THE GREAT GAME MOVES TO SEA: TRIPOLAR COMPETITION IN THE INDIAN
OCEAN REGION
Introduction
The Indian Ocean is the world’s third-largest body of water and has become a
growing area of competition between China and India. The two regional powers’
moves to exert influence in the ocean include deep-water port development in
littoral states and military patrols
IMPORTANCE
one fifth of the world’s total ocean area and is bounded by Africa and the Arabian
Peninsula, India’s coastal waters, and the Bay of Bengal near Myanmar and
Indonesia
It provides critical sea trade routes that connect the Middle East, Africa, and
South Asia with the broader Asian continent to the east and Europe to the west.
world’s most important strategic chokepoints, including the Straits of Hormuz
and Malacca—more than 50 percent of the world’s maritime oil trade—are found
in the Indian Ocean Region
Nearly 40 percent [PDF] of the world’s offshore petroleum is produced in the
Indian Ocean,
Three major powers — which together account for nearly half of the global
economy — are vying for influence in the Indian Ocean arena. India, China, and
the United States each view the region through their own geostrategic
frameworks, ensuring intense jostling at best or conflict at worst. India has the
“Security and Growth for all the Region” framework, a combination of its Act (or
Look) East and the Think West policies. China has the Maritime Silk Road, which is
half of the Belt and Road Initiative. The United States has the Indo-Pacific
Strategy (also known as the Free and Open Indo Pacific), a natural successor to
the Asia-Pacific rebalance.
Tri-polar competition between New Delhi, Beijing, and Washington.
Why is the Indian Ocean a source of competition?
China and India are dependent on energy resources transported via the
secure sealanes in the Indian Ocean to fuel their economies.
India imports nearly 80 percent of its energy, mostly oil from the Middle
East
Japan as the world’s third-largest energy consumer (behind China and the
United States).
According to a U.S. Department of Defense report, 84 percent [PDF] of
China’s imported energy resources passed through Strait of Malacca from
the Indian Ocean in 2012.
How are China and India competing in the
Indian Ocean?
Beijing’s regional vision, backed by $40 billion of pledged investment,
outlines its One Belt, One Road plan—combining the revitalization of
ancient land-based trade routes, the Silk Road Economic Belt, with
a Maritime Silk Road. China’s ties with regional states have deepened,
including the influx of Chinese capital into construction projects in
Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Since launching
counterpiracy operations in 2009, Beijing has become increasingly active
in the region. China has also undertaken efforts to modernize its military,
particularly its naval deployment capabilities to protect overseas
interests like personnel, property, and investments. Experts also argue that
Beijing’s forays into what is at times described as India’s neighborhood
are driven by China’s excess capacity challenges—incentivizing Chinese
firms out of domestic markets to compete in and open new markets
abroad.
For its part, India sees itself as the natural preeminent regional power.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi has doubled-down on fostering stronger
diplomatic, economic, and security ties with IOR maritime states as a
means to strengthen India’s economy, establish its role a driver of regional
growth , and simultaneously diminish China’s growing appeal, writes
CFR’s Alyssa Ayres.
“It is India’s neighbourhood that holds the key [PDF] to its emergence as
a regional and global power,” writes former Indian foreign secretary
Shyam Saran. Though Beijing deflects claims of hegemonic aspirations, it
identifies security in the IOR as a primary concern for Chinese “core
interests.” In 2015, a white paper charting China’s military
strategy indicated a shift of People’s Liberation Army Navy to focus on
both offshore water defense and open seas protection. Chinese behavior
suggests that Beijing seeks to establish a persistent regional maritime
presence. It now boasts a semipermanent naval presence through its
counterpiracy activities in the Indian Ocean and has more aggressively
asserted itself in the Pacific with extensive patrols and land reclamation
projects in disputed waters.
It is India’s neighbourhood that holds the key to
its emergence as a regional and global power.
Shyam Sara, Former Indian Foreign Secretary
China’s ambitions in the region have been described by many scholars by
the “string of pearls” metaphor, which holds that China is taking on
economic and investment projects with Indian Ocean states to secure ports
or places where its military forces could set up naval facilities or at the
very least, refueling and repair stations. Chinese experts dismiss this,
claiming that China seeks access, not bases, for economic gain. C. Raja
Mohan, director of Carnegie India, a regional center of the U.S.-based
Carnegie Endowment think tank, argues that as rising powers, China and
India’s pursuit of partnerships with smaller regional states is inevitable.
“Everyone is playing this game,” he says. “Bases is going to be the name
of the game in the Indian Ocean, and that game is going to be pretty
attractive in the coming years.”
Still, “maritime competition between China and India is still nascent and
should not be overblown,” cautions CFR’s Daniel S. Markey in
a Contingency Planning Memorandum. Still, he writes that a “tit-for-tat
politico-military escalation” is possible in the larger Indo-Pacific, a region
spanning both the Indian and Pacific oceans.
What fuels China-India tensions?
