Skylab Mission Report, First Visit
Skylab Mission Report, First Visit
Skylab Mission Report, First Visit
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FIRST VISIT
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DEPARTMENTOF COMMERCE
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FIRST VISIT
PREPARED BY
APPROVED BY
Kenneth S. Kleinknecht
Manager, Skylab Program
HOUSTON, TEXAS
August 1973
I
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Saturn Workshop
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FOREWORD
The program activity was planned for four distinct phases of opera-
tion:
TABLEOF CONTENTS
Section Page
PART I
PART II
4 2
•
MEDIC_ E_ERIMENTS ••eeeeeeee•eeeee
4-4
Section Page
4.2.7 Hemotalogy (Experiments MIll, MII2, MII3,
MII4 and MII5) ............... 4-8
4.2.8 Experiment MI31 - HumanVestibular
Function .................. 4-9
4.2.9 Experiment M133- Sleep Monitoring ..... 4-10
4.2.10 Experiment MI51 - Time and Motion Study... 4-11
4.2.11 Experiment MI71 - Metabolic Activity .... 4-11
4.3 EARTHOBSERVATIONS
................. 4-13
Section Page
6.2 MEDICAL EQUIPMENT...........
OPERATIONAL 6-3
6.2.1 Inflight Medical Support System ...... 6-3
6.2.2 Operational Bioinstrumentation System . . . 6-3
6.2.3 CarbonDioxide/Dew Point Monitor ...... 6-3
6.2.4 CarbonMonoxide Sensor ........... 6-4
6.2.5 Toluene Diisocyanate Monitor ........ 6-4
7.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULES ...... . ........ 7-1
Section Page
Section Page
Section Page
15.2 IMPLEMENTATION
................... 15-1
15.3 ASSESSMENT
..................... 15-7
16.0 LAUNCH PHASE SUMMARY ................... 16-1
Section Page
17.3 GOVERNMENT
FURNISHED
EQUIPMENT
ANOMALIES
...... 17-65
17.3.1 Blown Fuses in 70 mmCameraDuring
Film Transport ............... 17-65
17.3.2 70 mmCameraFrame Counter Failed ..... 17-67
17.3.3 Television CameraFailed .......... 17-68
17.3.4 Spotted Images Observedon Television
GroundMonitor ............... 17-72
17.3.5 Carbon Dioxide Meter/DewPoint
Monitor Failed ............... 17-76
17.3.6 Van Allen Belt Dosimeter Data Exhibited
Periodic Spurious Excursions ........ 17-79
17.3.7 Erratic Operation of 35 mmCamera
Incrementing FrameCounter ......... 17-80
18.0 CONCLUSIONS ....................... 18-1
Section Page
APPENDIX
C- POSTFLIGHT TESTING ................. C-I
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The payload shroud was jettisoned and the Apollo Telescope Mount and
its solar array were deployed as planned during the first orbit. Deploy-
ment of the Orbital Workshop solar array and the meteoroid shield were
not successful. Evaluation of the available data indicated that the fol-
lowing sequence of events and failures occurred.
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The solar array wing was released; however, there were indications
that the wing had not fully deployed. Wing 2 was inoperative or encoun-
tered structural failure. Temperature excursions in the Orbital Workshop
showed that the meteoroid shield was not affecting the temperatures as
intended. The remainder of the planned Orbital Workshop system activ-
ation and deployment functions occurred as scheduled with transfer of at-
titude control from the Instrument Unit to the Saturn Workshop approxi-
mately 4 1/2 hours after lift-off.
The electrical power available from the Apollo Telescope Mount solar
array was further reduced by the requirement to cycle certain power regu-
lator modules on and off to prevent the overheating caused by unplanned
vehicle attitudes. Although considerably below the total design capabil-
ity of approximately 8500 watts, the power was sufficient for the criti-
cal loads. Many components and systems were turned off or were cycled as
required to remain within the power generation capability.
The high internal temperatures that were reached in the Workshop can
cause outgassing of some materials which could have been hazardous to the
crew. Therefore, prior to the crew arrival, the habitation area was de-
pressurized and repressurized four times with nitrogen to purge the out-
gassing products. The final repressurization was with the proper oxygen/
nitrogen mixture for the crew.
PART II
FIRST VISIT
PARTII
1.0 INTRODUCTION
2.0 SUMMARY
The originally scheduled launch time was i0 days earlier, on May 15,
1973; however, thermal problems encountered with the Orbital Workshop ne-
cessitated the rapid design and construction of supplemental hardware to
be transported by the firs= manned vehicle. The intervening period was
also used for intensive crew training in new and modified procedures and
for restowing the command module with items which were considered to have
been damaged by the elevated temperatures.
The second mannedday was focused toward entry into the Saturn Work-
shop. The crew removedand inspected the docking probe and drogue, and
then entered the Multiple Docking Adapter to activate the Airlock Module
and the Multiple Docking Adapter systems. The Orbital Workshopatmosphere
was habitable, though hot, and the crew found no particular discomfort in
working in the environment for I0 to 15 minute intervals.
A Skylab parasol, designed to thermally protect the area exposed to
the sun by the missing meteoroid shield, was deployed through the solar
scientific airlock about 5 hours into the second workday. As a result,
the internal Orbital Workshop temperatures began decreasing. The command
module was then unstowed and all systems were deactivated except for those
which were required to support the Workshop and to maintain minimum com-
mand and service module requirements.
The crew established the Workshop manning routine and, for the next
Ii days, performed scientific and medical experiments under a reduced power
profile. During a 3 1/2 hour extravehicular activity on mission day 13,
the Commander and Science Pilot freed and deployed beam i and its solar
array. Adequate power was then available in the Saturn Workshop at return
to near normal activities.
The command module was reactivated on the last visit day and, after
donning suits, the crew performed the final Saturn Workshop closeout,
entered the command module, and undocked. A flyaround of the Saturn Work-
shop was performed to inspect and photograph it.
The command module separated from the vicinity of the Saturn Work-
shop at 09:40:00 G.m.t. on visit day 29, and all entry events were nor-
mal. The command module landed in the Pacific Ocean approximately 1300
kilometers southwest of San Diego, California. The time of landing was
13:49:49 G.m.t. on visit day 29, and the spacecraft was within visual
range of the recovery ship, the USS Ticonderoga. The command module re-
mained in a stable i attitude (upright) and the first visit terminated
when the spacecraft and crew were aboard the recovery ship about 40 min-
utes after landing. The total flight time of the first visit was 672
hours 49 minutes and 49 seconds.
3-1
The Skylab parasol (fig. 3-1) was launched with the first visit
spacecraft. The parasol provided thermal shielding for the area of the
Orbital Workshop which was exposed to the sun because of the missing me-
teoroid shield. The parasol concept, design, development, construction
and delivery to the Kennedy Space Center were accomplished within 7 days
by the Johnson Space Center. Two other thermal protection devices were
also devised and delivered during this same time period. One was a sail,
produced by the Johnson Space Center, and designed to be deployed by an
extravehicular crewman standing in the command module hatch while the
spacecraft was being flown in close proximity to the Orbital Workshop.
The other, called a twin boom sunshade, produced by the Marshall Space
Flight Center, was designed to be deployed by extravehicular crewmen
from the Apollo Telescope Mount station.
Figure 3-2 shows the packed parasol. Figure 3-3 shows the deployed
parasol. The parasol concept made use of a spare experiment T027 can-
ister which was designed to interface with the solar scientific air lock.
The seal design used in the back plate of the experiment canister was in-
corporated into a new back plate required for the parasol. This allowed
the use of deployment rods which were of the same type used for experi-
ment deployment, and also allowed use of the experiment T027 photometer
ejection rod, if jettisoning becomes necessary.
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which are extended several centimeters in locking the rod sections to-
gether (fig. 3-5). Release of these retainers with the spring fully
stretched imparts a shock force on the rod locks. The design is such
that shock loading can trip the lock. The design of the rod locks and
retainers on the new parasol has been changed to provide a more positive
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4-1
4.0 SCIENCE
Three experiments were planned for the first visit in the solar
physics and astrophysics areas. These were experiment S019 (Ultraviolet
Stellar Astronomy), experiment S020 (Ultraviolet X-Ray Solar Photography),
and experiment S149 (Particle Collection). All of these experiments were
to be performed through the scientific airlocks. Experiment S019 was to
be conducted through the anti-solar airlock, experiment S020 through the
solar airlock, and experiment S149 through both airlocks. The solar air-
lock was used during the entire mission by the Skylab parasol; conse-
quently, this eliminated the performance of experiment S020 and limited
the performance of experiment S149. Experiment S019 was not directly af-
fected by the loss of the solar airlock, but changes in the flight plan
indirectly resulted in completion of only a portion of the originally
planned passes.
Data were collected on three and one-half passes for the S019 exper-
iment. One additional pass was used for calibration and one additional
data taking pass was used for student experiment ED23 (Ultraviolet from
Quasars).
During the initial activation of the S019 experiment, the tilt mech-
anism was found jammed. The jamming was isolated to interference between
the tilt display gear clamp screw and the aluminum cover. A repair pro-
cedure teleprinted from the ground corrected the problem and restored the
experiment to normal operation. Details of this anomaly are given in sec-
tion 17.2.3.
That is, 270 second exposures are accomplished in about 220 seconds. This
results in a loss of about 0.2 in limiting magnitude and is of minor sig-
nificance. No adjustments are possible on the flight hardware. The sec-
ond problem is irregularity of widening. This may result from external
disturbances. The second visit crew has been advised not to touch the
spectrograph during exposures. Likewise, it has been emphasized that crew
motion should be kept to a mininum during exposures. An error in opera-
ting procedures during the first prism on pass prevented exposure. How-
ever, confirmation of experiment pointing, which was the primary objective
of this pass, was accomplished.
The two no prism passes were degraded by spacecraft motion. The mo-
tion amountedto about 0.026 radian per hour. This motion was probably
caused by a trim maneuvershortly before the S019passes.
During postflight testing, a leak was found in the film canister
around the reticle seal of the eyepiece. The leak and the exposure to
high temperatures contributed to background fog. However, no loss of
data resulted from this condition.
After crew departure, the experiment was deployed for data collec-
tion until docking on the second manned visit. Deployment and retrac-
tion are ground commanded. Deployment was normal.
4-3
TABLE4-1.- SUMMARY
OF S019 SCIENTIFIC RESULTS
Fog rise above lab film base fog . . . 0.05 densitometric units
4.2 MEDICALEXPERIMENTS
Although the preliminary medical data thus far have pointed out the
need for specific protocol and equipment modifications, none of the changes
noted in the crewmembers during flight and subsequent to flight were felt
to represent any unmanageable health or operational problems.
The foods eaten during the 31 day preflight period, the 28 day in-
flight period, and a 17 day postflight period were based on individual
crew preference and selection. A complete record of the exact intake of
all nutrients was kept for the whole of this time. The volume and chemi-
cal constituents of the water used during this time were also monitored.
All urine and feces during the 31 day preflight period were analyzed.
Blood samples were obtained for the analysis of selected constituents.
All the feces were dried and returned to the ground for analysis. The
urine specimens were sampled and the frozen samples were returned to the
ground for analysis. Urine and feces collection continued for 17 days
after the flight.
Inflight caloric intakes were 200 to 300 kilocalories less than pre-
flight baseline values, but close to the anticipated levels. The average
weight loss was 5.5 percent of total body weight. The disproportionate
measured loss of leg volume and total body stereophotogrammetry suggests
that muscular atrophy is responsible for some of the weight loss.
Evaluation of the recovery day data did not show a significant loss
of bone mineral during the 28 days of weightlessness.
Heart rate at rest tended to vary from test to test, and was gener-
ally comparable to preflight rates. The stressed heart rate in all crew-
men became higher in a somewhat cyclic pattern during flight without def-
inite evidence of a leveling-off trend. Blood pressure changes at rest
4-7
usually were within preflight ranges. In each crewman, lower body nega-
tive pressure stress caused either diastolic pressure or pulse pressure
to become lower, again periodically, but particularly in the latter half
of the flight. Changes in the heart rate and blood pressure responses to
lower body negative pressure were largel_confined to the high stress
levels.
Recovery day cardiac X-rays show a decrease in heart size with the
Commander showing the least change and the Science Pilot the most.
Data shows only minor changes during the inflight phase of the visit
and more marked changes during the postflight period. With the exception
of increased heart rates in the postflight period, the electrocardio-
graphic changes observed were not consistently present in all crewmen,
nor were any changes associated with clinically significant patterns.
4-8
4.2.7 Hematology
The inflight blood collection system was utilized four times during
the first visit. During each use, blood was drawn from each crewman,
transferred to the automatic sample processor, centrifuged and placed in
frozen storage. For the first and last sampling, a small vial of blood
with a fixative was also prepared. The hardware performed normally.
However, a minor procedural changewas madeto leave the automatic sample
processor on the vacuumadapter until ready to inject the blood. This
prevented leakage in the automatic sample processor. The centrifuge and
automatic sample processor worked normally. All automatic sample proc-
essor samples of plasma and cells were good.
Each of the crewmenhad blood drawn as shownin the following table.
4.2.7.3 Experiment MII3 - Blood Volume and Red Cell Life Span.-
Experiment MII3 is designed to determine the effect of weightlessness on
plasma volume and red blood cell populations.
The major changes in experiment data from the preflight baseline are
as follows :
a. Mean red cell mass decreased about 14 percent. Data are not yet
available to determine if this was a hemolytic event or inhibition of
erythropoiesis.
Preliminary sleep stage analysis shows that the rapid eye movement
stage, which is the period strongly associated with dreaming, averaged
22.2 percent prior to flight and was 19.7 percent during flight, an in-
significant change. Stage 1 was 5.3 percent prior to flight, and 4.4
percent in flight. Stage 3 also exhibited little change, averaging 14.8
percent prior to flight and 16.2 percent during the mission. Stages 2
and 4 do show a change, however, which, while it appears to be signifi-
cant, does not imply a degradation in sleep quality. Stage 2 decreased,
but stage 4, which was only 2.9 percent prior to flight, rose to 16.5
percent in flight_.
The inflight protocol was run every 4 to 5 days during the 28 day
mission and the following parameters were measured: heart rate, blood
pressure, respiratory gas exchange (oxygen consumption, carbon dioxide
production, minute volume), and electrical activity of the heart. Addi-
tional preflight and postflight measurements included: cardiac output,
carotid pulse, and vibrocardiogram.
The lap and shoulder harness restraint was very difficult to use in
zero g. Consequently, the crew did not use the restraint and, instead,
found that the best method to restrain themselves. The crew used tri-
angle shoes, which lock into the bicycle pedal structure, or they put
their hands against the ceiling during the pedaling process or used the
normal handlebar configuration.
4-12
4.3 EARTH
OBSERVATIONS
Some contamination of the aft lens element (reseau pla£e) was evident
on all stations. This contamination resulted from particulate material
appearing at random locations in the image area and was usually transient
in nature. However, some remained for an entire pass, but was usually
dislodged when the magazine was removed. The crew reported that the re-
seau plates were cleaned only once during the visit. Accumulation of
emulsion dust had been anticipated as a result of ground tests, but the
accumulation was minor and had a negligible effect on the data.
4-14
A "hissing" noise was heard while using the spare magazine. This
condition is attributed to a leak in the vacuumline connection as dis-
cussed in section 17.2.5.
The long wavelength (far infrared) data were degraded during the
first five passes because of high detector temperatures. This resulted
from improper thermal conditioning of the cryogenic cooler and, conse-
quently, insufficient cooling of the detector prior to starting the data
passes. Proper thermal conditioning of the cryogenic cooler was achieved
prior to the beginning of the sixth pass, because more electrical power
was available. After achieving proper cooler operating temperature, data
acquisition was normal.
The television camera was operated twice with the viewfinder tracking
system. Operation was normal except for the presence of random spots in
the picture. This condition was attributed to the television system and
is discussed in section 17.3.4.
4-16
The alignment of the thermal channel had shifted from its calculated
setting. The crew performed a thermal realignment, but the focus control
reached its mechanical stop before a peak reading was obtained. Data
indicate that the thermal channel is giving an estimated resolution of
about 3.2 ° K versus the specification value of 1.25 ° K.
The altimeter nadir alignment did not function properly on the first
pass because the Workshop attitude was too far off the nadir. Recon-
struction of the altimeter return pulse shape from the sample and hold
gate data on the first attempt did not match the expected return. Fur-
ther analysis verified that the data were valid. The return pulse shape
was distorted due to decreasing altitude, off nadir attitude angles, and
the associated delay in the tracker's ability to follow the changes in
altitude.
As expected, the altimeter lost lock many times over land, especi-
ally over rough terrain, and at land-water interfaces. Operation over
water was excellent since the altimeter was designed for this type of
operation.
Two reels of tape are being resupplied for the second visit. This
is required to replace one reel of tape which was returned for ground test
and one reel of tape which camefrom a knownbad web.
5-1
5.1 ENGINEERING
The maneuvering unit was not operated on the first visit because of
the uncertain condition of the batteries. The 322 ° to 327 ° K temperature
inside the Orbital Workshop during the first i0 days of the visit caused
concern that the batteries may have been damaged. Subsequent analyses
and tests have shown that the batteries are acceptable, subject to veri-
fication of cell voltages.
Despite the initial heat, the crew adapted extremely well and, with
a portable fan pulling hot air out of the Orbital Workshop toward the
Multiple Docking Adapter, they moved in and set up housekeeping. They
used both digital temperature sensors and the ambient thermometers to
track air temperature and surface temperature through the first several
days. The crew did get cold in the Multiple Docking Adapter and wore
the Jacket when on station at the Apollo Telescope Mount.
5-2
The crewmenwere quite mobile and were able to translate from point
to point accurately and efficiently. Restraint at various points was es-
sential to the effective conduct of the operations to be done there and,
for the most part, the inventory of restraint devices served well. In
someinstances, however, a more positive meansof retention was deemed
desirable. For example, the Velcro lap belt on the MI31 experiment chain
did not keep the crewmenfrom having unwantedbody excursions during
chair rotation. Also, the harness arrangement for the bicycle ergometer
was ineffective in retaining the crewmenin the proper position. For
normal activities, as a matter of convenience, the crewmenused the toes
of their shoes in addition to the cleats on the bottoms of the shoes as
a meansof temporary restraint. This use of the shoe led to abrasion of
the toe area, necessitating inflight repair with tape.
5-3
The crew's comments concerning the interface between the food and
the wardroom was that it was absolutely impossible to prepare and consume
food without a good deal of spattering. The room where this takes place
should be as spatter-proof as possible with solid flat features like the
waste management compartment rather than the nooks and crannies of the
wardroom with its open grid ceiling and floor. A lot of the debris es-
capes and makes cleaning a chore.
The primary leisure activities were earth watching out the window
and personal exploitation of the wonders of zero g. A favorite pastime
was listening to taped music.
5.2 TECHNOLOGY
6.1 FOOD
Food and water to support three visits were launched in the Orbital
Workshop. The initial food and accessory weight of 952 kilograms is di-
vided into five food categories: dehydrated food, intermediate moisture
food, thermostabilized food, frozen food, and beverages. The initial on-
board water weight of 2722 kilograms was stored in 10 circumferentially
located stainless steel storage tanks. The non-frozen foods were designed
to be stable and wholesome for periods of up to 2 years at temperatures
below 303 ° K. However, ambient food locker temperatures were recorded
at up to 333 ° K during the first 2 weeks after launch. Also, after Or-
bital Workshop deactivation, food freezer temperatures indicated an equip-
ment malfunction (temperatures up to 265 ° K were recorded). The cause
of the malfunction was not determined, but the temperatures began to re-
turn to specification ranges after manipulation of controls by ground
command.
The following food itmes will be supplied on the second Skylab visit:
a. Onehundred fifty catsup servings.
c. Spices (to improve the bland food taste noted by the first visit
crewmen).
6.2 MEDICAL
OPERATIONAL EQUIPMENT
The drugs were exposed to the high temperatures of the Orbital Work-
shop. A special drug resupply kit was carried on the first visit because
of the known effects of temperature on these medications.
This device was to be used during only the first visit. During ac-
tivation, a white residue was seen around carbon dioxide sensor A. Sub-
sequently, neither sensors A nor B were operating. Dew point and ambient
temperatures were also incorrect relative to Orbital Workshop measure-
ments. Further discussion of these problems is contained in section
17.3.5.
6-4
The command and service module vehicle structure and mechanical sys-
tems performed normally with the exception of the docking system. Fol-
lowing the successful initial "soft" docking and the subsequent undocking
for the standup extravehicular activity, seven unsuccessful attempts were
made to achieve docking probe capture prior to the successful docking us-
ing the emergency backup procedure. Section 17.1.3 contains a discussion
and evaluation of this anomaly.
7.2 THERMAL
Prior to the launch of the Saturn Workshop, the thermal math model
previously developed for the command and service module was modified to
include the effects of the configuration differences between the Apollo
and Skylab command and service module. The model was verified by the
data obtained from the thermal vacuum tests and was used to evaluate the
Skylab command and service module design, and to predict the flight per-
formance.
Following the loss of a solar array system wing on the Saturn Work-
shop during launch, steps were taken to minimize the spacecraft electri-
cal power consumption by optimizing the command and service module ther-
mal design for the first visit.
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Temperature, °K
QuadA
Engine package 394 286 377 324
Oxidizer line 352 280 331 281
Helium tank 333 28O 322 293
Fuel tank 332 274 320 294
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Engine package 394 286 Sensor failed
Oxidizer line 352 28O 294 275
Helium tank 333 280 295 282
Fuel tank 332 274 296 282
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7-6
At 16:18 G.m.t. on the second visit day, there was a main A bus un-
dervoltage indication. A review of data indicated that a command and
service module load requiring 16 amperes cycled on and remained on for
approximately 5 minutes. This caused the main A bus voltage to drop from
27.7 volts to 25.6 volts, which was the trip point of the undervoltage
sensor. Subsequently, the load that had cycled on was isolated to the
environmental control system secondary radiator heater. Section 17.1.7
contains a discussion of this anomaly.
The first Skylab visit fuel cells were activated on May 13, 1973,
during countdown for the planned May 15 launch. When the first Skylab
visit launch was delayed for i0 days, an operational evaluation indica-
ted that the fuel cells should not be shut down, but should be kept oper-
ating until launch on ground supplied reactants. At launch, fuel cell i
had accumulated 1072 hours of equivalent operating time and fuel cell 3
had accumulated 562 hours. Although the prelaunch equivalent operating
time limit of 840 hours was exceeded for fuel cell i, a fuel cell change-
out was not practical within the constraints of the countdown. Therefore,
the prelaunch equivalent operating time limit was waived when supporting
test data showed that the limit could reasonably be extended by at least
400 hours with little or no operational degradation.
The first visit cryogenic hydrogen and oxygen tanks were loaded on
May Ii, 1973, in preparation for the May 15 launch countdown sequence.
Because of the launch delay, the tanks were emptied and reloaded using
normal procedures on May 23 to maximize lift-off quantities and, there-
fore, the duration of available fuel cell power.
Whenthe fuel cells were shut down at 17:00 G.m.t. on visit day 21,
the non-propulsive hydrogen overboard vent was opened, and the hydrogen
system pressure decayed from 164.6 newtons per square centimeter to less
than 3.5 newtons per square centimeter in 120 hours.
7.3.4 Batteries
Command module entry batteries A and B supplied the main busses dur-
ing launch and during all service propulsion system maneuvers, delivering
a maximum of 26 amperes from battery A during one of the service propul-
sion firings. Both batteries performed well.
day 29 for 5 hours and 21 minutes at which time battery 2 was placed on
the bus to assure that the temperatures of batteries i and 3 did not ex-
ceed the operating temperature limit of 355° K. This configuration was
maintained until preparation for command module/service module separa-
tion when battery 2 was removed from main bus A to allow entry battery
conditioning. The maximum descent battery temperature experienced was
347 ° K. The total estimated battery capacity usage was 710 ampere hours
versus the expected usage of 727 ampere hours. (Total capacity avail-
able is 1500 ampere hours).
7.4.1 Communications
A problem was experienced with the updata link real time commands
wherein the S-band FM transmitter was improperly turned off when other
specific functions were commanded. Section 17.1.6 contains a discussion
of this anomaly.
During the first Skylab visit, the color television camera system
performed all of its required functions, although one of the two cameras
ceased operation during the visit. Also spots appeared on transmissions
from the other camera. Sections 17.3.3 and 17.3.4 discuss these anom-
alies.
the service module reaction control system quad A and the propellant stor-
age module pressure/temperature sensors failed. Section 17.1.2 discusses
this anomaly.
Control system performance during the soft docking and the hard dock-
ing attempts was normal. The crew reported closing velocities up to 0.65
meters per second. The separation velocity at final undocking was re-
ported as about 0.12 meters per second.
7-i0
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7-ii
Performance during the shaping and deorbit maneuvers was normal. The
spacecraft was guided to a successful landing at 24 degrees 46 minutes
north latitude, 127 degrees 4 minutes west longitude as indicated by the
onboard computer.
7.7 PROPULSION
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7-13
After undocking and prior to the shaping and deorbit maneuvers, the
propellant tank pressures were equalized by manually activating the heli-
um isolation valves. Firing times for the shaping and deorbit maneuvers
were approximately ii seconds and 7 seconds, respectively. System opera-
tion was normal during both maneuvers.
The first visit service module reaction control system was activated
on the launch pad by filllng the propellant manifolds from the propellant
storage module. The system was initially configured to feed the engines
from the quad propellant supplies. After 22 kilograms of propellant were
used from quad A, the propellant supply for the quad A engines was switched
to the propellant storage module. Quad B was switched after 13 kilograms
were used, quad C after 17 kilograms, and quad D after 16 kilograms were
used. Because of the rapid braking maneuvers, the flyaround, and the mul-
tiple docking attempts, propellant consumption and the number of thruster
firings were higher than predicted. However, systems performance was nor-
mal throughout the mission.
After the command_and service module docked with the Saturn Workshop,
the service module reaction control system heaters were configured for
minln_m power consumption. Temperatures were normal except for the quad
A propellant tank temperatures which reached 323 ° K. A discussion of
this problem is presented in section 17.1.2.
7.7.3 Command
Module Reaction Control System
7.8 ENVIRONMENTAL
CONTROL
SYSTEM
closing of the accumulator fill valve, the reservoir refilled and the ac-
cumulator quantity returned to the previous reading. Subsequently, the
primary accumulator was adjusted with no indication of any problems for
the remainder of the visit.
Stowing the tools, thermal shields, and deployment devices was accom-
plished using approximately 61 meters of rope and existing bags from
spares to secure the items in available locations. Deletions of 132.5
kilograms and addions of 235.0 kilograms to the first visit baseline com-
mandmodule launch stowage resulted in addition of 102.5 kilograms. Table
7-1V reflects the actual launch weight and center of gravity as compared
to limits.
7.9.1 StowageRelocations
The large quantities of additional hardware required relocating many
of the items already stowed. The crew was briefed on all the stowage
changesand the complete configuration changewas demonstrated using
training hardware.
The launch stowage location for the Skylab parasol blocked all ac-
cess to the water chlorination port, the environmental control unit, and
the panel 351 valve controls. Because access to these areas was required
shortly after launch (T + 25 minutes), a shroud cutter was used to quickly
cut enoughof the rope bindings for the required access. The first visit
launch stowage configuration outside the stowage lockers is shown in
figure 7-3. Couchrelationship to stowage items, resulting from a worse
case water or land landings, is shownin figure 7-4.
7.9.3 StowageDifferences
Tables 7-V and 7-VI define the first visit launch and return stow-
age differences from the stowage configuration defined prior to the oc-
currence of the Orbital Workshopthermal problem.
7-17
Actual Limits
Item Reason
70 mm magazine Flyaround
Stem Reason
Item Reason
Item Reason
e-
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7-24
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7-25
7.10 CONSUMABLES
The command and service module consumable usage during the first
visit was maintained well within the redline limits. Specific system
usage is discussed in the following paragraphs.
Propellant, kilograms
Condition
Fuel Oxidizer Total
Helium, kilograms
Condition
Storage bottles Propellant tanks
Propellant, kilogram
Condition
Fuel Oxidizer Total
Loaded
Consumed 572.4
ausable propellant is the amount loaded minus the amount trapped with
corrections made for gaging system errors.
7-27
Propellant, kilogram
Condition
Fuel Oxidizer Total
Loaded
Available at lift-off
Consumed
Tank i
Tank 2
Remaining at command
module/service mod-
ule separation
Tank 1 16
Tank 2 ii
Total 27
7-28
7.10.4 Water
The water quantities loaded, produced, and expelled during the mis-
sion are shown in the following table.
Potable tank 5
Waste tank 25
Produced in-flight
Dumped overboard 25
Lost as urine 15
Evaporator usage 9
Balance 4a
c. Docking
f. Undocking.
During the launch and boost phase, a negative suit to cabin differ-
ential pressure occurred. Analysis of this anomaly is discussed in sec-
tion 17.1.1.
The second coolant system was again not modulating properly before
the third extravehicular activity and, because a possibility of dislodg-
ing potential contamination in one of the heat exchangers existed, this
extravehicular activity was performed with all three crewmenreceiving
water cooling from suit umbilical water system I and with the primary
coolant system operating in the bypass modewith two pumps. Adequate
cooling was obtained by all three crewmen.
Table 8-1 showsthe heat load imposedby the extravehicular crewman
on the extravehicular mobility unit. Because all three crewmembers were
on a single water circuit and the water flow to each crewmanwas not con-
trolled, the flow split could not be accurately determined. Correlating
earth based test data with the telemetered liquid cooled garment differ-
ential temperature data allowed the flow split to be estimated. Table
8-1 is based on liquid cooled garment water temperature response and,
thus, somedampingof the metabolic rate occurred. Instantaneous meta-
bolic rates based on heart rate data would be expected to reveal higher
short term values. In addition, the analysis does not account for any
positive or negative body heat storage. The Science Pilot did store sig-
nificant heat during portions of the second extravehicular activity be-
cause of the inconvenience of manipulating the diverter valve, which re-
suited on the high heat load peak. Similarly, the Commander was hot
toward the end of the third extravehicular activity and this indicates
body heat storage and accounts for the relatively low heat loads for the
Commander during the third extravehicular activity.
8.2 CREW
PERSONAL
EQUIPMENT
9.0 BIOMEDICAL
This section summarizes the medical findings of the first visit and
is based on a preliminary analysis of the biomedical data.
The crew accumulated about 2018.5 man hours of space flight experi-
ence during the 28 days. The Commander and Science Pilot each accumulated
approximately 4 hours and 20 minutes of extravehicular activity, and the
Pilot accumulated approximately 2 hours and i0 minutes.
The infllght medical support system provided the capability for visit
completion in the event of any illness or injury that could be diagnosed
and treated in flight. It also provided the capability, in case of major
illness or injury, to stabilize the patient until reentry could be accom-
plished.
9.3 ENVIRONMENT
9.4 CREW
HEALTH
9.4.1 Preflight
Microbiological sampling was performed 70, 40, 25, and 15 days prior
to launch, and on launch day to monitor for potential inflight health
problems.
The only health problem involved the Pilot and occurred 31 days be-
fore launch. The Pilot developed a short term viral gastroenteritls (in-
flammation of stomach and intestines) and was removed from the crew living
and working areas for one day.
9.4.2 Infllght
Motion sickness was not experienced by any of the crew after orbital
insertion or during the adaptation phase of the intravehlcular activities.
Spatial orientation was good.
The crew was awake for 22 hours the first day and this disrupted the
crewmen's earth-oriented circadian rhythm. The crew began on visit day
21 to advance their bedtime and awakening each day in an attempt to re-
orient to the normal 24 hour physiological "body clock". Five days prior
to recovery, the workday was oriented to coincide with about a 2 a.m.
awakening, and about a 7 p.m.c.d.t, bedtime.
Toward the latter part of the visit, the skin on the hands became
dry and, in the case of the Commander and Science Pilot, scaling occurred.
9.4.3 Postflight
Prior to entry, the Commander and Science Pilot slept an estimated
4 to 5 hours and the Pilot slept only i hour.
After landing, when the crew were still in the couches, their pulse
rates were: Commander - 84 beats per minute; Science Pilot - 84 beats
per minute; and Pilot - 76 beats per minute. At separate times, with
each crewmansemistanding in the lower equipment bay, the pulse rates
on each individual were about 96 beats per minute.
The Commanderwalked unassisted to the Skylab mobile laboratory.
After approximately 1-1/2 hours, during which time blood drawing, micro-
biology testing, urine samples, and weighing were completed, the Commander
resumednormal ambulation.
Fluid and air bubbles were seen behind the Commander'sleft tympanic
membranefor about 3 days after the flight. The Commander'ssymptomsof
occasional left ear fullness have gotten progressively better.
The Commander'spostflight status was good except for somevertigo
associated with head motion and this lasted one day.
9-5
After the command module was taken aboard the primary recovery ship,
the Science Pilot went through the opened hatch with some difficulty be-
cause of vertigo and malaise. The Science Pilot required support as he
walked from the command module platform to the Skylab mobile laboratory.
About 4 hours after recovery, the nausea began to abate.
The day after recovery, ambulation was nearly normal, but rapid head
motion still induced stomach awareness and vertigo. Vertigo subsided by
7 days after recovery. Four days after recovery, vertigo was noted only
after deliberate rapid head motions.
9.5 METABOLIC
RATES
The average metabolic rate, using the heart rate method, was 337
watts during all the extravehicular activities. This was a little higher
than the predicted.
9.6 RADIATION
The peak dose rates observed by the Van Allen Belt dosimeter for its
Workshop location were 0.164 rad/hr at skin depth, and 0.116 rad/hr at
5 centimeters tissue depth. These values were recorded during a South
Atlantic Anomaly pass. Total doses during that pass were 5.3 millirad
at skin depth and 4.4 millirad at 5 centimeters skin depth. Other passes
were not as high in dose rate. The data became intermittent during the
latter part of the mission. See section 17.3.3.
The radiation survey meter was activated on visit day i0 for perform-
ance of a scheduled radiation survey of four locations: center sleep sta-
tion; wardroom; minus Z scientific alrlock; and Van Allen Belt dosimeter
location. The correlation between the radiation survey meter and the Van
Allen Belt dosimeter was excellent.
One passive dosimeter was worn by each crewman throughout the visit.
In addition, four passive dosimeters were placed in two drawers of the
Orbital Workshop film vault. The crewmen's passive dosimeters plus one
passive dosimeter from each drawer were returned. The two remaining film
vault passive dosimeters are scheduled for return at the end of the sec-
ond visit.
9-8
158:15:23 0 Depressurization
158:15:37 Sunset
panel out
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9-10
Visual flashes were once again observed by all crewmen during the
visit. Bursts of light or stars were apparently more common than streaks.
In some cases, the crew believed that an eye entrance and exit flash could
be identified. The accumulation of these data began with Apollo and no
cause for the flashes has been determined.
9.7 TOXICOLOGY
9.8 MICROBIOLOGY
Air and surface swab samples were taken on visit day 26 for post-
visit analysis. Staphylococcus aureus was present in two of the 15 sam-
ples and this was the only bacteria found that was of potential concern.
The air sample count is within the range which was determined to
be normal in the Skylab medical experiments altitude test. In general,
there appears to be little change in the Orbital Workshop microbial load
when compared to the preflight baseline.
9-11
Commander
Science Pilot
Pilot
ii. 1 SUMMARY
The 16 mm camera systems were used during the visit to record com-
mand module maneuvers around the Saturn Workshop, the Orbital Workshop
damage inspection, and the performance of many experiments.
ii.2.1 Usage
Table ii-I lists the 16 mm camera usage for all visit. Approximately
90 percent of the scheduled usage of the 16 mm data acquisition camera was
achieved during the first visit. The remaining I0 percent was not com-
pleted because of time limitations. The three magazines scheduled for
11-2
M093 Vectorcardiogram
use in the command module were exposed. A review of these magazines in-
dicates that the exposures were correct, except for the underexposed para-
chute sequence on earth landing.
The 35 mm camera system was used to record data for damage assess-
ment, student experiments, and operational photography. In addition, the
crew removed the electric camera body from the experiment S063 container
and used the camera with the 300 mm lens for alr-to-ground photography
of targets of interest. All other equipment was used as planned.
11-4
11.3.1 Usage
The 35 mm camera system operation was normal except for one minor
problem with the counter. The counter on the 35 mm electric camera stopped
counting the first time the camera was used. Further discussion of this
anomaly is contained in section 17.3.7.
beam. The picture was taken with the 300 mmlens on the 35 mm camera
and was made during the flyaround inspection of the Saturn Workshop.
Figure 11-2 is a typical picture of the interior operational documen-
tation photography obtained using an electronic flash unit.
11.4.1 Usage
The camera stowed in the command module was used for all photography.
Two film magazines were used exclusively for earth terrain and weather
photography. One magazine was used for recording data for the damage as-
sessment at the beginning of the visit, and one was used during the fly-
around inspection. The following table shows the system usage for the
first visit.
CX04 72 21 47
CX23 106 16 89
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12-1
12.0 TRAJECTORY
The ground and onboard solutions (table 12-11) agreed within the
comparison limits of 0.3 meters per second, 0.9 meters per second, and
0.9 meters per second in the X, Y, and Z axes, respectively. Consequently,
the onboard solutions were used for maneuver execution. The magnitude
of the second midcourse correction solution was approximately a 2-sigma
solution when compared to the preflight analyses, and was probably the
result of errors in the first midcourse correction.
o_ _ -,,1"
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Midcourse Maneuvers
b. Lock-on and maintaining it with the sextant and VHF were consid-
erably better than preflight estimates.
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12-6
Time, G.m.t.
Pass Track Revolution
Day
numbe r number number
S tar t Stop
_ Z Z Z Z
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13-1
The loss of the meterofd shield and the failure of the Orbital Work-
shop solar array system wlngs to deploy increased the difficulty in man-
aging the Orbital Workshop systems, as well as causing a i0 day delay of
the first visit. In this interim, the proficiency in operating the Mis-
sion ContrOl Center data retrieval system and in managing the various
spacecraft systems prior to crew arrival at the spacecraft was signifl-
cantly enhanced.
The basic prelaunch flight control activities schedule was used after
the activation sequence. This proved to be effective and will require
only slight modifications for subsequent visits. One exception was made
because of the critical aspects of the electrical power system. This ex-
ception was to generate a summary flight plan 2 days in advance, instead
of the originally planned i day. Each day, a detailed evaluation was made
of the electrical power profile to control the depth of discharge of the
Apollo Telescope Mount batteries. In most cases, the desired experiments
could be conducted; however, adjustments were invariably required in some
portion of the daily flight plan. These frequently included powering down
some spacecraft systems such as wall heaters, hot water heaters, food warm-
ing trays, etc. In addition, adjusting the sequence of experiments was
frequently necessary so that a daylight cycle existed between experiment
protocols requiring high power levels so that the Apollo Telescope Mount
batteries could recover. As the electrical power system responses became
better known and as the actual power usage of the various experiment modes
was demonstrated, operational constraints were adjusted to allow increased
experiment operations. This was particularly true in the case of the
Earth Resources Experiment Package where the original constraints were
relaxed and better opportunities for data acquisition became available.
The extravehicular activity to deploy the solar array system wing was
successfully conducted even though there were problems with the extrave-
hicular activity llfe support cooling system. These problems were over-
come in real time, and deployment of this wing alleviated the power con-
straints for this visit. After wing deployment, the experiment operations
were continuing with no operational constraints. However, some non-essen-
tial equipment power down was still required.
The Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network (fig. 13-1) support of the
first visit was satisfactory. The hardware, software and personnel per-
formance were each very good with minor exceptions. Some hardware fail-
ures, software problems, and personnel procedural problems were experi-
enced, but the collective impact on the visit support was minor. The most
significant impact was delays in the final processing of selected experi-
ments data. Data quality was poor on some passes. Two factors contrib-
uting to the poor quality data are: multipath signals on VgF at low ele-
vation angles and ignition noise from harbor vehicles near the range
station ship Vanguard.
The most significant change to the Spaceflight Tracking and Data Net-
work between Apollo and Skylab was in the techniques of processing telem-
etry data. During Apollo, fixed formats of selected data at reduced sam-
pling rates were used for transmission of telemetry data to the Mission
Control Center for mission operations. Detailed postfllght engineering
analysis and experiment data reduction was accomplished using magnetic
tape recordings of telemetry data shipped from each site to the Johnson
Space Center.
13-4
Carnarvon 1
Honeysuckle
Tananarive2 ! Goddard Space
Flight Center
Guam
Ascension
Madrid
I Hawaii
Canary Goldstone
Island
Texas
Newf°undlandl t'
Bermuda Vanguard 3
Network Operations
Control Center Apollo range
Merritt instrumentation
I s land
aircraft 4
Notes:
12 No unified
C-band S-band
radar only 1Mission Control I
3 Located.at -380 02' south [Center I
and 57 ° .32' west
4 With Apollo capabilities
Figure 13-1. - Spaceflight tracking and data network.
13-5
Command data processing for Skylab was very similar to Apollo. The
one major change for Skylab was the utilization of UHF transmitters from
Gemini and early Apollo flights for commends to the Orbital Workshop. One
computer was utilized at each site for command processing. Real time com-
mands were stored in the computer for uplink in response to the Mission
Control Center execute commands. Teleprinter and computer load commands
were formatted at the Mission Control Center, transmitted to appropriate
sites, sorted in the computer temporarily and uplinked in response to the
Mission Control Center execute commands. Commands were uplinked either
through the unified S-band or UHF systems depending upon whether the com-
mand was being sent to the co-,,and and service module or the Orbital Work-
shop •
The processing of tracking data was also very similar to that used
on the Apollo program. The unified S-band data were the primary data
source except during unmanned Workshop periods when the C-band radar skin
track data were utilized. High speed (10 samples every second) data from
Merrit Island and Bermuda were used during launch and low speed (one sam-
ple every 6 seconds) data were utilized for orbital ephemeris determina-
tions.
Real time voice communications with the crew were the same as Apollo.
Crew voice recorded onboard the command and service module or Orbital
Workshop was subsequently downlinked to a network site where the voice
was played back on a delayed basis and transmitted to the Mission Control
Center over voice circuits.
The television recording capability was used at all sites with uni-
fied S-band systems, plus the capability to remote television to the Mis-
sion Control Center was provided from Guam, Goldstone, Texas, and Merritt
Island. The Goldstone, Texas, and Merritt Island capabilities were util-
ized on a daily basis for real time and playback to the Mission Control
Center of t_levlsion previously recorded at those sites. Recordings of
television from other sites were shipped to the Johnson Space Center.
13-6
Twenty four hours prior to the launch for the first visit, the De-
partment of Defense recovery forces reported under the command of the
Department of Defense Manager for Manned Space Flight Support. After
orbital insertion, the recovery forces were released or placed on alert,
as appropriate.
Recovery support for the primary landing area in the Eastern Pacific
Ocean was provided by the USS Ticonderoga. Air support consisted of four
SH-3G helicopters and one E-IB aircraft from the USS Ticonderoga and two
HC-130 rescue aircraft staged from Hamilton AFB, California. Figure 13-2
shows the relative positions of the recovery ship and its aircraft, and
the HC-130 aircraft prior to landing. The figure also shows the target
point, the crew readout of the computer landing point (while on main par-
achutes), and the estimated landing point.
13-7
HC-130 2a Pease Air Force Base Launch abort area in west- and mid-
Atlantic areas.
aon air rescue and recovery service alert and configured with Skylab recovery
equipment.
I"
i_8
U.S.S. Ticonderoga 0
Ta et point _ 8 EDwAR_S.,_,5o
35 35
ELS•
30 "ID
-J --J
" •
25 25
1 Target point
Relay
• Hami Iton
rescue 2
20 20
Weather on recovery day was good. At landing, the cloud coverage was
90 percent at 550 meters and winds were 2.6 meters per second from north-
east. The water condition was 0.3 meter seas on top of 1.2 meter swells.
The air temperature was 291 ° K and the water temperature was 293 ° K.
Radar contact with the command module was reported by the USS Ticon-
deroga at 13:40:30 G.m.t., on June 22, 1973 (visit day 29). The command
module landed at 13:49:48 G.m.t. Using the ship's position, plus visual
bearings and radar ranges, the landing point coordinates of command mod-
ule were determined to be 24 degrees 45 minutes 18 seconds north latitude,
127 degrees 2 minutes west longitude.
The command module landed in the stable 1 attitude. The command mod-
ule was retrieved with the crew inside and the crew were aboard the recov-
ery ship 40 minutes after landing. The crew egressed from the command
module and walked to the Skylab mobile laboratory. After recovery, reef-
ing lines from the drogue parachute were found on one of the helicopter
landing gear struts. A discussion of this anomaly is contained in sec-
tion 17.1.9.
f
13-1o
Time relative
Event Time, G.m.t. to landing,
day:hr:mln
Time relative
Event T_,G.m.t. to landing,
day:hr:mln
b. Obtain medical data on the crew for use in extending the duration
of manned space flights.
Performance
Experiment Remarks
Planned a Completed
Commander 8 7
Science Pilot 8 7
Pilot 8 8
M093 - Vectorcardiogram
Commander 8 7
Science Pilot 8 7
Pilot 8 8
Commander 5 6
Science Pilot 5 6
Pilot 5 7
Task/sites Other
Task/
Discipline task/sites
sites
First partially
Total completed
visit completed
Agriculture/range 33 31 14
forestry
Geology 55 55 3O 3
Continental water 29 29 12
resources
Ocean 38 30 6 4
investigations
Atmospheric 58 47 19 4
investigations
Coastal zones, 21 21 5
shoals, and bays
Remote sensing 83 69 45 a 21
techniques
development
Regional planning 89 86 38 3
and development
Cartography 35 35 i0 3
I I
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14-5
Performance
Experiment Remarks
planned Actual
Radiation measurement 37 28
Water sample 1
Microbiological sample 4
Spacecraft/launch vehicle
adapter deployment ob-
servatlon
14-6
Visit Procedure
Activity observed
day designation
2 TV-41 Rendezvous
3 Parasol deployment
6 TV-3 Eating
15.1 SUMMARY
15.2 IMPLEMENTATION
Twenty four hour Mission Control Center support operations were di-
vided into the summary, execute, and detail shifts. The relationship of
these shifts to the crew day is shown in figure 15-2.
The flight planning sequence began with the summary shift on the
morning of day n, where a general plan for day n+l was worked out to the
level of detail shown in figure 15-3. A summary plan, shown in figure
15-4, was transmitted near the end of the workday to enable the crew to
discuss the next day's flight plan during their pre-sleep period. During
the detail shift on the evening of day n, the n+l plan, including any late
necessary modifications which were discovered during the crew workday,
would be developed to the level necessary to generate the detailed flight
plan (e.g., switch on times, pointing angles, maneuver times, etc.). The
detailed flight plan for day n+l was then uplinked to the Orbital Work-
shop via the teleprinter during the crew sleep period and was available
to the crew for implementation on the prescribed day. An example of a
portion of the detailed flight plan is shown in figure 15-5.
15-2
in !
ql I °°
hl _ I
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r,1
ow 0
,a.. _em _<_bl I
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15-6
15.3 ASSESSMENT
The techniques for flight planning worked well for the first visit.
This is especially important in view of the diverse requirements of the
widely different scientific disclplines on the Skylab program. Besides
the simple competition for crew time among the experiments, there was com-
petition for utilization of the scientific alrlock (only one experiment
could be accommodated at a time), as well as competing requirements on the
Workshop attitude. Such conflicts are inherent in a program which encom-
passes such a wide range of experiments, and such conflicts were antici-
pated prior to flight. The role of Program Scientist had been created
especially to resolve such interdisciplinary conflicts and to promote
better understanding between the scientific investigators on flight plan-
ning problems. Observations during the progress of the visit and dis-
cussions with the various experiment groups subsequent to the visit have
indicated that this worked effectively. The experiment groups suggested
the following areas where improvements in the flight planning area could
be made on subsequent visits. These suggestions are listed below and
these will be factored intO the planning.
15-8
Manhours utilization,
hr:min
Category (percent of total)
Preflight
Actual
allocation
The Saturn space vehicle supported the first visit by placing the
spacecraft into an earth orbit for subsequent rendezvous with the Saturn
Workshop. The performance of the space vehicle will be reported in de-
tall in the Marshall Space Flight Center's Saturn Workshop Report which
will be incorporated as Volume III of the Skylab Mission Evaluatlon Re-
port to be published by NASA Headquarters.
1.36 seconds later than nominal. The total space fixed velocity at this
time was 7.07 meters per second greater than planned. After separation,
the S-IB stage continued on a ballistic trajectory to earth impact. The
S-IVB stage firing terminated with guidance cutoff signal and parking
orbit insertion; both approximately 3.7 seconds later than planned. A
velocity of 1.82 meters per second greater than nominal at insertion re-
sulted in an apogee 6.32 kilometers higher than nominal. The parking or-
bit portion of the trajectory until spacecraft/launch vehicle separation
was close to nominal.
The structural loads during the flight were well below design values.
Thrust cutoff transients were similar to those of previous flights.
The command module suit circuit pressure dropped below the cabin
pressures and cycled between approximately plus 0.05 newtons per square
centimeter of water and minus 0.05 newtons per square centimeter of water
differential pressure during the final 32 minutes of the countdown. The
suit circuit pressure remained below cabin pressure for approximately
15 minutes and rose above cabin pressure only after the direct oxygen
flow was increased from 0.247 to 0.333 kilograms per hour and the Com-
mander and Science Pilot moved their suit hoses. The suit circuit pres-
sure again decreased below cabin pressure for a short period prior to
launch.
While the low pressure excursions were occurring, the crew was opera-
ting on the suit loop. Oxygen was being supplied at 0.247 kilograms per
hour through the direct oxygen valve and the system was relieving into the
cabin through the suit circuit demand regulator relief valve. The relief
valve should have maintained the lowest pressure in the suit circuit ap-
proximately 0.055 newtons per square centimeter of water above the cabin
pressure. A suit circuit schematic is shown in figure 17.1-1.
The pressure decrease could only have been caused by leakage from the
suit loop into the cabin. Also, as the inlet side of the compressor was
below the cabin pressure, the leak must have been at a point where the
suit loop pressure was above cabin pressure, that is, between the compres-
sor outlet and the suit outlet.
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17-3
The only component that displayed excessive low pressure leakage dur-
ing postflight testing was the suit circuit air return check valve. How-
ever, this valve is located near the pressure transducer in the suit cir-
cuit and could not have caused the negative pressure.
All potential causes of this problem have been tested and are normal.
Therefore, the most probable cause of this problem was an intermittent
leakage at low differential pressures not apparent during the postflight
testing. Should the problem recur on another command module to the ex-
tent observed on this first visit vehicle, adequate oxygen is available
through the direct oxygen valve to accommodate leakages of up to 4.25
kilograms per hour for extended operations and up to 19.0 kilograms per
hour for i0 minutes.
The service module reaction control system quad A and the propellant
storage module propellant quantity measurements failed off scale high.
Both measurements indicated off scale high from helium loading during
prelaunch operations until the end of the first visit; consequently, the
failure could have occurred before launch.
Analysis of the transducers from the second visit vehicle after the
lightning strike showed that in each case, one of the two differential
output transistors (QI and Q2 in fig. 17.1-2) was shorted. (The Apollo 12
and first manned vehicle transducers were not recovered as they were lo-
cated in the service module).
17-4
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17-5
The docking probe (fig. 17.1-35 is a tripod mounted device that serves
as the active portion of the docking system. The probe incorporates pro-
visions for the initial capture of the Multiple Docking Adapter drogue,
energy attenuation, command module/Workshop retraction, relative vehicle
alignment, and undocklng. The structural items (fig. 17.1-4) consist of
the central cylinder, a piston, a collar, three pitch arms, three shock
struts, and the three support arms. The primary subassemblies of the probe
consist of the capture latch assembly, the actuator assembly, the capture
latch release handle, the nitrogen pressure system, the ratchet handle as-
sembly, the extend latch/preload assembly, the shock struts, and the at-
tenuators.
17-6
The capture latch release handle (fig. 17.1-10) is located on the aft
end of the probe and provides a means for manual release of the capture
latches when the probe is in the retracted position. The probe must be
retracted for the capture latch torque shaft to mate with the keyed fe-
male telescoping drive shaft. The release handle is secured on the pyro-
technic cover by spring clip detents and a manual locking lever. Nor-
mally, prior to folding the probe for removal from the command module
tunnel, the release handle is unlocked and pulled from the spring clips.
17-9
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As the probe is folded, the sliding collar travels aft, contacts the re-
lease handle, and extends the telescoping drive shaft. The handle is
then accessible for manual rotation to release the capture latches.
b. The slot in the housing may have been wider than the slot in the
cap, thereby allowing the hook pin to be trapped (fig. 17.1-11). During
inspection of the command module 117 docking assembly, this condition was
noted.
The following changes have been implemented for the second visit
vehicle and subsequent docking probes:
a. Dimensional tolerances for the slots in the cap have been changed
to eliminate any possibility of overhang.
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17-23
Postflight testing showed that the steering diode for the set coll
of the select ii set/reset 2 relay was shorted (fig. 17.1-16). As a re-
sult of the short, whenever reset 2 and any select command was given, the
sneak current path through the shorted diode also reset the select ii set/
reset 2 relay.
Tests of the complete units are designed to detect this type of prob-
lem. Vehicle tests for the second and third visits and the Apollo-Soyuz
command modules have been modified to assure that none of the diodes asso-
ciated with critical command system relays are shorted.
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17-26
The primary and secondary coolant loops each have redundant heaters
immediately upstream of the service module radiators. The heaters are
powered by the service module dc bus. The heater controllers, however,
are powered by the com_nand module bus through a circuit breaker and switch,
so the controllers can be turned off (fig. 17.1-18).
The most probable failure was a short between the cathode of the re-
lay spike suppression diode and the contact wiper in one of the two heater
control relays (fig. 17.1-18). This was concluded from a controller which
was disassembled. The diode lead routing on all relay headers was as shown
in figure 17.1-19. Note the marginal clearance between the terminal and
diode lead. Assuming a short between the close clearance in this figure,
the heater controller would be powered from the service module main bus A
(fig. 17.1-18).
The heaters are not needed for the Skylab missions, therefore, the
primary and secondary heater fuses have been removed from the second and
third visit service modules.
The command module reaction control system i fuel system had a post-
flight leak rate of 250 standard cubic centimeters of nitrogen per minute,
a significant increase from the preflight test.
The fuel tank was removed from the spacecraft and the postflight de-
contamination leak was confirmed by an additional test. The bladder was
removed from the tank and a visual examination showed a U-shaped cut (or
tesr) approximately 0.3 centimeters long (fig. 17.1-20). No contaminate
that might have caused the cut was found on the bladder or in the tank.
The standpipe and tank were also examined for surface irregularities and
were smooth.
17-27
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17-28
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17-29
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1.0 --
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0.5 --
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Heliun
Fuel
outlet
f Diffuser
bladder
Liquid
side vent
The recovery helicopters entered the fall out pattern of the debris
resulting from the command module entry before all debris had reached the
ocean surface. A 3 meter section of drogue parachute reefing line im-
pacted the main rotor blade of one of the helicopters and was found draped
over a landing gear strut when the helicopter returned to the aircraft
carrier.
An impact time analysis has been performed for all debris generated
during entry. The following table shows the latest time of landing for
all debris which is still in the air after command module landing.
Time to landing
a
Item after command module
landing, min:sec
Three times during the visit, the command module computer sextant
trunnion angle position information was in error. All three times, the
optical loop was in the optics zero mode, and both the shaft and trunnion
angles in the computer should have read zero radians. The trunnion errors
observed at the three instances were 1/6, i, and 1/2 radians, respectively.
Figure 17.1-21 is a functional diagram of the optics and computer inter-
face. The coupling display unit contains the analog to digital converters
which interface the optics with the computer. Resolvers on the shaft and
trunnion axes of the sextant provide position signals to the read counter
in the coupling display unit. The read counter stores the resolver posi-
tion data in digital form. Limited data are available for the first oc-
currence. The second occurrence existed for about five seconds, and the
last occurence about 30 seconds.
Attempts were made to use the optics after each of the last two oc-
currences. The automatic optics positioning routine in the computer
pointed the optics in the wrong position because of the error, and the
desired stars were not acquired. At this time, the crew observed that
the mechanical position counters on the optics panel agreed with the de-
sired angle in the shaft axis from the computer, but did not agree in
the trunnion axis. (Once the erroneous information is stored in the com-
puter, the computer retains that data until the optics zero mode is re-
selected.) The optics zero mode was reselected and the computer and op-
tics were reinitialized. Therefore, the error was removed. Subsequent
use of the optics and the automatic positioning routine was normal. In
the zero optics mode, the computer issues no drive commands and the sex-
rant shaft and trunnion angles are driven to zero radians using only the
positioning electronics. Should the trunnion angle change (fig. 17.1-21)
the associated read counter and resolver no longer agree, and a read
counter difference signal is generated. The read counter difference sig-
nal causes the read counter to increment or decrement until the angle
again matches the resolver signal. As the read counter changes, a series
of pulses, each equal to I0 arc seconds trunnion angle, is sent to a com-
puter register that stores trunnion angle data. In this way, the computer
tracks the optics position changes.
The coupling display unit contains five read counter circuits. Two
are used for the sextant position control. The other three are used to
transfer the stable platform gimbal angle information to the computer.
17-32
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17-33
17.2 EXPERIMENT
ANOMALIES
R M 0 T
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Analysis indicates that the 5 volt power regulator that powers the
digital display had failed because of temperatures beyond the survival
limits of the solid state electronics.
All six film advance malfunction lights illuminated during the orig-
inal experiment $190A checkout on visit day 5. Progressively fewer lights
illuminated as the film was used until all lights remained off during ex-
periment operation. Subsequently, when the film was reloaded, the lights
again came on, and went off progressively one at a time as the film was
used. The crew verified during troubleshooting activities that the cam-
era was functioning and the film was moving, even though the film advance
malfunction lights were on.
The experiment SI90A film is wound on spools and loaded into cassettes,
which are then loaded into magazines for use. Once the cassette is loaded
into the magazine, the film is held so that it cannot unwind on the spool.
Before loading into the magazine, the film leader is taped to the outside
of the cassette to prevent it from slipping back into the cassette, how-
ever, the spool is free to rotate in the cassette.
/
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17-38
The articulated mirror system tilt mechanism did not function when
the first operation of experiment S019 was attempted on visit day 6. The
clutch on the tilt control knob for the articulated mirror appeared to
be slipping. One gear of the gear train, which operates the mirror and
is visible, did not turn when the control knob was turned.
A protective cover was installed over the digital display gear train
just prior to stowing the experiment for launch to prevent the digital dis-
play numbers from reaching the gears, should the numbers have come loose.
The protective cover was made of 0.4 millimeter sheet metal and had tabs
bent at right angles to the cover.
The gear box cover was removed during the flight to inspect for the
cause of the problem. The protective cover interfered with the gear clamp
screw (fig. 17.2-4). The cover was straightened and the tilt mechanism
then functioned normally.
The tape motion light did not illuminate properly for approximately
i0 seconds after commanding the tape recorder to change the recording tape
speed from 19 to 152.4 centimeters per second during the third Earth Re-
sources Experiment Package data pass. In a 44 second period subsequent to
the i0 second period, the tape motion light flickered, dimmed, and then
went off; the light then came on for the remainder of the second experi-
ment S192 recording interval. The approximate recording time interval
for this period was 1 minute and i0 seconds.
17-39
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17-41
The tape motion light should illuminate within 5 seconds after ini-
tiation of a tape speed transition command during normal operation. The
light may blink during the 5 second speed transition period, but should
remain on after indicating the proper tape speed.
The tape recorder consists of a tape transport and control and sig-
nal processing circuitry (fig. 17.2-5). The tape recorder control logic
receives commands from the control and display panel, and in turn, con-
trols the functions of the reel servos, the capstan servo, and the pinch
rollers.
The tape motion light circuitry monitors the phase error voltage.
At 152.4 centimeters per second tape speed, the tape motion light goes
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17-43
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17-45
off, if the phase error exceeds 3.14 radians steady state (phase slipping)
or if the phase error is varying at a frequency greater than 0.2 hertz
and the peaks exceed 1.57 radians phase difference.
Tape recorder speed variations were displayed and recorded using the
tape recorded during passes 3 and 4. The data indicates bursts of flutter
(in excess of 1 percent) just before the crew comment times. Two flutter
frequencies are present throughout the tape. These are a high frequency
flutter (100 Hz range) and a low frequency flutter (5 Hz range). During
flutter bursts, only the high frequency increases in amplitude. There
are no tape transport rotating components which would generate the high
frequency, but the bursts would cause the reported motion light dimming.
Also, the erratic nature of the bursts is characteristic of erratic fric-
tional drag from the magnetic tape. The relatively low amplitude of the
high frequency flutter would only occasionally, if at all, affect the
recovery of recorded data.
The experiment S192 data have been recovered from all 6 tapes with
no degradation that can be attributed to tape speed variations.
The camera magazine (fig. 17.2-8) has small holes in the platen lead-
ing to the vacuum reservoir which is an integral part of the platen assem-
bly. The vacuum held the film against the platen and was regulated to
0.07 newtons per square centimeter. The regulation was provided by a
circular bellows on the interior surface of the vacuum reservoir and a
bleed off orifice, which is vernier adjusted by a needle valve. The vac-
uum is placed on the reservoir through the vacuum fitting on the magazine.
This fitting is a plain smooth tube which inserts into the camera body in-
ner vacuum fitting (fig. 17.2-9) when the magazine is seated and latched
in the camera body. The meshing of these two vacuum fittings is accom-
plished without visual cues because the magazine obscures the view when
being inserted into the body cavity. Figure 17.2-10 shows the magazine
inserted and latched in the camera body.
Four possible sources for a vacuum leak exist inside the camera body.
They are the chamfered neoprene seal at the magazine to body interface,
the neoprene diaphragm of the regulator, the platen holes and channels
under the film, and the bleed off orifice.
,
17-48
17-49
Three such grommets plus an instruction decal are on the stowage list for
the second visit. A copy of the instruction decal (fig. 17.2-11) shows
the manner in which the grommet will be installed and seated.
The coronas and sparks provide free electrons that produce a local
photographic effect (exposure) on the film and produce the characteristic
streaks, spots, or fork like branches. The local exposure causes some
silver ions in the film emulsion to reduce to pure silver, producing
dark streaks or spots on the negative on black and white film.
Prior to the first manned visit launch, the overheated air of the
Orbital Workshop was dumped to the vacuum of space. As a result, the
salt pads in the Orbital Workshop film vault lost most of their moisture
and the film became dry.
The markings were observed on 5 percent of the film frames and were
either 2.3 mmwide single or double streaks from 12.7 to 61 centimeters
in length. The dual streaks were separated by about i0 millimeters, and
figure 17.2-12 shows that this corresponds spatially with roller gaps.
Marking of the film can be caused by friction that charges the film.
Charging is usually associated with low moisture content and low atmos-
pheric pressure. The center gaps in two rollers in the magazine provided
the transfer edges for the electrostatic discharges.
17-51
INSTRUCTION
!. INSTALL SEAL ON SPARE MAGAZINE VACUUM
TUSEPERinURE A
NOTE:
AFTER THE MAGAZINE HAS BEEN INSTALLED
IN THE ETC THE SEAL WILL BE REPOSITIONED
SIMILAR TO FIGURE II
FIG A FIG B
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17-53
b. The thermal alignment focus control was turned against the stop;
which is not compatible w_th prelaunch mid-range settings for approximate
alignment.
Figure 17.2-15 shows the internal scanner assembly before the detec-
tor dewar assembly is in place in the optical bench cradle. The optical
and thermal windows are visible in the detector assembly.
Figure 17.2-16 shows the detector dewar in place in its cradle. The
large butterfly screws which tighten the upper half of the cradle are vis-
ible in this view. 2hese screws were designed for finger tightening of
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17-58
the cradle about the cooler cylinder so that the primary detector dewar
assembly could be replaced by the onboard spare in the event of a compo-
nent failure.
When the detector assembly is lowered into place on the cradle, the
guide pins (fig. 17.2-13) enter the holes of the upper flange insuring
that the optical window is centered over the monochrometer lens when the
assembly is seated fully. The large butterfly screws are then tightened
to bring the upper and lower flanges together which brings the central
axis of the thermal window in line with the folded thermal beam. The small
butterfly screws are for tightening the heat pipe cradle to the cooler cyl-
inder wall. There is an indium shim between the heat pipe cradle and the
cooler cylinder wall to provide a tight fit and good thermal conductivity
across the interface for a cooler heat sink.
The large butterfly screws are a differential type with two differ-
ent thread pitches. The manner in which these screws tighten the cradle
flanges to hold the cooler cylinder may be seen in figure 17.2-17. The
nut is first captured blind by the screw coarse thread end. Further
turning of the differential screw advances it into the upper flange and
the nut. The advance into the nut, however, is more rapid than the ad-
vance into the flange (fig. 17.2-17). This permits a powerful clamping
pressure to be exerted on the cooler cylinder without requiring tools.
The only factor which could account for all of the abnormal condi-
tions is something loose in the internal scanner assembly.
There are three mating points which, if loose, could cause the ob-
served conditions. They are the optical bench to the adapter plate for
the Multiple Docking Adapter (fig. 17.2-15), the detector dewar assembly
flange to optical bench brackets, and the dewar housing to circular bolt
flange. The most probable loose point is the detector dewar assembly
mating to optical bench brackets. The capture of the nut by the differ-
ential screws (fig. 17.2-15) can lead to an improper mating. Assuming
the nut is not engaged in the first two turns of the screw, 2.5 centime-
ters of travel into the flange is lost because of the differential threads.
This would permit the shoulder of the screw to contact the upper flange,
giving a tight feel and leading to a false impression of tight mating of
the flange. Improper engagement of the differential screws has occurred
during ground testing.
17-59
7.1 thread s
per centimeter
Upper cradle
flange
cradle
flange
6.3 threads p.tive
per centimeter nut hou sing
Crew procedures have been developed and the crew has been trained
to identify the loose component and to tighten it during the next visit.
The data indicate that the transmitted pulse is being properly modu-
lated, but the return pulse is not being compressed. This could occur
only if the latching relay which supplies the return pulse to the delay
line was not being operated.
The time between the first and second ranging transmissions is auto-
matically varied in discrete steps so that the minimum time can be deter-
mined between ranging transmissions that will not result in interference
between one ranging transmission and the next.
The information in the first missing data frame is the time between
the end of the time delay time out and the first receiver noise measure-
ment. The information contained in the second missing frame is the time
between the first ranging pulse and the longest delayed second ranging
pulse.
Since the same data are produced during altimeter calibration, ex-
periment data analysis can be performed.
°_
°_
_3
m
E
E
.2
m
_z
-i
17-64
trol circuit, because of its long time constant, took about 30 seconds
to come out of saturation and the first 30 seconds of radiometer data
were lost (radiometer operate periods are normally about I to 5 seconds
long). This operation was duplicated with the backup flight hardware.
The first visit was launched with two experiment M133 recorders on
board, each containing a reel of tape. A third reel of tape was stowed
in one of the sleep compartment lockers. During the high temperature
period prior to the first visit manning, the tape reel stored in the sleep
compartment locker reached about 332 ° K. Consequently, a special thermal
test of a reel of tape was performed using the flight temperature profile.
The tape was then recorded and played back. In that case, the first 12
minutes of played back data were good, and thereafter, the played back
data were noisy and unrecoverable.
The crew reported two blown fuses in the 70 mm camera when using mag-
azine CX-04.
The 70 n-- camera magazines are loaded for flight with a full supply
spool of film and an empty take up spool. The drive gear train and as-
sociated indicators (fig. 17.3-1) for the spools are all contained in a
thin compartment on one side of the magazine. The film path through the
main magazine compartment is superimposed in a dashed llne to show the re-
latlonshlp with the manual film advance lug and shaft. The camera drive
interface gear engages the motor driven gear on the camera when the maga-
zine is mated with the camera. All film transport and indicator motions
are derived from this gear.
The drive enable paw1 (fig. 17.3-1) swings both left and right about
the pawl pivot point. When the pawl is pivoted to the left position, a
flat metal switch arm enters the magazine. This switch arm enables the
camera motor to drive the gear train through a film transport cycle, trans-
porting an unexposed frame of film in front of the platen whenever the
camera operate button is depressed. When the film transport is synchro-
nized (no overlap or skip), the red/whlte flag will show white through a
small circular window in the gear train cover. When the pawl is pivoted
to the right position, the camera switch arm is prevented from entering
the magazine and the motor cannot be started. Simultaneously, the red
indicator will show under the window, indicating that the film transport
is not synchronized. The film may then be manually advanced by turning
the manual film advance lug which extends through the gear train cover.
The manual advance is continued until the white indicator appears in the
window, at which time the film is re-synchronlzed. Depressing the camera
operate button will restore normal exposure and advance, if the camera
fuse is not blown.
E
E
O
p,,,
._
N
08
@ !
°_
0
©
h
17-67
mated with the flight camera, manually advanced to a white flag and then
cycled to fllm depletion with no further anomalies.
The flight camera stopped in the middle of a cycle and a red flag
was noted during an infllght frame advance. The magazine was removed
from the camera and the operate button was depressed with no response,
indicating a blown fuse. The fuse was replaced, the magazine remated,
and the film was manually advanced until the white flag was present.
At thls point, normal camera operation was restored. The camera was used
for several more frames when the camera again stopped. The crew replaced
both the magazine and fuse to insure proper operation of the camera.
Development of the film showed that the flrst stoppage was at frame
62. This is evidenced by a white over exposure. Following this, ten
good pictures were noted and at frame 72, the second stoppage occurred.
Fllm evidence and crew statements lead to the conclusion that the
first stoppage was due to a blown fuse. It is also probable that the
second stoppage also was due to a blown fuse. Four extra fuses will
be carried up on the next visit.
The 70 mm film magazines are loaded for flight with a full supply
spool of film and an empty take up spool. The drive gear train and asso-
ciated indicators for the spools (fig. 17.3-1) are all contained in a thln
compartment on one side of the magazine. The film path through the main
magazine compartment is superimposed to show the relationship with the
manual advance and the frame counter wheel. The camera drive interface-
gear engages the drive on the 70 mm camera when the magazine is placed
in the camera. All other camera and film operations are taken off this
main gear.
The frame counter ratchet arm (fig. 17.3-1) is spring loaded against
the frame counter ratchet wheel and increments the wheel to bring the in-
scribed frame number under a window in the side cover of the magazine. The
motion of this arm is obtained from an offset pivot point on the drive
gear.
17-68
°m
r,lJ _ e"
0
o_
0
o_
8
0
0
o_
o_
E
o_
l",.
v
0
_J o_
0
17-70
Tests showed the contamination was mostly tin and silver with minute
traces of copper and gold. The tin and silver are solder constituents.
The gold trace probably flaked off the substrate and the copper trace is
foreign to the package. (The package had been opened two times prior to
flight for repairs.) Since the package now operates, and the particulate
contamination has been disturbed, it is not known which sub-circuit was
shorted.
The two television cameras to be flown on the second visit will not
have their multichip hybrid packages removed for testing for contamina-
tion. Such action would require extensive disassembly of the cameras.
Each camera contains twelve packages and the disassembly would most likely
result in lowering the camera reliability. Further this was the first
such operational failure.
In case the problem recurs during the next visit, a backup camera
is available.
Printed
integrated
logic
clip
Multichip
hybrid
package
Spots were observed on the television images viewed through the ex-
periment S191 viewfinder tracking system telescope. The spot patterns
varied on other transmissions. For ordinary transmissions, a zoom lens
is used with the camera (fig. 17.3-4).
Two types of spots were observed. The first spots were observed
when the television camera was used with the optical adapter on the view-
finder tracking system during Earth Resources Experiment Package passes
9 and i0. The images had a pattern of an increasing number of blurred
and sharply focused spots, mostly fixed with respect to the reticle.
The second group of spots were observed when the television camera
was used with the zoom lens; the spots were blurry and in a fixed pattern
that did not change in number or location.
The inspection of the viewfinder tracking system by the crew did not
disclose any spots through the eyepiece, nor was any contamination noted
in the data acquisition camera photographs. An assessment of the contri-
bution of the viewfinder tracking system telescope to the contamination
I
17-73
" I
\ E
._o
0--
p.j_ / /
0--
f e-
0_
.o
!
U
0
0--
Z !
0
r_
0--
L_
0
17-74
Television
Video
Color wheel
Faceplate
(image plane)
Focus control
;ion
optical
adapter
Data
Data acquisition acquisition
camera window camera
image plane
I
Radiation
from earth
Figure 17.3-5.- Television camera configuration used with viewfinder tracking system telescope.
17-75
°i
17-76
shows that the entire telescope optical loop is probably free of contam-
ination. However, the crew did remove contamination on the outside op-
tical surfaces (data acquisition camera window and optical adapter outer
lenses). Therefore, the sharply focused spots were caused by the parti-
cles the crew removed from the external surfaces, and the telescope in-
ternal elements are clean. The blurred spots observed on the television
images were caused by the particles on the faceplate.
The faceplate, color wheel, and drive train were cleaned and in-
spected on the two television cameras to be used on the second visit.
Early in the visit, a wh±te residue was found around carbon dioxide
sensor A of the portable carbon dloxide/dew point monitor. Measurements
taken at that time disagreed with other onboard instrumentation in that
sensor A indicated 160 newtons per square meter, sensor B indicated 1600
newtons per square meter, and the onboard reading was 640 newtons per
square meter.
Seven days later, the crew used the carbon dioxide/dew point monitor
to measure dew point. The measured value was 297 ° K and, at the same
time, the onboard instrumentation was recording approximately 283 ° K, in-
dicating that the dew point measuring portion of the unit had failed.
_- 0 c
0 0
U_
8.
¢U
"0
°--
x
0
c-
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!
eq
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O'l
LL
17-78
The module pumps heat from the mirror and lowers the temperature
of the mirror surface. As the mirror temperature reaches the dew point,
the mirror surface fogs. The mirror surface reflects light to a photo-
electric sensor which operates in a bridge. The bridge output is ampli-
fied and used as feedback to control the cooler. The servo loop stabil-
izes the mirror temperature at the dew point (mirror surface just fogged).
The mirror temperature is then measured and displayed by the panel meter
as the dew point temperature.
A hand operated air sampling pump is located at the top of the carbon
dioxide/dew point monitor. The pump draws air through the inlet into the
air sampling compartment, where the air contacts the dew point ambient
temperature sensor and both of the carbon dioxide sensors.
The dew point measurement on visit day 8, indicated that the dew
point sensor was working at that time. However, the measurement which
was made 7 days later indicated the dew point sensor was not working prop-
erly. Possible causes of this failure are an inoperative cooler, an in-
operative light bulb, or failure of the dew point ambient temperature
meter switch.
This portable unit was planned for use only during the first visit
to measure carbon dioxide dew point and temperature in various workshop
locations. Fixed sensors will be used during the second and third visits;
therefore, no action will be taken.
The Van Alien Belt dosimeter telemetry data showed spurious alterna-
tions superimposed on the good data every 20 seconds starting on visit
day 21 between 16:40 and 17:50 G.m.t. These excursions were observed
when the readings were near zero, as well as when the readings rose as
high as 0.9 Rad/hr.
The Van Allen Belt dosimeter measures the radiation dose in radiation
absorbed dose per hour (Rad/hr) in the Orbital Workshop on the bulkhead
between the wardroom and the waste management compartment. The dosimeter
consists of two ion chambers and the associated electronics that measure
skin dose and depth dose. The skin dose is equivalent to the radiation
impinging directly upon a crewman's skin. The depth dose is equivalent
to the radiation penetrating beneath 5 centimeters of skin tissue depth,
and provides information on dose rates that penetrate into the blood-
forming regions of the body.
The Van Allen Belt dosimeter was changed on visit day 26 at about
17:00 G.m.t. The telemetry received from the second unit also exhibited
the same excursions.
The inertial measurement unit was not operated with the heaters cy-
cling prior to flight.
The data are readable and valid between the heater cycles. No cor-
rective action is required.
When the camera back is closed after loading the film, a tab on the
camera back cover depresses the counter engage lever on the camera. This
depression pushes a linkage assembly which engages the teeth on the coun-
ter mechanism so that the counter is incremented one count for each frame
advance.
The most likely cause of the lost counts was an insufficient depres-
sion of the counter engage lever. As a result, the linkage did not fully
engage, which allowed random skipping of the frame counts.
The camera was not returned and no crew repair will be attempted as
this problem has no effect on the mission.
18.0 CONCLUSIONS
2. This flight demonstrated that for long term manned and unmanned
space flight, provisions should be made for unforeseen inflight repair and
maintenance in the form of accessibility, hand holds, tools, facilities,
materials, and hardware appropriate for interior and exterior operation.
Figures A-I and A-2 show the items which comprise the 16.,,, data
acquisition camera system for use on the Skylab program. The principal
component is the 16 mm camera which uses 28 volts dc for power and pro-
vides sequence operation in lieu of cine operation. Shutter speeds range
from 1/60 to 1/1000 second and frame.rates are time exposure, 1 or 2
frames per second, 6 frames per second, 12 frames per second, or 24 frames
per second. Camera film is provided in a 43 meter magazine and a 122 me-
ter canister. The 122 meter canister is part of a unique three part 122
meter magazine system. The camera system also included various lenses,
brackets, power packs, and tools. The quantities of each item are iden-
tified in Table A-I. The various photographic tasks necessitated many
types of film. The types and amounts of film for the first visit are as
follows:
S0-368 137
S0-168 3170
130AOUV 61
2485 91
3401 91
Since the 300 mm f/4.5 lens was added for damage assessment after
the Saturn Workshop launch, it is not contained in the above reference.
This lens is virtually an off the shelf lens with the only modlfication
being the removal of the lens hood. The lens is 20.7 centimeters by 8.1
centimeters and weighs 1 kilogram. It has a field of view of 0.079 radi-
an by 0.119 radian. This lens provided the details necessary for post-
flight assessment of the damage to the Orbital Workshop and high resolu-
tion ground photography of targets of interest.
A-2
TABLEA-I.- 16 mmDATAACQUISITION
CAMERA
SYSTEM
Item Quantity
e-
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i,n
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E
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m
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.
A-6
Lens - 460 ram focal length, f/4 fixed aperture, color corrected
Additional equipment supplied for use with the earth terrain camera
are as follows: window, lens protective cover, five filters, six spare
desiccants, a magazine cavity cover, a spare magazine, and four film can-
isters. See figure A-5 for a layout of this equipment.
A-9
f>
0
0
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Y
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Y
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D-!
Mass properties for the Saturn Workshop launch and the first visit
are summarized in table D-I. These data represent the conditions as
determined from analyses of expendable loadings and usage during the
flight. Variations in the command and service module and Saturn Work-
shop mass properties are determined for each significant mission phase
from lift-off through landing. Expendables usage are based on reported
real-time data. The weights and center-of-gravity of the individual mod-
ules were measured prior to flight and inertia values were calculated.
All changes incorporated after the actual weighing were monitored, and
the mass properties were updated.
D-2
Event
Lift off 89 095.5 8361.9 -4.3 7.9 548 296 6 008 545 6 042 229 -13 422 4452 17 633
Saturn Workshop in orbit s 75 687.3 8256.5 0.7 12.1 426 704 4 634 993 4 666 736 -55 286 -4208 13 680
Apollo Telescope Mount 75 582.6 8182.4 0.7 -72.3 735 752 3 768 734 3 491 426 -56 858 -522 582 12 857
deployed
Apollo Tele,cope Mount 75 424.3 8184.2 0.4 -75.3 818 257 3 841 937 3 601 367 -59 872 -540 073 13 973
Iolar arrays deployed
Control moment gyro spin- 75 199.7 8185.9 0.4 -75.6 818 09i 3 832 767 3 592 331 -59 876 -539 046 13 973
up complete
Rendezvous complete 74 782.4 -816.7 -0.4 76.0 815 653 3 808 510 3 568 336 59 806 538 339 13 787
First Visit
Lift off 19 982 2550.9 5.8 5.1 38 502 530 809 531 673 -3283 1090 -1625
Initial orbit achieved 14 023 2448.1 7.5 6.5 23 908 71 074 72 079 -1591 939 -1628
Coelliptic orbit 13 516 2456.3 7.0 6.4 23 060 67 983 68 419 -1350 863 -1656
Rendezvous complete 13 386 2475.5 6.5 7.2 22 827 67 598 68 047 -1282 774 -1582
Command and service module 13 277 2458.2 5.9 8.1 22 633 67 370 67 898 -1214 667 1500
post-flyaround no. 1
Command and service _dule 13 276 629.1 0.3 -I0.0 22 633 66 132 69 135 1381 -146 265
at soft dock
Saturn Norkshop at soft 74 777 -816.7 -0.4 76.0 815 638 3 807 684 i3 567 514 59 806 538 288113 787
dock
Orbital assembly confls- 88 054 -598.7 -0.3 63.0 846 611 6 238 751 5 993 245 62 301 397 951 13 987
uration at soft dock
L
Command and service module 13 116 2459.5 "5.2 9.3 22 348 67 038 67 668 -1129 540 -1384
post-flyaround no. 2
Saturn Norkshop at hard 74 773 -816.6 -0.4 76.0 815 622 3 806 862 3 566 693 59 805 538 236 13 787
dock
Orbits1 usembly confis- 87 805 -602.3 -0.6 63.1 846 208 6 194 715 5 948 883: 58 658 398 697!14 050
uratlon at hard dock
CoNmand and service module 87 608 -612.0 -2.6 63.8 849 410 6 135 855 5 892 369 70 711 399 578 15 341
transfers complete
Solar array system no. 1 87 467 -609.9 -8.6 63,8 925 176 6 077 562 5 910 543 86 733 392 937 28 541
deployed at 90"
Command and service module 87 246 -607.7 -8.2 64.4 921 253 6 079 12015 914 593 86 288 390 571 27 814
reaction control system
trim maneuver
Comsnd and service module 87 179 -604.9 -8.3 63.9 919 954 6 113 711 5 948 431 87 313 390 152 27 386
pre-separation from
Saturn Norkshop
Saturn Norkshop remaining 74 428 -815.8 -9.8 76.5 892 442 3 773 920 3 614 293 70 128 526 226 28 389
in orbit
Commmd and service mvdule 12 627 2461. S 5.1 9.7 21 344 65 269 66 357 -1247 729 -993
post-flysround no. 3
Command and service module 11 932 2472.8 4.0 10.0 20 375 59 235 59 519 -851 646 -I071
st CM/SM separation
Command module at entry 5894 2638.8 -0.2 16.0 8014 7031 6284 67 -558 -12
interface
Command module at drogue 5661 2635.0 -0.2 15.8 7823 6605 5861 69 -528 -8
_rtar firing
Command module st landing 5422 2629.2 -0.3 16.2 7711 6118 5390 66 -496 -6
apsyload shroud Jettisoned solar array system no. 2 missins, and m_cromteroid shield rlaoved except
for 31.8 kilosraum of debris.
E-I
May 14 134
15 135
16 136
17 137
18 138
19 139
20 140
21 141
22 142
23 143
24 144
25 145 1
26 146 2
27 147 3
28 148 4
29 149 5
3Q 150 6
31 151 7
June 1 152 8
2 153 9
3 154 i0
4 155 II
5 156 12
6 157 13
7 158 14
8 159 15
9 160 16
I0 161 17
ii 162 18
12 163 19
13 164 20
14 165 21
15 166 22
16 167 23
17 168 24
18 169 25
19 170 26
20 171 27
21 172 28
22 173 29
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F-I
APPENDIX F - GLOSSARY
Hemo
ly t i c Destruction of red blood cells with separation
of hemoglobin from the cells.
Humoral-cellular Referring to the two broad categories of immunity:
noncellular and cellular.
Immunoglobulins Immuneproteins.
F-3
REFERENCES
Sensitized Materials I Section 12. Kodak publication No. M-111, Rev. 10-63.
Eastman Kodak Company, Rochester, N.Y., Dept. GS.
NASA-JSC
/
//