Arceo v. People
Arceo v. People
Arceo v. People
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G.R. No. 142641. July 17, 2006.
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* SECOND DIVISION.
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less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less
than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in
no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court. The same penalty shall be
imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep
sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check
if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing
thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank. Where the
check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons
who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under
this Act.
Same; Same; The 90-day period provided in the law is not an element
of the offense, neither does it discharge petitioner from his duty to maintain
sufficient funds in the account within a reasonable time from the date
indicated in the check.—In Wong v. Court of Appeals, 351 SCRA 100
(2001), the Court ruled that the 90-day period provided in the law is not an
element of the offense. Neither does it discharge petitioner from his duty to
maintain sufficient funds in the account within a reasonable time from the
date indicated in the check. According to current banking practice, the
reasonable period within which to present a check to the drawee bank is six
months. Thereafter, the check becomes stale and the drawer is discharged
from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay.
Same; Same; The presentment of the check to the drawee bank 120
days after its issue was still within the allowable period.—Cenizal’s
presentment of the check to the drawee bank 120 days (four months) after
its issue was still within the allowable period. Petitioner was freed neither
from the obligation to keep sufficient funds in his account nor from liability
resulting from the dishonor of the check.
Evidence; Best Evidence Rule; The best evidence rule applies only
where the content of the document is the subject of inquiry, and not where
the issue is the execution or existence of the document or the circumstances
surrounding its execution.—Petitioner’s insistence on the presentation of the
check in evidence as a condition sine qua non for conviction under BP 22 is
wrong. Petitioner anchors his argument on Rule 130, Section 3, of the Rules
of Court, otherwise known as the best evidence rule. However, the rule
applies only where the content of the document is the subject of the inquiry.
Where the issue is the execution or existence of the document or the
circumstances
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surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and
testimonial evidence is admissible.
Same; Same; The gravamen of the offense is the act of drawing and
issuing a worthless check, and not the fact of issuance or execution of the
check.—The gravamen of the offense is the act of drawing and issuing a
worthless check. Hence, the subject of the inquiry is the fact of issuance or
execution of the check, not its content.
Criminal Law; Batas Pambansa Blg. 22; The elements of the offense
are: (1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account
or for value; (2) knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time
of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) subsequent
dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit,
or dishonor of the check for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.—Based on the
allegations in the information, petitioner was charged for violating the first
paragraph of BP 22. The elements of the offense are: 1. the making, drawing
and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; 2. knowledge of
the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the
check in full upon its presentment; and 3. subsequent dishonor of the check
by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor of the
check for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the bank to stop payment.
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CORONA, J.:
This petition
1
for review on certiorari 2assails the April 28, 1999
decision and March 27, 2000 resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 19601 affirming the trial court’s judgment finding
petitioner Pacifico B. Arceo, Jr. liable for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. (BP) 22, otherwise known as the “Bouncing Checks
Law.”
The facts of the case as found by the trial court and adopted by
the Court of Appeals follow.
“On March 14, 1991, [petitioner], obtained a loan from private complainant
Josefino Cenizal [ ] in the amount of P100,000.00. Several weeks thereafter,
[petitioner] obtained an additional loan of P50,000.00 from [Cenizal].
[Petitioner] then issued in favor of Cenizal, Bank of the Philippine Islands
[(BPI)] Check No. 163255, postdated August 4, 1991, for P150,000.00, at
Cenizal’s house located at 70 Panay Avenue, Quezon City. When August 4,
1991 came, [Cenizal] did not deposit the check immediately because
[petitioner] promised [ ] that he would replace the check with cash. Such
promise was made verbally seven (7) times. When his patience ran out,
[Cenizal] brought the check to the bank for encashment. The head office of
the Bank of the Philippine Islands through a letter dated December 5, 1991,
informed [Cenizal] that the check bounced because of insufficient funds.
Thereafter, [Cenizal] went to the house of [petitioner] to inform him of
the dishonor of the check but [Cenizal] found out that [petitioner] had left
the place. So, [Cenizal] referred the matter to a lawyer who wrote a letter
giving [petitioner] three days from receipt thereof to pay the amount of the
check. [Petitioner] still failed to make good the amount of the check. As a
consequence, [Cenizal] executed on January 20, 1992 before the office of
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City his affidavit and submitted documents in
support of his complaint for [e]stafa and [v]iolation of [BP 22] against
[petitioner].
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After due investigation, this case for [v]iolation of [BP 22] was filed against
[petitioner] on March 27, 1992. The check in question and the return slip
were however lost by [Cenizal] as a result of a fire that occurred near his
residence on September 16, 1992. [Cenizal] executed an Affidavit of Loss
3
regarding the loss of the check in question and the return slip.”
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of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had
not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment,
shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more
than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the
amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the
court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws
and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit
to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety
(90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored
by the drawee bank.
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the
person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer
shall be liable under this Act.
4
In Wong v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the 90-day period
provided in the law is not an element of the offense. Neither does it
discharge petitioner from his duty to maintain sufficient funds in the
account within a reasonable time from the date indicated in the
check. According to current banking practice, the reasonable period
within which to present a check to the drawee bank is six months.
Thereafter, the check becomes stale and the drawer is discharged
from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay.
Thus, Cenizal’s presentment of the check to the drawee bank 120
days (four months) after its issue was still within the allowable
period. Petitioner was freed neither from the obligation to keep
sufficient funds in his account nor from liability resulting from the
dishonor of the check.
APPLICABILITY OF THE
BEST EVIDENCE RULE
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Court, otherwise known as the best evidence rule. However, the rule
applies only where the content of the document is the subject of the
inquiry. Where the issue is the execution or existence of the
document or the circumstances surrounding its execution, the best5
evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.
The gravamen6 of the offense is the act of drawing and issuing a
worthless check. Hence, the subject of the inquiry is the fact of
issuance or execution of the check, not its content.
Here, the due execution and existence of the check were
sufficiently established. Cenizal testified that he presented the
originals of the check, the return slip and other pertinent documents
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City when he
executed his complaint-affidavit during the preliminary
investigation. The City Prosecutor found a prima facie case against
petitioner for violation of BP 22 and filed the corresponding
information based on the documents. Although the check and the
return slip were among the documents lost by Cenizal in a fire that
occurred near his residence on September 16, 1992, he was
nevertheless able to adequately establish the due execution,
existence and loss of the check and the return slip in an affidavit of
loss as well as in his testimony during the trial of the case.
Moreover, petitioner himself admited that he issued the check.
He never denied that the check was presented for payment to the
drawee bank and was dishonored for having been drawn against
insufficient funds.
PRESENCE OF THE
ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE
7
Based on the allegations in the information, petitioner was charged
for violating the first paragraph of BP 22. The elements of the
offense are:
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In fact, this was why, on maturity date, he requested the payee not to
encash it with the promise that he would replace it with cash. He
made this request and assurance seven times but repeatedly failed to
make good on his promises despite the repeated accommodation
granted him by the payee, Cenizal.
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9 Section 2 of BP 22 provides:
Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds.—The making, drawing and
issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient
funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the
date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of
funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due
thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check
within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid
by the drawee.
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10
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back in the ordinary course of business. Instead, the check
remained in the possession of the payee who demanded the
satisfaction of petitioner’s obligation when the check became due as
well as when the check was dishonored by the drawee bank.
These findings (due notice to petitioner and nonpayment of the
obligation) were confirmed by the appellate court. This Court has no
reason to rule otherwise. Well-settled is the rule that the factual
findings of the trial11court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are
not to be disturbed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The April 28,
1999 decision and March 27, 2000 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19601 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
——o0o——
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10 Tan v. Mendez, Jr., supra; Lim v. People, 420 Phil. 506; 368 SCRA 436 (2001).
11 Miranda v. Besa, G.R. No. 146513, 30 July 2004, 435 SCRA 532.
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