Comperative Constitutional Law
Comperative Constitutional Law
Comperative Constitutional Law
University
NEW LAW COLLEGE, PUNE.
SUBMITTED BY:
ABBHEMANYU SIWACH
SEAT NO. 1915751023
ROLL NO. 7
LL.M SEM III ( 2 YRS COURSE)
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Table of Contents
Acknowledgement…………………………………………………………………………… 3
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………...4
Meaning……………………………………………………………………………………….4
Authority…………………………………………………………………………………..….5
Other authorities……………………………………………………………………………7,8
Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………….11
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Acknowledgement
I would like to express my special thanks of
gratitude to my teacher Mayura Ma’am who gave
me the golden opportunity to do this wonderful
project on the topic Scope Of “Other Authority”
Under Article 12 OF Constitution, which also
helped me in doing a lot of Research and I came to
know about so many new things I am really
thankful to her.
Thank You
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1.INTRODUCTION -SCOPE OF “OTHER AUTHORITY” UNDER
ARTICLE 12 OF INDIAN CONSTITUION
The Constitution of India had followed the U.S. precedent and enacted Fundamental Rights in
the Constitution itself. The United States Constitution has defined their legislative and
executive powers in two Articles, which makes it easier to define their correlation. However,
Indian Constitution being an elaborative one, it is difficult to correlate the legislative and
executive powers because those powers are to be found in widely separated parts of our
Constitution1.
The term “State” is defined under Article 12 of Part III (Fundamental Rights) of the
Constitution of India.
It states that, In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires, “the State” includes the
Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each States
and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the
Government of India2. The definition in Article 12 is only for the purpose of application of the
provisions contained in Part III. Hence, even though a body of persons may not constitute
‘State’ within the instant definition, a writ under Article 226 may lie against it on non-
constitutional grounds or on grounds of contravention of some provision of the Constitution
outside Part III, e.g., where such body has a public duty to perform or where its acts are
supported by the State or public officials3
In Ujjamm Bai v. State of U.P4., the Supreme Court observed that Article 12 winds up the list
of authorities falling within the definition by referring to “other authorities” within the territory
of India which cannot, obviously, be read as ejusdem generis with either the Government or
the Legislature or Local authorities. The word “State” is of wide amplitude and capable of
1
H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India: A critical commentary,349(4th ed.).
2
D.J. De’s Constitution of India, Asia Law House, 133 (1949).
3
Durga Das Basu, Commentary on Constitution of India,635, (8th Edition 2007).
4
AIR 1962 SC 1621
4
comprehending every authority created under the statute and functioning within the territory of
India. There is no characterization of the nature of authority set up under a statute for the
purpose of administering laws enacted by the Parliament or by the State including those vested
with the duty to make decisions in order to implement those laws.
3. SCOPE OF ARTICLE 12
When the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the
control of the government and such control is particular to the body and is pervasive, then it
will be “State” within Article 12. If the control is merely regulatory, it will not be a State. 6
The Context of a provision in Part III may exclude the meaning given by Article 12 to the word
‘State’. For instance, the expression ‘security of the State’ Article 19(2) refers not to the persons
carrying on the administration of the State but to the State as organized political society.
INCLUDES
This word indicates that the definition is not exhaustive. Hence, even though the definition
expressly mentions only the Government and the Legislature, there might be other
instrumentalities of State Action within the sweep of the definition. The non-mention of the
Judiciary does not, therefore, necessarily indicate that the courts are intended to be excluded
from the definition
5
Som Prakash v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 212.
6
Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Union of India, (2002) 5 SCC 111.
5
The author is definitely of the opinion that by reason of the word ‘includes’ the definition of
Article 12 enables the Indian Supreme Court to include within the definition all the three organs
of the State (executive, legislative and judicial) as well as all other authorities which have been
included within the concept of State action in U.S.A., and that any narrowing down of the ambit
of the definition would be defeating the object of inserting the definition of Article 12.
4. AUTHORITY
Literally ‘authority’ means a person or body exercising power or having a legal right to
command and be obeyed. An ‘Authority’ is a group of persons with official responsibility for
a particular area of activity and having a moral or legal right or ability to control others. If a
particular cooperative society can be characterized as a “State” under Article 12, it would also
be “an authority” within the meaning of Article 226 of the Constitution.7
“Authority” in law belongs to the province of power. The word “State” and “Authority” used
in Article 12 remain among “the great generalities of the Constitution” the content of which
has been and continues to be applied by Courts from time to time. 9
Local authorities are under the exclusive control of the States, by virtue of entry 5 of List II of
the 7th Schedule. That entry contains a list of some local authorities. This expression will,
therefore, include a Municipal Committee; a Panchayat; a Port Trust; Municipality is a “State”
within the meaning of Article 12. But that does not mean that the authorities are State
Government or Central Government and there is distinction between State and Government.
7
K. Morappan v. Dy. Registrar of Co-operative Society; (2006) 4 MLJ 641.
8
Rajasthan State Electtricity Board v. Mohal Lal, AIR 1967 SC 1857.
9
Pradeep, supra note 6.
6
In Union of India v/s R.C. Jain 10, to be considered a “local authority”, an authority must fulfill
the following tests-
4) Enjoys autonomy.
6. OTHER AUTHORITIES
In Article 12 the expression ‘other authorities’ is used after mentioning a few of them, such as,
the government, Parliament of India, the Government and Legislatures of each States and local
authorities. In University of Madras v. Santa Bai, the Madras High Court held that the ‘Other
Authorities’ could only incd0icates authorities of like nature, i.e. ejusdem generis. So
construed, it could only mean authorities exercising governmental or sovereign function. It
cannot include persons, natural or juristic, such as university unless it is ‘maintained by the
state’. But in Ujjambai v. State of U.P, the court rejected this restrictive interpretation of the
expression ‘other authorities’ given by the Madras High Court and held that the ejusdem
generis rule could not be resorted to in interpreting this expression. In Article 12 the bodies
specifically named are the Government of the Union and the States and the States and Local
Authorities. There is no common genus running through these named bodies nor can these
bodies so placed in one single category or any rational basis.
It refers to authorities other than those of local self- government, who have power to make
rules, regulations, etc. having the force of law. “Instrumentality” and “agency” are the two
terms, which to some extent overlap in their meaning. The basic and essential distinction
between an “instrumentality or agency” of the State and “other authorities” has to be borne in
mind. An ‘Authority’ must be authority sui juris within meaning of expression “other
authorities” under Article 12. A juridical entity, though an authority may also ratify the list of
10
State of Gujarat v. Shantilal, AIR 1969 SC 634 (643).
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being an instrumentality or agency of the state in which event such authority may be held to be
an instrumentality or agency of State, but not vice versa.11
In the case of R.D.Shetty v/s International Airport Authority12, the Court laid down five tests
to be considered “other authority”:
6) Object of Authority
In the case of Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi13, It has been held that whether a statutory
body falling within the purview of the expression “other authorities” is to be considered
differenctly. In the opinion of minority, the tests laid down in this case are relevant only for the
purpose of determining whether an entity is an “instrumentality or agency of the State”.
The Supreme Court held that the expression “other authorities” is wide enough to include all
authorities created by the Constitution or statute on whom the powers are conferred by Law. It
is not necessary that the statutory authority should be engaged in performing governmental or
sovereign function.
It was held that the U.P. Warehousing Corporation which was constituted under a statute and
owned and controlled by the Government was an agency or instrumentality of the Government
and therefore “the State” within the meaning of Article 12.
11
Dr. J.N. Pandey, Constitutional Law Of India, Central Law Agency, Pg.No:60 (50 th Edition)
12
1979 SCR (3)1014
13
(1981) 1 SCC 722.
14
AIR 1967 SC 1857 20 (1980) 3 SCC 459.
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In Som Prakash v. Union of India15, the Supreme Court held that a Government company
(Bharat Petroleum Corporation) fell within the meaning of the expression ‘the State’ used in
Article 12.
The expression ‘other authorities’ will include all constitutional or statutory authorities on
whom powers are conferred for the purpose of promoting economic activities. It is not only
confined to statutory corporations alone but may include a government company, a registered
society, or bodies which have some nexus with the government.16
However, the important question that was raised before the Court was whether a private
corporation fell within the ambit of Article 12. Unfortunately, the answer is yet to be decided.
The definition of State under Article 12 of the Constitution does not explicitly mention the
Judiciary. Hence, a significant amount of controversy surrounds its status vis-a-vis Part III of
the Constitution. Bringing the Judiciary within the scope of Article 12 would mean that it is
deemed capable of acting in contravention of Fundamental Rights. It is well established that in
its non-judicial functions, the Judiciary does come within the meaning of State. However,
challenging a judicial decision which has achieved finality, under the writ jurisdiction of
superior courts on the basis of violation of fundamental rights, remains open to debate.17
On the one hand, the Judiciary is the organ of the State that decides the contours of the
Fundamental Rights. Their determination, of whether an act violates the same, can be right or
wrong. If it is wrong, the judicial decision cannot ordinarily be said to be a violation of
fundamental rights. If this were allowed, it would involve protracted and perhaps unnecessary
litigation, for in every case, there is necessarily an unsatisfied party. On the other hand, not
allowing a decision to be challenged could mean a grave miscarriage of justice, and go
unheeded, merely because the fallibility of the Judiciary is not recognized.
The erroneous judgment of subordinate Court is subjected to judicial review by the superior
courts and to that effect, unreasonable decisions of the Courts are subjected to the tests of
Article 14 of the Constitution.
15
(1987) 3 SCC 395.
16
AIR 1981 SC 212 11.
17
Dr. J.N. Pandey, Constitutional Law Of India, Central Law Agency, Pg.No:67 (50 th Edition)
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The Bombay High Court expressed the view that the Judgment of the Court cannot be
challenged for violation of Fundamental Rights18.
The issue posed before the Supreme Court for consideration whether judiciary is covered by
the expression ‘State’ in Article 12 of the Constitution. The Court held that the fundamental
right is not infringed by the order of the Court and no writ can be issued to High Court. However
in yet another case, it was held that High Court Judge is as much a part of the State as the
executive.
In Rati Lal v. State of Bombay , it was held that Judiciary is not State for the purpose of Article
12. But Supreme Court in cases of A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and N. S. Mirajkar v/s State of
Maharashtra, it has been observed that when rule making power of Judiciary is concerned it is
State but when exercise of judicial power is concerned it is not State.
In Amirabbas v. State of M.B., the Court made the following observation: Denial of equality
before the law or the equal protection of the laws can be claimed against executive or legislative
process but not against the decision of a competent tribunal.
1) There being no ‘Due Process’ clause, there is no scope for challenging a judicial decision
on a constitutional ground of unfairness
2) The decisions of the Supreme Court being binding upon all Courts within the territory of
India [Art. 141], there is no scope for a decision of the Supreme Court being challenged as
violative of a fundamental right. But there is no reason why the decision or order of a
subordinate court shall not be open to be questioned on the ground that it contravenes a
fundamental right.
In fact so far as the guarantee of equal protection in Article 14 is concerned, our Supreme Court,
in the early case38 held that any State action, executive, legislative or judicial, which
contravenes Article 14, is void.
18
In Ratilal v. State of Bombay, AIR 1953
19
2 1966 (3) SCR 744
10
But the Supreme Court limited the application of Article 14 to judicial decisions by the
qualification that they will hit by the Article only when they involved a ‘wilful and purposeful
discrimination’.
However, In the landmark case of Rupa Ashok Hurra v Ashok Huna20, the Constitution Bench
of five judges examined whether a writ petition can be maintained under Article 32 to question
the validity of a judgment of this Court after the review petition has been dismissed. Firstly, it
was contended that there would be a re- examination of the case only where the judicial order
was passed without jurisdiction, in violation of the principles of natural justice, in violation of
fundamental rights or where there had been gross injustice, under the inherent jurisdiction of
the Court. It was admitted that, in the rarest of rare cases, a petition under Article 32 could be
entertained where even a review petition had been rejected. The “corrective jurisdiction” of the
Court, it was argued, arose from those provisions of the Constitution conferring power on the
Supreme Court such as Article 32 and Articles 129-40. Secondly, the remedy for the above
rare cases was, since no appeal lies from the order of the Apex Court, an application under
Article 32, if senior counsel were able to discern some permissible ground for the same. In this
case, Justice Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri pointed out that Article 32 can be invoked only for
the purpose of enforcing the fundamental rights conferred in Part III and that no judicial order
passed by any superior court in judicial proceedings can be said to violate any of the
fundamental rights, since superior courts of justice do not fall within the ambit of State or other
authorities under Article 12 of the Constitution. The Court adopted an unusual unanimous
approach by holding that even after exhausting the remedy of review under Article 137 of the
Constitution, an aggrieved person might be provided with an opportunity to seek relief in cases
of gross abuse of the process of the Court or gross miscarriage of justice, because the judgment
of the Supreme Court is final. It was held that the duty to do justice in these rarest of rare cases
shall have to prevail over the policy of certainty of judgment.
Several grounds were laid down whereby a “curative petition” could be entertained and a
petitioner is entitled to relief ex debito justitiae. It could be used, for example, in cases of
violation of principles of natural justice, where interested person is not a party to the lis and
where in the proceedings a Judge failed to disclose his connection with the subject-matter or
20
(2002) 4 SCC 388
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the parties giving scope for an apprehension of bias. The petitioner would have to specifically
mention the grounds on which he was filing the curative petition.
8. CONCLUSION
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