-

9- 1
............
...........
............
..............
.............
...........
.............
...........
MSC-04112
.............
.................
.............
............
...........
...................
; .-@If ..
'
N A T I O N A L AERO N A U T I C S A N D SPACE A D M I N I S T R A T I O N
:..
*...
...
............
...........
.......
......
.e:*:
....
............
...........
............
...........
............
A*.*.'.'

...........
............
.............
............
......................
...........
............
...........
.............
...........
............
...............
............
...............................
..............
I ............
..........
............
...........
............
...........
............
...........
............
...........
............
...........
............
...........
............
...........
............
...........
............
...........
APOLLO 14 MISSION REPORT

............
...........
............
...........
............
...........
............
...........
............
...........
............
.............
...........
...........
...........
............
...........
............
...........
............
...........
............
...........
............
...........
............
...........
............
...........
............
..............
......................
...........
...........
............
(NBS A-T M- X-74240) APOLLO 1 4 HISSION REPORT N76-7 80 3 6
(NASA)
Unclas
00/98 01216

DISTRIBUTION AND R E F E R E N C I N G
l h l r popor i s not ruitoblo for gonorol distribution or roforoncing. It may bo roforoncod
only in othor working corrospondonco and docurnonts by participating orgonixotions.

MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER

H 0U STON ,TE X A S
RtPRODUCED BY MAY 1971
NATIONAL TECHNIC A L
INFORMATION SERVICE
U S DEPARlMEWl Of COMMERCE
SPRINCfIELD. VA ZlSl
 MS C-0 4 112

APOLLO 1 4 MISSION mPORT

PREPARED BY

Mission Evaluation Team

APPROVED BY

.
A
WT * -

James A. McDivitt
Colonel, USAF
M Apollo Spacecraft Program

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER
HOUSTON, TEXAS
A p r i l 1971
Apollo 14 lift-off.
 iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

S e ct i on Page

1.0 MISSION SUMMARY ..................... 1-1

2.0 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1
3.0 LUNAR SURFACE EXPERIMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1
3.1 APOLLO LUNAR SURFACE EXPERIMENTS PACKAGE . . . . . 3-5
3.2 LASER RANGING RETRO-REFLECTOR .......... 3-12
3.3 LUNAR PORTABLE MAGNETOMETER EXPERIMENT . . . . . . 3-12
3.4 S O U R WIND COMPOSITION EXPERIMENT . . . . . . . . 3-14
3.5 LUNAR GEOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-14
. 3.6 LUNAR S O I L MECHANICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-15
3.7 MODULAR EQUIPMENT TRANSPORTER . . . . . . . . . . 3-16
3.8 APOLLO L A N D I N G SITES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-18
4.0 LUNAR ORBITAL EXPERIMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1
4.1 S-BAND TRANSPONDER ................ 4-1
4.2 BISTATIC RADAR .................. 4-1
4.3 CECENSCHEIN/MOULTON POINT PHOTOGRAPHY
FROM LUNAR ORBIT ................ 4-2
4.4 APOLLO WINDOW METEOROID EXPERIMENT . . . . . . . . 4-3
4.5 DIM-LIGHT PHOTOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4
4.6 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE ORBITAL SCIENCE
PHOTOGWHY ................... 4-4
4.7 PHOTOGRAPHS OF A CANDIDATE EXPLORATION S I T E ... 4-5
4.8 .
V I S I B I L I T Y AT HIGH SUN ANGLES . ........ 4-5
4.9 TRANSEARTH LUNAR PHOTOGRAPHY . . . ........ 4-6
.
5 0 INFLICHT DEMONSTRATIONS . . . . . . . . . ........ 5-1
5.1 ELECTROPHORETIC SEPARATION . . . . ........ 5-1
5.2 LIQUID TRANSFER . . . . . . . . . ........ 5-1
5.3 HEAT FLOW AND CONVECTION . . . . . ........ 5-4
5.4 COMPOSITE CASTING ................ 5-4
iv

Se ct i on Page

6.0 TRAJECTORY ...................... 6-1

6.1 LAUNCH AND TRANSLUNAR T R A J E C T O R I E S . . . . . . . 6-1
6.2 LUNARORBIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1
6.3 TRANSEARTH AND ENTRY T R A J E C T O R I E S . . . . . . . 6-12
6.4 S E R V I C E MODULE ENTRY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12
7.0 COMMAND AND S E R V I C E MODULE PERFORMANCE . . . . . . . . 7-1
7.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS . . . . . . . 7-1
7.2 E L E C T R I C A L POWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1
7.3 CRYOGENIC STORAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2
7.4 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3
7.5 INSTRUMENTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-4
7.6 GUIDANCE. NAVIGATION AND CONTROL . . . . . . . . 7-5
7.7 REACTIOIJ CONTROL SYSTEMS ............ 7-11
7.8 S E R V I C E PROPULSION SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . 7-12
7.9 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL AND CREW S T A T I O N ..... 7-12
7.10 CONSUMABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-15
8.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1
8.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEMS . . . . . . . 8-1
8.2 ELECTRICAL POWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-4
8.3 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-4
8.4 RADAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-5
8.5 INSTRUMENTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-5
8.6 GUIDANCE. NAVIGATION AND CONTROL . . . . . . . . 8-6
8.7 DESCENT P R O P U L S I O N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-13
8.8 ASCENT PROPULSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-14
8.9 . ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL AND CREW STATION . . . . . 8-15
8.10 EXTRAVEHICULAR M O B I L I T Y U N I T . . . . . . . . . . 8-16
8.11 CONSUMABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-17
9.0 PILOT'S REPORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1
9.1 TRAINING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1
9.2 LAUNCH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1
 V

Section Page

9.3 EARTH O R B I T .................. 9-2

9.4 TRANSLUNAR INJECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-2
9.5 TRA.NSLUNAR FLIGHT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-2
9.6 LUNAR O R B I T I N S E R T I O N ............. 9-4
9.7 ............
DESCENT O R B I T I N S E R T I O N 9-1;
9.8 LUNAR MODULE CHECKOUT . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-5
9.9 POWERED DESCENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-6
9.10 LUNAR SURFACE A C T I V I T Y . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-8
9.11 ASCENT. RENDEZVOUS. AND DOCKING . . . . . . . . 9-17
9.12 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE LUNAR ORBIT
ACTIVITIES .................. 9-19
9.13 T M S E A H T H I N J E C T I O N . . . . . .. .. 9-27
9.14 TRANSEARTH COAST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-27
9.15 ENTRY AND LANDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-28
10.0 BIOMEDICAL EVALUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1
10.1 BIOMEDICAL INSTRUMENTATION AND P H Y S I O L O G I C A L
DATA ..................... 10-1
10.2 MEDICAL OBSERVATIONS .............. 10-11
10.3 P H Y S I C A L EXAMINATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-14
10.4 F L I G H T CREW HEALTH S T A B I L I Z A T I O N . . . . . . . . 10-14
10.5 QUARANTINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-15
11.0 M I S S I O N SUPPORT PERFORMANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-1
11.1 F L I G H T CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-1
11.2 NETWORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-2
11.3 RECOVERY OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-3
12.0 ASSESSMENT OF M I S S I O N O B J E C T I V E S . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1
12.1 PARTIALLY COMPLETED O B J E C T I V E S . . . . . . . . . 12-3
12.2 I N F L I G H T DEMONSTRATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-4
12.3 APPROVED OPERATIONAL TESTS . . . . . . . . . . . 12-4
13.0 LAUNCH PHASE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-1
13.1 WEATHER CONDITIONS ............... 13-1
 vi

Sect i on Page
13.2 ATMOSPHERIC E L E C T R I C I T Y EXPERIMENTS 13-1
13.3 LAUNCH VEHICLE SUMMARY ..... . 13-6
14.0 ANOMALY SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-1
1 4 . 1 COMMAND AND S E R V I C E MODULE . . . 14-1
14.2 LUNARMODULF: . . . . . . . . . . 14-24
14.3 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT . 14-42
14.4 APOLLO LUNAR SURFACE EXPERIMENTS 14-47
15.0 CONCLUSIONS ............ 15-1

AFPENDIX A - VEHICLE: D E S C R I P T I O N - . A-1

A. 1 COMMAND AND S E R V I C E MODULE . A-1
A. 2 LUNAR MODULE ........ A-6
A. 3 EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY U N I T A-10
A.4 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT ... A-10
A.5 MASS P R O P E R T I E S . . . . . A-13
A P P E N D I X B - SPACECRAFT H I S T O R I E S . . . . B-1
APPENDIX C - POSTFLIGHT TESTING . . . . . c-1
A P P E N D I X D - DATA A V A I L A B I L I T Y . . . . D-1
APPENDIX E - M I S S I O N REPOKT SUPPLEMENTS E-1
APPENDIX F - GLOSSARY . . . .
.. F- 1
REFERENCES ............... R-1

* .
L L I L. L
 1-1

1.0 MISSION SUMMARY

The Apollo 1 4 mission, manned by Alan Shepard, J r . , Commander;

S t u a r t A. Roosa, Command Module P i l o t ; and Edgar D. M i t c h e l l , Lunar
M.:dule P i l o t ; w a s launched from Kennedy Space Center, F l o r i d a , at
4:03:02 p.m. e . s . t . (21:03:02 G . m . t . ) on January 31, 1971. Because of
u n s a t i s f a c t o r y weather conditions at t h e planned t i m e of launch, a
launch delay (about 40 minutes) w a s experienced f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e i n
t h e Apollo program. The a c t i v i t i e s during e a r t h o r b i t and t r a n s l u n a r
i n j e c t i o n were similar t o t h o s e of previous l u n a r landing missions; how-
e v e r , during t r a n s p o s i t i o n and docking following t r a n s l u n a r i n j e c t i o n ,
s i x attempts were r e q u i r e d t o achieve docking because of mechanical d i f -
f i c u l t i e s . Television w a s used during t r a n s l u n a r c o a s t t o observe a
crew i n s p e c t i o n of t h e probe and drogue. A l l i n d i c a t i o n s were t h a t t h e
system w a s functioning normally. Except f o r a s p e c i a l check of a s c e n t
b a t t e r y 5 i n t h e l u n a r module, t r a n s l u n a r coast a f t e r docking proceeded
according t o t h e f l i g h t plan. Two midcourse c o r r e c t i o n s were performed,
one at about 30-1/2 hours and t h e o t h e r at about 77 hours. These cor-
r e c t i o n s achieved t h e t r a j e c t o r y r e q u i r e d f o r t h e d e s i r e d l u n a r o r b i t
i n s e r t i o n a l t i t u d e and t i m e parameters.

The combined s p a c e c r a f t were i n s e r t e d i n t o l u n a r o r b i t at approxi-

mately 82 hours, and t w o revolutions l a t e r , t h e descent o r b i t i n s e r t i o n
maneuver placed t h e s p a c e c r a f t i n a 58.8- by 9.1-mile o r b i t . The l u n a r
module crew e n t e r e d t h e v e h i c l e at approximately 101-1/4 hours t o pre-
p a r e f o r t h e descent t o t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e .

The lunar module w a s undocked from t h e command module at about

103-3/4 hours. P r i o r t o powered descent, an abort command w a s d e l i v e r e d
t o t h e computer as t h e r e s u l t of a malfunction but a r o u t i n e w a s manu-
a l l y loaded i n t h e computer t h a t i n h i b i t e d t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of an abort
d i s c r e t e . The powered descent maneuver w a s i n i t i a t e d at about 108 hours.
A ranging s c a l e problem, which would have prevented a c q u i s i t i o n of r a d a r
d a t a u n t i l l a t e i n t h e d e s c e n t , w a s c o r r e c t e d by c y c l i n g t h e c i r c u i t
breaker o f f and on. Landing i n t h e F r a Mauro highlands occurred at
108:15:09.3. The landing coordinates were 3 degrees 40 minutes 24 sec-
onds south l a t i t u d e and 17 degrees 27 minutes 55 seconds w e s t longitude.

The command and s e r v i c e module, after undocking and s e p a r a t i o n , w a s

placed i n a c i r c u l a r o r b i t having an a l t i t u d e of approximately 60 miles
t o photograph t h e proposed Descartes landing s i t e , as w e l l as perform
landmark t r a c k i n g and o t h e r t a s k s r e q u i r e d f o r t h e accomplishment of
l u n a r o r b i t experiments and photography. Communications between t h e com-
mand and s e r v i c e module and e a r t h during t h i s p e r i o d were i n t e r m i t t e n t
because of a problem with t h e high-gain antenna.
1-2

Preparations f o r t h e i n i t i a l p e r i o d of l u n a r e x p l o r a t i o n began
about 2 hours a f t e r landing. A procedural problem w i t h t h e l u n a r module
communications delayed cabin d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n about 50 minutes. The Com-
mander egressed at about 113-3/4 hours and deployed t h e modular equipment
stowage assembly as h e descended t h e l a d d e r , providing transmission of
c o l o r t e l e v i s i o n . The Lunar Module P i l o t egressed a few minutes l a t e r .
Subsequently, t h e S-band antenna w a s e r e c t e d and a c t i v a t e d , t h e Apollo
l u n a r s u r f a c e experiments package was deployed, and various documented
l u n a r samples were taken during t h e e x t r a v e h i c u l a r p e r i o d which l a s t e d
about 4 3/4 hours. A modular equipment t r a n s p o r t e r , used on t h i s m i s -
s i o n f o r t h e f i r s t time, a s s i s t e d t h e crew i n c a r r y i n g equipment and
l u n a r samples.

Preparations f o r t h e second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r p e r i o d were begun f o l -

lowing a 6 1/2-hour rest period. The g o a l of t h e second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r
p e r i o d w a s t o t r a v e r s e t o t h e area of Cone Crater. Although t h e crew
experienced d i f f i c u l t i e s i n navigating, they reached a p o i n t w i t h i n
approximately 50 f e e t of t h e r i m of t h e c r a t e r . Thus, t h e o b j e c t i v e s
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h reaching t h e v i c i n i t y of t h i s c r a t e r and o b t a i n i n g t h e
d e s i r e d samples were achieved. Various documented rock and s o i l samples
were c o l l e c t e d on t h e r e t u r n t r a v e r s e from Cone Crater, and, upon com-
p l e t i n g t h e t r a v e r s e , t h e antenna on t h e lunar-experiment-package c e n t r a l
s t a t i o n w a s realigned. The second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r period l a s t e d about
4-1/2 hours f o r a t o t a l e x t r a v e h i c u l a r t i m e of approximately 9-1/4 hours.
About 96 pounds of lunar samples were c o l l e c t e d during t h e two extra-
vehicular periods.

The ascent stage l i f t e d o f f at about 141-3/4 hours and t h e v e h i c l e

w a s i n s e r t e d i n t o a 51.7- by 6.5-mile o r b i t . A d i r e c t rendezvous w a s
performed and t h e command-module-active docking operations were normal.
However, during t h e f i n a l braking phase, t h e l u n a r module abort guidance
system f a i l e d after t h e system w a s no longer required. Following crew
t r a n s f e r t o t h e command module, t h e ascent s t a g e w a s j e t t i s o n e d and
guided t o impact approximately 36 miles w e s t of t h e Apollo 1 4 landing
site.

Transearth i n j e c t i o n occurred during t h e 34th l u n a r r e v o l u t i o n at

about 148-1/2 hours. During t r a n s e a r t h c o a s t , one midcourse c o r r e c t i o n
w a s made using t h e s e r v i c e module r e a c t i o n c o n t r o l system. I n a d d i t i o n ,
a s p e c i a l o g g e n flow rate t e s t w a s performed and a navigation e x e r c i s e
simulating a r e t u r n t o e a r t h without ground c o n t r o l w a s conducted using
only t h e guidance and navigation system. I n f l i g h t demonstrations of f o u r
types o f processes under zero-gravity conditions were a l s o performed and
televised t o earth.

Entry w a s normal and t h e command module landed i n t h e P a c i f i c Ocean

at 216:01:58. The landing coordinates were 27 degrees 0 minutes 45 sec-
onds south l a t i t u d e and 172 degrees 39 minutes 30 seconds west longitude.
 2.0 INTRODUCTION

The Apollo 1 4 mission w a s t h e 14th i n a s e r i e s using Apollo f l i g h t

hardware and achieved t h e t h i r d l u n a r landing. The o b j e c t i v e s of t h e
mission were t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e near a p r e s e l e c t e d p o i n t
i n t h e Fra Mauro formation, deploy and a c t i v a t e an Apollo l u n a r s u r f a c e
experiments package, f u r t h e r develop man's c a p a b i l i t y t o work i n t h e
l u n a r environment, and obtain photographs of candidate e x p l o r a t i o n s i t e s .

A complete a n a l y s i s o f a l l f l i g h t d a t a i s not p o s s i b l e within t h e

time allowed f o r preparation of t h i s r e p o r t . Therefore, r e p o r t supple-
ments w i l l be published f o r c e r t a i n Apollo 1 4 systems analyses, as shown
i n appendix E. This appendix a l s o l i s t s t h e current s t a t u s of all Apollo
mission supplements, e i t h e r published o r i n p r e p a r a t i o n . Other supple-
ments w i l l be published as necessary.

I n t h i s r e p o r t , all a c t u a l times p r i o r t o e a r t h landing are elapsed

time from range zero, e s t a b l i s h e d as t h e i n t e g r a l second before l i f t - o f f .
Range zero f o r t h i s mission w a s 21:03:02 G.m.t., January 31, 1971. The
clock onboard t h e s p a c e c r a f t w a s changed at 54:53:36 by adding 40 min-
u t e s and 2.90 seconds; however, t h e t i m e s given i n t h i s r e p o r t do not
r e f l e c t t h i s clock update. Had t h e clock update not been performed, in-
d i c a t i o n s of elapsed t i m e i n t h e crew's d a t a f i l e would have been i n er-
r o r by t h e amount of t h e delay i n l i f t - o f f s i n c e t h e midcourse c o r r e c t i o n s
were t a r g e t e d t o achieve t h e prelaunch-desired l u n a r o r b i t i n s e r t i o n t i m e .
Greenwich mean t i m e i s used f o r all times after e a r t h landing. All r e f -
erences t o mileage d i s t a n c e are i n n a u t i c a l miles.
 3.0 LUNAR SURFACE EXPERIMENTS

The experiments discussed i n t h i s s e c t i o n c o n s i s t o f t h o s e associ-

a t e d with t h e Apollo l u n a r surface experiments package ( a suprathermal
ion d e t e c t o r , a cold cathode gage, a p a s s i v e seismometer, an a c t i v e s e i s -
mometer, and a charged p a r t i c l e environment d e t e c t o r ) , as w e l l as a laser
ranging r e t r o - r e f l e c t o r experiment, a lunar p o r t a b l e magnetometer experi-
ment, a s o l a r wind composition experiment, l u n a r geology, and s o i l mechan-
i c s . Descriptions of t h e purposes and equipment of experiments c a r r i e d
f o r t h e f i r s t time on previous missions are given i n t h e r e p o r t s of t h o s e
missions, and t h e a p p l i c a b l e r e p o r t s are referenced where a p p r o p r i a t e .
A b r i e f d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e experiment equipment used f o r t h e first t i m e
on Apollo 14 i s given i n appendix A.

Lunar s u r f a c e s c i e n t i f i c a c t i v i t i e s were performed g e n e r a l l y as

planned w i t h i n t h e a l l o t t e d t i m e p e r i o d s . Approximately 5 1 / 2 hours
after. landing, t h e crew egressed t h e l u n a r module f o r t h e f i r s t t r a v e r s e
of t h e lunar s u r f a c e . During t h e f i r s t e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y p e r i o d ,
which l a s t e d 4 hours 47 minutes 50 seconds, t h e crew:

a. Deployed t h e modular equipment stowage assembly.

b. Deployed and operated t h e c o l o r t e l e v i s i o n camera as r e q u i r e d

t o t e l e v i s e crew a c t i v i t i e s i n t h e v i c i n i t y of t h e lunar module.

c. T r a n s f e r r e d a contingency sample t o t h e l u n a r module.

d. Erected t h e United S t a t e s f l a g and t h e s o l a r wind composition

foil.

e. Deployed and loaded t h e modular equipment t r a n s p o r t e r used t o

a i d t h e a s t r o n a u t s i n t r a n s p o r t i n g equipment and samples.

f . Collected surface samples i n c l u d i n g two "small-football-size"

specimens weighing approximately 4.4 and 5.5 pounds.

g. Photographed a c t i v i t i e s , panoramas and equipment.

h. Deployed t h e Apollo l u n a r s u r f a c e experiments package f o r t h e

continuing c o l l e c t i o n of lunar s c i e n t i f i c data via r a d i o l i n k .
3-2

Following a planned r e s t p e r i o d , t h e second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y

p e r i o d began with preparations f o r M extended g e o l o g i c a l t r a v e r s e . The
duration o f t h e second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y p e r i o d w a s 4 hours 34 min-
u t e s 4 1 seconds, covering a t r a v e r s e of approximately 1.6 miles, during
which t h e crew:

a. Obtained l u n a r p o r t a b l e magnetometer measurements at two s i t e s

along t h e t r a v e r s e .

b. Collected documented, core t u b e , and t r e n c h - s i t e samples.

c .
Collected a "large-football-size" specimen weighing approximately
19 pounds.

d. Photographed t h e area covered, including panoramas and sample

sites.

e. Retrieved t h e s o l a r wind composition f o i l .

f . A d j u s t e d t h e antenna on t h e Apollo l u n a r s u r f a c e experiments

package c e n t r a l s t a t i o n .

The evaluations discussed i n t h i s s e c t i o n are based on t h e data

obtained during t h e first lunar day - l a r g e l y on crew comments and
real-time information. Certain equipment d i f f i c u l t i e s mentioned i n t h i s
s e c t i o n are discussed i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l i n s e c t i o n 1 4 . 4 . More compre-
hensive results w i l l be summarized i n a separate science r e p o r t t o be
published when t h e d e t a i l e d analyses a r e complete (appendix E ) . The
s i t e s at which t h e various l u n a r surface a c t i v i t i e s were conducted a r e
shown i n t h e f i g u r e 3-1. The s p e c i f i c a c t i v i t i e s at each l o c a t i o n a r e
i d e n t i f i e d i n t a b l e 3-1.
3-3
 3-4

TABLE 3-1.- LUNAR SURFACE

St at i o n Activities

Sampling and photography

Apollo l u n a r surface experiments Apollo l u n a r s u r f a c e experiment
package deployment s i t e a c t i v i t i e s and photography
Laser ranging r e t r o - r e f l e c t o r s i t e Deployment of instrument and
photography
Comprehensive sample s i t e Sampling and photography
Small-football-size rock s i t e Sampling and photography

activity period

Sampling, photography and f i r s t

deployment o f lunar p o r t a b l e
magnetometer
Sampling and photography
Sampling
Photography
Sampling and photography
Photography
Sampling, photography and
second deployment of l u n a r
. p o r t a b l e magnetometer
Sampling and photography
Sampling and photography
Sampling
Sampling
Sampling and photography
Sampling and photography
Sampling and photography
Sampling and photography

s ..
t' L i L L L L I- L.
 3-5

3.1 MOLL0 LUNAR SURFACE EXPERIMENTS PACKAGE

The Apollo l u n a r surface experiments package w a s deployed with t h e

c e n t r a l s t a t i o n p o s i t i o n e d 600 f e e t west-northwest of t h e l u n a r module
( f i g . 3-2). No d i f f i c u l t i e s were experienced i n off-loading t h e p a l l e t s
o r setting them up f o r t h e t r a v e r s e o t h e r than an i n i t i a l d i f f i c u l t y i n
l a t c h i n g t h e dome removal t o o l i n t h e f u e l cask dome. The crew i n s t a l l e d
t h e f u e l capsule i n t h e radioisotope t h e r m o e l e c t r i c g e n e r a t o r and lock-
on d a t a were obtained with i n i t i a l antenna alignment a t 116 hours 48 min-
utes.

NASA -5 -71 -1618

First geophone --I b

Lunar module

detector experiment

Third geophone --.).

gage experiment
Note: Distances nd to Scale

Figure 3-2.- Arrangement of t h e Apollo lunar s u r f a c e experiments.

3.1.1 Central S t a t i o n

I n i t i a l conditions of t h e c e n t r a l s t a t i o n ( r e f . 1) were normal.

Power output of t h e r a d i o i s o t o p e t h e r m o e l e c t r i c g e n e r a t o r w a s 69.1 w a t t s ,
and t h e c e n t r a l s t a t i o n thermal p l a t e temperature averaged 73.8' F. A
3-6

r e s e r v e power reading of 43.5 w a t t s i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e b a s i c power con-

sumption w a s normal f o r Apollo lunar s c i e n t i f i c experiment package s t a r t -
up. A s t h e generator warmed up, t h e power output i n c r e a s e d t o 72.0 watts
and has remained nearly constant at t h a t l e v e l .

The t r a n s m i t t e r s i g n a l s t r e n g t h at i n i t i a l a c q u i s i t i o n w a s lower
t h a n expected, and about 4 dB lower t h a n t h a t of t h e Apollo 12 experiment
package. This w a s p a r t i a l l y t h e r e s u l t of a c q u i s i t i o n occurring at t h e
t i m e of t h e worst-case condition of t h e r e l a t i v e earth-moon p o s i t i o n s .
I n a d d i t i o n , l u n a r surface photography shows t h a t t h e antenna w a s not
f u l l y s e a t e d i n t h e gimbal i n t e r f a c e socket ( r e s u l t i n g i n a misalignment
with gimbal s e t t i n g s ) and t h e gimbal p o i n t i n g toward t h e e a r t h w a s o f f
t h e nominal p o i n t i n g angle. Subsequent monitoring i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e
s i g n a l s t r e n g t h obtained from t h e Apollo 1 4 u n i t i s now equal t o t h a t of
t h e Apollo 1 2 u n i t and t h a t s i g n a l s t r e n g t h v a r i a t i o n can be p r e d i c t e d
based on t h e r e l a t i v e earth-moon p o s i t i o n s .

The .Apollo lunar s c i e n t i f i c experiment package c e n t r a l s t a t i o n w a s

commanded t o t h e high-bit-rate mode at 116 hours 56 minutes f o r t h e
a c t i v e seismic experiment/thumper mode of o p e r a t i o n , which continued
u n t i l 117 hours 34 minutes. Using t h e h i g h - b i t - r a t e mode, only t h e
a c t i v e seismic experiment d a t a and l i m i t e d engineering d a t a can be re-
ceived from t h e c e n t r a l s t a t i o n . The o t h e r experiments were t u r n e d on
following t h e a c t i v e seismic experiment/thumper mode of o p e r a t i o n .

During t h e deployment of t h e c e n t r a l s t a t i o n , t h e s u n s h i e l d e r e c t e d
normally. However, t h e crew had t o lift one s i d e on t h r e e occasions be-
cause it w a s sagging. L u n a - s u r f a c e photography i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e sun-
s h i e l d had been bumped downward i n a counterclockwise d i r e c t i o n . However,
t h e sagging condition has had no adverse e f f e c t on t h e c e n t r a l s t a t i o n
thermal c o n t r o l system, and t h e c e n t r a l s t a t i o n has been o p e r a t i n g w i t h i n
thermal l i m i t s .

The Apollo lunar s c i e n t i f i c experiment package 12-hour t i m e r p u l s e s

d i d not occur a f t e r i n i t i a l c e n t r a l s t a t i o n turn-on. Subsequent t e s t s
v e r i f i e d t h a t t h e mechanical s e c t i o n of t h e t i m e r w a s not o p e r a t i n g . The
timer f u n c t i o n s s t a r t e d t o occur on February 11 and t h e timer provided
12-hour pulses t h i r t e e n times i n succession before f a i l i n g . Loss of t h e
t i m e r has no adverse e f f e c t of t h e Apollo l u n a r experiment package s i n c e
all f u n c t i o n s a r e being accomplished by ground command. This problem i s
discussed f u r t h e r ' i n s e c t i o n 14.4.4.

The lunar dust d e t e c t o r of t h e c e n t r a l s t a t i o n i s showing normal

outputs from a l l t h r e e p h o t o e l e c t r i c c e l l s . No changes i n t h e outputs
of t h e s e c e l l s were observed during o r a f t e r lunar module a s c e n t , i n d i -
c a t i n g t h a t dust from t h e ascent engine exhaust d i d not s e t t l e on t h e
central station.
 3-7

3.1.2 Passive Seismic Experiment

The p a s s i v e seismic experiment ( r e f . 2 ) w a s deployed 10 f e e t n o r t h

o f t h e c e n t r a l s t a t i o n ( f i g . 3-2). No d i f f i c u l t y W:LS experienced i n de-
ploying t h e experiment o t h e r t h a n t h e i n a b i l i t y t o make t h e ribbon cab1.e
l i e f l a t on t h e s u r f a c e under t h e thermal shroud s k i r t . All elements
have operated as planned w i t h t h e following exceptions.

a. The long-period v e r t i c a l component seismometer i s u n s t a b l e i n

t h e normal mode ( f l a t - r e s p o n s e mode). (See s e c t i o n 14.4.6 f o r a d i s -
cussion of t h i s anomaly.) The problem w a s e l i m i n a t e d by removing t h e
feedback f i l t e r and operating i n t h e peaked-response mode. I n t h i s mode,
t h e siesmometer has a resonant p e r i o d of 2 . 2 seconds i n s t e a d of t h e nor-
m a l p e r i o d of 1 5 seconds. Without t h e extended f l a t response, t h e low-
frequency d a t a i s more d i f f i c u l t t o e x t r a c t . However, u s e f u l data are
being obtained over t h e planned spectrum by d a t a processing t e c h n i q u e s .

. b. The gimbal motor which l e v e l s t h e Y-axis long-period seismometer

has not responded t o commands on s e v e r a l occasions. I n t h e s e c a s e s , t h e
r e s e r v e power s t a t u s i n d i c a t e s t h a t no power i s being s u p p l i e d t o t h e
motor. The power c o n t r o l c i r c u i t of t h e motor i s considered t o be t h e
most l i k e l y cause of t h i s problem. Response t o commands has been achieved
i n a l l cases by r e p e a t i n g t h e motor d r i v e command. (See s e c t i o n 14.4.5
f o r a more d e t a i l e d discussion o f t h i s problem.)

3.1.3 A c t i v e Seismic Experiment

The a c t i v e s e i s m i c experiment (appendix A, s e c t i o n A.4.1) w a s de-

ployed during t h e f i r s t e x t r a v e h i c u l a r period with t h e f i r s t geophone
approximately 10 f e e t southwest of t h e c e n t r a l s t a t i o n and t h e geophone
array extending i n a southerly d i r e c t i o n ( f i g s . 3-2 and 3-3). The Apollo
lunar s c i e n t i f i c experiment package w a s commanded t o t h e h i g h - b i t - r a t e
mode f o r 28 minutes during t h e a c t i v e seismic experiment/thumper mode o f
operation. Thumping operations began at geophone 3 ( t h e f u r t h e s t from
t h e c e n t r a l s t a t i o n ) and proceeded f o r 300 f e e t at 15-foot i n t e r v a l s t o -
ward geophone 1.

The attempts t o f i r e t h e i n i t i a t o r s r e s u l t e d i n 13 f i r e d and 5 m i s -

f i r e d . Three i n i t i a t o r s were d e l i b e r a t e l y not f i r e d . I n some i n s t a n c e s ,
two attempts irere made t o f i r e an i n i t i a t o r . (See s e c t i o n 14.4.1 f o r
f u r t h e r discussion of t h i s anomaly.)

A c a l i b r a t i o n p u l s e w a s s e n t p r i o r t o t h e l a s t thumper f i r i n g v e r i -
f'ying t h a t all t h r e e geophones were o p e r a t i o n a l . The mortar package, was
deployed 10 f e e t north-northwest of t h e c e n t r a l s t a t i o n and aimed t o f i r e
f o u r grenades on command from e a r t h t o d i s t a n c e s of 5 0 0 , 1000, 3000 and
NASA-S-7 1-1619

-
F i g u r e 3-3. Apbllo l u n a r s u r f a c e experiment package
components deployed on t h e . lunar surf ace.
 3-9

5000 f e e t i n n r t h e r l y d i r e c t i o n . F i r i n of t h e four mortars has n o t

been scheduled. Postmission t e s t s and analyses a r e being performed t o
e s t a b l i s h t h e a p p r o p r i a t e time and p r o v i s i o n s f o r conducting t h i s p a r t
of t h e experiment.

3.1.4 Suprathermal Ion Detector Experiment

The suprathermal ion d e t e c t o r experiment ( r e f . 2 ) was deployed

s o u t h e a s t of t h e Apollo l u n a r s u r f a c e experiments package c e n t r a l s t a -
t i o n ( f i g . 3-2). Noisy d a t a were received at turn-on ( s e c t i o n 1 4 . 4 . 2 )
b u t t h e d a t a were s a t i s f a c t o r y a f t e r seal break and dust cover removal.
The experiment i s r e t u r n i n g good s c i e n t i f i c d a t a , with low background
r a t e s . Despite a l a r g e amount of l u n a r d u s t which adhered t o one end of
t h e package when it f e l l over s e v e r a l times during deployment ( f i g . 3-41,
t h e temperatures throughout t h e l u n a r day and n i g h t remained w i t h i n t h e
range allowed f o r t h e instrument. ,Fhotographs show t h a t t h e instrument
i s properly deployed and aligned.

,3.1.5 Cold Cathode Gage Experiment

The cold cathode gage ( r e f . 2 ) was deployed 4 f e e t s o u t h e a s t of t h e

suprathermal ion d e t e c t o r , aimed s l i g h t l y southwest ( f i g s . 3-2 and 3-4).
The deployment w a s accomplished a f t e r s e v e r a l attempts i n which t h e crew-
man experienced d i f f i c u l t y w i t h t h e s t i f f n e s s of t h e connecting cables
while handling t h e suprathermal i o n d e t e c t o r experiment, t h e cold cathode
gage, and t h e ground screen at t h e same t i m e .

The experiment w a s f i r s t t u r n e d on s h o r t l y b e f o r e l u n a r module de-

p r e s s u r i z a t i o n f o r t h e second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y . Commands were
s e n t t o t h e instrument t o t u r n on t h e high voltage and t o open t h e c o l d
cathode gage s e a l . The cold cathode gage d a t a came o f f t h e i n i t i a l f u l l -
s c a l e i n d i c a t i o n s much more r a p i d l y t h a n expected, i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e
seal may have been open earlier t h a n commanded.

Because a spontaneous change i n t h e o p e r a t i o n a l mode o f t h e cold

cathode gage and t h e suprathermal ion d e t e c t o r experiment occurred a f t e r
about 1 / 2 hour of o p e r a t i o n , t h e high v o l t a g e s were switched o f f u n t i l
a f t e r l u n a r s u n s e t . When t h e high v o l t a g e s were switched back on a f t e r
l u n a r sunset,' t h e response of t h e cold cathode gage went t o t h e most
s e n s i t i v e range, i n d i c a t i v e of t h e low ambient p r e s s u r e . When t h e
p r e s s u r e r o s e a t l u n a r s u n r i s e as expected, t h e mode of o p e r a t i o n w a s
changed by a ground command t o a less s e n s i t i v e range, and t h e c a l i b r a t e
p u l s e s appeared normal. The experiment is o p e r a t i n g normally.
3-10

NASA-S-7 1-1620

-
F i g u r e 3-4. Suprathermal i o n d e t e c t o r experiment and c o l d
cathode gage experiment deployed on t h e lunar surf ace.
 3-11

3.1.6 Charged P a r t i c l e Lunar Environment Experiment

The charged p a r t i c l e l u n a r environment experiment ( r e f . 3 ) i n s t r u -

ment ( f i g s . 3-2 and 3-5) w a s f i r s t commanded on a t 117 hours 58 minutes
during t h e f i r s t e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y f o r a 5-minute f u n c t i o n a l t e s t
and t h e instrument w a s normal. The complete i n s t r u m e n t checkout showed
t h a t prelaunch and post-deployment counting r a t e s agreed w i t h i n 20 per-
c e n t , w i t h t h e exception o f channel 6 i n a n a l y z e r B . The counting rates
on channel 6 were t w i c e as h i g h as t h e prelaunch v a l u e s . The c o n d i t i o n
i s a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e behavior of s c a t t e r e d e l e c t r o n s i n t h e p h y s i c a l
a n a l y z e r s which behave q u i t e d i f f e r e n t l y i n t h e e f f e c t i v e l y zero mag-
n e t i c f i e l d of t h e moon compared w i t h t h e 0.5-gauss magnetic f i e l d of
t h e e a r t h . The high counting r a t e s on channel 6 do n o t d e t r i m e n t a l l y

NASA-S-7 1-1621

F i g u r e 3-5.- Charged p a r t i c l e l u n a r environment experiment

deployed on t h e lunar s u r f a c e .
 3-12

a f f e c t t h e science data. A l l command functions of t h e instrument were

executed with t h e exception of t h e f o r c e d h e a t e r mode commands. Subse-
quent t o t h e checkout, t h e experiment w a s commanded t o standby.

A f t e r lunar module a s c e n t , t h e charged p a r t i c l e lunar environment

experiment w a s commanded on a t 142 hours 7 minutes and t h e d u s t cover
w a s removed about 1 5 hours and 20 minutes l a t e r . Operating temperatures
are nominal. The m a x i m u m temperature during l u n a r day i s 136' F and t h e
minimum temperature during l u n a r n i g h t i s minus 11' F. The i n s t r u m e n t ' s
o p e r a t i o n a l h e a t e r cycled on automatically when t h e e l e c t r o n i c s tempera-
t u r e reached 32' F a t l u n a r s u n s e t , and was commanded on i n t h e forced-on
mode at 14' F , as planned.

The instrument, on one occasion, changed from t h e manual mode ( a t

t h e p l u s 3500-volt s t e p ) t o t h e automatic mode. The instrument w a s sub-
sequently commanded back i n t o t h e manual mode. There i s no evidence i n
t h e data which would i n d i c a t e t h e cause of t h e mode change.

3.2 LASER RANGING RETRO-REFLECTOR

The l a s e r ranging r e t r o - r e f l e c t o r ( r e f . 4 ) w a s deployed during t h e

f i r s t e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y a t a d i s t a n c e of approximately 100 f e e t
west of t h e Apollo l u n a r s c i e n t i f i c experiment package c e n t r a l s t a t i o n
( f i g s . 3-2 and 3-6). Leveling and alignment were accomplished with no
d i f f i c u l t y . The instrument w a s ranged on by t h e McDonald Observatory
team p r i o r t o l u n a r module l i f t - o f f and a high-quality r e t u r n s i g n a l w a s
received. Ranging a f t e r l i f t - o f f , while not y e t conclusive, i n d i c a t e s
no s e r i o u s degradation of t h e r e t r o - r e f l e c t o r r e s u l t i n g from t h e e f f e c t s
of t h e a s c e n t s t a g e engine f i r i n g .

3.3 LUNAR PORTABLE MAGNETOMETER EXPERIMENT

The l u n a r p o r t a b l e magnetometer (appendix A , s e c t i o n A.4.2) w a s de-

ployed at s i t e A and near t h e r i m of Cone Crater ( f i g . 3-1) during t h e
second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y p e r i o d . The instrument o p e r a t e d nominally
i n a l l r e s p e c t s . The temperature of t h e experiment e l e c t r o n i c s package
reached equilibrium, between 120' and 150' F. Meter r e a d i n g s , r e l a y e d
over t h e voice l i n k , i n d i c a t e d t o t a l f i e l d s of 102 210 gammas at s i t e A
and 4 1 t10 gammas at Cone Crater. Vector component measurements of t h e s e
readings were well w i t h i n t h e dynamic range of t h e instrument. Leveling,
o r i e n t a t i o n , and p o s i t i o n i n g were accomplished without d i f f i c u l t y ; how-
e v e r , t h e experiment cable was d i f f i c u l t t o rewind. This problem i s d i s -
cussed i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l i n s e c t i o n 14.4.3.

L L 11
 3-13

NASA-S-7 1-1622

Figure 3-6.- Laser ranging r e t r o - r e f l e c t o r experiment

deployed on t h e l u n a r surface.
3-14

3.4 SOLAR WIND COMPOSITION EXPERIMENT

The s o l a r wind composition experiment ( r e f . 4) , a s p e c i a l l y pre-

pared aluminum f o i l r o l l e d on a s t a f f , w a s deployed during t h e f i r s t ex-
t r a v e h i c u l a r period f o r a f o i l exposure t i m e of approximately 2 1 hours.
Deployment w a s accomplished with no d i f f i c u l t y ; however, during r e t r i e v a l ,
approximately h a l f t h e f o i l r o l l e d up mechanically and t h e remainder had
t o be r o l l e d manually.

3.5 LUNAR GEOLOGY

The landing s i t e i n t h e Fra Mauro highlands i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by

north-south t r e n d i n g l i n e a r ridges t h a t are t y p i c a l l y 160 t o 360 f e e t
i n h e i g h t and 6000 t o 13 000 f e e t i n width. The r i d g e s and v a l l e y s are
d i s f i g u r e d by c r a t e r s ranging i n s i z e from very s m a l l up t o several thou-
sand f e e t i n diameter.

The major objective of t h e geology survey w a s t o c o l l e c t , d e s c r i b e ,

and photograph m a t e r i a l s of t h e Fra Mauro formation. The F r a Mauro f o r -
mation i s b e l i e v e d t o be e j e c t a from t h e Imbrium Basin, which, i n t u r n ,
i s b e l i e v e d t o have been c r e a t e d by a l a r g e impact. This material i s
probably b e s t exposed i n t h e v i c i n i t y of t h e landing s i t e where i t has
been excavated from below t h e r e g o l i t h by t h e impact t h a t formed Cone
Crater. The major p a r t of t h e second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y t r a v e r s e ,
t h e r e f o r e , w a s designed t o sample, d e s c r i b e , and photograph representa-
t i v e materials i n t h e Cone Crater e j e c t a . Most o f t h e r e t u r n e d rock
samples c o n s i s t of fragmental material. Photographs t a k e n on t h e e j e c t a
b l a n k e t of Cone Crater show v a r i o u s degrees of l a y e r i n g , s h e e t i n g , and
f o l i a t i o n i n t h e e j e c t e d boulders. A considerable v a r i e t y i n t h e n a t u r e
of t h e r e t u r n e d fragmental rocks has been noted.

During t h e f i r s t e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y , t h e crew traversed a t o t a l

d i s t a n c e of about 1700 f e e t . On t h e i r w a y back t o t h e l u n a r module a f t e r
deployment of t h e Apollo l u n a r s c i e n t i f i c experiment package, t h e crew
c o l l e c t e d a comprehensive sample and two " f o o t b a l l - s i z e " rocks. The com-
prehensive sample a r e a was photographed with l o c a t o r s h o t s t o t h e Apollo
l u n a r s c i e n t i f i c experiment package and t o t h e l u n a r module p r i o r t o sam-
p l i n g , and s t e r e o photographs were t a k e n o f t h e two " f o o t b a l l - s i z e " rocks
before t h e y were removed from t h e s u r f a c e . The l o c a t i o n of t h e Apollo .
l u n a r s c i e n t i f i c experiment package and t h e sampling and photographic
s i t e s f o r t h e f i r s t e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y are shown i n f i g u r e 3-1.
 3-15

The t r a v e r s e during t h e second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y covered a

t o t a l d i s t a n c e o f about 10 000 feet. The a c t u a l l i n e of t r a v e r s e i s
s h a m i n f i g u r e 3-1. The crew reached a p o i n t w i t h i n about 50 feet of
t h e r i m of Cone Crater. The crew w a s behind t h e t i m e l i n e when t h e y
neared t h e rim of t h e c r a t e r ; t h e r e f o r e , s e v e r a l o f t h e preplanned sam-
p l e and photographic s t a t i o n s along t h e r o u t e back t o t h e l u n a r module
were omitted. There w a s d i f f i c u l t y i n navigating t o s e v e r a l of t h e pre-
planned s t a t i o n p o i n t s because of t h e undulations i n t h e s u r f a c e which
prevented s i g h t i n g of t h e smaller landmarks t h a t were t o be used.

The crew c o l l e c t e d approximately 96 pounds of rock fragments and

s o i l samples. Approximately 25 samples can be a c c u r a t e l y l o c a t e d u s i n g
photographs and t h e air-to-ground t r a n s c r i p t , and t h e o r i e n t a t i o n of 12
t o 15 on t h e lunar s u r f a c e p r i o r t o t h e i r removal can be e s t a b l i s h e d .

Driving t h e core tubes with a rock hammer w a s somewhat d i f f i c u l t .

The double and t r i p l e cores could not be d r i v e n t h e i r f u l l l e n g t h , and
t h e . m a t e r i a l i n t h e s i n g l e core f e l l out upon removal of t h e core t u b e
because o f t h e g r a n u l a r n a t u r e o f t h e material. Some sample material
w a s recovered f r o m t h e double and t r i p l e core t u b e s .

The only geologic equipment problems r e p o r t e d were t h a t t h e contin-

gency sample bag cracked when f o l d e d , and t h e vacuum seal p r o t e c t o r on
one o f t h e s p e c i a l environmental sample c o n t a i n e r s came o f f when t h e
c o n t a i n e r w a s opened.

3.6 LUNARSOIL MECHANICS

Lunar s u r f a c e e r o s i o n r e s u l t e d from t h e descent engine exhaust as

observed i n previous l u n a r landings. Dust w a s f i r s t noted during de-
s c e n t at an a l t i t u d e of 100 f e e t but d i d not h i n d e r v i s i b i l i t y during
t h e f i n a l approach.

The l u n a r module footpad p e n e t r a t i o n on landing appears t o have

been greater t h a n t h a t observed on previous Apollo l a n d i n g s . Bootprint
p e n e t r a t i o n s f o r t h e crew ranged from 1 / 2 t o 3/4 inch on l e v e l ground
i n t h e v i c i n i t y o f t h e l u n a r module t o 4 inches on t h e rims of s m a l l
craters. Lunar s o i l adhered extensively t o t h e crewmen's c l o t h i n g and
e q u i p e n t as' i n earlier Apollo missions. Tracks from t h e modular equip-
-merit t r a n s p o r t e r were 1/4 t o 3/4 inch deep and were smooth.
The Apollo simple penetrometer ( a l s o used as t h e geophone cable
anchor) w a s used f o r t h r e e p e n e t r a t i o n t e s t s . I n each c a s e , t h e 26 1/2-
inch-long penetrometer could be pushed t o a depth of 16 t o 19 inches
w i t h one hand and t o t h e extension handle with both hands. No penetra-
t i o n i n t e r f e r e n c e a t t r i b u t a b l e t o rocks w a s encountered.
3-16

A s o i l mechanics t r e n c h w a s dug i n t h e r i m of a s m a l l c r a t e r n e a r
North T r i p l e t Crater. Excavation w a s e a s y , b u t w a s t e r m i n a t e d at a depth
of 18 inches because t h e t r e n c h w a l l s were c o l l a p s i n g . Three d i s t i n c t
l a y e r s were observed and sampled: (1)The s u r f a c e m a t e r i a l w a s dark
brown and fine-grained, (2) The middle layer w a s t h i n and composed pre-
dominantly of g l a s s y patches. ( 3 ) The lower layer w a s very l i g h t colored
g r a n u l a r material.

3.7 MODULAR EQUIPMENT TRANSPORTER

The modular equipment t r a n s p o r t e r ( d e s c r i b e d i n appendix A, sec-

t i o n A . 2 . 1 and shown i n f i g . 3-7) w a s deployed at t h e beginning of t h e
f i r s t e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y . Deployment w a s impeded by t h e thermal
blanket which r e s t r a i n e d t h e modular equipment t r a n s p o r t e r from r o t a t i n g
down from t h e bottom of t h e modular equipment stowage assembly. The crew
r e l e a s e d . t h e t r a n s p o r t e r by p u l l i n g t h e upper pip-pins and allowing t h e
t r a n s p o r t e r and thermal blanket t o f a l l freely t o t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e . The
thermal b l a n k e t w a s e a s i l y d i s c a r d e d and e r e c t i o n o f t h e t r a n s p o r t e r went
as planned. The t i r e s had i n f l a t e d as expected. Equipment w a s loaded on
t h e t r a n s p o r t e r without d i f f i c u l t y . Two of t h e t h r e e pieces of Velcro
which h e l d t h e l u n a r maps on t h e t r a n s p o r t e r handles came o f f at t h e be-
ginning of t h e f i r s t e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y . These p i e c e s had been
glued on a s u r f a c e having a d i f f e r e n t f i n i s h than t h e one t o which t h e
Velcro adhered.

The modular equipment t r a n s p o r t e r s t a b i l i t y w a s adequate during both

t r a v e r s e s . Rotation i n r o l l w a s f e l t by t h e crewman through t h e handle
but w a s easily r e s t r a i n e d by using a t i g h t e r g r i p i f t h e r o t a t i o n sensed
w a s excessive. The j o i n t e d l e g s i n t h e f r o n t o f t h e - t r a n s p o r t e r operated
as expected i n t h a t they f l e x e d when h i t and would s p r i n g back t o t h e
v e r t i c a l p o s i t i o n r e a d i l y . The smooth rubber t i r e s threw no n o t i c e a b l e
d u s t . No d u s t w a s noted on t h e wheel fenders o r on t o p of t h e m e t a l
frame o f t h e t r a n s p o r t e r .

The modular equipment t r a n s p o r t e r w a s c a r r i e d by both crewmen

at one p o i n t in t h e second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y t o reduce t h e e f f o r t
r e q u i r e d f o r one crewman t o p u l l t h e v e h i c l e . This w a s done f o r a s h o r t
p e r i o d of t i m e because it w a s b e l i e v e d t o be more e f f e c t i v e when t r a v e l -
i n g over c e r t a i n types of t e r r a i n .
 3-17

NASA-S-71-1623

F i g u r e 3-7. - Modular equipment t r a n s p o r t e r i n use during

t h e second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r p e r i o d .
 3-18

I
3.8 APOLLO LANDING SITES

,I The Apollo 11 through 1 4 missions have placed a considerable amount

cf equipment on t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e . Figure 3-8 shows t h e l o c a t i o n s of
all Apollo hardware t h a t has been placed o r impacted on t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e .
I
 3-47 4
NASA-S-71-1624
30W 25W 20w

LUNAR PLANNING
CHART (LOC-2) oo -
 I
1sw low

350 300 250 200 150 100 40 20 0 20 40 100 150 200

\ \ 1 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ I I I I I / / ~ / / r
P
\ I I I I I111 / 1 1
L KIL0METERS
 3-19 -e
1 SE 20E 2SP

Ii

r
A

Mercator Projection €DITION I , JULY I969

PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BY

THE AERONAUTICAL CHART AND INFORMATION CENTER, UNITED STATES
AIR FORCE FOR NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION.

1
i
Figure 3-8.- Apollo landing site and hardware locations on lunar surface.
 4.0 LUNAR ORBITAL EXPERIMENTS

Four lunar o r b i t a l experiments w e r e conducted on Apollo 1 4 : t h e

S-band transponder experiment, t h e downlink b i s t a t i c r a d a r experiment,
gegenschein/Moulton p o i n t photography from lunar o r b i t , and t h e Apollo
window micrometeoroid experiment ( a space exposure experiment not re-
q u i r i n g crew p a r t i c i p a t i o n ) . Detailed o b j e c t i v e s a s s o c i a t e d with pho-
tography while i n l u n a r o r b i t and during t r a n s e a r t h f l i g h t are d i s c u s s e d
i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e aforementioned experiments. The e v a l u a t i o n s of t h e
lunar o r b i t a l experiments given h e r e are based on preliminary data.
F i n a l r e s u l t s w i l l be published i n a s e p a r a t e s c i e n c e r e p o r t (appendix E )
when t h e d a t a have been completely analyzed.

4.1 S-BAND TRANSPONDER

The S-band transponder experiment w a s designed t o d e t e c t v a r i a t i o n s

i n t h e l u n a r g r a v i t a t i o n a l f i e l d caused by mass concentrations and d e f i -
c i e n c i e s , and e s t a b l i s h g r a v i t a t i o n a l p r o f i l e s of t h e s p a c e c r a f t ground
t r a c k s . This w i l l be accomplished by a n a l y s i s of d a t a obtained from
S-band Doppler t r a c k i n g of t h e command and s e r v i c e module and l u n a r mod-
ule using t h e normal s p a c e c r a f t S-band systems.

There were same d i f f i c u l t i e s during t h e prime d a t a c o l l e c t i o n p e r i o d

( r e v o l u t i o n s 3 through 1 4 ) . Two-way t e l e m e t r y lock w a s l o s t many times
during r e v o l u t i o n s 6 and 9 because of t h e high-gain antenna problem, mak-
ing t h e d a t a f o r t h o s e revolutions e s s e n t i a l l y useless. A t o t h e r times
maneuvers, o r i e n t a t i o n s , and other o p e r a t i o n s i n t e r f e r e d with t h e data.
However, s u f f i c i e n t d a t a were received t o permit s u c c e s s f u l completion
of t h e experiment o b j e c t i v e s . Preliminary i n d i c a t i o n s are t h a t t h e m a s s
concentrations i n Nectaris w i l l be b e t t e r d e s c r i b e d and t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n
of g r a v i t a t i o n a l f o r c e s a s s o c i a t e d with t h e Fra Mauro formation w i l l be
b e t t e r known. The d a t a w i l l a l s o permit o t h e r f e a t u r e s t o be evaluated.

4.2 BISTATIC RADAR

The o b j e c t i v e s of t h e b i s t a t i c r a d a r experiment were t o o b t a i n data

on lunar s u r f a c e roughness and t h e depth of t h e r e g o l i t h t o a l i m i t of
30 t o 60 feet. The experiment w a s a l s o designed t o determine t h e l u n a r
s u r f a c e B r e w s t e r a n g l e , which is a f u n c t i o n of t h e bulk d i e l e c t r i c con-
stant of t h e l u n a r material. No s p a c e c r a f t equipment o t h e r than t h e nor-
m a l s p a c e c r a f t systems w a s required f o r t h e experiment. The experiment
data c o n s i s t s of records of VHF and S-band transmissions from t h e cammand
 lr-2

and s e r v i c e module during t h e f r o n t s i d e pass on r e v o l u t i o n 25, w i t h

ground-based d e t e c t i o n of both t h e d i r e c t c a r r i e r s i g n a l s and t h e s i g -
n a l s r e f l e c t e d from the l u n a r s u r f a c e . Both t h e VHF and S-band equip-
ment performed as required during r e v o l u t i o n 25. The r e t u r n e d s i g n a l s
of b o t h frequencies were of p r e d i c t e d s t r e n g t h . Strong r a d a r echoes
were r e c e i v e d throughout t h e pass and frequency, phase, p o l a r i z a t i o n and
amplitude were recorded. S u f f i c i e n t d a t a were c o l l e c t e d t o determine,
i n p a r t , t h e Brewster angle.

4.3 GEGENsCHEIN/MOULTON POINT PHOTOGRAPHY FROM LUNAR ORBIT

The experiment r e q u i r e d t h r e e sets of photographs t o be taken t o

h e l p d i f f e r e n t i a t e between two t h e o r e t i c a l explanations o f t h e gegen-
I s c h e i n ( f i g . 4-1). Each set c o n s i s t e d o f two 20-second exposures and

I
NASA-S-71-1625

Toward

?7////A undefined)

to scale)

Figure 4-1 .- Camera aiming d i r e c t i o n s

f o r gegenschein/
Moult on p o i n t photography.
 I
4-3

one 5-second exposure t a k e n i n r a p i d succession. One s e t w a s obtained of

t h e e a r t h o r b i t s t a b i l i t y point i n t h e earth-sun system (Maulton p o i n t )
t o t e s t t h e theory t h a t t h e gegenschein i s l i g h t r e f l e c t e d from a con-
c e n t r a t i o n of p a r t i c l e s captured about t h e Maulton p o i n t . Two a d d i t i o n a l
sets were taken t o t e s t another theory that t h e glow i s l i g h t r e f l e c t e d
f r o m i n t e r p l a n e t a r y dust t h a t i s seen i n t h e a n t i - s o l a r d i r e c t i o n . I n
t h i s t h e o r y , t h e b r i g h t e n i n g i n t h e a n t i - s o l a r d i r e c t i o n i s thought t o be
due t o higher r e f l e c t i v i t y of p a r t i c l e s e x a c t l y opposite t h e sun. For
an observer on e a r t h , t h e a n t i - s o l a r d i r e c t i o n coincides with t h e d i r e c -
t i o n of t h e Moulton point and t h e observer i s unable t o d i s t i n g u i s h be-
tween t h e t h e o r i e s . F'rom t h e moon t h e observer i s displaced from t h e
a n t i - s o l a r d i r e c t i o n by approximately 1 5 degrees, and t h e r e f o r e , can
d i s t i n g u i s h between t h e two possible sources.

The 16-DIEId a t a a c q u i s i t i o n camera w a s used with an 18-EUD focal

l e n g t h l e n s . The camera w a s bracket-mounted i n t h e right-hand rendez-
vous window w i t h a r i g h t angle m i r r o r assembly a t t a c h e d ahead of t h e
l e n s and a remote c o n t r o l e l e c t r i c a l cable a t t a c h e d t o t h e camera so
t h a t t h e Command Module P i l o t could a c t u a t e t h e camera from t h e lower
e q u i p m n t bay. The f l i g h t f i l m had s p e c i a l , low-light-level c a l i b r a t i o n
exposures added t o it p r i o r t o and a f t e r t h e f l i g h t which w i l l permit
photometric measurements o f t h e phenomena by means of photographic den-
sitometer and i s o d e n s i t r a c e readings during d a t a reduction. The inves-
t i g a t o r s a l s o obtained ground photography of t h e phenomena u s i n g i d e n t i -
c a l equipment and film p r i o r t o t h e t i m e of Apollo 1 4 data c o l l e c t i o n .

The experiment was accomplished during t h e 15th r e v o l u t i o n of t h e

moon. The aiming and f i l m i n g were e x c e l l e n t and t h e experiment has deni-
o n s t r a t e d t h a t long exposures are p r a c t i c a b l e .

4.4 APOLLO WINDOW METEOROID EXPERIMENT

The obdective of t h i s experiment i s t o determine t h e meteoroid

c r a t e r i n g f l u x f o r p a r t i c l e s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e degradation of glass
surfaces exposed t o t h e space environment. The Apollo connnand module
windows are used as meteoroid d e t e c t o r s . P r i o r t o f l i g h t , t h e windows
are scanned at 20x t o determine t h e general background of chips, s c r a t c h e s
and o t h e r d e f e c t s . During p o s t l f i g h t i n v e s t i g a t i o n s , t h e windows w i l l
again be scehned at 20x t o map a l l v i s i b l e d e f e c t s . The p o i n t s of i n t e r -
est w i l l t h e n be magnified up t o 7 6 5 ~f o r further examination. The
Apollo 1 2 and 13 s i d e windows and hatch windows were examined following
t h o s e flights and t h e r e s u l t s w e r e compared w i t h p r e f l i g h t scans. No
meteoroid impacts larger than 50 microns i n diameter were d e t e c t e d on
t h e Apollo 12 windows although t h e r e w a s an i n c r e a s e i n t h e number of
c h i p s and o t h e r low-speed surface e f f e c t s . The Apollo 13 left-hand-side
srindow had a suspected nreteoroid impact 500 microns i n diameter.
4-4

4.5 DIM-LIGHT PHOTOGRAPHY

Low-brightness astronomical l i g h t sources were photographe, using

t h e 16-mm d a t a a c q u i s i t i o n camera with t h e 18-IIUU l e n s . The sources i n -
cluded t h e z o d i a c a l l i g h t , t h e g a l a c t i c l i g h t , t h e l u n a r l i b r a t i o n region
(L4) and t h e dark s i d e of t h e e a r t h .

A l l s t a r f i e l d s have been r e a d i l y i d e n t i f i e d and camera p o i n t i n g

appears t o have been w i t h i n one degree of t h e d e s i r e d aiming p o i n t s with
less t h a n one-third of a degree of i m a g e motion f o r f i x e d p o s i t i o n s .
This i s w e l l w i t h i n t h e l i m i t s requested p r i o r t o f l i g h t , and it confirms
t h a t longer exposures, which had been o r i g i n a l l y d e s i r e d , w i l l be pos-
s i b l e f o r s t u d i e s such as t h e s e on f u t u r e Apollo missions. The z o d i a c a l
l i g h t i s apparent t o t h e unaided eye on at least h a l f of t h e a p p r o p r i a t e
frames. The g a l a c t i c l i g h t survey and lunar l i b r a t i o n frames are f a i n t
and w i l l r e q u i r e c a r e f u l work. Earth-darkside frames of l i g h t n i n g p a t -
t e r n s , earth-darkside photography during t r a n s e a r t h c o a s t , and s-IVB
photographs were overexposed and are unusable.

4.6 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE ORBITAL SCIENCE PHOTOGRAPHY

This photography c o n s i s t e d of g e n e r a l coverage t o provide a b a s i s

f o r s i t e s e l e c t i o n f o r f u r t h e r photography, i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of l u n a r sur-
f a c e features and t h e i r e v o l u t i o n , end i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of s p e c i f i c areas
and features f o r study. The Apollo l u n a r missions have i n t h e p a s t ob-
t a i n e d photographs of t h e s e areas + targets-of-opportunity o r i n support
of s p e c i f i c o b j e c t i v e s .

The Apollo 13 S-IVB impact area w a s given h i g h e s t p r i o r i t y i n o r b i t -

al s c i e n c e photography. The t a r g e t w a s s u c c e s s f u l l y acquired on revolu-
t i o n 34 using t h e Hasselblad camera with t h e 500- l e n s , and t h e crew
o p t i c a l alignment s i g h t t o compensate f o r t h e s p a c e c r a f t ' s motion. Sec-
ond p r i o r i t y w a s given t o t h e l u n a r module landing t a r g e t which w a s ob-
t a i n e d with t h e l u n a r topographic camera on r e v o l u t i o n 1 4 . However, t h e
camera malfunctioned and subsequent photography with t h i s camera w a s
d e l e t e d ( s e c t i o n 14.3.1).

A t o t a l of eight photographic t a r g e t s w a s planned f o r hand-held pho-

tography using c o l o r f i l m ; t h r e e were t o be t a k e n with t h e 500-mm lens
( a t o t a l of 35 l u n a r d e g r e e s ) , and f i v e with t h e 250+m l e n s ( a t o t a l
o f ' 130 l u n a r degrees ). The 500-mu t a r g e t s were s u c c e s s f u l l y acquired.
Three of t h e f i v e 250-nrm t a r g e t s were d e l e t e d i n real-time f o r o p e r a t i o n a l
 4-5

reasons (60 lunar degrees), and two w e r e s u c c e s s f u l l y acquired (70 l u n a r

degrees). A t o t a l of 65 percent of o f f - t r a c k photography has been suc-
c e s s f u l l y acquired.

The e a r t h s h i n e t a r g e t w a s s u c c e s s f u l l y acquired using both t h e

Hasselblad d a t a camera with t h e 80-mm l e n s and t h e 16-~IIIdata a c q u i s i t i o n
camera with t h e 18-m l e n s .

4.7 PHOTOGRAPHS OF A CANDIDATE EXPLORATION SITE

High-resolution photographs of p o t e n t i a l landing s i t e s a r e r e q u i r e d

f o r touchdown hazard evaluation and p r o p e l l a n t budget d e f i n i t i o n . They
a l s o provide d a t a f o r crew t r a i n i n g and onboard n a v i g a t i o n a l data. The
photographs on t h i s mission were t o be taken w i t h t h e l u n a r topographic
camera on r e v o l u t i o n 4 (low o r b i t ) , and 27 and 28 (high o r b i t s ) . During
r e v o l u t i o n 4, malfunction of t h e l u n a r topographic camera w a s noted by
the Command Module P i l o t . On r e v o l u t i o n s 27, 28, and 30, t h e 70-mm
Hasselbald camera w i t h t h e 500-mm l e n s ( l u n a r topographic camera backup
system) w a s used t o obtain t h e r e q u i r e d photography. About 40 frames
were obtained of t h e Descartes region on each r e v o l u t i o n using t h e crew
o p t i c a l alignment sight t o compensate f o r i m a g e motion. The three t a r g e t s
w e r e s u c c e s s f u l l y acquired.

To support t h e photography, a s t e r e o s t r i p w a s taken w i t h t h e

Hasselblad d a t a camera with t h e 80-mm l e n s from terminator-to-terminator
i n c l u d i n g t h e crew o p t i c a l alignment sight maneuver f o r camera c a l i b r a t i o n .

4.8 V I S I B I L I T Y AT HIGH SUN ANGLES

This photography w a s accomplished t o o b t a i n o b s e r v a t i o n a l data i n

t h e lunar environment f o r evaluating t h e a b i l i t y of t h e crew t o i d e n t i f y
f e a t u r e s under viewing and l i g h t i n g conditions s i m i l a r t o those t h a t
would be encountered during descent f o r a T p l u s 24 hour launch. The
results will have a bearing on decisions t o land at higher sun a n g l e s ,
which, i n t u r n , could e a s e launch and f l i g h t c o n s t r a i n t s . Photography
of t h e lunar s u r f a c e i n support of t h i s d e t a i l e d o b j e c t i v e w a s obtained
using the Hasselblad data camera and t h e 80-mm l e n s . This w a s done f o r
t h r e e t a r g e t s , two on t h e moon's far s i d e and one on i t s near s i d e .
I 4-6

4.9 TRANSEARTH LUNAR PHOTOGRAPHY

Photographs were taken of t h e v i s i b l e d i s c of t h e moon after t r a n s -

e a r t h i n j e c t i o n t o provide changes i n p e r s p e c t i v e geometry, p r i m a r i l y
i n l a t i t u d e . The photographs w i l l be used t o relate t h e p o s i t i o n s of
lunar features at higher l a t i t u d e s t o features whose p o s i t i o n s are known
through landmark t r a c k i n g and e x i s t i n g o r b i t a l s t e r e o s t r i p s . The pho-
tography w a s s u c c e s s f u l using t h e Hasselblad d a t a camera w i t h t h e 80-mm
l e n s and black-and-white film. Additional coverage with t h e 70-mm
Hasselblad camera and t h e 250-mm l e n s using c o l o r film w a s a l s o obtained.

I . .
Y L I* i- L..
 I
5-1

5 .O I N n I G H T DEMONSTRATIONS

I n f l i g h t demonstrations were conducted t o e v a l u a t e t h e behavior of

p h y s i c a l processes o f i n t e r e s t under t h e near-weightless conditions of
space. Four c a t e g o r i e s of processes were demonstrated, and segments of
t h e demonstrations were t e l e v i s e d over a 30-minute period d u r i n g t r a n s -
e a r t h f l i g h t beginning at approximately 172 hours. F i n a l r e s u l t s of a l l
four demonstrations w i l l be published i n a supplemental r e p o r t a f t e r anal-
y s i s of d a t a has been completed. (See appendix E . )

5.1 ELECTROPHOFETIC SEPARATION

Most organic molecules, when placed i n s l i g h t l y a c i d o r a l k a l i n e

water s o l u t i o n s , w i l l move through them i f an e l e c t r i c f i e l d i s a p p l i e d .
This e f f e c t i s known as e l e c t r o p h o f e s i s . Molecules of d i f f e r e n t sub-
s t a n c e s move at d i f f e r e n t speeds; t h u s , some molecules w i l l outrun o t h e r s
as they move from one end of a tube of s o l u t i o n toward t h e o t h e r . This
process might be e x p l o i t e d t o prepare pure samples of o r g a n i c m a t e r i a l s
f o r a p p l i c a t i o n s i n medicine and b i o l o g i c a l research i f problems due t o
sample Sedimentation and sample mixing by convection can be overcome.

A s m a l l f l u i d e l e c t r o p h o r e s i s demonstration apparatus ( f i g . 5-1) w a s

used t o demonstrate t h e q u a l i t y of t h e s e p a r a t i o n s obtained w i t h t h r e e
sample mixtures having widely d i f f e r e n t molecular weights. They were:
(1) a mixture of r e d and blue organic dyes, ( 2 ) human hemoglobin, and
( 3 ) DNA ( t h e molecules t h a t carry g e n e t i c codes) from salmon sperm.

Postmission review of t h e f i l m e d data reveals t h a t t h e r e d and b l u e

organic dyes s e p a r a t e d as expected; however, s e p a r a t i o n of t h e hemoglobin
and DNA cannot be d e t e c t e d . P o s t f l i g h t examination of t h e apparatus i n -
d i c a t e s t h a t t h e samples were not r e l e a s e d e f f e c t i v e l y t o permit good
s e p a r a t i o n , causing t h e dyes t o streak. However, t h e f a c t t h a t t h e dyes
s e p a r a t e d supports t h e p r i n c i p l e of e l e c t r o p h o r e t i c s e p a r a t i o n and shows
t h a t sedimentation and convection e f f e c t s a r e e f f e c t i v e l y suppressed i n
t h e space environment. The hemoglobin and DNA samples d i d not s e p a r a t e
because they contained b a c t e r i a t h a t consumed t h e o r g a n i c molecules ~

p r i o r t o a c t i v a t i o n , o f t h e apparatus.

5.2 LIQUID TRANSFER

The l i q u i d t r a n s f e r demonstration ( f i g . 5-2) was designed t o evalu-

a t e t h e use of tank b a f f l e s i n t r a n s f e r r i n g a l i q u i d from one t a n k t o
NASA-S-71-1626

Figure 5-1.- Electrophoresis demonstration unit.

 I
5-3

NASA-S-7 1-1627
 I -

5-4

another under near-zero-gravity conditions. The demonstration w a s con-

ducted using two s e t s of t a n k s , one s e t containing b a f f l e s and t h e o t h e r
without b a f f l e s . Transfer of l i q u i d between t h e unbaffled t a n k s w a s un-
s u c c e s s f u l , as expected. Transfer between t h e b a f f l e d t a n k s demonstrated
t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of two d i f f e r e n t b a f f l e designs. Photographic d a t a i n -
d i c a t e t h a t both designs were successful i n p e r m i t t i n g l i q u i d t r a n s f e r .

5.3 HEAT FLOW AND CONVECTION

The purpose of t h e h e a t flow and convection 'demonstration ( f i g . 5-3)

was t o o b t a i n data on t h e types and amounts of convection t h a t can occur
i n t h e near-weightless environment o f space. Normal 'convective flow i s
almost suppressed under t h e s e conditions ; however, convective f l u i d flow
can occur i n space by means of mechanisms o t h e r than g r a v i t y . For i n -
s t a n c e , s u r f a c e tension gradients and, i n some c a s e s , residual accelera-
t i o n s cause low-level f l u i d flow. .Four independent c e l l s of s p e c i a l de-
sign were used t o detect convection d i r e c t l y , o r d e t e c t convective e f f e c t s
by measurement of heat flow rates i n f l u i d s . The heat flow rates were
v i s u a l l y displayed by c o l o r - s e n s i t i v e , l i q u i d c r y s t a l t h e r m a l s t r i p s and
t h e c o l o r changes filmed w i t h a 16-rn data camera. R e v i e w of t h e f i l m
has shown t h a t t h e expected data were obtained.

5.4 COMPOSITE CASTING

T h i s demonstration w a s designed t o e v a l u a t e t h e e f f e c t of near-zero-

g r a v i t y on t h e preparation of c a s t metals, fiber-strengthened materials, 1 -
and s i n g l e c r y s t a l s . Specimens were processed i n E s m a l l h e a t i n g cham- L

b e r ( f i g . 5-4) and returned f o r examination and t e s t i n g . A t o t a l of

11 specimens w a s processed. No problems w i t h t h e procedures o r equip:
ment were noted. An x-ray of t h e samples v e r i f i e d t h a t good mixing
occurred.

i
 5-5

NASA-S-71-1628

Figure 5-3.- Heat flow and convection demonstration unit.

5-6
 6 .o TRAJECrORY

The general t r e j e c t o r y p r o f i l e of t h i s mission w a s similar t o t h a t

of previous l u n a r missions except f o r a f e w innovations and refinements
i n some of t h e maneuvers. These changes were : ( a ) The s e r v i c e propul-
s i o n system w a s used t o perform t h e descent o r b i t i n s e r t i o n maneuver
placing t h e command and service modules i n t h e low-perilune o r b i t ( 9 . 1
miles). ( b ) A d i r e c t rendezvous w a s performed using t h e ascent pro-
pulsion system t o perform t h e t e r m i n a l phase i n i t i a t i o n maneuver.
Tables 6-1 and 6-11 give t h e t i m e s of major f l i g h t events and d e f i n i t i o n s
of t h e events; t a b l e s 6-111 and 6-IV c o n t a i n t r a j e c t o r y parameter i n f o r -
mation; and table 6-v i s a summary of maneuver data.

6.1 LAUNCH AND TRANSLUNAR TRAJECTORIES

The launch t r a j e c t o r y i s r e p o r t e d i n r e f e r e n c e 5. The S-IVB w a s

t a r g e t e d f o r t h e t r a n s l u n a r i n j e c t i o n maneuver t o achieve a 2022-mile
pericynthion f r e e - r e t u r n t r a j e c t o r y . The comand and s e r v i c e module/
lunar module t r e j e c t o r y w a s altered 28 hours l a t e r by t h e f i r s t mid-
course c o r r e c t i o n which placed t h e combined s p a c e c r a f t on a hybrid t r a -
j e c t o r y with a pericynthion of 67.0 miles. A second midcourse correc-
t i o n , 46 hours l a t e r , lowered t h e pericynthion t o 60.7 m i l e s .

A f t e r s p a c e c r a f t s e p a r a t i o n , t h e S-IVB performed a programmed pro-

p e l l a n t dump and two a t t i t u d e maneuvers t h a t d i r e c t e d t h e v e h i c l e t o a
l u n a r impact. The impact coordinates were 8 degrees 05 minutes 35 see-
onds south l a t i t u d e and 26 degrees 0 1 minute 23 seconds w e s t longitude;
156 miles from t h e prelaunch t a r g e t p o i n t but w i t h i n t h e nominal impact
zone.

6.2 LUNAR ORBIT

6.2.1 O r b i t a l Trajectory

The s e r v i c e propulsion system w a s used t o perform t h e l u n a r o r b i t

i n s e r t i o n maneuver. 'The o r b i t achieved had an apocynthion of 169 miles
and a pericynthion of 58.1 miles. After two lunar r e v o l u t i o n s , t h e serv-
i c e propulsion system w a s again used, t h i s t i m e t o perform t h e descent
o r b i t i n s e r t i o n maneuver which placed t h e combined s p a c e c r a f t i n an o r b i t
with a pericynthion of 9.1 m i l e s . On previous missions, t h e l u n a r module
descent propulsion system w a s used t o perform t h i s maneuver. The use o f
t h e s e r v i c e propulsion system allows t h e l u n a r module t o maintain a
 -
TABLE 6-1. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS'

Elapsed t i m e ,
h r :min :s e c

Range z e r o - 21:03:02 G . m . t . , January 31, 1971

Lift-off - 21:03:02.6 G . m . t . , January 31, 1971
02 :28:32
l'ranslunar i n j e c t i o n maneuver, F i r i n g t i m e = 350.8 s e c
rrans l u n a r i n j e c t i o n 02 :34 :32
S-IVB/command module s e p a r a t i o n 03 :02:29
l'ranslunar docking 04 :56:56
Spacecraft e j e c t i o n 05 :47 :14
F i r s t midcourse c o r r e c t i o n , F i r i n g time = 10.1 s e c 30 :36 :08
Second midcourse c o r r e c t i o n , F i r i n g t i m e = 0.65 s e c 76 :58 :12
Lunar o r b i t i n s e r t i o n , F i r i n g t i m e = 370.8 s e c 81 :56 :41
S-IVB l u n a r impact 82:37:52
Descent o r b i t i n s e r t i o n , F i r i n g time = 20.8 sec 86:10:53
Lunar module undocking and s e p a r a t i o n 103 :47 :42
C i r c u l a r i z a t i o n maneuver, F i r i n g t i m e = 4 s e c 105:11:46
Powered descent i n i t i a t i o n , F i r i n g t i m e = 764.6 s e c 108 :02:27
Lunar l a n d i n g 108:15 :09
S t a r t first extravehicular a c t i v i t y 113:39 :ll
F i r s t data f r c n n Apollo l u n a r s u r f a c e experiment package 116 :47:58
Plane change, F i r i n g t i m e = 18.5 s e c 117 :29:33
Complete f i r s t e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y 118:27:01
S t a r t second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y 131 :08:13
End second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y 135 :42:54
Lunar l i f t - o f f , F i r i n g time = 432.1 s e c 141 :45 :40
Vernier adjustment maneuver, F i r i n g time = 12.1 s e c 141 :56 :49
Terminal phase i n i t i a t i o n 142:30 :51
Terminal phase f i n a l i z a t i o n 143 :13:29
Docking 143 :32 :51
Lunar module j e t t i s o n 145 :44 :58
S e p a r a t i o n maneuver 145 :49 :43
Lunar module d e o r b i t maneuver, F i r i n g t i m e = 76.2 s e c 147 :14:17
Lunar module l u n a r impact 147:42:23
T r a n s e a r t h i n j e c t i o n , F i r i n g t i m e = 149.2 s e c 148 :36 :02
T h i r d midcourse c o r r e c t i o n , F i r i n g time = 3.0 s e c 165 :34:57
Command module/service module s e p a r a t i o n 215 :32 :42
Entry i n t e r f a c e . 215 :47 :45
Begin blackout 215 :48:02
End black out 215:51:19
Drogue deployment 215 :56 :08
Landing 216 :01:58

"see table 6-11 f o r event d e f i n i t i o n s .

 I
6- 3
1

TABLE 6-11.- DEFINITION OF EVENT TIMES

-
Event Definition

Range z e r o Final i n t e g r a l second b e f o r e l i f t - o f f

t

Lift-off I n s t m e n t a t i o n u n i t u m b i l i c a l disconnect

Translunar i n j e c t i o n maneuver S t a r t t a n k d i s c h a r g e valve opening, allowing

fuel t o be plrmped t o t h e S-IVB engine
s-IVB/cCmmand module r e p a r a t i o n . t r m r l u n a r The time of t h e event baaed on analysis of
docking, r p a c e c r a f t e j e c t i o n . lmar module s p a c e c r a f t rate and accelerometer data
undocking and s e p a r a t i o n . docking. and com-
a d module l a n d i n g

Conund and rervice module and l u n a r module The time t h e computer commands t h e engine on
compute r-cant rolled maneuvem and off

Commnd and s e r v i c e module and lunar module h g i n e i g n i t i o n M i n d i c a t e d by t h e appropri-

non-computer-controlled maneuvers ate engine b i l e v e l t e l e m e t r y measurement 1

S-IVB l u n a r impact Loss o f S-band transponder s i g n a l

Lunar module descent engine c u t o f f time B g i n e c u t o f f e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e beginning o f

drop i n t h w t chamber p r e s s u r e

Lunar module impact The time t h e f i n a l data p o i n t is t r a n s m i t t e d

from t h e v e h i c l e t e l e m e t r y system

I u n u landing P i n t c o n t a c t o f a l u n a r module landing pad

with t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e as d e r i v e d from anal-
y s i s of s p a c e c r a f t rate data

Beginning ,of e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y The t i m e cabin p r e s s u r e reaches 3 psi. during

depressurization
i
End of e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y The t i m e cabin p r e s s u r e reaches 3 p s i a during
repressurization

Apollo lunar rurface experiment package fint Receipt of f i n t data considered t o be v a l i d

data from t h e Apollo l u n a r r u r f a c e experiment
package telemetry system

Comaad module/service module s e p a r a t i o n Separation i n d i c a t e d by command module/service

module r e p a r a t i o n r e l q y s A and B v i a t h e
telemetry syrtem

The time t h e cormund module reaches bo0 000 i

Entry i n t e r f a c e
feet g e o d e t i c a l t i t u d e u i n d i c a t e d by t h e
b e s t estimate of t h e t r . j c c t o y

Begin and end blackout S-band coarmnication l o r e due t o d r i o n i z a t i o n

during e n t y

Drogue d e p l q m e n t Deployment i n d i c a t e d by drogue deploy relays

A and B r i a t h e telemetry ryrt-
Earth landing The t i m e t h e command module touches t h e vater
Y determined from accelerometem t
%
TABLE 6-111.- TRAJECZdRY PAMXBZEd

Lfannca Tiu. wit*. lalait*.

bog hrdn:ar 6 6 b6

-leu phr.

&.n

Iuth
Iuth

I I I
-
m 16:58:12.0 0.56 I 6l.b Y
km 76:58:U.6 036 I 6l.M tl
m u qrbi
--
hue

81:56:40.1 2.83 I 1 ~ 4 . mY . 8r.h 8 061.4 9.91 4T.S

82 :02 :51.5 0.U I 161.58 1 64.9 5 458.5 1.3 s3B.la
82:31:52.2

e6 :10 :53.0 6.58 I 173.60 Y . 59.2 5 W.8 -0.08 a4r.U

M:U:+8 6.29 I 11b.65 Y 59.0 5 m.5 -0.m rb6.94
103:47:lr1.6 12.65 I m.Ts I 9.5 5 435.8 -1.52 PL1.Q

lO5:U:46.1 1.05 I 118.56 I 60.11 5 2n.3 -0.1 8M.M

1q:ll:50.1 1.04 I 178.35 I 60.3 5 342.1 0.99 8M. 36
108:a2:26.5 7.38 8 1.s7 Y 7.e 5 565.6 0.00 W0.e
108:15:09.3

111:29:33.1 10.63 E 96.u I 62.1 5 333.1 -0.04 an.&

ll7:29:51.6 U.18 I 95.40 I 62.1 5 333.3 0.U r4l.m
l41:45 :cO
141:56 :49.4 0.5 1 n.1Y 11.1 5 5u.5 0.m 2W.l
142:30:51.1 ll.1 I 149.6 Y 44.t 5 396.6 o.n W.0
lb3:13:29.1 11.3 I 16.7 I 58.t 5 %5.5 -0.- W.5
143:32:50.5 10.18 I 161.hY 58.6 5 353.5 0.U 268.06
145 :a:58.0 3.21 8 21.80 Y 99.9 5 344.6 0.- ml.9
145 :Cr b . 5 0.62 I -1p.R Y 60 .6 5 S1.T 0 .LL9 2e.3

141:14 116.9 u.92 I 61.U 1 51.i 5 358.1 0 .ola 161.3

1bT:U 3 3 . 1 l2.u I 63.53 I 51.t 5 m.0 0.019 nd1.l
14T:b:23.4 3.b 8 l9.61 W 0.C 5 704.9 -3.685 rm.1

148:36:02.3 7.4l I Q.55 w 60 .I 5 3Lo.6 -0.11 nb0.m

l48:38:Y.5
-6.64 I 168.85 I 66.! 8 95.0 5.w a66.m

L
 6-5

TABLE 6-1v.- DEFINITION OF TRAJECTORY AND ORBITAL PARAMETERS

TrqJectory Darnmetere Definition

Geodetic l a t i t u d e The s p h e r i c a l coordinate measured along e meridian on t h e

e a r t h from t h e e q u a t o r t o t h e p o i n t d i r e c t l y beneath t h e
s p a c e c r a f t , deg

Selenographic l a t i t u d e The d e f i n i t i o n i s t h e same 8s t h a t of t h e g e o d e t i c l e t i -

tude except t h a t t h e r e f e r e n c e body is t h e moon r a t h e r
then t h e e a r t h , deg

Longitude The s p h e r i c a l c o o r d i n a t e , as measured i n t h e e q u a t o r i a l

p l a n e , between t h e plene of t h e r e f e r e n c e body's prime
meridian and t h e plane o f t h e s p a c e c r a f t meridian, dey,

Altitude The d i s t a n c e measured along e v e c t o r from t h e c e n t e r of

the e a r t h t o t h e spacecraft.. When t h e r e f e r e n c e body i s
the moon, it is t h e d i s t a n c e measured from t h e r a d i u s o f
the landing s i t e t o t h e s p a c e c r a f t along a v e c t o r from
the c e n t e r of t h e moon t o t h e s p a c e c r a f t , f t or miles

Space- f i x e d v e l o c i t y Magnitude o f t h e i n e r t i a l v e l o c i t y v e c t o r referenced t o

t h e body-centered, i n e r t i a l r e f e r e n c e coordinate system,
ft/sec

Space-fixed f l i g h t - p a t h angle Flight-path angle measured p o s i t i v e upward from t h e body-

centered l o c a l h o r i z o n t a l plane t o t h e i n e r t i a l v e l o c i t y
v e c t o r , deg

Space-fixed heading angle Angle of t h e p r o J e c t i o n o f t h e i n e r t i a l v e l o c i t y v e c t o r

onto t h e body-centered l o c a l h o r i z o n t a l p l a n e , measured
p o s i t i v e eastward from n o r t h , deg

Apogee The p o i n t of maximum o r b i t a l a l t i t u d e of t h e s p a c e c r a f t

above t h e c e n t e r o f t h e e a r t h , miles

Perigee The p o i n t of minimum o r b i t a l a l t i t u d e of t h e s p a c e c r a f t

above t h e c e n t e r o f t h e e a r t h . miles

Apocynthion The p o i n t o f maximum o r b i t a l a l t i t u d e above t h e moon as

measured from t h e r a d i u s of t h e l u n a r landing s i t e , miles

Pericynthion The p o i n t of minimum o r b i t a l a l t i t u d e above t h e moon as

measured from t h e r a d i u s of t h e l u n a r l a n d i n g s i t e , miles

Period Time r e q u i r e d f o r s p a c e c r a f t t o complete 360 degrees o f

o r b i t r o t a t i o n , min

Inclination The t r u e an'gle between the s p a c e c r a f t o r b i t plane and t h e

reference body's e q u a t o r i a l p l a n e , deg

Longitude o f t h e ascending node The longitude at which t h e o r b i t p l a n e crosses t h e r e f e r -

ence body's e q u a t o r i a l plane going from t h e Southern t o
t h e Northern Hemisphere, deg
6-6

TABLE 6-v.- MANEWER SUMMARY

Irtitud., mLlt-* Lrrinl tim

de8:dn dbg:8in hr :.in :*.c
4:lh I 172:24 w 82:15:19
2:56 I 17352 W &:ll:Za

2:os I 1=:52 w 82:01:01

P r o P ~ i ~
I e r r l n pmpulsion 30:36:07.9 10.1 n.1 67 8130 2:zl I 167:bd 1 &:OO:b5

8 . d c a propulsion 76:58:12 0.65 3.5 61 8153 2:12 I 167rb1 I &:bo136

rgnitim time. firing tin.

hr:Lln:m*c sec

81:56 : b o . 7 370.8 3022.b 169 .o 58.1

86:lo:53 20.8 205.7 58.8 9.1
103: h7 :b1.6 2.7 0.8 60.2 7.8

105:l.l A6.1 L .O 77.2 63.9 56 .O

lo8:02:26.5 764 :6 6639.1
l.l7:29:33.1 18.5 3T0.5 62.1 s7.7
1 b 1 :L5 :bO L9.l 6066.1 51.7 8.5
1b1:%: b9 .b l2.1 10.3 51.2 8.b

1L2:30 :s1.1 3.6 88.5 60 .l b6.0

1b3:13:W .1 26.1- 32.0. 61.5 58.2

145 :b9 :b2.5 15.8 3.b 63.4 56.8

1 4 1:lb :16.9 76.2 186 .l 56.1 -59.8

..
I I L L L- L- L L
 6-7

h i g h e r descent propulsion system p r o p e l l a n t margin. Both v e h i c l e s re-

mained i n t h e low-pericynthion o r b i t u n t i l s h o r t l y a f t e r l u n a r module
s e p a r a t i o n . After s e p a r a t i o n , t h e pericynthion of t h e command and serv-
i c e modules w a s i n c r e a s e d t o 56 m i l e s and a plane-change maneuver w a s
l a t e r executed t o e s t a b l i s h t h e proper conditions f o r rendezvous.

6.2.3 Lunar Descent

.-
P r e p a r a t i o n s f o r l u n a r descent The powered descent and l u n a r land-
i n g were similar t o t h o s e of previous missions. However, t h e navigation
performed i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r powered descent w a s more a c c u r a t e because
of t h e command and s e r v i c e modules being i n t h e 58.8- by 9.1-mile descent
o r b i t f o r 22 hours p r i o r t o powered descent i n i t i a t i o n . While i n t h i s
o r b i t , t h e Network obtained long periods of radar t r a c k i n g of t h e unper-
t u r b e d s p a c e c r a f t from which a more accurate s p a c e c r a f t s t a t e v e c t o r w a s
determined. The p o s i t i o n of t h e command module r e l a t i v e t o a known land-
mark n e a r t h e l a n d i n g s i t e w a s a c c u r a t e l y determined from s e x t a n t marks
t a k e n on t h e landmark. Corrections f o r known o f f s e t angles between t h e
landmark and t h e landing s i t e were used t o compute a v e c t o r t o t h e land-
i n g s i t e . This v e c t o r w a s s e n t t o t h e l u n a r module. Also, t h e Mission
Control Center propagated t h i s v e c t o r forward t o t h e t i m e of landing t o
p r e d i c t e r r o r s due t o navigation. This procedure w a s performed during
t h e t w o r e v o l u t i o n s b e f o r e powered descent and a f i n a l landing s i t e up-
date of 2800 f e e t w a s computed and relayed t o t h e crew. A f t e r i g n i t i o n
f o r t h e powered descent, t h e crew manually i n s e r t e d t h e update i n t o t h e
computer.

Powered descent .- Trajectory c o n t r o l during descent w a s nominal,

and only one t a r g e t redesignation of 350 f e e t l e f t (toward t h e s o u t h )
w a s made t o t a k e advantage of a smoother landing area. After manual
t a k e o v e r , t h e crew f l e w approximately 2000 f e e t downrange and 300 f e e t
n o r t h ( f i g . 6-1) because t h e t a r g e t e d coordinates of t h e landing s i t e
given t o t h e l u n a r module computer were i n e r r o r by about 1800 f e e t .

Coordinates of t h e landing p o i n t are 3 degrees 40 minutes 24 sec-

onds south l a t i t u d e and 17 degrees 27 minutes 55 seconds w e s t l o n g i t u d e ,
which i s 55 feet n o r t h and 165 f e e t east of t h e prelaunch landing s i t e
( f i g . 6-2). ( F u r t h e r discussion of t h e descent i s contained i n s e c t i o n
8.6.)
6- 8

+Jd
e,
V
co
d
k
0

i
E
4C
.I+
k
M
C
4

a
5
e,
M
Bk

aJ
w
9k
co
rn
0
k
V
I
rl
I
UI
 6-9

-0
d-
0
.m
6-10

6.2.3 Lunar Ascent and Rendezvous

Horizontal Radial
Data source velocity, velocity, A l t i t u d e , ft
ft/sec ft /sec

Primary guidance and

navigation system 5544 30 60 311
Powered f l i g h t processor 5544 29 60 345
Abort guidance system 5542 29 60 309

To accomplish a d i r e c t rendezvous with t h e command module, a re-

a c t i o n c o n t r o l system v e r n i e r adjustment maneuver of 1 0 . 3 f t / s e c w a s
performed approximately 4 minutes a f t e r ascent engine c u t o f f . The ma-
neuver w a s necessary because t h e l u n a r module ascent program i s t a r g e t e d
t o achieve an i n s e r t i o n v e l o c i t y and not a s p e c i f i c p o s i t i o n v e c t o r .
Direct rendezvous w a s nominal and docking occurred 1 hour 47 minutes
10 seconds a f t e r lunar l i f t - o f f .

The l u n a r module rendezvous navigation w a s accomplished throughout

t h e rendezvous phase and all s o l u t i o n s agreed c l o s e l y w i t h t h e ground
s o l u t i o n . The comand module which w a s performing backup rendezvous
navigation w a s not a b l e t o o b t a i n acceptable VHF ranging d a t a u n t i l a f t e r
t h e t e r m i n a l phase i n i t i a t i o n maneuver. The VHF anomaly i s discussed i n
section 14.1.4. Figure 14-7 i s a comparison of t h e r e l a t i v e range as
measured by l u n a r module rendezvous r a d a r and command module VHF, and
determined from comnand module s t a t e v e c t o r s and t h e best-estimate t r a -
j e c t o r y propagations. The VHF mark taken at 142:05:15 and incorporated
i n t o t h e command module computer's s t a t e v e c t o r f o r t h e l u n a r module
caused an 8.8-mile r e l a t i v e range e r r o r .

S e v e r a l s e x t a n t marks were taken after t h i s e r r o r w a s introduced.

Because t h e computer weighs t h e VHF marks more h e a v i l y than t h e s e x t a n t
marks, t h e a d d i t i o n a l s e x t a n t marks d i d not reduce t h e e r r o r s i g n i f i c a n t -
ly. The ranging problem apparently c l e a r e d up a f t e r t h e terminal phase
 6-11

i n i t i a t i o n maneuver and t h e VHF w a s used s a t i s f a c t o r i l y f o r t h e midcourse

c o r r e c t i o n s . Table 6-VI provides a summary or t h e rendezvous maneuver
solutions.

TABLE 6-v1. - RENDEZVOUS SOLUTIONS

Computed v e l o c i t y change, f t /sec

Maneuver
Lunar Command and
Network
module s e r v i c e module
~~

Terminal phase v = 63.0 v = 62.1 V = -67.4

initiation fl = 1.0 \r = 0.1 fl = 0.5
#Z = 67.0 :V = 63.1 Vy = -69.2
Vt = 92.0 V = 88.5 :V = 96.6
t
F i r s t midcours e No ground v = -0.9 v = 1.3
c o r r e c t i on solution. v" = 0.2 vx = -0.1
vy = 0.6 vy = -1.1
vt" = 1.1 vtz = 1 . 7
Second m i dcours e No ground v = -0.1 v = 0.6
correction solution. v" = 0.1 v" = -0.2
Vy = -1.4 vy = -2.2
vt = 1.6 v; = 2.3

6.2.4 Lunar Module Deorbit

Two hours after docking, t h e command and s e r v i c e modules and lunar

module were o r i e n t e d t o t h e lunar module d e o r b i t a t t i t u d e , undocked, and
t h e command and s e r v i c e modules then s e p a r a t e d from t h e l u n a r module.
The l u n a r module was d e o r b i t e d on t h i s mission, similar t o Apollo 12.
The d e o r b i t w a s performed t o e l i m i n a t e t h e l u n a r module as an o r b i t a l
d e b r i s hazard f o r f u t u r e missions and to provide an impact t h a t could
b e used as a c a l i b r a t e d impulse f o r t h e seismographic equipment. The
r e a c t i o n c o n t r o l system of t h e lunar module w a s used t o perform t h e
75-second d e o r b i t f i r i n g 1 hour 24 minutes 19.9 seconds a f t e r t h e com-
mand and s e r v i c e modules had separated from t h e l u n a r module. The l u n a r
module impacted t h e l u n a r surface a t 3 degrees 25 minutes 12 seconds
south l a t i t u d e and 19 degrees 40 minutes 1 second west longitude with a
v e l o c i t y of about 5500 f e e t per second. This p o i n t w a s 36 miles from t h e
Apollo 14 landing s i t e , 62 miles from t h e Apollo 1 2 landing s i t e , and
7 miles from t h e prelaunch t a r g e t p o i n t .
 6-12

6.3 TRANSEARTH AND ENTRY TRAJECTORIES

A nominal t r a n s e a r t h i n j e c t i o n maneuver w a s performed a t about

148 hours 36 minutes. Seventeen hours a f t e r t r a n s e a r t h i n j e c t i o n , t h e
t h i r d and f i n a l midcourse c o r r e c t i o n w a s performed.

F i f t e e n minutes Drior t o e n t e r i n g t h e e a r t h ' s atmosphere, t h e corn--

mand module was s e p a r a t e d frolii t n e s e r v i c e nloduie. The command module
w a s t h e n o r i e n t e d t o blunt-end-forvrard f o r e a r t h e n t r y . Entry w a s nom-
i n a l and t h e s p a c e c r a f t landed i n t h e P a c i f i c Ocean less t h a n one m i l e
from t h e prelaunch t a r g e t p o i n t .

6.4 SERVICE MODULE ENTRY

The s e r v i c e module should have e n t e r e d t h e e a r t h ' s atmosphere and

i t s d e b r i s landed i n t h e P a c i f i c Ocean approximately 650 miles southwest
of t h e command module landing p o i n t . No r a d a r coverage w a s planned n o r
. were t h e r e any s i g h t i n g s r e p o r t e d f o r confirmation.
 7.0 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE PERFORMANCE

7.1 STRUCTURALAND MECHANICAL S Y S T ~

S t r u c t u r a l loads on t h e s p a c e c r a f t during all phases of t h e mission

were w i t h i n design l i m i t s . The p r e d i c t e d and c a l c u l a t e d loads at l i f t -
o f f , i n t h e region of maximum dynamic p r e s s u r e , at t h e end of f i r s t s t a g e
boost, and during s t a g i n g w e r e similar t o t h o s e of previous missions.
Camand module accelerometer d a t a p r i o r t o S-IC c e n t e r engine cutoff i n -
d i c a t e a s u s t a i n e d 5-hertz l o n g i t u d i n a l o s c i l l a t i o n with an amplitude of
O.l7g, which i s s i m i l a r t o t h a t measured during previous f l i g h t s . Oscil-
l a t i o n s during t h e S-I1 boost phase had a m a x i m u m measured amplitude of
less t h a n 0.066 at a frequency o f 9 h e r t z . The amplitudes of both o s c i l -
l a t i o n s were w i t h i n acceptable s t r u c t u r a l design l i m i t s .

. S i x attempts were required t o dock t h e command and s e r v i c e module

with t h e lunar module following t r a n s l u n a r i n j e c t i o n . The measured rates
and i n d i c a t e d r e a c t i o n control system t h r u s t e r a c t i v i t y during t h e f i v e
unsuccessful docking attempts show t h a t capture should have occurred each
t i m e . The mechanism w a s actuated and i n s p e c t e d i n t h e command module
following docking. This i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e probe mechanical
components w e r e f’unctioning normally, Subsequent undocking and docking
while i n lunar o r b i t w e r e normal. The probe w a s r e t u r n e d f o r p o s t f l i g h t
a n a l y s i s . The docking anomaly i s discussed i n d e t a i l i n s e c t i o n 14.1.1.

7.2 ELECTRICAL POWER

7.2.1 Power D i s t r i b u t i o n

The e l e c t r i c a l power d i s t r i b u t i o n system performed normally except

f o r two discrepancies. P r i o r t o e n t r y , when t h e b u s - t i e motor switches
w e r e operated t o p u t t h e entry b a t t e r i e s on t h e main b u s s e s , b a t t e r y C
w a s not p l a c e d on main bus B. This anomaly w a s discovered by t h e data
review after t h e f l i g h t . P o s t f l i g h t c o n t i n u i t y checks revealed t h a t t h e
c i r c u i t b r e a k e r t y i n g b a t t e r y C t o main bus B w a s i n o p e r a t i v e . This
anomaly i s described i n s e c t i o n 14.1.7.

The second discrepancy occurred during e n t r y . Procedures c a l l f o r

main bus d e a c t i v a t i o n , at 800 feet a l t i t u d e , by opening t h e bus t i e
motor switches. The crew reported t h a t operation of the proper switches
d i d not remove power from t h e buses. The buses were manually d e a c t i v a t e d ,
after landing, by opening t h e i n - l i n e c i r c u i t breakers on Panel 275 ( a
normal procedure). Review of d a t a i n d i c a t e d and p o s t f l i g h t t e s t s con-
firmed t h a t t h e motor s w i t c h which t i e d b a t t e r y A t o main bus A w a s in-
o p e r a t i v e . This anomaly i s described i n s e c t i o n 14.1.6.
7-2

7.2.2 Fuel Cells

The fuel c e l l s were a c t i v a t e d 48 hours p r i o r t o launch, conditioned

f o r 4 h o u r s , and configured with f u e l c e l l 2 on t h e l i n e supplying a
20-ampere load as r e q u i r e d i n t h e countdown procedure. Fuel c e l l s 1 and
3 remained on open c i r c u i t u n t i l 5 hours p r i o r t o launch. A t launch,
f u e l c e l l 1 w a s on main bus A with fuel c e l l 2 , and f u e l c e l l 3 w a s on
main bus B. T h i s configuration w a s maintained throughout t h e f l i g h t .
I n i t i a l l y , t h e load variance was approximately 5 amperes, b u t it stabi-
l i z e d t o 3 o r 4 amperes e a r l y i n t h e f l i g h t . This i s normal and t y p i c a l
of o t h e r f l i g h t s .

A l l f u e l c e l l parameters remained w i t h i n normal o p e r a t i n g l i m i t s

and agreed with predicted f l i g h t v a l u e s . As expected, t h e f u e l c e l l 1
condenser-exit temperature e x h i b i t e d a p e r i o d i c f l u c t u a t i o n about every
6 minutes throughout t h e f l i g h t . This zero-gravity phenomenon w a s s i m i -
lar t o t h a t observed on all o t h e r f l i g h t s and has no e f f e c t on f u e l c e l l
performance ( r e f . 6 ) .

"he f u e l c e l l s supplied 435 kW-h o f energy at an average c u r r e n t of

2 3 amperes p e r f u e l c e l l and a m e a n bus v o l t a g e of 29 v o l t s d u r i n g t h e
mission.

7.2.3 Batteries

The comand and s e r v i c e module e n t r y and pyrotechnic b a t t e r i e s per-

formed normally. Entry b a t t e r i e s A and B were both charged once at t h e
launch s i t e and f i v e times d u r i n g f l i g h t with nominal charging perform-
ance. Load s h a r i n g and v o l t a g e d e l i v e r y were s a t i s f a c t o r y during each
of t h e s e r v i c e propulsion firings. The b a t t e r i e s were e s s e n t i a l l y f u l l y
charged at e n t r y .

7.3 CRYOGENIC STORAGE

Cryogenics were s a t i s f a c t o r i l y s u p p l i e d t o t h e f u e l c e l l s and t o

t h e environmental control system throughout t h e mission. The configura-
t i o n changes made as a r e s u l t of t h e Apollo 1 3 oxygen t a n k f a i l u r e are
described i n appendix A. A supplemental r e p o r t g i v i n g details of sys-
t e m performance w i l l be i s s u e d at a l a t e r d a t e (appendix E ) .

During p r e f l i g h t checkout o f t h e oxygen system, t h e s i n g l e - s e a t

check v a l v e f o r tank 2 w a s found t o have f a i l e d i n t h e open position and
was r e p l a c e d with an i n - l i n e double-seat v a l v e . During f l i g h t , t h i s
valve allowed gas leakage i n t o t a n k 2 from t a n k 3. "he purpose of t h i s
 7-3

valve i s p r i m a r i l y t o i s o l a t e tank 2 from t h e remainder of t h e system

should t a n k 2 f a i l . Thus, i t w a s q u a l i f i e d at a r e v e r s e d i f f e r e n t i a l
p r e s s u r e of 60 p s i d . This i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y higher t h a n t h a t normally
experienced during a f l i g h t . Tests have been conducted t o c h a r a c t e r i z e
t h e n a t u r e o f t h e check valve leakage at low p r e s s u r e d i f f e r e n t i a l and
show t h a t t h i s s i t u a t i o n i s not detrimental t o operation under abnormal
as w e l l as normal c o n d i t i o n s .

Two flow t e s t s on t h e oxygen system were conducted during f l i g h t .

One w a s t o demonstrate t h e c a p a b i l i t y of t h e system t o support a d d i t i o n a l
flow requirements f o r e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t i e s . The o t h e r w a s t o deter-
mine t h e h e a t e r temperature w h i l e o p e r a t i n g w i t h t h e o q g e n d e n s i t y less
t h a n 20 p e r c e n t . The i n t e n t of these two t e s t s w a s met and favorable
results were obtained although t e s t procedures were modified because of
t i m e c o n s t r a i n t s . The oxygen system i s capable of supporting t h e a n t i c -
i p a t e d requirements f o r Apollo 15 and subsequent missions. The low-
d e n s i t y flow t e s t i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e oxygen system can provide required
f l o w - r a t e s at low d e n s i t i e s and t h e data obtained provides f o r a more
a c c u r a t e assessment of h e a t e r operating temperature.

Consumable q u a n t i t i e s i n t h e cryogenic s t o r a g e system a r e discussed

i n s e c t i o n 7.10.3.

7.4 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT

The communications system s a t i s f a c t o r i l y supported t h e mission ex-

cept f o r t h e following described conditions.

The high-gain antenna f a i l e d t o acquire and t r a c k properly at various

times during t h e mission. The problems occurred during t h e a c q u i s i t i o n
o f s i g n a l r a t h e r t h a n after a c q u i s i t i o n . In t h i s r e g a r d , t h e problem i s
d i f f e r e n t from t h o s e experienced during Apollo 1 2 and 13 where t h e high-
g a i n antenna l o s t lock o r f a i l e d t o t r a c k a f t e r a c q u i s i t i o n . T h i s i s
discussed i n f u r t h e r d e t a i l i n s e c t i o n 14.1.2.

From j u s t p r i o r t o lunar l i f t - o f f through t e r m i n a l phase i n i t i a t i o n ,

t h e VHF system performance w a s marginal. Voice communications were weak
and n o i s y , and t h e VHF ranging performance w a s e r r a t i c and erroneous.
The voice conhunicati'ons problem i s not r e l a t e d t o t h e VHF problems ex-
perienced on previous missions where they were determined t o be proced-
u r a l e r r o r s . Switching antennas i n t h e command and s e r v i c e module and
e l i m i n a t i o n of t h e ranging s i g n a l d i d not c l e a r up t h e problems. The
problems are b e l i e v e d t o have been caused by equipment malfunction, but
t h e source has not been i s o l a t e d t o a p a r t i c u l a r component of t h e t o t a l
system. S e c t i o n 14.1.4 contains a d e t a i l e d discussion of t h i s anomaly.
7- 4

7.5 INSTRUMENTATION

The instrumentation system functioned normally throughout t h e mission

except f o r t h e loss of t h e r e a c t i o n c o n t r o l system quad B oxidizer mani-
f o l d p r e s s u r e measurement during s e p a r a t i o n of t h e command and s e r v i c e
module from t h e launch v e h i c l e . The most probable cause o f t h e f a i l u r e
w a s a break of t h e s i g n a l o r power l e a d s i n i t i a t e d by t h e pyrotechnic
shock a s s o c i a t e d with t h e spacecraft/launch v e h i c l e a d a p t e r panel separa-
t i o n . Since t h i s i s t h e only failure of f o u r measurements of t h i s t y p e
on each o f e i g h t f l i g h t s , t h e pyrotechnic shock i s n o t considered a prob-
l e m f o r normal elements of t h e instrumentation c i r c u i t . F u r t h e r , redun-
dant measurements a r e a v a i l a b l e t o permit determination o f t h e r e q u i r e d
d a t a . Consequently, no c o r r e c t i v e a c t i o n i s r e q u i r e d .

7.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL

A t t i t u d e control w a s nominal throughout t h e mission i n c l u d i n g a l l

periods of p a s s i v e thermal c o n t r o l , c i s l u n a r n a v i g a t i o n , as w e l l as
photography and landmark t r a c k i n g from l u n a r o r b i t . The s t a b i l i t y of
t h e i n e r t i a l measurement u n i t e r r o r parameters w a s e x c e l l e n t . The only
anomaly i n t h e guidance, navigation and c o n t r o l systems w a s failure of
t h e e n t r y monitor system O.OSg l i g h t t o i l l u m i n a t e . This i s discussed
i n s e c t i o n 14.1.5.

Because of inclement weather, t h e l i f t - o f f w a s delayed f o r t h e f i r s t

time i n t h e Apollo program. This required t h e f l i g h t azimuth t o b e changed
from 72 degrees t o 75.56 degrees and t h e platform t o be r e a l i g n e d accord-
i n g l y . A comparison o f command and s e r v i c e module and s-IVB navigation
data i n d i c a t e d s a t i s f a c t o r y performance during t h e launch phase. I n s e r -
t i o n e r r o r s were plus 7.02, p l u s 61.02, and minus 7.50 f t / s e c i n t h e X ,
Y , and Z axes, r e s p e c t i v e l y . These e r r o r s were comparable t o t h o s e ob-
served on o t h e r Apollo launches. The only s i g n i f i c a n t e r r o r w a s i n t h e
Y-axis v e l o c i t y caused by a prelaunch azimuth alignment e r r o r o f 0.14 de-
g r e e due t o one-sigma gyrocompassing i n a c c u r a c i e s . Table 7-1 i s a sum-
mary of p r e f l i g h t i n e r t i a l measurement u n i t error parameters a f t e r i t s
i n s t a l l a t i o n i n t h e coxmuand module. An update t o t h e i n e r t i a l parameters
w a s performed at approximately 29 hours. The t h r e e accelerometer biases
were updated t o minus 0.32, p l u s 0.12 and minus 0.13 cm/sec2, and t h e
X-gyro n u l l b i a s drift w a s updated t o p l u s 0.4 meru ( m i l l i e a r t h - r a t e
u n i t s 1.

The f i r s t platform realignment w a s performed after i n s e r t i o n and

agreed with t h e p r e d i c t e d alignment e r r o r s due t o prelaunch a z i m t h
e r r o r s . Table 7-11 i s 8 summary of s i g n i f i c a n t parameters during each
of t h e platform realignments.
 7- 5

TABLE 7-1.- INERTIAL COMPONENT PREFLIGHT HISTORY - COMMAND MODULE

Sample Standud lo. of Countdown Flight Inflight

Error mean deviation ramplea value load performmce

x .s c d e
factor e r r o r , p p ...... -144 58 8 -
MU, d r e c
2 ........... -0.23 0.13 8 -0.31 -0.23 -0.34

Y .scale factor error. p p . . . . . . -441 49 8 -

B i u . oI/rec 2 . . . . . . . . . . . 0.05 0.07 8 0. 09

2 - S c d e factor e r r o r , ppm . . . . . . -218 L9 8 -310 -

B i u . m/rec . . . . . . . . . . .
2 -0.29 0.07 ' 8 -0.18 -0.29 -0.18

Gyror copea

77-p- -
X - lull .......
b i M d r i f t , YN 0 *9 1.8 2.5

.
Aceeleratian d r i f t . apin reference
u i r meru/g . . . . . . . . . .
Acceleration d r i f t , input
3.0 2.0 8 4.9 1.0

u i r , meru/g . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 1.5 8 -1.6 0 .o

Y - l u l l b i M drift, .......
.CN -3.4 0.8 8 -4.2 -3.L
Acceleration d r i f t , apin reference
UiS.mcN/g . - * . . 3.2 1.5 8 3.8 3.0
Acceleration d r i f t , input
d . .meru/g .......... -9.9 k.5 16 -9.7 -5 .O

2 - l u l l b i u d r i f t . meru . . . . . . . 1.6 0.9 8 2.5 1.6

Acceleration d r i f t , ,spin reference
u i r . meru/g . . . . . . . . . . -3.1 1.0 8 -2.4 -3.9
Acceleration d r i f t , input
u i r , meruIg . . . . . . . . . .
-43.8 6.4 8 54.1 .o
-LO

%light perfo-ce aver- before update VM minus 2 . 0 .

S p a c e c r a f t dynamics during s e p a r a t i o n from t h e S-IVB were very s m a l l .

S p a c e c r a f t dynamics during each docking attempt were small and comparable
t o t h o s e seen on previous Apollo missions. Figure 7-1 is a t i m e h i s t o r y
of s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r o l system parameters during each docking attempt.

Performance during each of t h e seven s e r v i c e propulsion system ma-

neuvers was nominal. Trimming of r e s i d u a l v e l o c i t y e r r o r s w a s performed
only a f t e r t h e c i r c u l a r i z a t i o n and t r a n s e a r t h i n j e c t i o n maneuvers.
Table 7-111 i s a summary of s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r o l system parameters f o r
each of t h e maneuvers. The second midcourse c o r r e c t i o n was accomplished
w i t h a minimum-impulse s e r v i c e propulsion system maneuver i n o r d e r t o
 7-6

I Y

Y
r(

a
4
.

s
K?
[p!
I
c)

i
1
I
I

.
N

1
E
i
b

rl
 7-7

m
' 9 9
w
?,FI
o
m
....,
r-
I 0 0
0
\<
I
J
n
I O
lnN1 NN?
0000

* +0
0I 0 $ +++ ;\
-
W
4

m n
n. .n.
N ~ O \
~

e"? ??1?
W N
'91 ?'u
ot- mw
V" '9'9
NN a d o
N??
.. ..
%?IN + + I N 00
I +
N d
I +
00
I I
Orl
I I
o
+ oI n
+I
mm
f
4t4

-
t-t-
?'9?
ndw nwm
"e:! . .N
Wt. N
WO
'9N
t m
? ? '9?
WW NVI
'99
N N N
f.?? NN?
m m o 0004 00 N d 0 0 0 0 440 o o m
3% ++++ I + I + I + I I + I 1 + I I
I-t-
r l3
4 d

-
rlmN
???
2..:'w.. .. nt N d .-IN A t - mm m !
;
VI2
?? 4'9 ?? ?? N'9"
d d 0
7!7! ZI o d+ d+ 00
I +
4 4
I +
00
I +
0 0
I +
rloo
+ I 1
1 0
0 1 0
1
lnln
00
dr(
- i
t-m 4
4 'T"! m o ~w m o
N ~ O
?-'% '9: N NN? I??
0-40
7!7!
0000
+ + I +++
000 I 0
0 l 0
l

3%

t-w mm t w m n ww w m o
? ? ?N f.5 ? ? '9'9 ??? 119
oon
0000
+ I
00
+ I ++
00 4 0
+ I
40
+ I I 0
0 +0+ + I +

......
O'N?
A o m
I + +
mmm
1
0000
+
v
+
\ ?3 ?$
00
+ I
00
+ I
3
e
N
0'1
00
+
n

I
000 000
f
9
++
4I 0 m

om 01t- om ow l n N d
1 ?1 ?? If. ? ? ?N I N ?
0000
+ I + + 0I
4 27 $4 $4 00.4
I l l

Po
8
h
h
u
0
a
U
.3
e
e

E
.iZ2B
3
:

z
 7-8 -4
NASA-S-71-1632

T- +X,+P On
-X,+P On X O f f 1
+x, -P On - L O f f
-X, -P On T o r r u
-LOff
5 . -wlaa
CT,
-0

07
0) 2 - 0
-0
E
L r
e
L
V
.-
c
W n
G=J O
+X, +Y On .-
e
c
e

OnL O f f -1
m
-X,+Y r
V
+X, -Y On X O f f z
n 1
-X, -Y On - L O f f
l-Off -5
5 W
W
wl
1

g:
-0
W7
0
U a- 0
c
L. E
e
L
a2
W O
'0
3
c
c
c.
m
-1
+Z,+R On 2
> 1
'F
L-
+Z, -R On ' -5
-Z, -R On

+Y,+R On
-Y,+R On 1 0 ,f
O Xn O 1f f
A A
+Y, -R
-Y, -R O n 1Off
Off
I I

3: 13: 50 3: 14: 00 3: 14: 10

3: 55

Figure 7-1. - Time history of control system parameters d u r i n g m u

V'

A.
 1

I 1 4 1 1
3: 14: 20 3: 14: 30 3: 14:40 3: 14:50 3:15:00 3:16:10
Time, hr: min:sec

ltiple docking attempts.

 7-8 e

I
B
i
I
I

rn
Yaw attitude error

I I I
1: 16:20 3:16:30 3:16:40 3:16:50 3:23:35 3:23:45 3: 23:55
 1
I
I ,
.

..
-

-.- .. -
A-

4:32: 10 4: 32: 20 4: 32: 30

 7-7 4

I I I I

4:32:40 4:56:40 4: 56:50 4: 57: 00 4:57: 10 4:57:20

Time, hr:min:sec
 7-9 c

I 1 ._-.... __ . -.
.~_.,_
~. 1
'. . 7 ,, .~.
.. .- - .
,
I . - __ . .- . .
. . -. '

4:57:30 4:57:4O 4:57:50 4:58:00 4:58:10 4:58:M

Figure 7-1.- Time history of control system parameters during multiple docking attempts.
7-10

conserve r e a c t i o n c o n t r o l p r o p e l l a n t . This w a s t h e f i r s t s e r v i c e pro-

pulsion system minimum-impulse maneuver performed during a l u n a r mission.
The t h i r d midcourse c o r r e c t i o n w a s performed with t h e r e a c t i o n c o n t r o l 3- 1I .
system. 5 -

During t h e t r a n s l u n a r phase, a s e r i e s of star-horizon measurements

were taken t o e s t a b l i s h t h e p r e c i s e l o c a t i o n of t h e e a r t h horizon. This
w a s done i n preparation f o r a c i s l u n a r navigation exercise t o be performed
during t h e t r a n s e a r t h phase.

The command and s e r v i c e module combination was s e p a r a t e d from t h e

l u n a r module a f t e r t h e descent o r b i t i n s e r t i o n maneuver. Command and
s e r v i c e module c i r c u l a r i z a t i o n and plane-change maneuvers were t h e n per-
formed, and t h e Command Module P i l o t accomplished a s e r i e s of photographic
and landmark t r a c k i n g operations. For t h e f i r s t time, rate-aided o p t i c s
were a v a i l a b l e t o assist t h e crew i n making o p t i c a l s i g h t i n g s .

The s e x t a n t and VHF ranging data were used t o t r a c k t h e l u n a r mod-

u l e a f t e r t h e v e r n i e r adjustment maneuver following ascent from t h e l u n a r
s u r f a c e . Unacceptable VHF ranging data were received i n t h e i n t e r v a l be-
tween l u n a r module i n s e r t i o n and t h e terminal phase i n i t i a t i o n maneuver;
- T
a
however, t h e d a t a received during t h e f i n a l phase of rendezvous were good.
For a d e t a i l e d discussion o f rendezvous, see s e c t i o n 6.2.3. For a dis-
cussion of t h e VHF ranging anomaly, see s e c t i o n 1 4 . 1 . 4 .

Only one midcourse c o r r e c t i o n w a s r e q u i r e d on t h e r e t u r n t r i p t o

meet t h e e n t r y i n t e r f a c e conditions. Cislunar navigation w a s performed
during t h e t r a n s e a r t h phase t o simulate r e t u r n i n g t o e a r t h with no com-
munications. Accuracy of t h e onboard navigation techniques w a s demon-
s t r a t e d but t h e crew commented t h a t the computer/crew o p e r a t i o n a l i n t e r -
face could be improved by incorporating a recycle f e a t u r e i n t h e c i s l u n a r
n a v i g a t i o n a l s i g h t ing program.

The command module w a s s e p a r a t e d from t h e s e r v i c e module at 215:32:42

and t h e normal pitch-down disturbance w a s observed. The e n t r y monitor
system 0.05g l i g h t d i d not i l l u m i n a t e within t h e allowed 3 seconds a f t e r
t h e p r e d i c t e d t i m e f o r 0.05g. The crew s t a r t e d t h e system manually ac-
cording t o t h e c h e c k l i s t . Refer t o s e c t i o n 14.1.5 f o r f u r t h e r discussion . .. - 7 ,

of t h i s anomaly. Table 7-IV i s a summary of e n t r y monitor system n u l l - L I r

b i a s t e s t s performed during t h e mission. Accelerometer s t a b i l i t y and

performance were e x c e l l e n t .

The primary guidance system guided t h e command module t o a landing

at 27 degrees 0 minutes 45 seconds south l a t i t u d e and 172 degrees 39 min-
u t e s 30 seconds west longitude, which is 0.62 m i l e from t h e t a r g e t e d
landing p o i n t .

L. I
 7-11

TABLE 7-1v.- RESUEIS OF ENTRY MONITOR SYSTEM NULL BIAS TESTS

'hats 1 2 3 1, 5 6 7 8 9
*in 01:50:00 09:34:50 29:11:20 58:28:00 75:59:00 79:45:00 84:31:00 118:20:cO 165:15:00
Btrrmmitorwstarradlnl -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100
.t s t a r t Of tat. n 1 a c

htw a t o r y m t n redir 99.5 -99.L -99.6 -98.9 -90.L -98.5 -99.4 -98.5 -9.0
at end of tat. ft/sac

Diffonotial wlacity b i n . W.5 40.6 #.L *1.1 *1.6 i1.5 a.6 *1.5 *l.O
Rlar"

lull b i n . r t / a r 2 4O.005 M.006 t0.004 W.011 a016 M.015 KI.006 KI.015 +0.010

.treh test duratim is 100 a w e d . .

HColst rg is positive b l u .

7.7 REACTION CONTROL SYSTEm

7.7.1 S e r v i c e Module

Performance of t h e s e r v i c e module r e a c t i o n c o n t r o l w a s normal

throughout t h e mission. A l l telemetry parameters s t a y e d w i t h i n nominal
limits throughout t h e mission w i t h t h e exception o f t h e quad B o x i d i z e r
manifold p r e s s u r e . This measurement w a s l o s t when t h e command and
s e r v i c e module s e p a r a t e d from t h e S-IVB. The quad B h e l i u n and f u e l
manifold p r e s s u r e s w e r e used t o verify proper system operation. T o t a l
p r o p e l l a n t consumption f o r t h e mission w a s 102 pounds l e s s t h a n p r e d i c t e d ;
however, p r o p e l l a n t consumption during t r a n s p o s i t i o n , docking and e x t r a c -
t i o n was about 60 gounds more t h a n planned because of t h e a d d i t i o n a l ma-
neuvering a s s o c i a t e d with t h e docking d i f f i c u l t i e s .
The p r o p e l l a n t m a r -
g i n d e f i c i e n c y was recovered p r i o r t o l u n a r o r b i t i n s e r t i o n , and nominal
margins e x i s t e d during t h e remainder of t h e mission. Consumables i n f o r -
mation is contained i n s e c t i o n 7.10.2.

7.7.2 Comnand Module

The command module reaction c o n t r o l systems performed s a t i s f a c t o r i l y .

Both systems 1 and 2 w e r e a c t i v a t e d during t h e command module/service
module s e p a r a t i o n sequence. Shortly after s e p a r a t i o n , system 2 was d i s -
abled and system 1w a s used f o r t h e remainder of e n t r y . All t e l e m e t r y
d a t a i n d i c a t e d nominal system performance throughout t h e mission. Con-
s m a b l e s information is contained i n s e c t i o n 7.10.2.
7-12

7.8 SERVICE PROPULSION SYSTEM

S e r v i c e propulsion system performance w a s s a t i s f a c t o r y based on t h e

steady-state performance during all f i r i n g s . The steady-state p r e s s u r e
data, gaging system d a t a , and v e l o c i t i e s gained i n d i c a t e d e s s e n t i a l l y
nominal performance, The engine t r a n s i e n t performance during all s t a r t s
and shutdowns w a s s a t i s f a c t o r y . Nothing i n t h e f l i g h t d a t a o r p o s t f l i g h t
a n a l y s i s i n d i c a t e d combustion i n s t a b i l i t y o r t h e cause o f t h e s l i g h t hum
o r buzzing n o i s e reported by t h e p i l o t ( r e f . 9.13).

The p r o p e l l a n t u t i l i z a t i o n and gaging system provided near-ideal

p r o p e l l a n t u t i l i z a t i o n . The unbalance at t h e end of t h e t r a n s e a r t h i n -
j e c t i o n f i r i n g w a s reported by t h e crew t o be 40 lbm, decrease, which
agrees w e l l with telemetry values.

During t h e Apollo 9 , 1 0 , 11, and 12 missions, t h e s e r v i c e propulsion

system xiixture r a t i o w a s l e s s than expected, based on s t a t i c f i r i n g d a t a .
The p r e d i c t e d f l i g h t mixture r a t i o f o r t h i s mission w a s based on previous
f l i g h t d a t a t o more c l o s e l y simulate t h e expected mixture r a t i o . To
achieve t h e p r e d i c t e d mixture r a t i o at t h e end of t h e mission, t h e major-
i t y of t h e mission would have t o be flown w i t h t h e p r o p e l l a n t u t i l i z a t i o n
valve i n t h e increase p o s i t i o n . Consequently, t h e p r o p e l l a n t u t i l i z a t i o n
valve. w a s i n t h e increase p o s i t i o n a t launch.

Figure 7-2 shows t h e variance i n f u e l and o x i d i z e r remaining at

any i n s t a n t during t h e lunar o r b i t i n s e r t i o n and t r a n s e a r t h i n j e c t i o n
f i r i n g s , as computed from t h e telemetry d a t a , and t h e p r o p e l l a n t u t i l i z a -
t i o n valve movements made by t h e crew. The p r e f l i g h t expected values
and p r o p e l l a n t u t i l i z a t i o n movements are a l s o shown. "he s e r v i c e pro-
p u l s i o n system p r o p e l l a n t usage f o r t h e mission i s discussed i n sec-
t i o n 7.10.1.

7.9 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL AND CREW STATION

The environmental c o n t r o l system performed s a t i s f a c t o r i l y and pro-

vided a comfortable environment f o r t h e crew and adequate thermal c o n t r o l
of t h e s p a c e c r a f t equipment. The crew s t a t i o n equipment a l s o s a t i s f a c -
t o r i l y supported t h e f l i g h t .

The environmental c o n t r o l system w a s used i n conjunction with t h e

cryogenic oxygen system t o demonstrate t h e c a p a b i l i t y of providing oxygen
at high flow rates such as t h o s e t h a t w i l l be r e q u i r e d during extrave-
h i c u l a r o p e r a t i o n s on f u t u r e missions. A modified hatch overboard dump
nozzle with a c a l i b r a t e d o r i f i c e w a s used t o o b t a i n t h e d e s i r e d flow rate.
The emergency cabin pressure r e g u l a t o r maintained t h e cabin p r e s s u r e at
7-13

E:
0
..
%
W

W
In
ik
4J

al
In

M
E:
.ri
k
?
a
W

k
al
N
.I+
a
.d
X
0
I
cu
I
P-
al
k
 7-14

approximately 4.45 p s i a . The t e s t , scheduled t o l a s t 2-1/2 h o u r s , w a s

terminated a f t e r 70 minutes when t h e 100-psi o w g e n manifold pressure
decayed t o about 10 p s i . This w a s caused by opening of t h e u r i n e over-
board dump valve which caused an oxygen demand i n e.xcess of t h a t .which
t h e oxygen r e s t r i c t o r s were capable of providing. However, s u f f i c i e n t
data were obtained during t h e t e s t t o determine t h e high-flow c a p a b i l i t y
of t h e cryogenic oxygen system. (Also s e e s e c t i o n 7.3.)

I n f l i g h t cabin p r e s s u r e decay measurements were made f o r t h e f i r s t

t i m e during most of t h e crew s l e e p periods t o determine more p r e c i s e l y
, t h e cabin leakage during f l i g h t . Preliminary e s t i m a t e s i n d i c a t e t h a t
t h e f l i g h t leakage was approximately 0.03 l b / h r . This l e a k r a t e i s with-
i n design limits.

P a r t i a l r e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n of t h e oxygen s t o r a g e b o t t l e s w a s r e q u i r e d
t h r e e times i n addition t o t h e normal r e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n s during t h e m i s -
s i o n . This problem i s discussed i n s e c t i o n 14.1.8.

The crew reported s e v e r a l i n s t a n c e s of u r i n e dump nozzle blockage.

Apparently t h e dump nozzle w a s clogged with frozen u r i n e p a r t i c l e s . The
blockage c l e a r e d i n a l l i n s t a n c e s when t h e s p a c e c r a f t w a s o r i e n t e d so
t h a t t h e nozzle w a s i n t h e sun. This anomaly i s discussed f u r t h e r i n
s e c t i o n 14.1.3.

I n t e r m i t t e n t communications dropouts were experienced by t h e Com-

mander at 29 hours. The problem w a s c o r r e c t e d when t h e Commander's
c o n s t a n t wear garment e l e c t r i c a l a d a p t e r w a s replaced. The anomaly i s
discussed f u r t h e r i n section 14.3.4.

A vacuum c l e a n e r assembly and cabin f a n f i l t e r , used f o r t h e f i r s t

t i m e , along with t h e normal decontamination procedures e l i m i n a t e d prac-
t i c a l l y a l l of t h e objectionable d u s t such as t h a t p r e s e n t a f t e r t h e
Apollo 12 l u n a r docking. The fans were operated f o r approximately 4 hours
a f t e r lunar docking.

Sodium n i t r a t e w a s added t o t h e water b u f f e r ampules t o reduce sys-

tem c o r r o s i o n . This a d d i t i o n a l s o allowed a reduction i n t h e concentra-
t i o n of c h l o r i n e i n t h e c h l o r i n e ampules. No o b j e c t i o n a b l e t a s t e w a s
noted i n t h e water. The crew r e p o r t e d some d i f f i c u l t y i n i n s e r t i n g t h e
b u f f e r ampules i n t o t h e i n j e c t o r . The ampules and i n j e c t o r are b e i n g
t e s t e d t o e s t a b l i s h t h e cause of t h e problem. The crew a l s o i n d i c a t e d
t h a t t h e food p r e p a r a t i o n u n i t leaked s l i g h t l y a f t e r dispensing h o t water.
This problem i s discussed f u r t h e r i n s e c t i o n 14.1.7.
 7-15

7.10 CONSUMABLES

"he command and s e r v i c e module consumable usage during t h e Apollo 1 4

mission w a s w e l l w i t h i n t h e r e d l i n e l i m i t s and, i n a l l systems, d i f f e r e d
no more t h a n 5 percent from t h e p r e d i c t e d l i m i t s .

7.10.1 Service Propulsion P r o p e l l a n t

Service propulsion p r o p e l l a n t loadings and consumption values are

l i s t e d i n t h e following t a b l e . The loadings w e r e c a l c u l a t e d from gaging
system readings and measured d e n s i t i e s p r i o r t o l i f t - o f f .
~

Propellant, l b
Cond i ti on
F'ue 1 Oxi d i z e r Tot a1

Loaded 1 5 695.2 25 061 40 756.2

Consumed 14 953.2 23 900 38 853.2

Remaining at command module/ 742 1 161 1903

s e r v i c e module separation

Usable at command module/ 596 866 1 462

s e r v i c e module separation

7.10.2 Reaction Control System P r o p e l l a n t s

Service module.- The p r o p e l l a n t u t i l i z a t i o n and loading data f o r

t h e s e r v i c e module r e a c t i o n control system were as shown i n t h e follow-
i n g table. Consumption w a s c a l c u l a t e d from telemetered helium tank pres-
sure h i s t o r i e s and were based on p r e s s u r e , volume, and temperature r e l a -
tionships.
7-16

I Propellant, l b
Condition
Oxidizer Total

Lo ade d
Quad A 110.1 225.3 335.4
Quad B 109 99 225.2 335.1
Quad C 110.4 226.5 336.9
Quad D 109 7 223.5 333.2

Total 440.1 900.5 1340.6

%sable loaded 1233
i
Consumed 250 476 726

Remaining at command module/ 507

s e r v i ce module s eparat ion

%sable loaded p- r o-p e l l a n t i s t h e amount Loaded minus t h e

amount trapped and with c o r r e c t i o n s made f o r gaging e r r o r s .

Command module.- The loading and u t i l i z a t i o n of command module re-

a c t i o n c o n t r o l system p r o p e l l a n t w a s as follows. Consumption w a s calcu-
l a t e d from p r e s s u r e , volume and temperature r e l a t i o n s h i p s .

I Con di t i on
Fuel
Propellant, l b

Oxi d i z e r Tot a1

baded
System 1 44.3 78.6 122.9
system 2 44.5 78.1 122.6

Total 80.0 156.7 245 5

%sable l o a d e d 210 .o

I Consumed
System 1
System 2

Total

%sable loaded p r o p e l l a n t i s t h e amount loaded minus t h e

amount trapped and with c o r r e c t i o n s made f o r gaging errors.
bEstimated q u a n t i t y based on helium source pressure p r o f i l e
41
4
45

during e n t r y .
 7-17

7.10.3 Cryogenics

The t o t a l cryogenic hydrogen and oltygen q u a n t i t i e s a v a i l a b l e at lift-

o f f and consumed were as follows. Consmption values were based on quan-
t i t y data t r a n s m i t t e d by telemetry.
~~ ~

Hydrogen, l b Oxygen, l b
Condition ~~

Actual Planned Actual Planned

Available at l i f t - o f f
Tank 1 26.97 320.2
Tank 2 26 55 318.9
Tank 3 - 197.2

Total 53.52
a
-
53 52 836.3 '836.3

Consme d
Tank 1 19.12 119.3
Tank 2 19.14 113.8
Tank 3 - 163.4

Total 38.26 38.62 396.5 412.1

Remaining at command module/

s e r v i c e module s e p a r a t i o n
Tank 1 7.85 7.87 200 .g 204.2
Tank 2 7.41 7.03 205.1 195.2
Tank 3 - - 33.8 24.8

Total 15.26 14.90 439.8 424.2

%dated t o l i f t - o f f values.
7-18

7.10 .4 Wat e r
The water q u a n t i t i e s loaded, produced, and e x p e l l e d during t h e mis-
s i o n a r e shown i n t h e following t a b l e .

Condition Quantity, l b

Loaded ( a t l i f t - o f f )
Potable water t a n k 28.5
Waste water tank 32.4

Produced i n f l i g h t
Fuel c e l l s 342.3
Lithium hydroxide r e a c t i o n 21.0
Metabolic 21.0

Dumped overboard
Waste tank dumping 236.9
Urine and f l u s h i n g 133.2

Evaporated up t o command module/ 9 .o

s e r v i c e module s e p a r a t i o n

Remaining onboard at command module /

s e r v i c e module s e p a r a t i o n
Potable water tank 29 .7
Waste water tank 36.4

? *
L
?
A L- Y
.-
i
 8- 1

8.0 LUNAR MODULE PERFORMANCE

8.1 STRUCTURAL AND MECHANICAL SYSTEm

Lunar module s t r u c t u r a l loads were w i t h i n design values f o r a l l

phases o f t h e mission. The s t r u c t u r a l assessment w a s based on guidance
and c o n t r o l d a t a , cabin pressure measurements, comand module accelera-
t i o n d a t a , photographs, and crew comments.

Based on measured command module a c c e l e r a t i o n s and on simulations

using a c t u a l launch wind d a t a , lunar module loads were determined t o be
w i t h i n s t r u c t u r a l limits during e a r t h launch and t r a n s l u n a r i n j e c t i o n .
The sequence films from t h e onboard camera showed no evidence of s t r u c -
t u r a l o s c i l l a t i o n s during l u n a r touchdown, and crew comments agree with
t h i s assessment.

Landing on t h e l u n a r surface occurred w i t h estimated landing veloc-

i t i e s o f 3.1 f t / s e c v e r t i c a l , 1 . 7 f t / s e c i n t h e plus-Y footpad d i r e c t i o n ,
and 1.7 f t / s e c i n t h e plus-Z footpad d i r e c t i o n . The s p a c e c r a f t rates
and a t t i t u d e at touchdown are shown i n f i g u r e 8-1. The minus-Y footpad
apparently touched f i r s t , followed by t h e minus-Z footpad approximately
0.4 second l a t e r . The plus-Y and plus-Z footpads followed w i t h i n 2 sec-
onds and t h e v e h i c l e came t o rest w i t h a t t i t u d e s o f 1.8 degrees p i t c h
down, 6.9 degrees r o l l t o t h e r i g h t and 1 . 4 degrees yaw t o t h e l e f t of
w e s t . Very l i t t l e , i f any, of t h e v e h i c l e a t t i t u d e w a s due t o landing
g e a r s t r o k i n g . The f i n a l rest a t t i t u d e of approximately 7 degrees w a s
due almost e n t i r e l y t o l o c a l undulations at t h e landing p o i n t ( f i g . 8-2).
From a t i m e h i s t o r y o f t h e descent engine chamber p r e s s u r e , it appears
t h a t descent engine shutdown w a s i n i t i a t e d after - f i r s t footpad contact
but before plus-Y footpad contact. The chamber pressure w a s i n a s t a t e
o f decay at 108:15:11, and all vehicle motion had ceased 1.6 seconds
later.

F l i g h t d a t a from t h e guidance and propulsion systems were used i n

performing engineering simulations o f t h e touchdown phase. As i n
Apollo 11 and Apollo 1 2 , t h e s e simulations and photographs i n d i c a t e t h a t
landing g e a r s t r o k i n g w a s minimal i f it occurred at all. Photographs
a l s o i n d i c a t e no s i g n i f i c a n t damage t o t h e landing g e a r thermal insula-
tion.

Sixteen-millimeter films taken from t h e comand module p r i o r t o

lunar-orbit docking support a v i s u a l observation by t h e crew t h a t a
s t r i p of material about 4 f e e t long w a s hanging from t h e ascent s t a g e
base heat s h i e l d area. The base heat s h i e l d area i s designed t o pro-
t e c t t h e ascent s t a g e from t h e pressure and t h e r m a l environment result-
i n g from a s c e n t engine plume impingement during s t a g i n g . The absence
 8- 2

Tim. hkmirtsc
Figure 8-1.- A t t i t u d e e r r o r s and rates during lunar lending sequence.

11
a- 3

I
cu
I
a3
8- 4

of abnormal thermal responses i n t h e a s c e n t s t a g e i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e

heat s h i e l d w a s f u l l y e f f e c t i v e . S l m i l a r conditions have occurred dur-
i n g q u a l i f i c a t i o n t e s t s whereby one o r more layers o f t h e heat s h i e l d
m a t e r i a l have become unattached. I n t h e s e c a s e s , t h e thermal e f f e c t i v e -
ness of t h e heat s h i e l d w a s not reduced.

8.2 ELECTRICAL POWER

The e l e c t r i c a l power d i s t r i b u t i o n system and b a t t e r y performance w a s

s a t i s f a c t o r y w i t h one exception, t h e ascent b a t t e r y 5 open-circuit v o l t a g e
decayed from 37.0 v o l t s at launch t o 36.7 v o l t s at housekeeping, but w i t h
no e f f e c t on o p e r a t i o n a l performance. A l l power switchovers were accom-
p l i s h e d as r e q u i r e d , and p a r a l l e l o p e r a t i o n o f t h e descent and ascent bat-
t e r i e s w a s w i t h i n acceptable l i m i t s . The dc bus v o l t a g e w a s maintained
above 29.0 v o l t s , and maximum observed c u r r e n t w a s 73 amperes during pow-
e r e d descent i n i t i a t i o n .

The b a t t e r y energy usage throughout t h e l u n a r module f l i g h t i s given

i n s e c t i o n 8.11.6. The a s c e n t b a t t e r y 5 open-circuit low v o l t a g e i s d i s -
cussed i n s e c t i o n 14.2.1.

8.3 COMUNI CATIONS EQUIPMENT

S-band s t e e r a b l e antenna operation p r i o r t o l u n a r l a n d i n g w a s i n t e r -

m i t t e n t . Although antenna operation during r e v o l u t i o n 13 w a s nominal,
a c q u i s i t i o n and/or t r a c k i n g problems were experienced during r e v o l u t i o n s
11 and 12. Acquisition w a s attempted but a s i g n a l w a s n o t acquired dur-
i n g t h e f i r s t 3 minutes after ground a c q u i s i t i o n of s i g n a l on revolu-
t i o n 14. Because of t h i s , t h e omnidirectional antennas were used f o r
l u n a r landing. The s t e e r a b l e antenna w a s used f o r t h e a s c e n t and rendez-
vous phase and t h e antenna performed normally. The problems w i t h t h e
s t e e r a b l e antenna are discussed i n s e c t i o n 14.2.3.

P r i o r t o t h e first e x t r a v e h i c u l a r p e r i o d , d i f f i c u l t y was experienced

when configuring t h e communication system f o r e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y be-
cause of an open audio-center c i r c u i t breaker. E x t r a v e h i c u l a r c o r n m i c a -
t i o n s w e r e normal after t h e c i r c u i t b r e a k e r w e s c l o s e d .

During t h e l a t t e r p a r t o f t h e first e x t r a v e h i c u l a r p e r i o d , t h e tele-

v i s i o n r e s o l u t i o n decreased. The symptoms of t h e problem were i n d i c a t i v e
of an overheated focus c o i l c u r r e n t r e g u l a t o r . This c o n d i t i o n , while n o t
causing a complete f a i l u r e o f t h e camera, r e s u l t e d i n defocusing o f t h e
 8-5

e l e c t r o n readout beam i n t h e t e l e v i s i o n tube and, consequently, a degrada-

t i o n of r e s o l u t i o n . The high-temperature c o n d i t i o n w a s caused by operat-
i n g t h e camera f o r about 1 hour and 20 minutes w h i l e it w a s w i t h i n t h e
thermal environment of t h e closed modular equipment stowage assembly. The
camera w a s t u r n e d off between t h e e x t r a v e h i c u l a r periods t o allow cooling.
P i c t u r e r e s o l u t i o n during t h e second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y w a s s a t i s f a c -
tory.

The VHF system performance was poor from p r i o r t o lunar l i f t - o f f

through t e r m i n a l phase i n i t i a t i o n . This problem i s discussed i n d e t a i l
i n s e c t i o n s 7.4 and 14.1.4.

8.4 RADAR

The landing radar s e l f - t e s t w a s performed at 105 hours 44 minutes,

and t h e r a d a r w a s t u r n e d on f o r t h e powered descent about 2 hours l a t e r .
Four minutes f i f t y seconds p r i o r t o powered descent i n i t i a t i o n , t h e radar
changed from high- t o low-scale. A t t h a t t i m e , t h e o r b i t a l a l t i t u d e of
t h e lunar module w a s about 10.9 milesa. This c o n d i t i o n prevented acqui-
s i t i o n of ranging s i g n a l s at slant ranges g r e a t e r t h a n 3500 f e e t , and ve-
l o c i t y s i g n a l s at a l t i t u d e s g r e a t e r than about 4600 f e e t . The r a d a r w a s
r e t u r n e d t o high-scale by recycling t h e c i r c u i t breaker. A d e t a i l e d d i s -
cussion of t h i s problem i s given i n s e c t i o n 14.2.4. Range and v e l o c i t y
performance from a s l a n t range of about 25 000 feet t o touchdown i s shown
i n figure 14-22. There were no zero Doppler dropouts and no evidence of
radar lockup r e s u l t i n g from p a r t i c l e s s c a t t e r e d by t h e engine exhaust
plume during lunar landing.

Rendezvous r a d a r performance w a s nominal i n all r e s p e c t s , i n c l u d i n g

self-tests , checkout, rendezvous and l u n a r s u r f a c e t r a c k i n g , and tempera-
ture.

8.5 INSTRUMENTATION

The i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n system performed normally throughout t h e f l i g h t

with t h e exception of t h r e e of t h e f o u r ascent helium tank p r e s s u r e m e a s -
urements (two primary and two redundant). Coincident with propulsion
system p r e s s b i z a t i o n , t h e s e measurements exhibited negative s h i f t s of
up t o 4 p e r c e n t . "he l a r g e s t s h i f t s were i n t h e redundant measurements.
These t r a n s d u c e r s h i f t s were caused by t h e shock induced by t h e
p y r o t e c h n i c a l l y operated i s o l a t i o n valves. Since these measurements are
used t o monitor f o r l e a k s p r i o r t o propulsion system p r e s s u r i z a t i o n , a

%eferenced t o landing s i t e e l e v a t i o n .
 8- 6
~

s h i f t i n t h e s e measurements a t t h e time of system p r e s s u r i z a t i o n w i l l n o t

a f f e c t f u t u r e missions. (See appendix A, s e c t i o n A.2.3, f o r a descrip-
t i o n of changes made subsequent t o Apollo 13.)

8.6 GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, AND CONTROL

A t approximately 102 h o u r s , t h e primary guidance system w a s t u r n e d

on, t h e computer d i g i t a l clock w a s i n i t i a l i z e d , and t h e platform w a s
a l i g n e d t o t h e command module platform. Table 8-1 i s a summary of t h e
primary guidance platform alignment d a t a . The abort guidance system w a s
t u r n e d on at 102 hours 40 minutes and t h e a t t i t u d e r e f e r e n c e a l i g n e d t o
t h e lunar module platform. Table 8-11 i s a sumnary of i n e r t i a l measure-
ment u n i t component errors measured p r i o r t o launch and i n f l i g h t . The
abort guidance system w a s a l i g n e d t o t h e primary guidance system s i x
t i m e s , but d a t a were a v a i l a b l e f o r only f i v e , and are shown i n t a b l e
8-111.. Also shown i n t a b l e 8-111 a r e data from t h e independent alignment
of t h e abort system performed i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r l u n a r l i f t - o f f . The
abort guidance system had been a l i g n e d t o t h e g r a v i t y v e c t o r and an a z i -
muth a n g l e supplied by t h e ground. Twenty-seven minutes l a t e r , j u s t be-
f o r e l i f t - o f f , t h e a b o r t system compared w e l l with t h e primary system
which had been i n e r t i a l l y a l i g n e d t o t h e p r e d i c t e d l o c a l v e r t i c a l orien-
tation for lift-off.

The performance of t h e abort s e n s o r assembly of t h e abort guidance

system w a s not as good as on previous missions but w a s w i t h i n allowable
l i m i t s . The accelerometers e x h i b i t e d s t a b l e performance , b u t t h e Z-axis
gyro d r i f t r a t e change of 1 . 2 degrees p e r hour from t h e prelaunch value
w a s about 30 percent g r e a t e r t h a n t h e expected s h i f t . The expected and
t h e a c t u a l s h i f t s between p r e f l i g h t values and t h e f i r s t i n f l i g h t c a l i -
b r a t i o n , and s h i f t s between subsequent i n f l i g h t c a l i b r a t i o n s are shown
i n t a b l e &IV.

Table 8-V i s a sequence of events p r i o r t o and during t h e powered

descent t o t h e lunar s u r f a c e . A command t o abort using t h e descent en-
g i n e w a s d e t e c t e d a t a computer input channel at 104:16:07 (but w a s not
observed at o t h e r telemetry p o i n t s ) although t h e crew had not depressed
t h e abort switch on t h e p a n e l . The crew executed a procedure using t h e
engine s t o p switch and t h e a b o r t switch which i s o l a t e d t h e f a i l u r e t o
t h e abort switch. Subsequently, t h e command reappeared t h r e e more times;
each t i m e , t h e command w a s removed by t a p p i n g on t h e p a n e l near t h e abort
switch. (For a discussion of t h e probable cause o f t h i s f a i l u r e , see
s e c t i o n 14.2.2.)

I f t h e abort comand i s p r e s e n t after s t a r t i n g t h e powered descent

programs, t h e computer automatically switches t o t h e abort programs and
t h e lunar module i s guided t o an abort o r b i t . To avoid t h e p o s s i b i l i t y
f
III

P'd .
Y
a
s . ..)
.I

I
H
I
Q

3
9
I3
8-8

P
Y

a
I
H
H
I
co
3
2
f
3

I I U N
I
 TABLE 8-111.- GUIDANCE S Y S T E ALIGNMENT
~ COMPARISON

Primary minus abort system

Time of alignment Alignment e r r o r ( degrees )
X Y Z

103:54 :44.99 0.000 0.003 0.014

104 :04 :45 .9 0.061 0.030 0.002

104:34:45.2 0.000 0.007 0.003

109 :28 :36 -0.002 0.034 0.000

1 4 1 :15 :25.2 0 .ooo 0.002 0.001

I a
141:45:29.2 0.010 0.003 0.018

a
Systems aligned independently. Actual t i m e
o f a b o r t guidance system alignment was
141:18:35.2.

TABLE &IV.- ABOKT GUIDANCE SYSTEM CALIBRATION COMPARISONS

Actual gyro d r i f t r a t e ,
Three-s igma
deg/hr
Calibrations capability ~ ~~

estimate Y axis
X axis

F i r s t i n f l i g h t minus pre- 20.91 0.08 -0.07 -1.2

i n s t a l l a t ion

Second i n f l i g h t minus f i r s t 20.63 -0.01 0.23 0.26

-inflight

F i r s t s u r f a c e minus second k0.56 -0.02 -0.08 -0.43

inflight

Second s u r f a c e minus f i r s t +O. 55 0 .o -0 -08 -0.21

surface
8-10

TABU 8-V.- SaUENCE OF EVENTS DURING POWERED DESCENT

Elapsed time Time from

from l i f t - o f f , ignition, Event
h r :min :s e c min:sec

107 :51 ~ 8 . 6 6 -11:07.86 Landing r a d a r on

107 :52 :46.66 -9:39.86 F a l s e data good i n d i c a t i o n s from
landing radar
107 :57 :34.66 -4 5 1 - 8 6 Landing radar switched t o low s c a l e
107 :58: 13.80 -4t12.72 S t a r t loading abort b i t work-around
routine
108:02 :19.12 -0:07.40 Ullage on
108:02:26.52 0 :oo .oo I g n i ti on
108:02 :53.80 +O 2 7 . 2 8 Manual t h r o t t l e - u p t o full t h r o t t l e
position
108 :04 :49 .80 +2 2 3 . 2 8 Manual t a r g e t update (N69 )
108: 08 :47.68 +6:21.16 T h r o t t l e down
108:08: 50.66 +6:24.14 Landing radar t o high s c a l e ( c i r c u i t
breaker c y c l e )
108:09:10.66 +6:44.14 Landing r a d a r v e l o c i t y d a t a good
108:og :12.66 +6 :46 .I4 Landing r a d a r range d a t a good
108 :09 :35 .80 +7:09.28 Enable a l t i t u d e updates
108:11:09.80 +8:43.28 S e l e c t approach phase program ( ~ 6 4 )
108 :11:10.42 +8:43.90 S t a r t p i t c h over
108 :11 :51.60 +9:25.08 Landing r a d a r redesignation enable
108 :11 :52 .66 +9 t26.14 Landing radar antenna t o p o s i t i o n 2
108 :1 3:07.86 +10 :41.34 S e l e c t a t t i t u d e hold mode
108: 1 3:09.80 +10:43.28 S e l e c t landing phase program ( ~ 6 6 )
1 108:15:09.30 +12:42.78 Left pad touchdown
108:15 :11.13 +12 :44.61 Engine shutdown ( d e c r e a s i n g t h r u s t
chamber p r e s s u r e )
108:15:11.40 +12 :44.88 Right, forvard,and aft pad touchdown

v - ? 1-
L L. i
 8-11

of an unwanted abort, a work-around procedure w a s developed by ground

personnel and w a s relayed t o t h e crew f o r manual e n t r y i n t o t h e l u n a r
module computer. P a r t one of t h e four-part procedure w a s e n t e r e d i n t o
t h e computer j u s t a f t e r t h e f i n a l a t t i t u d e maneuver f o r powered descent.
The remainder w a s accomplished a f t e r t h e i n c r e a s e t o t h e f u l l - t h r o t t l e
p o s i t i o n . P a r t one c o n s i s t e d of loading t h e abort s t a g e program number
i n t o t h e mode r e g i s t e r i n t h e e r a s a b l e memory which i s used t o monitor
t h e program number displayed t o t h e crew. This d i d not cause t h e a c t i v e
program t o change, but it d i d i n h i b i t t h e computer from checking t h e
abort command s t a t u s b i t . A t t h e same t i m e , it i n h i b i t e d t h e automatic
command t o f u l l - t h r o t t l e p o s i t i o n , automatic guidance s t e e r i n g , and i t
a f f e c t e d t h e processing of t h e landing radar d a t a . Therefore, i n order
t o r e e s t a b l i s h t h e d e s i r e d configuration f o r descent, t h e i n c r e a s e t o
f u l l - t h r o t t l e p o s i t i o n w a s accomplished manually and t h e n t h e second,
t h i r d , and f o u r t h p a r t s of t h e procedure were e n t e r e d i n t o t h e computer.
I n o r d e r , they accomplished:

a. S e t t i n g a status b i t t o inform t h e descent program t h a t t h r o t t l e -

up had occurred and t o re-enable guidance s t e e r i n g

b. Resetting a s t a t u s b i t which d i s a b l e d t h e abort programs

c. Replacing t h e a c t i v e program number back i n t o t h e mode r e g i s t e r

so t h a t landing r a d a r data would be processed properly a f t e r landing
radar lock-on

The abort c a p a b i l i t y of t h e primary guidance system w a s l o s t by u s e of

t h i s procedure. Therefore, it would have been necessary t o use t h e abort
guidance system i f an a b o r t s i t u a t i o n had a r i s e n .

P r i o r t o powered descent maneuver i g n i t i o n , t h e landing radar s c a l e

f a c t o r switched t o low, which prevented a c q u i s i t i o n of data through t h e
f i r s t 400 seconds o f descent. (For f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n , refer t o sec-
t i o n 14.2.4.) The crew cycled t h e radar c i r c u i t b r e a k e r , which reset
s c a l i n g t o t h e high s c a l e , and landing radar lock-on occurred at 22 486
f e e t . Figure 14-22 i s a p l o t of s l a n t range as measured by landing radar
and as computed from primary guidance system s t a t e v e c t o r s . Figure 8-3
i s a p l o t of a l t i t u d e s computed by t h e abort and primary guidance systems
and shows a 3400-foot update t o t h e abort guidance system at t h e 1 2 000-
foot altitude.

T h r o t t l e o s c i l l a t i o n s t h a t had been noted on previous f l i g h t s were

not d e t e c t e d during t h e descent although some o s c i l l a t i o n i n t h e auto-
matic t h r o t t l e command w a s detected after descent engine manual shutdown.
The r e a c t i o n c o n t r o l system p r o p e l l a n t consumption during t h e braking
phase and approach phase programs w a s approximately h a l f t h a t seen on
previous missions. Further discussion of t h e s e two areas w i l l be pro-
.ided i n a supplement t o t h i s report.
8-12

\'\
2
---------_I-----

----1 7iEi
-
guidance solufion
-
1
---- -
altitude update
P, \ Landing
0
-
-1 I

Figure 8-3.- Comparison of a l t i t u d e s computed by abort and

primary guidance systems during descent.

While on t h e lunar s u r f a c e , a t e s t w a s performed t o compute g r a v i t y

using primary guidance system accelerometer d a t a . The value of g r a v i t y
w a s determined t o be 162.65 cm/sec2.

Performance during t h e ascent from t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e w a s nominal.

The primary and abort systems and t h e powered f l i g h t processor d a t a com-
pared w e l l throughout a s c e n t . The a s c e n t program i n t h e onboard computer
does not include t a r g e t i n g f o r a s p e c i f i c c u t o f f p o s i t i o n v e c t o r ; t h e r e -
f o r e , a v e r n i e r adjustment maneuver of 10.3 f t / s e c w a s performed t o sat-
i s f y t h e phasing conditions f o r a d i r e c t rendezvous with t h e command and
s e r v i c e module.

Performance throughout rendezvous, docking, and t h e d e o r b i t maneuver

w a s also nominal. The v e l o c i t y change imparted t o t h e l u n a r module a t
j e t t i s o n w a s minus 1.94, minus 0.05, and minus 0.10 f t / s e c i n t h e X, Y ,
and Z axes, r e s p e c t i v e l y .
 8-13

The abort guidance system functioned properly u n t i l t h e braking

phase of t h e rendezvous with t h e command and s e r v i c e module when a f a i l -
u r e caused t h e system t o b e down-moded t o t h e standby mode and r e s u l t e d
i n t h e loss of t h i s system f o r t h e remainder of t h e mission. Another
anomaly r e p o r t e d w a s a crack i n t h e g l a s s window of t h e address register
on t h e d a t a e n t r y and d i s p l e y assembly. These anomalies are d i s c u s s e d
i n s e c t i o n s 14.2.5 and 14.2.6, r e s p e c t i v e l y .

8.7 DESCENT PROPULSION

The descent propulsion system o p e r a t i o n w a s s a t i s f a c t o r y . The engine

t r a n s i e n t s and t h r o t t l e response were normal.

8.7.1 I n f l i g h t Performance

The d u r a t i o n of t h e powered descent f i r i n g w a s 764.6 seconds. A

manual t h r o t t l e - u p t o t h e full t h r o t t l e p o s i t i o n w a s accomplished approx-
imately 26 seconds a f t e r t h e engine-on command. "he throttle-down t o
57 p e r c e n t occurred 381 seconds a f t e r i g n i t i o n , about 1 4 seconds e a r l i e r
t h a n p r e d i c t e d b u t w i t h i n expected t o l e r a n c e s . Three seconds of t h e 1 4
are a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e landing s i t e offset t o c o r r e c t f o r t h e downrange
error i n a c t u a l t r a j e c t o r y , and t h e remaining 11 seconds t o a t h r u s t i n -
c r e a s e of approximately 80 pounds at t h e f u l l - t h r o t t l e p o s i t i o n .

8.7.2 System P r e s s u r i z a t i o n

During t h e p e r i o d from l i f t - o f f t o 1 0 4 hours, t h e o x i d i z e r t a n k u l l -

age p r e s s u r e decayed from 111 t o 66 p s i a and t h e f u e l t a n k u l l a g e pres-
sure decreased from 138 t o 211 p s i a . These decays r e s u l t e d from helium
absorption i n t o t h e p r o p e l l a n t s and were w i t h i n t h e expected range.

The s u p e r c r i t i c a l helium system performed as a n t i c i p a t e d . The sys-

t e m p r e s s u r e rise rates w e r e 8.0 p s i / h o u r on t h e ground and 6.2 p s i / h o u r
during t r a n s l u n a r c o a s t , which compare favorably with t h e p r e f l i g h t pre-
d i c t e d values of 8.1 p s i / h o u r and 6.6 p s i / h r , r e s p e c t i v e l y . During pow-
e r e d descent, t h e s u p e r c r i t i c a l helium system p r e s s u r e p r o f i l e w a s w e l l
w i t h i n t h e nominal 53-sigma pressure band, even though t h e p r e s s u r e at
i g n i t i o n was about 50 p s i lower t h a n a n t i c i p a t e d .

8.7.3 Gaging System Performance

The gaging system performance was s a t i s f a c t o r y throughout t h e m i s -

:ion. The low-level q u a n t i t y l i g h t came on approximately 711 seconds
8-14

after i g n i t i o n , and w a s most probably t r i g g e r e d by t h e p o i n t sensor i n

o x i d i z e r tank 2. Engine cutoff occurred 53 seconds a f t e r t h e low-level
s i g n a l , i n d i c a t i n g a remaining firing-time-to-depletion of 68 seconds.
Using probe d a t a t o c a l c u l a t e remaining f i r i n g time gave approximately
70 seconds remaining. This i s w i t h i n t h e accuracy a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e
p r o p e l l a n t quantity gagi ng sy st e m .
The new p r o p e l l a n t s l o s h b a f f l e s i n s t a l l e d on Apollo 14 appear t o
be e f f e c t i v e . The p r o p e l l a n t s l o s h l e v e l s present on Apollo 11 and 1 2
were not observed i n t h e s p e c i a l high-srunple-rate gaging system data of
t h i s mission.

8.8 ASCENT PROPULSION

The ascent propulsion system duty cycle c o n s i s t e d of two f i r i n g s -

t h e lunar ascent and t h e terminal phase i n i t i a t i o n . Performance of t h e
system f o r both f i r i n g s w a s s a t i s f a c t o r y . Table 8-VI i s a summary of

TABLE 8-VI.- STEADY-STATE PERFORMANCE WRING ASCENT

~~

10 seconds a f t e r ignition bo0 seconds after ignition

Paraw ter b b
Rcdi cteda Clcasured Predi cteda Measured

Regulator o u t l e t pressure, p s i a 184 182 184 181

Oxidizer bulk temperature, OF 7 0 .O 69.4 69 .o 69 .I
Fuel bulk temperature. OF 70 .O 69 .8 69.8 69.4

Oxidizer interface pressure , psia 170.5 168 169.7 167

Fuel interface pressure, p s i a 170.4 169 169.7 167
Engim chamber pressure, psia 123.4 121 123.2 120

Mixture r a t i o 1.607 - 1.598 -

Thrust. l b 3502. - 3468. -
Specific impulse, sec 310.3 - 309.9 -

%reflight prediction based on acceptance t e s t data and rcrsming nomlnal system pcrforrance.
bActual f l i & t drta w i t h no a d J w t w n t . .
 8-15

a c t u a l and p r e d i c t e d performance during t h e a s c e n t maneuver. The dura-

t i o n of engine f i r i n g f o r lunar a s c e n t w a s approximately 432 seconds,
and f o r t e r m i n a l phase i n i t i a t i o n , 3 t o 4 seconds. A more p r e c i s e e s t i -
mate of t h e t e r m i n a l phase i n i t i a t i o n f i r i n g t i m e i s not a v a i l a b l e be-
cause t h e f i r i n g occurred behind t h e moon and no telemetry d a t a were
received. System pressures were as expected both b e f o r e and after t h e
t e r m i n a l phase i n i t i a t i o n maneuver and crew r e p o r t s i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e
maneuver w a s naminal.

No o s c i l l a t i o n s were noted during f l i g h t i n e i t h e r helium r e g u l a t o r

o u t l e t p r e s s u r e measurement. O s c i l l a t i o n s i n t h e o u t l e t p r e s s u r e of
6 t o 19 p s i have been noted i n previous f l i g h t d a t a . Also, o s c i l l a t i o n s
of a si&lar n a t u r e and approximately twice t h a t magnitude w e r e noted
during p r e f l i g h t checkout of t h e a s c e n t propulsion system c l a s s I second-
ary helium r e g u l a t o r . However, during f l i g h t , c o n t r o l i s maintained,
normally, by t h e c l a s s I primary r e g u l a t o r .

8.9 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL AND CREM STATION

Performance of t h e environmental c o n t r o l system w a s s a t i s f a c t o r y

throughout t h e mission. Glycol pump n o i s e , a nuisance experienced on
previous missions, w a s reduced below t h e annoyance l e v e l by a muffler
on t h e pump system. Although t h e water s e p a r a t o r speed w a s higher than
expected much o f t h e t i m e , t h e s e p a r a t o r removed w a t e r adequately and
there were no problems w i t h water condensation o r cabin humidity.

Because o f water i n t h e suit loop on Apollo 1 2 ( r e f . 11, a f l o w re-

s t r i c t o r had been i n s t a l l e d i n t h e primary l i t h i u m hydroxide c a r t r i d g e s
t o reduce t h e gas flow i n t h e s u i t loop and, t h e r e b y , reduce water sep-
a r a t o r speed below 3600 r p m . (Separator speed i s a function of t h e water
mass t o b e s e p a r a t e d and t h e gas flow.) However, t h e water s e p a r a t o r
speed w a s above 3600 r p m while t h e s u i t w a s operated i n t h e cabin mode
(helmets and gloves removed). The high speed when i n t h e cabin mode re-
sulted from low moisture inputs from t h e crew (approximately 0.14 l b / h r )
and a high gas flow caused by low back p r e s s u r e which, i n t u r n , developed
from a low p r e s s u r e drop across t h e suit.

During p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r t h e f i r s t e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y , t h e t r a n s -
f e r hose o n - t h e u r i n e c o l l e c t i o n t r a n s f e r assembly w a s kinked. The kink
w a s e l i m i n a t e d by moving t h e hose t o a d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n .

The crew r e p e a t e d l y had t r o u b l e g e t t i n g t h e l u n a r module forward

window shades t o remain i n t h e i r r e t a i n e r s . The shades had been processed
t o reduce t h e curl and prevent cracking, a problem experienced on previous
f l i g h t s . I n reducing t h e c u r l , t h e diameter of t h e r o l l e d shades w a s in-
creased s o t h a t t h e shades would not f i t s e c u r e l y i n t h e r e t a i n e r s . For
8-16

Apollo 1 5 , t h e shades w i l l be f a b r i c a t e d t o permit them t o be r o l l e d

s m a l l enough t o be h e l d s e c u r e l y by t h e r e t a i n e r s .

The i n t e r i m stowage assembly could not be secured at all t i m e s be-

cause t h e s t r a p s could not be drawn t i g h t enough t o hold. This problem
r e s u l t e d from s t r e t c h i n t h e f a b r i c and i n t h e sewing t o l e r a n c e s . I n
t h e f u t u r e , more emphasis w i l l be placed upon manufacturing f i t checks
and crew compartment f i t checks t o a s s u r e t h a t t h e problem does not
recur.

8.10 ExTRAMIICUTJd MOBIUTY UNIT

Performance o f t h e e x t r a v e h i c u l a r mobility u n i t w a s very good during

t h e e n t i r e lunar s t a y . Oxygen, feeifwater, and power consumption (sec-
t i o n 8.11.7) allowed each e x t r a v e h i c u l a r p e r i o d t o be extended approxi-
mately. 30 minutes w i t h no d e p l e t i o n of contingency reserves. Comfortable
temperatures were maintained u s i n g t h e d i v e r t e r valve i n t h e minimum posi-
t i o n throughout most of both e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t i e s .

Preparations f o r t h e first e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y proceeded on

schedule w i t h few exceptions. The delay i n s t a r t i n g t h e first extra-
v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y occurred while t h e p o r t a b l e l i f e support system power
w a s o n , r e s u l t i n g i n b a t t e r y power being t h e l i m i t i n g consumable i n de-
termining t h e e x t r a v e h i c u l a r stay t i m e .

Oxygen consumption of t h e Lunar Module P i l o t during t h e first e x t r a -

v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y w a s one-third higher t h a n t h a t of t h e Commander. Tele-
metry d a t a during t h e Lunar Module P i l o t ' s s u i t i n t e g r i t y check i n d i c a t e d
a p r e s s u r e decay rate of approximately 0.27 psi/min; a rate of 0.30 p s i /
min i s allowable. I n p r e p a r a t i a n f o r t h e second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y ,
s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n w a s given t o cleaning and r e l u b r i c a t i n g t h e L u n a r Module
P i l o t ' s p r e s s u r e garment assembly neck and w r i s t r i n g seals i n an e f f o r t
t o lower t h e e x t r a v e h i c u l a r m o b i l i t y u n i t leak r a t e . A 0.22 psi/min pres-
sure decay rate w a s r e p o r t e d by t h e Lunar Module P i l o t p r i o r t o t h e second
e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y . P o s t f l i g h t unmanned l e a k rate tests on t h e Lunar
Module P i l o t ' s pressure garment assembly show no s i g n i f i c a n t i n c r e a s e i n
leakage.

Just p r i o r t o lunar module cabin d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n f o r t h e second

e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y , t h e hmar Module P i l o t r e p o r t e d a continuous
f o r c e i n h i s r i g h t e x t r a v e h i c u l a r glove w r i s t p u l l i n g t o t h e l e f t and
down. A more d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n i s given i n s e c t i o n 14.3.2. The ex-
t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y s t a r t e d and w a s completed without any r e p o r t e d
d i f f i c u l t y w i t h t h e glove.

? - t T
L i L
 8-17

8.11 CONSUMABLES

On t h e Apollo 1 4 mission, all lunar module consumables remained

w e l l w i t h i n r e d l i n e limits and were c l o s e t o p r e d i c t e d values.

8.11.1 Descent Propulsion System

P r o p e l l a n t . - "he q u a n t i t i e s of descent propulsion system p r o p e l l a n t

loading i n t h e following t a b l e were c a l c u l a t e d from readings and measured
densities prior t o lift-off.

Actual q u a n t i t y , l b
Condition
Fue 1 Oxidizer Tot a1

Loaded 7072.8 11 344.4 18 417.2

Consumed 6812.8 10 810.4 17 623.2

Remaining at engine c u t o f f

Total 260 .o 534.0 794.0

Us ab l e 228.0 400 .O 628.0

S u p e r c r i t i c a l helium.- The q u a n t i t i e s o f s u p e r c r i t i c a l helium were

determined by computation u t i l i z i n g p r e s s u r e measurements and t h e known
volume o f t h e t a n k .

Q u a n t i t y , lb
Condition
Actual P r e di c t e d
~~ ~ ~~

haded 48.5
Consumed 42.8 39.2

a( 40.8)

Remaining at touchdown 5.7 9.3

a
Adjusted p r e d i c t i o n t o account f o r longer-than-planned firing
duration.
8-18

8.11.2 Ascent Propulsion System

Propellant .- Ascent propulsion system t o t a l p r o p e l l a n t usage w a s

w i t h i n approximately 1 p e r c e n t of t h e p r e d i c t e d v a l u e . The loadings i n
t h e following t a b l e were determined from measured d e n s i t i e s p r i o r t o '

launch and from weights o f off-loaded p r o p e l l a n t s .

Actual q u a n t i t y , lb Predicted
Condition q u a n t i t y , lb
Fuel Oxidizer Total

Loaded 2007.0 3218.2 5225.2

T o t a l consumed 1879 .O 3014 .O 4893.0 4956 .o

Remaining at lunar 128.0 204.2 332 02 265.8
module j e t t i s o n

Actual
Condition
q u a n t i t y , lb

beded 13.4

Consm e d 8.8
Remaining at l u n a r module impact 4.6
 8-19

8.11.3 Reaction Control System Propellant

The reaction control system propellant consumption w a s calculated

fram telemetered helium tank pressure h i s t o r i e s using the relationships
between pressure, volume, and temperature.

Actual, lb
Condition Predicted, lb
Fuel Oxidizer Total

Loaded
System A 108 209
System B 108 209
Total 216 418 634 633
Consumed t o
Docking 260 283
Impact 378 393
Remaining at lunar impact 256 240
8-20

8.11.4 Oxygen

The o q g e n t a n k w a s not loaded t o t h e nominal 2730 p s i 8 used f o r

previous missions because of a p o s s i b l e hydrogen embrittlement problem
with t h e descent stage oxygen tank. Launch p r e s s u r e f o r t h e t a n k was
an i n d i c a t e d 2361 p s i a .

Actual P r e d i cte d
I Condition
quantity, l b quantity, lb

Loaded (at lift-off)

Des cent 8 tage 42.3
Ascent s t a g e
Tank 1 2.4
Tank 2 2.4

Total 47.1
Consme d
Des cent stage 24.9 23.9
Ascent stw
Tank 1 (a) 1.1
Tank 2 0 0

Total 25 .O

Remaining i n descent s t a g e at
lunar lift-off 17.4 18.4

Remaining at docking
Tank 1 (a> 1.3
Tank 2 2.4 2.4

Total 3.7

8
Consumables d a t a are not a v a i l a b l e because t h e t a n k 1 p r e s s u r e
t r a n s d u c e r malfunctioned b e f o r e launch.

..
L
t '
&
 8.U.5 Water

I n t h e following t a b l e , t h e a c t u a l q u a n t i t i e s loaded and consumed

a r e based on t e l e m e t e r e d data.

Condition Actual Predicted

l u a n t i t y , lb q u a n t i t y , lb

Loaded ( a t lift-off)
Descent s t a g e 255.5
Ascent s t a g e
Tank 1 42.5
Tank 2 42.5
Total 340.5
Consumed
Descent stage (lunar l i f t - o f f 200.9
Ascent s t a g e (docking)
Tank 1 6 .o
Tank 2 5.8
Total 212.7

Ascent s t a g e (impact )
Tank 1 14.4
Tank 2 14.9
%Ot al 230.2.

Remaining i n descent stage at 54.6

lunar lift-off

Remaining i n a s c e n t s t a g e at
impact
Tank 1 20.1
Tank 2 27.6
Total 55 - 7

a
Consumed during f l i g h t , both stages.
8-22

8. U..6 Electrical Pwer

The t o t a l battery energy usage i s given i n the following t a b l e .
Preflight predictions versus actual usage were within 3 percent.

Available Electrical parer consumed, A-h

Batteries power,
A-h Actual Predicted

Des cent 1600 I 1191 I 1220

A s cent 592 128 125

7 '

L
 8-2 3

8.11.7 Extravehicular Mobility Unit

Oxygen , feedwater and power consumption of t h e e x t r a v e h i c u l a r mobil-

i t y u n i t f o r both e x t r a v e h i c u l a r p e r i o d s a r e shown i n t h e following t a b l e .

Commander Lunar Module P i l o t

Condition
Actual Pre d i c t e d Actual Predi cted

F i rs t ext ravehi c u l ar act i v i ty

T i m e , min 288 255 288 25 5

Oxygen, l b
Lo ade d 1.31 1.31 1.31 1.31
Cons m e d 0.70 0 a97 1.02 0 -97
Remaining 0.61 0.34 0.29 0.34

Feedwater, l b
Loaded 8.59 8.55 8.66 8.55
Consumed 4.85 7.08 5.71 7.08
Remaining 3.74 1.47 2.95 1.47

Power, W-h
I n i t i a l charge 2 82 2 82 282 2 82
Consumed 228 223 2 37 223
Remaining 54 59 45 59

Second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y

Time, min 275 255 275 255

Oxygen, l b
Loaded 1.26 1.31 1.26 1.31
Cons m e d 0.86 1.02 0.96 1.02
Remaining 0.40 0.29 0.30 0.29

Feedwater, lb
Loaded 8.80 8.55 8.80 8.55
a a
Cons ume d 6.43 7.55 7.13 7.55
a a
R e m a i n i ng 2.37 1.0 1.67 1.o

Power, W-h
I n i t i a l charge 2 82 282 2 82 282
Consumed 225 225 222 225
R e m a i n i ng 57 57 60 57

%stinate based on e x t r a v e h i c u l a r mobility u n i t source heat pre-

d i c t i o n s because p o r t a b l e l i f e support system feedwater weight w a s
not taken following t h e second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y .
d
rl
k

0
d
d
0
9
 9-1

9 .O PILOT'S RF,PORT

The Apollo 14 mission expanded t h e techniques and overcame some of

t h e o p e r a t i o n a l l i m i t a t i o n s o f previous l u n a r landing missions. S p e c i f i c
d i f f e r e n c e s included performing onboard c i s l u n a r n a v i g a t i o n t o s i m u l a t e
a r e t u r n t o e a r t h with no communications, using t h e s e r v i c e propulsion
system f o r t h e descent o r b i t maneuver, landing i n t h e l u n a r h i g h l a n d s ,
extending t h e lunar s u r f a c e excursion t i m e and making a l u n a r - o r b i t ren-
dezvous during t h e f i r s t revolution of t h e s p a c e c r a f t . The d e t a i l e d
f l i g h t p l a n , executed i n i t s e n t i r e t y , w a s used as a r e f e r e n c e f o r t h e
a c t i v i t i e s of t h e p i l o t s during t h e mission ( f i g . 9-1, at end of s e c t i o n ) .

9.1 TRAINING

. The formal t r a i n i n g f o r t h i s crew w a s conducted over a t i m e span of

20 months i n general accordance w i t h t h e schedules used f o r previous
missions. The t r a i n i n g equipment and methods were concluded t o be ex-
c e l l e n t and are recommended f o r subsequent crews e s s e n t i a l l y unchanged.
Although none of t h e crew m e m b e r s had completed actual. f l i g h t experience
i n t h e Apollo program, each of t h e p i l o t s f e l t t h a t he w a s completely
ready f o r a l l phases of t h e f l i g h t .

9.2 LAUNCH

The countdown proceeded on schedule w i t h no problems encountered

i n t h e area of crew i n t e g r a t i o n o r i n g r e s s . The g e n e r a l c o n d i t i o n of
t h e c r e w s t a t i o n and d i s p l a y s was e x c e l l e n t . The crew w a s kept w e l l
informed of t h e n a t u r e of t h e launch delay and w a s apprised of launch
azimuth change procedures ; accordingly , t h a t phase w e n t smoothly. The
Commander noted no v i s i b l e moisture on windows 2 and 3 e i t h e r prelaunch
o r during atmospheric f l i g h t . The p r o p r i o c e p t i v e cues r e p o r t e d by
e a r l i e r crews were e s s e n t i a l l y unchanged during t h e launch of Apollo 1 4 .
No communication d i f f i c u l t i e s were noted during t h e launch. A very
s l i g h t l o n g i t u d i n a l o s c i l l a t i o n occurred during second s t a g e f l i g h t
s t a r t i n g at 8 minutes 40 seconds and continuing through shutdown. The
launch p r o f i l e s flown during p r e f l i g h t t r a i n i n g on t h e dynamic crew pro-
cedures s i m u l a t o r and t h e command module s i m u l a t o r were more t h a n ade-
quate f o r crew p r e p a r a t i o n .
 9-2

I
9 . 3 EAKTH ORBIT

This crew had placed s p e c i a l emphasis on s u i t e d t r a i n i n g periods

i n t h e command module simulator f o r t h i s p a r t i c u l a r phase. The space-
c r a f t system checks and unstarage of equipment were performed slowly
and p r e c i s e l y coincident with t h e process of f a m i l i a r i z a t i o n w i t h t h e
weightless state. No anomalies o r d i f f i c u l t i e s were noted.

The Command Module P i l o t noted t h a t , although he had heard t h e

o p t i c s cover j e t t i s o n , t h e r e w a s no d e b r i s , and a f i n i t e p e r i o d of sev-
e r a l minutes of dark-adaption w a s r e q u i r e d t o permit viewing of stars
through t h e telescope. The extension of t h e docking probe i s mentioned
here only t o i n d i c a t e t h a t it w a s extended on schedule, p e r t h e check-
l i s t , with no problems noted f r m e i t h e r audio o r v i s u a l cues.

9.4 TRANSLUNAR INJECTION

The delay i n launch produced off-nominal monitoring parameters with

t h e second S-IVB f i r i n g . These updates were forwarded smoothly and i n
a timely fashion so t h a t all preparations f o r t h e i n j e c t i o n were normal.
A t t i t u d e c o n t r o l of t h e S-IVB was e x c e l l e n t and right on schedule. The
i g n i t i o n w a s on t i m e , p o s i t i v e , and without roughness. The guidance
parameters comparison between t h e command module computer and t h e in-
strumentation u n i t w a s very c l o s e . A very l i g h t v i b r a t i o n o r buzz w a s
noted toward t h e end of t h e powered phase, and i s mentioned only t o in-
form f u t u r e crews as t o a resonance reference p o i n t . The s t a t e v e c t o r
conditions at cutoff were e x c e l l e n t and t h e tanks vented on schedule.
The Commander and Command Module P i l o t changed couch p o s i t i o n s i n accord-
ance with t h e f l i g h t plan.

9.5 TRANSLUNAR FLIGHT

9.5.1 Transposition and Docking

The physical s e p a r a t i o n from t h e S-IVB closed two p r o p e l l a n t i s o -

l a t i o n valves on t h e s e r v i c e module r e a c t i o n c o n t r o l system. These
were immediately reset w i t h no problems. The e n t r y monitor system was
not used as a reference during any p o r t i o n of t h e t r a n s p o s i t i o n and
docking maneuver. The plus-X t h r u s t i n g on s e p a r a t i o n and t h e i n i t i a l
t h r u s t i n g t o set up a c l o s i n g v e l o c i t y were performed using t h e event
timer.

.- . -
L L
?
k
..
Y
 9-3

Several attempts were required before docking w a s s u c c e s s f u l l y

achieved. [ E d i t o r ' s note: S i x contacts were made and t h e s e are r e f e r r e d
t o as s i x "docking attempts" i n o t h e r s e c t i o n s of t h e r e p o r t . The p i l o t s
considered t h e f i r s t two contacts t o be one attempt. ] The first attempt
w a s made at a c l o s i n g v e l o c i t y of approximately 0.1 t o 0.2 f t / s e c . A t
c o n t a c t , t h e capture l a t c h e s did not lock with t h e drogue. Plus-X t h r u s t
w a s used t o d r i v e t h e probe back i n t o t h e drogue, but a g a i n , capture w a s
not achieved. A l l switches and c i r c u i t breakers were v e r i f i e d by t h e
c h e c k l i s t and another docking attempt w a s made with a c l o s i n g v e l o c i t y
of approximately 1.0 ft/sec. The l a t c h e s again f a i l e d t o capture on t h i s
pass. The procedures were v e r i f i e d w i t h Houston and t h e docking probe
switch w a s placed t o extend, then back t o r e t r a c t ( t h e talkbacks were
v e r i f i e d gray i n both p o s i t i o n s ) . On t h e t h i r d attempt, plus-X t h r u s t
w a s h e l d f o r approximately 4 seconds after drogue c o n t a c t , but t h e l a t c h e s
f a i l e d t o capture. Three prominent s c r a t c h e s , approximately 2 inches long
and spaced 120 degrees around t h e drogue, were noted at t h i s t i m e and
Houston w a s informed. The scratches s t a r t e d near t h e hole i n t h e drogue
and.extended r a d i a l l y outward. The docking probe switch w a s placed t o
extend-release f o r 5 seconds, then back t o r e t r a c t ; t h e talkbacks were
v e r i f i e d gray i n both p o s i t i o n s . Another attempt w a s made using normal
procedures, and again, no capture w a s achieved. On t h e f i f t h and f i n a l
attempt, t h e probe w a s aligned i n t h e drogue and h e l d with plus-X t h r u s t .
The primary 1 r e t r a c t switch w a s a c t u a t e d , and approximately 4 t o 5 sec-
onds l a t e r , t h e talkbacks went barberpole, then gray, and t h e docking
r i n g l a t c h e s were actuated by t h e l u n a r module docking ring. The post-
docking procedures were performed using t h e normal crew c h e c k l i s t and t h e
locking of all twelve l a t c h e s w a s v e r i f i e d .

Immediately upon l u n a r module e j e c t i o n , a maneuver w a s s t a r t e d t o

view t h e S-IVB. As soon as t h e S-IVB w a s i n s i g h t , Houston w a s n o t i f i e d .
A n S-IVB yaw maneuver w a s t h e n commanded i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r t h e a u x i l i a r y
propulsion system evasive maneuver. Both t h e a u x i l i a r y propulsion system
evasive maneuver and t h e propellant dump of t h e S-IVB were v i s u a l l y moni-
t o r e d . The S-IVB w a s s t a b l e when last viewed by t h e crew.

The probe and drogue were removed during t h e f i r s t day f o r examin-

a t i o n and checkout using t h e crew c h e c k l i s t and procedures provided by
t h e Mission Control Center. The probe functioned properly at t h a t time.

9.5.2 Translunar Coast

A clock update w a s performed at approximately 55 hours t o compensate

f o r a weather hold of approximately 40 minutes during t h e launch count-
down. This procedure w a s an a i d t o t h e Command Module P i l o t while i n
l u n a r o r b i t because it eliminated t h e need f o r numerous updates t o t h e
Command Module P i l o t ' s solo book.
 9.5.3 Midcourse Correction

Two midcourse c o r r e c t i o n s were performed during t h e t r a n s l u n a r coast

phase. The f i r s t midcourse c o r r e c t i o n was performed at t h e second option
p o i n t and placed t h e s p a c e c r a f t on a hybrid t r a j e c t o r y . The maneuver w a s
performed under c o n t r o l of t h e guidance and c o n t r o l system with r e s i d u a l s
of p l u s 0.2, zero, and minus 0.1 f t / s e c . The second midcourse c o r r e c t i o n
w a s performed at t h e f o u r t h option p o i n t and w a s t a r g e t e d f o r a v e l o c i t y
change of 4.8 f't/sec. It w a s a s e r v i c e propulsion system maneuver per-
formed under c o n t r o l of t h e guidance and c o n t r o l system. The r e s i d u a l s
were p l u s 0.3, zero, and minus 0.1 f t / s e c .

9.6 LUNAR ORBIT INSERTION

Residuals r e s u l t i n g from t h e lunar o r b i t i n s e r t i o n maneuver were

p l u s 0.3; z e r o , and zero f t / s e c . "he f i r i n g t i m e w a s w i t h i n 1 second
of t h e pad valuea. The only unexpected i t e m noted during t h i s maneuver
w a s t h e operation of t h e p r o p e l l a n t u t i l i z a t i o n and gaging system. The
p r e f l i g h t b r i e f i n g s on t h e system i n d i c a t e d t h a t , at crossover, t h e un-
balance meter would o s c i l l a t e and t h e n s e t t l e out i n t h e 100 t o 150 i n -
crease p o s i t i o n . A t crossover, during t h e a c t u a l maneuver, t h e unbalance
meter went from its decrease p o s i t i o n smoothly up t o approximately zero.
It w a s c o n t r o l l e d about t h e z e r o p o i n t using t h e i n c r e a s e and normal
p o s i t i o n s of t h e s w i t c h .

9.7 DESCENT ORBIT INSERTION

On Apollo 1 4 , f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e , t h e descent o r b i t i n s e r t i o n
maneuver w a s made w i t h t h e s e r v i c e propulsion system. "he command mod-
u l e computer i n d i c a t e d a 10.4- by 58.8-mile o r b i t after t h e maneuver.
The Network i n d i c a t e d a 9.3- by 59.0-mile o r b i t . The f i r i n g time observ-
ed by t h e crew w a s 20.6 seconds. Pad f i r i n g t i m e w a s 20.8 seconds. The
maneuver w a s c o n t r o l l e d by t h e guidance and c o n t r o l system with command
module computer shutdown. Immediately after t h e descent o r b i t i n s e r t i o n
maneuver, t h e s p a c e c r a f t w a s o r i e n t e d t o an a t t i t u d e from which an abort
maneuver could have been performed i f r e q u i r e d , and s h o r t l y after acqui-
s i t i o n of s i g n a l , Houston gave a "go" t o stay i n t h e low o r b i t . Pad
f i r i n g t i m e vas t h e crew monitoring shutdown c r i t e r i a . This technique
v i r t u a l l y eliminated t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of an unacceptable overspeed.

$ad values me t h e voice-updated parameter values used t o perform

a maneuver.

.-
L
3 -
L L- i
.-
L L L I -
 9-5

9.8 LUNAR MODULE CHECKOUT

The checkout of t h e l u n a r module w a s conducted i n two phases -

t h e first _during t r a n s l u n a r coast and t h e second on t h e day of t h e de-
scent. Pressure readings, p r i o r t o e n t e r i n g t h e l u n a r module, i n d i c a t e d
t h a t t h e l u n a r module had a low leakage r a t e . P a r e r t r a n s f e r t o t h e
l u n a r module occurred at 61:41:11. The only anomaly w a s a s l i g h t l y low
voltage reading on battery 5 . There were about f i v e o r s i x very small
screws and washers f l o a t i n g around upon i n g r e s s . During t h i s p e r i o d ,
16-RRUmotion p i c t u r e s were made of 'a command module w a s t e water dump.
Some a d d i t i o n a l housekeeping and equipment t r a n s f e r served t o reduce t h e
workload on descent d a y . Power w a s t r a n s f e r r e d back t o t h e command mod-
u l e at 62:20:42.

The second l u n a r module checkout w a s accomplished on t h e same day

as powered descent i n i t i a t i o n . Two c h e c k l i s t s , one f o r each p i l o t , were
used t o speed up t h e a c t i v a t i o n process. The Commander and t h e Lunar
Module P i l o t both suited i n t h e command and s e r v i c e module p r i o r t o i n -
t r a v e h i c u l a r t r a n s f e r , b u t all equipment had been l o c a t e d t h e n i g h t be-
f o r e t o assure t h a t t h i s would be a timely and s u c c e s s f u l process. A n
e l e c t r o d e problem w i t h t h e Lunar Module P i l o t ' s biosensors made t h i s
p e r i o d full w i t h no e x t r a t i m e a v a i l a b l e . The window h e a t e r s were used
t o c l e a r some condensation found after i n g r e s s . The probe and drogue
w e r e i n s t a l l e d and checked w i t h no problem. P r i o r t o r e a c t i o n c o n t r o l
system p r e s s u r i z a t i o n , t h e system A main shutoff valve c l i c k e d during
r e c y c l e , i n d i c a t i n g t h a t it was probably closed at t h a t t i m e .

The remainder of t h e a c t i v a t i o n proceeded without i n c i d e n t u n t i l

s e p a r a t i o n . Subsequent t o s e p a r a t i o n , t h e checkout of t h e l u n a r module
systems continued with only two a d d i t i o n a l problems becoming e v i d e n t .

a. The S-band antenna behavior w a s e r r a t i c at various t i m e s when

i n t h e "auto" track mode. On two occasions, t h e S-band antenna c i r c u i t
breaker opened without apparent reason, b u t functioned properly upon
being reset. On at least two o t h e r occasions, t h e ground s i g n a l w a s
l o s t unexpectedly. The antenna drove t o t h e mechanical s t o p , at which
t i m e t h e breaker opened (as expected). An unusually loud n o i s e associ-
a t e d with t h e antenna w a s noted. It was subsequently found, by observing
t h e antenna shadow on t h e lunar s u r f a c e , t h a t t h e n o i s e w a s c o i n c i d e n t
with an o s c i l l a t i o n i n both p i t c h and yaw. Upon one occasion, t h e antenna
p i t c h p o s i t i o n i n d i c a t o r dial w a s observed t o be f u l l - s c a l e up, with t h e
antenna functioning properly. This anomaly c o r r e c t e d i t s e l f a s h o r t t i m e
later and d i d not r e c u r .

b. The o t h e r major problem, which occurred b e f o r e powered descent

i n i t i a t i o n , was observed by t h e Mission Control Center. The crew w a s
9-6

advised of an abort discrete being s e t i n t h e l u n a r module guidance com-

p u t e r w i t h t h e abort b u t t o n reset. ?'he crew d i d n o t p a r t i c i p a t e s i g n i f i -
c a n t l y i n s o l v i n g t h i s problem except t o follow t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s given
by t h e Mission Control Center. The remainder of t h e lunar module check-
out w a s nominal up t o t h e p o i n t of powered descent i n i t i a t i o n .

9.9 POWERED DESCENT

The primary guidance computer w a s used t o s e l e c t t h e descent pro-

gram f o r an i n i t i a l i g n i t i o n algorithm check8 about 50 minutes p r i o r t o
a c t u a l i g n i t i o n , The computer w a s a l s o targeted f o r a n o - i g n i t i o n abort
at t h i s t i m e . F i n a l systems checks and switch s e t t i n g s were t h e n made
and t h e abort guidance system w a s i n i t i a l i z e d t o t h e ground s t a t e v e c t o r
(which had been uplinked 30 minutes p r i o r t o i g n i t i o n ) . The anomalies
p r e s e n t at t h i s t i m e included t h e computer abort b i t problem and t h e
S-band' s t e e r a b l e antenna malf'unction. To assure continuous communica-
t i o n s , a d e c i s i o n w a s made t o use omnidirectional antennas during powered
des c e n t .

The descent program w a s r e s e l e c t e d i n t h e primary computer at i g n i -

t i o n minus 10 minutes and a f i n a l a t t i t u d e t r i m w a s completed about 5 min-
u t e s later. The f i r s t computer e n t r y , t o i n h i b i t t h e abort command, w a s
made j u s t after f i n a l t r i m . The remaining e n t r i e s were made after i g n i -
t i o n . Both t h e u l l a g e and t h e i g n i t i o n were automatic and occurred on
t i m e . The engine w a s t h r o t t l e d - u p manually by t h e Commander 26 seconds
after i g n i t i o n . The t h r o t t l e w a s r e t u r n e d t o t h e i d l e p o s i t i o n after
t h e computer e n t r i e s had been completed, at about 1 minute 25 seconds
i n t o t h e f i r i n g . The computer guidance w a s i n i t i a l i z e d , by manual key-
board e n t r y , about 42 seconds after i g n i t i o n , A landing p o i n t t a r g e t
update of 2800 f e e t downrange w a s e n t e r e d manually about 2 minutes 1 5 sec-
onds after i g n i t i o n . The s t e e r i n g equations and t o r q u e - t o - i n e r t i a r a t i o
of t h e lunar module s i m u l a t o r are n e a r l y i d e n t i c a l t o t h o s e f o r t h e a c t u a l
v e h i c l e . Therefore , t h e p i l o t ' s p r e f l i g h t t r a i n i n g w a s completely ade-
quate f o r t h e a c t u a l v e h i c l e response exhibited during t h e descent phase.

The t h r o t t l e recovery p o i n t occurred about 12 seconds p r i o r t o t h e

p r e d i c t e d t i m e . "he a l t i t u d e and v e l o c i t y l i g h t s of t h e computer d i s -
pley continuously i n d i c a t e d t h a t landing r a d a r data were i n v a l i d t o an
a l t i t u d e w e l l below t h e nominal update level. A c a l l w a s r e c e i v e d from
t h e Mission Control Center t o "cycle t h e landing radar c i r c u i t breaker."
This allowed a v a l i d update. The l i g h t s e x t i n g u i s h e d and t h e computer
e n t r y w a s made t o enable t h i s f u n c t i o n at an a l t i t u d e of about
2 1 000 feet. The Commander d i d n o t e v a l u a t e manual c o n t r o l after
t h r o t t l e recovery, as planned, because t h e t i m e r e q u i r e d f o r t h e l a n d i n g

% e r i f i c a t i o n of computer performance.
 9-7

rad r updat precluded uch action. The abort guidance system followed
t h e primary system very c l o s e l y during t h e period p r i o r t o landing r a d a r
update. There w a s , t h e r e f o r e , only a s i n g l e a l t i t u d e update t o t h e
abort system. This update w a s made at an a l t i t u d e of 1 2 000 f e e t . There
w a s no abnormal divergence of t h e abort guidance system through t h e re-
mainder of t h e landing phase.

The landing program of t h e primary computer w a s e n t e r e d 8 minutes

44 seconds a f t e r i g n i t i o n and at an a l t i t u d e of about 8000 f e e t . The
vehicle p i t c h e d down, as expected, and t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e w a s r e a d i l y
v i s i b l e . The t a r g e t landing point w a s recognized immediately by t h e
Commander without r e f e r e n c e t o t h e computer landing p o i n t designator.
The unique t e r r a i n p a t t e r n contributed t o t h i s s u c c e s s f u l r e c o g n i t i o n ,
but t h e determining f a c t o r w a s t h e high f i d e l i t y of t h e s i m u l a t o r v i s u a l
d i s p l a y and t h e t r a i n i n g time associated with t h e device. The f i r s t com-
parison of t h e landing p o i n t designator showed zero e r r o r s i n cross range
and down range. A redesignation of t h e t a r g e t p o i n t 350 f e e t t o t h e
south w a s made at an a l t i t u d e of about 2700 f e e t t o allow a landing on
what had appeared t o be smoother t e r r a i n i n t h e p r e f l i g h t s t u d i e s of
c h a r t s and maps. Several cross references between t h e t a r g e t and t h e
landing p o i n t designator were made u n t i l an a l t i t u d e of about 2000 f e e t
w a s reached, and good agreement w a s noted. A t some a l t i t u d e l e s s t h a n
1500 f e e t , two t h i n g s became apparent - f i r s t , t h a t t h e redesignated
( s o u t h ) landing p o i n t w a s t o o rough and, second, t h a t t h e automatic l a n d -
i n g w a s t o occur s h o r t of t h e t a r g e t .

The manual descent program w a s i n i t i a t e d at an a l t i t u d e of 360 f e e t

at a range of approximately 2200 feet s h o r t of t h e desired t a r g e t . The
l u n a r module w a s c o n t r o l l e d t o zero descent rate at an a l t i t u d e of about
170 feet above t h e t e r r a i n . Translation maneuvers forward and t o t h e
r i g h t were made t o a i m f o r t h e point o r i g i n a l l y t a r g e t e d . Although t h i s
area appeared t o be gradually sloping, it w a s , i n g e n e r a l , smoother than
t h e r i d g e south of t h e t a r g e t . "he f a c t t h a t no dust w a s noted during
t h e t r a n s l a t i o n w a s r e a s s u r i n g because it helped corroborate t h e primary
computer a l t i t u d e . Velocity on t h e c r o s s p o i n t e r w a s about 40 f t / s e c
forward at manual takeover and t h i s w a s gradually reduced t o near-zero
over t h e landing p o i n t . A cross v e l o c i t y of about 6 f t / s e c n o r t h w a s
a l s o i n i t i a t e d and gradually reduced t o zero over t h e landing p o i n t . The
c r o s s p o i n t e r s (primary guidance) were steady and t h e i r i n d i c a t i o n s were
i n good agre.ement with v i s u a l reference t o t h e ground. Control of t h e
v e h i c l e i n primary guidance attitude-hold mode and rate-of-descent mode
w a s e x c e l l e n t at a l l times. The use of t h e l u n a r landing t r a i n i n g ve-
h i c l e and t h e l u n a r module simulator had more than adequately equipped
t h e p i l o t f o r h i s t a s k . It w a s r e l a t i v e l y easy t o pick out an exact
landing s p o t and f l y t o it with p r e c i s e c o n t r o l .

Blowing surface d u s t w a s f i r s t noted at an a l t i t u d e of 110 f e e t , but

this w a s not a d e t r i m e n t a l factor. The dust appeared t o be less t h a n
 9-8

6 inches i n depth and rocks were r e a d i l y v i s i b l e through i t . A f i n a l

descent from 100 f e e t w a s made at a descent rate of 3 f t / s e c , with a de-
l i b e r a t e forward v e l o c i t y of about l f t / s e c and, e s s e n t i a l l y , zero cross
range v e l o c i t y . The forward v e l o c i t y w a s maintained u n t i l touchdown t o
preclude backing i n t o any small c r a t e r s . To provide a s o f t landing, a
delay of about 2 seconds w a s allowed between a c q u i s i t i o n of t h e contact
l i g h t s and a c t i v a t i o n of t h e engine s t o p button. Touchdown occurred at
shutdown with some s m a l l dust-blowing a c t i o n continuing during engine
t h r u s t t a i l o f f o r decay. The landing forces were extremely l i g h t and
t h e v e h i c l e came t o rest within 1 degree of zero i n p i t c h and yaw a t t i -
t u d e s , and w i t h a 7-degree r i g h t r o l l a t t i t u d e ( n o r t h e a s t t i l t ) . (Refer
t o f i g u r e 8-2.)

Some l i n e a t i o n s were evident i n t h e area of t h r u s t impingement on

t h e s u r f a c e along t h e f i n a l t r a c k and i n t h e landing area. As might be
expected, these areas are generally coincident with those i n which blow-
i n g s u r f a c e dust w a s noted at low a l t i t u d e s . The area i n t h e v i c i n i t y
of t h e descent engine after touchdown appeared t o have been c r a t e r e d
only t o a depth of about 6 inches and, as photographs show, only i n
a s m a l l , well-defined area.

There were no spurious t h r u s t e r f i r i n g s after touchdown. The

lunar dump valves were recycled with no anomalies noted and t h e descent
engine propellant vents were i n i t i a t e d . Although t h e primary guidance
computer w a s t a r g e t e d with a l i f t - o f f t i m e of 108:24:31, t h i s e a r l y
l i f t - o f f t i m e was not required. The l u n a r "stay" w a s forwarded by t h e
Mission Control Center and t h e computer w a s s e t t o i d l e at 108:21:13.

The S-band communications were maintained on t h e forward omnidirec-

t i o n a l antenna during t h e descent, switched t o a f t at pitchdown, and
then switched t o t h e steerable antenna, i n "slew" mode, after t h e l u n a r
stay w a s approved.

9.10 LUNAR SURFACE ACTIVITY

9.10.1 Cabin A c t i v i t y

Operations .- Subsequent t o lunar module touchdown, lunar s u r f a c e

a c t i v i t i e s progressed i n accordance with t h e c h e c k l i s t . On t h e check-
l i s t i s an item requesting a d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e t o t h e
Mission Control Center. Although important from a s c i e n t i f i c p o i n t of
v i e w , t h i s t a s k proved t o be most u s e f u l i n alluwing t h e crew t o a c c l i -
mate themselves t o t h e lunar envirorlment and, i n conjunction with Mis-
s i o n Control, t o determine more p r e c i s e l y t h e l o c a t i o n of t h e lunar mod-
u l e . I n subsequent e x t r a v e h i c u l a r work, it w i l l be important t h a t t h e
 9-9

crewmen have a p r e c i s e knowledge of t h e i r s t a r t i n g p o i n t on t h e t r a v e r s e

map.

The preparation f o r t h e f i r s t e x t r a v e h i c u l a r p e r i o d w a s nominal a t

all times except f o r a communications problem which became evident dur-
i n g switchover t o p o r t a b l e l i f e support system communications. This
problem subsequently proved t o be t h e result of cockpit e r r o r , which
p o i n t s again t o t h e n e c e s s i t y of having c h e c k l i s t s t h a t leave no l a t i -
tude f o r m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . The cue cards u t i l i z e d during all of t h e
e x t r a v e h i c u l a r preparations and t h e post-extravehicular a c t i v i t y were
quite adequate except f o r t h e one e n t r y . However, t h e cue cards need
t o be a t t a c h e d more securely t o t h e instrument panel t o prevent t h e i r
being dislodged by inadvertent contact.

Very l i t t l e s l e e p w a s obtained. This resulted primarily from being

uncomfortable i n t h e s u i t s , but w a s a l s o due, i n a lesser degree, t o t h e
tilt of t h e cabin. "he tilt w a s e s p e c i a l l y n o t i c e a b l e during t h e s l e e p
periods and made s l e e p d i f f i c u l t because t h e crew w a s uneasy i n t h i s awk-
ward p o s i t i o n . It i s t h e crew's f e e l i n g t h a t an unsuited s l e e p period
would g r e a t l y c o n t r i b u t e t o s u f f i c i e n t crew s l e e p f o r t h e longer missions.

I n g e n e r a l , t h e lunar module cabin provided an adequate base of op-

e r a t i o n s during l u n a r s u r f a c e a c t i v i t i e s i n s p i t e of t h e s m a l l area and
t h e 7-degree tilt. However, it i s f e l t t h a t , were t h e lunar module t o
land on t e r r a i n i n c l i n e d more than about 10 t o 1 2 degrees, some d i f f i -
c u l t y would be experienced i n moving about t h e cabin.

Equipment.- On t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e , t h e alignment o p t i c a l t e l e s c o p e
w a s s a t i s f a c t o r i l y used t o align t h e platform. Reflections i n t h e align-
ment o p t i c a l t e l e s c o p e appeared t o come from t h e l u n a r module rendezvous
radar antenna and t h e l u n a r module upper s u r f a c e s . These r e f l e c t i o n s
e l i m i n a t e t h e less-bright stars as candidates f o r use. During alignment
o p t i c a l t e l e s c o p e s i g h t i n g , t h e radar antenna had d r i f t e d from i t s parked
p o s i t i o n i n t o t h e f i e l d of view of t h e t e l e s c o p e . The antenna w a s re-
p o s i t i o n e d before continuing with t h e alignments.

A d i f f i c u l t y w a s experienced with t h e i n t e r i m stowage assembly i n

t h e lunar module cabin. Its r e t a i n i n g brackets d i d not hold s a t i s f a c -
t o r i l y . The i n t e r i m stowage assembly w a s c o n t i n u a l l y s l i p p i n g out of
t h e a f t , upper r e s t r a i n t and i n t e r f e r i n g with cabin a c t i v i t y . "here w a s
no adequate place t o stow used u r i n e bags; consequently, they w e r e i n
t h e way u n t i l such t i m e t h a t they could be placed i n j e t t i s o n bags f o r
disposal. The disposable containers and j e t t i s o n bags which were stowed
i n t h e 16- ID^ camera compartment on t h e left-hand s i d e f e l l out while t h e
camera w a s being removed, c r e a t i n g a s h o r t delay during hard-suit opera-
tions.
9-10

Even though e x t r a v e h i c u l a r preparations and post-extravehicular

procedures were q u i t e adequate, meticulous e f f o r t i s r e q u i r e d t o properly
stow a l a r g e number of l u n a r s u r f a c e samples. Although t h e r e i s adequate
stowage space when samples are properly handled, i t is impossible t o e s t i -
mate t h e number, s i z e and shape of t h e samples p r i o r t o f l i g h t . Thus,
much t i m e i s required t o s o r t , weigh and stow a l l of t h e material i n t h e
lunar module cabin i n accordance with stowage area weight c o n s t r a i n t s .
Marking of w e i g h bags as they a r e s o r t e d and stowed i s important.

Two hours a f t e r landing on t h e lunar s u r f a c e , t h e rendezvous radar

s a t i s f a c t o r i l y performed t h e command and s e r v i c e module t r a c k i n g e x e r c i s e .

9 .lO .2 EgressjIngress

During cabin d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n , a cabin p r e s s u r e of less t h a n 0 . 1 p s i a

w a s r e q u i r e d before t h e cabin door could be opened e a s i l y . The f i r s t per-
son out. i s crowded as he egresses because t h e hatch cannot be f u l l y opened
t o t h e L u n a r Module P i l o t ' s s i d e w i t h t h e o t h e r crewman standing b e h i n d
i t . The f i r s t person t o egress must remember, o r be coached, t o lean t o
h i s l e f t during egress i n order t o avoid t h e hatch seal. However, t h e
hatch opening i s adequate. During e g r e s s and i n g r e s s t h e crew must also
remember t o m a i n t a i n h o r i z o n t a l clearance i n order not t o scrape t h e
p o r t a b l e l i f e support system and remote c o n t r o l u n i t on t h e upper and
lower hatch seals. These techniques r e q u i r e p r a c t i c e but are worth t h e
e f f o r t t o assure i n t e g r i t y of t h e seal.

On previous missions, dust c a r r i e d i n t o t h e cabin during i n g r e s s w a s

a problem. However, it d i d not seem t o be a problem on Apollo 1 4 , perhaps
because t h e r e w a s l e s s dust on t h e lunar s u r f a c e , o r perhaps, being aware
of t h e problem made t h e crew more meticulous i n contamination c o n t r o l t h a n
they would have been otherwise. Care w a s t a k e n t o remove t h e d u s t from
t h e p r e s s u r e garment assembly and o t h e r equipment before e n t r y i n t o t h e
cabin. The brush t h a t w a s used f o r p r e s s u r e garment assembly cleaning
w a s adequate. The technique of stomping t h e boots a g a i n s t t h e l u n a r mod-
ule l a d d e r seemed t o h e l p t o some e x t e n t .

During egress and i n g r e s s , s t a b i l i t y and mobility while on t h e l u n a r

module ladder i s adequate even when grasping t h e ladder with one hand.
This leaves t h e o t h e r hand f r e e t o c a r r y equipment. However, one should
maneuver slowly and d e l i b e r a t e l y i n order t o a s s u r e s t a b i l i t y when nego-
t i a t i n g t h e ' l u n a r module l a d d e r with one hand. No d i f f i c u l t y w a s experi-
enced i n passing equipment from t h e man on t h e s u r f a c e t o t h e man on t h e
ladder. The lunar equipment conveyor and equipment t r a n s f e r bag worked
more e a s i l y than i n one-g simulations.

..
L
!-
L, Y
A,
 9-11

9.10.3 Lunar Surface Operations

Mobility.- Mobility on t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e i s e x c e l l e n t . Each crew-

men employs a technique f o r t r a v e l t h a t i s most s u i t a b l e f o r t h a t i n d i -
vidual. The step-and-hop g a i t appears t o r e q u i r e a minimum of e f f o r t .
The 1/6g simulations i n t h e KC-135 a i r c r a f t were adequate t o give one a
f e e l of t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e g r a v i t a t i o n a l f i e l d . The zero-g experienced
on t h e way t o t h e moon aided considerably i n conditioning f o r good mo-
b i l i t y during operations i n 1/6g. There w a s very l i t t l e tendency t o
over-control or use t o o much force when using t o o l s o r walking on t h e
lunar s u r f a c e .

V i s i b i l i t y . - V i s i b i l i t y on t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e i s very good when look-

i n g cross-sun. Looking up-sun, t h e s u r f a c e features are obscured when
d i r e c t s u n l i g h t i s on t h e v i s o r , although t h e sunshades on t h e lunar ex-
t r a v e h i c u l a r v i s o r assembly helped i n reducing t h e sun g l a r e . Looking
down-sun, v i s i b i l i t y i s acceptable ; however, h o r i z o n t a l t e r r a i n f e a t u r e s
are washed out i n z e r o phase, and v e r t i c a l f e a t u r e s have reduced v i s i -
b i l i t y . A f a c t o r i n reducing down-sun v i s i b i l i t y i s t h a t f e a t u r e s a r e
i n t h e l i n e of s i g h t of t h e i r shadows, t h u s reducing c o n t r a s t . A crew-
man's shadow appears t o have a h e i l i g e n s c h e i n around i t . The v i s i b i l i t y
on t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e a l s o d i s t o r t s judgment of d i s t a n c e . There i s a
d e f i n i t e tendency t o underestimate d i s t a n c e t o t e r r a i n f e a t u r e s . A n
adequate range f i n d e r i s e s s e n t i a l .

Navigation.- Navigation appears t o have been t h e most d i f f i c u l t prob-

l e m encountered during lunar surface a c t i v i t i e s . Unexpected t e r r a i n fea-
tures, as compared t o r e l i e f maps, w e r e t h e source of n a v i g a t i o n a l prob-
l e m s . The r i d g e s and v a l l e y s had an average change i n e l e v a t i o n of ap-
proximately 10 t o 1 5 feet. The landmarks t h a t were c l e a r l y apparent on
t h e n a v i g a t i o n a l maps were not a t all apparent on t h e s u r f a c e . Even when
t h e crewmen climbed t o a r i d g e , t h e landmark o f t e n w a s not c l e a r l y i n
s i g h t . I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e photography c o n t r i b u t e s t o t h e navigation
problem because photographs of small c r a t e r s make them appear much s m a l l e r
t h a n they do t o the eye. On t h e c o n t r a r y , boulders r e f l e c t l i g h t s o t h a t
i n t h e o r b i t a l photographs they appear much l a r g e r t h a n they do i n t h e
n a t u r a l state. Boulders 2 o r 3 f e e t i n s i z e sometimes appear i n t h e
o r b i t a l photography, b u t c r a t e r s of t h a t s i z e a r e completely i n d i s c e r n i b l e

- Dust.- Dust on t h e l u n a r surface seemed t o be less of a problem t h a n

had been a n t i c i p a t e d . The dust c l i n g s t o s o f t , porous m a t e r i a l s and i s
e a s i l y removed from m e t a l s . The p r e s s u r e garments were impregnated with
d u s t ; however, most of t h e surface dust could be removed. The l i t t l e
d u s t t h a t accumulated on t h e modular equipment t r a n s p o r t e r could e a s i l y
be removed by brushing. The lunar map c o l l e c t e d dust and r e q u i r e d brush-
i n g or rubbing with 'a glove t o make t h e map usable.
9-12

Timeline.- Operations on t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e r e q u i r e d a much l o n g e r

t i m e than had been a n t i c i p a t e d . The planned a c t i v i t i e s r e q u i r e 25 t o
30 percent more time t h a n would b e r e q u i r e d under one-g c o n d i t i o n s .
Scheduling a d d i t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s , i n t h e event t h a t c e r t a i n p o r t i o n s of
t h e e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y have t o b e c a n c e l l e d , i s advisable.

9.10.4 L u n a r Module I n t e r f a c e s

Modular equipment s t o w w e assembly.- The r e l e a s e handle w a s p u l l e d

and t h e assembly dropped t o a height s u i t a b l e f o r operations on t h e
l u n a r s u r f a c e . The modular equipment stowage assembly w a s manually
a d j u s t e d t o a higher p o s i t i o n t o remove t h e modular equipment t r a n s -
p o r t e r and r e a d j u s t e d t o *a lower p o s i t i o n f o r subsequent o p e r a t i o n s .
The h e i g h t adjustments were made without d i f f i c u l t y . The thermal blan-
k e t s were more d i f f i c u l t t o t a k e o f f t h a n had been a n t i c i p a t e d . Simi-
l a r l y , t h e thermal b l a n k e t s which p r o t e c t e d t h e modular equipment t r a n s -
p o r t e r supported i t s weight and manual removal of t h e b l a n k e t s w a s re-
quired during modular equipment t r a n s p o r t e r deployment.

As on previous f l i g h t s , a l l cables used on t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e had

s u f f i c i e n t s e t t o prevent them from l y i n g f l a t when deployed on t h e lunar
s u r f a c e . Both crewmen became entangled i n t h e cables from t i m e t o time.
The cables emanating from t h e modular equipment stowage assembly area
should e i t h e r be b u r i e d o r routed through r e s t r a i n i n g c l i p s t o keep them
from being underfoot during work around t h e modular equipment stowage
assembly.

S c i e n t i f i c equipment bay.- Both t h e doors and t h e p a l l e t s were re-

moved e a s i l y from t h e s c i e n t i f i c equipment bay by u t i l i z i n g t h e booms.
The p a l l e t s could have been removed manually i f required. However, t h e
h e i g h t of t h e p a l l e t s w a s at t h e l i m i t f o r easy manual deployment on
level terrain.

The offloading of t h e Apollo l u n a r s u r f a c e experiment package w a s

somewhat hindered by a small c r a t e r 8 t o 10 feet t o t h e r e a r of t h e l u n a r
module. However, s u f f i c i e n t working area w a s a v a i l a b l e i n which t o p l a c e
a pallet and conduct f u e l i n g operations.

Since t h e landing gear d i d not s t r o k e s i g n i f i c a n t l y during t h e land-

i n g , a jimp of about 3 f e e t w a s r e q u i r e d from t h e footpad t o t h e lowest
rung of t h e ladder. This provided no appreciable d i f f i c u l t y ; however,
a firm l a n d i n g which would stroke t h e landing g e a r a f e w inches would
f a c i l i t a t e a manual o f f l o a d i n g operation as w e l l as egress and i n g r e s s .

.- . I

A- L Y
 9-13

9 .lo.5 L u n a r Surface C r e w Equipment

Extravehicular mobility unit.- Both e x t r a v e h i c u l a r mobility u n i t s

performed w e l l during both of the e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t i e s . There w a s
s u f f i c i e n t cooling i n t h e minimum p o s i t i o n f o r normal a c t i v i t y . Both
crewmen were r e q u i r e d t o go t o intermediate, o r between minimum and i n -
t e r m e d i a t e , f o r v a r i o u s p e r i o d s of t i m e during t h e climb t o Cone C r a t e r
and t h e high-speed r e t u r n from Cone Crater t o Weird Crater. However,
o t h e r than during t h e s e p e r i o d s , minimum cooling w a s used predominantly.

The Lunar Module P i l o t ' s pressure garment assembly evidenced a higher-

than-usual l e a k rate f o r t h e f i r s t e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y , dropping 0.25
p s i during t h e 1-minute check. The s u i t s h a r e d no drop during p r e f l i g h t
checkout.

The Commander's u r i n e c o l l e c t i o n t r a n s f e r assembly hose had a kink

i n it which prevented proper t r a n s f e r of t h e u r i n e t o t h e c o l l e c t i o n bags.
Before both e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t i e s it w a s necessary t o unzip t h e s u i t
and s t r a i g h t e n t h i s kink out. I n one i n s t a n c e t h e s u i t w a s removed t o
t h e w a i s t t o f a c i l i t a t e access. The only o t h e r minor problem with t h e
p r e s s u r e garment assembly concerned t h e Lunar Module P i l o t ' s r i g h t glove.
"he glove developed an anomalous c o n d i t i o n b e f o r e t h e second extravehicu-
l a r a c t i v i t y which caused it t o assume a n a t u r a l p o s i t i o n t o t h e l e f t
and down.

It should be noted t h a t t h e w r i s t - r i n g and neck-ring s e a l s on both

p r e s s u r e garment assemblies were l u b r i c a t e d between e x t r a v e h i c u l a r ac-
t i v i t i e s . A t t h a t t i m e , t h e r e was very l i t t l e evidence of grit o r d i r t
on t h e seals. Lubricating t h e s e a l s between e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t i e s
i s a procedure t h a t should b e continued on subsequent missions.

Modular equipment t r a n s p o r t e r . - The modular equipment t r a n s p o r t e r

deployed s a t i s f a c t o r i l y from the l u n a r module except as previously noted.
The s p r i n g t e n s i o n on t h e r e t a i n i n g c l i p s w a s s u f f i c i e n t t o hold a l l t h e
equipment on t h e modular equipment t r a n s p o r t e r during l u n a r s u r f ace ac-
t i v i t i e s . However, with t h e t r a n s p o r t e r unloaded, t h e retacining s p r i n g s
have s u f f i c i e n t t e n s i o n t o lift it c l e a r of t h e lunar s u r f a c e when plat-
i n g equipment i n stowage l o c a t i o n s . This w a s not n o t i c e d a f t e r t h e
t r a n s p o r t e r w a s f u l l y loaded.

The wheels d i d not kick up o r s t i r up as much dust as expected be-

fore t h e f l i g h t . Very l i t t l e d u s t accumulated on t h e modular equipment
transporter.

The modular equipment t r a n s p o r t e r w a s s t a b l e , easily p u l l e d , and

proved t o be a very handy device f o r both e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t i e s .
Only at m a x i m u m speeds d i d t h e t r a n s p o r t e r evidence any i n s t a b i l i t y
9-14

and, t h e n , only because of rough t e r r a i n . This i n s t a b i l i t y w a s easy t o

c o n t r o l by hand motion on t h e triangular-shaped tongue.

Hand t o o l c a r r i e r . - The hand t o o l c a r r i e r mated t o t h e modular ,

equipment t r a n s p o r t e r w e l l , and w a s adequately r e t a i n e d by t h e hand t o o l

c a r r i e r r e t a i n i n g c l i p . A l l stowage areas except t h e deep pocket were
acceptable. This pocket w a s very d i f f i c u l t t o reach when s t a n d i n g adja-
cent t o t h e modular equipment t r a n s p o r t e r . It i s t o o deep f o r one t o
e a s i l y r e t r i e v e small items. With t h i s exception, t h e hand t o o l c a r r i e r
p e r f orme d s at i s fact o r i l y.
Cameras .- A l l cameras c a r r i e d i n t h e l u n a r module worked well. Only
two anomalies were noted. On t h e Commander's camera, t h e screw which
r e t a i n s t h e handle and t h e remote c o n t r o l u n i t c l i p worked loose s e v e r a l
t i m e s and had t o b e retightened. The second anomaly concerned a 16-ITU~
magazine which Jammed and produced only 30 f e e t of usable film.

The t e l e v i s i o n camera performed s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . It seems t o be a

u s e f u l t o o l f o r lunar s u r f a c e e x p l o r a t i o n . A remotely operated camera
w i t h adjustment of focus, zoom, and l e n s s e t t i n g c o n t r o l l e d from t h e
ground would be very u s e f u l i n making a v a i l a b l e l u n a r s u r f a c e time pres-
ently required for these tasks.

S-band e r e c t a b l e antenna.- The S-band antenna was e a s i l y offloaded

from t h e lunar module and presented no problems i n deployment except t h a t
t h e n e t t i n g which forms t h e d i s h caught on t h e feed horn and had t o be
released manually. The antenna o b s t r u c t s t h e work a r e a immediately
around t h e modular equipment stowage assembly. A longer cable would
allow deplayment a t a greater d i s t a n c e from t h e lunar module. Although
t h e deployment and e r e c t i o n of t h e S-band antenna i s a one-man j o b , t h e
antenna i s more e a s i l y aligned w i t h t h e two crewmen cooperating.

L u n a r surface s c i e n t i f i c equipment.- Offloading of t h e Apollo l u n a r

s u r f a c e experiments subpackages w a s normal, and a l l operations were ad-
equate except f o r t h e operation of t h e dome removal t o o l . It r e q u i r e d
s e v e r a l attempts t o lock t h e dome removal t o o l onto t h e dome. During
t h e t r a v e r s e t o t h e Apollo l u n a r s u r f a c e equipment package deployment
s i t e , t h e p a l l e t s on e i t h e r end of t h e mast o s c i l l a t e d v e r t i c a l l y and
t h e m a s t f l e x e d , making t h e assembly d i f f i c u l t t o c a r r y and t o hold i n
t h e hands. However, t h e arrangement i s acceptable f o r traverse up t o
approximately 150 yards. '

There w a s some d i f f i c u l t y i n f i n d i n g a suitable s i t e f o r Apollo

lunar s u r f a c e experiments package deplayment because of undulations i n
t h e t e r r a i n . It w a s necessary t o spend several moments considering t h e
c o n s t r a i n t s t h a t had been placed on Apollo lunar surface experiments

? -
? - P .-
L L A- Y L
 9-15

package deployment and matching those t o t h e s i t e i n o r d e r t h a t the ex-

periments could be properly deployed. A f t e r t h e s i t e had been s e l e c t e d ,
t h e lunar dust presented some problems f o r t h e remainder of t h e Apollo
l u n a r s u r f a c e experiments package deployment. The suprathermal. i o n de-
t e c t o r experiment sub-pallet had dust p i l e d up a g a i n s t it and i n t o t h e
hidden Boyd b o l t , which must b e reached b l i n d with t h e hand t o o l . Sever-
a l minutes were wasted before t h e suprathermal i o n d e t e c t o r experiment
w a s s u c c e s s f u l l y released from t h e s u b - p a l l e t . Subsequent t o t h a t , t h e
suprathermal i o n d e t e c t o r experiment w a s c a r r i e d t o i t s deployment s i t e
and a d d i t i o n a l d i f f i c u l t y w a s experienced i n handling t h e t h r e e compo-
nents of t h i s experiment simultaneously. The suprathermal i o n d e t e c t o r
experiment w a s not s u f f i c i e n t l y s t a b l e t o prevent it from t u r n i n g over
s e v e r a l t i m e s during deployment.

No problems were experienced during removal of t h e mortar pack.

During deployment, however, t h e footpads r o t a t e d out of t h e proper posi-
t i o n , and t h e package had t o be picked up and t h e pads r o t a t e d t o a
p o s i t i o n i n which they would r e s t properly a g a i n s t t h e s u r f a c e .

The thumper deployed as expected, but t h e lunar r e g o l i t h w a s s o

l o o s e t h a t t h e c e n t e r geophone w a s p u l l e d out during deployment of t h e
l a s t h a l f of t h e thumper cable. This w a s confirmed during r e t u r n along
t h e l i n e . Only 13 of t h e 2 1 thumper c a r t r i d g e s were f i r e d and t h e f i r s t
s e v e r a l of t h e s e required an extraordinary amount of f o r c e t o f i r e them
( s e c t i o n 1 4 . 4 . 1 ) . The problem seemed t o c l e a r up f o r t h e last s e v e r a l
i n i t i a t o r s and t h e equipment operated p r e c i s e l y as expected.

.-
L a s e r ranging r e t r o - r e f l e c t o r experiment The l a ser r e f l e c t o r w a s
deployed and l e v e l e d i n t h e normal fashion and i n t h e p r e s c r i b e d loca-
t i o n . The dust cover w a s removed, t h e l e v e l rechecked, and t h e u n i t
photographed.

S o l a r wind composition experiment.- No d i f f i c u l t y w a s experienced

i n e r e c t i o n of t h e s o l a r wind composition experiment. The only anomaly
occurred during t h e retrieval of t h e apparatus, at which time it r o l l e d
up only about h a l f way and had t o be manually r o l l e d t h e remainder of
the distance.

Lunar p o r t a b l e magnetometer experiment .- This p i e c e of equipment

performed q u i t e s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . The only d i f f i c u l t y experienced w a s t h e
r e e l i n g i n of t h e c a b l e s . The s e t i n t h e cable prevented a s u c c e s s f u l
rewind; consequently, t h e cable was allowed t o p r o t r u d e i n loops from
t h e reel during t h e remainder of t h e t r a v e r s e ( s e c t i o n 1 4 . b . 3 ) .

Geology.- The geology hand t o o l s are good and, i f t i m e had p e r m i t t e d ,

t h e y would have all been used. As i n previous missions, t h e hammer w a s
9-16

used by s t r i k i n g w i t h t h e f l a t of t h e hammer r a t h e r t h a n t h e small end.

The only discrepancy a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e geology t o o l s w a s t h e use of
t h e geology sample bags. It w a s d i f f i c u l t t o f i n d rocks small enough
t o f i t i n t o t h e small sample bags. Furthermore, t h e y a r e h a r d t o r o l l
up. The t a b s which should f a c i l i t a t e r o l l i n g up t h e bags become en-
t a n g l e d , making it d i f f i c u l t t o remove them from t h e d i s p e n s e r .

9.10.6 Lunar Surface Science

Geo10a.- The appearance of t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e w a s much as expected.

A l o o s e gray mantle of material covered t h e e n t i r e s u r f a c e t o an undeter-
mined depth; however, core tubes driven i n t o t h e s u r f a c e would not pene-
t r a t e more than 1-1/2 t u b e l e n g t h s and, i n most c a s e s , considerably less
t h a n t h a t . A "rain drop" p a t t e r n over most of t h e r e g o l i t h w a s observed
and i s c l e a r l y shown i n photographs. Also observed, i n c e r t a i n s e c t i o n s
of t h e t r a v e r s e , were small l i n e a t i o n s i n t h e r e g o l i t h material, which
can be seen i n c e r t a i n photographs.

There w a s evidence of c r a t e r i n g and r e c r a t e r i n g on a l l of t h e area

t h a t w a s traversed. There w a s no s u r f a c e evidence of m u l t i p l e l a y e r s .
Even i n t h e c r a t e r s , t h e loose gray mantle covered t h e e n t i r e s u r f a c e ,
except where rocks protruded through, and concealed any evidence of stra-
t i g r a p h y . I n t h e t r e n c h dug by t h e crew, however, evidence of t h r e e
d i f f e r e n t l a y e r s was found. I n one o r two p l a c e s on t h e flank of Cone
Crater t h e crewmen's boots dug through t h e upper l a y e r exposing a white
l a y e r about 3 inches from t h e s u r f a c e . It i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t
very few rocks are e n t i r e l y on t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e ; most a r e b u r i e d o r
p a r t i a l l y b u r i e d . Nearly all rocks of any s i z e have s o i l f i l l e t s around
them. The s m a l l rocks are g e n e r a l l y coated with d i r t , b u t some of t h e
larger rocks are n o t . Many of t h e larger rock s u r f a c e s a r e soft and
crumbly. However, when one uses t h e hammer and breaks through t h i s , it
i s found t h a t they are h a r d underneath.

S u b t l e v a r i a t i o n s i n rocks are not e a s i l y d i s c e r n i b l e , p r i m a r i l y be-

cause of t h e dust. It must be remembered t h a t t h e crew s e l e c t e d candidate
samples after having observed t h e rocks from a t least 5 o r 6 feet away
i n order t o prevent d i s t u r b i n g t h e s o i l around them. Features which a r e
obvious i n a hand-held specimen a r e not d i s c e r n a b l e at i n i t i a l viewing
d i s t a n c e . Furthermore, once t h e rock has been sampled, good u t i l i z a t i o n
of t i m e precludes examining t h e rock except t o n o t e i t s more prominent
f e a t u r e s . The p o i n t i s t h a t only t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a rock t h a t a r e
d i s c e r n i b l e at t h e i n i t i a l viewing d i s t a n c e e n t e r i n t o t h e d e c i s i o n t o
sample. Sampling s t r a t e g y should allow f o r t h i s l i m i t a t i o n when a wide
v a r i e t y of samples i s d e s i r e d .

The crew did observe, however, t h e evidence of b r e c c i a i n some of

t h e rock; end, on a few occasions, c r y s t a l l i n e s t r u c t u r e w a s e v i d e n t . I n

..
I L
 9-17

most c a s e s , t h e c r y s t a l s were small. Only on two occasions w a s g l a s s

seen on t h e lunar s u r f a c e at Fra Mauro. I n one s m a l l c r a t e r t h e r e seemed
t o be g l a s s - l i k e s p a t t e r on t h e bottom. I n t h e t r a v e r s e t o t h e r i m of
Cone C r a t e r , one 3-foot rock was observed t o be w e l l coated with "glass".

The population of rocks i n t h e Fra Mauro area w a s s u r p r i s i n g l y low,

much less t h a n 0.5 percent of t h e t o t a l area. Predominantly, t h e rocks
i n evidence were 3 t o 5 centimeters o r smaller and, b e i n g covered w i t h
d i r t , were i n many cases i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from i r r e g u l a r i t i e s i n t h e
s u r f a c e or from clumps of s o i l . A s t h e crew progressed t o t h e c r e s t of
Cone Crater, boulders became more prominent. In t h e boulder f i e l d , on
t h e s o u t h e a s t edge of Cone, t h e boulder population reached, perhaps, 3
t o 5 percent of t h e e n t i r e s u r f a c e , with many boulders undoubtedly being
concealed j u s t below t h e surface. Rays were not d i s c e r n i b l e on t h e edge
of t h e c r a t e r s , p o s s i b l y because of t h e low population and a l s o because
' t h e n e a r e s t horizon w a s seldom more than 150 f e e t away.

. S o i l mechanics.- Footprints on t h e lunar s u r f a c e were not more than

1 / 2 inch t o 3/4 inch deep except i n t h e r i m s of c r a t e r s , where, at times,
t h e y were 3/4 inch t o 1-1/2 inches deep. The modular equipment t r a n s -
p o r t e r t r a c k s were seldom more than 1 / 2 inch deep. The penetrometer w a s
e a s i l y pushed i n t o t h e l u n a r surface almost t o t h e l i m i t of t h e penetrom-
e t e r rod. During t h e trenching o p e r a t i o n , t h e t r e n c h walls would not r e -
main i n t a c t and s t a r t e d crumbling s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e t r e n c h w a s i n i t i a t e d .
When o b t a i n i n g one core t u b e sample, t h e s o i l d i d not compact and s p i l l e d
from t h e t u b e upon withdrawal.

9.11 ASCENT, RENDEZVOUS, AND DOCKING

Although t h e i n g r e s s a t the conclusion of t h e second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r

p e r i o d w a s approximately 2 hours ahead of t h e t i m e l i n e , an hour of t h i s
pad w a s used up i n stowing samples and equipment preparatory t o lift-
o f f . The remaining hour assured adequate t i m e f o r crew r e l a x a t i o n and
an e a r l y s t a r t on pre-ascent procedures. There were no d e v i a t i o n s from
t h e c h e c k l i s t , although a standby procedure w a s a v a i l a b l e i n t h e event
of subsequent communications problems. Lift-off occurred on t i m e . As
i n previous missions, d e b r i s from t h e i n t e r s t a g e area was e v i d e n t at
s t a g i n g . I n a d d i t i o n , at docking, t h e Command Module P i l o t reported a
tear i n ascent s t a g e ' i n s u l a t i o n on t h e bottom r i g h t s i d e of t h e lunar
module ascent stage ( s e c t i o n 8.1).

Ascent w a s completely nominal with auto i g n i t i o n and c u t o f f . Both

guidance systems performed well. The Mission Control Center voiced up
an adjustment maneuver which w a s performed at 141:56:49.4 using t h e re-
a c t i o n c o n t r o l system. The adjustment d e l t a v e l o c i t y w a s monitored with
both guidance systems.
 9-18

9.11.1 Rendezvous

Following t h e adjustment f i r i n g , a manual maneuver w a s made t o t h e

t r a c k i n g a t t i t u d e and rendezvous navigation procedures were i n i t i a t e d .
For t h e backup c h a r t s , an e l a p s e d t i m e of 4 minutes 3 seconds w a s a v a i l -
able (from t h e beginning of t h e adjustment maneuver u n t i l t h e r e q u i r e d
t e r m i n a l phase i n i t i a t i o n minus 30 minutes rendezvous r a d a r mark). This
proved t o be i n s u f f i c i e n t t i m e t o complete t h e r e q u i r e d procedures com-
f o r t a b l y . The backup c h a r t s should be r e v i s e d t o permit ample t i m e t o
o b t a i n t h i s first mark. The guidance systems were updated independently
using t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e i n s e r t i o n s t a t e v e c t o r s as i n i t i a l c o n d i t i o n s .
Nineteen marks were obtained with t h e primary guidance system. The abort
guidance system updates were commenced at t e r m i n a l phase i n i t i a t i o n minus
27 minutes and continued t o t e r m i n a l phase i n i t i a t i o n minus 7 minutes at
which t i m e t h e maneuver s o l u t i o n w a s compared. E i g h t marks were e n t e r e d
i n t o t h e abort guidance system. The s o l u t i o n s from both l u n a r module
guidance systems compared extremely w e l l , agreeing on line-of-sight angles
w i t h i n 0.3 degree and on t o t a l d e l t a v e l o c i t y w i t h i n 1.6 f t / s e c . Because
of VHF d i f f i c u l t i e s ( s e c t i o n 1 4 . 1 . 4 ) , t h e command module computer w a s
updated with s e x t a n t marks only, p r i o r t o t e r m i n a l phase i n i t i a t i o n and
produced a maneuver s o l u t i o n of minus 67.4, p l u s 0 . 5 , minus 69.2 (un-
c o r r e c t e d ) compared with t h e primary guidance navigation system s o l u t i o n
of p l u s 62.1, p l u s 0 . 1 , p l u s 63.1. Using a two-out-of-three v o t e , t h e
primary guidance navigation system s o l u t i o n w a s s e l e c t e d f o r t h e maneuver,
and t h e corresponding r o t a t e d v e c t o r w a s e n t e r e d i n t o t h e abort guidance
system. The ascent propulsion system t e r m i n a l phase i n i t i a t i o n maneuver
w a s executed without i n c i d e n t . A s a n t i c i p a t e d , t h e guided ascent pro-
pulsion system shutdown r e s u l t e d i n a s l i g h t underburn.

Subsequent t o t e r m i n a l phase i n i t i a t i o n , both lunar module naviga-

t i o n s o l u t i o n s were r e i n i t i a l i z e d and t r a c k i n g w a s resumed. Simultane-
ously, t h e command module VHF t r a c k i n g w a s found t o be o p e r a t i n g and
both s e x t a n t and VHF marks were e n t e r e d i n t o t h e command module computer.
The f i r s t midcourse s o l u t i o n i n t h e primary guidance navigation system
w a s used. The abort guidance system s o l u t i o n f o r t h e f i r s t midcourse
c o r r e c t i o n was i n excess of 5 f t / s e c ; consequently, t h i s s o l u t i o n w a s
discarded and abort guidance system navigation w a s continued without
r e i n i t i a l i z a t i o n . A t t h e second midcourse c o r r e c t i o n , t h e primary guid-
ance navigation system s o l u t i o n w a s used, and t h e abort guidance system
s o l u t i o n w a s within 2 f't/sec.

The l u n a r module remained a c t i v e during b r a k i n g and t h e rendezvous

w a s completed without i n c i d e n t . After passing through t h e f i n a l braking
g a t e , t h e l u n a r module began s t a t i o n keeping on t h e command and s e r v i c e
module. The Command Module P i l o t executed a 360-degree p i t c h maneuver.
No anomalies were observed during t h e i n s p e c t i o n of t h e command and

I
 9-19

s e r v i c e modules. Consequently, t h e Commander proceeded with t h e pre-

docking maneuver c o n s i s t i n g of a 90-degree p i t c h down and r i g h t yaw t o
b r i n g t h e l u n a r module docking t a r g e t i n t o t h e Command Module P i l o t ' s
f i e l d of view. A t t h i s point i n t h e mission, t h e abort guidance dis-
plays were blank and t h e f l i g h t d i r e c t o r a t t i t u d e i n d i c a t o r , driven by
t h e abort guidance system, w a s s t i l l i n d i c a t i n g 150 degrees p i t c h and
z e r o yaw. E f f o r t s t o r e s t o r e t h e abort guidance system t o operation
were unsuccessful ( s e c t i o n 14.2.5). Docking with t h e command and s e r v i c e
module a c t i v e w a s completed uneventfully , d e s p i t e e a r l i e r concern about
t h e docking mechanism.

The t r a n s f e r of crew and equipment t o t h e command and s e r v i c e module

proceeded on schedule but with some concern regarding t h e t i m e remaining
t o complete assigned t a s k s . The t i m e a l l o t t e d proved t o b e adequate but
not ample. The procedures f o r contamination c o n t r o l i n t h e command mod-
u l e were q u i t e s a t i s f a c t o r y , and p a r t i c l e s were not observed i n t h e com-
mand module subsequent t o hatch opening.

9.12 COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE LUNAR ORBIT ACTIVITIES

9.12.1 C i r c u l a r i z a t i o n and Plane Change Maneuvers

Two s e r v i c e propulsion system f i r i n g s were made during t h e command

and s e r v i c e module s o l o phase. The c i r c u l a r i z a t i o n maneuver, which placed
t h e command and s e r v i c e module i n approximately a 60-nautical-mile c i r -
c u l a r o r b i t , w a s a 4-second f i r i n g performed a f t e r s e p a r a t i n g from t h e
l u n a r module. The maneuver w a s c o n t r o l l e d by t h e guidance and c o n t r o l
system and r e s u l t e d i n a 2.0 f t / s e c overspeed, which w a s trimmed t o
1.0 f t / s e c . Subsequent t o t h i s maneuver, a change t o t h e constants i n
t h e command module computer s h o r t f i r i n g l o g i c w a s uplinked by t h e M i s -
s i o n Control Center. The plane change maneuver w a s nominal with an 18-
second f i r i n g c o n t r o l l e d by t h e guidance and c o n t r o l system.

9.12.2 Landmark Tracking

A l l t r a c k i n g , with t h e exception of t h e l u n a r module on r e v o l u t i o n

17, w a s done using t h e t e l e s c o p e with t h e 16-1~t1d a t a a c q u i s i t i o n camera
mounted on t h e s e x t a n t . Fourteen landmarks were t r a c k e d by t h e command
and s e r v i c e module, t w o of t h e s e n e a r p e r i g e e while i n t h e 60- by 8-
nautical-mile o r b i t . The low-altitude landmark t r a c k i n g w a s accomplished
with no s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f i c u l t i e s . Acquisition of t h e t a r g e t w a s no prob-
l e m and t h e manual o p t i c s d r i v e provided constant t r a c k i n g of t h e land-
mark through n a d i r .
9-20

Landmark DE-2 w a s not t r a c k e d s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . The high sun angle

at t h e time of t r a c k i n g prevented a c q u i s i t i o n of t h e landmark. Another
landmark i n t h e area of DE-2 w a s t r a c k e d and i d e n t i f i e d from t h e 16-I-III~
photographs. A l l of t h e o t h e r landmarks were t r a c k e d q u i t e e a s i l y .
With t h e exception of DE-2, a l l of t h e graphics f o r t h e landmark t a r g e t s
were very s a t i s f a c t o r y .

The l u n a r module, on t h e s u r f a c e , w a s t r a c k e d on r e v o l u t i o n 17.

The sun r e f l e c t i n g from t h e l u n a r module as w e l l as t h e long shadow of
t h e l u n a r module made i d e n t i f i c a t i o n p o s i t i v e . Acquisition of t h e lunar
module w a s accomplished by using t h e s i t e map i n t h e l u n a r graphics book
and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of s u r f a c e f e a t u r e s i n t h e landing a r e a . Also, on
r e v o l u t i o n 29, between scheduled landmarks, t h e l u n a r module w a s again
acquired by manual o p t i c s . A t t h a t t i m e , t h e sun could be seen r e f l e c t -
i n g o f f t h e Apollo lunar s u r f a c e experiment package s t a t i o n .

9.12.3 Bootstrap Photography

The l u n a r topographic camera w a s used on r e v o l u t i o n 4 t o o b t a i n

p i c t u r e s of t h e proposed Descartes l a n d i n g s i t e from t h e l o w o r b i t . Ap-
proximately one-third of t h e way i n t o t h e photography p a s s , a loud n o i s e
developed i n t h e camera. The camera counter continued t o count and t h e
photography pass w a s completed. One e n t i r e magazine w a s exposed. Sub-
sequent troubleshooting e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t t h e s h u t t e r w a s not o p e r a t i n g
properly ( s e c t i o n 14.3.1). The only o t h e r p i c t u r e s taken with t h e l u n a r
topographic camera were of t h e l u n a r module landing on t h e s u r f a c e .

The f l i g h t plan w a s changed s o t h a t t h r e e photography passes on t h e

Descartes s i t e were made using t h e 500-mm l e n s on t h e 70-mm Hasselblad
camera mounted on a b r a c k e t i n window 4 ( f i g . 9-2). The Descartes s i t e
w a s t r a c k e d manually with t h e crew o p t i c a l alignment s i g h t and t h e camera
manually operated t o expose a frame every 5 seconds. The ground s u p p l i e d
i n e r t i a l angles and times t o s t a r t t h e camera and t h e s p a c e c r a f t maneuver.
The s p a c e c r a f t was maneuvered i n minimum impulse t o keep t h e crew o p t i c a l
alignment sight on t h e t a r g e t . These same procedures w e r e a l s o used on
r e v o l u t i o n 34 t o photograph t h e a r e a n e a r Lansburg B where t h e Apollo 13
S-IVB impacted.

A v e r t i c a l s t e r e o s t r i p w a s obtained on r e v o l u t i o n 26 using t h e
70-mm Hasselblad and 80-mm l e n s . This v e r t i c a l s t e r e o s t r i p encompassed
almost t h e e n t i r e ground t r a c k from t e r m i n a t o r t o t e r m i n a t o r . A crew
o p t i c a l alignment s i g h t maneuver w a s accomplished at t h e end of t h e s t r i p
f o r canera c a l i b r a t i o n .

.-
L
7 '
L
 9-21
NASA-S-71-1652

Figure 9-2.- Lunar s u r f a c e f e a t u r e s i n Descartes landing s i t e area.

9.12.4 O r b i t a l Science Hand-Held Photography

Approximately h a l f t h e planned t a r g e t s f o r o r b i t a l science hand-held

photography were d e l e t e d because of t h e f l i g h t plan change t o use crew
o p t i c a l alignment s i g h t t r a c k i n g of t h e Descartes s i t e . There were t h r e e
s t e r e o s t r i p s taken with t h e 500-mm l e n s using t h e hand-held mode
( f i g . 9-3). The r i n g s i g h t w a s used t o improve t h e s i g h t i n g accuracy.
U t i l i z a t i o n of t h e camera i n t h i s mode w a s q u i t e acceptable as long as
9-22
YASA-S-71-1653

a. Western p o r t i o n of King c r a t e r w i t h smaller c r a t e r

i n l e f t foreground having an 0.8-mile diameter and
l o c a t e d 3 2 . 4 miles from c e n t e r of King c r a t e r .
Figure 9-3.- S e l e c t e d s t e r e o s t r i p photographs from l u n a r o r b i t .

t h e s p a c e c r a f t a t t i t u d e was s a t i s f a c t o r y f o r t a r g e t a c q u i s i t i o n . During
t h i s f l i g h t , a l l hand-held photography was t a k e n at t h e s p a c e c r a f t a t t i -
t u d e d i c t a t e d by o t h e r requirements. On a few of t h e t a r g e t s , t h e a t t i -
t u d e made it d i f f i c u l t t o s a t i s f a c t o r i l y a c q u i r e t h e t a r g e t at t h e p r o p e r
time out of any window.
 9-23

During t h e hand-held photography and a l s o d u r i n g t h e crew o p t i c a l

alignment s i g h t t r a c k i n g , a v a r i a b l e i n t e r v a l o m e t e r would c e r t a i n l y have
been an asset. A s i n g l e - l e n s r e f l e x camera would g r e a t l y s i m p l i f y t h e
p o i n t i n g t a s k . Having o r b i t a l science t a r g e t s l i s t e d i n t h e f l i g h t p l a n ,
at times t h e y are a v a i l a b l e , i s c e r t a i n l y more p r e f e r a b l e t h a n j u s t l i s t -
i n g them as t a r g e t s o f o p p o r t u n i t y . This i s t r u e of both photographic
and v i s u a l t a r g e t s .

NASA-S-71-1654

b. C e n t r a l p o r t i o n of 41-mile diameter King c r a t e r .

Figure 9-3.- Continued.
 9-24

NASA-S-71-1655

c. E a s t e r n p o r t i o n of King c r a t e r photographed from 178 m i l e s a w a y .

Figure 9-3.- Concluded.

9.12.5 Zero-Phase Observations

The camera c o n f i g u r a t i o n w a s changed from t h a t l i s t e d i n t h e f l i g h t

p l a n because t h e t e l e m e t r y c a b l e w a s not long enough t o reach t h e camera
mounted i n t h e h a t c h window. This c o n f i g u r a t i o n w a s n o t checked p r i o r
t o t h e f l i g h t because t h e b r a c k e t a r r i v e d l a t e and no b r a c k e t was a v a i l -
a b l e f o r t h e s i m u l a t o r . A mark w a s given over t h e intercom and/or t h e
 9-25

air-to-ground loop on t h e first and last camera a c t u a t i o n of each pass.

It w a s noted t h a t t h e camera operated close t o zero phase on each tar-
g e t . Eight s e p a r a t e areas were l i s t e d f o r zero-phase observations b u t
only s i x of t h e s e were observed. The other t w g were cancelled as a re-
sult of a f l i g h t plan change. Four of t h e t a r g e t s were on t h e back s i d e
of t h e moon and two were on t h e f r o n t s i d e . There w a s a s i g n i f i c a n t d i f -
ference i n t h e a b i l i t y t o observe t h e t a r g e t s at zero phase between t h e
back-side and front-side t a r g e t s . The two s i g n i f i c a n t parameters are
albedo and s t r u c t u r a l r e l i e f , o r c o n t r a s t . Because of t h e lack of con-
trast i n relief on t h e back s i d e , t h e t a r g e t s w e r e d i f f i c u l t o r , i n some
cases, impossible t o observe at zero phase. Two views of a back-side
t a r g e t , one at zero phase and one at low phase, are s h a m i n f i g u r e 9-4.
The two front-side t a r g e t s were c r a t e r s l o c a t e d i n a mare s u r f a c e . The
s t r u c t u r a l r e l i e f between t h e f l a t s u r f a c e and t h e c r a t e r r i m made t h e
t a r g e t s more v i s i b l e at zero phase.

9.12.6 Dim-Light Photography

The window shade f o r t h e right-hand rendezvous window w a s easy t o

i n s t a l l and appeared t o f i t properly. I n addition t o using t h e window
shade, t h e flood l i g h t s near t h e right-hand rendezvous window were taped.
The green s h u t t e r a c t u a t i o n l i g h t on t h e camera w a s taped and, i n gen-
e r a l , all s p a c e c r a f t l i g h t s were turned o f f f o r t h e d i m - l i g h t photog-
raphy '
A l l of t h e procedures were completed as l i s t e d i n t h e f l i g h t plan.
The only discrepancy noted w a s on t h e e a r t h dark-side photography. There
w a s considerable s c a t t e r e d l i g h t i n t h e s e x t a n t when it w a s pointed at
t h e dark p o r t i o n of t h e e a r t h . There w a s a l s o a double image of t h e
earth's crescent i n t h e sextant.

9.12.7 Cammuni cat ions

Communications between t h e command and s e r v i c e module and t h e

Manned Space F l i g h t Network were marginal many times while i n lunar
o r b i t . The high-gain antenna pointing angles were very c r i t i c a l ; a very
s m a l l adjustment of t h e angles w a s t h e d i f f e r e n c e between having a good
ccmmunication lockup or no a c q u i s i t i o n at all ( s e c t i o n 14.1.2).

The s e p a r a t e communications loop f o r t h e command and s e r v i c e module

should be a c t i v a t e d soon a f t e r command module/lunar module s e p a r a t i o n .
The time between s e p a r a t i o n and touchdown i s an extremely busy time f o r
t h e lunar module and any prolonged communication with t h e command and
s e r v i c e m o d u l e i s d i f f i c u l t , i f not impossible. VHF communications w i t h
t h e l u n a r module were good at t h e t i m e of s e p a r a t i o n and through touch-
down. On rendezvous, t h e VHF communications from l i f t - o f f t o s h o r t l y
 9-26

NASA-S-71-1656

(a) High overhead view with no zero phase washou’

Note: Recogiilzable landniarks are identified with like numbers on each P h o t o g r a p h .

(b) LOW eievatlori showmg zero p h a s e washout.

Figure 9-4.- Comparison of v i s i b i l i t y of lunar s u r f a c e d e t a i l s looking

w e s t t o east i n t h e P a s t e u r c r a t e r area.
 9-27

before t e r m i n a l phase i n i t i a t i o n were marginal. A l s o , t h e VHF ranging

would not lock up o r , when it d i d , a f a l s e range w a s i n d i c a t e d most of
t h e time. Both antennas were t r i e d , t h e squelch w a s adjusted, and rang-
ing w a s turned o f f temporarily. However, none of t h e s e procedures i m -
proved t h e s i t u a t i o n t o any great degree ( s e c t i o n 14.1.4). A f t e r
t e r m i n a l phase i n i t i a t i o n t h e voice communications and VHF ranging were
satisfactory .
9.13 TRANSEARTH INJECTION

The t r a n s e a r t h inje'ction maneuver w a s e s s e n t i a l l y nominal i n a l l

aspects. The only item worthy of comment occurred about 20 seconds
p r i o r t o t h e end of t h e maneuver. There w a s a s l i g h t hum o r buzz i n
t h e s e r v i c e propulsion system t h a t continued through shutdown. Every-
t h i n g was steady, however, and it w a s not a matter of g r e a t concern.
The r e s i d u a l s w e r e p l u s 0.6, plus 0.8, and minus 0.1 f t / s e c . These were
trimmed t o plus 0.1, plus 0.8, and minus 0.3 f t / s e c . The f i r i n g time
w a s within 1 second of t h e pad value.

9.14 TRANSEARTH COAST

The only midcourse correction during t h e t r a n s e a r t h coast phase w a s

one r e a c t i o n c o n t r o l system maneuver performed approximately 17 hours
after t r a n s e a r t h i n j e c t i o n . The t o t a l d e l t a v e l o c i t y w a s 0.7 f t / s e c .
During t h e t r a n s e a r t h coast phase, a schedule of no-communications navi-
g a t i o n a l s i g h t i n g s w a s completed. The s t a t e vector from t h e t r a n s e a r t h
i n j e c t i o n maneuver was not updated except by n a v i g a t i o n a l s i g h t i n g s .
The s t a t e vector w a s dawnlinked t o t h e Network p r i o r t o t h e one mid-
course c o r r e c t i o n . The midcourse c o r r e c t i o n w a s t h e n incorporated and
uplinked t o t h e s p a c e c r a f t . An updated Network s t a t e v e c t o r w a s main-
t a i n e d i n t h e l u n a r module s l o t at a l l times. J u s t p r i o r t o e n t r y , t h e
onboard state vector compared q u i t e w e l l with t h e vector obtained by
Network tracking. I n addition t o t h e navigational s i g h t i n g s f o r t h e
onboard s t a t e v e c t o r , a d d i t i o n a l s i g h t i n g s were performed t o obtain data
on stars outside of t h e present c o n s t r a i n t limits. The updates obtained
on t h e c o n s t r a i n t stars were not incorporated i n t o t h e s t a t e vector.
The c i s l u n a r n a v i g a t i o n a l s i g h t i n g program would be improved i f a re-
cycle f e a t u r e were incorporated. Recalling t h e program f o r each mark i s
a drawback t o expeditious navigational s i g h t i n g s .

The rest of t h e t r a n s e a r t h coast w a s l i k e t h a t of previous lunar

missions with two except ions-nf l i g h t demonstrations were performed
t o evaluate t h e e f f e c t s of zero-gravity on p h y s i c a l processes, and a
command and s e r v i c e module oxygen flaw-rate t e s t w a s performed. Even
9-28

though t h e metal composites demonstration w a s s t a r t e d during t r a n s l u n a r

c o a s t , t h e r e was not s u f f i c i e n t time while out of t h e passive t h e n n a l
c o n t r o l mode t o complete a l l of t h e 18 samples. The o t h e r t h r e e demon-
s t r a t i o n s were completed.

9.15 ENTRY AND LANDING

A change t o t h e nominal e n t r y stowage was t h e a d d i t i o n of t h e dock-

i n g probe. The docking probe w a s t i e d down f o r e n t r y at t h e f o o t of t h e
Lunar Module P i l o t ' s couch using procedures voiced by t h e Mission Control
Center. Three discrepancies were noted during e n t r y . The e n t r y m n i t o r
system was s t a r t e d manually at 0.05g ti= plus 3 seconds. The 0.05g l i g h t
never illuminated ( s e c t i o n 14.1.5). The steam pressure w a s l a t e i n reach-
i n g t h e peg. However, t h e cabin pressure w a s used as a backup. The time
of steam pressure pegging was approximately 5 t o 10 seconds l a t e and
occurred at an a l t i t u d e below 90 000 f e e t . [ E d i t o r ' s note: The crew
c h e c k l i s t gives a s p e c i f i c time at which t h e steam pressure gage should
peg high r e l a t i v e t o t h e i l l u m i n a t i o n of t h e 0.05g l i g h t as an i n d i c a t i o n
of t h e 90 000-foot a l t i t u d e ; however, t h e steam pressure measurement is
only an approximate i n d i c a t i o n . The crew i n t e r p r e t e d t h e c h e c k l i s t lit-
e r a l l y . ] Also, parer w a s s t i l l on at least one of t h e main buses a f t e r
t h e main bus t i e switches were turned off at 800 f e e t . The main buses
were not completely powered down u n t i l t h e c i r c u i t breakers on panel 275
were p u l l e d a f t e r landing ( s e c t i o n 14.1.6).

The landing impact w a s milder than a n t i c i p a t e d . The parachutes

were j e t t i s o n e d and t h e s p a c e c r a f t remained i n t h e s t a b l e I a t t i t u d e .
Recovery personnel a r r i v e d at t h e s p a c e c r a f t before t h e completion of
t h e 10-minute waiting p e r i o d r e q u i r e d p r i o r t o i n i t i a t i n g i n f l a t i o n of
t h e u p r i g h t i n g bags f o r a s t a b l e I landing. One parachute became en-
tangled on t h e spacecraft and was c u t l o o s e by t h e recovery team. The
carbon dioxide b o t t l e on t h e Lunar Module P i l o t ' s l i f e preserver was
l o o s e and t h e vest would n o t i n f l a t e when t h e l e v e r was p u l l e d . The
b o t t l e was t i g h t e n e d , and then t h e l i f e p r e s e r v e r inflated properly.

!
L
NASA-S-71-1636
9-29
Revolution counl
D,
Nigl
Lilt-off MSFN

Iiiscrtioci nd systrms checks

CRO

-' HSK S-Lw evasive m m v n

Platlam rcaligmneibl

S-IPB tiwid axyqen h p

Extcld doeking mbe

C i s l u u navigation
odics ulibratim
t-
Y N

tal 0 to 10 hours.
Figure 9-1.- F l i g h t plan a c t i v i t i e s .
9-30

3
NASA-S-71-1b37
Ellpvd tim

Figure 9-1.- Continued.

I
L
 9-31
NASA-S-71-1638

Day DW
MSFN Night Nisht
N

Platfan realiymes

Each &ride dim-light pho(ayaphy E

Initiate parrive thmnal colilml

Cm exercise m i a d

s-mr ) * l q * Y
I Initiate passive themu1 conbol

(cl 3Oto 51 hours.

Figure 9-1.- Continued.

1
9-32

Crew exercise

Bi-static rada fnquency check

I

S p m a r l t c b c k upd*c (+40:02.9)
udr a 54:53:3b

Id) 51 b 61 hours.
Figure 9-1.- Continued.

v -
c
 9-33
NASA-S-71-1640

Day I
Night Ni I
Housekeepin( 9 P

Luna iilodile clrckwt 1 Water nialaprnniiL w a l n cycled

Presruize lunr nodule E

1
1
Initiate hnr mduk a s m i battery e s t

le1 61 to 78 hours.

Figure 9-1. - Continued.

9- 34

rT
NASA-S-7 1-1641
count
~kpsedtime 0
Revolution count
I
Niy NII
18 MSFN

Terminate liiiia m d i l e ascciit

ballcry test
P latrain realiqimeiil

Platlomi realigiineiit

74

m
L M h W k (rrhinq

Systems checks la liiiia wbit Systems checks lw descent a b i i

IIIsert loll llJneUVeI inmution nwwu

81

111 ntom hours.

-
Figure 9-1. Cont h u e d .
 9-35
NASA-S-71-1642
Revolution count Revolution count
D< I
Nigl Nis

Platlmii reali~unent
Ternittiate rest motu&

Phmograllll Descrtcs

Initiate e s t attitude Open dockiiq tunnel and baisfm

I O l l u u mobbe

Luna moduk activation

and r y s t n r ckout

Luna module coasc

alignment

Undocking nd sep.r*ion

Y
-

lgl I to 105 hours.

Figure 9-1. - Cont inued.

9-36
NASA-S-7 1-1643
Revolution count
Elapsed lime

Cunniand rid service iiiodiile

IUIIUorbit circuIarizatioil
D*
Nig'
[!I
Revolution count
Elapsed time
MSFN L,lllaf sinlace iiavigatiwi
(LI ( ~ i o t i a nialiile)
~
NVJ

Colnrnandei
aiid Lunar
0

Modiilc
m Pilot eat
Cel)cnschein lJlotopapriy
Luna iiiodule descent popilsion by Command Module Pilol
system and laiidiny r a d s chechoul

Backwrd-loolring chase
C m a n d and suvice module 1 observalion by Carmind
I a n h a k tracking
ll Module Pilol

t ConunMd and service module a.d

luna niodule platform r r a l i p m n t
Cabin a d equipnenl p e w a -
(ions for Insc emavehlcular
aclIvIIy

Don portable life siippori

systms

F m r r d - l o o k i n g z u o phase
o h v a t i o n by Camand
Module Pilot

Portable Iile supper( syslml

connrunic*ims check

Command md suvice noduk Zodiacal Ii+ phologaphy by

orbital science phaog.phs C m n d Moduk Pilot
Luna nodule p a r e d descent Don helmetr/glons
initiation

Luu noduk landing Suit presswe i n t w i t y check

Carnand Md suvice module
p l * h nallqnncnl
Cmai Final pewalions for ewers
Modu k
Luna module platform e,
rralipmnl S t r t first eatravehtcula activity

1
14 hous 48 minuter)
Tekr

109
C m n d md service moduk
butin) of laded luna module

Camund md service module

k-1. backing

MSFN

110
(h) 1 8 to 115 b u n .
Figure 9-1. - Continued.

L. i
..
L
1 -
L
.-
L L
i -

A-
.-
L
 9-37
WA5A-5-11- 1644
Revolution count blution count
I Elapsed time
' + NI
r 1 a M S F N MSFN cannnd
hI nd Luna
Module
P i l eat
~

Cainiiaid Module
Pilot S I
1_

Camnd and w v i c e d k
platfann r r a l i p n m t

Galactic suvey p h o t o q q h y CamnMdI

by Canmiand Yobk Pilot
n d h
uoduk

I
Plb( S k

h a d ad service moble
p l a t f m realigmnent

Eathshine p h a o q a d ~ yby
C d yoduk Pilot

TenninYe first edrarehiwlr

wtivity
Cam~mdrd service mobk
p l a t f m mliqmmt
Repessuize knr mobk
cabin nd rrchrpc portlbk
COnnlVl
Yobk
P i W ea
1
1
life w w m sysllcns
Doff W b k life suppat
systems
Initme VHF b ~ r t a t i cr d r
test (11h a d
-

Orbital scnnce photoqaphy by

C m m a d Uobk Pibt

e sS-band
Initiate
radar t bi-static carnd

liI 115 to 130 hours.

Figure 9-1. - Cont inued.

 9-38
NASA-571-1645
Revolution count Revolution count
C
Nic
ISFN Te levisior
r a t i o n fa secmid extrave-
hicula actwily
Module
Pilot eat
I

1
Contiiigeiicy pliotograpliy 01
Dercartes by Coliiiiirid Modiile
PllOl

Don portable life siipport

sysluns and check Teniiiiiate second eauavcliiciila
canmunicatiois IcIIvII;l
Repressurize liiiiar modiile cahiii
Conunamd aiid service iiiodule
plrtfrml realiqmieiil
Final prpuations la egress
(CSMI
Vertical stweo md orbital science Dolt pacable life supporl
photaq~rphyby C m ~ n Module
d Pilot sys Ienis
Start second extravchiciila activily
(4 hours 35 niiiules) C m n u d and sovice oiiodule
platlam realiginwnt
Te, Depressurize lvnu mochilr cabin.
JCIIISM equipnnt. a i d repes-
sinize cabin

-137
- MSFN C m n d and service module
Iandmak tracking

1
Galactic s w e y photopraphy
by C-d Module Pilot

Luna libation )Ihotopaphy

by Camnnd Module P i k u

MSFN

Rendezvous rdr actiuation

and sell test
COlWlndcl
ndLwu
Yoduk
Pikt eat

1
B.ckwd-looLinp zuo phau
Obmvalimi nd a b i t a l SCHnCe
photopraphy by Connmd Yoduk
Pilot

F a w d - W i q zuo
. k U U * l o n by CIlUd
1.-1% W l e PiM
13 13010 140 hours.
Figure 9-1. - Continued.
 9-39
NASA-5-71-1646
Revolut ion count Revolution count

rtime
-1mMSFN MSFN
I
Nil
I
- 1
I

-141 MSFN Luna module platlmii Platlmii realiyiniieiit

realiqmnent

Coiitmiinalimi control
Pretvincli switcli checks t

Lift-off from l i m a surface

Orbilal inseflim
Tweak l l l ~ u r n

Pllaoglphr .
IApollo 12 lunar module.
4Apotlo 13 and 14 S-mimpact points

-14’ MSFN
Tnminal phase Iinalizaim

Telcrisiui
Docking
_t

-141 T r n r f n c q u i p m l md s n p k s
IO c d nodule md s t w Iheill

Initiate pnssiue Ilmmal s a b o t

-145
Ikl 140 to 150 hours.

Figure 9-1. - Continued .

9-40
UASA-S-71-1641
Elapsed time D<
Niql
1

SI

162

PUtlaiii realiqrmnetit
-

I
Terminate parrove thnntal control

170

Tmiioiate oxyqen llor rate test altitude

Initiate thnnal attitude

111 -
Ill 150 to 171 hours.

F i g u r e 9-1.- Continued.

.-
L
?
L L-
i

L
.
 I
Nil
N
"

I
lckrismu

Initiate passive thcnrul cmml

Platfani realiqmnent

Entry nonitor system m y check

Terminate passive thermal CWOI

Iml 171 to

-
F i g u r e 9-,1. Continued.
9-42
NASA-S-71-1649 D
D, Elapsed time
Niq
Nigl
Cislun
Y

t Robe IlorrW

Qew eaucise

Initiate parwe thermal conVol

Television

probe stowaqe

I
Cirlunr n i v i q Y i m

Plrfom n r l i q m n l

(n) 1m to 198 hours.

Figure 9-1.- Continued.
1
? - 1 .. .. ,- -_ - "

L A- A - A.a .Li i
 9-43
NASA-S-7 1-1650

Ela~sedtime
Ddv
FN Ni

1 lavigilion

i -

Pal
Cirluv l u r ~ i a a
Initiate p a r i v e Ucrul control

(0) lpll to 214 hours.

Figure 9-1.- Continued.

9-44
NASA-S-71-1651
Elamd time Day Elapsed time
v
Entry monitor system entry check

Command module/scrvice nicdule

scwatim

Entry mtaface

(PI214 to 2l7 hours.

Figure 9-1. - Concluded.

L
.- . -
L. L
1

I
.

L A-
.
A.
"
 10-1

10 .O BIOMEDICAL EVALUATION

This s e c t i o n i s a summary o f t h e Apollo 1 4 medical f i n d i n g s based

on a preliminary a n a l y s i s of t h e biomedical data. A comprehensive eval-
uation w i l l be published i n a s e p a r a t e r e p o r t . The t h r e e crewmen accu-
mulated a t o t a l o f 650 man-hours of space f l i g h t experience.

The crewmen remained i n excellent h e a l t h throughout t h e mission and

t h e i r performance w a s e x c e l l e n t d e s p i t e an a l t e r a t i o n of t h e i r normal
work/rest cycle. A l l physiological parameters obtained from t h e crew re-
mained within t h e expected ranges during t h e f l i g h t . No adverse e f f e c t s
which could be a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e l u n a r surface exposure have been observed.

10.1 BIOMEDICAL INSTRUMENTATION AND PHYSIOLOGICAL DATA

Problems with t h e Comander ' s biomedical instrument at i on h a r n e s s

began p r i o r t o l i f t - o f f when t h e s t e r n a l electrocardiogram s i g n a l became
unreadable 3 minutes a f t e r spacecraft i n g r e s s . A waiver w a s made t o t h e
launch mission r u l e r e q u i r i n g a readable electrocardiogram on all crew-
men. During t h e f i r s t o r b i t , t h e Commander's s t e r n a l electrocardiogram
s i g n a l returned t o normal.

A t about 57 1 / 2 hours, t h e Commander noted t h a t h i s lower s t e r n a l

sensor had leaked e l e c t r o d e paste around t h e s e a l i n g t a p e . This s i t u -
a t i o n w a s corrected by applying f r e s h e l e c t r o d e p a s t e and t a p e .

When t h e Commander t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e p o r t a b l e l i f e support system

in preparation f o r t h e e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y , h i s electrocardiogram
w a s s o noisy on two occasions t h a t t h e cardiotachometer outputs i n t h e
Mission Control Center were unusable and manual counting of t h e h e a r t
rate f o r metabolic r a t e assessment became necessary. A good e l e c t r o -
cardiogram signal on t h e Commander w a s reacquired a f t e r completion of
t h e e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y and r e t u r n t o t h e l u n a r module. The t h r e a d s
on t h e t o p connector of t h e s i g n a l conditioner were a c c i d e n t a l l y s t r i p p e d .
However, t h e electrocardiogram s i g n a l w a s r e s t o r e d f o r t h e remainder o f
t h e f l i g h t by t i g h t e n i n g t h i s connector.

The q u a l i t y o f t h e Lunar Module P i l o t ' s electrocardiogram w a s excel-

l e n t from s p a c e c r a f t ingress u n t i l approximately t h r e e days i n t o t h e m i s -
s i o n . A t t h a t t i m e , i n t e r m i t t e n t n o i s e transmissions t y p i c a l of a loose
sensor were received. The lower s t e r n a l sensor w a s r e s e r v i c e d with f r e s h
p a s t e and t a p e . This happened two a d d i t i o n a l times. No attempt w a s made
t o c o r r e c t t h e s i t u a t i o n on t h e last occurrence.
10-2

"he L u n a r Module P i l o t a l s o l o s t h i s impedance pneumogram a f t e r t h e

e i g h t h day of f l i g h t . P o s t f l i g h t examination showed t h a t t h e s i g n a l con-
d i t i o n e r had f a i l e d .

Physiological measurements were w i t h i n expected ranges throughout

t h e mission. The average crew h e a r t rates f o r work and s l e e p i n t h e
command module and l u n a r module are l i s t e d i n t h e following t a b l e .

I Activity
Commander
Average h e a r t rates, beats/min
Ccanmand Module
Pilot
L u n a r Module
Pilot

Command module:
Work
Sleep
Lunar module:
57
52
I 66
46

Work
Sleep

Figure 10-1 p r e s e n t s t h e crew h e a r t rates a f t e r t r a n s l u n a r i n j e c t i o n

during t h e multiple unsuccessful docking attempts and t h e f i n a l h a r d dock.
NASA-S-71-1657
160

140

120
.-C
> E

g 100
2

f
5
80

60

40
2:20 2:40 3:OO 320 340 4:OO 420 440 5:OO 5:20
Figure 10-1.- C r e w heart rates during m u l t i p l e docking attempts.
 10-3

During powered descent and ascent, t h e Commander's h e a r t - r a t e averages

ranged from 60 t o 107 beats per minute during descent and from 69 t o 83
b e a t s p e r minute during a s c e n t , as s h a m i n f i g u r e s 10-2 and 10-3, re-
s p e c t i v e l y . These h e a r t - r a t e averages f o r descent and a s c e n t . were t h e
lowest observed on a lunar landing mission.

NASA-S-71-1658

180

160

140

80

60

40
107:57 107:59 108:Ol 108:03 108:05 108:07 108:09 108:ll 108:13 108:15 108:17 108:19
l i m e , hrmin

Figure 10-2.- H e a r t rates of t h e Commander

during lunar descent.
1 10-4

NASA-S-71-1659

100

90

b
I
70

60
141:41 141:43 141:45 141:47 141:49 141:51 141:53 141:55
Time, hr:min

Figure 10-3.- Heart r a t e s of t h e Commander during l u n a r a s c e n t .

Heart r a t e s during t h e two e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y periods are shown

i n f i g u r e s 10-4 and 10-5. The Commander's average h e a r t rates were 81
and 99 beats p e r minute f o r t h e f i r s t and second p e r i o d s , r e s p e c t i v e l y ;
and t h e L u n a r Module P i l o t ' s average h e a r t rates were 91 and 95 b e a t s p e r
minute. The metabolic rates and t h e accumulated metabolic production of
each crewman during t h e e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y periods a r e p r e s e n t e d i n
tables 10-1 and 10-11. A summary of t h e metabolic production during t h e
two e x t r a v e h i c u l a r periods i s presented i n t h e following t a b l e .

II II Met ab o l i c product i on I
i
Crewmen
F i r s t period Second period
Btu/hr T o t a l , Btu Btu/hr T o t a l , Btu

Commander 800 3840 9 10 4156

Lunar Module P i l o t 930 4464 1000 4567

.-
L
P '
I Y
.-
L
. *

Y
.
L L
.-
L
7 -

L
 10-5

0
0
OD
rl

0
??
l-

0
0
P-
rl
rl

0
‘I!
9
rl
d

-
4

O
‘I!
v)
d
rl

0
0
v)
d

xob
al
X
0
m
0
I
rl 3
r(
I
0
rl
0 aJ
k
$!
Q
rl
r(

0
m
 10-6

a
al
a
?
d
V
C
0
V
I
3
I
0
rl
aJ

_ .
H U L L
10-7
10-8

aal
a
3
rl
0

u
I
in
I
0
rl
al
5
bo
.ri
R
 .--
I
10-9

.- mAB0I;IC
TAB= 10-1 ASSES-
MTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY PERIOD
OF THE FIRST

(b)
712
W 1

llbl47 I 18

8 (b)
6 95
P 53
15 225
35
9 159
2 b2
lz 2
s
2 30
4 s9
4 63
3 n
lo lo3
8 99
r
15
6n
275
2 26
P3 301
3
S
c
65
ll 1%
2 26
15 235
L m
3 P
4 46
1 l2
l2
21 309
3 62
5 lob
61
'930
10-10

B v r i r n activitr.

-Bb
40
639
m
$
Fn
53
ea
u 3
13
348
l33:lb 55
1 33: s 15
l33:22 2l2
133:1 I 2 P
l33:k 127
l33146 95
l33:52 30
l33:5L l2h
134:w 38
uI:o2 85
*:G6 bl
n
461
35
LT
60
'139
135& 1 2
90
20

bi%

-
l3lr08 12 82 &
u1:m 1 ll 93
lY:21 18 190 283
lY139 S 63 3n
l3l:u 2 3l 3Tl
lY:b6 8 111 w
13l:5b P P3 El1
mi26 8 ll2 923
m:3L 5 46 969
1P:39 3 bS ulb
1P:Q 2 34
1P:bh I 85
19:U L
1P:52
132:Sl
5
3
2
61
l33:m lb 292
133:lh 2 66
m:16 6 206
133:22 16 304
133x38 2 b3
133:M 6 116
133:n 6 lon 106
I3352 2 un 39
133:54 6 1331 134
uL:m 2 l*l b5
134502 b 1b63 91
13b:o6 3 l6Lo 82
134:w 2 lSSl 52
l3b:u 36 993 596
+3k :L l 2 l%L P
134 :b9 3 1p60 63
134:52 3 1558 18
u4:55 2 lbl5 41
13b:ST 28 IO&?
13S:25
135:35
10
8
UOP
996
%
116

L%7
 10-11

10.2 MEDICAL OBSERVATIONS

10.2.1 Adaptation t o Weightlessness

Adaptation t o t h e weightless s t a t e w a s r e a d i l y accomplished. S h o r t l y

a f t e r o r b i t a l i n s e r t i o n , each crewman experienced t h e t y p i c a l f u l l n e s s -
of-the-head sensation t h a t has been reported by previous f l i g h t crews.
N o nausea, vomiting, v e r t i g o , o r d i s o r i e n t a t i o n occurred during t h e mis-
s i o n , and t h e crew d i d not observe d i s t o r t i o n of f a c i a l features, such
as rounding of t h e face due t o lack of g r a v i t y , as reported by some pre-
vious crewmen.

During t h e f i r s t two days of f l i g h t , t h e crew reported discomfort

and soreness of t h e lower back muscles as has been noted on previous mis-
s i o n s . The discomfort w a s s u f f i c i e n t i n magnitude t o i n t e r f e r e with s l e e p
during t h e f i r s t day of t h e mission, and w a s a t t r i b u t e d t o changes i n
posture during weightlessness. I n f l i g h t e x e r c i s e provided r e l i e f .

10.2.2 Visual Phenomenon

Each crewman r e p o r t e d seeing t h e s t r e a k s , p o i n t s , and f l a s h e s of

l i g h t t h a t have been noted by previous Apollo crews. The frequency of
t h e l i g h t f l a s h e s averaged about once every 2 minutes f o r each crewman.
The Visual phenomenon w a s observed with t h e eyes both open and closed,
and t h e crew w a s more aware of t h e phenomenon immediately upon awakening
than upon r e t i r i n g . I n a s p e c i a l observation period s e t aside during t h e
t r a n s e a r t h coast phase, t h e Cammand Module P i l o t determined t h a t dark
adaptation w a s not a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r seeing t h e phenomenon i f t h e l e v e l
of s p a c e c r a f t i l l u m i n a t i o n w a s low. Furthermore, s e v e r a l of t h e l i g h t
f l a s h e s were apparently seen by two of t h e crewmen simultaneously. Coin-
cidence of l i g h t f l a s h e s f o r two crewmen, i f a t r u e coincidence, would
s u b s t a n t i a t e t h a t t h e f l a s h e s originated from an e x t e r n a l r a d i a t i o n source
and would i n d i c a t e t h a t they were generated by extremely-high-energy par-
t i c l e s , presumably of cosmic origin. Low-energy highly-ionizing p a r t i c l e s
would not have t h e range through t i s s u e t o have reached both crewmen.

10.2.3 Medications

No medications o t h e r than nose drops, t o r e l i e v e n a s a l s t u f f i n e s s

caused by s p a c e c r a f t atmosphere, were used during t h e mission. On t h e
t h i r d day of f l i g h t , t h e Commander and t h e Lunar Module P i l o t used one
drop i n each n o s t r i l . Relief w a s prompt and l a s t e d f o r approximately
1 2 hours. The Command Module P i l o t used t h e nose drops 3 hours p r i o r
t o entry.
10-12

On t h i s mission, t h . e n a s a l spray b o t t l e s i n t h e i n f l i g h t medical

k i t were replaced by dropper b o t t l e s because previous crews nad r e p o r t e d
d i f f i c u l t i e s i n obtaining medication from spray b o t t l e s i n zero-g. The
crew reported no problems associated with t h e dropper b o t t l e .

10.2.4 Sleep

The s h i f t of t h e crew's normal t e r r e s t r i a l s l e e p cycle during t h e

first f o u r days of f l i g h t w a s t h e l a r g e s t experienced so f a r i n t h e
Apollo s e r i e s . The displacement ranged from 7 hours on t h e f i r s t mission
day t o 11-1/2 hours on t h e fourth. The crew reported some d i f f i c u l t y
s l e e p i n g i n t h e zero-g environment, p a r t i c u l a r l y during t h e first two
s l e e p periods. They a t t r i b u t e d t h e problem p r i n c i p a l l y t o a lack o f
k i n e s t h e t i c sensations and t o muscle soreness i n t h e l e g s and lower back.
Throughout t h e mission, s l e e p was i n t e r m i t t e n t ; i . e . , never more than 2
t o 3 hours of deep and continuous sleep.

The l u n a r module crewmen received l i t t l e , i f my, s l e e p between t h e i r

two e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y p e r i o d s . The lack of an adequate place t o
rest t h e head, discomfort of t h e pressure s u i t , and t h e 7-degree starboard
l i s t of t h e l u n a r module caused by t h e l u n a r t e r r a i n were believed re-
sponsible f o r t h i s insomnia. "he crewmen looked out t h e window several
times during t h e sleep period f o r reassurance t h a t t h e l u n a r module w a s
not s t a r t i n g t o t i p over.

Following t r a n s e a r t h i n j e c t i o n , t h e crew s l e p t b e t t e r than t h e y had

previously. The lunar module crewmen required one a d d i t i o n a l s l e e p per-
iod t o make up t h e s l e e p d e f i c i t t h a t w a s incurred while on t h e l u n a r
s u r f ace.

The crewmen reported during p o s t f l i g h t discussions t h a t they w e r e

d e f i n i t e l y operating on t h e i r physiological reserves because of inade-
quate s l e e p . This lack of s l e e p caused them some concern; however, all
t a s k s were performed s a t i s f a c t o r i l y .

10.2.5 Radiation

The Lunar Module P i l o t ' s personal r a d i a t i o n dosimeter f a i l e d t o in-

t e g r a t e t h e dosage properly after t h e f i r s t 24 hours of f l i g h t . To en-
sure t h a t each l u n a r module crewman had a f u n c t i o n a l dosimeter w h i l e on
t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e , the Command Module P i l o t t r a n s f e r r e d h i s u n i t t o t h e
Lunar Module P i l o t on t h e f o u r t h day of t h e mission. The f i n a l readings
from t h e personal r a d i e t i o n dosimeters y i e l d e d n e t i n t e g r a t e d (uncorrected)
values of 640 and 630 millirads f o r t h e Commander and t h e Command Module
Pilot, r e s p e c t i v e l y . N o value can be determined f o r t h e Lunar Module
 10-13

P i l o t . The t o t a l r a d i a t i o n dose f o r each crewman was approximately 1.15

r a d s t o t h e s k i n and 0.6 r a d at a 5-centimeter t i s s u e depth. These doses
a r e t h e l a r g e s t observed on any Apollo mission; however, they are w e l l
below t h e t h r e s h o l d of detectable medical e f f e c t s . The magnitudes of t h e
r a d i a t i o n doses were apparently t h e r e s u l t of two f a c t o r s : (1)The t r a n s -
l u n a r i n j e c t i o n t r a j e c t o r y l a y c l o s e r t o t h e plane of t h e geomagnetic
equator than t h a t of previous f l i g h t s and, t h e r e f o r e , t h e s p a c e c r a f t
t r a v e l e d through t h e h e a r t of t h e t r a p p e d r a d i a t i o n belts. ( 2 ) The space
r a d i a t i o n background w a s g r e a t e r t h a n previously experienced. Whole-body
gamma spectroscopy w a s a l s o performed p o s t f l i g h t on t h e crew and i n d i -
c a t e d no cosmic r a y induced r a d i o a c t i v i t y .

10.2.6 Water

The crew reported t h a t t h e taste of t h e drinking water i n both t h e

command module and t h e lunar module w a s e x c e l l e n t . A l l e i g h t scheduled
i n f l i g h t c h l o r i n a t i o n s of t h e command module water system were accom-
plished. P r e f l i g h t t e s t i n g of t h e l u n a r module potable w a t e r system
shared t h a t t h e iodine level i n both water tanks was adequate f o r bac-
t e r i a l p r o t e c t i o n throughout t h e f l i g h t .

10.2.7 Food

The i n f l i g h t food w a s similar t o t h a t of previous Apollo missions.

Six new foods were included i n t h e menu:

a. Lobster bisque ( f r e e z e dehydrated)

b. Peach embrosia ( f r e e z e dehydrated)
c. Beef j e r k y (ready-to-eat bite-sized)
d. Diced peaches (thermostabilized)
e. Mixed f r u i t ( t h e r m o s t a b i l i z e d )
f. Pudding (thermostabilized)

The l a t t e r t h r e e items were packaged i n aluminum cans with easy-open,

f u l l - p a n e l , pull-out l i d s . The crew d i d not r e p o r t any d i f f i c u l t i e s
e i t h e r with removing t h e pull-out l i d s o r e a t i n g t h e food contained i n
t h e s e cans w i t h a spoon.

P r i o r t o t h e mission, each crewman evaluated t h e a v a i l a b l e food

items and s e l e c t e d h i s i n d i v i d u a l f l i g h t menu. These menus provided
approximately 2100 c a l o r i e s per man p e r day. During most of t h e f l i g h t ,
t h e crew maintained a food consumption l o g . The Commander and t h e Lunar
Module P i l o t a t e a l l t h e food planned f o r each meal, but t h e Command
Module P i l o t was s a t i s f i e d with l e s s .
 10-14

Recovery-day physical examinations revealed t h a t t h e Commander and

t h e L u n a r Module P i l o t had maintained t h e i r approximate p r e f l i g h t weight,
while t h e Command Module P i l o t l o s t n e a r l y 1 0 pounds. The Command Module
P i l o t s t a t e d t h a t he would have p r e f e r r e d a great.er q u a n t i t y of food items
r e q u i r i n g l i t t l e or no p r e p a r a t i o n t i m e .

I 10.3 PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS

Each crewman received a comprehensive p h y s i c a l examination a t 27,

1 5 , and 6 days p r i o r t o launch, with b r i e f examinations conducted d a i l y
during t h e l a s t 5 days before launch.

S h o r t l y a f t e r landing, a comprehensive p h y s i c a l examination showed

t h a t t h e crew w a s i n good h e a l t h . Both t h e Commander and t h e Command
Module P i l o t had a small amount of c l e a r , bubbly f l u i d i n t h e l e f t middle-
ear c a v i t y and s l i g h t reddening o f t h e eardrums. These f i n d i n g s disap-
peared i n 24 hours without treatment. The Lunar Module P i l o t had mode-
rate e y e l i d i r r i t a t i o n i n a d d i t i o n t o s l i g h t redness of t h e eardrums.
A l l crewmen showed a mild temporary r e a c t i o n t o t h e micrcpore t a p e cover-
i n g t h e i r biomedical s e n s o r s . This r e a c t i o n subsided w i t h i n 24 hours.

10.4 FLIGHT CRFW H W T H STABILIZATION

During previous Apollo missions, crew i l l n e s s e s were responsible

f o r numerous medical and o p e r a t i o n a l d i f f i c u l t i e s . Three days b e f o r e
t h e Apollo 7 launch, t h e crew developed an upper r e s p i r a t o r y i n f e c t i o n
which subsided before l i f t - o f f , b u t r e c u r r e d i n f l i g h t . Early on t h e
Apollo 8 mission, one crewman developed symptoms o f a 24-hour v i r a l gas-
t r o e n t e r i t i s which w a s epidemic i n t h e Cape Kennedy area around launch
t i m e . About two days p r i o r t o t h e Apollo 9 f l i g h t , t h e crew developed
common colds which n e c e s s i t a t e d a d e l a y of t h e launch f o r t h r e e days.
Nine days b e f o r e t h e Apollo 1 3 launch, t h e backup Lunar Module P i l o t de-
veloped German measles ( r u b e l l a ) and i n a d v e r t e n t l y exposed t h e prime Com-
mand Module P i l o t . The day b e f o r e launch, t h e prime Command Module P i l o t
w a s r e p l a c e d by h i s backup counterpart because laboratory t e s t s i n d i c a t e d
t h a t t h e prime crewman w a s not immune t o t h i s highly communicable d i s e a s e
with an incubation period of approximately two weeks.

I n w. attempt t o p r o t e c t t h e prime and backup f l i g h t crew members

from exposure t o communicable d i s e a s e during t h e c r i t i c a l prelaunch and
f l i g h t p e r i o d s , such as experienced on previous f l i g h t , a f l i g h t crew
h e a l t h s t a b i l i z a t i o n program w a s implemented. This program c o n s i s t e d of
t h e following phases :

*- . *
11 li L: L L
1
t t -

L- L-L L L L L i k- I - -
 10-15

a. I d e n t i f i c a t i o n , examination, and immunization of all primary con-

t a c t s (personnel who r e q u i r e d d i r e c t contact with t h e prime o r backup crew
during t h e l a s t t h r e e weeks p r i o r t o f l i g h t ) .

b . Health and epidemiological s u r v e i l l a n c e of t h e crew members and

t h e primary c o n t a c t s , t h e i r families, and t h e community.

c. Certain modifications t o f a c i l i t i e s used f o r t r a i n i n g and hous-

i n g t h e crew, such as t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n o f b i o l o g i c a l f i l t e r s i n all a i r
conditioning systems.

d. Housing of both t h e prime and backup crew members i n t h e crew

q u a r t e r s at t h e Kennedy Space Center from 2 1 days b e f o r e f l i g h t u n t i l
launch.

The f l i g h t crew h e a l t h s t a b i l i z a t i o n program w a s a complete success.

No i l l n e s s e s occurred during t h e p r e f l i g h t period i n any of t h e prime o r
backup crew members. This r e s u l t i s of p a r t i c u l a r s i g n i f i c a n c e because
t h e incidence of i n f e c t i o u s disease w i t h i n t h e local community w a s near
a seasonal high during t h e prelaunch period.

10.5 QUARANTINE

No change i n quarantine procedures were made on t h i s mission, except

as follows :

a. Two mobile quarantine f a c i l i t i e s were used.

b. Two h e l i c o p t e r t r a n s f e r s of t h e crew and support personnel were

performed.

The new procedures were implemented t o r e t u r n t h e crew t o t h e Lunar

Receiving Laboratory f i v e days e a r l i e r t h a n on previous l u n a r landing
missions.

The crew and 1 4 medical support personnel were i s o l a t e d behind t h e

microbiological b a r r i e r i n t h e Lunar Receiving Laboratory at Houston,
Texas, on February 1 2 , 1971. Daily medical examinations and p e r i o d i c
l a b o r a t o r y examinations shared no s i g n s o f i l l n e s s r e l a t e d t o l u n a r ma-
t e r i a l exposure. No s i g n i f i c a n t t r e n d s were noted i n any biochemical,
immunological, o r hematological parameters i n e i t h e r t h e crew o r t h e
medical support personnel. On February 27, 1971, a f t e r 20 days of iso-
l a t i o n w i t h i n t h e Lunar Receiving Laboratory, t h e f l i g h t crew and t h e
medical support personnel were released from quarantine. Quarantine
f o r t h e s p a c e c r a f t and samples of l u n a r material w a s terminated A p r i l 4,
1971
 ---
11-1

11.0 MISSION SUPPORT PERFORMANCE

11.1 FLIGHT CONTROL

F l i g h t c o n t r o l performance w a s s a t i s f a c t o r y i n providing t i m e l y
o p e r a t i o n a l support. Same problems were encountered and most are dis-
cussed i n o t h e r s e c t i o n s of t h e r e p o r t . Only t h o s e problems t h a t a r e
of p a r t i c u l a r concern t o flight c o n t r o l operations o r a r e not r e p o r t e d
elsewhere are r e p o r t e d i n t h i s s e c t i o n .

A l l launch v e h i c l e instrument u n i t analog d a t a were l o s t j u s t p r i o r

t o lift-off. A faulty multiplexer w i t h i n t h e instrument u n i t t h a t pro-
cesses t h e analog f l i g h t c o n t r o l d a t a had f a i l e d . The f l i g h t c o n t r o l l e r s
were a b l e t o recover m o s t of t h e analog d a t a from t h e S-IVB YHF downlink;
however, because of i t s l i m i t e d range, an e a r l y l o s s of d a t a w a s experi-
enced at 4 hours 27 minutes.

A l l launch v e h i c l e d i g i t a l computer data were l o s t at 3 hours and

5 minutes after launch. The v e h i c l e , however, executed a normal propul-
s i v e vent about 29 minutes l a t e r i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e computer w a s oper-
a t i n g properly. As a result of t h e loss of d i g i t a l computer d a t a , com-
mands t o t h e S-IVB had t o be t r a n s m i t t e d without v e r i f i c a t i o n of proper
execution. The crew provided v i s u a l a t t i t u d e information f o r t h e eva-
s i v e maneuver.

High-gain antenna lockup problems w e r e noted during r e v o l u t i o n 12

lunar o r b i t operations. Because of t h i s problem, a data s t o r a g e equip-
ment dump could not be accolnplished t o o b t a i n data from t h e r e v o l u t i o n 12
low-altitude landmark t r a c k i n g operation. These data were t o be used f o r
powered descent t a r g e t i n g .

During r e v o l u t i o n 1 2 , t h e planned voice updates f e l l behind t h e time-

l i n e because of problems with t h e l u n a r module s t e e r a b l e antenna. Conse-
quently, t h e powered descent was performed using t h e s p a c e c r a f t forward
and aft m n i d i r e c t i o n a l antennas and t h e 210-foot ground receiving an-
tenna. Receiving of communications and high-bit-rate d a t a were satis-
f a c t o r y except f o r some s m a l l l o s s e s when switching to t h e a f t antenna
late i n t h e descent phase.

A n abort command w a s set i n t h e lunar module guidance computer and

t h e i n d i c a t i o n w a s observed by F l i g h t Control during l u n a r module a c t i v a -
t i o n , about 4 hours p r i o r t o scheduled powered descent i n i t i a t i o n . A
procedure w a s uplinked t o t h e crew which r e s e t t h e abort command and l e d
t o t h e conclusion t h a t t h e abort switch had malfunctioned. Subsequently,
t h e abort coxnand reappeared t h r e e t i m e s and, each time, t h e command w a s
11-2

r e s e t by tapping on t h e panel near t h e abort switch. A procedure t o i n -

h i b i t t h e primary guidance system from going i n t o an abort program w a s
developed i n t h e i n t e r v a l p r i o r t o powered descent, and w a s uplinked t o
t h e crew f o r manual e n t r y i n t o t h e computer. The f i r s t p a r t of t h e four-
p a r t procedure w a s e n t e r e d j u s t p r i o r t o powered descent i n i t i a t i o n and'
t h e o t h e r p a r t s a f t e r t h r o t t l e - u p of t h e descent engine. Had an abort
been r e q u i r e d , it would have been accomplished using t h e abort guidance
system and would have allowed reestablishment of t h e primary guidance
system by keyboard e n t r y after t h e a b o r t .

A delay of approximately 50 minutes occurred i.n t h e first extrave-

h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y because of t h e l a c k of s a t i s f a c t o r y communications.
The crew were receiving ground communications but t h e Mission Control
Center w a s not receiving crew communications. The problem w a s c o r r e c t e d
by r e s e t t i n g t h e Cammander's audio c i r c u i t b r e a k e r which w a s n o t engaged.

The c o l o r t e l e v i s i o n camera r e s o l u t i o n gradually degraded during

t h e l a t t e r portions of t h e f i r s t e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y . The degrada-
t i o n w a s caused by overheating r e s u l t i n g from 1.5 hours of operation
while i n t h e modular equipment stowage assembly p r i o r t o i t s deployment.
The camera w a s turned o f f between t h e e x t r a v e h i c u l a r periods f o r cool-
i n g , i n s t e a d of leaving it operating as r e q u i r e d by t h e f l i g h t plan.
The camera p i c t u r e r e s o l u t i o n w a s s a t i s f a c t o r y during t h e second extra-
vehicular a c t i v i t y .

Three problems developed during t h e Apollo 1 4 mission t h a t , had t h e

crew not been p r e s e n t , would have prevented t h e achievement of t h e mis-
s i o n o b j e c t i v e s . These problems involved t h e docking probe ( s e c t i o n 7.11,
t h e landing radar ( s e c t i o n 8.4) and t h e lunar module guidance computer,
described above. In each case, t h e crew provided ground personnel with
v i t a l information and data f o r f a i l u r e analysis and development of alter-
n a t e procedures. The crew performed t h e necessary a c t i v i t i e s and t h e re-
q u i r e d work-around procedures t h a t allowed t h e mission t o be completed
as planned.

11.2 NETWORK

The Mission Control Center and t h e Manned Space F l i g h t Network pro-

vided e x c e l l e n t support. There were only two s i g n i f i c a n t problems. A
d e f e c t i v e - t r a n s f e r switch component caused a power outage at t h e Goddard
Space F l i g h t Center during l u n a r o r b i t . The power loss r e s u l t e d i n a
4 1/2-minute data loss. On lunar r e v o l u t i o n 12, a power a m p l i f i e r f a i l -
u r e occurred at t h e Goldstone s t a t i o n . The problem w a s c o r r e c t e d by
switching t o a redundant system. The Network C o n t r o l l e r ' s Mission Re-
p o r t f o r Apollo 1 4 , dated March 19, 1971, published by t h e Manned Space-
c r a f t Center, F l i g h t Support Division, contains a summary of all Manned
Space F l i g h t Network problems which occurred during t h e mission.

u 'L:
..
L I L L L L L L L L
 11-3

11.3 RECOVERY OPERATIONS

The Department of Defense provided recovery support commensurate

with mission planning f o r Apollo 1 4 . Ship support f o r t h e primary land-
i n g area i n t h e P a c i f i c Ocean w a s provided by t h e h e l i c o p t e r c a r r i e r
USS New Orleans. Active air support c o n s i s t e d of f i v e SH-3A h e l i c o p t e r s
from t h e New Orleans and two €IC-130 rescue a i r c r a f t staged from Pago
Pago, Samoa. Two of t h e h e l i c o p t e r s , designated "Swim 1" and "Swim 2",
c a r r i e d underwater demolition team personnel and t h e r e q u i r e d recovery
equipment. The t h i r d h e l i c o p t e r , designated "Recovery", c a r r i e d t h e de-
contamination swimmer and t h e f l i g h t surgeon, and w a s u t i l i z e d f o r t h e
r e t r i e v a l of t h e f l i g h t crew. The f o u r t h h e l i c o p t e r , designated "Photo" ,
served as a photographic platform f o r both motion-picture photography
and l i v e t e l e v i s i o n coverage. The f i f t h h e l i c o p t e r , designated "Relay",
served as a communications-relay a i r c r a f t . The ship-based a i r c r a f t were
i n i t i a l l y p o s i t i o n e d r e l a t i v e t o t h e t a r g e t p o i n t ; they departed s t a t i o n
to.commence recovery operations after t h e command module had been visu-
ally acquired. The two HC-130 a i r c r a f t , designated "Samoa Rescue 1" and
It
Samoa Rescue 2", w e r e positioned t o t r a c k t h e command module after it
had e x i t e d from S-band blackout, as w e l l as provide pararescue c a p a b i l i t y
had t h e ccaumand module landed uprange o r darnrange of t h e t a r g e t p o i n t .
A l l recovery f o r c e s dedicated f o r Apollo 1 4 support are l i s t e d i n
t a b l e 11-1. Figure 11-1 illustrates t h e recovery f o r c e p o s i t i o n s p r i o r
t o p r e d i c t e d S-band a c q u i s i t i o n t i m e .

U.3.1 Command M o d u l e Location and R e t r i e v a l

The New Orleans' p o s i t i o n w a s e s t a b l i s h e d using a navigation satel-

l i t e (SRN-9) f i x obtained at 2118 G.m.t. The s h i p ' s p o s i t i o n at t h e
t i m e of command module landing w a s determined t o be 26 degrees 59 min-
utes 30 seconds south l a t i t u d e and 172 degrees 4 1 minutes w e s t l o n g i t u d e .
The command module landing point w a s c a l c u l a t e d by recovery forces t o be
27 degrees 0 minutes 45 seconds south l a t i t u d e and 172 degrees 39 min-
utes 30 seconds w e s t longitude.

The first e l e c t r o n i c contact r e p o r t e d by t h e recovery f o r c e s w a s

an S-band contact by Samoa Rescue 1. Radar contact w a s t h e n r e p o r t e d by
t h e New Orleans. A v i s u a l s i g h t i n g w a s r e p o r t e d by t h e communications-
r e l a y h e l i c o p t e r and. t h e n by t h e New Orleans, Recovery, S w i m 1 and
Swim 2. S h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , voice transmissions from t h e command module
w e r e received by t h e New Orleans.

The command module landed February 9 , 1971, at 2105 G.m.t. and re-
mained i n t h e s t a b l e I f l o t a t i o n a t t i t u d e . The VHF recovery beacon w a s
a c t i v a t e d shortly after landing, and beacon contact w a s r e p o r t e d by Re-
covery at 2107 G.m.t. The crew then t u r n e d off t h e beacon as they knew
t h e recovery f o r c e s had v i s u a l c o n t a c t .
11-4

TABU ll-I.- AF'OLIX) 14 RECOVERY SUPPORT

Type S h i p name/ Area s u p p o r t e d

Number a i r c r a f t staging baae

Ships

ATF USS P a i u t e Launch s i t e area

LCU
DD USS Hawkina Launch a b o r t area and
West A t l a n t i c e a r t h -
o r b i t a l recovery zone
LSD USS S p i e g e l Grove Deep-space secondary land-
i n g areas on t h e A t l a n t i c
Ocean l i n e
DD E S Carpenter Mid-Pacifi c e a r t h - o r b i t a l
recovery zone
LPH USS New Orleans D e e p s p a c e secondary land-
i n g areas on t h e mid-Pacific
l i n e and t h e primary end-of-
m i s s i o n l a n d i n g area

Aircraft

HH-53c 3 P a t r i c k A i r Force B a s e Launch s i t e a r e a

a
HC-130 1 McCoy A i r Force B a s e Launch a b o r t area, West
A t l a n t i c recovery zone,
contingency l a n d i n g a r e a
a Pease Air Force B a s e Launch a b o r t area, West
HC- 130 1
A t l a n t i c recovery zone
a Launch a b o r t area, e a r t h
HC- 130 1 LaJes F i e l d , Azores
o r b i t a l contingency l a n d i n e
area
a
HC-130 1 Ascension I s l a n d A t l a n t i c Ocean l i n e and
contingency l a n d i n g area
a Mid-Pacific e a r t h o r b i t a l
HC-130 2 Hickem A i r Force B a s e
recovery zone, deep-space
secondary l a n d i n g area
and primary end-of-mission
l a n d i n g area
SH-3A 5 USS New Orleans Deep-s pace secondai y
l a n d i n g area and primary
end-of-mission l a n d i n g
area

%lUS one backup

.-
L
 11-5

NASA-S-71-1664

26' 4 0 '
I I I

26' 4 5 '

26' 50' -

177' 176' 175' 174' 173' 1 7 2 ' 171' 170'

West longitude
oy
.-
3
- 26' 55' -U
5 Swim 1
8.
v)

-k
Photo
w,l
Rclay
27'
Landing poi111
STarqct 1)o'tl

27' 05'
= -
Swim

270- 10'
173' 00' 55' 172' 50' 45' 172' 40' 35' 172' 30'
West longitude

Figure 11-1.- End-of-mission recovery support.

I
11-6

A f t e r confirming t h & t t h e command module and t h e crew were i n good

condition, Swim 2 attempted t o r e t r i e v e t h e main parachutes, and s w i m -
mers were deployed t o t h e command module t o i n s t a l l t h e f l o t a t i o n c o l l a r .
Recovery forces were unable t o r e t r i e v e any of t h e .main parachutes, but
d i d r e t r i e v e two drogue parachute covers and one s a b o t . The decontamin-
a t i o n swimmer w a s deployed t o pass f l i g h t s u i t s and r e s p i r a t o r s t o t h e
crew and assist them f r o m t h e command module i n t o t h e l i f e raft. The
f l i g h t crew were onboard t h e recovery h e l i c o p t e r 7 minutes a f t e r they
had egressed t h e command module and were aboard t h e New Orleans 5 minutes
l a t e r . Command module r e t r i e v a l took place at 27 degrees 2 minutes south
l a t i t u d e and 172 degrees 4 minutes west longitude at 2309 G . m . t .

The f l i g h t crew remained a b o a r d t h e New Orleans i n t h e mobile quar-

a n t i n e f a c i l i t y u n t i l they were flown t o Pago Pago, Samoa, where they
t r a n s f e r r e d t o a second mobile quarantine f a c i l i t y aboard a C - 1 4 1 air-
c r a f t . The crew w a s flown t o E l l i n g t o n Air Force B a s e , with a s t o p at
Norton A i r Force Base, C a l i f o r n i a , where t h e a i r c r a f t w a s r e f u e l e d .

After a r r i v a l of t h e New Orleans at H a w a i i , t h e comm nd module w a s

i!
offloaded and taken t o Hickam A i r Force B a s e f o r d e a c t i v a i o n . Upon com-
p l e t i o n of d e a c t i v a t i o n , t h e command module w a s t r a n s f e r r e d t o E l l i n g t o n
A i r Force B a s e v i a a C-133 a i r c r a f t , a r r i v i n g on February 22, 1971.

The following i s a chronological l i s t i n g of events during t h e re-

covery and quarantine operations.
 ~~

Time Time r e l a t i v e
Event t o landing
G.m.t.
days :hr :min

Feb. 9, 1971
S-band contact by Samoa Rescue 1 2055 -0 :00 :10
Radar contact by New Orleans 2056 -0:oo :09
Visual contact by "Relay" helicopter 2100 -o:oo :05
Voice contact with f l i g h t crew 2101 -0 :OO :Ob
Command module landing 2105 0 :oo :oo
Swimmers deployed t o command module 2112 0:oo :07
Flotation c o l l a r i n s t a l l e d and i n f l a t e d 2120 0:00:15
Decontamination s w i m m e r deployed 2127 0 :oo :22
Hatch ogened f o r crew egress 2140 0 :00:35
Flight crew i n egress raft 2141 0:00:36
Flight crew aboard h e l i c o p t e r 2148 0:00:43
Flight Crew aboard New Orleans 2153 0:00:48
Flight crew i n mobile quarantine f a c i l i t y 2203 0:00:58
Command module aboard New Orleans 2309 0:02:04
Feb. 11, 1971
F i r s t sample fli.ght departed ship 0355 1:05:00
Flight crew departed s h i p 1746 1 :18 :51
F i r s t sample f l i g h t a r r i v e d Houston 2057 1:22:02
( v i a Samoa end H a w a i i )
Feb. 12, 1971
Flight crew a r r i v e d Houston 0934 2:10:39
Flight crew a r r i v e d at Lunar Receiving 1135 2:12:40
Laboratory
Feb. 17, 1971
Mobile quarantine f a c i l i t y and command - 2130 7 :22:35
module offloaded i n H a w a i i
Feb. 18, 1971
Mobile quarantine f a c i l i t y arrived 0740 8:08:45
Houston
Feb . 19, 1971
Reaction control system deactivation com- 2300 10 :oo :05
pleted
Feb. 22, 1971
Command module arrived Houston 2145 12:22:50
Camnand module delivered t o Lunar Receiv- 2330 13 :00:35
i n g Laboratory

,
11-8

11.3.2 Postrecovery Inspection

The docking probe was removed from t h e command module and secured
i n t h e mobile quarantine f a c i l i t y f o r r e t u r n t o Houston. Otherwise, all
aspects of t h e command module postrecovery o p e r a t i o n s , t h e mobile quar-
a n t i n e f a c i l i t y operations and lunar sample r e t u r n operations were nor-
m a l with t h e exception of t h e following d i s c r e p a n c i e s noted during com-
m a n d module inspection.

a. There was an apparent chip (1-inch wide, 3-inches long, and 1/2-
inch deep) i n t h e minus Z quadrant o f t h e heat s h i e l d adjacent t o t h e
s m a l l heat s e n s o r , about 30-inches inboard from t h e l i p of t h e heat s h i e l d .
However, t h e heat s h i e l d can be considered t o be i n normal post-reentry
condition.

b . There w a s a f i l m layer on a l l windows ranging from approximately

10-percent coverage on t h e left s i d e window t o 100-percent on t h e r i g h t
side window.

c. The backup method w a s used t o o b t a i n t h e water samples because

t h e d i r e c t oqrgen valve had been l e f t s l i g h t l y open, causing t h e primary
p r e s s u r i z a t i o n system t o lose pressure.

d. The chlorine content o f t h e p o t a b l e water w a s not analyzed on

t h e s h i p because of lack o f t i m e .

e. The Commander's r a d i a t i o n dosimeter w a s broken and no reading

w a s obtained. The o t h e r two dosimeters w e r e l e f t aboard t h e command
module.
 1 2-1

12.0 ASSESSMEI9T OF MISSION OBJXCTIVES

The f o u r primary o b j e c t i v e s (ref. 7) assigned t o t h e Apollo 14 mis-

sion w e r e as follows:

a. Perform s e l e n o l o g i c a l i n s p e c t i o n , survey, and sampling of ma-

terials i n a p r e s e l e c t e d region of t h e F r a Mauro formation.

b. Deploy and activate t h e Apollo l u n a r surface experiments package.

c. Develop 1 p ~ n ' s c a p a b i l i t y t o work i n t h e l u n a r environment.

d. Obtain photographs of candidate e x p l o r a t i o n sites.

Eleven detailed o b j e c t i v e s ( d e r i v e d from primary o b j e c t i v e s ) and

s i x t e e n experiments ( l i s t e d in table 12-1 and described i n ref. 8) were
assigned t o t h e mission. All detailed o b j e c t i v e s , with the following
exceptions, w e r e s u c c e s s f u l l y completed:

a. Photographs of a candidate e x p l o r a t i o n site

b. V i s i b i l i t y at high sun a n g l e s

C. Camand and s e r v i c e module o r b i t a l science photography

d. Transearth l u n a r phutography

On the basis of p r e f l i g h t planning data, these f o u r o b j e c t i v e s were only

p a r t i a l l y satisfied.

Two d e t a i l e d o b j e c t i v e s were added and w e r e performed during t r a n s -

l u n a r c o a s t : S-IVB photography and command and s e r v i c e m d u l e water-dump
photography. The S-IW3 could not be i d e n t i f i e d on t h e f i l m during post-
f l i g h t a n a l y s i s and, althaugh sane p a r t i c l e s were seen on photographs of
t h e water dump, there was no i n d i c a t i o n of t h e "snow storm" described by
the crew.

In a d d i t i o n t o t h e spacecraft and l u n a r surface o b j e c t i v e s , t h e

following two launch v e h i c l e o b j e c t i v e s w e r e assigned and completed:

a. Impact t h e expended S-IVB/instrumentation u n i t on t h e l u n a r

surfsce under nominal f l i g h t p r o f i l e conditions.

b. Make a p o s t f l i g h t determination of t h e S-IVB/instrumentation

u n i t p o i n t of impact within 5 kilometers and t h e time of impact within
m e second.
12-2

TABLE 12.1.- DETAILED OBJECTIVES AND EXPERIMENTS

Description Completed

Detailed o b j e c t i v e s

Contingency sample c o l l e c t i on Yes

Photographs of 8 candidate e x p l o r a t i o n s i t e Partial
V i s i b i l i t y at high sun anglesa Partial
Modular equipment t r a n s p o r t e r e v a l u a t i o n Yes
Selenodetic reference p o i n t update Yes
Command and s e r v i c e module o r b i t a l s c i e n c e photography Partial
Assessment of e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y operation l i m i t s Yes
Command and s e r v i c e module oxygen flow rate Yes
Transearth l u n a r photography Partial
Thermal c o a t i n g degradation Yes
D i m - l i ght photography Yes

Experiments

Apollo lunar s u r f a c e experiments package:

M-515 Lunar dust d e t e c t o r Yes
S-031 Lunar passive seismology Yes
S-033 Luner a c t i v e seismology Yes
S-036 Suprathermal i o n d e t e c t o r Yes
S-058 Cold cathode gauge Yes
S-038 Charged p a r t i c l e l u n a r environment Yes
S-059 Lunar geology i n v e s t i g a t i o n Yes
S-078 Laser ranging r e t r o - r e f l e c t o r Yes
S-200 S o i l mechanics Yes
S-198 P o r t a b l e magnetometer Yes
S-170 B i s t a t i c radar Yes
S-080 S o l a r wind composition Yes
S-178 Gegenschein from l u n a r o r b i t Yes
S-164 S-band transponder Yes
s-176 Apollo window meteroid Yes
M-078 Bone mineral measurement Yes

5 r e l i m i n a r y analysis i n d i c a t e s t h a t s u f f i c i e n t data were

c o l l e c t e d t o v e r i f y t h a t t h e v i s i b i l i t y a n a l y t i c a l model
can be used for Apollo planning purposes.
 12-3

The impact of t h e S-IVB was det c t e d by t h Apoll 12 pas ive seismic

experiment. The impact of t h e spent l u n a r module ascent stage was de-
t e c t e d by both t h e Apollo 12 and Apollo 1 4 passive seismic experiments.

12.1 PARTIALLY COMPLETED OBJECTIVES

12.1.1 Photographs of a Candidate Exploration S i t e

Four p h o t o q a p h i c passes t o o b t a i n Descarrtes landing data w e r e sched-

uled: one high-resolution sequence w i t h t h e l u n a r topographic camera at
low a l t i t u d e , two high-resolution sequences with t h e l u n a r topographic
camera at high a l t i t u d e and one s t e r e o s t r i p with t h e Hasselblad e l e c t r i c
data camera at high a l t i t u d e . On t h e low a l t i t u d e ( r e v o l u t i o n 4 ) l u n a r
topographic camera pass, t h e camera malfunctioned and, although 192 frames
were obtained of an area east of Descartes, no usable phutography was ob-
t a i n e d of Descartes . On t h e subsequent high-altitude photographic passes,
t h e e l e c t r i c Hasselblad camera with t h e 5OO-mm l e n s was used i n s t e a d of
t h e l u n a r topographic camera. Excellent Descarbes photography w a s ob-
t a i n e d during t h r e e o r b i t s , but t h e r e s o l u t i o n was considerably lower
than that p o s s i b l e with t h e lunar topographic camera. Another problem
was encountered during t h e s t e r e o s t r i p photographic pass. Because t h e
command and s e r v i c e module S-band high-gain antenna did not operate prop-
e r l y , no usable high-bit-rate telemetry, and consequently, no camera
shutter-open data were obtained f o r postflight data reduction.

12.1.2 V i s i b i l i t y at H i g h Sun Angles

Four sets of zero-phase observations by t h e Camand Module P i l o t

were scheduled i n order t o obtain data on l u n a r surface v i s i b i l i t y at
high sun e l e v a t i o n angles. The last set, scheduled f o r r e v o l u t i o n 30,
was deleted t o provide another opportunity t o photograph t h e Descartes
area. Good data w e r e obtained fK>m the f i r s t three s e t s .

12.1.3 Command and Service Module O r b i t a l Science Photography

A l l obdectives were completed with t h e exception of those t h a t spec-
ified use o f - t h e lunar topographic camera. The Apollo 1 3 s-INB impact
c r a t e r area was phutographed using t h e e l e c t r i c Hasselblad 70-mm camera
with t h e 500-mm l e n s as a s u b s t i t u t e f o r t h e inopersble l u n a r topographic
camera.
12-4

12.1.4 Transearth L u n a r Photography

Excellent photography of t h e lunar surface with t h e e l e c t r i c Hassel-

b l a d data camera using t h e 80-III~l e n s was obtained. No l u n a r topographic
camera photography was obtained because of t h e camera malfunction.

12.2 INFLIGHT DEMONSTRATIONS

I n a d d i t i o n t o d e t a i l e d o b j e c t i v e s and experiments, f o u r zero-gravity

i n f l i g h t demonstrations were conducted. They w e r e performed on a non-
i n t e r f e r e n c e basis at t h e crew's option. The f o u r i n f l i g h t demonstra-
t i o n s and responsible NASA c e n t e r s were:

a. Electrophoretic separation - Marshall Space F l i g h t Center

b. . Heat flow and convection - Marshall Space F l i g h t Center
c. Liquid t r a n s f e r - Lewis Research Center
d. Composite c a s t i n g - Marshall Space F l i g h t Center.

12.3 APPHOVED OPERATIONAL TESTS

The Manned Spacecraft Center p a r t i c i p a t e d i n two of e i g h t approved

o p e r a t i o n a l t e s t s . Operational tests are not r e q u i r e d t o met t h e ob-
j e c t i v e s of t h e mission, do not affect t h e nominal t i m e l i n e , and add
no payload weight. The two o p e r a t i o n a l t e s t s were: l u n a r g r a v i t y mas-
urement ( u s i n g t h e l u n a r m d u l e primary guidance system) and a hydro-
gen maser t e s t ( a Network and u n i f i e d S-band i n v e s t i g a t i o n sponsored by
t h e Goddard Spaceflight Center). Both t e s t s were completed, and t h e re-
sults of t h e hydrogen maser t e s t are given i n r e f e r e n c e g.

The o t h e r s i x t e s t s were performed f o r t h e Department of Defense

and t h e Kennedy Space Center. These t e s t s are designated as follows.

a. Chapel B e l l ( c l a s s i f i e d Department of Defense t e s t )

b. R a d a r Skin Tracking
c. Ionospheric Disturbance from Missiles
d. Acoustic Measurement of M i s s i l e Exhaust Noise
e. Army Acoustic T e s t
f. Long-Focal-Length O p t i c a l System.

T
fr i L-
 13-1

13.0 LAUNCH PHASE SLMARY

13.1 WEATHER CONDITIONS

Cumulus clouds e x i s t e d i n t h e launch complex a r e a w i t h t o p s at

15 000 f e e t 20 minutes p r i o r t o t h e scheduled launch and w i t h t o p s a t
18 000 feet 10 minutes l a t e r . During t h i s time, t h e ground-based e l e c -
t r i c f i e l d meters c l e a r l y showed f l u c t u a t i n g f i e l d s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of
mildly d i s t u r b e d weather conditions. Since t h e mission r u l e s do not
allow a launch through cumulus clouds w i t h t o p s i n excess of 10 000 f e e t ,
a 40-minute hold w a s r e q u i r e d before a p e r m i s s i b l e weather s i t u t a t i o n
existed. A t launch, t h e cloud bases were at 4000 feet w i t h t o p s t o
10 000 f e e t . The launch under t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s d i d not enhance t h e
cloud e l e c t r i c fields enough t o produce a l i g h t n i n g d i s c h a r g e , t h u s
providing f u r t h e r confidence i n t h e p r e s e n t launch mission rules.

13.2 ATMOSPHERIC ELECTRICITY EXPERIMENTS

As a result of t h e l i g h t n i n g strikes experienced during t h e

Apollo 12 launch, s e v e r a l experiments were performed during t h e launch
of Apollo 13 and Apollo 1 4 t o study t h e e f f e c t s of t h e space v e h i c l e on
t h e atmospheric e l e c t r i c a l f i e l d during launch. I n i t i a l l y , it w a s hoped
t h a t t h e e f f e c t s could be r e l a t e d simply t o t h e e l e c t r i c a l - f i e l d -
enhancement f a c t o r of t h e v e h i c l e . However, t h e results of t h e Apollo 1 3
measurements showed t h a t t h e space v e h i c l e produced a much s t r o n g e r e l e c -
t r i c a l f i e l d d i s t u r b a n c e than had been expected and a l s o produced some
low-frequency r a d i o n o i s e . This d i s t u r b a n c e may have been caused by a
buildup of e l e c t r o s t a t i c charges i n t h e exhaust cloud, charge buildup on
t h e v e h i c l e , o r a combination o f both of these sources. To d e f i n e t h e
o r i g i n and t h e c a r r i e r s o f t h e charge, a d d i t i o n a l experiments were per-
formed during t h e Apollo 1 4 launch t o study t h e e l e c t r i c f i e l d phenomena
i n more d e t a i l , t o measure r a d i o n o i s e , and t o measure t h e temperature
of t h e S a t u r n V exhaust plume, which i s an important parameter i n calcu-
l a t i n g t h e e l e c t r i c a l b r e a k d m c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e exhaust. The pre-
liminary f i n d i n g s of these experiments are given here. When analyses of
data have been completed, 8 supplemental r e p o r t w i l l be i s s u e d (appendix E ) .

13.2.1 E l e c t r i c a l F i e l d Measurements

Atmospheric e l e c t r i c a l f i e l d measurements were made by t h e New

Mexico I n s t i t u t e of Mining and Technology and t h e Stanford Research In-
s t i t u t e at t h e l o c a t i o n s s h a m i n f i g u r e 13-1. I n a d d i t i o n , a f i e l d
measuring instrument ( f i e l d m i l l ) w a s i n s t a l l e d on t h e launch u m b i l i c a l
13-2

F i e l d mill Distance from launch Azimuth,

no. complex A, meters de9

1 750 19
2 377 49
3 655 70
4 1650 116
5 375 148
6 300 258
7 . 1675 270
8 1480 348
9 1600 270
10 800 300

I'
11 380 270 F i e l d mill instruments 1 through 8 were
12 400 210 provided by New Mexico Institute of Mining
13 800 180 and Technology. The remainder of the
14 On launch umbilical 0 instruments were provided by Stanford
tower Research Institute.

Figure 13-1.- F i e l d mill l o c a t i o n s at t h e launch s i t e .

tower t o d e t e c t any charge buildup on t h e v e h i c l e during i g n i t i o n and t h e

i n i t i a l seconds a f t e r l i f t - o f f . Accurate timing s i g n a l s , which were not
a v a i l a b l e on Apollo 1 3 , were provided t o most of t h e f i e l d measurement
equipment locations on Apollo 1 4 . Time-lapse photographs of t h e launch
cloud were also taken t o a i d i n t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e d a t a . Like
Apollo 13, t h e Apollo 1 4 launch produced a s i g n i f i c a n t e l e c t r i c a l dis-
turbance i n t h e f i e l d m i l l records ( f i g . 13-21, Although t h e d a t a are
s t i l l being analyzed, some preliminary observations can be made.

W i o r t o t h e Apollo 13 launch, t h e f i e l d m i l l s i n d i c a t e d s t a b l e
fine-weather f i e l d s of 100 t o 200 v o l t s p e r meter. Before t h e Apollo 1 4
launch, however, t h e f i e l d s were f l u c t u a t i n g s e v e r a l hundred v o l t s p e r
meter, p o s i t i v e and negative. This behavior w a s e n t i r e l y c o n s i s t e n t with
t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n weather conditions - good conditions f o r Apollo 13 but
mild disturbances f o r Apollo 14.
 13-3

NASA-S-71-1666

tEnginel
,-h--ti
clear tower

1 tgnitio!i>/ 1 I
titude of vehicle
engines above pad 1I
-1

Site 13
Y

-1

-1
4:O2 4:03 4:W 405 4:M 402 4:03 4:W 405 4:M
hster.n standard time, p. m., h m i n Eastern standard time, p. m., hr:min

Note: Location of sites can

be seen on figure 13-1.

Figure 13-2.- P o t e n t i a l gradient data during launch.

13-4

During t h e Apollo 13 launch, t h e instruments at s i t e s w e s t of t h e

launch complex r e g i s t e r e d a smooth p o s i t i v e f i e l d i n c r e a s e , succeeded
by a less pronounced negative excursion. For Apollo 1 4 , t h e n e g a t i v e
excursion w a s not evident ; however, t h e f i e l d v a r i a t i o n s occurred at ap-
proximately equivalent times f o r both launches. The p o s i t i v e excursion
w a s approximately f i v e times g r e a t e r f o r Apollo 13 t h a n f o r Apollo 1 4 ,
and reached m a x i m u m when t h e space v e h i c l e w a s at a l t i t u d e s g r e a t e r t h a n
1000 meters. This observation, coupled with t h e f a c t t h a t t h e maximum
e l e c t r i c f i e l d s were observed downwind on both launches makes it u n l i k e l y
t h a t t h e space vehicle charge w a s t h e dominant f a c t o r b u t , r a t h e r , t h a t
t h e p o s i t i v e l y charged clouds were t h e dominant sources of t h e e l e c t r i c
fields.

During l i f t - o f f , t h e s w i f t l y moving exhaust clouds are channeled

both n o r t h and south through t h e flame trough. The p r i n c i p a l cloud which
moved through t h e n o r t h end of t h e flame trough w a s composed l a r g e l y of
condensed spray water and contained a p o s i t i v e charge of approximately
50 millicoulombs and a f i e l d of approximately 4000 v o l t s / m e t e r ( S i t e 2
of f i g . 13-2). The cloud t h a t exhausted t o t h e south had much less water
and contained about a 5-millicoulomb negative charge. The cloud a l s o ap-
peared t o contain s o l i d p a r t i c u l a t e matter which r a p i d l y f e l l o u t .

The f i e l d mill on t h e launch u m b i l i c a l tower i n d i c a t e d a s m a l l posi-

t i v e value (<400 v o l t s / m e t e r ) a f e w seconds a f t e r l i f t - o f f . Model m e a s -
urements u s i n g a l / l b b - s c a l e model of t h e launch u m b i l i c a l tower and t h e
Apollo/Saturn vehicle i n d i c a t e d t h a t , i n t h i s c o n f i g u r a t i o n , t h e launch
u m b i l i c a l tower f i e l d and t h e v e h i c l e p o t e n t i a l are r e l a t e d by v o l t s /
f i e l d = 20 meters. Thus, t h e v e h i c l e p o t e n t i a l i s less t h a n 8000 v o l t s
(400 x 2 0 ) . A comparison of t h e launch u m b i l i c a l tower record with t h e
d a t a from t h e o t h e r s i t e s i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e charge on t h e v e h i c l e ap-
pears t o be less t h a n 1 millicoulomb.

13.2.2 Radio Noise Measurements

Narrow-band r a d i o r e c e i v e r s o p e r a t i n g at frequencies of 1 . 5 , 6 , 27,

51, and 120 kHz were l o c a t e d at camera pad 5 ( f i e l d m i l l s i t e 11) t o -
g e t h e r with a broadband d e t e c t o r . A s i n t h e case of Apollo 13, s i g n a l s
were d e t e c t e d at s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t frequencies, b u t t h e t i m e behavior of
d i f f e r e n t frequency components w a s not t h e same during t h e two launches.

The loop-antenna data ( f i g . 13-31 i n d i c a t e a l a r g e increase i n n o i s e

on t h e 1.5-kHz and 6 - k ~channels~ 3 Seconds after engine i g n i t i o n , while
t h e n o i s e on t h e 51-kHz channel d i d not begin until 2 seconds after lift-
o f f (about 11 seconds a f t e r i g n i t i o n ) . I n i t i a l l y , it appeared t h a t t h e
1.5- and 6 - k ~d a~t a might not r e p r e s e n t r a d i a t e d electromagnetic n o i s e ,
r a t h e r , microphonic n o i s e generated by some component of t h e system such
as t h e loop antenna p r e a m p l i f i e r . Preliminary d a t a from t h e e l e c t r i c
 13-5

NASA-S-71-1667

t
d

5 1.000 1(4:02:54
al

Ignition p.iii.)A Liift-off (4:i)3:02p.iii.1

0.300 I
m
e
.- 0.100
E
0.030
.-
L
al

-~0.001
8l
I
I I I I
.-
v)
-40 -20. 0 20 40 60 80 100
0
2
Time from lift-off, SCC

Figure 13-3.- Noise recorded by loop antenna system.

d i p o l e antenna at camera pad 5, however, i n d i c a t e t h e same g e n e r a l be-

h a v i o r , and as t h e two antenna systems use s e p a r a t e a m p l i f i e r s , it appears
t h a t t h e data are v a l i d . An abrupt c e s s a t i o n of t h e 1.5- and 6 - k ~n o~i s e
by both systems p r i o r t o t h e loss of t h e 51-kHz noise i s not understood
and f u r t h e r s t u d i e s of t h e noise d a t a are p r e s e n t l y being made.

13.2.3 Plume Temperature Measurements

The temperature c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h e Saturn V exhaust plume were

s t u d i e d from a s i t e about 5 miles w e s t of t h e launch complex using a two-
channel radiometer system operating at 1.26 and 1.68 microns. The radio-
meters viewed a narrow h o r i z o n t a l s e c t i o n of t h e exhaust plume which, i n
t u r n , provided temperature as a f u n c t i o n of d i s t a n c e down t h e plume as
t h e v e h i c l e ascended v e r t i c a l l y . Figure 13-4 shows t h e measured plume
temperature as a f u n c t i o n of d i s t a n c e behind t h e v e h i c l e . These r e s u l t s
are now being used t o improve t h e t h e o r e t i c a l c a l c u l a t i o n s of t h e e l e c -
t r i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h e exhaust plume. It appears t h a t t h e plume
may be a reasonable e l e c t r i c a l conductor over a l e n g t h of some 200 f e e t .
This result i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e low value of v e h i c l e p o t e n t i a l when
t h e v e h i c l e is passing t h e launch umbilical tower f i e l d meter s i n c e , at
t h a t t i m e , t h e v e h i c l e i s probably s t i l l e f f e c t i v e l y connected e l e c t r i c -
a l l y t o e a r t h . (Reference 10 contains a d d i t i o n a l information concerning
plume temperature measurements. 1
13-6

NASA-S-71-1668

Figure 13-4.- ESrhaust plume temperature c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .

13.3 LAUNCH VEHICLE SUMMARY

The seventh manned Saturn V Apollo space v e h i c l e , AS-509, was

launched on an azimuth 90 degrees east of north. A r o l l maneuver was
i n i t i a t e d at 12.8 seconds t h a t placed t h e v e h i c l e on a f l i g h t a z i m t h
of 75.558 degrees e a s t of n o r t h . The t r a j e c t o r y parameters from launch
t o t r a n s l u n a r i n j e c t i o n were c l o s e t o nominal with t r a n s l u n a r i n j e c t i o n
achieved 4.9 seconds earlier than nominal.
 13-7

All S-IC propulsion systems performed s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . T o t a l pro-

p e l l a n t consumption r a t e w a s 0.42 percent higher than p r e d i c t e d w i t h t h e
consumed mixture r a t i o 0.94 percent higher than predicted. S p e c i f i c i m -
pulse w a s 0.23 percent higher than predicted.

The S-I1 propulsion system performed s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . T o t a l propel-

l a n t flow r a t e w a s 0.12 percent below p r e d i c t e d and s p e c i f i c impulse w a s
0.19 percent below p r e d i c t e d . P r o p e l l a n t mixture r a t i o w a s 0.18 percent
above predicted. The pneumatically actuated engine-mixt ure- rat i o c o n t r o l
valves operated s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . Engine s t a r t tank conditions were mar-
g i n a l at s-I1 engine start command because of t h e lower s t a r t tank re-
l i e f valve s e t t i n g s caused by warmer-than-usual s t a r t tank temperatures.
These warmer temperatures were a result of t h e hold p r i o r t o launch.

The S-IVB s t a g e engine operated s a t i s f a c t o r i l y throughout t h e oper-

a t i o n a l phase of f i r s t and second f i r i n g s and had normal shutdowns. The
S-IVB f i r s t f i r i n g time w a s 4 . 1 seconds l e s s than predicted. The restart
at t h e full-open p r o p e l l a n t u t i l i z a t i o n valve p o s i t i o n w a s s u c c e s s f u l .
S-IVB second f i r i n g t i m e w a s 5.5 seconds l e s s than predicted. The t o t a l
p r o p e l l a n t consumption r a t e w a s 1.38 percent higher than p r e d i c t e d f o r
t h e first f i r i n g and 1.47 percent higher f o r t h e second f i r i n g . S p e c i f i c
impulses f o r each were proportionally higher.

The s t r u c t u r a l loads experienced were below design values. The max-

i m u m dynamic pressure period bending moment at t h e S - I C l i q u i d oxygen
tank w a s 45 percent of t h e design value. The t h r u s t cutoff t r a n s i e n t s
were s i m i l a r t o those o f previous f l i g h t s . The S-I1 s t a g e c e n t e r engine
l i q u i d oxygen f e e d l i n e accumulator s u c c e s s f u l l y i n h i b i t e d t h e 14- t o
16-hertz l o n g i t u d i n d o s c i l l a t i o n s experienced on previous f l i g h t s . Dur-
ing t h e maximum dynamic pressure region of f l i g h t , t h e launch v e h i c l e ex-
perienced winds t h a t were l e s s than 95-percentile January winds.

The S-IVB/instrument unit l u n a r impact w a s accomplished s u c c e s s f i l l y .

A t 82:37:52.2 elapsed t i m e from l i f t - o f f , t h e S-IVB/instrument u n i t i m -
pacted t h e lunar s u r f a c e at approximately 8 degrees 5 minutes 35 seconds
south l a t i t u d e and 26 degrees 1 minute 23 seconds west longitude, approx-
imately 150 miles from t h e t a r g e t of 1 degree 35 minutes 46 seconds south
l a t i t u d e and 33 degrees 15 minutes west longitude. Impact v e l o c i t y w a s
,8343 f t l s e c.
The ground systems, supporting countdown and launch , performed sat-
i s f a c t o r i l y . System component f a i l u r e s and malfunctions r e q u i r i n g cor-
r e c t i v e a c t i o n were corrected during countdown without causing unscheduled
holds. Propellant tanking w a s accomplished s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . Damage t o t h e
pad, launch umbilical tower, and support equipment w a s minor.
 14-1

14.0 ANOMALY SUMMARY

This s e c t i o n contains a discussion o f t h e s i g n i f i c a n t anomalies

t h a t occurred during t h e Apollo 14 m i s s i o n . The d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e s e
items i s divided i n t o f o u r major areas : command and s e r v i c e modules;
l u n a r module ; government-furnished equipment ; and Apollo l u n a r s u r f a c e
experiments package.

14.1 C O W D AND SERVICE MODULES

14.1.1 F a i l u r e t o Achieve Docking Probe Capture Latch Engagement

S i x docking attempts w e r e required t o s u c c e s s f u l l y achieve capture

l a t c h engagement during t h e t r a n s p o s i t i o n . and docking event. Subsequent
i n f l i g h t examination o f t h e probe showed normal o p e r a t i o n of t h e mecha-
nism. The l u n a r o r b i t undocking and docking were completely normal. Data
a n a l y s i s o f f i l m , accelerometers, and r e a c t i o n c o n t r o l system t h r u s t e r
a c t i v i t y i n d i c a t e s t h a t probe-to-drogue contact conditions were normal
f o r all docking attempts, and capture should have been achieved f o r t h e
f i v e unsuccessful attempts ( t a b l e 14-11. The capture-latch assembly must
not have been i n t h e locked configuration during t h e f i r s t f i v e attempts
based on t h e following:

a. The probe status talkback d i s p l a y s functioned properly b e f o r e

and after t h e unsuccessful attempts, t h u s i n d i c a t i n g proper switch oper-
a t i o n and power t o t h e talkback c i r c u i t s . The t a l k b a c k d i s p l a y s a l w a y s
i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e capture l a t c h e s w e r e i n t h e cocked p o s i t i o n during
t h e unsuccessful attempts ( f i g . 1 4 - 1 ) . (Note th-at no e l e c t r i c a l power
i s r e q u i r e d t o capture because t h e system i s cocked p r i o r t o f l i g h t and
t h e capture operation i s s t r i c t l y mechanical and t r i g g e r e d by t h e drogue

b. Each o f t h e s i x marks on t h e drogue r e s u l t e d from s e p a r a t e con-

t a c t s by t h e probe head ( f i g . 14-2). Although t h r e e o f t h e marks a r e
approximately 120 degrees a p a r t , a docking impact with locked capture
l a t c h e s should result i n t h r e e double marks ( t o match t h e l a t c h hooks)
I20 degrees a p a r t , and w i t h i n one inch of t h e drogue apex o r s o c k e t .
Although t h e drogue marks could i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l capture-
l a t c h hooks were d i f f i c u l t t o depress, such marks are not abnormal f o r
impact v e l o c i t i e s greater than 0.25 f e e t p e r second.

Since t h e l a t c h e s w e r e n o t locked, t h e anomaly w a s apparently caused

by f a i l u r e o f t h e capture-latch plunger ( f i g . 14-11 t o reach t h e forward
or locked p o s i t i o n . Motion of t h e plunger could have been r e s t r i c t e d by
14-2

a
aJ
In
5

dd

I a
k

n
w
3w
p:
I
H
I
3
d

L
Figure 14-1.- Cross secti on of probe head and capture-latch assembly.
 A
I,

2-3/4 in.

r)

1-1/8 in.

2-1/4 in.

F\

Drogue apex

/
0 A l l marks are single
0 E aiid F shiny niarks in dry lubrlcalrt
I I ~
A , E, C, aiid D are wide single marks liaviiiy
liavmy sllqlit
slight depressioti
lubrlcarlt in center
with scratch through dry lubricarit
E

Figure 14-2.- Location of marks on drogue assembly.

contamination o r dimensional changes due t o temperature. I n t e r n a l dam-
age t o t h e capture-latch mechanism can be r u l e d out because t h e system-
functioned properly i n all subsequent operations following t h e s i x t h
docking attempt and during p o s t f l i g h t t e s t i n g . .

Analyses were performed t o i n v e s t i g a t e t o l e r a n c e s and thermal

e f f e c t s on mating p a r t s and surfaces a s s o c i a t e d with t h e operation o f
t h e capture l a t c h e s . The r e s u l t s i n d i c a t e t h a t n e i t h e r temperature nor
t o l e r a n c e s could have caused t h e problem. I n a d d i t i o n , a thermal analy-
sis snows t h a t n e i t h e r t h e l a t c h e s n o r t h e s p i d e r could have been jammed
by i c e .

T e s t s using q u a l i f i c a t i o n probes t o determine capture-latch response

measurements w e r e made and showed no aging degradation of t h e system.
Tension t i e t e s t s produced c l e a r l y sheared p i n s ; however, i n one t e s t , a
sheared p o r t i o n o f t h e p i n d i d leave t h e t e n s i o n t i e with some v e l o c i t y
and landed o u t s i d e t h e r i n g i t s e l f .

No contamination, corrosion, s i g n i f i c a n t d e b r i s , o r f o r e i g n materi-

als were found, and t h e mechanism worked normally during all f u n c t i o n a l
t e s t s . The loads and response t i m e s compared with t h e s p e c i f i c a t i o n s
and with t h e probe p r e f l i g h t d a t a . Motor torque values and a c t u a t o r
assembly torque values ( s t a t i c drag and capture-latch r e l e a s e ) compare
favorably with p r e f l i g h t values.

During t h e i n s p e c t i o n , s m a l l s c r a t c h e s and r e s u l t i n g b u r r s were

found on t h e t e n s i o n t i e plug w a l l adjacent t o t h e plunger. The s c r a t c h e s
are being analyzed. A n anomaly report w i l l be i s s u e d under s e p a r a t e cover
when t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n has been completed.

The m o s t probable cause of t h e problem w a s contamination o r debris

which l a t e r became dislodged. A cover w i l l be provided t o p r o t e c t t h e
probe t i p from f o r e i g n material e n t e r i n g t h e mechanism p r i o r t o f l i g h t .

This anomaly i s open.

14.1.2 High-Gain Antenna Tracking Problems

During t r a n s l u n a r coast and l u n a r o r b i t o p e r a t i o n s , occasional prob-

lems w e r e encountered' i n acquiring good high-gain antenna t r a c k i n g with
e i t h e r t h e primary o r secondary e l e c t r o n i c s . The s p e c i f i c times of high-
g a i n antenna a c q u i s i t i o n and t r a c k i n g problems were :

a. 76:45:00 t o 76:55:00
b. 92:16:00 t o 93:22:00
c. 97:58:00 t o 98:04:02
d. 99:52:00.
14-6

An instrumentation problem with t h e antenna readout occurred f o r

about 3 hours e a r l y i n t h e mission when an e r r o r of about 30 degrees
e x i s t e d . Subsequently, t h e readings were normal. A mechanical i n t e r -
ference i n t h e instrument servos i s t h e most l i k e l y cause. The i n s t r u -
ment servos are an independent loop which d r i v e t h e antenna p i t c h and '

yaw meters i n t h e command module. No c o r r e c t i v e a c t i o n i s planned s i n c e

t h e servos do not a f f e c t t h e antenna performance f o r any modes of oper-
ation.

The ground data s i g n a t u r e s which show t h e f i r s t a c q u i s i t i o n and

t r a c k i n g problems a r e i l l u s t r a t e d i n f i g u r e 14-3. The antenna s t a r t e d
t r a c k i n g a p o i n t approximately 5 t o 8 degrees o f f t h e e a r t h p o i n t i n g
angle at 76:45:00 elapsed t i m e and continued t r a c k i n g w i t h low uplink
and downlink s i g n a l l e v e l s f o r 10 minutes at which t i m e a good narrow
beam lock-up w a s achieved.

NASA-S-71-1671
-75 d&n

-95 dBm to -93 dBm

Uplink
signal
Good
Tracking problem tracking
i

-103 dBiii
Beani switchiiio M
-120 dBin
Downlink

M A A M A AR A AR
Mode select f J

I I I
I I I
1
1 1
I I 4
I
76:44 76:46 76:48 76:50 76:52 76:54 76:56
Elapsed tiiiie froiii lift-off, hr:iiiiti

Figure 14-3.- Data from f i r s t period of anomalous operation.

 The low s i g n a l s c o r r e l a t e w i t h antenna p a t t e r n and g a i n data f o r a
5- t o S - e g-r e e b o r e s i g h t s h i f t i n t h e wide-beam mode. The d rect on of
t h e s p i k e s observed on t h e downlink d a t a i n f i g u r e 14-3 are c o n s i s t e n t
with switching between t h e wide and narrow beams. Conditions f o r a nor-
m a l alignment and a misalignment of t h e wide and narrow beams a r e shown
i n f i g u r e 14-4. A 5- t o 8-degree s h i f t i n t h e wide-beam mode b o r e s i g h t
NASA-S-71-1672

Narrow and wide beam boresight

Nanow beam

Switch to narrow Remain in tiarrow beam i f

beam when target is target is iii f 3 degree shaded
in this f l degree
shaded region

Side lobe

-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20

Off boresight, degrees
(a) Normal wide beam/narrow beam antenna alignment patterns.

-Narrow beam boresight

Wide beam
boresight

Wide beam

m ,
> Wide beam
bores,ight shift

-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20

Off boresight, degrees
(b) Alignment conditions indicated by Apollo 1 4 data.

Figure 14-4.- Antenna narrow and wide beam boresight relationship.

Figure 14-4. - Antenna narrow- and wide-beam b o r e s i g h t r e l a t i o n s h i p .
I 14-8

w i l l n o t allow narrow-beam l o c k s i n c e continuous switching between t h e

wide beam and narrow beam w i l l occur with t h e t a r g e t o u t s i d e t h e 23-
degree l i m i t of t h e narrow-beam b o r e s i g h t . These l a r g e e r r o r s i g n a l s
w i l l i n i t i a t e c y c l i c switching between t h e wide-beam and narrow-beam
modes.

The a c q u i s i t i o n and t r a c k i n g problems f o r t h e o t h e r t i m e periods

were similar. As a r e s u l t of t h e 5- t o &degree b o r e s i g h t s h i f t o f t h e
wide beam, t h e antenna at times would lock-up on t h e first s i d e l o b e
i n s t e a d o f t h e main l o b e ( f i g . 14-4). Since t h e antenna a r r a y i s n o t
symmetrical, t h e b o r e s i g h t e r r o r i n t h e wide-beam mode i s a f u n c t i o n o f
t h e t a r g e t approach p a t h .

A number of problems could have caused t h e e l e c t r i c a l s h i f t of t h e

wide beam; however, t h e y e f f e c t i v e l y reduce t o an i n t e r r u p t i o n o f one of
t h e four wide-beam elements which supply s i g n a l s t o t h e wide-beam com-
p a r a t o r . The most l i k e l y cause i s t h a t a connector t o one of t h e c o a x i a l
c a b l e s which are used t o connect t h e wide-beam antennas t o t h e comparator
assembly o f t h e s t r i p l i n e s w a s f a u l t y .

I n support of t h i s cause, f i v e bad c o a x i a l c e n t e r conductors have

been found. Also, a c o a x i a l connector w a s disconnected on t h e antenna
and t h e e f f e c t i n t h e beam occurred. There are two causes of t h e problem
with t h e c e n t e r conductor, both of which occur during cable-to-connector
assembly ( f i g . 14-5). The sleeve i s assembled t o t h e c a b l e , a Lexan
i n s u l a t o r i s t h e n s l i p p e d over t h e c e n t e r conductor, and t h e p i n i s in-
s e r t e d over t h e c e n t e r conductor and soldered. If t h e w i r e g e t s t o o h o t
during s o l d e r i n g , t h e Lexan grows and no longer f i t s l o o s e l y through t h e
h o l e i n t h e o u t e r body. When t h i s occurs and t h e o u t e r body i s screwed
o n t o t h e s l e e v e , t h e w i r e can be t w i s t e d and t h e c e n t e r conductor m a y
fail.

Another p o s s i b l e f a i l u r e occurs when t o o much s o l d e r i s used o r t h e

w i r e i s n o t centered i n t h e p i n . These conditions w i l l b i n d t h e p i n t o
t h e o u t e r body i n s u l a t i o n and, during assembly, t h e w i r e i s t w i s t e d t o
f a i l u r e . These conditions are being c o r r e c t e d by reworking a l l connect-
ors and applying proper i n s p e c t i o n and c o n t r o l procedures during t h e re-
work.

F a i l u r e s on previous f l i g h t s , i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e one on t h i s m i s s i o n ,
w e r e o f t h e t y p e t h a t appear under c e r t a i n thermal c o n d i t i o n s . The m a l -
f u n c t i o n c o n d i t i o n s of each o f t h e f a i l u r e s were i s o l a t e d t o d i f f e r e n t
components of t h e antenna. A l l of t h e s e d e f e c t s were of a t y p e which
could escape t h e t e s t s c r e e n i n g process. Another p o s s i b i l i t y i s t h a t t h e
shock which an antenna experiences during t h e s p a c e c r a f t - l u n a r module
a d a p t e r s e p a r a t i o n when t h e pyrotechnics f i r e might have caused d e f e c t s
i n t h e c i r c u i t r y which could open up under c e r t a i n thermal c o n d i t i o n s

..
1 I L i L ; L L l - Y - - 1
Y -.A 1- A- L A- L- A- -
 14-9

NASA-S-71-1673

Sleeve

Outer body

r Lexan insulator

pinJ IOuter body

i lis11 lat ion

Note: A slip fit is required between the piti

and insulator so that the pin does not rotate
when turning outer body during assembly of the
threaded sleeve.

Figure 14-5.- Coaxial cable failures.

I 14-10

d u r i n g t h e mission. The o r i g i n a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n t e s t s considered t h a t t h e

shock environment would be low.

To f u r t h e r i n v e s t i g a t e t h e e f f e c t s of t h e s p a c e c r a f t - l u n a r module
a d a p t e r pyrotechnic shock on an antenna, a shock t e s t has been conducted.
The results show t h a t t h e antenna experiences about an order-of-magnitude
g r e a t e r shock than had been o r i g i n a l l y a n t i c i p a t e d . However , thermal
t e s t i n g of t h e antenna has shown no d e t r i m e n t a l e f f e c t s because of t h e
shock. To b e t t e r s c r e e n out d e f e c t s which p o t e n t i a l l y could a f f e c t t h e
f u n c t i o n i n g of t h e antenna, a thermal acceptance t e s t w i l l be performed
on all f u t u r e f l i g h t antennas while r a d i a t i n g and under o p e r a t i n g con-
ditions.

T h i s anomaly i s closed.

14.1.3 Urine Nozzle Blockage

After t r a n s p o s i t i o n and docking and p r i o r t o i n i t i a t i n g p a s s i v e

thermal c o n t r o l , t h e crew i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e u r i n e nozzle ( f i g . 14-6)

NASA-S-71-1674

Main Main

5
Dump
nozzle

Figure 14-6. - Urine r e c e p t a c l e a n d nozzle.

 14-11

w a s obstructed. The same condition occurred s e v e r a l o t h e r t i m e s during

t h e mission and, i n each c a s e , t h e dump nozzle had not been exposed t o
s u n l i g h t f o r prolonged p e r i o d s .

The h e a t e r s and c i r c u i t r y were checked and found t o b e normal. The

system design has been previously v e r i f i e d under some, but not a l l , l i k e l y
thermal conditions while dumping u r i n e . Although t h e h i s t o r y of previous
missions has shown no i n d i c a t i o n s of f r e e z i n g , t h e dumps during t h i s
f l i g h t may have coincided w i t h a c o l d e r nozzle condition t h a n on any pre-
vious f l i g h t . Also, t h e purge-and-dry procedure used during t h i s mission
w a s d i f f e r e n t from t h a t used i n previous missions i n t h a t t h e u r i n e re-
c e i v e r w a s r i n s e d with water a f t e r each use and t h e system w a s purged
w i t h oxygen f o r longer times than i n p a s t missions. These changes may
have c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e freezing. A t e s t i s planned t o determine t h e
c o n t r i b u t i o n of t h e procedures t o t h e f r e e z i n g .

I f f r e e z i n g occurs i n t h e f u t u r e , thawing can be accomplished very

quickly by o r i e n t i n g t h e s p a c e c r a f t ' s o t h a t t h e nozzle i s i n s u n l i g h t .
This w a s demonstrated s e v e r a l times during t h i s f l i g h t . The a u x i l i a r y
hatch nozzle and t h e water overboard dump nozzle provide backup capabil-
i t i e s . No hardware change i s i n o r d e r , but procedural changes m a y be
necessary t h a t would e i t h e r r e s t r i c t t h e times when u r i n e m a y be dumped
o r modify t h e purging techniques.

This anomaly i s closed.

14.1.4 Degraded VHF Connnunications

The VHF l i n k between t h e comnand and s e r v i c e module and l u n a r mod-

u l e w a s degraded from p r i o r t o lunar l i f t - o f f through t e r m i n a l phase
i n i t i a t i o n . The received s i g n a l s t r e n g t h measured i n t h e l u n a r module
w a s lower than p r e d i c t e d during t h e periods when VHF performance w a s de-
graded. VHF voice w a s poor and, ll minutes p r i o r t o l u n a r l i f t - o f f , n o i s e
w a s r e c e i v e d i n t h e l u n a r module through t h e VHF system. Therefore, t h e
system w a s d i s a b l e d . When t h e system w a s again enabled about 4-1/2 min-
u t e s b e f o r e l u n a r l i f t - o f f , t h e n o i s e had disappeared.

P r i o r t o l u n a r descent, t h e VHF ranging and rendezvous r a d a r range

measurements c o r r e l a t e d c l o s e l y . However, during t h e t i m e period pre-
ceding t e r m i n a l phase i n i t i a t i o n , t h e VHF ranging system i n d i c a t e d erron-
eous measurements. During t h i s same t i m e p e r i o d , numerous range t r a c k i n g
dropouts also occurred. The range measurements were i n e r r o r by 5 t o
15 miles when compared with t h e rendezvous r a d a r range measurements
( f i g . 14-7). The VHF ranging d a t a p r e s e n t e d i n t h e f i g u r e r e s u l t s from
a number of d i f f e r e n t a c q u i s i t i o n s . After t e r m i n a l phase i n i t i a t i o n , t h e
14-12
 14-13

s i g n a l s t r e n g t h , as i n d i c a t e d by t h e lur,ar module receiver automatic g a i n

c o n t r o l v o l t a g e measurement, was adequate and VHF ranging o p e r a t i o n w a s
normal.

These problems would be expected i f t h e s i g n a l s t r e n g t h were low.

The s i g n a l s t r e n g t h w a s determined by measuring t h e automatic g a i n con-
t r o l v o l t a g e i n t h e l u n a r module VHF r e c e i v e r . The measurement range
w a s -97.5 t o -32 a m . Figure 14-8 shows t h e p r e d i c t e d s i g n a l s t r e n g t h s
and t h o s e measured during t h e mission at t h e l u n a r module r e c e i v e r .

The m a x i m u m p r e d i c t e d values assume t h a t d i r e c t and multipath s i g -

n a l s add. For t h e m i n i m u m p r e d i c t e d , t h e multipath s i g n a l i s assumed t o
s u b t r a c t from t h e d i r e c t s i g n a l . The antenna p a t t e r n model used c o n s i s t e d
of g a i n values i n 2-degree increments and d i d not i n c l u d e all t h e peaks
t h a t are known t o occur because o f antenna p o l a r i z a t i o n d i f f e r e n c e s be-
tween t h e l u n a r module and command and s e r v i c e module. Line-of-sight t o
t h e command module p a s s i n g through one of t h e s e peaks would e x p l a i n t h e
p u l s e s shown i n f i g u r e 14-8(a).

Figure 14-8(b) shows t h a t t h e s i g n a l s t r e n g t h should have been on

s c a l e subsequent t o about 1 0 minutes a f t e r i n s e r t i o n . Figure 14-8(c)
shows t h a t t h e measured s i g n a l s t r e n g t h w a s below t h a t expected f o r t h e
right-forward antenna, t h e one which t h e c h e c k l i s t c a l l e d out t o be used,
from i n s e r t i o n t o docking and above t h a t p r e d i c t e d f o r t h e r i g h t - a f t
antenna f o r t h i s same t i m e period. This i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e proper an-
t e n n a w a s s e l e c t e d , b u t some condition e x i s t e d which decreased t h e s i g n a l
s t r e n g t h t o t h e l u n a r module receiver.

The lower-than-normal RF l i n k performance w a s a two-way problem

( v o i c e w a s poor i n both d i r e c t i o n s ) ; t h e r e f o r e , c e r t a i n p a r t s o f t h e VHF
system a r e prime candidates f o r t h e cause of the problem. Figure 14-9
i s a block diagram o f t h e VHF communications system as configured during
t h e rendezvous phase o f t h e mission. Also shown are t h o s e areas i n which
a malf’unction could have a f f e c t e d t h e two-way RF l i n k performance. A
s i n g l e malfunction i n any o t h e r area would have a f f e c t e d one-way perform-
ance only.

The VHF ranging problems r e s u l t e d from lower-than-normal s i g n a l

s t r e n g t h t o g e t h e r with t h e e x i s t i n g range rate. The ranging equipment
i s designed t o o p e r a t e with s i g n a l s t r e n g t h s g r e a t e r t h a n -105 dBm.
The l u n a r module r e c e i v e d signal s t r e n g t h data are e s s e n t i a l l y q u a l i t a -
t i v e , s i n c e most of t h e i n f l i g h t data during t h e problem p e r i o d were
o f f - s c a l e low. Unfortunately, t h e s c a l e s e l e c t i o n w a s n o t chosen f o r
f a i l u r e analysis. A s p o t check of r e l a t i v e v e h i c l e a t t i t u d e s , as evi-
denced by normal performance of t h e rendezvous radar and by s e x t a n t
s i g h t i n g s , i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e a t t i t u d e s were proper. The crew a l s o
i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e y followed t h e c h e c k l i s t f o r VHF antenna s e l e c t i o n .
 14-14
NASA-S-7 1-1676
-60

d
U

5
- -80
cn
c
al

5
;-100
E
.-m
In
al
U
;. -120
al
0
a

-140
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

-6 0

4. -80
BE

s
;-100
.-Inccn
U

.f -120
al
0
a
-140 -

-60

s
U
-80
5
cn
al
E

-3
mE -100
.-Incn
U
al
.-al -120
al
E

- .-
-140
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 lo 11
Time from acquisition of signal, min
(c) Right forward and aft antennas from acquisition of signal to near docking time.

Figure 14-8.- Received signal s t r e n g t h from omnidirectional antennas.

tl K. L .
- .
L
.-
L.
 14-15

m
S
S

3z salm
.-
0
5 %
> >

U
-aJ
a
U
0
E

-a
al
-0
0
E
U
S
m
E
E
0
u

-n.-
Y
0

-
aJ
a
B
I
I C
rl m 0
E
T LL
I
>
m
E
7
a s
E
v)

s
14-16

A f l i g h t t e s t w a s performed t o v e r i f y t h a t t h e VHF ranging problem

w a s a s s o c i a t e d with t h e low VHF s i g n a l s t r e n g t h and w a s n o t r e l a t e d t o
t h e VHF ranging elements. The Apollo 1 4 range and range r a t e were dupli-
c a t e d and t h e results showed t h a t , f o r s i g n a l s t r e n g t h s below about
-105 dBm, e r r o r s i n i n d i c a t e d range similar t o t h o s e experienced on
Apollo 1 4 w i l l be generated.

The procedures f o r t e s t and checkout of t h e l u n a r module and com-

mand module elements of t h e VHF system have been r e a s s e s s e d and found
t o be s u f f i c i e n t , and a d d i t i o n a l i n s p e c t i o n o r t e s t i n g i s n o t p r a c t i c a l
o r necessary. The only a c t i o n t h a t w i l l be t a k e n i s t o add instrumen-
t a t i o n on both t h e l u n a r module and t h e command and s e r v i c e module t o
provide more i n s i g h t i n t o t h e n a t u r e o f t h e problem i f it occurs on sub-
sequent f l i g h t s . Therefore , f o r subsequent v e h i c l e s , r e c e i v e r automatic
g a i n c o n t r o l measurements w i l l be added t o both t h e l u n a r module and
t h e command and s e r v i c e module. Measurement s c a l e f a c t o r s w i l l be se-
l e c t e d t o g i v e on-scale data at t h e low s i g n a l s t r e n g t h range. The l u n a r
module 'data s t o r a g e and e l e c t r o n i c s assembly ( t a p e r e c o r d e r ) was r e t a i n e d
f o r subsequent p o s t f l i g h t e v a l u a t i o n of voice q u a l i t y a s s o c i a t e d with
t h e automatic gain c o n t r o l measurements.

C r e w t r a i n i n g w i l l be expanded t o include r e a l i s t i c simulations o f

weak s i g n a l s t r e n g t h s and t h e e f f e c t s of ranging on voice q u a l i t y . The
e f f e c t s o f t h e modes s e l e c t e d and o p e r a t i o n a l techniques such as v o i c e
l e v e l and microphone p o s i t i o n become important n e a r t h e range l i m i t s of
t h e system.

This anomaly i s closed.

14.1.5 Entry Monitor System 0.05g Light

The e n t r y monitor system 0.05g l i g h t d i d not i l l u m i n a t e w i t h i n

3 seconds a f t e r an O.O5g condition w a s sensed by t h e primary guidance
system. The crew then manually switched t o t h e backup p o s i t i o n .

The e n t r y monitor system i s designed t o s t a r t automatically when

O.O5g i s sensed by t h e system accelerometer. When t h i s s e n s i n g occurs,
t h e 0.05g l i g h t should come on, t h e s c r o l l should begin t o drive (al-
though barely p e r c e p t i b l e ) and t h e range-to-go counter should begin t o
count down. The crew r e p o r t e d t h e l i g h t f a i l u r e but w a s unable t o v e r i -
f y whether t h e s c r o l l o r counter responded b e f o r e t h e switch w a s manually
changed t o t h e backup mode. The crew a l s o r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e n e u t r a l
d e n s i t y f i l t e r w a s covering t h e 0.05g l i g h t and t h a t t h e r e were s u n l i g h t
r e f l e c t i o n s i n t h e cabin.
 14-17

Analysis of t h e range counter d a t a r e p o r t e d by t h e crew i n d i c a t e s

a landing p o i n t about 5 n a u t i c a l miles s h o r t ; whereas, i f t h e e n t r y mon-
i t o r system had not s t a r t e d when O.O5g w a s sensed and had s t a r t e d 3 sec-
onds l a t e r , t h e i n d i c a t e d landing p o i n t would have been on t h e o r d e r of
20 n a u t i c a l miles long.

P o s t f l i g h t t e s t s conducted on t h e system show t h a t t h e lamp d r i v e r

c i r c u i t and t h e redundant lamp filaments w e r e o p e r a t i n g properly. Analy-
s i s of t h e range counter d a t a and p o s t f l i g h t t e s t s i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e
f a i l u r e of t h e crew t o see t h e l i g h t w a s caused by having t h e f i l t e r
p o s i t i o n e d i n f r o n t of t h e l i g h t . Reflected l i g h t from t h e sun and t h e
i o n i z a t i o n layer would make it very d i f f i c u l t t o see t h e l i g h t . F u r t h e r ,
a c l e a r g l a s s f i l t e r i s used i n t h e s i m u l a t o r ; whereas, t h e s p a c e c r a f t
f i l t e r is silvered.

The c o r r e c t i v e a c t i o n i s t o r e p l a c e t h e f i l t e r i n t h e simulator
with a f l i g h t u n i t . Also, a f l i g h t procedural change w i l l be made t o
p o s i t i o n t h e f i l t e r s o t h a t it w i l l not obscure t h e l i g h t .

This anomaly i s closed.

14.1.6 I n a b i l i t y t o Disconnect Main Bus A

During e n t r y , when t h e main bus t i e switches (motor-driven s w i t c h e s )

were placed i n t h e o f f p o s i t i o n at 800 f e e t , main bus A should have de-
energized; however, t h e bus remained on u n t i l a f t e r landing when t h e
battery bus-tie c i r c u i t breakers were opened. P o s t f l i g h t t e s t i n g s h a r e d
t h a t t h e main motor switch contacts were closed ( f i g . 14-10). Also, t h e

M o r winding open

f
I switch
Battery Win bus tie I

bus A battery AIC

intermittently open

Mtery C

Figure 14-10.- Bus-tie c i r c u i t r y .

14-18

i n t e r n a l switches which c o n t r o l t h e drive motor were s h o r t e d t o g e t h e r and

t h e motor windings were open. These conditions i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e motor
switch s t a l l e d .

Main bus B should have been powered because of t h i s f a i l u r e , but

w a s n o t . P o s t f l i g h t t e s t i n g showed t h a t t h i s occurred because t h e main
bus B c i r c u i t breaker f o r b a t t e r y C w a s i n t e r m i t t e n t . This problem i s
discussed i n section 14.1.7.

A similar motor switch f a i l u r e w a s experienced during t e s t s of t h e

Apollo 15 command and s e r v i c e module a t t h e launch s i t e . Also, a second
similar motor switch on t h e Apollo 15 v e h i c l e r e q u i r e d 100 m i l l i s e c o n d s
t o transfer; whereas, normal transfer t i m e i s 50 m i l l i s e c o n d s . A motor
c u r r e n t s i g n a t u r e w a s taken f o r one switch cycle o f t h e slow-operating
switch and compared t o a similar s i g n a t u r e taken p r i o r t o d e l i v e r y . It
showed t h a t contact r e s i s t a n c e between t h e brushes and commutator had
degraded and become extremely e r r a t i c . Torque measurements o f t h e f a i l e d
motor s w i t c h without t h e motors were normal. This i s o l a t e s t h e problem
t o t h e motors o f t h e switch assembly.

A black t r a c k o f d e p o s i t s from t h e brushes w a s found on t h e Apollo

1 4 commutator, as w e l l as on both of t h e commutators from t h e Apollo 1 5
motors. One motor had f a i l e d , and t h e o t h e r was running slow. Normally,
a commutator should show some d i s c o l o r a t i o n along t h e brush t r a c k , b u t
a b u i l d u p o f brush m a t e r i a l along t h e t r a c k i s abnormal. As a r e s u l t
o f t h e t r a c k buildup, t h e r e s i s t a n c e between t h e brushes and commutator
became h i g h e r . The h i g h e r r e s i s t a n c e drops t h e v o l t a g e i n t o t h e armature
causing t h e motor t o run slower. (Switch t r a n s f e r , open t o c l o s e d , o r
v i c e v e r s a , r e q u i r e s 11 r e v o l u t i o n s o f t h e motor.) The i n c r e a s e d re-
s i s t a n c e at t h e brushes g e n e r a t e s more h e a t than normal. A v i s u a l in-
s p e c t i o n of t h e Apollo 1 4 motor brush assembly showed high h e a t i n g of
t h e brushes had occurred, and t h i s w a s concentrated at t h e brush-
commutator i n t e r f a c e . The condition w a s evident by t h e m e l t i n g p a t t e r n
of a t h i n nylon dish which r e t a i n s t h e brush i n t h e brush h o l d e r .

An a n a l y s i s i s b e i n g made t o determine t h e d e p o s i t buildup on t h e

c o m u t a t o r . E i t h e r t h e brush composition i s i n e r r o r , o r a contamination
e x i s t s i n t h e brush composition. X-ray r e f r a c t i o n a n a l y s i s shows t h e
same elements throughout t h e brush. The percentage of each of t h e sub-
s t a n c e s w i l l be determined and compared t o t h e s p e c i f i c a t i o n a n a l y s i s
of t h e brush.

I n s p e c t i o n o f t h e commutator o u t s i d e of t h e t r a c k shows a clean

copper s u r f a c e comparable t o o t h e r machined s u r f a c e s w i t h i n t h e motor.
It can be i n f e r r e d from t h i s t h a t t h e r e are no problems a s s o c i a t e d w i t h
 14-19

th g e / l i f e of t h e l u b r i c a n t s from t h e bearings o r with outgassing from

organic materials which might deposit on t h e commutators. The switch
assemblies are hermetically s e a l e d and under a 15-psi p r e s s u r e of n i t r o -
gen and helium gas.

Each motor i s operated continuously f o r 4 t o 8 hours t o seat t h e

brushes. The motors are t h e n disassembled, i n s p e c t e d , and cleaned.
Procedures f o r cleaning t h e motor assembly are not e x p l i c i t as t o mate-
rials o r techniques t o be used. T h i s could be t h e cause of t h e problem.
A f u r t h e r study of t h i s aspect i s being made. An anomaly r e p o r t w i l l be
i s s u e d upon completion of t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n .

There a r e 36 motor-driven switch assemblies i n t h e s p a c e c r a f t . Some

of t h e switches are normally not used i n f l i g h t . Some are used once o r ,
at most, s e v e r a l t i m e s . The increased r e s i s t a n c e of brush t o t h e commu-
t a t o r as a result of d e p o s i t s i s gradual from a l l i n d i c a t i o n s . A check
of t h e switch operation t i m e can be r e l a t e d t o t h e d e p o s i t buildup on t h e
commutator. Consequently, a check of t h e switch response t i m e can i n d i -
c a t e t h e dependability of t h e switch t o perform one o r s e v e r a l a d d i t i o n a l
switch t r a n s f e r s i n f l i g h t . This w i l l be done f o r Apollo 15 on each of
t h e switches. Work-around procedures have been developed i f any o f t h e
motor switches are questionable as a r e s u l t of t h e timing t e s t .

This anomaly i s open.

14.1.7 I n t e r m i t t e n t C i r c u i t Breaker

The motor switch f a i l u r e discussed i n s e c t i o n 14.1.6 should have

r e s u l t e d i n main buses A and B being energized a f t e r t h e motor switch
w a s commanded open ( f i g . 14-10). P o s t f l i g h t c o n t i n u i t y checks, however,
showed t h a t t h e r e w a s an open c i r c u i t between b a t t e r y C and main bus B
and t h a t t h e main bus B c i r c u i t breaker f o r b a t t e r y C w a s i n t e r m i t t e n t .

Disassembly and i n s p e c t i o n of t h e c i r c u i t b r e a k e r showed t h a t t h e

c o n t a c t s are c r a t e r e d ( f i g . 14-11). The c r a t e r contains a white sub-
s t a n c e which held t h e c o n t a c t s apart when t h e c i r c u i t breaker w a s actu-
ated.

The white substance w i l l b e analyzed t o determine i t s composition

and source. C i r c u i t breakers which have been used i n similar applica-
t i o n s i n Apollo 1 4 w i l l a l s o be examined. An anomaly r e p o r t w i l l be
i s s u e d under s e p a r a t e cover when t h e a n a l y s i s has been completed.

This anomaly i s open.

14-20

NASA-S-71-1679

ct 'In

Figure 14-11.- C i r c u i t b r e a k e r c o n t a c t .

T
L L-
 14-21

14.1.8 Food Preparation Unit Leakage

The crew r e p o r t e d t h a t a bubble of water c o l l e c t e d on t h e s t e m of

t h e food p r e p a r a t i o n u n i t af'ter hot water w a s ,dispensed, i n d i c a t i n g a
s l i g h t leak. This problem a l s o occurred on Apollo 1 2 .

T e s t s of both t h e Apollo 12 and Apollo 1 4 u n i t s showed no leakage

when room temperature w a t e r w a s dispensed through t h e hot water v a l v e ;
however, at an e l e v a t e d water temperature o f approximately 150' F, a
s l i g h t leakage appeared a f t e r valve a c t u a t i o n . Disassembly of t h e
Apollo 12 dispenser showed damage i n two valve O-rings, apparently as
a result of t h e considerable p a r t i c l e contamination found i n t h e hot
water valve. b s t o f t h e contamination w a s i d e n t i f i e d as m a t e r i a l re-
lated t o component f a b r i c a t i o n and valve assembly and probably remained
i n t h e valve because of incomplete cleaning procedures. Since t h e par-
t i c l e s were found only i n t h e hot water v a l v e , t h e contamination appar-
e n t l y o r i g i n a t e d e n t i r e l y within t h a t assembly and was not s u p p l i e d
from o t h e r p a r t s of t h e water system.

P o s t f l i g h t , when t h e hot water valve w a s cycled s e v e r a l t i m e s , t h e

outflow w a s considerably less than t h e s p e c i f i e d 1 ounce p e r cycle. D i s -
assembly o f t h e valve w i l l be performed and an anomaly r e p o r t w i l l be
i s s u e d under separate cover upon completion of t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n . The
Apollo 15 u n i t has been checked d u r i n g a l t i t u d e chamber t e s t s with hot
water and no leakage was noted.

This anomaly is open.

14.1.9 Rapid Repressurization System Leakage

Repressurization of t h e three s t o r a g e b o t t l e s i n t h e r a p i d repress-

u r i z a t i o n system ( f i g . 14-12) was r e q u i r e d t h r e e t i m e s i n a d d i t i o n t o
t h e normal r e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n s during t h e mission. The system r e q u i r e d
r e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n once i n lunar o r b i t and twice during t h e t r a n s e a r t h
c o a s t phase. J u s t p r i o r t o t h e f i r s t o f t h e t r a n s e a r t h c o a s t r e p r e s s u r i -
z a t i o n s , t h e system had been used ( f a c e mask checks) and r e f i l l e d
( f i g . 14-13). I n t h i s i n s t a n c e , t h e f i l l valve w a s closed b e f o r e t h e
system w a s f u l l y recharged. Calculations from t h e surge tank pressure
d a t a i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e r e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n package w a s at approximately
510 p s i at 199 hours 48 minutes and w a s only recharged t o about 715 p s i
( f i g . 14-13). The cabin i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e r e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n package pres-
sure would have i n d i c a t e d a higher p r e s s u r e because o f t h e temperature
rise of t h e compressed gas. The crew noted a value o f about TOO p s i
(due t o temperature s t a b i l i z a t i o n ) at approximately 211 hours and re-
charged t h e system again.
14-22

NASA-S-71-1680
Repressur itation bottles

ReIief
va 1ve
urization valve

I
I
i r
Face masks

B nut
connector

Recharge p
va Ive

'4 -1r - ' 900psia

To main
w u lators

Figure 14-12.- Rapid repressurization system.

.-
L
 14-23

NASA-S-71-1681
900 I I L,
I I

.-In I
n
- 800 Repressurization;
! rValve closed / Surge tank pressure
E3
In I fill valve open -I;IL(1
u)
aJ 700 I
h
c
aJ
I
u
9
600
'
0
X
IV 1 lsurge tank
I only'being
1 refilled
1

500

aJ
Y
. 1.0 9
h
Oxygen flow rate
0.5
4-

1
i
0
-
f
I~.
n
In

5 ' Cabin pressure

x
0

Figure 14-13.- Rapid repressurization package data.

14-24

Data are not a v a i l a b l e from t h e lunar o r b i t r e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n as t h e

s p a c e c r a f t w a s on t h e back s i d e o f t h e moon during t h e o p e r a t i o n . How-
ever, t h e general procedure used during t h e t r a n s e a r t h coast phase would
only p a r t i a l l y recharge t h e system.

P o s t f l i g h t checks of t h e 900-psi system showed t h a t t h e leakage rate

w a s about 40 standard cc/min as compared with t h e p r e f l i g h t value o f
1 4 s t a n d a r d cc/min. This change i n leakage rate i s not considered ab-
normal. A leakage r a t e of t h i s magnitude would lower t h e system p r e s s u r e
about 100 p s i every 3 days. Therefore, t h e lunar o r b i t recharging of t h e
system probably r e s u l t e d frcxn normal leakage.

Future crews w i l l be b r i e f e d on t h e recharging techniques f o r o t h e r

than normal rechargings t o i n s u r e t h a t t h e system i s f u l l y recharged.

This anomaly is closed.

14.2 LUNAR MODULF:

14.2.1 Ascent Battery 5 Low Voltage

A t 62 hours, t h e ascent b a t t e r y 5 open-circuit v o l t a g e had decreased

from a l i f t - o f f value o f 37.0 v o l t s t o 36.7 v o l t s i n s t e a d of remaining at
a constant l e v e l ( f i g . 14-14( a ) ) . Figure 14-14(b) shows c h a r a c t e r i s t i c
open-circuit voltages for a f u l l y charged b a t t e r y (peroxide l e v e l of all
c e l l s ) and all c e l l s o p e r a t i n g on t h e monoxide l e v e l o f t h e s i l v e r p l a t e .
Note t h a t one c e l l at t h e monoxide l e v e l and t h e remaining 19 at t h e per-
oxide l e v e l would have caused t h e observed open-circuit v o l t a g e of 36.7
v o l t s . Any one of t h e following conditions could have caused t h e v o l t -
age drop.

a. Battery c e l l short

b. C e l l short-to-case through an e l e c t r o l y t e path

c. External b a t t e r y load.

A s i n g l e - c e l l s h o r t could be caused by i n c l u s i o n of conductive

foreign material i n t h e c e l l - p l a t e pack at t h e t i m e o f manufacture o r
excessive b r a z e material at t h e brazed j o i n t between t h e p l a t e t a b and
p l a t e g r i d , e i t h e r of which could p i e r c e t h e cellophane p l a t e s e p a r a t o r
during t h e launch powered-flight phase, providing a conductive path be-
tween p o s i t i v e and negative p l a t e s ( f i g . 14-15).
 14-25

NASA-S-7 1-1602

37.0
-
Y,
4
attery 5 (flight)
0
>
.-
Y
. -
5 36.0
1L.
- Battery 5 voltage for a
0
constant external load
0
ti
35.0 I 1 I 1 1

(a) Open-circuit voltage variation during mission.

A l l cells fully charged

37 .O (peroxide level of the
silver cell plate)
UI

3
4
36.7 -
ir
One cell out of the 20 cells at the monoxide level
{All cells discharged to monoxide level
.- c)

.- 31.0
0

0
K
O +
400 0
Ampere hours

(b) Characteristic open-circuit voltage of a battery,

Figure 14-14.- Ascent b a t t e r y voltage c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .

14-26

NASA-S-71-1683

(a) 2 0 - c e l l ascent battery.

(b) Plate assembly. (c) Case plugs.

(d) Cross section of plug.

Figure 14-15. - Ascent b a t t e r y cell s t r u c t u r e .

 14-27

During b a t t e r y a c t i v a t i o n , one o f t h e descent b a t t e r i e s had a c e l l

s h o r t t o t h e case through an e l e c t r o l y t e p a t h around a c e l l plug j o i n t
( f i g . 14-15). The c e l l plug w a s not p r o p e r l y sealed t o t h e bottom o f
t h e p l a s t i c c e l l case. If t h i s c o n d i t i o n e x i s t e d i n a s c e n t b a t t e r y 5
i n f l i g h t , it could have decreased t h e b a t t e r y open-circuit v o l t a g e .

An e x t e r n a l b a t t e r y l o a d could have existed from l i f t - o f f t o 62 hours

on t h e c i r c u i t shown i n f i g u r e 14-16 i n which t y p i c a l types o f high resist-
ance s h o r t s are a l s o shown. For t h i s c o n d i t i o n , t h e c u r r e n t d r a i n would
have occurred on all c e l l s . Figure 14-14 shows t h e time h i s t o r y of t h e

NASA-S-7 1-1684

Ascent Vo 1tage monitor

400k
ohms
P

*-
I

On
Battery 5
normal switch

POSSIBLE HIGH RESISTANCE GROUNDS

Battery 5
On backup switch

Figure 14-16.- Ascent b a t t e r y 5 configured f o r open-circuit l o a d s .

14-28

open-circuit bus voltage f o r b a t t e r y 5 . For a constant e x t e r n a l l o a d ,

t h e b a t t e r y 5 open-circuit bus voltage would have been lower t h a n t h e
f l i g h t d a t a at 141 hours. Therefore, t h e e x t e r n a l l o a d would have had
t o change w i t h time.

To reduce t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of recurrence, c o r r e c t i v e a c t i o n has been

t a k e n f o r each of t h e p o s s i b l e causes. S t r i c t e r i n s p e c t i o n and improved
procedures have been incorporated f o r i n s t a l l a t i o n of t h e plugs. P a r t l c -
c u l a r a t t e n t i o n w i l l be given t o t h e assembly of t h e c e l l p l a t e s on f u t u r e
u n i t s . I n a d d i t i o n , a t e s t has been added at t h e launch s i t e t o measure
l u n a r module p a r a s i t i c loads p r i o r t o b a t t e r y i n s t a l l a t i o n t o i n s u r e t h a t
no abnormal loads are p r e s e n t .

This anomaly i s closed.

14.2.2 Abort S i g n a l Set I n Computer

P r i o r t o descent, t h e primary guidance computer received an abort

command four d i f f e r e n t times. The computer would have r e a c t e d i f t h e
descent program had been i n i t i a t e d . The f a i l u r e w a s i s o l a t e d t o one

NASA-S-71-1685
Abart switch
I
Lunar ModulePilol's
ground bus
+ I P i
4 1
Clelemetry)
Commander's F

a
T I
ground bus ! bikvel discrete

Lunar Engine arm switch

+28 V o Ascent engine

Commander's
+28 V dc bus
Descent
O

engine
y
Descent
[ control
engine logic I, Did not
A acur

engine -r/l(Telemetry)
control Abort bilevel
n Aicrrah

..__...___.Awnlink)
!
ogram I Start abort program

I
Problem isohted Did a c u r
to these contacts
guidance computer &
(Computer downlink)
Start abort program

Figure 14-17.- Abort switch l o g i c .

 14-29

s e t of c o n t a c t s of t h e a b o r t switch ( f i g . 14-17) because t h e abort com-

mand appeared only on t h e l u n a r module primary guidance computer down-
l i n k ( t e l e m e t r y ) and n o t on t h e abort guidance computer downlink (telem-
e t r y ) o r t h e t e l e m e t r y b i l e v e l d i s c r e t e s a s s o c i a t e d with t h e descent
engine c o n t r o l l o g i c . Recycling t h e switch o r tapping t h e p a n e l removed
t h e s i g n a l from t h e computer. To prevent an unwanted abort during powered
descent, a computer program w a s developed and v e r i f i e d w i t h i n 2 hours,
and i n t i m e t o be manually i n s e r t e d i n t o t h e l u n a r module computer p r i o r
t o powered descent i n i t i a t i o n . The program would have allowed t h e l u n a r
module computer t o ignore t h e abort command, had it appeared during
powered descent.

The most probable cause of t h e abort command w a s m e t a l l i c contam-

i n a t i o n w i t h i n t h e hermetically s e a l e d abort-switch module ( f i g . 14-18).
The f a i l u r e o f en i n t e r n a l switch component would not l i k e l y have caused
t h e abort i n d i c a t i o n because such a f a i l u r e would not have been i n t e r -
m i t t e n t . X-rays and d i s s e c t i o n of similar switches have shown m e t a l l i c
contamination i n s e v e r a l switches of t h e s i z e which could have caused
t h e f l i g h t f a i l u r e . The m e t a l l i c contamination appears t o come from t h e
i n t e r n a l switch p a r t s , p a r t i c u l a r l y one o f t h e t h r e e s t u d s which h o l d
t h e contact components. The s t u d i s , i n e f f e c t , r i v e t e d by h e a t and
p r e s s u r e ( f i g . 14-18). T h i s type of switch i s used i n e i g h t d i f f e r e n t
l o c a t i o n s , which are:

a. Abort switch
b. Abort s t a g e switch
c. Engine s t o p switches ( 2 )
d. Master alarm switches ( 2 )
e. Plus X t r a n s l a t i o n switch
f. Engine s t a r t switch.

Corrective a c t i o n c o n s i s t s of r e p l a c i n g all switches of t h i s t y p e

w i t h switches screened by x-ray and v i b r a t i o n . Since t h e s c r e e n i n g i s
not fool-proof, c i r c u i t modifications were made t o e l i m i n a t e s i n g l e -
p o i n t failures of t h i s t y p e . These modifications are:

a. The abort s t a g e switch descent-engine o v e r r i d e f u n c t i o n w a s

removed from t h e abort-stage c i r c u i t b r e a k e r and placed on t h e l o g i c
power switch contact. This involved r e l o c a t i n g one w i r e from one
switch t e r m i n a l t o another.

b . Each o f t h e two engine s t o p switches were rewired so t h a t two

s e r i e s c o n t a c t s are r e q u i r e d t o c l o s e i n o r d e r t o s t o p t h e engine. For-
merly, t h e two sets of contacts i n each s t o p switch were connected i n
p a r a l l e l s o t h a t c l o s u r e of e i t h e r would s h u t down t h e engine.
14-30

NASA-S-7 1-1686

Most likely source

of sliver

Metal contamination up to 0 . 0 3 0 - i n c h long slivers found in several switches

(a) Simplified sketch of internal switch parts.

(b) X-rays of switch showing metallic contamination.

Figure 14-18.- Abort switch contamination.

1 - 1 ,-
L- Y - - L L LA i
 14-31

c. The plus-X t r a n s l a t i o n switch w a s rewired so t h a t two series

c o n t a c t c l o s u r e s are r e q u i r e d t o f i r e t h e plus-X r e a c t i o n c o n t r o l sys-
t e m t h r u s t e r s . This removed t h e f o u r - t h r u s t e r t r a n s l a t i o n c a p a b i l i t y ,
l e a v i n g only a two-thruster t r a n s l a t i o n c a p a b i l i t y .

d. The e n g i n e - s t a r t switch and c i r c u i t r y were n o t changed because

of t h i s problem s i n c e inadvertent c l o s u r e would only g i v e t h e manual s t a r t
command, and t h e engine a r m comnand is a l s o r e q u i r e d t o f i r e t h e engine.
However, because of a switch failure i n another s p a c e c r a f t during ground
t e s t s , t h e switch w a s rewired so t h a t a s e r i e s - p a r a l l e l combination o f
f o u r switch c o n t a c t s are used f o r t h e f u n c t i o n . That failure w a s caused
by nonmetallic contamination (rust) p r e v e n t i n g switch contact c l o s u r e .
This contamination i s undetectable by x-rays.

e. The two m a s t e r a l a r m switches were not rewired s i n c e i n a d v e r t -

e n t contact c l o s u r e would only reset t h e m a s t e r alarm, and t h i s would
not a f f e c t t h e mission or crew s a f e t y .

f . The a b o r t and abort stage switch c i r c u i t r y t o t h e computer w a s

not modified. I n s t e a d , t h e primary guidance computer software w a s modi-
f i e d t o allow t h e crew t o lock o u t t h e computer abort and abort stage
program. I f t h e crew e x e r c i s e s t h i s o p t i o n , any r e q u i r e d abort would
have t o be performed u s i n g t h e a b o r t guidance system.

This anomaly i s closed.

14.2.3 I n t e r m i t t e n t S t e e r a b l e Antenna Operation

P r i o r t o t h e descent phase o f t h e mission, t h e S-band s t e e r a b l e

antenna o p e r a t i o n w a s i n t e r m i t t e n t . There were-nine i n s t a n c e s of un-
scheduled i n t e r r u p t i o n of antenna t r a c k i n g . Three of these have been
explained. One w a s caused by t h e crew switching t o an omnidirectional
antenna because o f an erroneous reading of t h e p i t c h p o s i t i o n i n d i c a t o r
at f u l l s c a l e of 255 degrees when t h e antenna w a s a c t u a l l y at 122 degrees.
Another occurred because t h e antenna w a s i n t h e manual s l e w mode and
n o t i n automatic-track. After undocking, t h e l u n a r module a t t i t u d e w a s
changed and, as a result, t h e antenna w a s pointed away from t h e e a r t h
r e s u l t i n g i n a l o s s o f s i g n a l . The t h i r d i n t e r r u p t i o n which has been
explained w a s caused by a failure i n t h e ground s t a t i o n power a m p l i f i e r
r e s u l t i n g i n ' a t e m p o r a r y l o s s of uplink s i g n a l .

The remaining unexplained t r a c k i n g i n t e r r u p t i o n s ( f i g . 14-19) have

s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . Five t r a c k i n g i n t e r r u p t i o n s occurred during
Goldstone coverage and f i g u r e 14-20 i s a p l o t of ground-station-received
s i g n a l s t r e n g t h s at t h e s e times. During t h e Madrid ground s t a t i o n cover-
age o f r e v o l u t i o n 32, another i n c i d e n t w a s noted with t h e same t y p e of
 14-32
NASA-S-71-1687

Revolution 11 Revolution 12 Revolution 13 Revolution 14

(Froill side only) (Front side only) (Front sidc oiily)

Steerable anleiiiia selected

. r
l Omiiidirectional aiiteiiiia selcckd

I Revolution 31 I Revolution 32 I
Unscheduled losses of lock, h:min (Front side only) (Front si& only)
a - 101:55 d - 104:36
b - 103:42 e - 107:31
c - 104i26 f - 144:ll
Figure 14-19 .- S-band s t e e r a b l e antenna o p e r a t i o n .

antenna response. I t i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e antenna began t o experience a

mechanical o s c i l l a t i o n of approximately 2 t o 3 h e r t z , which became in-
c r e a s i n g l y l a r g e r i n amplitude u n t i l t h e antenna l o s t lock. When antenna
o s c i l l a t i o n s exceed p l u s o r minus 5 degrees, excessive motor d r i v e cur-
r e n t causes t h e 28-voit dc c i r c u i t breaker t o open and t h e antenna ceases
t o t r a c k . The crew r e s e t t h i s c i r c u i t breaker s e v e r a l times. The an-
t e n n a w a s a l s o reported t o be noisy, i n d i c a t i n g t h e c o n t i n u a l d r i v i n g
t h a t would have occurred during t h e o s c i l l a t i o n s . The o s c i l l a t i o n s oc-
curred randomly at o t h e r t i m e s during t h e problem p e r i o d , b u t damped out
and d i d not cause t r a c k i n g i n t e r r u p t i o n s .

The two most probable causes of t h e s e o s c i l l a t i o n s a r e an unwanted

v a r i a t i o n i n t h e uplink s i g n a l o r a condition of i n s t a b i l i t y i n t h e
antenna/S-band t r a n s c e i v e r t r a c k i n g loop system. The conditions which
can cause t h e f i r s t i t e m a r e v e h i c l e blockage, r e f l e c t i o n s from t h e
s p a c e c r a f t s t r u c t u r e , multipath s i g n a l r e f l e c t i o n s from t h e l u n a r sur-
f a c e , n o i s e t r a n s i e n t s induced on t h e uplink signal, o r i n c i d e n t a l am-
p l i t u d e modulation on t h e c a r r i e r at t h e c r i t i c a l antenna l o b i n g fre-
quency ( 50 t o 100 h e r t z o r odd harmonics ) .
Look-angle d a t a i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e antenna w a s not p o i n t e d at or
near t h e v e h i c l e s t r u c t u r e during t h e t i m e periods when antenna lock
was lost.
 14-33

NASA-S-71-1688
-100
-120
-
-140
(a) 1 0 1 5 5 .

-120
--
5
m
- -100
5 -120
s
3 -140
.-
L
01
v)
(c) 104:26.

-100
-120

-140
(d) 104:36.

-100
-120
---
-
I
0 2 4 6 8 10
Relative time, sec

(e) 107:31.

Figure 14-20 .-
Signal strength o s c i l l a t i o n s associated
with f i v e unexplained l o s s e s of lock.
14-34

Multipath normally accurs when t h e s p a c e c r a f t i s n e a r t h e l u n a r

horizon. However, antenna loss-of-lock d i d not occur a t t h e s e times.

Noise t r a n s i e n t s on t h e uplink a r e h e l d t o a minimum because t h e

ground s t a t i o n power a m p l i f i e r operates i n s a t u r a t i o n . Also, t h e v e r i -
f i c a t i o n r e c e i v e r which monitors t h e uplink s i g n a l at t h e ground s t a t i o n
displayed normal output during t h e p r o b l e a t i m e p e r i o d s . Although t h e
i n c i d e n t a l amplitude modulstion has not been r e c e n t l y measured at Gold-
s t o n e and Madrid, production s u b - c a r r i e r o s c i l l a t o r s have been checked.
These t e s t s shoved t h a t t h e i n c i d e n t a l amplitude modulation at t h e c r i t i -
c a l frequencies w a s not d e t e c t a b l e ( l e s s than 0.1 p e r c e n t ) . A t e s t w a s
a l s o performed which showed t h a t t h e s t e e r a b l e antenna response t o in-
c i d e n t a l amplitude modulation became worse with t h e a d d i t i o n o f v o i c e
on t h e s u b - c a r r i e r and t h e presence of p u l s e r e p e t i t i m ranging. How-
e v e r , t h e r e i s no c o r r e l a t i o n between e i t h e r of t h e s e and l o s s e s o f an-
t e n n a lock. The most probable causes f o r t r a c k i n g loop i n s t a b i l i t y are
high loop g a i n , low gimbal f r i c t i o n , and low received s i g n a l s t r e n g t h
r e s u l t i n g i n low signal-to-noise r a t i o i n t h e t r a c k i n g l o o p . Both up-
l i n k and downlink s i g n a l s t r e n g t h s i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e RF l e v e l s were
nominal and were within t h e antenna's c a p a b i l i t y t o t r a c k .

The loop g a i n as measured during t h e acceptance t e s t of t h e

Apollo 1 4 equipment i n d i c a t e d a lower-than-nominal value i n d i c a t i n g
t h a t t h e s t a b i l i t y s h o u l d have been g r e a t e r than nominal.

There are no l i k e l y f a i l u r e s i n t h e antenna ;hat would cause a g a i n

change s u f f i c i e n t t o produce i n s t a b i l i t y without complete loss of t h e
antenna. There a r e many component f a i l u r e s i n t h e t r a n s c e i v e r which
might produce t h e r i g h t amount of g a i n change f o r o s c i l l a t i o n s . However,
t h e s e failures would a l s o a f f e c t t h e r e c e i v e r automatic g a i n c o n t r o l
reading which appeared normal throughout t h e problem t i m e .

The gimbal f r i c t i o n on t h e Apollo 1 4 antenna w a s measured during

ground t e s t s and found t o be h i g h e r t h a n nominal. This would i n c r e a s e
t h e antenna s t a b i l i t y . For gimbal f r i c t i o n t o cause t h e problem, a
v a r i a t i o n i n f r i c t i o n which c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y changed from normal t o
low, o r no f r i c t i o n , at s h o r t i n t e r v a l s and a t random t i m e s c o n s i s t e n t
with t h e antenna o s c i l l a t i o n s would have had t o occur.

There w a s no obvious v a r i a t i o n i n uplink s i g n a l and no obvious

change i n t h e a n t e n n a / t r m s c e i v e r t r a c k i n g loop which would cause t h e
antenna t o o s c i l l a t e . There must have been some i n t e r m i t t e n t condition
t h a t e x i s t e d i n t h e spacecraft/ground s t a t i o n system, which has n o t y e t
been i d e n t i f i e d . The i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s continuing and an anomaly r e p o r t c
w i l l be i s s u e d when t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n is completed.
 14-35

An a d d i t i o n a l problem occurred one t i m e during r e v o l u t i o n l

l when
t h e antenna p i t c h - p o s i t i o n i n d i c a t o r s t u c k at t h e f u l l - s c a l e reading
of 255 degrees. However, it became o p e r a t i v e again and continued t o
function properly. This m a y have been caused,by a f a i l u r e i n t h e
position-sensing c i r c u i t s i n t h e antenna or i n t h e meter i t s e l f . This
meter hung up twice d u r i n g acceptance t e s t i n g . A malfunction w a s found,
c o r r e c t e d , and a r e t e s t w a s s u c c e s s f u l . The i n d i c a t o r i s used only as
a gross i n d i c a t i o n o f antenna movement. Consequently, no f u r t h e r a c t i o n
w i l l be taken.

This anomaly i s open.

14.2.4 Landing Radar Acquisition

Two conditions occurred during t h e landing radar operation which

w e r e not expected; however, they were not abnormal. The first condition
occurred approximately 6 minutes a f t e r i n i t i a l a c t u a t i o n of t h e landing
radar. The system switched t o t h e low-range s c a l e , f o r c i n g t h e t r a c k e r s
i n t o t h e narrow-band mode o f operation. This w a s c o r r e c t e d by r e c y c l i n g
t h e main power c i r c u i t breaker which switched t h e radar t o high s c a l e .
Figure 14-21 shows t h e radar s c a l e switching l o g i c . The radar t h e n locked
on and "velocity-data-good" and "range-data-good" i n d i c a t i o n s were t r a n s -
ferred t o t h e computer. The "velocity-data-good" s i g n a l i s generated
when t h e Doppler t r a c k e r s lock on and t h e "range-data-good" s i g n a l i s
generated when t h e range t r a c k e r a l s o locks on.

NASA-S-71-1689

Data strem
Velocity circuit Gating I

!
Pulse to switch

T2 = Doppler tracker 2
TR = Range Gacker

Figure 14-21.- Landing r a d a r s c a l e switching l o g i c .

14-36

The second condition which w a s not expected occurred a f t e r t h e c i r -

c u i t b r e a k e r w a s recycled. A t t h i s time t h e i n i t i a l slant range reading
w a s approximately 13 000 f e e t g r e a t e r t h a n t h a t c a l c u l a t e d from t h e oper-
a t i o n a l t r a j e c t o r y . S e v e r a l seconds l a t e r , t h e i n d i c a t e d s l a n t range
jumped from 32 000 t o 25 000 f e e t . Subsequently, t h e landing r a d a r read-
ings compared favorably with t h e Operational t r a j e c t o r y ( f i g . 14-22).

108:08 108:09 108:lO 108:ll 108:12 108:13 108:14 108:lS

Time, hrmin

Figure 14-22.- Comparison of measured and computed s l a n t

range during powered descent.
 14-37

The s c a l e switching occurred at a e l a n t range of 63 000 feet with

a beam 4 v e l o c i t y of 3000 f t / s e c at an incidence angle of 35.4 degrees.
Operating t h e landing r a d a r under t h e s e conditions exceeds t h e maximum
range measurement design l i m i t ( f i g . 14-23). ,Under t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s ,
t h e r e c e i v e r i s sweeping w i t h maximum g a i n and t h e system w i l l be sen-
s i t i v e t o any received noise. A test w a s performed w i t h a radar oper-
a t i n g under t h e Apollo 14 conditions (two range-rate beams locked up
and t h e range beam unlocked). By i n s e r t i n g low-level n o i s e f o r a f r a c -
t i o n of a second i n t o t h e r e c e i v e r , range s c a l e switching occurred.
NASA-S-71-1691
80)

70

60

5:

i
3
m
50

Hf
s
40

30

20
0 1 2 3 4 5x lo3
Vehick velocity component along r a w bcm, f t / e c

Figure 14-23. - Landing radar range measurement design l i m i t a t i o n

as a f’unction of v e h i c l e v e l o c i t y component along range beam.
14-38

The high s l a n t range i n d i c a t e d at lock-cm by t h e landing radar w a s

most l i k e l y caused by t h e r a d a r locking onto energy r e t u r n e d i n t o t h e
antenna s i d e lobe. Based on t h e p r e f l i g h t t e r r a i n p r o f i l e and t h e pre-
f l i g h t o p e r a t i o n a l t r a j e c t o r y , s i d e lobe lock-on can be expected. Check-
l i s t procedures e x i s t t o c o r r e c t a s u s t a i n e d s i d e lobe lock-on. Once
t h e r a d a r i s locked on t h e main l o b e , s i d e l o b e lock-on cannot occur.

On f u t u r e s p a c e c r a f t , a wiring modification w i l l b e made t o enable

holding t h e system i n high s c a l e while i n antenna p o s i t i o n 1. b w s c a l e
w i l l only be enabled i n p o s i t i o n 2. P o s i t i o n 2 of t h e antenna i s auto-
m a t i c a l l y s e l e c t e d by t h e computer at high g a t e (7500 f e e t a l t i t u d e ) .
The manual s e l e c t i o n o f antenna p o s i t i o n s 1 and 2 w i l l a l s o c o n t r o l high
s c a l e and enable low s c a l e switching, r e s p e c t i v e l y .

This anomaly is closed.

14.2.5 Loss of t h e 'Abort Guidance System

The abort guidance system f a i l e d during t h e braking phase of ren-

dezvous. Telemetry d a t a were suddenly l o s t at 143:58:16; however, t h e r e
w a s no i n d i c a t i o n o f an abort guidance system warning l i g h t o r master
a l a r m . The crew w a s unable t o access t h e d a t a e n t r y and display assembly
and depressing any of t h e pushbuttons had no e f f e c t . The status switch
w a s cycled from operate t o standby t o operate w i t h no e f f e c t . Cycling
t h e 28-volt c i r c u i t breakers likewise had no e f f e c t . The system re-
mained i n o p e r a t i v e for t h e remainder of t h e mission.

The system w a s determined t o have been i n t h e standby mode af'ter

t h e f a i l u r e by comparing expected and a c t u a l bus c u r r e n t changes t h a t
were observed at t h e t i m e o f t h e failure and t h e subsequent cycling of
t h e c i r c u i t breakers. Further evidence o f t h e system having been i n
standby w a s t h e absence of t h e warning l i g h t and master alarm at t h e
time of t h e f a i l u r e . If standby power i n t h e e l e c t r o n i c s assembly were
not maintained, clock pulses t o t h e abort sensor assembly would have
been l o s t and t h e warning l i g h t would have i l l u m i n a t e d and t h e master
a l a r m sounded. A warning l i g h t and a master alarm would a l s o have oc-
curred i f t h e failure had been i n t h e abort guidance s t a t u s switch o r
t h e a s s o c i a t e d e x t e r n a l wiring. These conditions i s o l a t e t h e failure
t o t h e power supply s e c t i o n o r t h e sequencer of t h e a b o r t e l e c t r o n i c s
assembly ( f i g . 14-24).
 14-39

NASA-S-71-1692
28 volts
Abort guidance
status switch

Control

i-?Z I
I

d
I Operate
Power to abort
I 0 Standby C ,electronics assembly

-
memory and downlink
o--c
I Off
Power to data entry

-
I
-
and display assembly

J Standby power
28 volts
'ham telemetry
,
I To telemetry

Figure 14-24.- P a r t i a l abort guidance system f u n c t i o n a l diagram.

The f a i l u r e has been i s o l a t e d t o one of seven modules i n t h e p l u s

b-volt l o g i c power supply, one module i n t h e sequencer, o r one of
27 interconnections between t h e modules. There are a t o t a l o f 27 com-
ponent p a r t ty.pes ; twelve r e s i s t o r , two c a p a c i t o r , f o u r t r a n s i s t o r ,
four diode, f o u r transformer, and one s a t u r a b l e r e a c t o r t h a t could have
caused t h e f a i l u r e .

A complete f a i l u r e h i s t o r y review of t h e component p a r t types re-

vealed no evidence of a generic p a r t problem. A power d i s s i p a t i o n analy-
sis and a thermal a n a l y s i s of m a x i m u m case temperature f o r each o f t h e
suspect p a r t s showed adequate design margins.

Manufacturing procedures were reviewed and found t o be s a t i s f a c t o r y .

F i n a l l y , a review w a s conducted o f t h e t e s t i n g t h a t i s performed at t h e
component l e v e l , module l e v e l , and power supply l e v e l . T e s t procedures
were f o u n d - t o b e adequate f o r d e t e c t i o n of f a i l e d u n i t s and not s o severe
t h a t t h e y would expose t h e u n i t s t o unacceptable o r hazardous t e s t con-
ditions.

A component o r s o l d e r j o i n t f a i l u r e could have been due t o e i t h e r

an abnormal thermal s t r e s s o r a non-generic deficiency o r q u a l i t y d e f e c t
t h a t w a s unable t o withstand a normal environment. A n abnormal thermal
stress could have been caused by improper i n s t a l l a t i o n of t h e e q u i p e n t
on t h e cold rails. If t h i s occurred, t h e f i r s t component which should
f a i l i s in t h e p a r t i c u l a r power supply t o which t h e failure w a s i s o l a t e d .

I n any e v e n t , t h e methods and techniques used t o v e r i f y system

performance show no apparent areas which r e q u i r e improvement. F u r t h e r
stress a n a l y s i s of components and s o l d e r j o i n t s shows t h a t t h e design i s
adequate. The methods , techniques end procedures used i n i n s t a l l a t i o n
o f t h e equipment on t h e cold rails are a l s o adequate, providing t h e s e
procedures are followed. Consequently, no c o r r e c t i v e a c t i o n i s i n o r d e r .

This anomaly i s closed.

14.2.6 Cracked G l a s s on Data Entry and Display Assembly

The crew reported a crack i n t h e g l a s s across t h e address r e g i s t e r

of t h e d a t a e n t r y and display assembly. Figure 14-25 s h a r s t h e assembly
end t h e l o c a t i o n of t h e crack. Figure 14-26 i s an enlarged drawing of
t h e glass and a s s o c i a t e d electroluminescent segments.

NASl 5-71-1693
r

Crack 7
.Tape
locations

Figure 14-25.- Locations of crack and t a p e on d a t a

e n t r y and d i s p l a y assembly.
 NASA-S-7 1-1694
Room temperature
vu lcanizinq material

K o v a frane

Void
-Common
electrode

Glass

--Glass

Figure 14-26.- Cross s e c t i o n of d a t a e n t r y and d i s p l a y assembly g l a s s .

The cause o f t h e crack i s unknown. Glass cracks have n o t occurred

s i n c e a r e v i s i o n w a s made t o t h e procedure used t o mount t h e glass t o t h e
f a c e p l a t e of t h e d a t a e n t r y and d i s p l a y assembly. The assembly i s qual-
i f i e d f o r an environment i n excess of t h e f l i g h t conditions. Therefore,
e i t h e r excessive i n t e r n a l s t r e s s e s (under normal conditions ) were b u i l t
i n t o t h e g l a s s , o r t h e mounting w a s improper ( n o t as d e s i g n e d ) , or t h e
glass w a s i n a d v e r t e n t l y h i t .

Corrective a c t i o n c o n s i s t s of applying a c l e a r p l a s t i c tape p r i o r

t o f l i g h t on t h e glass of t h e electroluminescent windows above t h e key-
board ( f i g . 14-25), l i k e t h a t previously used on t h e mission t i m e r win-
dows. The t a p e i s t o prevent dislodging o f any glass p a r t i c l e s i f cracks
occur i n t h e f u t u r e , as w e l l as h e l p prevent moisture from p e n e t r a t i n g
 14-42

t h e electroluminescent segments should a crack occur. The presence of

moisture would cause t h e d i g i t segments t o t u r n dark i n about 2 hours i f
v o l t a g e were applied t o a cracked u n i t , making t h e assembly unreadable.
I
This anomaly i s closed.

14.3 GOVERNMEWT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT

14.3.1 Noisy Lunar Topographic Camera Operation

The lunar topographic camera exhibited noisy operation from t h e t i m e

of t h e Descartes s i t e photography pass at about 90 hours. I n both t h e
operate and standby modes w i t h power on t h e camera, t h e s h u t t e r operation
w a s continuous.

The developed f i l m i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e camera w a s f u n c t i o n i n g properly

at t h e time of camera checkout a t about 34 hours. On t h e f o u r t h l u n a r
r e v o l u t i o n , good imagery of t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e w a s obtained on 192 frames,
s t a r t i n g at Theophilus C r a t e r and ending about 40 seconds b e f o r e p a s s i n g
t h e Descartes s i t e . The r e s t of t h e f i l m c o n s i s t s of multiple-exposed
and f u l l y over-exposed f i l m .

P o s t f l i g h t tests with t h e f l i g h t camera showed s a t i s f a c t o r y opera-

t i o n i n a l l simulated environments ( p r e s s u r e , t h e r m a l , and v i b r a t i o n ) at
one-g. An i n t e r m i t t e n t f a i l u r e w a s found i n a t r a n s i s t o r i n t h e s h u t t e r
c o n t r o l c i r c u i t (fig. 14-27). The t r a n s i s t o r w a s contaminated with a

NASA-S-71-1695

I supply I 12 volts
lntcrvalaneter

Data
pint

, Shutter
drive

Figure 14-27.- Lunar topographic camera s h u t t e r c o n t r o l .

L
? .
A- -
 14-43

l o o s e p i e c e of aluminum 0.130 inch .By 0.008 i n c h , which ws8 f o r e i g n t o

t h e t r a n s i s t o r material. With a s h o r t e d t r a n s i s t o r , 28 v o l t s i s a p p l i e d
continuously t o t h e s h u t t e r d r i v e c i r c u i t , causing continuous s h u t t e r
operation , independent of the i n t e r v a l o m e t e r and independent of t h e
s i n g l e , auto, o r standby mode s e l e c t i o n s . The sprocket holes i n t h e
1/200 s l o t i n t h e s h u t t e r c u r t a i n were t o r n as 8 result of t h e prolonged,
continuous , high-speed s h u t t e r operation ( f i g . 14-28).

NASA-S-7 1-1696

Normal stopped position

of 1/200 slit
With torn sprocket holes,
stow position of a l l slits
is variable

Figure 14-28.- Lunar topographic camera film t r a c k .

14-44

The t r a n s i s t o r had been passed by normal high r e l i a b i l i t y s c r e e n i n g

and by premission and postmission system acceptance t e s t s o p e r a t i n g under
v i b r a t i o n , t h e r m a l , p r e s s u r e , and humidity c o n d i t i o n s ; none of which de-
t e c t e d t h e p i e c e of aluminum. Additional s c r e e n i n g b e i n g considered f o r
f u t u r e a p p l i c a t i o n s includes t h e use of N-ray and a c o u s t i c i n s p e c t i o n .
A n occurrence o f t h i s n a t u r e i s rare, but i t i s even rarer f o r such a
c o n d i t i o n t o pass t h e high r e l i a b i l i t y screening.

The anomaly occurred only a f t e r a p e r i o d of o p e r a t i o n at zero-g i n

f l i g h t , and when t h e case o f t h e t r a n s i s t o r i t s e l f w a s tapped p o s t f l i g h t .

This anomaly i s closed.

14.3.2 Extravehicular Glove Control

After s u i t p r e s s u r i z a t i o n f o r t h e second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y ,
t h e Lunar Module P i l o t r e p o r t e d t h a t h i s r i g h t glove had p u l l e d h i s hand
t o t h e l e f t and down and t h a t he had not had t h i s t r o u b l e during t h e
f i r s t e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y period. The condition w a s a nuisance
throughout t h e second e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y period. I n i t i a l indica-
t i o n s from t h e Lunar Module P i l o t were t h a t a cable had broken i n t h e
glove ( f i g . 14-29).

Cable guides (2)

Figure 14-29.- Extravehicular glove w r i s t c o n t r o l .

 14-45

A d e t a i l e d examination of t h e r e t u r n e d g l o v e , t o g e t h e r with chamber

t e s t s , have shown t h a t t h e r e a r e no broken cables and t h a t t h e r e i s f r e e
operation of t h e glove wrisz-control cable system. However, with t h e
Lunar Module P i l o t i n t h e pressurized f l i g h t s u i t , t h e glove took t h e
p o s i t i o n which w a s r e p o r t e d during t h e mission.

The w r i s t c o n t r o l assembly provides a free-moving s t r u c t u r a l i n t e r -

f a c e between t h e glove and t h e w r i s t disconnect s o as t o a s s u r e convolute
a c t i o n f o r w r i s t movement i n t h e p r e s s u r i z e d s t a t e . The design i n h e r e n t l y
allows t h e glove t o take various n e u t r a l p o s i t i o n s .

This anomaly i s closed.

14.3.3 Intervalometer Cycling

During i n t e r v a l o m e t e r operation, the. Command Module P i l o t heard one

double cycle from t h e intervalometer. Photography i n d i c a t e d t h a t double
cycling occurred 1 3 times out of 283 exposures.

P o s t f l i g h t t e s t i n g with t h e f l i g h t intervalometer and camera has

i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e double cycling w a s caused by a random response of t h e
intervalometer t o t h e camera motor c u r r e n t . The camera motor used on t h e
Apollo 1 4 cameras w a s a new motor having s l i g h t l y higher c u r r e n t charac-
t e r i s t i c s . P r e f l i g h t t e s t i n g of t h e equipment i n d i c a t e d compatibility
of t h e u n i t s and no double cycling.

Double cycling does not r e s u l t i n d e t r i m e n t a l e f f e c t s t o t h e camera

o r t h e intervalometer. No loss of photographic data occurs as a r e s u l t
of double c y c l i n g . Modifications t o t h e intervalometer t o make i t less
s e n s i t i v e t o t h e random pulses of t h e camera motor w i l l be made, i f prac-
t i c a l . On Apollo 1 5 , t h e intervalometer w i l l only provide Hasselblad
backup t o t h e s c i e n t i f i c instrument module cameras.

This anomaly i s closed.

14.3.4 I n t e r m i t t e n t Voice Communications

A t approximately 29 hours, Mission Control had d i f f i c u l t y i n com-

municating with t h e Coxnander. The Commander replaced h i s constant wear
garment e l e c t r i c a l a d a p t e r ( f i g . 14-30) with a s p a r e u n i t , and s a t i s f a c -
t o r y communications were r e e s t a b l i s h e d .

Following r e l e a s e of t h e hardware from q u a r a n t i n e , all four con-

s t a n t wear garment e l e c t r i c a l adapters were t e s t e d f o r c o n t i n u i t y and
r e s i s t a n c e , and a l l u n i t s were s a t i s f a c t o r y . The adapters were t h e n
 14-46

Ad

Figure 14-30.- Constant wear garment communications harness.

tltl L
? '
L
 14-47

connected t o a p o r t a b l e communications set which provided conditions

s i m i l a r t o f l i g h t conditions. While connected, t h e adapters were sub-
j e c t e d t o t w i s t i n g , bending, and p u l l i n g . None of t h e adapters showed
any e l e c t r i c a l i n t e r m i t t e n t s .

The most l i k e l y cause of t h e problem w a s poor contact between con-

n e c t o r s because of s m a l l contaminants o r improper mating of 8 connector,
which w a s c o r r e c t e d when t h e spare adapter w a s i n s t a l l e d .

This anomaly i s closed.

14.4 MOLL0 LUNAR SURFACE EXPERIMENTS PACKAGE

14.4.1 Active Seismic Experiment Thumper Misfires

. During t h e f i r s t e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y , t h e crew deployed t h e

thumper and geophones and attempted t o f i r e t h e i n i t i a t o r s w i t h t h e
following results: 13 f i r e d , 5 m i s f i r e d , and 3 i n i t i a t o r s were delib-
erately skipped t o save time. I n some i n s t a n c e s , two attempts were made
t o f i r e each i n i t i a t o r . I n a d d i t i o n , f o r t h e f i r s t four o r f i v e f i r i n g s ,
it w a s necessary t o squeeze t h e f i r i n g switch knob with both hands. Sub-
s e q u e n t l y , t h e excessive s t i f f n e s s seemed t o be r e l i e v e d and one-hand
actuation w a s possible.

The most l i k e l y causes of t h e problem a r e a s s o c i a t e d with t h e d e t e n t

p o r t i o n of t h e s e l e c t o r switch ( f i g . 14-31) and dirt on t h e f i r i n g switch
a c t u a t o r b e a r i n g s u r f a c e . The s e l e c t o r switch d i a l can r e p o s i t i o n out of
d e t e n t i n t h e course of normal handling because of t h e lack of p o s i t i v e
s e a t i n g i n t h e d e t e n t f o r each i n i t i a t o r p o s i t i o n . For an i n i t i a t o r t o
be f i r e d , t h e s e l e c t o r switch must provide contact t o t h e proper u n f i r e d
i n i t i a t o r p o s i t i o n . Examination of t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n u n i t has shown t h a t
t h e d e t e n t i s p o s i t i o n e d at t h e l e a d i n g edge of t h e contact s u r f a c e s o
t h a t any movement toward t h e previous p o s i t i o n w i l l break t h e c o n t a c t .
Also, t h e l i g h t e n i n g holes i n t h e f i r i n g switch knob make it p o s s i b l e f o r
d i r t t o g e t onto t h e Teflon bearing s u r f a c e s , temporarily i n c r e a s i n g t h e
f o r c e r e q u i r e d t o c l o s e t h e switch ( f i g . 14-31).

Corrective a c t i o n f o r Apollo 16 c o n s i s t s of adding a p o s i t i v e de-

t e n t mechani'sm, properly aligned w i t h t h e s e l e c t o r switch c o n t a c t s , and
dust p r o t e c t i o n f o r t h e f i r i n g switch a c t u a t o r assembly. The thumper
i s not c a r r i e d on Apollo 15.

This anomaly i s closed.

14-48

NASA-S-71-1699

Shorting

Rotate to arm
Push to fire

Figure 14-31.- Active seismic experiment.

- .
i L
 14-49

14.4.2 Suprathermal Ion Detector Experiment Noisy Data

During i n i t i a l turn-on of t h e Apollo l u n a r s u r f a c e experiments,

t r a n s m i s s i o n o f t h e suprathermal i o n d e t e c t o r l c o l d cathode gage e x p e r i -
ment o p e r a t e - s e l e c t command r e s u l t e d i n e r r a t i c d a t a from t h e supra-
thermal i o n d e t e c t o r experiment % t h e p a s s i v e s e i s m i c experiment % and t h e
charged p a r t i c l e l u n a r environment experiment. ( C e n t r a l s t a t i o n engineer-
i n g parameters remained normal.) Subsequent commanding o f t h e supra-
thermal ion d e t e c t o r / c o l d cathode gage experiments t o t h e standby mode
r e t u r n e d t h e o t h e r lunar s u r f a c e experiment d a t a t o normal.

S e v e r a l switching i t e r a t i o n s of t h e c e n t r a l s t a t i o n and t h e experi-

ment commands f a i l e d t o clear t h e problem u n t i l t h e suprathermal i o n
d e t e c t o r experiment w a s commanded t o t h e x 1 0 accumulation mode. Upon
execution o f t h i s command, normal experiment d a t a were r e c e i v e d and t h e
d a t a have remained normal s i n c e t h a t t i m e . The suprathermal i o n d e t e c t o r
experiment d u s t cover and t h e cold cathode gage experiment d u s t seal had
been removed at t h e t i m e t h e d a t a became normal.

The most probable cause w a s a r c i n g o r corona w i t h i n t h e suprathermal

i o n d e t e c t o r equipment p r i o r t o d u s t cover removal. During ground tests
under s i m i l a r c o n d i t i o n s , a r c i n g o r corona has r e s u l t e d i n t h e same t y p e
o f d a t a problems. Systems tests have i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e n o i s e generated
can a l s o a f f e c t t h e p a s s i v e seismic experiment and charged p a r t i c l e l u n a r
environment experiment data; and t h a t a r c i n g o r corona w i t h i n t h e supra-
thermal i o n d e t e c t o r experiment can result i n spurious commands w i t h i n
t h e suprathermal i o n d e t e c t o r experiment, causing removal of t h e d u s t
p r o t e c t o r s . However no detrimental e f f e c t s t o t h e equipment have been
experienced by t h i s event.

Performance acceptance d a t a from t h e Apollo 15 suprathermal i o n

d e t e c t o r / c o l d cathode gage experiments with t h e remaining l u n a r s u r f a c e
experiments have not i n d i c a t e d any a b n o r m a l i t i e s . The Apollo 1 5 u n i t
w i l l most l i k e l y e x h i b i t t h e same c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a r c i n g , with t h e d u s t
covers i n t a c t and t h e high voltage on, as t h a t of t h e Apollo 1 4 u n i t .
However, o p e r a t i o n s p r i o r t o d u s t cover removal w i l l be l i m i t e d t o t h e
t i m e r e q u i r e d f o r o p e r a t i o n v e r i f i c a t i o n p r i o r t o t h e l a s t extravehicu-
lar activity . 4

This anomaly i s closed.

14.4.3 Lunar Portable Magnetometer Cable D i f f i c u l t i e s

The crew r e p o r t e d t h a t it w a s d i f f i c u l t t o rewind t h e l u n a r p o r t -

a b l e magnetometer cable. The cable i s deployed and rewound at each lo-
c a t i o n where t h e lunar p o r t a b l e magnetometer is used ( f i g . 14-32).
14-50

NASA-S-7 1-1700

cable

reel-spins crank

Figure 14-32.- Lunar portable magnetometer cable r e e l .

 14-51

The l u n a r p o r t a b l e magnetometer ribbon cable s n a r l s easily at 1/68

and i s d i f f i c u l t and t e d i o u s t o u n s n a r l . If it i s necessary t o remove
t h e hand from t h e crank t o unsnarl t h e cable during t h e f i r s t p a r t o f
rewinding t h e c a b l e , t h e cable w i l l unwind w i t h i n t h e reel and s p i n t h e
r e e l handle ( f i g . 14-32). Free unwinding of t h e reel i s r e q u i r e d dur-
i n g deployment; however, i t i s d e s i r a b l e t o b e able t o lock t h e reel
a g a i n s t r o t a t i o n at t i m e s during rewind o f t h e c a b l e . Rewinding w a s
d i f f i c u l t because t h e r e w a s no provision t o lock t h e r e e l during rewind,
and g r i p p i n g t h e reel and crank w a s d i f f i c u l t w i t h t h e gloved hand.

Corrective a c t i o n f o r Apollo 16 c o n s i s t s of adding a r a t c h e t and

pawl locking device f o r a c t u a t i o n w i t h t h e gloved hand, and providing
a b e t t e r g r i p f o r t h e reel and crank. The l u n a r p o r t a b l e magnetometer
i s not c a r r i e d on Apollo 15.

This anomaly i s closed.

14.4.4 Central S t a t i o n Twelve-Hour T i m e r F a i l u r e

The c e n t r a l s t a t i o n t i m e r p u l s e s d i d not occur a f t e r i n i t i a l a c t i v a -

t i o n . Uplink command t e s t s v e r i f i e d t h a t t h e t i m e r l o g i c and t h e p u l s e
switches w e r e functioning s a t i s f a c t o r i l y , but t h a t t h e mechanical s e c t i o n
o f t h e timer w a s not d r i v i n g t h e s w i t c h e s . T i m e r f u n c t i o n s started t o
occur and t h e 12-hour pulses w e r e provided 13 times i n s u c c e s s i o n , i n d i -
c a t i n g t h a t t h e t i m e r b a t t e r y and o s c i l l a t o r are s a t i s f a c t o r y , but t h a t
t h e mechanical s e c t i o n i s o p e r a t i n g i n t e r m i t t e n t l y . The failure o f t h e
t i m e r is a s s o c i a t e d with t h e mechanical design.

This anomaly i s similar t o t h e t i m e r problem experienced on Apollo 12.

The l o s s o r e r r a t i c o p e r a t i o n of t h e 12-hour timer output p u l s e has no
adverse e f f e c t on experiments operations. The Apollo 15 c e n t r a l s t a t i o n
has a new s o l i d - s t a t e t i m e r . The Apollo 1 4 c e n t r a l s t a t i o n w i l l be t u r n e d
off by ground command, as i s planned for t h e Apollo 12 s t a t i o n .

This anomaly i s closed.

14.4.5 Passive Seismic Experiment Y - A x i s Leveling I n t e r m i t t e n t

The hori'zontal Y-axis l e v e l i n g motor of t h e gimbal l e v e l i n g system

o p e r a t e s i n t e r m i t t e n t l y ( f i g . 14-33). Although a command v e r i f i c a t i o n i s
r e c e i v e d when commands are s e n t , power i s not n e c e s s a r i l y r e c e i v e d by t h e
motor. When t h e r e i s an i n d i c a t i o n o f power t o t h e motor, t h e motor does
o p e r a t e . As a r e s u l t , during t h e f i r s t l u n a r day, response t o ground
commands w a s normal except f o r 6 o f t h e 22 conrmands when t h e r e w a s no
response.
14-52

NASA-S-7 1-1701

+29 volts

Level motor
(Y-axis) on/ ~
off command
m

-
~

S .
_ t
R
+12 volts
I
1-,
I
I
I
7
Y-axis motor
drive circuit

-12 ifolts

Figure 14-33.- Y-axis l e v e l i n g motor c i r c u i t r y .

Although no s c i e n t i f i c data have been l o s t t o date, i n t e r m i t t e n t

problems have been encountered when l e v e l i n g t h e Y-axis of t h e gimbal
p l a t f o r m upon which are mounted t h e three orthogonal long-period seis-
mmeters. Occasionally, e i t h e r t h e r e i s no electro-mechanical response,
o r t h e response i s delayed when t h e Y - a x i s m t o r i s commanded on. De-
l a y times vary. Thus far, l e v e l i n g has been achieved by c y c l i n g on/off
commands at varying t i m e i n t e r v a l s .

The problem i s caused by an i n t e r m i t t e n t component i n t h e motor

c o n t r o l c i r c u i t ( f i g . 14-33). There i s no c o r r e l a t i o n between t h e occur-
rence of t h e problem and t h e temperature of t h e lunar s u r f a c e , t h e cen-
t r a l s t a t i o n e l e c t r o n i c s , or t h e experiment. Whenever there i s an i n d i -
c a t i o n of power t o t h e motor, t h e motor o p e r a t e s . When t h e m t o r oper-
a t e s , it o p e r a t e s properly and p u l l s t h e normal c u r r e n t .

If t h e problem becomes worse u n t i l Y - a x i s l e v e l i n g cannot be

achieved, an emergency o p e r a t i o n a l mde can be implemented such as d r i v -
i n g remaining axes t o t h e i r s t o p s i n both d i r e c t i o n s i n an attempt t o
free electro-mechanical components which may be s t i c k i n g . P r e s e n t l y ,
however, t h e problem has not been s u f f i c i e n t l y s e r i o u s t o warrant i n t e r -
r u p t i o n of continuous s c i e n t i f i c data t o attempt such o p e r a t i o n s .

This anomaly i s closed.

 14-53

14.4.6 Passive Seismic Experiment Feedback F i l t e r F a i l u r e

The long-period v e r t i c a l ( Z ) seismometer w a s u n s t a b l e when operated
w i t h t h e feedback f i l t e r i n . The feedback f i l t e r s f o r all t h r e e long-
p e r i o d axes (X, Y , and Z ) were removed by command, and good d a t a (undamped)
now continue t o be received. The f i l t e r - o u t mode provides feedback t o t h e
seismometer f o r all periods of operation with an instrument having a n a t -
u r a l p e r i o d of approximately 2.5 seconds. Although t h e response curves
are peaked r a t h e r t h a n f l a t , and c r i t i c a l l y damped, no seismic energy i n
t h e 0.5- t o 15-second-period range i s l o s t .

The f i l t e r - i n mode provides a 1000-second t i m e constant f i l t e r i n

t h e feedback loop f o r an instrument having a n a t u r a l p e r i o d of approxi-
mately 1 5 seconds with a c r i t i c a l l y damped, f l a t - r e s p o n s e curve. On
Apollo 14 long-period seismometers, t h e d a t a during t h e f i l t e r - i n mode
have i n d i c a t e d a g e n e r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of i n i t i a l o s c i l l a t i o n s going on
t o s a t u r a t i o n . The problem appears t o b e e l e c t r i c a l r a t h e r t h a n mechan-
i c a l as experienced with t h e bent f l e x u r e s of t h e Apollo 12 long-period
v e r t i c a l s e i s m m e t e r . Performance d a t a during Apollo 1 4 acceptance t e s t -
i n g have i n d i c a t e d no abnormalities.

Preliminary a n a l y s i s of science d a t a from Apollo 11, 12, and 1 4

i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e n a t u r a l lunar seismic regime favors t h e range of 0.5-
t o 3.0-second p e r i o d s . As a r e s u l t it i s q u i t e probable t h a t f u t u r e
p a s s i v e seismic experiment u n i t s on t h e lunar s u r f a c e w i l l be operated
i n t h e f i l t e r - o u t mode i n o r d e r t o maximize t h e s e n s i t i v i t y at t h e appar-
e n t l y favored 2.0-second period. A t p r e s e n t , both Apollo 1 2 and Apollo 1 4
long-period seismometers a r e being operated i n t h e f i l t e r - o u t mode , pro-
ducing s a t i s f a c t o r y d a t a .

This anomaly i s closed.

14.4.7 Active Seismic Geophone 3 E l e c t r o n i c C i r c u i t E r r a t i c

The experiment w a s t u r n e d on i n t h e l i s t e n i n g mode on March 26,

1971, and geophone 3 d a t a were spiking off-scale high ( f i g . 14-34).
When t h e geophone channels were c a l i b r a t e d , t h e geophone 3 channel went
off-scale high simultaneously with t h e s t a r t of t h e c a l i b r a t i o n p u l s e
and s t a y e d off-scale high f o r t h e remainder o f t h e l i s t e n i n g period.
During t h e 1-second p e r i o d when t h e c a l i b r a t i o n p u l s e w a s p r e s e n t , d a t a
from geophones 1 and 2 showed t h e normal 7-hertZ r i n g i n g caused by t h e
c a l i b r a t i o n p u l s e . However, geophone 3 d a t a showed four negative-going
s p i k e s coincident with t h e f i r s t f o u r negative h a l f cycles of t h e ring-
i n g on t h e o t h e r two channels. The s p i k e s decreased i n d u r a t i o n from
t h e f i r s t t o t h e l a s t , t h e l a s t having an amplitude o f 90 percent of
14-54

0
L? v!? 0
N N l n
 14-55

f u l l s c a l e ( p l u s 2.5 v o l t s t o minus 2.0 v o l t s ) . During t h e t i m e t h a t

t h i s p u l s e w a s p r e s e n t , t h e signal on channel 2 changed from minus 2 . 2
v o l t s t o minus 2.35 v o l t s , i n d i c a t i n g t h a t channel 3 was operating at
an apparent g a i n of 30 t i m e s t h e channel 2 gain.

As shown i n f i g u r e 14-35, each geophone channel c o n s i s t s of a geo-

phone, an input p r e a m p l i f i e r , a low-pass f i l t e r , and a logarithmic com-
p r e s s o r a m p l i f i e r . The output of t h e logarithmic compressor feeds t h e
instrumentation system. The logarithmic compressor i s b a s i c a l l y an in-
v e r t i n g a m p l i f i e r with exponential negative feedback. Two diode-con-
nected t r a n s i s t o r s between t h e output and input of t h e a m p l i f i e r supply
t h e feedback. The f i r s t diode i s used f o r positive-going and t h e second
f o r negative-going input s i g n a l s . The diodes f o r all t h r e e geophone
channels (two p e r channel) are physically l o c a t e d i n an oven which con-
t r o l s t h e i r temperature a t 105' C.

WSA-S-71-1703

Figure 14-35.- Typical geophone channel.

It i s b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e f a i l u r e i s i n t h e logarithmic compression
a m p l i f i e r because s i g n a l s are coupled i n t o it through an input coupling
.capacitor. This c a p a c i t o r would block any o f f s e t v o l t a g e s from t h e pre-
ceding stages which would be required t o d r i v e t h e output o f f - s c a l e h i g h .
Analysis i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e most probable cause o f t h e problem i s an
i n t e r m i t t e n t open c i r c u i t i n t h e diode feedback p a t h . This would allow
t h e a m p l i f i e r input t r a n s i s t o r t o s a t u r a t e , d r i v i n g t h e output o f f - s c a l e
high. When s i g n a l s l a r g e enough t o d r i v e t h e input s t a g e out of s a t u r a -
t i o n were p r e s e n t , t h e output would t h e n respond and t h e output s i g n a l
would not be compressed.
 14-56

The experiment e l e c t r o n i c s uses "cordwood" c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e type

which has caused s o l d e r cracks i n o t h e r equipment. Two copper paths con-
duct t h e feedback diodes t o t h e l o g a r i t h m i c compressor a m p l i f i e r . A
s o l d e r crack i n e i t h e r p a t h would t h e n result i n t h e d a t a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .

There are 10 such s o l d e r j o i n t s f o r each geophone ( f i g . 14-36) :

four on t h e oven t e r m i n a l board, f o u r on t h e mother board, one on t h e
t o p board o f t h e l o g compressor module, and one on t h e bottom board o f
t h e l o g compressor module. The one most l i k e l y t o fail f i r s t i s on t h e
t o p board of t h e l o g compressor module. Continuity at t h e j o i n t re-
covers as long as t h e crack c l o s e s during t h e lunar day.

NASA-S-71-1704
Most likely cracked joint

Log compressor
- . .. A
. ..
. top board

Oven
termina I
board -
- Log compressa
bottom bad

Motherboard

Figure 14-36.- Suspected cracked s o l d e r j o i n t s i n a m p l i f i e r .

The log compressor modules f o r geophones 1 and 2 a r e of t h e same

type construction. Since t h e s e are l o c a t e d s l i g h t l y f u r t h e r from t h e
oven t h a n t h e one f o r geophone 3 , t h e maximum temperature may not be
q u i t e as high. As a r e s u l t , it may t a k e longer f o r them t o crack, i f
at all.

Systems t e s t i n g included o p e r a t i o n a l t h e r m a l c y c l i n g t e s t s over t h e

temperature range f o r l u n a r day and n i g h t . However, cracked s o l d e r j o i n t s
are a f'unction of time as w e l l as temperature, and apparently t h e ground
t e s t c y c l e d i d not allow enough t i m e f o r a creep f a i l u r e . This equipment
w a s designed and b u i l t p r i o r t o t h e t i m e when i t w a s found t h a t cordwood
construction w i t h soldered j o i n t s w a s u n s a t i s f a c t o r y .

? ' ?
If li. L L-
 14-57

A breadboard of t h e logarithmic compressor has been c o n s t r u c t e d ,

and t h e diode feedback loop will be opened t o d u p l i c a t e t h e experiment
data. The mechanical design of t h e l o g a r i t h m i c compressor w i l l be re-
viewed t o determine t h e changes t h a t must be made t o prevent s o l d e r
cracks on Apollo 16. The a c t i v e s e i s m i c experiment is not c a r r i e d on
Apollo 15.

Procedural changes under c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n c l u d e o p e r a t i o n of t h e

oven t o maintain compressor module temperature because t h e s o l d e r j o i n t
which i s most l i k e l y cracked i s i n compression ( s t r o n g e r ) at t h e h i g h e r
temperature.

This anomaly i s open.

14.4.8 I n t e r m i t t e n t Lnss of V a l i d Data from Suprathermal Ion

Detector Experiment P o s i t i v e Analog-to-Digital Converter

The data i n words 2 , 3, 7, and 8 of t h e suprathermal ion d e t e c t o r

experiment became e r r a t i c at 19:09 G . m . t . on A p r i l 5 , 1971. This con-
d i t i o n continued. u n t i l 22:15 G.m.t. on A p r i l 6. The same e r r a t i c con-
d i t i o n w a s a l s o observed during o p e r a t i o n a l support periods on A p r i l 7 ,
9 , and 21. Only t h o s e measurements a s s o c i a t e d with t h e p o s i t i v e s e c t i o n
o f t h e l o g analog-to-digital converter w e r e a f f e c t e d . There has been no
loss of s c i e n c e d a t a .

The affected measurements have a data c h a r a c t e r i s t i c wherein each

parameter processed by t h e p o s i t i v e l o g analog-to-digital converter
i n i t i a l l y i n d i c a t e s f i l l - s c a l e o u t p u t , followed by an erroneous d a t a
v a l u e . The erroneous d a t a value c o r r e l a t e s w i t h t h e value of t h e pre-
ceding measurement i n t h e serial d a t a format processed by t h e n e g a t i v e
analog-to-digital converter. The erroneous d a t a v a l u e i n some i n s t a n c e s
i n d i c a t e s one PCM count less than t h e negative analog-to-digital con-
v e r t e r parameter.

An i n t e r m i t t e n t failure of t h e s t a r t reset p u l s e f o r t h e p o s i t i v e
l o g analog-to-digital converter c o n t r o l l o g i c ( f i g . 14-37) could cause
t h e problem. Although t h e failure permits t h e p o s i t i v e c o n v e r t e r i n i t i a l
output t o f i l l t h e e i g h t - b i t binary counter and produce a f u l l - s c a l e read-
i n g ; t h e r e a f t e r , when a s t a r t pulse f o r t h e p o s i t i v e c o n v e r t e r should re-
set t h e e i g h t - b i t c o u n t e r , it f a i l s t o do s o , and t h e n e g a t i v e word which
i s s t i l l i n t h e counter i s read out as a p o s i t i v e word. The cause appears
t o be an i n t e r m i t t e n t component o r w i r e connection i n one o f t h e a s s o c i a t e d
modules. However, it does not appear t o be a f u n c t i o n o f t h e temperature.
The components have been passed by normal high r e l i a b i l i t y s c r e e n i n g , and
systems tests have included o p e r a t i o n a l p r e s s u r e , temperature, v i b r a t i o n ,
humidity, and a c c e l e r a t e d l u n a r environment c y c l e s . N o f a i l u r e of t h i s
14-58

Analog to Clock Serial Data to

digital Engineering
data inputs c Multiplexer bit format c central
enable counter logic station

Figure 14-37.- Simplified d a t a logic control.

type has been experienced with ground t e s t s . No a d d i t i o n a l t e s t i n g is

considered warranted f o r Apollo 15, which w i l l be t h e l a s t mission f o r
t h e experiment.

This anomaly i s closed.

14.4.9 Charged P a r t i c l e Lunar Environment Experiment

Analyzer B Data Lost

The v o l t a g e measurement reading on t h e analyzer B power supply

( f i g . 14-38) became e r r a t i c on A p r i l 8, 1971, and t h e analyzer B s c i e n c e
data w e r e l o s t .

On A p r i l 1 0 and 1 6 , t h e experiment w a s commanded on t o normal (low-

v o l t a g e ) mode, and t o i n c r e a s e (high-voltage) mode i n a series of t e s t s .
The r e s u l t s i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e p l u s 28-voit i n p u t , t h e r e g u l a t o r , and t h e
a n a l y z e r A power supply w e r e functioning p r o p e r l y , and t h a t t h e problem
w a s i n t h e analyzer B power supply.

The high-voltage power supply is a t r a n s i s t o r o s c i l l a t o r . The reso-

nant elements are a t r a n s f o r m e r primary winding and a c a p a c i t o r connected
i n p a r a l l e l between t h e t r a n s i s t o r emitter and ground. A second trans-
former winding provides p o s i t i v e feedback t o t h e t r a n s i s t o r base, causing
 4
I

Cr)
I
f
rl

r
I 14-60

t h e c i r c u i t t o o s c i l l a t e . A t h i r d transformer winding s u p p i i e s t h e i n -
p u t t o a diode-capacitor voltage multiplier chain. The output o f t h e
v o l t a g e m u l t i p l i e r is t h e n f i l t e r e d and d r i v e s t h e charged p a r t i c l e ana-
l y z e r . The output o f t h e f o u r t h transformer winding i s r e c t i f i e d and
f i l t e r e d . The f i l t e r e d voltage i s t h e n monitored by t h e instrumentation
system and i s p r o p o r t i o n a l t o t h e high v o l t a g e s u p p l i e d t o t h e analyzer.

Data i n d i c a t e d t h a t after t h e f a i l u r e occurred, t h e instrumentation

output w a s between 2.00 and 2.25 v o l t s dc. This could not occur i f t h e
o s c i l l a t o r were not s t i l l o s c i l l a t i n g . The i n p u t t o t h e v o l t a g e multi-
p l i e r i s also proportional t o t h e instrumentation o u t p u t . Shorts t o
ground can be p o s t u l a t e d at various p o i n t s i n and downstream of t h e volt-
age m u l t i p l i e r , and t h e s h o r t c i r c u i t c u r r e n t can be r e f l e c t e d back i n t o
t h e transformer primary winding t o determine how much t h e output v o l t a g e
should b e decreased. The decrease occurs because t h e transformer p r i -
mary winding ( t h e d r i v i n g winding) has r e s i s t a n c e (about 300 ohms), and
any v o l t a g e dropped across t h i s r e s i s t a n c e i s not a v a i l a b l e t o d r i v e t h e
trans former.

These c a l c u l a t i o n s show t h a t t h e s h o r t c i r c u i t must be i n one of

t h e output f i l t e r c a p a c i t o r s i n t h e high-voltage f i l t e r , i n t h e i n t e r -
connecting cable between t h e f i l t e r and a n a l y z e r , o r i n t h e analyzer.
Short c i r c u i t s i n any o t h e r l o c a t i o n s would result i n a much lower in-
strumentation output v o l t a g e .

This i s t h e last time t h e charged p a r t i c l e l u n a r environment experi-

ment w i l l be flown. If t h e f a i l u r e propagates t o t h e p o i n t where t h e
malfunctioning power supply s t o p s o s c i l l a t i n g , t h e c u r r e n t taken by t h i s
supply would i n c r e a s e t o about 0.1 ampere. I f t h i s i s s u f f i c i e n t t o
damage t h e series voltage r e g u l a t o r used for low-voltage o p e r a t i o n , t h e
o p e r a t i n g procedures w i l l be modified t o u s e low-voltage operation as
l i t t l e as p o s s i b l e t o extend t h e v o l t a g e r e g u l a t o r ' s l i f e .
 15-1

15 .O CONCLUSIONS

The Apollo 1 4 mission was t h e t h i r d s u c c e s s f u l l u n a r l a n d i n g and

demonstrated e x c e l l e n t performance of all c o n t r i b u t i n g elements, result-
i n g i n t h e c o l l e c t i o n of a wealth of s c i e n t i f i c information. The follow-
i n g conclusions are drawn from the information i n t h i s r e p o r t .

1. Cryogenic oxygen system hardware modifications and changes made

as a r e s u l t of t h e Apollo 13 failure s a t i s f i e d , w i t h i n safe limits, all
system requirements f o r f u t u r e missions, including e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t y .

2. The advantages of manned s p a c e f l i g h t were again c l e a r l y demon-

s t r a t e d on t h i s mission by t h e crew's a b i l i t y t o diagnose and work around
hardware problems and malfunctions which otherwise might have r e s u l t e d i n
mission terminat ion.

' 3 . Navigation was t h e most d i f f i c u l t l u n a r s u r f a c e t a s k because of

problems i n f i n d i n g and recognizing small features, reduced v i s i b i l i t y
i n t h e up-sun and down-sun d i r e c t i o n s , and t h e i n a b i l i t y t o judge d i s -
t ances .
4. Rendezvous w i t h i n one o r b i t of l u n a r ascent was demonstrated
f o r t h e first t i m e i n t h e Apollo program. This t y p e of rendezvous re-
duces t h e time between lunw l i f t - o f f and docking by approximately
2 hours from that r e q u i r e d on previous missions. The t i m e l i n e a c t i v i -
t i e s , however, are g r e a t l y compressed.

5. On previous lunar missions, l u n a r s u r f a c e dust adhering t o equip-

Illent being r e t u r n e d t o e a r t h has c r e a t e d a problem i n both s p a c e c r a f t .
The s p e c i a l d u s t c o n t r o l procedures and equipment used on t h i s mission
were e f f e c t i v e i n lowering t h e o v e r a l l l e v e l of d u s t .

6. Onboard navigation without air-to-ground comnunications was suc-

cessf'ully demonstrated during t h e t r a n s e a r t h phase of t h e mission t o be
s u f f i c i e n t l y accurate f o r u s e as a contingency mode of o p e r a t i o n during
f u t u r e missions.

7 . Launching through cumulus clouds w i t h t o p s up t o 1 0 000 feet

was demonstrated t o be a s a f e launch r e s t r i c t i o n f o r t h e prevention of
t r i g g e r e d l i g h t n i n g . The cloud conditions at l i f t - o f f were at t h e l i m i t
of t h i s r e s t r i c t i o n and no t r i g g e r e d l i g h t n i n g was recorded d u r i n g t h e
launch phase.
 A-1

APPENDIX A - VEHICLE DESCRIPTION

The Apollo 14 space vehicle c o n s i s t e d of a block I1 c o n f i g u r a t i o n

s p a c e c r a f t and a Saturn V launch v e h i c l e (AS-509). The assemblies com-
p r i s i n g t h e s p a c e c r a f t consisted o f a launch escape system, command and
s e r v i c e modules (CSM-1101, a spacecraft/launch v e h i c l e a d a p t e r , and a
l u n a r module (IM-8). The changes made t o t h e command and s e r v i c e modules,
t h e l u n a r module, t h e e x t r a v e h i c u l a r mobility u n i t , t h e lunar s u r f a c e
experiment equipment, and t h e launch v e h i c l e s i n c e t h e Apollo 13 mission
are presented. The changes made t o t h e s p a c e c r a f t systems are more num-
erous t h a n f o r previous l u n a r landing missions p r i m a r i l y because of im-
provements made as a r e s u l t of t h e Apollo 13 problems and p r e p a r a t i o n s
f o r more extensive e x t r a v e h i c u l a r operations.

A.l COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE

A.l.l S t r u c t u r a l and Mechanical Systems

The m o r s t r u c t u r a l changes were i n s t a l l a t i o n s i n t h e s e r v i c e mod-

ule t o accommodate an a d d i t i o n a l cryogenic oxygen tank i n s e c t o r 1 and
an a u x i l i a r y battery i n s e c t o r 4. These changes are discussed f u r t h e r
i n s e c t i o n A.1.3.

S t r u c t u r a l changes were made i n t h e spacecraft/launch v e h i c l e a d a p t e r

as follows. A door w a s i n s t a l l e d at s t a t i o n 547 (305 deg) t o provide ac-
c e s s t o quadrant 2 of t h e l u n a r module descent s t a g e where Apollo l u n a r
s u r f a c e experiment subpackages 1 and 2 were stowed. Also, doublers were
bonded on t h e adapter at s t a t i o n 547 (215 deg) i n case a similar door had
been r e q u i r e d f o r contingency access t o t h e l u n a r module cryogenic helium
tank during prelaunch operations.

The i n t e r i o r of gussets 3 and 4, which contain t h e breech-plenum

assemblies of t h e forward heat s h i e l d j e t t i s o n i n g system, were armored
w i t h a polyimide-impregnated f i b e r g l a s s t o prevent burn-through of t h e
gussets and p o s s i b l e damage t o adjacent equipment i n t h e event of es-
caping gas from t h e breech assemblies.
A-2

A.1.2 Environmental Control System

The postlanding v e n t i l a t i o n valves were modified t o i n c o r p o r a t e dry

(non-lubricated) brake shoes t o prevent p o s s i b l e s t i c k i n g and a second
shear p i n w a s added t o i n s u r e p o s i t i v e d r i v e between t h e a c t u a t o r s h a f t
and c m .

To provide c o n t r o l l e d v e n t i n g f o r an oxygen tank flow t e s t , t h e i n -

t e r n a l diameter of t h e a u x i l i a r y dump nozzle ( l o c a t e d i n t h e s i d e h a t c h )
w a s enlarged.

Sodium n i t r a t e w a s added t o t h e b u f f e r ampules used i n s t e r i l i z i n g

t h e p o t a b l e water, Addition of t h e sodium n i t r a t e w a s t o reduce system
c o r r o s i o n and enhance t h e s t e r i l i z a t i o n q u a l i t i e s of t h e c h l o r i n e .

A vacuum cleaner w i t h detachable bags w a s added t o assist i n remov-

i n g l u n a r dust from s u i t s and equipment p r i o r t o i n t r a v e h i c u l a r t r a n s f e r
from t h e l u n a r module t o t h e command module after l u n a r s u r f a c e opera-
t i o n s , and f o r cleanup i n t h e command module.

A.1.3 E l e c t r i c a l Power System

The e l e c t r i c a l power system w a s changed s i g n i f i c a n t l y after t h e

Apollo 1 3 cryogenic oxygen subsystem failure. The maJor changes are as
follows .
a. The i n t e r n a l c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e cryogenic oxygen tanks w a s mod-
i f i e d as described i n t h e following t a b l e .
Previous block I1 v e h i c l e s CSM-110 and subsequent v e h i c l e s
Each tank contained two destrat- Fans were deleted.
i f i c a t i o n fans.
Q u a n t i t y gaging probe w a s made Quantity gaging probe material
of aluminum. w a s changed t o s t a i n l e s s steel.
Heater c o n s i s t e d of two paral- Heater w a s changed t o three par-
lel-connected elements wound allel-connected elements w i t h
on a s t a i n l e s s s t e e l tube. s e p a r a t e c o n t r o l of one element.
F i l t e r w a s located i n tank F i l t e r w a s relocated t o external
discharge. line.
Tank contained h e a t e r thermal Heater t h e r m a l switches were re-
switches t o prevent heater move d.
element from overheating.
Fan motor wiring w a s Teflon- All wiring was magnesium oxide-
insulated. i n s u l a t e d and sheathed w i t h
s t a i n l e s s steel.
 A-3

b . A t h i r d cryogenic oxygen s t o r a g e t a n k w a s i n s t a l l e d i n s e c t o r 1
o f t h e s e r v i c e module. T h i s tank s u p p l i e d olCygen t o t h e f u e l c e l l s and
could b e used simultaneously With t h e two t a n k s i n s e c t o r 4. A new i s o -
l a t i o n valve w a s i n s t a l l e d between tanks 2 and 3 t o prevent t h e l o s s of
oxygen from tank 3 i n t h e event o f damage t o t h e plumbing f o r t a n k s 1 and
2. The closed i s o l a t i o n valve a l s o would have prevented t h e flow o f oxy-
gen from tank 3 t o t h e fuel c e l l s . However, tank 3 could have s u p p l i e d
t h e environmental c o n t r o l system with t h e i s o l a t i o n valve closed while
t h e a u x i l i a r y b a t t e r y , mentioned i n paragraph e, w a s t h e source of e l e c -
t r i c a l power.

c . The tank 1 and 2 pressure switches remained wired i n s e r i e s as

i n t h e previous configuration; t h e tank 3 switch w a s wired i n p a r a l l e l
and w a s independent of tanks 1 and 2.

d. The f u e l c e l l s h u t o f f valve used previously w a s an i n t e g r a l

f o r g i n g containing two check valves and t h r e e r e a c t a n t s h u t o f f v a l v e s .
I n t h e valve used f o r CSM-IlO, t h e two check valves remained i n t h e i n -
t e g r a l forging; however, t h e r e a c t a n t s h u t o f f valves were removed and
r e p l a c e d by t h r e e valves r e l o c a t e d i n l i n e w i t h t h e i n t e g r a l forging.
These valves were t h e same type as t h o s e used i n t h e s e r v i c e module re-
a c t i o n c o n t r o l helium system. "he valve seals were changed t o a t y p e
t h a t provides a b e t t e r s e a l under extreme cold. Figure A-1 i l l u s t r a t e s
t h e major changes t o t h e system except f o r t h e i n t e r n a l tank changes.

e . A n a u x i l i a r y b a t t e r y , having a c a p a c i t y of 400-ampere hours, w a s

i n s t a l l e d on t h e aft bulkhead i n s e c t o r 4 o f t h e s e r v i c e module t o pro-
v i d e a source of e l e c t r i c a l power i n case of a cryogenic subsystem f a i l -
ure. Two c o n t r o l boxes, not used on previous f l i g h t s , were added t o ac-
commodate t h e a u x i l i a r y b a t t e r y . One box contained two motor switches
which could disconnect fuel c e l l 2 from t h e s e r v i c e module and connect
t h e a u x i l i a r y b a t t e r y i n i t s place. The second box contained an over-
l o a d sensor f o r wire p r o t e c t i o n .

A.1.4 Instrumentation

S i x new telemetry measurements a s s o c i a t e d with t h e high-gain antenna

were added t o i n d i c a t e p i t c h , yaw, and beam-width, and whether t h e antenna
w a s o p e r a t i n g i n t h e manual, automatic t r a c k i n g , o r r e a c q u i s i t i o n m d e .
This a d d i t i o n a l instrumentation provided d a t a t o support F l i g h t Control
management of t h e high-gain antenna.
Other instrumentation changes were as follows. The cabin p r e s s u r e
t r a n s d u c e r w a s replaced with one which had been reworked, cleaned, and
inspected f o r contaminants. I n t h e p a s t , l o o s e n i c k e l - p l a t i n g p a r t i c l e s
had i n t e r f e r e d with i n f l i g h t measurements. Additional instrumentation
w a s incorporated t o monitor t h e a u x i l i a r y battery, t h e oxygen tank h e a t e r
element temperatures, t h e oxygen tank 2 and 3 manifold p r e s s u r e , and t h e
t m k 3 pressure.
A- 4

NASA-S-7 1-1707
c;1Oxygen relief

Pressure transducer

Pressure switch

(Third oxygen tank

and half-system
valve module added)

Figure A-1.- Cryogenic oxygen s t o r a g e system.

 A-5

A.1.5 Pyrotechnics

F a b r i c a t i o n and q u a l i t y c o n t r o l procedures o f two pyrotechnic devices

used i n t h e command and s e r v i c e module t e n s i o n t i e c u t t e r and t h e command
module forward h e a t s h i e l d j e t t i s o n i n g system were improved. Although no
known i n f l i g h t problem with t h e t e n s i o n t i e c u t t e r has e x i s t e d , a Skylab
q u a l i f i c a t i o n t e s t (performed under more severe vacuum and thermal condi-
t i o n s than f o r Apollo) revealed t h a t it v a r i e d i n performance. I n t h e
forward h e a t s h i e l d j e t t i s o n i n g system, t h e technique of assembling t h e
breech t o t h e plenum w a s improved t o e l i m i n a t e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of damage
t o t h e O-ring during assembly. On Apollo 13, t h e p r o p e l l a n t gas had l e a k -
ed from t h e gusset 4 breech assembly, a hole w a s burned through t h e alu-
minum gusset cover p l a t e , and t h e p i l o t parachute mortar cover w a s damaged.
S t r u c t u r a l modifications t o gussets 3 and 4 are described i n s e c t i o n A . l . l .

The docking r i n g s e p a r a t i o n system w a s modified by a t t a c h i n g t h e sep-

a r a t i o n charge holder t o t h e backup bars with b o l t s as w e l l as t h e s p r i n g
system used previously. This change w a s made t o i n s u r e t h a t t h e charge
h o l d e r remained secure upon a c t u a t i o n of t h e pyrotechnic charge at command
m d u l e / l u n a r mdule s e p a r a t i o n .

~ . 1 . 6 C r e w Provisions
A contingency water storage system w a s added t o provide drinking
w a t e r i n t h e event t h a t water could not be obtained from t h e r e g u l a r pota-
b l e w a t e r t a n k . The system included f i v e c o l l a p s i b l e 1-gallon c o n t a i n e r s ,
f i l l hose, and dispenser valve. The c o n t a i n e r s were 6-inch p l a s t i c cubes
covered with Beta c l o t h . The bags could also be used t o s t o r e u r i n e as a
backup t o t h e waste management system overboard dump nozzles. (The aux-
i l i a r y dump nozzle i n t h e side hatch w a s modified f o r an oxygen tank flow
t e s t and could n o t be used.)

A side hatch window camera bracket was added t o provide t h e capa-

b i l i t y t o photograph through t h e hatch window with t h e 7Omm Hasselblad
camera.

The i n t r a v e h i c u l a r boot bladder was r e p l a c e d with t h e type of blad-

der used i n t h e e x t r a v e h i c u l a r boot because it has s u p e r i o r wear qual-
ities.

A.l.7 Displays and Controls

The following changes were made which a f f e c t e d crew s t a t i o n d i s p l a y s

and c o n t r o l s . The a l a r m l i m i t f o r cryogenic hydrogen and oxygen p r e s s u r e
w a s lowered from 220 p s i a t o approximately 200 p s i a t o e l i m i n a t e nuisance
alarms. The f l a g i n d i c a t o r s on panel 3 f o r t h e hydrogen and oxygen re-
actant v a l v e s were changed t o i n d i c a t e c l o s i n g of e i t h e r s h u t o f f valve
A-6

i n s t e a d of closure o f both v a l v e s , and valve c l o s u r e w a s added t o t h e

c a u t i o n and warning matrix. Oxygen tank 2 and 3 manifold p r e s s u r e was
added t o t h e caution and warning system. C i r c u i t r y and c o n t r o l s necessary
t o c o n t r o l and monitor oxygen t a n k 3 were added ( h e a t e r s , pressure, and
q u a n t i t y ) . Switches were added t o panel 278 t o connect t h e a u x i l i a r y
b a t t e r y end a c t i v a t e t h e new i s o l a t i o n valve between oxygen t a n k s 2 and
3. C i r c u i t r y and-controls (Slg, S20 on panel 2; C/B on p a n e l 226) f o r
t h e cryogenic fan motors were d e l e t e d . The c o n t r o l s f o r t h e oxygen t a n k
h e a t e r s were changed t o permit t h e use o f one, two, o r t h r e e h e a t e r ele-
ments at a t i m e depending upon t h e need f o r oxygen flow.

A.2 LUNAR MODULF:

A.2.1 S t r u c t u r e s and Mechanical Systems

Support s t r u c t u r e w a s added t o t h e descent s t a g e f o r attachment of

t h e laser ranging r e t r o - r e f l e c t o r t o t h e e x t e r i o r of quadrant 1 and at-
tachment of t h e l u n a r p o r t a b l e magnetometer t o t h e e x t e r i o r of quadrant 2
( s e e s e c t i o n A.4 f o r d e s c r i p t i o n of experiment equipment). A modular
equipment t r a n s p o r t e r w a s a t t a c h e d t o t h e modular equipment stowage as-
sembly i n quadrant 4. T h i s system ( f i g . A-2) w a s provided t o t r a n s p o r t
equipment and lunar samples, and t o serve as a mobile workbench during
e x t r a v e h i c u l a r a c t i v i t i e s . The t r a n s p o r t e r w a s c o n s t r u c t e d of t u b u l a r
aluminum, weighed 25 pounds, and w a s designed t o c a r r y a l o a d of about
140 pounds, including about 30 pounds of lunar samples.

A.2.2 E l e c t r i c a l Power

Because of an anomaly which occurred on Apollo 1 3 i n which t h e de-

scent b a t t e r i e s experienced c u r r e n t t r a n s i e n t s and t h e crew noted a
thumping n o i s e and snowflakes v e n t i n g from quadrant 4 of t h e l u n a r mod-
u l e , both t h e ascent and descent b a t t e r i e s were modified as follows:

a. The t o t a l b a t t e r y c o n t a i n e r w a s p o t t e d and t h e p o t t i n g on t o p
of t h e b a t t e r y c e l l s w a s improved.

b. Manifolding from c e l l t o c e l l and t o t h e b a t t e r y case vent w a s

incorporated.

c. The outside and i n s i d e s u r f a c e s o f t h e b a t t e r y cover were re-

v e r s e d s o t h a t t h e r i b s were on t h e e x t e r i o r of t h e b a t t e r y .

I n a d d i t i o n , t h e ascent b a t t e r i e s were m d i f i e d i n t h e following

manner :
 F i w r e A-2. - Modular equipment transporter
and equipment.

a. The negative t e r m i n a l was r e l o c a t e d t o t h e opposite end of t h e

battery .
b. The case vent valve w a s r e l o c a t e d t o t h e same f a c e as t h e posi-
t i v e t e r m i n a l t o allow purging t h e f u l l l e n g t h of t h e b a t t e r y case.

c. The p i g t a i l , .purge p o r t , and t h e manifold vent valve were re-

l o c a t e d t o t h e same f a c e a s the negative t e r m i n a l .

A c i r c u i t b r e a k e r w a s added t o t h e l u n a r module t o bypass t h e com-

mand module/lunar module bus connect r e l a y c o n t a c t s f o r t r a n s f e r r i n g
power between v e h i c l e s after lunw ascent and docking. The command mod-
u l e / l u n a r module bus connect r e l a y c o n t r o l c i r c u i t i s i n t e r r u p t e d a t
lunar module s t a g i n g .
A-0

A.2.3 Instrumentation

Instrumentation changes i n t h e ascent propulsion system included t h e

i n s t a l l a t i o n of a p r e s s u r e t r a n s d u c e r i n each o f t h e two helium tanks i n
p l a c e of two t a n k temperkture E m i t s e n s o r s which had been used f o r meas-
u r i n g s t r u c t u r a l temperature. The added p r e s s u r e t r a n s d u c e r s , i n con-
j u n c t i o n with t h e primary p r e s s u r e t r a n s d u c e r s already p r e s e n t , provided
redundancy i n monitoring f o r l e a k s . Two temperature lneasurements were
added t o t h e ascent water tank l i n e s t o monitor s t r u c t u r a l temperatures
i n place of the measurements d e l e t e d from t h e ascent propulsion system
helium t a n k s .

A descent propulsion system f u e l b a l l valve temperature measurement

was added f o r p o s t f l i g h t a n a l y s i s purposes because of concern t h a t damage
could result from heat soak-back i n t o p r o p e l l a n t l i n e s after powered de-
scent.

A.2.4 Displeys and Controls

I n t h e ascent propulsion system, t h e i n p u t s from t h e f e e d l i n e i n t e r -

f a c e p r e s s u r e sensors t o t h e caution and warning system w e r e d i s a b l e d .
Because o f t h e low p r e s s u r e at t h e s e sensors p r i o r t o system p r e s s u r i z a -
t i o n , t h e i r i n p u t s t o t h e c a u t i o n and warning system would have masked
t h e low-pressure warning s i g n a l from t h e helium t a n k s at c r i t i c a l p o i n t s
i n t h e mission.

Because of e r r a t i c i n d i c a t i o n s given by t h e ascent propulsion system

f u e l low-level i n d i c a t o r during p r e f l i g h t checkout, t h e i n d i c a t o r w a s d i s -
abled t o prevent master alarms.

The f o u r r e a c t i o n c o n t r o l syst e m c l u s t e r temperature measurement

i n p u t s t o t h e caution and warning system were i n h i b i t e d t o prevent nuis-
ance alarms s i n c e it w a s determined t h a t t h e s e measurements w e r e no l o n g e r
needed.

An i n c o r r e c t i n d i c a t i o n of t h e ascent s t a g e gaseous oxygen tank 1

pressure input t o t h e caution and warning system w a s experienced during
p r e f l i g h t checkout. Therefore, t h e i n p u t t o t h e caution and warning
system w a s d i s a b l e d t o prevent meaningless alarms.

A.2.5 Descent Propulsion

Anti-slosh b a f f l e s w e r e i n s t a l l e d i n s i d e t h e descent s t a g e p r o p e l l a n t
t a n k s and t h e diameter of t h e o u t l e t h o l e s f o r t h e p r o p e l l a n t q u a n t i t y gag-
i n g system sensors w a s reduced from 5/8 inch t o 0.2 inch t o minimize pre-
mature low propellant l e v e l i n d i c a t i o n s due t o s l o s h i n g such as had been
experienced on Apollo 11 and 12.

L i
 A-9

It w a s determined by test t h a t t h e descent propulsion system f u e l

l u n a r dump valve would c l o s e under l i q u i d flow conditions when i n s t a l l e d
i n t h e normal flow d i r e c t i o n and could not be reopened. It w a s f u r t h e r
determined t h a t , by r e v e r s i n g t h e valve and i n s t a l l i n g an o r i f i c e upstream
of t h e valve, it would remain open under all expected l i q u i d flow condi-
t i o n s . Because of a p o s s i b l e requirement t o vent t h e p r o p e l l a n t tanks
and t h e cryogenic helium tank under zero-g conditions, t h e v a l v e w a s r e -
i n s t a l l e d i n t h e r e v e r s e flow d i r e c t i o n .

The p r o p e l l a n t q u a n t i t y gaging system sensors w e r e modified t o in-

clude a =tal s p l i t r i n g between t h e e l e c t r o n i c s package cover and t h e
sensor f l a n g e s . This increased t h e clearance between t h e e l e c t r o n i c s
package and cover t o preclude t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of crushed wires due t o
improper clearance.

A.2.6 Ascent Propulsion

To improve t h e seal f o r t h e four-bolt flanged j o i n t between the f i l l -

and-drain l i n e s and t h e main feed l i n e s i n t h e ascent propulsion system,
O-rings were used i n place of i n j e c t e d s e a l a n t s . Teflon O-rings were used
i n t h e o x i d i z e r l i n e s , and b u t y l rubber O-rings were used i n t h e fuel lines.

A.2.7 Environmental Control

A muffler w a s added i n t h e l i n e a t t h e o u t l e t of t h e water-glycol

pump assembly t o reduce t h e pump noise t r a n s m i t t e d t o t h e cabin through
t h e water-glycol l i n e s . The r e g u l a t o r band of t h e high-pressure oxygen
assembly w a s s h i f t e d t o i n c r e a s e t h e r e g u l a t e d pressure from approximately
950 p s i g t o 990 p s i g , providing a higher recharge pressure f o r t h e p o r t -
able l i f e support system and, t h u s , i n c r e a s i n g i t s o p e r a t i n g time f o r
extravehicular a c t i v i t i e s .

~ . 2 . 8 Crew Provisions

The f l e x i b l e - t y p e container assembly previously used f o r stowage i n

t h e l e f t hand s i d e of t h e lunar module cabin w a s replaced w i t h a metal
modularized container which w a s packed before being placed i n t o t h e l u n a r
module.

Return stowage c a p a b i l i t y was provided f o r two a d d i t i o n a l l u n a r rock

sample bags.
A-10

A.3 EmVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT

The t h i g h convolute of t h e p r e s s u r e garment assembly w a s r e i n f o r c e d

t o decrease bladder abrasion which had been noted on t r a i n i n g s u i t s .
Also, t h e crotch p u l l e y and cable r e s t r a i n t system w a s reconfigured t o
provide f o r heavier l o a d s .

The p o r t a b l e l i f e support system w a s modified as follows. A carbon

dioxide sensor w a s added and a s s o c i a t e d changes were made t o provide
t e l e m e t r y of carbon dioxide p a r t i a l pressure i n t h e p r e s s u r e garment as-
sembly. I n a d d i t i o n , an o r i f i c e was added t o t h e feedwater t r a n s d u c e r
t o prevent f r e e z i n g of water trapped w i t h i n t h e t r a n s d u c e r housing, which
would otherwise result i n i n c o r r e c t readings. The oxygen purge system
w a s modified by t h e d e l e t i o n of t h e oxygen h e a t e r system because t h e oxy-
gen does n o t r e q u i r e p r e h e a t i n g t o be compatible w i t h crew requirements.

A new piece of equipment, t h e buddy secondary l i f e support system,

was provided as a means of s h a r i n g cooling water from one p o r t a b l e l i f e
support system by both crewmen i n t h e event t h a t one cooling system
became i n o p e r a t i v e . The u n i t c o n s i s t s of a water u m b i l i c a l , r e s t r a i n t
hooks and t e t h e r l i n e , and a water-flow d i v i d e r assembly.

A.4 EXPERIMENT EQUIPMENT

Table A-I l i s t s t h e experiment equipment c a r r i e d on Apollo 14,

i d e n t i f i e s t h e stowage l o c a t i o n s of t h e equipment i n t h e l u n a r module,
and r e f e r e n c e s a p p l i c a b l e Apollo mission r e p o r t s i f equipment has been
described previously. Equipment not c a r r i e d on previous missions i s de-
s c r i b e d i n t h e following paragraphs. The two subpackages of t h e Apollo
lunar s u r f a c e experiments package are shown i n f i g u r e s A-3 and A-4.

A. 4.1 Active Seismic Experiment

The a c t i v e seismic experiment acquires information t o help deter-

mine t h e p h y s i c a l p r o p e r t i e s of l u n a r s u r f a c e and subsurface materials
u s i n g a r t i f i c i a l l y produced seismic waves.

The experiment equipment c o n s i s t s of t h r e e i d e n t i c a l geophones, a

thumper, a mortar package, a c e n t r a l e l e c t r o n i c s assembly, and i n t e r -
connecting cabling. The geophones a r e electromagnetic devices which
were deployed on t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e t o t r a n s l a t e surface move-nt into
e l e c t r i c a l s i g n a l s . The thumper i s a device t h a t was operated by one of
 A-ll

* -t

NlVN N (UN

-
U
n

U
Y
I A- 12

NASA-S-71-1709

Slde

Figure A-3.- Experiment subpackage no. 1.

NASA-S-71-1110

n Palkl and r.dioiro(g=

W
Figure A-4.- Experiment subpackage no. 2 .
 A-13

t h e crewmen t provide seismi , T h i g n a l s were generated by

holding t h e thumper a g a i n s t the l u n a r surface at v a r i o u s l o c a t i o n s along
t h e l i n e of t h e geophones and f i r i n g explosive i n i t i a t o r s l o c a t e d i n t h e
base of t h e thumper. The mortar package c o n s i s t s of a mortar box assem-
b l y and a grenade launch t u b e assembly. The mortar box e l e c t r o n i c s pro-
v i d e f o r t h e arming and f i r i n g of rocket motors which w i l l launch f o u r
high-explosive grenades from t h e launch t u b e assembly upon remote command.
The monitor package i s designed t o launch t h e grenades t o d i s t a n c e s of
5000, 3000, 1000, and 500 f e e t . S i g n a l s sensed by t h e geophones are t r a n s -
m i t t e d t o earth-based recorders.

A. 4.2 Lunar Portable Magnetometer Experiment

The l u n a r p o r t a b l e magnetometer w a s used t o measure t h e magnetic

f i e l d at two l o c a t i o n s along a traverse on t h e l u n a r s u r f a c e . The meas-
urements w i l l be used t o determine t h e l o c a t i o n , s t r e n g t h and dimensions
o f . t h e source, and, i n t u r n , t o study both l o c a l and whole-moon geolog-
i c a l structure.

The experiment equipment c o n s i s t s o f a sensor head containing three

orthogonal single-axis fluxgate sensor assemblies, an e l e c t r o n i c s and
data d i s p l a y package, and a t r i p o d . The e l e c t r o n i c s package i s powered
by E r c u r y c e l l s . The package has an on-off switch and a switch t o s e l e c t
high and low wter ranges (?lo0 gammas and +50 gammas). The data d i s p l a y
c o n s i s t s of t h r e e meters, one f o r each axis.

A.5 MASS PROPERTIES

Spacecraft mass p r o p e r t i e s f o r t h e Apollo 1 4 mission are summarized

i n table A-11. These data represent t h e conditions as determined from
p o s t f l i g h t analyses of expendable loadings and usage during t h e f l i g h t .
V a r i a t i o n s i n command and s e r v i c e module and l u n a r module mass p r o p e r t i e s
a r e determined f o r each s i g n i f i c a n t mission phase from l i f t - o f f through
landing. Expendables usage are based on r e p o r t e d real-time and post-
f l i g h t data as presented i n o t h e r s e c t i o n s of t h i s r e p o r t . The weights
and center-of-gravity o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l modules (command, s e r v i c e , ascent
s t a g e , and descent s t a g e ) were measured p r i o r t o f l i g h t and i n e r t i a values
calculated.' A l l changes incorporated a f t e r t h e a c t u a l weighing were mon-
i t o r e d , and t h e mass p r o p e r t i e s were updated.
 .

A-14

TABLE A-11.- MASS PROPERTIES

-
ll m.3 841.5 2.2 3.1 68 9 1 1 1 8 3 929 11% 165 Lo58
n2 083.6 1207.6 2.4 4.0 67 445 T24926 12l209 5759

61 388.0 934.4 C.0 6.b 251 . nos 19 5 3 l -1181

33 8 9 . 2 l236.1 -.2 -.3 22 533 2b 3 9 24 9 M -466
98 037.2 lo38.2 2.6 4.1 51 on 531 5n 540 sob - 8 1 4
91 901.) s. 2.6
los1 4.1 56969 5 3 ~ s ~ in -R?P
91 104.1 1038.9 2.6 b.0 56 567 535 156 539 02b -823

97 033.1 lo39 .o 2.6 b.0 56499 5% 582 538* -mu

n 168.8 lob.9 1.3 2.1 43 395 410 855 bii 3 U -5576
10 162.3 1086.b 1.3 2.1 b3 812 bo2639 bo8b% -M&
35 996.3 9b5.0 2.2 5.8 19 725 51 161 62 b5a -urn

35 6lo.4 9L5.2 2.2 5.8 19 b94 51 032 62 2bb -1%3

3h i25:5 9u.5 1.9 6.0 18 662 56 59h 6 1 218 -18l2

5 181.3 U65.2 4.6 -2.3 3 3b7 2 291 2 723 -UT

39 906.8 918.2 2.3 b.8 22 090 913 Ub 958 -1341

39 903.9 916.3 1.9 4.9 21 910 lo5751 U O 659 -zoo9
9 596.3 947.5 2 .O 5.7 18 74L 5103l 61660 -in2

3L 554.4 947.3 2.0 5.7 18 7 P 56 553 6 1 lb -1146

24 6 Y . 9 975.3 -1.6 1.4 13 592 b1 585 l11382 142

21 375.0 975.1 -1.6 1.5 13 386 41 34b b1 l90 11

11 659.9 906.4 -3.1 9.4 1 b59 l2908 13280 -4l8

12 115.1 1038.2 -.2 5.1 5 897 5 281 4 163 bb
12 m3.5 1039.2 - .2 5.6 5890 5-l I162 bb

12 13o.t 1031.6 -.l 5.8 5686 4 6fb L Lo3 Lb

--- --
ll 4 8 l . i lon.9 -.l 4.8 5 91 4 451 b 083
- 35

184.9
IAm

-.3
-
25 034
-
31b
33 651.9 2b 925

34 125.9 186.0 -.3 26 U P 26073 3l8

3b 067.8 185.9 -.3 26 018 25 965 Yll
16 3 l l . T 213.6 -.6 13 629 is059 398
M 779.8 2b3.9 .2 3 Lo8 5 95b 6

5 911.8 251.0 .3 2 908 2 14b lob 5

5 M0.l 256.8 .I 2899 2 123 M5 6

5 781.3 256.7 .4 2 ma 2 055 M5 8

5 301.6 258.2 .2 2 m 2 0%
- 3
 B-1

APPENDIX B - SPACECRAFT HISTORIES

The h i s t o r y of command and s e r v i c e module, (CSM 110) operations at
t h e manufacturer's f a c i l i t y , Downey, C a l i f o r n i a , is s h a m i n figure B-1,
and t h e o p e r a t i o n s at Kennedy Space Center, F l o r i d a , i n figure B-2.

The h i s t o r y of t h e lunar module (LM-8) at t h e manufacturer's f a c i l -

i t y , Bethpage, New York, i s shown i n figure B-3, and t h e operations at
Kennedy Space Center, F l o r i d a , i n f i g u r e B-4.

NASA-S-71-1711

-
1969

Febury I Yrch I April I May I June I July 1 August ISeptember I October November

-Individual systems checkout

lntepratcd systems test

=Data review

m m I Modifications and retest

rn m ~ p o 1 1100and 11 mission support

1Demate

-
installations and checkout III
Weight and balance I
Command module
Preshipnent inspection I

Preparation fa shipment and ship

Final installations and checkout

Service module

[ Preshipnent inspection

Preparation for shipment and ship-

1

Figure B-1.- Checkout flow f o r Command and s e r v i c e modules a t

c o n t r a c t o r 's f a c i l i t y .
B-2

NASA -S -71 -1712

1970 1 1971
I 1 I I August I November1 DecemberJanuary

-
April May June July I S S e m b e r l October

1 - ' Waterlglycol spill cleanup and equipment replacement (see note 2)

-Equipment installation and retest

8 Altitude chamber tests

Cryogenic and return enhancement modifications and retest

-
Spacecraflllaunch vehicle a s s e m b l y l

Move space vehicle to launch complex

Sector 4 cryogenic shelf installation1

Space vehicle systems and flight readiness tests-

Jotes:
1- Command and service modules Spacecraft propulsion leak checks and propellant loading1
delivered t o Kennedy Space
Center on November 19, 1969 Countdown demonstration test.
2. Spill resulted from hole accidentally
punched in cold plate during install- Countdown(
ation of new inertial measurement
unit on April 14, 1970 Launch '1 r

Figure 3-2.- Command and service module checkout h i s t o r y at

Kennedy Space Center.
NASA-S-?I -1113
I 1969 I
I
January February1 March I April I May 1 June 1 July I August ISeptemberl October I November
1-IManufacturing. cold flow I. and preparations lor subsystems testing

-Mated subsystems testing

-Manufacturing, cold (low n, and electrical preparations for

I
-
final engineering and evaluation acceptance test

I Final engineering and evaluation acceptance1test

- 1
mh
t
edcrew compartment 111 and function checks
I
Cold Ilarvmand modifications=

Mated retest

Preparationlor shipment and ship=

Figure B - 3 . - Checkout f l o w f o r lunar module

at c o n t r a c t o r ' s f a c i l i t y .

L
 B- 3

NASA-S-7 1-17 14

1970 1971
June
I July December January

Ascent stage delivered to Kennedy

Space Center on November 21, 1969;
Countdown 1
descent stage delivered on November Launch 7
24, 1969

Figure B-4.- Lunar module checkout h i s t o r y a t

Kennedy Space Center.
 c-1

APPENDIX C - POSTF'LIGHT TESTING

The command module a r r i v e d at t h e Lunar Receiving Laboratory, Houston,
Texas, on February 22, 1971, a f i e r r e a c t i o n c o n t r o l system d e a c t i v a t i o n
and pyrotechnic s a f i n g i n H a w a i i . A t t h e end of t h e quarantine p e r i o d ,
t h e crew equipment w a s removed and t h e command module w a s s h i p p e d t o t h e
c o n t r a c t o r ' s f a c i l i t y i n D m e y , C a l i f o r n i a , on A p r i l 8. P o s t f l i g h t t e s t -
i n g and i n s p e c t i o n of t h e command module f o r e v a l u a t i o n of t h e i n f l i g h t
performance and i n v e s t i g a t i o n of t h e f l i g h t i r r e g u l a r i t i e s were conducted
at t h e c o n t r a c t o r ' s and vendor's f a c i l i t i e s and at t h e Manned Spacecraft
Center i n accordance with approved Apollo Spacecraft Hardware U t i l i z a t i o n
Requests ( A S H U R ' s ) . The t e s t s performed as a r e s u l t of i n f l i g h t problems
are described i n t a b l e C-I and discussed i n t h e appropriate systems per-
formance s e c t i o n s of t h i s r e p o r t . Tests being conducted f o r o t h e r pur-
poses i n accordance w i t h o t h e r ASHUR's and t h e b a s i c c o n t r a c t are not
included.
c-2

W
I i

u
u V
L a 5
c
B
c.
4

C
2
N
4
u
W u
ga e.
h
8 +J
5;
c u
fP '
c
u o
'a 2;
u *
ud P
u U N
u o
W
d C
w v
ua
-
a R
zg
t W
Y O
-cIw
uu 5 t 4

8: g9
 c-3

d
0
u
I

I
H
I
u
Y
2
I3
 D-1

APPENDIX D - DATA AVAILABILITY

Tables D-I and D-I1 are summasies of t h e .data made a v a i l a b l e f o r
systems performance analyses and anomaly i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . Table D-I l i s t s
t h e d a t a from t h e command and s e r v i c e modules, and t a b l e D-11, t h e l u n a r
mdule . For a d d i t i o n a l information regarding d a t a a v a i l a b i l i t y , t h e
status l i s t i n g of a l l mission data i n t h e C e n t r a l Metric Data F i l e ,
b u i l d i n g 1 2 , MSC, should be consulted.
D -2

TABLE D-I.- COMMAND AND SERVICE MOWLE DATA AVAILABILITY

- -
Tim. h r : d n Bandpa88
plota Bilevela
Caputrr
vordn
--
m a
-04:OO
lb

w:30
or tam
X
00 :oo 00 :10 X x X X .X X
00:02 00:14 . Xx X X X
w:40 03:15 X X
01:28 01:4L X X
02:25 02 :34 X X X X X
02 :49 03:b9 X X X X X
03:05 12:oo
03:lb 06:21 X X X
03:k7 Ob.:h7 X X X X X X
04:45 05 :45 X X X X X
05:43 06:45 X X X
c6:b 07:ll X X X
07:18 lo:% X X X
07:b 08 :39 X X X
08:37 10:35 X X
10 :36 14 :35 X X X
lo:% 13:b6 X X
14:51 17:53 X X ' X
15:10 15:lh X X
16:07 16:20 X
17:07 19:W X
18:07 22:b9 X X X
19:08 23:09 X
20:07 21:09 X
22:49 26 :56 X X X
23:08 24:09 X
23:% 24 :50 X
27.:04 30:59 X X X
29 :37 30:37 X X
30:W 31:w X
30:W 30:37 X X
30 :30 31:W X X X X X X
31:Ol 31 31 X X X
34:w 35:28 X
34:54 3057 X X X
39:w b2:53 X X X
b2:53 17:W X X X
U:b8 48:26 X
19:a 51 :19 X
5O:IO 5b:W X X X
55:Ol 58:U X X X
58 :b8 6251 X X X
59:W 61:oo X
59:w 61:W X X
6Q:57 61:19 X X X X X
63:W 67:m X X X
64:w 66:W X
65:49 66:49 X
67:28 69:1@ X X X
67:19 69:M X
69:45 70:51 X X X
69:49 71:09 X
70 :55 75:& X X X
71:49 M:M X
7S:lO 78:b2 X X X
76:25 77:25 X X
76 :IO 77:oC X X X
76:57 77 :o; X X X X X
78:20 78:bi X
79:u &:SI X X X
Q:15 &:04 X X X
Q:bb &:Oh X X X X X X
-&:02 8Q:X X X X

? - 1 I "

L. L L Y 1 - - L I L Li L
 D-3

TABLE D-I.- COMMAND AND SEXVICE MODULE DATA AVAILABILITY - Continued

Tim. b r : d n BM&puO Special
plot. Bilerals Special
Plot.
-I~~ ~
'Ib or t a r or t a r
&:14 82:blr X
82:s 83:43 X
83:02 8l:ll X
&:a3 85:U X
85:lO 86:09 X
%:lo 90:50 X
86:lO 8653 X
88:25 &:35 X ' x
88:s &:3b X X
&:b2 90:23 X
9o:OO 101:oo X
W:M 91:28 X
91:OO 9b:59 X X
9b:lO 95:18 X
9b;59 98:bo X X
%:01 97:u X
97:55' 98:20 X X
98:Ob 98:U X
.98:19 99:05 X
98:b 102:b2 x X
98:52 98:55 X
W:b9 100:59 X
99:52 1OO:Ob X
102:OO 102:5b X X
102:b2 108:36 X X
103:38 10b:25 X X X
10b:23 lO4:47 X
.104:47 105:30 X X X
105:Y 106:&7 X
106:kh lD8:42 X X
107:25 108:43 X
108:42 ll0:42 X X
108:42 .lO9:30 X
110:Ll ll1:36 X X
111:20 112:08
111 :54 118:37 X X
116:%? U8:%? X X X
118:31122 :31 X X
U9:02 l20:32
120:02120:32 X X
l20:5512253
l22:31l26:26 X X
l23:15121:&9
l25:15126:30
126:28l29:38 X X
121:15128:25
129:lO129:bO
129:s 13o:bo X X
129:b2 130:lO X
1Y:oo 1P:oo X
131:OO 131:35
1Y:12 135:58 X X
131:33 132:3b X X
133:29 13b:24 X
13&:22 135:lO
135:08 135:12
135:09 136:20
136:19 138:u X
136:20 138:lL X
139:05 1k3:49 X
139:05 139:b5 X
i41:ko 142:18 X
lb2:lO lh3:OO x X X
112:lb 146:05 X I X
D-4

TABU D-I.- COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE DATA A V A I L A B I L I T i - Concluded

Time. hr:min Rurge

B.ndpass Oscillo- Special
Special
plots Bilevelr graph proer-
From To or tabs records

143:31
lb4:12
14h:lO
145:08
145:13 146:14
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
I
146:05 150:54 X X X
146:56 147:55 X
148:lO 1&8:50 X X X
151:lk 151:52 X X X
154:56 158:57 X X X
159 :08 162:56 X X X
162:CO 1 6 4 : ~
162:58 166:07 X X X
165:17 166:18 X X X
166:OO 176:OO
166:18 167:18 X X
166:47 . 170:53 X X X
167:OO 168:18 X X
161:23 168:03
168:18 1 6 9 : u X
169:OO 169:20 X X
169:11 170 :08 X X X
170:57 174:40 X X X
171:05 17b:Ob X
174:Ol 175:59 X
175:09 . 178:56 X X X
175:58 178:52 X
179:05 182:52 X X X
119:50 184:OO
183:05 186:52 X X X
187:02 188:62 X
187:25 190:54 X X X
190:54 194 :49 X X X
19&:49 198:46 X X X
199:06 203:02 X X X
203:U 206:50 X X X
207:06 210:52 X X X
210:b8 2 U : U X X
211:ll 2l4:L9 X X X
21b:17 2l5:06 X X
215:Ob 215:b6 X X X
2l5:08 21S:b3 X X X
215:08 215:bb
215:31 21S:51
215:31 216:oi X X X
 D-5

T A B U D-11.- LUNAR MODULE DATA AVAILABILITY

--
Time. hr:aia
R.n(F Bnuh
8p.ci.l

-
From
-01:OO
To
-02:oo
8t.tion

ALDG X
recorda plot8
or t a r

61 :50 62:15 HSK X X

61 :52 62:15 mn X X
77:31 T8:lO om X X
101 A 5 102:50 ODB X X X X X X X
101:16 102:b2 mn X X
102 :12 106:kb mn X X X
103:38 lOb:25 .om X X X X X X X
10L:lL 108:51 mn X X X
101:23 101 :1'1 aD8 X X X X X
105:31 106 :01 aD8 X X X X
106:05 M:1T om X X X X X X
106:bb lo8:12 lrsn X X X
107:25 107:15 om X X X X X X
107:b2 108:b3 0 X X X X X X X
loa& U0:15 ten X X
108:b3 lo9:oo am X
109:bO ll0:36 ISK X X X X
110 :31 ll1 :3b IBK X
112:20 111:s mn X X
112:25 113:lO 1p)K X
113:02 U5:03 MAD X
114:s U9:03 I6n X X
ll5:02 u9:m WID X
119 :21 =:15 mn X X
=:15 12253 am X
122:3l 126:28 mn X X
l22:51 M:15 om X
126:28 m:38 mn X X X
126:b3 l29:bO am X
l28:39 m:Lo aD8 X X X X
129:2b w:36 om X
129:3T 130:38 an X X
130:35 131:s PDB X X X
13l:12 135:58 lrscan X X X
1P:Y U3:S am X X X
133:b 135:lT am X
135:U 137:lo lplK X X X
136:19 136:b6 lrsn X X X
137:08 138:OT mK X X X
137:19 138:M WID X X
138:M 139:W IUD X X
139:05 lb3:19 mn X X X
139:39 1bl:W IUD X
110:s l&:W WID X
1bO :b9 1h:W WID X X X X
111 :lo 111:b8 IYD X X X
111:15 111:s IUD X X X
111:C9 lb2:18 IUD X X X X X X X
112:11 lb6:05 lrsn X X X
112:59 113:s IUD X X X X X X X
lb3:2l lbb :l6 IUD X X X X X X X

-
113:& lbb :Ol IUD X X
111:58 lb5:15 IUD X X X
115 :05 lb5:15 IUD X
lb5:l2 lb6:lk IUD X X X X X X
lh6:ob 117:W Ian X X X
lb6 :55
-
1b7:30 X X X X X X X
-
lbT:l2 lbT:b2 m X X X X X X
 APPENDIX E - MISSION REPOKT SUPPLEMENTS
Table E-I contains a l i s t i n g of a l l reports t h a t supplement t h e
Apollo 7 through Apollo 14 mission r e p o r t s . The table i n d i c a t e s t h e
p r e s e n t status of each r e p o r t not y e t completed and t h e p u b l i c a t i o n
date of t h o s e which have been published.

.
E-2

TABU E-I .- MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS

jupplement Publication
Title d a t e / s t a t us
number

Apollo 7
1 Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis May 1969
2 Communication System Performance June 1969
3 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System November 1969
Performance An a l y s i s
4 Reaction Control System Performance August 1969
5 Cancelled
6 Entry P o s t f l i g h t Analysis December 1969
Apollo 8
1 . Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis December 1969
2 Guidance Navigation and Control System November 1969
Performance Analysis
3 Performance of Command and S e r v i c e Module March 1970
Reaction Control System
4 Service Propulsion System F i n a l F l i g h t September 1970
Evaluation
5 Cancelled
6 Analysis of Apollo 8 Photography and December 1969
Visual Observations
7 Entry P o s t f l i g h t Analys i s December 1969
Apollo 9 ~~ ~

Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis November 1969

Command and S e r v i c e Module Guidance, Navi- November 1969
gation s and Control System Performance
Lunar Module Abort Guidance System Perform- November 1969
ance Analysis
Performance o f Command and Service Module A p r i l 1970
Reaction Control System
5 Service Propulsion System F i n a l F l i g h t December 1969
Evaluation
6 Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control August 1970
System
7 Ascent Propulsion System F i n a l F l i g h t December 1969
Eval uat i on
8 Descent Propulsion System F i n a l F l i g h t September 197(
Evaluation
9 Cancelled
10 Stroking T e s t Analysis December 1969
11 Cammunications System Performance December 1969
12 E n t r y P o s t f l i g h t Analysis December 1969

L
 E-3

TABLE E-1.- MISSION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS - Continued

upplement Pub li c a t i o n
Title date / s t a t us
number

1 T r a j e c t o r y Reconstruction and Analysis March 1970

2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System December 1969
Performance Analysis
3 Performance of Command and S e r v i c e Module Augus t 1970
Reaction Control System
4 S e r v i c e Propulsion System F i n a l F l i g h t September 1970
Evaluation
5 Performance of Lunar Module Reaction Control Augus t 1970
System
6 Ascent Propulsion System F i n a l F l i g h t January 1970
Evaluation
7 Descent Propulsion System F i n a l F l i g h t January 1970
Evaluat i on
0 Cancelled
9 Analysis of Apollo 10 Photography and Visual I n publication
Obse rvat i ons as SP-232
10 Entry P o s t f l i g h t Analysis December 1969
ll Comunications System Performance December 1969

Apollo 11

1 T r a j e c t o r y Reconstruction and Analysis May 1970

2 Guidance, Navigation, and Control System September 1970
Performance Analysis
3 Performance of Command and Service Module Review
Reaction Control System
4 S e r v i c e Propulsion System F i n a l F l i g h t October 1970
Evaluation
5 Performance o f Lunar Module Reaction Control Revi ew
Sys t e m
6 Ascent Propulsion System F i n a l F l i g h t September 197C
. Evaluation
7 Descent Propulsion System F i n a l F l i g h t September 197C
Evaluation
0 Cancelled
9 Apollo 11 Preliminary Science Report December 1969
10 Communications System Performance January 1970
11 Ent 4 Pos t f U g h t Analy s i s A p r i l 1970
E- 4

TABLE E-1.- MISSION REPOR" SUPPLEMENTS - Concluded

iupplement Publication
Title d a t e / s t a t us
number

Apollo 1 2

Trajectory Reconstruction and Analysis September 1970

Guidance, Navigation, and Control System September 1970
Performance Analysis
Service Propulsion System F i n a l F l i g h t Preparation
Evaluation
Ascent Propulsion System F i n a l F l i g h t Preparation
Evaluat i on
Descent Propulsion System F i n a l F l i g h t Preparation
Evaluation
Apollo 1 2 Preliminary Science Report J u l y 1970
Landing S i t e S e l e c t i o n Processes F i n a l review

Apollo 1 3
I
Guidance, Navigation, and Control System September 1970
Performance Analysis
Descent Propulsion System F i n a l F l i g h t October 1970
Evaluat i on
Entry Pos t f li gh t Analy s i s Cancelled

Apollo 14

Guidance, Navigation , and Control System Preparation

Performance Analysis
Cryogenic Storage Sys tem Performance Preparation
Analysis
Service Propulsion System F i n a l F l i g h t Preparation
Evaluation
Ascent Propulsion System F i n a l F l i g h t Preparation
Evaluation
Des cent Propulsion System F i n a l F l i g h t Preparation
Ev a l u a t i on
Apollo 14 Preliminary Science Report Preparation
A n a l y s i s of I n f l i g h t Demonstrations Preparation
Atmospheric E l e c t r i c i t y Experiments on Pr e p a r a t i on
Apollo 13 and 1 4 Launches

L -
 ~

F- 1

APPENDIX F - GLOSSARY
albedo percentage of l i g h t r e f l e c t e d from a s u r f a c e based upon
t h e amount incident upon it

Brewster angle t h e angle at which electromagnetic r a d i a t i o n i s i n c i -

dent upon a nonmetallic s u r f a c e f o r t h e r e f l e c t e d
r a d i a t i o n t o acquire m a x i m u m plane p o l a r i z a t i o n

eJecta m a t e r i a l thrown out o f a c r a t e r formed by impact o r

. volcanic action

electrophoresis movement of suspended p a r t i c l e s i n a f l u i d by e l e c t r o -

motive f o r c e

f o l i at i on P l a t y o r l e a f - l i k e laminae of a rock

galactic light t o t a l l i g h t emitted by stars i n a given area of t h e

SkY

ge gens ch e i n a f a i n t glow seen from t h e earth along t h e sun-earth

axis i n t h e a n t i - s o l a r d i r e c t i o n

lunar libration an a r e a 60 degrees from t h e earth-moon a x i s i n t h e

region ( ~ b ) d i r e c t i o n o f t h e moon's t r a v e l and on i t s o r b i t a l path

Moulton p o i n t t h e e a r t h ' s l i b r a t i o n p o i n t ( L 1 ) l o c a t e d on t h e sun-

earth axis i n the anti-solar direction

nadir t h e p o i n t on t h e c e l e s t i a l sphere t h a t i s v e r t i c a l l y
downward from t h e observer

regolith t h e s u r f a c e l a y e r of unsorted fragmented m a t e r i a l t h a t

o v e r l i e s consolidated bedrock

z e r o phase t h e condition whereby t h e vector from a r a d i a t i o n source

( s u n ) and t h e observer a r e c o l i n e a r

zodiacal l i g h t a f a i n t wedge of l i g h t seen from t h e earth i n t h e a n t i -

s o l a r . d i r e c t i o n extending upward from t h e horizon along
t h e e c l i p t i c . It i s seen from t r o p i c a l l a t i t u d e s f o r a
f e w hours a f t e r s u n s e t o r before s u n r i s e .
 R- 1

1. Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 1 2 Mission Report. MSC-01855.

March 1970.

2. Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 1 2 Preliminary Science Report.

NASA SP-235. J u l y 1970.

3. Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 13 Mission Report. MSC-02680.

September 1970.

4. Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 11 Preliminary Science Report.

NASA SP-214. December 1969.

5. Marshall Space F l i g h t Center: Saturn V Launch Vehicle F l i g h t

Evaluation Report AS-509 Apollo 1 4 Mission. MPR-SAT-FE-71-1.
A p r i l 1971.

6. Manned Spacecraft Center: Apollo 1 0 and I l Anomaly Report No. 1 -

F u e l C e l l Cm'denser Exit Temperature O s c i l l a t i o n s . MSC-02426.
A p r i l 1970.

7. NASA Headquarters: Apollo F l i g h t Mission Assignments. OmF M-D

MA 500-11 (SE 010-000-1) October 1969.

8. Manned Spacecraft Center: Mission Requirements, H-1 Type Mission

(Lunar Landinp;) .
SPD9-R-056. June 9, 1970.

9. Goddard Space F l i g h t Center: Post Mission Analysis Report.

S-832-71-175.

10. Manned Spacecraft Center: Radiometric Temperature Measurement of

Apollo 14/Saturn V Exhaust. Lockheed E l e c t r o n i c s Company ( 1 ~ 2 0 6 1 ) .
Contract NAS9-10950. A p r i l 1971.

NASA -MSC
 R- 2
MI SS I ON REPORT QUEST IONNA I RE
Mission Reports are prepared as an overall summary of specific Apollo flight
results, with supplemental reports and separate anomaly reports providing the
engineering detail in selected areas. Would you kindly complete this one-page
questionnaire so that our evaluation and reporting service to our readership might
be improved.
1. DO YOU T H I N K T H E CONTENT OF T H E M I S S I O N REPORTS SHOULD E E i

0 LESS DETAILED 0 MORE D E T A l L E D O A B O U T T H E SAME?

2. WOULD YOU SUGGEST ANY CHANGES TO THE P R E S E N T CONTENT?

3 . YOUR COPY I s (checlr m o r e t h a n o n e ) ,

0 READ COMPLETELY 0 READ PART~ALL;I 0 SCANNED 0 NOT READ OR S C A N N E D

0 R O U T E D T O ,OTHERS 0 FILED FOR REFERENCE 0 DISCARDED’ 0 GIVEN T O SOMEONE E L S E

4. ON T H E AVERAGE, HOW O F T E N DO YOU REFER L A T E R TO A M I S S I O N R E P O R T ?

0 NEVER
1. R E G A R D I N G R E P O R T SUPPLEMENTS, YOU,

O U S E THOSE YOU R E C E I V E ’ 0 DO NOT R E C E I V E ANY, B U T WOULD L I K E TO 0 DO NOT N E E D THEM

6. DO YOU W I S H T O C O N T I N U E R E C E I V I N G M I S S I O N R E P O R T S ?

0 YES 0 NO
1 . F U R T H E R S U G G E S T I O N S OR COMMENTS,

IAME ORGANIZATION ADDRESS

I 1

Please fold this form in half with the address on the outside, staple, and m i l
the form to me. Thank you for taking the time to complete this form.

Donald D. Arabian, Chief

Test Division
ISC Form 884 (way 70) NASA -
MSC