People v Pastrana | 305

Topic: Arrests, Searches and Seizures-One Warrant One Particular Offense

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 196045. February 21, 2018.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. AMADOR PASTRANA AND RUFINA

MARTIRES, J p:

FACTS:

On 26 March 2001, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Special Investigator Albert Froilan
Gaerlan (SI Gaerlan) filed a Sworn Application for a Search Warrant before the RTC, Makati City,
Branch 63, for the purpose of conducting a search of the office premises of respondents
Amador Pastrana and Rufina Abad at Room 1908, 88 Corporate Center, Valero Street, Makati City. SI
Gaerlan alleged that he received confidential information that respondents were engaged in a scheme
to defraud foreign investors. Some of their employees would call prospective clients abroad whom they
would convince to invest in a foreign-based company by purchasing shares of stocks. Those who
agreed to buy stocks were instructed to make a transfer for the payment thereof. No shares of stock,
however, were actually purchased. Instead, the money collected was allocated as follows: 42% to
respondent Pastrana's personal account; 32% to the sales office; 7% to investors-clients, who
threatened respondents with lawsuits; 10% to the cost of sales; and 8% to marketing. Special
Investigator Gaerlan averred that the scheme not only constituted estafa under Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC), but also a violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8799 or the Securities
Regulation Code (SRC).

In support of the application for search warrant, SI Gaerlan attached the affidavit of Rashed H.
Alghurairi, one of the complainants from Saudi Arabia; the affidavits of respondents' former employees
who actually called clients abroad; the articles of incorporation of domestic corporations used by
respondents in their scheme; and the sketch of the place sought to be searched.

On 26 March 2001, Judge Tranquil Salvador, Jr. (Judge Salvador, Jr.) of the RTC, Branch 63, Makati
City, issued Search Warrant No. 01-118

Oan 27 March 2001, NBI agents and representatives from the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) proceeded to respondents' office to search the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Search Warrant No. 01-118 is null and void because it violates the requirement that a
search warrant must be issued in connection with one specific offense only.

RULING:

Yes, Search Warrant No. 01-118 is null and void because it violates the requirement that a search
warrant must be issued in connection with one specific offense only.
 People v Pastrana | 305
One of the constitutional requirements for the validity of a search warrant is that it must be issued based
on probable cause which, under the Rules, must be in connection with one specific offense to prevent
the issuance of a scatter — shot warrant. In search warrant proceedings, probable cause is defined as
such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched.

In Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Alvarez, the Court further ruled:

In the determination of probable cause, the court must necessarily determine whether an offense
exists to justify the issuance or quashal of the search warrant because the personal properties that
may be subject of the search warrant are very much intertwined with the "one specific offense"
requirement of probable cause. The only way to determine whether a warrant should issue in
connection with one specific offense is to juxtapose the facts and circumstances presented by the
applicant with the elements of the offense that are alleged to support the search warrant.
xxx
The one-specific-offense requirement reinforces the constitutional requirement that a search warrant
should issue only on the basis of probable cause. Since the primary objective of applying for a search
warrant is to obtain evidence to be used in a subsequent prosecution for an offense for which the
search warrant was applied, a judge issuing a particular warrant must satisfy himself that the evidence
presented by the applicant establishes the facts and circumstances relating to this specific offense
for which the warrant is sought and issued.
xxx

In this case, Search Warrant No. 01-118 was issued for "violation of R.A. No. 8799 (The Securities
Regulation Code) and for estafa (Art. 315, RPC)."

Violation of the SRC is not an offense in itself for there are several punishable acts under the said
law such as manipulation of security prices, insider trading, acting as dealer or broker without being
registered with the SEC, use of unregistered exchange, use of unregistered clearing agency, and
violation of the restrictions on borrowings by members, brokers, and dealers among others. Even the
charge of "estafa under Article 315 of the RPC" is vague for there are three ways of committing the
said crime: (1) with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence; (2) by means of false pretenses or
fraudulent acts; or (3) through fraudulent means. The three ways of committing estafa may be
reduced to two, i.e., (1) by means of abuse of confidence; or (2) by means of deceit. For these
reasons alone, it can be easily discerned that Search Warrant No. 01-118 suffers a fatal defect.

Aside from its failure to specify what particular provision of the SRC did respondents allegedly violate,
Search Warrant No. 01-118 also covered estafa under the RPC.

Moreover, the SRC is not merely a special penal law. It is first and foremost a codification of various
rules and regulations governing securities. Hence, it is imperative to specify what particular provision
of the SRC was violated.

Contrary to petitioner's claim that violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC and estafa are so intertwined
with each other that the issuance of a single search warrant does not violate the one-specific-offense
rule, the two offenses are entirely different from each other and neither one necessarily includes or
is necessarily included in the other. An offense may be said to necessarily include another when
some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former constitute the latter. And vice versa, an
 People v Pastrana | 305
offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.

The elements of estafa in general are the following: (a) that an accused defrauded another by abuse
of confidence, or by means of deceit; and (b) that damage and prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation is caused the offended party or third person. On the other hand, Section 28.1 of
the SRC penalizes the act of performing dealer or broker functions without registration with the SEC.
For such offense, defrauding another and causing damage and prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation are not essential elements. Thus, a person who is found liable of violation of Section 28.1
of the SRC may, in addition, be convicted of estafa under the RPC. In the same manner, a person
acquitted of violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC may be held liable for estafa. Double jeopardy will
not set in because violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC is malum prohibitum, in which there is no
necessity to prove criminal intent, whereas estafa is malum in se, in the prosecution of which, proof
of criminal intent is necessary.

In this case, the core of the problem is that the subject warrant did not state one specific offense. It
included violation of the SRC which, as previously discussed, covers several penal provisions
and estafa, which could be committed in a number of ways.

Hence, Search Warrant No. 01-118 is null and void for having been issued for more than one specific
offense.