Paideusis, Volume 18 (2009), No. 2, pp.

19-27

Hermeneutics and Phenomenology Problems

When Applying Hermeneutic Phenomenological
Method in Educational Qualitative Research

LEENA KAKKORI
University of Jyväskylä, Finland

Hermeneutic phenomenology is a research method used in qualitative research in the fields of education and
other human sciences, for example nursing science. It is a widely used method example in Scandinavia, and
Van Manen is well known for his hermeneutic phenomenological method. In many studies the hermeneu-
tic phenomenological method is inarticulate or ambiguous. Researchers generally lack a common under-
standing of what this method actually is. One reason for that is that the expression “hermeneutic pheno-
menological method” is contradiction in terms. Hermeneutics and phenomenology have their own distinct
history. Hermeneutics and phenomenology as philosophical disciplines have their own distinct aims and
orientations. Hermeneutic is orientated to historical and relative meanings. Phenomenology in Husserlian
sense is orientated to universal and absolute essences. Martin Heidegger connects hermeneutics and phe-
nomenology in very sophisticated manner as hermeneutical phenomenology and he provides a very specific
definition of his brand of phenomenology. For Heidegger, hermeneutical phenomenology is the research of
the meaning of the Being as a fundamental ontology. However, this kind of phenomenology is of no use for
educational qualitative research.

Introduction
Phenomenology is usually described as studying the essence, and hermeneutics as studying the
processes of interpretation. There is a link between hermeneutics and phenomenology, but it is very
complicated and there are unsurpassable differences (Ricoeur, 2008, pp. 23-50). The father of modern
phenomenology is the German philosopher Edmund Husserl. Hans-Georg Gadamer is known as the
founder of philosophical hermeneutics. Martin Heidegger serves as the link between Husserl’s phe-
nomenology and Gadamer’s hermeneutics. Heidegger was a student of Husserl’s and Gadamer studied
under Heidegger. Their philosophies have a number of fundamental differences. There are also a num-
ber of other significant phenomenologists, such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty (2006)
claims that we are our bodies and that our lived experience of this body denies the detachment of sub-
ject from object.
In the 1970s and 1980s, Amadeo Giorgi (1985), Donald Polkinghorne (1976) and Max van Manen
(1984, 1989, 1990), among others, began promoting the use of phenomenological qualitative methods
in psychological and educational research. Their introduction of the phenomenological approach to the
sphere of empirical research in the human sciences was avant garde, and their merits are undisputable.

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20 Paideusis

Van Manen is the most famous of the three in the field of educational research. Van Manen is known
primarily for his concept of lived experience and his hermeneutic-phenomenological method. I agree
with Max van Manen that not all educational scientists and researchers have to be philosophers, even if
they do use hermeneutic-phenomenological methodology (van Manen, 1990, pp. 7-8). However, if we
do not know what we mean by using this methodology, we are in serious trouble. Many educational
researchers use the phrase “hermeneutic-phenomenological approach” without knowing the philosoph-
ical traditions of phenomenology and hermeneutics.
I would suggest that there is an inherent contradiction or tension between Husserlian phenome-
nology and Gadamerian hermeneutics. The goal of this article is to further highlight and explore this
contradiction. This tension can be explained briefly as follows: phenomenology is concerned with find-
ing the essence of the things, whereas hermeneutics sees that everything has its being in language and
interpretation.
On the basis of Husserl’s phenomenology, Aloys Fisher and Rudolf Lochener have developed a
school of thought referred to as “descriptive pedagogy.” Fisher attempted to construct education on
the basis of the notion of so-called unpreconditioned education, as well as that of the possibility of
producing a pure description of educational actuality. Descriptive pedagogy quite quickly separated
itself from Husserl’s phenomenology and was further developed by Lochner into positivistic value-free
education (Siljander, 1991, p. 2).
In Researching Lived Experience, Max van Manen develops the hermeneutic-phenomenological ap-
proach into research method. He defines hermeneutics and phenomenology as human science ap-
proaches which are rooted in philosophy, which is why it is imperative that one know something of
these philosophic traditions before attempting to use them. He emphasizes that this does not mean,
though, that one must actually become a professional philosopher in order to use them, but, rather, it is
sufficient to be able to articulate the epistemological or theoretical implications of doing phenomenolo-
gy and hermeneutics (van Manen, 1990, pp. 8-9).

What is Phenomenology?
The question of what actually constitutes phenomenology is problematic. One way to approach the
subject is to examine it in the context of the so-called phenomenological movement, which itself has
had difficulty defining the premises of phenomenology (Spiegelberg, 1984). Another way is by under-
standing phenomenology as a discipline that has its own sphere, which is consciousness or experience.
The main figure associated with the discipline is Edmund Husserl, who is the founding father of pure
phenomenology.
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) developed the concept of phenomenology as a new method des-
tined to supply a new foundation for both philosophy and science. He developed his concept of phe-
nomenology gradually and reformulated and reconceptualised it up until the very end of his life. We can
find at least three kinds of phenomenology, all of which Husserl himself practiced at some point in is
his philosophy. Husserl’s phenomenology began as a purely descriptive science and only later became a
theoretical or “transcendental” one.

1. Descriptive phenomenology: going (only) as far as the eidetic reduction;

2. Transcendental phenomenology: including the transcendental reduction;
3. Genetic phenomenology: below everyday consciousness, to a more primitive level, out of
which everyday consciousness is constructed.

Husserl considered reduction as the basic method of philosophy and his most significant achievement.
He also admits that this is the most complicated and problematic aspect of phenomenology. Husserl’s
famous slogan is: “To the things themselves.” This slogan implies that we should take a fresh approach
 Leena Kakkori 21

to concretely experienced phenomena; an approach that is as free as possible from conceptual presup-
positions. His central aim was to “complete reforming of philosophy into a science grounded on an
absolute foundation” (Husserl, 1999, p.1). Husserl claims that: “We are the true positivists,” by which
he was referring to his aim to establish the rigorous science (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2007). The real
concern of phenomenology was clearly formulated for the first time in his Logos article, Philosophie als
strenge Wissenschaft (Husserl, 1965). In this article, Husserl wrestled with two unacceptable views: natural-
ism and historicism.
The basic method of all phenomenological investigation, which was developed by and indeed
became the life’s work of Husserl himself, is the “reduction.” The reduction is a methodological device
one must possess before being able to do phenomenology. To put it simply, it is the transition from an
ordinary, straightforward attitude (natural attitude) toward the world and the objects in it to reflective
attitude. The precise nature of the reduction remained an acute problem for Husserl, and he spent his
entire life trying to develop it. In the reduction, the existence of the world is between brackets. Husserl
attempted to find a pure starting point for his investigation in a manner similar to Descartes, who pre-
sented the famous notion that one can only be sure about his own thinking. Husserl had no doubt that
the world exists, but he wanted to eliminate all presuppositions. The tool Husserl used to remove all
presuppositions was the epoche (Greek: “withholding” or “suspension”). The epoche is originally a prin-
ciple of ancient Greek skepticism, but in Husserl's philosophy, it is used as a means of “bracketing” of
all commonsensical beliefs so that pure phenomenological description can proceed. The epoche was just
one of a series of reductions that Husserl proposed in order to ensure that he was not presupposing
anything. The phenomenological epoche or reduction works in two ways: it reduces our prejudices about
things and leads us back to the things themselves. By doing so, it allows us to overcome the natural and
gives us access to the rigorous science (Spiegelberg 1984, p. 119).
The first reduction is the phenomenological reduction, through which everything we take for
granted becomes a phenomenon: that which is known in and by consciousness. This phenomenological
reduction reverses man's direction from an orientation toward objects to consciousness. In other
words, the existence of the world becomes bracketed (Juntunen 1986, pp. 74-75).
The second reduction is the eidetic reduction. In it, various acts of consciousness must be made
accessible in such a way that their essences can be grasped. Husserl refers to this grasping as the We-
sensschau, the intuition of essences and essential structures. This intuition forms a multiplicity of varia-
tions of what is given, and while maintaining the multiplicity, one focuses attention on what remains
unchanged in it. In other words, the eidetic reduction is a method by which the philosopher moves
from the consciousness of individual and concrete objects to pure essences and thus achieves an intui-
tion of the eidos of a thing or a being (Juntunen, 1986 p.72; Natason, 1973, pp. 65-66).
The third reduction is the transcendental reduction, which is also referred to as the transcenden-
tal-phenomenological reduction. The transcendental reduction supposedly provides us with access to
“the transcendental ego,” or “pure consciousness,” within which everything that exists is an object.
Whatever is in the world exists only as an object of pure consciousness. The phenomenologist task thus
becomes to describe how this pure consciousness actually works. Phenomenology thus now becomes
the exploration and description of the realm of being, which is not accessible to empirical observation
but only to phenomenological description. Husserl had some rather strange views on the transcendental
ego, for example that it would remain in existence even if entire world were destroyed. (Juntunen 1986,
pp. 70-74.)
Husserl (1981) introduced the concept of the life-world in his unfinished work, The Crisis of Euro-
pean Science and Transcendental Phenomenology. This is one of Husserl’s best-known concepts, and it is used
as the point of departure in the application of Husserlian phenomenology to the human sciences. This
concept is extremely interesting yet somewhat unclear (Derrida 2008, 141-143). Earlier, phenomenolog-
ical reflection had aimed at providing the foundations of scientific knowledge by reflecting on it, which
was only possible by giving up of the natural attitude. This raises the question: What is the relation
between the natural attitude and the lifeworld (see Zahavi, 2003 and Carr, 1981, pp. xxxviii – hl)?
22 Paideusis

Heidegger and Phenomenology as a Question of the Meaning of Being

Martin Heidegger was Husserl’s most well-known student. He redefined phenomenology and became
one of the major philosophers of the 20th century. Heidegger reiterated the importance of Husserl’s
work to his own philosophy: “The following investigation would have not been possible if the ground
had not been prepared by Edmund Husserl” (Heidegger, 1992, p. 62). For Heidegger, phenomenology
has just one task: to ask and clarify the core question of philosophy, the question of being. Heidegger
writes at the beginning of Being and Time that he only intends to present a preliminary explanation of the
conception of phenomenology. When we understand phenomenology in the context of the question of
being, it is the science of the being of entities, ontology. This same argument can be found in The Basic
Problems of Phenomenology: “Phenomenology is the name for the method of ontology” (Heidegger, 1988,
p. 20).
Heidegger argues that the investigation of the meaning of being requires Dasein, which is a spe-
cific aspect of the concept of human being. Dasein is an ontological-ontic entity, which means that
Dasein is a being that has the ability to question its own Being. This is the starting point of Heidegge-
rian hermeneutics, because he sees the phenomenology of Dasein as being hermeneutic in the primor-
dial sense of the word. Dasein’s ability to question its own being is the core of Heideggerian hermeneu-
tics. Heidegger makes no distinction between ontology and phenomenology, because both question the
meaning of Being. What phenomenology actually is remains vague, as Heidegger’s discussion of phe-
nomenology in Being and Time is quite brief. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology is not much help, as the
entire field of philosophy can be seen as phenomenology: “’Phenomenology’ is the name for the me-
thod of scientific philosophy in general” (Heidegger, 1988, p. 3).
In The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger presents three components of phenomenological
method: reduction, construction and destruction. In my presentation, I focus exclusively on the term
“reduction” because it originates from Husserl’s phenomenology. For Husserl, phenomenological re-
duction is the method of leading phenomenological vision from the natural attitude of human being
back to the transcendental life of consciousness, in which objects are constituted as correlates of con-
sciousness. For Heidegger, “Phenomenological reduction means leading phenomenological vision back
from the apprehension of being … to the understanding of the being of this being” (Heidegger, 1988,
p. 1). Heidegger’s main argument is that the question of being has either been forgotten altogether or
changed into the question of being as an entity. Being (Sein) is always the being of beings (Seiende), and
Heidegger sees the accession to Being only possible through some beings. For Heidegger, the pheno-
menological reduction is this transition from beings to Being. The other two components of the phe-
nomenological method, construction and destruction, serve the question of being in their own way
(Heidegger, 1988, pp. 21-23).

What is Hermeneutics?
The most common definition of hermeneutics is that it is the art of interpretation. Today there are a
number of different kinds of hermeneutics, from the exegesis of the Bible to radical hermeneutics as
philosophical theory. We can identify six modern definitions of hermeneutics which correspond to six
historical stages, which can be found also from Richard Palmer and Paul Ricoeur, among others, in
some form (Ricoeur, 2008, pp. 53-71, Palmer, 1969, p. 33):

1. The theory of biblical exegesis,

2. General philological methodology,
3. The science of linguistic understanding,
4. The methodological foundation of Geisteswissensaften (human science)
 Leena Kakkori 23

5. Phenomenology of existence and of existential understanding

6. The system of interpretation.

These definitions are not only historical stages, however, as each of them applies different standpoints
and approaches to the problems of hermeneutics. According to Richard Palmer, the very content of
hermeneutics itself tends to be reshaped according to these changes in standpoint:

1. Hermeneutics is probably most commonly understood as an exegesis. Exegesis refers to the in-
terpretation of Holy Scripture, such as the Old and New Testaments of the Bible, the Talmud, the Koran, etc.
Exegesis as a technical term means "to draw the meaning out of" a given text. The opposite of exegesis
is eisegesis, which means to read one's own interpretation into a given text. Exegesis can thus be said to
mean the research technique we use to find the inherent meaning of a text we read, i.e. what the writer
or person speaking actually said? In the context of Christianity, exegesis thus refers to what God really
said in the Bible. Hermeneutics started as biblical exegesis, but according to Ricoeur (2008), believers
today recognize the hermeneutical constitution of biblical faith and that way avoid the psychologizing
reduction of faith. (See Palmer, 1969, pp. 32-34.)
2. Friedrich August Wolf (1759-1824) and Friedrich Ast (1778-1841) are the two important phi-
lologists who expanded the conception of hermeneutics from strictly biblical exegesis to the study of
the meaning of other texts as well. We can already identify some of the basic conceptions of hermeneu-
tics in Ast’s thought, for example the hermeneutic circle and the relation of the part to the whole. Wolf
emphasizes the meaning of historical knowledge and the idea that the interpreter should possess as
much historical knowledge as possible. He also saw hermeneutics as inevitably having two sides: it al-
ways includes the components of understanding (verstehen) and explaining (erklären). (See Palmer, 1969,
pp. 78-82.)
3. For Schleiermacher (1768-1834), hermeneutics as the Science of linguistic understanding re-
fers to “general hermeneutics”, whose principles can serve as the foundation for all kinds of textual
interpretation (Ricoeur 2008, pp. 51-52, Gallagher 1992, pp. 332-333). Schleiermacher draws a clear
distinction between speaking and understanding, which thus propels hermeneutics in a new direction as
it becomes the art of understanding. The understanding always comes in the form of a dialogical rela-
tionship. There is a speaker and a hearer, and hearer mysteriously understands what the speaker is say-
ing. Hermeneutics is thus the art of hearing. The dialectical interaction between the whole and the part
in which each gives the other meaning is the hermeneutic circle. The goal of this circle is to understand
the mental process or true meaning of the speaker/writer. According to Schleiermacher, we must leap
into the centre of this hermeneutical circle in order to grasp the whole before we can understand the
parts and vice versa. The significance of Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics is that hermeneutics is no long-
er seen exclusively as a special disciplinary matter belonging, for example, to theology or literature, but
as the art of understanding any utterance of language. (See Palmer, 1967, pp. 90-92.)
4. Wilhelm Dilthey’s (1833-1911) goal was to formulate a truly humanistic methodology for the
Geisteswissensaften, and he saw hermeneutics as being the core discipline for all the Geisteswissenschaten. The
Geisteswissenschaften encompasses all those sciences which concern the understanding of man’s activi-
ty. He wanted to develop as adequate method for the human sciences as those which existed for the
natural sciences (Dilthey 1924): “We explain the nature but understand the human being.” Dilthey’s
idea that understanding is circular and historical is of central importance to hermeneutics. There is no
true starting point for understanding, since every part of the process of understanding presupposes the
next and the one before. Dilthey was also laying the foundations for twentieth-century phenomenology
by introducing the term Erlebnis. In English, there are no single words for Erlebnis and Erfahrung, which
are key terms for both hermeneutics and phenomenology. Erlebnis is translated as “lived experience,” a
term which is often used in hermeneutic-phenomenological research. For Dilthey, Erlebnis it is part of
his hermeneutics. Dilthey defines an Erlebnis, or “lived experience,” as follows:
24 Paideusis

That which in the stream of time forms a unity in the present because it has a unitary meaning
is the smallest entity which we can designate as an experience. Going further, one may call each
encompassing unity of parts of life bound together through a common meaning for the course
of life an “experience”—even when the several parts are separated from each other by inter-
rupting events. (Dilthey, GS VII, p. 194) (See Palmer, 1967, p. 107.)

An experience forms a unity of meaning and is the act itself. As such, experience is not so much a mat-
ter of content as an act of consciousness. The experience exists prior to the subject-object separation.
Erlebnis as an experience represents the kind of direct contact with life which we may refer to as “im-
mediate lived experience.” Experience is also intrinsically temporal and historical, which is why it is
constantly changing. This means that we can only understand the present in the horizon of the past and
the future (Palmer, 1967, pp. 190-191; Ricouer, 2008, pp. 56-61).
5. The two proponents of hermeneutics as the phenomenology of Dasein and existential under-
standing are Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer. Martin Heidegger explains the term herme-
neutics in his later writings as follows:

The expression ‘hermeneutics’ derives from Greek verb hermeneuein. That verb is related to the
noun hermeneus, which is referable to the name of the God Hermes by a playful thinking that is
more compelling than the rigor science. Hermes is the divine messenger. He brings the message
of destiny; hermeneuein is that exposition which brings tiding because it can listen to a message.
Such exposition becomes an interpretation of what has been said earlier by poets who, accord-
ing to Socrates in Plato’s Ion, hermenes eisin ton theon – “are interpreters of gods…. All this makes
it clear that hermeneutics mean not just the interpretation but, even before it, the bearing of
message. (Heidegger, 1982, p. 29)

Heidegger presents the hermeneutics of Dasein in his major work, Being and Time. This hermeneutics
refers neither to science or the rules of textual interpretation nor to the methodology of the Geisteswis-
senschaften, but to the phenomenological analysis of Dasein. His main goal is not to prove that there is a
hermeneutic circle, but to show the significance of this circular understanding to the ontology.
Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) was a student of Heidegger’s who developed his own philo-
sophical hermeneutics, which owes quite a bit to earlier hermeneutics in general and to Heidegger in
particular. Gadamer, however, takes his hermeneutics one step further with his controversial assertion
that: “Being that can be understood is language” (Gadamer, 1976, p. 31 and p. 103; 1989, p. 474). Her-
meneutics has thus encountered the positively philosophical question of the relationship of language to
being, understanding, existence, and reality. Hermeneutics is placed at the very core of these philosoph-
ical problems, as it was now forced to deal with epistemological and ontological questions.
One of the most significant concepts of Gadamer’s hermeneutics is hermeneutic experience,
which I will clarify in detail. Gadamer uses the word Ehrfahrung in the sense of its being hermeneutic
experience, while Erlebnis is used sense of its being an experience adding nothing new to the concept. A
good story—for example, an autobiography—widens our worldview. Gadamer refers to this kind of
experience as ‘hermeneutic’ or ‘dialectic’ experience. Hermeneutic experience broadens our horizon and
enables us to see something differently than we had in the past. Experience in this hermeneutic sense is
always a negation. It is related to what Hegel has referred to with the term “determinate negation.” It is
not the simple rejection of an earlier view, but the preservative overcoming of it with a new and wider
view (Gadamer, 1998):

(…) we use the word ‘experience’ in two different senses: the experience that conform to our
expectation and confirm it and the new experiences that occur to us. This latter—‘experience’
in the genuine sense—is always negative. If a new experience of an object occurs to us, this
means that hitherto we have not seen the thing correctly and now know it better. The negativity
of experience has a curiously productive meaning. It is not simply that we see through a decep-
tion and hence make a correction, but we acquire a comprehensive knowledge. We cannot,
 Leena Kakkori 25

therefore, have a new experience of any object at random, but it must be such a nature that we
gain better knowledge through it, not only of itself, but of what we thought we knew before –
i.e., of a universal. The negation by means of which it achieves this is a determinate negation.
We call this kind of experience dialectical. (p. 353)

In this hermeneutic sense, we cannot have the same experience twice. Experience in the trivial
sense of the word means repetitive experiences (Erlebnis), experiences that confirm our previous under-
standing of something?. We need these confirmative experiences, of course, although we do not learn
anything new from them. Trivial experiences do not make us more "experienced" in the Gadamerian
sense (Erfahrener). According to Gadamer, experienced persons are individuals who have experienced
genuine experiences which have broadened their horizon. After a series of genuine experiences, a per-
son has turned her attention to the nature of the event of this experience and has become more aware
of her ability to attain genuine experiences. This person is reflectively aware of her ability to learn new
things and broaden her perspective. “The experiencer has become aware of his experience; he is ‘expe-
rienced’. He has acquired a new horizon within something can become an experience for him” (Gada-
mer, 1998, p. 354). In educational literature, such a person is referred to as a “reflective learner.”
Thus, nothing ever appears the same again following a hermeneutic experience. We see ordinary
things ("ordinary things" in the former horizon, world view or paradigm) in a different light, and we
also become able to conceive of totally new entities. Our "world" undergoes a change, and we become
changed as people along with it.
6. Paul Ricoeur’s philosophy can be seen as representative of hermeneutics as a system of inter-
pretation. For Ricoeur, hermeneutics is the theory of the rules that govern an exegesis, an interpretation
of a particular text. The text is understood very widely. A text can be group of signs, symbols of
dreams, symbols or myths of literature etc.. For Ricoeur, hermeneutics is the system by which the dee-
per significance of a given text is revealed. He stresses, however, that there can be no universal canons
for exegesis, but only separate end opposing theories concerning the rules of interpretation. (see Ri-
coeur, 1976, 1990, 2008).
There are several philosophers whose philosophy can either be called hermeneutics or seen as
having contributed something to the field of hermeneutics, such as Karl-Otto Apel, Emilio Betti, Ru-
dolf Bultman, Jürgen Habermas and Gianni Vattimo. Unfortunately, for the sake of brevity, I am only
able to mention them here.

Phenomenology, Hermeneutics and Science of Education

In his book, van Manen offers a fruitful description of hermeneutic phenomenological reflection and
hermeneutic phenomenological writing. He describes that “the purpose of the phenomenological ref-
lection is to try to grasp the essential meaning of something” (van Manen, 1990, p. 77). He defines his
method thusly: “The phenomenological method consist of the ability, or rather the art of being sensi-
tive – sensitive to the subtle undertones of language, in the way language speaks when it allows the
thing themselves to speak.” (van Manen 1990, 111). He gives a very elegant demonstration both her-
meneutic phenomenological reflection and hermeneutic phenomenological writing, which have influ-
enced countless studies. But there are still inherent theoretical problems and contradictions between
hermeneutics and phenomenology in his argumentations. He uses the entire inheritance of phenome-
nology without distinguishing between the different types of phenomenology or phenomenological
movements. And there is a serious problem with his interpretation of Husserl’s lifeworld, which is the
key term of his phenomenology. He argues that the lifeworld is the world of the natural attitude of
everyday life. He is mistaken in confusing the natural attitude with the lifeworld, because the natural
attitude, as discussed above, is the target of bracketing in Husserl’s reductions (van Manen, 1990, p. 7).
This term is central to van Manen’s work and is also connected to Dilthey’s Erlebnis, or lived expe-
26 Paideusis

rience, which brings us to yet another problem. In Gadamerian hermeneutics, it is Erfahrung as opposed
to Erlebnis that refers to real experiences. Heidegger, too, sees Erlebnis as representing the state of the
possible death of art, whereas the experience of Erfahrung is the key to understanding both language and
art (Heidegger, 2002, p. 50). Yet another problem is the actual results of hermeneutic-
phenomenological research. If we understand it as revealing certain essences of experience, as tradition-
al phenomenology suggest, we must begin by asking what we mean by the term essence. Van Manen
sees the meaning of phenomenon and the essence of phenomenon as synonymous, which is something
I find quite problematic(van Manen, 1990, p. 78). Earlier in his book, van Manen agrees with Husserl
and Merleau-Ponty that the essence of a phenomenon is universal, something which makes a thing
what it is (van Manen, 1990, p. 10). Modern hermeneutics neither recognizes nor aims at recognizing
this kind of universal essence. Hermeneutics is concerned with the understanding and interpretation of
our being in the world and how our different ways of being in the world are connected to our under-
standing of things. Van Manen would seem to agree, because later in his book he writes that “The term
‘essence’ may be understood as a linguistic construction, a description of phenomenon” (van Manen,
1990, p. 39). Here van Manen comes close to a narrative and constructive way of thinking.
Perhaps I have been too harsh on van Manen. Perhaps we should thank him for highlighting the
most important problems of the so-called hermeneutic-phenomenological research method. I have to
wonder, for example, why it is not enough to just do the phenomenological research or hermeneutical
research. van Manen himself does no mention to hermeneutics at all in his article Phenomenological Peda-
gogy and the Question of Meaning (1996). Although they do have a lot to offer one another, my argument is
that there are significant fundamental differences between them. It is not enough to say that phenome-
nological research eventually becomes hermeneutic-phenomenological research simply because we
always understand and interpret things. And again, for the sake of brevity, I have chosen not to focus
here on yet another very big issue, namely the question of the truth. The question of the truth is con-
nected to the question of essence and the whole idea of human research in general. My argument is that
hermeneutics and phenomenology have given and will continue to contribute a great deal to the re-
search of education and the human sciences. Nevertheless, researchers must educate themselves about
both hermeneutics and phenomenology and reflect possible tension between them.

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About the Author

In 2001 Leena Kakkori has defended her doctoral thesis on Martin Heidegger at the University of
Jyväskylä, Finland. She has been working as a senior assistant and lecturer of philosophy at the Univer-
sity of Jyväskylä.