Legal Ethics - Valencia vs. Atty. Antiniw
Legal Ethics - Valencia vs. Atty. Antiniw
Legal Ethics - Valencia vs. Atty. Antiniw
ANTINIW, RESPONDENT
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; FIRST DUTY OF A LAWYER IS
NOT TO CLIENT BUT TO ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. — A lawyer owes entire devotion to
the interest of his client, but not at the expense of truth. The first duty of a lawyer is not to his
client but to the administration of justice. To that end, his client’s success is wholly subordinate.
His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. While a
lawyer must advocate his client’s cause in utmost earnestness and with the maximum skill he can
marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to illegal means for his client’s interest. It is the duty of an
attorney to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means as are
consistent with truth and honor.
DISBARMENT; NOT MEANT AS PUNISHMENT BUT INTENDED TO PROTECT THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. — Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. By far, the most important of them is mindfulness that a lawyer is an officer of the
court. This Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer whose acts show his unfitness to continue as a
member of the Bar. Disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a
source of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the administration of justice by requiring that
those who exercise this function should be competent, honorable and reliable in order that courts
and the public may rightly repose confidence in them. Atty. Antiniw failed to live up to the high
standards of the law profession.
Facts:
Respondent was DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his name is ordered stricken off from
the roll of attorneys. Subsequently, after his disbarment, the respondent consistently yearly
appealed to the court his reinstatement and that he showed his remorse and repentance, and to
demonstrate his willingness and capacity to live up once again to the exacting standards of
conduct demanded of every member of the bar and officer of the court. After multiple
manifestation, resolution and testimony of various civic, humanitarian and religious groups
attesting to the reformed good moral character of the respondent, after 15 years of disbarment,
the court ask the Commission on Bar Discipline for comments and resolution which was sent to
the IBP Board of Governors for approval.
Issue:
Held:
We agree with the foregoing recommendations of the Office of the Bar Confidant and the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline as affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors.
Records show that the long period of respondent’s disbarment gave him the chance to purge
himself of his misconduct, to show his remorse and repentance, and to demonstrate his
willingness and capacity to live up once again of conduct demanded of every member of the bar.
It is well-settled that the objective of disciplinary proceedings is restorative justice, not retribution.
A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client. (Santos vs. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622) but
not at the expense of truth. (Cosmos Foundry Shopworkers Union vs. La Bu, 63 SCRA 313). The
first duty of a lawyer is not to his client but to the administration of justice. (Lubiano vs. Gordalla,
115 SCRA 459) To that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and
must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. While a lawyer must advocate his
client's cause in utmost earnestness and with the maximum skill he can marshall, he is not at
liberty to resort to illegal means for his client's interest. It is the duty of an attorney to employ, for
the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means as are consistent with truth
and honor. (Pangan vs Ramos, 93 SCRA 87).
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. By far, the most important of them
is mindfulness that a lawyer is an officer of the court. (In re: Ivan T. Publico, 102 SCRA
722). This Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer whose acts show his unfitness to continue as a
member of the Bar. (Halili vs. CIR, 136 SCRA 112). Disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a
punishment depriving him of a source of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the
administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this function should be competent,
honorable and reliable in order that courts and the public may rightly repose confidence in them.
(Noriega vs. Sison 125 SCRA 293).
Moreover, it is well-settled that the objective of a disciplinary case is not so much to punish the
individual attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice by sheltering the judiciary and the
public from the misconduct or inefficiency of officers of the court. Restorative justice, not
retribution, is our goal in disciplinary proceedings.
Guided by this doctrine and considering the evidence submitted by respondent satisfactorily
showing his contrition and his being again worthy of membership in the legal profession, the
Court finds that it is now time to lift herein respondent's disbarment and reinstate him to the
august halls of the legal profession.
RESOLUTION OF THE COURT DATED 1 JUNE 2004 IN G.R. NO. 72954
AGAINST, ATTY. VICTOR C. AVECILLA
Overview: Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to
promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
Facts:
Respondent Atty. Avecilla and a certain Mr. Biraogo filed a petition before this Court impugning
the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 883, i.e., the law that called for the holding of a
presidential snap election.
The Court En banc issued a Resolution dismissing the petitions, effectively upholding the validity
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 883.
After the aforesaid resolution became final, the rollo, was entrusted to the Court’s Judicial
Records Office (JRO) for safekeeping.
On 2003, the respondent and Mr. Biraogo sent a letter to the Chief Justice Hilario Davide,
requesting that they be furnished several documents relative to the expenditure of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF), including the the rollo.
Chief Justice Davide instructed (Atty. Dimaisip), then Chief of the JRO, to forward the rollo of
G.R. No. 72954 for the purpose of verifying the claim of the respondent and Mr. Biraogo.
Atty. Dimaisip apprised Chief Justice Davide that the subject rollo could not be found in the
archives. Resorting to the tracer card, it was discovered that the subject rollo had been borrowed
from the JRO, but, unfortunately, was never returned.
As per Atty. Dimaisip report, Atty. Avecilla as a member of the legal staff of retired Justice
Gancayco borrowed it by virtue of his confidential employment, through Atty. Banzon, who is a
colleague of his in the office of Justice Gancayco.
Almost twelve (12) years after it was borrowed, the rollo was finally turned over by Atty. Avecilla
to the JRO.
The Chief directed the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) of this Court, to make a study, report
and recommendation on the incident.
The OCAT opining that the respondent may be administratively charged, as a lawyer and
member of the bar, for taking out the rollo.
The respondent conformed to this Court’s directive by submitting his Respectful Explanation.
o He neither borrowed nor authorized anyone to borrow the rollo.
o For some unknown reason, the subject rollo just ended up in his box of personal papers.
o Upon knowing that the rollo was in his possession he immediately extended his
cooperation to the JRO to return it.
The OCAT, the OBC dismissed the defenses of the respondent and found the latter to be fully
accountable for taking out the rollo, thus, recommended that the respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for one (1) year.
Issue:
WON, Atty. Avecilla should be held accountable and be suspended from the practice of law for
one (1) year.
Held:
First. Despite the denial of the respondent, the undisputed fact remains that it was from his
possession that the missing rollo was retrieved about twelve (12) years after it was borrowed from
the JRO. This fact, in the absence of any plausible explanation to the contrary, is sufficient
affirmation that, true to what the tracer card states, it was the respondent who borrowed the rollo
Second. The respondent offered no convincing explanation how the subject rollo found its way
into his box of personal papers and effects.
Given the foregoing, we find that there are sufficient grounds to hold respondent administratively
liable. First. Taking judicial records, such as a rollo, outside court premises, without the court’s
consent, is an administratively punishable act.
Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote
or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
We, therefore, temper the period of suspension to only six (6) months.
Overview: Section 90 of RA 7160 SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. - (a) All governors, city and
municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than
the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
CANON 1. Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Facts:
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot and the building erected thereon located in
Manila. His mother and brother contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu and Antonio
Pastor of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the
premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of
Barangay. Respondent, as punong barangay, summoned the parties to conciliation
meetings. When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a
certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.Respondent entered his appearance as
counsel for the defendants in the (subsequent ejectment) case. Complainant filed the instant
administrative complaint, claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer
and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he
presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.
Issue:
Held:
YES. Respondent suspended for six (6) months.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Applies Only to Former Government
Lawyers. Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left
government service and in connection "with any matter in which he intervened while in said
service." In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,11 we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former government
lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which
[they] had intervened while in said service. "Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at
the time he committed the act complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.
Section 90 of RA 7160 SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. - (a) All governors, city and
municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any
occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
CANON 1. Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for
violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months.
Overview: Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No.
6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
Facts:
Complainant Felipe E. Abella filed a complaint for violation of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees against respondent Atty. Asteria E.
Cruzabra. In his affidavit-complaint, complainant charged respondent with engaging in private
practice of law while employed in the government service.
Respondent was appointed at the Register of Deeds of General Santos City. During her term of
office, she applied for a notarial commission and notarized 3, 000 documents. These acts were
performed by respondent, without obtaining a permission from the Secretary of Justice.
Respondent invoke good faith as her defense. Respondent insists that she cannot be punish
because she was given permission by her senior officer to notarize. In fact, one of the agreement
in her appointment letter was that she will not imposed charges on papers from their office that
needs notarization. Moreover, respondent argued that she is new in the legal profession and she
does know the intricacies thereof.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees and merits disciplinary action.
Held:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials
and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute
prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to
be unlawful:
xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees
during their incumbency shall not:
xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; or
xxx
2. Memorandum Circular No. 17 of the Executive Department allows government employees to
engage directly in the private practice of their profession provided there is a written permission
from the Department head. It provides:
The authority to grant permission to any official or employee shall be granted by the head of the
ministry or agency in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules,
which provides:
“Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or
profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking
without a written permission from the head of Department; Provided, That this prohibition will be
absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require
that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government: Provided, further, That if an employee
is granted permission to engage in outside activities, the time so devoted outside of office hours
should be fixed by the chief of the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the
efficiency of the other officer or employee: And provided, finally, That no permission is necessary
in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve any real or
apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in
the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or
become an officer or member of the board of directors”,
Subject to any additional conditions which the head of the office deems necessary in each
particular case in the interest of the service, as expressed in the various issuances of the Civil
Service Commission. (Boldfacing supplied)
It is clear in this case that when respondent filed her petition for commission as a notary public,
she did not obtain a written permission from the Secretary of the DOJ. Respondent’s superior, the
Register of Deeds, cannot issue any authorization because he is not the head of the Department.
And even assuming that the Register of Deeds authorized her, respondent failed to present any
proof of that written permission. Respondent cannot feign ignorance or good faith because
respondent filed her petition for commission as a notary public after Memorandum Circular No. 17
was issued in 1986.
Wherefore, we find Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra guilty of engaging in notarial practice without the
written authority from the Secretary of the Department of Justice, and accordingly we
REPRIMAND her. She is warned that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall
merit a more severe sanction.
Overview: Canon 1.01 by engaging in deceitful conduct taking advantage of the complaint against
CDO to advance his own interests, and Canon 8, when he used abusive and offensive language in his
dealings. Canon 13 by making public statements in media.
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not, Atty. Mauricio has violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Held:
Yes. Atty. Mauricio has violated the code of professional responsibility. His recourse to the
Media, even after being told to desist from such was a clear violation of Rule 13.03 of Canon 13,
―A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to
arouse public opinion for or against a party‖. His action has put not only the company
Foodsphere and CDO in a bad light, but has also degraded the dignity and authority of the legal
system. Besides the above, he has also violated Canon 1.01 by engaging in deceitful conduct
taking advantage of the complaint against CDO to advance his own interests, and Canon 8, when
he used abusive and offensive language in his dealings.
Elaine Arma vs Atty. Anita Montevilla
Overview: Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any
task which by law may only be performed by a member of the bar in good standing.
Facts:
Elaine V. Arma filed a verified Complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Anita Montevilla for
improperly handling the case submitted to her by the petitioner, resulting to the prejudice of 32
dismissed workers.
Supposedly responded should have filed motion for reconsideration and an application for the
issuance of the restraining order to protect the interest of her clients but failed to do so.
Upon confrontation of the petitioner, the respondent directed her sister, to hand her back the
records of the case including a Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel.
The questioned signatures matched the specimen signatures of both E. Arma and Atty.
Montevilla, giving rise to the conclusion that both parties were at fault for the non-filing or
belated filing of the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel. However, the IBP Commissioner concludes
that this finding that Atty. Montevilla has been remiss in this instance will not justify the
imposition of the supreme administrative sanction of disbarment.
The Investigating Commissioner then recommended that the disbarment complaint against Atty.
Montevilla should be dismissed for lack of basis, but the respondent should be admonished for
her failure to observe due diligence in the filing and service of pleadings, especially relating to
the filing of her Motion to Withdraw as Counsel which she simply delegated to the complainant.
Issue:
Held:
In this case, the complainant failed to discharge this burden. In addition, the complainant failed
to refute the fact alleged by the respondent that the complaint is a vindictive charge of a
stubborn client against her counsel who refuses to extrajudicially execute a monetary judgment
in order not to jeopardize honesty and loyalty to the other clients. It must be noted, likewise,
that this Court affords protection not only to the aggrieved clients but also to members of the
bar who are at times maliciously charged.
However, it is worthy to note that respondent indeed fell short of her duty of meticulously
ensuring that all pleadings are properly filed and served on the concerned parties. Atty.
Montevilla was remiss when she passed on the filing of her Motion to Withdraw as Counsel to
her client.
The respondent should have been more diligent in her duties as lawyer, as dictated by the Code
of Professional Responsibility and as required by his oath as a lawyer.
In this case, the negligence of the respondent is not so gross as to justify removal from the legal
profession. The prayer for Disbarment is DENIED for lack of merit.