Journal for the History of

Reshef Agam-Segal
Analytical Philosophy Reflecting on Language from “Sideways-on”: Preparatory and
Volume 1, Number 6 Non-Preparatory Aspects-Seeing

Aspect-seeing, I claim, involves reflection on language. It involves

Editor in Chief letting oneself feel what it would be like to capture something with a
Mark Textor, King’s College London certain concept—conceptualize it—all the while remaining uncom-
mitted to this conceptualization. I distinguish between two kinds of
aspect-perception:
Editorial Board 1) Preparatory aspect-perception: allows us to develop, criti-
Juliet Floyd, Boston University cize, and shape concepts. It typically involves bringing a concept to
Greg Frost-Arnold, Hobart and William Smith Colleges an object for the purpose of examining what would be the best way
Ryan Hickerson, University of Western Oregon to conceptualize it.
Henry Jackman, York University 2) Non-Preparatory aspect-perception: allows us to express the
Sandra Lapointe, McMaster University ingraspability of certain experiences. It typically involves bringing a
Chris Pincock, Ohio State University concept to an object for the purpose of showing—per impossible—
Richard Zach, University of Calgary what it would take to properly capture one’s experience.
I demonstrate the usefulness of the two kinds of aspect percep-
tion in making conceptual judgments, as well as in making moral
Production Editor and aesthetic judgments.
Ryan Hickerson

Editorial Assistant
Daniel Harris

Design
Douglas Patterson

c 2012 Reshef Agam-Segal

Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy vol. 1 no. 6 [0]

 ment: make sense of the object in front of us in practice. In this
sense, until we decide what to call it and how to treat it, we are not
firmly grasping what is in front of us.
Reflecting on Language from Or take another example. A musical theme leaves a certain aes-
thetic impression on us. We want to use the word ‘pensive’ to de-
“Sideways-on”: Preparatory and scribe the theme. But here, of course, ‘pensive’ would not be used
Non-Preparatory Aspects-Seeing1 as it normally is; the musical theme is not a living creature and does
not have a mind. Here again, we are trying to grasp an experience
by means of language, and the experience does not give itself easily.
Reshef Agam-Segal We need to get imaginative.
In this paper, I would like to discuss, compare, and contrast sev-
eral ways in which we reflect on language and on our ways of mak-
We have the power to shape our own language. We do that when we ing sense of things. That reflection about concepts is even possible
feel we lack the resources with which to make sense of things, or may seem surprising: Concepts make deliberation and reasoning
when we feel that the concepts we have do a bad job. We may, for possible in the first place; they give us the language—the norms—
example, have difficulty deciding whether to call something “baby” with which to think. But when our difficulty is indeed conceptual,
or “embryo.” Partly, our difficulty is conceptual. To that extent, it is we cannot assume that our language is safe to use, that the concepts
not that we do not have enough facts; what we lack is more basic. we use in deliberation are the right ones. How is it possible to ask
The two terms, ‘baby’ and ‘embryo,’ bring with them two different questions about language, then, when we cannot even feel safe using
sets of norms, two conceptual nexuses—two distinct and possibly language to ask those questions?
incompatible ways of making sense of, capturing in thought, that Part of the answer is that conceptual difficulties tend to be local.
thing in the woman’s womb: Thinking about it as an embryo will In reflecting about a concept, we can usually rely on other concepts
reflect interest in things like brain- and lung-activity; thinking about that we are safe using. But this is only part of the answer. An-
it as a baby is, for instance, thinking about its name, of holding it other part, which will be my focus here, is our ability to perceive
when it cries, of talking to it, and making eye contact. We can, of aspects, the phenomena at the center of Wittgenstein’s discussion in
course, just decide; but we would like to have a reason with which §xi of the second part of Philosophical Investigations [Wittgenstein,
to justify our decision. What we lack in some cases, then, is con- 1958]. Aspect-perception, I will claim, allows us to reflect on our
ceptual clarity that could help guide the way we treat something—a ways of capturing the world in thought and practice: to conceptual-
clear set of concepts with which to make sense of it.2 We need ize. It can thus be used to justify conceptual judgments. In turn, this
to conceptualize—not only (or even mainly) to find the right words, may allow us to make certain moral and aesthetic judgments.
but more generally to place an object in a particular network of prac- The discussion of aspects stands at the crossroad of several
tices and interests: to give it a logical function. In terms borrowed philosophical issues: the nature of psychological concepts and of
from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, we need to see a symbol in the sign imagery, the character and uses of the imagination in perception and
[Wittgenstein, 1922]. And we do not just need the ability to make a elsewhere, the status of metaphors, and the nature of mathematical
conceptual judgment, but primarily the ability to exercise that judg-
discoveries. What binds those issues together, I believe, is that they tual level, between the abstract intellectual discovery and the palpa-
either involve difficulties of conceptualization, as in the discussion ble experience. The experience, we may say, is the medium for the
of psychological concepts, or involve a question about the very idea conceptual discovery.
of conceptualization, as in the discussion about metaphors and the There are many differences between cases of aspect-seeing, and
imagination. I do not propose to connect the phenomena of aspect- the discussion of the differences will be central to my discussion be-
seeing to any of those other philosophical issues here; this is a task low. Let me begin, however, in §1, with a general characterization
for other occasions. I will instead concentrate on the general issue: of aspect-seeing. In §§2-3 I discuss two types of aspect-seeing—
on how aspect-perception allows us to reflect on language or, more preparatory, and non-preparatory—and make some sub-distinctions.
generally, reflect on the ways we make sense of things—capture the
world in thought and practice.
We might not expect aspect-experiences to be reflective. They §1.
are typically experiences in which an object changes right before
one’s eyes without changing perceptually. Take Robert Jastrow’s a.
duck-rabbit, , for example. This may appear, at first, to be a
simple rabbit-picture, when it all of a sudden assumes a different When an aspect dawns, we experience a possible meaningful life of
appearance and is now a duck-picture. We can now see it both an object—or word, or picture, and so on. We may look at an object
ways. This is an aspect-experience. When such a thing dawns on us, and have a sense, for instance, that it is some kind of instrument, but
the object is seen—not merely interpreted but literally experienced, not have an idea what instrument, or see an agitated animal, sens-
perceived—in a different way. Nevertheless, such experiences are ing that something is going on inside it without having a word for
reflective: the duck-rabbit aspect-shift does not take place within a it.3 We may be “looking,” as Wittgenstein says, “without know-
given conceptual map, so to speak, but involves a reorientation of ing what [we are] looking for” [Wittgenstein, 1980, §60]. In such
the map. Questions like “where would its wings be?” will or will cases, the experience is of the meaning as waiting for us to discover
not make sense relative to how you see . it, not being quite able to put our finger on it. Often, however, in
Aspect-experiences thus involve a special kind of reflection. aspect-experiences, there is a particular concept that makes contact
They are not just cognitive or conceptual experiences, but embodi- with the object and lets us experience a particular meaningful life
ments of conceptual reflections in palpable experience—an experi- of the object.4 In Tractarian terms, it lets us see a symbol in the
ence that is an “echo of a thought” [Wittgenstein, 1958, 212]. The sign: it lets us experience what it would be like to conceptualize it
experience of an aspect—this is the other side of the coin—is a spe- in a particular way; and by ‘conceptualize’ I do not mean to attach
cial kind of experience: it has to be described in terms of an in- a certain term to it, but to place it in a logical network of practices
tellectual reflection. As Wittgenstein puts this: “an interpretation and interests by assigning it a logical function. When we have such
becomes an expression of experience. And the interpretation is not an aspect-experience it is an essential part of the experience that we
an indirect description; no, it is the primary expression of the expe- see how the concept can be detached from the object: We are not
rience” [Wittgenstein, 1980, §20]. In the case of aspect-perception, exercising—practicing—a committed judgment that this is the right
then, there is no distinction between the conceptual and the percep- concept for the object. We see the duck-aspect of , for instance;
we see that the image can be connected with the concept duck—

Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy vol. 1 no. 6 [2]

with this particular body of norms. And yet, in this experience, the and seeing an aspect. This means that seeing an aspect is differ-
concept duck is making a tentative, uncommitted, contact with ; ent, for example, from recognizing, identifying, and realizing some-
it will only stay connected as long as we hold the connection, and thing: all three involve bringing a concept to an object in a way
we can decide to connect it with another concept: rabbit. Or again, that does not imply that the concept is only tentatively attached to
suppose we look in the mirror, and suddenly see our father in our the object. To recognize, identify, or realize something is rather to
own reflection. His identity makes contact with our image, but the judge how the object should be conceptualized.7 To recognize the
connection is not decided: we are certainly not thereby committed symptoms of Malaria, for instance, is to judge that one is exam-
to identifying ourselves with him. ining a person sick with Malaria. Aspect-perception, on the other
Aspect-perception involves a special form of concept- hand, may only involve entertaining (not abstractly-intellectually,
application. Take the duck-rabbit again. As opposed to seeing a but in experience! I discuss this further in §1c) the possibility of
duck-aspect, to hold that something is a duck-picture is not merely conceptualizing the object in a certain way, but without exercising a
to see that, and how, it can be conceptualized as a duck-picture; it is commitment to this conceptualization.8
rather to actually conceptualize it, treat it, as such. This would nor-
mally involve using it in typical ways: teaching a child how ducks
look, using it in a sign that indicates that the duck hunting season is b.
open, and so on. We may say that in such cases we bring the con-
cept to an object—a picture in a picture book, a sign—but not in In both seeing an aspect and in exercising a commitment to a con-
such a way as to make the concept seem detachable. In such appli- ceptualization, we may be capturing the object by utilizing the very
cations, we exercise—put to use—a conceptualization, and thereby same concept. I suggest that we characterize the difference in the
give the object a de facto place and sense in our life. following way: In the two cases the object is seen from two dif-
My claim is that none of that is involved in aspect-perception. ferent standpoints. When exercising a committed conceptual judg-
In aspect-perception, when we see the duck-aspect of for in- ment, we are looking at the object “from within” our practices, that
stance, we are not actually putting the concept to work in the sense is, we are engaged with the norms for its usage. The cogwheels of
just described—we are not using the object in a way that is guided our mind are, as it were, turned by the mechanism of those norms—
by the norms internal to the concept.5 We are, however, reflecting animated by them—in some use of the object. For example, when
on doing that. We are, for instance, experiencing the need for a we use a fork during dinner, we—unreflectively, habitually—let the
concept, or experiencing how a particular concept may let us make judgment that this is a fork guide, “animate,” what we do with the
sense of an object: what it would be like, for instance, to use it as fork. On the other hand, when seeing an aspect we are looking
we typically use duck-pictures, or how the word ‘pensive’ allows at something “from sideways-on”:9 we suspend judgment. We may
us to express our experience of a musical theme.6 We may say, I experience the need for some norms for its usage, or we may (some-
suggest, that the application of a concept in aspect-perception is an times willfully and sometimes irresistibly) entertain some particular
application whose very essence is that it is reflective: referring to norms for its usage, think of it under some concept, but in a disen-
other applications of that same concept. gaged, reflective manner—a manner that does not involve a use of
There is a difference, then, between habitually using a concept the object according to those norms, but rather only an experience
of what it would be like to use it in some such way.

Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy vol. 1 no. 6 [3]

c. by something, as in the duck-rabbit case when the duck aspect
dawns. But we do not always experience aspects with our senses.
What indicates that we are indeed looking at things “from sideways- Imagine, for instance, sitting at a dinner table with your family and
on” in aspect-perception is that it involves an exceptional form of being suddenly struck by the familiarity of the event. This is an as-
reflection: palpable, experiential, rather than purely cognitive and pect experience, but we do not have a sense organ for it.11 Qualita-
abstract. The expression “see something differently” often just de- tively, some aspect-experiences feel somewhat like the way in which
notes a difference or change of opinion, and not an actual, visual, an emotion grasps you, floods you. What is important for my pur-
experience, as it literally suggests. In aspect-perception an actual, poses, in any case, is first that aspect-experiences are experiences,
palpable experience is involved. In such cases, we are not reasoning and second, that these experiences can only be described by refer-
by examining the logical implications of propositions. Rather, we ence to our interest in capturing the world in thought and practice—
consider conceptual alternatives (sometimes willfully, sometimes ir- the interest we have in having conceptual clarity that would help
resistibly) by having the reality of the relevant object—or picture, or guide the ways we treat things, like the language with which we
text, or whatever—leave a palpable, possibly perceptual, impression make sense of them in particular networks of practices and inter-
on us. Aspect-experiences are reflections on concepts, embodied in ests.
experience. So, for instance, when we see the duck-rabbit, or hear a musi-
Aspect-experiences are unlike other experiences we have—of cal phrase as answering another, or when we suddenly feel as if we
the shoes we wear, the word ‘salt’ when someone asks for the salt, disappear in a crowd of people, our experience has to be described
the pen we write with, the stop sign on the way to work. Un- in terms of those concepts: duck, answer, disappearance. “It is as
like aspect-experiences, these experiences normally do not involve if a germ of meaning were experienced, and then got interpreted”
a kind of stepping back from our routine ways of making sense of [Wittgenstein, 1980, §94].12 Once again, in the case of aspect-
things, and reflecting on those ways. Such experiences are a form perception, there is no distinction between the experience and the
of routine employment of concepts—themselves a sort of exercise abstract thought. The experience is the medium of the thought;
of conceptual judgments. 10 the thought is the content of the experience. In general, aspect-
To say that aspect-experience does not involve such exercise experiences are experiences of meaning.
of concepts is not to say that the experience is unmediated con-
ceptually, or that aspect-experience is an experience of some non-
d.
conceptual content. On the contrary, aspect-experiences are medi-
ated by concepts, but in a special way: The conceptual mediation is When seeing an aspect in something—in that short moment13 —the
not that of an exercised conceptual commitment. Rather, sometimes meaningful life of an object is in view, and yet we do not (yet) take
when experiencing an aspect the experience is mediated by a con- part in it. We may talk here of looking at something from a distance,
cept that tentatively makes contact with the object; at other times, perhaps even sub specie aeternitatis: from the point of view of eter-
the experience is mediated by the lack of some concept that would nity; seeing it, but so to speak, without coming into full practical
enable us to capture the object in thought. contact with it—bringing the concept to it, for instance, but not yet
The experience is different in different cases of aspect- putting it to work or practicing the norms for the application of this
perception. Some aspect-experiences involve being visually struck concept.14

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 Examining something from such a disengaged, uncommitted that we can endorse—can practice habitually, routinely—the aspect-
standpoint does not mean, however, that we are disengaged from experience is preparatory.
our humanity and interests—from what Stanley Cavell called our
“whirl of organism” [Cavell, 1969, 52]. On the contrary, the point b.
of occupying or taking that standpoint is to give expression to our
natural human interest in making sense of things, in capturing them Our ability to experience aspects in a preparatory way can be of
in thought. It is out of concern for the norms we are disengaged help to us in our attempt to overcome conceptual ambiguities. It
from that we adopt that reflective standpoint, and it may express the may be of such help, for instance, in cases where competing ways
wish to re-engage them. It is itself an expression of humanity.15 of seeing the matter—experiencing and conceptualizing it—strike
us as equally attractive. Here are some examples: Is it a heap or
just a bunch of grains? Is the Mona Lisa content, or is it her embar-
§2. rassed face? Was the death of that woman murder, or was it mercy
killing? Is this action legal, or is its flagrant and brutal injustice
a. enough to make it illegal? Should this be called marriage, or can
marriage only really exist between one man and one woman?17 –
Seeing an aspect, I argue, does not involve an exercised conceptual To the extent that these uncertainties are conceptual, I suggest we
commitment. Still, it involves a kind of awareness—a capturing in can make some progress towards their resolution with the help of
thought—of an object (or picture or text); and if this is right, then aspect-perception.
aspect-perception can be preparatory. That is, we may use the fact Before I explain how (in §2e), I will need to clarify the prob-
that we can see a certain aspect as grounds for so conceptualizing lem a bit more (in §2c-d). But even before that, let me acknowledge
the matter in practice.16 For example, seeing similarity between two that there are many differences between the cases. In different cases
faces may serve as a reason, justification, for using a picture of the the conceptual uncertainty has different origins. Sometimes, as in
one to identify the other. Or seeing the duck in may serve as the heap-grains case, there is a continuum, and no clear cutoff point
reason for putting it in a picture book to represent ducks. suggests itself. In the duck-rabbit case, there is no such continuum.
When we see an aspect in a preparatory way, then, we are Also, in some cases the decision may be more urgent than in others.
looking at something and are experiencing the need—possibly a In some cases where we can conceptualize in different ways there is
particular way—to connect (possibly reconnect) into life with it. also a question for us about the right conceptualization. I take it that
Metaphorically, we can describe this as standing at the sidelines of there may not be such a question, for instance, with the duck-rabbit.
the language-game—just outside our practical life with the object, But the decision is more urgent in the moral cases, for instance, than
or moving outside—but all the while facing inside, or backwards: in the heap-grain case or the Mona Lisa case. Also, some aspect-
towards our normative life with it, and with a view to return and experiences are the result of the aspect dawning on us—we are being
re-engage this life. The mark of a preparatory aspect-experience struck by an aspect. Only in some cases—like the duck-rabbit—we
is, then, that it intimates a sense that it should at least be possible can learn to see the object in more than one way, and willfully switch
to come into routine practical-normative life with the object. If, between aspects. Relatedly, in some cases there is more room for
for instance, the aspect we experience indicates a conceptualization remaining conceptually uncommitted than in others: Sometimes, as

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in the duck-rabbit case, we can freely move between conceptual- sense of, quantities in a particular way. For example, it allows us
izations. In other cases, concepts force themselves on us, so that to capture in a particular way the fact that yesterday I drank more
we cannot help conceptualizing the object in a certain way. This is cups of coffee than today, or that all weeks have the same number
the way in which slaughter-house images may ruin our dinner: they of days in them. We do not have to have number concepts to cap-
make what we have on our plate not seem like food anymore.18 ture these facts, but having them allows us to capture those facts in
Despite the differences between the cases, our interest in all is particularly useful ways: it allows us to ask how many more cups of
similar: we are entangled in the conceptualization of something— coffee I drank yesterday, and how many days there are in a week. It
attempting to capture it in thought and practice. Our ability to make is internal to understanding a concept that we understand the point
moral and aesthetic judgments in some of those cases depends on of having it—of capturing things in thought in that particular way.
our ability to settle that—to decide what language is appropriate, For example, to have the concept number is to see the point of being
and in which semantic field we should make the judgment. But even interested in quantities in a particular way. A concept that does not
in cases where we do not have an immediate interest in making such have functionality, a concept with which nothing can be captured,
judgments (e.g. the duck-rabbit), reflecting on the meaningfulness is not a concept. With regard to those internal things, therefore, it
of things is most natural to us: it is a basic human mode of inter- makes no sense to talk of having a concept without being able to
action with things. Preparatory aspect-perception, I am claiming, is do them (e.g. to have number concepts without being able to make
one of the forms that this interaction may take. sense of quantities). In this sense, concepts and what we (need to)
do with them are not given independently. My point about our diffi-
c. culty with the kind of conceptual uncertainties I described and what
we need in order to overcome those uncertainties pertains to the
To overcome conceptual uncertainties of the kind I described, we things that concepts allow us to do that are internal to having them.
need to acquire capacities that are internal to, definitive of, having
concepts: generally, the capacity to make sense of things and own
d.
them in thought. Let me clarify.
There are things that having a concept allows us to do which Aspect-perception, I claim, allows us to reflect on how to make
are external to having the concept. We may thus choose certain sense of things. My claim is that we can use the fact that we can
concepts and not others because the former fulfill some needs that see something in a particular way in deciding how to conceptual-
the latter do not. Having number concepts, for instance, allows us, ize the matter, and that often we do. I also believe that we should
among other things, to build stable bridges. This involves an idea do this, for otherwise, we may end up with ways of conceptualiz-
about the usefulness of concepts that only makes sense regarding ing that are unnatural, and that do not reflect our real interests and
the things we can do that are external to having concepts. needs. But I do not wish to argue that as a matter of logical neces-
Having a concept, however, is primarily tied to the things that sity we always have to use the fact that we can see something in a
it allows us to do that are internal to having it. To have a concept, particular way for such purposes.
in this sense, just is to be a master of some particular technique: to There are, alternatively, always some facts of the matter on
be able to do certain things—i.e. capture certain things in thought which we can rely: we will not conceptualize as a zebra, for
and practice. Having number concepts allows us to capture, make instance; and we will not conceptualize the creature in the preg-

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nant woman’s womb as a baby-horse. There are all sorts of limits, wise may be facing conceptual questions. Asking ourselves ques-
logical and factual, as well as things we are committed to—values, tions like: “Is that the kind of thing it would make sense to name,
ideas, theories, and even taste preferences—that can provide bound- or bury?” or “would not naming it be as humiliating as not naming
ary conditions on what possible conceptualizations are available to a person; would naming it be as funny as naming one’s foot?”—
us. Nevertheless, appeal to such prior commitments may not settle asking such questions can give us a feel, an experience, of what
the matter. We are not logically forced by the reality of things to we are talking about, but without assuming any commitment on our
conceptualize them only in certain ways and not others—duck or part. It allows us to feel what it would be like to conceptualize the
rabbit, baby or embryo. And even given all the facts and all our matter in this way or that—as a baby, or as an embryo—and can
prior commitments, we may still be able to conceptualize in several thus allow us to choose the appropriate language and practices.21
incompatible ways. The cases I mentioned above are only a sample; As these examples show, aspect-perception allows us to feel the
there are many such cases. contours of our conceptual uncertainty—to have a sense of what
would and what would not be a candidate for the missing concep-
e. tual piece. It does that without involving us in a committed exercise
of any particular way of conceptualizing the matter. If there is more
When we are conceptually uncertain, and appeals to facts, logic, than one alternative conceptualization, we may, by using questions
and prior commitments do not suffice, aspect-perception gives us an and images of the sort I have mentioned, let ourselves experience
essential part of what we need: an appreciation of the kind of inter- the different ways—sample the options. This would give us an idea
est we have in the object. Let me demonstrate this. When thinking what it would be like to conceptualize the matter, now this way now
about the morality of euthanasia, for instance, we may be facing a that, and thus, what it would take to conceptualize the matter prop-
conceptual question: what to call it—“an act of mercy,” or “mur- erly.
der?” And the problem may be conceptual. That is, our difficulty All of this can happen before we have exercised any concep-
making a moral judgment may stem from the fact that we have not tual judgment, and in a way that can later be used as grounds for
yet settled the question how to conceptualize this act. To the extent endorsing some way of conceptualizing the matter. Admittedly,
that we are faced with such a conceptual dilemma, saying: “If I were this sounds un-Wittgensteinian: it makes it seem as if the facts are
to keep a pet animal in the same condition I am in, I would be pros- there independently from their articulation, waiting to be captured
ecuted,”19 or “It is the kind of creature that makes sense of its pains, by means of concepts, and as if the experience of aspect is an ex-
and responds to the moral claims of its suffering”20 —appealing to perience of some non-conceptual content. However, this would be
such images may help. Such images stir us. They make us expe- a misunderstanding. As I argued above (§1c), the experience of
rience aspects—reveal to us possible ways of making sense of the aspect-perception—this kind of taking up of the facts in thought—
situation, conceptualizing it—and thereby force, in this particular is mediated by concepts; but the mediation takes a special form:
manner, these ways of making sense on us, typically for a limited we are not experiencing the facts by employing them according to
while. The images, that is, have a preparatory role: they allow us to the norms that their concept determines (as we experience the fork
experience what it would be like to conceptualize the matter in this during dinner). We rather let a concept make a tentative contact
particular way or that, and possibly make a decision. with the facts, and only experience (sometimes this is forced on us,
Or again, when thinking about the morality of abortion, we like-

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sometimes not) what it would be like to conceptualize them in this of performing other sorts of imaginative contemplation of works of
way. art. I discuss such forms of contemplation in §3.

f. g.
It is worth mentioning that there is a connection here with the philos- Experiencing a way of conceptualizing does not function as justi-
ophy of mathematics and the nature of mathematical understanding. fication of a certain conceptualization by forcing us to accept it on
Aspect-experiences, or something very much like them, occur also pain of involving ourselves with some contradiction. The decision
in mathematics. A collection of numbers, for instance, may look is our burden, and the burden is not to logically deduce what our
random and in this sense lifeless. It may suddenly dawn on us, and commitment should be, given the facts and our prior commitments.
we may suddenly see a point in taking them together: We may sud- When we deliberate about how to conceptualize something, we may
denly see the good of having a concept that would make sense of need to go beyond appeal to such considerations, and the burden
those numbers together—by animating them as an arithmetical se- may be yet heavier: to examine the possibilities, try the alternatives,
ries, for instance. In the same vein, Wittgenstein comments on the taste the options, and make up our own experienced minds. So, as
proposition, “I’ve just noticed that a familiar drawing contains this I argued above, it is not that we are logically forced by the real-
form: The discovery that this is so is of the same kind as mathemat- ity of things to conceptualize and capture them in thought only in
ical discoveries” [Wittgenstein, 1980, §439].22 certain ways and not others; but it is not as if we have nothing to
Also worth mentioning is a connection with the philosophy of go on either, or no way to justify ourselves—or think intelligently
art and the role of the imagination in critical understanding in gen- about—ways of conceptualization.
eral. When we look at a work of art and attempt to “interpret” it, I should emphasize that settling such conceptual matters is typ-
our activity is not always that of raising hypotheses about the work: ically not something we need individually. It is typically a shared
hypotheses that can be examined relative to independent data, such need, something we need together—as a community of language:
as data about the childhood of the artist, or the political climate a community that makes sense together. To the extent that aspect-
in which the work was created. Rather, we look for ways of de- experiences can serve as justifications, they also bring us together:
scribing the work; and unlike with ordinary objects—pillows and they allow us to put this life of ours into language together—give
spoons—the way in which the work of art is to be described is not us, or help us agree on, the concepts with which to make sense of
unproblematically given by the work. To capture a work of art, what things.
we sometimes—perhaps often—do, is bring concepts to the work of
art, or to part of it, and attempt to experience the work through the
medium of these concepts.23 Thus, for instance, we may look at the
§3
Mona Lisa, and see it through the medium of the concept embar-
a.
rassment, or alternatively through the concept contentment. When
we do this, we may be attempting to conceptualize the art-work, but Seeing aspects involves feeling the meaningful life of an object—
this is not necessary. More commonly, we bring a concept to an often by bringing a concept to it—and letting ourselves feel what
art-work, and attempt to see the work through the concept, as part it would be like to conceptualize the object with the concept, but

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without exercising a conceptual judgment. I have so far described exactly are, and how to measure that.
one way in which we do this—one reason: to prepare our linguistic
norms, shape and re-shape them. But we may do this for other rea- b.
sons as well. In this section, I would like to describe another kind of
reasons for doing this: non-preparatory reasons. The mark of non- Avner Baz takes something like this non-preparatory kind of aspect-
preparatory aspect-experiences is that they do not reflect a sense that perception as more paradigmatic of aspect-perception in general.
it is possible to properly come into routine practical-normative life He does not make a distinction between preparatory and non-
with the object. preparatory aspect-experiences, but he declines to give center stage
Non-preparatory aspect-perception characterizes some forms of to “the ambiguous figures and schematic drawings, which are piv-
aesthetic experience—for instance, when we feel that our experi- otal to most accounts of seeing aspects” [Baz, 2000, 100].26 He
ence defies conceptualization. We say in such cases things like: has in mind ambiguous figures like , which are indeed useful in
“I immerse myself in the colour [. . . ] I ‘cannot get my fill of a demonstrating the preparatory role of aspect-perception, but not its
colour”’ [Wittgenstein, 1958, §277].24 Similar things happen out- non-preparatory role.
side aesthetics—arguably in ethics—when we find ourselves drown- Baz is the first to have emphasized that there are cases of
ing in the eyes of a loved one.25 The color in which we immerse aspect-experiences that are unlike the two-dimensional experience
ourselves, the eyes in which we drown, are perfectly ordinary. They we have with Jastrow’s duck-rabbit. He should be further credited
were there even before we found ourselves drowned or immersed in for emphasizing that such aspect-experiences happen in our daily
them, and the routine of our conceptual life with them was safe. But encounter with ordinary objects, people, and words, and not only
now, an aspect-experience has shattered the routine: When we found with contrived laboratory-designed images. Nevertheless, by his re-
ourselves immersed or drowned, something happened that gave the peated talk of examples that are more and less representative of the
color and the eyes depths that they did not have before; or it exposed phenomena of aspects in general, Baz hinders attention to the impor-
dimensions we had not noticed before. tance of the fact that there is more than one kind of point to seeing
In preparatory aspect-perception, when seeing the duck aspect aspects.
of Jastrow’s duck-rabbit for instance, we are not committed to “Disentangling a philosophical puzzlement,” claims Baz, “can
a conceptualization, but we are committed to the possibiltiy of require the kind of patience and concentration and persistence that
conceptualizing—e.g. of conceptualizing as a duck. As op- disentangling a Gordian knot made of delicate threads would re-
posed to that, in non-preparatory aspect-perception, for example quire” [Baz, 2010, 237]. He gives voice to a Wittgensteinian notion
when suddenly noticing our father in our own reflection, we are not of philosophizing that necessitates patient attention to detail and
only uncommitted to identifying ourselves with him; we are also not particularity, a conception in which “we must focus on the details
committed to the possibility of such identification. Similarly, when of what goes on; must look at them from close to” [Wittgenstein,
we cannot get our fill of a color, we are not thereby committed to 1958, §51].
the possibility of saying how exactly we take colors in, and when In response to Baz, I want to point out that it is by comparing
we find ourselves drowned in the eyes of a loved one, we are not and contrasting different cases that we attend to particulars—not
thereby committed to the possibility of saying how deep these eyes just by looking deep into each and every case separately. It is by
putting different cases alongside one another, without taking some

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of them to be less important, as Baz does, but rather using them as riences: the depth of the color, the dimensions of soul that we see in
objects of comparisons, that we clarify grammar—here, the gram- the eyes. Aspect-perception allows us to deal with this kind of dif-
mar of aspect-perception; or so it is in the Wittgensteinian concep- ficulty just because it involves conceptually uncommitted thinking.
tion of philosophizing. That may be impeded by taking some cases This enables us to bring to the objects we experience concepts that
of aspect-perception as less paradigmatic, and as deserving less at- do not typically belong to them—to employ our concepts figura-
tention: Doing this runs the risk of a priori taking certain things tively, and thereby signal the specialness and the dimensions of the
that we might learn from the comparison to be not-so-important, experience, which do not have room in any literal use of language.
and thereby of possibly failing to learn from the comparison. And
this in fact happens in Baz’s discussion. So even though, as noted d.
above, Baz makes several important distinctions between kinds of
aspect-experiences, he often uses these distinctions to justify his dis- Let me describe three kinds of non-preparatory aspect-experiences.
interest in some aspect phenomena, and in what can be learnt from First, sometimes things—objects, words, people—become routine,
them. His insistence on treating some of these phenomena as less in a way that makes us blind to them, so to speak. Often, it takes a
paradigmatic obstructs his discussion. long time to realize that, and often we never do. However, it may
Comparing and contrasting the different phenomena of aspect- dawn on us that this is how we live—that we are not really reading
perception will give us an insight into the different ways we shape those texts even though we are reading all the words, or that we are
language, the different ways we assume the burden of taking care of not truly exposed to the existence of those people even though we
our concepts, and the various things we need concepts to do for us. are familiar with their names. It may dawn on us that we are treating
And so this is what I propose to do now: to contrast the preparatory them as a matter of course.
kind of aspect-perception I discussed in §2 with non-preparatory The experience of it dawning on us that we have been living
cases of aspect-perception. with something merely as routine—the experience of the need for
more dimensions, as it were—is itself a kind of aspect-experience:
an experience that may involve a feeling that this routine is shallow
c.
or empty. When we have this experience, we typically want to over-
Preparatory aspect-perception, I argued, allows us to deal with one come it. But our difficulty is not to find the appropriate routine; it
kind of conceptual difficulty, i.e. uncertainties about how to concep- is not that we are uncertain how to conceptualize our experience.
tualize things. Non-preparatory aspect-perception allows us to deal We rather need to deepen the shallowness of the way in which we
with a similar, but different, difficulty that we sometimes have in capture the matter, to break the routine. We need a way to bring
capturing things in thought: the poverty of concepts. Sometimes we ourselves to see those things—expose ourselves to them—anew. In-
need to capture an object in thought, but not in any routine, matter- ducing aspect-experiences is a way of doing this: and we may try to
of-course, way. We need to find in the object, or find a way to do it by, for instance, putting a urinal in a museum, or thinking about
express that the object has for us, dimensions that surpass what any a coworker through the concept someone’s daughter. As Avner Baz
norm-laden use of language could capture. says: “our relation to the world, as revealed by the dawning of as-
Aspect-perception allows us to deal with the experience we pects, is one in which we continually have to restore an intimacy
sometimes have that our concepts cannot quite capture our expe- with the world—an intimacy that is forever at stake, and that if taken

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for granted is bound to be lost” [Baz, 2010, 238].27 experienced as if the world in its background recedes, and it is left
Second, closely related to the kind of experiences just men- singled out as an embodiment of meaninglessness:
tioned, and not quite constituting a separate category, there is a kind
of linguistic shallowness that we notice only after the aspect dawned The roots of the chestnut tree were sunk in the ground
and the shallowness overcome. This is the kind of thing that hap- just under my bench. I couldn’t remember it was a root
pens when we notice our father in our own reflection in the mirror, anymore. The words had vanished and with them the
or when a portrait seems to be looking down on us from the wall. significance of things, their methods of use, and the fee-
Our routine, so far, with our image and with the portrait was per- ble points of reference which men have traced on their
fectly fine. But then an aspect dawned, and re-problematized the surface [Sartre, 2007, 126–7].
way we capture those things in thought. What we now need in order
to capture those things properly is to overcome the very routine- e.
ness, matter-of-course-ness, of our normal dealings with them. In
such cases, we accordingly often feel that our words fail us. The ob- My claim then is this: In non-preparatory aspect-experience we are
ject we consider, this is our experience, has more significance than attempting to capture our non-routine meaningful life with some-
it normally has—more dimensions; and our words do not normally thing, and we may do this for instance by bringing a concept to the
support those dimensions. object—letting ourselves feel what it would be like to conceptual-
Experiences of this sort can be less or more dramatic. In ize it with that concept—all the while not having any intention to
the more dramatic cases the new meaning revealed in the aspect- ever actually make a conceptual judgment—to exercise as a matter
experience can make the routine matter-of-course attitude seem of course a commitment to that conceptualization. We do not have
false or inauthentic. A word, say—a perfectly ordinary word—can such an intention, for the concept we are bringing to the object is
suddenly strike us as encapsulating great depths of meaning in a way intentionally foreign to it. The very point of appealing to foreign
that may make our previous understanding of the word seem wrong: concepts in such cases is to set the object apart. By this sort of at-
for instance, “Now I know what blue really means” after looking at tention, that is, we are able to exclude the object from its routine
a Picasso painting, or “Now this is what I call music” when listening life and usage, and treat it as special—perhaps even ontologically
to a Bach concerto. What we are experiencing in such cases is the special.30
object—or word, or whatever—as an embodiment of meaning. We Let me go back to a metaphor I used in §2a: When standing on
may say in such cases that we are struck by the “true” essence of a the sidelines of the language game—in that disengaged standpoint
perfectly ordinary object, or by the “real” meaning of an everyday from which we experience aspects and can reflect on our ways of
word.28 conceptualizing things in a non-committed manner—or when mov-
Third, there are also non-preparatory aspect-experiences in ing to this standpoint, we may, I argued, be facing inside or back-
which the very opposite of what I have so far described happens: ward: toward our normative life, and with the intention of finding
Rather than revealing new dimensions, a word or an object may a way into a norm-soaked life with the object. This is our position
strike us as devoid of meaning, or of any true reality.29 This hap- in preparatory aspect-perception. But, and this is my claim now, we
pens in a famous passage in Sartre’s Nausea, in which a chestnut is may also be facing outside, or forward—that is, not have any inten-
tion of finding a way into a norm-soaked routine with the object. We

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may reflect on an object, and bring a concept to it, not with a view point of such uses is to exclude the possibility of a literal translation
to actually conceptualize it, but in order to move away, escape or ex- (but not non-literal, figurative, translations and paraphrases in gen-
press that we are away, from any routine with it. This characterizes eral), and thereby to express the non-matter-of-course-ness of the
non-preparatory aspect-experiences. experience. In such cases we make what Wittgenstein called a use
of an expression in a secondary sense [Wittgenstein, 1958, 216f], or
f. secondary use [Wittgenstein, 1958, §282].31

I have so far mostly described cases of non-preparatory aspect-

g.
experiences that are somewhat extraordinary, or unusual. But there
is a variety of phenomena that have similar grammar—or so I As in the preparatory case, non-preparatory aspect-perception typ-
suggest—many of which are ordinary and common. Thus, finding ically does not merely express one individual’s need. It rather typ-
the atmosphere so tense that you could cut it with a knife, experienc- ically expresses a shared need: something we need together, as
ing a turn of phrase as unnatural, feeling at home in a conversation, a community that makes sense together. Non-preparatory aspect-
finding a musical phrase funny, discovering one’s father in one’s re- perception can bring things—words, objects—back to life for us
flection in the mirror, finding a name to be fitting a face, and more. when they have been eroded by use, forgetfulness, and careless-
What all these cases share grammatically—and this is the reason ness; and when this happens, we need to be able to communicate
why I suggest it is instructive to look at them together—is the kind this to others. This is why, as Avner Baz argues, seeing aspects al-
of attention we give to things is most naturally expressed by stretch- lows for intimacy: “the seeing of aspects, or rather its expression,
ing language: by employing ways of expression that deliberately go puts our attunement with other people to the test” [Baz, 2000, 99].
beyond, if not violate, accepted linguistic norms. So, even though Unlike the preparatory case, however, since seeing the aspect in the
those experiences are not unusual, they are not routine. non-preparatory cases is not done for the sake of setting norms and
In such cases, I claim, we find it natural to describe things in concepts for future use, or settling conceptual dilemmas, whether or
grammatically “inappropriate” terms. We let ourselves feel what it not others share such aspect experiences with us—our attunement
would be like to conceptualize an object with an “improper” con- with them—is not marked by their accepting the same norms as we
cept, and by stretching language in this way, we signal that our ex- do, or by exercising the same conceptual judgments.32
perience is not routine. We do not literally cut tense atmospheres Can we explain to others such uses of figurative language?
with knives, or see our father in the mirror, and the portrait does not Can we justify our deliberate use of grammatically “inappropriate”
literally look down on us from the wall. By employing such forms words and intentional violation of the rules of the language game?
of expression we are not exercising a conceptual judgment. We are, – Despite all this, I maintain, we may still be able to justify our
rather, bringing the concept to the object, as if it were possible to ways of expressing ourselves in such cases. As with the prepara-
conceptualize the object with it. And we do this in order to show, tory way of seeing aspects, a justification in non-preparatory cases
per impossible, what it would take—what imaginative feat it would calls upon people’s natural need to make sense of things, to capture
require—to appropriately capture the matter in thought. The non- things in thought. Unlike in the preparatory cases, the use of fig-
literal way of expression in such cases is therefore the most natural urative language in expressing non-preparatory aspect experiences
and direct way of expression. In fact, it is the only way: The very is meant to make people—tempt them to—experience the need to

Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy vol. 1 no. 6 [12]

make sense of something in a particular, exceptional, perhaps pe- Even sighted people can recognize the blind man’s intention. A re-
culiar, way. Again, as in the case of preparatory aspect-perception, flection on red brings to many minds the sound of a trumpet. To
we may use images and pictures to explain and justify our way of the extent that we recognize the possibility of expressing ourselves
seeing things. But there is also a difference. When utilizing fig- in such a way, we should also recognize that language here is em-
ures of speech in the non-preparatory cases, we do not call upon ployed in a peculiar way: for color is not something one hears. And
people to conceptualize something in a particular way. The type yet, this is the only way to express the relevant kind of experience,
of agreement we want to get out of them in the non-preparatory namely to use a concept outside its natural logical domain, so to
cases is therefore not an agreement on concepts. What we hope speak. And this is not a failure on our part, for part of our intention
for is rather a signal of a shared sense that the object under discus- in giving voice to our experience in such cases is to mark its pecu-
sion escapes conceptualization—that the normal conceptual tools liarity. Making secondary uses of expressions—using words out of
we have will not do. And we also hope for an agreement on the place—is our way of doing that.
particular way in which the object escapes conceptualization: we
hope that our interlocutor will feel the need to use the same—or h.
similar—“inappropriate” concepts and figures of speech to describe
their experience. When they do that, it signals that they share our To be sure, there is nothing unnatural or even unusual about looking
experience. for ways to escape established conceptual norms, and this is related
If, for instance, we wanted to explain our saying that the por- but it is not what Stanley Cavell means when he says that “nothing
trait is looking down on us from the wall—if, that is, we wanted to could be more human” than “the power of the motive to reject the
explain more than just the fact that it was taken en face, and not en human” [Cavell, 1979, 207]. Rejecting conceptual norms may be
profil—we would have to continue talking in terms that describe the a rejection of humanity, but one does not have to reject humanity
portrait as having a mind: We would have to say for instance, “See, when one rejects those norms. One may just as well be trying to
it is looking straight at me, scrutinizing me!” And the point of say- discover it.
ing this would be partly to convey the way in which our experience Discovering how to capture the world in thought is our task.
of this inanimate object escapes the forms of descriptions we have Sharing this task is part of what makes us human, and by accom-
for inanimate objects. plishing it we also discover what it takes to be human. My claim
Take another example. John Locke tells the following story: in this section comes to this: Our ability to experience aspects in
the non-preparatory way allows us to accomplish one aspect of this
A studious blind man, who had mightily beat his head task of discovering our humanity. It allows us to fill the linguistic
about visible objects, and made use of the explication void created when we cannot turn to our linguistic norms for help—
of his books and friends, to understand those names of not because there are none, or because there are too many, but for
light and colours which often came in his way, bragged the very fact that they are norms: just norms. Using them would
one day, that he now understood what scarlet signified. be an expression of routine, and what we want is to express some-
Upon which, his friend demanding what scarlet was? thing whose very essence is that it is not routine. The kind of depth
The blind man answered, it was like the sound of a that we see in the eyes of a loved one, the dimensions we see in
trumpet [Locke, 1996, Book III, Chapter IV, §11]. a Picasso blue, will not be tamed conceptually; they cannot be ex-

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pressed literally. We therefore have to appeal to essential figures of Notes
speech—figurative language that does not allow for literal transla-
tion. 1 For their comments and discussion, I am grateful and indebted to Avner Baz,

Using essentially figurative language does not reveal a way of Alice Crary, Keren Gorodeisky, Arata Hamawaki, Kelly Jolley, Oskari Kuusela,
making sense of the situation any more than it reveals the way— David Seligman, Michael Watkins, and Dafi Agam-Segal.
2 By talking about conceptual clarity I do not mean to imply that we are unclear
the particular way—in which the situation escapes our ability to
about the concepts yet clear about the object. Rather, the unclarity here is two-
make sense of it. Put differently, when having a non-preparatory folded: We do not know whether a concept—baby, embryo—appropriately applies
aspect-experience, part of the phenomenon that we need to cap- to the object, and in that sense are not clear about the concept; but at the same time
ture in thought and get others to see—part of what our form of we are not clear about how to call, and in general treat, the object, and in that sense
we are unclear about the object.
expression attempts to grasp—is a certain ingraspability in the phe- 3 See [Wittgenstein, 1980, §347]
nomenon: Whereas to capture things in thought is normally to con- 4 This is admittedly a figurative way of putting the matter. However, I sub-
ceptualize them, in the non-preparatory cases to capture things in mit that there is no non-figurative way of expressing this idea. In discussing the
thought is also to capture the way in which these things frustrate phenomena and the experiences of aspect, Wittgenstein often makes use of figura-
conceptualization—thwart committed mater-of-course application tive language: “The substratum of this experience is the mastery of a technique”
[Wittgenstein, 1958, 208]. “[. . . ] what I perceive in the dawning of an aspect is
of concepts. not a property of the object, but an internal relation between it and other objects”
[Wittgenstein, 1958, 212]. “It is as if one had brought a concept to what one sees,
and one now sees the concept along with the thing. It is itself hardly visible, and
yet it spreads an ordering veil over the objects” [Wittgenstein, 1980, §961]. Figura-
tive language itself becomes a topic in Wittgenstein’s discussion. When describing
There is much more to investigate in connection with aspect-
secondary uses of language, he notes that some phenomena cannot be described
perception. As I mentioned, the topic stands at the crossroad of except in figurative language. “Seeing aspects,” I submit, is a secondary use of
quite a few philosophical topics in the philosophy of psychology, of “seeing.” To defend this claim will take me too far off course, but I briefly discuss
art, of religion, ethics, and mathematics. I would like, in conclusion, the idea of secondary use of language in §3f.
5 Thus, says Wittgenstein: “[. . . ] I take it as the typical game of ‘seeing some-
to suggest that the matter has deep metaphilosophical implications:
thing as something,’ when someone says ‘Now I see it as this, now as that.’ When,
If aspect-perception is indeed a form of reflecting on language, then that is, he is acquainted with different aspects, and that independently of his mak-
we may ask: Is there a lesson here to be learnt about the forms that ing any application of what he sees” [Wittgenstein, 1980, §411].
6 What one brings to an object in such cases are typically images and feelings
philosophical reflection may, or perhaps in some cases should, take?
– It seems to me a matter worth pursuing. that are psychologically associated with a certain concept. One may therefore say
that this is a form of thinking without concepts. It is however equally worthwhile
to think of it as a particular form of thinking with a concept, that does not manifest
Reshef Agam-Segal mastery of the language-game with the concept—“an exercise of an unapplied con-
Virginia Military Institute cept,” as it were. (I take the expression from [Geach, P.T., 1957, 14] who treats it
[email protected] as an absurdity.) This will allow us to see the matter as part of a larger investigation
of thinking with and about concepts.
There is a question here about what is, and what is not, part of the language-
game with a concept. The employment of a concept in aspect-perception is not
Typeset in LATEX external to the language-game with the concept, but it is not a criterion for the
mastery of that game, so it is not quite internal either.
 7A similar distinction is implicitly made by Avner Baz: “what exactly is meant of a word’ it is as if I were providing contexts for its use. I do not actually provide
by ‘his sudden realization that the picture-object is both a picture-meek-man and them, but I must be able to do so” [Seligman, 1976, 216]. Seligman here makes
a picture-complacent-businessman’[?] Does it mean that he suddenly realizes—it an important connection between seeing aspects and experiencing the meaning of
all of a sudden occurs to him—that it could serve as either of them, be taken or in- a word, which I accept. I further agree with Seligman that when one sees an as-
terpreted to be either of them? Or does it mean that he found he could see it as one pect or experiences the meaning of a word, one often has the ability to provide a
or the other?” [Baz, 2010, 242]. Unlike me, Baz does not connect the phenomena context for use: there is often a use in the horizon, but not in actuality—a use that
of aspects to adopting a reflective attitude towards language. involves an exercise of a conceptual commitment. Unlike Seligman, I do not take
8 A note of warning: When we suddenly notice an aspect, we may sometimes such experiences to always have a use that involves a conceptual commitment in
express this by saying “I’ve just realized it is a duck!” That is, we may use the term view. To employ the terms I shall explain below, the ability to provide such a con-
‘realize’—and likewise ‘identify,’ and ‘recognize’—to express aspect experiences. text is only a necessary criterion for the experience in some preparatory, but not in
What is important, however, is not what term we use, but what we intend by using non-preparatory, aspect-experiences.
it: whether we intend to be making a conceptual judgment, in which case we are 17 With regard to this last example, there are at least two forms that the objec-

not expressing an aspect-experience; or whether we alternatively intend to say that tion to same-sex marriage takes: (1) there are those who think that such a thing
we have brought a concept to the object but have not thereby committed ourselves can exist, and so for instance, that there is no problem calling two women who go
to treating the object as if it decisively falls under that concept, in which case we through some ceremony “married;” they believe, however, that same-sex couples
are expressing an aspect-experience. should not go through such ceremonies, or that even if they do, they should not
9 I borrow this expression from [McDowell, 1981, 141–62]. I am using the be legally recognized as married. (2) There are those who would regard same sex
expression in a different way, however. McDowell uses it to refer to an illusory marriage as a conceptual impossibility. They would not even allow that the two
standpoint, independent of all human activities and reactions. As I explain in §1d, women who went through the ceremony are properly called “married.” For such
I do not take the standpoint from which we see aspects to be dehumanized. people such “marriage” is akin to marrying a table: whatever ceremony you go
10 I therefore side with Avner Baz in his criticism of Stephen Mulhall’s treat- through with a table, they would say, it would be a mistake to call it “marriage”
ment of aspect-seeing as characterizing our general relation to the world. See (even if people chose to make it legal), and they think that the same holds for
[Baz, 2000, 97–121] and [Mulhall, 2001]. same-sex couples.
11 This does not have to be a déjà vu experience, in which we feel that this has 18 In [Wittgenstein, 1998, 97] Wittgenstein claims that life can force the concept

happened before. It can rather be a feeling that can be described as a feeling that God on us. This, however, would be an example for a kind of non-preparatory
we already have a slot in our mind for this experience. aspect-perception.
12 See also [Wittgenstein, 1980, §1025]. 19 The words are from Bob Dent’s letter dictated to his wife on the eve of his
13 See [Wittgenstein, 1980, §§175–6], and [Wittgenstein, 1958, 210]: “I should death: [Dent, 1999, 19–32].
like to say that what dawns here lasts only as long as I am occupied with the object 20 For a defense of this view, see [Bachelard, 2002, 131–40]

in a particular way.” 21 See [Wittgenstein, 1980, §381] for a discussion of the Mona Lisa case men-
14 Wittgenstein talks of two ways of experiencing things sub specie aeternitatis: tioned above. Regarding the heap-grain case, this refers to the famous Sorites
“besides the work of the artist there is another through which the world may be Paradox: A difference of one grain does not turn a bunch of grains into a heap.
captured sub specie aeternitatis. It is—as I believe—the way of thought which One grain is not a heap, and a million are. By these assumptions, it seems that
as it were flies above the world and leaves it the way it is, contemplating it from there both must and cannot be a cutoff point in which a bunch of grains turns into
above in its flight” [Wittgenstein, 1998, 7]. Possibly, these correspond to the two a heap. This paradox reflects, I believe, a sort of conceptual uncertainty. When ap-
kinds of aspect-perception I discuss in §§2-3. plied to this sort of case, my suggestion that this uncertainty can be resolved with
15 Not that when this happens we are necessarily aware of this interest, or that the help of aspect-perception amounts to the claim that by adopting a disengaged
we would necessarily describe it as a linguistic interest if we were aware of it, or attitude, and letting oneself experience aspects—feel what it would be like to con-
as an interest in making sense in general. One does not have to be a philosopher of ceptualize the matter in this way or that—we may be able to say what the cutoff
language to experience aspects; but one also does not have to be such a philosopher point is. At the same time, however, our idea of what it is for there to be a cutoff
to have an interest in making sense of things. point in the first place, and thus of what it is to draw a cutoff point, may completely
16 David Seligman argues for a similar idea: “When I ‘experience the meaning change in the process. For a defense of the claim that we cannot discover cutoff

Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy vol. 1 no. 6 [15]

points, see [Williamson, 1994]. It is not part of Williamson’s account, however, to 31 For Wittgenstein, what distinguishes secondary uses from metaphors is that
spell out exactly what it is for there to be a cutoff point in different cases in the first metaphors can be “translated” into literal language, and secondary uses cannot.
place, and what it is—what it means—to draw a cutoff point in the different cases. For further discussion, see [Diamond, 1991a].
22 For further discussion of aspect-perception in connection with the philosophy 32 This is connected to Kant’s claims about the kind of agreement we can expect

of mathematics see [Diamond, 1991b, 243–66]; [Floyd, 2010, 314–37]. when making aesthetic judgments. Such judgments, he says, have only subjective,
23 Richard Eldridge makes similar claims in [Eldridge, 2003]. He claims not objective universality: they are made in what Kant calls a “universal voice”—
that “elucidatory-critical understanding is perceptual, not inductive or deductive” with the expectation of universal agreement. But since they do not rely on prior
(143), and he thinks that the perception here is also not ordinary, but rather “imag- conceptual commitments, they cannot logically necessitate agreement. If I am
inative.” I here concentrate on one particular type of imaginative perception: the right, then in opposition to Kant, our expectations should be similarly construed
experiencing of an object through the medium of a concept. in some non-aesthetic cases: the applicability of this form of judgment (in Kant’s
24 And this has clear ties to Kant’s view of aesthetic judgment: “the judgment sense of the word) is not limited only to aesthetic cases.
of taste determines the object, independently of concepts,” [Kant, 1952, 5:219].
Furthermore, the beauty judgment in Kant’s view does not conceptualize the ob-
ject: “it does not join the predicate of beauty to the concept of the object” (5:215).
In Kant’s terms, we may say that both preparatory and non-preparatory aspect-
perception involve reflective rather than determining judgment (see 5:179), the
point of preparatory—but not non-preparatory—reflection being conceptualiza-
tion. More generally, this whole discussion connects with what seems to be a
close relation between the philosophical interests of Kant and Wittgenstein: to
distinguish between and explore different forms of rationality, of judgment, of ex-
ercising concepts, and of thinking.
25 This involves a type of recognition of a person, and may thus be regarded as

a moral matter. In the background there is here a philosophical worry about the
possibility of distinguishing between moral and aesthetic judgments by saying that
they have different forms. Kant, for one, seems to have been after something like
this.
26 Elsewhere, Baz similarly argues that “we are almost bound to mislead our-

selves” if we take the duck-rabbit and examples like it as paradigmatic [Baz, 2011,
710]
27 Baz makes a similar point elsewhere: “What we need, then, if this experi-

ence [the experience of the ordinary] is not to be lost on us, [. . . is ] to find it [the
ordinary] new” [Baz, 2000, 99].
28 See also Wittgenstein on a word “striking a note on the keyboard of the imagi-

nation” [Wittgenstein, 1958, §6], and Cora Diamond on “Now I know what ‘down’
means!” in [Diamond, 1991a, 233].
29 In [Wittgenstein, 1980, §125], Wittgenstein describes a certain experience as

“a feeling of unreality.”
30 “[. . . ] by my attitude towards the phenomenon I am laying an emphasis on it:

I am concentrating on it, or retracing it in my mind, or drawing it, etc.” [Wittgen-

stein, 1969, 160–3]. The quotation is taken from a context in which Wittgenstein
discusses a related issue. The relation to the present context is made explicit in
[Wittgenstein, 1958, 207].

Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy vol. 1 no. 6 [16]

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