People Vs Chaves and Paderanga

Title of the Case PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.
HONORABLE
NAZAR U. CHAVES, Judge, RTC-Cagayan de Oro City, Br.
18 and MIGUEL P. PADERANGA, respondents.
(G.R. No. 131377. February 11, 2003)
Doctrine Discharge of accused to be state witness (Sec.17, Rule

119)
Petition This is a petition for review of the decision dated

November 7, 1997 of the Court of Appeals, which
dismissed the petition for certiorari assailing the Orders
dated June 3, 1993; July 15, 1993; and September 23,
1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City,
Branch 18 in Criminal Case No. 86-39.
Facts  Sometime in October 1986, Felipe Galarion, Manuel
Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe,
Peter Doe and Richard Doe were charged for Multiple
Murder for the killing of members of the Bucag family in
Gingoog City with the RTC of Gingoog City. The venue
of the case was then moved to Cagayan de Oro City.
Thus, Criminal Case No. 86-39 was transferred to the
RTC of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 18, presided by
respondent Judge Nazar U. Chaves. Amongst the
accused, only Felipe Galarion was tried and convicted
while the others were at large.
 In October 1988, Felizardo Roxas was identified as
another member of the group who was responsible for
the slaying of the Bucag family. Hence, an amended
information was filed to implead Roxas as a co-
accused. He then engaged the services of private
respondent Miguel Paderanga as his counsel.
 A preliminary investigation was conducted in order to
give Roxas the opportunity to adduce evidence to
support his defense. In his counter-affidavit, Roxas then
implicated Atty. Paderanga as the mastermind of the
killings. Consequently, the amended information was
once again amended to include Paderanga as one of
the accused in Criminal Case No. 86-39.
 The trial of the case then ensued wherein the
prosecution called Felizardo Roxas as its first witness.
However, the private respondent objected to the
presentation of Roxas’ testimony. The trial court
sustained private respondent’s objection. The
prosecution then filed a motion for reconsideration or,
in the alternative, to discharge Roxas as a state witness.
It also manifested its intention to present Julito Ampo as
another state witness or ordinary prosecution witness.
 On June 3, 1993, the trial court issued an Order denying
the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration but setting
the motion for the discharge of Roxas as state witness
for hearing. Thereafter, the trial court issued an Order
allowing the presentation of the testimony of Felizardo
Roxas for purposes of proving the conditions of the
Rules of Court on the discharge of a state witness.
 Private respondent interposed an objection, which the
trial court overruled. Thereafter, private respondent
Paderanga filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing
that the presentation of Roxas testimony will be
tantamount to allowing him to testify as a state witness
even before his discharge as such; that the
qualification of a proposed state witness must be
proved by evidence other than his own testimony; and
that at the hearing for the discharge of a proposed
state witness, only his sworn statement can be
presented and not his oral testimony.
Petitioner’s Contention  The petitioner argued that Ely Roxas and Julito Ampo
have voluntarily expressed their consent to testify as
prosecution witnesses. Hence, there is no need to first
discharge them as state witnesses before they can be
presented on the stand.
Respondent’s Contention  The trial court held that the presentation of Roxas’
testimony will violate his right against self-incrimination
before Roxas can be presented as a witness for the
prosecution, he must first be discharged as a state
witness. In other words, the prosecution cannot present
Roxas as a hostile witness.
RTC/Sandiganbayan Ruling  The trial court issued an Omnibus Order granting private
& other motions respondent’s motion for reconsideration. It held that
insofar as the proposed state witness is concerned, only
his sworn statement may be admitted and considered
by the Court. Moreover, it held that the evidence
contemplated in Rule 119, Sec. 9, is any evidence other
than his testimony.
 On August 9, 1993, the prosecution filed a motion for
reconsideration. However, it was denied by the trial
court for lack of merit. Thereafter, the prosecution,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
the Court of Appeals.
CA Ruling & other motions  The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of
merit. Hence, this petition for review on the decision of
the Court of Appeals.
Issue (1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in
ruling that the challenged order of the trial court (which
denied prosecution’s motion for Felizardo Ely Roxas to be
presented as an ordinary witness) has already become
final since no appeal has been perfected within the
reglementary period.
(2) Whether or not there is no need to first discharge Ely

Roxas and Julito Ampo as state witnesses before they can
be presented on the stand since they have voluntarily
expressed their consent to testify as prosecution witnesses.
(3) Whether or not the prosecution can validly present the

testimony of Ely Roxas and Julito Ampo at the hearing for
their discharge as state witnesses.
Ruling (1) YES. The Supreme Court held that the Order dated
June 3, 1993 was interlocutory; it did not finally dispose of
the case on its merits. As such, the Order cannot be the
proper subject of appeal. It may, however, be assailed in
a special civil action for certiorari.
(2) YES. The Court held that while it is true that an

accused cannot be made a hostile witness for the
prosecution for to do so would compel him to be a
witness against himself, he may however testify against a
co-defendant where he has agreed to do so, with full
knowledge of his right and the consequences of his
acts. It is not necessary that the court discharges him first
as state witness. There is nothing in the rules that says so.
There is a difference between testifying as state witness

and testifying as a co-accused. In the first, the proposed
state witness has to qualify as a witness for the state, after
which he is discharged as an accused and exempted
from prosecution. In the second, the witness remains an
accused and can be made liable should he be found
guilty of the criminal offense.
However, the Court emphasized that it cannot simply

rely on petitioners representation that Roxas and Ampo
have volunteered to testify for the prosecution. It is a
matter that the trial court must determine with certainty,
lest their right against self-incrimination be violated.
(3) YES. Rule 119, Section 17 of the Revised Rules of

Criminal Procedure provides that the trial court may
direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with
their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state
after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and
the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a
hearing in support of the discharge.
The provision does not make any distinction as to the
kind of evidence the prosecution may present. What it
simply requires, in addition to the presentation of the
sworn statement of the accused concerned, is the
presentation of such evidence as are necessary to
determine if the conditions exist for the discharge, so as to
meet the object of the law, which is to prevent
unnecessary or arbitrary exclusion from the complaint of
persons guilty of the crime charged. No exemption from
the term evidence is provided by the law as to exclude
the testimony of the accused. When the law does not
distinguish, we should not distinguish.
SC Decision WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is

GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
dated November 7, 1997 is REVERSED. The Regional Trial
Court of Cagayan de Oro City, in Criminal Case No. 86-
39, is directed to determine the voluntariness of Felizardo
Roxas and Julito Ampos decision to testify as prosecution
witnesses and, thereafter, to allow the prosecution to
present said witnesses. In the alternative, the trial court is
directed to allow Felizardo Roxas and Julito Ampo to
testify at the hearing on the motion for their discharge as
state witnesses.

People Vs Chaves and Paderanga

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

People Vs Chaves and Paderanga

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

People Vs Chaves and Paderanga

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Title of the Case PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.

(G.R. No. 131377. February 11, 2003)

Doctrine Discharge of accused to be state witness (Sec.17, Rule

Petition This is a petition for review of the decision dated

(2) Whether or not there is no need to first discharge Ely

(3) Whether or not the prosecution can validly present the

(2) YES. The Court held that while it is true that an

There is a difference between testifying as state witness

However, the Court emphasized that it cannot simply

(3) YES. Rule 119, Section 17 of the Revised Rules of

SC Decision WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is

You might also like