Analysis of Turkish Flag Vessels Deficiencies and Detentions
Analysis of Turkish Flag Vessels Deficiencies and Detentions
Analysis of Turkish Flag Vessels Deficiencies and Detentions
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ABSTRACT
Port State Control (PSC) refers to the inspection of foreign ships in national ports to verify that the condition of
the ship, its equipment and its crew complies with the requirements of international regulations and that the ship
is manned and operated in compliance with these rules. Port State Control (PSC) has a vital role within the shipping
industry ensuring that standards of safety and environmental protection are maintained and sub-standard vessels
are sanctioned to adapt the requirements of latest laws and regulations. There are several Memorandums of
Understanding (MoU) developed by groups of nations depending on their geographical location in order to
standardize the inspections applied to the vessels, to harmonize the actions to be taken against sub-standard ships
and to provide mutual comprehensive information exchange. As one of them, Black Sea MoU is formed in the
year of 2000 by 6 coastal nations around the Black Sea. In the last decade, Black Sea MoU Port State Controls
inspected around five thousand ships on average. In the scope of this study; the reasons of deficiencies and
detentions of Turkish flagged vessels are analyzed according to the data of PSCs of Black Sea Memorandum ports
for a period of two years beginning from January 2016 until February 2018. Through this period, 848 inspections
have been carried out by Black Sea MoU and 578 of them faced deficiencies. Frequency distribution of Turkish
flagged vessels inspected by Black Sea MoU in the given period is used to determine the main detention reasons.
The study primarily aims revealing the relationship between variables related to the ship specifications,
environmental-technical safety and the prevention of sea accidents (ship type, age and size, inspection type,
inspection port, specified deficiencies) with the detentions of ships from voyage by using statistical analysis.
Furthermore, determines the most frequent reasons of deficiencies, and ultimately providing suggestions for
solutions in order to reduce the detention rate of Turkish flagged vessels.
Keywords: Port State Control, PSC, Black Sea Mou, Ship Deficiencies, Ship Detention.
21
Bu çalışma Bandırma Onyedi Eylül Üniversitesi Bilimsel Araştırma Projeleri Koordinasyon Birimi tarafından (BAP-18-DF-
1009-061 proje numarası ile) desteklenmiştir. (This work was supported by Scientific Research Projects Coordination Unit of
Bandırma Onyedi Eylül University).
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Budapest, June 19-22, 2018
INTRODUCTION
Maritime transportation is not only known for its contribution to the economic
prosperity, but also for its many threats to the environment, causing huge casualties and losses.
As a result, various maritime safety measures have been taken to protect the human life and the
environmental effects of marine accidents. Port State Control (PSC) inspections are known as
one of them. Port State Control (PSC) is an internationally agreed regime for the inspection of
ships in the national ports to justify that the ship, its equipment and its crew complies with the
internationally agreed laws and regulations. Port State Controls have a crucial role regarding
with the safety of both the operations carried out on sea and the well-being of oceans and coastal
areas. Since the “Titanic” accident that took place in 1912 increasing marine accidents in the
last few decades such as “Torrey Canyon” in 1967 and “Amoco Cadiz” in 1978 have shown
that the sub-standard vessels pose a great deal of threat to the safety of life at sea and the marine
environment.
Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) Amoco Cadiz caused the largest oil spill in history
as it ran aground on the Portsall Rocks in Western France in the Atlantic Ocean (Amoco Cadiz,
2018). After that incident, it was decided to audit the safety of life at sea, the prevention of
marine pollution from ships and the working and living conditions in vessels. In the same year,
a number of European countries came together to agree on a memorandum for the audit of labor
conditions in accordance with the rules of the ILO on board vessels as to inspect whether they
are being applied. Also in 1978 North Sea states initiated The Hague MoU but it failed to bring
a substantial change and proved to be nothing more than a declaration of the common will
(Pamborides, 1999). Later on in January 1982, 14 European countries agreed on the
establishment of Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (Paris MoU)
which constituted as the first comprehensive attempt on creating a port state control unity which
now has 26 signatory countries (Paris MoU, 2007).
LITERATURE REVIEW
Increasing public pressure against the maritime accidents put pressure on the
governments in order to sustain the safety of maritime operations. As its result, port state control
(PSC) came up as an idea which traces its origins back to the memorandum of understanding
of The Hague signed by eight North Sea states in 1978 (Kasoulides, 1995). The purpose of this
earliest memorandum was to investigate if the labor requirements enforced by the International
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Labor Organization are applied on merchant vessels (Kasoulides, 1990). This agreement failed
to bring a substantial change and proved to be nothing more than a declaration of the common
will. In 1982, more comprehensive memorandum, Paris MoU was founded concerning the
safety of life at sea, prevention of pollution by ships and living and working conditions on board
ships (Paris MoU, 2017). Later on, many other MoUs was developed in different regions of the
world. One of them was the Black Sea MoU, formed in 2000 by 6 Black Sea coastal states in
order to achieve harmony and share of information in its region.
There are a number of studies explaining why the PSC inspections have become
necessary for the port states. First one that comes to mind is the scarce resources of the flag of
convenience countries. For instance, (Clarke, 1994) discusses how the ineffectiveness of flag
states has forced port states for “taking an active role on helping themselves”. (Ademuni -
Odeke, 1997) states that PSC inspections contribute to maritime safety and pollution prevention
as it slowly eliminates the unfair advantage associated with substandard ships that are operating
cheaper with the advantages of flag of convenience.
Australia's CSIRO Mathematical and Information Sciences Unit has analyzed the
details of inspected ships (approximately 18.000 inspections) for the Australian Maritime
Safety Administration for six years and came to a conclusion that the major determining factor
of the inspection result is by far the age of the ship (CSIRO, 2018). Ship type, ship inspection
history and, in some cases, ship size also appeared to have a significant influence.
Though it is not the only factor, (Cariou et al., 2007) and (Cariou et al., 2009) also
confirm the importance of age from a dataset of inspections carried out by the Swedish
Maritime Administration and maritime administrations that are part of the Indian Ocean MoU.
(Cariou et al., 2007) identified the age of the vessel (36.8%) as the first explanatory variable,
flag of registry (33.7%) as second and the ship type (28.3%) as the third. (Cariou et al., 2009)
have used the decomposition techniques on a sample of 26.515 PSC inspections carried out by
Indian MoU from 2002 to 2006. They concluded that 42.5% of the variation in the number of
deficiencies detected could be explained by age. Three main other significant determinants
were, in decreasing order of importance: the place of the inspection (30.8%), the vessel's
recognized organization (14.5%) and the ship type (7.5%).
(Grbić et al., 2015) stated in their study that 390 deficiencies related with Maritime
Labor Convention 2006 were reported during the Paris MoU inspections between 20 August
2013 and 31 December 2014. There have been 220 detentions during those inspections and
“wages of the crew, sanitary facilities and cleanliness of the engine room” were the most
commonly observed deficiency reasons. General cargo vessels (109) and bulk cargo vessels
(47) have been the most detained categories whereas vessels aged over 21 (133) are accounted
sixty percent of the detentions. Where Panama (40), Liberia (21) and Malta (13) flagged vessels
are to be at the top of the detention list, Turkish flagged vessels have faced 2 detentions as a
result of deficiencies related to MLC 2006 (Grbić et al., 2015).
(Graziano et al., 2018) use the dataset from the European Union ports with detailed
records from approximately 48,000 inspections and 130,000 deficiencies. The study takes the
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Budapest, June 19-22, 2018
time frame between 1 January 2014 and 31 December 2015. It focuses on the profile of the
inspectors and its effects on the results of inspections. The findings show that the more
inspectors are onboard the ship the more deficiency is detected and also previous job
experiences of the inspectors have an effect on the deficiency types that are detected. Authors
conclude that there is a lack of harmony in the inspection results and there is heterogeneity
between the inspections made in different ports.
In his doctorate thesis (Torkel Soma, 2005) used the Gaussian distribution to examine
the marine accident probabilities of the world fleet considering their PSC performances. He
grouped the safety level of vessels in three groups as; A, B and C level in a decreasing order of
safety. He saw that A class vessels stand for only 7% of the accidents whereas B and C class
vessels account for 42% and %51 of marine accidents consecutively.
(Im, Lee and Sin, 2016) analyzed the inspection results of ships that are registered to
Korean Register of Shipping. They have searched 170 ships that got a detention during 46
months of a period. The deficiencies were evaluated by considering ship types, ship age, flag
of ship, ports inspected, and criteria. As the result of the study, they conclude that bulk and
general cargo carriers dominate most of the detentions by almost 66 percent. The main reason
of repeating detentions is found as “Self-induced detention due to a lack of preparation by crews
and company support”. Ships between six and ten years old have showed the lowest detention
rate by 4 percent whereas ships younger than five years old generate the highest detention rate
by 22 percent. The authors suggest the idea that the younger the ship is the more effort is shown
for the preparations before the PSC inspections. Lack of documentation and certification, and
the clues support are the main categories of the detentions from ships that are less than 5 years
old. The authors expected that using social networking service by Korea Register would lower
the detention rate by sharing relevant information real-time to ships and owners (Im, Lee and
Sin, 2016).
(Yilmaz and Ece, 2017) studied the Paris MoU inspections during six years of period
between 2011 and 2016. They tried to identify the relation between the ship/inspection
specifications with the results of the inspections. In the study, statistically significant
relationships were found between the inspection result and age of the ship; between the
inspection result and number of deficiencies detected by PSC. Turkish flagged vessels have
faced 4,6% of detention rate which is above the 3% average of the Paris MoU. Almost seventy
percent of the vessels that are over 13 year old were detained (68,2%), and inspections with 5
or more deficiencies resulted most likely as detention (91,7%).
There are a number of studies focusing on the ship targeting factors of MoUs and thus
revealing it how the ship specifications affect the performance in a Port State Control. Most of
the academic study focused on Paris MoU and other major MoUs because of their extensive
network and reputation and yet however there is not a study found in the literature specifically
concerning the Black Sea MoU PSC inspections.
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Black Sea MoU introduced a new inspection regime called BS MOU New Inspection
Regime (BS-IR 2016) at the 16th meeting of the Port State Control Committee in Batumi,
Georgia, April 2015. New regime suggests inspection of ships from 1st January 2016 in a further
harmonized risk based targeting system and harmonization with the leading memorandums,
namely Paris MOU and Tokyo MOU. The existing ship targeting system expanded to
accommodate additional parameters such as the Flag State performance, Recognized
Organization and Company performances.
Under the, BS-IR (2016), Ship Risk Profile replaces the old ship targeting factor
matrix. The Ship Risk Profile groups ships into three; High Risk Ship (HRS), Standard Risk
Ship (SRS) and Low Risk Ship (LRS). The group is determined considering the ship historical
data over 36 months time window. The ship risk profile takes the factors listed below as
benchmark (Black Sea MoU, 2016):
Type of ship
Age of Ship
Number of detentions
Number of deficiencies per inspection (e.g. ship deficiency index level)
Performance of the Flag of the ship (e.g. detention index, deficiency index levels) and
IMO Audit
Performance of the recognized organizations (RO) (e.g. RO related detention index
level)
Performance of the company responsible for ISM Management (e.g. company
detention index)
The BS-IR (2016) includes two different categories of inspection; periodic and
additional inspection. Periodic inspections are determined by the time window. Additional
inspections are triggered by overriding or unexpected factors depending on the severity of
occurrence. The time window for the inspection frequency of one specific ship is determined
according to its ship risk profile. There are three time frames; 2-4 months, 5-8 months and 9-
18 months, the frequency increases as the ship has a greater point of risk.
The selection scheme of ships in the new regime for inspection is based upon their
priorities which are grouped into 3; Priority 1 ships are must be inspected, for which time
window has been closed or there is an overriding factor. Priority 2 ships can be inspected
occasionally, which is within time window or there is an unexpected occurrence. Third group
is called “Non priority ships” which are not obliged to be inspected if there is no overriding or
unexpected factor is logged, but if desired they can still be chosen for inspection (Black Sea
MoU, 2016).
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Budapest, June 19-22, 2018
Table 1: PSC Performance of Turkish Flagged Vessels within the Black Sea MoU
Inspections during 2005-2018
TURKISH FLAGGED VESSELS DETENTION RATE (%)
YEAR TURKISH BLACKSEA
NUMBER OF NUMBER OF
S FLAGGED MOU
INSPECTION DETENTION
VESSELS AVERAGE
2005 638 24 3,76 6,23
2006 589 17 2,89 5,56
2007 576 25 4,34 8,16
2008 647 21 3,25 6,37
2009 621 19 3,06 5,79
2010 559 15 2,68 5,8
2011 512 29 5,66 5,35
2012 479 19 3,97 4,67
2013 497 14 2,82 3,62
2014 437 14 3,2 2,97
2015 420 32 7,62 4,36
2016 427 39 9,13 4,52
2017 362 11 3,04 5,54
2018* 152 0 0 5,82
Source: Black Sea MoU Annual Reports 2005-2017 (Black Sea MoU, 2017).
*Data of 2018 as of 10 June 2018.
Figure 1: Detention Rate of Turkish Flagged Vessels and Black Sea MoU Average
10,00
9,00
8,00
7,00
DETENTION RATE %
6,00
5,00
4,00
3,00
2,00
1,00
0,00
DATE
TURKISH FLAGGED VESSELS
BLACKSEA MOU AVERAGE
Source: Black Sea MoU Annual Reports 2005-2017 (Black Sea MoU, 2017).
*Data of 2018 as of 10 June 2018.
Turkish flagged vessels operate mostly among Paris and Black Sea MoU member
ports. Thus the performance of vessels in the PSC inspections of these two MoU gives a general
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idea of the overall performance of the fleet. According to the records, until the year of 2010,
Turkish flagged vessels had an average detention rate of 3,3% which is below the MoU average.
In 2011 the detention rate increased to 5,66% and later in the three year of period between 2014
and 2016 it stayed above the MoU average (Black Sea MoU, 2017). In the first year of the new
BS-IR regime the detention rate scored its record. In the current year until June, no vessels have
been detained.
Dataset subject to the study refers to the data officially published by the Black Sea
MoU on the inspection results section of the BS MoU’s official page (http://www.bsmou.org/).
During the period between Jan. 2016 and March 2018, Turkish flagged vessels have faced 848
PSC inspections and 600 of them faced deficiencies. The dataset covers ship and inspection
specifications (ship type-age-size, inspection type, port of inspection, deficiency types and
numbers) and the results of inspections. The data is statistically analyzed with the SPSS
software. Variables were categorized and nominal scale was used in order to simplify the big
data processing. Inspection type variables were coded as numbers for the same reason of
simplification. The deficiency types are classified according to the Black Sea MoU deficiency
codes (Black Sea MoU, 2018).
In order for the Chi-Square Test to be used accurately, all samples must be random
and large enough so that the number of observations smaller than the expected value does not
exceed 20% of the total number of categories. The sample size for every category must be
greater than one. Which means no expected case (𝐸𝑖 ) should be less than 1. No more than 20%
of the cells should have less than 5 expected cases (Gingrich, 2004). Simplified formula of the
Chi-square test is as it follows (Gingrich, 2004):
𝑘
2
(𝑂𝑖 − 𝐸𝑖 )2
𝑥 =∑
𝐸𝑖
𝑖=1
If these conditions are not met, the Fisher's exact test is used instead of the Chi-Square
test. Chi-square (𝑥 2 ) Asymptotic Significance is chosen as 95% (p < 0, 05), and hypothesis tests
related to it were generally established as follows (Gingrich, 2004):
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Budapest, June 19-22, 2018
The zero hypothesis (H0 ) suggests that two criterias are independent unlike the
research hypothesis (H1 ) implies that there is a relationship between two criterias. If the
asymptotic significance is less than α = 0.05, H0 hypothesis denied and H1 hypothesis is
accepted (Güngör and Bulut, 2008).
As shown in Table 3, the expected number of categorical numbers less than five does
not exceed 20% of the total number of categories (12,5%), in all categories the value is greater
than one and the minimum expected value is greater than 1 (3,36), so the Chi-Square Test was
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Asymptotic Sig.
Value df
(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 3,972a 3 ,264
Likelihood Ratio 4,208 3 ,240
N of Valid Cases 848
a. 1 cells (12,5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3,36.
The average year of built for the vessels that are inspected was found as (1996,12)
according to the dataset. 2 categories are created according to this classification. Detention and
ship age cross-tab is as it follows in Table 4:
Balanced distribution is observed according to the data. 28 detained vessels are built
in 1996 or before whereas 22 detained vessels are built in 1997 or later. Chi-square test is
applied to 2x2 cross-tab and Fisher’s test and Chi-Square test result is given below. Although
older ships are detained more than younger ones (28 to 22), the dataset is perhaps not big enough
to identify the significant statistical relationship between variables. Chi square and Fisher’s test
results are greater than 0,05 so H0 Hypothesis is accepted and H1 is rejected.
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Budapest, June 19-22, 2018
a. 0 cells (0,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 24,59.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
Following on the test is carried out with Ship Age and “Deficiencies detected” in order
to identify if there is a significant statistical relationship.
Here we clearly see that ship age has a meaningful effect on the deficiency number.
As the ship gets older, it is more likely that it has more deficiency. Cramer’s V. test value is
0,202 and it shows that there’s a medium level of strength of association between variables.
%57 of ships with deficiency are built in 1996 or before. Expected value is greater than 1
(34,519), no cell has a frequency less than 1 and P value is less than 0,05 so Chi-square is
applied safely. H1 is accepted that it suggests Ship age has a significant statistical relationship
with deficiencies found.
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Ship sizes are categorized evenly, showing normal distribution, depending on the
Deadweight of vessels. Smaller vessels are detained slightly more but there’s no significant
difference. The data meets the preconditions of Chi-Square test. According to the results, the
ship size has no significant statistical relationship with the inspection result. H1 Hypothesis is
rejected and H0 is accepted.
In the initial inspections carried out by the Black Sea MoU to Turkish flagged vessels
there have been 3 detentions, in detailed inspections 27 detentions and expanded inspections 20
detentions. 28% of the expanded inspections have resulted as detention of the vessel.
Chi-square test has been applied safely as only one cell has a frequency less than 5,
the expected value is greater than 1 (77,721), minimum expected count is greater than 1 (4,19)
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and the P value is less than 0,05. There is a significant statistical relationship between the type
of inspection and the inspection result. H1 Hypothesis is accepted and H0 is rejected.
Table 10: Inspection Port (Country) and Number of Deficiency, Inspection Result
Bulgaria 28 50 8 0 86
Georgia 25 21 20 0 66
Romania 32 47 28 11 96
Most of the detentions and majority of the deficiencies are observed in Russian Port
State Inspections (34 detentions and 164 vessels with 6 or more deficiency) followed by
Ukraine and Romania. In Bulgarian and Georgian PSC inspections no detentions were
recorded.
According to the test results, Inspection country and Number of Deficiency are
statistically significant. Pre-conditions are met for the Chi-Square test and p value is less than
0,05 thus H1 Hypothesis is accepted, H0 is rejected.
In the second test between the Inspection Country and Detentions, Bulgaria and
Georgia are excluded since there is no frequency for the detained vessels. Still the result shows
that the variables are statistically significant. H1 Hypothesis is accepted, H0 is rejected. It should
be noted that (depending on the time limitations of the dataset) during the year of 2016 political
problems between Russia and Turkey may have triggered the increase in the detentions during
the period subject to the study. If the time period of dataset is expanded, the result may differ.
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Table 11: Chi-Square Test between Inspection Country - Deficiencies and Detentions
Chi-Square Test for Inspection Country - Chi-Square Test for Inspection Country -
Deficiencies Detentions
Asymp. Asymp.
Value df Sig. (2- Value df Sig. (2-
sided) sided)
Pearson Pearson
Chi- 157,995a 8 ,000 Chi- 35,860a 4 ,000
Square Square
Likelihoo Likelihoo
161,403 8 ,000 44,457 4 ,000
d Ratio d Ratio
N of Valid N of Valid
848 848
Cases Cases
a. 0 cells (0,0%) have expected count less than 5. a. 1 cells (10,0%) have expected count less than 5.
The minimum expected count is 20,78. The minimum expected count is 3,89.
b. Bulgaria and Georgia excluded because of 0
frequency in detentions.
Turkish flagged vessels have faced 50 detentions during the time frame subject to this
research within the Black Sea MoU inspections. 31,8% of the inspections has no deficiency,
36,8% of the vessels have 1-5 deficiency and remaining %31,4 has 6 or more deficiency.
Vessels with 1-5 deficiency has 2,2% detention rate and vessels with 6+ deficiency has 16,1%
detention rate. Overall detention rate is calculated as 5,8%.
Turkish flagged vessels have faced various types of deficiencies in the Black Sea MoU
PSC inspections. During the period of January 2016 to March 2018, Turkish flagged vessels
have faced 3910 deficiencies in total. Following Table 13 and 14 are the frequencies of the most
common types of deficiencies and the general categories of deficiencies depending on the Black
Sea MoU categorization (Black Sea MoU, 2018).
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Port State Controls have emerged as a tool to ensure that foreign-flagged vessels
comply with the framework of international maritime conventions and the maritime and
environmental safety regulations as much as possible, in order to reduce environmental
disasters. Black Sea MoU was founded in 2000 by the 6 Black Sea coastal nations for the
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harmonization of PSC inspections and preventing sub-standard ships from voyage. Turkish
flagged vessels have had an unusual increasing detention rate between 2014-2016 period.
Table 14: Most Common Types of Deficiencies of Turkish Flagged Vessels in Black Sea
MoU PSC Inspections
Mostly vessels built in 1996 or before had detained, in the national risk assessment
and targeting system, especially for pre-survey and unscheduled inspection applications, it may
be beneficial to treat these vessels as a priority group. Renewal of the Turkish fleet or in parallel
with the aging of the fleet, more stringent monitoring and maintenance related with aging of
the ship (such as hull & machinery) is expected to make a significant contribution to the
reduction of deficiencies and detentions in PSC inspections. The most common deficiencies
that the Turkish flagged vessels have faced in Black Sea MoU inspections are related with life
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saving appliances, navigational safety, labour conditions (health protection, medical care, and
social security), fire safety and propulsion and auxiliary machinery. Efforts towards restoring
these deficiencies would help decreasing the detention rate of Turkish flagged vessels in the
PSC inspections.
FUNDING
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