FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 141020 : June 12, 2008]

CASINO LABOR ASSOCIATION, Petitioner, v. COURT OF

APPEALS, PHIL. CASINO OPERATORS CORPORATION (PCOC)
and PHIL. SPECIAL SERVICES CORPORATION
(PSSC), Respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

This petition for certiorari 1 assails the Decision2 and Resolution3 of

the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 50826. The CA
dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner against
the First Division of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) and denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The series of events which ultimately led to the filing of the petition
at bar started with the consolidated cases4 filed by the petitioner
labor union with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. In an
Order5 dated 20 July 1987, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the
consolidated cases for lack of jurisdiction over the respondents
therein, Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)
and Philippine Casino Operators Corporation (PCOC).

On appeal to the NLRC, the Commission en banc issued a

Resolution6 dated 15 November 1988, which dismissed the separate
appeals filed by the petitioner on the ground that the NLRC has no
jurisdiction over PAGCOR.

Petitioner then elevated the case to this Court, via a Petition for
Review on Certiorari, 7 entitled Casino Labor Association v.
National Labor Relations Commission, Philippine Amusement
& Gaming Corporation, Philippine Casino Operators
Corporation and Philippine Special Services Corporation and
docketed as G.R. No. 85922. In a Resolution8 dated 23 January
1989, the Third Division of the Court dismissed the petition for
failure of the petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the NLRC.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was

denied with finality in a 15 March 1989 Resolution.9 The Resolution
states, in part:

x x x Any petitions brought against private companies will have to

be brought before the appropriate agency or office of the
Department of Labor and Employment.

Based solely on that statement, petitioner filed a

Manifestation/Motion10 with the NLRC praying that the records of
the consolidated cases be "remanded to the Arbitration Branch for
proper prosecution and/or disposition thereof against private
respondents Philippine Casino Operators Corporation (PCOC) and
Philippine Special Services Corporation (PSSC)."

Acting on the Manifestation/Motion, the NLRC First Division issued

an Order11 dated 30 June 1989, which granted the motion and
ordered that the records of the cases be forwarded to the
Arbitration Branch for further proceedings.

Respondents PCOC and PSSC filed a motion for reconsideration. In

an Order12 dated 22 July 1994, the NLRC First Division granted the
motion, set aside the 30 June 1989 Order for having been issued
without legal basis, and denied with finality the petitioner's
Manifestation/Motion. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied in a Resolution13 dated 28 November 1997.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari 14 with this Court asserting

that the NLRC First Division committed grave abuse of discretion in
ignoring the mandate of G.R. No. 85922. Petitioner argued that,
with the statement "(a)ny petitions brought against private
companies will have to be brought before the appropriate agency or
office of the Department of Labor and Employment," this Court laid
down the law of the case and mandated that petitions against
respondents PCOC and PSSC should be brought before the NLRC. By
way of resolution,15 this Court referred the case to the CA in
accordance with the ruling in St. Martin Funeral Homes v.
NLRC.16

On 22 June 1999, the CA rendered its Decision dismissing the

petition for certiorari . The CA found no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the NLRC First Division when it issued: (a) the 22 July
1994 Order, which set aside its 30 June 1989 Order remanding the
case to the Arbitration Branch for further proceedings; and (b) the
28 November 1998 Resolution, which denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which
the CA denied in its 6 December 1999 Resolution.

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari in which the petitioner

raises this sole issue:

CAN THE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORE THE MANDATE OF THE

HONORABLE SUPREME COURT'S RESOLUTION IN G.R. 85922, THAT
PETITIONS AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS PCOC AND PSSC
SHOULD BE TRIED BY THE COMMISSION (NLRC) THRU ITS
ARBITRATION BRANCH?

To determine whether the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion

correctable by certiorari, it is necessary to resolve one core issue:
whether the Supreme Court, in G.R. No. 85922, mandated that the
NLRC assume jurisdiction over the cases filed against PCOC and
PSSC.

The resolution of the case at bar hinges on the intended meaning of

the Third Division of the Court when it stated in its 15 March 1989
Resolution in G.R. No. 85922, viz:

x x x Any petitions brought against private companies will have to

be brought before the appropriate agency or office of the
Department of Labor and Employment.

Petitioner considers the foregoing statement as a legal mandate

warranting the remand of the consolidated labor cases to the
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC for further proceedings against
respondents PCOC and PSSC.
We do not agree.

A court decision must be read as a whole. With regard to

interpretation of judgments, Republic v. De Los Angeles stated:

As a general rule, judgments are to be construed like other written

instruments. The determinative factor is the intention of the court,
as gathered from all parts of the judgment itself. In applying this
rule, effect must be given to that which is unavoidably and
necessarily implied in a judgment, as well as to that which is
expressed in the most appropriate language. Such construction
should be given to a judgment as will give force and effect to every
word of it, if possible, and make it as a whole consistent, effective
and reasonable.17

Hence, a close scrutiny of the full text of the 23 January and 15

March 1989 Resolutions in G.R. No. 85922 sheds much needed
light. In the first Resolution, the Third Division of this Court
dismissed the petitioner's case in this wise:

The issue in this case is whether or not the National Labor Relations
Commission has jurisdiction over employee-employer problems in
the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), the
Philippine Casino Operators Corporation (PCOC), and the Philippine
Special Services Corporation (PSSC).

The present Constitution specifically provides in Article IX B, Section

2(1) that "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters." (Emphasis supplied) cralawlib rary

There appears to be no question from the petition and its annexes

that the respondent corporations were created by an original
charter, P.D. No. 1869 in relation to P.D. Nos. 1067-A, 1067-C,
1399 and 1632.

In the recent case of National Service Corporation, et al. v.

Honorable Third Division, National Labor Relations Commission, et
al. (G.R. No. 69870, November 29, 1988), this Court ruled that
subsidiary corporations owned by government corporations like the
Philippine National Bank but which have been organized under the
General Corporation Code are not governed by Civil Service Law.
They fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and
Employment and its various agencies. Conversely, it follows that
government corporations created under an original charter fall
under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission and not the
Labor Department.

Moreover, P.D. 1869, Section 18, specifically prohibits formation of

unions among casino employees and exempts them from the
coverage of Labor Code provisions. Under the new Constitution,
they may now form unions but subject to the laws passed to
regulate unions in offices and corporations governed by the Civil
Service Law.

CONSIDERING the failure of the petitioner to show grave abuse of

discretion on the part of the public respondent, the COURT
RESOLVED to DISMISS the petition.

Thus, in resolving the issue of whether or not the NLRC has

jurisdiction over employer-employee relations in PAGCOR, PCOC
and PSSC, the Third Division made the definitive ruling that "there
appears to be no question from the petition and its annexes that the
respondent corporations were created by an original charter." The
Court collectively referred to all respondent corporations, including
PCOC and PSSC, and held that in accordance with the Constitution
and jurisprudence, corporations with original charter "fall under the
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission and not the Labor
Department." The Court stated further that P.D. 1869 exempts
casino employees from the coverage of Labor Code provisions and
although the employees are empowered by the Constitution to form
unions, these are "subject to the laws passed to regulate unions in
offices and corporations governed by the Civil Service Law." Thus, in
dismissing the petition, the ruling of the Third Division was clear - -
- it is the Civil Service Commission, and not the NLRC, that has
jurisdiction over the employer-employee problems in PAGCOR,
PCOC and PSSC.
In its motion for reconsideration, petitioner lamented that its
complaint might be treated as a "pingpong ball" by the Department
of Labor and Employment and the Civil Service Commission. It
argued:

x x x the petitioner will now be in a dilemna (sic) for the reason,

that the charter creating PAGCOR expressly exempts it from the
coverage of the Civil Service Laws and therefore the petitioner, will
now be in a quandary whether it will be allowed to prosecute its
case against PAGCOR before the Civil Service Commission while its
own charter expressly exempts it from the coverage of the Civil
Service Law x x x18

The Third Division denied the motion for reconsideration in a

Resolution dated 15 March 1989, which contained the statement
upon which the petitioner's whole case relies. The Court stated:

The petitioner states in its motion for reconsideration that the

PAGCOR charter expressly exempts it from the coverage of the Civil
Service Laws and, consequently, even if it has an original charter,
its disputes with management should be brought to the Department
of Labor and Employment. This argument has no merit. Assuming
that there may be some exemptions from the coverage of Civil
Service Laws insofar as eligibility requirements and other rules
regarding entry into the service are concerned, a law or charter
cannot supersede a provision of the Constitution. The fear that the
petitioner's complaint will be rejected by the Civil Service
Commission is unfounded as the Commission must act in
accordance with its coverage as provided by the Constitution. Any
petitions brought against private companies will have to be
brought before the appropriate agency or office of the
Department of Labor and Employment.

CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, the COURT RESOLVED to DENY

the motion for reconsideration. This DENIAL is FINAL. (emphasis
added)

Petitioner contends that the "private companies" referred to therein

pertain to respondents PCOC and PSSC, and consequently, this
Court has laid down the law of the case in G.R. No. 85922 and has
directed that the cases against PCOC and PSSC should be
prosecuted before the Department of Labor and Employment or
NLRC.

Petitioner's contention is untenable. It is well-settled that to

determine the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific
portion thereof should be resorted to, but the same must be
considered in its entirety.19 Hence, petitioner cannot merely view a
portion of the 15 March 1989 Resolution in isolation for the purpose
of asserting its position. The 23 January 1989 Resolution already
ruled on the NLRC's lack of jurisdiction over all the respondents in
the case - PAGCOR, PCOC and PSSC. The Third Division neither
veered away nor reversed such ruling in its 15 March 1989
Resolution to petitioner's motion for reconsideration. A reading of
the two aforementioned resolutions clearly shows that the phrase
"private companies" could not have referred to PCOC and PSSC for
that would substantially alter the Court's ruling that petitioner's
labor cases against the respondents are cognizable by the Civil
Service Commission, and not by the NLRC. In its assailed decision,
the Court of Appeals ratiocinated:

Evidently, the [March 15] Resolution containing the questioned

pronouncement did not give legal mandate to petitioner to file its
Petition with the Department of Labor and Employment or any of its
agencies. On the contrary, the Resolution decided with finality that
petitions brought against the PAGCOR or similar
agencies/instrumentalities of the government must be filed with the
Civil Service Commission which has jurisdiction on the matter. The
questioned pronouncement, to Our mind, was made only to
illustrate the instance when jurisdiction is instead conferred on the
Department of Labor vis - à-vis the Civil Service Commission; that
is, when the petitions are filed [against] private companies.

Finally, as pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, the

subject matter of the pronouncement in question is "any petition"
not the petition filed by petitioners. Likewise, the petition must be
one which is brought against "private companies" not against
private respondents. Apparently, the abovequoted pronouncement
is intended to be a general rule that will govern petitions filed
against private companies. It is not intended to be a specific rule
that will apply only to the petition filed by herein petitioners. Where
the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish. A fortiori,
where the questioned pronouncement makes no distinctions, one
does not distinguish.

We agree with the CA. The statement that "(a)ny petitions brought
against private companies will have to be brought before the
appropriate agency or office of the Department of Labor and
Employment," upon which petitioner's entire case relies, is of no
consequence. It is obiter dictum.

In its memorandum,20 petitioner presents a second issue not

otherwise raised in its petition for certiorari, contending that
respondents waived their rights to controvert petitioner's valid and
just claims when they filed a motion to dismiss the consolidated
cases with the labor arbiter on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
However, in our 20 August 2003 Resolution requiring the parties to
submit their respective memoranda, we specifically stated that "no
new issues may be raised by a party in his/its Memorandum."
Moreover, petitioner, in support of this additional issue, presents its
arguments on the merits of the consolidated labor cases. This Court
is not a trier of facts. In Santiago v. Vasquez, we reiterated:

We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part

of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a
number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard
the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief
directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in
the lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent
jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought therein. This
practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon
the precious time of this Court but also because of the inevitable
and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of
the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower
court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better
equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts.
We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not
entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and
compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and
calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.21

In this case, the Civil Service Commission is the proper venue for
petitioner to ventilate its claims.

The Court is not oblivious to petitioner's plea for justice after waiting
numerous years for relief since it first filed its claims with the labor
arbiter in 1986. However, petitioner is not completely without fault.
The 23 January 1989 Resolution in G.R. No. 85922, declaring the
lack of jurisdiction by the NLRC over PAGCOR, PCOC and PSSC,
became final and executory on March 27, 1989. The petitioner did
not file a second motion for reconsideration nor did it file a motion
for clarification of any statement by the Court which petitioner
might have thought was ambiguous. Neither did petitioner take the
proper course of action, as laid down in G.R. No. 85922, to file its
claims before the Civil Service Commission. Instead, petitioner
pursued a protracted course of action based solely on its erroneous
understanding of a single sentence in the Court's resolution to a
motion for reconsideration.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition for certiorari is

DISMISSED. The assailed 22 June 1999 Decision and 6 December
1999 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 50826
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.