Clash of Civilization

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The Clash of
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Perhaps no article has been as often cited or hotly debated over the
past twenty years as that of Professor Samuel P. Huntington’s
Foreign Affairs article “The Clash of Civilizations?.” Certainly
Contents
considered among the preeminent political thinkers of his generation,
the clash of civilizations continues to be the reference point for a host
of theoretical arguments across the entire spectrum of the social
sciences. Written at a time when the world was going through 6 INTRODUCTION
massive shifts, his essay looked into the future and put forward a J. Paul Barker
thesis that culture would be at the center of international conflicts. A
host of events in the past twenty years have given credence to this 1 0 T W E N T Y Y E A R S A F T E R H U N T I N G TO N ’ S ‘ C L A S H OF
viewpoint, but also raise questions about many of its assertions. As C I V I L I Z AT I O N S ’
the essays in this collection make clear, the accuracy of the thesis is J e ff r e y H a y n e s
hotly debated and it remains a theory with which serious engagement
ought to be made. 14 E N E M Y WA N T E D : A P P LY W I T H O U T
D a v i d A . We l c h
J. Paul Barker is an Associate Editor at e-International Relations. He
holds a M.A. degree in International Relations from Fatih University 20 THE CRESCENT AND THE CROSS
and a B.A. in History and M.A. in Cross-Cultural Studies from Syed Mansoob Murshed
Northland International University. His main focus lies in the
convergence of religion and international affairs. 28 ‘ T H E C L A S H O F C I V I L I Z AT I O N S ’ A N D I T S U N E X P ECTED
LIBERALISM
Johan Eriksson
31 T H E ‘ C L A S H O F C I V I L I Z AT I O N S ’ FA C E S E V I D E N C E-BASED
PERUSAL
Ta k a s h i I n o g u c h i
39 H O W TO P R O M O T E A P E R S P I C A C I O U S I N T E R C U LTURAL
DIALOGUE?
Dieter Senghass
4 2 I N T E RV I E W W I T H A R S H I N A D I B - M O G H A D D A M
C o n d u c t e d b y J. Paul Barker
5 2 C O N T R I B U TO R S
Introduction
6 The late professor Samuel P. Huntington is among the most prolific 7

and influential political scientists of his generation. Yet, for many he is
known, not for his work on understanding civil-military relations, or on
theories of political order and its implications on modernization
theory, or for his work on the process of democratization.
Huntington’s legacy has become inextricably linked to a Foreign
Affairs article published twenty years ago this year. In his 1993 article
“The Clash of Civilizations?,”1 Huntington put forward his vision of
what the post-Cold War world might look like, and the debate has not
quelled since.
In the article Huntington put forward his belief that the shape of the
world was shifting and that conflicts would be defined by culture
rather than ideology or economic reasons. The nation state would
Introduction
remain a significant actor, Huntington posited, but the principle
conflicts would occur between nations and groups of different
cultures, and the “fault lines between civilizations will be the battle
lines of the future,”2 Huntington viewed this as the latest evolution in
the nature of conflict, an evolution in the line of those which occurred
following the Peace of Westphalia, then the French Revolution, and
then the Russian Revolution. This was shorthand for a process
J. PAUL BARKER
wherein Huntington saw the primary drivers of conflicts moving from
E-INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
princes, to nations, to ideologies, and now finally to civilizations.
Another significant observation Huntington would make was that “in
the politics of civilizations, the peoples and governments of non-
Western civilizations no longer remain the objects of history as
targets of Western colonialism but join the West as movers and
shapers of history.”3
While Huntington’s thesis made some important observations, it has

nevertheless attracted no shortage of serious critiques. The last
twenty years have provided the necessary real world data by which
to measure the arguments Huntington made as he looked forward
and attempted to make sense of this new world, absent the battle
between superpowers that had marked much of the previous forty
years.
This collection of essays commemorating the legacy of Huntington’s

Clash of Civilizations article twenty years on from its original
publication looks at the legacy of the theory. Some of the articles,
such as that of Takashi Inoguchi, raise some objections against the
thesis as it measures the theory against the evidence of the past two
The Clash of Civilization: Twenty Years On Introduction
8 decades. Inoguchi’s article, by examining the evidence of Southeast Adib-Moghaddam who is a scholar of the concept of the “Clash of 9
Asia, highlights how Huntington’s division of the world into large Civilizations” which in reality was present long before the Foreign
civilizational blocks was not accurate in making sense of these Affairs article of 1993. Adib-Moghaddam speaks from his extensive
regions and the diversity existing within them. The Crescent and the efforts to understand what was meant by the “Clash of Civilizations”
Cross is a look at some of the short-comings of a “culturalist” thesis, not only by Huntington in his modern packaging of the ideas,
approach in explaining the relationship between Islam and violence. but also what the thesis has meant throughout history. Adib-
While Huntington predicted that there would be conflict with the Moghaddam exposes what he feels are some of the methodological
Islamic civilization, Syed Mansoob Murshed, demonstrates that he errors within Huntington’s formulations, and also highlights the way in
failed to foresee that the greater conflict would occur within the which this ideology perpetuates narratives of “us” versus “them.” In
civilization itself. the increasingly globalized world, it is crucial to think clearly about
how to move forward so that through the increased interactions the
In two of the essays, the authors consider more closely how the differences that remain do not harden into the “clashes” Huntington
thesis can be applied in present-day discourse. Johan Eriksson predicted, but into something better.
examines the “unexpected liberalism” that emerged in the way
Huntington’s Clash thesis was utilized in the discourse of George W. Despite twenty years of commentary and critique, Samuel
Bush. Dieter Senghaas approaches the topic in a related way, Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations article remains a frequent
considering how Huntington’s thesis may be used to move towards reference point for many arguments across a wide spectrum of
intercultural dialogue in an attempt to minimize the potential for International Relations. For this reason, its legacy ought to be
clashes when cultures come into contact. commemorated, and yet, for the good of all peoples, we can hope its
analysis is ultimately proven wrong, and that the globalized world is
The remaining contributions to this collection include two articles that not one increasingly marked by violent conflict but by peace.
tell the story of Huntington and where the Clash of Civilizations thesis
fits within his personal body of work and within the broader climate of Endnotes
academia. Jeffrey Haynes’ opening article is an excellent introduction 1
Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” Foreign Affairs
to why exactly it is that this article has been so important. Its legacy 72, no. 3 (1993).
is drawn not so much because of its “correctness” or “rightness” but 2
Ibid., 22.
rather, Haynes argues that its influence is due to the precise way in 3
Ibid., 23.
which it captured the zeitgeist of the post-Cold War world and
because of the powerful statement it has made about globalization,
capturing both the hopes and fears present in it.
David Welch in his contribution looks more closely at Huntington

himself and articulates how the Clash of Civilizations thesis fit within
his own development. In Welch’s view Huntington was wrestling
through the challenges of what “culture” was to look like in a quickly
globalizing world. The challenges Huntington was confronting as he
looked at the conflict that would occur in various instances between
“us” and “them” was primarily about understanding better what “us”
meant in this new world, and the Clash thesis was a part of how he
sought to work out understanding those relationships.
The final contribution to the collection is an interview with Arshin

The Clash of Civilization: Twenty Years On Twenty Years after Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’
10 Today: Mali; yesterday: 9/11; the day before yesterday: Iran’s 1979 11
revolution and its aftermath, including sustained hostilities with the
USA. Since the late 1970s, the talk has been of the impossibility of
different sets of values, norms and beliefs living side-by-side in an
increasingly globalised world. In 1993, Samuel Huntington published
what must be one of the most cited articles ever: ‘The Clash of
Civilizations?’1 Why is the article so important? Why is it a
touchstone for nearly all contemporary debates about the capacity of
different groups to live together in relative amity not enmity?
My argument in this brief piece is not that Huntington’s article was so
Twenty Years after important because his argument was ‘correct’ or ‘right’. My claim is
twofold: First, Huntington’s article was and is important because it
captured perfectly the end-of-the-Cold War zeitgeist, a way of seeing
Huntington’s ‘Clash of the world which has endured in the uncertain times which we call
‘globalisation.’ Second, it has proved to be an abiding statement
about globalisation and the hopes and fears that it conveys.
Civilizations’ It is almost irrelevant that his focal point: the impossibility of the West
– read; the USA – and ‘Islam’ – read; ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ –
living together in harmony was laughingly over-simplified, redolent of
the paranoia of someone experiencing the shattering of a stable, safe
and unchanging world suddenly and demonstrably confronted with
JEFFREY HAYNES the scenario of the post-World War II paradigm smashed to
LONDON METR OPOLITAN UNIVERSITY, UK
smithereens. What is a card-carrying Realist to do? Of course: find a
new enemy and dress it up in the same preposterous ‘baddy’ clothes
that had marked the treatment by US Realists of the USSR since the
start of the Cold War and transfer the characteristics to a new ‘actor’:
‘Islamic fundamentalism.’
It is worth recalling – especially for our younger readers – that in the

early 1990s, we had just emerged from a 50-year period of secular
ideological polarisation. Despite the claims of some today in the
USA, the US did not ‘win’ the Cold War; rather, the Soviet Union ‘lost’
it. Unable to compete with America in a completion for global
dominance, its shaky, dysfunctional and misanthropic political/social/
economic system spectacularly imploded within a seemingly
impossibly short period of time: apparently as strong as ever in the
mid-1980s, by 1991, the Soviet Union and its system as well as its
parasitic coterie of attendant nations was no more. This left a gulf, a
hole, a vacuum. How, and with what, to fill it?
The Clash of Civilization: Twenty Years On Twenty Years after Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’
12 If globalisation was the force which defeated the USSR, it was also US response – the Bush administration’s ‘war on terror’ – targeted 13
the trend that enabled religion to resume its long-abandoned place in Muslims, some believe rather indiscriminately, in Afghanistan, Iraq
global politics. Exiled to marginalisation after 1648, the sudden and elsewhere. Some have claimed that these events ‘prove’ the
demise of the Cold War and the USSR and its attendant secular correctness of Huntington’s thesis on the ‘clash of civilizations’. In
ideology, opened the way for a new focus on ‘culture’. Now, as such views, the 9/11 attacks and the US response suggested that
everyone knows who has ever played a word association game, Huntington’s prophecy about clashing civilizations was now less
‘religion’ is almost a synonym for ‘culture’, because what primarily abstract and more plausible than when first articulated in the early
differentiates cultures from each other is religion and, especially, 1990s. Others contend, however, that 9/11 was not the start of the
religious difference. clash of civilizations – but, as already noted, the last gasp of radical
Islamists’ attempts to foment revolutionary change in inter alia,
The 9/11 attacks on the United States were a key event in the debate Algeria and Egypt in the 1980s and early 1990s. We can also note,
about the role of cultural and religious difference – especially, ‘Islamic however, that 9/11 not only had major effects on both the USA and
fundamentalism’ – in international conflict, especially in the way that international relations but also contributed to a surge of Islamic
they focused attention on al-Qaeda’s brand of globalised cultural radicalism in Saudi Arabia. This was a result not only of the presence
terrorism. For some scholars, analysts and policy makers – of US troops in the kingdom, as highlighted by bin Laden, but also
especially but not exclusively in the United States – 9/11 marked the due to a growing realisation that the function of Saudi Arabia’s ulema
practical onset of Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ between was and is overwhelmingly to underpin and explain away the
two cultural entities: the ‘Christian West’ and the ‘Islamic world’, with unearned and unrepresentative dominance of the ruling king, his
special concern directed at those entities which might attract the extended family and parasitic entourage.
nomenclature ‘Islamic fundamentalists.’ This is not to claim of course
that Huntington had it all his own way: Many have addressed his A dozen years after 9/11 and 20 years since the publication of
claims of global cultural conflict between the ‘Christian West’ and the Huntington’s article, what do we know now about the ‘clash of
‘Islamic fundamentalists’ by a counter-argument: 9/11 was not the civilizations’? Huntington did note in his article that he was aware of
start of a clash of civilizations but rather the last gasp of transnational differences of opinion and outlook within ‘civilizations’ but he
Islamist radicalism. (It remains to be seen if the unfolding events in appeared to think this was much less important than an apparently
Mali and Algeria are the start of a new phase.) It is hard to disagree clear ‘clash’ of values norms, and beliefs which for him characterised
with the claim that the events of September 11 thrust culture on to the division ‘between’ the ‘West’ and ‘Islam’. It is clear – to me, at
forefront of the international agenda, providing as a result least – that the very idea of a world divided into ‘seven, or eight
Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis with a new lease of life. major civilizations’3 is absurd. (In parenthesis, as it were, the very
Henceforward, many commentators were no longer inhibited in idea that there is ‘possibly [an] African civilization’4 is belied by
attributing essentialist characteristics to the ‘Christian West’ and current events in Mali: just one African civilization? What, pray tell,
‘Islam’. After 9/11, there was a pronounced penchant to see the world would this comprise?) Time has shown, once again, that anyone who
in a Huntington-inspired simplistic division, with straight lines on takes seriously the idea of a world divided into seven or eight major
maps – ‘Islam has bloody borders’, he averred – apparently the key
2
civilizations lacks capacity to have any possible understanding of our
to understanding what were increasingly portrayed as definitively fascinating mosaic of a world filled with myriad ideas, norms, beliefs
ethically and racially defined lines across the globe. and conceptions of how the world is.
September 11, 2001, as well as many subsequent terrorist outrages, Endnotes

were perpetrated by al-Qaeda or its followers; all involved extremist 1
Muslims that wanted to cause destruction and loss of life against 72, no. 3 (1993).
‘Western’ targets that nevertheless often led to considerable loss of 2
Ibid., p. 35.
life, for example in Istanbul and Casablanca, among Muslims. The 3
Ibid., p. 25. 4
Ibid.
Enemy Wanted: Apply Without
14 A friend of mine once told me a story about the seminar he attended 15

at which Samuel Huntington first presented his nascent ideas about
“the clash of civilizations.” The Cold War had recently ended, much
to everyone’s surprise, and people were scrambling to figure out
what world politics would look like next. Others had already staked
their claims. John Mearsheimer had predicted a return to rough-and-
tumble 1930s-style multipolarity.1 Charles Krauthammer had
proclaimed America’s “unipolar moment.”2 Francis Fukuyama had
foreseen the triumphal sweep of liberal democracy across the globe.3
And President George H. W. Bush had trumpeted a “new world
order” based on the rule of law and sound global governance.4
Enemy Wanted:
“Islam,” said Huntington.
“What?” said the audience.
Apply Without “Islam is the next enemy.”
“Why?”
“Well—it just is. They hate us.”

DAVID A. WELCH
BALSILLIE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, CANADA “What do you mean, ‘It just is,’ Sam? That’s not a reason. You need
some kind of theory to back that up.”
“Fine. I’ll be back.”
And thus, according to my friend, was the “clash of civilizations”

thesis born.
Now, I was not present in the room, so I cannot vouch for my friend’s
account. And in any case, he admitted that he was paraphrasing in
his typically colorful way. But that was the gist, he said; the clash of
civilizations thesis began with a hunch, and the theory came later.
Anyone who understands social science knows that it isn’t supposed

to work this way. We aren’t supposed to start with our predictions
and engineer theories to back them up. This isn’t even supposed to
be possible, epistemologically or psychologically. Our world views—
which in the case of International Relations (IR) scholars includes
specific kinds of theories—are supposed to shape our expectations.
The Clash of Civilization: Twenty Years On Enemy Wanted: Apply Without
16 Mearsheimer and Krauthammer came to the debate primed by nineteenth-century pattern lasted until the end of World War 17
“realism;” they disagreed on how many “poles” the post-Cold War I. Then, as a result of the Russian Revolution and the
world would have, but they agreed that international politics was reaction against it, the conflict of nations yielded to the
always and everywhere governed by raison d’état. Fukuyama conflict of ideologies, first among communism, fascism-
brought to the table training in classics, comparative literature, and Nazism and liberal democracy, and then between
political philosophy, as well as a disposition to think in terms of grand communism and liberal democracy. During the Cold War,
teleological narratives; liberal democracy was for him what the this latter conflict became embodied in the struggle between
Weberian Prussian state had been for Hegel. The first President the two superpowers, neither of which was a nation state in
Bush came to the White House with a generic predilection for the classical European sense and each of which defined its
mission and a latent Wilsonian streak;5 freed of Cold War constraints, identity in terms of its ideology.10
he relished the chance to indulge them.
Put another way, states did not have interests qua states; they were
What explained Huntington’s prediction, though? He was known as merely the vehicles through which political leaders pursued other
a high-impact scholar of civil-military relations, comparative political
6
kinds of objectives. Until the end of the Cold War, Huntington
development, and American politics. While he had written
7 8
insisted (following William Lind), the main fault lines of world politics
extensively on U.S. foreign and security policy, he had done so very were fault lines within the Western world—in effect, “Western civil
much in a Cold War vein where the parameters were taken for wars.” Non-Westerners were either uninvolved, colonized, or bit
granted. He was known to be a conservative Democrat, and people players in Western dramas. But with the collapse of communism,
suspected him of being sympathetic to realism (though perhaps of a there were no longer any significant cleavages within “the West.”
classical rather than “neo” kind)—but being a conservative Democrat Capitalist liberal democracy had triumphed. “With the end of the
would not generate any particular prediction about the post-Cold War Cold War,” Huntington wrote, “international politics moves out of its
world, and the fact that Huntington’s prediction seemed so very Western phase, and its centerpiece becomes the interaction between
different from Mearsheimer’s or Krauthammer’s seemed to call his the West and non-Western civilizations and among non-Western
realist credentials into question. What was going on? civilizations.”11
The first iteration of the clash of civilizations thesis—Huntington’s This was an intriguing idea, but a problematic one. Among the
widely-read 1993 Foreign Affairs piece —offered some potential
9
problems, as I and many others pointed out quickly enough, were the
answers to this question. Intriguingly, while not abandoning the fact that it was impossible to define and deploy the concept of
realist claim that states are the most important actors in world affairs, “civilization” rigorously, and even if one could, there was no reason to
he implied that realism had never really been enough: suspect that civilizational boundaries would all of a sudden become
politically salient if they never had been so before.12 There were
For a century and a half after the emergence of the modern perfectly good reasons why no one put Arnold Toynbee on his or her
international system with the Peace of Westphalia, the IR reading list.13
conflicts of the Western world were largely among princes—
emperors, absolute monarchs and constitutional monarchs The second, longer version of Huntington’s thesis—the 1996 book,
attempting to expand their bureaucracies, their armies, their which dropped the question mark from the original article’s title14 —
mercantilist economic strength and, most important, the only muddied the waters. Tensions and inconsistencies in his
territory they ruled. In the process they created nation treatment of “civilizations” not only between the book and the article
states, and beginning with the French Revolution the but within the book itself vindicated rather than rebutted his early
principal lines of conflict were between nations rather than critics. The entire effort had become self-refuting.
princes. In 1793, as R. R. Palmer put it, “The wars of kings
were over; the wars of peoples had begun.” This If the theory could not support the prediction, what could? For years,
The Clash of Civilization: Twenty Years On Enemy Wanted: Apply Without
18 the question of what had motivated it fascinated and mystified me. (September 11, 1990)”, Miller Center of Public Affairs http:// 19
millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3425 (accessed 21 May
But in 2004, I finally understood. That was the year in which 2013).
Huntington published his last major book, Who Are We? The 5
James David Barber, The Presidential Character: Predicting
Challenges to America’s National Identity15, in which he warned of Performance in the White House, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
the unwillingness of recent (primarily Hispanic) immigrants to Prentice Hall, 1992), 456-483.
embrace and assimilate into America’s “Anglo-Protestant culture,” 6
Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and
unlike earlier waves of immigrants from elsewhere. I was leafing Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of
through a copy of The New Yorker one day, when I stumbled across Harvard University Press, 1957).
a fascinating review of the book by Louis Menand—and that was 7
Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New
when I had the eureka moment. In an almost off-the-cuff kind of way, Haven: Yale University Press, 1969); Samuel P. Huntington, The
Menand casually remarked: “Huntington’s name for ideology is Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman:
‘culture.’”16 University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
8
Samuel P. Huntington, American Politics: The Promise of
That was it. Huntington was all about culture. He had defined Disharmony (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University
civilization as the most general, abstract level of culture. “Western Press, 1981).
civil wars” were intracultural wars. And culture matters, more than
9
anything else. “I think we all feel much more at home with people 72, no. 3 (1993).
who have similar cultures, language and values than we do with
10
Ibid., 22-23.
other people,” Huntington told Mark O’Keeffe in a revealing interview
11
Ibid., 23.
two years before he died. Huntington had never really felt at home,
12
The Clash of Civilizations? The Debate (New York: Council on
and clearly he longed for it. The problem was that globalization was Foreign Relations, 1993); Albert L. Weeks, “Do Civilizations Hold?,”
making it harder all the time. In 1993 he saw Islam as the great Foreign Affairs 72, no. 4 (1993); Richard E. Rubenstein and Jarle
danger because “they hate us;” in 2004, he saw Hispanic immigration Crocker, “Challenging Huntington,” Foreign Policy, no. 96 (1994);
as the great danger because “they aren’t us.” It wasn’t about the Roy P. Mottahedeh, “Clash of Civilizations? An Islamicist’s Critique,”
hate; it was about the us. Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review 2, no. 2 (1995); Pierre
Hassner, “Morally Objectionable, Politically Dangerous,” The National
If civilizations were the main fault lines of international politics, “we” Interest, no. 46 (1996); Michael J. Mazarr, “‘The Clash of
would just be “us”—at peace with ourselves in our own place, and Civilizations?’,” The Washington Quarterly 19, no. 2 (1996); Stephen
everyone else in theirs. The clash of civilizations was not a M. Walt, “Building up New Bogeymen,” Foreign Policy, no. 106
prediction or a theory after all: it was a wish. (1997); David A. Welch, “The ‘Clash of Civilizations’ Thesis as an
Argument and as a Phenomenon,” Security Studies 6, no. 4 (1997).
Endnotes
13
Arnold Joseph Toynbee, A Study of History, 12 vols. (London:
1
John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after Oxford University Press, 1935).
the Cold War,” International Security 15, no. 1 (1990); John J.
14
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking
Mearsheimer. “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,” The Atlantic of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
266, no. 2 (1990).
15
Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s
2
Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs 70, National Identity (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004).
(1990/1991).
16
Louis Menand, “Patriot Games: The New Nativism of Samuel P.
3
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New Huntington,” The New Yorker, 17 May 2004.
York: Free Press, 1992).
17
“Five Years after 9/11, the Clash of Civilizations Revisited”, The
4
George H. W. Bush, “Address before a Joint Session of Congress Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life http://bit.ly/1bxytOj.
The Crescent and the Cross
20 It is now two decades since Samuel Huntington put forward his clash 21
of civilizations hypothesis about the nature of future conflict being
cultural; specifically between Confucianism, or with greater likelihood
Islam, and the West.1 This piece contends that civilizational conflict
occurs mainly between distinct cultural groups within (and not
between) nation states, and this conflict does not occur in a socio-
economic vacuum.
Since the attacks on the United States on September 11th 2001,

Western countries have become increasingly fearful of the
phenomenon of “home-grown terrorism” arising out of the
radicalization of youthful first, second and even third generation
The Crescent and

Muslim immigrants. Radicalized individuals, born and bred in the
West were involved in terrorism, such as the Madrid train bombings
of March 2004, the murder of Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam in
the Cross
November 2004, and the London bombings of July 2005.
In addition to these acts of violence, Islamic “radicalization” also finds

expression in non-violent acts of defiance and statements of
difference, such as the wearing of the hijab or headscarf and other
distinct cultural practices. These symbolic actions produce
discomfiture, as these are seen as aggressive rejections of Western
SYED MANSOOB MURSHED
ERASMUS UNIVERSITY, NETHERLANDS civilization. Additionally, these developments help explain the rise in
popularity of theories of civilizational clashes between the West and
Islam2, with migration and terror allegedly two new weapons in the
Muslim armoury directed against the West. Furthermore, a heated
debate over the possibility of harmonious integration of Muslim
communities has emerged in the West.
Although there is a vast body of work on how Islamic radicalization

functions, and an even larger literature on the dangers it poses, the
development of radicalization is often assumed to have emerged in a
socio-economic and political vacuum. The “culturalist”3 view regards
Islam as the source of a monolithic and innately violent mindset,
using non-democratic means to achieve political objectives. The
hatred for the West by some Muslim groups is treated as a given;
hence conflict with the West necessarily follows. Some Western
writers depict Muslims as wallowing in wounded pride about their
historical decline. One states that: “the underlying problem for the
West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilisation,
whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are
obsessed with the inferiority of their power”.4
The Clash of Civilization: Twenty Years On The Crescent and the Cross
22 for example Sir William Muir said in 1878: “the sword of Mahomet, 23
and the Coran, are the most stubborn enemies of Civilization, Liberty
Contrary to “culturalist” predictions, global religions, such as Islam, and Truth”.9 Unfortunately, these notions are based on selective and
are not monolithic. Dichotomised identity categories, pitting Western limited interpretation. It can be equally argued that the Islam
culture (“us”) against Islam (“them”) and vice-versa, do not do justice celebrates racial diversity,10 and requires believers to accept other
to the fact that there are many faces of Islam across both historical religions as an article of faith.11 Some of the sayings of the Prophet
and time and at present. Secondly, and more importantly, individual Muhammad and his cousin and son-in-law Ali, during Islam’s
identity is regarded as a singular phenomenon, ignoring the inception are testimony towards inclusiveness.12 The important point
multiplicity of identities that individuals may possibly possess.5 Thus, is that a devout Muslim must eschew racism in all forms, should not
it is conceivable for an individual to be simultaneously a Muslim, a hate Judeo-Christian civilization and reject universal values of
Western citizen, a believer in democracy, as well as someone who toleration; rather the dislike of the West could emanate from
respects difference and human rights. Furthermore, culture is not injustices perpetrated thereof. Moreover, historically, Muslim
immutable; it evolves over time, and changes as material conditions countries and empires have exercised greater toleration towards
alter. other religions, compared to European practice until the 19th century
(a good example would be Muslim ruled Medieval Spain).
The alternative explanation for disgruntled Muslim behaviour in
Europe lies in wider socio-economic disadvantage, the underpinnings Historical acts that may add to the sense of Muslim collective
for which date back to Ted Gurr’s classic work on relative deprivation grievances include events such as the wholesale expulsion of
as the source of rebellion. Frances Stewart has documented the
6 Muslims who did not convert to Christianity from Spain (16th-17th
systematic disadvantage that Muslim groups face in Western centuries), Sicily (14th century) and the massacre and expulsion of
countries. Muslim citizens in European countries are systematically Muslims in the Balkans (18-20th centuries). In the Middle East, the
poorer, suffer from greater unemployment and are less than Anglo-French Sykes-Picot pact (during the First World War) resulted
proportionately represented in public life, in addition to the
7 in an extremely unfair disposition of the former Ottoman territories.13
opprobrium their cultural identity attracts. Muslims, particularly in Later, the emergence of Israel, and the West’s lack of even handed
Western Europe, may be subject to systemic inequalities of behaviour towards the protagonists in the Arab-Israeli conflict
opportunity in economic, political and social spheres. spawned deep resentment. Other areas of Muslim disadvantage in
the recent past include Kashmir in India, and Bosnia in the European
The Anatomy of Muslim Radicalization Balkans. Their predicament is often blamed on Western double
Contemporary racism in the West, especially in Europe, is driven standards towards the plight of Muslims.
more by disdain for cultural identities such as Islam, rather than the
traditional biologically based phenomenon, complexion. This explains Terrorism is only part of the total set of actions adopted by radicalized
the rise in anti-Muslim sentiment, which is not merely an indignant Muslim groups in Europe, as many adopt strategies of peaceful
reaction to violence perpetrated by Muslims, but is symptomatic of a protest, and some simply reject certain Western cultural practices.
wider disdain for Muslim culture. According to surveys, negative
8 Muslim religious discourse that accompanies the retreat into
perceptions about Muslims among non-Muslims had grown by 2008: confrontational behaviour towards the majority communities in their
52% in Spain, 50% in Germany, 38% in France, but only 23% in the countries of adoption or birth can be linked to the spread of the
UK and the USA felt negative about Muslims. The same survey Salafiyya movement (which means following those who went before,
indicates growth in the Muslim sense of identity amongst Muslims in this case early Muslims) among Muslim diasporas. Such dynamics
immigrants. should be analysed against the backdrop of the current three-fold
manifestation of Islamic activism: political, missionary and jihadi.14
It is widely believed, even in liberal circles, that Islam is an intolerant Political Islam, as embodied by the Muslim Brotherhood usually aims
and violent religion. There is a long ‘orientalist’ tradition in this regard; to seek power through political rather than violent means. Missionary
24 activism tends to refrain from political confrontation; rather it tends to bombing may be rational. This is because the individual has made an 25
concentrate on preaching and reviving the community of believers all or nothing choice between solidarity and individual autonomy.
(Ummah). It includes the Tablihgi (evangelical) and the Sufi (mystical)
movements, which although theologically distinct, are both avowedly Interaction between Fear and Hatred
peaceful. Jihadi Islamists committed to violence with a view to Just as aggrieved Muslims, indoctrinated and herded by conflict
defending (or expanding) Dar-al-Islam (the world of Islam). entrepreneurs into groups for collective action, may feel a profound
hatred for the West, certain politicians and political parties in the
Identity and Collective Action West seek their own political self-advancement by preaching the
Individuals may derive utility not just from consumption or dangers posed by Islam in general, and Muslim migrants in
identification with a cause, but also from behaviour in conformity to particular. In 2001, for instance, the Danish People’s Party
their sense of identity, and the like minded behaviour of other campaigned with a poster showing a young blond girl and the
members of the group they belong to; for example the performance statement “When she retires, we will be a Muslim majority nation.”
of prayers by the individual and his co-religionists. Here the position The party came in third in terms of seats in Parliament, experiencing
that the group occupies in societal hierarchy is also crucial to their a 70% increase in its vote bank. In the 2002 French Presidential
collective self-esteem. The individual not only derives utility from a elections, Jean-Marie Le Pen of the Front National – later convicted
set of his own actions, but also similar actions of other like-minded for spreading Islamophobic messages in an interview to the
individuals belonging to his group, and above all his own identity or Newspaper Le Monde in 2003- won a place in the runoff against
self image, which in turn depends on the group’s social standing. 15
Chirac and received 17% of votes. In August 2007, the Governor of
The last factor depends both on the group’s economic disadvantage, Carinthia in Austria, Joerg Haider promised to ban the construction of
and other factors such as the West’s foreign policy towards the mosques and minarets in his Province; the Austrian right won 28% of
Muslim world. If another group member suffers disutility from votes in the September 2008 general elections. The appeal of anti-
inappropriate behaviour by another group member, they may lure the Muslim political parties is growing, for example the Dutch PVV
errant individual back to the fold. This is more likely amongst poor gained 15% of the votes in the national election of 9th June 2010,
but culturally homogenous communities suffering from widespread making them the second largest party. This is the notion of fear of a
unemployment, living proximate to each other in isolated ghettos with minority, something that can be succinctly be described as the
close kinship ties. Moreover, the dissident group may use this type of phobia for ‘Eurabia’, which in part is whipped up by exaggerated
cooperative behaviour to resolve the collective action problem, which statements from hate-mongering politicians and exploited within
involves converting like-minded individuals into groups. Group electoral politics wherever feasible.
grievances become individual grievances, and individuals act upon
group grievances. It is useful to utilize the expression ‘horizontal We can think of the hate message against Muslim migrants as
inequality’, originating in the work of Frances Stewart. Horizontal originating in messages sent out by a demagogic politician. Its
inequality is inequality between culturally distinct groups, such as attractiveness to the public will depend on their need for scapegoats
between Catholics and Protestants, Muslims and Christians and so and their own personal life experiences of these minority groups. Not
on. all these signals will be believed: the better educated among the
public may discount part of the message and others with greater
From the viewpoint of the individual perpetrator of radicalized Islamic knowledge of minorities based upon personal interaction may
activities, intrinsic motivation, which is often the outcome of their similarly disregard this signal. Some individuals (older people, less
collective sense of humiliation, plays a major role. Perpetrators of educated, those whose jobs are vulnerable) are more likely to
extremist violence are not always uneducated and poor. It is not their abandon the search for truth in favour of the hate message. If
personal poverty that will necessarily drive individual membership of enough voters believe the signal then the state will act. These take
a radical group, but the disadvantage faced by the group at large. the form of anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant legislation making it
From the viewpoint of individual choice, extreme acts like suicide difficult for families to join relatives in Europe, linguistic and cultural
26 proficiency tests, and the banning of headscarves and veils. 4

Huntington 1996: 217. 27
5
See: Amartya Sen, “Violence, Identity and Poverty”, Journal of
Conclusions Peace Research, 45(1) (2008): 5-15.
Against the backdrop of a politicised Muslim identity, and substantial 6
Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel, (Princeton: University Press,
socioeconomic and political disadvantage suffered by Muslims, 1970).
domestic ‘integrationist’ policies aimed at ‘moderate Muslims’ are 7
Frances Stewart, ‘Global Aspects and Implications of Horizontal
unlikely to curb radicalization – let alone fight terrorism. Rather, they Inequalities (HIs): Inequalities Experienced by Muslims Worldwide’,
may backfire. American-style integrationist (as opposed to (2008), www.microcon.eu.
multicultural) policies are gaining favour in Europe, but these are 8
http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=262
doomed to failure unless the objects of the integrationist policies are 9
William Muir, The Life of Mahomet: From Original Sources, London:
also offered equality of economic, political and social opportunities. Smith, Elder, (1878): 235.
Furthermore, and quite crucially, if individuals have multiple identities, 10
“—We have created you male and female, and have made you
then they are more likely to act on the basis of their other (Western) nations and tribes that ye may know one another–the noblest of you,
identity when they are less socio-economically deprived and less in the sight of Allah, is the best in conduct”. Quran: 049.013. “And of
frowned upon. The presence of virulent Islamophobic messages not His signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the
only instils fear, but also elicits hatred, undoing the pacific- difference of your languages and colours”. Quran: 030.022. English
integrationist effects of material progress amongst Muslims migrants translations from Marmaduke Pickthall, The Glorious Quran, http://
in the West. www.islam101.com/quran/QTP/index.htm
11
“Say (O Muhammad): We believe in Allah and that which is
Two decades ago, after the end of the cold war, and the triumph of revealed unto us and that which was revealed unto Abraham and
liberal free market democracy, Samuel Huntington predicted that Ishmael and Isaac and Jacob and the tribes, and that which was
future conflict would be purely civilizational, and between nation vouchsafed unto Moses and Jesus and the prophets from their Lord.
states. The West’s antagonists in these future conflicts would be the We make no distinction between any of them, and unto Him we have
world’s remaining unassimilated non-Western cultures: surrendered”. Quran: 003.084.
Confucianism, but especially Islam. In the past decade, civilizational
12
Consider an excerpt from Muhammad’s Last Sermon (circa 632
conflict with Islam has, indeed, escalated. These struggles, however, AD): “An Arab has no superiority over a non-Arab nor a non-Arab has
are taking place, within and not between, nation states, including the any superiority over an Arab; also a black person has no superiority
internecine warfare (Fitnah) inside Islam. Finally, and most over a white person, nor a white person has any superiority over a
importantly, culture and civilization are inseparable from the black person, except by piety and good action. Indeed the best
economy, polity and society. Cultures are not shaped, nor do they among you is the one with the best character…” http://www.
ever evolve, in a socio-economic vacuum, making a purely themodernreligion.com/prophet/prophet_lastsermon.htm.
civilizational conflict virtually impossible.
13
See, Jeremy Salt, The Unmaking of the Middle East: A History of
Western Disorder in Arab Lands, (Berkeley: University of California
Endnotes Press, 2008).
1
14
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle_east___north_
72, no. 3 (1993). africa/egypt_north_africa/37_understanding_islamism.pdf.
2
See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the
15
See: George Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton ‘Economics and
Remaking of the World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996); Identity’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(3) (2000): 715-753.
Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror,
(London: Phoenix, 2003).
3
Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold
War and the Roots of Terror, (New York: Doubleday, 2004).
The Clash of Civilization: Twenty Years On The Clash of Civilizations and Its Unexpected Liberalism
28 University professors often complain about how little political 29

attention their ideas gain. Likewise, politicians often find the work of
academics esoteric, abstract, and policy-irrelevant. If scholars find it
hard enough to get their students and peers to read what they have
written, they find it nearly impossible to make an impact in policy
circles. Samuel Huntington’s 1993 Foreign Affairs article on “the
clash of civilizations” is a noteworthy exception. Not only is it one of
the most cited pieces ever written by an international relations
scholar — it is also one of the most widespread in policy and media
circles worldwide. While there is consensus from followers and critics
alike on what arguments Huntington was attempting to make – that
The ‘Clash of religion rather than ideology would become the main denominator in
post-Cold War conflicts, that the world’s major religious communities
are largely territorially delineated, and that these religious
Civilizations’ and Its communities are given and cannot be changed — Huntington’s
contentions stirred and continue to stir, heated debate.
Unexpected Liberalism Huntington not only rejected Francis Fukuyama’s then recently
published piece on the end of history, and the coming victory of
liberal democracy worldwide, but also reinvigorated the much-
critiqued Realist worldview of the never-ending tragedy of global
power politics. Huntington did so by simply replacing the clash of
ideology with the clash of civilizations (read: religions).
JOHAN ERIKSSON
SÖDERTÖM UNIVERSITY, SWEDEN
There is proof however that the “clash” thesis has been politically
utilized in a liberal and rather unexpected way, beyond, and even
contradicting, the usual story about bolstering neoconservative
notions of war on terrorism and Islamophobia. Surprisingly, the best
example of this is how former president George W. Bush used the
concept of a clash of civilizations. Bush’s foreign policy has generally
been described as strongly neoconservative, following rather than
refuting the idea of a clash of civilizations, citing as evidence his
distinction between “civilized nations” and “rogue states”.
Nevertheless, the manner in which Bush explicitly utilized
Huntington’s concept conveyed elements of liberalism. In a
Presidential Address to the Nation on September 11, 2007, Bush
commented on his “war on terrorism” in the following manner: “this
struggle has been called the clash of civilizations. In truth, it is a
struggle for civilization”. This refutation of Huntington’s idea was
repeated many times by Bush and his administration, including
Secretary of State Colin Powell and his successor Condoleezza
Rice.
The Clash of Civilization: Twenty Years On
30 This rejection of Huntington’s idea did not however mean that Bush 31
found it useless. On the contrary, Bush’s rhetoric redefined
“civilization” to distinctively liberal vales such as universal freedom
and democracy rather than separate religious community. This was
the effect of the simple rewording from a clash of to a clash for
civilization. This liberal underpinning of Bush’s foreign policy was
reinforced by many other rhetorical elements of the “war on
terrorism”, such as how “the force of freedom” will stop the “rise of
tyranny”, and how the war on terrorism was defined as a war of
ideology and ideas — not religion.
While Huntington’s pessimistic clash of civilizations presumed

religious communities as static and impermeable to change, Bush’s
optimistic clash for civilization presumed that communities are
The ‘Clash of
susceptible to fundamental value change. In his 2007 State of the
Union Address, Bush argued that: “Free people are not drawn to
malignant ideologies — and most will choose a better way when
Civilizations’ Faces
given the chance”. On various occasions, Bush made it clear that he
believed in the transformative power of spreading ideas of freedom Evidence-based Perusal
and democracy.
It is noteworthy that Obama, while having redirected US foreign

policy in many significant ways (emphasizing multilateralism, ending
the war in Iraq, shifting focus to East Asia), actually has continued TAKASHI INOGUCHI
UNIVERSITY OF NIIGATA PREFECTURE, JAPAN
rather than changed Bush’s liberal foreign policy rhetoric. In a speech
before the Turkish Parliament in April 2009, Obama stated that the
United Stated “is not and will never be at war with Islam”, echoing
Bush’s words that “the enemy of America is not our many Muslim
friends.”
What the above examples illustrate is that even an explicit refutation

of an idea can imply utility. In political debate, there is nothing as
useful as a diametrically opposed view, target, or enemy. By sharply
contrasting US foreign policy with the much-debated “clash of
civilizations”, Bush used this idea symbolically, legitimating policy,
and responding to critics. The ambiguity of the word civilization
allowed Bush’s cunning reframing from a neoconservative to a liberal
understanding. Such play on words is not always possible, and such
useful “others” are not always available. Nevertheless, a broader
understanding of “policy relevance” and “political utility” is called for
– an understanding which includes not only direct applicability, but
also conceptual and symbolic utilization.
The Clash of Civilization: Twenty Years On The ‘Clash of Civilizations’ Faces Evidence-based Perusal
32 The late Professor Samuel Huntington was a world-renowned great mixes. Cooper’s work (2000) is also broadly similar to Ronald 33
scholar of rara avis. He is greatly missed since his premature Inglehart’s work in that rising incomes sparks a transition from
passing away. He was full of often unorthodox ideas and his writings materialism to post-materialism. 7 Inoguchi (1999) juxtaposes three
exuded from passions about the United States and its missions. In frameworks—Westphalian, Philadelphian, and anti-Utopian—with
this essay I introduce Huntington’s clash of civilizations thesis in the their economic, political, and cultural foundations and principal
post-Cold War context of “one hundred schools of thought” authors specified. Principal authors of the Westphalian framework
blossoming across the globe. Then I situate his clash of civilizations are Henry Kissinger, Alexander Gerschenkron, and Benedict
thesis within his own intellectual contour of alarming and alerting Anderson.8 Principal authors of the Philadelphian framework are
fellow Americans about what he believed were the weaknesses and Francis Fukuyama, Robert Reich, and Benjamin Barber.9 Principal
vulnerabilities of the United States as it confronted the world with its authors of the anti-Utopian framework are Samuel Huntington, David
own devout missions. Thirdly, I carry out an evidence-based analysis Landes, and Robert Kaplan.10 Note that Huntington belongs to what I
of his thesis. This is an important exercise because Huntington was call the anti-Utopian school of thought along with another Harvard
not only a great scholar but also an irresistibly seductive writer. professor and a freelance writer. I argue that varying mixes of the
three frameworks depend on temporal and spatial contexts.
One Hundred Schools of Thought Blossom after the Cold War
The end of the Cold War saw the “one hundred schools of thought” Clash of Civilizations Thesis in Huntington’s Intellectual Contour
literally blossom. One can recall all the prophesies like the end of Huntington was articulate, astute, and agile in identifying what he
history, the imminent great crisis, U.S. primacy, and the clash of
1 2 3
believes to be the key weak points or vulnerability of the United
civilizations. I have joined the one hundred schools movement by
4
States in world politics. In 1957 when the United States faced the
proposing the scheme of the tripartization of global politics: Soviet challenge of Sputnik, he saw the vulnerability of the United
Westphalian, Philadelphian, and anti-Utopian.5 By tripartization I States vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in civil-military relations.11 In 1967
mean that the world would be driven largely by three distinctive Huntington saw that the United States misunderstood the
principles with varying mixes: Westphalian, Philadelphian, and development of emerging countries, most notably in southern
anti-Utopian. By Westphalian, I mean sovereign state-centered Vietnam, in that progress in economic development leads to political
perspective. By Philadelphian, I mean functionally formed global development, that is, democratization.12 His argument is that political
regimes. By anti-Utopian, I mean the prevalence of anarchical spirits institutionalization is critical in enabling many emerging countries to
and emotions. Instead of arguing that one dominant principle prevails leap forward to political development. In 1981 he saw the often-
in global politics as many of the prophets in the one hundred schools overlooked strength of the United States amid the Iranian crisis
movement do, I argue that three distinctive driving forces interact limited by the burdens carried over from the post-Vietnam and post-
together depending on history, geography, and economics. oil crises.13 In 1996 he saw the clash of civilizations as a time-
defining force, from which he saw one of the U.S. weaknesses.14 In
The three principles may look to some like Robert Cooper’s tripartite 2004 he saw the increase in the non-English speaking population of
geopolitics, in which he argues that global politics is governed by the United States (especially among Latinos) as a key national threat
three distinctive regions: post-modern, modern and pre-modern. By 6 because the English language is central to U.S. identity formation,
post-modern he means Western Europe and other trilateral countries; including the socialization processes inculcated in family, church, and
by modern he means all the newly independent countries with state school through the use of English.15 He was immensely versatile. He
sovereignty kept as a flagship: by pre-modern he means all the was impressively eloquent in writing but not as much in lectures.
countries that do not know Westphalian norms and institutions. Above all, Huntington was an intense patriot. He wanted to devote
Cooper’s tripartite characterization of global politics is tied to himself to country through these and other writings, but not through
geography and the colonialist legacy.Inoguchi (1999) differs from working in the government. He knew that he was at his best in writing
Cooper (2000), in that the former argues that the three governing about government, not acting in government. In sounding the alarm
principles of global politics coexist even in one society with varying and alerting others about the impending clash of civilizations after the
34 Cold War, Huntington wanted the United States to be well prepared do not qualify as a core state based on the responses of the 35
for what he saw as the tectonic change unfolding in global politics. AsiaBarometer to the question, “To what extent do you think the
Overall, he was correct in identifying some of the new driving forces following country has a good or bad impact on your country?” On the
such as China, Islam, and the increasing importance of religion in whole it is very difficult to assume that each civilizational entity, if it is
politics. But on three points the basis of his thesis is wrong. It is to to exist, has a core state with followers of a similar walk of life, most
these three points that I turn now. notably of a similar religious creed and habit, as far as the entire
Asian responses to the above noted question. This is a very critical
Evidenced-Based Analysis of Huntington’s Thesis point because in Huntington’s view the threat of Islam and the rise of
With the broad characterization of post-Cold War global politics and China pose structural dangers to the security of the United States
with the place of the clash of civilization thesis in Huntington’s and of the West. Neither of the two civilizational entities meets the
intellectual contour briefly summarized in the two previous sections, I structural components Huntington assumes, that is, a core state with
now turn to the evidence-based scrutiny of Huntington’s thesis and its followers presumably adjacent to it.
its foundations to see whether his thesis is of lasting value or not.
With the help of the AsiaBarometer,16 I argue that the clash of Underestimation of Permeation of Globalization
civilizations thesis suffers from three key weaknesses: (1) the Huntington assumes that the resurrection of religion even transcends
assumption of core states in major civilizations in Asia, (2) the borders and sometimes runs wild in the extreme version of Islam
underestimation of the deepening permeation of globalization, and fundamentalism. Why I categorize him as an anti-utopianist is that he
(3) the fascination combined with fixation with the specific appears to believe that the transborder and transnational forces of
geographical areas adjacent to Western Europe. religion make the world chaotic and anarchic. Outside of his
conception of Islam and China, the basic framework of Westphalian
Assumption of Core States in Major Civilizations state-centric sovereignty remains robustly retained. In assuming this,
Huntington assumes that core states exist in eight major civilizations Huntington tends to underestimate the deepening and fragmenting
that act as a sort of regional leader. Asia (i.e., East Asia, Southeast tide of globalization that permeates each and every part of the
Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia) presents anomalous situations world.19 It is as if he assumed that the strong sovereign state, further
for this assumption.17 It has produced five major civilizational-defining consolidated by the resurrected religious forces, asserts the
belief and value sets: Buddhism, Confucianism, Islam, Christianity, civilizational entities such as a greater cultural China and a
and Hinduism. Buddhism is concentrated in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, religiously united Islam. China has no followers.20 Islam is
Thailand, Vietnam, China, Korea, and Japan. But the core state is fragmented between Sunni and Shia, while globally Islam has no
difficult to identify. China is said to be the core state of Confucianism. center.21 This is not to say that Huntington is incorrect in foreseeing
But calling China Confucianism’s core state is somewhat difficult. the rise of China and of Islam. But he is incorrect in saying that each
Those countries adjacent to China, sometimes called the Confucian forms some civilizational entity that is bound to pose a great threat to
countries, that is, Vietnam, South and North Korea, and Japan, do the West. Also, Huntington is incorrect in saying that China and Islam
not necessarily have positive responses when the following question are likely to form a coalition against the West.
specifies China, “To what extent do you think the following country
has a good or bad impact on your country?”.18 Christianity does not What we see is often the opposite: China supports Serbian President
have a core state in Asia. Neither the Philippines nor South Korea Slobodan Milošević against Islamic Kosovo Albanians; China
can be said to be a core state. Hinduism has a core state: India. In supports Syrian President Bashar al-Asad against largely Islamic
this analysis, the most serious deficit is that Islam does not have a anti-government forces; China suppresses Islamic Uighurs inside
core state. Demographically, Indonesia has the largest Muslim China; China adopted a wait-and-see policy when Muammar
population in the world, followed in the Asian region by India, Gaddafi’s regime in Libya was under attack, extending emergency
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Maldives. Yet it is support to Libya without specifying any names of leaders or groups.
difficult to identify Indonesia as a core state. Also, Pakistan and Iran
36 Fixation on Areas Adjacent to Western Europe Endnotes 37

Huntington is, perhaps inadvertently, Western-biased. This comment 1
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Lasy Man, (New
is not meant to be critical of him. To non-Western observers of York: Free Press, 1992).
international relations, some American analysts of international 2
John Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future,” International Security, 15,
relations appear to focus on areas adjacent to the West, whether the no. 1 (1990): pp. 5-56.
frontier is located in Berlin or in Jerusalem or in the South China Sea. 3
Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs
Perhaps it is natural, as many Americans believe that the United (1990 / 1991): pp.23-33.
States was founded on the principles and spirit of seeing more of 4
Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of
like-minded peoples establishing their own republics. 22
In World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997).
Huntington’s case, the threat to the West comes from the frontiers of 5
See: Takashi Inoguchi, “Peering into the Future by Looking Back:
two fronts, the Middle East and East Asia. Until President Barack The Westphalian, Philadelphian and Anti-Utopian Paradigms,”
Obama steadily withdrew U.S. forces from Iraq and Afghanistan and International Studies Review 1, no. 2 (Summer 1999): pp. 173-191;
until he pronounced the Asia-Pacific pivot strategy that focuses the Takashi Inoguchi, “Three Japanese Scenarios for the Third
U.S. forces in East Asia and the Pacific, the U.S. capability of waging Millenium,” in Immanuel Wallerstein and Armand Clesse, eds., The
two wars simultaneously was the sacred doctrine. Huntington World We Are Entering, 2000-2050, (Amsterdam: Dutch University
pronounced the doctrine to prepare for the clash of civilizations, Press 2002): pp. 189-202; and Takashi Inoguchi, “World Order
which would help the United States to reconfigure U.S. forces most Debates in the Twentieth Century: Through the Eyes of the Two-
effectively and efficiently amid the post-Cold War relaxation, and to Level Game and the Second Image (Reversed),” The Chinese
boast of the unipolar moment in U.S. strategic focus. Journal of International Politics, (Summer 2009): pp. 155-188.
6
Robert Cooper, The Post-modern State and the World Order,
(A note on the AsiaBarometer: It was carried out in six waves in the (London: Demos, 2000).
2000s to register quality of life and related matters in all 29 Asian 7
See: Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution, (Princeton, NJ:
societies, with the exception of the Democratic People’s Republic of Princeton University Press, 1977); Ronald Inglehart. Culture Shifts in
Korea and Timor Leste. The surveys were carried out in random Advanced Industrial Society, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
samples and nation-wide schemes for each society. Roughly sixty- Press, 1990);
three thousand respondents, i.e., roughly eight million attributes are 8
Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization, (Princeton,
registered from them.) NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997). Ronald Inglehart and Christian
Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy,
Conclusion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
My scrutiny of Huntington’s clash of civilizations thesis has revealed
9
Henry Kissinger, A World Restored, (New York: Phoenix Press,
some of its fundamental fragilities. Yet his combination of patriotic 2000); Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in
passions, intellectual robustness and literary flair has undoubtedly Historical Perspective, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard
made him a great man to be remembered long after he ceased to be University Press, 1962); Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities:
busy alarming fellow patriots with seductive flows of sentences. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, (London: Verso,
1991).
10
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, (New
York: Free Press, 1992); Robert Reich, The Work of Nation:
Preparing Ourselves for 21st-Century Capitalism, (New York: A.A.
Knoph, 1991); Benjamin Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism
and Tribalism Are Reshaping the World, (New York: Balentine Books,
1996, reprint edition).
11
The Clash of Civilization: Twenty Years On
38 World Order, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997); David Landes, 39
The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and
Some So Poor, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998); Robert D. Kaplan,
The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post-Cold War,
(New York: Vintage, 2000).
12
Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and
Politics of Civil-Military Relations, (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1957).
13
Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968).
14
Samuel Huntington, American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony,
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980).
15
World Order, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997).
How to Promote a
16
Samuel Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s
National Identity, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004).
17
Takashi Inoguchi, “AsiaBarometer’s Achievements, Underutilized
Perspicacious Intercultural
Areas of the Survey Materials, and the Future Prospects,”
Comparative Democratization Section of the American Political Dialogue?
Science Association Newsletter, 10, no. 3 (Fall 2012): pp. 2, 13-15;
Takashi Inoguchi and Seiji Fujii, The Quality of Life in Asia: A
Comparison of the Quality of Life in 29 Asian Countries and
Societies, (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012).
18
Christian Collet and Takashi Inoguchi, “Is Globalization DIETER SENGHASS
Undermining Civilizational Identities? A Test of Huntington’s Core UNIVERSITY OF BREMEN, GERMANY
State Assumptions among the Publics of Greater Asia and the

Pacific,” Japanese Journal of Political Science, vol. 13, (December
(2012): pp. 553-585.
19
Ibid.
20
Takashi Inoguchi, “Peering into the Future by Looking Back: The
Westphalian, Philadelphian and Anti-Utopian Paradigms,”
International Studies Review 1, no. 2 (Summer 1999): pp. 173-191.
21
James McGregor, No Ancient Wisdom, No Followers: the
Challenges of Chinese Authoritarian Capitalism, (New York:
Prospecta Press, 2012).
22
Bernard Lewis, Faith and Power: Religion and Politics in the Middle
East, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); John Esposito, Islam
and Politics, (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1998).
23
Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi, American
Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000).
The Clash of Civilization: Twenty Years On How to Promote a Perspicacious Intercultural Dialogue?
40 At the end of his argument about the threatening, or actual, “clash of in fact exist. What we do find are representative champions of the 41
civilizations” Samuel Huntington pleaded for openness, collective most varied trends, who have long been present, though
learning, even cultural innovation (probably as a result of intercultural quantitatively diverging, in all cultures marked by structural
dialogues) – a plea which seems in discrepancy with his overall heterogeneity. There they are in conflict with one another:
assessment of the main development trend in our world: the clash of traditionalists and modernists, theocrats and secularists, modern
civilizations. But left unanswered is the question “how to implement value-promoters and reactionaries, universalists and communitarists,
this plea in practical terms?” unbelievers and fundamentalists, status-quo followers and
dissidents. Their differences are often to be found not so much in
Starting an intercultural dialogue with a good prospect of mutual specific cultural contents that are regarded as non-exchangeable and
understanding one has to omit one extremely counterproductive trap: non-negotiable. Instead these controversial and often antagonistic
the “essentialization” of cultures by which cultures, old and present, positions reflect modernization-conditioned analogous socio-
are assumed to be homogeneous or uniform entities. Instead, one economic and socio-political problems that as a rule transcend the
has to enter such a dialogue with the readiness to cope with the real individual cultural orbits. They also reflect analogous action
history of heterogeneous entities. What does such a perspective perspectives for the management and mastering of cultural conflicts
imply? within individual cultures (civilizations) – all this today is taking place
outside Europe, but no different from what it used to be in Europe
Europeans (and Westerners) should participate in an intercultural itself.
dialogue in the knowledge of their own real history. They should have
previously understood that many politically motivated cultural To cope with this empirical evidence, the past and ongoing clash
debates at present taking place in the wide world had their analogous within civilizations as an inescapable fact is likely to help escape the
precursors in Europe. The cultural struggles observed today are not clash of civilizations where it sporadically threatens to take place
unfamiliar, let alone new, so long as one recalls one’s own past. Such locally, regionally or even globally.
an entry into the dialogue has been found to work discursive
“wonders” in that it protects against a mostly unconscious
essentialization of a late phase in European (Western) culture (this
would equate European culture as such with modern value opinions
and organizational principles of a modern public order). Such an
approach also counteracts any temptation of essentializing other
cultures (still in comparable upheaval), i.e. of perceiving them as
quasi-monads. The point is that any essentialist cultural self-image
and any essentializing image of another culture leads any cultural
debate into a dead end, the more so if, as happens not infrequently,
it takes place under politicizing conditions. A fruitful cultural dialogue
therefore presupposes knowledge of the controversial paradigms that
characterize the real history of every cultural sphere and especially
of all global cultural regions.
As for the extra-European partners of such a dialogue, it would be

important that these do not allow themselves to be elevated into
representatives of their respective cultures or religions, nor to be
forced into such a position. Since, in view of profound acute cultural
conflicts within cultures, such “representative representatives” do not
Interview with Arshin Adib-Moghaddam
42 Arshin Adib-Moghaddam has emerged as one of the leading 43

intellectuals of his generation. His writings have penetrated many
fields including Middle Eastern Studies, International Relations,
Post-Colonial studies, Comparative Politics and Historiography.
Currently, Adib-Moghaddam is Reader in Comparative Politics and
International Relations at SOAS, University of London and the Chair
of the Centre for Iranian Studies. He is the author of A Metahistory of
the Clash of Civilisations: Us and them beyond Orientalism which
has been published by Hurst & Co. in London and Columbia
University Press in New York. He has also written The International
Politics of the Persian Gulf: A cultural genealogy (Routledge, 2006,
2009) and Iran in World Politics: The question of the Islamic Republic
Interview with Arshin

(Columbia University Press/Hurst, 2008, 2010). Educated at the
Universities of Hamburg, American University (Washington DC) and
Cambridge, he was the first Jarvis Doctorow Fellow in International
Adib-Moghaddam
Relations and Peace Studies at St. Edmund Hall and the Department
of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford. At
Cambridge, where he completed his MPhil and PhD as a scholarship
student, he was elected Honorary Fellow of the Cambridge European
Trust Society.
His writings have been translated into many languages and he is a

CONDUCTED BY J. PAUL BARKER
E-INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS frequent contributor to leading and alternative newspapers and TV
channels around the world. Adib-Moghaddam has lectured globally
on topics ranging from Iranian and west-Asian politics, US foreign
policy, Islamophobia, critical theory, comparative political thought and
the myth of a clash of civilisations. He is also active in digital
engagement through his website (www.adib-moghaddam.info),
facebook, and twitter.
His newest book, On the Arab Revolts and the Iranian Revolution:
Power and Resistance Today, will be published by Bloomsbury.
e-IR: You have authored “The Metahistory of the Clash of

Civilizations,” from your perspective: What does the “Clash of
Civilizations” mean? More specifically, what did Huntington
mean by it? What is meant by those who continue to employ it
today?
AA: With The Metahistory of the Clash of Civilisations I was tracing

how the idea that we are embroiled in a civilisational battle between
“us” and “them” came about. I researched and wrote the book during
The Clash of Civilization: Twenty Years On Interview with Arshin Adib-Moghaddam
44 a period when the so called “wars on terror” in Afghanistan and Iraq went as far as to say that Operation Desert Storm, the Second Gulf 45
recreated the myth that there is such a thing as a civilisational war War in 1990, was indicative of a clash of civilisations. Of course, the
between Islam and the west. I read the book of Huntington for the western alliance was aided and abetted by more Muslim countries
first time in German as a student at the University of Hamburg and than Saddam was, and the Ba’thist regime in Iraq was anything but
then again in English as a PhD student at Cambridge. In both Islamic adopting as it did a version of nationalism that was closer to
instances I found it utterly unconvincing. Huntington presented a the ideas of German romanticists such as Fichte and Herder than to
theory of conflict without an empirical basis. As a student of political Islamic forms of governance. The ideology of Saddam’s Iraq was
science and international relations this seemed unacceptable to me. based on a secular nationalist ideology and it was in constant
The idea that there is such a thing as civilisational entities and that opposition to Islamist forces. How could this be an instance of a
they can clash didn’t seem to appreciate the complexities of world clash of civilisations between Islam and the west?
politics.
Huntington, in typically Americo-centric fashion, did not deem it
So I took the opportunity of a generous research fellowship at Oxford necessary to educate himself in the histories of cultures that he took
University to start writing the book. I came to the conclusion that the liberty to write about. As such, his book appears as a semi-
Huntington presented a theory of conflict nurtured by a good deal of educated attempt to rally together an imagined Americo-centric west
unscholarly ignorance of other cultures. Huntington’s thesis is in order to ward off an equally imagined other. The theory of the
deceptively facile. It follows three methodological steps: Civilisations clash of civilisations is based on an outdated us-versus-them illogic
are cultural entities; cultures don’t change; given that “our” culture is which has lost traction, certainly for progressive intellectuals of my
different from “theirs” we are bound to be embroiled in a recurrent generation. Post-modernity has created hybrid areas that are largely
battle over supremacy in world politics. It seemed to me that the liberated from the pressures of civilisational identities and which do
historical context was important too. Huntington wrote the article and not readily respond to political manipulation couched in civilisational
the subsequent book after the demise of the Soviet Union. As a Cold language. At the same time, there has been a resurgence of the
War theorist who was always also close to decision-making circles in clash thesis espoused by the right-wing in Europe. Politicians such
the United States, he wanted to alert policy makers that the end of as Geert Wilders, for instance, wholeheartedly embrace the idea that
the global competition between the Soviet Union and the west will we are engaged in a continuous war between the west and Islam.
usher into a new period characterised by civilisational conflicts, Osama bin-Laden spoke of a clash of civilisations as well; indeed the
primarily between the west and Islam and what Huntington terms the clash disciples in east and west are in full agreement that there is a
“Confucian world.” From this perspective, the west is pitted against war between the west and Islam; a truly Orwellian irony. These
an increasingly assertive “rest”. digressions are not attributable to Huntington of course, but as a
seasoned scholar he must have known that a theory accentuating
More research into representations of “self” and “other” both in perpetual conflict and insurmountable cultural divisions can be easily
Europe and in texts written by Muslim thinkers revealed that the hijacked for rather more destructive agendas than he had in mind. As
theory of Huntington was not isolated; that it perpetuates an ancient such, he must be seen as a culprit in the perpetuation of the clash
myth that there is such a thing as civilisational entities and that they myth today and the histories of cultural conflicts that it continues to
can clash. I started to conduct this second phase of my research provoke.
upon my acceptance of my current position at the School of Oriental
and African Studies at the University of London about three years e-IR: Some would point to Huntington or slightly earlier with
before I finished the book. This period informed the historical Bernard Lewis, as the origin of the “Clash of Civilizations”
sections. I was increasingly convinced that the clash of civilisations is formulation. Where would you say the origin of the idea begins?
one of the most inaccurate theories ever invented. Huntington was
not educated in the history of Islam. In his writings he routinely
conflated being Arab with being Muslim, and vice versa. He even
46 AA: The myth of the clash of civilisations has an ancient presence. status quo: foreign invasions, antagonism towards the other, and at 47
This is what I tried to show in A Metahistory of the Clash of the margins racism and misogyny. As such, History books as well
Civilisations. I was attempting to write a history of the history of the continue to be replete with notions of us versus them, starting from
clash, that is I was tracing the strategies, institutional sites and antiquity with the myth of a cosmic battle between the democratic
normative systems that have anchored the myth in our archives of and civilised “Greeks” and the barbarian and autocratic Persians.
history. Lewis and Huntington are merely contemporary disciples of This epic falsehood was recently re-enacted in the Hollywood
the clash thesis. It is exactly because the myth has had an ancient blockbuster 300 which reinvigorates the myth of Thermopylae that
presence that it was so easy for them to repackage it for Herodotus, the so called father of history invented. But it is not only
contemporary consumption. Their ideas lodged into a pre-existing such comic depictions of history that contributes to facile notions
mentality that accentuates conflict between us and them. I hate to sustaining the us versus them logic. As indicated, academic studies
speak in momentous terms but really as a human species we have are complicit too. A host of classicists and historians continue to
not managed to invent a world order yet, that would eliminate the subscribe to the notion that the west is somehow distinct from the
idea that we have to be at war with the “other”. To my mind, critical rest and they continue to refer to the myths of antiquity in order to
scholarship has to contribute to forging such an alternative world- sustain their arguments. In his most recent book on the myth of
view. To that end, the university continues to be the only laboratory of Thermopylae, the Cambridge classicist Paul Cartledge deems my
thought where we can attempt to experiment with theories of peace position on the clash of civilisation “wildly overoptimistic” and yet in
and reconciliation. We have that luxury and yet a whole cast of none of his books on the topic has he presented convincing evidence
academics continue to stage-act epic dramas of conflict and mythical for the coherence of “western” history that he and others such as
battles between the forces of good (the west) versus the forces of Niall Ferguson continue to narrate. Western history became
evil (the rest), seemingly unaware of recent strides in “global history”, “western” because it was written as such and not due to a pre-
scholarship that appreciates the interconnectedness of cultures and ordained teleology. If Herodutus was the father of History, he was
the interdependence between east and west, north and south. I think also the father of the myth of History. Of course, he was immensely
their intransigent efforts to re-inscribe the west into a narrative of talented as a narrator, but he also consulted oracles to further his
superiority a waste of intellectual talent and material resources. To understanding of historical events. Surely, we have better devices at
make matters worse, our educational institutions are competing with hand to comprehend our common past. Yet in the absence of a
an uncritical culture industry which produces cults and celebrity, critical understanding of our archives, we are confronted with a huge
rather than criticism and knowledge. So the onus is on us; deluge of half-truths, romanticised tales and mythical narratives that
democracy, after all, suffocates without the voices of critique. entrench seemingly insurmountable cultural differences. I don’t
belong to the class of scholars that thinks that way. I insist on the
e-IR: Why has this narrative had such a lasting impact and moral right of the other to express herself in what we have
influence on cultural discourse? What are the elements that misrepresented as the “western” canon.
have perpetuated this idea across centuries and cultures?
The task has to be to reconstruct the historical debris that confronts
AA: This is exactly the topic of A Metahistory of the Clash of us with an empathetic appreciation of the presence of “the other” in
Civilisations which deconstructs how and why notions of a perpetual our archives. Emphasising “our” interdependence with “them” allows
war between us and them continue to be so popular. The book us to reassemble the interconnections of our common existence.
demonstrates how theories such as the clash of civilisation lodge into This can’t be but an intellectual battle centred on the last bastion of
a pre-existing mentality, a culture of thought that has habituated us to sanity: the university. But it can’t be confined to a specialist audience.
accept war as a normal condition. I have termed this a “clash Hence, my continuous emphasis on activist scholarship, an
regime”, a regime of truth that invents the idea of a clash on a intellectualised discourse that has transversal presence beyond the
continuous basis. The power of the clash regime explains why large university and which penetrates as many layers of society as
sections of society have been educated and tamed into accepting the possible. This is one of the reasons why I do interviews like this,
48 conscious that the odds are stacked against all of us who attempt to binds us all together, so that the clash theorists here and there are 49
disentangle the tightly woven web of lies and deceit that has nurtured contained.
the politics of aggression towards our neighbours for far too long
now. After all we experience the world primarily as human beings and e-IR: What are some possible ways forward in attempts to
not as members of seemingly coherent civilisations. This is our minimize the “clash” while recognizing there are differences
common bond and it is about time that it is represented as such. among peoples in terms of history, beliefs, and practices?
e-IR: As you indicate, one of the primary faults in a generalized AA: Differences should be celebrated; it is difference that sustains a
formulation such as Huntington’s is that it tends to create diverse and progressive culture. Lest we forget: sameness resembles
monolithic ‘us’ versus ‘them’ categories. In the increasingly the sanitised world that racists imagine where everyone is Aryan,
‘inter-connected’ world are these monolithic conceptions being blonde, members of a Herrenrasse. For the European racists of the
broken down or further hardened through greater interaction? 19th century and the first half of the 20th century this Herrenrasse
was biologically distinct. For today’s racists, for instance Anders
AA: There is a dual tendency, a paradox if you want. On the one Breivik, a great admirer of Geert Wilders and the English Defence
side, we are experiencing hybridisation, the break-down of grand League, or the various neo-fascist outfits that are re-appearing all
narratives and ideational systems in an increasingly networked, over Europe it is cultural and national distinction that need to be
post-modernised order, where ideational factors such as religious accentuated and fortified. Racism contracts space and solidifies
affiliation and nationality play a secondary role. The Arab revolts that categories. This is the reason why it was central to fascist ideology
spread like a wildfire throughout the region and from there to which denied the interdependence of humanity. In the Islamic worlds
southern Europe and elsewhere is indicative of this post-ideological there have been tendencies towards fascism as well; the ideas of
and trans-ideational world. The demonstrations were carried by Bin-Laden have more in common with those of Mussolini than with
universal themes such as democracy, social justice, empowerment, the canon of Islamic political thought. The right-wing here and there
pluralism etc. At the same time they were local, steeped in the craves sameness and worships categorisation, whereas the
secular and Islamic symbols and imagery that permeate the societies dialectical mind opens up spaces, contact points, an interspersed
in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere. It has been one of the great territory devoid of racial and cultural hierarchies.
fallacies of Eurocentric theories of globalisation to assume that “the
local” will evaporate in the great stream of the global. Rather, Let me point out that the dialectics that I am referring to are
globality and locality are increasingly intermingled and inseparable. “negative” in the sense that they do not resolve themselves in a
The properties of both are being changed in a grand dialectical grand Hegelian synthesis, an end of history where one side defeats
firework. We are there and they are here. This is the brave new world the other. Once it is acknowledged that winning history is futile –
that Huntington and other clash theorists don’t want to accept. human beings have tried in vain to co-opt each other for millennia –
peace with our neighbours remains the only rational alternative. In
It is no coincidence that Huntington was a great critic of what he concrete terms this requires constant resistance to the policies of
called the “Hispanisation” of the United States. The right-wing wants aggression, racism, wars, economic exploitation etc: Disseminating
the “other” out of here exactly in order to cleanse the self from any critical literature and scholarship, revealing the lies of government,
undue impingement. This is what the Enlightenment did to “History” countering racism in local and national politics, organising peaceful
as we know it here: it contributed to the great fallacy that the “west” vigils and demonstrations in support of world peace, blogging in the
stands alone, that Europe is unique, that our history can be detached name of equality, self-education about foreign cultures, tweeting
from theirs. Today, we stand in front of a majestic abstract painting about social injustices, a Facebook site covering human rights
where the contours of our existence blend in with other cultures in a abuses in your country, collecting critical literature and donating them
great display of mutual engagement. It is just a matter to bring this to local libraries, organising reading sessions covering radical art and
reality out more forcefully in the name of a common humanity that books; all of these are insurrectionary guerrilla tactics that each and
50 every one of us here can pursue and they are all very effective in the war movements and grassroots NGO’s in the fields of social 51
countering the clash mentality. In short: What we need is an army of justice, human rights and democracy are global too. On the Arab
empathetic peace disciples equipped with a dialectical mind-set Revolts and the Iranian Revolution looks at this mesmerising, brave
which thinks between cultures and not exclusively within them. new world and tries to differentiate this global field from local
expressions of protest. In the final analysis the book tries to show
e-IR: One of the observations Huntington made in the opening that we have to adjust our culture and our governing systems to the
of his article is that the Post-Cold War world and the non- challenges of post-modernity and that we have to discard the sturdy
Western world are no longer the objects of history but “join the thought patterns of yesterday. Our world is changing at a fast pace
West as movers and shapers of history.” Would this observation and it is about time that our mind-sets adapt to the complexity of our
fit with arguments you make in your newest book that we have contemporary world disorder. My work claims a humble contribution
been living in the end times of unitary categories such as “west” to that end.
and “east”? What implications does this have?
AA: It seems to me that Huntington makes the argument in order to

alert the “west” of a threat out there, to suggest a non-existent
civilisational challenge from what he calls “the rest”. Beware of our
revolting neighbours he seems to say. Let’s unite in the name of the
west and fortify our polis from the barbarian hordes threatening us
from the outside (Arabs, Iranians, Chinese etc.) and from within (e.g.
Hispanics, Muslims). This seems the logic behind Huntington’s
warning that the other has awakened to history. Yet it is not that the
non-Western world never had agency; even during the colonial
period they resisted. Even an astute scholar such as Edward Said
was wrong in Orientalism to suggest that the subaltern was muted.
Power and resistance go hand in hand, where there was Orientalist
silence about the other, there was a cacophony of voices that
resisted the colonial system on the ground. Luminaries such as
Mohammad Abduh in Egypt and Jamal-ad Din Afghani in Iran, Turkey
and elsewhere resisted in word and deed and were never really
subsumed or “pacified” by the colonial system or a discourse such as
Orientalism.
This never ending battle between systems of power and modes of

resistance is the topic of On the Arab Revolts and the Iranian
Revolution which proclaims the end times of monoliths such as
“west” and “east” as you rightly point out. I simply don’t think that
after the revolts of the past years, in the Arab world, in southern
Europe and the various Occupy Movements in the UK and the USA
which evolved in a distinctly global field, it is analytically prudent to
think in terms of geographical entities. Threats such as terrorism,
environmental deprivation and hyper-neoliberal capitalism are truly
global. Opportunities such as the increasingly internationalised stop
Contributors
Arshin Adib-Moghaddam is Reader in Comparative Politics and Macmillan, 2012). He is the founding editor of The Japanese Journal
International Relations at SOAS, University of London and the Chair of Political Science (Cambridge University Press) and International
of the Centre for Iranian Studies. He is the author of A Metahistory of Relations of the Asia-Pacific (Oxford University Press) and director of
the Clash of Civilisations: Us and them beyond Orientalism (Hurst & The AsiaBarometer Project. He can be reached at [email protected]
Co. in London, 2011) and The International Politics of the Persian tokyo.ac.jp.
Gulf: A cultural genealogy (Routledge, 2006) and Iran in World
Politics: The question of the Islamic Republic (Columbia University Syed Mansoob Murshed is Professor of the Economics of Conflict
Press/Hurst, 2008). and Peace at International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), Erasmus
University, Netherlands, and Professor of Economics at Coventry
Johan Eriksson is Head of Research at the Swedish Institute of University, UK. [email protected].
International Affairs, and Professor of Political Science at Södertörn
University, Stockholm. He has published seven books and numerous Dieter Senghaas is Professor Emeritus, University of Bremen,
articles. For a more in-depth discussion on the political utilization of Germany. He is the author of The Clash within Civilizations: Coming
the “clash”, see Eriksson’s 2011 article co-authored with Ludvig to Terms with Cultural Conflicts (Routledge, 2002).
Norman: “Political Utilization of Scholarly Ideas: ‘The Clash of
Civilizations’ vs. ‘Soft Power’ in US Foreign Policy”, Review of David A. Welch is CIGI Chair of Global Security, Balsillie School of
International Studies 37(1). See also Eriksson’s forthcoming article International Affairs. He has written extensively on foreign policy
“On the Policy Relevance of Grand Theory”, International Studies decision-making and international security. His works include Painful
Perspectives (2013). Choices: A Theory of Foreign Policy Change, Justice and the
Genesis of War, and, as co-author with Joseph Nye, Understanding
Jeffrey Haynes is Associate Dean of the Faculty of Law, Governance Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and
and International Relations, Director of the Centre for the Study of History, 9th ed. (Pearson, 2013).
Religion, Conflict and Cooperation, and Professor of Politics, at
London Metropolitan University. His expertise spans the areas of
religion and international relations; religion and politics; democracy
and democratisation; development studies; and comparative politics
and globalisation. He is the author of numerous books including
Religious Transnational Actors and Soft Power (Ashgate, 2012).
Takashi Inoguchi is President of the University of Niigata Prefecture
and Professor Emeritus of the University of Tokyo. He has published
more than 100 books and numerous articles on a broad range of
subjects, but focuses mostly on Japan and international affairs. The
latest include The Troubled Triangle: Economic and Security
Concerns for The United States, Japan and China, (Palgrave
Macmillan, forthcoming in 2013) and Political Parties and
Democracy: Contemporary Western Europe and Asia, (Palgrave

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EDITED COLLECTION

Published under a Creative Commons License: CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 Twenty Years On

Notice — For any reuse or distribution, you must make clear to

Image Credit: Ipoh kia (flickr)

6 The late professor Samuel P. Huntington is among the most prolific 7

While Huntington’s thesis made some important observations, it has

This collection of essays commemorating the legacy of Huntington’s

David Welch in his contribution looks more closely at Huntington

The final contribution to the collection is an interview with Arshin

My argument in this brief piece is not that Huntington’s article was so

It is worth recalling – especially for our younger readers – that in the

September 11, 2001, as well as many subsequent terrorist outrages, Endnotes

14 A friend of mine once told me a story about the seminar he attended 15

“What?” said the audience.

Apply Without “Islam is the next enemy.”

“Well—it just is. They hate us.”

“Fine. I’ll be back.”

And thus, according to my friend, was the “clash of civilizations”

Anyone who understands social science knows that it isn’t supposed

Since the attacks on the United States on September 11th 2001,

The Crescent and

In addition to these acts of violence, Islamic “radicalization” also finds

Although there is a vast body of work on how Islamic radicalization

26 proficiency tests, and the banning of headscarves and veils. 4

28 University professors often complain about how little political 29

While Huntington’s pessimistic clash of civilizations presumed

It is noteworthy that Obama, while having redirected US foreign

What the above examples illustrate is that even an explicit refutation

36 Fixation on Areas Adjacent to Western Europe Endnotes 37

State Assumptions among the Publics of Greater Asia and the

As for the extra-European partners of such a dialogue, it would be

42 Arshin Adib-Moghaddam has emerged as one of the leading 43

Interview with Arshin

His writings have been translated into many languages and he is a

e-IR: You have authored “The Metahistory of the Clash of

AA: With The Metahistory of the Clash of Civilisations I was tracing

AA: It seems to me that Huntington makes the argument in order to

This never ending battle between systems of power and modes of

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