specific  “term  for  a  code  of  punishment  or  codified  

norm   of   punishment”503,   while   being   “deterministic,   dictatorship-­‐oriented,   ruler-­‐

oriented,   manipulational,   state-­‐dominated,   and   externalistic”504,   this   study   argues  

that  the  Fajia   notion  of  law  facilitates   the   development   of   the   state   and   its   subjects  

through   its   differentiation   and   classification   in   a   “highly   ritualized”   way.     Still,   it  

may  not  be  pedagogical  or  concerned  with  human  development  in  the  same  way  as  

Rujia  texts.505     Whereas  Rujia  texts  appear  to  concern  themselves  with  maximizing  

state   development   through   the   maximization   of   human   development,   Fajia   texts  

appear   to   only   concern   themselves   with   human   development   to   the   degree   to  

which  it  ensures  the  maximization  of  state  development.  Fajia’s  complete  focus  on  

the  enrichment  and  strengthening  of  the  state  determined  how  its  law  was  applied,  

                                                                                                               
503  Cheng  1991:  315;  See  Cheng  Zhongying.“Legalism  versus  Confucianism:  A  Philosophical  

Appraisal”,  in  Cheng  Zhongying.  New  Dimensions  of  Confucian  and  Neo-­‐Confucian  Philosophy.  Albany,  
NY:  State  University  of  New  York  Press,  1991,  p.  311-­‐320.  
504  Cheng  1991:  330  
505  However,  more  attention  should  definitely  be  devoted  to  their  similarities,  particularly  the  

notion  of  law  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang  and  the  ritual  in  Rujia  texts.  

  276  
creating   channels   for   pursuing   private   profit   in   agriculture   and   warfare   while  

depriving  and  punishing  activity  outside  of  them.      

   The   Fajia   tradition   indeed   placed   too   much   faith   in   a   centralization   of  

power   that   insisted   on   uniformity,   viewing   it   as   the   crucial   element   needed   to  

fundamentally   change   society   by   exercising   state   power.     In   this   sense,   their  

thought  was  far  from  progressive  and,  in  many  ways,  represented  an  extreme  form  

of   the   Spring   and   Autumn   Rujia   decentralized   fengjian   ideal,   given   its   minimal  

challenge   to   elitism   and   hierarchy.     On   the   other   hand,   the   Fajia   tradition   was  

progressive   in   that   these   thinkers   keenly   understood   that   the   power   of   the   state  

and   its   structure   went   beyond   the   capability   of   force,   with   not   only   its   army   but  

also   a   bureaucracy   that   enables   it   to   impose   and   reinforce   its   will   upon   subjects.    

The   Fajia   tradition,   like   Vladimir   Lenin,   understood   that   the   power   of   state  

institutions  themselves  had  the  ability  to  direct  and  shape  society  in  a  way  in  which  

its  subjects  would  spontaneously  adhere  to  its  objectives.    Adam  Ulam  wrote:  

Thus   the   Bolsheviks’   achievement   in   1917,   great   though   it   was,   pales  

in  comparison  with  the  enormous  task  they  accomplished  in  the  next  
five  years  in  conquering  the  very  anarchy  they  had  helped  to  create  
and   in   building   out   of   the   most   anarchistic   of   the   revolutions   the  
most   authoritarian   state   in   the   world.     It   is   not   in   the   maker   of   the  
revolution  that  we  can  see  Lenin’s  genius  in  its  fullest;  far  greater  is  
his  achievement  as  its  conqueror.506  
 
Preceding   Lenin   by   over   two   thousand   years,   Shang   Yang   inspired   a   tradition   of  

thought  that  discovered  the  significance  of  a  method  of  governance  that  harnessed  

the   state’s   system   of   power   in   order   to   mold   or   reshape   the   regional   and   local.    

Although   the   Rujia   tradition   did   envision   a   lockstep   response   from   its   subjects  
                                                                                                               
506  Ulam  1998:  314;  See  Ulam,  Adam  B.  Bolsheviks:  The  Intellectual  and  Political  History  of  the  

Triumph  of  Communism  in  Russia.  Cambridge:  Harvard  University  Press,  1998.  

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through  ritual  li  禮,  until  the  Xunzi,  which  came  to  form  only  after  the  appearance  of  

Fajia  texts,  they  expressed  little  faith  that  state  institutions  could  be  an  important  

source   of   the   effective   regulation,   organization,   and   determination   of   its   subjects’  

behavior.  

Fu   suggested   that   the   Fajia   tradition   was   an   important   element   in   the  

historical   conditioning 507  of   Chinese   Marxism.     He   explained   that   there   is   a  

“compatibility   between   Legalist   tenets   and   Marxist-­‐Leninist   practice”   within  

Chinese   history. 508     According   to   him,   both   insist   on   the   “monopoly   and  

centralization   of   power”509.     He   explained,   “Like   the   ancient   Legalists,   Lenin   and  

Mao  Zedong  believed  that  political  authority  rests  on  power  and  power  ultimately  

derives   from   naked   force” 510 .   However,   the   essence   of   how   Fu   generally  

characterized   the   totalitarian   nature   of   Fajia   thought   can   be   expressed   more  

precisely.     Instead   of   focusing   on   dictatorial   domination   of   state   activity,   Claude  

Lefort  explains  that  totalitarianism  can  be  thought  of  as  “a  form  of  society  in  which  

                                                                                                               
507  Kelly,  David.  “Chinese  Marxism  since  Tiananmen:  Between  Evaporation  and  Dismemberment”,  in  

David  S.G.  Goodman  and  Gerald  Segal,  eds.  China  in  the  Nineties:  Crisis  Management  and  Beyond.  
Oxford:  Clarendon  Press,  1991,  p.  19-­‐34.  
508  Fu  1996:  131  
509  Fu  1996:  132  
510  Fu  1996:  135;  He  adds  that  Fajia  thought  and  Marxism-­‐Leninism  in  China  share  six  other  

features:  1)  a  “disregard  for  law  and  institutional  procedure”  in  which  the  “paramount  leader”  holds  
the  “absolute  power”  to  manipulate  laws  according  to  his  wishes  (Fu  1996:  137);  2)  the  
“subjugation  of  the  people  as  property  of  the  ruler  and  the  state”,  since  “Marxist-­‐Leninist  parties”  
considered  “the  ordinary  people”  to  be  “stupid  beings  with  subnormal  intelligence  and  no  sense  of  
their  own  interest”  (Fu  1996:  138);  3)  using  “the  state  as  an  instrument  of  political  suppression”  (Fu  
1996:  140);  4)  the  belief  that  “the  most  effective  way  to  rule  over  a  people  is  to  control  their  minds”,  
citing  Lenin  as  “the  first  modern  Marxist  to  call  for  large-­‐scale  mass  political  indoctrination  and  the  
creation  of  the  ‘New  Soviet  Man’”  (Fu  1996:  143);  5)  the  “establishment  of  a  universal  mutual  
surveillance  system”  (Fu  1996:  146),  illustrated  by  the  PRC’s  hukou  household  registration  system;  
and  6)  the  insistence  on  “state  control  of  the  economy”  (Fu  1996:  147).      

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all   activities   are   interrelated”511.     John   B.   Thompson   continued,   describing   how  

Lefort   characterized   totalitarianism   amidst   the   emergence   of   Stalinism   and   the  

phenomenon   of   the   totalitarian   party   writing,   “It   is   not   so   much   ‘a   monstrous  

outgrowth   of   political   power   in   society   as   a   metamorphosis   of   society   itself   in  

which  the  political  ceases  to  exist  as  a  separate  sphere’.    This  ‘homogenization’  or  

‘unification’  of  society  is  supposed  to  be  carried  out  by  the  party.    Ideally  the  party  

has   the   task   of   diffusing   politics   through   society   and   thereby   effecting   the   fusion   of  

society  and  the  state.    In  reality  it  operates  like  a  particular  group  whose  function  is  

to  present  an  imaginary  unity,  to  project  the  image  of  a  society  at  one  with  itself”.512    

According   to   Fajia   texts,   the   ruler   should   operate   in   a   similar   manner   to   this  

totalitarian   party.     His   approach   to   governance   should   be   far   more   sophisticated  

than   the   insistence   on   autocratic   control   and   a   monopoly   on   the   use   of   force.    

Rather,  he  must  rely  on  institutions  to  transform  society,  facilitating  a  condition  of  

unity  (albeit  with  distinctions  within  this  unity)  throughout  society  that  is  guided  

by   ideals   designed   to   develop   the   state   and   its   populace.     The   Fajia   notion   of   law   is  

the  primary  instrument  with  which  he  accomplishes  this.  

Hence,   the   Fajia   notion   of   law   should   be   conceptualized  beyond   a   “narrow  

sense”513  that   characterizes   it   as   “(a)   making   fa   universally   applicable   to   all   people,  

disregarding   their   status   or   situation;   (b)   applying   fa   basically   to   major   areas   of  

people’s   lives;   and   (c)   making   the   terms   of   punishment   as   heavy   as   possible”.514     At  

                                                                                                               
511  Thompson  1986:  6;  his  emphasis;  Thompson,  John  B.  “Introduction”,  in  Claude  Lefort.  The  

Political  Forms  of  Modern  Society:  Bureaucracy,  Democracy,  Totalitarianism.  John  B.  Thompson,  ed.  
Cambridge:  MIT  Press,  1986.  
512  Thompson  1986:  6  
513  Cheng  1991:  318  
514  Cheng  1991:  318  

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its   very   foundation,   it   is   the   primary   system   of   political   and   even   socio-­‐economic  

organization.     It   not   only   forms   the   foundation   of   economic   infrastructure,   creating  

clear  boundaries  for  state-­‐approved   industry   and   that   which   is   not   state-­‐approved;  

but   it   also   acts   as   the   source   of   a   continuously   reinforcing   economic   plan.     Along  

with  a  system  of  merit  to  reinforce  the  ruler’s  economic  and  military  ambitions,  the  

law  creates  a  culture  meant  to  largely  define  the  worth  of  the  ruler’s  subjects  and  

their  pursuits  on  the  basis  of  their  utility  for  the  state.    Thus,  this  study  disagrees  

with   the   notion   that   what   distinguished   the   Fajia   notion   of   law   is   simply   its  

“presupposed   motive   or   intent   and   planned   objective   and   goal”515.     Rather,   the  

Fajia   notion   of   law   included   a   structure   that   caused   the   ruler’s   subjects’  

competitive  pursuits  for  private  profit  to  contribute  to  the  wealth  and  strength  of  

the  state.  

As  a  result,  this  study  argues  that  the  discourse  on  the  Fajia  tradition  and  its  

distinctive   characteristics   should   devote   more   attention   to   the   role   of   Fajia  

rewards.  Rewards  are  an  undeniably  significant  aspect  of  the  Fajia  political  vision,  

at  least  within  its  textual  tradition.    It  creates  a  state-­‐specific  institution-­‐facilitated  

meritocratic   competition   meant   to   organize   subjects   and   develop   the   wealth   and  

strength   of   the   state.     This   point   is   overlooked   in   various   studies   that   have  

examined   the   political   visions   found   in   the   Book  of  Lord  Shang’s   and   other   extant  

Fajia   texts.     Again,   this   is   not   without   reason.     In   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang,   the  

character  fa  法,  almost  always  referring  to  laws,  was  used  about  two  hundred  and  

thirty-­‐four  times;  while  the  characters  for  punishment   xing  刑  and  fa  罰  were  used  

                                                                                                               
515  Cheng  1991:  314  

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about   one   hundred   and   thirty   times   and   twenty-­‐three   times   respectively.     In  

addition   to   their   etymological   connection,   the   characters   xing   and   fa   法   appear  

most   frequently   among   those   that   refer   to   an   important   aspect   of   Fajia   political  

culture.      

However,   a   deeper   look   at   the   frequency   with   which   rewards-­‐related  

characters   are   used   begins   to   reveal   a   different   picture   about   the   relative  

importance   of   state-­‐specific   institution-­‐facilitated   meritocratic   competition.     The  

character   for   rewards   shang   賞   was   used   about   one   hundred   and   six   times.     The  

characters   for   rank   jue   爵   and   emoluments   lu   祿,   the   more   specific   rewards   to  

which   the   aforementioned   character   shang   generally   refers,   were   used   about   one  

hundred  times  and  twenty-­‐nine  times  respectively.    It  should  also  be  noted  that  the  

characters   for   profit   li  利   and   merit   gong   功   were   used   frequently   as   well,   about  

eighty-­‐eight   times   and   fifty-­‐five   times   respectively.   Clearly,   the   rise   of   Fajia   texts  

not  only  indicates  a  heightened  intensity  of  the  Warring  State  political  climate,  but  

it   also   indicates   a   significant   expansion   of   structural   competition   as   a   system   of  

political  organization.  

Thus,  the  discussion  below  will  contextualize  Fajia’s  thought  within  ancient  

Chinese   history   and   comprehensively   conceptualize   its   notion   of   law.     More  

specifically,   this   study   has   sought   to   make   some   connections   to   practices   that   are  

known  to  have  occurred  in  the  Spring  and  Autumn  and  Warring  States  periods  of  

ancient   China,   and   also   illustrate   that   the  Fajia   notion   of   law   should   be   understood  

functionally  and  symbolically.    To  put  this  last  point  another  way,  the  Fajia  notion  

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of  law  “reflects”516,  “mirrors”517,  or  is  a  product  of  the  society  within  which  it  was  

created.    It  was  not  merely  the  product  of  “insulated”518  thinkers  or  “specialists  and  

experts”519  that   advocated   for   it   (and   the   state)   as   a   means   to   autocratically   rule  

over  others.      Rather,  Fajia  thinkers  also  conceptualized  law  as  an  institutionalized  

mechanism   “through   which   social   and   cultural   life   is   maintained,   challenged,   and  

altered,…‘constituted’   or   ‘constructed’”520.     In   short,   the   Fajia   law   was   not   simply  

meant  to  provide  a  structure  for  and  constructed  culture,  but  it  was  also  meant  to  

reflect  it.  

Fajia  Thought  and  its  Historical  Significance    

It  is  important  to  note  that  what  this  study  has  articulated  as  Fajia’s  system  

of   organization   is   reflected   in   archeological   findings   of   Qin   law   in   the   third   century  

B.C.521     Though   on   the   surface   this   may   not   seem   to   be   the   case,   the   compatibility  

between   this   study’s   characterization   of   Fajia   thought   and   the   state   of   Qin’s   law  

during   the   Warring   States   period   is   apparent   in   several   ways.     For   instance,   the  

“Statutes   on   Agriculture”   (tianlu  田律)   within   the   state   of   Qin’s   laws   indicate   that  

there  was  in  fact  a  system  in  which  fields  (tian  田)  were  bestowed  (shou  授)  to  men  

                                                                                                               
516  Chase  2005:  4;  Chase,  Oscar  G.  Law,  Culture,  and  Ritual:  Disputing  Systems  in  Cross-­‐Cultural  

Context.  New  York:  New  York  University  Press,  2005.  

517  Chase  2005:  4  
518  Chase  2005:  2  
519  Chase  2005:  2  
520  Chase  2005:  2  
521  For  a  deeper  discussion  of  the  contents  of  the  archeological  findings  for  Qin  law,  see  McLeod,  

Katrina  C.D.  and  Robin  D.S.  Yates.  “Forms  of  Ch’in  law:  an  Annotated  Translation  of  the  Feng-­‐chen  
shih.”  Harvard  Journal  of  Asiatic  Studies,  vol.  41,  no.  1,  1981,  p.  111-­‐163.;  Hulsewé,  A.F.P.  “The  
Legalists  and  the  Laws  of  Ch’in,”  in  Leyden  Studies  in  Sinology,  W.L.  Idema,  ed.  Leiden:  Brill,  1981,  1-­‐
22.;  Hulsewé,  Anthony  F.P.  “The  Influence  of  the  ‘Legalist’  government  of  Qin  on  the  Economy  as  
Eeflected  in  the  Texts  Discovered  in  Yunmeng  County,”  in  Stuart  R.  Schram,  ed.  The  Scope  of  State  
Power  in  China.  Hong  Kong  and  London:  The  Chinese  University  Press  and  School  of  Oriental  and  
African  Studies,  University  of  London,  1985,  p.  211-­‐235.  

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of   merit   in   the   state.     Although,   current   research   does   not   provide   much  

information   about   the   details   of   this   system522,   perhaps,   this   study   may   serve   to  

provide  a  foundation  on  which  future  archeological  evidence  can  build.      

To   be   fair,   though,   Hulsewé   mentioned   that   the   mere   bestowal   of   fields  

should  not  be  construed  as  evidence  of  “Legalist”  influence  because  “a  counterpart  

of  the  Qin  system  of  “bestowing”  fields  appears  also  to  have  been  practiced  in  the  

state  of  Wei”523.    However,  this  study  views  it  to  be  associated  with  Fajia  thought  in  

a  different  sense.    This  study  has  not  tried  to  insist  that  Fajia  texts  pioneered  all  of  

the   ideas   they   expounded   upon.     Rather,   this   study   has   tried   to   convey   that   Fajia  

texts   represent   a   unique   reflection   and   progression   of   the   changes   already  

occurring   in   many   of   the   states   during   the   late   Spring   and   Autumn   period   and  

Warring  States  period.      

Also,   Qin   law   indicates   that   rewards   and   punishments   were   administered  

based   on   performance   or   the   degree   to   which   one   fulfilled   their   duties.   Concerning  

agriculture,  the  “agricultural  overseer”  (tian  sefu  田嗇夫)  is  rewarded  “when  on  the  

occasion  of  the  four  annual  inspections  the  oxen  used  in  agricultural  work  were  in  

good   condition,   and   punished   if   they   were   thin”.524     Moreover,   overseers   of   labor  

were   also   rewarded   and   punished   based   on   the   accuracy   of   their   weights   and  

measures.     According   to   Hulsewé,   “Heavy   fines   were   imposed   on   overseers   when  

their   measures   showed   deviations   from   the   norm;   the   tolerance   allowed   for  

measures   of   capacity   was   not   inconsiderable,   varying   between   one   twentieth   and  

                                                                                                               
522  Hulsewé  in  Schram  1985:  215  
523  Hulsewé  in  Schram  1985:  234  
524  Hulsewé  in  Schram  1985:  222  

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one  eighteenth,  but  that  for  weights  was  much  stricter,  being  about  1/120th,  or  less  

than  one  percent.”525      

The   Qin   law   strips   provide   evidence   that   there   were   in   fact   pursuits   of  

private  wealth  that  were  favored  by  the  state:  agriculture  and  military  service.    In  

addition   to   the   fact   that   military   service   was   mandated   for   every   male   above   a  

certain   age,   Qin   law   also   showed   “contempt   for   the   secondary   pursuits”   because  

“workshop   (owners)   as   well   as   traders   were   not   permitted   to   have   themselves  

replaced   (e.g.   by   a   slave)   when   redeeming   their   debts   to   the   government   by  

working,  whereas  other  persons  were  allowed  to  do  so”526.    So,  at  the  very  least,  the  

law   did   show   preference   and   gave   privilege   to   those   who   devote   their   pursuit   of  

private   profit   within   the   state’s   preferred   occupations.     In   addition,   the   Qin   law  

strips  also  suggest  that  the  Qin  state  did  impose  some  forms  of  labor  conscription,  

highlighting   the   Book  of  Lord  Shang’s   serious   concern   about   state   development   and  

the  responsibilities  of  the  ruler’s  subjects  to  contribute  to  it.    The  forms  of  labor  in  

the  Qin  law  strips  were  divided  into  two  groups:  “statute  laborers  and  hard-­‐labor  

convicts”  527.    The  latter  even  included  “debt-­‐prisoners”528  who  paid  their  “fines  or  

redemption   fees”529  through   labor   with   convicts.     Both   forms   of   labor,   outside   of  

military  service,  mainly  referred  to  labor  conscripted  for  general  state  service,  like  

“construction   work,   such   as   building   pise   walls,   digging   canals.”530     Interestingly,  

                                                                                                               
525  Hulsewé  in  Schram  1985:  225  
526  Hulsewé  in  Schram  1985:  231-­‐232  
527  Hulsewé  in  Schram  1985:  226  
528  Hulsewé  in  Schram  1985:  226  
529  Hulsewé  in  Schram  1985:  224  
530  Hulsewé  in  Schram  1985:  226;  A  pisé  wall  refers  the  one  of  the  most  common  methods  of  

construction  in  the  pre-­‐imperial  and  early  imperial  periods.    It  is  a  wall  made  of  damp  packed  earth  
was  molded  around  an  initial  frame  in  the  shape  of  the  desired  structure,  walls,  watch  towers,  and  

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the   labor   of   convicts   indicates   that   labor   devoted   to   state   infrastructure,   which  

contributes  to  the  state’s  wealth,  was  highly  valued.    Though  it  may  not  have  been  a  

pursuit   for   which   the   state   wished   to   bestow   rewards,   it   was   conceptualized   as  

both   a   suitable   punishment   to   deter   crimes   while   directly   contributing   to   the  

development  of  the  state.    

Finally,   subjects   of   the   Qin   ruler   could   actually   be   fined   “one   suit   of  

armor”,531  if  they  traded  with  any  individual  that  failed  to  show  their  “passport  to  

the   officials”532.     This   serves   as   evidence   of   how   the   Qin   state   created   conditions  

that   facilitated   a   very   strong   state   identity   within   Qin   culture.     Moreover,   it  

confirms   the   practice   of   two   other   characteristics   found   in   Fajia   texts.     The   first  

characteristic   is   the   advocacy   for   state   prevention   of   its   subjects’   geographic  

mobility.     Various   registers   were   used   to   keep   track   of   the   population   in   Qin   and  

correspondence   to   the   records   of   the   registries   was   mandatory.     Therefore,  

geographic   mobility   was   a   threat   to   the   government’s   ability   to   easily   keep   track   of  

all   members   in   its   state.     This   is   not   to   say   that   the   ruler’s   subjects   could   not   move,  

but  “moving  had  to  be  formally  announced”533.    The  second  characteristic  is  the  fact  

that   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang   consistently   warned   rulers   to   perceive   itinerant  

scholars  and  itinerant  swordsmen  as  being  a  threat  to  order  in  the  state.    Not  only  

could   itinerant   scholars   cause   the   same   surveillance   problems   that   the   issue   of  

geographic   mobility   would,   but   it   was   also   specifically   described   as   a   cultural  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
houses  or  other  living  quarters.  (Lewis  in  Hansen  2012:  359);  See  Lewis,  Mark  Edward.  “The  City-­‐
State  in  Spring-­‐and-­‐Autumn  China”  in  Mogens  Herman  Hansen,  ed.  A  Comparative  Study  of  Thirty  
City-­‐State  Cultures:  An  Investigation,  vol.  21.  Copenhagen:  C.A.  Reitzels  Forlag,  2000,  p.  359-­‐374.  
531  Hulsewé  in  Schram  1985:  230  
532  Hulsewé  in  Schram  1985:  230  
533  Hulsewé  in  Schram  1985:  230  

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problem.     Though   the   Qin   laws   do   not   specifically   expound   on   itinerant   scholars  

and   swordsmen   as   a   cultural   problem,   the   strong   sense   of   state   identity   that   the  

laws  attempted  to  cultivate,  combined  with  the  fact  that  subjects  were  forbidden  to  

trade,  in  what  would  theoretically  be  considered  mutually  beneficial  transactions,  

with   individuals   whose   identity   had   not   been   confirmed   with   the   state,   heavily  

suggests   that   the   government’s   insistence   on   control   was   for   reasons   other   than  

economic  and  political  control.      

Much   of   the   evidence   from   the   Qin   strips   suggests   that   Qin   law   appears   to  

have   reflected   the   Fajia   insistence   on   limiting   the   opportunities   that   allow   the  

ruler’s  subjects  to  maximize  their  obtainment  of  private  profit.    The  effectiveness  of  

rewards  and  punishments  depended  on  these  limited  channels  of  opportunity.    The  

ideal   Fajia   state   was   fundamentally   designed   to   constantly   present   the   ruler’s  

subjects   with   two   choices,   potential   reward,   on   the   one   hand,   or   (relative)  

deprivation  on  the  other  hand.    However,  if  the  ruler’s  subjects  had  a  third  option  

to   reject   both   choices   in   favor   of   more   desirable   conditions   elsewhere,   then  

rewards   and   punishments   themselves,   and   even   the   ruler   who   administers   them,  

will  then  have  to  compete  with  the  other  states  for  human  resources.    This  notion  

not   only   undermines   the   ultimate   objectives   of   Fajia’s   approach   to   governance,   but  

it  also  violates  this  study’s  notion  of  Fajia  law  because  it  is  supposed  to  serve  as  the  

demarcating   line   between   the   one   who   doesn’t   need   to   compete   (the   ruler)   and  

those  that  do  need  to  compete  (his  subjects).    

In  addition  to  connections  the  Fajia  ideology  has  with  the  actual  government  

practice   suggested   in   the   Qin   law   strips,   this   study   argues   that   the   legacy   of   its  

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state-­‐specific   institution-­‐facilitated   meritocratic   competition   extends   beyond   the  

laws   of   the   state   of   Qin   or   even   the   Qin   dynasty.   For   instance,   having   considered  

Shen   Buhai   as   a   separate   wing   within   Fajia   thought,   Creel   explained   that   two  

practices   that   were   prominent   in   imperial   Chinese   government   institutions   and  

their   administration   can   be   traced   back   to   Shen   Buhai’s   ideas:   the   “civil   service  

examination”   and   the   “systematic   merit   rating   of   officials”.534  Creel   continued   to  

explain  saying,    

…Shen  perceived,  more  clearly  than  anyone  else,  the  principles  that  
were   implicit   in   this   development,   and   gave   them   their   clearest  
articulation.     Beyond   question   his   influence   on   the   structure   and  
practice  of  government  after  his  time  was  tremendous.    It  may  well  
be   that   Shen   Pu-­‐hai   had   more   influence   on   the   creation   of   the  
Chinese  administrative  system  than  any  other  individual.”535      
 
Indeed,   the   intellectual   achievement   of   Fajia   rewards   is   difficult   to   overstate.    

Generally,  this  study  would  agree  with  Creel’s  observations.  However,  it  insists  on  

at   least   two   caveats   to   Creel’s   claim.     As   this   study   has   shown,   the   “Shen   Buhai  

fragments”  do  not  seem  to  be  as  radically  different  from  other  Fajia  texts  as  Creel  

may  have  thought.    So,  it  would  appear  that  extant  Fajia  texts  collectively  represent  

a   significant   ideological   response   to   major   shifts   in   political   organization   and   the  

heightened  intensity  in  the  political  climate.    Moreover,  if  he  needed  to  single  out  

any  figure  for  such  praise,  Creel  may  have  been  more  accurate  to  have  directed  it  

towards  Shang  Yang.    This  is  clearly  not  to  say  that  Shang  Yang  invented  law  or  that  

he  actually  pioneered  structural  competition  in  his  reforms.    Rather,  it  is  to  say  that  

he  is  credited  as  the  master  of  a  textual  tradition  that  produced  pioneering  thought  

                                                                                                               
534  Creel  1974:  5  
535  Creel  1974:  5  

  287  
on   structural   competition,   along   with   a   merit-­‐based   hierarchical   ranking   system  

meant   to   reflect   the   results   of   this   competition,   as   a   method   of   organizing   an   entire  

state.      

Second,   the   civil   examination   system,   especially   in   the   Han   dynasty,   was   not  

used  as  the  primary  means  of  obtaining  imperial  government  positions.    Though,  as  

Kracke  explained,  the  civil  examination  system,  “above  all  other  ways  of  entrance”,  

came  to  represent  “the  principle  of  recruitment  through  merit”,536  it  is  not  until  the  

late   Tang   dynasty   (618-­‐907   A.D)   that   the   majority   of   officials   within   the   state  

government   actually   obtained   their   positions   through   the   examination   system537 .  

Even   so,   Kracke   added,   the   civil   examination   system   “never   quite   won   either   an  

exclusive   control   of   the   recruitment   process   or   unchallenged   approval   as   an  

ideal”.538  This  is  not  to  say  that  this  study  does  not  agree  with  Creel’s  assertion  that  

the   systematic   attempt   to   measure   merit   and   potential   officials   did   not   exist.     It  

appears   as   though   the   Han   dynasty   examination   system   did   involve   a   candidate  

answering  questions  posed  by  the  ruler  in  an  oral  examination.    

                                                                                                               
536  Kracke  Jr.  1957:  252;  See  Kracke  Jr.,  Edward  A.  “Region,  Family,  and  Individual  in  the  Chinese  

Examination  System”,  in  John  K.  Fairbank.  Chinese  Thought  and  Institutions.  Chicago:  University  of  
Chicago  Press,  1957.  
537  Kracke  Jr.  explained  that  the  “first  significant  increase”  in  the  number  of  examination  candidates  

entering  the  official  ranks  “came  abruptly  with  the  rise  to  power  of  the  ambitious  empress  Wu  Tse-­‐
t’ien”.  (Kracke  Jr.  1957:  253)    He  added  that  in  the  year  655  A.D.  “she  caused  forty-­‐four  doctoral  
examination  degrees  to  be  conferred”,  establishing  “the  quantitative  importance  of  examinations  for  
recruitment”.  (Kracke  Jr.  1957:  253)    Remarkably,  Wu  Zetian  did  not  even  become  empress  until  
690  A.D.  She  was  remarkably  influential  during  her  tenure  in  the  royal  court,  effectively  ruling  the  
Tang  by  660  A.D.  
538  Kracke  Jr.  1957:  252.  It  should  be  noted  that  Kracke  asserted  that  there  were  “successive  periods  

of  rise  and  decline”  for  the  “honor”  “practical  importance”  of  the  civil  examination  system.  (Kracke  
Jr.  1957:  252).    He  elaborated  saying,  “Testing  ability  rather  than  character,  they  failed  to  satisfy  
some  of  the  more  zealous  Confucians,  and  they  were  always  obliged  to  compete  with  other  
recruitment  methods  such  as  recommendation,  protection  (yin-­‐pu),  promotion  from  the  clerical  
service,  or  sale  of  official  rank.    The  changing  balance  among  methods  was  of  course  intimately  
involved  with  the  political  movements  of  different  periods.”  (Kracke  Jr.  1957:  252)  

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 Also,   the   Han   dynasty   examination   system   infused   Rujia  morality   into   how  

they   measured   a   candidate’s   qualifications   and   specifically   measured   their  

knowledge   of   Confucian   classics.     It   tested   its   candidate’s   wisdom,   virtue,   and  

uprightness.   This   is   in   stark   contrast   to   Fajia   ideology.     Its   notion   of   law   viewed  

expertise   in   one   of   the   five   Rujia   classics   as,   at   best,   irrelevant   and,   at   worst,  

counterproductive.     This   is   not   to   say   that   candidates   in   the   Han   dynasty  

examination  system  did  not  deal  with  issues  pertaining  to  policy.    In  fact,  they  were  

often   asked   policy   questions   that   dealt   with   what   the   emperor   and   his  

administration  thought  were  the  most  pressing  issues  of  the  time.539     However,  as  

Elman   noted,   “textual   expertise   on   a   particular   Classic   was   a   prerequisite   for  

appointment”540  in   a   government   position.     Fajia   structural   competition   did   not  

mandate   a   moral   content.   Therefore,   Elman’s   description   of   the   Han   examination  

system   actually   sounds   more   “Xunzian”   than   “Fajiaesque”.541     Moreover,   Kracke  

asserted   that   the   Han   civil   examination   system   was   “primarily   a   method   of  

classifying   candidates   who   had   been   recommended   for   governmental   service.   Also,  

                                                                                                               
539  For  a  succinct  discussion  of  the  Han  dynasty  civil  examination  system;  see  Elman,  Benjamin.  A  

Cultural  History  of  Civil  Examinations  in  Late  Imperial  China.  Berkeley:  University  of  California  Press,  
2000,  p.  5-­‐6.  
540  Elman  2000:  5  
541  This,  in  a  limited  way,  is  in  accordance  with  Edward  A.  Kracke  Jr.’s  assertion  about  the  civil  

examination  system.    He  stated,  “Behind  the  concept  of  competitive  examinations  for  office  lies  the  
ideal  of  Confucius  that  only  ability  and  virtue  qualify  a  man  for  service  in  government—an  ideal  
inherited  by  such  divergent  Confucian  schools  as  that  of  Hsün-­‐tzu,  authoritarian  in  its  trend,  and  
that  of  Mencius,  whose  more  liberal  principles  predominated  in  Chinese  thought  from  the  T’ang  
dynasty  onward.    Since  the  more  favored  Confucian  doctrine  held  that  human  nature  (including  the  
mind)  was  inherently  capable  of  perfection,  it  followed  that  ability  and  virtue  were  independent  of  
the  status  into  which  one  might  be  born.    Therefore  the  means  should  be  provided,  and  the  way  left  
open,  for  any  man  to  rise  from  low  birth-­‐status  to  the  highest  rank.”  (Kracke  1957:  251)    Obviously,  
this  study  takes  issue  with  the  fact  that  Kracke  Jr.’s  assertion  is  silent  about  the  state-­‐specific  
institution-­‐facilitated  meritocratic  competition  described  in  Fajia  texts.    Nevertheless,  Kracke  Jr.  
recognized  the  mandated  Rujia  moral  content  of  the  civil  examination  system  and  appropriately  
traces  it  to  the  ideas  expressed  in  the  Xunzi.    

  289  
the   Xunzi   was   almost   certainly   influenced   by   the   Fajia   notion   of   law.     This   is   not  

only   seen   in   its   advocacy   for   a   similar   notion   of   law   but   also   in   its   conception   of  

ritual.    As  Ames  pointed  out,  it  is  significantly  different  from  that  which  is  described  

in   the   Analects.542     Pre-­‐dating   the  Xunzi,   early   Fajia  texts  like  that  of  Shang  Yang   do  

represent   the   earliest   attempts   to   systematically   rank   officials   according   to   a  

conception  of  merit.    This  idea  undoubtedly  rests  at  the  foundation  of  the  Qin  and  

Han  bureaucracies.      

Though   Chaffee   has   pointed   out   that   the   civil   examination   system   did   not  

reach  the  level  of  importance  it  had  throughout  much  of  the  later  imperial  period  

until  the  Song  dynasty,  it  nevertheless  began  to  take  shape  with  at  least  one  notable  

Fajia  characteristic.543  Miyazaki  observed  that  the  civil  examination  system  played  

a   pivotal   role   in   greatly   concentrating   power   in   the   hands   of   the   emperor.     From  

Song   times   on,   the   emperor   “was   an   autocrat,   directly   supervising   all   important  

departments   of   government   and   giving   instructions   about   every   aspect   of  

government”.544     Additionally,   “even   minor   matters   of   personnel   needed   imperial  

sanction”.545     Therefore,   by   the   time   its   operation   and   role   had   matured,   the   civil  

examination   system   was   a   tool   that   was   generally   “open   to   all   qualified  

applicants” 546 ,   sought   to   organize   the   state   with   the   utmost   objectivity   and  

                                                                                                               
542  Ames  1991:  26-­‐27  
543  Chaffee  stated,  “Yet  the  Sung  role  was  special,  for  it  was  then  that  the  constellation  of  values,  

institutions,  and  social  structures  centering  on  the  examinations  assumed  much  of  the  shape  that  it  
was  to  have  throughout  the  late  imperial  period.”  (Chaffee  1995:  182);  Chaffee,  John  W.  The  Thorny  
Gates  of  Learning  in  Sung  China:  A  Social  History  of  Examinations.  Albany,  NY:  State  University  of  
New  York  Press,  1995.  
544  Miyazaki  1976:  115  
545  Miyazaki  1976:  115  
546  Miyazaki  1976:  118  

  290  
“fairness” 547 ,   and   theoretically   sought   to   establish   structural   competition  

throughout  the  entire  empire,  much  like  the  Fajia  notion  of  law.  

Future  Research  

  There   are   at   least   three   areas   for   further   research   that   would   assist   in  

further   developing   the   current   understanding   of   Fajia   thought.     First,   an  

examination  of  the  notion  of  law,  particularly  those  in  chapters  in  the  Guanzi  that  

are  not  considered  to  be  most  closely  associated  with  the  Fajia  tradition,  would  be  

of  extraordinary  use.    It  would  be  useful  because  the  Guanzi  is  filled  with  a  plethora  

of   different   attempts   to   reconcile   the   use   of   a   Fajia-­‐influenced   notion   of   law   with  

Rujia   virtues   and   even   many   elements   of   Daojia   thought,   especially   self-­‐cultivation.    

The   different   attempts   to   reconcile   the   use   of   law   with   extra-­‐legal   methods   of  

human   development   would   make   a   fascinating   study   of   the   wider   law-­‐related  

issues   of   governance   in   ancient   China.     Additionally,   though   a   serious   effort   was  

made   to   be   as   comprehensive   as   possible   in   this   study,   it   is   impossible   to  

exhaustively  analyze  all  of  the  law-­‐related  issues  in  the  multitude  of  texts  in  ancient  

China.     Therefore,   it   would   be   useful   to   explore   how   the   insistence   on   structural  

competition   in   Fajia   texts   interacted   with   other   philosophical   ideas   from   other  

textual  traditions  during  the  Warring  States  period.    

  Second,   it   is   relatively   important   to   investigate   the   form   of   pedagogy   in   all  

the   different   intellectual   traditions   in   Chinese   history.     This   could   even   include   a  

reevaluation   of   the   Rujia   process   of   teaching   and   transformation   and   how   it  

compares  to  other  forms  of  pedagogy  in  other  traditions.    Could  pedagogy  be  one  of  

                                                                                                               
547  Miyazaki  1976:  119  

  291  
the   more   prominent   distinguishing   features   of   many   of   the   great   intellectual  

traditions  in  Chinese  history?    Of  course  this  study  deems  it  particularly  important  

to   explore   the   different   attitudes   towards   competition   within   intellectual,  

philosophical,  and  religious  traditions.    Though  this  study  has  done  it  to  a  limited  

degree,   it   would   be   particularly   useful   to   explore   attitudes   toward   competition   in  

Rujia   texts   because   of   their   consistent   reverence   for   a   past   that   certainly   did   not  

encourage  it.      

  Third  and  finally,  a  project  that  specifically  revisits  the  notion  of  law  in  the  

Han  Feizi  would  be  very  helpful.    In  light  of  this  study’s  reading  of  the  Book  of  Lord  

Shang,  the  Han  Feizi’s  status  as  the  great  synthesizing  work  Han  Fei  himself  claimed  

it  to  be  is  in  doubt.  This  is  not  to  say  that  it  does  not  still  remain  arguably  one  of  the  

more  fruitful  sources  for  the  study  of  Fajia  thought.    It  does  suggest  however  that  

the   concept   of   law   in   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang   appears   to   be   much   more   complex  

than   it   has   traditionally   been   interpreted.     Its   use   of   rewards   and   punishments  

actually  creates  an  architecture  of  governance  that  includes  most,  if  not  all,  the  law-­‐

related  issues  in  later  Fajia  texts.    In  other  words,  it  may  be  the  case  that  other  Fajia  

texts   gradually   came   up   with   formal   terms   to   describe   phenomena   that   were  

already  present  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang’s  political  vision.    Of  course  there  were  

differences   between   the   texts,   but   as   this   study   has   shown,   they   all   appear   to   share  

a   distinct   characteristic   that   inherently   involves   issues   like   technique,   positional  

power,  accommodation  or  acquiescence,  among  others.    

  292  
Final  Remarks  

The   Fajia   cultures   of   competition   and   punishment   both   act   as   tools   of  

pedagogy,   developing   the   ruler’s   subjects   by   disciplining   them.     As   Michel   Foucault  

states,   “Discipline   ‘makes’   individuals;   it   is   the   specific   technique   of   a   power   that  

regards   individuals   both   as   objects   and   as   instruments   of   its   exercise.”548     While  

Fajia   texts   certainly   did   conceptualize   the   ruler’s   subjects   as   “objects”   and  

“instruments”   to   a   degree,   this   study   attempted   to   show   that,   unlike   what  

Foucault’s  definition  implies,  discipline  and  a  concern  for  human  development  are  

not   mutually   exclusive.     In   fact,   they   can   be   complementary   (i.e.   parenting).     This  

study  attempted  to  provide  insight  into  the  very  core  of  Fajia  thought,  responding  

to  past  calls  for  this  very  idea.    For  instance,  Cheng  wrote,    

There  is  first  of  all  the  problem  of  the  ambiguity  of  the  term  “fa  (law)  
in   classical   Chinese   philosophy:   In   what   way,   we   may   ask,   does   the  
Legalist   conceive   “fa”?     To   what   end   does   “fa”   subserve?   How   does  
Confucianism   conceive   fa?     Does   it   denounce   it   or   accept   it   on  
different  grounds  and  for  different  purposes  other  than  the  Legalists?    
The  clarification  of  these  questions  will,  on  the  one  hand,  exhibit  the  
true  nature  of  Legalism  and  its  social  and  political  objectives,  and  on  
the   other   hand,   explain   the   Legalist   burden   imposed   on   the   term   “fa”  
in  modern  contexts  of  its  use.549  
   
As  the  previous  chapters  have  hopefully  illustrated,  laws  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang  

and   other   Fajia   texts   are   very   distinct,   creating   a   state-­‐specific   institution-­‐

facilitated   meritocratic   competition   to   an   unprecedented   and   universal   degree.    

Perhaps  this  study’s  findings  contribute  to  another  place  of  uncertainty.    Recently  

Fischer   wrote,   “The   term   “Legalism”   as   a   translation   of   fajia   法家   has   been  

                                                                                                               
548  Foucault  1977:  170  
549  Cheng  1991:  311-­‐312  

  293  
recognized  by  a  number  of  scholars  as  highly  problematic...However,  since  no  one  

has   come   up   with   a   better   term,   I   shall   stick   with   ‘Legalism.’”550     In   light   of   this  

study’s  evidence  and  the  “highly  problematic”  nature  of  the  English  translation  of  

“Legalism”,   perhaps   the   Fajia   tradition  法家   should   be   referred   to   as   the   “School   of  

Competition”   or,   more   specifically,   the   “School   of   [Structural]   Competition”.     This  

study   intended   to   show   that   these   names   give   more   attention   to   the   qualities   of  

Fajia  thought  that  appear  to  be  most  distinct  and  common.  

 
 
 

                                                                                                               
550  Fischer  2012:  201  

  294  
 Appendix  I:  The  Book  of  Lord  Shang  and  Authenticity  
 
Though   textual   history   is   a   valuable   subject   to   explore,   this   appendix   will  

devote  less  attention  to  textual  history  and  more  attention  to  the  Chinese  debate  on  

dating.     This   study   considers   the   debate   on   dating   to   have   more   potential  

consequences   to   its   conclusions   about   the   ideas   expressed   in   the   Book   of   Lord  

Shang   than   an   in-­‐depth   investigation   of   how   the   extant   Book  of  Lord  Shang   came   to  

form.     The   discovery   of   consistency   in   the   ideas   expressed   in   the   Book   of   Lord  

Shang   would   reveal   a   remarkable   intellectual   commitment   within   the   textual  

tradition.     Moreover,   such   a   commitment   would   be   difficult   to   ignore   in  

characterizing  the  thought  of  the  larger  oral  tradition.551    

Introduction:  Brief  Textual  Background  

The   Book   of   Lord   Shang   商君書   is   a   collection   of   works   attributed   to   the  

statesman   Shang   Yang.     It   is   divided   into   five   sections   juan   卷   and   twenty-­‐six  

chapters   or   paragraphs   pian   篇.     Originally   thought   to   have   been   written   with  

twenty-­‐nine  pian,  it  is  believed  that  most  of  its  writings  were  composed  around  the  

late  Warring  States  period,  with  all  of  them  almost  certainly  dating  before  the  Han  

dynasty.   It   is   believed   that,   based   on   a   multitude   of   quotations   found   in   other  

philosophical  and  historical  texts,  at  least  some  of  its  writings  enjoyed  widespread  

popularity   during   the   Warring   States   through   the   Six   Dynasties   period.    

                                                                                                               
551  Recall  how  this  study  had  already  discussed,  in  its  “Methodology  and  Limitations”  section  of  its  

first  introductory  chapter,  how  texts  like  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang  were  almost  certainly  products  of  a  
larger  oral  tradition.    This  study’s  conclusion  has  already  pointed  out  that  its  ideas  did  in  fact  
significant  influence  on  the  administration  of  the  state  of  Qin  and  the  Qin  and  Han  empires.    So,  it  
would  not  be  unfair  to  conclude  that  its  ideas  must  have  had  some  meaningful  presence  in  its  larger  
oral  tradition  at  some  point.    Since  our  interpretation  of  the  ideas  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang  depends  
on  an  adequate  understanding  of  the  textual  dating,  the  forthcoming  debate  cannot  be  ignored.  

  295  
Interestingly  though,  according  to  J.J.L.  Duyvendak,  by  the  Tang  dynasty,  the  Book  

of  Lord  Shang  was  only  circulated  to  a  very  limited  degree.    Duyvendak  noted  how  

Sima  Zhen  司馬貞  (fl.  713-­‐742)  made  a  mistake  in  his  description  of  part  of  the  text  

that   led   him   to   conclude   that   Sima   Zhen   “had   therefore   evidently   never   seen   the  

actual   work”.552     It   should   also   be   noted   that   the   Han  shu     includes   two   different  

references  to  texts  attributed  to  Shang  Yang:  the  Shang  jun   商君   and   the   Gongsun  

Yang  公孫鞅,  with  twenty-­‐nine  and  twenty  seven  pian  respectively.    Little  is  known  

about  either  text.    What  seems  to  be  clearer  is  the  fact  that  by  the  Song  dynasty,  the  

Book   of   Lord   Shang   had   become   corrupt,   with   evidence   of   at   least   two   different  

versions  of  the  compilation  with  twenty-­‐six  and  twenty-­‐seven  pian  respectively.    By  

the  time  of  the  Yuan  dynasty,  the  sixteenth  and  twenty-­‐first  pian  were  lost.    Thus,  of  

the  original  twenty-­‐nine  pian,  only  twenty-­‐four  have  survived  thus  far.    Since  this  

time,   the   compilation   has   remained   the   same   more   or   less,   as   it   is   in   the   present  

day.553      

As   previously   mentioned,   the   Book  of  Lord  Shang   is   not   considered   to   be   a  

compilation   of   works   written   by   Shang   Yang   himself.     Though   Wu   Guozhen  

disagreed,554  for   various   reasons,   less   than   half   of   the   included   pian   could   have  

been  written  by  Shang  Yang  himself.    Within  traditional  Chinese  history,  the  Book  of  

Lord  Shang  has  long  been  associated  with  a  school  of  philosophy  known  as  Fajia  法

家   (commonly   in   English   referred   to   as   Legalism).     Thus,   the   compilation   is  

                                                                                                               
552  Duyvendak  1928:  135;  Duyvendak,  J.J.L.  The  Book  of  Lord  Shang:  A  Classic  of  the  Chinese  School  of  

Laws.  London:  Arthur  Probsthain,  1928.  

553  See  Levi,  Jean.  “Shang  Chün  Shu”  in  Michael  Lowe,  ed.  Early  Chinese  Texts:  A  Bibliographical  Guide.  

New  Haven:  The  Society  for  the  Study  of  Early  China,  1993,  p.  368-­‐371.  
554  See  Wu  Guocheng.  Ancient  Chinese  Political  Theories.  Arlington,  VA:  University  Publications  of  

America,  1975.  

  296  
generally  considered,  much  like  the  Analects  for  Rujia  thought,  as  an  illustration  of  

the   development   of   Fajia  thought   from   the   Warring   States   period   and,   potentially  

to  a  limited  extent,  Qin  dynasty  period.    In  this  section,  this  study  will  explore  the  

authenticity  of  the  collection  of  texts  titled  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang.    This  section  will  

attempt  to  capture  the  main  issues  of  debate  for  each  chapter  of  the  Book  of  Lord  

Shang,  focusing  on  five  scholars  that  have  put  forth  significant  works  on  the  issue,  

Chen   Chi-­‐tien 555 ,   Rong   Zhaozu 556 ,   Gao   Heng 557 ,   Cheng   Liang-­‐shu 558 ,   and   most  

recently  Zhang  Linxiang559.      

“The  Reform  of  the  Law”  

As   for   “The   Reform   of   the   Law”,   Chen   Chi-­‐tien   viewed   the   usage   of   Duke  

Xiao’s  posthumous  name  three  times  as  indicating  that  an  intellectual  descendant  

wrote   this   chapter   as   a   narration   of   a   possible   occurrence   during   Shang   Yang’s  

lifetime.   The   Shiji   writes   that   immediately   after   the   death   of   Duke   Xiao   of   Qin,  

Shang  Yang  was  accused  of  being  a  traitor  by  loyalists  of  the  newly  crowned  prince.    

Therefore,   he   immediately   fled   in   an   attempt   to   escape   execution.     Eventually,   he  

was  caught  and  executed,  so  Chen  concluded  that  it  is  doubtful  that  he  had  the  time  

or   access   to   be   informed   of   his   late   duke’s   posthumous   title   and   include   it   in  

                                                                                                               
555  Chen  Chi-­‐tien  (Chen  Qitian)陳啟天.  Shang  Yang  ping  zhuan  商鞅評傳.  Taibei  臺北:  Tai  wan  shang  

wu  yin  shu  guan  fa  xing  臺灣商務印書館,  1967.  

556  Rong  Zhaozu  容肇祖.  “Shang  jun  shu  kao  zheng”  商君書考證.  Yan  jing  xue  bao  燕京學報,  vol.  21,  

1937,  p.  61-­‐118.    

557  Gao  Heng  高亨.  Shang  chün  shu  chu  商君書注譯,  Beijing  北京:  Zhong  hua  清華大學出版社,  2011.  

558  Cheng  Liang-­‐shu  (Zheng  Liangshu)  鄭良樹.  Shang  Yang  ji  qi  xue  pai  商鞅及其學派.  Taibei  台北:  

Taiwan  xue  sheng  shu  ju  臺灣學生書局,  1987.  

559  Zhang  Linxiang  張林祥.  Shangjunshu  de  cheng  wei  yu  si  xiang  yan  jiu  商君書的成為與思想研究,  

Shanghai  上海:  Ren  Min  Chu  Ban  She  人民出版社,  2008.    Zhang  Linxiang  describes  the  other  four  
works  of  focus  in  this  study  as  the  works  that  manifest  “the  most  achievement”.  (Zhang  2008:  67)  

  297  
authoring  “The  Reform  of  the  Law”.560     This  is  precisely  why  Gao  Heng  also  agreed  

that  this  chapter  could  not  have  been  written  by  Shang  Yang  himself.561      

Rong   Zhaozu   pointed   out   that   the   exchange   in   “The   Reform   of   the   Law”   is  

strikingly   similar   to   the   exchange   between   King   Wuling   of   Zhao   and   Fei   Yi   in   the  

second   section   of   the   Zhanguoce’s   “Policies   of   Zhao”,   along   with   the   interaction  

between  Duke  Xiao  and  Shang  Yang  in  the  Shiji’s  “Biography  of  Lord  Shang”.    Since  

the  Zhanguoce  is  dated  earlier  than  the  Shiji,  Rong  admitted  that  it  is  difficult  to  tell  

for   certain   whether   it   or   “The   Reform   of   the   Law”   should   be   dated   earliest.    

However,   he   speculated   that   “The   Reform   of   the   Law”   was   written   first   because  

both  the  Zhanguoce  and  the  Shiji  lack  a  notable  citation.    “The  Reform  of  the  Law”  

states,   “The   law   of   Guo   Yan   says:   ‘Those   who   discuss   lofty   virtue   need   not   echo  

popular   understanding.     Those   whose   achievements   are   great   need   not   consult  

with  the  multitudes.’”562     Nevertheless,  Rong  did  view  “The  Reform  of  the  Law”  as  

having  been  written  only  slightly  before  the  Zhanguoce.      

Cheng  Liang-­‐shu  agreed  with  Rong,  not  only  asserting  that  Shang  Yang  could  

not  have  written  “The  Reform  of  the  Law”  but  also  dating  the  chapter  earlier  than  

the  Zhanguoce.    Cheng  added  that  the  reforms  that  were  made  during  King  Wuling’s  

reign   were   mainly   to   customs,   not   to   laws.     There   was   reform   in   government  

administration  though  that  was  completely  different  from  Shang  Yang’s  reforms.    If  

the  Zhanguoce  is  a  reliable  source  on  King  Wuling’s  reign,  then  reforms  to  the  law  

were  not  the  focal  point  during  his  administration.    Rather  it  was  clothing,  customs,  
                                                                                                               
560  Chen  1967:  123  
561  Gao  2011:  21  
562  郭偃之法曰：‘論至德者不和於俗。成大功者不謀於眾。’(Gao  2011:  27);  See  Rong  1937:  63-­‐

80  

  298  
ritual,   and   teachings.   Nevertheless,   Cheng   Liang-­‐shu   did   say   that   the   chapter   might  

be  an  accurate  depiction  of  a  debate  in  the  presence  of  the  emperor  between  Shang  

Yang   and   Gan   Long.     Therefore,   Cheng   speculated   that   a   student   or   early  

contributors  to  Shang  Yang’s  textual  tradition  wrote  “The  Reform  of  the  Law”.563      

Also,  Rong  pointed  out  that  the  style  of  writing  in  “The  Reform  of  the  Law”  

does  not  include  comprehensive  rationales,  another  indication  that  it  was  written  

relatively   early.564     For   instance,   Duke   Xiao   expresses   concern   about   receiving  

criticism   for   reforming   laws.565     In   response   to   Duke   Xiao’s   concern,   the   figure  

Shang  Yang  elaborates  on  the  aforementioned  citation  of  the  “law  of  Guo  Yan”  in  an  

effort   to   advocate   for   his   recommended   method   of   governance.566     The   figure  

Gongsun   Yang   certainly   assertively   responded   to   Duke   Xiao’s   concerns   with  

recommendations.     However,   Rong’s   assertion   was   not   saying   that   there   is   no  

rationale  in  the  passage,  but  rather  that  the  rationales  leaned  heavily  on  citations.    

Old(er)  sayings  are  treated  as  though  they  are  authoritative  sources,  which  seems  

counterintuitive   when   Gongsun   Yang   strongly   argues   against   treating   the   period   of  

antiquity   as   a   model   for   the   present.     Nevertheless,   a   brief   examination   of   other  

chapters   in   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang   clearly   shows   a   more   loquacious   explanatory  

style   in   chapters   considered   to   have   been   written   in   later   periods.     In   fact,   Rong  

viewed  the  taciturn  arguments  in  “The  Reform  of  the  Law”  as  being  fairly  similar  to  

that   found   in   “An   Order   to   Cultivate   Waste   Lands”,   a   chapter   almost   universally  

considered  to  have  been  written  by  Shang  Yang  himself.  

                                                                                                               
563  Cheng  1987:  207  
564  See  Rong  1937:  63-­‐80  
565  See  [I.]  in  the  Appendix  II  
566  See  [II.]  in  the  Appendix  II  

  299  
 Having   viewed   Rong   and   Cheng’s   analysis   of   the   relative   dates   of   the   “The  

Reform  of  the  Law”  passage  and  the  Zhanguoce  passage  as  not  entirely  conclusive,  

Zhang   Linxiang   added   that   not   only   was   the   chapter   not   written   by   Shang   Yang   but  

it   also   could   not   have   been   written   by   a   close   contemporary   or   student   of   Shang  

Yang’s  either.    He  provided  two  main  reasons  for  his  assertion.  First,  if  the  chapter  

was  written  by  a  contemporary,  they  would  have  had  to  have  been  present  for  the  

events  or  heard  of  these  events  from  someone  who  claimed  to  have  been  there.    If  

the  chapter  is  in  fact  a  secondhand  report,  then  there  is  no  way  of  knowing  whether  

their  source  is  reliable.    Second,  he  argued  that  if  the  events  that  lead  up  to  Shang  

Yang’s   death   are   in   fact   reliable,   then   any   close   contemporary   would   have   feared  

for  their  safety  as  well.    Therefore,  it  is  does  not  seem  as  though  “The  Reform  of  the  

Law”  was  even  written  during  Shang  Yang’s  lifetime.567      

In   addition,   this   study   is   more   in   agreement   with   Zhang   for   one   important  

reason:   in   one   passage   “The   Reform   of   the   Law”   makes   a   distinction   between  

different  forms  of  statecraft  in  a  three-­‐tiered  hierarchical  fashion.568     This  passage  

makes   a   distinction   between   three   different   kinds   of   statecraft:   true   Kingship,  

Hegemon,  and  the  ideal  ruler  of  the  present  time.    Interestingly,  it  does  not  appear  

to   make   an   explicit   absolute   claim   that   true   Kingship   is   necessarily   a   better   form   of  

statecraft  than  that  of  a  true  Hegemon.    However,  it  makes  its  distinction  between  

the   two   forms   of   statecraft   through   their   primary   tool   of   governance.     The  

achievement  of  true  Kingship  relied  on  ritual  li  禮,  the  achievement  of  becoming  a  

true  Hegemon  relied  on  laws  fa  法,  and  the  ideal  ruler  of  the  present  day  needs  to  
                                                                                                               
567  Zhang  2008:  69  
568  See  [III.]  in  the  Appendix  II  

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rely  both  on  laws  fa  法  and  ritual  li  禮.      What  connects  the  two  forms  of  statecraft  is  

the   essence   of   Gongsun   Yang’s   argument   in   the   passage:   a   ruler   must   govern  

according  to  the  demands  of  the  times  and  circumstances.    Therefore,  the  passage  

does   not   specifically   argue   that   the   statecraft   of   a   true   Hegemon   is   generally   better  

or  worse  than  that  of  true  Kingship.    However,  it  is  arguing  that  for  the  present  time,  

the  statecraft  of  true  Kingship  or  that  of  becoming  a  true  Hegemon  by  themselves  

are  insufficient  to  effectively  govern  the  state.    Additionally,  the  ritual  of  the  Three  

Dynasties   period   must   have   eventually   allowed   for   disorder   in   the   Spring   and  

Autumn   period,   causing   the   Hegemons   of   that   time   to   utilize   laws.     Therefore,   at  

least   for   the   Spring   and   Autumn   period,   ritual   was   insufficient   to   effectively   govern  

a  state.      

In   another   passage   later   in   the   chapter,   a   hierarchy   of   statecraft   becomes  

even   clearer.569     This   passage   makes   explicit   what   the   previous   passage   implicitly  

explained:  the  ruler  must  govern  in  accordance  with  the  times  and  circumstances.    

Just  as  importantly  though,  this  passage  strongly  implies  what  the  previous  passage  

merely   hints   at:   there   was   political   development   over   time.     In   other   words,   the  

forms  of  statecraft,  over  time,  have  needed  to  become  more  and  more  sophisticated  

and  complex  to  deal  with  the  new  challenges  of  their  time.    This  implicitly  makes  

statecraft   in   the   present   time,   if   it   adequately   responds   to   the   present  

circumstances,   necessarily   more   developed   and   sophisticated   to   deal   with   more  

complex  problems  of  governance.    So  “The  Reform  of  the  Law”  indeed  expresses  a  

hierarchy   of   statecraft   for   the   present   times:   relying   on   laws   and   ritual   (present  

                                                                                                               
569  See  [IV.]  in  the  Appendix  II  

  301  
times),   relying   on   laws   (Spring   and   Autumn   period),   and   relying   on   ritual   (Three  

dynasties).  

“An  Order  to  Cultivate  Waste  Lands”  

Chen   Chi-­‐tien   viewed   the   chapter   as   a   collection   of   various   methods   to  

cultivate   land.     According   to   him,   all   of   the   methods   are   very   consistent   with   Shang  

Yang’s  thought,  and,  from  start  to  finish,  there  is  no  evidence  of  any  tampering.570    

Gao  Heng571,  Cheng  Liang-­‐shu572,  and  Zhang  Linxiang573  all  share  the  same  opinion:  

this   chapter   was   probably   authored   by   Shang   Yang   himself.     Cheng   Liang-­‐shu  

pointed   out   that   content   aside,   it   is   important   to   note   that   “An   Order   to   Cultivate  

Waste  Lands”  and  “Within  the  Borders”  are  most  closely  related  stylistically.    Both  

chapters  are  essay  styled-­‐chapters,  delivered  in  a  simple  and  natural  way.574  

“Agriculture  and  War”  

Both   Chen   Chi-­‐tien575  and   Gao   Heng576  argue   that,   though   the   chapter   does  

reflect  some  of  Shang  Yang’s  thought,  there  is  doubt  that  this  chapter  was  written  

by   Shang   Yang   himself.     This   is   due   to   a   few   instances   in   which   the   chapter  

describes  a  phenomenon  that  in  a  manner  contrary  to  what  it  believed  to  have  been  

the  case  during  the  time  when  Shang  Yang  was  actively  administrating.577     In   this  

passage   it   is   clear   the   author,   like   those   in   several   other   chapters   in   the   Book   of  

Lord  Shang,   expresses   distaste   for   prattlers,   those   who   debate   with   lofty   but   empty  

                                                                                                               
570  Chen  1967:  123  
571  Gao  2011:  24  
572  Cheng  1987:  204  
573  Zhang  2008:  76  
574  Cheng  1987:  27  
575  Chen  1967:  124  
576  Gao  2011:  25  
577  See  [V.]  in  the  Appendix  II  

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language,   and   sophists.     However,   what   is   particularly   of   note   is   one   of   the  

phenomena  described  as  a  result  of  the  prattle  being  prevalent  in  political  culture:  

the  buying  and  selling  of  government  positions.    It  is  still  possible  that  Shang  Yang  

could  be  the  author  of  the  chapter  because  one  could  argue  that  this  phenomenon  

could   have   been   mentioned   in   reference   to   the   ways   of   political   culture   before  

Shang  Yang’s  arrival  in  Qin.      

However,   this   becomes   more   less   likely   when   one   takes   into   account   the  

issue  Chen  Chi-­‐tien  brought  forth.    In  one  passage  towards  the  end  of  the  chapter,  it  

describes   a   hypothetical   situation   that   implies   an   experience   that   neither   Shang  

Yang   nor   Duke   Xiao   could   have   had.578     As   previously   mentioned,   both   the   Xunzi  

and   the   Hanfeizi   reference   how   for   four   decades,   approximately   the   time   of   Duke  

Xiao’s   reign   along   with   Shang   Yang’s   active   years   to   a   lesser   extent,   the   state   of   Qin  

was   victorious   in   battle.     So   how   could   Shang   Yang   describe   this   kind   of   experience  

which  suggests  the  state  of  Qin  suffered  defeat  or  the  threat  of  peril  during  Shang  

Yang’s   active   years?     Again,   it   is   possible   that   Shang   Yang   could   have   written   the  

passage  and  been  purely  theoretical.    It  is  also  possible  that  Shang  Yang  and  Duke  

Xiao   did   experience   this   kind   of   event   at   some   point,   and   it   was   overlooked   by  

history.     However,   Chen   Chi-­‐tien   considered   both   of   these   phenomena   as  

inconsistent  with  what  is  known  about  Shang  Yang’s  active  years  in  Qin.    Therefore,  

he  expressed  doubt  that  this  chapter  was  written  by  Shang  Yang  himself.  

                                                                                                               
578  See  [VI.]  in  the  Appendix  II  

  303  
 Rong   Zhaozu   argued   that   “Agriculture   and   War”   might   share   an   author   with  

“The   Elimination   of   Strength”.579     In   both   passages   to   which   he   refers,   there   is  

strikingly  similar  language,  having  the  exact  same  wording  at  times.    Perhaps  even  

more   importantly,   they   both   begin   by   pointing   out   very   similar   phenomena   that  

potentially   bring   ruin   to   a   state.     The   only   difference   is   that   the   “Agriculture   and  

War”   passage   includes   benevolence   ren   仁,   and   wisdom   hui   慧,   whereas   the   “The  

Elimination   of   Strength”   passage   includes   the filial   piety   xiao   孝   and   brotherly   love  

弟.      Both  passages  also  assert  that  the  existence  of  the  ten  phenomena  that  bring  

ruin   to   a   state   specifically   hinder   the   state’s   defense   capability.     This   is   particularly  

important  as  both  passages  also  argue  that  a  state  must  be  fond  of  force  hao   li   zhe  

好力者.        

It   is   not   surprising   that   two   chapters   that   are   attributed   to   a   statesman  

during   the   Warring   States   period   share   the   common   assumption   that   the   state’s  

capacity   for   force   is   vital   to   its   survival   and   prosperity.     However,   it   is   important   to  

note  that  both  passages  describe  a  specific  strategy  that  demonstrates  the  quality  

of  being  fond  of  force.    Thus,  the  ten  phenomena  bring  ruin  to  a  state  because  they  

establish   a   culture   that   encourages   methods   that   are   described   as   “easy”.     It   is  

unsurprising   then,   that   both   passages   include   phenomena   related   to   texts,   virtue,  

and  speech.    These  activities  appear  to  be  prominent  phenomena  that  were  thought  

to  not  contribute  to  the  improvement  of  the  state’s  capacity  for  force  or  assist  the  

ruler  in  consolidating  his  subjects’  efforts.      

                                                                                                               
579  Rong  1937:  95-­‐97;  See  [VII.]  and  [VIII.]  in  the  Appendix  II  

  304  
 The  aforementioned  passage  is  sometimes  described  as  a  representation  of  

the   antagonistic   attitude   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang   has   towards   morality   or   virtue.    

The  aforementioned  passage  is  actually  specifically  criticizing  subjects  who  indulge  

in   the   texts   and   activities   associated   with   morality   or   virtue,   while   also   not  

prioritizing  the  fulfillment  of  their  state  responsibilities  in  farming,  trade,  or  office.    

In   other   words,   the   Book  of  Lord  Shang  insists   that   these   subjects   come   to   terms  

with   the   basic   demands   for   survival   and   prosperity   during   the   Warring   States  

period.    Simply  put,  an  individual  must  be  secure  to  self-­‐cultivate  and  a  state  must  

survive  in  order  to  develop  materially  and/or  morally.      

Therefore,   any   emphasis   on   virtue   must   prove   that   it   directly   leads   to   the  

achievement  of  an  undeniable  objective  for  all  of  the  state  during  this  time  period:  

the   defense   against   force.     So,   unless   the   aforementioned   ten   phenomena   can  

directly  contribute  to  the  achievement  of  victory  over  the  imposition  of  force,  they  

must   be   eliminated,   at   least   temporarily,   until   a   culture   that   prioritizes   the  

improvement  of  the  state’s  capacity  for  force  holds  a  firm  monopoly.    This  attitude  

is  not  anti-­‐virtue  or  anti-­‐morality.    It  opposes  the  kind  of  virtue  and  morality  that  

ignores  the  demands  of  the  times  and  the  necessary  response  to  ensure  survival.    In  

a  political  climate  in  which  every  state  is  competing  with  others  for  resources  and  

security,   what   practical   assurances   can   a   culture   of   virtue   provide?   Yuri   Pines  

described   the   intentions   of   the   author   in   “Agriculture   and   War” when   he  

  305  
states,“...the   author   does   not   assault   morality   as   such   but   is   critical   of   moralizing  

discourse...”580  

Cheng  Liang-­‐shu  argued  that  “Agriculture  and  War”  was  probably  written  by  

a   close   contemporary. 581     Cheng   also   made   an   additional   distinction   between  

“Agriculture   and   War”   and   “Eliminating   Strength”   that   the   aforementioned   authors  

did   not   discuss.     Cheng   argued   that   not   only   are   the   two   chapters   written   by   two  

different  authors,  but  “Agriculture  and  War”  was  written  earlier  than  “Eliminating  

Strength”.582  Also,   Cheng   pointed   out   that   “Agriculture   and   War”   appears   to   not  

have  been  written  during  Shang  Yang’s  lifetime  because  a  comparison  of  “An  Order  

to   Cultivate   Waste   Lands”   reveals   some   significant   differences.     First,   the   use   of   the  

character   yi   壹   in   “Agriculture   and   War”   is   significantly   different   from   “An   Order   to  

Cultivate  Waste  Lands”.    For  instance,  in  “An  Order  to  Cultivate  Waste  Lands”  the  

character  yi  壹  is  used  three  times,  connoting  a  general  condition  of  unification  or  

specialization;   while   in   “Agriculture   and   War”   the   character   yi   壹   is   used   about  

nineteen   times,   connoting   a   special   kind   of   unification   of   the   state   in   agricultural  

production  and  warfare.    Second,  “Agriculture  and  War”  is  much  more  intense  in  its  

insistence   on   the   ruler’s   subjects   not   engaging   in   activities   outside   of   agriculture  

and   war,   whereas   “An   Order   to   Cultivate   Waste   Lands”   is   less   intense   about  

activities   outside   of   agriculture   and   war   within   the   state.     Third,   “An   Order   to  

Cultivate   Waste   Lands”   describes   five   kinds   of   disasters   for   the   state,   whereas  

                                                                                                               
580  Pines,  Yuri.  “Alienating  Rhetoric  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang  and  its  Moderation”.  Extrême-­‐Orient,  

Extrême-­‐Occident,  vol.  34,  2012,  p.  79-­‐110.  

581  Cheng  1987:  39  
582  Cheng  1987:  33-­‐42  

  306  
“Agriculture  and  War”  describes  ten  different  kinds  of  disasters  that  are  much  more  

specific  to  the  Rujia  tradition.583  

Interestingly,   Zhang   Linxiang   argued   that   it   is   still   possible   that   “Agriculture  

and  War”  was  written  by  Shang  Yang  himself.    He  viewed  Chen  Chi-­‐tien’s  criticism  

of   the   chapter   as   mistakenly   assuming   that   Shang   Yang   could   have   only   written  

about   specific   events   that   actually   happened   under   his   chancellorship,   during   the  

reign  of  Duke  Xiao,  without  engaging  in  more  general  and  abstract  discussion  about  

emphasizing   the   two   occupations   of   agriculture   and   warfare.     Zhang   also   disagreed  

with   an   assertion   at   the   foundation   of   Cheng’s   analysis.     Cheng   asserted   that   the  

Book   of   Lord   Shang   presents   a   general   trend   over   time   within   Shang   Yang’s  

intellectual   current,   that   increasingly   incorporates   more   intense   attacks   on   Rujia  

ideas   about   education   and   morality.     In   short,   Cheng   asserted   that   the   more  

attention   to   ideas   associated   with   the   Rujia   tradition,   the   later   the   chapter   or  

passage  was  written.      

However,  Zhang,  in  contrast,  argued  that  the  chapter’s  criticisms  of  itinerant  

knights  you  shi  游士  and  those  who  indulge  in  texts  outside  of  orthodoxy,  shi  詩  The  

Book  of  Odes   and   shu   書   The  Book  of  History,   are   not   necessarily   evidence   of   a   focus  

on   attacking   the   Rujia   tradition   but   rather   attacking   phenomena   that   do   not   help  

the  state’s  practical  needs  to  defend  itself  from  outside  threats.    Zhang  added  that  

even  if  the  chapter  was  mainly  focused  on  the  exclusion  or  obstruction  of  itinerant  

knights,  this  occurred  in  two  main  time  periods,  both  of  which  are  about  forty  years  

                                                                                                               
583  Cheng  1987:  210-­‐211  

  307  
after  Shang  Yang’s  lifetime.    Therefore,  “Agriculture  and  War”  could  not  have  been  

written  shortly  after  Shang  Yang’s  lifetime,  as  Cheng  Liang-­‐shu  claimed.584  

“The  Elimination  of  Strength”  

Chen   Chi-­‐tien   essentially   pointed   out   that   this   chapter   seems   to   be   very  

scattered  in  its  thought.    It  discusses  a  number  of  topics:  the  strong  and  the  weak;  

the  poor  and  the  rich;  agriculture,  commerce  and  office;  the  Book  of  Odes,  the  Book  

of  History,  and  virtue;  uniformity;  harsh  punishments  and  small  rewards,  the  state’s  

thirteen   important   numbers,   etc.     Such   an   array   of   scattered   topics   causes   Chen  

Chi-­‐tien  to  label  this  chapter  one  of  mixed  authorship.585    Gao  Heng  pointed  out  that  

the  title  of  the  chapter  does  not  correspond  with  much  of  its  contents.    According  to  

Gao   Heng,   though   the   chapter   does   discuss   phenomena   that   make   a   state   or   its  

people  weaker  or  stronger,  a  framework  he  viewed  as  not  reflecting  Shang  Yang’s  

emphasis  in  thought,  it  also  discusses  a  number  of  other  topics  like  the  emphasis  of  

agriculture   and   warfare,   implementing   heavy   punishments   and   light   rewards,   a  

hukou   registry   program,   controlling   the   markets   within   the   economy,   etc.     This   led  

Gao  Heng  to  speculate  that  this  chapter  is  of  mixed  authorship  as  well.586      

Rong   Zhaozu   argued   that,   along   with   the   “The   Elimination   of   Strength”,  

“Discussion  about  the  People”,  “Making  Orders  Strict”,  “Weakening  the  People”,  and  

“Establishing   Laws”   all   appear   to   have   been   authored   by   the   same   person.587     Rong  

argued   that   “The   Elimination   of   Strength”   and   “Weakening   the   People”   both  

                                                                                                               
584  Zhang  2008:  83  
585  Chen  1967:  125  
586  Gao  2011:  23,  55  
587  Rong  1937:  91-­‐95  

  308  
address  very  similar  topics  and  feature  some  repetitive  language.588     It  should  also  

be   pointed   out   that   “Discussion   of   the   People”   begins   by   discussing   a   similar  

topic.589  The   final   part   of   the   “Weakening   the   People”   passage   actually   quotes   the  

same  language  as  the  first  part  of  the  “The  Elimination  of  Strength”  passage.      

Even   though   Rong   focused   only   on   the   first   two   passages,   all   three   passages  

view   the   strength   and   weakness   of   the   state   and   that   of   its   people   as   negatively  

correlated,   with   the   first   two   passages   juxtaposing   virtually   identical   notions   of   a  

“weak   people”   and   a   “strong   state”   or   a   “strong   people”   and   a   “weak   state”.    

Moreover,   this   idea   extends   to   enemy   states,   as   the   state   seeks   to   have   control   of  

them  as  well,  and  is  even  used  to  describe  the  relationship  between  the  ruler  and  

his   own   state.     The   “The   Elimination   of   Strength”   passage   asserts   that   the   ruler  

values  a  lot  of  changes  while  his  system  of  laws  cannot  work  most  efficiently  with  

many   changes.     There   almost   seems   to   be   a   somewhat   Daojia   undertone   to   the  

repeated   reference   of   a   balancing   of   two   oppositional,   yet   sometimes  

complementary,  forces:  the  state  and  its  people,  two  different  states,  the  ruler  and  

his   state,   etc.     Perhaps   most   importantly   though,   all   of   the   passages   insist   on   the  

establishment   of   an   orthodoxy   and   ensuring   a   strong   state   through   the   explicit  

claims   that   if   it   practices   goodness   shan   善   the   perverse   will   necessarily   be   in  

abundance  國為善，姦必多. Additionally,  the  state  should  not  allow  its  people  to  

engage   in   illicit   affairs   or   those   outside   of   orthodoxy   yin   淫,   pursuing   their   own  

ends  you  zhi  有志.    The  passages  implicitly  suggest  that  it  should  be  the  state  that  

                                                                                                               
588  See  [IX.]  and  [X.]  in  the  Appendix  II  
589  See  [XI.]  in  the  Appendix  II  

  309  
dictates  what  ends  its  people  should  pursue  and  that  failure  to  do  this  could  result  

in  the  state’s  dismemberment.      

Moreover,  Rong  also  pointed  out  that  there  are  strong  similarities  between  

certain   passages   in   “The   Elimination   of   Strength”,   “Discussion   about   the   People”,  

and   “Making   Orders   Strict”.590  Rong   illustrated,   through   a   comparison   of   different  

passages   from   these   three   chapters,   the   very   strikingly   similar   language   used   to  

assert  the  same  position  in  discussing  the  same  issue.    All  three  passages  assert  that  

a   ruler   should   apply   harsh   punishments   not   only   to   major   offenses   but,   just   as  

importantly,  to  minor  offenses  as  well.    When  the  ruler’s  subjects  understand  that  

harsh  punishments  will  be  imposed,  regardless  of  the  severity  of  their  malfeasance,  

then   in   pursuit   of   avoiding   the   pain   and   suffering   of   punishment,   they   will   never  

intentionally  violate  the  law.      

Second,  all  three  passages  also  assert  the  same  logic  on  the  notion  of  sway  

de   德.     Recall   how   in   the   Spring   and   Autumn   period   this   notion   of   virtue   or  

charisma  one  was  associated  with  the  bloodline  of  the  nobility.    The  greater  one’s  

proximity  to  the  Son  of  Heaven,  the  center  of  the  ancestral  cult,  the  more  virtue  or  

charisma   one   was   said   to   have.     Contrary   to   this   Spring   and   Autumn   notion,   the  

notion   of   virtue   in   the   aforementioned   passages   centers   around   force   li   力   or  

punishment   xing   刑.     This   is   particularly   interesting   because   these   passages  

introduce   a   very   different   basis   for   political   organization   than   that   which   was  

described  in  the  Spring  and  Autumn  period.      

                                                                                                               
590  See  [XII.],  [XIII.],  and  [XIV.]  in  the  Appendix  II  

  310  
 In   the   all   three   passages,   the   ruler’s   “sway”,   which   shapes   the   laws   that  

establish   good   faith   and   mutual   trust   xin   信   and   essentially   establishes   the   deep  

bond   yue   xin   約信   between   the   ruler   and   his   subjects,   is   defined   more   by   his  

capacity   and   ability   to   impose   force   or   punishment   than   any   other   variable.     This  

then,  could  potentially  provide  more  insight  into  the  negative  correlation  between  

the   strength   of   the   state   and   its   subjects   or   enemy   states,   in   the   aforementioned  

“The  Elimination  of  Strength”,  “Weakening  the  People”,  and  the  “Discussion  about  

the  People”.    The  “The  Elimination  of  Strength”,  “Discussion   about   the   People”,  and  

“Making  Orders  Strict”  passages  describe  a  ruler  that  is  defined  by  his  capacity  for  

force  and  punishment.    Therefore,  if  enemy  states  are  considered  stronger,  then  a  

ruler   and   his   state   must   necessarily   be   weaker   because   the   enemy   state   has   a  

greater   capacity   for   force.     If   a   particular   ruler’s   subjects   are   considered   stronger  

than   he,   this   could   mean   that   his   capacity   to   impose   punishments   upon   them   is  

ineffective  or  non-­‐existent.    In  both  cases,  the  survival  of  the  “weaker”  ruler  and  his  

state  would  necessarily  be  threatened.      

Based   on   this   argument,   the   only   way   for   a   ruler   to   ensure   his   state’s  

survival   is   through   strengthening   his   state’s   capacity   for   force   as   much   as   possible.    

More  specifically,  a  ruler  must  have  a  stronger  army  than  that  of  his  enemy  states,  

ensure   he   has   both   the   wealth   to   finance   unmatched   military   prowess   and   the  

quality  and  quantity  of  personnel,  and  impose  harsh  punishments  upon  his  subjects.    

These   features   can   act   as   demonstrations   of   the   ruler’s   almost   extra-­‐human  

qualities.    Michel  Foucault  elaborated  on  the  utility  of  punishment  being  used  as  an  

demonstration  of  extra-­‐human  qualities  when  he  stated:    

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 But   punishment   is   also   a   way   of   exacting   retribution   that   is   both  
personal  and  public,  since  the  physico-­‐political  force  of  the  sovereign  
is  in  a  sense  present  in  the  law:  ‘One  sees  by  the  very  definition  of  the  
law  that  it  tends  not  only  to  prohibit,  but  also  to  avenge  contempt  for  
its   authority   by   the   punishment   of   those   who   violate   its   prohibitions’  
(Muyart  de  Vouglans,  xxxiv)…  the  punishment  is  carried  out  in  such  a  
way   as   to   give   a   spectacle   not   of   measure,   but   of   imbalance   and  
excess;   in   this   liturgy   of   punishment,   there   must   be   an   emphatic  
affirmation   of   power   and   of   its   intrinsic   superiority.     And   this  
superiority   is   not   simply   that   of   right,   but   that   of   the   physical  
strength   of   the   sovereign   beating   down   upon   the   body   of   his  
adversary   and   mastering   it:   by   breaking   the   law,   the   offender   has  
touched  the  very  person  of  the  prince;  and  it  is  the  prince  –  or  at  least  
those  to  whom  he  has  delegated  his  force  –  who  seizes  upon  the  body  
of  the  condemned  man  and  displays  it  marked,  beaten,  broken.    The  
ceremony  of  punishment,  then,  is  an  exercise  of  ‘terror’.591  
 
  As   for   “The   Elimination   of   Strength”,   Zhang   agreed   that   the   chapter   is  

generally   less   focused   and   seems   to   express   inconsistent   aims.     Despite   the  

potential   inconsistencies,   he   acknowledged   that   the   chapter   generally   centers  

around   the   relationship   between   the   state’s   strength   and   weakness   and   the  

people’s  strength  and  weakness.    However,  he  did  not  view  the  chapter  as  having  

been   written   by   Shang   Yang   himself.     Moreover,   he   disagreed   with   Cheng’s  

assessment   that   “The   Elimination   of   Strength”   generally   follows   the   ideological  

position   found   in   “Agriculture   and   War”.     Cheng   even   asserted   that   “The  

Elimination   of   Strength”   seems   to   have   come   into   form   several   years   after  

“Agriculture   and   War”   and   therefore   was   not   written   by   Shang   Yang   himself.    

However,   Zhang   added   that   “The   Elimination   of   Strength”   also   shares   viewpoints  

with  “Opening  and  Debarring”,  “Making  Orders  Strict”,  and  “Establishing  Laws”.      

Therefore,   ideological   commonality   between   “The   Elimination   of   Strength”  

and   “Agriculture   and   War”   does   not   necessarily   prove   anything.     For   instance,   “The  
                                                                                                               
591  Foucault  1977:  49  

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Elimination  of  Strength”  states,  “Farmers,  merchants,  and  government  officials  are  

the   main   divisions   of   labor   in   the   state.”592     This   attitude   towards   merchants,  

acknowledging   them   as   having   an   important   function   within   the   state,   is   actually  

quite   contrary   to   many   other   chapters   in   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang.     A   passage   in  

“Agriculture   and   War”   is   one   example. 593     It   clearly   describes   the   cultures  

associated   with   commerce,   studying   Rujia   texts,   and   making   handicrafts,   as   both  

impoverishing   the   state’s   wealth   and   weakening   the   state’s   military   strength.    

Simply  put,  the  culture  associated  with  prioritizing  agriculture  and  warfare  and  the  

culture   associated   with   commerce   are   mutually   exclusive.     There   is   no   ideal  

condition  in  which  commerce  and  agriculture  can  coexist.    Therefore,  “Agriculture  

and   War”   must   disagree   with   “The   Elimination   of   Strength”   on   the   issue   of  

merchants  and  commerce.594  

“Discussion  about  the  People”  

Though  with  some  qualifications,  Chen  Chi-­‐tien  concluded  that  this  chapter  

was   written   by   Shang   Yang   himself.     Since   he   viewed   this   chapter   as   focused   on  

elucidating   methods   of   reporting   perversity   or   violations   of   state   standards   and  

laws,  he  considered  it  plausible  that  “Discussion  about  the  People”  was  written  by  

Shang   Yang   because   the   Shiji,   in   its   “Biography   of   Lord   Shang”,   describes   Shang  

Yang   as   having   implemented   policies   that   established   a   very   similar   method   in  

support   of   a   specific   form   of   political   organization.595     It   states,   “He   (Shang   Yang)  

ordered  the  people  into  groups  of  five  and  ten  families  to  be  mutually  responsible  
                                                                                                               
592  農，商，官三者，國之常官也。(Gao  2011:  56)    
593  See  [XV.]  in  the  Appendix  II  
594  Zhang  2008:  101  
595  Chen  1967:  125-­‐126  

  313  
for   one   another   while   also   potentially   suffering   guilt   by   association.     As   for   those  

who  did  not  report  on  a  criminal  member,  they  would  be  cut  in  two  at  the  waist.    As  

for  those  who  did  report  on  a  criminal  member,  they  would  be  rewarded  the  same  

as  if  they  had  beheaded  a  soldier  of  an  enemy  state.    As  for  those  who  hid  a  criminal  

member,   they   would   be   punished   the   same   as   if   they   had   surrendered   to   an   enemy  

state.”596     Clearly,  the  Shiji  attributes  a  form  of  mutual  surveillance  program,  based  

on   a   grouping   of   families   similar   to   that   mentioned   previously   of   Shang   Yang.     In  

one  passage,  the  chapter  in  question  does  seem  to  reflect  a  similar  principle  as  the  

aforementioned  Shiji  passage.597  

Though  lacking  the  direct  description  of  a  mutual  surveillance  program,  this  

passage  does  implicitly  convey  the  indispensability  of  two  aspects  of  creating  order  

within  a  state:  the  reliance  on  law  and  the  prevention  of  the  concealment  of  crimes.    

It   puts   forth   the   extreme   argument   that   it   is   better   for   a   ruler   to   employ   the  

“perverse”   jian   姦   because   this   circumstance   will   generally   cause   the   ruler’s  

subjects  to  cling  to  or  depend  upon,  to  a  substantial  degree,  state  laws.    They  will  

come  to  depend  on  state  laws  more  than  they  otherwise  would  because  state  laws  

will  be  the  only  mechanism  they  have  to  protect  them  from  the  crimes  of  others.    In  

addition,   since   the   ruler   employs   the   perverse,   his   administration   will   be   even  

better  at  preventing  the  concealment  of  crimes  because  their  self-­‐interest  and  the  

public   interest   will   mutually   reinforce   one   another.     Also,   the   passage   argues   that   a  

heightened  dependence  on  state  laws  will  help  eliminate  notions  of  goodness  that  

                                                                                                               
596  令民為什伍，而相牧司連坐。不告姦者腰斬，告姦者與斬敵首同賞，匿姦者與降敵同罰。

(Sima  1931:  47)  

597  See  [XVI.]  in  the  Appendix  II  

  314  
could   interfere   with   the   proper   bestowal   and   application   of   rewards   and  

punishments.     It   is   important   to   point   out   that   the   notion   of   goodness   shan   善   is  

associated  with  the  pursuit  of  private  welfare  that  does  not  contribute  to  what  the  

ruler  defines  as  public  welfare.    Its  very  definition  in  includes  the  “concealment  of  

others   crimes” 合而復者，善也。別而規者，姦也.     In   other   words,   this   notion   of  

goodness  works  in  opposition  to  public  welfare  because  it  is  in  the  state’s  interest  

to  punish  all  crimes  and  stop  all  malfeasance  in  order  to  produce  order  and  prevent  

chaos.    Thus,  it  can  only  be  for  reasons  of  private  welfare  that  an  individual  would  

exemplify   goodness.     So,   it   is   the   establishment   of   a   culture   that   imposes   mutual  

surveillance  amongst  the  ruler’s  subjects,  in  this  passage  and  others,  that  convinced  

Chen  Chi-­‐tien  that  this  chapter  was  indeed  written  by  Shang  Yang.598    

There   are   instances   in   which   the   chapter   suggests   evidence   of   mixed  

authorship.    One  passage  appears  to  abruptly  jump  to  different  topics.599     It  begins  

by   discussing   how   harsh   punishments   cause   rewards   to   be   more   honorable.     Then,  

it   briefly   discusses   how   punishments   relate   to   the   degree   of   detail   in   the   content   of  

the   laws.     This   is   followed   by   a   discussion   on   human   nature   and   how   a   ruler   can  

reconcile  it  in  the  attempt  to  create  order.    Finally,  the  passage  ends  with  the  notion  

that   harsh   punishments   should   be   used   for   all   offenses,   minor   and   major   alike.    

Clearly,   this   passage   does   not   present   the   smoothest   prose   compared   to   other  

chapters   in   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang.     Also,   this   passage   mentions   that   it   is   in   the  

people’s  nature  to  be  orderly  民之情也治.    Within  the  chapter  itself,  there  is  some  

                                                                                                               
598  Chen  1967:  125-­‐126    
599  See  [XVII.]  in  the  Appendix  II  

  315  
doubt   about   the   consistency.     For   instance,   the   combination   of   the   two  

aforementioned  passages  from  “Discussion  about  the  People”  leads  to  the  question:  

wouldn’t  governing  the  ruler’s  subjects  through  employing  the  perverse  be  similar  

to   governing   the   people   with   their   own   chaos?     By   definition,   the   perverse   were  

those  who  cared  only  for  themselves  and  kept  watch  on  the  crimes  of  others.    Can  

the   people   be   considered   naturally   orderly   if   they   are   all   caring   only   for  

themselves?     If   not,   then   this   would   represent   the   chaos   with   which   the   second  

passage  suggests  a  ruler  should  not  govern  the  people.    The  idea  that  the  people’s  

nature   is   naturally   orderly   is   particularly   strange   because   it   appears   closer   to   a  

view   of   human   nature   that   can   be   found   in   the   Laozi   than   the   rest   of   the   Book  of  

Lord   Shang.600     It   is   questionable   whether   this   notion   of   human   nature   is   even  

consistent   with   the   ideas   presented   in   other   chapters   in   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang.  

This   is   not   exactly   in   accordance   with   the   assumptions   about   human   behavior  

presented   in   “An   Order   to   Cultivate   Waste   Lands”.     Though   the   above   passage   does  

seem  to  view  a  prosperous  state  as  an  ideal  and  describes  good  order  as  a  means  to  

                                                                                                               
600  For  instance,  the  Laozi  states,  “Exterminate  the  sage,  discard  the  wise,  and  the  people  will  benefit  

a  hundredfold;  exterminate  benevolence,  discard  rectitude,  and  the  people  will  again  be  filial;  
exterminate  ingenuity,  discard  profit,  and  there  will  be  no  more  thieves  and  bandits.    These  three,  
being  false  adornments,  are  not  enough  and  the  people  must  have  something  to  which  they  can  
attach  themselves:  exhibit  the  unadorned  and  embrace  the  uncarved  block,  have  little  thought  of  self  
and  as  few  desires  as  possible.”  (Lau  2001:  27-­‐29);  See  Laozi.  Tao  Te  Ching:  Bilingual  Edition.  D.C.  
Lau,  trans.  Hong  Kong:  The  Chinese  University  Press,  2001  &  Lau,  D.C.  and  Chen  Fong  Ching,  ed.  A  
Concordance  to  the  Laozi.  Hong  Kong:  The  Commercial  Press,  1996.  This  passage  points  to  the  
phenomena  that  are  commonly  associated  with  Rujia  and  Fajia  thought  and  suggests  that  people  
need  to  “break  away”  from  all  of  those  concerns  in  order  to  sufficiently  reach  order  within  the  Dao.    
Rather  than  mastering  the  above  methods,  like  benevolence  and  proper  roles  or  cleverness  and  
profit,  the  Laozi  suggests  that  people  need  to  return  to  their  true  natures  before  they  are  corrupted  
by  the  aforementioned  methods  of  so-­‐called  development.    This  is  similar  to  the  “Discussion  about  
the  People”  passage  because  it  suggests  that  it  is  not  people’s  nature  but  rather  their  “circumstances”  
that  lead  to  chaos  qi  shi  ye  luan  其事也亂.    Now  unlike  the  Laozi,  the  “Discussion  about  the  People”  
passage  does  not  argue  that  all  constructs  of  human  organization  and  political  development  are  
insufficient,  but  rather  only  harsh  punishments  will  be  sufficient.  

  316  
achieve  prosperity,  unlike  “An  Order  to  Cultivate  Waste  Lands”,  it  considers  harsh  

punishments   as   a   means   to   return   the   ruler’s   subjects   back   to   an   original   orderly  

nature.  “An  Order  to  Cultivate  Waste  Lands”  depicts  harsh  punishments  as  a  means  

of  motivating  the  ruler’s  subjects’  assumed  pursuit  of  private  welfare  into  paths  of  

opportunity   for   gain.     Thus,   “Discussion   about   the   People”   asserts   that   human  

nature   can   naturally   cause   the   state   to   prosper.   “An   Order   to   Cultivate   Waste  

Lands”  asserts  that  assumed  human  behaviors  will  not  cause  the  state  to  prosper  

and,   therefore,   must   be   redirected.     These   notions   of   human   behavior   in   relation   to  

the  state’s  prosperity  are  not  compatible.    The  aforementioned  contradictions  raise  

serious  concerns  of  mixed  authorship.  

Other   scholars   have   tended   to   analyze   “Discussion   about   the   People”   in  

conjunction  with  “Weakening  the  People”  and  “The  Elimination  of  Strength”.    Both  

“Weakening   the   People”   and   “Discussion   about   the   People”   contain   borrowed  

phrases   from   other   works,   particularly   borrowing   from   “The   Elimination   of  

Strength”.     For   this   reason,   Gao   Heng   believed   that   neither   “Weakening   the   People”  

or   “The   Elimination   of   Strength”   could   have   been   written   by   one   person 601 ,  

whereas   Rong   Zhaozu   concluded   that   this   is   evidence   that   “Discussion   about   the  

People”,   “Weakening   the   People”,   and   “The   Elimination   of   Strength”   were   all  

written   by   the   same   person602.     Interestingly,   Cheng   Liang-­‐shu   agreed   with   Meng  

Jifu,   who   argued   that   the   two   chapters,   “Discussion   about   the   People”   and  

“Weakening  the  People”  are  actually  annotations  of  “The  Elimination  of  Strength”.    

Meng  Jifu  further  stated  that  they  seem  to  have  once  been  a  set  of  annotations  for  
                                                                                                               
601  Gao  2011:  23  
602  Rong  1937:  91-­‐95  

  317  
“The   Elimination   of   Strength”,   but   one   by   one   various   passages   began   to  

disintegrate.     Nevertheless,   originally,   “Weakening   the   People”   was   the   first   half  

and   “Discussion   of   the   People”   was   the   second   half   of   annotations   seeking   to  

elaborate  on  the  contents  of  “The  Elimination  of  Strength”.603    

As   for   “Discussion   about   the   People”   and   “Weakening   the   People”,   Zhang  

accepted  the  possibility  that  both  chapters  are  annotations  of   “The  Elimination  of  

Strength”,   as   Meng   Jifu   suggested.     However,   he   added   that   the   annotations   are  

relatively   freely   composed,   not   constrained   by   the   overall   form   or   thesis   of   the  

original   text.     Moreover,   the   annotations   are   not   a   sentence   by   sentence   or   even  

paragraph   by   paragraph   analysis   of   the   supposed   “mother   text”   but   merely  

selections  of  certain  passages  that  help  the  authors  of  the  annotations  express  their  

own   viewpoints.     Due   to   the   lack   of   coordination   between   the   two   supposed  

annotations,   Cheng   Liang-­‐shu   argued   the   author   of   “Discussion   about   the   People”  

did   not   see   the   first   half   of   “The   Elimination   of   Strength”   while   the   author   of  

“Weakening  the  People”  did  not  see  the  second  half  of  “The  Elimination  of  Strength”.    

Zhang   Linxiang   also   added   that   he   disagreed   with   Cheng’s   presumption   that   the  

annotators  of  “The  Elimination  of  Strength”  must  not  have  seen  the  other  half  of  the  

text  for  which  they  did  not  write  an  annotation.    He  pointed  out  that  in  the  middle  

of  “Discussion  about  the  People”  the  state  and  its  subjects’  wealth  and  strength  in  

                                                                                                               
603  Meng  Jifu  蒙季甫.  “Shangjunshu  shuo  min  ruo  min  wei  jie  shuo  qu  qiang  pian  gan  zheng  ji”  商君

書說民弱民為解說去強篇刊正記  in  Shangjunshu  zhui  zhi  商君書錐指.  Jiang  Li  Hong  蔣禮鴻,  ed.  
Beijing  北京:  Zhong  hua  shu  ju  中華書局,  1986,  p.  152-­‐161.;  Also  see  Cheng  1987:  59-­‐64.  

  318  
relation  to  the  three  occupations  san  guan  三官  are  discussed,  similar  to  the  second  

paragraph  in  the  first  half  of  “The  Elimination  of  Strength”.604      

“The  Calculation  of  Land”  

Chen   Chi-­‐tien   concluded   that   this   chapter   could   not   have   been   written   by  

Shang  Yang  because  there  are  at  least  three  instances  in  which  the  character  shu  術  

is   used.     This   study   does   not   translate   the   character   shu   術   as   technique.   In   the   one  

passage605,   the   character   shu   術   is   used   twice.     In   both   instances,   it   appears   to   be  

interchangeable  with  the  homophonic  character  shu  數,  which  seems  to  be  notably  

different  from  the  concept  of  technique  discussed  earlier.      

However,   even   if   “The   Calculation   of   Land”   is   referencing   the   concept   of  

technique  found  in  the  extant  Shen  Buhai  Fragments,  then  this  brings  serious  doubt  

that   Shang   Yang   could   have   authored   this   chapter.     Though   Shen   Buhai   was   a  

contemporary  of  Shang  Yang’s,  he  is  believed  to  have  come  to  power  in  354  B.C.  in  

the  state  of  Han  韓  while  Shang  Yang  is  thought  to  have  died  around  338  B.C.    It  is  

improbable   that   Shen   Buhai’s   concept   of   technique   could   have   not   only   reached  

Shang  Yang  before  his  death  and  at  least  sixteen  years  before  he  came  to  power,  but  

also  in  time  to  allow  him  to  incorporate  the  concept  in  his  writing.    Also,  if  Shang  

Yang   were   to   incorporate   Shen   Buhai’s   concept   of   technique,   he   would   not   have  

done  so  sparingly.606      

                                                                                                               
604  Zhang  2008:  101-­‐102  
605  Gao  2011:  76  
606  Chen  1967:  126  

  319  
 Rong   Zhaozu   added   that   “The   Calculation   of   Land”   may   have   shared   an  

author   with   “Policies”   because   both   chapters   describe   very   similar   political   goals  

and  concerns.607     Passages  from  each  share  two  important  characteristics.    First,  in  

accordance  with  what  seems  to  be  the  general  tenor  of  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang,  both  

passages   view   the   state’s   strength   or   capacity   for   force   as   the   crucial   element   in   its  

prosperity.    Most  importantly,  however,  is  that  both  passages  assert  that  the  ruler  

must   cause   his   subjects   to   unify   yi   壹   in   warfare.     The   first   passage   explicitly  

mentions   the   effects   of   this   unification   in   warfare.     It   argues   that   once   the   people  

are   unified   in   warfare,   they   will   necessarily   become   single-­‐minded,   causing   those  

not   in   battle   domestically   to   solely   focus   on   agriculture,   which   will   make   them  

simple  and  cause  them  to  live  in  peace  without  the  disturbances  of  evil.    The  second  

passage  focuses  on  the  disposition  of  those  that  will  be  in  battle.    When  the  ruler’s  

subjects   are   united   in   warfare,   their   attitude   towards   warfare   will   change   to   where  

they   actually   take   pleasure   in   battle   even   though   they   naturally   dislike   it.     In  

addition,   because   those   abroad   and   those   at   home   are   united   in   warfare,   the   moral  

support   given   to   those   abroad   reinforces   this   desired   animal-­‐like   hunger   for   battle.    

Both   passages   are   in   such   accordance   with   one   another   that   Rong,   as   a   result,  

concluded  that  both  chapters  were  written  by  the  same  author.608      

Cheng   Liang-­‐shu   definitely   did   not   think   that   the   two   chapters   could   have  

been  written  by  the  same  person.    An  analysis  of  their  contents,  prompted  Cheng  to  

argue  that  they  have  different  political  methods  and  differing  emphases  on  military  

and  agricultural  matters.      In  fact,  Cheng  argued  that  “The  Calculation  of  Land”  and  
                                                                                                               
607  See  [XVIII.]  and  [XIX.]  in  the  Appendix  II  
608  Rong  1937:  97-­‐99  

  320  
“Agriculture   and   War”   seem   to   have   been   written   around   the   same   time,   as   they  

both   use   the   characters   yi   壹 and   quan   權   in   similar   ways.     As   a   result,   “The  

Calculation  of  Land”  was  not  written  by  Shang  Yang  himself.      

Additionally  Cheng  added  that  “The  Calculation  of  Land”  should  actually  be  

dated   slightly   earlier   than   “Agriculture   and   War”   because   it   discusses   the   “five  

kinds of   people”   wumin   五民,   scholars   of   empty   rhetoric,   scholars   out   of   office,  

military   knights   not   loyal   to   the   state,   artisans,   and   merchants   (and   retailers).   At  

the   same   time,   Cheng   points   to   specific   attention   to   Rujia   notions,   also   found   in  

“Agriculture  and  War”,  as  a  powerful  indication  that  the  chapter  was  not  written  by  

an   early   contributor   to   Shang   Yang’s   textual   tradition,   according   to   Cheng.     Also,  

much   like   Rujia   texts,   like   the   Analects,   “The   Calculation   of   Land”   juxtaposes   the  

prince   with   the   petty   man  xiao  ren   小人.     Again,   Cheng   viewed   this   as   an   indication  

of   a   specific   attention   to   arguing   against   Rujia   ideas   and   even   debating   Rujia  

thinkers   with   their   own   terms   and   rhetorical   devices.     Third,   “The   Calculation   of  

Land”   includes   one   of   the   only   discussions   of   the   characters   shu   術   and   shi   勢,  

characters   prominent   in   the   Shen   Buhai   Fragments   and   the   “Shenzi   fragments”  

respectively.609  

Zhang   essentially   agreed   with   Cheng   but   added   two   more   reasons   that   “The  

Calculation  of  Land”  is  might  have  been  written  a  bit  earlier  than  “Agriculture  and  

War”.     First,   Jiang   Lihong   pointed   out   that   it   is   the   separation   of   the   notion   of  

technique  shu  術  from  the  notion  of  laws  fa  法  that  marks  a  possible  influence  from  

Shen  Buhai.    If  in  fact  Shen  Buhai  did  influence  the  chapter,  this  would  necessarily  
                                                                                                               
609  Cheng  1987:  208-­‐210  

  321  
date   it   later   than   Cheng   suggested.     Second,   though   the   chapter   does   include  

language   that   is   from   relatively   earlier   periods,   as   Cheng   has   explained,   it   also  

includes   terms   like   Princely   Man   junzi   君子   and   petty   man   xiao  ren   小人   that   are  

most   associated   with   the   Analects   and   other   works   much   earlier   than   the   period  

Cheng   suggested   for   the   its   dates.     This   raises   the   question   of   whether   the   use   of  

notions   from   earlier   periods   necessarily   means   a   chapter   should   date   within   or  

even  close  to  that  period.610  

In   contrast   to   assertions   that   argued   even   the   possibility   of   Shang   Yang’s  

authorship  of  “The  Calculation  of  Land”,  Li  Ling  examined  the  population  and  land  

proportion   claims   made   in   the   chapter.     Using   the   described   percentage   of   arable  

land   to   make   conclusions   about   the   number   of   households   in   the   state,   which  

specifically  reflect  the  size  of  the  military  in  the  state,  Li  Ling  tests  the  authenticity  

of  land  development  and  population  pressure  implied  in  the  chapter.611    He  pointed  

out   that   Gao   Heng   incorrectly   explains   the   meaning   of   the   character   shu   數   in   an  

important  passage  in  “The  Calculation  of  Land”.     In   the   passage   “故為國分田數小，

畝五百”,   Gao   Heng   interprets   the   character   shu   數   to   refer   to   the   size   of   an  

allotment  of  land  mu  畝.    But  according  to  Li  Ling,  the  character  shu  數  in  the  above  

passage  actually  refers  to  the  ratio  of  farmland  and  population  size  that  determines  

the   military   personal   quota.     Thus,   contrary   to   Gao   Heng’s   contention,   the   above  
                                                                                                               
610  Zhang  2008:  94-­‐95  
611  See  Li  Ling  李零.  “Shangjunshu  zhong  de  tu  di  ren  kou  zheng  ce  yu  jue  zhi”  《商君書》中的土地

人口政策與爵制  in  Zi  xuan  ji  自選集.  Guilin  桂林:  Guang  xi  shi  fan  da  xue  chu  ban  she  廣西師範大學
出版社,  1998.  Though  Li  Ling  points  out  that  it  is  problematic  to  cite  “The  Calculation  of  Land”,  “The  
Encouragement  of  Immigration”,  and  “Within  Borders”  as  reflection’s  of  Shang  Yang’s  thought.    
Though  he  does  admit  that  these  chapter’s  notion  of  law  are  very  similar  to  Shang  Yang’s,  citing  this  
as  a  reason  why  scholars  have  erroneously  cited  these  chapters  as  reflections  of  Shang  Yang’s  
thought.  (Li  1998:  184)  

  322  
passage   explains   that,   in   administering   a   state,   the   state   minimally   should   dispatch  

one   troop   per   five   hundred   mu   畝   of   land.   Li   Ling   then   pointed   to   the   line   that  

immediately  follows  the  above  passage,  方土百里，出戰卒萬人者，數小也,  which  

asserts  that  in  a  state  of  one  hundred  square  li  里,  it  will  minimally  dispatch  about  

ten   thousand   troops.   Li   Ling   also   added   that   one   finds   the   same   usage   of   the  

character  shu  數  in  “The  Encouragement  of  Immigration”.612  

So  since  the  absolute  minimum  of  troops  yielded  from  the  population  can  be  

no   less   than   one   soldier   for   every   five   hundred   mu,   it   becomes   clear   why   “The  

Calculation   of   Land”   also   argues   that   the   state   should   yield   at   least   ten   thousand  

eight   hundred   troops   overall.     Li   Ling   explained   that   since   the   entire   state   is  

approximately   nine   million   mu   and   only   sixty   percent   of   the   area   of   the   land   is  

arable   (the   sum   of   the   cultivated   lands   and   the   wastelands),   this   means   that   five  

million   four   hundred   mu   is   the   amount   of   land   from   which   the   state   would   actually  

conscript   troops.     Given   that   the   state   should   yield   no   less   than   one   soldier   for  

every   five   hundred   mu,   this   means   the   state’s   absolute   minimum   for   its   military  

personnel   quota   will   total   around   ten   thousand   eight   hundred   soldiers,   which   is  

very  close  to  the  expectation  of  a  minimum  of  ten  thousand  soldiers  expressed  the  

“The   Calculation   of   Land”.     Thus,   it   provides   extraordinary   support   for   Li   Ling’s  

estimation.  

                                                                                                               
612  Li  1998:  186  

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“Opening  and  Debarring”  

Both   Chen   Chi-­‐tien613  and   Gao   Heng614  identified   this   chapter   as   one   that  

could  have  been  written  by  Shang  Yang  because  it  does  seem  to  be  in  accordance  

with   what   they   view   as   Shang   Yang’s   thought.     More   specifically,   though   Chen  

viewed  the  thought,  style  of  writing,  and  theory  in  the  chapter  to  be  consistent  with  

Shang   Yang’s   ideology,   he   suspected   that   the   chapter   was   written   by   one   of   the  

later  contributors  Shang  Yang’s  textual  tradition.    However,  he  admitted  that  there  

is  not  enough  evidence  to  determine  for  sure.615      It  not  only  contains  passages  that  

reveal  an  emphasis  on  laws  or  standards  and  their  rewards  and  punishments,  but  it  

also  presents  a  view  of  history  most  associated  with  the  Fajia  tradition  and  one  that  

refutes  the  Rujia  tradition’s  insistence  on  venerating  the  past.    Both  Chen  Chi-­‐tien  

and  Gao  Heng  viewed  this  chapter  as  a  relatively  important  one  because  it  contains  

a   concept   of   history   that   serves   as   one   of   the   strongest   indications   of   theoretical  

development  within  Shang  Yang’s  intellectual  current.616      

Interestingly,  Rong  Zhaozu  argued  that  “Opening  and  Debarring”  may  share  

an   author   with   “The   Elimination   of   Strength”   and   “Discussion   about   the   People”.617    

This  is  because  all  three  of  these  chapters  include  very  similar  passages  discussing  

punishments   and   rewards.618  All   three   respective   passages   not   only   suggest   that  

ideally  a  state  should  apply  punishments  more  often  than  rewards,  but  they  even  

                                                                                                               
613  Chen  1967:  126-­‐127  
614  Gao  2011:  25  
615  Chen  1967:  126-­‐127  
616  This  will  be  discussed  in  greater  detail  later  in  this  study.  
617  Rong  1937:  96  
618  See  [XX.],  [XXI.],  and  [XXII]  in  the  Appendix  II  

  324  
go  so  far  as  to  specify  that  the  ratio  of  punishments  to  rewards  should  be  nine  to  

one.      

Moreover,   all   three   passages   specifically   describe   this   ideal   method   of   the  

administering   of   punishments   and   rewards   as   having   the   quality   of   true   Kingship  

wang   王.     This   is   particularly   interesting   because   in   addition   to   using   the   label   true  

Kingship,  the  first  two  passages  juxtapose  the  quality  of  true  Kingship  with  inferior  

forms  of  statecraft.    In  the  first  passage,  true  Kingship  is  juxtaposed  with  that  of  a  

“weak   state”   xiao   guo   削國.     Though   it   should   be   noted   that   this   passage   from  

“Opening  and  Debarring”  undoubtedly  assumes  that  there  is  another  kind  of  state:  

those   of   the   present   times   which   have   not   attained   supremacy   or   have   suffered  

dismemberment.    Thus,  it  actually  imagines  the  following  three-­‐tiered  hierarchy  of  

states  in  descending  order:  well-­‐ordered  states  that  achieve  true  Kingship,  states  of  

the   present   time,   and   chaotic   or   weak   states.       In   the   second   passage,   there   is   an  

even   clearer   three-­‐tiered   hierarchy,   juxtaposing   a   state   of   true   Kingship   with   a  

strong   state   qiang   guo   強國   and   a   weak   state   xiao   guo   削國.       The   third   passage  

describes   a   condition   in   which   the   correct   ratio   of   punishments   and   rewards   not  

only  exemplifies  that  of  true  Kingship  but  also  eliminates  the  elements  that  weaken  

the  state.      

The  first  two  passages  are  particularly  noteworthy  because  the  notion  of  a  

three-­‐tiered   hierarchy   of   statecraft   can   also   be   found   in   the   Xunzi619,   with   similar  

                                                                                                               
619  This  distinction  can  also  be  found  in  the  Hanfeizi,  like  in  a  previously  cited  passage  from  the  

chapter  “Mr.  He”.  

  325  
terminology.620     The   Xunzi   passage   clearly   presents   a   three-­‐tiered   hierarchy   of  

statecraft,   in   descending   order:   True   Kingship   wang   王,   Hegemon   ba   霸,   and   the  

Conqueror   jiang   彊.     As   for   the   quality   of   true   Kingship,   this   mode   of   statecraft   is  

superior   to   both   the   Conqueror   and   the   Hegemon.   This   is   the   ideal   form   of  

statecraft   in   the   Xunzi.     It   refers   to   Later   Kings   and   the   Western   Zhou,   which   the  

Rujia  tradition  often  refers  to  as  a  time  of  ideal  order.    More  importantly,  the  above  

passage   points   to   a   focus   on   winning   over   the   ruler’s   subjects   as   the   crucial  

difference  between  a  True  King  and  a  Hegemon  or  a  Conqueror.    How  does  a  True  

King   properly   win   over   his   subjects?     He   does   this   with   three   important  

elements.621     The   quality   of   true   Kingship   is   attained   when   the   ruler   properly  

cultivates   benevolence,   proper   roles,   and   awesomeness   and   causes   them   to  

pervade  amongst  his  subjects.      

Of   course   this   notion   of   true   Kingship   is   significantly   different   from   that  

which  was  previously  described  in  the  three  Book  of  Lord  Shang  passages.    In  fact,  it  

could  be  argued  that  the  Xunzi’s  conception  of  the  Conqueror  is  more  similar  to  the  

Book  of  Lord  Shang’s  notion  of  true  Kingship.  The  Conqueror  was  probably  the  kind  

of  ruler  the  Xunzi  considered  to  be  most  common  during  the  Warring  States  period.  

This   form   of   statecraft   primarily   seeks   to   expand   territory   through   warfare,  

without   giving   adequate   attention   to   other   methods   of   gaining   security   and  

resources,   like   virtue   or   other   forms   of   soft   power.     In   other   words,   the   Xunzi  

describes  the  Conqueror’s  conception  of  state  interest  and,  to  a  smaller  extent,  self-­‐

                                                                                                               
620  See  [XXIII.]  in  the  Appendix  II  
621  See  [XXIV.]  in  the  Appendix  II  

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interest   as   very   narrow,   as   it   concerns   itself   with   the   most   direct   pursuit   of  

material  gain.    This  is  why  the  Xunzi  characterizes  true  Kingship  to  be  superior  to  

the   Conqueror   jiang   彊,   or   as   some   translators   and   commentators   call   “the  

strong”.622     Since   the   characters   jiang   彊   and   qiang   強   are   thought   to   be   basically  

interchangeable   in   this   case,   this   chapter   in   the   Xunzi   essentially   makes   the   same  

kind  of  juxtaposition  as  the  first  two  Book   of   Lord   Shang   passages.   It  is  simply  that  

the  two  texts  characterize  the  definition  of  true  Kingship  very  differently.      

In   addition   to   the   Xunzi   and   the   Hanfeizi,   the   distinction   between   true  

Kingship   and   a   Hegemon   also   appears   in   “Method   of   Warfare”   in   the   Guanzi623  

chapter.624     Again,   there   is   not   only   a   distinction   between   true   Kingship   and   the  

statecraft  of  a  Hegemon,  but  the  Guanzi  passage  also  describes  the  rulers  of  the  day  

as   not   even   reaching   those   levels   of   statecraft.     Thus,   this   passage   also   indicates  

that  a  hierarchy  of  statecraft,  in  which  true  Kingship  is  valued  more  highly  or  even  

perceived   as   the   highest   form   of   statecraft,   indicates   a   later   period   of   authorship  

than  Shang  Yang’s  lifetime.    An  expression  of  this  form  of  hierarchy  describes  the  

late   Warring   States   period,   relative   to   the   Spring   and   Autumn   period   and   the  

Western   Zhou   period.     Therefore,   this   study   argues   that   the   “Opening   and  

Debarring”  was  written  during  the  late  Warring  States  period  because  it,  along  with  

“The   Elimination   of   Strength”,   includes   the   notion   of   a   three-­‐tiered   hierarchy   of  

statecraft  that  is  evident  in  other  later  texts  like  the  Xunzi  and  the  Guanzi.  

                                                                                                               
622  This  study  will  engage  in  a  discussion  of  the  difference  between  a  True  King  and  a  Hegemon  in  a  

later  chapter.  
623  Lau,  D.C.  and  Chen  Fong  Ching,  ed.  A  Concordance  to  the  Guanzi.  Hong  Kong:  The  Commercial  

Press,  2001.  
624  See  [XXV.]  in  the  Appendix  II  

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 Cheng   also   dated   “Opening   and   Debarring”   to   the   late   Warring   States   period  

because   the   chapter   consists   of   many   commonly   used   terms   of   that   time,   namely  

tian  xia  天下,  zhu  hou  諸侯,  qiang  guo  強國,    ruo  guo  弱國,    wan  sheng  萬乘,  and  yi  

guo  一國.    Originally,  he  explained,  due  to  the  fact  that  this  chapter  was  mentioned  

in   the   Huainanzi,   many   Han   dynasty   historians   considered   this   chapter   to   have  

actually   been   written   by   Shang   Yang   himself.     He   concluded   that   “Opening   and  

Debarring”   was   not   written   by   Shang   Yang   himself,625  though   he   did   regard   it   as   an  

important  contribution  to  the  doctrinal  tradition  of  Shang  Yang’s  thought.      

Interestingly,   Zhang   Linxiang   argued   that   it   is   still   possible   that   “Opening  

and   Debarring”   was   written   by   Shang   Yang   himself.     He   pointed   out   that   the   Shiji  

mentions   both   “Opening   and   Debarring”   and   what   can   be   interpreted   as  

“Agriculture  and  War”,  mentioning  a  chapter  name  or  concept  Geng  Zhan  Shu  耕戰

書   instead   of   Nong  Zhan   農戰(書),   associated   with   the   extant   version   of   the   Book  of  

Lord  Shang.    In  addition,  the  Huainanzi  points  to  a  chapter  name  or  concept  of  Qi  Sai  

啟塞,  instead  of  the  name  or  concept  associated  with  the  extant  version  Kai   Sai  開

塞,  connected  with  the  methods  of  Shang  Yang.    Although  Zhang  sympathized  with  

Cheng’s   reasoning,   which   rejected   Shang   Yang’s   authorship   of   “Opening   and  

Debarring”,  he  did  not  consider  it  to  be  conclusive.626  

“The  Unification  of  Words”  

This  chapter  is  another  that  Chen  Chi-­‐tien  suspected  was  written  later  in  the  

Warring   States   period.     Its   writing   style   and   content   are   both   in   accordance   with  
                                                                                                               
625  Cheng  1987:  86-­‐87,  220  
626  Zhang  2008:  81-­‐83  

  328  
what   Chen   viewed   as   Shang   Yang’s   thought. 627     In   fact,   one   passage   in   “The  

Unification  of  Words”  insists  on  a  similar  attitude  towards  history  as  that  found  in  

“The   Reform   of   the   Law”   and   other   chapters   in   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang.628     This  

passage  explains  that  an  ideal  ruler  must  follow  the  needs  of  the  times.    This  means  

that   the   ruler   must   be   able   to   recognize   what   his   state   needs   in   order   to   develop  

and   cause   his   subjects   to   act   accordingly   in   the   effort   to   develop   the   wealth   and  

strength  of  the  state.      

If   a   ruler   attempts   to   preserve   the   customs   of   antiquity,   this   will   necessarily  

result  in  disorder,  because  the  above  passage  describes  how  subordinates  will  hold  

fast  to  the  present  and  be  unwilling  to  change  with  the  times.    Therefore,  if  customs  

of   antiquity   are   preserved,   then   as   times   change,   there   will   necessarily   be   a  

disharmony   or   lack   of   coordination   between   what   the   ruler   recognizes   the   state  

needs   in   order   to   develop   and   what   his   subjects   actually   do   in   their   effort   to  

contribute   to   state   development.     Under   these   conditions,   if   the   ruler   were   to  

bestow   rewards,   he   would   be   bestowing   rewards   for   behavior   that   is   not   in  

accordance  with  what  he  recognizes  the  state  needs  in  order  to  develop.    In  fact,  the  

ruler   could   potentially   be   rewarding   behavior   that   is   counterproductive   to   what   he  

recognizes  the  state  needs.    This  explains  why  bestowing  numerous  rewards  leads  

to   punishment.     Also,   if   the   ruler   were   to   lightly   punish   behavior   that   is   not   in  

accordance  with  what  he  recognizes  the  state  needs  in  order  to  develop,  then  the  

ruler   would   not   only   be   ineffective   in   stopping   undesirable   behavior   but   also  

ineffective  in  encouraging  behavior  that  is  in  accordance  with  what  he  recognizes  
                                                                                                               
627  Chen  1967:  127  
628  See  [XXVI.]  in  the  Appendix  II  

  329  
the   state   needs   in   order   to   develop.     This   is   perhaps   why   the   lightening   of  

punishments   eliminates   rewards   and   the   ruler   establishes   punishments   but   the  

people  do  not  obey.      

It   is   also   important   to   point   out   that   this   study   reads   the   aforementioned  

passage   as   reflecting   the   notion   of   acquiescence   yin   因 ,   within   the   phrase  

“acquiescing  to  the  times”  yin  shi  因世,  used  most  notably  in  the  “Shenzi  fragments”.    

Although   laws   are   meant   to   be   a   set   of   state-­‐enforced   rules   that   govern   human  

behavior,   they   are   not   meant   to   ignore   the   characteristics   and   idiosyncrasies   of   the  

times   and   its   populace.     This   is   most   famously   expressed   in   the   “Shenzi   fragments”.    

In   the   section   “Acquiescence”,   the   “Shenzi   fragments”   states,   “As   for   the   way   of  

Heaven,  if  there  is  acquiescence,  then  there  is  greatness.    If  there  is  transformation,  

then   there   is   fragility.     Acquiescence   is   accommodating   human   nature.”629  In   the  

same  section,  the  “Shenzi  fragments”  adds,  “Therefore,  if  a  ruler  uses  the  people’s  

pursuit  of  their  own  interests  and  does  not  utilize  the  people  working  for  his  sake,  

then  there  is  none  that  will  not  be  able  to  be  employed  and  utilized.    This  is  what  is  

called   ‘acquiescence’.”630 If   the   figure   Shen   Dao   (ca.   395-­‐315   B.C.),   to   whom   the  

“Shenzi  fragments”  are  attributed,  did  introduce  the  concept  of  acquiescence,  then  

this  serves  as  evidence  that  “The  Unification  of  Words”  was  not  written  by  Shang  

Yang   himself,   having   been   written   during   the   later   times   of   the   Warring   State  

period.  

                                                                                                               
629天道因則大，化則細。因也者，因人之情也。(Lau  and  Chen  2000:  2/2/15);  Lau,  D.C.  and  Chen  

Fong  Ching,  ed.  A  Concordance  to  the  Shenzi,  Shizi,  Shenzi.  Hong  Kong:  The  Commercial  Press,  2000.  
630故用人之自為，不用人之為我，則莫不可得而用矣。此（謂之）「之謂」因。(Lau  and  Chen  

2000:  2/2/17-­‐18)  

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 Cheng   explained   that   “The   Unification   of   Words”,   along   with   “Policies”  

represent  a  different  notion  of  unity  yi  壹 than  that  found  in  “Agriculture  and  War”,  

which  he  considers  to  have  been  written  earlier.    In  “Agriculture  and  War”,  Cheng  

asserted  that  the  notion  of  unity  yi  壹 referred  to  the  consolidation  of  the  people’s  

efforts   in   both   agriculture   and   warfare.     Unlike   “Agriculture   and   War”,   “The  

Unification  of  Words”  and  “Policies”  include  a  notion  of  unity  yi  壹 that  appears  to  

only  refer  to  the  consolidation  of  the  people’s  efforts  in  agriculture,  not  warfare.631    

Zhang  argued  “The  Unification  of  Words”   was  written  around  the  same  time  

as   “The   Elimination   of   Strength”,   “Discussion   about   the   People”,   and   “Weakening  

the  People”,  after  “Agriculture  and  War”.    Like  “The  Elimination  of  Strength”  which  

Zhang   viewed   as   having   a   very   sophisticated   notion   of   poison   du   毒632 ,   “The  

Unification   of   Words”   presents   a   sophisticated   argument   of   its   own   through   its  

assertion  that  a  ruler  must  govern  according  to  the  times,  much  like  “Opening  and  

Debarring”,  among  others.    Along  with  dealing  with  relatively  complex  issues  and  

its   logic   being   relatively   developed,   Zhang   also   pointed   out   that   the   chapter  

includes   a   fairly   important   concept   that   is   consistently   expressed   in   the   Book   of  

Lord   Shang:   governing   in   accordance   with   the   times.     This   principle   is   often  

                                                                                                               
631  Cheng  1987:  219  
632  The  passage  states,  “If  the  state  is  strong  but  does  not  go  out  and  engage  in  war,  poison  will  be  

infused  inside  of  the  state,  where  ritual,  music,  and  harmful  parasitic  activities  will  appear  and  the  
state  will  be  dismembered.    It  the  state  is  strong  and  does  go  out  and  engage  in  war,  then  poison  will  
be  infused  inside  enemy  states.    Domestically,  there  will  be  no  ritual,  music,  and  parasitic  activity  
and  the  state  will  be  strong.”  國彊而不戰，毒輸於內，禮樂蝨官生，必削；國遂戰，毒輸於敵，國
無禮樂蝨官，必彊。(Gao  2011:  76)  Zhang  viewed  this  passage  as  a  sophisticated  way  of  arguing  for  
the  more  general  Fajia  position  that  emphasizes  agriculture  and  warfare.    It  is  not  enough  to  become  
a  strong  state.    In  order  to  maintain  strength,  a  state  must  go  out  and  engage  in  warfare  so  that  
poisonous  features  in  domestic  culture  have  no  support  to  become  prevalent.    This  points  out  that  
poisonous  features  of  a  state’s  culture  begin  in  times  of  inactivity  and  defeat  in  war,  serving  as  a  
principle  that  speaks  to  how  one  governs  domestically  and  strategizes  abroad.  

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expressed  in  conjunction  with  a  hierarchy  of  statecraft.    Though  a  hierarchy  is  not  

laid   out   in   “The   Unification   of   Words”,   Zhang   nevertheless   viewed   it   as   a   text  

written   around   the   later   part   of   the   Warring   States   period,   earlier   than   “Rewards  

and  Punishments”.633  

“Establishing  Laws”  

In  the  beginning  passage  of  the  this  chapter,  the  author  refers  to  himself  as  

chen  臣  minister  as  though  he  was  directly  addressing  a  ruler,  indicating  that  this  

work   was   presented   to   a   ruler   of   Qin.     Both   Chen   Chi-­‐tien634  and   Gao   Heng635  

determined   that   this   chapter   definitely   could   not   have   been   written   by   Shang   Yang  

himself.     This   is   mainly   because   “Establishing   Laws”   mentions   the   figure   Wu   Huo,   a  

knight  known  for  his  extraordinary  strength  during  the  time  of  King  Wu  of  Qin  (r.  

310-­‐307).636     For  instance,  it  states,  “Well  now,  Li  Lou  was  able  to  see  an  autumn’s  

hair  from  beyond  one  hundred  paces.    However,  he  was  unable  to  give  his  ability  to  

others.     Wu   Huo   was   able   to   lift   weight   of   a   thousand  jun,   but   he   too   could   not   give  

his  ability  to  others.    Now,  sages  all  possess  that  which  is  inherent  in  them,  but  they  

cannot  transfer  it  to  others.    However,  this  being  the  case,  merit  can  be  obtained—

through  the  law.”637      

Rong   Zhaozu   added   that   “Weakening   the   People”   includes   a   very   similar  

passage.    It  states,  “Now,  Li  Zhu  was  able  to  see  an  autumn’s  hair  from  beyond  one  

hundred  paces.    However,  he  was  unable  to  give  his  ability  to  others.    Wu  Huo  was  
                                                                                                               
633  Zhang  2008:  103-­‐104  
634  Chen  1967:  127-­‐128  
635  Gao  2011:  21  
636  Chen  1967:  127-­‐128  
637
夫離朱見秋豪百步之外，而不能以明目易人。烏獲舉千鈞之重，而不能以多力易人。夫聖人之
存體性，不可以易人，然而功可得者，法之謂也。(Gao  2011:  101)  

  332  
able  to  lift  weight  of  a  thousand  jun,  but  he  too  could  not  give  his  ability  to  others.    

Now,   sages   all   possess   that   which   is   inherent   in   them,   but   they   cannot   transfer  

them   to   others.” 638     Due   to   the   fact   that   both   the   “Establishing   Laws”   and  

“Weakening   the   People”   include   such   similar   passages,   Rong   argued   that   these  

chapters,  along  with  “The  Elimination  of  Strength”,  “Discussion  about  the  People”,  

and   “Making   Orders   Strict”,   were   written   by   the   same   author   but   not   Shang   Yang  

himself.639  In  addition,  this  passage  also  appears  in  the  Xunzi  in  a  very  similar  form.  

Cheng  agreed  with  Chen  and  added  that  “Establishing  Laws”  dates  after  “The  

Unification  of  Words”  because  of  its  heightened  emphasis  on  teaching  and  virtue.640    

For   instance,   “Establishing   Laws”   states,   “If   a   ruler   makes   clear   his   sagely   virtue  

and   his   teachings   guide   his   people,   then   he   is   able   to   utilize   all   that   his   subjects  

possess.” 641  Interestingly,   Meng   Jifu   even   argued   that   the   last   paragraph   of  

“Weakening   the   People”   does   not   adequately   correspond   to   “The   Elimination   of  

Strength”.     It   is   in   fact   more   likely   that   this   paragraph   was   originally   a   part   of  

“Establishing   Laws”. 642     Cheng   saw   this   view   as   possible   but   very   difficult   to  

validate.     Though   admitting   that   this   particular   chapter   is   difficult   to   date,   Cheng  

dated   it   shortly   after   “The   Unification   of   Words”   as   a   result   of   its   very   similar   ideas  

of  using  virtue,  along  with  laws  reinforced  by  rewards  and  punishments,  to  educate  

the  people.643  

                                                                                                               
638  今離婁見秋毫之末，不能「以」明目易人。烏獲舉千鈞之重，不能以多力易人。聖賢在存體性

也，不能以相易也。(Gao  2011:  171)  

639  Rong  1937:  91-­‐95  
640  Cheng  1987:  220  
641  德明教行，則能以民之有為己用矣。(Gao  2011:  98)
642  Meng  in  Jiang  1986:  152-­‐161  
643  Cheng  1987:  97-­‐109,  220  

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 Zhang  also  agreed  that  the  Wu  Huo  reference  serves  as  clear  evidence  that  

the  chapter  could  not  have  been  written  by  Shang  Yang  himself.    However,  he  did  

take  issue  with  Cheng’s  conclusion  that  “Establishing  Laws”  was  written  after  “The  

Unification   of   Words”,   which   Cheng   argued   seemed   to   have   less   Rujia   influenced  

language.     One   passage   in   “The   Unification   of   Words”   can   be   interpreted   to  

conceptually   have   a   significant   amount   of   Rujia   influence.644     According   to   Zhang,  

this   passage645  clearly   illustrates   a   concern   for   the   degree   and   kind   of   knowledge  

amongst   the   ruler’s   subjects.     It   also   even   links   the   lack   of   state   direction   in   that  

knowledge   to   the   production   of   perversity   and   parasites.     Therefore,   Zhang   argued  

that  Cheng’s  reasoning  is  inadequate.646  

“The  Method  of  Warfare”,  “The  Establishment  of  Fundamentals”,  

and  “Military  Defense”  

As   for   all   three   chapters   that   discuss   military   affairs,   “The   Method   of  

Warfare”,  “The  Establishment  of  Fundamentals”,  and  “Military  Defense”,  Chen  was  

doubtful  that  they  could  have  been  written  by  Shang  Yang.    According  to  Chen,  the  

logic  within  some  of  the  chapters  does  not  seem  to  indicate  that  Shang  Yang  is  the  

true   author. 647     For   instance,   consider   the   beginning   passage   in   “Military  

Defense”.648    The  passage  mentions  two  different  kinds  of  military  situations:  one  in  

which   a   state   is   exposed   to   enemy   attack   on   all   sides   and   one   in   which   a   state   rests  

                                                                                                               
644  See  [XXVII.]  in  the  Appendix  II  
645  Read  similarly  by  Zhang  Linxiang,  presumably  Cheng  Liang-­‐shu,  Chen  Chi-­‐tien  and  Gao  Heng,  

where  the  character  duan  短,  meaning  short,  is  read  as  zhi  知,  meaning  knowledge  or  
understanding,  distinctly  different  from  Duyvendak’s  English  translation.  
646  Zhang  2008:  96-­‐97  
647  Chen  1967:  128  
648  See  [XXVIII.]  in  the  Appendix  II  

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against  the  sea  at  its  rear.    Neither  of  these  situations  describes  the  state  of  Qin.    It  

could  be  argued  that  Shang  Yang’s  place  of  birth,  the  state  of  Wei  魏,  was  exposed  

to  attack  on  all  sides,  but  Chen  considered  it  unlikely  that  Shang  Yang  would  have  

written   for   the   benefit   of   his   home   state,   especially   while   not   once   describing   the  

state   of   Qin’s   geographic   situation.649     Cheng   agreed.     Cheng   argued   that   “Military  

Defense”  could  not  have  been  written  by  Shang  Yang  or  even  an  early  contributor  

in   Shang   Yang’s   textual   tradition.     Though   Cheng   admitted   that   the   chapter   could  

have   possibly   been   written   by   Shang   Yang   before   he   arrived   in   the   state   of   Qin,   the  

geographical   characteristics   lead   him   to   speculate   that   the   author   may   have  

actually  been  from  the  state  of  Qi  or  one  of  three  states  of  Jin.650    

Rong  added  that  “The  Method  of  Warfare”  appears  to  be  a  forgery  attributed  

to  Shang  Yang.    He  explained  that  a  passage  in  the  chapter  has  strong  resemblance  

to  a  passage  found  in  the  “Biography  of  Lord  Shang”  in  the  Shiji.651     The  passage  in  

“The  Method  of  Warfare”  states,  “Generally,  the  strategy  in  warfare  is  that  one  must  

gain   victory   in   the   fundamentals   of   politics.     Having   victory   politically,   the   people  

do   not   fight   with   one   another.     If   the   people   do   not   fight   one   another,   then   the  

ruler’s   aims   being   considered   [the   same   as]   an   individual’s   private   aims   does   not  

occur.     Therefore,   the   government   of   a   ruler   that   achieves   true   Kingship   causes   the  

people  in  villages  to  shy  away  from  battles  between  cities  and  to  be  brave  in  wars  

against  enemy  states.”652     Interestingly,  a  passage  in  the  Shiji  states,  “If  the  people  

                                                                                                               
649  Chen  1967:  128
650  Cheng  1987:  207  
651  Rong  1937:  104-­‐105  
652  凡戰法必本於政勝，則其民不爭，不爭則無以私意，以上為意。故王者之政，使民怯於邑鬥，

而勇於寇戰。(Gao  2011:  102)  

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are  brave  in  the  state’s  wars  and  fearful  in  private  battles,  the  villages  and  cities  are  

completely   in   order.”653     Both   the   general   concept   and   the   use   of   language   in   the  

two  passages  are  very  similar.    They  both  argue  that  a  ruler  should  seek  to  cause  

his  subjects  to  be  fearful  of  seeking  their  own  private  interests  through  engaging  in  

battles   with   other   locales.     Simultaneously,   the   ruler   must   cause   his   subjects   to  

develop   a   collective   or   more   public   gong   公   identity,   so   that   they   channel   their  

bellicosity  towards  invaders  kou  寇.    Lewis  explained,  “One  major  consequence  of  

the   reconstruction   of   the   Qin   state   was   the   emergence   of   a   distinctive   national  

character.    Qin  increasingly  defines  itself,  and  was  defined  by  others,  as  a  land  and  a  

people  apart.”654    

Though   he   labels   “The   Method   of   Warfare”   a   forgery,   Rong   did   argue   that  

“The  Establishment  of  Fundamentals”  and  “Method  of  Warfare”  appear  to  share  an  

author   because   they   both   contain   passages   that   share   very   similar   characteristics  

to  “Establishing  Laws”.655     Rong  argued  that  all  three  passages,  in  “The  Method  of  

Warfare”,   “The   Establishment   of   Fundamentals”,   and   “Establishing   Laws”  

respectively,  assert  that  three  conditions  must  be  met  in  order  for  the  army  to  be  

strong.    More  importantly,  they  also  argue  that  the  law  is  fundamental  to  building  a  

strong  army.656     This  study  points  out  that  “Establishing  Laws”  also  makes  the  key  

distinction   between   the   notions   of   Kings   and   Hegemons,   implying   a   three-­‐tiered  

hierarchy   of   statecraft   found   in   many   texts   dated   around   the   late   Warring   States  

                                                                                                               
653  民勇於公戰，怯於私鬬，鄉邑大治。(Sima  1931:  48)  
654  Lewis  2007:  39  
655  See  [XXIX.]  and  [XXX.]  in  the  Appendix  II  
656  Rong  1937:  104-­‐105  

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period,   indicating   that   it   could   not   share   an   author   with   the   three   military   affairs  

chapters.  

According   to   Cheng,   almost   exclusive   focus   on   warfare   in   a   chapter   is   a  

strong  indication  that  the  chapter  was  written  at  an  earlier  period,  perhaps  during  

Shang  Yang’s  lifetime  because,  in  many  historical  references,  Shang  Yang  is  known  

as   a   philosopher   of   warfare   just   as   much   as   he   was   connected   to   an   emphasis   on  

laws  in  governance.      At  first  glance,  Cheng  admitted  that  “The  Method  of  Warfare”  

and   “The   Establishment   of   Fundamentals”   may   appear   to   be   related,   even   if   only  

distantly,   to   the   School   of   Military,   which   includes   of   the   philosophies   of   Sunzi’s  

“Art   of   War”,   Sun   Bing’s   “Art   of   War”,   the   Wei  Liaozi,   etc.     However,   according   to  

Cheng,   a   closer   examination   of   the   texts   reveals   that   there   are   significant  

differences   between   the   two.     For   instance,   both   of   the   Book  of  Lord  Shang  chapters  

concern   themselves   not   just   with   the   military,   but   perhaps   even   more   importantly,  

how  the  military  and  matters  of  the  state,  such  as  technology,  the  legal  systems,  the  

prevalence   of   state   ideology,   and   even   cultural   formation   of   the   ruler’s   subjects,  

influence   each   other.     Cheng   concluded   that   both   of   these   chapters,   however,  

absolutely   express   and   accord   with   a   general   Fajia   emphasis   on   law   and   politics.    

Due   to   this,   Cheng   viewed   these   chapters   as   having   been   either   written   by   Shang  

Yang  or  an  early  contributor  to  his  textual  tradition.657  

Zhang   argued   that   it   is   still   possible   that   “The   Method   of   Warfare”,   “The  

Establishment  of  Fundamentals”,  and  “Military  Defense”  were  all  written  by  Shang  

Yang   himself.     As   for   “The   Method   of   Warfare”   and   “The   Establishment   of  

                                                                                                               
657  Cheng  1987:  109-­‐120,  206  

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Fundamentals”,  Zhang,  somewhat  like  Rong,  argued  that  both  chapters  could  have  

been   written   by   Shang   Yang   for   two   main   reasons.     First,   the   Book  of  Lord  Shang  

generally   has   a   tone   that   lays   equal   stress   on   agriculture   and   warfare.     However,  

some  chapters  provide  more  focus  on  agriculture,  like  “An  Order  to  Cultivate  Waste  

Lands”.   Thus,   having   just   four   chapters   that   engage   in   greater   detail   about   one   of  

the  ideal  state’s  two  essential  occupations  is  actually  in  accordance  with  the  overall  

tone  of  the  entire  collection  of  works.    Second,  they  both  stress  the  importance  of  

the   establishment   of   law   as   a   necessary   condition   for   military   development   and  

prowess.     Zhang   also   took   issue   with   Chen’s   and   Cheng’s   skepticism   of   “Military  

Defense”.     Zhang   argued   that   they   both   implicitly   assume   that   all   of   Shang   Yang’s  

writings   were   composed   after   he   arrived   in   Qin   and   therefore   must   have   Qin’s  

geographic   characteristics   in   the   backdrop.     According   to   Zhang,   this   assumption  

has  no  basis.658    

“Making  Orders  Strict”  

Chen   Chi-­‐tien   viewed   this   chapter   as   one   with   potentially   mixed   authorship,    

dating   as   late   as   Han   dynasty   times.659     First,   he   explained   that   the   first   part   of  

“Making   Orders   Strict”   is   almost   exactly   the   same   as   the   beginning   of   “Making  

Orders   Trim”   in   the   Hanfeizi. 660     The   passage   from   “Making   Orders   Strict”  

undoubtedly  encapsulates  one  of  the  most  central  ideas  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang:  

a   ruler   should   rely   on   a   system   of   laws   that   will   facilitate   a   culture   of   merit  

throughout   the   state.     Rewards   and   punishments,   as   the   reinforcements   for   laws,  
                                                                                                               
658  Zhang  2008:  87-­‐89  
659  Chen  1967:  128-­‐129  
660  See  [XXXI.]  in  the  Appendix  II  

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are   not   merely   believed   to   be   tools   that   manipulate   human   behavior.     The  

consistent  bestowal  of  rewards  and  application  of  punishment  is  also  supposed  to  

facilitate  a  culture  of  merit  gong  功 like  the  one  alluded  to  in  the  passage.      

So,  what  is  a  culture  of  merit?    Generally  in  theory,  if  an  individual  commits  

an  act  that  is  extraordinary,  this  will  warrant  either  the  bestowal  of  a  reward  or  the  

application   of   a   punishment,   depending   on   whether   the   ruler   determines   the   act   to  

be   behavior   that   contributes   to   state   needs,   given   the   present   times   and  

circumstances,   and   should   thus   be   encouraged   or   discouraged.     Merit   is   the  

accumulation  of  an  individual’s  record  of  extraordinary  behavior,  meriting  rewards  

and/or   punishment.     Therefore,   a   culture   of   merit   is   one   in   which   an   individual’s  

position   and   status   within   the   state   and   society   corresponds   to   their   record   of  

extraordinary   behavior.     So   in   essence,   this   kind   of   culture   is   a   “soft”   and   “micro”  

version  of  the  methods  of  channeling  human  behavior  found  in  “The  Calculation  of  

Land”.       This   explains   why   the   above   passage   claims   that   a   culture   in   which   men   of  

merit  are  relied  upon  causes  few  subjects  to  engage  in  lofty  speech.      

If  lofty  speech  is  not  considered  a  behavior  that  will  contribute  to  a  subject’s  

accumulation   of   merit,   then   the   ruler   will   successfully   prevent   his   subjects   from  

engaging   in   lofty   speech   because   “Making   Orders   Strict”,   like   “The   Calculation   of  

Land”   and   “An   Order   to   Cultivate   Waste   Lands”,   assumes   that   the   ruler’s   subjects  

will  not  engage  in  behavior  that  will  not  allow  them  to  obtain  private  profit.    Thus,  

in   the   above   passage   and   throughout   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang,   a   culture   of   merit,  

from  the  “bottom”,  allows  the  ruler  to  channel  his  subjects’  behavior  into  particular  

activities  that  he  determines  will  contribute  to  the  enrichment  and  strengthening  of  

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the   state   just   like   his   rewards,   punishments,   and   infrastructure,   from   the   “top”,  

cause   subjects   to   focus   their   efforts   in   particular   occupations   or   channels   that   he  

determines  will  contribute  to  the  enrichment  and  strengthening  of  the  state.      

Interestingly,   the   Hanfeizi   chapter   begins   with   a   strikingly   similar  

statement.661     The  similarities  between  the  two  passages  suggest  that  one  chapter  

may   have   been   the   template   for   the   other.     Gao   Heng   considered   “Making   Orders  

Strict”  to  have  definitely  been  written  by  Shang  Yang662  because,  in  addition  to  the  

above   similarities,   “Inner   Congeries   of   Sayings”   in   the   Hanfeizi   quotes   Gongsun  

Yang  stating,  “Gongsun  Yang  says:  ‘In  applying  punishments,  if  harsh  punishment  is  

applied   to   minor   offenses,   then   minor   offenses   will   not   occur   and   major   offenses  

will   not   appear.     This   is   called   using   punishments   to   abolish   punishments.’”663    

Corresponding   with   this   Gongsun   Yang   quotation   found   in   the   Hanfeizi,   “Making  

Orders   Strict”   states,   “In   applying   punishments,   if   harsh   punishment   is   applied   to  

minor   offenses,   then   minor   offenses   will   not   occur   and   major   offenses   will   not  

appear.    This  is  called  using  punishments  to  abolish  punishments.”664      

However,  evidence  of  this  sort  seems  to  be  what  drove  Chen’s  speculation  of  

mixed   authorship.     Though   there   is   evidence   that   the   chapter   could   have   been  

written   by   Shang   Yang   himself,   there   is   other   evidence   that   make   Shang   Yang’s  

authorship  doubtful.  He  pointed  out  that  there  is  notable   Rujia-­‐influenced  language  

                                                                                                               
661  See  [XXXII.]  in  the  Appendix  II  
662  Gao  2011:  24  
663  公孫鞅曰：行刑重其輕者，輕者不至，重者不來，是謂以刑去刑。(Lau  and  Chen  2000:  

30/65/17)  
664  行罰：重其輕者，輕其重者，輕者不至，重者不來，此謂以刑去刑。(Gao  2011:  118)  

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in   the   rest   of   the   chapter.  665  One   passage   seems   to   suggest   that   morality   does  

indeed   have   a   place   in   the   chapter’s   ideal   state. 666     Rewards   and   especially  

punishments  are  the  force  li  力  that  reinforces  the  laws.    This  force  is  the  origin  of  

sway   because   it   first   establishes   the   strength   and   power   of   the   state.     The  

establishment   of   the   strength   and   power   of   the   state   creates   awesomeness.     This  

awesomeness   is   felt   amongst   the   populace   and   characterized   by   both   a   fear   and  

respect   of   the   state’s   capacity   for   force.     When   respect   and   fear   have   been  

propagated   throughout   the   entire   state,   then   the   state   can   develop.     Thus  

benevolence   and   righteousness   become   pervasive   because   respect   and   fear   have  

been  effectively  inculcated  into  the  hearts  and  minds  of  all  within  the  ruler’s  state.      

Also,   the   notion   of   sway   de   德 in   the   passage   is   not   merely   describing   an  

individual’s  quality  of  behavior.    Rather,  it  seems  to  also  refer  to  a  condition  for  the  

state  as  a  whole.    It  describes  a  condition  in  which  the  ruler,  through  his  application  

of   force,   has   caused   his   subjects   to   be   in   accordance   with   his   vision   for   what   the  

state  needs  for  development  and  to  deeply  understand  their  roles  in  contributing  to  

the  enrichment  and  strengthening  of  the  state.    In  this  sense,  the  notion  of  sway  is  a  

condition  in  which  the  state  is  liberated  from  the  pitfalls  and  struggles  of  a  lack  of  

harmony   or   coordination   between   what   the   ruler   recognizes   the   state   needs   for  

development   and   how   subjects   understand   their   roles   in   contributing   to   the  

enrichment   and   strengthening   of   the   state.     It   is   the   condition   within   which   the  

internalization   of   the   ruler’s   laws   manifests   in   reality.   The   ruler   elevates   himself  

                                                                                                               
665  Chen  1967:  128-­‐129  
666  See  [XXXIII.]  in  the  Appendix  II  

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through   leading   and   facilitating   the   development   of   his   subjects   to   the   point   where  

five  li  is  the  unit  for  judgment  (and  the  basic  unit  the  state  is  predicated  on).    His  

subjects   develop   from   a   condition   in   which   their   pursuit   of   private   profit   did   not  

have  any  concern  for  public  welfare  or  how  it  could  contribute  to  the  enrichment  

and   strengthening   of   the   state   to   fully   complying   with   the   ruler’s   consolidation   and  

channeling  of  their  efforts.    In  any  case,  the  character   ren  仁,  so  often  used  in   Rujia  

texts   meaning   “benevolence”   or   “humaneness”,   is   used   to   express   the   ruler’s  

disposition   and   governance.     The   use   of   such   Rujia   language   to   describe   the  

establishment   of   a   Fajia   state   leads   Chen   to   conclude   that   Shang   Yang’   possible  

authorship  is  unlikely.  

Cheng   asserted   that   “Making   Orders   Strict”   was   most   likely   written   in   a  

period  shortly  before  Han  Fei’s  death,  around  233   B.C.,  for  a  few  reasons.    First,  he  

points  to  the  similarities  in  language  between  it  and  “Making  Orders  Trim”  in  the  

Hanfeizi.   Second,   he   pointed   to   the   fact   that   “An   Order   to   Cultivate   Waste   Lands”  

described   five   kinds   of   disasters   for   the   state,   “Agriculture   and   War”   ten,   “The  

Elimination  of  Strength”  ten  in  one  instance  and  eight  in  another,  and  “Discussion  

of  the  People”  eight.  “Making  Orders  Strict”  actually  describes  twelve  disasters  for  

the   state,   including   benevolence   and   righteousness,   which,   according   to   Cheng,  

indicates   that   it   was   written   in   a   later   period   relative   to   the   aforementioned  

chapters  with  a  similar  rhetorical  device,  having  the  benefit  of  being  influenced  by  

them.    Third,  the  use  and  conceptualization  of  the  character  yi  壹  in  “Making  Orders  

Strict”   is   very   similar   to   that   found   in   “The   Calculation   of   Land”   and   “Agriculture  

  342  
and   War”,   which   indicates   that   “Making   Orders   Strict”   should   not   be   dated   too  

much  later  than  those  chapters.667    

Zhang   disagreed   with   the   definitiveness   with   which   Chen   and   Cheng   draw  

their   conclusions   about   “Making   Orders   Strict”.     He   argued   that   it   is   still   possible  

that   “Making   Orders   Strict”   was   written   by   Shang   Yang   himself.     He   asserted   that  

the  similarities  between  “Making  Orders  Strict”  with  other  chapters  in  the  Book   of  

Lord   Shang,   namely   “The   Elimination   of   Strength”   and   “Discussion   about   the  

People”,  and  “Making  Orders  Trim”  in  the  Hanfeizi,  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  

“Making  Orders  Strict”  or  not  written  by  Shang  Yang  himself.   For  instance,  though  

the   chapter’s   last   paragraph   does   describe   the   sage   as   using   rewards   and  

punishments   to   assist   in   his   benevolence,   a   virtue   often   associated   with   the   Rujia  

tradition,   it   is   nevertheless   a   means   to   eventually   use   force,   which   is   much   more   in  

accordance   with   the   general   tone   of   the   rest   of   the   chapters   in   the   Book   of   Lord  

Shang   and   arguably   contrary   to   many   texts   associated   with   the   Rujia   tradition.    

There   are   other   passages   in   “Agriculture   and   War”,   “Policies”,   and   “Rewards   and  

Punishments”   that   similarly   describe   the   sage   as   one   who   understands   the   essence  

of   things.     Therefore,   Zhang   argued   that   these   passages   should   not   necessarily   be  

viewed   as   having   been   written   in   later   times   simply   because   of   their   incorporation  

of  Rujia  ideas.  668      

However,   this   study   notes   that   “Making   Orders   Strict”   contains   more  

evidence   that   it   was   written   during   the   late   Warring   States   period.     For   example,  

the  aforementioned  passage  states,  “Proper  application  of  laws  begins  with  making  
                                                                                                               
667  Cheng  1987:  218  
668  Zhang  2008:  85-­‐87  

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judgments.     If   within   five   li   is   the   unit   for   judgments,   this   is   true   kingship.     If   within  

ten  li  is  the  unit  for  judgments,  the  state  will  be  strong.    If  government  affairs  are  

delayed,   then   the   state   will   be   dismembered”   行治曲斷：以五里斷者王，以十里斷

者強，宿治者削.     Again,   there   is   a   hierarchy   of   statecraft   that   not   only   describes  

the   ideal,   but   admits   that   forms   of   statecraft   that   are   not   ideal   can   reach   some,  

albeit   limited,   success   while   others   are   sure   to   fail,   much   like   “The   Elimination   of  

Strength”,   “Discussion   about   the   People”,   “Opening   and   Debarring”,   “The  

Cultivation   of   Political   Assessment”,   and   “The   Encouragement   of   Immigration”,  

along   with   chapters   in   the   Xunzi,   the   Hanfeizi,   and   the   Guanzi.     Thus,   this   study  

suggests  that  Shang  Yang’s  authorship  of  “Making  Orders  Strict”  is  doubtful,  dating  

during  later  part  of  the  Warring  States  period.  

“The  Cultivation  of  Political  Assessment”  

According   to   Chen,   this   chapter   does   not   present   any   evidence   of   mixed  

authorship  and  he  considers  the  ideology  expressed  to  be  in  accordance  with  Shang  

Yang’s   ideology.     Therefore,   he   concluded   that   it   was   probably   written   by   Shang  

Yang   himself.     However,   he   did   admit   that   it   is   possible   that   it   was   written   later  

during  the  Warring  States  period.669    Rong  Zhaozu  asserted  that  “The  Cultivation  of  

Political  Assessment”  was  not  written  by  Shang  Yang  himself  because  it  employs  a  

rhetorical  method  most  associated  with  Rujia  texts,  emulating  the  ancient  kings.670    

It  states:    

If   the   boundaries   of   public   and   private   are   made   clear,   then   petty  
men   will   not   be   jealous   of   worthies.     Incapable   people   will   not   be  
                                                                                                               
669  Chen  1967:  129-­‐130  
670  Rong  1937:  105-­‐107  

  344  
 jealous   of   those   of   merit.     As   for   Yao   and   Shun’s   governing   of   all  
under   Heaven,   it   is   not   the   case   that   they   monopolized   all   under  
Heaven’s  profit.    It  is  the  case  that  they  governed  all  under  Heaven  for  
the   sake   of   all   under   Heaven.     Therefore,   they   selected   the   worthy  
and   able   and   passed   [this   method]   on   [to]   all   under   Heaven.     It   is   not  
the   case   that   they   were   estranged   from   their   sons   while   being  
intimate   with   strangers.     It   is   the   case   that   they   clearly   understood  
the   Way   of   order   and   disorder.     The   three   Kings   utilized   proper   roles  
in   order   to   be   close   with   their   subjects   while   the   Five   Hegemons  
utilized   laws   in   order   to   rectify   the   lords   of   fiefs.     It   is   not   the   case  
that  they  monopolized  the  profits  of  all  under  Heaven.    It  is  the  case  
that   they   governed   for   the   sake   of   all   under   Heaven.     Consequently,  
the  talented  are  able  to  obtain  reputation  and  establish  merit,  while  
the  people  all  under  Heaven  enjoyed  their  governance.    No  one  was  
able   to   harm   them.     Nowadays,   the   rulers   and   ministers   in   this  
chaotic   age,   on   a   small   scale,   monopolize   the   profits   of   their   states  
and   grasp   the   responsibilities   of   [lower]   bureaucrats   in   order   to  
pursue   their   individual   profit.     This   is   the   reason   states   are   in   peril.    
So,  it  can  be  seen  that  the  destruction  [of  the  demarcation  between]  
public  and  private  are  the  root  of  a  state’s  survival  and  death.671      
 
Indeed,  the  Rujia  influence  in  the  above  passage  is  fairly  clear.      

At  the  same  time,  it  should  be  noted  how  the  above  passage  is  in  accordance  

with   the   concern   for   the   public   gong   公   and   the   private   si   私,   as   seen   in   other  

chapters   in   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang.     For   instance,   though   it   does   not   specifically  

discuss   the   antagonistic   relationship   between   notions   of   public   and   private,   “An  

Order  to  Cultivate  Waste  Lands”  nevertheless  clearly  attempts  to  prevent  perverse  

officials  from  pursuing  private  profit  at  the  expense  of  the  people  邪官不及為私利

於民.    In  fact,  the  very  notion  of  perversity  was  inseparable  from  not  contributing  

to   or   not   complying   with   the   ruler’s   vision   for   the   state.     Given   the   assumptions  

                                                                                                               
671  公私之分明，則小人不疾賢，而不肖者不妬功。故堯舜之位天下也，非私天下之利也，為天下

位天下也，論賢舉能而傳焉，非疏父子親越人也，明於治亂之道也。故三王以義親，五霸以法正
諸侯，皆非私天下之利也，為天下治天下。是故擅其名而有其功，天下樂其政，而莫之能傷也。
今亂世之君臣，區區然皆擅一國之利，而管一官之重，以便其私，此國之所以危也。故公私之交
，存亡之本也。(Gao  2011:  123)  

  345  
made  about  human  behavior  in  “An  Order  to  Cultivate  Waste  Lands”,  it  is  clear  that  

a   pursuit   of   private   profit   is   not   considered   inherently   perverse.     Rather,   the  

pursuit   of   private   profit   is   only   perverse   if   it   does   not   comply   with   the   ruler’s  

infrastructure   channels.     The   notion   of   private   profit   in   the   above   passage   suggests  

the  very  same  idea.    Rulers  and  ministers  in  the  present  chaotic  age  were  thought  

to  have  abused  their  status  in  public  administration  in  order  to  enrich  their  private  

wealth.     This   was   thought   to   be   one   of   the   consequences   of   the   distinction   between  

public  and  private  not  being  clear.      

Rong  brought  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  above  passage  depicts  rulers  of  

the  past  (i.e.  the  three  Kings  and  the  Five  Hegemons)  as  models  to  emulate  in  the  

present.    This  is  an  important  observation  because  the  idea  of  emulating  the  past  in  

order   to   govern   in   the   present   times   is   not   in   accordance   with   the   notion   of  

governing   in   accordance   with   the   times,   which   can   be   found   in   many   chapters   in  

the   Book  of  Lord  Shang   like   “The   Reform   of   the   Law”,   “The   Unification   of   Words”,  

etc.  Rong  also  added  that  the  above  passage  contradicts  that  which  is  expressed  in  

the  Zhanguoce.    In  “The  Book  of  Qin”,  the  Zhanguoce  states:    

Upon  Wei  Yang  fleeing  the  state  of  Wei  and  entering  the  state  of  Qin,  
Duke   Xiao   used   him   as   chancellor.     He   enfeoffed   Shang,   titling   him  
Lord  Shang.    As  for  Lord  Shang’s  governance  of  Qin,  he  implemented  
laws   and   decrees   with   fairness   and   impartiality,   without   private  
[favor].     His   punishments   did   not   conceal   [the   malfeasance   of]   the  
strong   and   powerful.     His   rewards   did   not   show   private   favor   to  
those  intimate  and  close.    [His]  laws  [even]  reached  the  crown  Prince,  
with   his   tutor   being   tattooed   and   guardian   having   his   nose   cut   off.    
After   the   first   anniversary   of   Shang’s   rule,   on   the   roads,   no   one  
picked   up   [what]   was   lost.     The   people   did   not   steal.     The   army  
became  very  strong,  and  the  lords  of  fiefs  feared  it.      It  being  like  this,  
he   harshly   imposed   hard-­‐heartedness,   especially   using   force   to  
submit  them  (the  people).  In  the  eighth  year  of  Duke  Xiao’s  reign,  he  

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 became  very  ill  and  desired  to  bequeath  his  position  to  Lord  Shang,  
but  Lord  Shang  did  not  accept.672      
 
Rong  pointed  out  the  fact  that  this  passage  describes  Shang  Yang  as  having  rejected  

the  opportunity  to  become  the  King  of  Qin.    According  to  Rong,  this  is  noteworthy  

because  it  arguably  contradicts  the  essence  of  the  aforementioned  passage  from  the  

“The   Cultivation   of   Political   Assessment”.     If   one   is   supposed   to   govern   all   under  

Heaven   for   the   sake   of   all   under   Heaven,   then   why   would   Lord   Shang   reject   the  

opportunity  when  it  is  bequeathed  to  him?      

So   Rong   also   shows   that   the   passage   from   “The   Cultivation   of   Political  

Assessment”   describes   an   imperial   succession   that   is   based   on   worth   and   ability.    

Since   Lord   Shang   was   already   enfeoffed   and   had   acted   as   chancellor,   one   of   the  

highest  positions  in  the  Qin  state  government,  in  service  to  Duke  Xiao,  why  would  

he   still   not   accept   the   position   of   prince?     In   other   words,   if   he   is   arguably   the   most  

qualified  individual,  based  on  his  merit,  to  govern  all  under  Heaven,  why  would  he  

act  so  contrary  to  the  culture  of  merit  he  had  implemented  so  many  policies  in  an  

attempt   to   establish?     These   seemingly   contradictory   passages   caused   Rong   to  

doubt   that   “The   Cultivation   of   Political   Assessment”   was   written   by   Shang   Yang  

himself.673  However,  one  could  argue  that  Shang  Yang’s  refusal  to  accept  the  throne  

is   more   of   a   reflection   of   the   way   he   viewed   himself,   as   an   esteemed   counselor,  

                                                                                                               
672  衛鞅亡魏入秦，孝公以為相，封之於商，號曰商君。商君治秦，法令至行，公平無私，罰不諱

強大，賞不私親近，法及太子，黥劓其傅。期年之後，道不拾遺，民不妄取，兵革大強，諸侯畏
懼。然刻深寡恩，特以強服之耳。 孝公行之八年，疾且不起，欲傳商君，辭不受。(Lau  and  Chen  
1992:  39/12/22-­‐26;  See  Lau,  D.C.  and  Chen  Fong  Ching,  ed.  A  Concordance  to  the  Zhanguoce.  Hong  
Kong:  Commercial  Press,  1992.)    
673  Rong  1937:  105-­‐107  

  347  
similar  to  the  Rujia  conception  of  a  loyal  minister  and  subject,  whose  place  didn’t  

belong  on  a  throne  with  a  hereditary-­‐based  succession  ritual.  

This  study  additionally  points  out  that  the  above  passage,  like  those  in  “The  

Elimination   of   Strength”,   “Weakening   the   People”,   “Opening   and   Debarring”,   and  

“Attention  to  the  Law”,  along  with  chapters  in  both  the  Xunzi  and  the  Hanfeizi  also  

makes  a  distinction  between  the  notion  of  true  Kingship,  a  Hegemon,  and  inferior  

forms  of  statecraft  seen  in  the  present  times.    This  passage  specifically  criticizes  the  

rulers  of  the  day  for  appropriating  the  profit  of  their  state  for  their  own  personal  

enrichment,   arguing   that   this   approach   is   inferior   to   the   methods   of   statecraft  

employed   by   the   Five   Hegemons   and   three   Kings   of   earlier   periods   who   did   not  

monopolize   their   state’s   profits   for   their   own   private   interests.     This   creates   a  

three-­‐tiered   hierarchy   of   statecraft   that   suggests   that   “The   Cultivation   of   Political  

Assessment”  was  not  written  by  Shang  Yang  himself  and  was  composed  much  later  

in   the   Warring   States   period.     This   is   quite   different   from   Cheng’s   assertions.    

Though   he   believed   Shang   Yang’s   authorship   of   this   chapter   or   even   composition  

by  someone  else  during  his  lifetime  was  improbable,  he  did  assert  that  this  chapter  

follows   shortly   after   Shang   Yang’s   death.     Thus,   “The   Cultivation   of   Political  

Assessment”   inherits   two   key  attributes  of  what  Cheng  believed   to   be   Shang   Yang’s  

original  ideology:  1)  an  equal  emphasis  on  agriculture  and  military  matters,  while  

elevating  them  over  almost  all  other  concerns,  2)  advocacy  for  large  rewards  and  

harsh  punishments.674      

                                                                                                               
674  Cheng  1987:  211-­‐212  

  348  
 Also,   Zhang   considered   “Opening   and   Debarring”,   “Policies”,   and   “The  

Cultivation   of   Political   Assessment”   as   the   most   systematic   and   smoothly   written  

chapters   in   all   of   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang.     As   for   “The   Cultivation   of   Political  

Assessment”,   Zhang   disagreed   with   Rong’s   analysis,   asserting   that   the   chapter’s  

focus  is  not  on  royal  succession,  so  the  description  of  succession  could  have  merely  

been  hypothetical.    He  also  disagreed  with  Rong’s  assumption  that  the  Zhanguoce  is  

necessarily  a  reliable  source  to  test  the  authenticity  of  “The  Cultivation  of  Political  

Assessment”,   in   this   regard.     Also,   although   the   chapter   does   use   language   that   is  

often   associated   with   texts   that   are   believed   to   have   appeared   later   during   the  

Warring   States   period,   Zhang   asserted   that   calling   the   ruler   a   sage   or   even  

mentioning  Yao  and  Shun,  as  great  rulers  of  the  past,  does  not  necessarily  violate  

the   thought   most   associated   with   the   Fajia   tradition.     The   Fajia   tradition  

undoubtedly   elevates   the   ruler   while   also   claiming   that   the   ruler   alone,   without  

laws,   is   insufficient   as   a   sustainable   form   of   statecraft.     However,   due   to   the  

chapter’s   tight   structure,   smooth   style   of   writing,   the   theme   of   its   essay,   and   the  

contents   of   the   chapter   not   illustrating   “pure”   Fajia   thought,   Zhang   viewed   the  

chapter  as  having  been  written  relatively  late  within  the  Warring  State  period,  as  it  

sympathizes   with   perspectives   more   associated   with   the   Rujia   and   Mojia  

traditions.675      

 
                                                                                                               
675  Zhang  2008:  91-­‐94  

  349  
“The  Encouragement  of  Immigration”  

Both   Chen676  and   Gao   Heng677  viewed   this   chapter   as   one   that   could   not  

have  been  written  by  Shang  Yang  for  a  few  reasons.    First,  the  chapter  mentions  a  

historical   figure   that   is   believed   to   have   died   after   Shang   Yang   stating,   “Now,   for  

four  generations  the  three  Jin  states  have  not  achieved  victory  over  Qin.    Since  King  

Xiang  of  Wei,  the  three  Jin  states  have  been  no  match  for  Qin,  when  defending  cities  

or   in   large   and   small   battles.     The   losses   at   the   hands   to   Qin   have   been  

innumerable.” 678     The   reader   should   immediately   notice   the   familiar   “four  

generations”  of  victories  for  Qin  expression  that  has  been  pointed  out  in  both  the  

Xunzi   and   the   Hanfeizi.     Additionally,   the   passage   describes   Qin’s   military  

achievement  after  King  Xiang  of  Wei  who  is  believed  to  have  died  twelve  years  after  

Shang   Yang’s   passing.     How   could   Shang   Yang   have   known   information   about   the  

few  generations  after  the  passing  of  someone  who  died  after  him?      

Second,   the   chapter   mentions   Qin   military   victories   that   are   also   believed   to  

have  taken  place  after  Shang  Yang’s  death.    It  states,  “Moreover,  the  Zhou  and  Hua  

battles,   along   with   the   victory   at   Chang   Ping,   how   many   of   those   from   Qin   died?     Of  

Qin  residents  and  residents  of  foreign  states,  how  many  were  unable  to  engage  in  

the   fundamental   pursuits   (agriculture)?     I   think   the   amount   is   too   many   to   be  

counted.”679    The  victory  in  Chang  Ping  is  believed  to  have  happened  about  seventy-­‐

                                                                                                               
676  Chen  1967:  130  
677  Gao  2011:  21  
678  今三晉不勝秦，四世矣。自魏襄以來，野戰不勝，守城必拔，小大之戰，三晉之所亡於秦者，

不可勝數也。(Gao  2011:  126)  

679  且周軍之勝，華軍之勝，長平之勝，秦所亡民者幾何？民客之兵，不得事本者幾何？臣竊以為

不可數矣。(Gao  2011:  131)  

  350  
eight   years   after   Shang   Yang’s   death.680     Lewis   stated,   “The   greatest   bloodshed,  

according   to   sources   of   the   period,   occurred   when   Qin   defeated   Zhao   in   the  

campaign  at  Changping  in  260  B.C.,  a  battle  that  supposedly  ended  with  the  death  of  

400,000   Zhao   soldiers.     Although   Qin’s   own   massive   losses   in   this   campaign   and  

subsequent  defeat  at  the  hands  of  an  allied  army  postponed  for  several  decades  the  

final   conquests   that   created   the   first   empire,   the   crushing   defeat   of   Zhao   left   Qin  

with  no  serious  rival.”681    

Rong  pointed  out  that  the  Zhou  and  Hua  victories  both  occurred  under  the  

reign  of  King  Zhao  of  Qin,  with  the  Zhou  victory  taking  place  about  eighty  two  years  

after   Shang   Yang’s   death.     In   fact,   Rong   added   that   because   the   chapter   refers   to  

matters   that   occurred   during   the   reign   of   King   Zhao   of   Qin   and   the   language   it  

shares   with   the   two   Xunzi   chapters   is   logically   in   accordance   with   that   time   period,  

the  chapter  was  written  in  the  latter  part  of  that  period.682     Third  and  finally,  one  

passage   in   the   chapter   generally   describes   a   plan   of   expanding   the   state   of   Qin’s  

military   base   that   does   not   seem   to   be   in   accordance   with   Shang   Yang’s   known  

policies.683    This  passage  describes  a  policy  in  which  Qin  would  essentially  bribe  the  

populace   of   other   states,   especially   the   three   Jin   states,   through   tax-­‐free   and  

military  conscription  free  incentives,  to  ally  themselves  with  the  state  of  Qin  rather  

than  with  their  home  state.      

This   idea   seems   to   be   inconsistent   with   policies   that   are   thought   to   be   those  

advocated   by   Shang   Yang   historically.     According   to   traditional   Chinese   history,  

                                                                                                               
680  Chen  1967:  130  
681  Lewis  2007:  38  
682  Rong  1937:  85-­‐89  
683  See  [XXXIV.]  in  the  Appendix  II  

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Shang   Yang   employed   at   least   two   strategies   to   expand   the   state   of   Qin’s   military  

base.     First,   he   changed   the   tax   policy   in   Qin   in   such   a   way   that   it   resulted   in   an  

increase   in   the   amount   of   taxes   Qin   received,   some   of   which   was   specifically   meant  

for  military  funding.    Second,  he  established  a  household  registry  that  divided  the  

entire  populace  in  the  state  of  Qin  into  groups  of  five,  using  them  as  basic  units  for  

military  recruitment.    He  mandated  that  each  male  of  a  certain  age  was  obligated  to  

provide   military   service   to   the   state,   necessarily   increasing   the   state   of   Qin’s  

military  personnel.    The  policy  of  immigration  described  in  “The  Encouragement  of  

Immigration”   does   not   seem   to   accomplish   the   same   goals   over   the   same   time  

period.     The   ideas   in   “The   Encouragement   of   Immigration”   are   very   dependent  

upon   the   hope   that   in   return   for   the   tax   and   military   incentives,   those   who   migrate  

to  Qin  will  remain  devoted  to  Qin  even  after  the  exemptions  expire.    In  other  words,  

even  if  this  policy  is  successful,  it  has  an  extraordinarily  long-­‐term  focused  vision.    

This  policy  does  little  to  improve  a  state’s  quantity  or  quality  of  military  personnel  

or  funding  in  the  short-­‐term.  

Rong  asserted  that  “The  Encouragement  of  Immigration”  appears  to  have  a  

similar  author  as  “The  Calculation  of  Land”.684    Both  chapters  contain  passages  that  

ultimately  describe  the  territorial  proportions  within  the  state.    The  only  significant  

difference   is   that   the   passage   from   “The   Encouragement   of   Immigration”   considers  

how   the   size   of   the   population   corresponds   with   the   ideal   proportions   of   land,  

while   the   passage   from   “The   Calculation   of   Land”   does   not.     Nevertheless,   both  

passages  use  the  same  language  to  describe  ideal  territorial  proportions.      

                                                                                                               
684  Rong  1937:  97-­‐98;  See  [XXXV.]  and  [XXXVI.]  in  the  Appendix  II  

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 Rong  continued  further  to  argue  that  “The  Encouragement  of  Immigration”  

and   “The   Calculation   of   Land”   must   also   have   the   same   author   as   “An   Order   to  

Cultivate  Waste  Lands”.    He  argued  that  all  three  chapters  can  appropriately  fit  into  

one  form  of  political  organization.    “The  Encouragement  of  Immigration”  describes  

policy   that   encourages   immigration   to   a   state   in   order   to   increase   agricultural  

production.     “The   Calculation   of   Land”   deals   with   balancing   the   size   of   the  

population   of   a   state   with   the   amount   of   territory.     “An   Order   to   Cultivate   Waste  

Lands”   lays   out   various   policies   and   administrative   paths   that   encourage   the  

cultivation   of   wastelands.     Therefore,   it   can   be   argued   that   all   three   of   these  

chapters  deal  with  different  aspects  of  the  same  issue:  enriching  the  state  through  

the  increase  in  agricultural  production.685     Zhang  agreed  that  “The  Encouragement  

of  Immigration”  could  not  have  been  written  by  Shang  Yang  himself  for  the  reasons  

already   explained.     Indeed,   he   thinks   that   due   to   the   chapter’s   significant   focus,  

smooth   style   of   writing,   and   variations   of   sentences,   all   suggest   a   level   of  

sophistication   that   indicate   that   it   was   written   towards   the   end   of   the   Warring  

States  period.686  

Like   Rong,   Li   Ling   pointed   to   the   fact   that   the   first   paragraph   of   the   “The  

Encouragement  of  Immigration”  and  “The  Calculation  of  Land”  similarly  discuss  the  

proportions  of  land  and  population  in  an  ideal  state.    However  Li  Ling  mentioned  

that   there   is   one   very   important   difference   between   the   two   chapters.     “The  

Encouragement   of   Immigration”     includes   the   phrase   “fifty   thousand   can   be   fed”   以

此食作夫五萬.    Other  scholars  have  claimed  that  since  this  passage  puts  forth  fifty  
                                                                                                               
685  Rong  1937:  97-­‐98  
686  Zhang  2008:  95-­‐96  

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thousand   men   as   a   base   number   of   households   to   feed,   then   based   on   the  

calculations  in  “The  Calculation  of  Land”,  the  passage  is  additionally  asserting  that  

each  male  of  a  household  would  be  entitled  to  a  plot  of  one  hundred  and  eight  mu.      

However,  Li  Ling  argued  that  this  is  incorrect.     The  one  hundred  and  eight  

mu   assertion   fails   to   give   adequate   attention   to   the   passage   that   immediately  

follows   the   opening   passage   of   “The   Encouragement   of   Immigration”.     It   states,  

“Nowadays,  the  territory  of  Qin  has  five  thousand  square  li.    Yet  the  amount  of  tilled  

land  is  less  than  two-­‐tenths  of  that,  the  military  personnel  is  less  than  one  million,  

and   the   resources   and   treasures   of   the   lakes,   marshes,   valleys,   gorges,   streams,  

famous   mountains,   and   great   rivers   are   not   fully   utilized.     This   is   a   case   of   the  

erroneous  proportion  of  population  and  territory.”687    The  passage  is  different  from  

“The  Calculation  of  Land”  because,  it  specifically  points  out  that  the  state  of  Qin  has  

two  problems  the  under  exploitation  of  land  and  a  scarce  population.688     However,  

since  the  character  shu  refers  to  military  personnel,  Li  Ling  asserted  that  about  one  

million   troops   should   be   conscripted   from   one   thousand   square   li.     In   other   words,  

rather   than   interpreting   the   above   passage’s   usage   of   the   number   one   million   bai  

wan   百萬   to   refer   to   the   amount   of   fields   in   the   state,   Li   Ling   asserted   that   it  

actually   refers   to   the   fact   that   one   million   troops   should   be   available   from   one  

thousand  square  li  units  or  the  one-­‐fifth  of  Qin’s  arable  land.    

 
                                                                                                               
687 今秦之地，方千里者五，而穀土不能處什二，田數不滿百萬，其藪澤，谿谷，名山，大川之材
物，貨寶，又不盡為用，此人不稱土也。(Gao  2011:  126)
688  Li  1998:  188  

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“Rewards  and  Punishments”  

Chen  viewed  this  chapter  as  having  been  written  in  the  relatively  late  stage  

of   the   Book  of  Lord  Shang’s   formation.     Though,   he   did   view   this   chapter,   especially  

its  rationale  of  rewards  and  punishments,  to  generally  be  in  accordance  with  Shang  

Yang’s  ideology689.    The  chapter  opens  with  a  passage  explaining  the  rationales  for  

uniting  rewards,  punishments,  and  education.690     Gao  Heng  explained  that  the  idea  

behind   the   unification   of   rewards   yi   shang   壹賞   is   to   bestow   rewards   only   for  

military   merit   and   achievement.     As   a   result,   the   ruler   effectively   cancels   out   or  

even   surpasses   the   cost   of   bestowing   rewards   through   the   expansion   of   his   land,  

resources,  and  wealth  from  other  states,  thereby  effectively  the  ruler  is  not  giving  

rewards.     The   idea   behind   the   unification   of   punishments   yi  xing  壹刑  is   that   the  

ruler   not   only   metes   out   severe   punishments   but   also   imposes   collective  

punishment,   regardless   of   any   individual’s   rank   or   proximity   to   the   ruler.     As   a  

result,   ministers   will   be   scared   to   violate   the   law   and   will   be   hyper-­‐aware   of  

preventing   anyone   else   from   violating   the   law,   out   of   their   own   self-­‐interest.    

Therefore,  the  ruler  can  have  punishments  without  using  them.      

Finally,   the   idea   behind   the   unification   of   education   yi  jiao   壹教   is   the   use   of  

rank   and   emoluments   to   encourage   or   incentivize   the   ruler’s   ministers   and   officers  

to   actively   engage   in   war,   alleviating   the   state   of   the   books   and   techniques   of   the  

Rujia   tradition.     This   should   result   in   all   the   ruler’s   subjects   devoting   their   energies  

to  warfare,  effectively  making  education  outside  of  that  which  is  sponsored  by  the  

                                                                                                               
689  Chen  1967:  131    
690  See  [XXXVII.]  in  Appendix  II  

  355  
state   useless.     In   the   case   of   all   three   of   these   teachings,   unification   is   a   means   to  

inevitable   internalization,   and   will   therefore   render   all   three   unnecessary.     In   the  

case   of   rewards,   it   does   not   cost   the   state   resources   and   wealth.     In   the   case   of  

punishments,  it  does  not  cost  the  state  human  capital  or  population  diminishment.    

In   the   case   of   education,   it   does   not   cost   the   state   confusion,   or   opportunity   cost   of  

time  and  energy,  through  the  ruler’s  subjects  indulging  in  external  or  useless  forms  

of  education,  allowing  them  to  fully  devote  themselves  to  what  is  essential:  warfare  

(and  secondarily,  agricultural  production).691  

Both  Gao  Heng692  and  Cheng  pointed  out  that  the  entire  chapter  is  written  in  

the  first  person,  with  the  author  referring  to  himself  as  chen  臣,  which  is  usually  a  

strong  indication  that  the  chapter  was  a  memorial  presented  to  the  ruler  of  Qin  in  a  

relatively  late  period.    Cheng  added  that  there  are  a  few  reasons  why  “Rewards  and  

Punishments”  was  likely  not  written  by  Shang  Yang  himself.    First,  since  it  is  clear  

that  it  was  a  memorial  presented  to  a  ruler,  Cheng  speculated  that  it  was  presented  

to   Qin   Shi   Huangdi   a   short   time   before   the   Qin   state   unified   China.     Second,  

“Rewards  and  Punishments”  is  one  of  the  few  chapters  that  discusses  rewards  and  

punishments   in   an   exceptionally   thorough   and   sophisticated   fashion.     It   does   not  

just   question   whether   or   not   rewards   and   punishments   should   exist   but   also   to  

what  degree  they  should  they  exist  and  what  effects  they  should  have.    Third,  the  

chapter   uses   a   style   of   writing   that   often   cites   historical   examples.     The   individuals  

cited  in  the  chapter  are  of  relatively  later  times  than  those  seen  in  other  chapters  in  

the   Book   of   Lord   Shang.     Fourth,   and   perhaps   most   importantly,   the   way   that   it  
                                                                                                               
691  Gao  2011:  135  
692  Gao  2011:  22-­‐23  

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views   knowledge   outside   of   the   state’s   vision   for   education   is   relatively   extreme  

compared  to  other  chapters.693      

Zhang   argued   that   “Rewards   and   Punishments”   is   ideologically   similar   to  

“Agriculture   and   War”,   though   they   do   differ   on   emphasis   of   agriculture   and   war.    

According   to   him,   “Rewards   and   Punishments”   emphasizes   warfare   more   than  

agriculture  while  “Agriculture  and  War”  places  equal  emphasis  on  both,  or  arguably  

places   more   emphasis   on   agriculture.     He   agreed   that   texts   within   Shang   Yang’s  

ideological   current   increasingly   focused   on   warfare   during   the   Warring   States  

period,   Zhang   argued   that   “Rewards   and   Punishments”   was   written   later   than  

“Agriculture  and  War”.    Though,  he  took  issue  with  Cheng’s  claim  that  its  proposal  

for   a   net   cost   of   zero   in   rewards,   punishments,   and   education   is   evidence   of  

influence  from  the  Hanfeizi.    He  pointed  out  that  not  only  do  other  chapters  in  the  

Book   of   Lord   Shang   describe   using   one   political   tool   to   eventually   produce   an  

environment   in   which   the   tool   is   no   longer   necessary,   like   using   punishments   to  

abolish  punishments,  but  that  “Agriculture  and  War”  states,  “One  who  achieves  true  

Kingship  succeeds  in  the  essence  of  governing  the  people.    Therefore,  he  does  not  

need   to   rely   on   bestowing   rewards   and   the   people   love   their   ruler.     He   does   not  

need   to   rely   on   rank   and   salary   and   the   people   will   exert   themselves   in   their   work.    

He   does   not   need   to   rely   on   punishments   and   the   people   will   certainly   exhaust  

themselves.”694     Clearly,   “Rewards   and   Punishments”   is   not   the   only   chapter   that  

                                                                                                               
693  Cheng  1987:  221  
694  王者得治民之至要，故不待賞賜而民親上，不待爵祿而民從事，不待刑罰而民致死。(Gao  

2011:  51)  

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imagines   achieving   a   condition   in   which   the   ruler   does   not   need   to   rely   on   a  

particular  political  tool  in  order  to  effectively  govern  his  subjects.695      

“Policies”  

Chen   views   that   it   seems   to   have   been   authored   by   an   intellectual  

descendant.    Although  the  chapter  contains  ideas  that  are  in  accordance  with  Shang  

Yang’s  ideology,  like  governing  according  to  the  times  and  using  extreme  means  for  

the   sake   of   peaceful   ends,   it   also   includes   passages   that   express   antithetical  

ideas.696    For  instance,  “Policies”  states:  

A  state  is  either  doubly  entrenched  in  good  order  or  doubly  chaotic.    
If   a   clear-­‐sighted   ruler   resides   above,   and   he   necessarily   promotes  
the   worthy,   then   the   laws   can   be   implemented   by   the   worthies.     If  
laws   are   implemented   by   the   worthy,   then   laws   are   able   to   govern  
the   ruler’s   subjects   and   those   that   are   not   worthy   will   not   dare  
commit  malfeasance.    This  is  called  being  doubly  entrenched  in  good  
order.    If  a  ruler  who  is  not  clear-­‐sighted  resides  above,  then  he  will  
necessarily   promote   those   who   are   not   worthy,   the   state   will   lack  
clear-­‐sighted  laws,  and  those  that  are  not  worthy  will  dare  to  commit  
malfeasance.    This  is  being  doubly  chaotic.697    
   
Chen  pointed  out  that  the  above  passage  appears  to  elevate  those  the  ruler  employs,  

or   the   worthies   xian   賢,   in   a   way   that   is   more   similar   to   thought   expressed   in   Rujia  

texts  than  Shang  Yang’s  ideology.698  

   Cheng   pointed   out   that   “Policies”   could   not   have   been   written   by   Shang  

Yang   for   additional   reasons.     First,   the   chapter   generally   attacks   the  Rujia   concepts  

of   benevolence   and   proper   roles,   especially   the   latter,   more   intensely   than   many  

other   chapters   in   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang.     According   to   Cheng,   this   suggests   a  
                                                                                                               
695  Zhang  2008:  97-­‐98  
696  See  [XXXVIII.]  in  Appendix  II  
697  國或重治，或重亂。明主在上，所舉必賢，則法可在賢。法可在賢，則法在下，不肖不敢為非

，是謂重治。不明主在上，所舉必不肖，國無明法，不肖者敢為非，是謂重亂。(Gao  2011:  150)  

698  Chen  1967:  131  

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relatively   late   dating,   as   Shang   Yang’s   intellectual   descendants   and   the   rest   of   the  

Fajia   tradition   began   to   target   their   debates   more   intensely   against   competing  

schools   of   thought   as   the   Warring   States   period   progressed.     Second,   “Policies”  

includes   a   notion   of   unity   yi   壹   very   different   from   that   found   in   “An   Order   to  

Cultivate   Waste   Lands”   and   “Agriculture   and   War”.     Third,   the   actions   of   the   prince  

are   described   much   like   the   notion   of   wu   wei   無為.     Cheng   viewed   this   as   an  

indication   that   this   chapter   was   very   influenced   by   the   Hanfeizi,   as   it   is   generally  

consider  to  be  the  most  significant  Fajia  text  to  specifically  describe  the  ruler  in  this  

manner.699  

As   for   “Policies”,   Zhang   pointed   out   many   differences   between   it   and  

“Opening   and   Debarring”.     For   instance,   “Policies”   expresses   a   notion   of   true  

Kingship   that   is   more   defined   by   a   ruler’s   people   taking   pleasure   in   war.     The  

“Policies”  does  not  completely  negate  the  potential  usefulness  of  virtue,  but  it  does  

criticize   a   form   of   statecraft   that   depends   on   it.     The   establishment   of   laws   is   the  

only  path  to  creating  a  state  with  virtue.    In  “Opening  and  Debarring”,  it  argues  that  

a   ruler   rectifies   the   people   through   punishments,   establishing   what   the   people  

dislike   so   that   it   motivates   them   to   pursue   what   they   like   (rewards).     Also,   the  

chapters   have   different   references   in   explaining   their   notions   of   history.     These  

differences,  among  a  few  others,  led  Zhang  to  assert  that  “Policies”  is  written  with  a  

greater   degree   of   sophistication,   having   incorporated   ideas   most   associated   with  

the   Rujia   tradition   while   making   sharp   critiques   of   the   very   tradition   it   is   clearly  

                                                                                                               
699  Cheng  1987:  219-­‐220  

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influenced   by.     Therefore,   Zhang   concluded   that   “Policies”   was   written   at   a   later  

date,  sometime  during  the  late  Warring  States  period.      

This  study  would  agree  that  “Policies”  was  written  during  the  late  Warring  

States   period.     While   it   remains   unclear   if   “Opening   and   Debarring”   was   written  

earlier,  “Policies”  does  include  a  passage  that  presents  a  hierarchy  of  statecraft  for  

its   present   time.700 Not   only   does   the   passage   in   “Policies”   express   notions   of  

governing  according  to  the  times  and  using  extreme  means  for  peaceful  ends,  it  also  

presents  a  hierarchy  of  statecraft,  albeit  less  conspicuously  than  other  chapters.    

The  passage,  like  that  in  “Opening  and  Debarring”,  divides  history  into  three  

different   periods   in   chronological   order:   the   time   periods   of   Hao  Ying   昊英,   Shen  

Nong   神農,   and   Huang  Di   黃帝.     Before   Huang   Di’s   time,   this   passage   describes   two  

distinct  time  periods  in  which  order  was  possible  without  the  formation  of  a  formal  

state.       This   illustrates   the   passage’s   extraordinary   degree   of   flexibility   in   its  

judgment   of   what   constitutes   “good”   or   “better”   statecraft.     However,   the   most  

important  criterion  of  statecraft,  the  degree  to  which  it  accords  with  the  times,  does  

suggest   that,   despite   such   theoretical   flexibility,   there   is   a   hierarchy   of   statecraft  

being   established.     Over   the   three   time   periods,   there   is   an   implied   political  

development   and   notable   increase   in   sophistication,   as   a   result   of   population  

increase.    This  is  in  accordance  with  the  more  common  argument  within  the  Fajia  

tradition,  as  seen  in  many  other  chapters  in  the  Book   of   Lord   Shang,  which  asserts  

that  it  is  of  little  use  to  look  to  the  past  as  a  model  to  emulate  in  the  present.    

                                                                                                               
700  See  [XXXIX.]  in  Appendix  II  

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  Governance  in  the  present  time  should  depend  on  the  size  of  the  population  

(likely  to  be  greater  than  in  times  past),  what  motivates  and  interests  the  populace,  

and   what   means   are   at   the   ruler’s   disposal   to   allow   him   to   both   satisfy   his  

objectives   and   his   subjects.   However,   it   does   imply   that   forms   of   statecraft   of   the  

past   are   not   sufficient   in   the   present   because   of   the   new   circumstances.     If  

approaches  to  statecraft  in  the  past  were  sufficient  to  produce  order  in  the  present,  

there  would  be  no  disorder,  to  the  extent  expressed  in  the  above  passage  in  which  

weaker   people   were   oppressed   by   stronger   ones,   in   the   present.     Whether   this  

necessarily  implies  a  hierarchy  or  not,  there  are  three  distinct  time  periods  in  the  

example,   two   explicitly   discussed   historical   and   one   implied   in   the   present.     This  

leads   this   study   to   consider   “Policies”   to   have   been   written   in   the   late   Warring  

States  period.  

“Within  the  Borders”  

Chen   argued   that   this   chapter   was   written   by   Shang   Yang   himself   for   two  

main   reasons.     First,   it   describes   a   household   registry   system,   much   like   the   one  

attributed   to   his   policy   achievements.     For   instance,   “Within   the   Borders”   states,  

“The   men   and   women   within   the   state’s   four   borders   all   must   register   with  

superiors  (in  local  administrative  centers).    At  birth,  they  are  registered.    At  death,  

they  are  erased.”701  Second,  much  of  the  chapter  describes  a  military  ranks  system  

and   system   of   rewards   and   punishments,   also   thought   to   be   in   accordance   with  

Shang   Yang’s   ideology.702     On   the   other   hand,   Gao   Heng   argued   that   this   chapter  

                                                                                                               
701  四境之內，丈夫女子皆有名於上，「生」者著，死者削。(Gao  2011:  155)  

702  Chen  1967:  131-­‐132  

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could   not   have   been   written   by   Shang   Yang   himself   because   the   title   of   the   chapter  

does  not  sufficiently  correspond  with  its  actual  contents.703      

Rong  Zhaozu  asserted  that  “Within  the  Borders”  may  share  an  author  with  

“The   Elimination   of   Strength”.     This   is   because   “The   Elimination   of   Strength”   also  

has  a  passage  that  describes  registry  at  birth  and  the  erasing  of  names  in  death.    It  

states,   “If,   in   registering   the   population   of   the   people,   their   names   are   entered   in  

the   registry   upon   birth   and   erased   upon   death   so   that   the   people   cannot   escape  

agricultural  taxes  and  fields  do  not  become  wastelands,  then  the  state  will  become  

wealthy,   and   being   rich,   it   will   become   strong.”704     Both,   the   passages   from   “Within  

the   Borders”   and   “The   Elimination   of   Strength”   clearly   have   an   important   aspect   of  

their   imagined   political   organization   in   common.     They   both   not   only   mandate   a  

registry  of  households,  but  they  also  indicate  that  the  importance  of  the  registry  is  

to  allow  “superiors”  or  those  employed  by  the  ruler  to  more  effectively  keep  track  

of   their   population.     In   the   first   passage,   it   seems   to   highly   value   a   condition   in  

which  those  the  ruler  employs  know  the  common  people  they  are  responsible  for  

by  name.    In  the  second  passage,  it  goes  so  far  as  to  say  that  the  state  registry  will  

prevent   the   ruler’s   subjects   from   escaping   their   responsibilities   in   agriculture  

(most  likely  specifically  referring  to  the  fu  賦  tax  that  funds  military  activity),  which  

enriches  the  state,  which  will  in  turn  strengthen  the  state  (most  likely  through  its  

army).     Nevertheless,   both   passages   view   a   registry   as   an   important   means   to  

organize  and  govern  a  state.      

                                                                                                               
703  Gao  2011:  155  
704  舉民眾口數，生者著，死者削。民不逃粟，野無荒草，則國富，國富者彊。(Gao  2011:  61)

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 Cheng   agreed   with   Chen’s   belief   that  “Within   the   Borders”  and   “An   Order   to  

Cultivate   Waste   Lands”   were   both   written   by   Shang   Yang   himself.     This   is   for   a   few  

reasons.    First,  they  both  differentiate  the  programs  or  systems  that  they  propose,  

the   former   advocating   a   tax   system,   a   commodities   tax   system,   a   conscription  

system,   and   a   system   of   punishments   while   the   latter   advocates   a   hukou-­‐like  

system   (household   registry   system),   a   military   ranks   system,   and   system   of  

rewards  and  punishments,  and  a  system  to  reorganize  armed  forces.    Second,  their  

writing   styles   are   similarly   simple   and   natural.     Third,   they   also   are   essay-­‐styled  

chapters.705     So   Cheng   concluded   that   due   to   the   fact   that   many   of   the   ideas   from  

“An   Order   to   Cultivate   Waste   Lands”   were   actually   promulgated   into   law   in   the  

early  years  of  the  Qin  state’s  history  during  the  reign  of  Duke  Xiao,  and  the  fact  that  

“Within   the   Borders”   is   so   incredibly   close   in   style   to   it,   that   both   of   these   chapters  

could  have  been  written  by  Shang  Yang.706      

Zhang  agreed  with  Cheng  that  both  “An  Order  to  Cultivate  Waste  Lands”  and  

“Within   Borders”   are   stylistically   very   similar,   as   they   both   consist   of   plans   or  

actual   drafts   of   laws.     He   did,   however,   point   out   that   “Within   Borders”   lacks   the  

rationales   of   laws   that   are   included   in   “An   Order   to   Cultivate   Waste   Lands”.     This  

notwithstanding,  Zhang  asserted  that  policies  and  their  rationales  in  “An  Order  to  

Cultivate   Waste   Lands”   are   very   much   in   accordance   with   the   depiction   of   Shang  

Yang’s   reforms   in   his   biography   in   the   Shiji,   centering   around   many   of   the   same  

issues:   agriculture   and   warfare,   rewards   and   punishments,   the   ignorance   of   the  

people,   constraining   commerce,   and   attacking   widespread   learning   outside   of   the  

                                                                                                               
705  Cheng  1987:  27  
706  Cheng  1987:  33  

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orthodoxy.     It   is   because   of   these   crucial   similarities   that   Zhang   described   “An  

Order   to   Cultivate   Waste   Lands”   as   being   written   earlier   than   “Within   the  

Borders”.707     So   of   all   the   chapters,   Zhang   asserted   that   “Within   the   Borders”   and  

“An   Order   to   Cultivate   Waste   Lands”   are   the   two   chapters   most   likely   to   have   been  

written  by  Shang  Yang  himself.  

The  System  of  Rank  

Li   Ling   noted   that   first   passage   in   “Within   the   Borders”   is   particularly  

interesting  because  it  reflects  an  actual  practice  in  ancient  Chinese  military  affairs.    

The  shu  zi  庶子,  without  rank,  would  act  like  servants  for  those  of  rank,  chopping  

wood,   drawing   water,   cooking   food,   feeding   horses,   guarding   military  

impedimenta,   and   even   assisting   their   daifu   大夫,   which   in   this   case   is   a   generic  

term  for  a  man  of  rank,  in  combat.    It  is  important  to  know  about  these  unranked  

men   who   serve   the   military   because   they   are   included   when   the   text   uses   the   term  

“military  rank”  jun  jue  軍爵.    Thus,  when  the  text  refers  to  the  “ranks”,  xiao  校,  tu  徒,  

cao  操,  they  are  the  different  categories  of  unranked  military  servants.    The  official  

first  rank  was  the  gong  shi  公士,  to  which  the  notion  gong  jue  公爵  refers.      

The   second   official   rank   was   the   zu   卒.     This   category   of   men   of   rank  

referred  to  teams  of  armed  escorts  posted  on  the  sides  of  four-­‐horsed  carriages  or  

chariots.     The   third   official   rank   was   the   tun  zhang   屯長.   Li   Ling   pointed   out   that  

though   the   original   text   describes   the   tun  zhang   as   leaders   of   squads   of   five   men,  

this  is  inaccurate.    The  text  should  read  that  the  tun   zhang  were  leaders  of  squads  

                                                                                                               
707  Zhang  2008:  76-­‐77  

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of  fifty  men.    Also,  Li  Ling  explained  that  the  phrase  wu  bai  zhu  五百主,  consistently  

understood  to  mean  “the  leader  of  five  hundred  swordsmen  with  short  weapons”,  

actually   only   refers   to   a   leader   of   fifty   men.     This   term,   along   with   liu  bai  zhi  ling  六

百之令,  qi  bai  zhi  ling 七百之令,  ba  bai  zhi  ling 八百之令,  all  erroneously  include  the  

character  for  one  hundred  bai  百  instead  of  the  character  for  units  of  ten  shi  十.708    

Generally,  the  state  hierarchy  of  all  twenty  ranks  in  ascending  order  was  the  

following:  (Men  without  rank)   xiao  校à  tu  徒à  cao 操à(Men  of  rank)   gong  shi  公

士àshang  zao   上造àzan  niao   簪裊à  bu  geng   不更à  daifu   大夫à  guan  daifu   官大

夫à  gong  daifu   公大夫à  gong  sheng   公乘à  wu  daifu   五大夫à  zuo  shu  zhang   左庶

長à  you  shu  zhang  右庶長à  zuo   geng  左更à  zhong   geng  中更à  you   geng  右更à  

shao  shang  zao   少上造à  da  shang  zao   大上造à  si  che  shu  zhang   駟車庶長à  da  shu  

zhang  大庶長à   guan   nei   hou  關內侯à   che   hou 徹侯.709     When  this  ranking  system  

is   considered   within   the   phrase   “for   each   degree   the   service   of   one   man   is  

requested”   ji   qi   yi   ren   級乞一人,   it   becomes   fairly   clear   that   there   is   a   very  

important  distinction  made  between  men  of  rank  and  men  without  rank.    Moreover,  

high-­‐ranking  men  can  amass  a  significant  number  of  military  servants.      

Therefore,   Li   Ling   argued   that   the   phrase   戰 及 死 事 而 剄 短 兵 ,   which  

Duyvendak   translated   as   “if   in   a   battle,   it   comes   so   far   that   he   is   killed,   then   the  

swordsmen  are  beheaded”710,  should  be  interpreted  differently.    It  is  doubtful  that  

the  phrase  actually  means  that  other  surviving  men  of  rank  are  put  to  death  if  their  

                                                                                                               
708  Li  1998:  191  
709  Li  1998:  192-­‐193  
710  Duyvendak  1928:  297  

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leader  dies.    Rather,  Li  Ling  argued  that  the  term  duan  bing  短兵,  in  this  particular  

phrase,  refers  to  the  military  servants  that  accompany  the  leader  into  battle.    If  this  

is  the  case,  the  chapter  quite  powerfully  illustrates  the  differentiated  value  the  state  

places  on  men  of  rank  and  men  without  rank.  

“Weakening  the  People”  

Chen   considered   this   chapter   to   be   one   of   mixed   authorship,   explaining   that  

the   style   of   writing   is   not   very   cohesive,   while   including   many   abrupt   changes   in  

topic.  711    The  chapter  begins  discussing  the  mutual  exclusivity  of  the  strength  of  the  

state   and   the   strength   of   the   ruler’s   subjects,   immediately   followed   by   a   discussion  

about   how   the   people’s   disposition   affects   state   welfare,   followed   by   a   discussion  

on   how   to   make   an   army   strong.     It   even   includes   passages   that   are   arguably  

incompatible   with   the   predominant   tone   of   the  Book  of  Lord  Shang.     For   instance,  

the  “Weakening  the  People”  states,  “If  the  laws  constantly  operate,  then  the  people  

will  be  willing  to  comply  with  ranks.    If  the  ruler  adapts  to  changes  in  affairs,  then  

his   governance   will   achieve   success.     If   the   ruler’s   subjects   comply   with   the  

constantly  operating  laws,  then  the  prince  will  adapt  to  changes  and  there  will  be  

benefit.     Therefore,   the   prince   values   many   changes   while   his   subjects   value   few  

changes.”712     On   the   one   hand,   one   could   argue   that   this   passage   is   in   accordance  

with  governing  according  to  the  times,  consistently  asserted  through  out  the  Book  

of   Lord   Shang.     However,   the   end   of   the   passage   asserts   that   the   ruler’s   subjects  

value  few  changes.    This  assertion  appears  strange  considering  the  assumptions  of  

                                                                                                               
711  Chen  1967:  132-­‐133  
712  法有，民安其次。主變，事能得齊。國守安，主操權，利。故主貴多變，國貴少變。(Gao  

2011:  167)  

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human  behavior  found  in  other  chapters  in  the  Book   of   Lord   Shang,  like  “An  Order  

to  Cultivate  Waste  Lands”  and  “The  Calculation  of  Land”.    These  previous  chapters  

assumed  that  human  beings  would  pursue  the  obtainment  of  private  profit  through  

whatever   channels   the   ruler   allowed.     There   was   no   speculation   about   how   the  

ruler’s   subjects   would   view   the   quality   or   quantity   of   changes   made   to   the   ruler-­‐

approved   channels   in   infrastructure   or   culture.     In   other   words,   the   issue   of   how  

the  ruler’s  subjects  viewed  the  quality  or  quantity  of  changes  made  by  the  ruler  was  

not  thought  to  be  an  important  part  of  anticipating  how  they  would  behave.    If  how  

the   ruler’s   subjects   view   the   ruler’s   changes   does   not   affect   how   they   would  

behave,   then   why   would   it   matter   whether   the   ruler   made   many   changes   or   few  

changes  to  his  laws?  

More   importantly,   “Making   Orders   Strict”   specifically   asserts   that   the   ruler  

should  not  make  changes  to  the  laws  once  they  have  been  established.    It  stated,  “If  

a  system  of  laws  has  been  firmly  established  and  there  is  no  change,  then  men  of  

reputation   will   alter   their   original   schemes   of   conspiracy”   故法立而不革，則顯民

變誅.     So,   the   assertion   that   the   ruler’s   subjects   value   few   changes   is   more   about  

conforming   to   a   framework   that   is   common   in   “Weakening   the   People”,   “The  

Elimination   of   Strength”,   and   “Discussion   about   the   People”:   the   antagonistic  

relationships.    Since  the  above  passage  described  the  ruler  as  governing  according  

to   the   times,   the   author(s)   of   “Weakening   the   People”   simply   rationalized   it   with  

the  aforementioned  framework.    Thus,  it  is  implying  that,  in  the  eyes  of  his  subjects,  

the  ruler  making  changes  to  the  law  is  disruptive.    Therefore,  since  it  is  the  duty  of  

the   ruler’s   subjects   to   comply   with   changes   in   the   law,   they   hope   for   minimal  

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instances   or   disruption.     Nevertheless,   this   does   not   seem   to   be   consistent   with  

other  ideas  about  human  behavior  and  human  nature  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang.        

Additionally,  Chen  pointed  out  that  “Weakening  the  People”  could  not  have  

been  written  by  Shang  Yang  because  it  includes  a  passage  that  refers  to  Li  Lou  and  

Wu   Huo   found   in   “Establishing   Laws”   and   in   the   Xunzi’s   “Debate   on   Military  

Principles”.713     Rong   also   pointed   out   that   the   last   passage   in   “Weakening   the  

People”   refers   to   an   event   during   King   Zhao   of   Qin’s   reign.714  First,   Rong   pointed  

out  that  the  attack  on  the  state  of  Chu  that  the  passage  references  is  described  in  

the  Shiji  as  having  occurred  during  the  reign  of  King  Zhao  of  Qin,  when  his  general  

Bai   Qi   led   the   attack   capturing   Chu’s   capital   around   278   B.C.,715  long   after   Shang  

Yang’s  death.716     It  is  for  this  reason  that  Gao  Heng  argued  that  this  chapter  could  

not  have  been  written  by  Shang  Yang  himself.717      

Second,  this  passage  uses  very  similar  language  as  that  used  in  “Debate  on  

Military   Principles”   in   the   Xunzi.     In   the   Xunzi   passage,   the   same   scenario   is  

described   but   the   emphasis   is   on   the   state   of   Chu’s   lack   of   the   correct   guiding  

principle   rather   than   the   state   of   Qin’s   exceptional   laws   that   generate   results.718    

Again,   both   of   these   passages   reveal   a   fundamental   difference   between   the  

traditions   from   which   the   authors   of   both   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang   and   the   Xunzi  

expressed  their  thought.    Zhang  also  took  issue  with  the  presumption  that  because  

                                                                                                               
713  Chen  1967:  132-­‐133  
714  See  [XL.]  in  Appendix  II  
715  二十八年，大良造白起攻楚，取鄢、鄧，赦罪人遷之。(Sima  1959:  213);  See  Sima  Qian  司馬遷.  

Shi  ji  (di  yi  ce,  juan  yi  zhi  juan  yi  er)  史記第一冊，卷一至卷一二.  China  中國:  Zhong  hua  shu  ju  中華
書局,  1959.  
716  Rong  1937:  89-­‐90  
717  Gao  2011:  21  
718  Rong  1937:  89-­‐90;  See  [XLI.]  in  Appendix  II  

  368  
“Weakening  the  People”  contains  passages  about  Qin  conquering  Chu,  with  strong  

resemblance   to   the   passage   found   in   the   Xunzi,   that   it   must   have   been   written   later  

than   the   Xunzi.     According   to   him   though,   this   is   difficult   to   determine   for   certain  

because   they   both   have   such   strong   resemblance   to   one   another   while,   in   both  

cases,  the  passages  that  precede  them  are  completely  different.719  

“External  and  Internal  Affairs”  

Gao   Heng   considered   this   chapter   as   one   that   could   have   been   written   by  

Shang  Yang  because  the  thought  expressed  in  the  chapter  reflects  many  of  the  main  

ideas   associated   with   Shang   Yang,   emphasizing   agriculture   and   warfare,   bestowing  

reward   based   on   military   merit,   constraining   Rujia   devotees   and   practices,  

constraining  merchants,  shopkeepers,  and  those  seeking  to  make  a  living  outside  of  

the   two   primary   occupations,   etc.     However,   he   did   admit   that   this   conclusion  

cannot   be   definitive.720     Chen   did   not   claim   that   “External   and   Internal   Affairs”   was  

written  by  Shang  Yang.    In  fact,  he  argued  that  it  is  more  probable  that  the  chapter  

was   written   some   time   during   the   Western   Han.     This   is   for   two   main   reasons.    

First,  one  of  the  central  ideas  in  the  chapter  does  not  seem  to  be  in  accordance  with  

Shang   Yang’s   ideology.721     “External   and   Internal   Affairs”   states,   “Therefore   he   who  

governs  a  state  should  take  the  profit  on  the  battlefield  and  give  it  all  to  his  soldiers.    

[He   should]   take   the   profit   from   the   market   and   give   it   all   to   the   farmers.       If   he  

gives   all   the   profit   from   the   battlefield   to   his   soldiers,   the   state   will   be   strong.     If   he  

gives  all  the  profit  from  the  marketplace  to  the  farmers,  the  state  will  be  wealthy.    

                                                                                                               
719  Zhang  2008:  102  
720  Gao  2011:  24-­‐25  
721  Chen  1967:  133  

  369  
Therefore,  if  he  sends  his  soldiers  out  to  engage  in  warfare,  they  are  strong.    It  they  

return  and  are  at  rest,  then  the  state  is  wealthy.    With  this,  a  ruler  can  achieve  True  

Kingship.”722     According   to   Chen,   the   idea   of   giving   soldiers   all   of   the   profits  

attained   after   the   annexation   of   a   state   does   not   seem   to   be   a   strategy   of   funding  

military   activities   that   Shang   Yang   would   have   proposed.     This   study   would   also  

add   that   “External   and   Internal   Affairs”   probably   was   not   written   in   the   Western  

Han  for  a  similar  reason.    There  was  no  longer  a  need  for  annexing  of  states  by  that  

period.       Again,   Shang   Yang   expanded   military   funding   through   taxing   the   size   of  

landholdings   and   their   production.     The   tax   on   landholdings   was   specifically  

designed  to  fund  state  military  needs.    Why  would  he  be  concerned  with  enlarging  

a   tax   base   to   fund   military   activities   if   the   profits   from   military   victory   are   going   to  

be  used  to  benefit  soldiers  as  well?      

Perhaps   one   could   argue   that   the   above   passage   represents   an   idea   that  

could   be   thought   of   as   a   theoretical   addition   to   the   aforementioned   policies  

traditionally  associated  with  Shang  Yang.    However,  this  would  lead  to  one  to  ask:  If  

soldiers   received   both   a   notable   portion   of   all   taxes   paid   within   the   state   and   all  

profits  from  military  victories,  then  what  does  the  state  have  to  fund  other  issues  of  

state   importance   beyond   military   personnel,   like   military   implements,   building  

state   infrastructure,   engaging   in   ritual   activities,   etc.?     So,   if   all   the   profit   from  

military   victories   is   distributed   as   private   profit   for   all   soldiers,   and   profit   from   the  

marketplace   is   distributed   as   private   profit   for   all   farmers,   what   is   the   state’s   tax  

base?     This   puts   the   very   existence   of   a   tax   base  into   some   question.     However,   it   is  
                                                                                                               
722
故為國者，邊利盡歸於兵，市利盡歸於農。邊利歸於兵者彊；市利歸於農者富。故出戰而彊，
入休而富者，王也。(Gao  2011:  178)  

  370  
clear  that  the  author  of  “External  and  Internal  Affairs”  does  conceive  of  some  kind  

of   tax   system   because   the   chapter   states,   “If   merchants   and   craftsmen   hold   grain  

dear,  then  the  purchase  of  grain  will  not  be  [easy]  or  cheap.    If  there  is  an  increase  

in  their  taxes,  then  they  (merchants  and  craftsmen)  will  have  no  choice  but  to  leave  

commerce   and   shopkeeping   and   engage   in   agriculture.”723     Second,   Chen   Chi-­‐tien  

also  added  that  the  expression  for  profit  from  the  battlefield  or  frontier  bian  li  邊利,  

was  used  very  rarely  in  the  Warring  States  period.    This  is  why  he  suggested  that  

this  chapter  may  have  even  been  authored  in  the  Western  Han.724  

As   for   Chen’s   first   point   of   criticism,   this   study   would   add   that   the   idea   of  

giving   all   of   the   profits   from   military   victories   to   the   private   hands   of   the   ruler’s  

soldiers  is  not  very  consistent  with  the  general  attitude  expressed  in  chapters  like  

“An  Order  to  Cultivate  Waste  Lands”  and  “The  Calculation  of  Land”.    Both  of  them  

assumed   that   human   beings   generally   pursue   the   obtainment   of   private   profit  

and/or   fame   and   that   this   pursuit   is   the   primary   driving   force   for   much   of   their  

behavior.     Since   this   is   the   case,   both   chapters   also   assert   that   the   way   to   create  

good  order  in  a  state  is  to  create  channels  or  paths  through  which  individuals  can  

obtain   private   profit,   while   also   allowing   the   state   to   benefit   as   well.     More  

specifically,  the  ruler  creates  a  channel  in  agriculture  so  that  the  state  can  increase  

its   own   wealth   through   taxation   of   farmland   and   produce,   while   generally  

increasing  its  wealth  in  resources.    The  ruler  creates  a  channel  in  warfare  so  that  

the   state   can   augment   its   territory,   which   will   inevitably   also   increase   its   wealth   in  

human   and   natural   resources.     So,   in   other   words,   much   of   the   ruler’s   method   of  
                                                                                                               
723  食貴，糴食不利，而又加重征，則民不得無去其商賈，技巧，而事地利矣。(Gao  2011:  177)  

724  Chen  1967:  133  

  371  
governance  in  “An  Order  to  Cultivate  Waste  Lands”  and  “The  Calculation  of  Land”  is  

focused   on   extracting   benefits   from   the   pursuit   of   private   profit   and/or   fame   of   his  

subjects.      

However,  in  “External  and  Internal  Affairs”,  the  author  essentially  advocates  

for  the  opposite.    It  asserts  that  the  ruler  should  distribute  to,  rather  than  extract  

from,  his  subjects’  private  pursuits.    Also,  it  is  unclear  how  the  profit  from  military  

victories   and   the   marketplace   should   be   distributed.     Would   these   profits   be  

distributed   like   rewards   that   reinforce   the   ruler’s   laws?     Would   the   profits   be  

distributed   equally?     Answers   to   these   questions   could   potentially   provide   more  

insight   into   the   seemingly   irreconcilable   philosophical   difference   between   the  

“External   and   Internal   Affairs”,   “An   Order   to   Cultivate   Waste   Lands”,   and   “The  

Calculation  of  Land”.      

Cheng  considered  “External  and  Internal  Affairs”  to  have  inherited  a  similar  

ideology   to   that   expressed   in   “The   Encouragement   of   Immigration”   because   they  

both   separate   the   important   matters   of   the   state   into   two   main   categories:   internal  

or   external.     Therefore,   Cheng   actually   dated   this   chapter   shortly   after   “The  

Encouragement   of   Immigration”   because   of   the   striking   similarity   in   which   both  

chapters   conceptualize   state   affairs,   with   agricultural   production   being   of   the  

upmost   importance   internally   and   military   campaigns   externally.     Therefore,   he  

determined  “External  and  Internal  Affairs”  was  not  written  by  Shang  Yang  himself.    

Also,  despite  its  late  dating,  Cheng  considered  the  ideology  expressed  in  “External  

and   Internal   Affairs”   to   be   in   accordance   with   Shang   Yang’s   original   ideology  

because  it  advocates  large  rewards  and  severe  punishments.      

  372  
 Zhang  disagreed  with  Cheng’s  assertion  that  “External  and  Internal  Affairs”  

shares   an   ideological   base,   beyond   them   both   being   within   Shang   Yang’s  

intellectual   current,   with   “The   Encouragement   of   Immigration”.     Zhang   argued   that  

“External   and   Internal   Affairs”   takes   a   broader   outlook   on   its   affairs   domestically  

and  abroad,  whereas  “The  Encouragement  of  Immigration”  concerns  itself  with  its  

own  state  and  the  people  of  the  three  Jin  states.    Nevertheless,  Zhang  also  did  not  

consider  “External  and  Internal  Affairs”  to  have  been  written  by  Shang  Yang.    One  

important   reason   is   the   style   of   the   chapter.     He   described   it   as   having   a   tight  

structure   and   a   smooth   writing   style,   while   setting   up   questions   and   answering  

them  in  order  to  strengthen  its  proof.    This  makes  “External  and  Internal  Affairs”,  

according  to  Zhang,  arguably  the  most  structured  chapter  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang.    

He   added   that   one   could   argue   that   “Agriculture   and   War”   did   hint   at   a   similar  

concept,  but  the  notion  of  the  external  and  internal  fits  very  well  with  the  content  

of   “External   and   Internal   Affairs”   to   a   more   extraordinary   degree.       Therefore,  

Zhang  believed  “External  and  Internal  Affairs”  must  have  been  written  around  the  

late   Warring   States   period   because   it   is   difficult   to   date   the   chapter’s   level   of  

sophistication  in  the  early  or  even  middle  Warring  States  period.725      

“Prince  and  Minister”  

This   chapter,   due   to   its   short   length,   has   proved   particularly   difficult   for  

scholars  to  achieve  certainty  on  its  date.    Chen  viewed  its  content  as  being  highly  

compatible  with  Shang  Yang’s  ideology  and  even  speculated  that  it  could  have  been  

written   by   Shang   Yang   himself,   though   he   admits   a   notable   degree   of  

                                                                                                               
725  Zhang  2008:  104-­‐105  

  373  
uncertainty.726  For   instance,   one   passage   points   to   the   importance   of   agriculture  

and   warfare   merit   for   subjects   to   obtain   rewards.727     Chen   wrote   that   the   assertion  

that   the   ruler   should   ground   himself   in   the   law   and   govern   緣法而治   was  

particularly  in  accordance  with  Shang  Yang’s  ideology.728     Additionally,  there  are  a  

few   more   notable   aspects   of   this   passage   that   further   support   Chen’s   view.     First,  

the   passage   describes   rewards   and   punishments   with   a   very   contingent   quality.    

Rewards   are   based   on   merit,   and   merit   is   based   upon   very   specific   results   or  

achievement.     In   other   words,   rewards   are   used   as   a   tool   to   bring   about   the  

behavior   that   the   ruler   desires   from   his   subjects.     Second,   the   merit   for   which   a  

ruler   bestows   rewards   falls   into   two   categories:   military   and   agricultural  

achievement.    Third,  there  is  an  implicit  concern  about  the  sufficiency  zu  足  of  the  

rewards   bestowed.     Rewards   must   be   substantial   enough   to   channel   the   ruler’s  

subjects’  pursuit  of  private  profit.    Without  adequately  doing  so,  it  will  not  provide  

the  demarcating  lines  for  the  state-­‐endorsed  pursuits.      

In   addition,   if   rewards   are   not   sufficient,   then   subjects   may   be   inclined   to  

seek  other  opportunities  that  allow  them  to  maximize  their  obtainment  of  private  

profit.    If  this  occurs,  then  rewards  lose  their  ability  to  establish  and  maintain  the  

underlying   bond   between   the   ruler   and   his   subjects,   fostering   good   faith   and  

mutual  trust.    Fourth  and  perhaps  most  importantly,  the  chapter  shows  a  concern  

for  the  cultivation  of  wastelands.    In  order  for  farmers  to  get  the  rewards,  they  must  

not  leave  or  abandon  their  grounds  不離廛.    This  implies  that  the  state  is  keeping  

                                                                                                               
726  Chen  1967:  133  
727  See  [XLII.]  in  Appendix  II  
728  Chen  1967:  133  

  374  
track   of   what   grounds   farmers   are   registered   under   so   that   they   can   determine  

what  would  constitute  abandoning  one’s  grounds.    So,  not  only  do  farmers  need  to  

produce,   but   they   must   produce   on   specific   grounds.     The   passage   additionally  

asserts   that   rewards   must   be   sufficient   for   farmers   to   not   only   take   care   of   their  

parents   but   also   provide   for   military   activity   給軍事.       This   seems   to   imply   that   the  

wealth  of  farmers  must  be  correlated  to  military  activity,  which  indicates  that  this  

author’s  universe  involves  farmers  being  taxed  in  some  form  in  order  to  fund  the  

military.  

Rong   asserted   that   “Prince   and   Minister”   also   shares   an   author   with  

“Agriculture   and   War”.729     One   passage   in   the   chapter   specifically   points   to   the  

importance  of  law  as  the  tool  to  evaluate  the  ruler’s  subjects’  merit.730     Again,  one  

of   the   crucial   elements   in   the   critique   of   the   rulers   of   the   day   in   “Prince   and  

Minister”  is  that  they  do  not  rely  on  the  law  enough  which  creates  a  state  culture  

that   is   not   based   on   merit,   what   individuals   do   rather   than   what   they   say   or   talk  

about.    A  culture  not  based  on  merit,  according  to  “Prince  and  Minister”,  results  in  

the  ultimate  demise  of  a  state:  the  ruler’s  subjects  not  engaging  in  agriculture  and  

war.    In  other  words,  Rong  again  saw  a  very  similar  emphasis  on  the  notion  of  unity  

yi  壹  in  the  “Agriculture  and  War”  chapter.731  

  Cheng   disagreed   with   Chen,   dating   the   chapter   at   a   much   later   period.     He  

explained  that  earlier  chapters,  like  “Agriculture  and  War”  criticize  Rujia  ideology  

much  more  generally,  attacking  ten  different  kinds  of  Rujia  ideas  that  could  harm  

                                                                                                               
729  Rong  1937:  103  
730  See  [XLIII.]  in  Appendix  II  
731  Rong  1937:  103  

  375  
the   state.     Other   chapters,   like   “Making   Orders   Strict”   or   “Policies”,   focus   on  

benevolence  and  proper  roles,  illustrating  that  the  opposition  to  Rujia  ideas   within  

Shang  Yang’s  intellectual  current  became  more  acute  and  specific,  indicating  a  later  

period   of   composition.     Along   this   same   line,   Cheng   placed   “Prince   and   Minister”   in  

an  even  later  period,  which  concentrates  almost  exclusively  on  the  notion  of  yi  義  

proper   roles,   in   their   criticism   of   Rujia   thought.     Therefore,   Cheng   dated   this  

chapter   around   the   time   Qin   Shihuangdi   unites   the   Chinese   empire,   around   221  

B.C.,   being   one   of   three   chapters   in   the   latest   period   of   Shang   Yang’s   intellectual  

current.732      

Zhang  also  argued  that  “Prince  and  Minister”  was  not  written  by  Shang  Yang  

himself.     He   added   that   it   could   not   have   been   written   shortly   after   Shang   Yang’s  

lifetime   either.     Due   to   its   smooth   style   of   writing,   variation   of   sentences,   skillful  

rhetoric,   and   forceful   expression,   he   dated   this   chapter   to   the   later   part   of   the  

Warring  States  period.    He  took  issue  with  Cheng’s  reasoning  in  dating  the  chapter  

because   he   does   not   view   his   assumption   that   the   evolution   of   the   relationship  

between   Shang   Yang’s   intellectual   current   and   the   Rujia   tradition   necessarily  

became   more   contentious   as   the   Warring   States   period   progressed.     In   addition,  

Jiang  Lihong  read  the  character  for  proper  roles  yi  義  as  having  been  a  corruption  

that  should  read  yi  儀,  meaning  appearance  or  etiquette,  which  is  not  considered  an  

important  concept  in  the  Rujia  anatomy  of  virtue.733      

                                                                                                               
732  Cheng  1987:  223  
733  Zhang  2008:  98-­‐99  

  376  
 This  study  adds  that  notion  of  history  in  “Prince  and  Minister”,  like  “Opening  

and   Debarring”   and   “Policies”,   suggests   it   was   written   in   the   later   part   of   the  

Warring  States  period.  The  opening  passage  in  the  chapter  presents  a  three-­‐tiered  

hierarchy  of  statecraft  in  its  description  of  the  different  time  periods  in  history.  734    

In  chronological  order,  they  are:  the  times  of  antiquity  gu  zhe  古者,  the  times  of  the  

sages,   and   present   day   jin  shi   今世.     It   criticizes   rulers   of   today   for   not   governing  

according   to   the   law,   while   praising   the   sages   of   the   past   for   their   understanding  

that  ruling  without  the  law,  the  five  kinds  of  officials,  and  the  position  of  prince  is  

essentially   impossible.     Recall   that   the   passage   asserts   that   no   one   can   effectively  

govern   a   populace   without   the   aforementioned   state   infrastructure,   not   even   a  

ruler  with  the  wisdom  of  Yao  and  Shun.    Since  the  infrastructure  of  the  state,  in  this  

passage,   is   the   indispensable   tool   in   governing   a   numerous   populace,   the   passage  

does   in   fact   imply   a   hierarchy   of   statecraft   in   which   the   statecraft   of   the   present  

times   must   necessarily   be   a   higher   form   of   statecraft   than   that   described   in   the  

days  of  antiquity.    However,  due  to  the  fact  that  the  statecraft  of  the  present  times  

does  not  adequately  accord  with  the  law,  it  is  necessarily  not  as  high  of  a  form  of  

statecraft   as   the   statecraft   represented   by   the   sages   of   the   past.     Therefore,   in  

descending   order,   the   hierarchy   of   statecraft   is   as   follows:   the   sages   of   the   past  

(representing  the  highest  form  of  statecraft),  the  rulers  of  the  present  day  (the  next  

highest   form   of   statecraft),   and   the   days   of   antiquity   (representing   the   lowest   form  

of   statecraft).     Due   to   this   hierarchy   of   statecraft,   expressed   in   the   beginning  

                                                                                                               
734  See  [XLIV.]  in  Appendix  II  

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passages   of   this   chapter,   this   study   concludes   that   it   must   have   been   written  

sometime  in  the  late  Warring  States  period.  

“Interdicts  and  Encouragements”  

Interestingly,  Chen  viewed  this  chapter  as  having  possibly  been  written  by  

Shang   Yang   himself,   though   he   did   admit   to   some   doubt.     On   the   surface,   the  

general   tone   of   the   opening   passage   in   “Interdicts   and   Encouragements”   does  

suggest   the   possibility   of   Shang   Yang’s   authorship. 735     Clearly   this   passage  

advocates   a   few   ideas   that   are   recurring   in   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang,   like   the  

application   of   rewards   and   punishments,   the   establishment   of   a   culture   of   merit,  

and  devoting  significant  attention  to  preventing  malfeasance.      

However,   there   are   two   aspects   of   the   passage   that   suggest   some   doubt   that  

it   was   written   by   Shang   Yang   himself.     First,   the   passage   is   not   necessarily   in  

accordance  with  the  thought  expressed  in  other  chapters  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang.    

For   instance,   the   passage   asserts   that   the   former   Kings   “did   not   rely   on   the  

establishment  of  good  faith  and  mutual  trust”  不恃其信.    This  suggests  a  different  

conception  of  good  faith  and  mutual  trust  xin  信  than  in  other  chapters,  particularly  

“The   Cultivation   of   Political   Assessment”.     In   “The   Cultivation   of   Political  

Assessment”,   the   notion   of   good   faith   and   mutual   trust   was   inseparable   from   a  

ruler’s  bestowal  of  rewards  and  application  of  punishment.736     In  short,  the  ruler’s  

establishment   and   appropriate   administration   of   rewards   and   punishments   was  

the   means   by   which   he   established   good   faith   and   mutual   trust.     However,   the  

                                                                                                               
735  See  [XLV.]  in  Appendix  II  
736  Lau  and  Chen  1992:  13/18/7-­‐9  

  378  
above   passage   conceives   of   the   application   of   rewards   and   punishments   and   the  

notion  of  good  faith  and  mutual  trust  much  more  independently.    In  other  words,  it  

imagines  a  scenario  in  which  the  ruler  can  put  emphasis  on,  or  rely  on  one  of  them,  

without  necessarily  putting  emphasis  on,  or  relying  on  the  other.      

Second,  the  passage  also  pointed  to  a  notion  of  authority  shi  勢.    In  another  

passage,  “Interdicts  and  Encouragements”  elaborates  even  further  on  the  notion  of  

authority.737     This  passage  reveals  a  few  aspects  of  what  this  chapter  is  defining  as  

authority.     In   one   aspect,   the   passage   argues   that   obtaining   authority   de  shi   得勢  

allows   the   ruler   to   achieve   perfection,   utilize   his   laws,   and   handle   things  

appropriately.      

Therefore,   in   another   aspect,   and   perhaps   most   importantly,   the   ruler  

obtaining  authority  causes  his  officials  to  become  incorruptible  because  he  will  be  

able  to  prevent  them  and  other  subjects  from  pursuing  private  profit  at  the  expense  

of   the   public   welfare.     This   is   reminiscent   of   the   idea   expressed   in   “An   Order   to  

Cultivate  Waste  Lands”.    One  of  the  ruler’s  primary  responsibilities  is  to  prevent  his  

subjects  from  engaging  in  pursuits  for  private  profit  that  do  not  also  benefit  what  

he   defines   as   the   public   welfare.     Through   his   administration   of   rewards   and  

punishments,  he  is  able  to  create  boundaries  that  clearly  demarcate  the  distinctions  

between   the   pursuits   for   private   profit   that   are   encouraged   and   those   that   are  

discouraged.      

The   passage   also   asserts   that   the   ruler’s   officials   have   authority   as   well.    

Then   this   must   mean   that   the   notion   of   authority   must   refer   to   an   individual’s  

                                                                                                               
737  See  [XLVI.]  in  Appendix  II  

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position   and   corresponding   responsibilities   within   the   state’s   organization   and  

hierarchy.     This   would   not   only   explain   how   officials   can   have   authority   of   their  

own,   but   also   why   the   ruler   obtaining   his   authority   causes   the   officials   to   not   be  

corrupt  in  their  own  authority,  as  the  ruler  is  at  the  top  of  the  state’s  organization  

and   hierarchy   of   authority.     It   is   difficult   to   say   with   any   degree   of   certainty  

whether  or  not  the  notion  of  authority  in  this  passage  is  the  same  as  that  expressed  

in  the  “Shenzi  fragments”.    Though,  it  does  seem  as  if  the  two  notions  are  similar.    

This   would   indicate   that   Shang   Yang   could   not   have   authored   this   passage   because  

if  Shen  Dao  (circa  395  –  315   B.C.)  actually  originated  the  concept,  then  it  is  difficult  

to  see  how  Shang  Yang  would  have  been  able  to  incorporate  it  into  his  writings.      

  Also,   Cheng   pointed   out   that   this   chapter   uses   metaphors   frequently.     No  

other   chapter   in   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang   uses   metaphors   so   frequently,   which  

essentially   eliminates   the   possibility   that   this   author   could   have   been   the   same  

author   as   other   chapters   in   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang.     Also,   along   with   Rong  

Zhaozu738,  he  considered  the  mentioning  of  assistants  to  the  prefects  cheng  丞  and  

superintendents  jian  監  as  strong  indications  that  this  chapter  was  written  during  

the  Qin  dynasty  because  they  appear  in  the  Han  shu  and  are  described  as  such.739    

Also,   Zhang   agreed   with   the   aforementioned   evidence,   concluding   that   this   chapter  

was  not  written  by  Shang  Yang.    He  argued  that  the  chapter  was  arguably  written  

around  the  time  of  Han  Fei,  adding  that  it  is  difficult  to  say  whether  this  chapter  is  

even  within  Shang  Yang’s  intellectual  current.740    

                                                                                                               
738  Rong  1937:  107-­‐108  
739  Cheng  1987:  179-­‐180  
740  Zhang  2008:  99-­‐100  

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“Attention  to  Law”  

Chen   Chi-­‐tien   saw   this   chapter   as   one   written   by   Shang   Yang   and   sent   to  

Duke   Xiao   as   a   memorial,   since   in   one   passage,   the   author   refers   to   himself   as  

minister  chen  臣.741  The  notion  of  relying  on  laws  as  a  means  of  governing  a  state  

is   at   the   very   heart   of   the   vision   found   in   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang.     Interestingly,  

immediately   after   this   passage   the   chapter   rather   abruptly   switches   topics   to   the  

importance  of  agriculture  and  war.742    Chen  acknowledged  the  seemingly  disjointed  

nature  of  the  chapter.    The  first  part  of  the  chapter  focuses  on  destroying  faction-­‐

building   and   perverse   individuals   with   law,   while   the   latter   part   of   the   chapter  

argues   how   agriculture   and   war   are   the   foundation   of   the   strength   of   a   state,  

specifically  describing  force  as  the  basis  of  conquering  other  states  (i.e.  developing  

the   state’s   wealth   and   strength)   and   the   ruler   becoming   revered   (i.e.   gaining  

immovable   devotion   from   his   subjects).     This   is   certainly   in   accordance   with   the  

description  of  Shang  Yang  in  the  Shiji’s  “Biography  of  Lord  Shang”  and  the  Xunzi’s  

“Debate   on   Military   Principles”,   both   of   which   connect   his   establishment   and  

maintenance   of   laws,   and   the   bond   between   the   ruler   and   his   subjects,   as   being  

dependent  upon  coercion.    So,  Chen  concludes  that  this  chapter  may  have  been  to  

have  been  originally  two  different  chapters  that  eventually  became  one  chapter.743      

Rong  also  pointed  out  that  “Attention  to  Law”  expresses  a  similar  emphasis  

on   agriculture   and   war.     This   led   Rong   to   conclude   that   it   and   “Agriculture   and  

                                                                                                               
741  Chen  1967:  134;  See  [XLVII.]  in  Appendix  II  
742  See  [XLVIII.]  in  Appendix  II  
743  Chen  1967:  134  

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War”   share   an   author. 744     This   study   adds   that   the   above   passage   makes   a  

distinction  between  a  Hegemon  and  true  Kingship.    This  is  a  feature  that  implies  a  

three-­‐tiered   hierarchy   of   statecraft   seen   in   other   chapters   in   the   Book   of   Lord  

Shang,  like  “Opening  and  Debarring”  and  “The  Elimination  of  Strength”,  along  with  

certain  chapters  in  both  the  Xunzi,  the  Guanzi,  and  the  Hanfeizi.    This  suggests  that  

“Attention   to   Law”   was   written   relatively   late   in   the   Warring   States   period   and,  

thus,  not  written  by  Shang  Yang  himself.  745  

Cheng  viewed  this  chapter  as  similar  to  “Prince  and  Minister”  in  its  attack  on  

Rujia   ideas.     Like   “Making   Orders   Strict”   and   “Policies”,   it   focuses   on   the   Rujia  

notions   of   benevolence   and   proper   roles,   leading   him   to   date   “Attention   to   Law”  

slightly   earlier   than   “Prince   and   Minister”,   but   slightly   later   than   “Making   Orders  

Strict”  and  “Policies”.    Second,  the  last  passage  of  the  chapter  mentions  the  phrase  

“within   the   borders”   jing  nei   境內 (and   also   “outside   the   borders”   jing  wai   境外).    

This   is   particularly   noteworthy   considering   the   above   passage’s   context,   which  

describes   state   specific   policies   that   will   concentrate   the   ruler’s   subjects’   efforts   on  

agriculture  and  war.  According  to  Cheng,  the  use  of  jing  nei  境內 to  describe  “within  

the   border”   indicates   that   the   passage   must   have   been   written   before   the   Qin  

unification   in   221   B.C.     Third,   this   chapter   refers   to   teachings,   in   addition   to  

discussing   rewards   and   punishments.     A   concern   for   “teachings”   or   another  

emphasis   outside   of   rewards   and   punishments   is similar   to   the   conception   of   the  

                                                                                                               
744  Rong  1937:  103-­‐104;  See  [XLVIII.]  in  Appendix  II  
745  The  chapter  “Discussion  about  the  People”  should  also  be  considered  as  a  chapter  written  late  in  

the  Warring  States  period  as  well.  

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unification   of   education   in   “Rewards   and   Punishments”,   which   Cheng   also   dated  

relatively  late.746      

Zhang   also   viewed   this   chapter   as   having   been   written   relatively   late   and  

therefore  not  by  Shang  Yang  himself.    Though  he  generally  disagrees  with  Cheng’s  

reasoning,   he   did   argue   that   this   chapter   represents   the   most   intense   opposition   to  

the   concept   of   the   worthy   xian   賢   in   the   Book  of  Lord  Shang.     Admitting   that   this  

chapter   arguably   reveals   its   time   period   the   least,   he   views   it   as   having   been  

written   relatively   late   because   its   structure   is   tight   while   the   style   of   writing   is  

smooth  and  coherent,  relative  to  earlier  chapters.747    

“The  Fixing  of  Rights  and  Duties”  

Both  Chen  Chi-­‐tien748  and  Gao  Heng749  did  not  consider  this  chapter  to  have  

been  written  by  Shang  Yang  himself  for  one  main  reason.    A  passage  in  this  chapter,  

like   “Interdicts   and   Encouragements”,   includes   two   kinds   of   government   officials  

by  their  titles:  Assistant  to  the  Prefect  cheng  xiang  丞相  and  the  Officer  of  Plans  and  

Documents   yu   shi   御史.  750     Cheng   Liang-­‐shu   and   Rong   Zhaozu   came   to   similar  

conclusions.    Cheng  argued  that  the  reference  to  other  positions  like  the  Officer  of  

Plans  and  Documents  yu  shi  御史,  tai  guan  泰官,  and  lords  of  fiefs  zhu  hou  諸侯  in  

conjunction   with   the   notion   of   prefectures   and   sub-­‐prefectures   jun   xian   郡縣,  

strongly  indicates  the  author  is  of  a  period  after  the  unification  of  the  Qin  empire.    

He   added   that   the   notions   of   using   laws   as   teachings   yi   fa   wei   jiao   以法為教 and  
                                                                                                               
746  Cheng  1987:  222  
747  Zhang  2009:  99  
748  Chen  1967:  134-­‐135  
749  Gao  2011:  21  
750  See  [XLIX.]  in  Appendix  II  

  383  
using   officials   as   teachers   yi  li  wei  shi   以吏為師   also   suggest   that   the   chapter   was  

written   after   the   Qin   unification.     Also,   while   chapters   in   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang  

typically  refer  to  both  states   guo  國  and  all  under  heaven  tian  xia  天下,  this  chapter  

only   refers   to   the   notion   of   all   under   Heaven,   implying   it   was   written   during   a   time  

when  China  was  already  unified.751     Rong  even  suggested  that  the  aforementioned  

passage’s  usage  of  the  term  Son  of  Heaven  tian  zi  天子,  as  opposed  to  the  term  King  

wang  王  which  was  more  common  during  the  Warring  States  period,  suggests  that  

this   chapter   was   written   after   Qin’s   territorial   unification.     As   a   result,   Rong  

speculated  that  the  chapter  may  have  been  written  in  early  Han  times  because  the  

Han  Shu  mentions  these  positions  as  Qin  dynasty  positions.752    

Zhang   agreed,   arguing   that   “The   Fixing   of   Rights   and   Duties”   is   clearly  

another   attempted   narration   of   Shang   Yang’s   affairs   by   a   later   intellectual  

descendant,   as   the   official   titles   cited   in   the   chapter   suggest.     However,   unlike  

Cheng,   he   did   not   view   the   above   notions—of   of   using   laws   as   teachings   or   using  

officials   as   teachers—as   sufficient   evidence   that   it   was   written   after   the   Qin  

unification.  Rather,  he  argued  that  these  notions  could  be  interpreted  as  products  

of  the  evolution  of  Shang  Yang’s  early  emphasis  on  the  clarity  of  law.753  

Another   interesting   similarity   between   “The   Fixing   of   Rights   and   Duties”  

and   “Interdicts   and   Encouragements”   is   the   use   of   the   notion   of   authority   shi   勢.   In  

one   passage   in   “The   Fixing   of   Rights   and   Duties”,   differently   from   “Interdicts   and  

                                                                                                               
751  Cheng  1987:  187-­‐201  
752  Rong  1937:  80-­‐84  
753  See  Zhang  2008:  73-­‐76  

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Encouragements”,   it   uses   the   character   shi   勢   in   two   different   ways.754     The   first  

way   appears   to   be   inseparable   from   the   notion   of   making   the   division   of   names  

definitive.     The   passage   insists   that   the   division   of   names   being   definitive   is   of   vital  

importance.    When  the  division  of  names  is  not  definitive,  even  the  greatest  model  

of  outstanding  moral  quality,  like  Yao  and  Shun,  are  crooked  or  will  appear  crooked  

because  of  the  lack  of  clarity  in  the  division  of  names.    Also,  perversion  and  evil  will  

arise,  the  ruler  will  lose  his  shi  勢  and  awesomeness,  and  this  will  lead  to  state  ruin.    

So,   in   this   case   it   is   clear   that   the   notion   of   shi   勢   refers   to   authority   because   the  

division  of  names  not  being  definitive  is  characterized  as  a  cause  of  the  ruler  losing  

his  shi  勢.    

Authority  itself  is  a  relative  concept.    The  ruler’s  authority  is  distinguished  

by   its   entitlement   and   privilege   relative   to   his   subjects.     Therefore,   a   ruler   can   only  

lose  entitlement  and  privilege  in  one  of  four  ways:  1)  his  death;  2)  there  is  a  lack  of  

clarity  or  outright  rejection  of  the  system  or  form  of  organization  that  entitles  him  

to   it;   3)   there   is   a   lack   of   clarity   or   outright   rejection   of   the   position   and/or   its  

entitlement  and  privilege  within  the  system  or  form  of  organization  within  which  it  

exists;  or  4)  a  similar  attitude  towards  the  individual  to  fulfill  the  position  of  ruler  

that  necessarily  includes  entitlement  and  privilege  relative  to  his  subjects.    So,  if  the  

division   of   names   can   necessarily   cause   one   of   the   aforementioned   four  

possibilities,   then   it   must   necessarily   refer   to   a   division   of   authority   and  

corresponding  entitlements  and  privileges  within  the  state’s  hierarchy.    Therefore,  

confusion   about   the   correct   division   of   authority   and   the   corresponding  

                                                                                                               
754  See  [L.]  in  Appendix  II  

  385  
entitlements   and   privileges   would   necessarily   cause   the   ruler   to   lose   his  

entitlement,   privilege,   and   authority.     As   previously   mentioned,   the   use   of   the  

notion  of  authority  in  this  way  suggests  that  this  chapter  was  written  at  a  relatively  

late   period,   long   after   Shang   Yang’s   death.     Interestingly   though,   the   above   passage  

also   uses   the   character   shi   勢   to   refer   to   a   tendency   or   inclination   towards   a  

particular  action,  unlike  its  use  in  “Interdicts  and  Encouragements”.    However,  this  

usage  can  be  seen  as  early  as  the  4th  century  B.C.  in  texts  like  Sunzi  bing  fa  孫子兵法.  

Conclusion:  Questioning  “Authenticity”  

Although   this   appendix   devotes   significant   attention   to   the   Chinese   debate  

on   the   dating   of   the   different   chapters   in   the   Book   of   Lord   Shang,   it   should   be  

pointed   out   that   their   approach   should   be   understood   within   the   context   of   the  

brief   discussion   on   ancient   Chinese   authorship   in   the   introduction.     This   is   for  

several   reasons.     First,   these   scholars   have   used   what   they   determine   to   be  

historical   facts   about   Shang   Yang,   his   life,   and   his   reform,   as   important   criteria   in  

determining  whether  a  particular  chapter  is  “authentic”  or  not.    This  is  an  approach  

to  determining  authorship  that  Li  Ling  called  the  “distinguishing  forgeries”755  bian  

wei  xue  辨偽學  approach.    This  is  a  less  than  completely  fair  paradigm  within  which  

to   evaluate   ancient   Chinese   texts,   Shang   Yang’s   thought,   or   even   the   ideas   in   the  

Book  of  Lord  Shang.     As   previously   mentioned,   works   like   the   Book  of  Lord  Shang  

were   a   product   of   textual   traditions   that   transmitted   them   through   time   making  

changes  as  the  tradition  saw  fit.  

                                                                                                               
755  Li  1998:  22  

  386  
 This  is  not  to  say  that  Shang  Yang’s  life  and  his  reforms  are  irrelevant  or  not  

an  important  sources  with  which  to  use  in  the  dating  process.    This  is  merely  to  say  

that   a   methodology   that   relies   on   them   exclusively   or   too   heavily   is   incomplete.  

This   is   for   at   least   two   reasons.     The   first,   as   previously   mentioned,   is   that   Shang  

Yang   may   not   have   had   much   to   do   with   the   creation   or   the   development   of   the  

textual  tradition  in  his  namesake.    Shang  Yang’s  textual  tradition  probably  formed  

long   after   his   death,   suggesting   that   the   works   in   his   name   were   composed   by  

individuals   who   had   little   connection   to   Shang   Yang’s   actual   thought   or   ideology.    

The  second  reason  is  that,  even  if  Shang  Yang  was  very  involved  in  the  creation  of  a  

textual   tradition   dedicated   to   expounding   on   his   thought,   theory   is   very   different  

than   practice.     In   other   words,   the   ideals   of   statesmen   may   not   be   reflected   in   their  

policies,   whether   it   be   for   reasons   of   political   expediency,   political   feasibility,   or  

even  unpopularity.    

Still,   the   exercise   of   determining   whether   a   chapter   is   “authentic”   or   a  

“forgery”   imposes   a   less   than   completely   fair   notion   of   authorship   onto   ancient  

Chinese  texts.    As  the  introduction  previously  mentioned,  the  notion  of  authorship  

in  ancient  China  was  not  limited  to  one  or  more  persons  who  composed  the  actual  

content.     It   also   included   adding   and   subtracting,   rearranging,   and   compiling  

content.    Therefore,  it  is  almost  useless  to  label  various  parts  of  a  collection  of  texts  

“authentic”  or  “forged”  because  almost  all  received  texts  from  ancient  China  are  the  

result  of  numerous  changes  over  many  centuries  made  by  a  multitude  of  authors.    

Accordingly,   Li   Ling   insisted   that   we   call   the   study   of   these   texts   one   of   the  

  387  
“chronology”   of   the   development   of   textual   traditions   rather   than   one   of  

“differentiation”  between  the  authentic  and  forged.756    

It   should   additionally   be   pointed   out   that   the   aforementioned   Chinese  

scholars   treated   what   they   determined   to   be   Shang   Yang’s   thought   as   though   it  

would   have   remained   static   through   time.     In   other   words,   their   methods   to  

determine   authenticity   frequently   penalized   chapters—labeling   them   forgeries—

simply   because   their   thought   advocated   different   policies.     However,   it   is   not  

particularly  reasonable  to  suggest  that  Shang  Yang’s  policies  and  thought  may  not  

have   changed   in   a   different   time   or   under   different   circumstances.     In   fact,   the  

notion   of   adapting   to   different   times   and   circumstances   is   reiterated   within   the  

Book  of  Lord  Shang   as   one   of   the   most   important   aspects   in   a   ruler’s   approach   to  

governance.     Thus,   treating   Shang   Yang’s   policies   and   thought   as   static,   unchanging  

standards  by  which  to  judge  chapters  in  the  Book  of  Lord  Shang,  engages  in  the  very  

exercise  the  texts  repeatedly  criticize.    Nevertheless,  the  Chinese  academic  debate  

does   provide   a   useful   foundation   from   which   other   methods   can   build   upon.  

                                                                                                               
756  Li  1998:  22-­‐23;  See  Li  Ling  李零.  “Chu  tu  fa  xian  yu  gu  shu  nian  dai  de  zai  ren  shi”  出土發現與古

書年代的再認識  in  Zi  xuan  ji  自選集.  Guilin  桂林:  Guang  xi  shi  fan  da  xue  chu  ban  she  廣西師範大學
出版社,  1998.  

  388  
 Appendix  II  
 
 
 
 
The  chapters  of  Book  of  Lord  Shang  as  they  appear  in  J.J.L.  Duyvendak’s  
translation  
Chapter   Page  Numbers  
“The  Reform  of  the  Law”   p.  167  
“An  Order  to  Cultivate  Waste  Lands”   p.  175  
“Agriculture  and  War”   p.  185  
“The  Elimination  of  Strength”   p.  196  
“Discussion  about  the  People”   p.  206  
“The  Calculation  of  Land”   p.  214  
“Opening  and  Debarring”   p.  225  
“The  Unification  of  Words”   p.  234  
“Establishing  Laws”   p.  238  
“The  Method  of  Warfare”   p.  244  
“The  Establishment  of  Fundamentals”   p.  247  
“Military  Defense”   p.  248  
“Making  Orders  Strict”   p.  252  
“The  Cultivation  of  Political  Assessment”   p.  260  
“The  Encouragement  of  Immigration”   p.  266  
“Rewards  and  Punishments”   p.  274  
“Policies”   p.  284  
“Within  the  Borders”   p.  295  
“Weakening  the  People”   p.  303  
“External  and  Internal  Affairs”   p.  311  
“Prince  and  Minister”   p.  314  
“Interdicts  and  Encouragements”   p.  318  
“Attention  to  Law”   p.  322  
“The  Fixing  of  Rights  of  Duties”   p.  327  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

  389  
“The  Reform  of  the  Law”  
 
I. (“The   Reform   of   the   Law”)   In   inheriting   the   position   of   prince,   one   must   not  
forget   the   importance   of   the   altars   of   spirit   and   grain.     This   is   the   way   of   the  
prince.    Implementing  laws  and  serving  the  people  and  their  superior  is  the  
responsibility   of   the   minister.     Now,   I   wish   to   reform   laws   in   order   to  
properly   govern   and   reform   ritual   in   order   to   teach   the   people,   but   I   fear   all  
under  Heaven  will  criticize  me.757      
II. (“The  Reform  of  the  Law”)  Gongsun  Yang  says:  I  have  heard  it  said  that  one  
who   hesitates   in   action,   will   not   accomplish   anything.   One   who   handles  
affairs   nonchalantly   will   not   achieve   results.     Your   Majesty   should   quickly  
put   his   mind   to   reform   without   being   afraid   of   criticism   from   all   under  
Heaven.     One   who   conducts   himself   relatively   extraordinarily,   always  
receives   ridicule   from   the   world.     Those   with   thoughts   of   independent  
wisdom   are   necessarily   despised   by   the   world.     It   is   said:   ‘Ignorant   people  
complete   their   affairs   with   no   understanding   of   them,   while   wise   persons  
see  signs  before  anything  sprouts.’    Do  not  inquire  with  or  bring  forth  new  
ideas   regarding   the   state’s   affairs   to   the   ordinary   masses,   one   can   only  
celebrate   achievements   after   their   completion.   [The   law   of   Guo   Yan   says:  
‘Those   who   discuss   lofty   virtue   need   not   echo   popular   understanding.    
Those  whose  achievements  are  great  need  not  consult  with  the  multitudes.’]  
Law  is  that  which  is  used  to  love  the  people.  Ritual  is  that  which  is  used  to  
better  handle  affairs.    Therefore  a  sage  is  able  to  make  the  state  strong  and  
prosperous   so   long   as   he   does   not   model   after   antiquity.     He   benefits   the  
people  so  long  as  he  does  not  follow  the  ritual  of  antiquity.    Duke  Xiao  said:  
Great!758  
III. (“The   Reform   of   the   Law”)   Gongsun   Yang   says:   Your   words   are   that   of   an  
ordinary   person’s.     Ordinary   people   generally   hold   fast   to   custom,   and  
students  generally  are  limited  to  what  they  see  and  hear.    These  two  kinds  of  
people   can   fill   an   office,   preserving   the   law,   but   we   would   be   unable   to  
discuss   matters   outside   of   the   law   with   them.     The   three   dynasties   had  
different   systems   of   ritual   and   they   all   achieved   true   Kingship.     The   Five  
Hegemons   all   had   different   systems   of   laws   and   they   all   became   true  
Hegemons.    Therefore  the  wise  makes  laws  and  the  ignorant  are  regulated  
[by   them,   receiving   law].     The   worthy   reform   ritual   and   the   unworthies  
(ordinary   people)   are   restricted   [by   them,   receiving   ritual].     We   cannot  
engage   in   discussion   about   important   matters   with   those   that   are   restricted  

                                                                                                               
757  君曰：代立不忘社稷，君之道也。錯法務（民）「明」主（張）「長」，臣之行也。今吾欲變

法以治，更禮以教百姓，恐天下之議我也。(Gao  2011:  27)  

758  公孫鞅曰：“臣聞之，疑行無（成）「名」。疑事無功。君亟定變法之慮，殆無顧天下之議之

也。且夫有高人之行者，固見負於世。有獨知之慮者，心見驁於世。 語曰：‘愚者闇於成事。知
者見於未萌。民不可與慮始，而可與樂成。’郭偃之法曰：‘論至德者不和於俗。成大功者不謀
於眾。’法者所以愛民也。禮者所以便事也。是以聖人苟可以彊國，不法其故；苟可以利民，不
循於禮。” 孝公曰：善！(Gao  2011:  27)  

  390  
 by   ritual.     We   cannot   engage   in   discussion   about   important   matters   with  
those  that  are  regulated  by  laws.    My  Lord,  do  not  be  uncertain  about  this.759      
IV. (“The   Reform   of   the   Law”)   Gongsun   Yang   says:   “Previous   generations   did  
not   follow   the   same   teachings,   so   how   can   we   follow   the   example   of   the  
ancients?    Emperors  and  Kings  did  not  follow  one  another,  so  why  hold  fast  
to  their  rituals?    Fu  Xi  and  Shen  Nong  both  instructed  their  people  but  did  
not  kill  any  of  them.    Huang  Di,  Yao,  and  Shun  killed  their  people  but  it  did  
not   provoke   anger   [,   not   being   excessive].     King   Wen   and   King   Wu   each  
responded   to   the   circumstances   of   the   time,   establishing   laws.     Based   on  
actual   circumstances,   they   formulated   a   system   of   ritual.   Rituals   and   law  
were   both   formulated   based   on   the   times.     Commands   should   accord   with  
actual   demand   [of   the   times   and   circumstances].     Weapons,   armor,   and  
other  implements  were  all  practical.    Therefore,  I  say:  ‘There  isn’t  only  one  
way  to  govern  the  people.    For  the  sake  of  state  profit,  one  needs  not  follow  
the  example  of  the  ancients.’  The  rise  of  Tang  of  the  Shang  Dynasty  and  Wu  
of   the   Zhou   Dynasty   was   precisely   due   to   the   fact   that   they   did   not   hold   fast  
to  the  methods  of  the  ancients.  The  demise  of  Yin  of  the  Shang  Dynasty  and  
Jie  of  the  Xia  Dynasty  was  precisely  due  to  the  fact  that  they  did  not  reform  
old   rituals.     It   being   like   this,   those   who   overturn   methods   of   the   ancients,  
should   necessarily   be   rejected.     Those   who   hold   fast   to   old   ritual,   do   not  
necessarily  merit  praise.    My  Lord,  do  not  be  uncertain  about  this.760  
 
“Agriculture  and  War”  
 
V. (“Agriculture   and   War”)   As   for   one   who   is   skilled   at   administering   a   state,  
although   the   granaries   are   full,   they   do   not   relax   on   agricultural  
[production].    Though  the  state  is  large  and  the  people  are  numerous,  they  
are  not  misled  by  prattle.  It  being  like  this,  the  people  are  simple  and  single-­‐
minded.    If  the  people  are  simple  and  single-­‐minded,  they  are  unable  to  use  
perversion  and  prattle  as  means  to  obtain  office  and  rank,  and  the  perverse  
cannot   emerge.     If   the   perverse   cannot   emerge,   then   the   ruler   cannot   be  
misled.    Nowadays,  the  people  in  the  state  and  those  of  office  and  rank  see  
that   clever   prattle   and   debate   can   be   used   to   obtain   office   and   rank.    
Consequently,   office   and   rank   is   not   bestowed   routinely,   and   because   of   this  
they   go   to   court   and   ingratiate   themselves   with   their   ruler,   then   return  
home   only   to   think   about   how   to   profit   themselves   and   not   the   state,   for   the  
sake   of   rank   and   emoluments.     Subordinates   sell   away   their   ruler’s   power,  
                                                                                                               
759  公孫鞅曰：“子之所言，世俗之言也。夫常人安於故習，學者溺於所聞。此兩者所以居官而守

法，非所與論於法之外也。三代不同禮而王；五霸不同法而霸。故知者作法，而愚者制焉。賢者
更禮，而不肖者拘焉。拘禮之人不足與言事，制法之人不足與論變，君無疑矣。”  (Gao  2011:  29)    
760  公孫鞅曰：“前世不同教，何古之法？帝王不相復，何禮之循？伏羲，神農教而不誅。黃帝，

堯，舜誅而不怒。及至文，武，各當時而立法，因事而制禮。禮法以時而定。制令各順其宜。兵
甲器備，各便其用。臣故曰：治世不一道。便國不必法古。湯，武之王也，不（脩）「循」古而
興。殷，夏之滅也，不易禮而亡。然則反古者未必可非，循禮者未足多（是）也。君無疑矣。”  
(Gao  2011:  30)  

  391  
 which   is   not   emblematic   of   a   loyal   minister,   and   this   will   be   done   in   the  
pursuit   of   wealth.     Therefore   lower   government   officials   hope   to   be  
promoted   saying:   ‘So   long   as   my   wealth   is   abundant,   I   can   hope   to   be   a   high  
official.’   They   also   say:   ‘If   I   don’t   use   wealth   to   serve   my   superiors   and   hope  
to  be  promoted,  then  this  is  like  using  a  cat  to  attract  a  mouse.    There  is  no  
hope   for   this.     If   I   use   loyalty   in   serving   my   superiors   and   request   to   be  
promoted,  this  is  like  having  a  broken  rope  and  wanting  to  climb  a  crooked  
tree.    This  is  even  more  hopeless.    Since  these  two  methods  cannot  be  used  
to   obtain   office,   then   how   can   I   not   cause   subordinates   to   not   harass   the  
masses,  extort  state  wealth,  and  use  presents  in  serving  their  superiors?’761  
VI. (“Agriculture  and  War”)  When  the  state  is  in  peril,  the  ruler  is  worried,  and  
prattlers,  though  they  line  the  troops  up,  they  provide  absolutely  no  benefit  
to  the  state’s  safety  from  danger.    As  for  the  state’s  peril,  the  reason  the  ruler  
is  worried  is  due  to  there  being  strong  and  large  enemy  states.    If  the  ruler  is  
unable   to   conquer   the   enemy   state,   and   the   enemy   has   penetrated   state  
borders,  then  he  must  guard  his  facilities,  examine  the  topographical  factors,  
concentrate   on   the   people’s   strength,   and   deal   with   external   affairs   and  
incidents.     Only   then   can   he   eliminate   suffering   and   achieve   true   kingship.    
So   a   clear-­‐sighted   ruler   improves   his   governance,   implements   uniformity,  
eliminates   the   useless,   blocks   the   prattling   scholars   and   those   engaged   in  
frivolous   pursuits,   causing   them   to   be   concentrated   on   agriculture.     Only  
then   can   the   state   enrich   itself   and   the   people’s   strength   can   be  
consolidated.762  
VII. (“Agriculture  and  War”)  If  a  state  has  the  following  ten  things:  The  Book  of  
Odes,   Book   of   History,   ritual,   music,   goodness,   the   cultivation   of   virtue,  
benevolence,   integrity,   sophistry,   wisdom,   the   ruler   has   no   one   to   employ  
for   the   defense   of   [state]   territory   and   in   warfare.     If   the   state   uses   the  
aforementioned   ten   things   to   govern,   then   when   enemy   states   invade,   the  
state  will  necessarily  be  dismembered.    If  enemy  states  did  not  invade,  the  
state   will   necessarily   be   poor.     If   the   state   abolishes   these   ten   things,   then  
enemy   states   will   not   dare   invade.     If   an   enemy   state   does   invade,   it   will  
necessarily   retreat   in   defeat.   When   the   state   sends   out   its   army   to   attack  
other  states,  it  will  necessarily  obtain  territories,  and  upon  obtainment,  the  
state   will   necessarily   maintain   them.     If   the   state   does   not   send   out   its   army  
to  attack  other  states,  it  will  necessarily  be  wealthy.    A  state  that  is  fond  of  

                                                                                                               
761  善為國者，倉廩雖滿，不偷於農，國大民眾，不淫於言，則民樸壹。民樸壹，則官爵不可巧而

取也。不可巧取，則姦不生。姦不生，則主不惑。 今境內之民及處官爵者，見朝廷之可以巧言辯
說取官爵也，故官爵不可得而常也。是故進則曲主，退則慮私所以實其私，然則下賣權矣。夫曲
主慮私，非國利也，而為之者，以其爵祿也。下賣權，非忠臣也，而為之者，以末貨也。 然則下
官之冀遷者，皆曰：“多貨，則上官可得而欲也。”曰：“我不以貨事上而求遷者，則如以狸餌
鼠爾，必不冀矣。若以情事上而求遷者，則如引諸絕繩而求乘枉木也，愈不冀之矣，二者不可以
得遷，則我焉得無下動眾取貨以事上，而以求遷乎？”(Gao  2011:  46-­‐47)    
762  國危主憂，說者成伍，無益於安危也。夫國危主憂也者，彊敵大國也。人君不能服彊敵，破大

國也，則修守備，便地形，摶民力，以待外事，然後患可以去，而王可致也。是以明君修政作壹
，去無用，止浮學事淫之民，壹之農，然後國家可富，而民力可摶也。(Gao  2011:  51)    

  392  
 force  attacks  with  what  is  difficult.    When  it  attacks  with  what  is  difficult,  it  
will  necessarily  be  prosperous.    A  state  that  is  fond  of  sophistry  attacks  with  
what   is   easy.     When   it   attacks   with   what   is   easy,   it   will   necessarily   be   in  
danger.     Therefore,   as   for   sages   and   clear-­‐sighted   rulers,   it   is   not   the   case  
that   they   understand   the   ten   thousand   things.     It   is   simply   that   they   know  
what   is   essential   in   things.     In   their   administration   of   states,   it   is   only   that  
they  investigate  the  essence  of  things  and  that  is  all…A  state  that  establishes  
uniformity   for   a   year   will   yield   ten   years   of   prosperity.     Establishing  
uniformity  for  ten  years,  a  state  will  yield  one  hundred  years  of  prosperity.    
Establishing  uniformity  for  one  hundred  years,  a  state  will  be  able  to  achieve  
true  Kingship.”763  
VIII. (“Elimination   of   Strength”)“If   the   state   has   the   following   ten   things:   ritual,  
music,   Book   of   Odes,   Book   of   History,   goodness,   cultivation   of   virtue,   filial  
piety,   brotherly   love,   integrity,   sophistry,   then   the   ruler   will   not   be   able   to  
employ   his   subjects   in   warfare   and   the   state   will   necessarily   be  
dismembered,   reaching   the   point   of   extinction.     If   the   state   lacks   the  
aforementioned  ten  things,  then  the  ruler  will  be  able  to  employ  his  subjects  
in  warfare  and  the  state  will  necessarily  prosper,  reaching  the  point  of  true  
Kingship.     If   a   state   uses   those   who   exemplify   goodness   to   govern   the  
perverse,   then   there   will   necessarily   be   chaos,   reaching   the   point   of  
dismemberment.     If   the   state   uses   the   perverse   to   govern   those   who  
exemplify   goodness,   then   there   will   necessarily   be   order,   reaching   the   point  
of  strength.    If  the  state  uses  the  Book  of  Odes,  Book  of  History,  ritual,  music,  
filial  piety,  brotherly  love,  goodness,  and  the  cultivation  of  virtue  to  govern,  
then  when  enemy  states  invade,  they  will  necessarily  dismember  the  state.    
If  enemy  states  do  not  invade,  the  state  will  necessarily  be  poor.  If  the  state  
does  not  use  the  aforementioned  eight  things  to  govern,  then  enemy  states  
will  not  dare  invade,  and  even  if  they  do  invade,  they  will  necessarily  retreat  
in   defeat.     When   the   state   sends   out   its   army   to   attack   other   states,   it   will  
necessarily   obtain   territories,   and   upon   obtainment,   the   state   will  
necessarily  maintain  them.    If  the  state  does  not  send  out  its  army  to  attack  
other   states,   it   will   necessarily   be   wealthy.     A   state   that   is   fond   of   force   is  
said  to  attack  with  what  is  difficult.    A  state  that  is  fond  of  words  is  said  to  
attack  with  what  is  easy.    A  state  that  attacks  with  what  is  difficult  employs  
one   to   gain   ten,   while   a   state   that   attacks   with   what   is   easy   employs   ten   and  
loses  one  hundred…A  state  that  establishes  uniformity  for  a  year  will  yield  
ten   years   of   prosperity.     Establishing   uniformity   for   ten   years,   a   state   will  
yield   one   hundred   years   of   prosperity.     Establishing   uniformity   for   one  
hundred  years,  a  state  will  be  able  to  achieve  true  Kingship.”764  
                                                                                                               
763  《詩》，《書》，禮，樂，善，修，仁，廉，辯，慧，國有十者，上無使守戰。國以十者治，

敵至必削；不至必貧。國去此十者，敵不敢至；雖至必卻；興兵而伐，必取；按兵不伐，必富。
國好力者以難攻，以難攻者必興；好辯者以易攻，以易攻者必危。。。 國作壹一歲者，十歲彊；
作壹十歲者，百歲彊；作壹百歲者，千歲彊，千歲彊者王。(Gao  2011:  49-­‐51)    
764  國有禮有樂，有《詩》有《書》，有善有修，有孝有弟，有廉有辯。國有十者，上無使戰，必

削至亡；國無十者，上有使戰，必興至王。國以善民治姦民者，必亂，至削；國以姦民治善民者

  393  
  
“Elimination  of  Strength”  
 
IX. (“Elimination  of  Strength”)  If  the  people  become  strong  in  order  to  eliminate  
the   violators   of   the   law   who   are   strong,   then   the   state   is   necessarily   weak.   If  
the  people  become  weak  in  order  to  eliminate  the  violators  of  the  law  who  
are   strong,   then   the   state   is   necessarily   strong.     If   the   state   practices  
goodness,   the   perverse   will   necessarily   be   in   abundance.     If   a   state   is  
wealthy   and   governs   as   if   it   is   poor,   then   the   state   will   be   doubly   wealthy.    
The   doubly   wealthy   are   strong.     If   a   state   is   poor   and   governs   as   if   it   is  
wealthy,  then  the  state  will  be  doubly  poor.    The  doubly  poor  are  weak.    If  
the   state’s   army   does   what   enemy   states   dare   not   to   do,   then   the   state   is  
necessarily  strong.    If  affairs  in  the  state  prosper  in  which  an  enemy  state  is  
ashamed   to   perform,   then   the   state   will   necessarily   profit.     A   ruler’s   own  
calculations  value  many  changes,  while  a  state’s  system  of  laws  values  few  
changes.    If  a  state’s  resources  are  few,  it  will  necessarily  be  dismembered.    
If  a  state’s  resources  are  abundant,  it  is  necessarily  strong.    If  there  is  a  state  
of   one   thousand   chariots,   guards   at   the   side   of   its   ten   thousand   resources,   it  
will   necessarily   be   strong.     If   it   guards   at   the   side   of   its   one   thousand  
resources,  it  will  necessarily  be  weak.    If  in  entering  battle,  soldiers  are  in  an  
organized   formation   and   go   out   and   exert   themselves,   the   state   is  
necessarily  strong.  If  in  entering  battle,  soldiers  are  chaotic  and  bewildered  
and  go  out  with  indolence,  the  state  is  necessarily  weak.765  
X. (“Weakening   the   People”)   If   the   people   are   weak,   then   the   state   is   strong.     If  
the   state   is   strong,   then   the   people   are   weak.     Therefore,   a   state   with   the  
Way  (of  laws)  exerts  itself  to  weaken  the  people.    If  the  people  are  simple,  
the   state   becomes   strong.     If   the   people   engage   in   illicit   affairs,   the   state  
becomes   weak.     If   the   people   are   simple,   then   this   is   sufficient   to   preserve  
laws.   If   the   people   engage   in   illicit   affairs,   then   they   will   pursue   their   own  
ends.     If   the   people   are   weak,   then   they   can   be   employed.     If   the   people  
pursue   their   own   ends,   then   they   become   strong.     Therefore   it   is   said:   ‘If   the  
people   become   strong   in   order   to   eliminate   the   violators   of   the   law   who   are  
strong,   then   the   state   is   necessarily   weak.   If   the   people   become   weak   in  
order  to  eliminate  the  violators  of  the  law  who  are  strong,  then  the  state  is  
necessarily  strong.’766  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
，必治，至彊。國用《詩》，《書》，禮，樂，孝，弟，善，修治者，敵至必削國，不至必貧；
國不用八者治，敵不敢至，雖至必卻，興兵而伐必取，取必能有之，按兵而不攻必富。國好力，
日以難攻；國好言，日以易攻，國以難攻者，起一得十；以易攻者，出十亡百。。。國作壹一歲
者，十歲彊；作壹十歲，百歲彊；作壹百歲，千歲彊，千歲彊者王。威以一取十，以聲取實，故
能為威者王。(Gao  2011:  58-­‐60)    
765  以彊去彊者弱。以弱去彊者強。國為善，姦必多。國富而貧治，曰重富，重富者彊。國貧而富

治，曰重貧，重貧者弱。兵行敵所不敢行彊。事興敵所羞為，利。主貴多變。國貴少變。國多物
，削。主少物，彊。千乘之國守千物者削。戰事兵用曰彊。戰亂兵息而國削。(Gao  2011:  55)  
766  民弱國彊；民強國弱。故有道之國，務在弱民。樸則彊；淫則弱。弱則軌；淫則越志。弱則有

用；越志則彊。故曰：以彊去彊者，弱；以弱去彊者，彊。(Gao  2011:  165)    

  394  
 XI. (“Discussion   about   the   People”)   Sophists   and   the   ostentatiously   intelligent  
are   the   aid   for   chaotic   affairs.     Ritual   and   music   are   the   evidence   of  
licentiousness   and   laziness.     Kindness   and   benevolence   are   the   mothers   of  
transgression.     Employment   and   promotion   are   the   rat   holes   for   the  
perverse.     If   chaotic   affairs   are   aided,   they   create   uproar.     If   licentiousness  
and   laziness   evident,   then   they   become   [accepted]   practice.     If  
transgressions   have   a   mother,   then   they   will   occur.     If   the   perverse   have   rat  
holes,   then   they   will   never   be   stopped.     With   these   eight   phenomena,   the  
people   will   gain   victory   over   the   government.     If   a   state   does   not   have   these  
eight   things,   then   the   government   will   gain   victory   over   the   people.     If   the  
people   gain   victory   over   the   government,   the   state   is   weak.     If   the  
government  gains  victory  over  the  people,  the  army  is  strong.    Therefore,  if  
the  state  has  these  eight  phenomena,  the  ruler  will  not  have  that  which  he  
can   use   to   employ   the   people   to   protect   [state   territory]   and   go   out   and  
engage  in  war,  necessarily  causing  the  state  to  be  dismembered  and  it  will  
reach   the   point   of   ruin.     If   the   state   does   not   have   these   eight   phenomena,  
then  the  ruler  will  have  what  is  used  to  employ  the  people  to  protect  [state  
territory]   and   go   out   and   engage   in   war,   which   would   result   in   the   state  
prospering  and  reaching  the  point  of  true  Kingship.767  
XII. (“Elimination   of   Strength”)   If   one   uses   punishment   to   abolish   punishment,  
then   the   state   will   be   in   order.     If   one   uses   punishment   to   lead   to   more  
punishment,   the   state   will   be   in   chaos.     Therefore   it   is   said:   ‘In   applying  
punishment,  apply  harsh  punishments  to  minor  offenses.’    This  will  result  in  
punishments   being   abolished   and   tasks   being   completed,   making   the   state  
strong.    However,  if  harsh  punishments  are  applied  to  major  offenses  while  
light  punishments  are  applied  to  minor  offences,  then  punishments  will  be  
used   to   the   extent   that   chaotic   affairs   are   consequently   produced,   causing  
the   state   to   be   dismembered.     Punishment   produces   force,   force   produces  
strength,  strength  produces  awesomeness,  awesomeness  produces  kindness.    
Kindness  has  its  origin  in  force.768  
XIII. (“Discussion  about  the  People”)  Therefore,  if  harsh  punishments  are  applied  
to   major   offenses   and   light   punishments   applied   to   minor   offenses,   then  
minor  offenses  will  not  be  stopped  and  major  offenses  will  never  be  blocked.    
This  is  called  governing  the  people  by  their  own  chaos.    Therefore  if  heavy  
punishments   are   applied   to   minor   offenses,   then   punishments   will   be  
abolished   and   tasks   will   be   completed,   and   the   state   will   be   strong.     If   heavy  
punishments   are   applied   to   major   offenses,   then   punishments   will   be  
numerous,   tasks   will   not   be   completed,   and   the   state   will   be   dismembered…  
Punishments   produce   force,   force   produces   strength,   strength   produces  
                                                                                                               
767  辯慧，亂之贊也。禮樂，淫佚之徵也。慈仁，過之母也。任譽，姦之鼠也。亂有贊則行。淫佚

有徵則用。過有母則生。姦有鼠則不止。八者有群，民勝其政。國無八者，政勝其民。民勝其政
，國弱。政勝其民，兵彊。故國有八者，上無以使守戰，必削至亡。國無八者，上有以使守戰，
必興至王。(Gao  2011:  65)    
768  以刑去刑，國治。以刑致刑，國亂。故曰：行刑重輕，刑去事成，國彊；重重而輕輕，刑至事

生，國削。刑生力，力生彊，彊生威，威生惠，惠生於力。(Gao  2011:  62)  

  395  
 awesomeness,   awesomeness   produces   sway.     Sway   has   its   origins   in  
punishments.769  
XIV. (“Making   Orders   Strict”)   In   applying   punishments,   if   harsh   punishment   is  
applied   to   minor   offences,   then   minor   offences   will   not   occur   and   major  
offences   will   not   appear.     This   is   called   using   punishments   to   abolish  
punishments.    If  punishments  are  abolished,  then  tasks  will  be  completed.    If  
the  offences  are  major  and  the  punishments  are  light,  then  punishments  will  
be  used  to  the  extent  that  chaotic  affairs  are  consequently  produced.    This  is  
called  using  punishments  to  [further]  extend  [the  use  of]  punishments.    This  
causes   the   state   to   be   dismembered...Force   produces   strength,   strength  
produces   awesomeness,   awesomeness   produces   sway.     Sway   has   its   origin  
in  force.770  
XV. (“Agriculture   and   War”)   The   people   say:   ‘If   I   exert   myself   in   agriculture   and,  
first,   fill   the   public   granaries,   then   we   can   put   to   use   surplus   grains   and  
support  my  parents.    For  the  sake  of  the  ruler,  we  risk  our  lives  in  warfare  in  
order  to  raise  our  ruler’s  status,  defending  the  state’s  security.    If  the  state  
granaries  are  empty,  the  status  of  the  ruler  is  debased,  and  households  are  
poor,   then   this   is   not   as   good   as   seeking   office.’   If   relatives   and   friends   unite  
in  their  interests,  then  this  changes  their  plans  [from  their  original  pursuits  
of   agriculture   and   war].     Those   that   are   outstanding   will   exert   themselves  
studying  the  Book  of  Odes  and  the  Book  of  History,  seeking  refuge  [with  lords  
of   fiefs]   abroad.     Ordinary   people   will   pursue   commerce   and   making  
handicrafts,  using  these  as  escapes  from  agriculture  and  war.    If  the  people  
receive  these  teachings,  how  can  the  grain  [supply]  not  decrease?    How  can  
military  strength  not  be  weak?771  
 
Discussion  about  the  People  
 
XVI. (“Discussion   about   the   People”)   If   the   virtuous   are   employed,   then   people  
will  love  their  own  relatives.    If  the  perverse  are  employed,  then  the  people  
will   love   their   state’s   systems   of   laws.     Those   who   simultaneously   look   after  
others  and  conceal  the  crimes  of  others  are  those  that  exemplify  goodness.    
Those   who   only   care   for   themselves   and   keep   watch   on   others   crimes   are  
the   perverse.     If   a   ruler   praises   those   that   exemplify   goodness   then   the  
people’s   crimes   will   be   concealed.     If   the   ruler   employs   the   perverse,   then  
the   people’s   crimes   will   receive   punishment.     As   for   the   people’s   crimes  
                                                                                                               
769  故行刑重其輕者，輕者不生，則重者無從至矣，此謂治之於其治也。行刑，重其重者，輕其輕

者，輕者不止，則重者無從至矣，此謂治之於其亂也。故重輕，則刑去事成，國彊。重重而輕輕
，則刑至而事生，國削。。。 刑生力，力生彊，彊生威，威生德，德生於刑。(Gao  2011:  68-­‐69)
770  行罰：重其輕者，輕其重者，輕者不至，重者不來，此謂以刑去刑，刑去事成；罪重刑輕，刑

至事生，此謂以刑致刑，其國必削。。。 力生彊，彊生威，威生德，德生於力。(Gao  2011:  118-­‐

119)    
771  百姓曰：“我疾農，先實公倉，收餘以食親，為上忘生而戰，以尊主安國也。倉虛，主卑，家

貧。然則不如索官。”親戚交游合，則更慮矣。豪傑務學《詩》，《書》，隨從外權；要靡事商
賈，為技藝，皆以避農戰。民以此為教，則粟焉得無少，而兵焉得無弱也！(Gao  2011:  47)    

  396  
 being  concealed,  this  is  the  people  being  victorious  over  the  state’s  law.    As  
for  the  people’s  crimes  receiving  punishment,  this  is  the  state’s  law  having  
victory  over  the  people.    If  the  people  have  victory  over  state  laws,  there  is  
chaos.     If   state   laws   have   victory   over   the   people,   then   the   army   is   strong.    
Therefore   it   is   said:   ‘Using   the   virtuous   to   govern   will   necessarily   bring  
chaos  and  dismemberment.    Using  the  perverse  to  govern  must  necessarily  
bring  proper  governance  and  strength.772  
XVII. (“Discussion   about   the   People”)   If   punishments   are   harsh,   then   it   makes  
rank   appear   [even   more]   honorable.     If   rewards   are   light,   then   it   makes  
punishment   appear   [even   more]   severe.     If   rank   appears   honorable,   then  
when  the  ruler  bestows  rewards,  it  will  be  cherished  by  the  people.    When  
punishments   are   awe-­‐inspiring,   the   people,   in   fear   of   receiving   them,   will  
sacrifice  themselves  for  their  ruler.    So,  in  a  prosperous  state,  in  meting  out  
punishments,   the   people   receive   benefit.     In   bestowing   rewards,   the   ruler  
will   be   revered.     When   the   laws   are   excessively   detailed,   punishments  
increase.    When  laws  are  concise,  punishments  decrease.    As  for  the  people,  
there   is   order   and   then   there   is   chaos.     As   for   chaos,   if   a   ruler   tries   to  
properly   govern   it,   it   creates   more   chaos.     Therefore,   if   the   people   are  
governed  by  their  own  order,  then  there  will  be  proper  governance.    If  they  
are   governed   by   their   own   chaos,   then   there   will   be   chaos.     It   is   in   the  
people’s  nature  to  be  orderly.    It  is  their  conduct  that  creates  chaos.    So  if  the  
ruler   applies   harsh   punishment   to   their   minor   crimes,   then   minor   crimes  
will   not   occur   and   serious   offenses   will   not   appear.     This   is   called   governing  
the   people   by   their   own   order.     Therefore,   if   harsh   punishments   are   applied  
to   serious   offenses   and   light   punishments   applied   to   light   offenses,   then  
light  offenses  will  not  be  stopped  and  serious  offenses  will  never  be  blocked.    
This  is  called  governing  the  people  by  their  own  chaos.    Therefore  if  heavy  
punishments   are   applied   to   light   offenses,   then   punishments   will   be  
abolished   and   tasks   will   be   completed,   and   the   state   will   be   strong.     If   heavy  
punishments   are   applied   to   heavy   offenses,   then   punishments   will   be  
numerous,   tasks   will   not   be   completed,   and   the   state   will   be  
dismembered.773  
 
“The  Calculation  of  Land”  
 
XVIII. (“The  Calculation  of  Land”)  Domestically,  demand  that  the  people  engage  in  
agriculture.    Abroad,  demand  that  the  people  exhaust  themselves  in  warfare.    
                                                                                                               
772  用善則民親其親。任姦則民親其制。合而復者，善也。別而規者，姦也。 章善則過匿。任姦則
罪誅。過匿則民勝法。罪誅則法  勝民。民勝法，國亂。法勝民，兵彊。  故曰：以良民治，必亂至
削。以姦民治，必治至彊。(Gao  2011:  66)    
773  罰重，爵尊。賞輕，刑威。爵尊，上愛民。刑威，民死上。故興國行罰則民利，用賞則上重。

法詳則刑繁。法繁則刑省。民治則亂，亂而治之，又亂。故治之於其治則治，治之於其亂則亂。
民之情也治，其事也亂。故行刑重其輕者，輕者不生，則重者無從至矣，此謂治之於其治也。行
刑，重其重者，輕其輕者，輕者不止，則重者無從至矣，此謂治之於其亂也。故重輕，則刑去事
成，國彊；重重而輕輕，則刑至而事生，國削。(Gao  2011:  68)    

  397  
 As   a   result   of   this,   a   sage’s   administering   a   state   establishes   many  
prohibitions   in   order   to   prevent   the   people’s   capacity   [for   perversity]   and  
employs  force  in  order  to  put  an  end  to  deception.    If  these  two  methods  are  
employed   together,   then   the   people   within   the   borders   will   unite.     If   the  
people   are   united,   then   they   will   engage   in   agriculture.     If   they   engage   in  
agriculture,  then  they  will  be  simple.    If  they  are  simple,  then  they  will  live  in  
peace   and   evil   is   expelled.     Therefore,   the   sage’s   administering   of   a   state  
causes  the  people  to  invest  their  wealth  in  the  earth  and  very  few  will  take  
risks  outside  of  it  and  be  confused.774      
XIX. (“Policies”)   A   brave   people   are   victorious   in   warfare.     A   people   lacking  
courage  fails  in  warfare.    If  one  is  able  to  unify  the  people  in  warfare,  then  
the   people   are   brave.     If   one   is   unable   to   unify   the   people   in   warfare,   then  
the  people  are  not  brave.    A  sage  King  sees  the  achievement  of  true  Kingship  
in   the   armed   forces,   therefore   he   demands   [all   eligible   men   in]   the   entire  
state  to  serve  in  the  armed  forces.    For  instance,  upon  entering  a  state,  if  one  
observes  its  politics  and  the  armed  forces  are  fully  utilized,  then  the  state  is  
strong.     From   this,   how   does   one   know   that   the   army   is   fully   utilized?     If   the  
people  see  war  and  resemble  hungry  wolves  upon  seeing  meat,  then  this  is  
when   the   army   is   fully   utilized.     Generally,   war   is   what   people   dislike.     If   the  
ruler  can  cause  the  people  to  take  pleasure  in  engaging  in  warfare,  then  he  
will  achieve  true  Kingship.    As  for  the  people  of  a  strong  state,  upon  facing  
war,   fathers   message   their   sons,   older   brothers   message   their   younger  
brothers,   and   wives   message   their   husbands,   all   saying:     ‘Do   not   return  
home,   if   you   are   not   successful   [at   defeating   the   enemy]!’     Further,   they   say:  
‘Violation  of  the  law  or  neglect  of  orders  results  in  your  death  and  my  death.    
Since   you   have   no   means   to   escape,   then   we   have   no   place   to   migrate   to.’    
The   ways   of   rank   in   the   armed   forces   is   as   follows:   five   people   make   one  
unit,  distinguished  by  badges,  and  controlled  by  commands  so  that  there  is  
no   allowance   for   carelessness   or   laziness.     Because   of   these   three   armies,  
compliance  with  commands  is  like  running  water,  and,  in  death,  they  are  not  
on  their  heels.”775  
 
“Opening  and  Debarring”  
 
XX. (“Opening   and   Debarring”)   In   a   properly   ordered   state,   the   application   of  
punishments   is   frequent   and   the   bestowal   of   rewards   is   rare.     In   a   chaotic  
                                                                                                               
774  入使民屬於農，出使民壹於戰。故聖人之治也，多禁以止能，任力以窮詐，兩者偏用，則境內

之民壹，民壹則農，農則樸，樸則安居而惡出。故聖人之為國也，民資藏於地，而偏託危於外。
(Gao  2011:  80)  
775  民勇者戰勝，民不敢者戰敗。能壹民於戰者，民勇；不能壹民於戰者，民不勇。聖王見王之致

於兵也，故舉國而責之於兵。入其國，觀其治，兵用者彊。奚以知民之見用者也？民之見戰也，
如餓狼之見肉，則民用矣。凡戰者民之所惡也。能使民樂戰者王。彊國之民，父遺其子，兄遺其
弟，妻遺其夫，皆曰：“不得，無返！”又曰：“失法離令，若死，我死。鄉治之。行間無所逃
，遷徙無所入（入）。行間之治，連以五，辯之以章，束之以令，拙無所處，罷無所生。是以三
軍之眾，從令如流，死而不旋踵。(Gao  2011:  147)  

  398  
 state,  the  bestowal  of  rewards  is  frequent  and  the  application  of  punishment  
is   rare.     Therefore,   in   a   state   of   true   Kingship,   there   are   nine   punishments  
for  every  one  reward.    In  a  weak  state  [,  soon  to  be  dismembered],  there  are  
nine  rewards  for  every  one  punishment.776      
XXI. (“Elimination   of   Strength”)   In   a   state   of   true   Kingship,   there   are   nine  
punishments   for   every   one   reward.     In   a   strong   state,   there   are   seven  
punishments   for   every   three   rewards.     In   a   weak   state   [,   soon   to   be  
dismembered],  there  are  five  punishments  for  every  five  rewards.777  
XXII. (“Discussion  about  the  People”)  Therefore,  in  a  state  of  true  Kingship,  there  
are   nine   punishments   for   every   one   reward.     If   there   are   these   nine  
punishments   [for   every   one   reward],   then   the   six   parasites 778  will   be  
stopped.    If  there  is  one  reward  [for  every  nine  punishments],  then  the  four  
hardships779  will  be  executed.    If  the  six  parasites  are  stopped,  then  the  state  
lacks   perversity.     If   the   four   hardships   are   engaged   in,   then   the   army   will  
have  no  equal.780  
XXIII. (The   Xunzi:   “Regulations   of   a   King”)   The   True   King   tries   to   win   men;   the  
lord-­‐protector  to  acquire  allies;  the  powerful  to  capture  land.    One  who  tries  
to   win   men   makes   proper   servants   of   the   lords   of   fiefs;   one   who   tries   to  
acquire  allies  makes  friends  with  them;  one  who  tries  to  capture  land  makes  
enemies   of   them.     He   who   makes   servants   of   the   lords   of   fiefs   becomes   a  
True   King;   he   who   makes   friends   of   them   becomes   a   lord-­‐protector;   he   who  
makes  enemies  of  them  becomes  imperiled.781  
XXIV. (The  Xunzi:  “Regulations  of  a  King”)  The  Way  of  a  True  King  is  not  like  this.    
His   humanity   is   the   loftiest   in   the   world,   his   justice   the   most   admirable,   and  
his  majesty  the  most  marvelous.    His  humanity  being  the  loftiest  is  the  cause  
of   no   one   in   the   world   being   estranged   from   him.     His   justice   being   the   most  
                                                                                                               
776  治國刑多而賞少。故王者刑九而賞一，削國賞九而刑一。(Gao  2011:  89)    

777  王者刑九賞一；彊國刑七賞三；削國刑五賞五。(Gao  2011:  59-­‐60)  

778  The  same  chapter,  “The  Elimination  of  Strength”,  describes  the  six  parasites  when  it  states,  

“Farming,  trade  and  office  are  the  essential  functions  in  a  state.    As  for  these  three  functions,  they  
can  produce  six  parasitic  functions:  care  for  old  age,  living  off  of  others,  beauty,  love,  ambition  and  
virtuous  conduct.    If  these  six  parasites  find  an  attachment,  there  will  be  dismemberment.” 農，商，
官三者，國之常官也。三官者生蝨官者六：曰歲；曰食；曰美；曰好，曰志，曰行。六者有樸，
必削 。(Gao  2011:  56)  
779  There  does  not  appear  to  be  a  general  consensus  regarding  the  notion  of  the  four  hardships.    

Duyvendak  suggests  that  the  notion  of  the  four  hardships  refers  to  “that  which  the  people  dislike”  
described  in  “The  Calculation  of  Land”.  (Duyvendak  1928:  211)  “The  Calculation  of  Land”  states,  
“Shame,  humiliation,  hard  labor,  and  pain  are  what  the  people  dislike.” 羞辱勞苦者，民之所惡也。
(Gao  2011:  81-­‐82)  Distinctly  different  from  Duyvendak,  Chen  Chi-­‐tien  suggests  that  the  four  
hardships  refer  to  agriculture  農耕,  engagement  in  war  參戰,  reporting  perversity  告姦,  and  the  
presentation  of  grain  to  ancestors  出糧獻物.  (Chen  1976:  86)    Though  also  acknowledging  that  the  
four  hardships  generally  refer  to  activities  the  people  dislike,  Gao  Heng,  similar  to  Chen  Chi-­‐tien  
suggests  that  the  four  hardships  are  agricultural  service  務農,  fighting  hard  in  battle  力戰,  sending  
out  payment  (likely  of  taxes)  出錢,  and  reporting  perversity  告姦.    (Gao  Heng  2011:  70)  
780  故王者刑於九而賞出一。刑於九則六淫止。賞出一則四難行。六淫止則國無奸。四難行則兵無

敵。(Gao  Heng  2011:  70)  

781  Knoblock  1999:  227  

  399  
 admirable  is  the  cause  of  none  falling  to  esteem  him.    His  majesty  being  the  
most   marvelous   is   the   cause   of   no   one   in   the   world   presuming   to   oppose  
him.    His  majesty  permitting  no  opposition  coupled  with  a  way  that  wins  the  
allegiance   of   others   is   the   cause   of   his   triumphing   without   having   to   wage  
war,   of   his   gaining   his   objectives   without   resort   to   force,   and   of   the   world  
submitting  to  him  without  his  armies  exerting  themselves.    Such  is  the  one  
who  knows  the  Way  of  a  True  King.782  
XXV. (The  Guanzi:  “Method  of  Warfare”)  Truly,  though  arms  are  not  the  same  as  
the  all-­‐complete  Way  or  supreme  Power,  they  still  at  least  served  to  provide  
aid  to  the  kings  and  success  to  the  lord  protectors.    But  such  is  not  the  case  
with   those   who   employ   arms   today.     They   do   not   know   how   to   weigh   the  
proper   use   of   arms.     Thus,   on   the   very   day   they   take   up   arms,  
impoverishment  descends  within  their  own  borders.    They  are  not  certain  of  
victory   in   battle,   and   even   when   victorious,   many   of   their   men   die.     Even  
though  they  acquire  territory,  their  country  is  reduced  to  ruin.    These  four  
are   misfortunes   resulting   from   the   employment   of   arms.     If   these   four  
misfortunes  befall  a  country,  there  will  be  no  escape  from  danger.783  
 
“The  Unification  of  Words”  
 
XXVI. (“The   Unification   of   Words”)   Princes   of   current   times   all   desire   to   rule   the  
people,   but   their   helping   them   (the   people)   brings   disorder.     It   is   not   the  
case   that   they   like   causing   disorder,   but   they   preserve   antiquity   while   not  
investigating   the   needs   of   the   times.     As   a   result,   it   gets   them   nowhere.    
Subordinates  hold  fast  to  the  present  and  are  unwilling  to  change  with  the  
times.    So  when  changes  of  custom  are  not  made  clear  and  the  conditions  for  
governing  the  people  are  not  investigated,  then  the  use  of  frequent  rewards  
will   lead   to   punishment.     The   use   of   lighter   punishments   will   lead   to   the  
negation  of  rewards.    The  ruler  will  set  up  punishments  and  the  people  will  
not  obey.    He  will  exhaustively  use  rewards  and  the  perverse  will  continue  
to   increase.     So   the   ruler   in   relation   to   the   people   thinks   primarily   of  
punishments   and   rewards   as   secondary.     Therefore,   as   for   the   sage  
governing   a   state,   he   does   not   model   himself   after   antiquity,   nor   fixate   on  
the   present.     He   simply   acquiesces   to   the   times   in   his   governance,   and  
examines  customs  to  create  laws.    Therefore,  if  laws  are  established  without  
being  based  on  the  conditions  of  the  people,  then  they  cannot  succeed,  while  
governance   according   to   the   times   does   not   provoke   [perversity].    
Therefore,   as   for   the   governance   of   a   sage,   he   carefully   investigates   the  
needs  of  the  times  and  concentrates  his  mind  on  unification  and  that  is  all.784  

                                                                                                               
782  Knoblock  1999:  227  
783  Rickett  2001:  272  
784  今世主皆欲治民，而助之以亂；非樂以為亂也，安其故而不闚於時也。是上法古而得其塞，下

修令而不時移，而不明世俗之變，不察治民之情，故多賞以致刑，輕刑以去賞。夫上設刑而民不
服，賞匱而姦益多。故民之於上也，先刑而後賞。故聖人之為國也，不法古，不修今，因世而為

  400  
  
“Establishing  Laws”  
 
XXVII. (“The   Unification   of   Words”)   In   administering   a   state,   if   guidance   is   given   to  
the   people’s   knowledge   and   there   is   no   blocking   of   it,   then   the   people’s  
knowledge   will   grow.     If   the   people’s   knowledge   grows,   but   there   is   no  
attacking   enemy   states,   then   this   produces   perversity.     If   the   people’s  
knowledge  is  blocked  and  there  is  no  guidance  of  it,  then  the  people  will  be  
ignorant   [in   their   understanding   of   orthodoxy].     If   the   people   are   ignorant  
[in   their   understanding   of   orthodoxy]   and   they   are   not   utilized,   then   the  
people’s  strength  will  grow.    If  the  people’s  strength  grows  and  there  is  no  
attacking  enemy  states,  then  this  produces  parasites.”785  
 
“The  Method  of  Warfare”,  “The  Establishment  of  
Fundamentals”,  and  “Military  Defense”  
 
XXVIII. (“Military   Defense”)   A   state   exposed   to   enemy   attacks   on   all   sides   should  
focus   on   defensive   warfare.     A   state   in   which   the   sea   is   located   in   its   rear  
should  focus  on  offensive  warfare.    As  for  a  state  exposed  to  enemy  attacks  
on   all   sides,   if   it   is   fond   of   sending   armies   out   on   military   campaigns,   then   it  
will   be   in   danger.     As   soon   as   a   country   with   four   enemy   states   as   neighbors  
begins  its  campaigns,  its  four  neighbors  mobilize  their  armies.    Therefore  it  
is   said:   ‘The   state   is   in   danger.’     If   a   state   exposed   to   enemy   attacks   on   all  
sides   is   unable   to   raise   its   ten   thousand   residents   and   stations   an   army   of  
ten  thousand  men,  then  the  state  is  in  danger.    Therefore  it  is  said:  ‘A  state  
exposed   to   enemy   attacks   on   all   sides   must   make   great   effort   in   defensive  
warfare.’786      
XXIX. (“The   Establishment   of   Fundamentals”)   “Generally,   in   utilizing   an   army,  
obtaining  victory  involves  three  stages:  When  the  army  has  not  been  used,  
establish  laws.    After  establishing  laws,  then  one  is  able  to  cultivate  custom.    
After   cultivating   custom,   instruments   for   warfare   are   able   to   be   supplied.     It  
is  necessary  to  implement  these  three  phases  within  the  borders,  and  only  
then   can   the   army   be   sent   out   [for   battle].     There   are   two   conditions   in  
which  one  must  implement  the  aforementioned  three  phases:  First,  the  ruler  
should   [passively]   support   the   laws   so   that   they   can   be   applied.     Second,   the  
ruler   should   implement   them   (law)   properly   so   that   they   can   be   firmly  
established.    As  for  relying  on  the  masses,  it  is  called  using  thatch  to  build  a  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
之治，度俗而為之法。故法不察民之情而立之，則不成。治宜於時而行之，則不干。故聖王之治
也，慎為察務，歸心於壹而已矣。(Gao  Heng  2011:  95)  
785  夫開而不塞，則短長；長而不攻，則有姦。塞而不開，則民渾；渾而不用，則力多；力多而不

攻，則有姦蝨。(Gao  Heng  2011:  93)  

786  四戰之國貴守戰。負海之國貴攻戰。四戰之國好舉興兵以距四鄰者，國危。四鄰之國一興事，

而己四興軍，故曰國危。四戰之國不能以萬室之邑舍鉅萬之軍者，其國危。故曰：四戰之國務在
守戰。(Gao  Heng  2011:  108)  

  401  
 house.    As  for  relying  on  the  instruments  or  outward  appearance  of  engaging  
in   warfare,   this   is   called   finagling.     As   for   relying   on   the   calculations   and  
scheming   of   those   who   engage   in   empty   talk   and   hoodwink,   this   is   called  
swindling.    If  the  ruler  relies  on  any  of  the  aforementioned  three  phenomena,  
then  his  soldiers  will  be  captured  by  the  enemy.”787  
XXX. (“Establishing   Laws”)   “I   have   heard   that   when   clear-­‐sighted   rulers   of  
antiquity   established   laws,   there   was   no   perversity   amongst   the   people.    
When   they   initiated   affairs,   people   of   talent   naturally   engaged   in   them.    
When  they  bestowed  rewards,  the  army  became  strong.    These  three  actions  
are  the  foundation  of  government.    When  laws  were  established,  the  reason  
there   was   no   perversity   amongst   the   people   was   that   the   laws   were   clear  
and   people   believed   they   would   profit   from   them.     When   they   initiated  
affairs,   the   reason   people   of   talent   engaged   in   them   was   because   the  
measurement  of  merit  was  clear.    When  the  measurement  of  merit  is  clear,  
then   people   will   certainly   exhaust   their   strength.     Since   the   people   are  
certain   to   exhaust   their   strength,   people   of   talent   naturally   engage   in   it.    
When   they   bestowed   rewards,   the   reason   the   armed   forces   grew   stronger  
was   because   of   rank   and   emoluments.     Rank   and   emoluments   are   the  
essence   of   the   armed   forces’   strength.     Therefore,   when   the   prince   grants  
ranks   and   emoluments,   the   Way   [of   rewards]   is   clear.     If   the   Way   [of  
rewards]   is   clear,   then   the   state   grows   stronger   daily.     If   rank   and  
emoluments   spring   from   the   darkness   of   selfishness,   then   the   state   grows  
dismembered  daily.    Therefore,  the  Way  from  which  rank  and  emoluments  
spring  is  the  key  to  a  state’s  survival  and  death.    Now,  it  is  not  the  case  that  a  
dismembered   state   and   rulers   of   perishing   states   did   not   have   rank   and  
emoluments.     It   is   the   case   that   the   channel   from   which   rank   and  
emoluments   sprung   was   wrong.     What   the   three   Kings   and   the   Five  
Hegemons   used   was   no   more   than   rank   and   emoluments.     Their  
achievements   exceeded   the   aforementioned   [form   of   statecraft]   ten  
thousand-­‐fold   precisely   because   of   their   Way   [of   rewards].     As   a   result,   a  
clear-­‐sighted  ruler  certainly  employs  his  subjects  and  assigns  posts  to  them  
based  on  their  labor,  while  rewards  are  necessarily  conferred  based  on  their  
labor.    If  merit  and  rewards  are  clear,  then  subjects  will  compete  to  establish  
merit.     If,   in   administering   a   state,   one   is   able   to   cause   their   subjects   to  
exhaust   their   strength   and   compete   to   establish   merit,   then   the   army   will  
necessarily  be  strong.”788  
 
                                                                                                               
787  凡用兵，勝有三等：若兵未起則錯法；錯法而俗成；而用具。此三者必行於境內，而後兵可出

也。(Gao  Heng  2011:  106)  

788 臣聞:古之明君錯法而民無邪，舉事而材自練，賞行而兵彊。此三者治之本也。夫錯法而民無

邪者，法明而民利之也。舉事而材自練者，功分明。功分明，則民盡力。民盡力，則材自練。行
賞而兵彊者，爵祿之謂也，爵祿者，兵之實也。是故人君之出爵祿也，道明。道明則國日彊；道
幽則國日削。故爵祿之所道，存亡之機也。夫削國亡主非無爵祿也，其所道過也。三王五霸，其
所道不過爵祿，而功相萬者，其所道明也。是以明君之使其臣也，用必出於其勞，賞必加於其功
。功賞明，則民競於功。為國而能使其盡力以競於功，則兵必彊矣。(Gao  Heng  2011:  106)

  402  
 “Making  Orders  Strict”  
 
XXXI. (“Making   Orders   Strict”)   If   one   sternly   carries   out   orders,   government  
affairs  will  not  be  delayed.    If  the  system  of  laws  is  fair,  then  officials  will  not  
be  perverse.    If  the  system  of  laws  is  already  firmly  established,  though  some  
may   masterfully   talk,   the   ruler   will   not   harm   it.     If   he   relies   on   men   of   merit,  
few   subjects   will   engage   in   lofty   speech.     If   he   relies   on   men   of   goodness,  
then   numerous   subjects   will   engage   in   lofty   speech.     Proper   application   of  
laws   begins   with   making   judgments.     If   within   five   li   is   the   unit   for  
judgments,  this  is  true  kingship.    If  within  ten  li  is  the  unit  for  judgments,  the  
state  will  be  strong.    If  government  affairs  are  delayed,  then  the  state  will  be  
dismembered.     The   ruler   should   use   punishment   for   good   order   and  
rewards  to  encourage  the  engagement  in  warfare.    Seek  out  transgressions.    
Do   not   seek   out   goodness.     If   a   system   of   laws   has   been   firmly   established  
and   there   is   no   change,   then   men   of   reputation   will   alter   their   original  
schemes   of   conspiracy.     [Since   their   schemes   of   conspiracy   change],   the  
court’s  punishments  are  able  to  be  inactive.    [If  in  administering  a  state  the  
words  and  deeds  of  uniting  ministers  and  common  people  as  valuable,  then]  
the   service   of   the   ministers   and   the   common   people   will   be   differentiated.    
The   honorable   ranks   and   large   emoluments   of   each   administrative   area   will  
be  bestowed  according  to  individual  contribution.    If  the  state  lacks  perverse  
people,  then  there  is  no  perversity  in  the  capital.    If  luxurious  products  are  
numerous  in  trade,  then  artisans  will  be  numerous  and  agriculture  will  not  
be   undertaken.     The   perverse   will   be   arrogant,   and   this   kind   of   state   will  
necessarily  be  dismembered.    As  for  the  populace  having  a  surplus  of  grain,  
this   will   cause   them   to   attempt   to   trade   the   grain   for   office   and   rank.     If  
office   and   rank   are   necessarily   bestowed   for   their   effort,   then   farmers   will  
not   be   lacking.     If   a   tube   of   about   four   cun   has   no   bottom,   it   cannot   be   filled.    
If  the  receiving  of  office  or  rank  is  not  based  on  their  merit,  then  this  is  like  
the  tube  with  no  bottom.789  
XXXII. (In  the  Hanfeizi:  “Making  Orders  Trim”)  If  orders  are  made  trim,  laws  never  
deviate;   if   laws   are   equable,   there   will   be   no   culprit   among   the   officials.    
Once  the  law  is  fixed,  nobody  can  damage  it  by  means  of  virtuous  words.    If  
men  of  merit  are  appointed  to  office,  the  people  will  have  little  to  say;  if  men  
of   virtue   are   appointed   to   office   the   people   will   have   much   to   talk   about.    
The  enforcement  of  law  depends  upon  the  method  of  judicial  administration.    
Who   administers   judicial   affairs   with   the   ease   of   making   a   distance   of   five   li,  
attains  supremacy;  who  administers  judicial  affairs  with  the  effort  of  making  
nine  li,  attains  mere  strength.    Whoever  procrastinates  in  creating  order,  will  
                                                                                                               
789  靳令則治不留，法平則吏無姦。法已定矣，不以善言害法。任功則民少言。任善則民多言。行

治曲斷，以五里斷者王，以十里斷者彊，宿治者削。以刑治，以賞戰，求過不求善。故法立而不
革，則顯民變誅，計變誅止。（責商）「貴齊」殊便。百都之尊爵厚祿以自伐。國無姦民，則都
無姦（示）市。物多末眾，農弛姦勝，則國必削。民有餘糧，使民以粟出官爵，官爵必以其力，
則農不怠。四寸之管無當，必不滿也。授官，予爵，出則祿不以功，是無當也。(Gao  Heng  2011:  
113)    

  403  
 see   his   state   dismembered.     Govern   by   penalties;   wage   war   by   rewards;   and  
enlarge   the   bounties   so   as   to   put   the   principles   of   statecraft   into   practice.     If  
so,   there   will   be   no   wicked   people   in   the   state   now   will   there   be   any   wicked  
trade   at   the   market.     If   things   are   many   and   trifles   are   numerous,   and   if  
farming   is   relaxed   and   villainy   prevails,   the   state   will   certainly   be  
dismembered.     If   the   people   have   a   surplus   of   food,   make   them   receive   rank  
by  giving  grain  to  the  state.    If  only  through  their  own  effort  they  can  receive  
rank,  then  farmers  will  not  idle.    If  a  tube  three  inches  long  has  no  bottom,  it  
can  never  be  filled.    Conferring  office  and  rank  or  granting  profit  and  bounty  
without  reference  to  merit,  is  like  a  tube  having  no  bottom.790  
XXXIII. (“Making   Orders   Strict”)   The   Sage   prince   is   knowledgeable   about   the  
essence  of  things.    Therefore,  in  his  governance  of  the  people  he  emphasizes  
what  is  most  essential.    Therefore,  he  implements  rewards  and  punishments  
in   order   to   use   unity   (yi   壹 )   to   assist   his   benevolence.     This   is   the  
magnanimity  of  his  heart.    In  the  sage’s  administering  of  a  state,  he  is  able  to  
completely  sway  their  hearts,  so  that  he  can  use  his  force.    Force  produces  
strength.     Strength   produces   awesomeness.     Awesomeness   produces   sway.    
Sway  has  its  origin  in  force.    The  sage  prince  alone  possesses  this,  therefore  
he  is  able  to  propagate  benevolence  and  righteousness  throughout  all  under  
Heaven.791  
 
“The  Encouragement  of  Immigration”  
 
XXXIV. (“The   Encouragement   of   Immigration”)   Your   Majesty,   if   you   send   down  
sagacious  favor  that  allows  those  of  the  lords  of  fiefs  who  come  and  submit  
to  be  exempt  from  taxes  and  military  service  for  three  generations,  without  
any  obligations  in  military  affairs,  and  those  within  Qin’s  four  boundaries,  in  
the   hills,   mountains,   and   swamps,   for   ten   years   be   exempt   from   military  
conscription,   all   the   while   this   law   is   made   clear,   then   this   is   sufficient   to  
recruit  a  million  farmers.    I  have  said  previously:  ‘It  is  the  nature  of  people  to  
pursue  land  and  houses,  but  the  three  Jin  states  do  not  actually  have  these  
and  Qin  definitely  has  this  in  surplus.    If  this  is  the  case  and  the  populace  of  
the  three  Jin  states  do  not  migrate  westward,  then  it  is  because  the  lives  of  
the  people  of  Qin  is  worrisome  and  difficult.’    Now,  if  you  give  them  land  and  
houses,   allow   them   for   three   generations   to   be   exempt   from   taxes   and  
military   conscription,   while   giving   them   what   they   desire   and   not   calling   on  
them   to   do   what   they   dislike,   then   the   people   east   of   the   mountains   will  
migrate  westward.792  
                                                                                                               
790  Liao  1959:  322-­‐323
791  聖君知物之要，故其治民有至要。故執賞罰以壹輔仁者，心之續也。聖君之治人也，必得其心

，故能用力。力生彊，彊生威，威生德，德生於力。聖君獨有之，故能述仁義於天下。(Gao  Heng  
2011:  118-­‐119)  
792  今王發明惠，諸侯之士來歸義者，今使復之三世，無知軍事；秦四境之內，陵阪丘隰，不起十

年征，者於律也。足以造作夫百萬。曩者臣言曰：“意民之情，其所欲者田宅也，晉之無有也信；
秦之有餘也必。若此而民不西者，秦士戚而民苦也。”今利其田宅，而復之三世，此必與其所欲

  404  
 XXXV. (“The  Encouragement  of  Immigration”)  In  a  territory  of  one  hundred  square  
li,   mountains   and   hills   should   occupy   ten   percent.     Lakes   and   marshes  
should  occupy  ten  percent.    Rivers  and  streams  should  occupy  ten  percent.  
The   roads   of   cities   and   villages   should   occupy   ten   percent.     Wastelands  
should   occupy   twenty   percent,   while   cultivate   fields   should   occupy   forty  
percent.     Using   this   method,   fifty   thousand   can   be   fed,   and   the   mountains,  
hills,   lakes,   marshes,   rivers,   streams,   cities,   towns,   and   roads   are   all  
sufficient  to  accommodate  the  people.    This  is  the  principle  with  which  the  
former  Kings  regulated  territory  and  divided  the  people.793  
XXXVI. (“The   Calculation   of   Land”)   As   for   one   administering   the   state,   territory  
proportions   should   be   the   following:   In   a   territory   of   one   hundred   li,  
mountains  and  hills  should  occupy  ten  percent.    Lakes  and  marshes  should  
occupy   ten   percent.     Rivers   and   streams   should   occupy   ten   percent.   The  
roads   of   cities   and   villages   should   occupy   ten   percent.     Wastelands   should  
occupy  twenty  percent,  while  cultivated  fields  should  occupy  forty  percent.    
This  is  the  principle  of  rectification  of  the  Former  Kings.794  
 
“Rewards  and  Punishments”  
 
XXXVII. (“Rewards   and   Punishments”)   As   for   a   sage   administering   the   state,   he  
unifies   rewards,   unifies   punishments,   and   unifies   education.     If   he   unifies  
rewards,   then   the   army   will   have   no   enemy.     If   he   unifies   punishments,  
orders  will  be  carried  out.    If  he  unifies  education,  then  inferiors  will  listen  
to   and   obey   superiors.     Well   now,   if   he   clarifies   rewards,   they   will   not   be  
costly.     If   he   clarifies   punishments,   there   is   no   killing.     If   he   clarifies  
education,  there  are  no  changes.    Thus,  the  people  will  be  knowledgeable  of  
their  duties,  and  there  is  no  difference  between  the  state  [and  the  culture  it  
establishes]  and  customs.    Clarifying  rewards  is  like  attaining  a  condition  in  
which   there   are   no   rewards.     Clarifying   punishments   is   like   attaining   a  
condition   in   which   there   are   no   punishments.     Clarifying   education   is   like  
attaining  a  condition  in  which  there  is  no  education.795  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
，而不使行其所惡也。然則山東之民無不西者矣。且（非）直（虛）言之謂也，不然。夫實壙
（土）「什虛」，出天寶，而百萬事本，其所益多也，豈徒不失其所以攻乎？(Gao  Heng  2011:  
128-­‐129)  
793  地方百里者，山陵處什一，藪澤處什一，谿谷流水處什一，都邑蹊道處什一，惡田處什二，良

田處什四，以此食作夫五萬，其山陵，藪澤，谿谷，可以給其材，都邑，蹊道，足以處其民，先
王制土分民之律也。(Gao  Heng  2011:  125)    
794  故為國任地者，山林居什一，藪澤居什一，谿谷流水居什一，都邑蹊道居什四，此先王之正律

也。(Gao  Heng  2011:  73)  

795  聖人之為國也，壹賞，壹刑，壹教。壹賞則兵無敵。壹刑則令行。壹教則下聽上。夫明賞不費

，明刑不戮，明教不變，而民知於民務，國無異俗。明賞之猶至於無賞也。明刑之猶至於無刑也。
明教之猶至於無教也。(Gao  Heng  2011:  135)  

  405  
 “Policies”  
 
XXXVIII. (“Policies”)   A   state   is   either   doubly   entrenched   in   good   order   or   doubly  
chaotic.    If  a  clear-­‐sighted  ruler  resides  above,  and  he  necessarily  promotes  
the  worthy,  then  the  laws  can  be  implemented  by  the  worthies.    If  laws  are  
implemented   by   the   worthy,   then   laws   are   able   to   govern   the   ruler’s  
subjects   and   those   that   are   not   worthy   will   not   dare   commit   malfeasance.    
This  is  called  being  doubly  entrenched  in  good  order.    If  a  ruler  that  is  not  
clear-­‐sighted   resides   above,   then   he   will   necessarily   promote   those   who   are  
not   worthy,   the   state   will   lack   clear-­‐sighted   laws,   and   those   that   are   not  
worthy  will  dare  to  commit  malfeasance.    This  is  being  doubly  chaotic.796  
XXXIX. (“Policies”)  In  the  early  period  of  antiquity,  the  times  of  Hao  Ying,  the  people  
used  what  they  cut  from  trees  to  kill  animals.    The  people  were  few  and  the  
trees   and   animals   were   abundant.     In   times   of   Huang   Di,   the   people   could  
not  catch  young  animals  or  bird  eggs,  government  officials  had  none  in  their  
employ,  and  when  people  died  there  was  no  use  of  outer  coffins.    Hao  Ying  
and   Huang   Di’s   government   affairs   were   not   the   same,   yet   they   both  
achieved   true   Kingship.     This   was   due   to   their   times   [and   thus   their  
circumstances]   were   different!     In   the   times   of   Shen   Nong,   men   tilled   the  
fields  and  everyone  was  fed.    Women  weaved  cloths,  and  everyone  was  fed.    
He  did  not  use  punishments  and  decrees,  and  the  state  was  in  order.    He  did  
not   dispatch   his   armed   forces   and   achieved   supremacy.     After   Shen   Nong  
died,   the   people   relied   on   their   own   brutality,   abusing   those   that   were  
weaker.     They   depended   on   larger   numbers   to   coerce   those   fewer   in  
numbers.    Because  of  this,  Huang  Di  established  princes  and  ministers,  the  
rituals   between   inferior   and   superior,   father   and   son,   older   brother   and  
younger   brother,   and   the   union   between   husband   and   wife.     Domestically,  
he  applied  sword  and  saw,  while  abroad  he  dispatched  his  army.    This  was  
because  times  had  changed.    From  this  one  can  see,  that  it  is  not  that  Shen  
Nong   is   better   than   Huang   Di,   but   his   name   is   more   respected   than   Huang  
Di’s  because  his  politics  accorded  with  the  demands  of  the  times.    Therefore,  
if  one  uses  war  to  abolish  war,  then  even  [brutal]  warfare  is  acceptable.    If  
one  uses  killing  to  abolish  killing,  then  even  [brutal]  killing  is  acceptable.    If  
one   uses   punishments   to   abolish   punishments,   then   even   heavy  
punishments  are  acceptable.797  
 
 
                                                                                                               
796  國或重治，或重亂。明主在上，所舉必賢，則法可在賢。法可在賢，則法在下，不肖不敢為非

，是謂重治。不明主在上，所舉必不肖，國無明法，不肖者敢為非，是謂重亂。(Gao  Heng  2011:  

150)    
797  昔者昊英之世，以伐木殺獸，人民少而木獸多。黃帝之世，不麛不卵，官無供備之民，死不得

用椁。事不同，皆王者，時異也。神農之世，男耕而食，婦織而衣，刑政不用而治，甲兵不起而
王。神農既沒，以彊勝弱，以眾暴寡，故黃帝作為君臣上下之義，父子兄弟之禮，夫婦妃匹之合
；內行刀鋸，外用甲兵。故時變也。由此觀之，神農非高於黃帝也，然其名尊者，以適於時也。
故以戰去戰，雖戰可也。以殺去殺，雖殺可也。以刑去刑，雖重刑可也。(Gao  Heng  2011:  145)  

  406  
“Weakening  the  People”  
 
XL. (“Weakening  the  People”)  As  for  the  people  of  Chu,  the  soldiers  were  quick  
and   well-­‐organized,   along   with   being   speedy   like   a   whirlwind   in   their  
movements.    They  used  steel  to  produce  their  [superior]  iron  lances,  made  
from   iron   of   Wan,   that   were   sharp   as   stingers   on   scorpions   and   wasps.    
Their  armor  was  made  of  sharkskin  and  rhinoceros  hide,  firm  like  metal  and  
stone.     The   Yangzi   and   Han   rivers   were   its   moats,   while   the   Ru   and   Ying  
rivers   were   its   boundaries.     The   Deng   forest   was   its   protective   wall,   while  
the   Wall   of   Fang   mountain   was   its   frontier.     However,   when   the   army   of   Qin  
arrived,  it  captured  Yan  and  the  capital  Ying  like  knocking  down  a  withered  
tree  branch.    Tang  Mie  met  his  death  at  the  battle  of  Chui-­‐she,  Zhuang  Qiao  
rose  in  revolt  domestically,  and  the  state  of  Chu  was  divided  into  five  parts.    
This   was   not   because   the   territory   of   Chu   was   not   vast   or   because   its  
population  was  not  numerous  or  because  its  army,  weapons,  and  resources  
were   not   in   abundance.     The   reasons   they   could   not   achieve   victory   and   it  
was  unable  to  defend  itself  was  because  they  did  not  have  laws  to  generate  
results.798  
XLI. (The  Xunzi:  “Debate  on  the  Principles  of  Warfare”)  The  people  of  Chu  used  
sharkskin   and   rhinoceros   hide   for   armor,   solid   like   metal   and   stone.   They  
used   steel   to   produce   their   [superior]   iron   lances,   made   from   iron   of   Wan,  
that   were   sharp   as   stingers   on   scorpions   and   wasps.     The   soldiers   were  
agile,   nimble,   and   speedy   like   a   whirlwind.     However,   their   army   was  
defeated   at   Chuisha,   Tang   Mie   died   in   battle,   Zhuang   Qiao   dispatched   troops  
in   revolt,   and   the   state   of   Chu   was   dismembered   into   three   or   four   parts.    
This  certainly  did  not  occur  because  they  did  not  have  solid  armor  or  sharp  
lances.    This  occurred  because  their  method  of  ruling  the  state  was  not  that  
derived  from  the  Way  of  ritual  principles  and  proper  roles.    The  Ru  and  Ying  
rivers   were   its   boundaries,   and   the   Yangzi   and   Han   rivers   were   its   moats.    
The   Deng   forest   was   its   protective   wall,   while   the   Wall   of   Fang   mountain  
was   its   frontier.     However,   when   the   army   of   Qin   arrived,   it   captured   Yan  
and   the   capital   Ying   like   shaking   dried   leaves   from   a   tree.     This   certainly   did  
not   occur   because   there   was   no   fortification   from   danger.     This   occurred  
because  their  method  of  ruling  the  state  was  not  that  derived  from  the  Way  
of  ritual  principles  and  proper  roles.799  

                                                                                                               
798  楚 國之民，齊疾而均，速若飄風，宛鉅鐵鉈，利若蜂蠆。脅蛟犀兕，堅若金石。江，漢以為池。

汝，潁以為限。隱以鄧林。緣以方城。秦師至，鄢郢舉，若振槁，唐蔑死於垂沙，莊蹻發於內，
楚分為五。地非不大也，民非不眾也，兵甲兵財用非不多也；戰不勝，守不固，此無法之所生也
。(Gao  Heng  2011:  171)  
799  楚人鮫革，犀兕以為甲，鞈（堅）如金石；宛鉅鐵矛，慘如蜂蠆，輕利僄遫，卒如飄風；然而

兵殆於垂沙，唐蔑死。莊蹻起，楚分而為三四，是豈無堅甲利兵也哉！其所以統之者非其道故也
。汝，潁，以為險，江，漢以為池，限之以鄧林，緣之以方城；然而秦師至而鄢，郢舉，若振槁
然，是豈無固塞隘阻也哉？其所以統之者非其道故也。(Lau  and  Chen  1996:  15/72/14-­‐18)  This  
reading  substitues  the  character  in  parenthesis  with  the  character  preceding  it.    Also  differing  from  

  407  
  
“Prince  and  Minister”  
 
XLII. (“Prince   and   Minister”)   As   for   a   clear-­‐sighted   King   governing   all   under  
Heaven,  he  grounds  himself  in  the  law  and  governs.    Based  on  his  subject’s  
merit,   he   bestows   rewards.     For   the   sake   of   the   pursuit   of   rewards,   his  
subjects   are   willing   to   make   great   effort   in   warfare   and   not   avoid   death.    
Therefore,  under  the  governance  of  a  clear-­‐sighted  ruler,  knights  who  have  
the   merit   of   chopping   off   the   heads   of   enemy   soldiers   or   capturing  
prisoners,   their   increase   in   rank   will   give   them   sufficient   honor   and   their  
emolument   will   be   sufficient   to   live   on.     For   farmers   the   rewards   for   not  
leaving   their   grounds   will   be   sufficient   to   take   care   of   their   parents   and  
provide   for   military   activities.     Because   of   this,   soldiers   will   be   willing   to  
sacrifice  themselves  and  farmers  will  not  be  lazy.800  
XLIII. (“Prince  and  Minister”)  But  the  rulers  in  the  present  generation  are  not  like  
this.   They   abandon   the   law   and   rely   on   their   individual   wisdom.     They   do  
not  inquire  about  merit  and  listen  to  men  of  reputation  [that  is  not  based  on  
merit].     As   a   result,   soldiers   do   not   engage   in   warfare   and   those   in  
agriculture  will  move  from  place  to  place.    Your  humble  servant  has  heard  
that  the  gates  through  which  one  guides  the  people  reside  in  front  where  the  
ruler   walks.     One   can   cause   the   people   to   engage   in   agriculture   and   warfare,  
become   itinerant   officials,   or   engage   in   scholarship,   all   depending   on   how  
the  ruler  bestows  rewards.    If  the  ruler,  based  on  the  people’s  merit,  grants  
rank   and   emoluments,   then   the   people   will   engage   in   agriculture   and  
warfare.   If   a   ruler,   based   on   what   his   subjects   read,   Book   of   Odes   and   the  
Book  of  History,   grants   rank   and   emoluments,   then   the   people   will   engage   in  
scholarship.     The   people   tend   toward   profit   like   water   tends   downwards  
without   selecting   any   direction.     The   people   tend   towards   where   they   can  
obtain  profit  and  it  depends  on  where  the  ruler  grants  rewards.    If  men  with  
angry   eyes   and   clenched   fists   who   say   they   are   brave   obtain   [profit],   or   if  
men  with  drooped  down  robes  who  engage  in  empty  talk  obtain  [profit],  or  
if   men   who   work   for   private   families   (as   opposed   to   public   production   or  
service)  obtain  profit,  and  these  three  kinds  of  people  are  revered,  having  no  
merit  and  obtaining  profit,  then  people  will  flee  from  engaging  in  agriculture  
and  warfare  while  engaging  in  the  aforementioned  three  affairs.    They  will  
pursue   rank   and   emoluments   using   empty   talk,   rely   on   the   doting   of   the  
ruler   to   ask   for   it,   or   they   will   rely   on   the   bravery   of   private   persons   to   fight  
for   it.     As   a   result,   if   those   engaged   in   agriculture   and   war,   daily,   become  
fewer  and  fewer,  while  itinerant  officials  will  become  more  numerous,  then  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
the  ICS  version,  this  study  also  reads  the  character  mao  矛,  immediately  before  the  character  can  慘  
and  the  character  feng  蜂  before  the  character  chia  蠆.    
800 明王之治天下也，緣法而治，按功而賞。凡民之所疾戰不避死者，以求爵祿也。明君之治國也

，士有斬首捕虜之功，必其爵足榮也，祿足食也。農不離廛者，足以養二親，治軍事，故軍士死
節，而農民不偷也。(Gao  Heng  2011:  179)    

  408  
 the  state  will  be  chaotic,  the  territory  dismembered,  the  army  weak,  and  the  
ruler’s  status  debased.801  
XLIV. (“Prince   and   Minister”)   In   ancient   times,   when   there   was   no   prince   and  
minister,   inferior   and   superior,   the   people   were   numerous   and   disorderly  
and  there  was  no  rank.    Therefore,  the  sages  distinguished  noble  and  lowly,  
established  a  system  of  rank,  and  established  names  in  order  to  divide  rank  
and   the   proper   roles   of   prince   and   minister,   inferior   and   superior.     As   the  
territory   expanded,   the   people   became   more   numerous   and   resources  
became   more   abundant.     Therefore,   the   sages   set   up   five   kinds   of   officials.    
As   the   people   became   numerous   and   perversity   appeared,   the   sage  
established   laws,   creating   a   system   of   weights   and   measures   in   order   to  
prohibit   perversity.     As   a   result,   there   was   the   proper   roles   of   prince   and  
minister,  the  distribution  of  responsibility  to  the  five  kinds  of  officials,  legal  
sanction,  and  there  was  no  choice  but  to  pay  heed.    If  one  is  occupying  the  
position  of  prince  and  commands  are  not  carried  out,  then  there  is  danger.    
If  the  five  kinds  of  officials  already  have  their  responsibilities  and  there  is  no  
common   practice,   then   there   is   chaos.     If   the   laws   are   already   established  
and   private   practice   of   goodness   still   spreads,   then   the   people   do   not   fear  
laws.    If  only  the  ruler  is  revered,  then  commands  will  be  carried  out.    If  the  
officials   are   law-­‐abiding,   then   there   will   be   common   practice   in   their   duties.    
If  the  laws  are  made  clear,  then  the  people  fear  punishments.    If  the  laws  are  
not  made  clear  and  one  demands  his  people  to  comply  with  his  commands,  
this  cannot  be  done.    If  the  people  do  not  comply  with  commands  and  there  
is  hope  that  the  ruler  will  be  revered,  even  with  the  wisdom  of  Yao  and  Shun,  
one  cannot  rule.802  
 
“Interdicts  and  Encouragements”  
 
XLV. (“Interdicts  and  Encouragements”)  That  which  the  ruler  uses  to  employ  or  
prevent   his   subjects   is   the   application   of   rewards   and   punishments.     The  
bestowal   of   rewards   follows   their   merit,   while   the   application   of  
punishment  follows  their  transgressions.    Therefore,  the  ruler  will  have  no  
choice   but   to   attentively   and   definitively   judge   his   subject’s   merit   and  

                                                                                                               
801  今世君不然，釋法而以知，背功而以譽。故軍士不戰，而農民流（徙）「徙」。臣聞道民之門

，在上所先。故民，可令農戰，可令游宦，可令學問，在上所與。上以功勞與，則民戰；上以
《詩》《書》與，則民學問。民之於利也，若水於下也，四旁無擇也。民徒可以得利而為之者，
上與之也。瞋目扼腕而語勇者得；垂衣裳而談說者得；遲日曠久，積勞私門者得。尊向三者，無
功而皆可以得。民去農戰而為之，或談議而索之，或事便辟而請之，或以勇爭之。故農戰之民日
寡，而游食者愈眾。則國亂而地削，兵弱而主卑。(Gao  Heng  2011:  180-­‐181)  
802  古者未有君臣上下之時，民亂而不治。是以聖人別貴賤，制節爵位，立名號，以別君臣上下之

義。地廣，民眾，萬物多，故分五官而守之。民眾而姦邪生，故立法制，為度量，以禁之。是故
有君臣之義，五官之分，法制之禁。不可不慎也。處君位而令不行，則危。五官分而無常，則亂。
法制設而私善行，則民不畏刑。君尊則令行。官修則有常事。法制明則民畏刑。法制不明，而求
民之行令也，不可得也。民不從令，而求君之尊也，雖堯，舜之智，不能以治。(Gao  Heng  2011:  
179)    

  409  
 inspect  their  transgressions.    If  the  ruler  does  not  know  of  the  bestowal  of  
reward  or  the  application  of  punishment,  his  laws  will  be  like  having  no  laws.    
Therefore,   the   former   kings   did   not   rely   on   their   strength.     Rather,   they  
relied   on   their   authority.     They   did   not   rely   on   the   establishment   of   good  
faith  and  mutual  trust.    Rather,  they  relied  on  their  laws.803  
XLVI. (“Interdicts  and  Encouragements”)  When  a  ruler  grasps  authority,  he  is  able  
to   achieve   perfection.     Although   there   aren’t   many   officials   established,  
officials   are   incorruptible.     He   is   able   to   utilize   laws   and   handle   the  
multitude   of   things   appropriately.     Of   those   who   administer   states   today,  
many   rely   on   having   a   multitude   of   officials,   and   these   officials   are  
appointed  to  assist  the  ruler  and  supervise  other  personnel  for  the  sake  of  
preventing   subjects’   pursuit   of   private   profit.     However,   since   these  
assistants  and  supervisors  also  pursue  private  profit,  then  how  are  they  able  
to  prevent  others  from  doing  so?    Therefore,  if  one  relies  on  assistants  and  
supervisors  to  administer  a  state  their  governance  is  merely  transient.    One  
who  understands  method  is  not  like  this.    He  divides  his  officials’  authority,  
making  it  difficult  for  officials  to  pursue  their  own  private  profit.    It  can  be  
said:   ‘When   people   find   it   difficult   to   conceal   their   own   crimes,   even   Robber  
Zhi   does   not   commit   malfeasance.     Therefore,   the   former   Kings   attached  
importance  to  the  utilization  of  their  authority.’804  
 
“Attention  to  Law”  
 
XLVII. (“Attention  to  Law”)  Therefore,  a  clear-­‐sighted  ruler  or  a  loyal  minister  born  
in  these  times,  can  rule  his  state  if  he  does  not,  even  for  a  moment,  disregard  
the   law.     He   is   able   to   defeat   henchmen   in   factions,   the   perversely   clever,  
while   restraining   or   abolishing   the   sophists   through   relying   on   the   law.    
Then  the  state  will  be  properly  ordered.    If  he  is  able  to  cause  government  
officials   to   abide   by   no   other   standards   other   than   the   ruler’s   laws,   then  
although   they   may   be   perversely   clever,   they   will   be   unable   to   commit  
malfeasance.  If  he  is  able  to  cause  the  people  to  utilize  their  strength  in  no  
other  area  other  than  warfare,  then  although  they  may  be  sinister  and  crafty,  
they  will  be  unable  to  defraud  others.    In  using  laws  to  govern  the  state,  if  
people  are  employed  according  to  established  practice,  this  prevents  private  
praise   or   commendation   from   causing   additional   advantage   and   private  
slander  to  cause  unwarranted  harm.    Once  people  see  that  mutual  praise  or  
commendation  of  one  another  gains  no  additional  advantage,  then  they  will  
supervise  each  other  and  attack  the  perverse.    If  people  see  that  slandering  
each  other  will  not  cause  any  additional  harm,  then  even  if  there  is  mutual  
                                                                                                               
803  人主之所以禁使者，賞罰也。賞隨功。罰隨罪。故論功察罪，不可不審也。夫賞高罰下，而上

無必知，其道也與無道同也。凡知道者，勢，數也。 故先王不恃其彊，而恃其勢；不恃其信，而
恃其數。(Gao  Heng  2011:  183)  
804  得勢之至，不參官而潔，陳數而物當。今恃多官眾吏，官立丞，監，夫置丞立監者，且以禁人

之為利也。而丞監亦欲為利，則以何相禁？故恃丞監而治者，僅存之治也。通數者不然。別其勢
，難其道，故曰：其勢難匿者，雖跖不為非焉。（或）「故」先王貴勢。(Gao  Heng  2011:  183)  

  410  
 hate,   they   will   not   harm   each   other.     If   the   love   of   others   does   not   bring  
about  private  favor  and  the  hate  of  others  does  not  result  in  greater  harm,  
then  love  and  hate  can  both  be  proper  and  this  is  the  highest  achievement  of  
governance.    Therefore  I  [,  your  minister,]  say,  ‘Utilize  the  law  in  governing  
the  state,  and  the  state  will  be  properly  ordered.’805  
XLVIII. (“Attention   to   Law”)   A   state   of   one   thousand   chariots   is   able   to   defend   itself  
and   preserve   its   existence.     A   state   of   ten   thousand   chariots   is   able   to   attack  
an   enemy   state   and   strengthen   itself.     Even   a   ruler   like   Jie   of   the   Xia   dynasty  
could  not  weaken  these  words  and  cause  his  enemies  to  surrender.    On  the  
contrary,   as   for   a   country   that   advances   itself   without   attacking   people   or  
retreats  without  being  forced  to  defend  itself,  even  a  ruler  like  Yao,  against  a  
strong   enemy   state,   could   not   cause   it   to   surrender   or   make   peace.     Because  
of   this,   one   can   see   that   the   means   by   which   a   state   conquers   other   states  
and   the   ruler   becoming   revered   by   other   states   is   through   force.     Force   is  
what  strengthens  the  state  and  is  the  foundation  of  the  ruler’s  position.    Why  
is  it  that  none  of  the  rulers  of  the  present  age  are  able  to  develop  force?    The  
ruler   should   cause   not   tilling   fields   to   be   what   the   people   find   painful   and  
not  engaging  in  warfare  threatening  to  their  lives.    These  are  two  conditions  
that  sons  will  do  for  their  father’s  sake  and  loyal  ministers  will  do  for  their  
ruler’s   sake.     Nowadays,   rulers   desire   to   employ   the   masses   and   cause   them  
to   do   what   sons   and   loyal   ministers   dislike.     However,   your   servant   thinks  
this   cannot   have   success   unless   they   are   coerced   by   means   of   punishment  
and   urged   on   by   means   of   reward.     Yet   amongst   those   who   administer   state  
affairs  in  this  generation,  there  are  none  that  do  not  neglect  the  law  and  rely  
on   sophistry   and   wisdom,   pushing   to   the   rear   those   of   merit   and   strength  
while   promoting   men   of   benevolence   and   proper   roles.     Consequently,  
subjects   do   not   exert   themselves   in   agriculture   or   warfare.     If   they   do   not  
concentrate   their   strength   in   tilling   fields   and   warfare,   then   domestically,  
the   supply   of   grain   will   be   lacking   and   abroad,   the   army   will   be   weak.     Even  
though   one’s   territory   is   ten   thousand   li   and   one   million   armed   men,   the  
ruler’s  status  and  an  ordinary  person  will  have  a  similar  flatness.    Moreover,  
the  former  Kings  were  able  to  command  their  people  to  walk  on  a  mountain  
of  swards  and  endure  flying  arrows  and  stones.    Their  people  would  do  this,  
not   because   they   liked   doing   it,   but   it   was   none   other   than   for   the   sake   of  
avoiding   harm   [or   punishment].     Because   of   this,   my   teaching   is   the  
following:   Subjects   pursuing   profit   while   not   pursuing   tilling   fields   should  
not   obtain   profit.     Subjects   escaping   punishment   while   not   engaging   in  
warfare   cannot   escape.     There   will   be   no   subjects   within   the   borders   that  
will   not   prioritize   engaging   in   agriculture   and   warfare,   and   only   then   will  
they  obtain  what  gives  them  pleasure.    Therefore,  even  though  the  territory  
                                                                                                               
805  故有明主忠臣產於今世，而（散）「能」領其國者，不可以須臾忘於法。破勝黨任，節去言談

，任法而治矣。使吏非法無以守，則雖巧不得為姦。使民非戰無以效其能。則雖險不得為詐。夫
以法相治，以數相舉者，不能相益，訾言者不能相損。民見相譽無益，相管附惡；見訾言無損，
習相憎不相害也。夫愛人者不阿，憎人者不害，愛惡各以其正，治之至也。臣故曰：法任而國治
矣。(Gao  Heng  2011:  190)  

  411  
 is   small,   grain   will   be   abundant.     Even   though   the   population   is   small,   the  
army  will  be  strong.    If  one  enables  the  implementation  of  these  two  policies  
within   the   borders,   the   road   to   becoming   a   Hegemon   or   achieving   true  
Kingship  is  flawless.806      
 
“The  Fixing  of  Rights  and  Duties”  
 
XLIX. (“The   Fixing   of   Rights   and   Duties”)   All   laws   must   be   made   in   duplicates,   one  
located  in  the  Son  of  Heaven’s  palace.    Within  the  palace,  there  should  be  a  
forbidden   unit   built   for   the   law,   under   lock   and   key   preventing   entrance,  
sealed  with  the  laws  being  stored  inside.    Inside,  the  sealed  articles  should  
be   sealed   with   a   seal   prohibiting   its   breaking.     If   an   individual  
unauthorizedly  enters  the  forbidden  unit  or  breaks  the  seal  of  an  article,  or  
alters  a  character  of  an  article,  these  are  all  violations  punishable  by  death  
without   pardon.     Once   a   year,   laws   are   received   so   prohibitions   and  
commands  can  be  issued.    The  Son  of  Heaven  will  appoint  three  law  officers,  
one  in  the  palace,  one  in  the  government  office  of  the  yu  shi  御史,  one  in  the  
government   office   of   the   cheng   xiang   丞相.     In   the   prefectures   and   sub-­‐
prefectures  of  the  lords  of  fiefs,  the  Son  of  Heaven  will  give  them  each  their  
own   law   officers   and   other   officials   that   will   receive   their   orders   from   the  
law  officer  in  the  imperial  palace.    The  lords  of  fiefs  and  prefectures  and  sub-­‐
prefectures  will  receive  laws  from  the  imperial  court  and  learn  the  articles.    
As  for  government  officers  or  common  people  who  wish  to  inquire  about  the  
laws,   they   all   bring   their   inquiries   to   their   law   officers,   so   there   is   no   one  
who  does  not  understand  the  laws.    Since  the  government  officials  will  know  
that   the   people   understand   the   law,   none   of   them   will   dare   to   treat   the  
people  [in  such  a  way  that  is]  contrary  to  the  law.    The  people  will  not  dare  
to  violate  the  law,  as  they  will  come  into  conflict  with  law  officers.    Suppose  
government   officials   treated   the   people   contrary   to   the   law.     The   people  
could   go   and   inquire   about   the   law   to   the   law   officers.     The   law   officers  
would   then   tell   them   the   law   that   has   been   violated.     They   can   then   take   the  
law   officer’s   words   and   appeal   to   the   government.     So,   the   government  
officials,  knowing  this  is  the  case,  would  not  dare  treat  the  people  contrary  
to   the   law.     The   people   will   also   not   dare   violate   the   laws.     If   it’s   like   this,  
then  although  under  Heaven  there  are  those  that  are  able,  virtuous,  eloquent,  
and  wise  amongst  the  government  officials  and  the  common  people,  they  do  
                                                                                                               
806  千乘能以守者，自存也。萬乘能以戰者，自完也。雖桀為主，不肯詘半辭以下其敵。外不能戰

，內不能守，雖堯為主，不能以不臣諧所謂不若之國。自此觀之，國之所以重，主之所以尊者，
力也。於此二者力本，而世主莫能致力者，何也？使民之所苦者無耕，危者無戰，二者，孝子難
以為其親，忠臣難以為其君。今欲敺其眾民，與之孝子忠臣之所難，臣以為非劫以刑而敺以賞莫
可。 而今夫世俗治者，莫不釋法度而任辯慧，後功力而進仁義，民故不務耕戰。彼民不歸其力於
耕，即食屈於內。不歸其節於戰，則兵弱於外。入而食屈於內，出而兵弱於外，雖有地萬里，帶
甲百萬，與獨立平原一貫也。且先王能令其民蹈白刃，被矢石。其民之欲為之，非好學之，所以
避害。故吾教令：民之欲利者，非耕不得；避害者，非戰不免。境內之民莫不先務耕戰，而得其
所樂。故地少粟多，民少兵彊。能行二者於境內，則霸王之道畢矣。(Gao  Heng  2011:  191)  

  412  
 not   speak   a   word   in   violation   of   the   law.     Although   there   are   those   with  
more  than  one  thousand  pieces  of  gold,  they  cannot  use  one  twenty-­‐fourth  
of  an  ounce  to  violate  the  law.    As  a  result,  the  clever  and  crafty,  virtuous  and  
able,  all  behave  well  and  put  forth  great  effort  to  govern  themselves,  obeying  
public   laws.     When   people   are   ignorant,   they   are   easy   to   govern.     This   is  
precisely   the   result   of   the   laws   being   clear,   easily   understood,   and   strictly  
applied.807  
L. (“The  Fixing  of  Rights  and  Duties”)  If  the  ruler  above  promulgates  laws  but  
the   people   below   debate   them,   then   laws   are   not   definitive   and   the   ruler’s  
subjects   replace   him   [and   his   authority]   [in   making   decisions   about   laws].    
This  is  called  the  division  of  names  not  being  definitive.    When  the  division  
of  names  is  not  definitive,  even  Yao  and  Shun  crookedly  violate  them.    How  
much  more  so  for  the  masses  of  people?    This  causes  perversion  and  evil  to  
arise  to  a  significant  extent,  the  ruler  to  lose  his  awesomeness  and  authority  
and  bring  ruin  to  the  state,  following  the  path  of  the  destruction  of  the  altars  
of  soil  and  grain.    Now,  for  instance,  the  former  sage  kings  writing  works  and  
passing   them   down   to   later   generations   is   necessarily   like   a   teacher   passing  
on   [knowledge]   to   a   disciple.     The   disciple   then   understands   the   works’  
language   and   intention.     If   they   are   not   passed   on   from   teacher   [to   disciple],  
then  everyone  will  use  their  own  ideas  to  expound  [on  the  works],  so  until  
death   no   one   will   [truly]   understand   the   language   and   intention   [of   the  
works].     Therefore,   sages   necessarily   promulgate   laws   and   establish  
officials.     For   the   sake   of   making   the   division   of   names   definitive,   they  
establish  officials  to  act  as  teachers  for  all  under  Heaven.    If  the  division  of  
names   is   definitive,   then   the   major   swindlers   become   upright   and  
trustworthy,  the  common  people  are  circumspect  in  their  loyalty,  and  each  
is   able   to   govern   themselves.     Therefore,   making   the   division   of   names  
definitive   is   the   path   of   tending   towards   good   order.     Not   making   the  
division  of  names  definitive  is  the  path  of  tending  towards  chaos.    Therefore,  
tending   towards   good   order   cannot   be   chaotic.   Tending   towards   chaos  
cannot   have   good   order.   Now,   if   one   tends   toward   chaos   and   attempts   to  
govern   it,   then   there   will   be   even   more   chaos.     If   one   tends   toward   good  
order   and   attempts   to   govern   it,   then   there   will   be   even   more   good   order.    

                                                                                                               
807  法令皆副置一副天子之殿中。為法令為禁室，有鋌鑰，為禁而以封之，內藏法令一副禁室中，

封以禁印，有擅發禁室印，及入禁室視禁法令，及禁剟一字以上，罪皆死不赦。一歲受法令以禁
令。天子置三法官，殿中置一法官，御史置一法官及吏，丞相置一法官。諸侯郡縣皆各為置一法
官及吏，皆比秦一法官。郡縣諸侯一受寶來之法令， 學問並所謂。吏民知法令者，皆問法官，故
天下之吏民無不知法者。吏明知民知法令也，故吏不敢以非法遇民，民不敢犯法以干法官也。遇
民不修法，則問法官。法官即以法之罪告之。民即以法官之言正告之吏。吏知其如此，故吏不敢
以非法遇民，民又不敢犯法。 如此，則天下之吏民雖有賢良辯慧，不能開一言以枉法；雖有千金
，不能以用一銖。故智詐賢能者皆作而為善，皆務自治奉公。民愚則易治也，此皆生於法明白易
知而必行。(Gao  Heng  2011:  195-­‐196)  

  413  
 Therefore,   the   sage   kings   governed   good   order   and   did   not   attempt   to  
govern  chaos.  808  

                                                                                                               
808  人主為法於上，下民議之於下，是法令不定，以下為上也。此所謂名分之不定也。夫名分不定

，堯，舜猶將皆折而姦之，而況眾人乎？此令姦惡大起，人主奪威勢，亡國滅社稷之道也。 今先
聖人為書而傳之後世，必師受之，乃知所謂之名；不師受之，而人以其心意議之，至死不能知其
名與其意。故聖人必為法令置官也，置吏也，為天下師，所以定名分也。名分定，則大軸貞信，
民皆願愨，而各自治也。故夫名分定，勢治之道也；名分不定，勢亂之道也。故勢治者不可亂，
（世）「勢」亂者不可治。夫（世）「勢」亂而治之愈亂，勢治而治之則治。故聖王治治不治亂
。(Gao  Heng  2011:  198)    

  414  
  
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