62

PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT, petitioner,

vs

SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, respondent.

G.R. NO. 103144

APRIL 4, 2001

FACTS: Private respondents, who were recruited by Philsa for employment in Saudi Arabia, were required to
pay placement fees. After the execution of their respective work contracts, private respondents left for Saudi
Arabia. While in Saudi Arabia, private respondents were allegedly made to sign a second contract which changed
some of the provisions of their original contract resulting in the reduction of some of their benefits and privileges.
Their foreign employer forced them to sign a third contract which increased their work hours from 48 hours to
60 hours a week without any corresponding increase in their basic monthly salary. When they refused to sign
this third contract, the services of private respondents were terminated and they were repatriated to the
Philippines. Upon their arrival in the Philippines, private respondents demanded from Philsa the return of their
placement fees and for the payment of their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contract. When Philsa
refused, they filed a case before the POEA against Philsa on the grounds of illegal dismissal, payment of salary
differentials, illegal deduction/withholding of salaries, illegal exactions/refund of placement fees, and contract
substitution. Philsa insists, however, that it cannot be held liable for the POEA Memorandum Circular No. 11 and
2. Series of 1983, which enumerated the allowable fees which may be collected from applicants, is void for lack
publication.

ISSUE: Whether or not Philsa’s contention is correct.

RULING: The assailed issuances upon which private respondents based their cause of action were not published
or filed with the National Administrative Register as required by the Administrative Code of 1987. Hence, Philsa
is not liable.
 63

BAUTISTA

Vs

AGUSTIN
 64

TERESITA G. FABIAN, petitioner,

vs

NESTOR V. AGUSTIN, respondent.

G.R. No. 143092

FEBRUARY 14, 2003

FACTS: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated May 8, 2000 in CA G.R. SP No. 49182, Teresita G. Fabian vs. Hon. Aniano Desierto, et al.

The instant controversy arose from the verified letter-complaint[1] dated July 24, 1995 filed by Teresita Fabian,
petitioner, with the Office of the Ombudsman, charging Nestor Agustin, herein respondent, with grave
misconduct, disgraceful and immoral acts, and oppression.

Petitioner alleged therein that she was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction and
Development Corporation (PROMAT) engaged in construction business. In 1986, PROMAT participated in the
various biddings for the construction of government projects within the First Metro Manila Engineering District
(FMED) of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). Respondent is the incumbent District
Engineer of the FMED.

Petitioner further averred that respondent became a persistent suitor and refused to deal with PROMATs liaison
officer, insisting that she personally attend to her company’s projects with FMED, otherwise, her papers would
get stuck in his office. Respondent relentlessly pursued her and one time invited her to a snack at the Philippine
Plaza Hotel. After finishing her drink, she felt dizzy. Taking advantage of her semi-conscious state, he brought
her to a motel and raped her. That was the beginning of a hateful relationship. Her attempts to extricate herself
proved futile since he constantly warned her that PROMAT would no longer do business with FMED unless the
relationship continues.

On January 31, 1996, Graft Investigation Officer Eduardo Benitez issued a Resolution finding respondent guilty
of grave misconduct and irregular or immoral acts and ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of
all benefits under the law.

On February 27, 1996, then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved with modification the said Resolution
(reviewed by Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera) in the sense that respondent was found guilty only of
misconduct and that the penalty was reduced from dismissal from office to suspension without pay for one (1)
year.

Both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration. In his Order dated June 19, 1996, Graft
Investigation Officer Benitez denied respondents motion and reiterated his assailed Order. Graft Investigation
Officer Rafaelito H. Imperial and Legal Officer Andrew F. Ammuyutan likewise recommended that respondent
be found guilty of grave misconduct and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal from the service.

Before the parties motions for reconsideration were resolved, Atty. Amador Casino, a classmate and close
associate of Ombudsman Desierto, entered his appearance as counsel for the respondent. Forthwith,
Ombudsman Desierto inhibited himself and designated then Deputy Ombudsman Jesus Guerrero to resolve the
motions.

On June 18, 1997, Deputy Ombudsman Guerrero issued a Joint Order, dismissing the administrative complaint.

Simply stated, the Court of Appeals, in its assailed Amended Decision, held that since petitioner failed to prove
her charges by substantial evidence, her complaint must be dismissed. Pursuant to Section 27 of RA 6770 (The
Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman), the Joint Order of Deputy Ombudsman Guerrero dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence is, therefore, final and unappealable.

From the above Amended Decision, petitioner now appeals to this Court, contending that the Court of Appeals
erred in affirming the Guerrero Joint Order. She contends that she was able to prove her charges by substantial
evidence. For his part, respondent maintains that the petition raises only questions of fact which are not proper
for review by this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Court of Appeals is final and unappealable.

RULING: While we agree with respondent that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari, however, there are recognized exceptions to this rule, among which, is when there is a conflict
between the factual findings of the trial court and that of the appellate court. In such case, this Court is bound
to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below.

Here, it is undisputed that the discord in the factual findings existed not only at the Ombudsman level, but even
at the Appellate Court. First, it must be recalled that: (1) In his Resolution of January 31, 1996, Graft
Investigation Officer Eduardo Benitez found respondent guilty of grave misconduct as well as irregular or immoral
acts and recommended his dismissal from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits under the law; (2) Graft
Investigator and Legal Officer Andrew Ammuyutan made similar finding and recommendation; (3) Then
Ombudsman Desierto, approved the said finding and recommendation with modification in the sense that the
offense is only misconduct and that the penalty is suspension from office for one (1) year without pay; (4)
Eventually, Deputy Ombudsman Guerrero dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. Second, the
Court of Appeals, in its original Decision, reinstated Ombudsman Desiertos Order dated February
26, 1996 finding respondent guilty of misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of suspension from the
service for one (1) year without pay. Later, the Court of Appeals rendered an Amended Decision, this time,
affirming the Guerrero Joint Order dismissing the administrative complaint for insufficiency of evidence.

Such conflict in the factual findings compels this Court to deviate from the general rule and review the evidence
obtaining in this case.

In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence is required to hold respondent liable for the charges
against him. Here, we are convinced that petitioners charges are supported by substantial evidence
jurisprudentially defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.We quote with approval the following findings and observations of Graft Investigation Officer Benitez,
sustained by the Court of Appeals in its original Decision, thus:

The complainants evidence and respondents admissions stand for the requisite substantial evidence which in an
unprejudiced mind reasonably supports a conclusion that indeed the administrative offenses, subject of the
complaint had been committed. The uncontroverted facts show that respondent courted complainant and
established intimate relationship with her. On account of that affair, or at least in the course thereof, her firm
was awarded a number of contracts by the office of which respondent was the head. From these contracts even
the respondent averted that she derived windfall profits. Times were, through complainants persuasion,
respondent interceded for complainants firm whenever it was involved in contract violations. This alone
constitutes grave misconduct in office.

We thus find respondent guilty of grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral acts and oppression. Indeed, by
his conduct, respondent violated the policy of the State to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service.
Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. Public
servants must bear in mind this constitutional mandate at all times to guide them in their actions during their
entire tenure in the government service.
 65

MOISES S. SAMSON, petitioner,

G.R. No. 117741

SEPTEMBER 29, 2004

FACTS: This petition for certiorari and mandamus seeks the reversal of public respondent Office of the
Ombudsman Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureaus: [1] joint resolution dated May 27, 1994 (joint
resolution)[1] which dismissed petitioner Moises S. Samsons complaint (docketed as OMB-0-93-0920) against
private respondents Dr. Leonito L. Catarroja and Norma Sanchez for allegedly printing and issuing health
certificates sans serial numbers and official receipts to applicants without prior medical examination, in violation
of RA 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), as well as private respondents counter-charges against
petitioner for libel, falsification and perjury (docketed as OMB-0-93-3107), and [2] order dated August 26,
1994[2] which denied petitioners motion for partial reconsideration of said joint resolution.

Private respondents counter-alleged that petitioner had neither the personality to sue nor personal knowledge
of the veracity of the complaint, which was mere hearsay, not having been supported by any affidavit from the
purportedly affected, if not fictitious, health certificate applicants or sanitary inspectors. Also, petitioner did not
present any of his witnesses before the investigating committee created by then Quezon City Mayor Ismael
Mathay. Thus, private respondents filed counter-charges against petitioner for libel, falsification and perjury.

On May 27, 1994, public respondent, through Graft Investigation Officer Lamberto G. Sagum, issued a joint
resolution dismissing the cases filed by both parties.

Mr. Raul R. Arnau and Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr. reviewed and later on endorsed the
aforesaid joint resolution to Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa, who approved it on June 22, 1994.

The public respondent, in its August 26, 1994 order, approved by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Villa on September
9, 1994, denied petitioners motion for partial reconsideration of the joint resolution with respect to the dismissal
of OMB-0-93-0920.

Hence, this petition imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent for dismissing OMB-0-
93-0920, a supposedly prima facie graft case against private respondents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
case against private respondents.

RULING: For private respondents to be held criminally liable under paragraph (b) of Section 3 of RA 3019, they
must have requested or received, directly or indirectly, any gift or benefit for themselves or for another public
officer who has to intervene in any contract or transaction with the government. Under paragraph (e), they must
have given unwarranted benefits with evident bad faith, gross inexcusable negligence or manifest partiality.
Under paragraph (h), they must have had a financial interest, directly or indirectly, in any transaction in which
they took part in their official function or in any transaction in which they were prohibited by the Constitution or
any law from having any interest therein.

The Constitution and RA 6770 (the Ombudsman Act of 1989) endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with a
wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutorial powers, virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial
intervention, in order to insulate it from outside pressure and improper influence.
Furthermore, the calibration of evidence to asses whether a prima facie graft case exists against private
respondents is a question of fact. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more so in the consideration of the
extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither questions of fact nor law are entertained, but only questions of
lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.

Finally, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board,
or person against whom the action is taken, unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station, or [b] that such court, officer, board or
person has unlawfully excluded the petitioner from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is
entitled. Mandamus will lie to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty but not to compel the performance
of a discretionary duty requiring the exercise of judgment, as in this case.