1. Casar vs.

Soluren, 684 SCRA 293 (2012) 


MENDOZA, J.:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint against Judge Corazon D. Soluren (Judge Soluren) of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 96, Baler, Aurora.

In a Complaint, dated August 12, 2011, Assistant Provincial Prosecutors Hydierabad A. Casar, Jonald E. Hernandez, Dante P.
Sindac and Aurora, charged Judge Soluren with Gross Misconduct.

Facts:

Judge Soluren visited the Aurora Provincial Jail and talked with inmates, including inmates with pending cases in her sala.
Allegedly, the jail visitation of Soluren was to persuade the inmates to sign a letter addressed to Chief Justice Renato
Corona pleading to the latter to dismiss the administrative complaint filed against Judge Soluren by Atty. Reyes.

The jail visition was in contravention of Circular No. 03-2010, dated January 12, 2010, which suspended the conduct of jail
visitation and inspection by Executive Judges and Presiding Judges.

Issue:

Whether Judge Soluren is guilty of simple misconduct.

Ruling:

YES.
 Judge Soluren opened herself to charges of impropriety when she went to the Aurora Provincial Jail to solicit the
sympathies and signatures of the prisoners, especially those who had pendings cases in her sala.

This Court has consistently enjoined judges to avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance of
impropriety because the appearance of bias or prejudice can be damaging to the public’s confidence on the Judiciary’s
role in the administration of justice. To say the least, using detention prisoners who had cases before Judge Soluren cannot
be countenanced.

2. Madriaga vs. CBC, 677 SCRA 560 (2012) 


Topic: Judicial power presupposes actual controversies. When there is no more live subject of controversy, the Court ceases
to have a reason to render any ruling or make any pronouncement.

REYES, J.:

Before us is a petition for review of the Decision dated January 27, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissing the petition
for certiorari and the Resolution dated May 26, 2010 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof in CA-G.R. SP No. 96640.

The CA upheld the Order dated August 11, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17 of Malolos, in Civil Case No. P-
167-2002 denying herein petitioner Cesar V. Madriaga, Jr.’s (petitioner) motion to quash the ex parte writ of possession
issued in favor of herein respondent China Banking Corporation (China Bank).

Facts:

Spouses Trajano sold to Madriaga Sr. the subject lot. Upon completion of payment, Spouses Trajano executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favour of Madriaga Sr. but failed to deliver the lot titles prompting Madriaga Sr. to file for specific
performance. They later entered into a compromise agreement that the Spouses Trajano will return the money they
received as payment from Madriaga Sr. in their previous transaction. However, they again failed to comply with their
obligation so Madriaga Sr. filed with RTC. The RTC issued a writ of execution on the properties of Trajano, including the
subject lots. Madriaga Sr. won the bid and a certificate of sale was issued to him. Consequently, TCT Nos. 114853(M) and
114854(M) were cancelled and replaced by T-284713(M) and T- 284714 in his name.

Meanwhile, Spouses Trajano obtained a loan from China Bank secured by a mortgage over TCT Nos. 114853(M) and
114854(M). Upon default, China Bank foreclosed the mortgage and was declared the highest bidder. TCT Nos. T-346239(M)
and T- 346240(M) were issued to China Bank to replace, for the second time, TCT Nos. 114853(M) and 114854(M).
Madriaga Sr. filed an opposition to the writ but was denied because the RTC was merely performing a ministerial duty to
issue the writ of possession to China Bank. After Madriaga Sr’s death, Madriaga Jr succeeded to the properties and filed a
petition for certiorari to the CA contending grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC. The CA denied the petition on
the ground that the motion had already been rendered moot and academic since the writ was already satisfied on April
25, 2005 with the physical removal of Madriaga Sr. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether the case been rendered moot and academic .

Ruling:

Yes. The case has been rendered moot and academic by the full implementation/ satisfaction of the writ of possession.

The writ of possession the RTC issued to China Bank had been satisfied on April 15, 2005 after the petitioner had been
successfully removed from the subject premises, prompting the court to declare that the petitioner’s Motion to
Quash/Abate the Writ of Possession has been rendered moot and academic. Indeed, with the writ of possession having
been served and satisfied, the said motions had ceased to present a justiciable controversy, and a declaration thereon
would be of no practical use or value.

Judicial power presupposes actual controversies, the very antithesis of mootness. Where there is no more live subject of
controversy, the Court ceases to have a reason to render any ruling or make any pronouncement. Courts generally decline
jurisdiction on the ground of mootness – save when, among others, a compelling constitutional issue raised requires the
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; or when the case is capable of repetition
yet evading judicial review,which are not extant in this case.

In any event, as we have previously noted, the petitioner has already pursued Civil Case No. 406-M-2002 for "Specific
Performance, Nullification of Title, Reconveyance and Damages," a plenary action to recover possession or an accion
reivindicatoria." It is in said forum that the contending ownership claims of the parties, and resultantly the right of possession,
can be best ventilated and resolved with definiteness.

3. People vs. Gutierrez, 39 SCRA 173 


REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Petition for writs of certiorari and mandamus, with preliminary injunction, filed by the Solicitor General and State Prosecutors,
to annul and set aside the order of Judge Mario J. Gutierrez of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (respondent herein),
dated 20 July 1970, denying the prosecution's urgent motion to transfer Criminal Case Nos. 47-V and 48-V of said Court of
First Instance, entitled "People vs. Pilotin, et al.," to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District; to direct the
respondent Judge to effectuate such transfer; and to restrain the trial of the cases aforesaid in the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Sur, sitting in Vigan, capital of the province.

Facts:

The accused were charged with two crimes, i.e. arson with homicide and arson. They were arraigned before Judge
Gutierrez. Meanwhile, the Secretary of Justice issued Administrative Order No. 226 authorizing respondent Judge to transfer
the two criminal case to the Circuit Criminal Court in the interest of Justice. The prosecution moved to the respondent
Judge for a transfer of said cases to the Circuit Criminal Court, invoking the above-mentioned administrative orders, and
calling attention to the circumstance that they were issued at the instance of the witnesses for reason of security and
personal safety. The accused opposed such transfer and the respondent Judge declined the transfer sought on the ground
that said Administrative Order only provided for transfer of cases to the Circuit Criminal Court where the interest of justice
required it for more expeditious disposal of the cases; and in the cases involved, the accused had already pleaded; that if
the objective of the proposed transfer was to subsequently obtain a change of venue from the Supreme Court under Sec. 4
of RA No. 5179 the same should have been done right at the very inception of these cases.

In view of the lower court’s denial of the motion to transfer the cases to the Criminal Court, the prosecution resorted to the
SC for writs of certiorari and mandamus, charging abuse of discretion and praying to set aside the order of denial of transfer
and to compel the CFI to remand the cases to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Secondary Judicial District.

Respondents in their answer denied any abuse of discretion in view of the fact that the subject administrative order merely
authorized the court below, but did not require or command it to transfer the cases in question to the Circuit Criminal Court,
and likewise denied that the circumstances justified any such transfer.

Issue:

Whether the lower court committed abuse of discretion in denying to transfer cases to the Circuit Criminal Court.

Ruling:

Yes. Respondent Judge, in construing Administrative Order No. 226 as permissive and not mandatory, acted within the limits
of his discretion and violated neither the law nor the administrative orders mentioned. However, in refusing to consider
Department Administrative Order No. 226 of the Secretary of Justice as mandatory, respondent Judge failed to act upon
the contention of the prosecuting officers that the cases should be transferred to the Criminal Circuit Court of the Second
Judicial District because a miscarriage of justice was impending, in view of the refusal of the prosecution witnesses to testify
in the court where they felt their lives would be endangered. The Constitution has vested the Judicial Power in the Supreme
Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law (Article VIII, Section 13), and such judicial power connotes
certain incidental and inherent attributes reasonably necessary for an effective administration of justice. The courts can by
appropriate means do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an
effective institution of government. One of these incidental and inherent powers of courts is that of transferring the trial of
cases from one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the imperative of securing a fair and
impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice, so demands.

In the present case there are sufficient and adequate reasons for the transfer of the hearing of the said criminal cases of the
CFI of Ilocos Sur to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, in the interest of truth and justice. The
informations filed in the CFI of Ilocos Sur show that of the one hundred armed participants in the burning of the houses,
some eighty-two (82) are still unidentified and at large; that one of the accused, private respondent Vincent Crisologo,
belongs to an influential family in the province, being concededly the son of the Congressman and that the reluctant
witnesses are themselves the complainants in the criminal cases, and, therefore, have reasons to fear that attempts will be
made to silence them

4. In Re: Atty. Marcial Edillon, A.C. No. 1928, August 3, 1978 


Synopsis:

For respondent’s stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since the latter’s
constitution, notwithstanding due notice, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines unanimously
adopted and submitted to the Supreme Court a resolution recommending the removal of respondent’s name from its Roll of
Attorneys, pursuant to Par. 2, Sec. 24, Art. III of the By-Laws of the IBP.

Respondent, although conceding the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, questions the
all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership therein and the obligation to pay membership dues arguing that the
provisions therein (Section 1 and 9 of the Court Rule 139-A) constitute an invasion of his constitutional right in the sense that
he is being compelled, as a precondition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP
and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said
organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Respondent likewise questions the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike his
name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that this matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is of
an administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body.

The Supreme Court unanimously held that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar are valid exercise of the police
power over an important profession; that to compel a lawyer to be a member of the IBP is not violative of his constitutional
freedom to associate; that the requirement to pay membership fees is imposed as a regulatory measure designed to raise
funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration; that the penalty provisions for non-payment are not void
as unreasonable or arbitrary; that the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction and power to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of
Attorneys is expressly provided by Art.X, Section 5(5) of the Constitution and held as an inherent judicial function by a host
of decided cases; and that the provisions of Rules of Court 139-A ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines and
the IBP By-Laws complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
Respondent disbarred and his name ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

Facts:

Atty. Marcial A. Edillon was removed from the Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to the IBP
from the time of its constitution. However, he argued that the by-laws of the IBP constitute an invasion of his constitutional
rights whereby he is being compelled, as a pre-condition of maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the fees. He questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of
Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an
"administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."

Ruling:

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations
organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process
by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well
as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an
official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members.

All legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the
police power over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover
clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the
profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State — the
administration of justice — as an officer of the Court. The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of
this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. The
expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power".

To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate.
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member
of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations.

As to the payment of annual dues, the collection is to further the State’s legitimate interest to elevate the quality of
professional legal services. The fees are imposed to defray the cost of regulating the profession he belongs.

As to the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, the matters
of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are
indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion.

5. Maturan vs. Gutierrez-Torres, 681 SCRA 311 (2012) 


BERSAMIN, J.:

A judge must exert every effort to timely rule upon a case submitted for decision. If she thinks that she would need a period
to decide a case or to resolve an issue longer than what the Constitution prescribes, she may request an extension from the
Court to avoid administrative sanctions.

Facts:

Atty. Maturan was handling a criminal case which was already submitted for decision on since June 2002. However the
case had remained pending and unresolved. On August 2004, Atty. Maturan filed a complaint against the presiding judge,
Judge Gutierrez-Torres for unjustifiably delaying the rendition of the decision.

Issue:

Whether or not Judge Gutierrez-Torres shall be sanctioned.

YES. She is guilty of gross inefficiency.

Article VIII, Section 15 (1) of the 1987 Constitution requires that all cases or matters must be decided or resolved within:

a) SUPREME COURT- 24 months from date of submission unless reduced by the SC;

b) LOWER COLLEGIATE COURTS-12 months;

c) ALL LOWER COURTS-3 months.

Thereby, the Constitution mandates all justices and judges to be efficient and speedy in the disposition of the cases or
matters pending in their courts.

All judges should be mindful of the duty to decide promptly, knowing that the public's faith and confidence in the Judiciary
are at stake if they should ignore such duty. They must always be aware that upon each time a delay occurs in the
disposition of cases, their stature as judicial officers and the respect for their position diminish. Because of her act, the
reputation of the entire Judiciary, of which she is among the pillars, is also undeservedly tarnished.

If the Judge anticipate that she would need a period longer than what the Constitution and the issuances of the Court
prescribe within which to render her decision, she should request a proper extension of the period from the Court, through
the OCA, and lay out in the request the justification for her inability. In this case, Judge Gutierrez-Torres did not at all do so.

6. Judge Caoibes vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 132177, July 17, 2001 


Topic: It is the Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel and
has exclusive power to take administrative action against them in case of violations.

BUENA, J.:

Petitioner Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., Presiding Judge of Branch 253 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, seeks the review of
the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated August 22, 1997 denying the ex-parte motion to
refer to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and (2) the Order dated December 22, 1997 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidences.chanrob1es virtua1 1

Facts:

On May 20, 1997, at the hallway on the third floor of the Hall of Justice, Judge Alumbres asked Judge Caoibes to return the
executive table he borrowed from him. Judge Caoibes did not answer so Judge Alumbres reiterated his request but before
he could finish, Judge Caoibes blurted “Tarantido it ah”, and boxed Judge Alumbres at his right eyebrow and left lower jaw,
therefore destroying his eyeglasses.

Judge Alumbres filed before the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for physical injuries, malicious mischief for the
destruction of his eyeglasses and assault upon a person in authority. Later on, he lodged an administrative case with the
Supreme Court for the dismissal of Judge Caoibes from the judiciary on the ground of grave misconduct or conduct
unbecoming a judicial officer.

Justice Demetria claimed that if ever he said anything else during the discussion between Go Teng Kok and SP Formaran III,
such was not a form of intervention. He only admonished Go Teng Kok "to cool it" when the discussion between the
prosecutor and Go Teng Kok became heated. While he asked about the status of the case this, he said, demonstrated his
lack of knowledge about the case and bolstered his claim that he could not have possibly interceded for Yu Yuk Lai.

In fine, respondent Justice Demetria maintains that it is inconceivable for him to ask SP Formaran III whom he just met for the
first time to do something for Go Teng Kok whom he claims he just likewise met for the first time. Neither did he know Yu Yuk
Lai, a claim Yu Yuk Lai herself corroborated. It would be unthinkable for him to intercede in behalf of someone he did not
know. Indeed respondent Justice asserted that his meeting Go Teng Kok at the DOJ was purely coincidence, if not
accidental.
Issue:

Whether it is the Ombudsman or the SC who has jurisdiction over disciplinary cases involving members of the judiciary.

Ruling:

It is the Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. Prescinding
from this premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge,
or court employee, involves an administrative matter. It is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court
personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation
thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of
powers.

The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that a case before it does or does not have
administrative implications. To do so is to deprive the Court of the exercise of its administrative prerogatives and to arrogate
unto itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned. This is a dangerous policy which impinges, as it does, on judicial
independence.

7. Re: Derogatory News Item Charging Court of Appeals Justice Demetrio Demetria with Interference on 
 Behalf of a
Suspected Drug Queen, AM No. 00-7-09 CA, March 27, 2001 


PER CURIAM:

Men and women of the courts must conduct themselves with honor, probity, fairness, prudence and discretion. Magistrates
of justice must always be fair and impartial. They should avoid not only acts of impropriety, but all appearances of
impropriety. Their influence in society must be consciously and conscientiously exercised with utmost prudence and
discretion. For, theirs is the assigned role of preserving the independence, impartiality and integrity of the Judiciary.

The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates a judge to "refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or
dispute pending before another court or administrative agency.” The slightest form of interference cannot be
countenanced. Once a judge uses his influence to derail or interfere in the regular course of a legal or judicial proceeding
for the benefit of one or any of the parties therein, public confidence in the judicial system is diminished, if not totally
eroded.

Such is this administrative charge triggered by newspaper accounts which appeared on the 21 July 2000 issues of The
Manila Standard, The Manila Times, Malaya, The Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today. The national dailies collectively
reported that Court of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria tried to intercede on behalf of suspected Chinese
drug queen Yu Yuk Lai, alias Sze Yuk Lai, who went in and out of prison to play in a Manila casino.

Facts:

This administrative charge was triggered by newspaper accounts. The national dailies collectively reported that Court of
Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria tried to intercede on behalf of suspected Chinese drug queen Yu Yuk Lai,
alias Sze Yuk Lai, who went in and out of prison to play in a Manila casino. Respondent Justice Demetria, for his part,
vehemently denied having interceded for Yu Yuk Lai. While he admitted that he indeed visited the DOJ, he went there to
"visit old friends" and his meeting Go Teng Kok whom he did not know until that time was purely accidental. Justice
Demetria explained that he merely requested SP Formaran III "to do something to help Go Teng Kok about the case"
without ever specifying the kind of "help" that he requested. Respondent claimed that the "help" he was requesting could
well be "within legal bounds or line of duty." Justice Demetria claimed that if ever he said anything else during the discussion
between Go Teng Kok and SP Formaran III, such was not a form of intervention. He only admonished Go Teng Kok "to cool
it" when the discussion between the prosecutor and Go Teng Kok became heated. While he asked about the status of the
case this, he said, demonstrated his lack of knowledge about the case and bolstered his claim that he could not have
possibly interceded for Yu Yuk Lai. In fine, respondent Justice Demetria maintains that it is inconceivable for him to ask SP
Formaran III whom he just met for the first time to do something for Go Teng Kok whom he claims he just likewise met for the
first time. Neither did he know Yu Yuk Lai, a claim Yu Yuk Lai herself corroborated. It would be unthinkable for him to
intercede in behalf of someone he did not know. Indeed respondent Justice asserted that his meeting Go Teng Kok at the
DOJ was purely coincidence, if not accidental.

Issue:

Whether Justice Demetrio G. Demetria is guilty of violating the Code of Judicial Conduct
Ruling:

Yes. The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates a Judge to refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or
dispute pending before another court or administrative agency.” The slightest form of interference cannot be
countenanced. Once a judge uses his influence to derail or interfere in the regular course of a legal or judicial proceeding
for the benefit of one or any of the parties therein, public confidence in the judicial system is diminished, if not totally
eroded.

The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice is circumscribed
with the heavy of responsibility. His at all times must be characterized with propriety and must be above suspicion. His must
be free of even a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to the performance of his judicial duties, but also his behavior
outside the courtroom and as a private individual.

Unfortunately, respondent Justice Demetrio Demetria failed failed to live up to this expectation. Through his indiscretions,
Justice Demetria did not only make a mockery of his high office, but also caused incalculable damage to the entire
Judiciary. The mere mention of his name in the national newspapers, allegedly lawyering for a suspected drug queen and
interfering with her prosecution seriously undermined the integrity of the entire Judiciary.

Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness than a seat in the Judiciary. High ethical principles and a sense of propriety should be
maintained, without which the faith of the people in the Judiciary so indispensable in orderly society cannot be preserved.
There is simply no place in the Judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and
integrity.

8. Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cranch 5 U.S. 137 (1883) 


Facts:

On his last day in office, President John Adams named 42 justices of the peace and 16 new circuit court justices for the
District of Columbia under the Organic Act. Newly elected President Thomas Jefferson refused to honor the commissions,
claiming that they were invalid because they had not been delivered by the end of Adams’s term. William Marbury (P) was
an intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the peace.

Issue:

Whether the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of Congress and Executive and determine whether they are
unconstitutional and therefore void.

Ruling:

YES.
 The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) has constitutional authority to review executive actions and
legislative acts. It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to
particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Court must
decide on the operation of each. If courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act
of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.

In addition, Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in
Article III of the Constitution.

9. Hebron vs. Garcia II, 685 SCRA 417 (2012) 


REYES, J.:

This case stems from the administrative complaint dated September 30, 2011 filed with the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) by complainant Ernesto Hebron (Hebron), charging respondent Judge Matias M. Garcia II (Judge Garcia) with gross
ignorance of the law, incompetence, abuse of authority and abuse of discretion.
Facts:

Judge Matias M. Garcia II was charged of gross ignorance of the law, incompetence and abuse of authority and abuse of
discretion by Ernestro Hebron. He filed a case for falsification of public document against Aladin Simundac to which
Simundac filed for a TRO – first denied by the MTC and was later on raffled to the RTC, landing to Judge Matias’ court.
Hebron filed a motion for Judge Garcia’s inhibition, citing his perceived bias and partiality of Judge Garcia, who had earlier
dismissed an earlier civil case filed by Hebron against Simundac.

The administrative complaint was later withdrawn but the issue remains: the motion was submitted for resolution on
November 25, 2009 but Judge Matias claimed that they were unable to resolve the case until July 2011. He failed to resolve
the motion within the 90-day reglementary period provided by the Constitution.

Issue:

Whether Judge Garcia’s failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary period of ninety (90) days
constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction against him.

Ruling:

Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that “all cases or matters filed after the effectivity of the
Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the SC, and unless reduced
by the SC, twelve months for all collegiate courts, and three months for all other courts.” Judge Garcia failed to meet this
three-month deadline.

To the Court, the volume of Judge Garcias pending cases did not justify the delay. In Angelia v. Grageda, we
held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In consonance with the Constitutional mandate that all lower courts decide or resolve cases or matters within three (3)
months from their date of submission, the Code of Judicial Conduct in Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 3.05 of Canon 3,
provide:

Rule 1.02 A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.

Rule 3.05 A judge should dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.

Judges must decide cases and resolve matters with dispatch because any delay in the administration of justice deprives
litigants of their right to a speedy disposition of their case and undermines the people’s faith in the judiciary. Indeed, justice
delayed is justice denied.

The failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary period of ninety (90) days constitutes gross
inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction against the erring judge. This is not only a blatant
transgression of the Constitution but also of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which enshrines the significant duty of
magistrates to decide cases promptly. Under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, delay in rendering a decision
or order is considered a less serious offense that is punishable by either (1) suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for not less than one nor more than three months, or (2) a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000. The
sheer volume of Judge Garcias work may, at most, only serve to mitigate the penalty to be imposed upon him, as in the
case of Angelia where the fine was reduced to P5,000.00 given therein respondent judges 800 pending cases before his
sala.

10. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Balut, 758 SCRA 216 (2015) 


Topic: A judge should adhere to the highest standards of public accountability lest his action erode the public faith in the
Judiciary.

Facts:

The OCA conducted a judicial audit and physical inventory of cases at the MTCs of Bayombong and Solano, Nueva
Vizcaya wherein Judge Balut was the acting and presiding judge in both courts. Results showed that Judge Balut failed to
decide 33 cases and 101 motions without properly requesting for an extension. Further, both MTCs of Bayombong and
Solano incurred substantial cash shortages due to the continuous borrowing of Judge Balut for the past years, as alleged by
the Clerks of Court. The Court ordered udge Balut to pay a fine for his failure the decide the numbers of cases and motions
but referred to the CA the issue of cash shortages. The CA dismissed the charges against him for the failure of the OCA to
clearly substantiate and prove the participation of Judge Balut in the financial transactions of the courts. Despite his
admission that he borrowed money from the judiciary fund, the CA held that he could no longer be penalized because he
was already fined by the Court.

Ruling:

The SC disagrees with the recommendation of the CA. In administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary is substantial
evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The standard
of substantial evidence is justified when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the
misconduct complained of, even if such evidence is not overwhelming or even preponderant.

A review of the records shows that Judge Balut actually messed with the court collections. The three clerks of court of MTC
Bayombong, MTC Solano and MCTC Aritao-Sta Fe categorically stated that Judge Balut borrowed money from the court
funds and executed certifications to that effect. They separately reported that Judge Balut had been borrowing money
from the various funds of the court collections.

The Court stresses that judges must adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct. Because of the sensitivity of his position,
a judge is required to exhibit, at all times, the highest degree of honesty and integrity and to observe exacting standards of
morality, decency and competence. He should adhere to the highest standards of public accountability lest his action
erode the public faith in the Judiciary.

Judge Balut fell short of this standard for borrowing money from the collections of the court. He knowingly and deliberately
made the clerks of court violate the circulars on the proper administration of court funds. He miserably failed to become a
role model of his staff and other court personnel in the observance of the standards of morality and decency, both in his
official and personal conduct.

Therefore, Judge Alexander Balut GUILTY of gross misconduct and imposed upon him the penalty of DISMISSAL from the
service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the government,
including government-owned and controlled corporations, except the money value of accrued earned leave credits.

11. Re: Cases Submitted for Decision before Judge Baluma, 704 SCRA 415 (2013) 


LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before the Court is the request for Certificate of Clearance of Judge Teofilo D. Baluma (Baluma), former Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, of Tagbilaran City, Bohol, in support of his application for Retirement/Gratuity Benefits
under Republic Act No. 910,1 as amended.

Facts:

Judge Baluma availed himself of optional retirement on July 22, 2011. Reportedly, there were 23 cases submitted for
decision/resolution, which were left undecided by Judge Baluma. All 23 cases were already beyond the reglementary
period for deciding them by the time Judge Baluma retired. Thus, the processing of Judge Baluma’s Application for
Clearance has been put on hold pending clearance from the OCA. Judge Baluma’s son, averred that his father was
suffering from depression and requested for the early release of Judge Baluma’s retirement pay and other benefits. Atty.
Baluma appealed that if any amount needs to be withheld from Judge Baluma’s retirement benefits due to the undecided
cases, Judge Baluma’s health condition be taken into consideration.

Issue:

Whether Judge Baluma is guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision.

Ruling:

Yes. The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA, except as to the recommended penalty.

Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution provides that lower courts have three months within which to decide
cases or resolve matters submitted to them for resolution. Moreover, Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
enjoins judges to dispose of their business promptly and decide cases within the required period. In addition, this Court laid
down guidelines in SC Administrative Circular No. 13 which provides, inter alia, that "judges shall observe scrupulously the
periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15, of the Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters
submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months from date of
submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other lower courts are given a period of three months to do so."

The Court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously under the time-
honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Every judge should decide cases with dispatch and should be
careful, punctual, and observant in the performance of his functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith
and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute. Failure to decide a case
within the reglementary period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of
administrative sanctions on the defaulting judge.

At the same time, however, the Court is also aware of the heavy case load of trial courts. The Court has allowed reasonable
extensions of time needed to decide cases, but such extensions must first be requested from the Court. A judge cannot by
himself choose to prolong the period for deciding cases beyond that authorized by law.

Here, Judge Baluma failed to decide 23 cases already submitted for decision/resolution within the mandatory reglementary
period for doing so; he left said cases still undecided upon his retirement on July 22, 2011; he did not give any
reason/explanation for his failure to comply with the reglementary period for deciding cases; and there were no previous
requests by him for extension of time to decide said cases. Judge Baluma’s gross inefficiency, evident in his undue delay in
deciding 23 cases within the reglementary period, merits the imposition of administrative sanctions.

In the present case, the Court takes into account the survey of cases; together with the number of cases Judge Baluma
failed to decide within the reglementary period (23 cases upon his retirement) and the lack of effort on his part to proffer an
explanation or express remorse for his offense; but considering as well that he is suffering from depression and that he has no
prior infraction, the Court finds that a fine of ₱20,000.00 is adequate. He is FINED in the amount of ₱20,000.00, to be
deducted from his retirement benefits withheld by the Fiscal Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator. The
balance of his retirement benefits shall be released without unnecessary delay.

12. People vs. Wahiman, 758 SCRA 366 (2015) 


DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Appellant Jorie Wahiman y Rayos (appellant) was charged with the crime of murder for the death of Jose Buensuceso
(Buensuceso). During his arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.1 Trial on the merits ensued.

Facts:

Jorie Wahiman was charged of the crime of murder for the death of Jose. He was found guilty and the court directed him
to pay the heirs the sum of

P75,000.00 as moral damages,
 P75,000.00 [as] civil indemnity and
 actual damages as follows:


P59,280,000.00 lost earning capacity of the deceased;
 [P]25,000.00 actual damages; no receipt was presented for
P220,000[;] P1,500.00 Appearance fee; and
 P50,000.00 Attorney's fee.
 He shall serve his penalty in the National Penitentiary
of Davao Penal [C]olony.

Ruling:

Regarding the award for lost earnings, the general rule is that there must be documentary proof to support indemnity for
loss of earning capacity. Admittedly, there are exceptions to this rule: By way of exception, damages for loss of earning
capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-employed
earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the
deceased's line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker
earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.

Jose is neither self-employed earning less than the minimum wage nor is he employed as a daily wage worker. However, we
are inclined to award lost earnings considering that the deceased, as testified by his widow, was the manager of Stanfilco-
Dole, Phils, in Malaybalay City and was receiving a monthly salary of P95,000.00. He was 54 years of age when gunned
down by appellant. This testimony was not objected to by appellant or questioned during cross-examination or on appeal.
Clearly, the existence of factual basis of the award has been satisfactorily established. However, the amount of the award
for lost earnings must be modified following the formula [2/3 x 80 - age] x [gross annual income - necessary expenses
equivalent to 50% of the gross annual income]. Thus: [2/3 x (80-54)] [(P95,000 x 12) - 50% (P95,000 x 12)] = P9,878,100.00. The
award of actual damages is deleted; in lieu thereof, appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P25,000.00 as
temperate damages; he is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the victim exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00;
and all damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6%per annum from date of finality of this resolution until full
payment.

13. Disini, Jr. vs. Sec. of Justice, 716 SCRA 237 (2014) 


ABAD, J.:

These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act
of 2012, unconstitutional and void.

Facts:

These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act
of 2012, unconstitutional and void.
 Related to judiciary:

Section 8 – Penalties

The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative prerogative. Here the legislature
prescribed a measure of severe penalties for what it regards as deleterious cybercrimes. They appear proportionate to the
evil sought to be punished. The power to determine penalties for offenses is not diluted or improperly wielded simply
because at some prior time the act or omission was but an element of another offense or might just have been connected
with another crime. Judges and magistrates can only interpret and apply them and have no authority to modify or revise
their range as determined by the legislative department.

The courts should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body.

Section 14 – Disclusre of Computer Data

The process envisioned in Section 14 is being likened to the issuance of a subpoena. Petitioners’ objection is that the
issuance of subpoenas is a judicial function. But it is well-settled that the power to issue subpoenas is not exclusively a
judicial function. Executive agencies have the power to issue subpoena as an adjunct of their investigatory powers.

Besides, what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly issued court warrant, a function usually lodged in the
hands of law enforcers to enable them to carry out their executive functions. The prescribed procedure for disclosure would
not constitute an unlawful search or seizure nor would it violate the privacy of communications and correspondence.
Disclosure can be made only after judicial intervention.

14. Republic vs. Sereno G.R. No. 237428 May 11, 2018 


Facts:

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by Solicitor General Jose C. Calida, filed a Petition for the issuance of the
extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare void Respondent Sereno’s appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
(SC) and to oust and altogether exclude her therefrom.

Respondent served as a member of the faculty of the UP College of Law (UP) from 1986 to 2006. She also served as legal
counsel for the Republic of the Philippines for several agencies from 1994 until 2009. On July 2010, Respondent submitted her
application for the position of Associate Justice of the SC.

Despite the span of 20 years of employment with UP from 1986 to 2006 and despite having been employed as legal counsel
of various government agencies from 2003 to 2009, records from the UP Human Resources Development Office, Central
Records Division of the Office of the Ombudsman, and the Office of Recruitment Selection and Nomination (ORSN) of the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) show that the only Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) available on record
and filed by Respondent were those for the years 1985, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, and 2002, or
only 11 out of 25 SALNs that ought to have been filed. No SALNs were filed from 2003 to 2006 when she was employed as
legal counsel for the Republic. Neither was a SALN filed when she resigned from U.P. College of Law as of 1 June 2006 and
when she supposedly re-entered government service as of 16 August 2010.

Respondent was appointed Associate Justice in August 2010 by President Benigno Aquino III.
When the position for Chief Justice was declared vacant in 2012, the JBC announced the opening for applications and
nominations, requiring applicants to submit all previous SALNs up to 31 December 2011 (instead of the usual last two years of
public service) and stating that, “applicants with incomplete or out-of-date documentary requirements will not be
interviewed or considered for nomination.”

Respondent accepted several nominations for the position of Chief Justice, and submitted requirements in support thereof.

On 20 July 2012, the JBC in a special meeting en banc deliberated on nominees with incomplete documentary
requirements. The minutes of the deliberation show that Respondent has not submitted her SALNs for a period of ten years,
from 1986 to 2006, the duration for which, according to Senator Escudero (ex officio member of the JBC), she was a
professor in UP and was therefore required to submit SALNs.

Apart from Respondent, several other candidates had incomplete documents such that the JBC En Banc agreed to extend
the deadline for submission. It also delegated to the Execom the determination of whether or not the candidate has
substantially complied, failure to do so resulting in the exclusion from the list of candidates to be interviewed and
considered for nomination.

Pursuant to this, the OSRN required Respondent to submit her SALNs for the years 1995-1999, the period within which she was
employed by UP. Respondent replied through a letter that considering that such government records in UP are more than
15 years old, “it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all those files.” She also assured OSRN that UP has cleared
her of all responsibilities, accountabilities, and administrative charges in 2006. Lastly, she emphasized that her service in the
government was not continuous, having had a break between 2006 (when her service in UP ended) and 2010 (when she
was appointed to the SC).

Such letter was not examined or deliberated upon by the JBC. Neither can the JBC Execom produce minutes of the
deliberations to consider the issue of substantial compliance with documentary requirements. However, despite having
submitted only three SALNs (2009-2011), the Report regarding documentary requirements and SALNs of candidates shows
that her name was annotated with “COMPLETE REQUIREMENTS”, noting her letter that it was infeasible to retrieve all files. The
same annotation was found in another list regarding SALN submissions of 20 candidates, including Respondent.

Respondent was appointed by President Benigno Aquino III on 25 August 2012. Five years later, an impeachment complaint
was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon with the House Committee of Justice. Included in the complaint was the allegation that
Respondent failed to make a truthful statement of her SALNs. Such complaint filed in the House spawned a letter dated 21
February 2018 of Atty. Eligio Mallari to the OSG requesting the latter to initiate a quo warranto proceeding against
Respondent.

Case for the Petitioner:

The OSG (Petitioner) argues that quo warranto is an available remedy in questioning the validity of Respondent’s
appointment, and that the one-year bar rule does not apply against the State. It also argues that the SC has jurisdiction
over the petition. The petition alleges that the failure of Respondent to submit her SALNs as required by the JBC disqualifies
her, at the outset, from being a candidate for the position of Chief Justice. Lacking the required number of SALNs,
Respondent has not proven her integrity, which is a requirement under the Constitution. The Republic thus concludes that
since Respondent is ineligible for the position of Chief Justice for lack of proven integrity, she has no right to hold office and
may therefore be ousted via quo warranto.

Case for the Respondent:

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Chief Justice may only be ousted from office by impeachment on the basis
of the Constitution and a long line of jurisprudence. Alternatively, she argues that the present petition is time-barred, as it
should have been filed within one year from the cause of ouster, and not from the discovery of the disqualification.

It is likewise the contention of Respondent that public officers without pay or those who do not receive compensation are
not required to file a SALN. Thus, Respondent argues that for the years that she was on official leave without pay, she was
actually not required to file any SALN. She adds that to require the submission of SALNs as an absolute requirement is to
expand the qualifications provided by the Constitution.

Respondent urges the Court to apply in her favor the case of Concerned Taxpayer v. Doblada, Jr., and deem as sufficient
and acceptable her statement that she “maintains that she consistently filed her SALNs.” Respondent argues that the
Court’s rationale in Doblada that one cannot readily conclude failure to file SALNs simply because these documents are
missing in the Office of the Court Administrator's files should likewise be made applicable to her case.

In Respondent’s Reply, she also raised the issue of forum-shopping against Petitioner.

Motions for Inhibition:

Respondent filed motions for the inhibition of five Justices (Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo- de Castro),
imputing actual bias for having testified in the House Committee for Justice on the impeachment complaint and on Justice
Tijam for allegedly stating, in a Manila Times article, that Respondent is in culpable violation of the Constitution if she
continues to ignore the impeachment process. She alleged that their testimonies show that they harbored personal
resentment and ill feelings towards her, and that she has already been pre-judged by some as having committed a
culpable violation of the Constitution for having failed to submit her SALNs, among others. She also sought to disqualify
Justice Martires for his insinuations during the Oral Arguments questioning her mental and psychological fitness.
Issues:

A. Preliminary Issues

1. Whether the grant of the motions to intervene is proper.

B. Substantive Issues

1. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo warranto against
Respondent who is an impeachable officer and against whom an impeachment complaint has already been filed
with the House of Representatives;
2. Whether the petition is dismissible outright on the ground of prescription;
3. Whether Respondent is eligible for the position of Chief Justice:
1. Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination is the sole and exclusive function of
the JBC, and whether such determination partakes of the character of a political question outside the
Court’s supervisory and review powers;
2. Whether Respondent failed to file her SALNs as mandated by the Constitution and required by the law and
its implementing rules and regulations; and if so, whether the failure to file SALNs voids the nomination and
appointment of Respondent as Chief Justice;
3. Whether Respondent failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as required by the JBC; and if so,
whether the failure to submit SALNs to the JBC voids the nomination and appointment of Respondent as
Chief Justice; and
4. In case of a finding that Respondent is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice, whether the
subsequent nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the President cured such ineligibility.
4. Whether Respondent is a de jure or de facto officer.

Ruling on the Preliminary Issues:

1. Motions for Intervention

The Court noted the IBP’s intervention and resolved to deny the motions for intervention filed by several other groups. It
observed that intervention is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion; that movant- intervenors have no legal
interest in the case, as required in order to qualify a person to intervene; and that the remedy of quo warranto is vested in
the people, and not in a particular group. Lastly, such individuals do not claim a right to the questioned position, which is
the only time when an individual himself/herself may commence an action for quo warranto. In this case, the movants-
intervenors are neither individuals claiming to be entitled to the questioned position nor are they the ones charged with the
usurpation thereof.

2. Motions for Inhibition

There is no basis for the Associate Justices to inhibit. Movant must prove bias and prejudice by clear and convincing
evidence to disqualify a judge. Justice Tijam’s statement, taken as a whole, was only to prod the Respondent to observe
and respect the constitutional process of impeachment. It does not appear that there are grounds for compulsory
inhibition. As to voluntary inhibition, the mere fact that some of the Associate Justices participated in the hearings of the
Committee on Justice determining probable cause for the impeachment of Respondent does not disqualify them to hear
the instant petition. Their appearance was in deference to the House of Representatives whose constitutional duty to
investigate the impeachment complaint filed against Respondent could not be doubted. Their appearance was with the
prior consent of the Supreme Court En Banc and they faithfully observed the parameters that the Court set for the purpose.
Their statements in the hearing should be carefully viewed within this context, and should not be hastily interpreted as an
adverse attack against Respondent.

Ruling on the Substantive Issues:

1. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo warranto against
Respondent who is an impeachable officer and against whom an impeachment complaint has already been filed with the
House of Representatives. YES

a. SC has original jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution states that the
SC has original jurisdiction over petitions for quo warranto. This jurisdiction is concurrent with the Court of Appeals
(CA) and the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Section 7, Rule 66 of Rules of Court provides that the venue for an action
for quo warranto is in the RTC of Manila, CA, or SC when commenced by the Solicitor General.

While the hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs, a direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction in this case is justified considering that the
qualification of a Member of the Court is in question, and the issue is of public concern.

The petition for quo warranto is of transcendental importance. The instant petition is one of first impression and of
paramount importance to the public in the sense that the qualification, eligibility and appointment of an
incumbent Chief Justice, the highest official of the Judiciary, are being scrutinized through an action for quo
warranto.

b. On the argument that Respondent is an impeachable officer such that a quo warranto petition cannot prosper,
the Court held that the origin, nature and purpose of impeachment and quo warranto are materially different. While
 both impeachment and quo warranto may result in the ouster of the public official, the two proceedings materially
differ. At its most basic, impeachment proceedings are political in nature; while an action for quo warranto is
judicial or a proceeding traditionally lodged in the courts.

Furthermore, there is no forum-shopping, as alleged by the Respondent, because quo warranto and impeachment
can proceed independently and simultaneously, as they differ as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules
pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal, and (4) limitations. The causes of action in the two proceedings are
unequivocally different. In quo warranto, the cause of action lies on the usurping, intruding, or unlawfully holding or
exercising of a public office, while in impeachment, it is the commission of an impeachable offense. Likewise, the
reliefs sought in the two proceedings are different. Respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall be ordered to
cease holding a public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. On the other hand, in impeachment, a conviction
shall result in the removal of the Respondent from the public office that he/she is legally holding. Furthermore, the
impeachment case is yet to be initiated by the filing of the Articles of Impeachment before the Senate. Thus, at the
moment, there is no pending impeachment case against the Respondent. The proceedings in the House are
merely in the nature of a preliminary investigation whereby probable cause is sought to be determined.

c. Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly elected impeachable official
may be removed from office. Even the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) Rules expressly provide for the remedy of
either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the President and the Vice-
President, both of whom are impeachable officers. In fact, this would not be the first time the Court shall take
cognizance of a quo warranto petition against an impeachable officer (see cases of Estrada v. Desierto, et al. and
Estrada v. Macapagal- Arroyo where SC took cognizance of a quo warranto petition against former President
Macapagal- Arroyo considering whether former President Estrada’s act of resignation ended his official status as
President).

Furthermore, the language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a quo warranto action
against impeachable officers: “[T]he Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office ...” The provision uses the permissive term “may”
which, in statutory construction, denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect. An
option to remove by impeachment admits of an alternative mode of effecting the removal.

That the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is made absolute such that only those enumerated offenses are
treated as grounds for impeachment does not mean that it is to be taken as a complete statement of the causes
of removal from office. The word “may” cannot also be understood to qualify only the imposable penalties
because it would lead to the conclusion that other lesser penalties may be imposed — a situation not
contemplated in the language of the Constitutional provision.

The courts should be able to inquire into the validity of appointments even of impeachable officers. To hold
otherwise is to allow an absurd situation where the appointment of an impeachable officer cannot be questioned,
on the basis of citizenship or membership in the Bar, for example. Unless such an officer commits any of the grounds
for impeachment and is actually impeached, he can continue discharging the functions of his office even when he
is clearly disqualified from holding it. Such would result in permitting unqualified and ineligible public officials to
continue occupying key positions, exercising sensitive sovereign functions until they are successfully removed from
office through impeachment.

d. The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is not violative of the doctrine of
separation of powers. At the outset, an action for quo warranto does not try a person’s culpability of an
impeachment offense, neither does a writ of quo warranto conclusively pronounce such culpability. The Court’s
exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings does not preclude the House of Representatives from
enforcing its own prerogative of determining probable cause for impeachment, to craft and transmit the Articles of
Impeachment, nor will it preclude the Senate from exercising its constitutionally committed power of impeachment.

In this case, it is incidental that the non-filing of SALNs also formed part of the allegations in the Articles of
Impeachment, which in itself is a Constitutional requirement, the violation of which constitutes culpable violation of
the Constitution. But unlike other impeachable officers, Respondent’s position also demands compliance with the
qualifications of having to be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence — and the
failure to submit SALNs goes into the very qualification of integrity.

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, and to obviate confusion in the future as to when quo warranto as a
remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of, and in keeping with the Court’s function of
harmonizing the laws and the rules with the Constitution, the Court herein demarcates that an act or omission
committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as
to render such appointment or election invalid is properly the subject of a quo warranto petition, provided that the
requisites for the commencement thereof are present. On the contrary, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the
qualification of integrity, being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a
validly appointed and/or validly elected official, cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of
something else, which may either be impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or
omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.

e. The exercise of judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power
to try and decide all cases of impeachment, is thus misplaced. An outright dismissal of the petition based on
speculation that Respondent will eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court’s duty to
settle an actual controversy squarely presented before it. There is also no possibility of a constitutional crisis upon
which an abdication of such duty is to be premised because, as discussed, it is within the Court’s judicial power to
settle justiciable issues or actual controversies involving rights, which are legally demandable and enforceable. It is
not arrogating upon itself the power to impeach, which is a political exercise.
 f. Seeking affirmative relief from the Court is tantamount to voluntary appearance. Respondent cannot now be heard
to deny the Court’s jurisdiction over her person even as she claims to be an impeachable official because
Respondent in fact invoked and sought affirmative relief from the Court by praying for the inhibition of several
Members of this Court and by moving that the case be heard on Oral Arguments, albeit ad cautelam.

2. Whether the petition is dismissible outright on the ground of prescription. NO

a. Prescription does not lie against the State. The one-year limitation is not applicable when the Petitioner is not a mere
private individual pursuing a private interest, but the government itself seeking relief for a public wrong and suing for
public interest. In the three instances enumerated by Rules of Court, the Solicitor General is mandated under the
Rules to commence the necessary quo warranto petition, as seen in the use of the word “must.” In Agcaoili v.
Suguitan, “As a general principle it may be stated that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or penal, have no
application to quo warranto proceeding brought to enforce a public right.” In effect, when the government is the
real party in interest, and is proceeding mainly to assert its rights, there can be no defense on the ground of laches
or prescription. Indubitably, the basic principle that “prescription does not lie against the State” which finds textual
basis under Article 1108 (4) of the Civil Code, applies in this case.

b. Circumstances obtaining in this case preclude the application of the prescriptive period. That prescription does not
lie in this case can also be deduced from the very purpose of an action for quo warranto, which is to prevent a
continuing exercise of an authority unlawfully asserted. The Republic, then, cannot be faulted for questioning
Respondent’s qualification for office only upon discovery of the cause of ouster.

Respondent cleverly hid the fact of non-filing by stating that she should not be required to submit the said
documents as she was considered to be coming from private practice; that it was not feasible to retrieve most of
her records in the academe considering that the same are more than fifteen years old; and that U.P. already
cleared her of “all academic/administrative responsibilities, money and property accountabilities and from
administrative charges”. She has never been clear on whether she had filed the required SALNs or not. Given the
foregoing, there can be no acquiescence or inaction, in this case, on the part of the Republic as would amount to
an abandonment of its right to seek redress against a public wrong and vindicate public interest.

c. Lastly, the Court finds it more important to rule on the merits of the novel issues imbued with public interest
presented before Us than to dismiss the case outright merely on technicality.

3. Whether Respondent is eligible for the position of Chief Justice. NO

a. Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination is the sole and exclusive function of the JBC
and whether such determination partakes of the character of a political question outside the Court’s supervisory
and review powers. NO

The Court’s supervisory authority over the JBC includes ensuring that the JBC complies with its own rules. In interpreting the
power of the Court vis-a-vis the power of the JBC, it is consistently held that the Court’s supervisory power consists of seeing
to it that the JBC complies with its own rules and procedures. Furthermore, while a certain leeway must be given to the JBC
in screening aspiring magistrates, the same does not give it an unbridled discretion to ignore Constitutional and legal
requirements. The question of whether or not a nominee possesses the requisite qualifications is determined based on facts
and therefore does not depend on, nor call for, the exercise of discretion on the part of the nominating body. Proceeding
from this, qualifications under the Constitution cannot be waived or bargained away by the JBC — one such qualification is
the requirement of possession of proven integrity required not only in the Constitution, but also mentioned in administrative
cases, in the Canons of the New Code of Judicial Conduct as a continuing requirement, the Code of Professional Integrity,
and in the JBC- 009 Rules.

b. Whether Respondent failed to file her SALNs as mandated by the Constitution and required by the law and its
implementing rules and regulations; and if so, whether the failure to file SALNs voids the nomination and
appointment of Respondent as Chief Justice. YES

Compliance with the Constitutional and statutory requirement of filing of SALN intimately relates to a person’s integrity.
Contrary to Respondent’s postulation that the filing of SALN bears no relation to the requirement of integrity, the filing of
SALN itself is a Constitutional and statutory requirement, under Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution, R.A. No. 3019, and
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Faithful compliance with the requirement of
the filing of SALN is rendered even more exacting when the public official concerned is a member of the Judiciary.

Compliance with the SALN requirement indubitably reflects on a person’s integrity. To be of proven integrity, as required by
qualifications under the Constitution, means that the applicant must have established a steadfast adherence to moral and
ethical principles. In this line, failure to file the SALN is clearly a violation of the law. The offense is penal in character and is a
clear breach of the ethical standards set for public officials and employees. It disregards the requirement of transparency
as a deterrent to graft and corruption. For these reasons, a public official who has failed to comply with the requirement of
filing the SALN cannot be said to be of proven integrity and the Court may consider him/her disqualified from holding public
office.

Respondent’s argument that failure to file SALN does not negate integrity does not persuade. Whether or not Respondent
accumulated unexplained wealth is not in issue at this time, but whether she, in the first place, complied with the
mandatory requirement of filing of SALNs.
Respondent chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the Constitution, the law and the Code of Judicial Conduct.
A member of the Judiciary who commits such violations cannot be deemed to be a person of proven integrity. Respondent
could have easily dispelled doubts as to the filing or non-filing of the unaccounted SALNs by presenting them before the
Court. Yet, Respondent opted to withhold such information or such evidence, if at all, for no clear reason. Her defenses do
not lie: 1) The Doblada doctrine does not persuade because in that case Doblada was able to present contrary proof that
the missing SALNs were, in fact, transmitted to the OCA, thus rendering inaccurate the OCA report that she did not file
SALNs for a number of years, as opposed to the present case where no proof of existence and filing were presented; 2)
Being on leave from government service is not equivalent to separation from service such that she was still required to
submit SALNs during her leave; 3) While Respondent is not required by law to keep a record of her SALNs, logic dictates that
she should have obtained a certification to attest to the fact of filing; 4) That UP HRDO never asked Respondent to comply
with the SALN laws holds no water as the duty to comply with such is incumbent with the Respondent, and because there
was no duty for the UP HRDO to order compliance under the rules implemented at that time; 5) That Respondent’s
compliance with the SALN requirement was reflected in the matrix of requirements and shortlist prepared by the JBC is
dispelled by the fact that the appointment goes into her qualifications which were mistakenly believed to be present, and
that she should have been disqualified at the outset.

Respondent failed to properly and promptly file her SALNs, again in violation of the Constitutional and statutory
requirements. The SALNs filed by Respondent covering her years of government service in U.P. appear to have been
executed and filed under suspicious circumstances; her SALNs filed with the UPHRDO were either belatedly filed or belatedly
notarized, while SALNs filed as Chief Justice were also attended by irregularities. This puts in question the truthfulness of such
SALNs, and would amount to dishonesty if attended by malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements.

c. Whether Respondent failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as required by the JBC; and if so, whether the
failure to submit SALNs to the JBC voids the nomination and appointment of Respondent as Chief Justice. YES

The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those applicants who are incumbent Associate Justices, absent
which, the applicant ought not to have been interviewed, much less been considered for nomination. The established and
undisputed fact is Respondent failed to submit the required number of SALNs in violation of the rules set by the JBC itself
during the process of nomination. The JBC determined that she did not submit her SALNs from 1986 to 2006 and that, as
remarked by Senator Escudero, the filing thereof during those years was already required. There was no indication that the
JBC deemed the three SALNs (for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011) submitted by Respondent for her 20 years as a professor in
the U.P. College of Law and two years as Justice, as substantial compliance. Respondent was specifically singled out from
the rest of the applicants for having failed to submit a single piece of SALN for her years of service in the U.P. College of
Law.

In the end, it appears that the JBC En Banc decided to require only the submission of the past ten (10) SALNs, or from 2001-
2011, for applicants to the Chief Justice position. It is clear that the JBC En Banc did not do away with the requirement of
submission of SALNs, only that substantial compliance therewith, i.e., the submission of the SALNs for the immediately
preceding 10 years instead of all SALNs, was deemed sufficient. Records clearly show that the only remaining applicant-
incumbent Justice who was not determined by the JBC En Banc to have substantially complied was Respondent, who
submitted only three SALNs, i.e., 2009, 2010 and 2011, even after extensions of the deadline for the submission to do so. Her
justifications do not persuade. Contrary to her argument that the SALNs are old and are infeasible to retrieve, the Republic
was able to retrieve some of the SALNs dating back to 1985.

Furthermore, Respondent sought special treatment as having complied with the submission of the SALN by submitting a
Certificate of Clearance issued by the U.P. HRDO. This clearance, however, hardly suffice as a substitute for SALNs.

Respondent curiously failed to mention that she, in fact, did not file several SALNs during the course of her employment in
U.P. Such failure to disclose a material fact and the concealment thereof from the JBC betrays any claim of integrity
especially from a Member of the Supreme Court.

For these reasons, the JBC should no longer have considered Respondent for interview as it already required the submission
of, at least, the SALNs corresponding to the immediately preceding 10 years up to December 31, 2011.

Respondent’s failure to submit to the JBC her SALNs for several years means that her integrity was not established at the time
of her application. Contrary to Respondent’s argument that failure to submit her SALNs to the JBC is not cause for
disqualification, the requirement to submit the SALNs, along with the waiver of bank deposits, is not an empty requirement
that may easily be dispensed with, but was placed by the JBC itself for a reason — in order to allow the JBC to carry on its
mandate of recommending only applicants of high standards and who would be unsusceptible to impeachment attacks
due to inaccuracies in SALNs. Without submission of such requirement, the JBC and the public are without opportunity to
measure the candidate’s fitness or propensity to commit corruption or dishonesty. Respondent’s failure to submit her SALNs
to the JBC means that she was not able to prove her integrity at the time of her application as Chief Justice.

d. Whether the subsequent nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the President cured such ineligibility.

Respondent’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be cured by her nomination and subsequent appointment as
Chief Justice. As the qualification of proven integrity goes into the barest standards set forth under the Constitution to
qualify as a Member of the Court, the subsequent nomination and appointment to the position will not qualify an otherwise
excluded candidate. In other words, the inclusion of Respondent in the shortlist of nominees submitted to the President
cannot override the minimum Constitutional qualifications.

The Court has ample jurisdiction to void the JBC nomination without the necessity of impleading the JBC as the Court can
take judicial notice of the explanations from the JBC members and the Office of the Executive Officer (OEO), as regards the
circumstances relative to the selection and nomination of Respondent submitted to this Court. Neither will the President’s
act of appointment cause to qualify Respondent. The action of the JBC, particularly that of the Secretary of Justice as ex-
officio member, is reflective of the action of the President. Such as when the JBC mistakenly or wrongfully accepted and
nominated Respondent, the President, through his alter egos in the JBC, commits the same mistake and the President’s
subsequent act of appointing Respondent cannot have any curative effect.

While the Court surrenders discretionary appointing power to the President, the exercise of such discretion is subject to the
non-negotiable requirements that the appointee is qualified and all other legal requirements are satisfied, in the absence of
which, the appointment is susceptible to attack.

The Court also took into account, while conceding that the petition is not an administrative case nor an inquiry into tax
evasion against her, that Respondent’s disposition to commit deliberate acts and omissions demonstrating dishonesty and
lack of forthrightness are discordant with any claim of integrity. In addition to the suspicious and highly questionable
circumstances surrounding the execution of her SALNs, the following untruthful statements and dishonest acts ultimately
negate Respondent's claim that she is a person of proven integrity:

1. She engaged in private practice even if she had no permit from U.P. to do so while she was in government
service.
2. She represented that after her resignation from U.P. in 2006, she was engaged, full time, in private practice.
However, in her Personal Data Sheet (PDS), it was stated that she was engaged as counsel by the
government in the PIATCO cases from 1994 up to 2009.
3. She claims that it is the ministerial duty of the Head of the Office to ensure that the SALNs of its personnel
are properly filed and accomplished. However, U.P. HRDO could not have been expected to perform its
ministerial duty of issuing compliance orders to Respondent because such rule was not yet in existence at
that time.
4. Her PDS shows that she was Deputy Commissioner of the Commission on Human Rights only later to be
disclaimed by her during the Oral Argument stating that it was only a functional title.
5. In her Letter dated July 23, 2012 to the JBC, respondent represented that her SALNs were infeasible to
retrieve when the SALNs that she selectively filed were available all along in U.P. and in fact the OSG was
able to get copies of the same.
6. In the Letter, the Respondent reasoned that it is "infeasible to retrieve" all her SALNs because of the age of
said documents, i.e., that they are more than fifteen years old. However, during her Oral Arguments, she
explained that it was "infeasible" to retrieve them only because of time constraints.
7. She claims that the other candidates for the Chief Justice position did not comply with the SALN
requirement for the application, when it was only she who did not comply.
8. She committed tax fraud when she failed to truthfully declare her income in her income tax returns for the
years 2007-2009 and in her value-added tax (VAT) returns for the years 2005-2009.

Further, Respondent's disposition and propensity to commit dishonesty and lack of candidness are manifested through her
subsequent acts committed during her incumbency as Chief Justice, which are now matters of public

1. Caused the procurement of a brand-new Toyota Land Cruiser worth at least Php5,000,000.00;
2. Caused the hiring of Ms. Helen Macasaet without the requisite public bidding and who received excessive
compensation amounting to more than Php 11,000,000.00;
3. Misused at least Php3,000,000.00 of government funds for hotel accommodation at Shangri-La Boracay as
the venue of the 3rd ASEAN Chief Justices meeting;
4. Created the Judiciary Decentralized Office (JDO) in the guise of reopening the Regional Court
Administration Office (RCAO) without being sanctioned by the Court En Banc;
5. Issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) in Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines v.
COMELEC contrary to the Supreme Court's internal rules misrepresented that the TRO was issued upon the
recommendation of the Member-in- charge;
6. Manipulated the disposition of the DOJ request to transfer the venue of the Maute cases outside of
Mindanao;
7. Ignored rulings of the Supreme Court with respect to the grant of survivorship benefits which caused undue
delay to the release of survivorship benefits to spouses of deceased judges and Justices;
8. Appointed Geraldine Econg as Head of the JDO and Brenda Jay Angeles-Mendoza as Chief of the
Philippine Mediation Center Office (PMCO) without the approval of the Court En Banc;
9. Failed and refused to appoint qualified applicants to several high- ranking positions in the Supreme Court;
10. Ordered the dissemination of erroneous information on what transpired during the Supreme Court En Banc
deliberations in A.M. No. 16-08-04-SC on the alleged involvement of four (4) incumbent judges in illegal
drugs and undermined the co-equal power of the Executive Department by ordering the Executive
Secretary himself to file cases against the judges;
11. Manipulated the processes of the JBC to exclude then Solicitor General, now Associate Justice Francis
Jardeleza, by using highly confidential document involving national security against the latter;
12. Clustered the nominees for the six (6) vacant positions of Associate Justice in the Sandiganbayan without
legal basis and in so doing, impaired the power of the President to appoint members of the Judiciary;
13. Misrepresented to the members of the Supreme Court En Banc that there were Justices who requested to
do away with the voting of recommended applicants to the vacant positions in the Supreme Court;
14. Manipulated the processes .of the JBC to exclude Court of Appeals Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas-
Peralta from the shortlist of nominees for the position of Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals;
15. Interfered with the investigation conducted by the House of Representatives on the alleged misuse of the
tobacco funds in the Province ofllocos Norte by unilaterally preparing a Joint Statement, asking the House
of Representatives to reconsider its show cause order against the Justices of the Court of Appeals, and
then pressuring then Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, now Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. to
likewise sign the same; and
16. Undermined and disrespected the impeachment proceedings conducted by the House of Representatives
against her.
4. Whether Respondent is a de jure or de facto officer. DE FACTO

The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is ineligible therefor is that his presumably valid appointment will
give him color of title that confers on him the status of a de facto officer. For lack of a Constitutional qualification,
Respondent is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice and is merely holding a colorable right or title thereto. As such,
Respondent has never attained the status of an impeachable official and her removal from the office, other than by
impeachment, is justified. The remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at the instance of the State is proper to oust
Respondent from the appointive position of Chief Justice.

Upon a finding that Respondent is in fact ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice and is therefore unlawfully holding
and exercising such public office, the consequent judgment under Section 9, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court is the ouster and
exclusion of Respondent from holding and exercising the rights, functions and duties of the Office of the Chief Justice.

Blatant Disregard and Open Defiance of the Sub Judice Rule:

The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the
issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice.

It is thus perturbing that certain officials of the separate branches of the Government and even men and women learned in
law had succumbed to the tempting affray that tends to divert the instant quo warranto action from its primary purpose.
Even worse, Respondent and her spokespersons chose to litigate Respondent's case, apart from her Ad Cautelam
submissions to the Court, before several media-covered engagements. Through her actuations, Respondent appears to
have forgotten that this is a court action for quo warranto, and as such, the concomitant rule on sub judice applies.

Such actions, indeed, resulted in the obfuscation of the issues on hand, camouflaging the charges against her with assaults
to judicial independence, and falsely conditioning the public's mind that this is a fight for democracy. Once and for all, it
should be stated that this is not a fight for democracy nor for judicial independence. This is an undertaking of the Court's
duty, as it is called for by the Republic, to judicially determine and settle the uncertainty in the qualification, or otherwise, of
Respondent to occupy the highest position in the Judiciary.

Fallo:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo warranto is GRANTED. Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED from
and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY HOLDING and EXERCISING the OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly,
Respondent Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno is OUSTED and EXCLUDED therefrom.

The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared vacant and the Judicial and Bar Council is directed to
commence the application and nomination process.

This Decision is immediately executory without need of further action from the Court.

Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from receipt hereof why she should
not be sanctioned for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct for transgressing
the sub judice rule and for casting aspersions and ill motives to the Members of the Supreme Court.