IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man & Cybernetics, 18(4), 532-541, 1988.

A Conceptual Framework for Person-Computer Interaction

in Distributed Systems
Brian R. Gaines
Knowledge Science Institute
University of Calgary
Alberta, Canada T2N 1N4

Abstract
This paper presents a conceptual framework for complex systems of computers and people.
Distinctions between technology and people, and between computers and non-programmed
technology, are analyzed. This analysis is used to show how various forms of analogy and
abstraction may be used to derive design principles for person-computer interaction. The analysis
is extended to include relations between system structure and behavior, and used to develop a
hierarchical model of the protocols in person-computer systems.

1 Introduction
The increasing capabilities of computing systems, and the increasing demands for powerful
command and control systems, are leading to the development of very complex computer-based
systems involving large-scale software development, a wide variety of human-computer
interfaces, and the integration of complex behavior in people and computers. It is difficult for
human factors models and guidelines to keep pace with the rapid evolution of such systems.
Design recommendations in the literature are largely empirical, based on practical experience
rather than deep models, and, although they have grown from some ten rules in the 1970s
(Hansen 1971) to over one thousand in the 1980s (Smith & Mosier 1986), they apply largely to
past system designs, and generalizations to new systems depend on the intuitions of the system
designer.
Empirical guidelines may be seen as a ‘bottom-up’ approach to system design, taking specific
experience and generalizing it to other cases. An alternative, ‘top-down’ approach is to analyze
the significant distinctions being made by a system designer and develop a conceptual
framework for the design of complex systems. The two approaches are complementary since the
conceptual framework can be used to guide the generalization of empirical results, and the
empirical results can be used to guide the selection of significant distinctions.
This paper develops a foundational conceptual framework for person-computer interaction in
complex systems by analyzing them in terms of some very basic distinctions from the systems
theory literature, and showing that these correspond to the distinctions made in established
design guidelines and previously proposed conceptual frameworks. It shows that these
distinctions are not only descriptive of significant system features, but also provide a prescriptive
basis for design decisions relating to these features.

2 Systemic Foundations for Complex Person-Computer Systems

In analyzing person-computer interaction it is important to establish what are the critical
characteristics of a person and what are those of a computer. How are they differentiated from
one another and from other forms of system? Habermas (1981) has emphasized the essential
differences between the dynamics of society and that of physical systems. The “laws” that
govern human behavior are largely conventions embedded in our society and propagated through
our culture (Schutz & Luckman 1973). They do not have the necessity of the laws underlying
physical systems and their analysis differs in many ways from those of physical systems (Ulrich
1983). Human beings create their future through acts of choice that are constrained by their
forward-looking intentions. Physical systems unroll their future through acts of necessity that are
determined by their previous states. From this point of view, in person-computer interaction we
are dealing with phenomena of the life-world which are essentially different from those of the
physical world and cannot be encompassed by causal models.
This perspective is radically different from a behaviorist psychological model of people which
sees them as conditioned through reinforcement into patterns of behavior that mimic the causal
dependencies of physical systems (Skinner 1974, Mackenzie 1977). Habermas’ point of view is
more akin to a constructivist model of people which sees them as anticipating the future through
the development of personal construct systems that are, however, always reconstructable (Kelly
1955). It is reasonable to suppose that people exhibit both these phenomena, and that any model
of personal-computer interaction should be able to encompass those aspects of human behavior
that are best modeled as causally based and those which are best modeled as anticipatorily based.
The computer component of the system seems straightforward because it has a physical, causal
basis. However, computers are programmed by people and hence their behavior also involves
human choice. Once they are operating the causal model is appropriate, but in considering
system design and person-computer relationships it is important to take the human component
into account. The users’ mental models may be influenced by their impressions of the designers’
intentions. The system designer may be seen as behaving through the computer to anticipate the
future behavior of users.
To encompass the possibilities discussed, a conceptual framework is required that can account
for these essential differences and similarities, differentiating people from technology and
computing from non-programmed physical systems. Popper’s (1968) 3 worlds theory can be
used to provide foundations for the distinctions underlying physical processes, human activities,
and information technologies. He bases his theory on Bolzano’s notion of “truths in themselves”
in contradistinction to “those thought processes by which a man may grasp truths”, proposing
that “thoughts in the sense of contents or statements in themselves and thoughts in the sense of
thought processes belong to two entirely different worlds” (Popper in Schilpp 1974), and making
the three-fold distinction: “If we call the world of things—of physical objects—the first world
and the world of subjective experience the second world we may call the world of statements in
themselves the third world (world 3).” These concepts capture the differences between physical
systems and people, and the role of abstraction in moving the distinctions into a third realm
regardless of source.
Figure 1 shows the existential hypotheses underlying Popper’s 3 worlds as a conceptual
framework based on very general distinctions made about distinctions. It introduces a ‘World 0’
of distinctions in their own right before Popper’s criteria are applied. This world is one where
distinctions are made without reference to any criteria except that they are useful. It captures the
notions of value and of the underlying anarchy that Feyerabend (1975) sees in the scientific
process. Gaines (1980) has argued that any distinction generates a system and hence that World 0
as defined here is that of general systems.

2
 Figure 1 Anarchy, abstraction, actuality, and agency as
basic distinctions among distinctions
• World 0 arises from the assertion that there exist distinctions
— this defines a world of systems
— a key concept is that of anarchy, that distinctions may be made freely
— the conceptual framework involved is that of axiology, that distinctions have value
— truth in this world is utilitarian, that distinctions made are useful
— inference is pragmatic, based on chains of reasoning that appear to work

3
• World 1 arises from the assertion that there exist physically necessary distinctions
— this defines a world of physical systems
— a key concept is that of actuality, that the distinctions made are actual
— the conceptual framework involved is that of epistemology, that the distinctions have to
be drawn from the actual world
— truth in this world is by correspondence, that the distinctions made correspond to the
properties of physical systems
— inference is causal, based on chains of physical cause and effect
• World 2 arises from the assertion that there exist humanly chosen distinctions
— this defines a world of mental systems
— a key concept is that of agency, that distinctions have a maker
— the conceptual frameworks involved are those of psychology and sociology, that
distinctions exist in the mental worlds of individuals and groups
— truth in this world is performative, that the distinctions chosen will be continue to be
chosen
— inference is conventionalist, based on accepted chains of reasoning that are chosen within
a culture
• World 3 arises from the assertion that there exist formal systems of distinctions
— this defines a world of coherent systems
— a key concept is that of abstraction, that systems of distinctions have their own existence
— the conceptual framework involved is that of ontology, that some distinctions are made
independent of any criteria other than intrinsic structure
— truth in this world is by coherence, that the systems of distinctions have an acceptable
intrinsic structure
— inference is structuralist, based on chains of reasoning that conform to the structure
Worlds 1, 2 and 3 may be seen as components of World 0 and also as particular instances of it.
Similarly Worlds 2 and 3 may be seen as instances of World 1. Conversely World 0 may be seen
as an abstraction from Worlds 1, 2 and 3, and World 3 may be seen as an abstraction from
Worlds 2 and 3. The conceptual framework of Figure 1 shows how the worlds relate through this
abstraction and instantiation. It also shows the analogy between worlds 1 and 2 when we
attribute agency to the causal dynamics of physical objects or necessity to the social conventions
of human activity.
Figure 2 extends the conceptual framework to show equipment as an instance of a physical
system, people as an instance of mental systems, and computers as an instance of both physical
and mental systems, inheriting properties through both paths. The peculiar property of electronic
digital computers is that they are the archetype of deterministic causal systems, modeled in their
behavior as finite-state automata whose next state and output are precisely determined by their
current states and inputs. However, they are also programmed devices where the transition tables
of the automaton are completely under the control of people—what computers do is what we
chose them to do. Hence, they are also the archetype of performative, conventional systems,
modeled in their behavior as the intentional artefacts of people, and whose next state and output
are in major part determined by open choices made in programming.

4
 Figure 2 Conceptual structures for person-computer interaction
in terms of basic distinctions
This dual nature of computing systems underlies many of the problems and controversies in
person-computer interaction. The computer is a technological system and it may be advisable to
present it to its users as such, avoiding animistic considerations. However, the behavior of the

5
computer is prescribed by people and this underlying prescription may also be evident to the
user. The value systems and inter-personal attitudes of the system designer and programmer may
have become embedded in the system behavior, making an animistic perspective unavoidable.
The performative truth and conventionalist inference aspect of computers is implicit in rules for
programming effective person-computer dialog. For example (Gaines & Shaw 1984), “The
system should be consistent in operation—the commands should always do the same thing
throughout—the information presentation should always mean the same thing throughout” and
“The system should be uniform in operation—the facilities which users have learned to use in
one part of the package should be available to them in other parts if they might reasonably expect
this”, are both example of performative truths allowing inference from reasonable conventions.
The analogies between computers, people and equipment shown in Figure 2 are particularly
interesting. If the conventions of the life-world become widely accepted in a culture then they
assume the same status as the necessary distinctions of the physical world and the behavior of
people within a culture may appear as completely causal. In informal terms, one may be just as
hurt attempting to break a moral convention as attempting to walk through a brick wall. In
person-computer interaction skilled operators may have highly practiced patterns of behavior
that may be modeled through causal dynamics. They are no longer making choices at the lower
levels of functioning. This is the basis for some negative “transfer of training” phenomena when
functioning developed for one system is carried over to another where it may result in
inappropriate choices. It should also be noted that all technology has some aspects of human
choice embodied in it so that the distinction between technology in general and information
technology shown in Figure 2 is not a hard boundary.
The computer is also shown in Figure 2 as an instance of a World 3 system, that is an abstract
entity defined in terms of its coherent structure. Category-theoretic models of software systems
exemplify the possibility for a high degree of abstraction while still capturing essential features
of computing systems (Goguen and Meseguer 1983) and analogies between them, and between
them and people (Gaines 1975). The abstract World 3 entity will generally lose some features of
both the World 1 physical dynamics that underlies its implementation and the World 2
psychological dynamics that underlies the choice of what to implement.

3 Analogy and Abstraction in Analyzing Person-Computer Systems

The bases for the analogies between computers and people and between computers and other
technical equipment show up clearly in Figure 2. The bases of the abstractions that treat both
computers and people as general systems are also apparent. Figure 3 illustrates how these
analogies and abstractions give rise to a variety of conceptual frameworks for the study of
person-computer interaction which have been previously noted as major sources of information
about, and insight into, the analysis and design of person-computer systems (Gaines & Shaw
1986).

6
 Systems

System—System
Interaction

Equipment Computer—Equipment Computers Person—Computer

People
Interaction Interaction

Computer—Computer
Interaction Person—Person
Interaction
Person—Equipment
Interaction

Figure 3 Abstraction and analogies in the analysis of person-computer interaction

3.1 System-System Interaction
At the abstract level of system-system interaction there are many system-theoretic principles that
are instantiated in the situation where one system is a person and the other a computer. Wiener
(1948) emphasized this in his development of cybernetics as the study of “communication and
control in men and machines”, and many principles of communication theory and control theory
apply directly to person-computer interaction. For example, the dialog rule that “all actions are
initiated and controlled by the user” (Cheriton 1976) derives from a stability-theoretic result in
control theory, that two coupled systems with similar time constants may oscillate unstably
around their intended equilibrium state: the person modeling a computer and adapting to it while
the computer is modeling the person and adapting to him is a potential source of mutual
instability. General systemic principles at the abstraction level interact with more specific
considerations at the instantiation level. For example, the dialog rule “avoid acausality” (Gaines
1981) has a system-theoretic foundation in that causal modeling systems generate meaningless
models of systems with even slight acausalities. However, to apply this principle we have to
know that people are causal modelers (Gaines 1976), and we would not regard the rule as
significant unless we knew that time-sharing systems generate apparently random delay
distributions.
3.2 Computer-Equipment Interaction
The analogy from people to physical systems enables person-computer interaction to be seen to
be analogous to interfacing a computer to another system such as a piece of equipment. The
design principles applicable to computer-equipment interfaces are well known and carry over to
person-computer dialog. Problems arise because the system to which the computer is to be
interfaced already exists and is not another programmable computer. We may take it as it is and
design an interface that copes with its peculiarities. The dialog rule “use the user’s model”

7
(Gaines 1981) derives from this, that the dialog engineer should identify the existing interface
and attempt to emulate it rather than change it. Problems also commonly arise through noise at
the interface and the designer attempts both to provide a low-noise channel and to provide error-
detection and correction for unavoidable noise. In person-computer interaction such noise may
arise through lack of clarity in information presentation giving rise to perceptual errors in one
direction, mis-keying giving rise to errors in the other direction, and so on. The dialog rules
“detect user difficulties and assist him in returning to correct dialog” (Cheriton 1976) and
“validate data on entry” (Gaines 1981) are principles of communication over a noisy channel.
3.3 Computer-Computer Interaction
The analogy from people to computers enables person-computer interaction to be seen to be
analogous to computer-computer interaction. It is then possible to define protocols that any
programmable system may be reasonably expected to be able to implement. The Open System
Interconnection (OSI) ISO standard (Day & Zimmerman 1983) is particularly interesting
because it hierarchically structures computer-computer protocols for networks in a way that may
have relevance for person-computer protocols. The concept of an open system is itself relevant
because it expresses objectives for computer networks that are equally applicable to people using
those networks. The aim is to allow integrated systems to be formed from multiple components
not all from one vendor and not all installed at the same time. The OSI concept is that the
network is open to all systems that conform in their communications with certain well-defined
protocols. In human terms the protocols may be seen as social norms for the behavior of
members of a club; anyone may join provided they agree to conform to these norms. Taylor has
applied such protocol concepts to the analysis of person-computer dialog as a hierarchical
communications system (Taylor 1987).
3.4 Person-Equipment Interaction
The analogy from computers to physical systems enables person-computer interaction to be seen
to be analogous to the classic case of man-machine interaction. Consideration of people
interacting with equipment has been treated as a branch of applied psychology termed
ergonomics that arose, under the same pressures as computer technology, out of World War II
studies of pilots, gunners and so on. There is a wide range of results on general problems of
human skills, training, its transfer between different learning situations, the effects of fatigue,
and so on, that is applicable to person-computer interaction. While interactive computers were
used primarily as programming and data entry systems these effects were not major
considerations. However, as computer-based interfaces became increasingly the norm for a wide
variety of human activities the classic results of applied psychology and ergonomics have
become increasingly important. The novelty of the computer should not blind us to commonality
with much earlier equipment.
3.5 Person-Person Interaction
The analogy from computers to people, enables person-computer interaction to be seen to be
analogous to person-person interaction, that is normal linguistic interaction from which the terms
human-computer “conversation” and “dialog” in computing terminology have been generalized.
Modern linguistic theory (Bennett 1976) has become increasingly concerned with the interaction
between participants in a dialog, rather than a view of linguistic output as a predefined stream to
be decoded. This provides a rich source of models for person-computer interaction, particularly
8
as artificial intelligence techniques take us closer to emulating people and their language
behavior. There are also useful analogies of casual users in transactional analysis of the behavior
of strangers meeting (Berne 1974). Taylor notes that many of the principles of language such as
scoping and pronomial reference are general principles of communication that occur in gestural
graphic dialog with computers that involves no textual interaction (Taylor 1987).

4 System Origins and Activity

The principles underlying Figure 3 provide systemic foundations for the forms of reasoning by
analogy and abstraction that are commonly used in the analysis and design of person-computer
systems. To develop these concepts more formally and provide a framework for the overall
dynamics of person-computer interaction, we need to introduce a further distinction, that
between the activity and the origins of a system, between its behavior and its structure. In
abstract terms the behavior of a system provides a description of what the system does, and the
structure of a system provides a description of what the system is.
One of the most important problems of system theory is the analysis of the relations between
behavior and structure—in one direction, given the structure of a system, to derive its
behavior—in the other direction, given the behavior of a system, to derive its structure. In the
study of physical systems, mathematical techniques have been developed for moving in both
directions with causal models (Gaines 1977, Klir 1985), that is interrelating the necessities of
World 1 behavior and structure. However, as already noted, integrated computing systems
involve the choice behavior of people and hence show phenomena of the life-world which are
essentially different from those of the physical world and cannot be encompassed by causal
models.
The dynamics of human behavior are best modelled as those of an anticipatory system (Rosen
1985), enhancing its survival by modeling the world, both passively and actively, in order to
better anticipate the future. This corresponds to the choice component of World 2 phenomena,
that agents are not bound by rigid necessity but can plan and chose certain aspects of their
behavior. Figure 4 shows an analysis of the relations between a system, its origins and its
activities, when the actuality—agency distinction of Figure 1 is also taken into account. The
origins of a system have two components: its causal structure relating to how it was created; and
its anticipatory structure relating to why it was created. The activities of a system also have two
components: its causal behavior relating to how it carries out its activity; and its anticipatory
behavior relating to why it carries out its activity.
The basic distinctions of actuality—agency and structure—behavior are sufficient to define the
virtual machine hierarchy fundamental to computing, and to account for its technical and human
components and their relations. Figure 5 fills in Figure 4 to show how the levels of virtual
machine arise from the basic distinctions. The origins of any computer-based service are that a
virtual machine, a computing system, has been programmed by agents, the implementors, to
create an actuality, the implementation. This results in a second virtual machine, the programmed
computing system. The activities of the computer-based service are that a virtual machine, a
programmed computing system, is being operated by agents, the operators, to create an actuality,
the operations. This results in a third virtual machine, the service itself.

9
 Actuality Agency

System
origins

Causal Anticipatory
structure How created? Why created? structure

Structure
What is it?
System
What does it do? Behavior

Causal Anticipatory
behavior How activity? Why activity? behavior

System
activity

Figure 4 System origins and activity in terms of actuality and agency

10
 Actuality Agency

Virtual
machine
Computer

Implementation Implementors

Elegance Understandability

Virtual Structure
What is it?
machine
What does it do? Programmed Behavior
computer

Functionality Usability

Operations Operators

Virtual
machine
Service

Figure 5 Virtual machines in terms of system origins and activity

The relations between the central virtual machine and its structural and behavioral components
represent fundamental concepts in system implementation and operation (Edwards and Mason
1987):

11
• elegance considerations, capturing the notion of efficiency in design, concern the relation
between the system virtual machine and the underlying resource with which it is
implemented—this is another virtual machine capturing the characteristics of the high-level
language, operating system, and so on, used in implementation;
• understandability considerations, capturing the notion of comprehensibility in design,
concern the relation between the system virtual machine and the implementors responsible
for creating it;
• functionality considerations, capturing the notion of capabilities provided, concern the
relation between the system virtual machine and the tasks for which it is being implemented.
• usability considerations, capturing the notion of capabilities suitably interfaced, concern the
relation between the system virtual machine and the operators who use it.
The logic underlying Figures 4 and 5 may be iterated to interpolate as much detail as required
between the upper and lower levels—what is “activity” at one level becomes “structure” for the
lower level. Figure 6 shows an analysis of the key features of a computer system in terms of six
layers:-
• At the top level the overall computer system originates in terms of purpose and structure as
part of the culture within which it embedded. This cultural layer captures the milieu within
which the system has been generated and can itself be subject to detailed analysis.
• At the next level the activities generated through this structure and purpose lead to a system
of intentionality in which anticipatory activity leads to the acquisition of knowledge, or
models of the world, and the generation of goals. This intentionality layer captures the
anticipatory nature of an intelligent system in supporting its survival through prediction and
action.
• At the next level the activities generated through anticipation lead to actions and
communications—a linguistic distinction between activities directed to World 1 effects and
World 2 effects, respectively. This knowledge layer captures the internal processes
supporting the modeling and control activities of an anticipatory system.
• At the next level the activities generated through action and communication have to be
transmitted to some external medium. This action layer captures the internal processes
supporting the interfacing of an anticipatory system to the world.
• At the next level the activities generated through transmission have to be expressed in such a
way as to have the desired effect in the world. This expression layer captures the internal
processes supporting the encoding of actions and communications.
• At the lowest level the activities generated through expression exist physically in the external
world. This physical layer captures the external effects of the activities of an anticipatory
system.
It is interesting to relate the iterated levels of Figure 6 back to the terminology of Figure 5. First,
consider Figure 6 as a conceptual framework for a person. Systemically, the culture is the
‘implementor’ of the person, taking the genetic ‘virtual machine’ and socializing it to have
intentions and knowledge that conform with the purpose of a particular society. The intentions of
the person are carried out by the formation of anticipatory systems that acquire knowledge and
generate goals. These in turn implement goal-directed actors or communicators, which
themselves implement processes to transmit the activities of the actors to the world, ultimately as
sequences of acts that are directly expressed in the physical world. Second, consider Figure 6 as

12
a conceptual framework for a computer system, an intelligent integrated system. The diagram
from bottom up represents the evolution of computer technology, from the physical device
technology to carry out acts, through the programmed control of action, through the knowledge-
based derivation of action in fifth-generation systems, through the goal-creating activities of
intentionally-specified systems in future-generation computing, to the origins of information
technology in our culture at the top level.

System
Origins
Cultural
layer

System System
Structure Purpose

Intentionality
Intentionality
layer

Anticipations Anticipators
Acquire
Models, knowledge,
Goals Generate
goals

Knowledge
Knowledge
layer

Action, Actor,
Communication Communicator

Action
Action
layer

Transmission Transmitter

Expression
Expression
layer

Modalities Acts

System Physical
Activities
layer

Figure 6 The hierarchy of layers in a computing system

13
Figure 7 extends Figure 6 to multiple systems showing the virtual circuits in, and between, two
people communicating through a computer system. What is particularly interesting about this
diagram is that the same distinctions, terminology and model are being applied to the people,
their interactions with each other, their interface to the information technology, and its interface
to other information technology. The same systems principles apply to the psychology,
sociology, human-computer interaction, and computer-computer interaction because computing
systems have the dual identity shown in Figure 2. They are both technological and humanistic
systems and it is human component, the choice available in programming, that determines their
roles and behavior in interacting with people.
People Computing Computing People
System System
Cultural
Virtual Virtual Virtual
layer
circuit circuit circuit

Intentionality Intentionality Intentionality Intentionality

Intentionality
layer

Knowledge Knowledge Knowledge Knowledge

Knowledge
layer

Action Action Action Action

Action
layer

Expression Expression Expression Expression

Expression
layer

Physical
layer
Figure 7 Virtual circuits between layers in computing systems

14
5 From Description to Prescription
The conceptual framework for person-computer interaction developed above is a descriptive
knowledge structure showing what distinctions a system designer might be expected to make and
how these derive from fundamental systemic principles. However, critical distinctions are the
basis of the major prescriptive design rules that the designer has to keep in mind when making
significant decisions. If the distinction is important to the design then it must be maintained or
obviated and this requires two activities, each of which leads to design criteria which may be in
opposition. First, the distinction may be considered to be significant to maintain and this leads to
design considerations based on its maximizing its importance. Second, the distinction may be
considered exaggerated and this leads to design considerations based on minimizing its
importance. This possibility for opposition is what can lead to contradictory guidelines which are
both significant to take into account (Maguire 1982).
For example, maintaining or the distinctions between layers in Figures 5 and 6 may lead to
opposing design considerations. One group of designers may wish to maintain the importance of
the intentionality layer and note that the intentions of the human participants in using the system
are important. The users do not see themselves as interacting with interesting technology but as
carrying out an organizational function. The sales manager does not see himself as interacting
with a complex administrative and productive system, but rather as communicating directly with
a customer organization by supplying it with goods. The chief executive does not see himself as
concerned with that level of communication but rather as communicating directly with the board
and shareholders through a flow of profits and dividends. The system must be designed around
the perspectives of its users in terms of their intentions. However, another group of designers
may wish to obviate this distinction and be concerned with users only in terms of their actions
noting, perhaps, that in their situation the intentions of users are variable and not available to the
system. It would be confusing for the system to make assumptions about, or attempt to infer, the
user’s intentions. It should be designed around the perspectives of users in terms of their actions.
Thus conceptual structures are not only descriptive, providing a vocabulary and semantic
relationships for talking about interface design. They are also prescriptive in identifying the
critical dimensions along which design decisions must be analyzed. At an abstract level a
conceptual structure is arbitrary like the grid lines on a map serving a useful structure in dividing
up a territory so that different parts of it may be discussed. However, the concrete conceptual
structure of an expert is not arbitrary but more like the contour lines of map in following natural
phenomena and significant boundaries. The distinctions made are significant in that they indicate
differences where decisions are most likely to be relevant to the problems encountered.

6 Conclusions
Complex interactive systems are being built and, despite many problems, they will be made to
work because they are needed to deal with some of the very complex activities necessary to our
society. Conventional empirical studies of person-computer interaction based on single users
operating at standard workstations do not, and cannot, give adequate foundations for the design
and analysis of such systems. We have to go back to the basic distinctions between people,
computing and person-computer interaction and develop conceptual structures that can
encompass the problems and design considerations of complex interactive systems. The analysis
developed in this paper is the first step towards a conceptual framework within which to analyze
the structure and operation of the next generation of interactive systems.
15
Acknowledgements
Financial assistance for the studies on which it is based has been made available by the Natural
Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada. I am grateful to the anonymous referees
for detailed critical comments which have greatly improved the paper.

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