Language policy, multilingualism and language vitality in Pakistan1

Tariq Rahman
Quaid-i-Azam University
Islamabad, Pakistan

Abstract
Pakistan is a multilingual country with six major and over fifty-nine small languages. However,
the languages of the domains of power—government, corporate sector, media, education, etc.—
are English and Urdu. The state’s policies have favored these two languages at the expense of
others. This has resulted in the expression of ethnic identity through languages other than Urdu.
It has also resulted in English having become a symbol of the upper class, sophistication and
power. The less powerful indigenous languages of Pakistan are becoming markers of lower
status and culture shame. Some small languages are also on the verge of extinction. It is only by
promoting additive multilingualism that Pakistani languages will gain vitality and survive as
cultural capital rather than cultural stigma.

Language policy, multilingualism and language vitality in Pakistan

Pakistan is a multilingual country. Its national language, Urdu, is the mother tongue of only 7.57
per cent of the population though it is very widely used in the urban areas of the country.
Pakistan’s official language is still English as it was when the British ruled the country as part of
British India. In addition to this, the country has five major indigenous languages given below.

Table 1. Pakistani languages

Languages Percentage of speakers
Punjabi 44.15
Pashto 15.42
Sindhi 14.10
Siraiki 10.53
Urdu 7.57
Balochi 3.57
Others 4.66
Source: Census 2001: 107
There are also over fifty other languages, some of them on the verge of extinction (see Appendix-
1). The aim of this paper is to study the language policy of Pakistan with a view to determining
how it privileges certain languages and with what political, social, educational and economic
consequences. The paper also looks briefly at the impact of globalization on the languages of
Pakistan.

As the issue of power is central to policy, both to its making and consequence, let us consider it
first.

Power
Power is that quality which enables the users of a language to obtain more means of gratification
than the speakers of other languages. Forms of gratification may be tangible goods: houses, cars,
good food etc. or, they may be intangibles like pleasure, ego boosting, self-esteem etc (for full
explanation see Rahman 2002: 38-42). A powerful language is one that makes it possible for its
speakers and writers to obtain a higher share of these gratifications than others.

This is mostly possible in settled, modernizing or modern societies where there are domains such
as religion, education, the bureaucracy, the judiciary, the military, commerce, the media, research
and so on. In primitive tribes the manipulation of language matters less; in agricultural societies it

1
©Tariq Rahman, 2003

Tariq Rahman 1
emerges and becomes pervasive but is not the only passport to power; in industrial, modern
societies it becomes vitally important. Indeed, one simply cannot enter the domains of power
without being able to manipulate language for entry into these domains. It is the language of
employment (Rahman 2000: 41-42), and without employment one cannot possess much power in
modern societies.

Consequences of Pakistan’s language policies

There have been statements about language policy in various documents in Pakistan—the
different versions of the constitution, statements by governmental authorities in the legislative
assembly debates and, above all, in the various documents relating to education policy which have
been issued by almost every government. These are stated in the 1973 constitution as follows:

(1) The National language of Pakistan is Urdu and arrangements shall be made for its being
used for official and other purposes within fifteen years from the commencing day.

(2) Subject to clause (1) the English language may be used for official purposes until
arrangements are made for its replacement by Urdu.

(3) Without prejudice to the status of the National language, a Provincial Assembly may by
law prescribe measures for the teaching, promotion and use of a provincial language in
addition to the national language (Article 251).

The national language is Urdu (it was Urdu and Bengali from 1955 till 1971 when East Pakistan
became Bangladesh) though it is, and has always been, the mother tongue of a minority of the
population of Pakistan. This minority came from India, mostly after the creation of Pakistan in
1947, and is called Mohajir (refugee or immigrant).

The rationale for this privileging of Urdu, as given by the government of Pakistan, is that Urdu is
so widely spread that it is almost like the first language of all Pakistanis. Moreover, since most
jobs are available through Urdu, it is only just that all children should be given access to it. Above
all, it is a symbol of unity and helps in creating a unified ‘Pakistani’ identity. In this symbolic
role, it serves the political purpose of resisting ethnicity, which otherwise would break the
federation. As for the provision that other Pakistani languages may be used, it is explained that the
state, being democratic and sensitive to the rights of the federating units, allows the use of
provincial languages if desired.

As for the medium of instruction, the rationale is that Urdu, the most widespread urban language,
is the one used for teaching. As English is the official and international language, it too is taught
at the higher levels especially to those who seek to study science and technology.

The political consequences of the privileging of Urdu.

The major consequence of the privileging of Urdu has been ethnic resistance to it. As mentioned
before, Urdu is not the mother tongue of most Pakistanis, as census figures given earlier illustrate.
However, Urdu is indeed the most widely understood language and perhaps the major medium of
interaction in the urban areas of the country. Even ethnic activists agree that it could be a useful
link language between different ethnic groups. However, it has been resisted because it has been
patronized, often in insensitive ways, by the ruling elite at the centre.

The story of this patronization is given in detail in several books (see Rahman 1996) but it always
fell short of what the more ardent supporters of Urdu demanded (for their position see Abdullah
1976). In the beginning, since a very powerful section of the bureaucracy spoke Urdu as a mother
tongue (being Mohajirs), there was an element of cultural hegemony about the privileging of
Urdu. The Mohajir elites’ position, stated or implied, was that they were more cultured than the
speakers of the indigenous languages of Pakistan. Hence it was only natural that Urdu should be
used in place of the ‘lesser’ languages. This position, with which we are familiar through the

Tariq Rahman 2
works of linguists who oppose the arrogance of monolingual English speakers (see the following
authors for such arrogance in other contexts: Skutnabb-Kangas 2000; Crystal 2000: 84-88; Nettle
and Romaine 2000) created much resentment against Urdu and, indeed, may be said to have
infused the element of personal reaction to or antagonism against the speakers of Urdu in the first
twenty years of Pakistan’s existence.

The main reason for opposition to Urdu was, however, not merely linguistic or even cultural. It
was because Urdu was the symbol of the central rule of the Punjabi ruling elite that it was
opposed in the provinces. The use of Urdu as an ethnic symbol is given in detail in Rahman
(1996) but a brief recapitulation of major language movements may be useful.

The most significant consequence of the policy that Urdu would be the national language of
Pakistan was its opposition by the Bengali intelligentsia or what the Pakistani sociologist Hamza
Alavi calls the ‘salariat’—people who draw salaries from the state (or other employers) and who
aspire for jobs (Alavi 1987). One explanation is that the Bengali salariat would have been at a
great disadvantage if Urdu, rather than Bengali, had been used in the lower domains of power
(administration, judiciary, education, media, military etc). However, as English was the language
of the higher domains of power and Bengali was a ‘provincial’ language, the real issue was not
linguistic. It was that the Bengali salariat was deprived of its just share in power at the centre and
even in East Bengal where the most powerful and lucrative jobs were controlled by the West
Pakistani bureaucracy and the military. Moreover, the Bengalis were conscious that money from
the Eastern wing, from the export of jute and other products, was predominantly financing the
development of West Pakistan or the army which, in turn, was West Pakistani- (or, rather,
Punjabi-) dominated (HBWI: 1982: Vol 6: 810-811; Jahan 1972). The language, Bengali, was a
symbol of a consolidated Bengali identity in opposition to the West Pakistani identity. This
symbol was used to ‘imagine’, or construct, a unified Bengali community, as communities, such
as nations, were constructed through print language and other unifying devices in Europe
(Anderson 1983).

In Sindh, Balochistan, the N.W.F.P and South Western Punjab the languages used as identity
symbols were Sindhi, Balochi and Brahvi, Pashto and Siraiki. The mobilization of people,
especially the intelligentsia, as a pressure group, which became possible through these languages,
made them powerful ethnic symbols (Rahman 1996). However, Urdu was not resented or opposed
much except in Sindh where there were language riots in January 1971 and July 1972 (Ahmed
1992). But even in Sindh the crucial issue was of power. The Mohajirs were dominant in the
urban areas and the rising Sindhi salariat resented this. The most evocative symbol to mobilize
the community was language and it was this that was used.

Apart from the riots, people’s real conduct remains pragmatic. The Mohajirs, knowing that they
can get by without learning Sindhi, do not learn it except in rural areas where it is necessary for
them. The Sindhis, again because they know they cannot get by without learning Urdu, do learn it
(Rahman 2002: Chapter 10).

In short, the privileging of Urdu by the state has created ethnic opposition to it. However, as
people learn languages for pragmatic reasons (Rahman 2002: 36), they are giving less importance
to their heritage languages and are learning Urdu. This phenomenon, sometimes called ‘voluntary
shift’, is not really ‘voluntary’ as the case of the native Hawaiians, narrated by Daniel Nettle and
Suzanne Romaine, illustrates (Nettle and Romaine 2000: 94-97). What happens is that market
conditions are such that one’s language becomes a deficit in relation to what Bierre Bourdieu, the
French sociologist, would call ‘cultural capital’ (Bourdieu 1991: 230-231). Instead of being an
asset it becomes a liability. It prevents one from rising in society. In short, it is ghettoizing. Then,
people become ashamed of their language as the Punjabis, otherwise a powerful majority in
Pakistan, are observed to be by the present author and others (for a survey of the attitude of
Punjabi students towards their language see Mansoor 1993: 49-54). Or, even if language
movements and ethnic pride does not make them ashamed of their languages, they do not want to

Tariq Rahman 3
teach the language to their children because they think that would be overburdening the children
with far too many languages. For instance, Sahibzada Abdul Qayyum Khan (1864-1937) reported
in 1932 that the Pashtuns wanted their children to be instructed in Urdu rather than Pashto (LAD-
F 12 October 1932: 132). And even this year (2003), the MMA government has chosen Urdu, not
Pashto, as the language of the domains of power, including education, in the N.W.F.P. The same
phenomenon was noticed in Baluchistan. Balochi, Brahvi and Pashto were introduced as the
compulsory medium of instruction in government schools in 1990 (LAD-Bal 21 June and 15
April 1990). Language activists enthusiastically prepared instructional material but on 8
November 1992, these languages were made optional and parents switched back to Urdu
(Rahman 1996: 169). Such decisions amount to endangering the survival of minor languages and
they devalue even major ones but they are precisely the kind of policies that have created what is
often called ‘Urdu imperialism’ in Pakistan.

In short, the state’s use of Urdu as a symbol of national integration has had two consequences.
First, it has made Urdu the obvious force to be resisted by ethnic groups. This resistance makes
them strengthen their languages by corpus planning (writing books, dictionaries, grammars,
orthographies etc) and acquisition planning (teaching the languages, using them in the media
pressurizing the state to use them; for these terms see Cooper 1989). Secondly, it has jeopardized
additive multilingualism as recommended by UNESCO and, of course, by many eminent linguists
and educationists (Cf., Edwards 1994). As Urdu spreads through schooling, media and
urbanization, pragmatic pressures make the other Pakistani languages retreat. In short, the
consequence of privileging Urdu strengthens ethnicity while, at the same time and paradoxically,
threatens linguistic and cultural diversity in the country.

The policy for English

English was supposed to continue as the official language of Pakistan till such time that the
national language(s) replaced it. However, this date came and went, as had many other dates
before it, and English is as firmly entrenched in the domains of power in Pakistan as it was in
1947. The major reason for this is that this is the stated but not the real policy of the ruling elite in
Pakistan. The real policy can be understood with reference to the elite’s patronage of English in
the name of efficiency, modernization and so on.

To begin with, the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) was an Anglicized body of men who had
moulded themselves in the tradition of the British. The officer corps of the armed forces, as
Stephen P. Cohen suggests, was also Anglicized. It was, in his words, the ‘British generation’,
which dominated the army till 1971 (Cohen 1994: 162-163). It is understandable that members of
this elite had a stake in the continuation of English because it differentiated them from the masses;
gave them a competitive edge over those with Urdu-medium or traditional (madrassa) education;
and, above all, was the kind of cultural capital which had snob value and constituted a class-
identity marker. What is less comprehensible is why members of these two elites, who now come
increasingly from the lower-middle and middle classes and who have studied in Urdu-medium
schools (or schools which are called English-medium but teach mostly in Urdu), should also want
to preserve, and indeed strengthen, the hegemony of English—a language that has always been
instrumental in suppressing their class.

The answer lies in the fact that the elite has invested in a parallel system of elitist schooling of
which the defining feature is teaching all subjects, other than Urdu, through the medium of
English. This has created new generations, and ever increasing pools, of young people who have a
direct stake in preserving English. All the arguments which applied to a small Anglicized elite of
the early generation of Pakistan now applies to young aspirants who stand ready to enter the ranks
of this elite. And their parents, themselves not at ease in English, have invested far too much in
their children’s education seriously to consider decreasing the cultural capital and importance of
English.

Tariq Rahman 4
Moreover, most people think in terms of present-day realties which they may be critical of at
some level but which they take as permanent facts of life. This makes them regard all change as
utopian or suspiciously radical. To think of abolishing English is one such disquieting thought
because, at least for the last century and a half, the people of this part of the world have taken the
ascendancy of English for granted. In recent years, with more young people from the affluent
classes appearing in the British O’ and A’ level examinations, with the world-wide coverage of
the BBC and the CNN, with globalization and the talk about English being a world language, with
stories of young people emigrating all over the world armed with English—with all these things
English is a commodity in more demand than ever before.

The present author carried out a survey of 1085 students from different schools in Pakistan in
1999-2000. The results of this survey regarding English are reproduced below.

Table 2. Survey results for English

Madrassas Sindhi Urdu English-medium schools
(N=131) medium medium
schools schools
(N=132) (N=520)
Elitist Cadet Ordinary
(N=97) college (N=119)
(N=86)
1. What should be the medium of instruction in schools?
Urdu 43.51 9.09 62.50 4.12 23.26 24.37
English 0.76 33.33 13.65 79.38 67.44 47.06
Mother tongue 0.76 15.15 0.38 2.06 Nil 1.68
Arabic 25.19 Nil 0.19 Nil Nil 0.84
No response 16.79 37.88 16.54 5.15 Nil 8.40
2. Do you think higher jobs in Pakistan should be available in English?
Yes 10.69 30.30 27.69 72.16 70.93 45.38
No 89.31 63.64 71.15 27.84 29.07 53.78
NR Nil 6.06 1.15 Nil Nil 0.84
3. Should English-medium schools be abolished?
Yes 49.62 13.64 20.19 2.06 12.79 5.88
No 49.62 84.09 79.04 97.94 86.05 93.28
NR 00.76 2.27 0.77 Nil 1.16 0.84
Note: The results do not add up to 100 in some cases because those choosing two or more languages
have been ignored.
Source: Rahman, 2002: Appendix-14

These results suggest that 16 year-old students of matriculation (or equivalent level) in Pakistani
schools are not in favour of English as the medium of instruction in schools except in English-
medium schools. In the other schools they suffer because of English and, therefore, do not favour
it. When they grow up and enter elitist positions their investment in English, which now becomes
the language of schooling of their children, grows and they no longer support policies that would
replace English with other languages.

However, paradoxically, even school students do not support the abolition of English-medium
schools. Perhaps this seems too radical, visionary and impractical to them. Perhaps they feel that
English-medium schools provide good quality education and should remain available for the
modernization of the country. Or perhaps they understand that such schools are a ladder out of the
ghetto of their socio-economic class to a privileged class which their siblings or children might
make use of. In short, it is probably because of their pragmatism and a shrewd realization that
nothing is going to change that they want the English-medium schools to keep flourishing.

Tariq Rahman 5
The real policy regarding English
As mentioned earlier, the British colonial government and its successor Pakistani government
rationed out English. The stated policy was to support Urdu but that was only to create a
subordinate bureaucracy at low cost (vernacular-medium education costs less than English-
medium education). It was also to keep an anti-ethnic, centrist, ideological symbol potent and
vibrant in the country.

The armed forces, better organized than any other section of society, created cadet colleges from
the nineteen fifties onwards. These schools, run on the lines of the elitist British public schools,
were subsidized by the state. In the 1960s when students from ordinary colleges, who came by
and large from vernacular-medium schools, protested against these bastions of privilege, the
government appointed a commission to investigate their grievances. The report of this
commission agreed that such schools violated the constitutional assurance that ‘all citizens are
equal before law’ (Paragraph 15 under Right No. Vl of the 1962 Constitution). However, the
Commission was also convinced that these schools would produce suitable candidates for filling
elitist positions in the military and the civilian sectors of the country’s services (GOP 1966: 18).
This meant that the concern for equality was merely a legal nicety. And this, indeed, was what
happened. Today the public schools are as well-entrenched in the educational system of the
country as ever before. The total spending is as follows:

Table 3. Total spending

Cadet college Budget Average Part of the Number of Total cost per
monthly budget students student per
tuition Fees covered by year
fees
Kohat 19,981,217 4,701 44% 575 34,750
(8,785,923)
Larkana 23,176,006 550 95% 480 56,617
(22,017,205)
Pitaro 71,720,000 6000 80% 700 1,02,457
(57,376,000)
Lawrence 98,886,181 2000 18.19% 711 1,39,080
(17,987,396)
Hassanabdal 48,223,000 1350 12.75% 480 100,465
(6,148,433)
Mastung 36,300,000 2200 15.75% 360 100834
(5,500,000)

Source: Offices of the respective institutions except for the cost per student per year, which was obtained
by dividing the total budget by the number of students.

The total expenditure is not covered by tuition fees. The cadet colleges report subsidies from the
provincial government, grants by visiting dignitaries and free gifts of various kinds from “old
boys”and officials of the state.

Spending on other educational institutions is as follows:

Tariq Rahman 6
Table 4. Differences in costs in major types of educational institutions (in Pakistani rupees)
Institution Average cost per Payer (s) Cost to the state
student per year
Madrassas 5,714 (includes board Philanthropists + Very little as subsidy
and lodging) religious organizations on computers, books
etc in some madrassas
Urdu-medium 2264.5 (only tuition) State 2264.5
Schools
Elitist English 96,000---for ‘A’ level Parents None reported except
medium schools & 36,000 for other subsidized land in
levels (only tuition) some cantonments.
Cadet 90,061 (tuition and all Parents + state 14,171 (average of 5
colleges/public facilities). (average of 6 cadet cadet colleges only)
schools colleges + 1 public
school
Public universities 68,000 Parents + state 55,000
(parents pay an
average of Rs. 13,000
per year)
Public Colleges 9,572 State + parents 7,981
(provincial) (parents pay Rs. 1,591
per year on the
average).
Public Colleges 21,281 Parents pay Rs 2,525 18,756
(federal) for B.A on the average.
Source: Data obtained from several institutions

In short, by supporting English through a parallel system of elitist schooling, Pakistan’s ruling
elite acts as an ally of the forces of globalization, at least as far as the hegemony of English, which
globalization promotes, is concerned. The major effect of this policy is to weaken the local
languages and lower their status even in their home country. This, in turns, militates against
linguistic and cultural diversity; weakens the ‘have-nots’ even further and increases poverty by
concentrating the best-paid job in the hands of the international elite and the English-using elite of
the peripheries.

English, after all, is the language of the greatest power in the world. It spread as the language of
the colonies of Britain in African and Asian countries (Brutt-Griffler 2002). Then, when Britain
withdrew from its ex-colonies, English spread because of American economic power, American
control of world media and international commerce. This has been condemned as linguistic
imperialism by Phillipson (1992: 38-65) and Tove Skutnabb-Kangas calls English a ‘Killer
language’ (2000: 46).

Globalization will increase the power of English because it will open up more jobs for those who
know it. These jobs will be controlled by multinationals, which are dominated by the U.S.A. They
are also controlled by the international bureaucracy—United Nations, World Bank, IMF, donor
agencies etc.—which have started operating increasingly in ‘English’. This will increase the
demand for English schooling, which will make parents invest in English at the cost of their own
languages.

Let us look at the other languages that suffer because of the present policies.

Psychological and cultural costs of linguistic imperialism

As movements for the preservation of minor (or weaker) languages in Europe tell us, if a child is
told that his or her language is inferior, the message being conveyed is that he/she is inferior. In
short, one is giving a negative image to children by telling them that the ‘cultural capital’ they
possess is not capital at all but a stigma and a handicap. This makes children reject an aspect—

Tariq Rahman 7
and an essential one at that—of their legacy, history, culture and identity. What is created is
‘culture shame’—being ashamed of one’s own true identity.

Incidentally, the poor and less powerful classes, gender and communities have always been
ashamed of aspects of their identity. In South Asia, the caste system forced manual workers to
live miserable lives. This was unjust enough but the worst form of injustice is perpetrated by the
fact that the lower castes (or ajlaf, kammis, outcastes, Sudras etc) not only accept lower social
status but look down upon people lower in the social scale and even upon themselves. That is why
when people became literate and rose in affluence and power, they left their communities and
even started using names of groups with higher social respect. Here, ‘the number of Shaikhs and
the other categories’—Syed, Mughal and Pathan—increased phenomenally, while the
occupational “caste” groups registered a sharp decline’ (Ahmad, R. 1981: 115).

Moreover, there are many literary works in Urdu and other languages—not to mention one’s own
observation—that show how embarrassed the poor are by their houses, their clothes, their food,
their means of transportation and, of course, their languages. In short, the reality constructed by
the rich and the poor alike conspires to degrade, embarrass and oppress the less powerful, the less
affluent, the less ‘gifted’ of the human race. This relates to language-shame—being embarrassed
about one’s language—and hence to possible language death.

Language vitality in Pakistan

The year 2000 saw three excellent books on language death. David Crystal’s, Language Death;
Daniel Nettle and Suzanne Romaine’s Vanishing Voices and Tove Skutnabb-Kangas’, Linguistic
Genocide in Education or Worldwide Diversity and Human Rights. These books have made
linguists conscious that, with the standardization created by the modern state and the corporate
sector, the smaller languages of the world are dying. Either the speakers die or, which is more
often the case, they voluntarily shift to a powerful language which helps them survive but as
members of another human group rather than their own.

In Pakistan, as brought out earlier, the linguistic hierarchy is as follows: English, Urdu and local
language. In the N.W.F.P and Sindh, however, Pashto and Sindhi are seen as identity markers and
are spoken informally. In Punjab, unfortunately, there is widespread culture-shame about Punjabi.
Parents, teachers and the peer group combine to embarrass students about Punjabi. In all of the
elitist English-medium schools the author visited there were policies forbidding students from
speaking Punjabi. If anyone spoke it he or she was called ‘Paendu’ (rustic, village yokel) and
made fun of. Many educated parents speak Urdu rather than Punjabi with their children.

Pakistan TV plays use the term ‘Urdu-medium’ for lack of sophistication. The children of elitist
English-medium schools are indifferent to Urdu and claim to be completely bored by its literature.
They are proud to claim lack of competence in the subject even when they get ‘A’ grades in the
O’ and A’ level examination. They read only English books and not Urdu ones nor those in other
languages.

These attitudes are having a squeezing effect on Pakistani languages. Urdu is safe because of the
huge pool of people very proficient in it and especially because it is used in lower level jobs, the
media, education, courts, commerce and other domains in Pakistan. Punjabi is a huge language
and will survive despite culture shame and neglect. It is used in the Indian Punjab in many
domains of power and, what is even more significant, it is the language of songs, jokes, intimacy
and informality in both Pakistan and India. This makes it the language of private pleasure and if
so many people use it in this manner, it is not in real danger.

Sindhi, and Pashto are both big languages and their speakers are proud of them. Sindhi is also
used in the domains of power and is the major language of education in rural Sindh. Pashto is not
a major language of education nor is it used in the domains of power in Pakistan. However, its
speakers see it as an identity marker and it is used in some domains of power in Afghanistan. It

Tariq Rahman 8
too will survive though Pakistani city Pashto is now much adulterated with Urdu words. Educated
Pashtuns often code-switch between Pashto and Urdu or English. Thus, the language is under
some pressure.

Balochi and Brahvi are small languages under much pressure from Urdu. However, there is
awareness among educated Balochs that their languages must be preserved. As neither of these
languages is used in the domains of power they will survive as informal languages in the private
domain. However, the city varieties of these languages will become much Urdufied.

It is the over fifty small languages of Pakistan (Annexure A), mostly in Northern Pakistan, which
are under tremendous pressure. The Karakorum Highway, which has linked these areas to the
plains, has put much pressure on these languages. The author visited Gilgit and Hunza in August
2002 and met local language activists, among others. They all agree that their languages should be
preserved but they are so appreciative of the advantages of the road that they accept the threat to
their languages with equanimity. Urdu and English words have already entrenched themselves in
Shina and Burushaski and, as people emigrate to the cities, they are shifting to Urdu.

Even in the city of Karachi the Gujrati language is being abandoned, at least in the written form,
as young people seek to be literate in Urdu and English, the languages used in the domains of
power.

The languages that are about to become extinct are:

Badeshi exists in the Chail Valley of Swat and is probably a variety of Persian. However, Baart
(2003) confirms that it is under great pressure and may cease to be spoken soon.

Chilliso, spoken by a small number of people on the east bank of the Indus in District Kohistan, is
under great pressure by Shina. According to Hallberg, ‘A point which further underscores the idea
that language shift is taking place in this community is the fact that of the thirteen individuals who
were asked, four said that they spoke Chilisso in their home as a child but speak Shina in their
home today’ (Hallberg in SSNP Vol. 1, 1992: 122-123).

Domaaki is the language of the Doma people in Mominabad (Hunza). Backstrom reported only
500 speakers in 1992 (Backstrom in SSNP Vol. 2, 1992: 82). The present author visited the
village in 2002 and estimated 300 only.

Gowro is spoken on the east bank of the Indus in Distinct Kohistan mainly in the village of
Mahrin by the Gabar Khel class. Hallberg (in SSNP Vol. 1, 1992: 131). says that ‘it would seem
that the dominance of Shina may be slowly erasing the use of Gowro’. Baart (2003) confirms that
only a 1000 speakers are left now and it may be dying.

Ushojo is spoken in the Chail Valley of Swat. According to Sandra J. Decker of SIL, it was
spoken by 2000 people in 1990 (Decker in SSNP Vol. 1 1992: 66). She also reported that both
men and women spoke Pashto with her (ibid, 76). J. Baart (2003) suspects that the language is
under great pressure and is moribund.

The smaller languages of Chitral are also about to be lost. The Kalasha community, which follows
an ancient religion and lives in valleys in Chitral, is in danger of losing its languages. Some young
people are reported to have left the language when they converted to Islam (Decker in SSNP Vol.
5, 1992: 112). Other small languages, Yidgha, Phalura and Gawar-bati, are also losing their
vitality.

Two small languages, which would have been lost otherwise, are being recorded by local
language activists with the help of Baart. The first is Ormuri, the language of the village of
Kunigaram in South Waziristan, which was described as ‘a strong language in that area’ by

Tariq Rahman 9
Hallberg in 1992 (‘Hallberg in SSNP Vol. 4, 1992: 60). This is being recorded by Rozi Khan
Burki, a resident of the village, with the help of J. Baart.

The other one is Kundal Shahi which was discovered by Khwaja Abdur Rahman and is spoken in
the Neelam Valley in Azad Kashmir about 75 miles from Muzaffarabad. This is being preserved
by Khwaja Rahman with the help of Baart.

In short, while only the remotest and smallest of the languages of Pakistan are in danger of dying,
all other languages have decreased in stature. The undue prestige of English and Urdu has made
all other languages burdens rather than assets. This is the beginning of language sickness if not
death.

Conclusion
We have seen that the language policies of Pakistan, declared and undeclared, have increased both
ethnic and class conflict in the country. Moreover, our Westernized elites, in their own interests,
are helping the forces of globalization and threatening cultural and linguistic diversity. In this
process they are impoverishing the already poor and creating much resentment against the
oppression and injustice of the system.

Both globalization and the continuation of colonial language policies by the governments of
Pakistan have increased the pressure of English on all other languages. While this has also created
an increased awareness of language rights and movements to preserve languages, it has generally
resulted in more people learning English. In Pakistan this means that the poor are under more
pressure than before because they cannot afford expensive schools that ‘sell’ English at exorbitant
rates. As such, linguistic globalization is anti-poor, pro-elitist and exploitative.

While it may not be possible to reverse the trend of globalization, it is possible to promote the
concept of additive bilingualism rather than subtractive bilingualism. This means that we should
add to our repertoire of languages to gain power while retaining skills and pride in our own
languages. In order to do this the state and our education system should promote the concept of
linguistic rights.

There are tolerance-related and promotion-oriented rights. In Pakistan we have the former but not
the latter. This means that, while we keep paying lip service to our indigenous languages, we
create such market conditions that it becomes impossible to gain power, wealth or prestige in any
language except English and, to a lesser extent, Urdu. This must be changed and the change must
come by changing the market conditions. This is what was done in the case of Catalan, a language
while had been banned by General Franco of Spain, and which has been revived. Making Catalan
the language of jobs and the government of Catalonia (Hall 2001) has changed the power equation
and people started learning Catalan.

What we need in Pakistan are such promotion-oriented rights for our languages. What is needed
along with such rights is a good but fair system of schooling which will teach English and Urdu
but equally to all children and not as it is done now—very well to the elite and very badly to all
others (for details see Rahman 2002: Conclusion). Such steps might save us from the more
harmful linguistic effects of unjust and anti-poor language policies.

Tariq Rahman 10
 Annexure-1
MINOR LANGUAGES OF PAKISTAN
The number of language listed for Pakistan is 69. This chart however, lists only 58 as the major
languages are given in the text. The mutually intelligible varieties of Grater Punjabi (Siraiki,
Hindko, Potohari and Pahari) have not been included in this list.

Language Other Names Where Spoken Speakers Source

Aer Jikrio Goth around 200 in 1998 Grimes 2000
Deh 333, Hyderabad
Badeshi Badakhshi (variety of Bishigram, Chail Not known, maybe Grimes 2000
Persian) Valley (Swat, 400 Zaman 2002
Kohistan)
Bagri Bagria, Bagris, Baorias, Sindh and Punjab 200,000 Grimes 2000
Bahgri (nomadic between (in 1998)
India and Pakistan)
Balti Baltistani, Sbalti Baltistan 27,000-300,000 SSNP-2: 8 &
Grimes 2000
Bashgali Eastern Kativiri Gobar, Rumbur Valley 3700-5100 SSNP-5: 134
(Chitral)
Bateri Bateri Kohistani Indus Kohistan Batera 30,000 Breton 1997:
Baterawal, Baterawal village (East of Indus (in 1992) 200; Grimes
Kohistani North of Besham) 2000
Bhaya Kapri Goth near 700 Grimes 2000
Khipro Mirpur Khas (in 1998)
(Lower Sindh)
Burushaski Mishaski, Biltum, Hunza, Nagar, Yasin 55,000-60,000 (in SSNP-2: 37
Werchikwar Khajuna valleys (Northern 1981) Grimes 2000
areas)
Chilisso Chiliss, Galos Koli, Palas, Jalkot 2000-3000 Breton 1997: 200
Indus Kohistan (in 1992) & Grimes 2000
Dameli Gudoji, Damia, Damedi, Damel Valley 2000-5000 SSNP-5: 11
Damel (Southern Chitral) (in 1992)
Dehwari Deghwari Kalat, Mastung 10,000-13,000 Breton 1997: 200
(Central Balochistan) (in 1998) & Grimes 2000
Dhatki Dhati Tharparkar, Sanghar 200,000 plus Grimes 2000
(Sindh) (in 1987)
Dogri Punjabi, Pahari Azad Kashmir 1 million? Breton 1997: 200
Domaaki Domaski, Doma Mominabad (Hunza & 300 plus SSNP 2: 79;
Nagar) (in 2002) Grimes 2000;
personal
observation
Gawar-Bati Narsati, Nurisati, Southern Chitral, 1500 SSNP-5: 156
Gowari, Aranduiwar, Arandu, Kunar river (in 1992) Breton 1997: 200
Satr, Gowar-bati along Pakistan- & Grimes 2000
Afghanistan border
Ghera Sindhi Ghera, Bara Hyderabad Sindh 10,000 Grimes 2000
(in 1998)
Goaria Cities of Sindh 25,000 Grimes 2000
(in 1998)
Gowro Gabaro, Gabar Khel Indus Kohistan (on the 200 Breton 1997: 200
(different from Gawri) eastern bank, Mahrin (in 1990) &
village) Grimes 2000
Gujari Gujari, Gojri, Gogri Swat, Dir, Northern 300,000-700,000 SSNP-3: 96 &
Kashmir Gujuri, Gujuri areas, Azad Kashmir plus Grimes 2000
Rajasthani (in 1992)
Gujrati Gujrati Karachi, other parts of 100,000 Grimes 2000
Sindh

Tariq Rahman 11
Gurgula Marwari, Ghera (Lexical Karachi, cities of 35,000 Grimes 2000
similarity to Ghera) Sindh (in 1998)
Hazargi Hazara, Hezareh, Quetta 220,000 Grimes 2000
Hezare’i (similar to (in 1998)
Persian)
Jadgali Jatgali, Jatki, Jat Southern Balochistan 100,000 Grimes 2000
and Southwest Sindh (in 1998)
Jandavra Jhandoria Southern Sindh from 5000 Grimes 2000
Hyderabad to Mirpur (in 1998)
Khas
Kabutra Nat, Natra Umarkot, Kunri, Nara 1,000 Grimes 2000
Dhoro (Sindh) (in 1998)
Kachchi Cutch, Kachi Karachi 50,000 Grimes 2000
(in 1998)
Kalami Bashgharik, Dir Kalam (Swat) 60,000-70,000 Baart 1999: 4
Kohistani, Bashkarik, Dir Kohistan (in 1995)
Diri, Kohistana, Dirwali,
Kalami Kohistani, Gouri,
Kohistani, Bashkari,
Gawri, Garwi
Kalasha Bashgali, Kalashwar, Kalash Valleys 2900-5700 SSNP-5: 11
Urtsuniwar, (Chitral) southern (in 1992)
Kalashamon, Kalash
Kalkoti None reported Dir Kohistan in Kalkot 6000 Breton 1997:
village (in 2002) 200; Zaman
2002
Kamviri Skekhani, Kamdeshi, Chitral (southern end 2000 SSNP-5: 143;
Lamertiviri, Kamik of Bashgal Valley) (in 1992) Grimes 2000
Kashmiri Keshuri Kashmir & diaspora 105,000 Breton 1997:
(in 1993) 200; Grimes:
2000
Kati Bashgali, Kativiri, (Chitral) Gobar Linkah 3700-5100 Grimes 2000
Nuristani Valleys (in 1992)
Khetrani None reported Northeast Balochistan Few thousand Grimes 2000
(in 1987)
Khowar Chitrali, Qashqari, Chitral, Northern 250,000 plus (in SSNP-5: 11
Arniya, Patu, Kohwar, areas, Ushu in northern 1993) Breton 1997:
Kashkara Swat 200; Grimes
2000
Kohistani Indus Kohistani, Kalami, Indus Kohistan West 220,000 Grimes 2000
Dir Kohistani, Kohiste, bank of river (in 1993)
Khili, Maiyon, Maiya,
Shuthun, Mair
Koli Kachi Kachi, Koli, (Lower Sindh) around 170,000 Grimes 2000
Kachi Koli Towns of Tando (in 1998)
Allahyar & Tando
Adam
Koli Parkari Parkari (Lexical Lower Thar Desert 30,000 Grimes 2000
similarity with Marwari Nagar Parkar (in 1980)
Bhil and Tharadari)
Kundal Shahi Neelam Valley, Azad 500 (in 2003) Baart and
Kashmir Rehman 2003
Lasi Lassi Las Bela District 15,000 Grimes 2000
(south east (in 1998)
Balochistan)
Loarki Sindh---various places 25,000 Grimes 2000
(in 1998)
Marwari Rajasthani, Meghwar, South Punjab north of 220,000 Grimes 2000
(southern) jaiselmer, Marawar Dadu Nawabshah (in 1998)

Tariq Rahman 12
Memoni Similarities to Sindhi Karachi Unknown Grimes 2000
and Gujrati
Od Odki Scattered in Sindh & 50,000 Grimes 2000
south Punjab (in 1998)
Ormuri Buraki, Bargista Kaniguram 3000? SSNP-4: 54
(south Waziristan) Grimes 2000
some in Afghanistan
Pashai Refugees from 5000? Breton 1997: 200
Afghanistan
Persian Farsi, Madaglashti Balochistan, Shishikoh 2000-3000 SSNP-5: 11
Persian in Chitral Dari, Valley in Chitral, (in 1992) Grimes 2000
Tajik, Badakhshi Quetta, Peshawar, etc.
Phalura Dangarik, Ashreti, 7 villages near Drosh, 8600 SSNP-5: 11
Tangiri, Palula, Biyori, Chitral possibly 1 (in 1990)
Phalulo village in Dir Kohistan
Sansi None reported (Lexical North-western Sindh 10,000 Grimes 2000
similarity with Urdu) (in 1998)
Shina Sina, Shinaki Giligit, Kohistan, 500,000 SSNP-2: 93
Baltistan
Sindhi Bhil Bhil Badin, Matla, Thatta 50,000 Grimes 2000
(Sindh) (in 1998)
Sochi Dialect of Sansi with Sindh- various places 100,000 Grimes 2000
83% lexical similarity.
Torwali Kohistani, Bahrain Bahrain (Swat) 60,000 Breton 1997:
Kohistani 200; Lunsford
2001
Ushojo Upper part of Bishigram Chail Vally, Swat 1000 Zaman 2002
(Ushuji) Valley in Swat District (in 2002)
Vaghri Vaghri Koli Sindh (many places) 10,000 Grimes 2000
(in 1998)
Wadiyara Wadiyare Between Mirpurkhas 180,000 Grimes 2000
Koli and Matli
Wakhi Kheek, Kheekwar, Northern ends of 9,000 plus SSNP-2: 61
Wakhani, Wakhigi, Hunza & Chitral (in 1992)
Wakhan
Wanetsi Tarino, Chalgari Harnai 95,000 SSNP-4: 51
(East of Quetta) (in 1998) Breton 1997: 200
Grimes 2000
Yidgha Yidghah, Luthuhwar Upper Lutkoh Valley 5000-6000 SSNP-5: 11
(Western Chitral) (in 1991) Grimes 2000

Tariq Rahman 13
 References

Abdullah, Syed. 1976. Pakistan Mein Urdu Ka Masla. Lahore: Maktaba Khayaban-e-Adab.

Ahmad, Rafiuddin. 1981. The Bengali Muslim 1871-1906: A Quest for Identity Delhi: Oxford UP.
2nd-ed. 1988.

Ahmed, Feroze. 1992. ‘The language question in Sind’. In Zaidi, Akbar S. (ed.) 1992. Regional
Imbalances and the Regional Question in Pakistan. Lahore: Vanguard Books.

Alavi, H. 1987. ‘Pakistan and Islam: ethnicity and ideology’. In Halide, F. & Alavi, H. (eds.)
1987. State and ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan London: Macmillans and New
York: Monthly Review Press.

Anderson, Benedict. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism. London: Verso, Repr. edn. 1991.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1991. Language and Symbolic Power. (ed.) John B. Thompson. Trans. From the
French by Gino Raymond and Mathew Adamson. Cambridge: Policy Press. Edition used,
1994 reprint.

Baart, Joan L.G. 1999. A Sketch of Kalam Kohistani Grammar. Islamabad: National Institute of
Pakistan Studies & Summer Institute of Linguistics.

------- 2003. ‘Interview with the Present Author’, 10 August, Islamabad.

Baart, Joan and Rehman, Khwaja A. 2003. ‘The Language of the Kandal Shahi Qureshis in Azad
Kashmir’, Unpublished manuscript [I am grateful to the authors for showing it to me].

Breton, Roland J. L. 1997. Atlas of the Languages and Ethnic Communities of South Asia. New
Delhi & London: Sage Publications.

Brutt-Griffler, Janina. 2002. World English: A Study of Its Development Clevedon: Multilingual
Matters.

Census. 2001. 1998 Census Report of Pakistan Islamabad: Population Census Organization
Statistics Division. Govt of Pakistan.

Cohen, Stephen P. 1994. The Pakistan Army. Edition used. Karachi: Oxford University Press,
1998

Cooper, Robert L. 1989. Language Planning and Social Change. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.

Crystal, David. 2000. Language Death Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Edwards, John. 1994. Multilingualism London: Routledge.

GOP. 1966. Report of the Commission on Student’s Problems and Welfare and Problems
Islamabad : Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan

Grimes, Barbara F (ed). 2000. ‘Pakistan’. In Ethnologue: Languages of the World. 14th Edition
Dallas, Texas; Summer Institute of Linguistics. pp, 588-598.

Tariq Rahman 14
Hall, Jacqueline. 2001. Convivencia In Catalonia: Languages Living together Barcelona: Fundcio
Jaume Bofill.

HBWI. 1982. History of Bangladesh War of Independence. Dhaka: Government of Bangladesh,

Ministry of Information.

Jahan, Rounaq. 1972. Pakistan: Failure in National Integration. New York and London:
Columbia University Press.

LAD-B. Legislative Assimbly Debates of Baluchistan (dates and other details follow in the text)

LAD-F: Legislative Assembly Debates of the North-West Frontier Province (dates and other
details follow in the text).

Lunsford, Wayne A. 2001. ‘An Overview of Linguistic Structures in Torwali: A Language of

Northern Pakistan’, unpublished M.A. Thesis, The University of Texas, Arligton.

Mansoor, Sabiha. 1993. Punjabi, Urdu, English in Pakistan: A Sociolinguistic Study. Lahore:
Vanguard.

Nettle, Daniel and Romaine, Suzanne. 2000. Vanishing Voices: the Extinction of the World’s
Languages New York: Oxford University Press.

Phillipson, Robert. 1992. Linguistic Imperialism London: Oxford University Press.

Rahman, Tariq . 1996. Language and Polities in Pakistan Karachi, Oxford University Press.

--------. 2002 Language, Ideology and Power, Language Learning Among the Muslims of
Pakistan and North India Karachi: Oxford University Press.

Skutnabb-Kangas; Tove, 2000. Linguistic Genocide In Education or Worldwide Diversity and

Human Rights London: Lawrence Erlbaum.

SSNP. 1992. Sociolinguistic Survey of Northern Pakistan 5 vols. Islamabad: National Institute of
Pakistan Studies and Summer Institute of Linguistics.

Zaman, Muhammad. 2002. Report on a Language Survey Trip to the Bishigram Valley
[http://www.geocities.com/kcs_kalam/ushoji.html].

Tariq Rahman 15