Subject Matter Index 1

COOK COUNTY COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
SUBJECT MATTER INDEX OF DECISIONS AND ORDERS

from November, 1993 through November 30, 2006
INDEX COVERAGE: This Index includes summaries of substantive decisions and

orders issued by the Cook County Commission on Human Rights from November 8,
1993 through November 30, 2006.
INDEX ORGANIZATION: This Index is organized alphabetically by topic. Listed under

each topic and sub-topic are relevant decisions with concise summaries, followed by the
case name, case number and date of each decision.
COMMISSION DECISION AND ORDERS DEFINED: There are three types of

substantive orders: Commission Orders ("CO"), Hearing Officer Orders ("HO") and
Commission Decisions and Orders ("CDO"). A "Commission Order" is an order entered
by the Commission during the complaint investigation stage. A Commission Order is
usually a preliminary ruling by the Commission on jurisdictional questions raised by a
respondent, or a ruling by the Commission on a challenge to the form and substance of
the complaint itself. A "Hearing Officer Order" is an order entered by a Commission
Administrative Hearing Officer during an Administrative Hearing as defined by
Commission Procedural Rule 460.100. A Hearing Officer Order may include, but is not
limited to, rulings on issues of Commission jurisdiction and discovery disputes. A
"Commission Decision and Order" is an order entered by the Commission after
consideration by the Commissioners of the Cook County Commission on Human Rights.
Usually, it is the final order of the Commission subsequent to an Administrative Hearing.
EXPLANATION OF CASE CITATIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS IN INDEX: Following

each entry in the index is a citation, e.g. Smith v. Acme, Inc., 1999E017, 3-19-2001, HO.
The citation consists of the following information: Smith (Complainant) v. Acme, Inc.
(Respondent), 1999 (year the case was filed) E (classification of the case - "E" denotes
Employment, "H" for Housing, "C" for credit, "PA" for Public Accommodations, or “S” for
County Services), 017 (sequence number), 3-19-2001 (date order was issued), and HO
(classification of order, as described above). The Cook County Human Rights
Ordinance is referred to throughout as "CCHRO" or "the Ordinance," and the Procedural
Rules and Regulations of the Commission are referred to as the "Rules" or "Rule."
AVAILABILITY OF FULL TEXT OF DECISIONS AND ORDERS: Decisions and orders

summarized in this Index are available online at w w w .cookcountygov.com by locating
the Human Rights page under the "Agencies" link and then clicking the link to Decisions
and Orders. In addition, hard copies are kept at the Com mission's Office and may be
copied for the cost of $0.10 per page.
69 W est W ashington Street, Suite 3040 Chicago, Illinois 60602-3007

312/603-1100 (Voice); 312/603-9988 (Fax); 312/603-1101 (TTY/TDD)
[email protected]
www.cookcountygov.com (follow agencies links to Human Rights)
SUBJECT M ATTER INDEX
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING ..................................................................................................................................... 1

Briefs on Exceptions ............................................................................................................................................ 1
Default Hearing .................................................................................................................................................... 1
Default Order and Judgm ent Entered ............................................................................................................ 1
No Liability Found ........................................................................................................................................... 1
Failure to Appear at Adm inistrative hearing ........................................................................................................ 1
Com plaint Dism issed ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Failure to Cooperate ............................................................................................................................................ 1
Powers and Duties of Hearing Officer ................................................................................................................. 2
Discretion in Adm itting Evidence .................................................................................................................... 2
Discretion W ith Pre-Hearing Mem orandum ................................................................................................... 2
Sanctions Other than Dism issal/Default ......................................................................................................... 2
Pro Se Parties ..................................................................................................................................................... 2
Obligation to Participate ................................................................................................................................. 2
Failure to Appear ............................................................................................................................................ 2
Rem and to Hearing Officer .................................................................................................................................. 3
Subpoenas .......................................................................................................................................................... 3
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW
See W RIT OF CERTIORARI
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE ........................................................................................................................................... 3
AGE DISCRIMINATION .............................................................................................................................................. 3

Prim a Facie Case ................................................................................................................................................ 3
Liability Not Found ............................................................................................................................................... 4
AGENCY LIABILITY .................................................................................................................................................... 4
AIDING AND ABETTING

See INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEFS .......................................................................................................................................... 4
ANSW ER
See RESPONSE
APPEARANCE
See ATTORNEY APPEARANCE
ATTORNEY APPEARANCE ....................................................................................................................................... 4

Leave to W ithdraw
See W ITHDRAW AL OF ATTORNEY
Pro Hac Vice ........................................................................................................................................................ 4
ATTORNEY'S FEES ................................................................................................................................................... 5

Costs ................................................................................................................................................................... 5
Degree of Success on the Merits ........................................................................................................................ 5
Fee-Shifting Provision ......................................................................................................................................... 5
Lodestar Method for Calculating Fees ................................................................................................................. 5
Prevailing Com plainant ........................................................................................................................................ 5
Prevailing Respondent ......................................................................................................................................... 5
Proportionality Not Required ................................................................................................................................ 6
BACK PAY ................................................................................................................................................................... 6
i
Awarded ............................................................................................................................................................... 6
Mitigation ............................................................................................................................................................. 6
Not Awarded ........................................................................................................................................................ 6
BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS ................................................................................................................................ 6
BURDEN OF PROOF ................................................................................................................................................. 6
BURDEN-SHIFTING ................................................................................................................................................... 7
COMMISSION DEADLINES ....................................................................................................................................... 7
COMMISSION EXECUTIVE REVIEW COMMITTEE ................................................................................................. 7
COMPLAINTS ............................................................................................................................................................. 7
Am endm ent ......................................................................................................................................................... 7
Post-Evidence Determ ination ......................................................................................................................... 7
Add Claim s ............................................................................................................................................. 7
Pre-Evidence Determ ination .......................................................................................................................... 7
Add Claim s ............................................................................................................................................. 7
Add Parties ............................................................................................................................................. 8
Add Clarifying Facts ............................................................................................................................... 8
Articulate Prim a Facie Case ................................................................................................................... 8
Cure Technical Defect ............................................................................................................................ 8
Deceased Respondent ........................................................................................................................... 8
Content ................................................................................................................................................................ 8
Prim a Facie Case ........................................................................................................................................... 8
Evidence of Pattern/Practice .......................................................................................................................... 9
Notice Pleading .............................................................................................................................................. 9
Com plaint Reinstatem ent .................................................................................................................................... 9
CONCILIATION CONFERENCE ................................................................................................................................. 9

Failure to Appear ................................................................................................................................................. 9
Com plaint Not Dism issed ............................................................................................................................... 9
Fine Assessed .............................................................................................................................................. 10
Pro Se Parties .............................................................................................................................................. 10
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION
See JURISDICTION
CONFLICT OF INTEREST ....................................................................................................................................... 10

Com plaint Against Com m ission and/or Any of its Staff ..................................................................................... 10
Intergovernm ental Agreem ent ........................................................................................................................... 10
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS .................................................................................................................................... 10

First Am endm ent ............................................................................................................................................... 10
Free Exercise of Religion ............................................................................................................................. 10
Free Speech ................................................................................................................................................. 10
CONTINUING VIOLATIONS ..................................................................................................................................... 10
COSTS
See ATTORNEY'S FEES - Costs
CREDIBILITY ............................................................................................................................................................ 11
During Adm inistrative Hearing ........................................................................................................................... 11
Following a Default Order ............................................................................................................................. 11
Liability .......................................................................................................................................................... 11
ii
During Investigation ........................................................................................................................................... 11
DAMAGES ................................................................................................................................................................. 11
Actual Dam ages ................................................................................................................................................ 12
Awarded ...................................................................................................................................................... 12
Factors Considered ...................................................................................................................................... 13
Egregiousness of Conduct .................................................................................................................... 13
Foreseeability ........................................................................................................................................ 13
Advocacy Organizations .................................................................................................................................... 13
Back Pay ............................................................................................................................................................ 13
Awarded ....................................................................................................................................................... 13
Not Awarded ................................................................................................................................................. 14
Fringe Benefits .................................................................................................................................................. 14
Injunctive Relief ................................................................................................................................................. 14
Interest ............................................................................................................................................................... 14
Mitigation ........................................................................................................................................................... 14
Proof of Dam ages ............................................................................................................................................. 14
Credibility ...................................................................................................................................................... 14
Punitive Dam ages ............................................................................................................................................. 15
Authority to Award ........................................................................................................................................ 15
Awarded ....................................................................................................................................................... 15
Retaliation .............................................................................................................................................. 15
Sexual Harassm ent ............................................................................................................................... 15
Calculation of Award .................................................................................................................................... 15
Conduct ................................................................................................................................................. 15
Relevance of Net W orth and Incom e .................................................................................................... 15
Legal Standard ............................................................................................................................................. 16
Not Awarded ................................................................................................................................................. 16
Purpose ........................................................................................................................................................ 16
DEFAULT .................................................................................................................................................................. 16
Failure to Respond ............................................................................................................................................ 16
Judgm ent Entered ....................................................................................................................................... 16
Hearing on Dam ages ......................................................................................................................................... 17
Motion for Default .............................................................................................................................................. 17
Request to Vacate ............................................................................................................................................. 17
DEFERRAL OF COMMISSION INVESTIGATION .................................................................................................... 17

Com m ission Discretion ...................................................................................................................................... 17
Deferral Denied ................................................................................................................................................. 18
Adm inistrative Efficiency ............................................................................................................................. 18
Dissim ilarity of Charges .............................................................................................................................. 18
Jurisdiction of Other Agency is Lacking ...................................................................................................... 18
Substantially Sim ilar Charges Filed at Another Agency .............................................................................. 19
Tem porary Stay ........................................................................................................................................... 19
Deferral Granted ................................................................................................................................................ 19
Adm inistrative Efficiency ............................................................................................................................. 19
Intergovernm ental Agreem ent .................................................................................................................... 19
DEPOSITIONS
See DISCOVERY
DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION ................................................................................................................................ 20

Em ploym ent Discrim ination ................................................................................................................................ 20
Barriers Model - Prima Facie Case .............................................................................................................. 20
Failure to Accom m odate .............................................................................................................................. 20
Lack of Substantial Evidence ....................................................................................................................... 20
Substantial Evidence .................................................................................................................................... 20
Undue Hardship ........................................................................................................................................... 21
iii
Disability Defined ................................................................................................................................................ 21
Definition ...................................................................................................................................................... 21
Major Life Activity - W orking ......................................................................................................................... 21
Substantially Lim ited ..................................................................................................................................... 21
Disparate Treatm ent .......................................................................................................................................... 21
Adm inistrative Hearing ................................................................................................................................. 21
Investigation Stage ....................................................................................................................................... 22
Prima Facie Case ......................................................................................................................................... 22
Housing Discrim ination ....................................................................................................................................... 22
Liability Found ............................................................................................................................................. 22
Indirect Discrim ination ........................................................................................................................................ 22
Public Accom m odations Discrim ination ............................................................................................................. 22
Futile Gesture Doctrine ................................................................................................................................ 22
Prima Facie Case ......................................................................................................................................... 23
Readily Achievable ....................................................................................................................................... 23
Regulations ......................................................................................................................................................... 23
Absence of Com m ission Regulations .......................................................................................................... 23
Structural Barriers - Rem oval ............................................................................................................................. 23
Em ploym ent ................................................................................................................................................. 24
Housing ........................................................................................................................................................ 24
Public Accom m odation ................................................................................................................................. 24
DISCOVERY ............................................................................................................................................................. 24
Depositions ......................................................................................................................................................... 24
Com m ission Investigator .............................................................................................................................. 24
Com plainant ................................................................................................................................................. 25
Request Denied ............................................................................................................................................ 25
Good Cause Required ........................................................................................................................................ 25
Motion to Com pel ................................................................................................................................................ 25
Denied .......................................................................................................................................................... 25
Granted ........................................................................................................................................................ 25
Requests for Production of Docum ents ....................................................................................................... 26
Sanctions ............................................................................................................................................................ 26
Subpoenas .......................................................................................................................................................... 26
Request Denied ............................................................................................................................................ 26
W ork Product Doctrine ....................................................................................................................................... 26
Privilege W aived ........................................................................................................................................... 26
DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT ................................................................................................................................... 26

Bankruptcy Proceeding ....................................................................................................................................... 26
Failure to Cooperate
See FAILURE TO COOPERATE
Failure to Establish an Em ploym ent Relationship ............................................................................................... 27
Dism issal Denied .......................................................................................................................................... 27
Failure to State a Claim ...................................................................................................................................... 27
Lack of Jurisdiction
See JURISDICTION
Lack of Substantial Evidence .............................................................................................................................. 28
Material Question of Fact .................................................................................................................................... 28
Sim ilar Allegation Filed in Other Forum .............................................................................................................. 28
Circuit Court ................................................................................................................................................. 28
Federal Court ............................................................................................................................................... 29
Tim eliness of Filing ............................................................................................................................................. 29
W ant of Prosecution ........................................................................................................................................... 29
DISPARATE IMPACT ............................................................................................................................................... 29
DISPARATE TREATMENT ....................................................................................................................................... 29

Burden of Production .......................................................................................................................................... 29
iv
Mixed-Motive ............................................................................................................................................... 30
Not Sustained ............................................................................................................................................... 30
Sustained ..................................................................................................................................................... 30
Burden of Proof ................................................................................................................................................... 31
Not Sustained ............................................................................................................................................... 31
Sustained ..................................................................................................................................................... 32
McDonnell Douglas Test ..................................................................................................................................... 33
Pretext ................................................................................................................................................................. 33
Established ................................................................................................................................................... 33
Not Established ............................................................................................................................................ 34
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS .......................................................................................................................................... 35

Com plaint Reinstatem ent ................................................................................................................................... 35
Right to Investigation .......................................................................................................................................... 35
Type of Investigation ........................................................................................................................................... 36
EMPLOYEES
See EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION - Em ployee
EMPLOYERS
See EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION - Em ployer
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION .......................................................................................................................... 36

After-Acquired Evidence ..................................................................................................................................... 36
Age Discrim ination .............................................................................................................................................. 36
Burden of Proof ................................................................................................................................................... 36
Burden-Shifting ................................................................................................................................................... 37
Constructive Discharge ....................................................................................................................................... 37
Disability Discrim ination ...................................................................................................................................... 37
See DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION ............................................................................................................ 37
Em ployee Defined ............................................................................................................................................... 37
Clerk of the Court Em ployees ...................................................................................................................... 37
Independent Contractors .............................................................................................................................. 37
Em ploym ent Relationship ...................................................................................................................... 38
Standing ................................................................................................................................................ 38
Tem porary/Leased Em ployees .................................................................................................................... 38
Em ployer Defined ............................................................................................................................................... 38
Covered ........................................................................................................................................................ 38
Fire Protection District ........................................................................................................................... 38
Township Highway Departm ent ............................................................................................................ 38
W ater Reclam ation District .................................................................................................................... 38
School Districts ...................................................................................................................................... 38
Not Covered ................................................................................................................................................. 38
Clerk of the Circuit Court ....................................................................................................................... 38
States' Attorney of Cook County ........................................................................................................... 39
Em ploym ent Relationship ................................................................................................................................... 39
Affecting Opportunities Test ......................................................................................................................... 39
Econom ic Realities Test ............................................................................................................................... 39
Joint Em ployer Test ...................................................................................................................................... 39
Rem uneration Not Required ......................................................................................................................... 39
Hostile W ork Environm ent .................................................................................................................................. 40
Race Discrim ination ..................................................................................................................................... 40
Sexual Harassm ent ...................................................................................................................................... 40
Sexual Orientation Discrim ination ................................................................................................................ 40
National Origin Discrim ination ............................................................................................................................. 40
Progressive Discipline ......................................................................................................................................... 41
Retaliation
See RETALIATION
v
ENFORCEMENT OF COMMISSION ORDERS ....................................................................................................... 41
ENFORCEMENT OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

See SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
EVIDENCE ................................................................................................................................................................ 41
Adm issibility ........................................................................................................................................................ 41
After-Acquired Evidence ..................................................................................................................................... 41
Circum stantial Evidence ..................................................................................................................................... 41
Credibility ............................................................................................................................................................ 41
Direct Evidence ................................................................................................................................................... 42
Evidence Depositions ......................................................................................................................................... 42
Prior Bad Acts ..................................................................................................................................................... 42
EXCEPTIONS TO RECOMMENDED DECISIONS .................................................................................................. 42
FAILURE TO COOPERATE ...................................................................................................................................... 43

Adm inistrative Hearing ........................................................................................................................................ 43
Dism issed ..................................................................................................................................................... 43
Pro Se Parties .............................................................................................................................................. 43
Show Cause Order ....................................................................................................................................... 43
Conciliation Conference ...................................................................................................................................... 43
Discovery Order .................................................................................................................................................. 44
W ant of Prosecution ........................................................................................................................................... 44
FAILURE TO RESPOND
See DEFAULT
FINDINGS OF FACT ................................................................................................................................................. 44
FINES ........................................................................................................................................................................ 44
Abuse of Process ................................................................................................................................................ 44
After Adm inistrative Hearing ............................................................................................................................... 45
Failure to Attend Conciliation Conference .......................................................................................................... 45
HEARING OFFICER ................................................................................................................................................. 46

Authority .............................................................................................................................................................. 46
Disqualification .................................................................................................................................................... 46
Recusal ............................................................................................................................................................... 46
HOME RULE AUTHORITY ....................................................................................................................................... 47
HOUSING DISCRIMINATION ................................................................................................................................... 47

Advocacy Organizations ..................................................................................................................................... 47
Covered Transactions ......................................................................................................................................... 47
Disability .............................................................................................................................................................. 47
Failure to Rent .................................................................................................................................................... 47
Hom eless Shelters .............................................................................................................................................. 47
Managing Agent Liability ..................................................................................................................................... 48
Marital Status ...................................................................................................................................................... 48
Methodist Cam pground ...................................................................................................................................... 48
Parental Status ................................................................................................................................................... 49
Prim a Facie Case ............................................................................................................................................... 49
Reasonable Accom m odation .............................................................................................................................. 49
Retaliation
See RETALIATION
HOUSING STATUS .................................................................................................................................................. 50
vi
INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY ............................................................................................................................................. 50
Aiding and Abetting ............................................................................................................................................. 50
Em ploym ent ........................................................................................................................................................ 50
Corporate Board Mem bers ........................................................................................................................... 50
Decision-Makers ........................................................................................................................................... 51
Owners/Principals ........................................................................................................................................ 51
Managing Agent ........................................................................................................................................... 51
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF ................................................................................................................................................ 51

Awarded .............................................................................................................................................................. 51
Factors Considered ............................................................................................................................................ 52
INVESTIGATION ....................................................................................................................................................... 52
Com plaint Consolidation ..................................................................................................................................... 52
Evidence of Pattern and Practice ........................................................................................................................ 52
Fact-Finding Conference .................................................................................................................................... 52
Investigation Standard ........................................................................................................................................ 52
Investigation Type/Method .................................................................................................................................. 53
Tim eline for Investigation .................................................................................................................................... 53
JURISDICTION ......................................................................................................................................................... 53
Com plaint Reinstatem ent ................................................................................................................................... 53
Concurrent Jurisdiction ....................................................................................................................................... 53
Deferral ............................................................................................................................................................... 53
Governm ental Entities/Agencies ......................................................................................................................... 54
City of Chicago Com m ission on Hum an Relations ...................................................................................... 54
Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County .................................................................................................... 54
Cook County Com m ission on Hum an Rights ............................................................................................... 54
Em ployees of Cook County .......................................................................................................................... 55
Illinois Departm ent of Hum an Rights ............................................................................................................ 55
Regional Transportation Authority ................................................................................................................ 55
States Attorney of Cook County ................................................................................................................... 55
School Districts ............................................................................................................................................. 55
Township Highway Departm ent ................................................................................................................... 55
Village Departm ents ..................................................................................................................................... 55
Harm Required ................................................................................................................................................... 55
Jurisdiction Lacking ............................................................................................................................................ 56
Alleged Violation in Cook County ................................................................................................................. 56
Alleged Violation Outside Cook County ........................................................................................................ 56
Jurisdiction Retained ........................................................................................................................................... 56
Alleged Violation in Cook County ................................................................................................................. 56
County Em ployees in the City of Chicago .................................................................................................... 56
Housing Status Discrim ination in the City of Chicago .................................................................................. 56
Location of Alleged Violation ........................................................................................................................ 56
Retaliation in the City of Chicago ................................................................................................................. 56
Separate Causes of Action ........................................................................................................................... 57
Jurisdictional Hearing .......................................................................................................................................... 57
Newspapers ........................................................................................................................................................ 57
Res Judicata ....................................................................................................................................................... 57
Settlem ent Enforcem ent ..................................................................................................................................... 57
Statute of Lim itations
See STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Term ination of Jurisdiction .................................................................................................................................. 58
Discrim ination Com plaint Filed Elsewhere ................................................................................................... 58
LOCATION OF VIOLATION ...................................................................................................................................... 58

In Cook County ................................................................................................................................................... 58
Outside Cook County .......................................................................................................................................... 58
vii
W ithin the City of Chicago .................................................................................................................................. 58
County Em ployees ....................................................................................................................................... 58
Housing Status ............................................................................................................................................. 59
Retaliation ..................................................................................................................................................... 59
MARITAL STATUS DISCRIMINATION ..................................................................................................................... 59

Liability Not Found .............................................................................................................................................. 59
Prim a Facie Case ............................................................................................................................................... 59
MOTIONS .................................................................................................................................................................. 59
Extension of Tim e ............................................................................................................................................... 59
Motion to Dism iss ............................................................................................................................................... 60
Sum m ary Judgm ent ............................................................................................................................................ 60
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE ........................................................................................................................................ 60

Coextensive coverage ........................................................................................................................................ 60
NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION .................................................................................................................... 61
PRECEDENT ............................................................................................................................................................ 61
Com m ission Orders ............................................................................................................................................ 61
Other Agency Decisions ..................................................................................................................................... 61
Chicago Ordinance ....................................................................................................................................... 61
Illinois Hum an Rights Act ............................................................................................................................. 61
Other Court Decisions ........................................................................................................................................ 62
Federal Court Decisions ............................................................................................................................... 62
Illinois Suprem e Court Decisions ................................................................................................................. 62
United States Suprem e Court Decisions ...................................................................................................... 62
PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION
See SEX DISCRIMINATION
PRE-ORDINANCE CONDUCT ................................................................................................................................. 61

Adm issibility at Hearing ....................................................................................................................................... 61
Lim ited Purpose ........................................................................................................................................... 61
During Com plaint-Filing Stage ............................................................................................................................ 61
Lack of Jurisdiction ....................................................................................................................................... 61
PRIMA FACIE CASE ................................................................................................................................................. 62

Default Hearing ................................................................................................................................................... 62
Em ploym ent ........................................................................................................................................................ 63
Housing ............................................................................................................................................................... 63
Public Accom m odations ..................................................................................................................................... 63
Retaliation ........................................................................................................................................................... 63
Sexual Harassm ent ............................................................................................................................................ 63
See Individual Categories of Discrim ination ....................................................................................................... 64
PRO SE PARTIES
See ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING - Pro Se Parties
PROTECTIVE ORDERS ........................................................................................................................................... 64

During Adm inistrative Hearing ............................................................................................................................ 64
During Investigation ............................................................................................................................................ 64
PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS ................................................................................................................................. 64

Access Lim ited or Curtailed ................................................................................................................................ 65
Adverse Action Required .................................................................................................................................... 65
Covered .............................................................................................................................................................. 65
Newspapers ................................................................................................................................................. 65
viii
Retail Merchants .......................................................................................................................................... 66
Schools - Harassm ent .................................................................................................................................. 66
Futile Gesture Doctrine ....................................................................................................................................... 66
Markedly Hostile Behavior .................................................................................................................................. 66
Not Covered ........................................................................................................................................................ 66
Access to a Particular Investigator ............................................................................................................... 66
Illinois Departm ent of Hum an Rights ............................................................................................................ 66
Police Departm ent Conduct ......................................................................................................................... 67
Schools - Internal Discipline ......................................................................................................................... 67
Prim a Facie Case ............................................................................................................................................... 67
Readily Achievable Accom m odations ................................................................................................................. 67
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
See DAMAGES - Punitive Dam ages
RACE DISCRIMINATION .......................................................................................................................................... 68

Mixed Liability Found .......................................................................................................................................... 68
Prim a Facie Case ............................................................................................................................................... 68
RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION ................................................................................................................................ 69

Prim a Facie Case ............................................................................................................................................... 69
REMAND ................................................................................................................................................................... 69
After Adm inistrative Hearing ............................................................................................................................... 69
REMEDIES
See DAMAGES, INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, FINES
REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION .................................................................................................................... 69

After Dism issal for Lack of Substantial Evidence ............................................................................................... 70
Request Granted .......................................................................................................................................... 70
Request Denied ............................................................................................................................................ 70
Additional Docum entation Needed ............................................................................................................... 72
After Settlem ent Agreem ent ............................................................................................................................... 72
Tim e for Filing ..................................................................................................................................................... 72
RES JUDICATA
See CONCURRENT JURISDICTION
RESPONSE ............................................................................................................................................................... 72
Am endm ent to Response ................................................................................................................................... 72
Content ............................................................................................................................................................... 73
Default for Failure to Respond ............................................................................................................................ 73
Extension of Tim e ............................................................................................................................................... 73
Verification .......................................................................................................................................................... 73
RETALIATION ........................................................................................................................................................... 73
Em ploym ent Discrim ination ................................................................................................................................ 73
Retaliatory Discharge ................................................................................................................................... 74
Liability Found ....................................................................................................................................... 74
Liability Not Found ................................................................................................................................. 74
Cam pground Case .............................................................................................................................................. 74
Prim a Facie Case ............................................................................................................................................... 74
Protected Expression .......................................................................................................................................... 75
Public Accom m odations ..................................................................................................................................... 75
ix
RETROACTIVITY ...................................................................................................................................................... 75
SANCTIONS
See FINES
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ................................................................................................................................... 76

Binding Agreem ent ............................................................................................................................................. 76
Coercion/Duress ................................................................................................................................................. 76
Enforcem ent of Agreem ent ................................................................................................................................. 76
Com m ission Requirem ents ......................................................................................................................... 76
Oral Settlem ent Agreem ent .......................................................................................................................... 76
Private Settlem ent Agreem ent ..................................................................................................................... 76
Release of Claim s ............................................................................................................................................... 77
SEX DISCRIMINATION ............................................................................................................................................ 77

Pregnancy ........................................................................................................................................................... 77
Prim a Facie Case ............................................................................................................................................... 77
SEXUAL HARASSMENT .......................................................................................................................................... 78

Analytical Fram ework .......................................................................................................................................... 78
Co-Em ployee Harassm ent .................................................................................................................................. 78
Constructive Discharge ....................................................................................................................................... 78
Objective and Subjective Com ponents ........................................................................................................ 78
See also EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION - Hostile W ork Environm ent
Liability Found ..................................................................................................................................................... 78
Supervisory Em ployees ...................................................................................................................................... 79
SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION ............................................................................................................ 79

Liability Found ..................................................................................................................................................... 79
STANDING ................................................................................................................................................................ 79
Advocacy Agency ................................................................................................................................................ 79
Executor of Estate .............................................................................................................................................. 80
Requirem ents ..................................................................................................................................................... 80
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS .................................................................................................................................... 80

180-Day Filing Period .......................................................................................................................................... 80
Continuing Violations .......................................................................................................................................... 80
Date of Alleged Violation ..................................................................................................................................... 81
Equitable Tolling ................................................................................................................................................. 82
Notice of Discrim inatory Act ................................................................................................................................ 82
STRICT LIABILITY .................................................................................................................................................... 82
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ...................................................................................................................................... 83
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ........................................................................................................................................... 83

See also MOTIONS
UNLAW FUL DISCHARGE

See also RETALIATION - Em ploym ent Discrim ination - Unlawful Discharge
VERIFIED RESPONSE ............................................................................................................................................. 83

See RESPONSE
x
W ILLFUL INTERFERENCE ...................................................................................................................................... 83
W ITHDRAW AL OF ATTORNEY ............................................................................................................................... 83

Leave Granted .................................................................................................................................................... 83
Conflict of Interest ........................................................................................................................................ 83
During Adm inistrative Hearing ...................................................................................................................... 84
Inability to Continue ...................................................................................................................................... 84
Irreconcilable Differences ............................................................................................................................. 84
Post-Adm inistrative Hearing ......................................................................................................................... 85
Non-Cooperative Client ................................................................................................................................ 85
Settlem ent Agreem ent .................................................................................................................................. 85
Substitute Counsel ....................................................................................................................................... 85
W RIT OF CERTIORARI ............................................................................................................................................ 85
xi
ADM INISTRATIVE HEARING
Briefs on Exceptions
Hearing officer found that com plainant's brief on exceptions to his initial proposed decision and order sim ply
reargued the interpretation of facts and failed to argue any legal basis for reversal or m odification of the hearing
officer's legal conclusions. Alcegueire v. Cook County Departm ent for Managem ent of Inform ation System s,
1992E003 and 1992E026, 8-10-95, CDO.
Hearing officer filed a separate ruling on com plainant's exceptions to initial proposed decision and order, and
incorporated that ruling as appropriate in the final proposed decision and order. Meallet v. Cook County Departm ent
of Purchasing, 1992E016, 8-18-94, CDO; Carroll, et al v. Chicago District Cam pground Assoc., et al, 1999H006-
009, 2-24-06, HO.
Default Hearing
Default Order and Judgment Entered

Com m ission entered an order of default against the respondent for failing to respond to the com plaint.
Adm inistrative hearing held on dam ages, respondent did not appear and consequently the testim ony of com plainant
is undisputed. Liability found and dam ages awarded. Feges v. The New Em bers Restaurant, 1993E013, 6-16-94,
CDO.
After respondent repeatedly failed to respond to discovery requests, com plainants m oved for sanctions. Following a
status conference at which both respondent and com plainants appeared, the hearing officer granted com plainants'
m otion for sanctions, ordering that all paragraphs of the com plainants' request for adm ission of fact would be
deem ed to be adm itted for the purpose of this action and a default would be entered in favor of the com plainants
and against the respondent pursuant to Section 460.145(E) of the Com m ission's Procedural Rules. Garcia v.
W inston, et al., 2003H003, 2003H004, 5-16-06, CDO.
No Liability Found
Com m ission entered an order of default against the respondent for failing to respond to the com plaint.
Adm inistrative hearing held, respondent did not appear and consequently the testim ony of the com plainant is
undisputed. However, in this case, the com plainant failed to m eet the obligation of proving a prim a face case of an
unlawful denial of access to a place of public accom m odation based on com plainant's disability. Sm ith v.
McCafferty's Pub, 2002PA029, 11-18-04, CDO.
Failure to Appear at Administrative Hearing
Com plaint Dismissed

Com plainant had am ple tim e to hire substitute counsel or to present her case pro se. Even pro se parties have an
obligation to the Com m ission to participate in Com m ission proceedings. The Com m ission cannot fulfill its public duty
in the absence of such cooperation by those invoking its processes. The Com m ission finds that failure to appear at
the adm inistrative hearing was unexcused. The com plaint was dism issed for com plainant's failure to cooperate.
Banks v. Cook County Juvenile Tem porary Detention Center, 1994E088, 11-14-96, CDO.
Com plaint Dismissed

Dism issal of com plaint for want of prosecution due to com plainant's failure to attend pre-hearing m eeting, failure to
otherwise cooperate in adm inistrative hearing process and failure to show cause why com plaint should not be
dism issed. Sam pson v. Cerm ak Health Services, 1993E009, 4-27-95, CDO; D'Adam v. Bridgeview Sports Club
Association, Inc., 2004PA004, 8-11-05, CDO.
After hearing officer issued an order to show cause why the m atter should not be dism issed for failure of both
parties to attend a scheduled pre-hearing m eeting for which notice was provided, the m atter was dism issed when
both parties failed to respond to the order to show cause. Swift v. Signs Unlim ited, 2000E042, 7-27-01, 9-19-01, HO.
1
Pow ers and Duties of Hearing Officer
Com m ission's hearing officer has full authority to control the procedures of Com m ission hearings. Lacy v. Cook
County Hospital, 1992E033, 6-8-95, CDO; Parchim v. TLR Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a The Living Room , 2001PA001,
10-17-2002, CO.
Discretion in Adm itting Evidence

At the adm inistrative hearing, the hearing officer determ ines the adm issibility of any testim onial evidence and
exhibits and "shall not be bound by the strict rules of evidence applicable in courts of law or equity." Garcia v.
Discretion W ith Pre-Hearing M em orandum

W here failure of com plainant to respond to discovery requests resulted in respondent's inability to provide a pre-
hearing m em orandum , Com m ission hearing officer waived that requirem ent in view of com plainant's inaction and
pro se status. Sam pson v. Cerm ak Health Services, 1993E009, 4-27-95, CDO.
Sanctions Other Than Dismissal or Default

W hen a party fails to appear at an adm inistrative hearing, hearing officer m ay recom m end som e other rem edy
deem ed appropriate and just--other than dism issal or default. Com m ission assessed respondent $70 for costs of
court reporter after respondent failed to appear at a scheduled adm inistrative hearing. Lacy v. Cook County
Hospital, 1992E033, 6-8-95, CDO.
Com plainant's m otion to com pel granted in part as an appropriate sanction for respondent's disregard of discovery
order. Respondent's actions are an affront to the Com m ission and significantly underm ine the public interest in swift
and fair adjudication of discrim ination com plaints. Respondent ordered to serve its response to com plainant's
interrogatories, requests for production and requests for adm ission without objection. Com plainant granted the right
to am end her com plaint to reflect discovery responses. McCoy v. United Airlines, 1996E111, 10-3-01, HO.
Pro Se Parties
Obligation to Participate
Pro se parties have an obligation to respond to Com m ission orders. Com m ission cannot fulfill its public duty in the
absence of cooperation. W here com plainant failed to attend a m andated pre-hearing m eeting, failed to respond to
respondent's requests for discovery, or respond to respondent's m otion to dism iss, Com m ission dism issed the
com plaint with prejudice. Sam pson v. Cerm ak Health Services, 1993E009, 4-27-95, CDO; Banks v. Cook County
Juvenile Tem porary Detention Center, 1994E088, 11-14-96, CDO. Klegerm an v. Heritage Manor Condom inium
Association and Rowell Property Mgt., 1998H009, 1-13-05, CDO; D'Adam v. Bridgeview Sports Club Association,
Inc., 2004PA004, 8-11-05, CDO;
Failure to Appear
W hen, after Com m ission found substantial evidence to support allegations of com plaint, pro se com plainant failed to
attend a m andated pre-hearing m eeting, failed to respond to respondent's requests for discovery, failed to respond
to respondent's m otion to dism iss, in the face of a clear statem ent that silence would result in dism issal of her
com plaint, Com m ission dism issed the com plaint with prejudice. Sam pson v. Cerm ak Health Services, 1993E009, 4-
27-95, CDO.
Com plainant had am ple tim e to hire substitute counsel or present her case pro se. Even pro se parties have an
obligation to the Com m ission to respond to Com m ission orders, to abide by Com m ission rules and procedures,
and to attend scheduled Com m ission proceedings. The Com m ission cannot fulfill its public duty in the absence
of such cooperation by those invoking its processes. The Com m ission finds that failure to appear at the
adm inistrative hearing was unexcused. Banks v. Cook County Juvenile Tem porary Detention Center,
1994E088, 11-14-96, CDO.
The decision to dism iss or to im pose sanctions for failure of a party to participate in a m andatory conciliation
conference is discretionary on the part of the Com m ission. Parchim v. TLR Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a The Living Room ,
2001PA001, 9-25-02, CO.
2
Remand to Hearing Officer
After Hearing
In accordance with Com m ission Procedural Rule 470.105, the Com m ission rem anded to the hearing officer for
consideration the lim ited legal issue of whether the Com m ission should consider and for what purpose pre-
CCHRO conduct. Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO.
The Com m ission rem anded the Final Proposed Decision and Order to the hearing officer for the lim ited
purposes of (1) reconsidering the em otional dam age award, and (2) expanding the dam ages analysis to include
relevant Com m ission precedent and offer support for the award given. On reconsideration, the hearing officer
increased the dam age award and offered substantive case law in support of her decision. Carroll, et al v.
Chicago District Cam pground Assoc., et al, 1999H006-009, 8-15-06, CO.
On July 15, 2003, the Com m ission rem anded the decision to the Hearing Officer to review and consider: (1) whether
respondent waived its opportunity to present and rely upon the Burlington Industries v. Ellerth affirm ative defense;
(2) how and why such waiver occurred; and (3) if the hearing officer determ ines that respondent did not waive its
opportunity to present an affirm ative defense, whether Burlington applies to Com m ission cases in general, whether
it m ay be applied in this case, and if so, whether respondent adequately established its existence as a viable
defense. Upon reconsideration, the hearing officer found that respondent waived its opportunity to present and rely
upon the Burlington affirm ative defense because respondent did not assert such defense until after reviewing the
Initial Recom m ended Order and Decision. Thus, since respondent waived any potential affirm ative defense, it is not
necessary to resolve whether this defense applies to Com m ission cases in general and/or whether respondent
adequately established its existence as a viable defense in this case. Conway v. Trans-Action Database Marketing,
Inc., 1999E010, 10-09-03, HO.
Subpoenas
See SUBPOENAS
ADM INISTRATIVE REVIEW

See W RIT OF CERTIORARI
AFFIRM ATIVE DEFENSE
The Com m ission generally will not dism iss either a com plaint or any affirm ative defense based solely on the
pleadings prior to the conclusion of the Com m ission's neutral fact finding investigation. Kret v. Falcon and Am erican
Golf Corporation d/b/a Mission Hills Country Club, 1995E058, 3-4-96, CO; Krzyszton v. Falcon and Am erican Golf
Corporation d/b/a Mission Hills Country Club, 1995E059, 3-4-96, CO.
Under § 42-35 (E) of the CCHRO an em ployer is responsible for its acts and the acts of its agents and supervisory
em ployees, regardless of whether the specific acts were authorized or even forbidden by the em ployer. Thus, in
both quid pro quo and hostile work environm ent claim s of sexual harassm ent, an em ployer is vicariously and strictly
liable for its supervisors’ conduct and can not assert an affirm ative defense to such claim s. Desparte v. Arlington
Heights Kirby et al., 2002E020, 6-20-06, CDO.
AGE DISCRIM INATION
Prima Facie Case
Com plainant m ade out prima facie case of discrim ination on the basis of age by alleging that she was over 40 years
old; she believed she was m eeting respondent's legitim ate perform ance expectations; she was term inated by the
respondent; and, she was replaced by a m ale who was under 40 years of age. Hudok v. Quality Transportation
System s, Inc., 1994E031, 12-27-94, CO.
Com m ission grants com plainant leave to am end com plaint to set forth a prima facie case of age discrim ination.
Com plainant directed to apprise respondent as to tim e, place and specific facts of the violation alleged. Alpert v.
Evanston Hospital Corporation, 1996E105, 3-20-97, CO.
3
In proving a prima facie case of age discrim ination, it is not necessary that a com plainant show replacem ent by
som eone outside (i.e., replacem ent by a younger individual) the protected group. This finding overrules the
Com m ission order in Alpert v. Evanston Hospital, 1996E105, 3-29-97 as to the articulation of a prima facie case of
age discrim ination. Scardine v. Zenith Electronics Corporation, 1996E079, 11-30-99, CDO.
Liability Not Found
Com plainant established a prima facie case of age discrim ination. However, the respondent, through specific and
credible testim ony, articulated its legitim ate nondiscrim inatory reason for term inating com plainant: respondent had
to term inate about one-third of the persons in com plainant's departm ent for reasons of econom ic necessity.
Com plainant bears the burden of persuasion to show by the preponderance of the evidence that respondent was
m otivated by age discrim ination in selecting her for term ination. Com plainant did not m eet her burden. Scardine v.
Zenith Electronics Corporation, 1996E079, 11-30-99, CDO.
AGENCY LIABILITY
The CCHRO further provides in § 42-35 (E) that [a]n em ployer is responsible for its acts and those of its agents and
supervisory em ployees with respect to sexual harassm ent regardless of whether the specific acts com plained of
were authorized or even forbidden by the em ployer and regardless of whether the em ployer knew or should have
known of their occurrence. Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO.
Respondent owner found liable for m anager's sexual harassm ent toward com plainant and for retaliatory discharge.
Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO.
Pursuant to an order of default for respondent's refusal to respond to com plaint, respondent found liable for
m anager's unlawful discharge on the basis of sexual orientation. Feges v. The New Em bers Restaurant, 1993E013,
6-16-94, CDO.
Respondent em ployer held jointly and severally liable with offending em ployee in a supervisory position who
sexually harassed com plainant. Desparte v. Arlington Heights Kirby et al., 2002E020, 6-20-06, CDO.
AIDING AND ABETTING

See INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEFS
W here a m otion to dism iss is pending, Com m ission grants m otion of civil rights organization with considerable
expertise in the area of law im plicated by com plaint to file amicus curiae brief. Sherry v. Office of Cook County
Public Defender, 1996E007, 10-15-96, CO.
ANSW ER
See RESPONSE
APPEARANCE
See ATTORNEY APPEARANCE
ATTORNEY APPEARANCE
Leave to W ithdraw
See W ITHDRAW AL OF ATTORNEY
Pro Hac Vice

Motion granted for leave to appear on a pro hac vice basis for the lim ited purpose of representing respondent in the
proceedings before the Com m ission. Krzyszton v. Falcon and Am erican Golf Corporation d/b/a Mission Hills
Country Club, 1995E089, 9-5-95, CO; Dawson v. Elizabeth Arden d/b/a Mario Tricoci, 2005E028, 7-7-05; Magestro
v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc. d/b/a Jared, The Galleria of Jewelry, 2005E066, 1-3-06, CO.
4
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
Costs
It is appropriate to award costs proxim ately related to a m ove forced by discrim inatory conduct. Com plainants
testified that they would not have m oved but for being evicted by respondent. Com plainants presented evidence
that the $500 in costs were proxim ately related to their m ove. Accordingly, the Com m ission awards $500 to
com plainant in out-of-pocket expenses. Garcia v. W inston, et al., 2003H003, 2003H004, 5-16-06, CDO.
Degree of Success on the M erits
The Com m ission has held that a lodestar am ount m ay be adjusted in light of the degree of com plainant's success.
One basis for adjusting the am ount is that the com plainant did not prevail on all of her claim s although a
com plainant is usually entitled to a full fee if the claim s on which he or she did not prevail and the claim s on which
he or she prevailed involved a com m on core of facts or were based on related legal theories. Pirrone v. W heeling
Industrial Clinic, 1997E006, 9-19-01, CDO (Citing Pace v. McGill Managem ent et al., 1996H009, 11-30-99, CDO).
Fee Shifting Provision
§ 42-34 (C)(1)(g) of the CCHRO contains a fee shifting provision that provides that respondents m ust pay the
prevailing com plainant's attorney fees and costs. The purpose of such a fee shifting provision is to ensure effective
access to the judicial process of persons with civil rights grievances. Pace v. Board of Managers of the Courts of
Randview Townhom e Association, 1996H009, 9-13-00, CO.
Lodestar M ethod for Calculating Fees
The Com m ission has adopted the Lodestar Method for calculating a reasonable attorney's fee under the CCHRO.
Under that m ethod, the m ost useful starting point for determ ining the am ount of a reasonable attorney's fee is the
num ber of hours reasonably expended on the litigation m ultiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Pirrone v. W heeling
Industrial Clinic, 1997E005, 9-19-01, CDO (Citing Pace v. McGill Managem ent et al., 1996H009, 11-30-99, CDO).
Prevailing Complainant
Com m ission finds that complainants should be awarded fees because they prevailed in this case by achieving the
benefits they sought in bringing this suit. Com plainants were awarded reasonable attorney's fees after the hearing
officer exam ined tim e sheets and affidavits. See, e.g., Pace v. McGill Managem ent, 1996H009, 11-18-99, CDO
(awarding $12,897.00 in fees and $128.18 in costs).
Prevailing owners suing a board m anaging a condom inium or townhom e association under the CCHRO need not
pay his or her proportional share of the board's expenses of the litigation, including attorney's fees and costs
awarded to the prevailing unit owner. Pace v. McGill Managem ent, 1996H009, 9-13-00, CO.
Pursuant to Com m ission Rule 470.110, a prevailing com plainant m ay file and serve upon the hearing officer (with a
copy to the Com m ission office), a petition for attorney fees and costs within 21 days of receipt of the Com m ission's
decision and order. See, e.g., Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO; Garcia v.
Under § 42-34 (C)(1)(g) of the Ordinance, prevailing com plainants are entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees
and costs. The com plainants have prevailed, although not on all of their argum ents. Not all of the actions
com plainants challenged have been unlawful. Therefore, the hearing officer recom m ends that the Com m ission
issue an award that contem plates the award of an “appropriate” proportion of their reasonable attorney fees and
costs. Carroll, et al v. Chicago District Cam p Ground Assoc., et al, 1999H006-009, 10-14-06, CDO.
Prevailing Respondent
W here a respondent is found not liable for a com plaint of discrim ination, each party bears its own costs and
attorneys' fees. Fiore v. Bloom Township Highway Departm ent, 1993E074, 2-8-96, CDO; Iverson v. Horwitz,
1994E021, 2-8-96, CDO; Green v. Avon Products, 1996E096, 4-29-99, CDO; Blakem ore v. City of Chicago Fire
Departm ent and Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authority, 2002PA015, 10-26-04, CO; Blakem ore v. Trizec Holdings,
5
Inc., (a/k/a) Trizec Office Properties, 2003PA007, 4-21-06, CDO.
Proportionality Not Required
There is no requirem ent that the am ount of attorney's fees awarded be proportional to the am ount of dam ages
received. Pace v. McGill Managem ent et al., 1996H009, 11-18-99, CDO.
BACK PAY
Aw arded
Upon a showing of proof, com plainant, pursuant to an order of default for respondent's failure to respond to the
com plaint, was awarded the equivalent of 12 weeks of pay of $2,247.84 for the period he was unem ployed. Feges
v. The New Em bers Restaurant, 1993E013, 6-16-94, CDO.
Com m ission finds respondent liable to com plainant for back pay in the am ount of $41,418.37 and any additional
back pay am ount that m ay have accrued subsequent to issuance of CDO, plus applicable interest on the back pay.
Hall v. GMRI, Inc., d/b/a Red Lobster Restaurants, 1996E101, 9-10-98, CDO.
Upon a showing of proof at an adm inistrative hearing, com plainant was awarded back pay in the am ount of $7,770
for 19-week period after she got fired to the tim e she stopped looking for work, m inus the am ounts she earned on
another job and m inus unem ploym ent com pensation received. Pirrone v. W heeling Industrial Clinic, 1997E005, 4-
12-01, CDO.
Following a default, com plainant proved that she was entitled to back pay dam ages in the am ount of $3,864 for one
year of back pay. Anything m ore would have been speculative because there was no evidence that com plainant
would have worked at respondent after her work study period ended. Desparte v. Arlington Heights Kirby et al.,
2002E020, 6-20-06, CDO.
M itigation
The Com m ission finds that com plainant m ade reasonable attem pts to m itigate his dam ages. Respondent has the
burden of proof on this point and did not carry its burden. Hall v. GMRI, Inc., d/b/a Red Lobster Restaurants,
1996E101, 9-10-98, CDO.
Not Aw arded
Back pay not awarded because the am ount was speculative due to lack of sufficient proof. Gluszek v. Stadium
Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO; McClellan v. Cook County Law Library, 1996E026, 6-7-99, CDO.
BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS
Although the Com m ission m ay proceed with its neutral fact finding investigation into a bankrupt respondent as an
action "by" a governm ent agency, the autom atic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362(a)(1)
prevents the Com m ission from proceeding with a conciliation conference, as that is an action only by a com plainant
and not by the Com m ission. Holloway v. W olf Cam era & Video, 1999E050, 8-29-05, CO.
Respondent declared bankruptcy but failed to notify com plainant, as a potential creditor, of his obligation to file a
proof of claim . After the bankruptcy proceedings were finalized, respondent's assets were liquidated and the
Com m ission had no jurisdiction to order m oney dam ages against respondent. Com plaint was dism issed without
prejudice, allowing com plainant to challenge the bankruptcy order to allow his com plaint to be acknowledged as a
potential creditor, should he so desire. Holloway v. W olf Cam era & Video, 1999E050, 8-18-06, CO.
BURDEN OF PROOF
The com plainant retains at all tim es the ultim ate burden of proving that the respondent engaged in unlawful
discrim ination. Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO; Dwyer v. Il Pescatore et al.,
2001PA017, 6-12-03, CDO; Blakem ore v. Trizec Holdings, Inc., (a/k/a) Trizec Office Properties, 2003PA007, 4-21-
06, CDO; Desparte v. Arlington Heights Kirby et al., 2002E020, 6-20-06, CDO.
6
W hen the respondent's and com plainant's depiction of events is in question, the burden of proof falls upon the
com plainant. Dwyer v. Il Pescatore Palace Restaurant & Banquet Hall and Vito Barbenente, individually,
2001PA017, 6-12-03, CDO.
Respondent has the burden of proof to establish that com plainant did not sufficiently m itigate dam ages sustained
due to respondent's conduct. Hall v. GMRI, Inc., d/b/a Red Lobster Restaurants, 1996E101, 9-10-98, CDO.
BURDEN-SHIFTING
Com plainant m ust establish by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrim ination. The burden
then shifts to the respondent to articulate a legitim ate non-discrim inatory reason for its actions. If the respondent
articulates a non-discrim inatory reason for its actions, the com plainant m ust then prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the articulated reason was pretext for unlawful discrim ination. Com plainant retains the ultim ate
burden of proving that the respondent unlawfully discrim inated at all tim es. See, e.g., Meallet v. Cook County
Departm ent of Purchasing, 1992E016, 8-18-94, CDO (finding that com plainant was unable to prove that
respondent's articulated reason was pretextual); Desparte v. Arlington Heights Kirby et al., 2002E020, 6-20-06, CDO
(respondent failed to articulate a non-discrim inatory reason for its actions).
COM M ISSION DEADLINES
The 180-day investigation period is directory, not m andatory, and therefore the 180-day period is not jurisdictional.
The Com m ission did not lose jurisdiction over a com plaint because the Com m ission's investigation exceeded 180
days. Montgom ery v. Rosenthal, 1994H001, 10-18-94, CO; Conway v. Transaction Database Marketing, Inc.,
1999E010A, 7-17-02, HO.
COM M ISSION EXECUTIVE REVIEW COM M ITTEE
The Executive Review Com m ittee, not the Com m ission investigator, upon review of the investigation report and
supporting docum entation, m akes the final evidence determ ination, i.e., finding substantial evidence or a lack of
substantial evidence of CCHRO violation. Iverson v. Horwitz, 1994E021, 4-6-95, HO.
COM PLAINTS
Amendment
Post-Evidence Determination
Com m ission grants m otion to am end com plaint pursuant to Com m ission Rule 420.140, to add additional claim s that
arose after the com plaint was filed, where respondent had not objected and where com plainant's first discovery of
additional claim s was after filing. Friedl v. The W om en's Club of Evanston, 1994PA001, 4-9-96, HO.
Com plainant perm itted to am end com plaint when respondent failed to establish that the adm ission of additional
evidence and the filing of an am ended com plaint would prejudice respondent's ability to m aintain a defense on the
m erits. McClellan v. Cook County Law Library, l996E026, 12-17-97, HO.
Com m ission denies com plainant's oral m otion to add respondent. The Com m ission's Procedural Rules require such
am endm ents to be filed in the sam e m anner as the original com plaint in writing. Feges v. The New Em bers
Restaurant, 1993E013, 6-16-94, HO.
Pre-Evidence Determination
Add Claims
Section 420.140(B) of the Com plainant's m otion to am end com plaint m ade during jurisdictional hearing taken under
advisem ent until resolution of jurisdiction issues because additional claim s were not relevant to jurisdictional issue
before the hearing officer. Munda v. Block Medical Center, 2003E032, 1-27-04, HO.
Add Clarifying Facts

Com m ission grants com plainant's m otion to am end com plaint prior to evidence determ ination to am plify and clarify
allegations originally m ade and to set forth additional facts relating to the original charge. Kessel v. Cook County
Sheriff's Office, 1999E068, 1-4-00, CO.
7
Add Parties
Com m ission grants m otion to am end com plaint to add an additional respondent prior to evidence determ ination
because additional respondent had actual knowledge of the com plaint, no objection was filed with the Com m ission,
and granting of Com plainant's m otion would not prejudice additional respondent in m aintaining its defense on the
m erits of the com plaint. Harm on v. SRC/21st Century Healthcare Managem ent, 1999E066, 12-14-99, CO
Com m ission grants m otion to am end com plaint to add an additional com plainant and will have the am ended
com plaint relate back to the original filing date if (1) the cause of action alleged by the person sought to be m ade a
Com plainant arises out of the sam e transaction or occurrence set forth in the original Com plaint; (2) Respondents
had tim ely knowledge of the original Com plaint and the fact that the person sought to be added m ight be involved as
a Com plainant; (3) the additional Com plainant sought to be added could have independently filed a Com plaint
against Respondents in the first instance; and (4) any objecting party fails to dem onstrate that such an am endm ent
would prejudice it in m aintaining its action or defense upon the m erits. Laiser and S&L Managem ent v. Baldwin
Greens Hom eowners Association et al., 1997H009, 4-26-00, CO.
During the course of the Com m ission's neutral fact finding investigation, the Com m ission has determ ined that
Com plainant's daughter should also be nam ed as com plainant in the case. Adding com plainant in this case would
neither prejudice the Respondents, nor would it delay the Com m ission's investigation process. Anderson v. Lee,
2005H002, 11-2-06, CO.
Respondent does not contest that it is the correct respondent in this case. Therefore, the Com m ission will proceed
with jurisdictional hearing even though the respondents who are added m ay be able to revisit som e of the issues
considered at the hearing at a later date. Munda v. Block Medical Center, 2003E032, 1-27-04, HO.
Articulate Prima Facie Case

Com m ission grants com plainant leave to file an am ended com plaint setting forth a prima facie case of sexual
orientation and m arital status discrim ination in accordance with the standards articulated by CCHRO. The com plaint
m ust apprize Respondent of pertinent facts related to discrim ination by specifically identifying Com plainant's
em ployer, and setting forth specific allegations of conduct or treatm ent she has experienced which would violate the
CCHRO. Eischen v. Cook County, 2000E002, 5-4-00, CO.
Cure Technical Defect

Motion for leave to substitute party respondent, correcting the nam e of the respondent granted. Shirley W aleska
Soto v. W YLL FM Radio and Salem Com m unications Corporation, 2000E022, 6-5-00, CO.
The Com m ission determ ines that an incorrect date of discrim ination is a defect which m ay be cured by an
am endm ent to the com plaint. Any dispute as to the actual date of discrim ination will be addressed during the
course of the Com m ission's neutral fact finding investigation. Perez v. Lake Park Construction, Inc., 2004E063, 3-
21-05, CO.
Deceased Respondent
In accordance with Rule 420.140(H), a legal successor m ay be substituted for deceased respondent. It is the
com plainant's responsibility to identify the legal successor. Benson v. Affordable Carpet Cleaning and Alfonso
Houston, 1996E0106, 12-21-00, CO.
Content
Prima Facie Case

Pursuant to Rule 420.105, com plainant is not required to prove the elem ents of a prima facie case at the com plaint-
filing stage of the proceedings. A com plainant satisfies the m andate of the CCHRO if she sets forth the basic
elem ents of her discrim ination claim s so as to apprise a respondent of the nature of her allegations. See, e.g.,
Hudok v. Quality Transportation System s, Inc., 1994EO31, 12-27-94, CO; Perez v. Lake Park Construction, Inc.,
2004E063, 8-1-06, CO, Blakem ore v. Chicago Transit Authority, et. al., 2006PA008, 11-30-06, CO.
W hile § 42-34 (B)(1)(b) of the CCHRO requires that a com plaint "be in such detail as to substantially apprise any
party properly concerned as to the tim e, place and facts surrounding the alleged violation," the Com m ission has held
that a com plainant satisfies that m andate if he or she sets forth the basic elem ents of a discrim ination claim in a
com plaint so as to apprise a respondent of the nature of the allegations. However, if a com plaint fails to satisfy these
m inim um requirem ents, the Com m ission m ay reject the com plaint without prejudice and without investigation.
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Blakem ore v. City of Chicago Fire Departm ent and Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authority, 2002PA015, 10-26-04,
CO; Munda v. Polish et al., 2004E044A, 2-10-05, CO; Blucher v. W ilkes & McClean Ltd., 2004E015, 5-24-05, CO.
Evidence of Pattern/Practice
In the context of a com plaint, conduct outside the 180-day filing period m ay nonetheless be included in a com plaint
and be of significance during the investigatory stage if the conduct established a pattern and practice of
discrim inatory conduct or behavior. Such incidents, where appropriate, m ay be used to assess credibility, m otive or
bias of the respondent. Martin v. Club Fever, 1998PA009, 11-10-98, CO (citing Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and
Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95).
Notice Pleading
The CCHRO and Rules do not require a com plaint to be stated with particularity, but rather provide that a com plaint
substantially apprise a respondent of dates, places and facts of an alleged violation of the CCHRO. See, e.g.,
Hudok v. Quality Transportation System , Inc., 1994E031, 12-27-94, CO; Blakem ore v. Kinko's, Inc., 2002PA011, 7-
14-03, CO; Blucher v. W ilkes & McClean Ltd., 2004E015, 5-24-05, CO.
Complaint Reinstatement
Com m ission reinstates com plaint, dism issed as a result of Com m ission error and where com plainant was
sufficiently diligent about pursuing and participating in the investigation of his com plaint. To deprive com plainant of
his due process right to an investigation of his com plaint under these circum stances would be unjust. Gaines v.
Cook County Hospital, 1994E100, 1-30-96, CO.
Com plainant's request for reconsideration and reinstatem ent of com plaint granted. The Com m ission m isapplied the
law when it dism issed the com plaint as being untim ely. The Com m ission initially determ ined that the 180-day filing
lim itations period began to run prior to when the com plainant had definitive, unam biguous com m unication of
respondent's decision to term inate com plainant. Clay v. Cook County Hospital, 1996E059, 8-8-97, CO.
Relying on § 42-34 (D)(5) of the CCHRO, which grants Com plainants an individual right of action, four different
com plainants chose to rem ove their com plaints from the Com m ission to various Cook County circuit courts. In
separate decisions or orders, the courts declared the CCHRO subsection relied upon by these com plainants to be
invalid and dism issed the court com plaints. The individual com plainants then sought to have their com plaints
reinstated at the Com m ission. Although neither the CCHRO nor the Com m ission's Rules specifically address the
issue of reinstatem ent, the Com m ission finds without reinstatem ent by the Com m ission, com plainants would be
deprived any forum for consideration of the m erits of their com plaints. Equity concerns support the Com m ission
consideration and subsequent granting of com plainants' respective m otions for resum ing jurisdiction and
reinstatem ent of the original com plaints of discrim ination at the Com m ission. See, e.g., Gilich v. LaGrange
Mem orial Hospital, 1995E036, 5-23-00, CO; Hakim v. Payco-General Am erican Credits, Inc., 1999E021, 5-23-00,
CO; Newm an v. Hum ana, Inc., 1998E047, 5-23-00, CO; Lucas v. Zeta International and Branco Jevtic, 1996E022,
6-12-00, CO.
CONCILIATION CONFERENCE
Duty to Participate
All parties have an obligation to the Com m ission to participate in scheduled Com m ission procedures. The
Com m ission cannot fulfill its public duty in the absence of such cooperation by those invoking its processes. See,
e.g., Sam pson v. Cerm ak Health Services, 1993E009, 4-27-95, CDO; Banks v. Cook County Juvenile Tem porary
Detention Center, 1994E088, 11-14-96, CDO.
Failure to Appear
Complaint Dismissed
Com plaint dism issed for com plainant's failure to attend a Com m ission-scheduled conciliation conference. Ham ilton
v. David Kilheeney, et al., 1999H004, 7-13-00, CO; Pope V. Berkeley Auto Service, et al., 2000PA007, 1-21-03, CO.
Complaint Not Dismissed

9
2001PA001, 9-25-02, CO.
Fine Assessed
Com m ission assessed fines against respondent for unexcused failure to attend a com m ission ordered conciliation
conference. Marrero v. Injectec, Inc., 1995E052, 5-7-96, CO; Desparte v. Arlington Heights Kirby, et al., 2002E020,
7-22-05, CO.
Pro Se Parties
Pro se parties have an obligation to abide by Com m ission rules and procedures. See, e.g., Sam pson v. Cerm ak
Health Services, 1993E009, 4-27-95, CDO; D'Adam v. Bridgeview Sports Club Association, Inc., 2004PA004, 8-11-
05, CDO.
The Com m ission has the discretion to excuse a pro se party’s failure to appear at the Conciliation Conference due
to illness. Parchim v. TLR Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a The Living Room , 2001PA001, 9-25-02, CO.
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION
See JURISDICTION
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
Complaint Against the Commission and/or Any of its Staff
Filing a com plaint with the Com m ission against the Com m ission and any of its staff presents obvious conflict of
interest concerns. The Com m ission shall not accept com plaints filed against itself or its staff and shall refer such
com plaints to other civil rights agencies. Blakem ore v. Cook County Com m ission on Hum an Rights et al.,
2002PA025, 6-12-03, CO.
Intergovernmental Agreement
The Com m ission entered into an intergovernm ental agreem ent with the Chicago Com m ission on Hum an Relations
providing that com plaints of discrim ination m ade against the Com m ission or any of its staff which cannot be filed at
other civil rights agencies, shall be referred to and accepted by the Chicago Com m ission for processing under the
Chicago Ordinances. Blakem ore v. Cook County Com m ission on Hum an Rights et al., 2002PA025, 6-12-03, CO.
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM S
First Amendment
Free Exercise of Religion

The Com m ission lacks the authority to resolve internal church disputes, or m atters requiring the interpretation of
church doctrine, where to do so would abridge the right to free exercise of religion. If the respondents’ actions were
based on their sincerely-held religious beliefs, the Com m ission would lack jurisdiction to review those actions. Here,
because respondents do not have a sincerely held religious belief that prohibits them from allowing practicing
hom osexuals to rent or own their cottages, respondents cannot claim the protection of the First Am endm ent.
Carroll, et al v. Chicago District Cam p Ground Assoc., et al., 1999H006-009, 10-14-06, CDO.
Free Speech
Respondent's argum ent that its First Am endm ent and Illinois Constitutional rights would be violated if they were
com pelled to publish a specific personal advertisem ent could be a valid defense to a com plaint alleging
discrim ination based on sexual orientation in denial of access to a public accom m odation. However, these issues
raise factual questions which are not appropriate for a Com m ission resolution in a m otion to dism iss. Reyes v.
Penny Saver Publications, 1995PA005, 9-21-95, HO.
CONTINUING VIOLATIONS
§ 42-34 (B)(1)(a) of the CCHRO and Com m ission Procedural Rule 420.100(A) recognize that a violation of the
CCHRO m ay be of a continuing nature. The continuing violation theory allows incidents which would otherwise be
tim e-barred to be considered tim ely because they are part of a pattern of related events, at least one of which
10
occurred during the 180-day filing period. In determ ining whether allegations are of a continuing nature, the
Com m ission considers the following factors: (1) whether the alleged events involve the sam e type of discrim ination;
(2) whether the acts are recurring and not isolated or discrete; and (3) whether a pattern or series of acts over a
period of tim e finally alerts the individual that his or her rights are being violated. See, e.g., Martin v. Club Fever,
1998PA009, 11-30-98, CO; Howard v. Pappas Transport, 1999E033, 2-8-00, CO.
The "continuing violations" theory m ay allow a discrim ination com plainant can reach back to events occurring m ore
than 180 days before the filing of a charge or com plaint as long as the tim ely allegations are substantially related to
the earlier events. W hen it is clear from the face of the com plaint that the only tim ely allegations within the com plaint
have little or no connection at all to the tim e-barred allegations, the continuing violations theory will not prevent
dism issal of the tim e-barred allegations. Munda v. Block Medical Center, et al., 2004E061, 2-10-05, CO.
The effects or outgrowth of alleged past discrim ination m ay continue in the present but do not create an
independent basis for a com plaint and do not cause a new filing period to run. Com plainant's allegation that the
filing of a lien was discrim inatory was not tim ely. The Com m ission rejected her argum ent that the rem oval of the lien
(an outgrowth of the original filing) caused a new filing period to begin to run. Spurgash v. 7041-49 O'Connell
Condom inium Association and Kiner, 1994H006, 10-19-98, CDO.
The CCHRO and Procedural Rules require com plainants to file their claim s with the Com m ission within 180 days of
the alleged violation or continuing violation. Neither a com plainant’s appeals nor a respondent’s responses to those
appeals can delay the tolling of the filing period. Com plainant failed to file his com plaint within 180 days of the
alleged discrim inatory acts, and therefore, the Com m ission grants respondent’s m otion and dism isses the com plaint
for lack of jurisdiction. Totten v. Chicago District Cam pground Association et al, 2001H003, 8-16-2001, CO.
COSTS
See ATTORNEY'S FEES - Costs
CREDIBILITY
During Administrative Hearing
Follow ing a Default Order

W hen respondents were not present at the adm inistrative hearing to challenge com plainant's evidence or offer any
of their own, the only real issue was for the Hearing Officer to decide whether he believed com plainant and her only
witness, her m other, who testified principally about dam ages. The Hearing Officer found com plainant's testim ony
credible. Desparte v. Arlington Heights Kirby et al., 2002E020, 5-6-05, CO.
Liability
W hen the respondent's and com plainant's depiction of events is in question, no credibility determ ination is
necessary and the burden of proof falls upon the com plainant. Dwyer v. Il Pescatore Palace Restaurant & Banquet
Hall and Vito Barbenente, individually, 2001PA017, 6-12-03, CDO.
Com m ission finds that despite the lack of credibility of one of the m ain defense witnesses there was sufficient
evidence to find for respondent and for term ination of com plainant. Alcegueire v. Cook County Departm ent For
Managem ent of Inform ation System s, 1992E003 and 1992E026, 8-10-95 CDO.
Respondent's pretextual argum ent rebutting charge of retaliation found not credible. Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar
and Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO.
During Investigation
W hen credibility of parties and witnesses is at issue during a Com m ission investigation, a substantial evidence
determ ination is appropriate. The choice of whom to believe should be m ade by an adm inistrative hearing officer
with witnesses under oath and applying the rules of evidence. Ehlers v. United Parcel Service, 1997E027, 9-21-98,
CO.
DAM AGES
Pursuant to the CCHRO, the Com m ission can order statutory fines, dam ages for em otional harm and paym ent of
11
interest on dam ages awarded. Rem edies and relief set forth in § 42-34 of the CCHRO are not m eant to be
exclusive. The Ordinance itself expressly provides that the CCHRO is to be liberally construed for the
accom plishm ent of its purposes. Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO. Garcia v.
Under the Ordinance, relief for violations m ay include, but is not lim ited to, an order to cease the illegal conduct
com plained of and to take steps to alleviate the effect of the illegal conduct complained of; to pay actual dam ages
for injury or loss suffered; to entertain applications to sell or lease housing to the com plainants; to pay the
com plainants all or a portion of the costs of pursuing the com plaint and to take such action necessary to m ake the
com plainant whole; and to pay a fine of not less than $100 and not m ore than $500 for each offense. Carroll, et al v.
Chicago District Cam p Ground Assoc., et al., 1999H006-009, 10-14-06, CDO.
The Com m ission has broad power to award rem edies as set forth in § 42-34 (C) of the CCHRO. Included within this
power is the power to discourage respondent from engaging in sim ilar discrim inatory conduct in the future. Garcia
v. W inston, et al., 2003H003, 2003H004, 5-16-06, CDO.
Actual Damages
The Com m ission has clear precedent for the awarding of com pensatory dam ages. Garcia v. W inston, et al.,
2003H003, 2003H004, 5-16-06, CDO.
§ 42-34 (C)(1)(b) authorizes an award of actual dam ages for em otional harm . "Hum iliation, sham e, and m ental
anguish are elem ents of actual dam ages which cannot be precisely m easured." Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and
Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO; Desparte v. Arlington Heights Kirby et al., 2002E020, 6-20-06, CDO.
Aw arded
Award of em otional distress dam ages m ust be directly related to the incidents com plained of. Com m ission
authorized award of $3,500.00 actual dam ages for injury such as em otional harm . Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar
and Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO.
The Com m ission awards em otional distress dam ages and interest thereon for pain, suffering and m ental anguish in
the am ount of $50,000.00. After com plainant was fired, he was in shock, suffered depression, stayed in bed for two
weeks, his dosage of an anti-depressant m edication was increased, he was subsequently hospitalized for one night
and as of date of adm inistrative hearing still suffered consequences as a result of this hospitalization. Hall v. GMRI,
Inc., d/b/a Red Lobster Restaurants, 1996E101, 9-10-98, CDO.
The Com m ission awards em otional distress dam ages and interest thereon for pain, suffering and m ental anguish in
the am ount of $35,000.00. For 14 m onths, com plainant felt hum iliation, sham e and m ental anguish both from
retaliatory actions and threats. Com plainant felt unprotected by respondent. Com plainant's repeated attem pts to
report ongoing harassm ent to respondent went unheeded. In addition, com plainant's testim ony was supported by
testim ony from her husband, as well as evidence that com plainant sought m edical treatm ent and therapy, in part
related to respondent's actions. McClellan v. Cook County Law Library, 1996E026, 6-7-99, CDO.
A com pensatory dam age award is appropriate for the com plainants' loss of their right to occupy their cottage. If the
cottage has already been sold, the com plainants are entitled to the proceeds of that sale; otherwise, the
com plainants are entitled to receive the right to occupy the cottage. Additionally, com plainants are entitled to any
proceeds realized by the respondent from renting the cottage, less any upkeep expenses. However, since
com plainants failed to provide evidence of the rental value, no such awards will be m ade. Carroll, et al v. Chicago
District Cam p Ground Assoc., et al., 1999H006-009, 10-14-06, CDO.
Com m ission finds that the retaliatory discharge in response to a sim ple letter requesting an end to discrim inatory
treatm ent could have created the kind of em otional distress testified to by com plainant. Thus, a $6,500.00
com pensatory dam age award which includes reim bursem ent for com plainant's sessions with a social worker is
justified. Pirrone v. W heeling Industrial Clinic, 1997E005, 4-12-01, CDO.
Com m ission finds that the harassing conduct consisted of discrete acts over a short period of tim e; no m edical
evidence was presented as to any prolonged m edical treatm ent; and the specific testim ony on em otional distress
was som ewhat generic, resulting in an appropriate award of $2,000.00. A sm aller award would overly m inim ize the
12
im pact of the blatant and hom ophobic statem ents m ade by a supervisor directed to an em ployee. Conway v. Trans-
Action Database Marketing, Inc., 1999E010, 3-13-03, CDO.
Factors Considered
In considering an appropriate award for em otional distress dam ages, the Com m ission considers previous
Com m ission and other tribunal decisions, as well as the following factors: (a) the extent of testim ony concerning the
em otional distress, i.e., was there negligible or m erely conclusory testim ony or was there detailed testim ony
revealing specific effects of the distress; (b) the length of the discrim inatory conduct; the type of discrim inatory
conduct, i.e., acts occurring briefly or egregious behavior accom panied by face to face conducts, epithets and/or
actual m alice; (d) the duration of the discrim inatory conduct's effects; (e) whether m edical treatm ent was sought
and/or whether and to what extent physical m anifestations or psychiatric m anifestations related to the distress; (f)
whether the discrim inatory conduct was so egregious that one would expect a reasonable person to experience
severe em otional distress; (g) the vulnerability or fragility of the com plainant due to past discrim inatory experiences
or pre-existing condition; (h) whether the conduct involved refusal to rent, rather than harassm ent, or an attem pt to
evict or refusal to sell; (I) whether the discrim inatory act was accom panied by acts or threats of violence; and (j)
whether serious m edical or psychological reactions to the discrim inatory acts were present. McClellan v. Cook
County Law Library, 1996E026, 6-7-99, CDO.
Egregiousness of Conduct
Com m ission awarded com plainant $15,000.00 in com pensatory dam ages for em otional distress. Here, com plainant
was still in high school and suffered repeated physical contact of a very sensitive nature. For that reason, a
substantially higher award is justified. Desparte v. Arlington Heights Kirby et al., 2002E020, 6-20-06, CDO.
Given the severity of em otional distress suffered by the com plainants, the physical sym ptom s suffered by
com plainant, and respondent's egregious conduct in evicting them during the m iddle of winter while com plainant
was pregnant, the Com m ission awards $10,000.00 to com plainant for em otional and physical distress caused by
respondent's discrim ination. Garcia v. W inston, et al., 2003H003, 2003H004, 5-16-06, CDO.
The unlawful treatm ent of the Carroll com plainants was sufficiently egregious, public and persistent, and so went to
the heart of their identification as a fam ily of two hom osexual m en and their (then-foster) son, that an award of
$5,000.00 to each fam ily m em ber, totaling $15,000.00. Carroll, et al v. Chicago District Cam p Ground Assoc., et al.,
1999H006-009, 10-14-06, CDO.
Foreseeability
It was reasonably foreseeable that the com plainants would have som e sort of problem s with any housing they were
able to secure within the short tim e period available to them due to the eviction by respondent. In this case, it is
clear that being evicted by respondent was the proxim ate cause of at least som e of the em otional distress that
com plainant suffered, especially the m igraine headaches, the crying, and sleeplessness. Garcia v. W inston, et al.,
2003H003, 2003H004, 5-16-06, CDO.
The sizeable awards for em otional distress dam ages sought by com plainants are not warranted because the
testim ony failed to dem onstrate significant em otional distress resulting from the discrim ination. Dam ages of
$1000.00 for each com plainant awarded. Pace v. McGill Managem ent, 1996H009, 2-25-99, CDO.
Advocacy Organizations
Advocacy organizations m ay be proper parties under the ordinance and can be awarded dam ages. The
Com m ission determ ined that the South Suburban Housing Center (SSHC), an advocacy agency that is involved in
m onitoring, training, and rem edying unlawful housing practices that are included in the CCHRO m ay be a proper
com plainant under the CCHRO. Garcia v. W inston, et al., 2003H003, 2003H004, 5-16-06, CDO.
Back Pay
Aw arded
Upon a showing of proof, com plainant, pursuant to an order of default for respondent's failure to respond to the
com plaint, was awarded the equivalent of 12 weeks of pay of $2,247.84 for the period he was unem ployed. Feges
v. The New Em bers Restaurant, 1993E013, 6-16-94, CDO.
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Upon a showing of proof at an adm inistrative hearing, com plainant was awarded back pay in the am ount $41,418.37
and any additional back pay am ount that m ay have accrued subsequent to the issuance of the Com m ission's
Decision and Order, plus applicable interest. This am ount reflects what com plainant would have been m aking had
he not been unlawfully term inated by the respondent, including yearly raises and appropriate deductions for
m itigating factors. Hall v. GMRI, Inc., d/b/a Red Lobster Restaurants, 1996E101, 9-10-98, CDO.
Upon a showing of proof at an adm inistrative hearing, com plainant was awarded back pay in the am ount of $7,770
for 19-week period after she got fired to the tim e she stopped looking for work, m inus the am ounts she earned on
another job and m inus unem ploym ent com pensation received. Pirrone v. W heeling Industrial Clinic, 1997E005, 4-
12-01, CDO.
Following a default order, com plainant proved that she was entitled to back pay dam ages in the am ount of $3,864
for one year of back pay. Anything m ore would have been speculative because there is no evidence that
com plainant would have worked at respondent after her work study period ended. Desparte v. Arlington Heights
Kirby et al., 2002E020, 6-20-06, CDO.
Not Aw arded
Back pay not awarded because the am ount was speculative due to lack of sufficient proof. Gluszek v. Stadium
Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO; McClellan v. Cook County Law Library, 1996E026, 6-7-99, CDO.
The Com m ission finds that the record is devoid of any probative evidence that would allow the com plainant to be
awarded back pay. In addition, the Com m ission's finding on m ixed m otive and after-acquired evidence analysis as it
applies to com plainant's term ination also supports a finding of no back pay award for com plainant. Conway v.
Trans-Action Database Marketing, Inc., 1999E010, 3-13-03, CDO.
Fringe Benefits
§ 42-34 (C)(1)(c) and (h) of the CCHRO provide that the Com m ission m ay order a respondent to provide such fringe
benefits the com plainant m ay have been denied. Respondent ordered to pay com plainant the value of lost benefits
in the am ount of $1,482.00, plus interest on these benefits. Respondent ordered to return stock options
com plainant lost as a result of the unlawful term ination and give to com plainant the stock options that he would have
received but for his term ination. Hall v. GMRI, Inc., d/b/a Red Lobster Restaurants, 1996E101, 9-10-98, CDO.
Injunctive Relief
See INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Interest
In order to m ake com plainants whole, § 42-34 (C)(1)(h) of the CCHRO provides for the paym ent of interest on
dam ages awarded. The Com m ission awards interest from the date of the violation for em otional distress dam ages
and from the date of the judgm ent for all other dam ages and shall be calculated at prim e rate, adjusted quarterly
and com pounded annually. See, e.g., Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO; Garcia v.
W inston, et al., 2003H003, 2003H004, 5-16-06, CDO; Desparte v. Arlington Heights Kirby et al., 2002E020, 6-20-06,
CDO.
M itigation
The Com m ission finds that com plainant m ade reasonable attem pts to m itigate his dam ages. Respondent has the
burden of proof on this point and did not carry its burden. Hall v. GMRI, Inc., d/b/a Red Lobster Restaurants,
1996E101, 9-10-98, CDO.
Proof of Damages
Credibility
witness, her m other, who testified principally about dam ages. The Hearing Officer found com plainant's testim ony
credible. Except for som e confusion about the order of the three incidents, her testim ony was straightforward and
believable. Her dem eanor added to her credibility because her em otions seem ed sincere, and were not m anifested
14
to im press the Hearing Officer. Sim ilarly, the Hearing Officer found com plainant's m other a credible witness about
her daughter's em otional distress, based on her straightforward testim ony and her dem eanor in that she also did not
testify in an overly em otional m anner so as to evoke sym pathy. Desparte v. Arlington Heights Kirby et al.,
2002E020, 5-6-05, CDO.
Following a default order, at the Adm inistrative Hearing, the burden is upon com plainants to support their requests
for dam ages. Also, at the Adm inistrative Hearing the Hearing Officer determ ines the adm issibility of any testim onial
evidence and exhibits and "shall not be bound by the strict rules of evidence applicable in courts of law or equity."
(Section 460.105) Garcia v. W inston, et al., 2003H003, 2003H004, 5-16-06, CDO.
The duration of the unlawful acts them selves was brief and the evidence of em otional distress suffered is very
sketchy. The Com m ission awards $1,000.00 for each Graham fam ily m em ber, totaling $4,000.00 Carroll, et al v.
Chicago District Cam p Ground Assoc., et al., 1999H006-009, 10-14-06, CDO.
Punitive Damages
Authority to Award
Pream ble expressly provides that CCHRO is to be liberally construed for the accom plishm ent of its purposes. Thus
§ 42-34 of the CCHRO, while not expressly providing for punitive dam ages, does not explicitly prohibit them . The
list of rem edies in § 42-34 is not intended to be exhaustive. Com m ission has authority to award punitive dam ages.
Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO; Desparte v. Arlington Heights Kirby et al.,
2002E020, 6-20-06, CDO.
Aw arded
Retaliation
Respondent discharged com plainant based on her letter to him com plaining about her treatm ent. This conduct was
taken in reckless disregard for com plainant's right and should be sanctioned to deter future wrongdoing.
Com m ission finds that a punitive dam ages award of $4000.00 is sufficient as a reasonable punishm ent for
respondent, a sm all occupational m edicine clinic, to deter potential wrongdoers. Pirrone v. W heeling Industrial
Clinic, 1997E005, 4-12-01, CDO.
Sexual Harassment
Com m ission levies punitive dam ages of $5,000.00 for em ployer's reckless disregard for victim 's rights by allowing
supervisor to continue conduct. Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO.
Com m ission awards $12,500.00 in punitive dam ages for sexual harassm ent because the supervisor's behavior went
unpunished; the em ployer dem onstrated no real plan to prevent it; the violations were egregious, and the pattern of
behavior was ongoing despite Com plainant's com plaints. Desparte v. Arlington Heights Kirby et al., 2002E020, 6-
20-06, CDO.
Calculation of Award
Conduct
Com m ission awards $12,500.00 in punitive dam ages for sexual harassm ent because of the greater need for
deterrence given the repeated conduct the supervisor engaged in with no real punishm ent or plan to prevent it by
respondent em ployer. Desparte v. Arlington Heights Kirby et al., 2002E020, 6-20-06, CDO.
Relevance of Net W orth and Income

Com m ission grants com plainant's m otion to com pel inform ation regarding respondent's net worth and incom e as
relevant to the issue of punitive dam ages, if any. Nunnery v. Lewy, et al., 1998H008, 8-7-01, HO; Interfaith Housing
Center of the Northern Suburbs v. Lewy et al., 1998H009, 8-7-01, HO.
Incom e and assets of respondent are relevant to the issue of punitive dam ages. In this rule applicable to the
Com m ission, the Com m ission follows both the rule of law adopted by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the
Chicago Com m ission on Hum an Relations. Gonzalez v. Kedzierski. 1995H014, 2-19-96, HO; Nunnery v. Lewy et
al., 1998H008, 8-3-01, HO; Interfaith Housing Center of the Northern Suburbs, 1998H010, 8-3-01, HO.
15
Legal Standard
Punitive dam ages are appropriate when a respondent's actions are shown to be m otivated by evil m otive or intent,
or when actions involve reckless or callous indifference to the protected rights of others. The Com m ission levies
punitive dam ages where em ployer's reckless disregard for victim 's rights allows supervisor to continue unlawful
harassing conduct. Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO; Desparte v. Arlington
Not Aw arded
Punitive dam ages are not appropriate where respondent, acting on advice from counsel, did not act with evil m otive
or intent when it denied com plainants' request for an accom m odation. Pace v. McGill Managem ent, 1996H009, 2-
25-99, CDO.
In prom ulgating the CCHRO, there is no specific indication that the Cook County Board of Com m issioners intended
to override the specific provisions of the Illinois Tort Im m unity Act. The Act prohibits a local public entity from being
held liable for punitive dam ages; hence the Com m ission can not assess punitive dam ages against respondent, the
Cook County Law Library. McClellan v Cook County Law Library, 1996E026, 6-7-99, CDO.
The Com m ission finds this case is inappropriate for an award of punitive dam ages. The award of actual dam ages in
this case is substantial. However, actual dam ages are not a substitute for punitive dam ages, although the
substantial award of actual dam ages m ay have the incidental effect of deterring future discrim ination by respondent.
Hall v. GMRI, Inc., d/b/a Red Lobster Restaurants, 1996E101, 9-10-98, CDO.
A finding of liability does not in and of itself entitle a com plainant to an award of punitive dam ages. Based on the
facts that the m ain harasser is no longer em ployed with respondent, that there is no evidence that respondent
encouraged or condoned the supervisor's illegal behavior, and that the record is relatively thin as to the context and
frequency of the discrim inatory slurs, punitive dam ages are not appropriate in this m atter. Conway v. Trans-Action
Database Marketing, Inc., 1999E010, 3-13-03, CDO.
Punitive dam age awards are appropriate where the respondents’ actions are willful and/or m alicious or where the
respondents recklessly disregarded the rights of the com plainants. In this case the First Am endm ent issues were
sufficiently com plex, and the status of the respondent under the First Am endm ent sufficiently unclear, that it cannot
be said that respondents acted with evil m otive or intent. Punitive dam ages are inappropriate in this case. Carroll, et
al v. Chicago District Cam p Ground Assoc., et al., 1999H006-009, 10-14-06, CDO.
Purpose
The purpose of punitive dam ages is to punish the respondent for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and
others like him from sim ilar conduct in the future. Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95,
CDO; Randle El et al v. Pizza Hut of Am erica, Inc., 1996PA013, 4-14-97, CO; Desparte v. Arlington Heights Kirby et
al., 2002E020, 6-20-06, CDO.
The Com m ission wants em ployers and supervisors to understand that their failure to take strong m easures to
prevent physical sexual harassm ent of a teenage em ployee by a repeated sexual harasser and the actions of such
a sexual harasser are the kind of m isconduct that punitive dam ages were designed for. Desparte v. Arlington
DEFAULT
Failure to Respond
Judgm ent Entered

After respondent repeatedly refused to participate in the procedures of the Com m ission and num erous notices of the
consequences of that failure were issued by the Com m ission, a default order was entered against respondent.
Consequently, respondent is deem ed to have adm itted to all of the factual allegations of com plainants' com plaint.
See, e.g., Feges v. The New Em bers Restaurant, 1993E013, 11-8-93, CO; Matthews v. Eugene's Fireside
Restaurant, 1997PA017, 12-29-98, CO; Desparte v. Arlington Heights Kirby et al., 2002E020, 5-6-05, CO;
Garcia v. W inston et al., 2003H003, 2003H004, 5-16-06, CDO.
16
Hearing on Damages
Liability Found
Subsequent to the entry of a default order, an adm inistrative hearing was held to determ ine com plainant's relief, if
any. Due to respondent's failure to file a tim ely response to the com plaint, all of com plainant's well-pleaded
allegations were deem ed adm itted, com plainant established a prima facie case of discrim ination and dam ages were
awarded. Feges v. The New Em bers Restaurant, 1993E013, 6-16-94, CDO.
Liability Not Found

Having received no written verified response to the Com m ission com plaint, no response to the notice of default, and
no response or request for reconsideration of the Com m ission's order of default, the Com m ission scheduled this
m atter for an adm inistrative hearing. At an adm inistrative hearing in a default case, a com plaint m ust establish a
prima facie case of discrim ination and prove any dam ages. Even though this is a default case, com plainant has
failed to m eet his obligation of proving a prima facie case. Therefore, the com plaint is dism issed. Sm ith v.
M otion for Default
Denied
A strict application of the default rule would violate the spirit of the CCHRO, which is to be liberally construed to
accom plish its purpose. Failure of respondent to respond tim ely or otherwise is not cause for the im m ediate entry of
an order of default; rather, the Com m ission's rules perm it the Com m ission to issue a notice of default. W hile the
notice form ally com m unicates to a dilatory respondent that the Com m ission's next action m ay be the entry of an
order for default, the notice also provides a respondent with an opportunity to explain and correct their om ission,
thereby avoiding the harsh sanction of default. Jacob v. Northwestern University, 2002E037, 10-24-02, CO.
Default is a severe sanction which should not be entered in a punitive m anner, especially where the underlying
om ission was due to an error, not disregard for Com m ission procedures. Jacob v. Northwestern University,
2002E037, 10-24-02, CO.
Granted
After respondent repeatedly refused to participate in the procedures of the Com m ission and num erous notices of the
consequences of that failure were issued by the Com m ission, a default order was entered against respondent.
Consequently, respondent is deem ed to have adm itted to all of the factual allegations of com plainants' com plaint.
Garcia v. W inston et al., 2003H003, 2003H004, 5-16-06, CDO.
Request to Vacate
The CCHRO and the Com m ission's Procedural Rules do not provide for vacating a final order or judgm ent. In the
absence of its own rules on the subject, the Com m ission looks to rules of procedure of the courts of general
jurisdiction for guidance. The courts are concerned with the preservation of justice through the exercise of fairness
to both parties. In this case, the parties have agreed to settle their differences and it is reasonable to vacate the final
default order and approve the settlem ent agreem ent. Tsim ogiannis v. UBS and Quinones, 1995E074, 1-3-00, CO.
To vacate a default order and judgm ent, respondent m ust affirm atively set forth in his or her tim ely filed m otion
specific factual allegations supporting each of the elem ents: (1) the existence of a m eritorious defense or claim ,
which through no fault of respondent was not initially brought before the Com m ission; (2) due diligence in pursuing
this defense or claim in the original action; and (3) due diligence in filing the m otion to vacate. Feges v. The New
Em bers Restaurant, 1993E013, 11-3-94, CDO; Matthews v. Eugene's Fireside Restaurant, 1997PA017, 8-4-97,
CDO: Vacated 3-21-00.
DEFERRAL OF COM M ISSION INVESTIGATION
Commission Discretion
The Ordinance acknowledges that the Com m ission shares concurrent jurisdiction with other agencies over certain
discrim ination com plaints, and thus gives the Com m ission discretionary authority to defer investigation of a
com plaint when it would serve the goal of conserving adm inistrating resources and m inim izing the burden on
17
respondents without com prom ising the due process rights of the com plainant to an investigation of the com plaint.
See, e.g., Hudok v. Quality Transportation System s, Inc., 1994E031, 12-27-94, CO; Lee v. DaVita d/b/a Logan
Square Dialysis, 2002E082, 12-19-02, CO; Harrington v. John H. Stroger, Jr. Hospital, 2005E010, 3-30-2005, CO.
The deferral operates like a grace period, allowing the opportunity for a com plaint to be resolved in another forum
before the Com m ission begins its investigation. If the dispute is not resolved in the alternative forum on the m erits or
through settlem ent or m ediation which would result in the voluntary dism issal of the com plaint filed with the
Com m ission, the Com m ission will com m ence its investigation. Hudok v. Quality Transportation System s, Inc.,
1994E031, 12-27-94, CO; Barnes v. United Parcel Service, 2003E024, 6-26-03, CO; Peters v. Lyons School District
No. 103, 2004E067, 1-7-05, CO; Diggs v. Dollar General, Inc., 2005E016, 5-16-2005, CO.
If the EEOC finds no reasonable cause at the close of its investigation, the Com m ission shall review the inform ation
the EEOC has collected in its investigation of the charge and decide whether the Com m ission shall dism iss the
com plaint for lack of substantial evidence, conduct further investigation, find there is substantial evidence of a
violation of the CCHRO, or take other steps as appropriate. If the EEOC tries to conciliate the case, it shall try to
have the Com m ission com plaint resolved at the sam e tim e. If the case does not settle and if either the EEOC or the
com plainant files in federal court, the Com m ission shall dism iss the com plaint. Benson v. Northwestern University,
2005E043, 11-15-05, CO.
Deferral Denied
Motion to defer denied. Respondent failed to provide any substantive inform ation which indicated that a resolution
on the m erits in the com plaint/charge filed and pending with the other agency was forthcom ing. See, e.g., Harper v.
Foster W heeler Constructors, 1996E069, 4-2-97, CO; Heavrin v. Health O'Meter Products, 1997E020, 7-31-97, CO.
Neither the Com m ission's Procedural Rules nor Com m ission precedent require the Com m ission to exercise its
discretion and defer its investigation m erely because a com plaint is filed in another forum . W here the Com m ission
com plaint was filed earlier, and that respondent has not provided the Com m ission any substantive inform ation as to
the procedural status of the investigation at the other forum , or that a resolution on the m erits was forthcom ing, the
Com m ission has not been persuaded that its investigation should be delayed. See, e.g., Bohn v. Il Prim o Foods,
Ltd.,1994E120, 5-15-95, CO; W illiam s v. Cook County Sheriff et al., 1999E028, 2-14-00, CO; Jam ison v. Rowland-
Borg Corporation, et al., 2001E045, 5-30-02, CO.
Adm inistrative Efficiency

Motion to defer denied. The Com m ission determ ined that issues of adm inistrative efficiency would not be served by
deferral. No evidence that other agency has com pleted its investigation, is near com pletion or that the parties are
close to resolving the substantive issues raised in the com plaint filed at the other agency. W here another
adm inistrative agency is in the process of conducting their investigation does not in and of itself warrant deferral.
See, e.g., Green v. Avon Products, Inc., 1996E096, 3-31-97, CO; Stagailo v. Salton-Maxim Housewares, 1999E017,
7-20-99, CO.
Respondents' m otion to defer denied. The com plaint filed at the Com m ission contains allegations (national origin
discrim ination) not alleged in a charge filed at the Illinois Departm ent of Hum an Rights. The Com m ission concludes
that the interests of adm inistrative efficiency would be m ore effectively served by the Com m ission proceeding with
its investigation into all of the allegations. Vourazeris v. Cham pion Technologies, 1995E096, 12-28-95, CO; Torres-
Munoz v. Cook County Clerk et al., 2002E075, 2-03-03, CO.
Dissimilarity of Charges
Motion to defer denied where the charge filed at the other adm inistrative agency is dissim ilar to the com plaint filed
with the Com m ission. See, e.g., Solis v. Hi-Tem p Incorporated, 1994E046, 11-5-94, CO; Tillm an v. Andrew
Corporation, 1995E101, 1-3-96, CO; Malone v. Foster W heeler Constructors, Inc., 1996E071, 4-2-97, CO.
Jurisdiction of Other Agency Lacking

Respondent's m otion to defer denied. Com plaint filed with the Com m ission is not the sam e com plaint filed with the
Chicago Com m ission on Hum an Relations. In fact, the retaliation in housing com plaint could not be filed with the
City of Chicago Com m ission because the City Com m ission lacks jurisdiction over retaliation in housing cases.
Stovall v. Metroplex,Inc. et al., 1995H010, 10-19-95, CO.
18
Respondent's m otion to defer denied. Com plainant filed a com plaint of discrim ination based on housing status with
the Com m ission and filed a com plaint of discrim ination based on race with the Chicago Com m ission on Hum an
Relations. Respondent alleges that the Com m ission should either dism iss the Com m ission com plaint or defer the
Com m ission investigation because both the Chicago Hum an Relations com plaint and the Com m ission com plaint
involve the sam e parties and arise from the sam e facts and involve sim ilar issues and subject m atters. Because the
Chicago Ordinance does not prohibit discrim ination based on housing status, the Chicago Com m ission lacks
jurisdiction to consider allegations of such discrim ination, and therefore, it is not appropriate for the Com m ission to
defer its fact finding investigation. Blakem ore v. Dublin Bar and Grill, Inc., an Illinois Corporation d/b/a Dublin Pub,
2005PA008, 4-3-06, CO.
Substantially Similar Charge Filed at Another Agency

Motion to defer is denied. Although the act of the alleged discrim ination is substantially sim ilar to the one before
another agency, the Com m ission still needs to com plete its own neutral fact finding investigation. However, to
m inim ize duplication and the burden on respondent, the Com m ission will review the docum entation subm itted by
respondent, and will only request additional inform ation the Com m ission investigator believes necessary to
com plete her investigation. Harrington v. John H. Stroger, Jr. Hospital, 2005E010, 3-30-2005, CO; Diggs v. Dollar
General, Inc., 2005E016, 5-16-2005, CO.
Respondent's m otion to defer denied. Even though the EEOC charges are substantially sim ilar to the allegations
contained in the Com m ission com plaint, respondent notified the Com m ission that the EEOC dism issed the charges,
rendering respondent's request for deferral of the Com m ission investigation m oot. Green v. D & K Machine,
1999E014, 7-2-99, CO.
Temporary Stay
Although respondent's m otion to defer is denied, the Com m ission tem porarily stays respondent's responsibility to file
with the Com m ission their written response to the Com m ission questionnaire and position statem ent. Harrington v.
John H. Stroger, Jr. Hospital, 2005E010, 3-30-2005, CO.
Deferral Granted
Adm inistrative Efficiency

Motion to defer granted. Com plainant filed with the Com m ission a com plaint alleging retaliation in violation of the
CCHRO. Com plainant also filed a charge at the IDHR, alleging unlawful discrim ination based on national origin and
retaliation. In this case, since the IDHR has jurisdiction over both the national origin discrim ination charge and the
retaliation charge, the Com m ission, in the interests of adm inistrative efficiency, will defer its investigation into
com plainant's retaliation allegation while the IDHR proceeds with its investigation into both allegations. See, e.g.,
Nem oyer v. Video 44/Telem undo of Chicago, Inc., 2002E038, 6-21-02, CO; Barnes v. United Parcel Service,
2003E024, 6-26-03, CO, Peters v. Lyons School District No. 103, 2004E067, 1-7-05, CO.
Intergovernmental Agreement
Respondent's m otion to defer granted. Com m ission granted deferral of investigation for a six m onth period of tim e
where identical com plaint filed a charge with the IDHR on the sam e day, where com plainant did not object to the
deferral request, where respondent had already subm itted to IDHR a verified response, and where a new expedited
investigation process was instituted at IDHR. Luszczak v. S&S Sales, Ltd., 1996E075, 12-10-96, CO.
Respondent's m otion to defer granted. Com m ission's investigation was deferred for a lim ited tim e where m ediation
of sim ilar charge possibly resulting in settlem ent of Com m ission com plaint is scheduled at other adm inistrative
agency. Young v. Cook County Sheriff, 1997E063, 7-28-97, CO.
Com plainant's m otion to defer granted. Com m ission granted deferral request where a question exists as to the City
of Chicago Com m ission's jurisdiction to consider the underlying m erits of the com plaint. Ehrsam v. National Casein
Co. et al., 1994E126, 10-16-95, CO.
Respondent's m otion to defer granted. Com m ission granted deferral request where Com plainant filed a sim ilar
charge of age discrim ination with the IDHR and finds the Com m ission com plaint and the IDHR charge to be
substantially sim ilar. Based on this fact, in this case, the Com m ission will defer its investigation of the age
discrim ination com plaint for a period of six m onths. Powers v. Stroger Hospital of Cook County, 2006E043, 12-22-06
19
The EEOC and the Com m ission have entered into an intergovernm ental agreem ent that covers parallel cases filed
with each respective agency. The agreem ent provides, in pertinent part, that either the Com m ission or the EEOC
m ay defer its fact finding investigation of a substantially sim ilar charge of discrim ination while the non-deferring
agency conducts and concludes its fact-finding investigation. In this case, the Com m ission will defer its
investigation while the EEOC proceeds with its own investigation. See, e.g., Abelm an v. G.E. Financial Assurance,
2001E034, 5-30-02, CO; Benson v. Northwestern University, 2005E043, 11-15-05, CO; Kram er v. ACGT, Inc.,
2005E037, 11-18-05, CO.
DEPOSITIONS
See DISCOVERY
DISABILITY DISCRIM INATION
Employment Discrimination
In cases of em ploym ent discrim ination based on disability, the Illinois courts have developed and recognized three
m odels or theories by which a com plainant can typically prove his/her case: (1)
the disparate treatm ent m odel; (2) the disparate im pact m odel; and (3) the barriers m odel. Green v. Avon Products,
Inc., 1996E096, 1-20-98, CO.
Barriers M odel - Prima Facie Case

The barriers m odel requires com plainant to establish a prima facie case that (1) she is disabled, (2) her disability is
unrelated to her ability to perform her job with accom m odation, and (3) the em ployer failed to accom m odate her
disability. Im plicit in the prima facie case is the em ployer's duty to accom m odate where the em ployer has
knowledge of com plainant's disability and where the com plainant has m ade an effort to seek accom m odation. See,
e.g., Green v. Avon Products, Inc., 1996E096, 1-20-98, CO; San Ram on v. Cook County Hospital, 2000E014, 5-2-
01, CO; Boykin v. Provident Hospital, 1997E018, 2-14-02, CDO; Sotelo v. J.F. Schroeder, 2001E014, 5-21-02, CO.
Once a com plainant has succeeded in establishing a prima facie case, the em ployer m ust rebut that showing by
proving that an accom m odation would im pose an undue hardship. Green v. Avon Products, Inc., 1996E096, 4-29-
99, CDO.
Failure to Accommodate
To dem onstrate that the em ployer has violated the CCHRO by failing to m ake a reasonable accom m odation, the
com plainant must show that (1) she is disabled, (2) her disability is unrelated to her ability to perform her job with
accom m odation, and (3) the em ployer failed to provide a m eaningful accom m odation for the known disability of
com plainant, which would have perm itted the com plaint to perform the essential functions of her job. San Ram on v.
Lack of Substantial Evidence

During the investigation stage, the com plainant was unable to establish the first elem ent of a prima facie case that
she was disabled within the m eaning of the CCHRO under either the disparate treatm ent or barriers theory of
disability discrim ination. Adam s v. Cook County Juvenile Tem porary Detention Center, 2001E013, 1-23-02, CO.
Substantial Evidence
During the investigation stage, the com plainant m et her lim ited burden of providing substantial evidence that she is
disabled within the m eaning of the CCHRO; that respondent knew of her disability; and that com plainant was fully
able to perform her job and work overtim e if her request for accom m odation was granted. Green v. Avon Products,
Inc., 1996E096, 1-20-98, CO.
During the investigation stage, the com plainant has shown m ore than a m ere scintilla of evidence that she is
disabled with or without her hearing aids under either the "substantially lim ited" or "regarded as" prongs of the
CCHRO's disability definition. Com plainant presented evidence that her disability was unrelated to her ability to
perform her job and that her proposed accom m odation would not have been an undue hardship for respondent.
Finally, com plainant presented sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that respondent failed to m ake a
reasonable accom m odation. San Ram on v. Cook County Hospital, 2000E014, 5-2-01, CO.
20
Undue Hardship
Com plainant's preferred accom m odation was not reasonable because it would have im posed undue hardship on
respondent through disruption and delay of production and added work and longer hours for the other em ployees on
com plainant's line. Green v. Avon Products, Inc., 1996E096, 4-29-99, CDO.
Disability Defined
Definition
In order to prove a prima facie case of discrim ination based on disability, the com plainant m ust have offered
substantial evidence that she (1) has a physical or m ental im pairm ent that substantially lim its one or m ore of her
m ajor life activities, such as caring for oneself, perform ing m anual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning or working; (2) has a record of such im pairm ent; or (3) is regarded as having such an im pairm ent.
Com plainant failed to establish a prima facie case that she has a disability as defined by the CCHRO. San Ram on v.
Cook County Hospital, 2000E014, 5-2-01, CO; Adam s v Cook County Juvenile Tem porary Detention Center,
2001E013, 1-23-02, CO; Boykin v. Cook County Hospital, 1997E018, 2-14-02, CDO; Sotelo v. J.F.Schroeder Co.
Inc., 2001E014, 5-21-02, CO.
M ajor Life Activity - W orking

The ability to work has been considered a m ajor life activity. Boykin v. Provident Hospital, 1997E018, 2-14-02, CDO;
Sotelo v. J.F.Schroeder Co. Inc., 2001E014, 5-21-02, CO.
Substantially Limited
The first elem ent of the CCHRO's definition of disability is whether a physical or m ental im pairm ent substantially
lim its one or m ore of a com plainant's life activities. In this case, the Com m ission found that the com plainant had a
physical im pairm ent, however, there was a lack of evidence to show that the com plainant was substantially lim ited in
one or m ore of her m ajor life activities. Com plainant's im pairm ent was transitory in nature, the duration of her
im pairm ent was lim ited, and no evidence was introduced to show that com plainant would suffer perm anent or long-
term effects from her im pairm ent. Adam s v. Cook County Juvenile Tem porary Detention Center, 2001E013, 1-23-
02, CO.
Com plainant suffers from sensory-neural hearing loss. At the investigation stage, respondent does not seriously
dispute that com plaint is a person with a disability either because her hearing loss is a physical im pairm ent that
substantially lim its one or m ore or her m ajor life activities, or because she is regarded as having such an im pairm ent.
San Ram on v. Cook County Hospital, 2000E014, 5-2-01, CO.
W here working is the m ajor life activity in question, an individual m ust dem onstrate a significant restriction to show a
substantial lim itation. The factors to be considered include: (1) the nature and severity of the im pairm ent; (2) the
duration of the im pairm ent; (3) and the actual long-term im pact of the im pairm ent. Though com plainant's
uncontradicted testim ony was that while her depression was an im pairm ent, it did not substantially lim it her ability to
work in nursing. Thus she failed to establish a prima facie case that she has a disability as defined by the CCHRO.
Boykin v. Provident Hospital, 1997E018, 2-14-02, CDO.
There has been no evidence offered that com plainant had a substantial lim itation in any m ajor life activity, like
walking or working. Sotelo v. J.F.Schroeder Co. Inc., 2001E014, 5-21-02, CO.
Disparate Treatment
Administrative Hearing
At adm inistrative hearing, com plainant failed to establish the third prong of her disparate treatm ent argum ent,
specifically, that the respondent treated her differently than sim ilarly situated non-disabled em ployees. Green v.
Avon Products, Inc., 1996E096, 4-29-99, CDO; Phillips v. Gilbert & Associates, Ltd., 1997 E101, 1-9-01, CO; San
Ram on v. Cook County Hospital, 2000E014, 5-2-01, CO.
Respondent has partially articulated a legitim ate business reason for com plainant's term ination: overtim e work by all
em ployees was necessary. However, no reason was articulated for treating com plainant differently than other
sim ilarly situated em ployees who left work early and were not disciplined or subsequently term inated. Green v.
Avon Products, Inc., 1996E096, 1-20-98, CO.
21
Investigation Stage
Com plaint alleged sufficient facts to set forth the elem ents of a prima facie case of discrim ination based on disability
in an unlawful discharge case. Com plainant alleged that she was disabled (blind in one eye); she believed she was
m eeting respondent's legitim ate perform ance expectations; she was term inated by the respondent; and, she was
replaced by a m ale who was not disabled. Hudok v. Quality Transportation System s, Inc., 1994E031, 12-27-94,
CO.
Com plainant has not shown even a scintilla of evidence at the investigation stage that he was disabled at the tim e of
his discharge or that his em ployer perceived him to be disabled so this claim m ust be dism issed for a lack of
substantial evidence. Sotelo v. J.F. Schroeder Co., Inc., 2001E014, 5-21-02, CO.
During the investigation stage, com plainant has shown substantial evidence that her discharge was the result of
disparate treatm ent discrim ination in violation of the CCHRO. Com plainant has m et her lim ited burden of providing
substantial evidence that she has a disability; she suffered an adverse em ploym ent decision in that she was
term inated for leaving work early; and other non-disabled em ployees were not disciplined or were subjected to
lesser discipline than com plainant for leaving work early. Green v. Avon Products, Inc., 1996E096, 1-20-98, CO.
During the investigation stage, the com plainant presented sufficient evidence that respondent discrim inated against
her based on her disability in m eting out discipline and in other term s and conditions of her em ploym ent. San
During the investigation stage, the com plainant was unable to establish the first elem ent of a prima facie case under
either the disparate treatm ent or barriers theory of disability discrim ination, that she was disabled within the m eaning
of the CCHRO. Adam s v. Cook County Juvenile Tem porary Detention Center, 2001E013, 1-23-02, CO.
Prima Facie Case

In a discharge case involving allegations of disability discrim ination based on disparate treatm ent, a com plainant
m ay use two alternative m ethods to establish and prove a prima facie case of discrim ination. In the first m ethod the
com plainant m ust show the following: (1) she is disabled; (2) the respondent took an adverse action related to her
disability against the com plainant; and, (3) the disability is unrelated to the com plainant's ability to perform the job.
In the second m ethod the com plainant m ust show the following: (1) she is a m em ber of a group protected by the
law; (2) she was treated in a certain m anner by the respondent; and, (3) the respondent treated her differently than
sim ilarly situated em ployees who are not m em bers of the protected group. Green v. Avon Products, Inc.,
1996E096, 1-20-98, CO; Adam s v. Cook County Juvenile Tem porary Detention Center, 2001E013, 1-23-02, CO.
Housing Discrimination
Liability Found
The com plainants proved by a preponderance of evidence that respondent board is liable because the com plainants
proved that: (1) they are disabled, (2) their request for a disabled parking space is a reasonable request that affords
them an equal opportunity to use and enjoy their townhom e; and (3) the board refused to grant their request for a
reasonable accom m odation. Pace v. McGill Managem ent, 1996H009, 2-25-99, CDO.
Indirect Discrimination
Com m ission denies m otion to dism iss one of two com plainants. Com plainants, husband and wife, reside in
separate, but adjoining apartm ent units. Neither of com plainants' leases was renewed by respondent. The
Com m ission finds a sufficient nexus between the alleged disability of the com plainant husband, his related behavior
and the failure of the respondents to renew the lease of com plainant wife as stating a claim of indirect discrim ination
based on com plainant wife's actual association with her husband, a person with a disability. Jam es and Marjorie
Anderson v. Town Managem ent, Howard Fink, Barrington Lakes Apartm ents, and Lois Phelps, 1996H012, 6-9-97,
CO.
Public Accommodations Discrimination
Futile Gesture Doctrine

The futile gesture doctrine has been applied to claim s of disability discrim ination in the public accom m odations
context. The doctrine protects an individual with a disability from having to m ake repeated efforts to gain access to a
22
public accom m odation but require that such individual be genuinely interested in its use and express that interest in
som e m anner designed to give the owner or operator som e notice of that interest. In this case, the com plainant has
not shown that he had any interest in partaking of the use of respondent. Sm ith v. McCafferty's Pub, 2002PA029,
11-18-04, CDO; Sm ith v. Michael Anthony's Restaurant, 2002PA028, 4-12-05, CO.
Prima Facie Case

A com plainant m ay establish a prima facie case of denial of the full use of a public accom m odation in two ways: The
com plainant shows that (1) she is disabled within the m eaning of the CCHRO; (2) the respondent is a public
accom m odation; (3) she sought to use the public accom m odation or expressed an interest in using it to som eone
em ployed at the public accom m odation but nevertheless was denied full and equal treatm ent in its use due to her
disability; (4) such denial was due to an architectural barrier, and either (a) that structure was built after 1985 or
rehabilitated at a cost of m ore than 15% of the reproduction cost of the facility and does not com ply with Illinois
Environm ental Barriers Act (410 ILCS 25/1) and its accom panying regulations, the Illinois Accessibility Code (71 Ill.
Adm in. Code ' 410.110 et seq.); or (b) that structure was built after 1985 or rehabilitated at a cost of m ore than 15%
of the reproduction cost of the facility and the rem oval of such barrier is readily achievable; OR If the com plainant
can show elem ents (1), (2) and (4), but did not seek to use the public accom m odation or express an interest in using
the public accom m odation, she m ay still establish a prima facie case by showing that it was futile to attem pt to enter
or use the public accom m odation. Sm ith v. McCafferty's Pub, 2002PA029, 11-18-04, CDO; Sm ith v. Michael
Anthony's Restaurant, 2002PA028, 4-12-05, CO.
Com plainant failed to m ake out a prima facie case in that he failed to provide any evidence that he sought to enter
or that he expressed an interest in dining or drinking at respondent and that the m eans of entrance into respondent
could be m ade accessible to the com plainant in a readily achievable way. Sm ith v. McCafferty's Pub, 2002PA029,
Readily Achievable
The Com m ission defines "readily achievable" as "easily accom plishable and able to be carried out without m uch
difficulty or expense." Sm ith v. McCafferty's Pub, 2002PA029, 11-29-04, CDO; Sm ith v. Michael Anthony's
Restaurant, 2002PA028, 4-12-05, CO.
Regulations
Absence of Commission Regulations

In the absence of the Com m ission's own substantive rules or regulations, the Com m ission will follow reasonable
interpretations of the federal regulations when adjudicating claim s of disability discrim ination under the CCHRO.
Previously, the Com m ission has considered "these interpretations to be reasonable explanations of the requirem ents
of the CCHRO that the im pairm ent substantially lim its one or m ore m ajor life activities" that should be followed "in
adjudicating claim s of disability discrim ination under the CCHRO." Green v. Avon Products, Inc., 1996E096, 1-20-
98, CO; Sotelo v. J.F. Schroeder Co., Inc., 2001E014, 5-21-02, CO.
The duty to reasonably accom m odate the disability of em ployees is im plicit in the CCHRO's proscription against
em ploym ent discrim ination. In the absence of interpretive regulations, the Com m ission will develop additional
standards for adjudicating the issue of reasonable accom m odation on a case by case basis. Green v. Avon
Products, Inc., 1996E096, 1-20-98, CO; San Ram on v. Cook County Hospital, 2000E014, 5-2-01, CO; Sotelo v. J.F.
Schroeder Co., Inc., 2001E014, 5-21-02, CO.
The CCHRO does not expressly contain the ADA requirem ent that structural barriers be rem oved when readily
achievable and it does not contain an express requirem ent that owner or operators of public accom m odation
reasonably accom m odate the disability of person desiring to use the facility. However, the Com m ission interprets
the CCHRO as including such requirem ents because the pream ble to the CCHRO requires that it be interpreted
liberally to effectuate its purposes, one of which is to ensure that persons with disability can fully participate in the
program s and services offered at place of public accom m odation. Sm ith v. McCafferty's Pub, 2002PA029, 11-18-
04, CDO.
Structural Barriers – Removal
23
04, CDO; Sm ith v. Michael Anthony's Restaurant, 2002PA028, 4-12-05, CO.
Employment
The duty to reasonably accomm odate the disability of em ployees is im plicit in the CCHRO's proscription against
em ploym ent discrim ination. In the absence of interpretive regulations, the Com m ission will develop additional
standards for adjudicating the issue of reasonable accom m odation on a case by case basis. Green v. Avon
Products, Inc., 1996E096, 1-20-98, CO; San Ram on v. Cook County Hospital, 2000E014, 5-2-01, CO; Sotelo v. J.F.
Schroeder Co., Inc., 2001E014, 5-21-02, CO.
The federal courts have found that an em ployer under federal law has a duty to engage in an interactive process
with an em ployee who seeks an accom m odation to his or her disability. Although the Com m ission has not
previously held that this interactive process is required under the CCHRO, it is appropriate to conclude, as have the
federal courts, that the determ ination of an appropriate and effective accom m odation requires an exchange of
relevant inform ation and that both em ployer and em ployee have a responsibility to engage in that exchange. San
During the investigation stage, the com plainant was able to show that there was m ore than a m ere scintilla of
evidence that she is disabled with or without her hearing aids under either the "substantially lim ited" or "regarded as"
prongs of CCHRO's disability definition. Com plainant also presented evidence that her disability was unrelated to
her ability to perform her job. Finally, com plainant presented evidence to support a conclusion that respondent
failed to m ake a reasonable accom m odation. San Ram on v. Cook County Hospital, 2000E014, 5-2-01, CO.
The CCHRO does not require em ployers to accom m odate an em ployee's personal preferences. Com plainant failed
to prove that a reasonable accom m odation from respondent was necessary or available to enable her to do the
essential functions of her job. Com plainant's suggested accom m odations were not reasonable and it would have
im posed undue hardship on respondent. Green v. Avon Products, Inc., 1996E096, 4-29-99, CDO.
Housing
The com plainants have the right to a reasonable accom m odation that provides them with an equal opportunity to
use and enjoy the privileges that com e with their townhom e under the CCHRO. The com plainants' requested
accom m odation that the board convert one of the open spaces to a disabled space for the use of any owner or
guest who needs disabled parking was reasonable because the num ber of spaces that can be m ade into disabled
parking is so lim ited. Pace v. McGill Managem ent, 1996H009, 2-25-99, CDO.
Public Accommodation
DISCOVERY
Depositions
Commission Investigator
Motion to com pel deposition of Com m ission investigator and to call investigator as witness at an adm inistrative
hearing denied. Com m ission finds no "good cause" as required by Com m ission Procedural Rule 460.145(A) and
(B) to com pel deposition of Com m ission investigator. Good cause requires am ong other things that the inform ation
to be obtained has significant probative value. As to the adm inistrative hearing, Com m ission Procedural Rule
460.175 requires finding am ong other things that the inform ation elicited be adm issible. Iverson v. Horwitz,
1994E021, 4-6-95 & 11-30-95, HO.
24
Complainant
Discovery deposition of com plainant denied. No good cause shown. The fact that the com plainant is the
com plainant is not in and of itself good cause. Iverson v. Horwitz, 1994E021, 4-6-95 & 11-30-95, HO.
Request Denied
The taking of depositions is not generally favored by the Com m ission where the inform ation is available through
other m eans and where the taking of depositions would unreasonably delay the proceeding. Respondent's m otion
for depositions is denied because it would require further postponem ent of the hearing dates and because the
respondent m ay directly contact the proposed deponents (who are not parties) for interviews. Greco v. Millm an,
1996PA001A, 9-29-98, HO.
Hearing officer denied respondent's request for leave to subpoena for deposition of non-party witnesses, who
refused to cooperate with respondent. Discovery beyond lim ited interrogatories, requests for adm issions, and
requests for docum ents, will be perm itted only upon good cause shown, and the requesting party has the burden of
dem onstrating good cause. Iverson v. Horwitz, 1994E021, 11-30-95, HO; Greco v. Millm an, 1996PA001A, 9-29-98,
HO; Carroll et al v. Chicago District Cam pground Assoc. et al., 1999H006-009, 4-5-02, HO.
Com m ission denies com plainant's m otion to hold open the record and for leave to take an evidence deposition of an
out-of-town witness, where com plainant proffered no support that the deposition m ight have a significant im pact on
the issues in the case. Com m ission concluded that it would be burdensom e for respondent to undergo the expense
and delay occasioned by an out-of-state deposition. Rush v. Ford Motor Com pany, 1996E013, 4-27-00, HO.
Good Cause Required
Com m ission denied respondent's m otion for leave to issue subpoenas for third party witnesses because
respondents failed to m ake a showing of good cause pursuant to Com m ission Procedural Rule 460.145(B). W ith
regard to discovery, good cause requires, am ong other things, a showing that the inform ation to be obtained through
deposition testim ony is not otherwise obtainable, and such inform ation has significant probative value, and that
respondent has attem pted to obtain the inform ation by direct inquiry, or that the inform ation is not available from
other witnesses to the sam e events. Carroll et al v. Chicago District Cam pground Assoc. et al., 1999H006-009, 4-5-
02, HO.
M otion to Com pel
Denied
Com m ission denies respondent's m otion to com pel, effectively a denial of leave to file discovery m ore than five
weeks past the deadline, as an appropriate sanction for respondent's disregard for the Com m ission's procedures.
Borio v. ANCA Managem ent, Inc., W illow Creek #7 Condo Association, 1996H008, 4-24-97, HO.
Granted
Respondent's m otion to com pel granted in part. Although com plainant cannot be com pelled to provide inform ation
that he does not have, he m ust provide inform ation that he does have, either through his own knowledge or through
conversations with others, including his wife. Com plainant ordered to cure om issions from his answers to certain
interrogatories, to produce docum ents, and subm it under oath his answers to interrogatories and requests to adm it.
Greco v. Millm an, 1996PA001A, 9-29-98, HO.
Com plainant's m otion to com pel granted in part, effectively closing discovery, as an appropriate sanction for
respondent's disregard of the Com m ission's post-conciliation processes, its published Procedural Rules, and
hearing officer's scheduling order. Respondent was ordered to serve its responses to com plainant's interrogatories,
requests for production and requests for adm ission without objection. McCoy v. United Airlines, 1996E111, 10-3-01,
HO.
Com m ission grants com plainant's m otion to com pel inform ation regarding respondent's net worth and incom e as
relevant to the issue of punitive dam ages. Nunnery v. Lewy et al., 1998H008, 8-7-01, HO; Interfaith Housing Center
of the Northern Suburbs v. Lewy et al. 1998H009, 8-7-01, HO.
25
Respondents' m otion to com pel production of a tape recording of an interview by com plainant's counsel of one of
the nam ed respondents in the presence of respondent's attorney was granted. Com plainants' claim that the tape
recording is protected by the work product doctrine was rejected by the Com m ission, inasm uch as presence of
respondents' and com plainants' attorneys at the interview constitutes waiver of the protection. Carroll et al v.
Chicago District Cam pground Assoc. et al., 1999H006-009, 1-15-02, HO.
Requests for Production of Documents

Com plainant's m otion to com pel granted in part. Unlike interrogatory answers, requests for production of docum ents
require only that the responding party provide all such docum ents which they actually have or can locate, using
reasonable diligence. Attorneys practicing before the Com m ission, as before the courts, are officers of the court
and it is presum ed that where a party, through counsel, asserts that it has produced all docum ents which it could
locate, that representation is accurate and m ade in good faith. Burgin et al. v. Com m unity Consolidated School
District 168 et al., 2000PA010, 5-24-02, HO.
Motion to com pel production of com plainant's tax returns granted in part where tax returns m ay be relevant to
com plainant's status as an em ployee of respondent. Com plainant shall produce her tax returns to the hearing
officer only, for in cam era inspection. The hearing officer will then determ ine whether the tax returns, or any parts
thereof, shall be produced to respondent. Munda v. Block Medical Center, 2003E032, 1-27-04, HO.
Sanctions
See SANCTIONS
Subpoenas
Request for subpoena m ust, pursuant to Com m ission Procedural Rule 430.100(B), state (1) the reason the
evidence sought is relevant to the com plaint and (2) could not be obtained through discovery process pursuant
to Com m ission Procedural Rule 460.145. Request denied. Zaccardo and Zaccardo v. Circle Hill Apartm ents,
Matanky Realty, Inc. and Robert Kinter, 1994E025, 5-30-95, HO.
Request Denied
Hearing officer denied respondent's request for leave to subpoena for deposition of non-party witnesses, who
refused to cooperate with respondent. The Com m ission does not issue subpoenas lightly. Its rules and
procedures perm it only lim ited discovery. Discovery beyond lim ited interrogatories, requests for adm issions, and
requests for docum ents, will be perm itted only upon good cause shown, and the requesting party has the
burden of dem onstrating good cause. In this case, the parties have already taken depositions, and engaged in
discovery far beyond the norm in Com m ission proceedings. The non-party witnesses have not been designated
as expert witnesses, nor is there evidence that their possible testim ony will have any value. Iverson v. Horwitz,
1994E021, 11-30-95, HO; Greco v. Millm an, 1996PA001A, 9-29-98, HO; Carroll et al v. Chicago District
Cam pground Assoc. et al., 1999H006-009, 4-5-02, HO.
W ork Product Doctrine
Privilege W aived
Illinois Suprem e Court Rule 201(b)(2), the work product doctrine, states that m aterial prepared by and for a party in
preparation for trial is subject to discovery if it does not contain or disclose the theories, m ental im pressions or
litigation plans of the party's attorney. The work product doctrine protects a m ixture of factual m aterial and counsel's
work product in the form of his conclusions, characterizations and sum m aries. W here, com plainants m ade no effort
to protect their questions to a nam ed respondent from disclosure to a party opponent and to opposing counsel, the
work product doctrine privilege was deem ed waived. Carroll et al v. Chicago District Cam pground Assoc. et al.,
1999H006-009, 1-15-02, HO.
DISM ISSAL OF COM PLAINT
Bankruptcy Proceeding
Com plainant m ay not proceed at Com m ission because he did not file the requisite proof of claim with the court
before the statutory deadline, nor was the claim preserved in Respondent's Plan of Liquidation. Consequently, if the
Com m ission proceeded and determ ined that Respondent was liable for the discrim ination alleged in the com plaint,
26
the Com m ission could not order Respondent to pay dam ages or recom m end any other relief be awarded to the
Com plainant because Com plainant, as a creditor, did not file a proof of claim , and because Respondent, as it
existed at the tim e of the Com plaint, has liquidated its assets and is no longer a legal entity. Holloway v. W olf
Cam era & Video, 1999E050, 9-11-06, CO.
See FAILURE TO COOPERATE
Failure to Establish an Employm ent Relationship
Respondents' m otion to dism iss em ploym ent discrim ination com plaint granted where respondents had no
em ploym ent relationship with com plainant. Respondents, who were the attorneys for com plainant's form er
em ployer, never had nor did com plainant seek any em ploym ent relationship with respondents and therefore, cannot
have violated the CCHRO's prohibition against disability discrim ination in em ploym ent. Munda v. Polish, Cram er, et
al., 2004E044A, 2-10-05, CO.
Com m ission grants m otion to dism iss respondent. Com plainant m ade no allegations which either directly or
indirectly im plicate that one of the respondents was com plainant's em ployer. Eklin v. Farm ers Insurance Group and
Kenneth C. More Agency, 1996E018, 6-25-96, CO; Dixon v. Chicago Zoological Society and the Forest Preserve
District of Cook County, 1996E082, 4-2-97, CO; Hilgendorf v. Dr. Debbie Tekdogan, 1997E097, 3-27-98, CO.
Dismissal Denied
In a joint order, the Com m ission denies the respondents' m otions to dism iss. Respondents assert that school
districts are not proper respondents, as they cannot be considered either "em ployers" or "persons" under the
CCHRO. However, the Com m ission holds that school districts are m unicipal corporations, who are, in turn, included
in the CCHRO's definition of "person," and thus are em ployers under the CCHRO. Jim inez v. Maine Township High
School District #207, 2003E005, 11-24-06; Johnson v. Maine Township District #207, 2001E062, 11-24-06; Knowles
v. Cicero Public High School District #99, 2001E056, 11-24-06; Robinson v. Leyden School District #212,
2002E054, 11-24-06.
Failure to State a Claim
Com m ission dism isses com plaint against City of Chicago for failure to state a claim of public accom m odations
discrim ination because no adverse action by respondent City of Chicago was alleged. Blakem ore v. City of Chicago,
Argus Security and Two Unknown W hite Argus Security Officers, 2002PA019, 4-23-02, CO.
Com m ission dism isses com plaint against Regional Transportation Authority (RTA) because Com plainant fails to
allege that any em ployee or agent of RTA actually denied, withheld or curtailed Com plainant's use of a CTA bus.
Moreover Com plainant does not allege that RTA or any of its em ployees actually control, own, operate or otherwise
the CTA or the bus that Com plainant attem pted to board nor does RTA have personnel authority over the CTA.
Blakem ore v. Chicago Transportation Authority, et. al., 2006PA008, 11-30-06, CO.
Com m ission dism isses the com plaint against certain respondents. The com plaint alleged aiding and abetting and
interference violations on the part of these certain respondents. The Com m ission, drawing reasonable inferences in
the light m ost favorable to the com plainant, was unable to discern from the com plaint any alleged act or other detail
which indicates how these respondents allegedly aided and abetted anyone in a violation of the CCHRO or
interfered with the perform ance of a duty or power by the Com m issioners of the Hum an Rights Com m ission. Munda
v. Polish, et al., 2004E044, 09-09-04, CO; Munda v. Block Medical Center, et al., 2004E061, 2-10-05, CO.
Com m ission review of the allegations set forth in the com plaint particulars dictate that this com plaint be dism issed
sua sponte by the Com m ission for failing to state a claim under the CCHRO upon which relief m ay be granted. §
42-34 (B)(1)(b) of the CCHRO states that "[t]he Com m ission m ay reject without prejudice and without investigation
any com plaint that fails to set forth sufficient evidence to state a prima facie case of a violation of this CCHRO."
There are no allegations which support com plainant's claim that he was denied full and equal access to a place of
public accom m odation or that com plainant opposed housing status discrim ination with respondent and, therefore,
fails to state a claim of retaliation based on housing status discrim ination. Blakem ore v. W algreens, 2005PA001, 4-
04-05, CO.
27
discrim ination because no adverse action by respondent City of Chicago was alleged. Blakem ore v. City of Chicago,
Argus Security and Two Unknown W hite Argus Security Officers, 2002PA019, 4-23-02, CO.
Com m ission dism isses com plaint against Regional Transportation Authority (RTA) because Com plainant fails to
allege that any em ployee or agent of RTA actually denied, withheld or curtailed Com plainant's use of a CTA bus.
Moreover Com plainant does not allege that RTA or any of its em ployees actually control, own, operate or otherwise
the CTA or the bus that Com plainant attem pted to board nor does RTA have personnel authority over the CTA.
Blakem ore v. Chicago Transportation Authority, et. al., 2006PA008, 11-30-06, CO.
Com m ission grants m otion to dism iss one of three individually nam ed respondents. Even construing the com plaint
liberally, there is no indication that this individual respondent, unlike the other two individually nam ed respondents,
knew or should have known of the alleged sexual conduct. Urbach v. Am elio's Restaurant et al., 1997E089, 7-1-98,
CO.
See JURISDICTION
Lack of Substantial Evidence
Com plainant has not shown even a scintilla of evidence at the investigation stage that he was disabled at the tim e of
his discharge or that his em ployer perceived him to be disabled so this claim m ust be dism issed for a lack of
substantial evidence. Sotelo v. J.F. Schroeder Co., Inc., 2001E014, 5-21-02, CO.
M aterial Question of Fact
Respondent asserts that no em ployee-em ployer relationship existed between the parties and, therefore, the
Com m ission lacks jurisdiction to consider the com plaint. The Com m ission m ust resolve this threshold issue before
it proceeds with its neutral fact finding investigation into the underlying m erits of the com plaint. However,
respondent’s m otion reveals contested issues of fact whose resolution lies outside of the param eters of the
com plaint itself. To m ake a determ ination on respondent’s m otion requires the Com m ission to go beyond the face
of the pleadings. Munda v. Block Medical Center, 2003E032, 10-9-03, CO.
Respondent asserts through its m otion to dism iss that it did not do business, hire new laborers, or em ploy any
workers and therefore cannot be held liable for em ploym ent discrim ination. Com plainant, in his com plaint and in his
response to Respondent's m otion, alleges that Respondent hired a new em ployee after the alleged date of
discrim ination and that Respondent continued to conduct business throughout the relevant tim e periods. The
Com m ission has held that when ruling on a m otion to dism iss, only those allegations in the com plaint and the
subsequent reasonable inferences drawn therefrom will be considered. Thus, while Respondent has presented facts
that m ay shield it from liability, com paring Respondent's claim s to those facts alleged by Com plainant raises a
m aterial issue of when or whether Respondent ceased conducting business. Material issues of fact cannot be
resolved on a m otion to dism iss, and are m ore appropriately addressed through the Com m ission's neutral fact-
finding investigation. Hudok v. Quality Transportation System s, Inc.,1994E031, 12-27-94, CO; Perez v. Lake Park
Construction, Inc., 2004E063, 8-1-06, CO.
Similar Allegation Filed in Other Forum
Circuit Court
Pursuant to § 42-34 (D)(5), the Com m ission m ust dism iss a com plaint filed with the Com m ission when a suit filed in
circuit court contains the sam e or substantially sim ilar allegations of discrim ination. Palom a v. The Cottage
Restaurant, 1994E085, 12-7-95, CO; Gilich v. LaGrange Mem orial Hospital, 1995E036, 6-8-98, CO.
Dismissal Denied
Motion to dism iss is denied. Com plainant's filing of com plaint in court is not the sam e or substantially sim ilar to the
com plaint filed with the Com m ission. Conway v. Trans-Action Database Marketing, Inc., 1999E010, 3-13-03, CO;
Gerick v. Airoom Architects, Inc. et al., 2002E080, 6-30-03, CO.
Other Agency
Respondent's m otion to dism iss denied. Com plainant filed a com plaint of discrim ination based on housing status
28
with the Chicago Com m ission. Respondent alleges that the Com m ission should either dism iss the Com m ission
com plaint or defer the Com m ission investigation because both the Chicago com plaint and the Com m ission
com plaint involve the sam e parties and arise from the sam e facts and involve sim ilar issues and subject m atters.
Because the Chicago Hum an Rights Ordinance does not prohibit discrim ination based on housing status, the
Chicago Com m ission lacks jurisdiction to consider allegations of such discrim ination. Therefore it is not appropriate
for the Com m ission to dism iss the Com m ission com plaint. Blakem ore v. Dublin Bar and Grill, Inc., an Illinois
Corporation d/b/a Dublin Pub, 2005PA008, 4-3-06, CO.
Federal Court
Pursuant to § 42-34 (D)(5) of the CCHRO, the Com m ission's jurisdiction autom atically term inates and the
Com m ission will dism iss a com plaint sua sponte or by m otion of either party when a suit filed in federal court
contains sam e or substantially sim ilar allegations of discrim ination. See, e.g., Enzenbacher v. Interstate Steel Co.,
1994E105, 6-14-95, CO; CO; Taylor v. Zenith Electronics Corporation, 1996E089, 4-3-97, CO.
Timeliness of Filing
Com m ission lacks jurisdiction and will dism iss a com plaint when the com plaint is filed beyond the 180-day statute of
lim itations set forth in Com m ission Procedural Rule 420.100(B). Kwok-Keung Law v. Real Estate Buyer's Agent,
Inc., 1994H003, 4-15-94, CO; Jones v. Motorola, Inc., 1995E086, 10-24-95, CO.
See also STATUTE OF LIM ITATIONS
W ant of Prosecution
Dism issal of com plaint for want of prosecution due to failure to attend a pre-hearing m eeting or adm inistrative
hearing or failure to otherwise cooperate in adm inistrative hearing process. See, e.g., Koop v. Drs. Pick & Am adeo,
1994E016, 11-9-95, CDO; Banks v. Cook County Juvenile Tem porary Detention Center, 1994E088, 10-30-95, CO;
Henderson v. Office of Cook County Medical Exam iner, 1995E016, 3-13-97, CDO; Burns v. Sam 's W arehouse Club,
1996E033, 5-26-98, CDO; Sam pson v. Cerm ak Health Services, 1993E009, 4-27-95, CDO; Klegerm an v. Heritage
Manor Condom inium Association and Rowell Property Mgt., 1998H009, 1-13-05, CDO; D'Adam v. Bridgeview
Sports Club Association, Inc., 2004PA004, 8-11-05, CDO.
Com plaint dism issed for com plainant's failure to attend a Com m ission-scheduled conciliation conference. Ham ilton
v. David Kilheeney, et al., 1999H004, 7-13-00, CO; Pope v. Berkely Auto Service et al., 2000PA007, 1-21-03, CO;
Trigueros v. Sprint PCS, 2002E039, 5-2-05, CO.
After hearing officer issued an order to show cause why the m atter should not be dism issed, for failure of both
both parties failed to respond to the order to show cause. Swift v. Signs Unlim ited, 2000E042, 7-27-01; 9-19-01, HO.
Com plaint dism issed after Com plainant failed to contact or respond to Com m ission in tim ely m anner. Turner v.
Evanston Northwestern Healthcare, 2003E020, 2-7-06, CO.
DISPARATE IM PACT
Disparate im pact, although suggested, was neither pled nor proven at the adm inistrative hearing and, therefore, was
not considered by the Com m ission. Alcegueire v. Cook County Departm ent For Managem ent of Inform ation
System s, 1992E003 and 1992E026, 8-10-95, CDO.
DISPARATE TREATM ENT
Burden of Production
Respondent carries its burden of production if it articulates a legitim ate non-discrim inatory reason for its actions.
Respondent does not need to persuade a trier of fact that it was actually m otivated by the proffered reasons, but
m erely to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discrim inated against the com plainant. Meallet v. Cook
County Departm ent of Purchasing, 1992E016, 8-18-94, CDO; Scardine v. Zenith Electronics Corporation,
1996E079, 11-30-99, CDO.
29
Once a com plainant establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the respondent to rebut the inference of
disparate treatm ent by articulating a legitim ate, non-discrim inatory reason for its actions. If the respondent
articulates a nondiscrim inatory reason for its actions, the com plainant m ust then prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the articulated reason was pretext for unlawful discrim ination. The com plainant retains at all tim es the
ultim ate burden of proving that the respondent unlawfully discrim inated. Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill,
1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO; Hardim on v. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 1996E003, 10-11-01, CDO; Blakem ore v.
Trizec Holdings, Inc., (a/k/a) Trizec Office Properties, 2003PA007, 4-21-06, CDO; Desparte v. Arlington Heights
Kirby et al., 2002E020, 6-20-06, CDO.
M ixed-M otive
In a m ixed-m otives case, an em ployer relies on both an illegal reason and a legal reason as the basis for an
adverse action. W hen a com plainant establishes an illegal reason, the respondent m ust prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that it would have m ade the sam e adverse decision absent the discrim inatory m otive. Here,
respondent proved that it would have term inated com plainant regardless of any retaliatory m otive, and that portion
of the com plaint was dism issed. Conway v. Trans-Action Database Marketing, Inc., 1999E010, 3-13-03, CDO.
Not Sustained
Respondent proffered two nondiscrim inatory reasons for discharging com plainant. Com plainant proved those
reasons to be unworthy of credence and designed to hide discrim inatory m otive. Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and
Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO.
Partially Sustained
Respondent partially articulated a legitim ate business reason for com plainant's term ination, in that overtim e work by
all em ployees was necessary. However, no reason was articulated for treating com plainant differently than other
sim ilarly situated em ployees who left work early and were not disciplined or subsequently term inated. Green v.
Avon Products, Inc., 1996E096, 1-20-98, CO.
Sustained
Respondent offered and proved a legitim ate non-discrim inatory reason for com plainant's term ination which was
clear, reasonably specific and supported by evidence. Freiberg v. South Cook Broadcasting, Inc., 1994E068, 5-26-
98, CDO.
Respondent m ust introduce, not prove, credible evidence sufficient to establish a non-discrim inatory basis for its
treatm ent of com plainant. Respondent has m et its burden by articulating that com plainant was discharged because
he refused to subm it to a drug test. Fiore v. Bloom Township Highway Departm ent, 1993E074, 2-8-96, CDO.
Respondent m et its burden of articulating a legitim ate non-discrim inatory reason for its exercise of discretion to
deploy the departm ent work force m ost efficiently. Meallet v. Cook County Departm ent of Purchasing, 1992E016, 8-
18-94, CDO.
Respondent m et its burden of articulating a legitim ate non-discrim inatory reason for its failure to select com plainant
for assignm ent to "election duty" (resulting in additional pay) and for term ination of com plainant. Alcegueire v. Cook
County Departm ent For Managem ent of Inform ation System s, 1992E003 and 1992E026, 8-10-95, CDO.
Respondent, through specific, credible testim ony articulated a legitim ate non-discrim inatory reason for term inating
com plainant: nam ely, that respondent had to term inate about one-third of the persons in com plainant's departm ent
for reasons of econom ic necessity. Scardine v. Zenith Electronics Corporation, 1996E079, 11-30-99, CDO.
Respondent m et its burden of producing an articulated non-discrim inatory reason for a disciplinary suspension of
com plainant, which reason was not rebutted. Rush v. Ford Motor Com pany, 1996E013, 9-13-00, CDO.
Com plainant had no evidence to cast doubt on respondent's reason for dism issing him . The pretext analysis seeks
to uncover the true intent of the respondent, not the belief of the com plainant. Hardim on v. Allied Tube and Conduit
Corporation, 1996E003, 10-11-01, CDO.
Respondent m et its burden of articulating a legitim ate, non-discrim inatory business reason for firing com plainant.
Respondent had a policy to term inate em ployees who fought in the workplace and com plainant fought a co-worker.
Hardim on v. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 1996E003, 10-11-01, CDO.
30
Com m ission finds that respondent has m et his burden of production by articulating a legitim ate reason for revoking
his decision to rent an apartm ent to com plainant. As a m atter of law, he need not prove that was the reason, but
m erely articulate it through adm issible evidence. To rebut that articulation, com plainant m ust prove that this
asserted reason was not credible or was pretextual to hide the real discrim inatory reason. Piesen v. Fleurisca,
1998H032, 5-9-02, CDO.
Burden of Proof
The com plainant retains at all tim es the ultim ate burden of proving that the respondent engaged in unlawful
discrim ination. Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO; Dwyer v. Il Pescatore et al.,
2001PA017, 6-12-03, CDO; Blakem ore v. Trizec Holdings, Inc., (a/k/a) Trizec Office Properties, 2003PA007, 4-21-
06, CDO; Desparte v. Arlington Heights Kirby et al., 2002E020, 6-20-06, CDO.
To sustain a claim of discrim ination, the com plainant m ust prove, beyond a preponderance of the evidence, that (1)
she was unlawfully discrim inated against; and (2) she has rebutted respondent's articulated non-discrim inatory
reasons for its actions. Here, com plainant failed to rebut respondent's articulated reasons. Meallet v. Cook County
Departm ent of Purchasing, 1992E016, 8-18-94, CDO.
Once the respondent articulates a nondiscrim inatory reason for its actions, the com plainant m ust then prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the articulated reason was pretext for unlawful discrim ination. Gluszek v.
Stadium Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO; Blakem ore v. Trizec Holdings, Inc., (a/k/a) Trizec Office
Properties, 2003PA007, 4-21-06, CDO; Desparte v. Arlington Heights Kirby et al., 2002E020, 6-20-06, CDO.
Com plainant bears burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence a causal connection between adverse
action and protected basis. See, e.g., Meallet v. Cook County Departm ent of Purchasing, 1992E016, 8-18-94,
CDO; Hardim on v. Allied Tube and Conduit Corporation, 1996E003, 10-11-01, CDO.
Not Sustained
Com plainant has not m et her burden of proof that (1) she was unlawfully discrim inated against on the basis of her
race and/or sex and (2) has failed to rebut respondent's articulated non-discrim inatory reasons for its actions.
Meallet v. Cook County Departm ent of Purchasing, 1992E016, 8-18-94, CDO.
Com plainant failed to sustain his burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence that his failure to be selected
for "election duty" (resulting in additional pay) or the ultim ate term ination of em ploym ent was proxim ately caused by
unlawful discrim ination in violation of the CCHRO. Alcegueire v. Cook County Departm ent For Managem ent of
Inform ation System s, 1992E003 and 1992E026, 8-10-95 CDO.
Com plainant failed to establish a prima facie case of discrim ination in access to a public accom m odation on the
basis of perceived housing status because he failed to prove that any agent of the respondent was involved in the
alleged adverse action taken against him . Blakem ore v. Metropolitan Pier and Exposition Authority, 2002PA015, 4-
21-06, CDO.
Com plainant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she was m eeting respondent's legitim ate
expectations for perform ance in the training program . McCoy v. United Airlines, Inc., 1996E1111, 10-10-02, CDO.
Com plainant failed to provide a statistical analysis or other evidence that would allow the Com m ission to conclude
that, in m aking term ination decisions, respondent was m otivated by a concern as to the age of the em ployees it was
term inating. Scardine v. Zenith Electronics Corporation, 1996E079, 11-30-99, CDO.
Com plainant failed to prove his ultim ate burden of showing that his discharge or any other treatm ent of him was
m otivated by his national origin. Fiore v. Bloom Township Highway Departm ent, 1993E074, 2-8-96, CDO.
Com plainant has not m et her burden of proof that respondent's articulated legitim ate non-discrim inatory business
reason for replacing com plainant was pretext for unlawful discrim ination. Iverson v. Horwitz, 1994E021, 2-8-96,
CDO
Com plainant failed to sustain her burden of proof by showing that her term ination was based upon her sex. In light
of respondent's legitim ate non-discrim inatory reasons for their actions, com plainant's evidence of a one-tim e
31
com m ent by respondent is insufficient to prove pretext. Freiberg v. South Cook Broadcasting, Inc., 1994E068, 5-26-
98, CDO.
At hearing, com plainant failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrim ination
based on race. Com plainant failed to show that non African-Am erican custom ers were treated m ore favorably by
respondent than she. Gilm ore v. Menard's, Inc., 1999PA002, 5-9-2002, CDO.
Com plainant failed to m eet his burden of proof because he failed to provide either direct or circum stantial evidence
of discrim ination. W hen the credibility of both the respondent's and com plainant's depiction of events is not in
question, the burden of proof falls upon the com plainant. Dwyer v. Il Pescatore et al., 2001PA017, 6-12-03, CDO.
Com plainant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that respondents articulated
legitim ate reason was pretext for unlawful discrim ination. Com plainant was unable to carry her burden of
persuasion. Gilm ore v. Menard's, Inc. 1999PA002, 5-9-02, CDO; McCoy v. United Airlines, Inc., 1996E111, 10-10-
02, CDO.
Com plainant was unable to carry her burden of persuasion to show pretext to hide a discrim inatory m otivation on
the part of the respondent in his revoke the agreem ent to rent the apartm ent to com plainant. Piesen v. Fleurisca,
1998H032, 4-11-02, CDO.
Com plainant failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, a causal connection between the adverse action
and protected basis. Specifically, com plainant has not m et his burden of proving that: (1) he is perceived to be
hom eless; (2) he was denied full access to the Sears Tower; and (3) he was treated in a m arkedly hostile m anner
and/or in a m anner which a reasonable person would find objectively unreasonable. Blakem ore v. Trizec Holdings,
basis of perceived housing status against respondent. Because the com plainant failed to prove at an adm inistrative
hearing that any agent of the respondent was involved in his rem oval from the Navy Pier Grand Ballroom , the
com plaint m ust be dism issed. Blakem ore v. City of Chicago Fire Departm ent and Metropolitan Pier & Exposition
Authority, 2002PA015, 4-21-06, CDO.
Com plainant failed to provide direct or circum stantial evidence of disparate treatm ent of sim ilarly situated em ployees
and thus failed to sustain the ultim ate burden of proving discrim ination. Rush v. Ford Motor Com pany, 1996E013, 9-
13-00, CDO; Hardim on v. Allied Tube and Conduit Corporation, 1996E003, 10-11-01, CDO.
Com plainant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he was retaliated against by respondent for his
protected activity of filing a form al com plaint of discrim ination with the Com m ission. However, respondent proved by
a preponderance of the evidence that it would have m ade the sam e decision to term ination com plainant absent the
unlawful retaliation. Conway v. Trans-Action Database Marketing, Inc., 1999E010, 3-13-03, CDO.
Sustained
During the com plaint investigation stage, com plainant has offered substantial evidence that respondent's proffered
reasons for her term ination were pretextual. Com plainant has shown substantial evidence that her discharge was
the result of the disparate treatm ent discrim ination in violation of the CCHRO. Com plainant has m et her lim ited
burden of providing substantial evidence that she has a disability within the m eaning of the CCHRO. Com plainant
has produced substantial evidence that she suffered an adverse em ploym ent decision in that she was term inated for
leaving work early and other non-disabled em ployees were not disciplined for leaving work early. Com plainant was
also treated differently than another em ployee who left work early and was subjected to lesser discipline than
com plainant. Green v. Avon Products, Inc., 1996E096, 1-20-98, CO.
Com plainant has proven by preponderance of evidence that she was sexually harassed during her em ploym ent in
that she was subjected to a hostile work environm ent. Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95,
CDO.
Com plainant has m et her burden of proving constructive discharge due to sexual harassm ent. Com plainant showed
that the working conditions becam e so intolerable that a reasonable person in the em ployee's position would have
felt com pelled to resign. Desparte v. Arlington Heights Kirby et al., 2002E020, 6-20-06, CDO.
32
M cDonnell Douglas Test
The Com m ission has adopted the analytical fram ework enunciated in McDonnell Douglas and Texas Departm ent of
Com m unity Affairs in adjudicating disparate treatm ent cases where no direct evidence of discrim inatory intent is
present. Com plainant m ust establish by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrim ination. The
burden then shifts to the respondent to articulate a legitim ate non-discrim inatory reason for its actions. If the
respondent articulates a non-discrim inatory reason for its actions, the com plainant m ust then prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the articulated reason was pretext for unlawful discrim ination. Com plainant
retains at all tim es the ultim ate burden of proving that the respondent unlawfully discrim inated. See, e.g., Meallet v.
Cook County Departm ent of Purchasing, 1992E016, 8-18-94, CDO; Hudok v. Quality Transportation System s, Inc.,
1994E031, 12-27-94, CO; Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO; Fiore v. Bloom
Township Highway Departm ent, 1993E074, 2-8-96, CDO; Iverson v. Horwitz, 1994E021, 2-8-96, CDO; Green v.
Avon Products, Inc., 1996E096, 1-20-98, CO; Blakem ore v. Trizec Holdings, Inc., (a/k/a) Trizec Office Properties,
2003PA007, 4-21-06, CDO.
Once a com plainant establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the respondent to rebut the inference of
disparate treatm ent by articulating a legitim ate, non-discrim inatory reason for its actions. If the respondent
articulates a nondiscrim inatory reason for its actions, the com plainant m ust then prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the articulated reason was pretext for unlawful discrim ination. The com plainant retains at all tim es the
ultim ate burden of proving that the respondent unlawfully discrim inated. Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill,
1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO; Hardim on v. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 1996E003, 10-11-01, CDO; Blakem ore v.
Trizec Holdings, Inc., (a/k/a) Trizec Office Properties, 2003PA007, 4-21-06, CDO; Desparte v. Arlington Heights
Kirby et al., 2002E020, 6-20-06, CDO.
Pretext
Respondents’ stated reason for denying housing to com plainants was the “disruption” that com plainants’ actions
caused is pretext for unlawful discrim ination. Other residents who were sim ilarly at fault for disruptions were not
barred from renting or owning a cottage at respondent and the failure to handle these incidents even-handedly
dem onstrates unlawful discrim ination on the basis of sexual orientation. Carroll, et al v. Chicago District Cam p
Ground Assoc., et al., 1999H006-009, 10-14-06, CDO.
Com plainant has the burden of proving that a respondent's legitim ate non-discrim inatory reason is pretext for
unlawful discrim ination. Pretext m ay be proven by a com plainant's initial evidence com bined with effective cross
exam ination of the respondent; by showing that the em ployer's explanation is inherently unbelievable; by showing
that the em ployer treated em ployees in the protected class different from the way it treated em ployees outside the
protected class. Iverson v. Horwitz, 1994E021, 2-8-96, CDO.
For claim s, the com plainant m ust first establish a prim a facie case of unlawful discrim ination and once the
com plainant establishes a prim a facie case, a rebuttable presum ption arises that the em ployer unlawfully
discrim inated against the com plainant; to rebut the presum ption, the em ployer m ust articulate, not prove, a
legitim ate, nondiscrim inatory reason for its decision; and if the em ployer carries its burden of production, the
presum ption of unlawful discrim ination falls and com plainant m ust then prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the em ployer's articulated reason was not its true reason, but was instead a pretext for unlawful discrim ination.
The ultim ate burden rem ains with com plainant at all tim es. Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-
16-95, CDO; Hardim on v. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 1996E003, 10-11-01, CDO.
The Com m ission has adopted the analytical fram ework enunciated by the United States Suprem e Court in
adjudicating disparate treatm ent cases where no direct evidence of discrim inatory intent is present. Com plainant
m ust establish by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of sexual harassm ent. The burden then
shifts to the respondent to articulate a legitim ate non-discrim inatory reason for its actions. If the respondent
evidence that the articulated reason was pretext for unlawful discrim ination. Com plainant retains at all tim es the
ultim ate burden of proving that the respondent engaged in unlawful behaviors. Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and
Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO; Desparte v. Arlington Heights Kirby et al., 2002E020, 6-20-06, CDO.
Established
During the com plaint investigation stage, com plainant offered substantial evidence that respondent's proffered
reasons for her discharge were pretextual. Green v. Avon Products, Inc., 1996E096, 1-20-96, CO.
33
Com m ission finds that while the proof of em ployer's articulated reason for term ination is not wholly credible, this
does not equate to proof of pretext, but raises the possibility that com plainant was term inated for reasons other than
unlawful discrim ination. Alcegueire v. Cook County Departm ent For Managem ent of Inform ation System s,
1992E003 and 1992E026, 8-10-95, CDO.
W hile respondent has articulated a legitim ate business reason for discharge, asserting that it would be unable to
operate its business if it had to consult with com plainant's attorney in job assignm ents, com plainant has proven that
this proffered business reason is unworthy of credence because at no tim e did respondent ask com plainant if she
would take job assignm ents without consulting her attorney. Pirrone v. W heeling Industrial Clinic, 1997E005, 4-12-
01, CDO.
Prior to com plainant's term ination, respondent did not give com plainant any counseling, written warning, or
probation pertaining to the alleged conflict and creation of a hostile work environm ent for another em ployee.
Respondent's failure to follow their own progressive discipline policy m ay be evidence that the respondent did not
view the incident with the other em ployee as an instance of poor job perform ance by the com plainant. Hall v. GMRI,
Respondent found liable for retaliatory discharge. Com plainant established her prim a facie case of retaliation in
that: she engaged in protected expression when she com plained about com m ents regarding her sexual orientation
and practices; respondent's discharge of com plainant constitutes an adverse em ploym ent decision; and established
a causal link because of the proxim ity in tim e between the com plaint and her discharge. Respondent has m et its
lim ited burden by proffering two nondiscrim inatory reasons for discharging her. However, com plainant proved these
reasons are pretextual in that they were unworthy of credence and designed to hide the real discrim inatory m otive.
Not Established
Respondent's articulation of its legitim ate non-discrim inatory reason for com plainant's term ination was clear and
supported by evidence. Com plainant failed to show that respondent's explanation was a pretext for discrim ination.
A one-tim e com m ent by the respondent is insufficient to prove pretext. Freiberg v. South Cook Broadcasting,
Inc.,1994E068, 5-26-98, CDO.
Respondent's articulation of its legitim ate non-discrim inatory reason for com plainant's term ination was specific and
credible. Com plainant failed to prove pretext. Scardine v. Zenith Electronics Corporation, 1996E079, 11-30-99,
CDO; Rush v. Ford Motor Com pany, 1996E013, 9-13-00, CDO.
Com plainant had no evidence to cast doubt on respondent's reason for firing him , nor did cross-exam ination shake
respondent's articulated reason for dism issal. Hardim on v. Allied Tube and Conduit Corporation, 1996E003, 10-11-
01, CDO.
Com plainant failed to prove that respondent's legitim ate nondiscrim inatory reason for term inating com plainant from
the flight dispatch program was pretext for discrim ination based on sex. McCoy v. United Airlines, Inc., 1996E111,
10-10-02, CDO.
Respondent has articulated a legitim ate business reason for revoking his agreem ent to rent the apartm ent to
com plainant. Com plainant has failed to prove that the reason was pretextual and was due to her m arital status.
Piesen v. Fleurisca, 1998H032, 4-11-02, CDO.
Com m ission finds that respondent has m et its burden of articulating a legitim ate non-discrim inatory reason for its
action toward com plainant. Gilm ore v. Menard's, Inc. 1999PA002, 5-9-2002, CDO.
Com plainant had no evidence to cast doubt on respondent's reason for dism issing him ., nor did cross-exam ination
shake respondent's articulated reason for dism issal. The pretext analysis seeks to uncover the true intent of the
respondent, not the belief of the com plainant. Hardim on v. Allied Tube and Conduit Corporation, 1996E003, 10-11-
01, CDO.
Com m ission finds respondent has m et its burden of articulating a legitim ate non-discrim inatory reason for its
exercise of discretion to deploy the departm ent work force m ost efficiently. Com plainant did not rebut or prove that
respondent's reason for an intra-departm ent transfer was pretext for discrim ination based on sex or race. Meallet v.
34
Cook County Departm ent of Purchasing, 1992E016, 8-18-94, CDO.
Pretext not shown where com plainant failed to establish that while the decision m aker m ay have m ade disparaging
rem arks about Italians, there was no evidence that those feelings im pacted upon respondent's decision to term inate
com plainant. Also, it is undisputed that com plainant was subjected to random drug tests as a condition of his
em ploym ent with respondent and that com plainant refused to subm it to a drug test as directed by respondent. Fiore
v. Bloom Township Highway Departm ent, 1993E074, 2-8-96, CDO.
Com m ission finds that em ployer reasonably believed com plainant had voluntarily resigned and had a legitim ate
non-discrim inatory reason for replacing her. Com plainant did not establish that the reason was pretext for
discrim ination based on religion and national origin. Iverson v. Horwitz, 1994E021, 2-8-96, CDO.
Com m ission finds that respondent has m et its burden of articulating a legitim ate non-discrim inatory reason for its
failure to select com plainant for assignm ent to election duty (resulting in additional pay) and for term ination of
com plainant. Alcegueire v. Cook County Departm ent For Managem ent of Inform ation System s, 1992E003 and
1992E026, 8-10-95, CDO.
Respondent's articulation of its legitim ate non-discrim inatory reason for com plainant's term ination was specific and
credible. Com plainant failed to prove pretext. Scardine v. Zenith Electronics Corporation, 1996E079, 11-30-99,
CDO.
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
Com m ission reinstates com plaint, dism issed as a result of Com m ission error and where com plainant was
sufficiently diligent about pursuing and participating in the investigation of his com plaint. To deprive com plainant of
his due process right to an investigation of his com plaint under these circum stances would be unjust. Gaines v.
Relying on § 42-34 (D)(5) of the CCHRO, four different com plainants chose to rem ove their com plaints from the
Com m ission to various Cook County circuit courts. In separate decisions or orders, the courts declared the
CCHRO subsection relied upon by these com plainants to be invalid and dism issed the court com plaints. The
individual com plainants then sought to have their com plaints reinstated at the Com m ission. Although neither the
CCHRO nor the Com m ission's Rules specifically address the issue of reinstatem ent, the Com m ission finds that the
CCHRO was drafted as rem edial legislation. Equity concerns support the Com m ission consideration and
subsequent granting of com plainants' respective m otions for resum ing jurisdiction and reinstatem ent of the original
com plaints of discrim ination at the Com m ission. Lucas v. Zeta International and Branco Jevtic, 1996E022, Gilich v.
LaGrange Mem orial Hospital, 1995E036, Newm an v. Hum ana, Inc., 1998E047, and Hakim v. Payco-General
Am erican Credits, Inc. 1999E021, 5-23-00, CO.
Right to Investigation
Com m ission finds that if the Com m ission granted a m otion to dism iss because of a lack of proof for a prima facie
case, com plainant would be denied access to Com m ission's investigatory process and effectively deny her due
process right to a com plaint investigation. The Com m ission follows the U.S. Suprem e Court in Logan v. Zim m erm an
Brush Co. 455 U.S. 422 (1982). Hudok v. Quality Transportation System s, Inc., 1994EO31, 12-27-94, CO.
Com m ission finds that if it granted a m otion to dism iss because the investigation was not com pleted within 180
days, com plainant would be denied access to the Com m ission's investigatory process and effectively denied her
due process right to an investigation of her com plaint. Com m ission follows the U.S. Suprem e Court in Logan v.
Zim m erm an Brush Co. 455 U.S. 422 (1982). Montgom ery v. Rosenthal, 1994H001, 10-18-94, CO; J. Eugene
O'Neill v. Handy Andy Hom e Im provem ent Centers, 1994E053, 6-20-95, CO.
Once a charge was filed, a property interest was created, which could not be term inated without the due process of
having the agency consider the charge on its m erits by com pleting its investigation. The Com m ission follows the
U.S. Suprem e Court in Logan v. Zim m erm an Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982). Hart v. Market Facts, Inc.,
1999E009, 4-22-04, CO.
35
Type of Investigation
Sim ply because a com plainant does not get the exact type of investigation that he or she would like, and arguably
the corresponding results, does not m ean that a com plainant was denied due process during the course of the
investigation. Com plainant's request for reconsideration denied. Hart v. Market Facts, Inc., 1999E009, 4-22-04,
CO.
EM PLOYEES
See EM PLOYM ENT DISCRIM INATION - Employee
EM PLOYERS
See EM PLOYM ENT DISCRIM INATION - Employer
EM PLOYM ENT DISCRIM INATION
After-Acquired Evidence
W hen an em ployer seeks to rely upon after-acquired evidence of wrongdoing, it m ust establish that it was unaware
of the evidence at the tim e of discharge and that the wrong doing was of such severity that the em ployee, in fact,
would have been term inated on those grounds alone if the em ployer had known of it at the tim e of discharge. The
Com m ission finds that while the record is not clear as to when respondent first becam e aware of the allegation that
com plainant had illegally used credit card inform ation to the detrim ent and substantial financial cost to the
respondent, a reasonable inference can be drawn that it was not appraised of the allegations until after term ination
of the com plainant. Conway v. Trans-Action Database Marketing, Inc., 1999E010, 3-13-03, CDO.
Age Discrimination
Com plainant established a prima facie case of age discrim ination. Com plainant has proved a prima facie case by
showing that (1) she was 65 years old at the tim e of her term ination; (2) she was perform ing her work in a m anner
consistent with the com pany's expectations; (3) she was term inated in the RIF; and (4) two younger em ployees in
her work group were retained. Scardine v. Zenith Electronics Corporation, 1996E079, 11-30-99, CDO.
The respondent in this case, through specific and credible testim ony, articulated its legitim ate nondiscrim inatory
reason for term inating com plainant, respondent had to term inate about one-third of the persons in com plainant's
departm ent for reasons of econom ic necessity. Com plainant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that respondent was m otivated by age discrim ination in selecting her for term ination. Com plainant did not
m eet her burden. Scardine v. Zenith Electronics Corporation, 1996E079, 11-30-99, CDO.
Burden of Proof
The com plainant retains at all tim es the ultim ate burden of proving that the respondent unlawfully discrim inated.
Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO; Desparte v. Arlington Heights Kirby et al.,
2002E020, 6-20-06, CDO.
To sustain a claim of discrim ination, the com plainant m ust prove, beyond a preponderance of the evidence, that (1)
she was unlawfully discrim inated against; and (2) she has rebutted respondent's articulated non-discrim inatory
reasons for its actions. Here, com plainant failed to rebut respondent's articulated reasons. Meallet v. Cook County
Departm ent of Purchasing, 1992E016, 8-18-94, CDO.
Once the respondent articulates a nondiscrim inatory reason for its actions, the com plainant m ust then prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the articulated reason was pretext for unlawful discrim ination. Gluszek v.
Stadium Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO; Desparte v. Arlington Heights Kirby et al., 2002E020, 6-20-
06, CDO.
Com plainant bears burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence a causal connection between adverse
action and protected basis. See, e.g., Meallet v. Cook County Departm ent of Purchasing, 1992E016, 8-18-94,
CDO; Pirrone v. W heeling Industrial Clinic, 1997E005, 4-12-01, CDO; Hardim on v. Allied Tube and Conduit
Corporation, 1996E003, 10-11-01, CDO.
36
Burden-Shifting
Com plainant m ust establish by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrim ination. The burden
then shifts to the respondent to articulate a legitim ate non-discrim inatory reason for its actions. If the respondent
evidence that the articulated reason was pretext for unlawful discrim ination. Com plainant retains the ultim ate
burden of proving that the respondent unlawfully discrim inated at all tim es. See, e.g., Meallet v. Cook County
Departm ent of Purchasing, 1992E016, 8-18-94, CDO; Conway v. Trans-Action Database Marketing, Inc.,
1999E010, 3-13-03, CDO; Desparte v. Arlington Heights Kirby et al., 2002E020, 6-20-06, CDO.
Constructive Discharge
To show a constructive discharge due to sexual harassm ent, a com plainant m ust prove that the working conditions
becam e so intolerable that a reasonable person in the em ployee's position would have felt com pelled to resign.
Desparte v. Arlington Heights Kirby et al., 2002E020, 6-20-06, CDO.
The CCHRO does not require a tangible em ploym ent decision to find an em ployee's constructive discharge
attributed to the em ployer when it stem s from sexually harassing conduct by a supervisor. Desparte v. Arlington
Disability Discrimination
See DISABILITY DISCRIM INATION
Em ployee Defined
Clerk of the Court Employees

Motion to dism iss granted. Com m ission finds non-judicial em ployees of the Office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of
Cook County are em ployees of the State of Illinois for purposes of coverage under the CCHRO. The Com m ission
follows the Illinois Suprem e Court decision in Drury v. County of McLean, 89 Ill.2d 417, 420, 433 N.E.2d 666, 667
(Ill.1982). Eischen v. Cook County, 2000E002, 11-21-01, CO.
Independent Contractors
Com m ission denies respondent's m otion to dism iss and restates its position that the CCHRO protects "any
individual" from unlawful discrim ination in em ploym ent. This m eans no specific label such as "independent
contractor" will determ ine an individual's standing to file a com plaint. There is no language in the CCHRO reading
"only an em ployee" m ay file a com plaint. Freiberg v. South Cook Broadcasting, Inc., 1994E068, 5-1-95, CO.
The Com m ission will review the totality of the circum stances surrounding the em ploym ent relationship between the
parties. Being labeled or considered an independent contractor under traditional agency law does not necessarily
preclude coverage of an individual under the CCHRO, rather, coverage will turn on the given facts of each case.
The Com m ission concludes that com plainant's em ploym ent relationship with respondent was m ore akin to a
traditional "em ployee relationship" and that the econom ic realities test and affecting opportunities test support the
com plainant's coverage under the CCHRO. Freiberg v. South Cook Broadcasting, Inc., 1994E068, 5-26-98, CDO.
Respondent, in support of its m otion to dism iss, argues that com plainant was an independent contractor and that
because respondent was never com plainant’s “em ployer” as defined by the CCHRO, the Com m ission has no
jurisdiction over this m atter. Com m ission denies respondent’s m otion to dism iss and orders a jurisdictional hearing
to resolve the issue of whether the type of em ploym ent arrangem ent, regardless of how it is labeled, is covered by
the CCHRO. Munda v. Block Medical Center, 2003E032, 10-9-03, CO.
Employm ent Relationship

Respondent’s m otion to dism iss granted. Respondents had no em ploym ent relationship with com plainant.
Com plainant argued in part that the em ploym ent discrim ination provisions of the CCHRO do not require one to have
an em ploym ent relationship to file a com plaint of discrim ination in em ploym ent. Com plainant argues that language
in the CCHRO, because it refers to "any individual," allows her to pursue a claim of em ploym ent discrim ination with
any em ployer even absent an em ploym ent relationship with them . The Com m ission does not agree. Respondents,
who were the attorneys for com plainant's form er em ployer, argue that com plainant never had nor sought any
em ploym ent relationship with respondents and therefore, cannot have violated the CCHRO's prohibition against
37
disability discrim ination in em ploym ent. Munda v. Polish, Cram er, et al., 2004E044A, 2-10-05, CO.
Standing
The Com m ission denies respondent's m otion to dism iss and restates its position that the CCHRO protects any
individual from unlawful discrim ination in em ploym ent. This m eans no specific label such as independent contractor
will determ ine whether an individual has standing to file a com plaint. There is no language in the CCHRO reading
only an em ployee m ay file a com plaint. Freiberg v. South Cook Broadcasting, Inc., 1994E068, 5-1-95, CO.
Temporary/Leased Em ployees
A tem porary or leased em ployee m ay bring suit against an em ploym ent agency and its client under the joint-
em ployer doctrine. Thom pson v. Prem ier Delivery, Inc., 1995E085, 8-15-97, CO.
Volunteers
Com m ission finds com plainant engaged in em ploym ent was an em ployee protected by the Ordinance, whether paid
or unpaid. Zaccardo and Zaccardo v. Circle Hill Apartm ents et al., 1994E025, 7-20-95, HO.
Em ployer Defined
Covered
Fire Protection District

Municipal corporations and other units of local governm ent other than governm ents of m unicipalities are not exem pt
from the CCHRO's definition of "em ployer." Pearce v. Lem ont Fire Protection District, 1997E016, 4-14-97, CO.
Tow nship Highway Department

Com m ission finds township highway departm ent not exem pt from the CCHRO's definition of em ployer. It is not a
governm ent of a m unicipality. Fiore v. Bloom Township Highway Departm ent, 1993E074, 2-8-96, CDO.
W ater Reclamation District

Respondent argues that it is either a m unicipal corporation or a unit of m unicipal governm ent. Com m ission finds
respondent, while it m ay be either a m unicipal corporation or a unit of m unicipal governm ent, or both, it is not a
governm ent of a m unicipality and, therefore, is not exem pt from the CCHRO's definition of em ployer. Palm er v.
Metropolitan W ater Reclam ation District of Greater Chicago, 1994E057, 3-31-95, CO.
School Districts
Com m ission rejects school districts' argum ent that the application of the CCHRO to public schools am ounts to an
unconstitutional violation of the state legislature's exclusive authority to create and regulate public schools. The
regulation im posed by the CCHRO parallels legal obligations already im posed by state and federal law and are not
unconstitutional. The CCHRO does not im pose any additional burden that is incom patible with or in conflict with
state law. Jim inez v. Maine Township High School District #207, 2003E005, 11-24-06; Johnson v. Maine Township
District #207, 2001E062, 11-24-06; Knowles v. Cicero Public High School District #99, 2001E056, 11-24-06;
Robinson v. Leyden School District #212, 2002E054, 11-24-06.
Respondent argues that it is a m unicipal corporation and, therefore, exem pt from the CCHRO's definition of
em ployer. Governm ents of m unicipalities are distinct from other units of local governm ent, such as m unicipal
corporations. Com m ission finds school district is an "em ployer" under the CCHRO. Kelly v. Morton High School
District No. 201, 1995E039, 3-28-96, CO.
The Com m ission finds a school district, while it m ay be a "quasi-m unicipal corporation" created by the state, is not
part of the state governm ent itself, or an agency of the state for the purposes of being considered an exem pt
em ployer under § 42-31 (E) of the CCHRO. Elrod v. Elem entary School District No. 150, 1995E053, 3-28-96, CO
Not Covered
Clerk of the Circuit Court

Interpreting the language of the Illinois Constitution, the Suprem e Court of Illinois has held that the governm ent of
the State of Illinois and Clerks of the Circuit Court are clearly state, not county, officers. As a state official, the Clerk
of the Circuit Court is part of the governm ent of Illinois and therefore, expressly exem pt from the definition of an
em ployer under the CCHRO. Eischen v. Cook County, 2000E002, 11-21-01, CO.
38
States' Attorney of Cook County
Com plaint dism issed for lack of jurisdiction. § 42-31 (E) of the CCHRO specifically exem pts from its definition of
em ployer, the governm ent of the State of Illinois and any agency or departm ent thereof. In interpreting the language
of the Illinois Constitution and in exam ining relevant case law, including decisions of the Illinois Suprem e Court, it is
clear that the State's Attorney is a state official, and em ployees of the office of the State's Attorney are state, not
county em ployees. Based on the foregoing, the Com m ission lacks jurisdiction over respondent, the office of the
Cook County State's Attorney and its em ployees. Vaughn v. Office of the State's Attorney of Cook County,
1993E062, 11-21-01, CO; Young v. Office of the Cook County States Attorney, 2003E048, 11-25-03, CO.
the State of Illinois and the State's Attorney of Cook County are state, not county, officers. As a state official, the
State's Attorney of Cook County is part of the governm ent of Illinois and therefore, expressly exem pt from the
definition of an em ployer under the CCHRO. John Doe v. Cook County State's Attorney, 1999E061, 11-21-01, CO;
Vaughn v. Cook County State's Attorney, 1993E062, 11-21-01, CO.
Employm ent Relationship
Respondent, in support of its m otion to dism iss, argues that com plainant was an independent contractor and that
because respondent was never com plainant’s “em ployer” as defined by the CCHRO, the Com m ission has no
jurisdiction over this m atter. Com m ission denies respondent’s m otion to dism iss and orders a jurisdictional hearing
to resolve the issue of whether the type of em ploym ent arrangem ent, regardless of how it is labeled, is covered by
the CCHRO. Munda v. Block Medical Center, 2003E032, 10-9-03, CO.
Affecting Opportunities Test

Com m ission applies the "affecting opportunities" test to determ ine status of the em ploym ent relationship. This test
looks to whether an em ployer has the power to affect an individual's access to em ploym ent opportunities in a
discrim inatory m anner. Freiberg v. South Cook Broadcasting, Inc., 1994E068, 5-1-95, CO.
In applying the principles of the "affecting opportunities" to com plainant's em ploym ent, the Com m ission finds that
respondent had the opportunity to negatively affect every m em ber of its work force equally, but respondent
exercised that opportunity only with respect to the com plainant, and in a discrim inatory way. Freiberg v. South Cook
Broadcasting, Inc., 1994E068, 5-26-98, CDO.
Economic Realities Test

Com m ission applies the "econom ic realities" test to determ ine status of the em ploym ent relationship. The
"econom ic realities" test looks to whether the em ployer has the right to control and direct the work of the individual,
not only as to the result to be achieved, but also as to the details by which that result is achieved. Freiberg v. South
Cook Broadcasting, Inc., 1994E068, 5-1-95, CO.
In applying the principles of the "econom ic realities" test to com plainant's em ploym ent, the Com m ission finds that,
regardless of her title and som e aspects of her em ploym ent relationship with respondent, the "econom ic reality" was
that she was treated sim ilarly to respondent's other em ployees and as such, com plainant should be regarded as a
covered individual. Freiberg v. South Cook Broadcasting, Inc., 1994E068, 5-26-98, CDO.
Joint Em ployer Test

In evaluating a shared em ploym ent situation involving tem porary or leased em ploym ent, the Com m ission finds the
joint em ployer test instructive. In assessing whether a joint em ploym ent situation exists, the Com m ission looks to
whether each em ployer exercises substantial control over significant aspects of the com pensation, term s, conditions
or privileges of a com plainant's em ploym ent. The m ost im portant factor to evaluate is the extent of the em ployer's
right to control the m eans and m anner of a worker's perform ance. Thom pson v. Prem ier Delivery Inc., 1995E085, 8-
15-97, CO.
Remuneration Not Required

Com m ission finds com plainant engaged in em ploym ent was an em ployee protected by the Ordinance, whether paid
or unpaid. Zaccardo and Zaccardo v. Circle Hill Apartm ents et al., 1994E025, 7-20-95, HO.
39
Hostile W ork Environment
Race Discrimination
An em ployer has an affirm ative duty to m aintain a working environm ent free of harassm ent on the basis of
m em bership in any protected class covered by the CCHRO. Respondent had an affirm ative duty to m aintain a work
environm ent free of harassm ent directed at any em ployee based on his race (African-Am erican) and/or his sexual
orientation (hom osexual). Com plainant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he was subjected to a
hostile environm ent as a result of racist and hom ophobic slurs directed at him by his supervisor. Conway v. Trans-
Action Database Marketing, Inc., 1999E010, 3-13-03, CDO.
Sexual Harassment
Respondent owner found liable for m anager's sexual harassm ent toward com plainant, for creating a sexually hostile
work environm ent and for retaliatory discharge of com plainant. Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052,
3-16-95, CDO; Desparte v. Arlington Heights Kirby et al., 2002E020, 6-20-06, CDO.
Com plainant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that she was sexually harassed during her em ploym ent at
respondent in that she was subjected to a hostile environm ent. Com plainant failed to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that respondent's response to her allegations were insufficient or ineffective, therefore, respondent not
held liable for sexual harassm ent. McClellan v. Cook County Law Library, 1996E026, 6-7-99, CDO.
The CCHRO codifies the current understanding of the m eaning of sexual harassm ent in the workplace as it has
developed by the Suprem e Court. The Com m ission has adopted the Court's m iddle position that actionable conduct
falls between conduct that is m erely offensive and conduct that causes a tangible psychological injury. Additionally,
the Com m ission's analysis requires both (1) an objective com ponent--a reasonable person m ust find the conduct
sufficient to create a hostile environm ent; and (2) a subjective component--the com plainant perceived the conduct
as creating a hostile environm ent. Language and behavior m ay both objectively and subjectively rise to the level of
sexual harassm ent. Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO; Desparte v. Arlington
To determ ine whether both the subjective and objective elem ents are present, the Com m ission will consider the
following factors: (1) the frequency of the discrim inatory conduct; (2) the severity of the discrim inatory conduct; (3)
whether it is physically threatening or hum iliating, or a m ere offensive utterance; and (4) whether it unreasonably
interferes with an em ployee's work perform ance. The effect on the com plainant's psychological well-being is also
an issue to consider to determ ine whether the person subjectively found the environm ent hostile but it is not
dispositive. Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO; Desparte v. Arlington Heights Kirby
et al., 2002E020, 6-20-06, CDO.
Sexual Orientation Discrimination

Com plainant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he was subjected to a hostile environm ent as a result
of racist and hom ophobic slurs directed at him by his supervisor. Conway v. Trans-Action Database Marketing, Inc.,
1999E010, 3-13-03, CDO.
National Origin Discrimination
Com m ission finds no hostile work environm ent but that com plainant had resigned voluntarily and em ployer
reasonably believed so when she was replaced. Com m ission finds, in accordance with United States Suprem e
Court precedent, that m ere utterance of an epithet that engenders offensive feelings does not establish em ploym ent
conditions so severe and pervasive so as to create a hostile work environm ent based on national origin or religion.
The rem arks were not frequent, com plainant could not rem em ber m ore than one or two rem arks a year, nor were
they threatening or hum iliating. Iverson v. Horwitz, 1994EO21, 2-8-96, CDO.
40
Harm suffered from disparate treatm ent by em ployer not a function of com plainant's national origin (Italian), and that
em ployer did not intentionally discrim inate against com plainant for prohibited reason. Fiore v. Bloom Township
Highway Departm ent, 1993E074 2-8-96, CDO.
Progressive Discipline
Retaliation
See RETALIATION
ENFORCEM ENT OF COM M ISSION ORDERS
In accordance with Com m ission Procedural Rule 480.125, failure to fully com ply with a Com m ission order m ay
result in the referral to the Office of Cook County State's Attorney for judicial enforcem ent. Pace v. Board of
Managers of the Courts of Randview Townhom e Association, 1996H009, 9-13-00, CO.
ENFORCEM ENT OF SETTLEM ENT AGREEM ENT

See SETTLEM ENT AGREEM ENT
EVIDENCE
Admissibility
Com m ission denies m otion to com pel deposition of Com m ission investigator, whose testim ony m ost likely will not be
adm issible, as required by Com m ission Procedural Rule 460.175, inasm uch as his inform ation is a work product
and is subject to the Com m ission's Executive Review Com m ittee for a final evidence determ ination. Iverson v.
Horwitz, 1994E021, 4-6-95, HO.
After-Acquired Evidence
W hen an em ployer seeks to rely upon "after-acquired" evidence of wrongdoing, it m ust establish that it was unaware
of the evidence at the tim e of discharge and that the wrong doing was of such severity that the em ployee, in fact,
would have been term inated on those grounds alone if the em ployer had known of it at the tim e of discharge. The
Com m ission finds that while the record is not clear as to when respondent first becam e aware of the allegation that
com plainant had illegally used credit card inform ation to the detrim ent and substantial financial cost to the
respondent, a reasonable inference can be drawn that it was not apprised of the allegations until after term ination of
the com plainant. Conway v. Trans-Action Database Marketing, Inc., 1999E010, 3-13-03, CDO.
Circum stantial Evidence
"Circum stantial" evidence is thought of as such evidence as "suspicious tim ing, am biguous statem ents, oral or
written, behavior towards or com m ents directed at other em ployees in the protected group, and other bits and
pieces ... of evidence none conclusive in itself but together com posing a convincing m osaic of discrim ination against
the plaintiff." The Com m ission finds the testim ony and exhibits in this case replete with evidence that is a direct
indication that one of respondent's supervisors was hostile toward com plainant in particular or toward hom osexual
m ales in general or from which such hostility could be easily inferred. Hall v. GMRI, Inc., d/b/a Red Lobster
Restaurants, 1996E101, 9-10-98, CDO; Dwyer v. Il Pescatore Palace Restaurant & Banquet Hall and Vito
Barbenente, individually, 2001PA017, 6-12-03, CDO.
Credibility
W hen the respondent's and com plainant's depiction of events is in question, no credibility determ ination is
necessary and the burden of proof falls upon the com plainant. Dwyer v. Il Pescatore Palace Restaurant & Banquet
Hall and Vito Barbenente, individually, 2001PA017, 6-12-03, CDO.
41
Despite the lack of credibility of one of the m ain defense witnesses, there was sufficient evidence to find in
respondent's favor and for term ination of com plainant. Alcegueire v. Cook County Departm ent For Managem ent of
Inform ation System s, 1992E003 and 1992E026, 8-10-95 CDO.
W hen respondent's pretextual argum ent rebutting charge of retaliation found not credible, the com plainant prevailed
on her claim s of unlawful sexual harassm ent and retaliation. Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-
16-95, CDO.
determ ination is appropriate. The choice of whom to believe should be m ade by an adm inistrative hearing officer
with witnesses under oath and applying the rules of evidence. Ehlers v. United Parcel Service, 1997E027, 9-21-98,
CO.
witness, her m other, who testified principally about dam ages. Her dem eanor added to her credibility because her
em otions seem ed sincere, and not m anifested to im press the Hearing Officer. Sim ilarly, the Hearing Officer found
com plainant's m other a credible witness about her daughter's em otional distress, based on her straightforward
testim ony and her dem eanor in that she also did not testify in an overly em otional m anner so as to evoke sym pathy.
Desparte v. Arlington Heights Kirby et al., 2002E020, 5-6-06, CO.
Direct Evidence
"Direct" evidence is thought of as "evidence that can be interpreted as an acknowledgm ent of discrim inatory intent
by the defendant or its agents." The Com m ission finds the testim ony and exhibits in this case replete with evidence
that is a direct indication that one of respondent's supervisors was hostile toward com plainant in particular or toward
hom osexual m ales in general. Hall v. GMRI, Inc., d/b/a Red Lobster Restaurants, 1996E101, 9-10-98, CDO; Dwyer
v. Il Pescatore Palace Restaurant & Banquet Hall and Vito Barbenente, individually, 2001PA017, 6-12-03, CDO.
Evidence Depositions
Com m ission denies com plainant's m otion to hold open the record and for leave to take an evidence deposition of an
out-of-town witness, where com plainant proffered no support that the deposition m ight have a significant im pact on
the issues in the case. Com m ission concluded that it would be burdensom e for respondent to undergo the expense
and delay occasioned by an out-of-state deposition. Rush v. Ford Motor Com pany, 1996E013, 4-27-00, HO.
Prior Bad Acts
Prior bad acts m ay be adm issible as background in assessing im pact of post-CCHRO conduct but not adm issible for
determ ining liability or assessing dam ages. Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO.
EXCEPTIONS TO RECOM M ENDED DECISIONS
Com m ission adopts the Hearing Officer's final proposed decision and order after the Hearing Officer found that
com plainant's brief on exceptions to his initial proposed decision and order sim ply reargued the interpretation of
facts and failed to argue any legal basis for reversal or m odification of the hearing officer's legal conclusions.
Alcegueire v. Cook County Departm ent For Managem ent of Inform ation System s, 1992E003 and 1992E026, 8-10-
95, CDO.
Hearing officer filed a separate ruling on com plainant's exception to initial proposed decision and order, and
incorporated that ruling as appropriate in the final proposed decision and order. Meallet v. Cook County Departm ent
of Purchasing, 1992E016, 8-18-94, CDO; Lacy v. Cook County Hospital,1992E033, 6-8-95, CDO; Hall v. GMRI, Inc.,
d/b/a Red Lobster Restaurants. 1996E101, 9-10-98, CDO; Carroll et al v. Chicago District Cam pground Assoc. et
al, 1999H006-009, 2-24-06, CDO.
The Com m ission ruled that com plainant failed to prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence both at
the adm inistrative hearing and in his exceptions. Rush v. Ford Motor Com pany, 1996E013, 9-13-00, CDO.
42
Exceptions properly filed when m otion stated com plainant was not aware that his previous attorney filed a m otion to
dism iss the case. Lacy v. Cook County Hospital, 1992E033, 6-8-95, CDO.
FAILURE TO COOPERATE
Administrative Hearing
Dismissed
Dism issal of com plaint for want of prosecution due to failure to attend adm inistrative hearing, failure to otherwise
cooperate in adm inistrative hearing process and failure to show cause why com plaint should not be dism issed.
Banks v. Cook County Juvenile Tem porary Detention Center, 1994E088, 11-14-95, CO; Henderson v. Office of
Cook County Medical Exam iner, 1995E016, 3-13-97, CDO; Klegerm an v. Heritage Manor Condom inium Association
and Rowell Property Mgt., 1998H009, 1-13-05, CDO.
After Com m ission found substantial evidence to support allegations of com plaint, com plainant failed to attend a
m andated pre-hearing m eeting, failed to respond to respondent's requests for discovery, failed to respond to
respondent's m otion to dism iss, in the face of a clear statem ent that silence would result in dism issal of her
27-95, CDO; Klegerm an v. Heritage Manor Condom inium Association and Rowell Property Mgt., 1998H009, 1-13-
05, CDO; D'Adam v. Bridgeview Sports Club Association, Inc., 2004PA004, 8-11-05, CDO.
After hearing officer issued an order to show cause why the m atter should not be dism issed for failure of both
both parties failed to respond to the Order to Show Cause. Swift v. Signs Unlim ited, 2000E042, 7-27-01 (Show
Cause); 9-19-01 (Dism issal), HO.
Com plainant had am ple tim e to hire substitute counsel or to present her case pro se. The Com m ission finds that
failure to appear at the adm inistrative hearing was unexcused. The com plaint was dism issed for com plainant's
failure to cooperate. Banks v. Cook County Juvenile Tem porary Detention Center, 1994E088, 11-14-96, CDO.
Pro Se Parties
Even pro se parties have an obligation to the Com m ission to respond to Com m ission orders, to abide by
Com m ission rules and procedures, and to attend scheduled Com m ission proceedings. The Com m ission cannot
fulfill its public duty in the absence of such cooperation by those invoking its processes. Sam pson v. Cerm ak Health
Services, 1993E009, 4-27-95, CDO; Banks v. Cook County Juvenile Tem porary Detention Center, 1994E088, 11-
14-96, CDO.
W hen, after Com m ission found substantial evidence to support allegations of com plaint, pro se com plainant failed to
attend a m andated pre-hearing m eeting, failed to respond to respondent's requests for discovery, failed to respond
to respondent's m otion to dism iss, in the face of a clear statem ent that silence would result in dism issal of her
27-95, CDO.
Com plainant had am ple tim e to hire substitute counsel or to present her case pro se. The Com m ission finds that
failure to appear at the adm inistrative hearing on was unexcused. The com plaint was dism issed for com plainant's
failure to cooperate. Banks v. Cook County Juvenile Tem porary Detention Center, 1994E088, 11-14-96, CDO.
Show Cause Order

After hearing officer issued an order to show cause why the m atter should not be dism issed, for failure of both
both parties failed to respond to the order to show cause. Swift v. Signs Unlim ited, 2000E042, 7-27-01 (Show
Cause), 9-19-01 (Dism issal), HO.
Conciliation Conference
Com plaint dism issed for want of prosecution for com plainant's failure to attend a Com m ission-scheduled conciliation
conference. Ham ilton v. David Kilheeney and any other owners of 13612 State Street, Riverdale, IL, 1999H004, 7-
13-00, CO; Triqueros v. Sprint PCS, 2002E039, 5-02-05, CO.
43
Discovery Order
The Com m ission entered an order denying com plainants' m otion for sanctions for respondent's failure to com ply
with discovery, which had been entered in response to respondent's failure to respond to com plainants' request to
produce docum ents, com plainants' interrogatories, and com plainants' request for adm ission of fact. The order
provided that appropriate sanctions would be entered should respondent fail to respond to all outstanding discovery,
and provided a deadline of three weeks. Six weeks after the entry of the order, following a status conference at
which both respondent and com plainants appeared, the hearing officer granted com plainants' m otion for sanctions,
ordering that all paragraphs of the com plainants' request for adm ission of fact would be deem ed to be adm itted for
the purpose of this action and a default would be entered in favor of the com plainants and against the respondent
pursuant to Section 460.145(E) of the Com m ission's Procedural Rules. Garcia v. W inston, et al., 2003H003,
2003H004, 5-16-06, HO.
W ant of Prosecution
Dism issal of com plaint for want of prosecution due to failure to attend pre-hearing m eeting, failure to otherwise
cooperate in adm inistrative hearing process and failure to show cause why com plaint shouldn't be dism issed.
Sam pson v. Cerm ak Health Services, 1993E009, 4-27-95, CDO; Koop v. Drs. Pick & Am adeo, 1994E016, 11-9-95,
CDO; Burns v. Sam 's W arehouse Club, 1996E033, 5-26-98, CDO.
W hen a party fails to appear at an adm inistrative hearing, hearing officer m ay recom m end som e other rem edy
deem ed appropriate and just, other than dism issal or default. Respondent ordered to pay $70 costs of court
reporter. Lacy v. Cook County Hospital, 1992E033, 6-8-95, CDO.
FAILURE TO RESPOND
See DEFAULT
FINDINGS OF FACT
Findings of fact in a Com m ission decision and order after adm inistrative hearing do not have to include every
statem ent m ade during the hearing nor need they repeat the contents of docum entary evidence that has been
adm itted into evidence. Findings should succinctly recite all relevant factual m atters necessary to support the
hearing officer's adjudication of the claim s. Findings of fact should not include argum ent in addition to the factual
content. Conway v. Trans-Action Database Marketing, Inc., 1999E010, 3-13-03, CDO.
FINES
Abuse of Process
Com m ission denies respondent's m otion to com pel discovery that cam e m ore than five weeks past the deadline to
file such m otions, effectively closing discovery, as an appropriate sanction for respondent's disregard for the
Com m ission's processes. Borio v. ANCA Managem ent, Inc, W illow Creek #7 Condo Association, 1996H008, 4-24-
97, HO.
Com plainant's m otion to com pel granted in part, effectively closing discovery, as an appropriate sanction for
respondent's disregard of the Com m ission's post-conciliation processes, its published Procedural Rules, and
hearing officer's scheduling order. Respondent's actions are an affront to the Com m ission and significantly
underm ine the public interest in swift and fair adjudication of discrim ination com plaints. Respondent shall serve its
responses to com plainant's interrogatories, requests for production and requests for adm ission without objection.
Com plainant shall have the right to am end her com plaint to reflect discovery responses. McCoy v. United Airlines,
1996E111, 10-3-01, HO.
W hile entering an order of default is an appropriate sanction for failure to participate in the Com m ission procedures,
the hearing officer in her discretion determ ined that certain m itigating factors in this case furnished sufficient reason
for not im posing such a severe sanction. The Com m ission cautions this respondent and all others who exhibit a
blatant disregard for Com m ission process and procedure that the Com m ission will not hesitate to im pose as
warranted stricter sanctions than those im posed in this case. McCoy v. United Airlines, 1996E111, 10-10-02, CDO.
44
The Com m ission entered an order denying com plainants' m otion for sanctions for respondent's failure to com ply
with discovery, which had been entered in response to respondent's failure to respond to com plainants' request to
produce docum ents, com plainants' interrogatories, and com plainants' request for adm ission of fact. The order
provided that appropriate sanctions would be entered should respondent fail to respond to all outstanding discovery,
and provided a deadline of three weeks. Six weeks after the entry of the order, following a status conference at
which both respondent and com plainants appeared, the hearing officer granted com plainants' m otion for sanctions,
ordering that all paragraphs of the com plainants' request for adm ission of fact would be deem ed to be adm itted for
the purpose of this action and a default would be entered in favor of the com plainants and against the respondent
pursuant to Section 460.145(E) of the Com m ission's Procedural Rules. Garcia v. W inston, et al., 2003H003,
2003H004, 5-16-06, HO.
After Administrative Hearing
Pursuant to § 42-34 (C)(1)(k), of the CCHRO, the Com m ission can order a respondent to pay a fine of not less than
$100 nor m ore than $500 for each violation. The Com m ission orders that respondent pay a fine of one thousand fifty
dollars ($1,050.00). Five hundred dollars ($500.00) of the fine is to be im posed because of the unlawful discharge of
com plainant. Two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00) is im posed because of the supervisor's unwelcom e slap on
Com plainant's buttock. The rem ainder of the fine is im posed for at least three separate acts of verbal abuse, at one
hundred dollars ($100.00) for each incident. These fines are necessary to ensure that this respondent and other
potential violators of the CCHRO understand and fully appreciate the consequence of such violations. Gluszek v.
Stadium Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO; see also Pirrone v. W heeling Industrial Clinic, 1997E005,
4-12-01, CDO (em ploym ent discrim ination based on com plainant's parental status [pregnant]).
Respondent found liable for fine of $500.00 for having so flagrantly violated com plainant's hum an rights by creating
a hostile work environm ent and ultim ately term inating com plainant based on his sexual orientation. Feges v. The
New Em bers Restaurant, 1993E013, 6-16-94, CDO.
Respondent did not act with evil m otive or intent when it refused com plainants' request for accom m odation. The
Com m ission im posed the m inim um fine of $100.00. Pace v. McGill Managem ent, 1996H009, 2-25-99, CDO.
Here, based upon the egregiousness of respondent's behavior in evicting com plainant based solely on her parental
status (pregnant) and with little notice to find a new place to live, respondent is assessed a fine in the m axim um
am ount of $500.00. Garcia v. W inston, et al., 2003H003, 2003H004, 5-16-06, CDO.
Com m ission orders that respondents be jointly and severally liable to pay a fine of $500 for each incident of sexual
harassm ent in this case, for a total of $1,500.00. These fines are necessary to ensure that respondents and other
potential violators of the CCHRO understand and fully appreciate the consequences of unlawful acts of
discrim ination. Desparte v. Arlington Heights Kirby et al., 2002E020, 6-20-06, CDO.
In light of the seriousness of respondents’ violations towards the com plainants, the Com m ission shall im pose a total
fine of $1,000.00 for the separate offenses of unlawful discrim ination in denying the Carroll com plainants housing;
and a total fine of $1,000.00 for taking away the Graham s’ right to occupy their cottage in retaliation for their
opposition to the Respondents’ offenses against the Carroll com plainants. Carroll et al v. Chicago District
Cam pground Assoc. et al., 1999H006-009, 8-15-06, CDO.
Failure to Attend Conciliation Conference
2001PA001, 9-25-02, CO.
Com m ission assessed respondent $112.50 costs of conciliator's fee after failing to appear at a Com m ission-ordered
conciliation conference. Marrerro v. Injectec, Inc., 1995E052, 5-7-96, CO.
Respondents had am ple tim e to advise the Com m ission prior to the date of the scheduled conference that they
would be unable to attend. The disregard for Com m ission process and procedure exhibited by the respondents in
their unexcused failure to attend the conciliation conference, warrants the im position upon respondents, of the cost
of the Com m ission conciliator's fees for the tim e incurred in preparing and attending to this m atter. Desparte v.
Arlington Heights Kirby et al., 2002E020, 5-6-05, CO.
45
HEARING OFFICER
Authority
Pursuant to Com m ission Procedural Rule 460.105, Com m ission's hearing officer has full authority to control the
procedures of Com m ission hearings. Lacy v. Cook County Hospital, 1992E033, 6-8-95, CDO.
At the adm inistrative hearing, the hearing officer determ ines the adm issibility of any testim onial evidence and
exhibits and "shall not be bound by the strict rules of evidence applicable in courts of law or equity." Garcia v.
Disqualification
Respondent's m otion to disqualify hearing officer denied where respondent has not com plied with Com m ission
Procedural Rule 460.110 in setting forth details for such disqualification including, but not lim ited to circum stances
set forth in Illinois Suprem e Court Rule 63(c). As required by Suprem e Court Rule 63(c), respondent failed to allege
that the hearing officer has personal bias concerning respondent or his lawyer; or had personal knowledge of
evidentiary facts; or had represented any party in the com plaint; or had substantial financial interest affected by the
outcom e of the com plaint; or that any person closely related to him was involved in the proceeding. Rom ain v.
Hawthorne Racecourse, 1994E052, 9-28-95, HO.
Respondent's m otion to disqualify hearing officer cited several grounds that were dism issed by hearing officer as an
insufficient basis for disqualification. Respondent does not claim that hearing officer has any direct financial interest
in the case, or personal knowledge of disputed facts. Respondent does claim hearing officer has an indirect
financial interest in the outcom e of this case because it will benefit her law firm 's reputation. Respondent's claim of
inherent bias because of past representation or decisions is also not supported by the facts, nor is this claim a basis
for disqualification. Gilich v. LaGrange Mem orial Hospital, 1995E036, 8-31-00, HO.
Respondent's m otion to disqualify a Com m ission hearing officer on the ground that he briefly represented two
em ployees of respondent in an attem pt to inform ally resolve claim s of em ploym ent discrim ination which the
em ployees had filed or intended to file, is denied. Neither Com m ission case law nor Illinois Suprem e Court Rule
63(c) provides any grounds warranting recusal. Moreover, the m atter in which the hearing officer was briefly
involved concerned a claim by em ployees of respondent, rather than a claim of discrim ination in access to public
accom m odations, such as the instant case concerns. Thus, even if the hearing officer were to recall any details of
the previous m atter, it would be wholly irrelevant to the issues in the case at bar. Blakem ore v. Metropolitan Pier
and Exposition Authority, 2002PA015, 6-24-05, CO.
Com plainant’s m otion to disqualify Com m ission Hearing Officer denied. Com plainant alleges that the Hearing
Officer was biased and had an interest in the case because she filed adm inistrative actions against him . First, the
Com m ission found no facts to support an allegation of bias. Second, sim ply filing an action against a hearing officer
is not necessarily a basis for disqualification. Munda v. Block Medical Center, 2003E032, 6-16-04, HO.
Recusal
Hearing officer m ade voluntary disclosure that she had litigated against one of respondent's attorneys over ten years
previously, and that her law firm is currently involved in a legal m atter with respondent's attorney's law firm .
Com plainant supported retaining the hearing officer, and respondent's attorney respectfully requested that hearing
officer recuse herself. Hearing officer recused herself im m ediately. No substantive rulings were issued by her prior
to recusal. McCoy v. United Airlines, 1996E111, 8-17-01, HO.
Com plainant’s m otion to disqualify Com m ission Hearing Officer denied; however, the Hearing Officer recuses
him self. Because com plainant, in her m otion, alleged coercion, duress and undue influence, and has further alleged
that these claim s are based at least in part by statem ents m ade by the Hearing Officer during the off the record
settlem ent conference, the Hearing Officer believes that it would be m ost prudent to recuse him self and let the
Com m ission or another Hearing Officer decide how to proceed in this case. Munda v. Block Medical Center,
2003E032, 6-16-04, HO.
46
HOM E RULE AUTHORITY
The CCHRO as applied to a public school district is an authorized regulation by a hom e rule unit of governm ent.
Kelly v. Morton High School District No. 201, 1995E039, 3-28-96, CO.
The CCHRO as applied to a public library located within Cook County is an authorized regulation by a hom e rule
unit of governm ent. Gannello v. Oak Park Public Library, 1998E001, 4-17-98, CO.
Inasm uch as Cook County is a hom e rule unit of local governm ent, and pursuant to the Illinois Constitution m ay
exercise its powers liberally, that enacting and enforcing the provisions of the CCHRO is a valid exercise of the
County's hom e rule authority. Flood v. Saffarzadeh and J.S. Com puter Learning Center, 1997E009, 4-21-97, CO.
It is possible for a hom e rule city and home rule county to adopt and concurrently enforce consistent ordinances.
§42-39 (6)(c) of the Illinois Constitution does not deprive Cook County of the power to regulate hum an rights within
the City of Chicago. Rather, the County Com m ission on Hum an Rights m ay enforce the CCHRO within the
jurisdictional lim its set forth in § 42-33 of the CCHRO. The language of § 42-33 of the CCHRO places a self
lim itation on the County's jurisdiction over certain claim s. The first sentence of Section 2 of § 42-33 allows that to
the extent that a m unicipal ordinance is consistent with or duplicates the provisions of the CCHRO and provides
rem edies, the County will cede its concurrent jurisdiction over the subject m atter. The second sentence of Section 2
is a lim itation on the first sentence. It clarifies that where a m unicipal ordinance is silent with respect to som e
conduct covered by the County Ordinance, the County Ordinance shall be enforceable with respect to such conduct
not covered by the m unicipal ordinance to the extent perm itted under the Illinois Constitution. Blakem ore v. Chicago
Com m ission on Hum an Relations, et al., 2001PA019-20, 8-21-02, CO.
HOUSING DISCRIM INATION
Advocacy Organizations
Covered Transactions
The term "real estate transaction" encom passes those residential housing transactions in which no m onetary
consideration is exchanged, including where only occupancy is at issue. Articles VI(A)(2) and VI(B)(2) of the
CCHRO provide that occupancy or the provision of services in connection with occupancy of residential real
property are covered real estate transactions. Respondents' transitional housing facility is real property being used
for residential purposes. The Com m ission finds that com plainants need not pay rent in order to be entitled to the
protection of the CCHRO. Brown v. Strictly for Christ Church and LaRavierre, 1997H008, 11-12-97, CO.
Disability
The com plainants proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the board is liable because the com plainants
proved that: 1) they are disabled, 2) their request for a disabled parking space is a reasonable request that affords
them an equal opportunity to use and enjoy their townhom e; and 3) the board refused to grant their request for a
reasonable accom m odation. Pace v. McGill Managem ent, 1996H009, 2-25-99, CDO.
Failure to Rent
The Com m ission finds that com plainant failed to prove that respondent's decision in Septem ber, 1998, to revoke his
agreem ent to rent one of his apartm ents to com plainant and her com panion was due to her m arital status (single).
Homeless Shelters
Hom eless shelters are covered as housing units under the language of the CCHRO. In light of the broad language
47
used in § 42-38 (A)(1) of the CCHRO, the liberal construction language set forth in the CCHRO's Pream ble, and in
keeping with both local and federal holdings, the Com m ission finds that hom eless shelters are housing units
covered by the CCHRO and those persons who occupy such shelters for residential purposes are entitled to
protection from unlawful discrim ination during their residency. Brown v. Strictly for Christ Church and LaRavierre,
1997H008, 11-12-97, CO.
Com m ission finds a sufficient nexus between the alleged disability of the com plainant husband and the failure of the
respondents to renew the lease of com plainant wife as stating a claim of indirect discrim ination based on
com plainant wife's actual association with her husband, a person with a disability. Jam es and Marjorie Anderson v.
Town Managem ent, Howard Fink, Barrington Lakes Apartm ents, and Lois Phelps, 1996H012, 6-9-97, CO.
M anaging Agent Liability
Com m ission denies m otion to dism iss and finds that the m anaging agent or individual working on behalf of a
m anaging agent (individual condom inium board m em ber) is a person within the meaning of § 42-38 (A) of the
CCHRO and m ay be found individually liable for his discrim inatory actions." Spurgash v. 7041-49 O'Connell
Condom inium Association and Philip Kiner, Treasurer, 1994H006, 6-20-97, HO; Klegerm an v. Heritage Manor,
1998H009, 1-5-99, CO.
The CCHRO prohibits conduct that denies disabled persons equal term s, conditions and privileges in real estate
transactions. The denial by a m anagem ent authority of a reasonable accom m odation in rules, policies, practices or
services that would afford a disabled person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the privileges that com e with his
or her dwelling is unlawful under the CCHRO. Pace v. McGill Managem ent et al., 1996H009, 2-25-99, CDO.
The board of m anagers is liable to com plainants for refusing to grant a reasonable accom m odation because the
board was authorized to act, and did act as the agent of the owners of the townhom es with respect to the operation
and regulation of the open parking spaces that are provided as a service in connection with the purchase and
occupancy of the com plainant's townhom e. Pace v. McGill Managem ent et al., 1996H009, 2-25-99, CDO.
Respondents are the alleged owners and or operators of a hom eless shelter; as such, they are persons defined by §
42-38 (A)(1) of the CCHRO and are therefore intended to be covered by the CCHRO. Brown v. Strictly for Christ
Church and LaRavierre, 1997H008, 11-12-97, CO.
M arital Status
To prove a prima facie case of housing discrim ination based on m arital status, a com plainant m ust show that (1) she
is a m em ber of a group protected by the CCHRO; (2) she had applied for and was qualified to rent the property in
question; (3) she was rejected as a prospective tenant; and (4) the rental property rem ained available thereafter.
Com m ission finds that although com plainant, who is single, established a prima facie case, com plainant did not
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the landlord declined to rent to her due to her m arital status.
M ethodist Campground
Com plainants established a prim a facie case of retaliation with direct evidence. Respondents adm itted that they
took away com plainants’ license to occupy their cottage because of com plainants’ opposition to unlawful
discrim ination on the basis of sexual orientation. Com plainants also established a prim a facie case of retaliation
with indirect evidence because (1) they engaged in expression protected under the Ordinance; (2) they suffered an
adverse housing action; and (3) there was a causal link between the protected expression and the adverse action.
Carroll et al v. Chicago District Cam pground Assoc. et al., 1999H006-009, 10-14-06, CDO.
Respondents adm ittedly denied com plainants housing solely because they had created disturbances at respondent
cam pground. Other individuals who were sim ilarly at fault for disruptions were not barred from renting or owning
cottages at respondent. There is no evidence of any legitim ate basis for this unequal treatm ent. Thus, respondents
unlawfully discrim inated against com plainants on the basis of their sexual orientation, and against com plainants’
48
foster son because the only reason he could not return to live at respondent was because of his fam ily relationship
with com plainants. Carroll, et al v. Chicago District Cam p Ground Assoc., et al., 1999H006-009, 10-14-06, CDO.
Parental Status
By entering a default order was entered against respondent for failing to respond to discovery requests, the
Com m ission deem ed adm itted the factual allegations of the com plaint, which supported a finding of housing
discrim ination on the basis of parental status. Respondent evicted com plainants from the apartm ent they rented
from her when com plainant was three m onths pregnant. Respondent provided no explanation when she evicted the
com plainants. On various occasions, respondent told com plainant that she refused to rent to people with children.
Garcia v. W inston, et al., 2003H003, 2003H004, 5-16-06, CDO.
Prima Facie Case
Com plainant alleged a prima facie case. She was single when she sought to rent the apartm ent from respondent
and hence a m em ber of a group protected by the CCHRO. Second, she sought to rent an apartm ent from
respondent and proved that she was qualified because he originally agreed to rent her one. Third, she was denied
the opportunity to rent the apartm ent when respondent decided to revoke his acceptance of her tenancy. Fourth,
the apartm ent rem ained open and un-rented for another m onth. Piesen v. Fleurisca, 1998H032, 4-11-02, CDO.
Com plainant alleged a prima facie case that respondent discrim inated against her by evicting her from her
apartm ent one m onth after being inform ed that com plainant was pregnant and told com plainants that she refused to
rent to people with children. Parental status is a protected status under the CCHRO. Because com plainant alleged
a prim a facie case of housing discrim ination, the Com m ission entered a default order against respondent after
respondent repeatedly refused to participate in the procedures of the Com m ission. Garcia v. W inston, et al.,
2003H003, 2003H004, 5-16-06, CDO.
Reasonable Accommodation
Because the language and intent of the CCHRO's housing provisions and those of the Fair Housing Act, the Illinois
Hum an Rights Act, and the Chicago Fair Housing Ordinance are sim ilar, that it is also unlawful under the CCHRO
to refuse to m ake a reasonable accom m odation, when a reasonable accom m odation is necessary to afford a
disabled person equal opportunity to use and enjoy housing. Pace v. McGill Managem ent et al., 1996H009, 2-25-
99, CDO.
The com plainants have the right to a reasonable accom m odation that provides them with an equal opportunity to
use and enjoy the privileges that com e with their townhom e under the CCHRO. The com plainants' requested
accom m odation that the Board convert one of the open spaces to a disabled space for the use of any owner or
guest who needs disabled parking was reasonable because the num ber of spaces that can be m ade into disabled
parking is so lim ited. Pace v. McGill Managem ent et al, 1996H009, 2-25-99, CDO.
Retaliation
See RETALIATION
HOUSING STATUS
The protected basis of "housing status," is not included in the Chicago Hum an Rights Ordinance. Therefore,
discrim inatory conduct based on a person's housing status is not prohibited by the Chicago Hum an Rights
Ordinance. Although the conduct of housing status discrim ination occurred within the City of Chicago, in
accordance with § 42-33 of the County Ordinance, the County Com m ission has jurisdiction to proceed with the
investigation of housing status allegations asserted in the com plaint. See, e.g., Blakem ore v. Chicago Tem ple
Building, Building Manager, and Janitorial Staff, 2002PA006, 5-13-02, CO; Blakem ore v. City of Chicago Fire
Departm ent and Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authority, 2002PA015, 10-26-04, CO (public accom m odations
cases).
To establish a prima facie case of discrim ination in access to a public accom m odation due to her/his housing status
or perceived housing status, a com plainant m ust show (1) (she is a m em ber of a protected class; (2) (s)he was
denied full enjoym ent of the public accom m odation; and (3) others not within her/his protected class were allowed
full enjoym ent of those services and/or (s)he received services in a m arkedly hostile m anner and in a m anner which
49
a reasonable person would find objectively unreasonable. Blakem ore v. Kinko's, Inc., 2002PA011, 7-14-03, CO;
Blakem ore v. The Market Place, 2004PA008, 6-7-04, CO; Blakem ore v. City of Chicago Fire Departm ent & MPEA,
2002PA015, 10-26-04, CO; Blakem ore v. Trizec Holdings, Inc., (a/k/a) Trizec Office Properties, 2003PA007, 4-21-
06, CDO.
In a com m ercial context the courts have allowed for an alternative m ethod of establishing a prima facie case of
public accom m odation discrim ination by showing that a com plainant received services in a "m arkedly hostile
m anner and in a m anner which a reasonable person would find objectively unreasonable." In this case, the
com plainant failed to indicate any evidence of record to show that com plainant was treated in such a m anner or in
anyway discrim inated against because of her/his (perceived) housing status, and thus the com plaint was dism issed.
Blakem ore v. Kinko's, Inc., 2002PA011, 7-14-03, CO; Blakem ore v. The Market Place, 2004PA008, 6-7-04, CO;
Blakem ore v. City of Chicago Fire Departm ent & MPEA, 2002PA015, 10-26-04, CO; Blakem ore v. Trizec Holdings,
To state a claim of retaliation for his opposition to housing status discrim ination, the com plaint needs to contain
allegations that com plainant expressed or com m unicated to respondent his opposition to what he reasonably
believed to be housing status discrim ination. The com plaint contains no allegations that com plainant opposed
housing status discrim ination with respondent and, therefore, fails to state a claim of retaliation based on housing
status discrim ination. Blakem ore v. W algreens, 2005PA001, 4-4-05, CO.
21-06, CDO.
INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY
Aiding and Abetting
Under § 42-41 (B) of the CCHRO, individuals m ay be held liable when they aid and abet another person (including
the corporation they work for) in the com m ission of a violation under the CCHRO. The Com m ission will look to
Illinois case law construing the requirem ents for finding aiding and abetting under other statutes, as well as cases
interpreting aiding and abetting provisions in sim ilar anti-discrim ination laws for guidance. Fallico v. Radiology
Im aging Specialists, Ltd., et. al., 1995E010, 7-29-98, CO.
Although the com plainant asserts that respondents aided, abetted, com pelled or coerced Com m ission personnel to
com m it a violation under the CCHRO, the com plaint fails to identify what CCHRO violation was alleged to have
been com m itted by Com m ission personnel or specifically how respondents aided, abetted, com pelled or coerced
the Com m ission in com m itting this unidentified CCHRO violation. Respondents' m otion to dism iss granted. Even
construed m ost liberally, com plainant's allegations neither identify nor im plicate a protected basis of discrim ination
under the CCHRO, nor do they constitute conduct of unlawful discrim ination under § 42-38 I of the CCHRO. Munda
v. Block Medical Center, et al., 2004E061, 2-10-05, CO; Munda v. Polish et al., 2004E044A, 2-10-05, CO.
W hile legal representatives, including non-lawyers, m ight be proper respondents in a com plaint filed under the
CCHRO, the Com m ission finds that, based on the facts as alleged in this com plaint, the respondents nam ed in this
case are not proper respondents. Specifically, com plainant's characterization of respondents' conduct and
com plainant's legal conclusions about this conduct do not state a claim for either retaliation or aiding and abetting,
and do not otherwise rise to a violation of the CCHRO. Munda v. Polish, et al., 2004E044A, 2-10-05, CO.
Employment
Corporate Board M embers

There m ust be specific acts of wrongdoing alleged against individual board m em bers for them to be individually
nam ed as respondents. Fallico v. Radiology Im aging Specialists, Ltd., et. al., 1995E010, 7-29-98, CO.
Motion to dism iss individually nam ed corporate board m em bers as respondents is denied. W hen board m em bers
have the ability to m ake decisions affecting com plainant's em ploym ent, they m ay be liable for acts of discrim ination
for which they were responsible in whole or in part. Fallico v. Radiology Im aging Specialists, Ltd., et. al., 1995E010,
7-29-98, CO; Gordon v. Enclave Condom inium Association, 2002H002, 8-12-05, CO.
50
Decision-M akers
Under § 42-35 (B)(1) of the CCHRO, individual decision m akers, supervisors, agents of the com pany/em ployer, as
well as the hum an representative of a com pany m ay be held individually liable when they are responsible in whole
or in part for acts of discrim ination. Fallico v. Radiology Im aging Specialists, Ltd., et. al., 1995E010, 7-29-98, CO;
Gordon v. Enclave Condom inium Association, 2002H002, 8-12-05, CO.
Individuals that fall within the definition of § 42-35 (E) of the CCHRO can be held personally liable for their own acts
of discrim ination and sexual harassm ent that violate § 42-35(E) of the CCHRO. Urbach v. Am elio's Restaurant et
al., 1997E089, 7-1-98, CO.
Ow ners/Principals
Respondent owner found liable for m anager's sexual harassm ent toward com plainant, and for retaliatory discharge.
Pursuant to an order of default for respondent's refusal to respond to com plaint, respondent found liable for
m anager's unlawful discharge on the basis of sexual orientation. Feges v. The New Em bers Restaurant, 1993E013,
6-16-94, CDO.
A m anaging agent m ay be liable to the com plainant for sexual harassm ent com m itted by a volunteer m aintenance
worker that the m anaging agent hired. Zaccardo and Zaccardo v. Circle Hill Apartm ents, et al., 1994E025, 7-20-95,
HO.
M anaging Agent
Com m ission denies m otion to dism iss and finds that the m anaging agent or individual working on behalf of a
m anaging agent (individual condom inium board m em ber) is a person within the meaning of § 42-38 (A) of the
CCHRO and m ay be found individually liable for his discrim inatory actions." Spurgash v. 7041-49 O'Connell
Condom inium Association and Philip Kiner, Treasurer, 1994H006, 6-20-97, HO.
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
The Com m ission has broad power to award rem edies as set forth in § 42-34 (C). § 42-34 (C)(1)(c) and (a) of the
CCHRO provides that the Com m ission m ay order appropriate injunctive relief to prevent future discrim inatory
practices. Hall v. GMRI, Inc., d/b/a Red Lobster Restaurants, 1996E101, 9-10-98, CDO; Garcia v. W inston, et al.,
2003H003, 2003H004, 5-16-06, CDO.
Aw arded
§ 42-34 (C)(1)(a) and (c) of the CCHRO provides that the Com m ission m ay order injunctive relief as appropriate.
The Com m ission ordered the following injunctive relief: reinstatem ent of com plainant in his position; cease and
desist unlawful discrim ination in general; cease and desist unlawful discrim ination against com plainant; com m ence
diversity training/sensitivity training for m anagers of respondent; and the issuance of written com m unications to all
em ployees that unlawful discrim ination in all of its form s will not be tolerated. Hall v. GMRI, Inc., d/b/a Red Lobster
Restaurants, 1996E101, 9-10-98, CDO.
The Com m ission ordered respondent to designate the open space next to com plainants' space as disabled parking
and to m ake and enforce rules for parking in such space. Pace v. McGill Managem ent et al., 1996H009, 2-25-99,
CDO.
The Com m ission ordered that respondent cease and desist from form s of unlawful discrim ination; be enjoined from
reassigning violator to respondent's place of business; reassign com plainant to her shift if she so desires; conduct
diversity/sensitivity training for all m anagem ent level em ployees of respondent; issuance of written com m unication
to all em ployees that such discrim ination will not be tolerated. McClellan v. Cook County Law Library, 1996E026,
6-7-99, CDO.
The respondent is perm anently enjoined from discrim inating against any person because of his or her parental
status in any of the term s or conditions of housing. The respondent will cooperate with South Suburban Housing
51
Center ("SSHC") in future m onitoring and will attend training provided by SSHC. Garcia v. W inston, et al.,
2003H003, 2003H004, 5-16-06, CDO.
Respondents shall cease and desist from all acts of discrim ination, sexual harassm ent and constructive discharge
due to that harassm ent, as are found to have occurred in this case. Further, respondent shall post notices as
required in § 42-34 (C)(1)(j) of the CCHRO. Desparte v. Arlington Heights Kirby et al., 2002E020, 5-6-05, CO.
The Com m ission shall order respondents to cease discrim inating in the rental or “sale” of cottages on the basis
of sexual
orientation, or on the basis of an individual’s opposition to such discrim ination, and shall be ordered to entertain
applications from the Carroll com plainants. Sim ilarly, if the Graham s com plainants’ cottage is still within the
respondents’ inventory, respondents shall be ordered to reinstate their right to occupy that cottage. Carroll et al v.
Chicago District Cam pground Assoc. et al., 1999H006-009, 10-14-06, CDO.
Factors Considered
Num erous factors are to be considered in determ ining whether injunctive relief is appropriate, or in fashioning
relief under an injunctive decree once the court has determ ined that such a rem edy is necessary. These factors
include the bona fide intention of the party found guilty of discrim ination to presently com ply with the law, the
effective discontinuance of the discrim inatory practices in question, and in som e cases, the character of past
violations. In other words, affirm ative injunctive relief for past discrim inatory practices is appropriate where the
court believes that the lingering effects of discrim ination have yet to be rem edied. Here, respondent testified that
she had no intention of changing her rental policies in the future. Clearly, an equitable rem edy is necessary to
ensure that respondent does not continue to discrim inate against tenants on the basis of parental status. Garcia
v. W inston, et al., 2003H003, 2003H004, 5-16-06, CDO.
INVESTIGATION
Complaint Consolidation
For the purposes of investigation and other Com m ission procedures, consolidation of two com plaint num bers is
appropriate and will not prejudice the parties. Due to the substantial sim ilarities between the facts of each
com plaint, the com m onality of parties, and the com m on questions of law, consolidation is warranted. Donnell,
Cotton, HOPE v. Sprovieri, 1998H011-012, 11-30-98, CO; Carroll, et al v. Chicago District Cam pground Association,
et al., 1999H006-009, 7-23-01, HO.
Evidence of Pattern and Practice
In the context of a com plaint, conduct which m ay in and of itself be outside the 180-day filing period m ay
nonetheless be included in a com plaint and be of significance during the investigatory stage if the conduct
established a pattern and practice of discrim inatory conduct or behavior. As stated in the Com m ission's previous
decisions, such incidents, where appropriate, m ay be used to assess credibility, m otive or bias of the respondent.
Martin v. Club Fever, 1998PA009, 11-10-98, CO.
Fact-Finding Conference
It is within the discretion of the Com m ission investigator assigned to a case to determ ine whether a fact-finding
conference would assist in gathering relevant inform ation and docum entation which would otherwise be obtainable
through witness interviews or the Com m ission's questionnaire process. Phillips v. Howard E. Gilbert & Associates,
1997E101, 1-9-01, CO, Hart v. Market Facts, Inc., 1999E009, 4-22-04, CO.
Investigation Standard
The Com m ission's neutral fact finding investigation will look at the conduct alleged as a whole. At the com plaint
filing stage, the com plainant does not need to prove the elem ents of a prima facie case, the com plainant m ust
sim ply articulate those elem ents. Blucher v. W ilkes and McClean, Ltd., 2004E015, 5-24-05, CO.
52
Investigation Type/M ethod
Com plainant's request for reconsideration denied when the request was based on com plainant's allegations of a
denial of due process. However, sim ply because a com plainant does not get the exact type of investigation that he
or she would like, and arguably the corresponding results, does not m ean that a com plainant was denied due
process during the course of the investigation. Hart v. Market Facts, Inc., 1999E009, 4-22-04, CO.
Timeline for Investigation
§ 42-34 (B)(2)(a) of the CCHRO provides that an "investigation shall be com pleted within 180 days after
filing...unless im practical to do so within that tim e." The Com m ission finds that due to delays in service, and
requests for extension of tim e for response, it was im practical for the Com m ission to com plete investigation within
180 days. Montgom ery v. Rosenthal, 1994H001, 10-18-94, CO; Conway v. Transaction Database Marketing, Inc.
1999E010A, 7-17-02, HO.
JURISDICTION
Relying on the right to sue provisions of the CCHRO, four different com plainants chose to rem ove their com plaints
from the Com m ission to various Cook County circuit courts. In separate decisions or orders, the courts declared
the CCHRO subsection relied upon by these com plainants to be invalid, dism issed com plainants court com plaints,
thereby, depriving com plainants of any forum for their com plaints. The individual com plainants then sought to have
their com plaints reinstated at the Com m ission. Although neither the CCHRO nor the Com m ission's Rules
specifically address the issue of reinstatem ent, the CCHRO was drafted as rem edial legislation. Equity concerns
support the Com m ission consideration and subsequent granting of com plainants' respective m otions for resum ing
jurisdiction and reinstatem ent of the original com plaints of discrimination at the Com m ission. Lucas v. Zeta
International and Branco Jevtic, 1996E022, Gilich v. LaGrange Mem orial Hospital, 1995E036, Newm an v. Hum ana,
Inc., 1998E047, and Hakim v. Payco-General Am erican Credits, Inc. 1999E021, 5-23-00, CO.
Concurrent Jurisdiction
§ 42-34 (B)(2)(b) of the CCHRO is an acknowledgm ent of the Com m ission's concurrent jurisdiction with other sim ilar
agencies over discrim ination com plaints. Solis v. Hi-Tem p Incorporated, 1994E046, 11-5-94, CO; Blakem ore v.
Dublin Bar and Grill, Inc., an Illinois Corporation d/b/a Dublin Pub, 2005PA008, 4-3-06, CO; Harrington v. John H.
Stroger, Jr. Hospital, 2005E010, 3-30-2005, CO; Diggs v. Dollar General, Inc., 2005E016, 5-16-2005, CO.
Com m ission has concurrent jurisdiction with other adm inistrative agencies. The Illinois Hum an Rights Act confers
authority to localities to create a departm ent or com m ission which prom otes the purposes of the Act and
contem plates concurrent jurisdiction with local departm ents and com m issions. Lindberg v. Chicago Transit
Authority, 1994E063, 7-27-95, CO; Urban v. W estchester School District 92 2, 2000E008, 2-26-00, CO.
The Ordinance’s pream ble expressly provides that the CCHRO is to be liberally construed for the accom plishm ent
of its purposes, and nothing in the CCHRO shall be construed to lim it rights granted under the laws of the state of
Illinois or the United States. Thus, no person can be barred from seeking any other rem edy or right of action.
53
Com m ission has concurrent jurisdiction with the IDHR and will not dism iss the Com m ission com plaint sim ply
because a sim ilar action has been filed with that agency. Langille v. Baldwin Court Condom inium Assn., 1994H012,
9-20-95, CO.
In accordance with § 42-33 of the CCHRO, the Com m ission generally does not exercise its concurrent jurisdiction
over com plaints of discrim ination or harassm ent which can be properly filed with the City of Chicago Com m ission on
Hum an Relations. Alternatively, where the Chicago Ordinance does not cover conduct which is covered by the
County Ordinance, a com plainant m ay file with the County Com m ission. Ehrsam v. National Casein Co. et al.,
1994E126, 10-16-95, CO.
Com m ission denied respondent's m otion for deferral of com plaint, when com plainant also filed with the Chicago
Com m ission on Hum an Relations. Pursuant to concurrent jurisdiction, Com m ission norm ally would have deferred
the com plaint filed with the Com m ission if the allegations of violation are the sam e or sim ilar; However, in this case
the Chicago Com m ission could not entertain jurisdiction over an allegation of retaliation in housing, inasm uch as the
CCHRO, while it covers sexual harassm ent, does not cover retaliation in housing. Stovall v. Metroplex, Inc. et al.,
1995H010, 10-19-95, CO.
Deferral
§ 42-34 (B)(2)(b) of the CCHRO provides in relevant part that "the Com m ission m ay defer investigation of a tim ely
filed com plaint where the sam e com plaint, or a substantially sim ilar com plaint, has been filed by the com plainant
with another adm inistrative agency." This provision is an acknowledgm ent of the Com m ission's concurrent
jurisdiction with other agencies over certain discrim ination com plaints. It is designed to give the Com m ission the
discretionary authority to defer investigation of a com plaint when it would serve the goal of conserving adm inistrative
resources and m inim ize the burden on respondents without com prom ising the due process rights of the com plainant
to an investigation of the com plaint. Practically speaking, the deferral operates like a grace period which allows the
opportunity for a com plaint to be resolved in another forum before the Com m ission begins its investigation. If the
dispute is not resolved in the alternative forum on the m erits or through settlem ent or m ediation which would result
in the voluntary dism issal of the com plaint filed with the Com m ission, the Com m ission will com m ence its
investigation. See, e.g., Hudok v. Quality Transportation System s, Inc., 1994E031, 12-27-94, CO; Lee v. DaVita
d/b/a Logan Square Dialysis, 2002E082, 12-19-02, CO; Barnes v. United Parcel Service, 2003E024, 6-26-03, CO;
Peters v. Lyons School District No. 103, 2004E067, 1-7-05, CO; Harrington v. John H. Stroger, Jr. Hospital,
2005E010, 3-30-2005, CO; Diggs v. Dollar General, Inc., 2005E016, 5-16-2005, CO.
Governm ental Entities/Agencies
Municipal corporations and other units of local governm ent other than governm ents of m unicipalities are not exem pt
from the CCHRO's definition of "em ployer." Pearce v. Lem ont Fire Protection District, 1997E016, 4-14-97, CO.
Respondent argues that it is either a m unicipal corporation or a unit of m unicipal governm ent. Com m ission finds
respondent, while it m ay either be a m unicipal corporation or a unit of m unicipal governm ent, or both, it is not a
governm ent of a m unicipality and, therefore, is not exem pt from CCHRO's division of em ployer. Palm er v.
Metropolitan W ater Reclam ation District of Greater Chicago, 1994E057, 3-31-95, CO.
City of Chicago Commission on Human Relations

The Cook County Com m ission on Hum an Rights has no authority or jurisdiction to enforce the Chicago Hum an
Rights Ordinance. A com plaint alleging a violation of the Chicago Hum an Rights Ordinance m ust be filed with the
Chicago Com m ission on Hum an Relations. Eischen v Cook County, 2000E002, 5-4-00, CO; Blakem ore v. Dublin
Bar and Grill, Inc., an Illinois Corporation d/b/a Dublin Pub, 2005PA008, 4-3-06, CO.
Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County

the State of Illinois and Clerks of the Circuit Court are clearly state, not county, officers. As a state official, the Clerk
of the Circuit Court is part of the governm ent of Illinois and therefore, expressly exem pt from the definition of an
em ployer under the CCHRO. Eischen v. Cook County, 2000E002, 11-21-01, CO.
Cook County Commission on Human Rights

Due to a conflict of interest the Com m ission cannot hold jurisdiction over com plaints filed against the Com m ission or
Com m ission staff. Com plaints filed against the Com m ission will be handled by the Chicago Com m ission on Hum an
54
Relations. Blakem ore v. Cook County Com m ission on Hum an Rights and Jennifer Vidis, 2002PA025, 6-12-03, CO.
Employees of Cook County

Com m ission has authority to investigate com plaints of discrim ination and violations filed under the County
Ordinance by County em ployees whose offices are located within the City of Chicago. Eischen v. Cook County,
2000E002, 5-4-00, CO.
Illinois Department of Human Rights

The governm ent of the State of Illinois is clearly and plainly excluded from the CCHRO's definition of person as set
forth in § 42-31(N). The IDHR is a departm ent of the governm ent of the State of Illinois. Blakem ore v. State of Illinois
Departm ent of Hum an Rights, 2001PA003, 4-27-01, CO.
Regional Transportation Authority

Com m ission concludes that it m ay exercise jurisdiction over CTA because to do so would not be inconsistent with
the intent of either the RTA Act or the Illinois Hum an Rights Act. Com plainant's claim is one of discrim ination based
on housing status, specifically perceived hom elessness. Neither the Illinois Hum an Rights Act, nor the Chicago
Com m ission on Hum an Relations, covers housing status discrim ination. To exclude from the Com m ission's
jurisdiction all of CTA would contradict the intent of the Illinois Hum an Rights Act, and would provide no outlet for an
individual who felt he had been discrim inated against by the CTA based on his perceived housing status. Blakem ore
v. Chicago Transportation Authority, et. al., 2006PA008, 11-30-06, CO.
Based on the language of the Regional Transportation Act and the Illinois Hum an Rights Act, the Illinois General
Assem bly did not intend to exclude the respondent Regional Transportation Authority from the Com m ission's
jurisdiction. Paquet v. PACE Suburban Bus, 1997E068, 7-28-98, CO.
States Attorney of Cook County

the State of Illinois and the State's Attorney of Cook County are state, not county, officers. As a state official, the
State's Attorney of Cook County is part of the governm ent of Illinois and therefore, expressly exem pt from the
definition of an em ployer under the CCHRO. Vaughn v. Cook County State's Attorney, 1993E062, 11-21-01, CO;
John Doe v. Cook County State's Attorney, 1999E061, 11-21-01, CO; Young v. Office of the Cook County State’s
Attorney, 2003E048, 11-25-03, CO.
School Districts
W hile a school district m ay be a "quasi-m unicipal corporation" created by the state, it is not part of the state
governm ent itself, or an agency of the state for the purposes of being considered an exem pt em ployer under § 42-
31(E) of the CCHRO. Elrod v. Elem entary School District No. 159, 1995E053, 3-28-96, CO.
The application of the Ordinance to a public school district is an authorized regulation by a hom e rule unit of
governm ent. Kelly v. Morton High School District No. 201, 1995E039, 3-28-96, CO.
Tow nship Highway Department

A township highway departm ent is not exem pt as an em ployer under § 42-31(E)(2)(d) of the CCHRO. The township
highway departm ent is not a governm ent of a m unicipality, but rather it is a unit of local governm ent which is not
exem pt from the CCHRO. Fiore v. Bloom Township Highway Departm ent, 1993E074, 4-26-95, HO.
Village Departments
Com m ission finds that complainant's em ployer was not the departm ent of parks and recreation, but the Village of
Orland Park, which is exem pt from the em ploym ent provisions of the CCHRO; thus, the Com m ission is without
jurisdiction to investigate or adjudicate the com plaint. Lim anowski v. Orland Park Parks and Recreation, 1998E090,
6-30-00, CO.
Harm Required
The only allegation of the com plaint that m ight be considered tim ely (rem oval of a lien) was not actionable because
com plainant was not injured by the action and, therefore, it did not constitute a violation of the CCHRO. Spurgash v.
7041-49 O'Connell Condom inium Association and Kiner, 1994H006, 10-19-98, CDO.
The Com m ission will exam ine claim s on a case by case basis and will consider the totality of the facts alleged in
55
order to determ ine whether a claim or allegation is too trivial to constitute adverse action or to otherwise state a
claim of public accom m odation discrim ination under the CCHRO. Mere inconvenience or an alteration of
expectations is not sufficient to constitute adverse action or a violation of the CCHRO. Blakem ore v. Chicago
Com m ission on Hum an Relations, et al., 2001PA019-020, 8-21-02, CO.
Jurisdiction Lacking
Alleged Violation in Cook County

The Com m ission has long held that the County Ordinance does not apply to complaints of discrim ination occurring
within the City of Chicago which involve conduct covered by the Chicago Hum an Rights Ordinance. See, e.g.,
Blakem ore v. Metropolitan W ater Reclam ation District of Greater Chicago, 2001PA004, 3-14-01, CO (public
accom m odation discrim ination/race); Tortorello v. Oracle Corporation, 2002E060, 7-24-02, CO (public
accom m odation discrim ination/race); Blakem ore v. Chicago Com m ission on Hum an Relations, 2001PA019-020, 8-
21-02, CO (public accom m odation discrim ination/race).
Alleged Violation Outside Cook County

CCHRO applies to discrim ination in em ploym ent that is or would be located in whole or in part in Cook County or
when the act of unlawful discrim ination takes place in Cook County. The Com m ission lacks jurisdiction over alleged
discrim inatory conduct occurring in Buffalo Grove, which is in Lake County. Kajiwara v. John S. Swift Com pany,
1994E028, 8-10-94, CO; see also Esquivel v. Cherry Creek Nursery, Inc., (location in W ill County) 1995E084, 10-
10-95, CO; Rosas v. Arrow Plastic Manufacturing Co. and Illinois Bottle Manufacturing Co., (location in DuPage
County) 1999E015, 3-17-99, CO.
Jurisdiction Retained
Alleged Violation in Cook County

For the purposes of surviving a m otion to dism iss prior to the com pletion of the Com m ission's fact finding
investigation, the Com m ission finds that the com plainant has articulated facts which, if proven, would show that the
location of the alleged violation is in Cook County, where com plainant worked in the CTA's m aintenance shop in
Rosem ont. Pursuant to § 42-35 (A), the CCHRO covers em ploym ent that is or would be in whole or in part of Cook
County. Lindberg v. Chicago Transit Authority, 1994E063, 7-27-95, CO; Gutzm er v. Midwest Mechanical, Inc.,
(alleged violation occurred in Mount Prospect, which is located in Cook County), 1997E054, 8-8-97, CO; Borelli v.
Presidential Mortgage Com pany, (alleged violation occurred in Arlington Heights, which is located in Cook County),
1998E058, 10-1-98, CO; Schwartz v. webMethods, Inc. (alleged violation occurred in Oak Park, which is located in
Cook County), 2000E061, 3-19-01, CO.
County Employees in the City of Chicago

The Com m ission has authority to investigate com plaints of discrim ination and violations filed under the County
2000E002, 5-4-00, CO.
Housing Status Discrimination in the City of Chicago

investigation of housing status allegations asserted in of the com plaint. See, e.g., Blakem ore v. Chicago Tem ple
Building, Building Manager, and Janitorial Staff, 2002PA006, 5-13-02, CO; Blakem ore v. City of Chicago, Argus
Security, et al., 2002PA019, 4-23-02, CO.
Location of Alleged Violation

Motion to dism iss denied. Resolving respondent’s claim that the Com m ission is lacking subject m atter jurisdiction
because respondent’s principal place of business was outside of Cook County would require the Com m ission to
look beyond the face of the pleadings to rule on the truth and substance of the allegations from both parties, and
thus not properly resolved on a m otion to dism iss at this phase of the proceedings. Perez v. Lake Park
Construction, Inc., 2004E063, 8-1-06, CO.
Retaliation in the City of Chicago

Com m ission denied respondent's m otion for deferral of com plaint which was also filed with the Chicago Com m ission
56
on Hum an Relations. Pursuant to concurrent jurisdiction, Com m ission norm ally would have deferred the com plaint
filed with the Com m ission if the allegations of violation are the sam e or sim ilar; However, in this case the Chicago
Com m ission could not entertain jurisdiction over an allegation of retaliation in housing, inasm uch as that Ordinance
while it covers sexual harassm ent, does not cover retaliation in housing. Stovall v. Metroplex, Inc. et al., 1995H010,
10-19-95, CO.
Com plainant filed with the Com m ission a com plaint alleging retaliation in violation of the CCHRO. The alleged
discrim inatory conduct and retaliation occurred within the City of Chicago. Com plainant also filed at the IDHR a
charge alleging unlawful discrim ination based on national origin and retaliation. In this case, since the IDHR has
jurisdiction over both the national origin discrim ination charge and the retaliation charge, the Com m ission, in the
interests of adm inistrative efficiency, will defer its investigation into com plainant's retaliation allegation while the
IDHR proceeds with its investigation into both allegations. Nem oyer v. Video 44/Telem undo of Chicago, Inc.,
2002E038, 6-21-02, CO.
Separate Causes of Action

The filing of a com plaint with the Com m ission does not preclude a com plainant from seeking redress for other rights
that m ay have been violated arising out of the sam e incident(s) set forth in the com plaint and which are enforced by
other adm inistrative agencies or the courts. Lindberg v. Chicago Transit Authority, 1994E063, 7-27-95, CO; Urban
v. W estchester School District 92 2, 2000E008,2-26-00, CO.
Claim s filed in circuit court for breach of contract or tortuous claim s of intentional infliction of em otional distress and
fraud are distinctly different than those discrim ination claim s filed at the Com m ission. The Com m ission will dism iss
a com plaint in the interest of adm inistrative efficiency and to avoid duplication of litigation only when a com plaint
filed in court also contains allegations of discrim ination. Rabe v. Michael's Funeral Hom e, et al., 1994PA008, 10-22-
96, CO; Doe v. Riverside-Brookfield Township High School Dist. 206, 1995PA006, 11-25-96, CO; Etnire v. PRP
W ines International, Inc. et al., 1999E012, 7-8-99, CO, Conway v. Trans-Action Database Marketing, 1999E010, 3-
13-03, CO.
Com m ission will not dism iss an age discrim ination com plaint filed with the Com m ission where a com plaint filed in
federal court involving the sam e facts and parties did not allege age discrim ination. Alpert v. Evanston Hospital
Corporation, 1996E105, 3-20-97, CO; W illis v. The Prescription Com puter Store, Inc., d/b/a Micro Age, 1996E023,
1-27-98, CO (race).
Jurisdictional Hearing
In order to resolve the jurisdictional question of whether an em ploym ent relationship existed between the
respondent and com plainant, and whether this relationship is one which was intended to be covered by § 42-31 of
the CCHRO, a jurisdictional hearing is ordered to specifically answer the question of jurisdiction. Munda v. Block
Medical Center, 2003E032, 10-9-03, CO.
New spapers
Com m ission denies respondent's m otion to dism iss, finding respondent is a public accom m odation, distributing a
written periodical as a product or service. Respondent's First Am endm ent argum ent could be a valid defense to the
com plaint but it raises factual issues not appropriate for consideration in a m otion to dism iss. Reyes v. Penny Saver
Publications, 1995PA005, 9-21-95, HO.
Res Judicata
The doctrine of res judicata is not applicable to the question of concurrent jurisdiction. The Com m ission did not
decide whether res judicata is applicable when another adm inistrative agency or even when a court of general
jurisdiction has decided the issue. Rabe v. Michael's Funeral Hom e et al., 1994PA008, 10-22-96, CO.
Settlement Enforcement
Com m ission Procedural Rule 440.155 requires that a settlem ent agreem ent m ust be reduced to writing, signed by
the parties and subm itted to the Com m ission for approval. Absent these or other special conditions, the Com m ission
has no jurisdiction to enforce the term s of the settlem ent. Com m ission Procedural Rule 440.155(B) specifies that to
retain jurisdiction to enforce a settlem ent agreem ent, each party to the agreem ent m ust acknowledge in the
57
agreem ent that the Com m ission has jurisdiction to enforce it. Lacy v. Cook County Hospital, 1992E033, 6-8-95
CDO; Banks v. Cook County Juvenile Tem porary Detention Center, 1994E088, 3-14-96, CO. But see Jaber v. Allan
Managem ent Services and Karen Doroski, 1994H009, 6-30-98, CO (Com m ission will enforce a non-private oral
settlem ent agreem ent in certain circum stances).
The parties to a Com m ission approved settlem ent agreem ent specifically acknowledge that the Com m ission retains
jurisdiction for the purposes of enforcing the agreem ent, including seeking judicial enforcem ent where appropriate.
Com m ission Procedural Rule 440.160 provides that if a party believes there is non-com pliance with the term s of the
settlem ent agreem ent, the party is required to notify the Com m ission which will com m ence an investigation into the
alleged non-com pliance. Marquez v. Kostich, 1996H001, 11-12-98, CO.
The Com m ission lacks jurisdiction to proceed to hear a m atter which the parties have settled. Thus, unless the
parties have agreed that the Com m ission will retain jurisdiction over a m atter for the purposes of enforcing the term s
of a settlem ent, the Com m ission m ust dism iss a com plaint which has been settled. Munda v. Block Medical Center,
2003E032, 09-23-04, HO.
Statute of Limitations
See STATUTE OF LIM ITATIONS
Termination of Jurisdiction
Discrimination Complaint Filed Elsew here

Pursuant to § 42-34 (D)(5)of the CCHRO, the Com m ission's jurisdiction autom atically term inates and the
Com m ission will dism iss a com plaint sua sponte or by m otion of either party when a suit filed in federal court
contains sam e or substantially sim ilar allegations of discrim ination. See, e.g., Verem is v. Interstate Steel Co.,
1994E096, 6-14-95, CO; Enzenbacher v. Interstate Steel Co., 1994E105, 6-14-95, CO; Thom pson v. Cook County
Departm ent of Supportive Services, 2005E012, 1-5-06, CO; McDowell v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 2002E045, 3-7-
06, CO; Kem p v. Schoops Ham burgers/ Mantel Enterprise, 2005E049, 3-16-06, CO.
LOCATION OF VIOLATION
In Cook County
For the purposes of surviving a m otion to dism iss prior to the com pletion of the Com m ission's fact finding
investigation, the Com m ission finds that the com plainant has articulated facts which, if proven, would show that the
location of the alleged violation is in Cook County, where com plainant worked in the CTA's m aintenance shop in
Rosem ont. Pursuant to § 42-35 (A), the CCHRO covers em ploym ent that is or would be in whole or in part of Cook
County. Lindberg v. Chicago Transit Authority, 1994E063, 7-27-95, CO; see also Gutzm er v. Midwest Mechanical,
Inc., 1997E054, 8-8-97, CO (alleged violation occurred in Mount Prospect, which is located in Cook County); Borelli
v. Presidential Mortgage Com pany, 1998E058, 10-1-98, CO (alleged violation occurred in Arlington Heights, which
is located in Cook County); Schwartz v. webMethods, Inc. (alleged violation allegedly occurred in Oak Park, which is
located in Cook County) 2000E061, 3-19-01, CO.
Outside Cook County
CCHRO applies to discrim ination in em ploym ent that is or would be located in whole or in part in Cook County or
when the act of unlawful discrim ination takes place in Cook County. The Com m ission lacks jurisdiction over alleged
discrim inatory conduct occurring in Buffalo Grove which is in Lake County. Kajiwara v. John S. Swift Com pany,
1994E028, 8-10-94, CO; Esquivel v. Cherry Creek Nursery, Inc., (location in W ill County) 1995E084, 10-10-95, CO;
Rosas v. Arrow Plastic Manufacturing Co. and Illinois Bottle Manufacturing Co., (location in DuPage County)
1999E015, 3-17-99, CO.
W ithin the City of Chicago
County Employees
The Com m ission has authority to investigate com plaints of discrim ination and violations filed under the County
2000E002, 5-4-00, CO.
58
The Com m ission has long held that the County Ordinance does not apply to complaints of discrim ination occurring
within the City of Chicago which involve conduct covered by the Chicago Hum an Rights Ordinance. See, e.g.,
Blakem ore v. Metropolitan W ater Reclam ation District of Greater Chicago, 2001PA004, 3-14-01, CO; Blakem ore v.
Chicago Com m ission on Hum an Relations, 2001PA019-020, 8-21-02, CO. Blakem ore v. Kinko's, Inc., 2002PA011,
7-14-03, CO.
Housing Status
investigation of housing status allegations asserted in of the com plaint. See, e.g., Blakem ore v. Chicago Tem ple
Building, Building Manager, and Janitorial Staff, 2002PA006, 5-13-02, CO; Blakem ore v. Dublin Bar and Grill, Inc.,
an Illinois Corporation d/b/a Dublin Pub, 2005PA008, 4-3-06, CO.
Retaliation
Com m ission denied respondent's m otion for deferral of com plaint which was also filed with the Chicago Com m ission
on Hum an Relations. Pursuant to concurrent jurisdiction, Com m ission norm ally would have deferred the com plaint
filed with the Com m ission if the allegations of violation are the sam e or sim ilar; however, in this case the Chicago
Com m ission could not entertain jurisdiction over an allegation of retaliation in housing, inasm uch as the CCHRO,
while it covers sexual harassm ent, does not cover retaliation in housing. Stovall v. Metroplex, Inc. et al., 1995H010,
10-19-95, CO.
Com plainant filed with the Com m ission a com plaint alleging retaliation in violation of the CCHRO. The alleged
discrim inatory conduct and retaliation occurred within the City of Chicago. Com plainant also filed at the IDHR
alleging unlawful discrim ination based on national origin and retaliation. In this case, since the IDHR has jurisdiction
over both the national origin discrim ination charge and the retaliation charge, the Com m ission, in the interests of
adm inistrative efficiency, will defer its investigation into com plainant's retaliation allegation while the IDHR proceeds
with its investigation into both allegations. Nem oyer v. Video 44/Telem undo of Chicago, Inc., 2002E038, 6-21-02,
CO.
M ARITAL STATUS DISCRIM INATION
Liability Not Found
Com m ission follows Illinois Suprem e Court decision construing language identical to the CCHRO, and holds that the
CCHRO's definition of m arital status protects individuals allegedly harm ed due to their m arital status, and does not
protect individuals who are subjected to adverse em ploym ent decisions based solely on the identity of their spouse.
Sm ith v. Bell Packaging Corp., d/b/a Visy Packaging, 1999E008, 7-13-99, CO.
Com m ission finds that although com plainant established a prima facie case, com plainant was not able to show that
the landlord revoked his agreem ent to rent the apartm ent to com plainant due to her m arital status (single). Piesen
v. Fleurisca, 1998H032, 5-9-02, CDO.
Prima Facie Case
To prove a prima facie case of housing discrim ination, specifically failure to rent based on m arital status, a
com plainant m ust show that (1) she is a m em ber of a group protected by the CCHRO; (2) she had applied for and
was qualified to rent the property in question; (3) she was rejected as a prospective tenant; and (4) the rental
property rem ained available thereafter. Piesen v. Fleurisca, 1998H032, 5-9-02, CDO.
M OTIONS
Extension of Tim e
Com m ission denies com plainant's objection to respondent's m otion for extension of tim e in which to file its
response. A response to a com plaint provides respondent with its first form al opportunity to provide its version of
the facts surrounding an allegation of discrim ination. A response also provides the Com m ission staff with
inform ation which will facilitate its neutral fact-finding process. Nor did com plainant articulate to the Com m ission
59
how the com plainant would be prejudiced by a m otion for a two-week extension of tim e. Berger v. Hilfiger Retail,
Inc., 1995E033, 6-8-95, CO; Valencia v. LaFrancaise Bakery, 2001E055, 11-19-01, CO.
W hen respondent files a good faith request for an extension of tim e and proffers good cause, Com m ission is
inclined to grant request. Com m ission grants respondent's m otion for extension of tim e based on good faith
representation that respondent will be investigating and preparing a response. Schickel v. Advocate South
Suburban Hospital, 2006E041, 11-1-06, CO.
Respondent's m otion for extension of tim e granted based on respondent's representation the parties were in
settlem ent discussions. The Com m ission strongly encourages the parties to reach a m utually agreed-upon
resolution of the com plaint as an alternative to form al action by the Com m ission. Rosin v. C. Foster Toys,
2001E027, 8-6-01, CO.
M otion to Dismiss
Com m ission finds instructive Section 2-615 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615) which allows a
respondent to file a m otion to dism iss a com plaint based solely on a defect in the pleadings, but respondent has the
burden of pointing out any defect with specificity. In this case, respondent has failed to dem onstrate that no set of
facts set forth by com plainant can be proven which would entitle com plainant to recover, or that the com plaint does
not set forth the essential elem ents of a prima facie case. Hudok v. Quality Transportation System s, Inc.,
1994E031, 12-27-94, CO; Munda v. Polish et al., 2004E044A, 2-10-05, CO; Perez v. Lake Park Construction, Inc.,
2004E063, 8-1-06, CO.
In evaluating a m otion to dism iss, the Com m ission cannot go beyond the face of the pleadings and m ust take
com plainant's allegations as true and view them together with reasonable inferences to be drawn from them in the
m ost favorable light to com plainant. See, e.g., Thom as v. Cook County Treasurer's Office, 1995EO34, 12-6-95 CO;
Blucher v. W ilkes & McClean Ltd., 2004E015, 5-24-05, CO; Perez v. Lake Park Construction, Inc., 2004E063, 8-1-
06, CO.
Summary Judgment
Com m ission Procedural Rule 460.160 does not allow for sum m ary judgm ent m otions and thus such m otions will not
be considered. See, e.g., Seaphus et al v. Laiser et al d/b/a. S&L Managem ent, 1994H007, 4-11-95, CO; Borelli v.
Presidential Mortgage Com pany, 1998E058, 10-1-98, CO; Munda v. Block Medical Center, 2003E032, 10-9-03,
CO.
Respondent, in subm itting a m otion to dism iss with supporting docum entation countering com plainant's allegations,
is actually filing a m otion for sum m ary judgm ent, which is specifically prohibited by Com m ission Procedural Rule
460.160. Respondent raises disputed issues of fact which are m ore appropriately resolved during the fact finding
investigation, not in a m otion to dism iss. Seaphus et al v. Laiser et al d/b/a. S&L Managem ent, 1994H007, 4-11-95,
CO; Freiberg v. South Cook Broadcasting, Inc., 1994E068, 5-1-95, CO; Reyes v. Penny Saver Publications,
1995PA005, 9-21-95, HO; Thom as v. Cook County Treasurer's Office, 1995E034, 12-6-95 CO; Borelli v.
Presidential Mortgage Com pany, 1998E058, 10-1-98, CO; Morris v. Perfecto Cleaners, 1999E019, 6-4-99, CO;
Conway v. Trans-Action Database Marketing, Inc., 1999E010, 3-13-03, CO; Gerick v. Airoom Architects, Inc. et al.,
2002E080, 6-30-03, CO; Munda v. Block Medical Center, 2003E032, 10-9-03, CO; Perez v. Lake Park Construction,
Inc., 2004E063, 3-21-05, CO; Perez v. Lake Park Construction, Inc., 2004E063, 8-1-06, CO.
Respondent's m otion to dism iss raises factual issues that require the Com m ission to look beyond the face of the
pleadings for their relevance and resolution. Respondent's statem ents present genuine issues of m aterial facts of
which the truth, falsity and significance are m ore properly addressed through a Com m ission fact-finding
investigation. See, e.g. Seaphus et al v. Laiser et al d/b/a. S&L Managem ent, 1994H007, 4-11-95, CO; Munda v.
Block Medical Center, 2003E032, 10-9-03, CO; Blucher v. W ilkes and McClean, Ltd., 2004E015, 5-24-05, CO.
M UNICIPAL ORDINANCE
Coextensive coverage
The CCHRO does not apply to com plaints of discrim ination occurring within the City of Chicago which involve
conduct covered by the Chicago Hum an Rights Ordinance. This rule, em bodied in § 42-33 of the CCHRO is in line
60
with Article VII, Section 68 of the State of Illinois Constitution. § 42-39 provides in part that if a county ordinance
conflicts with an ordinance of a m unicipality, the m unicipal ordinance shall prevail within its jurisdiction. The Chicago
Hum an Rights Ordinance regulates conduct which is prohibited under the CCHRO and provides rem edies; thus the
CCHRO shall not apply within the jurisdiction of Chicago with respect to such conduct. See, e.g., Blakem ore v.
Metropolitan W ater Reclam ation District of Greater Chicago, 2001PA004, 3-14-01, CO; Blakem ore v. City of
Chicago Dept. of Consum er Services, 2001PA005, 8-16-01, CO; Blakem ore v. Metropolitan Pier & Expo. Authority,
Chicago Departm ent of Procurem ent Services and Chicago Police Departm ent, 2001PA006, 7-12-01, CO;
Blakem ore v. Chicago Com m 'n Hum an Relations et al., 2001PA019- 020, 8-21-02, CO.
NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIM INATION
Harm suffered from disparate treatm ent by em ployer not a function of com plainant's national origin (Italian), and that
em ployer did not intentionally discrim inate against com plainant for prohibited reason. Fiore v. Bloom Township
Highway Departm ent, 1993E074 2-8-96, CDO.
Mere utterance of an epithet that engenders offensive feelings does not establish em ploym ent conditions so severe
and pervasive as to create a hostile work environm ent based on national origin (Polish). The rem arks were not
frequent, com plainant could not rem em ber m ore than one or two rem arks a year, nor were they threatening or
hum iliating. Iverson v. Horwitz, 1994E021, 2-8-96, CDO.
Com m ission finds that com plainant failed by preponderance of the evidence to sustain his burden of proof that his
failure to be selected for election duty (resulting in additional pay) or the term ination of his em ploym ent was
proxim ately caused by unlawful discrim ination based on his national origin (Haitian) in violation of the CCHRO.
Alcegueire v. Cook County Departm ent For Managem ent of Inform ation System s, 1992E003 and 1992E026, 8-10-
95, CDO.
PRECEDENT
Commission Orders
Decisions from other tribunals are not binding on the Com m ission, but the Com m ission does follow its own prior
decisions and orders in adjudicating new com plaints. Sm ith v. McCafferty's Pub, 2002PA029, 11-18-04, CDO.
Other Agency Decisions
Com m ission found decisions from other tribunals to be helpful, but not binding on Com m ission. Gluszek v. Stadium
Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO.
Chicago Ordinance
W here issues have been adjudicated frequently under the Chicago Hum an Rights Ordinance, it is appropriate to
seek guidance from such decisions, but the CCHRO is a different law and the Com m ission need not follow
unquestioningly the precedents established under the Chicago Ordinance. Meallet v. Cook County Departm ent
of Purchasing, 1992E016, 8-19-94, CDO.
An exam ination of em otional distress awards by the City of Chicago Com m ission on Hum an Relations, while
non-binding upon this Com m ission reveals precedent supporting the award for em otional distress dam ages in
this case. Garcia v. W inston, et al., 2003H003, 2003H004, 5-16-06, CDO.
It is appropriate to award costs proxim ately related to a m ove forced by discrim inatory conduct. The
Com m ission considered the Chicago Com m ission on Hum an Relations decisions, as the Com m ission had not
yet addressed this exact question. Garcia v. W inston, et al., 2003H003, 2003H004, 5-16-06, CDO.
Illinois Human Rights Act

At the tim e this m atter was filed with the Com m ission, the Com m ission did not have regulations that further
delineated any of the CCHRO's disability definitions or indicate in which circum stances existing physical barriers to
the entry of a public accom m odation constitute discrim ination in the full use of such a public accom m odation or
whether there is a duty to reasonably accom m odate the disability of som eone attem pting to use the public
accom m odation. The Com m ission followed Jones v. Chicago Transit Authority, a landm ark IHRC case, finding that
the CCHRO im plicitly requires that a public accom m odation m ust reasonably accom m odate the disabilities of
61
persons seeking to use the facility. Additionally, the Com m ission interprets the CCHRO to include the ADA
requirem ents that structural barriers be rem oved when readily achievable because the pream ble to the CCHRO
requires that it be interpreted liberally to effectuate its purposes, one of which is to ensure that persons with
disability can fully participate in the program s and services offered at place of public accom m odation. Sm ith v.
McCafferty's Pub, 2002PA029, 11-18-04, CDO; Sm ith v. Michael Anthony's Restaurant, 2002PA028, 4-12-05, CO.
Other Court Decisions
Federal Court Decisions

Advocacy organizations m ay be proper parties under the ordinance and can be awarded dam ages. Federal courts
have routinely awarded dam ages to this type of com plainant and to agencies with sim ilar functions as long as those
awards are not excessive. The Com m ission follows this precedent. Garcia v. W inston, et al., 2003H003,
2003H004, 5-16-06, CDO.
Illinois Supreme Court Decisions

The Com m ission follows Illinois Suprem e Court precedent in holding that non-judicial em ployees of the Office of the
Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County are em ployees of the State of Illinois for purposes of coverage under the
CCHRO. Eischen v. Cook County, 2000E002, 11-21-01, CO.
United States Supreme Court Decisions

In adhering to United States Suprem e Court precedent, the Com m ission finds that if the Com m ission granted a
m otion to dism iss, com plainant would be denied access to Com m ission's investigatory process and effectively
denied her due process right to an investigation. Hudok v. Quality Transportation System s, Inc., 1994EO31, 12-27-
94, CO; Montgom ery v. Rosenthal, 1994H001, 10-18-94, CO; J. Eugene O'Neill v. Handy Andy Hom e Im provem ent
Centers, 1994E053, 6-20-95, CO; Hart v. Market Facts, Inc., 1999E009, 4-22-04, CO.
PREGNANCY DISCRIM INATION

See SEX DISCRIM INATION
PRE-ORDINANCE CONDUCT
Admissibility at Hearing
Limited Purpose
Conduct that predates the effective date of the CCHRO is not adm issible for determ ining liability or assessing
dam ages. Such conduct m ay, however, be considered as background by the trier of fact in assessing other issues,
such as credibility, bias or m otive which relate to post-CCHRO conduct. Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill,
1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO; Iverson v. Horwitz, 1994EO21, 2-8-96, CDO.
The Com m ission does not have jurisdiction over conduct that occurred before the effective date of the CCHRO, May
21, 1993, or over allegations in a com plaint, which occurred outside of the 180-day com plaint filing period unless a
continuing violation. However, any such conduct m ay be used by the Com m ission as evidence to help assess
conduct over which the Com m ission does have jurisdiction. Hall v. GMRI, Inc., d/b/a Red Lobster Restaurants,
1996E101, 9-10-98, CDO.
During Complaint-Filing Stage
Com m ission grants respondent's m otion to dism iss because the Com m ission lacks jurisdiction to consider a
violation where the violation, alleged to have occurred on May 15, 1992, occurred prior to the effective date of the
CCHRO on May 21, 1993. Chen v. Northwestern University, 1993E054, 9-1-94, CO.
PRIM A FACIE CASE
Default Hearing
62
prima facie case of discrim ination and prove-up any dam ages. Even though this is a default case, com plainant has
Employment
To establish a prima facie case of discrim ination in em ploym ent, com plainant m ust show that: (1) he or she is a
m em ber of the protected class; (2) that he or she was m eeting the respondent's legitim ate perform ance
expectations for the assignm ent; (3) that there was an adverse action against com plainant; and (4) there was a
causal connection between the adverse action and discrim inatory act. Meallet v. Cook County Departm ent of
Purchasing, 1992E016, 8-18-94, CDO; Hudok v. Quality Transportation System s, Inc., 1994E031, 12-27-94, CO.
Housing
To prove a prima facie case of housing discrim ination , a com plainant m ust show that: (1) she is a m em ber of a
group protected by the CCHRO; (2) she applied for and was qualified to rent the property in question; (3) she was
rejected as a prospective tenant; and (4) the rental property rem ained available thereafter. Com m ission finds that
although com plainant, who is single, established a prima facie case, com plainant did not show that the landlord
declined to rent to her due to her m arital status. Piesen v. Fleurisca, 1998H032, 5-9-02, CDO.
Public Accommodations
To establish a prima facie case of discrim ination in access to a public accom m odation, a com plainant m ust show (1)
she is a m em ber of a protected class; (2) she was denied full enjoym ent of the public accom m odation; and (3)
others not within her protected class were allowed full enjoym ent of those services and/or she received services in a
m arkedly hostile m anner and in a m anner which a reasonable person would find objectively unreasonable. See,
e.g., Sm ith v. McCafferty's Pub, 2002PA029, 11-18-04, CDO (disability); Sm ith v. Michael Anthony's Restaurant,
2002PA028, 4-12-05, CO (disability); Blakem ore v. Trizec Holdings, Inc., (a/k/a) Trizec Office Properties,
2003PA007, 4-21-06, CDO (perceived housing status).
In a com m ercial context the courts have allowed for an alternative m ethod of establishing a prima facie case of
public accom m odation discrim ination by showing that a com plainant received services in a "m arkedly hostile
m anner and in a m anner which a reasonable person would find objectively unreasonable." In this case, the
com plainant failed to indicate any evidence of record to show that com plainant was treated in such a m anner or in
anyway discrim inated against because of her/his protected status. See, e.g., Gilm ore v. Menard's, Inc. 1999PA002,
5-9-02, CDO (race); Blakem ore v. Kinko's, Inc., 2002PA011, 7-14-03, CO (perceived housing status); Blakem ore v.
The Market Place, 2004PA008, 6-7-04, CO (perceived housing status); Blakem ore v. City of Chicago Fire
Departm ent & MPEA, 2002PA015, 10-26-04, CO (perceived housing status).
In the alternative, a com plainant m ay still prove a prima facie case by showing that it was futile to attem pt to enter or
use the public accom m odation. Com plaint has failed to m ake out a prima facie case since com plainant is unable to
show (1) that he sought to enter or expressed an interest in dining or drinking at respondent, and (2) that the
rem oval of any architectural barrier was readily achievable. Sm ith v. McCafferty's Pub, 2002PA029, 11-18-04,
CDO; Sm ith v. Michael Anthony's Restaurant, 2002PA028, 4-12-05, CO.
Retaliation
Com plainant m ust show: (1) she engaged in protected expression; (2) the em ployer took an adverse action against
her; and (3) a causal link exists between the expression and adverse action. Hudok v. Quality Transportation
System s, Inc. 1994E031, 12-27-94, CO; Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill. 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO;
Alcegueire v. Cook County Departm ent For Managem ent of Inform ation System s. 1992E003 and 1992E026, 8-10-
95, CDO; Pirrone v. W heeling Industrial Clinic, 1997E005, 4-12-01, CDO; Carroll et al v. Chicago District
Cam pground Assoc. et al., 1999H006-009, 10-16-06, CDO.
Sexual Harassment
In determ ining whether a com plainant has established a prim a facie case of sexual harassm ent, the facts will
often vary and the specific prim a facie proof required is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing
63
factual situations. A prim a facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of discrim ination only
because it is presum ed that the acts com plained of, if otherwise unexplained, are m ore likely than not based on
the consideration of im perm issible factors. Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO.
The Com m ission has adopted the position that actionable conduct falls between conduct that is m erely offensive
and conduct that causes a tangible psychological injury. Additionally, the Com m ission's analysis requires both
(1) an objective com ponent--a reasonable person m ust find the conduct sufficient to create a hostile
environm ent; and (2) a subjective com ponent--this particular person perceived the conduct as creating a hostile
environm ent. Language and behavior m ay both objectively and subjectively rise to the level of sexual
harassm ent. Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO; Desparte v. Arlington Heights
Kirby et al., 2002E020, 6-20-06, CDO.
an issue to consider in determ ining whether the person subjectively found the environm ent hostile, but it is not
et al., 2002E020, 6-20-06, CDO.
See also Individual Categories of Discrimination
PRO SE PARTIES
See ADM INISTRATIVE HEARING - Pro Se Parties
PROTECTIVE ORDERS
Hearing officer finds that due to sensitive nature of the case, the entry of a protective order pertaining to discovery
and depositions (if any) appears to be appropriate and warranted. Tolf v. Kuenster and Thom pson-Kuenster
Funeral Hom e, 1995E037, 6-26-96, HO; Carroll et al v. Chicago District Cam pground Assoc. et al., 1999H006-009,
8-15-06, CO.
Hearing officer finds that due to sensitive nature of inform ation about respondent's incom e and assets, the entry of a
protective order pertaining to respondent's tax returns for the last two years and a statem ent setting forth net worth
as of the present tim e is appropriate and warranted for purposes of ascertaining the am ount of punitive dam ages.
Nunnery v. Staley and Alice Lewy, 1998H008, 8-3-01, HO; Interfaith Housing Center of the Northern Suburbs,
1998H010, 8-3-01, HO.
During Investigation
Com m ission entered a protective order applying to student disciplinary files during the investigative stage. Ram irez,
on behalf of her m inor child, Valles v. St. Laurence High School, 1995PA013, 10-11-95, CO.
PUBLIC ACCOM M ODATIONS
The CCHRO's definition of public accom m odation is far m ore expansive than the contem plation of a "physical
location." The CCHRO's definition which allows a "person" as well as a "place or facility" to be a public
accom m odation, indicates a specific legislative intent to expand beyond the m ore literal concept of "facility" and
"place" relied on by the respondents in this case. In addition, unlike other statutes, the CCHRO does not contain an
illustrative list of entities that are considered public accom m odations. This lack of lim iting language supports a m ore
expansive interpretation of the County definition of public accom m odation. Reyes v. Penny Saver Publications,
1995PA005, 9-21-95, HO.
The public accom m odation language of the CCHRO is m ore expansive than other statutory definitions of public
accom m odation. An event which m ay typically be viewed as a private function but to which the general public, in
reality, is allowed to attend, m ay fall within the definition and scope of the CCHRO's public accom m odation
language. Blakem ore v. City of Chicago Fire Departm ent & MPEA, 2002PA015, 10-26-04, CO.
64
Although the CCHRO does not expressly contain the Am ericans with Disabilities Act requirem ent that structural
barriers be rem oved when readily achievable nor does it contain an express requirem ent that owners or operators of
public accom m odations reasonably accom m odate the disabilities of persons desiring to use the facility, the
Com m ission interprets the CCHRO as including such requirem ents because the Pream ble to the CCHRO requires
that it be interpreted liberally to effectuate its purposes. One of those purposes is to ensure that persons with
disabilities can fully participate in program s and services offered at places of public accom m odations. Sm ith v.
McCafferty’s Pub, 2002PA029, 11-18-04, CDO; Sm ith v. Michael Anthony’s Restaurant, 2002PA028, 4-12-05, CO.
Access Limited or Curtailed
Respondent argued that com plainant was never denied services by respondent and thus the com plaint should be
dism issed. The Com m ission denied this request stating that the prohibition against discrim ination in public
accom m odations in the CCHRO states that a provider of public accom m odations cannot, "withhold deny, curtail,
lim it, or discrim inate concerning the full use of such public accom m odations." Com plainant alleges that his use of
respondent's services was lim ited and curtailed, therefore the com plaint will proceed. Blakem ore v. Kinko's Inc.,
2002PA011, 7-14-03, CO.
The public accom m odation language of the CCHRO is m ore expansive than other statutory definitions of public
accom m odation. An event which m ay typically be viewed as a private function but to which the general public, in
reality, is allowed to attend, m ay fall within the definition and scope of the CCHRO's public accom m odation
language. Blakem ore v. City of Chicago Fire Departm ent & MPEA, 2002PA015, 10-26-04, CO.
Adverse Action Required
The Com m ission will exam ine on a case by case basis and will consider the totality of the facts alleged in order to
determ ine whether a claim or allegation is too trivial to constitute adverse action or to otherwise state a claim of
public accom m odation discrim ination under the CCHRO. Blakem ore v. Chicago Com m ission on Hum an Relations,
et al., 2001PA019-020, 8-21-02, CO.
discrim ination because no adverse action by respondent was alleged. Blakem ore v. City of Chicago, Argus Security
and Two Unknown W hite Argus Security Officers, 2002PA019, 4-23-02, CO, Blakem ore v. W algreens, 2005PA001,
4-4-05, CO (m erely hearing an announcem ent calling for "security on the floor" does not constitute an adverse
action sufficient to state a claim of public accom m odation discrim ination under the CCHRO).
21-06, CDO.
Com plainant failed to prove that he was denied full access to or enjoym ent of the public accom m odation because he
was given access in exactly the sam e m anner as other visitors. Blakem ore v. Trizec Holdings, Inc., (a/k/a) Trizec
Office Properties, 2003PA007, 4-21-06, CDO.
Even taking all of com plainant's allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences from them in a light m ost
favorable to com plainant, the allegations do not state a claim of retaliation as defined by the CCHRO because the
letter com plainant claim ed em bodied the allegations that denied public accom m odation contain no indication that
respondents gave com plainant the letter in question because of com plainant's opposition to discrim ination or
because he filed under the CCHRO or testified, assisted or participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
under the CCHRO as m andated by Art. IX(A). Blakem ore v. Cook County Com m ission on Hum an Rights et al.,
2002PA025, 6-12-03, CO.
Covered
New spapers
Com m ission denies respondent's m otion to dism iss, finding respondent is a public accom m odation. The respondent
is in the business of publishing a written periodical for distribution to the general public. The Com m ission finds that
respondent's periodical is a "product" or "service" and, therefore, falls within the broad definitional language of a
65
public accom m odation under the CCHRO. Reyes v. Penny Saver Publications. 1995PA005, 9-21-95, HO.
Retail M erchants
Respondent is licensed to do business in Illinois, and operates a retail store in Illinois. Respondent is a public
accom m odation as defined by the CCHRO. Gilm ore v. Menard's, Inc. 1999PA002, 5-9-2002, CDO.
Schools - Harassment
Because the CCHRO specifically exem pts single-sex schools from sex discrim ination in the public accom m odations
provision of the CCHRO, the drafters intended that schools otherwise be covered as public accom m odations. In
addition, the protections of the CCHRO are intended to cover students while in school, not just while attending
sporting events or certain school related activities. M. Mario Doe v. Riverside-Brookfield Township High School
District 208, 1995PA006, 3-28-96, CO.
Futile Gesture Doctrine
The futile gesture doctrine has been applied to claim s of disability discrim ination in the public accom m odations
context. The doctrine protects an individual with a disability from having to m ake repeated efforts to gain access to
a public accom m odation but require that such individual be genuinely interested in its use and express that interest
in som e m anner designed to give the owner or operator som e notice of that interest. In this case, the com plainant
has not shown that he had any interest in partaking of the use of respondent. Sm ith v. McCafferty's Pub,
2002PA029, 11-18-04, CDO; Sm ith v. Michael Anthony's Restaurant, 2002PA028, 4-12-05, CO.
M arkedly Hostile Behavior
The Com m ission finds that com plainant failed to establish a prima facie case of discrim ination in a public
accom m odation. Com plainant failed to show that she received services in a m arkedly hostile m anner and in a
m anner which a reasonable person would find objectively unreasonable. To establish a "m arkedly hostile m anner,"
com plainant would have to show that the conduct exhibited by respondent is: (1) so profoundly contrary to the
m anifest financial interests of the m erchant; (2) so far outside of widely accepted business norm s; and (3) so
arbitrary on its face, that the conduct supports a rational inference of discrim ination. Gilm ore v. Menard's, Inc.,
1999PA002, 5-9-2002, CDO; Blakem ore v. City of Chicago Fire Departm ent & MPEA, 2002PA015, 10-26-04, CO;
Blakem ore v. The Market Place, 2004PA008, 6-7-04, CO; Blakem ore v. Kinko's, Inc., 2002PA011, 7-14-03, CO;
Blakem ore v. Trizec Holdings, Inc., 2003PA007, 4-21-06, CDO.
In reviewing the totality of the circum stances in a public accom m odation case based on a m arkedly hostile theory,
the factors that the Com m ission will consider shall include factors such as how severe, invidious and/or long-lasting
the underlying conduct was; whether the behavior was pervasive, that is, whether it "polluted" the entire interaction
between the parties or was m ore an isolated instance; was the behavior so profoundly contrary to the financial
interests of the m erchant; was the conduct so far outside widely accepted business norm s; or how obviously
discrim inatory or retaliatory was the action that was taken. Blakem ore v. The Market Place, 2004PA008, 6-7-04,
CO.
The Com m ission finds that com plainant failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrim ination in access to a
public accom m odation. Com plainant, a black fem ale, failed to show that she received services in a m arkedly hostile
m anner and in a m anner which a reasonable person would find objectively unreasonable. Gilm ore v. Menard's, Inc.,
1999PA002, 5-9-02, CDO.
Not Covered
Access to a Particular Investigator

Access to a particular investigator for the purpose of handling either the intake or investigation of a com plaint is not
a public accom m odation within the m eaning of the CCHRO. Blakem ore v. Chicago Com m ission on Hum an
Relations, 2001PA019-020, 8-21-02, CO.
Illinois Department of Human Rights

The governm ent of the State of Illinois is clearly and plainly excluded from the CCHRO's definition of "person" as set
forth in § 42-31 (N). The IDHR is a departm ent of the governm ent of the State of Illinois. Blakem ore v. State of
Illinois Departm ent of Hum an Rights, 2001PA003, 4-27-01, CO.
66
Police Department Conduct
Com m ission grants respondent Police Departm ent's m otion to dism iss com plaint on the grounds that the
Com m ission does not have jurisdiction in this case in that the Police Departm ent does not provide a service to the
general public. The police departm ent is not providing a service to an individual against whom it is exercising its law
enforcem ent activity. The fact that an agency provides som e services to the general public does not m ean that the
agency is a public accom m odation for all purposes. Blakem ore v. Metropolitan Pier & Expo. Authority, Chicago
Departm ent of Procurem ent Services and Chicago Police Departm ent, 2001PA006, 7-12-01, CO; Nwaezeigwe v.
Desplaines Police Departm ent and City of Desplaines, 2001PA012, 8-10-01, CO.
Schools - Internal Discipline

W hile the CCHRO prohibits discrim ination in access to services provided by public accom m odations, school
disciplinary m easures are directed to adm itted students and are not "services" offered to the general public; hence,
for that function, a school is not a public accom m odation within the definition of the CCHRO. Jackson v. Thornton
Fractional South High School, 1996PA004, 8-16-01, CO; Ram irez ex rel Valles v. St. Laurence High School, 1995
PA013, 8-16-01, CO.
Prima Facie Case
Not everything that m akes a com plainant unhappy rises to the level of a violation of the CCHRO. Instead, in
determ ining whether an allegation is too trivial to constitute adverse action, or to otherwise articulate a prima facie
claim of public accom m odation discrim ination under the CCHRO, such as under a m arkedly hostile theory, the
Com m ission will exam ine each case individually and consider the totality of the facts as alleged. Blakem ore v. The
Market Place, 2004PA008, 6-7-04, CO
A com plainant m ay establish a prima facie case of denial of the full use of a public accom m odation by showing that
(1) com plainant is a m em ber of a protected class; (2) com plainant was denied enjoym ent of the public
accom m odation; and (3) others not within com plainant's protected class were allowed full enjoym ent of these
services, and or com plainant received services in a m arkedly hostile m anner and in a m anner which a reasonable
person would find objectively unreasonable. Blakem ore v. The Market Place, 2004PA008, 6-7-04, CO; Blakem ore
v. City of Chicago Fire Departm ent & MPEA, 2002PA015, 10-26-04, CO Blakem ore v. Trizec Holdings, Inc., (a/k/a)
Trizec Office Properties, 2003PA007, 4-21-06, CDO.
Com plainant failed to m ake out a prima facie case in that he failed to provide any evidence that he sought to enter
or that he expressed an interest in dining or drinking at respondent and that the m eans of entrance into respondent
could be m ade accessible to the com plainant in a readily achievable way. Sm ith v. McCafferty's Pub, 2002PA029,
prima facie case of discrim ination and prove-up any dam ages. Even though this is a default case, com plainant has
Readily Achievable Accommodations
The Com m ission applies two different standards for determ ining liability in an artificial barrier case: (1) if a public
facility was built before Septem ber 1985 and has not been altered at a cost of m ore than 15% of the reproduction
cost of the facility, that facility m ust com ply with the Illinois Environm ental Barriers Act (410 ILCS 25/1) and its
accom panying regulations, the Illinois Accessibility Code (71 Ill. Adm in. Code ' 410.110 et seq.); (2) if a public facility
was built before Septem ber 1985 and has not been altered at a cost of m ore than 15% of the reproduction cost of
the facility, the rem oval of any architectural barrier m ust be readily achievable. Sm ith v. McCafferty's Pub,
2002PA029, 11-29-04, CDO; Sm ith v. Michael Anthony's Restaurant, 2002PA028, 4-12-05, CO.
The Com m ission defines accom m odations as "readily achievable" as "easily accom plishable and able to be carried
out without m uch difficulty or expense." Sm ith v. McCafferty's Pub, 2002PA029, 11-29-04, CDO; Sm ith v. Michael
Anthony's Restaurant, 2002PA028, 4-12-05, CO.
67
PUNITIVE DAM AGES

See DAM AGES - Punitive Damages
RACE DISCRIM INATION
Liability Not Found
Com m ission finds that complainant has not m et her burden of proof that she was unlawfully discrim inated against on
the basis of her race and/or sex because she has failed to rebut respondent's articulated non-discrim inatory reasons
for its adverse actions. Meallet v. Cook County Departm ent of Purchasing, 1992E016, 8-18-94, CDO.
Com m ission finds that com plainant could not prove that respondent's prior failures to assign him to election duty
(resulting in additional pay) were caused by race, rather than his job title. Alcegueire v. Cook County Departm ent
For Managem ent of Inform ation System s, 1992E003 and 1992E026, 8-10-95 CDO.
Com plainant failed to provide any evidence that respondent's articulated reason for the two-week disciplinary
suspension was a pretext for race discrim ination and failed to counter respondent's evidence that it was unaware of
any sim ilar conduct on the part of any Caucasian supervisor. Rush v. Ford Motor Com pany, 1996E013, 9-13-00,
CDO.
Com m ission finds that assum ing com plainant m et his prima facie case of discrim ination, unlawful discharge based
on race, that respondent articulated his legitim ate non discrim inatory reasons for its actions and com plainant was
unable to establish respondent's actions were pretext. Hardim on v. Allied Tube and Conduit Corporation,
1996E003, 10-11-01, CDO.
M ixed Liability Found
The Com m ission entered an order finding m ixed liability. Com plainant proved by a preponderance of the evidence
that he was subjected to a hostile environm ent as a result of racist slurs directed at him by his supervisor. However,
com plainant failed to prove discrim ination based on unequal discipline due to his race. The Com m ission lim ited the
dam age award to em otional distress dam ages for the hostile environm ent. Conway v. Trans-Action Database
Marketing, Inc., 1999E010, 3-13-03, CO.
Prima Facie Case
Com plainant, who is African Am erican, presented a prima facie case that respondent unlawfully discrim inated
against her on the basis of her race and sex, by reassigning her duties to a white m ale em ployee and then paying
that em ployee m ore than she had been paid for perform ing those duties. Meallet v. Cook County Departm ent of
Purchasing, 1992E016, 8-18-94, CDO.
Com plainant presented a prima facie case of disparate treatm ent based upon race by com ing forward with evidence
that he is African-Am erican, that he suffered the adverse action of a two-week disciplinary suspension, and that at
least one Caucasian supervisor who had com m itted a sim ilar act with respect to the authorization of overtim e pay
was not sim ilarly disciplined. Rush v. Ford Motor Com pany, 1996E013, 9-13-00, CDO.
The Com m ission finds that com plainant failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrim ination in access to a
public accom m odation. Com plainant, a black fem ale, failed to show that she received services in a m arkedly
hostile m anner and in a m anner which a reasonable person would find objectively unreasonable. Gilm ore v.
Menard's, Inc. 1999PA002, 5-9-02, CDO.
68
RELIGIOUS DISCRIM INATION
Liability Not Found
Mere utterance of an epithet that engenders offensive feelings does not create em ploym ent conditions so severe
and pervasive as to create a hostile environm ent of religious discrim ination. The rem arks were not frequent,
com plainant could not rem em ber m ore than one or two rem arks a year, nor were they threatening or hum iliating.
Iverson v. Horwitz, 1994EO21, 2-8-96, CDO.
Prima Facie Case
Com plainant m ade out a prima facie case of discrim ination on the basis of religion and unlawful discharge. Hudok
v. Quality Transportation System s, Inc., 1994E031, 12-27-94, CO.
REM AND
After Administrative Hearing
In accordance with Com m ission Procedural Rule 470.105, the Com m ission rem anded to the hearing officer for
consideration, the lim ited legal issue of whether the Com m ission should consider and for what purpose pre-CCHRO
conduct. Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO.
The Com m ission rem anded the decision to the Hearing Officer to review and consider: (1) whether respondent
waived its opportunity to present and rely upon the Burlington Industries v. Ellerth affirm ative defense; (2) how and
why such waiver occurred; and (3) if the hearing officer determ ines that respondent did not waive its opportunity to
present an affirm ative defense, whether Burlington applies to Com m ission cases in general, whether it m ay be
applied in this case, and if so, whether respondent adequately established its existence as a viable defense. Upon
reconsideration, the hearing officer found that respondent waived its opportunity to present and rely upon the
Burlington affirm ative defense because respondent did not assert such defense until after reviewing the Initial
Recom m ended Order and Decision. Thus, since respondent waived any potential affirm ative defense, it is not
necessary to resolve whether this defense applies to Com m ission cases in general and/or whether respondent
adequately established its existence as a viable defense in this case. Conway v. Trans-Action Database Marketing,
Inc., 1999E010, 10-09-03, HO.
After considering the Hearing Officer’s final proposed decision and order, the Com m ission rem anded the case to the
Hearing Officer for the lim ited purpose of reviewing the dam age award and supplem enting the discussion portion of
the decision and order to incorporate relevant Com m ission case law. Carroll et al v. Chicago District Cam pground
Assoc. et al., 1999H006-009, 8-15-06, CO
REM EDIES
See DAM AGES or INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION
A com plainant m ay request reconsideration of a dism issal of a com plaint or dism issal of a portion of a com plaint
because of a lack of substantial evidence determ ination. Pursuant to Section 480.105 of the Rules, the party
m aking a request for reconsideration of a Com m ission order m ust state with specificity the reason(s) supporting the
request, such as the existence of relevant evidence which is newly discovered and was not available at the tim e of
the original determ ination, or the presentation of new, legal precedent not available at the tim e of the original
determ ination or the Com m ission's m isapprehension or m isapplication of law. A request for reconsideration m ust be
filed with the Com m ission within 30 days of receipt of the Com m ission's evidence determ ination order. In
considering a request for reconsideration, the Com m ission will not reconsider the sam e facts and argum ents
originally raised unless the requesting party can dem onstrate that the Com m ission m ade a m istake of fact or law,
which if corrected, would alter the outcom e of the finding. See, e.g., Hart v. Market Facts, Inc., 1999E009, 04-22-
04, CO; Onichuk v. Bruce Noxon, DPM, PC, DBA Glenbrook Podiatry, 2005E039, 4-7-06, CO; McBride v. Cerm ak
Health Services, 2003E045, 12-13-06, CO.
69
After Dismissal for Lack of Substantial Evidence
Request Granted
Com plainant's request for reconsideration and reinstatem ent of com plaint granted. The Com m ission m isapplied the
law when it dism issed the com plaint as being untim ely. The Com m ission initially determ ined that the 180-day filing
lim itations period began to run prior to when the com plainant had definitive, unam biguous com m unication of
respondent's decision to term inate com plainant. Clay v. Cook County Hospital, 1996E059, 8-8-97, CO.
Com plainant's request for reconsideration granted. Upon re-exam ination of the evidence, the Com m ission finds that
there is m ore than a m ere scintilla of evidence that respondent perceived com plainant to have a disability and
discrim inated against com plainant because of his perceived disability. Gannello v. Oak Park Library, 1998E001, 3-
16-00, CO.
Com plainant's request for reconsideration granted. Upon re-exam ination of the law, the Com m ission concludes that
Joyce Lane, a m em ber of the Enclave Condom inium Board Association Board of Directors, should be reinstated as
a respondent in this m atter. §§ 42-31(O) and 42-38(1) of the CCHRO provide that individuals m ay be nam ed as
respondents in com plaints of discrim ination or harassm ent brought under the CCHRO. In addition, Com m ission
precedent has allowed individuals to be held personally liable for their own acts of unlawful em ploym ent
discrim ination, as long as these individuals were decision m akers, supervisors, agents of the com pany/em ployer, or
the alter ego of a com pany. Gordon v. Enclave Condom inium Association, 2002H002, 8-12-05, CO.
Request Denied
Com m ission treated respondent's m otion to vacate a default order as a request for reconsideration. Nonetheless,
the request failed to set forth with any specificity the basis for reconsideration and failed to set forth any cause as to
why the response to the com plaint was not tim ely filed. Feges v. The New Em bers Restaurant, 1993E013, 1-26-94,
CO.
Com m ission denies request for reconsideration, which is required to state with specificity new and relevant evidence
which is newly discovered and was not available, and where respondent m erely seeks to have the Com m ission
reconsider facts and argum ents in a light m ore favorable to the m ovant. Com plainant's challenges to evidence
found unsubstantial. See, e.g., Basith v. Cook County Hospital Pharm acy Departm ent, 1993E042, 9-1-94, CO;
Harris v. Cook County Hospital/ Departm ent of Medicine, 1994EO95, 6-26-96, CO; Harding v. Cook County
Hospital, 1994E078, 11-12-98, CO; Saraiya v. O'Hare Kitchenette Apartm ents W est, 2003E062, 1-10-05, CO;
Calloway v. Provident Hospital of Cook County, 2001E046, 10-4-06, CO.
Com m ission finds request for reconsideration did not present any evidence which was relevant and/or was
unavailable at the tim e of investigation. Nor did the com plainant m ake a coherent or persuasive argum ent
supported by any evidence that a m istake of fact or law was m ade by the Com m ission. Com plainant's unsupported
allegations that investigator was biased are deem ed irrelevant. Thom as v. Cook County Treasurer's Office,
1995EO34, 6-26-96, CO; McBride v. Cerm ak Health Services, 2003E045, 12-13-06, CO.
Com m ission denies request for reconsideration as sim ply argum ents for reinterpretation of facts and evidence
gathered by Com m ission investigator. See, e.g., Hedges v. Cook County Juvenile Tem porary Detention Center,
1994EO38, 5-16-96, CO; Blandin v. fed Ex Ground Package System , Inc., and Howard Trudo, 2004E001, 7-12-05,
CO.
Com plainant filed a request for reconsideration after her com plaint was dism issed due to lack of substantial
evidence. The Com m ission issued an order to respondent directing respondent to provide additional docum entation
in support of its non-discrim inatory reasons for discharging com plainant. After reviewing this additional inform ation,
the Com m ission concludes that respondent articulated and adequately supported its legitim ate and non-
discrim inatory reason for term inating and replacing com plainant. The Com m ission did not uncover any evidence that
the proffered reasons for com plainant's term ination were pretext for national origin discrim ination, and thus denied
com plainant's request for reconsideration. Gonzalez v. MetalStik, Inc., 1996E030, 12-28-01, CO.
Com m ission denied the Request for Reconsideration when the request was based solely on allegations that the
investigator failed to interview witnesses who witnessed alleged harassm ent over five years before the com plaint
was filed. Ram ona Esquibel v. John E. Hughes Com pany, 2002E046, 3-20-03, CO.
70
Com plainant's Request is based on argum ents which were fully considered by the Com m ission during its
investigation. Com plainant's Request does not m ake an argum ent that a m istake of fact or law was m ade by the
Com m ission in its investigation which would alter the lack of substantial evidence determ ination. Com plainant's
Request does not argue the existence of relevant, newly discovered evidence, nor does it argue the existence or
applicability of new legal precedent that was unavailable at the tim e of the Com m ission's evidence determ ination.
Rather, the Request, which includes copies of witness statem ents (which had previously been subm itted to the
Com m ission), argues that the Com m ission failed to interview witnesses to incidents of alleged sexual harassm ent
which occurred in October 1997. Candelaria v. Cerm ak Health Services, 1998E051, 5-6-05, CO.
Request for reconsideration denied because com plainant m ay not interject new facts which were not previously
alleged prior to the filing of the Request. Laiser et al. v. Baldwin Greens Hom eowners Association et al. 1997H009,
7-22-04, CO.
Com plainant's request now provides the nam es of two witnesses that com plainant states m ust be interviewed if the
Com m ission's investigation is to be properly com pleted. These witnesses were unknown to the Com m ission at the
tim e of the investigation and no reason is provided by com plainant as to why the nam es of these witnesses were not
provided earlier. Com plainant's Request reargues facts already considered by the Com m ission. It does not argue
that a m istake of fact or law was m ade by the Com m ission in its investigation which would alter the Com m ission's
lack of substantial evidence determ ination, and to the extent that com plainant's Request attem pts to assert new
allegations of discrim ination or harassm ent not raised in the original com plaint, a request for reconsideration is not
the appropriate vehicle for consideration of these new or different allegations. Copney v. Cook County Auditor,
2002E007, 4-22-05, CO.
An investigator's discretionary decision to not conduct a fact finding conference does not warrant a determ ination of
any new evidence by the Com m ission. Evidence that existed and could have been disclosed before the
Com m ission investigator m ade its finding is not "newly discovered relevant evidence" where (1) the com plainant had
am ple tim e to disclose but failed to disclose that evidence to the investigator, or (2) failed to state with specificity any
reasons for the claim that the evidence was not available at the tim e of the original determ ination, or (3) show how
the "newly discovered relevant evidence" would alter the Com m ission's finding. Com plainant's use of counsel's
alleged statem ents in another forum does not constitute "new evidence" since there is no assertion that
respondent's counsel was a witness to any alleged discrim inatory conduct or that respondent's counsel even had
personal knowledge of discrim inatory conduct. Hart v. Market Facts, Inc., 1999E009, 04-22-04, CO.
The Com m ission determ ines that the conduct that occurred over five years prior to the filing of the com plaint was
outside of the Com m ission's jurisdiction, having occurred outside of the Com m ission's 180-day jurisdictional filing
period, and not part of a continuing violation. Since the Com m ission is without jurisdiction over that conduct, there is
nothing for the Com m ission to reconsider at this tim e. Candelaria v. Cerm ak Health Services, 1998E051, 5-6-05,
CO; Verm eer v. Peter F. Olesen & Assoc., 2004E002, 3-13-06, CO.
Com plainant's Request attem pts to assert new allegations of discrim ination or harassm ent not raised in the original
com plaint, a request for reconsideration is not the appropriate vehicle for consideration of these new or different
allegations. Barnes v. United Parcel Service, 2003E024, 2-8-05, CO.
The Com m ission will not reconsider the sam e facts and argum ents originally raised unless the requesting party can
dem onstrate that the Com m ission m ade a m istake of fact or law which, if corrected, would alter the outcom e of the
finding. Vachula v. Flower Fantasy, 2003E053, 3-8-06, CO; Ortiz v. Orchard Medical Group, 2005E020, 3-14-06,
CO; Onichuk v. Bruce Noxon, DPM, PC, DBA Glenbrook Podiatry, 2005E039, 4-7-06, CO.
Providing the Com m ission with the addresses of two witnesses who allegedly support his com plaint is not sufficient
to support a Request for Reconsideration. Vachula v. Flower Fantasy, 2003E053, 3-8-06, CO.
Com plainant's Request fails to provide relevant inform ation which was unavailable at the tim e of the investigation
and which if presented to the Com m ission at the tim e of the investigation would have changed the evidence
determ ination. Calloway v. Provident Hospital of Cook County, 2001E046, 10-4-06, CO; Diaz v. Market Advantage,
2003E038, 12-18-06, CO.
Com plainant's request for reconsideration is denied because, am ong other things, com plainant did not rebut, nor did
the investigation reveal any evidence that respondent's reason for term ination was pretext for discrim ination based
71
on age and race. Esquibel v. John E. Hughes & Com pany, 2002E46, 3-20-03, CO.
Additional Documentation Needed

Com m ission finds that in order to rule on com plainant's request for reconsideration, additional docum entation and
evidence should be presented to the Com m ission. Gonzalez v. Metalstik, Inc., 1996E030, 5-28-97, CO.
After Settlement Agreement
Request denied. The Com m ission issued an Order dism issing the com plaint on the basis that the parties had
entered into a settlem ent agreem ent during a settlem ent conference. Com plainant filed a request for
reconsideration of the order on the basis that the parties did not reach a settlem ent. Com plainant’s m otion
essentially repeats the argum ents which she raised in her previous brief in opposition to respondent’s original
m otion to enforce the settlem ent. Munda v. Block Medical Center, 2003E032, 11-23-04, HO.
Time for Filing
Com m ission finds request for reconsideration was not tim ely filed, having been filed 30 days late, hence not in
accordance with Com m ission Procedural Rule 480.100(A) which requires filing within 30 days after decision by the
Com m ission. Lifter v. Cook County Hospital, 1995E014, 2-27-97, CO; Berger v. Hilfiger, Retail, Inc., 1995E033, 6-9-
97, CO; Constantini v. Motorola, Inc., 1994E129, 5-12-97, CO (request for reconsideration denied when filed 15
m onths late with no explanation for untim eliness); Scott v. Tastee Donut, 1999E074, 8-17-00, CO (request denied
when filed 18 days late).
A request by respondent seeking reconsideration or rehearing of facts at the heart of a substantial evidence
determ ination which is m ade prior to the com m encem ent of an adm inistrative hearing is prem ature. Com m ission
Procedural Rule 440.1208 states that when a substantial evidence determ ination is m ade, a request for
reconsideration of this Com m ission order m ay be m ade only in accordance with Com m ission Procedural Rule
480.100(B), which states that when an order finding substantial evidence is entered reconsideration of this order is
proper only as part of that parties briefs on exceptions to a hearing officer's initial proposed decision and order.
Thezan v. Georgios Bar & Grill, Ltd., 1995E071, 11-20-98, CO.
A request for reconsideration m ust be filed with the Com m ission within 30 days of receipt of the Com m ission's
evidence determ ination order. Respondent states that the Request was filed 9 days after the Request was due. In
accordance with the Com m ission's Rules, service of a Com m ission docum ent is presum ed to be com plete 3
business days after m ailing. In this case, the Com m ission initially served the order and report on com plainant at an
incorrect address. The Com m ission re-served the order and report on com plainant ten days later. Based on the
foregoing, the Com m ission considered com plainant's request for reconsideration to be tim ely filed. Gordon v.
Enclave Condom inium Association, 2002H002, 8-12-05, CO.
RES JUDICATA
See CONCURRENT JURISDICTION
RESPONSE
Amendment to Response
At a disability evidentiary conference, respondent's m otion to am end its verified response with substantive changes
is denied. Respondent cannot, under any circum stances, sim ply undo the judicial adm issions it m ade in its original
verified response. Respondent's m otion alleges that its original verified response was a product of m istake and
inadvertence, but its proposed am ended verified response contains no such allegations. At this stage, com plainant
is at least entitled to rely on the statem ents in respondent's original verified response that are m ost favorable to
com plainant's case. The hearing officer denied respondent's m otion to am end its verified response without
prejudice, but allowed respondent to revisit the issue after a substantial evidence determ ination and before any
adm inistrative hearing. Sotelo v. J.F. Schroeder Co. Inc., 2001E014, 1-2-02, HO.
A respondent's failure to tim ely respond underm ines the public interest in swift and fair adjudication of discrim ination
com plaints. The public interest assum es that the parties follow the cardinal rules of due process which require
respondents to respond to com plaints. Com m unication with a deadline should be answered, and a quasi-judicial
72
agency's rules such as, the Com m ission's, should be followed. McCoy v. United Airlines, 1996E111, 10-03-01, CO;
Jacob v. Northwestern University, 2002E037, 10-24-02, CO.
Content
Com m ission denies com plainant's m otion to strike and determ ines that respondent has filed a verified response in
conform ity with Com m ission Procedural Rule 420.165. In pertinent part, Rule 420.165 states that a response shall
identify the nam es and addresses of any representatives of respondent, and that the response, in short and plain
term s, shall state the respondent's defense to each claim asserted. The Com m ission finds that respondent's failure
to articulate a defense to each claim asserted does not constitute substantial non-com pliance with Com m ission
Procedural Rule 420.165(B). Freiberg v. South Cook Broadcasting Inc., 1994E068, 10-24-95, CO.
Com m ission denies com plainant's m otion to strike and finds respondent's am ended and verified response in
substantial com pliance with Com m ission Procedural Rule 420.165. Respondent's failure to specifically address the
issue of dam ages in the com plaint does not constitute non-com pliance with the abovem entioned rule. Donnell,
Cotton and HOPE v. Sprovieri, 1998H011, 1998H012, 11-30-98, CO.
Default for Failure to Respond
Com m ission enters default order for respondent's failure to respond to Com m ission com plaint. Respondent failed to
respond to Com m ission contacts and notices pursuant to Com m ission Procedural Rule 420.165. Com m ission m ust
consider com plainant's allegations as true. Feges v. The New Em bers Restaurant, 1993E013, 11-8-93, CO;
Matthews v. Eugene's Fireside Restaurant, 1997PA017, 12-29-98, CO; W hite v. W ooten, 1998H033, 8-18-99, CO;
Sm ith v. McCafferty's Pub, 2002PA029, 5-29-03, CO.
Subsequent to the entry of a default order, an adm inistrative hearing was held to determ ine com plainant's relief, if
any. Due to respondent's failure to file a tim ely response to the com plaint, all of com plainant's well-pleaded
allegations were deem ed adm itted, com plainant established a prima facie case of discrim ination and dam ages were
awarded. Feges v. The New Em bers Restaurant, 1993E013, 6-16-94, CDO.
prima facie case of discrim ination and prove any dam ages. Even though this is a default case, com plainant has
Extension of Tim e
The Com m ission prefers to resolve com plaints on their m erits. In order to do so, the Com m ission relies on a
respondent's verified response, position statem ent and answers to the Com m ission questionnaire to assist in its
neutral fact-finding investigation. Thus, when a respondent files a good faith request for an extension of tim e, and
proffers good cause, the Com m ission is inclined to liberally grant those requests. See, e.g., Arnett v. Cezar's Inn,
2003PA005, 6-20-03, CO.
Verification
Respondent's response was appropriately verified in accordance with Com m ission Procedural Rule 490.190(A).
Freiberg v. South Cook Broadcasting Inc., 1994E068, 10-24-95, CO.
RETALIATION
Employment Discrimination
Com plainant m ust show: (1) she engaged in protected expression; (2) an adverse action was taken by em ployer;
and (3) a causal link exists between the expression and adverse action. Hudok v. Quality Transportation System s,
Inc.,1994E031, 12-27-94, CO; Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill. 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO; Alcegueire v.
Cook County Departm ent For Managem ent of Inform ation System s, 1992E003 and 1992E026, 8-10-95, CDO;
Pirrone v. W heeling Industrial Clinic, 1997E005, 4-12-01, CDO.
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Retaliatory Discharge
Liability Found
Respondent found liable for retaliatory discharge when com plainant opposed sex discrim ination and was
subsequently term inated. Com plainant showed (1) she engaged in protected expression, (2) an adverse action was
taken by her em ployer, and (3) a causal link exists between the expression and adverse action. Pirrone v.
W heeling Industrial Clinic, 1997E005, 4-12-01, CDO.
Respondent proffered two nondiscrim inatory reasons for discharging com plainant: (1) her allegedly poor
perform ance, and (2) her allegedly poor attitude. However, com plainant has shown that both these reasons are
pretextual in that they were unworthy of credence and designed to hide the real discrim inatory m otive. The first
reason--allegedly poor perform ance in a num ber of areas--was not credible because the supervisor indicated that
com plainant was not fired for this reason. The second reason also was pretextual because again the evidence did
not support a finding that com plainant’s attitude had undergone such a dram atic change as to cause her discharge.
Thus, the Com m ission finds that com plainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that she was
discharged in retaliation for her com plaints about the supervisor’s sexually abusive treatm ent of her offered by
respondent shown to be unworthy of credence and designed to hide discrim inatory m otive. Gluszek v. Stadium
Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO.
Respondent found liable for retaliatory discharge. Com plainant established her prim a facie case of retaliation in
that: she engaged in protected expression when she com plained about com m ents regarding her sexual orientation
and practices; respondent's discharge of com plainant constitutes an adverse em ploym ent decision; and established
a causal link because of the proxim ity in tim e between the com plaint and her discharge. Respondent has m et its
lim ited burden by proffering two nondiscrim inatory reasons for discharging her. However, com plainant has shown
that both these reasons are pretextual in that they were unworthy of credence and designed to hide the real
discrim inatory m otive. Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO.
Liability Not Found

Com m ission finds that complainant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that respondent's articulated
reason for his term ination was pretextual and hence retaliatory. Alcegueire v. Cook County Departm ent For
Managem ent of Inform ation System s, 1992E003 and 1992E026, 8-10-95, CDO.
Com m ission does not find discharge was unlawfully based on discrim ination due to hostile work environm ent but
that com plainant had resigned voluntarily and em ployer reasonably believed so when she was replaced. Iverson v.
Horwitz, 1994E021, 2-8-96, CDO.
Com plainant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he was retaliated against by respondent for his
protected activity of filing a form al com plaint of discrim ination with the Com m ission. However, respondent proved by
a preponderance of the evidence that it would have m ade the sam e decision to term ination com plainant absent the
unlawful retaliation. Conway v. Trans-Action Database Marketing, Inc., 1999E010, 3-13-03, CDO.
Com plainants established a prim a facie case of retaliation with direct evidence: respondents adm itted that they took
away com plainants’ license to occupy their cottage because of com plainants’ opposition to unlawful discrim ination
on the basis of sexual orientation. Com plainants also established a prim a facie case of retaliation with indirect
evidence because (1) they engaged in expression protected under the Ordinance; (2) they suffered an adverse
housing action; and (3) there was a causal link between the protected expression and the adverse action. Carroll et
al v. Chicago District Cam pground Assoc. et al., 1999H006-009, 10-16-06, CDO.
Com m ission denied respondent's m otion for deferral of com plaint investigation for a com plaint which was also filed
with the Chicago Com m ission on Hum an Relations. The Chicago Com m ission did not have jurisdiction over an
allegation of retaliation in housing, therefore, the com plaint which alleged retaliation for opposing sexual harassm ent
in housing was properly filed with the Com m ission. Stovall v. Metroplex,Inc. et al., 1995H010, 10-19-95, CO; Sellers
v. Outland, 2002H001, 5-6-02, CO.
Prima Facie Case
The Com m ission finds that respondent's individual actions of retaliation against com plainant when viewed
74
collectively constitute a clear pattern of retaliatory conduct by respondent in the wake of com plainant's inform al
com plaint of sexual harassm ent to the respondent. Respondent failed to adequately articulate a legitim ate non
discrim inatory reason for any of their adverse actions against the com plainant. McClellan v. Cook County Law
Library, 1996E026, 6-7-99, CDO.
To prove a prima facie case of retaliation a com plainant m ust show: (1) she engaged in protected expression; (2)
an adverse action was taken by em ployer; and (3) a causal link exists between the expression and adverse action.
Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill. 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO; Hudok v. Quality Transportation System s, Inc.
1994E031, 12-27-94, CO; Alcegueire v. Cook County Departm ent For Managem ent of Inform ation System s.
1992E003 and 1992E026, 8-10-95 CDO; McClellan v. Cook County Law Library, 1996E026, 6-7-99, CDO.
Protected Expression
Not all acts of protest of discrim inatory treatm ent are protected from retaliatory activity on part of the em ployer, such
as com plaining on a continual basis in exaggerated, inflam m atory, disruptive and inappropriate ways. Alcegueire v.
Cook County Departm ent For Managem ent of Inform ation System s, 1992E003 and 1992E026, 8-10-95 CDO.
Com plainant has established a prima facie case of retaliation in that a letter she wrote to her em ployer was
protected expression and she was discharged one week later during a discussion about that letter. Pirrone v.
W heeling Industrial Clinic, 1997E005, 4-12-01, CDO.
Com m ission finds that while com plainant som etim es protested and com plained of acts which he legitim ately and in
good faith believed to be discrim inatory, as the body of em ploym ent discrim ination law m akes clear, not all acts of
protest of discrim inatory treatm ent are protected from retaliatory activity on part of the em ployer. Alcegueire v. Cook
County Departm ent For Managem ent of Inform ation System s, 1992E003 and 1992E026, 8-10-95 CDO.
W hile legal representatives, including non-lawyers, m ight be proper respondents in a com plaint filed under the
CCHRO, the Com m ission finds that in this case, they are not. Specifically, com plainant's characterization of
respondents' conduct and com plainant's legal conclusions about this conduct do not state a claim for either
retaliation or aiding and abetting, and do not otherwise rise to a violation of the CCHRO. Munda v. Polish, et al.,
2004E044A, 2-10-05, CO.
Public Accommodations
Even taking all of com plainant's allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences from them in a light m ost
favorable to com plainant, the allegations do not state a claim of retaliation as defined by the CCHRO because the
letter com plainant claim ed em body the allegations that denied public accom m odation contain no indication that
respondents gave com plainant the letter in question because of com plainant's opposition to discrim ination or
because he filed under the CCHRO or testified, assisted or participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
under the CCHRO as m andated by Art. IX(A). Blakem ore v. Cook County Com m ission on Hum an Rights et al.
2002PA025, 6-12-03, CO.
Com plainant's rem aining allegations, that were not released by settlem ent and not tim e-barred under the
Com m ission's Procedural Rule, fail to state a claim in any respect because, other than the unproven charge that a
Com m ission investigator conspired with the respondent's attorneys, there was nothing within the com plaint that
suggests that any of the nam ed respondents com m itted any act that could be characterized as aiding and abetting,
interfering, or retaliating. Munda v. Block Medical Center et al., 2004E061, 2-10-05, CO.
To state a claim of retaliation for his opposition to housing status discrim ination, the com plaint needs to contain
allegations that com plainant expressed or com m unicated to respondent his opposition to what he reasonably
believed to be housing status discrim ination. The com plaint contains no allegations that com plainant opposed
housing status discrim ination with respondent and, therefore, fails to state a claim of retaliation based on housing
status discrim ination. Blakem ore v. W algreens, 2005PA001, 4-4-05, CO.
RETROACTIVITY
Pre-Ordinance conduct m ay be adm issible as background in assessing im pact of post-Ordinance conduct but not
adm issible for determ ining liability or assessing dam ages. Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-
16-95, CDO.
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SANCTIONS
See FINES
SETTLEM ENT AGREEM ENT
Binding Agreement
In determ ining that the parties have entered into a binding settlem ent agreem ent, the com m ission m ade the
following findings: (1) the com m ission m ay exam ine the statem ents the parties m ade during the negotiation leading
to the settlem ent; (2) an oral agreem ent is not any less valid than a written one in the eyes of the law; (3)
respondent’s refusal to issue the settlem ent check until the agreem ent was reduced to writing does not negate the
agreem ent to settle; (4) no m aterial term s rem ained to be negotiated; and (5) a settlem ent m ay be rendered
unenforceable due to coercion or duress include a showing that m edical issues caused a party to enter into an
agreem ent that, but for the m edical condition, she would never have entered. The Com m ission rejects
Com plainant’s argum ent that the norm al pressures of the litigation process cause the com plainant to m ake a
decision that she now regrets. Munda v. Block Medical Center, 2003E032, 9-23-04, 11-23-04, HO.
Coercion/Duress
The types of grounds upon which Illinois courts have found coercion or duress to exist, rendering a settlem ent
unenforceable, include a showing that m edical issues caused a party to enter into an agreem ent that, but for the
m edical condition, she would never have entered. The Com m ission rejects Com plainant’s argum ent that the norm al
pressures of the litigation process cause the com plainant to m ake a decision that she now regrets. Munda v. Block
Medical Center, 2003E032, 11-23-04, HO.
Enforcement of Agreement
Com mission Requirements

In order for the Com m ission to have jurisdiction and to enforce a settlem ent agreem ent, the agreem ent m ust be
reduced to writing, signed by the parties, subm itted to the Com m ission for approval. Each party to a settlem ent
agreem ent m ust also acknowledge that the Com m ission has jurisdiction to enforce the agreem ent. Absent that
acknowledgm ent, the Com m ission has no jurisdiction to enforce the settlem ent. Lacy v. Cook County Hospital,
1992E033, 6-8-95, CDO; Banks v. Cook County Juvenile Tem porary Detention Center, 1994E088, 3-14-96, CO;
Munda v. Block Medical Center, 2003E032, 09-23-04, HO.
The parties to a Com m ission approved settlem ent agreem ent specifically acknowledge that the Com m ission retains
jurisdiction for the purposes of enforcing the agreem ent, including seeking judicial enforcem ent where appropriate.
Com m ission Procedural Rule 440.160 provides that if a party believes there is non-com pliance with the term s of the
settlem ent agreem ent, the party is required to notify the Com m ission which will com m ence an investigation into the
alleged non-com pliance. Marquez v. Kostich, 1996H001, 11-12-98, CO.
Oral Settlement Agreement

Under appropriate circum stances, the Com m ission will enforce a non-private, properly m ade oral settlem ent
agreem ent. For an oral settlem ent agreem ent to be enforceable, there m ust be an offer and acceptance, definite
and certain term s, and a m eeting of the m inds as to those term s. In this case, there was no m eeting of the m inds as
to the term s of the proposed oral agreem ent. Jaber v. Allan Managem ent Services and Karen Doroski, 1994H009,
6-30-98, CO.
The Hearing Officer concludes that the parties entered into an enforceable oral agreem ent to settle this case on
specified term s. But because the Com m ission lacks in this instance the authority to enforce the agreem ent, it is the
responsibility of respondent- should com plainant continue to decline to execute the settlem ent agreem ent and
release- to file an appropriate action in an appropriate state court seeking enforcem ent. Munda v. Block Medical
Center, 2003E032, 9-23-04, CO.
Private Settlement Agreement

The Com m ission lacks jurisdiction to proceed to hear a m atter that the parties have settled. Thus, unless the parties
have agreed that the Com m ission will retain jurisdiction over a m atter for the purposes of enforcing the term s of a
settlem ent, the Com m ission m ust dism iss a com plaint that has been settled. Munda v. Block Medical Center,
76
2003E032, 09-23-04, HO.
The Com m ission’s Rules specify at Section 440.125 that a settlem ent agreem ent can be enforced by the
Com m ission only after it has been executed in writing and subm itted to the Com m ission for approval. That did not
occur in this instance. Nothing, however, in the CCHRO or Rules prevents the Com m ission from dism issing a
com plaint which has been settled, nor requires it to continue to hear a case which has been settled, and, in fact, the
Com m ission lacks jurisdiction to proceed to hear a m atter which the parties have settled. Munda v. Block Medical
Center, 2003E032, 9-23-04, CO.
Release of Claim s
In evaluating a request for reconsideration after a com plaint has been dism issed due to a settlem ent agreem ent, the
Com m ission m ay consider statem ents m ade during a settlem ent agreem ent to determ ine whether a binding
settlem ent has occurred. Munda v. Block Medical Center, 2003E032, 11-23-04, HO.
The Com m ission has jurisdiction to determ ine whether a com plaint should be dism issed because the com plainant
released his Com m ission claim s pursuant to a private settlem ent agreem ent. The Com m ission found that the
com plainant failed to prove fraud or m utual m istake and, therefore, the release dism issing the Com m ission
com plaint is valid. Lacy v. Cook County Hospital, 1992E033, 6-8-95, CDO.
Motion to dism iss is granted, given that m ost of com plainant's claim s lodged against respondents were released
through the parties' settlem ent of the com plaint in question. However, claim s after the settlem ent conference will not
be released. If, under the guise of filing new com plaints, the com plainant is attem pting to circum vent or challenge
the Com m ission's dism issal of a prior com plaint, her appropriate recourse is to appeal that decision through a
petition for writ of certiorari in a court of appropriate jurisdiction. Munda v. Block Medical Center, et al., 2004E061,
2-10-05, CO.
SEX DISCRIM INATION
Liability Not Found
Com m ission finds that complainant has not m et her burden of proof that she was (1) unlawfully discrim inated
against on the basis of her race and/or sex and (2) has failed to rebut respondent's articulated non-discrim inatory
reasons for its actions. Meallet v. Cook County Departm ent of Purchasing, 1992E016, 8-18-94, CDO; Freiberg v.
South Cook Broadcasting, Inc., 1994E068, 5-26-98, CDO (sex discrim ination).
In a case other than a discharge case, com plainant, a fem ale, m ust show that she was in a protected class, was
m eeting respondent's legitim ate job expectations, and was term inated from the training program , while respondent
continued to accept new dispatchers through its training program . Com plainant failed to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that she was m eeting respondent's legitim ate expectations for perform ance in the flight dispatch
training program . McCoy v. United Airlines, Inc., 1996E111, 10-10-02, CDO.
Pregnancy
In the absence of a specific reference in the CCHRO to pregnancy or a definition of sex discrim ination in which sex
discrim ination is defined as including pregnancy or proof that pregnancy was used as a pretextual basis to hide
different treatm ent given to sim ilarly situated m ale em ployees, com plainant's claim of pregnancy discrim ination is
not actionable under the CCHRO. Pirrone v. W heeling Industrial Clinic, 1997E005, 4-12-01, CDO.
Prima Facie Case
Com plainant m ade out a prima facie case of discrim ination on the basis of sex and unlawful discharge in violation of
the CCHRO. Com plainant alleged that she belongs to a protected class, she is fem ale; she was m eeting
respondent's legitim ate perform ance expectations for her assignm ent; she was term inated by the respondent; and,
she was replaced by a m ale. Hudok v. Quality Transportation System s, Inc., 1994E031, 12-27-94, CO.
Com plainant, who is a black fem ale, presented a prima facie case that respondent unlawfully discrim inated against
her on the basis of her race and sex, by reassigning her duties to a white m ale em ployee and then paying that
77
em ployee m ore than she had been paid for perform ing those duties. Meallet v. Cook County Departm ent of
Purchasing, 1992E016, 8-18-94, CDO.
SEXUAL HARASSM ENT
Analytical Framew ork
The Com m ission has adopted the analytical fram ework enunciated in McDonnell Douglas and Texas
Departm ent of Com m unity Affairs in adjudicating disparate treatm ent cases where no direct evidence of
discrim inatory intent is present. Com plainant m ust establish by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie
case of sexual harassm ent. The burden then shifts to the respondent to articulate a legitim ate non-
discrim inatory reason for its actions. If the respondent articulates a non-discrim inatory reason for its actions, the
com plainant m ust then prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the articulated reason was pretext for
unlawful discrim ination. Com plainant retains at all tim es the ultim ate burden of proving that the respondent
engaged in unlawful behaviors. Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO; Desparte v.
Arlington Heights Kirby et al., 2002E020, 6-20-06, CDO.
In determ ining whether a com plainant has established a prim a facie case of sexual harassm ent, the facts will
often vary and the specific prim a facie proof required is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing
factual situations. A prim a facie case under the McDonnell Douglas, raises an inference of discrim ination only
because it is presum ed that these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are m ore likely than not based on the
consideration of im perm issible factors. Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO.
Co-Employee Harassment
Em ployer is responsible for acts of sexual harassm ent between co-em ployees where em ployer, (or its agents or
supervisors) knew or should have known of the conduct, unless em ployer can show it took im m ediate and
appropriate corrective action. Urbach v. Am elio's Restaurant, et al., 1997E089, 7-1-98, CO.
Constructive Discharge
The CCHRO does not require a tangible em ploym ent decision to find an em ployee's constructive discharge
attributed to the em ployer when it stem s from sexually harassing conduct by a supervisor. Desparte v. Arlington
Objective and Subjective Components

an issue to consider to determ ine whether the person subjectively found the environm ent hostile, but it is not
et al., 2002E020, 6-20-06, CDO.
See also EM PLOYM ENT DISCRIM INATION - Hostile W ork Environment
Liability Found
Respondent found liable for sexual harassm ent toward com plainant, for creating a hostile work environm ent and for
retaliatory discharge. Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO; Desparte v. Arlington
Liability Not Found
Com plainant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that she was sexually harassed during her em ploym ent at
respondent in that she was subjected to a hostile environm ent. Com plainant failed to prove by a preponderance of
78
the evidence that respondent's response to her allegations were insufficient or ineffective, therefore, respondent not
held liable for sexual harassm ent. McClellan v. Cook County Law Library, 1996E026, 6-7-99, CDO.
Supervisory Employees
§ 42-35 (E) of the CCHRO states that "[a]n em ployer is responsible for its acts and those of its agents and
known of their occurrence." Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO; Desparte v.
Arlington Heights Kirby et al., 2002E020, 6-20-06, CDO.
Respondent owner found liable for supervisor's sexual harassm ent toward com plainant, for creating a sexually
hostile work environm ent and for retaliatory discharge of com plainant. Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill,
1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO; Desparte v. Arlington Heights Kirby et al., 2002E020, 6-20-06, CDO.
The CCHRO provides for strict liability of the em ployer for a supervisor's sexual harassm ent. Desparte v. Arlington
The CCHRO does not require a tangible, adverse em ploym ent decision to find an em ployee's constructive
discharge attributed to the em ployer when it stem s from sexually harassing conduct by a supervisor. Desparte v.
Arlington Heights Kirby et al., 2002E020, 6-20-06, CDO. Desparte v. Arlington Heights Kirby et al., 2002E020, 6-20-
06, CDO.
SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIM INATION
An em ployer has an affirm ative duty to m aintain a working environm ent free of harassm ent on the basis of
m em bership in any protected class covered by the CCHRO. Respondent had an affirm ative duty to m aintain a work
environm ent free of harassm ent directed at any em ployee based on his sexual orientation. Com plainant proved by
a preponderance of the evidence that he was subjected to a hostile environm ent as a result of hom ophobic slurs
directed at him by his supervisor. Conway v. Trans-Action Database Marketing, Inc., 1999E010, 3-13-03, CDO.
Liability Found
W hen an em ployer bases its hiring or firing decisions on an individual's sexual orientation, such discrim ination is
offensive to the principles of fairness and equal treatm ent. Firing an individual due to his actual or perceived
heterosexuality, hom osexuality or bisexuality explicitly violates the CCHRO. Pursuant to an order of default for
respondent's refusal to respond to com plaint, respondent found liable for m anager's unlawful discharge on the basis
of sexual orientation. Feges v. The New Em bers Restaurant, 1993E013, 6-16-94, CDO.
Respondent found liable for term ination of com plainant due to his sexual orientation. The respondent is still liable if
unknowing upper m anagem ent acted as an unwitting conduit for the discrim ination of lower m anagem ent. Hall v.
GMRI, Inc., d/b/a Red Lobster Restaurants, 1996E101, 9-10-98, CDO.
Based on the evidence presented, an inference is drawn to establish a causal connection between one of
respondent's supervisor's hostility toward hom osexual m ales in general and com plainant in particular and
com plainant's term ination. The respondent, who relied upon and was influenced by, this supervisor's behavior is
liable for com plainant's unlawful term ination. Hall v. GMRI, Inc., d/b/a Red Lobster Restaurants, 1996E101, 9-10-
98, CDO.
STANDING
Advocacy Agency
79
Executor of Estate
The executor of an estate has standing to file a com plaint for violation of civil rights on behalf of estate, despite
absence of contractual relationship between executor and estate. Rabe v. Michael's Funeral Hom e et al.,
1994PA008, 10-22-96, CO.
Com m ission finds a sufficient nexus between the alleged disability of the com plainant husband, his related behavior
and the failure of the respondents to renew the lease of com plainant wife as stating a claim of indirect discrim ination
based on com plainant wife's actual association with her husband, a person with a disability. Jam es and Marjorie
Anderson v. Town Managem ent, Howard Fink, Barrington Lakes Apartm ents, and Lois Phelps, 1996H012, 6-9-97,
CO.
Requirements
A com plainant has standing to bring an action when a claim ed injury is (1) distinct and palpable; (2) fairly traceable
to defendant's actions; and (3) substantially likely to be prevented or redressed by the grant of the requested relief.
Lack of standing Is an affirm ative defense that m ust be raised by a defendant or respondent. Sm ith v. McCafferty's
Pub, 2002PA029, 11-18-04, CDO; Sm ith v. Michael Anthony's Restaurant, 2002PA028, 4-12-05, CO.
STATUTE OF LIM ITATIONS
180-Day Filing Period
Subsequent to an investigation of com plainant's allegations, the Com m ission determ ined that the com plaint was not
tim ely filed in accordance with § 42-34 (B)(1) of the CCHRO and therefore dism issal for lack of jurisdiction is proper.
Mendez v. Autozone, 2000E037, 9-24-01, CO; Pleasant v. The Thresholds, 2001E007, 7-13-01, CO; Totten v.
Chicago District Cam pground Association et al, 2001H003, 8-16-01, CO.
The language of the CCHRO in § 42-34 (B)(1)(a) does not explicitly refer to the 180-day filing period as
jurisdictional. The 180-day filing period is like a statute of lim itations which in appropriate circum stances m ay be
tolled, e.g., where the com plainant acts diligently. O'Neill v. Handy Andy Hom e Im provem ent Centers, 1994E053,
6-20-95, CO.
Motion to dism iss denied. A dispute as to whether a com plaint was filed within the 180 day period involves m ixed
questions of fact and law and is not properly decided on a m otion to dism iss. However, through the fact finding
investigation, if it becom es clear that the allegations either do not state a cause of action, or that the Com m ission is
without jurisdiction over the com plaint itself, the Com m ission will dism iss the com plaint. Munda v. Block Medical
Center, et al., 2004E061, 2-10-05, CO.
Continuing Violations
§ 42-34 (B)(1)(a) of the CCHRO and Com m ission Procedural Rule 420.100(A) recognize that a violation of the
CCHRO m ay be of a continuing nature. The continuing violation theory allows incidents which would otherwise be
tim e-barred to be considered tim ely because they are part of a pattern of related events, at least one of which
occurred during the 180-day filing period. In determ ining whether allegations are of a continuing nature, the
Com m ission considers the following factors: (1) subject m atter: do the alleged events involve the sam e type of
discrim ination; (2) frequency: are the acts recurring and not isolated or discrete; and (3) perm anence: does a pattern
or series of acts over a period of tim e finally alert the individual that his or her rights are being violated. Martin v.
Club Fever, 1998PA009, 11-30-98, CO; Howard v. Pappas Transport, 1999E033, 2-8-00, CO.
The effects or outgrowth of alleged past discrim ination m ay continue in the present but do not create an
independent basis for a com plaint and do not cause a new filing period to run. Com plainant's allegation that the
filing of a lien was discrim inatory was not tim ely. The Com m ission rejected her argum ent that the rem oval of the lien
(an outgrowth of the original filing) caused a new filing period to begin to run. Spurgash v. 7041-49 O'Connell
Condom inium Association and Kiner, 1994H006, 10-19-98, CDO.
80
Section 420.100(A) of the Com m ission's procedural rules provides that a com plaint m ust be filed with 180 days of
the date of the alleged occurrence. Here, the only two allegations of the com plaint not tim e-barred are
com plainant's allegations that respondents aided and abetted, interfered, and retaliated against her. The sole
argum ent available to com plainant as to the tim eliness defense would be the "continuing violations" theory pursuant
to which, under certain narrow circum stances, a discrim ination com plainant can reach back to events occurring
m ore than 180 days before the filing of a charge or com plaint. It is clear from the face of the com plaint, however,
that the only tim ely allegations within the com plaint have little or no connection at all to the tim e-barred allegations.
Thus, respondent's m otion to dism iss is granted. Munda v. Block Medical Center, et al., 2004E061, 2-10-05, CO.
Date of Alleged Violation
Com plaint dism issed due to lack of jurisdiction because com plaint was filed beyond the 180-day filing lim itations
period. See, e.g., Kwok-Keung Law v. Real Estate Buyer's Agent,Inc., 1994H003, 4-15-94, CO; Jones v. Motorola,
Inc., 1995E086, 10-24-95, CO; Sulls v. McDonald's Restaurant, 1996E117, 6-3-97, CO; McBride v. Quebecor
Printing, 1999E030, 6-3-99, CO; Munda v. Block Medical Center, et al., 2004E061, 2-10-05, CO.
Disputed facts regarding whether com plaint was tim ely filed raises a jurisdictional issue whose ultim ate resolution, if
not evident from the face of the pleadings, would be properly considered during the Com m ission's fact finding
investigation. Thom as v. Cook County Treasurer's Office, 1995E034, 12-6-95, CO.
Com m ission denies m otion to dism iss filed subsequent to the com m encem ent of an adm inistrative hearing, where
unresolved factual questions exist regarding whether the com plaint was tim ely filed such that, at the adm inistrative
hearing, com plainant m ay prove facts to support her claim that the com plaint was tim ely filed. Spurgash v. 7041-49
O'Connell Condom inium Association and Philip Kiner, Treasurer, 1994H006, 6-20-97, HO.
The Com m ission lacked jurisdiction of the com plaint because the last act that could form the basis of a violation of
the CCHRO (the filing of a lien) occurred m ore than 180 days before the date the com plaint was filed. The
Com m ission found that the 180-day filing period began to run when the com plainant had notice of the filing of the
lien. The Com m ission rejected argum ents that the subsequent rem oval of the lien be construed as the act which
caused the 180-day filing period to run because the rem oval of the lien was m erely an outgrowth of the original filing
of the lien (not an independent basis for a com plaint) and the rem oval of the lien was not injury in violation of the
CCHRO. Spurgash v. 7041-49 O'Connell Condom inium Association and Kiner, 1994H006, 10-19-98, CDO.
Com m ission dism isses respondent's m otion to dism iss and finds that com plainant's allegation of the date of alleged
violation m ust be taken as true and not an arbitrary date chosen by respondent with no reason in support. Howard v.
Pappas Transport, 1999E033, 2-8-00, CO.
Subsequent to an investigation of com plainant's allegations, the Com m ission has determ ined that the com plaint was
not tim ely filed in accordance with § 42-34 (B)(1) of the CCHRO and therefore dism issal for lack of jurisdiction is
proper. Mendez v. Autozone, 2000E037, 9-24-01, CO; Pleasant v. The Thresholds, 2001E007, 7-13-01, CO; Totten
v. Chicago District Cam pground Association et al, 2001H003, 8-16-01, CO.
The Com m ission determ ines that the conduct that occurred during 1997, over 5 years prior to the filing of the
com plaint, was outside of the Com m ission's jurisdiction, having occurred outside of the Com m ission's 180-day
jurisdictional filing period, and not part of a continuing violation. Since the Com m ission is without jurisdiction over
that conduct, there is nothing for the Com m ission to reconsider at this tim e. Candelaria v. Cerm ak Health Services,
1998E051, 5-6-05, CO.
Section 420.100(B) of the Com m ission's Rules provides that the Com m ission m ay waive any of its com plaint filing
requirem ents in Section 420.100(B) upon a showing of extraordinary circum stances. Here, com plainant requested
to am end com plaint to cure a technical defect to place the actual date of discrim ination three days earlier, and
therefore, placing the alleged violation within the 180 day requirem ent. Any dispute as to the actual date of
discrim ination will be addressed during the course of the Com m ission's neutral fact finding investigation, and
therefore, com plainant's m otion to am end com plaint is granted. Perez v. Lake Park Construction, Inc., 2004E063,
3-21-05, CO.
81
Equitable Tolling
The language of the CCHRO in § 42-34 (B)(1)(a) does not explicitly refer to the 180-day filing period as
jurisdictional. The 180-day filing period is like a statute of lim itations which in appropriate circum stances m ay be
tolled, i.e., where the com plainant acts diligently. O'Neill v. Handy Andy Hom e Im provem ent Centers, 1994E053, 6-
20-95, CO.
In deciding whether it is appropriate to toll the 180-day filing period the Com m ission will consider the following in a
given case: (1) the com plainant's diligence; (2) the Com m ission's role, if any, in a late filing; and (3) whether the
decision to equitably toll the filing period serves the purposes of both the CCHRO and the Com m ission's Procedural
Rules. Com plainant was diligent in pursuing his claim and was in no way at fault for the late filing and should not be
penalized for an unintentional m istake m ade by a Com m ission investigator; and thus equitable tolling allowed. Ross
v. Orthopedic Specialists, S.C., 1998E043, 7-9-98, CO; Borelli v. Presidential Mortgage Com pany, 1998E058, 10-1-
98, CO; Muriel Brown v. Lutheran General Hospital, 1995E038, 3-20-96, CO.
Notice of Discriminatory Act
The 180-day filing period lim itation begins to run with notice of the discrim inatory act, not at the point when the
consequences of the act becom e painful. Neither appeals nor a deferral of final date of em ploym ent postpone the
tim e within which com plainant m ust m ake the com plaint. Chen v. Northwestern University, 1993E054, 9-1-94, CO.
See also Spurgash v. 7041-49 O'Connell Condom inium Association and Kiner, 1994H006, 10-19-98, CDO.
Notice of the discrim inatory act com plained of m ust be definitive and unam biguous. The language used herein was
too am biguous to serve as final notice of a decision by respondent to term inate the com plainant. Clay v. Cook
County Hospital, 1996E059, 8-8-97, CO.
The Com m ission finds that the 180-day filing period did not begin to run the date com plainant was discharged.
Com plainant's suspension five m onths prior to his term ination did not constitute definitive and unam biguous
notice of the alleged discrim inatory act. Thom pson v. Prem ier Delivery Service, Inc., 1995E085, 8-15-97, CO.
The Com m ission finds that the com plaint was not tim ely filed within the 180-day period and further finds that the
180-day filing period begins to run when em ployee was notified that he was term inated rather than the
subsequent date upon which he received his severance and vacation benefits paychecks. Kracke v. Thorn
Creek Basin Sanitary District, 2000E006, 4-6-00, CO.
The 180-day filing period begins to run when the com plainant had definitive and unam biguous notice of the alleged
discrim ination. The Com m ission finds that the com plaint was not tim ely filed because the com plainant had notice of
the alleged discrim ination in excess of 180 days of filing his com plaint. Com plainant's subsequent appeals of the
board's decisions do not constitute independent acts of discrim ination and, therefore, do not delay the tolling of the
com plaint filing period. Totten v. Chicago District Cam pground Association, 2001H003, 8-16-01, CO.
STRICT LIABILITY
The CCHRO provides for strict liability of the em ployer for a supervisor's sexual harassm ent. Desparte v. Arlington
Respondent is liable for discrim ination if unknowing upper m anagem ent acted as an unwitting conduit for the
discrim ination of lower m anagem ent. Hall v. GMRI, Inc., d/b/a Red Lobster Restaurants, 1996E101, 9-10-98, CDO.
§ 42-35 (E) of the CCHRO states that "[a]n em ployer is responsible for its acts and those of its agents and
known of their occurrence." Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO; Desparte v.
Arlington Heights Kirby et al., 2002E020, 6-20-
Respondent owner found liable for m anager's sexual harassm ent toward com plainant, for creating a sexually hostile
work environm ent and for retaliatory discharge of com plainant. Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill, 1993E052,
3-16-95, CDO; Desparte v. Arlington Heights Kirby et al., 2002E020, 6-20-06, CDO.
82
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
determ ination is appropriate. The choice of whom to believe should be m ade by an adm inistrative hearing
officer with witnesses under oath and the rules of evidence applying. Ehlers v. United Parcel Service,
1997E027, 9-21-98, CO.
Substantial evidence is shown when "m ore than a m ere scintilla of relevant evidence exists such that a reasonable
m ind m ight find it sufficient to support a conclusion." Green v. Avon Products, Inc., 1996E096, 1-20-98, CO, citing
Com m ission Procedural Rule, 440.120(C) and Zunino v. Cook County Com m ission on Hum an Rights, 289 Ill.
App.3d. 133, 136 (1st Dist. 1997).
SUM M ARY JUDGM ENT
Com m ission Procedural Rule 460.160 does not allow for sum m ary judgm ent m otions and as such will not entertain
or consider such m otions. See, e.g., Seaphus et al v. Laiser et al d/b/a. S&L Managem ent, 1994H007, 4-11-95, CO;
Borelli v. Presidential Mortgage Com pany, 1998E058, 10-1-98, CO; Munda v. Block Medical Center, 2003E032, 10-
9-03, CO.
See also M OTIONS
UNLAW FUL DISCHARGE
Com plainant m ust show: (1)she engaged in protected expression; (2) she was subsequently term inated; and (3) a
causal link exists between the expression and adverse action. Hudok v. Quality Transportation System s,
Inc.,1994E031, 12-27-94, CO; Gluszek v. Stadium Sports Bar and Grill. 1993E052, 3-16-95, CDO; Alcegueire v.
Cook County Departm ent For Managem ent of Inform ation System s, 1992E003 and 1992E026, 8-10-95, CDO;
Pirrone v. W heeling Industrial Clinic, 1997E005, 4-12-01, CDO.
See also RETALIATION - Employment Discrimination - Unlaw ful Discharge
VERIFIED RESPONSE
See RESPONSE
W ILLFUL INTERFERENCE
Com plainant's allegation relating to interference under § 42-41 (C) of the CCHRO fails to state a claim because,
am ong other things, the allegation does not specifically identify which duty or exercise of power by the Com m ission
was the subject of respondents' willful interference or exactly how respondents willfully interfered with such a duty or
power, Moreover, her allegations contain no factual support for such claim s. Furtherm ore, the Com m ission draws no
inference from the allegations that respondents engaged in willful interference with the Com m ission's exercise of its
powers or duties. Finally, it rejects any suggestion by com plainant that respondents' advocacy on behalf of their
clients constitutes willful interference under the CCHRO. Munda v. Polish et al., 2004E044A, 2-10-05, CO.
The allegations in the com plaint, which were not released by settlem ent and not tim e-barred under the
Com m ission's Procedural Rules, fail to state a claim in any respect and are therefore, dism issed. Other than the
unproven charge that a Com m ission investigator conspired with the respondent's attorneys, there is nothing within
the com plaint that suggests that any of the nam ed respondents com m itted any act that could be characterized as
aiding and abetting, interfering, or retaliating. The Com m ission also finds that com plainant failed to set forth specific
facts that could support any claim that respondents are vicariously liable for their counsel's alleged actions in the
m atter. Munda v. Block Medical Center et al., 2004E061, 2-10-05, CO.
W ITHDRAW AL OF ATTORNEY
Leave Granted
Conflict of Interest
Com m ission grants respondent's attorney leave to withdraw from representing an individually nam ed respondent.
83
W hen the counsel initially appeared on behalf of the individual respondent, he was em ployed by respondent Cook
County Juvenile Tem porary Detention Center. He is no longer em ployed by respondent and based on the reasons
for his separation of em ploym ent from respondent, continued representation would cause a potential conflict of
interest. Gilyard v. Cook County Juvenile tem porary Detention Center and Donald Person, 2004E069, 12-6-05, CO;
See also Lam et v. Niles Township Jewish Congregation, 1995E041, 6-11-96, CO.
In case with two nam ed respondents, Com m ission grants attorney leave to withdraw from representing the
individually nam ed respondent when individual is no longer em ployed by the other respondent and a conflict or
potential conflict exists between representing the interests of both respondents. Tsim ogiannis v. United Buying
Service and Ricky Quinones, 1995E074, 3-24-98, CO.
Com m ission grants attorney leave to withdraw because he was hired for a federal position which prohibits
continuing representation of com plainant, who since had secured a new counsel. Palm er v. Metropolitan W ater
Reclam ation District of Greater Chicago, 1994E057, 8-7-95, CO.

Com m ission grants attorney leave to withdraw where respondent is no longer in business, no attorney fees have
been paid to him , and where attorney lost contact with client. Jaber v. Allen Managem ent System s and Karen
Doroski, 1994H009, 4-7-99, HO.
Inability to Continue
Com m ission grants attorney leave to withdraw where an evidence determ ination has not yet been m ade and
com plainant's attorney m ight be a witness to one of the key issues in the case, and pursuant to Rule 3.7 of the
Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, an attorney "shall not accept or continue em ploym ent...if m ay be called as a
witness". Boughton v. Zonac Alum inum Siding and Jerry Malinowski, 1998E032, 3-27-02, CO.
Irreconcilable Differences
Com m ission grants attorney leave to withdraw because of irreconcilable differences with com plainant. See, e.g.,
Spector v. ARA Cory Refreshm ent Services, 1995E098, 12-20-96, CO; San Ram on v. Cook County Hospital,
2000E014, 6-13-00, HO;Florczyk v. MBC Mortgage Corp., 2002E086, 3-19-03, CO.
W ithdrawal of attorney will be perm itted when such withdrawal would neither delay Com m ission proceedings nor
otherwise affect adm inistrative efficiency or prejudice com plainant. See, e.g., Lopez v. Advanced Transform er Co.,
1995E013, 2-13-97, CO; McAndrew v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 1995E057, 5-28-96, CO; Caffarello v. Filene's
Basem ent, Inc., 2004E047, 2-7-05, CO; Kram er v. Security Solutions ADT, and Brett Blessen Individually,
2004E029, 1-11-05, CO.
Com m ission grants attorney leave to withdraw. Counsel indicated to the Com m ission that he believes respondents
are no longer in business and he was unaware of any working phone num ber for respondents. Desparte v.
Arlington Heights Kirby et al., 2002E020, 5-06-05, CO.
Com m ission grants respondent's attorney leave to withdraw, where an evidence determ ination has not yet been
m ade and respondent's president has filed an appearance on behalf of respondent. Hopp v. Bruce W oodworking,
Inc., 1997E099, 1-5-98, CO.
Com m ission grants m otion of respondents' attorneys to withdraw when respondent inform ed counsel that their
services are no longer required. Diaz v. NBC, Inc. 1997E014, 12-11-97, CO; Mitchell v. South Suburban System s,
Inc., d/b/a McDonald's, 1997E092, 5-14-98, CO; Finn v. LaSalle Bank, 1998E078, 9-30-99, CO.
Com m ission grants m otion of com plainant's attorney where com plainant had constructively term inated attorney-
client relationship. Tobin v. W MC Equity Services and Todd Soronen, 1998E068, 4-21-00, CO; Martin v. Club
Fever, 1998PA009, 5-13-02, CO.
W here attorney's withdrawal is solely a m atter of form ality, Com m ission will not withhold leave. Bishop v. H2O Plus,
LLP, 2004E026, 1-4-06, CO.
Non-Cooperative Client
Com m ission grants m otion of attorney for com plainant to withdraw as counsel because of com plainant's refusal to
respond to phone calls and letters from counsel. Thom pson v. Prem ier Delivery, Inc., 1995E085, 8-5-97, CO;
84
Medina v. LeFebvre Intergraphics Inc., et al., 1996E010A, 5-5-98, CO, Aughtry v. Zanayed & Panzarotto,
2003H001, 5-16-03, CO.
Post-Administrative Hearing
Com m ission grants attorney leave to withdraw where there was no agreem ent of counsel to represent com plainant
throughout any stage of the appeal process, after the Com m ission issued its decision and order. Alcegueire v. Cook
County Departm ent for Managem ent of Inform ation System s, 1992E003 and 1992E026, 9-21-95, CO.
Settlement Agreement
Com m ission grants attorney leave to withdraw although com plainant's attorney did not file a m otion with the
Com m ission and did not wait for Com m ission leave to withdraw because com plainant entered into private
settlem ent agreem ent with respondent. Bishop v. H2O Plus, LLP, 2004E026, 1-4-06, CO.
Substitute Counsel
Respondent's m otion to substitute counsel granted. There has been no showing that com plainant would be
prejudiced by allowing Sachnoff & W eaver to withdraw as attorneys for respondent. Munda v. Block Medical
Center, 2003E032, 1-20-04, HO.
W RIT OF CERTIORARI
Pursuant to Com m ission Procedural Rule 480.115 any party m ay file a petition for writ of certiorari in accordance
with applicable law seeking an appeal of a final order or a final decision of the Com m ission. Alcegueire v. Cook
County Departm ent for Managem ent of Inform ation System s, 1992E003 and 1992E026, 9-21-95, CO.
Motion to dism iss is granted, given that m ost of com plainant's claim s lodged against respondents were released
through the parties' settlem ent of the com plaint in question. However, claim s after the settlem ent conference will not
be released. If, under the guise of filing "new" com plaints, the com plainant is attem pting to circum vent or challenge
the Com m ission's dism issal of a prior com plaint, her appropriate recourse is to appeal that decision through a
petition for writ of certiorari in a court of appropriate jurisdiction. Munda v. Block Medical Center et al., 2004E061, 2-
10-05, CO.
85

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COOK COUNTY COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

SUBJECT MATTER INDEX OF DECISIONS AND ORDERS

INDEX COVERAGE: This Index includes summaries of substantive decisions and

INDEX ORGANIZATION: This Index is organized alphabetically by topic. Listed under

COMMISSION DECISION AND ORDERS DEFINED: There are three types of

EXPLANATION OF CASE CITATIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS IN INDEX: Following

AVAILABILITY OF FULL TEXT OF DECISIONS AND ORDERS: Decisions and orders

69 W est W ashington Street, Suite 3040 Chicago, Illinois 60602-3007

ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING ..................................................................................................................................... 1

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE ........................................................................................................................................... 3

AGE DISCRIMINATION .............................................................................................................................................. 3

AGENCY LIABILITY .................................................................................................................................................... 4

AIDING AND ABETTING

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEFS .......................................................................................................................................... 4

ATTORNEY APPEARANCE ....................................................................................................................................... 4

ATTORNEY'S FEES ................................................................................................................................................... 5

BACK PAY ................................................................................................................................................................... 6

BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS ................................................................................................................................ 6

BURDEN OF PROOF ................................................................................................................................................. 6

COMMISSION DEADLINES ....................................................................................................................................... 7

COMMISSION EXECUTIVE REVIEW COMMITTEE ................................................................................................. 7

CONCILIATION CONFERENCE ................................................................................................................................. 9

CONFLICT OF INTEREST ....................................................................................................................................... 10

CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS .................................................................................................................................... 10

CONTINUING VIOLATIONS ..................................................................................................................................... 10

DEFERRAL OF COMMISSION INVESTIGATION .................................................................................................... 17

DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION ................................................................................................................................ 20

DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT ................................................................................................................................... 26

DISPARATE IMPACT ............................................................................................................................................... 29

DISPARATE TREATMENT ....................................................................................................................................... 29

DUE PROCESS RIGHTS .......................................................................................................................................... 35

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION .......................................................................................................................... 36

ENFORCEMENT OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

EXCEPTIONS TO RECOMMENDED DECISIONS .................................................................................................. 42

FAILURE TO COOPERATE ...................................................................................................................................... 43

FINDINGS OF FACT ................................................................................................................................................. 44

HEARING OFFICER ................................................................................................................................................. 46

HOME RULE AUTHORITY ....................................................................................................................................... 47

HOUSING DISCRIMINATION ................................................................................................................................... 47

HOUSING STATUS .................................................................................................................................................. 50

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF ................................................................................................................................................ 51

LOCATION OF VIOLATION ...................................................................................................................................... 58

MARITAL STATUS DISCRIMINATION ..................................................................................................................... 59

MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE ........................................................................................................................................ 60

NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION .................................................................................................................... 61

PRE-ORDINANCE CONDUCT ................................................................................................................................. 61

PRIMA FACIE CASE ................................................................................................................................................. 62

PROTECTIVE ORDERS ........................................................................................................................................... 64

PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS ................................................................................................................................. 64

RACE DISCRIMINATION .......................................................................................................................................... 68

RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION ................................................................................................................................ 69

REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION .................................................................................................................... 69

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ................................................................................................................................... 76

SEX DISCRIMINATION ............................................................................................................................................ 77

SEXUAL HARASSMENT .......................................................................................................................................... 78

SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION ............................................................................................................ 79

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS .................................................................................................................................... 80

STRICT LIABILITY .................................................................................................................................................... 82

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ...................................................................................................................................... 83