Nietzsche:

Prodigy child, born in 1844, died of mental illness in 1900, started studying theology

(as his father, who was a pastor), disillusioned with religion, got interested in philology (study

of language), friends with Wagner (opera guy) for some time, Paul Rée and Lou Salomé as

well (they were couple and Nietzsche proposes to Salomé while they were all travelling

together in Rome, then he feels betrayed by both). As he gets ill, his mum and sister take care

of him, sister is anti-semitist and edits his text.

Notes on The Genealogy of Morals

Preface

Why are we knowers unknown to ourselves? Why would anyone start a book like that?

What is Nietzsche’s aim and methodology in this book?

We’re unknown to ourselves – “We remain strange to ourselves out of necessity, we do

not understand ourselves, we must confusedly mistake who we are” (3)

To function, we cannot know ourselves, truth is hard

“everyone is furthest from himself” – so, we are closer to others? How come? Yeah,

Lykke hasn’t tried to be her own student, so we might know her better, but still we just know

what she shows… It’s also easier to accept that someone else is bad than that you’re bad (self-

deceit)
 II

Thoughts on the “descent of our moral prejudices” began in Human, All Too Human. A

Book of Free Spirits. Such thoughts arise as “stemming from a single root, from a fundamental

will to knowledge deep inside me which took control, speaking more and more clearly and

making ever clearer demands. And this is the only thing proper for a philosopher. We have no

right to stand out individually: we must not either make mistakes or hit on the truth individually.

Instead, our thoughts (…) grow from us with the same inevitability as fruits borne on the trees.”

(4) Commented [PL1]: On how a philosopher should think

He wrote during a break, and then he came back to them. The philosophical knowledge

is something greater than the individual

III

Preoccupied with the problem of the origin of evil since an early age – a priori (innate)

He wonders “under what conditions did man invent the value judgments good and evil?

And what value do they themselves have? Have they up to now obstructed or promoted human

flourishing? Are they a sign of distress, poverty and the degeneration of life? Or, on the

contrary, do they reveal the fullness, strength and will of life (…)?” (5) – thesis statement.

IV

The Origin of the Moral Sensations motivated him to write about his hypotheses on the

origin of morality – by opposition, he hated everything there. Doesn’t aim at refuting it though.

More than being preoccupied with the origin of morality he was interested in the value Commented [PL2]: It concerned him “only for one end,
to which it is one of many means” – no entiendo qué dice
of morality.
 His teacher Schopenhauer really values compassion.

Nietzche dealt “with the value of the unegoistic, the instincts of compassion, self-denial,

self-sacrifice. (…) I understood the morality of compassion, casting around ever wider to catch

even philosophers and make them ill” (7) – COMPASSION IS A PROBLEM (we look down

on people who are ill, we need to look for life)

VI

Compassion seems an isolated program -> it isn’t, exploring it leads to the conclusion

that “we need a critique of moral values, the values of these values should itself, for once, be

examined – and so we need to know about the conditions and circumstances under which the

values grew up, developed and changed (morality as result, as symptom, as mask, as tartuffery,

as sickness, as misunderstanding; but also morality as cause, remedy, stimulant, inhibition,

poison)” (7) “People have taken the value of these “values” as given, as factual, as beyond all

questioning”

Maybe “the evil” has a greater value than “the good man”. Morality might be the

dangers of dangers

VII

“The vast, distant and hidden land of morality (…) has to be journeyed through with

quite new questions and as it were with new eyes: and surely that means virtually discovering

this land for the first time?” – supongo que va a hacer con moralidad lo mismo que Descartes

con el conocimiento

Ponele que se mete con Dr Rée diciendo que tiene que usar otro método y qué sé yo.

Aparentemente el color gris es importante

 “The day we can say, with conviction: Forwards! Even our old morality would make a

comedy! We shall have discovered a new twist and possible outcome for the Dionysian drama

of the “fate of the soul”” (9) Commented [PL3]: No estoy segura de entenderlo ni
por qué sería relevante pero suena interesante

VIII

Yo hablo claro hermano, ok?

 First essay: “Good and Evil”, “Good and Bad”

Etymology – created by the nobles, aristocracy

Usefulness of these values – invalid, not from morality

Why do Nietzsche disagree with the English Psychologists?

What is Nietzsche’s methodology? How does it work? Give an example of him using

his methodology. Is this example convincing?

English psychologists tried to “write a history of the emergence of morality” but their

attempts are pretty poor, they kept “pushing the partie honteuse of our inner world to the Commented [PL4]: No idea what this means

foreground, and looking for what is really effective, guiding and decisive for our development

where man’s intellectual pride would least wish to find it” (10) -ejemplifica con cosas

insignificantes que los tipos analizan sobre nuestras mentes

Wonders about the reasons why physchologists go in that direction, says it might be “a

bit of everything, a bit of meanness, a bit of gloominess, a bit of anti-Christianity, a bit of a

thill and a need for pepper” (10)

Le dicen “nah, dejate de joder, nada más están viejos” pero él no quiere creer eso,

“sincerely hopes” que sean tipos posta.

II

I think he means that even though we should respect this people, they aren’t historically

relevant.
 “later, everyone forgot the origin of the praise and because such acts had always been

habitually praised as good, people also began to experience them as good – as if they were

something good as such”(11)

Desde el principio es obvio que su concepto de “genealogy of morals” es estúpido,

arrancan con la descendencia del término good – después de que los cita (ellos definen que el

concepto de good surge cuando una persona lo recibe) critica “we have “usefulness,

“forgetting”, “habit” and finally “error”, all as the basis of a respect for values of which the

higher man has hitherto been proud, as though it were a sort of general privilege of mankind”

(11)

Creo que está diciendo que el good lo definieron las clases altas a su conveniencia “It

was from this pathos of distance that they first claimed the right to create values and give these

values names: usefulness was none of their concerns!” (11) Commented [PL5]: Ta, me copa loco pero… me darías
un ejemplo de cómo pasó eso? O te tengo que creer y ta?

Sí, definitivamente lo está diciendo: “The pathos of nobility and distance, (…), the

continuing and predominant feeling of complete and fundamental superiority of a higher ruling

kind in relation to a lower kind, to those “below” – that is the origin of the antithesis “good”

and “bad”” (11)

“the origin of language itself as a manifestation of the power of the rulers” PAHHH –

Language as an avenue for power (peeero puede ser como Alasdair dice que aunque el lenguaje

esté conectado, el significado no lo esta, como esperar de wait y esperar de hope. A su vez, el

caso de “negro” en Uruguay, la connexion con el significado se pierde. Hysterical es un

ejemplo en el lenguaje actual, viene de un órgano femenino)

Because of all this “the word “good” is absolutely not necessarily attached to

“unegoistic” actions” (11), recién cuando dejamos de pensar como aristócratas es que la idea

de egoismo vs. altruism nos empieza a entrar

 Creo que dice algo relevante al terminar la sección pero no termino de entenderlo

III

Es tan importante que ya pasa al subconsciente “this usefulness has been a permanent

part of our everyday experience, something, then, that has been constantly stressed anew;

consequently, instead of fading from consciousness, instead of becoming forgettable, it must

have impressed itself on consciousness with ever greater clarity”

El argumento de ellos no solo es insostenible (untenable) sino que se contradice: la

utilidad del altruismo es el origen de su valor, pero el origen se supone que ha sido olvidado.

Es que el altruismo dejó de ser útil asi de la nada? Nah, Nietzche dice que eso no puede ser, se

tiene que haber vuelto una parte re importante y “it must have impressed itself on consciousness

with ever greater clarity”(12).

Otra gente lo explica por otro lado que está mal pero que es sostenible racional y

psicologicamente – Herbert Spencer, asociación good-useful-practical, bad-harmful-

impractical.

IV

Etymologically, good develops in the same way in many different languages “noble,

aristocratic in social terms is the basic concept from which, necessarily, “good” in the sense of

“spiritually noble”, “aristocratic”, of “spiritually highminded”, “spiritually priviledged”

developed: a development that always runs parallel with that other one which ultimately

transfers “common”, “plebeian”, “low” into the concept “bad” (13)

“In these words and roots which denote “good”, we can often detect the main nuance

which made the noble feel they were men of higher rank”
Empieza a dar pila de ejemplos en que los nombres muestran un typical character trait.

Pre-aryan y qué sé yo

To answer from section VI to X

- What is the morality of the clerical caste? Why does Nietzche consider it

unhealthy?

Wrongly associated with purity. Involves diets, fasting, sexual abstinence, the “flight

into the desert”. It’s unhealthy because it’s “antagonistic towards the senses”. They

make “everything more dangerous”. Clearly Nietzche hates them, but I cannot work

out all the reasons. They don’t enjoy themselves, it goes against life

They are powerless and “out of this powerlessness, their hate swells into something

huge and uncanny to a most intellectual and poisonous level”.

Power is in terms of physicality. They only rely on their intelligence, which makes them

resentful.

Animal instinct to fight and then move on, they cannot do this, which makes them evil.

Page 20 makes a point on this

- What is the morality of the chivalric/aristocratic caste? What does Nietzche think

of it?

It’s “based on a powerful physicality, a blossoming, rich, even effervescent good health

that includes the things needed to maintain it, war adventure, hunting, dancing, jousting

and everything else that contains strong, free, happy action”

They make mistakes because their knowledge is not enough.

What is slaves’ revolt in morality? How does it relate to the Jews? What does it have to

do with new love? How does it relate to ressentiment?

Jews – priestly people, rejected “the aristocratic value equation (good = noble =

powerful = beautiful = happy = blessed)” and reversed it by saying “Only those who

suffer are good (…) salvation is for them alone, whereas you rich (…) you are eternally

wicked (…) you will also be eternally wretched, cursed and damned!” – This change in

the equation is SLAVES’ REVOLT IN MORALITY

“The slaves’ revolt in morality begins with the jews: a revolt which has two thousand

years of history behind it and which has only been lost sight of because – it was

victorious” (Later on he also says “Slaves’ revolt in morality begins with

ressentiment”)

From Jewish hatred “new love” arouse “pursing the aim of that hatred, victory, spoils,

seduction with the same urgency with which the roots of that hatred were burrowing

ever more thoroughly and greedily into everything what was deep and evil”. Jesus was

“seduction in its most sinister and irresistible form”, he was a bait (no idea what that

means). Jesus is good, Jesus is crucified, therefore, Jesus is the ultimate symbol of

good=suffer

“Israel, with is revenge and revaluation of all former values, has triumphed repeatedly

over all the other ideals, all nobler ideas”

Characterize slave morality and master morality, man of ressentiment and the noble

man.

Man of ressentiment Noble man

Morality Slave morality: Master morality:
o Arises from ressentiment o “grow(s) out of a triumphant
(“orientation to the outside saying “yes” to itself” (20)
 instead of back onto itself”) o Spontaneous, “seeking out
getting creative its opposite only so that it
o “says “no” on principle to can say “yes” to itself even
everything that is “outside”, more thankfully and
“other”, “non-self”” (20) exultantly”
o “no” = “creative deed” (20) o “its negative concept ‘low’,
o “In order to come about, slave ‘common’, ‘bad’ is only a
morality first has to have an pale contrast created after
opposing, external world, it the event compared to its
needs, physiologically positive basic concept,
speaking, external stimuli in saturated with life and
order to act at all – its action passion”(20) – the creation
is basically a reaction” (20) of “bad” is not a big deal in
comparison to the positive
event
Characteristics o When they have a distorted o When they have a distorted
image of someone, this image image of someone, this
comes from “entrenched image “results from the
hatred and revenge”, attacks feeling of contempt, disdain
opponent. and superciliousness”, it’s
o Lie themselves into feeling not a big deal
happy. o Simply feel happy
o Happiness “manifests itself o Happiness is not separated
as essentially a narcotic, an from action, “being active is
anaesthetic, rest, peace by necessity counted as part
“sabbath”, relaxation of the of happiness” (21)
mind and stretching of the o “confident and frank with
limbs” PASSIVE. himself”
o “Neither upright nor naïve, o Cleverness “is nowhere near
nor honest and straight with as important as the complete
himself.” certainty of function of the
o Secretive. Cleverer. governing unconscious
o Cleverness “as a condition of instincts”(21)
existence of the first rank” o “When ressentiment does
o Evil enemy occur in the noble man
o “denied the proper response himself, it is consumed and
of action, compensate for it exhausted in an immediate
only with imaginary revenge” reaction, and therefore it
(20) – Implica lo que does not poison”
hablábamos en clase de que o Forgetting is one of their
esta gente no tiene fuerza virtues (“To be unable to
física (fuerza física acá sería take his … misdeeds
la “proper response of seriously for long – that is
action), supongo the sign of strong, rounded
natrues with a
superabundance of a power
which is flexible, formative,
healing and can make one
forget”(22))
o Respect for his enemies
 SECTION XI
Opposite of Good/evil Good/bad
good o Evil is “the original, the o “Conceives of the basic idea
beginning, the actual deed in “good” by himself, in
the conception of slave advance and spontaneously,
morality” (22) and only then creates a
o Evil = what’s good for noble notion of “bas”” (22)
“but re-touched, re- o Bad is “an afterthought, an
interpreted and reviewed aside, a complementary
through the poisonous eye of colour” (22)
ressentiment”

VI

Clerical – highest – title chosen by them

Rule: “the concept of political superiority always resolves itself into the concept of

psychological superiority” (15)

Juxtaposition of “pure” and “impure” (back then it just meant, showering or not),

creates divisions between men (clefts)

“the very nature of an essentially priestly aristocracy shows how contradictory

valuations could become dangerously internalized and sharpened”

“surely one must say that its aftereffects have shown it to be a hundred times more

dangerous than the disease it was meant to cure?” he’s against self-denial, la “cura” de los

curas te trae más enferemedades, ellos se quejan de muchas cosas

Metaphysics of the clergy opposes the senses and make them lazy and refined.

Strive for nothingness

Priests- counter life, if this becomes morality and that’s unhealthy

VII Commented [PL6]: Side note – super man, free of

social values, authentic. Wants people to be vital
 There’re two types of superiority:

Chivalric-aristocratic (knights related) – powerful physicality, a blossoming, rich, even

effervescent good health. Strong, free, happy action.

Priestly-aristocratic – priests make the most evil enemies because they are the most

powerless. “nobody else’s intelligence [Geist] stands a chance against the intelligence [Geist]

of priestly revenge”. They hate a lot

VIII

Nobel, ressentiment, y otras dualidades, judíos y más judíos

IX

Ni idea qué pasó acá. Aparentemente hace como que está hablando con alguien

Page 22-27 (Section 11-13)

What is the difference between good/evil and good/bad? Who created what concept?

Ressentiment created evil first, by opposition. Ressentiment spreads and prevails.

See table above

Who are these good men that Nietzsche argues are known as evil?

Noble man. Good created first

“behave towards one another by showing such resourcefulness in consideration, self-

control, delicacy, loyalty, pride and friendship. … They enjoy freedom from every social

constraint, in the wilderness they compensate for the tension which is caused by being closed

in and fenced in by the peace of the community for so long, they return to the innocent

conscience of the wild beast, as exultant monsters, who perhaps go away having committed a

hideous succession of murder, arson, rape and torture, in a mood of bravado and spiritual
equilibrium as though they had simply played a student’s prank, convinced that poets will now

have something to sing about and celebrate for quite some time” (23)

What does Nietzsche argue is the meaning of all culture? What does Nietzsche think

about culture? What kind of man does culture produce?

Culture tames people (like rousseau said)

“it is the meaning of all culture to breed a tame and civilized animal, a household pet,

out of the beast of prey “man””(24) Hasta acá todo piola man, pero después arranca con

“then one would undoubtedly have to view all instinctive reaction and instinctive ressentiment,

by means of which the noble races and their ideals were finally wecked and overpowered, as

the actual instruments of culture” y Bueno, ni idea qué carajo son los instruments of culture.

What is Nietzsche’s ideal man like (Section 12)?

Superman

“But from time to time grant me … a glimpse, grant me just one glimpse of something

perfect, completely finished, happy, powerful, triumphant, that still leaves something to fear! a

glimpse of a man who justifies man himself, a stroke of luck, an instance of a man who makes

up for and redeems man, and enables us to retain our faith in mankind!”

What does Nietzsche mean by the lamb and bird of prey example? In your opinion, is

he right that “it is just as absurd to ask strength not to express itself as strength … as it is to ask

weakness to express itself as strength” (26)?

If it’s natural for us to accept that birds of prey target lambs, then it should be natural

for us to accept that strong men express their strength.

“Popular morality separates strength from the manifestations of strength, as though

there were an indifferent substractum behind the strong person which had the freedom to
manifest strength or not” (26) – if you apply it to homosexuality it’s pretty cool but… strength?

Does it really work like that?

He’s saying that common people create a “doer” to explain this, when the action should

be conceived all together.

“This type of man needs to believe in an unbiased ‘subject’ with freedom of choice,

because he has an instinct of self-preservation and self-affirmation in which every lie is

sanctified. The reason the subject (or, as we more colloquially say, the soul) has been, until

now, the best doctrine on earth, is perhaps because it facilitated that sublime self-deception

whereby the majority of the dying, the weak and the oppressed of every kind could construe

weakness itself as freedom, and their particular mode of existence as an accomplishment.”

(27)

Page 27-34 (Section 14-17)

What does the mythical “dark workshop” (27) say about fabrication of ideals in our

world?

Factory – ideals – fabricated

Slave morality – good = weak and suffering

We take common qualities and make them great to our favour?:

- “Lies are turning weakness into an accomplishment” (27)

- “impotence which doesn’t retaliate is being turned into “goodness”; timid

baseness is being turned into “humility”; submission to people one hates is being

turned into “obedience” (actually towards someone who, they say, orders this

submission – they call him God)” (27)

“black magicians who can turn anything black into whiteness, milk and innocence”

(28) priests
“"justice" is an invention of slave morality made out as an ideal that masters brazenly

disregard. Slave morality does not seek revenge, but waits for the "Judgment of God"

that will restore justice.” (sparknotes) – He’s mocking the priests, saying that they are

only seeking justice, he believes they actually seek revenge and hate, but disguise it as

injustice.

What is Nietzsche’s view on religious people and their aspirations for paradise and

eternal bliss? What is wrong to him with being excited for the “afterlife”?

Humble in life, ambitious in afterlife: “I said: they are so humble about everything!

Just to experience that, you need to live long, well beyond death, – yes, you need

eternal life in order to be able to gain eternal recompense in ‘the kingdom

of God’ for that life on earth ‘in faith’, ‘in love’, ‘in hope”(28)

With your understanding of history, how is Nietzsche’s historical analysis in section

16?

The only relevant part I found was the last: “Napoleon appeared as a man more

unique and late-born for his times than ever a man had been before, and in him, the

problem of the noble ideal itself was made flesh – just think what a problem that is:

Napoleon, this synthesis of Unmensch (brute) and Übermensch (overman)”(33)

inhuman and overhuman

Reformation is also slave morality.

 French revolution example of how men of ressentiment go against nobles.

How does Nietzsche promote his methodology in section 17? Why does he consider it

important?

Wants philosophers and people with other professions to discuss the history of morality,

starting with: “What signposts does linguistics, especially the study of etymology, give to the

history of the evolution of moral concepts?”

 Second Essay

The important part: “Forgetfulness … is … an active ability to suppress, positive in the

strongest sense of the word, to which we owe the fact that what we simple live through,

experience, take in, no more enters our consciousness during digestion (one could call it

spiritual ingestion) than does the thousand-fold process which takes place with our physical

consumption of food, our so-called ingestion”. Forgetfulness implies “not to be bothered by

the noise and battle with which our underworld of serviceable organs work with and against

each other … to make room for something new, above all for the noble functions and

functionaries”(35)

“forgetfulness can be suspended in certain cases ... it is by no means merely a passive

inability … instead it is an active desire not to let go”

The same thing with my words:

The ability to forget is vital for life because it allows us to focus on what’s

important and it gives us peace. Not being able to forget what’s happening in our

minds would feel like being aware of every step of the process of digestion.

Forgetfulness can be stopped in some cases when there’s a desire to keep what

we lived.

What are the benefits to forgetfulness? (Section 1)

Why has man become truly predictable? (Section 2)

 (Prerogative: something that certain people are able or allowed to do or have, but is not

possible or allowed for everyone)

Giving man the “prerogative to promise” --- implies --- “making man to a certain

degree necessary, uniform, a peer amongst peers” – which makes man predictable. (36)

“Morality of custom”: “The actual labour of man on himself”(36)

“with the help of the morality of custom and the social straitjacket, man was made truly

predictable”(36)

Why are autonomous and ethical mutually exclusive to Nietzsche? Why is it necessary

for the free man to have his own standard of values?

Is the sovereign individual supra-ethical to Nietzche’s notion of ethics or the popular

one? Popular one!

I guess that he needs to have his own standard of values because of “his superiority

over everybody who does not have the prerogative to promise or answer to himself, how much

trust, fear and respect he arouses -he “merits” all three- and … he has necessarily been given

mastery over circumstances, over nature and over all creatures with a less enduring and

reliable will”

What is the sovereign human being’s consciousness and what does it have to do with

responsibility?

Sovereign individual:

 “freed itself from the morality of custom, an autonomous, supra-ethical individual

… with his own, independent, enduring will, whose prerogative is to promise” (37)

 “proud consciousness …[showing] what he has finally achieved and incorporated,

an actual awareness of power and freedom”

  “actually has the prerogative to promise” – Lykke comments that this connects with

the beginning of the essay in the sense that we need society to get the prerogative to

promise but society constrains us in memory and shit.

 “master of the free will”

 To promise “like a sovereign” is to do it “ponderously, seldom, slowly, and is

sparing with his trust, who confer an honour when he places his trust, who gives his word

as something that can be relied on, because he is strong enough to remain upright in the

face of mishap or even in the face of fate” (37).

 “The proud knowledge of the extraordinary privilege of responsibility, the

consciousness of this rare freedom and power over himself and his destiny, has

penetrated him to his lowest depths and become an instinct, his dominant instinct…

conscience”

 Bad conscience sería que te pese la consciencia, que el superyó te castigue. Igual

parece que cuando Nietzche habla de bad conscience se refiere a que la calidad de tu

consciencia es mala. Sección 4 dice que “the consciousness of guilt, the whole “bad

conscience”

 Different kind of consciences, most are sour, ripe fruits are rare (you promise

because of yourself, not because society tells you – section 3 “To be answerable to

oneself, and proudly, too, and therefore to have the prerogative to say ‘yes’ to oneself –

is, as I said, a ripe fruit, but also a late fruit”)

What makes mnemonics (devices to aid memory) so cruel? What does it have to do

with ascetics? (Section 3)

Mnemonics was the way of “solving” the question of “How do you give a memory to

the animal, man? How do you impress something upon this partly dull, partly idiotic,

inattentive mind, this personification of forgetfulness, so that it will stick?”(38). The idea
behind the “solution” was that “a thing must be burnt in so that it stays in the memory: only

something that continues to hurt stays in the memory”(38). The “evidence” for this is that

“wherever on earth you still find ceremonial, solemnity, mystery, gloomy shades in the lives of

men and peoples … is still working”. It is, nonetheless, cruel: “when man decided he had to

make a memory for himself, it never happened without blood, torments and sacrifices”(38).

Ascetic: “avoiding physical pleasures and living a simple life, often for religious

reasons” (dictionary) – so… PRIESTS!

“ascetic procedures and lifestyles are a method of freeing those ideas from competition

with all other ideas, of making them “unforgettable”” (38).

How is “reason” produced?

“With the aid of this sort of memory [previous tortures], people finally came to

“reason”!”

“Ah, reason, solemnity, mastering of emotions, this really dismal thing called

reflection, all these privileges and splendours man has: what a price had to be paid for them!

How much blood and horror lies at the basis of all ‘good things’! . . .” wait, WHAT? Is memory

cool or not? Apparently he’s being sarcastic about “good things”, the things they normally

praise have blood and horror behind, so they aren’t that cool.

How does Nietzsche show that morality has a brittle (fragile) relationship to the truth?

(Section 4)

Is he really saying that morality has a brittle relationship to the truth or that moral

genealogist have such? Genealogist have!

If it’s about genealogists, the explanation comes through looking at the things these

people have ignored, such as the fact that “the main moral concept “guilt” descends from the
very material concept of debts” and that “punishment, as retribution, evolved quite

independently from any assumption about freedom or lack of freedom of the will”(39).

Bad conscience arouse from this stupid idea of being guilty means being in debt.

What according to Nietzsche is the history of punishment? What does it have to do with

considerations of free will? What does it have to do with ideas of trade?

“punishment has not been meted out because the miscreant was held responsible for

his act, therefore it was not assumed that the guilty party alone should be punished: … but this

anger was held in check and modified by the idea that every injury has its equivalent which

can be paid in compensation, if only through the pain of the person who injures”(40).

Connection with free will: as he said before, “punishment, as retribution, evolved quite

independently from any assumption about freedom or lack of freedom of the will”(39).

Punishment has been thought with “an equivalence between injury and pain”(40) that

resembles the concept of creditor and debt, it’s as if the one who injures is in debt with the

injured.

What is this whole “strange matter of compensation? What kind of pleasures or rights

does the creditor receive as repayment or compensation? (Section 5)

“promises are made; precisely here, the person making the promise has to have a

memory made for him … The debtor, in order to inspire confidence that the promise of

repayment will be honoured … pawns something to the creditor by means of the contract in

case he does not pay, something that he still ‘possesses’ and controls, for example, his body,

or his wife, or his freedom, or his life”(40).

 “The equivalence is provided by the fact that instead of an advantage directly making

up for the wrong (so, instead of compensation in money, land or possessions of any kind), a

sort of pleasure is given to the creditor as repayment and compensation”(41).

Nietzsche asks a great question: “to what extent can suffering be a compensation for

‘debt’?” (Section 6, p. 42) What do you think Nietzsche’s answer to this question is? Find

examples in the text to back up your response.

“To see suffering does you good, to make suffer, better still – that is a hard proposition,

but an ancient, powerful, human-all-too-human proposition to which, by the way, event eh apes

might subscribe”(42-3). So it seems that it can be a compensation, but then again, he’s against

revenge (he said it before: “anyone who clumsily tries to interject the concept ‘revenge’ has

merely obscured and darkened his own insight, rather than clarified it (– revenge itself just

leads us back to the same problem: ‘how can it be gratifying to make someone suffer?’)”(42)).

Yeah, making someone suffer definitely makes us feel better, but does it compensate?

Well, he’s saying that revenge is not fair

Cruelty is part of humanity, the moment you start making it part of society and

oppressing everyone – Lykke’s words

Everyone is cruel but they won’t admit it (intellectuals), they take joy and pleasure in

punishing others.
 Section 7 to 11

What is Nietzsche’s view on cruelty in Section 7? How does it align with the view of

cruelty, society, and forgetting as described in the previous sections?

Cruelty is a feature of human beings and, as such, we shouldn’t deny it: “at the time

when mankind felt no shame towards its cruelty, life on earth was more cheerful than it is

today, with its pessimists.” (43)

Cruelty is also implicit in our current language: “Perhaps I can even be allowed to

admit the possibility that pleasure in cruelty does not really need to have died out: perhaps …

it had to be transformed into the imaginative and spiritual, and adorned with such inoffensive

names that they do not arouse the suspicion of even the most delicate hypocritical conscience

(“tragic pity is one such name)” (44)

Society needs to be cruel nowadays, but Nietzsche doesn’t agree

What arouses the indignation over suffering? How do humans such as Christians and

ancients deals with this senseless suffering? (Section 7 )

The problem isn’t suffering but suffering with no purpose. In Nietzsche’s view,

Christians and naïve men suffer for no reason, even though they justify their suffering under

the salvation, and the pleasure of a god, respectively: “What actually arouses indignation over

suffering is not the suffering itself, but the senselessness of suffering: but neither for the

Christian, who saw in suffering a whole, hidden machinery of salvation, nor for naïve man in

ancient times, who saw all suffering in relation to spectator or to instigators of suffering, was

there any such senseless suffering” (44) GREATEST ATTACK TO CRISTIANITY

 With the trading of punishments between creditors and debtors, what does Nietzsche

argue is the nature of justice? (Section 8)

The idea of credit and debt started as only legal rights and became important at a social

level “the germinating sensation of … debt, … compensation was simply transferred from the

most rudimentary form of the legal rights of persons to the most crude and elementary social

units” (46)

The nature of justice is the good will to be even with the ones around you: “‘Every

thing has its price: everything can be compensated for’ – the oldest, most naïve canon of morals

relating to justice, the beginning of all ‘good naturedness’, ‘equity’, all ‘good will’, all

‘objectivity’ on earth. Justice at this first level is the good will, between those who are roughly

equal, to come to terms with each other, to ‘come to an understanding’ again by means of a

settlement – and, in connection with those who are less powerful, to force them to reach a

settlement amongst themselves. –“ (46)

General notes section 8:

Relationship creditor-debtor is where “the feeling of guilt, of personal obligation, to

pursue our train of inquire again” (45) originated

“Man designated himself as the being who measures values, who values and measures,

as the “calculating animal as such”” (45)

Why is the relationship between the community and the community member like that

of a creditor and a debtor? (Section 9)

Because the community will only give to you as long as you give back to it:

“You live in a community, you enjoy the benefits of a community, … you live a sheltered,

protected life in peace and trust, without any worry of suffering certain kinds of harm and
hostility to which the man outside, the ‘man without peace’, is exposed, … you make pledges

and take on obligations to the community with just that harm and hostility in mind. What

happens if you do not? The community, the cheated creditor, will make you pay up as best it

can” (46).

What is the relationship between the power of community and the leniency of its

punishments? Why is it so? How does this relate to mercy? (Section 10)

The more powerful a community is, the more lenient it will be with its punishments

because one bad action becomes less harmful: “As a community grows in power, it ceases to

take the offence of the individual quite so seriously, because these do not seem to be as

dangerous and destabilizing for the survival of the whole as they did earlier” (47).

What would Nietzche say about a society like Uruguay’s?

Mercy – being nice to each other without meaning – boooo

Mercy – having mercy to someone when they did wrong to us - cool

What is the nature of ressentiment justice? (Section 11)

“to sanctify revenge with the term justice – as though justice were fundamentally simply

a further development of the feeling of having been wronged – and belatedly to legitimize with

revenge emotional reactions in general” (48)

What to Nietzsche is a piece of perfection, the highest form of mastery on earth? Should

we expect to see it? (Section 11)

The sovereign man, someone who is able to maintain an objective view of justice even

in the worse circumstances: “If it actually happens that the just man remains just even towards

someone who has wronged him … if the just and judging eye … is not dimmed even in the face

of personal injury, of scorn and suspicion, well, that is a piece of perfection, the highest form
of mastery to be had on earth, – and even something that we would be wise not to expect and

should certainly find difficult to believe” (48-9)

Ubermensch, sovereign, (a veces lo llama noble)

What is the noble man’s relationship to justice? (Section 11)

“Historically speaking, justice on earth represents … the battle … against reactive

sentiment” The noble man has always been closer to justice because he doesn’t react, “he

simply does not need to place a false and prejudiced interpretation on the object of his attention

… he has always had a clearer, a better conscience on his side” (49), moreover, it is the noble

man who fights the battle against reactive sentiment, because the noble man is “the active, the

strong, the spontaneous, and the aggressive” (49).

What to Nietzsche is the nature of the legal system? What does he think of it? (Section

11)

Setting up a legal system is “the most decisive thing” that authorities can do to fight the

battle of injustice. A legal system is “the imperative declaration of what counts as permissible

in their eyes, as just, and what counts as forbidden, unjust” (49). While revenge looks at bad

actions only from the injured’s point of view, the law treats it “as a crime, as violation of the

law, as insurrection against the higher authorities themselves, they distract the damage done

by such violations”

What is life like in Nietzsche’s eyes? How about the Will to Life? Do you agree with

him? (Section 11)

To talk of ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ as such is meaningless, an act of injury, violence,

exploitation or destruction cannot be ‘unjust’ as such, because life functions essentially in an

injurious, violent, exploitative and destructive manner, or at least these are its fundamental

processes and it cannot be thought of without these characteristics. (50)

Will to life: seeks power.

What is the relationship between the purpose of punishment and the origin of it?

(Section 12)

Moral genealogists use purpose and cause interchangeably, they might say that revenge

or deterrence it the purpose of punishment, and then they’ll say it’s also the cause.

But he believes that purpose and origin are completely disconnected: “the origin of the

emergence of a thing and its ultimate usefulness, its practical application and incorporation

into a system of ends, are toto coelo separate; that anything in existence, having somehow

come about, is continually interpreted anew, requisitioned anew, transformed and redirected

to a new purpose by a power superior to it” (51)

the act of punishing is what endures, and the purpose for which we punish is what is

fluid - sn

“the whole history of a “thing”, an organ, a tradition can to this extent be a continuous

chain of signs, continually revealing new interpretations and adaptations, the causes of which

need not be connected even amongst themselves, but rather sometimes just follow and replace

one another at random” – the origin is a continuous chain of signs that needs to be subjected

to our interpretation

Existence precedes essence – we have a hand, we give the purpose of grasping to it.

Will to power is introduced for the first time in this passage. What do you take it to

mean? (Section 12)

 “the will to power has achieved mastery over something less powerful and has

impressed upon it its one idea of a use function” (51)

It’s the explanation of how change happens

How does Nietzsche explain that meaning is fluid? (Section 12)

“The form is fluid, the ‘meaning’ [Sinn] even more so . . . It is no different inside any

individual organism: every time the whole grows appreciably, the ‘meaning’ [Sinn] of the

individual organs shifts, – sometimes the partial destruction of organs, the reduction in their

number (for example, by the destruction of intermediary parts) can be a sign of increasing

vigour and perfection. To speak plainly: even the partial reduction in usefulness, decay and

degeneration, loss of meaning [Sinn] and functional purpose, in short death, make up the

conditions of true progressus: always appearing, as it does, in the form of the will and way to

greater power and always emerging victorious at the cost of countless smaller forces” (51-2).

Referring to evolution, organs shifts – meaning changes

How we punish is fluid, meaning even more

What came first – punishment or the intention/meaning/purpose of punishment?

(Section 13)

“we have to distinguish between two of its aspects: one is its relative permanence, the

custom, the act, the ‘drama’, a certain strict sequence of procedures, the other is its fluidity,

its meaning [Sinn], purpose and expectation, which is linked to the carrying out of such

procedures” (52).

Permanence: custom, act, drama, procedure. – Permanent in the sense that it’s just facts

Fluidity: meaning, purpose, expectation. – Constantly open to interpretation.

 “the procedure itself will be something older, predating its use as punishment” (53)

“in short, that the matter is not to be understood in the way our naïve moral and legal

genealogists assumed up till now, who all thought the procedure had been invented for the

purpose of punishment, just as people used to think that the hand had been invented for the

purpose of grasping” (53). – We started hitting people, we realized “pain fixes memory” (o

algo así) and we kept on doing it.

“With regard to the other element in punishment, the fluid one, its ‘meaning’, the

concept ‘punishment’ presents, … not just one meaning but a whole synthesis of ‘meanings’

[Sinnen]: … the history of the use of punishment for a variety of purposes, finally crystallizes

in a kind of unity which is difficult to dissolve back into its elements, difficult to analyse and,

this has to be stressed, is absolutely undefinable. (Today it is impossible to say precisely why

people are actually punished: all concepts in which an entire process is semiotically

concentrated defy definition; only something which has no history can be defined.)” (53) – it’s

been such a long time that it’s hard to identify the individual reasons for punishment

What is the primary purpose of punishment to Nietzsche? What does he think of it?

What are the real effects of punishment? (Section 14-15)

“On the whole, punishment makes men harder and colder, it concentrates, it sharpens

the feeling of alienation; it strengthens the power to resist” (54).

even today, punishment does not awaken a feeling of guilt. Punishment arouses the

sense of "something has gone unexpectedly wrong" not of "I should not have done that." -sn:

“the actual effect of punishment primarily in the sharpening of intelligence, in a

lengthening of the memory, in a will to be more cautious, less trusting, to go about things more

circumspectly from now on, in the recognition that one was, once and for all, too weak for

many things, in a sort of improvement of self-assessment. What can largely be achieved by

punishment, in man or beast, is the increase of fear, the intensification of intelligence, the

mastering of desires: punishment tames man in this way but does not make him ‘better’, – we

would be more justified in asserting the opposite. (‘You can learn from your mistakes’ as the

saying goes, but what you learn also makes you bad. Fortunately it often enough makes you

stupid.)” (56).

“He himself, the recipient of punishment, which again descended like a piece of fate,

felt no ‘inner pain’ beyond what he would feel if something unforeseen suddenly happened, a

terrible natural disaster, a boulder falling on him and crushing him, where resistance is futile.”

(55) – so, punishment doesn’t really cause guilt, you just feel a bit bad. Feeling of guilt is even

hindered.

Page 56-62

• What is bad conscience to Nietzsche and how did it come to be? (Section 16)

Bad conscience is man turning against himself, it’s an illness resulting from the

following process:. Instincts were supressed – turned inwards (internalization of man) – turned

against himself.

“I look on bad conscience as a serious illness to which man was forced to succumb by

the pressure of the most fundamental of all changes which he experienced, – that change

whereby he finally found himself imprisoned within the confines of society and peace. … – at

one go, all instincts were devalued and ‘suspended’. Now they had to walk on their feet and

‘carry themselves’”(56) (in the “…” he’s comparing what happened to human instincts to the

transition that animals experienced from aquatic to land)

“All instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards – this is what I call the

internalization of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his ‘soul’”

(57).
 “all those instincts of the wild, free, roving man were turned backwards, against man

himself. … that is the origin of ‘bad conscience’”(57). State puts walls

• How does he explain the origin of the soul? (Section 16)

Internalization of man, instincts turned inwards.

“All instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards – this is what I call the

internalization of man: with it there now evolves in man what will later be called his ‘soul’.

The whole inner world, originally stretched thinly as though between two layers of skin, was

expanded and extended itself and gained depth, breadth and height in proportion to the degree

that the external discharge of man’s instincts was obstructed” (57).

• What do you think Nietzsche means when he says that “something… were being

prepared [for man], as though man were not an end but just a path, an episode, a bridge, a great

promise” (58)? (Section 16)

There’s greater purpose to human life (?

There’ll be one more step in evolution, superman

• What are Nietzsche’s assumptions in his theory on the origin of bad conscience?

(Section 17)

First assumption: “the alteration was not gradual and voluntary and did not represent

an organic assimilation into new circumstances, but was a breach, a leap, a compulsion, an

inescapable fate that nothing could ward off, which occasioned no struggle, not even any

ressentiment” (58). Sudden and involuntary

 Second assumption: “shaping of a population, …, as happened at the beginning with

an act of violence, could only be concluded with acts of violence, -that consequently the oldest

“state” emerged as a terrible tyranny, as a repressive and ruthless machinery, and continued

working until the raw material of people and semi-animals had been finally… shaped” (58).

Started with violence, must end with violence

• Who is the state and what do they have to do with bad conscience? (Section 17)

The state shaped the changes that led to bad conscience (see assumption 2).

The state is “some pack of blond beasts of prey, a conqueror and master race, which,

organized on a war footing, and with the power to organize, unscrupulously lays its dreadful

paws on a populace which, though it might be vastly greater in number, is still shapeless and

shifting” (58).

Appears without contracts, just oppressing people. The noble people

• Nietzsche underhandedly defines Will to Power in Section 18. What is his

definition?

“creates bad conscience for itself, and builds negative ideals, it is that very instinct for

freedom (put into my language: the will to power)” (59).

• Keep adding to your description of bad conscience. (Section 18)

Neglecting yourself.

Lykke: pleasure attached to bad conscience. Pleasure in cruelty. Masochistic. Bad

conscience people are unegoistic because they don’t have a self

 • What point is Nietzsche making about the current generation and its ancestors?

How does he relate this to the origin of gods? (Section 19)

Creditors/debtors – present generation/forebears. People are in debt with the first

generations for what they have created: “There is a prevailing conviction that the tribe exists

only because of the sacrifices and deeds of the forefathers, – and that these have to be paid

back with sacrifices and deeds: people recognize an indebtedness [Schuld], which continually

increases because these ancestors continue to exist as mighty spirits, giving the tribe new

advantages and lending it some of their power” (60).

The payment happens as sacrifices and the success of a tribe continues being associated

with the creators. Because of this continual association is that some creators end up with the

category of gods: “the ancestors of the most powerful tribes must have grown to an immense

stature and must have been pushed into the obscurity of divine mystery and transcendence: –

inevitably the ancestor himself is finally transfigured into a god. Perhaps we have here the

actual origin of gods, an origin, then, in fear!” (61).

• What do God/gods have to do with guilt and debt? Why would atheism help

with this problem? (Section 19-20)

Man “also inherited, along with the divinities of tribes and clans, the burden of unpaid

debts and the longing for them to be settled (…). The feeling of indebtedness towards a deity

continued to grow for several millennia, and indeed always in the same proportion as the

concept of and feeling for God grew in the world and was carried aloft”(61-2).

Believing in God perpetuates the feeling of debt, therefore, atheism would stop this

feeling: “from the unstoppable decline in faith in the Christian God there is, even now, a

considerable decline in the consciousness of human debt; indeed, the possibility cannot be
rejected out of hand that the complete and definitive victory of atheism might release humanity

from this whole feeling of being indebted towards its beginnings, its causa prima. Atheism and

a sort of second innocence belong together” (62).

• What is the debtor’s relationship to bad conscience? (Section 21)

Bad conscience is established in the debtor.

(you could re-read it…)

Bad conscience is also called awareness of our guilt

• How does Nietzsche relate debt/guilt and duty with religion? What does “eternal

punishment,” “original sin,” and Jesus’ crucifixion have to do with all this? (Section 22)

“this man of bad conscience has seized on religious presupposition in order to provide

his self-torture with its most horrific hardness and sharpness” – Man of bad conscience took

advantage of religious claims to torture himself even more.

“he reinterprets these self-same animal instincts as debt/guilt before God” His instincts

turn into debt before God (instead of feeling strong you feel guilty for being strong)

Eternal punishment – unable to finish paying the debt. We are sinners as the basis of

everything.

Jesus’ crucifixion makes people feel even more in debt and guilty because Jesus died

to redeem humanity’s debt.

Tithe – diezmo. Repent – paying ba

 • Why does man want to find himself guilty? (Section 22)

His will to find himself guilty is a product of his bad conscience, of supressing his

instincts.

• Why is the shout of love in the night of torture problematic to Nietzsche?

(Section 22)

It’s ridiculous for him that Christians consider what they do is in the name of love, it’s

suffering, not love.

• How do the Greek gods differ from the Christian God? How do they influence

human beings differently? (Section 23)

“Greek gods, these reflections of noble and proud men in whom the animal in man felt

deified, did not tear itself apart and did not rage against itself! These Greeks, for most of the

time, used their gods expressly to keep “bad conscience” at bay so that they could carry on

enjoying the freedom of soul” (64-5) Greek gods praised the animal side of men and helped

them to avoid getting a bad conscience. They’re noble.

They wouldn’t criticize humans as much as the Christian God. When mortals

misbehave they would just say they’re foolish, not committing a sin.

“The gods served to justify man to a certain degree, even if he was in the wrong they

served as causes of evil – they did no, at that time, take the punishment on themselves, but

rather, as is nobles, the guilt” (65) Gods accounted responsibility for men’s sins.
 • Nietzsche summarizes his ideas in this section. What is bad conscience? Who

is the Übermensch? What is his twofold personality? (Section 24)

Bad conscience: “For too long, man has viewed his natural inclinations with an “evil

eye”, so that they finally came to be intertwined with “bad conscience” in him” (66)

Übermensch: “we would need another sort of spirit than those we are likely to

encounter in this age: spirits who are strengthened by wars and victories, for whom conquest,

adventure, danger and even pain have actually become a necessity” (66)

• Whose coming is Nietzsche prophesizing in the end of Section 24 and in Section

25? What is the goal of this Antichrist?

Übermensch “will redeem us, not just from the ideal held up till now, but also from

those things which had to arise from it, from the great nausea, the will to nothingness, from

nihilism, that stroke of midday and of great decision that makes the will free again” (66-7)

• Is Nietzsche being theistic or religious through this prophecy? (Section 25)

 Essay 3

How does wisdom want us and why? Why does Nietzsche start his Third Essay with

this quote? (Section 1)

Carefree, mocking, violent – fits with master morality – starts with what he likes

What general piece of information do you receive about the ascetic ideal? Does it fit

whatever else you know about the clerical caste? (All Sections)

Dictionary – ascetic: avoiding physical pleasures and living a simple life, often for

religious reasons

Brainstorming:

- It prefers to will nothingness (God, gives constant meaning, not admit that will

nothingness), rather than not will (68)

- They choose pain over pleasure (previous sections).

- It is against sensuality (section 2) – this opposition is created by those stupid people,

he thinks that ascetic ideals and sensuality can go together, people just make things

more complicated.

- Their strongest weapon against pain is nothingness (God)

- Means nothing to the artists (72).

“Nietzsche finds the meaning of ascetic ideals among philosophers: it is a means to

maximize the feeling of power. Ascetic ideals are not a denial of existence, but rather an

affirmation of existence, wherein the philosopher affirms his and only his existence. Thus,

Nietzsche concludes, philosophers do not write about asceticism from a disinterested

standpoint. They think of its value to themselves, and how they can benefit from it. Philosophers
are at their best when they isolate themselves from the bustle and chatter of the world about

them.

Having identified the value of ascetic ideals among philosophers, Nietzsche goes on to

argue that philosophy was born of and depends on ascetic ideals. All major changes in our

world have been achieved through violence and have been mistrusted. The contemplative,

sceptical mood of philosophy ran counter to ancient morality, and must have been mistrusted.

The best way to dispel this mistrust was to arouse fear, and Nietzsche sees the ancient Brahmins

as paramount in this respect. Through self-torture and asceticism, they made not only others

fear and reverence them, but they came also to fear and reverence themselves.

Essentially, Nietzsche suggests, philosophers could not parade as philosophers, and so

chose a different mask to present themselves. With the Brahmins, and with most philosophers

since, this mask has been that of the ascetic priest. Nietzsche suggests that this is still the case:

there is not yet enough freedom of will on this earth for the philosopher to drop the pretence

of the ascetic priest.” (Sparknotes)

What is Nietzsche’s point in bringing up Wagner? What question does he ask? (Section

2)

Radical change in Wagner’s views…

Wagner paying homage to chastity = he praises ascetic ideals

What does it mean if an artist takes up ascetic ideals?

What is the role of the artist? What is the relationship between the art and the artist?

(Section 4)
 “it is certainly better if we separate an artist sufficiently far from his work as not

immediately to take the man as seriously as his work. After all, he is merely the precondition

for the work, the womb, the soil, sometimes the manure and fertilizer on which it grows, – and

as such, he is something we have to forget about in most cases if we want to enjoy the work.”

(71)

Pregnant woman must forget the pain to enjoy the child, we must forget the artists to

enjoy the art.

The artist is not eternal but drives to create sth eternal

What should the relationship between the artists and the ascetic ideals be? (Section 5)

Ascetic ideals mean nothing to an artist – artists aim for an eternal life through their art,

makes no sense that they go by ascetic ideals

What does it mean if a philosopher pays homage to the ascetic ideal? (Section 5)

What is Schopenhauer’s thoughts on art and what is Wagner’s relationship to him?

(Section 5)

Schopenhauer gives Wagner this suffering and tragic ideas.

Before Schopenhauer music was a mean to an end for Wagner, then music became

sovereign, man-like, telephone to the beyond, almost an oracle, therefore close to ascetic ideals

What does Nietzsche say about Kant and art? How does it oppose to Stendhal’s view?

What about Schopenhauer’s? Which of them does Nietzsche prefer? (Section 6)

 Kant: “something is beautiful if it gives pleasure without interest” – Nietzche says

hahahaha as if you could conceive this without interest.

Pygmalion – created with interest.

Greatest good – painless condition (Epicurus quoted by Schopenhauer). Schopenhauer

signs with Kant but, in Nietzsche’s perspective, he doesn’t fully understand him. Kant is

impersonal, Schopenhauer isn’t, he wants pleasure but cannot have it.

Nietzsche returns to the philosopher’s relationship to ascetic ideals? What does he

conclude? Why do you think he concludes that?

What type of morality would you categorize Schopenhauer to have? Why? (Section 7)

- Treated sexuality as a personal enemy

- Needed enemies to stay cheerful (would become ill otherwise)

- Loved wrathful, bilious, black-green words (wrathful = extreme anger, bilious =

unpleasant/illness-related)

- Got angry for the sake of it Commented [ML7]: This are quotes from what
Nietzsche say about schopenhauer

SLAVE MORALITY

How does Schopenhauer’s similarity to other philosophers? (Section 7)

He also has slave morality

Why are philosophers warm to the ascetic ideal? Give several examples of how they

are warm from the text. (Section 7)

 Philosophers being warm to the ascetic ideals is a fundamental condition: “there exists

a genuine partiality and warmth among philosophers with regard to the whole ascetic ideal

(...) Both these features belong, as I said, to the type; if both are lacking in a philosopher, he

is always just a ‘so-called’ philosopher” (76) – will to power (pero la puta pedazo de pelotuda,

me escribiste will to power aca pero no lo conectaste con nada, la cos ava por la quote al final

de la pagina “Every animal, including the bête philosophe, instinctively strives for an optimum

of favourable conditions in which to fully release his power and achieve his maximum of power-

sensation; every animal abhors equally instinctively, with an acute sense of smell that is ‘higher

than all reason’, any kind of disturbance and hindrance that blocks or could block his path to

the optimum (– it is not his path to ‘happiness’ I am talking about, but the path to power,

action, the mightiest deeds, and in most cases, actually, his path to misery).” )

Such warmth happens because every animal (philosophers included) instinctively

strives for the “optimum” (full release of power, maximum of power-sensation) and avoid

anything that might come as an obstacle in this path. Going by the ascetic ideals is a way of

avoiding those obstacles.

Example: avoiding marriage, not having kids

Ascetic ideal = independence, “optimum condition of the highest and boldest

intellectuality” (77)

Ascetic ideals do not care about virtues. It’s their mean to be better philosophers.

Philosophers want power

Outline the philosophers’ relation to the ascetic ideals? Find examples of how similar

they are. (Section 8)

 Ni idea qué significa esto pero parece importante: “they think of the ascetic ideal as the

serene asceticism of a deified creature that has flown the nest and is more liable to roam above

life than rest.” (78)

Ascetic = simple life, simple life 4 philosophers = “freedom from compulsion,

disturbance, noise, business,

duties, worries; clear heads;

the dance, bounce and flight

of ideas”

Ascetic = poverty, humility, chastity; 4 philosophers = “most proper and natural

prerequisites for their best

existence and finest

productivity”

Mentions something like they go to the desert to isolate themselves, but the desert is

kind of metaphorical.

“we philosophers need a rest from one thing above all: anything to do with ‘today’. We

appreciate peace, coldness, nobility, distance, the past, more or less everything at the sight of

which the soul is not forced to defend itself and button up” (79)

“You can recognize a philosopher by his avoidance of three shiny loud things, fame,

princes, women” (79)

They don’t take on the ascetic ideals out of acquiring a virtue but out of selfishness

What does the philosopher’s pregnancy have to do with his abstinence? (Section 8)

Pregnancy keeps women in a dependency state.

 “ with regard to the chastity of philosophers, this type of spirit obviously has a different

progeny than children, and perhaps maintains the survival of its name, its bit of immortality,

in some other way (…). This has nothing of chastity from ascetic scruple or hatred of the senses,

any more than it is chastity when an athlete or jockey abstains from women: instead, it is their

dominating instinct, at least during periods when they are pregnant with something great.”

No need to have children, they give birth to ideas

Keep outlining the philosophers’ relation to the ascetic ideals. (Section 9) Commented [ML8]: PAPER 3!

Ascetic ideals are treated with partiality by philosophers.

Philosophy could only start thanks to the leading-rein of the ascetic ideals.

“At first, philosophy began like all good things, – for a long time, everyone lacked self-

confidence, looking round to see if anyone would come to their aid, even afraid of anyone who

looked on. If we draw up a list of the particular drives and virtues of the philosopher – his drive

to doubt, his drive to deny, his drive to prevaricate (his ‘ephectic’ drive), his drive to analyse, Commented [ML9]: The “ephectic” drive’ is the drive
to put off, delay, hold back, hesitate, suspend judgment.
his drive to research, investigate, dare, his drive to compare and counter-balance, his will to

neutrality and objectivity, his will to every ‘sine ira et studio’ –: surely we realize that all these Commented [ML10]: At the beginning of his Annals (I,
1), Tacitus expresses his intention to write ‘without anger
or partisanship’.
ran counter to the primary demands of morality and conscience for the longest period of

time?” (81)

Explain whether and how (or how not) this behavior sounds like slave morality.

(Section 9)

It pretty much is slave morality…

(Continuation of quote in previous question) “Would not a philosopher, assuming he

had achieved an awareness of himself, practically feel he was the embodiment of ‘nitimur in

vetitum’ – and wouldn’t he consequently guard himself ‘from feeling’, from being aware of Commented [ML11]: ‘We have an inclination toward
that which is forbidden’
himself?” suggest philosophers’ self-denial, “ran counter to the primary demands of morality

and conscience”

Process of philosophers is just like our society: “Hubris today characterizes our whole Commented [ML12]: describes a personality quality of
extreme or foolish pride or dangerous overconfidence. In its
ancient Greek context, it typically describes behavior that
attitude towards nature, our rape of nature with the help of machines and the completely defies the norms of behavior or challenges the gods, and
which in turn brings about the downfall, or nemesis, of the
unscrupulous inventiveness of technicians and engineers; hubris characterizes our attitude to perpetrator of hubris”

God, or rather to some alleged spider of purpose and ethics lurking behind the great spider’s

web of causality (…) Afterwards we heal ourselves: being ill is instructive, we do not doubt,

more instructive than being well, – people who make us ill seem even more necessary for us

today than any medicine men and ‘saviours’. We violate ourselves these days, no doubt, we are

nutcrackers of the soul, questioning and questionable, treating life as though it were nothing

but cracking nuts; whereby we have to become daily more deserving of being questioned, more

deserving of asking questions, more deserving – of living? . .” (82)

(There’s another clear quote about the morality of custom at the end of this section)

What role does fear have in philosophers’ lives? How and why do they use fear?

(Section 10)

Philosophers need to be feared so that they can do their philosophy

Early philosophers came up could terrible methods to make people fear them, “namely

in order to fear and respect themselves. Because they found in themselves all their value

judgments turned against themselves, they had to fight off every kind of suspicion and

resistance to the ‘philosopher in themselves’” (83).

They were “power-hungry hermits and thought innovators, for whom it was necessary

first to violate the gods and tradition in themselves, so they could believe in their own

innovations..” (84)
 How are philosophers dependent on the ascetic ideal? (Section 10)

Philosophy would have been impossible if it hadn’t been for the ascetic ideals.

“the philosophic spirit has always had to disguise and cocoon itself among previously

established types of contemplative man, as a priest, magician, soothsayer, religious man in

general, in order for its existence to be possible at all: the ascetic ideal served the philosopher

for a long time as outward appearance, as a precondition of existence, – he had to play that

part [darstellen] in order to be a philosopher, he had to believe in it in order to be able to play

it [um es darstellen zu können].”(84)

Finally (!), what does the ascetic ideal really mean? To where does it lead? (Section 11)

It leads to the after life! They say no to life and preserve it at the same time. By saying

no to life they become masters, like a 2-year-old child!

The ascetic priest rests his faith and power in that ideal, though it “will hardly be the

happiest defender of his own ideal”.

“in this case, the case of the ascetic life, life counts as a bridge to that other existence.

The ascetic treats life as a wrong path that he has to walk along backwards till he reaches the

point where he starts; or, like a mistake which can only be set right by action – ought to be set

right: he demands that we should accompany him, and when he can, he imposes his valuation

of existence.” (85)

What is the idea we are fighting over? (Section 11)

 “the valuation of our life by the ascetic priests” (85) this valuation is “one of the most

wide-spread and long-lived facts there are” (85). It clearly isn’t spread by procreation (but I

didn’t quite get how it actually is).

What are the problems of ascetic life to Nietzsche? What is its paradox? (Section 11)

“For an ascetic life is a self-contradiction: here an unparalleled ressentiment rules,

that of an unfulfilled instinct and power-will that wants to be master, not over something in

life, but over life itself and its deepest, strongest, most profound conditions; here, an attempt is

made to use power to block the sources of the power; here, the green eye of spite turns on

physiological growth itself, in particular the manifestation of this in beauty and joy; while

satisfaction is looked for and found in failure, decay, pain, misfortune, ugliness, voluntary

deprivation, destruction of selfhood, self-flagellation and self-sacrifice. This is all paradoxical

in the extreme: we are faced with a conflict that wills itself to be conflicting, which relishes

itself in this affliction and becomes more self-assured and triumphant to the same degree as

its own condition, the physiological capacity to live, decreases.” (86)

Word “conflict” is used but is the German word “zwiespaltigkeit” which means to split.

It’s paradoxical because ascetic ideals are against life while at the same time they are

used to preserve life.

What is it to philosophize? (Section 12) Commented [ML13]: Releelo para paper 3

Where life is true

“it will look for error precisely where the actual instinct of life most unconditionally

judges there to be truth” (86)

What is the ascetic conflict [Zweispältigkeit]? Why is it a paradox? (Section 13)

 “the ascetic ideal springs from the protective and healing instincts of a degenerating

life, which uses every means to maintain itself and struggles for its existence; it indicates a

partial physiological inhibition and exhaustion against which the deepest instincts of life,

which have remained intact, continually struggle with new methods and inventions. The ascetic

ideal is one such method: the situation is therefore the precise opposite of what the worshippers

of this ideal imagine, – in it and through it, life struggles with death and against death, the

ascetic ideal is a trick for the preservation of life” (88)

What does Nietzsche say about different perspectives? (Section 12)

“to see differently, and to want to see differently to that degree, is no small discipline

and preparation of the intellect for its future ‘objectivity’ (…) we can use the difference in

perspectives and affective interpretations for knowledge.”(87)

“There is only a perspectival seeing, only a perspectival ‘knowing’; the more affects

we are able to put into words about a thing, the more eyes, various eyes we are able to use for

the same thing, the more complete will be our ‘concept’ of the thing, our ‘objectivity’.” (87)

What happens if we turn off emotions? (Section 12)

“But to eliminate the will completely and turn off all the emotions without exception,

assuming we could: well? would that not mean to castrate the intellect?” (87)

Give examples of what ascetic life is to Nietzsche. (Section 13)

“the ascetic ideal springs from the protective and healing instincts of a degenerating

life, which uses every means to maintain itself and struggles for its existence; it indicates a

partial physiological inhibition and exhaustion against which the deepest instincts of life,
which have remained intact, continually struggle with new methods and inventions. (…) the

ascetic ideal is a trick for the preservation of life.” (88)

Explain how these opinions fit in with your overall understanding of Nietzsche.

Who are the most dangerous to man? Why? (Section 14)

“The sick are the greatest danger for the healthy; harm comes to the strong not from

the strongest but from the weakest.”(89)

Fear of man is desirable because it “forces the strong to be strong”.

What’s dangerous is nausea at man, as well as compassion for man – when they merge

the “most uncanny would be produced, the ‘last will’ of man, his will to nothingness, nihilism”

(89)

Give examples of slave morality/men of ressentiment shown in the text (be ready to

share these in class). Are these characteristics similar to your prior understanding? (Section 14)

- “vengeance-seekers disguised as judges, with the word justice continually in their

mouth like poisonous spittle, pursing their lips and always at the ready to spit at

anybody who does not look discontented and who cheerfully goes his own way.”

(90). Who they spit at is the overmensch

- “The sick woman spares nothing, either living or dead, to this end, she digs up the

things most deeply buried” (91)

Classmates say it does not divert from the previous explanations of slave morality

What is the effect of men of ressentiment‘s unhappiness? What is Nietzsche’s solution

to the problem? Why is a solution necessary? (Section 14)

 They make the strong men unhappy as well – “on to the conscience of the happy: so

that the latter eventually start to be ashamed of their happiness and perhaps say to one another:

‘It’s a disgrace to be happy! There is too much misery!’” (91)

The solution is to keep these types of men separate from each other because it would

be catastrophic if their disease continues to be transmitted.

4- What is the mission of the ascetic priest? (Section 15)

To fulfil the necessity of doctors and nurses who are sick themselves. “The ascetic

priest must count as predestined saviour, shepherd and defender of the sick herd in our eyes

(…) Rule over the suffering is his domain, his instinct directs him towards it and his own special

skill, mastery and brand of happiness are to be had in it” (92)

The ascetic priest serves the purpose of altering the direction of the ressentiment by

persuading the masses that they themselves and no one else are to blame for the suffering

(sparknotes)

5- Give examples of the priest’s characteristics (be ready to share these in class).

(Section 15)

In order to understand the disease he must:

- Sick

- Have a sick close relative

- Destitute

In order to “be their support, defence, prop, compulsion, disciplinarian, tyrant,

God”(92):

- Have the trust and fear of the sick

 In order to have those, he must be:

- Strong

- More master of himself than of others

- Unscathed in his will to power

His role is to defend his herd against the healthy, “but also against envy of the healthy;

he must be the natural opponent and despiser of all crude, stormy, unbridled, hard,

violently predatory health and mightiness” (92)

The priest despises more easily than it hates.

He’s a master of the suffering.

Priests encourage hard work (sparknotes)

6- What is the actual physiological causation of ressentiment and how does it work?

(Section 15)

“physiological causation of ressentiment: revenge and their ilk, in a yearning, then, to

anaesthetize pain through emotion” (93)

Tied with the previously mentioned concept of senseless suffering

What are the characteristics of sick people (be ready to share these in class)? Nietzsche

claims that they enjoy being victims – what does Nietzsche advise to do instead? How is the

priest a direction changer? (Section 15)

Characteristics (basically all are quotes):

- All of them say “someone or other must be to blame that I feel ill”

- Ignorance of the true reason, the physiological one, why they feel ill.
 - Enjoy being mistrustful

- Dwelling on wrongs and imagined slights

- They love to “wallow in tortured suspicion, and intoxicate themselves with their

own poisonous wickedness” (94)

“every sufferer instinctively looks for a cause of his distress; more exactly, for a culprit,

even more precisely for a guilty culprit who is receptive to distress, – in short, for a living being

upon whom he can release his emotions, actually or in effigy, on some pretext or other: because

the release of emotions is the greatest attempt at relief, or should I say, at anaesthetizing on

the part of the sufferer, his involuntarily longed -- for narcotic against pain of any kind.” (93)

How priests fulfil their missions: “but first he has to wound so that he can be the doctor;

and whilst he soothes the pain caused by the wound, he poisons the wound at the same time”

(93) The priest help the sick to anaesthetize the pain by being the people with whom the sick

can release their emotions (?

Ill people need to release emotion and blame someone

Nietzsche says to blame yourself, and that’s the function of ascetic priest. But Nietzsche

is more like accept what you’ve done and priests are more like feel guilty

I don’t quite get the change in direction that it’s talking about

Nietzsche states that the ascetic priests employs a tyranny paradoxical concepts in

relation to the sick. What is this paradox? (Section 16) Commented [ML14]: Read again

Paradoxical concept of guilt and sinfulness. Means to make the sick people healthier.

Makes them feel bad. This makes them aware, being aware they’re powerless, cannot spread it

again,
 They use the paradox to make the ill feel bad for them to be healthier

Page 94 talks about the cure… dunno there’s a quote you should look at

How does Nietzsche relate facts with interpretations? (Section 16)

“‘sinfulness’ in man is not a fact, but rather the interpretation of a fact, namely a

physiological upset, – the latter seen from a perspective of morals and religion which is no

longer binding on us. – The fact that someone feels ‘guilty’, ‘sinful’, by no means proves that

he is right in feeling this way; any more than someone is healthy just because he feels healthy.”

(95)

Where does the priest’s genius lie? Is he really a doctor? Why/why not? (Section 17)

“The alleviation of suffering, ‘consolation’ of every kind, – that is where his genius lies:

how imaginatively he has understood his task as consoler, how unscrupulously and boldly he

has chosen the means to do it!”(96)

Slave – weak by nature, feel ressentiment, senseless suffering

Ascetic priests – masters within slave morality, observe senseless suffering – see the

lack of meaning – thus, change the direction of ressentiment. Brings meaning with the

excitement of being sinners. Symptomatic treatment. Makes them worse cause they become

dependent on being told that they are sinners.

They consider themselves as saviours. Not doctors cause they don’t cure, just treat

symptoms

What is the main concern of all great religions? Do you find this to be true? (Section

17)

“with all great religions, the main concern is the fight against a certain weariness and
heaviness that has become epidemic.” (96)

“physiological feeling of obstruction will rule amongst large masses of people which,

however, is not consciously perceived as such, through lack of physiological knowledge, so

that its ‘cause’ and its cure can be sought and tested only on the psychological-moral level (–

actually, this is my most general formula for what is usually called a ‘religion’).” (96)

How does Nietzsche show that the ascetic ideal is a paradox? (Section 17)

“Firstly, we fight against that dominating lethargy with methods that reduce the

awareness of life to the lowest point. If possible, absolutely no more wanting, no more wishing;

everything that arouses the emotions and ‘blood’ must be avoided (…) The result in

psychological and moral terms: ‘loss of self’, ‘sanctification’, in physiological terms:

hypnotization, – the attempt to achieve for man something akin to what hibernation is for some

kinds of animal and estivation is for many plants in hot climates, a minimum of expenditure of

energy and metabolism, (…) We can have absolutely no doubt that these sportsmen of

‘holiness’ who are so abundant at all times, in almost all peoples, have actually found a real

deliverance from what they fought against with such a rigorous training, – they finally rid

themselves of that deep, physiological depression with the help of a system of hypnotizing

methods in countless cases: for which reason their methodology belongs among the most

general ethnological facts.”

Why is the absence of suffering the highest good and God nothingness and how do they

aid the main concern of religion? What does Nietzsche think about it? (Section 17) Commented [ML15]: Revisar

“the hypnotic feeling of nothingness, the repose of deepest sleep, in short, absence of

suffering – this may be counted as the highest good, the value of values, by the suffering and

by those who are deeply depressed, it has to be valued positively by them and found to be the
positive itself. (According to the same logic of feeling, nothingness is called God in all

pessimistic religions.)” (99)

Alasdair points out that some people are incurable, therefore it’s okay to have ascetic

priests.

How does the mechanical activity that combats depression work? (Section 18)

“another training is tried to combat the condition of depression, which at all events is

easier: mechanical activity. It is beyond doubt that with this, an existence of suffering is

alleviated to a not inconsiderable extent: today people call this fact, rather dishonestly, ‘the

blessing of work’. The alleviation consists of completely diverting the interest of the sufferer

from the pain, – so that constantly an action and yet another action enters consciousness and

consequently little room is left for suffering: because this chamber of human consciousness is

small!” (99)

How is “Love Thy Neighbour” a form of medication? How does it work with Will to

Power and herd organization? (Section 18)

“An even higher-valued means of fighting depression is the prescription of a small

pleasure which is readily accessible and can be made into normal practice; this medication is

often used in conjunction with those just discussed. The most frequent form in which a pleasure

of this type is prescribed as a cure is the pleasure of giving pleasure (…); the ascetic priest

thereby prescribes, when he prescribes ‘love thy neighbour’, what is actually the arousal of

the strongest, most life-affirming impulse, albeit in the most cautious dose, – the will to power.”

(100)

Self-interest. Way of showing superiority

 Based on this passage and your prior knowledge, what is Will to Power and how does

it work? (Section 18)

Power of the most powerful at the time, who inserts their interpretation into sth.

In this passage is the feeling of superiority, grasping that power.

Three ways of will to power: work, pleasure, and herd

“This ‘will to reciprocity’, to form a herd, a ‘community’, a ‘conventicle’, called forth

in such a manner is bound to lead, if only in miniature, to a new and much fuller outbreak of

the will to power: the formation of a herd is an essential step and victory in the fight against

depression. With the growth of the community, a new interest is kindled for the individual as

well, which often enough will lift him out of the most personal element in his discontent, his

aversion to himself” (100)

What are the ascetic priest’s guilty means in the fight against displeasure? (Section 19)

“now let us turn to the more interesting, the ‘guilty’ means. They are all concerned with

one thing: some kind of excess of feeling,” (101)

They oppose the innocent means that were described before

The guilty means are “used as the most effective anaesthetic for dull, crippling, long-

drawn-out pain”.

The priests trying to use guilty means can be described in an euphemistic way as

“making use of the enthusiasm that lies in all strong affects”. (obviously Nietzsche hates to

talk about it in that way and dedicates stupid sentences to explain how it’s stupid to talk about

it in that way… yep, he just continues with how psychologist should resist over-moralistic

language).
 Okay, here he said something important: “the most characteristic feature of modern

souls, modern books, is not their lies but the deep-rooted innocence in their moralistic

mendaciousness”. -and the role of psychologists is to “rediscover this “innocence”

everywhere” (not sure what he means by that though).

1. How are modern people both innocent and liars? Why do they have to be dishonest liars

instead of honest ones? (Section 19)

“Our educated people today, our ‘good’ men, do not lie – that is true, but it does them

no credit! The actual lie, the genuine, resolute ‘honest’ lie (…) would be something far too

tough and strong for them; it would demand something of them that one must not demand, that

they open their eyes to themselves, that they come to know how to distinguish between ‘true’

and ‘false’ with regard to themselves. The dishonest lie is the only thing fitting for them;

everyone who feels himself to be a ‘good person’ today is completely incapable of approaching

anything except in a dishonestly mendacious way, in a way that was mendacious right down to

its very depths, but innocently mendacious, true-heartedly mendacious, blue-eyed mendacious,

virtuously mendacious.” (102)

Not lying in a mean way.

I guess that he is getting at the fact that they don’t realize they’re lying, they’re blinded

to their reality (I guess that’s why they’re innocent). Commented [PL16]: But I don’t quite get what would
be an “honest lie”

An theeen he keeps talking about how people are too moral and how we could tell

history in a different way if a real psychologist wrote about those people like Luther and

Wagner.

2. What happens when the ascetic ideal produces an excess of feeling? (Section 20)
 He actually starts talking about the psychologists and how they might also be infected

bla bla

Reduces lethargy (lethargy is a problem to be solved, people have lethargy and are

depressed, stagnation – slaves) –oh my god Paula you were so lazy you didn’t even

look up the definition of lethargy, here it goes now “a lack of energy and enthusiasm”-

It reduced lethargy by “throwing humans out of joint plunging it into terror, frosts,

fires” bla bla. I guess he is referring to mnemonics (? -the idea of imposing something

through pain- Commented [PL17]: Maybe check if this is so

“the ascetic priest has insouciantly taken into his service the whole pack of wild hounds

in man, releasing now one, then another, always with the same purpose of aking man

out of his long-drawn-out melancholy” – si, basicamente el priest les mueve el piso

3. What emotions are released from this action? (Section 20)

Excess of feelings

Sin – terror, fires, frosts, fear, guilt – hell

Depression

Hope and triumph (giving money to the church)

After all of that happens they get a goal: morality. (not a cure, it’s a medication,

continues in next paragraph)

I don’t quite get my previous notes but the whole point of that process is to moverles

el piso by releasing any strong emotion suddenly (anger, fear, voluptuousness, revenge,

hope, triumph, despair, cruelty) but… “Every such excess of emotion has to be paid for

afterwards, it goes without saying – it makes the sick person even sicker –: and
 therefore this type of remedy for pain is a ‘guilty’ one, measured against the modern

yardstick.”

4. What is the consequence of provoking this excess of feeling? (Section 20)

“it makes the sick person even sicker –: and therefore this type of remedy for pain is a

‘guilty’ one, measured against the modern yardstick.” (104)

5. Is this excess of feeling a cure? Does the ascetic priest believe in its efficacy? (Section 20)

It’s not a cure, it’s a remedy against the “lethargy of depression” that aims at

“alleviating and anaesthetizing it”. The ascetic priests applies it with “good conscience” and

a firm belief in it and its efficacy. In a way, it is effective because it does fulfil its aim but it’s

not a cure.

6. How does the ascetic priest produce this excess of feeling? (Section 20)

GUILT! (Debt)

7. What is sin? (Section 20)

“‘Sin’ – for that is the name for the priestly reinterpretation of the animal ‘bad

conscience’ (cruelty turned back on itself) – has been the greatest event in the history of the Commented [PL18]: But.. the priests are the ones who
promote the internalization of man so… how can it be that
the thing they “hate” the most is a reinterpretation of the
sick soul up till now: with sin, we have the most dangerous and disastrous trick of religious thing they promote?

interpretation.” (104)

8. What ‘tip’ does the ascetic priest give the sick man in order to relieve his suffering?

(Section 20)
You’re a sinner because you’re feeling bad conscience. So you need to be aware of your guilt

and look into yourself again

Context: man goes to the ascetic priest because he is “suffering from himself in some way”(104)

and “yearning for reasons -reasons bring relief-“

Okay so now Nietzsche tells us in a horror movie style that THERE IS NO TURNING

BAAAACK, man is now THE SINNER.

9. How is the will to misunderstand suffering made into the content of life? How does it help?

(Section 20)

“everywhere, the will to misunderstand suffering made into the content of life, suffering

reinterpreted as feelings of guilt, fear, punishment; everywhere, the scourge, the hair

shirt, the starving body,” (105)

Suffering gives meaning

He mentions something about “the hypnotic glance of the sinner always moving in one

direction” (105) but I’m not sure if that explains HOW things changes.

10. Why do people start desiring more pain? (Section 20)

The more pain, the less sinful

If you are like “cool, I’m going to heaven”, then you back into lethargy

“the ascetic priest -had obviously won, his kingdom had come: already people were no longer

making complaints against pain, they thirsted for it” (105)

11. What is Nietzsche’s judgment of the sick man’s improvement through the use of the

priest’s treatment? (Section 21)

Yeah, he improved, but “improve” to Nietzsche meant “tamed, weakend, discouraged, refined,

molly-coddled, emasculated (so, almost the same as injured…) (…) a system like this makes

the sick patient more sick in every case (…) everywhere where the ascetic priest has prevailed

with this treatment of the sick, the sickness has increased in depth and breadth at a terrific

speed” (106) Apparently Nietzsche believes that the sickness manifests itself in the form of

epileptic, paralyses and long-term depressions.

12. What is the real catastrophe in the history of the health of the European man? (Section 21)

Ascetic ideals (?

13. Why does Nietzsche prefer the Old Testament to the New Testament? (Section 22)

“Old Testament! I find in it great men, heroic landscape and something of utmost rarity

on earth, the incomparable naïvety of the strong heart; even more, I find a people. In contrast,

in the New Testament I find nothing but petty sectarian groupings, nothing but rococo of the

soul, nothing but arabesques, crannies and oddities, nothing but the air of the conventicle, not

to forget the occasional breath of bucolic sugariness which belongs to the epoch” (107)

Okay… we got to some weird discussion about the old testament involving frogs…

Basically the old one punishes, the new one is super lenient and soft

14. What is the ascetic ideal like? (Section 22)

“The ascetic ideal, you have guessed, was never anywhere a school of good taste, still

less of good manners, – at best it was a school for hieratic manners, –: which means it contains

within itself something that is the deadly enemy of all good manners, – lack of moderation,

dislike of moderation, being itself a ‘non plus ultra’” (108)

They are extreme people. Don’t care how it looks.

 Not sure if there’s any more to it than the quote

15. The ascetic ideal expresses a will. What fundamental question does Nietzsche ask in

relation to this will? (Section 23)

“The ascetic ideal expresses a will: where is the opposing will, in which an opposing

ideal might express itself? The ascetic ideal has a goal, – this being so general that all the

interests of human existence appear petty and narrow when measured against it;” (109)

16. What are the characteristics of the ascetic ideal? (Section 23)

“it permits of no other interpretation, no other goal, and rejects, denies, affirms,

confirms only with reference to its interpretation (– and was there ever a system of

interpretation more fully thought through?); it does not subject itself to any power, in fact, it

believes in its superiority over any power, in its unconditional superiority of rank over any

other power, – it believes there is nothing on earth of any power that does not first have to

receive a meaning, a right to existence, a value from it, as a tool to its work, as a way and

means to its goal, to one goal” (109)

Bueno, ta, es superpoderoso… y?

17. Nietzsche asks whether science is the counterpart to the ascetic ideal? Is it? Why/why not?

(Section 23)

Scientists claim that modern science is “a genuine philosophy of reality (…) it believes

only in itself, possesses the courage to be itself, the will to be itself and has got by well enough

without God.”, Nietzsche, on the other hand says: “their voices do not come from the depth,

the abyss of scientific conscience does not speak from them (…) science today has absolutely

no faith in itself, let alone in an ideal above it, – and where it is still passion, love, fire, suffering,
it is not the opposite of the ascetic ideal but rather the latter’s own most recent and noble

manifestation” (109-10)

18. How is science a hiding place for bad conscience and a means of self-anaesthetic? (Section

23)

Nietzsche personally likes science but he still criticizes it (“I am the last to want to

spoil the pleasure of these honest workers in their craft: for I delight in their work”(110))

“then science today is a hiding place for all kinds of ill-humour, unbelief, gnawing

worms, despectio sui, bad conscience -it is the disquiet of the lack of ideals itself, the suffering

from a lack of great love, the discontent over enforced contentedness.”

19. What are scholars/scientists ultimately like? (Section 23)

“Bad musicians”, they don’t deserve to be called scientists, they’re wrong when talking

about the nature of science.

They’re “sufferers who do not want to admit what they are to themselves, with people

drugged and dazed who fear only one thing: coming to consciousness…”(110)

20. Next, Nietzsche asks whether philosophers are counter-idealists to the ascetic ideal? Is that

the case? Why/why not? (Section 24)

They really, REALLY, want to be opposite to the ascetic ideal people… but they can’t

Because of their faith in truth (will to truth, creo)

21. Are the philosophers really free spirits? What does this have to do with a belief in truth?

(Section 24)
 However, the compulsion towards it, that unconditional will to truth, is faith in the

ascetic ideal itself, even if, as an unconscious imperative, make no mistake about it, –

it is the faith in a metaphysical value, a value as such of truth as vouched for and

confirmed by that ideal alone (it stands and falls by that ideal). (112)

So… they’re not really free spirits because their will to truth is faith in the ascetic ideal?

“our mistrust has gradually trained us to conclude the opposite to what was formerly

concluded: namely, to presuppose, wherever the strength of a belief becomes prominent, a

certain weakness, even improbability of proof.” (111)

“they themselves are its most intellectualized product (…) they are very far from being

free spirits because they still believe in truth”

What makes their arguments problematic is their absolute quality, no pueden ser tan

porfiados – “nothing is stranger to these people who are absolute in one thing, these so-called

‘free spirits’, than freedom and release in that sense, in no respect are they more firmly bound;

precisely in their faith in truth they are more rigid and more absolute than anyone else” (112)

Their “neutrality” is also problematic, in their attempt to be objective they end up saying

nothing: “that venerable philosopher’s abstinence prescribed by such a faith like that commits

one, that stoicism of the intellect which, in the last resort, denies itself the ‘no’ just as strictly

as the ‘yes’, that will to stand still before the factual, the factum brutum, that fatalism of ‘petits

faits’ (…) that renunciation of any interpretation (of forcing, adjusting, shortening, omitting,

filling-out, inventing, falsifying and everything else essential to interpretation) – on the whole,

this expresses the asceticism of virtue just as well as any denial of sensuality”( 112)
22. Why does Nietzsche think is it an issue that truth itself has not been allowed to be a

problem? (Section 24)

“turn to the most ancient and most modern philosophies: all of them lack a

consciousness of the extent to which the will to truth itself needs a justification, here is a gap

in every philosophy – how does it come about? Because the ascetic ideal has so far been master

over all philosophy, because truth was set as being, as God, as the highest authority itself,

because truth was not allowed to be a problem. Do you understand this ‘allowed to be’? –

From the very moment that faith in the God of the ascetic ideal is denied, there is a new problem

as well: that of the value of truth.” (113)

23. What is Nietzsche’s further critique of science and its relationship to ascetic ideals?

(Section 25)

Science is not independent enough, it lacks a value-ideal, a way of believing in itself.

Science never creates values. “It still represents the driving force in the inner evolution of that

ideal”. It doesn’t oppose the ideal, it opposes the “ways the ideal temporarily hardens,

solidifies, becomes dogmatic”

“both overestimate truth (more correctly: they share the same faith that truth cannot

be assessed or criticized), and this makes them both necessarily allies,” (113) (van en la misma

bolsa para todo)

24. What is art’s relationship to ascetic ideals? (Section 25)

“art, in which lying sanctifies itself and the will to deception has good conscience on

its side, is much more fundamentally opposed to the ascetic ideal than science is (…) Artistic

servitude in the service of the ascetic ideal is thus the specific form of artistic corruption,

unfortunately one of the most common: for nothing is more corruptible than an artist.” (114)
25. How does science physiologically rest on the same base as the ascetic ideals? (Section 25)

“the precondition of both the one and the other is a certain impoverishment of life, –

the emotions cooled, the tempo slackened, dialectics in place of instinct, solemnity stamped on

faces and gestures” (114)

(Quote that is not related but definitely says sth about Nietzsche’s thoughts: “The

preponderance of the mandarins never indicates anything good: any more than the rise of

democracy, international courts of arbitration instead of wars, equal rights for women, the

religion of compassion and everything else that is a symptom of life in decline”)

26. How is modern science the best ally for the ascetic ideal? (Section 25)

“for the simple reason that it is the most unconscious, involuntary, secret and

subterranean!”

27. What is historiography’s relationship to ascetic ideals? (Section 26)

“is a mirror, it rejects all teleology, it does not want to ‘prove’ anything any more; it

scorns playing the judge, and shows good taste there, – it affirms as little as it denies, it asserts

and ‘describes’” (116) a.k.a IT’S ASCETIC (but it’s even more nihilistic)

28. Why does Nietzsche prefer nihilists to contemplatives? (Section 26)

Contemplative is the one “who reveals, by the mere falsetto of his approval, all that he

lacks, where he lacks it, where the fates in his case have been, alas! rather too surgical with

their cruel scissors! I have neither taste nor patience for this” (117)

29. Why do you think Nietzsche has respect for ascetic ideals as long as they are honest?

(Section 26)
30. Who is the single enemy and injurer of the ascetic ideal? (Section 27)

“the comedians of this ideal – because they arouse mistrust” (118)

31. What is atheism’s relationship to ascetic ideals? What does it have to do with will to truth?

(Section 27)

“Unconditional, honest atheism (…) is therefore not opposed to the ascetic ideal as it

appears to be; instead, it is only one of the ideal’s last phases of development, one of its final

forms and inherent logical conclusions, – it is the awe-inspiring catastrophe of a two-thousand-

year discipline in truth-telling, which finally forbids itself the lie entailed in the belief in God”

(118)

32. What conquered the Christian God and why? (Section 27)

“Christianity as a dogma was destroyed by its own morality, in the same way

Christianity as a morality must also be destroyed, – we stand on the threshold of this

occurrence.” (119)

Christian morality

Will to truth is crucial. The more they’re interested in truth the more they don’t find it.

This will to find truth for the sake of god has made God disappear. (the quest for truth has

killed God, paradoxically the quest for truth was to find God).

Jesus = truth (according to the bible I guess)

The chaos is when the will to understanding takes over the faith

33. What does will to truth have to do with the meaning of our being and the destruction of

morality? (Section 27)

 Once our will to truth becomes conscious, we start thinking that Christian morality. Not

only the Christian god is destroyed but also Christian morality.

La crisis de darte cuenta que la biblia es una mierda.

34. Why is the drama in Europe in the next two centuries the one with the greatest hope?

(Section 27)

Because they’ll get rid of Christianity for once and for all! Yay

“Without a doubt, from now on, morality will be destroyed by the will to truth’s

becoming-conscious-of-itself: that great drama in a hundred acts reserved for Europe in the

next two centuries, the most terrible, most questionable drama but perhaps also the one most

rich in hope . . .”(119)

35. What does the ascetic ideal mean? (Section 28)

Gives meaning to men (re-direction of ressentiment)

36. What is the most terrible kind of suffering? (Section 28)

Senseless suffering

37. Why is willing nothingness better than not willing at all? (Section 28)

You get some meaning

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General notes

What opposes ascetic ideals?

Science? No

Philosophy? No
 Atheism? No

Historiography? No, they’re objective

All of the above are looking for truth, that’s why

Art? More or less. Will to deceive, they’re not really looking for truth. Artists are

corruptible, can be used in the service of the ascetic ideals

The clown within is the greatest enemy to the ascetic ideals. It’s someone who belongs

to the ascetic ideals. They create a bad name, mistrust about it. (Stalin to communism,

according to Alasdair)