Appellate Brief For Defendant/Appellee, Agosta v. FAST Systems Corp.
Appellate Brief For Defendant/Appellee, Agosta v. FAST Systems Corp.
Appellate Brief For Defendant/Appellee, Agosta v. FAST Systems Corp.
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Docket No.
VITO AGOSTA and FUEL SYSTEMS DESIGN, LLC, 2015-03780
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
against
TABLE OF CONTENTS:
Questions Presented: 3
Preliminary Statement: 3
Statement of Facts: 7
Point I: Plaintiff Dr. Agosta had unclean hands from his breach of his
fiduciary duties to defendant Corporation: 8
Point II: Plaintiff Dr. Agosta must be held to the legal consequences of his
Agreements: 12
Point IV: The Plaintiffs/Appellants did not overcome the presumption that
the USPTO record is correct: 20
Conclusion: 24
2
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
between the parties, together with the conduct of the parties, gave rise to an
2. Did the Court below correctly find that several relevant writings in the
case contained "all of the elements of a binding contract," and hold that the
3. In light of the Court's dismissal of the first, third, fourth and fifth
counterclaims, is there any basis for these remaining counterclaims to stand? The
Court below did not specifically answer this question, but implicitly answered
"Yes."
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT:
CPLR § 5531 statement; The full names of the original parties are Vito Agosta
and Fuel Systems Design, LLC, Plaintiffs, and FAST Systems Corporation and
3
Mark H. Schlam, Defendants. Per Stipulation dated 23 September 2013 [RA1],
Mark H. Schlam was removed as a Defendant in his personal capacity, and the
characterizes the nature of the current action as "fraud and negligence;" as detailed
in this Brief, the Respondent would also characterize the current action as being in
The decision appealed from has been reported in full text form at Agosta v.
FAST Systems Corp., 2015 NY Slip Op 50107(U), 2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 315
(Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co. 2015). Its full text is also available in the New York Law
I "FAST" is properly spelled out in majuscules, being the acronym for "Fuel Additive Smart
Technologies.
4
("FSD"), the Limited Liability Company Dr. Agosta controlled and continues to
control, has reneged on his agreement to further the exploitation and monetization
various prospective investors and funding sources, including SUNY Stony Brook
and the office of Congressman Steve Israel [RA5 - RA13; AA157; AA391 -
AA392]. Such marketing attempts are within the very broad discretion under the
services, Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2 (Sup.Ct., N.Y. Co. 1944), and as such, are
not subject to subsequent review by the courts, Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave.
Apartment Corp., 75 N.Y.2d 530, 553 N.E.2d 1317 (1990). Dr. Agosta
potential grant providers and investors, and also trademark development and
2 Patents and Trademarks often go hand-in-hand. See, e.g. Moshe H. Bonder, Patent and
Lanham Acts: Serving Two Legitimate Purposes or Providing an Indefinite Monopoly?, 15 Alb.
L.J. Sci. & Tech. 1 (2004); see also Adamson v. Commissioner, 5 T.C.M. (CCH) 1071, T.C.M.
(RIA) 46286 (Tax Ct. 1946); Gentile v. Gill, 2013 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 935 (Minn.App.
2013).
The use of trademarks and trade names is often intertwined with the exploitation and
protection of patents. E.g. Petersen v. Fee International, Ltd., 381 F. Supp. 1071, (W.D. Okla.
1974); In re Albion Disposal, Inc., 152 B.R. 794, 816 (Bankr., W.D.N.Y. 1993); L.A. Gear, Inc.
v. Thorn McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 2529, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1913 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied 510 U.S. 908,114 S. Ct. 291, 126 L. Ed. 2d 240 (1993).
Laws of the states, including New York, can provide greater protection in such regard than that
afforded under federal laws, L.A. Gear at 1134 - 1135. Species of intellectual property other
than patent may continue to pertain and provide protection even after expiration of the patent.
Hubbell Inc. v. Pass & Seymour, 883 F. Supp. 955, (S.D.N.Y. 1995), certif. for appeal denied
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11050 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
5
involvement in the commercial aspects of the venture, preferring to limit his
involvement in the venture to the technological aspects [AA 451, lines 12 - 20].
Trademark Office (USPTO) [AA36, ,-r,-r 37 -39]. As detailed further below, the
these are appropriately included in an Appendix to this instant Brief. 3 See Cross
3 References to the Respondent's Appendix will be designated herein as with the "RA" prefix, to
distinguish them from the Appellant's Appendix, which will be designated with the "AA" prefix.
6
Westchester Development Corp. v. Sleepy Hollow Motor Court, Inc., 222 A.D.2d
644,636 N.Y.S.2d 372 (2d Dept. 1995), appeal denied, 88 N.Y.2d 802, 667
N.E.2d 338, 644 N.Y.S.2d 688 (1996); Kimberly-Clark Corp., v. Power Authority
ofthe State ofNew York, 34 A.D.2d 1095,313 N.Y.S.2d 623 (4th Dept. 1970);
2001 Real Estate v. Campeau Corp., 148 A.D.2d 315,538 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1st Dept.
1989).
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
endorse in all respects the version of the fact pattern so set forth by the Appellant.
The Respondent's conception of the facts of the case as they differ from the
The Appellant's Brief asserts that Plaintiff Vito Agosta ("Dr. Agosta") was
[Appellant's Brief at 4]. It is FAST's contention and understanding that the legal
fees of Dr. Agosta paid by FAST to Heather Kress, Esq. did, in fact, entail
7
representation in the transaction. As discussed in this Brief, however, whether or
The Respondent disagrees with the Appellant's assertion to the effect that
there was no meeting of the minds, and no intent to be bound. As further detailed
in this Brief (and in the Decision appealed from), Dr. Agosta's conduct, including
POINT I: Plaintiff Dr. Agosta had unclean hands from his breach of his
fiduciary duties to defendant Corporation:
At the time of the relevant events (and continuing until the drafting of this
FAST Systems Corporation. It is beyond cavil that officers and directors are
fiduciaries with respect to the corporation, and their duties include a duty of loyalty
towards one another and toward the corporation similar to those of partners in a
partnership. Young v. Chiu, 49 A.D.3d 535, 536, 853 N.Y.S.2d 575) (2d Dept.
2008); In re Validation Review Associates, Inc., 223 A.D.2d 134, 138, 646
N.Y.S.2d 149, 151 (2d Dept. 1996), rev'd on other grounds 91 N.Y.2d 840, 690
8
N.E.2d 487,667 N.Y.S.2d 678, (1997); Greer v. Greer, 124 A.D.2d 707,708,508
N.Y.S.2d 217,219 (2d Dept. 1986); Motherway v. Cartisano, 2014 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 2145 at *8 - *9, 2014 NY Slip Op 31215(U) at *4 (Sup. Ct., Suffolk Co.
2014) (Emerson, J.). This fiduciary duty extends beyond situations of conflicts
known with certainty, and even covers possible speculative conflicts, Birnbaum v.
(1989). Simple honesty does not suffice; the fidiciary must proactively assert the
interests of his or her principal, "the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive" being
the standard. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
Dr. Agosta was under fiduciary duty to not place his personal interests in a position
of conflict with those of the corporation. Fender v. Prescott, 101 A.D.2d 418, 422
- 423, 476 N.Y.S.2d 128, 132 (1st Dept. 1984), affd 64 N.Y.2d 1079,479 N.E.2d
counterclaims that "On information and belief, Dr. Agosta did engage in
discussions and/or negotiations, with one or more third parties, with the intent to
have such third parties promote, market, and exploit the Inventions in lieu of
and/or to the exclusion of [Defendant FAST Systems]" and that "Dr. Agosta does
9
not have clean hands in the instant dispute." [AAI05, ~ 85]. These allegations
were undenied in the Plaintiffs' Reply of 17 October 2013, despite the fact that
[AA116, ~ 1]. 4 Accordingly, the Defendant's counterclaim that Dr. Agosta held
discussions with third parties with the intent to enter into agreements contrary to
Dr. Agosta cannot now be heard to deny that he did in fact engage in such
activities, Napper v. Napper, 50 N.Y.2d 1009, 409 N.E.2d 1355, 431 N.Y.S.2d 681
constituted a breach of his fiduciary duties, Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458,
Dr. Agosta's fiduciary duty towards FAST, and his breach thereof, carry
various ramifications:
aforestated misconduct pertained directly to the matter in litigation, and FAST was
4 The denials contained in Paragraph 1 of the Reply entail "Paragraphs 87-112 inclusive." The
relevant counterclaims entail Paragraphs 84 and 85.
10
injured thereby, the equitable relief now sought by Plaintiffs must not be granted
because Dr. Agosta has unclean hands, Weiss v. Mayflower Doughnut Corp., 1
Candido v. Young Stars, Inc., 10 A.D.2d 922,200 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1st Dept 1960).
Much ado was made in the litigation below over whether a certain Assignment of
AA54] was signed by him in his individual capacity, or in his capacity as the
President of Fuel Systems Design, LLC. This point of contention was duly noted
from the Bench in the Decision now under appeal, [Agosta v. FAST Systems Corp.,
2015 NY Slip Op 50107(U), n. 1 at *10, 2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 315 at *2 (Sup.
Ct. Suffolk Co. 2015) [AA5]. Dr. Agosta's fiduciary duty towards FAST renders
the capacity in which he executed the document irrelevant because his fiduciary
relationship imposed upon him the obligation to do all in his power to effect the
Dr. Agosta's breach of fiduciary duty disqualifies him from claiming any
11
FAST, South Pierre Associates v Meyers, 12 Misc. 3d 955,820 N.Y.S.2d 485
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2006) and cases cited therein.
POINT II: Plaintiff Dr. Agosta must be held to the legal consequences of his
agreements.
3]. There is no dispute to those contentions, nor to his contentions that he holds a
Ph.D. degree and has had significant service as a university professor [AA19, ~ 3].
N.Y.S.2d 563 (2d Dept. 2004); Huang v. Cheng, 182 A.D.2d 600,583 N.Y.S.2d
370, (1st Dept. 1992), appeal denied 80 N.Y.2d 760,605 N.E.2d 874, 591
N.Y.S.2d 138 (1992); Geary v. Rueger, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20063 at *23 (E.D.
12
Pa. 2004). People of intellect and erudition, including college professors, are held
to similar expectations. D'Andrea v. Hawaii, 453 Fed. Appx. 749 (9th Cir. 2011),
cert. denied_ U.S. _ , 132 S. Ct. 2395, 182 L. Ed. 2d 1021 (2012); Super 8
Worldwide, Inc. v. American Lodging Partners, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7007
at *22 - *23 (N.D. Ill. 2011). Dr. Agosta contends that his engagement of Heather
Kress, Esq. was for the purpose of forming FSD [AA511 - AA512]. This
constitutes an implicit admission that Dr. Agosta, with all of his aforementioned
advise him regarding his legal affairs. For the reasons stated above, even if the
engagement of Heather Kress, Esq. was limited to the formation ofFSD, Dr.
Agosta should still be held to the legal consequences of his transactions with
FAST; it is irrelevant whether Dr. Agosta was or was not represented by counsel in
Dr. Agosta testified that he did not read the Assignment of Invention
Q. Did you have a meeting with Mr. Likourezos and Mr. Schlam and
13
A. Yes, I did.
MR. eARN: He wants to know if that is the document, what he has just
handed you, is a copy of the document that Mr. Schlam and Mr. Likourezos
gave to you at that meeting on December 15,2011 and
asked you to sign it?
A. Yes. And Mr. Schlam gave me the paper not Mr. Likourezos.
A Yes.
14
[Document was marked as Defendant's Exhibit D at deposition,
Assignment of Invention.]
A. I assumed the papers were legal properly filled out by the lawyer,
by Mr. Schlam and I did not read it. I just signed it as a matter of
course as Vito Agosta, I suppose.
15
Dr. Agosta's words and actions, both contemporaneous with and subsequent
agreement. See, e.g. Flores v. Lower East Side Service Center, 4 N.Y.3d 363, 368,
828 N.E.2d 593, 795 N.Y.S.2d 491 (2005). It is of no consequence if, in his mind,
Dr. Agosta entertained contrary thoughts, ideas, and intentions; he must be bound
by the meaning exuded by his words and actions. Hotchkiss v. National City Bank
ofNew York, 200 F. 287, 293 - 294 (2d Cir. 1911), affd sub nom. National City
Bank ofNew Yorkv. Hotchkiss, 231 U.S. 50 (1913); Gillman v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 135 A.D.2d 488,491 - 492,521 N.Y.S.2d 729,732 (2d Dept. 1987).
failed to read it, or to engage counsel to read or interpret for him, this is his own
folly, of which he must bear the consequences. Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
135 A.D.2d 488,491 - 492,521 N.Y.S.2d 729,732 (2d Dept. 1987); see also
words, he cannot now be heard to say that his mind never actually assented to the
terms of the document he signed. Pimpinello v. Swift & Co., Inc., 253 N.Y. 159,
162 - 163, 170 N.E. 530, 631 (1930). Nor can Dr. Agosta, having declined to read
the document, now be heard to say that he was misled or defrauded in connection
16
with signing the document, Leasing Service Corp. v. Graham, 646 F. Supp. 1410,
It is noted that New York law construes contracts according to the objective
theory of contracts whereby a party's manifestations of intent are viewed from the
vantage point of a reasonable person in the position of the other party. Brown
plus relevant Exhibits]. Annexed to the court reporter's transcript was Exhibit 3,
the Minutes to the FAST Annual Shareholders' Meeting of25 January 2012.
[AA109 - AA 111] 5 The Minutes to that meeting, in tum, included the text of an e-
5 The Minutes to the 22 January 2012 Shareholder's Meeting, while entered as an Exhibit
annexed as part of the record of the 25 January 2012 meeting, were included in the Appellant's
Appendix as an Exhibit to the Defendant's Answer, where they also were presented before the
17
mail exchange that occurred three days previously, on 22 January 2012, regarding
the terms and conditions of Dr. Agosta's relationship with FAST [AA108.1 -
AA108.3].
Not only did Dr. Agosta agree to enter the minutes of the 25 January 2012
meeting into the record of the 14 February meeting, but he himself seconded the
motion to dispense with the reading of the minutes from the 25 January 2012
meeting [AA435, lines 8 - 11]. The record of the 14 February meeting is replete
with active participation by Dr. Agosta. The record of the 14 February meeting is
also replete with actions and references to actions taken by FAST in going forward
The minutes of the meeting satisfied the Statute of Frauds requirement. See,
e.g. Northstream Investments, Inc., v. 1804 Country Store Co.739 N.W.2d 44,50-
51 (S. Dak. 2007); Scherer v. Laborers International Union, 746 F. Supp. 73, 85
(N.D. Fla. 1988); see also DFI Communications, Inc. v. Greenberg, 51 A.D.2d
403,406,381 N.Y.S.2d 880, 883 (1st Dept. 1976), modified on other grounds 41
N.Y.2d 602, 363 N.E.2d 312, 394 N.Y.S.2d 586 (1977). Meeting minutes
Court below. Additional placement of the 22 January 2012 Minutes following the Transcript of
the 25 January 2012 Meeting would be undesirable and redundant surplusage, see CPLR R
5528(5).
18
evidencing oral agreement, together with partial performance, serve to estop the
application of the Statute of Frauds defense. Young v. Pleasant Dale Park District,
That the meeting minutes were memorialized by a court reporter makes them
especially reliable and suitably compliant with any statute of frauds requirement.
Beach v. Anderson, 417 N.W.2d 709 (Minn.App. 1988), review denied 1988 Minn.
The Spirt and Gupta cases cited in the Appellants' Brief are inapposite
because the parties in those cases did not stand in fiduciary relationships as Dr.
FAST towards exploiting and developing his patents must be viewed in light of his
19
POINT IV: The Plaintiffs/Appellants did not overcome the presumption that
the USPTO record is correct.
The Appellant appeals "from every part" of the Judgment of the Court below
[AA2]. This includes the denial of summary judgment for the Plaintiffs/Appellants
with respect to their Seventh Cause of Action, declaring that the Plaintiff holds
The records and deliberations of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
("USPTO") reflect that FAST holds title to the invention [RA13 - RA14].
Government records are presumed correct, and the challenger bears burden of
proving otherwise. Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 604 F.3d 1378, 1380 - 1381
decisions, see, e.g. Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d
1555, 1574 - 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1992), reh'g denied 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 415 (Fed.
Cir. 1993), and applies to Certificates of Correction issued by the USPTO, which
are part of the patents themselves, Superior Fireplace Co. v. Majestic Products
Co., 270 F.3d 1358, 1366 - 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2001), reh'g denied 2002 U.S. App.
LEXIS 2623 (Fed. Cir. 2002). This presumption of correctness must be overcome
by clear and convincing evidence, which the Plaintiffs have failed to present, Id.
That the Court below saw fit to note the persistence of ambiguities in the nature of
20
the Assignment of Invention document indicates that the evidence presented by the
Appellant to the Court below, ifit did demonstrate ownership of the patent in any
entity other than FAST, did not and could not have risen to the requisite "clear and
convincing" level.
Agosta participated in the activities of as though FAST did in fact hold the
connections [RA004 - RAOI2]. The actions of Dr. Agosta in the months following
his execution of the document are reflective of his status mentis and mindset, and
indicate that his true intent at the time he signed the document (and entered into
other aspects of the transactions with FAST) was to repose the rights to the
invention in FAST. See, e.g. Slatt v. Slatt, 64 N.Y.2d 966, 477 N.E.2d 1099,488
N.Y.S.2d 645 (1985). Dr. Agosta's failure to disavow the assignment of the
21
POINT V: The Lower Court's denial of Summary Judgment to the
Defendant does not necessarily foreclose the Defendant prevailing on the
issues:
Singletree, Inc. v. Lowe, 55 A.D.3d 861, 863, 866 N.Y.S.2d 702, 704 (2d Dept.
2008). "[D]enial of summary judgment means only that the case should be heard
by the trier of fact, and cannot be resolved as a matter of law," In re Salim, 2015
"[Summary judgment] does not deny the parties a trial; it merely ascertains
that there is nothing to try. Rather than resolve issues, it decides whether issues
exist. As is often said of the motion, issue finding rather than issue determination is
its function." Laura LL v. Robert LL, 186 Misc. 2d 642,643 - 644, 719 N.Y.S.2d
823 (Family Ct., Albany Co. 2000) (quoting SIEGEL, NY PRACTICE § 278, at 438
[3d ed]. 6). The purpose of summary judgment "is to encourage judicial economy
by eliminating unnecessary trials," Cole v. Flathead County, 771 P.2d 97, 100
(Mt. 1989).
6The 5th Edition of the late Prof. Siegel's magnum opus continues to carry the same passage
verbatim. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 278, at 476 [5th ed].
22
It is further noted that "the doctrine of the law of the case is flexible, not an
inescapable straightjacket." Garcia v. City a/New York, 104 A.D.2d 438, 478
N.Y.S.2d 957 (2d Dept. 1984), affd 65 N.Y.2d 805, 482 N.E.2d 923, 493
treatments of the various claims and counterclaims [Appellant's Brief at 34]. The
inconsistencies imagined by the Appellant may well cut either way, and any that be
viewed as an error to the detriment of the Appellant could just as well be a lower
summary judgment, "the perception of whether or not the papers raise an issue of
fact sufficient to ground the judgment should be measured is not the product of
bench, and before that, at the bar." SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 278, at 477 [5th
ed].
23
CONCLUSION:
For the reasons set forth above, the Appellant's appeal should be denied in
its entirety.
28 October 2015
Respect ly submitted,
Kenneth H. Ry y, Esq.
Counsel on the Brief
FAST Systems Corporation
142 Burr Road
East Northport, NY 11731
TO:
CAHN & CAHN, LLP
Richard C Cahn, of Counsel
22 High Street, #3
Huntington, NY 11743
24
CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE
the State of New York, do hereby certify that the foregoing brief was prepared by
spaced 14-point Times New Roman typeface in the main body (except for
headings and quotations exceeding two (2) lines) and 12-point Times New Roman
typeface in the footnotes; and that the total word count of the instant brief,
28 October 2015
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