Last Minute Tips in Civil Law 2018

2018 LAST MINUTE TIPS IN CIVIL LAW
By: Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr.
Q: If a Filipino spouse secures a foreign decree of divorce, and the alien

spouse is capacitated to remarry – will that divorce be valid in the
Philippines?
A: YES.
Article 26 of the Family Code only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained
abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that it is the alien spouse who
initiated the proceeding. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the
petitioner or respondent in the divorce proceeding. The provision is a corrective
measure to address an anomaly where a Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage
while the foreign spouse is free to remarry. [Republic v. Manalo, GR No. 221029,
April 24, 2018].
Q: What are the requisites for Art. 26 to apply [for a foreign divorce decree to
be valid in the Philippines)?
Answer:
1. At the time the divorce was secured abroad, there was a valid marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad where the alien spouse is capacitated to
remarry (regardless which spouse secured the divorce); and
3. The divorce decree must be valid under the national law of the foreign
spouse and the law of the place where the divorce was obtained. [See Republic v.
Manalo, GR No. 221029, April 24, 2018].
Q: May a husband or wife of a prior marriage file a petition to recognize a

foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her
spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy?
A: Yes. There is no reason to disallow the spouse of a prior marriage to simply prove
as a fact the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage between his spouse and
another on the ground of bigamy. The foreign judgment is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the
beginning under Article 35 (4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, the foreign judgment can be proven in
accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of
the Rules of Court. [Fujiki v. Marinay, June 26, 2013]
Q: What is the proper procedure for a foreign decree of divorce to be

enforced in the Philippines?
A: It may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in

the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules
of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact."
2018 Last Minute Tips in Civil Law by Atty. Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr. 1|Page
Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person's life which are recorded by the
State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public
consequence such as birth, death or marriage, which the State has an interest in
recording. [Fujiki v. Marinay, June 26, 2013]
Q: Wanting to get out from his marriage, Oscar Mallion filed a petition
for the declaration of nullity of his marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code—the inimitable psychological incapacity to comply with the essential
marital obligations. His petition was denied. About a year later, Mallion filed
another petition seeking the nullity of his marriage on the ground that it was
performed without a valid marriage license. His wife, Editha Alcantara,
countered with a motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and forum
shopping. Will this 2nd petition of Mallion prosper? Or is it barred by res
judicata? Decide.
A: The 2nd petition is barred by Res judicata.
It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade or avoid the application of res
judicata by simply varying the form of his action or adopting a different method of
presenting his case.
Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null and
void because no valid celebration of the same took place due to the alleged lack of a
marriage license. In his fist petition, however, petitioner impliedly conceded that
the marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner
is now bound by this admission. The alleged absence of a marriage license which
petitioner raises now could have been presented and heard in the earlier case.
Suffice it to state that parties are bound not only as regards every matter offered and
received to sustain or defeat their claims or demand but as to any other admissible
matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all other matters that
could have been adjudged in that case. (Mallion v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 141528,
October 31, 2006)
Q: How do you establish the filiation of illegitimate children?
A: The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by

(1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation
shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is
required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory
recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate
action for judicial approval. [RODOLFO S. AGUILAR vs. EDNA G. SIASAT, G.R.
No. 200169, January 28, 2015, J. Del Castillo]
Q: Can a Baptismal certificate be used as evidence to prove filiation?
A: No. Just like in a birth certificate, the lack of participation of the supposed
father in the preparation of a baptismal certificate renders this document
incompetent to prove paternity. And “while a baptismal certificate may be
considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of
the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect
to the child’s paternity. Thus, baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in
evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as
circumstantial evidence to prove the same.” (Antonio Perla v. Mirasol Baring and
Randy B. Perla, G.R. No. 172471, November 12, 2012).
Q: Is there a Prima facie presumption of filiation when sexual relations

with the putative father has been established?
A: YES. There is a prima facie case if a woman declares — supported by

corroborative proof — that she had sexual relations with the putative father; at this
point, the burden of evidence shifts to the putative father. The two affirmative
defences available to the putative father are: (1) incapability of sexual relations with
the mother due to either physical absence or impotency, or (2) that the mother had
sexual relations with other men at the time of conception (Charles Gotardo v.
Divina Buling, G.R. No. 165166, August 15, 2012).
Q: May a father compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate

children upon his recognition of their filiation?
A: NO. Art. 176 of the Family Code gives illegitimate children the right to
decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the father or
the mother who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their
illegitimate children. On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And
where there is no ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word
"may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is
under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may"
is permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children.
[Grande v. Antonio, G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014, Velasco, Jr.]
Q: Can the illegitimate child choose to use the surname of his father?
ANSWER: NO. The law is clear that illegitimate children shall use the surname
and shall be under the parental authority of their mother. The use of the word
"shall" underscores its mandatory character. The discretion on the part of the
illegitimate child to use the surname of the father is conditional upon proof of
compliance with RA 9255. “Illegitimate children may use the surname of their father
ONLY if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father”. [TINITIGAN
v. REPUBLIC, ET AL. G.R. No. 222095, August 7, 2017]
Q: What is the tender age rule?
A: The so-called “tender-age rule” under Article 213 of the Family Code states
that, generally, no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother, except when the court finds cause to order otherwise. Only the most
compelling of reasons, such as the mother's unfitness to exercise sole parental
authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and the award of
custody to someone else. In the past, the following grounds have been considered
ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and parental authority: neglect or
abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable disease.
(Pablo-Gualberto vs. Gualberto, G.R. 154994 & 156254, June 28, 2005).
Q: Who between the legal wife and the common law wife is entitled to the
remains of their common husband?
A: The Supreme Court ruled that the duty and the right to make funeral
arrangements are confined within the family of the deceased particularly the spouse
of the deceased to the exclusion of a common law spouse. (Valino v. Adriano, G.R.
No. 182894, April 22, 2014).
Q: Virginia Remo, a Filipino citizen, is married to Francisco Rallonza. In

her passport, the following entries appear: "Rallonza" as her surname, "Maria
Virginia" as her given name, and "Remo" as her middle name. Prior to the
expiration of her passport, Virginia applied for the renewal of her passport
with the DFA, with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the
replacement passport. Virginia, relying on Article 370 of the Civil Code,
contends that the use of the husband’s surname by the wife is permissive
rather than obligatory. Is Virginia correct?
A: No. A married woman has an option, but not a duty, to use the surname of
the husband in any of the ways provided by Art. 370 of the Civil Code. However,
R.A. 8239 or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996 limits the instances when a married
woman applicant may exercise the option to revert to the use of her maiden name.
These are death of husband, divorce, annulment, and declaration of nullity of
marriage.
In case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husband’s
surname or continuously use her maiden name. However, once she opted to use her
husband’s surname in her original passport, she may not revert to the use of her
maiden name, except if any of the four grounds provided under R.A. 8239 is present.
Further, even assuming R.A. 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of
R.A. 8239 which is a special law specifically dealing with passport issuance must
prevail over the provisions of the Civil Code which is the general law on the use of
surnames. A basic tenet in statutory construction is that a special law prevails over a
general law (Remo v. Sec. of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. 169202, March 5, 2010).
Q: Ludwig and Deoven were given casino chips (of Legenda Casino) worth
$6,000.00 by their Chinese client as payment for the repairs they made on the
latter’s car. They then went to Legenda Casino and after losing only $100.00
in a game of baccarat, they decided to encash the casino chips. They were
then accosted by casino security personnel on the ground that their casino
chips are presumed stolen since they did not secure it from the casino itself.
The casino chips were then confiscated and forfeited by the casino. Is the
casino correct? Explain.
A: NO. Though casino chips do not constitute legal tender, there is no law which
prohibits their use or trade outside of the casino which issues them. In any case, it is
not unusual — nor is it unlikely — that Ludwig and Deoven could be paid by a
Chinese client at the former's car shop with the casino chips in question; said
transaction, if not common, is nonetheless not unlawful. These chips are paid for
anyway; the Casino would not have parted with the same if their corresponding
representative equivalent — in legal tender, goodwill, or otherwise — was not
received by it in return or exchange. Given this premise — that casino chips are
considered to have been exchanged with their corresponding representative value —
it is with more reason that this Court should require petitioner to prove
convincingly and persuasively that the chips it confiscated from Ludwig and Deoven
were indeed stolen from it; if so, any Tom, Dick or Harry in possession of genuine
casino chips is presumed to have paid for their representative value in exchange
therefor. If petitioner cannot prove its loss, then Article 559 cannot apply; the
presumption that the chips were exchanged for value remains. [SUBIC BAY
LEGEND RESORTS AND CASINOS, INC vs. BERNARD C. FERNANDEZ, G.R.
No. 193426, September 29, 2014, J. Del Castillo]
Q: What is meant by the easement of light and view?
A: Articles 667-673 governs legal easements of light and view. Articles 581
and 582 of the Civil Code enumerate the conditions under which an adjoining lot
owner may enjoy the easement of light and view. Said articles absolutely prohibit
the construction of windows with direct views, or balconies or any similar openings
projecting over adjoining property, unless there is a distance of at least 2 meters
between the wall in which they are built and the adjoining property. Neither can
side or oblique views upon or towards such conterminous property be had, unless
there be a distance of sixty centimeters. [Alolino v. Flores, April 4, 2016]
Q: What is a nuisance?
A:
Art. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of
property, or anything else which:
(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or

(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or
(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or
(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street,
or any body of water; or
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.
Q: Distinguish nuisance per se and per accidens.
A: Nuisances are of two kinds: nuisance per se and nuisance per accidens. The
first is recognized as a nuisance under any and all circumstances, because it
constitutes a direct menace to public health or safety, and, for that reason, may be
abated summarily under the undefined law of necessity. The second is that which
depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and existence being a question
of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to
decide whether such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance.
Q: What are the two requisites for an action to quiet title prosper?
A: For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur,
namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title to or interest in
the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on the title must be shown to be in fact
invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or efficacy.
[VILMA QUINTOS, et al vs. PELAGIA I. NICOLAS, et al., G.R. No. 210252, June
16, 2014, J. Velasco, Jr.]
Q: What is the concept of possession? Can a person be convicted of illegal

possession of prohibited drugs if he only had constructive and not actual
possession of the drugs?
A: This crime of illegal possession of prohibited drugs is mala prohibita, and as

such, criminal intent is not an essential element. However, the prosecution must
prove that the accused had the intent to possess (animus possidendi) the drugs.
Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive
possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical
possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession
exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or
when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where
it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot
avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place where
the contraband is located, is shared with another.
Thus, conviction need not be predicated upon exclusive possession, and a showing
of non-exclusive possession would not exonerate the accused. Such fact of
possession may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence and any reasonable
inference drawn therefrom. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused
had knowledge of the existence of the presence of the drug in the place under his
control and dominion and the character of the drug. Since knowledge by the
accused of the existence and character of the drugs in the place where he exercises
dominion and control is an internal act, the same may be presumed from the fact
that the dangerous drugs is in the house or place over which the accused has control
or dominion, or within such premises in the absence of any satisfactory explanation.
[People v. Del Castillo, September 30, 2004]
Q: In actions for right of way, what is the standard to be used? Is the
convenience of the dominant estate the governing principle?
A: The convenience of the dominant estate has never been the gauge for the
grant of compulsory right of way. To be sure, the true standard for the grant of
the legal right is "adequacy." Hence, when there is already an existing adequate
outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway, as in this case, even when the
said outlet, for one reason or another, be inconvenient, the need to open up another
servitude is entirely unjustified. (Dichoso v. Marcos, G.R. No. 180282, April 11,
2011; Alicia B. Reyes vs. Spouses Francisco S. Valentin and Anatalia Ramos,
G.R. No. 194488, February 11, 2015)
Q: Are trees movable or immovable property?
A: (a) Trees by their nature are immovable properties because they are not to
be moved from one place to another.
However, the moment they are cut or uprooted, they become personal
property because they ceased to be adhered to the soil. If they are just bent to the
ground as by a strong typhoon but the roots remaining imbedded in the ground,
they are still real property.
(b) Plants adhered to the soil by incorporation are immovable property.
Plants on pots used for ornamentation are personal property because the pots could
be moved from place to another.
Q: Are Animals considered movable or immovable property?
A: It depends.
Beehives when purposely constructed and attached to the ground or on
another immovable (like a tree; wall), fishponds and other similar breeding places,
like cemented container where breeding of fishes or crustaceans is done, are
considered immovable property if the owner of the land or tenement
intended them to be permanent. The animals in the animal houses, the pigeons
in the pigeon houses, the bees in the beehives, the fish in the fishponds are included
and considered part of the immovable property.
The moment the fish is gathered from the fishpond, it is considered personal
property because the fish ceased to be part of the fishpond or breeding place once
extracted therefrom. In the same way, animals which had escaped from the animal
houses ceased to become part of the immovable where they are kept until they are
recovered and put back into their houses. But, if they are out only temporarily, such
as when they are brought out to a watering place and to be returned back, they
remain part of the immovables where they are kept. Cages for parrots and other
domesticated birds which are hanging on houses or buildings are not realty because
they can be moved from place to place.
Q: What is meant by Res Vinta?
A: Res Vinta.—These are immovables by incorporation and not by nature,
destination or by analogy. When separated from the immovable, they regain their
condition as movable property. Examples: (a) Ceiling fans attached to a ceiling; (b)
fire escape in a building.
The rule is that everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in

such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the
material or deterioration of the object are deemed immovable by
incorporation or res vinta.
Q: A drug lord and his family reside in a small bungalow where they sell
shabu and other prohibited drugs. When the police found the illegal trade,
they immediately demolished the house because according to them, it was a
nuisance per se that should be abated. Did the police act correctly? Explain.
Answer: No, the demolition cannot be sustained. The house is not a nuisance
per se or at law as it is not an act, occupation, or structure which is a
nuisance at all times and under any circumstances, regardless of location or
surroundings. Since the demolished house was not a nuisance during the times that
it was not being used for selling drugs, it cannot be considered as nuisance per se.
Therefore, since it is merely a nuisance per accidens, judicial intervention is
necessary for its abatement.
It is a standing jurisprudential rule that unless a nuisance is a nuisance per se, it may
not be summarily abated. Aside from the remedy of summary abatement which
should be taken under the parameters stated in Articles 704 (for public nuisances)
and 706 (for private nuisances) of the Civil Code, a private person whose property
right was invaded or unreasonably interfered with by the act, omission,
establishment, business or condition of the property of another may file a civil
action to recover personal damages. Abatement may be judicially sought through a
civil action therefor if the pertinent requirements under the Civil Code for summary
abatement, or the requisite that the nuisance is a nuisance per se, do not concur. To
note, the remedies of abatement and damages are cumulative; hence, both may be
demanded. [LINDA RANA vs. TERESITA LEE WONG, et al., G.R. No. 192861;
G.R. No. 192862, June 30, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe]
Q: What is the Principle of Self-Help? Can a land owner eject a squatter

on his property without any court order pursuant to the principle of “self-
help”?
A: This is the principle which authorizes an owner or lawful possessor of

a property to use reasonable counter-force to prevent or stop another person
from taking the former’s property. The force must be reasonably necessary to
repel the unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of property.
But a land owner cannot use the principle of self-help to eject a squatter without any
court order. Art. 433 of the Civil Code provides:. Actual possession under claim
of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner
must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property. A person who
is in actual possession of a property and who at the same time claims ownership
over it is presumed to be the owner thereof (See Perez vs. Mendoza, 65 SCRA 481).
Even assuming that the squatter has no claim of ownership, still the land lord
cannot eject the squatter without any court order. Article 536 provides: “In no case
may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is
a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or a
right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the
competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.”
Q: While strolling in a certain street, Ricky finds a purse containing

P1,000. Does he become the owner thereof by his mere possession? How can
he become the owner of the P1,000? Can that be considered a hidden
treasure. Explain.
Answer: No. Mere possession does not make Ricky the owner thereof. If Ricky
knows the owner of the purse, there is no way by which he can become the owner of
the P1,000 because according to the law, he must return the purse including its
contents to such owner. If the owner is unknown, Ricky should immediately deposit
the movable with the mayor of the place where the finding took place.
There shall then be a public announcement of the finding for 2 consecutive weeks.
Six months from the publication having elapsed without the owner having
appeared, the thing found shall be awarded to Ricky, after reimbursement of the
expenses. (Art. 719)
If the owner should appear in time, he shall be obliged to pay Ricky, as a reward, 1/10
of the amount found. (Art. 720)
(Note: the money found cannot be considered a “treasure” because it was not
“hidden and unknown”. Art. 439 states “By treasure is understood, for legal
purposes, any hidden and unknown deposit of money, jewelry or other precious
objects, the lawful ownership of which does not appear.” Hence, the rules on hidden
treasure do not apply.)
Q: Par. 15 of the Contract states: "the project is estimated to be completed

in six (6) years." Is this a day certain? Is this an obligation with a resolutory
period?
A: NO. Obligations with a resolutory period take effect at once, but terminate
upon arrival of the day certain. A day certain is understood to be that which must
necessarily come, although it may not be known when. If the uncertainty consists in
whether the day will come or not, the obligation is conditional. Here, the six (6)-
year period provided for project completion, or termination of the contract was a
mere estimate and cannot be considered a period or a "day certain" in the context of
Art. 1193. The lapse of six (6) years from the perfection of the contract did not, make
the obligation to finish the project demandable, such as to put the obligor in a state
of actionable delay for its inability to finish. [ROWENA R. SALONTE vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, et al, G.R. No. 207348, August 19, 2014, J. Velasco,
Jr.]
Q: Differentiate an option contract from a right of first refusal.
A: An option contract is a preparatory contract in which one party grants to another,

for a fixed period and at a determined price, the privilege to buy or sell, or to decide
whether or not to enter into a principal contract. It binds the party who has given
the option not to enter into the principal contract with any other person during the
period designated, and within that period, to enter into such contract with the one
whom the option was granted, if the latter should decide to use the option. It is a
separate and distinct contract.
In a right of first refusal, while the object may be determinate, the exercise of the
right would be dependent not only on the grantor’s eventual intention to enter into
a binding juridical relation with another but also on terms, including the price, that
are yet to be firmed up.
Q: Distinguish a contract to sell from a conditional contract of sale.
A: In a contract to sell, upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition which is

the full payment of the purchase price, ownership will not automatically transfer to
the buyer although the property may have been previously delivered to him. The
prospective seller still has to convey title to the prospective buyer by entering into a
contract of absolute sale.
A contract to sell is different from a conditional contract of sale where the seller may
likewise reserve title to the property subject of the sale until the fulfillment of a
suspensive condition, because in a conditional contract of sale, the first element of
consent is present, although it is conditioned upon the happening of a contingent
event which may or may not occur. If the suspensive condition is not fulfilled, the
perfection of the contract of sale is completely abated (cf. Homesite and Housing
Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 777 [1984]). However, if the suspensive
condition is fulfilled, the contract of sale is thereby perfected, such that if there had
already been previous delivery of the property subject of the sale to the buyer,
ownership thereto automatically transfers to the buyer by operation of law without
any further act having to be performed by the seller.
VII. SUCCESSION
Q: Testator died leaving an estate worth P1,000,000.00. He left an indebtedness

of P300,000.00. When still alive, he gave a donation of P100,000.00 to “A,” a
legitimate son. Testator is survived by four legitimate children, “A,” “B,” “C” and “D.”
Divide his estate.
Answer:
P1,000,000.00 —value of property of testator at the time of his death;

P300,000.00 — to be deducted from said value of property;
2018 Last Minute Tips in Civil Law by Atty. Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr. 10 | P a g e
P— 700,000.00 net value of hereditary estate.
P100,000.00 — donation to “A” is to be added being collationable.
Total hereditary Estate is P800,000.00.
Legitime of “A,” “B,” “C” and “D” is P400,000.00.
Free Portion is P400,000.00.
“A,” “B,” “C” and “D” will get P100,000.00 each for their legitimes.
Since “A” got already an advance legitime of P100,000.00 he will not receive
anything anymore as legitime.
Q: Is a contract of guaranty extinguished by death?
A: No, because a contract of guaranty does not fall in any of the exceptions
under Art. 1311. A guarantor’s obligation is basically to pay the creditor if the
principal debtor cannot pay. Payment does not require any personal qualifications.
The personal qualifications become relevant only at the time the obligation is
incurred but not so at the time of discharge or fulfillment of the obligation.
Q: Is an action to quiet title extinguished by death?
A: No, an action to quiet title is not extinguished by the death of the decedent,
it being a patrimonial right. Hence, the heirs have the right to be substituted to the
action even before their having declared as heirs.
Q. State the rules on soundness of mind.
ANS: (1) To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full
possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken,
unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause. It shall be sufficient if
the testator was able at the time of making the will, to know the nature of the estate
to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the
testamentary act. (Art. 799, NCC).
(2) The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of
proof to the contrary. The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind
at the time of making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of
the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his will was publicly
known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will must prove
that the testator made it during a lucid interval. (Art. 800, NCC; See also Torres vs.
Lopez, 48 Phil. 722).
Q: The Alex and Michelle had three (3) children. Michelle later obtained a
judgment of nullity of marriage. Their absolute community of property having been
dissolved, they delivered P1 million to each of their 3 children as their presumptive
legitimes. Alex later re-married and had two (2) children by his second wife Lanie.
Alex and Lanie, having successfully engaged in business, acquired real properties.
Alex later died intestate.
Who are Alex’s legal heirs and how will his estate be divided among them?
What is the effect of the receipt by Alex’s 3 children by his first marriage of their
presumptive legitimes on their right to inherit following Alex’s death?
Suggested Answer:
A. If the ground of nullity is psychological incapacity:
3 children of first marriage – 1/6th of the estate each

2 children of second marriage – 1/6th of the estate each
Surviving second spouse – 1/6th of the estate
B. If the ground of nullity is not psychological incapacity:
2 legitimate children of second marriage – 1/4th of the estate each

Surviving second spouse – 1/4th of the estate
3 illegitimate children of first marriage – 1/12th of the estate each
The legitime of an illegitimate child is supposed to be ½ of the legitime of a

legitimate child or 1/8th of the estate. But the estate will not be sufficient to pay the
said legitimes of the 3 illegitimate children because only ¼ of the estate is left after
paying the legitime of the surviving spouse which is preferred. Hence, the remaining
¼ of the estate shall be divided among the 3 illegitimate children.
C. In the distribution of Alex’s estate, one-half of the presumptive legitime

received by the three children of the first marriage shall be collated to Alex’s estate
and shall be imputed as an advance on their respective inheritance from Alex. Only
half of the presumptive legitime is collated to the estate of Peter because the other
half shall be collated to the estate of his first wife.
Q: What is the Principle of Instanter?
A: The express revocation of the 1st will renders it void because the revocatory clause
of the 2nd will, not being testamentary in character, operates to revoke the 1st will
instantly upon the execution of the will containing it.
Q. May An Unborn Child Be Instituted As An Heir?
A: It depends. A child already conceived at the time of death of the decedent is

capable of succeeding, provided, it be born later under the condition prescribed in
Article 41 of the Code. Otherwise, the institution is void because the fetus did not
become a person.
Art. 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is
completely delivered from the mother’s womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-
uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-
four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb. (New Civil Code)
Q: Can the testator institute as an heir an unknown person?

A: No.
Art. 845. Every disposition in favor of an unknown person shall be void,
unless by some event or circumstance his identity becomes certain. However, a
disposition in favor of a definite class or group of persons shall be valid.
Example: A testator provided in his will—“I bequeath my property

(identified) to the Bar topnotcher of the year immediately following my death.”
Here, the heir is unknown but he will be identified later when the results of the Bar
Examinations for the year indicated are released.
Q: Can the testator institute as an heir a class or group of persons?

A: Yes. (See Art. 845)
A disposition in favor of a definite class or group of persons is allowed by law.
Example: “I bequeath One Million Pesos to all honor graduates of the Faculty of
Civil Law, University of Santo Tomas from 1995 to year 2000.” The institution is valid
provided the graduates are not incapacitated at the death of the testator.
Q: What Classes Or Groups Can Be Instituted As Heirs?

A:
1. Art. 848—Brothers and sisters, some of the full blood, others half blood.
2. Art. 849—A person and his children.
3. Art. 959—Testator’s relatives (nearest in degree).
4. Art. 1030—The poor in general living in the domicile of the testator or
the poor in a definite locality.
Q: Distinguish Preterition From Disinheritance.—

A:
1. In preterition, the compulsory heir is deprived of his legitime by omission; thus,
the deprivation is tacit; in disinheritance, the deprivation is express.
2. Preterition may be voluntary or involuntary; disinheritance is always voluntary.
3. In preterition, the law presumes there is an oversight or mistake committed by
the testator; in disinheritance there is some legal cause.
4. In preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line, the omitted heir gets both
his legitime and his share in the free portion not disposed of by devises or legacies.
In a valid disinheritance, the heir is totally excluded from the hereditary estate. If
the disinheritance is defective, that is, ineffective, the heir is given merely his
legitime.
5. In preterition, nullity of institution of heir is total; in defective disinheritance,
nullity of institution of heir is only partial.
Q: Is an adopted child considered a compulsory heir?

A: YES.
A legally adopted child is raised by law to the level of a legitimate child and
acquires the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relation-ship of
parent and child. But an extrajudicial adoption is not valid and legal (Santos-Yñigo
vs. Republic, 95 Phil. 244; Cabatbat-Lim vs. IAC, 166 SCRA 451 cited in Manuel vs.
Ferrer, 247 SCRA 482).
An adopted child is considered a legitimate child of the adopting parent or

parents with all the rights appurtenant to one legitimate child. Thus, he succeeds as
a legitimate child. If an adopted child is preterited in a will, the institution of heirs is
void (Art. 854, NCC; See also Art. 979, NCC and Art. 189, Family Code; Acain vs.
IAC, 155 SCRA 100).
Q: May an adopted child represent the adopter in the inheritance of the

adopter’s parents?
A: YES. Under the old rule, adoption is personal between the adopted and the
adopting parents; their relationship does not go beyond them. The children of the
adopted child are not considered heirs of the adopting parent or parents nor vice-
versa. However, it appears now that the adopted may represent the adopter in
the inheritance of the latter’s parents. Section 17, R.A, No. 8552 -The Domestic
Adoption Law of 1998] expressly accorded the adopter and the adoptee in case of
intestate succession reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from
legitimate filiation. Article 189 of the Family Code further declared that “both
(referring to the adopters and adopted) shall acquire reciprocal rights and
obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child.”
Q: If a will is executed by a testator who is a Filipino citizen, what law will

govern if the will is executed in the Philippines? What law will govern if the
will is executed in another country? Explain your answers.
A: If a will is executed by a testator who is a Filipino citizen, Philippine law will

govern the formalities or extrinsic validity if the will is executed in the Philippines. If
the will is executed in another country, then the formalities shall be governed by the
law of the place where the will is executed. This is pursuant to Article 17 of the Civil
Code or the principle of “lex loci celebrationis.”
On the other hand, the intrinsic validity of the will shall be governed by the national
law of the decedent, regardless of where the will was executed (here or abroad).
Under Article 16 of the Civil Code, intestate or testamentary succession, both with
respect to the order of succession, amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of the testamentary provisions shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is under consideration. (Art. 16[2], NCC). The capacity to
succeed is also governed by the national law of the decedent. (Art. 1039, NCC).
VIII. SALE & LEASE
Q: A leased a parcel of land to B for a period of two years. The lease

contract did not contain any express prohibition against the assignment of
the leasehold or the subleasing of the leased premises. During the third year
of the lease, B subleased the land to C. In turn, C, without A’s consent,
assigned the sublease to D.
A then filed an action for the rescission of the contract of lease on the
ground that B has violated the terms and conditions of the lease agreement.
If you were the judge, how would you decide the case, particularly with
respect to the validity of:
(i) B’s sublease to C? and

(ii) C’s assignment of the sublease to D?
(iii)Explain your answers.
ANSWER:
A. B’s sublease to C is valid. Although the original period of two years for the
lease contract has expired, the lease continued with the acquiescence of the lessor
during the third year. Hence, there has been an implied renewal of the contract of
lease. Under Art. 1650 of the Civil Code, the lessee may sublet the thing leased, in
whole or in part, when the contract of lease does not contain any express
prohibition (Arts. 1650, 1670, CC). A’s action for rescission should not prosper on
this ground.
B. C’s assignment of the sublease to D is not valid. Under Art. 1649 of the CC,
the lessee cannot assign the lease without the consent of the lessor, unless there is a
stipulation to the contrary. There is no such stipulation in the contract. If the law
prohibits assignment of the lease without the consent of the lessor, all the more
would the assignment of a sublease be prohibited without such consent. This is a
violation of the contract and is a valid ground for rescission by A.
Q. Marvin offered to construct the house of Carlos for a very reasonable

price of P900, 000.00, giving the latter 10 Days within which to accept or
reject the offer. On the fifth day before Carlos could make up his mind.
Marvin withdrew his offer. What is the effect of the withdrawal of Marvin’s
offer?
ANSWER: The withdrawal of Marvin’s offer is valid because there was no

consideration paid for the option. An option is a separate contract from the contract
which is the subject of the offer, and if not supported by any consideration, the
option contract is not deemed perfected. Thus, Marvin may withdraw the offer at
any time before acceptance of the offer.
Q: In 1992, A sold a piece of land to B who delivered a check to A as full
payment for the land. The land was never delivered to B. In 2001, B filed an
action for specific performance. A opposed the action alleging that the sale
was never consummated as he did not encash the check given by B in
payment of the full purchase price of the land. Is the contention of A correct?
Answer: No. The contract of sale is valid. While it is true that delivery of a
check produces the effect of payment only when it is cashed, pursuant to Article
1249 of the Civil Code, the rule is otherwise if the debtor is prejudiced by the
creditor’s unreasonable delay in presentment. The acceptance of a check implies an
undertaking of due diligence in presenting it for payment and if he from whom it is
received sustains loss by want of such diligence, it will be held to operate as actual
payment of the debt or obligation for which it was given. This is in harmony with
Article 1249 under which payment by way of a check or other negotiable instrument
is conditioned on its being cashed, except when through the fault of the creditor,
the instrument is impaired. (Papa v. A.U. Valencia, January 23, 1998)
Q: The parties entered into a contract of lease for one (1) year with option
to purchase. The contract of lease expired without the lessee purchasing the
property. But the lessee remained in possession thereof. Hence, there was an
implicit renewal of the contract of lease on a monthly basis. Will the implied
renewal of the lease carry with it the revival of the option to purchase the
property?
A: NO. The other terms of the original contract of lease which are revived in the
implied new lease under Article 1670 of the New Civil Code are only those terms
which are germane to the lessee's right of continued enjoyment of the property
leased. Therefore, an implied new lease does not ipso facto carry with it any implied
revival of private respondent's option to purchase (as lessee thereof) the leased
premises. The provision entitling the lessee the option to purchase the leased
premises is not deemed incorporated in the impliedly renewed contract because it is
alien to the possession of the lessee. The lessee’s right to exercise the option to
purchase expired with the termination of the original contract of lease for one year.
[Dizon v. CA, G.R. No. 124741. January 28, 2003, Velasco, J.]
Q: What is the rule on double sale?

A:
Article 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the
ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession
thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property. Should it be immovable
property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith
first recorded it in the Registry of Property. Should there be no inscription, the
ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession;
and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided
there is good faith.
After the sale of a realty by means of a public instrument, the vendor, who resells it
to another, does not transmit anything to the second vendee, and if the latter, by
virtue of this second sale, takes material possession of the thing, he does it as mere
detainer, and it would be unjust to protect this detention against the rights of the
thing lawfully acquired by the first vendee.
X. DAMAGES
Q: Arthur sold his Isuzu MU-X to Benjo for P1 Million. Benjo took the vehicle
but did not register the sale with the Land Transportation Office. He allowed his son
Carlitos, a minor who did not have a driver's license, to drive the car to buy pan de
sal in a bakery. On the way, Carlitos, while driving in a reckless manner, sideswiped
Matt who was then riding a bicycle. As a result, he suffered serious physical injuries.
Matt filed a criminal complaint against Carlitos for reckless imprudence resulting in
serious physical injuries.
A. Can Dennis file an independent civil action against Carlos and his father
Benjamin for damages based on quasi-delict? Explain.
B. Assuming Dennis' action is tenable, can Benjamin raise the defense he is not
liable because the vehicle is not registered in his name? Explain.
Answer:
A. Yes, Matt can file an independent civil action against Carlitos and his father for
damages based on quasi-delict there being an act or omission causing damage to
another without contractual obligation. Likewise, Section 1 of Rule 111 of the
2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, provides that what is deemed instituted with
the criminal action is only the action to recover civil liability arising from the act or
omission punished by law. An action based on quasi-delict is no longer
deemed instituted and may be filed separately.
B. No, Benjamin cannot raise the defense that the vehicle is not registered in his
name. His liability, vicarious in character, is based on Article 2180 because he is the
father of a minor who caused damage due to negligence. While the suit will
prosper against the registered owner, it is the actual owner of the private vehicle
who is ultimately liable. The purpose of car registration is to reduce difficulty in
identifying the party liable in case of accidents.
Q: Jayson and his classmates were conducting a science experiment about fusion of
sulphur powder and iron fillings under the tutelage of Tabugo, the subject teacher
and employee of St. Joseph College. Tabugo left her class while the experiment was
ongoing without having adequately secured the students from any untoward
incident or occurrence. In the middle of the experiment, Jayson checked the result
of the experiment by looking into the test tube with magnifying glass and it was
moved towards his eyes. At that instance, the compound spurted from the test tube
and several particles hit Jayson’s eyes. His left eye was chemically burned, for which
he had to undergo surgery and spend for medication. Jayson filed a complaint for
damages against the school and Tabugo. Can the said school and its teacher,
Tabugo, be held liable for the unfortunate incident of Jayson?
A: Yes. The proximate cause of the student’s injury was the concurrent failure of
petitioners to prevent the foreseeable mishap that occurred during the conduct of
the science experiment. Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercise the higher
degree of care, caution and foresight incumbent upon the school, its administrators
and teachers. Art. 218 of the FC, in relation to Art. 2180 of the NCC, bestows special
parental authority on a school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual,
entity or institution engaged in child care, and these persons have responsibility
over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody. Authority
and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside
the premises of the school, entity or institution.
In this case, the petitioners’ negligence and failure to exercise the requisite degree of
care and caution was demonstrated by the following: (i) petitioner school did not
take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to its students although it had full
information on the nature of dangerous science experiments conducted by the
students during class; (ii) petitioner school did not install safety measures to protect
the students who conduct experiments in class; (iii) petitioner school did not
provide protective gears and devices, specifically goggles, to shield students from
expected risks and dangers; and (iv) petitioner Tabugo (the teacher) was not inside
the classroom the whole time her class conducted the experiment, specifically, when
the accident involving the student occurred (St. Joseph’s College v. Miranda, G.R.
No. 182353, June 29, 2010).
Q: What is the doctrine of Parens Patriae?

A:
The State as parens patriae (father of his country) is obliged to minimize the risk of
harm to those who because of their minority (or incapacities) are as yet unable to
take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its utmost protection
(People vs. Baylon, 57 SCRA 115). If there is no margin and allowance given to the
incapacitated, disadvantaged or handicapped, inequity will arise in matters
involving them.
Generally, when laws are doubtful, the doubt is resolved in favor of the weak or
disadvantaged. This is specially true in labor laws where in case of doubt, the laws
are interpreted in favor of the laborer or employee (See: Euro-Linea Phils., Inc. vs.
NLRC, 156 SCRA 78; Abella vs. NLRC, 152 SCRA 140; Bautista vs. Murillo, 4 SCRA
175).
Examples of parens patriae provisions under the Civil Code:
Art. 1332. When one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in a
language not understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person
enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained
to the former.
Art. 1364. When through the ignorance, lack of skill, negligence or bad faith on
the part of the person drafting the instrument or of the clerk or typist, the
instrument does not express the true intention of the parties, the courts may order
that the instrument be reformed.
Art. 1399. When the defect of the contract consists in the incapacity of one of the
parties, the incapacitated person is not obliged to make any restitution except
insofar as he has been benefited by the thing or price received by him.
Art. 1415. Where one of the parties to an illegal contract is incapable of giving
consent, the courts may, if the interest of justice so demands, allow recovery of
money or property delivered by the incapacitated person.
Art. 1418. When the law fixes, or authorizes the fixing of the maximum number of
hours of labor, and a contract is entered into whereby a laborer undertakes to work
longer than the maximum thus fixed, he may demand additional compensation for
service rendered beyond the time limit.
Art. 1419. When the law sets, or authorizes the setting of a minimum wage for
laborers, and a contract is agreed upon by which a laborer accepts a lower wage, he
shall be entitled to recover the deficiency.
Q: What is the rule against thoughtless extravagance?

A:
Art. 25 of the Civil Code provides: ”Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for
pleasure or display during a period of acute public want or emergency may be
stopped by order of the courts at the instance of any government or private
charitable institution.”
The requisites for the filing of actions to stop thoughtless extravagance are:
1. There is thoughtless extravagance in expenses;

2. The extravagance is for pleasure or display;
3. There is a period of acute public want or emergency;
4. The case is filed in court by a governmental institution or private charitable
institution.
Q: Distinguish nominal from temperate damages.

A:
Nominal damages are only awarded to vindicate a right that has been violated and
not to indemnify a party for any loss suffered by the latter. Temperate or
moderate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary
loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be
provided with certainty. Considering that it has been established that respondent
suffered a loss, even if the amount thereof cannot be proven with certainty, the what
should have been awarded was temperate damages. [SEVEN BROTHERS
SHIPPING CORPORATION vs. DMC-CONSTRUCTION RESOURCES, INC.,
G.R. No. 193914. November 26, 2014, C.J. Sereno]
Q: What is the formula for computing loss of earning capacity?

A:
The formula for the computation of loss of earning capacity is as follows:
Net earning capacity = Life Expectancy x [Gross Annual Income - Living Expenses
(50% of gross annual income)], where life expectancy = 2/3 (80 - the age of the
deceased). [PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENJAMIN CASAS Y VINTULAN,
G.R. No. 212565, February 25, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe]
Q: If a building collapses and caused damages, would the

proprietor/owner, and/or architect of the building be held responsible?
Explain when each may be held responsible.
Answer:
The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damages resulting

from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs
(Art. 2190, NCC).
Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused:

(i) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due
diligence, and the inflammation of explosive substances which have not been
kept in a safe and adequate place;
(ii) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property;
(iii) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by
force majeure;
(iv) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter,
constructed without precautions suitable to the place (Art. 2191, NCC).
As a general rule, the owner of the building is the one liable for damages
when a building collapses. However, the engineer or architect who drew up the
plans and specifications for the building is liable for damages if within 15 years from
the completion of the structure, the same should collapse by reason of a defect in
those plans and specifications, or due to the defects in the ground.
The contractor may also be held liable if the edifice falls, within the same
period, on account of defects in the construction of the use of materials of inferior
quality furnished by him, or due to any violation of the terms of the contract (Art.
1723, NCC).
Q: An alien or foreigner husband of a Filipina bought with his capital funds a

parcel of land in Bohol and also paid for the construction of a house thereon. This
property was registered under the name of the Filipina. Can the alien husband claim
any right of ownership over the said house and lot?
ANSWER: NO. Being an alien, he is absolutely prohibited from acquiring

private and public lands in the Philippines. The Filipina wife acquired sole
ownership of both house and lot. This is true even if the alien husband provided the
funds for such acquisition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would
accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he would
then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the
Constitution does not permit him to have. [Taina Manigque-Stone v. Cattleya
Land, September 5, 2016]
Q. Mr. ZY lost P100,000 in a card game called Russian poker, but he had
no more cash to pay in full the winner at the time session ended. He
promised to pay PX, the winner, two weeks thereafter. But he failed to do so
despite the lapse of two months, so PX filed in court a suit to collect the
amount of P50.000 that he won but remained unpaid. Will the collection suit
against ZY prosper? Could Mrs. ZY file in turn a suit against PX to recover the
P 100,000 that her husband lost? Reason.
ANSWER:
1) The suit by PX to collect the balance of what he won from ZY will not prosper.
Under Article 2014 of the Civil Code, no action can be maintained by the winner for
the collection of what he has won in a game of chance. Although poker may depend
in part on ability, it is fundamentally a game of chance.
2) If the money paid by ZY to PX was conjugal or community property, the wife of

ZY could sue to recover it because Article 117(7) of the Family Code provides that
losses in gambling or betting are borne exclusively by the loser-spc-use. Hence,
conjugal or community funds may not be used to pay for such losses. If the money
were exclusive property of ZY, his wife may also sue to recover it under Article 2016
of the Civil Code if she and the family needed the money for support.
Q: Will the mere opening of a credit line in a bank create a loan

obligation?
A: NO. Opening a credit line does not create a credit transaction of loan or
mutuum, since the former is merely a preparatory contract to the contract of loan or
mutuum. Under such credit line, the bank is merely obliged, for the considerations
specified therefor, to lend to the other party amounts not exceeding the limit
provided. The credit transaction thus occurred not when the credit line was opened,
but rather when the credit line was availed of. [UCPB v. Beluso, G.R. No. 159912,
August 17, 2007, 530 SCRA 567.]
Q: The contract of sale provides that you can pay for your purchase using
bitcoin or crypto currency. Is the contract valid?
A: YES. Such stipulation of payment in bitcoin or other crypto currency is not

prohibited by any prevailing law or jurisprudence. In this regard, Article 1249 of the
Civil Code provides:
Art. 1249. The payment of debts in money shall be made in the currency
stipulated, and if it is not possible to deliver such currency, then in the currency
which is legal tender in the Philippines.

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2018 LAST MINUTE TIPS IN CIVIL LAW

By: Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr.

Q: If a Filipino spouse secures a foreign decree of divorce, and the alien

Q: May a husband or wife of a prior marriage file a petition to recognize a

Q: What is the proper procedure for a foreign decree of divorce to be

A: It may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in

A: The 2nd petition is barred by Res judicata.

Q: How do you establish the filiation of illegitimate children?

A: The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by

Q: Is there a Prima facie presumption of filiation when sexual relations

A: YES. There is a prima facie case if a woman declares — supported by

Q: May a father compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate

Q: Virginia Remo, a Filipino citizen, is married to Francisco Rallonza. In

Q: What is meant by the easement of light and view?

(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or

Q: What is the concept of possession? Can a person be convicted of illegal

A: This crime of illegal possession of prohibited drugs is mala prohibita, and as

Q: Are trees movable or immovable property?

Q: Are Animals considered movable or immovable property?

Q: What is meant by Res Vinta?

The rule is that everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in

Q: What is the Principle of Self-Help? Can a land owner eject a squatter

A: This is the principle which authorizes an owner or lawful possessor of

Q: While strolling in a certain street, Ricky finds a purse containing

Q: Par. 15 of the Contract states: "the project is estimated to be completed

A: An option contract is a preparatory contract in which one party grants to another,

Q: Distinguish a contract to sell from a conditional contract of sale.

A: In a contract to sell, upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition which is

Q: Testator died leaving an estate worth P1,000,000.00. He left an indebtedness

P1,000,000.00 —value of property of testator at the time of his death;

P100,000.00 — donation to “A” is to be added being collationable.

Total hereditary Estate is P800,000.00.

Legitime of “A,” “B,” “C” and “D” is P400,000.00.

Free Portion is P400,000.00.

Q: Is a contract of guaranty extinguished by death?

Q: Is an action to quiet title extinguished by death?

Q. State the rules on soundness of mind.

A. If the ground of nullity is psychological incapacity:

3 children of first marriage – 1/6th of the estate each

B. If the ground of nullity is not psychological incapacity:

2 legitimate children of second marriage – 1/4th of the estate each

The legitime of an illegitimate child is supposed to be ½ of the legitime of a

C. In the distribution of Alex’s estate, one-half of the presumptive legitime

Q: What is the Principle of Instanter?

Q. May An Unborn Child Be Instituted As An Heir?

A: It depends. A child already conceived at the time of death of the decedent is

Q: Can the testator institute as an heir an unknown person?

Example: A testator provided in his will—“I bequeath my property

Q: Can the testator institute as an heir a class or group of persons?

Q: What Classes Or Groups Can Be Instituted As Heirs?

Q: Distinguish Preterition From Disinheritance.—

Q: Is an adopted child considered a compulsory heir?

An adopted child is considered a legitimate child of the adopting parent or

Q: May an adopted child represent the adopter in the inheritance of the

Q: If a will is executed by a testator who is a Filipino citizen, what law will

A: If a will is executed by a testator who is a Filipino citizen, Philippine law will

Q: A leased a parcel of land to B for a period of two years. The lease

(i) B’s sublease to C? and

Q. Marvin offered to construct the house of Carlos for a very reasonable