141. QUIRINO BOLAÑOS v. J.M. TUASON & CO.

, INC

FACTS:

Appellants J.M. Tuason Inc and People’s Homesite & Housing Corp., their agents and all
other persons acting in their behalf were adjudged and enjoined from disturbing the
physical possession of petitioner-appellee Bolaños the parcel of land comprising of 13.2619
hectares said notice having been published in a newspaper of general circulation. Hence,
they then filed an appeal before the SC.

ISSUE:

W/N THE PETITION IS ALREADY BARRED BY THE JUDGMENT IN G.R. NO. L-4935 ENTITLED
J. M. TUASON & CO. INC., ET AL. VS. QUIRINO BOLAÑOS, PROMULGATED ON 28 MAY 1954
(95 Phil. 106)?

DISCUSSION:

NO. Leaving aside all the other issues raised in appellants’ brief about res judicata,
conclusiveness of judgment and conclusiveness of the respondents-appellants’ Torrens
Titles, it is obvious that the subject matter of appellee’s petition was clearly beyond the
competence and jurisdiction of the trial court sitting as it did in this case as a land
registration court, this, even on the assumption, which is most doubtful, that such a general
against-the-whole world preliminary injunction could be sought in any court, it being
axiomatic that an auxiliary remedy cannot be secured unless there is a principal remedy to
which it pertains.

Once a land registration proceeding is terminated and a corresponding decree has been
issued, the only matter of possession of the land involved the remains within the jurisdiction
of the Land Registration Court is in regard to the issuance of the writ of possession, if one
should be needed.

No provision of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) or any other law has been cited by
appellees and We know of none which authorizes the land registration court to resolve
issues of possession, in any of its aspects, after the original registration proceedings have
come to an end and a writ of possession has already been issued and implemented. Section
112 of Act 496 which is the only provision in the said law empowering the land registration
court to issue post or after-registration orders refers exclusively to amendments and
alterations of the title issued and has nothing to do with possession of the land at all.

here is no showing that there is now pending in the lower court either an action or any kind
of proceeding in which appellees are asking that Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 37677
and 37686 of appellant Tuason should be annulled, assuming without deciding that such a
relief could still be available to appellees inspite of Tuason vs. Bolaños, supra. Such being
the case, the trial court placed the cart before the horse in issuing its questioned order, for
how could anyone be enjoined from disturbing the possession of somebody whose right to
such possession has not even been alleged, much less established in an appropriate
proceeding?

HELD:

Appealed order is declared to have been issued beyond the jurisdiction of the court a quo
and it is hereby declared null and void and set aside, costs against the appellees.
142. JOSE A. vs. CA

FACTS:

Petitioners Jose A. Linzag and the heirs of Cristobal A. Linzag are members of the non-
Christian tribe known as the Kalagan tribe of Mati, Davao Oriental who inherited from their
deceased parents, Datu Joaquin Linzag and Regina Agustino, a parcel of land, otherwise
known as Waniban Island, designated as Lot No. 1222 of the Mati Cadastre, with an area of
36,575 square meters.

Jose Linzag and one Patricio Cunanan filed a claim over the contested lot. Likewise one
Orlando L. Salvador filed a motion to award Lot No. 1222, as an uncontested lot, in his
favor. He alleged therein that he had acquired the rights of Patricio Cunanan for sufficient
consideration and that the other claimant, Cristobal Linzag, had withdrawn his answer/claim
in favor of Patricio Cunanan and/or his successors-in-interest, thereby making said lot as a
"non-contested lot."

The cadastral court issued an order declaring Salvador and his predecessors-in-interests
had been in peaceful, open, continuous, exclusive and adverse possession of Lot No. 1222,
in concept of an owner for a period of at least 30 years; that Salvador was the successor-in-
interest of original claimant Patricio S. Cunanan; and that the lot was a non-contested lot.

After the Order became final, the cadastral court issued an Order 6 directing issuance of the
decree of registration. In due time, Decree No. N-137262 was issued. Then on 13 October
1971, pursuant to said Decree, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. O-2039 7 covering Lot
No. 1222 was issued in the name of Orlando L. Salvador. On 4 February 1977, petitioners
herein filed an action for annulment of title and reconveyance with damages against private
respondent Patricio Cunanan and Orlando Salvador

ISSUE:

W/N A PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF TITLE FILED AND DISMISSED BY THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS A BAR (RES JUDICATA) TO THE FILING OF A PETITION FOR
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS OF AN LRC CASE RENDERED
BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SITTING AS A CADASTRAL COURT?

DISCUSSION:

YES. The doctrine of res judicata is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of
jurisprudence and is founded upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the
common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity which makes it to the interest of the
State that there should be an end to litigation — republicae ut sit litium, and (2) the
hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause — nemo debet
bis vexari et eadem causa. A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quit to
the will and neglect of individuals and prefer gratification of the litigious disposition on the
part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness.

The claim of petitioners that the judgment in Civil Case No. 571 does not bar CA-G.R. SP
No. 35877 because the former was for annulment of title only, while the latter was for
annulment of the judgment, is palpably unmeritorious. There is here a clear case of hair-
splitting. It is settled that a party cannot evade or avoid the application of res judicata by
simply varying the form of his action or adopting a different method of presenting his case.
24 This is as good a time as any to remind lawyers that any attempt to do so merits the
Court's condemnation for being an abuse or misuse of the rules of procedure.
The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals in an action to
annual a judgment of a Regional Trial Court (or of its predecessor the Court of First
Instance) is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, where only question of law
may be raised.

HELD:

PETITION IS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT.

143. HEIRS OF THE LATE PEDRO PINOTE v. HON. JUDGE CEFERINO E. DULAY

FACTS:

Francisco P. Otto, representing his mother Petra Pinote, filed in the CFI of Cebu, Branch
XVI, at Lapu-Lapu City, a verified petition for reconstitution of the original certificate of title
to Lot 2381 of the Opon Cadastre, which, as shown by a certified copy of the Municipal
Index of Decrees, was supposedly adjudicated to Saturnino, Juana, Irineo, Pedro, and
Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote, under Decree No. 230607 dated May 7, 1934 in Cadastral
Case No. 20, LRC Rec. No. 1004.

By an order dated November 6, 1978, the court set the case for hearing on February 22,
1979 at 8:30 A.M. A copy of the notice of hearing was ordered to be published in the Official
Gazette, furnished to all the adjoining owners, and posted by the Sheriff at the main
entrances of the Provincial Capitol Building, the City Hall, and the Public Market of Lapu-
Lapu City, at least 30 days prior to the date of hearing. The court also ordered copies of the
notice and order to be sent to the Registers of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City and Cebu, the
Director of Lands, and the Commissioner of Land Registration, directing them to show
cause, if any, why the petition may not be granted.

It does not appear, however, that notices were sent to each of the registered co-owners —
Saturnino, Juana, Irineo, Pedro and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote, or their heirs, so that
they could have been heard on the petition. As there was no opposition to the petition when
it was called for hearing, the lower court commissioned its Clerk of Court to receive the
evidence.

Based on the Commissioner’s Report, as well as the oral and documentary evidence
submitted by Francisco Otto in support of his petition, the Court issued an order on June 7,
1979, directing the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City to reconstitute the original
certificate of title of Lot 2381 of the Opon Cadastre, upon payment of the corresponding
fees, in the names of Saturnino Pinote, married to Maria Igot, Juana, Irineo, Petra (not
Pedro) and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote. The court relied on the supposed abstract of the
decision of the cadastral court, the technical descriptions, plan and report of the Land
Registration Commission which are not found in the records before SC.

On October 1, 1979, Atty. Porfirio Ellescas, as alleged counsel for the heirs of Pedro, Juana
and Saturnino Pinote, supposedly all deceased, filed a motion for reconsideration of the
court’s order, and sought the re-opening of the proceedings and the rectification of the June
7, 1979 order, for, while Otto’s main petition for reconstitution based on the Municipal Index
of Decrees, alleged that Lot 2381 was decreed in the names of Irineo, Juana,
Saturnino,Pedro, and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote, the court’s order of June 7, 1979
ordered the reconstitution of the title in the names of Saturnino, Juana, Irineo, Petra
(instead of Pedro) and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote. The heirs of Pedro Pinote claimed that
they “learned of the error” only on September 27, 1979 through their counsel, who made
the inquiry and obtained a copy of the court order.

On December 2, 1979, the court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration.
The petitioners heirs of the late Pedro Pinote filed their notice of appeal. But court denied
due course to the appeal on the ground of tardiness as the petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration, which the court declared to be pro forma, did not suspend the finality of
the court’s June 7, 1979 order. Hence, the petition for mandamus and/or certiorari.

ISSUE:

(1) whether the petitioners’ appeal is timely; and

(2) whether the reconstitution proceedings should be reopened and the order of
reconstitution dated June 7, 1979 should be rectified or amended.

DISCUSSION:

(1) YES. First, because the petitioners’ appeal was not tardy. Their motion for
reconsideration of the order dated June 7, 1979 was not pro forma. The motion for
reconsideration was timely. The petitioner had not been separately notified of the
reconstitution proceedings except by constructive notice through the published notice of
hearing. They discovered the assailed order dated June 7, 1979 on September 27,
1979, through Atty. Ellescas. They had up to October 27, 1979 to either file a motion
for reconsideration or appeal. They filed a motion for reconsideration on October 1,
1979 after only four (4) days of the 30-day appeal period had elapsed, so, they had 26
days left to appeal. On December 11, 1979, they received the court’s order denying
their motion for reconsideration (p. 23, Rollo). They filed a notice of appeal, cash appeal
bond and a motion for extension of time to file a record on appeal on January 4, 1980
or 24 days later, with two (2) or more days of the appeal period to spare. Their record
on appeal was actually filed on January 8, 1980, within the 10-day extension which they
sought from the court (p. 29, Rollo). Clearly, their appeal was seasonably filed.

(2) YES. As the petition for reconstitution of title was a proceeding in rem,
compliance with the requirements of R.A. 26 is a condition sine qua non for the
conferment of jurisdiction on the court taking cognizance of the petition. Considering
that both the petition and the court’s notice of hearing, referred to the reconstitution of
the title of Lot 2381 in the names of the registered co-owners, Saturnino Pinote married
to Maria Igot, Juana, Irineo, Pedro and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote, the cadastral
court had jurisdiction only to grant or deny the prayer of the petition as published in the
notice of hearing.

The court could not receive evidence proving that Petra Pinote, instead of Pedro, is a
registered co-owner of Lot 2381. The reconstitution or reconstruction of a certificate of
title literally and within the meaning of Republic Act No. 26 denotes restoration of the
instrument which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original form and
condition. The purpose of the reconstitution of any document, book or record is to have
the same reproduced, after observing the procedure prescribed by law, in the same
form they were when the loss or destruction occurred. Hence, in Bunagan, Et Al. v. CFI
of Cebu, Et Al., 97 SCRA 72, where the certificate of title was decreed in the names of
"Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong," the reconstitution of the title in the names of
"spouses Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong" was held to be "a material change that
cannot be authorized."
It was only when Pedro’s name (and in effect, his interest in Lot 2381) disappeared from
the court’s order of reconstitution that his heirs had cause to rise in arms as it were, and
ask for the reopening of the case.

There is no gainsaying the need for courts to proceed with extreme caution in proceedings
for reconstitution of titles to land under R.A. 26. Experience has shown that this proceeding
has many times been misused as a means of divesting a property owner of the title to his
property. Through fraudulent reconstitution proceedings, he wakes up one day to discover
that his certificate of title has been cancelled and replaced by a reconstituted title in
someone else’s name.

Courts, therefore, should not only require strict compliance with the requirements of R.A. 26
but, in addition, should ascertain the identity of every person who files a petition for
reconstitution of title to land. If the petition is filed by someone other than the registered
owner, the court should spare no effort to assure itself of the authenticity and due execution
of the petitioner’s authority to institute the proceeding.

HELD:

the petition for certiorari is granted.

144. ESPIRITU BUNAGAN v. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU

FACTS:

Herein private respondents Dionisia Icong and her children named Filemon, Manuel,
Arsenio, and Napoleon, all surnamed Ompad, filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a
petition for the reconstitution of the original certificate of title covering Lot 1660 of the Opon
Cadastre in the name of "Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong, spouses," and once
reconstituted, to cancel the same and another one issued in the name of "Filemon Ompad.

The petition was opposed by the herein petitioner, Espiritu Bunagan, upon the ground that
he is the owner of the lot in question, having bought the same from Guadalupe Lumongsod
and Perpetua Inso, legitimate heirs of the late Antonio Ompad; and that Dionisia Icong is
merely a trustee of the lot in behalf of Antonio Ompad.

On April 22, 1967, the petitioners therein moved to dismiss the opposition, contending that
the said opposition constitute an adverse claim against the rights of Antonio Ompad and
Dionisia Icong which cannot be entertained by the cadastral court. Acting upon the petition
and the opposition, the cadastral court ruled that it could not entertain the claim of the
oppositor which should be ventilated in an ordinary civil action, and gave due course to the
petition.

Thereafter, Original Certificate of Title No. RO-0675 was issued in the name of "spouses
Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong.” On November 22, 1967, Espiritu Bunagan filed an
urgent motion to correct the order of June 17, 1967 and the original certificate of title No.
RO-9675, by substituting, as the registered owners of Lot 1660. Now, the petitioners have
filed the instant recourse to annul and set aside the said orders.
ISSUE:

W/N Section 112 of the Land Registration Act which authorizes alteration or amendment of
the title upon proper petition is applicable for reconstitution of titles?

DECISION:

NO. The court finds petition as meritorious. The reconstitution or reconstruction of a

The purpose of the reconstitution of any document, book or record is to have the same
reproduced, after observing the procedure prescribed by law, in the same form they were
when the loss or destruction occurred. If the certificate of title covering the lot was decreed
in the form of "Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong," as in this case, the reconstituted
certificate of title should likewise be in the name of the owners as they appeared in the lost
or destroyed certificate of title sought to be reconstituted. Any change that should be made
in the ownership of the property should be the subject of a separate suit.

In the instant case, it appears that the petition filed on December 19, 1966 is not merely for
the reconstitution of a lost or destroyed certificate of title. Dionisia Icong and her children
also wanted the correction of the name of the owners of the lot from "Antonio Ompad and
Dionisia Icong" to "spouses Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong" which involves a material
change in the certificate of title, a change which, not being consented to by the herein
petitioners whose interests are affected thereby, cannot be authorized under the summary
proceedings for reconstitution prescribed in Republic Act No. 26. A change of this nature
raises an issue which should be ventilated and decided in an ordinary civil action.

HELD:

The orders of June 17, 1967 and January 4, 1968 are modified in the sense that the petition
for reconstitution is granted only insofar as it orders the reconstitution of the original
certificate of title covering Lot 1660 of the Opon Cadastre in the name of "Antonio Ompad
and Dionisia Icong" and the Register of Deeds of Lapulapu City is hereby ordered to correct
the name of the registered owners in Original Certificate of Title No. RO-0675 accordingly.

145. REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

The petitioner seeks to reversal the granting of reconstitution of title in favor of the
respondents. On March 7, 1987, fire gutted the Office of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan.
On March 16, 1989, private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan a
Petition for Reconstitution of TCT No. T-304198, on the ground that its original was among
the documents destroyed in the conflagration.

During the hearing, private respondents submitted in evidence, among others, the following
"Certification of Publication" issued by the Director of the National Printing Office.” They did
not submit nor offer in evidence actual copies of the June 12, 1989 and June 19, 1989
issues of the Official Gazette. According to the Republic, the certification of publication
issued by the National Printing Office is not sufficient proof of publication, the best evidence
being the presentation of the copies of the Official Gazette where the notice was included.
On October 9, 1989, the trial court issued an Order granting private respondents' petition
for reconstitution. The Order was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on February 28, 1991.

ISSUE:

W/N the MERE CERTIFICATION OF PUBLICATION as evidence submitted by the respondents

DISCUSSION:

YES. Reconstitution of title under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26 ("An Act Providing A Special
Procedure For The Reconstitution Of Torrens Certificates Of Title Lost Or Destroyed") is an
action in rem, which means it is one directed not only against particular persons, but
against the thing itself.6 Its object is to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make
any objection against the right sought to be enforced, hence the judgment therein is binding
theoretically upon the whole world. The jurisdictional requirements of publication, posting
and service of notice are provided in Section 13 of R.A. No. 26.

They seek to provide constructive notice to the whole world of the in rem reconstitution
proceedings. Their purpose is to apprise all interested parties of the existence of such action
and to give them ample time to intervene in the proceeding.8 They bring in the whole world
as a party to the case and vest the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.

Anent the publication requirement, R. A. No. 26 obligates the petitioner to prove to the trial
court two things, namely that: (1) its Order giving due course to the petition for
reconstitution and setting it for hearing was published twice, in two consecutive issues of
the Official Gazette; and (2) such publication was made at least thirty days prior to the date
of hearing.

In the case at bench, private respondents were able to show both elements
through the certification of the Director of the National Printing Office, a
government official who enjoys the undisputed presumption of regularity in the
performance of the functions of his office. We note that, on the other hand, mere
submission of the subject Official Gazette issues would have evidenced only the
first element.

Petitioner's reliance on the Best Evidence Rule is erroneous. What must be proved
under Section 13, R. A. No. 26 is not the content of the Order published in the
Official Gazette, but the fact of two-time publication in successive issues thereof
at least thirty days before the hearing date.

This Court has consistently accepted the probative value of certifications of the Director of
the National Printing Office in reconstitution cases. In Register of Deeds of Malabon v. RTC,
Malabon, MM, Br. 170 and Republic v. Court of Appeals, the parties seeking reconstitution
did not submit copies of the Official Gazette in evidence, but merely relied on certifications
comparable to the one at bench. In both cases, the granting of reconstitution by the trial
court was reversed. But the reversals were not made on the basis of the failure to present
the Official Gazette issues. They were, instead, both grounded on the fact — as clearly
evidenced by the National Printing Office Director's certification — that the publications were
made less than thirty days prior to the date of the hearing. There is no reason for us to
deviate from our earlier rulings and now require the submission of Official Gazette issues to
satisfy the jurisdictional requirement in reconstitution cases.

HELD:

PETITION IS DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT.

146. ALABANG DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. HON. MANUEL E. VALENZUELA,

FACTS:

The petition for certiorari and prohibition filed against the order of reconstitution alleges
that the petitioners are registered owners as evidenced by certain Transfer Certificates of
Title all issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal covering parcels of land located at Barrio
Cupang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that after hearing the Court issued an order dated April
19, 1969, by virtue of which the Register of Deeds of Rizal issued among others sixty-seven
(67) Transfer Certificates of Titles; that said parcels of land surrounded by a high perimeter
wall on their boundaries were sold to innocent purchasers in good faith for valuable
consideration as part of Alabang Hills Village Subdivision, owned by petitioner Alabang
Development Corporation, many of whom were already issued in turn the corresponding
Transfer Certificates of Title in their favor; and that these innocent purchasers for value
have been in open, actual, adverse, continuous, notorious and uninterrupted possession of
their respective lands since 1969.

Petitioners further alleged that in the reconstitution case below, filed only in 1977, herein
respondents as petitioners therein sought to reconstitute a lost certificate of title, original
and owner's duplicate copy (allegedly lost or destroyed over 30 years earlier in the last
World War II) and issued allegedly pursuant to Decree No. 15170 dated March 4, 1914 in
the name of their predecessor-in-interest, deceased Manuela Aquial, covering two lots, 2
and 4, indicated in Plan II-4374, situated in Barrio San Dionisio, Parañaque, Rizal, now
Barrio Cupang, Muntinlupa, Rizal; that on the basis of the technical descriptions contained in
petitioners' titles and as appear in the alleged title sought to be reconstituted, the latter
overlap the parcels of land owned by petitioners and duly registered in their names; that
petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, actual, continuous,
adverse, notorious possession since time immemorial of these parcels of land and that they
have been paying religiously the real estate taxes thereon up to the present time; that
petitioners being actual possessors and registered owners were not served with notice of
the hearing of the petition for reconstitution in violation of Republic Act 26 such that the
court a quo acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in granting the reconstitution and
that there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.

ISSUE:

W/N the petition for reconstitution should have been granted?

DISCUSSION:
NO. There are a number of other observations in the Bernal case that would warrant
rejection of the totality of the evidence presented by respondents in support of their petition
for reconstitution but a discussion thereon would be superfluous since the weight of all such
other evidence is anchored upon the veracity or falsity of Survey Plan II-4374 as
determined by the office of the Bureau of Lands commissioned by the Court for that
purpose, and also considering, as stated earlier, that this is a special civil action wherein a
ruling on jurisdiction is sufficient to adjudicate the matter in controversy.

The herein respondents attribute laches to the petitioners for not appealing from the order
of the lower court denying their motion to intervene and motion for new trial hence allowing
the said order/decision to become final. There is no laches nor finality of any decision to
speak of since the decision under question is herein pronounced null and void for having
been rendered without jurisdiction. Prescinding therefrom, as admitted by themselves in
their comment, the judgment of reconstitution is "ineffective" against the owners of lands
covered thereby who were not joined as parties in the proceeding.

As the Court ruled in the Bernal case on the matter of intervention "a valid judgment
cannot even be rendered where there is want of indispensable parties" such as petitioners
who hold subsisting Torrens Titles to the properties in question and "this aspect of the case
commands the joinder of indispensable parties to allow them to uphold their interests based
upon the Torrens titles they hold overrides any question of late intervention." Petitioners
have precisely availed of the proper, speedy and adequate remedy of the present special
civil action of certiorari and prohibition to annul and set aside for want of jurisdiction the
decision and all proceedings of respondent judge.

HELD:

The petition for reconstitution is ordered dismissed.

147. ESSO STANDARD EASTERN INC vs. ALFONSO LIM

FACTS:

The subject matter of litigation in the above-mentioned cases is a parcel of urban land, with
an approximate area of 20,000 square meters, valued at Two Million Pesos more or less at
the time the cases were filed, and located at Poro Point, San Fernando, La Union.

The said parcel of land was originally owned by one Miguel Flores who sold it to Leon Rivera
on December 6, 1926. By a document executed by Leon Rivera himself in 1926, he and
Angel Salanga were jointly invested in common ownership over the property.The parcel of
land was brought under the Torrens System in Land Registration Case No. 259 (Exhibit "J")
sometime in 1933.

Earlier, on January 28, 1930, in a deed of sale duly executed, notarized, and registered,
Leon Rivera and Angel Salanga for and in consideration of the amount of Four Thousand
Eight Hundred Pesos sold the land in question to the Standard Oil Company of New York
which was the predecessor corporation of Standard Vacuum Oil Company which in turn was
the predecessor corporation of Esso Standard Eastern, Inc.

On August 26, 1955, the appellee's predecessor-in-interest, Standard Vacuum Oil Co., filed
a petition for the reconstitution of title covering Lot 4, which petition for reconstitution was
docketed as Administrative Case No. 316-R, Special Proceeding Record No. 145. The
Standard Vacuum Oil Co., alleged that the Original Certificate of Title No. 503753 covering
Lot 4 was lost and destroyed during the last world war.

The appellee, in the course of the reconstitution proceedings, submitted an alleged plan of
the property. The petition for reconstitution was granted by the Court of First Instance of La
Union. The Standard Vacuum Oil Co., was issued a reconstituted Original Certificate of Title
No. RO-2321(N.A.).

Appellant Alfonso Lim filed Civil Case No. 2162 for the annulment of the reconstituted
Original Certificate of Title No. RO-2321 issued in favor of the appellee and for declaration
as the lawful and rightful owner of the property in question by prescriptive acquisition.

ISSUE:

W/N that the reconstitution of title over Lot 4, Psu-148885, the property in question, was
validly done in spite of the clear showing that there was absolute no proven title to
reconstitute?

DISCUSSION:

YES. Appellants contend that the requirements of Section 15, Republic Act No. 26, that the
destroyed or lost certificate of title which may be reconstituted is one that was in force at
the time of loss or destruction was not complied with.

This argument has no merit. It is clear from the records that in the reconstitution
proceeding, Esso was able to show its valid title over the property in question. It was able to
prove that it lost its owner's duplicate certificate of title when its building was burned in
Manila while the original thereof was lost or destroyed in the custody of the Register of
Deeds of La Union when its offices were also burned. Both destructions were during World
War II. Furthermore, the order in the reconstitution proceedings, being in rem in nature,
has long become final and unassailable. The findings of the court therein can no longer be
opened for review especially with the kind of speculative challenge posed by the appellant.

The salvaged index cards of the Commissioner of Land Registration show that Angel Salanga
and Leon Rivera applied for the registration of four parcels of land and that Decrees 503752
and 503753 were issued for these parcels on March 6, 1933. The certified copy of Decree
No. 503752 covers lots Numbered 1, 2, and 3 in the names of Salanga and Rivera. It
logically follows that Decree No. 503753 covers Lot No. 4, the contested area. The records
of the Land Registration Commission corroborate the other evidence for the appellee in this
case.

HELD:

The judgment of the lower court is AFFIRMED

148. LENCIA ALIPOON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

On December 18, 1930, pursuant to a Cadastral Decree of Registration No. 414946 spouses
Fausto Alipoon and Silveria Duria, parents of herein petitioners, were declared as owners in
fee simple of Lot No. 663 situated in Cauayan, Negros Occidental.
Pursuant to the aforementioned Decree, Original Certificate of Title No. 28203 was issued on
January 30, 1931 over Lot No. 663 in the names of spouses Fausto Alipoon and Silveria
Duria. Thereafter, OCT No. 28203 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-17224 was
issued on March 16, 1933 in the name of Marcelina Alvarez, married to Agripino Alvarez,
and mother of respondents.

acting on a petition (for reconstitution of title) filed by Manuel Concha in behalf of private
respondents Alvarez, et al., the Regional Trial Court, Branch 47, Bacolod City issued an
order requiring the Register of Deeds to reconstitute TCT No. T-17224 using the owners
duplicate copy in the name of Marcelina Alvarez as basis thereof. However, when private
respondents went to the Office of the Register of Deeds to have their title reconstituted,
they were informed that a reconstituted title (OCT No. RO-12890 [N.A.]) over said Lot No.
663 was already issued in the names of herein petitioners Alipoon, et al. This prompted
private respondents Alvarez, et al. to institute Civil Case No. 409 against petitioners for
annulment of OCT No. RO-12890 (N.A.) and damages.

In dismissing the complaint and deciding in favor of defendants, the trial court ruled that
therein plaintiffs Alvarez were not able to satisfactorily prove their ownership over the
subject land and that the owners copy of TCT No. T-17224 is eroded with inherent defects.
According to the trial court, TCT No. T-17224 does not bear the signature of the Register of
Deeds; that the title is not authentic because the Register of Deeds issued a certification
dated June 18, 1988 stating that as of June 18, 1988 there was no transfer certificate of
title ever issued by the office over Lot No. 663 and that the title issued pursuant to Decree
No. 414946 is OCT No. RO-12890 (N.A.) and not OCT No. 28203 which was the basis for the
issuance of TCT No. T-17224.

ISSUES:

W/N the reconstituted title in favour of Alipoon valid?

DISCUSSION:

NO. The Court of Appeals correctly upheld the genuineness of TCT No. T-17224 issued by
the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental on March 16, 1933 covering Lot No. 663 in the
name of Marcelina P. Alvarez, predecessor of private respondents herein. Inasmuch as TCT
No. T-17224 has been in existence as early as March 16, 1933, the issuance in 1989 of a
reconstituted original certificate of title bearing the number OCT No. RO 12890
(N.A.) over Lot No. 663 in the name of petitioners parents Fausto Alipoon and
Silveria Duria is rendered legally doubtful, and the reconstituted title is void.

Republic Act No. 26 as amended, is the special law which provides for a specific procedure
for the reconstitution of Torrens certificates of title lost or destroyed. Sections 2 and 3
thereof provide how original certificates of title and transfer certificates of title shall be
respectively reconstituted and from what specific sources successively enumerated therein
such reconstitution shall be made. Under the law, reconstitution is limited to lost or
destroyed Torrens certificates of titles on file with the Register of Deeds. In view of the
existence of TCT No. 17224 covering Lot No. 663 in the name of Marcelina Alvarez since
March 16, 1933 which title is not in fact, lost or destroyed, there was no necessity for the
issuance in 1989 of reconstituted original certificate of title bearing number OCT No. RO-
12890 (N.A.) covering also Lot No. 663.

It is a basic rule that the reconstitution or reconstruction of a certificate of title literally and
within the meaning of Republic Act No. 26, as amended, denotes restoration of the
instrument which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original form and
condition. The purpose of the reconstitution of title or any document is to have the same
reproduced, after proper proceedings in the same form they were when the loss or
destruction occurred. If the court goes beyond such purpose it acts without or in excess of
jurisdiction.

From the own admissions of defendants-appellees, the issuance of the Reconstituted Title in
favor of the parents of defendants-appellees, is rendered doubtful. If no title was ever
issued over lot 663, then defendants-appellees should have asked for the Issuance of Title
pursuant to Decree No. 414946 and not for a reconstitution of title.

The existence of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17224 issued in favor of plaintiffs-
appellants further proves that the issuance of Reconstituted Original Certificate of Title in
favor of defendants-appellees is void.

In Serra Serra vs. Court of Appeals, this Court already held that if a certificate of title has
not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void
and the court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals is correct in stating that the trial court erred when it declared that reconstituted
original certificate of title bearing number OCT No. RO-12890 (N.A.) is the original title
issued pursuant to Decree No. 414946 and concluded that TCT No. T-17224 is not authentic
because it was not issued pursuant to the cancellation and/or in lieu of OCT No. RO-12890
(N.A.).

The Register of Deeds never certified that its office never issued a transfer certificate of title
over Lot 663. There is nothing in the certification from which such interpretation can be
inferred. The fact that the Office of the Register of Deeds does not have in its file a title over
Lot 663 does not imply that a transfer certificate of title was never issued over Lot 663.

the fact that the title is not in the file of the Office of the Register of Deeds does not imply
that a Transfer Certificate of Title had never been issued. Therefore, on this ground, the
Transfer Certificate of Title cannot be declared to be false.

HELD:

The petition is DENIED.

149. LUZON SURETY COMPANY, INC vs. ROMAN MIRASOL, JR.,

FACTS:

This case involves the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, sitting as a land
registration court, to resolve a petition to cancel a fraudulently reconstituted title.

On December 9, 1967 the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City branch
issued an order directing the register of deeds to reconstitute the original and owner's
duplicate of an unnumbered transfer certificate of title covering Lot No. 133 of the
Binalbagan cadastre.

That order was issued on the basis of the ex parte verified petition of Roman Mirasol, Jr.
who claimed to be the purchaser of Lot No. 133. He filed the petition for reconstitution in
Cadastral Case No. 16, LRC (GLRO) Record No. 139 involving Lot No. 133, a nine hectare
land located at Barrio Enclaro Binalbagan Negros Occidental.

On March 13, 1968 Luzon Surety Co., Inc. filed a petition also with the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City and in that same Cadastral Case No. 16
covering Lot No. 133 of the Binalbagan cadastre. Luzon Surety prayed for the cancellation of
the reconstituted title, TCT No. RT-13661, and the title issued to Mirasol. It alleged that
fraud and bad faith vitiated the reconstitution proceeding, the declarations of heirship, and
the issuance of a new title to Mirasol.

Mirasol who was served with a copy of the petition and who claimed to be a purchaser in
good faith and for value of Lot No. 133, filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction.

Luzon Surety contended that the lower court has jurisdiction over its petition under Republic
Act No. 26 which governs the reconstitution of lost or destroyed Torrens titles.

The lower court in its order of April 20, 1968 dismissed the Petition without prejudice to the
right of Luzon Surety to file an ordinary action to impugn the validity of the transfer to
Mirasol of the four-sixths share. Luzon Surety interposed this appeal BEFORE SC.

ISSUES:

W/N the reconstituted title granted by the lower court alleged to be fraudulent is invalid?

DISCUSSION:

NO. In reality, the petition of Luzon Surety is predicated, not on Republic Act No. 26, but on
section 112 of the Land Registration Law. Under section 112, the Court of First Instance,
sitting as a land registration court, has no jurisdiction or authority to reopen the original
decree of registration. The court cannot "impair the title or other interest of a purchaser
holding a certificate for value and in good faith, or his heirs or assigns, without his or their
written consent"

Luzon Surety has taken a simplistic view of the case. Its theory is that since the fraudulently
reconstituted title was issued by the lower court, sitting as a land registration court in a
reconstitution proceeding under Republic Act No. 26, the said title should be annulled by the
same court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction as a land registration court.

That theory is not well-taken. The instant case is not a simple case of annulling the
fraudulently reconstituted title, a "bastard" title according to Luzon Surety. It is a more
complicated case. it is actually a case wherein it is necessary to determine who is the true
owner of two-thirds of Cadastral Lot No. 133: Is it Luzon Surety by reason of the 1941
execution sale or is it Mirasol by reason of his purchase of the said share from the supposed
registered owners (impostors according to Luzon Surety)

Luzon Surety has not cited any specific provision of Republic Act No. 26 or any ruling under
Act No. 496 that sustains its theory that such a question may be decided by the land
registration court. A long catena of decided cases holds that such a question should be
ventilated in an ordinary action and should be decided by the lower court in the exercise of
its general jurisdiction.

HELD:

Petition is dismissed.

150. TOMAS AVERIA vs. THE HONORABLE MILAGROS V. CAGUIOA

FACTS:

The petitioner, refused to participate in the hearing of the registration proceedings below,
claiming the respondent court, acting as a cadastral court, had no competence to act upon
the said case under Section 112 of Act 496, otherwise known as the "Land Registration Act."
The respondent court then held the hearing ex parte and later rendered a decision ordering
the registration prayed for on the basis of the evidence presented by the private respondent
herein.

In his petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, it is argued that the
lower court had no competence to act on the registration sought because of the absence of
unanimity among the parties as required under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act.

ISSUES:

W/N the court has jurisdiction to order the registration of a deed of sale which is opposed on
the ground of an antecedent contract to sell.

DISCUSSION:

No. In Section 2 of the said P.D. No. 1529, it is clearly provided that:

SEC. 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts.-Judicial proceedings for

Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original
registration of title to lands, including improvements and interests therein, and over all
petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine a
questions arising upon such applications or petitions. The court through its clerk of court
shall furnish the Land Registration Commission with two certified copies of all pleadings,
exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issued in applications or petitions for land
registration, with the exception of stenographic notes, within five days from the filing or
issuance thereof.

The above provision has eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in
the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when
acting merely as a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has
simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the regional trial courts the authority
to act not only on applications for "original registration" but also "over all petitions filed after
original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon
such applications or petitions."
Consequently, and specifically with reference to Section 112 of the Land Registration Act
(now Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529), the court is no longer fettered by its former limited
jurisdiction which enabled it to grant relief only in cases where there was "unanimity among
the parties" or none of them raised any "adverse claim or serious objection." Under the
amended law, the court is now authorized to hear and decide not only such non-
controversial cases but even this contentious and substantial issues, such as the question at
bar, which were beyond its competence before.

It appears that the respondent court proceeded to hear the case below notwithstanding the
manifestation by the petitioner of his intention to elevate to this Court the question of
jurisdiction he had raised. 6 The trial court should have given him the opportunity to do so
in the interest of due process, pending a categorical ruling on the issue. As it happened, it
arrived at its decision after considering only the evidence of the private respondent and
without regard to the evidence of the petitioner.

HELD:

Decision of the lower court is SET ASIDE.

151. PACIFICO GARCIA vs. BENJAMIN M. GOZON

FACTS:

This case is about the issuance of two or more transfer certificates of title to different
persons for the same lots, or subdivisions thereof, due to the fact that the original title was
allegedly not cancelled when the first transfer certificates of title were issued to replace the
original title. The factual background is as follows:

On August 9, 1918, a deed of sale for two parcels of land, E and G (with a total area of
more than seven hectares) of the Hacienda Maysilo, located in Malabon, Rizal and covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. 983, was executed in favor of Ismael Lapus a bona fide
occupant thereof. The deed was executed pursuant to an order of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal in Civil Case No. 391, Negao vs. Vidal, a partition proceeding involving the said
hacienda (See Bustamante vs. Tuason, 47 Phil. 433, 434).

2. The deed of sale was presented for registration at two-twenty five in the afternoon of
January 15, 1920 and was recorded as Primary Entry No. 7710. That deed of sale itself
contains the following entries showing that it was annotated on the back of OCT NO. 983.

However, it seemed that, contrary to the foregoing entry and the official routine or standard
operating procedure, the deed of sale was not annotated on OCT No. 983 and that,
consequently, that title was apparently not cancelled. Why that annotation did not appear in
OCT No. 983 and why there was no notation of the cancellation of that title, as it appeared
in 1962, is a mystifying circumstance in this case.

3. As a result of the registration of that deed of sale, Transfer Certificate of 'Title No. 4910
was issued to Lapus for the two parcels of land, E and G, and I Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 4911 was issued for the remaining five lots covered by OCT No. 983. Lapus on different
occasions mortgaged the two parcels of land to secure his obligations to the Philippine
National Bank, the Government and the Philippine Trust Company.

Garcia contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that his title is valid and that
the titles of Ismael Lapus and his successors-in-interest lost their right to the disputed lots
due to their negligence or inaction.

Should Lapus' title prevail even if it was not annotated by the register of deeds on the
anterior or parent title which was not cancelled before 1963? It was that non-cancellation
which led to the issuance of the duplicative title to the Riveras and eventually to the
execution of the controversial mortgages and foreclosure sales to the two banks.

ISSUE:

W/N the 1920 title issued to Lapus and the titles derived therefrom should prevail over the
1963 title issued to the Riveras and the subsequent titles derived from it?

DISCUSSION:

The two appeals have no merit. The title of Lapus and the titles derived therefrom should be
given effect. The title of the Riveras and the titles springing from it are void.

There can be no doubt that Lapus was an innocent purchaser for value. He validly
transmitted to his successors-in-interest his indefeasible title or ownership over the disputed
lots or parcels of land. That title could not be nullified or defeated by the issuance forty-
three Years later to other persons of another title over the same lots due to the failure of
the register of deeds to cancel the title preceding the title issued to Lapuz. This must be so
considering that Lapus and his interest remained in possession of the disputed successors in
lots and the rival claimants never possessed the same.

The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same
land, the earlier in date prevail, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be
wholly, or only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate"

And the rule that in case of double registration the owner of the earlier certificate is the
owner of the land applies to the successive vendees of the owners of such certificates. "The
vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of
the later certificate"

the deed of sale in favor of Lapus, which was judicially authorized, was entered in the entry
book and a new title was issued to him. As already stated, and this point should be
underscored, the deed of sale in favor of Lapus contains the notation that it was annotated
on the back of OCT No. 983 (presumably, the original and owner's duplicate thereof).

It is settled that is this jurisdiction the maxim prior est in tempore, potior est in jure (he
who is first in time is preferred in right) is followed in land registration matters

HELD:

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS IS AFFIRMED.

152. PEDRO PILAPIL vs. COURT OF APPEALS

In the instant petition for review on certiorari, questioning the decision of the CA affirming
the decision of the trial court.

Felix Otadora was the registered owner of a parcel of land (273,796-sqm) in Ormoc city
covered by OCT No. 26026. He died and was survived by his wife Leona and 3 children
(vitaliana, Maxima and Agaton). Subsequently, Leona and the three children sold portions of
said lot, leaving a portion with an area of 51, 019 sqm (Lot 8734-B-5) . Then Leona died.

On March, 1962, the Otadora siblings, together with their nephew Antonio, executed a deed
of extrajudicial partition and confirmation of sales, giving each of them one-fourth undivided
share in the remaining property. That very same day, Vitallana and Agaton sold to
petitioners Pilapil and Penaranda an undivided portion of the, measuring 18,626 sqm of lot
Lot 8734-B-5. The deed of sale, which was executed in the presence of Antonio and another
witness, specified that the possession and ownership of the property sold shall be
transferred to the buyers from the date of the instrument. The deed of extrajudicial partition
was annotated on OCT No. 26026. Because of such partition, OCT No. 26026 was cancelled
and replaced by TCT No. 4026 which, in turn, was superseded by TCT No. 4029, indicating
as owners Agaton, Vitaliana, Maxima, and Antonio. The sale to petitioners was inscribed at
the back of TCT No. 4029 as Entry No. 10903 on March 29, 1962.

Later, Antonio sold his one-fourth share to his cousin Bensig, who ceded one-half thereof to
the spouses Visitacion Otadora and S. Aldrin, by a deed of quitclaim. Because of such, TCT
No. 4029 was cancelled and supplanted by TCT No. 4484, which showed Agaton, Vitaliana,
Maxima, Bensig, and the spouses Visitacion and S. Aldrin as owners of Lot 8734-B-5.
Petitioners’ names did not appear among the owners, although in the memorandum of
encumbrances at the back of TCT No. 4484 regarding the sale to them by Vitaliana was
retained.

Despite the sale of 18, 626 sqm of their undivided share in said lot earlier made in favor of
petitioners, Agaton AGAIN sold his one-fourth share in the lot to his daughter Carmen
covered by TCT No. 9130. Vitaliana on the other hand, RE-SOLD her one-fourth share to
Maxima. 4 days later, Maxima sold her now one-half share to her sons Dionisio and Macario
who were able to register the said properties in their names. On Sept, 1971, TCT was issued
to spouses Visitacion and S. Aldrin, and another TCT for Carmen and her husband.

Upon discovery of the new titles, petitioners filed a protest with the register of deeds or
Ormoc city, who in a letter informed Carmen, S. ALdrin, Macario and Dionisio of the
existence of the deed of sale in favor of petitioner and required them to present their
original titles for proper annotation. Such request was, however, ignored.

On July 1972, Carmen and her husband Masias sold the one-fourth share sold by Carmen’s
father to her to respondent Serafica and Sons Corp. which was not able to register the same
because of the annotation in TCT No. 9130 earlier made showing the sale in favor of
petitioners. Because of this, the corporation charged the vendors with estafa before the City
Fiscal’s Office, but the complaint did not prosper.

Petitioners therefore filed, on December 1973, a complaint for quieting of title, annulment of
deeds, cancellation of titles, partition, and recovery of ownership with damages, against
herein private respondents. The complaint alleged, among other things, that petitioners
succeeded in possessing only 12,000 square meters of the lot and needed 6,626 square
meters more to complete the total area purchased from Vitaliana and Agaton in 1962.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the defendants (Serafica & Sons Corporation)
and against the plaintiffs (Pilapil) hereby dismissing plaintiffs complaint, and ordering the
plaintiffs to pay the defendants for attorney’s fee, to vacate the lot in question and deliver
the same to defendant. In its decision dated June 1994, the court a quo concluded that the
annotation on TCT No. 4484 of the sale by Vitaliana and Agaton in favor of petitioners was
null and void because the latter failed to surrender the owner’s duplicate copy of the title, in
violation of Section 55 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496).

The CA said that OCT No. 26026 thereby became inexistent, it having been already
cancelled by TCT(s) Nos. 4026 and 4029. It would have been against the law to have the
deed of sale registered in TCT No. 4029 without an order from the proper court authorizing
such registration, specifically because OCT No. 26026 had already undergone two
cancellations, first by TCT No. 4026 and then by TCT No. 4029 .It held that Appellants
should have filed the necessary petition with the proper court asking that the Register of
Deeds be authorized to annotate the deed of sale executed by Agaton Otadora and Vitaliana
Otadora in their favor. The said title was, therefore, null and void, and the same did not
acquire the effect of a constructive notice to the whole world of the interest over the land in
question of the plaintiffs-appellants.

At most, the deed of sale is merely a contract between the plaintiffs-appellants and the
vendors appearing therein but without any binding effect upon their persons and upon
whom bad faith cannot be imputed. Also, The deed of sale did not specify what part of the
1/4 share of each of the registered owners who executed the sale was sold to the
appellants. The CA also agreed with the lower court that H. Serafica & Sons Corporation was
an innocent purchaser for value as it was not required by law to go beyond TCT No. 9130
which, on its face, appeared to be unencumbered.

Hence, the petition.

ISSUES:

W/N the deeds of sale respectively executed by Agaton and Vitaliana in favor of Carmen and
Maxima are valid and superior to that executed earlier by Agaton and Vitaliana in their
favour?

DISCUSSION:

Production of the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title is required by Section 55 of Act
No. 496 (now Section 53 of Presidential Decree No. 1529), and only after compliance with
this and other requirements shall actual registration retroact to the date of entry in the day
book.18

However, nonproduction of the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title may not invalidate
petitioners' claim of ownership over the lot involved considering the factual circumstances of
this case.

It is undisputed that after the sale of the lot to petitioners, the same vendors sold the same
property to persons who cannot be considered in law to be unaware of the prior sale to the
petitioners.

Considering these relationships and contrary to the findings of the courts below, the
vendees, Carmen and Maxima, cannot be considered as third parties who are not bound by
the prior sale between Agaton and Vitaliana as vendors and petitioners as vendees, because
there is privity of interest between them and their predecessors.
The reason for this is that the validity of a title to a piece of property depends on the
buyer's knowledge, actual or constructive, of a prior sale. While there is no direct proof that
Carmen and Maxima actually knew of the sale to petitioners, they are deemed to have
constructive knowledge thereof by virtue of their relationship to both Agaton and Vitaliana.

when Carmen sold the property to H. Serafica and Sons Corporation, she no longer had any
rights of dominion to transmit, since her own father who sold to her the property had
himself earlier relinquished his ownership rights in favor of the petitioners. Accordingly,
Carmen transmitted no right to the corporation.

Under these circumstances, the corporation, having failed to obtain relief through the
criminal complaint filed against the spouses Carmen Otadora and Luis Masias, and having
relied on the unencumbered transfer certificate of title shown to it by the Masias spouses, is
entitled to damages of P1,275.00 a year from July 10, 1972, which was awarded to it by the
trial court. Needless to say, the corporation may file a case against the assurance funder
under Section 101 of the Land Registration Act and Section 95 of P.D. No. 1529; but to
obviate multiplicity of suits, the award of damages in its favor should now be upheld.

The sale to the petitioners must be respected by the successors-in-interest of Agaton and
Vitaliana. Inasmuch as petitioners had managed to possess only 12,000 square meters of
the 18,625 square meters they bought from Agaton and Vitaliana, the whole area purchased
by them should be taken from the shares of Agaton and Vitaliana upon partition of the
property.

HELD:

The appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.