Model Course 1.

XX

SHIP SECURITY OFFICER

DRAFT 29 May 2003

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)

IMO
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This course for Ship Security Officer

is based on material developed jointly by the
Government of the United States of America and the
Director General of Shipping, Government of India.

It has been prepared by the United States Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point,
New York and the Anglo Eastern Maritime Training Centre, Mumbai.

IMO wishes to express its sincere appreciation to the governments of the United States of
America and India for their provision of expert assistance, valuable cooperation, and generous
funding in support of this work.
 Contents

FOREWORD ...................................................................................................................................I
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 1
PART A: COURSE FRAMEWORK .................................................................................................. 3
PART B: COURSE OUTLINE ......................................................................................................... 7
PART C: DETAILED TEACHING SYLLABUS .................................................................................. 12
PART D: INSTRUCTOR MANUAL ................................................................................................. 23
PART E: EVALUATION............................................................................................................... 40
INFORMATION REQUESTED OF INSTRUCTORS WHO IMPLEMENT IMO MODEL COURSES ................. 43
ATTACHMENT: GUIDANCE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF IMO MODEL COURSES
 Foreword

Since its inception the International Maritime Organization has recognized the importance of
human resources to the development of the maritime industry and has given the highest priority
to assisting developing countries in enhancing their maritime training capabilities through the
provision or improvement of maritime training facilities at national and regional levels. IMO has
also responded to the needs of developing countries for postgraduate training for senior
personnel in administration, ports, shipping companies and maritime training institutes by
establishing the World Maritime University in Malmö, Sweden, in 1983.
Following the earlier adoption of the International Convention on Standards of Training,
Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978, a number of IMO Member Governments
had suggested that IMO should develop model training courses to assist in the implementation
of the Convention and in achieving a more rapid transfer of information and skills regarding new
developments in maritime technology. IMO training advisers and consultants also subsequently
determined from their visits to training establishments in developing countries that the provision
of model courses could help instructors improve the quality of their existing courses and
enhance their effectiveness in meeting the requirements of the Convention and implementing
the associated Conference and IMO Assembly resolutions.
In addition, it was appreciated that a comprehensive set of short model courses in various fields
of maritime training would supplement the instruction provided by maritime academies and allow
administrators and technical specialists already employed in maritime administrations, ports and
shipping companies to improve their knowledge and skills in certain specialized fields. IMO has
therefore developed the current series of model courses in maritime security in response to
these generally identified needs and with the generous assistance of the United States and
India.
These model courses may be used by any training institution and the Organization is prepared
to assist developing countries in implementing any course when the requisite financing is
available.

W.A. O’Neill
Secretary-General
 Introduction

Purpose of the model courses

The purpose of the IMO model courses is to assist maritime training institutes and their teaching
staff in organizing and introducing new training courses, or in enhancing, updating or
supplementing existing training material where the quality and effectiveness of the training
courses may thereby be improved.

It is not the intention of the model course program to present instructors with a rigid “teaching
package” which they are expected to “follow blindly”. Nor is it the intention to substitute audio-
visual or “programmed” material for the instructor’s presence. As in all training endeavors, the
knowledge, skills and dedication of the instructor are the key components in the transfer of
knowledge and skills to those being trained through IMO model course material.

Because educational systems and the cultural backgrounds of trainees in maritime subjects
vary considerably from country to country, the model course material has been designed to
identify the basic entry requirements and trainee target group for each course in universally
applicable terms, and to specify clearly the technical content and levels of knowledge and skill
necessary to meet the technical intent of IMO conventions and related recommendations.

Use of the model course

To use the model course the instructor should review the course plan and detailed syllabus,
taking into account the information provided under the entry standards specified in the course
framework. The actual level of knowledge and skills and the prior technical education of the
trainees should be kept in mind during this review, and any areas within the detailed syllabus
which may cause difficulties because of differences between the actual trainee entry level and
that assumed by the course designer should be identified. To compensate for such differences,
the instructor is expected to delete from the course, or reduce the emphasis on, items dealing
with knowledge or skills already attained by the trainees. He should also identify any academic
knowledge, skills or technical training which they may not have acquired.

By analyzing the detailed syllabus and the academic knowledge required to allow training in the
technical area to proceed, the instructor can design an appropriate pre-entry course or,
alternatively, insert the elements of academic knowledge required to support the technical
training elements concerned at appropriate points within the technical course.

Adjustment of the course objectives, scope and content may also be necessary if in your
maritime industry the trainees completing the course are to undertake duties which differ from
the course objectives specified in the model course.

Within the course plan the course designers have indicated their assessment of the time that
should be allotted to each learning area. However, it must be appreciated that these allocations
are arbitrary and assume that the trainees have fully met all entry requirements of the course.
The instructor should therefore review these assessments and may need to re-allocate the time
required to achieve each specific learning objective.

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 1 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
 Lesson plans

Having adjusted the course content to suit the trainee intake and any revision of the course
objectives, the instructor should draw up lesson plans based on the detailed syllabus. The
detailed syllabus contains specific references to the textbooks or teaching material proposed for
use in the course. Where no adjustment has been found necessary in the learning objectives of
the detailed syllabus, the lesson plans may simply consist of the detailed syllabus with keywords
or other reminders added to assist the instructor in making his presentation of the material.

Presentation

The presentation of concepts and methodologies must be repeated in various ways until the
instructor is satisfied that the trainee has attained each specific learning objective. The syllabus
is laid out in learning-objective format and each objective specifies what the trainee must be
able to do as the learning outcome.

Implementation

For the course to run smoothly and to be effective, considerable attention must be paid to the
availability and use of:

properly qualified instructors;

support staff;
rooms and other spaces;
equipment;
textbooks, technical papers; and
other reference material.

Thorough preparation is the key to successful implementation of the course. IMO has produced
“Guidance on the Implementation of IMO Model Courses,” which deals with this aspect in
greater detail and is included as an attachment to this course.

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 2 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
 Part A: Course Framework
Aims
This model course aims to provide knowledge to those who may be designated to perform the
duties and responsibilities of a Ship Security Officer (SSO), as defined in section A/2.1.6 (and
section A/12.1) of the ISPS Code, and in particular the duties and responsibilities with respect to
the security of a ship, for implementing and maintaining a Ship Security Plan and for liaising with
the Company Security Officer (CSO) and with Port Facility Security Officers (PFSOs).

Objective

Those who successfully complete this course should be able to undertake the duties and
responsibilities as Ship Security Officer, as defined in section A/12.2 of the ISPS Code, which
include, but are not limited to:

.1 undertaking regular security inspections of the ship to ensure that appropriate

security measures are maintained;

.2 maintaining and supervising the implementation of the Ship Security Plan, including
any amendments to the plan;

.3 coordinating the security aspects of the handling of cargo and ship’s stores with
other shipboard personnel and with the relevant Port Facility Security Officers;

.4 proposing modifications to the Ship Security Plan;

.5 reporting to the Company Security Officer any deficiencies and non-conformities

identified during internal audits, periodic reviews, security inspections and
verifications of compliance and implementing any corrective actions;

.6 enhancing security awareness and vigilance on board;

.7 ensuring that adequate training has been provided to shipboard personnel, as

appropriate;

.8 reporting all security incidents;

.9 coordinating implementation of the Ship Security Plan with the Company Security
Officer and the relevant Port Facility Security Officer; and

.10 ensuring that security equipment is properly operated, tested, calibrated and
maintained, if any.

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 3 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
 Entry standards
It is assumed that those attending this course will be serving seafarers (or other shipboard
personnel) and that they are likely to be designated as Ship Security Officer. However, no
specific entry requirements are envisaged.

Course certificate, diploma or document

Documentary evidence should be issued to those who have successfully completed this course
indicating that the holder has completed training as “Ship Security Officer” based on this model
course.

Course delivery
The outcome of this course may be achieved through various methods, including classroom
training, in-service training, distance learning, computer-based training or combinations of these
methods.

Course intake limitations

The maximum number of trainees should depend on the facilities and equipment available,
bearing in mind the aims and objectives of this course.

Staff requirements
The instructor in charge of the course should have adequate experience in maritime security
matters and should have knowledge of the requirements of Chapter XI-2 of SOLAS 74 as
amended and of the ISPS Code.
It is recommended that instructors should either have appropriate training in or be familiar with
instructional techniques and training methods.

Teaching facilities and equipment

An ordinary classroom or similar meeting room with a blackboard or equivalent is sufficient for
the lectures. In addition, when making use of audiovisual materials, it should be ensured that
appropriate equipment is available. Finally, the use of shipboard environments (vessels or
mock- ups) for certain segments of the course may enhance the overall effectiveness of this
training.

Teaching aids (A)

A1 IMO Model Course x.xx, Ship Security Officer
A1.1 Course Framework (Part A of the course)
A1.2 Instructor Manual (Part D of the course)
A2 Audiovisual aids: video cassette player, TV, slide projector, overhead projector, etc.
Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 4 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
 A3 Photographs, models, or other representations of various vessels and vessel parts to
illustrate operational elements and security vulnerabilities.
A4 Video cassette(s):
V1 Ship Security Officer Guide to ISPS

Available from: Maritime Training Services, Inc.

2633 Eastlake Avenue East, Suite 302
Seattle, WA 98102 USA
001 206 467 8458

V2 Shipboard Security Awareness

Available from: Ship Operations Cooperative Program

C/o Mr. Ram Nagendran
PRC, Inc. MS 6S3
1500 PRC Drive
McLean, VA 22102 USA

V3 Organise Your Security

Available from: Anglo Eastern Maritime Training Centre

(further details to follow)

A5 Distance learning package(s):

D1 Shipboard Security
Available from: Videotel
84 Newman Street
London W1T 3EU
UK
+44 207 299 1800

A6 National legislative and regulatory references

Bibliography (B)
B1 The American Waterways Operators. (2002, April). AWO Model Vessel Security
Plan. Arlington, VA: AWO.

B2 Fernandez, L., & Merzer, M. (2003). Jane’s Crisis Communications Handbook, (1st
ed.). Alexandria: Jane’s Information Group.

B3 Hawkes, K. G. (1989). Maritime Security. Centreville: Cornell Maritime Press.

B4 International Chamber of Shipping. (2001, November). Guidance for Shipowners,

Ship Operators and Masters on the Protection of Ships from Terrorism and
Sabotage. London: ICS.

B5 Republic of Liberia. (2002, April). Proposed Security Manual for Ships and Mobile
Offshore Drilling Units. MSC/Inf. 27. London: International Maritime Organization.

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 5 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
 B6 Sidell, F. R., et al. (2002). Jane’s Chem-Bio Handbook. (2nd ed.). Alexandria:
Jane’s Information Group.

B7 Sullivan, J. P., et al. (2002). Jane’s Unconventional Weapons Response Handbook.

(1st ed.). Alexandria: Jane’s Information Group.

B8 United States Department of Transportation. Volpe National Transportation Systems

Center. (1999). Intermodal Cargo Transportation: Industry Best Security Practices.
Cambridge: Volpe Center.
B9 Viollis, P., et al. (2002). Jane’s Workplace Security Handbook. (1st ed.).
Alexandria: Jane’s Information Group.

IMO references (R)

R1 International Maritime Organization. (2003). International Ship & Port Facility
Security (ISPS) Code, 2003 and December 2002 Amendments to SOLAS. London:
IMO. (IMO-I116E).
R1.1 SOLAS Chapter XI-1
R1.2 SOLAS Chapter XI-2
R1.3 ISPS Code Part A
R1.4 ISPS Code Part B

Textbooks (T)
No specific textbooks are recommended for use by trainees.

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 6 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
 Part B: Course Outline
Subject Area Hours
1 Introduction 1.5
1.1 Course overview
1.2 Competencies to be achieved
1.3 Historical perspective

1.4 Current security threats and patterns

1.5 Ship and port operations and conditions

2 Maritime Security Policy 1.0

2.1 Relevant international conventions, codes, and recommendations
2.2 Relevant government legislation and regulations
2.3 Definitions
2.4 Legal implications of action or non-action by the Ship Security Officer
2.5 Handling sensitive security-related information and communications

3 Security Responsibilities 1.5

3.1 Contracting governments
3.2 Recognized Security Organizations
3.3 The company
3.4 The ship
3.5 The port facility
3.6 Ship Security Officer

3.7 Company Security Officer

3.8 Port Facility Security Officer
3.9 Vessel personnel with specific security duties

3.10 Facility personnel with specific security duties

3.11 Other personnel

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 7 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
Subject Area Hours
4 Ship Security Assessment 1.0
4.1 Risk assessment methodology
4.2 Assessment tools
4.3 On-scene security surveys

4.4 Security assessment documentation

5 Security Equipment 1.0

5.1 Security equipment and systems

5.2 Operational limitations of security equipment and systems

5.3 Testing, calibration and maintenance of security equipment and systems

6 Ship Security Plan 1.0

6.1 Purpose of the Ship Security Plan

6.2 Contents of the Ship Security Plan
6.3 Confidentiality issues
6.4 Implementation of the Ship Security Plan
6.5 Maintenance and modification of the Ship Security Plan

7 Threat Identification, Recognition, and Response 1.5

7.1 Recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and
devices

7.2 Methods of physical searches and non-intrusive inspections

7.3 Implementing and coordinating searches
7.4 Recognition, on a non-discriminatory basis, of persons posing potential
security risks

7.5 Techniques used to circumvent security measures

7.6 Crowd management and control techniques

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 8 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
Subject Area Hours
8 Ship Security Actions 1.0
8.1 Actions required by different security levels

8.2 Maintaining security of the ship/port interface

8.3 Usage of the Declaration of Security

8.4 Implementation of security procedures

9 Emergency Preparedness, Drills, and Exercises 1.0

9.1 Contingency planning
9.2 Security drills and exercises
9.3 Assessment of security drills and exercises

10 Security Administration 1.0

10.1 Documentation and records
10.2 Reporting security breaches
10.3 Monitoring and control
10.4 Security audits and inspections
10.5 Reporting nonconformities

11 Security Training 0.5

11.1 Training requirements

Total: 12.0

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 9 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
 Ship Security Officer
Course Timetable

Day/Period 1st Period (1.5 hours) 2nd Period (1.5 hours) 3rd Period (1.5 hours) 4th Period (1.5 hours)

Day 1 1 Introduction 2 Maritime Security Policy 3.5 The port facility 4.3 On-scene security surveys
1.1 Course overview 2.1 Relevant international 3.6 Ship Security Officer 4.4 Security assessment
1.2 Competencies to be achieved conventions, codes, and 3.7 Company Security Officer documentation
1.3 Historical perspective recommendations 3.8 Port Facility Security Officer
1.4 Current security threats and 2.2 Relevant government legislation 3.9 Vessel personnel with specific 5 Security Equipment
patterns and regulations security duties 5.1 Security equipment and
1.5 Ship and port operations and 2.3 Definitions 3.10 Facility personnel with specific systems
conditions 2.4 Legal implications of action or security duties 5.2 Operational limitations of
non-action by the Ship Security 3.11 Other personnel security equipment and
Officer systems
2.5 Handling sensitive security- 4 Ship Security Assessment
5.3 Testing, calibration and
related information and 4.1 Risk assessment methodology
communications 4.2 Assessment tools maintenance of security
equipment and systems
3 Security Responsibilities
3.1 Contracting governments
3.2 Recognized Security
Organizations
3.3 The company
3.4 The ship

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 10 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
Day/Period 1st Period (1.5 hours) 2nd Period (1.5 hours) 3rd Period (1.5 hours) 4th Period (1.5 hours)

Day 2 6 Ship Security Plan 7.2 Methods of physical searches 8.3 Usage of the Declaration of 10 Security Administration
6.1 Purpose of the Ship Security and non-intrusive inspections Security 10.1 Documentation and records
Plan 7.3 Implementing and coordinating 8.4 Implementation of security 10.2 Reporting security breaches
6.2 Contents of the Ship Security searches procedures 10.3 Monitoring and control
Plan 7.4 Recognition of persons posing 10.4 Security audits and inspections
6.3 Confidentiality issues potential security risks 9 Emergency Preparedness, 10.5 Reporting nonconformities
6.4 Implementation of the Ship 7.5 Techniques used to circumvent Drills, and Exercises
Security Plan security measures 9.1 Contingency planning 11 Security Training
6.5 Maintenance and modification 7.6 Crowd management and control 9.2 Security drills and exercises 11.1 Training requirements
of the Ship Security Plan techniques 9.3 Assessment of security drills
and exercises
7 Threat Identification, 8 Ship Security Actions
Recognition, and Response 8.1 Actions required by different
7.1 Recognition and detection of security levels
weapons, dangerous 8.2 Maintaining security of the
substances and devices ship/port interface

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 11 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
 Part C: Detailed Teaching Syllabus
The detailed teaching syllabus has been written in learning objective format in which the
objective describes what the trainee should be able to do to demonstrate that knowledge has
been transferred. All objectives are understood to be prefixed by the words, "The expected
learning outcome is that the trainee .............................”
In order to assist the instructor, references are shown against the learning objectives to indicate
IMO references and publications, additional technical material and teaching aids, which the
instructor may wish to use when preparing course material. The material listed in the course
framework has been used to structure the detailed teaching syllabus; in particular:
Teaching aids (indicated by A);
IMO references (indicated by R);
will provide valuable information to instructors. The abbreviations used are:
add.: addendum
app.: appendix
art.: article
ch.: chapter
encl. : enclosure
p.: page
pa.: paragraph
reg.: regulation
sect.: section

The following are examples of the use of references:

R1.2 reg.1 refers to regulation 1 of the December, 2002 Amendments to the 1974 SOLAS
Convention;
Al.2 pa.5 refers to training area 5 ("Security Equipment") in the guidance notes of the instructor
manual.

Note

Throughout the course, safe working practices are to be clearly defined and emphasized with
reference to current international requirements and regulations. It is expected that the national
institution implementing the course will insert references to national and/or regional
requirements and regulations as necessary.

Competences
The competences required by candidates may be expressed as follows:

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 12 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
 1. Maintain and supervise the implementation of a Ship Security Plan;

2. Assess security risk, threat, and vulnerability;

3. Undertake regular inspections of the ship to ensure appropriate security measures are
implemented and maintained;

4. Ensure that security equipment and systems, if any, are properly operated, tested and
calibrated; and

5. Encourage security awareness and vigilance.

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 13 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
 IMO Biblio Teaching
Learning Objectives Reference graphy Aid
1. Introduction (1.5 hours)
1.1. Course overview
A1.1
.1 describes the topics and emphasis of the
course
1.2. Competencies to be achieved
.1 describes the competencies that will be
achieved through completion of the course
1.3. Historical perspective A1.2 pa. 1.3
.1 describes representative incidents involving
criminal activity in the maritime environment
.2 summarizes incident statistics and discusses
underlying motivation and results
1.4. Current security threats and patterns A1.2 pa. 1.4
.1 identifies threats to the maritime transport
industry, such as:
piracy and armed attacks
terrorism
contraband smuggling
stowaways and refugees
cargo theft
collateral damage
1.5. Ship and port operations and conditions B8

.1 characterizes the intermodal nature of

transportation and the interfaces between
ships and other modes
2. Maritime Security Policy (1.0 hours)
2.1. Relevant international conventions, codes, and
recommendations
.1 lists previous efforts of IMO towards maritime A1.2 pa. 2.1
security, such as MSC/Circ.443, SUA Act,
etc.
.2 describes the rapidity with which IMO acted to
enhance maritime security following 9/11
.3 summarizes the amendments to SOLAS
Chapter XI and the contents of the ISPS
Code
2.2. Relevant government legislation and regulations A1.2 pa. 2.2

.1 states the requirements of relevant national

legislation and regulations.

2.3. Definitions
.1 defines R1.2 reg. 1

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 14 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
 IMO Biblio Teaching
Learning Objectives Reference graphy Aid
Ship Security Plan
Company Security Officer
Ship Security Officer
Port facility
Ship / Port Interface
Ship to ship activity
Port Facility Security Officer
Designated Authority
Recognized Security Organization
Declaration of Security
Security incident
Security Level
the three security levels R1.3 pa. 2.1.9 –
2.4. Legal implications of action or non-action by 2.1.11
security personnel B3
.1 identifies the legal limits of authority and the
obligations of personnel with security duties
2.5. Handling sensitive security-related information
B2, B3
and communications
.1 defines security sensitive information and the
importance of keeping it confidential

3. Security Responsibilities (1.5 hours)

3.1. Contracting governments
.1 describes the responsibilities of contracting R1.3 pa. 4
governments with respect to SOLAS Chapter
XI-2 and the ISPS Code
3.2. Recognized Security Organizations
R1.4 pa. 4.3 -
.1 characterizes the role of the Recognized 4.6
Security Organization and identifies the
extent of its function
3.3. The company
R1.2 reg. 5
.1 describes the responsibilities of the company
R1.3 pa. 6
with respect to:
ensuring Master has documents on board
relating to the crewing of the vessel and its
employment
ensuring that the Ship Security Plan contains R1.2 reg. 8
a clear statement emphasizing the master’s R1.3 pa. 6.1
authority
designating a Company Security Officer and
Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 15 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
 IMO Biblio Teaching
Learning Objectives Reference graphy Aid
a Ship Security officer and ensuring that they
are given the necessary support to fulfill their
duties and responsibilities
3.4. The ship R1.3 pa. 7
.1 states that the ship shall comply with the
requirements of the Ship Security Plan as per
the security level set
3.5. The port facility
R1.3 pa. 14
.1 states that port facilities shall comply with the
relevant requirements of Chapter XI-2 of
SOLAS and the ISPS Code
.2 states that the port facility shall act upon the
security levels set by the Administration within
whose territory it is located
3.6. Ship Security Officer
R1.3 pa. 12
.1 states that the company shall designate a
Ship Security Officer for each ship
.2 lists the duties and responsibilities of the Ship
Security Officer
3.7. Company Security Officer
R1.3 pa. 11
.1 states that the company shall designate a
Company Security Officer
.2 describes that the person designated as
Company Security Officer may act as
Company Security Officer for one or more
ships provided that it is clearly identified for
which ships he is responsible
.3 indicates that the company may designate
several persons as Company Security Officer
provided that it is clearly identified for which
ships each is responsible
.4 lists the duties and responsibilities of the
Company Security Officer
3.8. Port Facility Security Officer R1.3 pa. 17
.1 states that the Port Facility Security Officer
shall be designated for each port facility
.2 states that a person may be designated as
the Port Facility Security Officer for one or
more port facilities
.3 lists the duties and responsibilities of the Port
Facility Security Officer
3.9. Shipboard personnel with specific security
duties
.1 states that members of the ship’s crew may
be assigned security duties in support of the
Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 16 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
 IMO Biblio Teaching
Learning Objectives Reference graphy Aid
Ship Security Plan
3.10. Port facility personnel with specific security
duties
.1 states that port facility personnel other than
the PFSO may be assigned security duties in
support of the port facility Security Plan
3.11. Other personnel
.1 States that other shipboard and port facility
personnel may have a role in the
enhancement of maritime security
.2 states that personnel other than ship or
facility personnel may have a role in the
enhancement of maritime security

4. Ship Security Assessment (1.0 hour) R1.3 pa. 8 A6

4.1. Risk assessment methodology

.1 states the basic principles of risk assessment
in day-to-day operations
4.2. Assessment tools
.1 discusses the use of checklists in conducting
security assessments
4.3. On-scene security surveys R1.4 pa. 8.14 B3
.1 lists the preparations required prior to an on-
scene survey
.2 lists the procedures and measures and
operations to be evaluated during an on-
scene survey
.3 discusses the security aspects of ship layout
.4 divides the survey into the following sections:
Physical Security
Structural Integrity
Personnel Protection Systems
Procedural Policies
Radio and Telecommunication Systems
Other Areas
.5 discusses the importance and elements of
physical security aboard ship
.6 describes the significance of structural
integrity for ships and other structures
.7 discusses the components and operations of
systems to protect shipboard personnel
.8 states the role of proper procedures in

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 17 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
 IMO Biblio Teaching
Learning Objectives Reference graphy Aid
preventing and mitigating security incidents
.9 describes the use of information technology
and communications systems in ship
operations and in maintaining security
.10 identifies other areas that may, if damaged or
used for illicit observation, pose a risk to
persons, property, or operations aboard the
ship or within a port facility
.11 discusses the identification of vulnerabilities
in the above areas and the preparation of
countermeasures to address them
.12 states the importance of having in place
emergency plans to deal with contingencies
.13 explains and demonstrates how to carry out a
security assessment with new measures in
place and checks if further mitigating
measures are required
4.4. Security assessment documentation
.1 describes proper form and practice for
recording day-to-day security assessment
results
5. Security Equipment (1.0 hour) A1.2 pa. 5

5.1. Security equipment and systems

.1 lists the various types of security equipment
and systems that can be used aboard ships
and in port facilities
5.2. Operational limitations of security equipment
and systems
.1 explains the limitations of individual items of
equipment and security systems
5.3. Testing, calibration and maintenance of security
equipment and systems
.1 describes the testing, calibration and
maintenance requirements for the above
security equipment and systems

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 18 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
 IMO Biblio Teaching
Learning Objectives Reference graphy Aid
6. Ship Security Plan (1.0 hour) R1.3 pa. 9 B3
R1.4 pa. 9
6.1. Purpose of the Ship Security Plan
.1 states that each ship shall carry a Ship
Security Plan approved by the Administration
.2 explains that the Ship Security Plan
addresses the security measures that should
be taken at each security level
6.2. Contents of the Ship Security Plan
A6
.1 lists the required elements of a Ship Security
Plan
.2 states that the Ship Security Plan shall
establish procedures for the performance of
ship security duties.
6.3. Confidentiality issues
.1 states that the Ship Security Plan is
confidential
.2 states that the Ship Security Plan is not
subject to inspection by Port State Control
.3 describes the circumstances under which
certain sections of the plan may be shown to
Port State Control Authorities
6.4. Implementation of the Ship Security Plan
.1 explains procedures to be employed in
implementing the Ship Security Plan
.2 explains the requirement to coordinate
implementation of the Ship Security Plan with
the Company Security Officer and the Port
Facility Security Officer
.3 discusses the importance of giving due R1.4 pa. 8.11
regard to the effect that security measures
may have on shipboard personnel who may
remain on board the ship for long periods
6.5. Maintenance and modification of the Ship R1.3 pa. 9
Security Plan R1.4 pa. 9

.1 explains mechanisms for ensuring the

continuing effectiveness and updating of the
Ship Security Plan
.2 explains the procedures for implementing any
corrective actions
.3 states that amendments to the plan shall not
be implemented unless approved by the
Administration

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 19 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
 IMO Biblio Teaching
Learning Objectives Reference graphy Aid
7. Threat Identification, Recognition, and Response B3, B6, B7 A1.2 pa. 7
(1.5 hours)
7.1. Recognition and detection of weapons,
dangerous substances and devices
.1 describes the various types of weapons,
dangerous substances and devices, the
damage they can cause, and their
appearance
7.2. Methods of physical searches and non-intrusive
inspections
.1 demonstrates how to carry out physical
searches and non-intrusive inspections.
7.3. Implementing & coordinating searches
.1 describes the equipment the search team
should carry for conducting a search
.2 describes the procedures to be followed for
an efficient search
.3 describes the various places of concealment
on board a ship
7.4. Recognition, on a non-discriminatory basis, of
persons posing potential security risks
.1 describes the general characteristics and
behavioral patterns of persons who are likely
to threaten security
.2 states how important it is to be observant to
recognize such persons
7.5. Techniques used to circumvent security
measures
.1 describes the techniques that may be used to
circumvent security measures
7.6. Crowd management and control techniques
.1 explains the basic psychology of a crowd in a
crisis situation
.2 states the importance of clear communication
with crew and passengers during an
emergency
8. Ship Security Actions (1.0 hours) R1.3 pa. 7

8.1. Actions required by different security levels

.1 states the three security levels and the
actions required for each level.
8.2. Maintaining security of the ship/port interface
.1 lists the reporting requirements for the ship
prior entering port

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 20 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
 IMO Biblio Teaching
Learning Objectives Reference graphy Aid
8.3. Usage of the Declaration of Security
R1.3 pa. 5 A6
.1 explains the Declaration of Security and what
R1.4 app. 1
it addresses.
.2 states who determines when it should be
completed
.3 lists the situations in which the ship can
request that the Declaration of Security be
completed.
.4 states who is required to complete it
8.4. Implementation of security procedures
.1 states the requirements for the Ship Security
Officer to carry out regular security
inspections
.2 lists the security measures and procedures at A6
the three security levels required to:
ensure the performance of all ship security
duties
control access to the ship
control the embarkation of persons and their
effects
monitor restricted areas to ensure only
authorized persons have access
monitor deck areas and areas surrounding
the ship
coordinate the security aspects of the
handling of cargo and ship’s stores; and
ensure that security communication is readily
available
9. Emergency Preparedness, Drills, and Exercises B3 A1.2 pa. 9
(1.0 hour)
9.1. Contingency planning
.1 discusses action to take in case of a breach
of security
.2 discusses contingency plans for:
hijacking
bomb threat
unidentified objects / explosives on vessel
damage to / destruction of port facility
piracy
stowaways
9.2. Security drills and exercises R1.3 pa. 13.4
.1 states the requirements for conducting drills
and exercises
Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 21 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
 IMO Biblio Teaching
Learning Objectives Reference graphy Aid
9.3. Assessment of security drills and exercises
.1 states the purpose of carrying out an
assessment at the end of each drill
10. Security Administration (1.0 hour) R1.3 pa. 10

10.1. Documentation and records

.1 states the documents that shall be available
on board at all times
.2 describes the International Ship Security R1.3 app.1
and 2
Certificate, its validity and verification
requirements
.3 states the requirements of the Continuous R1.1 reg. 5
Synopsis Record and what it shall contain
.4 states the activities for which records shall be
kept on board and the duration for which they
should be retained.
10.2. Reporting security incidents
R1.3 pa.
.1 states the reporting requirements in case of a 12.2.8
security incident
10.3. Monitoring and control
.1 states the requirements for the Master and
Ship Security Officer to review the Ship
Security Plan
10.4. Security audits and inspections
.1 states the requirements for carrying out
internal audits and inspections
10.5. Reporting nonconformities
.1 states the requirements for reporting
nonconformities and deficiencies identified
during internal audits, periodic reviews, and
security inspections
11. Security Training (0.5 hour) R1.3 pa. 13 B3

11.1. Training requirements

.1 Explains which personnel must receive
training and in what subjects they must be
trained
.2 Explains the requirement for enhancing
security awareness and vigilance onboard
Total: 12.0 hours

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 22 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
 Part D: Instructor Manual
The instructor manual provides guidance on the material that is to be presented during the Ship
Security Officer course. This manual reflects the views of the course developers with respect to
methodology and organization as well as what they consider relevant and important in light of
their experience as instructors. Although the guidance given should be of value initially, each
instructor should develop his/her own methods and ideas, recognize and refine what is
successful, and discard that which does not work satisfactorily.
The material has been arranged under the following eleven main headings:
1 Introduction
2 Maritime Security Policy
3 Security Responsibilities
4 Ship Security Assessment
5 Security Equipment
6 Ship Security Plan
7 Threat Identification, Recognition, and Response
8 Ship Security Actions
9 Emergency Preparedness, Drills, and Exercises
10 Security Administration
11 Security Training
The course outline and timetable provide guidance on the time allocation for the course
material, but the instructor is free to modify this if it is deemed necessary. The detailed teaching
syllabus must be studied carefully and, where appropriate, lesson plans or lecture notes
compiled.
Preparation and planning are the most important criteria in effectively presenting this course.
Availability and proper use of course materials is also essential for maximum efficacy in
conveying the subject to trainees. The capabilities and limitations of the facilities in use may
dictate that the learning objectives be adjusted but it is suggested that this be kept to a
minimum.
This course employs no practical demonstrations and therefore the transference of subject
matter to the trainee is largely accomplished by lectures and the like. In this regard instructors
are encouraged to concentrate on effective lecturing techniques so that the trainee’s interest
level is maintained. Where possible, lectures should be supported by written course materials,
videos, and other media that allow the trainee to embrace the material more fully. It will be
necessary to prepare material for use with overhead projectors or for distribution to trainees as
handouts.

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 23 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
Guidance Notes

1 Introduction
1.1 Course overview
As with other IMO Model Courses the starting point should be a brief statement of the purpose
of the course, a short review of the timeline, an introduction of participants, determination of
knowledge and experience levels, and a brief description of the teaching facility.

1.2 Competencies to be achieved

The aim of the course is stated, competences from Part C of the course are reviewed, and the
outcome of the learning objectives is made clear; namely, that “the expected learning outcome
is that the trainee .............................”
Instructors should emphasize that no one is being trained to fight or similarly respond to security
threats but rather that trainees should be able to identify, deter, or mitigate such actions through
proper planning, preparation, and coordination with various entities.

1.3 Historical perspective

Trainees are most likely to appreciate the seriousness and proportions of the problem of
security in general and maritime security in particular if they have a sense of the relevant
history. Notable examples of security incidents should be relayed to this end. These might
include the Achille Lauro in 1985, Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988, the Mumbai bomb blasts of 1993,
the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the hijackings of the M.T. Petro Ranger in 1998 and
the M.V. Alondra Rainbow in 1999, the bomb attack on the USS Cole in 2000, the hijacking of
the M.V. Inabukwa in 2001, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon, the hijacking of the MT Han Wei in 2002 and the explosion of the
Limburg in 2002.

1.4 Current security threats and patterns

Current threats to maritime security should be summarized in order to provide a basis for
understanding of the recent conventions and legislation in this area and to fully grasp the
importance of the training provided by this course. The prospective security officers receiving
this training must clearly sense the reality of today’s security issues. Some may have adopted a
mindset that places the problem of security in the past or in such a remote corner that it appears
distant or irrelevant. Before continuing on with the course this mindset should be identified and
addressed.
Piracy and armed attacks continue to occur on an all too frequent basis. Attacks occur mostly in
port areas whereas piracy by definition usually occurs on ships at sea. In fact, the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 101, defines piracy as any of the following
acts: illegal acts of violence or detention or any act of depredation committed for private ends by
the crew or the passengers of a private ship or private aircraft and directed on the high seas
against another ship or aircraft or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft. It
also includes such acts against a ship, aircraft, person or property in a place outside of the
jurisdiction of any State.

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 24 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
Terrorism usually involves violence or the threat of violence by extremist groups seeking to gain
political objectives by other than democratic means. Various types of bombs or bomb threats
may be employed or hijacking may be the method by which the terrorist group hopes to make a
statement. Increasingly terrorists are acting in connection with extremist religious sects that
promote suicidal behavior.
Contraband smuggling, a criminal activity, may result in large financial loss to the shipowner
whose ship is being used by the smugglers. Often drugs are the commodity being smuggled
and they may be brought on board in a number of creative ways such as in luggage, stores, on
or in a person’s body, or in electronic equipment to name a few. Weapons are also a frequent
item associated with smuggling and they too find their way on board in creative ways such as
cargo containers.
Cargo theft, an age-old problem, continues to plague the maritime industry and causes financial
losses in staggering amounts. Prevention is normally the most effective method of dealing with
this security threat. Although there may not be violence or political issues involved in most cargo
theft cases, this matter remains high on the list of security threats and requires solutions
discussed in this course. Instructors should convey that cargo theft is only one of the various
threats to the security of cargo. Other such security threats should be discussed during
this section of the course.
Collateral damage occurs when a nearby fire, explosion, or attack results in damage to a ship or
facility. While the damage is sometimes unintended, the costs are nevertheless real. There are
measures that may minimize the consequences of this type of damage.

1.5 Ship and port operations and conditions

This section of the course should provide trainees with sufficient understanding of the larger
transportation and logistics context in which maritime operations occur to render them able to
effectively undertake their security responsibilities. A basic understanding of the general
patterns and mechanisms of cargo and passenger movement through international and
intermodal transportation chains is essential for those who are charged with enhancing maritime
security. Discussion of the operational interfaces between maritime and other modes is a
central component of this segment of the course. Trainees should also be exposed to the
fundamentals of cargo tracking and related information systems in the context of security.

2 Maritime Security Policy

2.1 Relevant international conventions, codes, and recommendations
Trainees should appreciate the attempts by international bodies to minimize, stop, or otherwise
control threats to security in maritime transportation. The International Maritime Organization
(IMO) has adopted a number of resolutions and conventions to this end. For example,
Resolution A.545(13)--Measures To Prevent Acts Of Piracy And Armed Robbery Against Ships
was signed in 1983. In 1985 came IMO Resolution A.584 (14)--Measures To Prevent Unlawful
Acts Which Threaten Safety Of Ships And Security Of Passengers (this was later reviewed in
November of 2001 with IMO Resolution A.924(22)). Then in 1986 the IMO approved
MSC/Circ.443--Measures To Prevent Unlawful Acts Against Passengers And Crew On Board
Ships. In 1988 came the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation (SUA) treaties aimed at ensuring that appropriate judicial action is taken
against persons committing unlawful acts against ships which would include the seizure of ships
by force, acts of violence against persons on board ships, and placing devices on board a ship

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 25 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
which are likely to destroy or damage it. The convention obliges contracting governments either
to extradite or prosecute alleged offenders. The SUA came into effect on March 1, 1992.
Following the tragic events in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001 the twenty-
second session of the International Maritime Organization, in November of 2001, unanimously
agreed to the development of new measures relating to the security of ships and of port facilities
for adoption by a Conference of Contracting Governments to the International Convention for
the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 in December of 2002 (the Diplomatic Conference). This timetable
of little more than a year represents a landmark achievement for the IMO and provides a clear
indication of the gravity of the situation as well as the intention to protect world shipping against
security incidents and threats.
The meeting of the Diplomatic Conference in December of 2002 resulted in amendments to
SOLAS 74. These amendments enter into force on July 1, 2004. A brief summary of these
amendments should be carried out with mention of changes to Chapter V but with emphasis on
the changes to Chapter XI, Regulations 3 and 5 and the new Chapter XI-2 Regulations 1-13 and
the ISPS Code. Since portions of the ISPS Code will be studied in more depth in later sections
of the course, the summary here can be brief.

2.2 Relevant government legislation and regulations

It would be helpful for trainees to understand that some governments have acted on a national
level to produce legislation and/or regulations concerned with measures to enhance maritime
security. Instructors may wish to use the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA
2002) and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) as examples, or may
elect to use some other nation's legislation to illustrate the focus of this section of the course.
Some of the key features of the MTSA are as follows:
Requirements for port, facility, and vessel vulnerability assessments
Preparation by the Secretary of Transportation of a National Maritime Transportation
Security Plan and Area Plans for each U.S. Coast Guard Captain of the Port Zone
Development of security plans for certain facilities and commercial vessels
The issuance and use of Transportation Security Cards for personnel whose
responsibilities require them to access secure spaces aboard ships
Establishment of a permanent program of grants to facilitate the enhancement of
maritime security
Assessment by the Secretary of Transportation of the effectiveness of antiterrorism
measures at foreign ports
Establishment of an enhanced system of foreign seafarer identification
Creation of Maritime Security Advisory Committees at national and area levels
Installation and operation of Automatic Identification Systems aboard certain commercial
vessels
Establishment of a program to better secure international intermodal transportation
systems, to include cargo screening, tracking, physical security, compliance monitoring,
and related issues.
Provision of civil penalties for violation of statutes or regulations

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 26 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
 Extension of seaward jurisdiction of the Espionage Act of 1917 to 12 nautical miles
offshore of the territorial sea baseline
Codification of the U.S. Coast Guard Sea Marshall program and consideration of utilizing
merchant mariners and other personnel to assist the Coast Guard
Requirements that shipment data be provided electronically to U.S. Customs prior to
arrival or departure of cargo
Reporting by the Secretary of Transportation to Congress on foreign-flag vessels calling
at United States ports
Development of standards and curricula for maritime security professional training

The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) is a program through which U.S.
Customs provides streamlined clearance of cargo to firms that establish appropriate security
procedures. The Container Security Initiative (CSI) is another program in which U.S. Customs is
working with foreign ports to identify potentially dangerous shipments before they arrive in the
United States.

2.3 Definitions
Trainees will need a working knowledge of several terms found in SOLAS Chapter XI-2
Regulation 1 and in the ISPS Code Part A section 2. These terms may well need
clarification from an experienced instructor in order for trainees to reach the necessary
level of understanding. For instance, it might require emphasis or other clarification by
the instructor to establish that the Ship Security Officer is a person on board the ship
and in that sense it may be impossible for a Company Security Officer to also act as the
Ship Security Officer.

2.4 Legal implications of action or non-action by security personnel

Action or non-action by security personnel is likely to have legal implications which may
vary from one place to another and which are not entirely clear at this time. Personnel
will have certain authorities and obligations yet they will also find that they face certain
constraints. Instructors should carefully monitor developments locally and internationally
along this line and be sure to bring the most recent information into each class as it is
taught.

2.5 Handling sensitive security-related information and communications

Trainees should understand that certain information and communications will be considered
security sensitive and that the level of sensitivity may change, as do levels of security 1, 2, and
3. Heretofore benign conversations may result in disastrous consequences and all personnel
will need to appreciate the risk of security leaks through communication by improper methods or
to the wrong persons.

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 27 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
3 Security Responsibilities
This section is intended to give trainees a clear picture of the proportions of the maritime
security system conceived of by the IMO and to show how the various entities will work together
to form an efficient and effective whole.

3.1 Contracting governments

SOLAS Chapters XI-1 and XI-2 discuss the roles of the contracting governments and their
obligations in the overall scheme to enhance maritime security. A brief understanding of this will
help the trainee to comprehend how and why their own governments have acted and how they
may experience the port state control exercised by another government.

3.2 Recognized Security Organizations

Recognized Security Organizations are defined in SOLAS Chapter XI-2 Regulation 1 part 1.16
and discussed throughout Parts A and B of the ISPS Code. The trainee should understand how
and when an RSO may take on the security related activities of a contracting government. This
may be of particular importance to the Company Security Officer and the Port Facility Security
Officer.

3.3 The company

The company is defined by SOLAS Chapter XI-1 and is given numerous obligations under
Chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code from Continuous Synopsis Records to the maintenance of the
International Ship Security Certificate. Trainees would benefit greatly from a clear understanding
of the role of the company and the support that they should expect from the company.

3.4 The ship

The term ship as used here means a ship to which Chapter XI of SOLAS applies. Various
segments of Chapter XI and the ISPS Code discuss the persons, activities, plans,
documentation and so forth that a ship will be exposed to in a security context. All trainees will
need to understand these requirements as they relate to this important cornerstone of a
maritime transportation system.

3.5 The port facility

The Port Facility is defined in SOLAS Chapter XI-2 Regulation 1 part 1.9 and is the location
where a ship/port interface takes place. As such, numerous duties and activities are assigned to
the Port Facility. All trainees should understand the role of the Port Facility in maintaining the
security of a maritime transportation system.

3.6- 3.11 Ship Security Officer, Company Security Officer, Port Facility Security Officer,
Shipboard personnel with specific security duties, Port facility personnel with specific
security duties, and Other personnel

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 28 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
Trainees should understand the role of each of these various persons and know what to expect
from each in terms of authority and responsibility. The ISPS Code Parts A and B clearly
delineate the functions, duties, and training requirements for each of these categories of
personnel. In the end these are the very people that will make the security plans work and will
recognize areas for improvement. They will each need to appreciate their own role as well as
that played by the others.

4 Ship Security Assessment

4.1 Risk assessment methodology
Ship security assessment is an essential and integral part of the process of developing and
updating the ship security plan. In this segment of the course, it should be communicated to
trainees that risk-based decision-making is one of the best tools to complete a security
assessment and to determine appropriate security measures for a vessel. Risk based decision-
making is a systematic and analytical process to consider the likelihood that a security breach
will endanger an asset, individual, or function and to identify actions to reduce the vulnerability
and mitigate the consequences of a security breach.
A security assessment is a process that identifies weaknesses in physical structures, personnel
protection systems, processes, or other areas that may lead to a security breach, and may
suggest options to eliminate or mitigate those weaknesses.
Detailed guidance concerning methodologies for risk-based security assessment are provided in
the ISPS Code Part B and the USCG NVIC 10-02.

4.2 Assessment tools

Trainees in the Ship Security Officer course must be encouraged to adopt systematic and
consistent approaches to the evaluation of security conditions and vulnerabilities. The focus of
the Ship Security Officer in this regard will be more operational and less detailed than that of the
Company Security Officer. The use of checklists to perform assessments of security in day-to-
day operations should be discussed, noting the inclusion of categories such as the following:
General layout of the ship.
Location of areas that should have restricted access, such as the bridge, engine room,
radio room, etc.
Location and function of each actual or potential access point to the ship.
Open deck arrangement including the height of the deck above water.
Emergency and stand-by equipment available to maintain essential services.
Numerical strength, reliability, and security duties of the ship’s crew.
Existing security and safety equipment for protecting the passengers and crew.
Existing agreements with private security companies for providing ship and waterside
security services.
Existing protective measures and procedures in practice, including inspection, control
and monitoring equipment, personnel identification documents and communication,
alarm, lighting, access control and other appropriate systems.

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 29 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
4.3 On-scene security surveys
Trainees should be taught that the on-scene security survey is an integral part of any Ship
Security Assessment. They should understand that the survey should fulfill the following
functions:
identification of existing security measures, procedures and operations;
identification and evaluation of key shipboard operations that it is important to protect;
identification of possible threats to the key shipboard operations and the likelihood of
their occurrence, in order to establish and prioritize security measures; and
identification of weaknesses, including human factors in the infrastructure, policies and
procedures.
It should be emphasized to course participants that the on-scene survey should examine and
evaluate existing shipboard protective measures, procedures and operations for:
ensuring the performance of all ship security duties;
monitoring restricted areas to ensure that only authorized persons have access;
controlling access to the ship, including any identification systems;
monitoring of deck areas and areas surrounding the ship;
controlling the embarkation of persons and their effects (accompanied and
unaccompanied baggage and the personal effects of ship’s personnel);
supervising the handling of cargo and the delivery of ship’s stores; and
ensuring that ship security communication, information, and equipment are readily
available.

4.4 Security assessment documentation

Trainees should understand that the Ship Security Assessment shall be documented, reviewed,
accepted and retained by the company. Upon completion of the Ship Security Assessment, a
report shall be prepared, consisting of a summary of how the assessment was conducted, a
description of each vulnerability found during the assessment and a description of counter
measures that could be used to address each vulnerability. The report shall be protected from
unauthorized access or disclosure.

5 Security Equipment
5.1 Security equipment and systems
Course participants should be aware of the types of security equipment and systems that are
useful in enhancing maritime security, both ashore and afloat. Examples of such equipment
include:
Ship Security Alert System
Locks
Lighting
Handheld radios

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 30 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
 GMDSS equipment
Closed Circuit Televisions
Automatic Intrusion Detection Device (Burglar Alarm)
Metal detectors
Explosive detectors
Baggage screening equipment
Container X-ray devices
General alarm
Participants are not expected to acquire detailed technical or scientific knowledge concerning
the theoretical underpinnings of the operation of security equipment. The objective is to ensure
familiarity with the capabilities and appropriate deployment of such devices and systems. The
Company Security Officer and the Port Facility Security Officer may well be in the position to
influence the purchase and installation of security equipment. Instructors are encouraged to
discuss this possibility as well as the resultant additional level of knowledge with trainees.

5.2 Operational limitations of security equipment and systems

The intent of this course segment is to communicate to trainees the functional limitations and
operating constraints of security equipment that they may encounter or be called upon to use.
Issues such as effective range, environmental sensitivities, and operator (human) error should
be addressed as appropriate.

5.3 Testing, calibration and maintenance of security equipment and systems

Trainees should be familiar with methods for ensuring the continuing accuracy, efficiency, and
operational readiness of selected items of security equipment and associated systems. For the
Ship Security Officer, the focus should be on the tasks and procedures required to support such
equipment while the vessel is at sea. Company Security Officer and Port Facility Security Officer
trainees should understand the need for developing methods to ensure that the tasks and
procedures required to support such equipment while the vessel is at sea are in place and are
adhered to.

6 Ship Security Plan

6.1 Purpose of the Ship Security Plan
The Ship Security Plan is defined in the ISPS Code Part A Section 2.1 as a ship-specific plan
that will ensure the application of measures on board the ship to provide protection from the
risks of a security incident. Therefore it is imperative that all candidates for the Ship Security
Officer and Company Security Officer positions fully understand the nature of the Ship Security
Plan. The Ship Security Officer will need to maintain and supervise the implementation of the
plan while the Company Security Officer will need to ensure that such a plan is developed, that
it is submitted for approval, and thereafter that it is implemented and maintained. These are
considerably different requirements and this course has addressed these differences in both
content and time allotted for the subject.

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 31 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
6.2 Contents of the Ship Security Plan
The contents of the Ship Security Plan are most clearly established in the ISPS Code Part A
section 9.4 with additional information provided in Section 9 of Part B of the Code. Trainees
should be intimately familiar with the contents of the plan in a generic fashion thus knowing what
to expect as they are assigned to various ships and experience various Ship Security Plans. It is
suggested that a completed sample plan be provided by instructors to give trainees a better
opportunity to understand the document to which they must be responsive aboard each ship to
which they are assigned as Ship Security Officer.

6.3 Confidentiality issues

Essentially the Ship Security Plan is to be considered a confidential document and must be
protected from unauthorized access or disclosure. Instructors should place notable emphasis
on this and clearly delineate those few circumstances when and what sections of the Ship
Security Plan may be inspected by Port State Control Officers.

6.4 Implementation of the Ship Security Plan

Implementation of the Ship Security Plan is a shared responsibility of the Company Security
Officer and the Ship Security Officer with the Ship Security Officer being at the front line in this
endeavor. Details concerning this shared responsibility should be presented in such as way as
to not only ensure the understanding of the process but to also leave no doubt as to who is
responsible for what. Both Ship Security Officer and Company Security Officer must be clear on
their roles in the implementation of the plan.

6.5 Maintenance and modification of the Ship Security Plan

As written, the Ship Security Plan is intended to address security measures for each of the three
security levels but on further inspection it can be seen that the Ship Security Plan is a living
document and will require modification over time. Trainees must understand not only the
provisions set out by the Ship Security Plan but also their role in maintaining its effectiveness
and contributing to positive modifications of the plan over time. Instructors should consider
creating an exercise or a sample scenario showing the proper method of maintenance,
realization of the need for modification, the proper route to follow for suggesting modifications,
and the approval necessary before a modification or amendment can be set in place as new
policy.

7 Threat Identification, Recognition, and Response

7.1 Recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices
The focus of this session is on the characteristics and potential effects of prohibited weapons;
explosives; chemical, biological, and radiological devices; substances and compounds that pose
a hazard to personnel and/or ships and facilities, and related topics.

7.2 Methods of physical searches and non-intrusive inspections

In this segment of the course, trainees will learn techniques used to conduct physical and non-
intrusive searches of persons, personal effects, baggage, cargo, and ship’s stores. Trainees
Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 32 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
should be informed that, unless there are clear security grounds for doing so, members of the
ship’s crew should not be required to search their colleagues or their personal effects. It should
be conveyed that any such search shall be undertaken in a manner that fully takes into account
the human rights of the individual and preserves his or her basic human dignity.

7.3 Implementing and coordinating searches

Course participants should be familiar with the basic items of equipment that may be employed
in conducting searches. Examples of this equipment include:
flashlights and batteries;
screwdrivers, wrenches and crowbars;
mirrors and probes;
gloves, hard hats, overalls and non-slip footwear;
plastic bags and envelopes for collection of evidence;
forms on which to record activities and discoveries.
Trainees should learn procedures to be followed so as to ensure effective and efficient
searches. Examples of these include the following:
Crew members and facility personnel should not be allowed to search their own areas in
recognition of the possibility that they may have concealed packages or devices in their
own work or personal areas
The search should be conducted according to a specific plan or schedule and must be
carefully controlled.
Special consideration should be given to search parties working in pairs with one
searching “high” and one searching “low”. If a suspicious object is found, one of the pair
can remain on guard while the other reports the find.
Searchers should be able to recognize suspicious items.
There should be a system for marking or recording “clean” areas
Searchers should maintain contact with the search controllers, perhaps by UHF / VHF
radio.
Searchers should have clear guidance on what to do if a suspect package, device, or
situation is found.
Searchers should bear in mind that weapons and other dangerous devices may be
intentionally placed to match its context as a means of disguise, such as a toolbox in an
engine room.
Participants in the course should be acquainted with the fact that there are many places on
board a ship where weapons, dangerous substances, and devices can be concealed. Some of
these are:
Cabins
Back sides and underneath drawers
Between bottom drawer and deck
Beneath bunks, e.g. taped to bunk frame under mattress

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 33 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
 Under wash basin
Behind removable medicine chest
Inside radios, recorders etc
Ventilator ducts
Inside heater units
Above or behind light fixtures
Above ceiling and wall panels
Cutouts behind bulkheads, pictures, etc.
False bottom clothes closets-hanging clothes
Inside wooden clothes hangers
Inside rolled socks, spare socks
Hollowed-out molding
Companionways
Ducts
Wire harnesses
Railings
Fire extinguishers
Fire hoses and compartments
Access panels in floors, walls, ceilings
Behind or inside water coolers, igloos
Toilet and Showers
Behind and under washbasins
Behind toilets
In ventilation ducts and heaters
Toilet tissue rollers, towel dispensers, supply lockers
Taped to shower curtains, exposed piping, and light fixtures
Access panels in floors, walls, ceiling

Deck
Ledges on deck housing, electrical switch rooms, winch control panels
Lifeboat storage compartments, under coiled rope, in deck storage rooms
Paint cans, cargo holds, battery rooms, chain lockers.
Engine room
Under deck plates
Cofferdams, machinery pedestals, bilges

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 34 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
 Journal-bearing shrouds and sumps on propeller shaft
Under catwalk, in bilges, in shaft alley
Escape ladders and ascending area.
In ventilation ducts, attached to piping or in tanks with false gauges.
Equipment boxes, emergency steering rooms, storage spaces.

Galleys and Stewards’ Stores

Flour bins and dry stores
Vegetable sacks, canned foods (re-glued labels)
Under or behind standard refrigerators
Inside fish or sides of beef in freezers
Bonded store lockers, slop chest, storage rooms.

7.4 Recognition, on a non-discriminatory basis, of persons posing potential security

risks
Instructors should explain suspicious patterns of behavior, while emphasizing the importance of
avoiding racial profiling and ethnic stereotyping. Examples of suspicious behaviors include:
Unknown persons photographing vessels or facilities.
Unknown persons attempting to gain access to vessels or facilities.
Suspicious individuals establishing businesses or roadside food stands either adjacent
or in proximity to facilities.
Unknown persons loitering in the vicinity of ships or port facilities for extended periods of
time.
Unknown persons telephoning facilities to ascertain security, personnel, or standard
operating procedures.
Vehicles with personnel in them loitering and perhaps taking photographs or creating
diagrams of vessels or facilities.
Small boats with personnel on board loitering and perhaps taking photographs or
creating diagrams of vessels or facilities.
Suspicious general aviation aircraft operating in proximity to vessels or facilities.
Suspicious persons who may be carrying bombs or participating in suicide squad
activities.
Unknown persons attempting to gain information about vessels or facilities by walking up
to personnel or their families and engaging them in a conversation.
Suspicious vendors attempting to sell merchandise.
Unknown or suspicious workmen trying to gain access to facilities to repair, replace,
service, or install equipment.
Suspicious emails on Internet, public affairs attempting to obtain information regarding
the facility, personnel, or standard operating procedures.

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 35 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
 Suspicious package drop-offs/attempted drop-offs.
Anti-national sentiments being expressed by employees or vendors.
Anti-national pamphlets or flyers distributed to employees or placed on windshields in
parking lots.
Repeated or suspicious out-of-ordinary phone calls.
Recreational boaters posing as mariners in distress to attract assistance from other
vessels.

7.5 Techniques used to circumvent security measures

Trainees should be cautioned that no security equipment or measure is infallible. They should
be apprised of the known techniques that can be employed to evade security systems and
controls, such as the disabling of alarm systems, picking of locks, jamming of radio signals, etc.

7.6 Crowd management and control techniques

Course participants should be familiarized with the basic patterns of behavior of people in
groups during time of crisis. The critical importance of clear communication with vessel
personnel, port facility personnel, passengers, and others involved should be underscored.

8 Ship Security Actions

In general, the “ship security actions” section of this course is material that both the Ship
Security Officer and the Company Security Officer should be very familiar with. The Port Facility
Security Officer will need a slightly different level of understanding and the model course for
Port Facility Security Officer varies in that respect. Parts A and B of the ISPS Code are helpful
in organizing material to be conveyed in this section of the course. Instructors should indicate
that this section of the course is where ideas, plans, and preparation turn into actions and
procedures.

8.1 Actions required by different security levels

The instructor should convey the different types of security measures that should be considered
for ships at sea and those in port as they respond to security incidents and the various security
levels that may be set. Feedback from or discussion among the trainees will help in deciding
whether or not the necessary knowledge is being conveyed. Trainees may benefit from an in-
class creation of a checklist detailing the appropriate generic actions given various conditions.

8.2 Maintaining security of the ship/port interface

The ship/port interface is defined in SOLAS Chapter XI-2 Regulation 1. It is this interface that
determines that a port facility exists and therefore determines the need for a Port Facility
Security Plan and the interaction with the Ship Security Plan. The setting of security levels by
the port or by the ship, with liaison services provided by the Company Security Officer, will allow
the Port Facility Security Officer and the Ship Security Officer to understand their duties and
constraints. Instructors should ensure that trainees are clear on the critical importance of the
interaction between the shipboard security plan and that of the port facility.

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 36 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
8.3 Usage of the Declaration of Security
The Declaration of Security is defined in Regulation 1 of SOLAS Chapter XI-1. The ISPS Code
further describes the function of the Declaration of Security, when it should be completed, who
may initiate it, and who is required to sign it. There is a sample Declaration of Security in
Appendix 1 of Part B of the ISPS Code, which may be helpful in explaining the nature and use
of the Declaration of Security.

8.4 Implementation of security procedures

Building on the understanding gained from previous sections in this course, trainees should be
ready to synthesize the requirements and plans into actual procedures such as security
inspections, controlling access to the ship, monitoring deck areas and areas surrounding the
ship, and so forth.

9 Emergency Preparedness, Drills, and Exercises

9.1 Contingency planning
This portion of the course is concerned with incident response planning for a variety of
contingencies associated with terrorism and other criminal activities that may arise in the
maritime setting. Appropriate action to be taken in the case of bomb threats, explosions, piracy,
hijackings, and similar events should be discussed.

9.2 Security drills and exercises

It should be conveyed to course participants that the objective of drills and exercises is to
ensure that shipboard personnel are proficient in all assigned security duties at all security
levels and in the identification of any security related deficiencies, which need to be addressed.
Trainees should learn that the effective implementation of the provisions of the ship security
plan requires that drills be conducted at least once every three months. In addition, in cases
where more than 25 percent of the ship’s personnel have been changed, at any one time, with
personnel that have not previously participated in any drill on that ship within the last 3 months,
a drill should be conducted within one week of the change. These drills should test individual
elements of the plan such as:
damage to, or destruction of, the ship or of a port facility, e.g. by explosive devices,
arson, sabotage or vandalism;
hijacking or seizure of the ship or of persons on board;
tampering with cargo, essential ship equipment or systems or ship’s stores;
unauthorized access or use, including presence of stowaways;
smuggling weapons or equipment, including weapons of mass destruction;
use of the ship to carry those intending to cause a security incident and/or their
equipment;
use of the ship itself as a weapon or as a means to cause damage or destruction;
attacks from seaward while at berth or at anchor; and
Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 37 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
 attacks while at sea.
Various types of exercises that may include participation of Company Security Officers, Port
Facility Security Officers, relevant authorities of Contracting Governments as well as Ship
Security Officers, if available, should be carried out at least once each calendar year with no
more than 18 months between the exercises. These exercises should test communications,
coordination, resource availability, and response. These exercises may be:
full scale or live;
tabletop simulation or seminar; or
combined with other exercises held such as search and rescue or emergency response
exercises.

9.3 Assessment of security drills and exercises

At the end of each drill or exercise, the Ship Security Officer shall review the drill or exercise,
and ensure that any mistakes made or deficiencies identified are corrected. All personnel
involved shall give their comments on the effectiveness of the drill to the Ship Security Officer.

10 Security Administration
10.1 Documentation and records
Drawing on Chapter XI-1 Regulation 5 and Chapter XI-2 of SOLAS the instructor will find
sufficient references to, and examples of, required documents as well as requirements for
record keeping. The International Ship Security Certificate should be the main emphasis here;
the Continuous Synopsis Record warrants coverage as well. Records of activities addressed in
the Ship Security Plan must be kept on board for certain time periods that are determined by
administrations. Section 10 of the ISPS Code Part A is very useful on the subject of records.

10.2 Reporting security incidents

Trainees will appreciate that all security incidents must be reported in accordance with specific
reporting requirements. It may be helpful to for instructors to provide several sample security
incidents and have the class or individuals explain how they would go about reporting these
incidents.

10.3 Monitoring and control

Here the focus of monitoring is on the Ship Security Plan itself. Proper administration of the
plan requires that the Master and the Ship Security Officer review the Ship Security Plan and
measure its effectiveness and relevance over time.

10.4 Security audits and inspections

In a fashion similar to the ISM Code the IMO requires that audits and inspections be conducted
to formally assess the effectiveness of the Ship Security Plan in all respects. The ISPS Code
provides sufficient material for instruction in this area.

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 38 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
10.5 Reporting nonconformities
The audit, inspection, and periodic review process required by the ISPS Code naturally calls for
a means of identifying, communicating, and rectifying non-conformities. Both the Ship Security
Officer and the Company Security Officer play key roles in this effort to keep the Ship Security
Plan in an optimum condition.

11 Security Training
11.1 Training requirements
The training requirements set out under the ISPS Code can be found in Parts A and B of the
Code and should be explained briefly to the trainees. Instructors should clarify, in this brief
amount of time, the requirements for who needs to be trained, what the training consists of, and
where the responsibility lies for the training of various persons involved in maritime security.

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 39 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
 Part E: Evaluation
Introduction

The effectiveness of any evaluation depends on the accuracy of the description of what is to be
measured.

The learning objectives that are used in the detailed teaching syllabus will provide a sound base
for the construction of suitable tests for evaluating trainee progress.

Method of evaluation

The methods chosen to carry out an evaluation will depend upon what the trainee is expected to
achieve in terms of knowing, comprehending and applying the course content.

The methods used can range from a simple question-and-answer discussion with the trainees
(either individually or as a group) to prepared tests requiring the selection of correct or best
responses from given alternatives, the correct matching of given items, the supply of short
answers or the supply of more extensive written responses to prepared questions.

Where the course content is aimed at the acquisition of practical skills, the test would involve a
practical demonstration by the trainee making use of appropriate equipment, tools, etc.
The responses demanded may therefore consist of:

the recall of facts or information, by viva-voce or objective tests

the practical demonstration of an attained skill
the oral or written description of procedures or activities
the identification and use of data from sketches, drawings, maps, charts, etc.
carrying out calculations to solve numerical problems
the writing of an essay or report.

Validity

The evaluation must be based on clearly defined objectives, and it must truly represent what is
to be measured. There must be a reasonable balance between the subject topics involved and
also in the testing of trainees’ KNOWLEDGE, COMPREHENSION and APPLICATION of
concepts.

The time allocated for the trainee to provide a response is very important. Each question or task
must be properly tested and validated before it is used to ensure that the test will provide a fair
and valid evaluation.

Reliability

To be reliable, an evaluation procedure should produce reasonably consistent results no matter

which set of papers or version of the test is used.

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 40 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
 Subjective testing

Traditional methods of evaluation require the trainee to demonstrate what has been learned by
stating or writing formal answers to questions.

Such evaluation is subjective in that it invariably depends upon the judgement of the evaluator.
Different evaluators can produce quite different scores when marking the same paper or
evaluating oral answers.

Objective testing

A variety of objective tests have been developed over the years. Their common feature is that
the evaluation does not require a judgement by the evaluator. The response is either right or
wrong.

One type of objective test involves supplying an answer, generally a single word, to complete
the missing portion of a sentence. Another involves supplying a short answer of two or three
words to a question. Such tests are known as ‘completion tests’ and ‘short answer tests’.

Another form of objective testing consists of ‘selective response tests’ in which the correct, or
best, response must be selected from given alternatives. Such tests may consist of ‘matching
tests’, in which items contained in two separate lists must be matched, or they may be of the
true/false type or of the multiple-choice type.

The most flexible form of objective test is the multiple-choice test, which presents the trainee
with a problem and a list of alternative solutions, from which he must select the most
appropriate.

Distracters

The incorrect alternatives in multiple-choice questions are called ‘distracters’, because their
purpose is to distract the uninformed trainee from the correct response. The distracter must be
realistic and should be based on misconceptions commonly held, or on mistakes commonly
made.

The options “none of the above” or “all of the above” are used in some tests. These can be
helpful, but should be used sparingly.

Distracters should distract the uninformed, but they should not take the form of ‘trick’ questions
that could mislead the knowledgeable trainee (for example, do not insert “not” into a correct
response to make it a distracter).

Guess factor

The ‘guess factor’ with four alternative responses in a multiple-choice test would be 25%. The
pass mark chosen for all selective-response questions should take this into account.

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 41 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
 Scoring

In simple scoring of objective tests one mark may be allotted to each correct response and zero
for a wrong or nil response.

A more sophisticated scoring technique entails awarding one mark for a correct response, zero
for a nil response and minus one for an incorrect response. Where a multiple-choice test
involves four alternatives, this means that a totally uninformed guess involves a 25% chance of
gaining one mark and a 75% chance of losing one mark.

Scores can be weighted to reflect the relative importance of questions, or of sections of an

evaluation.

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 42 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
 Information Requested of Instructors Who
Implement IMO Model Courses
Introduction
1 IMO model courses are periodically revised to take into account the changes which have
taken place in relevant Conventions, resolutions and other matters affecting each course. To
help IMO to improve the content of courses when they are revised, the assistance of all
instructors who implement or participate in implementing courses is requested, whether the
implementation is part of an IMO technical co-operation project or part of a Maritime Training
Academy’s regular programme.

Information requested and its format

2 To simplify their consolidation by IMO, the technical comments and suggestions for the
improvement of model courses should follow the format that is outlined below. If no comments
or suggestions are to be provided under a topic, please insert “no comment” against the item.

3 Please identify:

.1 the course number and title;

.2 the date and location of its implementation;
.3 the approximate number of IMO model courses you have implemented to date; and
.4 the approximate number of times you have implemented this particular model course.

4 In commenting on Part A – Course Framework, please comment on the items (‘Scope’,

‘Objectives’, etc.) in the order in which they appear in the course; in all cases, please indicate:

.1 the number of participants who met the entry standards and the number who did not;
.2 the course intake and, if the recommendations in ‘Course intake limitations’ were
exceeded, the reasons for this and your observations on the effect of this on the
quality of the course;
.3 if the conditions under ‘Staff requirements’ were met; if not, please indicate the nature
of the deficiency and give your observations of the effect of this on the quality of
presentation of the course; and
.4 any lack of equipment or facilities as compared with the recommendations under
‘Teaching facilities and equipment’ and your observations of the effect of this lack on
the quality of presentation of the course.

5 In commenting on Part B – Course Outline, please bear in mind that minor variations in time
allocations are inevitable. Major difficulties with allocations of time and any omissions or
redundancies of subject areas should be briefly explained.

6 In commenting on Part C – Detailed Teaching Syllabus, please identify the specific learning
objectives concerned by their paragraph numbers.

7 In commenting on Part D – Instructor’s Manual, please clearly identify the section

concerned. If the bibliography or the practical exercises are found to be unsatisfactory, please

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 43 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)
identify suitable alternative texts, as far as is possible, or outline alternative exercises, as
appropriate.

8 Any further comments or suggestions you may have which fall outside the scope of the items
listed above may be added at the end. In particular, your views on the usefulness of the course
material to you in implementing the course would be appreciated, as would the contribution to
IMO of any additional teaching material you found useful in implementing it.

Please address your comments to:

Maritime Safety Division
International Maritime Organization
4 Albert Embankment
London SE1 7SR
U.K.
[Telefax (+) 44 171 587 3210]

Security-Sensitive Document DRAFT Page 44 of 48

(This draft model course is under review by an IMO Validation Panel until 31 July 2003. It will be finalized
by the course developers and submitted to the Secretariat in camera-ready format by 8 September 2003.)