VOL.

338, AUGUST 22, 2000 393

Malang vs. Moson
*
G.R. No. 119064. August 22, 2000.
NENG “KAGUI KADIGUIA” MALANG, petitioner, vs.
HON. COROCOY MOSON, Presiding Judge of 5th
Shari’a District Court, Cotabato City, HADJI
MOHAMMAD ULYSSIS MALANG, HADJI ISMAEL
MALINDATU MALANG, FATIMA MALANG,
DATULNA MALANG, LAWANBAI MALANG,
JUBAIDA KADO MALANG, NAYO OMAL MALANG
and MABAY GANAP MALANG, respondents.
Code of Muslim Personal Laws (P.D. 1083); Civil
Registry; Traditionally, Muslims do not register acts, events
or judicial decrees affecting civil status.—Resolution of the
instant case is made more difficult by the fact that very few
of the pertinent dates of birth, death, marriage and divorce
are established by the record. This is because, traditionally,
Muslims do not register acts, events or judicial decrees
affecting civil status. It also explains why the evidence in the
instant case consisted substantially of oral testimonies.
Same; Actions; Remand of Cases; The Court has
concluded that the record of the case is simply inadequate for
purposes of arriving at a fair and complete resolution of the
petition, and justice and accountability dictate a remand.—
Proceeding upon the foregoing, the Court has concluded that
the record of the case is simply inadequate for purposes of
arriving at a fair and complete resolution of the petition. To
our mind, any attempt at this point to dispense with the
basic issue given the scantiness of the evidence before us
could result in grave injustice to the parties in this case, as
well as cast profound implications on Muslim families
similarly or analogously situated to the parties herein.
Justice and accountability dictate a remand; trial must
reopen in order to supply the factual gaps or, in
Congressman Mastura’s words, “missing links,” that would
be the bases for judgment and accordingly, allow respondent
court to resolve the instant case. In ordering thus, however,
we take it as an imperative on our part to set out certain
guidelines in the interpretation and application of pertinent
laws to facilitate the task of respondent court.
 Same; Marriage; Civil Code; Muslim marriages
celebrated prior to the enactment of the Muslim Code (P.D.
1083) are governed by the Civil Code.—The time frame in
which all eight marriages of Hadji Abdula were
_____________
* EN BANC.
394
394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Malang vs. Moson
celebrated was during the effectivity of the Civil Code which,
accordingly, governs the marriages. Article 78 of the Civil
Code recognized the right of Muslims to contract marriage in
accordance with their customs and rites, by providing that x
x x Notably, before the expiration of the thirty-year period
after which Muslims are enjoined to solemnize their
marriages in accordance with the Civil Code, P.D. 1083 or
the Muslim Code was passed into law. The enactment of the
Muslim Code on February 4, 1977 rendered nugatory the
second paragraph of Article 78 of the Civil Code which
provides that marriages between Muslims thirty years after
the approval of the Civil Code shall be solemnized in
accordance with said Code.
Same; Same; Same; Prior to the enactment of P.D. 1083,
there was no law in this jurisdiction which sanctioned
multiple marriages.—Prior to the enactment of P.D. 1083,
there was no law in this jurisdiction which sanctioned
multiple marriages. It is also not to be disputed that the only
law in force governing marriage relations between Muslims
and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950.
Same; Same; Same; Admittedly an apparent antagonism
arises when it is contemplated that what the provisions of the
Civil Code contemplate and nurture is a monogamous
marriage.—Admittedly, an apparent antagonism arises when
we consider that what the provisions of the Civil Code
contemplate and nurture is a monogamous marriage.
“Bigamous or polygamous marriages” are considered void
and inexistent from the time of their performance. The
Family Code which superseded the Civil Code provisions on
marriage emphasizes that a subsequent marriage celebrated
before the registration of the judgment declaring a prior
marriage void shall likewise be void. These provisions
illustrate that the marital relation perceived by the Civil
Code is one that is monogamous, and that subsequent
marriages entered into by a person with others while the
first one is subsisting is by no means countenanced.
Same; Same; Same; Family Code; Since it is the Civil
Code which determines the validity of the marriages
contracted before P.D. 1083, it is the same Code that
determines and governs the property relations of the
marriages, and inasmuch as the Family Code makes
substantial amendments to the Civil Code provisions on
property relations, some of its provisions are also material,
particularly to property acquired from and after August 3,
1988.—This is the main issue presented by the instant
petition. In keeping with our holding that the validity of the
marriages in the instant case is determined by the Civil
Code, we hold that it is the same Code that determines and
governs the property relations of the marriages in this case,
for the reason that at the time of the celebration of the
marriages in
395
VOL. 338, AUGUST 22, 2000 395
Malang vs. Moson
question the Civil Code was the only law on marriage
relations, including property relations between spouses,
whether Muslim or non-Muslim. Inasmuch as the Family
Code makes substantial amendments to the Civil Code
provisions on property relations, some of its provisions are
also material, particularly to property acquired from and
after August 3, 1988. Which law would govern depends upon:
(1) when the marriages took place; (2) whether the parties
lived together as husband and wife; and (3) when and how
the subject properties were acquired.
Same; Same; Same; Co-Ownership; In a long line of
cases, the Supreme Court has interpreted the co-ownership
provided in Article 144 of the Civil Code to require that the
man and the woman living together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage
must not in any way be incapacitated to marry.—In a long
line of cases, this Court has interpreted the co-ownership
provided in Article 144 of the Civil Code to require that the
man and woman living together as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage must not in
any way be incapacitated to marry. Situating these rulings to
the instant case, therefore, the co-ownership contemplated in
Article 144 of the Civil Code cannot apply to Hadji Abdula’s
marriages celebrated subsequent to a valid and legally
existing marriage, since from the point of view of the Civil
Code Hadji Abdula is not capacitated to marry. However, the
wives in such marriages are not precluded from proving that
property acquired during their cohabitation with Hadji
Abdula is their exclusive property, respectively. Absent such
proof, however, the presumption is that property acquired
during the subsistence of a valid marriage—and in the Civil
Code, there can only be one validly existing marriage at any
given time—is conjugal property of such subsisting marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Family Code; While the Civil
Code merely requires that the parties “live together as
husband and wife” the Family Code in Article 147 specifies
that they “live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife.”—It will be noted that while the Civil Code merely
requires that the parties “live together as husband and wife”
the Family Code in Article 147 specifies that they “live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife.” Also, in
contrast to Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted by
jurisprudence, Article 148 of the Family Code allows for co-
ownership in cases of cohabitation where, for instance, one
party has a pre-existing valid marriage, provided that the
parties prove their “actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry” and only to the extent of their
proportionate interest therein. The rulings in Juaniza vs.
Jose, 89 SCRA 306, Camporodendo vs. Garcia, 102 Phil.
1055, and related cases are embodied in the second
paragraph of Article 148, which declares that
396
396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Malang vs. Moson
the share of the party validly married to another shall accrue
to the property regime of such existing marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Succession; Where a Muslim died
intestate in 1993, it is the Muslim Code which would
determine the identification of the heirs in the order of
intestate succession and the respective shares of the heirs,
while the status and capacity to succeed on the part of the
individual parties who entered into each and every marriage
ceremony will depend upon the law in force at the time of the
performance of the marriage rite, and those of the children
will depend upon the law in force at the time of the conception
or birth of the child.—Hadji Abdula died intestate on
December 16, 1993. Thus, it is the Muslim Code which
should determine the identification of the heirs in the order
of intestate succession and the respective shares of the heirs.
Meanwhile, the status and capacity to succeed on the part of
the individual parties who entered into each and every
marriage ceremony will depend upon the law in force at the
time of the performance of the marriage rite. The status and
capacity to succeed of the children will depend upon the law
in force at the time of conception or birth of the child. If the
child was conceived or born during the period covered by the
governance of the Civil Code, the Civil Code provisions on the
determination of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child
would appear to be in point, x x x If the child was conceived
or born during the period covered by the governance of the
Muslim Code, i.e., from February 4, 1977 up to the death of
Hadji Abdula on December 18, 1993, the Muslim Code
determines the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child.
Same; Same; Same; Divorce; A Muslim divorce under
R.A. 394 is valid if it took place from June 18, 1949 to June
13, 1969.—R.A. 394 authorized absolute divorce among
Muslims residing in non-Christian provinces, in accordance
with Muslim custom, for a period of 20 years from June 18,
1949 (the date of approval of R.A. 394) to June 13, 1969.
Thus, a Muslim divorce under R.A. 394 is valid if it took
place from June 18, 1949 to June 13, 1969.
Same; Same; Same; Courts; Customs; The Court is duty-
bound to resolve the instant case applying such laws and
rights as are in existence at the time the pertinent civil acts
took place, and is unable to supplant governing law with
customs, albeit widely observed.—Amicus curiae
Congressman Mastura agrees that since the marriage of
petitioner to decedent took place in 1972 the Civil Code is the
law applicable on the issue of marriage settlement, but
espouses that customs or established practices among
Muslims in Mindanao must also be applied with the force of
law to the instant case. Congressman Mastura’s disquisition
has proven ex-
397
VOL. 338, AUGUST 22, 2000 397
Malang vs. Moson
tremely helpful in impressing upon us the background in
which Islamic law and the Muslim Code need to be
interpreted, particularly the interconnectedness of law and
religion for Muslims and the impracticability of a strict
application of the Civil Code to plural marriages recognized
under Muslim law. Regrettably, the Court is duty-bound to
resolve the instant case applying such laws and rights as are
in existence at the time the pertinent civil acts took place.
Corollarily, we are unable to supplant governing law with
customs, albeit how widely observed. In the same manner,
we cannot supply a perceived hiatus in P.D. 1083 concerning
the distribution of property between divorced spouses upon
one of the spouses’ death.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.
Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Arnel S. Datukon for petitioner.
     Mama S. Dalandag for private respondents.
     Ricardo C. Puno and Michael O. Mastura, Amici
Curiae.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Presented for resolution in this special civil action of
certiorari is the issue of whether or not the regime of
conjugal partnership of gains governed the property
relationship of two Muslims who contracted marriage
prior to the effectivity of the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws of the Philippines (hereafter, “P.D. 1083” or
“Muslim Code”). The question is raised in connection
with the settlement of the estate, of the deceased
husband.
Hadji Abdula Malang, a Muslim, contracted
marriage with Aida (Kenanday) Limba. They begot
three sons named Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis, Hadji
Ismael Malindatu and Datulna, and a daughter named
Lawanbai. Hadji Abdula Malang was engaged in
farming, tilling the land that was Aida’s dowry (mahr
or majar). Thereafter, he bought a parcel of land in
Sousa, Cotabato. Hadji Abdula and Aida already had
two children when he married for the second time
another Muslim named Jubaida Kado in Kalumamis,
Talayan, Maguindanao. No child was born out of Hadji
Abdula’s second marriage. When Aida, the first wife,
was pregnant with their fourth child, Hadji Abdula
divorced her.
398
398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Malang vs. Moson
In 1965, Hadji Abdula married another Muslim, Nayo
H. Omar but they were childless. Thereafter, Hadji
Abdula contracted marriage with Hadji Mabai (Mabay)
H. Adziz in Kalumamis, Talayan, Maguindanao and
soon they had a daughter named Fatima (Kueng).
Hadji Abdula and Hadji Mabai stayed in that place to
farm while Hadji Abdula engaged in the business of
buying and selling of rice, corn and other agricultural
products. Not long after, Hadji Abdula married three
other Muslim women named Saaga, Mayumbai and
Sabai but he eventually divorced them.
Hadji Abdula then migrated to Tambunan where, in
1972, he married petitioner Neng “Kagui Kadiguia”
Malang, his fourth wife, excluding the wives he had
divorced. They established residence in Cotabato City
but they were childless. For a living, they relied on
farming and on the business of buying and selling of
agricultural products. Hadji Abdula acquired vast
tracts of land in Sousa and Talumanis, Cotabato City,
some of which were cultivated by tenants. He
deposited money in such banks as United Coconut
Planters Bank, Metrobank and Philippine Commercial
and Industrial Bank.
On December 18, 1993, while he was living with
petitioner in Cotabato City, Hadji Abdula died without
leaving a will. On January 21, 1994, petitioner filed
with the Shari’a District Court in Cotabato City a
petition for the settlement of his estate with a prayer
that letters of administration be issued in the name of
her niece, Tarhata Lauban.
Petitioner claimed in that petition that she was the
wife of Hadji Abdula; that his other legal heirs are his
three children named Teng Abdula, Keto Abdula and
Kueng Malang, and that he left seven (7) parcels of
land, five (5) of which are titled in Hadji Abdula’s
name “married to Neng P. Malang,” and a pick-up
jeepney.
On February 7, 1994, the Shari’a District1
Court
ordered the2 publication of the petition. After such
publication or on March 16, 1994, Hadji Mohammad
Ulyssis Malang (“Hadji Mohammad,” for brevity), the
eldest son of Hadji Abdula, filed his opposition to the
_______________
1 Record, p. 14.
2 Exhs. C-1, D-1 & E-1.
399
VOL. 338, AUGUST 22, 2000 399
Malang vs. Moson
petition. He alleged among other matters that his
father’s surviving heirs are as follows: (a) Jubaida
Malang, surviving spouse; (b) Nayo Malang, surviving
spouse; (c) Mabay Malang, surviving spouse; (d)
petitioner Neng Malang, surviving spouse; (e)
oppositor Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis Malang who is
also known as “Teng Abdula,” son; (f) Hadji Ismael
Malindatu Malang, also known as “Keto Abdula,” son;
(g) Fatima Malang, also known as “Kueng Malàng,”
daughter; (h) Datulna Malang, son; and (i) Lawanbai
Malang, daughter. Oppositor Hadji Mohammad
Ulyssis Malang alleged that since he and his brother,
Hadji Ismael Malindatu Malang, had help their father
in his business, then they were
3
more competent to be
administrators of his estate.
On March 30, 1994, Jubaida Malang, Ismael
Malindatu Malang, Nayo Malang, Fatima Malang,
Mabay Malang, Datulna Malang and Lawanbai
Malang filed an opposition to the petition, adopting as
4
their own the written opposition of Hadji Mohammad.
On April 7, 1994, the Shari’a District Court issued
an Order appointing Hadji Mohammad administrator
of his father’s properties outside Cotabato City. The
same order named petitioner and Hadji Ismael
Malindatu Malang as joint administrators of the estate
in Cotabato City. Each administrator was required
5
to
post a bond in the amount of P100,000.00. On April
13, 1994, letters of administration were issued to Hadji
Mohammad after he had posted the 6
required bond. He
took his oath on the same day. The following day,
Hadji Ismael and petitioner likewise filed their
respective bonds and hence, 7they were allowed to take
their oath as administrators.
On April 25, 1994 and May 3, 1994, petitioner filed
two motions informing the court that Hadji Abdula had8
outstanding deposits with nine (9) major banks.
Petitioner prayed that the managers of
_______________
3 Record, p. 20.
4 Ibid., p. 28.
5 Ibid., p. 31.
6 Ibid., pp. 32-36.
7 Ibid., pp. 37-49.
8 These banks were allegedly: (1) United Coconut Planters Bank;
(2) Solidbank; (3) Far East Bank and Trust Company; (4) Philippine
Com-
400
400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Malang vs. Moson
each of those banks be ordered to submit a bank9
statement of the outstanding deposit of Hadji Abdula.
The Shari’a District Court having granted the
10
motions, Assistant Vice President Rockman O.
Sampuha of United Coconut Planters Bank informed
the court that as of April 24, 1994, the outstanding
deposit of Hadji Abdula amounted to one million five
hundred twenty thousand four hundred pesos and
11
forty-eight centavos (P1,520,400.48). The Senior
Manager of the Cotabato branch of Metrobank also
certified that as of December 18, 1993, “Hadji Abdula
Malang or Malindatu Malang” had on savings deposit
the balance of three hundred seventyeight thousand
four hundred 12ninety-three pesos and 32/100 centavos
(P378,493.32). PCIB likewise issued a certification
that Hadji Abdula had a balance of eight hundred fifty
pesos13(P850.00) in his current account as of August 11,
1994.
During the pendency of the case, petitioner suffered
a congestive heart failure that required immediate
medical treatment. On May 5, 1994, she filed a motion
praying that on account of her ailment, she be allowed
to withdraw from UCPB the amount of three hundred
thousand pesos (P300,000.00) that shall constitute
14
her
advance share in the estate of Hadji Abdula. After
due hearing, the Sharia District Court allowed
petitioner to withdraw the sum 15
of two hundred fifty
thousand pesos (P250,000.00).
On May 12, 1994, the Shari’a District Court
required petitioner and Hadji Ismael as joint
administrators to submit an inventory and appraisal of
16
all properties of Hadji Abdula. In compliance
therewith, Hadji Ismael submitted an inventory
showing that in Cotabato City, Hadji Abdula had seven
(7) residential lots with
_______________
mercial and Industrial Bank; (5) Bank of the Philippine Islands;
(6) Metrobank; (7) Philippine National Bank; (8) Land Bank of the
Philippines; and (9) Development Bank of the Philippines.
9 Record, pp. 50-59.
10 Ibid., pp. 52 & 61.
11 Ibid., p. 220 (Exh. CC).
12 Ibid., p. 219 (Exh. BB).
13 Ibid., p. 221 (Exh. DD).
14 Ibid., pp. 62-63.
15 Ibid., pp. 102-103.
16 Ibid., p. 97.
401
VOL. 338, AUGUST 22, 2000 401
Malang vs. Moson
assessed value ranging from P5,020.00 to P25,800.00,
an agricultural land with assessed value of P860.00,
three (3) one-storey residential 17buildings, and one (1)
two-storey residential building. All these properties
were declared for taxation purposes in Hadji Abdula’s
name.
For her part, petitioner submitted an inventory
showing that Hadji Abdula “married to Neng Malang”
had seven (7) residential lots with a total assessed
value of P243,840.00 in Cotabato City, an Isuzu pick-18
up jeepney valued at P30,000.00 and bank deposits.
In the Memorandum that she filed with the Shari’a
District Court, petitioner asserted that all the
properties located in Cotabato City, including the
vehicle and bank deposits, were conjugal properties in
accordance with Article 160 of the Civil Code and
Article 116 of the Family Code while properties located
outside of Cotabato
19
City were exclusive properties of
the decedent.
On the other hand, the oppositors contended in their
own Memorandum that all the properties left by Hadji
Abdula were his exclusive properties for various
reasons. First, Hadji Abdula had no conjugal
partnership with petitioner because his having
contracted eight (8) marriages with different Muslim
women was in violation of the Civil Code that provided
for a monogamous marriage; a conjugal partnership
presupposes a valid civil marriage, not a bigamous
marriage or a common-law relationship. Second, the
decedent adopted a “complete separation of property
regime” in his marital relations; while his wives
Jubaida Kado, Nayo Hadji Omal and Mabay Ganap
Hadji Adzis contributed to the decedent’s properties,
there is no evidence that petitioner had contributed
funds for the acquisition of such properties. Third, the
presumption that properties acquired during the
marriage are conjugal properties is inapplicable
because at the time he acquired the properties, the
decedent was married to four (4) women. Fourth, the
properties are not conjugal in nature notwithstanding
that some of these properties were titled in the name of
the decedent “married to Neng Malang” because such
description is not conclusive of the conjugal
_______________
17 Ibid., pp. 123-126.
18 Ibid., p. 108.
19 Ibid., pp. 229-232.
402
402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Malang vs. Moson
nature of the property. Furthermore, because
petitioner admitted in her verified petition that the
properties belonged “to the estate of decedent,” she was
estopped from claiming, after formal offer of evidence,
that the properties were conjugal in nature just
because some of the properties were titled in Hadji
Abdula’s name “married to Neng Malang.” Fifth, if it is
true that the properties were conjugal properties, then
these should have been registered
20
in the names of both
petitioner and the decedent.
In its Order of September 26, 1994, the Shari’a
District Court presided by Judge Corocoy D. Moson
held that there was no conjugal partnership of gains
between petitioner and the decedent primarily because
the latter married eight times. The Civil Code
provision on conjugal partnership cannot be applied if
there is more than one wife because “conjugal
partnership presupposes a valid civil marriage, not a
plural marriage or a common-law relationship.” The
court further found that the decedent was “the chief, if
not the sole, breadwinner of his families” and that
petitioner did not contribute to the properties unlike
the other wives named Jubaida, Nayo and Mabay. The
description “married to Neng Malang” in the titles to
the real properties is no more than that—the
description of the relationship between petitioner and
the decedent. Such description is insufficient to prove
that the properties belong to the conjugal partnership
of gains. The court stated:
In the instant case, decedent had four (4) wives at the time
he acquired the properties in question. To sustain the
contention of the petitioner that the properties are her
conjugal property with the decedent is doing violence to the
provisions of the Civil Code. Be it noted that at the time of
the marriage of the petitioner with the decedent, there were
already three (3) existing marriages. Assuming for the
moment that petitioner and the decedent had agreed that the
property regime between them will be governed by the
regime of conjugal partnership property, that agreement is
null and void for it is against the law, public policy, public
order, good moral(s) and customs.
Under Islamic law, the regime of property relationship is
complete separation of property, in the absence of any
stipulation to the contrary in the marriage settlements or
any other contract (Article 38, P.D. 1083).
_______________
 20 Ibid., pp. 222-228.
403
VOL. 338, AUGUST 22, 2000 403
Malang vs. Moson
There being no evidence of such contrary stipulation or
contract, this Court concludes as it had begun, that the
properties in question, both real and personal, are21 not
conjugal, but rather, exclusive property of the decedent.
Thus, the Shari’a District Court held that the Islamic
law should be applied in the distribution of the estate
of Hadji Abdula and accordingly disposed of the case as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court orders the
following:
1) That the estate shall pay the corresponding estate
tax, reimburse the funeral expenses in the amount of
P50,000.00, and the judicial expenses in the amount
of P2,040.80;
2) That the net estate, consisting of real and personal
properties, located in Talayan, Maguindanao and in
Cotabato City, is hereby ordered to be distributed and
adjudicated as follows:
a) Jubaida Kado 2/64 of the
Maiang.................................. estate
b) Nayo Omar Malang 2/64 - do -
....................................
c) Mabai Aziz Malang 2/64 - do -
....................................
d) Neng “Kagui Kadiguia” 2/64 - do -
Malang.................
e) Mohammad Ulyssis 14/64 - do -
Malang......................
f) Ismael Malindatu 14/64 - do -
Malang...........................
g) Datulna 14/64 - do -
Malang..........................................
h) Lawanbai 7/64 - do -
Malang........................................
i) Fatima (Kueng) Malang 7/64 - do
...............................
  Total ................................... 64/64  
3) That the amount of P250,000.00 given to Neng
“Kagui Kadiguia” Malang by way of advance be
 charged against her share and if her share is not
sufficient, to return the excess; and
4) That the heirs are hereby ordered to submit to this
court their Project of Partition for approval, not later
than three (3) months from receipt of this order.
SO ORDERED.
On October 4, 1994, petitioner filed a motion for the
reconsideration of that Order. The oppositors objected
to that motion. On January 10, 1995, the Shari’a
District Court denied petitioner’s
_______________
21 Order of September 26, 1994, pp. 12-13; Rollo, pp. 25-56.
404
404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Malang vs. Moson
22
motion for reconsideration.
23
Unsatisfied, petitioner
filed a notice of appeal. However, on January 19,
1995, she filed a manifestation withdrawing the notice
of appeal on the strength of the following provisions of
P.D. No. 1083:
Art. 145. Finality of Decisions—The decisions of the Shari’a
District Courts whether on appeal from the Shari’a Circuit
Court or not shall be final. Nothing herein contained shall
affect the original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court as provided in the Constitution.
Petitioner accordingly informed the court that she
would be filing “an
24
original action of certiorari with the
Supreme Court.”
On March 1, 1995, petitioner filed the instant
petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction
and/or restraining order. She contends that the Shari’a
District Court gravely erred in: (a) ruling that when
she married Hadji Abdula Malang, the latter had three
existing marriages with Jubaida Kado Malang, Nayo
Omar Malang and Mabay Ganap Malang and therefore
the properties acquired during her marriage could not
be considered conjugal, and (b) holding that said
properties are not conjugal because under Islamic Law,
the regime of relationship is complete separation of
property, in the absence of stipulation to the contrary
25
in the marriage settlement or any other contract.
As petitioner sees it, “the law applicable on issues of
marriage and property regime is the New Civil Code,”
under which all property of the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership. The Shari’a
Court, meanwhile, viewed the Civil Code provisions on
conjugal partnership as incompatible with plural
marriage, which is permitted under Muslim law, and
held the applicable property regime to be complete
separation of property under P.D. 1083.
Owing to the complexity of the issue presented, and
the fact that the case is one of first impression—this is
a singular situation where the issue on what law
governs the property regime of a
_______________
22 Ibid., pp. 280-281.
23 Ibid., p. 282.
24 Ibid., p. 284.
25 Petition, pp. 5 & 10.
405
VOL. 338, AUGUST 22, 2000 405
Malang vs. Moson
Muslim marriage celebrated prior to the passage of the
Muslim Code has been elevated from a Shari’a court
for the Court’s resolution—the Court decided to solicit
the opinions
26
of two amici curiae, Justice Ricardo C. 27
Puno and former Congressman Michael O. Mastura.
The Court extends its warmest thanks to the amici
curiae for 28their valuable inputs in their written
memoranda and in the hearing of June 27, 2000.
Resolution of the instant case is made more difficult
by the fact that very few of the pertinent dates of birth,
death, marriage and divorce are established by the
record. This is because, traditionally, Muslims do not
register29 acts, events or judicial decrees affecting civil
status. It also explains why the evidence in the
instant case consisted substantially of oral testimonies.
What is not disputed is that: Hadji Abdula
contracted a total of eight marriages, counting the
three which terminated in divorce; all eight marriages
were celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code
and before the enactment of the Muslim Code; Hadji
Abdula divorced four wives—namely, Aida, Saaga,
Mayumbai and Sabai—all divorces of which took place
before the enactment of the Muslim Code; and, Hadji
Abdula died on December 18, 1993, after the Muslim
Code and Family Code took effect, survived by four
wives (Jubaida, Nayo, Mabay and Neng) and five
children, four of whom he begot with Aida and one
with Mabay. It is also clear that the following laws
were in force, at some point or other, during the
marriages of Hadji Abdula: the Civil Code, which took
effect on August 30, 1950; Republic Act No. 394 (“R.A.
394”), authorizing Muslim divorces, which was
effective from June 18, 1949 to June
_______________
26 Retired Justice of the Court of Appeals and former Minister of
Justice, author, noted civil law professor, and law practitioner. He
was also a member of the Family Code Revision Committee.
27 Former Congressman, law practitioner, and member of the
Presidential Code Commission which reviewed P.D. 1083.
28 Justice Puno’s Compliance by Amicus Curiae was submitted on
June 27, 2000 while Congressman Mastura’s Memorandum was
submitted on March 29, 2000.
29 The registration of marriages, divorces, revocations of divorce
and conversions into Islam is now required under Title VI (Civil
Registry) of P.D. 1083.
406
406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Malang vs. Moson
13,1969; the Muslim Code, which took effect February
4, 1977; and the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988.
Proceeding upon the foregoing, the Court has
concluded that the record of the case is simply
inadequate for purposes of arriving at a fair and
complete resolution of the petition. To our mind, any
attempt at this point to dispense with the basic issue
given the scantiness of the evidence before us could
result in grave injustice to the parties in this case, as
well as cast profound implications on Muslim families
similarly or analogously situated to the parties herein.
Justice and accountability dictate a remand; trial must
reopen in order to supply the factual gaps or, in
Congressman Mastura’s words, “missing links,” that
would be the bases for judgment and accordingly, allow
respondent court to resolve the instant case. In
ordering thus, however, we take it as an imperative on
our part to set out certain guidelines in the
interpretation and application of pertinent laws to
facilitate the task of respondent court.
It will also be recalled that the main issue presented
by the petition—concerning the property regime
applicable to two Muslims married prior to the
effectivity of the Muslim Code—was interposed in
relation to the settlement of the estate of the deceased
husband. Settlement of estates of Muslims whose civil
acts predate the enactment of the Muslim Code may
easily result in the application of the Civil Code and
other personal laws, thus convincing the Court that it
is but propitious to go beyond the issue squarely
presented and identify such collateral issues as are
required to be resolved in a settlement of estate case.
As amicus curiae Congressman Mastura puts it, the
Court does not often come by a case as the one herein,
and jurisprudence will be greatly enriched by a
discussion of the “watershed
30
of collateral issues” that
this case presents.
The Court has identified the following collateral
issues, which we hereby present in question form: (1)
What law governs the validity of a Muslim marriage
celebrated under Muslim rites before the effectivity of
the Muslim Code? (2) Are multiple marriages
celebrated before the effectivity of the Muslim Code
valid? (3) How do the Court’s pronouncements in
People vs. Subano, 73 Phil. 692
_______________
30 TSN, Oral Argument of July 27, 2000, p. 26.
407
VOL. 338, AUGUST 22, 2000 407
Malang vs. Moson
(1942), and People vs. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246 (1935),
affect Muslim marriages celebrated before the
effectivity of the Muslim Code? (4) What laws govern
the property relationship of Muslim multiple
marriages celebrated before the Muslim Code? (5)
What law governs the succession to the estate of a
Muslim who died after the Muslim Code and the
Family Code took effect? (6) What laws apply to the
dissolution of property regimes in the cases of multiple
marriages entered into before the Muslim Code but
dissolved (by the husband’s death) after the effectivity
of the Muslim Code? and (7) Are Muslim divorces
effected before the enactment of the Muslim Code
valid?
The succeeding guidelines, which derive mainly
from the Compliance of amicus curiae Justice Puno,
are hereby laid down by the Court for the reference of
respondent court, and for the direction of the bench
and bar:
First Collateral Issue: The Law(s) Governing
Validity of Muslim Marriages Celebrated Before
the Muslim Code
The time frame in which all eight marriages of Hadji
Abdula were celebrated was during the effectivity of
the Civil Code which, accordingly, 31
governs the
marriages. Article 78 of the Civil Code recognized the
right of Muslims to contract marriage in accordance
with their customs and rites, by providing that—
Marriages between Mohammedans or pagans who live in the
non-Christian provinces may be performed in accordance
with their customs, rites or practices. No marriage license or
formal requisites shall be necessary. Nor shall the persons
solemnizing these marriages be obliged to comply with
article 92.
However, thirty years after the approval of this Code, all
marriages performed between Muslims or other non-
Christians shall be solemnized in accordance with the
provisions of this Code. But the President of the Philippines,
upon recommendation of the Commissioner of National
Integration, may at any time before the expiration of said
period, by proclamation, make any of said provisions
applicable to the Muslims and non-Christian inhabitants of
any of the non-Christian provinces.
_______________
31 As amended by Republic Act No. 6268, which was approved on
June 19, 1971 and was made to take effect as of June 18, 1969.
408
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Malang vs. Moson
Notably, before the expiration of the thirty-year period
after which Muslims are enjoined to solemnize their
marriages in accordance with the Civil Code, P.D. 1083
or the Muslim Code was passed into law. The
enactment of the Muslim Code on February 4, 1977
rendered nugatory the second paragraph of Article 78
of the Civil Code which provides that marriages
between Muslims thirty years after the approval of the
Civil Code shall be solemnized in accordance with said
Code.
Second and Third Collateral Issues: The Validity
of Muslim Multiple Marriages Celebrated Before
the Muslim Code; The Effect of People vs. Subano
and People vs. Dumpo
Prior to the enactment of P.D. 1083, there was no law
in this 32jurisdiction which sanctioned multiple
marriages. It is also not to be disputed that the only
law in force governing marriage relations between
Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of
1950.
The Muslim
33
Code, which is the first 34comprehensive
codification of Muslim personal laws, also provides
in respect of acts that transpired prior to its
enactment:
Art. 186. Effect of code on past acts.—(1) Acts executed prior
to the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by the laws in
force at the time of their execution, and nothing herein
except as otherwise specifically provided, shall affect their
validity or legality or operate to extinguish any right
acquired or liability incurred thereby.
______________
32 Article 27 of P.D. 1083 now provides: “Notwithstanding the rule
of Islamic law permitting a Muslim to have more than one wife but
not more than four at a time, no Muslim male can have more than
one wife unless he can deal with them with equal companionship
and just treatment as enjoined by Islamic law and only in
exceptional cases.”
33 The Explanatory Note to the Draft Muslim Code states: “This
(Code) is the first fundamental concept that the Muslim legal system
breathes into the Philippine legal system which has recognized to
the present only the application of jural rules of mainly non-Muslim
origin.”
34 Includes all laws on personal status, marriage and divorce,
matrimonial and family relations, succession and inheritance, and
property relations between spouses. Muslim Code, Art. 7, par. (i).
409
VOL. 338, AUGUST 22, 2000 409
Malang vs. Moson
The foregoing provisions are consistent with the
principle that all laws operate prospectively, unless the
contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and 35
unequivocably expressed or necessarily implied;
accordingly, every case of doubt will 36be resolved
against the retroactive operation of laws. Article 186
aforecited enunciates the general rule of the Muslim
Code to have its provisions applied prospectively, and
implicitly upholds the force and effect of a preexisting
body of law, specifically, the Civil Code—in respect of
civil acts that took place before the Muslim Code’s
enactment.
Admittedly, an apparent antagonism arises when
we consider that what the provisions of the Civil Code
contemplate and nurture is a monogamous marriage.
“Bigamous or polygamous marriages” are considered
void and 37 inexistent from the time of their
performance. The Family Code which superseded the
Civil Code provisions on marriage emphasizes that a
subsequent marriage celebrated before the registration
of the judgment 38declaring a prior marriage void shall
likewise be void. These provisions illustrate that the
marital relation perceived by the Civil Code is one that
is monogamous, and that subsequent marriages
entered into by a person with others while the first one
is subsisting is by no means countenanced.
Thus, when the validity of Muslim plural marriages
celebrated before the enactment of the Muslim Code
was touched upon in two criminal cases, the Court
applied the perspective in the Civil Code that only one
valid marriage can exist at any given time.
In People vs. Subano, supra, the Court convicted the
accused of homicide, not parricide, since—
(f)rom the testimony of Ebol Subano, father of the deceased,
it appears that the defendant has three wives and that the
deceased was the last in point of time. Although the practice
of polygamy is approved by custom among these non-
Christians, polygamy, however, is not sanctioned by the
______________
35 CIR vs. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co., Inc, 164 SCRA 27 (1988);
Castro vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 6 SCRA 886 (1962); Ichong vs.
Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 (1957).
36 Segovia vs. Noel, 47 Phil. 543 (1925).
37 Civil Code, Art. 80, par. 4.
38 Family Code, Arts. 52, 53.
410
410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Malang vs. Moson
39
Marriage Law, which merely recognizes tribal marriage
rituals. The deceased, under our law, is not thus the lawful
wife of the defendant and this precludes conviction for the
crime of parricide.
In People vs. Dumpo, supra, Mora Dumpo was
prosecuted for bigamy when, legally married to Moro
Hassan, she allegedly contracted a second marriage
with Moro Sabdapal. The Court acquitted her on the
ground that it was not duly proved that the alleged
second marriage had all the essential requisites to
make it valid were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage. As it appears that the consent of the bride’s
father is an indispensable requisite to the validity of a
Muslim marriage, and as Mora Dumpo’s father
categorically affirmed that he did not give his consent
to her union with Moro Sabdapal, the Court held that
such union could not be a marriage otherwise valid
were it not for the existence of the first one, and
resolved to acquit her of the charge of bigamy.
The ruling in Dumpo indicates that, had it been
proven as a fact that the second marriage contained all
the essential requisites to make 40it valid, a conviction
for bigamy would have prospered.
Fourth Collateral Issue: Law(s) Governing
Property Relations of Muslim Marriages
Celebrated Before the Muslim Code
This is the main issue presented by the instant
petition. In keeping with our holding that the validity
of the marriages in the instant case is determined by
the Civil Code, we hold that it is the same Code that
determines and governs the property relations of the
marriages in this case, for the reason that at the time
of the celebration of the marriages in question the Civil
Code was the only law on marriage relations, including
property relations be-
______________
39 The Marriage Law, approved on December 4, 1929, preceded
the Civil Code of 1950 and was the governing law when People vs.
Subano was promulgated.
40 This is significantly changed by the enactment of P.D. 1083,
Article 180 of which provides: “The provisions of the Revised Penal
Code relative to the crime of bigamy shall not apply to a person
married in accordance with the provisions of this (Muslim) Code or,
before its effectivity, under Muslim law.”
411
VOL. 338, AUGUST 22, 2000 411
Malang vs. Moson
tween spouses, whether Muslim or non-Muslim.
Inasmuch as the Family Code makes substantial
amendments to the Civil Code provisions on property
relations, some of its provisions are also material,
particularly to property acquired from and after
August 3, 1988.
Which law would govern depends upon: (1) when
the marriages took place; (2) whether the parties lived
together as husband and wife; and (3) when and how
the subject properties were acquired.
 Following are the pertinent provisions of the Civil
Code:
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage
settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of
property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon
any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or
when the same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code
shall govern the property relations between husband and
wife.
Art. 135. All property brought by the wife to the marriage,
as well as all property she acquires during the marriage, in
accordance with article 148, is paraphernal.
Art. 136. The wife retains the ownership of the
paraphernal property.
Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains
the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of
their separate property and the income from their work or
industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the
marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits
obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the
marriage.
Art. 143. All property of the conjugal partnership of gains
is owned in common by the husband and wife.
The Civil Code also provides in Article 144:
When a man and a woman live together as husband and
wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from
the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of
them through their work or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In a long line of cases, this Court has interpreted the
co-ownership provided in Article 144 of the Civil Code
to require that the man and woman living together as
husband and wife without
412
412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Malang vs. Moson
the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage
41
must
not in any way be incapacitated to marry. Situating
these rulings to the instant case, therefore, the co-
ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil
Code cannot apply to Hadji Abdula’s marriages
celebrated subsequent to a valid and legally existing
marriage, since from the point of view of the Civil Code
Hadji Abdula is not capacitated to marry. However, the
wives in such marriages are not precluded from
proving that property acquired during their
cohabitation with Hadji42
Abdula is their exclusive
property, respectively. Absent such proof, however,
the presumption is that property acquired during the
subsistence of a valid marriage—and in the Civil Code,
there can only be one validly existing marriage at any
given time—is
43
conjugal property of such subsisting
marriage. With the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988, the following provisions of the said
Code are pertinent:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage, their wages and salaries shall he owned by them
in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them
through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules
on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired
while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article,
a party who did not participate in the acquisition of the other
party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
_______________
41 Adriano vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124118, March 27, 2000, 328
SCRA 738; Belcodero vs. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 303 (1993); Juaniza
vs. Jose, 89 SCRA 306 (1979); Camporodendo vs. Aznar, 102 Phil. 1055
(1958); Osmeña vs. Rodriguez, 54 O.G. 5526; Malajacan vs. Rubi 42 O.G.
5576.
42 In Osmeña vs. Rodriguez, supra, the Court ruled that a parcel of land
acquired in the subsistence of a prior valid marriage did not belong to the
conjugal estate of such marriage, in the face of evidence submitted by the
common-law wife that such land was her exclusive property.
43 Civil Code, Art. 160; Adriano vs. Court of Appeals, supra; Belcodero vs.
Court of Appeals, supra.
413
VOL. 338, AUGUST 22, 2000 413
Malang vs. Moson
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of
the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos
of his or her share in the property acquired during
cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of
the other, until after the termination of the cohabitation.
 When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good
faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership
shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of
default or of waiver by any or all of the common children or
their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party.
In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination
of the cohabitation.
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the
preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding
shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and
evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or
her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the
manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even
if both parties are in bad faith.
It will be noted that while the Civil Code merely
requires that the parties “live together as husband and
wife” the Family Code in Article 147 specifies that they
“live exclusively with each other as husband and wife.”
Also, in contrast to Article 144 of the Civil Code as
interpreted by jurisprudence, Article 148 of the Family
Code allows for co-ownership in cases of cohabitation
where, for instance, one party has a pre-existing valid
marriage, provided that the parties prove their “actual
joint contribution of money, property, or industry” and
only to the extent of their proportionate interest
therein. The rulings in Juaniza vs. Jose, 89 SCRA 306,
Camporodendo vs. Garcia, 102 Phil. 1055, and related
cases are embodied in the Second paragraph of Article
148, which declares
414
414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Malang vs. Moson
that the share of the party validly married to another
shall accrue to the property regime of such existing
marriage.
Fifth and Sixth Collateral Issues: Law(s) on
Succession and Dissolution of Property Regimes
Hadji Abdula died intestate on December 16, 1993.
Thus, it is the Muslim Code which should determine
the identification of the heirs in the order of intestate
succession and the respective shares of the heirs.
Meanwhile, the status and capacity to succeed on
the part of the individual parties who entered into each
and every marriage ceremony will depend upon the
law in force at the time of the performance of the
marriage rite.
The status and capacity to succeed of the children
will depend upon the law in force at the time of
conception or birth of the child. If the child was
conceived or born during the period covered by the
governance of the Civil Code, the Civil Code provisions
on the determination of the legitimacy or illegitimacy
of the child would appear to be in point. Thus, the Civil
Code provides:
Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days
following the celebration of the marriage, and before three
hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of
the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted
other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband’s
having access to his wife within the first one hundred and
twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of
the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
(1) By the impotence of the husband;
(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living
separately, in such a way that access was not
possible;
(3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although
the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress.
415
VOL. 338, AUGUST 22, 2000 415
Malang vs. Moson
If the child was conceived or born during the period
covered by the governance of the Muslim Code, i.e.,
from February 4, 1977 up to the death of Hadji Abdula
on December 18, 1993, the Muslim Code determines
the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child. Under the
Muslim Code:
Art. 58. Legitimacy, how established.—Legitimacy of filiation
is established by the evidence of valid marriage between the
father and the mother at the time of the conception of the
child.
Art. 59. Legitimate children.—
(1) Children conceived in lawful wedlock shall be
presumed to be legitimate. Whoever claims
illegitimacy of or impugns such filiation must prove
his allegation.
(2) Children born after six months following the
consummation of marriage or within two years after
the dissolution of the marriage shall be presumed to
be legitimate. Against this presumption no evidence
shall be admitted other than that of physical
impossibility of access between, the parents at or
about the time of the conception of the child.
Art. 60. Children of subsequent marriage.—Should the
marriage be dissolved and the wife contracts another
marriage after the expiration of her ‘idda, the child born
within six months from the dissolution of the prior marriage
shall be presumed to have been conceived during the former
marriage, and if born thereafter, during the latter.
Art. 61. Pregnancy after dissolution.—If, after the
dissolution of marriage, the wife believes that she is
pregnant by her former husband, she shall, within thirty
days from the time she became aware of her pregnancy,
notify the former husband or his heirs of that fact. The
husband or his heirs may ask the court to take measures to
prevent a simulation of birth.
Upon determination of status and capacity to succeed
based on the foregoing provisions, the provisions on
legal succession in the Muslim Code will apply. Under
Article 110 of the said Code, the sharers to an
inheritance include:
(a) The husband, the wife;
(b) The father, the mother, the grandfather, the
grandmother;
(c) The daughter and the son’s daughter in the
direct line;
(d) The full sister, the consanguine sister, the
uterine sister and the uterine brother.
416
416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Malang vs. Moson
When the wife survives with a legitimate child or a
child of the decedent’s son, she is entitled to one-eighth
of the hereditary estate; in the absence of such
descendants,
44
she shall inherit one-fourth of the
estate. The respective shares of the other sharers, as
set out in Article 110 abovecited, are provided for in
Articles 113 to 122of P.D. 1083.
Seventh Collateral Issue: Muslim Divorces Before
the Effectivity of the Muslim Code
R.A. 394 authorized absolute divorce among Muslims
residing in non-Christian provinces, in accordance with
Muslim custom, for a period of 20 years from June 18,
1949 45(the date of approval of R.A. 394) to June 13,
1969. Thus, a Muslim divorce under R.A. 394 is valid
if it took place from June 18, 1949 to June 13, 1969.
From the seven collateral issues that we discussed,
we identify four corollary issues as to further situate
the points of controversy in the instant case for the
guidance of the lower court. Thus:
1. Which of the several marriages was validly and
legally existing at the time of the opening of the
succession of Hadji Abdula when he died in 1993? The
validly and legally existing marriage would be that
marriage which was celebrated at a time when there
was no other subsisting marriage standing undissolved
by a valid divorce or by death. This is because all of the
marriages were celebrated during the governance of
the Civil Code, under the rules of which only one
marriage can exist at any given time.
Whether or not the marriage was validly dissolved
by a Muslim divorce depends upon the time frame and
the applicable law. A Muslim divorce under R.A. No.
394 is valid if it took place from June 18, 1949 to June46
13, 1969, and void if it took place from June 14, 1969.
_______________
44 Art. 112, Muslim Code.
45 The 20-year period expired on June 13, 1969, considering that
there were five leap years (1952, 1956, 1960, 1964 and 1968) since
the approval of R.A. 394 in 1949.
46 Divorce provisions are now embodied in Articles 45 to 55 of the
Muslim Code. Under Article 13 of the same Code, the provisions on
di-
417
 VOL. 338, AUGUST 22, 2000 417
Malang vs. Moson
2. There being a dispute between the petitioner and the
oppositors as regards the heirship of the children
begotten from different marriages, who among the
surviving children are legitimate and who are
illegitimate? The children conceived and born of a
validly existing marriage as determined by the first
corollary issue are legitimate. The fact and time of
conception or birth may be determined by proof or
presumption depending upon the time frame and the
applicable law.
3. What properties constituted the estate of Hadji
Abdula at the time of his death on December 18, 1993?
The estate of Hadji Abdula consists of the following:
a. Properties acquired during the existence of a
valid marriage as determined by the first
corollary issue are conjugal properties and
should be liquidated and divided between the
spouses under the Muslim Code, this being the
law in force at the time of Hadji Abdula’s
death.
b. Properties acquired under the conditions
prescribed in Article 144 of the Civil Code
during the period August 30, 1950 to August 2,
1988 are conjugal properties and should be
liquidated and divided between the spouses
under the Muslim Code. However, the wives
other than the lawful wife as determined under
the first corollary issue may submit their
respective evidence to prove that any of such
property is theirs exclusively.
c. Properties acquired under the conditions set
out in Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code
during the period from and after August 3,
1988 are governed by the rules on co-
ownership.
d. Properties acquired under conditions not
covered by the preceding paragraphs and
obtained from the exclusive efforts or assets of
Hadji Abdula are his exclusive properties.
4. Who are the legal heirs of Hadji Abdula, and what
are their shares in intestacy? The following are Hadji
Abdula’s legal heirs: (a) the lawful wife, as determined
under the first corollary issue, and (2) the children, as
determined under the second corollary
_______________
 vorce apply to marriages “wherein both parties are Muslims, or
wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part
of the Philippines.”
418
418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Malang vs. Moson
issue. The Muslim Code, which was already in force at
the time of Hadji Abdula’s death, will govern the
determination of their respective shares.
As we have indicated early on, the evidence in this
case is inadequate to resolve in its entirety the main,
collateral and corollary issues herein presented and a
remand to the lower court is in order. Accordingly,
evidence should be received to supply the following
proofs: (1) the exact dates of the marriages performed
in accordance with Muslim rites or practices; (2) the
exact dates of the dissolutions of the marriages
terminated by death or by divorce in accordance with
Muslim rites and practices, thus indicating which
marriage resulted in a conjugal partnership under the
criteria prescribed by the first, second, and third
collateral issues and the first corollary issue; (3) the
exact periods of actual cohabitation (“common life”
under a “common roof”) of each of the marriages during
which time the parties lived together; (4) the
identification of specific properties acquired during
each of the periods of cohabitation referred to in
paragraph 3 above, and the manner and source of
acquisition, indicating joint or individual effort, thus
showing the asset as owned separately, conjugally or in
co-ownership; and (5) the identities of the children
(legitimate or illegitimate) begotten from the several
unions, the dates of their respective conceptions or
births in relation to paragraphs 1 and 2 above, thereby
indicating their status as lawful heirs.
Amicus curiae Congressman Mastura agrees that
since the marriage of petitioner to decedent took place
in 1972 the Civil Code is the 47 law applicable on the
issue of marriage settlement, but espouses that
customs or established practices among Muslims in
Mindanao must also48
be applied with the force of law to
the instant case. Congressman Mastura’s disquisition
has proven extremely helpful in impressing upon us
the background in which Islamic law
_______________
47 Memorandum of Amicus Curiae, p. 9.
 48 Ibid., pp. 9, 27, 35-37, 42. Congressman Mastura particularly
suggests that the Court take judicial notice of the principle of sa-
pancharian on property acquired through the joint efforts of the
husband and wife, judicially recognized by the Muslim courts of
Malaysia and Singapore and also allegedly practiced as custom by
Muslims in Mindanao.
419
VOL. 338, AUGUST 22, 2000 419
Malang vs. Moson
and the Muslim Code need to be interpreted,
particularly the
49
interconnectedness of law and religion
for Muslims and the impracticability of a strict
application of the Civil Code 50
to plural marriages
recognized under Muslim law. Regrettably, the Court
is dutybound to resolve the instant case applying such
laws and rights as are in existence at the time the
pertinent civil acts took place. Corollarily, we are
unable to supplant governing law with customs, albeit
how widely observed. In the same manner, we cannot
supply a perceived hiatus in P.D. 1083 concerning the
distribution of property between
51
divorced spouses upon
one of the spouses’ death.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated September 26,
1994 of the Fifth Shari’a District Court of Cotabato
City in Special Proceeding No. 94-40 is SET ASIDE,
and the instant petition is REMANDED for the
reception of additional evidence and the resolution of
the issues of the case based on the guidelines set out in
this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
     Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Judgment set aside, case remanded.
Notes.—A Jurisconsult in Islamic Law or Muffi is
an officer who renders legal opinions on any question
relating to Muslim law. (Re: Samanodin L. Ampaso,
256 SCRA 679 [1996])
The shari’a courts are not vested with original and
exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages
celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws—Regional
Trial Courts are not divested of their general original
jurisdiction under Sec. 19, par. (6) of BP Blg. 129.
(Tamano vs. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584 [1998])
 ——o0o——
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49 Ibid., pp. 12, 18; TSN, Oral Argument, pp. 15-17.
50 TSN, Oral Argument, p. 18, et. seq.
51 TSN, Oral Argument, p. 24; Memorandum of Amicus Curiae, p.
14.
420
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