2 Pfeider vs. People

10/18/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 827

G.R. No. 208001. June 19, 2017.*

P/C SUPT. EDWIN A. PFLEIDER, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Prosecution of Offenses;

Injunction; Criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by
injunction, preliminary or final.—Ordinarily, the determination of probable
cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in an appropriate case is
confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial determination, as
the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of
jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that criminal
prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or
final. There are, however, exceptions to this rule. Among the exceptions are
enumerated in Brocka v. Enrile, 192 SCRA 183 (1990).
Same; Same; Appeals; The Supreme Court (SC) is not a trier of facts.
The determination of probable cause is and will always entail a review of
the facts of the case.—It must be emphasized that this Court is not a trier of
facts. The determination of probable cause is and will always entail a review
of the facts of the case. The CA, in finding probable cause, did not exactly
delve into the facts of the case but raised questions that would entail a more
exhaustive review of the said facts. It ruled that, “Questions remain as to
why, among all people, Ryan would implicate Pfleider as the inducer and
why the other witnesses would associate Pfleider to the crime.” From this
query, the CA has raised doubt. Under the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure: Section 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.—(a) By the
Regional Trial Court.—Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint
or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the
prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the
case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he
finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment
order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued
by the judge who con-
_______________
* SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION.

www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016ddf0ee70ec214add1003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/36

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344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pfleider vs. People
ducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or

information was filed pursuant to Section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on
the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue
must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the
complaint of information.
Criminal Law; Extinction of Criminal Liability; Death of the Accused;
In view of the demise of P/C Supt. Edwin A. Pfleider on April 15, 2017,
which effectively extinguished his criminal liability, this case had been
rendered moot and academic.—It is my view that the Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated July 23, 2013, of
petitioner P/C Supt. Edwin A. Pfleider (Ret.), should have been granted
insofar as his prayer to set aside the Decision dated October 23, 2012 and
Resolution dated June 26, 2013, both of the Court of Appeals; and for this
Court to order that this case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court of
Tacloban City for the judicial determination of probable cause and the
proper disposition of the same case. However, in view of the demise of P/C
Supt. Edwin A. Pfleider on April 15, 2017, which effectively extinguished
his criminal liability, this case had been rendered moot and academic. Thus,
the criminal action against him should just be dismissed, and deemed closed
and terminated inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the
accused.
VELASCO, JR., J., Dissenting Opinion:
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; View that the

prosecution lost its right to appeal and cannot remedy the lost appeal by
filing a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion.—The
Order denying the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration was received by
the prosecution on October 26, 2011. Pursuant to Section 6 of Rule 122 and
the “fresh period rule,” the prosecution had until November 10, 2011 to
perfect their appeal. However, instead of filing the appeal, the prosecution
opted to file the Petition for Certiorari with the CA on December 23, 2011,
or 57 days after the receipt of the Order. From the foregoing, the
prosecution lost its right to appeal and cannot remedy the lost appeal by
filing a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion against
Judge Rogelio C. Sescon.

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VOL. 827, JUNE 19, 2017 345

Same; Same; Same; View that with the expiration of the fifteen (15)
days provided by the Rules of Court for it to file an appeal, the Resolution of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) finding no probable cause against Pfleider
became final and terminated the proceedings therein. The prosecution is
now precluded from using the extraordinary remedy of certiorari under Rule
65.—Remarkably, the prosecution misrepresented in its petition for
certiorari that “there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.” The prosecution, despite feigning
innocence or ignorance, obviously knew that it had the opportunity to use
the remedy of appeal under Section 6, Rule 122, yet it failed to use it. An
appeal is, in fact, the speediest and most adequate remedy the prosecution
should have availed of. However, the prosecution let the 15-day period lapse
and opted to use the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari, which
is hardly the speedy remedy that the prosecution complained of.
Consequently, with the expiration of the 15 days provided by the Rules of
Court for it to file an appeal, the Resolution of the RTC finding no probable
cause against Pfleider became final and terminated the proceedings therein.
The prosecution is now precluded from using the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari under Rule 65.
Same; Same; Same; View that in the seminal case of The Insular
Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 428 SCRA 79 (2004), the
Supreme Court (SC) had the occasion to expound on the instances that are
deemed as exceptions to the generally accepted rule that this Court cannot
evaluate issues of facts.—In the seminal case of The Insular Assurance
Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 428 SCRA 79 (2004), this Court had the
occasion to expound on the instances that are deemed as exceptions to the
generally accepted rule that this Court cannot evaluate issues of facts,
namely: x x x x (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse
of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its
findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when
the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based;

346

(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the
findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by
the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.
Same; Remand of Cases; View that it is an established rule for the
Supreme Court (SC) not to remand cases where it is in a position to resolve
the dispute based on the records before it.—It is also an established rule for
this Court not to remand cases where it is in a position to resolve the dispute
based on the records before it. There are several reasons that rationalize this
doctrine. In Golangco v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 493 (1997), this
Court explained that remanding the case was not proper since, in all
probability, it will only cause further delay as the decision would again be
appealed to this Court. For the expeditious administration of justice, this
Court in Golangco deemed it proper to resolve the issues presented before it.
Same; Evidence; Hearsay Evidence Rule; Witnesses; View that Section
36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that a witness can testify only to
those facts which he knows of his own personal knowledge. Hence, the
hearsay rule bars the testimony of a witness who merely recites what
someone else has told him.—In People v. Manhuyod, Jr., 290 SCRA 257
(1998), hearsay evidence is defined as “evidence not of what the witness
knows himself but of what he has heard from others.” Likewise, Section 36,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that a witness can testify only to
those facts which he knows of his own personal knowledge. Hence, the
hearsay rule bars the testimony of a witness who merely recites what
someone else has told him. The rule that hearsay testimony is inadmissible
in evidence is fundamental. It is indubitable that Gillamac, based on the
records, had no personal knowledge as regards the identity of the principal,
if any, of the assassination operation of Bautista. Gillamac’s sole basis in
claiming that petitioner is involved in the crime is merely the story Bautista
told him. Since Gillamac has no personal knowledge of any information
that it was petitioner who induced or ordered Bautista to kill the victim
Granados, Gillamac’s

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statements are purely hearsay and inadmissible in evidence to prove the

complicity of petitioner.
Same; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; Warrant of Arrest; Words
and Phrases; View that probable cause, for purposes of issuance of warrant
of arrest, has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed by the person sought to be arrested.—Probable cause, for
purposes of issuance of warrant of arrest, has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested. It is the knowledge of facts, actual or apparent, strong enough to
justify a reasonable man in the belief that he has lawful grounds for
arresting the accused. The requirement that a warrant of arrest can issue
only upon the existence of probable cause is a protection against false arrest
enshrined in no less than Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.
Same; Evidence; Extrajudicial Confessions; View that the Supreme
Court (SC) held in People v. Masinag Vda. de Ramos, 403 SCRA 167
(2003), that the application of the rule that an extrajudicial confession may
be accepted as corroborative evidence necessarily implies that there must be
other direct or circumstantial evidence.—The proposition of the prosecution
that an extrajudicial confession may be admissible as corroborative evidence
of other facts is unavailing. This Court held in People v. Masinag Vda. de
Ramos, 403 SCRA 167 (2003), that the application of the rule that an
extrajudicial confession may be accepted as corroborative evidence
necessarily implies that there must be other direct or circumstantial
evidence. In the absence of any other evidence, then there will be nothing
for the extrajudicial confession to corroborate.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of

the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Leonidas A. Escoro for private complainant.
Salantandre & Associates Law Office for petitioner.

348

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
RESOLUTION

PERALTA, J.:

This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated July 23, 2013, of petitioner P/C
Supt. Edwin A. Pfleider (Ret.) assailing the Decision dated October
23, 2012 and Resolution dated June 26, 2013, both of the Court of
Appeals (CA).
The facts follow.
An Information for Murder against petitioner and Ryan Bautista
was filed on April 18, 2011 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tacloban City, which reads as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of September 2010 or prior thereto, in the
City of Tacloban, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above named accused, conspiring, confederating and by offering
a price, reward or consideration to Ryan O. Bautista (Crim. Case No. 2010-
09-497) and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and with the
qualifying circumstance of treachery, evident premeditation, while Ryan O.
Bautista was armed with an unlicensed firearm, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one Manuel Granados
with the use of said unlicensed firearm and inflicting upon the said victim
fatal wounds on different parts of his body, which resulted to his untimely
death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

The RTC dismissed the case for lack of probable cause against
petitioner in a Resolution dated September 5, 2011.

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The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration on

September 26, 2011 praying for the reinstatement of the case, but the
Court denied the said motion on October 26, 2011.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was
therefore filed with the CA. The petition was grounded on grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, since
(a) the questioned resolution and order: (i) discarded and ignored
vital evidence and the authority of the public prosecutor in
determining the existence of probable cause; (ii) excluded the
extrajudicial confession executed by petitioner’s co-accused, Ryan
Bautista, despite the presumed voluntariness and due execution
thereof; and (iii) failed to give weight and consideration to other
vital pieces of evidence evincing trustworthiness of Bautista’s
extrajudicial confession and establishing petitioner’s complicity; and

(b) the manifest presence of probable cause supports the charge of
murder as against petitioner.
On March 19, 2012, petitioner filed his Comment/Opposition
and, on April 23, 2012, respondent filed its Reply to which petitioner
filed a Rejoinder dated May 23, 2012.
The CA, in its Decision dated October 24, 2012, set aside the
September 5, 2011 Resolution and October 26, 2011 Order of the
trial court, and directed the reinstatement of the Information for
Murder against petitioner.
Petitioner, on November 26, 2012, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on the CA’s decision. Respondent, on the other
hand, filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest
on November 29, 2012. Petitioner responded by filing an Opposition
dated December 8, 2012, and a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration dated January 24, 2013. In a Resolution dated
February 4, 2013, the CA resolved, among others, to Note the Office
of the Solicitor General’s (OSG) Motion for the Issuance of a
Warrant of Arrest.
On March 7, 2013, respondent filed its Comment to petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion

350

and, in response, petitioner filed his Reply dated March 21, 2013.
The CA, in a Resolution dated June 26, 2013, denied the Motion
for Reconsideration for lack of merit, there being no legal and
factual basis for the Court to depart from its earlier ruling reinstating
Criminal Case No. 2011-04-286 for Murder against petitioner.
Hence, the present Petition.
This Court, in a Resolution dated September 2, 2013, resolved
“to DENY the petition and AFFIRM the ruling of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on October 23, 2012 for failure to show any
reversible error committed by it when it held that the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 9 of Tacloban City committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the case against Edwin A. Pfleider despite
the presence of probable cause linking him as one of the perpetrators
of the crime charged against him.”1 Thus, petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration dated October 8, 2013.2
In a Resolution dated December 11, 2013, this Court resolved to
“GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration and SET ASIDE the
Resolution dated September 2, 2013, REINSTATE the petition and
to require the Office of the Solicitor General to COMMENT thereon

within ten (10) days from notice.”3
A Motion for Extension4 dated February 4, 2014 was filed by the
OSG which was granted by this Court in its Resolution5 dated
March 24, 2014.
The OSG filed its Comment6 dated April 2, 2014, while the
petitioner filed his Reply7 dated May 15, 2014.
_______________
1 Rollo, p. 909.
2 Id., at pp. 912-978.
3 Id., at p. 979.
4 Id., at pp. 980-985.
5 Id., at p. 986.
6 Id., at pp. 987-1035.

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VOL. 827, JUNE 19, 2017 351

Petitioner raises the following Assignment of Errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
GIVING DUE COURSE AND NOT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI FILED BY THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
AS THE SAME IS NOT THE PROPER REMEDY, AND CANNOT BE
AVAILED OF AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE LOST REMEDY OF AN
APPEAL;

II.
ASSUMING THAT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI CAN BE AVAILED IN
LIEU OF A LOST APPEAL, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT HONORABLE JUDGE
ROGELIO SESCON OF BRANCH 9, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
TACLOBAN CITY, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHEN HE DISMISSED THE CRIMINAL CASE FOR MURDER WITH
NO. 2011-04-268 AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER FOR LACK OF
PROBABLE CAUSE;

III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
HONORABLE JUDGE ROGELIO SESCON ARROGATED UPON
HIMSELF THE EXECUTIVE FUNCTION OF DETERMINING
PROBABLE CAUSE, AND ALLEGEDLY ASSUMED THE POWER TO

PROSECUTE VESTED IN THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT; AND

IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS, AND THAT
PROSECUTION WAS ALLEGEDLY ABLE TO PROFFER SUFFICIENT
BASIS TO ESTABLISH, MORE LIKELY THAN NOT, A LINK
BETWEEN
_______________
7 Id., at pp. 1043-1113.

352

PETITIONER AND RYAN BAUTISTA WITH RESPECT TO THE

KILLING OF MANUEL GRANADOS.

The OSG, in its Comment, posited the following arguments:
I.

A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 IS
THE PROPER REMEDY TO CORRECT ERRORS OF JURISDICTION
WHICH, IN THIS CASE, ARE DEMONSTRATED BY THE TRIAL
COURT IN:
A. EXERCISING THE EXECUTIVE FUNCTION OF
DETERMINING THE EXISTENSE OF PROBABLE CAUSE IN
SUPPORT OF THE MURDER CHARGE;
B. IGNORING AND DISREGARDING THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
CONFESSION OF PETITIONER’S CO-ACCUSED, RYAN
BAUTISTA; AND
C. REJECTING THE SAID EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION
DESPITE ITS PRESUMED AND MANIFEST VOLUNTARINESS
AND DUE EXECUTION.

II.
WELL-ENTRENCHED IS THE RULE THAT MINOR AND TRIVIAL
INCONSISTENCIES IN THE STATEMENTS OF PROSECUTION
WITNESSES DO NOT WEAKEN, BUT RATHER STRENGTHEN
THEIR CREDIBILITY;

III.
THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD SHOWS THAT, MORE LIKELY THAN
NOT, CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN COMMITTED AND THAT
RESPONDENT IS PROBABLY GUILTY OF THE SAME, THE JUDGE
SHOULD NOT DISMISS THE CASE;

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VOL. 827, JUNE 19, 2017 353

IV.
THE CIDG IS PRESUMED TO HAVE PERFORMED ITS OFFICIAL
FUNCTIONS REGULARLY AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.

Basically, what the petitioner and the respondent want from this
Court is for it to review the facts and to finally determine whether a
probable cause really exists in the case against petitioner for murder.
Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged
with this Court. Its duty in an appropriate case is confined to the
issue of whether the executive or judicial determination, as the case
may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of
jurisdiction.8 This is consistent with the general rule that criminal
prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by injunction,
preliminary or final.9 There are, however, exceptions to this rule.
Among the exceptions are enumerated in Brocka v. Enrile.10
_______________
8 Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 324 Phil. 568, 615; 254 SCRA 307, 345
(1996).
9 Id.
10 G.R. Nos. 69863-65, December 10, 1990, 192 SCRA 183, 188-189.
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused
(Hernandez v. Albano, et al., 125 Phil. 513; 19 SCRA 95 [1967]);
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga, et al. v. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304
[1922]; Hernandez v. Albano, et al., id.; Fortun v. Labang, 192 Phil. 125; 104 SCRA
607 [1981]);
c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice (De Leon v.
Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202 [1940]);
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas v.
Gil, 67 Phil. 62 [1939]);
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young
v. Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556 [1916]; Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389 [1925]);

354

However, a close examination of the arguments presented by

both parties would show that the present case does not fall under any
of the above cited exceptions. Furthermore, in this case, this Court is
once again confronted with the often raised issue of the difference
between the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor on
one hand and the determination of probable cause by the judge on
the other. To have a clearer view on the matter, see the case of
Mendoza v. People of the Philippines, et al.11
It must be emphasized that this Court is not a trier of facts. The
determination of probable cause is and will always entail a review of
the facts of the case. The CA, in finding probable cause, did not
exactly delve into the facts of the case but raised questions that
would entail a more exhaustive review of the said facts. It ruled that,
“Questions remain as to why, among all people, Ryan would
implicate Pfleider as the inducer and why the other witnesses would
associate Pfleider to the crime.”12 From this query, the CA has
raised doubt. Under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure:
_______________
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang v. People and Alvendia,

109 Phil. 1140 [1960]);
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez v. City Judge, 124
Phil. 1211; 18 SCRA 616 [1966]);
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia v. Ocampo,
C.A.-G.R. No. 4760, March 25, 1960);
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance (Recto v. Castelo, 18 L.J., [1953], cited in Rañoa v. Alvendia, C.A.-G.R.
No. 30720-R, October 8, 1962; Guingona, Jr. v. City Fiscal of Manila, 213 Phil. 516;
128 SCRA 577 [1984]); and
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to
quash on that ground has been denied (Salonga v. Cruz Paño, L-59524, February 18,
1985, 134 SCRA 438).
11 733 Phil. 603; 722 SCRA 647 (2014).
12 Rollo, p. 125.

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Section 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.—(a) By the Regional

Trial Court.—Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or
information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the
prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the
case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he
finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment
order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued
by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the
complaint or information was filed pursuant to Section 7 of this Rule. In
case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice
and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the
filing of the complaint of information.13

In this case, the judge of the RTC, not finding the existence of
probable cause, outrightly dismissed the case. The contrasting
findings of the CA and the RTC is well noted and from the very
provision of the Rules of Court,14 the remedy, in case of doubt, is for
the judge to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence.
Therefore, in the interest of justice, this Court finds it appropriate to
remand the case to the trial court for its proper disposition, or for a
proper determination of probable cause based on the evidence
presented by the prosecution. This is not the first time that this Court
has remanded a case to the trial court for it to make a ruling on
whether certain Informations should be dismissed or not.15
Thus, it is my view that the Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated July 23, 2013, of
petitioner P/C Supt. Edwin A. Pfleider (Ret.), should have
_______________
13 Sec. 6, Rule 112.

14 Id. (Emphasis ours)
15 See People v. Lacson, 432 Phil. 113, 131; 382 SCRA 365, 380 (2002).

356

been granted insofar as his prayer to set aside the Decision dated
October 23, 2012 and Resolution dated June 26, 2013, both of the
Court of Appeals; and for this Court to order that this case be
remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City for the
judicial determination of probable cause and the proper disposition
of the same case. However, in view of the demise of P/C Supt.
Edwin A. Pfleider on April 15, 2017, which effectively extinguished
his criminal liability, this case had been rendered moot and
academic. Thus, the criminal action against him should just be
dismissed, and deemed closed and terminated inasmuch as there is
no longer a defendant to stand as the accused.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated July 23, 2013 of petitioner P/C
Supt. Edwin A. Pfleider (Ret.) is hereby GRANTED insofar as his
prayer to SET ASIDE the Decision dated October 23, 2012 and
Resolution dated June 26, 2013, both of the Court of Appeals.
However, considering the demise of P/C Supt. Edwin A. Pfleider,
instead of remanding the case to the Regional Trial Court of
Tacloban City for the determination of probable cause, the criminal
action is DISMISSED, there being no defendant to stand as
accused.16
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe and Leonen, JJ., concur.

Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), J., Please see Dissenting Opinion.
_______________
16 See People v. Layag, G.R. No. 214875, October 17, 2016, 806 SCRA 190. See
also Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code.

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DISSENTING OPINION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

I respectfully register my dissent from the position of the
majority.
At the onset, the counsel of petitioner P/C Supt. Edwin A.

Pfleider (Pfleider) filed a Manifestation dated April 21, 2017
informing the Court that his client passed away on April 15, 2017.
As such, any criminal liability which petitioner Pfleider may have by
reason of Criminal Case No. 2011-04-268 had already been
extinguished. Nevertheless, the Court, as the final adjudicator, must
resolve the petition on its merits in order to fulfill its bounden duty
to put an end to unsettled judicial controversies, especially so if it is
in the pursuit of clearing the name of an innocent man before he is
laid to rest.

Nature of the Petition

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision dated
October 23, 2012 and Resolution dated June 26, 2013 issued by the
Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 06544. The assailed
Decision reversed and set aside the Resolution dated September 5,
2011 and Order dated October 26, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Tacloban City, Branch 9 in Criminal Case No. 2011-04-
268 dismissing the case against petitioner Pfleider for lack of
probable cause.

The Facts

This criminal case arose from a Complaint-Affidavit for Murder
dated October 6, 2010 filed against petitioner Pfleider before the
Department of Justice (DOJ) implicating him in the killing of the
victim, Manuel S. Granados (Granados). The Complaint alleged that
it was petitioner Pfleider who induced

358

accused Ryan O. Bautista (Bautista) to kill Granados by means of

price, reward, or promise.
The facts of the case are as follows:
At around 7:00 a.m. of September 15, 2010, Granados was
fatally shot by Bautista in front of his home in Tacloban City. After
the shooting, Bautista attempted to flee the crime scene but was
unsuccessful because his getaway motorcycle failed to start its
engine. A neighbor of the victim, Butch Price, came to the rescue
and shot and wounded Bautista. Granados was immediately rushed
to the Divine Word Hospital for emergency medical treatment but
was declared dead by the attending physician. On the other hand,

Bautista was brought to the Eastern Visayas Regional Medical
Center for treatment of the gunshot wound he sustained from Butch
Price.
On the same day, SPO2 Norman Loy Fevidal interviewed
Bautista while the latter was still confined and under medication in
the hospital. Bautista executed an extrajudicial confession, or his
First Affidavit, in a Question and Answer format based on the
interview. In his First Affidavit, Bautista implicated petitioner
Pfleider as the alleged mastermind of the assassination. He claimed
that Pfleider induced him by means of a price, reward or promise of
sixty thousand pesos (P60,000) for the hit.
On September 16, 2010, Rex M. Gillamac (Gillamac) surfaced
and gave his statement alleging that he was the one who introduced
Bautista to Pfleider. He also claimed that he was with Bautista
during a surveillance they conducted on Granados during the second
week of July 2010.
On September 17, 2010, a criminal Information for murder was
filed against Bautista with the Tacloban City RTC, Branch 9.
On September 18, 2010, Bautista, assisted by Atty. Abet Hidalgo,
executed a Second Affidavit, an Affidavit of Recantation, wherein
he claimed that the persons who previously interviewed him for his
first affidavit were already carrying

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with them a prepared affidavit implicating Pfleider as the

mastermind in the shooting of Granados. He alleged that he was
pressured and threatened that he will be executed on an electric chair
if he did not agree to implicate petitioner. He also alleged that the
First Affidavit was not read to him and the contents thereof were not
explained to him. Further, he claimed that he did not know if there
was a lawyer present during the time of his first interview and he
was not given a copy of said affidavit.
On September 28, 2010, a certain Jimmy Atoy (Atoy), a
junkshop helper and mechanic for Maning’s Enterprises, executed
an affidavit and claimed that the motorcycle used during the
shooting incident was bought from the store where he was
employed. He further alleged that it was petitioner Pfleider who
personally handed him the money to be paid to the cashier Catherine
Delos Santos (Catherine) for the purchase of the motorcycle.
On October 6, 2010, Evelyn Granados (Evelyn) and Jeric Dane
Granados (Jeric), the wife and daughter of the victim, respectively,
filed a Complaint-Affidavit with the DOJ against petitioner Pfleider,

alleging that the motive for the crime is business rivalry. Private
complainants submitted the First Affidavit of Bautista, the Affidavit
of Gillamac dated September 16, 2010, and the Affidavit of Atoy
dated September 28, 2010, among others.
In his Counter-Affidavit and Rejoinder-Affidavit dated
December 15, 2010 and February 2, 2011, respectively, petitioner
Pfleider denied any involvement in the crime. He claimed that the
arguments of the complainants were mere suppositions and
unwarranted presumptions, speculations, and conjectures. He also
stated that the statements of the witnesses were mere afterthoughts
and obviously scripted and supplied to suit the malicious case
against him. He also said that the allegations were all factually and
legally unfounded and, thus, bereft and unworthy of any credence
and belief.

360

During the course of the preliminary investigation, private

complainants submitted Bautista’s Third Affidavit dated January 12,
2011.
Meanwhile, a Resolution dated April 11, 2011 was issued by
Asst. State Prosecutor Rex Gingoyon finding that probable cause for
murder against petitioner Pfleider exists, and caused the filing of an
Information with the Tacloban City Regional Trial Court, raffled to
Branch 9.
On April 19, 2011, petitioner Pfleider filed with the RTC an
Omnibus Motion to Defer Proceedings and Issuance of Warrant of
Arrest. Subsequently, petitioner Pfleider filed on April 28, 2011 a
Manifestation and Supplemental Motion to the Omnibus Motion
wherein he attached the Affidavit of one Renato Mendoza1
(Mendoza) dated April 26, 2011. Mendoza, in his Affidavit, denied
the allegation of PO3 Felizardo Sacris (Sacris) that he supplied the
caliber .45 pistol MKIV, Series 80 with Serial Number 120876, or
any other firearm, to Sacris.
Meanwhile, petitioner Pfleider assailed the findings of Asst. State
Prosecutor Gingoyon and filed a petition for review with the DOJ.
After conducting a full evaluation of the evidence submitted by
both the prosecution and petitioner Pfleider to determine the
existence of probable cause for purposes of issuance of warrant of
arrest, the RTC, in a Resolution dated September 5, 2011, dismissed
the case against petitioner for lack of probable cause. The
dispositive portion of said Resolution states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds no probable

cause against accused P/C SUPT. EDWIN A. PFLEIDER (Ret.) and
accordingly, this Court hereby DISMISSES this case.
SO ORDERED.
_______________
1 Annex “K” of the Petition for Review on Certiorari.

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VOL. 827, JUNE 19, 2017 361

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the prosecution was

denied in an Order dated October 26, 2011.
On December 23, 2011, respondent People of the Philippines,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Special
Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court with the CA.
In the meantime, the Secretary of Justice issued a Resolution
dated May 4, 2012 on the petition for review filed by petitioner
Pfleider ruling that since the trial court has dismissed the case, which
ruling it concurs with, the petition for review has become moot and
academic.
In a Decision2 dated October 23, 2012, the CA granted the
Petition for Certiorari reversing and setting aside the RTC’s
Resolution dated September 5, 2011 and Order dated October 26,
2011. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 5, 2011

Resolution and October 26, 2011 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
9, Tacloban City are SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 2011-04-268 for
MURDER against Ret. P/C Supt. Edwin A. Pfleider is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration, on which the OSG filed its Comment.
Meanwhile, on January 21, 2013, Asst. State Prosecutor
Gingoyon filed with Branch 8 RTC of Tacloban City an Amended
Information against Bautista. The Information now reads as follows:
_______________
2 Penned by Associate Justice Carmelita Salandanan-Manahan, and concurred in

by Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Maria Elisa Sempio-Diy.

362

AMENDED INFORMATION

The undersigned Assistant State Prosecutor acting as the City Prosecutor
of Tacloban City per DOJ D.O. No. 472 dated June 10, 2011, accuses
RYAN BAUTISTA y OSTOLANO of the crime of MURDER, committed
as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of September, 2010 or prior thereto, in the
City of Tacloban, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above mentioned accused, conspiring, confederating and who
was offered a price, reward or consideration by another person whose true
name, identity and whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping one
another, with intent to kill and with the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, evident premeditation and with the use of an unlicensed firearm
intended for that purpose, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and fire upon the herein victim Manuel “Boyen”
Granados with the said unlicensed firearm (handgun) hitting him on the
different parts of his body, causing him to sustain several gunshot wounds
thereon which resulted to this untimely death, to the damage and prejudice
of his heirs. (underscoring supplied)

On January 25, 2013, Bautista was arraigned on the newly
amended Information, assisted by his counsel Atty. Gaspay. He was
read the Information in the vernacular he knows, speaks and
understands, to which he pleaded “NOT GUILTY.”
The CA issued a Resolution dated June 26, 2013 denying
petitioner Pfleider’s Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, the filing of the instant Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with
this Court.

Grounds for the Petition

Petitioner raises the following grounds to support his petition, to
wit:

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VOL. 827, JUNE 19, 2017 363

I.
THE [CA] GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE AND NOT
DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY THE [OSG]
AS THE SAME IS NOT THE PROPER REMEDY, AND CANNOT BE
AVAILED OF AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE LOST REMEDY OF AN
APPEAL;
II.
ASSUMING THAT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI CAN BE AVAILED IN
LIEU OF A LOST APPEAL, THE [CA] GRAVELY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT HONORABLE JUDGE ROGELIO SESCON OF
BRANCH 9, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, TACLOBAN CITY,
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN HE
DISMISSED CRIMINAL CASE FOR MURDER WITH NO. 2011-04-268
AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER FOR LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE;
III.
THE [CA] ERRED IN HOLDING THAT HONORABLE JUDGE
ROGELIO SESCON ARROGATED UPON HIMSELF THE EXECUTIVE
FUNCTION OF DETERMINING PROBABLE CAUSE, AND
ALLEGEDLY ASSUMED THE POWER TO PROSECUTE VESTED IN
THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT; AND
IV.
THE [CA] LIKEWISE ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PROBABLE CAUSE
EXISTS, AND THAT PROSECUTION WAS ALLEGEDLY ABLE TO
PROFFER SUFFICIENT BASIS TO ESTABLISH, MORE LIKELY THAN
NOT, A LINK BETWEEN PETITIONER AND RYAN BAUTISTA WITH
RESPECT TO THE KILLING OF MANUEL GRANADOS.3
_______________
3 Rollo, pp. 15-16.

364

In answer to the petition, the OSG filed its Comment dated April
2, 2014 to which petitioner Pfleider filed his Reply on May 14, 2014.

Discussion

I vote to grant the petition.

Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 is not a remedy or
substitute for a lost appeal

The instant petition is similar to Santos v. Orda2==4 wherein the
RTC dismissed the case for murder on the ground that no probable
cause existed to indict the accused. In that case, the prosecution filed
a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Aggrieved by the
Decision of the RTC, the OSG filed a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 with the CA claiming that the RTC committed grave abuse
of discretion in finding that no probable cause existed against the
accused. The CA thereafter granted said petition. However, this
Court reversed and set aside the decision of the CA holding that:
. . . the petition for certiorari filed by respondent under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court is inappropriate. It bears stressing that the Order of the RTC,
granting the motion of the prosecution to withdraw the Information
and ordering the case dismissed, is final because it disposed of the case
and terminated the proceedings therein, leaving nothing to be done by
the court. Thus, the proper remedy is appeal.5 (emphasis supplied)

Similar to Orda, the instant case was dismissed by the RTC for
lack of probable cause. The motion for reconsidera-
_______________
4 G.R No. 189402, May 6, 2010, 620 SCRA 375.

5 Id., at p. 383.

365
VOL. 827, JUNE 19, 2017 365

tion of the prosecution was likewise dismissed by the RTC. And just
like in Orda, the Solicitor General filed a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA instead of filing an
appeal via Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Court within 15 days6
from receipt of the Order dismissing the motion for reconsideration.
The Order denying the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration
was received by the prosecution on October 26, 2011. Pursuant to
Section 6 of Rule 122 and the “fresh period rule,”7 the prosecution
had until November 10, 2011 to perfect their appeal. However,
instead of filing the appeal, the prosecution opted to file the Petition
for Certiorari with the CA on
December 23, 2011, or 57 days after the receipt of the Order.
From the foregoing, the prosecution lost its right to appeal
and cannot remedy the lost appeal by filing a petition for
certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion against Judge
Rogelio C. Sescon. Remarkably, the prosecution misrepresented in
its petition for certiorari that “there is no appeal nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”8 The
prosecution, despite feigning innocence or ignorance, obviously
knew that it had the opportunity to use the remedy of appeal under
Section 6, Rule 122, yet it failed to use it. An appeal is, in fact, the
speediest and most adequate remedy the prosecution should have
availed of. However, the prosecution let the 15-day period lapse and
opted to use the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari,
which is hardly the speedy remedy that the prosecution complained
of. Consequently, with the expiration of the 15 days provided by the
Rules of Court for it to file an appeal, the Resolution of the RTC
finding no probable cause
_______________
6 Section 6. When appeal to be taken. An appeal must be taken within fifteen

(15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order
appealed from.
7 Neypes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005, 469 SCRA
633, 644.
8 Rollo, p. 715.

366

against Pfleider became final and terminated the proceedings therein.

The prosecution is now precluded from using the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari under Rule 65.
The CA cannot invoke the liberalization of the Rules merely
based on an allegation of serving the “broader interest of justice” in
order to rule on the merits instead of dismissing the petition outright.
By allowing the wrong mode of appeal to remedy a lost appeal, the
CA is guilty of denying justice to Pfleider. The pronouncement that
no probable cause existed cannot be deemed as a grave abuse of
discretion since Judge Sescon fully studied and evaluated all the
relevant evidence submitted to his sala.
The DOJ, in its Resolution dated May 4, 2012, even agreed to the
findings of Judge Sescon that no probable cause existed and that the
petition for review was moot and academic. The DOJ held:
x x x In said case, Judge Rogelio C. Sescon issued a Resolution dated

September 5, 2011, which found no probable cause against respondent
P/C Supt. Edwin Pfleider (Ret.).
The Court’s Resolution, to which we agree, renders the petition for review
moot and academic. As held by the Supreme Court in Sps. Freddie &
Elizabeth Webb, et al. v. Secretary of Justice, et al., G.R. No. 139120, July
31, 2003, “once a complaint or information is filed in court, however, as in
the present case, any disposition of the case — be it dismissal of the case, or
conviction or acquittal of the accused — rests on the sound discretion of the
court. For although the prosecutor of criminal cases even while the case is
already in court, he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court which is
the final arbiter on whether or not to proceed with the case.” (emphasis
supplied)

In reversing the RTC and at the same time basing such reversal
on a superficial review of the evidence, the CA

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VOL. 827, JUNE 19, 2017 367

committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to deny the petition

for certiorari.

The Court has authority to
resolve the issues and a re-
mand of the case to the trial
Court is not warranted be-
cause the record is sufficient
to render judgment

While this Court, as a general rule, is not a trier of facts, the
instant case clearly falls within the exceptions to the general rule.
In the seminal case of The Insular Assurance Company, Ltd. v.
Court of Appeals,9 this Court had the occasion to expound on the
instances that are deemed as exceptions to the generally accepted
rule that this Court cannot evaluate issues of facts, namely:
x x x x (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,

surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its
findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when
the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10)
when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the
_______________
9 G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 79.

368

Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not

disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.10 (emphasis supplied)

It is quite evident that the instant petition falls under the above
stated exceptions because the findings of the RTC and the CA are
manifestly contradictory. The RTC dismissed the case while the CA
found probable cause and ordered the reinstatement of the criminal
Information against petitioner Pfleider.
Moreover, the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion. Looking at the Decision of the CA
dated October 23, 2012, the CA obviously failed to examine
exhaustively the affidavits of the witnesses, which, if properly
examined, would show glaring inconsistencies. In reversing a trial
court’s decision based on the facts and evidence submitted to the
court, the appellate court should review and explain substantially the
reason for its reversal by showing the errors the trial court made in
rendering its decision. In the herein CA Decision, the pieces of
evidence examined were superficially explained and merely
enumerated. The CA stated the following:
First, the testimony of Jimmy Atoy deposing that the getaway vehicle
used by Ryan was the same vehicle bought by Pfleider from their store and
it was Pfleider’s instruction that the receipt and invoice be named after
Ryan. Second, PO3 Sacris attested that Pfleider sent him to a gunsmith to
get a gun which was later identified as the same gun used to kill the victim
Manuel. Third, Rex Gillamac averred that Ryan told him about Pfleider’s
order to kill Manuel for P50,000.00.11 x x x
_______________
10 Id., at p. 86.

11 Rollo, p. 124.

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VOL. 827, JUNE 19, 2017 369

Had the CA carefully considered the evidence on record, it would

have arrived at a different conclusion. Studying the evidentiary basis
that the CA relied upon, it should have seen that: first, Atoy, the
mechanic/janitor of Maning’s Enterprises, claimed that he allegedly
received P30,000 from petitioner Pfleider and gave the same to the
cashier, Catherine. Thereafter, he stated that petitioner Pfleider
allegedly ordered Catherine to place Bautista’s name on the receipt.
Yet, the prosecution failed to secure the testimony of the cashier,
who personally handled the transaction. Obviously, between Atoy
and Catherine, the latter’s testimony is more credible since she was
the one who allegedly personally interacted with petitioner Pfleider.
Common sense of a prudent man would of course view the
testimony of the mechanic as mere hearsay since the mechanic did
not personally interact with a customer and conduct the sale. It is
highly doubtful that a customer will hand money to a mechanic
instead of paying directly to the cashier. Second, PO3 Sacris attested
that petitioner Pfleider sent him to a gunsmith, Mendoza, to get the
gun used to kill Granados. Again, the prosecution failed to get the
testimony of Mendoza to further corroborate the accusation of PO3
Sacris. Ironically, the gunsmith Mendoza, in his Affidavit, denied
that PO3 Sacris got the gun from him. The denial of Mendoza
disproved the accusation of PO3 Sacris that the gun was obtained
from him. Third, Gillamac’s testimony deserves scant notice since
his and Bautista’s Affidavits are full of contradictions.
Since the CA heavily relied on the affidavit of both Bautista and
Gillamac to reverse the findings of the RTC, a comprehensive
review should have been done. Studying the affidavits filed by both
Bautista and Gillamac would show that both failed to corroborate

the other. Also, Bautista belatedly sought to correct the blatant errors
in his First Affidavit by submitting a supplemental/corrective
affidavit, already his Third Affidavit, in an attempt to make it appear
that his affidavits corroborate Gillamac’s affidavit.

370

Worse, the CA did not even test the admissibility of the

prosecution’s evidence. For instance, the CA still put probative
weight on the Affidavit of PO3 Sacris despite its clear
inadmissibility due to the untimely death of PO3 Sacris. The CA
likewise failed to screen the testimony of Gillamac as being hearsay,
and thus inadmissible.
A superficial analysis of the aforementioned affidavits would not
serve justice. Clearly, this petition falls also under the exception “(1)
when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures.”
Evidently, this Court can fully appreciate and decide the case
based on the evidence submitted because of the aforementioned
exceptions. Accordingly, a remand to the RTC is unnecessary
because this will entail additional expenses to both parties, as well as
the judicial courts. Likewise, justice will not be served due to the
delay a remand necessarily entails.
More importantly, remanding this case back to the RTC will
result in a scenario where exactly the same pieces of evidence will
be reevaluated at the trial court level. In doing so, a dangerous
precedent resulting in the destabilization of our justice system may
be triggered where the trial court evaluates issues of facts again and
again, ad infinitum, to the detriment of the parties.
Also, there is no indication that the prosecution was denied their
day in court. In fact, the contrary occurred because the prosecution
was allowed to submit pieces of evidence on multiple occasions.
This led to the RTC’s observation stating that the prosecution
submitted its evidence piecemeal resorting to multiple clarificatory
or supplemental affidavits after realizing that the evidence it had
previously submitted was vague, inadequate or conflicting. The
submission of multiple clarificatory affidavits served only to weaken
the allegations of the prosecution since doubt as to the credibility of
the witnesses arose due to the inconsistent facts submitted by them.

371
VOL. 827, JUNE 19, 2017 371

For instance, the prosecution submitted the First Affidavit of

Bautista at the time the Information was filed with the RTC. Around
four months thereafter, and sensing that the petitioner had exploited
the vagueness and inconsistencies of Bautista’s First Affidavit when
juxtaposed with Gillamac’s Affidavit, the prosecution submitted
Bautista’s Third Affidavit in an effort to explain the perceived
contradictions.
The prosecution never complained that it was prevented from
presenting any evidence that it wished to be considered by the RTC,
and, therefore, cannot impute grave abuse of discretion on the part
of RTC Judge Sescon for any whimsical, capricious or malicious
action, since there is none.
Hence, the record of this case unquestionably contains all
evidence submitted by both parties, and there are no more pieces of
evidence that any party may further wish to adduce. Remanding the
case back to the RTC, which already conducted a full and detailed
evaluation of all the evidence, may lead to multiple, unending, or
even conflicting determinations of fact.
It is also an established rule for this Court not to remand cases
where it is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records
before it.12 There are several reasons that rationalize this doctrine. In
Golangco v. Court of Appeals,13 this Court explained that remanding
the case was not proper since, in all probability, it will only cause
further delay as the decision would again be appealed to this Court.
For the expeditious administration of justice, this Court in Golangco
deemed it proper to resolve the issues presented before it.
In Board of Commissioners (CID) v. De la Rosa,14 it was held
that it is a rule for this Court to strive to settle the entire controversy
in a single proceeding, leaving no root or branch
_______________
12 Baylon v. Fact-finding Intelligence Bureau, G.R. No. 150870, December 11,
2002, 394 SCRA 21.
13 G.R. No. 124724, December 22, 1997, 283 SCRA 493, 501.
14 G.R. Nos. 95612-13, May 31, 1991, 197 SCRA 853, 875-876.

372

to bear the seeds of future litigation. This Court explained that no

useful purpose will be served if a case or the determination of an
issue in a case is remanded to the trial court only to have its decision
raised again to the CA, and from there back again to this Court.
In Nicolas v. Desierto,15 it was similarly held that remand was
not necessary because the Court was in a position to resolve the
issue based on the records and evidence before it. More importantly,
the Court held that the ends of speedy justice would not be served by
such remand.
In People v. Escober,16 this Court deemed it wise to render
judgment, rather than to remand the case in order to accord the
accused therein their Constitutional right for the speedy disposition
of their cases.
Certainly, we can add to the aforementioned explanations and
further enrich our jurisprudential principles by affirming that
remanding a case is not warranted when doing so can result in
multiple, unending, or contradicting determinations of factual issues.
Based on the foregoing, there is no just explanation to remand the
instant petition back to the RTC.

The evidence on record
submitted by the prosecu-
tion clearly failed to sup-
port a finding that prob-
able cause exists

It is the considered view that the Court must uphold the detailed
analysis made by Judge Sescon that the evidence on record is clearly
insufficient to support a finding that probable cause exists.
_______________
15 G.R. No. 154668, December 16, 2004, 447 SCRA 154, 164.
16 Nos. L-69564 & L-69658, January 29, 1988, 157 SCRA 541.

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VOL. 827, JUNE 19, 2017 373

The prosecution was fully aware and even admitted that it could
not successfully establish probable cause solely based on the
extrajudicial confessions of Bautista. Thus, the prosecution saw the
need to present additional evidence and submitted the affidavits of

three other witnesses, namely: (1) Affidavit of PO3 Sacris; (2)
Affidavit of Gillamac; and (3) Affidavit of Atoy.
First, the prosecution presented the Affidavit of PO3 Sacris who
alleged that he was sent by no less than petitioner himself to claim a
gun from a certain Renato Mendoza. To prevent the possibility that
the gun may be inadvertently interchanged with another firearm,
PO3 Sacris asserted that he copied the serial number of the gun on
his PNP tickler. This gun turned out to be the same firearm that was
recovered from the gunman Bautista that was used in the shooting of
Granados.
Unfortunately, while this case was pending, PO3 Sacris died in
an accident while he was riding on his motorcycle. Tragically and
ironically, the vehicle that hit PO3 Sacris causing his untimely
demise was owned by the family of the victim Granados.17 There is
no indication that petitioner had been involved in any manner with
regard to the death of PO3 Sacris.
In view of Sacris’ untimely demise, this Court can no longer take
into account PO3 Sacris’ statements in determining the existence of
probable cause, for doing so would violate the Constitutional rights
of the petitioner to meet the witness against him face to face.18 The
statements of PO3 Sacris can no longer have any probative value.19
It was, therefore, a grave error on the part of the CA when it
continued to consider the allegations of PO3 Sacris.
_______________
17 Annex “X” of the Petition for Review on Certiorari.

18 1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 14.
19 Tating v. Marcella, G.R. No. 155208, March 27, 2007, 519 SCRA 79.

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VOL. 827, JUNE 19, 2017 375

Second, the prosecution submitted the Affidavit of Gillamac who

claimed that the son of petitioner hired him as a bodyguard-driver
during the May 2010 elections. While serving as a bodyguard-driver,
Gillamac averred that he was the one who introduced Bautista to
petitioner in relation to an alleged assassination plot against a certain
Mayor Po. Accordingly, Gillamac said that he got to know that
Bautista had a project to assassinate Granados when he accompanied
Bautista to conduct a surveillance operation. Based on Gillamac’s
statements, Bautista confided to him the identity of the mastermind

in the assassination of Granados:
Q: During your surveillance, was there anything that Ryan confided to you?
A: Ryan said his niece is sick and needs to be brought to the hospital as soon
as possible so he needed money for her medication and that project is an
opportunity for him to have money.
Q: Did he tell you who induced him to do the project and how much?
A: Yes, he said the project is worth P50,000.00 and his principal is alias
“Bebot Heneral.”20

The foregoing is a classic and perfect example of what
constitutes hearsay evidence. In People v. Manhuyod, Jr., hearsay
evidence is defined as “evidence not of what the witness knows
himself but of what he has heard from others.”21 Likewise, Section
36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that a witness can testify
only to those facts which he knows of his own personal knowledge.
Hence, the hearsay rule bars the testimony of a witness who merely
recites what someone else
_______________
20 Page 2, Affidavit of Rex Maceda Gillamac dated September 16, 2010.
21 G.R. No. 124676, May 20, 1998, 290 SCRA 257, 270.

375
VOL. 827, JUNE 19, 2017 375

has told him. The rule that hearsay testimony is inadmissible in

evidence is fundamental.22
It is indubitable that Gillamac, based on the records, had no
personal knowledge as regards the identity of the principal, if any, of
the assassination operation of Bautista. Gillamac’s sole basis in
claiming that petitioner is involved in the crime is merely the story
Bautista told him. Since Gillamac has no personal knowledge of
any information that it was petitioner who induced or ordered
Bautista to kill the victim Granados, Gillamac’s statements are
purely hearsay and inadmissible in evidence to prove the complicity
of petitioner.
In Agcaoili v. Aquino,23 a case involving parties that were
members of the bench, this Court made a categorical ruling that
hearsay evidence cannot be the basis of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. A witness can testify only to those
facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, that is, which are
derived from his own perception. Hearsay evidence, therefore, has
no probative value whatsoever.
Interestingly, Bautista, in his First Affidavit, never even
mentioned Gillamac’s name as the person who went with him for the
surveillance of the victim.
Third, the prosecution submitted the Affidavit of Atoy who
averred that it was petitioner Pfleider who personally bought the
motorcycle that Bautista used and was recovered from the crime
scene. Atoy claimed that he was employed as a junkshop helper and
mechanic at Maning’s Enterprises. Atoy further claimed that he was
the one who personally received the payment for the getaway
motorcycle vehicle from petitioner Pfleider. According to Atoy, he
came to personally know petitioner Pfleider after the latter allegedly
bought two mo-
_______________
22 People v. Masinag Vda. de Ramos, 451 Phil. 214, 224; 403 SCRA 167, 174-
175 (2003).
23 MTJ-95-1051, October 21, 1996, 263 SCRA 403.

376

torcycles on a previous occasion, and in that event a coworker had

told him that the buyer was petitioner Pfleider:
Q: How did you know General Pfleider? Are you acquainted with him?
A: Yes sir, I know General Pfleider because he had already bought from us
two (2) other motorcycles he used during the May 2010 election before
he purchased the said STX motorcycle he gave to Ryan Bautista.
Besides, I know him (Pfleider) to be the owner/proprietor of the
Duptours van for hire.
Q: How long do you know General Pfleider?
A: I have known him since he bought at our store the two (2) units of
motorcycles before the May 2010 National and Local Elections.
Q: Did he actually go to your office to personally buy that two (2) units of
motorcycle that he used in the elections?
A: Yes sir, he was the one who went to our store that is why I knew him.
Q: Who told you the name and identity of General Pfleider?
A: Our former mechanic, Jovie Laude of Ormoc City who knows him.

Petitioner Pfleider, in his Counter-Affidavit, denied that he

bought the motorcycle that was used as getaway vehicle by Bautista,
or that he bought any motorcycle from Maning’s Enterprises for that
matter. Petitioner Pfleider also raised in his defense that he was not
the buyer of the getaway motorcycle as proven by Sales Invoice No.
4401 indicating the name of Bautista as buyer.
Petitioner Pfleider further submitted an Affidavit executed by his
son, Edwin “B.” Pfleider. The latter admitted in his affidavit that it
was he who personally bought a motorcycle from Maning’s
Enterprises, and not his father whose full name is Edwin “A.”
Pfleider. To corroborate his assertions,

377
VOL. 827, JUNE 19, 2017 377

petitioner submitted a Sales Invoice dated November 17, 2009 and a

Deed of Absolute Sale notarized on November 18, 2009, both of
which indicate that the name of the person who bought a motorcycle
from Maning’s Enterprises is the son Edwin “B.” Pfleider, and not
petitioner Edwin “A.” Pfleider.
Simply stated, the prosecution wishes to convince this Court that
even if Sales Invoice 4401 reflects the name of Bautista, such does
not negate a finding that petitioner Pfleider was the true purchaser.
On a more crucial point, however, it must not escape the keen
observation of this Court that the prosecution never addressed the
contention of petitioner Pfleider that it was another person who was
involved in the previous motorcycle sale. This point is so crucial
because Atoy claimed that it was during this very occasion that he
became aware of the identity of petitioner Pfleider.
The documentary evidence on record, in the form of Sales
Invoice and notarized Deed of Sale, all points to the conclusion that
it was not petitioner Pfleider, but his son whose name is Edwin “B.”
Pfleider, who previously bought a motorcycle from Maning’s
Enterprises. These documents came into existence long before the
crime occurred and could not have been hatched merely to suit the
self-serving interests of petitioner Pfleider. On their part, the
prosecution was not able to submit any Sales Invoice, Deed of Sale,
or other documentary evidence showing that petitioner made any
purchases from Maning’s Enterprises. The sale of a motorcycle unit
is a regulated transaction and is bound to yield a document trail. The
absence of any documentary evidence establishing that petitioner
purchased from Maning’s Enterprises can only mean that no such
transaction ever took place. In fact, the prosecution never
contradicted Pfleider’s allegation that it was another person who was

involved in the previous sales transaction referred to by Atoy.
This means that Atoy was either seriously mistaken or was not
being truthful when he claimed that he came to person-

378

ally know the identity of petitioner Pfleider when the latter

purportedly transacted at Maning’s Enterprises on a previous
occasion. Atoy’s statement clearly cannot support a finding of
probable cause because, aside from being left uncorroborated, it
points to the conclusion that he never met the petitioner. It remains
uncontroverted that it was not petitioner Pfleider, but another person
in the name of Edwin “B.” Pfleider, who made the previous
motorcycle purchase.
Probable cause, for purposes of issuance of warrant of arrest, has
been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed by the person sought to be arrested. It is the
knowledge of facts, actual or apparent, strong enough to justify a
reasonable man in the belief that he has lawful grounds for arresting
the accused.24 The requirement that a warrant of arrest can issue
only upon the existence of probable cause is a protection against
false arrest enshrined in no less than Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution.
Tested against the aforementioned standard, it is clear that the
pieces of evidence submitted by the prosecution, all circumstantial
in nature, cannot support a finding that judicial probable cause
exists. The statements of PO3 Sacris and Gillamac are indubitably
not admissible in evidence and produce no legal effect. The
testimony of Atoy is left uncorroborated and suffers from serious
flaws.
The prosecution also advanced the theory that the First and Third
Affidavits of Bautista can be admitted, although not as direct
evidence, but as corroborating evidence to show the probability of
participation of a co-accused.
The proposition of the prosecution that an extrajudicial
confession may be admissible as corroborative evidence of other
facts is unavailing. This Court held in People v. Vda. de
_______________
24 Allado v. Diokno, G.R. No. 113630, May 5, 1994, 232 SCRA 192, 199-200.

379
VOL. 827, JUNE 19, 2017 379

Ramos25 that the application of the rule that an extrajudicial

confession may be accepted as corroborative evidence necessarily
implies that there must be other direct or circumstantial evidence. In
the absence of any other evidence, then there will be nothing for the
extrajudicial confession to corroborate.
In the instant case, Bautista’s extrajudicial confessions cannot
serve to corroborate the allegations of PO3 Sacris and Gillamac. It
bears reiterating that PO3 Sacris already died and his death makes it
impossible for the petitioner to confront him. On the other hand,
Gillamac’s allegation regarding the involvement of petitioner is
hearsay in nature. Bautista’s First Affidavit also cannot serve to
corroborate Atoy’s statements simply because it never made any
reference to Atoy.
Bautista’s allegations in his Third Affidavit are too speculative
and the manner in which his affidavits were executed was replete
with serious irregularities. First, Bautista’s Third Affidavit, which
constitutes a confession, was executed without the assistance of
counsel in violation of the Constitutional guarantee against
uncounselled confessions. Second, Bautista was not informed of his
right to have a competent and independent counsel of his own
choice in executing his Third Affidavit. Third, Bautista’s Third
Affidavit was executed in English, a language that Bautista does not
understand. Fourth, Bautista entered a plea of not guilty during his
arraignment. As a legal consequence, the prosecution is now
required to independently prove all elements of the crime charged
and the prosecution can no longer rely on Bautista’s extrajudicial
confessions. Fifth, Bautista executed three different affidavits, a fact
that adversely affects his credibility and the voluntariness of his
confessions.
Then, the extrajudicial statements of Bautista consist of
incredulous accounts. According to Bautista, a certain “Bebe” and
“Kokie” invited him to go with them. Bautista agreed to go despite
barely knowing “Bebe” and “Kokie,” and despite
_______________
25 Supra note 22 at p. 225; pp. 175-176.

380

not knowing where the group planned to go. Strangely, the group
allegedly ended up meeting with petitioner, where Bautista was
introduced as a barber. Months later, petitioner purportedly
contacted Bautista and all of a sudden gave the assassination
instruction. The narration is highly improbable, contrary to human
experience, or even ridiculous.
Also, Bautista claimed that it was Pfleider himself who
accompanied him during a surveillance to identify the target victim.
This statement of Bautista contradicts Gillamac’s version wherein
Gillamac claimed that he was the one who accompanied Bautista
during the latter’s surveillance of the victim. Bautista likewise
claimed that it was “Kokie” who introduced him to Pfleider. This is
clearly contrary to the allegations of Gillamac claiming that he was
the one who introduced Bautista to Pfleider. Notably, nowhere in
Bautista’s First Affidavit did he even mention Gillamac’s name.
Notably, Bautista attempted to salvage the foregoing
inconsistencies in his Third Affidavit when he explained that more
than one surveillance operation was made. Pfleider allegedly
accompanied Bautista in one surveillance operation, while it was
Gillamac who went with Bautista in another surveillance. Bautista
also claimed that “Bebe” and Gillamac is actually one and the same
person.
The subsequent addition of completely new stories in Bautista’s
Third Affidavit seriously undermines his spontaneity and
truthfulness with respect to the new allegations. It is more than
likely that the new stories in Bautista’s Third Affidavit were merely
fabricated to “fix” fatal drawbacks the prosecution’s theory had
suffered after the contradictions were exploited. These drawbacks,
coupled with the fact that the execution of Bautista’s Third Affidavit
transgressed multiple Constitutional safeguards, lead to a conclusion
that the prosecution’s evidence clearly fails to satisfy the required
probable cause threshold.
Finally and importantly, we should note that on January 21, 2013,
Asst. State Prosecutor Gingoyon filed with Branch 8

381
VOL. 827, JUNE 19, 2017 381

of the RTC, Tacloban City, an Amended Information against

Bautista which incorporated an accusatory portion that alleges the
presence of conspiracy in the murder of Granados. Most
interestingly, when Bautista was arraigned on January 25, 2013
pursuant to the newly Amended Information and assisted by his
counsel, Atty. Gaspay, Bautista pleaded “Not Guilty.” This filing of
an Amended Information against Bautista seems to be a desperate
attempt to tag petitioner Pfleider as the mastermind behind the
murder of Granados. In reviewing the records of this case, the
Amended Information took more than two (2) years for the
prosecution to amend Bautista’s Information solely causing the
murder of Granados to conspiring with other persons to commit the
crime. Most remarkably, the Amended Information intentionally left
Pfleider’s name unmentioned, again We quote: “another person
whose true name, identity and whereabouts are still unknown.”
This Amended Information is a patent violation of Section 2,
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which states: “The
complaint or information shall be in writing, in the name of the
People of the Philippines against all persons who appear to be
responsible for the offense involved.” Likewise, Section 6 of the
same rule also provides that: “When an offense is committed by more
than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or
information.”
Thus, despite the prosecution’s tenacious advocacy of implicating
Pfleider as the mastermind of the crime, it is quite obvious that the
prosecution was never sure about Bautista’s alleged coconspirator.
This dislocates their charge against Pfleider of ordering the murder
of Granados.
Finally, Bautista’s plea of “NOT GUILTY” to the charge found in
the Amended Information shows that he was fully aware that the
State was charging him for conspiring with another person in the
murder of Manuel. By denying his guilt to the charge in the
Amended Information, he effectively withdrew and denounced the
extrajudicial confession in his

382

First Affidavit wherein he confessed to committing the crime against

Granados. This most recent plea of Bautista only underlines the
unreliability and unworthiness of his allegations in the eyes of the
law and effectively diminishes his credibility as a witness.
Therefore, the evidence on record submitted by the prosecution
clearly failed to support a finding that probable cause exists to
charge petitioner for murder.

Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the instant petition.
Petition granted insofar as prayer to set aside the decision dated

October 23, 2012 and resolution dated June 26, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals.
Notes.—A witness may not testify on matters which he or she

merely learned from others either because said witness was told or
read or heard those matters. (Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. vs.
Alberto, 664 SCRA 791 [2012])
The extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused is
admissible only against said accused, but is inadmissible against the
other accused. (Yapyuco vs. Sandiganbayan, 674 SCRA 420 [2012])

——o0o——
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10/18/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 827

G.R. No. 208001. June 19, 2017.*

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Prosecution of Offenses;

* SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION.

344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or

VELASCO, JR., J., Dissenting Opinion:

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; View that the

VOL. 827, JUNE 19, 2017 345

346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 827, JUNE 19, 2017 347

statements are purely hearsay and inadmissible in evidence to prove the

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of

348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ofﬁce of the Solicitor General for respondent.

VOL. 827, JUNE 19, 2017 349

The prosecution ﬁled a Motion for Reconsideration on

extrajudicial confession and establishing petitioner’s complicity; and

350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

to require the Ofﬁce of the Solicitor General to COMMENT thereon

VOL. 827, JUNE 19, 2017 351

Petitioner raises the following Assignment of Errors:

PROBABLE CAUSE, AND ALLEGEDLY ASSUMED THE POWER TO

7 Id., at pp. 1043-1113.

352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

PETITIONER AND RYAN BAUTISTA WITH RESPECT TO THE

VOL. 827, JUNE 19, 2017 353

354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

However, a close examination of the arguments presented by

f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang v. People and Alvendia,

VOL. 827, JUNE 19, 2017 355

Section 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.—(a) By the Regional

13 Sec. 6, Rule 112.

356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe and Leonen, JJ., concur.

VOL. 827, JUNE 19, 2017 357

At the onset, the counsel of petitioner P/C Supt. Edwin A.

358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

accused Ryan O. Bautista (Bautista) to kill Granados by means of

was declared dead by the attending physician. On the other hand,

VOL. 827, JUNE 19, 2017 359

with them a prepared afﬁdavit implicating Pﬂeider as the

filed a Complaint-Affidavit with the DOJ against petitioner Pfleider,

360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

During the course of the preliminary investigation, private

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court ﬁnds no probable

1 Annex “K” of the Petition for Review on Certiorari.

VOL. 827, JUNE 19, 2017 361

The Motion for Reconsideration ﬁled by the prosecution was

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 5, 2011

2 Penned by Associate Justice Carmelita Salandanan-Manahan, and concurred in

362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 827, JUNE 19, 2017 363

3 Rollo, pp. 15-16.

364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

4 G.R No. 189402, May 6, 2010, 620 SCRA 375.

VOL. 827, JUNE 19, 2017 365

6 Section 6. When appeal to be taken. An appeal must be taken within ﬁfteen

366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

against Pﬂeider became ﬁnal and terminated the proceedings therein.