VICENTE YU CHANG AND SOLEDAD YU CHANG, Petitioners, v.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent. G.R. No. 171726 : February 23, 2011

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS:

 Soledad Yu Chang, and brother, Vicente Yu Chang, filed a petition for registration of title over a
piece of land claiming that they are the co-owners of the subject lots.
 That they and their predecessors-in-interest “have been in actual, physical, material, exclusive,
open, occupation and possession of the above described parcels of land for more than 100
years”; and that allegedly, they have continuously, peacefully, and adversely possessed the
property in the concept of owners.
 The trial court rendered a Decision granting petitioners' application.
 The CA reversed the trial court's decision and dismissed petitioners’ application for land
registration on account that the land is classified as forest land and is thus not subject to
appropriation and alienation.
 The CA considered the petition to be governed by Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No.
141 or the Public Land Act, as amended, and held that petitioners were not able to present
incontrovertible evidence that the parcels of land sought to be registered are alienable and
disposable.
 Petitioners insist that the subject properties could no longer be considered and classified as
forest land since there are buildings, residential houses and even government structures existing
and standing on the land.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court erred in dismissing their application for registration of
title on the ground that they failed to prove compliance with the requirements of Section 48(b) of
thePublicLandAct.

HELD: The petition lacks merit.

CIVIL LAW: Forest land

Petitioners did not adduce any evidence to the effect that the lots subject of their application are
alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Instead, petitioners contend that the subject
properties could no longer be considered and classified as forest land since there are building
structures, residential houses and even government buildings existing and standing on the area.
This, however, is hardly the proof required under the law.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Unless and until the land
classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part
of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title
do not apply.DENIED.
Laurel vs. Garcia G.R. 92013 July 25, 1990
Art. 419-421
*Petition for injunction

Facts:
 The Philippine government acquired 4 properties in Japan under the Reparation Agreement
entered with the Japan on May 9, 1956, these properties procured from Japan are part of the
indemnification to the Filipinos for losses and sufferings during WWII, and one of those
properties is Roppongi property.
 The Roppongi property consist land and building was projected for chancery of the Philippine
Embassy however, the property was not developed due to lack of funds and the chancery was
later on transferred to Nampeidai. Under the administration of Pres. Cory Aquino, the
government intended to sell the said property. The first bidding was held but did not push
through because there’s only one competent bidder The next did not materialize and the third
one is restrained by this proceeding The petitioners argue that under the Art. 420 of the Civil
Code, the government cannot alienate the said property it being a property of public dominion
and therefore beyond the commerce of men.
 The respondents on the other hand, invokes that the property being situated in Japan, the Civil
Code inapplicable and the governing laws that will be followed will be that of Japan’s. They
argued that the lexsitus principle will apply.

Issue:
1) Whether the Roppongi property and other of its kind can be alienated by the Philippine Gov’t.

Held:
Answer’s in negative. See Arts. 419-421
There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has
become patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do.
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be
alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and enjoyment, an application
to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social group. The purpose is not to serve the
State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare and cannot
be the object of appropriation.

2) Whether the President, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction to sell the
property.
Negative.
The force and effect of law since the president already lost her legislative powers.
Del Fierroet. al. vs Rene SeguiranG.R. No. 152141 August 8, 2011

 Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they were the owners and possessors of a parcel of
land identified as Lot Nos. 1625 and 1626, formerly part of Lot No. 1197, situated at Barangay
Locloc, Palauig, Zambales. On July 26, 1964, Lodelfo and NarcisoMarcial unlawfully entered the
land occupied by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs sued them for forcible entry before the Municipal Court of
Palauig. The municipal court ruled in favor of plaintiffs, which decision was affirmed on appeal
by the CFI of Iba, Zambales, Branch II on August 1, 1973. Lodelfo and Narciso were ejected from
the premises.
 However, on June 29, 1964, LodelfoMarcial had mortgaged the lots to the Rural Bank of
San Marcelino, Inc., which foreclosed the real estate mortgage on December 26, 1972, and
consolidated ownership over the lots on April 22, 1982. On October 28,1981, defendant Rene S.
Seguiran purchased from LodelfoMarcial (deceased) the subject lots. On November 9,1981,
defendant purchased the subject lots again from the Rural Bank of San Marcelino, Inc.
Moreover, plaintiffs alleged that Lodelfo Marcial, predecessor-in-interest of defendant, had
no legal right to convey the said lots to plaintiffs, since he was merely a deforciant in the said
lots and was able to secure OCT Nos. P-7013 and P-7014 for Lot Nos. 1625 and 1626,respectively.
 On September 13, 1985, petitioners , filed a Complaint for reconveyance and cancellation of
titles against defendant Rene Seguiran, respondent herein, before the RTC of Iba, Zambales.
 RTC held that plaintiffs (petitioners) failed to prove the identity of the property sought to be
recovered as there is no clear showing that parts of Liozon became Locloc. Moreover, although
the Del Fierros were declared as the possessors of the property in the ejectment case (forcible
entry filed by Generosa del Fierro against Lodelfo and NarcisoMarcial, the property concerned in
the said case is Lot No. 1197. There was no evidence as to the original size of Lot No. 1197 and
no proof that Lot Nos. 1625 and 1626 formed part of Lot No. 1197.
 CA Affirmed RTC

Issue: Whether petitioners are entitled to reconveyance of Lot Nos. 1625 and 1626.

Held:

No. Petitioners are not entitled.

Art. 434. In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the
strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendants claim.
Article 434 of the Civil Code provides that to successfully maintain an action to recover the
ownership of a real property, the person who claims a better right to it must prove two (2)
things: first, the identity of the land claimed; and second, his title thereto.
In regard to the first requisite, in an accionreinvindicatoria, the person who claims that he has a better
right to the property must first fix the identity of the land he is claiming by describing the location, area
and boundaries thereof. Anent the second requisite, i.e., the claimant's title over the disputed area, the
rule is that a party can claim a right of ownership only over the parcel of land that was the object of the
deed.
Del Rosario v. Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc.G.R.No. 170575. June 8, 2011

Facts:

 Manuel del Rosario appears to be the registered owner of Lot 3-A of Psd-301974 located
inRoxas City which is described in and covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT).Sometime
in 1991, the Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc., (GRFI) as a legitimate foundation,took possession and
occupancy of said land by virtue of a memorandum of agreement it entered with Roxas City.
 Its possession and occupancy of said land is in the character of being a lessee thereof. In
February and March 2003, the Spouses Manuel and Florentinadel Rosario served notices upon
the GRFI to vacate the premises of said land. GRFI, however, did not heedsuch notices because it
still has the legal right to continue its possession and occupancy of said land.
 On July 2003, the spouses filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against GRFI before
theMunicipal Trial Court in Cities. Said complaint contains, among others, the following
significantallegations:
Plaintiffs are the true, absolute and registered owners of a parcel of land, situated
atDayao, Roxas City and covered by and described in TCT No. 18397 issued to the plaintiffsby
the Register of Deeds for Roxas City.
Sometime in 1991, without the consent and authority of the plaintiffs, defendant took
fullcontrol and possession of the subject property, developed the same and used it for
commercial purposes.7. Plaintiffs have allowed the defendant for several years, to make use of
the land withoutany contractual or legal basis. Hence, defendant’s possession of the subject
property is only by tolerance.
But plaintiffs’patience has come to its limits. Hence, sometime in the last quarter of
2002,plaintiffs made several demands upon said defendant to settle and/or pay rentals for the
useof the property. Notwithstanding receipt of the demand letters, defendant failed and
refused, as itcontinues to fail and refuse to pay reasonable monthly rentals for the use and
occupancy of the land, and to vacate the subject premises despite the lapse of the fifteen-day
period specified in the said demand letters. Consequently, defendant is unlawfully
withholding possession of the subject property from the plaintiffs, who are the owners thereof.
Issue:
Whether or notthe allegations in the Complaint establish a cause of action for forcible entry and not an
unlawful detainer?
Held:
Yes. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by meansof force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. Where the defendant’s possession of theproperty is illegalab
initio, the summary action for forcible entry (detentacion) is the remedy to recoverpossession.In their
Complaint, the spouses maintained that the GRFI took possession and control of the subject property
without any contractual or legal basis. Assuming thatthese allegations are true,it hence follows that
GRFI’s possession was illegal from the very beginning. Therefore, thefoundation of the spouses
Complaint is one for forcible entry – that is, the forcible exclusion of theoriginal possessor by a person
who has entered without right. Thus, there can be no tolerance as thespouses alleged that GRFI’s
possession was illegal at the inception.Corollarily, since the deprivation of physical possession, as alleged
in the spouses’ Complaint was attended by strategy and force, this Court finds that the
proper remedy for the spouses was tofile a Complaint for Forcible Entry and not the instant suit for
unlawful detainer.
Jose vsAlfuertoG.R. No. 169380 November 26, 2012.

FACTS:

 Respondents are occupying the property when on April 1, 1999, Chua Sing leased the property
involved to the petitioner which provides that the term of this lease shall be FIVE (5) years and
renewable for the same period upon mutual agreement of the parties to commence upon the
total eviction of any occupant or occupants. The LESSOR hereby transfers all its rights and
prerogative to evict said occupants in favor of the LESSEE which shall be responsible for all
expenses that may be incurred without reimbursement from the LESSOR. It is understood
however that the LESSOR is hereby waiving, in favor of the LESSEE any and all damages that may
be recovered from the occupants.
 Despite written demand to vacate and pay rent, respondents refused to do so, thus, petitioner
filed an ejectment case against the respondents before the MeTC.
 MeTC ruled in favor of the petitioner, held that the respondents had no right to possess the land
and that their occupation was merely by the owner’s tolerance.
 On these premises, the MeTC ordered the respondents to vacate the premises and to remove all
structures introduced on the land; to each pay P500.00 per month from the date of filing of this
case until they vacate the premises; and to pay Jose, jointly and severally, the costs of suit and
P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
 The RTC affirmed the MeTC decision
 The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC and MeTC decisions.
 The Court of Appeals emphasized that ejectment cases are summary proceedings where the
only issue to be resolved is who has a better right to the physical possession of a property. The
petitioner’s claim, on the other hand, is based on an accionpubliciana: he asserts his right as a
possessor by virtue of a contract of lease he contracted after the respondents had occupied the
land.

Issue: Whether unlawful detainer is the proper remedy.

Held:

No. Unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy for the present case.
The key issue in this case is whether an action for unlawful detainer is the proper remedy.
Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of real property. This action may
be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or
building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by
virtue of any contract, express or implied.
In unlawful detainer, the possession of the defendant was originally legal, as his possession was
permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express or implied contract between them. However, the
defendant’s possession became illegal when the plaintiff demanded that the defendant vacate the
subject property due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess under the contract, and the
defendant refused to heed such demand. A case for unlawful detainer must be instituted one year from
the unlawful withholding of possession.
The allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the
court. The complaint must specifically allege the facts constituting unlawful detainer. In the absence of
these allegations of facts, an action for unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy and the municipal
trial court or the MeTC does not have jurisdiction over the case.
Barrientos vs. Rapal

Facts:
 On April 15, 1998, respondent Mario Rapal acquired a parcel of land at Quezon city via a
notarized Deed of Transfer of Possessory Right. The parcel of land was said to be a portion of
the estate of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. Thereafter, respondent constructed a
semi-concrete house on the lot and took actual possession of the property by himself and
through his caretaker, Benjamin Tamayo.
 In 1993, Petitioner BienvinidoBarrientos and his family were allowed to stay in the subject
property as caretakers with a condition that they shall vacate the premises when the
respondent would need it. Upon demand to vacate, petitioner refused to leave the subject
property. Thus, respondent filed a complaint of Unlawful Detainer against the petitioner.
 MeTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondent. It ordered petitioner to vacate the
premises and to pay respondent a compensation for the use of the structure.
 RTC reversed the Decision of the MeTC and resolved in favor of petitioner, reasoning that
respondent has not shown any prior lawful possession of the property in question.
 CA rendered the assailed Decision reversing the decision of theRTC and reinstating the decision
of the MeTC. The CA found that both parties presentedweak evidence of ownership. In
determining who between the parties was first inpossession, the CA concluded that respondent
was, indeed, first in possession of thelot. Hence, petitioner elevated the case to the SC.

Issue: Whether unlawful detainer case is proper remedy.

Held:

Ejectment cases, forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary proceedings designed to provide
expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved. The
only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical
possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does
not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable. In an unlawful detainer case, the sole
issue for resolution is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim
of ownership by any of the parties. Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the
courts may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right to possess the property. The
adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same
parties involving title to the property.

It can be deduced that petitioner's occupation of the subject lot was by mere tolerance only. Petitioner
was initially permitted by respondent to occupy the lot as a caretaker. Petitioner even admitted this fact
in his Beneficiary Evaluation and Qualification Form.

Perusing respondent's complaint, respondent clearly makes out a case for unlawful detainer, since
petitioner's occupation of the subject property was by mere tolerance. A person who occupies the land
of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that he will vacate the same upon demand, failing which a summary action
for ejectment is the proper remedy against them
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC. V COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
 Spouses Jose are residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are owners of the land situated in
sitioInarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal (the land being disputed in the case at bar.)
 The spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing petitioner German
Management Services to develop their property. They have already acquired the proper permits
to do so but they discovered that the land was occupied by the respondent with 20 other
farmers (members of the Concerned of Farmer’s Association.) These farmers have occupied and
tilled the land for the last twelve to fifteen years prior to the issuance of the permits and they
already have their crops all over the property. In short, they are in actual possession of the land.
 Petitioners tried to forcibly drive the farmers away and demolish and bulldoze their crops and
property.
 The respondents filed an forcible entry case against GMSI because they were deprived of their
property without due process of law by trespassing, demolishing and bulldozing their crops and
property situated in the land.
 MTC dismissed private respondents' complaint for forcible entry.
 RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch LXXI sustained the dismissal by the MTC.
 CA reversed the decision of MTC and RTC held that since private respondents were in actual
possession of the property at the time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private
respondents have a right to commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or
illegality of possession.

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against petitioner?

HELD:
YES, they are entitled to file a forcible entry case! Since private respondents were in actual possession of
the property at the time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents have a right to
commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of possession.
Private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry case against petitioner
because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never determines the
actual title to an estate. Title is not involved, only actual possession. It is undisputed that private
respondents were in possession of the property and not the petitioners nor the spouses Jose. Although
the petitioners have a valid claim over ownership this does not in any way justify their act of ―forcible
entry.
It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property the party in
peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party
who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever
may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that
entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by
accionpubliciana or accionreivindicatoria.
The doctrine of self help, which the petitioners were using to justify their actions, are not applicable in
the case because it can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is
absent in the case at bar (in fact they are the ones who are threatening to remove the respondents with
the use of force.) Article 536 basically tells us that the owner or a person who has a better right over the
land must resort to judicial means to recover the property from another person who possesses the land.
When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of
property.
G.R. No. L-43938 April 15, 1988

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT), petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) and JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents

FACTS:

 February 11, 1965, Jose de la Rosa applied for the registration of a parcel of land situated in
Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, which was divided into 9 lots that he bought from
fromMamayaBalbalio and Jaime Alberto in 1964.
 The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big
Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9.
 Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it
on September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in
September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909.
 Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and Fredia
mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on
January 2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder of Baguio.
 The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought
to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No.
217 dated February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation
under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
 RTC denied the application
 CA reversed, recognized the claims of the applicant, but subject to the rights of Benguet and
Atok respecting their mining claims. In other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface
rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of
Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claim.

ISSUE: Whether the subject lots are forest land and thus, inalienable.

HELD:

NO. Lots are no longer forest lands.

The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and Emma mineral claims of Atok having been
perfected prior to the approval of the Constitution of the Philippines of 1935, they were removed from
the public domain and had become private properties of Benguet and Atok.

Once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time,
such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of
its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any private
party, including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining
operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of course entitled to
just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings. 21

Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their
respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the
alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at
the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to the private
respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them
and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, -versus- LUCMAN G. IBRAHIM et. al, G.R. No. 168732
June 29, 2007

Facts:

 Ibrahim and his co-heirs own several parcels of land located in Lanaodel Norte which was
divided into three lots.
 In 1978, NAPOCOR, without consent of the heirs, took possession of the sub-terrain area of the
land and constructed underground tunnels on the said property.
 The tunnels were apparently being used by NAPOCOR in siphoning the water of Lake Lanao and
in the operation of NAPOCOR’s Agus projects.
 In 1991, Maruhom (one of the co-heirs of Ibrahim) requested Marawi City Water District for a
permit to construct or install a motorized deep well on the parcel of land but it was rejected on
the grounds that the construction would cause danger to lives and property by reason of the
presence of the underground tunnels.
 Maruhom demanded NAPOCOR to pay damages and to vacate the sub-terrain portion of the
land but the latter refused to vacate, much less, pay damages.
 Ibrahim and his co-heirs instituted an action against petitioner NAPOCOR for recovery of
possession of land and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanaodel Sur.
 RTC the action however, ordered NAPOCOR to pay the fair market value of the subject land and
the rent.
 CA reinstated original RTC judgment.

Issue: WON Ibrahim is the rightful owner of the sub-terrain area of the land.If yes, are they entitled to
the payment of just compensation.

Held: YES. The sub-terrain portion of the property belongs to Ibrahim.

The Supreme Court cited Article 437 of the Civil Code which provides that: The owner of a parcel of land
is the owner of its surface and of everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works or make
any plantations and excavations which he may deem proper, without detriment to servitudes and
subject to special laws and ordinances. xxx

Hence, the ownership of land extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil under it. Therefore,
Ibrahim owns the property as well as the sub-terrain area of the land where the underground tunnels
were constructed.

On the issue of just compensation, the Supreme Court also said that Ibrahim should be paid a just
compensation.

Ibrahim could have dug upon their property and built motorized deep wells but was prevented from
doing so by the authorities because of the construction of the tunnels underneath the surface of the
land.

Ibrahim still had a legal interest in the sub-terrain portion insofar as they could have excavated the same
for the construction of the deep wells. It has been shown that the underground tunnels have deprived
the plaintiffs of the lawful use of the land and considerably reduced its value.

It was held that: If the government takes property without expropriation and devotes the property to
public use, after many years, the property owner may demand payment of just compensation in the
event restoration of possession is neither convenient nor feasible. This is in accordance with the
principle that persons shall not be deprived of their property except by competent authority and for
public use and always upon payment of just compensation.
EDNA PALERO-TAN, Complainant, - versus - CIRIACO I. URDANETA, JR., UTILITY WORKER I, RTC,
BRANCH 14, BAYBAY, LEYTE, Respondent.

Facts:
 Edna Palero-Tan (complainant) a Court Stenographer III of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
14, Baybay, Leytecharged Ciriaco I. Urdaneta, Jr. (respondent), Utility Worker I of the same
court, with Conduct Unbecoming a Court Personnel, for stealing her ring and bracelet.
 Urdaneta allegedly found a plastic containing the ring and bracelet belonging to Edna Tan,
however, when his wife found the jewelry in his pouch his wife suspected that he bought the
jewelry for his mistress.
 Edna Tan is informed her colleagues that she lost jewelry.
 Despite knowledge that Tan was looking for her jewelry, Urdaneta did not return the jewelry
instead he threw it away when he quarreled with his wife suspected that he bought the jewelry
for a mistress.

Issues:

Whether or not Urdaneta can be faulted for throwing away the jewelry he found.

Held:

Yes, he can be faulted.

When a person who finds a thing that has been lost or mislaid by the owner takes the thing into his
hands, he acquires physical custody only and does not become vested with legal possession. In assuming
such custody, the finder is charged with the obligation of restoring the thing to its owner. It is thus
respondent’s duty to report to his superior or his officemates that he found something. The Civil Code,
in Article 719, explicitly requires the finder of a lost property to report it to the proper authorities, thus:

Article 719. Whoever finds a movable, which is not treasure, must return it to its previous possessor. If
the latter is unknown, the finder shall immediately deposit it with the mayor of the city or municipality
where the finding has taken place.
The finding shall be publicly announced by the mayor for two consecutive weeks in the way he deems
best.

If the movables cannot be kept without deterioration, or without the expenses which considerably
diminish its value, it shall be sold at public auction eight days after the publication.

Six months from the publication having elapsed without the owner having appeared, the thing found, or
its value, shall be awarded to the finder. The finder and the owner shall be obliged, as the case may be,
to reimburse the expenses.
MARIANO FLOREZA, petitioner, vs. MARIA D. de EVANGELISTA and SERGIOEVANGELISTA, respondents
G.R. No. L-25462 February 21, 1980

FACTS

 Plaintiffs Maria de Evangelista and Sergio Evangelista, who are mother and son, (the
EVANGELISTAS, for short) are the owners of a residential lot located at Sumilang St., Tanay,
Rizal, with an area of 204.08 sq. ms., assessed at P410.00.
 In May 1945, the EVANGELISTAS borrowed from FLOREZA the amount of P100.00.
 On or about November 1945, with the consent of the EVANGELISTAS, FLOREZA occupied the
above residential lot and built thereon a house of light materials (barong- barong) without any
agreement as to payment for the use of said residential lot owing to the fact that the
EVANGELISTAS has then a standing loan of P100.00 in favor of FLOREZA.
 On the following dates, the EVANGELISTAS again borrowed the indicated amounts: September
16, 1946 — P100.00; August 17, 1947 — P200,00; January 30, 1949 — P200.00; April 1, 1949 —
P140.00, or a total of P740.00 including the first loan
 January 1949: Floreza demolished the house of light material and constructedone of strong
material assessed at P1400. Floreza has not been paying anyrentals since the beginning of
their transactions.
 August 1949: Evangelistas sold, with a right to repurchase within 6 years,their land
to Floreza for P1000.
 Seven months before the expiry of the repurchase period, the Evangelistaswere
able to pay in full.
 Floreza refused to vacate the lot unless he was first reimbursed for the valueof the house he
built.
 Evangelistas filed a complaint. CFI ruled based on Art, 448 of the Civil Codesaying that
Evangelistas have the choice between purchasing the house orselling the land to
Floreza.
 CA ruled that Art. 448 was inapplicable and that Floreza was not entitled tot h e
reimbursement of his house and could remove the same at his
o w n expense.

ISSUE:

1.WONFloreza was entitled to reimbursement of the cost of his house.

2.WON he (his heirs who replaced him) should pay rental of the land.

HELD:

YES.
1) The issue of reimbursement is not moot because if Floreza has no right of retention, then he
must pay damages in the form of rentals. Agree with CA that Art. 448 is inapplicable because it
applies only when the builder is in good faith (he believed he had a right to
build).Art. 453 is also n o t a p p l i c a b l e b e c a u s e i t r e q u i r e s b o t h o f t h e
p a r t i e s t o b e i n b a d f a i t h . Neither is Art. 1616 applicable because Floreza is not a
vendeea retro.
Theho u s e w a s a l r e a d y c o n s t r u c t e d i n 1 9 4 5 ( l i g h t m a t e r i a l s ) e v e n b e f o r e t
h e pacto de retrowas entered into in 1949.Floreza cannot be classified as a builder in
good faith nor a vendeea retro, who made useful improvements during thepacto de retro,
he has no right to reimbursement of the value of the house, much less to the
retention of the premises until he is paid.His rights are more akin to a usufructury
under Art. 579, who may make onthe property useful improvements but with no right to
be indemnified thereof,He may, however, remove such improvements should it be possible to
do sowithout damage to the property.
2) F r o m t h e t i m e t h e r e d e m p t i o n p r i c e w a s p a i d i n J a n u a r y 3 , 1 9 5 5 ,
F l o r e z a ’ s right to use the residential lot without rent ceased. He should be held liable for
damages in the form of rentals for the continued use of the lot for P10monthly from
January 3, 1955 until the house was removed and the property vacated by Floreza or his heirs.
G.R. No. L-44001 June 10, 1988

PAZ MERCADO, CAROLINA S. CHICO, LUCIANA CABRERA, JOAQUIN IGNACIO, ELMER FLORES, AVELINA
C. NUCOM, et al., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO PUNO, LOLITA C. BULAONG, FLORENTINO AGULTO,
SEVERINO SALAYSAY, SUSANA BERNARDINO, et al

FACTS:
 From 1956 to 1972, BulaongGroup, had for many years been individual lessees of stalls in the
public market of Baliuag, Bulacan.
 The market was destroyed by fire on February 17, 1956; the members of the Bulaong Group
constructed new stalls therein at their expense; and they thereafter paid rentals thereon to the
Municipality of Baliuag.
 Sometime in 1972 the members of Bulaong Group sub leased the stalls to Mercado Group.
 Subsequently, while the Mercado Group was occupying the stalls, as sub-lessees, the municipal
officials of Baliuag cancelled the long standing leases of the Bulaong Group in favor of the
Mercado Group on the basis of their Municipal Ordinance which prohibit the sub-leasing of
stalls by the lessees.
 Bulaong Group filed complaints with the Court of First Instance seeking recovery of their stalls
from the Mercado Group as well as damages. Their theory was anchored on their claimed
ownership of the stalls constructed by them at their own expense, and their resulting right, as
such owners, to sub-lease the stalls, and necessarily, to recover them from any person
withholding possession thereof from them.
 RTC ruled Bulaong Group to be builders in good faith, entitled to retain possession of the stalls
respectively put up by them until and unless indemnified for the value thereof.

ISSUE:
Whether the Bulaong Group are builders in Good Faith.

HELD:
NEGATIVE.
The members of this group were admittedly lessees of space in the public market; they
therefore could not, and in truth never did make the claim, that they were owners of any part of the
land occupied by the market so that in respect of any new structure put up by them thereon, they could
be deemed builders in good faith. To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person
assert title to the land on which he builds; i.e., that he be a possessor in concept of owner, and that he
be unaware "that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. It is such a
builder in good faith who is given the right to retain the thing, even as against the real owner, until he
has been reimbursed in full not only for the necessary expenses but also for useful expenses.On the
other hand, unlike the builder in good faith, a lessee who "makes in good faith useful improvements
which are suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, without altering the form or substance of
the property leased," can only claim payment of "one-half of the value of the improvements" or, "should
the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, ... remove the improvements, even though the principal
thing may suffer damage thereby.
ROSENDO BALUCANAG, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE ALBERTO J. FRANCISCO and RICHARD
STOHNER, respondents. G.R. No. L-33422 May 30, 1983

FACTS:

 Cecilia dela Cruz Charvet was the owner of lot located in Zamora Street, Pandacan, Manila.
 On August 31, 1952, Mrs. Charvet leased said lot to respondent Richard Stohner for a period of
five [5] years at the monthly rental of 2140.00, payable in advance within the first ten [10] days
of each month. The lease contract provided, among others, that:

IV. The lessee may erect such buildings upon and make such improvements to the
leased land as he shag see fit. All such buildings and improvements shall remain the property of
the lessee and he may remove them at any nine, it being agreed, however, that should he not
remove the said buildings and improvements within a period of two months after the expiration
of this Agreement, the Lessor may remove the said buildings and improvements or cause them
to be removed at the expense of the Lessee.

 During the existence of the lease, Stohner made fillings on the land and constructed a house
thereon, said improvements being allegedly valued at P35,000.00.
 On March 8, 1966, Mrs. Charvet sold the said lot to petitioner RosendoBalucanag.
 For Stohner's failure to pay the rents, Balucanag, thru counsel, wrote Stohner a letter
demanding that he vacate the premises.
 Stohner, claimed that he was a builder in good faith of the residential house erected in the land.

ISSUE: Whether Stohner (as lessee) is a builder in good faith?

HELD:

NEGATIVE. The lessee cannot be considered a builder in good faith.

The provision under Art. 448 of the New Civil Code on a builder of good faith applies only to the owner
of the land who believes he is the rightful owner thereof, but not to a lessee who's interest in the land is
derived only from a rental contract. Neither can Stohner be considered a 'possessor in good faith'. A
possessor in good faith is a party who possesses property believing that he is its rightful owner but
discovers later on a flaw in his title that could indicate that he might not be its legal owner. It cannot
apply to a lessee because he knows right from the start that he is merely a lessee and not the owner of
the premises.
As a mere lessee, he introduces improvements to the property at his own risk such that he cannot
recover from the owner the reimbursements nor he has any right to retain the premises until
reimbursements. What applies in this case is Art. 1678 (NCC) which provides that, " if the lessee, makes,
in good faith, useful improvements which are suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, without
altering the form or substance of the property leased, the lessor upon the termination of the lease shall
pay the lessee 1/2 of the value of the improvements at the time. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse
said amount, the lessee may remove the improvements even though the principal thing may suffer
damage thereby. He shall not, however, cause any more impairment upon the property leased than is
necessary."
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. GENEROSO DE JESUS, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact,
CHRISTIAN DE JESUS, respondent. [G.R. No. 149295. September 23, 2003]

FACTS:

 Respondent acquired a parcel of land situated in Mamburao, OccidentalMindoro,

 After the survey of the property and he discovered that the northern portion of the lot was
being encroached upon by a building of petitioner to the extent of 124 square meters. Despite
two letters of demand sent by respondent, petitioner failed and refused to vacate the area.
 10 June 1995, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of
Occidental Mindoro for recovery of ownership and possession, with damages, over the
questioned property
 The trial court decided the case in favor of respondent declaring him to be the rightful owner of
the disputed 124-square-meter portion of the lot and ordering petitioner to surrender
possession of the property to respondent and to cause, at its expense, the removal of any
improvement thereon.
 The Court of Appeals, on appeal, sustained the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether PNB is in bad faith

HELD:
NEGATIVE. PNB is a builder in good faith.
Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown, or planted in good
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the
indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price
of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged
to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such a case, he shall
pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after
proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the
court shall fix the terms thereof.
Article 449. He who builds, plants, or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is
built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.
Article 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad
faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to
replace things in their former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he
may compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.
A builder in good faith can, under the foregoing provisions, compel the landowner to make a
choice between appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay
the price of the land. The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle
of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around. Even as the
option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. He much choose one. He
cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the building to instead remove it from the land. In order,
however, that the builder can invoke that accruing benefit and enjoy his corresponding right to demand
that a choice be made by the landowner, he should be able to prove good faith on his part.
Good faith, here understood, is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning
or statutory definition, and it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of
malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. An individual’s
personal good faith is a concept of his own mind and, therefore, may not conclusively be determined by
his protestations alone. It implies honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances
which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the
validity of ones right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach
another. Applied to possession, one is considered in good faith if he is not aware that there exists in his
title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
URBANO JAVIER and LEONILA ALBIELA, petitioners, vs. HON. HERMOGENES CONCEPCION, JR., Hon.
ANDRES REYES, Hon. LUIS REYES, LIM CHUA, TAN TIAN ON alias TAN TIAN UNA and TAN SIOK TAN
alias TAN SIOK TUAN, respondents. G.R. No. L-36566 November 7, 1979

FACTS:
 Lim Chua, Tan Tian On and Tan Sick Tan filed for the reconveyance of a parcel of land (Lot 12)
against Urbano Javier and LeonilaAlbiela. Lot 12 is allegedly a portion of a big parcel of land (Lot
6) located in Quezon. It was alleged that Lot 12 was ordered excluded from Lot 6 by Chua et. al.
They said that Lot 12 can never be a part of Lot 6 because the Guhit River serves as a natural
boundary between the Lot 12 (which was located in Dolores, Quezon) and Lot 6 (located in
Candelaria, Quezon).
 As a defense, Javier alleged that they acquired Lot 12 by part-purchase and part-inheritance;
that they have a Spanish title to the lot; that the lot was adjudicated to their predecessors-in-
interest in Land Registration Cases, that they have declared the land for tax purposes; that they
planted the land with numerous fruits w/o interference from Chua et. al; and that Chua et. al,
were never owners of Lot 12 as they have acquired their title through fraud and deceit.
 The court a quo rendered judgment in favor of Chua et. al. It held that Lot 12 was part of Lot 6
as evidenced by the records of the Chief Surveyor of the Land Registration Office. Javier knew of
this fact. His contention that the Commissioner’s report and the plotted area should not be
admitted has no merit because of the manifestation of the Chief Surveyor.
 The CA affirmed the decision thus the certiorari.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not there was fraud (BAD FAITH) in the registration of Lot 12.
2. Who is entitled to the fruits.

HELD:

1) NEGATIVE. Fraud as a legal basis for review of a decree means actual/positive fraud as
distinguished from constructive/legal fraud. Actual fraud is a question of fact. Lot 12 was found
to be part of Lot 6 under TCT 16817 issued in the name of Chua. Furthermore, the decree of
registration has long become final. Under sec 38 of Land Registration Act: the person allegedly
deprived of the land by a decree of registration under fraud should file in the CFI a petition for
review w/in 1 yr. after the entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value has
acquired an interest. Granting that there was no actual/ positive fraud in securing the title,
Javier is barred from questioning it.
2) As possessors in good faith, petitioners are entitled to the fruits received before their possession
was legally interrupted upon receipt of judicial summons in connection with the filing of the
complaint for reconveyance on October 17, 1959.
For the difference of a few days or about two (2) weeks in reckoning the starting date of
possession in bad faith will not materially affect the prevailing party's entitlement to the fruits of
the holding since the same will be reckoned seasonally. Petitioners should also be refunded the
necessary and useful expenses, with the right to retain the land until reimbursed of the same,
pursuant to Article 546 of the Civil Code. Under the said provision, respondents have the option
to refund the amount of useful expenses or to pay the increase in value which the land may
have acquired by reason thereof.
SPOUSES JUAN NUGUID AND ERLINDA T. NUGUID, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND
PEDRO P. PECSON, respondents. [G.R. No. 151815. February 23, 2005]

FACTS:
 Pedro P. Pecson owned a commercial lot located at 27 Kamias Road, Quezon City, on which he
built a four-door two-storey apartment building.For failure to pay realty taxes, the lot was sold
at public auction by the City Treasurer of Quezon City to MamertoNepomuceno, who in turn
sold it for P103,000 to the spouses Juan and Erlinda Nuguid.
 Pecson challenged the validity of the auction sale before the RTC of Quezon City.
 RTC upheld the spouses title but declared that the four-door two-storey apartment building was
not included in the auction sale.
 Court of Appeals affirmed RTC and thereafter by the Supreme Court
 On June 23, 1993, by virtue of the Entry of Judgment of the aforesaid decision, the Nuguids
became the uncontested owners of the 256-square meter commercial lot.
 As a result, the Nuguid spouses moved for delivery of possession of the lot and the apartment
building.

ISSUE: Whether Pecson is entitled to retain the ownership of the building and retain the fruits thereof
while the value thereof was not fully reimbursed.
Whether Pecson may be compelled in paying the rent while period of retention is in effect.

HELD:
AFFIRMATIVE.Under Article 448, the landowner is given the option, either to appropriate the
improvement as his own upon payment of the proper amount of indemnity or to sell the land to the
possessor in good faith. Relatedly, Article 546 provides that a builder in good faith is entitled to full
reimbursement for all the necessary and useful expenses incurred; it also gives him right of retention
until full reimbursement is made.
While the law aims to concentrate in one person the ownership of the land and the improvements
thereon in view of the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, it guards against
unjust enrichment insofar as the good-faith builders improvements are concerned. The right of
retention is considered as one of the measures devised by the law for the protection of builders in good
faith. Its object is to guarantee full and prompt reimbursement as it permits the actual possessor to
remain in possession while he has not been reimbursed (by the person who defeated him in the case for
possession of the property) for those necessary expenses and useful improvements made by him on the
thing possessed.
Accordingly, a builder in good faith cannot be compelled to pay rentals during the period of
retention nor be disturbed in his possession by ordering him to vacate.
In addition, as in this case, the owner of the land is prohibited from offsetting or compensating the
necessary and useful expenses with the fruits received by the builder-possessor in good
faith. Otherwise, the security provided by law would be impaired. This is so because the right to the
expenses and the right to the fruits both pertain to the possessor, making compensation juridically
impossible; and one cannot be used to reduce the other.
EDEN BALLATAN and SPS. BETTY MARTINEZ and CHONG CHY LING, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, GONZALO GO, WINSTON GO, LI CHING YAO, ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE and
JOSE N. QUEDDING, respondents. [G.R. No. 125683. March 2, 1999]

FACTS:
 Eden Ballatan, together with other petitioners, is living in and registered owners of Lot No. 24.
Respondent Winston Go is living in and registered owners of Lot No. 25 and 26. And Li Ching Yao
is living in and the registered owner of Lot. 27.
 The Lots are adjacent to each other.WhenBallatan constructed her house in her lot, she noticed
that the concrete fence and side pathway of the adjoining house of respondent Winston Go
encroached on the entire length of the eastern side of her property. She was informed by her
contractor of this discrepancy, who then told respondent Go of the same.
 Respondent, however, claims that his house was built within the parameters of his father’s lot;
and that this lot was surveyed by engineer Jose Quedding, the authorized surveyor of Araneta
Institute of Agriculture (AIA).
 Petitioner called the attention of AIA on the matter and so the latter authorized another survey
of the land by Engineer Quedding. The latter then did the survey twice which led to the
conclusion that Lots Nos 25, 26 (owned by respondent Go) and 27 (owned by Li Ching Yao)
moved westward to the eastern boundary of Lot 24 (owned by petitioner Ballatan.)
 It was later on discovered by the courts that Go encroached 42 square meters from the property
of Ballatan and Yao encroached 37 square meters on Go’s property, all of which were in GOOD
FAITH
 Ballatan made written demands to the respondent to dismantle and move their improvements
and since the latter wasn’t answering the petitioner filed accionpubliciana in court. Go’s filed
their “Answer with Third-Party Complaint” impleading as third party defendants respondents Li
Ching Yao, the AIA and Engineer Quedding.
 RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner ordering respondent Go to demolish their improvements and
pay damages to Petitioner but dismissing the third-party complaint.
 CA affirmed the dismissal of the third party-complaint as to AIA but reinstated the the complaint
against Yao and the Engineer. CA also affirmed the demolition and damages awarded to
petitioner and added that Yao should also pay respondent for his encroachment of respondent
Go’s property. Jose Quedding was also ordered to pay attorney’s fees for his negligence which
caused all this fuzz.

ISSUE: 1)Whohas the make an option when both Land Owner and Builder are in Good faith.Where
should the value of the property be based on.

HELD:
Art 448 is the proper remedy (Lower Courts are wrong in awarding the damages). It was established in
the case that the parties had no knowledge of the encroachment until Ballatan noticed it there all of
them were builders in Good faith. In that scenario they have two options. 1st option is that the land
owner will buy the improvements and the 2nd option is to oblige the builders to buy the land given that
the value of the land is not considerably more than the buildings or tree; otherwise the owner may
remove the improvements thereon.
The builder, planter or sower, however, is not obliged to purchase the land if its value is considerably
more than the building, planting or sowing. In such case, the builder, planter or sower must pay rent to
the owner of the land. If the parties cannot come to terms over the conditions of the lease, the court
must fix the terms thereof. The right to choose between appropriating the improvement or selling the
land on which the improvement of the builder, planter or sower stands, is given to the owner. If the
option chooses is to sell the lot, the price must be fixed at the prevailing market value at the time of
payment.
Petitioner was given by SC 30 days to decide on what to do or which right to exercise. Likewise, Go was
also given time to do the regarding Yao’s encroachment. Engineer Quedding was still asked to pay
attorney’s fees.
HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND HEIRS OF
SINFOROSO PASCUAL, respondents. [G.R. No. 68166. February 12, 1997]

Parties:
Heirs of Emiliano Navarro: petitioner
IAC and Heirs of SinforosoPascual: respondents

Facts:
 SinforosoPascual (+) filed an application for foreshore lease covering a tract of foreshore land in
Bataan with approx. 17 hectares.
 Predecessors-in-interest of Emiliano Navarro also filed a fishpond application with the Bureau of
Fisheries covering 25 hectares of foreshore land, also situated in Bataan. Initially, this application
was denied by the Director of Fisheries on the ground that it formed part of public domain.
However, upon MFR, the Director of Fisheries gave the application due course and approved the
application only insofar as 7 hectares are concerned.
 Sinforoso then filed an application to register and confirm his title over a parcel of land in Bataan,
as he claimed that the land was his as that was an accretion to his property.
 The land was bounded by Talisay River (east), Bulacan River (west) and Manila Bay (north). The
Talisay River and Bulacan River flow downstream to Manila Bay thereby positing sand and silt on
Pascual's property resulting in an accretion. Pascua claimed this as accretion as the riparian
owner.
 Assistant Solicitor General, filed an opposition, indicating that the land title to subject property
belongs to the properties of the State and should not be disturbed.
 During the pendency of the case, SinforosaPascual filed a complaint for ejectment against
Emiliano Navarro, Marcelo Lopez and their privies alleging that the latter obtained the ownership
through stealth, force and strategy.
 Lower court ruled against SinforosaPascual.
 Pascual&Emiliano died.
 Upon appeal, the CA respondent reversed the findings of the lower court.

ISSUE: Whether the land sought for is a product of accretion, and should be registered.

HELD:

NO, the land sought for is not a product of accretion; the land is a part and parcel of public. domain.
Accretion, as part of acquiring ownership should comply with the following requisites:
(1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible;
(2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where the
accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.
(3) Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited, while alluvium is the soil deposited on
the estate fronting the river bank.

The alluvium, by mandate of Article 457 of the Civil Code, is automatically owned by the riparian
owner from the moment the soil deposit can be seen but is not automatically registered property, hence,
subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
Lastly, the accretion formed from Manila Bay is not an accretion on a river bank, but that of a sea bank.
This sea bank is automatically part of public domain, thus cannot be registered. Only the executive and
possibly the legislative departments have the right and the power to make the declaration so that the
lands gained be capable of appropriating.
DESAMPARADO VDA. DE NAZARENO and LETICIA NAZARENO TAPIA, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, MR. & MRS. JOSE SALASALAN, MR. & MRS. LEO RABAYA, AVELINO LABIS, HON. ROBERTO G.
HILARIO, ROLLEO I. IGNACIO, ALBERTO M. GILLERA and HON. ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR., in their official
and/or private capacities, respondents. [G.R. No. 98045. June 26, 1996]

FACTS:
 Sometime in 1979, private respondents Jose Salasalan and Leo Rabaya leased the subject lots on
which their houses stood from one Antonio Nazareno, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest.
 In the latter part of 1982, private respondents allegedly stopped paying rentals. As a result,
Antonio Nazareno and petitioners filed a case for ejectment with the Municipal Trial Court of
Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 4.
 Before he died, Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of the survey
plan designated as Plan Csd-106-00571 with a view to perfecting his title over the accretion area
being claimed by him.
 Before the approved survey plan could be released to the applicant, however, it was protested
by private respondents before the Bureau of Lands.
 In compliance with the order of respondent District Land Officer Alberto M. Gillera, respondent
Land Investigator Avelino G. Labis recommended the cancellation of the survey plan
 Antonio Nazareno filed a motion for reconsideration with respondent Rolleo Ignacio,
Undersecretary of the Department of Natural Resources and Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of
Lands who denied the motion.
 Respondent Director of Lands AbelardoPalad then ordered him to vacate the portions
adjudicated to private respondents and remove whatever improvements they have introduced
thereon. He also ordered that private respondents be placed in possession thereof.
 Upon the denial of the late Antonio Nazareno's motion for reconsideration, petitioners
DesamparadoVda. de Nazareno and Leticia Tapia Nazareno, filed a case before the RTC, Branch
22 for annulment of the previous orders by the other RTC branches
 RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies which resulted in
the finality of the administrative decision of the Bureau of Lands.
 CA affirmed the decision of the RTC dismissing the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject land is public land.

HELD:

YES. LAND IS PUBLIC LAND.

Accretion, as a mode of acquiring property under Art. 457 of the Civil Code, requires the
concurrence of these requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the
land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks or rivers (or the sea coast). These are called
the rules on alluvion which if present in a case, give to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
or streams any accretion gradually received from the effects of the current of waters.
For petitioners to insist on the application of these rules on alluvion to their case, the above-
mentioned requisites must be present. However, they admit that the accretion was formed by the
dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials on portions of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan
River bounding their land. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the accumulation of such boulders, soil
and other filling materials was gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the action of the waters or the
current of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River.
The word "current" indicates the participation of the body of water in the ebb and flow of waters
due to high and low tide. Petitioners' submission not having met the first and second requirements of
the rules on alluvion, they cannot claim the rights of a riparian owner.
In the case at bar, the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun
Valley Lumber Co. consequent to its sawmill operations. Even if this Court were to take into
consideration petitioners' submission that the accretion site was the result of the late Antonio
Nazareno's labor consisting in the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials into the
Balacanas Creek and Cagayan River bounding his land, the same would still be part of the public domain.

PEDRO P. ROXAS, petitioner-appellee, vs. JULIA TUASON, THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN PEDRO MACATI,
AND ALEJANDRO AND CONSOLACION AGUIRRE, respondents-appellants. G.R. No. L-3788 December
21, 1907

FACTS:

 On February 19, 1906, attorneys Rosado, Sanz&Opisso, on behalf of Pedro P. Roxas, applied
for the registration of the estate owned by the said Roxas, known as the Hacienda de San
Pedro Macati, in accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act;
 The hacienda was acquired by the petitioner by inheritance under the will of his late father,
Jose BonifacioRoxas, y Ubaldo.
 He constructed building thereon in strong materials
 The owners of the adjoining properties having been summoned and notified by means of
subpoenas and notices published in the daily papers.
 Julia Tuason (neighbor), appeared and set forth her opposition to the registration and
authentication of the title of Roxas, as regards the parcel marked "C," for the reason that
two old monuments which had separated their respective properties had been pulled down
and new ones erected without her consent, and in her opinion the latter included a
considerable portion of the land owned by her.
 The municipality of San Pedro Macati also filed opposition to the requested registration,
alleging that the land occupied by the municipal building and the public school had been in
the possession of the town from time immemorial, and that all the land occupied by roads,
highways, lanes, and public landing places belonged to the public domain and should be
excluded from registration in favor of the petitioner.
 Alejandro Aguirre and Consolacion Aguirre also filed opposition to said application for
registration alleging that the two parcels of land owned by them had been improperly
included within the bounds of said hacienda.
 The court dismissed the opposition and ordered the registration of the land in question.

ISSUE: Whether there was accretion on the property sought to be registered, if there is, is the
registration proper?

HELD:

Article 366 of the Civil Code in dealing with the right of accession to real property reads:

The accretions which banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effects of the currents belong to the
owners of the estates bordering thereon.

The provision in this article is perfectly applicable to the strip of land, which, on account of the
accretion, has come to be undeniable increase in the land of the hacienda inasmuch as it has increased
all along the bank of the creek, the gradual effect of the currents; and even though the law does not
require an express act of possession of the accretion which has enlarged the estate, it is certain that the
owner of the hacienda has possessed it for more than thirty years through his tenants, who have been
cultivating their respective parcels of land together with the corresponding portion of the said strip
down to the bank of said creek.

RTC judgment is affirmed.

LEONIDA CUREG CARNIYAN ET AL petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, (4TH CIVIL CASES
DIVISION), DOMINGO APOSTOL, SOLEDAD GERARDO, ROSA GERARDO, NIEVES GERARDO, FLORDELIZA
GERARDO, AND LILIA MAQUINAD, respondent. G.R. No. 73465 September 7, 1989

FACTS:

 Respondents are the successors in interest of one the late Domingo Apostol who have been in
actual, open, peaceful and continuous possession, under a bona fide claim of ownership and
adverse to all other claimants, of a parcel of land (referred to as their "motherland"), situated in
Casibarag-Cajel, Cabagan, Isabela.
 In 1979, respondents Soledad Gerardo, Rosa Gerardo, Nieves Gerardo, Flordeliza Gerardo and
Lilia Maquinad verbally sold the "motherland" to co-respondent Domingo Apostol;
 On September 10, 1982, the verbal sale and conveyance was reduced into writing by the
vendors who executed an "Extra-Judicial Partition with Voluntary Reconveyance
 That about the time of the execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition, their "motherland" already
showed/manifested signs of accretion of about three (3) hectares on the north caused by the
northward movement of the Cagayan River;
 That Domingo Apostol declared the motherland and its accretion for tax purposes under Tax
Declaration No. 08-13281 on September 15, 1982.
 When private respondents were about to cultivate their "motherland" together with its
accretion, they were prevented and threatened by petitioners herein from continuing to do so.
 Further, the complaint stated that Antonio Carniyan was the owner of a piece of land situated in
Casibarag-Cajel, Cabagan, Isabela.
 Petitioners' answer alleged that the "motherland" claimed by private respondents is non-
existent;
 Antonio Carniyan, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, was the owner of a piece of land
bounded on the north by Cagayan River and not by the land of Francisco Gerardo as claimed by
private respondents;
 That the "subject land" is an accretion to their registered land and that petitioners have been in
possession and cultivation of the "accretion" for many years now.
 On November 5, 1982, private respondents, filed a complaint for quieting of title and damages
with preliminary injunction against herein petitioners
 CFI deniedthe application on the ground that the defendants were in actual possession of the
land in litigation prior to September 1982.
 Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed

ISSUE: To whom does the land belong.

HELD:
Anent Tax Declaration No. 13131, in the name of Antonio Carniyan (Exhibit "C", p. 203, Rollo), which the
appellate court considered as an admission by him that his land is bounded on the north by the land of
Domingo Gerardo and that he (Carniyan) is now estopped from claiming otherwise, We hold that said
tax declaration, being of an earlier date cannot defeat an original certificate of title which is of a later
date. Since petitioner's original certificate of title clearly stated that subject land is bounded on the
north by the Cagayan River, private respondents" claim over their "motherland," allegedly existing
between petitioners" land and the Cagayan River, is deemed barred and nullified with the issuance of
the original certificate of title.
The "subject land" is an alluvial deposit left by the northward movement of the Cagayan River and
pursuant to Article 457 of the New Civil Code:
To the owners of land adjoining the banks of river belong the accretion which they gradually receive
from the effects of the current of the waters.
owever, it should be noted that the area covered by OCT No. P-19093 is only four thousand five hundred
eighty four (4,584) square meters. The accretion attached to said land is approximately five and a half
(5.5) hectares. The increase in the area of petitioners'land, being an accretion left by the change of
course or the northward movement of the Cagayan River does not automatically become registered
land just because the lot which receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. (See Grande v.
Court of Appeals, L-17652, June 30, 1962). As such, it must also be placed under the operation of the
Torrens System.