GENERAL PRINCIPLES The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A.

95, as
amended by PD 1264 and 1643, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as
Liban v. Gordon
a private corporation since Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935
FACTS: Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Constitution states that “[t]he Congress shall not, except by general law,
Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private
Court what they styled as “Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the
Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate” against respondent Gordon, Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.” The Court
who was elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) thus directed the PNRC to incorporate under the Corporation Code and
Board of Governors during his incumbency as Senator. register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be
a private corporation. The fallo of the Decision read:
Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC
Board of Governors, respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the
Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in
provides that “[n]o Senator . . . may hold any other office or a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the
corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act No. 95, as
seat.” Petitioners cited the case of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because
129049, decided August 6, 1999, which held that the PNRC is a GOCC, they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate
in supporting their argument that respondent Gordon automatically powers.
forfeited his seat in the Senate when he accepted and held the position
Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for
of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.
Reconsideration of the Decision. The PNRC likewise moved to intervene
Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5,[1] and filed its own Motion for Partial Reconsideration. They basically
held that the office of the PNRC Chairman is NOT a government office questioned the second part of the Decision with regard to the
or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article pronouncement on the nature of the PNRC and the constitutionality of
VI of the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Chairman is elected by the PNRC some provisions of the PNRC Charter.
Board of Governors; he is not appointed by the President or by any
ISSUE: Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on
subordinate government official. Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a GOCC
the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC charter? Corollarily: What
because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded, and privately-run
is the nature of the PNRC?
charitable organization and because it is controlled by a Board of
Governors four-fifths of which are private sector individuals. Therefore, THE RULING: [The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED the
respondent Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat when he was dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the second sentence
elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator. thereof.]
NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the law is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a private
constitutional issue because it was not the very lis mota of the case. The corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.
PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a private
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none
corporation.
like it[,] not just in terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public
The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the service and official status accorded to it by the State and the
parties, and was not among the issues defined in the body of the international community. There is merit in PNRC’s contention that its
Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case. We have structure is sui generis. It is in recognition of this sui generis character
reiterated the rule as to when the Court will consider the issue of of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and effective from the
constitutionality in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc., thus: time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution
and during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987
This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the
Constitution. The PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not been
very lis mota. It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass
questioned or challenged on constitutional grounds, not even in this
upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional
case before the Court now.
or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it
is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the [T]his Court [must] recognize the country’s adherence to the Geneva
court may [rest] its judgment, that course will be adopted and the Convention and respect the unique status of the PNRC in consonance
constitutional question will be left for consideration until such question with its treaty obligations. The Geneva Convention has the force and
will be unavoidable. effect of law. Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
[T]his Court should not have declared void certain sections of . . . the
the land. This constitutional provision must be reconciled and
PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial restraint
harmonized with Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of
on this matter, especially since there was some other ground upon
using the latter to negate the former. By requiring the PNRC to organize
which the Court could have based its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC,
under the Corporation Code just like any other private corporation, the
the entity most adversely affected by this declaration of
Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRC’s special status under
unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a party to this case,
international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State,
was being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly
designated to assist it in discharging its obligations under the Geneva
reorganize and incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more
Conventions.
than sixty (60) years of existence in this country.
The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times,
Crescent Movement, can neither “be classified as an instrumentality of
particularly on June 11, 1953, August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and
the State, so as not to lose its character of neutrality” as well as its
October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264,
independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since it is regulated
and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The passage of several laws relating to
by international humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary of the
the PNRC’s corporate existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the
State.
constitutional proscription on the creation of private corporations by
Although [the PNRC] is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality FACTS: The Commission on Audit issued COA Resolution No. 99-011 in
of the government, nor a GOCC or a subsidiary thereof . . . so much so which the said resolution state that the BSP was created as a public
that respondent, under the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his corporation under Commonwealth Act No. 111, as amended by
position as Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, Presidential Decree No. 460 and Republic Act No. 7278; that in Boy
such a conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a “private Scouts of the Philippines vs. National Labor Relations Commission, the
corporation” within the contemplation of the provision of the Supreme Court ruled that the BSP, as constituted under its charter, was
Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation Code. [T]he a “government-controlled corporation within the meaning of Article IX
sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies (B)(2)(1) of the Constitution; and that “the BSP is appropriately regarded
involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis. as a government instrumentality under the 1987 Administrative Code.”
The BSP sought reconsideration of the COA Resolution in a letter signed
In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and
by the BSP National President Jejomar Binay. He claimed that RA 7278
auxiliary of the government in the humanitarian field in accordance with
eliminated the “substantial government participation” in the National
its commitments under international law. This Court cannot all of a
Executive Board by removing: (i) the President of the Philippines and
sudden refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the issue of
executive secretaries, with the exception of the Secretary of Education,
the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised by the
as members thereof; and (ii) the appointment and confirmation power
parties. It bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded to almost all
of the President of the Philippines, as Chief Scout, over the members of
national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to provide a
the said Board. The BSP further claimed that the 1987 Administrative
substantial portion of the country’s blood requirements. Its
Code itself, of which the BSP s. NLRC relied on for some terms, defines
humanitarian work is unparalleled. The Court should not shake its
government-owned and controlled corporations as agencies organized
existence to the core in an untimely and drastic manner that would not
as stock or non-stock corporations which the BSP, under its present
only have negative consequences to those who depend on it in times of
charter, is not. And finally, they claim that the Government, like in other
disaster and armed hostilities but also have adverse effects on the
GOCCs, does not have funds invested in the BSP. The BSP is not an entity
image of the Philippines in the international community. The sections
administering special funds. The BSP is neither a unit of the
of the PNRC Charter that were declared void must therefore stay. [Thus,
Government; a department which refers to an executive department as
R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. The Court
created by law; nor a bureau which refers to any principal subdivision
MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the second
or unit of any department.
sentence, to now read as follows: WHEREFORE, we declare that the
office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a ISSUE: Whether the BSP falls under the COA’s audit jurisdiction.
government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled
RULING: After considering the legislative history of the amended
corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of
charter and the applicable laws and the arguments of both parties, the
the 1987 Constitution.] Boy Scouts of the Philippines vs. Commission on
Court found that the BSP is a public corporation and its funds are subject
Audit
to the COA’s audit jurisdiction.
BSP v. COA
The BSP Charter created the BSP as a “public corporation” to serve the continues to be a public corporation or a government instrumentality,
following public interest or purpose: xxx to promote through the Court concludes that it is subject to the exercise by the COA of its
organization and cooperation with other agencies, the ability of boys to audit jurisdiction in the manner consistent with the provisions of the
do useful things for themselves and others, to train them in scout craft, BSP Charter.
and to inculcate in them patriotism, civic consciousness and
responsibility, courage, self-reliance, discipline and kindred virtues, and
moral values, using the method which are in common use by boy scouts. Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v.
Commission on Audit
The purpose of the BSP as stated in its amended charter shows that it
was created in order to implement a State policy declared in Article II, FACTS: The petitioner was incorporated as a juridical entity over one
Section 13 of the Constitution. Evidently, the BSP, which was created by hundred years ago by virtue of Act No. 1285, enacted on January 19,
a special law to serve a public purpose in pursuit of a constitutional 1905, by the Philippine Commission. The petitioner, at the time it was
mandate, comes within the class of “public corporations” defined by created, was composed of animal aficionados and animal
paragraph 2, Article 44 of the Civil Code and governed by the law which propagandists. The objects of the petitioner, as stated in Section 2 of its
creates it, pursuant to Article 45 of the same Code. charter, shall be to enforce laws relating to cruelty inflicted upon
animals or the protection of animals in the Philippine Islands, and
The Constitution emphatically prohibits the creation of private
generally, to do and perform all things which may tend in any way to
corporations except by a general law applicable to all citizens. The
alleviate the suffering of animals and promote their welfare. The
purpose of this constitutional provision is to ban private corporations
petitioner was initially imbued under its charter with the power to
created by special charters, which historically gave certain individuals,
apprehend violators of animal welfare laws. In addition, the petitioner
families or groups special privileges denied to other citizens.
was to share one-half (1/2) of the fines imposed and collected through
The BSP is a public corporation or a government agency or its efforts for violations of the laws related thereto. Subsequently,
instrumentality with juridical personality, which does not fall within the however, the power to make arrests as well as the privilege to retain a
constitutional prohibition in Article XII, Section 16, notwithstanding the portion of the fines collected for violation of animal-related laws were
amendments to its charter. Not all corporations, which are not recalled by virtue of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 148. An audit team
government owned or controlled, are ipso facto to be considered from COA wanted to conduct an audit survey but petitioner refused
private corporations as there exist another distinct class of corporations saying that it is a private corporation and not a public one.
or chartered institutions which are otherwise known as “public
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is a private corporation.
corporations.” These corporations are treated by law as agencies or
instrumentalities of the government which are not subject to the test HELD: Yes. A reading of petitioner’s charter shows that it is not subject
of ownership or control and economic viability but to different criteria to control or supervision by any agency of the State, unlike government-
relating to their public purposes/interests or constitutional policies and owned and -controlled corporations. No government representative
objectives and their administrative relationship to the government or sits on the board of trustees of the petitioner. Like all private
any of its Departments or Offices. Since BSP, under its amended charter, corporations, the successors of its members are determined voluntarily
and solely by the petitioner in accordance with its by-laws, and may President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in line with the government‘s policy
exercise those powers generally accorded to private corporations, such of pursuing peace negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
as the powers to hold property, to sue and be sued, to use a common (MILF), asked Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to convince the
seal, and so forth. It may adopt by-laws for its internal operations: the MILF to continue negotiating with the government. MILF, thereafter,
petitioner shall be managed or operated by its officers “in accordance convened its Central Committee and decided to meet with the
with its by-laws in force.” The employees of the petitioner are Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). Formal peace talks
registered and covered by the Social Security System at the latter’s were held in Libya which resulted to the crafting of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
initiative, and not through the Government Service Insurance System, Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) which consists of three
which should be the case if the employees are considered government (3) aspects: a.) security aspect; b.) rehabilitation aspect; and c.)
employees. This is another indication of petitioner’s nature as a private ancestral domain aspect. Various negotiations were held which led to
entity. The fact that a certain juridical entity is impressed with public the finalization of the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral
interest does not, by that circumstance alone, make the entity a public Domain (MOA-AD). The said memorandum was set to be signed last
corporation, inasmuch as a corporation may be private although its August 5, 2008. In its body, it grants ―the authority and jurisdiction
charter contains provisions of a public character, incorporated solely for over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro to
the public good. This class of corporations may be considered quasi- the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). The latter, in addition, has the
public corporations, which are private corporations that render public freedom to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relation
service, supply public wants, or pursue other eleemosynary objectives. with foreign countries. ―The sharing between the Central Government
While purposely organized for the gain or benefit of its members, they and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be
are required by law to discharge functions for the public benefit. The 75:25 in favor of the BJE. The MOA-AD further provides for the extent
true criterion, therefore, to determine whether a corporation is public of the territory of the Bangsamoro. It describes it as ―the land mass as
or private is found in the totality of the relation of the corporation to well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including
the State. If the corporation is created by the State as the latter’s own the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the
agency or instrumentality to help it in carrying out its governmental Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region. With regard to governance,
functions, then that corporation is considered public; otherwise, it is on the other hand, a shared responsibility and authority between the
private. Applying the above test, provinces, chartered cities, and Central Government and BJE was provided. The relationship was
barangays can best exemplify public corporations. They are created by described as ―associative. With the formulation of the MOA-AD,
the State as its own device and agency for the accomplishment of parts petitioners aver that the negotiation and finalization of the MOA-AD
of its own public works. violates constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation,
as mandated by Executive Order No. 3, and right to information. They
further contend that it violates the Constitution and laws. Hence, the
The Province Of North Cotabato, Et Al. v. The Government of the filing of the petition.
Republic of the Philippines
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the MOA-AD violates constitutional and effecting such policy. An essential element of these freedoms is to keep
statutory provisions on public consultation and right to information 2. open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the
Whether or not the MOA-AD violates the Constitution and the laws. government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the
channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the
HELD: The MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern,
government may perceive and be responsive to the people‘s will.
involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State,
Envisioned to be corollary to the twin rights to information and
which directly affects the lives of the public at large. Intended as a
disclosure is the design for feedback mechanisms. The imperative of a
―splendid symmetry to the right to information under the Bill of Rights
public consultation, as a species of the right to information, is evident
is the policy of public disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the
in the ―marching orders‖ to respondents. The mechanics for the duty
Constitution which provides that subject to reasonable conditions
to disclose information and to conduct public consultation regarding
prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full
the peace agenda and process is manifestly provided by E.O. No. 3. The
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3 declares that there is a need to
Moreover, the policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-
further enhance the contribution of civil society to the comprehensive
quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to information on
peace process by institutionalizing the people‘s participation. One of
matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to
the three underlying principles of the comprehensive peace process is
information guarantees the right of the people to demand information,
that it ―should be community-based, reflecting the sentiments, values
while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information
and principles important to all Filipinos and ―shall be defined not by
even if nobody demands. The policy of public disclosure establishes a
the government alone, nor by the different contending groups only, but
concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely
by all Filipinos as one community. Included as a component of the
open democracy, with the people‘s right to know as the centerpiece. It
comprehensive peace process is consensus-building and empowerment
is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy.
for peace, which includes ―continuing consultations on both national
These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression
and local levels to build consensus for a peace agenda and process, and
and essential to hold public officials at all times accountable to the
the mobilization and facilitation of people‘s participation in the peace
people. Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure
process. Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a
need not await the passing of a statute. As Congress cannot revoke this
plebiscite to effectuate “continuing” consultations, contrary to
principle, it is merely directed to provide for ―reasonable safeguards.‖
respondents’ position that plebiscite is “more than sufficient
The complete and effective exercise of the right to information
consultation. Further, E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and
necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure
responsibilities of the PAPP, one of which is to ―conduct regular
derive the same self-executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-
dialogues with the National Peace Forum (NPF) and other peace
in-hand, it is absurd to say that the broader right to information on
partners to seek relevant information, comments, recommendations as
matters of public concern is already enforceable while the correlative
well as to render appropriate and timely reports on the progress of the
duty of the State to disclose its transactions involving public interest is
comprehensive peace process. E.O. No. 3 mandates the establishment
not enforceable until there is an enabling law. Respondents cannot thus
of the NPF to be ―the principal forum for the Presidential Adviser on
point to the absence of an implementing legislation as an excuse in not
Peace Progress (PAPP) to consult with and seek advi[c]e from the peace
advocates, peace partners and concerned sectors of society on both the use of the term ―associative in the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD contains
national and local levels, on the implementation of the comprehensive many provisions which are consistent with the international legal
peace process, as well as for government [-]civil society dialogue and concept of association, specifically the following: the BJE‘s capacity to
consensus-building on peace agenda and initiatives. In fine, E.O. No. 3 enter into economic and trade relations with foreign countries, the
establishes petitioners’ right to be consulted on the peace agenda, as a commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE‘s
corollary to the constitutional right to information and disclosure. In participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized
general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the Central
powers conceded therein to the BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers Government over external defense. Moreover, the BJE‘s right to
granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local government under participate in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of
present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before border agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of revenues
assessing some of the specific powers that would have been vested in pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands
the BJE, however, it would be useful to turn first to a general idea that forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the
serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD, governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the
namely, the international law concept of association. Significantly, the U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them. These
MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept, indicating that the Parties provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties
actually framed its provisions with it in mind. Association is referred to aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate,
in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and a status closely approximating it. The concept of association is not
paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned provision, recognized under the present Constitution. No province, city, or
however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe the municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as
envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central Government. having an ―associative‖ relationship with the national government.
Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever
The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro
granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also
juridical entity shall be associative characterized by shared authority
implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The
and responsibility with a structure of governance based on executive,
Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this
legislative, judicial and administrative institutions with defined powers
jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide
and functions in the comprehensive compact. A period of transition
for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine
shall be established in a comprehensive peace compact specifying the
territory for independence.
relationship between the Central Government and the BJE. The nature
of the ―associative relationship may have been intended to be defined Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD‘s provisions,
more precisely in the still to be forged Comprehensive Compact. therefore, already requires for its validity the amendment of
Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of ―association in constitutional provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article
international law, and the MOA-AD – by its inclusion of international law X:
instruments in its TOR– placed itself in an international legal context,
SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of
that concept of association may be brought to bear in understanding
the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays.
There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the of another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A and B
Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. SECTION 15. There shall be created mentioned earlier in the overview. That the present components of the
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas therein in 2001, however, does not render another plebiscite
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because what these
economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within areas voted for then was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE.
the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well
Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the
as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD is to be effected. That constitutional
It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its provision states: ―The State recognizes and promotes the rights of
relationship with the national government being fundamentally indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity
different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name and development. An associative arrangement does not uphold
as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo national unity. While there may be a semblance of unity because of the
Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the act
government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states. of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in
international practice, has generally been a preparation for
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national
independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity.
government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present
Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and
the M OA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying
with the Constitution and the laws. Article X, Section 18 of the them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP
Constitution provides that ―[t]he creation of the autonomous region and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the
shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that independence. While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the
only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will
plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region. not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not
cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing
The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even
an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central
assuming that it is covered by the term ―autonomous region in the
Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions
constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in
from the President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government
conflict with it. Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d)
peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees
and 2(e), the present geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition,
that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will
the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the
eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the
ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite – Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar,
President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding
Tagoloan and Tangkal – are automatically part of the BJE without need
such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the
constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional control by Congress. It should be stressed that “municipal corporations
Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, are mere creatures of Congress”, which has the power to “create and
for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the abolish municipal corporations” due to its “general legislative powers”.
amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with Congress, therefore, has the power of control over the Local
that process. governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to
tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back
the power.
2. The City of Manila’s power to impose license fees on gambling, has
PRINCIPLE OF LOCAL AUTHORITY long been revoked by P.D. No. 771 and vested exclusively on the
National Government. Therefore, only the National Government has
Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
the power to issue “license or permits” for the operation of gambling.
Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local
3. Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the
autonomy.
National Government. PAGCOR is government owned or controlled
Basco vs. PAGCOR corporation with an original charter, P.D. No. 1869. All of its shares of
stocks are owned by the National Government. PAGCOR has a dual role,
FACTS: Petitioner is seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and
to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter -- PD 1869, because it is
governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or
allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because it
instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the
constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right
Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local
recognized by law. It waived the Manila City government’s right to
taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or
impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law. For the same
subjected to control by a mere Local Government.
reason, the law has intruded into the local government’s right to impose
local taxes and license fees. This is in contravention of the 4. Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the
constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy. Constitution will be violated by P.D. No. 1869. Article 10, Section 5 of
the 1987 Constitution:
ISSUE: Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1869 is valid.
“Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own
RULING:
source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to
1. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent
inherent right to impose taxes. Their charter or statute must plainly with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges
show an intent to confer that power, otherwise the municipality cannot shall accrue exclusively to the local government.”
assume it. Its power to tax therefore must always yield to a legislative
SC said this is a pointless argument. The power of the local government
act which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which
to “impose taxes and fees is always subject to “limitations” which
has the “inherent power to tax.” The Charter of Manila is subject to
Congress may provide by law. Besides, the principle of local autonomy Moreover, ordinances should not contravene statutes as municipal
under the 1987 Constitution simply means “decentralization.” It governments are merely agents of the national government. The local
does not make local governments sovereign within the councils exercise only delegated legislative powers which have been
state. Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED conferred on them by Congress. The delegate cannot be superior to the
principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. This being
Lina v. Paño
the case, these councils, as delegates, cannot be superior to the
FACTS: Private respondent Tony Calvento, was appointed agent by principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. The
PCSO to install a terminal for the operation of lotto, applied for a question of whether gambling should be permitted is for Congress to
mayor’s permit to operate a lotto outlet in San Pedro,Laguna. It was determine, taking into account national and local interests. Since
denied on the ground that an ordinance entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, Congress has allowed the PCSO to operate lotteries which PCSO seeks
Taon1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna prohibited to conduct in Laguna, pursuant toits legislative grant of authority, the
gambling in the province, including the operation of lotto. With the province's Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot nullify the exercise of said
denial of his application, private respondent filed an action for authority by preventing something already allowed by Congress.
declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of private
respondent enjoining petitioners from implementing or enforcing the Limbona vs. Mangelin
subject resolution.
FACTS: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of
ISSUE: Whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central
Panlalawigan of Laguna and the denial of a mayor’s permit based Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid
thereon are valid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House
of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the
HELD: No. The questioned ordinance merely states the “objection” of
Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local government
the council to the said game. It is but a mere policy statement on the
officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly
part of the local council, which is not self-executing. Nor could it serve
members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session
as a valid ground to prohibit the operation of the lotto system in the
in November as his presence was needed in the house committee
province of Laguna. As a policy statement expressing the local
hearing of Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly
government’s objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part
held a session in defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he was
of the local government’s autonomy to air its views which may be
unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's
contrary to that of the national government’s. However, this freedom
proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was
to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may
still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the
actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by
case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly expressly expelling
Congress. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could
petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner
not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance
had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of
prohibiting the operation of lotto.
the Assembly on a question which should have been resolved within the administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the
confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that base of government power and in the process to make local
the petition had become "moot and academic" because of its governments “more responsive and accountable,” “and ensure their
resolution. fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more
effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social
ISSUES:
progress.” At the same time, it relieves the central government of the
1. Whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner (pending litigation) burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on
has made the case moot and academic. national concerns. The president exercises “general supervision” over
them, but only to “ensure that local affairs are administered according
2. Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao subject to
to law.” He has not control over their acts in the sense that he can
the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is the extent
substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on
of self-government given to the two autonomous governments of
the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of
Region 9 and 12?
local government units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the
RULING: autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its
future with minimum intervention from central authorities.
1. The Court does not agree that the case is moot and academic simply
by reason of the expulsion resolution that was issued. If the expulsion According to the Supreme Court, an examination of the very
was done purposely to make the petition moot and academic, it will not Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of
make it academic. On the ground of due process, the Court hold that Mindanao persuades us to believe that they were never meant to
the expulsion is without force and effect. First, there is no showing that exercise autonomy through decentralization of power. The Presidential
the Sanggunian had conducted an investigation. It also does not appear Decree, in the first place, mandates that “the President shall have the
that the petitioner had been made aware that he was charged with graft power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions.”
and corruption before his colleagues. It cannot be said therefore that In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is
he was accorded any opportunity to rebut their accusations. As it made to dischage chiefly administrative services. Thus, the SC assumes
stands, the charges now are leveled amount to mere accusations that jurisdiction. Upon the facts presented, the Court finds two sessions held
cannot warrant expulsion. Thus, the Court ordered reinstatement of the on November to be invalid. Wherefore, the petition is Granted. The
petitioner. petitioner is reinstated as Member and speaker of the Sanggunian.

2. The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in

Regions 9 and 12 by Presidential Decree No. 1618. In relation to the
Disomangcop vs. DPWH
central government, the Presidential Decree provides that “the
President shall have the power of general supervision and control over FACTS: Petitioners seek the following principal reliefs: (1) to annul and
the Autonomous Regions...” Now, autonomy is either decentralization set aside D.O. 119; (2) to prohibit respondent DPWH Secretary from
of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization implementing D.O. 119 and R.A. 8999 and releasing funds for public
of administration when the central government delegates works projects intended for Lanao del Sur and Marawi City to the
Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office and other administrative regions authority and responsibility from the national office to the regional and
of DPWH; and (3) to compel the Secretary of the Department of Budget local offices. This mode of decentralization is also referred to as
and Management (DBM) to release all funds for public works projects administrative decentralization. Devolution, on the other hand,
intended for Marawi City and the First District of Lanao del Sur to the connotes political decentralization, or the transfer of powers,
DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur only; and to responsibilities, and resources for the performance of certain functions
compel respondent DPWH Secretary to let the DPWH-ARMM First from the central government to local government units. This is a more
Engineering District in Lanao del Sur implement all public works projects liberal form of decentralization since there is an actual transfer of
within its jurisdictional area. R.A. 8999 ventures to reestablish the powers and responsibilities. It aims to grant greater autonomy to local
National Government’s jurisdiction over infrastructure programs in government units in cognizance of their right to self-government, to
Lanao del Sur. D.O. 119 creates the Marawi Sub-District Engineering make them self-reliant, and to improve their administrative and
Office which has jurisdiction over infrastructure projects within Marawi technical capabilities.] [This Court elucidated the concept of autonomy
City and Lanao del Sur. The department order, in effect, takes back in Limbona v. Mangelin, thus: “Autonomy is either decentralization of
powers which have been previously devolved. administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization
of administration when the central government delegates
ISSUE: Whether R.A. 8999 and D.O. 119 are unconstitutional
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the
RULING: Yes. The ARMM Organic Acts are deemed a part of the regional base of government power and in the process to make local
autonomy scheme. While they are classified as statutes, the Organic governments “more responsive and accountable,” and “ensure their
Acts are more than ordinary statutes because they enjoy affirmation by fullest development as self- reliant communities and make them more
a plebiscite. Hence, the provisions thereof cannot be amended by an effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social
ordinary statute, such as R.A. 8999 in this case. The amendatory law has progress.” At the same time, it relieves the central government of the
to be submitted to a plebiscite. R.A. 8999 contravenes true burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on
decentralization which is the essence of regional autonomy. national concerns. The President exercises “general supervision” over
Decentralization is a decision by the central government authorizing its them, but only to “ensure that local affairs are administered according
subordinates, whether geographically or functionally defined, to to law.” He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can
exercise authority in certain areas. It involves decision-making by substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on
subnational units. It is typically a delegated power, wherein a larger the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of
government chooses to delegate certain authority to more local local government units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the
governments. Federalism implies some measure of decentralization, autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its
but unitary systems may also decentralize. Decentralization differs future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According
intrinsically from federalism in that the sub-units that have been to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to “self-
authorized to act (by delegation) do not possess any claim of right immolation,” since in that event the autonomous government becomes
against the central government.[Decentralization comes in two forms— accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.”] The
deconcentration and devolution. Deconcentration is administrative in challenged law creates an office with functions and powers which, by
nature; it involves the transfer of functions or the delegation of virtue of E.O. 426, have been previously devolved to the DPWH-ARMM,
First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur. D.O. 119 creating the Marawi grant franchises to operate CATV. Whatever authority the LGUs had
Sub-District Engineering Office which has jurisdiction over before, the same had been withdrawn when President Marcos issued
infrastructure projects within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur is violative P.D. No. 1512 terminating all franchises, permits or certificates for the
of the provisions of E.O. 426. The office created under D.O. 119, having operation of CATV system previously granted by local governments.
essentially the same powers, is a duplication of the DPWH- ARMM First Today, pursuant to Section 3 of E.O. No. 436, only persons, associations,
Engineering District in Lanao del Sur formed under the aegis of E.O. 426. partnerships, corporations or cooperatives granted a Provisional
The department order, in effect, takes back powers which have been Authority or Certificate of Authority by the NTC may install, operate and
previously devolved under the said executive order. D.O. 119 runs maintain a cable television system or render cable television service
counter to the provisions of E.O. 426. The DPWH’s order, like spring within a service area. It is clear that in the absence of constitutional or
water, cannot rise higher than its source of power—the Executive. legislative authorization, municipalities have no power to grant
franchises. Consequently, the protection of the constitutional provision
as to impairment of the obligation of a contract does not extend to
Batangas CATV v. CA privileges, franchises and grants given by a municipality in excess of its
powers, or ultra vires.
FACTS: Batangas City Sangguniang Panlungsod (R) enacted Resolution
No. 210 granting Batangas CATV (P) franchise to operate cable system
in the city. Sec. 8 of the Resolution provides that P is authorized to
POWER OF THE PRESIDENT OVER LGUs
charge subscribers maximum rates but increase shall be subject to R’s
review. P then increased subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per Dadole v. COA
month so R threatened it to get approval from the latter.
FACTS: In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started
P: P filed with the RTC a petition for injunction alleging that R has no receiving monthly allowances of P1,260 each through the yearly
authority to regulate subscriber rates charged by CATV operators appropriation ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the
because under E.O. No. 205, the NTC has sole authority to regulate said city. In 1991, Mandaue City increased the amount to P1,500 for
CATV in the Philippines. Also, the LGC extends to LGUs the general each judge.
power to perform any act that would benefit constituents but doesn’t
On March 15, 1994, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
authorize them to regulate CATV operation.
issued the disputed Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which
R: R argues that Resolution was enacted pursuant to Sec. 177(c) & (d) provided that:... such additional allowances in the form... of honorarium
of BP 337 (LGC of 1983) which authorizes LGUs to regulate businesses at rates not exceeding P1,000.00 in provinces and cities and P700.00 in
and is in the nature of a contract between P & R. municipalities may be granted
ISSUE: Whether R can regulate CATV franchise. Acting on the DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices
of disallowance to herein petitioners,... in excess of the amount
RULING: No. The resolution is an enactment of an LGU acting only as
authorized by LBC 55... the additional monthly allowances of the
agent of the national legislature. There is no law authorizing LGUs to
petitioner judges were reduced to P1,000 each. They were also asked of their legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not
to reimburse the amount they received in excess of P1,000 withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the Constitution
and the law.
The petitioner judges filed... a motion for reconsideration and indorsed
the same to the COA... respondent COA rendered a decision denying the President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local
petitioners' motion for reconsideration. government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to
law. This is the scope of the President's supervisory powers over local
ISSUES:
government units. Hence, the President or any... of his or her alter egos
1. Is LBC 55 null and void. cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local
government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the
2. Does LBC 55 go beyond the law it seeks to implement?
Constitution. Any directive therefore by the President or any of his or
RULING: We declare LBC 55 to be null and void. her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a... law-conforming
judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity
We recognize that, although our Constitution guarantees autonomy to
because it violates the principle of local autonomy and separation of
local government units, the exercise of local autonomy remains subject
powers of the executive and legislative departments in governing
to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by
municipal corporations.
the President. Section 4 of Article X of... the 1987 Philippine Constitution
provides that: Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160, the law that supposedly serves
as the legal basis of LBC 55,... allows the grant of additional allowances
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
to judges "when the finances of the city government allow." The said
supervision over local governments. x x x
provision does not authorize setting a definite maximum limit to the
This provision... has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. additional allowances granted to judges. Thus, we need not belabor the
point that the finances of a... city government may allow the grant of
In Taule v. Santos, we further stated that the Chief Executive wielded no
additional allowances higher than P1,000 if the revenues of the said city
more authority than that of checking whether local governments or
government exceed its annual expenditures.
their officials were performing their duties as... provided by the
fundamental law and by statutes. He cannot interfere with local Setting a uniform amount for the grant of additional allowances is an
governments, so long as they act within the scope of their authority. inappropriate way of enforcing the criterion found in Section 458, par.
"Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160. The DBM over-stepped its power of supervision
mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not... include any over local government units by imposing a prohibition that did not...
restraining authority over such body,"... the heads of... political correspond with the law it sought to implement. In other words, the
subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate prohibitory nature of the circular had no legal basis.
from the electorate, to whom they are directly accountable.
Furthermore, LBC 55 is void on account of its lack of publication
By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the President's supervision
Principles:
only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised... within the sphere
Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or December 1998, President Estrada issued AO 43, reducing to 5% the
accomplishment of... an act. If these rules are not followed, they may, amount of IRA to be withheld from LGU.
in their discretion, order the act undone or redone by their subordinates
ISSUES:
or even decide to do it themselves. On the other hand, supervision does
not cover such authority. Supervising officials merely see to it... that the 1. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion in
rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor ordering all LGUS to adopt a 25% cost reduction program in violation of
do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are the LGU'S fiscal autonomy
not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to
2. Whether Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10 percent
conform to such rules. They may not prescribe... their own manner of
of their internal revenue allotments, are valid exercises of the
execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to
President's power of general supervision over local governments
see to it that the rules are followed.
HELD:
the President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local
government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to 1. Section 1 of AO 372 does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local
law. This is the scope of the President's supervisory powers over local fiscal
government units. Hence, the President or any... of his or her alter egos
Autonomy does not rule out any manner of national government
cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local
intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local
government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the
programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals.
Constitution. Any directive therefore by the President or any of his or
Significantly, the President, by constitutional fiat, is the head of the
her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a... law-conforming
economic and planning agency of the government, primarily
judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity
responsible for formulating and implementing continuing, coordinated
because it violates the principle of local autonomy and separation of
and integrated social and economic policies, plans and programs for the
powers of the executive and legislative departments in governing
entire country. However, under the Constitution, the formulation and
municipal corporations.
the implementation of such policies and programs are subject to
"consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various private
sectors, and local government units." The President cannot do so
Pimentel vs. Aguirre
unilaterally. Consequently, the Local Government Code provides:
FACTS: In 1997, President Ramos issued AO 372 which: (1) required all
"x x x [I]n the event the national government incurs an unmanaged
government departments and agencies, including SUCs, GOCCs and
public sector deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby
LGUs to identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce
authorized, upon the recommendation of [the] Secretary of Finance,
total expenditures for the year by at least 25% of authorized regular
Secretary of the Interior and Local Government and Secretary of Budget
appropriations for non-personal services items (Section 1) and (2)
and Management, and subject to consultation with the presiding
ordered the withholding of 10% of the IRA to LGUs (Section 4). On 10
officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the liga, to
make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of 2. Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal
local government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national
thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution. The
of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year x x x." Local Government Code specifies further that the release shall be made
directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of
There are therefore several requisites before the President may
the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be
interfere in local fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit
imposed by the national government for whatever purpose." As a rule,
of the national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers
the term "shall" is a word of command that must be given a compulsory
of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of
meaning. The provision is, therefore, imperative. (Pimentel vs. Aguirre,
the various local leagues; and (3) the corresponding recommendation
G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000)
of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local
Government, and Budget and Management. Furthermore, any
adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty percent
Province of Batangas vs. Romulo
(30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third
fiscal year preceding the current one. FACTS: Petitioners assail the provisos of the GAAs of 1999, 200 and 2001
relating to the Local Government Service Equalization Fund, as well as
Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply with these
the Oversight Committee’s Resolutions issued pursuantht ereto,
requisites before the issuance and the implementation of AO 372. At
because said provisos imposed conditions for the release thereof. The
the very least, they did not even try to show that the national
petitioner posits that to subject the distribution and release of the five-
government was suffering from an unmanageable public sector deficit.
billion-peso portion of the IRA, classified as the LGSEF, to compliance by
Neither did they claim having conducted consultations with the
the LGUs with the implementing rules and regulations, including the
different leagues of local governments. Without these requisites, the
mechanisms and guidelines prescribed by the Oversight Committee,
President has no authority to adjust, much less to reduce, unilaterally
contravenes the explicit directive of the Constitution that the LGUs’
the LGU's internal revenue allotment.
share in the national taxes “shall be automatically released to them.”
AO 372, however, is merely directory and has been issued by the The petitioner maintains that the use of the word “shall”must be given
President consistent with his power of supervision over local a compulsory meaning. To further buttress this argument, the
governments. It is intended only to advise all government agencies and petitioner contends that to vest the Oversight Committee with the
instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that will help authority to determine the distribution and release of the LGSEF, which
maintain economic stability in the country, which is facing economic is a part of the IRA of the LGUs, is an anathema to the principle of local
difficulties. Besides, it does not contain any sanction in case of autonomy as embodied in the Constitution and the Local Government
noncompliance. Being merely an advisory, therefore, Section 1 of AO Code of 1991.
372 is well within the powers of the President. Since it is not a
ISSUE: Whether the assailed provisos infringe the Constitution and the
mandatory imposition, the directive cannot be characterized as an
LGC of 1991
exercise of the power of control.
RULING: Yes. Assailed provisions violate the constitutional precept of based on a quarterly assessment to be conducted by certain
local autonomy. To the Court’s mind, the entire process involving the committees which the GAA specifies, namely, the Development Budget
distribution and release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible. Coordinating Committee, the Committee on Finance of the Senate, and
The LGSEF is part of the IRA or “just share” of the LGUs in the national the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
taxes. To subject its distribution and release to the vagaries of the
Thus, while the GAA appropriates P111,778,000,000 of IRA as
implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines and
Programmed Fund, it appropriates a separate amount of P10 Billion of
mechanisms unilaterally prescribed by the Oversight Committee from
IRA under the classification of Unprogrammed Fund, the latter amount
time to time, as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999,
to be released only upon the occurrence of the condition stated in the
2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions, makes the release not
GAA.
automatic, a flagrant violation of the constitutional and statutory
mandate that the “just share” of the LGUs “shall be automatically On August 22, 2000, a number of NGOs and POs, along with 3 barangay
released to them.” The LGUs are, thus, placed at the mercy of the officials filed with this Court the petition at bar, for Certiorari,
Oversight Committee. Prohibition and Mandamus With Application for Temporary Restraining
Order, against respondents then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora,
then Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management
Alternative Center for Organizational Reforms and Development, Inc. Benjamin Diokno, then National Treasurer Leonor Magtolis-Briones,
(ACORD), VS. Zamora and the Commission on Audit, challenging the constitutionality of
provision XXXVII (ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS)
FACTS: Pres. Estrada, pursuant to Sec 22, Art VII mandating the Pres to
referred to by petitioners as Section 1, XXXVII (A), and LIV
submit to Congress a budget of expenditures within 30 days before the
(UNPROGRAMMED FUND) Special Provisions 1 and 4 of the GAA (the
opening of every regular session, submitted the National Expenditures
GAA provisions)
program for FY 2000. The President proposed an IRA of
P121,778,000,000. This became RA 8760, “AN ACT APPROPRIATING Petitioners contend that the said provisions violates the LGUs autonomy
FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC by unlawfully reducing the IRA allotted by 10B and by withholding its
OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY-ONE, release by placing the same under “Unprogrammed funds”. Although
TWO THOUSAND, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” also known as General the effectivity of the Year 2000 GAA has ceased, this Court shall
Appropriations Act (GAA) for the Year 2000. It provides under the nonetheless proceed to resolve the issues raised in the present case, it
heading “ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS” that the IRA being impressed with public interest. Petitioners argue that the GAA
for local government units shall amount to P111,778,000,000”. violated the constitutional mandate of automatically releasing the IRAs
when it made its release contingent on whether revenue collections
In another part of the GAA, under the heading “UNPROGRAMMED
could meet the revenue targets originally submitted by the President,
FUND,” it is provided that an amount of P10,000,000,000 (P10 Billion),
rather than making the release automatic.
apart from the P111,778,000,000 mentioned above, shall be used to
fund the IRA, which amount shall be released only when the original ISSUE: WON the subject GAA violates LGUs fiscal autonomy by not
revenue targets submitted by the President to Congress can be realized automatically releasing the whole amount of the allotted IRA.
HELD: implication is that Congress is not authorized by the Constitution to
hinder or impede the automatic release of the IRA.
Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution provides:
In another case, the Court held that the only possible exception to
SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as
mandatory automatic release of the IRA is, as held in Batangas: …if the
determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically
national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less
released to them. Petitioners argue that the GAA violated this
than 40 percent of the collections of the preceding third fiscal year, in
constitutional mandate when it made the release of IRA contingent on
which case what should be automatically released shall be a
whether revenue collections could meet the revenue targets originally
proportionate amount of the collections for the current fiscal year. The
submitted by the President, rather than making the release automatic.
adjustment may even be made on a quarterly basis depending on the
Respondents counter argue that the above constitutional provision is
actual collections of national internal revenue taxes for the quarter of
addressed not to the legislature but to the executive, hence, the same
the current fiscal year. This Court recognizes that the passage of the
does not prevent the legislature from imposing conditions upon the
GAA provisions by Congress was motivated by the laudable intent to
release of the IRA.
“lower the budget deficit in line with prudent fiscal management.” The
Respondents thus infer that the subject constitutional provision merely pronouncement in Pimentel, however, must be echoed: “[T]he rule of
prevents the executive branch of the government from “unilaterally” law requires that even the best intentions must be carried out within
withholding the IRA, but not the legislature from authorizing the the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable
executive branch to withhold the same. In the words of respondents, purposes must be carried out by legal methods.”
“This essentially means that the President or any member of the
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. XXXVII and LIV Special Provisions
Executive Department cannot unilaterally, i.e., without the backing of
1 and 4 of the Year 2000 GAA are hereby declared unconstitutional
statute, withhold the release of the IRA.”As the Constitution lays upon
insofar as they set apart a portion of the IRA, in the amount of P10
the executive the duty to automatically release the just share of local
Billion, as part of the UNPROGRAMMED FUND.
governments in the national taxes, so it enjoins the legislature not to
pass laws that might prevent the executive from performing this duty.
To hold that the executive branch may disregard constitutional
Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines
provisions which define its duties, provided it has the backing of statute,
is virtually to make the Constitution amendable by statute – a FACTS: Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim
proposition which is patently absurd. If indeed the framers intended to Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No.
allow the enactment of statutes making the release of IRA conditional 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the
instead of automatic, then Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution would first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054
have been worded differently. Since, under Article X, Section 6 of the amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the
Constitution, only the just share of local governments is qualified by the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA
words “as determined by law,” and not the release thereof, the plain No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001.
RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the
2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992
thereafter. and for all the following elections.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections,
been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a
these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the “local” election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.
various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No.
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates
10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May
the synchronization of elections, including the ARMM elections.
2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the
country. 2. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the
ARMM is constitutional
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court,
the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153. [During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open
to Congress in order to resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM
ISSUES:
officials in the interim [in order to achieve synchronization in the 2013
1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to
elections [including the ARMM elections]? remain in office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the
2. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in the
constitutional? ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in
the [2013] synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the
RULING:
President to appoint OICs, [their respective terms to last also until those
[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]
constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto.]
2.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the
1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of terms of office of the incumbent ARMM officials We rule out the [hold
elections. While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This
has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards provision states:
this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no
Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of
[emphases ours]
elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the
provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and
patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they
cannot extend their term through a holdover. xxx.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the
mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution
term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view – like the of that power.
extension of the elective term – is constitutionally infirm because
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the
Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a
scheduled August 2011 elections and setting another date – May 13,
way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed,
2011 – for regional elections synchronized with the presidential,
if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then
congressional and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has
all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term and
made a policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it
effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This
shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in
is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.
intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President.
Hence, holdover – whichever way it is viewed – is a constitutionally After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can
infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken. act to the contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of
the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there
thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating.
had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No.
To be sure, the Court is not without the power to declare an act of
9054) in the past, we have to remember that the rule of holdover can
Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having been
only apply as an available option where no express or implied legislative
exercised in grave abuse of discretion. But our power rests on very
intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent
narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it
is evident.
is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers.
the intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot
No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy
be extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by
decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in the
putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the
exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon
Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen – a term of less
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation, except where
than two years – if a call for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while
an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.
synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an
2.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since express provision of the Constitution.
COMELEC, on its own, has no authority to order special elections.
2.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. OICs in the interim is valid.
[N]o elections may be held on any other date for the positions of
The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure
President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials,
– RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern
except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of
the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No.
3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only measure that Congress can make. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the President can
This choice itself, however, should be examined for any attendant appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the
constitutional infirmity. assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to
and the limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the
should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must be Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials
clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is to be “elective and representative of the constituent political units.”
embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states: This requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance
in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
defective.
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, problem is more apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government and representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153,
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those however, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA
law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the No. 10153 in fact only does is to “appoint officers-in-charge for the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members
commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours] of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions
pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President
2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.” This power is
can appoint. These are:
far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials
public ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the elected in the May 2013 elections.
Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers
[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA
whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution;
No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are
the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is
not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President
how RA No. 10153 should be read – in the manner it was written and
may be authorized by law to appoint; and Fourth, officers lower in rank
based on its unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order for
whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President
synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure responding
alone.
to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.
 funds. Rather, the list is meant to show what expenses are not covered
by the development fund, and LGUs remain at liberty to map out their
Villafuerte v. Robredo
own development plans. Contrary to petitioners’ claims, the said
FACTS: In 1995, the Commission on Audit found that some LGUs had circulars also do not provide sanctions for non- compliance, but only
actually used 20% of their Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for reminds LGUs to adhere to existing rules regarding the 20%
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE), in violation of development fund. It must also be stressed that the state policy of LGU
R.A. No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC). Following autonomy outlined in Art. X of the Constitution does not totally sever
this, on September 20, 2005, then DILG Sec. Angelo Reyes and DBM Sec. them from the national government. In Ganzon v. Court of Appeals, the
Romulo Neri issued Joint Memorandum Circular No. 1, s. 2005, which Court mentioned the paradoxical dynamic where local governments are
contained guidelines on the proper use of the said 20% for development subject to limited regulation to enhance self-government. At any rate,
projects. On August 31, 2010, respondent incumbent DILG Sec. Jesse MC Nos. 2010-83 and 2011-08 are really implementations of the
Robredo issued Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 2010-83, which constitutional mandate of transparency and accountability, as
mandated local chief executives to publicly post budget statements reiterated in the LGC and R.A. No. 9184.
such as the CY 2010 Annual Budget and CY 2010 20% of the IRA
RESULT:
Utilization. Afterward, on December 2 that same year he issued MC No.
2010-138, which provided a list of expenses for which 20% of the IRA Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
must not be utilized. On January 13, 2011, respondent issued MC No.
2011-08, which imposed strict compliance with Secs. 288 and 354 of the
LGC and MC No. 2010-83. Mandanas v. Ochoa, Jr.
On February 21, 2011, petitioner then Camarines Sur Gov. Luis FACTS: The petitioners hereby challenge the manner in which the just
Raymund Villafuerte, Jr. and the Provincial Government of Camarines share in the national taxes of the local government units (LGUs) has
Sur filed a petition for certiorari, seeking to nullify MC Nos. 2010-83, been computed. This is a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition
2010-138, and 2011-08. and mandamus assailing the manner the General Appropriations Act
(GAA) for FY 2012 computed the IRA for the LGUs. Certain collections of
ISSUE: Whether Memorandum Circulars Nos. 2010-83, 2010-138, and
NIRTs by the Bureau of Customs (BOC) — specifically: excise taxes, value
2011-08 violate the principles of local and fiscal autonomy in the
added taxes (VATs) and documentary stamp taxes (DSTs) — have not
Constitution and the LGC.
been included in the base amounts for the computation of the IRA. The
HELD: NO. Petitioners assert that MC No. 2010-83 is mandatory in procedural issue is the propriety of the remedy of mandamus in
nature, and by issuing it respondent has exceeded his supervisory violation of doctrine of separation of powers. The substantive issue is
powers. A reading of the assailed circular reveals that it is in fact an whether Section 284 of the LGC is unconstitutional for being repugnant
advisory to LGUs reminding them to observe Sec. 287 of the LGC in to Section 6, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
utilizing 20% of their IRA. Likewise, the enumeration provided by MC
Sec. 6, Art. X, 1987 Constitution.
No. 2010-138 is not meant to restrict LGUs’ discretion in using their
Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in (1) Section 284 of the LGC deviates from the plain language of Section
the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. 6 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution
Sec. 284, Local Government Code. Allotment of Internal Revenue Taxes. The phrase national internal revenue taxes engrafted in Section 284 is
undoubtedly more restrictive than the term national taxes written in
Local government units shall have a share in the national internal
Section 6. Verba legis non est recedendum (from the words of a statute
revenue taxes based on the collection of the third fiscal year preceding
there should be no departure).
the current Fiscal year as follows: • x x x
According to Garcia v. Executive Secretary, customs duties is the
Sec. 21, National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
nomenclature given to taxes imposed on the importation and
Sources of Revenue. exportation of commodities and merchandise to or from a foreign
country. Although customs duties have either or both the generation of
The following taxes, fees and charges are deemed to be national internal
revenue and the regulation of economic or social activity as their
revenue taxes:
moving purposes, it is often difficult to say which of the two is the
a) Income tax; principal objective in any given particular instance, for, verily, customs
duties, much like internal revenue taxes, are rarely designed to achieve
b) Estate and donor's taxes;
only one policy objective.
c) Value-added tax;
Strictly speaking, customs duties are also taxes because they are
d) Other percentage taxes; exactions whose proceeds become public funds.

e) Excise taxes; Further, Section 102 (oo) of R.A. No. 10863 (Customs Modernization
and Tariff Act) expressly includes all fees and charges imposed under
f) Documentary stamp taxes; and
the Act under the blanket term of taxes.
g) Such other taxes as are or hereafter may be imposed and
(2) Congress can validly exclude taxes that will constitute the base
collected by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
amount for the computation of the IRA only if a Constitutional provision
Section 286, Local Government Code. Automatic Release of Shares. allows such exclusion

(a) The share of each local government unit shall be released, without Although it has the primary discretion to determine and fix the just
need of any further action, directly to the share of the LGUs in the national taxes, Congress cannot disobey the
express mandate of the Constitution for the just share of the LGUs to
Provincial, city, municipal or barangay treasurer, as the case may be, on
be derived from the national taxes.
a quarterly basis within five (5) days after the end of each quarter, and
which shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed The phrase as determined by law in Section 6 follows and qualifies the
by the National Government for whatever purpose. x x x phrase just share, and cannot be construed as qualifying the succeeding
phrase in the national taxes. The intent of the people in respect of
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE
Section 6 is really that the base for reckoning the just share of the LGUs Section 8 of R.A. No. 6632. Excluded in the base for computing the just
should include all national taxes. share
To read Section 6 differently as requiring that the just share of LGUs in Proceeds do not come from a tax, fee or exaction imposed on the sale
the national taxes shall be determined by law is tantamount to the and conversion:
unauthorized revision of the Constitution.
Share of the affected LGUs in the proceeds of the sale and conversion
The national taxes to be included in the base for computing the just of the former military bases pursuant to R.A. No. 7227.
share the LGUs shall henceforth be, but shall not be limited to, the
Conforms to Section 29 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as money
following:
collected on any tax levied for a special purpose:
1. The NIRTs enumerated in Section 21 of the NIRC, as amended, to be
Excise taxes imposed on: (1) locally manufactured Virginia tobacco
inclusive of the VATs, excise taxes, and DSTs collected by the BIR and
products; (2) the share of the affected LGUs in incremental revenues
the BOC, and their deputized agents;
from Burley and native tobacco products; (3) the share of the COA in
2. Tariff and customs duties collected by the BOC; the NIRTs; and (4) the share of the host LGUs in the franchise taxes paid
by the Manila Jockey Club, Inc., and Philippine Racing Club, Inc.
3. 50% of the VATs collected in the ARMM, and 30% of all other national
taxes collected in the ARMM; the remaining Same is true for the franchise taxes paid under Section 6 of R.A. No.
6631 and Section 8 of R.A. No. 6632, inasmuch as certain percentages
50% of the VATs and 70% of the collections of the other national taxes
of the franchise taxes go to different beneficiaries
in the ARMM shall be the exclusive share of the ARMM pursuant to
Section 9 and Section 15 of R.A. No. 9054; Section 7, Article X of the 1987 Constitution allows affected LGUs to
have an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization of the nation's
4. 60% of the national taxes collected from the exploitation and
national wealth "within their respective areas.
development of the national wealth; the remaining 40% will exclusively
accrue to the host LGUs pursuant to Section 290 of the LGC; Exclusion of the share of the different LGUs in the excise taxes imposed
on mineral products pursuant to Section 287 of the NIRC in relation to
5. 85% of the excise taxes collected from locally manufactured Virginia
Section 290.
and other tobacco products; the remaining 15% shall accrue to the
special purpose funds pursuant created in R.A. No. 7171 and R.A. No. Properly excluded for such taxes are intended to truly enable a
7227; sustainable and feasible autonomous region as guaranteed by the 1987
Constitution.
6. The entire 50% of the national taxes collected under Section 106,
Section 108 and Section 116 of the NIRC in excess of the increase in NIRTs collected by the provinces and cities within the ARMM whose
collections for the immediately preceding year; and portions are distributed to the ARMM's provincial, city and regional
governments.
7. 5% of the franchise taxes in favor of the national government paid by
franchise holders in accordance with Section 6 of R.A. No. 6631 and
PAYMENT OF THE ARREARS OF THE LGUS' JUST SHARE CANNOT BE municipal or barangay treasurer, as the case may be, shall be "without
GRANTED need of any further action.”
The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or As compared to the provisions of the 1987 Constitution on Judiciary,
executive act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an Constitutional Commissions, Ombudsman, and the Commission on
operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be Human rights which shares to aspects: The first relates to the grant of
erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or fiscal autonomy, and the second concerns the automatic release of
executive act but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the funds. The common denominator of the provisions is that the automatic
general rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect. release of the appropriated amounts is predicated on the approval of
the annual appropriations of the offices or agencies concerned.
AUTOMATIC RELEASE OF THE LGUS' JUST SHARE IN THE NATIONAL
TAXES DISCUSSION IN THE MAIN DECISION
The 1987 Constitution is forthright and unequivocal in ordering that the Local Autonomy
just share of the LGUs in the national taxes shall be automatically
One of the key features of the 1987 Constitution is its push towards
released to them. With Congress having established the just share
decentralization of government and local autonomy.
through the LGC, it seems to be beyond debate that the inclusion of the
just share of the LGUs in the annual GAAs is unnecessary, if not Local autonomy has two facets, the administrative and the fiscal.
superfluous. Hence, the just share of the LGUs in the national taxes shall
Fiscal autonomy means that local governments have the power to
be released to them without need of yearly appropriation.
create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share
Section 6, Article X of the 1987 Constitution commands that the just in the national taxes released by the National Government, as well as
share of the LGUs in national taxes shall be automatically released to the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their own
them. The term automatic connotes something mechanical, priorities.
spontaneous and perfunctory; and, in the context of this case, the LGUs
Such autonomy is as indispensable to the viability of the policy of
are not required to perform any act or thing in order to receive their
decentralization as the other.
just share in the national taxes.
(A) Basic Principles underlying our System of Local Government
This is because Congress not only already determined the just share
through the LGC's fixing the percentage of the collections of the NIRTs Municipal corporations are now commonly known as local
to constitute such fair share, but also explicitly authorized such just governments. They are the bodies politic established by law partly as
share to be "automatically released" to the LGUs in the proportions and agencies of the State to assist in the civil governance of the country.
regularity set under Section 285 of the LGC without need of annual Their chief purpose has been to regulate and administer the local and
appropriation. To operationalize the automatic release without need of internal affairs of the cities, municipalities or districts.
appropriation, Section 286 of the LGC clearly provides that the
Municipal corporations, being the mere creatures of the State, are
automatic release of the just share directly to the provincial, city,
subject to the will of Congress, their creator. Their continued existence
and the grant of their powers are dependent on the discretion of concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the
Congress. legislature.
(a1) Modified Dillons Rule (Merriam v. Moody’s Executors) This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local
government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the
A municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following
Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. True, there are
powers and no others:
certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct
(1) those granted in express words; conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, which
cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the
(2) those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers
national legislature is still the principal of the local government units,
expressly granted;
which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.
(3) those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the
(a3) Sec. 5 (a) LGC (Tempered the Application of Dillon’s Rule)
corporation-not simply convenient but indispensible;
Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally
(4) any fair, reasonable, doubt as to the existence of a power is resolved
interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall
by the courts against the corporation against the existence of the
be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the local
powers.
government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of
(a2) Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc. the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit
concerned;
Municipal governments are only agents of the national government.
Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on (B) Extent of the Autonomy granted to the LGUs by the 1987
them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot Constitution
be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the
The 1987 Constitution limits Congress' control over the LGUs by
latter.
ordaining in Section 25 of its Article II that: "The State shall ensure the
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and autonomy of local governments." The autonomy of the LGUs as thereby
rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of ensured does not contemplate the fragmentation of the Philippines into
life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As a collection of mini-states, or the creation of imperium in imperio.
it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some
The constitutional mandate to ensure local autonomy refers to
constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single
decentralization.
act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a
wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the Decentralization of Power involves the abdication of political power in
State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no favor of the autonomous LGUs as to grant them the freedom to chart
limitation on the right so far as to the corporation themselves are their own destinies and to shape their futures with minimum
intervention from the central government. This amounts to self-
immolation because the autonomous LGUs thereby become Based on the delineation of the operative principles of decentralization
accountable not to the central authorities but to their constituencies. under Sec. 3, decentralization can be considered as the decision by the
central government to empower its subordinates, whether
Decentralization of Administration occurs when the central government
geographically or functionally constituted, to exercise authority in
delegates administrative powers to the LGUs as the means of
certain areas. It involves decision-making by subnational units, and is
broadening the base of governmental powers and of making the LGUs
typically a delegated power, whereby a larger government chooses to
more responsive and accountable in the process, and thereby ensure
delegate authority to more local governments. It is also a process, being
their fullest development as self-reliant communities and more
the set of policies, electoral or constitutional reforms that transfer
effective partners in the pursuit of the goals of national development
responsibilities, resources or authority from the higher to the lower
and social progress. This form of decentralization further relieves the
levels of government. It is often viewed as a shift of authority towards
central government of the burden of managing local affairs so that it
local governments and away from the central government, with total
can concentrate on national concerns. Decentralization of Power in the
government authority over society and economy imagined as fixed.
Philippines
As a system of transferring authority and power from the National
The decentralization of power has been given to the regional units
Government to the LGUs, decentralization in the Philippines may be
(namely, the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao [ARMM] and
categorized into four, namely:
the constitutionally mandated Cordillera Autonomous Region [CAR]).
This aims to permit determinate groups with common traditions and (1) Political decentralization or devolution;
shared social-cultural characteristics to freely develop their ways of life
(2) Administrative decentralization or deconcentration;
and heritage, to exercise their rights, and to be in charge of their own
affairs through the establishment of a special governance regime for (3) Fiscal decentralization; and
certain member communities who choose their own authorities from
(4) Policy or decision-making decentralization. Political decentralization
within themselves, and exercise the jurisdictional authority legally
or devolution occurs when there is a transfer of powers, responsibilities,
accorded to them to decide their internal community affairs.
and resources from the central government to the LGUs for the
Decentralization of Administration in the Philippines performance of certain functions.
LGUs (i.e., provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays) enjoy the It is a more liberal form of decentralization because there is an actual
decentralization of administration to make governance at the local transfer of powers and responsibilities. It aims to grant greater
levels more directly responsive and effective. In turn, the economic, autonomy to the LGUs in cognizance of their right to selfgovernment,
political and social developments of the smaller political units are to make them self-reliant, and to improve their administrative and
expected to propel social and economic growth and development. technical capabilities.
It is not unlimited but involves only the powers enumerated by Section Section 16 to Section 19 of the LGC characterize political
20, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and by the acts of Congress. decentralization in the LGC as different LGUs empowered to address the
Decentralization under Sec. 3 of the LGC different needs of their constituents. In contrast, devolution in favor of
the regional units is more expansive because they are given the making decentralization exists if at least one subnational tier of
authority to regulate a wider array of subjects, including personal, government has exclusive authority to make decisions on at least one
family and property relations. policy issue.
Administrative decentralization or deconcentration
involves the transfer of functions or the delegation of authority and Zabal v. Duterte
responsibility from the national office to the regional and local offices.
Petitioners claim that they were deprived of their property right to work
Consistent with this concept, the LGC has created the Local School and make a living in violation of the constitutional right to due process.
Boards, the Local Health Boards and the Local Development Councils, Are they correct?
and has transferred some of the authority from the agencies of the
Wrong. It is true that the right to work and make a living are property
National Government, like the Department of Education and the
rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally
Department of Health, to such bodies to better cope up with the needs
constitutes an actionable wrong. But when the conditions so demand
of particular localities.
as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the
Fiscal decentralization means that the LGUs have the power to create primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by
their own sources of revenue in addition to their just share in the due process, must yield to general welfare.
national taxes released by the National Government.
Have petitioners acquired vested rights to their sources of income in
It includes the power to allocate their resources in accordance with Boracay?
their own priorities. Fiscal decentralization emanates from a specific
No because they are part of the informal sector of the economy where
constitutional mandate that is expressed in several provisions of Article
earnings are not guaranteed.
X of the 1987 Constitution, specifically: Section 5; Section 6; and Section
7. Fiscal decentralization under the Constitution been formalized from What are vested rights?
Section 128 to Section 133 of the LGC. To implement the LGUs'
Vested rights are ‘fixed, unalterable, or irrevocable.’ more extensively,
entitlement to the just share in the national taxes, Congress has enacted
they are depicted as follows: rights which have so completely and
Section 284 to Section 288 of the LGC. Congress has further enacted
definitely accrued to or settled in a person that they are not subject to
Section 289 to Section 294 of the LGC to define the share of the LGUs
be defeated or cancelled by the act of any other private person, and
in the national wealth.
which it is right and equitable that the government should recognize
This is limited by Congress in subjecting the LGUs' power to tax to the and protect, as being lawful in themselves, and settled according to the
guidelines set in Section 130 of the LGC and to the limitations stated in then current rules of law, and of which the individual could not be
Section 133 of the LGC. The concept of local fiscal autonomy does not deprived arbitrarily without injustice, or of which he could not justly be
exclude any manner of intervention by the National Government in the deprived otherwise than by the established methods of procedure and
form of supervision if only to ensure that the local programs, fiscal and for the public welfare.
otherwise, are consistent with the national goals. Policy- or decision-
a right is not ‘vested’ unless it is more than a mere expectancy based on otherwise, at a national level. This, for one, reasonably takes the issues
the anticipated continuance of present laws; it must be an established therein from a level that concerns only the local officials
interest in property, not open to doubt. x x x to be vested in its accurate
CREATION AND ALTERATION OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS/LGUs
legal sense, a right must be complete and consummated, and one of
which the person to whom it belongs cannot be divested without his Sema v. COMELEC
consent.
FACTS: On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional
What kind of right to earnings in Boracay do petitioners have? Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19,
Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201
Merely inchoate right or one that has not fully developed and therefore
(MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed
cannot be claimed as one’s own. An inchoate right is a mere
of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. MMA
expectation, which may or may not come into fruition. “it is contingent
Act 201 provides:
as it only comes ‘into existence on an event or condition which may not
happen or be performed until some other event may prevent their Later, three new municipalities were carved out of the original nine
vesting.”‘ municipalities constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total number
of municipalities to 11. Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were the
Petitioners claim that they were being made to suffer the consequences
municipalities constituting its second legislative district. Cotabato City,
of the environmental transgressions of others. Is this claim correct?
although part of Maguindanao’s first legislative district, is not part of
Wrong. The temporary closure of boracay as a tourist destination and the Province of Maguindanao.
the consequent ban of tourists into the island were not meant to serve
On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City
as penalty to violators of environmental laws. The liabilities of the
passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to “clarify the
violators remain and only they alone shall suffer the same. Other
status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of
government agencies are involved in the rehabilitation works.
Maguindanao into a regular province” under MMA Act 201.
Does this not create the inference that the powers and functions of the
Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted the recommendation of the
LGUs are being encroached upon?
COMELEC’s Law Department under a Memorandum dated 27 February
No. Because the respective roles of each government agency are 2007, provides in pertinent parts:
particularly defined and enumerated in executive order no. 5365 and all
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
are in accordance with their respective mandates.
resolves, to adopt the recommendation of the Law Department that
Also, the situation in Boracay can in no wise be characterized or labelled pending the enactment of the appropriate law by Congress, to maintain
as a mere local issue as to leave its rehabilitation to local actors. Boracay the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the
is a prime tourist destination which caters to both local and foreign First Legislative District of Maguindanao.
tourists. Any issue thereat has corresponding effects, direct or
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of
these petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the
legislative district in question as “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority
Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local
City).” legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However,
under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local
ISSUE:
legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject
(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to
and barangays, is constitutional; and provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create
barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the
(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM
criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite
Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article
requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However,
VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of
under the Local Government Code, “only x x x an Act of Congress” can
Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative
create provinces, cities or municipalities.
district for such province.
However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section
In G.R No. 177597 and G.R No. 178628, whether COMELEC Resolution
5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, “Each city with a population
No. 7902 is valid for maintaining the status quo in the first legislative
of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
district of Maguindanao (as “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato
least one representative” in the House of Representatives. Similarly,
City [formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City]”),
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, “Any
despite the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan out of such
province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population
district (excluding Cotabato City).
may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall
HELD: WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one
9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly Member x x x.”
of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district
provinces and cities. Thus, we declare VOID Muslim Mindanao
because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well
Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the
Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.
same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also
RATIO: The creation of any of the four local government units – be created without a legislative district.
province, city, municipality or barangay – must comply with three
This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create
conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow
or reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national
the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation
legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its
must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there
incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts
must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a
law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to statute — which cannot provide otherwise — nor by apportionment,
create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment.”
Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative
First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic Act No.
body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body.
4695 (RA 4695), creating the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province,
In view of certiorari and mandamus Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao and providing for congressional
representation in the old and new provinces, was unconstitutional for
The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of
“creating congressional districts without the apportionment provided in
discretion by “any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
the Constitution.”
judicial functions.” On the other hand, the writ of Mandamus will issue
to compel a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person to perform Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695 because (1)
an act “which the law specifically enjoins as a duty.” it validly created legislative districts “indirectly” through a special law
enacted by Congress creating a province and (2) the creation of the
In view of mootness
legislative districts will not result in breaching the maximum number of
There is also no merit in the claim that respondent Dilangalen’s legislative districts provided under the 1935 Constitution. Felwa does
proclamation as winner in the 14 May 2007 elections for representative not apply to the present case because in Felwa the new provinces were
of “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City” mooted this created by a national law enacted by Congress itself. Here, the new
petition. This case does not concern respondent Dilangalen’s election. province was created merely by a regional law enacted by the ARMM
Rather, it involves an inquiry into the validity of COMELEC Resolution Regional Assembly.
No. 7902, as well as the constitutionality of MMA Act 201 and Section
What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by
19, Article VI of RA 9054. Admittedly, the outcome of this petition, one
Congress does not emanate alone from Congress’ power to reapportion
way or another, determines whether the votes cast in Cotabato City for
legislative districts, but also from Congress’ power to create provinces
representative of the district of “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with
which cannot be created without a legislative district. Thus, when a
Cotabato City” will be included in the canvassing of ballots. However,
province is created, a legislative district is created by operation of the
this incidental consequence is no reason for us not to proceed with the
Constitution because the Constitution provides that “each province
resolution of the novel issues raised here. The Court’s ruling in these
shall have at least one representative” in the House of Representatives.
petitions affects not only the recently concluded elections but also all
the other succeeding elections for the office in question, as well as the Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative
power of the ARMM Regional Assembly to create in the future district to Shariff Kabunsuan upon its creation, this will leave Cotabato
additional provinces. City as the lone component of the first legislative district of
Maguindanao. However, Cotabato City cannot constitute a legislative
In view of the Felwa case
district by itself because as of the census taken in 2000, it had a
As further support for her stance, petitioner invokes the statement in population of only 163,849.
Felwa that “when a province is created by statute, the corresponding
representative district comes into existence neither by authority of that
Second. Sema’s theory also undermines the composition and During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint
independence of the House of Representatives. Under Section 19, Resolution No. 29. This Resolution reached the Senate. However, the
Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM Regional Assembly can create 12th Congress adjourned without the Senate approving Joint Resolution
provinces and cities within the ARMM with or without regard to the No. 29.
criteria fixed in Section 461 of RA 7160, namely: minimum annual
During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the
income of P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous territory of 2,000
unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed between November and
square kilometers or minimum population of 250,000. The following
December of 2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress,
scenarios thus become distinct possibilities:
individual cityhood bills containing a common provision, as follows:
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail
Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x shall be
over the Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the Constitution expressly
exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act
provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited
No. 9009.
“within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of the
Constitution and national laws, x x x.” The Preamble of the ARMM These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates from March to July
Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states that the ARMM Government is 2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them.
established “within the framework of the Constitution.” This follows
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws
Section 15, Article X of the Constitution which mandates that the ARMM
unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution,
“shall be created x x x within the framework of this Constitution and the
as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also
national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will
Philippines.”
reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment
League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set
aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
Facts: During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law RA 9009
amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the ISSUE: Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of
annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city the Constitution and the equal protection clause
from P20 million to P100 million to restrain the “mad rush” of
HELD: Yes, the Cityhood Laws violate both the Constitution and the
municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the
equal protection clause
Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of
fiscal independence. Ratio: Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Prior to its enactment, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided,
pending in Congress. Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills during merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in
the 11th Congress. accordance with the criteria established in the local government code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a
follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in municipality into a city from P20 million toP100 million. Section 450 of
any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not provide
Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government any exemption from the increased income requirement.
Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the
The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid
conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such
classification under the following conditions:
criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.
1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;
Section 450 of the Local Government Code provides:
2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A municipality or a cluster of
barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a locally 3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of
4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same
Finance, of at least One hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for
class.
the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if
it has either of the following requisites: Limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the
requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated.
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square
Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent
kilometers, as certified by the Land Management Bureau; or
municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in
inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office. the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the
The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and
equal protection clause.
income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less
than the minimum requirements prescribed herein. Navarro v. Ermita
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly FACTS: October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into
identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not law Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of
apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or Dinagat Islands).
more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two
December 3, 2006, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) conducted
(2) or more islands.
the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the province under the Local Government Code (LGC). The plebiscite
general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes. With the
income. approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del
Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat).
November 10, 2006, petitioners filed before this Court a petition for their legal interest in this case was not yet existent. They averred that
certiorari and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, they were unaware of the
9355. The Court dismissed the petition on technical grounds. Their proceedings in this case.
motion for reconsideration was also denied.
October 5, 2010, the Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment,
Undaunted, petitioners filed another petition for certiorari seeking to stating that the decision in this case had become final and executory on
nullify R.A. No. 9355 for being unconstitutional. They alleged that the May 18, 2010.
creation of Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate
ISSUE: Whether or not the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and
an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 valid.
Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal
Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area. They HELD: Yes, the Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of
pointed out that when the law was passed, Dinagat had a land area of Dinagat to become a full-fledged province, enacted R.A. No. 9355,
802.12 square kilometers only and a population of only 106,951, failing following the exemption from the land area requirement, which, with
to comply with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and of Section respect to the creation of provinces, can only be found as an express
461 of the LGC. provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative
powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in
May 12, 2010, movants-intervenors raised three (3) main arguments to
Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted
challenge the above Resolution, namely: (1) that the passage of R.A. No.
R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat.
9355 operates as an act of Congress amending Section 461 of the LGC;
(2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity, when the intended The land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local
province consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption from government unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot
the application of the minimum land area requirement; and (3) that the become a province, taking into account its average annual income of
Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the instant case. P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of
Local Government Finance, which is four times more than the minimum
July 20, 2010, the Court denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene and
requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The
to File and to Admit Intervenors’ Motion for Reconsideration of the
delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible
Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on the ground that the allowance or
and sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and
disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound
the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which
discretion of the Court, and that the appropriate time to file the said
cannot operate in favor of Dinagat’s existence as a province, they must
motion was before and not after the resolution of this case.
be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of
September 7, 2010, movants-intervenors filed a Motion for becoming a province. This Court should not be instrumental in stunting
Reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution, citing several rulings of such capacity.
the Court, allowing intervention as an exception to Section 2, Rule 19 of
Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A
the Rules of Court that it should be filed at any time before the rendition
statute must be read according to its spirit or intent, for what is within
of judgment. They alleged that, prior to the May 10, 2010 elections,
the spirit is within the statute although it is not within its letter, and that 2. Does the court has jurisdiction over the issue, or is it a political
which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the question? – YES.
statute. Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of the
3. Is RA 8528 constitutional? – NO.
lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter, and that
which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless RATIO:
within the intent of the lawmakers. Withal, courts ought not to interpret
1. On standing: The petitioners have standing with regards to the issue,
and should not accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent of
because they sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The
the law and its legislators.
mayor, Mr. Miranda, will now be under administrative supervision of
Miranda v. Aguirre the Provincial Governor. All the mayor’s executive orders are to be
reviewed. His powers as mayor are to be limited by the act. The other
FACTS: On May 5, 1994, Congress enacted RA 7720, which converted
petitioners are to sustain direct injury as well. As residents and voters in
the municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an independent component
the city of Santiago, their right to be heard in the conversation of their
city. On July 4, 1994, the people of Santiago ratified the act in a
city is to be trampled by not holding a plebiscite with regards to the
plebiscite
issue.
Years later, Congress again passed RA 9528, converting the city of
2. On the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction: Under Sec 1 Art VIII of the 1987
Santiago, Isabela from an independent component city, to a component
Constitution, it is the duty of the court to settle controversies regarding
city.
department’s use of discretion amounting to abuse of jurisdiction.
Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ
3. On the constitutionality of RA 8528: The changes that will result in
preliminary injunction assailing the constitutionality of RA 8528. They
the downgrading of Santiago City from being an independent
argued that there is no provision for ratification by the people of
component city, to a component city cannot be characterized as
Santiago in a proper plebiscite.
insubstantial: taxes collected from the city will be shared with the
Respondents assailed the standing of the petitioners, and contended province, resolutions and ordinances will have to be reviewed by
that the petition raises a political question, which the Court has no Provincial Board, City Government’s share will be diluted since certain
jurisdiction over. portions will accrue to the Provincial Government. Downgrading it,
without the involvement of the people, will run against the spirit of Sec
Solicitor General commented in favor of respondents saying that RA
10 Art X of the 1987 Constitution.
8528 was a mere reclassification, and does not “involve any creation
division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of Having significant changes introduced to the political and social climate
local government units” and therefore, a plebiscite is not needed. of the province would need a plebiscite for it to push through, according
to Rule II Art 6 Par F1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
ISSUES:
Local Government Code, because that gravity of changes already
1. Do the petitioners have standing in raising the constitutionality of RA amount to a ‘conversion’. Even the principal author of the Local
8528? – YES.
Government Code of 1991 agrees that the plebiscite is absolute and ISSUE: Was RA 8535 unconstitutional? NO.
mandatory, since it promotes autonomy to the local government units.
There is a presumption of constitutionality in favor of a statute. One
Samson v. Aguirre who attacks a statute must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable
doubt. Samson has failed to discharge the burden.
SUMMARY: Samson, a councilor in Quezon City, assailed RA 8535 which
created the City of Novaliches. According to him, the RA failed to Samson did not present any proof, only allegations that no certifications
conform to the requirements of the LGC as to certifications in income, were submitted to the House Committee on Local Government—as
population, and land area. It has not been proved that the mother city such certifications attesting compliance with the LGC and its IRR is
would not suffer adverse effects from the creation of Novaliches. Court required. Allegations cannot substitute for proof. The presumption
held against him. The presence and oral declarations of the government stands that the law passed by Congress complied with all the requisites.
officials armed with records during the public deliberations and
a. The representative from the Bureau of Local Government Finance
hearings are more effective certifications than mere certificates which
estimated the combined average annual income of the 13 barangays for
are routinely signed. The representatives all declared that Novaliches
2 years to be around P27M. Under the Local Government Code, a
exceeded the requirements. The QC mayor was also present, and his
proposed city must have an average annual income of only at least
conformity implies that there is no damage done to QC. The non-receipt
P20,000,000.00 for the immediately preceding two years.
of copies is too insubstantial to sustain invalidity of a statute. Samson
failed to overturn the presumption of constitutionality accorded b. The representative from the NSO estimated the population in the
legislative acts. barangays that would comprise the proposed City of Novaliches to be
around 350,000. This figure is more than the 150,000 required by the
FACTS: President Ramos signed into law RA 8535, creating the City of
Implementing Rules.
Novaliches out of 15 barangays of Quezon City. Samson, incumbent
councilor of the first district of Quezon City, challenged the c. There is no need to consider the land area, given these figures, since
constitutionality of the RA. He sought to enjoin its implementation, under the Local Government Code, the proposed city must comply with
holding of the plebiscite, and disbursement of funds as RA 8535 failed requirements as regards income and population or land area. Other
to conform to the criteria in the LGC as to income, population, land area, than the income requirement, the proposed city must have the
seat of government, having no adverse effect to its mother city, and requisite number of inhabitants or land area. Compliance with either
furnishing a copy of the barangay resolution. Also, he said the law would requirement, in addition to income, is sufficient. Judicial notice may
amend the Constitution. also be taken that Novaliches is now highly urbanized.
In answer, the respondents claimed Samson failed to substantiate said 2. Samson averred that oral manifestations are not enough certification.
allegations with convincing proof. He had the burden of proof to But in the hearings, the DBM, DILG, and Finance Officials were present
overcome the legal presumption that Congress considered all the legal along with other officers armed with official statistics and reference
requirements under the Local Government Code of 1991 in passing R.A. materials. In their official capacity, they spoke and shed light on
8535. Further, there is no document supporting the unconstitutionality population, land area and income of the proposed city. Their official
claim. statements could serve the same purpose contemplated by law
requiring certificates. Their affirmation as well as their oath as inform the City Council of the move to create another city and to enable
witnesses in open session of either the Senate or the House of it to formulate its comments and recommendations on said petition.
Representatives give even greater solemnity than a certification The Quezon City Council members are obviously aware of the petition.
submitted to either chamber routinely. The matter has been widely publicized in the mass media. Surely
members of the Council could not now be heard to claim they have not
3. Samson failed to show that the representatives did not also submit
known of the contents of the barangays’ petition to create the City of
written certifications. Under the IRR, written certifications are required
Novaliches.
to be attached to the petition for the creation of a city, to be submitted
by interested municipalities or barangays to Congress in the form of a The proposed creation of the City of Novaliches will in no way result in
resolution. Samson did not present a copy to prove that it was without a prohibited amendment of the Constitution. The ordinance appended
the written certifications attached as required by law. It is presumed to the Constitution merely apportions the seats of the House of
that these requirements were met appropriately in the passage of the Representatives to the different legislative districts in the country.
assailed legislative act. Nowhere does it provide that Metro Manila shall forever be composed
of only 17 cities and municipalities as claimed by petitioner. Too literal
Samson argued that the RA failed to specify the seat of government of
a reading of the ordinance in or appendix of the Constitution will only
the proposed City of Novaliches as required. However, this omission is
result in its erroneous interpretation.
not as fatal to the validity. Under Section 12 of the Local Government
Code, the City of Novaliches can still establish a seat of government Alvarez v. Guingona
after its creation. While Section 12 speaks of the site of government
FACTS: On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled “An Act Converting the
centers, such site can very well also be the seat of government, “from
Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be
where governmental and corporate service shall be delivered.”
known as the City of Santiago,” was filed in the House of
Samson failed to present any concrete evidence on the adverse effect Representatives. Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill
to Quezon City. Quezon City Mayor Mathay was present during the No. 1243, was filed in the Senate. On March 22, 1994, the House of
deliberations and made no mention of anything concerning such. As Representatives, upon being apprised of the action of the Senate,
chief executive, he would be the first person to protest any approved the amendments proposed by the Senate.
development that might prove detrimental to Quezon City. This is
ISSUE: Does the passing of SB No. 1243, the Senate’s own version of HB
indicative of the non-existence of such negative issues. Moreover, in
No. 8817, into Republic Act No. 7720 be said to have originated in the
the plebiscite, all persons concerned will obviously have the opportunity
House of Representatives as required?
to raise those issues even before they vote on the principal question of
the cityhood of Novaliches. HELD: Yes. Although a bill of local application should originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim of petitioners that
That the Quezon City Council was not furnished a copy of the petition
Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate exclusively in the House of
of concerned barangays calling for the creation of the City of
Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was
Novaliches, if true, will also not render invalid the RA. The evident
passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB
purpose of this requirement, found in the Implementing Rules, is to
No. 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB No. these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a
1243 was filed in the Senate. hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or
controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano)
The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt
are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they
of the bill from the House, does not contravene the constitutional
hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which
requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House
this Court has no jurisdiction.
of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon
until it receives the House bill. Cawaling Jr. v. COMELEC
Mariano v. COMELEC FACTS: Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8806 which created the City of
FACTS: This is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief filed by
Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto.
petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay,
Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law
Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the R.A. No. 8806, an "Act Creating the City of Sorsogon By Merging The
petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And
residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, Appropriating Funds Therefor." The COMELEC a plebiscite in the
they assail sections 2, 51, and 52 of Republic Act No. 7854 as Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for
unconstitutional. ratification proclaimed the creation of the City of Sorsogon as having
been ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to
plebiscite.
challenge the constitutionality of one of the questioned sections of R.A.
No. 7854. Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer, the petitioner filed the
present petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the plebiscite
HELD: The requirements before a litigant can challenge the
on the following grounds:
constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be
an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the
be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be required 120-day period from the approval of R.A. 8806, in violation of
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the Section 54 thereof; and
constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the
B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of
case itself.
twenty (20) day extensive information campaign in the Municipalities of
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The Bacon and Sorsogon before conducting the plebiscite.
petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e.,
Petitioner instituted another petition declaring enjoin R.A. No. 8806
that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that
unconstitutional, contending, in essence, that:
he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-
election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that
1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates such merger or division shall comply with the requirements prescribed
Section 450(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (in relation to by the Code.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which requires that only "a
(2) This argument goes into the wisdom of R.A. No. 8806, a matter which
municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a
we are not competent to rule. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, this
component city"; and
Court, made it clear that "the judiciary does not pass upon questions of
2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation." In the exercise of judicial
the City of Sorsogon and the (b) abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon power, we are allowed only "to settle actual controversies involving
and Sorsogon, thereby violating the "one subject-one bill" rule rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," and "may not
prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution. annul an act of the political departments simply because we feel it is
unwise or impractical.”
Petitioner contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a
component city may be created only by converting "a municipality or a 3) No. There is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that is,
cluster of barangays," not by merging two municipalities, as what R.A. the creation of the City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the
No. 8806 has done. corporate existence of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to
their merger is not a subject separate and distinct from the creation of
ISSUE: (1) WON a component city may be created by merging two
Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and
municipalities.
inevitable consequence of the merger. The rule is sufficiently complied
(2) WON there exist a "compelling" reason for merging the with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in order to create the City of object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the
Sorsogon persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences
of the proposed law and its operation.
(3) WON R.A. No. 8806 violate the "one subject-one bill" rule
enunciated in Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution (4) No. Every statute has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of
(4) WON R.A No 8806 is unconstitutional
separation of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate
HELD: Yes. Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's
is erroneous. The phrase "A municipality or a cluster of barangays may acts. The theory is that every law, being the joint act of the Legislature
be converted into a component city" is not a criterion but simply one of and the Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to ensure that it is in
the modes by which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X of the accord with the fundamental law. This Court, however, may declare a
Constitution allows the merger of local government units to create a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown
province city, municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a
established by the Code. the creation of an entirely new local doubtful or argumentative one. In other words the grounds for nullity
government unit through a division or a merger of existing local must be beyond reasonable doubt, for to doubt is to sustain. We hold
government units is recognized under the Constitution, provided that
that petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat HELD: It was ruled that the said Act is constitutional. The plain and clear
the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. No. 8806. distinction between a city and a province was explained under the
second sentence of Section 5 (3) of the Constitution. It states that a
Aquino v. COMELEC
province is entitled into a representative, with nothing was mentioned
FACTS: The said case was filed by the petitioners by way of a Petition for about a population. While in cities, a minimum population of 250,000
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was must first be satisfied. In 2007, CamSur had a population of 1,693,821
addressed to nullify and declared as unconstitutional, R.A. 9716 entitled making the province entitled to two additional districts from the
“An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second present of four. Based on the formulation of Ordinance, other than
Legislative Districts (2nd) in the province of Camarines Sur and Thereby population, the results of the apportionment were valid. And lastly,
Creating a New Legislative District from such Reapportionment.” other factors were mentioned during the deliberations of House Bill No.
4264.
Said Act originated from House Bill No. 4264, and it was enacted by
President Macapagal-Arroyo. Effectuating the act, it has divided the Tan v. COMELEC
existing four districts, and apportioned districts shall form additional
FACTS: This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa
district where the new first district shall be composed of 176,383
Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be
population count.
known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment runs afoul of the explicit (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava,
constitutional standard with a minimum population of 250,000 for the Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and
creation of a legislative district under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Salvador Benedicto proposed to belong to the new province).
Constitution. It was emphasized as well by the petitioners that if
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled
population is less than that provided by the Constitution, it must be
a plebiscite for January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for
stricken-down for non-compliance with the minimum population
Prohibition and contending that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not
requirement, unless otherwise fixed by law.
in complete accord with the Local Government Code because:
Respondents have argued that the petitioners are guilty of two fatal
The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than
technical effects: first, error in choosing to assail R.A. 9716 via the
those living within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte,
Remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
were not included in the plebiscite.
Court. And second, petitioners have no locus standi to question the
constitutionality of R.A. 9716. The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte
would only be about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum
ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act No. 9716 is unconstitutional and
area prescribed by the governing statute, Sec. 197 of LGC.
therefore null and void, or whether or not a population of 250,000 is an
indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new ISSUE: WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the
legislative district in a province. constitutional requisites of the Constitution, which states that — “Sec.
3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in POLICE POWER/ GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE
accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code,
Dela Cruz v. Paras
and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in
the unit or units affected”? NO. FACTS: Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They
assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition
HELD: Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is
and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the
substantial alteration of the boundaries, “the approval of a majority of
said Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the
votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected” must first be
said ordinance would close out their business. That the hospitality girls
obtained. The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del
they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with
Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration of the existing
customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against
boundaries of Negros Occidental (parent province).
Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be is pursuant to RA 938 which reads “AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR
affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE
because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES
affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL
the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del JURISDICTIONS”. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of
Norte. police power to promote general welfare. Dela Cruz then appealed
citing that they were deprived of due process.
Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a
doctrinal or compelling precedent. Rather, the dissenting view of Justice ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can,
Abad Santos is applicable, to wit: prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and
the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses
“…when the Constitution speaks of “the unit or units affected” it means
pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.
all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided
such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or more municipalities HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then
if there be a merger.” regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would
pass the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant
The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area
with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as
affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent
well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said
province, not to mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer,
that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could
eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners.”
qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public
SC pronounced that the plebiscite has no legal effect for being a patent morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that
nullity. does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face
is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved
could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an
absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations.
should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets. Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be
a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the
Binay v. Domingo
repository of the inherent powers of the State.
FACTS: Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved
Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare
Resolution No. 60 which extends P500 burial assistance to bereaved
clause. Pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such
families whose gross family income does not exceed P2,000.00 a
ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out
month. The funds are to be taken out of the unappropriated available
and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as
funds in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila Commission
shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort
approved the resolution. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a
and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals,
disbursement of P400,000.00 for the implementation of the program.
promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the
However, the Commission on Audit disapproved said resolution and the
inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein.
disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof for the following
reasons: (1) the resolution has no connection to alleged public safety, 2. Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been,
general welfare, safety, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati; (2) purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all
government funds must be disbursed for public purposes only; and, (3) comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet the exigencies
it violates the equal protection clause since it will only benefit a few of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done,
individuals. provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.
ISSUES:
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said
1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police power
to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for
under the general welfare clause
the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and
2. Whether the questioned resolution is for a public purpose convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to
all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation
3. Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause
and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide
HELD: scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever
affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the
1. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of
community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with
sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded
conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare
largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus
of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity,
populi est suprema lex. Its fundamental purpose is securing the general
and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the
welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.
inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to
attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan also enacted a resolution that
limits of police power. prohibits the catching, gathering, buying, selling and possessing and
shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for a period of
Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally
5 years within the Palawan waters. The petitiones Airline Shippers
benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the
Association of Palawan together with marine merchants were charged
Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare
for violating the above ordinance and resolution by the city and
legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social
provincial governments. The petitioners now allege that they have the
services, the promotion of the general welfare, social justice as well as
preferential rights as marginal fishermen granted with privileges
human dignity and respect for human rights." The care for the poor is
provided in Section 149 of the Local Government Code, invoking the
generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long
invalidity of the above-stated enactments as violative of their
been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the
preferential rights.
common good.
ISSUE: Whether or not the enacted resolutions and ordinances by the
3. There is no violation of the equal protection clause. Paupers may be
local government units violative of the preferential rights of the
reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment.
marginal fishermen?
Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is
the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving HELD: No, the enacted resolution and ordinance of the LGU were not
rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer violative of their preferential rights. The enactment of these laws was a
from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc. Resolution valid exercise of the police power of the LGU to protect public interests
No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of and the public right to a balanced and healthier ecology. The rights and
Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government privileges invoked by the petitioners are not absolute. The general
towards social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of welfare clause of the local government code mandates for the liberal
pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family is a interpretation in giving the LGUs more power to accelerate economic
painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially development and to upgrade the life of the people in the community.
burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of The LGUs are endowed with the power to enact fishery laws in its
the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should municipal waters which necessarily includes the enactment of
have more in law." This decision, however must not be taken as a ordinances in order to effectively carry out the enforcement of fishery
precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to laws in their local community.
embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives
White Light Corp. v. City of Manila
political or otherwise.
FACTS: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law
Tano v. Socrates
Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting
FACTS: The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princessa enacted Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate
ordinance no. 15-92 banning the shipment of live fish and lobster Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and
outside Puerto Princessa City for a period of 5 years. In the same light, Similar Establishments in the City of Manila” (the Ordinance).” The
ordinance sanctions any person or corporation who will allow the exercise of police power; and it is unreasonable and oppressive
admission and charging of room rates for less than 12 hours or the interference in their business.
renting of rooms more than twice a day.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the
The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation constitutionality of the ordinance. First, it held that the ordinance did
(TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC), who not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only
own and operate several hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit
motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of
on the ground that the ordinance will affect their business interests as police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained
operators. The respondents, in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the ordinance is
legitimate exercise of police power. satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful
method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the
RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it “strikes at the
adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its
personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by
constituents in general.
the Constitution.” Reference was made to the provisions of the
Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.
needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic
ISSUE: Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power
enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships
of the State.
the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated
by simply paying for a 12-hour stay, HELD: No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise
of police power, and as such, it is unconstitutional.
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a
valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of
Local Government Code which confers on cities the power to regulate Manila v Laguio Jr ruling, but the 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel
the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila.
beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at
other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. bar goes beyond the singularity of the localities covered under the
Also, they contended that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter, respective ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a view
they have the power to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and of regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in transient
proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle case,
and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services
convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants and to offered by these establishments have been severely restricted. At its
fix penalties for the violation of ordinances. core, this is another case about the extent to which the State can
intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens
Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since
it violates the right to privacy and freedom of movement; it is an invalid
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice
including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it Malcolm to include “the right to exist and the right to be free from
must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere
unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is
must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which
not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as
or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not are necessary for the common welfare,
prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized
public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
and the invasion of it should be justified by a compelling state interest.
The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business Jurisprudence accorded recognition to the right to privacy
practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully
than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should
power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.
Code through such implements as the general welfare clause.
An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with
corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Police power has another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the ordinance as a
been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the
interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably
use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly
oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other
fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability
alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of
of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement.
private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must
Those means must align with the Constitution.
exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed
SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the
ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property
petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
by the law that they were capacitated to act upon is the injury to
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be
property sustained by the petitioners. Yet, they also recognized the
struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of
their patrons – those persons who would be deprived of availing short The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already
time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question. prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing
The rights at stake herein fell within the same fundamental rights to laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of
prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more However, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE)
effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil
existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. companies in which they agreed that “the scaling down of the Pandacan
These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option.” In the MOU,
petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the oil companies were required to remove 28 tanks starting with the
the ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole LPG spheres and to commence work for the creation of safety buffer
day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. and green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. In exchange, the
Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect “wash rates” City Mayor and the DOE will enable the oil companies to continuously
from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for operate within the limited area resulting from joint operations and the
motel rooms and even apartments. scale down program. The Sangguniang Panlungosod ratified the MOU
in Resolution No. 97.
SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the
extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public Petitioners pray for a mandamus to be issued against Mayor Atienza to
interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the
restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. terminals of the oil companies.
However well¬-intentioned the ordinance may be, it is in effect an
ISSUE: Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce
arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments
Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals.
as well as their patrons. The ordinance needlessly restrains the
operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the RULING: Yes. The mayor has the mandatory legal duty to enforce
rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The ordinance Ordinance No. 8027 because the Local Government Code imposes upon
rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a respondent the duty, as city mayor, to “enforce all laws and ordinances
day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions. relative to the governance of the city.” One of these is Ordinance No.
8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.
Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the
Social Justice Society v. Atienza Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his
ministerial duty to do so.
FACTS: Ordinance No. 8027 enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod
of Manila reclassified the area from industrial to commercial and In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., it provides that officers cannot refuse to
directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed to cease perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute
and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the imposing the duty. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public
date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question
the area are the so-called “Pandacan Terminals” of the oil companies the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon
Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional.
Petroleum Corporation.
SJS officers v. Lim
FACTS: On 12 October 2001, a Memorandum of Agreement was of manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in
entered into by oil companies (Chevron, Petron and Shell) and case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals.
Department of Energy for the creation of a Master Plan to address and
The oil companies filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) on the 7
minimize the potential risks and hazards posed by the proximity of
March 2007 Decision. The SC later resolved that Ordinance No. 8027 is
communities, business and offices to Pandacan oil terminals without
constitutional and that it was not impliedly repealed by Ordinance No.
affecting security and reliability of supply and distribution of petroleum
8119 as there is no irreconcilable conflict between them.
products.
SC later on denied with finality the second MR of the oil companies.
On 20 November 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) enacted
Ordinance No. 8027 which reclassifies the land use of Pandacan, Sta. On 14 May 2009, during the incumbency of Mayor Alfredo Lim (Mayor
Ana, and its adjoining areas from Industrial II to Commercial I. Lim), the SP enacted Ordinance No. 8187. The Industrial Zone under
Ordinance No. 8119 was limited to Light Industrial Zone, Ordinance No.
Owners and operators of the businesses affected by the reclassification
8187 appended to the list a Medium and a Heavy Industrial Zone where
were given six (6) months from the date of effectivity to stop the
petroleum refineries and oil depots are expressly allowed.
operation of their businesses. It was later extended until 30 April 2003.
Petitioners Social Justice Society Officers, Mayor Atienza, et.al. filed a
On 4 December 2002, a petition for mandamus was filed before the
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the validity of Ordinance
Supreme Court (SC) to enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
No. 8187. Their contentions are as follows:
Unknown to the SC, the oil companies filed before the Regional Trial
It is an invalid exercise of police power because it does not promote the
Court of Manila an action to annul Ordinance No. 8027 with application
general welfare of the people
for writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary
mandatory injunction. The same was issued in favor of Chevron and It is violative of Section 15 and 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution as
Shell. Petron, on the other hand, obtained a status quo on 4 August well as health and environment related municipal laws and
2004. international conventions and treaties, such as: Clean Air Act;
Environment Code; Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law; Civil Code
On 16 June 2006, Mayor Jose Atienza, Jr. approved Ordinance No. 8119
provisions on nuisance and human relations; Universal Declaration of
entitled “An Ordinance Adopting the Manila Comprehensive Land Use
Human Rights; and Convention on the Rights of the Child
Plan and Zoning Regulations of 2006 and Providing for the
Administration, Enforcement and Amendment thereto”. This The title of Ordinance No. 8187 purports to amend or repeal Ordinance
designates Pandacan oil depot area as a Planned Unit No. 8119 when it actually intends to repeal Ordinance No. 8027
Development/Overlay Zone.
On the other hand, the respondents Mayor Lim, et.al. and the
On 7 March 2007, the SC granted the petition for mandamus and intervenors oil companies contend that:
directed Mayor Atienza to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027. It
The petitioners have no legal standing to sue whether as citizens,
declared that the objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents
taxpayers or legislators. They further failed to show that they have
suffered any injury or threat of injury as a result of the act complained the Sanggunian reclassified the area defined in the ordinance from
of industrial to commercial.
The petition should be dismissed outright for failure to properly apply The following facts were found by the Committee on Housing,
the related provisions of the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and/or the Resettlement and Urban Development of the City of Manila which
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases relative to the appropriate recommended the approval of the ordinance:
remedy available
(1) The depot facilities contained 313.5 million liters of highly
The principle of the hierarchy of courts is violated because the SC only flammable and highly volatile products which include petroleum gas,
exercises appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the constitutionality liquefied petroleum gas, aviation fuel, diesel, gasoline, kerosene and
or validity of an ordinance under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 fuel oil among others;
Constitution
(2) The depot is open to attack through land, water and air;
It is the function of the SP to enact zoning ordinance without prior
(3) It is situated in a densely populated place and near Malacañang
referral to the Manila Zoning Board of Adjustment and Appeals; thus, it
Palace; and
may repeal all or part of zoning ordinance sought to be modified
(4) In case of an explosion or conflagration in the depot, the fire
There is a valid exercise of police power
could spread to the neighboring communities.
On 28 August 2012, the SP enacted Ordinance No. 8283 which
The Ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and
essentially amended the assailed Ordinance to exclude the area where
safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and not just of a particular class.
petroleum refineries and oil depots are located from the Industrial
The depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a representation of
Zone. The same was vetoed by Mayor Lim.
western interests which means that it is a terrorist target. As long as
ISSUES: WON Ordinance No. 8187 is unconstitutional in relation to the there is such a target in their midst, the residents of Manila are not safe.
Pandacan Terminals It therefore becomes necessary to remove these terminals to dissipate
the threat.”
RULING: Yes. In striking down the contrary provisions of the assailed
Ordinance relative to the continued stay of the oil depots, the SC The same best interest of the public guides the present decision. The
followed the same line of reasoning used in its 7 March 2007 decision, Pandacan oil depot remains a terrorist target even if the contents have
to wit been lessened. In the absence of any convincing reason to persuade the
Court that the life, security and safety of the inhabitants of Manila are
“Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted for the purpose of promoting a sound
no longer put at risk by the presence of the oil depots, the SC holds that
urban planning, ensuring health, public safety and general welfare of
the Ordinance No. 8187 in relation to the Pandacan Terminals is invalid
the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to take measures
and unconstitutional.
to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case
of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective, For, given that the threat sought to be prevented may strike at one
point or another, no matter how remote it is as perceived by one or
some, the SC cannot allow the right to life be dependent on the At the instance of MIAA, the OGCC issued Opinion No. 147
unlikelihood of an event. Statistics and theories of probability have no clarifying Opinion No. 061, pointing out that Sec. 206 of the LGC
place in situations where the very life of not just an individual but of requires persons exempt from real estate tax to show proof of
residents of big neighborhoods is at stake. exemption. According to the OGCC, Sec. 21 of the MIAA Charter is the
proof that MIAA is exempt from real estate tax. MIAA, thus, filed a
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to restrain the City of
1. Ordinance No. 8187 is declared unconstitutional and invalid Parañaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying against, and
with respect to the continued stay of the Pandacan Oil Terminals. auctioning for public sale the airport lands and buildings, but this was
dismissed for having been filed out of time.
2. The incumbent mayor of the City of Manila is ordered to cease
and desist from enforcing Ordinance No. 8187 and to oversee the Hence, MIAA filed this petition for review, pointing out that it is
relocation and transfer of the oil terminals out of the Pandacan area exempt from real estate tax under Sec. 21 of its charter and Sec. 234 of
the LGC. It invokes the principle that the government cannot tax itself
3. The oil companies shall, within a non-extendible period of forty-
as a justification for exemption, since the airport lands and buildings,
five (45) days, submit to the RTC Manila, Branch 39 an updated
being devoted to public use and public service, are owned by the
comprehensive plan and relocation schedule, which relocation shall be
Republic of the Philippines. On the other hand, the City of Parañaque
completed not later than six (6) months from the date the required
invokes Sec. 193 of the LGC, which expressly withdrew the tax
document is submitted.
exemption privileges of government-owned and controlled
TAXING POWER corporations (GOCC) upon the effectivity of the LGC.

MIAA v. Court of Appeals It asserts that an international airport is not among the
exceptions mentioned in the said law. Meanwhile, the City of Parañaque
Facts: The Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the
posted and published notices announcing the public auction sale of the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Complex in Parañaque City
airport lands and buildings. In the afternoon before the scheduled
under Executive Order No. 903 (MIAA Charter), as amended. As such
public auction, MIAA applied with the Court for the issuance of a TRO
operator, it administers the land, improvements and equipment within
to restrain the auction sale. The Court issued a TRO on the day of the
the NAIA Complex. In March 1997, the Office of the Government
auction sale, however, the same was received only by the City of
Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued Opinion No. 061 to the effect that the
Parañaque three hours after the sale.
Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC) withdrew the exemption from
real estate tax granted to MIAA under Section 21 of its Charter. Issue: Whether or not the airport lands and buildings of MIAA are
exempt from real estate tax?
Thus, MIAA paid some of the real estate tax already due. In June
2001, it received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the Held: The airport lands and buildings of MIAA are exempt from real
City of Parañaque for the taxable years 1992 to 2001. The City Treasurer estate tax imposed by local governments. Sec. 243(a) of the LGC
subsequently issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the airport exempts from real estate tax any real property owned by the Republic
lands and buildings. of the Philippines. This exemption should be read in relation with Sec.
133(o) of the LGC, which provides that the exercise of the taxing powers MCIAA enjoyed the privilege of exemption from payment of realty taxes
of local governments shall not extend to the levy of taxes, fees or in accordance with Section 14 of its Charter. However on 11 October
charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and 1994, the Office of the Treasurer of Cebu, demanded for the payment
instrumentalities. of realty taxes on several parcels of land belonging to the petitioner.
These provisions recognize the basic principle that local Petitioner objected to such demand for payment as baseless and
governments cannot tax the national government, which historically unjustified and asserted that it is an instrumentality of the government
merely delegated to local governments the power to tax. performing governmental functions, which puts limitations on the
taxing powers of local government units.
The rule is that a tax is never presumed and there must be clear
language in the law imposing the tax. This rule applies with greater force The City refused to cancel and set aside petitioner’s realty tax account,
when local governments seek to tax national government insisting that the MCIAA is a government controlled corporation whose
instrumentalities. Moreover, a tax exemption is construed liberally in tax exemption privilege has been withdrawn by virtue of Sections 193
favor of national government instrumentalities. and 234 of the Local Government Code (LGC), and not an
instrumentality of the government but merely a government owned
MIAA is not a GOCC, but an instrumentality of the government.
corporation performing proprietary functions. MCIAA paid its tax
The Republic remains the beneficial owner of the properties. account “under protest” when City is about to issue a warrant of levy
MIAA itself is owned solely by the Republic. At any time, the President against the MCIAA’s properties.
can transfer back to the Republic title to the airport lands and buildings
MCIAA filed a Petition of Declaratory Relief with the RTC contending
without the Republic paying MIAA any consideration. As long as the
that the taxing power of local government units do not extend to the
airport lands and buildings are reserved for public use, their ownership
levy of taxes or fees on an instrumentality of the national government.
remains with the State. Unless the President issues a proclamation
It contends that by the nature of its powers and functions, it has the
withdrawing these properties from public use, they remain properties
footing of an agency or instrumentality of the national government;
of public dominion. As such, they are inalienable, hence, they are not
which claim the City rejects. The trial court dismissed the petition, citing
subject to levy on execution or foreclosure sale, and they are exempt
that close reading of the LGC provides the express cancellation and
from real estate tax.
withdrawal of tax exemptions of Government Owned and Controlled
However, portions of the airport lands and buildings that MIAA Corporations.
leases to private entities are not exempt from real estate tax. In such a
ISSUE: Whether the MCIAA is exempted from realty taxes.
case, MIAA has granted the beneficial use of such portions for a
consideration to a taxable person. RULING: Tax statutes are construed strictly against the government and
liberally in favor of the taxpayer. But since taxes are paid for civilized
MCIAA vs. MARCOS
society, or are the lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns against
FACTS: Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was exemptions from taxation and statutes granting tax exemptions are
created by virtue of Republic Act 6958. Since the time of its creation,
thus construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in FACTS: Respondent Bayan Telecommunications, Inc. (Bayantel) is a
favor of the taxing authority. legislative franchise holder under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3259 (1961) to
establish and operate radio stations for domestic telecommunications,
A claim of exemption from tax payments must be clearly shown and
radiophone, broadcasting and telecasting. Section 14 (a) of R.A. No.
based on language in the law too plain to be mistaken. Taxation is the
3259 states: “The grantee shall be liable to pay the same taxes on its
rule, exemption therefrom is the exception. However, if the grantee of
real estate, buildings and personal property, exclusive of the franchise,
the exemption is a political subdivision or instrumentality, the rigid rule
xxx”. In 1992, R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the “Local
of construction does not apply because the practical effect of the
Government Code of 1991” (LGC) took effect. Section 232 of the Code
exemption is merely to reduce the amount of money that has to be
grants local government units within the Metro Manila Area the power
handled by the government in the course of its operations.
to levy tax on real properties. Barely few months after the LGC took
Further, since taxation is the rule and exemption therefrom the effect, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7633, amending Bayantel’s original
exception, the exemption may be withdrawn at the pleasure of the franchise. The Section 11 of the amendatory contained the following tax
taxing authority. The only exception to this rule is where the exemption provision: “The grantee, its successors or assigns shall be liable to pay
was granted to private parties based on material consideration of a the same taxes on their real estate, buildings and personal property,
mutual nature, which then becomes contractual and is thus covered by exclusive of this franchise, xxx“. In 1993, the government of Quezon City
the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. enacted an ordinance otherwise known as the Quezon City Revenue
Code withdrawing tax exemption privileges.
MCIAA is a “taxable person” under its Charter (RA 6958), and was only
exempted from the payment of real property taxes. The grant of the ISSUE: Whether or not Bayantel’s real properties in Quezon City are
privilege only in respect of this tax is conclusive proof of the legislative exempt from real property taxes under its franchise.
intent to make it a taxable person subject to all taxes, except real
RULING: YES. A clash between the inherent taxing power of the
property tax.
legislature, which necessarily includes the power to exempt, and the
Since Republic Act 7160 or the Local Government Code (LGC) expressly local government’s delegated power to tax under the aegis of the 1987
provides that “All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees Constitution must be ruled in favor of the former. The grant of taxing
[sic], executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or powers to LGUs under the Constitution and the LGC does not affect the
part of parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions power of Congress to grant exemptions to certain persons, pursuant to
of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.” a declared national policy. The legal effect of the constitutional grant to
local governments simply means that in interpreting statutory
With that repealing clause in the LGC, the tax exemption provided for
provisions on municipal taxing powers, doubts must be resolved in favor
in RA 6958 had been expressly repealed by the provisions of the LGC.
of municipal corporations.
Therefore, MCIAA has to pay the assessed realty tax of its properties
effective after January 1, 1992 until the present. The legislative intent expressed in the phrase “exclusive of this
franchise” cannot be construed other than distinguishing between two
City Government of Quezon City v. Bayan Telecommunications, Inc.
(2) sets of properties, be they real or personal, owned by the franchisee,
namely, (a) those actually, directly and exclusively used in its radio or ISSUE: WON the lower court has jurisdiction to consider the
telecommunications business, and (b) those properties which are not constitutionality of Sec 187 of the LGC
so used. It is worthy to note that the properties subject of the present
HELD: Yes. BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all
controversy are only those which are admittedly falling under the first
civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
category.
estimation. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests
Since R. A. No. 7633 was enacted subsequent to the LGC, perfectly in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and
aware that the LGC has already withdrawn Bayantel’s former exemption orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or
from realty taxes, the Congress using, Section 11 thereof with exactly validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
the same defining phrase “exclusive of this franchise” is the basis for presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
Bayantel’s exemption from realty taxes prior to the LGC. In plain regulation is in question.
language, the Court views this subsequent piece of legislation as an
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with
express and real intention on the part of Congress to once again remove
the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a
from the LGC’s delegated taxing power, all of the franchisee’s
declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than
(Bayantel’s) properties that are actually, directly and exclusively used in
on the doctrine of separation of powers. It is also emphasized that
the pursuit of its franchise.
every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a
Drilon v. Lim purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the
theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and
FACTS: The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section
the legislative departments and determined by them to be in
187 of the Local Government Code . The Secretary of Justice (on appeal
accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally approved. To
to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No.
doubt is to sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be
7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-compliance with the
overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an
procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain
infraction of the Constitution.
provisions contrary to law and public policy.
ISSUE: WON Section 187 of the LGC is unconstitutional
The RTC revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained the
ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional because it HELD: Yes. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only
vests on the Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation of the the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted,
policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution. The Secretary to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or
argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to
procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government
specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been observed. that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila
(Petition originally dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what
certified true copy of the decision, but reinstated it anyway.) the Code should be.. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he
did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were
performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the No written notices of public hearing, no publication of the ordinance,
prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant no minutes of public hearing, no posting, no translation into Tagalog)
of powers to the city government under the Local Government Code.
Judge Palattao however found that all the procedural requirements had
As we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere supervision.
been observed in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code and that
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they the City of Manila had not been able to prove such compliance before
are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re- the Secretary only because he had given it only five days within which
done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. to gather and present to him all the evidence (consisting of 25 exhibits)
Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or later submitted to the trial court. We agree with the trial court that the
superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he procedural requirements have indeed been observed. Notices of the
himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion public hearings were sent to interested parties as evidenced. The
to modify or replace them. minutes of the hearings are found in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3.
Exhibits B and C show that the proposed ordinances were published in
Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local
the Balita and the Manila Standard on April 21 and 25, 1993,
Autonomy Act. That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to
respectively, and the approved ordinance was published in the July 3, 4,
suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in his opinion, the tax or fee
5, 1993 issues of the Manila Standard and in the July 6, 1993 issue of
levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. Determination
Balita, as shown by Exhibits Q, Q-1, Q-2, and Q-3.
of these flaws would involve the exercise of judgment or discretion and
not merely an examination of whether or not the requirements or The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but
limitations of the law had been observed; hence, it would smack of this omission does not affect its validity, considering that its publication
control rather than mere supervision. That power was never questioned in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will
before this Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not given satisfy due process. It has also not been shown that the text of the
the same latitude under Section 187. All he is permitted to do is ordinance has been translated and disseminated, but this requirement
ascertain the constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without applies to the approval of local development plans and public
the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is unjust, excessive, oppressive investment programs of the local government unit and not to tax
or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this matter. In fact, Secretary ordinances.
Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to with,
BATANGAS CITY v. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORP.
the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires provisions and non-
compliance with the prescribed procedure in its enactment. These FACTS: Respondent Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation operates an
grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or reasonableness, of the oil refinery and depot in Tabagao, Batangas City, which manufactures
tax measure. and produces petroleum products that are distributed nationwide.
The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the In 2002, respondent was only paying the amount of P98,964.71 for fees
enactment of the Manila Revenue Code is another matter. (allegations: and other charges which include the amount of P1,180.34 as Mayor's
Permit... on February 20, 2001, petitioner Batangas City, through its City
Legal Officer, sent a notice of assessment to respondent... demanding Respondent paid under protest the Mayor's Permit Fees for the year
the payment of P92,373,720.50 and P312,656,253.04 as business taxes 2003 amounting to P774,840.50 as manufacturer and P3,525,010.50 as
for its manufacture and distribution of petroleum products... distributor.
respondent was also required and assessed to pay the amount of
Offered the amount of PI50,000.00 as... compromise Mayor's Permit
P4,299,851.00 as Mayor's Permit Fee based on the gross sales of... its
Fee without prejudice to the outcome of the case... rejected
Tabagao Refinery.
RTC of Batangas City rendered a Decisionsustaining the imposition of
Pursuant of Section 134 of the LGC of 1991 and Section 23 of its
business taxes by petitioners upon the manufacture and distribution of
Batangas City Tax Code of 2002.
petroleum products by respondent... the RTC withheld the imposition
Respondent filed a protest on April 17, 2002 contending among others of Mayor's
that it is not liable for the payment of the local business tax either as a
Permit Fee in deference to the provisions of Section 147 of the LGC, in
manufacturer or distributor of petroleum products
relation to Section 143(h) of the same Code, which imposed a limit to
Mayor's Permit Fees are exorbitant,... confiscatory, arbitrary, the power of petitioners to collect the said business taxes.
unreasonable and not commensurable with the cost of issuing a license.
Taxes on the privilege of engaging in the business of manufacturing,
petitioners denied respondent's protest and declared that under distribution or dealing in petroleum products... imposed by Batangas
Section 14 of the Batangas City Tax Code of 2002, they are empowered City on Pilipinas Shell, is VALID
to withhold the issuance of the Mayor's Permit for failure of respondent
Mayor's Permit Fee... based on gross receipts/sales as grossly excessive
to pay the business taxes on its manufacture and... Distribution of
and unreasonable
petroleum products.
CTA Second Division granted the said application and ordered
Respondent filed a Petition for Review pursuant to Section 195 of the
petitioners to hold in abeyance the collection of the questioned
LGC of 1991 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City.
manufacturer and... Distributor’s taxes, conditioned upon the filing of
Respondent maintained that petitioners have no authority to impose respondent of a surety bond in the amount of P500,000,000.00.
the said taxes and fees, and argued that the levy of local business taxes
The CTA Second Division granted respondent's petition.
on the business of manufacturing and distributing gasoline and other
petroleum products is contrary to law and against... national policy. It It held that respondent is not subject to the business taxes on the
further contended that the Mayor's Permit Fee levied by petitioners manufacture and distribution of petroleum products because of the
were unreasonable and confiscatory. express limitation provided under Section 133(h) of the LGC.
Petitioners contended that the City of Batangas can legally impose taxes Respondent filed a "Motion for Clarification" on the exact amount to be
on the business of manufacturing and distribution of petroleum refunded by petitioners as regards the Mayor's Permit Fees.
products, including the Mayor's Permit Fees upon respondent.
Since [petitioners] failed to modify the computation of the mayor's
permit fee and based on justice and equity, [respondent] should be
refunded with the mayor's permit fees ordered revoked by the court a including businesses which are already subject to excise, value-added
quo or percentage tax under the National Internal Revenue
The amount to be refunded is not the full amount of P4,299,851.00 but Code (NIRC) provided that the same shall not exceed two percent of the
the excessive mayor's permit for manufacturing and distributing in the gross sales or receipts of the preceding calendar year.
amount of P704,305.00 and P3,166,555.00, respectively, or in the total
RULING: We do not agree.
amount of P3,870,860.00.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that although the power to tax is
the CTA En Banc promulgated a Decision affirming in toto the Amended
inherent in the State, the same is not true for LGUs because although
Decision of the CTA Second Division.
the mandate to impose taxes granted to LGUs is categorical and long
ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE POWER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT established in the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the same is not all...
UNITS TO TAX BUSINESS IS SOLELY GOVERNED BY SEC. 143 AND 143(h) encompassing as it is subject to limitations as explicitly stated in Section
OF THE LOCAL GOVENRMENT CODE 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE WORD "TAXES" IN SEC. 133(h) DOES Principles:
NOT INCLUDE BUSINESS TAXES.
SECTION 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create
ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN TAXES ON its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject
ARTICLES AND TAXES ON BUSINESS to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide,
consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such... taxes, fees,
INCORRECTLY CONSTRUED A CLEAR PROVISION OF LAW, SPECIFICALLY
and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments.
SECTION 133(h) OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991, AS AN
EXPRESS LIMITATION ON THE POWER OF LOCAL GOVENRMENT UNITS The LGUs' power to tax is... subject to the limitations set forth under
TO IMPOSE TAXES ON THE BUSINESS OF Section 133 of the LGC.
MANUFACTURE AND DISTRIBUTION OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS. It is already well-settled that although the power to tax is inherent in
the State, the same is not true for the LGUs to whom the power must
ISSUES: whether a LGU is empowered under the LGC to impose business
be delegated by Congress and must be exercised within the guidelines
taxes on persons or entities engaged in the business of manufacturing
and limitations that Congress may provide.
and distribution of petroleum products.
It is settled that a municipal corporation unlike a sovereign state is
petitioners assert that any activity that involves the production or
clothed with no inherent power of taxation. The charter or statute must
manufacture and the distribution or selling of any kind or nature as a
plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality, cannot
means of livelihood or with a view to profit can be taxed by the LGUs.
assume it. And the power when granted is to be... construed in
They posit that the authority granted to them by
strictissimi juris.
Section 143(h) of the LGC is so broad that it practically covers any
business that the sanggunian concerned may deem proper to tax, even
Per Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, "the power to tax is no taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall
longer vested exclusively on Congress; local legislative bodies are now not extend to the levy of the following:
given direct authority to levy taxes, fees and other charges."
XXXX
Nevertheless, such authority is "subject to such guidelines and...
limitations as the Congress may provide." (h) Excise taxes on articles enumerated under the National Internal
Revenue Code, as amended, and taxes, fees or charges on petroleum
Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the local
products
Government Code of 1991. Book II of the LGC governs local taxation and
fiscal matters. From the foregoing, Section 133(h) clearly specifies the two kinds of
taxes which cannot be imposed by LGUs: (1) excise taxes on articles
First, Section 130 provides for the following fundamental principles
enumerated under the NIRC, as amended; and (2) taxes, fees or charges
governing the taxing powers of LGUs:
on petroleum products.
Taxation shall be uniform in each LGU.
explicit... statutory impediment provided for under Section 133(h) of
Taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall:... be equitable and the same Code which prohibits LGUs from imposing "taxes, fees or
based as far as practicable on the taxpayer's ability to pay;... be levied charges on petroleum products." It can, therefore, be deduced that
and collected only for public purposes;... not be unjust, excessive, although petroleum products are subject to excise tax, the same is
oppressive orconfiscatory;... not be contrary to law, public policy, specifically excluded... from the broad power granted to LGUs under
national economic policy, or in the restraint of trade. Section 143(h) of the LGC to impose business taxes.
The collection of local taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall Additionally, Section 133(h) of the LGC makes plain that the prohibition
in no case be left to any private person. with respect to petroleum products extends not only to excise taxes
thereon, but all "taxes, fees or charges."
The revenue collected pursuant to the provisions of the LGC shall inure
solely to the benefit of, and be subject to the disposition by, the LGU While LGUs are authorized to burden all such other class of goods with
levying the tax, fee, charge or other imposition unless otherwise "taxes, fees... and charges," excepting excise taxes, a specific prohibition
specifically provided by the LGC. is imposed barring the levying of any other type of taxes with respect to
petroleum products
Each LGU shall, as far as practicable, evolve a progressive system of
taxation. It is likewise irrefutable that the specific exemption provided under
Section 133 of the LGC prevails over Section 143 of the same Code.
Second, Section 133 provides for the common limitations on the taxing
powers of LGUs. Section 133 of the LGC is a specific provision that explicitly withhold
from LGUs the power to impose taxes, fees and charges on petroleum
SECTION 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local
products.
Government Units. - Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of
as long as the subject matter of the taxing powers of the LGUs is the gravely abused its discretion in finding the PEZA liable for real property
petroleum products per se or even the activity or privilege related to taxes to the Province of Bataan.
the petroleum products, such as manufacturing and distribution of said
ISSUE: Whether the PEZA is exempt from payment of real property
products, it is covered by the said... limitation and thus, no levy can be
taxes?
imposed
RULING: The PEZA is exempt from payment of real property taxes.
On the contrary, Section 143 of the LGC defines the general power of
LGUs to tax businesses within its jurisdiction. Thus, the omnibus grant The PEZA is an instrumentality of the national government
of power to LGUs under Section 143(h) of the LGC cannot overcome the
An instrumentality is “any agency of the National Government, not
specific exception or exemption in Section 133(h) of the same Code.
integrated within the department framework, vested with special
Second, Article 232(h) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate
of the LGC of 1991 states: powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter.
ARTICLE 232. Tax on Business. - The Municipality may impose taxes on
the following businesses:... that in line with existing national policy, any With the PEZA as an attached agency to the Department of Trade and
business engaged in the production, manufacture, refining, distribution Industry, the 13-person PEZA Board is chaired by the Department
or sale of oil, gasoline, and other petroleum... products shall not be Secretary. Among the powers and functions of the PEZA is its ability to
subject to any local tax imposed in this Article. coordinate with the Department of Trade and Industry for policy and
program formulation and implementation. In strategizing and
CITY OF LAPU-LAPU v. PEZA
prioritizing the development of special economic zones, the PEZA
FACTS: These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari the coordinates with the Department of Trade and Industry.
City of Lapu-Lapu and the Province of Bataan separately filed against
The PEZA also administers its own funds and operates autonomously,
the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA).
with the PEZA Board formulating and approving the PEZA’s annual
In G.R. No. 184203, the City of Lapu-Lapu (the City) assails the Court of budget. Appointments and other personnel actions in the PEZA are also
Appeals’ decision dated January 11, 2008 and resolution dated August free from departmental interference, with the PEZA Board having the
6, 2008, dismissing the City’s appeal for being the wrong mode of exclusive and final authority to promote, transfer, assign and reassign
appeal. The City appealed the Regional Trial Court, Branch 111, Pasay officers of the PEZA.
City’s decision finding the PEZA exempt from payment of real property
As an instrumentality of the national government, the PEZA is vested
taxes.
with special functions or jurisdiction by law. Congress created the PEZA
In G.R. No. 187583, the Province of Bataan (the Province) assails the to operate, administer, manage and develop special economic zones in
Court of Appeals’ decision dated August 27, 2008 and resolution dated the Philippines. Special economic zones are areas with highly developed
April 16, 2009, granting the PEZA’s petition for certiorari. The Court of or which have the potential to be developed into agro-industrial,
Appeals ruled that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 115, Pasay City
industrial tourist/recreational, commercial, banking, investment and explicitly declared exempt from real property taxes under its charter.
financial centers. Section 21 of Presidential Decree No. 66.
Being an instrumentality of the national government, the PEZA cannot The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, on the other hand, does not
be taxed by local government units. specifically exempt the PEZA from payment of real property taxes.
Although a body corporate vested with some corporate powers, the Nevertheless, we rule that the PEZA is exempt from real property taxes
PEZA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation taxable for by virtue of its charter. A provision in the Special Economic Zone Act of
real property taxes. 1995 explicitly exempting the PEZA is unnecessary. The PEZA assumed
the real property exemption of the EPZA under Presidential Decree No.
The law created the PEZA’s charter. Under the Special Economic Zone
66.
Act of 1995, the PEZA was established primarily to perform the
governmental function of operating, administering, managing, and Section 11 of the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995 mandated the
developing special economic zones to attract investments and provide EPZA “to evolve into the PEZA in accordance with the guidelines and
opportunities for preferential use of Filipino labor. regulations set forth in an executive order issued for this purpose.”
President Ramos then issued Executive Order No. 282 in 1995, ordering
Under its charter, the PEZA was created a body corporate endowed with
the PEZA to assume the EPZA’s powers, functions, and responsibilities
some corporate powers. However, it was not organized as a stock or
under Presidential Decree No. 66 not inconsistent with the Special
non-stock corporation. Nothing in the PEZA’s charter provides that the
Economic Zone Act of 1995.
PEZA’s capital is divided into shares. The PEZA also has no members who
shall share in the PEZA’s profits. The non-profit character of the EPZA under Presidential Decree No. 66
is not inconsistent with any of the powers, functions, and
The PEZA does not compete with other economic zone authorities in
responsibilities of the PEZA. The EPZA’s non-profit character, including
the country. The government may even subsidize the PEZA’s
the EPZA’s exemption from real property taxes, must be deemed
operations. Under Section 47 of the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995,
assumed by the PEZA.
“any sum necessary to augment [the PEZA’s] capital outlay shall be
included in the General Appropriations Act to be treated as an equity of In addition, the Local Government Code exempting instrumentalities of
the national government.” the national government from real property taxes was already in force
when the PEZA’s charter was enacted in 1995. It would have been
The PEZA, therefore, need not be economically viable. It is not a
redundant to provide for the PEZA’s exemption in its charter
government-owned or controlled corporation liable for real property
considering that the PEZA is already exempt by virtue of Section 133(o)
taxes.
of the Local Government Code.
The PEZA’s predecessor, the EPZA, was declared non-profit in character
As for the EPZA, Commonwealth Act No. 470 or the Assessment Law
with all its revenues devoted for its development, improvement, and
was in force when the EPZA’s charter was enacted. Unlike the Local
maintenance. Consistent with this non-profit character, the EPZA was
Government Code, Commonwealth Act No. 470 does not contain a
provision specifically exempting instrumentalities of the national
government from payment of real property taxes. It was necessary to RULING: No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of
put an exempting provision in the EPZA’s charter. taking private property. The ordinance is actually a taking without
compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit
Real properties under the PEZA’s title are owned by the Republic of the
paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of
Philippines
building or maintain a public cemeteries. State's exercise of the power
Under Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code, real properties of expropriation requires payment of just compensation. Passing the
owned by the Republic of the Philippines are exempt from real property ordinance without benefiting the owner of the property with just
taxes. compensation or due process, would amount to unjust taking of a real
property. Since the property that is needed to be taken will be used for
Even the PEZA’s lands and buildings whose beneficial use have been
the public's benefit, then the power of the state to expropriate will
granted to other persons may not be taxed with real property taxes. The
come forward and not the police power of the state.
PEZA may only lease its lands and buildings to PEZA-registered
economic zone enterprises and entities. These PEZA-registered CITY OF CEBU v. SPOUSES APOLONIO
enterprises and entities, which operate within economic zones, are not
FACTS: On 17 September 1993, Petitioner City of Cebu filed a complaint
subject to real property taxes. Under Section 24 of the Special Economic
for eminent domain against respondents spouses Apolonio and Blasa
Zone Act of 1995, no taxes, whether local or national, shall be imposed
Dedamo. The petitioner alleged that they needed the parcels of land
on all business establishments operating within the economic zones.
owned by the respondents for public purpose because they are
EMINENT DOMAIN planning to construct a public road which will serve as an access or relief
road of Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum Avenue and
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QC v. ERICTA
the back of Magellan International Hotel Roads in Cebu City.
FACTS: An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon city which approved
However, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
the regulation of establishment of private cemeteries in the said city.
because the purpose of expropriation was not for public purpose but
According to the ordinance, 6% of the total area of the private memorial
for the benefit of the Cebu Holdings, Inc. They alleged that the
park shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are
petitioner could simply buy directly the property from them at its fair
paupers and have been residents of QC. Himlayang Pilipino, a private
market value just like what they did with the neighboring lots and the
memorial park, contends that the taking or confiscation of property
price offered was very low. They also alleged that they have no other
restricts the use of property such that it cannot be used for any
land in Cebu City.
reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his
property. It also contends that the taking is not a valid exercise of police From this, a pre-trial was conducted. On 23 August 1994, the petitioner
power, since the properties taken in the exercise of police power are filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession pursuant to
destroyed and not for the benefit of the public. Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160. The motion was granted by the trial court
on 21 September 1994. The parties executed an agreement and
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance made by Quezon City is a valid
submitted to the trial wherein they declared that they have partially
taking of private property
settled the case in consideration of the stipulations in the agreement.
Pursuant to the said agreement, the trial court appointed Palermo M. In this case, the applicable law as to the point of determining the just
Lugo, Alfredo Cisneros and Herbert E. Buot to be the commissioners to compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which expressly provides
determine the just compensation of the lots sought to be expropriated. that just compensation shall be determined as of the time of actual
The commissioner’s report contained that the plaintiff is directed to pay taking. The SC justifies that although the general rule in determining just
a just compensation costs P24,865.930.00 to the respondents. compensation in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the
date of the filing of the complaint, the rule admits of an exception:
But the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that
where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was
the commissioner’s report was inaccurate since it included an area
taken and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation
which was not subject to expropriation. Then the commissioners submit
proceedings.
an amendment which made the just compensation costs
P20,826,339.50 which was later approved by the trial court. Moreover, both of the parties agreed to be bound by the report of the
commission so they need to comply on the agreement in good faith.
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals alleging that the
Also, the petitioner was too late to question the valuation without
lower court erred in fixing the amount of just compensation at
violating the principle of equitable estoppel. And lastly, Section 4, Rule
P20,826,339.50. They also alleged that just compensation should be
67 of the Rules of Court cannot prevail over R.A. 7160, which is a
based on the prevailing market price of the property at the
substantive law.
commencement of the expropriation proceedings. However, the Court
of Appeals was not convinced and affirmed the lower court’s decision. Therefore, the petition was denied.
The petitioner filed with a petition for review to the SC. They asserted REPUBLIC v. CA (GR 146587)
that just compensation should be determined on September 17, 1993,
FACTS: Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings on 19
as of the date of the filing of the complaint and not at the time the
September 1969 before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Bulacan,
property was actually taken in 1994.
covering a total of 544,980 square meters of contiguous land situated
ISSUE: Whether just compensation should be determined as of the date along MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized for the
of the filing of the complaint. continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for
the "Voice of the Philippines" project.
HELD: No. Just compensation should not be determined as of the date
of the filing of the complaint. Petitioner, through the Philippine Information Agency ("PIA"), took over
the premises after the previous lessee, the "Voice of America," had
Eminent domain is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from
ceased its operations thereat. Petitioner made a deposit of
sovereignty. It is the Governments right to appropriate, in the nature of
P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as being the reasonable value
a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or
of the property.
purpose. However, the Government must pay the owner thereof just
compensation as consideration therefor. On 26 February 1979, or more than nine years after the institution of
the expropriation proceedings – condemning the properties of the
defendants and that plaintiff is ordered to pay the defendants the just
compensation for said property which is the fair market value of the just compensation for the expropriated property of the late Luis Santos
land condemned, computed at the rate of six pesos (P6.00) per square subject to such final computation as might be approved by the court.
meter, with legal rate of interest from September 19, 1969, until fully This time, the Santos heirs, opposing the manifestation and motion,
paid submitted a counter-motion to adjust the compensation from P6.00 per
square meter previously fixed in the 1979 decision to its current zonal
The bone of contention in the instant controversy is the 76,589-square
valuation pegged at P5,000.00 per square meter or, in the alternative,
meter property previously owned by Luis Santos which forms part of the
to cause the return to them of the expropriated property. On 01 March
expropriated area.
2000, the Bulacan RTC ruled in favor of respondents and issued the
It would appear that the national government failed to pay to herein assailed order, vacating its decision of 26 February 1979 and declaring
respondents the compensation pursuant to the foregoing decision, it to be unenforceable on the ground of prescription —

On 09 May 1984, respondents filed a manifestation with a motion Petitioner brought the matter up to the Court of Appeals but the
seeking payment for the expropriated property. petition was outrightly denied. It would appear that the denial was
based on Section 4, Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which
On 07 June 1984, the Bulacan RTC, after ascertaining that the heirs
provided that the filing of a motion for reconsideration in due time after
remained unpaid in the sum of P1,058,655.05, issued a writ of execution
filing of the judgment, order or resolution interrupted the running of
served on the plaintiff, through the Office of the Solicitor General, for
the sixty-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari; and that
the implementation thereof.
if a motion for reconsideration was denied, the aggrieved party could
When the order was not complied with, respondents again filed a file the petition only within the remaining period, but which should not
motion urging the trial court to direct the provincial treasurer of be less than five days in any event, reckoned from the notice of such
Bulacan to release to them the amount of P72,683.55, a portion of the denial.
sum deposited by petitioner at the inception of the expropriation
Thus this instant petition.
proceedings in 1969, corresponding to their share of the deposit. The
trial court, in its order of 10 July 1984, granted the motion.
In the meantime, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Proclamation ISSUE/S: WON defendants can expropriate unpaid lands from the
No. 22, 2 transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated property to the government?
Bulacan State University for the expansion of its facilities and another 5
RULING: The expropriated property has been shown to be for the
hectares to be used exclusively for the propagation of the Philippine
continued utilization by the PIA, a significant portion thereof being
carabao. The remaining portion was retained by the PIA.
ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan State University
This fact notwithstanding, and despite the 1984 court order, the Santos and for the propagation of the Philippine carabao, themselves in line
heirs remained unpaid, and no action was taken on their case until 16 with the requirements of public purpose.
September 1999 when petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to
Respondents question the public nature of the utilization by petitioner
permit the deposit in court of the amount of P4,664,000.00 by way of
of the condemned property, pointing out that its present use differs
from the purpose originally contemplated in the 1969 expropriation Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional
proceedings. The argument is of no moment. The property has assumed sense, for the condemning authority is not required to assert any
a public character upon its expropriation. Surely, petitioner, as the conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the
condemnor and as the owner of the property, is well within its rights to condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and
alter and decide the use of that property, the only limitation being that possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title or interest
it be for public use, which, decidedly, it is. in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right
to compensation for the taking.
In insisting on the return of the expropriated property, respondents
would exhort on the pronouncement in Provincial Government of Limitation of Right to eminent Domain:
Sorsogon vs. Vda. de Villaroya 14where the unpaid landowners were
1. First, the taking must be for public use; and
allowed the alternative remedy of recovery of the property there in
question. It might be borne in mind that the case involved the municipal a. In determining "public use," two approaches are utilized
government of Sorsogon, to which the power of eminent domain is not
i. The first is public employment the actual use by the
inherent, but merely delegated and of limited application.
public, and
The grant of the power of eminent domain to local governments under
ii. The second is public advantage or benefit.
Republic Act No. 7160 15 cannot be understood as being the pervasive
and all-encompassing power vested in the legislative branch of 2. Second, that just compensation must be given to the private owner
government. For local governments to be able to wield the power, it of the property.
must, by enabling law, be delegated to it by the national legislature, but
These twin proscriptions have their origin in the recognition of the
even then, this delegated power of eminent domain is not, strictly
necessity for achieving balance between the State interests, on the one
speaking, a power of eminent, but only of inferior, domain or only as
hand, and private rights, upon the other hand, by effectively restraining
broad or confined as the real authority would want it to be.
the former and affording protection to the latter
The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate
The expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued
right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its
utilization by the PIA, a significant portion thereof being ceded for the
territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. Fundamental to the
expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan State University and for the
independent existence of a State, it requires no recognition by the
propagation of the Philippine carabao, themselves in line with the
Constitution, whose provisions are taken as being merely confirmatory
requirements of public purpose.
of its presence and as being regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of
the power. The property has assumed a public character upon its expropriation.
Surely, petitioner, as the condemnor and as the owner of the property,
The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature
is well within its rights to alter and decide the use of that property, the
of the expropriation proceedings.
only limitation being that it be for public use, which, decidedly, it is.
The judgment rendered by the Bulacan RTC in 1979 on the WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution, dated 31 July
expropriation proceedings provides not only for the payment of just 2000, of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition for certiorari, as
compensation to herein respondents but likewise adjudges the well as its resolution of 04 January 2001 denying the motion for
property condemned in favor of petitioner over which parties, as well reconsideration, and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan,
as their privies, are bound. Petitioner has occupied, utilized and, for all dated 01 March 2000, are SET ASIDE. Let the case be forthwith
intents and purposes, exercised dominion over the property pursuant remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan for the proper
to the judgment. execution of its decision promulgated on 26 February 1979 which is
hereby REINSTATED. No costs.
The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing
interests on the zonal value of the property to be computed from the RECLASSIFICATION OF LANDS
time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and "took" the
DAR VS SARANGANI
property in September 1969. This allowance of interest on the amount
found to be the value of the property as of the time of the taking Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel, Sarangani passed Resolution
computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum 28 should No. 97-08 adopting a 10 year comprehensive development plan of the
help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the municipality and its land use. On January 30, 1998, pursuant to
value of the currency over time. 29 Article 1250 of the Civil Code, Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 08, Series of 1997, and to accelerate
providing that, in case of extraordinary inflation or deflation, the value the development and urbanization of Alabel, the Sangguniang Bayan of
of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall Alabel passed Resolution No. 98-03 reclassifying lots that were located
be the basis for the payment when no agreement to the contrary is within the built-up areas, based on the 1995-2005 Land Use Plan of the
stipulated, has strict application only to contractual obligations. 30In municipality, from agricultural to non-agricultural uses.
other words, a contractual agreement is needed for the effects of
Later, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sarangani approved Resolution
extraordinary inflation to be taken into account to alter the value of the
No. 98-018 or the “Resolution Adopting the Ten-Year Municipal
currency.
Comprehensive Development Plan (MCDP 1995-2205) and the Land
All given, the trial court of Bulacan in issuing its order, dated 01 March Use Development Plan and Zoning Ordinance of the Municipality of
2000, vacating its decision of 26 February 1979 has acted beyond its Alabel, Sarangani Per Resolution No. 97-08 and Municipal Ordinance
lawful cognizance, the only authority left to it being to order its No. 97-08, S. of 1997 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel.” A portion of
execution. Verily, private respondents, although not entitled to the the area involving 376.5424 hectares, however, was covered by the
return of the expropriated property, deserve to be paid promptly on the CARP commercial farms deferment scheme.
yet unpaid award of just compensation already fixed by final judgment
The Zoning Certification issued by the office of the Municipal
of the Bulacan RTC on 26 February 1979 at P6.00 per square meter, with
Planning and Development Council (MPDC) showed that respondents’
legal interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the date of
properties located at Barangay Maribulan, Alabel were among those
"taking" of the property, i.e., 19 September 1969, until the due amount
reclassified from agricultural and pasture land to residential,
shall have been fully paid.
commercial institutional, light industrial and open space in the 1995- ISSUE: WON the DAR should use the comprehensive land use plans and
2005 land use plan of Alabel. ordinance of the local sanggunian as primary reference
The respondent then field an application for land use conversion HELD: Yes, Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as
of certain parcels of land. Meanwhile, members of the Sarangani the Local Government Code of 1991, empowers the local government
Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association, Inc. (SARBAI) sent a letter- units to reclassify agricultural lands. Memorandum Circular No. 54
petition to the DAR Secretary oppposing the application for land use “Prescribing the Guidelines Governing Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160
conversion filed by SACI. SARBAI alleged that its members were merely Otherwise Known as the Local Government Code of 1991 Authorizing
forced to sign the waiver of rights, considering that the commercial Cities and Municipalities to Reclassify Agricultural Lands Into Non-
farm deferment period ended on June 15, 1998. Later, the PLUTC Agricultural Uses” issued by President Ramos on June 8, 1993 specified
agreed to recommend the disapproval of a portion of a property which the scope and limitations on the power of the cities and municipalities
was still viable for agriculture. The conversion was deferred subject to to reclassify agricultural lands into other uses. It provided that all
the submission of certain requirements. ordinances authorizing reclassification of agricultural lands shall be
subject to the review and approval of the province in the case of
Later, the DAR Secretary denied SACI’s application for land use
component cities or municipalities, or by the HLURB for highly
conversion.
urbanized or independent component cities in accordance with
On November 9, 2000, DAR Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr. Executive Order No. 72, Series of 1993.
denied SACI’s application for land use conversion. SACI appealed to the
Hence, with regard to agricultural lands that have been reclassified for
Office of the President. The Office of the President dismissed the appeal
non-agricultural uses by the local government unit concerned, the CA is
and affirmed in toto the challenged DAR Orders. Respondents’ motion
correct in declaring that DAR should refer to the comprehensive land
for reconsideration was denied, so they filed with the Court of Appeals
use plans and the ordinances of the Sanggunian in assessing land use
a petition for review raising substantially the same issues.
conversion applications, thus:
The CA granted the petition and ordred DAR to issue a
Construing Sec. 20 of the Local Government Code and the subsequent
conversion order. As to the deferred portion, DAR was directed to
administrative issuances implementing the same, we are of the opinion
expedite the processing and evaluation of petitioner’s application.
that while the DAR retains the responsibility for approving or
ISSUE: WON a notice of coverage is an indispensable requirement for disapproving applications for land use conversion filed by individual
the acquisition of land landowners on their landholdings, the exercise of such authority should
be confined to compliance with the requirements and limitations under
HELD: No, Under the circumstances, a notice of coverage is not an
existing laws and regulations, such as the allowable percentage of
indispensable requirement before DAR can acquire the subject lots or
agricultural [area] to be reclassified, ensuring sufficient food
commercial farms, which are covered by a deferment period under the
production, areas non-negotiable for conversion and those falling under
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or R.A. No 6657 upon its
environmentally critical areas or highly restricted for conversion under
effectivity on June 15, 1998
the NIPAS law. Definitely, the DAR’s power in such cases may not be
exercised in such a manner as to defeat the very purpose of the LGU which has expired on June 15, 1998. By law, these lands are subject to
concerned in reclassifying certain areas to achieve social and economic redistribution to CARP beneficiaries upon the lapse of the ten-year
benefits in pursuit of its mandate towards the general welfare. period, counted from the date of the effectivity of the CARL or R.A. No.
Precisely, therefore, the DAR is required to use the comprehensive land 6657 on June 15, 1988, which was way before the creation of the
use plans and accompanying ordinances of the local Sanggunian as Province of Sarangani and the eventual reclassification of the
primary references in evaluating applications for land use conversion agricultural lands into non-agricultural in the Municipality of Alabel
filed by individual landowners. In this case, petitioners have already where respondents’ properties are located.
complied with the standard requirements laid down under the
In short, the creation of the new Province of Sarangani, and the
applicable rules and regulations of the DAR....
reclassification that was effected by the Municipality of Alabel did not
The conversion of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses operate to supersede the applicable provisions of R.A. No. 6657.
shall be strictly regulated and may be allowed only when the conditions
Moreover, Section 20 of the LGC of 1991 on the reclassification
prescribed under R.A. No. 6657 are present. In this regard, the Court
of lands explicitly states that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed
agrees with the ratiocination of the CA that DAR’s scope of authority in
as repealing, amending or modifying in any manner the provisions of
assessing land use conversion applications is limited to examining
R.A. No. 6657.” Thus, where the law speaks in clear and categorical
whether the requirements prescribed by law and existing rules and
language, there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for
regulations have been complied with. This holds true in the present case
application.
where, because of the creation of the Province of Sarangani and in view
of its thrust to urbanize, particularly its provincial capital which is the CLOSURE AND OPENING OF ROADS
Municipality of Alabel, the local government has reclassified certain
SANGALANG vs INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
portions of its land area from agricultural to non-agricultural. Thus, to
reiterate, in accordance with E.O. No. 72, Series of 1993, and subject to FACTS: Jose Sangalang and wife, herein petitioners are residents of
the limitations prescribed by law, DAR should utilize the comprehensive Jupiter Street, Makati Metro Manila. Sangalang and the other
land use plans in evaluating the land use conversion application of petitioners who are also residents of Jupiter Street initially filed a case
respondents whose lands have already been reclassified by the local against Ayala to enforce by specific performance restrictive easement
government for non-agricultural uses. upon property pursuant to stipulations embodied in the deeds of sale
covering the subdivision, and for damages. The other petitions were
This is not to say, however, that every property of respondents
also for the enforcement of the aforesaid restrictions stipulated in the
which is included in the comprehensive land use plan of the
deeds of sale executed by the Ayala Corporation.
Municipality of Alabel shall be automatically granted non-coverage. As
mentioned earlier, said application is subject to the limitations and The lots which were acquired by the petitioners, were all sold by MDC
conditions prescribed by law. One such limitation that is present here is subject to certain conditions and easements contained in Deed
that a portion of respondents’ property of 376.5424 hectares, a portion Restrictions which formed a part of each deed of sale. When MDC sold
totaling 154.622 [or 154.1622] hectares which are planted to bananas the above-mentioned lots to appellees' predecessors-in-interest, the
and coconuts, are covered by CARL’s ten-year deferment scheme, whole stretch of the commercial block between Buendia Avenue and
Jupiter Street, from Reposo Street in the west to Zodiac Street in the On appeal, CA reversed the lower court, finding the decision appealed
east, was still undeveloped. Altough it was not part of the original plan, from as not supported by the facts and the law on the matter, it was
MDC constructed a fence or wall on the commercial block along Jupiter. set aside and another one entered dismissing the case for lack of a cause
of action.
In 1975, the municipal council of Makati enacted its ordinance No. 81,
providing for the zonification of Makati (Exh. 18). Under this Ordinance, Issues:
Bel-Air Village was classified as a Class A Residential Zone, with its
1. Whether or not Ayala Corporation is liable for damages as a result of
boundary in the south extending to the center line of Jupiter Street.
the destruction of the perimeter wall.
Under the zoning classifications, Jupiter Street, therefore, is a common
boundary of Bel-Air Village and the commercial zone. 2. Whether or not the exercise of police power is valid.
Gates had been installed by BAVA (Bell-Arat strategic locations across Held:
Jupiter Street which were manned and operated by its own security
1. NO. Jupiter Street lies as the boundary between Bel-Air Village and
guards who were employed to maintain, supervise and enforce traffic
Ayala Corporation's commercial section, it had been considered as a
regulations in the roads and streets of the village. Then, on January 17,
boundary not as a part of either the residential or commercial zones of
1977, the Office of the Mayor of Makati directed that, in the interest of
Ayala Corporation's real estate development projects, hence it cannot
public welfare and for the purpose of easing traffic congestion, the
be said to have been "for the exclusive benefit" of Bel-Air Village
streets in Bel-Air Village should be opened for public use. The other
residents.
streets in Bel-Air Village were voluntarily opened except Jupiter Street.
The Municipal Engineer of Makati in a letter addressed to BAVA advised Jupiter Street lies as a mere boundary, a fact acknowledged by the
the latter to open for vehicular and pedestrian traffic the entire portion authorities of Makati and the National Government and, as a scrutiny of
of Jupiter Street from Makati Avenue to Reposo Street. Finally, the the records themselves reveals, by the petitioners themselves, as the
municipal officials of Makati concerned allegedly opened, destroyed articles of incorporation of Bel-Air Village Association itself would
and removed the gates constructed/located at the corner of Reposo confirm. As a consequence, Jupiter Street was intended for the use by
Street and Jupiter Street as well as the gates/fences both -the commercial and residential blocks. It was not originally
located/constructed at Jupiter Street and Makati Avenue forcibly, and constructed, therefore, for the exclusive use of either block, least of all
then opened the entire length of Jupiter Street to public traffic. the residents of Bel-Air Village, but, we repeat, in favor of both, as
distinguished from the general public. When the wall was erected in
Petitioners brought the present action for damages against the
1966 and rebuilt twice, in 1970 and 1972, it was not for the purpose of
defendant-appellant Ayala Corporation predicated on both breach of
physically separating the two blocks. According to Ayala Corporation, it
contract and on tort or quasi-delict. After trial on the merits, the then
was put up to enable the Bel-Air Village Association "better control of
Court of First Instance favored the petitioners and awarded damages.
the security in the area, and as the Ayala Corporation's "show of
Defendant is further ordered to restore/reconstruct the perimeter wall
goodwill". That maintaining the wall was a matter of a contractual
at its original position in 1966 from Reposo Street in the west to Zodiac
obligation on the part of Ayala, to be pure conjecture. In fine, we cannot
Street in the east, at its own expense,
hold the Ayala Corporation liable for damages for a commitment it did 1. BAVA – applied for injunction; trial court issued temporary
not make, much less for alleged resort to machinations in evading it. restraining order but after due hearing, trial court denied the issuance
of a preliminary injunction.
2. Yes. While non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally
guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with 2. BAVA – appealed to CA which issued preliminary injunction and
the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., "the power to prescribe later ruled that MMDA has no authority to order the opening of
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of
order or safety and general welfare of the people.' Invariably described its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council
as "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers" and "in a of Makati by ordinance.
sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of government," the
3. MMDA – filed motion for reconsideration but was denied by CA;
exercise of the power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only
hence the current recourse.
if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been
a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable ISSUES
constitutional guarantee. Resolution No. 27, 1960 declaring the
1. Has the MMDA the mandate to open Neptune Street to public
western part of High way 54, now E. de los Santos Avenue (EDSA, for
traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers?
short) from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial and
commercial zone, was obviously passed by the Municipal Council of 2. Is the passage of an ordinance a condition precedent before the
Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to safeguard or MMDA may order the opening of subdivision roads to public traffic?
promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of
HELD: The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, "development
the people in the locality.
authority." All its functions are administrative in nature.
MMDA v. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION INC.
The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation,
FACTS: Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management,
delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Respondent Bel-Air Village monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and
Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the
members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.
Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune
The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.
community. It is the local government units, acting through their
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through respective legislative councils that possess legislative power and police
its Chairman, a notice dated December 22, 1995 requesting respondent power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City
to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of
1996. Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is
illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling.
Actions Filed:
The MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan ISSUE: Whether or not the means employed by the Lucena Sannguniang
transportation system but unfortunately the powers granted by its Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were reasonably necessary
charter are limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the opening for and not duly oppressive upon individuals.
public use of a private street in a private subdivision without any legal
HELD: With the aim of localizing the source of traffic congestion in the
warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is not antithetical to the
city to a single location, the subject ordinances prohibit the operation
preservation of the rule of law.
of all bus and jeepney terminals within Lucena, including those already
Dispositive existing, and allow the operation of only one common terminal located
outside the city proper, the franchise for which was granted to Lucena.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Decision and Resolution
The common carriers plying routes to and from Lucena City are thus
of the Court of Appeals are affirmed.
compelled to close down their existing terminals and use the facilities
LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL INC. v. JAC LINER INC. of Lucena. The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium
between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the
Two ordinances were enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to
Lucena with the objective of alleviating the traffic congestion said to
rights. A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a
have been caused by the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals
more careful formulation of solutions to societal problems. From the
within the city. City Ordinance 1631 grants franchise to the Lucena
memorandum filed before the Court by Lucena, it is gathered that the
Grand Central Terminal, Inc. to construct, finance, establish, operate
Sangguniang Panlungsod had identified the cause of traffic congestion
and maintain common bus- jeepney terminal facility in the City of
to be the indiscriminate loading and unloading of passengers by buses
Lucena. City Ordinance 1778, on the other hand, strips out all the
on the streets of the city proper, hence, the conclusion that the
temporary terminals in the City of Lucena the right to operate which as
terminals contributed to the proliferation of buses obstructing traffic on
a result favors only the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. The
the city streets. Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help
Regional Trial Court of Lucena declared City Ordinance 1631 as a valid
impede the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the
excercise of police power while declaring City Ordinance 1778 as null
existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to Lucena, can be
and void for being invalid. Petitioner Lucena Grand Central Terminal,
considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, the
Inc. filed its Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Lucena then
Court has not been enlightened. If terminals lack adequate space such
elevated it via petition for review under Rule 45 before the Court. The
that bus drivers are compelled to load and unload passengers on the
Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) with which it
streets instead of inside the terminals, then reasonable specifications
has concurrent jurisdiction. The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed
for the size of terminals could be instituted, with permits to operate the
the challenged orders of the trial court. Its motion for reconsideration
same denied those which are unable to meet the specifications. In the
having been denied by the CA, Lucena now comes to the Court via
subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the
petition for review to assail the Decision and Resolution of the CA.
maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which might be
able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred
from operating at all. The Court is not unaware of the resolutions of
various barangays in Lucena City supporting the establishment of a (2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
common terminal, and similar expressions of support from the private
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
sector, copies of which were submitted to this Court by Lucena Grand
Central Terminal, Inc. The weight of popular opinion, however, must be (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
balanced with that of an individual‘s rights.
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
LEGISLATIVE POWER
(6) must not be unreasonable.
CITY OF MANILA v. LAGUIO JR.
The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching,
On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN is subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject
ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable a nd for the public
BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid
ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to
AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR general laws.
OTHER PURPOSES. It basically prohibited establishments such as bars,
SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN v. QC
karaoke bars, motels and hotels from operating in the Malate District
which was notoriously viewed as a red light district harboring thrill FACTS: Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to
seekers. Malate Tourist Development Corporation avers that the implement a nationwide curfew for minors, several local governments
ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels and motels in the enumeration in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their curfew ordinances
of places offering amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that on minors through police operations which were publicly known as part
they do not market such nor do they use women as tools for of "Oplan Rody."
entertainment. MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only
Among those local governments that implemented curfew ordinances
regulate motels but cannot prohibit their operation. The City reiterates
were respondents:
that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power as provided as well
in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized that the purpose of the law is Petitioners, spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong
to promote morality in the City. Kabataan (SPARK)- an association of young adults and minors that aims
to forward a free and just society, in particular the protection of the
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.
rights and welfare of the youth and minors - filed this present petition,
HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they:
noted that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the (a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall
corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be under the void for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by
passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew
conform to the following substantive requirements: hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel
without substantive due process; and (d) deprive parents of their
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
natural and primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due They do not assert any confusion as to what conduct the subject
process. ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point to the ordinances' lack
of enforcement guidelines
Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a) are
unconstitutional as they deprive minors of the right to liberty and the As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any ambiguous
right to travel without substantive due process; and (b) fail to pass the standard in any of the provisions of the Curfew Ordinances, but rather,
strict scrutiny test, for not being narrowly tailored and for employing lament the lack of detail on how the age of a suspected minor would be
means that bear no reasonable relation to their purpose. determined. Thus, without any correlation to any vague legal provision,
the Curfew Ordinances cannot be stricken down under the void for
ISSUES: The primordial issue for the Court's resolution in this case is
vagueness doctrine.
whether or not the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional.
While it is true that the Curfew Ordinances do not explicitly state these
RULING: The petition is partly granted.
parameters, law enforcement agents are still bound to follow the
In particular, petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are void for prescribed measures found in statutory law when implementing
not containing sufficient enforcement parameters, which leaves the ordinances.
enforcing authorities with unbridled discretion to carry out their
This provision should be read in conjunction with the Curfew
provisions. They claim that the lack of procedural guidelines in these
Ordinances because RA 10630 (the law that amended RA 9344) repeals
issuances led to the questioning of petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo,
all ordinances inconsistent with statutory law. Pursuant to Section 57-A
even though they were already of legal age. They maintain that the
of RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630, minors caught in violation of
enforcing authorities apprehended the suspected curfew offenders
curfew ordinances are children at risk and, therefore, covered by its
based only on their physical appearances and, thus, acted arbitrarily.
provisions.
Meanwhile, although they conceded that the Quezon City Ordinance
requires enforcers to determine the age of the child, they submit that B. Right of Parents to Rear their Children. Petitioners submit that the
nowhere does the said ordinance require the law enforcers to ask for Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they deprive parents
proof or identification of the child to show his age. of their natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth without
substantive due process.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained.
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It
Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's
It is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due policy relative to the rights of parents in the rearing of their children:
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."[48] the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances
Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.) based on the minors' right to travel. They claim that the liberty to travel
is a fundamental right, which, therefore, necessitates the application of
This means that parents are not only given the privilege of exercising
the strict scrutiny
their authority over their children; they are equally obliged to exercise
this authority conscientiously. At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners' invocation of the
overbreadth doctrine, considering that petitioners have not claimed
While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be
any transgression of their rights to free speech or any inhibition of
stressed that "when actions concerning the child have a relation to the
speech-related conduct. In Southern Hemisphere Engagement
public welfare or the well-being of the child, the [S]tate may act to
Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council (Southern Hemisphere), this
promote these legitimate interests."[66] Thus, "[i]n cases in which harm
Court explained that "the application of the overbreadth doctrine is
to the physical or mental health of the child or to public safety, peace,
limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of
order, or welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may
a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases," viz.:
override the parents' qualified right to control the upbringing of their
children." In Virginia v. Hicks,[84] it was held that rarely, if ever, will an
overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not
As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid
specifically addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on
parents in the moral development of their children, and, thus, assumes
overly broad statutes are justified by the 'transcendent value to all
a supporting role for parents to fulfill their parental obligations.
society of constitutionally protected expression."'... transcendent value
At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances to all society of constitutionally protected expression."'
apply only when the minors are not - whether actually or constructively
That being said, this Court finds it improper to undertake an
(as will be later discussed) - accompanied by their parents.
overbreadth analysis in this case, there being no claimed curtailment of
This serves as an explicit recognition of the State's deference to the free speech. On the contrary, however, this Court finds proper to
primary nature of parental authority and the importance of parents' examine the assailed regulations under the strict scrutiny test.
role in child-rearing. Parents are effectively given unfettered authority
The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a fundamental right
over their children's conduct during curfew hours when they are able to
under Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, to wit: Section 6.
supervise them.
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
In this respect, the ordinances neither dictate an over-all plan of prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
discipline for the parents to apply to their minors nor force parents to court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest
abdicate their authority to influence or control their minors' activities. of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided
As such, the Curfew Ordinances only amount to a minimal - albeit by law. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
reasonable - infringement upon a parent's right to bring up his or her
child.
Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely make critical decisions in an informed and mature manner; and third,
from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines.[89] It the importance of the parental role in child rearing:[118]
is a right embraced within the general concept of liberty.
It is true children have rights, in common with older people, in the
The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access and primary use of highways. But even in such use streets afford dangers for
exercise their other rights, such as the rights to education, free them not affecting adults. And in other uses, whether in work or in other
expression, assembly, association, and religion things, this difference may be magnified.[12... i) interferes with the
exercise of fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed
As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State may impose limitations
under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes.
on the exercise of this right, provided that they: (1) serve the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are provided by Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial
law. scrutiny to determine the reasonableness of classifications. The strict
scrutiny test applies when a classification either (i) interferes with the
The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the
exercise of fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed
promotion of juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile crime,
under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes. The intermediate
inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The restriction on the
scrutiny test applies when a classification does not involve suspect
minor's movement and activities within the confines of their residences
classes or fundamental rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such as
and their immediate vicinity during the curfew period is perceived to
in classifications based on gender and legitimacy. Lastly, the rational
reduce the probability of the minor becoming victims of or getting
basis test applies to all other subjects not covered by the first two tests.
involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to the second requirement,
i.e., that the limitation "be provided by law," our legal system is replete Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in our legal
with laws emphasizing the State's duty to afford special protection to system guaranteed no less by our Constitution, the strict scrutiny test is
children,... Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603, the applicable test.
which explicitly authorizes local government units, through their city or
Thus, the government has the burden of proving that the classification
municipal councils, to set curfew hours for children.
(i) is necessary to achieve a compelling State interest, and (ii) is the least
The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to restrictive means to protect such interest or the means chosen is
minors are likewise constitutionally permissible. In this relation, this narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest a. Compelling State
Court recognizes that minors do possess and enjoy constitutional Interest.
rights,[108] but the exercise of these rights is not co-extensive as those
This Court has ruled that children's welfare and the State's mandate to
of adults.
protect and care for them as parens patriae constitute compelling
In Bellotti,[117] the US Supreme Court identified three (3) justifications interests to justify regulations by the State.
for the differential treatment of the minors' constitutional rights. These
In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate
are: first, the peculiar vulnerability of children; second, their inability to
objective of the Curfew Ordinances is to keep unsupervised minors
during the late hours of night time off of public areas, so as to reduce -
if not totally eliminate - their exposure to potential harm, and to insulate home during the curfew hours; (e) those running errands under the
them against criminal pressure and influences which may even include supervision of their parents, guardians, or persons of legal age having
themselves. authority over them; (f) those involved in accidents, calamities, and the
like. It also exempts minors from the curfew during these specific
Similar to the City of Charlottesville in Schleifer, the local governments
occasions: Christmas eve, Christmas day, New Year's eve, New Year's
of Quezon City and Manila presented statistical data in their respective
day, the night before the barangay fiesta, the day of the fiesta, All Saints'
pleadings showing the alarming prevalence of crimes involving
and All Souls' Day, Holy Thursday, Good Friday, Black Saturday, and
juveniles, either as victims or perpetrators, in their respective
Easter Sunday
localities.[139] Based on these findings, their city councils found it
necessary to enact curfew ordinances pursuant to their police power This Court observes that these two ordinances are not narrowly drawn
under the general welfare clause.[140] In this light, the Court thus finds in that their exceptions are inadequate and therefore, run the risk of
that the local governments have not only conveyed but, in fact, overly restricting the minors' fundamental freedoms.
attempted to substantiate legitimate concerns on public welfare,
First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church activities,
especially with respect to minors. A... b. Least Restrictive Means/
it hinders them from engaging in legitimate non-school or non-church
Narrowly Drawn.
activities in the streets or going to and from such activities; thus, their
When it is possible for governmental regulations to be more narrowly freedom of association is effectively curtailed.
drawn to avoid conflicts with constitutional rights, then they must be so
Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the curfew
narrowly drawn.
during Christmas Eve and Christmas day, it effectively prohibits minors
After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective provisions, from attending traditional religious activities (such as simbang gabi) at
this Court finds that only the Quezon City Ordinance meets the above- night without accompanying adults,... Third, the Navotas Ordinance
discussed requirement, while the Manila and Navotas Ordinances do does not accommodate avenues for minors to engage in political rallies
not. or attend city council meetings to voice out their concerns in line with
their right to peaceably assemble and to free expression.
The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the coverage
of the curfew, namely: (a) minors accompanied by their parents, family In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely
members of legal age, or guardian; (b) those running lawful errands stricken down since their exceptions, which are essentially
such as buying of medicines, using of telecommunication facilities for determinative of the scope and breadth of the curfew regulations, are
emergency purposes and the like; (c) night school students and those inadequate to ensure protection of the above-mentioned fundamental
who, by virtue of their employment, are required in the streets or rights.
outside their residence after 10:00 p.m.; and (d) those working at
As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under
night.[146] For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides more
the Quezon City Ordinance is more narrowly drawn to sufficiently
exceptions, to wit: (a) minors with night classes; (b) those working at
protect the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, travel,
night; (c) those who attended a school or church activity, in
to peaceably assemble, and of free expression.
coordination with a specific barangay office; (d) those traveling towards
Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of exceptions viz.:... what they prohibit is the imposition of penalties on minors for
guarantees the protection of these aforementioned rights. These items violations of these regulations.
uphold the right of association by enabling minors to attend both official
In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community service is a
and extra-curricular activities not only of their school or church but also
valid form of intervention program that a local government (such as
of other legitimate organizations. The rights to peaceably assemble and
Navotas City in this case) could appropriately adopt in an ordinance to
of free expression are also covered by these items given that the minors'
promote the welfare of minors.
attendance in the official activities of civic or religious organizations are
allowed during the curfew hours. Unlike in the Navotas Ordinance, the The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is likewise
right to the free exercise of religion is sufficiently safeguarded in the consistent with Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344 as it is merely a formal
Quezon City Ordinance way of giving warnings and expressing disapproval to the minor's
misdemeanor.
Meanwhile, the Manila Ordinance imposed various sanctions to the
minor based on the age and frequency of violations, to wit: SEC. 4. In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-based
Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any child or youth violating this programs and admonition are clearly not penalties - as they are not
ordinance shall be sanctioned/punished as follows: (a) If the offender is punitive in nature - and are generally less intrusive on the rights and
Fifteen (15) years of age and below, the sanction shall consist of a conduct of the minor. To be clear, their objectives are to formally inform
REPRIMAND for the youth offender and ADMONITION to the offender's and educate the minor, and for the latter to understand, what actions
parent, guardian or person exercising parental authority. (b) If the must be avoided so as to aid him in his future conduct.
offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and under Eighteen (18) years of
Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably constitute
age, the sanction/penalty shall be: For the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand
penalties - as provided in our various criminal and administrative laws
and Admonition; For the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand and
and jurisprudence - that Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, evidently
Admonition, and a warning about the legal impostitions in case of a
prohibits.
third and subsequent violation; and For the THIRD AND SUBSEQUENT
OFFENSES, Imprisonment of one (1) day to ten (10) days, or a Fine of In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have
TWO THOUSAND PESOS (Php2,000.00), or both at the discretion of the passed the first prong of the strict scrutiny test - that is, that the State
Court, PROVIDED, That the complaint shall be filed by the Punong has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to promote juvenile safety
Barangay with the office of the City Prosecutor.[156] (Emphases and and prevent juvenile crime in the concerned localities, only the Quezon
underscoring supplied). City Ordinance has passed the second prong of the strict scrutiny test,
as it is the only issuance out of the three which provides for the least
Thus springs the question of whether local governments could validly
restrictive means to achieve this interest.
impose on minors these sanctions - i.e., (a) community service; (b)
reprimand and admonition; (c) fine; and (d) imprisonment. Pertinently, In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance provides for adequate
Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, prohibit the imposition exceptions that enable minors to freely exercise their fundamental
of penalties on minors for status offenses such as curfew violations, rights during the prescribed curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly
drawn to achieve the State's purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said
ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian", has
also been construed to include parental permission as a constructive
form of accompaniment and hence, an allowable exception to the
curfew measure; the manner of enforcement, however, is left to the
discretion of the local government unit. In fine, the Manila and Navotas
Ordinances are declared unconstitutional and thus, null and void, while
the Quezon City Ordinance is declared as constitutional and thus, valid
in accordance with this Decision.