PRACTICE OF LAW On July 2, 2014, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended

1.CONCEPT Buri's suspension to wit:1

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, undersigned

Commissioner recommends to impose the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for a period of three
SECOND DIVISION (3) months upon the respondent, Atty. Grace C. Buri, and
for her to pay the complainant the amount of
A.C. No.11156 [Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3680], PhP200,000.00 upon execution by complainant and
March 19, 2018 spouse of the Deed of Absolute Sale of the condominium
unit subject of the sale between the parties.
MICHELLE YAP, Complainant, v. ATTY. GRACE C. On January 31, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued
BURI, Respondent. Resolution No. XXI-2015-062,2 which adopted the
foregoing recommendation but with modification, thus:
DECISION RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
PERALTA, J.: in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A," finding Respondent's violation of
The instant case stemmed from the complaint of Michelle Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Hence,
Yap against respondent Atty. Grace C. Buri for refusing to Atty. Grace C. Buri is hereby SUSPENDED from the
pay her monetary obligation and for filing a criminal case practice of law for one (1) year. The order to pay
of Estafa against her based on false accusations. P200,000.00 is deleted without prejudice to the filing of
proper action by Complainant in Court.
The factual backdrop of the case is as follows:
The Court's Ruling
Complainant Michelle Yap was the vendor in a contract of
The Court finds no sufficient reason to overturn the
sale of a condominium unit, while Atty. Grace C. Buri,
findings and recommendation of the IBP that Buri must be
Yap's close friend and her daughter's godmother, was the
disciplined accordingly.
vendee. Buri made an offer to purchase the property but
asked for the reduction of the price from P1,500,000.00 to
Here, instead of paying Yap the remaining balance of the
P1,200,000.00. After consulting with her husband, Yap
purchase price of the condominium unit, Buri opted to
agreed. Of the total amount of purchase price of
simply threaten her and file a criminal case against her.
P1,200,000.00, P200,000.00 remains unpaid; Buri insisted
Obviously, this strategy was to intimidate Yap and prevent
that she would just pay the balance on installment
her from collecting the remaining P200,000.00. When
starting in but without specifying the amount to be paid
given a chance to defend herself, Buri chose to stay silent
on each installment. Because she trusted the respondent,
and even refused to file an answer, attend the hearing, or
Yap gave Buri the full and immediate possession of the
to submit her position paper, despite due notice. Hence,
condominium unit upon completion of the P1,000,000.00
Yap's version of the facts stands and remains
despite the outstanding balance and even without the
uncontroverted.
necessary Deed of Absolute Sale. However, when Yap
finally asked for the balance in January 2011, Buri said
Buri's unwarranted tenacity simply shows, not only her
she would pay it on a monthly installment of P5,000.00
lack of responsibility, but also her lack of interest in
until fully paid. When Yap disagreed, Buri said she would
clearing her name, which, as pronounced in case law, is
just cancel the sale. Thereafter, Buri also started
indicative of an implied admission of the charges levelled
threatening her through text messages, and then later on
against her.3
filed a case for estafa against her.
Buri's persistent refusal to pay her obligation despite
Buri alleged in the criminal case that when she found out
frequent demands clearly reflects her lack of integrity and
that the sale of the condominium unit was made without
moral soundness; she took advantage of her knowledge of
the consent of Yap's husband, Yap cancelled the sale and
the law and clearly resorted to threats and intimidation in
promised to return the amount of P1,000,000.00 initially
order to get away with what she wanted, constituting a
paid. Despite several demands, however, she failed and
gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of
refused to return the money. Thus, Buri was constrained
public confidence in the legal profession.4
to file a case for estafa against Yap. Said case was later
dismissed.
Buri indubitably swept aside the Lawyer's Oath that
enjoins her to support the Constitution and obey the laws.
Yap then filed an administrative complaint against Buri for
She forgot that she must not wittingly or willingly promote
the alleged false accusations against her.
or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid
nor consent to the same. She also took for granted the
When ordered to submit her answer, Buri failed to comply.
express commands of the Code of Professional
She did not even appear during the mandatory
Responsibility (CPR), specifically Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and
conference. Thus, the mandatory conference was
Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the CPR.
terminated and the parties were simply required to submit
their respective position papers. However, only Yap
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR provide:
complied with said order.
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL condition precedent to the admission to the legal
PROCESSES. profession, but its continued possession is essential to
maintain one's good standing in the profession.
Rule 1.01 -A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, Consequently, a lawyer can be deprived of his license for
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the
Court after giving him the opportunity to be heard.8
xxxx
Verily, Buri has fallen short of the high standard of
While Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the CPR state:
morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing expected of
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD
her. On the contrary, she employed her knowledge and
THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
skill of the law in order to avoid fulfillment of her
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF
obligation, thereby unjustly enriching herself and inflicting
THE INTEGRATED BAR.
serious damage on Yap. Her repeated failure to file her
answer and position paper and to appear at the
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
mandatory conference aggravate her misconduct. These
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
demonstrate high degree of irresponsibility and lack of
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
respect for the IBP and its proceedings. Her attitude
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
severely stains the nobility of the legal profession.9
The foregoing canons require of Buri, as a lawyer, an
enduring high sense of responsibility and good fidelity in The Court sustains the modified recommendation of the
all her dealings and emphasize the high standard of IBP Board of Governors. The Court has held that the
honesty and fairness expected of her, not only in the deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross
practice of the legal profession, but in her personal misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with
dealings as well. A lawyer must conduct himself with great one (1) year-suspension from the practice of law.10 The
propriety, and his behavior should be beyond reproach Court likewise upholds the deletion of the payment of the
anywhere and at all times. For, as officers of the courts P200,000.00 since the same is not intrinsically linked to
and keepers of the public's faith, they are burdened with Buri's professional engagement. Disciplinary proceedings
the highest degree of social responsibility and are thus should only revolve around the determination of the
mandated to behave at all times in a manner consistent respondent lawyer's administrative and not his civil
with truth and honor. Likewise, the oath that lawyers liability. Thus, when the claimed liabilities are purely civil
swear to impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting the in nature, as when the claim involves money owed by the
highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor in their lawyer to his client in view of a separate and distinct
relationships with others. Thus, lawyers may be transaction and not by virtue of a lawyer-client
disciplined for any conduct, whether in their professional relationship, the same should be threshed out in a
or in their private capacity, if such conduct renders them separate civil action.11
unfit to continue to be officers of the court.5
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
That Buri's act involved a private dealing with Yap is Court SUSPENDS Atty. Grace C. Buri from the practice of
immaterial. Her being a lawyer calls for - whether she was law for a period of one (1) year and WARNS her that a
acting as such or in a non professional capacity - the repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt
obligation to exhibit good faith, fairness and candor in her with more severely.
relationship with others. There is no question that a
lawyer could be disciplined not only for a malpractice in Let copies of this decision be included in the personal
his profession, but also for any misconduct committed records of Atty. Grace C. Buri and entered in her file in the
outside of his professional capacity. Buri's being a lawyer Office of the Bar Confidant.
demands that she conduct herself as a person of the
highest moral and professional integrity and probity in her Let copies of this decision be disseminated to all lower
dealings with others.6 courts by the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, for their
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the practice of information and guidance.
law is imbued with public interest and that a lawyer owes
substantial duties, not only to his client, but also to his SO ORDERED.
brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the
public, and takes part in the administration of justice, one
of the most important functions of the State, as an officer
of the court. Accordingly, lawyers are bound to maintain,
not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of
morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.7

Time and again, the Court has stressed the settled

principle that the practice of law is not a right but a
privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that
they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications
required by law for the conferment of such privilege.
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. A high sense of morality, honesty, and fair
dealing is expected and required of a member of the bar.
The nature of the office of a lawyer requires that he shall
be of good moral character. This qualification is not only a
 A.C. No. 11246, June 14, 2016 once again, Atty. Limos did not bother to submit her
position paper.
ARNOLD PACAO, Complainant, v. ATTY. SINAMAR
LIMOS, Respondent. On May 5, 2014, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended the disbarment of Atty. Limos.10 The
Investigating Commissioner found enough evidence on
DECISION record to prove that Atty. Limos committed fraud and
practiced deceit on the complainant to the latter's
PER CURIAM: prejudice by concealing or omitting to disclose the
material fact that she no longer had the authority to
negotiate and conclude a settlement for and on behalf of
Before this Court is a verified complaint1 filed on
BHF, nor was authorized to receive the P200,000.00 from
November 4, 2011 by Arnold Pacao (complainant),
the complainant. Atty. Limos was likewise ordered to
seeking the disbarment of Atty. Sinamar Limos (Atty.
return to the complainant the full amount of P200,000.00
Limos) for conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar.
with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from
the date of her receipt of the said amount to the date of
The Facts
her return of the full amount.11 ChanRobles Vi rtualawl ib rary

Sometime in March 2008, complainant's wife Mariadel

In a Resolution12 dated April 19, 2015, the IBP Board of
Pacao, former vault custodian of BHF Pawnshop (BHF)
Governors adopted and approved the Investigating
branch in Mandaluyong City, was charged with qualified
Commissioner's report and recommendation.
theft by BHF. At the preliminary investigation, Atty. Limos
appeared as counsel for BHF. Thereafter, the case was
On March 8, 2016, the IBP transmitted the notice of the
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong
resolution and the case records to the Court for final
City.2
action pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.13 As
ChanRoblesVirt ualawli bra ry

per verification of the Court, neither party has filed a

To buy peace, the complainant initiated negotiation with
motion for reconsideration or a petition for review
BHF, through Atty. Limos, for a possible settlement. A
thereafter.
meeting was then arranged between the complainant and
Atty. Limos, where the latter represented that she was
The Issue
duly authorized by BHF. After a series of negotiations,
Atty. Limos relayed that BHF is demanding the sum of
Whether or not the instant disbarment complaint
P530,000.00 to be paid in full or by installments. Further
constitutes a sufficient basis to disbar Atty. Limos from
negotiation led to an agreement whereby the complainant
the practice of law?14
would pay an initial amount of P200,000.00 to be
ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry

entrusted to Atty. Limos, who will then deliver to the

complainant a signed affidavit of desistance, a Ruling of the Court
compromise agreement, and a joint motion to approve
compromise agreement for filing with the court.3 ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry
To begin with, the Court notes that this is not the first
time that Atty. Limos is facing an administrative case, for
On October 29, 2009, the complainant gave the initial she had already been twice suspended from the practice
amount of P200,000.00 to Atty. Limos, who in turn, of law, by this Court, for three months each in Villaflores
signed an Acknowledgment Receipt4 recognizing her v. Atty. Limos15 and Wilkie v. Atty. Limos.16 In Villaflores,
undertakings as counsel of BHF. However, Atty. Limos Atty. Limos received attorney's fees of P20,000.00 plus
failed to meet the terms of their agreement. miscellaneous expenses of P2,000.00, but she failed to
Notwithstanding such failure, Atty. Limos still sought to perform her undertaking with her client; thus she was
get from the complainant the next installment amount of found guilty of gross negligence and dereliction of duty.
their purported agreement, but the latter refused.5 ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary
Likewise, in Wilkie, Atty. Limos was held administratively
liable for her deceitful and dishonest conduct when she
Thereafter, in June 2010, the complainant met BHF's obtained a loan of P250,000.00 from her client and issued
representative, Camille Bonifacio, who informed him that two postdated checks in the latter's favor to pay the said
Atty. Limos was no longer BHF's counsel and was not loan despite knowledge of insufficiency of funds to cover
authorized to negotiate any settlement nor receive any the same. In both cases, the Court, gave Atty. Limos a
money in behalf of BHF. The complainant also learned that warning that repetition of the same or similar acts by her
BHF did not receive the P200,000.00 initial payment that will merit a more severe penalty.
he gave to Atty. Limos.6 ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry

Once again, for the third time, Atty. Limos is facing an

This prompted the complainant to send a demand administrative case before this Court for receiving the
letter7 to Atty. Limos to return the P200,000.00 initial amount of P200,000.00 from the complainant purportedly
settlement payment, but the latter failed and refused to for a possible amicable settlement with her client BHF.
do so.8 ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry
However, Atty. Limos was no longer BHF's counsel and
was not authorize to negotiate and conclude a settlement
The complainant then filed a disbarment case against for and on behalf of BHF nor was she authorized to receive
Atty. Limos before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines any money in behalf of BHF. Her blunder is compounded
(IBP) - Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). The IBP-CBD by the fact that she did not turn over the money to BHF,
required Atty. Limos to file an answer but she did not file nor did she return the same to the complainant, despite
any responsive pleading.9 A mandatory conference was due demand. Furthermore, she even tried to get the next
then set on March 1 and 29, 2012, and April 19, 2012, but installment knowing fully well that she was not authorized
Atty. Limos failed to attend. Thereafter, the IBP-CBD to enter into settlement negotiations with the complainant
ordered the parties to submit their position paper, but as her engagement as counsel of BHF had already ceased.
 most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn
The fact that this is Atty. Limos' third transgression servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate
exacerbates her offense. The foregoing factual and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to
antecedents demonstrate her propensity to employ deceit ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his
and misrepresentation. It is not too farfetched for this position and office, and sets a pernicious example to the
Court to conclude that from the very beginning, Atty. insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body
Limos had planned to employ deceit on the complainant to politic."21
ChanRob les Virtualawl ibra ry

get hold of a sum of money. Such a conduct is

unbecoming and does not speak well of a member of the Indeed, Atty. Limos has disgraced the legal profession.
Bar. The facts and evidence obtaining in this case definitely
establish her failure to live up to her duties as a lawyer in
Atty. Limos' case is further highlighted by her lack of accordance with the strictures of the lawyer's oath, the
regard for the charges brought against her. Similar Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of
with Wilkie, despite due notice, Atty. Limos did not bother Professional Ethics, thereby making her unworthy to
to answer the complaint against her. She also failed to file continue as a member of the bar.
her mandatory conference brief and her verified position
paper. Worse, Atty. Limos did not even enter appearance WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sinamar Limos, having
either personally or by counsel, and she failed to appear violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by
at the scheduled date of the mandatory conferences which committing grave misconduct and willful insubordination,
she was duly notified.17ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary is DISBARRED and her name ordered STRICKEN
OFF the Roll of Attorneys effective immediately.
By her failure to present convincing evidence, or any
evidence for that matter, to justify her actions, Atty. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the records of
Limos failed to demonstrate that she still possessed the Atty. Sinamar Limos. Further, let other copies be served
integrity and morality demanded of a member of the Bar. on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office
Her seeming indifference to the complaint brought against of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate
her was made obvious by her unreasonable absence from them to all the courts in the country for their information
the proceedings before the IBP. Her disobedience to the and guidance.
IBP is, in fact, a gross and blatant disrespect for the
authority of the Court. This Decision is immediately executory.

Despite her two prior suspensions, still, Atty. Limos is SO ORDERED.

once again demonstrating to this Court that not only is
she unfit to stay in the legal profession for her deceitful
conduct but is also remiss in following the dictates of the
Court, which has supervision over her. Atty. Limos'
unwarranted obstinacy is a great insolence to the Court
which cannot be tolerated.

The present case comes clearly under the grounds given

in Section 27,18 Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The Court, however, does not hesitate to impose the
penalty of disbarment when the guilty party has become a
repeat offender. Considering the serious nature of the
instant offense and in light of Atty. Limos' prior
misconduct which grossly degrades the legal profession,
the imposition of the ultimate penalty of disbarment is
warranted.

In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon Atty. Limos,

the Court is aware that the power to disbar is one to be
exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affect the standing and
character of the lawyer as a legal professional and as an
officer of the Court.19 However, Atty. Limos' recalcitrant
attitude and unwillingness to heed with the Court's
warning, which is deemed to be an affront to the Court's
authority over members of the Bar, warrant an utmost
disciplinary sanction from this Court. Her repeated
desecration of her ethical commitments proved herself to
be unfit to remain in the legal profession. Worse, she
remains apathetic to the need to reform herself.

"[T]he practice of law is not a right but a privilege

bestowed by the State upon those who show that they
possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications
required by law for the conferment of such privilege.
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions."20 "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is
A.C. No. 10164 March 10, 2014 betrayal of trust and confidence when he participated
in a case filed against the complainants in MCTC
STEPHAN BRUNET and VIRGINIA ROMANILLOS explaining that his appearance was for and in behalf
BRUNET, Complainants, of Atty. Ervin Estandante, the counsel on record, who
vs. failed to appear in the said hearing.
ATTY. RONALD L. GUAREN, Respondent.
In the Report and Recommendation,1 dated August
RESOLUTION 24, 2012, the Investigating Commissioner found Atty.
Guaren to have violated the Canon of Professional
MENDOZA, J.: Responsibility when he accepted the titling of
complainants’ lot and despite the acceptance of
₱7,000.00, he failed to perform his obligation and
On August 9, 2002, complainant spouses Stephan
allowed 5 long years to elapse without any progress in
and Virginia Brunet (complainants) filed a complaint
the titling of the lot. Atty. Guaren should also be
against respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren (Atty.
disciplined for appearing in a case against
Guaren) before the Commission on Bar Discipline
complainants without a written consent from the latter.
(CED), Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
The CBD recommended that he be suspended for six
(6) months.
Complainants alleged that in February 1997, they
engaged the services of Atty. Guaren for the titling of
In its May 20, 2013 Resolution,2 the IBP Board of
a residential lot they acquired in Bonbon, Nueva
Governors, adopted and approved with modification
Caseres; that Atty. Guaren asked for a fee of Ten
the Report and Recommendation of the CBD,
Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) including expenses
suspending Atty. Guaren from the practice of law for
relative to its proceeding; that it was agreed that full
three (3) months only.
payment of the fee shall be made after the delivery of
the title; that Atty. Guaren asked for an advance fee of
One Thousand Pesos (Pl,000.00) which they gave; The Court adopts the findings of the IBP Board of
that Atty. Guaren took all the pertinent documents Governors on the unethical conduct of Atty. Guaren,
relative to the titling of their lot-certified true copy of except as to the penalty.
the tax declaration, original copy of the deed of
exchange, sketch plan, deed of donation, survey plan, The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession
and original copy of the waiver; that on March 10, in which duty to public service, not money, is the
1997, Atty. Guaren asked for additional payment of primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily
Six Thousand Pesos (₱6,000.00) which they dutifully meant to be a money-making venture, and law
gave; that from 1997 to 2001, they always reminded advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields
Atty. Guaren about the case and each time he would profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a
say that the titling was in progress; that they became secondary consideration. The duty to public service
bothered by the slow progress of the case so they and to the administration of justice should be the
demanded the return of the money they paid; and that primary consideration of lawyers, who must
respondent agreed to return the same provided that subordinate their personal interests or what they owe
the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00) be to themselves.3
deducted to answer for his professional fees.
Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Complainants further alleged that despite the Responsibility provides that:
existence of an attorney-client relationship between
them, Atty. Guaren made a special appearance CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
against them in a case pending before the client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
Metropolitan Circuit Trial Court, Oslob, Cebu (MCTC). confidence reposed in him.

Atty. Guaren admitted that he indeed charged CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with
complainants an acceptance fee of ₱10,000.00, but competence and diligence.
denied that the amount was inclusive of expenses for
the titling of the lot. He claimed, however, that he In the present case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he
received the payment of ₱1,000.00 and ₱6,000.00; accepted the amount of ₱7,000.00 as partial payment
that their agreement was that the case would be filed of his acceptance fee. He, however, failed to perform
in court after the complainants fully paid his his obligation to file the case for the titling of
acceptance fee; that he did not take the documents complainants' lot despite the lapse of 5 years. Atty.
relative to the titling of the lot except for the photocopy Guaren breached his duty to serve his client with
of the tax declaration; and that he did not commit
competence and diligence when he neglected a legal
matter entrusted to him. 1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren is

found GUILTY of having violated Canons 17 and 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
SIX (6) MONTHS effective from receipt of this
Resolution, with a warning that a similar infraction in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar

Confidant to be included in the records of the
respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the
Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts
throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.] taken for them in matters connected with the law. An
attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an
RENATO L. CAYETANO, Petitioner, v. CHRISTIAN office where he is held out to be an attorney, using a
MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling
ON APPOINTMENTS, and HON. GUILLERMO clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel
CARAGUE in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for
Management, Respondents. services rendered by his associate." (Black’s Law
Dictionary, 3rd ed.).
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co- in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken,
counsel for petitioner. 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also
considered to be in the practice of law when he: jgc:chan robles. com.ph

DECISION ". . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of

advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to
their rights under the law, or appears in a representative
capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
PARAS, J.: prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law
or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching representative capacity performs any act or acts for the
proportions While ostensibly only legal issues are purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their
involved, the Court’s decision in this case would clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect representative capacity, engages in the business of
of our national existence. advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while
so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1(1), Article IX- outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the
C:jgc:chanro bles.c om.ph practice of law." (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley
and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
"There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural- This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.
born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their Agrava, (105 Phil. 173, 176-177) stated: jgc:chan robles. com.ph

appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a

college degree, and must not have been candidates for "The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
any elective position in the immediately preceding or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
elections. However, a majority thereof, including the pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who proceedings, the management of such actions and
have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
years." (Emphasis supplied) and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section 1(1), with the law incorporation services, assessment and
Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly condemnation services contemplating an appearance
provides: jg c:chan roble s.com.p h before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and
"There shall be an independent Commission on Elections insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship
shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
and holders of a college degree. However, a majority work done involves the determination by the trained legal
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jr.
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
law for al least ten years." (Emphasis supplied)
"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence small part of work performed outside of any court and
as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
qualification to an appointive office. chan roble s virtual lawl ibra ry embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a
large variety of subjects, and the preparation and
Black defines "practice of law" as: jgc:chanrobles .com.p h execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field
of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the these transactions may have no direct connection with
application of legal principles and technique to serve the court proceedings, they are always subject to become
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and
conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special complex situations. These customary functions of an
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the
order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the "This has been discussed by the Committee on
lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it
which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his important to take it up on the floor so that this
office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that interpretation may be made available whenever this
these manifold customary functions be performed by provision on the qualifications as regards members of the
persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least
sound moral character, and acting at all times under the ten years is taken up.
heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. "MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one
3 [1953 ed.], p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the question.
Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar
Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139, "MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
144). (Emphasis ours).
"MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law
orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission
the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader on Audit?"
terms as advocacy, counseling and public service.
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA
"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work;
employment in the profession. If what he does exacts it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are
knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys employed in COA now would have the necessary
engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he qualifications in accordance with the provision on
follows some one or more lines of employment such as qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on
this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.
of the statute." (Barr D. Cardell, 155 NW 312).
"MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, that this is equivalent to the practice of law.
which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the "MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law "MR. OPLE. Thank you." cralaw virt ua1aw lib rary

is to give notice or render any kind of service, which

device or service requires the use in any degree of legal . . . (Emphasis supplied)
knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23).
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution,
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional provides, among others, that the Chairman and two
Commission show that it has adopted a liberal Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should
interpretation of the term "practice of law." chanrobles vi rt ual lawli bra ry either be certified public accountants with not less than
ten years of auditing practice, or members of the
"MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed
to make a very brief statement? Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and
which is in many ways synonymous with the word
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in
private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of
The Commissioner will please proceed. lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke,
Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons:
"MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the Illinois), 1986], p. 15]).
members of the Commission on Audit. Among others, the
qualifications provided for by Section 1 is that ‘They must At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice.
be Members of the Philippine Bar’ — I am quoting from The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual
the provision — ‘who have been engaged in the practice of or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal
law for at least ten years.’" services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often
called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called
"To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of
excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized
the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make as professional corporations and the members called
the clarification that this provision on qualifications shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are
regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are
or involve actual practice of law outside the COA. We have younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneys called
to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who "associates." (Ibid.).
are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge
or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional
they are qualified to be considered for appointment as areas of law practice is essentially tautologies, unhelpful
members or commissioners, even chairman, of the defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do.
Commission on Audit. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West
Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of
law is defined as "the performance of any acts . . . in or roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some
out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of lawyers’ work the constraints are imposed both by the
law. (State Bar Ass’n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is
Conn. 222, 140 A. 2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance organized into a social unit to perform that work. The
Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A. 2d 623, 626 most common of these roles are those of corporate
[1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).
known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be workable. In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily,
(Wolfram, op. cit.) herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law
practice, a departure from the traditional concept of
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a practice of law.
client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers
as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most We are experiencing today what truly may be called a
lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice.
percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those
case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do members participating in various legal-policy decisional
continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer’s role colors contexts, are finding that understanding the major
much of both the public image and the self-perception of emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to
the legal profession. (Ibid.).chan robles. com:c ralaw:red intelligent decision-making.

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of
public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this today requires an accurate understanding of the nature
so? Recall that the late Alexander Sycip, a corporate and implications of the corporate law research function
lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are accumulation. The recognition of the need for such
still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly
one who principally tries cases before the courts. The "model-making" and contingency planning," has
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional
such as businessmen, know that in most developed procedures in many decisional contexts.
societies today, substantially more legal work is
transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be
practitioners of law who do both litigation and non- processed, the sorting and weighing of significant
litigation work also know that in most cases they find conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the
themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses
describe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. of action, and the need for fast decision and response in
The business lawyer has been described as the planner, situations of acute danger have prompted the use of
the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] sophisticated concepts of information flow theory,
need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and
surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an
effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. improved decisional structure must stress the predictive
11, 1989, p. 4). component of the policy-making process, wherein a
model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is
In the course of a working day the average general developed to test projected alternative courses of action in
practitioner will engage in a number of legal tasks, each terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal
processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested Although members of the legal profession are regularly
parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the
specialized practice will usually perform at least some law, the subject of corporate finance law has received
legal services outside their specialty. And even within a relatively little organized and formalized attention in the
narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift philosophy of advancing corporate legal education.
from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal
importantly different one such as representing a client research has become a vital necessity.
before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p.
687). Certainly, the general orientation for productive
contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, improved through an early introduction to multi-variable
unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a decisional contexts and the various approaches for
litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either
much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to a master’s or doctorate degree in business administration
have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of or management, functioning at the legal policy level of
client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and decision-making now have some appreciation for the
negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new concepts and analytical techniques of other professions
skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for which are currently engaged in similar types of complex
many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.). decision-making.

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance
litigation work that is constrained in very important ways, problems would require the services of an astute attorney
at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the because of the complex legal implications that arise from
salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special each and every necessary step in securing and
maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4). Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily
with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is into current advances which are of particular significance
assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable
He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a disciplinary skills applicable to a corporate counsel’s
clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the
business and industry. organization and management of the legal function itself.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many These three subject areas may be thought of as
people could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them.
does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial
single corporation will vary with the size and type of the jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate
corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations counsel’s total learning.
farm out all their legal problems to private law firms.
Many others have in-house counsel only for certain Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences
matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to affect the counsel’s role. For that matter, the corporate
handle most legal problems in-house. lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the
resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a counsel for are required to make, and the need to think
lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His about a corporation’s strategy at multiple levels. The
areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal
corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as both with global multinational entities and simultaneously
corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly
both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the collaborate not only with public entities but with each
Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other other — often with those who are competitors in other
capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.
chanrobles. com:cha nrob les.com. ph
chan roble s v irtua lawlib rary arenas.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume Also, the nature of the lawyer’s participation in decision-
responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business making within the corporation is rapidly changing. The
of the corporation he is representing. These include such modern corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a
matters as determining policy and becoming involved in stockholder — in some cases participating in the
management. (Emphasis supplied.) organization and operations of governance through
participation on boards and other decision-making roles.
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal
being isolated from the action, or not understanding how institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These
one’s work actually fits into the work of the organization. trends are complicated as corporations organize for global
This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the operations. (Emphasis supplied).
results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer
is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with
involved in the running of the business. governmental policies toward the promotion and
management of technology. New collaborative
Moreover, a corporate lawyer’s services may sometimes arrangements for promoting specific technologies or
be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some competitiveness more generally require approaches from
large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available industry that differ from older, more adversarial
to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned
number of companies and law firms. Because working in a from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race
foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, this is are examples of collaborative efforts between
an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, governmental and business Japan’s MITI is world famous.
however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys (Emphasis supplied)
while the younger attorneys do their "international
practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of
Practice," May 25, 1990, p. 4). the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within
the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations.
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups
in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard- within organizations has been found to be related to
educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such
is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the
who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is environment, coordinating work with outsiders, promoting
one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate team achievements within the organization. In general,
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4). such external activities are better predictors of team
performance than internal group processes.
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a
"shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of
the traditional law teaching method of confining the the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of
subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking
Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures
management issues. and to understand relationships of financial liability and
insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied) corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the
legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, corporate lawyer’s aim is not the understand all of the
three factors are apropos: chanrob 1es vi rtual 1 aw libra ry law’s effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very
least, also gain a working knowledge of the management
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
been found an effective tool for new managerial thinking "constitution" or make-up of the modern corporation.
regarding both planning and pressing immediate "Business Star, The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p.
problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops, 4).
inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to
simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical, The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench)
economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New is to have more than a passing knowledge of financial law
programming techniques now make the systems dynamics affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would
principles more accessible to managers — including admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law
corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied). territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of
professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk
better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jar.
the context of a law department, it can be used to 11, 1989, p. 4).chanroble s law lib rary : red

appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in

negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President
involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the
supplied) COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the
Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer- opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does
based models can be used directly by parties and not possess the required qualification of having been
mediators in all kinds of negotiations. All integrated set of engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation
support, including hands-on on instruction in these On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments
techniques. A simulation case of an international joint confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
venture may be used to illustrate the point. COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office.
On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of COMELEC.
the legal function, concern three pointed areas of
consideration, thus: chanrob 1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s nomination,
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant
special skills that comprise a major part of the general petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
counsel’s responsibilities. They differ from those of confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod
remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared
minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal null and void.
rights for such legal entities at that time when
transactional or similar facts are being considered and Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar,
made. chanrob les lawli bra ry : redna d having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade
of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in
which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license
legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo).
supportive of this nation’s evolving economic and
organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and
in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law
theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank
relationships needed in trying to make a global economy Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations
work. officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama,
which involved getting acquainted with the laws of
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel’s member-countries, negotiating loans and coordinating
Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon
decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the
profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an
key aspects of the firm’s strategic issues, including investment bank and subsequently of a business
structuring its global operations, managing improved conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to
relationships with an increasingly diversified body of various companies as a legal and economic consultant or
employees, managing expanded liability exposure, chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General
creating new and varied interactions with public decision- (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL.
makers, coping internally with more complex make or by Monsod’s work involved being knowledgeable in election
decisions. law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation
hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy,
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-
corporate law is not enough to make one a good general Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen’s Conference for
Human Development, has worked with the under construction is the set of terms and conditions which
privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor determines the contractual remedies for a failure to
groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in perform one or more elements of the contract. A good
affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately agreement must not only define the responsibilities of
the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his both parties, but must also state the recourse open to
legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, either party when the other fails to discharge an
a quasi-judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings obligation. For a complete debt restructuring represents a
(1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is
(1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on sine qua non for foreign loan agreements — an adherence
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of
the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz- whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell
Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile Holmes, Jr. once said: ‘They carry no banners, they beat
government functions with individual freedoms and public no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and
accountability and the party-list system for the House of bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene
Representative." (pp. 128-129 Rollo) (Emphasis supplied) mastery.’ (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in
Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters,
Atty. Monsod used to be a member. 1977, p. 265).

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the
as a team, and which is adequately constituted to meet term "practice of law", particularly the modern concept of
the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal
Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are construction intended by the framers of the Constitution,
the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance Atty. Monsod s past work experiences as a lawyer-
manager, and an operations officer (such as an official economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of
involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than
Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been
Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country’s Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said: chanroble s.com : vi rtual law lib rary

Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan

transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan "Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and
Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) must be performed by the officer in which it is vested
fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower’s according to his best lights, the only condition being that
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; the appointee should possess the qualifications required
and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13) by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be
faulted on the ground that there are others better
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any qualified who should have been preferred. This is a
debt restructuring program. For aside from performing the political question involving considerations of wisdom which
tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score only the appointing authority can decide." (Emphasis
national development policies as key factors in supplied).
maintaining their countries’ sovereignty. (Condensed from
the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers No less emphatic was the Court in the case of Central
for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it
regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for stated:jgc:chanro bles. com.ph

International Development, during the Session on Law for

the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World "It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as
Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace in this case, and all the other legal requirements are
Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). (Emphasis satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest
supplied). to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service
Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more appointment on the ground that another person is more
so than purely re negotiation policies, demand expertise in qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority
the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To
and in re negotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested
work with an international business specialist or an upon the appointing authority. An appointment is
economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever
Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a it is vested, subject to the only condition that the
mixture of technical language that they should be appointee should possess the qualifications required by
carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of law." (Emphasis supplied).
competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of
adequate technical support personnel. (See International The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the
Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination;
unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3)
1987, p. 321). (Emphasis supplied). issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon
submission by the Commission on Appointments of its
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract certificate of confirmation, the President issues the
permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath- by the Commission in the exercise of such an
taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except
L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion
Officers, p. 200) amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec.
1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with
consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the the Commission’s judgment. In the instant case, there is
Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) no occasion for the exercise of the Court’s corrective
Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of
provides:jg c:chan roble s.com.p h discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs
"The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed prayed, for has been clearly shown. chanrobles lawlib rary : rednad

by the President with the consent of the Commission on

Appointments for a term of seven years without re Additionally, consider the following: c hanro b1es vi rt ual 1aw li bra ry

appointment. Of those first appointed, three Members

shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five (1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee
years, and the last Members for three years, without re by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the
appointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment?
for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary (2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee,
whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla’s separate opinion, suffice it likewise clear.
to say that his definition of the practice of law is the
traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as (3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming
distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a
law, which modern connotation is exactly what was Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S.
intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Moreover, Justice Padilla’s definition would require
generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practiced two or Finally, one significant legal maxim is: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice

once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, "We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by
this is far from the constitutional intent. the spirit that giveth life."
cra law virtua1aw li bra ry

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once,
Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson’s
of a definition of law practice which really means nothing beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on
because the definition says that law practice." . . is what condition that —
people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I
cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident "No blade shall touch his skin;
from my statement that the definition of law practice by
"traditional areas of law practice is essentially No blood shall flow from his veins." cralaw virtua1aw li bra ry

tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase

itself that is being defined. When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured,
the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law three inches away from in front of Samson’s eyes. This
covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to
use of the law, or in advising others on what the law her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and
means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, fuming with righteous fury, Accused the procurator of
but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did
a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his
practicing law for over ten years. This is different from the veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter,
acts of persons practicing law, without first becoming not the spirit of the agreement.
lawyers.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on
the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action
or petition be brought against the President? And even Melencio-Herrera, J., concurs in the result.
assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the
action be entertained since he is the incumbent President? Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition.
(Fernan, C.J.).
We now proceed: cha nro b1es vi rtua l 1aw lib ra ry

Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted
during the public hearings on Monsod’s confirmation, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., took no part.
implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary
qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered Separate Opinions
 repeatedly or customarily.

NARVASA, J., concurring: chan rob1es v irt ual 1aw l ib rary Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is
habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified
Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not appear public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to
to me that there has been an adequate showing that the practice his profession as an accountant. In the same
challenged determination by the Commission on way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or
Appointments — that the appointment of respondent a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental
should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
due assessment thereof, be confirmed — was attended by
error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion As aptly held by this Court in the case of People v.
and consequently merits nullification by this Court in Villanueva: 2
accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY "Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it
the petition. consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent
PADILLA, J., dissenting: chanrob1es v irt ual 1aw li bra ry habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864,
42 LRA, M S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the
The records of this case will show that when the Court prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily
first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not only to or habitually holding one’s self out to the public as a
require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State
was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647.) . . ." (Emphasis
restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from supplied).
assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the
Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on
office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the Appointments in a Memorandum it prepared, enumerated
inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties several factors determinative of whether a particular
concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:
jgc:chanroble s.com.p h

Monsod’s disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the

Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence "1. Habituality. The term ‘practice of law’ implies
already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the
not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as
prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman. when one sends a circular announcing the establishment
of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney
After considering carefully respondent Monsod’s comment, Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office
I am even more convinced that the constitutional as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a
requirement of" practice of low for at least ten (10) years" manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his
has not been met. intention to practice law in all courts in the country
(People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents
deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the core Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it
issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of
of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual
membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State
to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
ten (10) years." (Art IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987
Constitution). Questions involving the construction of 2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must
constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. have presented himself to be in the active and continued
As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. practice of the legal profession and that his professional
139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn services are available to the public for compensation, as a
and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said
and defining constitutional boundaries." cralaw virt ua1aw lib ra ry services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging
for services such as preparation of documents involving
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term
for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that he must ‘practice of law’ (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and
have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People’s
(10) years." It is the bounded duty of this Court to ensure Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who
that such standard is met and complied with. renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a
statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent,
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v.
understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance or Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If
application of knowledge as distinguished from mere compensation is expected, `all advice to clients and all
possession of knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual, action taken for them in matters connected with the law;
repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice" law, or any are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette Et. Al., v. Arthur C.
profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359).
an employment or profession actively, habitually,
3. Application of law, legal principle, practice, or
procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from
experience is within the term `practice of law’. (Martin examining the qualifications of the respondent simply
supra). because his nomination has been confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of political question that we are barred from resolving.
law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client Determination of the appointee’s credentials is made on
relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of
which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney- that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion
client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law would still be subject to our review.cha nrob les vi rtua l lawlib ra ry

books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the

practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was
Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30)." 3 involved was the discretion of the appointing authority to
choose between two claimants to the same office who
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful both possessed the required qualifications. It was that
aids in determining whether or not respondent Monsod kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.
meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for
at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people
COMELEC Chairman. may be ousted by this Court for lack of the required
qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualify
The following relevant questions may be asked: chanrob1e s virtual 1aw lib rary an appointee simply because he has passed the
Commission on Appointments.
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which
are peculiar to the practice of law? Even the President of the Philippines may be declared
ineligible by this Court in an appropriate proceeding
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no
habitually? less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that
what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected
habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN in the first place.
(10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC
Chairman? Coming now to the qualifications of the private
respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been too
Given the employment or job history of respondent sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as
Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded that to render the qualification practically toothless. From the
if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I
the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even
least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law
Chairman. as long as his activities involve the application of some
law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the
activities which could be latitudinarianly considered definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that
activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting are likely "to become involved in litigation." cralaw vi rtua1aw l ibra ry

of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or

advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law
do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To even if his main occupation is another business and he
become engaged in the practice of law, there must be a interprets and applies some law only as an incident of
continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the such business. That covers every company organized
Solicitor General in People v. Villanueva: 4 under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC
under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the
"Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not
one must have presented himself to be in the active and affected by some law or government regulation the
continued practice of the legal profession and that his businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again
professional services are available to the public for a going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner.
consideration of his said services." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house
or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to knowledge and application of the laws regulating such
declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for the transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his
position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed
the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the
appointment to such position. Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the
Energy Regulatory Board.
CRUZ, J., dissenting: chan rob1e s virtual 1aw l ibra ry

The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the

I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother practice of law as the "performance of any acts . . . in or
Paras but find I must dissent just the same. There are out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of
certain points on which I must differ with him while of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes
course respecting his viewpoint. on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every
function known in the commercial and governmental His integrity and competence are not questioned by the
realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a specific
be workable." cralaw vi rtua 1aw lib rary requirement written into the Constitution.

The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk
consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in the
practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the
least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the
are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with term beyond rational limits.
some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception
is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he
ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not engaged
pubescent pretensions. in an activity where membership in the bar is a
requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been
The respondent’s credentials are impressive, to be sure, engaged in the practice of law.
but they do not persuade me that he has been engaged in
the practice of law for ten years as required by the Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only
Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in for COMELEC chairman but also for appointment to the
business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges
himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a or Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling
practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in
the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a
experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in
attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on Government or private practice, except that in one joyful
the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the
lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and bar examinations?
urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the
Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice
farmers and priests) and was a member of the Davide of law for at least ten years." The deliberate choice of
Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these words shows that the practice envisioned is active and
capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent,
actual practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged"
qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant in an activity for ten years requires committed
talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on participation in something which is the result of one’s
Elections. decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and
involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year
than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully vote to period.
grant the petition.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting: chan rob1es v irt ual 1aw l ibra ry submitted by respondent Monsod to the Commission on
Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the
When this petition was filed, there was hope that practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears
engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for public that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an
office would be settled one way or another in fairly alleged one year period after passing the bar
definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result. examinations when he worked in his father’s law firm.
Even then his law practice must have been extremely
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D.
Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of law (with degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania
one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official during that period. How could he practice law in the
leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 United States while not a member of the Bar there?
categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting
in the result because there was no error so gross as to The professional life of the respondent follows: jgc:c han robles. com.ph

amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave

with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the "1.15.1 Respondent Monsod’s activities since his passing
issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the the Bar examinations in 1961 consist of the following: cha nrob 1es vi rtua l 1aw libra ry

decision.cha nrob les law li bra ry

1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate),

There are two key factors that make our task difficult. University of Pennsylvania
First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional
Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to 2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry
look into the qualifications of persons appointed to high Department; Operations, Latin American Department;
office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no power to Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International
set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of Finance Corporation
discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our
belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in 3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various
terms of executive ability, proficiency in management, companies, i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine
educational background, experience in international Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation
banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public.
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such
Development Corporation and affiliated companies knowledge would be helpful. c hanrob les lawl ibra ry : redna d

5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a
term, which even an ordinary layman accepts as having a
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every
Executive Officer resident of this country who has reached the age of
discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at
7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not
Member necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor,
barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman,
8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet,
December 1989 Coup Attempt — Member can these people honestly assert that as such, they are
engaged in the practice of law?.
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive
Officer of the following companies: chan rob1e s virtual 1aw l ibra ry The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years." It is not satisfied
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc. with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at
least ten years.."
b. Dataprep, Philippines
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as
c. Philippine SUN systems Products, Inc. follows:jgc:c hanrobles. com.ph

d. Semirara Coal Corporation "The practice of law involves not only appearance in court
in connection with litigation but also services rendered out
e. CBL Timber Corporation of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the
rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or
Member of the Board of the Following: c han rob1es v irt ual 1aw l ibra ry knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other
instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines conditions involved, must be carefully determined. People
ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass’n v. Tinkoff, 399 III. 282, 77
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass’n v.
People’s Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E.
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation 901, and cases cited.

d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a
formula or definition of what constitutes the practice of
e. Graphic Atelier law.’Practicing law’ has been defined as ‘Practicing as an
attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and
f. Manila Electric Company customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition
of any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc. when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service
requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill.’
h. Philippine Electric Corporation Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being
substantially correct in People ex rel . Illinois State Bar
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises Ass’n v. People’s Stock Yards State Bank, 344 III. 462,
176 N.E. 901." (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776).
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
For one’s actions to come within the purview of practice of
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation law they should not only be activities peculiar to the work
of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually,
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation" frequently or customarily, to wit: chan rob1e s virtual 1aw lib rary

(Rollo, pp. 21-22) x x x

There is nothing in the above bio-data which even

remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has given the "Respondent’s answers to questions propounded to him
law enough attention or a certain degree of commitment were rather evasive. He was asked whether or not he ever
and participation as would support in all sincerity and prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate
candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He
least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has answered: ‘Very seldom.’ In answer to the question as to
lawyers working for him. Instead of giving legal advice of how many times he had prepared contracts for the parties
legal services, he was the one receiving that advice and during the twenty-mine years of his business, he said: ‘I
those services as an executive but not as a lawyer. have no idea.’ When asked if it would be more than half a
dozen times his answer was I suppose.’ Asked if he did
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments not recall making the statement to several parties that he
show an effort to equate "engaged in the practice of law" had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he
with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of answered: ‘I don’t recall exactly what was said.’ When
endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a
practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment
charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where itself recognizes habituality as a required component of
he was not the broker in the deal, he answered: Well, I the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared
don’t believe so, that is not a practice.’ Pressed further for and issued by it, to wit:
jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

an answer as to his practice in preparing contracts and

deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally "1. Habituality. The term ‘practice of law’ implies
answered: ‘I have done about everything that is on the customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the
books as far as real estate is concerned.’ public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109
citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as
x x x when one sends a circular announcing the establishment
of a law office for the general practice of law (U S. v. Noy
Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real- as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a
estate broker he has a lawful right to do any legal work in manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his
connection with real-estate transactions, especially in intention to practice law in all courts in the country
drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in
these practices over the years and has charged for his Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it
services in that consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual
x x x exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA log citing State v.
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115).

". . . An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person x x x

designated or employed by another to act in his stead; an
agent; more especially, one of a class of persons
authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod
legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are may have profited from his legal knowledge, the use of
attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated
styled ‘attorneys in fact;’ but the single word is much used activities which do not fall under the denomination of
as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not
attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at required for membership in the Constitutional Commission
law.’ Abb. Law Dict.’Attorney.’ ‘A public attorney, or or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup
attorney at law, says Webster, ‘is an officer of a court of Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been
law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened
such court on the retainer of clients.’The principal duties to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the
of an attorney are (1) to be true to the court and to his Philippines which do not categorize the foreign
client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care, corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the
skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to practice of law, doing business also should be active and
the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional,
to him as such. . . . His rights are to be justly incidental and casual transactions are not within the
compensated for his services.’ Bouv. Law Dict. context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case
tit.’Attorney.’ The transitive verb ‘practice,’ as defined by of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 143
Webster, means ‘to do or perform frequently, customarily, SCRA 288 [1986]).
or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to
practice gaining; . . . to carry on in practice, or repeated Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader,
action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a and member of the Constitutional Commission may
profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or possess the background, competence, integrity, and
medicine,’ etc. . . ." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President,
523; Emphasis supplied) Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but
the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10)
denotes frequency or a succession of acts. Thus, we years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered
stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 that he may not be confirmed for that office. The
[1965]): cha nro blesvi rtua lawlib rary
Constitution charges the public respondents no less than
this Court to obey its mandate.
x x x
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on
Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in
". . . Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as
consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of Chairman of the COMELEC.
acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent
habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, I vote to GRANT the petition.
42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily Bidin, J., dissents.
or habitually holding one’s self out to the public, as a
lawyer and demanding payment for such services. . . ."
(at p. 112)
 A.C. No. 11494, July 24, 2017
During the pendency of the above cases, or on September
HEIRS OF JUAN DE DIOS E. CARLOS, NAMELY, 22, 1997, Atty. Linsangan and Juan executed a Contract
JENNIFER N. CARLOS, JOCELYN N. CARLOS, for Professional Services9 enumerating the above cases
JACQUELINE CARLOS-DOMINGUEZ, JO-ANN being handled by Atty. Linsangan for Juan. In said
CARLOS-TABUTON, JIMMY N. CARLOS, LORNA A. Contract, Atty. Linsangan and Juan agreed, as follows: chanRoblesvi rt ualLa wlibra ry

CARLOS, JERUSHA ANN A. CARLOS AND JAN JOSHUA xxxx

A. CARLOS, Complainants, v. ATTY. JAIME S.
LINSANGAN, Respondent. WHEREAS, the Parties have decided to consolidate their
agreements in connection with ATTORNEY's engagement
as CLIENT's attorney to recover the subject property;
DECISION
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the
TIJAM, J.: foregoing premises, the parties hereto have mutually
agreed and bound themselves as follows:
Complainants are children of the late Juan De Dios E.
1. That ATTORNEY shall continue to take all legal steps to
Carlos (Juan) who presently seek to disbar respondent
recover the 10,000 square meters covered by TCT No.
Atty. Jaime S. Linsangan (Atty. Linsangan). Atty.
139061, or any portion thereof acceptable to CLIENT,
Linsangan acted as counsel for their late father in several
through any or all of the Court cases mentioned above, or
cases, one of which involving the recovery of a parcel of
such other Court cases as may be necessary;
land located in Alabang, Muntinlupa City. Complainants
alleged that Atty. Linsangan forced them to sign pleadings
2. That ATTORNEY shall not enter into any compromise
and documents, sold the parcel of land in Alabang,
agreement without the written consent of CLIENT. CLIENT
Muntinlupa City in cahoots with complainants' estranged
may enter into any compromise agreement only upon
mother, and evaded payment of income taxes when he
consultation with ATTORNEY;
divided his share in the subject property as his supposed
attorney's fees to his wife and children, all in violation of
3. That ATTORNEY shall avail of all legal remedies in order
his oath as lawyer.
to recover the property and shall continue the prosecution
of such remedies to the best of his knowledge, ability, and
The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings
experience, all within legal and ethical bounds;
The parcel of land located in Alabang, Muntilupa City and
4. That CLIENT shall shoulder all necessary and incidental
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 139061
expenses in connection with the said cases;
with an area of 12,331 square meters was previously
owned by the Spouses Felix and Felipa Carlos. Their son,
5. That considering, among others, the extent of services
Teofilo Carlos (Teofilo), convinced them to transfer said
rendered by ATTORNEY; the value of the property sought
title to his name with a promise to distribute the same to
to be recovered; the importance of the case to CLIENT;
his brothers and sisters. Teofilo delivered the owner's
the difficulty of recovery (considering that the Balbanero
duplicate copy of the title to his brother, Juan. However,
spouses have a favorable Court of Appeals['] Decision in
Teofilo sold the entire property to Pedro Balbanero C.V. No. 29379, while Felicidad Sandoval's name appears
(Pedro). Pedro, however, failed to pay the agreed
in the TCT No. 139061 as wife of the registered owner,
installment payments.
Teofilo Carlos), the professional ability and experience of
ATTORNEY; as well as other considerations, CLIENT
For purposes of recovering the subject property from
hereby confirms and ratifies that he has agreed and
Teofilo (and Teofilo's supposed wife, Felicidad), and from
bound himself to pay ATTORNEY a contingent fee in
Pedro, Juan engaged the services of Atty. Linsangan. It
an amount equivalent to FIFTY PERCENT (50%) of
appears that Atty. Linsangan, for Juan, filed the following
the market value of the property, or portion thereof,
cases: (a) a case1 against Felicidad which was settled with
which may be recovered, or the zonal value thereof,
the latter acknowledging Juan's one-half interest and
whichever is higher.
ownership over the property; (b) a case against Pedro
which was concluded on September 12, 1997; and (c)
The said attorney's fees shall become due and payable
another case2 against Felicidad, albeit filed by another upon recovery of the property, or any portion thereof, (a)
lawyer who acted under the direct control and supervision
upon finality of a favorable Court decision, or (b)
of Atty. Linsangan. In this case against Felicidad, it
compromise settlement, whether judicially or
appears that the other half of the property was
extrajudicially, through the execution of any document
adjudicated to Juan, as Teofilo's sole heir. Said
acknowledging or transferring CLIENT's rights over the
adjudication was appealed to the CA.3
property, or any portion thereof, whether or not through
ATTORNEY's, CLIENT's, or other person's efforts or
It further appears that Atty. Linsangan represented Juan
mediation, or (c) or by any other mode by which CLIENT's
in the following cases, likewise all involving the subject
interest on the subject property, or a portion thereof, is
property: (a) an action for partition4 filed by Bernard Rillo
recognized, or registered, or transferred to him; or (d)
against Pedro; (b) an ejectment case5 filed by Juan
should CLIENT violate this contract; or (e) should CLIENT
against Pedro; and (c) Juan's intervention in the
terminate ATTORNEY's services without legal or just
case6 between Pedro and Teofilo.
cause.
It finally appears that Atty. Linsangan also represented
6. That CLIENT undertakes and binds himself to pay the
Juan in the certiorari cases and petitions for review filed
said attorney's fees to the following:
before the CA7 and this Court,8 likewise involving the
chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

same property.
(a) To ATTORNEY himself; property for a purchase price of One Hundred Fifty Million
(b) In case of ATTORNEY'S death or disability, to LORNA Pesos (PhP150,000,000). Atty. Linsangan sold the entire
OBSUNA LINSANGAN; property using the following: chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

(c) In case of death or disability of ATTORNEY and LORNA 1. a Special Power of Attorney21 dated August 26, 2010,
OBSUNA LINSANGAN, jointly and severally, to LAUREN executed by his wife Lorna Linsangan, and children,
KYRA LINSANGAN, LORRAINE FREYJA LINSANGAN, and Lauren Kyra O. Linsangan, Lorraine Freyja O. Linsangan
JAMES LORENZ LINSANGAN; and James Lorenz O. Linsangan to sell their shares in the
(d) In default of all the [foregoing], to the estate of subject property;
ATTORNEY.
2. a Special Power of Attorney22 dated September 2009,
7. That this Contract shall be binding and enforceable
executed by Juan's wife, Bella N. Vda. de Carlos, and their
upon CLIENT's heirs, successors-in-interest,
children, Jo-Ann Carlos Tabuton, Jacqueline Carlos-
administrators, and assigns, if any.
Dominguez and Jimmy N. Carlos to represent them in all
cases involving their interests and shares in the properties
8. That finally, CLIENT hereby authorizes, at ATTORNEY's
of Juan;
option, the annotation of this contract on TCT No. 139061
or any subsequent title which may be issued. (Emphasis
3. a Special Power of Attorney23 dated September 30,
supplied)
2009 executed by Lorna A. Carlos, Jerusha Ann A. Carlos
and Jan Joshua A. Carlos to represent them in all cases
x x x x10
involving their interests and shares in the properties of
However, it was not only Juan who went after the Juan;
property, but also Bernard Rillo and Alicia Carlos, a sister-
in-law. The latter also filed an action11 for recovery of 4. a Special Power of Attorney24 dated May 2013 executed
their share and by Compromise Agreement, an area of by Porfirio C. Rillo and Jose Rillo to sell their shares
2,331 square meters was awarded in their favor, leaving a consisting of 200 square meter portion and 199 square
10,000 square meter portion of the property.12 meter portion, respectively, of the subject property;

This remaining 10,000 square meter portion was 5. a Special Power of Attorney25 dated October 15, 2009
eventually divided in the case filed by Juan against executed by Jocelyn N. Carlos and Jennifer N. Carlos to
Felicidad (which Atty. Linsangan admits13 to have filed represent them in all cases involving their interests and
albeit through another lawyer who acted under his control shares in the properties of Juan;
and supervision), through a Compromise Agreement
wherein 7,500 square meters of the subject property was 6. a Special Power of Attorney26 dated May 28, 2010
given to the heirs of Juan while the remaining 2,500 executed by Bernard Rillo in favor of Alicia D. Carlos to
square meters thereof was given to Felicidad.14 In said sell his share in the subject property by virtue of a
Compromise Agreement, the parties likewise agreed to Compromise Agreement dated September 3, 1987 in the
waive as against each other any and all other claims case of Bernard Rillo, et al. vs. Teofilo Carlos, et al., Civil
which each may have against the other, including those Case No. 11975, Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
pending in the CA15 and this Court. This Compromise Branch CXLIV.
Agreement was approved by the trial court on December
On November 28, 2015, Helen issued several checks27 in
11, 2009.16
varying amounts either made payable to Cash or to Jaime
S. Linsangan or Lorna O. Linsangan and simultaneous
Subsequently, a Supplemental Compromise
thereto, Atty. Linsangan released the owner's duplicate
Agreement17 dated December 16, 2009 was submitted by
original of TCT No. 139061 to Helen.28 It further appears
the heirs of Juan and Atty. Linsangan, dividing among
that in lieu of one check in the amount of PhP2,500,000,
them the 7,500 square meter-portion of the property as
Atty. Linsangan received, in cash, the amounts of
follows: 3,750 square meters to the heirs of Juan and
PhP2,000,000 on December 4, 2015,29 and PhP500,000
3,750 square meters to Atty. Linsangan pursuant to the
on December 10, 2015,30 from Helen.
Contract for Professional Services. In said Supplemental
Compromise Agreement, Atty. Linsangan waived in favor
Upon learning of the sale, complainants allegedly
of his wife and children his 3,750 square meter share,
requested from Atty. Linsangan for their shares in the
except as to the 250 square meters thereof, as
proceeds and for the copies of the Special Power of
follows:
Attorney as well as the case records, but that Atty.
cha nRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

(a) To Mrs. Lorna O. Linsangan - 2,000 square meters;

Linsangan refused.31 Complainants also requested from
(b) To Lauren Kyra O. Linsangan - 500 square meters;
Atty. Linsangan, this time through another lawyer, Atty.
(c) To Lorraine Freyja O. Linsangan - 500 square meters;
Victor D. Aguinaldo, that their shares in the subject
(d) To James Lorenz O. Linsangan - 500 square meters;
property be at least segregated from the portion sold.32
(e) To Atty. Jaime S. Linsangan - 250 square meters.18
Said Supplemental Compromise Agreement was likewise On August 20, 2016, complainants wrote a letter33 to Atty.
approved by the trial court in its Decision19 dated Linsangan revoking the Special Power of Attorney which
December 18, 2009. There was no mention in the record, they executed in the latter's favor. In said letter,
however, that the Compromise Agreement and the complainants accused Atty. Linsangan of conniving with
Supplemental Compromise Agreement were likewise their mother, Bella N. Vda. De Carlos, in submitting the
presented for approval before the several courts where Compromise Agreement and in selling the subject
the other cases were pending. property. Complainants, however, recognized Atty.
Lisangan's services for which they proposed that the latter
On December 10, 2015, Atty. Linsangan executed a Deed be paid on the basis of quantum meruit instead of fifty
of Absolute Sale20 with a certain Helen S. Perez (Helen) percent (50%) of the subject property.34
covering the entire 12,331 square meters of the subject
Subsequently, or in September 2016, complainants filed Atty. Linsangan, probably anticipating that he may be
the instant administrative complaint35 against Atty. charged of having undue interest over his client's property
Linsangan accusing the latter of forcing them to sign in litigation, caused another lawyer to appear but all the
pleadings filed in court, copies of which were not furnished while making it absolutely clear to Juan that the latter's
them; of selling the subject property in cahoots with their appearance was nevertheless under Atty. Linsangan's
mother; of evading the payment of income taxes when he "direct control and supervision."
apportioned his share in the subject property to his wife
and children.36 Plainly, these acts are in direct contravention of Article
1491(5)45 of the Civil Code which forbids lawyers from
By way of Comment,37 Atty. Linsangan avers that the acquiring, by purchase or assignment, the property that
Supplemental Compromise Agreement was never has been the subject of litigation in which they have taken
questioned by the complainants until now38 and that they part by virtue of their profession. While Canon 10 of the
had never requested for a copy thereof from him. Atty. old Canons of Professional Ethics, which states that "[t]he
Linsangan admits that the subject of the sale with Helen is lawyer should not purchase any interests in the subject
the property in Alabang, Muntinlupa City and that matter of the litigation which he is conducting," is no
complainants were not given a share from the payments longer reproduced in the new Code of Professional
because such were specifically made applicable to his and Responsibility (CPR), such proscription still applies
his family's share in the subject property only.39 Atty. considering that Canon I of the CPR is clear in requiring
Linsangan also contends that the proposal that he be paid that "a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws
on the basis of quantum meruit is only for the purpose of of the land and promote respect for law and legal process"
reducing his 50% share as stated in the Contract for and Rule 138, Sec. 3 which requires every lawyer to take
Professional Services he executed with Juan, so that the an oath to "obey the laws as well as the legal orders of
balance thereof may accrue to complainants.40 the duly constituted authorities therein."46 Here, the law
transgressed by Atty. Linsangan is Article 1491(5) of the
The Issue Civil Code, in violation of his lawyer's oath.

The threshold issue to be resolved is whether respondent While jurisprudence provides an exception to the above
is guilty of violating his lawyer's oath. proscription, i.e., if the payment of contingent fee is not
made during the pendency of the litigation involving the
The Ruling of this Court client's property but only after the judgment has been
rendered in the case handled by the lawyer,47 such is not
After a careful review of the record of the case, the Court applicable to the instant case. To reiterate, the transfer to
finds that respondent committed acts in violation of his Atty. Linsangan was made while the subject property was
oath as an attorney thereby warranting the Court's still under litigation, or at least concurrently with the
exercise of its disciplinary power. pendency of the certiorari proceedings in the CA and the
petitions for review in this Court.48 As mentioned, there
We begin by emphasizing that the practice of law is not a was nothing in the record which would show that these
right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon those cases were likewise dismissed with finality either before
who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the the execution of, or by virtue of, the Compromise
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such Agreement and the Supplemental Compromise Agreement
privilege.41 Whether or not a lawyer is still entitled to between complainants and Atty. Linsangan.
practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend
or disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to What is more, Atty. Linsangan, at the guise of merely
hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities waiving portions of the subject property in favor of his
of an attorney. The avowed purpose of suspending or wife and children, actually divided his attorney's fee with
disbarring an attorney is not to punish the lawyer, but to persons who are not licensed to practice law in
remove from the profession a person whose misconduct contravention of Rule 9.02,49 Canon 950 of the CPR.
has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to an office of an attorney, and Another misconduct committed by Atty. Linsangan was his
thus to protect the public and those charged with the act of selling the entire 12,331 square meters property
administration of justice.42 The lawyer's oath is a source of and making it appear that he was specifically authorized
obligations and its violation is a ground for suspension, to do so by complainants as well as by the other
disbarment or other disciplinary action.43 persons51 to whom portions of the property had been
previously adjudicated. However, a perusal of the
The record shows and Atty. Linsangan does not deny, that supposed Special Power of Attorney attached to the Deed
while the cases involving the subject property were still of Absolute Sale, save for that executed by his wife and
pending resolution and final determination, Atty. children, only authorizes Atty. Linsangan to represent
Linsangan entered into a Contract for Professional complainants in the litigation of cases involving Juan's
Services with Juan wherein his attorney's fees shall be properties. Nothing in said Special Power of Attorney
that equivalent to 50% of the value of the property, or a authorizes Atty. Linsangan to sell the entire property
portion thereof, that may be recovered. It is likewise not including complainants' undivided share therein.
denied by Atty. Linsangan that he apportioned upon
himself, and to his wife and children, half of the property Atty. Linsangan's reasoning that he only took it upon
awarded to complainants as heirs of Juan, through a himself to sell the property because complainants were
Supplemental Compromise Agreement. Similarly, such unfamiliar with real estate transactions does not exculpate
Supplemental Compromise Agreement was entered into him from liability. If indeed that were the case, then it is
by Atty. Linsangan and the heirs of Juan concurrently with incumbent upon Atty. Linsangan to make it clear to the
the pendency of several cases before the CA and this complainants that he was acting in such capacity and not
Court44 involving the very same property. What is more, as their lawyer.52 But even this, Atty. Linsangan failed to
do.

Worse, Atty. Linsangan does not deny having received the

downpayment for the property from Helen. Atty.
Linsangan does not also deny failing to give complainants'
share for the reason that he applied said payment as his
share in the property. In so doing, Atty. Linsangan
determined all by himself that the downpayment accrues
to him and immediately appropriated the same, without
the knowledge and consent of the complainants. Such act
constitutes a breach of his client's trust and a violation of
Canon 1653 of the CPR. Indeed, a lawyer is not entitled to
unilaterally appropriate his client's money for himself by
the mere fact that the client owes him attorneys
fees.54 The failure of an attorney to return the client's
money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that
he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice
and violation of the general morality, as well as of
professional ethics; it also impairs public confidence in the
legal profession and deserves punishment. In short, a
lawyer's unjustified withholding of money belonging to his
client, as in this case, warrants the imposition of
disciplinary action.55

Pointedly, the relationship of attorney and client has

consistently been treated as one of special trust and
confidence. An attorney must therefore exercise utmost
good faith and fairness in all his relationship with his
client. Measured against this standard, respondent's act
clearly fell short and had, in fact, placed his personal
interest above that of his clients. Considering the
foregoing violations of his lawyer's oath, Article 1491(5) of
the Civil Code, Rule 9.02, Canon 9, and Canon 16 of the
CPR, the Court deems it appropriate to impose upon
respondent the penalty of six (6) months suspension from
the practice of law.56

WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Jaime S.

Linsangan LIABLE for violations of his lawyer's oath,
Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, Rule 9.02, Canon 9, and
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and he
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX
(6) months effective from the date of his receipt of this
Decision. Let copies of this Decision be circulated to all
courts of the country for their information and guidance,
and spread in the personal record of Atty. Linsangan.

SO ORDERED.
2.QUALIFICATIONS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR (BAR and issued the corresponding INFORMATION for
QUALIFIED SEDUCTION on 04 July 2002.
MATTER 1153)
5. Thereafter, the herein Complainant filed a MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION dated 26 August 2002 which was
denied in the RESOLUTION dated 02 October 2002 of the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan Del Sur.

I. REQUIREMENT OF GOOD MORAL

6. The aforesaid RESOLUTION dated 02 October 2002 was
CHARACTER elevated to the Department of Justice, by way of a
PETITION FOR REVIEW, and is pending resolution by the
Department of Justice.

xxx

A.C. No. 9608 : November 27, 2012 8. The act/s committed by the herein Respondent Atty.
Danilo S. Samson against the herein Complainant MARIA
MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA, Complainant, v. ATTY. VICTORIA B. VENTURA as hereinbefore stated clearly
DANILO S. SAMSON, Respondent. constitute "grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines which
provides for a penalty of "DISBARMENT or SUSPENSION
DECISION of an Attorney by the SUPREME COURT."

PER CURIAM: Complainant narrated in her Sworn Statement3 that ςrν ll

sometime in December 2001, at around midnight, she was

The Court has often reminded members of the bar to live sleeping in the maids room at respondents house when
up to the standards and norms of the legal profession by respondent entered and went on top of her. Respondent
upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code kissed her lips, sucked her breast, and succeeded in
of Professional Responsibility. Lawyers are bound to having sexual intercourse with her. She felt pain and
maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but found blood stain in her panty. She stated that another
also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. incident happened on March 19, 2002 at respondents
Lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful public eye poultry farm in Alegria, San Francisco, Agusan del Sur.
and community approbation. Needless to state, those Respondent asked her to go with him to the farm. He
whose conduct both public and private fail this scrutiny brought her to an old shanty where he sexually abused
have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, her. Thereafter, respondent gave her five hundred pesos
accordingly penalized.1 ς rνll
and warned her not to tell anyone what had happened or
he would kill her and her mother.
Complainant Maria Victoria B. Ventura filed on July 29,
2004 a Complaint2 for Disbarment or Suspension before
ςrν ll
In her Supplemental-Complaint,4 complainant averred
ςrνll

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on that respondent allowed her to sleep in his house after her
Bar Discipline against respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson mother agreed to let her stay there while she studied at
for "grossly immoral conduct." the Agusan National High School. She further stated that
on the night she was sexually abused, she was awakened
when respondent went on top of her. She struggled to
In her complaint, complainant alleged that
free herself and shouted, but respondent covered her
mouth and nobody could hear as nobody was in the
2. The herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA house. Complainant also claimed that on March 19, 2002,
executed a Sworn Statement dated 19 April 2002 and a between 5:00 p.m. to 6:00 pm, respondent forced her to
Supplemental-Complaint dated 10 May 2002 stating ride a multi-cab. When they arrived at his poultry farm in
therein that the crime of RAPE was committed against her Alegria, respondent dragged her to a dilapidated shack.
person sometime in December, 2001 and on 19 March She resisted his advances but her efforts proved futile.
2002 when she was merely thirteen (13) years of age by
herein Respondent ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON, then thirty
Respondent alleged in his Answer5 that
eight (38) years old, married to Teresita B. Samson,
ς rν ll

Filipino and resident of Barangay 5, San Francisco, Agusan

Del Sur, Philippines. 2. Respondent admits the allegations in paragraph 2 of
the complaint to the effect that Maria Victoria Ventura
filed a complaint against him for Rape at the Provincial
3. In his Counter-Affidavit, herein Respondent ATTY.
Prosecutors Office with qualification that the said
DANILO S. SAMSON admitted that sexual intercourse
complaint for Rape was dismissed. Respondent, however,
indeed transpired between the herein Complainant MARIA
has no knowledge or information as to the truth of the
VICTORIA B. VENTURA and himself.
allegation that she was 13 years.

4. After the conduct of preliminary investigation, the

xxx
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan Del Sur,
Philippines issued a RESOLUTION dated 10 June 2002
dismissing the charge of RAPE and finding the existence of 5. Respondent vehemently denies the truth of the
probable cause for the crime of QUALIFIED SEDUCTION allegations in paragraph 8 of the complaint to the effect
that the acts of respondent in having sex with complainant He alleged therein that complainant usually stayed late at
constitute grossly immoral conduct. The truth is that the night with her male friends when her mother was out of
act of respondent in having sex with complainant was the house. He claimed that he heard rumors that
done with mutual agreement after respondent gave complainant had sexual affairs with different boys.
money to complainant. Respondent respectfully submits Respondent narrated that on March 19, 2002, he saw
that his act of having sex with complainant once does not complainant with some of her classmates near their
constitute grossly immoral conduct. rented house. Complainant told him that they wanted to
go out to swim but they did not have money. When she
There is no human law that punishes a person who has asked if he could spare some amount, he gave her
sex with a woman with mutual agreement and money. He told her in jest that he wanted to see her that
complainant accepts compensation therefore. Having sex afternoon and go to a place where they could be alone,
with complainant once with just compensation does not and he was surprised when she agreed. He just thought
amount to immoral conduct. that for complainant, sex is a common thing despite her
age. At around 5:00 p.m., he fetched complainant at her
house. She casually walked towards the car and boarded
xxx it. He told her that they will not check in a lodging house
because people might recognize him. Upon reaching his
6. The complaint is instigated by Corazon Ventura who poultry farm, respondent met his farm worker and asked
was an employee at the Law Office of respondent herein. him if he could use the latters hut. The farm worker
The said Corazon Ventura entertained hatred and had a agreed and they went straight to the hut.
grudge against the herein respondent who terminated her
services due to misunderstanding. Inside the farm workers hut, complainant did not hesitate
in entering the room. Respondent did not notice any
7. The filing of the Criminal Case against respondent as involuntariness on her part as she undressed herself. He
well as this Administrative Case is a well orchestrated and asserted that they had sexual intercourse based on their
planned act of Corazon Ventura as vengeance against mutual understanding. Thereafter, the complainant
respondent as a result of her separation from the dressed up and walked back to the multi-cab where she
employment in the Law Office of the respondent. This waited for him. He told her not to tell anyone about what
claim is supported by the Affidavit of Natividad Ruluna, had happened, to which she replied "natural buang kay
the former Office Clerk at the Law Office of respondent. motug-an" meaning, shes not crazy as to tell anyone. He
alleged that she accepted the money he gave because she
needed to buy some things but her mother did not give
8. To show that Corazon Ventura desires to get back at
her any allowance. Respondent insisted that what
respondent, she demanded from respondent to settle with
happened between them was the first and the last
her and demanded the payment of the amount of
incident. He claimed that he was able to confirm that
P2,000,000.00; otherwise she will file a case against him
complainant is no longer a virgin.
in Court for Rape and for disbarment. Respondent did not
come across with Corazon Ventura, the latter made good
her threats and filed the criminal case for Rape. [sic] It likewise appears that the Investigating Prosecutors
When the case for rape did not prosper because the found that probable cause exists for respondent to stand
Prosecutor dropped the Rape Case, Corazon Ventura sent trial for qualified seduction.7 The charge of rape,
ς rνll

word to respondent that she is amenable for the amount however, was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. An
of P400,000.00. In effect, Corazon Ventura wanted to Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
extort from respondent so that she can get even with him of Agusan del Sur, Branch 6, but complainant who was not
and his wife for separating her from the employment; satisfied with the dismissal of the rape charge, filed a
motion for reconsideration. When said motion was denied,
complainant filed a petition for review with the
9. Complainant is a woman of loose moral character. This
Department of Justice (DOJ). However, the DOJ sustained
is supported by the Affidavit of Patronio Punayan, Jr.
the findings of the prosecutor.
which is hereto attached as Annex "3". And Corazon
Ventura can afford to utilize Maria Victoria Ventura as her
instrument in putting down the respondent herein because Then, on December 14, 2006, complainant and her
Maria Victoria Ventura is not her biological daughter and mother appeared before the public prosecutor and
she knows before hand that her ward has a questionable executed their respective Affidavits of
reputation. The fact that Corazon Ventura is not the Desistance.8 Complainant stated that what happened
ςrν ll

biological mother of Maria Victoria Ventura is shown by between respondent and her in March 2002 was based on
the pre-trial order in Criminal Case No. 5414. mutual understanding. Thus, she was withdrawing the
complaint she filed against respondent before the RTC as
xxx well as the one she filed before the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline. Accordingly, the criminal case against
respondent was dismissed.9 ς rνll

Respondent has not violated any grounds mentioned in

this rule. Respondent respectfully submits that his having
In its Report and Recommendation10 dated October 10,
sex with complainant with just compensation once does
ςrν ll

2007, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended

not amount to immoral conduct. For who among men will
that respondent be suspended for a period of one year
not yield to temptation when a woman shall invite him for
sex? from the practice of law for immorality with the warning
that repetition of the same or similar act will merit a more
severe penalty.
Attached to respondents Answer is his Counter-
Affidavit6 which he submitted to the Provincial Prosecutor.
ςrνll
On November 10, 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
issued Resolution No. XVIII-2007-237, to wit: chan roble svirtual lawlib rary scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,14 the possession
ςrνl l

unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED with modification, of good moral character is both a condition precedent and
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made and to retain membership in the legal profession. It is the
part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the bounden duty of members of the bar to observe the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering integrity of the Bar.15 Consequently, any errant behavior
ςrνl l

that respondent is found guilty of immorality, the victim is on the part of a lawyer, be it in the lawyers public or
a minor, respondent and his wife was victims guardians private activities, which tends to show said lawyer
and for being a married man, Atty. Danilo S. Samson is deficient in moral character, honesty, probity or good
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for five (5) demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or
years with Stern Warning that repetition of the same or disbarment.
similar act in the future will be dealt with more
severely.11ςrνl l

Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or

shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the
Complainant now moves to reconsider the IBP Resolution. opinion of the upright and respectable members of the
She argues that the penalty imposed by the IBP is not community.16 Immoral conduct is gross when it is so
ςrνll

commensurate to the gravity and depravity of the offense. corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled
She contends that respondent committed grossly immoral as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when
conduct by forcing himself to have sexual intercourse with committed under such scandalous or revolting
a young and innocent lass of 13 years of age. He also took circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of
advantage of his moral ascendancy over complainant decency.17ςrν ll

considering that she was then staying at respondents

residence. Moreover, there was a betrayal of the marital From the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence
vow of fidelity considering that respondent was a married and the admissions of respondent himself, we find that
man. She insists that this detestable behavior renders respondents act of engaging in sex with a young lass, the
respondent unfit and undeserving of the honor and daughter of his former employee, constitutes gross
privilege which his license confers upon him.Thus, immoral conduct that warrants sanction. Respondent not
complainant prays that the penalty of disbarment be only admitted he had sexual intercourse with complainant
imposed.12 ςrνll

but also showed no remorse whatsoever when he asserted

that he did nothing wrong because she allegedly agreed
Meanwhile, respondent also filed a Motion for and he even gave her money. Indeed, his act of having
Reconsideration13 of the IBP Resolution. He asserts that
ςrν ll carnal knowledge of a woman other than his wife
complainant has not presented any proof of her minority. manifests his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of
Likewise, during the sexual encounter, complainant was marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. Moreover,
not under their custody. He contends that complainants the fact that he procured the act by enticing a very young
mother even testified that her daughter stayed at woman with money showed his utmost moral depravity
respondents house only until February 2002. He further and low regard for the dignity of the human person and
stresses that because of his admission and remorse, and the ethics of his profession.
since this is the first time he has been found
administratively liable, he is entitled to a reduction of the In Cordova v. Cordova,18 we held that the moral
penalty to one year suspension from the practice of law.
ςrνll

delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the

bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the
The pertinent provisions in the Code of Professional generally accepted moral standards of the community,
Responsibility provide: c han roblesv irt uallawl ibra ry conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the
inviolable social institution of marriage.
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND Respondent has violated the trust and confidence reposed
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. on him by complainant, then a 13-year-old minor,19 who ς rνll

for a time was under respondents care. Whether the

Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, sexual encounter between the respondent and
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. complainant was or was not with the latters consent is of
no moment. Respondent clearly committed a disgraceful,
grossly immoral and highly reprehensible act. Such
xxx conduct is a transgression of the standards of morality
required of the legal profession and should be disciplined
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE accordingly.
INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly
states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or
xxx suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for, among others, any deceit, grossly immoral
conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required to
Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
take before admission to the practice of law. It bears to
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
stress that membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately
with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law through executory, be made part of the records of respondent in
the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be the Office of the. Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the
withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the
lawyers lack of the essential qualifications required of Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all
lawyers.20ς rν ll courts.

Likewise, it was held in Maligsa v. Cabanting21 that a ςrν ll This Decision takes effect immediately. ς rαl αωl ιb rα r

lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct, whether in

his professional or private capacity, which shows him to SO ORDERED.
be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and
good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of
the court. Similarly, in Dumadag v. Lumaya,22 the Court ςrν ll

pronounced: chan roble svirtuallaw lib rary

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.

Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness,
maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful
compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the
conditions required for remaining a member of good
standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to
practice law.

The fact that complainant filed an Affidavit of Desistance

during the pendency of this case is of no moment.
Complainants Affidavit of Desistance cannot have the
effect of abating the instant proceedings in view of the
public service character of the practice of law and the
nature of disbarment proceedings as a public interest
concern. A case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis
and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil
case, but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal
profession of its undesirable members in order to protect
the public and the courts. A disbarment case is not an
investigation into the acts of respondent but on his
conduct as an officer of the court and his fitness to
continue as a member of the Bar.23 ςrνll

Illicit sexual relations have been previously punished with

disbarment, indefinite or definite suspension, depending
on the circumstances.24 In this case, respondents gross ςrνl l

misbehavior and unrepentant demeanor clearly shows a

serious flaw in his character, his moral indifference to
sexual exploitation of a minor, and his outright defiance of
established norms. All these could not but put the legal
profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the
administration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict
but appropriate disciplinary action.25 ςrνll

The Court is mindful of the dictum that the power to

disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a
clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
Court and as a member of the bar. Thus, where a lesser
penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish
the end desired, disbarment should never be
decreed.26 However, in the present case, the seriousness
ςrνl l

of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to

disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty.27 ςrν ll

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson is

hereby DISBARRED for Gross Immoral Conduct, Violation
of his oath of office, and Violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01
and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
 [A.C. NO. 5095 : November 28, No. 1214, Page 243, Book III, Series
2007] of 1998, dated December 10, 1998.

FATHER RANHILIO C. AQUINO, Father Aquino further alleged that

LINA M. GARAN, ESTRELLA C. on June 23 and July 26, 1999, Atty.
LOZADA, POLICARPIO L. Angel Beltran, Clerk of Court,
MABBORANG, DEXTER R. Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao,
MUNAR, MONICO U. TENEDRO, certified that none of the above
ANDY R. QUEBRAL, NESTOR T. entries appear in the Notarial
RIVERA, EDUARDO C. Register of Atty. Pascua; that the
RICAMORA, ARTHUR G. IBAÑEZ, last entry therein was Document No.
AURELIO C. CALDEZ and DENU A. 1200 executed on December 28,
AGATEP, Complainants, v. ATTY. 1998; and that, therefore, he could
EDWIN PASCUA, Respondent. not have notarized Documents Nos.
1213 and 1214 on December 10,
DECISION 1998.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: In his comment on the letter-

complaint dated September 4, 1999,
For our resolution is the letter- Atty. Pascua admitted having
complaint dated August 3, 1999 of notarized the two documents on
Father Ranhilio C. Aquino, then December 10, 1998, but they were
Academic Head of the Philippine not entered in his Notarial Register
Judicial Academy, joined by Lina M. due to the oversight of his legal
Garan and the other above-named secretary, Lyn Elsie C. Patli, whose
complainants, against Atty. Edwin affidavit was attached to his
Pascua, a Notary Public in Cagayan. comment.
In his letter-complaint, Father The affidavit-complaints referred to
Aquino alleged that Atty. Pascua in the notarized documents were
falsified two documents committed filed by Atty. Pascua with the Civil
as follows: Service Commission. Impleaded as
respondents therein were Lina M.
(1) He made it appear that he had
Garan and the other above-named
notarized the "Affidavit-Complaint"
complainants. They filed with this
of one Joseph B. Acorda entering the
Court a "Motion to Join the
same as "Doc. No. 1213, Page No.
Complaint and Reply to
243, Book III, Series of 1998, dated
Respondent's Comment." They
December 10, 1998".
maintain that Atty. Pascua's
omission was not due to
(2) He also made it appear that he
had notarized the "Affidavit- inadvertence but a clear case of
Complaint" of one Remigio B. falsification.1 On November 16,
1999, we granted their motion.2
Domingo entering the same as "Doc.
Thereafter, we referred the case to In the instant case, there is no
the Office of the Bar Confidant for question that the subject documents
investigation, report and allegedly notarized by Atty. Pascua
recommendation. were not recorded in his notarial
register.
On April 21, 2003, the Office of the
Bar Confidant issued its Report and Atty. Pascua claims that the
Recommendation partly reproduced omission was not intentional but due
as follows: to oversight of his staff. Whichever
is the case, Atty. Pascua cannot
A notarial document is by law escape liability. His failure to enter
entitled to full faith and credit upon into his notarial register the
its face. For this reason, notaries documents that he admittedly
public must observe the utmost care notarized is a dereliction of duty on
to comply with the formalities and his part as a notary public and he is
the basic requirement in the bound by the acts of his staff.
performance of their duties (Realino
v. Villamor, 87 SCRA 318). The claim of Atty. Pascua that it was
simple inadvertence is far from true.
Under the notarial law, "the notary
public shall enter in such register, in The photocopy of his notarial
chronological order, the nature of register shows that the last entry
each instrument executed, sworn to, which he notarized on December 28,
or acknowledged before him, the 1998 is Document No. 1200 on Page
person executing, swearing to, or 240. On the other hand, the two
acknowledging the instrument, xxx affidavit-complaints allegedly
xxx. The notary shall give to each notarized on December 10, 1998 are
instrument executed, sworn to, or Document Nos. 1213 and 1214,
acknowledged before him a number respectively, under Page No. 243,
corresponding to the one in his Book III. Thus, Fr. Ranhilio and the
register, and shall also state on the other complainants are, therefore,
instrument the page or pages of his correct in maintaining that Atty.
register on which the same is Pascua falsely assigned fictitious
recorded. No blank line shall be left numbers to the questioned affidavit-
between entries" (Sec. 246, Article complaints, a clear dishonesty on his
V, Title IV, Chapter II of the Revised part not only as a Notary Public, but
Administrative Code). also as a member of the Bar.

Failure of the notary to make the This is not to mention that the only
proper entry or entries in his notarial supporting evidence of the claim of
register touching his notarial acts in inadvertence by Atty. Pascua is the
the manner required by law is a affidavit of his own secretary which
ground for revocation of his is hardly credible since the latter
commission (Sec. 249, Article VI).
cannot be considered a disinterested notaries public who were found
witness or party. guilty of dishonesty or misconduct
in the performance of their
Noteworthy also is the fact that the duties.
questioned affidavit of Acorda (Doc.
No. 1213) was submitted only when In Villarin v. Sabate, Jr. (325 SCRA
Domingo's affidavit (Doc. No. 1214) 123), respondent lawyer was
was withdrawn in the administrative suspended from his Commission as
case filed by Atty. Pascua against Notary Public for a period of one
Lina Garan, et al. with the CSC. This year for notarizing a document
circumstance lends credence to the without affiants appearing before
submission of herein complainants him, and for notarizing the same
that Atty. Pascua ante-dated instrument of which he was one of
another affidavit-complaint making the signatories. The Court held that
it appear as notarized on December respondent lawyer failed to exercise
10, 1998 and entered as Document due diligence in upholding his duties
No. 1213. It may not be sheer as a notary public.
coincidence then that both
documents are dated December 10, In Arrieta v. Llosa (282 SCRA 248),
1998 and numbered as 1213 and respondent lawyer who certified
1214. under oath a Deed of Absolute Sale
knowing that some of the vendors
A member of the legal fraternity were dead was suspended from the
should refrain from doing any act practice of law for a period of six (6)
which might lessen in any degree months, with a warning that another
the confidence and trust reposed by infraction would be dealt with more
the public in the fidelity, honesty severely. In said case, the Court did
and integrity of the legal profession not impose the supreme penalty of
(Maligsa v. Cabanting, 272 SCRA disbarment, it being the
409). respondent's first offense.

As a lawyer commissioned to be a In Maligsa v. Cabanting (272 SCRA

notary public, Atty. Pascua is 409), respondent lawyer was
mandated to subscribe to the sacred disbarred from the practice of law,
duties appertaining to his office, after being found guilty of notarizing
such duties being dictated by public a fictitious or spurious document.
policy and impressed with public The Court considered the
interest. seriousness of the offense and his
previous misconduct for which he
A member of the Bar may be was suspended for six months from
disciplined or disbarred for any the practice of law.
misconduct in his professional or
private capacity. The Court has It appearing that this is the first
invariably imposed a penalty for offense of Atty. Pascua, a
suspension from the practice of law that such wrongful act "constitutes
for a period of six (6) months may misconduct" and thus imposed upon
be considered enough penalty for him the penalty of suspension from
him as a lawyer. Considering that the practice of law for six months,
his offense is also a ground for this being his first administrative
revocation of notarial commission, offense. Also, in Vda. de Rosales v.
the same should also be imposed Ramos,7 we revoked the notarial
upon him. commission of Atty. Mario G. Ramos
and suspended him from the
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most practice of law for six months for
respectfully recommended that the violating the Notarial Law in not
notarial commission of Atty. EDWIN registering in his notarial book the
V. PASCUA, if still existing, be Deed of Absolute Sale he notarized.
REVOKED and that he be In Mondejar v. Rubia,8 however, a
SUSPENDED from the practice of law lesser penalty of one
for a period of six (6) months."3 month suspension from the practice
of law was imposed on Atty. Vivian
After a close review of the records of G. Rubia for making a false
this case, we resolve to adopt the declaration in the document she
findings of facts and conclusion of notarized.
law by the Office of the Bar
Confidant. We find Atty. Pascua In the present case, considering that
guilty of misconduct in the this is Atty. Pascua's first offense,
performance of his duties for failing we believe that the imposition of a
to register in his Notarial Register three-month suspension from the
the affidavit-complaints of Joseph B. practice of law upon him is in order.
Acorda and Remigio B. Domingo. Likewise, since his offense is a
ground for revocation of notarial
"Misconduct" generally means commission, the same should also
wrongful, improper or unlawful be imposed upon him.
conduct motivated by a
premeditated, obstinate or WHEREFORE, Atty. Edwin Pascua is
intentional purpose.4 The term, declared GUILTY of misconduct and
however, does not necessarily imply is SUSPENDED from the practice
corruption or criminal intent.5 of law for three (3) months with
a STERN WARNING that a
The penalty to be imposed for such repetition of the same or similar act
act of misconduct committed by a will be dealt with more severely. His
lawyer is addressed to the sound notarial commission, if still existing,
discretion of the Court. In Arrieta v. is ordered REVOKED.
Llosa,6 wherein Atty. Joel A. Llosa
notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale SO ORDERED.
knowing that some of the vendors
were already dead, this Court held
A.C. No. 10179 be held liable for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and
(Formerly CBD 11-2985) Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and that the penalty of suspension
BENJAMIN Q. ONG, Complainant, from the practice of law for two years, plus the return
vs. of the amount of P100,000.00 to the complainant,8 be
ATTY. WILLIAM F. DELOS SANTOS, Respondent. meted on Atty. Delos Santos in view of an earlier
disbarment case brought against him (Lucman v. Atty.
DECISION Delos Santos, CBD Case No. 09-253).

BERSAMIN, J.: Resolution No. XX-2013-253

A lawyer's issuance of a worthless check renders him On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors
in breach of his oath to obey the laws. To accord with issued Resolution No. XX-2013-253 adopting and
the canon of professional responsibility that requires approving the findings of IBP Commissioner Dela
him to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the Rama, Jr.,9 to wit:
land, and promote respect for the law and legal
processes, he thereby becomes administratively liable RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
for gross misconduct. hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Antecedents Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A," and finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence
In January 2008, complainant Benjamin Ong was
on record and the applicable laws and rules and
introduced to respondent Atty. William F. Delos
considering that Respondent violated Canon 1, Rule
Santos by Sheriff Fernando Mercado of the
1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. After several calls
Professional Responsibility, Atty. William F. Delos
and personal interactions between them, Ong and
Santos is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
Atty. Delos Santos became friends.1 In time, according
law for three (3) years and ORDERED to RETURN
to Ong, Atty. Delos Santos asked him to encash his
the amount of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00)
postdated check inasmuch as he was in dire need of
Pesos to complainant with legal interest within thirty
cash. To reassure Ong that the check would be
days from receipt of notice.
funded upon maturity, Atty. Delos Santos bragged
about his lucrative practice and his good paying
clients. Convinced of Atty. Delos Santos’ financial Issue
stability, Ong handed to Atty. Delos Santos on
January 29, 2008 the amount of P100,000.00 in By issuing the worthless check, did Atty. Delos Santos
exchange for the latter’s Metrobank Check No. violate Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of
0110268 postdated February 29, 2008.2 However, the the Code of Professional Responsibility?
check was dishonored upon presentment for the
reason that the account was closed.3 Ong relayed the Ruling
matter of the dishonor to Atty. Delos Santos, and
demanded immediate payment, but the latter just We agree with the findings of the IBP but modify the
ignored him.4 When efforts to collect remained futile, recommended penalty.
Ong brought a criminal complaint for estafa and for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against Atty. Every lawyer is an officer of the Court. He has the
Delos Santos.5 Ong also brought this disbarment duty and responsibility to maintain his good moral
complaint against Atty. Delos Santos in the Integrated character. In this regard, good moral character is not
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), which docketed the only a condition precedent relating to his admission
complaint as CBD Case No. 11-2985. into the practice of law, but is a continuing imposition
in order for him to maintain his membership in the
Findings and Recommendation Philippine Bar.10 The Court unwaveringly demands of
of the IBP Bar Commissioner him to remain a competent, honorable, and reliable
individual in whom the public may repose
In his Commissioner’s Report,6 IBP Bar Commissioner confidence.11 Any gross misconduct that puts his
Jose I. Dela Rama, Jr. stated that Ong had sufficiently moral character in serious doubt renders him unfit to
established the existence of the dishonored check; continue in the practice of law.12
and that Atty. Delos Santos did not file his answer
despite notice, and did not also present contrary Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 has been enacted in order to
evidence.7 He recommended that Atty. Delos Santos safeguard the interest of the banking system and the
legitimate public checking account users.13 The scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
gravamen of the offense defined and punished by profession.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, according to Lozano v.
Martinez,14 is the act of making and issuing a These canons, the Court has said in Agno v.
worthless check, or any check that is dishonored upon Cagatan,17 required of him as a lawyer an enduring
its presentment for payment and putting it in high sense of responsibility and good fidelity in all his
circulation; the law is designed to prohibit and dealings, thus:
altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious
practice of issuing checks with insufficient funds, or The afore-cited canons emphasize the high standard
with no credit, because the practice is deemed a of honesty and fairness expected of a lawyer not only
public nuisance, a crime against public order to be in the practice of the legal profession but in his
abated. The Court has observed in Lozano v. personal dealings as well. A lawyer must conduct
Martinez: himself with great propriety, and his behavior should
be beyond reproach anywhere and at all times. For,
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check as officers of the courts and keepers of the public's
transcends the private interests of the parties directly faith, they are burdened with the highest degree of
involved in the transaction and touches the interests social responsibility and are thus mandated to behave
of the community at large. The mischief it creates is at all times in a manner consistent with truth and
not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an honor. Likewise, the oath that lawyers swear to
injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting the
valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor in
a thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of their relationships with others. Thus, lawyers may be
trade and commerce, injure the banking system and disciplined for any conduct, whether in their
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public professional or in their private capacity, if such
interest.15 xxx conduct renders them unfit to continue to be officers
of the court.18
Being a lawyer, Atty. Delos Santos was well aware of
the objectives and coverage of Batas Pambansa Blg. That his act involved a private dealing with Ong did
22. If he did not, he was nonetheless presumed to not matter. His being a lawyer invested him – whether
know them, for the law was penal in character and he was acting as such or in a non- professional
application. His issuance of the unfunded check capacity – with the obligation to exhibit good faith,
involved herein knowingly violated Batas Pambansa fairness and candor in his relationship with others.
Blg. 22, and exhibited his indifference towards the There is no question that a lawyer could be disciplined
pernicious effect of his illegal act to public interest and not only for a malpractice in his profession, but also
public order.16 He thereby swept aside his Lawyer’s for any misconduct committed outside of his
Oath that enjoined him to support the Constitution and professional capacity.19 His being a lawyer demanded
obey the laws. He also took for granted the express that he conduct himself as a person of the highest
commands of the Code of Professional Responsibility, moral and professional integrity and probity in his
specifically Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule dealings with others.20
7.03, viz:
Moreover, in issuing the dishonored check, Atty.
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE Delos Santos put into serious question not only his
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND personal integrity but also the integrity of the entire
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND Integrated Bar. It cannot be denied that Ong acceded
LEGAL PROCESSES. to Atty. Delos Santos’ request for encashment of the
check because of his complete reliance on the nobility
Rule 1.01 - A Lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, of the Legal Profession. The following excerpts from
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Ong’s testimony bear this out, to wit:

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES COMM. DELA RAMA: What did you feel when you
UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE were issued a bounced check by the respondent?
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. MR. ONG: Actually, the reason I even loaned him
money because actually he was not even my friend.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that He was just referred to me. The reason why I felt at
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor ease to loan him money was because the sheriff told
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a me that abogado eto. It is his license that would be at
stake that’s why I lent him the money.21
 xxxx GUILTY of violating the Lawyer’s Oath, and Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
COMM. DELA RAMA: In other words, what you are
saying is that you felt betrayed when the lawyer Professional Responsibility, and, accordingly,
issued a bounced check in your favor. SUSPENDS HIM FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW
FOR A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS EFFECTIVE
MR. ONG FROM NOTICE, with a stern warning that any similar
infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely.
:
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of
Yes, Commissioner. the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty. Delos
Santos' personal record as an attorney; to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to all courts in
COMM. DELA RAMA:
the country for their information and guidance.
Why, what is your expectation of a lawyer?
SO ORDERED.
MR. ONG

They uphold the law, they know the law. He

should not have issued the check if you know it

cannot be funded because actually I have many
lawyer friend[s] and I have always high regard for
lawyers.22

Atty. Delos Santos should always be mindful of his

duty to uphold the law and to be circumspect in all his
dealings with the public. Any transgression of this duty
on his part would not only diminish his reputation as a
lawyer but would also erode the public’s faith in the
Legal Profession as a whole. His assuring Ong that
he was in good financial standing because of his
lucrative law practice when the contrary was true
manifested his intent to mislead the latter into giving a
substantial amount in exchange for his worthless
post-dated check. Such actuation did not speak well
of him as a member of the Bar.

Accordingly, Atty. Delos Santos was guilty of serious

misconduct, warranting appropriate administrative
sanction. Noting that the criminal complaint charging
him with the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was
already dismissed, and that he already repaid to Ong
the full amount of P100,000.00,23 both of which are
treated as mitigating circumstances in his favor, we
find the recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors to suspend him from the practice of law for
a period of three years harsh. Thus, we reduce the
penalty to suspension from the practice of law to six
months in order to accord with the ruling in Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Carandang.24

ACCORDINGLY, the Court PRONOUNCES

respondent ATTY. WILLIAM F. DELOS SANTOS
 A.C. No. 11078, July 19, 2016 Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex Officio Sheriff
Regional Trial Court
VERLITA V. MERCULLO AND RAYMOND Caloocan City
VEDANO, Complainants, v. ATTY. MARIE FRANCES E.
RAMON, Respondent. Re: Redemption of the property covered by EJF No. 7484-
2013

DECISION Dear Arty. Dabalos,

BERSAMIN, J.: Please assist Ms. Carmelita Vedano, through her Attorney-
in-Fact in redeeming the property covered by EJF No.
7484-2013. Please provide the necessary computation as
This case concerns the complaint for the disbarment of
to the full redemption amount in order for Ms. Vedano to
Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon for violating Rule 1.01,
redeem the same.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Lawyer's Oath for deceiving the complainants in order to
Thank you. Truly yours,
obtain the substantial amount of P350,000.00 on the
pretext of having the foreclosed asset of the latter's
(Sgd.)
mother redeemed.
Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon
Antecedents
Verlita and Raymond went to the NHMFC on September 9,
In the period from 2002 to 2011, the National Home 2013 to follow up on the redemption, but discovered that
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) sent several the respondent had already ceased to be connected with
demand letters to Carmelite T. Vedaño1 regarding her the NHMFC. On September 20, 2013, they met with her at
unpaid obligations secured by the mortgage covering her Branch 145 of the Regional Trial Court in Makati City
residential property in Novaliches, Caloocan City.2 To where she was attending a hearing. She informed them
avoid the foreclosure of the mortgage, Carmelita that the redemption was under process, and that the
authorized her children, Verlita Mercullo and Raymond certificate of redemption would be issued in two to three
Vedaño (complainants herein), to inquire from the NHMFC weeks time.9 chan roble slaw

about the status of the obligations. Verlita and Raymond

learned that their mother's arrears had amounted to After communicating through text messages with the
P350,000.00, and that the matter of the mortgage was respondent, Verlita and Raymond finally went to see the
under the charge of respondent Atty. Ramon, but who was Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court in Caloocan City
not around at that time. On November 27, 2013 to inquire on the status of the
redemption. There, they discovered that the respondent
On June 20, 2012, Carmelita received a letter from the had not deposited the redemption price and had not filed
sheriff of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Caloocan City, the letter of intent for redeeming the property.10 cha nro bleslaw

stating that her property would be put up for auction in

July 2013. Verlita and Raymond thus went to the NHMFC On December 5, 2013, Verlita and Raymond again went to
to see the respondent, who advised them about their right Branch 145 of the Regional Trial Court in Makati City
to redeem the property within one year from the where the respondent had a hearing, and handed to her
foreclosure.3 cha nrob leslaw
their demand letter requiring her to return the amount
she had received for the redemption.11 She acknowledged
In August 2013, Verlita and Raymond called up the the letter and promised to return the money on December
respondent, and expressed their intention to redeem the 16, 2013 by depositing the amount in Verlita's bank
property by paying the redemption price. The latter account. However, she did not fulfill her promise and did
agreed and scheduled an appointment with them on not show up for her subsequent scheduled hearings in
August 30, 2013. Branch 145.12 chanrobles law

On August 30, 2013, the respondent arrived at the With their attempts to reach the respondent being in vain,
designated meeting place at around 1:30 p.m., carrying Verlita and Raymond brought their disbarment complaint
the folder that Verlita and Raymond had seen at the in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
NHFMC when they inquired on the status of their mother's
property. After the respondent had oriented them on the Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
procedure for redemption, the complainants handed
P350,000.00 to the respondent, who signed an The respondent did not submit her answer when required
acknowledgment receipt.4 The respondent issued two to do so. She also did not attend the mandatory
acknowledgment receipts for the redemption price and for conference set by the IBP despite notice. Hence, the
litigation expenses,5 presenting to the complainants her investigation proceeded ex parte.13 chan robles law

NHMFC identification card. Before leaving them, she

promised to inform them as soon as the documents for IBP Commissioner Arsenio P. Adriano submitted his Report
redemption were ready for their mother's signature.6 chan roble slaw
and Recommendation,14 whereby he found the respondent
to have violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
On September 4, 2013, the respondent met with Verlita Responsibility for engaging in deceitful conduct, and
and handed a letter7 that she had signed, along with the recommended her suspension from the practice of law for
special power of attorney (SPA) for Carmelita's two years, and her return to the complainants of
signature.8 The letter reads: P350,000.00. with legal interest from December 2, 2013.
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

The IBP Board of Governors adopted Commissioner

Adriano's recommendation as stated in its Resolution No. provides:
XXI-2014-929,15viz.: chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for
ADOPTED AND APPROVED, the Report and legal processes.
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation to be fully dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.
supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws,
and for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Evil intent was not essential in order to bring the unlawful
Responsibility, Atty. Marie Frances E. Ramon is
act or omission of the respondent within the coverage of
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility20 The
(2) years and Ordered to Return the amount of
Code exacted from her not only a firm respect for the law
Three Hundred Fifty Thousand (P350,000.00) Pesos
and legal processes but also the utmost degree of fidelity
to Complainant.
and good faith in dealing with clients and the moneys
entrusted by them pursuant to their fiduciary
Ruling of the Court relationship.21 c hanro bles law

The Court declares the respondent guilty of dishonesty Yet another dereliction of the respondent was her wanton
and deceit. disregard of the several notices sent to her by the IBP in
this case. Such disregard could only be wrong because it
The Lawyer's Oath is a source of the obligations and reflected her undisguised contempt of the proceedings of
duties of every lawyer. Any violation of the oath may be the IBP, a body that the Court has invested with the
punished with either disbarment, or suspension from the authority to investigate the disbarment complaint against
practice of law, or other commensurate disciplinary her. She thus exhibited her irresponsibility as well as her
action.16 Every lawyer must at no time be wanting in utter disrespect for the Court and the rest of the Judiciary.
probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions It cannot be understated that a lawyer in her shoes should
precedent to his admission to the Bar, but are also comply with the orders of the Court and of the Court's
essential for his continued membership in the Law duly constituted authorities, like the IBP, the office that
Profession.17 Any conduct unbecoming of a lawyer the Court has particularly tasked to carry out the specific
constitutes a violation of his oath. function of investigating attorney misconduct.22 chanro bleslaw

The respondent certainly transgressed the Lawyer's Oath The respondent deserves severe chastisement and
by receiving money from the complainants after having appropriate sanctions. In this regard, the IBP Board of
made them believe that she could assist them in ensuring Governors recommended her suspension for two years
the redemption in their mother's behalf. She was from the practice of law, and her return of the amount of
convincing about her ability to work on the redemption P350,000.00 to the complainants. The recommended
because she had worked in the NHFMC. She did not penalty is not commensurate to the gravity of the
inform them soon enough, however, that she had misconduct committed. She merited a heavier sanction of
meanwhile ceased to be connected with the agency. It suspension from the practice of law for five years. Her
was her duty to have so informed them. She further professional misconduct warranted a longer suspension
misled them about her ability to realize the redemption by from the practice of law because she had caused material
falsely informing them about having started the prejudice to the clients' interest.23 She should somehow
redemption process. She concealed from them the real be taught to be more ethical and professional in dealing
story that she had not even initiated the redemption with trusting clients like the complainants and their
proceedings that she had assured them she would do. mother, who were innocently too willing to repose their
Everything she did was dishonest and deceitful in order to utmost trust in her abilities as a lawyer and in her
have them part with the substantial sum of P350,000.00. trustworthiness as a legal professional. In this connection,
She took advantage of the complainants who had reposed we state that the usual mitigation of the recommended
their full trust and confidence in her ability to perform the penalty by virtue of the misconduct being her first offense
task by virtue of her being a lawyer. Surely, the totality of cannot be carried out in her favor considering that she
her actuations inevitably eroded public trust in the Legal had disregarded the several notices sent to her by the IBP
Profession. in this case. As to the return of the P350,000.00 to the
complainant, requiring her to restitute with legal interest
As a lawyer, the respondent was proscribed from is only fair and just because she did not comply in the
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful least with her ethical undertaking to work on the
conduct in her dealings with others, especially clients redemption of the property of the mother of the
whom she should serve with competence and complainants. In addition, she is sternly warned against a
diligence.18 Her duty required her to maintain fealty to similar infraction in the future; otherwise, the Court will
them, binding her not to neglect the legal matter have her suffer a more severe penalty.
entrusted to her. Thus, her neglect in connection
therewith rendered her liable.19 Moreover, the unfulfilled WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS ATTY .
promise of returning the money and her refusal to MARIE FRANCES E. RAMON guilty of violating Canon 1,
communicate with the complainants on the matter of her Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
engagement aggravated the neglect and dishonesty the Lawyer's Oath; SUSPENDS HER FROM THE
attending her dealings with the complainants. PRACTICE OF LAW FOR A PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS
EFFECTIVE FROM NOTICE, with the STERN
The respondent's conduct patently breached Rule 1.01, WARNING that any similar infraction in the future will be
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which dealt with more severely; ORDERS her to return to the
complainants the sum of P350,000.00 within 30 days from
notice, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from
the finality of this decision until full payment;
and DIRECTS her to promptly submit to this Court written
proof of her compliance within the same period of 30 days
from notice of this decision.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the

Bar Confidant, to be appended to Atty. Marie Frances E.
Ramon's personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines; and to the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout
the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 A.C. No. 11064, September 27, 2016 not submit any Answer.

BIENVENIDA FLOR SUAREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. On January 31, 2013, IBP Commissioner Loreto C. Ata
ELEONORA. MARAVILLA-ONA, Respondent. (Commissioner Ata) notified the parties to appear for a
mandatory conference scheduled on March 7, 2013. The
notice stated that "nonappearance by any of the parties
DECISION shall be deemed a waiver of their right to participate in
further proceedings."6 chan rob leslaw

PER CURIAM:
At the mandatory conference, only Bienvenida appeared.
Thus, Commissioner Ata issued an Order7 noting Atty.
This administrative case arose from a verified letter-
Maravilla-Ona's absence during the mandatory conference
complaint1 dated July 19, 2012 filed by complainant
and her failure to file an Answer. Accordingly, Atty.
Bienvenida Flor Suarez before the Commission on Bar
Maravilla-Ona was declared in default.
Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) seeking for the refund of the professional and legal
Considering the condition and age of Bienvenida, who was
fees which she paid to respondent Atty. EleonorA.
already 84 years old at that time, Commissioner Ata found
Maravilla-Ona.
it imperative to proceed with the investigation ex parte.
Hence, after clarificatory questions were propounded on
The Facts
Bienvenida, the mandatory conference was terminated
and the case was submitted for report and
On February 22, 2011, Bienvenida went to the office of
recommendation.8
Atty. Maravilla-Ona to seek the latter's legal assistance in
chanro bles law

transferring title to a land, under her name. Atty.

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
Maravilla-Ona agreed to render her services for a
consideration of forty-eight thousand pesos (P48,000) by
In its Report and Recommendation9 dated July 22, 2014,
way of professional and legal fees. Accepting the
the CBD found that Atty. Maravilla-Ona was guilty of gross
engagement, Bienvenida turned over the necessary
misconduct and violations of the Code of Professional
documents to Atty. Maravilla-Ona and gave the latter the
Responsibility for: (1) issuing a worthless check; (2)
amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000) as down
refusing to settle due obligations despite demand; (3)
payment, as evidenced by Official Receipt No.
failing to serve the complainant with competence and
515532 dated February 22, 2011.
diligence; and (4) failing to apprise her client of the status
of the transactions.10 Thus, the CBD recommended that
On March 4, 2011, Bienvenida returned to Atty. Maravilla-
Atty. Maravilla-Ona be suspended from the practice of law
Ona's office to make another payment in the amount of
for a period of one (1) year and ordered to pay Bienvenida
thirty-five thousand pesos (P35,000), as evidenced by
the amount of P58,000.
Official Receipt No. 49376. Thereafter, on March 28, 2011,
Bienvenida made her final payment to Atty. Maravilla-Ona
On December 13, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors
in the amount of twelve thousand pesos (P12,000), as
passed a Resolution11 adopting the Report and
evidenced by Official Receipt No. 52163.3
Recommendation of the CBD with the modification
chanrob leslaw

increasing Atty. Maravilla-Ona's penalty to disbarment, to

Despite the lapse of a considerable period, Bienvenida did
wit:
not receive any update on the status of the transfer of
land title under her name. Apparently, Atty. Maravilla-Ona chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

failed to do anything to facilitate the said transfer of title. RESOLUTION NO. XXI-2014-917
Thus, Bienveriida opted not to push through with the CBD Case No. 12-3534
transaction and, instead, claimed reimbursement for the Bienvenid[a] Flor Suarez vs.
amounts she paid to Atty. Maravilla-Ona, to which the Atty. EleonorA. Maravilla-Ona
latter agreed.
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
After a year of waiting, Atty. Maravilla-Ona issued to ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report
Bienvenida a Bank of Commerce check dated May 9, 2012 and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
in the amount of fifty-eight thousand pesos in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
(P58,000).4 However, to Bienvenida's dismay, when she Resolution as Annex "A", and finding Respondent guilty of
presented the check to the bank, it was dishonored due to gross misconduct and violation of the Code of Canon 18
insufficiency of funds. Atty. Maravilla-Ona thereafter made and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
several promises to return Bienvenida's money, which, up for issuing a worthless check, for her refusal to settle due
to this moment, remain unfulfilled. obligations despite demand, for her failure to serve the
Complainant with competence and diligence, and for her
Aggrieved, Bienvenida filed the instant administrative case failure to apprise her client of the status of transactions in
before the CBD praying for the recovery of P58,000, relation to a plethora of cases, Atty. Eleanor A. Maravilla-
representing the amount of the dishonored check issued Ona is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law
by Atty. Maravilla-Ona. and [her] name ORDERED stricken off from the Roll
of Attorneys.12 chanrob lesvi rtua llawli bra ry

Acting on the complaint, the CBD, through Director for Bar

Discipline Pura Angelica Y. Santiago, issued an
Order5 dated August 1, 2012 requiring Atty. Maravilla-Ona On January 11, 2016, the CBD transmitted to this Court
to submit her Answer to the complaint, with a warning the Notice of Resolution along with the records of this
that failing to do so would render her in default. However, case. 13 chanrob leslaw

notwithstanding the said warning, Atty. Maravilla-Ona did

 The Court's Ruling contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.17 Such malfeasance is not only unacceptable,
We concur with the IBP Board of Governors' finding of disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession; it
administrative liability. also reveals a basic moral flaw that makes her unfit to
practice law.18 chan robles law

Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code provides that "[lawyers]

shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
deceitful conduct." By taking the lawyer's oath, lawyers of Court mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or
become guardians of the law and indispensable suspended by this Court for any of the following acts: (1)
instruments for the orderly administration of justice.14 As deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4)
such, they can be disciplined for any conduct, in their grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime
professional or private capacity, which renders them unfit involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer's
to continue to be officers of the court.15 chanrob leslaw oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney
In the instant case, it is clear that Atty. Maravilla-Ona for a party without authority to do so.19 Thus, a lawyer
violated her sworn duties under the Lawyer's Oath and the may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his
Code. The records plainly show that Atty. Maravilla-Ona oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an odious
was completely remiss and negligent in fulfilling her deportment unbecoming an attorney. However, the
obligations as a lawyer to Bienvenida. After collecting the question as to what disciplinary sanction should be meted
full amount of her professional and legal fees, Atty. out against a lawyer found guilty of misconduct requires
Maravilla-Ona did not take a single step to process the consideration of a number of factors.
registration of land title in Bienvenida's name. Worse,
when asked to return the money she received from In the instant case, the misconduct of Atty. Maravilla-Ona
Bienvenida, Atty. Maravilla-Ona issued a worthless check is aggravated by her unjustified refusal to obey the orders
which consequently bounced when presented for of the IBP directing her to file an answer to the complaint
payment. of Bienvenida and to appear at the scheduled mandatory
conference. This .constitutes blatant disrespect for the IBP
In Belleza v. Atty. Macasa, the Court ruled that a lawyer's which amounts to conduct unbecoming lawyer.
failure to return the client's money upon demand gives In Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, We held that a lawyer must
rise to the presumption that the lawyer has maintain respect not only to the courts, but also to judicial
misappropriated it for his or her own use to the prejudice officers and other duly constituted authorities, including
of and in violation of the trust reposed in him or her by the IBP:
the client. It is a gross violation of general morality as well chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

as of professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in The misconduct of respondent is aggravated by his
the legal profession and deserves punishment.16 Atty. unjustified refusal to heed the orders of the IBP requiring
Maravilla-Ona's failure to return Bienvenida's money is a him to file an answer to the complaint-affidavit and,
breach of Rule 16.01 of the Code, which provides: afterwards, to appear at the mandatory conference.
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
Although respondent did not appear at the conference, the
Rule 16.01 -A lawyer shall account for all money or IBP gave him another chance to defend himself through a
property collected or received for or from the client. position paper. Still, respondent ignored this directive,
exhibiting a blatant disrespect for authority. Indeed, he is
justly charged with conduct unbecoming a lawyer, for a
Atty. Maravilla-Ona's agreement to render her legal
lawyer is expected to uphold the law and promote respect
services to Bienvenida, sealed by her receipt of her legal
for legal processes. Further, a lawyer must observe and
fees, is an assurance and representation that she would
maintain respect not only to the courts, but also to judicial
be diligent and competent in fulfilling her responsibilities
officers and other duly constituted authorities, including
as Bienvenida's lawyer. However, Atty. Maravilla-Ona
the IBP. Under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the Court
acted to the contrary. Thus, the IBP correctly found that
has empowered the IBP to conduct proceedings for the
she violated Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 thereof, which
disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys.20
state:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

Canon 18 A lawyer shall serve his client with competence We also take note of the past disbarment complaints that
and diligence; had been filed against Atty. Maravilla-Ona. In A.C. No.
10107 entitled Beatrice C. Yatco, represented by her
xxxx Attorney-In-Fact, Marivic Yatco v. Atty. Eleanor Ma illa-
Ona, the complainant filed a disbarment case against Atty.
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter Maravilla-Ona for issuing several worthless checks as
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection rental payments for the complainant's property and for
therewith shall render him liable. refusing to vacate the said property, thus forcing the
latter to file an ejectment case against Atty. MaraviJla-
Ona. The IBP required Atty. Maravilla-Ona to file her
Atty. Maravilla-Ona's negligence, her failure to return her Answer, but she failed to do so. Neither did she make an
client's money, and her act of issuing a worthless check appearance during the scheduled mandatory conference.
constitute dishonesty, abuse of trust and confidence, and In its Resolution21 dated February 13, 2013, IBP found
betrayal of her client's interests. These acts undoubtedly Atty. Maravilla-Ona guilty of serious misconduct and for
speak of deceit Deceitful conduct involves moral turpitude violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code. The Court latter
and includes anything done contrary to justice, modesty adopted and approved the IBP's findings in its Resolution
or good morals. It is an act of baseness, vileness or dated September 15, 2014 and suspended Atty. Maravilla
depravity in the private and social duties which a person Ona from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
owes to his or her fellowmen or to society in general,
In yet another disbarment case against Atty. Maravilla-
Ona, docketed as A.C. No. 10944 and entitled Norma M. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eleonor A. Maravilla-
Gutierrez v. Atty. Eleanor Maravilla-Ona, the complainant Ona is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and violation of
therein alleged that she engaged the services of Atty. Canons 1, 16, and 18; and Rules 1.01, 16.01, 18.03, and
Maravilla-Ona and gave her the amount of P80,000 for the 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
filing of a case in court. However, Atty. Maravilla-Ona Accordingly, she is hereby DISBARRED from the practice
failed to file the case, prompting the complainant to of law and her name is ordered stricken off from the Roll
withdraw from the engagement and to demand the refund of Attorneys, effective immediately. The Court orders
of the amount she paid. Atty. Maravilla-Onreturned respondent to RESTITUTE complainant Bienvenida Flor
P15,000 and executed a promissory note to pay the Suarez the amount of fifty-eight thousand pesos
remaining P65,000. However, despite several demands, (P58,000) within thirty (30) days from receipt of this
Atty. Maravilla-Ona failed to refund the complainant's Decision. Otherwise, respondent may be held liable for
money. Thus, a complaint for disbarment was filed against contempt.
Atty. Maravilla-Ona for grave misconduct, gross
negligence and incompetence. But again, Atty. Maravilla- Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts of the
Ona failed to file her Answer and appear in the mandatory land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the
conference before the IBP. The IBP found that Atty. Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and
Maravilla-Ona violated Canon 16, Rule 16.03 of the guidance, and let it be entered in Atty. Eleonor A.
Code22 and recommended her suspension for a period of Maravilla-Ona's record in this Court.
five ( )years, considering her pr ious infractions. The
Court, however, reduced Atty. Maravilla-Ona's penalty to SO ORDERED. chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary

suspension from the practice of law for a period of three

(3) years, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will be dealt with more severely. She was
also ordered to return the complainant's money.

Clearly, Atty. Maravilla-Ona exhibits the habit of.violating

her oath as a lawyer and the Code, as well as defying the
processes of the IBP. The Court cannot allow her blatant
disregard of the Code and her sworn duty as a member of
the Bar to continue. She had been warned that a similar
violation will merit a more severe penalty, and yet, her
reprehensible conduct has, again, brought embarrassment
and dishonor to the legal profession.

In her previous disbarment case, We showed leniency by

reducing her penalty to suspension for a period of three
(3) years. We cannot similarly treat Atty. Maravilla-Ona
this time. It is clear that she did not learn any lesson from
her past experiences and since then has continued to
exhibit traits of incorrigibility. It is time to write finis to
Atty. Maravilla-Ona's professional legal career for the sake
of the public, the profession and the interest of justice.23 chan robles law

In Overgaard v. Valdez,24 the respondent was disbarred

for deserting his client after collecting the full amount of
his legal fees without attending to any of the cases for
which he was engaged. This Court ruled that respondent
committed manifestly deceitful and dishonest acts, which
violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 15; and Rule 16.01
of Canon 16 of the Code.

Similarly in Arellano University, Inc. v. Mijares III,25 the

cralawred

Court disbarred the· lawyer therein for misappropriating

the client's money intended for securing a certificate of
title on the latter's behalf. Finally, in CF Sharp Crew
Management Incorporated v. Atty. Torres,26 the Court
disbarred the respondent for failing to account for, and
misappropriating, the various amounts he received from
his client.

Considering all of the foregoing, We deem it fit to affirm

the imposition of the ultimate penalty of disbarment from
the practice of law upon Atty. Maravilla-Ona. Membership
in the legal profession is a privilege, and whenever it is
made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of
the trust and confidence of her clients and the public, it
becomes not only the right but also the duty of the Court
to withdraw the same.27 chanrobles law
3.CONTINUING REQUIREMENT FOR MEMBERSHIP IN 13, 2015 was sent to respondent on October 20, 2015,
during which the latter did not appear.13
THE BAR
The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation14 dated November 14,

2016, the IBP Investigating Commissioner (IC) found
respondent administratively liable, and accordingly,
A.C. No. 12156, June 20, 2018 recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for one (1) year and be ordered
PAULINO LIM, Complainant, v. ATTY. SOCRATES R. to return to complainant the amount of P75,000.00 with
RIVERA, Respondent. legal interest reckoned from July 19, 2014.15 The other
loans alleged by complainant were not duly proven. 16
DECISION
The IBP IC declared that respondent's act of issuing a
worthless check was a violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
of Professional Responsibility (CPR) which requires that "a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 dated deceitful conduct." Citing the case of Foronda v. Alvarez,
March 9, 2015 filed by Paulino Lim (complainant) against Jr.,17 the IBP IC held that the issuance of a check that was
respondent Atty. Socrates R. Rivera (respondent), praying later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed
that the latter be meted disciplinary sanctions for account indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and
defrauding the former by issuing a worthless check as confidence reposed on him and hence, constitutes a
guarantee for the payment of respondent's loan. ground for disciplinary action.18 The penalty of one (1)-
year suspension from the practice of law was based on the
The Facts case of Lao v. Medel,19 where the Court meted the same
penalty for gross misconduct committed by deliberately
failing to pay just debts and issuing worthless checks.20
Complainant alleged that he met respondent sometime in
June 2014 in the hallway of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City while accompanying his cousin who was then In a Resolution21 dated June 14, 2017, the IBP Board of
inquiring about the status of a case. The two (2) became Governors adopted the aforesaid report and
acquainted after striking a conversation with each other. recommendation.
The following month, or in July 2014, respondent
borrowed from complainant the amount of P75,000.00, The Issue Before the Court
which the former needed immediately.2 Complainant did
not think twice in lending money to respondent and
The essential issue in this case is whether or not
issuing in his favor BDO Check No. 03565553 dated July 3,
respondent should be held administratively liable for the
2014 for P75,000.00, especially since the latter issued a
issuance of a worthless check in violation of the CPR.
guarantee check (Union Bank Check No.
00034057804 dated July 19, 2014) to ensure payment of
the loan. Subsequently, respondent made several other The Court's Ruling
loans in the amounts of P150,000.00, P10,000.00, and
another P10,000.00, for which he no longer issued any After a judicious perusal of the records showing the
guarantee checks. Complainant claimed to have been existence of the loan obligation incurred by respondent as
taken by respondent's sweet talk and promises of evidenced by complainant's BDO Check No. 0356555
payment considering the millions he expects to receive as dated July 3, 2014, as well as Union Bank Check No.
contingent fee in one (1) of his cases.5 0003405780 dated July 19, 2014 issued by respondent to
guarantee the payment of said loan but which was
However, when complainant deposited Union Bank Check dishonored upon presentment for the reason "Account
No. 0003405780, it was dishonored for the reason Closed," the Court concurs with the findings and adopts
"Account Closed." Thereafter, respondent would not take the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors,
or return complainant's calls nor respond to the latter's except for the return to complainant of the amount of
text messages. He completely avoided P75,000.00 with legal interest.
complainant.6 Consequently, complainant's lawyer wrote a
demand letter7 dated October 15, 2014 for the payment of Time and again, the Court has imposed the penalty of
respondent's indebtedness in the aggregate amount of suspension or disbarment for any gross misconduct that a
P245,000.00, but to no avail. Thus, complainant was lawyer may have committed, whether it is in his
constrained to file an administrative case before the professional or in his private capacity. Good character is
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).8 an essential qualification for the admission to and
continued practice of law. Thus, any wrongdoing, whether
In an Order9 dated April 17, 2015, the IBP directed professional or non-professional, indicating unfitness for
respondent to submit his answer to the complaint within a the profession justifies disciplinary action,22 as in this
period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of said Order, case.
failing which the case shall be heard ex parte.10 However,
respondent filed no answer.11 Subsequently, a Notice of It is undisputed that respondent had obtained a loan from
Mandatory Conference/Hearing12 scheduled on November complainant for which he issued a post-dated check that
was eventually dishonored and had failed to settle his
obligation despite repeated demands. It has been and the law confer to him, for which he must suffer the
consistently held that "[the] deliberate failure to pay consequence.
just debts and the issuance of worthless
checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on
may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the
law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of surrounding facts.28 In the cases of Lao v.
justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are Medel,29Rangwani v. Dino,30 and Enriquez v. De
expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a Vera,31 the Court imposed the penalty of one (1)-year
high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair suspension from the practice of law for deliberate failure
dealing so that the peoples' faith and confidence in the to pay just debts and for the issuance of worthless checks.
judicial system is ensured. They must at all times In Sanchez v. Torres,32 the Court increased the penalty to
faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the two (2) years in light of the amount of the loan which was
courts and to their clients, which include prompt P2,200,000.00, and the fact that respondent therein had
payment of financial obligations. They must conduct repeatedly asked for extensions of time to file an answer
themselves in a manner that reflects the values and and a motion for reconsideration, which he nonetheless
norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of failed to submit, and had likewise failed to attend the
Professional Responsibility."23 Thus, the IBP IC correctly disciplinary hearings set by the IBP. Considering,
ruled that respondent's act of issuing a worthless check therefore, that the amount of the loan proven by
was a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which complainant herein is P75,000.00, the Court sustains the
explicitly states: recommended penalty of one (1)-year suspension from
the practice of law. With respect, however, to the return
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey of the amount of P75,000.00 which respondent received
the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal from complainant, the same cannot be sustained. It is
processes. settled that in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers,
the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, to be allowed to continue as a member of the
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Bar.33 In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,34 the Court held that its
"findings during administrative-disciplinary proceedings
have no bearing on the liabilities of the parties involved
In Enriquez v. De Vera,24 the Court categorically which are purely civil in nature – meaning, those liabilities
pronounced that a lawyer's act of issuing a worthless which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer's professional
check, punishable under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, engagement – as the same should be threshed out in a
constitutes serious misconduct penalized by suspension proper proceeding of such nature."35 Thus, the return of
from the practice of law for one (1) year, for which no the P75,000.00 clearly lies beyond the ambit of this
conviction of the criminal charge is even necessary. Batas administrative case.
Pambansa Blg. 22 was '"designed to prohibit and
altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious
practice of issuing checks with insufficient funds, or with WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Socrates R. Rivera is
no credit, because the practice is deemed a public found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code
nuisance, a crime against public order to be of Professional Responsibility, as well as the Lawyer's
abated."25 Being a lawyer, respondent was well aware of, Oath, and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
or was nonetheless presumed to know, the objectives and for one (1) year to commence immediately from the
coverage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Yet, he knowingly receipt of this Decision, with a WARNING that a
violated the law and thereby "exhibited his indifference repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a
towards the pernicious effect of his illegal act to public more severe penalty.
interest and public order."26
He is DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation to the
In addition, respondent's failure to answer the complaint Court that his suspension has started, copy furnished all
against him and his failure to appear at the scheduled courts and quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his
mandatory conference/hearing despite notice are evidence appearance as counsel.
of his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and
illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in violation Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to: the Office of
of Section 3, Rule 138, Rules of Court.27 Respondent the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's
should stand foremost in complying with the directives of personal record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar of the
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline not only because as Philippines for its information and guidance; and the Office
a lawyer, he is called upon to obey the legal orders of duly of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in
constituted authorities, as well as court orders and the country.
processes, but also because the case involved the very
foundation of his right to engage in the practice of law. SO ORDERED.
Therefore, his lack of concern or interest in the status or
outcome of his administrative case would show how much
less he would regard the interest of his clients.

Indisputably, respondent has fallen short of the exacting

standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal
profession. His transgressions showed him to be unfit for
the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license
 A.C. No. 10245, August 16, 2017 Elibena moreover claimed that respondent lawyer failed to
indicate his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
ELIBENA A. CABILES, Complainant, v. ATTY. LEANDRO compliance11 in the position paper and in the
S. CEDO, Respondent. memorandum of appeal that he prepared. Elibena pointed
to a certification12 issued on June 29, 2010 by the MCLE
Office that respondent lawyer had not at all complied with
DECISION the first, second, and third compliance periods13 of the
(MCLE) requirement.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Elibena also averred that in May 2009, she hired
Complainant Elibena Cabiles (Elibena) filed this respondent lawyer to file a criminal case for unjust
administrative complaint1 before the Integrated Bar of the vexation against Emelita Claudit; that as evidenced by a
Philippines (IBP) seeking the disbarment of Atty. Leandro May 5, 2009 handwritten receipt,14 she paid respondent
Cedo (respondent lawyer) for neglecting the two cases lawyer his acceptance fees, the expenses for the filing of
she referred to him to handle. the case, and the appearance fees totalling Php45,000.00;
and that in order to come up with the necessary amount,
The Facts she sold 'to respondent lawyer her 1994 Model Mitsubishi
Lancer worth Php85,000.00, this sale being covered by an
unnotarized Deed of Sale15 dated August 1, 2009.
According to Elibena, she engaged the services of
respondent lawyer to handle an illegal dismissal case, i.e.,
Elibena claimed that, despite payment of his professional
NLRC NCR Case No. 00-11-16153-08 entitled "Danilo
fees, respondent lawyer did not exert any effort to
Ligbos v. Platinum Autowork and/or Even Cabiles and Rico
seasonably file her Complaint for unjust vexation before
Guido," where therein respondents were Elibena's
the City Prosecutor's Office; that the Office of the City
business partners. Respondent lawyer was paid
Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City dismissed her Complaint for
Php5,500.002 for drafting therein respondents' position
unjust vexation on September 10, 2009 on the ground of
paper3 and Php2,000.004 for his every appearance in the
prescription; and that although she moved for
NLRC hearings.
reconsideration of the Order dismissing the case, her
motion for reconsideration was denied by the City
During the hearing set on March 26, 2009, only Danilo Prosecutor's Office in a resolution dated October 19,
Ligbos (Danilo), the complainant therein, showed up and 2009.16
submitted his Reply.5 On the other hand respondent
lawyer did not file a Reply for his clients,6 despite being
In his Answer,17 respondent lawyer argued that the March
paid his appearance fee earlier.7
26, 2009 hearing was set to provide the parties the
opportunity either to explore the possibility of an amicable
In a Decision8 dated March 31, 2009, the Labor Arbiter settlement, or give time for him (respondent lawyer) to
ruled for Danilo, and ordered the clients of respondent decide whether to file a responsive pleading, after which
lawyer to pay Danilo backwages, separation pay, and the case would be routinely submitted for resolution, with
13th month pay. or without the parties' further appearances. As regards
the cash vouchers, respondent lawyer opined that their
Worse still, on October 27, 2009, the NLRC likewise submission would only contradict their defense of lack of
dismissed the appeal of the clients of respondent lawyer employer-employee relationship. Respondent lawyer
for failure to post the required cash or surety bond, an likewise claimed that Elibena was only feigning ignorance
essential requisite in perfecting an appeal.9 of the cost of the appeal bond, and that in any event,
Elibena herself could have paid the appeal bond. With
regard to Elibena's allegation that she was virtually forced
According to Elibena, respondent lawyer misled them by
to sell her car to respondent lawyer to complete payment
claiming that it was Danilo who was absent during the
of the latter's professional fee, respondent lawyer claimed
said hearing on March 26, 2009; and that moreover,
that he had fully paid for the car.18
because of the failure to submit a Reply, they were
prevented from presenting the cash vouchers10 that would
refute Danilo's claim that he was a regular employee. Respondent lawyer did not refute Ebilena's claim that he
failed to indicate his MCLE compliance in the position
paper and in the memorandum of appeal.
With regard to the non-perfection of the appeal before the
NLRC, Elibena claimed that respondent lawyer instructed
them (his clients) to pick up the said Memorandum only The IBP's Report and Recommendation
on the last day to file the appeal, i.e., on May 28, 2009;
that the memorandum was ready for pick up only at In a May 18, 2011 Report and Recommendation,19 the
around 2:30 p.m. that day; that left to themselves, with Investigating Commissioner found respondent lawyer
no help or assistance from respondent lawyer, they guilty of having violated Canons 5, 17, and 18 of the Code
rushed to file their appeal with the NLRC in Quezon City of Professional Responsibility and recommended his
an hour later; that the NLRC Receiving Section informed suspension from the practice of law for two years. Aside
them that their appeal was incomplete, as it lacked the from respondent lawyer's failure to comply with the MCLE
mandatory cash/surety bond, a matter that respondent requirements, the Investigating Commissioner also found
lawyer himself did not care to attend to; and, him grossly negligent in representing his clients,
consequently, their appeal was dismissed for non- particularly (1) in failing to appear on the March 26, 2009
perfection. hearing in the NLRC, and file the necessary responsive
pleading; (2) in failing to advise and assist his clients who
had no knowledge of, or were not familiar with, the NLRC The circumstances of this case indicated that respondent
rules of procedure, in filing their appeal and; 3) in failing lawyer was guilty of gross negligence for failing to exert
to file seasonably the unjust vexation complaint before the his utmost best in prosecuting and in defending the
city prosecutor's office, in consequence of which it was interest of his client. Hence, he is guilty of the following:
overtaken by prescription.
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF
In its March 20, 2013 Resolution, the IBP Board of HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST
Governors adopted and approved the Investigating AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
Commissioner's Report and Recommendation, but
modified the recommended administrative sanction by CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
reducing the suspension to one year. COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

The Court's Ruling Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
We adopt the IBP's finding that respondent lawyer therewith shall render him liable.
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. We also
agree with the recommended penalty. Furthermore, respondent lawyer's act of receiving an
acceptance fee for legal services, only to subsequently fail
Violation of Canon 5 to render such service at the appropriate time, was a clear
violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Firstly, Bar Matter 850 mandates continuing legal Responsibility.24
education for IBP members as an additional requirement
to enable them to practice law. This is ''to ensure that Respondent lawyer did not diligently and fully attend to
throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and the cases that he accepted, although he had been fully
jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and compensated for them. First off, respondent lawyer never
enhance the standards of the practice of law."20 Non- successfully refuted Elibena's claim that he was paid in
compliance with the MCLE requirement subjects the advance his Php2,000.00 appearance fee on March 21,
lawyer to be listed as a delinquent IBP 2009 for the scheduled hearing of the labor case on March
member.21 In Arnado v. Adaza,22 we administratively 26, 2009, during which he was absent. Furthermore,
sanctioned therein respondent lawyer for his non- although respondent lawyer had already received the sum
compliance with four MCLE Compliance Periods. We of Php45,000.00 to file an unjust vexation case, he failed
stressed therein that in accordance with Section 12(d) of to promptly file the appropriate complaint therefor with
the MCLE Implementing Regulations,23 even if therein the City Prosecutor's Office, in consequence of which the
respondent attended an MCLE Program covered by the crime prescribed, resulting in the dismissal of the case.
Fourth Compliance Period, his attendance therein would
only cover his deficiency for the First Compliance Period, We have held that:
and he was still considered delinquent and had to make
up for the other compliance periods. Consequently, we
declared respondent lawyer therein a delinquent member Case law further illumines that a lawyer's duty of
of the IBP and suspended him from law practice for six competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing
months or until he had fully complied with all the MCLE the cases entrusted to the counsel's care or giving sound
requirements for all his non-compliant periods. legal advice, but also consists of properly representing the
client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled
hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required
In the present case, respondent lawyer failed to indicate pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable
in the pleadings filed in the said labor case the number dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for
and date of issue of his MCLE Certificate of Compliance for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so.
the Third Compliance Period, i.e., from April 15, 2007 to
April 14, 2010, considering that NLRC NCR Case No. 00-
11-16153-08 had been pending in 2009. In fact, upon Conversely, a lawyer's negligence in fulfilling his duties
checking with the MCLE Office, Elibena discovered that subjects him to disciplinary action. While such negligence
respondent lawyer had failed to comply with the three or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the
MCLE compliance periods. For this reason, there is no Court has consistently held that the lawyer's mere failure
doubt that respondent lawyer violated Canon 5, which to perform the obligations due his client is per se a
reads: violation.25

CANON 5 - A LAWYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL "[A] lawyer 'is expected to exert his best efforts and
DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICIPATE IN CONTINUING LEGAL [utmost] ability to [protect and defend] his client's cause,
EDUCATION PROGRAMS, SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his client likewise
HIGH STANDARDS IN LAW SCHOOLS AS WELL AS IN THE serves the ends of justice."'26 However, in the two cases
PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW STUDENTS AND ASSIST IN for which he was duly compensated, respondent lawyer
DISSEMINATING INFORMATION REGARDING THE LAW was grossly remiss in his duties as counsel. He exhibited
AND JURISPRUDENCE. lack of professionalism, even indifference, in the defense
and protection of Elibena's rights which resulted in her
losing the two cases.
Violation of Canons 17 and 18 and Rule 18.03

With regard to the labor case tor which he opted not to

file a Reply and refused to present the cash vouchers
which, according to Elibena, ought to have been submitted SO ORDERED.
to the NLRC, we hold that even granting that he had the
discretion being the handling lawyer to present what he
believed were available legal defenses for his client, and
conceding, too, that it was within his power to employ an
allowable legal strategy, what was deplorable was his way
of handling the appeal before the NLRC. Aside from
handing over or delivering the requisite pleading to his
clients almost at the end of the day, at the last day to file
the appeal before the NLRC, he never even bothered to
advise Elibena and the rest of his clients about the
requirement of the appeal bond. He should not expect
Elibena and her companions to be conversant with the
indispensable procedural requirements to perfect the
appeal before the NLRC. If the averments in his Answer
are any indication, respondent lawyer seemed to have
relied heavily on the NLRC's much vaunted 'leniency' in
gaining the successful prosecution of the appeal of his
clients in the labor case; no less censurable is his
propensity for passing the blame onto his clients for not
doing what he himself ought to have done. And, in the
criminal case, he should have known the basic rules
relative to the prescription of crimes that operate to
extinguish criminal liability. All these contretemps could
have been avoided had respondent lawyer displayed the
requisite zeal and diligence.

As mentioned earlier, the failure to comply with the MCLE

requirements warranted a six-month suspension in
the Adaza case. Respondent lawyer must likewise be
called to account for violating Canons 17, 18, and Rule
18.03. In one case involving violation of Canons 17 and
18 where a lawyer failed to file a petition for review with
the Court of Appeals, the lawyer was penalized with a six-
month suspension.27 In another case,28 involving
transgression of the same Canons, the guilty lawyer was
meted out the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law for a period of six months and admonished and
sternly warned that a commission of the same or similar
acts would be dealt with more severely.

"[T]he appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends

on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the
surrounding facts."29 Given herein respondent lawyer's
failure to maintain a high standard of legal proficiency
with his refusal to comply with the MCLE as well as his
lack of showing of his fealty to Elibena's interest in view of
his lackadaisical or indifferent approach in handling the
cases entrusted to him, we find it apt and commensurate
to the facts of the case to adopt the recommendation of
the IBP to suspend him from the practice of law for one
year.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Leandro S. Cedo is

hereby found GUILTY of violating Canons 5, 17, 18, and
Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year effective upon receipt of this
Decision, and warned that a repetition of the same or a
similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Cedo's

personal record as attorney-at-law. Further, let copies of
this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator,
which is directed to circulate said copies to all courts in
the country for their information and guidance.
4.APPEARANCE OF NON LAWYERS On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the
MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration seeking to
A.NEW LAW STUDENT PRACTICE reverse the February 1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule
138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, does not
have the effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule
138, for the authority to interpret the rule is the source
G.R. No. 154207 April 27, 2007 itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone.

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner, In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied
vs. the Motion for Reconsideration.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO
and HON. ZENAIDA LAGUILLES, Respondents. On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a
Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for
DECISION Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order against the private respondent and the public
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: respondent MeTC.

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to
65 of the Rules of Court, grounded on pure questions restrain public respondent MeTC Judge from
of law, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing proceeding with Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending
the Resolution dated May 3, 2002 promulgated by the the Certiorari proceedings, the RTC, in a Resolution
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City, dated May 3, 2002, resolved to deny the issuance of
in Civil Case No. 02-0137, which denied the issuance an injunctive writ on the ground that the crime of
of a writ of preliminary injunction against the Grave Threats, the subject of Criminal Case No. 00-
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 45, Pasay 1705, is one that can be prosecuted de oficio, there
City, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705;1 and the RTC’s being no claim for civil indemnity, and that therefore,
Order dated June 5, 2002 denying the Motion for the intervention of a private prosecutor is not legally
Reconsideration. No writ of preliminary injunction was tenable.
issued by this Court.
On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a
The antecedents: Motion for Reconsideration. The petitioner argues that
nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave
On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz Threats has no civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites
(petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which
Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case expressly provides for the appearance of a non-
No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats, where his father, lawyer before the inferior courts, as an agent or friend
Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness. of a party litigant, even without the supervision of a
member of the bar.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law
student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for
on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Reconsideration before the RTC, the petitioner filed a
Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc Second Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7,
in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr.2 that a non-lawyer 2002 with the MeTC seeking the reversal of the March
may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or 4, 2002 Denial Order of the said court, on the strength
friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore of Bar Matter No. 730, and a Motion to Hold In
avers that his appearance was with the prior Abeyance the Trial dated June 10, 2002 of Criminal
conformity of the public prosecutor and a written Case No. 00-1705 pending the outcome of the
authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his certiorari proceedings before the RTC.
agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.
On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as
private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC
governing limited law student practice in conjunction denied the petitioner’s Second Motion for
with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Reconsideration and his Motion to Hold in Abeyance
Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling the Trial on the ground that the RTC had already
of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the denied the Entry of Appearance of petitioner before
case for continuation of trial.3 the MeTC.
On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court in Cantimbuhan, the Court takes cognizance of
Court, the instant Petition and assigns the following herein petition.
errors:
The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law
I. student, may appear before an inferior court as an
agent or friend of a party litigant.
the respondent regional trial court abused its
discretion when it resolved to deny the prayer for the The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice
writ of injunction of the herein petitioner despite Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the Rules of
petitioner having established the necessity of granting Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from
the writ; entering his appearance in behalf of his father, the
private complainant in the criminal case without the
II. supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law
school.
THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION, TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE OF Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule,
THE LAW, WHEN IT RESOLVED TO DENY THE provides:
PRAYER FOR THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION AND THE SUBSEQUENT MOTION RULE 138-A
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
PETITIONER ON THE BASIS THAT [GRAVE]
THREATS HAS NO CIVIL ASPECT, FOR THE SAID Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law
BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE student who has successfully completed his 3rd year
LAW; of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and
is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal
III. education program approved by the Supreme Court,
may appear without compensation in any civil,
THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL criminal or administrative case before any trial court,
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients
DENIED THE MOTION TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.
TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED BY THE
RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS THE Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law
ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY student authorized by this rule, shall be under the
INJUNCTION and WHEN THE RESPONDENT direct supervision and control of a member of the
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS YET TO DECIDE ON Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by
THE MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI; the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs,
memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be
IV. signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of
the legal clinic.
THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY
IGNORING THE LAW WHEN THEY PATENTLY However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar
REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic] THE CLEAR Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified:
MANDATE OF THE LAPUT, CANTIMBUHAN AND
BULACAN CASES, AS WELL AS BAR MATTER NO. The rule, however, is different if the law student
730, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF appears before an inferior court, where the issues and
NON-LAWYERS BEFORE THE LOWER COURTS procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a
(MTC’S).4 law student may appear in his personal capacity
without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule
This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling 138 provides:
reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the issues
reviewed, may take cognizance of petitions filed Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the
directly before it.5 court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct
his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or
Considering that this case involves the interpretation, friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the
clarification, and implementation of Section 34, Rule aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may
138 of the Rules of Court, Bar Matter No. 730, conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
Circular No. 19 governing law student practice and attorney, and his appearance must be either personal
Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, and the ruling of the or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such
court as an agent or friend of a party without the conclusion had been intended by the RTC. In denying
supervision of a member of the bar.7 (Emphasis the issuance of the injunctive court, the RTC stated in
supplied) its Decision that there was no claim for civil liability by
the private complainant for damages, and that the
The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in records of the case do not provide for a claim for
Bar Matter No. 730 is subsequently changed to "In the indemnity; and that therefore, petitioner’s appearance
court of a municipality" as it now appears in Section as private prosecutor appears to be legally untenable.
34 of Rule 138, thus:8
Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every
SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable
Court of a municipality a party may conduct his except in instances when no actual damage results
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend from an offense, such as espionage, violation of
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and crime
an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct against popular representation.9 The basic rule
his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and applies in the instant case, such that when a criminal
his appearance must be either personal or by a duly action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied) civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the
which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner offended party waives the civil action, reserves the
filed his Entry of Appearance with the MeTC on right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
September 25, 2000. No real distinction exists for action prior to the criminal action.10
under Section 6, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, the
term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no
shall include Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of the civil
Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that
Circuit Trial Courts. the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats is deemed
instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the
There is really no problem as to the application of private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to
Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, prosecute the civil aspect.
the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend
of a party litigant, is expressly allowed, while the latter WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The
rule provides for conditions when a law student, not assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial
as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear Court, Branch 116, Pasay City
before the courts. are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to
Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in
Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a quo must have Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor
been confused by the fact that petitioner referred to under the direct control and supervision of the public
himself as a law student in his entry of appearance. prosecutor.
Rule 138-A should not have been used by the
courts a quo in denying permission to act as private No pronouncement as to costs.
prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason
that Rule 138-A is not the basis for the petitioner’s SO ORDERED.
appearance.

Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before

the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed,
irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As
succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of
Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as
an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the
supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.

Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously

held that, by its very nature, no civil liability may flow
from the crime of Grave Threats, and, for this reason,
the intervention of a private prosecutor is not possible.
B. NON LAWYERS IN COURT / AND OR ADMINISTRATIVE On the other hand, Atty. Alvarez claims the following:
TRIBUNALS
Atty. Alvarez is Legal Officer III of the National Center for
Mental Health under the Department of Health.11 He has
authority to engage in private practice of the
profession.12 He represented Teresita in several cases
C. PROCEEDINGS WHERE LAWYERS ARE PROHIBITED before the Office of the Ombudsman.13
FROM APPEARING AS COUNSELS
ChanRoblesVi rtua lawlib rary

Atty. Alvarez and Teresita had an arrangement that

Teresita would consult Atty. Alvarez whenever a case was
filed against her.14 Atty. Alvarez would then advise
A.C. No. 9018, April 20, 2016 Teresita to send him a copy of the complaint and its
attachments through courier.15 Afterwards, Atty. Alvarez
would evaluate the case and call Teresita to discuss his
TERESITA P. FAJARDO, Complainant, v. ATTY. fees in accepting and handling the case.16 A 50%
NICANOR C. ALVAREZ, Respondent. downpayment would be deposited to Atty. Alvarez's or his
secretary's bank account.17 The balance would then be
DECISION paid in installments.18 The success fee was voluntary on
Teresita's part.19
ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry

LEONEN, J.:
On July 10, 2009, Atty. Alvarez received a call from
Teresita regarding a meeting at Shangri-La Mall to discuss
This administrative case involves the determination of the decision and resolution she received from the Office of
whether a lawyer working in the Legal Section of the the Ombudsman dismissing her from service for
National Center for Mental Health under the Department dishonesty and indicting her for violation of Section 3 of
of Health is authorized to privately practice law, and Republic Act No. 3019, respectively.20 Atty. Alvarez
consequently, whether the amount charged by respondent accepted the case and asked for P500,000.00 as
for attorney's fees is reasonable under the principle acceptance fee.21 According to Atty. Alvarez, he arrived at
of quantum meruit. the amount after considering the difficulty of the case and
the workload that would be involved, which would include
Complainant Teresita P. Fajardo (Teresita) was the appeals before the Court of Appeals and this
Municipal Treasurer of San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija. She Court.22 However, the fee is exclusive of filing fees,
hired respondent Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez (Atty. Alvarez) appearance fees, and other miscellaneous fees such as
to defend her in criminal and administrative cases before costs for photocopying and mailing.23 ChanRoble sVirtualawl ibra ry

the Office of the Ombudsman.

Atty. Alvarez claimed that he prepared several pleadings
The parties have differing versions of the facts as in connection with Teresita's case:
summarized by the Investigating Commissioner of the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. Teresita's version of the facts is as follows: (1) motion for reconsideration filed
Around 2009, Teresita hired Atty. Alvarez to handle on July 23, 2009 in connection
several cases filed against her before the Office of the with the administrative case;
Ombudsman.1 Atty. Alvarez was then working in the Legal
Section of the National Center for Mental Health.2 He
asked for P1,400,000.00 as acceptance fee.3 However, (2) motion for reconsideration filed
Atty. Alvarez did not enter his appearance before the on July 23, 2009 in connection
Office of the Ombudsman nor sign any pleadings.4 ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

with the criminal case;

Atty. Alvarez assured Teresita that he had friends
connected with the Office of the Ombudsman who could (3) petition for injunction filed on
help with dismissing her case for a certain fee.5 Atty.
October 15, 2009 before the
Alvarez said that he needed to pay the amount of
P500,000.00 to his friends and acquaintances working at Regional Trial Court of Gapan
the Office of the Ombudsman to have the cases against City; and
Teresita dismissed.6ChanRob les Virtualawl ibra ry

However, just two (2) weeks after Teresita and Atty. (4) petition for preliminary injunction
Alvarez talked, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a with prayer for a temporary
resolution and decision recommending the filing of a
criminal complaint against Teresita, and her dismissal
restraining order filed before the
from service, respectively.7 ChanRoble s Vi rtualaw lib rary Court of Appeals on November
18, 2009, and the amended
Teresita then demanded that Atty. Alvarez return at least
a portion of the amount she gave.8 Atty. Alvarez promised petition on November 26, 2009.24
to return the amount to Teresita; however, he failed to
fulfill this promise.9 Teresita sent a demand letter to Atty.
Alvarez, which he failed to heed.10 Atty. Alvarez also said that he prepared several letters to
different government officials and agencies.25
ChanRoble sVirt ualawli bra ry

ChanRoblesVi rt ualawlib ra ry
Atty. Alvarez alleged that Teresita made staggered every now and then money for the satisfaction of the
payments for the amounts they agreed on.26 Teresita only allege[d] friend of the Respondent[.]
paid the balance of the agreed acceptance fee equivalent
to P450,000.00 on February 11, 2010.27 While Teresita Complainant is an ordinary Municipal Treasurer of a 4th or
paid P60,000.00 for the miscellaneous expenses, she did 5th class municipality and the amount of attorney's fees
not pay the expenses for other legal work performed and demanded by the Respondent is very much excessive. . . .
advanced by Atty. Alvarez.28 ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary The exorbitant amount that he demanded from
complainant is too much for a lowly local government
On the last day for filing of the petition for review of the employee. What the Respondent did is not only illegal,
Office of the Ombudsman's Decision, Teresita informed immoral and dishonest but also taking advantage of a
Atty. Alvarez that she was no longer interested in defenseless victim.
retaining Atty. Alvarez's services as she had hired Atty.
Tyrone Contado from Nueva Ecija, who was Atty. Alvarez's ....
co-counsel in the cases against Teresita.29 ChanRoblesVirtualawli bra ry

While a lawyer should charge only fair and reasonable

On June 1, 2011, Teresita filed before the Office of the Bar fees, no hard and fast rule may be set in the
Confidant a Verified Complaint praying for the disbarment determination of what a reasonable fee is, or what is not.
of Atty. Alvarez.30 This Court required Atty. Alvarez to file That must be established from the facts of each case[.]
his comment on the complaint within 10 days from
notice.31
ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary ....

On December 7, 2011, the case was referred to the The fees claimed and received by the Respondent for the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report, alleged cases he handled despite the fact that the records
and recommendation.32 ChanRoblesVi rt ualawlib ra ry and evidence does not show that he ever signed pleadings
filed, the amount of P700,000.00 is reasonable, thus,
In his Report and Recommendation33 dated November 12, fairness and equity dictate, he has to return the excess
2012, Investigating Commissioner Honesto A. Villamayor amount of P700,000.00 to the complainant[.]40 cralawre d

found Atty. Alvarez guilty of violating the Code of

In Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-778 dated June 21, 41
Professional Responsibility and recommended Atty.
2013, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Alvarez's suspension from the practice of law for one (1)
Governors adopted the findings and recommendations of
year.34 Atty. Alvarez was also ordered to return the
the Investigating Commissioner:
amount of P700,000.00 to Teresita with legal interest
chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

RESOLVED to ADOPT AND APPROVE, as it is hereby

from the time of demand until its full payment.35 The
unanimously ADOPTED AND APPROVED, the Report and
dispositive portion of the Investigating Commissioner's
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
Report and Recommendation reads:
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution
chanRoblesv irtual Lawlib rary

WHEREFORE, finding Respondent guilty of committing

as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully
unlawful, immoral and deceitful acts of the Canon of
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
Professional Responsibility, [it] is recommended that he
laws and rules and considering that complaint [sic] is
be suspended for one (1) year in the practice of law and
guilty of unlawful, immoral and deceitful acts, Atty.
he be ordered to return the amount of P700,000.00 to the
Nicanor C. Alvarez is hereby SUSPENDED from the
Complainant within two (2) months from receipt of this
practice of law for one (1) year with [a]
order with legal interest from the time of demand, until
Warning that repetition of the same acts shall be dealt
fully paid, with a warning that repetition of [a] similar
with more sever[ejly. Further, he is Ordered to Return the
offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.36
amount of P700,000.00 to complainant with legal interest
cra lawred

On the unauthorized practice of law, the Investigating from the time of demand.42 (Emphasis in the original) c ralawred

Commissioner found that while Atty. Alvarez claimed that

Atty. Alvarez moved for reconsideration of the
he was authorized by his superior to privately practice
Resolution,43 but the Motion was denied by the Board of
law, the pleadings he allegedly prepared and filed did not
Governors in Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2014-
bear his name and signature.37 Hence, the Investigating
28644 dated May 3, 2014. The Resolution reads:
Commissioner stated that:
cha nRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

RESOLVED to DENY Respondent's Motion for

chanRoblesvirtua lLawli bra ry

The time that Respondent spent in following up the case

Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to reverse
of Complainant in the Office of the Ombudsman is a time
the findings of the Commission and the resolution subject
lost to the government which could have been used in the
of the motion, it being a mere reiteration of the matters
service of many taxpayers[.]38
which had already been threshed out and taken into
cra lawred

In any case, granting that Atty. Alvarez was authorized by consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-778 dated
his superior to practice his profession, the Investigating June 21, 2013 is hereby AFFIRMED.45 (Emphasis in the
Commissioner stated that Atty. Alvarez was prohibited to original)
cralaw red

handle cases involving malversation of funds by

We resolve the following issues:
government officials such as a municipal treasurer.39 ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary

First, whether respondent Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez, as a

Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner found that the
lawyer working in the Legal Section of the National Center
attorney's fees Atty. Alvarez asked for were
for Mental Health under the Department of Health, is
unreasonable:
authorized to engage in the private practice of law; and
chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

From all indication, Complainant was forced to give to the

Respondent the amount of P1,400,000.00 because of the
Second, whether the amount charged by respondent for
words of Respondent that he has friends in the Office of
attorney's fees is reasonable under the principle
the Ombudsman who can help with a fee. That because of
of quantum meruit.
that guarantee, Complainant was obligated to shell out
The Investigating Commissioner did not make a ....
categorical declaration that respondent is guilty of
unauthorized practice of his profession. The Investigating The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting
Commissioner merely alluded to respondent's orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed
unauthorized practice of law. the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader
terms as advocacy, counseling and public service.
We find that respondent committed unauthorized practice "One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of
of his profession. employment in the profession. If what he does exacts
knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys
Respondent claims that he is authorized to practice his engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he
profession46 as shown in the letter dated August 1, 2001 follows some one or more lines of employment such as
of National Center for Mental Health Chief Bernardino A. this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning
Vicente.47 The letter reads: chanRob lesv irtua lLawl ibra ry of the statute." cralawred

TO : ATTY. NICANOR C. ALVAREZ

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court,
Legal Officer III
which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
This Center
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are
Subject : Authority to engage in private practice
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law
of profession
is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
This refers to your request for permission to engage in
knowledge or skill."
private practice of your profession.
....
In accordance with Administrative Order No. 21, s. 1999
of the Department of Health, which vested in the
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the
undersigned the authority to grant permission for the
term "practice of law," particularly the modern concept of
exercise of profession or engage in the practice of
law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal
profession, you are hereby authorized to teach or engage
construction intended by the framers of the Constitution,
in the practice of your profession provided it will not run in
Arty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-
conflict with the interest of the Center and the Philippine
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of
government as a whole. In the exigency of the service
industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
however, or when public interest so requires, this
legislator of both the rich and the poor—verily more than
authority may be revoked anytime.
satisfy the constitutional requirement—that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
Please be guided accordingly.
years.50 (Emphasis supplied) cralaw red

[sgd.] Cayetano was reiterated in Lingan v. Calubaquib:51

BERNARDINO A. VICENTE, MD, FFPPA, MHA, CESO IV Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of court, which
Medical Center Chief II48 (Emphasis supplied) c ralaw red requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience." It includes
Respondent practiced law even if he did not sign any
"[performing] acts which are characteristics of the [legal]
pleading. In the context of this case, his surreptitious
profession" or "[rendering any kind of] service [which]
actuations reveal illicit intent. Not only did he do
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
unauthorized practice, his acts also show badges of
offering to peddle influence in the Office of the
Work in government that requires the use of legal
Ombudsman.
knowledge is considered practice of law. In Cayetano v.
Monsod, this court cited the deliberations of the 1986
In Cayetano v. Monsod,49 the modern concept of the term
Constitutional Commission and agreed that work rendered
"practice of law" includes the more traditional concept of
by lawyers in the Commission on Audit requiring "[the use
litigation or appearance before courts:
of] legal knowledge or legal talent" is practice of
chanRob lesvi rtual Lawli bra ry

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases

law.52 (Citations omitted)
in court. A person is also considered to be in the practice
cralaw red

of law when he: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ib rary By preparing the pleadings of and giving legal advice to
"x x x for valuable consideration engages in the business complainant, respondent practiced law.
of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as
to their rights under the law, or appears in a Under Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, Public Officials and Employees, and Memorandum Circular
referee, board, body, committee, or commission No. 17, series of 1986,53 government officials or
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies employees are prohibited from engaging in private
and there, in such representative capacity performs any practice of their profession unless authorized by their
act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the department heads. More importantly, if authorized, the
rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one practice of profession must not conflict nor tend to conflict
who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business with the official functions of the government official or
of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or employee: chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court Republic Act No. 6713:
or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the
practice of law."cralawred Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition
to acts and omissions of public officials and employees
now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions failed to present any proof of that written permission.
of any public official and employee and are hereby Respondent cannot feign ignorance or good faith because
declared to be unlawful: respondent filed her petition for commission as a notary
public after Memorandum Circular No. 17 was issued in
.... 1986.57 ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

(b) Outside employment and other activities related In this case, respondent was given written permission by
thereto. - Public officials and employees during their the Head of the National Center for Mental Health, whose
incumbency shall not: authority was designated under Department of Health
Administrative Order No. 21, series of 1999.58 ChanRobles Vi rt ualawlib ra ry

....
However, by assisting and representing complainant in a
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession suit against the Ombudsman and against government in
unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, general, respondent put himself in a situation of conflict of
that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with interest.
their official functions[.]
Respondent's practice of profession was expressly and
.... impliedly conditioned on the requirement that his practice
will not be "in conflict with the interest of the Center and
Memorandum Circular No. 17: the Philippine government as a whole."59 ChanRoblesVi rtua lawlib rary

The authority to grant permission to any official or In Javellana v. Department of Interior and Local
employee shall be granted by the head of the ministry or Government,60 the petitioner was an incumbent City
agency in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Councilor or member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Revised Civil Service Rules, which provides: c hanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry Bago City. He was a lawyer by profession and had
"Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in continuously engaged in the practice of law without
any private business, vocation, or profession or be securing authority from the Regional Director of the
connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or Department of Local Government.61 In 1989, the
industrial undertaking without a written permission from petitioner acted as counsel for Antonio Javiero and
the head of Department; Provided, That this prohibition Rolando Catapang and filed a case for Illegal Dismissal
will be absolute in the case of those officers and and Reinstatement with Damages against Engr. Ernesto C.
employees whose duties and responsibilities require that Divinagracia, City Engineer of Bago City.62 ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry

their entire time be at the disposal of the

Government: Provided, further, That if an employee is Engr. Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed an administrative case
granted permission to engage in outside activities, the before the Department of Local Government for violation
time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by of Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713 and relevant
the chief of the agency to the end that it will not impair in Department of Local Government memorandum circulars
any way the efficiency of the other officer or on unauthorized practice of profession, as well as for
employee: And provided, finally, That no permission is oppression, misconduct, and abuse of authority.63 While
necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer the case was pending before Department of Local
or employee, which do not involve any real or apparent Government, the petitioner was able to secure a written
conflict between his private interests and public duties, or authority to practice his profession from the Secretary of
in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, Interior and Local Government, "provided that such
and he shall not take part in the management of the practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his official
enterprise or become an officer or member of the board of functions."64 ChanRoblesVi rtua lawlib rary

directors",cralaw red

This Court in Javellana observed that the petitioner

subject to any additional conditions which the head of the
practiced his profession in conflict with his functions as
office deems necessary in each particular case in the
City Councilor and against the interests of
interest of the service, as expressed in the various
government:
issuances of the Civil Service Commission.
chanRob lesvi rtual Lawl ibra ry

In the first place, complaints against public officers and

cralawred

In Abella v. Cruzabra,54 the respondent was a Deputy employees relating or incidental to the performance of
Register of Deeds of General Santos City. While serving as their duties are necessarily impressed with public interest
an incumbent government employee, the respondent for by express constitutional mandate, a public office is a
"filed a petition for commission as a notary public and was public trust. The complaint for illegal dismissal filed by
commissioned . . . without obtaining prior authority from Javiero and Catapang against City Engineer Divinagracia is
the Secretary of the Department of Justice."55 According in effect a complaint against the City Government of Bago
to the complainant, the respondent had notarized around City, their real employer, of which petitioner Javellana is a
3,000 documents.56 This Court found the respondent councilman. Hence, judgment against City Engineer
guilty of engaging in notarial practice without written Divinagracia would actually be a judgment against the
authority from the Secretary of Justice. Thus: City Government. By serving as counsel for the
complaining employees and assisting them to prosecute
It is clear that when respondent filed her petition for their claims against City Engineer Divinagracia, the
commission as a notary public, she did not obtain a petitioner violated Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 (in
written permission from the Secretary of the relation to Section 7[b-2] of R[epublic] A[ct] [No.] 6713)
D[epartment] [of] J[ustice]. Respondent's superior, the prohibiting a government official from engaging in the
Register of Deeds, cannot issue any authorization because private practice of his profession, if such practice would
he is not the head of the Department. And even assuming represent interests adverse to the government.
that the Register of Deeds authorized her, respondent
Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local complainant miserably failed to comply with the burden of
Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular proof required of her. A mere charge or allegation of
No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not
Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the statute synonymous with guilt.74 (Emphasis in the original,
nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme Court's power citations omitted) cra lawred

and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The

Moreover, lawyers should not be hastily disciplined or
Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular
penalized unless it is shown that they committed a
No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public
transgression of their oath or their duties, which reflects
officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the
on their fitness to enjoy continued status as a member of
discharge of their public duties and the private practice of
the bar:
their profession, in those instances where the law allows
chanRoblesv irtual Lawlib rary

The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be

it.65
exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
cra lawred

There is basic conflict of interest here. Respondent is a principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty
public officer, an employee of government. The Office of reasons and only on clear cases of misconduct which
the Ombudsman is part of government. By appearing seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer
against the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent is going as an officer of the court and member of the Bar. Only
against the same employer he swore to serve. those acts which cause loss of moral character should
merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts which
In addition, the government has a serious interest in the neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer
prosecution of erring employees and their corrupt acts. should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are of
Under the Constitution, "[p]ublic office is a public such nature and to such extent as to clearly show the
trust."66 The Office of the Ombudsman, as "protectors of lawyer's unfltness to continue in the practice of law. The
the [P]eople,"67 is mandated to "investigate and prosecute dubious character of the act charged as well as the
. . . any act or omission of any public officer or employee, motivation which induced the lawyer to commit it must be
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be clearly demonstrated before suspension or disbarment is
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient."68 ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary meted out. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances
that attended the commission of the offense should also
Thus, a conflict of interest exists when an incumbent be considered.75 cralaw red

government employee represents another government

Likewise, we find that respondent violated the Lawyer's
employee or public officer in a case pending before the
Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility when he
Office of the Ombudsman. The incumbent officer
communicated to or, at the very least, made it appear to
ultimately goes against government's mandate under the
complainant that he knew people from the Office of the
Constitution to prosecute public officers or employees who
Ombudsman who could help them get a favorable decision
have committed acts or omissions that appear to be
in complainant's case.
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.69 Furthermore, this
is consistent with the constitutional directive that "[p]ublic
Lawyers are mandated to uphold, at all times, integrity
officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable
and dignity in the practice of their
to the [P]eople, serve them with utmost responsibility,
profession.76 Respondent violated the oath he took when
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and
he proposed to gain a favorable outcome for
justice, and lead modest lives."70
complainant's case by resorting to his influence among
ChanRoblesVirtualawli bra ry

staff in the Office where the case was pending.77

The objective in disciplinary cases is not to punish the
ChanRoblesVirt ualawli bra ry

erring officer or employee but to continue to uplift the

Thus, respondent violated the Code of Professional
People's trust in government and to ensure excellent
Responsibility. Canon 1, Rules 1.01, and 1.0278 prohibit
public service:
lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or
cha nRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

[W]hen an officer or employee is disciplined, the object

deceitful conduct.79 Respondent's act of ensuring that the
sought is not the punishment of that officer or employee,
case will be dismissed because of his personal
but the improvement of the public service and the
relationships with officers or employees in the Office of
preservation of the public's faith and confidence in the
the Ombudsman is unlawful and dishonest. Canon 780 of
government. . . . These constitutionally-enshrined
the Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to
principles, oft-repeated in our case law, are not mere
always "uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
rhetorical flourishes or idealistic sentiments. They should
profession."
be taken as working standards by all in the public
service.71
In relation, Canon 1381 mandates that lawyers "shall rely
c ralawre d

Having determined that respondent illicitly practiced law, upon the merits of his [or her] cause and refrain from any
we find that there is now no need to determine whether impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the
the fees he charged were reasonable. appearance of influencing the court."

In disbarment or disciplinary cases pending before this A lawyer that approaches a judge to try to gain influence
Court, the complainant must prove his or her allegations and receive a favorable outcome for his or her client
through substantial evidence.72 In Advincula v. violates Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Macabata,73 this Court dismissed a complaint for Responsibility.82 This act of influence peddling is highly
disbarment due to the lack of evidence in proving the immoral and has no place in the legal profession: c hanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

complainant's allegations: chanRoblesv irt ual Lawl ibra ry The highly immoral implication of a lawyer approaching a
As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies on the judge—or a judge evincing a willingness—to discuss, in
party who makes the allegations—ei incumbit probation, private, a matter related to a case pending in that judge's
qui decit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum sala cannot be over-emphasized. The fact that Atty.
negantis probation nulla sit. In the case at bar, Singson did talk on different occasions to Judge Reyes,
initially through a mutual friend, Atty. Sevilla, leads us to judicial system and the institutions composing it, and to
conclude that Atty. Singson was indeed trying to influence ensure that these are not compromised by unscrupulous
the judge to rule in his client's favor. This conduct is not or misguided members of the Bar.87 (Emphasis supplied) cralaw red

acceptable in the legal profession.83

In the interest of ridding itself of corrupt personnel who
cralaw red

In Jimenez v. Verano, Jr.,84 we disciplined the respondent encourage influence peddling, and in the interest of
for preparing a release order for his clients using the maintaining the high ethical standards of employees in the
letterhead of the Department of Justice and the stationery judiciary, this Court did not hesitate in dismissing its own
of the Secretary: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry employee from government service when she peddled
The way respondent conducted himself manifested a clear influence in the Court of Appeals:88
intent to gain special treatment and consideration from a What brings our judicial system into disrepute are often
government agency. This is precisely the type of improper the actuations of a few erring court personnel peddling
behavior sought to be regulated by the codified norms for influence to party-litigants, creating the impression that
the bar. Respondent is duty-bound to actively avoid any decisions can be bought and sold, ultimately resulting in
act that tends to influence, or may be seen to influence, the disillusionment of the public. This Court has never
the outcome of an ongoing case, lest the people's faith in wavered in its vigilance in eradicating the so-called "bad
the judicial process is diluted. eggs" in the judiciary. And whenever warranted by the
gravity of the offense, the supreme penalty of dismissal in
The primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients but to an administrative case is meted to erring personnel.89 c ralawred

the administration of justice. To that end, their clients'

The Investigating Commissioner found that complainant
success is wholly subordinate. The conduct of a member
was "forced to give . . . Respondent the amount of
of the bar ought to and must always be scrupulously
P1,400,000.00 because of the words of Respondent that
observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not
he ha[d] friends in the Office of the Ombudsman who
honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the
c[ould] help with a fee."90 It is because of respondent's
lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his client's
assurances to complainant that she sent him money over
cause, is condemnable and unethical.
the course of several months.91 These assurances are
seen from the text messages that respondent sent
....
complainant: chanRoblesvi rt ualLaw lib rary

FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>

Zeal and persistence in advancing a client's cause must
always be within the bounds of the law. A self-respecting
SUBJECT:
independence in the exercise of the profession is expected
if an attorney is to remain a member of the bar. In the
Cnbi ko dun sa kontak dati na magbibigay tayo na pera sa
present case, we find that respondent fell short of these
allowance lang muna later na ang bayad pag labas ng
exacting standards. Given the import of the case, a
reso at kaliwaan pero sbi nya mas maganda kung
warning is a mere slap on the wrist that would not serve
isasabay na ang pera pagbgay ng letter mo sa omb..
as commensurate penalty for the offense.85
Parang dun tayo nagkamali pero ang solusyon ay sana
cralaw red

Similar to the present case, in Bueno v. Rañeses,86 we ibalik nila ang pera . . in d meantime hindi dapat apektado
disbarred a lawyer who solicited bribe money from his ang kaso at kailangan an Appeal sa CA at may deadline
client in violation of Canon 13 of the Code of Professional yun
Responsibility:c hanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

Rather than merely suspend Atty. Rañeses as had been DATE: 31-05-2010
done in Bildner, the Court believes that Atty. Rañeses
merits the ultimate administrative penalty of disbarment TIME: 5:24 pm
because of the multi-layered impact and implications of
what he did; by his acts he proved himself to be what a TYPE: Text Message
lawyer should not be, in a lawyer's relations to the client,
to the court and to the Integrated Bar. ....

First, he extracted money from his client for a purpose FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
that is both false and fraudulent. It is false because no
bribery apparently took place as Atty. Rañeses in fact lost SUBJECT:
the case. It is fraudulent because the professed purpose
of the exaction was the crime of bribery. Beyond these, he Gud pm pnro, naLBC n b ang Reso? Kung Jan un pnrmahn
maligned the judge and the Judiciary by giving the ...
impression that court cases are won, not on the merits,
but through deceitful means—a decidedly black mark DATE: 21-05-2010
against the Judiciary. Last but not the least, Atty. Rañeses
grossly disrespected the IBP by his cavalier attitude TIME: 5:13 pm
towards its disciplinary proceedings.
TYPE: Text Message
From these perspectives, Atty. Rañeses wronged his
client, the judge allegedly on the "take," the Judiciary as ....
an institution, and the IBP of which he is a member. The
Court cannot and should not allow offenses such as these FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
to pass unredressed. Let this be a signal to one and all—to
all lawyers, their clients and the general public—that the SUBJECT:
Court will not hesitate to act decisively and with no
quarters given to defend the interest of the public, of our Pnro sbi ng Dep Omb la png cnabi sa knya ng Omb. Ang
CA Reso pnaiwan n Orly @ studyohn nya (txt kontal)
DATE: 30-03-2010
DATE: 15-04-2010
TIME: 5:00 pm
TIME: 6:07 pm
TYPE: Text Message
TYPE: Text Message
....
....
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
SUBJECT:
SUBJECT:
Gud pm pnro. Ang Dep. Omb. My closd dor mtng pro
Yung blessing pala ni gutierez ang hnhntay ng overall dep pnkta s knya ang note q at sabi rw bumalik aq aftr Holy
omb si orly at dun din siya subok kuha letter pero wk. C Orly nman ay ngsabi n es2dyuhn p rw nya.
nasbhan na si gutierez ng dep omb for Luzon sbi ko
pwwde b nila gawin total alam na ni gutierez. . . Maya DATE: 30-03-2010
tawag ko sayo update
TIME: 4:52 pm
DATE: 15-04-2010
TYPE: Text Message
TIME: 12:44 pm
....
TYPE: Text Message
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
....
SUBJECT:
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
Binigay ko na pera kahapon at kinausap ko para sa letter
SUBJECT: magkikita pa kami marnaya las 2 at kukunin nya copy
letter natin kay sales at CA reso
Gud mrng Tess hindi na svmagot kahapon tnxt ko pero
minsan hndi tlga sumasagot yun nag ttxt lang pagkatapos DATE: 15-04-2010
kaya lang d mo pala naiintindihan ang txt nya bisaya
"istudyahun" ibig sabihn kausapin pa so nasbi na nya sa TIME: 12:32 pm
omb yung letter at istudzahan pa
TYPE: Text Message
DATE: 31-03-2010
....
TIME: 8:25 am
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
TYPE: Text Message
SUBJECT:
....
Tess ndpst mo na? Kakausapin ko kasi na qc na lang kami
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224> kita at malapit ako dun maya at hindi na sa crsng. Tnx

SUBJECT: DATE: 14-04-2010

Ok panero update ko na lang client pero nag txt tlga TIME: 1:29 pm
kailangan daw nya letter habang wala pa omb reso., Txt
mo lang ko panero, have a nice holidays., (sagot ko yan TYPE: Text Message
tess)
....
DATE: 03-03-2010
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
TIME: 5:03 pm
SUBJECT:
TYPE: Text Message
Gud pm pnro. Ok ba ang 15k rep maya 6pm? Thnx (txt ng
.... kontak tess kausapin ko mbuti sa letter)

FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224> DATE: 14-04-2010

SUBJECT: TIME: 10:25 am

Sa dep omb for Luzon na nya follow up ang MR at saka TYPE: Text Message
overall dep omb si orly dun nya kukunin letter
....
....
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
SUBJECT:
SUBJECT:
Pnro ung rep alo n bngay mo 1st Mar 24 ay ok Ing pra s 2
falo-ups q Mar 25 @ Mar 30. As usual, magkita tau Apr 14 Gud pm uli pnro. Kung subukan q n lkrn ky Orly ung cnabi
@ kunin q 20th para sa falo-up Apr 15 thnx mong letr adrsd 2 DOF Sec @ synd n Orly ang letr,
pktanong s rspndnt kung ok b s knya nab yarn nya aq ng
DATE: 08-04-2010 Atty's fee n 75thou upfront @ another 75thou upon
receipt of a DOF ordr holdng n abyans implmntation of hr
TIME: 10:58 am dsmsal due 2 Orly's letr? thnx

TYPE: Text Message DATE: 11-03-2010

.... TIME: 7:03 pm

FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224> TYPE: Text Message92 cralawred

In response to his alleged text messages, respondent

SUBJECT:
claims that complainant must have confused him with her
other contacts.93 Respondent found it "mesmerizing" that
Ok panero kailangan malinaw din ang presentation lp sa
complainant was able to save all those alleged text
client panero at ang impression nya yun na ang hningi
messages from two (2) years ago.94 Moreover, assuming
natin... so april 15 panero an balik mo sa MR at yung
these messages were "true, still they [were] not legally
letter form omb to dof bhala ka na sa diskarte panero pag
admissible as they [were] covered by the lawyer-client
nakakuha tayo nakahanda na 150k dun
privileged communication as those supposed texts '[had
been] made for the purpose and in the course of
DATE: 08-04-2010
employment, [were] regarded as privileged and the rule
of exclusion [was] strictly enforced.'"95
TIME: 10:56 am
ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry

In cases involving influence peddling or bribery, "[t]he

TYPE: Text Message
transaction is always done in secret and often only
between the two parties concerned."96 Nevertheless, as
....
found by the Investigating Commissioner and as shown by
the records, we rule that there is enough proof to hold
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
respondent guilty of influence peddling.
SUBJECT:
We agree with the penalty recommended by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors. We
Pnero dapat maalala mo n ung purpose ng 400 hindi
th
find respondent's acts of influence peddling, coupled with
directly delivery ng Reso granting d MR pro ung delivery
unauthorized practice of law, merit the penalty of
by the Dep Omb ng letr of appeal 2 d Omb at pgpaliwang
suspension of one (1) year from the practice of law. To be
nya sa Omb. Re sa hnhngi ng rspondnt n modfcation ng
so bold as to peddle influence before the very institution
Dcsion. Nung 1st mtng ntn Mar 24, ngin4m q sau n ngawa
that is tasked to prosecute corruption speaks much about
n i2 ng Dep Omb pro kausapn p ng Omb c Orly. Itong huli
respondent's character and his attitude towards the courts
ang nabtn p, pro yon ay dscrtion n ng Omb@ wing control
and the bar.
d2 and Dep. Omb.
Lawyers who offer no skill other than their acquaintances
DATE: 08-04-2010
or relationships with regulators, investigators, judges, or
Justices pervert the system, weaken the rule of law, and
TIME: 10:55 am
debase themselves even as they claim to be members of a
noble profession. Practicing law should not degenerate to
TYPE: Text Message
one's ability to have illicit access. Rather, it should be
about making an honest appraisal of the client's situation
....
as seen through the evidence fairly and fully gathered. It
should be about making a discerning and diligent reading
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
of the applicable law. It is foremost about attaining justice
in a fair manner. Law exists to temper, with its own
SUBJECT:
power, illicit power and unfair advantage. It should not be
conceded as a tool only for those who cheat by unduly
Tess gud mrng, wag mo kalimutan mgdpst 25k today 6pm
influencing people or public officials.
mtng naming omb tnx.
It is time that we unequivocally underscore that to even
DATE: 24-03-2010
imply to a client that a lawyer knows who will make a
decision is an act worthy of the utmost condemnation. If
TIME: 10:23 am
we are to preserve the nobility of this profession, its
members must live within its ethical parameters. There is
TYPE: Text Message
never an excuse for influence peddling.
While this Court is not a collection agency for faltering
debtors,97 this Court has ordered restitution of amounts to
complainants due to the erroneous actions of
lawyers.98 Respondent is, therefore, required to return to
complainant the amount of P500,000.00—the amount that
respondent allegedly gave his friends connected with the
Office of the Ombudsman.

WHEREFORE, Respondent Arty. Nicanor C. Alvarez is

guilty of violating the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees, the Lawyer's
Oath, and the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year
with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely. Respondent
is ORDERED to return the amount of P500,000.00 with
legal interest to complainant Teresita P. Fajardo.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the

Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent's personal
record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
5. PROHIBITED PRACTICE OF NON LAWYERS AND purchased by his son from Lilia. Atty. Arrojado
APPEARANCE W/OUT AUTHORITY maintained that he did not violate Article 1491 as he
had absolutely no interest in the property purchased
by his son; and that the proscription in the said article
did not extend to the relatives of the judicial officers
6. PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW; mentioned therein. He postulated that, when the sale
PROHIBITIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS took place, Julius was already of legal age and
discretion, as well as a registered nurse and an
established businessman; and that while it was
through him (respondent lawyer) that Lilia and Julius
A.C. No. 8502 met, he did not at all facilitate the transaction.
Respondent lawyer also pointed out that complainant
failed to cite a specific provision or canon in the Code
CHRISTOPHER R. SANTOS, Complainant
of Professional Responsibility which he had allegedly
vs.
transgressed or violated.
ATTY. JOSEPH A. ARROJADO, Respondent
Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar
DECISION
of the Philippines
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
In his Report and Recommendation,4 Investigating
Commissioner Winston A. Abuyuan of the Integrated
Where a lawyer's integrity is questioned through a Bar of the Philippines - Commission on Bar Discipline,
disbarment complaint, this Court, as the ultimate (IBP-CBD), recommended the exoneration of Atty.
arbiter of such disbarment proceedings, is duty-bound Arrojado.
to ascertain the veracity of the charges involved
therein. But, when the charges lack merit, the Court
In recommending the dismissal of the administrative
will not hesitate to dismiss the case.
case against respondent lawyer, the Investigating
Commissioner opined that:
In an Affidavit1 dated December 7, 2009, complainant
Christopher R. Santos (Complainant Santos) sought
Undeniably, [Julius] is the son of [Atty. Arrojado],
the disbarment of respondent Atty. Joseph A.
counsel of the owners of the parcel of land which was
Arrojado (Atty. Arrojado) for violation of Article 1491 of
leased by [Santos]. The subject property was
the Civil Code, by acquiring an interest in the land
acquired by (Julius] while the unlawful detainer case
involved in a litigation in which he had taken part by
was still pending before the Supreme Court.
reason of the exercise of his profession
In an unlawful detainer case, the issue to be resolved
Complainant Santos alleged that he was the
is possession and not ownership of the property in
defendant in the unlawful detainer case filed by Lilia
question. This is very clear. There is no showing that
Rodriguez (Lilia) wherein the respondent lawyer, Atty.
[Santos] is even claiming ownership of the property in
Arrojado, was the counsel for Lilia. The case
question. In fact, it appears that the issues that remain
eventually reached the Supreme Court which
to be resolved are [Santos'] obligation to pay the
resolved2 the same in favor of Atty. Arrojado's client.
rentals due (as lessee) to the owner of the property.
Complainant, however, claimed that on August 7,
Did [Atty. Arrojado] take advantage of his fiduciary
2009, while the case was pending before the
relationship with his clients when his son bought the
Supreme Court, Lilia sold one of the properties in litis
property in question? We rule in the negative.
pendentia to Atty. Arrojado's son, Julius P. Arrojado
(Julius) and that Atty. Arrojado even signed as a
witness of that sale. Believing that Atty. Arrojado There is no evidence to show that [Atty. Arrojado] had
committed malpractice when he acquired, through his used his son as a conduit to gain the property in
son Julius, an interest in the property subject of the question considering that (Julius] is a personality
unlawful detainer case in violation of Article 1491 of separate and distinct from his father, herein
the Civil Code, complainant instituted the instant respondent. He is quite capable of acquiring property
complaint. on his own. x x x. Moreover, a scrutiny of
complainant's arguments would reveal that he himself
is even unsure if respondent had indeed taken
In his Verified Comment,3 Atty. Arrojado admitted: (1)
advantage of his fiduciary relationship with his client,
that Lilia was a client of the law firm wherein he was a
as he safely uses the words 'it looks like' or 'we
senior partner; (2) that Julius was his son; and (3) that
believe'. There is no established jurisprudence to the
one of the subject properties in the ejectment suit was
effect that the prohibition applies to immediate family question, cannot acquire the property subject of
members. In fact, Article 1491(5) is quite clear and litigation, either personally or through his son, without
explicit, stating in unequivocal terms that the violating the Civil Code and his ethical duties.
prohibition solely applies to lawyers, with respect to
the property and rights to the object in litigation. There The Court does not agree.
is not even the slightest inkling that the prohibition
was qualified to extend to any family member. For reference, Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code is
reproduced below:
xxxx
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by
There is even no proof presented to show that [Atty. purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in
Arrojado] had used his fiduciary relationship with his person or through the mediation of another.
client in order to obtain the property in question. What
merely changed was the ownership of the property, xxxx
and the lease of [Santos] was not in any [manner]
affected. In fact, records would reveal that [Julius] was
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of
even thinking of allowing [Santos] to continue leasing
superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
the property in question but the same was rejected by
employees connected with the administration of
the latter. As can be seen, no rights of (Santos] were
justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied
prejudiced by this sale.
upon on execution before the court within whose
jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective
xxxx functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring
by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with
Considering that there is no proof presented by respect to the property and rights which may be the
[santos] to substantiate any of his allegations, we object of any litigation in which they may take part by
have no other option but to dismiss the charges.5 virtue of their profession.

The Board of Governors (BOG) of the IBP, in In Pena v. Delos Santos, 8 we held that:
Resolution No. XX- 2012-359 dated July 21, 2012,
adopted the findings of the Investigating The rationale advanced for the prohibition in Article
Commissioner and his recommendation to dismiss the 1491(5) is that public policy disallows the transactions
complaint for lack of merit.6 in view of the fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the
relation of trust and confidence and the peculiar
Similarly, in Resolution7 No. XX-2013-306 dated control exercised by these persons. It is founded on
March 21, 2013, the IBP-BOG denied complainant's public policy because, by virtue of his office, an
motion for reconsideration. attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity
and ignorance of his client and unduly enrich himself
Hence, the case in now before us for final action at the expense of his client. x x x
pursuant to Section 12(c), Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court. Undeniably, Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code prohibits
the purchase by lawyers of any interest in the subject
Issue matter of the litigation in which they participated by
reason of their profession. Here, however, respondent
Whether or not the prohibition in Article 1491(5) of the lawyer was not the purchaser or buyer of the property
Civil Code against justices, judges, prosecuting or rights in litigation. For, in point of fact, it was his son
attorneys, clerks of court, and other officers and Julius, and not respondent lawyer, who purchased the
employees connected with the administration of subject property.
justice, as well as lawyers, from purchasing property
and rights which may be the object of any litigation in Were we to include within the purview of the law the
which they may take part by virtue of their profession, members of the immediate family or relatives of the
extends to their respective immediate families or lawyer laboring under disqualification, we would in
relatives. effect be amending the law. We apply to this case the
old and familiar Latin maxim expressio unius est
Our Ruling exclusio alterius, which means that the express
mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence
It is complainant's contention that respondent lawyer, excludes all others. Stated otherwise, "where the
as counsel of record in the ejectment case in terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may
not, by interpretation or construction, be stretched or
extended to other matters."9

As worded, Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code covers

only (1) justices;

(2) judges; (3) prosecuting attorneys; (4) clerks of

court; (5) other officers and employees connected
with the administration of justice; and (6)
lawyers. The enumeration cannot be stretched or
1âw phi 1

extended to include relatives of the lawyer - in this

case, Julius, son of respondent lawyer.

Concededly, Article 1491 provides that "[t]he following

persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public
or judicial auction, either in person or through the
mediation of another xx x." However, perusal of the
records would show that complainant failed to adduce
any shred of evidence that Julius acted or mediated
on behalf of respondent lawyer, or that respondent
lawyer was the ultimate beneficiary of the sale
transaction. The mere fact that it was Julius, son of
respondent lawyer, who purchased the property, will
not support the allegation that respondent lawyer
violated Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code. As aptly
noted by the Investigating Commissioner, "[t]here is
no evidence to show that respondent had used his
son as a conduit to gain the property in question xx
x." 10

In addition, it must be stressed that the "prohibition

which rests on considerations of public policy and
interests is intended to curtail any undue influence of
the lawyer upon his client on account of his fiduciary
and confidential relationship with him." 11 Again, we
adopt the findings of the Investigating Commissioner
that "a scrutiny of complainant's arguments would
reveal that he himself [was] even unsure if respondent
had indeed taken advantage of his fiduciary
relationship with his client, as he safely uses the
words "it looks like" or "we believe". 12 Moreover, the
Investigating Commissioner aptly observed that there
was no "slightest proof showing that [Julius] was used
by respondent to acquire the property of his clients.
Affidavits executed by the owners, as well as [Julius]
himself showed that respondent did not even actively
participate in the negotiations concerning the
property." 13 At most, although respondent lawyer's
role or participation in the sale in question, if any,
might ruffle very sensitive scruples, it is not,
however, per se prohibited or forbidden by said Article
1491.

WHEREFORE, the present administrative case

is DISMISSED for lack of me

SO ORDERED.
 [A.C. No. 6273 : March 15, 2010] X X X PROMOTED OR SUED A GROUNDLESS, FALSE OR
UNLAWFUL SUIT, AND GAVE AID AND CONSENT TO THE
ATTY. ILUMINADA M. VAFLOR-FABROA, SAME[11]
COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. OSCAR PAGUINTO,
RESPONDENT. X X X DISOBEYED LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE[D]
DISRESPECT FOR LAW AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION[12]
DECISION
X X X DID NOT CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY,
CARPIO MORALES, J.: FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL
COLLEAGUE AND ENGAGED IN HARASSING TACTICS
AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL[13]
An Information for Estafa[1] was filed on June 21, 2001
against Atty. Iluminada M. Vaflor-Fabroa (complainant) X X X VIOLATED CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL
along with others based on a joint affidavit-complaint REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS
which Atty. Oscar Paguinto (respondent) prepared and OF THE LAW[14]
notarized. As the joint affidavit-complaint did not indicate
the involvement of complainant, complainant filed a X X X RUINED AND DAMAGED NOT ONLY THE GEN.
Motion to Quash the Information which the trial court MARIANO ALVAREZ SERVICES COOPERATIVE, INC.
granted.[2] Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of the (GEMASCO, INC.) BUT THE ENTIRE WATER-CONSUMING
quashal of the Information was denied[3] COMMUNITY AS WELL[15]

Respondent also filed six other criminal complaints against

complainant for violation of Article 31 of Republic Act No. Despite the Court's grant,[16] on respondent's
6938 (Cooperative Code of the Philippines) before the motion,[17] of extension of time to file Comment,
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, but he eventually filed respondent never filed any comment. The Court thus
a Motion to Withdraw them.[4] required him to show cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with,[18] but just the same he failed to
On October 10, 2001, complainant, who was Chairperson comply.[19]
of the General Mariano Alvarez Service Cooperative, Inc.
(GEMASCO), received a Notice of Special General The Court thus referred the complaint to the Integrated
Assembly of GEMASCO on October 14, 2001 to consider Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
the removal of four members of the Board of Directors recommendation.[20]
(the Board), including her and the General
Manager.[5] The notice was signed by respondent. It appears that during the mandatory conference before
the IBP, complainant proposed the following issues:
At the October 14, 2001 Special General Assembly
presided by respondent and PNP Sr. Supt. Angelito L. 1. Whether or not the acts of respondent
Gerangco (Gerangco), who were not members of the then constitute violations of the Code of
current Board,[6] Gerango, complainant's predecessor, as Professional Responsibility, particularly
Chair of the GEMASCO board, declared himself Chair, the following:
appointed others to replace the removed directors, and
appointed respondent as Board Secretary.
1.1Canon 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the
On October 15, 2001, respondent and his group took over Constitution, obey the laws of the
the GEMASCO office and its premises, the pumphouses,
water facilities, and operations. On even date, respondent
land and promote respect for law and
sent letter-notices to complainant and the four removed legal [processes].
directors informing them of their removal from the Board
and as members of GEMASCO, and advising them to
cease and desist from further discharging the duties of 1.2Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct
their positions.[7] himself with courtesy, fairness, and
Complainant thus filed on October 16, 2001 with the
candor toward his professional
Cooperative Development Authority (CDA)-Calamba a colleagues, and shall avoid harassing
complaint for annulment of the proceedings taken during tactics against opposing counsel.
the October 14, 2001 Special General Assembly.

The CDA Acting Regional Director (RD), by Resolution of 1.3Canon 10 - A lawyer owes candor,
February 21, 2002, declared the questioned general
assembly null and void for having been conducted in fairness and good faith to the court.
violation of GEMASCO's By-Laws and the Cooperative
Code of the Philippines.[8] The RD's Resolution of February
1.4Canon 19 - A lawyer shall represent
21, 2002 was later vacated for lack of jurisdiction[9] of
CDA. his client with zeal within the bounds
of the law.
In her present complainant[10] against respondent for
disbarment, complainant alleged that respondent:
1.5Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after
obtaining extensions of time to file
 pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let over the Board of Directors and the GEMASCO facilities,
respondent violated the provisions of the Cooperative
the period lapse without submitting Code of the Philippines and the GEMASCO By-Laws. He
the same or offering an explanation also violated the Lawyer's Oath, which provides that a
lawyer shall support the Constitution and obey the laws.
for his failure to do so.
When respondent caused the filing of baseless criminal
2. complaints against complainant, he violated the Lawyer's
3. Whether or not the above acts of Oath that a lawyer shall "not wittingly or willingly promote
respondent constitute violations of his or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid
lawyer's oath, particularly the following: or consent to the same."

When, after obtaining an extension of time to file

2.1support the Constitution and obey the comment on the complaint, respondent failed to file any
laws as well as the legal orders of the and ignored this Court's subsequent show cause order, he
duly constituted authorities therein violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which states that "A lawyer shall not, after
obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda
2.2will do no falsehood, nor consent to or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same
or offering an explanation for his failure to do
the doing of any in court so." Sebastian v. Bajar[28] teaches:

2.3will not wittingly or willingly promote x x x Respondent's cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring
the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter
or sue any groundless, false or disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondent's conduct
unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A Court's
Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor
to the same should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or
selectively". Respondent's obstinate refusal to comply with
2.4will delay no man for money or malice the Court's orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in
her character; it also underscores her disrespect of the
Court's lawful orders which is only too deserving of
4. reproof.
5. Whether or not the above acts of
[respondent] complained of are grounds Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and
for disbarment or suspension of attorneys processes and respondent's deference is underscored by
by the Supreme Court as provided for in the fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules lawyer not only to punishment for contempt but to
of Court.[21] disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility
is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the
integrity of the courts and to show respect to their
Respondent's counsel who represented him during the processes.[29] (Citations omitted).
conference proposed the issue of whether, on the basis of
the allegations of the complaint, misconduct was
The Court notes that respondent had previously been
committed by respondent.[22]
suspended from the practice of law for six months for
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility,[30] he
After the conclusion of the conference, both parties were
having been found to have received an acceptance fee
ordered to submit position papers.[23] Complainant filed
and misled the client into believing that he had filed a
hers,[24] but respondent, despite grant, on his motion, of
case for her when he had not.[31] It appears, however,
extension of time, did not file any position paper.
that respondent has not reformed his ways. A more
severe penalty this time is thus called for.
In her Report and Recommendation,[25] Investigating
Commissioner Lolita A. Quisumbing found respondent
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto,
guilty of violating the Lawyer's Oath as well as Canons 1,
is SUSPENDED for two years from the practice of law for
8, 10, and Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional
violation of Canons 1, 8, 10, and Rule 12.03 of the Code
Responsibility. Noting that respondent had already been
of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath,
previously suspended for six months, the Commissioner
effective immediately.
recommended that respondent be suspended for two
years.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the
Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent's personal
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) Board of
record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar of the
Governors opted for the dismissal of the complaint,
Philippines; and all courts in the country for their
however, for lack of merit.[26]
information and guidance.
On Motion for Reconsideration,[27] the IBP-CBD Board of
SO ORDERED.
Governors recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for six months.

The Court finds that by conniving with Gerangco in taking

 respondents Santiago and Tolentino, which recommended
her dismissal from service.

Complainant then filed the present case, accusing the

respondents of making deceitful statements in said
Resolution, committing gross misconduct and violating
their Attorney's Oath for recommending her dismissal
without just cause or due process. Quoted hereunder is
the aforesaid resolution with emphasis on the allegedly
false statements:
A.C. No. 3921, June 11, 2018
RESOLUTION
DELFINA HERNANDEZ
SANTIAGO, Complainant, v. ATTY. ZOSIMO SANTIAGO
AND ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondents. This is a case involving Atty. Delfina H. Santiago, Asst.
City Administrator, indorsed to this office by the Hon.
Mayor, Macario A. Asistio, Jr. for appropriate action.
RESOLUTION
The facts of the case are as follows:
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,* J.:
1. In 1972, Atty. Delfina H. Santiago was, per court
We resolve the administrative case for disbarment1 filed decision, dismissed illegally as Asst. City Administrator on
by complainant Judge Delfina Hernandez Santiago against Personal Matters.
respondents Atty. Zosimo Santiago and Atty. Nicomedes
Tolentino, charging them with deceit, gross misconduct
and violating their oaths as members of the Bar. 2. In 1976, Atty. Santiago, was appointed Chief,
Administrative Office, a position of lower rank.

During the time when the material events transpired in

this case, complainant was the City Personnel Officer of 3.In 1983, Atty. Santiago was charged
Caloocan City while respondents Santiago and Tolentino administratively for UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCES, in
respectively held the positions of City Legal Officer and violation of Civil Service laws. Upon recommendation
Legal Officer II in the City Government of Caloocan. of the Office of the City Legal Office, Atty. Santiago was
validly and lawfully ordered to be dropped from the rolls
which was subsequently approved and affirmed by the
In 1988, complainant applied for, and was granted, a sick Civil Service Commission in the latter's order dated
leave of absence with commuted pay covering 240 days October 1983 x x x.
from January 25 to December 31, 1988.2 Sometime in
February 1988, complainant received a
Memorandum3 from then Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr., xxxx
which cancelled all leaves of absence of city officials and
employees. She also received a memorandum,4 detailing 4. In 1985, the Supreme Court, in affirming an RTC
her to the Office of the Secretary to the Mayor. decision, ordered the reinstatement of Santiago as Asst.
Complainant apparently paid no heed to said memoranda. City Administrator on Personal Matters and declaring the
She was later directed to return to work in a letter5 dated 1972 dismissal as illegal.
April 21, 1988 signed by respondent Tolentino, which
pertinently state: 5. In 1986, Atty. Santiago was appointed by Mayor
Martinez as Asst. City Administrator, her former position,
On February 5, 1988 you were served with a pursuant to the Supreme Court decision.
[Memorandum] from the Office of the Mayor that all
[leaves] of absence of city officials and employees were 6. In January 1988 Atty. Santiago filed a leave of
cancelled in the interest of public service. [In spite] of the absence (Sick Leave & Vacation Leave) on advice of
aforesaid memo you did not return to work thereby, her Doctor, a Med. Cert. was attached thereto and the
ignoring the memo of the Hon. Mayor Macario A. Asistio, duration of the leave was 240 days starting January 25 up
Jr. to December 31, 1988.

In this [regard], we are giving you another five (5) days The said leave of absence was initially approved but later
from receipt hereof to report for work, otherwise, the disapproved by the Hon. Macario A. Asistio, Jr. when the
undersigned may be constrained to take drastic action latter issued a Memorandum dated February 5, 1988
against you. cancelling all leave of absence of which Memo Atty.
Santiago was duly served with. However despite service of
Complainant replied with a handwritten note,6 asking for the said Memo to Atty. Delfina H. Santiago she failed and
ten days within which to answer and/or act on the letter. refused to report for work [continuously] up to the
She, however, did not return to work. At the end of her present. There was not even a semblance of showing that
leave, she tendered her resignation.7 She subsequently she would comply with the memorandum.
received a memorandum8 dated May 18, 1989 from Mayor
Asistio terminating her employment. Enclosed therewith At this juncture the office of the City Mayor indorsed this
was a Resolution9dated December 19, 1988 signed by case against Atty. Delfina H. Santiago for appropriate
action. This office conducted an investigation and
summoned Atty. Delfina H. Santiago for several with it and therefore insubordination is clearly
times to appear before the undersigned; present her present aside from neglect of duty.
evidence and explain her side in consonance with
the due process mandated by the constitution. RECOMMENDATION
Despite several notice sent to Delfina Santiago the
latter did not heed the said notices, thereby, leaving
the undersigned without any alternative but to decide the WHEREFORE, the instant case being the second
case on the basis of the evidence available and the [infraction] of the Civil Service law by Atty. Santiago, it is
records pertaining to Atty. Delfina Santiago. respectfully. recommended that the latter be dismissed
from service.10 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
FINDINGS
Complainant contended that she was not administratively
charged for any offense in 1983 or in 1988. Thus, she was
The records disclosed that the memorandum dated not an incorrigible employee. Instead of being sent a
February 5, 1988 issued by the Hon. City Mayor, Macario notice or summons, she received respondent Tolentino's
A. Asistio, Jr. to all employees of the City Government letter dated April 21, 1988, but the same neither stated
cancelled all leave of absences in the interest of service that an administrative case had been filed against her nor
effective 5 February 1988. There is no doubt a so that did it require her to appear in any investigation. Since she
Atty. Santiago was duly served with the said memo as was on a sick leave of absence, not a vacation leave, she
appearing on the said memo is her signature, an evidence could not be guilty of neglect of duty as she had no duties
of receipt thereof. Having received the said memo Atty. to perform. She was also not in a position to defy any
Santiago was fully aware of the cancellation of her leave lawful order, which would have amounted to
of absence and therefore as a prudent employee she insubordination. Annexed to the complaint were copies of:
should have obeyed the memorandum of the City Mayor (a) the Resolution December 19, 1988; (b) Mayor Asistio's
by way of reporting for work as called for. What happened dismissal order dated May 18, 1989; (c) complainant's
instead was that Atty. Santiago never showed-up, resignation letter; (d) her approved sick leave of absence
thereby, neglecting her duty as Asst. City Administrator application; and (e) the commutation voucher showing the
and committed, in effect, insubordination. payment of her salaries.

What is nagging and aggravates the predicament of In respondent Santiago's comment11 to the complaint, he
Atty. Santiago is that the instant case is already her argued that the allegedly deceitful statements in the
second violation which places her in the category of above Resolution were not malicious imputations of
incorrigible employees. The first is when she was falsehoods. If the statements were inaccurate, the same
charged of UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCES, punished for may have been caused by a misappreciation of facts or
said act and made to suffer the corresponding evidence. As to whether complainant was formally
penalty thereof. charged for unauthorized absences in 1983, the material
point considered was that she was dismissed because of
Under the Civil Service Law, Art. 9, Section 36 Par. 3, "No unauthorized absences. It also did not matter that she
office or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended filed a sick leave of absence, not a. vacation and sick
except for the cause as provided by law and after due leave, as the issue of the investigation was whether she
process". was liable for disobeying Mayor Asistio's directives.

The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action: Respondent Santiago further alleged that Mayor Asistio
indorsed12 to the City Legal Office the matter of
x x x x 3. Neglect of Duty x x x complainant's noncompliance with the Mayor's return to
work order and this referral was equivalent to an
administrative complaint. Complainant was sent a notice
27. Insubordination regarding her failure to report for work, thereby informing
her that she could be subjected to disciplinary action. Her
The actuations of the respondent Atty. Santiago squarely failure to answer indicated her intent to disregard Mayor
falls on the aforequoted grounds for dismissal as her Asistio's order and her option not to participate in the
failure to report for work amounts to [willful] disobedience investigation. Respondents' investigation proceeded ex
to her superior officer. Nothing can be more important to parte and the assailed Resolution was issued on the basis
the upholding and maintenance of the public service in its of the evaluation of the evidence at hand. Without proof of
integrity and good name than the enforcement of the bad faith or adverse personal motives, respondents
reasonable discipline of laws. In the discharge of an cannot be held administratively liable for issuing the
official duty and obligation Atty. Santiago as a Resolution in the discharge of their official duties even if
government employee is expected to obey the order and the same turned out to be erroneous.
instruction of the duly constituted authorities and she
should not ignore or disregard a legitimate official order. In respondent Tolentino's comment,13 he likewise argued
Her act is inimical to the public service. To tolerate that Mayor Asistio's referral of the case to the City Legal
Santiago to get away with it would be tantamount to Office was treated as a complaint. Complainant was
allowing her to act as she suits and satisfies her personal apprised of the nature thereof and she even requested ten
convenience in violation of her superior's order. An act days within which to answer the same. After the City
which would be certainly demoralizing to the public Legal Office conducted an investigation wherein
service. As may be gleaned from the foregoing complainant failed to participate, respondents decided the
discussions Atty. Santiago had [willfully] ignored case on the basis of records and evidence available. Anent
her superior's order without any attempt to comply the charge that she was not administratively charged in
1983, what was considered was that she did incur administratively charged in 1983 and they used the term
unauthorized absences that led to her dropping from the summons in referring to the letter dated April 21, 1988.
rolls. That she filed a sick leave of absence, not sick leave Still, respondents cannot be held liable for deceit without
and vacation leave, was immaterial as Mayor Asistio's proof that they deliberately worded their Resolution to
memorandum did not qualify the nature of the leaves of mislead Mayor Asistio into dismissing complainant.
absence being cancelled.
Respondents were also not found guilty of misconduct as
Among the documents attached to respondent Tolentino's their actions neither indicated moral depravity, nor did it
comment were copies of: (a) Mayor Asistio's letter 14 to affect their qualifications as lawyers. Respondents may
complainant dated August 4, 1982 about her sick leave of have erred in failing to follow the procedure under Section
absence; (b) Mayor Asistio's letter15 to complainant dated 3825 of Presidential Decree No. 807 and they may be
July 5, 1983 about her unauthorized absences; (c) investigated for such lapses as government officials before
letter16 dated August 4, 1982 of Administrative Officer some other venue. However, absent evidence showing
Soriano to Mayor Asistio, seeking advice on the action to respondents' moral depravity in issuing the said
be taken on complainant's situation; (d) Mayor Asistio's Resolution, they cannot be penalized therefor as members
indorsement17 dated October 5, 1983 to the City Legal of the Bar.
Office of complainant's case; (e) the indorsement18 from
the City Legal Office dated October 6, 1983, Lastly, Commissioner Andres ruled that respondents did
recommending that complainant be dropped from the roll not violate their oath as members of the Bar, particularly
of employees; (f) the order19 of Mayor Asistio dated the oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
October 19, 1983 regarding complainant's separation from any in court."26 The falsehood contemplated in the
service; and (g) the Orders20 dated October 27, 1983 and Attorney's Oath is one that is intentional or committed
November 3, 1983 from the office of the Regional Director with malice. Although the allegedly deceitful statements in
of the Civil Service Commission (CSC)-National Capital respondents' Resolution may not be wholly accurate, the
Region (NCR), approving the complainant's dismissal. same were found to be based on documents and made in
the discharge of respondents' official functions as City
Complainant insisted in her Consolidated Reply21 that the Legal Officers.
indorsement of Mayor Asistio was not at all signed by the
Mayor and it was merely an indorsement of documents for In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-22527 passed on May 22,
study and recommendation. She was also not informed of 2008, the IBP Board of Governors approved Commissioner
said document. She asked for a period of ten days within Andres's recommendation.
which to answer and/or act on respondent Tolentino's
letter dated April 21, 1988 and she did report to Atty.
Enrique Cube, the Mayor's secretary to explain why she Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration with
cannot go back to work yet. As no administrative case was Motion to Vacate Resolution of the IBP,28 which the Office
filed against her in 1988, there could not have been a of the Bar Confidant (OBC) of the Supreme Court referred
valid investigation under Presidential Decree No. to the IBP for appropriate action.29
807.22 Yet, respondents made up fictitious statements of
facts and conclusions of law in recommending her In an Order30 dated September 30, 2008, the IBP required
dismissal. the respondents to comment on the above motion. Only
respondent Tolentino commented31 thereon, praying that
The Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the it be denied for being a mere rehash of complainant's
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and previous pleadings and issues that had already been
recommendation.23 passed upon.

The IBP Report and Recommendation Complainant filed before this Court an Ex Parte Motion to
Vacate IBP Order dated September 30, 2008/to Declare
this Case Submitted for Decision,32 arguing that the
IBP Investigating Commissioner Mario V. Andres issued a Court's referral of her complaint to the IBP did not include
Report and Recommendation24 dated April 4, 2008, which the latter's authority to decide it. She averred that the IBP
recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of was also not in a position to take cognizance of her
merit. Commissioner Andres found that complainant failed motion for reconsideration since the pleading was not
to present convincing evidence that respondents acted in addressed to the latter. Moreover, since respondents
bad faith in rendering the Resolution dated December 19, failed to present their case before the IBP, they were
1988. Thus, they were held to be entitled to the legal allegedly precluded from presenting any evidence in their
presumption of innocence. behalf and any comment to complainant's motion for
reconsideration will not serve any purpose.
According to Commissioner Andres, respondents
concluded that complainant was previously charged for In a Resolution33 dated March 11, 2009, the Court
unauthorized absences by relying on existing records that referred to the IBP complainant's Motion for
showed that she was dropped from the rolls in 1983. Reconsideration with Motion to Vacate Resolution of the
Complainant's letter asking for a period of ten days to IBP and her Ex Parte Motion to Vacate IBP Order dated
reply to respondents' April 21, 1988 letter also meant that September 30, 2008/to Declare this Case Submitted for
she understood that an investigation was underway. When Decision.
she failed to respond, respondents assumed that she
waived her right to present evidence. Respondents may
have only been careless in their choice of words when In Resolution No. XIX-2011-41334 passed on June 26,
they wrongly assumed that complainant was 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied complainant's
motion for reconsideration as it found no cogent reason to or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a
reverse its previous ruling. superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. x
The IBP then transmitted the record of the case to the xx
Court for final action.
In this case, complainant accused the respondents of
Undaunted, complainant filed with this Court a Motion to deceit, gross misconduct and of violating their Attorney's
Disregard IBP Resolution No. XIX-2011-413 dated June Oath in issuing the Resolution dated December 19, 1988
26, 2011,35 arguing that the IBP had no jurisdiction to that allegedly contained false statements and which was
dismiss her complaint or to rule on her motion for arrived at without her being informed of the charges or
reconsideration. She insisted that the Resolution Nos. given the opportunity to present evidence.
XVIII-2008-225 and XIX-2011-413 of the IBP Board of
Governors should have only been recommendatory in As Commissioner Andres correctly ruled, deceit covers
nature and the IBP should not have arrogated unto itself intentional falsehoods or false statements and
the power of the Court to decide on her complaint. representations that are made with malice or with the
intent to do wrong. Gross misconduct, on the other hand,
The Ruling of the Court is "any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct
on the part of a person concerned with the administration
of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the
The Court finds no merit in the complaint. parties or to the right determination of the cause. The
motive behind this conduct is generally a premeditated,
At the outset, we reject complainant's contention that the obstinate or intentional purpose."38 Similarly, on the
IBP infringed on this Court's jurisdiction in dismissing her charge of the alleged violation of the Attorney's Oath, the
complaint and denying her motion for reconsideration settled rule is that:
thereon.
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to
The case was initiated upon the filing of the complaint for apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the
disbarment with this Court and the same was government service. In fact, by the express provision of
subsequently referred to the IBP for investigation, report, Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of
and recommendation in accordance with Section 1, Rule lawyers '"shall apply to lawyers in government service in
139-B36 of the Rules of Court. The Resolution Nos. XVIII- the discharge of their official tasks." Thus, where a
2008-225 and XIX-2011-413 of the IBP Board of lawyer's misconduct as a government official is of
Governors embody their recommendation to this Court. As such nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer
succinctly stated in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma37 : or to show moral delinquency, then he may be
disciplined as a member of the bar on such
grounds. Although the general rule is that a lawyer who
Clearly, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors is
holds a government office may not be disciplined as a
merely recommendatory. The "power to recommend"
member of the bar for infractions he committed as a
includes the power to give "advice, exhortation or
government official, he may, however, be disciplined as a
indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character,
lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath
not binding upon the party to whom it is made."
[as] a member of the legal profession.39 (Citations
Necessarily, the "final action" on the resolution of the IBP
omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Board of Governors still lies with this Court. x x x (Citation
omitted.)
Before the Court may impose against respondents the
severe disciplinary sanction of disbarment, complainant
Verily, there is nothing in the IBP resolutions that would
must be able to establish by substantial evidence the
suggest that the same already constituted the final
malicious and intentional character of the misconduct
determination of the case and were beyond the power of
complained of that evince the moral delinquency of
the Court to review.
respondents. Substantial evidence is the amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
After thoroughly reviewing the record of this case, the adequate to support a conclusion.40
Court affirms the recommendation of Commissioner
Andres and the IBP Board of Governors that the instant
Except for complainant's allegations, however, she failed
complaint should be dismissed.
to present sufficient evidence to substantiate her
complaint. The Court agrees with the findings of
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides for the Commissioner Andres that complainant has not proffered
grounds for the imposition of the penalty of disbarment, any evidence that tended to show that respondents
to wit: intentionally and deliberately made false statements in the
Resolution dated December 19, 1988 in order to deceive
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by and induce Mayor Asistio to dismiss complainant from
Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member of the bar service. She neither offered any documentary evidence to
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney buttress her arguments nor presented any witness to
by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or corroborate her claims.
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime Quite the contrary, complainant herself revealed her lack
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath of certainty as to the malicious intent or other ill motives
which he is required to take before admission to practice, of respondents when she made the following statements
on her Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Vacate SO ORDERED.
Resolution of the IBP before the Court:

[Respondents] knew that there was never a first nor a

second administrative case against her. Yet they twisted
their facts and language to suit their purpose. Whether
they misled the Hon. Mayor Asistio to dismiss her
from the service, or they conspired to engineer her
removal from the service, or followed a directive
from Mayor Asistio to justify her dismissal, she does
not specifically know. But certainly, their Resolution
is not an honest mistake of judgment, as shown by
the malicious warp and woof of the Resolution
itself.41 (Emphasis supplied.)

We find such line of argumentation distinctly wanting.

Complainant cannot simply rely on speculations and
suspicions, no matter how deep-seated, without evidence
to support the same. We held in Osop v. Fontanilla42 that
charges meriting disciplinary action against a lawyer
generally involve the motives that induced him to commit
the act charged and that, to justifY disbarment or
suspension, the case against the lawyer must be clear and
free from doubt, not only as to the act charged but as to
his motive. Furthermore, in Cabas v. Sususco,43 we ruled
that "mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent
to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and
speculation likewise cannot be given credence."

As a final point, the Court deliberately dispensed with any

discussion regarding the validity of the Resolution dated
December 19, 1988. Commissioner Andres aptly pointed
out that complainant may file in the proper tribunal a
separate case against respondents, as City Legal Officers,
for possible lapses in the procedure undertaken by them
in the administrative investigation of the charge against
her and/or the propriety of her dismissal. On this matter,
complainant admitted in her complaint and consolidated
reply that she had indeed filed administrative cases
against respondents before the CSC, as well as a separate
administrative case against Mayor Asistio, in order to
impugn the validity of her dismissal from service.
However, the specific details, stages and/or outcome of
said cases were not properly manifested before this Court.
Complainant merely stated that she was not satisfied with
these other proceedings so she opted to file the instant
case for disbarment.44

The Court cannot allow this to be done.

What is at once clear is that this case for disbarment

cannot be resorted to as another remedy in order to
attack the legality of said Resolution or to nullify its
consequences. The only issue that should be determined
in this case is whether respondents committed misconduct
that put into question their moral character and moral
fitness to continue in the practice of law. As previously
discussed, this issue had been answered in the negative.

Considering that complainant failed to discharge the

burden of proof to warrant the imposition of
administrative penalty against respondents Santiago and
Tolentino, we dismiss the complaint.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against

respondents Atty. Zosimo Santiago and Atty. Nicomedes
Tolentino is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
 loan. Nevertheless, respondent admitted to having
confirmed the spurious SPA in his favor already
annotated at the back of TCT No. 21176 upon the
prodding of Roque and Diaz, and because he was
also in need of money at that time. Hence, he signed
the real estate mortgage and received his
proportionate share of ₱130,000.00 from the
proceeds of the loan, which he asserted to have fully
settled.
A.C. No. 7481 April 24, 2012
Finally, respondent denied signing the Deed of
LORENZO D. BRENNISEN, Complainant, Absolute Sale in favor of Ho and insisted that it was a
vs. forgery. Nonetheless, he sought complainant's
ATTY. RAMON U. CONTAWI, Respondent. forgiveness and promised to repay the value of the
subject property.
DECISION
In the Resolution7 dated July 16, 2008, the Court
PER CURIAM: resolved to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for recommendation.
disbarment filed by complainant Lorenzo D. Brennisen
against respondent Atty. Ramon U. Contawi for deceit The Action and Recommendation of the IBP
and gross misconduct in violation of his lawyer's oath.
During the mandatory conference held on October 21,
The Facts 2008, the parties stipulated on the following matters:

Complainant is the registered owner of a parcel of 1. That complainant is the owner of a property
land located in San Dionisio, Parañaque City covered covered by TCT No. 21176 (45228) of the
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 211762 of the Register of Deeds of Parañaque;
Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal. Being a
resident of the United States of America (USA), he 2. Respondent was in possession of the
entrusted the administration of the subject property to Owner's Duplicate Certificate of the property
respondent, together with the corresponding owner's of the complainant;
duplicate title.
3. The property of the complainant was
Unbeknownst to complainant, however, respondent, mortgaged to a certain Roberto Ho;
through a spurious Special Power of Attorney
(SPA)3 dated February 22, 1989, mortgaged and
4. The title to the property of complainant was
subsequently sold the subject property to one Roberto
cancelled in year 2000 and a new one, TCT
Ho ("Ho"), as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
No. 150814 was issued in favor of Mr.
Sale4 dated November 15, 2001. As a result, TCT No.
Roberto Ho;
21176 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No.
1508145 issued in favor of Ho.
5. The Special Power of Attorney dated 24
February 1989 in favor of Atty. Ramon U.
Thus, on April 16, 2007, complainant filed the instant
Contawi is spurious and was not signed by
administrative complaint against respondent for
complainant Lorenzo D. Brennisen;
having violated his oath as a lawyer, causing him
damage and prejudice.
6. That respondent received Php100,000.00
of the mortgage loan secured by the
In his counter-affidavit, respondent denied any formal
6
mortgagee on the aforementioned property of
lawyer-client relationship between him and the
complainant;
complainant, claiming to have merely extended his
services for free. He also denied receiving money
from the complainant for the purpose of paying the 7. That respondent did not inform the
real estate taxes on the property. Further, he averred complainant about the unauthorized mortgage
that it was his former office assistants, a certain Boy and sale of his property;
Roque ("Roque") and one Danilo Diaz ("Diaz"), who
offered the subject property to Ho as collateral for a
 8. That respondent has a loan obligation to Indisputably, respondent disposed of complainant's
Mr. Roberto Ho; property without his knowledge or consent, and
partook of the proceeds of the sale for his own
9. That respondent has not yet filed any case benefit. His contention that he merely accommodated
against the person whom he claims to have the request of his then financially-incapacitated office
falsified his signature; assistants to confirm the spurious SPA is flimsy and
implausible, as he was fully aware that complainant's
10. That respondent did not notify the signature reflected thereon was forged. As aptly
complainant that the owner's copy of TCT No. opined by Commissioner De Mesa, the fraudulent
21176 was stolen and was taken out from his transactions involving the subject property were
office.8 effected using the owner's duplicate title, which was in
respondent's safekeeping and custody during
complainant's absence.
In its Report9 dated July 10, 2009, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), through
Commissioner Eduardo V. De Mesa, found that Consequently, Commissioner De Mesa and the IBP
respondent had undeniably mortgaged and sold the Board of Governors correctly recommended his
property of his client without the latter's knowledge or disbarment for violations of the pertinent provisions of
consent, facilitated by the use of a falsified SPA. the Canons of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Hence, in addition to his possible criminal liability for
falsification, the IBP-CBD deduced that respondent Canon 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution,
violated various provisions of the Canons of obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
Professional Responsibility and accordingly and legal processes.
recommended that he be disbarred and his name
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. Canon 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
On May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the report of Commissioner De Canon 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys
Mesa through Resolution No. XIX-2011-24810 as and properties of his client which may come into his
follows: possession.

"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is Canon 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or
hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the property collected or received for or from client.
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein Canon 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and
made part of this Resolution as Annex 'A' and finding property of his client when due or upon demand.
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence
on record and the applicable laws and rules, and Canon 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
finding Respondent guilty of falsification; making or client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
using falsified documents; and for benefiting from the confidence reposed in him.
proceed[s] of his dishonest acts, Atty. Ramon U.
Contawi is hereby DISBARRED."
In Sabayle v. Tandayag,11 the Court disbarred one of
the respondent lawyers and ordered his name
The Issue stricken from the Roll of Attorneys on the grounds of
serious dishonesty and professional misconduct. The
The sole issue before the Court is whether respondent lawyer knowingly participated in a false
respondent violated his lawyer's oath when he and simulated transaction not only by notarizing a
mortgaged and sold complainant's property, which spurious Deed of Sale, but also – and even worse –
was entrusted to him, without the latter's consent. sharing in the profits of the specious transaction by
acquiring half of the property subject of the Deed of
The Court's Ruling Sale.

After a punctilious examination of the records, the In Flores v. Chua,12 the Court disbarred the respondent
Court concurs with the findings and recommendation lawyer for having deliberately made false
of Commissioner De Mesa and the IBP Board of representations that the vendor appeared personally
Governors that respondent acted with deceit when, before him when he notarized a forged deed of sale.
through the use of a falsified document, he effected He was found guilty of grave misconduct.
the unauthorized mortgage and sale of his client's
property for his personal benefit.
In this case, respondent's established acts exhibited SO ORDERED.
his unfitness and plain inability to discharge the
bounden duties of a member of the legal profession.
He failed to prove himself worthy of the privilege to
practice law and to live up to the exacting standards
demanded of the members of the bar. It bears to
stress that "[t]he practice of law is a privilege given to
lawyers who meet the high standards of legal
proficiency and morality. Any violation of these
standards exposes the lawyer to administrative
liability."13

Moreover, respondent's argument that there was no

formal lawyer-client relationship between him and
complainant will not serve to mitigate his liability.
There is no distinction as to whether the transgression
is committed in a lawyer's private or professional
capacity, for a lawyer may not divide his personality
as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at
another.141âwphi1

With the foregoing disquisitions, the Court thus finds

the penalty of disbarment proper in this case, as
recommended by Commissioner De Mesa and the
IBP Board of Governors. Section 27, Rule 38 of the
Rules of Court provides:

"SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by

Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
xxx or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice xxx"
(emphasis supplied)

The Court notes that in administrative proceedings,

only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, is required.15 Having
carefully scrutinized the records of this case, the
Court therefore finds that the standard of substantial
evidence has been more than satisfied.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. RAMON U.

CONTAWI, having clearly violated his lawyer's oath
and the Canons of Professional Responsibility
through his unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct,
is DISBARRED and his name
ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of

the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance. Let a copy of this Decision
be attached to respondent's personal record as
attorney.
 Respondent failed to submit his comment on the
complaint, despite receipt of the copy of the Court's
Resolution, as evidenced by Registry Return Receipt
No. 30639. Thus, the Court, in a Resolution5 dated
March 17, 2003, resolved to require respondent to
show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt
with or held in contempt for failing to file his comment
on the complaint against him.6

On December 10, 2002, Bansig filed an Omnibus Ex

Parte Motion7 praying that respondent's failure to file
his comment on the complaint be deemed as a waiver
A.C. No. 5581 January 14, 2014
to file the same, and that the case be submitted for
disposition.
ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, Complainant,
vs.
On May 4, 2003, in a Motion, respondent claimed that
ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, Respondent.
while it appeared that an administrative case was filed
against him, he did not know the nature or cause
DECISION thereof since other than Bansig's Omnibus Motion, he
received no other pleading or any processes of this
PER CURIAM: Court. Respondent, however, countered that Bansig's
Omnibus Motion was merely a ploy to frighten him
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated January and his wife from pursuing the criminal complaints for
8, 2002 filed by complainant Rose Bunagan-Bansig falsification of public documents they filed against
(Bansig) against respondent Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Bansig and her husband. He also explained that he
Celera (respondent) for Gross Immoral Conduct. was able to obtain a copy of the Court's Show Cause
Order only when he visited his brother who is
In her complaint, Bansig narrated that, on May 8, occupying their former residence at 59-B Aguho St.,
1997, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan Project 3, Quezon City. Respondent further averred
(Bunagan), entered into a contract of marriage, as that he also received a copy of Bansig's Omnibus
evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate Motion when the same was sent to his law office
of marriage issued by the City Civil Registry of address.
Manila.2 Bansig is the sister of Gracemarie R.
Bunagan, legal wife of respondent. Respondent pointed out that having been the family's
erstwhile counsel and her younger sister's husband,
However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage with Bansig knew his law office address, but she failed to
Bunagan, respondent contracted another marriage on send a copy of the complaint to him. Respondent
January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres suspected that Bansig was trying to mislead him in
Alba (Alba), as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of order to prevent him from defending himself. He
the certificate of marriage issued by the City added that Bansig has an unpaid obligation
Registration Officer of San Juan, Manila.3 amounting to ₱2,000,000.00 to his wife which
triggered a sibling rivalry. He further claimed that he
Bansig stressed that the marriage between and his wife received death threats from unknown
respondent and Bunagan was still valid and in full persons; thus, he transferred to at least two (2) new
legal existence when he contracted his second residences, i.e., in Sampaloc, Manila and Angeles
marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage had City. He then prayed that he be furnished a copy of
never been annulled or rendered void by any lawful the complaint and be given time to file his answer to
authority. the complaint.

Bansig alleged that respondent’s act of contracting In a Resolution8 dated July 7, 2003, the Court
marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still resolved to (a) require Bansig to furnish respondent
subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct with a copy of the administrative complaint and to
unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which renders submit proof of such service; and (b) require
him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar. respondent to file a comment on the complaint against
him.
In a Resolution4 dated February 18, 2002, the Court
resolved to require respondent to file a comment on In compliance, Bansig submitted an Affidavit of
the instant complaint. Mailing to show proof that a copy of the administrative
complaint was furnished to respondent at his given Civil Case No. 59353, pending before the Regional
address which is No. 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Tuguegarao City,
Subdivision, Angeles City, as evidenced by Registry respondent entered his appearance as counsel with
Receipt No. 2167.9 mailing address to be at "Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922
Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City."16
On March 17, 2004, considering that respondent
failed anew to file his comment despite receipt of the On February 13, 2006, the Court resolved to resend a
complaint, the Court resolved to require respondent to copy of the Show Cause Order dated May 16, 2005 to
show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt respondent at his new address at Unit 8, Halili
with or held in contempt for such failure.10 Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City.17

On June 3, 2004, respondent, in his On June 30, 2008, due to respondent's failure to
Explanation,11 reiterated that he has yet to receive a comply with the Show Cause Order dated May 16,
copy of the complaint. He claimed that Bansig 2005, for failure to file his comment on this
probably had not complied with the Court's Order, administrative complaint as required in the Resolution
otherwise, he would have received the same already. dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (a) IMPOSE
He requested anew that Bansig be directed to furnish upon Atty. Celera a FINE of ₱1,000.00 payable to the
him a copy of the complaint. court, or a penalty of imprisonment of five (5) days if
said fine is not paid, and (b) REQUIRE Atty. Celera to
Again, on August 25, 2004, the Court granted COMPLY with the Resolution dated July 7, 2003 by
respondent's prayer that he be furnished a copy of the filing the comment required thereon.18
complaint, and required Bansig to furnish a copy of
the complaint to respondent.12 In a Resolution19 dated January 27, 2010, it appearing
that respondent failed to comply with the Court's
On October 1, 2004, Bansig, in her Resolutions dated June 30, 2008 and July 7, 2003,
Manifestation,13 lamented the dilatory tactics allegedly the Court resolved to: (1) DISPENSE with the filing by
undertaken by respondent in what was supposedly a respondent of his comment on the complaint; (2)
simple matter of receipt of complaint. Bansig asserted ORDER the arrest of Atty. Celera; and (3) DIRECT
that the Court should sanction respondent for his the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation
deliberate and willful act to frustrate the actions of the (NBI) to (a) ARREST and DETAIN Atty. Celera for
Court. She attached a copy of the complaint and non-compliance with the Resolution dated June 30,
submitted an Affidavit of Mailing stating that again a 2008; and (b) SUBMIT a report of compliance with the
copy of the complaint was mailed at respondent's Resolution. The Court likewise resolved to REFER the
residential address in Angeles City as shown by complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
Registry Receipt No. 3582. investigation, report and recommendation.20

On May 16, 2005, the Court anew issued a Show However, the Return of Warrant21 dated March 24,
Cause Order to respondent as to why he should not 2010, submitted by Atty. Frayn M. Banawa,
be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for Investigation Agent II, Anti-Graft Division of the NBI,
failure to comply with the Resolution dated July 7, showed that respondent cannot be located because
2003 despite service of copy of the complaint by neither Halili Complex nor No. 922 Aurora Blvd., at
registered mail.14 Cubao, Quezon City cannot be located. During
surveillance, it appeared that the given address, i.e.,
On August 1, 2005, the Court noted the returned and No. 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City was a
unserved copy of the Show Cause Order dated May vacant lot with debris of a demolished building.
16, 2005 sent to respondent at 238 Mayflower St., Considering that the given address cannot be found
Ninoy Aquino Subd. under Registry Receipt No. or located and there were no leads to determine
55621, with notation "RTS-Moved." It likewise respondent's whereabouts, the warrant of arrest
required Bansig to submit the correct and present cannot be enforced.
address of respondent.15
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, meanwhile, in
On September 12, 2005, Bansig manifested that compliance with the Court's Resolution, reported that
respondent had consistently indicated in his as per their records, the address of respondent is at
correspondence with the Court No. 238 Mayflower St., No. 41 Hoover St., Valley View Royale Subd., Taytay,
Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City as his Rizal.
residential address. However, all notices served upon
him on said address were returned with a note Respondent likewise failed to appear before the
"moved" by the mail server. Bansig averred that in mandatory conference and hearings set by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Torres Alba at the Mary the Queen Church, Madison
Discipline (IBP-CBD), despite several notices. Thus, St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.
in an Order dated August 4, 2010, Commissioner
Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, of the IBP-CBD, declared Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the
respondent to be in default and the case was marriage certificates to prove that respondent entered
submitted for report and recommendation. The Order into a second marriage while the latter’s first marriage
of Default was received by respondent as evidenced was still subsisting. We note that the second marriage
by a registry return receipt. However, respondent apparently took place barely a year from his first
failed to take any action on the matter. marriage to Bunagan which is indicative that indeed
the first marriage was still subsisting at the time
On January 3, 2011, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and respondent contracted the second marriage with Alba.
Recommendation, recommended that respondent
Atty. Celera be suspended for a period of two (2) The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts,
years from the practice of law. issued by a public officer in custody thereof, are
admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as
RULING provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, to wit:
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely
civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an investigation Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document
by the court into the conduct of its officers.22 The issue is a public record. – When the original of a document
to be determined is whether respondent is still fit to is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
continue to be an officer of the court in the public office, its contents may be proved by a certified
dispensation of justice. Hence, an administrative copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.
proceeding for disbarment continues despite the
desistance of a complainant, or failure of the Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage
complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case, certificates, other than being admissible in evidence,
the failure of respondent to answer the charges also clearly indicate that respondent contracted the
against him despite numerous notices. second marriage while the first marriage is subsisting.
By itself, the certified xerox copies of the marriage
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has certificates would already have been sufficient to
the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the establish the existence of two marriages entered into
allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence has by respondent. The certified xerox copies should be
been defined as such relevant evidence as a accorded the full faith and credence given to public
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support documents. For purposes of this disbarment
a conclusion. For the Court to exercise its disciplinary proceeding, these Marriage Certificates bearing the
powers, the case against the respondent must be name of respondent are competent and convincing
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which
proof. Considering the serious consequence of the renders him unfit to continue as a member of the
disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, Bar.24
this Court has consistently held that clear
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
imposition of the administrative penalty.23
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
In the instant case, there is a preponderance of dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
evidence that respondent contracted a second
marriage despite the existence of his first marriage. Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
The first marriage, as evidenced by the certified xerox integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
3, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of Manila, Gloria C.
Pagdilao, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
Celera contracted marriage on May, 8, 1997 with
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
Gracemarie R. Bunagan at the Church of Saint
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in
Augustine, Intramuros, Manila; the second marriage,
a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
however, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of
profession.
the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 4, 2001
by the City Civil Registry of San Juan, Manila, states
that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree
marriage on January 8, 1998 with Ma. Cielo Paz of morality required of him as a member of the Bar.
He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a
a second marriage while his first marriage is Court’s Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere
subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct and request, nor should it be complied with partially,
are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule inadequately, or selectively." Respondent’s obstinate
138 of the Revised Rules of Court.25 refusal to comply with the Court’s orders "not only
betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also
This case cannot be fully resolved, however, without underscores his disrespect of the Court's lawful
addressing rather respondent’s defiant stance against orders which is only too deserving of reproof."26
the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard
of its Resolution requiring him to file his comment on Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
the complaint. This case has dragged on since 2002.
In the span of more than 10 years, the Court has Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
issued numerous directives for respondent's Supreme Court grounds therefor. - A member of the
compliance, but respondent seemed to have bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
preselected only those he will take notice of and the attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
rest he will just ignore. The Court has issued several malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
resolutions directing respondent to comment on the grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
complaint against him, yet, to this day, he has not conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or for
submitted any answer thereto. He claimed to have not any violation of the oath which he is required to take
received a copy of the complaint, thus, his failure to before admission to practice, or for a willful
comment on the complaint against him. Ironically, disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
however, whenever it is a show cause order, none of or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for
them have escaped respondent's attention. Even a party to a case without authority to do so. The
assuming that indeed the copies of the complaint had practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain,
not reached him, he cannot, however, feign ignorance either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
that there is a complaint against him that is pending constitutes malpractice.
before this Court which he could have easily obtained
a copy had he wanted to. Considering respondent's propensity to disregard not
only the laws of the land but also the lawful orders of
The Court has been very tolerant in dealing with the Court, it only shows him to be wanting in moral
respondent's nonchalant attitude towards this case; character, honesty, probity and good demeanor. He
accommodating respondent's endless requests, is, thus, unworthy to continue as an officer of the
manifestations and prayers to be given a copy of the court.
complaint. The Court, as well as Bansig, as evidenced
by numerous affidavits of service, have relentlessly IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find
tried to reach respondent for more than a decade; respondent ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA,
sending copies of the Court's Resolutions and guilty of grossly immoral conduct and willful
complaint to different locations - both office and disobedience of lawful orders rendering him unworthy
residential addresses of respondent. However, of continuing membership in the legal profession. He
despite earnest efforts of the Court to reach is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law
respondent, the latter, however conveniently offers a and his name stricken of the Roll of Attorneys,
mere excuse of failure to receive the complaint. When effective immediately. 1âwphi1

said excuse seemed no longer feasible, respondent

just disappeared. In a manner of speaking,
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of
respondent’s acts were deliberate, maneuvering the
the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in the
liberality of the Court in order to delay the disposition
personal file of respondent. All the Courts of the
of the case and to evade the consequences of his
Philippines and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
actions. Ultimately, what is apparent is respondent’s
shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters.
deplorable disregard of the judicial process which this
Court cannot countenance.
SO ORDERED.
Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful
disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in
itself alone a sufficient cause for suspension or
disbarment. Respondent’s cavalier attitude in
repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court
constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution.
Respondent’s conduct indicates a high degree of
 Criminal Case Nos. CBU-48996 and CBU-49706
together with Criminal Case Nos. CBU-50599, CBU-
50279, CBU-50335 and CBU-51277, finding Atty.
Diores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of six (6)
counts of Estafa through false pretenses and
fraudulent means under Article 315 (2) (a) of the
A.C. No. 8887 Revised Penal Code by engaging in a Ponzi
scheme,7 as follows:
ROMAN DELA ROSA VERANO* , Complainant
vs. WHEREFORE, the court hereby finds the accused
ATTY. LUIS FERNAN DIORES, JR., Respondent Luis F. Diores, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
six (6) counts of the crime of Estafa and sentences
DECISION him as follows:

PER CURIAM: (1) In Criminal Case No. CBU-50599, to suffer the

penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2)
This administrative case stemmed from a letter- months of prision correccional as minimum, to twenty
complaint1 filed with the Court on February 2, 2011 by (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to
complainant Roman Dela Rosa Verano (Verano) pay the off ended party Irene Lumapas the sum of
against respondent Atty. Luis Fernan Diores, Jr. (Atty. [₱]3,050,000.00 plus legal interest to be computed
Diores) for deceit, malpractice, gross ignorance of the from June 2, 1999 until such time that the amount is
law and violation of the Lawyer's Oath for paid in full;
surreptitiously using Verano's parcel of land to secure
bail bonds in connection with at least 61 cases (2) In Criminal Case No. CBU-48996, to suffer the
of Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2)
(B.P. Blg. 22) that had been filed against Atty. Diores.2 months of prision correccional as minimum, to twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to
The salient facts, as borne by the records, are the pay the offended party Calixto Ventic the sum of
following: [₱]500,000.00 plus legal interest to be computed from
December 7, 1998 until such time that the amount is
paid in full;
On April 11, 2006, Verano executed a Special Power
of Attomey3 (SP A) in favor of Atty. Diores authorizing
the latter to use Verano's parcel of land covered by (3) In Criminal Case No. CBU-49706, to suffer the
TCT No. T-77901 (subject property) as guaranty to penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2)
obtain a bail bond for particular criminal cases4 that months of prision correccional as minimum, to twenty
had been filed against Atty. Diores. (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to
pay the offended party Lilia Amy Ursal the sum of
[₱]416,000.00 plus legal interest to be computed from
Verano was surprised when he subsequently
March 2, 1999 until such time that the amount is paid
discovered that Atty. Diores executed a Memorandum in full;
of Agreement5 (MOA) dated August 31, 2006 with
Visayan Surety and Insurance Corporation (Visayan
Surety) in order to use the subject property as (4) In Criminal Case No. CBU-50279, to suffer the
guarantee to obtain bail bonds for at least 61 cases penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2)
of Estafa and Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 that had been months of prision correccional as minimum, to twenty
filed against him, which included, among others, (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to
Criminal Case Nos. CBU-48996 and CBU-49706, pay the offended party Rolando Chiu the sum of
which were filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch [₱]660,000.00 plus legal interest to be computed from
6, Cebu City (RTC). Verano alleged that he did not May 4, 1999 until such time that the amount is paid in
authorize Atty. Diores to enter into such MOA, much full;
less to use the subject property as collateral for bail
bonds of the more than 61 Estafa cases filed against (5) In Criminal [Case] No. CBU-50335, to suffer the
the latter which were other than those he authorized penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2)
under the SPA, causing great loss and damage to months of prision correccional as minimum, to twenty
Verano. (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to
pay the offended party Philholina Villamor the sum of
Thereafter, the aforementioned RTC branch, through [₱]200,000.00 plus legal interest to be computed from
Presiding Judge Ester M. Veloso, promulgated a Joint May 8, 1999 until such time that the amount is paid in
Judgment6 dated November 16, 2009 in the said full; and
(6) In Criminal Case No. CBU-51277, to suffer the the said Report and Recommendation, but
penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) recommended that Atty. Diores be disbarred, thus:
months of prision correccional as minimum, to twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
pay the offended party John Michael Velez the sum of hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
[₱]2,100,000.00 plus legal interest to be computed modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
from August 2, 1999 until such time that the amount is Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
paid in full. case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
"A ", and considering that Respondent is liable for
SO ORDERED.8 deceit in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility aggravated by his
Thus, Verano filed this letter-complaint against Atty. recalcitrance to legal orders in his refusal to comply
Diores. In its Resolutions dated March 9, 20119 and with the resolution of the Supreme Court for him to file
November 28, 2011,10 the Court directed Atty. Diores Comment and his deliberate failure to file his Position
to file his comment on the letter-complaint. However, Paper with the IBP and attend the Mandatory
Atty. Diores failed to file any comment despite notice. Conference before the Investigating Commissioner,
Consequently, in its Resolution11 dated July 25, 2012, Atty. Luis Fernan Diores[, Jr.] is hereby DISBARRED
the Court considered as waived the filing of Atty. from the practice of law and his name stricken off the
Diores' comment, and referred the case to the Roll of Attorneys.20
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. After a judicious examination of the records and
submissions of the parties, the Court has no
At the scheduled mandatory conference before the compelling reason to diverge from the factual findings
IBP on April 1, 2013,12 only Verano appeared together of Commissioner Antiquiera and the recommended
with his counsel, Atty. Manuel F. Ong. Atty. Diores, on penalty of the IBP Board of Governors.
the other hand, failed to appear despite
notice.13 Thereafter, Verano filed his position In dealing with clients or other people, lawyers are
paper,14 adding that subsequent to the filing of the expected to observe the highest degree of good faith,
letter-complaint before the Court, Atty. Diores had fairness and candor, both in their private and
jumped bail in some of his criminal cases and had professional capacities. Thus, any form of deception
failed to serve his sentence on some of the decided or fraudulent act committed by a lawyer in either
cases against him which had already become final capacity is not only disgraceful and dishonorable, but
and executory.15 Atty. Diores, on the other hand, failed also severely undermines the trust and confidence of
to file his position paper. people in the legal profession, violates Canon 1, Rule
1.01 of the CPR, and puts the lawyer's moral
After due proceedings, Commissioner Eldrid C. character into serious doubt as a member of the Bar,
Antiquiera (Commissioner Antiquiera) rendered a rendering him unfit to continue his practice of
Report and Recommendation16 on June 18, 2013, law.21 Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to obey lawful
finding Atty. Diores guilty of deceit in violation of orders of a superior court and the IBP. Willful
Canon 1, Rule 1.0117 of the Code of Professional disobedience to such orders, especially to those
Responsibility (CPR), holding that Atty. Diores: (1) issued by this Court, is a sufficient ground to disbar a
took undue advantage of the trust reposed on him by lawyer or suspend him from the practice of law under
Verano by secretly entering into the subject MOA; (2) Section 27,22 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.23
jumped bail on some of the criminal cases and failed
to serve sentence in those where he was duly In this case, Commissioner Antiquiera observed that
convicted by final judgment; and (3) refused to comply while there was an SPA executed by Verano in favor
with the orders of the Court and the IBP to submit his of Atty. Di ores for the latter to use Verano's land as
comment and position paper, and to attend the guarantee for the bail bonds, it only authorized Atty.
mandatory conference. The dispositive portion reads: Diores to use the same for specific criminal cases,
and not for the other criminal cases filed against him.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is In addition, Atty. Diores failed to file his comment to
recommended that respondent be SUSPENDED from Verano's letter-complaint filed against him despite two
the practice of law for a period of TWO (2) YEARS (2) notices from the Court ordering him to do so, failed
with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or to attend the mandatory conference and file his
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.18 position paper despite orders from the IBP, and
jumped bail in the criminal cases filed against him.
In its Resolution19 dated October 10, 2014, the IBP
Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve
The Court agrees with Commissioner Antiquiera's of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Willful
observation. While the SPA executed by Verano Disobedience to a Lawful Order of the Court and
empowered Atty. Diores, in his private capacity, to Conviction for Estafa, both in violation of Section 27,
use the subject property as guaranty for his bail bond Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. He is
1âwphi1

in some of his criminal cases, this did not grant hereby DISBARRED, and his name is
him carte blanche to use the said property to secure ordered STRICKEN FROM the Roll of Attorneys
bail bonds in his other criminal cases which were not effective immediately upon the date of his receipt of
included in the SP A, much less enter into a MOA with this Decision.
Visayan Surety for the said purpose. Such act not
only violates the trust granted to him by Verano, but Atty. Diores is hereby DIRECTED to immediately file a
also shows doubt as to his moral character. Manifestation to the Court that his disbarment has
commenced, copy furnished to all courts and quasi-
Moreover, the fact that Atty. Diores jumped bail in the judicial bodies where he has entered his appearance
criminal cases filed against him, failed to file a as counsel.
comment in the instant case despite notice from the
Court, and also failed to attend the mandatory Let copies of this Decision be furnished to: (a) the
conference and file his position paper when he was Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to
directed to do so by the IBP, shows his propensity to all courts throughout the country for their information
willfully disobey the orders - of the Court, no less - and guidance; (b) the Integrated Bar of the
and other judicial authorities, including the IBP, which Philippines; and (c) the Office of the Bar Confidant to
is a grave affront to the legal profession, and which be appended to Atty. Di ores' personal record as a
should be penalized to the greatest extent. member of the Bar.

As for the recommended penalty, the Court agrees SO ORDERED.

with, and hereby adopts, the IBP's recommendation
that Atty. Diores should be disbarred, in view of the
totality of infractions he had committed, compounded
by his conviction for six (6) counts of Estafa by the
RTC.

It is also well-settled that Estafa, which is an act of

defrauding another person, whether committed
through abuse of confidence, false pretenses or other
fraudulent acts,24 is a crime involving moral
turpitude25 which is also a violation of Canon 1, Rule
1.01 of the CPR, and a ground to disbar or suspend a
lawyer as gross misconduct under Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court.

Here, Atty. Diores was convicted of not only one, but

six (6) counts of Estafa through false pretenses and
fraudulent means under Article 315(2)(a) of the
Revised Penal Code. Such conviction simply shows
his criminal tendency to defraud and deceive other
people into remitting to him their hard-earned money,
which the legal profession condemns in the strongest
terms. This, together with his willful disobedience of
court orders and his act of using Verano's subject
property as guaranty for his bail bond outside the
criminal cases wherein he was authorized, cements
his utter unfitness to continue exercising his duties as
a lawyer. Thus, the Court will not hesitate to adopt the
penalty of the IBP and hereby disbar Atty. Diores to
protect the trust and confidence of the people in this
noble profession.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis Fernan Diores,

Jr. is found GUILTY of Deceit in violation of Rule 1.01
 Atty. Sison later discovered that on May 26, 2011, the
RTC had already rendered a decision5 in favor of
MDAHI granting its insurance claim plus interests in
the amount of approximately P65,000,000.00.

On August 11, 2011, Atty. Camacho sent a letter6 to

A.C. No. 10910 MDAHI recommending a settlement with Paramount
[Formerly CBD Case No. 12-3594) Insurance in Civil Case No. 05-655 in the amount of
Pl5,000,000.00 allegedly to prevent a protracted
ANTERO M. SISON, JR., Complainant, appeal with the appellate court. MDAHI refused the
vs. offer of compromise and did not indicate its conforme
ATTY. MANUEL N. CAMACHO, Respondent. on the letter of Atty. Camacho. Surprisingly, even
without the written conformity of MDAHI, Atty.
DECISION Camacho filed the Satisfaction of Judgment,7 dated
August 15, 2011, before the R TC stating that the
PERCURIAM: parties had entered into a compromise agreement.

In his verified affidavit-complaint,1 dated September On August 18, 2011, Atty. Sison met with Atty.
17, 2012, filed before the Integrated Bar of the Camacho to clarify the events that transpired.8 He
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (JBP- asked Atty. Camacho whether he paid the amount of
CBD), complainant Atty. Antero M. Sison, Jr. (Atty. Pl,288,260.00 as additional dockets fees, and the
Sison), president of Marsman-Drysdale Agribusiness latter replied that he simply gave it to the clerk of court
Holdings Inc. (MDAHI), charged respondent Atty. as the payment period had lapsed.
Manuel Camacho (Atty. Camacho) with violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). He Disappointed with the actions of Atty. Camacho, Atty.
accused Atty. Camacho of violating Rule 1.01, for Sison sent a letter,9 dated August 24, 2011, stating
dishonestly entering into a compromise agreement that he was alarmed that the former would accept a
without authorization, and Rule 16.01, for failure to disadvantageous compromise; that it was against
render an accounting of funds which were supposed company policy to bribe any government official with
to be paid as additional docket fees. respect to the Pl,288,260.00 given to the clerk of
court; and that MDAHI would only pay P200,000.00 to
Complaint's Position Atty. Camacho as attorney's fees.

Atty. Sison alleged that Atty. Camacho was the Respondent's Position
counsel of MDAHI in an insurance claim action
against Paramount Life & General Insurance In his verified answer,10 dated October 30, 2012, Atty.
Corp. (Paramount Insurance), docketed as Civil Case Camacho denied all the allegations against him. He
No. 05-655, before the Regional Trial Court, Makati stressed that he had the authority to enter into the
City, Branch 139 (RTC). The initial insurance claim of compromise agreement. Moreover, the alleged docket
MDAHI against Paramount Insurance was fees given to him by MDAHI formed part of his
P14,863,777.00. attorney's fees.

On March 4, 2011, Atty. Camacho met with Atty. He further stated in his position paper11 that the
Enrique Dimaano (Atty. Dimaano), corporate judgment debt was paid and accepted by MDAHI
secretary of MDAHI, and proposed to increase their without any objection, as duly evidenced by an
claim to P64,412,534. l 8 by taking into account the acknowledgment receipt.12 Thus, there was no
interests imposed. Atty. Camacho, however, clarified irregularity in the compromise agreement.
that the increase in the claim would require additional
docket fees in the amount of Pl,288,260.00, as shown With respect to the amount handed to him, Atty.
in his hand-written computation.2 MDAHI agreed and Camacho averred that he filed a Motion to Compel
granted the said amount to Atty. Dimaano which was Plaintiff to Pay Attorney's Fee on September 13, 2011
evidenced by a Payment Request/Order before the RTC. The Court granted the said motion in
Form.3 On May 27, 2011, Atty. Dimaano gave the its April 12, 2012 Order13 stating that the amount of
money for docket fees to Atty. Camacho who Pl,288,260.00 was considered as part of his attorney's
promised to issue a receipt for the said amount, but fees.
never did.4
On July 6, 2012, the R TC issued an Order14 resolving
the motion for reconsideration filed by both parties in
favor of Atty. Camacho. In the said order, the RTC The Court finds that Atty. Camacho violated Rules
opined that only P300,000.00 was previously paid to 1.01 and 16.01 of the CPR.
Atty. Camacho15 as attorney's fees. Based on the
foregoing, Atty. Camacho asserted that the amount of Entering into a compromise
Pl,288,260.00 which he received, truly formed part of agreement without written
his unpaid attorney's fees. He stressed that the said authority of the client
RTC order had attained finality and constituted res
judicata on the present administrative case. He added Those in the legal profession must always conduct
that MDAHI disregarded the RTC order as it filed an themselves with honesty and integrity in all their
estafa case against him concerning the amount dealings. Members of the Bar took their oath to
ofl:ll,288,260.00. conduct themselves according to the best of their
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well
Report and Recommendation to the courts as to their clients and to delay no man
for money or malice. These mandates apply
After the mandatory conference on January 24, 2013 especially to dealings of lawyers with their clients
and upon a thorough evaluation of the evidence considering the highly fiduciary nature of their
presented by the parties in their respective position relationship.22
papers, the IBP-CBD submitted its Report and
Recommendation,16 dated April 1, 2013 finding Atty. In the practice of law, lawyers constantly formulate
Camacho to have violated the provisions of Rule 1.01 compromise agreements for the benefit of their
and Rule 16.01 of the CPR and recommending the clients. Article 1878 of the Civil Code provides that " [
imposition of the penalty of one (1) year suspension s ]pecial powers of attorney are necessary in the
from the practice of law against him. In its Resolution following cases: xxx (3) To compromise, to submit
No. XX-2013-474,17 dated April 16, 2013, the Board of questions to arbitration, to renounce the right to
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the appeal from a judgment, to waive objections to the
Philippines (Board) adopted the said report and venue of an action or to abandon a prescription
recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Eldrid already acquired xxx."
C. Antiquiera.
In line with the fiduciary duty of the Members of the
Aggrieved, Atty. Camacho filed a motion for Bar, Section 23, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
reconsideration18 before the Board reiterating that the specifies a stringent requirement with respect to
compromise agreement was valid because MDAHI compromise agreements, to wit:
did not reject the same and that the amount of
Pl,288,260.00 formed part of his attorney's fees. Sec. 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. -
Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any
In his Comment/Opposition,19 Atty. Sison countered case by any agreement in relation thereto made in
that Atty. Camacho never denied that he filed the writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of
satisfaction of judgment without the written authority ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without
of MDAHI and that there was ca pending estafa case special authority, compromise their client's
against him before the Regional Trial Court, Makati litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a
City, Branch 146, docketed as Criminal Case No. 13- client's claim but the full amount in cash.
1688, regarding the Pl,288,260.00 handed to him.
[Emphasis and Underscoring Supplied]
In its Resolution No. XXI-2014-532,20 dated August 10,
2014, the Board adopted the report and In the case at bench, the R TC decision, dated May
recommendation21 of National Director Dominic C.M. 26, 2011, awarded MDAHI approximately
Solis. The Board partially granted the motion for P65,000,000.00. When Paramount Insurance offered
reconsideration and dismissed, without prejudice, the a compromise settlement in the amount of
charge regarding the failure to account for the money, Pl5,000,000.00, it was clear as daylight that MDAHI
because it was premature to act on such issue due to never consented to the said offer. As can be gleaned
the pending criminal case against the Atty. Camacho. from Atty. Camacho's letter, MDAHI did not sign the
Accordingly, the penalty of one (1) year suspension conforme regarding the compromise agreement.23
imposed was lowered to six (6) months suspension
from the practice of law.
Glaringly, despite the lack of a written special
authority, Atty. Camacho agreed to a lower judgment
Hence, the case was elevated to the Court. award on behalf of his client and filed a satisfaction of
judgment before the R TC. The said pleading also
The Court's Ruling failed to bear the conformity of his client.24 Although
MDAHI subsequently received the payment of P15M actuations may give rise at the same time to criminal,
from Paramount Insurance, it does not erase Atty. civil, and administrative liabilities, each must be
Camacho's transgression in reaching the compromise determined in the appropriate case; and every case
agreement without the prior consent of his client. must be resolved in accordance with the facts and the
law applicable and the quantum of proof required in
For entering into a compromise agreement without the each.26
written authority of his client, Atty. Camacho violated
Rule 1.01 of the CPR, which states that " [a] lawyer Delving into the substance of the allegation, the Court
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or rules that Atty. Camacho indeed violated Rule 16.01
deceitful conduct." Members of the Bar must always of the CPR. When Atty. Camacho personally
conduct themselves in a way that promotes public requested MDAHI for additional docket fees, the latter
confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.25 obediently granted the amount of Pl ,288,260.00 to
the former. Certainly, it was understood that such
Failing to account for amount was necessary for the payment of supposed
the money of the client additional docket fees in Civil Case No. 05-655. Yet,
when Atty. Sison confronted Atty. Camacho regarding
Atty. Camacho was also charged with violation of the said amount, the latter replied that he simply gave
Rule 16.01 of the CPR, which provides for a lawyer's it to the clerk of court as the payment period had
duty to "account for all money or property collected or lapsed. Whether the said amount was pocketed by
received for or from the client." him or improperly given to the clerk of court as a form
of bribery, it was unmistakably clear that Atty.
Camacho did not apply the amount given to him by
Here, Atty. Sison alleged that MDAHI gave Atty.
his client for its intended legal purpose.
Camacho the amount of P 1,288,260.00 as payment
of additional docket fees but the latter failed to apply
the same for its intended purpose. In contrast, Atty. Atty. Camacho did not even deny making that request
Camacho invoked the July 6, 2012 Order of the RTC to MDAHI for additional docket fees and receiving
which declared the MDAHI allegation as such amount from his client. Rather, he set up a
unsubstantiated, and claimed that the said amount defense that the said amount formed part of his
formed part of his attorney's fees. The Board, on the attorney's fees. Such defense, however, is grossly
other hand, opined that it was still premature to decide contradictory to the established purpose of the
such issue because there was a pending estafa case, Pl,288,260.00. In its Payment Request/Order
docketed as Criminal Case No. 13-1688, filed by Form,27 it is plainly indicated therein that MDAHI
MDAHI against Atty. Camacho involving the same released the said amount only to be applied as
amount of P 1,288,260.00. payment for additional docket fees, and not for any
other purposes. Consequently, the lame excuse of
Atty. Camacho is bereft of merit because it constitutes
The Court is of the view that it is not premature to rule
a mere afterthought and a manifest disrespect to the
on the charge against Atty. Camacho for his failure to
legal profession. Atty. Camacho is treading on a
account for the money of his client. The pending case
perilous path where the payment of his attorney's fees
against him is criminal in nature. The issue therein is
is more important than his fiduciary and faithful duty of
whether he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
accounting the money of his client. Well-settled is the
misappropriating the amount of Pl,288,260.00
rule that lawyers are not entitled to unilaterally
entrusted to him by his client. The present case,
appropriate their clients' money for themselves by the
however, is administrative in character, requiring only
mere fact that the clients owe them attorney's fees.28
substantial evidence. It only entails a determination of
whether Atty. Camacho violated his solemn oath by
failing to account for the money of his client. Moreover, Atty. Camacho failed to issue a receipt to
Evidently, the adjudication of such issue in this MDAHI from the moment he received the said
administrative case shall not, in any way, affect the amount. In Tarog v. Ricafort,29 the Court held that
separate criminal proceeding. ethical and practical considerations made it both
natural and imperative for a lawyer to issue receipts,
even if not demanded, and to keep copies of the
In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only
receipts for his own records. Pursuant to Rule 16.01
issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be
of the CPR, a lawyer must be aware that he is
allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. The
accountable for the money entrusted to him by the
1âwphi1

only concern of the Court is the determination of the

clients, and that his only means of ensuring
respondent's administrative liability. The findings in
accountability is by issuing and keeping receipts.
this case will have no material bearing on other
judicial action which the parties may choose to file
against each other. While a lawyer's wrongful
Worse, on May 26, 2011, the RTC already rendered In this case, Atty. Camacho entered into a
its decision in Civil Case No. 05-655, adjudging compromise agreement without the conformity of his
MDAHI entitled to an insurance claim in the amount of client which is evidently against the provisions of the
approximately P.65,000,000.00. From that date on, CPR and the law. Moreover, he deliberately failed to
there was no more need for additional docket fees. account for the money he received from his client,
Apparently, still unaware of the judgment, MDAHI which was supposed to be paid as additional docket
subsequently released the money for additional fees. He even had the gall to impute that the money
docket fees to Atty. Dimaano, who handed it to Atty. was illicitly given to an officer of the court. The
Camacho on May 27, 2011. Despite a decision having palpable indiscretions of Atty. Camacho shall not be
been rendered, Atty. Camacho did not reject the said countenanced by the Court for these constitute as a
amount or return it to his client upon receipt. Instead, blatant and deliberate desecration of the fiduciary duty
he unilaterally withheld the said amount by that a lawyer owes to his client.
capriciously invoking the payment of his attorney's
fees. The Court finds that Atty. Camacho's acts are so
reprehensible, and his violations of the CPR are so
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the flagrant, exhibiting his moral unfitness and inability to
counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty discharge his duties as a member of the Bar. His
to account for the money or property collected or actions erode rather than enhance the public
received for or from his client. Money entrusted to a perception of the legal profession. Therefore, in view
lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for the of the totality of his violations, as well as the damage
purpose should be immediately returned. A lawyer's and prejudice they caused to his client, Atty.
failure, to return upon demand, the funds held by him Camacho deserves the ultimate penalty of
on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption disbarment.
that he has appropriated the same for his own use in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such Further, he must be ordered to return the amount of
act is a gross violation of general morality as well as Pl,288,260.00 to MDAHI, which he received in his
of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in professional capacity for payment of the purported
the legal profession and deserves punishment.30 additional docket fees. Disciplinary proceedings
revolve around the determination of the respondent-
Administrative penalty lawyer's administrative liability, which must include
those intrinsically linked to his professional
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even engagement.35
disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney,
for violation of the lawyer's oath and/or for breach of WHEREFORE, Atty. Manuel N. Camacho is found
the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and Rule 16.01 of the
CPR. The practice of law is a profession, a form of Code of Professional Responsibility. For reasons
public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to above-stated, he is DISBARRED from the practice of
those who are qualified and who possess good moral law and his name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys,
character. The appropriate penalty for an errant effective immediately.
lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the surrounding facts.31 Furthermore, Atty. Manuel N. Camacho
is ORDERED to return to Marsman-Drysdale
In Luna v. Galarrita,32 the Court suspended the Agribusiness Holdings Inc. the money intended to pay
respondent lawyer for two (2) years because he for additional docket fees which he received from the
accepted a compromise agreement without valid latter in the amount of P 1,288,260.00 within ninety
authority and he failed to tum over the payment to his (90) days from the finality of this decision.
client. In the case of Melendrez v. Decena,33 the
lawyer therein was disbarred because he entered Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Office of
into a compromise agreement without the special the Bar Confidant to be entered into the records of
authority of his client and he drafted deceptive and respondent Atty. Manuel N. Camacho. Copies shall
dishonest contracts. Similarly, in Navarro v. Meneses likewise be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
III,34 another lawyer, who misappropriated the money Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator
entrusted to him by his client which he failed and/or for circulation to all courts concerned.
refused to account for despite repeated demands,
was disbarred because his lack of personal honesty SO ORDERED.
and good moral character rendered him unworthy of
public confidence.
 Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) while he was
serving as Provincial Legal Officer.5

All three (3) complaints prayed that Muñoz be disbarred

for unlawfully engaging in private practice. In addition,
Olaybal sought Muñoz's disbarment for acts of disloyalty,
particularly, for violating the rule against conflict of
interest.6

To support their position, the complainants raised that

Muñoz had been previously disciplined by the Ombudsman
A.C. No. 5582, January 24, 2017 for two (2) counts of unauthorized practice of profession
in OMB-ADM-101-0462, and was meted the penalty of
ARTHUR O. MONARES, Complainant, v. ATTY. LEVI P. removal and dismissal from service. The complainants
MUÑOZ, Respondent. further manifested that Muñoz had been convicted by the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Legazpi City in
A.C. No. 5604, January 24, 2017 Criminal Case Nos. 25568 and 25569 for violation of
Section 7(b)(2) in relation to Section 11 of Republic Act
ALBAY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, No. 6713.7 Muñoz's conviction has since become final
INC., Complainant, v. ATTY. LEVI P. pursuant to the Court's Resolution dated June 14, 2004 in
MUÑOZ, Respondent. G.R. No. 160668.8

A.C. No. 5652, January 24, 2017 In his respective comments to the complaints,9 Muñoz
claimed that he had requested Governor Al Francis C.
BENJILIEH M. CONSTANTE,1, Complainant, v. ATTY. Bichara (Governor Bichara) for authority to continue his
LEVI P. MUÑOZ, Respondent. private practice shortly after his appointment. This
request was granted on July 18, 199510 Thereafter, Muñoz
DECISION submitted the same request to Rafael C. Alunan III, then
Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG).11 On September 8, 1995, Acting
CAGUIOA, J:
Secretary Alexander P. Aguirre granted Muñoz's request,
under the following conditions:
For resolution is the Joint Petition for Review with Prayer
for Absolution and/or Clemency2 (Joint Petition) dated May
1. That no government time, personnel, funds or
14, 2009 filed by respondent Atty. Levi P. Muñoz (Muñoz)
supplies shall be utilized in connection (sic)
, in connection with the complaints for disbarment filed by
and that no conflict of interest with your present
by Arthur O. Monares (Monares), Atty. Oliver 0. Olaybal
position as Provincial Legal Officer shall arise
(Olaybal) purportedly representing Albay Electric
thereby;
Cooperative, Inc. (ALECO), and Benjilieh M. Constante
chan rob leslaw

(Constante), dated January 17, 2002, February 4, 2002

and March 21, 2002, respectively. 2. That the time so devoted outside of office hours,
the place(s) and under what circumstances you
can engage in private employment shall be fixed
Monares is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 9923 filed against by the Governor of Albay to the end that it will
Ludolfo Muñoz (Ludolfo) before the Regional Trial Court not impair in any way your efficiency; and
(RTC) of Legazpi City. In his complaint, Monares alleged
that Muñoz represented his brother Ludolfo in the said
3. That any violation of the above restrictions will be
case during regular government hours while employed as
a ground for the cancellation and/or revocation of
Provincial Legal Officer of Albay City.3
this authority.12 (Emphasis supplied)

Under the chairmanship of Olaybal, ALECO's old board of

Pursuant to the DILG's authorization, Governor Bichara
directors (BOD) engaged Muñoz as retained counsel
imposed the following conditions upon Muñoz:
sometime in June 1998. Olaybal averred that Muñoz did
not inform ALECO's old BOD that he was employed as
Provincial Legal Officer at such time. Olaybal raised that a. [Y]ou cannot handle cases against the Province of
after its administrator, the National Electrification Albay;chanrob leslaw

Administration (NEA), deactivated the old BOD on the

ground of mismanagement, Muñoz served as retained b. [Y]ou will be on call and you will have no fix (sic)
counsel of the NEA-appointed team which took over the working hours provided that the efficiency of the
management of ALECO. Moreover, Olaybal alleged that Provincial Legal Office shall not be prejudiced;cha nrob leslaw

Muñoz illegally collected payments in the form of notarial

and professional fees in excess of what was agreed upon c. [Y]ou are exempted in (sic) accomplishing your
in their retainer agreement.4 Daily Time Record considering the limitation
already mentioned above; [and]
Constante is the Executive Assistant for Legal Affairs of
Sunwest Construction and Development Corporation d. In addition to the above enumeration[,] you are
(Sunwest). Constante claimed that Muñoz filed ten (10) to perform functions subject to limitations in Sec.
cases against Sunwest on Ludolfo's behalf before the 481 of RA 7160.13
Muñoz emphasized that his authority to engage in private The Court agrees with the IBP-BOG's findings and
practice was renewed by Governor Bichara on July 3, recommendations.
1998 for his second term ending in July 2001, and again
on July 5, 2001 for his third term ending in July 2004.14 Muñoz violated the conditions of his
DILG authorization.
The complaints were separately referred by the Court to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for Munoz's DILG authorization prohibited him from utilizing
investigation, report and recommendation.15 The government time for his private practice. As correctly
complaints were then consolidated through the Order observed by Commissioner Aguila, Rule XVII of the
dated January 16, 2003 issued by Commissioner Milagros Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order
V. San Juan.16 Subsequently, the complaints underwent a No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws (Omnibus
series of re-assignments, until finally assigned to Rules), requires government officers and employees of all
Commissioner Dorotea B. Aguila.17 departments and agencies, except those covered by
special laws, to render not less than eight (8) hours of
In his Report dated March 11, 200518 (IBP Report), work a day for five (5) days a week, or a total of forty
Commissioner Aguila recommended that Muñoz be found (40) hours a week.30 The number of required weekly
guilty of gross misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01, working hours may not be reduced, even in cases where
6.02, 15.01 and 15.03 of the Code of Professional the department or agency adopts a flexible work
Responsibility (CPR). The penalty of suspension from the schedule.31
practice of law for an aggregate period of four (4)
years19 was recommended. On automatic review, the IBP Notably, Muñoz did not deny Monares' allegation that he
Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) approved and adopted made at least eighty-six (86) court appearances in
Commissioner Aguila's recommendation in a Resolution connection with at least thirty (30) cases from April 11,
dated October 22, 2005.20 1996 to August 1, 2001.32 He merely alleged that his
private practice did not prejudice the functions of his
On December 22, 2005, Muñoz filed an Ex-Parte Appeal office.
for Mercy, Clemency and Compassion before the IBP-BOG,
praying that the recommended penalty be reduced to one Court appearances are necessarily made within regular
(1) year.21 This appeal was denied on January 28, 2006.22 government working hours, from 8:00 in the morning to
12:00 noon, and 1:00 to 5:00 in the
Muñoz filed before this Court an Ex-Parte Appeal for afternoon.33 Additional time is likewise required to study
Mercy, Clemency, Forgiveness and Compassion23 (Appeal) each case, draft pleadings and prepare for trial. The sheer
dated April 8, 2006 praying for the reduction of the volume of cases handled by Muñoz clearly indicates that
recommended penalty of suspension for four (4) years to government time was necessarily utilized in pursuit of his
one (1) year or less, and the dismissal of the complaints private practice, in clear violation of the DILG
for disbarment filed against him. As an alternative prayer, authorization and Rule 6.0234 of the CPR.
Muñoz requested that he be granted special limited
authority to practice law until all his pending cases are Muñoz should have requested for
terminated.24 authority to engage in private practice
from the Secretary of DILG for his
In his Appeal, Muñoz, insisted that when he served as second and third terms.
Provincial Legal Officer from June 1995 to May 2002, he
engaged in private practice pursuant to the three (3) Acting Secretary Aguirre's grant of authority cannot be
written authorities issued by Governor Bichara, and the unreasonably construed to have been perpetual.
written authority of the DILG issued during his first term, Moreover, Muñoz cannot claim that he believed in good
which he claims had never been revoked. Muñoz also faith that the authority granted by Governor Bichara for
argued that no conflict of interest existed between his second and third terms sufficed.
ALECO's old BOD and the NEA management team, since
he was engaged as retained counsel of ALECO as an
institution, not its management teams.25 Memorandum No. 17 dated September 4, 1986
(Memorandum 17) , which Muñoz himself cites in his Joint
Petition, is clear and leaves no room for interpretation.
On August 28, 2006, the Court resolved to remand The power to grant authority to engage in the practice of
Muñoz's Appeal to the IBP for disposition.26 one's profession to officers and employees in the public
service lies with the head of the department, in
Acting on Muñoz's Appeal, the IBP-BOG issued a accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised
Resolution reducing the recommended period of Civil Service Rules which provides, in part:
suspension from four (4) to three (3) years.27 Unsatisfied,
Muñoz filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the IBP- Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in
BOG denied on December 11, 2008.28 any private business, vocation, or profession or be
connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or
Aggrieved, Muñoz elevated his case anew to this Court industrial undertaking without a written permission
through this Joint Petition. In fine, Muñoz reiterates the from the head of Department: Provided, That this
allegations in his Appeal, with the additional assertion that prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers
the fees he collected from ALECO were contemplated and employees whose duties and responsibilities require
under their retainer agreement.29 that their entire time be at the disposal of the
Government: Provided, further, That if an employee is
granted permission to engage in outside activities, the 2002.37 (Underscoring omitted; additional emphasis
time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by supplied)
the chief of the agency to the end that it will not impair in
any way the efficiency of the officer or employee x x x. Muñoz thereafter served as retained counsel of ALECO
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) under the direction of the NEA management team. Muñoz
could have easily anticipated that his advice would be
Memorandum 17 was issued more than nine (9) years sought with respect to the prosecution of the members of
prior to Muñoz's appointment as Provincial Legal Officer, the old BOD, considering that the latter was deactivated
hence, he cannot feign ignorance thereof. As a local public due to alleged mismanagement. The conflict of interest
official, it was incumbent upon Muñoz to secure the proper between Olaybal's board on one hand, and NEA and its
authority from the Secretary of the DILG not only for his management team on the other, is apparent. By
first term, but also his second and third. His failure to do representing conflicting interests without the permission
so rendered him liable for unauthorized practice of his of all parties involved, Muñoz violated Rules 15.01 and
profession and violation of Rule 1.0135 of the CPR. 15.03 of the CPR.38

Muñoz represented conflicting interests. In Catu v. Rellosa,39 the Court imposed the penalty of
suspension for six (6) months upon a punong
Muñoz cannot elude Olaybal's allegations of disloyalty. barangay who acted as counsel for respondents in an
In Mabini Colleges, Inc. v. Pajarillo,36 the Court explained ejectment case without securing the authority of the
the tests to determine the existence of conflict of interest, Secretary of DILG. In Aniñon v. Sabitsana, Jr.,40 the Court
thus: imposed the penalty of one (1) year suspension upon a
lawyer who accepted a new engagement that required him
to oppose the interests of a party whom he previously
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents represented. In view of Muñoz's multiple infractions, the
inconsistent interests of two or more opposing Court finds the recommended penalty of suspension for an
parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one aggregate period of three (3) years proper.
client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or
claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other
client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this WHEREFORE, Atty. Levi P. Muñoz is found GUILTY of
argument will be opposed by him when he argues gross misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01, 6.02, 15.01
for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in and 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
which confidential communications have been confided, hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed of three (3) years effective upon receipt of this Decision,
or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interest if the with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of any
acceptance of the new retainer will require the violation hereunder shall be dealt with more severely.
attorney to perform an act which will injuriously
affect his first client in any matter in which he SO ORDERED.
represents him and also whether he will be called
upon in his new relation to use against his first
client any knowledge acquired through their
connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests
is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent
an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance thereof. (Emphasis supplied)

As Muñoz himself detailed in his Joint Petition, he acted as

counsel for ALECO under the management of the old BOD
in the following cases:

A. Civil Case No. 10007 — ALECO (Petitioner) vs. Eleuterio

Adonay, NEA Project Supervisor and his team John Catral
et. al., a case filed by Oliver O. Olaybal and his
group. For: Injunction, Accounting with Prayer for Writs
of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order, seeking to stop the election of the new set of
member (sic) of the Board of Directors x x x.

B. Civil Case [N]o. 10066 entitled ALBAY ELECTRIC

COOPERATIVE, INC. as Petitioner, also filed by Oliver O.
Olaybal, a case for Prohibition, Mandamus and
Receivership, with Preliminary Prohibition and Mandatory
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining and Mandatory
Orders. Among others, this Petition was filed to stop
the second scheduled election of the ALECO Board of
Directors scheduled for February 23, and 24,
 In his Report, IBP Investigating
Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid Jr.
summarized the allegations of the
complainant in this wise:

"x x x. In his Letter-Complaint,

Complainant alleged, among others, that
Respondent in notarizing several
JONAR SANTIAGO, COMPLAINANT, documents on different dates failed
VS. ATTY. EDISON V. RAFANAN, and/or refused to: a)make the proper
RESPONDENT. notation regarding the cedula or
community tax certificate of the affiants;
DECISION b) enter the details of the notarized
documents in the notarial register; and
PANGANIBAN, J.: c) make and execute the certification
Notaries public are expected to exert and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in
utmost care in the performance of their the documents he had notarized, all in
duties, which are impressed with public violation of the notarial provisions of the
interest. They are enjoined to comply Revised Administrative Code.
faithfully with the solemnities and
requirements of the Notarial Law. This "Complainant likewise alleged that
Court will not hesitate to mete out Respondent executed an Affidavit in
appropriate sanctions to those who favor of his client and offered the same
violate it or neglect observance thereof. as evidence in the case wherein he was
actively representing his client. Finally,
Complainant alleges that on a certain
The Case and the Facts date, Respondent accompanied by
several persons waited for Complainant
Before us is a verified Complaint[1] filed after the hearing and after confronting
by Jonar Santiago, an employee of the the latter disarmed him of his sidearm
Bureau of Jail Management and and thereafter uttered insulting words
Penology (BJMP), for the disbarment of and veiled threats."[6]
Atty. Edison V. Rafanan. The Complaint On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the
was filed with the Commission on Bar January 19, 2001 Order of the
Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar CBD,[7] Atty. Rafanan filed his verified
of the Philippines (IBP) on January 16, Answer.[8] He admitted having
2001. It charged Atty. Rafanan with administered the oath to the affiants
deceit; malpractice or other gross whose Affidavits were attached to the
misconduct in office under Section 27 of verified Complaint. He believed,
Rule 138[2] of the Rules of Court; and however, that the non-notation of their
violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02 and 1.03[3], Residence Certificates in the Affidavits
Canon 5[4], and Canons 12.07[5] and and the Counter-affidavits was allowed.
12.08 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). He opined that the notation of residence
certificates applied only to documents on January 4, 2001. Respondent
acknowledged by a notary public and requested the assistance of the
was not mandatory for affidavits related Cabanatuan City Police the following
to cases pending before courts and other day, January 5, 2001, which was the
government offices. He pointed out that next scheduled hearing, to avoid a
in the latter, the affidavits, which were repetition of the incident and to allay the
sworn to before government fears of his clients. In support of his
prosecutors, did not have to indicate the allegations, he submitted
residence certificates of the affiants. Certifications[10] from the Cabanatuan
Neither did other notaries public in City Police and the Joint Affidavit[11] of
Nueva Ecija -- some of whom were older the two police officers who had assisted
practitioners -- indicate the affiants' them.
residence certificates on the documents
they notarized, or have entries in their Lastly, he contended that the case had
notarial register for these documents. been initiated for no other purpose than
to harass him, because he was the
As to his alleged failure to comply with counsel of Barangay Captain Ernesto
the certification required by Section 3 of Ramos in the cases filed by the latter
Rule 112[9] of the Rules of Criminal before the ombudsman and the BJMP
Procedure, respondent explained that as against complainant.
counsel of the affiants, he had the option
to comply or not with the certification. After receipt of respondent's Answer, the
To nullify the Affidavits, it was CBD, through Commissioner Tyrone R.
complainant who was duty-bound to Cimafranca, set the case for hearing on
bring the said noncompliance to the June 5, 2001, at two o'clock in the
attention of the prosecutor conducting afternoon. Notices[12] of the hearing were
the preliminary investigation. sent to the parties by registered mail. On
the scheduled date and time of the
As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 hearing, only complainant appeared.
of the CPR, respondent argued that Respondent was unable to do so,
lawyers could testify on behalf of their apparently because he had received the
clients "on substantial matters, in cases Notice only on June 8, 2001.[13] The
where [their] testimony is essential to hearing was reset to July 3, 2001 at two
the ends of justice." Complainant o'clock in the afternoon.
charged respondent's clients with
attempted murder. Respondent averred On the same day, June 5, 2001,
that since they were in his house when complainant filed his Reply[14] to the
the alleged crime occurred, "his verified Answer of respondent. The
testimony is very essential to the ends of latter's Rejoinder was received by the
justice." CBD on July 13, 2001.[15] It also received
complainant's Letter-Request[16] to
Respondent alleged that it was dispense with the hearings. Accordingly,
complainant who had threatened and it granted that request in its
harassed his clients after the hearing of Order[17] dated July 24, 2001, issued
their case by the provincial prosecutor through Commissioner Cimafranca. It
thereby directed the parties to submit
their respective memoranda within Respondent's Administrative
fifteen days from receipt of the Order, Liability
after which the case was to be deemed
submitted for resolution. Violation of the Notarial Law

The CBD received complainant's The Notarial Law is explicit on the

Memorandum[18] on September 26, obligations and duties of notaries public.
2001. Respondent did not file any. They are required to certify that the
party to every document acknowledged
before them has presented the proper
The IBP's Recommendation residence certificate (or exemption from
the residence tax); and to enter its
On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board number, place of issue and date as part
of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI- of such certification.[21] They are also
2003-172[19] approving and adopting the required to maintain and keep a notarial
Investigating Commissioner's Report register; to enter therein all instruments
that respondent had violated specific notarized by them; and to "give to each
requirements of the Notarial Law on the instrument executed, sworn to, or
execution of a certification, the entry of acknowledged before [them] a number
such certification in the notarial register, corresponding to the one in [their]
and the indication of the affiant's register [and to state therein] the page
residence certificate. The IBP Board of or pages of [their] register, on which the
Governors found his excuse for the same is recorded."[22] Failure to perform
violations unacceptable. It modified, these duties would result in the
however, the recommendation[20] of the revocation of their commission as
investigating commissioner by notaries public.[23]
increasing the fine to "P3,000 with a
warning that any repetition of the These formalities are mandatory and
violation will be dealt with a heavier cannot be simply neglected, considering
penalty." the degree of importance and
evidentiary weight attached to notarized
The other charges -- violation of Section documents. Notaries public entering
27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and into their commissions are presumed to
Canons 1.01 to 1.03, 12.07 and 12.08 of be aware of these elementary
the CPR --were dismissed for requirements.
insufficiency of evidence.
In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,[24] the
Court explained the value and meaning
The Court's Ruling of notarization as follows:

We agree with the Resolution of the IBP "The importance attached to the act of
Board of Governors. notarization cannot be overemphasized.
Notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. It is invested
with substantive public interest, such is patently irrelevant. No law dispenses
that only those who are qualified or with these formalities. Au contraire, the
authorized may act as notaries public. Notarial Law makes no qualification or
Notarization converts a private exception. It is appalling and
document into a public document thus inexcusable that he did away with the
making that document admissible in basics of notarial procedure allegedly
evidence without further proof of its because others were doing so. Being
authenticity. A notarial document is by swayed by the bad example of others is
law entitled to full faith and credit upon not an acceptable justification for
its face. Courts, administrative agencies breaking the law.
and the public at large must be able to
rely upon the acknowledgment executed We note further that the documents
by a notary public and appended to a attached to the verified Complaint are
private instrument." the Joint Counter-Affidavit of
respondent's clients Ernesto Ramos and
For this reason, notaries public should
Rey Geronimo, as well as their
not take for granted the solemn duties
witnesses' Affidavits relative to Criminal
pertaining to their office. Slipshod
Case No. 69-2000 for attempted
methods in their performance of the
murder, filed by complainant's brother
notarial act are never to be
against the aforementioned clients.
countenanced. They are expected to
These documents became the basis of
exert utmost care in the performance of
the present Complaint.
their duties,[25] which are dictated by
public policy and are impressed with
As correctly pointed out by the
public interest.
investigating commissioner, Section 3 of
Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal
It is clear from the pleadings before us --
Procedure expressly requires
and respondent has readily admitted --
respondent as notary -- in the absence of
that he violated the Notarial Law by
any fiscal, state prosecutor or
failing to enter in the documents
government official authorized to
notations of the residence certificate, as
administer the oath -- to "certify that he
well as the entry number and the pages
has personally examined the affiants
of the notarial registry.
and that he is satisfied that they
voluntarily executed and understood
Respondent believes, however, that
their affidavits." Respondent failed to do
noncompliance with those requirements
so with respect to the subject Affidavits
is not mandatory for affidavits relative
and Counter-Affidavits in the belief that
to cases pending before the courts and
-- as counsel for the affiants -- he was
government agencies. He points to
not required to comply with the
similar practices of older notaries in
certification requirement.
Nueva Ecija.
It must be emphasized that the primary
We cannot give credence to, much less
duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the
honor, his claim. His belief that the
land and promote respect for the law
requirements do not apply to affidavits
and legal processes.[26] They are
expected to be in the forefront in the measure in this case.
observance and maintenance of the rule
of law. This duty carries with it the Lawyer as Witness for Client
obligation to be well-informed of the
existing laws and to keep abreast with Complainant further faults respondent
legal developments, recent enactments for executing before Prosecutor
and jurisprudence.[27] It is imperative Leonardo Padolina an affidavit
that they be conversant with basic legal corroborating the defense of alibi
principles. Unless they faithfully comply proffered by respondent's clients,
with such duty, they may not be able to allegedly in violation of Rule 12.08 of the
discharge competently and diligently CPR: "A lawyer shall avoid testifying in
their obligations as members of the bar. behalf of his client."
Worse, they may become susceptible to
committing mistakes. Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR
states:
Where notaries public are lawyers, a
graver responsibility is placed upon "Rule 12.08 A lawyer shall avoid
them by reason of their solemn oath to testifying in behalf of his client, except:
obey the laws.[28] No custom or age-old
practice provides sufficient excuse or a) on formal matters, such as the
justification for their failure to adhere to mailing, authentication or custody of an
the provisions of the law. In this case, instrument and the like;
the excuse given by respondent
exhibited his clear ignorance of the b) on substantial matters, in cases where
Notarial Law, the Rules of Criminal his testimony is essential to the ends of
Procedure, and the importance of his justice, in which event he must, during
office as a notary public. his testimony, entrust the trial of the
case to another counsel."
Nonetheless, we do not agree with
Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer
complainant's plea to disbar respondent
is not disqualified from being a
from the practice of law. The power to
witness,[31] except only in certain cases
disbar must be exercised with great
pertaining to privileged communication
caution.[29] Disbarment will be imposed
arising from an attorney-client
as a penalty only in a clear case of
relationship.[32]
misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and the character of the lawyer
The reason behind such rule is the
as an officer of the court and a member
difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task
of the bar. Where any lesser penalty can
of dissociating their relation to their
accomplish the end desired, disbarment
clients as witnesses from that as
should not be decreed.[30] Considering
advocates. Witnesses are expected to tell
the nature of the infraction and the
the facts as they recall them. In
absence of deceit on the part of
contradistinction, advocates are
respondent, we believe that the penalty
partisans -- those who actively plead and
recommended by the IBP Board of
defend the cause of others. It is difficult
Governors is a sufficient disciplinary
to distinguish the fairness and the accused to be afforded full
impartiality of a disinterested witness opportunity to rebut the charges against
from the zeal of an advocate. The them. They are entitled to suggest all
question is one of propriety rather than those reasonable doubts that may arise
of competency of the lawyers who testify from the evidence as to their guilt; and
for their clients. to ensure that if they are convicted, such
conviction is according to law.
"Acting or appearing to act in the double
capacity of lawyer and witness for the Having undertaken the defense of the
client will provoke unkind criticism and accused, respondent, as defense counsel,
leave many people to suspect the was thus expected to spare no effort to
truthfulness of the lawyer because they save his clients from a wrong conviction.
cannot believe the lawyer as He had the duty to present -- by all fair
disinterested. The people will have a and honorable means -- every defense
plausible reason for thinking, and if and mitigating circumstance that the
their sympathies are against the lawyer's law permitted, to the end that his clients
client, they will have an opportunity, not would not be deprived of life, liberty or
likely to be neglected, for charging, that property, except by due process of
as a witness he fortified it with his own law.[36]
testimony. The testimony of the lawyer
becomes doubted and is looked upon as The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan
partial and untruthful."[33] was clearly necessary for the defense of
his clients, since it pointed out the fact
Thus, although the law does not forbid that on the alleged date and time of the
lawyers from being witnesses and at the incident, his clients were at his residence
same time counsels for a cause, the and could not have possibly committed
preference is for them to refrain from the crime charged against them.
testifying as witnesses, unless they Notably, in his Affidavit, complainant
absolutely have to; and should they do does not dispute the statements of
so, to withdraw from active management respondent or suggest the falsity of its
of the case.[34] contents.

Notwithstanding this guideline and the Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08
existence of the Affidavit executed by contemplates a situation in which
Atty. Rafanan in favor of his clients, we lawyers give their testimonies during the
cannot hastily make him trial. In this instance, the Affidavit was
administratively liable for the following submitted during the preliminary
reasons: investigation which, as such, was merely
inquisitorial.[37] Not being a trial of the
First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer case on the merits, a preliminary
to assert every remedy and defense that investigation has the oft-repeated
is authorized by law for the benefit of purposes of securing innocent persons
the client, especially in a criminal action against hasty, malicious and oppressive
in which the latter's life and liberty are prosecutions; protecting them from
at stake.[35] It is the fundamental right of open and public accusations of crime
and from the trouble as well as expense SO ORDERED.
and anxiety of a public trial; and
protecting the State from useless and
expensive prosecutions.[38] The
investigation is advisedly called
preliminary, as it is yet to be followed by
the trial proper.

Nonetheless, we deem it important to

stress and remind respondent to refrain
from accepting employment in any
matter in which he knows or has reason
to believe that he may be an essential
witness for the prospective client.
Furthermore, in future cases in which
his testimony may become essential to
serve the "ends of justice," the canons of
the profession require him to withdraw
from the active prosecution of these
cases.

No Proof of Harassment

The charge that respondent harassed

complainant and uttered insulting words
and veiled threats is not supported by
evidence. Allegation is never equivalent
to proof, and a bare charge cannot be
equated with liability.[39] It is not the
self-serving claim of complainant but
the version of respondent that is more
credible, considering that the latter's
allegations are corroborated by the
Affidavits of the police officers and the
Certifications of the Cabanatuan City
Police.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan

is found guilty of violating the Notarial
Law and Canon 5 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is
hereby FINED P3,000 with a warning
that similar infractions in the future will
be dealt with more severely.
 Information Office revealed that similar
advertisements were published in the
August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the
Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000
issue of The Philippine Star.[2]

On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G.

Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant
Court Administrator and Chief of the
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN v. ATTY. Public Information Office, filed an
RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO + administrative complaint against Atty.
Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper
456 Phil. 560 advertising and solicitation of his legal
services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and
Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27
of the Rules of Court.[3]
This administrative complaint arose
from a paid advertisement that appeared
In his answer, respondent admitted the
in the July 5, 2000 issue of the
acts imputed to him, but argued that
newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer,
advertising and solicitation per se are
which reads: "ANNULMENT OF
not prohibited acts; that the time has
MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-
come to change our views about the
2667."[1]
prohibition on advertising and
solicitation; that the interest of the
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff
public is not served by the absolute
member of the Public Information Office
prohibition on lawyer advertising; that
of the Supreme Court, called up the
the Court can lift the ban on lawyer
published telephone number and
advertising; and that the rationale
pretended to be an interested party. She
behind the decades-old prohibition
spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that
should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed
her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo,
that he be exonerated from all the
was an expert in handling annulment
charges against him and that the Court
cases and can guarantee a court decree
promulgate a ruling that advertisement
within four to six months, provided the
of legal services offered by a lawyer is
case will not involve separation of
not contrary to law, public policy and
property or custody of children. Mrs.
public order as long as it is dignified.[4]
Simbillo also said that her husband
charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of
The case was referred to the Integrated
which is payable at the time of filing of
Bar of the Philippines for investigation,
the case and the other half after a
report and recommendation.[5] On June
decision thereon has been rendered.
29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-
Further research by the Office of the
2002-306,[6] finding respondent guilty
Court Administrator and the Public
of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Court, and suspended him from the Rule 2.03. - A lawyer shall not do or
practice of law for one (1) year with the permit to be done any act designed
warning that a repetition of similar acts primarily to solicit legal business.
would be dealt with more severely. The
IBP Resolution was noted by this Court Rule 3.01. - A lawyer shall not use or
on November 11, 2002.[7] permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-
In the meantime, respondent filed an laudatory or unfair statement or claim
Urgent Motion for regarding his qualifications or legal
Reconsideration,[8] which was denied by services.
the IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
dated October 19, 2002[9]
Court states:
Hence, the instant petition
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension
for certiorari, which was docketed as
of attorneys by Supreme Court,
G.R. No. 157053 entitled, "Atty. Rizalino
grounds therefor. - A member of the bar
T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP
may be disbarred or suspended from his
Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty.
office as attorney by the Supreme Court
Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court
for any deceit, malpractice or other
Administrator and Chief, Public
gross misconduct in such office, grossly
Information Office, Respondents." This
immoral conduct or by reason of his
petition was consolidated with A.C. No.
conviction of a crime involving moral
5299 per the Court's Resolution dated
turpitude, or for any violation of the
March 4, 2003.
oath which he is required to take before
the admission to practice, or for a willful
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003,
disobedience appearing as attorney for a
the parties were required to manifest
party without authority to do so.
whether or not they were willing to
submit the case for resolution on the It has been repeatedly stressed that the
basis of the pleadings.[10] Complainant practice of law is not a business.[12] It is a
filed his Manifestation on April 25, profession in which duty to public
2003, stating that he is not submitting service, not money, is the primary
any additional pleading or evidence and consideration. Lawyering is not
is submitting the case for its early primarily meant to be a money-making
resolution on the basis of pleadings and venture, and law advocacy is not a
records thereof. [11] Respondent, on the capital that necessarily yields
other hand, filed a Supplemental profits.[13] The gaining of a livelihood
Memorandum on June 20, 2003. should be a secondary
consideration.[14] The duty to public
We agree with the IBP's Resolutions service and to the administration of
Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606. justice should be the primary
consideration of lawyers, who must
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of subordinate their personal interests or
what they owe to themselves.[15] The are a deliberate and contemptuous
following elements distinguish the legal affront on the Court's authority.
profession from a business:
What adds to the gravity of respondent's
acts is that in advertising himself as a
1. A duty of public service, of which self-styled "Annulment of Marriage
the emolument is a by-product, Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly
and in which one may attain the erodes and undermines not only the
highest eminence without making stability but also the sanctity of an
much money; institution still considered sacrosanct
despite the contemporary climate of
2. A relation as an "officer of the permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in
court" to the administration of assuring prospective clients that an
justice involving thorough annulment may be obtained in four to
sincerity, integrity and reliability; six months from the time of the filing of
the case,[19] he in fact encourages people,
3. A relation to clients in the highest who might have otherwise been
degree of fiduciary; disinclined and would have refrained
from dissolving their marriage bonds, to
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar do so.
characterized by candor, fairness,
and unwillingness to resort to Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal
current business methods of business is not altogether proscribed.
advertising and encroachment on However, for solicitation to be proper, it
their practice, or dealing directly must be compatible with the dignity of
with their clients.[16] the legal profession. If it is made in a
modest and decorous manner, it would
There is no question that respondent bring no injury to the lawyer and to the
committed the acts complained of. He bar.[20] Thus, the use of simple signs
himself admits that he caused the stating the name or names of the
publication of the advertisements. While lawyers, the office and residence address
he professes repentance and begs for the and fields of practice, as well as
Court's indulgence, his contrition rings advertisement in legal periodicals
hollow considering the fact that he bearing the same brief data, are
advertised his legal services again after permissible. Even the use of calling
he pleaded for compassion and after cards is now acceptable.[21] Publication
claiming that he had no intention to in reputable law lists, in a manner
violate the rules. Eight months after consistent with the standards of conduct
filing his answer, he again advertised his imposed by the canon, of brief
legal services in the August 14, 2001 biographical and informative data is
issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads likewise allowable. As explicitly stated
Newspaper.[17] Ten months later, he in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:[22]
caused the same advertisement to be
published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Such data must not be misleading and
Buy & Sell.[18] Such acts of respondent may include only a statement of the
lawyer's name and the names of his firm or of changes in the partnership,
professional associates; addresses, associates, firm name or office address,
telephone numbers, cable addresses; being for the convenience of the
branches of law practiced; date and profession, is not objectionable. He may
place of birth and admission to the bar; likewise have his name listed in a
schools attended with dates of telephone directory but not under a
graduation, degrees and other designation of special branch of law.
educational distinctions; public or (emphasis and italics supplied)
quasi-public offices; posts of honor;
WHEREFORE, in view of the
legal authorships; legal teaching
foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T.
positions; membership and offices in bar
SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of
associations and committees thereof, in
violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the
legal and scientific societies and legal
Code of Professional Responsibility and
fraternities; the fact of listings in other
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
reputable law lists; the names and
Court. He is SUSPENDED from the
addresses of references; and, with their
practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR
written consent, the names of clients
effective upon receipt of this Resolution.
regularly represented.
He is likewise STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same
The law list must be a reputable law list
or similar offense will be dealt with
published primarily for that purpose; it
more severely.
cannot be a mere supplemental feature
of a paper, magazine, trade journal or
Let copies of this Resolution be entered
periodical which is published
in his record as attorney and be
principally for other purposes. For that
furnished the Integrated Bar of the
reason, a lawyer may not properly
Philippines and all courts in the country
publish his brief biographical and
for their information and guidance.
informative data in a daily paper,
magazine, trade journal or
SO ORDERED.
society program. Nor may a lawyer
permit his name to be published in a
law list the conduct, management, or
contents of which are calculated or
likely to deceive or injure the public or
the bar, or to lower dignity or standing
of the profession.

The use of an ordinary simple

professional card is also permitted. The
card may contain only a statement of his
name, the name of the law firm which he
is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law
practiced. The publication of a simple
announcement of the opening of a law
 decision. Complainant further claims that she asked
respondent "several times" about the status of the
appeal, but "despite inquiries he deliberately withheld
response [sic]," to the damage and prejudice of the
spouses.4

The Resolution became final and executory on 8

January 2004. Complainant was informed of the
Resolution sometime in July 2005, when the Sheriff of
the RTC came to her house and informed her of the
Resolution.

On 9 September 2005, complainant filed an Affidavit

A.C. No. 9387 June 20, 2012 of Complaint5 with the Committee on Bar Discipline of
(Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1562) the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), seeking
the disbarment of respondent on the following
EMILIA R. HERNANDEZ, Complainant, grounds: deceit, malpractice, and grave misconduct.
vs. Complainant prays for moral damages in the amount
ATTY. VENANCIO B. PADILLA, Respondent. of ₱ 350,000.

RESOLUTION Through an Order6 dated 12 September 2005, Director

of Bar Discipline Rogelio A. Vinluan ordered
SERENO, J.: respondent to submit an answer to the Complaint. In
his Counter-Affidavit/Answer,7 respondent prayed for
This is a disbarment case filed by Emilia Hernandez the outright dismissal of the Complaint.
(complainant) against her lawyer, Atty. Venancio B.
Padilla (respondent) of Padilla Padilla Bautista Law Respondent explained that he was not the lawyer of
Offices, for his alleged negligence in the handling of complainant. He averred that prior to the mandatory
her case. conference set by the IBP on 13 December 2005, he
had never met complainant, because it was her
The records disclose that complainant and her husband who had personally transacted with him.
husband were the respondents in an ejectment case According to respondent, the husband "despondently
filed against them with the Regional Trial Court of pleaded to me to prepare a Memorandum on Appeal
Manila (RTC). because according to him the period given by the CA
was to lapse within two or three days."8 Thus,
In a Decision1 dated 28 June 2002, penned by Judge respondent claims that he filed a Memorandum on
Rosmari D. Carandang (Judge Carandang), the RTC Appeal because he honestly believed that "it is this
ordered that the Deed of Sale executed in favor of pleading which was required."9
complainant be cancelled; and that the latter pay the
complainant therein, Elisa Duigan (Duigan), attorney’s Before filing the Memorandum, respondent advised
fees and moral damages. complainant’s husband to settle the case. The latter
allegedly "gestured approval of the advice."10
Complainant and her husband filed their Notice of
Appeal with the RTC. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals After the husband of complainant picked up the
(CA) ordered them to file their Appellants’ Brief. They Memorandum for filing, respondent never saw or
chose respondent to represent them in the case. On heard from him again and thus assumed that the
their behalf, he filed a Memorandum on Appeal husband heeded his advice and settled the case.
instead of an Appellants’ Brief. Thus, Duigan filed a When respondent received an Order from the CA
Motion to Dismiss the Appeal. The CA granted the requiring him to file a comment on the Motion to
Motion in a Resolution2 dated 16 December 2003. Dismiss filed by Duigan, he "instructed his office staff
to contact Mr. Hernandez thru available means of
No Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the Resolution communication, but to no avail."11 Thus, when
dismissing the appeal was filed by the couple. complainant’s husband went to the office of
Complainant claims that because respondent ignored respondent to tell the latter that the Sheriff of the RTC
the Resolution, he acted with "deceit, unfaithfulness had informed complainant of the CA’s Resolution
amounting to malpractice of law."3 Complainant and dismissing the case, respondent was just as
her husband failed to file an appeal, because surprised. The lawyer exclaimed, "KALA KO BA
respondent never informed them of the adverse NAKIPAG AREGLO NA KAYO."12
In his 5 January 2009 Report,13 IBP Investigating prosecution of his case that calls for the strict
Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. found that application of the Code; x x x19
respondent violated Canons 5, 17, and 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (the Code). He As proof that none of them ever intended to enter into
recommended that respondent be suspended from a lawyer-client relationship, he also alleges that
practicing law from 3 to 6 months. complainant’s husband never contacted him after the
filing of the Memorandum of Appeal. According to
The board of governors of the IBP issued Resolution respondent, this behavior was "very unusual if he
No. XIX-2010-452 on 28 August 2010. Therein, they really believed that he engaged" the former’s
resolved to adopt and approve the Report and services.20
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Respondent was suspended from the practice of law Complainant pointed out in her Reply21 that respondent
for six months. was her lawyer, because he accepted her case and
an acceptance fee in the amount of ₱ 7,000.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration.14 He
prayed for the relaxation of the application of the According to respondent, however, "[C]ontrary to the
Canons of the Code. On 14 January 2012, the IBP complainant’s claim that he charged ₱ 7,000 as
board of governors passed Resolution No. XX-2012- acceptance fee," "the fee was only for the preparation
1715 partly granting his Motion and reducing the of the pleading which is even low for a Memorandum
penalty imposed to one-month suspension from the of Appeal: x x x."22
practice of law.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, acting attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty
Director for Bar Discipline Dennis A.B. Funa, through of fidelity to the client’s cause.23 Once a lawyer agrees
a letter16 addressed to then Chief Justice Renato C. to handle a case, it is that lawyer’s duty to serve the
Corona, transmitted the documents pertaining to the client with competence and diligence.24 Respondent
disbarment Complaint against respondent. has failed to fulfill this duty.

We adopt the factual findings of the board of According to respondent, he merely drafted the
governors of the IBP. This Court, however, disagrees pleading that complainant’s husband asked from him.
with its Decision to reduce the penalty to one-month Respondent also claims that he filed a Memorandum
suspension. We thus affirm the six-month suspension of Appeal, because he "honestly believed" that this
the Board originally imposed in its 28 August 2010 was the pleading required, based on what
Resolution. complainant’s husband said.

Respondent insists that he had never met The IBP Investigating Commissioner’s observation on
complainant prior to the mandatory conference set for this matter, in the 5 January 2009 Report, is correct.
the disbarment Complaint she filed against him. Regardless of the particular pleading his client may
However, a perusal of the Memorandum of Appeal have believed to be necessary, it was respondent’s
filed in the appellate court revealed that he had signed duty to know the proper pleading to be filed in appeals
as counsel for the defendant-appellants therein, from RTC decisions, viz:
including complainant and her husband.17 The
pleading starts with the following sentence: Having seen the Decision dated 18 June 2002 of the
"DEFENDANT[S]-APPELLANTS, by counsel, unto trial court, respondent should have known that the
this Honorable Court submit the Memorandum and mode of appeal to the Court of Appeals for said
further allege that: x x x."18 Nowhere does the Decision is by ordinary appeal under Section 2(a)
document say that it was filed only on behalf of Rule 41 of the1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
complainant’s husband. In all such cases, Rule 44 of the said Rules applies.25

It is further claimed by respondent that the relation When the RTC ruled against complainant and her
created between him and complainant’s husband husband, they filed a Notice of Appeal. Consequently,
cannot be treated as a "client-lawyer" relationship, viz: what should apply is the rule on ordinary appealed
cases or Rule 44 of the Rules on Civil Procedure.
It is no more than a client needing a legal document Rule 44 requires that the appellant’s brief be filed after
and had it prepared by a lawyer for a fee. Under the the records of the case have been elevated to the CA.
factual milieu and circumstances, it could not be said Respondent, as a litigator, was expected to know this
that a client entrusted to a lawyer handling and procedure. Canon 5 of the Code reads:
CANON 5 — A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal filing a comment, as ordered by the appellate court,
developments, participate in continuing legal he chose to ignore the CA’s Order. He claims that he
education programs, support efforts to achieve high was under the presumption that complainant and her
standards in law schools as well as in the practical husband had already settled the case, because he
training of law students and assist in disseminating had not heard from the husband since the filing of the
information regarding the law and jurisprudence. latter’s Memorandum of Appeal.

The obligations of lawyers as a consequence of their This explanation does not excuse respondent’s
Canon 5 duty have been expounded in Dulalia, Jr. v. actions.
Cruz,26 to wit:
First of all, there were several remedies that
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of respondent could have availed himself of, from the
lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote moment he received the Notice from the CA to the
respect for the law and legal processes. They are moment he received the disbarment Complaint filed
expected to be in the forefront in the observance and against him. But because of his negligence, he chose
maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with to sit on the case and do nothing.
it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing
laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, Second, respondent, as counsel, had the duty to
recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative inform his clients of the status of their case. His failure
that they be conversant with basic legal principles. to do so amounted to a violation of Rule 18.04 of the
Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may Code, which reads:
not be able to discharge competently and diligently
their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the
may become susceptible to committing mistakes. status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client’s request for information.
In his MR, respondent begged for the consideration of
the IBP, claiming that the reason for his failure to file If it were true that all attempts to contact his client
the proper pleading was that he "did not have enough proved futile, the least respondent could have done
time to acquaint himself thoroughly with the factual was to inform the CA by filing a Notice of Withdrawal
milieu of the case." The IBP reconsidered and of Appearance as counsel. He could have thus
thereafter significantly reduced the penalty originally explained why he was no longer the counsel of
imposed. complainant and her husband in the case and
informed the court that he could no longer contact
Respondent’s plea for leniency should not have been them.28 His failure to take this measure proves his
granted. negligence.

The supposed lack of time given to respondent to Lastly, the failure of respondent to file the proper
acquaint himself with the facts of the case does not pleading and a comment on Duigan’s Motion to
excuse his negligence. Dismiss is negligence on his part. Under 18.03 of the
1âwphi1

Code, a lawyer is liable for negligence in handling the

Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall client’s case, viz:
not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation. While it is true that respondent was not Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
complainant’s lawyer from the trial to the appellate entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
court stage, this fact did not excuse him from his duty therewith shall render him liable.
to diligently study a case he had agreed to handle. If
he felt he did not have enough time to study the Lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to
pertinent matters involved, as he was approached by them, otherwise their negligence in fulfilling their duty
complainant’s husband only two days before the would render them liable for disciplinary action.29
expiration of the period for filing the Appellant’s Brief,
respondent should have filed a motion for extension of
Respondent has failed to live up to his duties as a
time to file the proper pleading instead of whatever
lawyer. When a lawyer violates his duties to his client,
pleading he could come up with, just to "beat the
he engages in unethical and unprofessional conduct
deadline set by the Court of Appeals."27
for which he should be held accountable.30
Moreover, respondent does not deny that he was
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Venancio Padilla is
given notice of the fact that he filed the wrong
found guilty of violating Rules 18.02, 18.03, 18.04, as
pleading. However, instead of explaining his side by
well as Canon 5 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Hence, he is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS and STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the

personal records of respondent as a member of the
bar and furnished to the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts of the country for their
information and guidance.

No costs.
 application because of his personal interest over the
subject land. The complainant alleged that the
respondent exerted undue pressure and influence
over the complainant’s father, Miguel P. Olazo, for the
latter to contest the complainant’s sales application
and claim the subject land for himself. The
complainant also alleged that the respondent
prevailed upon Miguel Olazo to accept, on various
dates, sums of money as payment of the latter’s
alleged rights over the subject land. The complainant
A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC December 7, 2010 further claimed that the respondent brokered the
transfer of rights of the subject land between Miguel
JOVITO S. OLAZO, Complainant, Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, who is the
vs. nephew of the respondent’s deceased wife.
JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA (Ret.), Respondent.
As a result of the respondent’s abuse of his official
DECISION functions, the complainant’s sales application was
denied. The conveyance of rights to Joseph Jeffrey
BRION, J.: Rodriguez and his sales application were
subsequently given due course by the Department of
Before us is the disbarment case against retired Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga
(respondent) filed by Mr. Jovito S. Olazo The Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03
(complainant). The respondent is charged of violating
Rule 6.02,1 Rule 6.032 and Rule 1.013 of the Code of The second charge involves another parcel of land
Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting within the proclaimed areas belonging to Manuel
interests. Olazo, the complainant’s brother. The complainant
alleged that the respondent persuaded Miguel Olazo
Factual Background to direct Manuel to convey his rights over the land to
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. As a result of the
In March 1990, the complainant filed a sales respondent’s promptings, the rights to the land were
application covering a parcel of land situated in transferred to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
Barangay Lower Bicutan in the Municipality of Taguig.
The land (subject land) was previously part of Fort In addition, the complainant alleged that in May 1999,
Andres Bonifacio that was segregated and declared the respondent met with Manuel for the purpose of
open for disposition pursuant to Proclamation No. nullifying the conveyance of rights over the land to
2476,4 issued on January 7, 1986, and Proclamation Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The complainant claimed
No. 172,5 issued on October 16, 1987. that the respondent wanted the rights over the land
transferred to one Rolando Olazo, the Barangay
To implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum Chairman of Hagonoy, Taguig. The respondent in this
No. 119 was issued by then Executive Secretary regard executed an "Assurance" where he stated that
Catalino Macaraig, creating a Committee on Awards he was the lawyer of Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey
whose duty was to study, evaluate, and make a Rodriguez.
recommendation on the applications to purchase the
lands declared open for disposition. The Committee The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01
on Awards was headed by the Director of Lands and
the respondent was one of the Committee members, The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged
in his official capacity as the Congressman of Taguig in unlawful conduct considering his knowledge that
and Pateros (from 1987 to 1998); the respondent’s Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez was not a qualified
district includes the areas covered by the beneficiary under Memorandum No. 119. The
proclamations. complainant averred that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez is
not a bona fide resident of the proclaimed areas and
The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02 does not qualify for an award. Thus, the approval of
his sales application by the Committee on Awards
In the complaint,6 the complainant claimed that the amounted to a violation of the objectives of
respondent abused his position as Congressman and Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum No. 119.
as a member of the Committee on Awards when he
unduly interfered with the complainant’s sales
The complainant also alleged that the respondent denied that he had an inordinate interest in
violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and the subject land.
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 since he engaged in (3) He claimed that there was nothing wrong
the practice of law, within the one-year prohibition in signing as a witness in Miguel Olazo’s
period, when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee affidavit where the latter asserted his rights
and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee over the subject land. The affidavit merely
on Awards. attested to the truth.

In his Comment,7 the respondent claimed that the (4) He asserted that he and Miguel Olazo
present complaint is the third malicious charge filed were cousins and that the latter decided to sell
against him by the complainant. The first one was his rights over the subject land for the medical
submitted before the Judicial and Bar Council when treatment of his heart condition and the illness
he was nominated as an Associate Justice of the of his daughter, Francisca Olazo. The
Supreme Court; the second complaint is now pending respondent insisted that the money he
with the Office of the Ombudsman, for alleged extended to them was a form of loan.
violation of Section 3(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended. (5) The respondent’s participation in the
transaction between Miguel Olazo and Joseph
With his own supporting documents, the respondent Jeffrey Rodriguez involved the payment of the
presented a different version of the antecedent loan that the respondent extended to Miguel
events. Olazo.

The respondent asserted that Miguel Olazo owned (6) Manuel’s belated and secondhand
the rights over the subject land and he later conveyed allegation in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated
these rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Miguel January 20, 2000, regarding what his father
Olazo’s rights over the subject land and the transfer of told him, cannot prevail over his earlier
his rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were duly Sinumpaang Salaysay with Francisca Olazo,
recognized by the Secretary of the DENR before dated August 2, 1997. In the said Sinumpaang
whom the conflict of rights over the subject land Salaysay, Manuel categorically asserted that
(between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey his father Miguel Olazo, not the complainant,
Rodriguez, on one hand, and the complainant on the was the farmer-beneficiary. Manuel also
other hand) was brought. In its decision, the DENR expressed his agreement to the transfer of
found Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez a qualified applicant, rights (Pagpapatibay Sa Paglilipat Ng
and his application over the subject land was given Karapatan) in favor of Joseph Jeffrey
due course. The respondent emphasized that the Rodriguez, and the withdrawal of his father’s
DENR decision is now final and executory. It was application to give way to Joseph Jeffrey
affirmed by the Office of the President, by the Court of Rodriguez’s application.
Appeals and by the Supreme Court.
(7) The complainant’s allegation that the
The respondent also advanced the following respondent had pressured and influenced
defenses: Miguel Olazo to sell the subject land was not
sufficient as it was lacking in specificity and
(1) He denied the complainant’s allegation corroboration. The DENR decision was clear
that Miguel Olazo told him (complainant) that that the complainant had no rights over the
the respondent had been orchestrating to get subject land.
the subject land. The respondent argued that
this allegation was without corroboration and The respondent additionally denied violating Rule
was debunked by the affidavits of Miguel 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
Olazo and Francisca Olazo, the complainant’s alleged that during his third term as Congressman
sister. from 1995 to 1997, the conflicting applications of the
complainant, Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey
(2) He denied the complainant’s allegation Rodriguez were not included in the agenda for
that he offered the complainant ₱50,000.00 deliberation of the Committee on Awards. Rather,
for the subject land and that he (the their conflicting claims and their respective supporting
respondent) had exerted undue pressure and documents were before the Office of the Regional
influence on Miguel Olazo to claim the rights Director, NCR of the DENR. This office ruled over the
over the subject land. The respondent also conflicting claims only on August 2, 2000. This ruling
became the basis of the decision of the Secretary of Since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct
the DENR. demanded upon lawyers in the government service is
more exacting than the standards for those in private
Similarly, the respondent cannot be held liable under practice. Lawyers in the government service are
Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility subject to constant public scrutiny under norms of
since the provision applies to lawyers in the public accountability. They also bear the heavy
government service who are allowed by law to burden of having to put aside their private interest in
engage in private law practice and to those who, favor of the interest of the public; their private
though prohibited from engaging in the practice of activities should not interfere with the discharge of
law, have friends, former associates and relatives who their official functions.11
are in the active practice of law.8 In this regard, the
respondent had already completed his third term in The first charge involves a violation of Rule 6.02 of
Congress and his stint in the Committee on Awards the Code of Professional Responsibility. It imposes
when he represented Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez on the following restrictions in the conduct of a
May 24, 1999. government lawyer:

Lastly, the respondent claimed that he cannot be held A lawyer in the government service shall not use his
liable under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional public position to promote or advance his private
Responsibility since he did not intervene in the interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his
disposition of the conflicting applications of the public duties.
complainant and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez because
the applications were not submitted to the Committee The above provision prohibits a lawyer from using his
on Awards when he was still a member. or her public position to: (1) promote private interests;
(2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private
The Court’s Ruling interest to interfere with his or her public duties. We
previously held that the restriction extends to all
Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office government lawyers who use their public offices to
may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for promote their private interests.12
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a
government official.9 He may be disciplined by this In Huyssen v. Gutierrez,13 we defined promotion of
Court as a member of the Bar only when his private interest to include soliciting gifts or anything of
misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as monetary value in any transaction requiring the
a lawyer.10 approval of his or her office, or may be affected by the
functions of his or her office. In Ali v. Bubong,14 we
The issue in this case calls for a determination of recognized that private interest is not limited to direct
whether the respondent’s actions constitute a breach interest, but extends to advancing the interest of
of the standard ethical conduct – first, while the relatives. We also ruled that private interest interferes
respondent was still an elective public official and a with public duty when the respondent uses the office
member of the Committee on Awards; and second, and his or her knowledge of the intricacies of the law
when he was no longer a public official, but a private to benefit relatives.15
lawyer who represented a client before the office he
was previously connected with. In Vitriolo v. Dasig,16 we found the act of the
respondent (an official of the Commission on Higher
After a careful evaluation of the pleadings filed by Education) of extorting money from persons with
both parties and their respective pieces of evidence, applications or requests pending before her office to
we resolve to dismiss the administrative complaint. be a serious breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.17 We reached the same
Accountability of a government lawyer in public office conclusion in Huyssen, where we found the
respondent (an employee of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation) liable under Rule 6.02
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, based on
highlights the continuing standard of ethical conduct
the evidence showing that he demanded money from
to be observed by government lawyers in the
the complainant who had a pending application for
discharge of their official tasks. In addition to the
visas before his office.18
standard of conduct laid down under R.A. No. 6713
for government employees, a lawyer in the
government service is obliged to observe the standard Similarly, in Igoy v. Soriano19 we found the respondent
of conduct under the Code of Professional (a Court Attorney of this Court) liable for violating Rule
Responsibility. 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, after
considering the evidence showing that he demanded NCR;21 the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 12,
and received money from the complainant who had a 1996;22 and the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17,
pending case before this Court. 199623), do not contain any reference to the alleged
pressure or force exerted by the respondent over
Applying these legal precepts to the facts of the case, Miguel Olazo. The documents merely showed that the
we find the absence of any concrete proof that the respondent helped Miguel Olazo in having his farm
respondent abused his position as a Congressman lots (covered by the proclaimed areas) surveyed.
and as a member of the Committee on Awards in the They also showed that the respondent merely acted
manner defined under Rule 6.02 of the Code of as a witness in the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July
Professional Responsibility. 17, 1996. To our mind, there are neutral acts that may
be rendered by one relative to another, and do not
First, the records do not clearly show if the show how the respondent could have influenced the
complainant’s sales application was ever brought decision of Miguel Olazo to contest the complainant’s
before the Committee on Awards. By the complaint’s sales application. At the same time, we cannot give
own account, the complainant filed a sales application any credit to the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated
in March 1990 before the Land Management Bureau. January 20, 2000, of Manuel. They are not only
By 1996, the complainant’s sales application was hearsay but are contrary to what Miguel Olazo states
pending before the Office of the Regional Director, on the record. We note that Manuel had no personal
NCR of the DENR due to the conflicting claims of knowledge, other than what Miguel Olazo told him, of
Miguel Olazo, and, subsequently, of Joseph Jeffrey the force allegedly exerted by the respondent against
Rodriguez. The records show that it was only on Miguel Olazo.
August 2, 2000 that the Office of the Regional
Director, NCR of the DENR rendered its decision, or In turn, the respondent was able to provide a
after the term of the respondent’s elective public office satisfactory explanation - backed by corroborating
and membership to the Committee on Awards, which evidence - of the nature of the transaction in which he
expired in 1997. gave the various sums of money to Miguel Olazo and
Francisca Olazo in the year 1995. In her affidavits
These circumstances do not show that the respondent dated May 25, 200324 and July 21, 2010,25 Francisca
did in any way promote, advance or use his private Olazo corroborated the respondent’s claim that the
interests in the discharge of his official duties. To sums of money he extended to her and Miguel Olazo
repeat, since the sales application was not brought were loans used for their medical treatment. Miguel
before the Committee on Awards when the Olazo, in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated May 25,
respondent was still a member, no sufficient basis 2003, asserted that some of the money borrowed
exists to conclude that he used his position to obtain from the respondent was used for his medical
personal benefits. We note in this regard that the treatment and hospitalization expenses.
denial of the complainant’s sales application over the
subject land was made by the DENR, not by the The affidavit of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez further
Committee on Awards. corroborated the respondent’s claim that the latter’s
involvement was limited to being paid the loans he
Second, the complainant’s allegation that the gave to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo. According
respondent "orchestrated" the efforts to get the to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, he and Miguel Olazo
subject land does not specify how the orchestration agreed that a portion of the loan would be directly
was undertaken. What appears clear in the records is paid by Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez to the respondent
the uncorroborated Sinumpaang Salaysay of Miguel and the amount paid would be considered as part of
Olazo, dated May 25, 2003,20 categorically stating that the purchase price of the subject land.26
the respondent had no interest in the subject land,
and neither was he a contracting party in the transfer It also bears stressing that a facial comparison of the
of his rights over the subject land. In the absence of documentary evidence, specifically the dates when
any specific charge, Olazo’s disclaimer is the nearest the sums of money were extended by the respondent
relevant statement on the respondent’s alleged – on February 21, 1995, September 2, 1995 and
participation, and we find it to be in the respondent’s October 17, 1995, and the date when the Deed of
favor. Conveyance27 over the subject land was executed or
on October 25, 1995, showed that the sums of money
Third, the other documents executed by Miguel Olazo, were extended prior to the transfer of rights over the
that the complainant presented to support his claim subject land. These pieces of evidence are consistent
that the respondent exerted undue pressure and with the respondent’s allegation that Miguel Olazo
influence over his father (namely: the letter, dated decided to sell his rights over the subject land to pay
June 22, 1996, to the DENR Regional Director- the loans he obtained from the respondent and, also,
to finance his continuing medical treatment.
Private practice of law after separation from public separation from public office, except in the case of
office subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional
concerned cannot practice his profession in
As proof that the respondent was engaged in an connection with any matter before the office he used
unauthorized practice of law after his separation from to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall
the government service, the complainant presented likewise apply.
the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000,
of Manuel and the document entitled "Assurance" As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to
where the respondent legally represented Ramon Lee engage in the private practice of their profession
and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Nevertheless, the during their incumbency.29 By way of exception, a
foregoing pieces of evidence fail to persuade us to government lawyer can engage in the practice of his
conclude that there was a violation of Rule 6.03 of the or her profession under the following conditions: first,
Code of Professional Responsibility. the private practice is authorized by the Constitution
or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict
In Cayetano v. Monsod,28 we defined the practice of or tend to conflict with his or her official
law as any activity, in and out of court, that requires functions.30 The last paragraph of Section 7 provides
the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, an exception to the exception. In case of lawyers
training and experience. Moreover, we ruled that to separated from the government service who are
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts covered under subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7 of
which are characteristics of the profession; to practice R.A. No. 6713, a one-year prohibition is imposed to
law is to give notice or render any kind of service, practice law in connection with any matter before the
which device or service requires the use in any office he used to be with.
degree of legal knowledge or skill.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Under the circumstances, the foregoing definition echoes this restriction and prohibits lawyers, after
should be correlated with R.A. No. 6713 and Rule leaving the government service, to accept
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which engagement or employment in connection with any
impose certain restrictions on government lawyers to matter in which he had intervened while in the said
engage in private practice after their separation from service. The keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code of
the service. Professional Responsibility is the term "intervene"
which we previously interpreted to include an act of a
Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 reads: person who has the power to influence the
proceedings.31 Otherwise stated, to fall within the
ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. — In
Responsibility, the respondent must have accepted
addition to acts and
engagement or employment in a matter which, by
virtue of his public office, he had previously exercised
omissions of public officials and employees now power to influence the outcome of the proceedings. 1avv phi 1

prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the

following shall constitute prohibited acts and
As the records show, no evidence exists showing that
transactions of any public official and employee and
the respondent previously interfered with the sales
are hereby declared to be unlawful:
application covering Manuel’s land when the former
was still a member of the Committee on Awards. The
xxxx complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that
the respondent was engaged in the practice of law. At
(b) Outside employment and other activities related face value, the legal service rendered by the
thereto. – Public officials and employees during their respondent was limited only in the preparation of a
incumbency shall not: single document. In Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc.,32 we
specifically described private practice of law as one
xxxx that contemplates a succession of acts of the same
nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession the public as a lawyer.
unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided,
that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict In any event, even granting that respondent’s act fell
with their official functions; x x x within the definition of practice of law, the available
pieces of evidence are insufficient to show that the
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period legal representation was made before the Committee
of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or on Awards, or that the Assurance was intended to be
presented before it. These are matters for the 6.03 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
complainant to prove and we cannot consider any Responsibility, filed against retired Supreme Court
uncertainty in this regard against the respondent’s Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga, for lack of merit.
favor.
SO ORDERED.
Violation of Rule 1.01

Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in

unlawful, immoral or deceitful conduct. From the
above discussion, we already struck down the
complainant’s allegation that respondent engaged in
an unauthorized practice of law when he appeared as
a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.

We find that a similar treatment should be given to the

complainant’s claim that the respondent violated
paragraph 4(1)33 of Memorandum No. 119 when he
encouraged the sales application of Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez despite his knowledge that his nephew was
not a qualified applicant. The matter of Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez’s qualifications to apply for a sales
application over lots covered by the proclaimed areas
has been resolved in the affirmative by the Secretary
of the DENR in the decision dated April 3,
2004,34 when the DENR gave due course to his sales
application over the subject land. We are, at this point,
bound by this finding.

As pointed out by the respondent, the DENR decision

was affirmed by the Office of the President, the Court
of Appeals35 and, finally, the Court, per our Minute
Resolution, dated October 11, 2006, in G.R. No.
173453. In our Resolution, we dismissed the petition
for review on certiorari filed by the complainant after
finding, among others, that no reversible error was
committed by the Court of Appeals in its decision.36

All told, considering the serious consequences of the

penalty of disbarment or suspension of a member of
the Bar, the burden rests on the complainant to
present clear, convincing and satisfactory proof for the
Court to exercise its disciplinary powers.37 The
respondent generally is under no obligation to prove
his/her defense,38 until the burden shifts to him/her
because of what the complainant has proven. Where
no case has in the first place been proven, nothing
has to be rebutted in defense.39

With this in mind, we resolve to dismiss the

administrative case against the respondent for the
complainant’s failure to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the former committed unethical
infractions warranting the exercise of the Court’s
disciplinary power.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS

the administrative case for violation of Rule 6.02, Rule
 van shipment bearing No. KKFU7195683 which was
falsely declared to contain 40 pallets/1,690 cartons of
CD kit cleaner and plastic CD case, said imported
items having customs duties amounting to Three
Million Three Hundred Forty One Thousand Two
Hundred Forty Five Pesos (Php 3,341,245) of which
only the amount of One Hundred Thousand Three
Hundred Sixty Two Pesos (Php100,362) was paid, in
violation of the above-captioned law, and to the
prejudice and damage of the Government in the
G.R. No. 208290 December 11, 2013 amount of Three Million Two Hundred Forty Thousand
Eight Hundred Eighty Three Pesos (Php3,240,883).4
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs. In a hearing held on August 1, 2012, Garcia and
THE HONORABLE JUANITO C. CASTANEDA, JR., VestidasJr.pleaded "Not Guilty" to the aforementioned
HONORABLE CAESAR A. CASANOVA, charge. Thereafter, a preliminary conference was held
HONORABLE CIELITO N. MINDARO-GRULLA, AS on September 5, 2012 followed by thepre-trial on
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SPECIAL September 13, 2012. Both the prosecution and the
SECOND DIVISION, COURT OF TAX APPEALS; defense agreed to adopt the joint stipulations of facts
and MYRNA M. GARCIA AND CUSTODIO and issues entered in the course of the preliminary
MENDOZA VESTIDAS, JR., Respondents. conference.

RESOLUTION Thereafter, trial ensued.

PER CURIAM: The prosecution presented a number of witnesses

whoessentially observed5 the physical examination of
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Container Van No. KKFU 7195638 conducted6 by the
Rules of Court seeking to review the March 26, Bureau of Customs (BOC) and explained7 the process
20131 and May 15, 20132 Resolutions of the Court of of electronic filing under the Electronic to Mobile
Tax Appeals (CTA) in CTA Crim. Case No. 0-285, (E2M) Customs Systems of the BOC and the alleged
ordering the dismissal of the case against the private misdeclared goods therein.
respondents for violation of Section 36023 in relation
to Sections 2503 and 2530 (f) (i) and 1, (3) (4) and (5) Subsequent to the presentation of witnesses, the
of the Tariff and Customs Codeof the Philippines, as prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Evidence on
amended, on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. December 10, 2012.

The antecedentsas culled from the records: On January 15, 2013, Garcia and Vestidas, Jr. filed
their Omnibus Motion to File Demurrer to Evidence
Private respondents Myrna M. Garcia (Garcia) and with Leave of Court to Cancel Hearing Scheduled on
Custodio Mendoza Vestidas, Jr.(VestidasJr.)were January 21, 2013,whichwas grantedby the CTA.
charged before the CTA under an Information which Thereafter, they filed theDemurrer to Evidence, dated
reads: January 13, 2012, claimingthat the prosecution failed
to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the
That on or about November 5, 2011, or prior or following reasons:
subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the a)The pieces of documentary evidence
above-named accused Myrna M. Garcia and Custodio submitted by the prosecution were
Mendoza Vestidas, Jr. as owner/proprietress and inadmissible incourt;
broker of Plinth Enterprise respectively, conspiring
and confederating with each other, with intent to b)The object evidence consisting of the
defraud the government, did then and there willfully, allegedly misdeclared goods were not
unlawfully and fraudulently import into the Port of presented as evidence; and
Manila, 858 cartons of 17,160 pieces of Anti-Virus
Software Kaspersky Internet Security Premium 2012, c)None of the witnesses for the prosecution
subject to customs duties,by misdeclaration under made a positive identification of the two
Import Entry No. C-181011 and Bill of Lading No. accused as the ones responsible for the
PFCMAN1715, filed with the Bureau of Customs supposed misdeclaration.
(BOC),covering One Forty Footer (1x40) container
Despite opposition, the CTA dismissed the alleged misdeclared goods were not presented as
caseagainst Garcia and Vestidas Jr.in its March 26, evidence; and 3) the witnesses failed to positively
2013 Resolution, for failure of the prosecution to identifythe accused as responsible forthe
establish theirguilt beyond reasonable doubt. misdeclaration of goods.

According to the CTA, "no proof whatsoever was The Court agrees with the disposition of the CTA.
presented by the prosecution showing that the
certified true copies of the public documents offered in At the outset, it should be noted that the petition was
evidence against both accused were in fact issued by filed beyond the reglementary periodfor the
thelegal custodians."8 It cited Section 26, Rule 132 of filingthereof under Rule 65. The petition itself
the Revised Rules of Court, whichprovidesthat"when statedthat a copy of the May 15, 2013 Resolution was
the original of a document is a public record, it should received by the BOC two (2) days after its
not generally be removed from the office or place in promulgation, or on May 17, 2013. Nonetheless, the
which it is kept."9 As stated in Section 7, Rule 130,10 its RATS was only alerted by the developments in the
contents may be proven using secondary evidence case on July 24, 2013, when Atty. Danilo M. Campos
and such evidence may pertain to the certified true Jr. (Atty. Campos) received the July 15, 2013
copy of the original document issued by the public Resolution of the CTA ordering the entry of judgment
officer in custody thereof.Hence, the CTA wrotethat in the case, considering that no appeal was taken by
the certified true copiesof the public documents any of the parties. According toAtty. Campos, it was
offered in evidence should have been presented in only on that occasion when he discovered the May
court. 15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA.Thus, it was prayed
that the petitionbe given due course despite its late
Anent its offer of private documents,11 the prosecution filing.
likewise failed to comply with Section 27, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court, which reads, "[a]n authorized This belated filing cannot be countenanced by the
public record of a private document may be proved by Court.
the original record, or by a copy thereof, attested by
the legal custodian of the record, with an appropriate Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
certificate that such officer has the custody." Procedureis explicit in stating thatcertiorarishould be
Considering that the private documents were instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the
submitted and filed with the BOC, the same became judgment, orderor resolution sought to be assailed.
part of public records. Again, the records show that The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any
the prosecution failed to present the certified true unreasonable delay that would violate the
copies of thedocuments. constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition
of their case.13 While there are recognized
The CTA noted that,in its Opposition to the exceptions14 to such strict observance, there should
Demurrer,the prosecution even admitted that none of be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality
their witnesses ever positively identified the accused to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation
in open court and that the alleged misdeclared goods for his/her failure to comply with the rules.15
were not competently and properly identified in court
by any of the prosecution witnesses. In the case at bench, no convincing justification for the
belated filing of the petition was advanced to warrant
The prosecution filed its motion for reconsideration, the relaxation of the Rules.Notably, the records show
but it was deniedby the CTAin its May 15, 2013 that the petition was filedonly on August 12, 2013, or
Resolution, stressing, among others, that to grant it almost a month late from the due date which fell on
would place the accused in double jeopardy.12 July 16, 2013. To excuse this grave procedural lapse
will not only be unfairto the other party, but it will also
On July 24, 2013, the Run After the Smugglers sanction a seeming rudimentary attempt to circumvent
(RATS) Group, Revenue Collection Monitoring Group standing rules of procedure. Suffice it to say, the
(RCMG), as counsel for the BOC, received a copy of reasons proffered by the petitioner do not carry even
the July 15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA ordering the a tinge of merit that would deserve leniency.
entry of judgment in the case.
The late filing of the petition was borne out of the
Hence,this petition for certiorari, ascribing grave petitioner’s failure to monitor incoming court
abuse of discretion on the part of theCTA when in processes that neededto be addressed by the office.
ruled that: 1) the pieces of documentary evidence Clearly, this is an admission of inefficiency, if not lack
submitted by the prosecution were inadmissible in of zeal, on the part of an office tasked toeffectively
evidence; 2) the object evidence consisting of the
curb smuggling activities which rob the government of have been issued in accordance with the rules on
millions of revenue every year. evidence and existing jurisprudence.

The display of patent violations of even the On a final note, the Court deems it proper to remind
elementary rules leads the Court to suspectthat the the lawyers in the Bureau of Customs that the canons
case against Garcia and Vestidas Jr. was doomed by embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility
designfrom the start. The failure to present the equally apply to lawyers in government service in the
certified true copies of documentary evidence; the discharge of their official tasks. 17 Thus, RA TS
failure to competently and properly identify the lawyers should exert every effort and consider it their
misdeclared goods; the failure to identify the accused duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
in court; and,worse, the failure to file this petition on administration of justice.18
time challenging a judgment of acquittal, are tell-tale
signs ofa reluctantand subduedattitude in pursuing the WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the
case. This stance taken by the lawyers in government assailed March 26, 2013 and May 15, 2013
service rouses the Court’s vigilance against Resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals are
inefficiency in the administration of justice. Verily, the AFFIRMED.
lawyersrepresenting the offices under the executive
branchshould be reminded that theystill remain as The Office of the Ombudsman is hereby ordered to
officers of the courtfrom whom a high sense of conduct an investigation for possible criminal or
competence and fervor is expected. The Courtwill not administrative offenses committed by the Run After
close its eyes to this sense of apathy in RATS the Smugglers (RA TS) Group, Revenue Collection
lawyers, lest the government’s goal of revenue Monitoring Group (RCMG), Bureau of Customs,
enhancement continues to suffer the blows of relative to the filing and handling of the subject
smuggling and similar activities. complaint for violations of the Tariff and Customs
Code of the Philippines.
Even the error committed by the RATS in filing a
motion for reconsideration with the CTA displays Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of
gross ignorance as to the effects of an acquittal in a the President, the Secretary of Finance, the Collector
criminal case and the constitutional proscription on of Customs, and the Office of the Ombudsman for
double jeopardy. Had the RATS been eager and keen their guidance and appropriate action.
in prosecuting the respondents, it would have, in the
first place, presented its evidence with the CTA in
SO ORDERED.
strict compliance with the Rules.

In any case, even if the Court decides to suspend the

rules and permit this recourse, the end result would
remain the same. While a judgment of acquittal in a
criminal case may be assailed in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,it must
be shown that there was grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial
of due process.In this case, a perusal of the
challenged resolutions ofthe CTAdoes not disclose
any indication of grave abuse of discretion on its
partor denial of due process.The records are replete
with indicators that the petitioner actively participated
during the trial and, in fact, presented its offer of
evidence and opposed the demurrer. 1âwphi1

Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious or

whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.16 Here, the subject resolutions of the CTA
 to the said fund by way of the docket and legal fees
they paid as petitioners in G.R No. 72954.7

On 28 July 2003, Chief Justice Davide

instructed8 Atty. Teresita Dimaisip (Atty. Dimaisip),
then Chief of the JRO, to forward the rollo of G.R. No.
72954 for the purpose of verifying the claim of the
respondent and Mr. Biraogo.

On 30 July 2003, following a diligent search for the

rollo of G.R. No. 72954, Atty. Dimaisip apprised9 Chief
Justice Davide that the subject rollo could not be
found in the archives. Resorting to the tracer card10 of
A.C. No. 6683 June 21, 2011 G.R. No. 72954, Atty. Dimaisip discovered that the
subject rollo had been borrowed from the JRO on 13
RE: RESOLUTION OF THE COURT DATED 1 JUNE September 1991 but, unfortunately, was never since
2004 IN G.R. NO. 72954 AGAINST, ATTY. VICTOR returned.11 The tracer card named the respondent,
C. AVECILLA, Respondent. although acting through a certain Atty. Salvador
Banzon (Atty. Banzon), as the borrower of the subject
DECISION rollo.12

PEREZ, J.: The next day, or on 31 July 2003, Chief Justice

Davide took prompt action by directing13 Atty.
The present administrative case is based on the Dimaisip to supply information about how the
following facts: respondent was able to borrow the rollo of G.R. No.
72954 and also to take necessary measures to secure
Prelude the return of the said rollo.

Sometime in 1985, respondent Atty. Victor C. Avecilla Reporting her compliance with the foregoing
(Atty. Avecilla) and a certain Mr. Louis C. Biraogo (Mr. directives, Atty. Dimaisip sent to Chief Justice Davide
Biraogo) filed a petition before this Court impugning a Memorandum14 on 13 August 2003. In substance,
the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 883, i.e., the Memorandum relates that:
the law that called for the holding of a presidential
snap election on 7 February 1986. The petition was 1. At the time the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 was
docketed as G.R. No. 72954 and was consolidated borrowed from the JRO, the respondent was
with nine (9) other petitions1 voicing a similar concern. employed with the Supreme Court as a
member of the legal staff of retired Justice
On 19 December 1985, the Court En banc issued a Emilio A. Gancayco (Justice Gancayco).
Resolution dismissing the consolidated petitions, Ostensibly, it was by virtue of his confidential
effectively upholding the validity of Batas Pambansa employment that the respondent was able to
Blg. 883.2 gain access to the rollo of G.R. No. 72954.15

On 8 January 1986, after the aforesaid resolution 2. Atty. Dimaisip had already contacted the
became final, the rollo3 of G.R. No. 72954 was respondent about the possible return of the
entrusted to the Court’s Judicial Records Office (JRO) subject rollo.16 Atty. Dimaisip said that the
for safekeeping.4 respondent acknowledged having borrowed
the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 through Atty.
The Present Case Banzon, who is a colleague of his in the office
of Justice Gancayco.17
On 14 July 2003, the respondent and Mr. Biraogo
sent a letter5 to the Honorable Hilario G. Davide, Jr., On 18 August 2003, almost twelve (12) years after it
then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (Chief was borrowed, the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 was finally
Justice Davide), requesting that they be furnished turned over by Atty. Avecilla to the JRO.18
several documents6 relative to the expenditure of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). In order to show On 22 September 2003, Chief Justice Davide
that they have interest in the JDF enough to be directed19 the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) of
informed of how it was being spent, the respondent this Court, to make a study, report and
and Mr. Biraogo claimed that they made contributions recommendation on the incident. On 20 November
2003, the OCAT submitted a Memorandum20 to the respondent, however, intimated that the same
Chief Justice opining that the respondent may be might have belonged to Atty. Banzon.31
administratively charged, as a lawyer and member of
the bar, for taking out the rollo of G.R. No. 72954. The 2. The respondent asserted that, for some
OCAT made the following significant observations: unknown reason, the subject rollo just ended
up in his box of personal papers and effects,
1. Justice Gancayco compulsorily retired from which he brought home following the
the Supreme Court on 20 August retirement of Justice Gancayco.32 The
1991.21 However, as is customary, the respondent can only speculate that the one
coterminous employees of Justice Gancayco who actually borrowed the rollo might have
were given an extension of until 18 September been a colleague in the office of Justice
1991 to remain as employees of the court for Gancayco and that through inadvertence, the
the limited purpose of winding up their same was misplaced in his personal box.33
remaining affairs. Hence, the respondent was
already nearing the expiration of his "extended 3. The respondent also denounced any ill-
tenure" when he borrowed the rollo of G.R. motive for failing to return the rollo, professing
No. 72954 on 13 September 1991.22 that he had never exerted effort to examine
his box of personal papers and effects up until
2. The above circumstance indicates that the that time when he was contacted by Atty.
respondent borrowed the subject rollo not for Dimaisip inquiring about the missing
any official business related to his duties as a rollo.34 The respondent claimed that after
legal researcher for Justice Gancayco, but finding out that the missing rollo was, indeed,
merely to fulfill a personal agenda.23 By doing in his personal box, he immediately extended
so, the respondent clearly abused his his cooperation to the JRO and wasted no
confidential position for which he may be time in arranging for its return.35
administratively sanctioned.24
On 24 February 2004, this Court referred the
3. It must be clarified, however, that since the respondent’s Explanation to the OCAT for initial study.
respondent is presently no longer in the In its Report36 dated 12 April 2004, the OCAT found
employ of the Supreme Court, he can no the respondent’s Explanation to be unsatisfactory.
longer be sanctioned as such
employee.25 Nevertheless, an administrative On 1 June 2004, this Court tapped37 the Office of the
action against the respondent as a lawyer and Bar Confidant (OBC) to conduct a formal investigation
officer of the court remains feasible.26 on the matter and to prepare a final report and
recommendation. A series of hearings were thus held
Accepting the findings of the OCAT, the Court En by the OBC wherein the testimonies of the
banc issued a Resolution27 on 9 December 2003 respondent,38 Atty. Banzon,39 Atty. Dimaisip40 and one
directing the respondent to show cause why he Atty. Pablo Gancayco41 were taken. On 6 August
should not be held administratively liable for 2007, the respondent submitted his Memorandum42 to
borrowing the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 and for failing to the OBC reiterating the defenses in his Explanation.
return the same for a period of almost twelve (12)
years. On 13 October 2009, the OBC submitted its Report
and Recommendation43 to this Court. Like the OCAT,
The respondent conformed to this Court’s directive by the OBC dismissed the defenses of the respondent
submitting his Respectful Explanation and found the latter to be fully accountable for taking
(Explanation)28 on 21 January 2004. In the said out the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 and failing to return it
explanation, the respondent gave the following timely.44 The OBC, thus, recommended that the
defenses: respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
one (1) year.45
1. The respondent maintained that he neither
borrowed nor authorized anyone to borrow the Our Ruling
rollo of G.R. No. 72954.29 Instead, the
respondent shifts the blame on the person We agree with the findings of the OBC. However,
whose signature actually appears on the owing to the peculiar circumstances in this case, we
tracer card of G.R. No. 72954 and who, find it fitting to reduce the recommended penalty.
without authority, took the subject rollo in his
name.30 Hesitant to pinpoint anyone in The Respondent Borrowed The Rollo
particular as the author of such signature, the
After reviewing the records of this case, particularly Verily, the tracer card of G.R. No. 72954 was never
the circumstances surrounding the retrieval of the adequately controverted. We, therefore, sustain its
rollo of G.R. No. 72954, this Court is convinced that it entry and hold the respondent responsible for
was the respondent, and no one else, who is borrowing the rollo of G.R. No. 72954.
responsible for taking out the subject rollo.
Respondent’s Administrative Liability
The tracer card of G.R. No. 72954 bears the following
information: Having settled that the respondent was the one who
borrowed the rollo of G.R. No. 72954, We next
1. The name of the respondent, who was determine his administrative culpability.
identified as borrower of the rollo,46 and
We begin by laying the premises:
2. The signature of Atty. Banzon who, on
behalf of the respondent, actually received the 1. The respondent is presently no longer in
rollo from the JRO.47 the employ of this Court and as such, can no
longer be held administratively sanctioned as
The respondent sought to discredit the foregoing an employee.51 However, the respondent, as a
entries by insisting that he never authorized Atty. lawyer and a member of the bar, remains
Banzon to borrow the subject rollo on his behalf.48 We under the supervisory and disciplinary aegis of
are, however, not convinced. this Court.52

First. Despite the denial of the respondent, the 2. The respondent was already nearing the
undisputed fact remains that it was from his expiration of his "extended tenure" when he
possession that the missing rollo was retrieved about borrowed the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 on 13
twelve (12) years after it was borrowed from the JRO. September 1991.53 We must recall that Justice
This fact, in the absence of any plausible explanation Gancayco already retired as of 20 April 1991.
to the contrary, is sufficient affirmation that, true to Hence, it may be concluded that for whatever
what the tracer card states, it was the respondent who reason the respondent borrowed the subject
borrowed the rollo of G.R. No. 72954. rollo, it was not for any official reason related
to the adjudication of pending cases.54
Second. The respondent offered no convincing
explanation how the subject rollo found its way into 3. The respondent’s unjustified retention of the
his box of personal papers and effects. The subject rollo for a considerable length of time
respondent can only surmise that the subject rollo all but confirms his illicit motive in borrowing
may have been inadvertently placed in his personal the same. It must be pointed out that the
box by another member of the staff of Justice subject rollo had been in the clandestine
Gancayco.49 However, the respondent’s convenient possession of the respondent for almost
surmise remained just that—a speculation incapable twelve (12) years until it was finally discovered
of being verified definitively. and recovered by the JRO.

Third. If anything, the respondent’s exceptional Given the foregoing, We find that there are sufficient
stature as a lawyer and former confidante of a Justice grounds to hold respondent administratively liable.
of this Court only made his excuse unacceptable, if
not totally unbelievable. As adequately rebuffed by the First. Taking judicial records, such as a rollo, outside
OCAT in its Report dated 12 April 2004: court premises, without the court’s consent, is an
administratively punishable act. In Fabiculana, Sr. v.
x x x However, the excuse that the rollo "inadvertently Gadon,55 this Court previously sanctioned a sheriff for
or accidentally" found its way to his personal box the wrongful act of bringing court records home, thus:
through his officemates rings hollow in the face of the
fact that he was no less than the confidential legal Likewise Ciriaco Y. Forlales, although not a
assistance of a Member of this Court. With this respondent in complainant's letter-complaint, should
responsible position, Avecilla is expected to exercise be meted the proper penalty, having admitted taking
extraordinary diligence with respect to all matters, the records of the case home and forgetting about
including seeing to it that only his personal belongings them. Court employees are, in the first place, not
were in that box for taking home after his term of allowed to take any court records, papers or
office in this Court has expired.50 documents outside the court premises. It is clear that
Forlales was not only negligent in his duty of
transmitting promptly the records of an appealed case
to the appellate court but he also failed in his duty not
to take the records of the case outside of the court
and to subsequently forget about them.56 (Emphasis
supplied)

Second. The act of the respondent in borrowing a

rollo for unofficial business entails the employment of
deceit not becoming a member of the bar. It 1aw phi 1

presupposes the use of misrepresentation and, to a

certain extent, even abuse of position on the part of
the respondent because the lending of rollos are, as a
matter of policy, only limited to official purposes.

As a lawyer then employed with the government, the

respondent clearly violated Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:

Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service

shall not use his public position to promote or
advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to
interfere with his public duties. (Emphasis supplied).

Third. However, We find the recommended penalty of

suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year
as too harsh for the present case. We consider the
following circumstances in favor of the respondent:

1. G.R. No. 72954 was already finally resolved

when its rollo was borrowed on 13 September
1991. Thus, the act of respondent in keeping
the subject rollo worked no prejudice insofar
as deciding G.R. No. 72954 is concerned.

2. It was never established that the contents

of the rollo, which remained confidential
despite the finality of the resolution in G.R.
No. 72954, were disclosed by the respondent.

3. After his possession of the subject rollo was

discovered, the respondent cooperated with
the JRO for the return of the rollo.

We, therefore, temper the period of suspension to

only six (6) months.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the

respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for six (6) months. The respondent is also
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar
offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
 On March 22, 2007, Atty. Baliga, also the Regional
Director of the Commission on Human Rights
Regional Office for Region II, filed the undated ex
parte clarificatory pleading with leave of court.9

In his ex parte clarificatory pleading, Atty. Baliga

alleged that on July 14, 2006, complainant Lingan
wrote the Commission on Human Rights. Lingan
requested the Commission to investigate Atty. Baliga
following the latter's suspension from the practice of
law.

After this court had suspended Atty. Baliga from the

practice of law, the Commission on Human Rights En
Banc issued the resolution10 dated January 16, 2007,
A.C. No. 5377 June 30, 2014 suspending him from his position as Director/Attorney
VI of the. Commission on Human Rights Regional
VICTOR C. LINGAN, Complainant, Office for Region II. According to the Commission on
vs. Human Rights En Banc, Atty. Baliga's suspension
ATTYS. ROMEO CALUBAQUIB and JIMMY P. from the practice of law "prevent[ed] [him] from
BALIGA, Respondents. assuming his post [as Regional Director] for want of
eligibility in the meantime that his authority to practice
RESOLUTION law is suspended."11

LEONEN, J.: Atty. Baliga · argued that he cannot be suspended for

acts not connected with his functions as Commission
on Human Rights Regional Director. According to
This court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the
Atty. Baliga, his suspension from the practice of law
practice of law. When this court orders a lawyer did not include his suspension from public office. He
suspended from the practice of law, the lawyer must
prayed for clarification of this court's resolution dated
desist from performing all functions requiring the
June 15, 2006 "to prevent further injury and prejudice
application of legal knowledge within the period of
to [his] rights."12
suspension. This includes desisting from holding a
position in government requiring the authority to
practice law. This court noted without action Atty. Baliga's ex parte
clarificatory pleading as this court does not render
advisory opinions.13
For our resolution is respondent Atty. Jimmy P.
Baliga's motion to lift one-year suspension from the
practice of law.1 On May 8, 2009, this court received ·a letter from
complainant Lingan. In his letter14 dated May 4, 2009,
Lingan alleged that Atty. Baliga continued practicing
In the resolution2 dated June 15, 2006, this court
law and discharging his functions as Commission on
found Attys. Romeo I. Calubaquib and Jimmy P.
Human Rights Regional Director, in violation of this
Baliga guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the court's order of suspension.
Code of Professional Responsibility3 and of the
Lawyer's Oath.4 Respondents allowed their
secretaries to notarize documents in their stead, in Complainant Lingan allegedly received a copy of the
violation of Sections 2455 and 2466 of the Notarial Commission on Human Rights En Banc 's resolution
Law. This court suspended respondents from the suspending Atty. Baliga as Regional Director. On Atty.
practice of law for one year, revoked their notarial Baliga's motion, the ommission reconsidered Atty.
commissions, and disqualified them from Baliga's suspension and instead admonished him for
reappointment as notaries public for two years. "[violating] the conditions of his commission as a
notary public."15 According to complainant Lingan, he
was not served a copy of Atty. Baliga's motion for
Complainant Victor C. Lingan filed his motion for reconsideration.16
reconsideration,7 praying that respondents be
disbarred, not merely suspended from the practice of
law. In the resolution8 dated September 6, 2006, this Complainant Lingan claimed that the discharge of the
court denied complainant Lingan's motion for functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional
reconsideration for lack of merit. Director necessarily required the practice of law. A
Commission on Human Rights Regional Director must
be a member of the bar and is designated as Attorney his constitutional rights [sic] to due process and to the
VI. Since this court suspended Atty. Baliga from the statutory principle in law that what is not included is
practice of law, Atty. Baliga was in effect "a non- deemed excluded."25
lawyer . . . and [was] disqualified to hold the position
of [Regional Director] [during the effectivity of the In the resolution26 dated September 23, 2009, this
order of suspension]."17 The Commission on Human court required respondents to file their respective
Rights, according to complainant Lingan, should have motions to lift order of suspension considering the
ordered Atty. Baliga to desist from performing his lapse of the period of suspension. This court further
functions as Regional Director. Complainant Lingan ordered Atty. Baliga and the Commission on Human
prayed that this court give "favorable attention and Rights to comment on complainant Lingari's allegation
action on the matter."18 that Atty. Baliga continued performing his functions as
Regional Director while he was suspended from the
This court endorsed complainant Lingan's letter to the practice of law. The resolution dated September 23,
Office of the Bar Confidant for report and 2009 provides:
recommendation.19
Considering that the period of suspension from the
In its report and recommendation20 dated June 29, practice of law and disqualification from being
2009, the Office of the Bar Confidant found that the commissioned as notary public imposed on
period of suspension of Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga respondents have [sic] already elapsed, this Court
had already lapsed. It recommended that respondents resolves:
be required to file their respective motions to lift order
of suspension with certifications from the Integrated (1) to require both respondents, within ten (10)
Bar of the Philippines and the Executive Judge of the days from notice, to FILE their respective
court where they might appear as counsel and state motions to lift relative to their suspension and
that they desisted from practicing law during the disqualification from being commissioned as
period of suspension. notary public and SUBMIT certifications from
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
On the claim that the Commission on Human Rights Executive Judge of the Court where they may
allowed Atty. Baliga to perform his functions as appear as counsel, stating that respondents
Regional Director during the period of suspension, the have actually ceased and desisted from the
Office of the Bar Confidant said that the Commission practice of law during the entire period of their
"deliberate[ly] disregard[ed]"21 this court's order of suspension and disqualification, unless
suspension. According to the Office of the Bar already complied with in the meantime;
Confidant, the Commission on Human Rights had no
power to "[alter, modify, or set aside any of this court's (2) to require Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga to
resolutions] which [have] become final and executory. SUBMIT a certification from the Commission
"22 on Human Rights [CHR] stating that he has
been suspended from office and has stopped
Thus, with respect to Atty. Baliga, the Office of the Bar from the performance of his functions for the
Confidant recommended that this court require him to period stated in the order of suspension and
submit a certification from the Commission on Human disqualification, within ten (10) days from
Rights stating that he desisted from performing his notice hereof;
functions as Regional Director while he was
suspended from the practice of law.23 (3) to require respondent Atty. Baliga and the
CHR to COMMENT on the allegations of
The Office of the Bar Confidant further recommended complainant against them, both within ten (10)
that Atty. Baliga and the Commission .on Human days from receipt of notice hereof;
Rights be required to comment on complainant ...27 (Emphasis in the original)
Lingan's allegation that Atty. Baliga continued to
perform his functions as Regional Director while he In compliance with this court's order, Attys.
was suspended from the practice of law. Calubaquib and Baliga filed their respective motions
to lift order of suspension.28 Atty. Baliga also filed his
On July 17, 2009, Atty. Baliga filed a comment on complainant Lingan's allegation that he
manifestation,24 arguing that his suspension from the continued performing his functions as Regional
practice of law did not include his suspension from Director during his suspension from the practice of
public office. Atty. Baliga said, "[t]o stretch the law.
coverage of [his suspension from the practice of law]
to [his] public office would be tantamount to [violating]
In his comment29 dated November 13, 2009, Atty. control over Attorneys III, IV, and V. Being a "lawyer-
Baliga alleged that as Regional Director, he manager," Atty. Baliga practiced law while he held his
"perform[ed], generally, managerial functions,"30 which position as Regional Director.
did not require the practice of law. These managerial
functions allegedly included ."[supervising] ... the day With respect to Atty. Baliga's claim that he was in
to day operations of the regional office and its good faith in reassuming his position as Regional
personnel";31 "monitoring progress of investigations Director, complainant Lingan countered that if Atty.
conducted by the [Commission on Human Rights] Baliga were really in good faith, he should have
Investigation Unit";32 "monitoring the implementation of followed the initial resolution of the Commission on
all other services and assistance programs of the Human Rights suspending him from office. Atty.
[Commission on Human Rights] by the different units Baliga did not even furnish this court a copy of his
at the regional level";33 and "[supervising] . . . the motion for reconsideration of the Commission on
budgetary requirement preparation and disbursement Human Right's resolution suspending him from office.
of funds and expenditure of the [Regional By "playing ignorant on what is 'practice of law',
Office]."34 The Commission allegedly has its own twisting facts and philosophizing,"46 complainant
"legal services unit which takes care of the legal Lingan argued that Atty. Baliga "[no longer has that]
services matters of the [Commission]."35 moral vitality imperative to the title of an
attorney."47 Compfainant Lingan prayed that Atty.
Stating that his functions as Regional Director did not Baliga be disbarred.
require the practice of law, Atty. Baliga claimed thaf
he "faithful[ly] [complied] with [this court's resolution On February 17, 2010, this court lifted the order of
suspending him from the practice of law]."36 suspension of Atty. Calubaquib.48 He was allowed to
resume his practice of law and perform notarial acts
The Commission on Human Rights filed its subject to compliance with the requirements for
comment37 dated November 27, 2009. It argued that issuance of a notarial commission.
"the penalty imposed upon Atty. Baliga as a member
of the bar is separate and distinct from any penalty On the other hand, this court referred to the Office of
that may be imposed upon him as a public official for the Bar Confidant for evaluation, report, and
the same acts."38 According to the Commission, Atty. recommendation Atty. Baliga's motion to lift one-year
Baliga's suspension from the practice of law is a "bar suspension and the respective comments of Atty.
matter"39 while the imposition of penalty upon a Baliga and the Commission on Human Rights.49
Commission on Human Rights official "is an entirely
different thing, falling as it does within the exclusive In its report and recommendation50 dated October 18,
authority of the [Commission as] disciplining body."40 2010, the Office of the Bar Confidant stated that Atty.
Baliga "should not [have been] allowed to perform his
Nevertheless, the Commission manifested that it functions, duties, and responsibilities [as Regional
would defer to this court's resolution of the issue and Director] which [required acts constituting] practice .of
would "abide by whatever ruling or decision [this law."51 Considering that Atty. Baliga claimed that he
court] arrives at on [the] matter. "41 In reply42 to Atty. did not perform his functions as Regional Director
Baliga's comment, complainant Lingan argued that which required the practice of law, the Office of the
Atty. Baliga again disobeyed this. court. Atty. Baliga Bar Confidant recommended that the Commission on
failed to submit a certification from the Commission on Human Rights be required to comment on this claim.
Human Rights stating that he was suspended from The Office of the Bar Confidant also recommended
office and desisted from performing his functions as holding in abeyance the resolution of Atty. Baliga's
Regional Director. motion to lift suspension "pending [the Commission
on Human Right's filing of comment]."52
As to Atty. Baliga's claim that he did not practice law
while he held his position as Regional Director and In the resolution53 dated January 12, 2011, this court
only performed generally managerial functions, held in abeyance the resolution of Atty. Baliga's
complainant Lingan countered that Atty. Baliga motion to lift one-year suspension. The Commission
admitted to defying the order of suspension. Atty. on Human Rights was ordered to comment on Atty.
Baliga admitted to performing the functions of a Baliga's claim that he did not practice law while he
"lawyer-manager,"43 which under the landmark case of held his position as Regional Director.
Cayetano v. Monsod44 constituted practice of law.
Complainant Lingan reiterated that the position of In its comment54 dated April 6, 2011, the Commission
Regional Director/ Attorney VI requires the officer "to on Human Rights reiterated that the penalty imposed
be a lawyer [in] good standing."45 Moreover, as on Atty. Baliga as a member of the bar is separate
admitted by Atty. Baliga, he had supervision and from the penalty that might be imposed on him as
Regional Director. The Commission added that it is d. To conduct dialogues or preliminary
"of honest belief that the position of [Regional conferences among parties and discuss
Director] is managerial and does not [require the "immediate courses of action and protection
practice of law]."55 It again manifested that it will "abide remedies and/or possible submission of the
by whatever ruling or decision [this court] arrives on matter to an alternative dispute resolution";68
[the] matter."56
e. To issue Commission on Human Rights
The issue for our resolution is whether Atty. Baliga's processes, including notices, letter-invitations,
motion to lift order of suspension should be granted. orders, or subpoenas within the territorial
jurisdiction of the regional office;69 and
We find that Atty. Baliga violated this court's order of
suspension. We, therefore, suspend him further from f. To review and approve draft resolutions of
the practice of law for six months. human rights cases prepared by the legal
officer.70
Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, These powers and functions are characteristics of the
knowledge, training and experience."57 It includes legal profession. Oaths and affirmations are usually
"[performing] acts which are characteristics of the performed by members of the judiciary and notaries
[legal] profession"58 or "[rendering any kind of] service public71 - officers who are necessarily members of the
[which] requires the use in any degree of legal bar.72 Investigating human rights complaints are
knowledge or skill."59 performed primarily by the Commission's legal
officer.73 Discussing immediate courses of action and
Work in government that requires the use of legal protection remedies and reviewing and approving
knowledge is considered practice. of law. In Cayetano draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared by
v. Monsod,60 this court cited the deliberations of the the legal officer require the use of extensive legal
1986 Constitutional Commission and agreed that work knowledge.
rendered by lawyers in the Commission on Audit
requiring "[the use of] legal knowledge or legal The exercise of the powers and functions of a
talent"61 is practice of law. Commission on Human Rights Regional Director
constitutes practice of law. Thus, the Regional
The Commission on Human Rights is an independent Director must be an attorney - a member of the bar in
office created under the Constitution with power to good standing and authorized to practice law.74 When
investigate "all forms of human rights violations the Regional Director loses this authority, such as
involving civil and political rights[.]"62 It is divided into when he or she is disbarred or suspended from the
regional offices with each office having primary practice of law, the Regional Director loses a
responsibility to investigate human rights violations in necessary qualification to the position he or she is
its territorial jurisdiction.63 Each regional office is holding. The disbarred or suspended lawyer must
headed by the Regional Director who is given the desist from holding the position of Regional Director.
position of Attorney VI.
This court suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of
Under the Guidelines and Procedures in the law for one year on June 15, 2006, "effective
Investigation and Monitoring of Human Rights immediately."75 From the time Atty. Baliga received the
Violations and Abuses, and the Provision of CHR court's order of suspension on July 5, 2006,76 he has
Assistance,64 the Regional Director has the following been without authority to practice law. He lacked a
powers and functions: necessary qualification to his position as Commission
on Human Rights Regional Director/ Attorney VI. As
a. To administer oaths or affirmations with the Commission on Human Rights correctly resolved
respect to "[Commission on Human Rights] in its resolution dated January 16, 2007:
matters;"65
WHEREAS, this suspension under ethical standards,
b. To issue mission orders in their respective in effect, prevents Atty. Baliga from assuming his
regional offices;66 post, for want of eligibility in the meantime that his
authority to practice law is suspended. This is without
prejudice to the investigation to be conducted to the
c. To conduct preliminary evaluation or initial
practice of law of Atty. Baliga, which in the case of all
investigation of human rights complaints in the
Regional Human Rights Directors is not generally
absence of the legal officer or investigator;67
allowed by the Commission;
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the We impose the same penalty on Atty. Baliga for
Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines holding his position as Regional Director despite
resolved to put into effect and implement the legal lack.of authority to practice law.
1âw phi 1

implications of the SC decision by decreeing the

suspension of Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga in the discharge We note that the Commission on Human Rights En
of his functions and responsibilities as Banc issued the resolution dated April 13, 2007,
Director/Attorney VI of CHRP-Region II in Tuguegarao reconsidering its first resolution suspending Atty.
City for the period for which the Supreme Court Baliga as Regional Director/ Attorney VI. Instead, the
Resolution is in effect.77 (Emphasis in the original) Commission admonished Atty. Baliga and sternly
warned him that repeating the same offense will
In ordering Atty. Baliga suspended from office as cause his dismissal from the service. The resolution
Regional Director, the Commission on Human Rights with CHR (III) No. A2007-045 dated April 13, 2007
did not violate Atty. Baliga's right to due process. reads:
First, he was only suspended after: investigation by
the Commission on Human Rights Legal and In his Motion for Reconsideration dated March 15,
Investigation Office.78 Second, the Commission gave 2007, respondent Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga prays before
Atty. Baliga an opportunity to be heard when he filed the Honorable Commission to recall and annul his
his motion for reconsideration. suspension as Regional Director/ Attorney VI of the
Commission on Human Rights - Regional Office No.
Atty. Baliga's performance of generally managerial II, per 16 January 2007 Commission en Banc
functions was not supported by the record. It was also Resolution CHR (III) No. A2007-013.
immaterial. He held the position of Commission on
1âwphi 1

Human Rights Regional Director because of his The grounds relied upon the motion are not sufficient
authority to practice law. Without this authority, Atty. to convince the Commission that Atty. Jimmy P.
Baliga was disqualified to hold that position. Baliga is totally blameless and should not suffer the
appropriate penalty for breach of the Code of
All told, performing the functions of a Commission on Professional Responsibility and his Lawyer's oath.
Human Rights Regional Director constituted practice
of law. Atty. Baliga should have desisted from holding The Commission, in the exercise of its authority to
his position as Regional Director. discipline, is concerned with the transgression by Atty.
Baliga of his oath of office as government employee.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, As records have it, the Commission granted Atty.
willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior Baliga authority to secure a commission as a notary
court is a ground for disbarment or suspension from public. With this, he is mandated to act as a notary
the practice of law: public in accordance with the rules and regulations, to
include the conditions expressly set forth by the
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Commission.
Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as With the findings clearly enunciated in the Supreme
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, Court resolution in SC Administrative Case No. 5277
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, dated 15 June 2006, the Commission cannot close its
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his eyes to the act of Atty. Baliga that is clearly repugnant
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for to the conduct of an officer reposed with public trust.
any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful This is enough just cause to have this piece of word,
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, short of being enraged, and censure Atty. Baliga for
or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for having contravened the conditions of his commission
a party to a case without authority so to do. The as a notary public. What was granted to Atty. Baliga is
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of merely a privilege, the exercise of which requires such
gain, either personally or through paid agents or high esteem to be in equal footing with the
brokers, constitutes malpractice. constitutional mandate of the Commission. Clearly,
Atty. Baliga should keep in mind that the Commission
In Molina v. Atty. Magat,79 this court suspended further exacts commensurate solicitude from whatever
Atty. Ceferino R. Magat from the practice of law for six privilege the Commission grants of every official and
months for practicing his profession despite this employee.
court's previous order of suspension.
The Commission notes that by now Atty. Baliga is
serving the one year suspension imposed on him
pursuant to the Supreme Court resolution. The
Commission believes that the further suspension of
Atty. Baliga from the office may be too harsh in the
meantime that the Supreme Court penalty is being
served. This Commission is prevailed upon that the
admonition of Atty. Baliga as above expressed is
sufficient to complete the cycle of penalizing an erring
public officer.

WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby modifies its

ruling in Resolution CHR (III) No. A2007-013 and
imposes the penalty of admonition with a stem
warning that a repetition of the same will merit a
penalty of dismissal from the service.80 (Emphasis in
the original)

The Commission on Human Rights erred in issuing

the resolution dated April 13, 2007. This resolution
caused Atty. Baliga to reassume his position as
Regional Director/ Attorney VI despite lack of authority
to practice law.

We remind the Commission on Human Rights that we

have the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice
of law.81 The Commission cannot, by mere resolutions
and .other issuances, modify or defy this court's
orders of suspension from the practice of law.
Although the Commission on Human Rights has the
power to appoint its officers and employees,82 it can
only retain those with the necessary qualifications in
the positions they are holding.

As for Atty. Baliga, we remind him that the practice of

law is a "privilege burdened with conditions."83 To
enjoy the privileges of practicing law, lawyers must
"[adhere] to the rigid standards of mental fitness,
[maintain] the highest degree of morality[,] and
[faithfully comply] with the rules of [the] legal
profession."84

WHEREFORE, we further SUSPEND Atty. Jimmy P.

Baliga from the practice of law for six ( 6) months.
Atty. Baliga shall serve a total of one (1) year and six
(6) months of suspension from the practice of law,
effective upon service on Atty. Baliga of a copy of this
resolution.

SERVE copies of this resolution to the Integrated Bar

of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and
the Commission on Human Rights.

SO ORDERED.
 and influence at Marikina City, and Complainants have [a]
well[-]grounded belief that they could not obtain justice in
[the] said venue. Complainants have already suffered
injustice when they [first] lodged their complaint before
the local police but they were instead given [a] run-
around and advised for the 9th time to go back and forth
to the Marikina Police Headquarters.

Compounding complainant[']s predicament, they are

Engineers/Contractors based at Balanga City[,] Bataan
and have no means and method[s] to steal-mate [sic]
respondents influence and political clout at Marikina City,
except via the direct intervention of your office.3
On even date, respondent lawyer's clients, Ernesto S.
Mallari (Ernesto) and Danilo A. Rustia, Jr. (Danilo),
executed a Joint Complaint Affidavit against herein
complainants for syndicated estafa, qualified theft and
grave threats cases.4

Claiming that respondent lawyer's January 3, 2012 letter

A.C. No. 10992, June 19, 2018 contained scurrilous statements intended to malign and
besmirch Cynthia's reputation and business standing,
RODOLFO M. YUMANG, CYNTHIA V. YUMANG AND Cynthia and her husband, the complainant Rodolfo, filed a
ARLENE TABULA, Complainants, v. ATTY. EDWIN M. libel complaint against respondent lawyer, Ernesto, and
ALAESTANTE, Respondent. Danilo before the Pasig City Prosecutor's Office (libel
case).5
A.C. No. 10993, , June 19, 2018
In their counter-affidavit, Ernesto and Danilo denied any
BERLIN V. GABERTAN AND HIGINO knowledge of, or participation in, the writing of the said
GABERTAN, Complainants, v. ATTY. EDWIN M. letter.6
ALAESTANTE, Respondent.
On the other hand, respondent lawyer admitted that he
DECISION was the author of the letter.7 He denied, however, that
the letter was libelous or defamatory, and insisted that
the same was privileged communication. He claimed that
DEL CASTILLO, J.: he wrote the letter to protect and advance the interests of
Ernesto and Danilo.8
Subject of the present Decision are two administrative
cases for disbarment, separately filed against Atty. Edwin In a Resolution9 dated October 5, 2015, the Office of the
M. Alaestante (respondent lawyer) by complainants City Prosecutor of Pasig found probable cause to indict
Rodolfo M. Yumang (Rodolfo), Cynthia V. Yumang respondent lawyer, as well as Ernesto, and Danilo, for the
(Cynthia), and Arlene Tabula (Arlene), in A.C. No. 10992, crime of libel.
and Berlin V. Gabertan (Berlin), and Higino Gabertan
(Higino), in A.C. No. 10993, (collectively, complainants). In the meantime, in a Resolution10 dated November 28,
Complainants charged respondent lawyer with violating 2012, the DOJ dismissed for lack of merit, the complaint
the Code of Professional Responsibility; gross ignorance of for syndicated estafa, qualified theft, and grave threats
the law; grave misconduct; grave abuse of authority; filed by Ernesto and Danilo against herein complainants.
gross dishonesty; malpractice; and infidelity to the client.1
Based on the foregoing, herein complainants filed on
Facts March 7, 2013, two separate disbarment complaints
against respondent lawyer before the Integrated Bar of
On January 3, 2012, respondent lawyer wrote then the Philippines (IBP).
Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Leila De Lima
(Secretary De Lima) a letter,2viz.: In their Joint Affidavit of Complaint/Petition for
Dear Secretary De Lima: Disbarment,11 complainants Rodolfo, Cynthia, and Arlene
averred that respondent lawyer violated his Oath of Office
May I respectfully request from your Honorable Office for and the Code of Professional Responsibility, when he
the conduct of preliminary investigation and/or prepared, wrote, signed, and published the malicious and
Prosecution of respondent Cynthia V. Yumang, et al., for libelous January 3, 2012 letter.
the crimes of syndicated Estafa, Qualified Theft and Grave
Threats. For their part, complainants Berlin and Higino declared in
their Sinumpaang Salaysay12 that they were the
Though mindful that venue/jurisdiction of the alleged respondents in the alleged syndicated estafa, grave
crimes is primarily vested with your Public Prosecutor at threats and qualified theft cases alongside their relatives,
Marikina City, we earnestly seek your good favor, and Cynthia and Arlene. They claimed that they had previously
instead take a direct action on our case since respondent engaged respondent lawyer's legal services in other
Cynthia V. Yumang is a savvy businesswoman and cases; that since they knew respondent lawyer, they
possesses material wealth and tremendous political clout approached him regarding his letter dated January 3,
2012, but respondent lawyer told them not to worry about
the cases mentioned in the said letter, and promised to Higino Gabertan whom he charged together with the other
draft the appropriate pleadings for their defense; that complainants with the DOJ (Exh. L).
indeed respondent lawyer drafted their Counter-Affidavit
and their Rejoinder by way of defense; and that in Clearly, Respondent violated the prohibition that [a]
payment for his professional legal services, they issued lawyer should not represent new clients whose interest
respondent lawyer a Bank of Commerce check in the oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or
amount of P50,000.00. not they are parties in the same action or totally unrelated
cases. (In Re Dela Rosa, 27 Phil. 258. Lim et al. vs.
Higino stressed that respondent lawyer's act of preparing Villorosa A.C. 5303 June 15, 2006).
their responsive pleadings in the syndicated estafa, grave
threats and qualified theft cases was violative of the It is enough that the counsel of one party had a hand in
proscription against lawyers representing conflicting the preparation of the pleading of the other party,
interests since he was the very same lawyer who initiated claiming adverse and conflicting interest with that of his
and/or drafted the complaint in these cases against them; original client. (Artezuela vs. Madferazo, A.C. No. 4354
and that as a consequence thereof, he (Berlin) moved to April 22, 2002).
discharge respondent lawyer as counsel in another case.13
Respondent violated his Lawyer's Oath when he sent
In his Answer,14 respondent lawyer admitted that he was unsealed malicious and libelous letter against herein
the author of the January 3, 2012 letter to then DOJ Complainants without any effort to ascertain the truth
Secretary De Lima; but he insisted that the letter was thus constituted gross evident bad faith for which act he is
privileged because it was written in response to a moral or liable in CBD Case No. 13-3767 while for acting as counsel
legal duty, he being the lawyer for his clients in the cases for the complainant in the case before the DOJ and [at]
mentioned in the letter. He denied that he was the the same time preparing the counter affidavit of Berlin
defense counsel for Berlin and Higino in the syndicated and Higino Gabertan who were Respondents] in the DOJ
estafa, grave threats and qualified theft cases, and case he filed against herein complainants, thus he is also
averred that the P50,000.00 check that was issued in his liable under CBD Case No. 13-3767.
favor by Berlin and Higino was just a "petty portion" of the
P1.1 million that he previously entrusted to Berlin and It was found out also [that] the Respondent was the
Higino relative to a case that he lawyered for them. defense counsel of Berlin Gabertan whom he charged
before the DOJ in an ongoing civil case at San Mateo,
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Rizal RTC Branch 76 but claimed that he was just acting
Commissioner: as counsel pro-bono.

In a Report and Recommendation15 dated September 10, Complainants having presented sufficient evidence thus
2013, the Investigating Commissioner16 recommended proving their case by clear preponderance of evidenced it
respondent lawyer's suspension from the practice of law is hereby recommended that Respondent be meted the
for six months, in connection with the disbarment case appropriate penalty for the violation he committed.17
filed by Cynthia, Rodolfo, and Arlene; and suspension
Report and Recommendation of the IBP-Board of
from the practice of law for one year, in regard to the
Governors (BOG):
disbarment case filed by Berlin and Higino.
Finding the Report and Recommendation supported by law
The Investigating Commissioner ratiocinated that -
and the evidence, the IBP-BOG adopted and accepted the
It is admitted that Respondent authored a letter
Investigating Commissioner's recommendation, but with
addressed to the Secretary of DOJ on January 03, 2012
modification as regards the recommended penalty in that
and the matter was investigated by the DOJ but the same
respondent lawyer be suspended from the practice of law
was dismissed for lack of merit. x x x
for one year in the complaint filed by Cynthia, Rodolfo,
and Arlene; and for two years, in the case filed by Berlin
That prior to January 03, 2012 x x x filing of the charges
and Higino,18 said penalties to be served successively.
with the DOJ, against herein Complainants, Berlin and
Higino Gabertan engaged the services of Respondent as
their counsel in several cases since April 2011 to August Ruling
31, 2012.
These administrative cases bear some factual
That Respondent received the amount of P50,000.00 from resemblance to Pacana, Jr. v. Atty. Pascual-
Berlin and Higino Gabertan thru Bank of Commerce check Lopez.19 In Pacana, Jr., the lawyer denied any lawyer-
No. 0000008 dated June 11, 2012 and personally client relationship with the complainant, saying that no
encashed by the Respondent (Exh. H). x x x formal agreement had been entered to that effect; also,
the therein counsel questioned the admissibility of an
That because of that letter filed with the DOJ by electronic mail he sent to therein complainant. In said
Respondent and [which] was [later] dismissed, case, the lawyer likewise assured the complainant that
complainants filed a libel case with the RTC, Pasig City there was nothing to worry about when the latter
Branch 157 (Exh. D). expressed doubts over the propriety of the lawyer's
representing conflicting interests. We therein rejected the
That the letter filed by Respondent with the DOJ [was] erring lawyer's defenses, thus:
correctly ruled by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig Respondent also tries to disprove the existence of such
City, as not privileged communication as it [was] not relationship by arguing that no written contract for the
made in the course of judicial proceedings. (Exh. C). engagement of her services was ever forged between her
and complainant. This argument all the more reveals
That Respondent acted as defense counsel for Berlin and respondent's patent ignorance of fundamental laws on
contracts and of basic ethical standards expected from an parcel of land.26
advocate of justice. The IBP was correct when it said:
The absence of a written contract will not preclude the It is almost a cliche to say that a lawyer is forbidden "from
finding that there was a professional relationship between representing conflicting interests except by written
the parties. Documentary formalism is not an consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
essential element in the employment of an attorney; facts. Such prohibition is founded on principles of public
the contract may be express or implied. To establish policy and good taste as the nature of the lawyer-client
the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance relations is one of trust and confidence of the highest
of an attorney is sought and received in any matter degree. Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate
pertinent to his profession. the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance
of [impropriety] and double-dealing for only then can
Given the situation, the most decent and ethical tiling
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
which respondent should have done was either to advise
lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the
complainant to engage the services of another lawyer
administration of justice.27
since she was already representing the opposing parties,
or to desist from acting as representative of Multitel
The alleged "non-payment of professional [fees, even if
investors and stand as counsel for complainant. She
true, would] not exculpate respondent [lawyer] from
cannot be permitted to do both because that would
liability. [The a]bsence of monetary consideration does
amount to double-dealing and violate our ethical rules on
not exempt lawyers from complying with the prohibition
conflict of interest.20 (Emphasis in the original)
against pursuing cases with conflicting interests. The
What is more, administrative cases are sui generis.21 This prohibition attaches from the moment the attorney-client
Court, acting as the legal profession's sole disciplinary relationship is established and extends even beyond the
body, is not strictly bound by the technical rules of duration of the professional relationship."28
procedure and evidence.22 Indeed, hewing strictly to
technical rules of procedure and evidence could at times The sending of the unsealed scurrilous letter by
thwart this Court's efforts to rid the legal profession of respondent lawyer to DOJ Secretary De Lima, was a
unscrupulous individuals who use their very knowledge of violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional
the law to perpetrate fraud or commit transgressions to Responsibility, which stipulates that "[a] lawyer shall not,
the detriment of their clients, who purposefully have in his professional dealings, use language which is
sought their legal opinion and assistance in the hopes of abusive, offensive or otherwise improper." In that letter,
attaining justice. not only did respondent lawyer employ intemperate or
unbridled language, he was also guilty of corner-cutting
Here, even disregarding the electronic mail sent by unprofessionally. His act of directly asking the Secretary
respondent lawyer, we are satisfied that other of Justice to intervene immediately in the syndicated
incontrovertible evidence supports the allegation that a estafa, grave threats and qualified theft cases showed his
lawyer-client relationship did exist, or had been propensity for utterly disregarding the rules of procedure
established, between respondent lawyer on the one hand, which had been formulated precisely to regulate and
and Berlin and Higino on the other. For one thing, it was govern legal and judicial processes properly.
remarkable that respondent lawyer never refuted or
denied Berlin's claim that he (Atty. Alaestante) Under the circumstances, we find the penalty of
represented him in a civil case pending before the suspension for six (6) months from the practice of law, in
Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal (RTC-Rizal). As connection with A.C. No. 10992, and suspension for one
against a Motion to Discharge Counsel duly filed with the (1) year from the practice of law, in connection with A.C.
RTC-Rizal, respondent lawyer's bare denial of the No. 10993, as recommended by the Investigating
existence of a lawyer-client relationship is of no Commissioner, proper and commensurate.
avail.23 Caught in a web of lies, Atty. Alaestante even
contradicted himself when he stated that "[a]fter having ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to SUSPEND Atty.
been convinced of the personalities of Berlin and Higino Edwin M. Alaestante from the practice of law for six (6)
Gabeitan in relation to counsel'[s] pro bono handling of months in A.C. No. 10992 and for one (1) year in A.C. No.
the case in RTC San Mateo, as well as the smell of estafa 10993, reckoned from his receipt of this Decision, said
having been committed by Berlin Gabeitan against the penalties to be sewed in succession, with
plaintiff thereof, counsel decided not to pursue defending a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
defendant Gabertan."24 That is the problem with fibs, offense will warrant a more severe penalty.
falsehoods, dissemblances, prevarications, and half-
truths. They not only collide with the truth, they also Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the
collide with each other. Office of the Bar Confidant, and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office
More than these, guided by the tenor of a Memorandum of of the Bar Confidant is also DIRECTED to append a copy
Agreement25 (MOA) constituted between or amongst, of this Decision to respondent's record as a member of the
Berlin, respondent lawyer, and two other persons, it can Bar.
hardly be doubted that Berlin and respondent lawyer had
a close relationship with the parties therein, and that he SO ORDERED.
offered his legal expertise to the said parties. This is
evident from the language of the MOA where Berlin and
respondent lawyer were collectively referred to as the
"second parties" who were able to secure "a favorable
decision dated August 26, 2011 from the Honorable
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila[,] Branch 26" and were
hired "to recover actual and physical possession over" a
 COMELEC issued a TRO, directing Hon. Gay Marie F.
Lubigan-Rafael (RTC Judge), in her official capacity as
Presiding Judge of the RTC, to cease and desist from
enforcing the January 15, 2014 Order, effective
immediately.9 Accordingly, the RTC issued another
Order10 dated February 25, 2014 (February 25, 2014
Order), pertinent portion of which reads:

In view thereof, the OIC-Branch [COC] is directed NOT

TO ISSUE a Writ of Execution in accordance with the
[January 15, 2014] Order until further notice.11

Despite the TRO and the RTC's February 25, 2014 Order,
respondent, as counsel of Villarosa, filed five (5)
manifestations12 addressed to the COC insisting on the
writ's issuance. Notably, he did not serve copies of these
manifestations to the other party.13

In these manifestations, respondent claimed that his client

received the RTC's January 15, 2014 Order on January 18,
2014, and counting from said date, the twenty-day period
A.C. No. 11600, June 19, 2017 ended on February 12, 2014.14 Since the COMELEC only
issued the TRO on February 13, 2014, the TRO no longer
had any effect. Respondent further asserted that the TRO
ROMULO DE MESA FESTIN, Complainant, v. ATTY. was addressed only to the RTC Judge, and not to the
ROLANDO V. ZUBIRI, Respondent. COC; therefore, the COC is not bound by the TRO. For
these reasons, respondent insisted that the COC could
DECISION legally issue the writ of execution pending appeal.15

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: The COC eventually issued a Writ of Execution Pending

Appeal addressed to the sheriff. However, complainant
This administrative case stemmed from an affidavit- only found out about respondent's manifestations when
complaint1 filed by complainant Romulo De Mesa Festin the sheriff attempted to serve the writ on him.16 Soon
(complainant) against respondent Atty. Rolando V. Zubiri thereafter, complainant filed the disbarment complaint.
(respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for gross violations of the Code of Professional In his complaint, complainant argued that respondent
Responsibility (CPR). violated his ethical duties when he misled and induced the
COC to defy lawful orders - particularly, the COMELEC's
The Facts TRO and the RTC's February 25, 2014 Order.17 As a result,
respondent allegedly violated Canons 1, 10, 15, and 19 of
the CPR.18
Complainant alleged that he was elected as Mayor of the
Municipality of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro in the May
2013 elections. His opponent, Jose Tapales Villarosa In his answer,19 respondent claimed that, first, since the
(Villarosa), filed an election protest against him before the case records had been transmitted to the COMELEC on
Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, January 31, 2014, the RTC was divested of jurisdiction
Branch 46 (RTC).2 After deciding in favor of Villarosa, the over the case; therefore, it had no more power to issue
RTC issued an Order3 dated January 15, 2014 (January the February 25, 2014 Order.20 Respondent put forward
15, 2014 Order), granting his motion for execution the same reason for filing the five manifestations with the
pending appeal, viz.: COC instead of the RTC Judge.21Second, the
manifestations contained no misleading statements or
factual deviations. He merely stated in his manifestations
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal is his honest belief that the twenty-day period had already
GRANTED. lapsed when the COMELEC issued its TRO; hence, it no
longer had any binding effect. He explained that the filing
The OIC-Branch Clerk of Court [(COC)] is hereby directed of manifestations to highlight his position did not violate
to issue a Writ of Execution Pending Appeal after the any rule.22Third, he allegedly filed those manifestations
lapse of twenty (20) working days to be counted from pursuant to his duty under Canon 18 of the CPR to
the time [complainant's] counsel receives a copy of this represent his client with competence and diligence.23
Special Order, if no restraining order or status quo
order is issued pursuant to Section 11 (b),4 Rule 14 of The IBP's Report and Recommendation
A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC.5 (Emphasis supplied)

In a Report and Recommendation24 dated September 1,

Distressed, complainant filed a petition 2014, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that
for certiorari6 before the Commission on Elections respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six
(COMELEC), seeking a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) (6) months.25 He observed that by filing manifestations
against the issuance of the writ of execution pending instead of motions, respondent was able to disregard the
appeal.7 In an Order8 dated February 13, 2014, the
rule that motions shall be served on the other party and from the next meeting of the Board following the
shall contain a notice of hearing. In this regard, the submission of the Investigator's report.
Investigating Commissioner noted that a manifestation
merely informs the court about a certain matter involving c) The Board's resolution, together with the entire
the case, and does not require affirmative action by the records and all evidence presented and submitted,
court. In the present case, however, the manifestations shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final
filed by respondent were actually motions as these action within ten (10) days from issuance of the
contained arguments to support his prayer for the resolution.
issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal. Moreover,
the Investigating Commissioner also held that respondent
acted in bad faith when he convinced the COC to x x x x (Emphases supplied)
disregard the COMELEC's TRO. He pointed out that when
the TRO enjoins the court, it includes the judge and all Under the old rule, the IBP Board had the power to "issue
officers and employees of the court, including the clerk of a decision" if the lawyer complained of was either
court. Hence, respondent was unfair to the other party exonerated or meted a penalty of "less than suspension of
and employed deceit when he filed the manifestations. As disbarment." In this situation, the case would be deemed
a result, the other party was not afforded due process by terminated unless an interested party files a petition
being deprived of an opportunity to oppose the before the Court.33 The case of Ramientas,34 which was
manifestations.26 cited as respondent's basis for filing the present petition
for review, was pronounced based on the old rule.35
In a Resolution27 dated December 14, 2014, the IBP Board
of Governors (IBP Board) adopted and approved the In contrast, under the amended provisions cited above,
Report and Recommendation of the Investigation the IBP Board's resolution is merely recommendatory
Commissioner. regardless of the penalty imposed on the lawyer. The
amendment stresses the Court's authority to discipline a
Respondent moved for reconsideration,28 which was, lawyer who transgresses his ethical duties under the CPR.
however, denied in a Resolution29 dated May 28, 2016. Hence, any final action on a lawyer's administrative
liability shall be done by the Court based on the entire
records of the case, including the IBP Board's
On October 10, 2016, respondent filed a petition for recommendation, without need for the lawyer-respondent
review30 before the Court purportedly pursuant to the to file any additional pleading.
procedure laid out in Ramientas v. Reyala (Ramientas).31

On this score, respondent's filing of the present petition

The Issue Before the Court for review is unnecessary. Pursuant to the current rule,
the IBP Board's resolution and the case records were
The core issue in this case is whether or not respondent forwarded to the Court. The latter is then bound to fully
should be held administratively liable for the acts consider all documents contained therein, regardless of
complained of. any further pleading filed by any party - including
respondent's petition for review, which the Court shall
The Court's Ruling nonetheless consider if only to completely resolve the
merits of this case and determine respondent's actual
administrative liability.
I.
II.
At the outset, the Court deems it proper to clarify that
respondent's filing of the instant petition for review does
not conform with the standing procedure for the After a judicious review of the case records, the Court
investigation of administrative complaints against lawyers. agrees with the IBP that respondent should be held
administratively liable for his violations of the CPR.
However, the Court finds it proper to impose a lower
Section 12 (b) and (c) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, penalty.
as amended by Bar Matter No. 1645 dated October 13,
2015,32 states:
Canon 1 of the CPR mandates lawyers to uphold the
Constitution and promote respect for the legal
Section 12. Review and Recommendation by the Board processes.36 Additionally, Canon 8 and Rule 10.03, Canon
of Governors. - 10 of the CPR require lawyers to conduct themselves with
fairness towards their professional colleagues, to observe
xxxx procedural rules, and not to misuse them to defeat the
ends of justice. These provisions read thus:
b) After its review, the Board, by the vote of a majority of
its total membership, shall recommend to the Supreme CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
Court the dismissal of the complaint or the imposition of CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAW OF THE LAND AND
disciplinary action against the respondent. The Board shall PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations, clearly and distinctly stating the facts xxxx
and the reasons on which it is based. The resolution shall
be issued within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days
CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH "within the bounds of the law" pursuant to Canon 19 of
COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARDS HIS the CPR. Accordingly, he is ethically bound to employ only
PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID fair and honest means to attain their clients' objectives.
HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL
Respondent further argues that his filing of the
xxxx manifestations with the COC is justified considering that
the RTC had already lost jurisdiction over the case and the
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND COC had the ministerial duty to issue the writ of
GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. execution. His argument fails to persuade. The Court has
ruled that a COC has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of
execution when the judge directs its issuance.41 In this
xxxx case, however, the RTC Judge had issued the second
Order (dated February 25, 2014) explicitly directing the
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure COC "NOT TO ISSUE a Writ of Execution." Therefore, the
and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. COC in this case did not have a ministerial duty to issue
the writ of execution. If respondent honestly believed that
his client was entitled to the writ, then he should not have
Contrary to these edicts, respondent improperly filed the
clandestinely submitted ex parte manifestations directly to
five (5) motions as "manifestations" to sidestep the
the COC to coerce the latter to grant his intended relief.
requirement of notice of hearing for motions. In effect, he
Instead, respondent should have filed the proper motions
violated his professional obligations to respect and
before the court, which alone has the inherent power to
observe procedural rules, not to misuse the rules to cause
grant his prayer pursuant to Section 5 (c), (d), and (g),
injustice, and to exhibit fairness towards his professional
Rule 135 of the Rules of Court.42
colleagues.

The Court has the plenary power to discipline erring

The difference between a manifestation and a motion is
lawyers. In the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, it
essential in determining respondent's administrative
may to impose a less severe punishment if such penalty
liability.
would achieve the desired end of reforming the errant
lawyer.43 In light of the foregoing discussion, the Court
A manifestation is usually made merely for the deems that a penalty of suspension from the practice of
information of the court, unless otherwise indicated. In a law for three (3) months is sufficient and commensurate
manifestation, the manifesting party makes a statement with respondent's infractions.44
to inform the court, rather than to contest or argue.37 In
contrast, a motion is an application for relief from the
As a final note, the Court stresses that a lawyer's primary
court other than by a pleading38 and must be
duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice.
accompanied by a notice of hearing and proof of service to
Any conduct that tends to delay, impede, or obstruct the
the other party, unless the motion is not prejudicial to the
administration of justice contravenes this
rights of the adverse party.39 Settled is the rule that a
obligation.45 Indeed, a lawyer must champion his client's
motion without notice of hearing is pro forma or a mere
cause with competence and diligence, but he cannot
scrap of paper; thus, the court has no reason to consider
invoke this as an excuse for his failure to exhibit courtesy
it and the clerk has no right to receive it. The reason for
and fairness to his fellow lawyers and to respect legal
the rule is simple: to afford an opportunity for the other
processes designed to afford due process to all
party to agree or object to the motion before the court
stakeholders.
resolves it. This is in keeping with the principle of due
process.40
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Rolando V. Zubiri
(respondent) is found GUILTY of violating Canon 1,
In the present case, respondent filed five (5)
Canon 8, and Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of
manifestations before the COC praying for affirmative
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he
reliefs. The Court agrees with the IBP that these
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
"manifestations" were in fact motions, since reliefs were
months effective from the finality of this Decision, and
prayed for from the court - particularly, the issuance of
is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
the writ of execution pending appeal. By labelling them as
similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
manifestations, respondent craftily sidestepped the
requirement of a notice of hearing and deprived the other
party of an opportunity to oppose his arguments. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the
Moreover, the fact that he submitted these manifestations Bar Confidant, to be attached to respondent's personal
directly to COC, instead of properly filing them before the record as a member of the Bar. Furthermore, let copies of
RTC, highlights his failure to exhibit fairness towards the the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the
other party by keeping the latter completely unaware of Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator,
his manifestations. Undoubtedly, respondent violated his which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the
professional obligations under the CPR. country for their information and guidance.

He attempts to justify his acts by arguing that he merely SO ORDERED.

represented his client with competence and diligence.
However, respondent should be reminded that a lawyer is
ethically bound not only to serve his client but also the
court, his colleagues, and society. His obligation to
represent his client is not without limits, but must be
 to October 15, 1999,3 thereby paying respondent the total
sum of P35,690.00.4

Complainant further claimed that, later, respondent filled

up two of the postal checks she issued in blank, Check
Nos. 47261 and 47262 with the amount of P50,000.00
each and with the dates January 15, 2000 and January
20, 2000 respectively, which respondent claims was in
exchange for the P100,000.00 cash that complainant
received on November 15, 1999. Complainant insisted
however that she never borrowed P100,000.00 from
respondent and that it was unlikely that respondent would
lend her, a mail sorter with a basic monthly salary of less
than P6,000.00, such amount. Complainant also claimed
that respondent victimized other employees of the Postal
Office by filling up, without authorization, blank checks
issued to him as condition for loans.5

In his Comment dated January 18, 2000, respondent

averred that his dealings with complainant were done in
his private capacity and not as a lawyer, and that when he
filed a complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
(B.P. Blg.) 22 against complainant, he was only
vindicating his rights as a private citizen. He alleged
[A.C. NO. 5338 : February 23, 2009] further that: it was complainant who deliberately deceived
him by not honoring her commitment to their November
EUGENIA MENDOZA, Complainant, v. ATTY. VICTOR V. 15, 1999 transaction involving P100,000.00 and covered
DECIEMBRE, Respondent. by two checks which bounced for the reason "account
closed"; the October 13, 1999 transaction was a separate
and distinct transaction; complainant filed the disbarment
RESOLUTION
case against him to get even with him for filing the estafa
and B.P. Blg. 22 case against the former; complainant's
PER CURIAM: claim that respondent filled up the blank checks issued by
complainant is a complete lie; the truth was that the
Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow checks referred to were already filled up when
as demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not be complainant affixed her signature thereto; it was
tolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority for unbelievable that complainant would issue blank checks,
there is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred and that she was a mere low-salaried employee, since she
ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative was able to maintain several checking accounts; and if he
than that of law.1 really intended to defraud complainant, he would have
written a higher amount on the checks instead of
only P50,000.00.6
Before the Court is the Petition filed by Eugenia Mendoza
(complainant) dated September 19, 2000, seeking the
disbarment of Atty. Victor V. Deciembre (respondent) for The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
his acts of fraudulently filling up blank postdated checks Philippines7 (IBP), and the parties were required to file
without her authority and using the same for filing their position papers.8
unfounded criminal suits against her.
In her Position Paper, complainant, apart from reiterating
Complainant, a mail sorter at the Central Post Office her earlier claims, alleged that respondent, after the
Manila, averred that: On October 13, 1998, she borrowed hearing on the disbarment case before the IBP on
from Rodela Loans, Inc., through respondent, the amount September 5, 2001, again filled up three of her blank
of P20,000.00 payable in six months at 20% interest, checks, Check Nos. 47263, 47264 and 47265,
secured by 12 blank checks, with numbers 47253, 47256 totaling P100,000.00, to serve as basis for another
to 47266, drawn against the Postal Bank. Although she criminal complaint, since the earlier estafa and B.P. Blg.
was unable to faithfully pay her obligations on their due 22 case filed by respondent against her before the Office
dates, she made remittances, however, to respondent's of the Prosecutor of Pasig City was dismissed on August
Metrobank account from November 11, 1998 to March 15, 14, 2000.9
1999 in the total sum of P12,910.00.2 Claiming that the
amounts remitted were not enough to cover the penalties, Respondent insisted in his Position Paper, however, that
interests and other charges, respondent warned complainant borrowed P100,000.00 in exchange for two
complainant that he would deposit Postal Check No. postdated checks, and that since he had known
47253 filled up by him on March 30, 1999 in the amount complainant for quite some time, he accepted said checks
of P16,000.00. Afraid that respondent might sue her in on complainant's assurance that they were good as
court, complainant made good said check and respondent cash.10
was able to encash the same on March 30, 1999.
Thereafter, complainant made subsequent payments to
Investigating Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes
the Metrobank account of respondent from April 13, 1999
submitted his Report dated September 6, 2002, finding
respondent guilty of dishonesty and recommended (rediscounting) contacted on November 15, 1999 and
respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one not for a loan contracted on October 13, 1998. x x x He
year.11 The Report was adopted and approved by the IBP claims that the October 13, 1998 transaction is an earlier
Board of Governors in its Resolution dated October 19, and different transaction. x x x On the very next day, or
2002.12 Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration on November 16, 1999, Complainant again allegedly
which was denied, however, by the IBP Board of contracted another loan for another P100,000.00 for
Governors on January 25, 2003 on the ground that it no which Complainant allegedly issued the following Postal
longer had jurisdiction on the matter, as the same was Bank checks [Check No. 0047263 dated May 16, 2001
already endorsed to the Supreme Court.13 for P20,000.00; Check No. 0047264 dated May 30, 2001
for P30,000.00 and Check No. 0047265 dated June 15,
On June 9, 2003 this Court's Second Division issued a 2001 for P50,000.00].
Resolution remanding the case to the IBP for the conduct
of formal investigation, as the Report of Commissioner xxx
Reyes was based merely on the pleadings submitted.14
Oddly though, Respondent never narrated that
After hearings were conducted,15 Investigating Complainant obtained a second loan on November 16,
Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa submitted his Report 1999 in his Answer [dated January 18, 2000] and in his
dated December 5, 2006 finding respondent guilty of Position Paper [dated October 8, 2001]. He did not even
gross misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional discuss it in his Motion for Reconsideration dated
Responsibility, and recommended respondent's December 20, 2002, although he attached the Resolution
suspension for three years.16 of the QC Prosecutor's Office. Clearly, the November 16,
1999 transaction was a mere concoction that did not
Commissioner Funa held that while it was difficult at first actually occur. It was a mere afterthought. Respondent
to determine who between complainant and respondent once again filled-up three of the other checks in his
was telling the truth, in the end, respondent himself, with possession (checks dated May 16, 2001, May 30, 2001
his own contradicting allegations, showed that and June 15, 2001) so that he can again file another
complainant's version should be given more credence.17 estafa/BP 22 case against Complainant (October 17,
2001) AFTER the earlier complaint he had filed before the
Pasig City Prosecutor's Office had been dismissed (August
Commissioner Funa noted that although complainant's 14, 2000) and AFTER herein Complainant had filed this
total obligation to respondent was only P24,000.00, since disbarment case (October 2, 2000).
the loan obtained by complainant on October 13, 1998
was P20,000.00 at 20% interest payable in six months, by
April 13, 1999, however, complainant had actually paid More telling, and this is where Respondent gets caught,
respondent the total amount of P30,240.00. Thus, even are the circumstances attending this second loan of
though the payment was irregularly given, respondent November 16, 1999. In addition to not mentioning it at all
actually earned more than the agreed upon 20% interest. in his Answer, his Position Paper, and his Motion for
Moreover, the amounts of P50,000.00 as well as the name Reconsideration, which makes it very strange, is that fact
of the payee in the subject checks were all typewritten18 that he alleges that the loan was contracted on November
16, 1999 for which Complainant supposedly issued checks
dated May 16, 2001, May 30, 2001 and June 15, 2001.
Commissioner Funa also gave credence to complainant's Note that May 16, 2001 is eighteen (18 months), or 1
claim that it was respondent's modus operandi to demand year and 6 months, from November 16, 1999. This is
a certain amount as "settlement" for the dropping of strangely a long period for loans of this nature. This loan
estafa complaints against his borrowers. As Commissioner was supposedly not made in writing, only verbally. With
Funa explains: no collaterals and no guarantors. Clearly, this is a non-
existent transaction. It was merely concocted
[A] complaint for estafa/violation of BP 22 was filed by Respondent.
against [complainant] before the Prosecutor's Office in
Pasig City on June 21, 2000. On August 14, 2000, the More importantly, and this is where Respondent
Prosecutor's Office dismissed the complaint. On October 2, commits his fatal blunder thus exposing his illegal
2000, Complainant filed this disbarment case. About one machinations, Complainant allegedly
year later, or on September 5, 2001, Complainant was received P100,000.00 in cash on November 16, 1999 for
surprised to receive a demand letter demanding payment which Complainant gave Respondent, in return, checks
once again for another P100,000.00 corresponding to also amounting to P100,000.00. The checks were
another three checks, Check Nos. 0047263, 0047264 and supposedly dated May 16, 2001, May 30, 2001 and June
0047265. 15, 2001 x x x.

Furthermore, Respondent filed another criminal complaint Now then, would not Respondent suffer a financial loss if
for estafa/violation of BP 22 dated October 17, 2001, this he gave away P100,000.00 on November 16, 1999 and
time before the QC Prosecutor's Office. The prosecutor's then also receive P100,000.00 on May 16, 2001 or 1 year
office recommended the filing of the criminal case for one and 6 months later? A person engaged in lending business
of the checks. would want to earn interest. The same also with a person
re-discounting checks. In this instance, in his haste to
xxx concoct a story, Respondent forgot to factor in the
interest. At 20% interest, assuming that it is per annum,
for 1' years, Respondent should have collected from
Respondent's version, on the other hand, is that Check
Complainant at least P130,000.00. And yet the checks he
Nos. 0047261 and 0047262 were given to him for loans
filled up totaled only P100,000.00. The same is true in re- 5365, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is hereby SUSPENDED
discounting a check. If Complainant gave INDEFINITELY from the practice of law to be served
Respondent P100,000.00 in checks, Respondent should be successively after the lifting of Respondent's Indefinite
giving Complainant an amount less Suspension.24
than P100,000.00. This exposes his story as a
fabrication. Although no motion for reconsideration was filed before
the IBP Board of Governors, nor a Petition for Review
The same observations can be made of the first loan before this Court as reported by IBP and Office of the Bar
of P100,000.00 secured by Check Nos. 0047261 and Confidant, the Court considers the IBP Resolution merely
0047262. recommendatory and therefore would not attain finality,
pursuant to par. (b), Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules
More strangely, during the course of the entire of Court. The IBP elevated to this Court the entire records
investigation, Respondent never touched on what of the case for appropriate action.
transpired on the dates of November 15 and 16, 1999.
Consider that Complainant's position is that no such The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP, but finds
transaction took place on November 15 and 16. And yet, that disbarment and not just indefinite suspension is in
Respondent never made any effort to establish that order.
Complainant borrowed P100,000.00 on November 15 and
then another P100,000.00 again on November 16. The practice of law is not a right but merely a privilege
Respondent merely focused on establishing that bestowed by the State upon those who show that they
Complainant's checks bounced - - - a fact already possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications
admitted several times by the Complainant - - - and the required by law for the conferment of such privilege.25 A
reasons for which were already explained by Complainant. high sense of morality, honesty and fair dealing is
This only shows the lack of candor of Respondent.19 expected and required of members of the bar.26 They
must conduct themselves with great propriety, and their
xxx behavior must be beyond reproach anywhere and at all
times.27
We take note further that Complainant is a mere mail
sorter earning less than P6,000.00 per month. Who The fact that there is no attorney-client relationship in this
would lend P200,000.00 to an employee earning such a case and the transactions entered into by respondent
salary, nowadays, and not even secure such a loan with a were done in his private capacity cannot shield
written document or a collateral? It defies realities of respondent, as a lawyer, from liability.
finance, economy and business. It even defies common
sense.20 A lawyer may be disciplined for acts committed even in his
private capacity for acts which tend to bring reproach on
Commissioner Funa also took note that the instant case the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion
had practically the same set of facts as in Olbes v. of the public.28 Indeed, there is no distinction as to
Deciembre21 and Acosta v. Deciembre.22 In Olbes, whether the transgression is committed in a lawyer's
complainants therein, who were also postal employees, private life or in his professional capacity, for a lawyer
averred that respondent without authority filled up a total may not divide his personality as an attorney at one time
of four checks to represent a total of P200,000.00. and a mere citizen at another.29
In Acosta, the complainant therein, another postal
employee, averred that respondent filled up two blank In this case, evidence abounds that respondent has failed
checks for a total of P100,000.00. Acosta, however, was to live up to the standards required of members of the
dismissed by Commissioner Lydia Navarro on the ground legal profession. Specifically, respondent has transgressed
that it did not involve any lawyer-client relationship, which provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to
ground, Commissioner Funa believes, is erroneous.23 wit:

On May 31, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors issued a CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey
resolution adopting and approving Commissoner Funa's the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
Report, but modifying the penalty, as follows: processes.

RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2007-219 Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
Adm. Case No. 5338 dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Eugenia Mendoza v.
Atty. Victor V. Deciembre
xxx

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby

ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and dignity of the legal profession and support the
of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this activities of the integrated bar.
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on xxx
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
Respondent's gross misconduct and for practically found
Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
guilty of committing the same set of facts alleged in AC
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a As manifested by these cases, respondent's offenses are
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. manifold. First, he demands excessive payments from his
borrowers; then he fills up his borrowers' blank checks
As correctly observed by IBP Investigating Commissioner with fictitious amounts, falsifying commercial documents
Funa, respondent failed to mention in his Comment dated for his material gain; and then he uses said checks as
January 18, 2000, in his Position Paper dated October 8, bases for filing unfounded criminal suits against his
2001 and in his Motion for Reconsideration dated borrowers in order to harass them. Such acts manifest
December 20, 2002, the P100,000.00 loan which respondent's perversity of character, meriting his
complainant supposedly contracted on November 16, severance from the legal profession.
1999. It is also questionable why the checks dated May
16, 2001, May 30, 2001 and June 15, 2001 which were While the power to disbar is exercised with great caution
supposedly issued to secure a loan contracted about 18 and is withheld whenever a lesser penalty could
months earlier, i.e. November 16, 1999, were made accomplish the end desired,36 the seriousness of
without any interest. The same is true with the checks respondent's offense compels the Court to wield its
dated January 15 and 20, 2000 in the total sum supreme power of disbarment. Indeed, the Court will not
of P100,000.00, which were supposed to secure a loan hestitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed
contracted on November 15, 1999, for the same amount. brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for
Considering these circumstances and the sequence of it.37 This is because in the exercise of its disciplinary
dates when respondent filed his criminal cases against powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar
complainant, and complainant her disbarment case to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court,
against respondent, what truly appears more believable is with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
complainant's claim that respondent was merely utilizing profession and the proper and honest administration of
the blank checks, filling them up, and using them as bases justice by purging the profession of members who by their
for criminal cases in order to harass complainant. misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to
be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining
The Court also notes that the checks being refuted by to the office of an attorney.38
complainant, dated January 15 and 20, 2000, May 16,
2001, May 30, 2001 and June 15, 200130 had its dates, As respondent's misconduct brings intolerable dishonor to
amounts and payee's name all typewritten, while the the legal profession, the severance of his privilege to
blanks on the check for P16,000.00 dated March 30, 1999 practice law for life is in order.
which complainant used to pay part of her original loan,
were all filled up in her handwriting.31 WHEREFORE, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is hereby
found GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT and
It is also observed that the present case was not the only VIOLATION of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule
instance when respondent committed his wrongful acts. 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
In Olbes,32 complainants therein contracted a loan from DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is
respondent in the amount of P10,000.00 on July 1, 1999, ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys effective
for which they issued five blank checks as collateral. immediately.
Notwithstanding their full payment of the loan, respondent
filled up four of the blank checks with the amount Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the
of P50,000.00 each with different dates of maturity and Bar Confidant which shall forthwith record it in the
used the same in filing estafa and B.P. Blg. 22 cases personal files of respondent; all the courts of the
against complainants. The Court, in imposing the penalty Philippines; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which
of indefinite suspension on respondent, found his shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters; and all
propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation as administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic
reprehensible and his misuse of the filled up checks, of the Philippines.
loathsome.33

SO ORDERED.
In Acosta,34 complainant therein also averred that on
August 1, 1998, she borrowed P20,000.00 from
respondent with an interest of 20% payable in six months
and guaranteed by twelve blank checks. Although she had
already paid the total amount of P33,300.00, respondent
still demanded payments from her, and for her failure to
comply therewith, respondent filed a case against her
before the City Prosecutor of Marikina City, using two of
her blank checks which respondent filled up with the total
amount of P100,000.00. Unfortunately, the complaint was
dismissed by IBP Investigating Commissioner Navarro on
October 2, 2001 on the ground that the said transaction
did not involve any lawyer-client relationship.35 As
correctly observed by Commissioner Funa, such
conclusion is erroneous, for a lawyer may be disciplined
even for acts not involving any attorney-client
relationship.
 approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in
Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that
the validity of imposing dues on the IBP members has
been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an
Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of the IBP
Board of Governors of no exemption from payment of
dues is but an implementation of the Court's directives for
all members of the IBP to help in defraying the cost of
integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no rule
allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues as
requested by respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary
termination and reinstatement of membership. It asserted
that what petitioner could have done was to inform the
secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so
that his membership in the IBP could have been
terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have
been stopped. It also alleged that the IBP Board of
Governors is in the process of discussing proposals for the
creation of an inactive status for its members, which if
approved by the Board of Governors and by this Court,
will exempt inactive IBP members from payment of the
annual dues.

In his reply4 dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends

that what he is questioning is the IBP Board of Governor's
Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual
membership dues of lawyers regardless of whether or not
they are engaged in active or inactive practice. He
asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the
[B.M. NO. 1370 : May 9, 2005]
payment of annual membership dues suffers from
constitutional infirmities, such as equal protection clause
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., and the due process clause. He also posits that
REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP compulsory payment of the IBP annual membership dues
DUES. would indubitably be oppressive to him considering that
he has been in an inactive status and is without income
DECISION derived from his law practice. He adds that his removal
from nonpayment of annual membership dues would
constitute deprivation of property right without due
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
process of law. Lastly, he claims that non-practice of law
by a lawyer-member in inactive status is neither injurious
This is a request for exemption from payment of the to active law practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues filed by status, nor to the community where the inactive lawyers-
petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr. members reside.

In his letter,1 dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is
exemption from payment of IBP dues in the amount of entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the
P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years time that he was inactive in the practice of law that is,
1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he
Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine was working abroad from 1986-2003? cralawl ibra ry

Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to,
and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his We rule in the negative.
retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he
cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was
working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which
Service law prohibits the practice of one's profession while every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
in government service, and neither can he be assessed for association organized by individual lawyers themselves,
the years when he was working in the USA. membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar
is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar
is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his
comment.2
portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the
direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its national body of which all lawyers are required to be
comment3 stating inter alia: that membership in the IBP is members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules
not based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the
continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the
he continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and
obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional
determined by the IBP Board of Governors and duly responsibility, breach of which constitutes sufficient
reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed
cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay
disbarment of the offending member.5 abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in the
IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official dues could have been discontinued.
unification of the entire lawyer population. This requires
membership and financial support of every attorney as As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that
condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing
retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the the situation of members under inactive status and the
Supreme Court.6 nonpayment of their dues during such inactivity. In the
meantime, petitioner is duty bound to comply with his
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.
with anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the
to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion penalty of removal would amount to a deprivation of
to which he is subjected is the payment of his annual property without due process and hence infringes on one
dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster the State's of his constitutional rights.
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional
legal services, may require that the cost of improving the This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty.
profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and Marcial Edillon,10 in this wise:
beneficiaries of the regulatory program - the lawyers.7

. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the

Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license
prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider
duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the at length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of
practice of law and in the integration of the Philippine the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the
Bar8 - which power required members of a privileged Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right
class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward to practice law before the courts of this country should be
defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if
which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is, the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
indeed, imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its
raise funds for carrying out the noble objectives and payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
purposes of integration. payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is
the Integration of the Philippine Bar,9 thus: not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such
must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
does not mean that the Court is attempting to levy a tax.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership
A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions,11 one of
regulation, while tax purpose of a tax is a revenue. If the which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to
judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if
that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.
membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible
to put on an integrated Bar program without means to WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption from
defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is ordered to pay
necessarily carries with it the power to impose such P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as
exaction. membership fees for the years 1977-2005, within a non-
extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of this
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the decision, with a warning that failure to do so will merit his
privilege of law is that the regulation does not impose an suspension from the practice of law.
unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by
the integration of the Bar far outweighs the slight SO ORDERED.
inconvenience to a member resulting from his required
payment of the annual dues.

Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of

membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This
means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues
subsists for as long as one's membership in the IBP
remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type
of practice, the member is engaged in.

There is nothing in the law or rules which allows

exemption from payment of membership dues. At most,
 Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a
number of years now, has not
indicated the proper PTR and IBP
O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of
issuance) in his pleadings. If at all,
he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060"
but he has been using this for at
least three years already, as shown
by the following attached sample
pleadings in various courts in 1995,
1996 and 1997: (originals available)

Annex A .......- "Ex-Parte Manifes

dated December 1
Q-95-25253, RTC,
Annex B .......- "Urgent Ex-Parte M
dated November 1
A.C No. 4749. January 20, 2000 95-030, RTC Br. 2
MM
SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, Annex C .......- "An Urgent and Re
JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. extension of Time
FRANCISCO R.
and Opposition" d
LLAMAS, Respondent.
CA-G.R. SP (not C
6th Div.
DECISION

MENDOZA, J.: This matter is being brought in the

context of Rule 138, Section 1 which
This is a complaint for qualifies that only a duly admitted
misrepresentation and non-payment member of the bar "who is in good
of bar membership dues filed and regular standing, is entitled to
against respondent Atty. Francisco practice law". There is also Rule
R. Llamas. 139-A, Section 10 which provides
that "default in the payment of
In a letter-complaint to this Court annual dues for six months shall
dated February 8, 1997, warrant suspension of membership
complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., in the Integrated Bar, and default in
himself a member of the bar, such payment for one year shall be
alleged that: a ground for the removal of the
name of the delinquent member
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to from the Roll of Attorneys."
bring to your attention and
appropriate sanction the matter of
Among others, I seek clarification 1, 1995, November 13, 1996, and
(e.g. a certification) and appropriate January 17, 1997 referred to by
action on the bar standing of Atty. complainant, bearing, at the end
Francisco R. Llamas both with the thereof, what appears to be
Bar Confidant and with the IBP, respondents signature above his
especially its Rizal Chapter of which name, address and the receipt
Atty. Llamas purports to be a number "IBP Rizal 259060."1 Also
member. attached was a copy of the
order,2 dated February 14, 1995,
Please note that while Atty. Llamas issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario,
indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" Jr. of the Regional Trial Court,
sometimes, he does not indicate any Branch 66, Makati, denying
PTR for payment of professional tax. respondents motion for
reconsideration of his conviction, in
Under the Rules, particularly Rule Criminal Case No. 11787, for
138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the
of an attorney may be done not only Revised Penal Code.
by the Supreme Court but also by
the Court of Appeals or a Regional On April 18, 1997, complainant filed
Trial Court (thus, we are also copy a certification3 dated March 18,
furnishing some of these courts). 1997, by the then president of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Finally, it is relevant to note the Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that
track record of Atty. Francisco R. respondents "last payment of his IBP
Llamas, as shown by: dues was in 1991. Since then he has
not paid or remitted any amount to
1........his dismissal as Pasay City
cover his membership fees up to the
Judge per Supreme Court Admin.
present."
Matter No. 1037-CJ En
Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 ( On July 7, 1997, respondent was
in SCRA ) required to comment on the
complaint within ten days from
2........his conviction for estafa per
receipt of notice, after which the
Decision dated June 30, 1994 in
case was referred to the IBP for
Crim. Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66,
investigation, report and
Makati, MM (see attached copy of
recommendation. In his comment-
the Order dated February 14, 1995
memorandum,4 dated June 3, 1998,
denying the motion for
respondent alleged:5
reconsideration of the conviction
cräläwvi rtua lib räry

which is purportedly on appeal in 3. That with respect to the

the Court of Appeals). complainants absurd claim that for
using in 1995, 1996 and 1997 the
Attached to the letter-complaint
same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal
were the pleadings dated December
IBP, respondent is automatically no Undersigned since 1992 have
longer a member in good standing. publicly made it clear per his Income
Tax Return, up to the present, that
Precisely, as cited under the context he had only a limited practice of law.
of Rule 138, only an admitted In fact, in his Income Tax Return,
member of the bar who is in good his principal occupation is a farmer
standing is entitled to practice law. of which he is. His 30 hectares
orchard and pineapple farm is
The complainants basis in claiming located at Calauan, Laguna.
that the undersigned was no longer
in good standing, were as above Moreover, and more than anything
cited, the October 28, 1981 else, respondent being a Senior
Supreme Court decision of dismissal Citizen since 1992, is legally exempt
and the February 14, 1995 under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432
conviction for Violation of Article 316 which took effect in 1992, in the
RPC, concealment of encumbrances. payment of taxes, income taxes as
an example. Being thus exempt, he
As above pointed out also, the honestly believe in view of his
Supreme Court dismissal decision detachment from a total practice of
was set aside and reversed and law, but only in a limited practice,
respondent was even promoted from the subsequent payment by him of
City Judge of Pasay City to Regional dues with the Integrated Bar is
Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150. covered by such exemption. In fact,
he never exercised his rights as an
Also as pointed out, the February
IBP member to vote and be voted
14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No.
upon.
11787 was appealed to the Court of
Appeals and is still pending. Nonetheless, if despite such honest
belief of being covered by the
Complainant need not even file this
exemption and if only to show that
complaint if indeed the decision of
he never in any manner wilfully and
dismissal as a Judge was never set
deliberately failed and refused
aside and reversed, and also had the
compliance with such dues, he is
decision of conviction for a light
willing at any time to fulfill and pay
felony, been affirmed by the Court
all past dues even with interests,
of Appeals. Undersigned himself
charges and surcharges and
would surrender his right or privilege
penalties. He is ready to tender such
to practice law.
fulfillment or payment, not for
allegedly saving his skin as again
4. That complainant capitalizes on
irrelevantly and frustratingly
the fact that respondent had been
delinquent in his dues. insinuated for vindictive purposes by
the complainant, but as an honest
act of accepting reality if indeed it is
reality for him to pay such dues
despite his candor and honest belief respondent, he has invoked and
in all food faith, to the contrary. cited that "being a Senior Citizen
since 1992, he is legally exempt
On December 4, 1998, the IBP under Section 4 of Republic Act No.
Board of Governors passed a 7432 which took effect in 1992 in
resolution6 adopting and approving the payment of taxes, income taxes
the report and recommendation of as an example."
the Investigating Commissioner
which found respondent guilty, and ....
recommended his suspension from
the practice of law for three months The above cited provision of law is
and until he pays his IBP dues. not applicable in the present case.
Respondent moved for a In fact, respondent admitted that he
reconsideration of the decision, but is still in the practice of law when he
this was denied by the IBP in a alleged that the "undersigned since
resolution,7 dated April 22, 1999. 1992 have publicly made it clear per
Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, his Income tax Return up to the
12(b) of the Rules of Court, this present time that he had only a
case is here for final action on the limited practice of law." (par. 4 of
decision of the IBP ordering Respondents Memorandum).
respondents suspension for three
months. Therefore respondent is not exempt
from paying his yearly dues to the
The findings of IBP Commissioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Alfredo Sanz are as follows:
On the second issue, complainant
On the first issue, Complainant has claims that respondent has misled
shown "respondents non-indication the court about his standing in the
of the proper IBP O.R. and PTR IBP by using the same IBP O.R.
numbers in his pleadings (Annexes number in his pleadings of at least
"A", "B" and "C" of the letter six years and therefore liable for his
complaint, more particularly his use actions. Respondent in his
of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least memorandum did not discuss this
three years." issue.

The records also show a First. Indeed, respondent admits

"Certification dated March 24, 1997 that since 1992, he has engaged in
from IBP Rizal Chapter President Ida law practice without having paid his
R. Makahinud Javier that IBP dues. He likewise admits that,
respondents last payment of his IBP as appearing in the pleadings
dues was in 1991." submitted by complainant to this
Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal
While these allegations are neither 259060" in the pleadings he filed in
denied nor categorically admitted by court, at least for the years 1995,
1996, and 1997, thus practice is "limited." While it is true
misrepresenting that such was his that R.A. No. 7432, 4 grants senior
IBP chapter membership and receipt citizens "exemption from the
number for the years in which those payment of individual income taxes:
pleadings were filed. He claims, provided, that their annual taxable
however, that he is only engaged in income does not exceed the poverty
a "limited" practice and that he level as determined by the National
believes in good faith that he is Economic and Development
exempt from the payment of taxes, Authority (NEDA) for that year," the
such as income tax, under R.A. No. exemption does not include payment
7432, 4 as a senior citizen since of membership or association dues.
1992.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal
Rule 139-A provides: 259060" in his pleadings and
thereby misrepresenting to the
Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every public and the courts that he had
member of the Integrated Bar shall paid his IBP dues to the Rizal
pay such annual dues as the Board Chapter, respondent is guilty of
of Governors shall determine with violating the Code of Professional
the approval of the Supreme Court. Responsibility which provides:
A fixed sum equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of the collections Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not
from each Chapter shall be set aside engage in unlawful, dishonest,
as a Welfare Fund for disabled immoral or deceitful conduct.
members of the Chapter and the
compulsory heirs of deceased CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL
members thereof. TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE
dues. - Subject to the provisions of ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED
Section 12 of this Rule, default in BAR.
the payment of annual dues for six
months shall warrant suspension of CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES
membership in the Integrated Bar, CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD
and default in such payment for one FAITH TO THE COURT.
year shall be a ground for the
removal of the name of the Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do
delinquent member from the Roll of any falsehood, nor consent to the
Attorneys. doing of any court; nor shall he
mislead or allow the court to be
In accordance with these provisions, misled by any artifice.
respondent can engage in the
practice of law only by paying his Respondents failure to pay his IBP
dues, and it does not matter that his dues and his misrepresentation in
the pleadings he filed in court indeed
merit the most severe penalty.
However, in view of respondents
advanced age, his express
willingness to pay his dues and plea
for a more temperate application of
the law,8 we believe the penalty of
one year suspension from the
practice of law or until he has paid
his IBP dues, whichever is later, is
appropriate.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty.

Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for ONE (1)
YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP
dues, whichever is later. Let a copy
of this decision be attached to Atty.
Llamas personal record in the Office
of the Bar Confidant and copies be
furnished to all chapters of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
to all courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.
 Responsibility and Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court:

(1) The respondent's abuse of court

remedies and processes by filing a
petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals (CA), two petitions
for annulment of title before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), a
petition for annulment of judgment
before the RTC and lastly, a petition
for declaratory relief before the RTC
(collectively, subject cases) to assail
and overturn the final judgments of
the Metropolitan Trial Court2 (MeTC)
and RTC3 in the unlawful detainer
case rendered against the
respondent's clients. The respondent
in this regard, repeatedly raised the
issue of lack of jurisdiction by the
MeTC and RTC knowing fully-well
A.C. NO. 7054 : December 4, that these courts have jurisdiction
2009] over the unlawful detainer case. The
respondent also repeatedly attacked
CONRADO the complainant's and his siblings'
QUE, Complainant, v. ATTY. titles over the property subject of
ANASTACIO REVILLA, the unlawful detainer case;
JR. Respondent.
(2) The respondent's commission of
DECISION forum-shopping by filing the subject
cases in order to impede, obstruct,
PER CURIAM: and frustrate the efficient
administration of justice for his own
In a complaint for personal gain and to defeat the right
disbarment,1 Conrado Que of the complainant and his siblings
(complainant) accused Atty. to execute the MeTC and RTC
Anastacio Revilla, Jr. (respondent) judgments in the unlawful detainer
before the Integrated Bar of the case;
Philippines Committee on Bar
Discipline (IBP Committee on Bar (3) The respondent's lack of candor
Discipline or CBD) of committing the and respect towards his adversary
following violations of the provisions and the courts by resorting to
of the Code of Professional falsehood and deception to
misguide, obstruct and impede the
due administration of justice. The The CBD required the respondent to
respondent asserted falsehood in the answer the complaint.
motion for reconsideration of the
dismissal of the petition for In his Answer,5 the respondent
annulment of judgment by declared that he is a member of the
fabricating an imaginary order Kalayaan Development Cooperative
issued by the presiding judge in (KDC) that handles pro bono cases
open court which allegedly denied for the underprivileged, the less
the motion to dismiss filed by the fortunate, the homeless and those in
respondents in the said case. The the marginalized sector in Metro
complainant alleged that the Manila. He agreed to take over the
respondent did this to cover up his cases formerly handled by other
lack of preparation; the respondent KDC members. One of these cases
also deceived his clients (who were was the unlawful detainer case
all squatters) in supporting the handled by the late Atty. Catolico
above falsehood.4 where the complainant and his
siblings were the plaintiffs and the
(4) The respondent's willful and respondent's present clients were
revolting falsehood that unjustly the defendants.
maligned and defamed the good
name and reputation of the late With respect to paragraph 1 of the
Atty. Alfredo Catolico (Atty. disbarment complaint, the
Catolico), the previous counsel of respondent professed his sincerity,
the respondent's clients. honesty and good faith in filing the
petitions complained of; he filed
(5) The respondent's deliberate, these petitions to protect the
fraudulent and unauthorized interests of his clients in their
appearances in court in the petition property. The respondent asserted
for annulment of judgment for 15 that these petitions were all based
litigants, three of whom are already on valid grounds - the lack of
deceased; jurisdiction of the MeTC and the RTC
over the underlying unlawful
(6) The respondent's willful and detainer case, the extrinsic fraud
fraudulent appearance in the second committed by the late Atty. Catolico,
petition for annulment of title as and the extrinsic fraud committed by
counsel for the Republic of the the complainant and his family
Philippines without being authorized against his clients; he discovered
to do so. that the allegedly detained property
did not really belong to the
Additionally, the complaint accused complainant and his family but is a
the respondent of representing fifty- forest land. The respondent also
two (52) litigants in Civil Case No. asserted that his resort to a petition
Q-03-48762 when no such authority for annulment of judgment and a
was ever given to him. petition for declaratory relief to
contest the final judgments of the Office of the Solicitor General to
MeTC and RTC were all parts of his represent his clients in the case.6
legal strategy to protect the
interests of his clients. The respondent submitted that he
did not commit any illegal, unlawful,
On the allegations of falsehood in unjust, wrongful or immoral acts
the motion for reconsideration of the towards the complainant and his
order of dismissal of the petition for siblings. He stressed that he acted in
annulment of judgment (covered by good faith in his dealings with them
paragraph 3 of the disbarment and his conduct was consistent with
complaint), the respondent his sworn duty as a lawyer to uphold
maintained that his allegations were justice and the law and to defend
based on his observations and the the interests of his clients. The
notes he had taken during the respondent additionally claimed that
proceedings on what the presiding the disbarment case was filed
judge dictated in open court. because the complainant's counsel,
Atty. Cesar P. Uy (Atty. Uy), had an
The respondent denied that he had axe to grind against him.
made any unauthorized appearance
in court (with respect to paragraphs Lastly, the respondent posited in his
5 and 6 of the disbarment pleadings7 before the IBP that the
complaint). He claimed that the 52 present complaint violated the rule
litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03- on forum shopping considering that
48762 were impleaded by the subject cases were also the ones
inadvertence; he immediately on which a complaint was filed
rectified his error by dropping them against him in CBD Case No. 03-
from the case. On the petition for 1099 filed by Atty. Uy before the IBP
annulment of judgment, the Committee on Bar Discipline. The
respondent claimed that a majority respondent also posited that the
(31 out of 49) of the litigants who present complaint was filed to
signed the certification constituted harass, ridicule and defame his good
sufficient compliance with the rules name and reputation and, indirectly,
on forum-shopping. The respondent to harass his clients who are
likewise denied having represented marginalized members of the KDC.
the Republic of the Philippines in the
second petition for annulment of The Findings of the Investigating
title. The respondent pointed out Commissioner
that there was no allegation
whatsoever that he was the sole Except for the last charge of
representative of both the unauthorized appearance on behalf
complainants (his clients) and the of 52 litigants in Civil Case No. Q-
Republic of the Philippines. The 03-48762, Investigating
respondent pointed out that the Commissioner Renato G.
petition embodied a request to the Cunanan8 (Investigating
Commissioner Cunanan) found all Cunanan found ample evidence
the charges against the respondent showing that the respondent was
meritorious. In his Report and dishonest in dealing with the court
Recommendation, he stated: as shown in his petition for
annulment of judgment; he resorted
While an attorney admittedly has to falsities and attributed acts to
the solemn duty to defend and Atty. Catolico and to the presiding
protect the cause and rights of his judge, all of which were untrue.12
client with all the fervor and energy
within his command, yet, it is On the fifth and sixth charges, the
equally true that it is the primary Investigating Commissioner
duty of the lawyer to defend the disregarded the respondent's
dignity, authority and majesty of the explanation that he had no intention
law and the courts which enforce it. to represent without authority 15 of
A lawyer is not at liberty to maintain the litigants (three of whom were
and defend the cause of his clients already deceased) in the petition for
thru means, inconsistent with truth annulment of judgment (Civil Case
and honor. He may not and must No. Q-01-45556). To the
not encourage multiplicity of suits or Investigating Commissioner, the
brazenly engage in forum-shopping.9 respondent merely glossed over the
representation issue by claiming that
On the first charge on abuse of court the authority given by a majority of
processes, Investigating the litigants complied with the
Commissioner Cunanan noted the certification of non-forum shopping
unnecessary use by the respondent requirement. The Investigating
of legal remedies to forestall the Commissioner likewise brushed
execution of the final decisions of aside the respondent's argument
the MTC and the RTC in the unlawful regarding his misrepresentation in
detainer case against his clients.10 the second complaint for annulment
of title since he knew very well that
On the second charge, the only the Solicitor General can
Investigating Commissioner ruled institute an action for reversion on
that the act of the respondent in behalf of the Republic of the
filing two petitions for annulment of Philippines. Despite this knowledge,
title, a petition for annulment of the respondent solely signed the
judgment and later on a petition for amended complaint for and on
declaratory relief were all done to behalf of his clients and of the
prevent the execution of the final Republic.
judgment in the unlawful detainer
case and constituted prohibited The Board of Governors of the IBP
forum-shopping.11 Committee on Bar Discipline,
through its Resolution No. XVII-
On the third and fourth charges, 2005-164 on CBD Case No. 03-
Investigating Commissioner 1100, adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation of imposed a suspension of two (2)
Investigating Commissioner years, but in an act of leniency
Cunanan and recommended that the subsequently reduced the
respondent be suspended from the suspension to six (6) months.16
practice of law for two (2)
years.13 On reconsideration, the Abuse of court procedures and
Board of Governors reduced the processes
respondent's suspension from the
practice of law to one (1) year.14 The following undisputed facts fully
support the conclusion that the
The Issue respondent is guilty of serious
misconduct for abusing court
The case poses to us the core issues procedures and processes to shield
of whether the respondent can be his clients from the execution of the
held liable for the imputed unethical final judgments of the MeTC and
infractions and professional RTC in the unlawful detainer case
misconduct, and the penalty these against these clients:
transgressions should carry.
First, the respondent filed a petition
The Court's Ruling for certiorari (docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 53892) with prayer for the
Except for the penalty, we agree issuance of preliminary injunction
with the Report and and temporary restraining order to
Recommendation of Investigating question the final judgments of the
Commissioner Cunanan and the MeTC and RTC for lack of
Board of Governors of the IBP jurisdiction. In dismissing the
Committee on Bar Discipline. respondent's petition, the CA held:

We take judicial notice that this Even for the sake of argument
disbarment complaint is not the only considering that the petition case be
one so far filed involving the the proper remedy, still it must be
respondent; another complaint rejected for failure of petitioners to
invoking similar grounds has satisfactorily demonstrate lack of
previously been filed. In Plus jurisdiction on the part of the
Builders, Inc. and Edgardo C. Garcia Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
v. Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, City over the ejectment case.17
Jr.,15 we suspended the respondent
from the practice of law for his Second, notwithstanding the CA's
willful and intentional falsehood dismissal of the petition
before the court; for misuse of court for certiorari, the respondent again
procedures and processes to delay questioned the MeTC's and the
the execution of a judgment; and for RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the
collaborating with non-lawyers in the unlawful detainer case in a petition
illegal practice of law. We initially for annulment of judgment
(docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01- respondent's persistence in
45556) before the RTC with an preventing and avoiding the
ancillary prayer for the grant of a execution of the final decisions of
temporary restraining order and the MeTC and RTC against his clients
preliminary injunction. The RTC in the unlawful detainer case.
dismissed this petition on the basis
of the motion to dismiss filed.18 Under the circumstances, the
respondent's repeated attempts go
Third, the respondent successively beyond the legitimate means
filed two petitions (docketed as Civil allowed by professional ethical rules
Case No. Q-99-38780 and Civil Case in defending the interests of his
No. Q-02-46885) for annulment of client. These are already uncalled for
the complainant's title to the measures to avoid the enforcement
property involved in the unlawful of final judgments of the MeTC and
detainer case. The records show that RTC. In these attempts, the
these petitions were both dismissed respondent violated Rule 10.03,
"for lack of legal personality on the Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
part of the plaintiffs" to file the Responsibility which makes it
petition.19 obligatory for a lawyer to "observe
the rules of procedure and. . . not
Fourth, after the dismissals of the [to] misuse them to defeat the ends
petition for annulment of judgment of justice." By his actions, the
and the petitions for annulment of respondent used procedural rules to
title, the respondent this time filed a thwart and obstruct the speedy and
petition for declaratory relief with efficient administration of justice,
prayer for a writ of preliminary resulting in prejudice to the winning
injunction to enjoin the complainant parties in that case.20
and his siblings from exercising their
rights over the same property Filing of multiple actions and forum
subject of the unlawful detainer shopping
case. The respondent based the
petition on the alleged nullity of the The respondent likewise violated
complainant's title because the Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04, Canon
property is a part of forest land. 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,21 as well as the rule
Fifth, the persistent applications by against forum shopping, both of
the respondent for injunctive relief which are directed against the filing
in the four petitions he had filed in of multiple actions to attain the
several courts - the petition same objective. Both violations
for certiorari, the petition for constitute abuse of court processes;
annulment of judgment, the second they tend to degrade the
petition for annulment of administration of justice; wreak
complainant's title and the petition havoc on orderly judicial
for declaratory relief - reveal the procedure;22 and add to the
congestion of the heavily burdened In here, counsel for the petitioners
dockets of the courts.23 (defendants therein), deliberately
neglected to file the proper remedy
While the filing of a petition then available after receipt of the
for certiorari to question the lower denial of their Motion for
courts' jurisdiction may be a Reconsideration - thus corruptly sold
procedurally legitimate (but out the interest of the petitioners
substantively erroneous) move, the (defendants therein) by keeping
respondent's subsequent petitions them away to the Court and in
involving the same property and the complete ignorance of the suit by a
same parties not only demonstrate false pretense of compromise and
his attempts to secure favorable fraudulent acts of alleging
ruling using different fora, but his representing them when in truth and
obvious objective as well of in fact, have connived with the
preventing the execution of the attorney of the prevailing party at
MeTC and RTC decisions in the his defeat to the prejudice of the
unlawful detainer case against his petitioner (defendants therein) '24
clients. This intent is most obvious
with respect to the petitions for Yet, in paragraph 35 of the same
annulment of judgment and petition, the respondent alleged that
declaratory relief, both geared no second motion for
towards preventing the execution of reconsideration or for new trial, or
the unlawful detainer decision, long no other petition with the CA had
after this decision had become final. been filed, as he believed "that the
decisions rendered both by the
Willful, intentional and deliberate MeTC and the RTC are null and
falsehood before the courts void."25 These conflicting claims, no
doubt, involve a fabrication made for
The records also reveal that the the purpose of supporting the
respondent committed willful, petition for annulment. Worse, it
intentional and deliberate falsehood involved a direct and
in the pleadings he filed with the unsubstantiated attack on the
lower courts. reputation of a law office colleague,
another violation we shall separately
First, in the petition for annulment
discuss below.
of judgment filed before the RTC,
Branch 101, Quezon City, the Second, the respondent employed
respondent cited extrinsic fraud as another obvious subterfuge when he
one of the grounds for the filed his second petition for
annulment sought. The extrinsic annulment of title, which was an
fraud was alleged in the last unsuccessful attempt to circumvent
paragraph of the petition, as follows: the rule that only the Solicitor
General may commence reversion
proceedings of public lands26 on
behalf of the Republic of the REMAINING
Philippines. This second petition, PERIOD.27 [Underscoring and
filed by a private party and not by emphasis theirs]
the Republic, showed that: (a) the
respondent and his clients requested The records, however, disclose that
that they be represented by the the scheduled hearing for June 28,
Solicitor General in the proceedings; 2002 was actually for the
(b) the Republic of the Philippines respondent's application for
was simply impleaded in the temporary restraining order and was
amended petition without its not a hearing on the adverse party's
consent as a plaintiff; and (c) the motion to dismiss.28 The records
respondent signed the amended also show that RTC-Branch 101 held
petition where he alone stood as in abeyance the respondent's
counsel for the "plaintiffs." In this application for injunctive relief
underhanded manner, the pending the resolution of the motion
respondent sought to compel the to dismiss filed by the adverse
Republic to litigate and waste its party.29 As stated in the order of the
resources on an unauthorized and Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 101:
unwanted suit.
Browsing over the records of this
Third, the respondent also case specifically the transcripts of
committed falsehood in his motion stenographic notes as transcribed by
for reconsideration of the order the Stenographer, the same will
dismissing his petition for annulment indicate that the allegations in the
of judgment where he Motion for Reconsideration are not
misrepresented to the court and his true.
clients what actually transpired in
the hearing of June 28, 2002 in this 'how can this Court make a ruling on
wise: the matter even without stating the
factual and legal bases as
Likewise, the proceedings on said required/mandated by the Rules.
date of hearing (June 28, 2002) Moreover, there are no indications
show, that after both counsel have or iota of irregularity in the
argued on the aforesaid pending preparation by Stenographer of the
incident, the Honorable Presiding transcripts, and by the Court
Judge, in open court, and in the interpreter of the Minutes of the
presence and within the hearing open Court session.[Underscoring
distance of all the plaintiffs and their theirs]
counsel as well as the counsel of the
defendants resolved: TO DENY THE The records further disclose that
MOTION TO DISMISS FILED AND despite knowledge of the falsity of
DIRECTED DEFENDANTS COUNSEL his allegations, the respondent took
TO FILE AN ANSWER TO THE advantage of his position and the
COMPLAINT WITHIN THE trust reposed in him by his clients
(who are all squatters) to convince In defending his clients' interest, the
them to support, through their respondent also failed to observe
affidavits, his false claims on what Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of
allegedly transpired in the June 28, Professional Responsibility, which
2002 hearing.30 reads:

For these acts, we find the CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL

respondent liable under Rule 10.01 REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL
of Canon 10 the Code of Professional WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF LAW
Responsibility for violating the
lawyer's duty to observe candor and Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ
fairness in his dealings with the only fair and honest means to attain
court. This provision states: the lawful objectives of his clients x
xx
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES
CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD This Canon obligates a lawyer, in
FAITH TO THE COURT defending his client, to employ only
such means as are consistent with
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do truth and honor.36 He should not
any falsehood, nor consent to the prosecute patently frivolous and
doing of any in Court, nor shall he meritless appeals or institute clearly
mislead or allow the Court to be groundless actions.37 The recital of
mislead by an artifice. what the respondent did to prevent
the execution of the judgment
Likewise, the respondent violated his against his clients shows that he
duty as an attorney and his oath as actually committed what the above
a lawyer "never to mislead the judge rule expressly prohibits.
or any judicial officer by an artifice
or false statement of fact or Maligning the name of his fellow
law."31 The respondent failed to lawyers
remember that his duty as an officer
of the court makes him an To support the charge of extrinsic
indispensable participant in the fraud in his petition for annulment of
administration of justice,32 and that judgment, the respondent attacked
he is expected to act candidly, fairly (as quoted above) the name and
and truthfully in his work.33 His duty reputation of the late Atty. Catolico
as a lawyer obligates him not to and accused him of deliberate
conceal the truth from the court, or neglect, corrupt motives and
to mislead the court in any manner, connivance with the counsel for the
no matter how demanding his duties adverse party.
to his clients may be.34 In case of
conflict, his duties to his client yield We find it significant that the
to his duty to deal candidly with the respondent failed to demonstrate
court.35 how he came upon his accusation
against Atty. Catolico. The In the first instance, the records
respondent, by his own admission, show that the respondent filed the
only participated in the cases petition for annulment of judgment
previously assigned to Atty. Catolico on behalf of 49 individuals, 31 of
after the latter died. At the same whom gave their consent while the
time, the respondent's petition for other 15 individuals did not. We
annulment of judgment also cannot agree with the respondent's
represented that no second motion off-hand explanation that he truly
for reconsideration or appeal was believed that a majority of the
filed to contest the MeTC and RTC litigants who signed the certification
decisions in the unlawful detainer of non-forum shopping in the
case for the reason that the petition already gave him the
respondent believed the said necessary authority to sign for the
decisions were null and void ab others. We find it highly improbable
initio. that this kind of lapse could have
been committed by a seasoned
Under these circumstances, we lawyer like the respondent, who has
believe that the respondent has been engaged in the practice of law
been less than fair in his for more than 30 years and who
professional relationship with Atty. received rigid and strict training as
Catolico and is thus liable for he so proudly declares, from the
violating Canon 8 of the Code of University of the Philippines College
Professional Responsibility, which of Law and in the two law firms with
obligates a lawyer to "conduct which he was previously
himself with courtesy, fairness, and associated.39 As Investigating
candor toward his professional Commissioner Cunanan found, the
colleagues." He was unfair because respondent's explanation of
he imputed wrongdoing to Atty. compliance with the rule on the
Catolico without showing any factual certification of non-forum shopping
basis therefor; he effectively glossed over the real charge of
maligned Atty. Catolico, who is now appearing in court without the
dead and unable to defend himself. proper authorization of the parties
he allegedly represented.
Unauthorized appearances
In the second instance, which
We support Investigating occurred in the second complaint for
Commissioner Cunanan's finding annulment of title, the respondent
that the respondent twice knew that only the Solicitor General
represented parties without proper can legally represent the Republic of
authorization: first, in the petition the Philippines in actions for
for annulment of judgment; and reversion of land. Nevertheless, he
second, in the second petition for filed an amended petition where he
annulment of title.38 impleaded the Republic of the
Philippines as plaintiff without its
authority and consent, as a affirmatively operating with furtive
surreptitious way of forcing the design or with some motive of self-
Republic to litigate. Notably, he interest, ill will or for an ulterior
signed the amended complaint on purpose.43 As both concepts are
behalf of all the plaintiffs - his clients states of mind, they may be
and the Republic. deduced from the attendant
circumstances and, more
In both instances, the respondent particularly, from the acts and
violated Sections 21 and 27, Rule statements of the person whose
138 of the Rules of Court when he state of mind is the subject of
undertook the unauthorized inquiry.
appearances. The settled rule is that
a lawyer may not represent a In this case, we find that the
litigant without authority from the respondent acted in bad faith in
latter or from the latter's defending the interests of his clients.
representative or, in the absence We draw this conclusion from the
thereof, without leave of misrepresentations and the dubious
court.40 The willful unauthorized recourses he made, all obviously
appearance by a lawyer for a party geared towards forestalling the
in a given case constitutes execution of the final judgments of
contumacious conduct and also the MeTC and RTC. That he took
warrants disciplinary measures advantage of his legal knowledge
against the erring lawyer for and experience and misread the
professional misconduct.41 Rules immeasurably strengthen the
presence of bad faith.
The Respondent's Defenses
We find neither sincerity nor honest
We find no merit in the respondent's belief on the part of the respondent
defenses. in pleading the soundness and merit
of the cases that he filed in court to
"Good faith connotes an honest prevent the execution of the MeTC
intention to abstain from taking and RTC decisions, considering his
unconscientious advantage of own conduct of presenting
another. Accordingly, in University conflicting theories in his petitions.
of the East v. Jader we said that The succession of cases he filed
"[g]ood faith connotes an honest shows a desperation that negates
intention to abstain from taking the sincere and honest belief he
undue advantage of another, even claims; these are simply scattershot
though the forms and technicalities means to achieve his objective of
of law, together with the absence of avoiding the execution of the
all information or belief of facts, unlawful detainer judgment against
would render the transaction his clients.
unconscientious."42 Bad faith, on the
other hand, is a state of mind
On the respondent's allegations justice, and it must be done within
regarding his discretion to determine the bounds of reason and common
legal strategy, it is not amiss to note sense. A lawyer's responsibility to
that this was the same defense he protect and advance the interests of
raised in the first disbarment his client does not warrant a course
case.44 As we explained in Plus of action propelled by ill motives and
Builders, the exercise of a lawyer's malicious intentions against the
discretion in acting for his client can other party.45
never be at the expense of truth and
justice. In the words of this cited We cannot give credence to the
case: respondent's claim that the
disbarment case was filed because
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity the counsel of the complainant, Atty.
to the cause of his client, full Uy, had an axe to grind against him.
devotion to his genuine interest, and We reject this argument, considering
warm zeal in the maintenance and that it was not Atty. Uy who filed the
defense of his rights, as well as the present disbarment case against
exertion of his utmost learning and him; Atty. Uy is only the counsel in
ability, he must do so only within this case. In fact, Atty. Uy has filed
the bounds of the law. He must give his own separate disbarment case
a candid and honest opinion on the against the respondent.
merits and probable results of his
client's case with the end in view of The sui generis nature of a
promoting respect for the law and disbarment case renders the
legal processes, and counsel or underlying motives of the
maintain such actions or complainants unimportant and with
proceedings only as appear to him very little relevance. The purpose of
to be just, and such defenses only a disbarment proceeding is mainly to
as he believes to be honestly determine the fitness of a lawyer to
debatable under the law. He must continue acting as an officer of the
always remind himself of the oath court and a participant in the
he took upon admission to the Bar dispensation of justice - an issue
that he 'will not wittingly or willingly where the complainant's personal
promote or sue any groundless, motives have little relevance. For
false or unlawful suit nor give aid this reason, disbarment proceedings
nor consent to the same'; and that may be initiated by the Court motu
he 'will conduct [himself] as a proprio upon information of an
lawyer according to the best of [his] alleged wrongdoing. As we also
knowledge and discretion with all explained in the case In re:
good fidelity as well to the courts as Almacen:
to [his] clients.' Needless to state,
the lawyer's fidelity to his client . . .disciplinary proceedings like the
must not be pursued at the expense present are sui generis. Neither
of truth and the administration of purely civil nor purely criminal, this
proceeding is not - and does not Based on the foregoing, we conclude
involve - a trial of an action or a that the respondent committed
suit, but is rather an investigation by various acts of professional
the Court into the conduct of one of misconduct and thereby failed to live
its officers. Not being intended to up to the exacting ethical standards
inflict punishment, it is in no sense a imposed on members of the Bar. We
criminal prosecution. cannot agree, however, that only a
penalty of one-year suspension from
xxx the practice of law should be
imposed. Neither should we limit
It may be initiated by the ourselves to the originally
Court motu proprio. Public interest is recommended penalty of suspension
its primary objective, and the real for two (2) years.
question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a Given the respondent's multiple
fit person to be allowed the violations, his past record as
privileges as such. Hence, in the previously discussed, and the nature
exercise of its disciplinary powers, of these violations which shows the
the Court merely calls upon a readiness to disregard court rules
member of the Bar to account for his and to gloss over concerns for the
actuations as an officer of-the Court orderly administration of justice, we
with the end in view of preserving believe and so hold that the
the purity of the legal profession and appropriate action of this Court is to
the proper and honest disbar the respondent to keep him
administration of justice by purging away from the law profession and
the profession of members who by from any significant role in the
their misconduct have proved administration of justice which he
themselves no longer worthy to be has disgraced. He is a continuing
entrusted with the duties and risk, too, to the public that the legal
responsibilities pertaining to the profession serves. Not even his
office of an attorney. In such ardor and overzealousness in
posture, there can thus be no defending the interests of his client
occasion to speak of a complainant can save him. Such traits at the
or a prosecutor.46 ςηαñrοb lεš νι r† υαl lαω l ιbrαrÿ

expense of everything else,

particularly the integrity of the
Hence, we give little or no weight to profession and the orderly
the alleged personal motivation that administration of justice, this Court
drove the complainant Que and his cannot accept nor tolerate.
counsel to file the present
disbarment case. Additionally, disbarment is merited
because this is not the respondent's
Conclusion first ethical infraction of the same
nature. We penalized him in Plus
Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia v.
Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla for his
willful and intentional falsehood
before the court; for misuse of court
procedures and processes to delay
the execution of a judgment; and for
collaborating with non-lawyers in the
illegal practice of law. We showed
leniency then by reducing his
penalty to suspension for six (6)
months. We cannot similarly treat
the respondent this time; it is clear
that he did not learn any lesson
from his past experience and since
then has exhibited traits of
incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis
to the respondent's professional
legal career for the sake of the
public, the profession and the
interest of justice.

WHEREFORE, premises considered,

we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No.
XVII-2005-164 dated December 17,
2005 and Resolution No. XVII-2008-
657 dated December 11, 2008 of
the Board of Governors of the IBP
Committee on Bar Discipline insofar
as respondent Atty. Anastacio
Revilla, Jr. is found liable for
professional misconduct for
violations of the Lawyer's Oath;
Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03,
Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04,
Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of
the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and Sections 20(d),
21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court. However, we modify the
penalty the IBP imposed, and hold
that the respondent should
be DISBARRED from the practice of
law.

SO ORDERED.
 When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced
upon each other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of
the case filed against them before the Office of the
Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied that he
represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet
Divinagracia in person. When Rustia showed him the
Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared that the signature
appearing above his name as counsel for
Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty.
Bancolo to sign an affidavit to attest to such fact. On 9
December 2004, Atty. Bancolo signed an affidavit
denying his supposed signature appearing on the
Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and
submitted six specimen signatures for comparison.
Using Atty. Bancolo’s affidavit and other documentary
evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a counter-affidavit
accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the signature of his
alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo.

A.C. No. 9604 March 20, 2013 In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the
Ombudsman provisionally dismissed the Complaint
RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. since the falsification of the counsel’s signature posed
RUSTIA, Complainants, a prejudicial question to the Complaint’s validity. Also,
vs. the Office of the Ombudsman ordered that separate
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS cases for Falsification of Public Document2 and
T. JARDER, Respondents. Dishonesty3 be filed against Divinagracia, with Rustia
and Atty. Bancolo as complainants.
DECISION
Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit
CARPIO, J.: dated 1 August 2005 denying that he falsified the
signature of his former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo.
Divinagracia presented as evidence an affidavit dated
The Case
1 August 2005 by Richard A. Cordero, the legal
assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo
This administrative case arose from a Complaint tiled Law Office accepted Divinagracia’s case and that the
by Rodrigo E. Tapay (Tapay) and Anthony J. Rustia Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman
(Rustia), both employees of the Sugar Regulatory was signed by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolo’s
Administration, against Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo (Atty. instructions. Divinagracia asked that the Office of the
Bancolo) and Atty. Janus T. larder (Atty. Jarder) for Ombudsman dismiss the cases for falsification of
violation of the Canons of Ethics and Professionalism, public document and dishonesty filed against him by
Falsification of Public Document, Gross Dishonesty, Rustia and Atty. Bancolo and to revive the original
and Harassment. Complaint for various offenses that he filed against
Tapay and Rustia.
The Facts
In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office
Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia of the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for
received an Order dated 14 October 2004 from the falsification of public document (OMB-V-C-05-0207-E)
Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to for insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive portion
file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of states:
authority, falsification of public document, and graft
and corrupt practices filed against them by Nehimias WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby
Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a co-employee in the DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence, without
Sugar Regulatory Administration. The prejudice to the re-filing by Divinagracia, Jr. of a
Complaint1 dated 31 August 2004 was allegedly proper complaint for violation of RA 3019 and other
signed on behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie offenses against Rustia and Tapay.
L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in
Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.
SO ORDERED.4
The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05- conference was reset to 10 August 2006. On the said
0219-E) was also dismissed for lack of substantial date, complainants were present but respondents
evidence in a Decision dated 19 September 2005. failed to appear. The conference was reset to 25
September 2006 for the last time. Again, respondents
On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with failed to appear despite receiving notice of the
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a conference. Complainants manifested that they were
complaint5 to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, submitting their disbarment complaint based on the
Atty. Bancolo’s law partner. The complainants alleged documents submitted to the IBP. Respondents were
that they were subjected to a harassment Complaint also deemed to have waived their right to participate
filed before the Office of the Ombudsman with the in the mandatory conference. Further, both parties
forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants were directed to submit their respective position
stated further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the papers. On 27 October 2006, the IBP received
Complaint was not the only one that was forged. complainants’ position paper dated 18 October 2006
Complainants attached a Report6 dated 1 July 2005 and respondents’ position paper dated 23 October
by the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory 6 2006.
which examined three other letter-complaints signed
by Atty. Bancolo for other clients, allegedly close The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the
questioned signatures in the letter-complaints and the On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the
submitted standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo were Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on
not written by one and the same person. Thus, Bar Discipline of the IBP, submitted her Report. Atty.
complainants maintained that not only were Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo violated Rule
respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
practices, they were also involved in falsification of Responsibility while Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of
documents used to harass and persecute innocent Canon 1 of the same Code. The Investigating
people.
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be
On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement suspended for two years from the practice of law and
to the Disbarment Complaint Due to Additional Atty. Jarder be admonished for his failure to exercise
Information. They alleged that a certain Mary Jane certain responsibilities in their law firm.
Gentugao, the secretary of the Jarder Bancolo Law
Office, forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo. In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating
Commissioner opined:
In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the
disbarment complaint, respondents admitted that the x x x. In his answer, respondent Atty. Charlie L.
criminal and administrative cases filed by Divinagracia Bancolo admitted that his signature appearing in the
against complainants before the Office of the complaint filed against complainants’ Rodrigo E.
Ombudsman were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia with the Ombudsman
Law Office. The cases were assigned to Atty. were signed by the secretary. He did not refute the
Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged that after being findings that his signatures appearing in the various
informed of the assignment of the cases, he ordered documents released from his office were found not to
his staff to prepare and draft all the necessary be his. Such pattern of malpratice by respondent
pleadings and documents. However, due to some clearly breached his obligation under Rule 9.01 of
minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the Canon 9, for a lawyer who allows a non-member to
pleadings and communications be signed in his name represent him is guilty of violating the aforementioned
by the secretary of the law office. Respondents added Canon. The fact that respondent was busy cannot
that complainants filed the disbarment complaint to serve as an excuse for him from signing personally.
retaliate against them since the cases filed before the After all respondent is a member of a law firm
Office of the Ombudsman were meritorious and composed of not just one (1) lawyer. The Supreme
strongly supported by testimonial and documentary Court has ruled that this practice constitute
evidence. Respondents also denied that Mary Jane negligence and undersigned finds the act a sign of
Gentugao was employed as secretary of their law indolence and ineptitude. Moreover, respondents
office. ignored the notices sent by undersigned. That showed
patent lack of respect to the Integrated Bar of the
Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 Philippines’ Commission on Bar Discipline and its
March 2006. Thereafter, the parties were directed by proceedings. It betrays lack of courtesy and
the Commission on Bar Discipline to attend a irresponsibility as lawyers.
mandatory conference scheduled on 5 May 2006. The
On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior Motion for Reconsideration and Comment Filed by
partner of the law firm Jarder Bancolo and Associates Complainants dated 29 January 2008.
Law Office, failed to exercise certain responsibilities
over matters under the charge of his law firm. As a In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012,
senior partner[,] he failed to abide to the principle of the IBP Board of Governors denied both
"command responsibility". x x x. complainants’ and Atty. Bancolo’s motions for
reconsideration. The IBP Board found no cogent
xxxx reason to reverse the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner and affirmed Resolution No. XVIII-
Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned 2007-97 dated 19 September 2007.
practitioner, having passed the bar in 1995 and
practicing law up to the present. He holds himself out The Court’s Ruling
to the public as a law firm designated as Jarder
Bancolo and Associates Law Office. It behooves Atty. After a careful review of the records of the case, we
Janus T. Jarder to exert ordinary diligence to find out agree with the findings and recommendation of the
what is going on in his law firm, to ensure that all IBP Board and find reasonable grounds to hold
lawyers in his firm act in conformity to the Code of respondent Atty. Bancolo administratively liable.
Professional Responsibility. As a partner, it is his
responsibility to provide efficacious control of court Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for
pleadings and other documents that carry the name of a former client before the Office of the Ombudsman
the law firm. Had he done that, he could have known was signed in his name by a secretary of his law
the unethical practice of his law partner Atty. Charlie office. Clearly, this is a violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon
L. Bancolo. Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder failed to 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
perform this task and is administratively liable under provides:
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.7
CANON 9
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR
On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007- INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED
97, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved with PRACTICE OF LAW.
modification the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner. The Resolution states:
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any
unqualified person the performance of any task which
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is by law may only be performed by a member of the
hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with Bar in good standing.
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
This rule was clearly explained in the case of
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio,9 where we held:
"A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and considering Respondent Atty. The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not
Bancolo’s violation of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the Code to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is
of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. founded on public interest and policy. Public policy
Bancolo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of requires that the practice of law be limited to those
law for one (1) year. individuals found duly qualified in education and
character. The permissive right conferred on the
lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to
However, with regard to the charge against Atty.
withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of
Janus T. Jarder, the Board of Governors RESOLVED
moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to
as it is hereby RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby
protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar
AMENDED the Recommendation of the Investigating
from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
case for lack of merit.8
disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a
lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the
Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to
Likewise, Atty. Bancolo filed his Motion for permit his professional services or his name to be
Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007. used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized
Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed his separate practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate.
Consolidated Comment/Reply to Complainants’ And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part,
subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo
unauthorized practice of law. from the practice of law for one year is warranted. We
also find proper the dismissal of the case against Atty.
In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation,10 we larder.
held that the preparation and signing of a pleading
constitute legal work involving the practice of law WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against
which is reserved exclusively for members of the legal Atty. Janus T. larder for lack of merit.
profession. Atty. Bancolo’s authority and duty to sign
a pleading are personal to him. Although he may We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo
delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer, administratively liable for violating Rule 9.01 of Canon
he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
the Rules of Court, counsel’s signature serves as a hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to year effective upon finality of this Decision. He is
the best of his knowledge, information and belief there warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts in
is good ground to support it; and (3) it is not the future shall be dealt with more severely.
interposed for delay.11 Thus, by affixing one’s
signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent
the responsibility to certify to these matters and give Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo's record in this Court as
legal effect to the document. 1âwphi1

attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be

furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed
2007, Atty. Bancolo wants us to believe that he was a to circulate them to all the courts in the country for
victim of circumstances or of manipulated events their information and guidance.
because of his unconditional trust and confidence in
his former law partner, Atty. Jarder. However, Atty. SO ORDERED.
Bancolo did not take any steps to rectify the situation,
save for the affidavit he gave to Rustia denying his
signature to the Complaint filed before the Office of
the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had an opportunity to
maintain his innocence when he filed with the IBP his
Joint Answer (with Atty. Jarder) dated 26 January
2006. Atty. Bancolo, however, admitted that prior to
the preparation of the Joint Answer, Atty. Jarder
threatened to file a disbarment case against him if he
did not cooperate. Thus, he was constrained to allow
Atty. Jarder to prepare the Joint Answer. Atty.
Bancolo simply signed the verification without seeing
the contents of the Joint Answer.

In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that

because of some minor lapses, the communications
and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were
signed by his secretary, albeit with his tolerance.
Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer
to affix his signature to a pleading. This violation Is an
act of falsehood which IS a ground for disciplinary
action.

The complainants did not present any evidence that

Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had knowledge of,
or even participated in the wrongful practice of Atty.
Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his secretary to sign
pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the finding of
the IBP Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively
liable.
 located in Gumay, Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte. They
were issued Homestead Patent No. V-15414 on
March 13, 1953andOriginal Certificate of Title No. P-
376 on July 2, 1953.On April30, 1955, the spouses
Cadavedo sold the subject lot to the spouses Vicente
Ames and Martha Fernandez (the spouses Ames)
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4792 was
subsequently issued in the name of the spouses
Ames.

The present controversy arose when the spouses

Cadavedo filed an action5 before the RTC(then Court
of First Instance) of Zamboanga City against the
spouses Ames for sum of money and/or voiding of
contract of sale of homestead after the latter failed to
pay the balance of the purchase price. The spouses
Cadavedo initially engaged the services of Atty.
Rosendo Bandal who, for health reasons, later
withdrew from the case; he was substituted by Atty.
Lacaya.

G.R. No. 173188 January 15, 2014 On February 24, 1969, Atty. Lacaya amended the
complaint to assert the nullity of the sale and the
THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE issuance of TCT No. T-4792 in the names of the
spouses Ames as gross violation of the public land
SPOUSES VICENTE CADAVEDO AND BENITA
ARCOY-CADAVEDO (both deceased), substituted law. The amended complaint stated that the spouses
by their heirs, namely: HERMINA, PASTORA, Cadavedo hired Atty. Lacaya on a contingency fee
Heirs of FRUCTUOSA, Heirs of RAQUEL, basis. The contingency fee stipulation specifically
EVANGELINE, VICENTE, JR., and ARMANDO, all reads:
surnamed CADAVEDO, Petitioners,
vs. 10. That due to the above circumstances, the plaintiffs
VICTORINO (VIC) T. LACAYA, married to Rosa were forced to hire a lawyer on contingent basis and if
Legados, Respondents. they become the prevailing parties in the case at bar,
they will pay the sum of ₱2,000.00 for attorney’s fees.6
DECISION
In a decision dated February 1, 1972, the RTC upheld
the sale of the subject lot to the spouses Ames. The
BRION, J.:
spouses Cadavedo, thru Atty. Lacaya, appealed the
case to the CA.
We solve in this Rule 45 petition for review on
certiorari1 the challenge to the October 11, 2005
decision2 and the May 9, 2006 resolution3 of the Court On September 18, 1975, and while the appeal before
of Appeals (CA) inPetitioners, CA-G.R. CV No. 56948. the CAin Civil Case No. 1721was pending, the
The CA reversed and set aside the September 17, spouses Ames sold the subject lot to their children.
1996 decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), The spouses Ames’ TCT No. T-4792 was
Branch 10, of Dipolog City in Civil Case No. 4038, subsequently cancelled and TCT No. T-25984was
issued in their children’s names. On October 11,
granting in part the complaint for recovery of
possession of property filed by the petitioners, the 1976, the spouses Ames mortgaged the subject lot
Conjugal Partnership of the Spouses Vicente with the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)
Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo against Atty. in the names of their children.
Victorino (Vic) T. Lacaya, married to Rosa Legados
(collectively, the respondents). On August 13, 1980, the CA issued itsdecision in Civil
Case No. 1721,reversing the decision of the RTC and
declaring the deed of sale, transfer of rights, claims
The Factual Antecedents
and interest to the spouses Ames null and void ab
initio. It directed the spouses Cadavedo to return the
The Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy- initial payment and ordered the Register of Deeds to
Cadavedo (collectively, the spouses Cadavedo) cancel the spouses Ames’ TCT No. T-4792 and to
acquired a homestead grant over a 230,765-square reissue another title in the name of the spouses
meter parcel of land known as Lot 5415 (subject lot)
Cadavedo. The case eventually reached this Court via Meanwhile, on May 21, 1982, the spouses Cadavedo
the spouses Ames’ petition for review on certiorari filed before the RTC an action against the DBP for
which this Court dismissed for lack of merit. Injunction; it was docketed as Civil Case No. 3443
(Cadavedo v. DBP).The RTC subsequently denied
Meanwhile, the spouses Ames defaulted in their the petition, prompting the spouses Cadavedo to
obligation with the DBP. Thus, the DBP caused the elevate the case to the CAvia a petition for certiorari.
publication of a notice of foreclosure sale of the The CA dismissed the petition in its decision of
subject lot as covered by TCT No. T-25984(under the January 31, 1984.
name of the spouses Ames’ children). Atty. Lacaya
immediately informed the spouses Cadavedo of the The records do not clearly disclose the proceedings
foreclosure sale and filed an Affidavit of Third Party subsequent to the CA decision in Civil Case No. 3443.
Claim with the Office of the Provincial Sheriff on However, on August 18, 1988, TCT No. 41051was
September 14, 1981. issued in the name of the spouses Cadavedo
concerning the subject lot.
With the finality of the judgment in Civil Case No.
1721,Atty. Lacaya filed on September 21, 1981 a On August 9, 1988, the spouses Cadavedo filed
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. before the RTC an action9 against the respondents,
assailing the MTC-approved compromise agreement.
On September 23, 1981,and pending the RTC’s The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 4038 and is
resolution of the motion for the issuance of a writ of the root of the present case. The spouses Cadavedo
execution, the spouses Ames filed a complaint7 before prayed, among others, that the respondents be
the RTC against the spouses Cadavedo for Quieting ejected from their one-half portion of the subject lot;
of Title or Enforcement of Civil Rights due Planters in that they be ordered to render an accounting of the
Good Faith with prayer for Preliminary Injunction. The produce of this one-half portion from 1981;and that
spouses Cadavedo, thru Atty. Lacaya, filed a motion the RTC fix the attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit
to dismiss on the ground of res judicata and to cancel basis, with due consideration of the expenses that
TCT No. T-25984 (under the name of the spouses Atty. Lacaya incurred while handling the civil cases.
Ames’ children).
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 4038, the
On October 16, 1981, the RTC granted the motion for spouses Cadavedo executed a Deed of Partition of
the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. Estate in favor of their eight children. Consequently,
1721,andthe spouses Cadavedo were placed in TCT No. 41051 was cancelled and TCT No. 41690
possession of the subject lot on October 24, 1981. was issued in the names of the latter. The records are
Atty. Lacaya asked for one-half of the subject lot as not clear on the proceedings and status of Civil Case
attorney’s fees. He caused the subdivision of the No. 3352.
subject lot into two equal portions, based on area, and
selected the more valuable and productive half for The Ruling of the RTC
himself; and assigned the other half to the spouses
Cadavedo. In the September 17, 1996 decision10 in Civil Case No.
4038, the RTC declared the contingent fee of 10.5383
Unsatisfied with the division, Vicente and his sons-in- hectares as excessive and unconscionable. The RTC
law entered the portion assigned to the respondents reduced the land area to 5.2691 hectares and ordered
and ejected them. The latter responded by filing a the respondents to vacate and restore the remaining
counter-suit for forcible entry before the Municipal 5.2692hectares to the spouses Cadavedo.
Trial Court (MTC); the ejectment case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 215. This incident occurred while The RTC noted that, as stated in the amended
Civil Case No. 3352was pending. complaint filed by Atty. Lacaya, the agreed attorney’s
fee on contingent basis was ₱2,000.00. Nevertheless,
On May 13, 1982, Vicente andAtty. Lacaya entered the RTC also pointed out that the parties novated this
into an amicable settlement (compromise agreement when they executed the compromise
agreement)8 in Civil Case No. 215 (the ejectment agreement in Civil Case No. 215 (ejectment case),
case), re-adjusting the area and portion obtained by thereby giving Atty. Lacaya one-half of the subject lot.
each. Atty. Lacaya acquired 10.5383 hectares The RTC added that Vicente’s decision to give Atty.
pursuant to the agreement. The MTC approved the Lacaya one-half of the subject lot, sans approval of
compromise agreementin a decision dated June 10, Benita, was a valid act of administration and binds the
1982. conjugal partnership. The RTC reasoned out that the
disposition redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership as it was done precisely to remunerate
Atty. Lacaya for his services to recover the property Considering these established facts and consistent
itself. with Canon 20.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (enumerating the factors that should
These considerations notwithstanding, the RTC guide the determination of the lawyer’s fees), the CA
considered the one-half portion of the subject lot, as ruled that the time spent and the extent of the
Atty. Lacaya’s contingent fee,excessive, services Atty. Lacaya rendered for the spouses
unreasonable and unconscionable. The RTC was Cadavedo in the three cases, the probability of him
convinced that the issues involved in Civil Case No. losing other employment resulting from his
1721were not sufficiently difficult and complicated to engagement, the benefits resulting to the spouses
command such an excessive award; neither did it Cadavedo, and the contingency of his fees justified
require Atty. Lacaya to devote much of his time or the compromise agreement and rendered the agreed
skill, or to perform extensive research. fee under the compromise agreement reasonable.

Finally, the RTC deemed the respondents’ The Petition

possession, prior to the judgment, of the excess
portion of their share in the subject lot to be in good In the present petition, the petitioners essentially
faith. The respondents were thus entitled to receive its argue that the CA erred in: (1) granting the attorney’s
fruits. fee consisting of one-half or 10.5383 hectares of the
subject lot to Atty. Lacaya, instead of confirming the
On the spouses Cadavedo’s motion for agreed contingent attorney’s fees of ₱2,000.00; (2)
reconsideration, the RTC modified the decision in its not holding the respondents accountable for the
resolution11 dated December 27, 1996. The RTC produce, harvests and income of the 10.5383-hectare
ordered the respondents to account for and deliver portion (that they obtained from the spouses
the produce and income, valued at ₱7,500.00 per Cadavedo) from 1988 up to the present; and (3)
annum, of the 5.2692hectares that the RTC ordered upholding the validity of the purported oral contract
the spouses Amesto restore to the spouses between the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya
Cadavedo, from October 10, 1988 until final when it was champertous and dealt with property then
restoration of the premises. still subject of Civil Case No. 1721.13

The respondents appealed the case before the CA. The petitioners argue that stipulations on a lawyer’s
compensation for professional services, especially
The Ruling of the CA those contained in the pleadings filed in courts,
control the amount of the attorney’s fees to which the
lawyer shall be entitled and should prevail over oral
In its decision12 dated October 11, 2005, the CA
agreements. In this case, the spouses Cadavedo and
reversed and set aside the RTC’s September 17,
Atty. Lacaya agreed that the latter’s contingent
1996 decision and maintained the partition and
attorney’s fee was ₱2,000.00 in cash, not one-half of
distribution of the subject lot under the compromise
the subject lot. This agreement was clearly stipulated
agreement. In so ruling, the CA noted the following
in the amended complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1721.
facts: (1) Atty. Lacaya served as the spouses
Thus, Atty. Lacaya is bound by the expressly
Cadavedo’s counsel from 1969 until 1988,when the
stipulated fee and cannot insist on unilaterally
latter filed the present case against Atty. Lacaya; (2)
changing its terms without violating their contract.
during the nineteen (19) years of their attorney-client
relationship, Atty. Lacaya represented the spouses
Cadavedo in three civil cases –Civil Case No. 1721, The petitioners add that the one-half portion of the
Civil Case No. 3352, and Civil Case No. 3443; (3) the subject lot as Atty. Lacaya’s contingent attorney’s fee
first civil case lasted for twelve years and even is excessive and unreasonable. They highlight the
reached this Court, the second civil case lasted for RTC’s observations and argue that the issues
seven years, while the third civil case lasted for six involved in Civil Case No. 1721, pursuant to which the
years and went all the way to the CA;(4) the spouses alleged contingent fee of one-half of the subject lot
Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya entered into a was agreed by the parties, were not novel and did not
compromise agreement concerning the division of the involve difficult questions of law; neither did the case
subject lot where Atty. Lacaya ultimately agreed to require much of Atty. Lacaya’s time, skill and effort in
acquire a smaller portion; (5) the MTC approved the research. They point out that the two subsequent civil
compromise agreement; (6) Atty. Lacaya defrayed all cases should not be considered in determining the
of the litigation expenses in Civil Case No. 1721; and reasonable contingent fee to which Atty. Lacaya
(7) the spouses Cadavedo expressly recognized that should be entitled for his services in Civil Case No.
Atty. Lacaya served them in several cases. 1721,as those cases had not yet been instituted at
that time. Thus, these cases should not be considered
in fixing the attorney’s fees. The petitioners also claim Marcelito L. Lacaya, Raymundito L. Lacaya, Laila
that the spouses Cadavedo concluded separate Lacaya-Matabalan, Marivic Lacaya-Barba, Rosalie L.
agreements on the expenses and costs for each of Lacaya and Ma. Vic-Vic Lacaya-Camaongay.16
these subsequent cases, and that Atty. Lacaya did not
even record any attorney’s lien in the spouses The Court’s Ruling
Cadavedo’s TCT covering the subject lot.
We resolve to GRANT the petition.
The petitioners further direct the Court’s attention to
the fact that Atty. Lacaya,in taking over the case from The subject lot was the core of four successive and
Atty. Bandal, agreed to defray all of the litigation overlapping cases prior to the present controversy. In
expenses in exchange for one-half of the subject lot three of these cases, Atty. Lacaya stood as the
should they win the case. They insist that this spouses Cadavedo’s counsel. For ease of discussion,
agreement is a champertous contract that is contrary we summarize these cases (including the dates and
to public policy, prohibited by law for violation of the proceedings pertinent to each) as follows:
fiduciary relationship between a lawyer and a client.
Civil Case No. 1721 – Cadavedo v. Ames (Sum of
Finally, the petitioners maintain that the compromise money and/or voiding of contract of sale of
agreement in Civil Case No. 215 (ejectment case) did homestead), filed on January 10, 1967. The writ of
not novate their original stipulated agreement on the execution was granted on October 16, 1981.
attorney’s fees. They reason that Civil Case No. 215
did not decide the issue of attorney’s fees between
Civil Case No. 3352 – Ames v. Cadavedo (Quieting of
the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya for the
Title and/or Enforcement of Civil Rights due Planters
latter’s services in Civil Case No. 1721.
in Good Faith with Application for Preliminary
injunction), filed on September 23, 1981.
The Case for the Respondents
Civil Case No. 3443 – Cadavedo v. DBP (Action for
In their defense,14 the respondents counter that the Injunction with Preliminary Injunction), filed on May
attorney’s fee stipulated in the amended complaint 21, 1982.
was not the agreed fee of Atty. Lacaya for his legal
services. They argue that the questioned stipulation
Civil Case No. 215 –Atty. Lacaya v. Vicente
for attorney’s fees was in the nature of a penalty that,
Cadavedo, et. al. (Ejectment Case), filed between the
if granted, would inure to the spouses Cadavedo and
latter part of 1981 and early part of 1982. The parties
not to Atty. Lacaya.
executed the compromise agreement on May 13,
1982.
The respondents point out that: (1) both Vicente and
Atty. Lacaya caused the survey and subdivision of the
Civil Case No. 4038 –petitioners v. respondents (the
subject lot immediately after the spouses Cadavedo
present case).
reacquired its possession with the RTC’s approval of
their motion for execution of judgment in Civil Case
No. 1721; (2) Vicente expressly ratified and confirmed The agreement on attorney’s fee
the agreement on the contingent attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of the subject
consisting of one-half of the subject lot; (3) the MTC in lot is void; the petitioners are entitled
Civil Case No. 215 (ejectment case) approved the to recover possession
compromise agreement; (4) Vicente is the legally
designated administrator of the conjugal partnership, The core issue for our resolution is whether the
hence the compromise agreement ratifying the attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot
transfer bound the partnership and could not have is valid and reasonable, and binds the petitioners. We
been invalidated by the absence of Benita’s rule in the NEGATIVE for the reasons discussed
acquiescence; and (5) the compromise agreement below.
merely inscribed and ratified the earlier oral
agreement between the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. A. The written agreement providing for
Lacaya which is not contrary to law, morals, good a contingent fee of ₱2,000.00 should prevail
customs, public order and public policy. over the oral agreement providing for one-
half of the subject lot
While the case is pending before this Court, Atty.
Lacaya died.15 He was substituted by his wife -Rosa - The spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed on a
and their children –Victoriano D.L. Lacaya, Jr., contingent fee of ₱2,000.00 and not, as asserted by
Rosevic Lacaya-Ocampo, Reymar L. Lacaya, the latter, one-half of the subject lot. The stipulation
contained in the amended complaint filed by Atty. disputes of others in which the intermeddler has no
Lacaya clearly stated that the spouses Cadavedo interest whatever, and where the assistance rendered
hired the former on a contingency basis; the Spouses is without justification or excuse."20 Champerty, on the
Cadavedo undertook to pay their lawyer ₱2,000.00 as other hand, is characterized by "the receipt of a share
attorney’s fees should the case be decided in their of the proceeds of the litigation by the
favor. intermeddler."21 Some common law court decisions,
however, add a second factor in determining
Contrary to the respondents’ contention, this champertous contracts, namely, that the lawyer must
stipulation is not in the nature of a penalty that the also, "at his own expense maintain, and take all the
court would award the winning party, to be paid by the risks of, the litigation."22
losing party. The stipulation is a representation to the
court concerning the agreement between the spouses The doctrines of champerty and maintenance were
Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya, on the latter’s created in response "to medieval practice of assigning
compensation for his services in the case; it is not the doubtful or fraudulent claims to persons of wealth and
attorney’s fees in the nature of damages which the influence in the expectation that such individuals
former prays from the court as an incident to the main would enjoy greater success in prosecuting those
action. claims in court, in exchange for which they would
receive an entitlement to the spoils of the
At this point, we highlight that as observed by both the litigation."23 "In order to safeguard the administration of
RTC and the CA and agreed as well by both parties, justice, instances of champerty and maintenance
the alleged contingent fee agreement consisting of were made subject to criminal and tortuous liability
one-half of the subject lot was not reduced to writing and a common law rule was developed, striking down
prior to or, at most, at the start of Atty. Lacaya’s champertous agreements and contracts of
engagement as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel in maintenance as being unenforceable on the grounds
Civil Case No. 1721.An agreement between the of public policy."24
lawyer and his client, providing for the former’s
compensation, is subject to the ordinary rules In this jurisdiction, we maintain the rules on
governing contracts in general. As the rules stand, champerty, as adopted from American decisions, for
controversies involving written and oral agreements public policy considerations.25 As matters currently
on attorney’s fees shall be resolved in favor of the stand, any agreement by a lawyer to "conduct the
former.17 Hence, the contingency fee of ₱2,000.00 litigation in his own account, to pay the expenses
stipulated in the amended complaint prevails over the thereof or to save his client therefrom and to receive
alleged oral contingency fee agreement of one-half of as his fee a portion of the proceeds of the judgment is
the subject lot. obnoxious to the law."26 The rule of the profession that
forbids a lawyer from contracting with his client for
B. The contingent fee agreement between part of the thing in litigation in exchange for
the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya, conducting the case at the lawyer’s expense is
awarding the latter one-half of the subject designed to prevent the lawyer from acquiring an
lot, is champertous interest between him and his client. To permit these
arrangements is to enable the lawyer to "acquire
Granting arguendo that the spouses Cadavedo and additional stake in the outcome of the action which
Atty. Lacaya indeed entered into an oral contingent might lead him to consider his own recovery rather
fee agreement securing to the latter one-half of the than that of his client or to accept a settlement which
subject lot, the agreement is nevertheless void. might take care of his interest in the verdict to the
sacrifice of that of his client in violation of his duty of
undivided fidelity to his client’s cause."27
In their account, the respondents insist that Atty.
Lacaya agreed to represent the spouses Cadavedo in
Civil Case No. 1721 and assumed the litigation In Bautista v. Atty. Gonzales,28 the Court struck down
expenses, without providing for reimbursement, in the contingent fee agreement between therein
exchange for a contingency fee consisting of one-half respondent Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales and his client
of the subject lot. This agreement is champertous and for being contrary to public policy. There, the Court
is contrary to public policy.18 held that an reimbursement of litigation expenses paid
by the former is against public policy, especially if the
lawyer has agreed to carry on the action at his
Champerty, along with maintenance (of which
expense in consideration of some bargain to have a
champerty is an aggravated form), is a common law
part of the thing in dispute. It violates the fiduciary
doctrine that traces its origin to the medieval
relationship between the lawyer and his client.29
period.19 The doctrine of maintenance was directed
"against wanton and in officious intermeddling in the
In addition to its champertous character, the A thing is in litigation if there is a contest or litigation
contingent fee arrangement in this case expressly over it in court or when it is subject of the judicial
transgresses the Canons of Professional Ethics and, action.34 Following this definition, we find that the
impliedly, the Code of Professional subject lot was still in litigation when Atty. Lacaya
Responsibility.30 Under Rule 42 of the Canons of acquired the disputed one-half portion. We note in this
Professional Ethics, a lawyer may not properly agree regard the following established facts:(1)on
with a client that the lawyer shall pay or beat the September 21, 1981, Atty. Lacaya filed a motion for
expense of litigation.31 The same reasons discussed the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No.
above underlie this rule. 1721; (2) on September 23, 1981, the spouses Ames
filed Civil Case No. 3352 against the spouses
C. The attorney’s fee consisting of Cadavedo; (3)on October 16, 1981, the RTC granted
one-half of the subject lot is excessive the motion filed for the issuance of a writ of execution
and unconscionable in Civil Case No. 1721 and the spouses Cadavedo
took possession of the subject lot on October 24,
We likewise strike down the questioned attorney’s fee 1981; (4) soon after, the subject lot was surveyed and
and declare it void for being excessive and subdivided into two equal portions, and Atty. Lacaya
unconscionable. The contingent fee of one-half of the
1âwphi 1
took possession of one of the subdivided portions;
subject lot was allegedly agreed to secure the and (5) on May 13, 1982, Vicente and Atty. Lacaya
services of Atty. Lacaya in Civil Case No. executed the compromise agreement.
1721.Plainly, it was intended for only one action as
the two other civil cases had not yet been instituted at From these timelines, whether by virtue of the alleged
that time. While Civil Case No. 1721 took twelve years oral contingent fee agreement or an agreement
to be finally resolved, that period of time, as matters subsequently entered into, Atty. Lacaya acquired the
then stood, was not a sufficient reason to justify a disputed one-half portion (which was after October 24,
large fee in the absence of any showing that special 1981) while Civil Case No. 3352 and the motion for
skills and additional work had been involved. The the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No.
issue involved in that case, as observed by the 1721were already pending before the lower courts.
RTC(and with which we agree), was simple and did Similarly, the compromise agreement, including the
not require of Atty. Lacaya extensive skill, effort and subsequent judicial approval, was effected during the
research. The issue simply dealt with the prohibition pendency of Civil Case No. 3352. In all of these, the
against the sale of a homestead lot within five years relationship of a lawyer and a client still existed
from its acquisition. between Atty. Lacaya and the spouses Cadavedo.

That Atty. Lacaya also served as the spouses Thus, whether we consider these transactions –the
Cadavedo’s counsel in the two subsequent cases did transfer of the disputed one-half portion and the
not and could not otherwise justify an attorney’s fee of compromise agreement –independently of each other
one-half of the subject lot. As assertedby the or resulting from one another, we find them to be
petitioners, the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya prohibited and void35 by reason of public
made separate arrangements for the costs and policy.36 Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code,
expenses foreach of these two cases. Thus, the contracts which are contrary to public policy and those
expenses for the two subsequent cases had been expressly prohibited or declared void by law are
considered and taken cared of Based on these considered in existent and void from the beginning.37
considerations, we therefore find one-half of the
subject lot as attorney’s fee excessive and What did not escape this Court’s attention is the CA’s
unreasonable. failure to note that the transfer violated the provisions
of Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, although it
D. Atty. Lacaya’s acquisition of recognized the concurrence of the transfer and the
the one-half portion contravenes execution of the compromise agreement with the
Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code pendency of the two civil cases subsequent to Civil
Case No. 1721.38 In reversing the RTC ruling, the CA
Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code forbids lawyers from gave weight to the compromise agreement and in so
acquiring, by purchase or assignment, the property doing, found justification in the unproved oral
that has been the subject of litigation in which they contingent fee agreement.
have taken part by virtue of their profession.32 The
same proscription is provided under Rule 10 of the While contingent fee agreements are indeed
Canons of Professional Ethics.33 recognized in this jurisdiction as a valid exception to
the prohibitions under Article 1491(5) of the Civil
Code,39 contrary to the CA’s position, however, this
recognition does not apply to the present case. A approved it in its June 10, 1982 decision in the
contingent fee contract is an agreement in writing ejectment case. The MTC could not have acquired
where the fee, often a fixed percentage of what may jurisdiction over the subject matter of the void
be recovered in the action, is made to depend upon compromise agreement; its judgment in the ejectment
the success of the litigation.40 The payment of the case could not have attained finality and can thus be
contingent fee is not made during the pendency of the attacked at any time. Moreover, an ejectment case
litigation involving the client’s property but only after concerns itself only with the issue of possession de
the judgment has been rendered in the case handled facto; it will not preclude the filing of a separate action
by the lawyer.41 for recovery of possession founded on ownership.
Hence, contrary to the CA’s position, the petitioners–
In the present case, we reiterate that the transfer or in filing the present action and praying for, among
assignment of the disputed one-half portion to Atty. others, the recovery of possession of the disputed
Lacaya took place while the subject lot was still under one-half portion and for judicial determination of the
litigation and the lawyer-client relationship still existed reasonable fees due Atty. Lacaya for his services –
between him and the spouses Cadavedo. Thus, the were not barred by the compromise agreement.
general prohibition provided under Article 1491 of the
Civil Code, rather than the exception provided in Atty. Lacaya is entitled to receive attorney’s fees on a
jurisprudence, applies. The CA seriously erred in quantum meruit basis
upholding the compromise agreement on the basis of
the unproved oral contingent fee agreement. In view of their respective assertions and defenses,
the parties, in effect, impliedly set aside any express
Notably, Atty. Lacaya, in undertaking the spouses stipulation on the attorney’s fees, and the petitioners,
Cadavedo’s cause pursuant to the terms of the by express contention, submit the reasonableness of
alleged oral contingent fee agreement, in effect, such fees to the court’s discretion. We thus have to fix
became a co-proprietor having an equal, if not more, the attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis.
stake as the spouses Cadavedo. Again, this is void by
reason of public policy; it undermines the fiduciary "Quantum meruit—meaning ‘as much as he
relationship between him and his clients.42 deserves’—is used as basis for determining a
lawyer’s professional fees in the absence of a contract
E.The compromise agreement could not x x x taking into account certain factors in fixing the
validate the void oral contingent fee amount of legal fees."47 "Its essential requisite is the
agreement; neither did it supersede the acceptance of the benefits by one sought to be
written contingent fee agreement charged for the services rendered under
circumstances as reasonably to notify him that the
The compromise agreement entered into between lawyer performing the task was expecting to be paid
Vicente and Atty. Lacaya in Civil Case No. 215 compensation"48 for it. The doctrine of quantum meruit
(ejectment case) was intended to ratify and confirm is a device to prevent undue enrichment based on the
Atty. Lacaya’s acquisition and possession of the equitable postulate that it is unjust for a person to
disputed one-half portion which were made in retain benefit without paying for it.49
violation of Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code. As
earlier discussed, such acquisition is void; the Under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of
compromise agreement, which had for its object a Court50 and Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
void transaction, should be void. Responsibility,51 factors such as the importance of the
subject matter of the controversy, the time spent and
A contract whose cause, object or purpose is contrary the extent of the services rendered, the customary
to law, morals, good customs, public order or public charges for similar services, the amount involved in
policy is in existent and void from the beginning.43 It the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client
can never be ratified44 nor the action or defense for the from the service, to name a few, are considered in
declaration of the in existence of the contract determining the reasonableness of the fees to which a
prescribe;45 and any contract directly resulting from lawyer is entitled.
such illegal contract is likewise void and in existent.46
In the present case, the following considerations
Consequently, the compromise agreement did not guide this Court in considering and setting Atty.
supersede the written contingent fee agreement Lacaya’s fees based on quantum meruit: (1) the
providing for attorney’s fee of ₱2,000.00; neither did it questions involved in these civil cases were not novel
preclude the petitioners from questioning its validity and did not require of Atty. Lacaya considerable effort
even though Vicente might have knowingly and in terms of time, skill or the performance of extensive
voluntarily acquiesced thereto and although the MTC research; (2) Atty. Lacaya rendered legal services for
the Spouses Cadavedo in three civil cases beginning
in 1969 until 1988 when the petitioners filed the
instant case; (3) the first of these civil cases
(Cadavedo v. Ames) lasted for twelve years and
reaching up to this Court; the second (Ames v.
Cadavedo) lasted for seven years; and the third
(Cadavedo and Lacaya v. DBP) lasted for six years,
reaching up to the CA; and (4) the property subject of
these civil cases is of a considerable size of 230,765
square meters or 23.0765 hectares.

All things considered, we hold as fair and equitable

the RTC’s considerations in appreciating the
character of the services that Atty. Lacaya rendered in
the three cases, subject to modification on valuation.
We believe and so hold that the respondents are
entitled to two (2) hectares (or approximately one-
tenth [1/10] of the subject lot), with the fruits
previously received from the disputed one-half
portion, as attorney’s fees. They shall return to the
petitioners the remainder of the disputed one-half
portion.

The allotted portion of the subject lot properly

recognizes that litigation should be for the benefit of
the client, not the lawyer, particularly in a legal
situation when the law itself holds clear and express
protection to the rights of the client to the disputed
property (a homestead lot). Premium consideration, in
other words, is on the rights of the owner, not on the
lawyer who only helped the owner protect his rights.
Matters cannot be the other way around; otherwise,
the lawyer does indeed effectively acquire a property
right over the disputed property. If at all, due
recognition of parity between a lawyer and a client
should be on the fruits of the disputed property, which
in this case, the Court properly accords.

WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we

hereby GRANT the petition. We AFFIRM the decision
dated September 17, 1996 and the resolution dated
December 27, 1996of the Regional Trial Court of
Dipolog City, Branch 10,in Civil Case No. 4038, with
the MODIFICATION that the respondents, the
spouses Victorino (Vic) T. Lacaya and Rosa Legados,
are entitled to two (2) hectares (or approximately one-
tenth [1/10] of the subject lot) as attorney’s fees. The
fruits that the respondents previously received from
the disputed one-half portion shall also form part of
the attorney’s fees. We hereby ORDER the
respondents to return to the petitioners the remainder
of the 10.5383-hectare portion of the subject lot that
Atty. Vicente Lacaya acquired pursuant to the
compromise agreement.

SO ORDERED.
 cohabited with Mae FlorGalido, with whom he has
four children. He also accused respondent of
engaging in money-lending business5 without the
required authorization from the
BangkoSentralngPilipinas.

In his defense, respondent explained that he accepted

Sps. Yap's case on a 25% contingent fee basis, and
advanced all the expenses. He disputed the August
11, 1995 letter for being a forgery and claimed that
Sps. Yap assumed to pay complainant's commission
which he clarified in his July 16, 1997 letter. He, thus,
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for the
corresponding sanction against complainant's
counsel, Atty. Florencio B. Gonzales, for filing a
baseless complaint.6

In the Resolution7 dated February 16, 2004, the Court

resolved to refer this administrative case to the
A.C. No. 6116 August 1, 2012 Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. In his
ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON, Complainant, Report and Recommendation8 dated October 10,
vs. 2008, the Investigating IBP Commissioner
ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO, Respondent. recommended that respondent be suspended for one
(1) year from the active practice of law, for violation of
RESOLUTION the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1; Rule 7.03,
Canon 7 and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code). The IBP Board of
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: Governors adopted and approved the same in its
Resolution No. XIX-2010-4539 dated August
Before the Court is an administrative complaint for
disbarment filed by complainant Engr. Gilbert 28, 2010. Respondent moved for
Tumbokon against respondent Atty. Mariano R. reconsideration10 which was denied in Resolution No.
Pefianco for grave dishonesty, gross misconduct XIX-2011-141 dated October 28, 2011.
constituting deceit and grossly immoral conduct.
After due consideration, We adopt the findings and
In his Complaint,1 complainant narrated that recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
respondent undertook to give him 20% commission,
later reduced to 10%, of the attorney's fees the latter
The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed
would receive in representing Spouses Amable and
by the State on those who show that they possess
Rosalinda Yap (Sps. Yap), whom he referred, in an
action for partition of the estate of the late Benjamin and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the
Yap (Civil Case No. 4986 before the Regional Trial profession. As such, lawyers are expected to maintain
Court of Aklan). Their agreement was reflected in a at all times a high standard of legal proficiency,
letter2 dated August 11, 1995. However, respondent morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must
failed to pay him the agreed commission perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal
profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance
notwithstanding receipt of attorney's fees amounting
to 17% of the total estate or about ₱ 40 million. with the values and norms embodied in the
Instead, he was informed through a letter3 dated July Code.11 Lawyers may, thus, be disciplined for any
16, 1997 that Sps. Yap assumed to pay the same conduct that is wanting of the above standards
after respondent had agreed to reduce his attorney's whether in their professional or in their private
fees from 25% to 17%. He then demanded the capacity.
payment of his commission4 which respondent
ignored. In the present case, respondent's defense that forgery
had attended the execution of the August 11, 1995
Complainant further alleged that respondent has not letter was belied by his July 16, 1997 letter admitting
lived up to the high moral standards required of his to have undertaken the payment of complainant's
profession for having abandoned his legal wife, commission but passing on the responsibility to Sps.
Yap. Clearly, respondent has violated Rule
Milagros Hilado, with whom he has two children, and
9.02,12 Canon 9 of the Code which prohibits a lawyer Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
from dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to
services with persons not licensed to practice law, all courts in the country.
except in certain cases which do not obtain in the
case at bar. SO ORDERED.

Furthermore, respondent did not deny the accusation

that he abandoned his legal family to cohabit with his
mistress with whom he begot four children
notwithstanding that his moral character as well as his
moral fitness to be retained in the Roll of Attorneys
has been assailed. The settled rule is that betrayal of
the marital vow of fidelity or sexual relations outside
marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it
manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the
Constitution and affirmed by our laws.13 Consequently,
We find no reason to disturb the IBP's finding that
respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath14 and Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which proscribes a lawyer
from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct."

However, We find the charge of engaging in illegal

money lending not to have been sufficiently
established. A "business" requires some form of
1âwphi1

investment and a sufficient number of customers to

whom its output can be sold at profit on a consistent
basis.15 The lending of money to a single person
without showing that such service is made available to
other persons on a consistent basis cannot be
construed asindicia that respondent is engaged in the
business of lending.

Nonetheless, while We rule that respondent should be

sanctioned for his actions, We are minded that the
power to disbar should be exercised with great
caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affect the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and as member of the
bar,16 or the misconduct borders on the criminal, or
committed under scandalous circumstance,17 which do
not obtain here. Considering the circumstances of the
case, We deem it appropriate that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one
(1) year as recommended.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. MARIANO R.

PEFIANCO is found GUILTY of violation of the
Lawyer’s Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of
the same Code and SUSPENDED from the active
practice of law ONE (1) YEAR effective upon notice
hereof.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the

personal record of respondent as a member of the
Philippine Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar