Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 196804 October 9, 2012

MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RODERICK A. ALCALA, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 197015

PHILIP M. CASTILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BARBARA RUBY TALAGA and RODERICK A.
ALCALA, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

In focus in these consolidated special civil actions are the disqualification of a substitute who was
proclaimed the winner of a mayoralty election; and the ascertainment of who should assume the
office following the substitute’s disqualification.

The consolidated petitions for certiorari seek to annul and set aside the En Banc Resolution issued
on May 20, 2011 in SPC No. 10-024 by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), the dispositive
portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the January 11, 2011 Resolution of the Second
Division;

2. GRANTING the petition in intervention of Roderick A. Alcala;

3. ANNULLING the election and proclamation of respondent Barbara C. Talaga as mayor of

Lucena City and CANCELLING the Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation issued therefor;

4. Ordering respondent Barbara Ruby Talaga to cease and desist from discharging the
functions of the Office of the Mayor;

5. In view of the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of Lucena City, the
proclaimed Vice-Mayor is ORDERED to succeed as Mayor as provided under Section 44 of
the Local Government Code;
 6. DIRECTING the Clerk of Court of the Commission to furnish copies of this Resolution to
the Office of the President of the Philippines, the Department of Interior and Local
Government, the Department of Finance and the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panglunsod
of Lucena City.

Let the Department of Interior and Local Government and the Regional Election Director of Region
IV of COMELEC implement this resolution.

SO ORDERED. 1

Antecedents

On November 26, 2009 and December 1, 2009, Ramon Talaga (Ramon) and Philip M. Castillo
(Castillo) respectively filed their certificates of candidacy (CoCs) for the position of Mayor of Lucena
City to be contested in the scheduled May 10, 2010 national and local elections. 2

Ramon, the official candidate of the Lakas-Kampi-CMD, declared in his CoC that he was eligible for
3

the office he was seeking to be elected to.

Four days later, or on December 5, 2009, Castillo filed with the COMELEC a petition denominated
as In the Matter of the Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon
Y. Talaga, Jr. as Mayor for Having Already Served Three (3) Consecutive Terms as a City Mayor of
Lucena, which was docketed as SPA 09-029 (DC). He alleged
4

therein that Ramon, despite knowing that he had been elected and had served three consecutive
terms as Mayor of Lucena City, still filed his CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in the May 10, 2010
national and local elections.

The pertinent portions of Castillo’s petition follow:

1. Petitioner is of legal age, Filipino, married, and a resident of Barangay Mayao Crossing,
Lucena City but may be served with summons and other processes of this Commission at
the address of his counsel at 624 Aurora Blvd., Lucena City 4301;

2. Respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. is likewise of legal age, married, and a resident of
Barangay Ibabang Iyam, Lucena City and with postal address at the Office of the City Mayor,
City Hall, Lucena City, where he may be served with summons and other processes of this
Commission;

3. Petitioner, the incumbent city vice-mayor of Lucena having been elected during the 2007
local elections, is running for city mayor of Lucena under the Liberal party this coming 10
May 2010 local elections and has filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor of Lucena;

4. Respondent was successively elected mayor of Lucena City in 2001, 2004, and 2007 local
elections based on the records of the Commission on Elections of Lucena City and had fully
served the aforesaid three (3) terms without any voluntary and involuntary interruption;

5. Except the preventive suspension imposed upon him from 13 October 2005 to 14
November 2005 and from 4 September 2009 to 30 October 2009 pursuant to
Sandiganbayan 4th Division Resolution in Criminal Case No. 27738 dated 3 October 2005,
 the public service as city mayor of the respondent is continuous and uninterrupted under the
existing laws and jurisprudence;

6. There is no law nor jurisprudence to justify the filing of the certificate of candidacy of the
respondent, hence, such act is outrightly unconstitutional, illegal, and highly immoral;

7. Respondent, knowing well that he was elected for and had fully served three (3)
consecutive terms as a city mayor of Lucena, he still filed his Certificate of Candidacy for City
Mayor of Lucena for this coming 10 May 2010 national and local elections;

8. Under the Constitution and existing Election Laws, New Local Government Code of the
Philippines, and jurisprudence the respondent is no longer entitled and is already disqualified
to be a city mayor for the fourth consecutive term;

9. The filing of the respondent for the position of city mayor is highly improper, unlawful and
is potentially injurious and prejudicial to taxpayers of the City of Lucena; and

10. It is most respectfully prayed by the petitioner that the respondent be declared
disqualified and no longer entitled to run in public office as city mayor of Lucena City based
on the existing law and jurisprudence. 5

The petition prayed for the following reliefs, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of Candidacy filed
by the respondent be denied due course to or cancel the same and that he be declared as a
disqualified candidate under the existing Election Laws and by the provisions of the New Local
Government Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
6

Ramon countered that that the Sandiganbayan had preventively suspended him from office during
his second and third terms; and that the three-term limit rule did not then apply to him pursuant to
the prevailing jurisprudence to the effect that an involuntary separation from office amounted to an
7

interruption of continuity of service for purposes of the application of the three-term limit rule.

In the meantime, on December 23, 2009, the Court promulgated the ruling in Aldovino, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections, holding that preventive suspension, being a mere temporary incapacity,
8

was not a valid ground for avoiding the effect of the three-term limit rule. Thus, on December 30,
2009, Ramon filed in the COMELEC a Manifestation with Motion to Resolve, taking into account the
intervening ruling in Aldovino. Relevant portions of his Manifestation with Motion to Resolve are
quoted herein, viz:

4. When respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Mayor of Lucena City, the
rule that ‘where the separation from office is caused by reasons beyond the control of the officer –
i.e. involuntary – the service of term is deemed interrupted’ has not yet been overturned by the new
ruling of the Supreme Court. As a matter of fact, the prevailing rule then of the Honorable
Commission in [sic] respect of the three (3)-term limitation was its decision in the case of Aldovino, et
al. vs. Asilo where it stated:

"Thus, even if respondent was elected during the 2004 elections, which was supposedly his third
and final term as city councilor, the same cannot be treated as a complete service or full term in
office since the same was interrupted when he was suspended by the Sandiganbayan Fourth
Division. And the respondent actually heeded the suspension order since he did not receive his
salary during the period October 16-31 and November 1-15 by reason of his actual suspension from
office. And this was further bolstered by the fact that the DILG issued a

Memorandum directing him, among others, to reassume his position." (Emphasis supplied.)

5. Clearly, there was no misrepresentation on the part of respondent as would constitute a ground
for the denial of due course to and/or the cancellation of respondent’s certificate of candidacy at the
time he filed the same. Petitioner’s ground for the denial of due course to and/or the cancellation of
respondent’s certificate of candidacy thus has no basis, in fact and in law, as there is no ground to
warrant such relief under the Omnibus Election Code and/or its implementing laws.

6. Pursuant, however, to the new ruling of the Supreme Court in respect of the issue on the three
(3)-term limitation, respondent acknowledges that he is now DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of
Mayor of Lucena City having served three (3) (albeit interrupted) terms as Mayor of Lucena City prior
to the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the 2010 elections.

7. In view of the foregoing premises and new jurisprudence on the matter, respondent respectfully
submits the present case for decision declaring him as DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of
Mayor of Lucena City. 9

Notwithstanding his express recognition of his disqualification to run as Mayor of Lucena City in the
May 10, 2010 national and local elections, Ramon did not withdraw his CoC.

Acting on Ramon’s Manifestation with Motion to Resolve, the COMELEC First Division issued a
Resolution on April 19, 2010, disposing as follows:
10

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, Ramon
Y. Talaga, Jr. is hereby declared DISQUALIFIED to run for Mayor of Lucena City for the 10 May 2010
National and Local Elections.

SO ORDERED.

Initially, Ramon filed his Verified Motion for Reconsideration against the April 19, 2010 Resolution of
the COMELEC First Division. Later on, however, he filed at 9:00 a.m. of May 4, 2010 an Ex-parte
11

Manifestation of Withdrawal of the Pending Motion for Reconsideration. At 4:30 p.m. on the same
12

date, Barbara Ruby filed her own CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in substitution of Ramon, attaching
thereto the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) issued by Lakas-Kampi-CMD, the
party that had nominated Ramon. 13

On May 5, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc, acting on Ramon’s Ex parte Manifestation of Withdrawal,
declared the COMELEC First Division’s Resolution dated April 19, 2010 final and executory. 14

On election day on May 10, 2010, the name of Ramon remained printed on the ballots but the votes
cast in his favor were counted in favor of Barbara Ruby as his substitute candidate, resulting in
Barbara Ruby being ultimately credited with 44,099 votes as against Castillo’s 39,615 votes. 15

Castillo promptly filed a petition in the City Board of Canvassers (CBOC) seeking the suspension of
Barbara Ruby’s proclamation. 16

It was only on May 13, 2010 when the COMELEC En Banc, upon the recommendation of its Law
Department, gave due course to Barbara Ruby’s CoC and CONA through Resolution No. 8917,
17
thereby including her in the certified list of candidates. Consequently, the CBOC proclaimed Barbara
18

Ruby as the newly-elected Mayor of Lucena City. 19

On May 20, 2010, Castillo filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation with the
COMELEC, docketed as SPC 10-024. He alleged that Barbara Ruby could not substitute Ramon
20

because his CoC had been cancelled and denied due course; and Barbara Ruby could not be
considered a candidate because the COMELEC En Banc had approved her substitution three days
after the elections; hence, the votes cast for Ramon should be considered stray.

In her Comment on the Petition for Annulment of Proclamation, Barbara Ruby maintained the
21

validity of her substitution. She countered that the COMELEC En Banc did not deny due course to or
cancel Ramon’s COC, despite a declaration of his disqualification, because there was no finding that
he had committed misrepresentation, the ground for the denial of due course to or cancellation of his
COC. She prayed that with her valid substitution, Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9006 applied, 22

based on which the votes cast for Ramon were properly counted in her favor.

On July 26, 2010, Roderick Alcala (Alcala), the duly-elected Vice Mayor of Lucena City, sought to
intervene, positing that he should assume the post of Mayor because Barbara Ruby’s substitution
23

had been invalid and Castillo had clearly lost the elections.

On January 11, 2011, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed Castillo’s petition and Alcala’s
petition-in-intervention, holding:
24

In the present case, Castillo was notified of Resolution 8917 on May 13, 2010 as it was the basis for
the proclamation of Ruby on that date. He, however, failed to file any action within the prescribed
period either in the Commission or the Supreme Court assailing the said resolution. Thus, the said
resolution has become final and executory. It cannot anymore be altered or reversed.

xxxx

x x x. A close perusal of the petition filed by Castillo in SPA 10-029 (Dc) shows that it was actually for
the disqualification of Ramon for having served three consecutive terms, which is a ground for his
disqualification under the Constitution in relation to Section 4(b)3 of Resolution 8696. There was no
mention therein that Ramon has committed material representation that would be a ground for the
cancellation or denial of due course to the CoC of Ramon under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code. The First Division, in fact, treated the petition as one for disqualification as gleaned from the
body of the resolution and its dispositive portion quoted above. This treatment of the First Division of
the petition as one for disqualification only is affirmed by the fact that its members signed Resolution
No. 8917 where it was clearly stated that the First Division only disqualified Ramon.

Having been disqualified only, the doctrine laid down in Miranda v. Abaya is not applicable. Ramon
was rightly substituted by Ruby. As such, the votes for Ramon cannot be considered as stray votes
but should be counted in favor of Ruby since the substituted and the substitute carry the same
surname – Talaga, as provided in Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9006.

xxxx

Moreover, there is no provision in the Omnibus Election Code or any election laws for that matter
which requires that the substitution and the Certificate of Candidacy of the substitute should be
approved and given due course first by the Commission or the Law Department before it can be
considered as effective. All that Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code as implemented by
Section 13 of Resolution No. 8678 requires is that it should be filed with the proper office. The
respondent is correct when she argued that in fact even the BEI can receive a CoC of a substitute
candidate in case the cause for the substitution happened between the day before the election and
mid-day of election day. Thus, even if the approval of the substitution was made after the election,
the substitution became effective on the date of the filing of the CoC with the Certificate of
Nomination and Acceptance.

There being no irregularity in the substitution by Ruby of Ramon as candidate for mayor of Lucena
City, the counting of the votes of Ramon in favor of Ruby is proper. The proclamation, thus, of Ruby
as mayor elect of Lucena City is in order. Hence, we find no cogent reason to annul the proclamation
of respondent Barbara Ruby C. Talaga as the duly elected Mayor of the City of Lucena after the
elections conducted on May 10, 2010. 25

Acting on Castillo and Alcala’s respective motions for reconsideration, the COMELEC En Banc
issued the assailed Resolution dated May 20, 2011 reversing the COMELEC Second Division’s
ruling.
26

Pointing out that: (a) Resolution No. 8917 did not attain finality for being issued without a hearing as
a mere incident of the COMELEC’s ministerial duty to receive the COCs of substitute candidates; (b)
Resolution No. 8917 was based on the wrong facts; and (c) Ramon’s disqualification was resolved
with finality only on May 5, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc concluded that Barbara Ruby could not
have properly substituted Ramon but had simply become an additional candidate who had filed her
COC out of time; and held that Vice Mayor Alcala should succeed to the position pursuant to Section
44 of the Local Government Code (LGC). 27

Issues

The core issue involves the validity of the substitution by Barbara Ruby as candidate for the position
of Mayor of Lucena City in lieu of Ramon, her husband.

Ancillary to the core issue is the determination of who among the contending parties should assume
the contested elective position.

Ruling

The petitions lack merit.

1.

Existence of a valid CoC is a condition

sine qua non for a valid substitution

The filing of a CoC within the period provided by law is a mandatory requirement for any person to
be considered a candidate in a national or local election. This is clear from Section 73 of the
Omnibus Election Code, to wit:

Section 73. Certificate of candidacy — No person shall be eligible for any elective public office
unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.

Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code specifies the contents of a COC, viz:
Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy.—The certificate of candidacy shall state that the
person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said
office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly
urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he
belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his
profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to
the best of his knowledge. x x x

The evident purposes of the requirement for the filing of CoCs and in fixing the time limit for filing
them are, namely: (a) to enable the voters to know, at least 60 days prior to the regular election, the
candidates from among whom they are to make the choice; and (b) to avoid confusion and
inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes cast. If the law does not confine to the duly-registered
candidates the choice by the voters, there may be as many persons voted for as there are voters,
and votes may be cast even for unknown or fictitious persons as a mark to identify the votes in favor
of a candidate for another office in the same election. Moreover, according to Sinaca v. Mula, the
28 29

CoC is:

x x x in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole world of the candidate’s political creed or
lack of political creed. It is a statement of a person seeking to run for a public office certifying that he
announces his candidacy for the office mentioned and that he is eligible for the office, the name of
the political party to which he belongs, if he belongs to any, and his post-office address for all
election purposes being as well stated.

Accordingly, a person’s declaration of his intention to run for public office and his affirmation that he
possesses the eligibility for the position he seeks to assume, followed by the timely filing of such
declaration, constitute a valid CoC that render the person making the declaration a valid or official
candidate.

There are two remedies available to prevent a candidate from running in an electoral race. One is
through a petition for disqualification and the other through a petition to deny due course to or cancel
a certificate of candidacy. The Court differentiated the two remedies in Fermin v. Commission on
Elections, thuswise:
30

x x x A petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, or Section 40 of the Local Government Code. On the other hand, a petition
to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material
representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a
person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the
person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a
candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC. 31

Inasmuch as the grounds for disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (i.e.,
prohibited acts of candidates, and the fact of a candidate’s permanent residency in another country
when that fact affects the residency requirement of a candidate) are separate and distinct from the
grounds for the cancellation of or denying due course to a COC (i.e., nuisance candidates under
Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code; and material misrepresentation under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code), the Court has recognized in Miranda v. Abaya that the following
32

circumstances may result from the granting of the petitions, to wit:

 (1) A candidate may not be qualified to run for election but may have filed a valid CoC;

(2) A candidate may not be qualified and at the same time may not have filed a valid CoC;
and

(3) A candidate may be qualified but his CoC may be denied due course or cancelled.

In the event that a candidate is disqualified to run for a public office, or dies, or withdraws his CoC
before the elections, Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code provides the option of substitution, to
wit:

Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal. — If after the last day for the
filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party
dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the
same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or
was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his
certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later
than mid-day of the day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur
between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with
any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of
candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission.

Nonetheless, whether the ground for substitution is death, withdrawal or disqualification of a

candidate, Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code unequivocally states that only an official
candidate of a registered or accredited party may be substituted.

Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, there can be no valid
33

substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be clear, too,
that a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not be validly substituted, because a person
without a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not
filed a CoC is not at all a candidate.
34

Likewise, a candidate who has not withdrawn his CoC in accordance with Section 73 of the Omnibus
Election Code may not be substituted. A withdrawal of candidacy can only give effect to a
substitution if the substitute candidate submits prior to the election a sworn CoC as required by
Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code. 35

2.

Declaration of Ramon’s disqualification

rendered his CoC invalid; hence, he was not
a valid candidate to be properly substituted

In the light of the foregoing rules on the CoC, the Court concurs with the conclusion of the
COMELEC En Banc that the Castillo petition in SPA 09-029 (DC) was in the nature of a petition to
deny due course to or cancel a CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

In describing the nature of a Section 78 petition, the Court said in Fermin v. Commission on
Elections:36
Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on
the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is
false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is
noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks.
Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a
material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to
deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding
under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal
with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section
78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of
the winning candidate.

Castillo’s petition contained essential allegations pertaining to a Section 78 petition, namely: (a)
Ramon made a false representation in his CoC; (b) the false representation referred to a material
matter that would affect the substantive right of Ramon as candidate (that is, the right to run for the
election for which he filed his certificate); and (c) Ramon made the false representation with the
intention to deceive the electorate as to his qualification for public office or deliberately attempted to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render him ineligible. The petition expressly
37

challenged Ramon’s eligibility for public office based on the prohibition stated in the Constitution and
the Local Government Code against any person serving three consecutive terms, and specifically
prayed that "the Certificate of Candidacy filed by the respondent Ramon be denied due course to or
cancel the same and that he be declared as a disqualified candidate." 38

The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under Section 78 involves a finding not
only that a person lacks a qualification but also that he made a material representation that is
false. A petition for the denial of due course to or cancellation of CoC that is short of the
39

requirements will not be granted. In Mitra v. Commission on Elections, the Court stressed that there
40

must also be a deliberate attempt to mislead, thus:

The false representation under Section 78 must likewise be a "deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." Given the purpose of
the requirement, it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be
candidate’s qualifications for public office. Thus, the misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses
cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where the intent to
deceive is patently absent, or where no deception on the electorate results. The deliberate character
of the misrepresentation necessarily follows from a consideration of the consequences of any
material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, he
cannot serve; in both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws.

It is underscored, however, that a Section 78 petition should not be interchanged or confused with a
Section 68 petition. The remedies under the two sections are different, for they are based on
different grounds, and can result in different eventualities. A person who is disqualified under
41

Section 68 is prohibited to continue as a candidate, but a person whose CoC is cancelled or denied
due course under Section 78 is not considered as a candidate at all because his status is that of a
person who has not filed a CoC. Miranda v. Abaya has clarified that a candidate who is disqualified
42 43

under Section 68 can be validly substituted pursuant to Section 77 because he remains a candidate
until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled under Section
78 cannot be substituted because he is not considered a candidate. 1âwphi1

To be sure, the cause of Ramon’s ineligibility (i.e., the three-term limit) is enforced both by the
Constitution and statutory law. Article X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Section 43 of the Local Government Code reiterates the constitutional three-term limit for all elective
local officials, to wit:

Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was
elected. (Emphasis supplied.)

The objective of imposing the three-term limit rule was "to avoid the evil of a single person
accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay
in the same office." The Court underscored this objective in Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections, stating:
44

x x x The framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the people’s freedom to
choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating
excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same
office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three
consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when
they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the
City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same
territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very
scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.

To accord with the constitutional and statutory proscriptions, Ramon was absolutely precluded from
asserting an eligibility to run as Mayor of Lucena City for the fourth consecutive term. Resultantly, his
CoC was invalid and ineffectual ab initio for containing the incurable defect consisting in his false
declaration of his eligibility to run. The invalidity and inefficacy of his CoC made his situation even
worse than that of a nuisance candidate because the nuisance candidate may remain eligible
despite cancellation of his CoC or despite the denial of due course to the CoC pursuant to Section
69 of the Omnibus Election Code. 45

Ramon himself specifically admitted his ineligibility when he filed his Manifestation with Motion to
Resolve on December 30, 2009 in the COMELEC. That sufficed to render his CoC invalid,
46

considering that for all intents and purposes the COMELEC’s declaration of his disqualification had
the effect of announcing that he was no candidate at all.

We stress that a non-candidate like Ramon had no right to pass on to his substitute. As Miranda v.
Abaya aptly put it:

Even on the most basic and fundamental principles, it is readily understood that the concept of a
substitute presupposes the existence of the person to be substituted, for how can a person take the
place of somebody who does not exist or who never was. The Court has no other choice but to rule
that in all the instances enumerated in Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, the existence of a
valid certificate of candidacy seasonably filed is a requisite sine qua non.
All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in
the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed
certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person was not a candidate, he
cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Code. Besides, if we were to allow the so-called
"substitute" to file a "new" and "original" certificate of candidacy beyond the period for the filing
thereof, it would be a crystalline case of unequal protection of the law, an act abhorred by our
Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
47

3.

Granting without any qualification of petition in

SPA No. 09-029(DC) manifested COMELEC’s intention to
declare Ramon disqualified and to cancel his CoC

That the COMELEC made no express finding that Ramon committed any deliberate
misrepresentation in his CoC was of little consequence in the determination of whether his CoC
should be deemed cancelled or not.

In Miranda v. Abaya, the specific relief that the petition prayed for was that the CoC "be not given
48

due course and/or cancelled." The COMELEC categorically granted "the petition" and then
pronounced — in apparent contradiction — that Joel Pempe Miranda was "disqualified." The

Court held that the COMELEC, by granting the petition without any qualification, disqualified Joel
Pempe Miranda and at the same time cancelled Jose Pempe Miranda’s CoC. The Court explained:

The question to settle next is whether or not aside from Joel "Pempe" Miranda being disqualified by
the Comelec in its May 5, 1998 resolution, his certificate of candidacy had likewise been denied due
course and cancelled.

The Court rules that it was.

Private respondent’s petition in SPA No. 98-019 specifically prayed for the following:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of Candidacy filed by respondent for the
position of Mayor for the City of Santiago be not given due course and/or cancelled.

Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.

(Rollo, p. 31; Emphasis ours.)

In resolving the petition filed by private respondent specifying a very particular relief, the Comelec
ruled favorably in the following manner:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (FIRST DIVISION) GRANTS the Petition.
Respondent JOSE "Pempe" MIRANDA is hereby DISQUALIFIED from running for the position of
mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, in the May 11, 1998 national and local elections.

SO ORDERED.

(p.43, Rollo; Emphasis ours.)

From a plain reading of the dispositive portion of the Comelec resolution of May 5, 1998 in SPA No.
98-019, it is sufficiently clear that the prayer specifically and particularly sought in the petition was
GRANTED, there being no qualification on the matter whatsoever. The disqualification was simply
ruled over and above the granting of the specific prayer for denial of due course and cancellation of
the certificate of candidacy. x x x.
49

xxxx

x x x. There is no dispute that the complaint or petition filed by private respondent in SPA No. 98-019
is one to deny due course and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda (Rollo,
pp. 26-31). There is likewise no question that the said petition was GRANTED without any
qualification whatsoever. It is rather clear, therefore, that whether or not the Comelec granted any
further relief in SPA No. 98-019 by disqualifying the candidate, the fact remains that the said petition
was granted and that the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda was denied due course
and cancelled. x x x.50

The crucial point of Miranda v. Abaya was that the COMELEC actually granted the particular relief of
cancelling or denying due course to the CoC prayed for in the petition by not subjecting that relief to
any qualification.

Miranda v. Abaya applies herein. Although Castillo’s petition in SPA No. 09-029 (DC) specifically
sought both the disqualification of Ramon and the denial of due course to or cancellation of his CoC,
the COMELEC categorically stated in the Resolution dated April 19, 2010 that it was granting the
petition. Despite the COMELEC making no finding of material misrepresentation on the part of
Ramon, its granting of Castillo’s petition without express qualifications manifested that the
COMELEC had cancelled Ramon’s CoC based on his apparent ineligibility. The Resolution dated
April 19, 2010 became final and executory because Castillo did not move for its reconsideration, and
because Ramon later withdrew his motion for reconsideration filed in relation to it.

4.

Elected Vice Mayor must succeed

and assume the position of Mayor
due to a permanent vacancy in the office

On the issue of who should assume the office of Mayor of Lucena City, Castillo submits that the
doctrine on the rejection of the second-placer espoused in Labo, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections should not apply to him because Ramon’s disqualification became final prior to the
51

elections. Instead, he cites Cayat v. Commission on Elections, where the Court said:
52 53

x x x In Labo there was no final judgment of disqualification before the elections. The doctrine on the
rejection of the second placer was applied in Labo and a host of other cases because the judgment
declaring the candidate’s disqualification in Labo and the other cases had not become final before
the elections. To repeat, Labo and the other cases applying the doctrine on the rejection of the
second placer have one common essential condition — the disqualification of the candidate had not
become final before the elections. This essential condition does not exist in the present case.

Thus, in Labo, Labo’s disqualification became final only on 14 May 1992, three days after the 11 May
1992 elections. On election day itself, Labo was still legally a candidate. In the present case, Cayat
was disqualified by final judgment 23 days before the 10 May 2004 elections. On election day, Cayat
was no longer legally a candidate for mayor. In short, Cayat’s candidacy for Mayor of Buguias,
Benguet was legally non-existent in the 10 May 2004 elections.
The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot
be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. This is a mandatory provision of law.
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, states:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.— Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to
be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be

counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court
or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension
of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis
added)

Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two situations. The first is when the
disqualification becomes final before the elections, which is the situation covered in the first
sentence of Section 6. The second is when the disqualification becomes final after the elections,
which is the situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6.

The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law governing the
first situation is categorical: a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be
voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. The Resolution disqualifying Cayat became
final on 17 April 2004, way before the 10 May 2004 elections. Therefore, all the 8,164 votes cast in
Cayat’s favor are stray. Cayat was never a candidate in the 10 May 2004 elections. Palileng’s
proclamation is proper because he was the sole and only candidate, second to none. 54

Relying on the pronouncement in Cayat, Castillo asserts that he was entitled to assume the position
of Mayor of Lucena City for having obtained the highest number of votes among the remaining
qualified candidates.

It would seem, then, that the date of the finality of the COMELEC resolution declaring Ramon
disqualified is decisive. According to Section 10, Rule 19 of the COMELEC’s Resolution No. 8804, a 55

decision or resolution of a Division becomes final and executory after the lapse of five days following
its promulgation unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. Under Section 8, Rule 20 of
Resolution No. 8804, the decision of the COMELEC En Banc becomes final and executory five days
after its promulgation and receipt of notice by the parties.

The COMELEC First Division declared Ramon disqualified through its Resolution dated April 19,
2010, the copy of which Ramon received on the same date. Ramon filed a motion for
56

reconsideration on April 21, 2010 in accordance with Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No.
57

8696, but withdrew the motion on May 4, 2010, ostensibly to allow his substitution by Barbara Ruby.
58 59

On his part, Castillo did not file any motion for reconsideration. Such circumstances indicated that
there was no more pending matter that could have effectively suspended the finality of the ruling in
due course. Hence, the Resolution dated April 19, 2010 could be said to have attained finality upon
the lapse of five days from its promulgation and receipt of it by the parties. This happened probably
on April 24, 2010. Despite such finality, the COMELEC En Banc continued to act on the withdrawal
by Ramon of his motion for reconsideration through the May 5, 2010 Resolution declaring the April
19, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division final and executory.

Yet, we cannot agree with Castillo’s assertion that with Ramon’s disqualification becoming final prior
to the May 10, 2010 elections, the ruling in Cayat was applicable in his favor. Barbara Ruby’s filing of
her CoC in substitution of Ramon significantly differentiated this case from the factual circumstances
obtaining in Cayat. Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayat, the petitioner in Cayat, was disqualified on April 17,
2004, and his disqualification became final before the May 10, 2004 elections. Considering that no
substitution of Cayat was made, Thomas R. Palileng, Sr., his rival, remained the only candidate for
the mayoralty post in Buguias, Benguet. In contrast, after Barbara Ruby substituted Ramon, the May
10, 2010 elections proceeded with her being regarded by the electorate of Lucena City as a bona
fide candidate. To the electorate, she became a contender for the same position vied for by Castillo,
such that she stood on the same footing as Castillo. Such standing as a candidate negated Castillo’s
claim of being the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes, and of being consequently
entitled to assume the office of Mayor.

Indeed, Castillo could not assume the office for he was only a second placer. Labo, Jr. should be
1âwphi1

applied. There, the Court emphasized that the candidate obtaining the second highest number of
votes for the contested office could not assume the office despite the disqualification of the first
placer because the second placer was "not the choice of the sovereign will." Surely, the Court
60

explained, a minority or defeated candidate could not be deemed elected to the office. There was to 61

be no question that the second placer lost in the election, was repudiated by the electorate, and
could not assume the vacated position. No law imposed upon and compelled the people of Lucena
62

City to accept a loser to be their political leader or their representative.

63

The only time that a second placer is allowed to take the place of a disqualified winning candidate is
when two requisites concur, namely: (a) the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is
disqualified; and (b) the electorate was fully aware in fact and in law of that candidate’s
disqualification as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but the electorate still cast
the plurality of the votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. Under this sole exception, the electorate
64

may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their
franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case the eligible candidate with the second highest
number of votes may be deemed elected. But the exception did not apply in favor of Castillo simply
65

because the second element was absent. The electorate of Lucena City were not the least aware of
the fact of Barbara Ruby’s ineligibility as the substitute. In fact, the COMELEC En Banc issued the
Resolution finding her substitution invalid only on May 20, 2011, or a full year after the decisions.

On the other hand, the COMELEC En Banc properly disqualified Barbara Ruby from assuming the
position of Mayor of Lucena City. To begin with, there was no valid candidate for her to substitute
due to Ramon’s ineligibility. Also, Ramon did not voluntarily withdraw his CoC before the elections in
accordance with Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code. Lastly, she was not an additional
candidate for the position of Mayor of Lucena City because her filing of her CoC on May 4, 2010 was
beyond the period fixed by law. Indeed, she was not, in law and in fact, a candidate. 66

A permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena City thus resulted, and such vacancy should
be filled pursuant to the law on succession defined in Section 44 of the LGC, to wit: 67

Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-
Mayor. – If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or
vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. x x x

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petitions in these consolidated cases; AFFIRMS the
Resolution issued on May 20, 2011 by the COMELEC En Banc; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay
the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.