!!

EMB-145/EMB-135

Recurrent Guide

!
!!

!
!!

EMB-145/EMB-135

Recurrent Guide

Brought to you by

!
!!

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

!
!! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG Table of Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction
About This Manual 001-1
An Introduction to Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) 001-1

II. Knowledge Validation

Limitations 002-1
Memory Items 002-2
Flight Deck Overview00 002-3
Power Source Summary 02-13
System Test Procedures 02-16

III. Special Purpose Operational Training

All Engine Departure Hierarchy Flow Chart 0 3-1
Single Engine Departure Hierarchy 3-1
Single Engine Missed Approach Hierarchy 3-1
Approach Navigation Sources 3-2

IV. Maneuvers Validation

Steep Turns 4-1
Stalls 4-2
Windshear Escape Maneuver 4-3
Aborted Takeoff 4-4
Engine Failure/Fire During Takeoff 4-5
Single Engine Approach 4-6
Go Around 4-7

V. Line Operational Evaluation

Emergency Procedures 5-1
Threat and Error Management (TEM) 5-1

05.25.2014 ! iii!
!! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG Table of Contents

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

iv! !
05.25.2014
! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG I. Introduction

I. INTRODUCTION
About This Manual
This guide is designed to help current ExpressJet EMB-145 pilots prepare for recurrent training. This document
contains an overview of topics and procedures commonly encountered in recurrent training that are not commonly
experienced on the line. It is important to remember that this unofficial guide is just a review of the basics. It is
recommended that you still study the source material (OM Vol. I, OM Vol. II, and the FOM) in order to effectively
prepare for recurrent training.
Contact me at [email protected] if you have any comments, corrections, or suggestions.

An Introduction to Advanced Qualification Program (AQP)

In an attempt to change recurrent training from strictly a pass/fail event focused on the individual, the FAA and
airline training departments have developed a training program focused on improving industry safety. The new
training program is called Advanced Qualification Program (AQP). The training program takes lessons learned
from actual operations (ASAP, FOQA, LOSA, etc.) and develops realistic training events designed to evaluate not
only a pilot’s technical knowledge and flying skills but also their CRM skills.
In addition to the change in training goals, AQP also changes the standards pilots are held to. In developing AQP,
the FAA realized that abnormal procedures such as stalls, steep turns, and V1 cuts are normally only experienced
during checking events in simulators. Instead of the outcome of a pilot’s training event dependent on whether or
not a pilot is able to maintain altitude during a steep turn, pilots are allowed to be retrained (except for the KV and
LOE) without it resulting in a failed checking event.
Recurrent training is divided into several modules: Recurrent ground training, Special Purpose Operational
Training (SPOT), Knowledge Validation (KV), Maneuvers Validation (MV), and Line Operational Evaluation (LOE).
Recurrent ground training is done in a classroom environment over a two-day period and is separate from the
simulator portion. The SPOT, KV, MV, and LOE are done over another two-day period and include simulator
sessions.
Recurrent ground training reviews systems, SOPs, the FOM, and any other special items the training department
wants to reinforce (usually related to the SPOT topics). A review of Threat and Error Management (TEM)
techniques is also done.
The SPOT is incorporated in the brief prior to the first simulator session. This allows the training department to
focus on company specific procedures or problems encountered on the line. This could include clarification on
AeroData procedures, checklist changes, or how to best implement a new procedure. After the SPOT, the crew
will go to the simulator to conduct the MV. During the MV procedures such as aborted takeoffs, missed
approaches, steep turns, and One Engine Inoperative (OEI) operations are done. Since these procedures are
rarely practiced, each pilot can be “trained to proficiency” by the instructor. The second day normally includes the
KV. During the KV, the instructor can ask any questions related to the operation of the aircraft and company
policies. After the KV, additional SPOT topics are discussed and performed in the simulator. Prior to the LOE, a
first look item is performed. The first look item allows the training department to see how crews react to something
unexpected. The crew is not being tested during the first look item; it is merely helps the training department
determine what may need to be included in future training. After a break, the LOE is conducted. The LOE is
designed to represent a normal flight with realistic abnormalities. During the LOE, crew coordination is paramount.
Typical AQP Simulator Training Schedule
!
DAY 1 DAY 2
Brief: SPOT Brief: KV
AeroData procedures Review of manuals/Jepps
Windshear Limitations
System test procedures
Simulator: SPOT
SPOT
Windshear escape maneuver
Mountainous terrain
Parallel ILS breakout
MV Simulator: SPOT
Aborted takeoff RNAV departure & arrival
Engine failure/fire at V1 CFIT maneuver
Single engine ILS approach First Look Item
Rejected landing Unusual attitudes
Missed approach procedure LOE
! RVR below 1200’ taxi
Generator failure
LOC 13 into KCRP
!
!
05.25.2014 1-1
! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG I. Introduction

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

!
1-2 05.25.2014
 ! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG II. KV

II. KNOWLEDGE VALIDATION

Limitations
1. Min flight crew: 2 pilots 36. Max N1: 100%
2. The EMB-145 is certified in the transport category for day & night 37. LP & HP spool vibration rates may be exceeded up to but not
VFR, IFR, & known icing conditions. including 2.5 ips for 5 minutes during takeoff & go arounds &
3. Max runway slope: ±2% 10 seconds at all other times.
4. Approved runways surface: Paved 38. Engines must run at or below taxi thrust for 2 minutes before
they can be shut down.
5. Max tailwind: 10 knots
39. If any engine limit is reached or exceeded it must be
6. Min/max takeoff & landing pressure altitude: -1,000’/8,000’ (EP/LR)
monitored & logged by the crew.
& -1,000’/10,000’ (XR)
40. Minimum battery temperature for an APU start: -20°C
7. Max SAT: ISA+35°C
41. APU start cycles 1-2: 1 minute off
8. Min/max SAT for takeoff: -40/52°C rd
42. 3 APU start cycle: 30 minutes off
9. Maintenance inspection required when landing below: -40°C SAT
43. Max altitude for an APU start: FL300
10. Min/max SAT at FL370: -65/-21.5°C
44. Max operational altitude of the APU: FL370
11. Min SAT below FL250: -54°C
45. Max APU generator load above FL300: 300 amps
12. Min TAT above FL250: -45°C (momentary deviations to -50°C)
46. The APU will automatically shut down at 104% rotor speed.
13. VMO/M MO (EP/LR): At & below 8,000’, 250 KIAS; 10,000’-FL260,
320 KIAS; above 10,000’, 0.78 M 47. APU EGT between 680-717°C is limited to 5 minutes.
14. VMO/M MO (XR): At & below 8,000’, 320 KIAS; 10,000’-FL260, 320 48. Max fuel imbalance: 800 lbs
KIAS; above 10,000’, 0.80 M 49. Min/max fuel tank temperature: -40/52°C
15. VA: 200 KIAS 50. Max airspeed without retrimming after takeoff: 160 KIAS
16. Max turbulent air penetration airspeed at & below 10,000’: 200 51. Max altitude for flap extension: 20,000 feet
KIAS 52. VFE (Flaps 9°): 250 KIAS
17. Max turbulent air penetration airspeed above 10,000’: 250 53. VFE (Flaps 18°): 200 KIAS
KIAS/0.63 M (whichever is lower) 54. VFE (Flaps 22°): 200 KIAS
18. Min oil temperature for engine start: -40°C
55. VFE (Flaps 45°): 145 KIAS (EP/LR) & 160 KIAS (XR)
19. Engine start cycles 1-4: 1 minute on & 1 minute off
th
56. VFE (Flaps 22°) above 10,000’ with YD off (XR): 180 KIAS
20. 5 engine start cycle: 1 minute on & 5 minutes off
57. VFE (Flaps 45°) above 10,000’ with YD off (XR): 145 KIAS
21. Dry motoring limits: 5 minutes on & 5 minutes off
58. VLO: 200 KIAS (retraction)/250 KIAS (extension)
22. Max ITT during engine start: 800°C
59. VLE: 250 KIAS
23. An engine is considered cold if it has been shut down for more
60. Service ceiling: FL370
than 90 minutes.
61. Max pressure differential: 7.8 psi
24. After start, engines must run at or below taxi thrust for 4 minutes
for cold engines & 2 minutes for warm engines. 62. Max over-pressure differential: 8.1 psi
25. Min/max oil pressure below 88% N2: 34/110 psi 63. Max negative pressure differential: -0.3 psi
26. Max oil pressure may be exceeded during an engine start when oil 64. Min temperature for manual anti-ice operation: -40°C
temperature is below 21°C. The engine must remain at idle until the 65. Max temperature for manual anti-ice operation: 10°C
oil pressure is less than 110 psi. 66. Holding configuration in icing conditions: Landing gear up,
27. Oil pressures from 111-115 psi are displayed in amber & are flaps 0, & min airspeed of 200 KIAS
limited to 5 minutes. 67. Do no operate windshield wipers on: Dry windshields
28. Oil pressures from 116-155 psi are displayed in amber & are 68. Max windshield wiper operating speed: 170 KIAS
limited to 2 minutes, but the total over-pressure time must not 69. Min CAT II DH: 100’
exceed 5 minutes. 70. Min CAT II RVR: 1,200’
29. To increase N2 above 83%, either the oil temperature must be at 71. Max CAT II tailwind: 10 knots (9 knots XR)
least 40°C, the engine must have been running for 8 minutes, or a
72. Max CAT II crosswind: 10 knots
static runup to 88% N2 must be done until the oil pressure is at or
below 83 psi. 73. The aircraft must not be moved during power-up initialization.
30. Min/max oil pressure at & above 88% N2 (EP/LR): 50/110 psi 74. Do not cage the standby attitude indicator in turning flight.
31. Min/max oil pressure at & above 88% N2 (XR): 48/110 psi 75. Max ISIS duration in essential power: 40 minutes, but it can
be extended to 45 minutes if pitot/static system 3 heat is off
32. Operation at & above 88% N2 with oil pressure 34-50 psi (34-48
in non-icing conditions.
psi for XR) is permitted during: Takeoff & go around
76. Min AP engagement height: 500’ AGL
33. Takeoff thrust ratings & ITT limits are limited to 5 minutes.
77. Min AP disengagement height: 200’ for visual, 200’ for CAT I
34. XR takeoff thrust ITT up to 970°C is limited to 5 minutes. ILS, 85’ for CAT II, & before leaving MDA for non-precision
35. XR takeoff thrust ITT between 971-992°C is limited to 90 seconds. approaches.

!
05.25.2014 2-1
! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG II. KV

Memory Items

ENGINE FIRE/SEVERE DAMAGE

Affected Engine
Thrust Lever: IDLE
Start/Stop Selector: STOP
Fire Extinguishing Handle: PULL (DO NOT ROTATE)

CABIN FIRE OR SMOKE

Crew Oxygen Masks: DON, SELECT 100%
Smoke Goggles: DON
Recirculation Fan: OFF
Crew Communication: ESTABLISH

AILERON HARDOVER/ROLL TRIM RUNAWAY

Quick Disconnect Button: PRESS AND HOLD
Aileron Systems 1 and 2: OFF
!
RUDDER HARDOVER/YAW TRIM RUNAWAY
Quick Disconnect Button: PRESS AND HOLD
Rudder Systems 1 and 2: OFF

PITCH TRIM RUNAWAY

Control Column: HOLD FIRMLY
Quick Disconnect Button: PRESS AND HOLD

RAPID CABIN DEPRESSURIZATION

Crew Oxygen Masks: DON
Crew Communication: ESTABLISH

EMERGENCY DESCENT
Cabin Crew: NOTIFY
Fasten Belts: ON
Thrust Levers: IDLE
Speed Brakes: OPEN
Airspeed: 240 KIAS
Landing Gear: DOWN
Flaps: 0
Altitude: 10,000 FT. OR MEA,
WHICHEVER IS HIGHER

ABORTED TAKEOFF PROCEDURE/CHECKLIST

Thrust Levers: IDLE OR MAX REVERSE
Brakes: APPLY MAXIMUM
Directional Control: MAINTAIN

ENGINE FIRE ON GROUND

Affected Engine
Thrust Lever: IDLE
Start/Stop Selector: STOP
Fire Extinguishing Handle: PULL AND ROTATE

STEERING SYSTEM INOPERATIVE OR

UNCOMMANDED SWERVING ON GROUND
Control the aircraft using rudder command and differential brakes.
Tiller: DO NOT USE
IF unable to control the aircraft,
Steering Disengagement Trigger: PRESS
Consider the use of differential reverse thrust if available.

!
2-2 05.25.2014
! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG II. KV

Flight Deck Overview

!
05.25.2014 2-3
! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG II. KV

!
2-4 05.25.2014
! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG II. KV

!
05.25.2014 2-5
! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG II. KV

EMBRAER 145 CENTER PEDESTAL

Inhibition Logic •Checks takeoff configuration warning by
•Takeoff simulating TLs advanced
•Active > V1-15
•If  ok,  “TAKEOFF  OK”  voice  message
•Deactive. RA > 400 ft, •Mechanical gust lock secures only the elevator
or < 60 kts, or > 1 min. •If  fail,  “TAKEOFF  ___”  voice  message  &  NO
•Electromechanical gust lock does the same thing but
•Landing TAKEOFF CONFIG EICAS msg
uses a solenoid and locking pins installed in the
•Disconnects  CA’s   •Valid < 200 ft
horizontal stabilizer. Powered by DC Bus 2 & FLAPS
elevator control from •Deactve. WOW > 3
incorporates an amber indication light on the glareshield.
FO’s   sec., or > 1 min. SPOILERS

•CA’s  side  has  all  AP   TRIM

servos & stick pusher BRAKES
•Cannot be reset in flight

Illuminates when •Disconnects  CA’s  

aileron  control  from  FO’s  
disconnection
mechanism activated •FO’s  side  has  roll  trim  
actuator & artificial feel
unit
•Cannot be reset in flight

Illuminates when
disconnection
Thrust Reversers have mechanism activated
3 locking systems. The
Primary & Secondary
are electrically MAX – max. takeoff
controlled & rating mode at any time
hydraulically actuated.
THRUST SET –
The third lock is
FADEC controls engine
completely electric.
to achieve N1 target
Loss of electric power
latches locks closed IDLE – GI~ 64% N2, FI~
68% N2
MAX REV – max.
reverse thrust. Doors
cmd’d  open  when  TLs  
at soft detent (TLA 14º)
•Cmds outboard spoiler
panels to open when: If OEI or one reverser
TLA of both not deployed FADEC
engines < 50º will only cmd reverse
from good engine if TL
Flaps < 13º requesting reverse
•No intermediate and OEI TL set to
positions Thrust Lever IDLE
Friction Knob
•Electrically controlled
thru DC Bus 1 & 2 •Electrically actuated &
•Hydraulically actuated controlled
•DC Bus 1 & 2
•If one channel fails,
remaining motor can
drive flaps at half speed
•Pulling actuates
•3º asymmetrical limit
emergency brakes (no
disables system for
anti-skid)
duration of flight
•Pull & rotate to set
parking brake
•Always have toe
brakes applied when
setting or releasing to
prevent hydraulic fluid
transfer
Thrust Mode select buttons
•All 4 brakes supplied (no ATTCS)
by Hyd Sys 2
proportional to handle
displacement with no Joystick controls
protections MFD designator

•With control column held full back, momentary push CON thrust if one of the following:
•Pedal brking actuates SPS test (stick shaker, clacker, & stick pusher) •Cuts out SPS channel •>300 ft AFL & gear not locked down, or
•Hyd Sys 1 supplies outbd brakes •TEST button illuminated after an unsuccessful test or if 1 or 2 in case of failure
• >1700 ft AFL
system has not been tested. •Striped bar in button
•Hyd Sys 2 supples inbd brakes Limited to OEI only
•TEST button inhibited inflight till 30 sec. after landing, when pressed
•Anit-skid protection > 10 knots
above 70 KIAS, or with gear not downlocked.
wheel speed
•Ice compensation of SPS inhibited for 5 min. after takeoff. Pusher inhibited CLB or CRZ thrust if one of the following:
•Locked wheel protection through
On grnd (except for test) •>500 ft AFL, gear not locked down, AEO, or
anti-skid system > 30 knots wheel •Ice compensation reset if:
•Below 0.5 G
speed • >1700 ft AFL and AEO
airborne & flaps set to 45º. SPS ICE SPEED msg •While Quick Disconnect
•Touchdown protection allows remains,or button pressed
braking 3 seconds after •< 200 ft if RA failed •TO thrust
on ground after pressing TEST button. SPS ICE
touchdown, or when wheel speed •Any Cutout button
SPEED msg cleared. •T/O-1 for the EMB 145
> 50 knots. pressed
•> 200 knots •T/O RSV for the EMB 135/140
•At least 1 channel inop
25 February
May 2006, William
2008 William de Grohde Groh

!
2-6 05.25.2014
 ! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG II. KV

DAU 1: Forward aircraft & engine 1 parameters. Landing Gear Free-Fall Compartment
Ch A: Ess DC Bus 1 & Backup Ess Bus (default) On floor between FO’s seat and control pedestal
Ch B: DC bus 1
Electrical Override Switch
DAU 2: Aft aircraft & engine 2 parameters
Ch A: Ess DC Bus 2 & Backup Ess Bus (default) NORMAL – Extension/retraction controlled by LGEU
Ch B: DC Bus 2 DOORS – Bypasses LGEU to open nose landing gear doors
GEAR DOORS – Bypasses LGEU extending landing gear
while keeping nose landing gear doors open
Free-Fall Lever
Initial movement operates the free fall selector valve
relieving hydraulic pressure and connecting the lines to the
return. Further movement mechanically unlocks the landing
gear uplocks allowing the gear to free-fall to the down and
locked position.

!
05.25.2014 2-7
! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG II. KV

EMBRAER 145 OVERHEAD CHANNEL A

•ELEC EMERG. – Loss of all generators in flight. The batteries supply the Central & Essential Buses, sharing the load & not being
charged. The Inverter, Shed and DC Buses not energized.
•ELEC EMERG. ABNORMAL – The EDL configured for an electrical emergency when not required. The generator supplied DC
Buses are isolated from the battery supplied Central & Essential Buses & the batteries are not being charged.
•ELEC ESS XFER FAIL – The EDL failed to configure for an electrical emergency when required. DC Bus 1 and/or DC Bus 2 are
not isolated from the batteries & the batteries are not being charged.
Jack for a 600 ohm headphone to monitor
Erases data only on the ground with audio signals & tones.
•Tests integrity of CVR
parking brake set. Only the •2 sec. 800 Hz tone for successful CVR
manufacturer  can  recover  the  “erased”   •Green STATUS LED illuminates for test
data. 1 sec. if test is good
•3 sec. 400 Hz tone for successful CVR
erase
•Connects (pressed) or disconnects
(released) the GPU to/from the
DC Bus 2, 2 hr recording, 5g switch
electrical system.
•Connects (pressed) or disconnects
•GPU AVAIL inscription illuminates (released) the 28 vDC, 400 Amp engine-
when operating GPU is physically driven generators to/from respective DC
connected to aircraft; does not indicate Bus
good power.
•Gens online when N2 > 56.4%
•Inscription goes out when button
pressed & GPU connected to electrical •Cycling resets GCU if generator is
network. Priority over alll batts & gens. running.

•Striped bar in button when pressed. •If current > 400 A, GEN 1 (2, 3, 4) OVLD
msg.
•Verify 26.0 - 29.0 V before selecting.
•Striped bar in button when released.

Ground Service Bus is energized when

BATT 1 & 2 OFF (BC1 & BC2 open) •Connects (pressed) or disconnects
and GPU AVAIL inscription in GPU (released), 28 vDC 400 Amp, APU Starter-
button (GPC open). Cockpit dome, Generator when APU rotor speed > 95% +
courtesy, galley, cabin, lav, bagg, & 7 sec.
service cmpt. lights
•BATT 2 used to start APU
•Striped bar in button when released.
•On (pressed), overrides auto transfer
to electrical emergency configuration &
ensures batteries powering only
Essential Buses regardless of EDL. OFF – BC kept open disconnecting
Isolates batteries from DC Buses. battery from electrical system.
(EBC 1 & 2, and EIC closed, BC1 and AUTO – BC controlled by EDL
BTC 2 open).
•Two 24vDC, 44 amp-hour NiCad
• Auto (released), power contactors batteries, located in battery cmpt. (Nose
operate automatically according to left side).
EDL. (EBC 1 & 2, and EIC open, BC1
and BTC 2 closed). •BATT 2 supples power for APU starting,
while BATT 1 isolated to provide
•Striped bar in button when pressed. stabilized power to voltage transient
sensitive equipment.

OVRD – BTCs kept closed regardless •Both BCs open if GPU connected to
of EDL provided no overcurrent system
detected by one of 5 GCUs. •During an Electrical Emergency both
AUTO – BTCs controlled by EDL. batteries can supply Essential Buses for
40 min., which includes 3 APU starts.
OFF – Opens BTCs regardless of EDL.
•If batt > 70 C, BATT 1 (2) OVTEMP msg.

•Connects (pressed) or disconnects

OVRD – Closes Shed Bus contactors
(released) the 250 VA/400 Hz Static
while on ground with at least one
inverter to/from the system.
generator on line.
•Inverter supplied from DC Bus 1 & AUTO – EDL controls Shed Bus
provides 115 vAC to 115 vAC Bus. contactors.
115 VAC BUS OFF msg. if Bus OFF – Opens Shed Bus contactors
deenergized manually regardless of EDL.
•Powers TCAS II & GPWS
•Striped bar in button when released.
•Connects (pressed) or disconnects
(released) the com/nav supplied by
•Connects (pressed) or disconnects Avionics Switched Buses.
(released) the Backup Battery to/from
the electrical system. •Allows prevention of undesirable voltage
transients during APU battery starts on
•24 vDC, 5A lead acid battery, in fwd the ground.
avionic cmpt. in front of FO.
•Backup Batter y charged when •Striped bar in button when released.
button pressed with BATT 1 in AUTO
• BKUP BATT OFF BUS msg when
button released.
•Supplies Backup Hot Bus, providing •ON – Emergency lights ON using the 4 dedicated batteries; 15 min. duration; batteries not charging - EMER LT NOT ARMED
stablized power for the GCU's •OFF – Emergency lights turned off if EMER LTS button on F/A Panel in NORM; batteries not being charged - EMER LT NOT ARMED.
protective function in case of a short- (Switch that turns on the lights is the only switch that can turn them off)
circuit or near zero system voltage. •ARM – Emergency lights off & batteries being charged; lights illuminate automatically in Elec. Emerg.

25 February
May 2006, William
2008 William de Grohde Groh

!
2-8 05.25.2014
! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG II. KV

EMBRAER 145 OVERHEAD CHANNEL B

FUEL 1 (2) LOW LEVEL

•Illuminates red upon fire detection •Fuel remaining ranges from 463 to 584
lbs.
•Pulling will send close cmd to:
FUEL IMBALANCE
Hyd. Pump SOV
•Comes on at 800 lbs difference
Bleed Air SOV
•Goes off at 100 lbs difference
Engine Intake Lip Anti-ice SOV
Fuel SOV (on Hot Bus).
Remember H.A.L.F.
•Rotate CCW fires bottle A & CW fires
bottle B
•Fire bell can be canceled but visual
warning cannot as long as fire signal
exists.

LOW 1 – opens cross-feed valve & shuts off

left selected electric fuel pump
OFF – closes cross-feed valve & returns
•Selects which electric fuel pump will be electric fuel pump to normal operation
operating continuously for that engine
LOW 2 – opens cross-feed valve & shuts off
•Remaining pumps of associated side are right selected electric fuel pump
kept in auto standby
•To cross-feed select tank with lower fuel
•If fuel pressure < 6.5 psi remaining two
pumps come on line & will cycle with •Switch powered by Ess DC Bus 2
inoperative  pump  causing  “clicking”  in  relay  
box.
•Fuel Pump A on associated Essential Bus
•Fuel Pump B on cross-side Essential Bus
•Fuel tank temperature taken from left tank
only & displayed on MFD, FUEL page. •Fuel Pump C on associated DC Bus

• FUEL TANK LO TEMP msg. indicates fuel

temp. inside left tank is < -40ºC
•E1 (2) FUEL LO TEMP msg. indicates engine ON – Energizes selected pump
fuel temp. (leaving FCOC) is < 5ºC. OFF – De-energizes selected pump
•Pressure refueling to full leaves 7.9 U.S.
gallons below fuel tank capacity; must fuel
over wing to get that last 7.9 U.S. gallons.
•To de-fuel left tank set XFEED to LOW 2 and
Tank 1 - ON with de-fuel SOV open
Interphone Control Unit (ICU)

•Allows interphone com

between FA and pilots.
•Generates cabin chime •Generates a cabin chime to call FA

•On  FA’s  Call  Panels:  

•Allows interphone com between pilots and
PILOT FA in case of normal mode failure
•Illuminated CABIN and CAB EMER buttons
•Striped bar when button on ICU, and PILOT and EMER PILOT
when pressed annunciators  on  Attendant’s  Call  Panel
•Striped bar in button when pressed
Same as CABIN button
except  on  F/A’s  Call  Panels:
EMER
PILOT

•Turns on or off the associated lights

DFDR begins recording when RED
BCN switch in ON or A/C is airborne .

25
MayFebruary 2006, William
2008 William de Grohde Groh

!
05.25.2014 2-9
! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG II. KV

EMBRAER 145 OVERHEAD CHANNEL C

Permits testing the fire detection system •Class C baggage compartment
On grnd, if pressed & held > 10 sec. APU •Two cargo extinguisher bottles located in
auto shut down in the same manner as if rear Electrical Compartment
the FUEL SHUTOFF button was pressed.
•Two smoke detectors – Maintenance must
If necessary to repeat fire test, wait at least reset
6 sec.
•Sight glass in lavatory

In the case of APU fire detection, the APU •Button illuminated if smoke detected in
will NOT auto shutdown in flight but will baggage compartment
auto shutdown if A/C on the ground.
•When pressed
Discharges both bottles; the high rate &
•Causes APU Normal Shutdown, and metered discharge bottles
closes APU Fuel Feed SOV in wing stub Deactivates baggage compartment fans
(APU FUEL SOV CLSD EICAS msg) & (if not previously deactivated by smoke
closes APU Main Fuel Solenoid Valve (at detection)
APU)
50 minutes of protection
•Discharges APU fire bottle
•Does NOT illuminate
•Sends stop request to FADEC, and
•30 sec delay, per EPC, before pressing
•Closes APU Fuel Feed SOV in wing stub
(APU FUEL SOV CLSD EICAS msg) & closes
APU Main Fuel Solenoid Valve (at APU)
OFF – De-energizes FADEC, closes APU
Fuel Feed SOV in wing stub (APU FUEL •Striped bar in button when pressed
SOV CLSD EICAS msg) & closes APU
Main Fuel Solenoid Valve (at APU)
APU Normal Shutdown
R.emoves APU indications & alarms when
RPM < 10%, cmds APU shutdown. •Sends stop request to FADEC and closes the
APU Main Fuel Solenoid Valve (at the APU).
ON – Energizes FADEC (Ess DC Bus 2 or
HOT Bus 1), opens APU Fuel Feed SOV,
enables APU indications & alarms on APU start cycle:
EICAS. FADEC performs self-test.
3% (0% airborne): ignition energized & Main
START – Initiates start cycle Fuel Solenoid Valve opens
50%: Starter de-energized
70%: ignition exciter de-energized
Abnormal APU Shutdown:
95%+7sec: Max Fuel Solenoid Valve
In Flight: Overspeed, underspeed, loss of
energized, pneumatic & electrical power
speed data, failure to start, accelerate, or
available
light, external short, or FADEC failure or
loss of signal. If no EGT rise then 1 auto restart (swing start):
starter de-energized at 20% & re-energized at
On Ground: Fire (APU FIRE aural warning
5%.
of 10 sec. or more), EGT over-temperature,
Loss of EGT, high oil temperature, low oil
pressure, oil pressure switch short.
OFF – De-energizes ignition system
AUTO – Active FADECs control ignition
system automatically
One channel for grnd start (14% N2)
RESET – Resets FADEC & clears faults
Both channels for airstart (10% N2)
ALTN – Alternates FADEC in control
Auto-relight (above 53% N2)
•Inoperative if held > 3 sec.
ON – Cmds FADECs to continuously
activate both ignition channels; A & B.

Enabled on grnd only with TLA < 50º First flt of day

1st press – enables T/O Mode setting Cold eng. starts SAT or oil < 5ºC

2nd press – REF TO TEMP External air or Crossbleed start

3rd press – REF A-ICE Contam.runway TO AND < 10ºC.

4th press – stores values. Data accepted if Moderate or > turb. or heavy precip.
REF TO TEMP within +/-10ºC & both
engines running
•T/O Mode: DEC – ALT T/O-1,
INC – T/O-1 or T/O (135/140 only)
•REF TO TEMP: DEC – decreases temp.
STOP – Cmds FADEC to shut engine setting, INC – increases temp. setting
down provided TLA is IDLE
•REF A-ICE: DEC – OFF, INC - ON
RUN – Allows normal engine operations
START – Initiates engine start cycle, and
automatically switches FADEC from the Turns on/off wing landing lights
FADEC that had the last successful engine
start. If held > 3 sec. knob becomes
inoperative. In this case select STOP and
reset the FADEC to reset knob
•Turns on/off both taxi lights & nose
landing light, respectively
•Taxi & nose landing lights automatically
extinguished when nose gear not down &
locked, regardless of switch position
•Shed Bus 2 must be energized (OVRD
with < 3 generators on line)

25
MayFebruary 2006, William
2008 William de Grohde Groh

!
2-10 05.25.2014
! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG II. KV

EMBRAER 145 OVERHEAD CHANNEL D

•Illuminates red upon fire detection

Automatic Rudder Shutoff Through Speed Switch
•Pulling will send close cmd to:
•Rudder limiter for high speed
Hyd. Pump SOV
•Rudder Sys 1 auto shutoff > 135 kts to reduce
Bleed Air SOV rudder authority at high speed
Engine Intake Lip Anti-ice SOV •If Sys 2 fails Sys 1 comes back on line
Fuel SOV. automatically with EICAS message

Remember H.A.L.F. •RUDDER OVERBOOST if neither Sys shuts off

> 135 kts
•Rotate CCW fires bottle A & CW fires
bottle B
•Fire bell can be canceled but visual Rudder Hardover Protection (for low speed)
warning cannot as long as fire signal
•Both Sys 1 & 2 auto shutoff
exists.
Force on any pedal > 130 lbs, and
Rudder deflected > 5º to opposite side, and
Both engines running (N2 > 56.4%)
•Inhibited at higher speeds due to speed switch
logic that reduces rudder authority. Rudder
deflection will not achieve 5º
•Inhibited with OEI operation

•Enables (pressed) or disables

(released) associated hydraulic •Enables (pressed) or disables
system pressure to both aileron (released) associated rudder hydraulic
actuators. actuator.
•Striped bar in button when released •Striped bar in button when released

•Hyd. Pump driven by engine accessory

gear box
Priority Valve
•Provides 3000 + 100 psi @ 9.2 gal/min
•Only on Hyd Sys 1
•E1 (2) HYD PUMP FAIL msg < 1600
•Priority valve closes during ldg psi or N2 < 56.4%
gear operation with only electric
•HYD 1 (2) LO QTY msg if reservoir < 1
hyd. pump supplying system, to
liter
isolate ldg. gear giving priority to
the flight controls. •Reservoir capacity 6 liters

24 hr parking brake or 6 full

Accumulator emerg. brake applications

Emerg. Brake
Accumulator

An accumulator is basically a
“hydraulic  battery”  storing  
hydraulic energy & providing
surge protection.
•Closes (pressed) or opens (released)
engine-driven Hyd. Pump SOV
•Hyd. Pump continues to run if engine
running
•Striped bar in button when released

OFF – Electric Hyd. Pump off

ON – Electric Hyd. Pump on. Provides
2900 + 100 psi @ 1 gal/min
AUTO – Electric Hyd. Pump in standby
ready to come on line if engine driven
pump outlet pressure < 1600 psi or N2 <
56.4%
HYD SYS 1 (2) FAIL msg if hyd.
pressure < 1300 psi

Control logo lights on •Turns signs on or off with a

underside of Control cockpit chime
horizontal stabilizer dome lights at a
fixed intensity •Both signs are automatically
activated when pax O2
dispensing units open

25 February
May 2006, William
2008 William de Grohde Groh

!
05.25.2014 2-11
! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG II. KV

EMBRAER 145 OVERHEAD CHANNEL E

•Off (released) or selects auto mode
•Off (released) or permits (pressed)
(pressed) of wing and/or horizontal stabilizer
automatic activation of engine lip anti-icing
A/I valves. L pneumatic supplies horizontal.
•OPEN inscriptions indicates engine lip anti-
ice valve open •OPEN inscription means valves open with
system  cmd’d  open  or  at  least  one  valve  
•Striped bar in button when released open  with  system  not  cmd’d  open.
•Source is a valve upstream of HSV with no •Striped bar in button when released
temperature control (i.e. EBVs can be
closed & still operate)
•Can be open on the grnd without limitation

•Off (released) or auto mode (pressed)

•On (pressed) or off (released)
•Striped bar in button when released
•Striped bar in button when released
•Pitot 1/2, Pitot/Static 3, AOA 1/2, ADS Static
•Defog mode if no ice detected - maintains
Ports 1,2,3,4, & Press. Static Ports 1/2 are
windshield at 26 C. If ice cond. anti-ice
heated with at least one engine N2 > 56.4%
mode holds windshield at 43 C
•Separate logic ensures Pitot/Static 3 & Press.
•3 sensors, 1 temp control, 1 overheat
protection, 1 spare Sys. Static Port 2 heated in any flight condition

•Should be off when OAT > 10ºC on grnd •TAT 1 & 2 heat when TLs > 65º TLA (~78.5 to
82.5% N1) and assoc. engine A/I system on,
OR anytime inflight.

Power Source
ENG – Inlet A/I valve openSummary
with engine
running. On grnd. with wheel speed > 25 kts
•EICAS msg inhibited during takeoff & landing.

an ICE CONDITION will open WING and

TAIL A/I valves.
AUTO – Allows automatic operation of
bleed air anti-ice system. On grnd. no A/I Permits testing wing, horizontal stabilizer,
valves open. But at wheel speeds > 25 kts and engine anti-ice valves by simulating an
an ICE CONDITION will open all A/I valves ice condition on ice detectors 1 & 2.
(ENG, WING, & TAIL)
ALL – Turns on entire bleed air anti-ice
•Pressed- right pack automatically
system in flight regardless of ice detection.
controlled between 18ºC and 29ºC by
On grnd inlet A/I valve open & when wheel
Digital Temperature Controller
speed > 25 kts the WING and TAIL A/I
valves open, regardless of ice condition. •Pull for manual operation
•ATTD – Control transferred to FA Panel
where green ON light illuminates.
•Pressed- left pack automatically controlled
between 18ºC and 29ºC by Digital
Temperature Controller. •On (pressed) or off (released) AIRBORNE
ONLY
•Pull for manual operation
•Gasper ON with DC Bus 2 energized on grnd
regardless of button position
•On (pressed) or off (released) •Striped bar in button when released
•Controls both recirc fans. On grnd •Supplies gaspers, and ventilation for the O 2
during hot soak days must be OFF; cyl. cmpt., relay boxes, and rear elect. cmpt.
during cold soak days must be ON
•Striped bar in button when released
CLOSED – Closes CBV
OPEN – Opens CBV (CROSS BLD OPEN)
AUTO – Automatic operation of CBV
•Opens (pressed) or closes (released) the •Electrically controlled, pneumatically
Pack Pressure Regulating and SOV (PRSOV) actuated
•Striped bar in button when released
•On grnd, with main door open & pack < •EBV (PRSOV) open (pressed) only when
227ºC PRSOV operates in high mode, other bleed air demanded or closed (released).
times in low mode
•LEAK inscription indicates duct leakage.
•PACK 1 closes with A/I on below 24,600 ft
provided PACK 2 operating •Engine inlet lip A/I taken upstream of HSV

•Max thrust (takeoffs & go-arounds) with EBVs •HSV (14th stage) open during low thrust,
open, Pack Valves automatically close by crossbleed starts, and A/I operations
FADEC when: •9th stage air joins 14th stage, both with
OEI  up  to  9700’  MSL  &  TAT  >19ºC at BACVs, then thru precooler upstream of EBV
S.L. decreasing to -5ºC  at  9700’  MSL •EBV closed by Fire Handle or automatically
AEO  up  to  1700’  AGL  &  TAT  >19ºC   with intense hot air leak (BLD VLV CLOSED)
decreasing to -5ºC  at  9700’  MSL •Used for engine start, ECS, pressurization,
•Must reset Pack Valves after auto shutdown & ice protection

•If both Pack Valves closed in flight the ram

air valves open & recirculation fans auto
shutdown. •Opens (pressed) or closes (released) ABV.
Striped bar in button when pressed
•On the ground the ram air valves are always
closed, regardless of Pack Valve position. •OPEN inscription indicates ABV in open
position
LOW – 80 strokes/min
•APU bleed air not sufficient for A/I
HI – 140 strokes/min
•Auto closes if LH EBV or RH EBV with CBV
TIMER – Intermittent operation, 2 strokes at high are open to prevent reverse flow. BACV
speed with 8 sec. delay downstream of ABV for same purpose.
“BLEED  TEMP”  on  ECS  page  of  MFD  is   Dry windshield protection parks blades until knob •Electrically controlled & pneumatically
taken downstream of precooler. cycled to OFF to reset. actuated
Maximum speed for operation - 160 KIAS

25 February
May 2006, William
2008 William de Grohde Groh

!
2-12 05.25.2014
! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG II. KV

Power Source Summary

!
05.25.2014 2-13
! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG II. KV

!
2-14 05.25.2014
! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG II. KV

!
05.25.2014 2-15
! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG II. KV

System Test Procedures

CVR Test
(Required after crew change)

! Press the TEST button and look for a green status light. If the light does
not illuminate, plug a headset into the CVR panel, press the TEST button
again, and listen for a high pitch tone. If there is no green light and no
tone, the CVR test has failed.!

Light Test
(Not required)

! Hold the light test switch (if installed) in the TEST position to check for
inoperative light bulbs. The following buttons will not illuminate during the test:
o GPU
o APU EXTG, BAGG EXTG, and fire handles
o STORE
o ATTD CALL

Fuel Pump Test

(Required on the first flight of the day for the aircraft)

! Turn the fuel pump power control knobs to ON, ensure both fuel pumps are on (verify on the MFD fuel
page), and select the next set of pumps (for example, if the previous flight came in using pumps B, switch
to C).
! Test the crossfeed function:

o Crossfeed knob to LOW 1 – Verify the tank 1 pump is off and the FUEL XFEED
OPEN advisory message is on the EICAS.
o Crossfeed knob to OFF – Verify the FUEL XFEED OPEN advisory message is
removed from the EICAS and the tank 1 fuel pump comes back on.
o Crossfeed knob to LOW 2 – Verify the tank 2 pump is off and the FUEL XFEED
OPEN advisory message is on the EICAS.
o Crossfeed knob to OFF – Verify the FUEL XFEED OPEN advisory message is
removed from the EICAS and the tank 2 fuel pump comes back on.

On the EMB-145XR, make sure the ventral tank fuel transfer knob is in AUTO and alternate the
transfer pump each flight.

Fire Detection Test

(Required on the first flight of the day for the aircraft)

! Press and hold the TEST button. During the test, verify:
o Fire extinguishing handles illuminate
o BAGG EXTG button illuminates
o Master warning annunciators illuminate
o Master caution annunciators illuminate
o Fire bell sounds (press the master warning annunciator to stop the bell)
o EICAS messages
! ENG 1-2 FIRE warning
! APU FIRE warning
! BAGG SMOKE warning
! ENG 1-2 FIRE DET FAIL caution
! APU FIRE DET FAIL caution

! NOTE: If you hold the TEST button for less than two seconds, the BAGG EXTG
button may stay illuminated after the test. Perform the test again to reset.
!

!
2-16 05.25.2014
! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG II. KV

Hydraulic Pump Test

(Required on the first flight of the day for the aircraft)

! During this test, the hydraulic systems will be pressurized. To prevent the nose
gear steering system from activating while the towbar is connected, (which could
cause serious damage and injury) press the steering disengage button on the
back of the yoke and ensure the STEER INOP caution message is on the EICAS
indicating that the steering is disengaged. Also, advise the Captain not to touch
the tiller.
! While monitoring the MFD hydraulic page, turn both electric pump control knobs
to AUTO.
! Verify the pumps come on – “ON” indication on the hydraulic page and pressure is at 2,900-psi +/-200 psi.
! Switch both electric hydraulic pump control knobs to the ON position and verify no change.
! Turn the electric hydraulic pump control knobs OFF. Verify the hydraulic pressure decreases on the MFD.

Autopilot Test
(Required after crew change)

! Ensure the flight director is coupled to your side.

! Release the gust lock and move the yoke to a neutral position.
! Engage the autopilot by pressing the AP button on the flight guidance control panel. The yaw damper
should come on automatically. Verify AP and YD indications are displayed on the PFD Flight Mode
Annunciator (FMS).
! Press and release the red quick disconnect button on the yoke. This should disengage the autopilot and
the yaw damper. Cancel the “Autopilot” aural warning either by clicking the TCS button, or by pressing the
quick disconnect button again.
! Couple the flight director to the other side and ensure it transfers.

Oxygen Mask Test

(Required after crew change)

! Release the BOOM/MASK button on the digital audio panel to the MASK position to
test the oxygen mask microphone.
! Ensure the microphone selector on the yoke is in the HOT position, the speaker is off,
and the speaker volume is up.
! Check that the mode selector on the face of the oxygen mask is in the 100% position.
! Press the test button on the oxygen mask compartment. Verify the flow indicator turns
yellow and ensure you hear the oxygen flow over the flight deck speakers.
! Then reselect the BOOM/MASK button to the MASK position on the digital audio panel.

!
05.25.2014 2-17
! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG II. KV

Reversionary Panel Test

(Required on the first flight of the day for the aircraft)

! Move the MFD knob to the PFD position, verify the PFD information
is now on the MFD screen and the PFD screen is blank.
! Move the knob to the EICAS position (no need to stop at NORM)
and verify the EICAS information is on the MFD and the EICAS
screen is blank.
! Switch back to the NORM position.
! Press the ADC reversion button. Verify the altimeter, airspeed, VSI, and temperature indications are valid.
Note the ADC2 amber flag on both PFDs. The flag notifies both pilots that only one ADC is being used and
therefore, the automatic comparison feature is inoperative.
! Release the ADC reversion button and press the AHRS button. Verify the heading and attitude indications
are valid. Note the MAG1 (2) and ATT1 (2) flags on the PFD and another MAG1 (2) flag on the MFD map view.
! Release the AHRS button and press the SG button. Make sure all screen instruments are valid; note the
SG1 (2), ADC1 (2), MAG1 (2), and ATT1 (2) flags. Release the button.

TCAS Test
(Required on the first flight of the day for the aircraft)

! Set both RMU TCAS display modes to AUTO (PGE button, then ATC/TCAS).!
! Select the transponder code, then press and hold TST until the test starts.!
! Verify that the TCAS display appears on both MFDs and both vertical speed indicators display vertical
speed guidance.!
! A successful test is indicated by the, “TCAS test pass” aural message.!

Stall Protection System Test

(Required before every flight)

! Release the gust lock and move the yoke back to a neutral position. Then press and release the stall
protection test button. The following should occur:
o Stick shakers activate
o Aural warning (high pitch beep)
o Pitch Limit Indicator (PLI) appears on the attitude indicators
o Stick pusher (no need to oppose the yoke) activates
o The SPS/ICE SPEEDS advisory message is removed from the EICAS (if it was present)
o SPS TEST button light extinguishes

!
2-18 05.25.2014
! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG II. KV

Ice Protection Test B

(Required on the first flight of the day for the aircraft unless ice protection test A is performed)

Ice protection test B can be done when icing conditions are not expected during the
takeoff and initial climb phases. It is done in two parts. Part one is done on the
ground and tests the ice detection system. Part two is done in flight and tests the
thermal anti-icing system.

Ice Protection Test B, Part One:

! Close the APU and engine bleed valves (buttons deselected).

! The position of the crossbleed knob does not matter.
! Open both PACK valves. Opening the PACK valves removes residual air
from the pneumatic system.
! Set the ice detection override knob to the AUTO position.
! Hold the ice detection test knob in position 1 for 10 seconds. This will
generate a false icing signal causing the following EICAS messages to
appear:
o ICE DET 1 FAIL caution message
o BLD 1 LOW TEMP caution message (takes up to 10 seconds to appear)
o ICE CONDITION advisory message
! Verify no other caution or warning messages appear.
On the EMB-145XR, the following additional messages and indications only appear when the ice
detection test knob is held in position 1:
o CLR ICE 1 caution message
o CLR ICE 2 caution message
o CLR/I INOP 1 caution message
o CLR/I INOP 2 caution message
o CLR ICE 1 glareshield light illuminates
o CLR ICE 2 glareshield light illuminates
! Release the ice detection test knob and verify that the messages are removed from the EICAS.
! Hold the ice detection test knob in position 2 for 10 seconds. This will generate a false icing signal
causing the following EICAS messages to appear:
o ICE DET 2 FAIL caution message
o BLD 2 LOW TEMP caution message (takes up to 10 seconds to appear)
o ICE CONDITION advisory message
! Verify no other caution or warning messages appear.

Ice Protection Test B, Part Two:

After takeoff between 2,000 feet AGL and 23,000 feet MSL with the SAT below 10°C and the thrust levers in
the THRUST SET position:
! Set the ice detection override knob to the ALL position for 20 seconds.
! Verify all four OPEN inscriptions in the engine air inlet, wing, and horizontal stabilizer anti-icing buttons
illuminate.
! NO ICE A/I ON caution message is displayed on the EICAS.
! Verify that the E1 (2) A/ICE FAIL, STAB A/I FAIL, and WG A/I FAIL caution messages do not appear.

NOTE: Since the air portion of ice protection test B cannot be done below 2,000 feet AGL
and takes 20 seconds to complete, ice protection test A should be completed before
takeoff if icing conditions are expected below 3,000 feet AGL on the first flight of the day.
! !

!
05.25.2014 2-19
! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG II. KV

Ice Protection Test A

(Required on the first flight of the day for the aircraft unless ice protection test B is performed)

If ice protection test B cannot be completed prior to entering icing conditions, ice
protection test A must be performed. Ice protection test A tests the ice detection
system and the thermal anti-icing system while the aircraft is on the ground.
Because the thermal anti-icing system is tested, both engines must be set to a
minimum of 83% N2 to provide adequate bleed air. Consideration must be taken for
objects behind the aircraft so coordinate with ATC/ground personnel if able. The
test cannot be done while taxing; the parking brake must be set. To perform ice
protection test A:

! Set the parking brake. Verify that the BRAKE ON light illuminates.
! Set thrust to 83% N2.
! Close the APU bleed valve and open both engine bleed valves.
! Set the cross-bleed knob to the AUTO position.
! Set the ice detection override knob to the ALL position. Verify both OPEN inscriptions in the engine air
inlet anti-icing buttons illuminate.
! Hold the ice detection test knob in position 1 for at least 10 seconds but no more than 15 seconds.
The test knob overrides the wing and horizontal stabilizer anti-icing valve groundspeed logic, so the
OPEN inscriptions in the wing and horizontal stabilizer anti-icing buttons should illuminate. This also
generates a false icing signal causing the following EICAS messages to appear:
o ICE DET 1 FAIL caution message
o BLD 1 LOW TEMP caution message (takes up to 10 seconds to appear)
o ICE CONDITION advisory message
! Verify that the E1 (2) A/ICE FAIL, STAB A/I FAIL, and WG A/I FAIL caution messages do not appear.
On the EMB-145XR, the following additional messages and indications only appear when the ice
detection test knob is held in position 1:
o CLR ICE 1 caution message
o CLR ICE 2 caution message
o CLR/I INOP 1 caution message
o CLR/I INOP 2 caution message
o CLR ICE 1 glareshield light illuminates
o CLR ICE 2 glareshield light illuminates
! Release the ice detection test knob and verify that the messages are removed from the EICAS.
! Hold the ice detection test knob in position 2 for at least 10 seconds but no more than 15 seconds.
The test knob overrides the wing and horizontal stabilizer anti-icing valve groundspeed logic, so the
OPEN inscriptions in the wing and horizontal stabilizer anti-icing buttons should illuminate. This also
generates a false icing signal causing the following EICAS messages to appear:
o ICE DET 2 FAIL caution message
o BLD 2 LOW TEMP caution message (takes up to 10 seconds to appear)
o ICE CONDITION advisory message
! Verify that the E1 (2) A/ICE FAIL, STAB A/I FAIL, and WG A/I FAIL caution messages do not appear.
! When the test is complete, return the ice detection override knob to AUTO or ENG and set the bleeds
as required for takeoff.

NOTE: Since the air portion of ice protection test B cannot be done below 2,000 feet AGL
and takes 20 seconds to complete, ice protection test A should be completed before
! takeoff if icing conditions are expected below 3,000 feet AGL on the first flight of the day.
!
NOTE: Due to the high thrust setting during ice protection test A, the aircraft may slide
during the test if the airport surfaces are slippery. If a suitable area cannot be found to
perform ice protection test A, the test can be delayed until the next flight.
!

!
2-20 05.25.2014
! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG III. SPOT

III. SPECIAL PURPOSE OPERATIONAL TRAINING

All Engine Departure Hierarchy Flow Chart

!
Is there an all engine special
procedure (10-0 page)?
!

YES NO
! !

Fly as published Are you cleared via an

! RNAV SID or a SID with
a published heading?
!

YES NO
! !

Does the SID tell Are you cleared via

you when to turn? radar vectors or a SID
! with radar vectors?
!
YES NO
! !
YES NO
Turn as published Turn at 400’ AFE ! !
! !
Is it IMC? Is there a
! published ODP?
!
YES NO
! !
YES NO
Is there a Turn at 400’ AFE ! !
published ODP? !
! Turn as published Is it IMC?
! !
YES NO
! ! YES NO
! !
Turn at 400’ AFE Turn at 1,000’ AFE
! ! Turn at 1,000’ AFE Turn at 400’ AFE
! !

Single Engine Departure Hierarchy

EFP Type Conditions Procedure
Standard VMC or IMC EFP to 1,000’ AFE
VMC EFP to 1,000 AFE
Simple Special
IMC EFP to 1,000 AFE and continue climb to 3,000’ AFE
Complex Special (10-0 page) VMC or IMC Full EFP unless radar vectors are permitted

Single Engine Missed Approach Hierarchy

EFP Type Approach Procedure
Visual Visual
Standard
IAP Published MAP
Visual EFP to 1,000 AFE
Simple Special
IAP EFP to 1,000 AFE and either radar vectors or continue climb to 3,000’ AFE
Complex Special (10-0 page) Visual or IAP Full EFP unless radar vectors are permitted

!
05.25.2014 3-1
! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG III. SPOT

Approach Navigation Sources

LOC-Based Precision Approaches
PF PM

Approach NAVAID Approach NAVAID

LOC-Based Non-Precision Approaches

PF PM

Approach NAVAID FMS

Ground-Based Non-Precision Approaches (Non-LOC)

PF PM

FMS Approach NAVAID

RNAV Overlay Approaches (“VOR or GPS” in approach title)

Dual FMS Single FMS
PF PM PF PM

FMS FMS FMS Approach NAVAID

RNAV Approaches
PF PM

FMS FMS

!
3-2 05.25.2014
! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG IV. MV

IV. MANEUVERS VALIDATION

Steep Turns
Entry
The gear should be up and the flaps should be at 0°. Select takeoff thrust via the
thrust-rating button and establish the aircraft in straight and level flight at 200
knots. N1 should be around 60% and the pitch should be near 4°.
Turn the autopilot and yaw damper off. Have the PM turn off the flight director
and couple the autopilot to the PM’s side.

Right Turn
Quickly and smoothly roll the aircraft to the right towards 45°. When passing 30°
of bank, increase pitch to 7° and increase N1 to 64%.
When approaching 20° prior to the initial heading, begin the rollout. When
passing through 30° of bank, reduce pitch back to 4° and reduce N1 back to 60%.
It is important to quickly roll the aircraft in and out of the turn as this aids in
aircraft control. Once the aircraft is established at a constant bank, it is easier to
adjust pitch and power to maintain altitude and airspeed. If the aircraft is slowly
rolled, the pitch and power needed for level flight constantly changes. By rolling
quickly, you only have to focus on controlling the aircraft at two bank angles (0°
and 45°).

Left Turn
As the aircraft returns to the initial heading, quickly and smoothly roll the aircraft
to the left towards 45°. When passing 30° of bank, increase pitch to 7° and
increase N1 to 64%.
When approaching 20° prior to the initial heading, begin the rollout. When
passing through 30° of bank, reduce pitch back to 4° and reduce N1 back to 60%.

Exit
Return the aircraft to the initial heading and altitude while maintaining 200 KIAS.
Have the PM turn the flight director back on and couple it to your side. Then have
the PM engage the autopilot.

!
05.25.2014 4-1
! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG IV. MV

Stalls
The primary goal in stall recovery is to reduce the angle of attack. The secondary goal is to minimize altitude loss.
At the first indication of a stall (stick shaker or perceptible buffet):
! Adjust the pitch attitude to reduce the angle of attack
! Level the wings
! Apply maximum thrust
The amount of altitude loss will vary depending on the density altitude, weight, bank angle, and configuration. A
departure stall will result in little to no altitude loss while a stall at cruise will result in significant altitude loss (can
exceed 1,500 feet).
If an EGPWS warning occurs during a stall recover, set the aircraft pitch to the PLI. This will cause the stick
shaker to remain activated but it will also provide maximum lift while preventing an actual stall. This will increase
the likelihood of avoiding the terrain and should allow you to gain enough altitude to fully recover from the stall.
Departure Stall

“GEAR UP SPEED”

“FRA”

“THRUST SET,
84.5%”

“CROSSCHECKED”

Cruise Stall

Approach Stall

OR “GEAR UP, SPEED, NAV”

!
4-2 05.25.2014
! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG IV. MV

Windshear Escape Maneuver

The windshear detection and escape guidance system detects possible
windshear and provides escape guidance when necessary. It arms below
1,500 feet AGL.
The detection system recognizes either an increasing performance windshear
or a decreasing performance windshear event. When an increasing
performance windshear event is detected, an amber WDSHEAR annunciation
is presented on the PFDs. The escape guidance system will automatically
activate if the flight director is in the TO or GA modes. When a decreasing
performance windshear event is detected, a red WDSHEAR annunciation is
presented on the PFDs. The escape guidance system will automatically
activate if the flight director is in the TO or GA modes or if the thrust levers are
above 78°. The escape guidance system can also be manually activated by
pressing the go-around buttons on the thrust levers when either windshear
annunciation is present.
The guidance system will provide flight director commands to first avoid a stall
(alpha), then to prevent the aircraft from descending (gamma), and finally to
prevent VMO/MMO from being exceeded (speed target). Escape guidance is
cancelled when any of the following occur:
! ! FLC, VS, SPD, or ALT flight director modes are selected
! Invalid AHRS, ADC, or SPS
! RA greater than 1,500 feet
Whenever a windshear warning annunciator is shown:
! Press the go-around buttons on the thrust levers
! Disengage the autopilot
! Apply maximum thrust
! Follow the flight director
! Do not change the aircraft configuration
! If ground contact is imminent, pitch to the PLI

It is important that no configuration changes are made until all windshear indications are removed and ground
contact is no longer a factor.

!
05.25.2014 4-3
! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG IV. MV

Aborted Takeoff

“THRUST SET, 84.2%”

“CRO SSCHECKED”

On a right seat takeoff, at “Thrust set,” the Captain takes the thrust levers. When calling, “Abort, abort, I have the
aircraft,” the Captain takes the aircraft from the First Officer and applies maximum braking and reverse thrust.
On a left seat takeoff, it is very important for the First Officer to call out what the abnormal indication is, including
reading the indication or EICAS message out loud. This gives the Captain the information to decide whether or not
to abort. If an EICAS message appears and the First Officer doesn’t read it out loud, the Captain may not be able
to look at the screen and will decide to abort when it may not have been the best decision. All takeoffs should be
aborted if any of the following five EICAS messages appear (remember “FAILD”):
! ENG1 (2) REV FAIL caution message
! E1 (2) ATTCS NO MRGN warning message
! ICE COND-A/I INOP warning message
! E1 (2) LOW N1 warning message
! ENG1 (2) REV DISAGREE caution message
Below 80 knots is the ‘low speed regime’ and it is safe to abort for any abnormal indication. Faster than 80 knots
is the ‘high speed regime.’ Only abort a takeoff above 80 knots for severe engine problems, directional control
problems, or if the structural integrity or ability of the aircraft to fly is in doubt.
Do not perform any immediate action items for the malfunction (such as engine fire on the ground) until the aircraft
is at a complete stop.
Aborting after V1 is prohibited. If your takeoff weight was limited by the runway limit, you will most likely run off the
end of the runway before being able to stop if initiating the abort at V1 or higher.
When the aircraft comes to a complete stop perform:
! Aborted Takeoff IAC
! QRH for the malfunction
! Finish the Aborted Takeoff IAC
! After Landing Checklist
or
! Aborted Takeoff IAC
! Evacuation IAC

!
4-4 05.25.2014
! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG IV. MV

Engine Failure/Fire During Takeoff

After rotation, pitch for V2. This allows a maximum bank angle of 14° without stalling and provides a sufficient
climb gradient. If loss of thrust occurs, aircraft pitch should not exceed 14° (13° for flaps 18° takeoff) when below
the flap retraction altitude.
The Engine Failure Path (EFP) must be flown regardless of previous ATC instructions. Notify the tower of your
intentions since they are not familiar with the EFPs ExpressJet uses. If a heading is required, the Pilot Flying will
call, “Heading, low bank” and the Pilot Monitoring will select the HDG lateral mode and the low bank feature. If the
EFP is standard (runway heading to 1,000 feet AFE), then radar vectors can be accepted when reaching 1,000
feet AFE. If there is a simple special EFP, turns can be made above 50 feet AFE to comply with the EFP. Radar
vectors can be accepted when reaching 1,000 feet AFE, but a climb to 3,000 feet AFE should be made if in IMC.
If there is a complex special (10-0 page), the full procedure must be flown unless radar vectors are permitted in
the procedure.
Do not perform immediate action items, QRH, or checklists until reaching a safe altitude (at least 1,500 feet above
the airport elevation).
Above a safe altitude (1,500 feet above the airport elevation), perform:
! The “Engine Failure/Precautionary Engine Shutdown” QRH or “Engine Fire/Severe Damage” memory
items/IAC
! Notify ATC
! N.T.S.B. the Flight Attendant
! Notify Dispatch
Engine Failure/Fire at V1 – Flaps 9°

Engine Failure/Fire at V1 – Flaps 18°

!
05.25.2014 4-5
! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG IV. MV

Single Engine Approach

Strategic use of drag is crucial to effectively flying a single engine approach. The EMB-145 has a low drag
airframe and a single AE-3007 engine provides sufficient thrust in the terminal environment. At idle thrust with
One Engine Inoperative (OEI), the aircraft behaves similarly as with two engines. However, when thrust is
increased to full power with OEI, a considerable amount of aileron and rudder correction is needed to maintain
heading. In order to minimize the changes in aileron and rudder correction during the approach, drag is used to
keep the engine spooled up at a near constant thrust. Below is a rough gouge on thrust and configuration settings
for a single engine approach. It is important to remember that the numbers below are only rough estimates that
cannot be expected to work in all circumstances
To maintain VREF+5 KIAS while descending at 700 fpm with the landing gear down and flaps set to 22° requires a
thrust setting of 69% N1 at 42,000 lbs. Since aircraft control with one engine is mainly affected by thrust, N1 should
be kept near 69% as much as possible.
The worst-case scenario for a single engine approach is if you are vectored for an ILS approach at the FAF
altitude. This requires you to slow the aircraft to VREF+5 KIAS in less than a minute while descending with the
thrust near 69% N1. To accomplish this, slow the aircraft to 180 KIAS with the flaps at 0° on the base leg. This
should result in an N1 of 69%. When a descent to the FAF altitude is permitted, extend the flaps to 9°, and
commence a descent at 1,000 fpm. As the aircraft levels off, extend the flaps to 22° and allow the airspeed to
decelerate towards 150 KIAS. As the glideslope is captured, extend the gear to allow the aircraft to descend while
slowing to VREF+5 KIAS at 69% N1. During the flare, it is important to remember that as thrust is reduced to idle,
the aileron and rudder correction required for the approach thrust setting will need to be smoothly reduced.

Single Engine Approach Gouge

SELECT FLAPS 9

SELECT FLAPS 22 EXTEND THE GEAR

N1: 69%
180 KIAS

N1: 69% N1 : 69%

180 KIAS & SLOWING VREF +5 KIAS

NOTE: Prior to passing the FAF ensure the autopilot is disengaged.

!
4-6 05.25.2014
! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG IV. MV

Go Around
Either pilot should initiate a go around whenever a safe landing is in doubt. A go around is required if the aircraft is
not stabilized by 1,000 feet above the touchdown zone elevation in IMC or 500 feet above the touchdown zone
elevation in VMC. A go around must also be performed if the required visual references are not sighted by the
DA/DDA/MAP, when the FMS performance requirements are not met on an FMS-based approach, or when CAT II
performance requirements are not met on a CAT II approach.

NOTE: Although a go around can be initiated at any point of the approach, only climbs
may be performed before the MAP. Turns must not be made before reaching the MAP.

When a go around is necessary, either the Pilot Flying or the Pilot Monitoring can call, “Go around.” The Pilot
Flying will respond by pressing the TOGA buttons, smoothly rotating to a 10° nose up pitch attitude, and
advancing the thrust levers full forward (past the detent). The Pilot Flying will call, “Go around, max thrust.” The
Pilot Monitoring will ensure the go around mode is indicated on the FMA and the engines are developing
maximum thrust. Above VREF, the Pilot Flying will call, “Flaps 9.” After a positive rate of climb is announced, the
Pilot Flying will call, “Gear up, speed, NAV/(or other desired lateral mode).” The Pilot Monitoring will raise the
gear, select the SPD vertical mode, move the speed bug to VGA9, and select the desired lateral mode.
Normally, the FMS should be used for the missed approach procedure. If the FMS will be used for the missed
approached procedure, the Pilot Flying will call, “Gear up, speed, NAV” after the “Positive rate “ call is made. The
Pilot Monitoring should ensure that the Pilot Flying has selected the FMS as the primary navigation source prior to
selecting the NAV lateral mode. If the FMS is not going to used for the missed approach procedure, the Pilot
Flying will call, “Gear up, speed” after the “Positive rate” call. When a specific heading is required, the Pilot Flying
will call, “Heading.” Also, the low bank feature must be used when conducting a single engine go around.
When the flap retraction altitude is reached, the Pilot Monitoring will call, “FRA.” The Pilot Flying will then call,
“Flight level change/speed ___/vertical speed ___.” When accelerating through V2+15 KIAS, the Pilot Flying will
call, “Flaps 0”, set climb (meaning press CLB, BNK if low bank was selected, and YD), after takeoff check.”
During a single engine go around, the flight path is dependent on the type of approach (visual or IAP), flight
conditions, and the EFP for the runway. If conducting a visual approach to a runway with a standard EFP, the go
around can be performed visually. If conducting an IAP to a runway with a standard EFP, the published missed
approach procedure must be flown. If conducting any type of approach to a runway with a simple special EFP, the
EFP must be flown to 1,000 feet AFE. If in IMC, radar vectors can then be accepted but a climb to 3,000 feet AFE
should be made. If conducting any type of approach to a runway with a complex special EFP (10-0 page), the full
procedure must be flown unless radar vectors are permitted in the procedure.
Two Engine Go Around

Single Engine Go Around

!
05.25.2014 4-7
! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG IV. MV

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

!
4-8 05.25.2014
! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG V. LOE

V. LINE OPERATIONAL EVALUATION

Emergency Procedures
In the event of a system failure or other malfunction, comply with the following procedures:
1. When a discrepancy is noted, inform the other pilot.

NOTE: Aural warnings may be silenced as soon as the cause of the warning is determined.

2. The Pilot Flying will call for the appropriate checklist. All actions will be accomplished under the
direction and/or supervision of the Captain.
3. When accomplishing the checklist, the Pilot Monitoring should:
! Read the challenge to identify the item.
! Call out the response to determine the action.
! Perform the appropriate action.
! Notify the Pilot Flying when the checklist is complete.

NOTE: The Pilot Flying should fly the aircraft first and monitor the Pilot Monitoring’s actions second.

Critical emergency procedures are located on the Immediate Action Checklist (IAC). Within the IAC are time
sensitive items that must be performed from memory by the flight crew when required. The black boxes on the
IAC indicate which steps are memory items.
When a memory item must be performed, the Pilot Flying will announce the memory item to be done and call out
each step for the Pilot Monitoring to perform. The Pilot Monitoring will place their hand on the control that the Pilot
Flying called for. The Pilot Flying will confirm that the Pilot Monitoring has selected the correct control and then the
Pilot Flying will announce the action the Pilot Monitoring is to perform with that control. When the memory items
are completed, the Pilot Monitoring will then take the IAC and do all items (including the memory item) on the IAC
procedure. The IAC will then reference a Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) procedure to accomplish.

Threat and Error Management (TEM)

An Introduction to TEM
TEM is the next generation of CRM that incorporates non-technical skills and behaviors designed to reduce risk
and increase safety. No plane has crashed because a crewmember did not know the definition of a stabilized
approach, but planes have crashed because crewmembers did not notice the approach was unstable, did not
care that the approach was unstable, or did not know how to effectively remedy an unstable approach. Unlike
dedicated aircraft safety systems, TEM is the only tool that directly addresses human factors.
Safety used to be improved by creating new systems such as EGPWS or TCAS in order to stop an accident chain
at the final link. TEM attempts to stop the accident chain much earlier. That way the outcome is not dependent on
the performance of an automatic safety system (such as a stick pusher) or extreme piloting skill (such as
salvaging an unstable approach). TEM is based on four principles:
! Inevitability of error
! Conscientious adherence to standards
! Crew concept
! The value of learning
! Risk

Risk is the probability of something happening multiplied by the resulting cost or benefit if it does. It is
impossible to eliminate risk. Instead, risk must be managed to an acceptable level. Risk can be managed with
the following items:
! FARs
! Aircraft limitations
! Company policies
! SOPs
! Airmanship
!
!
05.25.2014 5-1
! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG V. LOE
While things like FARs and limitations can be held to objective standards, airmanship is a subjective quality.
Airmanship itself is made of several different components:
! Professionalism
! Experience
! Technical knowledge
! Piloting ability
! Aeronautical decision making
! TEM skills
!
Unlike the other components of airmanship, TEM is the only one that requires you to work effectively with
other people.
TEM becomes critical when all other risk management tools have failed to maintain a minimum level of safety.
When an abnormal situation arises that current procedures do not address, the crew must use TEM to
achieve a safe outcome. When an abnormal situation requires creative action from the crew, the following
should be considered in the decision making process:
! Ensure no SOP exists to address the abnormality
! Obtain relevant information about the abnormality
! Solicit input from stakeholders
! Establish a minimum level of safety
! Develop possible solutions
! Revise the plan when new information becomes available
! Resolve conflicts of opinion
! Investigate conflicting information
Undesired Aircraft State (UAS)
A UAS is a situation that results in unnecessary risk. A UAS does not mean the outcome will be an
accident/incident, it means that the chance of an accident/incident is greater than it should be. A UAS that
results in a positive outcome is just as bad as a UAS that results in a negative outcome. Because the
outcome of an event does not determine whether or not a UAS occurred, UASs occur much more frequently
than most people think.
Published Standards
Published standards (regulations, SOPs, etc.) cannot address every possible situation. They create a passive
safety net to catch common and/or critical errors. TEM is an active safety net that requires creative and
conscientious participation from crewmembers. By ensuring published standards are complied with, the crew
can focus on effective TEM to catch errors that published standards cannot account for.
Threats and Errors
A threat is an event or condition that was not caused by the crew which increases the operational complexity of a
flight and may require crew attention and action in order to maintain adequate safety margins. To prevent a threat
from developing into a UAS, the threat must be identified. Common threats include:
! Adverse weather
! Fatigue
! MELs
! Unfamiliar airports
! New/infrequently used procedures
Threats are often overlooked as just “part of the job,” but they need to be verbally announced so that all
crewmembers are aware that the threat must be addressed.
An error is an action or inaction by the flightcrew that leads to deviations from organizational or crew intentions
and/or expectations. Threats are placed on the crew, but errors come from the crew. Errors must be avoided
when possible. Following published standards is a good way to ensure this.
Avoid and Trap
It is impossible to identify all threats and avoid all errors, but when an error is made, the error must be
‘trapped’ before the error becomes consequential. Crosschecking is a common way we trap errors. One pilot
may make an error in the flight plan, but the other pilot can trap that error if they crosscheck the flight plan.

!
5-2 05.25.2014
! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG V. LOE
Mitigate
If an error is not trapped, the crew must take action to bring the flight back in line with normal safety
parameters. If an error is trapped early on, error mitigation is easy. If one pilot sets an incorrect altitude, the
other pilot can confirm to correct altitude with ATC and adjust the autopilot before that altitude is reached. If
an error is not trapped soon enough a UAS will develop. When a UAS develops, it requires immediate action.
UAS Mitigation
When a UAS occurs, errors have already been made and safety may have been compromised. It is
important to correct the UAS first before trapping the errors that caused the UAS. Incorrect UAS
mitigation can worsen the situation. For example, if the wrong approach is loaded into the FMS, having
both pilots focus on the FMS instead of the approach can cause the approach to become unstable. In
that case, both pilots are fixated on fixing the error rather than mitigating the UAS. It is important for a
crew to recognize when a UAS has developed so that they can transition from avoiding, trapping, and
mitigating errors to mitigating the UAS.
Management
The management component on TEM consists of three countermeasures:
! Planning
! Execution
! Evaluation
Planning countermeasures get the entire crew ahead of the aircraft. Effective communication is key. When both
pilots communicate what they want to accomplish and how they will accomplish it, the situational awareness of
the entire crew is enhanced. Failure to communicate goals and intentions prevents the other pilot from identifying
threats to the plan. Communicating goals and intentions allows the other pilot to anticipate your actions and
advise you when the situation no longer matches your expectations.
Execution countermeasures prevent, trap, and correct errors. This involves monitoring, crosschecking, managing
workload, and managing automation. Effective monitoring means scanning the correct instruments to determine
that the flight is proceeding as expected. Crosschecking involves verifying the actions of the other pilot or the
performance of automatic systems. The goal of workload management is to accomplish tasks during low threat
phases of flight and prioritize actions during high threat phases. Automation management means the crew
chooses the most effective level of automation, announces changes made, and verifies that the automation is
performing as desired.
Evaluation countermeasures allow plans to be modified as situations change. This requires crewmembers to
make inquires about the current plan and advocate when they feel uncomfortable. When an inquiry is made or the
other pilot is uncomfortable, more information must be obtained. If more information does not resolve the problem,
the pilot must state their concern and suggest an alternate course of action.

Effective Behavioral Markers

CRM Environment
! Leadership/Followership
! Vigilance
! Interpersonal Relationships
! Communication/Decision Making
! Crew Self-Critique

TEM: Planning TEM: Execution TEM: Evaluation

! Briefings ! Monitor/Crosscheck ! Evaluation/Modification of
! Plans Stated ! Workload Management Plans
! Workload Assignment ! Automation Management ! Inquiry and Advocacy
! Contingency Management ! Assertiveness

!
05.25.2014 5-3
! EMB-145/EMB-135 RG V. LOE
TEM Evaluation
The outcome of an LOE is dependent on how both pilots
implement TEM. The instructor and the LOE scenario impose
threats on the crew. Those threats may contribute to errors made
by the crew. Those errors can then lead to a UAS. The UAS can
then lead to an incident or accident.

When threats are identified, they can be managed by developing

plans to prevent the threats from impacting safety. Errors should
be avoided, but if they do occur, error management techniques can
trap and mitigate them. Finally, if an error does allow a UAS to
develop, proper UAS management should result in a positive
outcome.

During the LOE, the whole crew is evaluated on how well TEM is implemented. Only if the crew allows a UAS to
result in a negative outcome can they fail the LOE. Even if a UAS develops, the crew can still pass the LOE if the
UAS is properly mitigated. Just like an actual flight, there are only two outcomes of the LOE; either both
crewmembers fail or both crewmembers pass.
Conclusion
Compared to technical knowledge, FARs, and company policies, TEM is constantly evolving and requires pilots to
continually develop their TEM skills. By identifying threats, avoiding errors, trapping errors that fail to be avoided,
mitigating errors that do not get trapped, and managing each phase of flight, possible accidents can be prevented
long before they are even noticed by the crew.

!
5-4 05.25.2014