-4 (2), 2011 European Journal of Economic and Political Studies

The Role of the Military in Disaster

Response in the U.S.

Naim Kapucu1

Abstract:
Several scholarly works have documented a heightened military involvement in
responding to natural and man-made disasters. This is due to both the historical focus
of the military on responding to domestic disasters and the recent impact of large-scale
terrorist attacks on the U.S. territory. While retaining its primary role of safeguarding
the country from external threats, the military has become one of the main partners of
federal, state, and local agencies in disaster response operations, providing its available
resources, logistical capacity, and operational services effectively used  against both
man-made and natural disasters. This article discusses the role of the military in
responding to natural and man-made disasters and explores the historical involvement
of military in disaster management.

Keywords: Disaster Management, Crisis Management, Posse Comitatus Act,

Natural Disasters, Man-made Disasters, Military’s Role in Crisis Management

1
University of Central Florida, [email protected]

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Introduction
Disaster and crisis management is a quintessential role of the state/public
administration. The military is accepted as a disaster response agency that provides
assistance and resources to civil communities in natural disasters, both in the US and
abroad. Most of the time, military support is activated only in large-scale disasters
since small-scale disasters can be handled with the capacity of local resources
(Anderson 1970; Schrader 1993). Recent disasters in the US such as the BP Oil Spill,
the 2011 Mississippi River Floods, the April 25-28 2011 Tornado Outbreak, and the
2011 Joplin Tornado all reflect the importance of the military’s response in disasters.
Recent disasters across the globe including the Haiti Earthquake and the Pakistan
Floods in 2011 also show that the US military is an important player in international
disaster response within other countries which lack the capabilities to respond. This
study focuses on the evolving role of the military within the US, using Hurricane
Katrina as a case.
One of the unique characteristics of the US governance system is the relatively
strict divide between the role of civilian law enforcement agencies and the role
of the military. In contrast the military plays a domestic role in supporting local
governments in natural disasters and also provides peace-keeping functions in
extraordinary circumstances (Banks 2004). The US military may provide support
to local and state governments by offering transportation, communication, logistics
and deployment capabilities during disaster response (Bullock et al. 2006; Miller
et al. 2008; Miskel 2006).The military’s involvement in short-term response and
recovery operations may include:
Search and rescue; emergency medical care; emergency transport
of people; mass feeding; in-kind distribution of food, clothing, and
other necessary commodities; epidemiological work and disease
control; decontamination (in hazardous materials or radiological
circumstances); temporary sheltering; firefighting; help in restoration
of electric power and other utility services; debris removal to reopen
roads; and bridge repair or temporary bridge replacement, as well
as offer security and property protection aid (Sylves 2008, 172).
Based on the different types of disasters and requests for assistance by state
governors, Schrader (1993) defines three response sectors the military is capable
of assuming during a disaster mission: special skills corresponding to assistance of
response operations; communication in terms of disaster command and control; and
organized forces providing general support in a number of actions. The military’s

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primary skills and capabilities in disaster response are comprised of its transportation
advantages (helicopters, transportation ships, off-road vehicles, etc.), and technical
advantages and experience in urban search and rescue, mobile hospitals, personnel
and technology of surveillance and reconnaissance, radiation monitoring, situation
assessment, and damage assessment advantages. The military is also the first force
that acquires updated equipment and trained personnel in response to establishing
communication in disasters (Schrader 1993). During a disaster, federal, state and
local governments are quick to call for the military’s help and support, availing
themselves of the advantages attached to military operations and response. These
benefits include; manpower with specific qualifications, skills and expertise, strategic
and rapid mobilization, updated technology and a variety of equipment (helicopters,
aircraft, earth-moving machinery, respirators, medical supplies, power and lighting
equipment, under-water capability, etc.) that most emergency organizations
are unable to acquire. Moreover, the military’s relative autonomy and efficient
bureaucratic structure with hierarchical rules; which are effective in command,
coordination, and control of manpower, authority, and regulations, is beneficial in
providing effective response actions (Anderson 1970; Schrader 1993; Sylves 2008;
US House of Representatives 2006). In addition to these advantages, the military
assists in sheltering, the construction of temporary housing and restoration of minimal
critical infrastructure (water, electric, sanitation, communication infrastructure, etc.)
(Miskel 2006; Schrader 1993). Brake (2001) stresses the importance of the inter-
organizational relations of the Department of Defense (DOD) with the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), emphasizing the capabilities and resources of the military
in effectively dealing with terrorism and natural disaster situations.
It is important to note that the recent impact of large scale terrorist attacks like
those on September 11, 2001, the potential threat of similar terrorist attacks that
recognize no boundaries, and the historical role of the military in providing response
operations in Hurricane Katrina have all supported the argument referring to the
need, intervention and tendency of the military’s unique potential, scope and role
in responding to disasters (GAO 2006; Bowman 2003; Goldich 2002; Bullock et al.
2006; Kapucu and Van Wart 2006; Sylves 2008). These events have increased the
importance of the military, turning it into one of the main partners of federal, state,
and local agencies in responding to disasters and emergencies (Bowman 2003).
However, these events have also highlighted the complex patchwork of legislation,
plans and processes that guide the military’s response. With so many diverse
military units existing and responding, coordination and interoperability problems
in response operations have come to light.

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This article examines the role of the military in disaster and emergency
management in the United States. This paper aims to answer the following research
questions: How has the role of the military evolved in the US? What are the legal and
national frameworks guiding and changing the role of the military? What were the
US military’s accomplishments and weaknesses in its response to Hurricane Katrina?
The first part of the paper the various laws and legislations outlining the role of the
military in disaster response. An overview of the legal framework is followed by
a discussion on the evolution of the national response frameworks and plans that
guide and delineate the role and responsibilities of the military. This comprehensive
overview is followed by an analysis of the military’s involvement during Hurricane
Katrina, and the implications for improving the military response.

Legal and National Frameworks Guiding the Role of the Military in Disasters
To appreciate the importance and central role of the military in disasters, it
is essential to understand the historical evolution of the roles and responsibilities
of the military with an emphasis on existing laws, legislation and national plans
and documents.

Posse Comitatus Act of 1878

The involvement process and general statutory prohibition of the military in the
domestic use of civilian and law enforcement activities are addressed in the Posse
Comitatus Act of 1878, 18 U.S.C. § 1385. The Act prohibits and restricts the use of the
Army (including its specific subunits) or the Air Force for law enforcement purposes.
However, there are many exceptions and limitations to the Posse Comitatus Act,
which allow troops to be used in certain cases: e.g. The National Guard designated
with Title 32 and functioning under state authority; military personnel performing
aerial photographs, visual search and surveillance; members of the Judge Advocate
Corps participating in investigations (Russo 2004; Larson and Peters 2001); Inspector
General of the DOD carrying out audits and investigations; and the Navy and Air
Force providing assistance to FBI in investigations of assassination, kidnapping or
assault of the president (Doyle 2000).
The background for the Posse Comitatus Act dates back to the 1850s when the
army played an integral role in assisting US Marshals and local sheriffs in the West.
During this time the military was also employed both to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act
of 1850 and to support the role of the police. However, during the US Reconstruction

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era (1863-1877) the involvement of the army, not only in law enforcement activities,
but also in governance, became tarnished and politicized (Geiger 2006; Matthews
2006). The main change in the role of the military took place in 1878 with the
enactment of the Posse Comitatus Act by the Congress; the Act essentially reverted
the role of the military to what it was prior to the 1850s, but it legislatively enforced a
strict civilian-military demarcation except under extraordinary conditions. Recently
the devastating impact of Hurricane Katrina once again elicited the pivotal need for
military assistance and raised questions regarding precision and efficacy of specific
prohibitions and restrictions under the Posse Comitatus Act (Geiger 2006).
The military may be involved in direct law enforcement when specifically
approved by the Constitution or Act of Congress (Brake 2001), which corresponds
to the federalization of “direct and active” military involvement with civilian law
enforcement (Geiger 2006). The limitation, restrictions and complexity  of the
application of the Posse Comitatus Act, however, creates ambiguity in elucidating
the clear and transparent boundaries of military involvement procedures (Geiger
2006). The Insurrection Act, which is coupled with the Posse Comitatus Act and
serves as an exception to the Act, framed in 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-335 Sections, authorizes
the President, by the request of the state governor in federalization, to deploy and
call for the military including National Guard forces for domestic use and assistance
in restoration of public order, preventing disorder, domestic violence, looting and
other law enforcement activities (Banks 2004; Elsea 2007; FEMA 1999; Miskel 2006;
Nicholson 2005; Russo 2004).

Robert Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Act

The legal basis, scope of programs, and processes of federal assistance
including military assistance in post-disaster situations and disaster relief operations
is described in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act,
42 U.S. Code §§ 5121-5206 (Bazan 2005; Elsea 2007; Miskel 2006; Nicholson, 2005;
Sylves 2008). This Act allows assistance to states, local governments, tribal nations,
individuals, and organizations in major disasters and emergencies (Buchalter
2007; Nicholson 2005; Sylves 2008). The relevant military involvement under the
Stafford Act is managed by the request of DHS from DOD (Sylves 2008). Also, the
president is empowered to determine and issue “a major disaster” declaration
and authorize the appropriate type of support by the federal government (Sylves
2008). The declaration from the president is implemented by the governor of the
impacted state, and in some cases, through the states’ legislature. Provided that the

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disaster is an “incident of national significance,” the governor of the affected state,

under 44 C.F.R. § 206.36, should submit an acknowledgment and request to the
President for an emergency declaration (Bazan 2005). 
The process of request for federal assistance usually starts from the local government.
When local resources are exhausted, local governments ask for the assistance of the
state government in providing their resources to respond. By the request of a governor
through the FEMA/Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) Regional Office,
state and federal officials conduct a preliminary damage assessment (PDA). The PDA is
conducted to estimate the impact and cost of the disaster. If there is a need for a major
disaster request, the governor of the affected state includes collected PDA information
in his/her request to the president and indicates the size and severity of the disaster. If a
disaster with a significant impact requires immediate action, the governor may request
federal help prior to a PDA. Thus, by the approval of a Presidential Declaration of a
major disaster, federal military assistance is provided to the affected state. However,
the process of involvement of the military and its resources is different in this situation. In
case of a disaster risk, local authorities directly request the governor to provide military
assistance via the National Guard (Sylves 2008).
When requesting military assistance, some factors should be taken into
consideration. These are:
• legality – which implies whether the legal basis of military involvement
aligns with the laws and regulations;
• cost – which corresponds to the potential cost of military involvement and
its impact on the DOD budget;
• lethality – which defines the possibility of the use of lethal force while
providing assistance;
• risk – which implies the risk that can threaten the DOD forces in provision
of military engagement;
• appropriateness – which interprets if the existing military services and
resources are appropriate for providing assistance; and
• readiness – which corresponds to the state of readiness of military forces
in order to provide assistance that will not harm the primary mission of the
DOD (Buchalter 2007; DOD 1997; FEMA 2008).
These six sections define the feasibility  for military involvement in response,
recovery and relief operations and failure in meeting any of these conditions may
result in rejecting the establishment of military assistance (FEMA 2008).

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Involvement of the National Guard in Disaster Management

The National Guard is a significant division of a state governors’ power and
resources (Schrader 1993). Unless federalized by the government, the National
Guard remains under state control (Sylves 2008). The personnel of the National
Guard are under the command and control of the state governor, and the discipline
process of these soldiers corresponds to the state’s military code. Also, the National
Guard personnel under Title 32 status are not restricted by the prohibitions of the
Posse Comitatus Act and are legally qualified to engage in the implementation of a
number of law enforcement missions (Ketchum 2005).
Sylves (2008) explains that the disaster management structure in the US has
been referred to as “bottom-up” historically. Federal government assistance
is provided if state or local governments cannot respond to disasters by using
their own resources. Therefore, in the case of any local or statewide disaster,
the activation of a military response process usually starts with the activation
of support from the National Guard (Sylves 2008). When it is not previously
committed by active-duty or not called for short or long-term deployment by the
federal government, the National Guard remains on call and can be activated
by declaration of the governors. Moreover, the National Guard can take control
of law enforcement activities when the governor declares a “Martial Law.”
While the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits active-duty military engagement in law
enforcement duties, the engagement of the National Guard in law enforcement
activities by the declaration of a governor does not violate the Posse Comitatus
Act. However, if the National Guard is federalized and mobilized by the approval
of the president, it becomes a part of the federal troops. At this time they are
legally under the same prohibitions and limitations as active-duty military in
the engagement and control of law enforcement activities, and are subject to
the restrictions and prohibitions of the Posse Comitatus Act (Davis et al. 2007;
Sylves 2008).
Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, essential changes took place enhancing
the military’s responsibility in providing security to the nation not only against outside
risk, but also in keeping the primary role of establishing security within the US, and
partly changing its structure to provide congruity in managing domestic security. Along
with active-duty military units, the National Guard became active in broad response
activities. Under the regulation of the federal government, the National Guard has
been used in activities such as “border patrol, customs agencies and airport security
personnel, …, air patrols, and … site security” (Bowman 2003, 3).

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The Role of the Military in Man-made Disasters and the US PATRIOT Act
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the focus of enhanced military intervention
shifted more toward prevention and response activities of manmade disasters rather
than natural disasters (Bolkcom and Katzman 2005; Sylves 2008). The acts of prevention
and response to the potential threat of terrorism within the borders of the US is one of the
most challenging contemporary issues, which requires a vast amount of intelligence,
manpower, resources, time, capability, coordination and planning (Sylves 2008).
Throughout the last 15 years or so, the role of the military in responding to
manmade disasters has gained significance with the enhanced threat of Weapons
of Mass Destruction (WMD), nuclear and chemical weapons, and biological attacks
(Banks 2004). . In 1995, President Clinton signed the Presidential Decision Directive
39 (PDD-39) to address these issues, including the threat of nuclear, chemical and
biological WMDs (Brake 2001; United States Government 2001). Later, Congress
passed the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act in 1996, according to
which, one of the main roles of the DOD is to function as a supporting agency (Brake
2001) and to develop rapid response teams to manage the assistance of federal,
state and local governments. The developed response teams by the DOD comprise
the Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS) (Banks 2004). The main function of JTF-CS
is to provide assistance for domestic attacks and incidents of chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear and high yield explosive consequence management operations
(Joint Task Force Civil Support 2008).
The federal government has always depended on the experience and resources
of the DOD in responding to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear crisis
situations (Bowman 2003). In 2000, the National Commission on Terrorism,
considering the grave threat of terrorism, emphasized the potential for the DOD to
become one of the first leading federal agencies to respond to terrorist attacks as
well (Banks 2004). Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, pursuant to the 107th Session of
Congress, the USA PATRIOT Act was enacted and signed by the President. The main
ideas behind this legislation were to enhance, strengthen and increase the authority
of law enforcement agencies, augment penalties and expand the definitions for
different types of domestic terrorism. The scope and funding of federal organizations,
including the military, was broadened with the main focus of providing enhanced
counter-terrorism activities. Changes in the Act also elaborated the role of the DOD
in crisis situations including the threat of WMD (US Congress 2001).
The impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks was also a reason for changes in
the application of the Posse Comitatus Act. According to 18 U.S.C Section 831

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(prohibited transactions involving nuclear materials), in a threat or emergency

related to potential risk of nuclear materials, the DOD may provide assistance to the
Department of Justice in certain activities and is not subject to the Posse Comitatus
Act. The assistance of military support for civilian law enforcement agencies can be
provided under chapter 18 of title 10 by the request of the Attorney General from the
Secretary of Defense, provided that this assistance does not contradict the primary
mission and preparedness of the DOD (Brinkerhoff 2002; Miskel 2006).
The legal basis and role of the National Guard in responding to biological and
radiological threats or attacks is relatively new (e.g., enforcing quarantine, providing
emergency supplies to civil law organizations, etc.). The National Guard developed
the Rapid Response and Initial Detection (RAID) teams program in 1999, which
was modified and renamed the Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams
(WMD-CSTs) to provide support to local law enforcement authorities. WMD-CSTs
consist of National Guard personnel who advise civilian first responders and assess
a WMD event. Since the establishment of support teams, the National Guard keeps
a centralized position in providing counter-terrorist actions such as identifying and
tracking the potential threat of biological or chemical attacks, providing control over
the affected area, establishing communication among states and the government,
providing technical advice, accomplishing evacuation processes, and assisting
federal and local authorities.
The scope of support provided by the National Guard is determined by the
type of disaster (Banks 2004). Another significant support function of the National
Guard is the Chemical, Biological, Radiological/Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE)
- Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP). The CERFP consists of four main
elements; search and extraction, decontamination, medical, and command and
control. The core mission of the CERFP team is to provide response to the governor
in searching the incident site, rescuing and decontaminating casualties, providing
initial medical assistance, performing medical triage and stabilizing injured people
for transportation to the medical facilities. The CERFP command and control team
coordinates with the JTF Commander (National Guard 2007).
Working closely with the FBI, FEMA, and the Environmental Protection Agency,
the US Army Technical Escort Unit within the DOD also provides assistance when a
potential threat of chemical and biological weapons arises in the form of providing
“chemical and biological advice, verification, detection, mitigation, decontamination,
escort, and remediation of chemical and biological devices or hazards” (Bowman
2003, 6). According to Brake (2001), (provided that military involvement does not

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contradict the Posse Comitatus Act status and prohibitions) the range of military
assistance to law enforcement agencies and the provision of technical assistance
in responding to domestic crisis situations are specified as: provision of expert
advice on different issues concerning WMD; checking the safety of areas which
are suspected to have traps or are not safe from explosive devices; monitoring,
containing, or disposing of suspected biological, chemical, or nuclear materials,
devices or WMD’s; provision of specialized equipment, personnel or vehicles;
participation in the questioning of suspects in order to determine the characteristics
of the suspected WMD device, components or elements (Brake 2001).
The military can also play an important role in searching for and providing
evidence for a possible threat of WMD. As a supporting agency for the FBI, the
military can be requested to clear and search a hazardous area by the request of
law enforcement organizations in the absence of the FBI. Provided that a WMD of
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear characters are safe to be carried, the
military, by the request of the FBI and with approval of the Secretary of Defense, can
provide transportation and disposition of WMD’s (Brake 2001).

The Role of the Military in Disaster Management Plans: From FRP to NRF
The contemporary baseline of military support was recognized in the Federal
Response Plan (FRP) which was established in 1992 as “a process and structure for
the systematic, coordinated, and effective delivery of federal assistance to address
the consequences of any major disaster or emergency declared under the Robert
T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act” (FEMA 1999, 1). Since the
implementation of this plan, the military has been a significant player in providing
personnel, equipment and supplies when responding to major disasters. The FRP defines
the assistance of the DOD as a last resort, provided that state or local governments have
exhausted their capacity to deal with the impact of a disaster. The Disaster Coordinating
Officer (DCO) is responsible for the coordination and management of the use of DOD
resources. The type and size of a disaster defines the degree of military involvement
in a particular situation. Based on the size of a disaster, the DOD is tasked to initiate the
establishment of temporarily formed units as the Joint Task Force (JTF) or the Response
Task Force (RTF), where their primary focus is to provide personnel, equipment and
supplies to assist in the aftermath of disasters (FEMA 1999).
The main impetus behind the adaptation of the National Response Plan (NRP) in
2004 was to replace the previously accepted plans (FRP, Initial National Response
Plan, US Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations

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Plan [CONPLAN], and the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan) and to
establish a comprehensive unified “national-level” incident management plan with
an “all-discipline” and “all-hazards” approach. This would include both man-made
and natural domestic disasters with enhanced preparedness, prevention, response
and recovery actions. The NRP provides a platform that integrates and coordinates
“national-level” resources and the responsibilities and incident management
activities of federal, state and local governments, Nonprofit or Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs), first responders and private sector organizations (Buchalter
2007; Kapucu 2006). The NRP, which was built on the template of the National
Incident Management System, aims to: maximize the integration of incident-related
activities; improve the coordination and integration of organizations at different
levels; maximize the utilization of resources; establish effective communication and
increase situational awareness across jurisdictions; establish an effective strategy
with the primary mission of facilitating mutual aid at all levels of governments; and to
provide a proactive response to catastrophic events (DHS 2004).
According to the NRP, the DOD provides Defense Support of Civil Authorities
(DSCA), which enables the assistance of federal military forces (DOD civilians,
personnel, agencies, units, and components) in a number of domestic natural and
man-made disaster situations if the resources and capabilities of local, state and
federal governments are overwhelmed. The process of request for assistance to civil
authorities is made through the Secretary of Defense. By the approval of the Secretary
of Defense, an appropriate senior officer is designated for the implementation and
coordination of the mission. Based on the NRP, the DOD/USACE is the primary
responsible agency and coordinator of ESF # 3 (Public Works and Engineering
Annex) and the supporting agency in all other ESFs. As a primary agency, the DOD/
USACE is designated to execute the mission of ESF #3 and to provide resources
such as: technical assistance, engineering, and construction management resources
and support during disaster activities, and is authorized to coordinate meetings,
plans, exercises, training and other activities. Following the activation of ESF #3,
USACE Operations Center (UOC) has the responsibility of notifying the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, the Joint
Directorate of Military Support, and the Army Operations Center and providing
situation reports to the Army Operations Center (DHS 2004).
Insufficiencies in the NRP have led to the adoption of the National Response
Framework (NRF) in 2008. With the goal of providing more flexibility and improve
insufficiencies, the role of the Military has significantly been enhanced. The

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NRF intended to clearly define the roles and responsibilities of the stakeholders
involved; to enhance and supplement the roles of primary and supporting agencies;
to inform emergency management practitioners, government executives,
private-sector and NGO leaders about the structures and tools that are used
by first responder agencies and managers; and, to establish a “guide” to the
previously adopted “all-hazards” approach. The NRF enhances the partnerships
among federal, state, local, and tribal governments. It focuses on the key lessons
learnt from natural and manmade disasters, and builds its structure based on
the command and management structure of the National Incident Management
System (NIMS) to provide an effective coordinated response for managing
disasters and incidents. The NRF is comprised five main chapters covering:
roles and responsibilities; response actions; response organization; planning;
and, additional resources. It also contains ESF Annexes, Support Annexes, and
Incident Annexes (FEMA 2008). 
The NRF coordinates and outlines the response functions of the DOD and clearly
states that the DOD is one of the closest federal partners to DHS and holds a vital
position in responding to nationwide incidents. Moreover, although federal military
forces are authorized to support civil authorities, the command of the forces involved
is under the regulation of the Secretary of Defense (FEMA 2008).
The Evolving Role of the Military from FRP to NRF
The shift from the FRP to the NRF reflects the significance of expansion in disaster
management plans and the supplemented roles and functions of the agencies
involved. The number of ESFs was twelve in the FRP and was extended to fifteen in
the NRP. The responsibilities and functions of the military as well as other primary
and supporting agencies have been supplemented and enhanced through plan
improvements. However, the fundamental role of the DOD in terms of the ESFs (with
the exception of ESF 3 and 9) has overall remained unchanged.
Responsibilities and functions of the military units were primarily generalized
in the FRP in terms of ESFs. However, they are more detailed in terms of breaking
up the roles and responsibilities for military units and subunits in the NRP. The role
of the military has become more centralized in NRF, as the military was a primary
and coordinative agency in terms of ESF #3 in the NRP, however, its roles were
emphasized in terms of both ESF #3 and ESF #9 in the NRF. In the NRF, the military
was entrusted with the primary responsibility of implementing ESF #9 and to provide
search and rescue operations as well.
Compared to the FRP, the NRP intended to take an “all-hazards” – “all-discipline”

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approach. Three new ESFs were added to the list of needed actions, and the military
took the responsibility of a supporting agency in all new Support Annexes. For
instance, the new specific roles of the military included provisions of physical and
electronic system assistance and experience in terms of ESF #13 - Public Safety
and Security Annex, technical assistance and expertise in community planning and
engineering, support of development of national strategies and plans regarding
housing, debris management and restoration of public infrastructure in terms of ESF
#14 – Long Term Community Recovery and the Mitigation Annex, and support of
appropriate assistance in terms of ESF #15 - External Affairs Annex.
The role of the Secretary of Defense and the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, the Joint Director of Military,
Defense Coordinating Officers, and the DOD are more specifically defined in the
NRF in ESF #2 compared to the NRP.  The role of the DOD and National Guard, in
NRP ESF #2, was broadened; to notify the Communication Branch Director about
“communications requirements, assets available, and assets deployed to the incident
area”, to provide response and military capability provided that federal resources
and capabilities are overwhelmed, to provide “civilian oversight and policy direction
for the use of DOD assets”, and to “serve as the interface to FEMA” (FEMA 2008:
ESF 2-10). The role of the DOD in ESF #3 expanded to include: providing expertise
and support in removal operations; exercising and managing salvage contracts; and
coordinating assets, capabilities, and wreck removal operations (FEMA 2008).
Noticeable changes in the roles and responsibilities of the DOD also took place
in ESF #9 – Search and Rescue Annex. While the responsibilities and roles of the
DOD and its units are relatively briefly discussed in NRP, the DOD, US Air Force
(USAF) and Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC) are regarded as both
the primary and supporting agencies responsible in implementation of the Search
and Rescue (SAR) Annex. More emphasis is laid on the specifically described roles
of the DOD, USAF and AFRCC for serving as a primary agency for “SAR operations
for aviation-related incidents”, managing coordination of “US aeronautical Search
and Rescue Region (SRR)”, providing “incident reports, assessments, and situation
reports”, providing “SAR Command and Control experts to augment a JTF Joint
Personnel Recovery Center”, facilitating “resolution of any conflicting demands
for aeronautical distress response resources”, and ensuring “coordination
between DHS/USCG and other federal, state, tribal, and local emergency response
activities”. Additionally, the roles and responsibilities of the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA), which is a part of the DOD, are more broadly explored

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in the NRF document in terms of SAR operations (FEMA 2008: ESF #9-6).
The Military’s role has also been slightly enhanced in terms of ESF #10 – Oil and
Hazardous Materials Response Annex, ESF #8 – Public Service and Medical Services
Annex, and ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Annex. The newly
added responsibilities of the DOD in ESF #10 cover DOD Defense Support to Civil
Authorities (DSCA) and support of the Navy Supervisor of Salvage as “technical,
operational, and emergency support in the ocean engineering disciplines of marine
salvage, pollution abatement, and diving services” (FEMA 2008: ESF #10-11). In
terms of ESF #8, the DOD’s role was modestly increased, taking into consideration
the responsibility of support for the veterinary military personnel in the medical
treatment of animals. Finally, in terms of ESF #7, the logistics functions of the DOD/
USCG were broadened to include the provision of logistic support in Energy (oil and
electricity) issues as well (FEMA 2008). All-in-all, there was a significant emphasis
on specifying the military’s scope and roles through demonstrating, exploring and
expanding details in the NRF rather than just generalizing its functions and duties
which was a main characteristic of the previous plans.
Table 1 in the appendix provides a snapshot and overview of the role of the
military in all three national plans. National plans, laws and legislation have evolved to
reflect the important role of the military in both man-made and natural disasters. The
following section discusses and analyzes the military’s involvement and response
during Hurricane Katrina.

The Role of the Military in Managing Natural Disasters: The Case of

Hurricane Katrina
During Hurricane Katrina, the state, federal and local organizations did not have the
individual capacities to provide human power, technology and resources with the strict
command and coordination structures that the military is capable of providing (Anderson
1970; Brake 2001; US House of Representatives 2006). Even though there were several
challenges in military deployment, mobilization, and response actions, overall the
Military’s support in Hurricane Katrina was invaluable, speedy, effective and critical.
Reports suggest that the assistance of the military during Hurricane Katrina helped to
increase the number of lives saved (GAO 2006; Miller et al. 2008; Miskel 2006).

Performance of the Military in Response to Hurricane Katrina

Hurricane Katrina, the costliest and the most destructive natural disaster in the

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 European Journal of Economic and Political Studies

history of the US (Rubin 2007), caused the largest domestic military deployment since
the Civil War (US House of Representatives 2006). Soon after the announcement of the
first devastating impacts of Hurricane Katrina by the National Hurricane Center as a
Category 5 Hurricane, the DOD immediately started considering the capability of its
resources and manpower to effectively meet FEMA’s requests and provide a timely
provision of assistance (Davis et al. 2007; US House of Representatives 2006). The DOD
took significant advanced planning relief steps, and published warnings and orders two
weeks prior to Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, while NORTHCOM activated emergency
protocols to provide assistance to affected areas. Following landfall on August 29,
President Bush issued a Federal Emergency Declaration of National Significance
(Bowman, Kapp and Belasco 2005; GAO 2006; US House of Representatives 2006).
Following the state emergency declaration by the governors of the affected states,
the activation of the National Guard and execution of DOD relief actions were put
into motion. Within two days of evacuation, 7,200 active-duty Army and Marine land
forces, approved by the presidential order, were deployed to Louisiana (Davis et al.
2007). As a result, “by September 7, DOD assets in the affected area included 42,990
National Guard personnel, 17,417 active-duty personnel, 20 ships, 360 helicopters,
and 93 fixed wing aircraft” (Bowman, Kapp and Belasco 2005, 6).
The performance of the National Guard, active-duty military and other military
forces was significant in Hurricane Katrina. Following landfall, immediate steps were
taken not only by the Army and the Marines but also the Navy, the US Coast Guard,
the US Air Force and the US Army Corps of Engineers. Deployed active-duty military
personnel alone exceeded 20,000 by September 1st 2005 (Davis et al. 2007). Shortly
after Hurricane Katrina made landfall, the USACE started a provision of mass care
requirements for ice, water and power, and established the removal of debris (Davis
et al. 2007; US House of Representatives 2006). The only problem for USACE was that
it mainly functions on pre-awarded contracts, which are part of USACE’s Advanced
Contracting Initiative (ACI); however, because of the huge impact of Hurricane
Katrina, and lack of experience to deal with the potential aftermath of a natural disaster
of this degree, the existing contracts were not adequate and additional contracts were
approved and awarded by the government, which in turn created minor delays (US
House of Representatives 2006). Overall the general assistance provision of the military
in Hurricane Katrina can be regarded as a provision of search and rescue operations,
evacuation assistance and a provision of relief operations (Davis et al. 2007).
The USACE, along with the National Guard partnership, were also actively
involved in support actions such as repairing the levees of New Orleans. The USCG,

21
 Naim Kapucu

the Air Force, the Marines, and the National Guard provided helicopter-carriers
to establish search and rescue operations for the affected population. However,
Davis et al. (2007, 30) stress a point by asking “…why the decision to deploy active-
duty Army and Marine land forces was not made until five days after hurricane
landfall, even though both the Army and the Marines have units in a ready status
for responding to civil disturbances and for unforeseen contingencies at home and
overseas?” What was the main reason of confusion regarding the late and insufficient
deployment of military troops by the federal government, considering that decision-
makers in the White House, DHS and DOD were fully aware of the seriousness of
the situation (GAO 2006; US House of Representatives 2006)? These are integral
questions to raise with no clear-cut easy answers. They reflect a major weakness in
the military response. Some reasons and causes for this weakness are explored in
the following section.

Challenges the Military Faced in Response to Hurricane Katrina

Waugh and Tierney (2007) mention three reasons why the military’s disaster
response can have negative effects. First, the involvement of the military in disaster
response activities may affect and drift it away from its primary mission of preventing
and fighting wars and establishing peace and security of a nation. Second, it may
create problems and confusion in terms of the roles and legal status of the military
when it is engaged side-by-side with civil authority, raising the questions of ‘Who
is in charge?’, and ‘Who will be held accountable and responsible for accepted
decisions?’ Third, there is a problem of enhanced expectations of the local and state
governments about the military’s assistance. The presence of military support and
assistance could lead to a decrease in the provision of support by local and state
government levels (Sylves 2008; Waugh and Tierney 2007).
Davis et al. (2007) specify challenges which affected the National Guard and
the active-duty military’s ability to respond to Hurricane Katrina. The main problem
was that the request for government assistance by the governors of impacted states
was not made clear. Even though the need for military assistance was included in
request letters, the explicit types and numbers of military units were not specified
in the first few days. Another challenge was the complexity of legal statuses and
command and control structures. The separation in the command structure of both
the National Guard and the active-duty military resulted in slower operations and
overall military response. Although positive examples exist, not all National Guard
troops could effectively come together as a unit, manage deployment, and provide

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 European Journal of Economic and Political Studies

search and rescue operations due to coordination difficulties (Davis et al. 2007).
The US House of Representatives (2006) emphasizes that when a disaster occurs
it is generally more preferable to call the National Guard rather than the active-duty
military for assistance since the National Guard provides the majority of response
forces during disasters and it is always on scene under state active duty status.
Whenever the DOD is not familiar with the various geographic and cultural diversities
of the local areas of different states, the National Guard is the more desired choice.
Also, the social capital, experience, trust, formal and informal relations and networks
of the National Guard with first responders such as law enforcement agencies, fire
departments and community based organizations makes its response preferable in
an emergency situation (US House of Representatives 2006).
Historically, similar challenges have plagued disaster response. For instance,
failure in assessing damage and gaining situational awareness were issues in
Hurricane Andrew in 1992. The NRP defines the responsibility for gaining situational
awareness and damage assessment to state and local governments, and stresses
that when state and local government resources are overwhelmed, the federal
government is responsible for taking immediate steps to replace this function.
However, the NRP is not clear about detailed procedures in this regard (GAO 2006).
Thus, in order to effectively establish the role of the military in disaster response
operations, the limits and restrictions of the military’s role need to be explored to
eliminate uncertainties, misinterpretation of media and incorrect public criticism in
the future (Schrader, 1993).
Bowman et al. (2005) argue that one major reason for the delay of support and
provision of resources was “procedural obstacles and administrative failures” and a
lack of “better understanding of the timing and content of any presidential directives
and of the specific requests DHS/FEMA or local authorities made to DOD” (Bowman
et al. 2005, 13). Moreover, transportation challenges also affected the late arrival of
military troops, which means “earlier and phased deployment could have brought
assets closer to the affected region in a more timely fashion” (Bowman et al. 2005, 13).
Lastly, the overseas deployment of the National Guard and other military units also
affected their ability to provide effective assistance in relief operations (Bowman et
al. 2005; Davis et al. 2007), which at the same time indicates that the National Guard
and other military units may not always be fully available when needed (Waugh and
Tierney 2007).

Interoperability and Coordination Issues

23
 Naim Kapucu

The formal call process for military assistance is too complex, and usually
passes through several layers, in which the approval of each layer is significant for
its referral to the next higher level. The request for military assistance starts from
the State level, which is then passed to the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) of
FEMA, and then to the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO), who in turn moves
the request to the Joint Task Force (JTF). Consequently, the request is passed to
the Executive Secretariat of the Secretary of Defense and to the Joint Directorate of
Military Support through the NORTHCOM. This process of military request creates
maximum coordination for the DOD. However, such a process was regarded as
a challenge by Louisiana officials, and had an impact on the response process
of the DOD in Hurricane Katrina. During Hurricane Katrina, there was no correct
formal origin for the military call made by the State of Louisiana, mainly because,
according to Louisiana officials, the request was made directly to the DOD without
FEMA coordination (US House of Representatives 2006). This process has been
streamlined since Hurricane Katrina. Among other initiatives, NORTHCOM has
constructed a series of Pre-scripted Mission Assignments (PMAs) for a broad
range of natural disasters to reduce response time and improve communication.
NORTHCOM has also integrated and involved Defense Coordinating Officers
(DCOs) into each region and counterparts of the FEMA (USNORTHCOM 2006).
Davis et al. (2007) argue that the division of the military forces into different units
and forces, (for instance, the National Guard and active-duty Army forces) created
ambiguousness in terms of the legal basis for the provision of military assistance in
responding to Hurricane Katrina, which in turn generated problems for a “unified
command and control” structure. Although the DOD (NORTHCOM) started its
support operations and coordination procedures prior to Katrina’s landfall, the
deployment of the active-duty Army and the Marine land forces reached the
desired locations days after landfall. One main reason was a flawed  perception
about the National Guard’s capacity to deal with the circumstances (Bowman et al.
2005; Davis et al. 2007).
Prior to Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, federal assistance request letters sent to the
President by the governors of Louisiana and Mississippi did not specifically outline
the need for military assistance. Therefore, during the first few days, the provision
of support by the federal government was mainly restricted to the needs that were
outlined in request letters; however, when Hurricane Katrina made its devastating
landfall on August 29, the governors of the affected states officially announced the
request for assistance of all possible and available resources, including the assistance
of the military, which inevitably prevented a fully effective military assistance

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 European Journal of Economic and Political Studies

provision. The process of deployment and the assistance provision of the active-
duty military (including all related departments), as well as the National Guard, also
faced some challenges (Davis et al. 2007; Miskel 2006). On September 2nd 2005,
considering the plight, Governor Blanco assumed there was a need for an additional
40,000 active-duty military forces and made two requests to the President through
a written declaration and by a personal meeting. However, only 7,200 Army and
Marine forces were approved to be deployed to Louisiana the next day. Moreover,
Davis et al. (2007) specifically notes that, though the order for deployment of Army
and Marine forces was approved on September 3rd by the President, it took at
least four days for the Army and Marine forces to be fully deployed. The whole
process of deployment was finished almost after the evacuation of the Superdome
and Convention Center. However, despite the late deployment of military forces,
they still played an important role in providing search and rescue operations and
establishing civil security in Louisiana. As stated above, not all military units were
available at the time of need. Most of the Marine forces or the National Guard troops
were either in training, overseas deployment or in an active-duty position in Iraq or
Afghanistan (Davis et al. 2007).
Inter-organizational communication and coordination among the DOD, DHS
and FEMA (US House of Representatives 2006) was another primary challenge,
which deteriorated  response and evacuation operations. Following landfall,
main communication towers were destroyed because of strong winds, and the
communication system was paralyzed immediately. Communication systems were
established a few days after the arrival of the DOD, but lack of interoperability, and
communication and coordination among JTF-Katrina, the National Guard, the US
Coast Guard and other federal, state, and local assets created confusions concerning
situational awareness and caused an unexpected number of deaths and continued
destruction (Davis et al. 2007; Meeds 2006; US House of Representatives 2006).
The deficiencies in communication led to serious problems in providing ‘search
and rescue,’ and evacuation operations for the first responder agencies and for
other military organizations. Many organizations did not have diverse or redundant
communication systems (satellite phones, radio phones, GPS, blue force tracker,
etc.) as the DOD had, which, in turn, created a lack of interoperability among
military units with civil and other organizations. In addition, unless augmented with
specialized equipment, military communication systems are not compatible with
the communication systems of first responder agencies such as the police, fire
department and medical emergency organizations. Due to these problems, effective

25
 Naim Kapucu

response efforts could not be successfully established among local, state and federal
levels of government (Meeds 2006; GAO 2006; US House of Representative 2006).
Significant improvements were made after the Hurricane to ease communication and
coordination problems. The National Guard’s Joint CONUS Communications Support
Environment (JCCSE) program is a significant example. The program enables the
National Guard to encompass and support the information technology capabilities
of USNORTHCOM, USPACOM, USSTRATCOM, Homeland Defense and Defense
Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). The JCCSE program extends interagency
communication, information sharing and collaboration (National Guard 2007).
There was also information sharing problems such as: the source of some
information was considered confidential by military assets and could not be shared
with civil law enforcement organizations; civil agency computers were not able to
download data which was too large. Thus, the military started deployment without fully
understanding the potential size of the impact and the need for assistance (GAO 2006).
There were also partnership issues between the DOD and FEMA. Even though
FEMA was managing the DOD activities and made some official requests from
the DOD about the provision of special types of assistance, the DOD declined to
implement some of these assistance requests simply because they deemed these
missions inappropriate to implement, which in turn led to conflicts between FEMA
and the DOD. As a result, FEMA lost its preference to seek assistance from the
DOD, and after Hurricane Katrina, FEMA’s reliance on the DOD was restricted to the
provision of logistical functions (US House of Representatives 2006). Political conflicts
such as this need to be tackled with better laws, legislation and national frameworks
that guide the roles and responsibilities of the military and its partners. The NRF was
a major improvement post-Hurricane Katrina that helped to delineate a more defined
role of the Military in terms of different response functions (as discussed earlier).

Conclusion
The military played an active role in rescuing and evacuating thousands of people
from affected areas; transporting and carrying a thousand tons of cargo (sandbags,
and all needed materials); repairing levees and cleaning debris; providing millions
of meals, a million gallons of water, a million pounds of ice; providing house-to-house
search operations; establishing medical treatment for thousands of affected civilians;
providing mosquito spraying operations; providing damage assessments of affected
areas by using reconnaissance aircrafts and satellite imagery; and other significant
actions on behalf of the states. However, despite these accomplishments there were

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 European Journal of Economic and Political Studies

many challenges and weaknesses in the military’s response which were caused by
lengthy procedures for requesting military support, complexity in legal statuses of
different military units, and coordination and interoperability issues between different
military units and other responding agencies.
This article provided background information about the role of the military in
managing crises and disasters. It also described the evolving role of the military in
managing disasters and crises from the FRP to the NRF.  This study provided several
reasons for the failure in response to Hurricane Katrina, but it also stresses that
even though the relevant declaration was made in a timely manner, it did not have
a sufficient impact on the flow of the response and rescue operations. The role of the
military in responding to natural and manmade disasters is vitally important, but the
clarified role of the military response actions is more dependent on bureaucratic
rules and procedures. Although the military is largely considered a supporting
agency in all of the ESF Annexes, and as a responsible agency in two Annexes in the
NRF and the NRP, the provision of its support is as vital as that of a primary agency.
The military is considered as a last, though powerful and trusted, resort. In its
absence, more emphasis should be put on the states and federal governments in
terms of the response roles and functions. The military currently is governed by
a lengthy, complex authorization process. Considering the lessons learned from
Hurricane Katrina about the failures in establishing effective military engagement,
emphasis should be put on addressing procedural obstacles, legal complexities,
cost factors, political complications, tensions between the NRP and NRF, and other
factors that contribute to the timeliness of a military response. The findings of the
article might have some implications for the role of the military in other settings with
a different structure and culture as well.

27
 Naim Kapucu

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Appendix 1: The Role of the Military in National-level Response Plans.

Federal National National Response

Response Plan Response Plan Framework (2008)
(1992) (2004)

Number of ESFs 12 15 15

The Military listed as • ESF #3 – Public Works • ESF #3 – Public Works • ESF #3 – Public Works
a Primary Agency and Engineering and Engineering Annex and Engineering Annex
Annex (DOD and (DOD and USACE) (DOD and USACE)
USACE) • ESF #9 – Search and
Rescue Annex

The Military listed • DOD listed as • All ESFs excluding #3 • All ESFs ( excluding #3
as a Supporting supporting agencies in (including 3 new ESFs) and #9)
Agency all ESFs except #3

Role of the Military • Established the • The DOD provides • Clearly states that
Military as a significant Defense Support the DOD is one of the
player in providing of Civil Authorities closest federal partners
personnel, supplies (DSCA), which enables to DHS and holds a vital
and equipment during the assistance of federal position in responding to
disasters. military forces when disasters
• Defined the assistance local, state and federal • More detail provided
of DOD as a last resort governments are in terms of roles and
when state, local and overwhelmed responsibilities
federal governments • More detail is provided • The role of the military
exhaust their capacity in terms of breaking has become more
• Responsibilities and up the roles and centralized in NRF (Both
functions of the military responsibilities for in ESF #3 and #9 )
units were primarily the military units and
generalized subunits in the NRP
• Three new ESFs
included which expand
the role of the military

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 European Journal of Economic and Political Studies

Major Changes in • DOD/USACE is • The DOD, US Air Force

the Role of the designated to execute (USAF) and Air Force
Military the mission of ESF Rescue Coordination
#3 and to provide Center (AFRCC) are
resources such as: regarded as both the
technical assistance, primary and supporting
engineering, agencies responsible in
and construction implementation of ESF
management #9 - Search and Rescue
resources and (SAR) Annex.
support during • More emphasis is laid
disaster activities, on the specifically
and is authorized to described roles of
coordinate meetings, the DOD, USAF and
plans, exercises, AFRCC for serving as a
training and other primary agency for SAR
activities. operations.
• The Directorate of • The roles and
Military Support responsibilities of the
(DOMS) is the National Geospatial-
national-level DOD Intelligence Agency
representative. (NGA), which is a part
of the DOD, are more
broadly explored

Minor changes in • The Military listed as a • The Military’s role

the Role of the supporting agency in has also been slightly
Military three new ESFs (ESF enhanced in terms
#13 - Public Safety of ESF #10 – Oil and
and Security Annex, Hazardous Materials
ESF #14 – Long Term Response Annex, ESF
Community Recovery #8 – Public Service
and Mitigation Annex, and Medical Services
and ESF #15 - External Annex, and ESF #7 –
Affairs Annex. Logistics Management
and Resource Support
Annex.
• The role of the DOD
and National Guard in
ESF #2 and ESF #3 was
expanded.

33