The Global State of Democracy 2019 PDF

The Global State
of Democracy 2019
Addressing the Ills, Reviving the Promise
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© 2019 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
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The Global State
of Democracy 2019
International IDEA Contents
2019
Contents
Foreword iv Chapter 4. The state of democracy in Asia
Preface vi and the Pacific 166
Acknowledgements vii 4.1. Introduction 168
Abbreviations ix 4.2. Taking the long-term perspective: democratic
Introduction x developments since 1975 168
4.3. The current democracy landscape in Asia and
Chapter 1. The global democracy landscape 1 the Pacific 170
1.1. Global democratic trends 3 4.4. Conclusion 198
1.2. Spotlight on key global issues in democracy References 206
landscape 25
References 57 Chapter 5. The state of democracy in Europe 211
5.1. Introduction 211
Chapter 2. The state of democracy in Africa 5.2. Taking the long-term perspective: democratic
and the Middle East 61 developments since 1975 213
2.1. The state of democracy in Africa 63 5.3. The current democracy landscape in Europe 213
2.2. The state of democracy in the Middle East 91 5.4. Conclusion 236
References 110 References 243
Methodology 246
Chapter 3. The state of democracy in the
Americas 114
3.1. The state of democracy in Latin America and
the Caribbean 116
3.2. The state of democracy in North America 150
References 161
iii
Foreword The Global State of Democracy 2019
Foreword
Not too long ago the world was euphoric about the gains being made around the world, such as the fact that
advancement of democracy. The fall of the Berlin wall in despite the challenges and threats to the quality of democracy,
1989, the end of the Cold War in 1991 and the end of the number of democracies continues to grow. Countries
apartheid in South Africa in 1994 are some of the defining such as Armenia, The Gambia, Malaysia, Myanmar and
moments that gave reason to be optimistic about the future Tunisia, which were not counted as democracies only a few
of democracy. Only three decades after the fall of the Berlin years ago, now are. More people today choose their leaders
wall, the euphoria about democracy´s forward march has through the ballot box rather than through the bullet, and
been replaced by doom and gloom narratives that allude to more people today live in democracies than 40 years ago.
the death of democracy. We certainly cannot and should not While progress is painstakingly slow, there is more gender
ignore the contemporary threats to democracy such as the equality in politics and representative institutions than
blatant disrespect for the norms of multilateralism, extreme there has ever been in history.
inequality resulting in the capture of politics by elites,
persistent corruption that continues to rob ordinary citizens Even more compelling is for us to boldly tell the story of
of opportunities of service provision and better quality of citizens’ activism and demand for democracy in authoritarian
life; conflictual identity politics, intolerance and societal contexts such as Algeria, Hong Kong and Sudan; while
polarisation aggravated by social media and spurred by in democratic countries, citizens are demanding better
populistic politics that promise quick and simple solutions quality representation, accountability, a stop to corruption
to complex socio-economic problems and more. Added and better quality of life. The citizen activism that we are
to these pressures, are global development threats, such witnessing around the world in democracies and non-
as climate change and its perils; fears of a looming global democracies alike is a story of hope for the future of
economic slow-down exacerbated by a trade war between democracy that needs to be told! The point is—we need to
US and China, and global insecurity—not least exacerbated hear balanced narratives of the state of democracy. Indeed,
by terrorism from external and internal forces. warnings about threats to democracy help us to be vigilant
and not be complacent in our efforts to defend and advance
The onslaught on multilateralism, that plays out in the form democracy. However, narratives that highlight gains and
of nationalistic sentiments and nativist politics, led by the opportunities as well as propose solutions, encourage those
traditional yesteryear champions of multilateralism—has in the frontlines of protecting, defending and advancing
left a global leadership vacuum at a time when the world democracy that their efforts are not in vain.
desperately needs a committed and predictable leadership
that can effectively galvanise it around contemporary global International IDEA’s Global State of Democracy Report
challenges—including threats to democracy. Unfortunately, is a breath of fresh air in this regard. First, its analysis is
this leadership vacuum, has empowered and emboldened based on a robust and transparent methodology, based
authoritarian regimes that have political and economic on a broad multi-dimensional conception of democracy.
muscle to export their models of governance to different It is my opinion that the citizens’ demand for better
parts of the world, and are keen to write democracy’s quality democracy the world over, is a demonstration that
obituary! democracy cannot be viewed as only limited to elections and
the exercise of civil and political rights. Equally important
It is important to note however that the doom and gloom is the quality of representation, better quality of life for
narratives about the state of democracy do carry some citizens including respect for and protection of the totality
truth. However, it is not the whole truth! In particular, of their human rights. Secondly, the report offers a balanced
such narratives tend to overshadow stories about positive narrative of the Global State of Democracy. It highlights
democratic developments around the world which equally challenges and positive democratic developments, while also
deserve to be highlighted. Nonetheless, rather than cause us recommending possible solutions. In this regard, this report
to despair, we should see these narratives as warning bells that stands to readily inform policy decisions and programmatic
should jolt us into action in defence of democracy. While choices in the democracy-assistance field, while providing
acknowledging the challenges and the threats to democracy, data needed by democracy defenders to inform and shape
we must be equally bold in telling the stories of democratic evidence-based advocacy for the broadening and deepening
iv
International IDEA Foreword
2019
of democracy in their countries and regions. Thirdly, the challenges they each face, and therefore providing a great
analysis is based on data that spans from 1975 until today, opportunity for targeted policy choices at various levels.
providing a good balance of the long and short-term view
of the state of democracy. This allows for a balanced and less In today’s multi-polar world, where, in the absence of global
events driven analysis that has framed some of the alarmist leadership, authoritarianism is rising in all regions, practical
narratives. Balanced narratives such as carried in this report, solutions and action in defence of democracy is even more
will surely encourage and embolden democracy defenders urgent. This report couldn’t have come at a better time. I am
to keep on fighting for more and better-quality democracy. truly delighted to be associated with it!
Finally, by taking both a global and regional view, this report
highlights a thread that run across the state of democracy Winnie Byanyima
in different regions, while bringing to bare the unique Executive Director
Oxfam International, Kenya
v
Preface The Global State of Democracy 2019
Preface
Democracy is experiencing severe challenges all over the about corruption and democracy’s ability to deliver results.
world. The sense of hope and inevitability that infused Democratic erosion is further exacerbated by polarization,
democracy’s remarkable expansion during the second half disinformation and hate speech. Seriously weakened Checks
of the 20th century is all but gone. Pessimism and hand on Government and a shrinking civic space are seen despite
wringing about the health of democracy have become the the widespread adoption of elections.
norm.
These worrying signs notwithstanding, there are also reasons
Is democracy ill? If so, what are the remedies? to be optimistic. The number of democracies around the
In this report, International IDEA, the only intergovernmental world continues to grow, and a wide range of countries has
organization exclusively working on democracy worldwide, transitioned to democracy in recent years. Our data shows
provides a global health check of democracy. Based on data that, despite its shortcomings, democracy is still by far the
covering 158 countries since 1975, we explore democratic preferred form of government in all continents. Democracy
trends, challenges and opportunities, and provide a uniquely continues to be an aspiration for those who have never
comprehensive analysis of democracy at national, regional experienced it. When democracy is threatened, citizens all
and global levels. In addition to vital democratic elements over the world have united to protect it. In nearly every
such as free and fair elections, independent judiciaries democracy, most people want democracy to work, even
and representative institutions, our analysis also includes when they feel that it may not be working perfectly for them.
diagnostics of civil society participation, social rights and
equality, media integrity and corruption, to name a few. A This report—and, indeed, all of the work that International
total of 28 aspects of democracy—based on 97 indicators— IDEA carries out globally—is driven by the recognition
are used to measure and compare democratic performance that, despite its current ills, democracy’s vitality should
over time. This provides a nuanced, holistic assessment of be acknowledged and celebrated. It aims to shed light on
democracy’s health. democracy’s present predicament, as well as the possible
solutions to this predicament. As such, these pages are infused
The overall diagnosis is both worrying and with a sense of urgency, but also of possibility and hope.
hopeful Through this report, we provide actionable knowledge, tools
When looking at democratic developments in the past and advice to actors working on democratic reform processes
decade, there are legitimate reasons to be concerned. The at the subnational, national and regional levels. We seek to
data demonstrates that democracy continues to expand empower and enlighten, sustain and support, reinvigorate
its global reach, while experiencing a significant decline in and relaunch the efforts to protect and advance democracy
quality across the board. This multi-faceted deterioration worldwide. It is only through a vast collective effort, fired by
affects old and new democracies alike, across all regions. conviction but also grounded in facts, that we can address
The erosion of popular trust in democratic institutions democracy’s ills and revive its promise.
and processes reflects—and nurtures—an alarming rise in
authoritarian rhetoric and practices. Democratic backsliding Kevin Casas-Zamora
is a growing malaise, often initiated through electoral and Secretary-General
International IDEA
constitutional channels and fuelled by civic disenchantment
vi
International IDEA Acknowledgements
2019
Acknowledgements
International IDEA would like to thank everyone who Acknowledgements for individual chapters and sections
has been involved in the 2019 edition of The Global appear below.
State of Democracy. This publication has benefited from
contributions made by many individuals at International Chapter 1
IDEA, and from the input of members of the Institute’s Section 1.1 on global democratic trends was written
partner organizations. by Annika Silva-Leander, who also edited Section 1.2 on
the global democratic landscape and wrote the sections
The Global State of Democracy 2019 was led by the report on shrinking civic space, ICTs and democracy and on the
editor Annika Silva-Leander, Head of International IDEA’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Martin Brusis
Democracy Assessment and Political Analysis (DAPA) wrote the section on democratic backsliding together with
unit, and written and compiled by the members of the Annika Silva-Leander and also, the section on populism
project team, including Annika Silva-Leander, Armend with Elliot Bulmer. Sead Alihodžić, Erik Asplund, Oliver
Bekaj, Martin Brusis, Elisenda Ballesté Buxó, Rosinah Joseph and Therese Pearce Laanela wrote the section on
Ismail-Clarke, Naomi Malaki, Joseph Noonan and Adina electoral processes. Yukihiko Hamada wrote the section on
Trunk (from the Secretary-General’s Office). The Global corruption. The peer reviewers for this chapter were Gerardo
State of Democracy (GSoD) Indices data analysis for Munck and Svend-Erik Skaaning. Other reviewers and
each chapter was carried out by Martin Brusis and Joseph contributors included Petra Auer-Himberg, Armend Bekaj,
Noonan. The DAPA unit is part of International IDEA’s Martin Brusis, Elisenda Ballesté Buxó, Alberto Fernández
Global Programme, whose Director Keboitse Machangana Gibaja, Meghna Kulshrestha, Keboitse Machangana, Joseph
has provided strategic guidance throughout the drafting Noonan, Anna Marie Obermeier, David Rosén, Massimo
of the report. International IDEA’s Secretary-General Tommasoli, Adina Trunk and Peter Wolf.
since August 2019, Kevin Casas-Zamora, has provided
final clearance to the report. Chapter 2
Section 2.1 on the state of democracy in Africa was led
International IDEA would like to thank Professor and edited by Armend Bekaj. Pinkie Gaorebolwe Mekgwe
Svend-Erik Skaaning of the Department of Political was the regional coordinator for this chapter and Gilbert
Science at Aarhus University, Denmark, who has led Khadiagala wrote the African regional case study. The
the conceptualization of the GSoD Indices, supervised background subregional case study authors were Abibata
the annual data updates and peer-reviewed the GSoD Barry (Central Africa), Karuti Kanyinga and George Michuki
Indices analysis of the report. Thanks also goes to (East Africa), Annie Barbara Chikwanha (Southern Africa)
Associate Professor Claudiu Tufis of the Political Science and Idayat Hassan (West Africa). Individual country cases
Department at the University of Bucharest, Romania, studies were written by Abibata Barry (Burundi), Karuti
who acted as the GSoD Indices Data Manager. Thanks Kanyinga (Kenya), Sherif Alaa (Libya), Idayat Hassan (The
also to the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute at Gambia), Idayat Hassan (Nigeria), Zaid Al-Ali (Tunisia) and
the University of Gothenburg, which has made available Annie Barbara Chikwanha (Zimbabwe). The peer reviewer
its data that a significant share of the GSoD Indices draw was Gilbert Khadiagala. Other reviewers and contributors
on. Special thanks to Gerardo Munck of the School of included Elisenda Ballesté Buxó, Maurice Mboula Jean-
International Relations at the University of Southern Claude Didier Enguelegue, Rosinah Ismail-Clarke,
California who peer-reviewed the overall report. Rumbidzai Kandawasvika-Nhundu, Keboitse Machangana,
Nicholas Matatu, Gram Matenga, Gideon Nhundu, Joseph
This report was produced with the assistance of members Noonan, Anna Marie Obermeier, Adebayo Olukoshi and
of International IDEA’s Communications and Knowledge Annika Silva-Leander.
Management Unit, including Ingrid Bicu, Lisa Hagman,
Katarina Jörgensen, Tomas Spragg Nilsson, Lynn Section 2.2 on the state of democracy in the Middle East
Simmonds, Lucy Smith and Tahseen Zayouna. We would was led by Armend Bekaj and written by Elisenda Ballesté
also like to thank the copyeditor, David Prater, for his Buxó, who also wrote the background country case study
meticulous attention to detail. on Yemen. Mohamed El Dahshan wrote the background
vii
Acknowledgements The Global State of Democracy 2019
regional case study. Other reviewers and contributors Chapter 4

included Sherif Alaa, Armend Bekaj, Rosinah Ismail- Chapter 4 on the state of democracy in Asia and the
Clarke, Keboitse Machangana, Joseph Noonan, Anna Marie Pacific was led and edited by Annika Silva-Leander. The
Obermeier and Annika Silva-Leander. regional co-editors for this chapter were Amanda Cats-
Baril and Leena Rikkilä Tamang. The sections on social
Chapter 3 media and conflict were written by Mark Salter, who also
Section 3.1 on the state of democracy in Latin America and contributed to edit the chapter. Authors of the background
the Caribbean was led and edited by Annika Silva-Leander, subregional case studies included Saniia Toktogazieva
who also edited Section 3.2 on the state of democracy (Central Asia), Julio Cabral Teehankee (East Asia, and
in North America. The regional co-editors for the Latin the Pacific Islands) and Amanda Cats-Baril (South Asia).
American and Caribbean section were Khushbu Agrawal Imelda Deinla and Kent Marjun Primor co-wrote the
and Daniel Zovatto. Miguel Carter wrote the Latin America background case studies on South East Asia and the
and the Caribbean background regional case study on which Philippines. Authors of the background country case
the chapter draws. Country case background studies were studies included Tom Daly (Australia), Sumona DasGupta
written by Sandra Botero (Colombia), Guilherme Simões (India), Abdul Gaffar Karim (Indonesia), Chin Huat Wong
Reis (Brazil), Irma Méndez de Hoyos (Mexico), Elvira Cuadra (Malaysia), Seira Tamang (Nepal), Kim Hyejin and Erik
Lira (Nicaragua), Daniel Chasquetti Perez (Uruguay) and Mobrand (South Korea) and Eugenie Merieau (Thailand).
Michael Penfold (Venezuela). Frank McLoughlin and Seema The peer reviewers for this chapter were Ketut Putra Erawan
Shah co-wrote the case study on the state of democracy in the and Peter R. deSouza. Other reviewers and contributors
United States. The peer reviewers for Latin America and the included Adhy Aman, Battuul Baterdene, Elisenda Ballesté
Caribbean were Sergio Bitar (member of the International Buxó, Rosinah Ismail-Clarke, Avinash Kumar, Keboitse
IDEA Board of Advisers) and Gerardo Munck. The peer Machangana, Joseph Noonan, Anna Marie Obermeier,
reviewers for North America were Nicole Goodman (member Nyla Grace Prieto and Antonio Spinelli.
of the International IDEA Board of Advisers) and Abraham
Lowenthal. Other reviewers and contributors included Chapter 5
Armend Bekaj, Martin Brusis, Elisenda Ballesté Buxó, Kevin Chapter 5 on the state of democracy in Europe was led
Casas-Zamora, Alfonso Ferufino, Carolina Floru, Rosinah and edited by Armend Bekaj. The regional co-editors for
Ismail-Clarke, Celso Lafer, Keboitse Machangana, Percy this chapter were Sam van der Staak and Nana Kalandadze.
Medina, Joseph Noonan, Anna Marie Obermeier, Adolfo Florian Bieber wrote the background subregional case study
Ocana, Miguel Angel Lara Otaola, Lourdes Gonzales Prieto on Central and Eastern Europe. Richard Youngs wrote the
and Massimo Tommasoli. Several ideas advanced in Section background case studies on Europe and Spain and acted
3.1, especially in the Policy Recommendations section, owe as the peer reviewer for this chapter. Marko Prelec wrote
much to insights shared during a conference organized by the background case studies on the Western Balkans and
International IDEA and the United Nations Economic North Macedonia. Background country case studies were
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ‘El written by Magdalena Solska (Poland), Dimitris Tsarouhas
estado de la democracia en América Latina: 40 años del inicio (Turkey) and Valeriya Mechkova (Ukraine). Other reviewers
de la Tercera Ola Democrática’ [The state of democracy in and contributors included Elisenda Ballesté Buxó, Alberto
Latin America: 40 years since the beginning of the Third Fernández Gibaja, Rosinah Ismail-Clarke, Keboitse
Democratic Wave], in Santiago de Chile, 26–28 November Machangana, Joseph Noonan, Anna Marie Obermeier and
2018. Annika Silva-Leander.
viii
International IDEA Abbreviations
2019
Abbreviations
AU African Union
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CSO Civil society organization
ECLAC UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
EMB Electoral management body
EU European Union
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
GNC General National Congress (Libya)
GSoD Global State of Democracy
HoR House of Representatives
ICT Information and communications technology
ISIS Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
LGBT Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender
NGO Non-governmental organization
OAS Organization of American States
OHCHR Office of the UN High Commission on Human Rights
SAO State Audit Office (Georgia)
SDG Sustainable Development Goal
ix
Introduction The Global State of Democracy 2019
Introduction
Democracy is ill and its promise needs revival. Indeed, the The rise of populist politics is linked to a variety of
value, viability and future of democracy are more contested context-specific factors, but some common drivers include
now than ever before in modern history, or at least since the a disenchantment with traditional political actors; the
1930s. While the past four decades have seen a remarkable perceived inability of current political systems to address
expansion of democracy throughout all regions of the world, core societal and economic problems; and a clash between
recent years have been marked by declines in the fabric of expectations of what democracy should provide and what
both older and younger democracies. While the idea of it actually delivers. Populists tap into citizen discontent
democracy continues to mobilize people around the world, about rising inequalities (perceived or actual), corruption,
the practice of existing democracies has disappointed and increasing mass migration (again, perceived or actual),
disillusioned many citizens and democracy advocates. unemployment and precarity of employment, and increased
digitalization and its impact on labour market structures.
Democratic erosion is occurring in different settings and
contexts. New democracies are often weak and fragile. Their A feature of populist rhetoric and practice is disrespect
governments and political representatives face the challenge for the accountability institutions that check government,
of building and strengthening democratic institutions in protect political pluralism and constitute democracy.
resource-constrained environments. Older democracies This inherent predisposition for unconstrained power
are struggling to guarantee equitable and sustainable turns populism into a threat for democracy. However,
economic and social development. The share of high-quality some also argue that populist politicians have helped put
democracies is decreasing and many of them are confronted on the agenda important issues—such as corruption in
with populist challengers, which combine exclusionary democracies—that democracies need to tackle in order to
claims with a disregard for democratic principles. regain their legitimacy.
Both old and young democracies are suffering from a At the same time, a number of large countries with political
shrinking civic space, with declines in civil liberties, and economic clout seem immune to democracy. These
clampdowns on civil society, and restrictions on freedom political regimes not only persist as non-democracies
of expression. The present report contains a number of (e.g. China, Egypt, Saudi Arabia) or hybrids regimes (e.g.
examples of countries where governments intentionally Singapore), but have also begun to export their model of
limited the civic space and weakened constitutional checks governance to other countries.
on executive authority, resulting in democratic backsliding
and a deteriorating rule of law. In some countries, this Despite this gloomy picture, there are also reasons for
illness has been so severe that it has resulted in partial optimism. Democratic transitions continue to occur in
(with examples such as Nicaragua and Pakistan) or full political regimes that seemed staunchly undemocratic
democratic breakdown (Venezuela). or stuck in the hybrid grey zone between democracy and
non-democracy. Examples include The Gambia in 2017,
Modern democratic backsliding occurs from within the promising democratic openings in Ethiopia in 2018, and the
democratic system: through legislative and constitutional transitions to democracy in 2018 of two of the world’s most
reforms and policy decisions by democratically elected enduring hybrid regimes: Armenia and Malaysia.
majorities. The gradual hollowing-out of the non-electoral
pillars in backsliding democracies ultimately damages Popular demands for democratic reforms backed by intense
democracy’s core principles of popular control and political social mobilization have been witnessed across the world
equality. in places such as Algeria, Armenia, Egypt, Hong Kong,
Russia and Sudan. New democracies such as Timor-Leste
Democratic backsliding coincides with the rise of populist and Tunisia and more recently The Gambia have also
politicians and movements that appeal to growing numbers consolidated some of their democratic gains.
of voters, most notably in Europe but also in the Americas,
and Asia and the Pacific, although forms vary according to One of the main findings of this report is that democracy
cultural and regional contexts. has not always produced the sustainable and prosperous
x
International IDEA Introduction
2019
outcomes that many expected. A number of democratically In addition to providing a health check of the world’s
elected governments have failed to substantially reduce democracies, this report aims to infuse the democracy
corruption, advance gender equality, reduce social, political debate with evidence and data and describe how
and economic inequalities or produce employment and democracy’s challenges and opportunities play out in
economic growth. different ways around the world, shaped by regional and
country contexts. Beyond the diagnostic, the report also
However, the GSoD Indices data shows that most hybrid seeks to provide some solutions, building on the good
forms of democracy that flirt with authoritarianism, practices and cases which have shown resilience in the
and non-democracies, have generally not delivered and face of challenges. These have been collected through
sustained better policy outcomes, with some exceptions. The International IDEA’s more than 20 years of regional and
data shows that democracies are more likely to create the country-level technical assistance in democratic reform
conditions necessary for sustainable development compared throughout the world.
to non-democracies or hybrid regimes. Levels of gender
equality are overall higher in democracies, access to political This, we believe, is the main contribution of the report—to
power is more equal, there is generally less corruption, move the debate beyond the diagnostic, to also point the
there is generally more basic welfare, and it is often easier way forward, inspire change and push for reform based on
to do business in democracies. The choice is therefore not what has worked and what has worked less well in different
between non-democracy or illiberal or hybrid forms of it and parts of the world.
democracy. The world needs more and better democracy, to
revive the democratic promise. The democracy landscape is changing so fast that some of the
events described in this report may already be outdated by
What is the aim of this report? the time it is printed. Nevertheless, the hope is that the data,
International IDEA is trying to address the current ills concepts and good practices proposed to advance democracy
of democracy with data; evidence-based, global and will withstand the circumstantial events.
region-specific analysis; and solutions based on sound
comparative global knowledge and tested good practices. The report builds on the global and regional knowledge of
This report therefore provides a health check of the state International IDEA and is a collaborative institution-wide
of the world’s democracy, analysing trends, opportunities effort. Because the report covers all the attributes of the
and challenges that are seen across various regions and GSoD framework, in-depth analysis of each of the topics
within regions. has not been possible this time. The report therefore seeks
to provide highlights from International IDEA’s global and
The report mainly targets policymakers and civil society regional knowledge, so that those interested in more in-depth
organizations working at the national, regional or analysis on specific topics can go into those publications,
international levels, either implementing, supporting or referenced at the end of each chapter.
advocating for democratic reforms. The report also targets
those policymakers who may not be working directly on The report has also benefited from the inputs of a number
democratic reform but are involved in reform processes more of recognized regional and country experts who have
broadly, be they economic, social or digital. contributed their views and analysis to each of the regional
chapters. All case study authors, and other contributors, are
This report is important for other readers as well, as it argues listed in the Acknowledgements section of this report.
that democracy matters. Democracy matters as a goal in
itself, but it also matters for sustainable development. If The structure of the report
democracy faces challenges producing sustainable societies The Methodology section explains the conceptual framework
for the survival of the planet, non-democratic and hybrid of the GSoD Indices and provides an explanation of the new
forms of democracy will certainly be even less able to steer regime classification that this second edition of the report
future generations towards a better and more sustainable has introduced, as well as definitions of some of the key
world. concepts used in the analysis.
That is why this report closely connects with the 2030 The main body of the report is divided into five main
Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). chapters. They are written in a modular fashion, so that
Each chapter contains a section on progress on SDG 16 and they can be read as stand-alone chapters, depending on the
SDG 5, as measured by the GSoD Indices. specific regional interests of the reader.
xi
Introduction The Global State of Democracy 2019
Chapter 1 looks at the global democracy landscape and is divide Europe into a number of subregions including East-
divided into two main parts: a section on global democratic Central Europe, East Europe/post-Soviet Europe, North
trends, based on the GSoD Indices data, and a second part and West Europe, and South Europe. Europe as defined in
that zooms in on a selected number of issues in the current the GSoD Indices also includes Israel and Turkey. For more
global democracy landscape for more in-depth analysis. information on these and other regional classifications see
The chapter includes a series of policy considerations that the Methodology section in this report.
draw from International IDEA’s regional and country-level
technical assistance. Each regional chapter follows the same structure. For those
who do not have time to read the full chapter, the key
The four remaining chapters focus on the state of democracy findings provide a quick overview of the key opportunities
in the different regions of the world. and challenges in each region. The reader can then choose
which sections in the longer analysis they are interested in
Chapter 2 focuses on the state of democracy in two looking at in more detail. Each chapter contains a summary
intertwined regions: Africa and the Middle East. It should table on progress on SDG 16 and SDG 5 in the relevant
be noted that the GSoD Indices classify the Middle East region, a brief discussion of long-term democratic trends
and Iran as a single region, referred to in this report as the since 1975, and an analysis of current opportunities and
Middle East. Furthermore, while the GSoD Indices classify challenges to democracy in each region.
the subregion of North Africa as part of Africa, the Middle
East and North Africa are closely interconnected from a Each chapter concludes with a table summarizing the GSoD
historical, religious, cultural, political, linguistic and ethnic Indices data for each attribute as well as a set of policy
perspective. considerations that are linked to the data. A table of the
countries covered by the GSoD Indices is provided for each
Chapter 3 focuses on the Americas, a region which is not region, including regime classifications and country-level
defined in the GSoD Indices, but which is used in this report democratic performance on each of the five GSoD attributes.
as an umbrella term for two regions covered in separate
sections—Latin America and the Caribbean, and North The conceptual framework of the GSoD Indices is used as
America, including a case study on the state of democracy the broad organizing structure of the bulk of the analysis
in the United States. in each chapter, with a focus on each of the five attributes:
Representative Government, Fundamental Rights, Checks
Chapter 4 offers an overview of the long-term democratic on Government, Impartial Administration and Participatory
trends in Asia and the Pacific, the most populous region Engagement.
covered by the GSoD Indices, with 30 countries across five
subregions. As the GSoD Indices only cover countries with Finally, the GSoD Indices depict democratic trends at the
more than one million inhabitants, data on most Pacific country, regional and global levels across a broad range of
Islands is not included. However, in order to ensure coverage attributes of democracy from 1975 to 2018. The Indices
for the Pacific Islands, qualitative analysis and other data currently produce data for 158 countries and are updated
sources are used to assess these smaller countries. annually. Anyone can freely access the country-level data for
all Indices. The data can be downloaded via the Global State
Chapter 5 focuses on Europe, the region in the world with of Democracy Indices website <http://www.idea.int/gsod-
the largest number of democracies. The GSoD Indices indices>
xii
International IDEA Chapter 1
2019 The global democracy landscape
Chapter 1
The global democracy landscape
This chapter analyses key trends and issues in the current global democracy landscape. The first section
of the chapter provides a global overview of democratic trends based on the Global State of Democracy
(GSoD) Indices data, which now covers world events up to the end of 2018. Where there is a lag between
the GSoD data and recent political events, this is indicated in the text. The analysis first briefly examines
democratic trends from a long-term perspective, looking at developments in the last four decades, and then
continues with a focus on key developments in the last five years.
The second section provides a more in-depth analysis of five issues currently affecting the global democracy
landscape: the crisis of representation of political parties and the rise of populism; patterns and conditions
of democratic backsliding; the empowerment of civil society in a shrinking civic space; managing electoral
processes as fair competition in challenging environments; and corruption and money in politics. A brief
overview of information and communications technologies and their impact on democracy is also included.
GLOBAL PROGRESS ON THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS
is needed on this target as 43 per cent of countries in the world

still have high levels of corruption, which is a key impediment to
Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions human development.
Targets that have seen mixed progress include SDG 16.3 on

The GSoD Indices provide complementary data to official rule of law, with observed advances on Access to Justice and
indicators to track progress on eight Sustainable Development Predictable Enforcement, but declines in Judicial Independence;
Goals (SDGs), and in particular SDG 16 and SDG 5.5 (see Table 1.1 SDG 16.6 on effective institutions, which has seen declines on
and Figure 1.1).1 Judicial Independence, Free Political Parties and Civil Society
Participation, but advances in Effective Parliament; and SDG 16.7
According to the GSoD Indices, global progress on SDG 16 is on inclusive decision-making, with declines in Clean Elections
facing significant challenges, although some advances are noted. and Elected Government, stagnation in Electoral Participation and
Of the 18 GSoD indicators used to measure progress on SDG 16, Local Democracy and advances in Effective Parliament.
a total of 12 have seen significant declines, with just 5 indicators
showing advances, and 1 seeing stagnation.
The SDG 16 targets that are facing most challenges, with more
declines than advances, are SDG 16.1 on reducing violence Gender Equality
and SDG 16.10 on freedom of expression and fundamental
freedoms.
SDG 5.5 on political representation of women has seen
One of the targets where advances outnumber declines is SDG regression, with two countries declining since 2015 and no
16.5 on reducing corruption. However, more sustained progress country advancing.
1 The methodology for tracking progress on SDG 16 with the GSoD Indices is described in International IDEA, ‘Tracking progress on Sustainable Development Goal 16 with the Global State
of Democracy Indices’, GSoD In Focus No. 8, September 2019c.
1
Chapter 1 The Global State of Democracy 2019
The global democracy landscape Addressing the Ills, Reviving the Promise
KEY FINDINGS
• The number of democratic re-transitions is on the increase,

pointing to the democratic fragility of many newer
Positive developments democracies. The number of weak democracies with low
democratic quality is also increasing. The largest share of
weak democracies is in Africa, but they can be found in almost
all regions of the world.
• More than half of the countries in the world (62 per cent, or 97
countries) covered by the GSoD Indices are now democratic • Democratic erosion is on the rise. The share of countries
(compared to only 26 per cent in 1975), and more than half (57 experiencing democratic erosion has more than doubled in the
per cent) of the world’s population now lives in some form of past decade compared to the decade before. North America,
democracy, compared to 36 per cent in 1975. Europe, and Asia and the Pacific are the regions most affected
by democratic erosion, with more than half of countries in
• The number of democracies continues to rise, from 90 in 2008
these regions falling into this category. This is also the case for
to 97 in 2018. This increase has occurred despite a slowdown in
under half of democracies in Africa, and Latin America and the
global democratic expansion since the mid-1990s.
Caribbean.
• Popular demands for democracy are strong even in countries
• There are signs that the quality of the world’s high-performing
that have never experienced democracy. In 2018, protests
democracies is eroding. The share of democracies with high
and demands for democratic change in Armenia and
performance on all five democratic attributes has decreased in
Malaysia—both seemingly enduring hybrid regimes—led to
the last decade.
democratic transitions in those countries. Protests in Algeria,
Egypt and Sudan in 2019 demonstrate that democratic • Despite some advances in political gender equality in the
aspirations are strong and find expression even in hybrid or past decades, serious efforts are still required to achieve
non-democratic contexts. political equality for men and women. At the current rate of
progress, it will take another 46 years to reach gender parity in
• Other countries (e.g. Ethiopia) have not yet undergone
parliaments (see Figure 1.23).
democratic transitions but are experiencing democratic reforms
that provide promising prospects for a democratic opening. • In all regions of the world, and across all regime types, civic
space is shrinking.
• The large majority (81 per cent) of the world’s 97 democracies
have proven democratically resilient, having maintained their • Democratic backsliding is a particular form of democratic erosion
democratic status uninterruptedly since 1975 or when they involving the gradual and intentional weakening of checks and
transitioned to democracy. balances and curtailment of civil liberties. This phenomenon has
become more frequent in the last decade. A total of 10 countries
• On average, democracies have higher levels of Gender Equality
in the world are currently experiencing democratic backsliding.
and Human Development and lower levels of corruption than
non-democracies and hybrid regimes. Democracies are also • Venezuela represents the most severe democratic backsliding
generally better countries in which to do business than non- case in the past four decades. Venezuela is the only country
democracies and hybrid regimes. that has gone from being a democracy with high levels of
Representative Government in 1975 to a non-democracy (since
• The aspect of democracy that matters most for Human
2017).
Development is Absence of Corruption. The less corrupt a
country is, the more likely it is to have high levels of Human • The share of hybrid regimes has increased in the last decades. In
Development and vice versa. the majority of cases, hybridity is not a transitional stage towards
democracy but a defining feature of the regime. Of the world’s
hybrid regimes, 71 per cent have never been democracies. This is
also the case for 67 per cent of the world’s non-democracies.
Challenges to democracy • Non-democracies and hybrid regimes, taken together, still

represent a significant share of countries (38 per cent) and of the
world’s population (43 per cent).
• Despite the continued quantitative increase in the world’s • While a number of hybrid regimes and non-democracies have
democracies, the quality of the world’s democracies is seen some advances in their democratic indicators in the past
eroding. 10 years, a significant number have also experienced deepening
autocratization and become more repressive.
2
Democracy continues to expand its reach to this day, albeit

at a slower pace. Democratic aspirations have proven strong,
1.1. Global democratic trends even in countries that have never experienced democracy.
Popular demands in these countries have often been a key
1.1.1. Introduction driving force of recent democratic transitions.
In the past four decades, democracy has undergone a
remarkable global expansion across all regions of the However, the quantitative expansion of democracy has not
world. This has included an expansion of suffrage, and a been matched by a qualitative increase. On the contrary,
strengthening of electoral processes, institutions and actors democracy is facing a deterioration in quality. New
central to a healthy democracy, including political parties, democracies are often weak and democratically fragile. They
parliaments, electoral institutions, judiciaries, the media and face the challenge of building and strengthening democratic
civil society organizations (CSOs). institutions in resource-constrained environments.
FIGURE 1.1
The GSoD conceptual framework and its link to the Sustainable Development Goals
cal
tical
raege
e
Free Politi
s
Inclusiv
Suffrage
FreePPaortliie
Cle ions
Parties
Inc siv
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CEle ions
Go Elect men
uff
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t
an
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n
c
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De
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Lol ocr
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resentat e Ac Justcce tice

ca ac
Repverpnremseennivta to A o Ju
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t
D oR t enive
y
Dem irecDtir G overnm t t

ocerm ect
D G
acoyc
rac
Civil vsil
Partiacigpeme ry
Fu Righ
y
Engagem tornyt
Fu aRmigehntal
ato
tCiei
nd ts
t
L ber berties
en
i
nda ts
Electora Li
Particip
ParticipElecltoral
mental
Partiationa
cip tion
Democracy
Eng
Democracy Social Rights

andSocial Rights
Equality
ociety iety Popular Control and and Equality
Civil S ilaS ocn
tio Popular Control and
C
iciv
ip Political Equality
Par rticipation
t
Political Equality *
Pa *
Ad
en n
p
Im
in artpa s E
o
ot
Ad
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ck ks Pa ffectEff
Im
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le istin ialrt Che ehrnem

c m rliaPa iveec
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ab t le raitst ial n mrelia tive

edict metnab nt
c e
iorant
ion GovC over ntme
Pr forrceedi cem G nt
En P nfor
Ind
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E
ep
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Absrruptio of
iecpi nc
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Integrity
Media
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*Subattribute that indirectly measures SDG 16

*Subattribute that indirectly measures SDG 16
3
TABLE 1.1 developments in the last four decades, and then continues
with a focus on key developments in the last five years (i.e.
Democracy and the Sustainable Development Goals the period 2013–2018). A selection of issues in the current
global democracy landscape are analysed in more depth in
SDG Target Description Progress
Section 1.2.
Significantly reduce all forms of The analysis is based on the Global State of Democracy
Declines
Target 16.1 violence and related death rates Indices (GSoD Indices) which translate International
everywhere
IDEA’s definition of democracy—popular control over
public decision-making and decision-makers, and equality
Promote the rule of law at the
Mixed between citizens in the exercise of that control—into five
Target 16.3 national and international levels and
progress
ensure equal access to justice for all main democracy attributes. The attributes cover aspects
related to Representative Government; Fundamental Rights;
Substantially reduce corruption and Advances Checks on Government; Impartial Administration; and
Target 16.5
bribery in all their forms
Participatory Engagement.
Develop effective,
Mixed
Target 16.6 accountable and transparent The GSoD Indices build on 97 indicators that measure
progress
institutions at all levels trends in democratic development for 158 countries
and six regions: Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe,
Ensure responsive, inclusive,
Target 16.7 participatory and representative
Mixed Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and
progress Iran (referred to in this report as the Middle East), and
decision-making at all levels
North America (see the Methodology section for further
Ensure public access to information information). The Indices now cover world events up to
and protect fundamental freedoms,
Declines the end of 2018. Where there is a lag between the GSoD
Target 16.10 in accordance with national
legislation and international data and recent political events (e.g. Thailand’s 2019
agreements elections), this is indicated in the text.
Ensure women's full and effective 1.1.2. Encouraging democratic trends: advances
participation and equal opportunities
Target 5.5 for leadership at all levels of
Declines and opportunities
decision-making in political, The analysis in The Global State of Democracy 2019 reflects
economic and public life the data in the GSoD Indices for the period 1975–2018,
which shows that democracy continues to expand its
reach around the world, with the number of democracies
Sources: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019), <http://www.
idea.int/gsod-indices>; United Nations General Assembly, ‘Transforming our world: the continuing to grow. Democracy has also proven resilient
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’, UN Document A/RES/70/1, 21 October 2015, over time. Furthermore, democracies are associated with
<http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E>.
more sustainable outcomes than hybrid regimes or non-
democracies.
The number of democracies continues to grow

The world is more democratic than it was in 1975,
Older democracies face challenges in maintaining high following a global democratic expansion in the last four
democratic performance while also guaranteeing equitable decades. As illustrated in Figure 1.2, more than half of the
and sustainable economic and social development. Both countries in the world (62 per cent, or 97 countries) are
older and newer democracies are facing increasing citizen now democratic (compared to only 26 per cent in 1975),
expectations of what democracy can deliver for them, both and more than half (57 per cent) of the world’s population
in terms of democratic and socio-economic quality. now lives in a democracy, compared to 36 per cent in 1975.
The share of non-democracies has more than halved since
This section provides an overview of key global democratic 1975 (68 per cent of countries in 1975 versus 20 per cent
trends, commencing with the advances and opportunities in 2018). See Figures 1.3 and 1.4 for more detail.
for democracy, followed by the key challenges facing
democracies today. The analysis begins by briefly examining The number of democracies continues to rise, despite
democratic trends from a long-term perspective, looking at a slowdown of the global democratic expansion since
4
FIGURE 1.2
Map of the world by regime type, 2018
Democracy Hybrid regime Non-democracy
Notes: Land areas marked in grey are not included in the analysis as they either are territories or have a population of less than one million.
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019), <http://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>.
FIGURE 1.3
Population living in each regime type, 1975–2018
1975 2018
Democracy Hybrid regime Non-democratic regime
Sources: World Bank: World Development Indicators, 2019; International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019), <http://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>.
5
FIGURE 1.4 in 2009–2010 was caused by several countries sliding into

hybridity, including Honduras and Madagascar (in 2009),
Regime types, 1975–2018 and Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti and Sri Lanka (in
2010). There was also a noticeable increase between 2010
100 and 2013, and some smaller variations have been observed
90
80
since then.
Number of countries
70
60 Democracy continues to spread to countries that have
50 never experienced democracy. In the past 10 years (i.e. since
40
2008), 11 countries transitioned to democracy for the first
30
20
time in their history. Four of these transitions have occurred
10 in the past four years: Burkina Faso and Myanmar in 2015,
0 and Armenia and Malaysia in 2018. This is more than the
previous decade and equals the number of new transitions in
2000
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
1975
the first decade of the third wave (1975–1985).

Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019), <http://www.idea. Democratic progress continues worldwide
int/gsod-indices>.
Democracies can now be found across all regions of the
world. In 1975, the majority of the world’s democracies
were concentrated in North and West Europe and North
America, and to a lesser extent in Asia and the Pacific, Latin
the mid-1990s. In fact, between 2008 and 2018 the America and the Caribbean, and Africa.
number of democracies continued to rise, from 90 to 97.
This data therefore does not support the hypothesis of a In North America and Europe in 2018, 100 and 93 per
‘reverse’ third wave of democratization (i.e. a significant cent of countries are democracies, closely followed by Latin
and sustained decline in the number of democracies) America (86 per cent of countries). Europe contains the
(Huntington 1991).2 The majority (72 per cent) of today’s largest share of the world’s democracies (39 countries, or
democracies were established after 1975 as part of the 40 per cent of the global total), followed by Africa (21
third wave of democratization. Of these, more than three- per cent and 20 democracies), and Latin America and the
quarters transitioned before 2000 (and are referred to as Caribbean (20 per cent and 19 democracies). In Asia, the
‘early third-wave’ democracies), while less than one-quarter total number of democracies is equal to the combined total
transitioned after 2000 (and are referred to as ‘new third- of hybrid regimes and non-democracies, while in Africa
wave democracies’). The remaining 28 per cent of the world’s and the Middle East democracies constitute less than half
current democracies, all of which were established prior to of countries (41 per cent and 17 per cent, respectively). See
1975 (and therefore referred to as ‘older democracies’), have Figure 1.5 for more detail.
experienced uninterrupted democracy between 1975 and
2018, except Sri Lanka. There is democratic variation among subregions. The
most democratic subregions in the world are Oceania,
The largest democratic expansion occurred between 1985 North and West Europe, South Europe, and East-Central
and 1995, when 39 countries became democracies. Of these, Europe, which only contain democracies. Other subregions
more than one-quarter (28 per cent) were new countries with a large share of democracies are South America (90
that gained independence, typically following the end of per cent), Central America (86 per cent), the Caribbean
the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet/Communist (80 per cent) and West Africa (73 per cent).
bloc. Subsequently, the pace of democratic expansion
slowed but continued uninterruptedly until 2006. Since A number of aspects of democracy have been particularly
then, the number of democracies has continued to increase strengthened during the democratic expansion of the last
(from 90 in 2008 to 97 in 2018), although several year- four decades. Significant global progress has been made
to-year fluctuations have also occurred. For example, a dip in the quality of elections, the effectiveness of parliaments,
2 In 1991 Samuel Huntington used the concept of waves to describe periods in time with a significant and sustained increase or decrease (reverse wave) in the number of democracies.
According to Huntington, the first wave of democracy began in the 1820s and ended in 1926, while the second wave began in 1945 and lasted until 1962, and the third wave started in
1974 (Huntington 1991: 12).
6
FIGURE 1.5 FIGURE 1.6
Number and percentage of regime types per region, Advances in democratic aspects by region, 2013–
2018 2018
100 11 Absence of Corruption
41% 50% 93% 86% 17% 100%
(20) (15) (39) (19) (2) (2) Access to Justice
90 10
Effective Parliament
25% Judicial Independence
80 9
Percentage of countries in region
(3) Freedom of Expression

70 Clean Elections
8
60 7
37% 58%
No. of countries
(18) (7)
50 6
17%
(5)
40
5
30 33%
(10) 4
20 22%
(11) 3
5% (1)
10
2% (1) 9% (2) 2
5% (2)
0
1
Africa Asia and Europe Latin Middle North
the Pacific America East America
and the 0
Caribbean Africa Asia and Europe Latin Middle
the Pacific America and East
Non-democracy Hybrid regime Democracy the Caribbean
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019), <http://www.idea. Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019), <http://www.idea.
int/gsod-indices>. int/gsod-indices>.
Local Democracy and levels of Electoral Participation. with significant declines outnumber those with advances in
Furthermore, there has been an increase in freedom for each of those dimensions, except for Effective Parliament
political parties, enhanced Media Integrity and increased and Access to Justice, which have seen an equal amount
levels of Civil Society Participation. Globally, Checks on of countries declining and advancing (see section on
Government have been strengthened, suffrage has become Concerning democratic trends: challenges).
more inclusive and there has been an expansion of Civil
Liberties, enhanced Gender Equality and higher levels of Democracy comes in many shapes and democratic
Basic Welfare. Progress on these aspects has been made to performance patterns
varying degrees, across all regions over the world, even in Democracy comes in many shapes and forms. The
weak democratic contexts such as the Middle East. democratic performance of the world’s democracies
varies widely. The GSoD Indices measure low, mid-range
A number of countries have seen significant advances and high performance (according to GSoD score) on the 0
in reducing corruption, strengthening the rule of law to 1 scale on its five attributes of democracy: Representative
and ensuring respect for Civil Liberties since 2013. Government, Fundamental Rights, Checks on Government,
Most countries advancing are recorded in Africa, although Impartial Administration and Participatory Engagement.
Asia and the Pacific has seen a larger share of its countries
advancing (see Figure 1.6). A total of 23 different democratic performance patterns can
be identified among the world’s 97 democracies. However,
Despite the long-term gains observed in these aspects of only a small percentage of democracies (22 per cent) are high
democracy, in the past five years, the number of countries performing on all democratic attributes. The largest share of
7
these (14 of 21) are older democracies located in Northern Well over half (71 per cent) of the high-performing
and Western Europe, although they can be found across other democracies are older democracies (i.e. those that were
world regions, including Asia and the Pacific (Australia, New democracies before 1975), while the rest are early third-wave
Zealand, South Korea and Taiwan), Latin America and the democracies (i.e. those that transitioned to democracy between
Caribbean (Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay) and North 1975 and 2000). Mid-range performance across all attributes
America (Canada). is also a common performance pattern, with 20 countries in
FIGURE 1.7
Democratic performance patterns in 2018, global level
Representative Fundamental Checks on Impartial Participatory

Government Rights Government Administration Engagement
High Mid-range Low
Notes: Distribution and performance patterns of the world’s 97 democracies. The blue bars on the right indicate the number of countries in each performance pattern.
8
the world in this category. The remaining 56 democracies FIGURE 1.8

perform better on some aspects of democracy than others,
in 21 different performance constellations. This suggests that Interruptions to democracy, 1975–2018
the world’s democracies vary in term of both democratic
performance and performance patterns (see Figure 1.7).
Democracy has proven resilient over time

81% 19%
The world’s democracies have proven remarkably (79 democracies) (18 democracies)
resilient. The large majority (81 per cent) of the world’s 97
democracies have proven democratically resilient, having
maintained their democratic status uninterruptedly since
1975 (or since they transitioned to democracy). See
Figure 1.8 for more detail.
Older democracies have shown more democratic resilience

than third-wave democracies. A total of 28 countries in the
world were democracies before 1975, when the third wave of
democratization began. Democracy has been interrupted in
just two of these countries: Sri Lanka, which re-transitioned
back to democracy in 2015, and Venezuela, which is the only
old democracy to have experienced a gradual democratic
backsliding over the past two decades, and which ultimately
Democracies in 2018 that have experienced one or several
became a non-democracy in 2017. undemocratic political episodes from 1975 to 2018
Democracies that have not had such episodes during the period
Third-wave democracies have proven relatively resilient,
although less so than the older democracies. Of the
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019), <http://www.idea.
83 countries that transitioned to democracy after 1975, int/gsod-indices>.
well over half (64 per cent) have remained democracies
uninterruptedly. Of the 70 current third-wave democracies,
76 per cent have remained democracies uninterruptedly since
their transition. More than half (56 per cent) of the countries In the case of Ethiopia, the four advances recorded in 2018
that experienced partial or full democratic breakdown after were significant enough to lead to a change in its regime
1975 have since returned to democracy. classification, from a non-democracy to a hybrid regime.
Uzbekistan is a non-democracy that has experienced
Some hybrid and non-democratic regimes have made advances on five of its democratic subattributes, reflecting
incremental gains the unprecedented administrative and constitutional reform
Hybrid and non-democratic regimes are not static in processes undertaken since 2016, although these have not
their democratic development and can also experience yet been sufficient to alter the regime type (see Chapter 4 for
advances in aspects of democracy. While this progress a more detailed discussion).
may represent genuine attempts at democratic reform,
this will not always be the case. These improvements can Democracy as an enabler of sustainable development
also represent attempts to strengthen the legitimacy of the International IDEA views democracy as a universal human
regimes by creating or maintaining their democratic façade. aspiration and as a goal worth pursuing because of its
intrinsic value to societies. However, it also believes that
Around half of all hybrid regimes (10 in total) and non- democracy has an instrumental value, as an enabler of
democracies (11 in total) have seen advances in at least sustainable development (International IDEA 2018a: 5–9).
one of their democratic aspects in the past five years. Four
countries stand out for their advances over this time: Angola, The GSoD Indices data provides some backing for this
Central African Republic (CAR), Ethiopia and Uzbekistan view, while recognizing that more research is needed beyond
(see Table 1.2). Each of these countries has seen advances on descriptive statistics to explore with greater depth when, how
four or more aspects of democracy, reflecting the progress of and under what circumstances democracy can lead to more
emerging democratic reforms. sustainable societal, economic and environmental outcomes.
9
International IDEA also acknowledges that regime type is viewed as outcomes of democracy, rather than defining
only one of the factors that comes into play when determining characteristics (Munck 2016).
sustainable development outcomes and is therefore not a
sufficient condition for this determination. Indeed, a number While several hybrid regimes and non-democracies perform
of democracies have low levels of sustainable development. well on these aspects, they are the exception rather than
This has been identified as one of the drivers for the rise of the rule. Democracy is not a sufficient condition for high
populism, an issue explored in more detail in Section 1.2. performance and not all democracies perform well on these
aspects. However, democracies are more likely to have high
For this reason, The Global State of Democracy 2019 does not performance than non-democracies.
claim a direct causal link between democracy and sustainable
development. However, the GSoD Indices provide some On average, democracies have higher levels of Fundamental
backing for a number of claims on the association between Rights (including Access to Justice, enjoyment of Civil
democracy and certain aspects of sustainable development. Liberties, and Social Rights and Equality) than hybrid
regimes and non-democracies (see Table 1.3). All the
Democracies generally outperform hybrid regimes and countries with high levels of Fundamental Rights are
non-democracies on aspects not generally considered democracies (see Figure 1.9). Inversely, 59 per cent of non-
core to democracy. The GSoD framework includes a democracies have low levels of Fundamental Rights. There
broad range of democratic characteristics—such as Basic are only two democracies in the world with low levels of
Welfare, Access to Justice, Gender Equality, Social Group Fundamental Rights: Haiti and Turkey.
Equality and Absence of Corruption—which link to
sustainable social, human and economic development. In Democracies are associated with higher levels of Gender
other definitions of democracy, these dimensions are often Equality. On average, democracies have higher levels of
TABLE 1.2
Hybrid regimes and non-democracies with significant advances, 2013–2018
Country Regime type (2018) No. of significant advances Democratic aspects with significant advances
Predictable Enforcement
Absence of Corruption
Angola Hybrid regime 4
Media Integrity
Civil Liberties
Civil Society Participation
Access to Justice
Central African Republic Hybrid regime 6
Clean Elections
Predictable Enforcement
Civil Liberties
Ethiopia Hybrid regime* 4
Access to Justice
Media Integrity
Civil Liberties
Uzbekistan Non-democracy 5 Effective Parliament
Access to Justice
Civil Society Participation
Notes: *Ethiopia was classified as a non-democracy in 2017 but transitioned to a hybrid regime in 2018.
10
Gender Equality than non-democracies and hybrid regimes. The aspect of democracy that has the highest correlation
All but one of the countries with high levels of Gender with Basic Welfare and Human Development is Absence of
Equality are democracies, while this is the case for only one Corruption. In other words, the more corrupt a country is,
non-democracy (Rwanda). Half of non-democracies have the more likely it is to have low levels of Human Development
low levels of Gender Equality, while only three democracies and vice versa.
(Iraq, Papua New Guinea and Turkey) have low levels of
Gender Equality. On average, democracies have significantly lower levels of
corruption than non-democracies and hybrid regimes (see
Democracies have on average higher levels of Basic Table 1.3). More than two-thirds (78 per cent) of non-
Welfare and Human Development than non-democracies democracies have high levels of corruption, as do 64 per
or hybrid regimes. On average, democracies have higher cent of hybrid regimes, while no non-democracy has low
levels of Basic Welfare (which in the GSoD Indices aggregates levels of corruption. The fact that only one hybrid regime
indicators on nutrition, literacy, life expectancy and health (Singapore) has low levels of corruption confirms that
equality) and Human Development (UNDP 2018) than Singapore constitutes the exception rather than the rule.
non-democracies or hybrid regimes (see Table 1.3). Close to In comparison, only 25 per cent of democracies have high
half of the world’s democracies (48 per cent) have high levels levels of corruption.
of Basic Welfare, while this is the case for only 28 per cent of
non-democracies and 11 per cent of hybrid regimes. A recent meta-analysis of quantitative studies confirms
the GSoD Indices finding that democracies tend to be
Democracies have on average significantly lower levels of less corrupt than non-democracies (Doorenspleet 2019:
corruption than non-democracies and hybrid regimes. 189; see also Casas-Zamora and Carter 2017 and Mills,
TABLE 1.3 FIGURE 1.9
Average score by regime type and aspect of democracy, High performance levels by regime type
2018
100
100% 97% 100% 80% 96%
Average GSoD Indices score
90
Attribute
Democracies Hybrid regimes Non-democratic
Percentage of high-performing countries
(n=97) (n=28) regimes (n=32) 80
Fundamental 70
0.69 0.50 0.37
Rights
60
Gender
0.64 0.51 0.44
Equality 50
Basic 40
0.68 0.50 0.57
Welfare
30
Absence of
0.54 0.37 0.30
Corruption 20
5%
15%
Human 10
Development 0.74 0.62 0.66
Index 3% 4%
0
Fundamental Gender Social Group Basic Absence
Notes: The Human Development Index figures are from 2017 and are not included in the
Rights Equality Equality Welfare of Corruption
GSoD Indices data set. The green-coloured cells denote the highest average score.
Non-democracy Hybrid regime Democracy
Sources: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019),
<http://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>; United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
Human Development Index, 2018, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-
index-hdi>
int/gsod-indices>.
11
Obasanjo, Herbst and Biti 2019). However, the GSoD The GSoD Indices find that democracies with high and
Indices data, similar to the meta-analysis, does not support mid-range levels of Representative Government have
a direct causal link between democracy and low corruption, achieved higher rates of long-term gross domestic product
given the prevalence of high levels of corruption in a quarter (GDP) growth than non-democracies with low levels of
of the world’s democracies. The meta-analysis identifies Representative Government (see Table 1.4). Moreover,
level of democratic consolidation as an explanation for transitions from non-democracy to democracy have been
the prevalence of corruption: the more consolidated found to increase GDP per capita by about 20 per cent
a democracy is, the less corruption there is likely to be. for 25 years, compared to income levels in countries that
Weaker democracies, with weaker institutions, are more remained non-democratic (Acemoglu et al. 2019: 48).
prone to corruption.
Democracies are better for doing business. Democracies
Another factor that interacts with corruption is the provide better regulations for business and protect property
level of economic development. Particular institutions rights more effectively than other regime types. The average
within democracies, such as free and independent media score on the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Score
organizations, are seen to effectively limit corruption is 67 for democracies, compared to 53 for hybrid regimes
(Doorenspleet 2019: 189). The GSoD Indices data confirms and 54 for non-democracies (see Figure 1.10). Regime type
these findings, with moderate levels of correlation between is also significant when controlling for other factors in the
Media Integrity and Absence of Corruption. The highest regression analysis (World Bank 2018b).
correlations in the GSoD data set are, however, found
between Absence of Corruption and Access to Justice and
Clean Elections. FIGURE 1.10
Overall, these findings confirm that democracy, while not Average Ease of Doing Business score by regime type,
perfect, is a better institutional choice than non-democracy 2018
or hybridity for combating corruption and that efforts are
needed to further strengthen democracies’ capacity to reduce 80
corruption.
70 67
According to the GSoD Indices and some academic studies,
economic and environmental performance also seems to
60
Average Ease of Doing Business score
differ according to regime type, although a direct causal link 54 53

is not claimed in this report.
50
TABLE 1.4 40
Mean GDP per capita by level of Representative 30

Government, 1975 and 2017
20
Level of Mean GDP per capita

Representative in current US dollars Increase
10
Government
1975 2018
Low 1,490 7,000 5 times 0

Non-democracies Hybrid regimes Democracies
Mid-range 1,031 13,105 13 times
High 5,812 49,789 9 times Notes: The Ease of Doing Business score compares economies with respect to regulatory
best practice. The 2018 scores for GSoD Indices countries range between 20 and 87, with
higher scores denoting better performance.
Sources: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019), <http://www. Sources: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019),
idea.int/gsod-indices>; World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2018a, <https:// <http://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>. World Bank, Ease of Doing Business Score, 2018,
databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators>. <https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/data/doing-business-score>, accessed 6 August 2019.
12
Democracies are associated with higher average levels Weak democratic performance of third-wave
of environmental performance than non-democracie.s. democracies is on the increase
The Environmental Performance Index measures how well The democratic performance and quality of many of the
countries protect human health from environmental harm and third-wave democracies remain weak and the share of
preserve vital ecosystems (Wendling et al. 2018). Democracies weak democracies is on the rise. Democracies that score low
score an average of 72 out of 100 on the Environmental on at least one attribute of democracy have been labelled weak
Performance Index, compared to an average of 62 for non- democracies.3 They are characterized by having weak formal
democracies and 59 for hybrid regimes (see Figure 1.11). and informal democratic institutions, processes and practices.
The share of democracies with weak democratic performance
1.1.3. Concerning democratic trends: challenges has increased in the last decade, from 20 per cent in 2008 to 25
Despite the significant democratic achievements observed per cent in 2018 (see Figure 1.12). Of these weak democracies,
in most regions of the world over the past decades, and just over one-half (13 countries) transitioned to democracy
the continued increase in the number of democracies, between 1975 and 2000 but remained in a state of democratic
there are other concerning signs that may point to a global fragility and vulnerable to breakdown, while the remainder, a
democratic malaise. This condition is defined by a number little less than one-half, transitioned to democracy after 2000.
of challenges, including a loss in democratic quality in both
older and third-wave democracies and challenges related to Africa is the region with the largest share of weak
the difficulties in meeting citizens’ expectations of high and democracies. However, weak democracies are present across
equitable democratic, social and economic performance. other regions of the world, with four each in Latin America
and the Caribbean, and Europe; three in Asia and the Pacific;
and the two democracies in the Middle East (see Table 1.5).
FIGURE 1.11
Environmental performance by regime type, 2018 TABLE 1.5
80
Democracies with weak and very weak performance, 2018
72
70
Very
Weak-performing
62 Region weak-performing
59 democracies
60 democracies
Environmental performance
Burkina Faso,
50 Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau,
Africa
Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Madagascar
Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia
40
Asia and Malaysia, Myanmar,
the Pacific Papua New Guinea
30
Europe Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine Turkey

20
Latin America
Dominican Republic,
and the Haiti
Guatemala, Honduras
10 Caribbean
The Middle
0 Lebanon Iraq
East
Non-democracies Hybrid regimes Democracies
Notes: The difference between regime types loses significance when controlling for income levels. Notes: Weak performance is defined as a low score on at least one attribute of democracy
(unless a country scores high on the other four attributes), while very weak performance is
Sources: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019),
defined as a low score on at least two attributes.
<http://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>. Wendling, Z. A. et al., 2018 Environmental Performance
Index (New Haven, CT: Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, 2018), <https://epi. Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019), <http://www.idea.
envirocenter.yale.edu/>. int/gsod-indices>.
3 The coding rule for weak democracies is low score on at least one attribute, unless they have high on the four other attributes, which is the case for Ireland.
13
Countries with low performance on at least one Share of countries by performance level in Access to
attribute of democracy, 1975–2018 Justice, 1975–2018
35 70
30 60
2018: 25% of
97 democracies
25 50
Percentage of countries
20 40
15 2008: 30
20% of 90
democracies
10 20
1980:
13% of 38
democracies
5 10
0 0
2000
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
1975
2000
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
1975
Percentage of democracies with at least one low attribute Low Mid-range High
Increases in the share of countries with low democratic since returned to democracy, while the remaining 40 per cent
performance have been seen in relation to democratic have remained in either a hybrid or non-democratic state.
aspects such as Fundamental Rights, Social Group
Equality, Civil Society Participation and Electoral The increasing number of re-transitions to democracy
Participation. The decrease in Fundamental Rights is points to the democratic fragility of a number of third-
particularly visible in aspects related to Access to Justice wave democracies. In the period 2007–2018, there were
(see Figure 1.13) and Civil Liberties (see Figure 1.14)— 19 such transitions—more than twice as many as in the
mostly in relation to Freedom of Association and Assembly previous decade (see Figure 1.15). All of these countries
and Personal Integrity and Security, but also Freedom of had transitioned to democracy at some point after 1975,
Expression and Freedom of Religion. Since 2016, the share experienced a partial (to hybrid) or full (to non-democracy)
of countries with low levels of Clean Elections has also seen a democratic breakdown and then returned to democracy. The
slight increase (from 20 per cent to 23 per cent of countries). most recent examples include Sri Lanka (2015), Haiti (2016),
The Gambia (2017) and Lebanon (2018). Therefore, while
Democracy remains fragile in some transitional contexts the world continues to experience a quantitative increase in
The majority of countries that underwent a democratic the number of democracies, the quality of many of these
transition after 1975 have kept their democratic status democracies remains low and subject to democratic fragility.
uninterruptedly. Nevertheless, around 36 per cent have
experienced democratic fragility. This is described in the The majority of countries with partial or full democratic
GSoD as partial (to hybrid) or full (to non-democracy) breakdowns experienced only one such episode. However,
democratic breakdowns at some point in the past four 9 of the 30 experienced several breakdowns since 1975, and
decades. More than half of these countries (18 in total) have 4 of those (Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Nepal and Sri Lanka)
14
have currently returned to democracy (note that Guinea- FIGURE 1.14

Bissau and Haiti are also weak democracies). Six countries
(Bangladesh, Nicaragua, Niger, Zambia and most recently Share of countries by performance level in Civil
Pakistan) with previous democratic breakdowns have Liberties, 1975–2018
remained in a hybrid state while Thailand remained in a
70
non-democratic state until 2019.
Africa contains the largest share of fragile democracies. 60
A total of seven fragile democracies are in Africa but Latin

America and the Caribbean, Europe, and Asia and the 50
Pacific also contain fragile democracies. Two-thirds of fragile
democracies are early third-wave democracies (i.e. those that
40
transitioned before 2000), while the remainder are third-
wave democracies that transitioned after 2000.
30
Democratic weakness and fragility are closely

interlinked. Two-thirds (12 of 18) of fragile democracies 20
(i.e. those that have experienced undemocratic interruptions)
are also low-performing weak democracies. The largest share
10
of those weak, low-quality and fragile democracies is found
in Africa, but they can also be found in Latin America and
the Caribbean, in Europe and the Middle East (see Table 0
1.6). Democratic weakness and low democratic quality make
2000
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
1975
democracies more vulnerable to partial (into hybridity)

or full (into non-democracy) democratic backsliding or Low Mid-range High
breakdown, therefore reinforcing their democratic fragility. Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019), <http://www.idea.
int/gsod-indices>.
Democratic erosion is on the rise

The share of democracies experiencing democratic
erosion has seen a consistent increase in the past FIGURE 1.15
decades and has more than doubled in the past decade
compared to the decade before. The GSoD Indices define First-time democratic transitions versus re-transitions
democratic erosion as a statistically significant decline on by decade, 1976–2018
at least one democratic subattribute over a five-year period 35
in democracies. Democratic erosion can occur at different
30
levels of democratic development.
No. of (re-) transitions
25
In 2018, one-half (50 per cent) of the world’s democracies 20
experienced democratic erosion, with declines on at least 15

one subattribute of democracy, and 15 per cent experienced 10
declines on three subattributes or more. Nearly half of the
5
world’s population (43 per cent) live in countries that have
0
experienced some form of democratic erosion in the last
1976−1985 1986−1995 1996−2006 2007−2018
five years (see Figure 1.16).
First time transition to democracy
Re-transition to democracy
The regions with the largest share of democracies
experiencing democratic erosion are North America, Notes: Some countries may have experienced several re-transitions in a decade and may
Asia and the Pacific, and Europe (see Figure 1.17). therefore be counted more than once. First-time transitions to democracy refer to countries
that experienced a democratic transition after 1975 for the first time in their history, while
Democratic erosion affects more than half of the re-transitions are those countries that transitioned to democracy after 1975, experienced
democracies in these regions, and a little under half of partial or full democratic breakdown, and then returned to democracy.
all democracies in Africa and Latin America and the int/gsod-indices>.
Caribbean (43 per cent and 42 per cent, respectively).
15
TABLE 1.6
Fragile and weak democracies, 2018
Combination of fragility Latin America

Africa Europe The Middle East
and weakness and the Caribbean
The Gambia, Kenya, Dominican Republic,

Fragile and weak Georgia Lebanon
Mali, Nigeria Honduras
Very fragile and weak Guinea-Bissau
Fragile and very weak Madagascar Turkey
Very fragile and very weak Haiti
Notes: Democracies that are both weak and fragile according to definitions provided in text.
Roughly half of both older (48 per cent) and third-wave In 2014, in another sign of global democratic erosion,
democracies (53 per cent) have experienced democratic countries with significant democratic declines in
erosion in the last five years. The democracies that have Fundamental Rights started to outnumber those with
seen the most widespread democratic erosion in the past five significant advances. Furthermore, in 2016, for the first
years, judging by the number of democratic subattributes time since 1975, the number of countries with significant
declines, are six third-wave democracies (Brazil, Hungary, declines in Representative Government and Checks on
Kenya, Poland, Romania and Turkey) and two older Government also began to outnumber those with significant
democracies: India and the United States. advances.
FIGURE 1.16
Share of world population living in countries with and without democratic erosion, 2018
43%
of the worldʼs population lives
57%
in countries with democratic erosion
of the worldʼs population lives

in countries without democratic erosion
16
FIGURE 1.17 While democratic weakness and fragility affects a number

of third-wave democracies, there are also signs that the
Democratic erosion by region, 2018 quality of the world’s high-performing democracies is
eroding. This erosion has been particularly marked in the
last decade. High performance in this context refers to a high
100% (2)
North
score on all five attributes of democracy. Despite the number
America of democracies more than doubling in the past four decades,
100% (2)
the share of democracies with high performance on all five
60% (9)
democratic attributes has been cut by more than half during
Asia and
40% (6)
the same period (from 47 per cent in 1980 to 22 per cent in
the Pacific 2018). In the past decade alone (i.e. since 2008), the share of
20% (3)
high-performing democracies has been reduced from 27 per
58% (22) cent to 22 per cent (see Figure 1.19).
Europe 40% (15)
18% (7) The aspects of democracy that have eroded most in high-
performing democracies are those related to civic space.
43% (9)
The GSoD Indices measure this erosion via indicators on
Africa 38% (8)
Civil Society Participation, Media Integrity and Civil
5% (1)
Liberties (in particular Freedom of Religion, Personal
42% (8) Declines on... Integrity and Security, and Freedom of Expression) as well
Latin America one or more
and the 32% (6) subattributes
Caribbean 11% (2) ...1−2 subattributes
FIGURE 1.19
...> 2 subattributes
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percentage of democracies
High performance on five GSoD Indices attributes,
1975–2018
int/gsod-indices>. 60
1980:
47% of 38
democracies
50
FIGURE 1.18
40
Significant declines on one or more subattributes of
democracy, 1980s to 2010s 2008:
27% of 90
30 30 democracies
Mean annual percentage of democracies
20
2018:
20 22% of 97
democracies
10
10
0
2000
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
1975
0
1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s Percentage of democracies with five high attributes
Decliners on one or two subattributes

Notes: This figure shows the percentage of countries with high performance on all five GSoD
Decliners on three or more subattributes Indices attributes over time. It illustrates how the quality of democracy has declined in
former high-performing democracies.
17
as Electoral Participation and Free Political Parties. Declines significant declines in a number of countries (see Figures
are also seen in Judicial Independence. 1.20, 1.21 and 1.22).
The share of countries with high performance on Judicial Although Europe still has higher levels of civic space than other
Independence, Free Political Parties, and Personal Integrity regions of the world, it is the region that has seen the largest
and Security was lower in 2018 than in 1990, while Media share of countries with declines in the Civil Liberties and Media
Integrity and Freedom of Expression had regressed to 1990s Integrity aspects of civic space. Meanwhile Africa, Asia and the
levels. Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean have seen an
equal number of countries declining on Media Integrity.
There are increasing signs of democratic backsliding
Democratic backsliding, a particular form of democratic Progress on other crucial aspects of democracy has
erosion involving the gradual and intentional weakening been slow (e.g. corruption, gender equality and judicial
of checks and balances and of civil liberties, has become independence)
more frequent in the last decade. The GSoD Indices The democratic aspects that have seen the slowest
define democratic backsliding as a gradual and intentional advances in the past four decades relate to reducing
weakening of checks on government and accountability corruption, advancing Gender Equality, increasing
institutions, accompanied by declines in civil liberties. This Social Group Equality, and strengthening Judicial
issue is discussed in more detail in Section 1.2. Independence. Absence of Corruption is the only aspect
of democracy that has deteriorated globally in the past
A total of 10 countries in the world are currently experiencing four decades, with a three per cent decrease since 1975,
democratic backsliding. The most severe cases are Hungary,
Poland, Romania, Serbia and Turkey. However, countries
such as India, the Philippines and Ukraine are also affected. FIGURE 1.20
In Nicaragua (2016) and Pakistan (2018), the backsliding
was so severe that it led to a regression into hybridity (partial Significant declines and advances in Civil Liberties,
democratic breakdown). 1980–2018
60
Venezuela represents the most severe democratic
backsliding case in the past four decades. Venezuela is 55
the only country that has gone from being a democracy 50
with high levels of Representative Government in 1975 to
45
a non-democracy (since 2017) (see Section 3.1 for more
information). 40
No. of countries
35
Civic space is shrinking
In all regions of the world and across all regime types, 30
civic space is shrinking. The GSoD Indices show most 25

countries declining on aspects of democracy related to
20
civic space. This decline is observed in various contexts,
including of democratic erosion, democratic backsliding and 15
deepening autocratization. This has serious implications for 10

democratic health and sustainability—a vibrant civic space
5
is key to building and sustaining healthy democracies and
safeguarding them against threats. This issue is discussed in 0
more detail in Section 1.2.
2000
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
The aspects of civic space that have seen the largest number Advancers Decliners
of countries declining are Civil Liberties (particularly
Freedom of Expression, but also Freedom of Association Notes: Advancers and decliners refer to countries with statistically significant declines or
and Assembly, Personal Integrity and Security, Freedom of advances over five-year periods from 1980 to 2018.
Religion and Freedom of Movement) and Media Integrity. int/gsod-indices>.
Levels of Civil Society Participation have also seen
18
except in Latin America and the Caribbean. The share of decades. Despite the significant economic and democratic
democracies with high levels of corruption has more than progress that the world has made in the past 43 years,
doubled in 40 years: in 1975, 9 per cent of the democracies efforts to secure more equal access to political power, and to
had high levels of corruption (3 of 35), while this was the strengthen the independence of judiciaries, have significantly
case for 25 per cent of democracies in 2018 (24 of 97). lagged behind other democratic advances.
Despite some advances in political gender equality in Social Group Equality, which measures equality in access to
the past decades, serious efforts are still required to political power and enjoyment of Civil Liberties by social
achieve political Gender Equality. Only 24 per cent of group, has only increased by 10 per cent, making it the
parliamentary seats in the world are occupied by women. second-slowest advancing aspect in the GSoD framework.
No regional average has reached the ‘critical minority’ point Similarly, global levels of Judicial Independence have only
of 30 per cent of women legislators (International IDEA advanced by 15 per cent since 1975. Since 2013, the
2019), although some subregions—including North and number of countries with significant declines (19) in Judicial
West Europe (36 per cent), East Africa (34.5 per cent), and Independence outnumber those with advances (16).
Central America and Mexico (32 per cent)—have done so
(V-Dem 2019). Despite these advances, serious efforts are While all countries with high levels of Social Group
still required to achieve political equality for women. Equality are democracies, 14 per cent of democracies have
low levels of equality in access to political power. Of the
Political inclusion and judicial independence have not democracies with high levels of social group inequality in
seen sufficient global improvements in the past four 2018, more than half also had high levels of income inequality.
Significant declines and advances in Media Integrity, Significant declines and advances in Civil Society
1980–2018 Participation, 1980–2018
60 60
55 55
50 50
45 45
40 40
No. of countries
No. of countries
35 35
30 30
25 25
20 20
15 15
10 10
5 5
0 0
2000
2000
2005
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
1985
1995
2015
Advancers Decliners Advancers Decliners
Notes: Advancers and decliners refer to countries with statistically significant declines or Notes: Advancers and decliners refer to countries with statistically significant declines or
advances over five-year periods from 1980 to 2018. advances over five-year periods from 1980 to 2018.
19
FIGURE 1.23
How long will it take to reach gender parity in parliaments?
50% Equal numbers

of men and women
in parliaments
24%
in 2019
19%
in 2009
0%
2009 2019 2065

46 years
Note: International IDEA's own calculations based on the Varieties of Democracy data set (V-Dem 2019) and on data collected by the Inter-Parliamentary Union <https://www.ipu.org/our-
impact/gender-equality>, accessed 1 August 2019.
Of the 11 most income-unequal countries in the world The number of hybrid regimes has more than quadrupled
(with a Gini coefficient4 over 50), almost two-thirds since 1975, from 7 (or 5 per cent) of countries to 28 (or 18
are democracies. Furthermore, of the 58 countries per cent) in 2018.
with relatively high levels of income inequality (with a
Gini coefficient over 40), more than half (62 per cent) More than half of the world’s hybrid regimes are located in
are democracies. The largest share of the most income- Africa. The Middle East also contains a significant number of
unequal democracies in the world is found in Latin such regimes. Hybrid regimes are found in all regions except
America and the Caribbean (17 countries), followed by North America. In 2018 Pakistan and Tanzania became the
Africa (14 countries), although they are also found across most recent democracies to regress into hybridity.
all other regions of the world (World Bank 2019).
In the majority of cases, hybridity is not a transitional
As will be seen in the following chapters, the perceived stage towards democracy but a defining feature of the
inability of democracies to reduce corruption and socio- regime. Of the world’s hybrid regimes, almost three-quarters
economic and political inequalities, among other challenges, (71 per cent) have never been democracies. Less than one-
reduces trust in democracy. This perceived inability is at third (30 per cent) of third-wave democracies underwent a
the core of the current crisis of democracy in regions such hybrid phase before transitioning to democracy. A very small
as Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia and share (20 per cent) of the world’s hybrid regimes and non-
the Pacific, where voters are turning to populist responses democracies experienced democratic interruptions at some
in the hope that they will be better able to address these point in the last four decades.
challenges.
However, in 2018, two of the world’s most enduring hybrid
Hybridity has increased in past decades regimes transitioned to democracy: Armenia and Malaysia.
The share of hybrid regimes has increased in the past Malaysia became a democracy after more than four decades
decades. Hybrid regimes occur in countries that adopt of hybridity following the 2018 general elections in which
democratic façades (often in the form of periodic, albeit the monopoly of the National Front Coalition (Barisan
non-competitive, elections), generally coupled with severe Nasional) came to an end on the back of a united opposition
restrictions on Civil Liberties and other democratic rights. and a strong civil society. Armenia, a hybrid regime since
4 The Gini coefficient measures inequality in income distribution in a country. A Gini coefficient of 0 represents perfect equality, while a coefficient of 100 implies the highest levels of inequality.
20
its independence in 1991, was beset by a wave of popular Central Africa, which contained no democracies in 2018.
protests in 2018 that led to the resignation of its prime North Africa and East Africa have just one democracy each.
minister and long-standing president, and a subsequent
electoral victory for the opposition. These cases demonstrate Even within non-democracies, performance patterns
the strong popular democratic aspirations that exist even in vary. Some non-democracies score low on all democratic
regimes that have never experienced democracy. attributes—almost half of all non-democracies (16) can be
found in this category across all regions with such regimes—
Performance patterns vary widely across hybrid regimes, while others score mid-range on some of their attributes.
ranging from countries that score mid-range on all attributes, The United Arab Emirates is the only non-democracy that
to countries that score low on all attributes. Several hybrid scores high on a democratic attribute, namely Impartial
regimes have exceptionally high performance on some Administration (due to its low levels of corruption). If
aspects of democracy. Singapore, for example, is the only performance at the subattribute or subcomponent level is
hybrid regime with high levels of Impartial Administration. analysed, some non-democracies also score exceptionally
However, hybrid regimes and non-democracies with high high on some aspects. Cuba, for example, scores in the top
performance on a democratic attribute are the exception 25 per cent in the world on both Basic Welfare and Gender
rather than the rule. Equality. Rwanda is a non-democracy with high levels of
Gender Equality.
Non-democratic regimes have persisted and deepened
their autocratization A significant share of the world’s non-democracies has
Non-democracies and hybrid regimes together still proven remarkably persistent, and citizens in these
represent 38 per cent of countries. More than 3 billion countries have never experienced democracy. More than
people or 43 per cent of the world’s population live in half of the world’s non-democracies (18 of 32) and the
such regimes. The share of non-democracies has been large majority (73 per cent) of hybrid and non-democracies
significantly reduced in the past decades (from 68 per combined have never been a democracy at any point since
cent of countries in 1975 to only 20 per cent in 2018). 1975. The influence of these persistent non-democracies
Non-democratic regimes include autocracies, authoritarian on the global democracy landscape should not be
regimes, one-party rule, military regimes, authoritarian underestimated.
monarchies and failed states or war-torn, conflict-ravaged
countries without a centralized monopoly on the use of The actions of China (and Russia) in Venezuela, providing
force. the regime of President Nicolás Maduro with favourable
loans in exchange for subsidized oil, are seen as key factors
In most non-democratic regimes, civil liberties tend to be in his maintenance of power. In the case of Cambodia, no-
systematically curtailed. There is often no clear separation of strings financial loans to the government, in addition to
power, the judiciary is usually controlled by the executive, large economic investments, have also been key elements in
oppositional political parties are often barred from operating the country’s deepening autocratization, helping to shield
freely, and the media tends to be systematically restricted the regime from international pressure. China invests in all
as are critical voices within civil society, although in non- regions of the world and also reportedly exerts its political
democracies that are failing states and countries ravaged by and economic influence by exporting surveillance technology
civil war, the executive usually lacks autocratic repressive to non-democratic regimes.
powers over the judiciary and opposition parties.
While a number of hybrid regimes and non-democracies
The share of people living in non-democracies (28 per cent) have seen some advances in their democratic indicators
remains significant as a number of non-democracies (i.e. in the past 10 years, a significant number have also
China, Egypt and Saudi Arabia) have large populations. become increasingly autocratic. This process (referred to as
Non-democracies are found across all regions of the world. deepening autocratization) is defined in the GSoD Indices as
The Middle East is the least democratic region in the significant declines in at least three democratic subattributes
world, with more than half (58 per cent) of its countries during a five-year period (see Table 1.7). In some cases, this
being non-democracies. Of the 32 non-democracies in the has pushed some hybrid regimes into non-democracies,
world, the largest share (34 per cent) are in Africa, followed as was the case in Venezuela in 2017 and in Cambodia in
by Asia and the Pacific (31 per cent), and the Middle East 2018. The number of countries experiencing deepening
(22 per cent). The least democratic subregions in the world autocratization has increased in the last decade and has now
are Central Asia, which has never had a democracy, and reached its highest peak since 1975 (see Figure 1.24).
21
TABLE 1.7
Countries experiencing deepening autocratization, 2013–2018
Number of subattribute Within hybrid Shift from hybrid to Within non-democratic

declines, 2013–2018 category non-democratic category category
Venezuela 8 2017
Yemen 8 X
Burundi 7 X
South Sudan 5 X
Egypt 3 X
Mauritania 3 X
Togo 3 X
Bahrain 3 X
Cambodia 3 2018
1.1.4. Conclusion FIGURE 1.24

There is some hope for democracy worldwide. The number
of democracies continues to rise, and people’s democratic Deepening autocratization per decade 1980s–2010s
aspirations remain high, even in countries that have never
experienced democracy. Those popular demands have often 8
been a key driving force of recent democratic transitions.

However, democracy is under stress and faces a global malaise. 7
While the quantitative expansion of democracy continues

Mean annual number of countries
6
today, the quality of the world’s democracies is deteriorating.
This deterioration takes different forms depending on 5
the context. New democracies exhibit weak democratic
performance and, even while building their democratic 4
institutions and capacities, remain susceptible to backsliding
into hybridity or a non-democratic state.
3
The share of countries with high democratic performance is

2
decreasing and these countries face the challenges of democratic
erosion and backsliding, often spurred by the rise of populist
1
alternatives. Populists attract voters with promises of more
effective solutions to socio-economic challenges at the expense of
0
democratic quality. In all these contexts, civic space is shrinking. 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s
Hybrid and non-democratic regimes

At the same time, governments in a number of large or with more than two significant declines
economically powerful countries across all regions of the world
seem immune to democracy and endure as non-democracies
Notes: This figure shows the annual number of non-democratic and hybrid regimes with at
(e.g. China, Egypt and Saudi Arabia) or hybrid regimes (e.g. least three significant declines, averaged per decade. Note that the decade of the 2010s is
Singapore), while luring others with an exportable model of only made up of eight years’ worth of data (2010–2018).
governance. Some of these opportunities and challenges for int/gsod-indices>.
democracy are analysed in greater depth in Table 1.8.
22
TABLE 1.8
The Global State of Democracy Indices: A global snapshot

This section offers a snapshot of the Global State of Democracy, using the GSoD conceptual framework as an organizing structure. The
analysis covers the five main attributes of democracy—Representative Government, Fundamental Rights, Checks on Government, Impartial
Administration and Participatory Engagement—as well as their subattributes.
Representative Of the world’s 97 democracies in 2018, 55 per cent have mid-range levels and 45 per cent
Government have high levels of Representative Government.
Elected Government:
When counting countries with more than one million inhabitants, the world has 97 democracies with democratically elected
governments, 32 non-democracies and 28 hybrid regimes.
In 2018, Pakistan and Tanzania regressed from democracy to become hybrid regimes, while Armenia and Malaysia
transitioned from hybridity to democracy.
Clean Elections:
Overall, 59 per cent of democracies (57 countries) have high levels of Clean Elections, while 41 per cent (40 countries) have
mid-range levels. Of the countries with high levels of Clean Elections, 49 per cent are found in Europe, while 19 per cent are
found in Latin America and the Caribbean, 8 per cent in both Africa and Asia and the Pacific and 2 per cent in North America.
Inclusive Suffrage:
In 2018, 94 per cent of countries in the world had high levels of Inclusive Suffrage.
Free Political Parties:

Overall, 29 per cent of democracies have high levels of Free Political Parties, while 71 per cent have mid-range levels.
Of the countries with high levels, 47 per cent are found in Europe, while 21 per cent are found in Latin America and the
Caribbean, 18 per cent in Asia and the Pacific and 7 per cent in both Africa and North America.
In 2018 more than half of all democracies (55 per cent) had mid-range performance on
Fundamental Rights Fundamental Rights, while 43 per cent had high performance. Only two democracies—
Haiti and Turkey—had low performance on this attribute.
Access to Justice:
Of all the democracies in the world, only four—El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti and Turkey—have low levels of Access to Justice.
Three of these countries are in Latin America and the Caribbean. In contrast, 56 per cent of non-democracies (18 of 32 countries)
have low levels of Access to Justice.
Civil Liberties:
In the past five years, 38 countries have seen significant declines in their Civil Liberties scores: 32 per cent are in Europe,
24 per cent in Africa, and 18 per cent in Asia and the Pacific and in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Gender Equality:
In 2018, 18 per cent of countries had high levels of political Gender Equality, while 68 per cent had mid-range levels and 14 per
cent had low levels. A total of three democracies had low levels of Gender Equality: Iraq, Papua New Guinea and Turkey.
23
Social Group Equality:

Overall, 23 per cent of democracies (22 countries) have high levels of Social Group Equality, while 14 per cent have low
scores on this measure (14 countries). No hybrid regime or non-democracy has high levels of Social Group Equality.
The regions with the largest number of countries with low levels of Social Group Equality are Africa (16 countries) and Asia
and the Pacific (14 countries).
Basic Welfare:
Of all the democracies in the world, 48 per cent have high levels of Basic Welfare, while 42 per cent have mid-range scores
and 10 per cent have low performance.
In 2018, 62 per cent of the 97 democracies in the world had mid-range performance on
Checks on Checks on Government, and 37 per cent had high performance. Only one country, Turkey,
Government
had low performance on this attribute.
Effective Parliament:
Overall, 21 per cent of countries have high levels of Effective Parliament, while 24 per cent have low levels.
Judicial Independence:
Since 2013, 19 countries have seen significant declines in Judicial Independence. While most of the declines are seen in
Europe and Africa (32 per cent or six countries each), most of the 16 countries presenting significant advances in the last
five years are in Africa and Asia and the Pacific.
Media Integrity:
In 2018, 47 per cent of democracies had high performance in Media Integrity, while 52 per cent had mid-range
performance and 1 per cent had low levels.
Impartial 27 per cent of democracies in the world have high levels of Impartial Adminsitration,
Administration 61 per cent have mid-range levels and 12 per cent have low levels.
Absence of Corruption:
While 23 per cent of democracies have low levels of corruption (> 0.7 on Absence of Corruption), this is true for only one
hybrid regime (Singapore) and for no non-democracies.
In 2018, high levels of corruption could be found in 25 per cent of democracies. Of these countries, 37 per cent are in
Africa, 25 per cent in Latin America and the Caribbean, 17 per cent in Europe, 13 per cent (three countries) in Asia and
the Pacific and 8 per cent (two countries) in the Middle East.
Of the 22 democracies with low levels of corruption, 68 per cent are in Europe, four (18 per cent) are in Asia and the
Pacific, while three are in the Americas.
A total of 23 countries have seen significant advances in their Absence of Corruption score in the last five years, while 14
have seen significant declines.
Predictable Enforcement:
In the last five years, 17 countries have seen significant declines on Predictable Enforcement.
24
Participatory In 2018, 41 per cent of democracies performed highly on Participatory Engagement, while
Engagement 40 per cent performed mid-range and 19 per cent had low performance.
Civil Society Participation:

In 2018, 44 per cent of democracies had high performance on Civil Society Participation, while 55 per cent performed
mid-range. Only one democracy, Turkey, had low performance.
Electoral Participation:
Electoral Participation levels are low in 8 per cent of democracies and 25 per cent of non-democracies. Just one
hybrid regime (Ethiopia) has high levels of Electoral Participation. Of the 57 democracies that perform mid-range,
49 per cent are in Europe, 10 (18 per cent) are in Latin America and the Caribbean, 9 (16 per cent) are in Africa, and 6
(11 per cent) are in Asia and the Pacific. The Middle East and North America have two countries each, or a 3 per cent
share.
Direct Democracy:
Only two countries—Taiwan and Switzerland—have high levels of Direct Democracy; both are democracies. Bulgaria,
Ecuador, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, New Zealand, Peru, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Uruguay account for the
12 per cent of democracies that have a mid-range performance, while the rest (86 per cent, or 83 countries) have low
levels. Overall, 91 per cent of countries have low performance on this subattribute.
Local Democracy:
Among the world’s democracies, 46 per cent have high performance in Local Democracy, 36 per cent perform mid-range
and 15 per cent have low performance.
1.2.1. The crisis of representation of political

parties and the rise of populism
1.2. Spotlight on key global issues in Democracy relies on effective representation, in the form
democracy landscape of responsive political parties and leaders who can craft
This section provides more in-depth analysis of a selected policy solutions for their societies. Yet many citizens
number of issues identified in the previous section on question whether traditional political parties can handle
global democratic trends that are currently affecting the current challenges and crises, and this has increased apathy
global democracy landscape: the crisis of representation and distrust among voters. It has also encouraged many to
of political parties and the rise of populism; democratic support alternative paths of political action, triggering the
backsliding; the empowerment of civil society in a shrinking rise of ideologically extremist parties and movements with
civic space; managing elections as fair competition in populist bents on both the right and left of the political
challenging environments; and corruption and money in spectrum and across all regions of the world.
politics.
Party systems in democracies are under threat, and
The five sections can be read in isolation depending on the traditional political leadership is caught between the
specific interests of the reader, although the linkages between centralization of policy decisions on the one hand, and
issues are also explored. Each provides a brief overview of disaffected voters on the other hand, who turn to populist
key global trends and their impact on the global democracy responses. However, what is a populist political party or
landscape; points to main drivers, explanatory factors and leader, what gives rise to populism and what impact does
consequences; and offers a set of policy considerations for it have on democracy and on other societal aspects such
harnessing the opportunities and addressing the challenges. as welfare and the economy? This section seeks to provide
A text box on information and communications technologies some answers to these questions.
and their impact on democracy is also included (see Box 1.1).
25
KEY FINDINGS
The crisis of representation of political parties and the • The second key challenge for civil society is a rapidly shrinking
rise of populism civic space in many countries.
• Citizens are disenchanted with traditional political parties’ perceived
• Declines in civic space are seen in countries across all regions of
lack of capacity to address societal and economic problems. This
the world and across all levels of democratic performance. These
has encouraged many voters to support alternative paths of political
declines in civic space are occurring in contexts of democratic
action, thereby contributing to the rise of extremist parties and
erosion, democratic backsliding and deepening autocratization.
movements on both the right and left of the political spectrum.
• Populist actors often show disrespect for the accountability

Managing elections as fair competition in challenging
institutions that check government, protect political pluralism environments
and constitute liberal democracy. This inherent predisposition for • Elections have now become the norm rather than the exception.
unconstrained power turns populism into a threat for democracy. A total of 62 per cent of countries in the world regularly hold free,
fair and competitive elections. Of the world’s democracies in 2018,
• The GSoD Indices data shows that populist governments diminish more than half (59 per cent) have high levels of Clean Elections.
the quality of democracy compared to non-populist governments.
The only aspect of democracy that has improved more under • Most electoral processes taking place around the world manage to
populist governments is Electoral Participation. successfully overcome the inevitable technical hiccups and facilitate
orderly transitions of power. However, when confronted with serious
• However, some also argue that populists have helped to put on the technical challenges and significant efforts of delegitimization, electoral
agenda important issues (e.g. corruption in democratic systems) processes may fail to deliver credible or trusted results. Failed elections
that democracies need to tackle in order to regain their legitimacy. can trigger political crises with profound negative effects on societies.
Patterns and conditions of democratic backsliding • For countries undergoing significant democratic reforms as part of
• Democratic backsliding is a particular form of democratic erosion transition processes, revising electoral rules and strengthening electoral
that involves the gradual weakening of checks on government systems is key to ensuring the sustainability of such processes.
and civil liberties by democratically elected governments. This
• Many undemocratic regimes strive to uphold elections as means of
intentional dismantling of checks and balances has more than
internal and external legitimization. In country contexts ruled by hybrid
doubled in the past decade and has, in the case of Venezuela, led
or non-democratic regimes, elections can reinforce a democratic
to a full democratic breakdown.
façade, both domestically and internationally. The distortion of electoral
• Low levels of popular support for democracy as well as societal principles for non-democratic purposes can further undermine
and political polarization appear to be linked to an increased public trust in the value of the electoral process in democracies.
probability and extent of backsliding.
• Social media provides a communication channel whereby rumours
• Populist presidents and governments tend to make backsliding and disinformation spread at an unprecedented rate and this can also
more likely and to increase the scope of democratic decline. undermine trust in electoral processes. A need for a more rigorous
regulation of social media platforms has become increasingly apparent.
• Higher levels of Effective Parliament and Civil Society Participation
appear to effectively prevent the start of a backsliding process, Corruption and money in politics
make continued backsliding less probable and reduce the scope of • Absence of Corruption is closely connected to the United Nations
backsliding. Sustainable Development Goal 16 (SDG 16) to promote just,
peaceful and inclusive societies and, in particular, SDG 16.5 which
The empowerment of civil society in a shrinking civic space aims to substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all its forms.
• The global democratic expansion in the past four decades has enabled
an expansion of civil society and civic space at the global, regional, • Absence of Corruption also indirectly contributes to achieving the
national and subnational levels across all regions of the world. other SDGs, as corruption can hinder the effective implementation
of policies at improving health or education, eradicating poverty,
• A transformation of civic space has been observed in recent years, promoting gender equality or fostering economic growth.
brought about by the use of information and communications
technologies and the transformation of political parties, with a • Corruption not only affects people’s trust in politicians but can also
shift towards an individualization of civic engagement beyond undermine trust in government and democracy more broadly.
formal organizational structures, to citizen mobilization and
• Democracy matters for corruption. In and of itself, democracy is
networking into looser and more fluid forms of interactions, often
not sufficient to guarantee low levels of corruption: indeed, 25 per
facilitated by social media.
cent of democracies suffer from high levels of corruption. However,
• There are two key challenges related to civic space, in the current global democracies are by and large less corrupt than non-democracies
democracy landscape. The first relates to the emergence of uncivil and hybrid regimes.
elements in civil society. While such currents have always existed,
• The lack of progress in reducing corruption has serious implications
new forms have acquired a more potent voice and become more visible.
for the sustainability, stability and health of both older and newer
Some of these voices (e.g. movements on the extreme right in Germany,
democracies. The perceived inability of some countries to effectively
Sweden and the United States) are the product of democratic societies
curb corruption is seen as one of the causes for the rise of populism.
and constitutionally acquired rights such as freedom of expression.
26
What is populism? Critics of populist politics have also used the term
Populism has become a loaded term, frequently used to ‘authoritarian populism’ to highlight linkages between
discredit political opponents and their views. A popular populism and authoritarian values (Norris and Inglehart
interpretation of the word encapsulates the idea of populists 2019: 69–71). The compatibility of populist ideas has
as the true representatives of the neglected people, in contrast supported their transnational diffusion and their adoption
to the ruling elites. by mainstream political actors trying to compete with
populist challengers.
Scholars studying the phenomenon have defined populism as
an ideology, a political mobilization strategy or a discursive- Populist politicians often seek to convince their followers by
stylistic repertoire. Most agree that the opposition between using simplistic rhetoric associated with the language used
‘the people’ and an elite that fails to represent the people’s by ordinary people (Brubaker 2017; Mudde and Rovira
true interest constitutes the core idea of populist rhetoric and Kaltwasser 2017: 68). Various rhetorical tropes are used to
framing of politics. According to one prominent definition, criticize incumbent elites and democratic institutions, for
populists consider ‘society to be ultimately separated into example: ‘the mainstream media (“fake news”), elections
two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, “the pure people” (“fraudulent”), politicians (“drain the swamp”), political
versus “the corrupt elite” and argues that politics should be parties (“dysfunctional”)’ (Norris and Inglehart 2019: 4).
an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the Populists also tend to provide seemingly simple solutions to
people’ (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017: 6). complex challenges, such as inequalities, migration or the
economy.
However, some view this definition as too broad as it may
potentially include all those who criticize ruling elites. Because populists present themselves as the only true
Other definitions therefore complement the anti-elitist representatives of the people, they often interpret their
element of populism with the idea that populists do not electoral support as a mandate authorizing them to ignore or
only oppose elites, but also claim to exclusively represent disrespect institutions enshrined in democratic constitutions.
the people (Müller 2016). This claim questions the In the populist framing, constitutional checks and balances
legitimacy of competing political actors. Some also view against the abuse of executive authority have not only failed
the people–elite opposition as overly narrow because it to make elites responsive but also enabled elite conspiracy.
overlooks populists’ separation between ‘the people’ and This is why these checks and balances also lack any legitimacy
outside groups such as foreign nationals—immigrants in to constrain the will of the people. The direct personalistic
particular—as well as foreign political or economic powers link between populist leaders and the people renders these
(Brubaker 2017). institutions obsolete and can override or substitute them.
This inherent predisposition for unconstrained power turns
Electoral successes of populist politicians and parties have populism into a potential threat for democracy.
posed challenges to both older and newer democracies,
as populist politicians claim that democratically elected However, there is also a more ‘benign’ view of populism,
political elites do not represent the ‘true’ interests of ‘the whereby it is seen as contributing to the reinvigoration
people’. As a ‘thin-centred’ ideology (Freeden 1998; Mudde of democracy by identifying flaws and failures in current
and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017), populism can be attached to democratic systems and pushing forward necessary reform.
different political positions. A left-wing variant, motivated In these circumstances, where the political system fails to
by issues of economic justice and distribution, sees elites respond to major unmet public needs through established
primarily in financial terms, as a plutocratic ruling class democratic channels such as elections, parties and legislatures,
who must be restrained and overcome in the name of the voters turn to populist alternatives in the hope that they will
people. better meet their expectations.
A right-wing variant sees elites in cultural terms, as a liberal On one reading, populism is a rational response to the failure
cosmopolitan bourgeoisie that betrays the ‘true values’ of the of established political parties to represent an important
nation and looks down on the homespun folkways of the section of voters; if the established parties will not speak
people. This variant can be seen as amalgamating populism for them, then new parties (or new insurgent movements)
and ethnonationalism. One example of this variant is the will. According to this understanding, the rise of new parties
ethnonational populism with religious roots that has, occupying this policy space is not, in itself, a problem for
according to observers, gained salience as a political discourse democracy. Such parties give voice not only to neglected
in India (Mishra 2017). classes and ideologies, but to overlooked rural and regional
27
areas away from metropolitan economic and cultural centres. communist Eastern Europe. Sociocultural modernization
They also place important issues on the public agenda, such has also led to the emergence of an individualistic and
as responses to unemployment, and the need to address disintegrated political culture, with a decline in mass-
socio-economic inequalities and reduce corruption. Some membership organizations such as political parties, trade
therefore argue that the rise of these populist parties is not, unions and churches that once gave form and substance to
as many worry, a symptom of democracy in crisis, but rather collective political action (Putnam 2000; van Biezen, Mair
a healthy sign of democracy’s capacity for self-correction and and Poguntke 2012). The Global State of Democracy 2017
peaceful change. identified a crisis of representation of political parties,
with growing public frustration with political institutions
However, if populism is viewed as rejecting pluralism and and processes that seem unresponsive to their needs and
opposing outsiders, populists violate the liberal norms loss of trust in political leaders, parties and institutions
underpinning democracy, even if they may succeed in (International IDEA 2017: 98–122).
making democracy more representative by mobilizing
previously less-represented voters. Globalization has raised awareness of the need for
action by national governments to manage complex
The causes of populism new transnational interdependencies. Global economic
The origins of the recent populist wave can be traced competition and financial market integration has caused
back to several interacting factors and developments. many governments to adopt policies broadly in line with
Economic and cultural globalization has transformed the the dominant paradigm of neoliberal economics. Private
social structure and political culture of Western, post- businesses and non-governmental actors on the one
socialist and developing countries alike (Appadurai 2006). hand, and non-elected agencies and institutions such as
International economic integration has supported the international regulatory bodies or central banks on the other,
growth of middle classes in developing countries (Chen and have become more important partners in the formulation
Chunlong 2011; Ravallion 2010). These social groups have and implementation of public policies. Such partnerships
nurtured higher expectations regarding the performance of and the delegation of public tasks to non-elected bodies
political regimes and democracies in particular. They also have only partly reinstated the policy autonomy of
have more resources, enabling them to participate in politics. elected governments constrained by global economic
Sociocultural modernization has weakened traditional interdependencies (Mair 2013; Rodrik 2011). Populists
authority mechanisms and shifted the burden of regime have criticized the influence of these non-elected bodies and
legitimacy towards performance, democratic responsiveness, supranational organizations such as the European Union.
legal rationality or personal charisma. Socio-economic, They claim that these organizations constrain popular
sociocultural and generational changes have resulted in more sovereignty and serve the interests of technocratic elites or
political mobilization, protests and civil society activism foreign economic or political powers. Such claims have been
(Bermeo and Yashar 2017; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). made, for example, during the refugee and Eurozone crisis
or during the referendum on ‘Brexit’ held in the United
Western and post-socialist societies have undergone Kingdom.
equally profound changes resulting in the decline of
traditional industrial sectors and the growth of services The use of the Internet and the spread of social media
or high-technology manufacturing. These processes have have fundamentally transformed the public sphere and
increased domestic disparities between the beneficiaries of political communication across the world. These new
economic globalization and groups falling behind because technologies greatly facilitate transnational communication,
of structural disadvantages related to age, location or a contributing to the transfer of social and cultural practices
lack of skills. The World Bank describes these groups as across nation states, and increasing citizens’ awareness of
disenchanted by a broken ‘social contract’, where their realities in other countries. While new technologies ease
preferences for equity and perceptions about inequalities access to information for many citizens, they also multiply
clash with how markets and public policies distribute these the flows of information and dilute the filter functions
resources (Bussolo et al. 2018). performed by traditional mass media, as well as some of the
mediating functions of political parties. These technologies
Hence, rising inequalities (real or perceived) combined with reduce the transaction costs of collective action and therefore
increasing vulnerability, the loss of social status and related support political mobilization through protests and other
fears have made these groups particularly susceptible to the public campaigns (Bennett and Segerberg 2012; Diamond
appeals of populist political movements in Western and post- and Plattner 2012).
28
However, unlimited information flows enabled by These factors and the rising demand of citizens for better
digital technologies and the underlying business models governance confront incumbent political elites with a
of the commercial platform providers also lead to a more dilemma: they increasingly depend on policy performance
fragmented and segmented public sphere, harming the (economic growth, rising incomes, and social and human
inclusiveness and quality of democratic deliberation security) as a resource of regime legitimacy, but are less able
(Keane 2013; Tucker et al. 2017). A fragmenting public to generate this resource due to eroded state capacities and
sphere has catalysed the polarization of society into increased interdependencies.
adversarial ‘tribes’, lacking a sense that they share a polity
in common; and the collapse of the civic virtues that were The underperformance of democracies causes
once held to be essential to a democratic polity, such dissatisfaction among citizens and reduces trust in
as tolerance, integrity, truthfulness and responsibility established democratic institutions and political parties
(Fukuyama 2018). Social media platforms lend themselves (Armingeon and Guthmann 2014). The tendency of
to populist mobilization because they facilitate interactive politicians to over-promise during political campaigns and
communication, but their potential is also misused to to under-deliver while in power leads elected representatives
simulate a direct exchange between populist political to be viewed as failing to fulfil popular expectations. This
leaders and citizens. casts doubt on the institutions designed to hold these
representatives accountable. Declining trust in institutions
Increasing inflows of immigrants and refugees to Europe and declining turnout are particularly salient in third-wave
and the United States—partly fleeing from violent conflicts democracies because the transition to democracy has raised
in Afghanistan, Syria and other countries, partly induced by performance expectations, and democratic institutions are
poverty and economic crises in developing countries—have less consolidated in political culture.
compounded fears and resentment particularly among
socially vulnerable citizens, that question whether nation
states are still able to protect their citizens and their
distinct national culture against the perceived threats of
globalization. Drivers of populism
Political factors driving populism include the crisis of
The long-term challenges of globalization, immigration representation of traditional political parties; the decline
and digitalization have concurred with the medium-term in party membership; and more politically aware and
disruptions triggered by the global financial and economic mobilized middle-class populations with high expectations
of democracy’s delivery capacity. Other factors include
crisis after 2008. This crisis and the ensuing sovereign
the transformation and disintegration of political culture
debt crisis in the Eurozone undermined the credibility of caused by increasing individualism; and the fragmentation
the EU and the nexus between economic integration and and polarization of the public sphere, deepened by the
prosperity—a belief that had guided political elites in emergence of new technologies and social media.
Eastern and Southern Europe for several decades (Kriesi
Economic factors driving populism include expectations
2018). Disappointed citizens voted for populist and anti- of democracy from rising middle classes disenchanted by
establishment parties to protest against mainstream elites democracy’s perceived weak delivery (e.g. in promoting
and what many perceived as externally inflicted economic growth and employment and in reducing corruption); labour-
and migration crises (Krastev 2014). market transformation caused by technological advances,
which in turn has led to an increase in domestic socio-
economic disparities; globalization and loss of national
In summary, political regimes and political elites are
control over key policy decisions; vulnerability ensuing from
under pressure to meet the expectations of citizens and the economic and financial crises of 2008; and increased
respond to their demands. However, global economic immigration flows to Europe and North America.
competition and interdependence constrain governments’
power to tax capital owners and raise public revenues.
Governments increasingly depend on private, international
or non-profit actors to implement policies. Transnational
migration and transnational security risks challenge the The consequences of populism
protective functions of nation states. Immigration and To what extent are populists in government able to erode
emigration are perceived as threats by vulnerable social or dismantle democratic accountability? Or is there
groups. evidence confirming that populist governments are more
responsive to the needs and concerns of the people?
29
The present report explores these questions using the When comparing populist and non-populist periods of
GSoD Indices. However, since the GSoD Indices do not government using the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business
measure populism, this report relies on two extant data sets Score (World Bank 2018), the mean annual change in policy
to assess how populism affects democracy: the Tony Blair outcomes under non-populist governments (+0.7 per cent)
Institute for Global Change’s ‘Populists in Power: 1990– is slightly higher than under populist governments (+0.5 per
2018’ database (see Kyle and Gultchin 2018) and the cent), although the difference is not statistically significant.
Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index (Timbro 2019).5
In the absence of a single robust data set on populist When performing similar comparisons using the Ecological
governments, the findings of this analysis therefore need be Footprint metric (Global Footprint Network n.d.), the
interpreted with caution. mean annual change in policy outcomes under non-populist
governments (–0.01 per cent) is lower than under populist
To examine how populist governments influence democracy, governments (+0.01 per cent), although the difference is not
the following analysis compares years under populist statistically significant. Further research on the consequences
government with years of non-populist government in the of populism is recommended to further develop this analysis.
same sample of countries. Since the duration of populist
governments in office differs across countries, the analysis Policy considerations
looks at the mean changes of GSoD Indices aspects per In 2018, International IDEA, the Netherlands Institute
year, comparing ‘populist’ and ‘non-populist’ episodes for a for Multiparty Democracy, the Organization for Security
sample of 43 countries from 1980 to 2018. and Co-operation’s Office for Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights, the Research Centre for the Study of
The data shows that populism weakens and undermines Parties and Democracy, and the Westminster Foundation
democracy. As Table 1.9 illustrates, periods with populist for Democracy formulated a Global Agenda for the Renewal
governments in office show a decline on the four attributes of Representation. The agenda reflects these organizations’
of democracy in the GSoD Indices data set that have collective view on the best response to address the underlying
an aggregate score (International IDEA 2019). These drivers of populism and focuses on a number of action
declines are significant for Elected Government, and for points to improve the quality, transparency and functioning
Civil Liberties and three of its subcomponents (Freedom of democratic institutions as well as their economic and
of Expression, Freedom of Association and Assembly, and social outcomes.
Freedom of Movement).6
• Dare to defend democracy. Governments, civil society
In contrast, episodes with non-populist governments are groups, political institutions (including parliaments and
marked by improvements on the vast majority of GSoD political parties) and democracy assistance providers (and
Indices dimensions, while only six aspects of democracy their donors) need to make the case for democracy in clear
improved under populist governments. Of these, only and compelling terms. In defending democracy, these
Electoral Participation increased under populist governments, actors should be both honest and specific about the flaws in
while it declined under non-populist governments. The existing systems and show greater precision in describing
other aspects (Direct Democracy, Inclusive Suffrage, Basic the problems that democratic institutions currently
Welfare, Gender Equality and Local Democracy) saw an confront, rather than subsuming everything under the
increase during both types of period but improved more label of populism. Democracy assistance providers and
during periods of non-populist government. the academic community need to collaborate more
effectively in disseminating and showcasing the ‘evidence
The preliminary GSoD findings also suggest that populist for the defence’ on how democracy benefits people.
governments not only are more harmful for democracy, but
also do not perform better than non-populist governments in • Get creative and get serious about political participation.
promoting basic welfare and a sound business environment Governments, political parties and parliaments should
or in protecting the environment. make use of a wider range of participatory mechanisms—
5 The Populists in Power: 1990–2018 database identifies 46 populist leaders or political parties in office, covering 33 countries since 1990. The Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index maps
populist parties in 33 European countries since 1980, based on an in-house coding of parties relying on various data sources. More information on these data sets and the methodology
employed in this section can be found in the ‘Background Paper to Global State of Democracy Report 2019: Analysis of Conditions and Consequences of Populism and Democratic
Backsliding’ (2019) on the International IDEA website.
6 To determine significant differences, a series of regression analyses were run. This made it possible to measure the effect of populist government on the GSoD Indices aspects by
controlling for the influence of individual country features, years, and levels of income and democracy.
30
TABLE 1.9
GSoD Indices scores in populist and non-populist periods of government, 1980–2018
GSoD attribute GSoD subattribute/subcomponent Non-populist period (% change) Populist period (% change)
1. Representative Government 1.4 –0.3
1.1 Clean Elections 1.4 –0.3
1.2 Inclusive Suffrage 0.5 0.2
1.3 Free Political Parties 1.0 –0.4
1.4 Elected Government* 0.9 –0.4
2. Fundamental Rights 0.9 –0.4
2.1 Access to Justice 0.7 –0.4
2.2 Civil Liberties* 1.1 –0.8
2.2.A: Freedom of Expression* 1.2 –0.9
2.2.B: Freedom of Association and Assembly* 1.3 –0.9
2.2.C: Freedom of Religion 0.6 –0.4
2.2.D: Freedom of Movement* 0.6 –0.2
2.2.E: Personal Integrity and Security 0.9 –0.4
2.3.A: Social Group Equality 0.4 –0.2
2.3.B: Basic Welfare 1.0 0.8
2.3.C: Gender Equality 1.1 0.5
3. Checks on Government 1.1 –0.8
3.1 Effective Parliament 1.1 –0.6
3.2 Judicial Independence 0.8 –0.7
3.3 Media Integrity 1.2 –0.8
4. Impartial Administration 0.6 –0.5
4.1 Absence of Corruption 0.3 –0.1
4.2 Predictable Enforcement 0.8 –0.8
5. Participatory Engagement
5.1 Civil Society Participation 1.3 –0.8
5.2 Electoral Participation –0.1 0.6
5.3 Direct Democracy 2.6 2.1
5.4 Local Democracy 1.1 0.1
Notes: This table shows mean percentage changes in GSoD Indices aspects per year, comparing ‘populist’ and ‘non-populist’ episodes in a sample of 43 countries which experienced populist
episodes of government between 1980 and 2018. There is no aggregate score for Participatory Engagement. Red shading denotes declines, while green denotes advances. Asterisks denote
statistically significant differences.
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019), <http://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>; Kyle, J. and Gultchin, L., ‘Populists in power around the world’, Tony Blair Institute
for Global Change, 13 November 2018, <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3283962>; Timbro, Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index (Stockholm: Timbro, 2019), <https://populismindex.com/report/>.
31
such as consultation processes, sortition, citizen to political participation, such as the costs of running
assemblies and other forms of direct democracy—to for political office. Political parties have a critical role to
ensure that political participation goes beyond elections play in nominating, and supporting the campaigns of, a
and democracy unfolds daily. Such practices need to broader range of candidates across all levels of politics.
link the institutions more closely to citizens, particularly Governments should expand options such as subsidizing
to those groups of society that have felt excluded from the costs of election campaigns to increase diversity
decision-making. Political parties should develop and competitiveness and creating formal mechanisms
mechanisms for participation that reach beyond their through which marginalized groups can contribute to
membership base, recognizing that an increasing number the development of policies that affect them.
of citizens want to engage with political parties and
decision-making processes in a less permanent manner. • Improve the integrity and transparency of political
The scope for democratic policy alternatives should be institutions. Governments, civil society and democracy
expanded in order to address the gap between citizens’ assistance providers should improve the integrity
expectations and the capabilities of governments that of political institutions by tackling corruption,
have triggered populist protests. Civil society should increasing transparency and implementing effective
generate new ideas about how participation can take policies to tackle social and economic inequalities. To
place and build partnerships that bridge the gap between increase transparency, governments should design and
formal and informal institutions. Democracy assistance implement enforceable frameworks to regulate the role
providers, civil society and academic researchers need of money in politics, making use of digital technology
to generate and disseminate new knowledge about how to ensure disclosure systems are visible to, and accessible
different forms of participation work and the impacts by, the public. Where necessary, this should be paired
they have in different contexts. with reforms that increase the probity of public
procurement, reduce the influence of organized crime
• Invest in civic education and digital media literacy. on politics, improve transparency in the banking system
Governments and democracy assistance providers should and empower oversight agencies to conduct their work
invest in civic education to promote democratic values, in an effective manner. Political institutions, including
equipping citizens of all ages with the skills required parliaments and political parties, should establish and
to engage with information in a critical manner while adhere to clear codes of ethics and be more proactive
remaining respectful of differences. Civil society or civic in disclosing information about how political decisions
educators should provide the public with opportunities are made.
for direct exposure to real-life participation, emphasize
the value of community service and increase digital In addition, International IDEA recommends conducting
media literacy. Governments and democracy assistance more research on the linkage between populism, democracy
providers should collaborate with the media to ensure and economic, social and sustainable development, to better
that civic education is effective and reaches a broad understand the drivers and impact of populism and connect
audience. Political parties and parliaments should invest academia with policymakers working on the topic.
in the skills of their own staff and members to ensure
that political institutions use new communication 1.2.2. Patterns and conditions of democratic
channels, such as social media, in a way that strengthens backsliding
and enriches democratic practice. Academic researchers The share of democracies experiencing democratic erosion
should expand our understanding of how new channels is on the rise, having more than doubled in the past decade
of communication affect democratic practice. compared to the decade before. The GSoD Indices define
democratic erosion as a statistically significant decline on
• Ensure inclusive representative mechanisms. Governments at least one democratic subattribute over a five-year period
and political institutions, with the support of democracy within democracies. In 2018, half (50 per cent) of the world’s
assistance providers, should work to make representative democracies experienced some form of democratic erosion,
mechanisms more inclusive. They should continue recording declines on at least one subattribute of democracy.
to invest in the inclusion of women and youth while Of these, 15 per cent experienced declines on three or
expanding efforts to include other marginalized groups, more subattributes. This section discusses the definition,
such as indigenous communities and people with identification and effects of one specific form of democratic
disabilities. Concrete steps in this direction should erosion: democratic backsliding. It builds on the analysis of
include reducing the financial and administrative barriers The Global State of Democracy 2017 (International IDEA
32
2017a: 70–94) to further explore the facilitating conditions Various methods and techniques are used to subvert
and to distinguish patterns of democratic backsliding, based democratic institutions. These include the capturing of
on the GSoD Indices data. courts and state agencies; the sidelining of (potential) rivals
in the political opposition, business or the media; and
What is democratic backsliding? changes to the constitutional and electoral rules governing
The GSoD Indices refer to democratic backsliding as the political process (Waldner and Lust 2018; Levitsky and
the gradual weakening of checks on government and Ziblatt 2018). In addition, incumbents often constrain the
civil liberties by democratically elected governments. public sphere and politicize executive power by replacing
Democratic backsliding is an incremental, partly concealed a merit-based professional bureaucracy with clientelist
institutional change that is legitimized by references to dependency relations (Ginsburg and Huq 2018). They also
popular electoral mandates, majority decisions and laws. It is use biased referenda and manipulative public campaigns
often driven by the intentional dismantling of accountability against alleged enemies to demonstrate popular approval
institutions. Other forms of democratic erosion are generally for their policies and legitimize the outmanoeuvring of
not driven by such explicit intentions. Not all countries democratic institutions (Pech and Scheppele 2017).
experiencing democratic erosion necessarily experience
democratic backsliding, but the countries that experience These methods share the common strategic aim of
backsliding do so as part of a process of democratic erosion. rendering incumbent political elites less accountable to
constitutional and political institutions with scrutiny and
International IDEA distinguishes between modern sanctioning powers. In order to increase and consolidate
and traditional democratic backsliding. The new type their power, incumbents seek to weaken legislatures,
of democratic weakening contrasts with the democratic opposition deputies, courts, prosecutors, public agencies,
expansion of the 1990s and differs from traditional independent watchdogs, mass media, CSOs and, ultimately,
authoritarian reversals, which featured drastic interventions the electorate.
by powerful non-democratic actors who suspended
democratic institutions through coups, outrightly The concept of democratic backsliding also implies
disregarding election results. While these still occur, they that a political regime moves ‘back’ to a lower level
are not as common as they used to be (International of democracy in its own history or in the course
IDEA 2017a: 73–74). Therefore, in this report, the term of democratization more generally. The notion of
‘democratic backsliding’ refers to modern democratic backsliding partly overlaps with scholarly concepts such
backsliding. as ‘democratic recession’ (Diamond 2015), ‘democratic
decay’ (International IDEA 2017b), ‘de-democratization’
Democratic backsliding is initiated and driven by (Bogaards 2018), ‘deconsolidation’ (Foa and Mounk
executive incumbents, legislative majorities and 2017; Mounk 2018) or ‘autocratization’ (Lührmann and
governing political parties. The process is relatively Lindberg 2019; Cassani and Tomini 2019).
straightforward. First, they win competitive elections.
Second, they form governments and use their power to Most scholars apply the concept of democratic backsliding
weaken institutional checks on governmental power. Third, to declines within democracies, but some authors have
they modify the constitutional balance in their favour, suggested also including declines in the democratic qualities
restrict electoral competition and reduce the civic space of governance observable within autocracies (see e.g. Waldner
underpinning political participation (International IDEA and Lust 2018: 95). The present report aligns with the
2017a: 73–74). view that democratic backsliding starts within democratic
political regimes and may or may not result in democratic
These actions do not question democratic elections or breakdown. Further democratic declines that occur within
voting rights as such. Institutional reforms carried out as hybrid regimes or non-democracies are referred to in this
part of democratic backsliding do not completely abolish report as cases of deepening autocratization (see Section 1.1
the freedoms of expression, assembly and association for a discussion of this phenomenon).
underpinning meaningful political participation. On the
contrary, incumbents often justify their attacks on the While democratic backsliding may result in a breakdown
checks and balances of liberal democracy by claiming that of democracy and the (re-)installation of an authoritarian
their measures will make politics more democratic, curtail regime, it may also leave the fundamentals of a democracy
the influence of corrupt elites and re-establish popular intact, albeit with a permanent loss of democratic
sovereignty (Bermeo 2016). quality. Determining the endpoint of a backsliding process
33
is difficult because episodes of backsliding occur gradually, the Freedoms of Expression, Association and Assembly,
and many have begun only recently. Incumbent elites need, Religion, Movement, and Personal Integrity and Security.
and claim to sustain, the public façade of democracy and
seek to frame the unchecking of executive authority as a The analysis focuses on the period after the global expansion
deepening of democracy. Democratic legitimacy continues of democracy in the early 1990s. Democratic backsliding
to be a requirement and constraint of these elite actions, cases are defined as those democracies that have suffered a
preventing incumbents from openly promoting autocratic net decline of at least 0.1 points on their average Checks on
rule. The term democratic backsliding focuses on the process Government and Civil Liberties scores over a period of five
itself and is therefore more open to different possible final years.7 This enables the analysis to focus on net declines over
states of backsliding. a five-year period and identify accumulated declines and
changes by summing up year-to-year changes (Coppedge
This report identifies democratic backsliding as a form 2017: 7).8
of democratic erosion. When country-level declines in one
or more aspects of democracy are observed, but do not fit A total of 158 country–years show a decline of at least 0.1
the conceptual and quantitative description of democratic in Checks on Government and Civil Liberties during the
backsliding, they are referred to as other forms of democratic period 1975–2018. Of these cases, 106 occurring after 1998
erosion or democratic deterioration (these terms are used have been selected. Countries with non-contiguous years of
interchangeably in the report). backsliding are then either classified as one episode if the
scores for intermediate years do not improve (e.g. Nicaragua,
Measuring backsliding using the GSoD Indices North Macedonia, Ukraine and Venezuela) or the prior
The Global State of Democracy 2019 builds on the analysis episode is omitted (e.g. Nepal 2002–2005, Pakistan 1999).
of democratic backsliding initiated in the 2017 edition These selection criteria generated a sample of 20 countries in
(International IDEA 2017a: 70–94) and further explores which democratic backsliding has occurred since 1994. As
the scope and patterns of democratic backsliding, applying shown in Figure 1.25, the number of democratic backsliding
updated GSoD Indices data to identify country cases. cases has more than doubled in the past decade.
Empirical studies of backsliding have used declines over time
on composite indicators of democracy (Coppedge 2017; According to the GSoD Indices, 10 democracies (10 per
Mainwaring and Bizzarro 2019; Kaufman and Haggard cent of the world’s democracies) experienced democratic
2019), but scholars differ regarding the size and time backsliding in 2018. In Nicaragua and Pakistan, democratic
span required to qualify as backsliding. While the gradual backsliding has resulted in partial democratic breakdown
character of the process suggests setting low threshold values (into hybridity), while Venezuela’s backsliding resulted in
as the most appropriate method, setting these thresholds a full democratic breakdown in 2017. All 10 democracies
too low would risk including minor declines that do not have backslid over several years. The average length of a
reflect institutional change and may result from imprecise backsliding episode is nine years. The countries with the
measurement. largest number of backsliding years are Venezuela (20 years)
and Hungary and Nicaragua (13 years). Within the sample
The present analysis uses the GSoD Indices attribute of countries, European countries, democracies and upper-
Checks on Government and the subattribute Civil Liberties middle-income countries are overrepresented.
to identify cases of backsliding. Checks on Government
captures the extent to which the legislature supervises the Table 1.10 lists all backsliding countries identified by the
executive (Effective Parliament), the media landscape offers GSoD Indices. The table distinguishes between countries
diverse and critical coverage of political issues (Media affected by moderate democratic backsliding and those
Integrity) and the courts are not subject to undue influence suffering severe democratic backsliding (see Figure 1.26
from other branches of government (Judicial Independence). for a visual representation). Both types occur in regimes
Civil Liberties denotes the extent to which civil rights and that remain democratic but experience a significant loss
liberties are respected, that is, to what extent citizens enjoy in democratic quality. Countries with mid-range levels of
7 This value is approximately seven times the size of the confidence interval for the mean of Checks on Government and Civil Liberties. It has been selected to include all cases that have
been frequently discussed as examples of backsliding (see also Lührmann and Lindberg 2019 for a similarly sized indicator).
8 For the countries and years (referred to as country–years) identified by this threshold, ‘episodes’ of democratic backsliding are constructed by adding preceding and subsequent years
in which the backsliding indicator does not improve. In a third step, high-performing democracies are excluded if their mean scores on Checks on Government and Civil Liberties decline
by less than 0.15 points during an episode. This restriction seeks to filter out cases of minor declines at high levels of Representative Government, assuming that the comparatively
resilient institutions of such democracies can better contain incumbentsʼ attempts to weaken accountability. For more information on the methodological steps carried out to perform this
calculation see International IDEA (2019).
34
FIGURE 1.25 Representative Government and declines of less than –0.15

on their average Checks on Government and Civil Liberties
Average annual number of countries experiencing scores during their episode of backsliding (e.g. India) are
democratic backsliding, by decade listed as cases of moderate backsliding. Countries with
larger declines at high or mid-range levels of Representative
14 Government are classified as suffering from severe democratic
backsliding (e.g. Hungary, Poland and Turkey). Among the
12 cases of democratic breakdown, Table 1.10 also makes a
distinction between cases of full breakdown (i.e. Venezuela)
Mean annual number of countries
resulting in non-democracy and cases of partial breakdown

10
leading to a hybrid political regime (i.e. Nicaragua).
8 Declines in Checks on Government and Civil Liberties

are positively and strongly correlated with declines in Civil
6 Society Participation, Access to Justice and Predictable
Enforcement, indicating that backsliding often affects those
dimensions of democracy (Coppedge 2017). Democratic
4
backsliding is only weakly correlated with the electoral-
representative dimension of democracy which comprises
2 Clean Elections, Electoral Participation and Inclusive
Suffrage—except for cases that become so severe that they
0 result in partial or full democratic breakdown.
1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s
The causes of and facilitating conditions for democratic

Notes: The data for the most recent decade only covers the years 2010–18. backsliding
int/gsod-indices>. According to the GSoD Indices data, and other
complementary data sources, a number of factors, including
TABLE 1.10
Episodes of democratic backsliding in the GSoD data set
Severe democratic backsliding resulting in democratic breakdown

Moderate democratic Severe democratic
backsliding backsliding Partial democratic breakdown Full democratic breakdown
(from democracy to hybrid regime) (from democracy to non-democracy)
India (2006–2018) Hungary (2006–2018) Nicaragua (2006–2018) Madagascar (2009–2012)

Philippines (2015–2018) Poland (2013–2018) Pakistan (2014–2018) Niger (2005–2010)
Ukraine (2010–2018) Romania (2017–2018) CAR (1999–2007) Bangladesh (2001–2010)
Ecuador (2008–2016) Serbia (2010–2018) Russia (1999–2010) Venezuela9 (regressed from a
North Macedonia (2008–2016) Turkey (2008–2018) Venezuela (1999–2010, regressed hybrid regime to a non-democracy
to a hybrid regime in 2008) in 2017)
Nepal (2012–2016)
Mali (2012–2016)
Notes: The data in the GSoD Indices reflects events up to the end of 2018. Cases of democratic backsliding listed as occurring up to and including 2018 may therefore have since evolved or
changed. For more information on the definitions of moderate and severe democratic backsliding see the Methodology section of this report.
9 According to the GSoD data, Venezuela experienced two years (2011/12) interrupting the backsliding process it had started in 1999, ending the episode identified by the coding rule. By
then Venezuela had already backslid into a hybrid regime. Technically, therefore, when it backslid into a non-democracy in 2017, it was a case of deepening autocratization. It is included
in the table to indicate that the country has passed through all phases of a backsliding process, ultimately culminating in a non-democracy.
35
FIGURE 1.26
The process of democratic backsliding
Intentional weakening of Checks

on Government and Civil Liberties
Moderate
democratic
backsliding
Severe
democratic
backsliding
Partial
democratic
breakdown
Full
democratic
breakdown

No regime change Regime change
economic factors, features of the digital public sphere Moreover, the fact that the Indices cover a 43-year period
and political polarization, contribute to the triggering (from 1975 to 2018) means that they enable an assessment
and sustaining of episodes of democratic backsliding. The of how long, and to what extent, a particular democracy has
statistical analyses compare the conditions prior to and endured over that period. More stable institutions in older
during these episodes both over time and across countries. democracies might render them less prone to decline, but
the passing of time may also be associated with citizens’
A first set of potentially influential factors relates to disenchantment with democracy and the expansion of rent-
democratic institutions. Independent courts, free and seeking and vested interests.
pluralist media outlets, a vibrant civil society, opposition
parties harnessing their powers in the legislature, and Second, democratic stability may also depend on the extent
impartial bureaucrats can be assumed to prevent governing to which citizens support democracy as a political regime
majorities from dismantling checks and balances. The GSoD (see e.g. Foa and Mounk 2016; Easton 1965; Claassen
Indices measure the strength of these factors in detail. 2019a, 2019b). To assess this so-called diffuse support,
36
the analysis of democratic backsliding carried out for higher probability and extent of backsliding. Variables
the purposes of this report includes results from public indicating aspects of political polarization—including the
opinion surveys for which data exists for about 91 per cent polarization of society, the fractionalization of online media
of the years identified as backsliding in the data set. These and the use of hate speech and false information by political
representative surveys include the Afrobarometer, Arab parties—show significant effects in most statistical models
Barometer, Eurobarometer and Latinobarómetro, as well that have been constructed. Therefore, it is possible to infer
as the World Values Survey. that countries with deep political divides and embittered
political controversies are prone to experiencing democratic
Third, the analysis considers the extent to which economic backsliding as measured by the GSoD Indices.
recessions, levels of economic wealth or international
economic dependencies, captured by high shares of foreign However, the analysis also shows that there is no dominant
trade, might have facilitated changes of government that led strategy of polarizing political disputes and escalating political
to backsliding. conflicts. Polarization may be facilitated by political parties
that use hate speech or disseminate false information in their
A fourth group of possible causal factors pertain to campaigning but it may also be catalysed by a public sphere
political polarization, populism and the public sphere in disintegrating into fragmented, tribe-like communities or
general. Extreme polarization, populist confrontation and by declines in journalistic quality driven by the shift from
radicalizing online discourses and communities have been traditional quality media to online media outlets with less
viewed as conducive to the erosion of democratic norms, stable funding.
whereby extreme partisan polarization is identified as a factor
contributing to the electoral success of political leaders and Higher levels of Effective Parliament and Civil Society
parties committed to eroding accountability institutions, Participation appear to effectively reduce the probability
paving the way for democratic backsliding. of backsliding, prevent the start of a backsliding
process, make continued backsliding less probable
Polarization is seen as linked to partisan degradation of party and reduce the scope of backsliding. These effects may
competition and is often exacerbated by the emergence of be explained by the fact that strong parliaments and civil
populism (Ginsburg and Huq 2018: 78–90). It is seen society participation often help provide voice to critics of
as weakening informal norms of democracy such as the an incumbent government. They can enable opposition
acceptance of political rivals as legitimate actors and the use parties, CSOs and engaged citizens to limit the attempts of
of restraint in employing institutional prerogatives (Levitsky incumbents to maximize their power. However, higher levels
and Ziblatt 2018: 11). These norms often appear to have been of Free Political Parties and Media Integrity seem to have
eroded prior to the start of a democratic backsliding episode. the opposite effect. Indeed, democracy provides not only the
institutions to check executive authority, but also the arena
The present report studies these potential causes by including for political polarization, which has been identified as an
variables that measure whether a country has a populist explanatory factor for democratic backsliding.
government and how the Internet and social media affect
political behaviour. These variables come from the above- Longer preceding democratic periods significantly increase
mentioned populism studies (Kyle and Gultchin 2018; the probability of backsliding or the extent of democratic
Timbro 2019) and the Digital Society Survey conducted decline in the models analysed. This could suggest that
in connection with the V-Dem project (Digital Society backsliding is more likely to occur if the immediate post-
Project n.d.). This survey asks country experts to what extent transition phase has receded into history, if the transitional
people consume online media; major domestic online media constellation of political actors has changed and, perhaps, if
disagree in their presentation of major political news; and initial popular hopes linked to a democratic transition have
political parties disseminate false information and use hate been dashed.
speech. The surveyed experts also assess the polarization of
society, that is, the extent of ‘serious differences in opinions Low levels of public support for democracy are
in society on almost all key political issues, which result in associated with higher declines and an increased
major clashes of views’ (Mechkova et al. 2019; Coppedge et probability of backsliding. Declines in support may be
al. 2019: 298). due to weak governmental performance, economic crisis
or more adversarial political conflicts undermining the
The main finding of the GSoD Indices analysis confirms credibility of democratic institutions. The relevance of
the view that a polarized society is associated with a democratic legitimacy as an explanatory factor corresponds
37
to the importance of the public sphere, communication protection of minorities. Constitutional designs
and the public perception of political elites. that facilitate efficient public administration and
enable responsive and responsible government—
Populist presidents and governments tend to make rather than those that fragment responsibility and
backsliding more likely and to increase the scope of decline, create deadlocks in policy delivery—may help
as one would expect. However, these effects are only partially prevent a crisis of representation from arising in
significant and should be interpreted with caution, since the first place. Such constitutional design choices
the available survey and populism data does not cover all keep dissatisfaction within tolerable limits and
countries identified as backsliding. Backsliding episodes may help strengthen democracy’s self-correcting
usually begin prior to the inauguration of populist-led tendencies. If there is scope to pursue policies
governments, but this does not mean that populist challengers within the framework of a constitution, while
did not exist when the backsliding began. On the contrary, respecting democratic procedure, the rights of the
qualitative evidence from the cases analysed suggests that opposition, judicial independence and so on, then
such challengers contributed to the polarization of society there will be less incentive to violate these norms in
before they took power. order to deliver on promises made to voters. While
rules enabling effective and responsible government
Democratic backsliding also appears to be a political may reduce dissatisfaction, it is also important to
reaction to economic vulnerabilities exposed in the ensure political moderation—a government must
wake of international economic integration and the be capable of being contested, challenged, held to
global financial crisis. Exposure to economic globalization, account, and sometimes forced to compromise.
measured as a share of foreign trade in gross domestic
product, contributes to the increased probability of –– Polarizing tendencies in the public sphere
continued backsliding. This effect reflects, to some extent, should be limited. This entails acting against
the overrepresentation of upper-middle-income countries extremist demagogues, preventing the spread of
from Europe among the countries experiencing declines. disinformation and hate speech through social
media, strengthening quality media outlets, and
However, the trade share also relates to economic openness, educating citizens to acquire critical media literacy.
interdependency and exposure to international economic
developments. High levels of Social Rights and Equality • Strengthen institutions that check the executive, such
reduce the probability of backsliding and the scope of as the legislature, but also courts and an independent,
democratic decline, although this effect is only partially pluralist media system. These institutions enable
significant. The analyses show that lower or negative citizens, who are faced with restrictions to their rights, to
economic growth rates contribute to the triggering and use and protect their political freedoms. Stronger checks
continuation of backsliding. Hence, backsliding may occur on government may constrain the scope for quick and
as a response to a growing sense of economic vulnerability far-reaching policy change that is sometimes needed. At
in countries depending on international trade integration. the same time, they ensure that incumbent governments
reach out to other political actors and build inclusive
Policy considerations coalitions that are likely to make policy change more
• Policies aimed at the prevention and termination of sustainable.
democratic backsliding should seek to address the
polarization and disintegration of the public sphere • Design constitutional rules to enforce deliberation.
that has preceded and accompanied many episodes This deliberation could be between a government
of backsliding. Moderate political elites should and opposition in a parliamentary system; between
demonstrate their readiness to listen to the concerns of the executive and legislature in a presidential system;
citizens and to bridge political divides by integrating between members of a governing coalition; or between
different parts of society. Taking these concerns seriously different levels of government. Even if the government’s
would reduce the scope for populist challengers who view ultimately prevails, as in most Westminster-style
exploit grievances against established political elites: democracies, it should be forced to justify its actions,
to give an account of its reasoning, to hear the other
–– Institutional reforms should seek to contribute side, and perhaps to make concessions to other views.
to the reduction of polarization, for example Details of constitutional design (e.g. how and when
by ensuring adequate representation and parliament can be dissolved, who presides over the
38
public accounts committee, how the auditor-general is What is civic space and why is it important for
chosen, or the powers of a leader of the opposition) can democracy?
be important in striking this balance between effective Civic space is the space in which formal and informal CSOs
responsible government and a proper scrutiny and engage, together with other actors (e.g. the media and the
accountability. public), to make their voices heard and advocate for change.
• Protect new democratic institutions against the The GSoD Indices measure civic space through three
popular disappointment that is likely to ensue if subattributes of its framework: Civil Liberties, which
the high expectations attached to their creation measures aspects such as Freedom of Expression, Freedom of
are not met. To better manage popular expectations, Association and Assembly and Freedom of Religion; Media
policymakers should engage in a rational, open Integrity, which measures the diversity of media perspectives
dialogue with citizens that fosters an understanding of in society; and Civil Society Participation, which measures
the constraints and trade-offs of democratic politics. both the vibrancy of civil society and the extent to which it
Improved popular knowledge of policies would also is consulted on key policy issues.
enable citizens to make more informed assessments of
electoral promises and their viability. Memories of the Views of civil society are divided into two broad camps:
authoritarian past should be preserved and conveyed in those that celebrate civil society as a democratizing force
order to remind younger generations of the achievements and as a key pillar of democracy, and those that see civil
of democracy, therefore guarding against misleading society as reproducing existing social and economic
nostalgic sentiment. inequalities.
• Governments should protect their citizens against the The GSoD framework is grounded in the former view. Civil
disruptive effects of economic crisis and globalization. society is seen as an important dimension of a healthy and
This requires policies that enable vulnerable groups of vibrant democracy as it provides a pluralistic set of societal
society, including immigrants, to adapt to job losses voices and enhances informal checks on government. A
and provide them with equitable access to services, vocal civil society also provides a bulwark against democratic
employment, opportunities and resources. backsliding.
• Strengthen and enable a vibrant civic space and CSOs have over the past decades increasingly played a key
counteract efforts to undermine it. role as service providers, often replacing or filling the gaps
of faulty or non-existent public services in developing and
• Support civic and other forms of education on developed countries, and generally with a focus on reaching
democracy, to educate children, youth and adults on poor and marginalized groups that may otherwise not be
the value of democracy, and its benefits for society. reached. They have also played a role as advocates, holding
governments to account in a variety of fields, including
1.2.3. The empowerment of civil society in a governance, human rights protection, anti-corruption
shrinking civic space efforts, environmental protection and many others. In
The democratic expansion in the past four decades has also developing countries, both of these roles have been strongly
enabled an expansion of civil society and civic space at the supported by international and bilateral donors, the first in a
global, regional, national and subnational levels across all context of shrinking states and public–private collaboration
regions of the world, with CSOs playing key roles as service in service delivery, as well as to support the demand side of
providers and advocates. In contexts of democracy advocacy, governance.
CSOs often work in collaboration with or in parallel to the
media. In recent years, civic space has been transformed, with In recent years, however, a transformation of civic space
a shift to an individualization of civic engagement beyond has been observed. This transformation has been brought
formal organizational structures, and a move towards looser about by the use of information and communications
and more fluid forms of interactions. At the same time, technologies and by the transformation of political parties,
civil society organizations are facing increasing obstacles with a shift towards an individualization of civic engagement
to operate and advocate for societal change in a context of beyond formal organizational structures, to citizen
shrinking civic space. This section explores the challenges mobilization and networking into looser and more fluid
and opportunities faced by an empowered civil society in an forms of interactions, often facilitated by social media. The
increasingly shrinking civic space. Gilets Jaunes (Yellow Vests) movement in France is one case
39
in point (Kramer 2019). Often, but not always, CSOs play The second challenge for civil society is the shrinking
a role behind the scenes in mobilizing these forces, although of civic space in many countries. Any reduction in civic
the movements go well beyond these formal organizational space has severe consequences for democracy, as it erodes
structures. and weakens the societal fabric in which civil society and
democracy are embedded, reduces the diversity of voices in
Civil society has advocated for reforms in contexts of society (including critical voices) and ultimately undermines
democratic transition and taken various positions either checks on government, as civil society and the media also
for or against reforms on other issues of concern. For play key roles in scrutinizing state power and holding the
example, civil society groups advocated for democratic state to account.
reforms in Tunisia in 2011; in The Gambia in 2016; in
Armenia in 2018; and in Algeria, Sudan and Venezuela in Beginning in 2012, and for the first time since 1975,
2019. CSOs campaigned against corruption in Romania in the GSoD Indices data records a steep rise in the
2018; against gun violence and for gender equality in the number of countries with significant declines on the
United States (the ‘Women’s March’) in 2018; against labour three aspects of civic space measured by the data. These
law reforms in Hungary in 2019; against privatization of declines have been seen since 2012 on Media Integrity,
public services and denouncing illicit campaign finance in since 2014 on Civil Liberties, and since 2015 on Civil
Honduras in 2019; and against legal reforms in Hong Kong Society Participation (see Figure 1.28). In all three cases,
in 2019 (BBC News 2019). the steep rise in declining countries coincides with a
significant decline in the number of countries with gains
CSOs use a variety of tactics to make their voices heard, in these aspects. In fact, for the first time since the GSoD
including offline and online protest, advocacy and Indices measurement began in 1975, these declines now
collaboration. This expansion of civic activity has led at outnumber the number of countries with gains.
least one observer to claim that ‘political participation is on
the rise’ (Economist Intelligence Unit 2018: 2). However, The aspect of Civil Liberties with most countries
while civil society represents an opportunity for democratic declining (a total of 38 countries since 2013) is Freedom
advancement and protection, there are two key challenges of Expression (see Figure 1.27). In recent years, an increasing
related to civic space in the current global democracy number of countries that previously performed highly on
landscape. this dimension have slipped into the mid-range, reflecting
worsening conditions in these contexts. The share of high-
The first challenge relates to the emergence of uncivil performing countries on Freedom of Expression peaked in
elements in civil society. While such currents have always 2011, at 42 per cent, before dropping to 36 per cent by
existed, new forms have taken shape, gained ground, acquired 2018.
a more potent voice and become more visible in recent
years. Some, including movements on the extreme right in Likewise, the share of high-performing countries on
older democracies such as Germany, Sweden or the USA, Media Integrity has dropped from 39 per cent in 2006 to
are the product of democratic societies and constitutionally 29 per cent in 2018. A total of 24 countries have also seen
acquired rights such as freedom of expression and freedom significant declines in Freedom of Association and Assembly,
of association and assembly. while 11 countries in the world have seen a decrease in levels
of Civil Society Participation in the last five years.
In many democracies the emergence of these movements has
led to public debates about the extent to which fundamental Declines in civic space have been observed in all regions of
rights such as freedom of expression and the right to protest the world and across all levels of democratic performance.
should be respected, even when such groups proclaim anti- Europe is the region with the largest share of countries with
democratic values, by denying rights to other groups and declines in their Civil Liberties scores, followed by Africa.
promoting hate speech. The tension between freedom of On Media Integrity, Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and Latin
speech and the propagation of hate speech has also played America and the Caribbean have seen an equal number of
out in the online sphere, where social media and Internet countries in decline (see Figure 1.28). These declines in
platforms (such as Facebook, Twitter, Google and WhatsApp) civic space are occurring in contexts of democratic erosion
and the technology firms behind them have been criticized (including milder forms of democratic deterioration),
for enabling hate speech to be propagated and amplified, democratic backsliding and deepening autocratization (see
further polarizing public debate, deepening divisions in Table 1.11).
societies and, in the most extreme cases, promoting violence.
40
FIGURE 1.27 A number of countries (e.g. India) have recently passed and
enforced laws or revived existing laws that seek to regulate
Performance levels in Freedom of Expression, 1975– foreign funding to NGOs, under a nationalist discourse, to
2018 stave off attempts of foreign interference (see the case study
in Chapter 4 of this report). Similarly, laws have been passed
in some countries (e.g. Bangladesh and Hungary) using
60
the justification of tighter controls over organizations that
finance activities linked to terrorism. When such laws are
50 passed in bilateral donor countries, this has ripple effects
on funding to CSOs in the developing world, which are aid
recipients. Many of these organizations play a key role in
40 public service delivery to poor and marginalized groups and

are therefore key to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda.
30
A number of CSOs have also been affected by funding cuts
linked to the ban introduced under the administration of
20 US President Donald Trump, on funding to organizations
providing family-planning assistance. This has had serious
consequences for CSOs working on women’s and children’s
10 issues more broadly.
A number of countries (e.g. Australia, France and the

0
USA) have also passed or revised laws that regulate public
2000
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
1975
protest, again as part of measures to combat terrorism

and promote law and order. Others (including France,
Low Mid-range High Germany and several Pacific Island countries) have passed
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019), <http://www.idea. laws aimed at regulating online engagement. Such laws have
int/gsod-indices>.
been passed in democracies and non-democracies alike, but
their implementation takes more repressive forms in non-
democratic contexts (e.g. China).
One explanatory factor for the shrinking of civic In the most severe cases, restrictions on civic space take
space is the rise of nationalist political parties (e.g. in the form of harassment (and in some cases killings)
India), which seek to restrict foreign funding of, and of human rights activists. Front Line Defenders, an
foreign interference in, national non-governmental international human rights organization that collects data
organizations (NGOs) to preserve national sovereignty on threats against human rights activists, estimates that 321
and limit foreign-imposed agendas that are viewed civil society activists were killed in 2018, although this figure
as undermining national values. In other cases (e.g. is most likely severely under-reported and highly contested
Hungary and Poland), drivers include governmental as there is no global agreement on who should be classified
measures to combat terrorism, promote law and order as such (Front Line 2019).
and national security. In some countries (e.g. Egypt,
Nicaragua and Venezuela), attacks have aimed at limiting Of the 321 confirmed murders in 2018, 74 per cent
the space for opposition and critical voices. The spread occurred in Latin America. The highest numbers were
of disinformation on social media has also led some recorded in Colombia (126) and Mexico (48)—which
countries (e.g. most recently Sri Lanka) to restrict social together accounted for more than half of the murders of civil
media use. society activists in 2018—followed by the Philippines (39
civil society activists killed), Guatemala (26), Brazil (23) and
In what ways is civic space shrinking? India (19) (Front Line 2019).
The shrinking of civic space has taken several forms,
including changes to legislative and regulatory The majority of those killed (77 per cent) were working on
frameworks, funding cuts, and laws that regulate public issues related to land, indigenous peoples’ and environmental
protest and online engagement. rights. Front Line Defenders estimate that activists working
41
FIGURE 1.28
Declines in civic space by region, 2013–2018

12 Civil Liberties
11 Media Integrity
10 Civil Society
Participation
9
8
No. of countries
0
Africa Asia and Europe Latin America Middle North
the Pacific and the Caribbean East America
Notes: This figure shows the absolute number of countries with significant declines between 2013 and 2018 in each region, per subattribute in the three aspects of civic space (Civil Liberties,
Media Integrity and Civil Society Participation). While the comparison made is between regions, each region has a different number of countries.
TABLE 1.11
Declines in civic space, 2013–2018
Extent of decline No. of countries Details
Declines on all three 7 Democracies:

aspects of civic space Brazil, India, Turkey (democratic backsliding)
Non-democracies:
Burundi, Venezuela, Yemen (deepening autocratization)
Thailand (democratic breakdown from 2014 to 2018)
Declines on two 14 Democracies:

aspects of civic space Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Serbia (severe democratic backsliding)
Chile, Colombia, France, Kenya (democratic erosion)
Hybrid regimes:
Nicaragua, Pakistan, Togo
Non-democracies:
Bahrain, South Sudan (deepening autocratization)
Decline on one aspect 46 Civil Liberties (17)

of civic space Media Integrity (7)
Civil Society Participation (1)
Notes: The three aspects of civic space covered by the GSoD Indices are Media Integrity, Civil Liberties and Civil Society Participation.
42
in those sectors are three times more likely to be killed than those working on corruption and human rights and
activists working in other sectors (Front Line 2019). Activists the weaker and less well-resourced organizations, which
and journalists exposing corruption cases are also a likely often tend to be those working on women’s rights and
target, as are civil society activists advocating for lesbian, gay, LGBT issues.
bisexual and transgender (LGBT) rights (Front Line 2019).
1.2.4. Managing elections as fair competition in
Reporters Without Borders reports that 80 journalists were challenging environments
killed in 2018, up from 55 in 2017. While 26 journalists Clean elections are instruments for ensuring representative
(or 33 per cent) were killed in war or conflict zones (i.e. governments and popular control over decision-making.
Afghanistan, Syria and Yemen), the remainder were killed in In the GSoD Indices the subattribute of Clean Elections
non-war torn countries, with the largest share (47 per cent) measures the extent to which elections are free, fair and
in democracies, including Mexico (the deadliest country competitive, and held with integrity. A number of indicators
for journalists outside a conflict zone, with eight journalists are also used to assess the cleanliness (i.e. integrity) of
murdered), followed by India and the USA (six each). elections, including the scope of electoral competition, the
One journalist was also killed in Central Eastern Europe level of voting irregularities, government intimidation, and
(Slovakia) in relation to investigative reporting on criminal the autonomy and capacity of electoral management bodies
networks and corruption. The remaining five journalists (EMBs). While not a sufficient condition for democracy
were killed in CAR, Palestine and Saudi Arabia. to thrive, elections are a necessary component of any
democratic system. This section explores some of the key
More than half of the journalists killed were deliberately current challenges and opportunities relating to electoral
targeted because their reporting threatened the interests of processes worldwide.
certain people in positions of political, economic, or religious
power or organized crime (Reporters Without Borders Elections have now become the norm rather than the
2018). More than half of the world’s imprisoned journalists exception
are held in five countries, of which two (Egypt and Turkey, While only 36 countries held competitive elections in 1975,
which together hold 38 per cent of imprisoned journalists) a total of 97 countries in the world (or 62 per cent) now do so
have undergone a recent process of democratic backsliding, regularly. Moreover, global average levels of Clean Elections
while another 33 per cent are held in non-democracies such have increased by 73 per cent since 1975. Democracies with
as China, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Journalists have also been high levels of Clean Elections are now found throughout all
detained in new democracies such as Myanmar. regions of the world, although the regions with the largest
shares (50 per cent of countries and over) are Europe, Latin
In an increasingly globalized world, closing civic space in America and the Caribbean, and North America. However,
one country may have spill-over effects on other countries, despite the expansion of countries with clean elections, the
as seems to be the case across the globe, through both share of democracies with high levels of Clean Elections was
norm diffusion and the replication-domino effect that such higher in 1975, at 74 per cent, compared to 59 per cent of
phenomena in large countries may have on others in a region democracies today.
(Hossain et al. 2018). Added to this is the role of countries,
such as China, that provide a model in which limited civic Most electoral processes that take place around the world
space is an intrinsic feature, and which also export this manage to successfully overcome the inevitable technical
model. Freedom House (2018), for example, notes China’s hiccups and facilitate orderly transitions of power. At the
export of surveillance training to like-minded regimes. same time, when confronted with serious technical challenges
and significant efforts of delegitimization, electoral processes
Policy considerations sometimes fail to deliver credible or trusted results. Failed
• Support the strengthening of CSOs working on elections may trigger political crises with profound negative
democracy and human rights issues in contexts where effects on societies.
these rights are threatened.
Because of the implications and the dynamics of failed
• Support a free media and training to journalists on elections, EMBs—the agencies tasked with administering
democracy reporting. elections—have an increasingly important social role to
play. The way in which they interpret and perform this
• Facilitate access to regional and international civil society role is crucial. EMBs are well aware that their legal status
networks for CSOs that face restrictions, especially and technical mandates are not sufficient to protect them
43
from errors or spoilers. With no guarantee that electoral a change in political habits requires long-term commitment
stakeholders will comply with the rules of a level playing and the involvement of multiple sectors of society beyond
field, or that technical aspects will play out as planned, formal government institutions (International IDEA 2005;
EMBs are increasingly taking proactive steps to ensure that Hamid 2014).
they are protected against known and unknown risks.
However, there is also increased understanding of the
Electoral processes and the role of EMBs: opportunities need for periodic and systematic review of rules that
EMBs that demonstrate the resilience to adjust to new govern the organization of elections—even in older
circumstances, embark on meaningful reforms, and democracies with well-established electoral systems.
engage potential spoilers are in a better position to secure While the GSoD Indices data shows that 22 of the world’s
legitimate—and accepted—electoral outcomes. Strategies 27 older democracies have high levels of Clean Elections
for building a bulwark against malicious attempts to hijack and electoral systems that are decades or centuries old
electoral processes may take the form of investments in the and possess unquestioned integrity, these systems are
integrity of electoral processes and the competencies of increasingly recognized as requiring review and adjustment
electoral staff, or thoughtful engagement with like-minded to modern contexts.
agencies and civil society groups.
Global engagements in peer exchange, responding
In countries undergoing democratic reforms, rules timely and constructively to election observation
that govern elections are being continuously revised to mission recommendations, examining and learning from
strengthen democratic process. For countries undergoing international comparative examples, and the purposeful
significant democratic reforms as part of transition processes, inclusion of opposition, women, youth and minority
revising electoral rules and strengthening electoral systems voices in the reform process are now all elements of
are key to ensuring the sustainability of such processes. standard electoral management practice.
For example, in 2018 Ethiopia initiated an ambitious Sweden provides a good example, having responded to
democratic reform programme that seems to have set criticism by the OSCE/ODIHR on the secrecy of the vote
the country on the path towards democracy. An advisory in its national elections in 2018, and undertaken a review
council has been established to support its law reform of its practices on polling station layout (OSCE/ODIHR
initiatives and a specific working group designated to 2018). A process for ballot paper redesign has been launched
review the design of democratic institutions, including which involves examining sample ballot papers from across
electoral ones, which currently perform among the bottom the globe.
25 per cent in the world on Clean Elections (Ethiopian
News Agency 2018). In the United Kingdom, a number of pressure groups (see
e.g. Electoral Reform Society n.d.) are lobbying for major
Following a dramatic election result in 2018 in Malaysia, changes in the electoral process including adopting a
which had been governed by a hybrid regime for the proportional representation electoral system instead of the
previous 42 years, electoral reform was designed to provide first-past-the-post majoritarian system.
all stakeholders, particularly members of parliament,
with a comprehensive understanding of the complex and Addressing some of the new (and ongoing) obstacles
multifaceted issues related to reforming the current electoral to clean elections requires inter-agency regulatory
framework (The Star Online 2018). collaboration. While many EMBs traditionally have
a mandate to regulate, oversee and/or enforce matters
In Fiji, a dialogue framework between the EMB and CSOs pertaining to electoral processes, these mandates are not
is being considered to provide a platform for assessing the always sufficient to deal with the ever-creative behaviours
electoral institutions and processes during the post-electoral that threaten the fairness of the electoral process in areas such
period (International IDEA 2018a). as political financing or use of social media for campaigning.
While one-off measures are important, so is a practice of This regulatory gap becomes problematic when the quick
consistent reflection and refinement. In Indonesia, electoral tempo of technological change outpaces any rulebooks.
reform involving many stakeholders has been continually While EMBs do not have the mandate to regulate all aspects
underway since the transition to democracy two decades of an election process, they do initiate and provide advice on
ago, demonstrating that a shift in institutional culture and regulatory guidelines for relevant legislative and regulatory
44
bodies. One example is the British Electoral Commission’s However, beyond the benefits of technology for electoral
advice on digital campaigning (Electoral Commission n.d.). processes, there is also a shift towards a more widespread
agreement that technology alone is not able to deliver
EMBs find inventive ways to collaborate with a range of meaningful improvements in contexts with severe
state and non-state actors on a range of issues pertaining democratic deficits, where democratic institutions have
to the conduct of clean elections. In India, the national been considerably weakened, and trust in democratic and
EMB has the formal authority to deploy security agencies; electoral processes is low. Events in the Democratic Republic
in Mexico the coordination group involves multiple security of Congo and Venezuela in 2018 are recent cases in point
and civilian agencies who coordinate on issues of electoral where even the application of some of the most advanced
operations and security; in Kenya and many other African election technology did not lead to election results being
countries, electoral coordination forums bring together state widely accepted and perceived as legitimate and credible.
agencies and the civil society sector; in Ghana, traditional In Venezuela, on the contrary, such technology has been
leaders are an EMB partner (International IDEA 2018b). seen as manipulated to favour the regime (Berwick 2018;
Reuters 2017).
Even without formal powers to regulate or direct behaviours
and actions of political parties and media, EMBs can and However, where introduction of technologies in elections
do work with these stakeholders to codify and enforce codes is based on well-informed decisions and managed
of conduct for political parties and media during elections properly, technology has contributed to the resolution of
(International IDEA and Swiss Federal Department of long-standing electoral problems and, ultimately, to the
Political Affairs 2017; UNDP 2014). In many countries, acceptance of results.
CSOs are important partners for EMBs in voter education, as
well as in the monitoring of negative party campaigning and Biometric voter registration technology, for example, is now
interferences in processes. Further, in the case of Indonesia, used in many countries, especially in Africa and Latin America,
voting results confirmed by CSOs in the 2014 presidential and has increased the integrity of voter registers and reduced
election boosted the credibility of the EMB in disputes with electoral malpractice (International IDEA 2017a). One such
the parliament (Thornley 2014: Hasanuddin 2014). case is Nigeria where a long history of unreliable voter lists
and voter impersonation has been addressed through technical
One critical area in which inter-agency collaboration is solutions, thereby contributing to the strengthening of electoral
being fast-tracked is in response to cybersecurity concerns processes in Africa’s largest new third-wave democracy.
in elections. While EMBs lack sufficient mandates,
expertise or resources to deal with complex cyberattack Another example is the introduction of SMS-based voter
vectors, or to holistically protect elections from a broad registration in Libya in 2013 that enabled citizens in remote
range of emerging electronic threats, cyber-experts lack the areas to register electronically without travelling long
essential electoral experience to provide effective protection. distances, especially considering the security situation in the
Recognizing the urgency as well as the transnational nature country (Chao 2014).
of the problem, international electoral assistance providers
are facilitating international, multi-stakeholder discussions While security and privacy concerns, risks, high costs and
on this topic. The aim is to obtain comparative experiences community traditions hinder a wider adoption of electronic
about contemporary challenges and good practices in order voting; Brazil, Estonia, India, Mongolia and the Philippines
to distil policy considerations in this area. are examples of countries where wide acceptance of electronic
voting has had positive impacts on electoral integrity. In
Concerns about cybersecurity in elections have led to the context of the GSoD Indices, Brazil, Estonia and India
more thoughtful discussions of the benefits and risks have high levels of Clean Elections, while Mongolia and the
of technology-based electoral reform. Some electoral Philippines have mid-range levels.
stakeholders have seen voting technology as a panacea to
strengthening democracy, a shortcut to credible election Finally, the application of open-data principles in elections
outcomes even in an environment where overall electoral allows for unprecedented advances in electoral transparency
integrity is low. When technology such as electronic voting is and citizen participation, for example through digital
used as a tool in electoral processes, this can enhance political solutions for political finance reporting disclosure or more
equality as it reduces barriers to electoral participation and efficient and accessible results aggregation and publication
helps make elections more inclusive. More inclusive electoral systems (International IDEA 2017b).
processes in turn strengthen representative government.
45
Global challenges to electoral processes confront efforts to delegitimize their electoral processes,
Delivering legitimate elections results accepted by all from both domestic forces and foreign election interference.
stakeholders, or at least the critical majority of actors (e.g
major political parties, CSOs, domestic observers and The consequences of failed electoral processes may be
the international community), is becoming increasingly particularly grave in transition contexts, acting as a tipping
complicated for EMBs. point that damages the societal confidence necessary to ensure
a peaceful, stable and democratic transition to democracy.
What makes an election result more likely to be accepted The challenges for EMBs are about being able not only to
as legitimate? This question serves as a common theme that run an election technically well—which in many countries is
overshadows recent political crises, in which irregularities difficult enough—but also to navigate multiple minefields of
and flaws in electoral processes, genuine or perceived, have stakeholder pressures, voter apathy and mobility, heightened
led to delayed, cancelled, disputed or re-run elections. unrest, vendor influence, international expectations, and a
Recent examples include Bolivia, Nigeria and Turkey range of historical and contextual factors, including, inter
in 2019; the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq and alia, security, corruption and weak institutions.
Venezuela in 2018; Kenya in 2017; Austria in 2016; and
Afghanistan and Libya in 2014. When democratic processes and institutions are questioned
and contested or susceptible to political pressure, the
While circumstances leading to the rejection of results may credibility of EMBs is at stake. A glaring example of this
differ between countries and elections, two critical dynamics is Malaysia during the general elections in 2018. Due to
intersect: process flaws and polarizing context settings. At pressure from the incumbent administration, the EMB
this intersection, digital disruptions deserve special attention delayed the announcement of the results to—allegedly—give
because of their contemporary relevance. the incumbent time to convince some minor party winners
to change sides, which would have given them a majority.
In many contested elections, the ostensible reasons for In the end, the incumbent party lost the elections, but the
non-acceptance of the results relate to process flaws, such resulting scandal led to all electoral commissioners resigning
as technical irregularities or manipulations occurring in under pressure from the new administration and the people.
critical phases of the electoral process. In Nigeria in 2019,
for example, the opposition claimed that the ruling party Many undemocratic regimes strive to uphold elections as
had manipulated the vote. Another example is the 2018 means of internal and external legitimization. In country
parliamentary elections in Iraq, where electronic counting of contexts ruled by hybrid or non-democratic regimes,
votes was widely disputed, leading the parliament to order a elections can serve the purpose of reinforcing a democratic
manual recount of votes under the supervision of a panel of façade, both domestically and internationally. Almost all (87
nine judges replacing the nine members of the Iraqi EMB per cent) non-democracies hold some form of elections, as
(Aboulenein 2018). do most hybrid regimes, even though these elections cannot
be classified as clean. In these contexts, electoral results
The complexity and magnitude of delivering elections are likely to be perceived as illegitimate by a large mass of
provides ample space for making claims that are difficult to the population and by the opposition (as was the case in
cross-check and verify in a timely manner, if at all. While Venezuela in 2005 and 2018).
technical mishaps are rarely of proportions that impact
electoral outcomes, there is no room for complacency in The distortion of electoral principles for non-democratic
the administration of elections. Sometimes the theoretical purposes can undermine public trust in the value of the
possibility of irregularities in the vote count changing the electoral process in democracies. This distortion can occur
outcome of an election is deemed enough for the result to be subtly, especially in contexts of democratic backsliding or
overturned, as in the Austrian presidential election in 2016 deepening autocratization (these concepts are described in
(Atkins 2016). more detail in Section 1.1).
In democratic contexts where political stakes are high, Systemic manipulations can manifest in the form of a
EMBs remain exposed to the risk that results will be redesign of legal frameworks, reforms to extend term
rejected or annulled, even when they deliver a technically mandates (as in the cases of Nicaragua, Venezuela and
well-executed process. This is because elections reflect the most recently Egypt), exclusion of political opponents and
society and the historical context in which they are held— supporters, abuse of state resources for campaigning, use of
for better or worse. Older and third-wave democracies alike physical and psychological violence, weakening checks and
46
balances and—critically—the exercise of control over the inform and mobilize voters, to cast and count votes, and to
electoral administration. This is referred to by some scholars transmit, compute and tabulate results. With opportunities
as ‘electoralism’ (see e.g. Karl 1986: 9–36). come challenges and trade-offs. Voting technology can
be complex, difficult to understand for many electoral
In these circumstances, EMBs have limited powers and space stakeholders, and potentially perceived as a manipulation
to deliver credible elections and legitimate results. This type tool or a game changer with uncertain impacts.
of democratic backsliding contributes to the hollowing out
of democracy and can lead to partial (e.g. Nicaragua) or full This inevitably raises suspicion among political contestants.
democratic breakdowns (Venezuela). Reservations concerning fraud or vulnerabilities,
substantiated or not, can quickly gain traction and affect
The challenges faced by EMBs working in environments election credibility, as seen previously in the Netherlands
shaped by a culture of political mistrust or of deeply in 2017, Kenya in 2017 and Iraq in 2018. Therefore, the
embedded societal and political divides can be daunting. incorporation of major technology upgrades in elections is
In such instances, even genuine election results may be not simply a technical or administrative process, but also
rejected by gameplaying political actors who exploit a small- demands a concurrent political and societal trust-building
scale irregularity for short-term political gain. exercise that EMBs are often not well equipped to provide.
Social media may be used by spoilers (the effect of vote splitting Social media provides a communication channel
between candidates who often have similar ideologies) as via which rumours and disinformation spread at an
a platform for undermining elections in such contexts, unprecedented rate, and this can also undermine trust
contributing to further polarization. Negative perceptions in electoral processes. While sometimes information on
can be augmented by residual grievances from past elections, candidates or on the electoral process is spread organically,
or through mistrust in the state’s capacity for impartiality. there is an increase of systemic disinformation campaigns,
sometimes funded by unknown sources, and sometimes also
If an EMB loses the confidence of the critical mass, the as part of an official political campaign.
legitimacy and acceptance of the election results will suffer,
even if the outcome is lawful. In such contexts, a rejection of Such disinformation campaigns have been used in attempts
results may be a well-calculated act of gameplaying that aims to undermine the trust in credible EMBs and the electoral
to compensate for unfavourable election results. By rejecting events they organize, and in political parties and candidates,
genuine election results, actors aim to generate political and to manipulate voters’ participation and choices. The two
crises where power-sharing deals can be sought. If the losing most recent examples, both in 2016, are the US presidential
party is an incumbent or armed stakeholder, a rejection of a elections and the European Union Membership Referendum
result can be a gambit for the violent usurpation of power. in the UK (known as the ‘Brexit’ referendum), in which social
media is believed to have possibly been used to manipulate
An example is the 2014 legislative election in Libya, when the voters’ choices. Furthermore, in the Brazilian elections in
General National Congress (GNC)—the interim legislative 2018, WhatsApp became a conduit for disinformation
body expected to act as a parliament until a permanent during the presidential election campaign (see Section 3.1
House of Representatives (HoR) could be elected—refused in this report).
to acknowledge the results of the internationally recognized
parliament after a presumably ‘baseless’ ruling from the The need for a more rigorous regulation of social media
Supreme Court dissolving the HoR. This led to the creation of platforms has become increasingly apparent. In response
two parallel legislative bodies and two parallel governments, to increasing public scrutiny, social media providers have
and the eruption of nationwide instability and violence. In proposed and implemented measures to mitigate excesses
2015, all parties to the conflict signed the United Nations- and have increased self-regulation in the political space.
brokered Libyan Political Agreement, a power-sharing Examples include the political advertising transparency tools
arrangement between the major Libyan political players and fact-checking mechanisms increasingly implemented
(including the GNC whose legal mandate had expired) since 2017 by platforms such as Facebook, Google, Twitter
(UNSMIL 2016). and WhatsApp for elections in Australia, Brazil, the European
Union, India and the USA.
Digital disruption has negative effects on electoral
processes. Digital resources are increasingly applied to However, while EMBs argue that more needs to be done,
electoral processes to store electoral data, to register, identify, regulation requires mandates, resources and expertise that
47
they may not have at their disposal. Regulation that is hastily in thoughtful and context-aware discussions and
implemented and flawed can hinder innovation and lead analysis of the benefits and risks of the options at hand.
to lost opportunities; conversely, a hesitancy to implement When there is already a lack of trust in democratic and
regulation increases the risk of harm to those who require electoral institutions, the introduction of technology
protection. can be a controversial issue. Where the introduction
of technologies in elections is based on well-informed
As challenges to electoral processes become more sophisticated, decisions and managed properly, technology can
fast-paced, and nuanced, EMBs need to be forward-looking potentially contribute to the resolution of long-standing
and increasingly creative. Innovative regulatory instruments, electoral problems.
skill sets and management processes, the effective use of
technologies, and collaboration with other agencies will help • Protect democratic gains against risks. Trust in electoral
EMBs effectively respond to new challenges. processes and institutions can be easily lost. When this
happens, trust is difficult to restore. Therefore, EMBs
Policy considerations should institutionalize risk management and resilience-
• Carry out reform thoughtfully. EMBs should make a building processes. Risk management will help EMBs
periodic and systematic review of rules that govern the to anticipate and address various risks before they
organization of elections and ensure their adjustment to negatively impact the process and results. Resilience-
modern contexts. Parameters for the design of a review building will strengthen the capacity of the system to
process should include internal audits and consultations, deal with inevitable shocks and stresses.
peer-exchange events and examination of international
comparative examples, constructive responses to election 1.2.5. Corruption and money in politics
observer recommendations, and the purposeful inclusion When government officials abuse their office for personal
of opposition voices in the reform process. These reviews gain, through embezzlement, bribery or theft, this further
should become standard electoral management practice. undermines the impartial administration of state power, and
the fairness and predictability of its exercise. Corruption
• Encourage new regulatory alliances. When EMBs do not only affects people’s trust in politicians but can also
not have formal powers to directly regulate all issues undermine trust in government and democracy more broadly.
of concern, they should initiate such processes with Efforts to reduce corruption have not kept up with the pace
relevant regulatory bodies and play a constructive role in of other forms of democratic progress. Furthermore, the lack
supporting informed decisions. Critical areas may relate of progress in reducing corruption has serious implications
to the illicit financing of political parties, cybersecurity, for the sustainability, stability and health of both older and
social media regulations and prevention of electoral newer democracies. This section examines corruption in
violence, among others. Concrete actions by EMBs democratic processes, with a particular emphasis on the role
could include methodological documentation and of money in politics.
analysis of a problem with a view to distilling pieces of
advice for respective legislative and regulatory agencies. Why does corruption matter?
Democracy is not only about access to power and control of
• Invest in people. To plan and implement election power, but also the exercise of that power (International IDEA
activities in difficult environments—often marked by 2018d). If policy implementation is unfair and unpredictable,
social and political tensions, security challenges and and there are large discrepancies between official policies and
risks of natural hazards—EMBs need knowledgeable how they are practised, the fulfilment of democratic principles
and capable staff. To ensure that permanent and is threatened (Munck 2009; Alexander and Welzel 2011).
temporary staff can respond to changing circumstances,
EMBs should provide continuous capacity building Corruption (when government officials abuse their office
opportunities, for example through dedicated training for personal gain, through embezzlement, bribery or theft)
departments, peer exchanges or attendance at specialized further undermines the impartial administration of state
courses. The establishment of electoral training centres power, and the fairness and predictability of its exercise.
may provide additional opportunities for training of key The OECD has identified corruption as the ‘heart of the
electoral stakeholders. governance trap’ that includes a declining trust in institutions
and weakening of the social contract in OECD countries and
• Introduce technology carefully. The introduction of regions such as Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean,
technologies in electoral processes should be anchored and North America (OECD 2018: 16).
48
Corruption not only affects people’s trust in politicians from high levels of corruption, only surpassed by the Middle
but can also contribute to the undermining of trust in East (the case for the only two democracies) and Africa (45 per
government and democracy more broadly (Arkhede Olsson cent) which both have lower levels of democratic development.
2014; Fisman and Golden 2017; OECD 2018). Moreover,
recent events show that corruption is a salient electoral Since 2016, North America has witnessed a worsening
issue that can make or break governments (Carothers and situation, with declining scores that are primarily driven by
Carothers 2018; Bågenholm 2010). developments in the United States, as well as a slight decline
in Canada. Nonetheless, only North America and Europe
The GSoD Indices’ Absence of Corruption subattribute outperform the global average with regard to Absence of
is closely connected to the United Nations’ Sustainable Corruption.
Development Goals (SDGs), including SDG 16, to promote
just, peaceful and inclusive societies, and SDG 16.5, in The lack of progress in reducing corruption has serious
particular, which aims to substantially reduce corruption and implications for the sustainability, stability and health of
bribery in all its forms (United Nations General Assembly both older and newer democracies. All democracies with
2015). high levels of corruption are third-wave democracies that
transitioned to democracy after 1975. While democratic
Absence of Corruption also indirectly contributes to fragility is caused by a number of different context-specific
achieving the other SDGs, as corruption can hinder the factors, and caution should be used in arguing for a causal
effective implementation of policies aimed at improving link, more than half (57 per cent) of the democracies that
health or education, eradicating poverty, promoting gender have high levels of corruption have experienced democratic
equality or fostering economic growth (OECD 2018). breakdown at some point after their first transition to
This claim is supported by the GSoD Indices data, where democracy.
Absence of Corruption is the aspect of democracy most
highly correlated with Basic Welfare (correlation coefficient Between 1975 and 2018, democratic breakdowns were
of 0.709), which measures levels of Human Development. nearly three times more frequent in countries with high
levels of corruption than in countries with mid-range levels
Democracy matters for corruption. Democracy in and of of corruption. No breakdown occurred at low levels of
itself is not sufficient to guarantee low levels of corruption: corruption, although this calculation does not control for
25 per cent of democracies actually suffer from high levels of other factors that may also have been in play.
corruption, therefore making it impossible to draw a direct
causal link. However, non-democracies and hybrid regimes More recent advances have nevertheless been made in
are, by and large, much more corrupt than democracies. fighting corruption. Despite a stagnation in the reduction
More than two-thirds (78 per cent) of non-democracies have of global and regional levels of corruption, individual
high levels of corruption, as do 68 per cent of hybrid regimes. countries have seen advances in reducing corruption, while
No single non-democracy and only one hybrid regime others have seen setbacks and increases in corruption levels.
(Singapore) has low levels of corruption, demonstrating that
Singapore constitutes the exception rather than the rule. Since 2006, however, the number of countries reducing their
corruption levels has consistently been higher than those
Trends in corruption with increasing levels. From 2013 to 2018, 23 countries
Efforts to reduce corruption have not kept up with the pace increased their Absence of Corruption scores (and therefore
of other forms of democratic progress over the past four reduced their levels of corruption), while 14 countries saw
decades. Global levels of corruption are slightly higher today a decline in their Absence of Corruption scores (see Figure
than they were in 1975, with a three per cent global decrease 1.29). The share of countries with high levels of corruption
in the Absence of Corruption score (noting that a lower score was reduced from 48 per cent of countries in 2000 to 42 per
on this measure denotes an increase in corruption). cent of countries in 2018 (see Figure 1.30).
This lack of progress is also seen at the regional level. Latin This reflects the development and effective implementation
America and the Caribbean is the only region to show some of policies and institutions to fight corruption in
progress in reducing its regional corruption levels since 1975, a number of countries and is at odds with other
while all other regions have seen slight statistically insignificant democratic aspects covered by the GSoD Indices, where
declines. Despite this, a significant share of democracies in more countries have been declining than advancing
Latin America and the Caribbean (31 per cent) still suffer since 2014 (see International IDEA 2018e).
49
Declines and advances in Absence of Corruption, Global trends in Absence of Corruption, 1975–2018
2000–2018
50
30 2018:
23 countries
45
28
26 40
24
35
22
20 30
18
No. of countries
25
16 2018:
2000: 14 countries
14 13 countries 20
12
15
10
10
8
2000:
6 8 countries 5
4
0
2
2000
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
1975
0
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Low Mid-range High
Advancers Decliners
Notes: A high score on the indicator Absence of Corruption is positive. To enable accurate
Notes: This graph shows the number of countries worldwide between 2000 and 2018 that have comparisons over time and avoid distortions due to increases in the absolute numbers of
experienced statistically significant advances and declines in their Absence of Corruption scores. countries, this graph shows percentages rather than counts.
Political corruption and money in politics in combination with lax regulatory frameworks, weak
While corruption could take place anywhere, corruption enforcement or weak judicial institutions has led political
involving public administration, government and political corruption to become a significant share of overall
parties is referred to as political corruption. For example, corruption.
procurement for public administration is often identified
as an area that is vulnerable to political corruption, since While corruption takes a number of different forms (e.g.
elected officials might exploit the system and award public bribery, abuse of public resources, tax evasion, money
contracts to those who supported them in their campaigns as laundering and accounting fraud), inadequately controlled
a return of favours (OECD 2018). funding of political parties and election campaigns is one of
the most widely exploited entry points for private interests to
Throughout the world, politics and in particular elections exert undue influence (so-called policy capture) over politics
have become increasingly expensive. Money is needed and political decisions.
for political parties and politicians to communicate
to constituents, run successful election campaigns, Corruption in general undermines trust in democracy
strengthen political organizations, support policy research but political corruption further weakens the democratic
or train party members (International IDEA 2017a: principles of popular control and political equality. It
126–56). Financing political activities is an important distorts representative government by diverting politicians’
element of any democracy and is not a corrupt act per se, responsiveness to donors rather than voters. It creates an
but the amount of resources involved in such processes unequal playing field for candidates’ political participation
50
and representation, favouring those with access to financial illicit sources of money, therefore contributing to the
resources and networks, thereby reinforcing existing socio- broader fight against corruption (International IDEA
economic inequalities. When it goes as far as breaking 2017b).
laws, it undermines the integrity of political processes
and of public administration (International IDEA 2016; According to International IDEA’s Political Finance
OECD 2018). Database, more than 60 per cent of surveyed countries
currently disclose political finance information publicly
Towards a holistic and comprehensive approach to (International IDEA n.d.). Among those countries, there
money in politics has been considerable progress in the use of ICTs to enhance
Adequate design and effective enforcement of political transparency and accountability in political finance in recent
finance regulations is critical to weaken incentives for years.
political corruption and penalize corrupt behaviour
and transactions. Existing political finance regulations A growing number of countries now require political parties
alone cannot limit the access of undue interests to political and candidates to submit their financial reports online to the
processes. This realization has led to a major shift in anti- EMB or other oversight agency, with the data subsequently
corruption strategies in both international organizations disclosed in a searchable public database. While the
and national governments in order to connect political development of online reporting and disclosure systems is
finance with other related issues such as asset declaration not a silver bullet to fight against corruption and money
systems and lobbying registers (International IDEA 2017a: in politics, it can exert pressure on political parties and
126–56). candidates to submit accurate and detailed data, as an online
platform facilitates the public scrutiny of political finance
Significant advances have been achieved in this regard. information (International IDEA 2017b).
Several countries have been undergoing major political
finance reforms and several others are underway. For For example, Georgia’s State Audit Office (SAO) developed
example, in South Africa, the Political Party Funding Act, an online political finance reporting and disclosure system
which seeks to improve accountability and transparency in in 2014. The SAO publishes regular reports detailing
political finance, came into effect in 2019 and introduced party incomes and expenditure, and the names and
stricter regulation of private donations. identity numbers of individual donors, in searchable
and downloadable formats. Based on the disclosed data,
Similarly, Malaysia’s political finance is so far largely Transparency International Georgia also launched its own
unregulated and foreign donations, for example, are portal to provide information on all donations made to
permitted. It was in this context that former Prime Georgian political parties since 2012 (International IDEA
Minister Najib Razak became embroiled in the 1Malaysia and OGP 2019).
Development Berhad (1MDB) scandal in 2015.
Approximately USD 700 million from foreign individuals Moldova has also adopted new technologies for reporting
and corporations was allegedly transferred to Najib via and disclosing political finance information, and other
1MDB, a government-run strategic development company, countries such as Bolivia, Mongolia, Peru and South
claiming that these funds were a legal campaign donation Africa are discussing their implementation (International
from foreign sources. IDEA 2019). It would be ideal if such a system is
linked to other databases such as tax records, in order
Since the change of government in 2018, and after 61 years to interconnect multiple data sets and detect corruption
of single-party rule, Malaysia’s Election Commission has risks. For example, in Mexico political finance data is
begun developing more comprehensive political finance cross-checked with data from several financial institutions
regulations, including donation limits and donor registration including the Financial Intelligence Unit, the National
(Loheswar 2019). Bank and the Monetary Commission (International
IDEA 2017b).
Digital technologies for greater transparency and
accountability Closing loopholes in political finance regulations
Information on how much money circulates in and While most countries have some kind of laws regulating
around elections, where resources are coming from and the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns,
how they are spent could expose the undue influence of shortcomings still exist in many contexts. This, in
politicians and help protect against the infiltration of combination with weak judicial institutions and poor
51
access to justice, helps explain the slow advances in and the capacity to enforce regulations (OECD 2016).
reducing corruption in a number of countries. In reality, many agencies have rather limited human and
financial resources to effectively deal with large volumes of
For example, setting spending limits for political parties and oversight work.
candidates could prevent a spending race and reduce the
incentives for corruption stemming from high expenditures. For example, Greece recently updated its political
According to International IDEA’s Political Finance finance regulations in line with good practices in other
Database, overall spending limits for political parties exist European countries. Under the new system, political
in 32 per cent of the surveyed countries. However, only finance oversight is carried out by an audit committee.
3 per cent of countries have a specific spending limit on However, the committee’s chairperson is appointed by the
online media advertisement for political parties, while 5 parliament and uncertainty remains as to the committee’s
per cent have a spending limit for candidates (International ability to conduct independent and effective auditing
IDEA n.d.). of political parties and members of parliament (Svarrer
2017). Furthermore, while the audit committee maintains
In Romania, candidates are allowed to spend up to 30 per a website to disclose political finance information, most of
cent of their total spending limit on online electoral campaign the data regarding private donations and bank loans is not
material. As social media has become an important platform uploaded in a timely manner.
for political communications around the world, countries
may consider developing specific regulations in relation to No matter how comprehensive a law looks on paper, the
online media advertisement spending by political parties and level of implementation is what matters the most. Countries
candidates. need to ensure that oversight agencies are equipped with
adequate resources to fulfil their roles.
In addition, levelling the political playing field and
ensuring the inclusion of women, youth and other Corruption risks posed by new technologies
marginalized groups helps make political processes more Blockchain, big-data analytics, artificial intelligence
resilient in the face of corruption risks. By linking the and other new technologies are changing political
amount of public funding to the level of gender equality participation and representation across the world.
among the candidates that a political party puts up for While technologies such as digital reporting and disclosure
election, or earmarking a certain portion of public funding platforms can be a major driver to increase transparency and
for gender-related activities, political finance regulations accountability in political finance, new technologies can also
could make money play a positive role in promoting pose a new regulatory challenge for anti-corruption efforts.
diversity and anti-corruption in politics (International
IDEA 2018a). For example, the emerging popularity of cryptocurrencies
such as bitcoin raises concerns about their use to finance
However, this type of gender-targeted public funding only politics (International IDEA 2018c, 2019b). Depending
exists in approximately 30 countries, including France, on the design, some cryptocurrencies could make it very
Haiti, Kenya, Portugal and South Korea. Other countries difficult to trace donors’ identities and the destinations of
should follow suit and could consider updating their political their donations. Cryptocurrencies could be exploited to
finance regulations accordingly. circumvent existing political finance regulations such as
donation limits and bans from foreign and anonymous
Ensuring effective implementation sources.
One of the major lessons from recurring corruption
scandals is that many countries continue to struggle Although the use of cryptocurrencies in political finance is
with the effective implementation of political finance not common practice, some political parties and candidates
regulations. While there is no one-size-fits-all model to have started to accept donations in cryptocurrencies.
regulate the negative impact of money in politics, efficient For example, in 2014 Mathias Sundin, a cryptocurrency
oversight, timely reporting and auditing, public scrutiny and advocate, was elected to the Swedish parliament after
dissuasive sanctions play a crucial role in promoting anti- funding his election campaign solely using bitcoin. While
corruption. his political views won him the seat, his radical approach
to fundraising garnered international attention and sparked
Institutions responsible for political finance oversight must a debate on the implication of cryptocurrencies in political
be independent. They require a clear mandate, legal powers finance (Coindesk 2014).
52
Similarly, Georgia is now ranked second in the world for • Consider the adoption of digital reporting and disclosure
cryptocurrency mining behind only China (Hileman and platforms for greater transparency and accountability
Rauchs 2017). One Georgian political party has started in money in politics. Online databases also facilitate
accepting cryptocurrencies to fund its political campaign. In scrutiny of money in politics. Such platforms should
Canada, the popularity of cryptocurrencies has prompted an ideally be connected to other systems such as a tax
ongoing debate as to whether the digital currency should database in order to discern patterns and detect signs of
be officially regulated as part of political finance processes corruption.
(O’Malley 2019).
• Close loopholes in existing political finance regulations
It may be too soon to draw any conclusions about the to address remaining and emerging corruption risk
impact of cryptocurrencies on corruption. However, it areas. For example, countries may consider introducing
becomes increasingly important for governments to have a specific regulations on online media spending by
better grasp on such emerging technologies. It is important political parties and candidates or adopting gender-
to first dissect what diverse implications they have for targeted public funding to level the political playing
political finance and anti-corruption efforts. Only then will field among all stakeholders.
it be possible to assess how they can be best utilized. In the
case of cryptocurrencies, regulations need to be considered • Focus on the effective implementation of existing
regarding how to exchange cryptocurrencies to regular political finance regulations. In order to do so,
currency. countries must ensure independent oversight
mechanisms by providing clear mandates, legal powers
The fight against corruption more broadly requires and sufficient capacities to the regulatory agencies to
strengthening of the rule of law, particularly access to justice, fulfil their tasks.
and judicial capacity and independence—two issues with
a high degree of correlation with corruption in the GSoD • Carefully consider the pros and cons of new technologies
Indices data (with correlation coefficients in 2018 of 0.836 such as cryptocurrencies and adopt necessary measures
and 0.737, respectively). The uneven and slow progress in accordingly. Governments and regulatory agencies are
reducing corruption levels around the world underscores the often too slow to react to emerging corruption risks
need to intensify efforts to fight against corruption as well as brought by new technologies.
thinking about more innovative ways to make money play a
positive role in politics. • Promote civic education and awareness of the importance
of integrity in politics and other societal and economic
Policy considerations spheres.
• Improve political finance transparency and, wherever
possible, develop a holistic and comprehensive anti- • Monitor state performance, use of public resources and
corruption approach that links political finance with corruption through investigative activities and reporting,
other related matters such as asset disclosure and and report to judicial institutions for processing. Use
lobbying registers. International instruments such as the media to increase pressure for integrity.
OECD recommendations and the Open Government
Partnership (OGP) initiatives could support countries’ • Consider the role of the private sector. It can act as
anti-corruption reform efforts in that direction. either a catalyst for, or an obstacle to, organized criminal
engagement in political corruption. Working together
• Political parties should pledge full transparency of party with private companies is therefore crucial in fighting
finances by incorporating anti-corruption mechanisms this phenomenon. One example is the role of the banking
in codes of conduct (e.g. declarations of assets from party sector in monitoring transfers that may involve money
representatives and conflict-of-interest norms), strictly laundering. Leveraging the potential for corporate social
regulating conflicts of interest, banning anonymous responsibility principles to encourage companies to
donations, and implementing sound anti-corruption conduct due diligence in detecting potential criminal
policies and internal party democracy mechanisms interests in their market chain is another important
(International IDEA 2017a). avenue.
53
BOX 1.1
New technologies and democracy

New technologies, including information and communications their position on issues. This can help provide incentives
technologies (ICTs) and social media, are contributing to a for reducing corruption and enhancing the impartiality of
profound transformation of the global democracy landscape. administration.
They provide unprecedented opportunities to deepen
democracy, while also creating new challenges and risks. This • New technologies, particularly social media platforms, can
box summarizes these. help bridge the gap between citizens/voters and decision-
makers. Whereas such interactions were once mediated by
gatekeepers such as the media and political parties, social
Opportunities for democracy provided by new technologies
media allows direct interaction, eliminating the need for this
• ICTs provide new and enhanced opportunities for increasing
mediating filter (Tufekci 2018). While this can help increase
political equality and enhancing popular control. The use
proximity, it also fundamentally alters the traditional
of new technologies has the potentials to democratize
dynamics of interactions between decision-makers and
participatory engagement, political engagement and activism
citizens.
and thereby strengthen political equality and help increase
pressure for political and democratic change. • Anonymous speech and anonymous information access have
become a critical component of the online political debate.
• In particular, ICTs have provided citizens with new tools to
The ability to use Internet technologies to communicate
voice their opinions and mobilize pressure for change. People
anonymously has enabled journalists, CSOs and members of
can now voice their opinion, mobilize for protest, organize the
ethnic, religious or minority groups (who may be persecuted
signature of petitions or vote from the comfort of their home,
because of their sexual orientation or gender identity)
breaking down geographical, physical and gender barriers
to exercise their right to freedom of expression, while
that may have hindered or prevented their meaningful political
protecting their privacy. This has led to a diversification of
participation.
the public arena, bringing more voices into the public debate
• New technologies can help increase pressure for political and broadening the range of issues discussed, as anonymity
and democratic change. This was seen during the Arab often allows people to talk about issues previously off the
Uprisings, the democratic transition processes in Armenia agenda.
and The Gambia and also more recently in Algeria and
Sudan, where social media helped amplify societal voices
Challenges to democracy posed by new technologies
and mobilize protests. Together with other offline processes,
• New technologies can also contribute to the weakening
this helped create pressure for change and accelerated
or even undermining of democratic processes, with
democratic openings that could lead to broader democratic
disinformation playing a key role.
transitions. However, online mobilization needs to be
combined with offline actions (e.g. protests, political • When used as a tool to manipulate public opinion, social
reforms, political will, international action and electoral media can harm core democratic processes. Coordinated
processes) to effect change. manipulation campaigns on social media and digital networks
can harm democratic politics in a number of ways:
• New technologies can help strengthen representative
government. When a technology such as electronic voting is –– The manipulation of public opinion online has the
used in electoral processes, this enhances political equality potential to skew the political debate towards topics
as it reduces barriers to electoral participation and increases favoured by those with more resources and access to these
inclusivity. More inclusive electoral processes in turn manipulative techniques.
strengthen representative government. Biometric technology
can also improve the accuracy of voter registration and reduce –– The spread of disinformation on political candidates and
the potential for vote tampering, strengthening the integrity their positions can contribute to the distortion of factual
and transparency of electoral processes (International IDEA electoral debate. While the use of disinformation to
2017). discredit political opponents is not a new phenomenon,
the speed at which information travels online is a key
• Technology can provide additional avenues for citizen factor that adds to the challenges, as is the scale of
participation. Governments and parliaments can use online disinformation when amplified on social media to reach
tools to engage citizens in public debate, consultations millions of viewers.
and referenda on particular issues. New technologies can
also be used to hold political decision-makers to account, –– Manipulation and disinformation via social media can
increasing societal checks on government and the means of potentially change electoral outcomes as voters may turn
popular control. CSOs can use new technologies to monitor against (or for) a candidate based on the disinformation
government spending, and to pressure politicians to clarify received.
54
–– Coordinated manipulation of social media can generate • The GSoD data shows that increase polarization is a key
confusion about the trustworthiness of the information contributing factor for democratic backsliding.
ecosystem, affecting the credibility and confidence of the
political process. This reduces trust in electoral processes • Social media and other Internet platforms can contribute
and, as a consequence, trust in democracy more broadly to a weakened media environment through fragmentation
(Chertoff and Donahoe 2018). and monopolization, and a reduction in quality, with
online content published without editorial oversight and
–– A reduction of trust in democratic processes can lead quality control. This weakens the role of the media as an
citizens to opt out of these processes, increase voter apathy independent check on government performance (Tufekci
or push voters towards political parties and leaders of a 2018).
populistic bent who may not always support democratic
ideals. • The shaping of public opinion and agenda setting shifts
from the public arena and its traditional actors (media and
–– The ease of manipulation of online content (via anonymous politicians) to the private arena. The latter includes a number
human interaction, trolls and bots) enables and facilitates of global technology giants that control key communication
foreign interference in electoral processes and domestic platforms, which manage large information flows, vast
public debate, which undermines national sovereignty, amounts of personal data as well as research into artificial
popular control and political equality. intelligence and algorithms.
–– The use of online manipulation techniques, such as • Technologies are tools that, in the hands of non-democratic
microtargeting or astroturfing, means that individuals may regimes, can be used to reinforce authoritarianism, increase
be excluded from political information flows and lose the citizen surveillance and disseminate propaganda. V-Dem data
ability to form opinions freely and independently without shows that 70 per cent of non-democratic regimes use the
fear of reprisals (United Nations 1966: Article 18). This is Internet to manipulate the information environment in their
also applicable online (United Nations 1966: Comment 25 to countries (V-Dem 2019).
Article 19).
• Governments are grappling with how to curb the harmful
–– Social media contributes to the polarization of the political spread of disinformation, while balancing other democratic
debate, and undermines its civility, which is central to the rights such as free speech. This is a difficult balancing act in
democratic conversation. Social media platforms, by design, democracies, but can easily go overboard in non-democracies,
seek to capture the attention of users. This generates filter where the curbing of disinformation can provide a legitimizing
bubbles and echo chambers, and reinforces already-held façade to crack down on free speech.
views, reducing access to alternative viewpoints. The effect
is deepened polarization rather than balanced opinion
shaping.
55
FIGURE 1.31
New technologies and social media i mpact on democracy
Strengthen participatory engagement Disinformation can distort and harm democratic

processes, in particular the electoral process
Democratization of information and
media landscape Increase polarization, which can provide
breeding ground for democratic backsliding
Increase societal checks on government and means
of popular control, which can reduce corruption and Decrease in quality of information
enhance impartial administration for citizens to make informed choices
Bridge gap between citizens/voters and Weakened media environment undermines

decision-makers checks on government, facilitating
unaccountable and corrupt practices
Strengthen representative government
Tools to reinforce authoritarianism
Increase political equality
Increase pressure for political and

democratic change
Conclusion The policy considerations build on International IDEA’s

This analysis has sought to provide an overview of a global, regional and country expertise, based on nearly 25
selection of issues, including both opportunities and years of accumulated institutional experience in providing
challenges, that affect the global democracy landscape. It is advice and analysing democratic reforms worldwide.
not exhaustive but rather a selection of current issues in the
democracy debate that the GSoD Indices have sought to The following chapters provide more in-depth analysis of
unpack and analyse, with the aim of helping policymakers how these issues take shape in different regional contexts
better understand and tackle the key global issues of our and what can be done to tackle regional- and country-level
time. democratic challenges, while building on advances and
harnessing current opportunities.
56
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60
2019 The state of democracy in Africa and the Middle East
Chapter 2
The state of democracy
in Africa and the Middle East
This chapter focuses on the state of democracy in two intertwined regions. The first section offers an
overview of democratic trends in Africa, while the second aims to provide an understanding of the current
democratic landscape in the least democratic region of the world, the Middle East. The chapter offers a long-
term perspective on democracy in each region, followed by overviews of their respective current democratic
landscapes, using the Global State of Democracy (GSoD) conceptual framework as an organizing structure.
The analysis highlights current gains and opportunities for democracy as well as democratic challenges.
Finally, the chapter includes a number of policy considerations for Africa and the Middle East.
It should be noted that the GSoD Indices classify the Middle East and Iran as a single region, referred to
in this report as the Middle East. However, for the purposes of the analysis in this chapter, the Middle East
is regarded as part of a wider region—that of Africa and the Middle East. Furthermore, while the GSoD
Indices classify the subregion of North Africa as part of Africa, the Middle East and North Africa are closely
interconnected from a historical, religious, cultural, political, linguistic and ethnic perspective. Examples
from North African countries are therefore mentioned in both the Africa and the Middle East sections.
AFRICA AND THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS
institutions has also seen declines outnumbering advances for

independent judiciaries and civil society participation, but not for
Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions parliaments. SDG 16.7 has had mixed results, with gains in Elected
Government, Effective Parliament and Social Group Equality,
but declines in Clean Elections and stagnation on Electoral
Africa is the region that has made most progress in
Participation and Local Democracy.
implementing Sustainable Development Goal 16 (SDG 16) since
2015, if measured by the number of indicators that have seen
more countries advancing than declining. However, significant
challenges remain if Africa is to achieve SDG 16; levels of
Gender Equality
democratic development measured by this goal remain low
compared to the world average.
Of the 18 GSoD indicators used to measure progress on SDG 16, Significant challenges remain in terms of achieving gender
8 have seen more countries in Africa with gains than declines since equality and SDG 5.5 on political representation of women.
2015. This is the case for SDG 16.1 on reducing violence, SDG 16.5 The GSoD measure of (political) Gender Equality for Africa
on reducing corruption and SDG 16.10 on access to information and has seen stagnation since 2015, with no countries declining
fundamental freedoms. However, SDG 16.3 on rule of law has seen or advancing. Africa has the second-lowest levels of political
more countries declining than advancing. SDG 16.6 on accountable Gender Equality in the world, after the Middle East.
61
The state of democracy in Africa and the Middle East Addressing the Ills, Reviving the Promise
KEY FINDINGS
• Of the new third-wave democracies, Tunisia has seen most

democratic advances and now scores among the top 25 per
Positive developments cent in the world on seven of its democratic subattributes. The
Gambia is another new third-wave democracy that has seen
significant democratic advances since its transition in 2017.
• The expansion of democracy in Africa since 1975 is second only

to Latin America and the Caribbean. Africa has experienced
a remarkable democratic expansion in the last few decades,
Challenges to democracy
particularly since the early 1990s when many countries in the
region introduced multiparty elections.
• In 1975, 41 countries were non-democracies while only 3 • While democracies hold the largest share of regime type in the
countries were classified as democracies. By 2018, the share region, a total of 11 African countries are still categorized as
of democracies had increased fivefold to 20 countries, making non-democracies, representing 22 per cent of countries in the
democracy the most common regime type in the region (41 per region.
cent).
• Africa also has the largest share of hybrid regimes in the world,
• Representative Government has been strengthened in Africa. Of with more than one-third of countries (18) in this category. The
the 20 countries categorized as democracies, the large majority latest country to regress into hybridity is Tanzania, in 2018.
have mid-range levels of Representative Government. However,
only one country (Mauritius) has a high level of Representative • Despite gains in the past decades, the conduct of elections in
Government. a number of African countries remains flawed. While the region
has witnessed a rise in the number of transitions from ruling
• Between 1975 and 2018, the gains recorded on Representative to opposition parties, many countries have failed to enact key
Government were followed by advances on Checks on reforms that would enhance the integrity of electoral processes.
Government and Fundamental Rights. Disputed elections are a common feature of electoral processes
in the region, sometimes leading to the outbreak of election-
• Democratic aspirations in Africa remain strong. Popular
related violence.
mobilizations demanding democratic change in countries with
long-standing autocratic leaders have been seen recently in • Another set of challenges to democratic consolidation seen
Ethiopia (2014–2018) and The Gambia (2016), resulting in in many parts of Africa today relates to conflict and civil war.
incipient democratic reforms in the former and a democratic In several countries, earlier gains have been reversed due to
transition in the latter after 22 years of non-democratic rule. The violence, a return to military rule, or failure to transform the
large pro-democracy protests that rocked Algeria and Sudan political process.
in 2019 also testify to the growing demands for democracy in
enduring hybrid and non-democratic regimes in the region. • An array of challenges inhibits the implementation of regional
and country-level initiatives in Africa on gender equality. To
• Civil Liberties are one of the best-performing aspects of varying degrees, women in Africa lack equal access to political
democracy in Africa. In 2018, 33 per cent of countries had high power and socio-economic status, and their inclusion remains a
levels of Civil Liberties. The high performance is concentrated major hurdle for most countries.
in the subregion of West Africa, followed by Southern Africa.
Of the countries that score highly on this measure, 87 per cent • Despite the expansion of democracy in the region, several
(14) are democracies, while only 12 per cent (2) are hybrid countries have experienced significant declines in recent years.
regimes. No single non-democratic regime has high levels of Such declines are discernible in countries such as Egypt which,
Civil Liberties. following the Arab Uprisings, experienced further democratic
declines and deepening autocratization.
• Elections have become the norm rather than the exception
throughout Africa. Only four countries in the region (Eritrea, • Judicial Independence is one of the weakest aspects of
Libya, Somalia and South Sudan) hold no form of elections, democracy in Africa. Levels of Judicial Independence are low in
scoring zero on Clean Elections and Inclusive Suffrage and, as almost half of the countries in the region.
a result, on Representative Government. Although Libya and
South Sudan held elections in 2014 and 2010 respectively, • Africa is the region with the highest levels of corruption as
regular elections are not held in these two countries because of well as the highest share of democracies with high levels
protracted civil war. In countries in West Africa such as Liberia of corruption. High levels of corruption are highly correlated
and Sierra Leone, democratic elections and stronger governments with low levels of human development. This, therefore, has
have replaced long-standing civil wars. detrimental effects for sustainable development in the region.
62
weakening of checks on government), infringements

on constitutional norms and practices, and reversals in
2.1. The state of democracy in Africa fundamental freedoms or civil liberties.
2.1.1. Introduction This section offers an overview of the long-term democratic

Between 1975 and 2018, Africa made significant trends in Africa, and an overview of the current democratic
democratic advances which, while encompassing most landscape, using the GSoD conceptual framework as an
aspects of democracy, were spread somewhat unevenly organizing structure. The analysis covers issues linked to
across the continent. These advances gathered momentum Representative Government, Fundamental Rights, Checks
in the early 1990s following the end of the Cold War, which on Government, Impartial Administration and Participatory
triggered a wave of multiparty elections in the region. As in Engagement, highlighting the current opportunities for
Asia and the Pacific, Africa’s democratic advances continue democracy in the region, as well as the democratic challenges
today, while other regions are now seeing stagnation or even it faces. The analysis is based on the GSoD Indices as the
decline. However, the African democratic landscape presents principal data source, complemented by other sources. The
a speckled picture, with 11 non-democracies, the largest share section concludes with an overview of policy considerations
of hybrid regimes in the world (18), and 20 democracies, of relevant to democratic trends and challenges in Africa.
which several are experiencing states of democratic fragility.
Africa’s most democratic subregion is West Africa, followed 2.1.2. Taking the long-term perspective:
by Southern Africa, North Africa and East Africa. Central democratic developments in Africa since 1975
Africa is the only African subregion with no democracies. The democratic expansion that has occurred in Africa
since 1975 is second only to the Latin American and the
In addition to the uneven spread of regime types across its Caribbean region in terms of its range and scope. Between
subregions, Africa’s current democratic landscape offers a 1975 and 2018, the overall landscape in Africa points to a
diverse set of opportunities and challenges. According to remarkable democratic expansion, with a gradual upward
the Global State of Democracy (GSoD) Indices, which now trend that has seen the region move away from autocracy
contain data up to and including 2018, improvements and and towards democracy. This expansion saw a particularly
opportunities for further potential gains can be seen in the sharp take-off from the early 1990s onwards, following the
conduct of elections (7 countries recorded gains on Clean broad introduction of multiparty elections across the region.
Elections), administration and civil service (9 recorded
gains on Absence of Corruption, and 8 on Predictable To put the scope of Africa’s democratic expansion into
Enforcement), judicial access and accountability (11 perspective, in 1975 a total of 41 African countries were
recorded gains on Access to Justice), and parliamentary non-democracies, while only three countries were classified
oversight (6 recorded gains on Effective Parliament). as democracies. By 1990, the share of non-democracies was
still high, at 85 per cent (39 countries), and the number of
However, such gains are countered and, to a degree, democracies had only increased by one (Namibia, which
neutralized by declines, most of which are recorded on a became independent from South Africa in the same year),
wide range of civil liberties (nine recorded declines on Civil while a new type of hybrid regime had emerged, with three
Liberties), Media Integrity (five recorded declines on Media countries in that category.
Integrity), the conduct of elections (nine recorded declines
on Clean Elections), and judicial access and accountability In contrast, in 2018 a total of just 11 African countries
(eight recorded declines on Access to Justice). The fact that (23 per cent of countries in the region) were still in the
some of the main gains and declines impact on the same category of non-democracies (see Figure 2.1). The share of
GSoD aspects indicates that while these aspects may be democracies has increased fivefold, to 20 countries, meaning
doing well in some countries of Africa, other countries are that democracies now constitute the largest share of regime
grappling with challenges in the same areas. type in the region (41 per cent). At the same time, the
number of hybrid regimes has increased to 18 countries (37
The GSoD findings also indicate that the democratization per cent of countries in the region).
landscape in Africa is currently characterized by the
prospects of a broadening civic space and strengthened Africa’s most democratic subregion is West Africa, followed
fundamental human rights in some countries. At the same by Southern Africa, North Africa and East Africa. Central
time, serious challenges remain in some contexts, related Africa is the only African subregion with no democracies
to shrinking civic space, democratic backsliding (including (see Figure 2.2).
63
Regime types in Africa over time Regime types in Africa by subregion, 2018
100
100 57% (4) 13% (1) 14% (1) 58% (7) 73% (11)
90
90
38% (3) 43% (3)
80
Percentage of countries by subregion

80
70
70
60 60
50 50
50% (4)
40 40 43% (3) 43% (3) 33% (4)
30 30
27% (4)
20 20
10 10
8% (1)
0 0
Central East North Southern West
2000
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
1975
Africa Africa Africa Africa Africa

Notes: Using percentages to compare between subregions is important, as subregions may

Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019), <http://www.idea. have a varying number of countries. The absolute number, however, is also included in
int/gsod-indices>. brackets in each column.
int/gsod-indices>.
Of the new third-wave democracies in Africa, Tunisia is

the country that has seen most democratic advances; it now a positive change on this measure, whereas 12 per cent of
scores among the top 25 per cent in the world on seven of its countries have seen a negative change.
democratic subattributes. The Gambia has also made great
strides towards democratic advancement since its transition 2.1.3. The current democracy landscape in Africa
in 2017. The analysis in this section covers issues linked to
Representative Government, Fundamental Rights, Checks
Between 1975 and 2018, several gains can be discerned on Government, Impartial Administration and Participatory
across democratic attributes, particularly between the late Engagement, highlighting the current opportunities for
1990s and early 2000s. During these four decades, and democracy in the region, as well as the democratic challenges
particularly during the 1990s, Representative Government it faces.
improved the most, followed by Checks on Government and
Fundamental Rights (see Figure 2.3).
Representative Government
Since 2013, two countries—Burundi and Libya—
have experienced statistically significant declines in
Representative Government, while only Burundi has The GSoD Indices use the Representative Government attribute to
experienced similar declines in Checks on Government. evaluate countries’ performance on the conduct of elections, the
extent to which political parties are able to operate freely, and the
Meanwhile, Fundamental Rights saw no declines and extent to which access to government is decided by elections. This
most countries have seen positive developments. Since attribute is an aggregation of four subattributes: Clean Elections,
1975, there have been slow advances in Impartial Inclusive Suffrage, Free Political Parties and Elected Government.
Administration. Only 31 per cent of countries have seen
64
Summary: Representative Government in Africa, 2018 Guinea-Bissau and Nigeria—which score mid-range on this
attribute—have all experienced statistically significant gains
Regional average: Mid-range (0.45) in the last five years (see Table 2.1).
High Mauritius The data at the subregional level is complex:

(>0.7)
Mid-range Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Central

• In Southern Africa, apart from Madagascar, only
(0.4–0.7) African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, The Botswana and Namibia have seen some improvement,
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, although this is not statistically significant. At the
Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria,
same time, when compared to the rest of Africa,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Southern Africa has experienced some of the highest
Togo, Tunisia, Zambia and Zimbabwe levels of electoral participation since 2005 (Schulz-
Herzenberg 2014).
Low Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Democratic
(<0.4) Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea,
Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Libya, Mauritania, • In North Africa, Tunisia leads the subregion in terms
Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, South of democratic reforms. Developments in the country
Sudan, Sudan and Uganda since the 2011 revolution provided a key opportunity
for democratic gains. The 2014 Constitution,
negotiated among key players, provides for freedom of
Progress across the region on Representative
Government has been uneven
The GSoD Indices data for 2018 shows that FIGURE 2.3
Representative Government has been strengthened
in the African region as a whole. According to data, 20 Democratic development in Africa between 1975
countries are now categorized as democracies, of which all and 2018
but one (Mauritius) has mid-range levels of Representative 100
Government. However, the depth and scope of democracy
90
varies considerably, depending on an individual country’s
performance. For example, three countries—The Gambia, 80 81%
70 73%
TABLE 2.1
60 61%
57%
Data on Representative Government, 2013 and 2018 50
Representative Government score 40

39%
Country
2013 2018 30
31%
27%
Mauritius 0.79 0.81 20
19%
The Gambia 0.38 0.56 10 12%
0
Guinea-Bissau 0 0.58
Representative Fundamental Checks on Impartial
Government Rights Government Administration
Madagascar 0.40 0.47
Decline No change Progress
Nigeria 0.49 0.63

Notes: This bar graph shows the percentage of countries which have experienced positive,
negative or no change between 1975 and 2018 according to each of the four democratic
attributes that are aggregated. In order to measure change on each attribute, it was
High Mid-range Low necessary to determine if there was a statistically significant difference between the
country’s score on an attribute in 1975 in comparison to 2018.
65
TABLE 2.2
Heat map of democratic performance patterns in Africa, 2018

Country
Mauritius
Ghana
Tunisia
Benin
Sierra Leone
Senegal
Liberia
Malawi
South Africa
Namibia
Lesotho
Botswana
The Gambia
Mali
Côte d'Ivoire
Burkina Faso
Nigeria
Kenya
Guinea-Bissau
Madagascar
High Mid-range Low
Notes: This heat map shows the performance of the 20 democracies in Africa by attribute in 2018. Green indicates a high-performance level, while yellow denotes mid-range performance,
and red shows low-range performance.
expression, popular participation in decision-making to entrench democracy by checking executive excesses

and civic engagement in politics (see Box 2.1). (International IDEA and Hanns Seidel Stiftung 2016).
• In West Africa, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau • In Central Africa, only two countries—Central
and Nigeria have made significant advances on African Republic (CAR) and Gabon—score mid-range
Representative Government, as well as Clean Elections on Representative Government, while the rest score
and Free Political Parties. Most constitutions in this low. Gabon has made attempts to organize a political
subregion were written by military or authoritarian dialogue although it was not attended by the main
regimes which held sway for an extended period. opposition party (Akum 2019). The CAR government
With the return to civil rule, countries such as signed a peace accord with armed groups in February
Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire have embarked on 2019. However, it is still early to say whether such a deal
constitutional amendment reviews, which are helping will hold (International Crisis Group 2019).
66
• In East Africa, Kenya and Tanzania are the only two perform highly on two attributes. At the other, two fragile
countries that score in the mid-range on Representative democracies (Guinea-Bissau and Madagascar) have no
Government, while all other countries score low. high scores and record low performance on two attributes,
Kenya and Tanzania are examples of countries where respectively (see Table 2.2).
presidents have adhered to constitutional requirements
on terms of office. Kenya continues at present to Democratic progress has been incremental across the
maintain quite solid participatory institutions and region
adherence to the rule of law (Mbaku 2018). However, Elections have become the norm rather than the
Tanzania regressed into a hybrid regime in 2018, due exception throughout Africa. Only four countries in the
to a deteriorating political environment and significant region (Eritrea, Libya, Somalia and South Sudan) currently
democratic declines. hold no form of elections. Each of these countries therefore
scores 0 on both Clean Elections and Inclusive Suffrage
Africa’s democracies vary quite widely in terms of their and, as a result, on Representative Government. Although
democratic performance patterns and the quality of Libya and South Sudan held elections in 2014 and 2010,
their democracy. For example, the only democracy to respectively, regular elections are not held in these two
score highly on Representative Government is Mauritius. countries because of protracted civil wars. Eight countries
There are nine additional variations on democracy in the in the region (Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ghana,
region. At one extreme, two countries (Ghana and Tunisia) Mauritius, Senegal, South Africa and Tunisia) score highly
BOX 2.1
Tunisia: the story of a fledgling democracy

Following the overthrow of the regime of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and is presently among the best performing democracies
in 2011 (Chrisafis and Black 2011), Tunisia experienced major in Africa, with seven GSoD subattributes in the top 25 per
advances across most aspects of the GSoD Indices. In the cent in the world (see Table 2.3 for a summary of Tunisia’s
last 10 years it has recorded significant advances in 11 GSoD GSoD scores in 2018). The new Tunisian Constitution (2014)
subattributes: Clean Elections, Free Political Parties, Access introduced sweeping reforms. To date, successful presidential,
to Justice, Civil Liberties, Social Rights and Equality, Effective parliamentary and municipal elections have been organized,
Parliament, Judicial Independence, Media Integrity, Absence building on the trend set when the country’s first democratic
of Corruption, Predictable Enforcement and Civil Society elections took place in 2011.
Participation (see Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5).
However, a number of important challenges remain. The first
Due to the gains achieved during this period, Tunisia is relates to the large number of institutional and structural
currently the only country in North Africa to have made a reforms that have not yet been carried out. For example, the
successful transition from non-democracy to democracy constitutional court provided for by the 2014 Constitution has
TABLE 2.3
The state of democracy in Tunisia, 2018
GSoD attribute score

0.62 = 0.76 = 0.80 = 0.61 = Low
High Mid-range Low
Notes: = denotes no statistically significant increase or decrease in the last 5-year period.
67
not yet been established (Democracy Reporting International deficit and government debt, and opportunities for growth
2017). The legislative framework for the court, which is intended remain limited (OECD 2018). Tunisia’s national authorities are
to play the role of ultimate arbiter in the country’s democratic under significant pressure to liberalize various segments of the
system, has been adopted but parliament is yet to reach an economy, but little action has been taken to date (AfDB Group
agreement on its composition. 2019). This will remain a major source of concern in the coming
period, and it will certainly prove to be a testing ground for the
The second is the framework for decentralization. In April 2018, resilience of the country’s fledgling democracy.
the Tunisian Parliament adopted a decentralization law that
reformed the general framework within which municipalities are Finally, and perhaps most importantly given the context,
supposed to function. The new law sets out a list of powers that Tunisia’s national debate on policy reform remains
municipalities are supposed to exercise directly (most of which unsatisfactory, partly because political parties remain highly
relate to environmental issues such as garbage disposal), and fractured and embryonic. Parties continue to break apart and
a list of powers that municipalities are supposed to share with lose members at an alarming rate, often preventing serious
the central government (Kherigi 2018). However, municipalities discussion about major issues, including those raised above.
cannot exercise any of the shared powers until a second law, Arguably the most important example of this phenomenon is
which has not yet made any legislative progress, is adopted. the end of the alliance between the country’s secular party,
Therefore, Tunisia’s score on the Local Democracy subattribute Nidaa Tounes, and the Islamist Ennahda party (Grewal and
remains low (0.17). Hamid 2018). While Tunisia scored 0.70 on Free Political Parties
in 2013, there has since been a decline, albeit an insignificant
The third challenge relates to economic reform. Since 2011, one, to 0.65 in 2018.
Tunisia’s economy has stagnated. Unemployment remains
stubbornly high, there has been a sharp increase in fiscal
Representative Government in Tunisia, 1975–2018 Civil Society Participation in Tunisia, 1975–2018
0.8 1.0
0.7 0.9
0.8
0.6
0.7
0.5
0.6
0.4
0.5
0.3
0.4
0.2 0.3
0.1 0.2
0.1
0.0
0.0
2000
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
1975
2000
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
1975
Tunisia Regional mean Tunisia Regional mean

Global mean Confidence interval Global mean Confidence interval
Notes: The y-axis indicates the score (0–1), while the x-axis indicates the years. Notes: This graph allows for both temporal (over time) and spatial (between country
The shaded areas around the line display the 68 per cent confidence bound of the and region) comparison. The y-axis indicates the subattribute’s score, measured
estimate. from 0 to 1 while the x-axis indicates the years.
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019), <http://www. Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019), <http://
idea.int/gsod-indices>. www.idea.int/gsod-indices>.
68
on Clean Elections, while 25 score in the mid-range and 16 The persistence of election-related violence in many contexts
countries have a low performance (see Figure 2.6). is a symptom of these challenges. Elections are used to
legitimize undemocratic regimes in a number of countries,
In several countries in West Africa, democratic including Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea,
elections and stronger governments have replaced long- Eritrea, The Gambia, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe
standing civil wars (Annan 2014). Although the legacy (although The Gambia experienced democratization reforms
of authoritarian rule and armed conflicts has continued to following the 2017 elections). Each of these countries has
derail democratization, a number of countries have tried to a record of conducting regular elections which are largely
surmount these legacies. flawed and uncompetitive. In other contexts, if an opposition
exists it has little chance of dislodging the incumbent
For example, the 2017 elections in Liberia—in which party from power (for more see: Temin 2017; Wodrig and
the candidate of the opposition Congress for Democratic Grauvogel 2016; Galvin 2018; Moore 2017).
Change, George Weah, defeated the candidate of the ruling
Unity Party, Joseph Boakai, in a run-off—marked the third In some East African countries, including Burundi,
general-election cycle since the end of the civil war in 2003 electoral institutions are not independent of the executive.
(MacDougall and Cooper 2017). Similarly, in Sierra Leone This undermines their ability to conduct free, open and
the candidate from the opposition Sierra Leone People’s Party, democratic elections (Makulilo et al. 2015). Challenges
Julius Maada Bio, defeated Samura Kamara of the ruling All range from the registration of voters, compilation of the
People’s Congress candidate in the March 2018 elections voter registry, procurement of voting materials, the actual
(The Carter Center 2018). Côte d’Ivoire exhibits remarkable conduct of elections, and eventual counting and final
progress in managing its post-conflict institutional challenges, announcements of results. In each of these stages there is a
but still struggles with undisciplined security services that level of opaqueness that should be addressed if the region is
have attempted violent mutinies (Tsolakis 2018). to enhance the credibility of its elections.
Between 2013 and 2018, virtually all countries in the

FIGURE 2.6
West African subregion, including those previously under
long-term authoritarian or military rule, conducted polls.
Another positive characteristic of this subregion is the Clean Elections in Africa, 1975–2018
increase in the rate at which opposition candidates were able 90
to emerge victorious at the polls to take over power from the
incumbent through a peaceful transition (see Figure 2.7). 80
Despite gains, the conduct of elections remains flawed 70
in several countries across the African region. Some

60
countries have failed to enact sufficiently robust legal and
institutional reforms to level the playing field between
50
ruling parties and opposition parties. Electoral bodies
are often constrained by a lack of adequate human and 40
financial resources, while others lack independence from
the executive branch. This has led to a context of mistrust 30
between electoral stakeholders, which is exacerbated by
low levels of judicial independence and the perception that 20
disputes will not be resolved impartially (Söderberg Kovacs
and Bjarnesen 2018). 10
0
2000
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
1975
Nine countries in Africa (Burundi, Cameroon,

Egypt, Kenya, Libya, Niger, Togo, Zambia and Low Mid-range High
Zimbabwe) have seen their Clean Elections
score drop significantly in the last five years. Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019), <http://www.idea.
int/gsod-indices>.
69
FIGURE 2.7 election initially scheduled for July 2014, and subsequently
postponed until October 2018, could not be held due to
Representative Government in West Africa, conflict and instability.
1975–2018
1.0 Central Africa offers several examples whereby electoral
Sierra Leone Liberia Ghana
outcomes, especially for the presidency, have translated
Côte d’Ivoire Africa West Africa
0.9 into little real change in terms of power alternation.
According to the GSoD Indices, most countries where
0.8
there has been a re-election of heads of state score low on
Representative Government. With two exceptions, all heads
0.7
of state in this subregion have recently been re-elected.
0.6
In Cameroon, President Paul Biya has ruled for 37 years
0.5 and was re-elected in 2018. Idriss Deéby Itno of Chad
came to power in 1990 through a coup d’état and won
0.4 the presidential elections of 2016. In the same year, Sassou
Nguessou, President of the Republic of Congo since 1979
0.3 (with an intermission between 1992 and 1997), was re-
elected. In Equatorial Guinea, President Teodoro Obiang
0.2
had ruled the country for nearly 40 years when he won the
0.1
2016 elections (Al Jazeera 2016). Finally, in Gabon, Ali
Bongo Odimba, the 60-year-old son of the late President
0.0 Omar Bongo, who came to power after his father’s death in
2009, was re-elected after the disputed elections in 2016.
2000
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
1975
Notes: The y-axis measures the score (0–1), while the x-axis indicates the year. Scores of 0
The two exceptions occurred in CAR and the Democratic
indicate that no regular elections were held due to coups, conflicts or other interruptions. Republic of the Congo (DRC). The December 2018
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019), <http://www.idea. presidential elections in DRC saw the election of an
int/gsod-indices>.
opposition candidate, Felix Tsisekedi, although the transition
did not occur without controversies (see Berwouts 2019). A
change of power also occurred in CAR, which as a result
For example, Kenya’s 2013 and 2017 presidential elections of peace processes has had two presidents in the last five
were both contested at the Supreme Court. The 2017 years, one of them being a woman: Catherine Samba-Panza
presidential election was annulled based on a number of (Murray and Mangan 2017).
flaws in the electoral process, and the repeat election, while
affirmed by the Supreme Court, was also replete with flaws One of the most common challenges to democratic
inconsistent with an open, credible and democratic election. consolidation is the manipulation that takes place
There were claims that insufficient time was allocated for the around elections and the electoral system. Many African
preparation of the election, and provocations of violence in leaders have consolidated their power base by preaching
several election centres (Mbaku 2018). the language of democratic reforms, whereas in fact such
language only serves to hide their authoritarian tendencies
Similarly, in Uganda’s 2016 elections the main opposition to keep their hold on power. In some instances, leaders
candidate, Kizza Besigye, was detained for weeks and themselves have chosen the voters by deciding who should
eventually charged with treason. In that case, social media vote (Mkandawire 2008).
was shut down ahead of the general elections (Mattes and
Bratton 2016). There were also questions with regards to Additionally, in order to stay in power some regimes
the credibility of the re-run elections in Zanzibar in March continue to manipulate the constitution in favour of the
2016, which were boycotted by the opposition following incumbents. For example, constitutional changes to adjust
the annulment of the 2015 poll prior to the announcement term limitations (e.g. in Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda)
of final results. In South Sudan, meanwhile, no election have weakened the process of democratic reforms or
has been held since the assumption of office by President reinforced ongoing autocratization processes (e.g. in Egypt).
Salva Kiir after the 2011 independence referendum. An In Uganda, where term limits were scrapped in 2005, the
70
Constitution was altered in 2017 to remove the age limit for Togo remains a hybrid regime which is partly attributable
presidential candidates (Biryabarema 2017). to the slow pace of governance reforms aimed at opening
up the political space and loosening the one-sided grip of
In Rwanda, the 2015 constitutional referendum enabled the ruling party on the key levers of power, including the
the incumbent President Paul Kagame to run for a third security forces. Term limits and the electoral system have
seven-year term in 2017 before introducing a limit of two been at the heart of the street protests that have engulfed
five-year terms. Since the amendments were not retroactive, Togo since 2017 but so far this has not resulted in greater
this effectively makes Kagame eligible to serve until 2034 political openings (Ahlijah 2018).
(McVeigh 2015). In Burundi, the 2018 constitutional
referendum focused on extending the presidential term from While the country held legislative elections in December
five to seven years. The current President, Pierre Nkurunziza, 2018, they were boycotted by the opposition (Kohnert
has stated that he will not be contesting the next election, 2019). The increased majority for the ruling party in the
although he would be eligible to serve a further two terms. legislature will facilitate the passage of a constitutional
The last country to remove presidential term limits was amendment that will permit the incumbent to run for
Egypt, in 2019. a further two terms in 2020. This is likely to exacerbate
tensions ahead of the 2020 presidential election (Al Jazeera
In some countries, there is a lack of political will to 2019b).
democratize and elite rule remains entrenched. Central
Africa is illustrative of this trend, being home to the longest- Table 2.4 offers a snapshot of scores on the Representative
serving leaders in Africa, including Biya in Cameroon, Déby Government attribute and its subattributes in Central
in Chad and Sassou Nguessou in Republic of the Congo. African countries.
These countries have continued to hold regular elections,
but there has not been any change in leadership, and their
parliaments have very weak checks on the executive (Akum
and Donnefeld 2017). Fundamental Rights
Burundi and Uganda illustrate similar patterns. In Uganda,

democratic advances have essentially ground to a halt The Fundamental Rights attribute aggregates scores from three
because of President Yoweri Museveni’s determination to subattributes: Access to Justice, Civil Liberties, and Social Rights
and Equality. Overall it measures the fair and equal access to
remain in power after more than three decades. Recently, justice, the extent to which civil liberties such as freedom of
Uganda even passed legislation that removed presidential age expression or movement are respected, and the extent to which
limits (Africa Center for Strategic Studies 2018). Burundi countries are offering their citizens basic welfare and political
equality.
has been in crisis since 2015 when President Nkurunziza
announced his intention to run for a third term. In May
2018, the country faced more inter-ethnic tensions during
the campaign for a referendum to allow Nkurunziza to rule Summary: Fundamental Rights in Africa, 2018
for another 14 years when his term expires in 2020. While
the referendum was approved despite strong opposition, Regional average: Mid-range (0.52)
Nkurunziza declared afterwards that he would step down
in 2020 (Mikhael 2019). As a culture of impunity has re- High Benin, Ghana, Mauritius, Senegal and Tunisia
emerged in Burundi, there are mounting concerns about the (>0.7)
resumption of a large-scale civil war (Temin 2017; Wodrig
Mid-range Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Central
and Grauvogel 2016). This explains why, according to the
(0.4–0.7) African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Eswatini,
GSoD Indices, Burundi scores low on all five attributes and Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-
falls firmly under the category of a non-democracy. Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique,
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Republic of Congo,
Similarly, Cameroon has struggled to overcome the legacy Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania,
of a highly centralized state under President Biya. Political Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe
parties exist under repressive conditions and the resurgence
of a secessionist movement in anglophone regions since 2016 Low Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Democratic Republic
(<0.4) of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Libya,
has underscored serious gaps in representative governance Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan
(Galvin 2018).
71
TABLE 2.4
Representative Government in Central African countries, 2018
Representative Government subattributes

Country
Clean Elections Inclusive Suffrage Free Political Parties Elected Government
Cameroon 0.29 0.81 0.47 0.65
CAR 0.48 0.87 0.49 0.65
Chad 0.22 0.82 0.47 0.51
DRC 0.38 0.82 0.45 0.65
Equatorial Guinea 0.16 0.80 0.32 0.37
Gabon 0.38 0.84 0.49 0.65
Republic of Congo 0.31 0.83 0.43 0.51
High Mid-range Low
Conflicts and liberation struggles have led to the negotiations on a power-sharing deal between the military
militarization of social and political life and the civilian opposition—under pressure from the
Another set of challenges to democratic consolidation, African Union (AU)—have led to the installation of a
seen in many parts of Africa today, relate to conflicts and transition government that will govern the country for
civil wars. There are several states where earlier gains have a 39-month period until elections are organized. As of
been reversed because of violence, a return to military rule, July 2019, the political landscape in Egypt is dominated
or a failure to transform the political process. Most North President Abdel Fattah Al Sisi, in power since July 2013
African countries caught up in the Arab Uprisings in 2011 and sworn into office in June 2014 (Goldberg 2018). In
fall under this category (Abderrahim and Aggad 2018). Egypt an April 2019 referendum a majority of voters approved
relapsed into militarism while Libya has been engulfed in a constitutional amendments that could see the President
civil war since the fall of Gaddafi in 2011. Algeria, Morocco stay in power until 2030 (Al Jazeera 2019a).
and Sudan (all hybrid regimes) successfully weathered
the uprisings and, through some measured reforms, have Central Africa and West Africa both continue to grapple
managed to reorganize their authoritarian systems. with the consequences of conflict, which has in turn
perpetuated a so-called militarization of social and political
In Algeria, leading opposition parties boycotted the May life. The frequency of coups d’état and coup attempts, civil
2018 legislative elections, resulting in a low voter turnout. unrests accompanied with political assassinations, and the
After 20 years in power, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika emergence of religious fundamentalism and insurgency
resigned in April 2019 following pressure from the army feed a practice of militarization that keeps democratic
and massive street protests demanding democratic reforms progress at bay. DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Mali and Niger are
in the country (Nossiter 2019). In April 2019, Sudan’s among the countries facing such challenges (Barka and
leader Omar Al-Bashir was ousted by the military following Ncube 2012). It must be noted, however, that according
weeks of mass protest and is wanted by the International to the Cline Center for Advanced Social Research’s Coup
Criminal Court (ICC) on charges of crimes against D’etat Project (2013), the number of coups and attempted
humanity and genocide (Reinl 2019; Reuters 2019). The coups has decreased significantly compared to previous
protests were initially met with brutal repression and a decades. This claim is corroborated by more recent studies
strengthening of the military’s hold on power, although too (Besaw and Frank 2018).
72
In a number of countries in Africa, the AU has been Advances have been made in gender equality in Africa
instrumental in preventing or resolving conflicts. The but challenges remain
AU has overseen the Abuja Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks, Africa’s average levels of political Gender Equality are in
deployed peacekeeping missions including the African the mid-range (0.53), slightly below the world average
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), mediated in crises (0.58). While the overwhelming majority of countries in
in Côte d’Ivoire and Libya (Oguonu and Ezeibe 2014) the region (41 countries or 84 per cent) score mid-range,
and pressed for a peaceful transition in The Gambia in 15 countries score among the bottom 25 per cent in the
2016. By mid-2019 the AU was preoccupied with pre- world on Gender Equality (see Figure 2.8). The largest share
empting further upheavals in Sudan and pressured for a of those are non-democracies (eight), and five are hybrid
power-sharing deal and a transition to democracy, as well regimes, but two (Kenya and Nigeria) are democracies. Two
as in launching the African Continental Free Trade Area countries score in the top 25 per cent in the world on Gender
(Abebe 2019). Furthermore, the AU has been vocal against Equality: of these, one is a democracy (Senegal) and one is a
unconstitutional changes of government, as initially non-democracy: Rwanda. With a score of 0.73, Rwanda has
pronounced in the Lomé Declaration, formalized in the AU one of the highest levels of Gender Equality in the world.
Constitutive Act, and then further elaborated in the 2007
African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance Important advances have been made recently in terms of
(ACDEG), which seeks to promote systems of government gender equality in Africa. The year 2016 in particular was
that are representative based on the holding of regular, an important milestone for gender equality and women’s
transparent, free and fair elections (see International IDEA empowerment in Africa, as it marked the 30th anniversary
2016: 18–26). of the coming into force of the African Charter on Human
Five countries in Southern Africa—Angola,

Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe— FIGURE 2.8
have made some democratic progress, to different
degrees, through protracted liberation struggles. The Share of countries by performance level in Gender
liberating parties have remained dominant political parties Equality in Africa, 1975–2018
since the attainment of independence. Decades later, the
shift to democratic consolidation is still a challenge as a 90
result of the enduring legacies of those liberation struggles.
80
The influence of war veterans in politics varies significantly
between countries. In the extreme case of Zimbabwe, key 70
bureaucratic posts charged with managing democratic

60
processes remain largely staffed or controlled by veterans and
ruling-party officials (Latek 2018). The cadre deployment
50
policy of South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC),
and the appointment by the Zimbabwe African National 40
Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) of former freedom
fighters to high-ranking positions, are relevant examples of 30
stalling democracy through the institution of liberation-
war fighters. 20
As Table 2.5 shows, despite instances where countries 10
with conflict legacy have transitioned to hybrid regimes or

0
democracies, this has not necessarily led to improvements
2000
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
1975
in the relevant democracy attributes. As some of the cases

discussed in this section also demonstrate, liberation
movements have generally failed to evolve into vibrant Low Mid-range High
political parties that foster inclusion and a good governance

culture. This trend has been observed in Mozambique, Notes: The year 2004 was the first in which a country scored ‘high’ on Gender Equality in Africa.
Namibia and Zimbabwe, and to a lesser degree in Angola int/gsod-indices>.
and South Africa.
73
TABLE 2.5
Countries with conflict legacy, 1991 versus 2018
Attribute

Country Year Regime type
Non-
1991 0 0.31 0.24 0.35
democracy
Angola
2018 Hybrid 0.42 0.51 0.44 0.42
Non-
1991 N/A 0.52 0.40 0.44
democracy
Mozambique
2018 Hybrid 0.47 0.59 0.56 0.43
1991 Democracy 0.55 0.66 0.66 0.60

Namibia
2018 Democracy 0.59 0.69 0.63 0.63
Non-
1991 0.15 0.38 0.50 0.47
democracy
South Africa
2018 Democracy 0.68 0.66 0.699 0.50
1991 Hybrid 0.41 0.51 0.42 0.53

Zimbabwe
2018 Hybrid 0.42 0.46 0.50 0.25
High Mid-range Low
and People’s Rights in 1986, which was further built on by women in the African region lack equal access to power and
the Maputo Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa socio-economic status, while their inclusion in decision-
(African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 2003). making remains a major hurdle for most countries. Women
and youth in general, as well as the less wealthy, tend to
The year 2016 also marked the beginning of the second be systematically disadvantaged from access to political
phase of the AU’s African Women’s Decade 2010–2020 power. Even in cases where democracy is advancing, social
(AU n.d.), an implementation framework which aims to competition has often produced inequalities that advantage
advance gender equality and the empowerment of women. some groups over others, leaving women to fare poorly
Additionally, in 2015 the African Development Bank (AfDB (Lührmann et al. 2018).
Group) launched a Gender Equality Index (AfDB Group
2015), which is the most comprehensive assessment of the Civil Liberties shows promising potential
state of gender equality on the continent. It examines the The subattribute of Civil Liberties is one of the best-
role of women as producers, as economic agents, in human performing aspects of democracy in Africa, with one-
development and as leaders in public life. third of countries (16) scoring at high levels. The high
performance is concentrated in the subregions of West
Nevertheless, an array of challenges continues to Africa and Southern Africa (see Figure 2.9). One notable
inhibit the implementation of regional and country- example is The Gambia, which scored 0.37 in 2013 but
level initiatives on gender equality. To varying degrees, increased to 0.73 in 2018 (see Box 2.2). Of the countries
74
BOX 2.2
The Gambia: breaking with the past? Indices subattributes: Clean Elections, Free Political Parties,
Elected Government, Access to Justice, Civil Liberties, Effective
The Gambia presents an interesting case, having experienced Parliament, Judicial Independence, Media Integrity, Absence
declines across all democratic attributes following the 1994 of Corruption, Predictable Enforcement and Civil Society
military coup which toppled Sir Dawda Jawara, the country’s Participation.
first prime minister (and later president). The 22-year-long rule
of President Yahyah Jammeh was synonymous with human
rights violations, corruption, press censorship and civil society FIGURE 2.10
curtailment.
However, The Gambia has now returned to the path of Advances and declines: The Gambia, 1980–2018
democratic progress (see Figure 2.10 and Table 2.6). The 12
December 2016 election of President Adama Barrow marked
the first alternation in power in the country, which has begun 11
dotting its democratic landscape with numerous democratic
10
gains and opportunities. Many political prisoners have been
released, exiled Gambians are returning en masse, the press is 9
operating more freely, and civil society is beginning to thrive.
8
There also is an expressed commitment to the development
No. of subattributes
and independence of indigenous judiciary. 7
Since December 2017 The Gambia has made great strides, setting 6
up a Constitutional Review Commission; a Truth, Reconciliation
and Reparations Commission; and a National Human Right 5
Commission. This is the first step in facilitating the process of
4
reconciliation and compensation for the victims of human rights
violations (Law Hub Gambia 2017; Jeffang 2018). Furthermore, 3
the once dreaded and anti-people National Intelligence Agency is
2
undergoing reform. Opposition parties are operating freely.
1
However, despite these gains and opportunities, some of the
threats lurking in the country’s democracy landscape include 0
the persistence of draconian laws, repression of peaceful
2000
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
protests by the current administration, weak capacity of
parliamentarians, failure to address constitutional term limits,
and ethnic politics (Hartmann 2017). Advances Declines
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019), <http://www.
The Gambia is the country with the most gains in democratic idea.int/gsod-indices>.
performance since 2013. It has seen increases in 11 of its GSoD
TABLE 2.6
The state of democracy in The Gambia, 2018

0.56 + 0.63 + 0.66 + 0.56 + Low
High Mid-range Low
Notes: + denotes a statistically significant increase in the last five-year period.

75
FIGURE 2.9
Nine countries in Africa have seen a

Civil Liberties in Africa, 1975–2018 significant drop in Civil Liberties since 2013.
Of these, Burundi and Cameroon are among
0.8
Central Africa East Africa North Africa the four countries in the world with the most
Southern Africa Africa West Africa severe declines in civic space. They are
0.7
followed by Guinea, Kenya, Libya, Mauritania,
South Sudan, Tanzania and Togo.
0.6
0.5
Checks on Government
0.4
0.3 The Checks on Government attribute aggregates scores from three

subattributes: Effective Parliament, Judicial Independence and
Media Integrity. It measures the extent to which parliament oversees
0.2 the executive, as well as whether the courts are independent, and
whether media is diverse and critical of the government without
being penalized for it.
0.1
0.0
Summary: Checks on Government in Africa, 2018
2000
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
1975
Regional average: Mid-range (0.51)

int/gsod-indices>.
High Mauritius and Tunisia
(>0.7)
Mid-range Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Central

that score highly on Civil Liberties, 14 (or 87.5 per cent) (0.4–0.7) African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic
are democracies, while only two are hybrid regimes; no non- Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, The
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya,
democratic regime has high levels on this measure. Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique,
CAR, Ethiopia and The Gambia have all experienced a Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda,
statistically significant advance on Civil Liberties. However,
Zambia and Zimbabwe
nine countries have seen significant declines in Civil Liberties
in the past five years. One is a democracy (Kenya), five are Low Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Egypt,
hybrid regimes (Cameroon, Guinea, Mauritania, Tanzania (<0.4) Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Republic of
and Togo), and three are non-democratic regimes (Burundi, Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan and Sudan
Libya and South Sudan).
The regional performance is particularly high for Freedom of

Movement, and for Freedom of Religion. On each of these Democratic backsliding and democratic fragility are on
measures, 26 countries (or more than half of the countries the rise
in Africa) score highly. Six countries (Benin, Ghana, Liberia, The expansion of democracy in Africa has brought about
Namibia, Sierra Leone and South Africa) also score in the qualitative challenges. A number of African countries remain
top 25 per cent in the world on Freedom of Association democratically fragile and prone to regressing into hybridity
and Assembly. However, Africa performs particularly poorly or breaking down into non-democracy. Africa is home to
on some aspects of Civil Liberties. Close to half (22) of the more than three-quarters of the world’s fragile democracies,
countries in the region have low levels of Personal Integrity which are countries that transitioned to democracy after
and Security. Of these countries, 9 are non-democracies, 11 1975, but then experienced a partial (to hybrid) or full
are hybrid regimes and only 2 are democracies. democratic breakdown (to non-democracy) but have since
76
returned to democracy. Six democracies in the region can TABLE 2.7

be considered fragile, of which one (Guinea-Bissau) is very
fragile, in that it has experienced more than one democratic Countries experiencing deepening autocratization,
breakdown since its first transition to democracy. Moreover, 2013–2018
more than half of Africa’s democracies can be considered
weak democracies, with a low performance on at least one
No. of
of their democratic attributes. Of these, two countries subattribute Within Within non-
(Guinea-Bissau and Madagascar) stand out as very weak, Country
declines, hybrid democratic
with low performance on both Impartial Administration 2013–2018
and Participatory Engagement. Seven countries (The
Burundi 7 YES
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali
and Nigeria) combine weak democratic performance with
South Sudan 5 YES
democratic fragility.
Egypt 3 YES
When African countries experience partial (to hybrid
regime) or full democratic breakdown, this occurs through Mauritania 3 YES
both so-called modern democratic backsliding and more
traditional coups. The GSoD Indices refer to modern Libya 3 YES
democratic backsliding as the gradual weakening of checks
Togo 3 YES
on government accompanied by concomitant declines in civil
liberties. This occurred in Madagascar (2009–2012), Mali
(2012–2016), CAR (1999–2007) as well as Niger (2005– int/gsod-indices>.
2010). While Madagascar and Mali backslid into hybridity
and have since returned to democracy, CAR and Niger have
remained in a state of hybridity. Backsliding also occurs in
contexts which do not fit either of those two definitions, but FIGURE 2.11
which nevertheless exhibit overall democratic deterioration.
This was the case for Tanzania and Zambia, both of which Judicial Independence in Africa, 1975–2018
regressed to hybrid regimes in 2018 due to a deteriorating
political environment and significant democratic declines. 60
55
A number of countries in Africa have recently suffered from
50
deepening autocratization, which refers to hybrid regimes
and non-democracies that become more repressive. This has 45
been defined in the GSoD Indices as significant declines
40
in at least three of the democratic subattributes of hybrid
35
regimes or non-democracies during a five-year period. Since
2013, more than half of the countries in the world that 30
have suffered from deepening autocratization are in Africa.
25
Mauritania and Togo are hybrid regimes and the remainder
are non-democracies: Burundi, Egypt, Libya and South 20
Sudan (see Table 2.7). 15
10
Gains in judicial independence have been coupled with
severe weaknesses 5
Judicial Independence is one of the weakest aspects of 0
African democracy. Levels of Judicial Independence for
2000
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
1975
2018 were low in 24 countries across Africa. Of these, 3

are democracies, 11 are hybrid regimes, and 10 are non-
Low Mid-range High
democratic regimes. Additionally, progress has been slow,
with average levels of performance similar to those observed int/gsod-indices>.
in 1975 (see Figure 2.11).
77
However, in some countries the judiciary is gaining more Corruption: a corroding and enduring phenomenon
independence and holding leaders to account. While The All of Africa’s subregions have continued to show low
Gambia is still grappling with its transition to democracy, levels of performance on Impartial Administration
and Tunisia is in the process of consolidating its democratic and its subattributes, irrespective of advances on
institutions, on Judicial Independence they are the only Representative Government, Checks on Government
countries in Africa to score highly in 2018. When comparing and Participatory Engagement. Weak impartiality
relative scores for 2018, Benin, The Gambia, Namibia and of public administration and high levels of corruption
Tunisia perform among the top 25 per cent of countries in are among the weakest aspects of African democracy
the world on Judicial Independence. (International IDEA 2018a). This undermines the
democratic gains in other aspects and presents serious
impediments to the advancement of human development in
Impartial Administration
the region. The average level of Impartial Administration in
Africa stands at 0.41.
Impartial Administration is the aggregation of two subattributes: On the subattribute of Absence of Corruption, the region
Absence of Corruption and Predictable Enforcement. It measures the records the lowest average performance in the world.
extent to which the state is free from corruption, and whether the
enforcement of public authority is predictable. Moreover, after the Middle East, Africa has the largest share
of democracies with high levels of corruption, with 45 per
cent of the region’s democracies falling into this category.
According to GSoD Indices data for 2018, 32 countries
Summary: Impartial Administration in Africa, 2018

FIGURE 2.12
High N/A
(>0.7)
Impartial Administration in Africa, 1975–2018
Mid-range Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Côte
70
(0.4–0.7) d’Ivoire, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia,
Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius,
Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria,
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, 60
Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda and Zambia
50
Low Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African
(<0.4) Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the

Congo, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea,
40
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar,
Mauritania, Republic of Congo, Somalia, South
Sudan, Sudan, Togo and Zimbabwe
30
20
A total of 19 of the 49 countries in Africa (39

per cent) are below the global average on
10
Impartial Administration, and 17 of these
are in the bottom 25 per cent globally. On
Absence of Corruption, 18 of 49 African 0
countries are in the bottom 25 per cent globally, and 32
2000
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
1975
were below the world average in 2018. Only three countries

in Africa (Botswana, Rwanda and Tanzania) are among the
countries in the world with the lowest levels of corruption, Low Mid-range High
while 37 per cent of the countries in the region are in the 25th
percentile, with the highest levels of corruption in the world. Notes: No countries in Africa score highly on this subattribute at any point between 1975
Among the countries with the highest levels of corruption, and 2018.
almost half are in Africa (International IDEA 2018b). Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019), <http://www.idea.
int/gsod-indices>.
78
in Africa have low scores on Absence of Corruption (of and Nigeria. Advances were also recorded in Angola, CAR,
which 10 are non-democracies, 13 are hybrid and 9 are Ethiopia and Tanzania. At the same time, in all these cases,
democracies). In contrast, no country in the region scores levels of corruption were either high and moved to mid-
highly on Absence of Corruption—not even the only range, or decreased within the mid-range, and none reduced
country that has high levels of Representative Government to low levels of corruption.
(Mauritius).
For the most part, the persistence of corruption across
However, despite the low performance, there are some Africa signifies that progress on building democracy has not
signs of hope. In the last five years, nine countries in been matched by similar efforts in improving governance
Africa (18 per cent) have experienced statistically significant and impartial administration and in reducing corruption
advances in tackling corruption. West Africa saw the greatest (International IDEA 2018b). Zimbabwe offers an example
number of countries improving, with statistically significant of a country where, despite of changes in government,
advances in Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia Impartial Administration levels remain low (see Box 2.3).
BOX 2.3
Zimbabwe: low Impartial Administration despite changes in government

Zimbabwe has traditionally performed poorly on Impartial In November 2017 the Zimbabwean military removed
Administration, and there are no signs of immediate President Robert Mugabe from power in a bloodless coup.
improvement despite the change of government leadership in Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa, another veteran of the
2018. Currently, Zimbabwe scores low (0.25) on this dimension, liberation struggle, was sworn in as caretaker president until
as well as on Absence of Corruption (0.24) and Predictable the July 2018 elections. According to Zimbabwe’s electoral
Enforcement (0.24). There have been no significant changes on authorities, Mnangagwa and ZANU-PF won the elections by a
these scores in the last five years. very narrow margin, resulting in his installation as president
of the so-called Second Republic of Zimbabwe, while the
The country’s poor performance across all the attributes main opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change
is connected to the fact that the country’s governance and Alliance, cried foul over the results (Burke 2018).
administrative systems remain heavily skewed in favour of
ZANU-PF members. No substantial progress has been made Zimbabwe is now classified as a hybrid regime, with mid-
in tackling rampant corruption despite the creation of the range levels on the attributes of Representative Government,
Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission under Chapter 12 of the Fundamental Rights and Checks on Government, and low scores
2013 Constitution. Public service posts that are awarded as on Impartial Administration and Participatory Engagement (see
a reward for party loyalty appear to haunt the country, even Figure 2.13 and Table 2.8).
after the change of government leadership. Extensive systemic
socio-political reforms and inclusive accountability systems The low ratings on Representative Government relate to the
and processes are essential to turn this around. lack of Clean Elections and Free Political Parties. In fact, the
TABLE 2.8
The state of democracy in Zimbabwe, 2018

0.42 = 0.46 = 0.50 = 0.25 = Low
High Mid-range Low
Notes: = denotes no statistically significant increase or decrease in the last five-year period.
79
2018 elections reinforced claims that electoral processes Judicial independence has always been problematic in
are plagued by mistrust originating from a history of partisan Zimbabwe. A highly politicized justice system has resulted in
electoral management bodies (EMBs). Further, there are citizens losing confidence in the criminal justice system. This
accusations of the abuse of state resources for party campaigns confidence is yet to be regained despite new constitutional
by ZANU-PF and allegations of voter rigging, and intimidation provisions that create room for the design of more accountable
of voters is so institutionalized that its subtlety can easily institutions. Scores across all the subattributes are lower
go unnoticed. After every general election, questions remain than the regional and world averages. A somewhat robust
around the legitimacy and credibility of election processes and but polarized media has struggled to draw attention to weak
the electoral law. governance processes, especially around corruption.
On Fundamental Rights, the country has been experiencing The engagement of the public and civil society in decision-
a decline in the economy and the absence of basic public making processes is weak and intermittent. ZANU-PF’s
services, which affects Social Rights and Equality. The Bill of sophisticated party-controlled instruments for political
Rights in the Constitution has reduced the excesses of the state involvement are in place all over the country. In this context,
in violating citizens’ human rights. However, current challenges the inclination to conform to the ruling party’s decisions
relate to aligning administrative statutes with constitutional undermines their functionality and effectiveness, and the
provisions to address historical injustices and correct the work of civil society is considerably curtailed by the repressive
previous Republic’s imbalances and exclusion. actions of the system and the laws that are in place.
FIGURE 2.13
Democratic performance: Zimbabwe, 2018
0.42 0.48 0.50 0.25

1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0.31 0.88 0.55 0.65 0.47 0.48 0.39 0.56 0.38 0.54 0.24 0.24 0.56 0.63 0.16 0.26
Clean Elections
Inclusive
Suffrage
Free Political
Parties
Elected
Government
Access to
Justice
Civil Liberties
Social Rights
and Equality
Effective
Parliament
Judicial
Independence
Media Integrity
Predictable
Enforcement
Civil Society
Participation
Electoral
Participation
Direct
Democracy
Local
Democracy
Absence of
Corruption
Notes: Vertical black lines in columns indicate the extent of measurement uncertainty (68 per cent confidence intervals).
80
In West Africa, democratic advances are frustrated by a

Participatory Engagement restrictive civic space and a clampdown on the opposition,
civil society and media. Some governments in the region
are promulgating laws to ban online speech, shutting
Participatory Engagement is the only attribute that does not have down the Internet during elections and protests. For
a score, as its four subattributes (Civil Society Participation, instance, on the eve of its presidential run-off elections
Electoral Participation, Direct Democracy and Local Democracy) are
not aggregated. The subattributes measure citizens’ participation in August 2018, the Malian government blocked Internet
in civil society organizations (CSOs) and in elections, and the access in the country (Tobor 2018). Such shutdowns
existence of direct democracy instruments available to citizens, as point to a wider trend in Africa, with regimes in many
well as the extent to which local elections are free.
other countries (including Ethiopia, Togo, Uganda and
Zimbabwe) subjecting their citizens to similar measures
(Ogola 2019).
In Nigeria, the Not-Too-Young-To-Run movement was

Summary: Participatory Engagement in Africa, 2018
conceived in 2016 and driven by young people demanding
a reduction in the minimum age for contesting elective
Regional average: Low
positions in the country. By 2018, following several
High Ghana, Liberia, Mauritius and Sierra Leone ultimatums directed to the president, the movement
succeeded in having the law amended to effect the
reduction in the age limit. In Senegal, between 2011
Mid-range Benin, Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi, and 2012 youth movements such as Y’en A Marre (‘Fed
Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania,
Uganda and Zambia
Up!’ or ‘Enough is Enough!’) organized demonstrations
to resist an attempt by incumbent President Abdoulaye
Low Algeria, Angola, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Wade to actualize his third-term presidential ambitions,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte which contributed to his defeat in the polls in 2012
d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt,
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The
(Diome 2014). Modelled on Y’en A Marre, the Balai
Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Libya, Citoyen Movement was instrumental in the overthrow
Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, of President Blaise Compaoré in Burkina Faso in 2014
Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Senegal, (Wienkoop and Bertrand 2018).
Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia and
Zimbabwe
In Central Africa, Chad has permitted the growth of
democratic institutions despite the persistence of a strong
executive under President Déby. A weak parliament and
A promising civil society coupled with a shrinking civic the absence of an independent judiciary have reinforced
space Déby’s dominance. Chad has fairly active CSOs,
Despite advances in civil society in some countries, the particularly labour and student movements, as well as a
empirical evidence shows that there have been many free media, which have used the limited space to make
setbacks. In East Africa, countries such as Burundi, demands on the government through popular protests and
Kenya and Tanzania have seen a worsening of fundamental boycotts.
human rights and civil liberties. Tanzania, a democracy
from 2010 until 2018, has regressed into hybridity in Ethiopia faced considerable democratic challenges
2018 because of President John Magufuli’s continuing following mass anti-government protests between 2014
assault on political opponents, journalists and ordinary and 2018 which centred on demands for enhanced political
citizens expressing their views on social media. Similarly, and economic reforms (Kelecha 2016). In 2016, the
in Uganda, in the face of a growing youth resistance Ethiopian government imposed a state of emergency and
to President Museveni, the government has reverted to released several opposition supporters from jail, but these
repression, intimidation, and detention of opposition efforts did not stem the protests (Human Rights Watch
politicians, civil society and the media. Uganda’s failed 2017). Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn resigned in
democratic transition is illustrated in GSoD Indices February 2018, paving way for the appointment of a new
scores that show no improvements in the promotion Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed, who has embarked on a set
and protection of Fundamental Rights and the country of ambitious and promising democratic reforms, although
continues to be classified as a hybrid regime. a full transition to democracy is yet to come.
81
As a result, in 2018 Ethiopia’s GSoD Indices classification space in the region are occurring in contexts of deepening
was upgraded from a non-democracy to a hybrid regime. autocratization (e.g. Burundi, Egypt and Togo), as well as
According to the latest reports, Ethiopia’s stability is being overall democratic erosion (e.g. Tanzania).
rocked by political infighting and resistance against
Ahmed. In June 2019, the army chief, the country’s Amhara Civil Society Participation in Africa demonstrates mixed
governor and some of their close friends and colleagues were results since 1975. In general, there have certainly been
killed following alleged attempts to organize a coup. In the improvements, with some movement towards a higher
past year alone, more than 1,000 people have been arrested engagement of civil society. By 2018, 5 countries (10 per
on terror-related charges for inciting ethnic-based attacks cent) in Africa had low Civil Society Participation scores,
(Associated Press 2019). These events have precipitated calls while 12 countries (25 per cent) scored highly, and 32
for caution, amid fears that Ethiopia will suffer further splits countries (65 per cent) scored in the mid-range.
and divisions ahead of the elections scheduled for 2020
(Blomfield 2019). 2.1.4. Conclusion
Between the beginning of the third wave of democratization
As is the case in several other regions of the world, a in 1975 and 2018, Africa made great progress towards
number of African countries have also experienced a democratic consolidation across a number of areas,
shrinking civic space in recent years. The GSoD Indices encompassing the majority of the aspects covered by the
measure civic space through three subattributes: Civil GSoD Indices but somewhat unevenly spread across the
Liberties, which measures aspects such as Freedom of region.
Expression, Freedom of Association and Assembly, and
Freedom of Religion; Media Integrity, which looks at the As is the case in other regions, including Central and
diversity of media perspectives in society; and Civil Society Eastern Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean, the
Participation, which measures both the vibrancy of civil democratic advances in Africa gathered pace in the early
society and the extent to which it is consulted on key 1990s following the end of the Cold War, which triggered
policy issues. As shown in Table 2.9, the declines in civic a wave of multiparty elections in the region. Importantly,
Africa—together with Asia and the Pacific—continues to
witness democratic advances, while other regions are seeing
TABLE 2.9
stagnation or even decline.
Declines in civic space and deepening autocratization According to GSoD Indices, the democratization landscape
in Africa in Africa is currently characterized by the prospects of a
strengthened civil society and fundamental human rights.
Extent of decline Examples However, many outstanding challenges remain in relation to
the curtailment of civic space, with declines in Civil Liberties
Declines on all three Burundi (deepening autocratization of a and Civil Society Participation and weakening of Checks on
aspects of civic space non-democracy)
Government.
Kenya (democracy), South Sudan
Declines on two
(deepening autocratization of a non- A number of countries face democratic weakness and
aspects of civic space
democracy) and Togo (hybrid regime) fragility. In most cases, this is due to the weakness of
democratic institutions, but such weakness can also be
Civil Liberties: Cameroon, Guinea,
Mauritania, Tanzania (hybrid regimes)
caused or exacerbated by the risk of recurring conflict, or the
and Libya (non-democracy) potential for relapse into either hybridity or authoritarianism.
Decline on one aspect Furthermore, infringements of constitutional norms and
Media Integrity: Benin (democracy) and
of civic space
Egypt (non-democracy) practices, as well as reversals in fundamental freedoms and
Civil Society Participation: Niger (hybrid civil liberties, pose potential threats to the democratic gains
regime)
and advances in the region.
int/gsod-indices>.
82
TABLE 2.10
The Global State of Democracy Indices snapshot: Policy considerations for Africa
This table offers a snapshot of the state of democracy in Africa, using the GSoD conceptual framework as an organizing structure. It
presents policy considerations across the five main attributes of democracy—Representative Government, Fundamental Rights, Checks on
Government, Impartial Administration and Participatory Engagement.
Representative GSoD Indices score: Mid-range (0.45)

Government
Elected Government: Priority countries for reform:

During the past four- Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Morocco, Somalia and South Sudan (countries with
and-a-half decades, low performance in Elected Government)
Africa has made major
improvements in terms Priority areas for reform:
of Elected Government. Conducting periodic elections that are free, credible and fair is paramount to consolidating
In 1975, 41 countries in democracy. To achieve this, governments that have not yet done so should sign and ratify
Africa were classified as continental and subregional instruments such as the ACDEG. African states that have
non-democracies, while already ratified these instruments should enact reforms to align national laws, regulations
only 3 were classified and processes with their aspirations.
as democracies and 1
as a hybrid regime. By Good-practice countries for regional learning:
2018, 20 countries in Benin, Ghana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Zambia (countries
Africa were classified with high performance in Elected Government and in top 25%)
as democracies, with 18
hybrid regimes and 11
non-democracies.
Clean Elections: Priority countries for reform:

A total of 8 countries in Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, DRC, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon,
Africa (16 per cent) have Libya, Republic of Congo, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe (countries with
high performance on low performance in Clean Elections)
Clean Elections, while
51 per cent (25) have Priority areas for reform:
mid-range and 33 per States should build stakeholder trust in the impartiality and neutrality of EMBs to
cent (16) have low levels. strengthen public confidence in electoral processes. Reforms should aim to make the
From 2013 to 2018, seven nomination and appointment process for electoral commissioners more consultative
countries improved their and merit-based to ensure electoral policymakers are known for their independence and
Clean Elections scores, integrity. Legal revisions aimed at strengthening operational and financial independence
while nine saw declines. of EMBs should be enacted to reduce opportunities for government interference in
There is wide regional electoral processes. States should also support EMBs in investing in institution building
variation in performance, and strengthening the capacity of electoral officials at all levels, particularly in countries
with West Africa and that use technology in their electoral processes. Reforms should be enacted to ensure
Southern Africa having electoral dispute-resolution mechanisms are effective and timely to reduce the possibility
the highest average of election-related violence. Electoral stakeholders should also be held accountable
scores (which are in line via binding codes of conduct to ensure all actors contribute to transparent and peaceful
with the world average), electoral processes.
while North Africa, Central
Africa and East Africa Good-practice countries for regional learning:
all fall below the global Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mauritius, Senegal, South Africa and Tunisia
average. (countries with high performance in Clean Elections)
83
Inclusive Suffrage: Priority countries for reform:

While the vast majority Eritrea, Libya, Somalia and South Sudan
of countries in Africa
(45 countries, or 92 per Priority areas for reform:
cent) have high levels Countries should strive to ensure that all eligible voters have an opportunity to register to
of Inclusive Suffrage, 4 participate in electoral processes. Measures to be adopted include reducing barriers to
countries (Eritrea, Libya, voter registration and broadening the reach of voter registrations efforts, particularly to
Somalia and South include marginalized persons. Countries that use technology for the registration of voters
Sudan) have low levels of should ensure electoral officials are well trained to avoid the risk of poor data capture.
Inclusive Suffrage. Lawmakers should also examine the feasibility of conducting out-of-country voting to
broaden electoral participation.
Good-practice countries for regional learning:

Mauritius and South Africa (countries with high performance in Inclusive Suffrage and in
top 25%)
Free Political Parties: Priority countries for reform:

The majority of countries Burundi, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Rwanda and South Sudan (countries
in Africa (40 countries, with low performance in Free Political Parties)
or 82 per cent) score in
the mid-range on Free Priority areas for reform:
Political Parties, while Lawmakers should reform legal frameworks to remove barriers to registration for
7 countries have low political parties and independent candidates. They should also examine the feasibility
levels. Only two countries of supporting political parties that meet minimum requirements (including gender
(Botswana and Mauritius) requirements) through public financing, while also putting in place measures to regulate
score highly. campaign funding and expenditure to ensure competitive electoral playing fields. Ruling
parties should desist from using their incumbency advantage and state resources to
campaign. States should also ensure that opposition parties are able to campaign freely
and have equal access to state media. Political parties must ensure that candidate
selection processes (e.g. party primaries) are credible and transparent, as this is critical to
the overall conduct of elections.

Botswana and Mauritius
Fundamental Rights GSoD Indices score: Mid-range (0.52)
Access to Justice: Priority countries for reform:

Access to Justice Burundi, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Libya, Mauritania,
improved in 11 African Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan (countries with low levels in Access to Justice)
countries (Algeria, CAR,
Egypt, Eritrea, Eswatini, Priority areas for reform:
Ethiopia, Gambia, Priority countries should institute reforms that will enhance increased access to justice for
Nigeria, Republic of all citizens, including strengthening the legal infrastructure and making legal provisions
Congo, Sierra Leone and for the use of paralegals. Deliberate measures should also be taken to foster access to
Tunisia) in the period justice for marginalized groups such as women. Civic spaces for civil society engagement
2013–2018. However, on access to justice should be broadened for lobbying, with duty bearers and providing
just seven countries awareness raising to rights holders. Mechanisms should be instituted to strengthen the
(Benin, Botswana, Ghana, role of parliaments as guardians of citizens’ rights and liberties.
Mauritius, Namibia,
Senegal and Tunisia) have Good-practice countries for regional learning:
high levels of Access to Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius, Namibia, Senegal and Tunisia (countries with high
Justice, while 61 per cent levels in Access to Justice)
of countries are in the
mid-range and 24 per cent
have low levels.
84
Civil Liberties: Priority countries for reform:

One-third of African Burundi, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Republic of Congo, South Sudan and Sudan
countries have high levels (countries with low performance in Civil Liberties)
of Civil Liberties, while
only 14 per cent have low Priority areas for reform:
levels. Most countries Measures should be taken to reform legislative frameworks to provide for civil liberties.
(53 per cent) score in the Legislation that constrains fundamental civil liberties should be repealed. Security-
mid-range. A majority of sector institutions should be reformed to enhance their civilian relations and uphold civil
countries in West Africa liberties.
and Southern Africa score
above the global average. Good-practice countries for regional learning:
From 2013 to 2018, three Benin, Ghana and Mauritius (countries with high performance in Civil Liberties and in top
countries advanced while 25%)
nine declined.
Gender Equality: Priority countries for reform:

The vast majority of Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Libya, Somalia and South Sudan
countries in Africa
have mid-range levels Priority areas for reform:
of political Gender Align legislative frameworks and policy documents to the aspirations of subregional,
Equality. Only one country regional and international normative frameworks and standards on the promotion of
(Rwanda) has high levels, gender equality and women’s empowerment.
while seven (Egypt,
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Good-practice countries for regional learning:
Eswatini, Libya, Somalia Rwanda
and South Sudan) have
low levels. Between 2013
and 2018, no countries
in Africa saw statistically
significant improvements
or declines in Gender
Equality.
Social Group Equality: Priority countries for reform:

A majority of African Angola, Chad, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Mauritania, Republic of Congo,
countries (32, or 65 per Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan (countries with low performance in Social Group Equality
cent) score in the mid- and in the bottom 25%)
range on Social Group
Equality, while almost Priority areas for reform:
one-third of countries Institute legislative and policy measures to enhance representation of disadvantaged
(16, or 33 per cent) have groups (e.g. minorities and people living with disabilities) to ensure that they are
low levels. Only Tunisia represented in national legislative and local government assemblies. Measures should
has high levels of Social also be instituted to advance equitable enjoyment of civil liberties, inclusive and equitable
Group Equality. political participation, and representation.

Tunisia
Basic Welfare: Priority countries for reform:

Africa has seen a Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Côte dʼIvoire, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea,
remarkable improvement Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia
in terms of its Basic and South Sudan (countries with low performance in Basic Welfare and in the bottom 25%)
Welfare performance:
since 2013, more Priority areas for reform:
countries score in the Reform legislative frameworks to ensure inclusive and equitable delivery of basic services
mid-range (30) than in the such as education, health and social security. Priority countries for reform should further
low range (19 countries). ratify and domesticate the African Charter on the Values and Principles of Decentralisation,
Local Government and Local Development.

Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa and Tunisia
85
Checks on GSoD Indices score: Mid-range (0.51)

Government
Effective Parliament: Priority countries for reform:

The majority of African Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea,
countries (67 per cent) Mauritania, Republic of Congo, South Sudan and Sudan (countries with low performance in
score in the mid-range Effective Parliament)
on Effective Parliament,
while only three countries Priority areas for reform:
(6 per cent) score highly. Countries should support parliamentary reform processes geared towards the
From 2013 to 2018, six strengthening of parliament’s role as independent policymakers; guardians of citizens’
countries improved on rights, liberties and needs; and overseers of government. The reform process should also
this measure, while only aim to enhance pluralism and the representativeness of views in parliaments.
four declined.
Malawi, Mauritius and Tunisia (countries with high performance in Effective Parliament)
Judicial Independence: Priority countries for reform:

Only two countries in Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea,
Africa (The Gambia and Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Sudan and Togo (countries with
Tunisia) have high scores low performance in Judicial Independence and in the bottom 25%)
on Judicial Independence,
while the remainder are Priority areas for reform:
split between low and There is a need to sustain reform efforts to build more robust, accountable and results-
mid-range performance. oriented judiciaries. Political interference should be pre-empted by consolidated legal
From 2013 to 2018, five frameworks and financial support for judicial authorities.
countries advanced
while six declined on this Good-practice countries for regional learning:
dimension. The Gambia and Tunisia
Media Integrity: Priority countries for reform:

Only eight African Countries with lower levels of Media Integrity (e.g. Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau,
countries (16 per cent) Lesotho and Tanzania)
have high levels of Media
Integrity, while seven Priority areas for reform:
(14 per cent) have low Reform and align media-related legislation, regulatory frameworks and institutions to
levels. The remaining 34 international standards on media freedom, independence and pluralism.
countries (69 per cent)
are in the mid-range. Good-practice countries for regional learning:
From 2013 to 2018, three Burkina Faso, Namibia, Senegal, South Africa and Tunisia
countries advanced while
five declined on this
dimension.
86
Impartial GSoD Indices score: Mid-range (0.41)

Administration
Absence of Corruption: Priority countries for reform:

A majority of African Countries struggling with corruption (e.g. CAR, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia,
countries (65 per cent) Madagascar, Malawi, Nigeria and Sierra Leone)
have high levels of
corruption, with the Priority areas for reform:
remaining 35 per cent Countries that have not yet done so should sign and ratify the African Union Convention
having mid-range levels. on Preventing and Combatting Corruption. Countries that have signed the convention
No country in Africa has should align their national legislation to ensure effective implementation. Countries should
low levels of corruption. develop measures such as asset declarations to ensure public officials remain accountable
On the positive side, to the public and discharge their duties transparently. National governments should invest
between 2013 and 2018 resources in maintaining and building the capacity of effective independent institutions
a total of nine countries to combat corruption. National governments and anti-corruption agencies should apply
improved their Absence of resources for investigations into corrupt practices in an impartial manner based on strict
Corruption scores, while criteria to avoid the politicization of their work. Judicial authorities should enforce the
three declined. laws and apply sanctions in a non-partisan and impartial manner. Efforts to strengthen
media and civil society capacities in investigative journalism should also be undertaken to
strengthen their watchdog role.

Botswana, Rwanda and Tanzania, (countries with mid-range performance in Absence of
Corruption and in top 25%)
Predictable Enforcement: Priority countries for reform:

No country in Africa has Countries with low levels of Predictable Enforcement (e.g. CAR, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya and
high levels of Predictable Madagascar)
Enforcement, while 39 per
cent have low Predictable Priority areas for reform:
Enforcement and 61 per National governments should strengthen the capacity and independence of law-enforcement
cent score in the mid- agencies and the judiciary to improve the rule of law and the predictability of law enforcement.
range. From 2013 to 2018 National legislation should be updated to avoid the use of public administration and other state
there were eight advances resources for political purposes. A particular focus should be placed on studying the possibility
and four declines on this of putting in place restrictions on the commissioning of new policies or projects close to
measure. electoral events. National governments should also invest in strengthening the capacity of
civil-service officials to enhance bureaucratic efficiency and quality.

Benin, Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, Senegal and Tunisia (countries with mid-range
performance in Predictable Enforcement and in top 25%)
87
Participatory GSoD Indices score: Low

Engagement
Civil Society Priority countries for reform:

Participation: Burundi, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea and South Sudan (countries with low performance
By 2018, 10 per cent in Civil Society Participation)
of countries in Africa
had low Civil Society Priority areas for reform:
Participation scores, Governments at all levels must ensure that CSOs are allowed to operate without
while 24 per cent scored intimidation or restrictions (including on funding). Governments should seek to promote
highly and 65 per cent partnerships with civil society at the expense of adversarial relations by including them in
scored in the mid-range. policy consultations and public outreach. Efforts must be made to encourage and promote
inclusive participation by creating an atmosphere and incentives that encourage active
participation of youth, women and people living with disabilities in political processes.
Governments should aim to support civil society initiatives through the provision of
funding to strengthen civil society’s capacity to foster accountability.

Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Liberia, Mauritius, Niger, Sierra Leone
and Tunisia (countries with high performance in Civil Society Participation and in top 25%)
Electoral Participation: Priority countries for reform:

Of the 49 countries in Countries with low levels of Electoral Participation (e.g. Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, The
Africa, 9 score among Gambia, Madagascar and Nigeria)
the top 25 per cent in
the world on Electoral Priority areas for reform:
Participation, while 16 Electoral stakeholders should undertake research to study voter turnout patterns in greater
(33 per cent) have low detail, including generating data on the demographics of voters. EMBs, political parties
levels and 23 (47 per and CSOs should engage in broad campaigns targeting potential voters and encouraging
cent) have mid-range them to participate in electoral processes by making voter information easily accessible
performance. to all eligible citizens. EMBs should consider increasing the number of polling stations
to ensure voters can participate in elections more easily. They should also study the
feasibility of early voting and out-of-country voting without compromising the integrity of
electoral processes.

Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda and Sierra
Leone (countries with high performance in Electoral Participation and in top 25%)
Direct Democracy: Priority countries for reform:

West Africa has the Countries with low levels of Direct Democracy (e.g. Benin, CAR, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho,
highest levels of Direct Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and South Africa)
Democracy in the region,
followed very closely by Priority areas for reform:
North Africa and East National legislation should be developed or strengthened to ensure public input into key
Africa. decisions such as constitutional amendments, especially regarding the issue of term and
age limits for elected officials. Stakeholders should also study the feasibility of introducing
citizen-led initiatives and the possibility of enabling citizens to recall elected officials.

Mauritius and Tanzania
88
Local Democracy: Priority countries for reform:

Only 2 African countries Countries with low levels of Local Democracy (e.g. CAR, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia,
(4 per cent) have high Madagascar and Tunisia); and hybrid regimes with mid-range levels of Local Democracy
levels of Local Democracy, (e.g. Algeria, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Rwanda and Zambia)
while 33 (69 per cent)
have low levels. The Priority areas for reform:
remaining countries have National governments that have not yet done so should sign and ratify the African
mid-range levels. Charter on the Values and Principles of Decentralisation, Local Governance and Local
Development. Countries that have ratified the Charter should align national legislation
to ensure it is fully implemented. National governments and other stakeholders should
invest in local government capacity-building programmes to ensure responsive systems
are established that can deliver essential services to residents. EMBs and other
stakeholders should also conduct outreach campaigns to educate citizens about the roles
and responsibilities of local governments to encourage participation in local government
elections and other platforms for citizens to engage with local authorities.

Mauritius and Sierra Leone (countries with high levels in Local Democracy).
TABLE 2.11
Regime classification for Africa, 2018

Table 2.11 shows the regime classification for all of the countries in Africa covered by the GSoD Indices, as well as their respective scores
on the five GSoD attributes.
GSoD Attribute

Country
Democracies
Benin 0.66 = 0.75 = 0.60 = 0.61 + Mid-range
Botswana 0.69 = 0.68 = 0.63 = 0.66 = Mid-range
Burkina Faso 0.62 = 0.60 = 0.58 = 0.57 = Low
Côte d’Ivoire 0.56 = 0.53 = 0.54 = 0.58 = Low
The Gambia 0.56 + 0.63 + 0.66 + 0.56 + Low
Ghana 0.67 = 0.72 = 0.65 = 0.43 = High
Guinea-Bissau 0.58 + 0.47 = 0.53 = 0.28 = Low
Kenya 0.50 = 0.46 = 0.58 = 0.42 = Low
Lesotho 0.63 = 0.60 = 0.58 = 0.48 = Mid-range
Liberia 0.61 = 0.64 = 0.60 = 0.396 = High
Madagascar 0.47 = 0.51 = 0.54 = 0.35 = Low
Malawi 0.55 = 0.64 = 0.698 = 0.49 = Mid-range
Mali 0.51 = 0.52 = 0.55 + 0.42 = Low
Mauritius 0.81 = 0.74 = 0.701 = 0.60 = High
Namibia 0.59 = 0.69 = 0.63 = 0.63 = Mid-range
Nigeria 0.63 + 0.62 = 0.65 = 0.43 = Low
Senegal 0.63 = 0.73 = 0.65 = 0.61 = Low
89
Sierra Leone 0.62 = 0.64 = 0.51 = 0.47 = High
South Africa 0.68 = 0.66 = 0.69 = 0.49 = Mid-range
Tunisia 0.62 = 0.76 = 0.80 = 0.61 = Low
Hybrid regimes
Algeria 0.35 = 0.54 = 0.395 = 0.38 = Low
Angola 0.42 = 0.51 = 0.44 = 0.42 + Low
Cameroon 0.36 = 0.38 = 0.39 = 0.21 = Low
CAR 0.45 = 0.44 + 0.57 = 0.34 + Low
DRC 0.38 = 0.36 = 0.46 = 0.17 = Low
Ethiopia 0.36 = 0.52 = 0.42 = 0.50 + Low
Gabon 0.406 = 0.65 = 0.48 = 0.49 = Low
Guinea 0.49 = 0.44 = 0.41 = 0.33 = Low
Mauritania 0.37 = 0.402 = 0.42 = 0.398 + Low
Morocco 0.45 = 0.63 = 0.56 = 0.49 = Low
Mozambique 0.47 = 0.59 = 0.56 = 0.43 = Mid-range
Niger 0.55 = 0.67 = 0.59 = 0.50 = Low
Sudan 0.38 = 0.31 = 0.37 = 0.25 = Low
Tanzania 0.52 = 0.57 = 0.58 = 0.58 + Mid-range
Togo 0.42 = 0.49 = 0.47 = 0.32 = Low
Uganda 0.38 = 0.53 = 0.59 = 0.43 = Mid-range
Zambia 0.52 = 0.52 = 0.51 = 0.44 = Mid-range
Zimbabwe 0.42 = 0.46 = 0.50 = 0.25 = Low
Non-democracies
Burundi 0.25 - 0.30 = 0.25 - 0.12 - Low
Chad 0.32 = 0.39 = 0.35 = 0.17 = Low
Egypt 0.28 = 0.43 = 0.397 = 0.27 = Low
Equatorial Guinea 0.21 = 0.30 = 0.19 = 0.19 = Low
Eritrea 0= 0.22 = 0.07 = 0.26 = Low
Eswatini 0.26 = 0.53 = 0.38 = 0.402 = Mid-range
Libya 0- 0.39 = 0.58 = 0.18 - Low
Republic of Congo 0.33 = 0.42 = 0.38 = 0.36 = Low
Rwanda 0.35 = 0.57 = 0.35 = 0.63 = Low
Somalia 0= 0.34 = 0.49 = 0.20 = Low
South Sudan 0= 0.24 = 0.25 = 0.15 = Low
High Mid-range Low
Notes: = denotes no statistically significant increase or decrease in the last five year period; + denotes a statistically significant increase in the last five year period; – denotes a statistically
significant decrease in the last five year period.
90
and his subsequent death led to a series of street protests

throughout the country. Tunisia’s President Zine El
2.2. The state of democracy in the Middle East Abidine Ben Ali, who had ruled the country for 22 years,
This section offers an overview of the long-term democratic threatened to use military action against the protesters
trends in the Middle East, and an analysis of the current but was ousted in January 2011. The protests in Tunisia,
democratic landscape, using the GSoD conceptual sometimes referred to as the Jasmine Revolution, spread to
framework as an organizing structure. The analysis covers other authoritarian regimes in the region (Chakchouk et
issues linked to Representative Government, Fundamental al. 2013: 575).
Rights, Checks on Government, Impartial Administration
and Participatory Engagement, highlighting the current In February 2011, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak
gains and opportunities for democracy in the region, as was also removed from power (Taylor 2017). In February
well as the democratic challenges it faces. The analysis is and March 2011, in Bahrain, pro-democracy protests were
based on the GSoD Indices as the principal data source, attacked by security forces. The global condemnation that
complemented by other sources. The section concludes with followed prompted King Hamad to create the Bahrain
an overview of policy considerations relevant to democratic Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) in July that
trends and challenges in the Middle East. year, which recommended the prosecution of security forces
personnel (Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry
2.2.1. Introduction 2011). Until 2015, of the 26 recommendations made by
The Arab Uprisings of 2010–2011 raised hopes for the commission, only 2 were fully implemented and 8 saw
democratic progress and seemed to be a turning point in no progress at all (Americans for Democracy and Human
the history of the Middle East and North Africa. However, Rights in Bahrain 2015). Because of protests in Jordan, two
the majority of the movements that demanded greater successive cabinets resigned (The Telegraph 2011a, 2011b).
democracy in the region have since fizzled out, and the In Kuwait the Prime Minister was replaced in November
expected transitions have been either aborted or diverted. 2011 and the parliament was dissolved until elections were
The sole exception has been Tunisia, the country where held in February 2012. In March 2011, Oman’s legislative
the uprisings began, and which has since undergone a powers were given to advisory councils (Khaleej Times
transition to democracy. 2011). That same month in Saudi Arabia, the government
banned protests and tried to stifle dissent by providing an
Mohamed Bouazizi, a street vendor in the central Tunisian additional USD 127 billion in social benefits to citizens
town of Sidi Bouzid, set himself on fire in December 2010, (BBC News 2013).
THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS
the case for SDG 16.10 on fundamental freedoms. SDG 16.7

shows a mixed picture, with stagnation on three indicators, a
Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions small increase in Effective Parliament and a small decline in
Clean Elections.
The Middle East has made some progress in implementing

Sustainable Development Goal 16 (SDG 16) since 2015,
although significant challenges remain, and half of the 18 Gender Equality
indicators used to measure progress have shown stagnation.
The Middle East remains the lowest-scoring region in the world
on all indicators linked to SDG 16. A total of six indicators have
Significant challenges need to be overcome if gender equality,
seen some advances, while four have seen declines.
and SDG 5.5 on political representation of women, are to be
SDG 16.3 on rule of law and SDG 16.5 on reducing corruption achieved in the region. The Middle East remains the lowest-
have seen more countries advancing than declining. SDG 16.1 performing region on this target. The GSoD Indices measure of
has seen stagnation, and one-half of the indicators linked to political Gender Equality for the region has been stagnant since
SDG 16.6 on effective institutions have also shown stagnation, 2015, with no countries declining or advancing.
while the other half have shown small increases. This is also
91
KEY FINDINGS
Positive developments Challenges to democracy
• According to the GSoD Indices, the Middle East contained just • The Arab Uprisings in 2010–2011 raised hopes for democratic
two democracies in 2018: Iraq, which is considered a very weak progress in the Middle East and seemed to be a turning point in the
democracy; and Lebanon, which is a weak and fragile democracy. democratic history of the region. However, many of the movements
that demanded greater democracy for the Middle East and North
• Iraq is the only country in the Middle East where democracy Africa have since fizzled out. With the exception of Tunisia in North
is proving to be resilient. Although its democratic institutions Africa, the expected transitions have been aborted.
remain fragile, it has not backslid into hybridity since its
transition to democracy in 2010. The country is a very weak • The Middle East remains the least democratic region in
democracy, with low levels of Impartial Administration and the world. This is readily apparent from its low number of
Participatory Engagement, and has levels of Fundamental Rights democracies (2 out of 12 countries in the region). It is also the
among the bottom 25 per cent of countries in the world. region with the largest share of non-democracies. More than
half of the countries in the Middle East (58 per cent) are non-
• Some efforts have been made on Gender Equality in the Middle democracies, while one-quarter are hybrid regimes.
East. Much work is still needed, but small steps are observed. Iraq
has introduced quotas for women in the legislative branch. Saudi • Non-democracies in the region have, unfortunately, also
Arabia has established quotas for the appointment of women proven resilient. Of the 12 countries in the region, 10 have
in the Shura Council (Consultative Council). However, this is never experienced democracy. The regime status of six of these
perceived as more of an effort to appease Western partners than a countries has never changed, while the remaining four have had
reflection of fundamental reform in favour of gender equality. periods of hybridity.
Peaceful protests also erupted in Syria in March 2011, where 2.2.2. Taking the long-term perspective: democratic
the Syrian Government responded by killing hundreds of developments in the Middle East since 1975
demonstrators and imprisoning many others. By July Since 1975, the Middle East region has seen the slowest
2011, the Free Syrian Army was formed with the aim of democratic progress in the world. In 1975, 11 of the 12
overthrowing the regime of President Bashar Al Assad, countries in the region were non-democracies. Lebanon, a
thus marking the beginning of the civil war that has now weak democracy in 1975 and on the verge of a civil war,
plagued the country for eight years (Al Jazeera 2018). backslid into a hybrid regime in 1976 and slipped in and out
of hybridity up until 2018, when it returned to democratic
Because of these developments, in a period of three status. The region has only gained one democracy since
years the Middle East experienced more changes within 1975: Iraq, which transitioned to democracy for the first
its governmental institutions than in the previous few time in its history in 2010. This makes the Middle East the
decades. This did not, however, translate into significant region with the smallest share of democracies.
democratic progress for the Middle East. The hope for
democracy inspired by the wave of protests across the The Middle East also contains six of the most enduring non-
region was quickly dashed, as more repressive regimes and democracies in the world, which are countries that have
authoritarian governments replaced those that crumbled never experienced democracy or even hybridity at any point
under the pressure of the Arab Uprisings. in their history: Bahrain, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria
and the UAE. Since 1975, incremental improvements have
According to the Global State of Democracy (GSoD) been noted in Jordan, Kuwait, Oman and Yemen, which
Indices data, in 2011 there were two democracies in the went from non-democracies to hybrid regimes for the first
Middle East (Iraq and Lebanon), as well as three hybrid time in 1991, 2005, 2012 and 1993, respectively. Of these
regimes (Jordan, Kuwait and Oman) and seven non- four countries, however, only Kuwait did not slide back into
democracies: Bahrain, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, non-democracy.
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Yemen. By 2018,
six years after the Arab Uprisings, the share remained In summary, currently seven countries (almost 58 per cent)
unchanged. Similarly, in North Africa, the only country in the region are non-democracies, three countries (25 per
that has seen changes since the Uprisings, and which cent) are hybrid regimes, and two countries (17 per cent) are
should be taken as an example for the region, is Tunisia. classified as democracies (see Figure 2.14).
92
Between 1975 and 2018, the Middle East showed the attributes (Impartial Administration and Participatory
slowest progress and consistently poorest performance Engagement), while Lebanon is considered a weak
of all the world regions on the GSoD attributes of democracy as it scores low on one attribute (Impartial
Representative Government, Fundamental Rights and Administration).
Checks on Government. On each of these attributes, the
region’s performance has consistently been well below the Iraq, a non-democracy in 1975, transitioned to a hybrid
world average. regime in 2005, when the first multiparty elections were
held. This hybrid stage lasted until 2010, when the country
In 1975, every country in the region had low levels of transitioned to democracy with the first fully competitive
Representative Government. In 2018, only two countries in elections. Although it is considered a very weak democracy,
the region (Iraq and Lebanon, both democracies) performed Iraq has so far proved resilient: it has not experienced an
mid-range on the same attribute. undemocratic interruption since its transition in 2010
(see Box 2.4). Lebanon is a very fragile democracy, having
One-half of the countries in the region (Iran, Iraq, Saudi experienced two democratic breakdowns—one between
Arabia, Syria, the UAE and Yemen) had low performance 1976 and 2008, and the other between 2014 and 2017—
on Fundamental Rights in 1975, while five (Jordan, Kuwait, before bouncing back to democratic status in 2018.
Lebanon, Oman and Qatar) performed mid-range.10 In
2018, Saudi Arabia’s, Syria’s and Yemen’s performance In the Middle East, four countries have advanced from a non-
remained low, although the latter two countries have been democracy to a hybrid regime but have never transitioned
fighting wars in their territories for more than five years, and out of hybridity. Of these countries, Jordan, Oman and
this affects their performance on all dimensions of the GSoD Yemen have had intermittent periods of hybridity and non-
framework (see Box 2.6 for a discussion of how the conflict democracy, while Kuwait became a hybrid regime in 2005
in Yemen affects its GSoD scores). Kuwait and Lebanon were and has been so ever since (see Table 2.12).
the only two countries performing mid-range on Checks on
Government in 1975, while the rest performed low on this
attribute. By 2018, Iran, Iraq and Jordan had also moved to FIGURE 2.14
the mid-range, while seven countries maintained their low
performance. Regime types in Middle East, 1975–2018
100
90
In 1975, Kuwait was the country in the Middle
East with most subattributes (five) in the
80
top 25 per cent in the world. By 2018, the
UAE was the country with most subattributes
70
(two) in the top 25 per cent.
60
50
Saudi Arabia, one of the 18 countries in the world

40
that has never experienced democracy, has the poorest
performance in the region on the GSoD attributes. In 30
1975, the country scored low on four of the five GSoD
attributes, and among the bottom 25 per cent in the world 20
on 7 out of 16 subattributes. By 2018, Saudi Arabia’s

10
performance worsened even further: it scored in the bottom
25 per cent in the world on almost all its democratic 0
subattributes (15 of 16).
2000
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
1975
Of the two countries that qualified as democracies in Democracy Hybrid regime Non-democracy
2018, Iraq has very weak performance, scoring low on two
int/gsod-indices>.
10 There is no GSoD data between 1975 and 2004 on Fundamental Rights for Bahrain.
93
BOX 2.4
Iraq: a resilient but weak democracy

Iraq has been classified a democracy by the GSoD Indices since for the government, along with the US-led coalition, to drive
2010. Having made its democratic transition, the country has out the self-proclaimed Islamic State.
remained a resilient—albeit weak—democracy ever since. After
the invasion of Iraq by the United States and its allies in 2003, Two years after ISIS decimation in Iraq, the organization is
the country faced and overcame enormous challenges. Iraq’s still operating, especially in Iraq’s remote regions, where the
democratic achievements, given the context, are unique in government is largely absent, and citizens continue to lack
history. There have been five peaceful and successful national adequate access to services or resources (Magid 2019). This
parliamentary elections since 2005, with three democratic and situation needs monitoring by the Iraqi Government as it could
non-violent changes of power. Iraqi citizens also participated in lead to the re-emergence of the so-called Caliphate, as the
a constitutional referendum and several local elections during conditions that provided fertile ground for ISIS to expand its
this time (Ollivant and Bull 2018). reach have not fully been addressed.
However, Iraq’s institutions are weak and far from stable. In addition, Iraq’s internal and sectarian divisions could
Since the first elections in 2005 the Iraqi Government also threaten stability and democracy. The country should
has been led by Shiites, who have gradually isolated the work towards strengthening its democratic institutions
Sunni majority. This created a sense of anger and distrust and accountability tools; decrease corruption and increase
which enabled the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to transparency; and improve access to services for its citizens.
be considered a viable choice, becoming one of the major Nonetheless, ‘Iraq remains a hopeful wild card precisely
obstacles to democratic development in Iraq. By 2014, ISIS because its democratic politics, though ugly, have been
had taken over large portions of the country; it took three years resilient’ (Gerecht 2019).
TABLE 2.12
Changes in regime type in the Middle East, 1975–2018
Year
2000
2005
1980
1990
2018
2010
1985
1995
2015
1975
Country
Iraq
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Oman
Yemen
Notes: This timeline displays the changing regime types in the Middle East between 1975 and 2018 in countries that experienced hybridity or democracy at some point during that period.
94
2.2.3. The current democracy landscape in the FIGURE 2.15

Middle East
Clean Elections in the Middle East, 1975–2018
Representative Government 100
90
The GSoD Indices use the Representative Government attribute to

evaluate countries’ performance on the conduct of elections, the 80
extent to which access to government is decided by elections. This 70
attribute is an aggregation of four subattributes: Clean Elections,
Inclusive Suffrage, Free Political Parties and Elected Government. 60
50
40
Summary: Representative Government in the Middle
East, 2018 30
20
Regional average: Low (0.23)
10
High N/A
(>0.7) 0
2000
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
1975
Mid-range Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait and Lebanon

(0.4–0.7)
Above global average Below global average
Low Bahrain, Iran, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria,
(<0.4) UAE and Yemen Notes: Country percentages may not always add up to 100 per cent, as some countries’
scores are at the global average, a category which is not represented in this graph.
int/gsod-indices>.
In 2018, the Middle East had the lowest score in the world
on Representative Government, lower than all other regions,
and below the world average.
Emirates Ministry of State for Federal National Council
Elections are a mirage when political parties are either Affairs 2015). The most important advance in the
limited or banned 2015 election was the single-vote system—in the 2011
The majority of the countries in the Middle East do not elections, voters had been allowed to vote for up to half
hold clean elections and, even when they do occur, they of the number of seats in their respective Emirates, which
are likely to be sham elections. The few electoral exercises had resulted in the election of candidates of the same
in place have limited sway over the executive power. In tribe, skewing the results of the electoral process (Salama
2018 almost 60 per cent of countries scored below the 2015). However, despite the introduction of the single-
global average on Clean Elections (see Figure 2.15). vote system, elections in the UAE are still not regarded
as competitive, which contributes to the country being
To take one example, the UAE—a non-democracy in the form classified as a non-democracy.
of a federation of absolute monarchies—held parliamentary
elections in 2015 for the third time since its independence in Free political parties are rare in the region. The Gulf
the early 1970s. The 2015 elections were the first to include Cooperation Council (GCC) monarchies—Bahrain,
a single-vote system and universal suffrage. The Emirati Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE—
Government had been working for several years to create all ban political parties, although what they refer to as
awareness on the importance of voting, and to educate people ‘societies’ or ‘blocs’ function as such. The countries that
on their role in the election of the Federal National Council. do allow political parties place severe restrictions on their
Voter turnout was 35 per cent, an increase in comparison to operation or even existence, making access to political
the 27 per cent turnout in the 2011 elections (United Arab power in the region hardly free or equal. The space
95
within which political parties can express themselves is while Kuwait became a hybrid regime in 2005 and has
also significantly limited by institutional factors, because been so ever since.
in most countries in the region monarchs hold broad
executive authority. During the last five decades, non-democratic regimes have
been taking advantage of their resources and geographical
Islam and politics have historically been interconnected positions. They have created networks that have helped them
and have never been separate entities in the Middle East stay in power. The oil-rich GCC monarchies of the Arabic
and North Africa. Islamist parties are the outcome of Gulf—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the
reform and modernization, what is known as political Islam UAE—have never experienced democracy and rely on their
(Schwedler 2011; Hirschkind 1997). Islamist political important oil assets and their geopolitical location to sustain
parties have been a constant in the Arab world and Iran, their power. They have maintained historical business and
although they have been subjected to fierce repression, foreign policy ties with the USA, but also with Europe.
especially since 2011, and have drawn criticism from those
who argue that politics and Islam should not be mixed (see The USA and Europe have provided the region with security
Tran 2013; Warraq 2018). and weapons and have in turn received multi-billion-dollar
contracts, and access to oil and key geopolitical points,
An example of an Islamist party is the Freedom and Justice including the Strait of Hormuz and Bab-al-Mandab. The
Party in Egypt, which was created in 2011. Although Middle East countries have also been reliable and dependable
formally independent, it was considered the political wing political partners. However, with the Arab Uprisings this
of the Muslim Brotherhood, one of the biggest political scenario shifted slightly. The US Government supported
movements in Egypt. The parliamentary elections in the protesters, and a sense of wariness was instilled in the
November 2011 and January 2012 saw the Freedom and regimes that had been supportive of the USA for decades.
Justice Party gain 47 per cent of seats in the Egypt’s People’s New foreign policy options began to be explored. For
Assembly (see Carnegie Endowment for International Peace example, in 2011 US President Barack Obama introduced
2015). The party’s presidential candidate, Mohamed Morsi, the so-called Rebalance Strategy, which focused on giving
went on to win the May–June 2012 presidential elections. Asia and the Pacific priority over the Gulf monarchies,
In July 2013 the Egyptian military, headed by General and created unease in Saudi Arabia (Simon 2015; Mesa
Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, overthrew Morsi and suspended the Delmonte 2017a). In 2015 the five permanent members of
2012 constitution, while protesters on both sides—pro- the UN Security Council and Germany (the P5+1) signed
Morsi and pro-military—demanded change (Fontevecchia the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) which
2013). Morsi was sent to jail (where he died in June 2019) relieved Iran of sanctions limiting its nuclear ambitions
and the Freedom and Justice Party was dissolved by al-Sisi’s (Storey 2019). This pushed Saudi Arabia to tighten its
administration in 2014. existing ties with Russia and China, signing economic deals
worth billions of dollars and sending a clear message to the
Despite constraints, Islamist movements are likely to USA and Europe that Saudi Arabia should not be taken for
continue. The role of Islamist parties—like all other granted (Borshchevskaya 2017).
political parties—is crucial and, as some argue, the
legitimate involvement of Islamist parties could contribute In 2017, the inauguration of Donald Trump as US
to broaden prospects for democratization in the region President brought a new phase of dialogue between the
(Cesari 2017). The existence of free political parties, USA and the GCC monarchies. All parties were of the view
including both Islamist and non-religious parties, are that Iran and its ‘expansionist policies’ were a problem for
important for democracy to potentially take root in the the region and that the JCPOA was detrimental for the
region. region (Mesa Delmonte 2017b). In November 2018,
the US Government reinstated its sanctions on Iran.
Non-democracies in the region are persistent Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia continues to strengthen its ties
The Middle East is home to six of the most persistent with Russia (Foy 2018; Mammadov 2019). This illustrates
non-democracies in the world: Bahrain, Iran, Qatar, the fact that the political scenario is liable to change, and
Saudi Arabia, Syria and the UAE. Four countries have that even when Saudi Arabia (and the region in general)
advanced from a non-democratic state to become hybrid is moving towards a post-oil economy, the Middle East
regimes but have never transitioned out of hybridity. countries remain important geopolitical players—even
Of these countries, Jordan, Oman and Yemen have had when democracy, human rights and civil liberties in the
intermittent periods of hybridity and non-democracy, region are severely curtailed.
96
Rights. Yemen was the only country to regress (from 0.41

Fundamental Rights
to 0.27) over the past five years.
Regimes in the region continue to curtail civil liberties

and control people
The Fundamental Rights attribute aggregates scores from three
subattributes: Access to Justice, Civil Liberties, and Social Rights For years the adherence to civil liberties has been one
and Equality. Overall it measures the fair and equal access to of the weakest points for regimes in the Middle East.
justice, the extent to which civil liberties such as freedom of Freedoms of expression, religion, movement, association
expression or movement are respected, and the extent to which
countries offer their citizens basic welfare and political equality. and assembly have been on the decline. Citizens have started
to prioritize greater civil freedoms and have asserted their
rights, pressuring their governments for more accountability
and participatory politics. Although slow transformations
Summary: Fundamental Rights in the Middle East, 2018 with respect to rule of law and gender equality are occurring,
there is still much to be achieved in these and other areas—
Regional average: Mid-range (0.42) for example, in media freedom.
High N/A
(>0.7) A number of governments in the region have taken advantage
of anti-terrorism and cybercrime laws to criminalize free
Mid-range Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar speech. In Jordan, the 2014 amendments to the Anti-
(0.4–0.7) and UAE Terrorism Law broadened the definition of terrorism to
include provisions which threaten freedom of expression in
Low Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen
(<0.4)
the country. The amendments removed the requirement that
an act of violence should be connected to the action, meaning
that any act that ‘shows discord’ or ‘disturbs public order’
would be punishable by law (Human Rights Watch 2014).
Between 1975 and 2018, one-quarter of the countries in
the Middle East saw improvements in their Fundamental Since 2015, governments in Bahrain (see Box 2.5), Jordan,
Rights scores. However, eight countries scored below Kuwait and Palestine have introduced anti-cybercrime laws
the world average in 2018. Between 1980 and 2009, the that have been criticized by human rights organizations
regional score rose from 0.36 to 0.44 (a 30 per cent increase) as restricting freedom of expression online (Social Media
but it has plateaued since, and the region stills shows the Exchange 2018).
slowest growth compared to other regions.
Freedom of religion has been significantly curtailed in Iran
since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. According to Human
Rights Watch, religious minorities such as the Bahá’í, Sunni
Compared to other Fundamental Rights
Muslims and Christians face discrimination in both public
aspects, Social Rights and Equality shows
a stronger positive trend over time. Jordan,
and private life. For example, as of November 2018, 79
Kuwait, Lebanon and Oman score higher than Bahá’ís were held in detention in Iran, and younger members
the region’s average score. of the minority are forbidden to register at public universities
(Human Rights Watch 2019). Furthermore, during the
first week of December 2018, 114 Christians were arrested
as part of an Iranian Government strategy to ‘warn’ other
Jordan, Kuwait and Oman fall under the category of Christians against evangelization during Christmas (World
hybrid regimes, where basic liberties such as freedom of Watch Monitor 2018; Open Doors 2019).
speech, freedom of assembly and association, and freedom
of religion are limited. Despite this, together with Iraq Saudi Arabia dominated world news during 2018 because
and Lebanon (the only democracies in the region), five of the country’s record on human rights violations, its
countries—Iran, Jordan, Oman, Qatar and the UAE— media censorship and silencing of activists, and the globally
score mid-range on Fundamental Rights. Three countries publicized killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. On 24 June
(Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen) recorded scores low for 2018 Saudi Arabia ended its ban on women driving cars;
this attribute in 2018. These three countries score among just weeks previously, Saudi authorities had arrested and
the bottom 25 per cent in the world on Fundamental allegedly tortured at least 13 women (and seven men) who
97
BOX 2.5
Bahrain: the deepening autocratization of a non-democracy

Bahrain is a non-democracy that has experienced a recent FIGURE 2.16
deepening autocratization, with significant declines observed
on three of its democratic subattributes: Clean Elections,
Civil Liberties (particularly in Freedom of Expression and
Decline of Civil Liberties in Bahrain, 1975–2018
Freedom of Association and Assembly) and Media Integrity
(see Figure 2.16). The Bahraini Government has curtailed the 0.7
right to free expression and has responded with violence to
protest movements. After security forces in Diraz used live
0.6
ammunition to shoot protesters on 26 January 2017, Freedom
House issued a statement condemning Bahrain’s security
forces, accusing them of regularly using deadly force against 0.5
protesters and inviting the government to ‘hold its security
forces accountable for its repeated excessive use of force’
(Freedom House 2017). 0.4
In July 2018 the Office of the UN High Commission on Human

0.3
Rights (OHCHR), through its Human Rights Committee, called
on Bahrain to end its restrictions on freedom of expression
and the repression of activists. In its report, the committee 0.2
highlighted the fact that Bahrain’s anti-terrorism act was being
used extensively ‘outside the scope of terrorist, including
against human rights defenders and political activists’ (UN 0.1
OHCHR 2018: 5). The committee encouraged Bahrain to allow
peaceful protest and freedom of expression, citing the case
0.0
of Nabeel Rajab, one of the leaders of the pro-democracy 2000
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
protests, who was sentenced to five years in prison for
1975
criticizing Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the Yemen war, and

for accusing Bahraini prison authorities of torture (Frontline Bahrain Regional mean
Defenders 2019). Global mean Confidence interval
Notes: The y-axis is the index score, from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates high levels of Civil
Liberties. The light-shaded band around the green line demarcates the 68 per cent
confidence bounds of the estimate.
idea.int/gsod-indices>.
had campaigned for the lifting of the ban (Associated Press In the last 43 years, only five countries in the region (Bahrain,
2018). At least nine women remain detained without charges Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE) have seen significant
and subjected to violence, with some experts anticipating advances on Gender Equality—all still show low performance
their sentence could be up to 20 years (Human Rights Watch on this subcomponent. In 2018, only Lebanon and Jordan
2018). Their trial began in March 2019, although no foreign performed in the mid-range, and the rest performed at the
media, diplomats or independent observers were allowed to low level. Iraq (0.40), together with Papua New Guinea
attend the hearings. Three of the women were later released (0.26) and Turkey (0.35), is one of the three democracies in
on bail (Michaelson 2019). the world with a low score on Gender Equality.
Quotas are a step towards political gender equality No single country in the Middle East has reached the critical
The Middle East is the slowest-performing region in the minority point of 30 per cent women’s representation in the
world on Gender Equality, with an average score of 0.35 legislature. In fact, the average for the region is 11 per cent, the
in the GSoD Indices, and all countries in the bottom 25 lowest in the world. As of February 2019, the countries with
per cent of the world score. the highest percentages of women in councils (i.e. legislatures)
98
are Iraq (25 per cent), the UAE (23 per cent), Saudi Arabia in Yemen, including the Citizenship Law, Personal Status
(20 per cent) and Jordan (15 per cent). Of these, only Iraq’s Law, the penal code and the Evidence Law ‘systematically
is democratically elected (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2019). discriminate against women’ (Manea 2010: 3).
Since 2013 Iraq has imposed a quota for women in the Countries in the region are experiencing serious
country’s legislative branch, reserving 25 per cent of the humanitarian crises
seats in the Shura Council. So far, however, women have Despite the fact that two of the world’s worst
not received enough votes to be elected beyond the quota humanitarian crises—in Syria and Yemen—are currently
and gender discrimination continues as there are no unfolding in the region, the Middle East performs in the
structures that can assert women’s power in parliament (Al mid-range on Fundamental Rights. Both Syria and Yemen
Rahim 2019). While Saudi Arabia has reserved 25 per cent score in the bottom 25 per cent on all subattributes (Access
of the appointed seats in the Shura Council (Consultative to Justice, Civil Liberties, and Social Rights and Equality)
Council) for women, this can be viewed as an effort of Fundamental Rights. Both war-torn countries continue
to appeal to or appease Western partners rather than a to face democratic challenges, but most importantly a
representation of the progression of women’s rights in the worsening humanitarian crisis.
country.
In Syria, where the civil war commenced in 2011, it is
All countries in the region allow women to run for office, estimated that 12 million people are in need of assistance:
even those which do not impose gender quotas. Nonetheless, 95 per cent of the population lack adequate healthcare, 70
it is very difficult for women to win seats in councils. For per cent lack regular access to water and half of all children
example, the National Assembly in Kuwait is composed of receive no education. Because of the conflict, 30 per cent
65 seats, of which 15 are filled ex officio (Inter-Parliamentary of Syria’s citizens have been forced out of the country to
Union 2017). In the country’s 2016 elections, 15 women seek asylum, either in neighbouring countries or in Europe
ran for the 50 open seats but only 1 was successful: Safa Al (World Vision 2019).
Hashem, who was re-elected, and has been the only woman
in the parliament since 2012 (Cohn 2016). In Jordan, In Yemen, a period of unrest which began in 2012 had, by
the establishment of a 25 per cent quota at the local level 2015, developed into an ongoing war between Houthi rebels
(Dalacoura 2019: 18) translated into an increase in the and the internationally recognized Yemeni Government
number of women represented in the regional councils, from (backed by a Saudi-led coalition). Half of the population is
30 seats in 1995 to 241 seats in 2007. now at risk of famine, 75 per cent of the population require
some form of humanitarian assistance and 1.1 million
The Arab Uprisings brought minor progress in Yemeni people have contracted cholera, in the largest-ever epidemic
political participation, especially for women. In 2011, the of its kind (UN High Commissioner for Refugees 2019). In
GCC Initiative supported stronger participation of women 2018 the UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, declared
in parliament. In 2014, the National Dialogue Conference Yemen ‘the world’s worst humanitarian crisis’ (UN Office in
(NDC) stated that 30 per cent of the high offices, elected Geneva 2018).
bodies and the civil service had to be represented by women
(Council on Foreign Relations 2019). Efforts by women Palestine is also in need of humanitarian aid. The Israeli–
to achieve this goal were met with disdain by clerics and Palestinian conflict has been ongoing for years, although in the
tribal chiefs, who sought to keep women away from public last 11 years both the Israeli blockade and internal divisions
political life. As of 2017 there were no women in parliament within Palestine have further aggravated the humanitarian
and only 5 per cent of ministerial positions were held by crisis (BBC News 2019). According to the UN Office
women. However, many female activists in Yemen continue for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),
to fight for their voice to be heard, and for a more inclusive between 2013 and 2018, a total of 3,026 Palestinians were
interpretation of the Koran and Shari’a, which would killed and 80,598 were injured, while 160 Israelis were killed
empower women and their role in politics. Nevertheless, and 3,688 were injured (UN OCHA n.d.). The Palestinian
as of 2018, due to the ongoing conflict in the country, the protests taking place in Gaza near Israel’s perimeter fence
quota system had not become a reality. have escalated the number of Palestinian casualties and the
Gaza Strip is facing an unprecedented humanitarian crisis.
The laws in several countries in the region discriminate Access to essential services for its two million inhabitants is
against women, including on matters of personal status, insecure, and entire sectors of the economy have been wiped
criminal law and citizenship. For example, a number of laws out (UN News 2019a).
99
region opening dialogues on the importance of constitutional

reforms. By 2014, constitutional changes in countries such
as Egypt and Tunisia had laid the groundwork for other
countries (e.g. Morocco) to follow suit and make changes
The Checks on Government attribute aggregates scores from three in their constitutions. This, in turn, provided Middle
subattributes: Effective Parliament, Judicial Independence and Eastern countries with the means to develop robust judicial
the executive, as well as whether the courts are independent, and institutions and promote a more transparent and efficient
whether media is diverse and critical of the government without rule of law (Szmolka 2014).
Unfortunately, this opportunity was not seized, and the
constitutional reforms undertaken by some countries in
Summary: Checks on Government in the Middle East, the region did not translate into advances in Checks on
2018 Government scores. Instead reforms have been used by
governments as a pretext to strengthen their legitimacy
Regional average: Low (0.37) while holding on to power. For example, members of
the constitutional courts in Jordan and Syria are mostly
High N/A appointed by the executive. In this context, judges’ decisions
(>0.7)
are often made in alignment with the executive’s interests,
Mid-range Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait and Lebanon rather than in accordance with the law, for fear of losing
(0.4–0.7) their positions or privileges. If rules and procedures are not
established to allow constitutional courts to resist political
Low Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, UAE pressure, they will continue to be a façade for the rule of
(<0.4) and Yemen
law (International IDEA and Center for Constitutional
Transitions 2014).
Struggling for free media can be life-threatening

Iraq stands out as the country with the highest
Media freedoms are an essential building block for strong
scores on Checks on Government (0.61) in
the region (with Jordan and Lebanon right
and robust democracies. In order to hold governments
behind), and on par with the world average accountable, citizens have found new spaces for expression,
(0.62). Iraq outperforms the Middle East on all including social media networks. Protesters and journalists
Checks on Government subattributes. in the Middle East have used social media tools to raise issues
on the public agenda and to expose human rights and other
violations. Nevertheless, for journalists, the Middle East
continues to be one of the most dangerous regions in which
Checks on Government have remained stagnant in to operate.
the Middle East, with 9 out of 12 countries showing
no overall or net improvements on this measure since Media Integrity, one of the subattributes of Checks on
1975. According to the GSoD Indices, 8 (20 per cent) out Government, fares poorly in the region, with scores of 0.38
of 40 countries in the world currently scoring in the bottom and 0.35 in 2013 and 2018, respectively (see Figure 2.17).
25 per cent on Checks on Government are in the Middle Following some gains in the post-2011 period, the media
East. Effective Parliament showed the biggest advance in landscape has witnessed a steady erosion, with the exception
the region, with a 99 per cent improvement between 1975 of countries such as Kuwait and Lebanon, which have a
and 2018. On this measure, eight countries have recorded more consolidated tradition of relatively free media (see
significant advances in the last 43 years, while none have e.g. Fanack 2018). Compared to the regional GSoD Indices
declined. score on Media Integrity, Lebanon has a score of 0.69, and
Kuwait scores 0.59, placing them above the world average.
Constitutional reforms have not led to increased judicial
independence Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index
The overthrow of authoritarian leaders, such as Ben Ali in (2019a), which provides measurements for 180 countries,
Tunisia (2011) or Abdullah Saleh in Yemen (2012), meant shows that 5 countries in the Middle East are among the 15
that people’s hopes for democratic change in the region were worst countries for journalists in the world: Bahrain (ranked
raised. Ensuing events led to a number of countries in the 167th), Yemen (168th), Iran (170th), Saudi Arabia (172nd)
100
and Syria (174th). Syria actually advanced three positions in Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2018). However, this
the ranking between 2018 and 2019. Although 11 journalists initial firmness has evaporated and individually European
were killed in Syria in 2018, the number of killed has fallen countries are seeking to maintain a degree of normalcy in
each year, from 69 in 2013 to 36 in 2014, 26 in 2015, 20 in their relations with Saudi Arabia, driven to a large extent
2016 and 13 in 2017 (Reporters Without Borders 2019b). by business interests. Although the European Union is
expected to continue calling on Saudi Arabia to improve
The assassination of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in its human rights and civil liberties record, firmer measures
the Saudi Arabian consulate in Istanbul in October 2018 are not to be expected (Barnes-Dacey 2019). Russia, on the
received widespread international media attention and other hand, kept quiet and acknowledged Saudi statements
also had a regional impact. International media outlets on the issue (Hall 2018).
demanded that Saudi Arabia—especially Mohammed Bin
Salman, the crown prince who is believed to have been Nonetheless, the sustained pressure from Western media
implicated in the assassination—be held accountable. outlets and activist groups demanding justice for the slain
However, the reaction of the US administration has been journalist might have played a role in the decision of Saudi
interpreted by some as legitimizing Saudi Arabia’s actions Arabia to push for the peace talks on the conflict in Yemen,
(see e.g. Reuters 2018a). Europe’s stance was, in principle, which were held in December 2018 in Stockholm (UN
stronger. Germany re-imposed an arms embargo and, Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for
together with France and the United Kingdom, demanded a Yemen 2018). As a consequence of the talks, an agreement
thorough investigation, as its ties to Saudi Arabia depended was reached on a ceasefire in the city of Hodeidah, which
on the credibility of such an investigation (Reuters 2018b; would enable humanitarian aid to enter the country.
However, the Stockholm Agreements have still not been
enacted, with parties delaying the process. The timeframe
FIGURE 2.17
of the Hodeidah agreement was too short (21 days) to be
effectively enacted and the language lacked precision. The
Media Integrity in selected Middle Eastern countries, UN Special Envoy for Yemen is still working to achieve the
1975–2018 decisions reached in the agreement and a multiparty dialogue
is taking place. Some advances have been made, not only to
1.0
reach a peace agreement but to develop a strategy that will
Iraq Lebanon
0.9 Syria United Arab Emirates
ensure a peaceful transition to democracy.
World
0.8
0.7
0.6 Impartial Administration is the aggregation of two subattributes:

Absence of Corruption and Predictable Enforcement. It measures the
0.5 extent to which the state is free from corruption, and whether the
enforcement of public authority is predictable.
0.4
0.3
Summary: Impartial Administration in the Middle East,
0.2 2018
0.1 Regional average: Mid-range (0.42)
0.0 High UAE

(>0.7)
2000
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
1975
Mid-range Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar

Notes: This figure compares the countries with the highest and lowest scores on Media
(0.4–0.7)
Integrity in the region for 2018 and displays their performance over time.
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy (2019), <http://www.idea.int/ Low Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and
gsod-indices>. (<0.4) Yemen
101
Impartial Administration is the only attribute for which FIGURE 2.18

the Middle East does not have the lowest scores in the
world. On this measure the Middle East, with a score of Absence of Corruption in the Middle East, 1975–2018
0.42, sits midway between Asia and the Pacific (0.45) and
80
Africa (0.39). Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen
score lower than the regional average for the Middle East,
70
while the UAE is the only country in the region to score highly
on this attribute. In fact, the UAE is the only country in the
60
Middle East among the 40 countries that make up the top
25 per cent in the world on Impartial Administration. Both
50
the UAE and Oman score also higher than the regional and
world averages on Absence of Corruption and are considered
40
the least corrupt countries in the Middle East.
30
The obstinacy of politicians ensures that corruption
continues unchecked
20
The topic of corruption has been at the centre of the debate
in the Middle East for decades, as it is one of the central 10
challenges in the region. According to the GSoD Indices,
eight countries’ levels of corruption are above the world 0
average. Five countries have high levels of corruption,
2000
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
1975
scoring low for Absence of Corruption, while seven

have mid-range levels. While no country has low levels Low Mid-range High
of corruption, the UAE has relatively high mid-range
levels, scoring at 0.69 despite being one of the world’s few int/gsod-indices>.
persistent non-democracies (see Figure 2.18).
Some countries in the region are trying to take action to practice in Iran, gifts or bribes to public officials in Oman
address corruption. However, political corruption is so are criminalized, making them a rare act when trying to
ingrained that efforts by governments to increase transparency obtain favourable judicial decisions (GAN Integrity 2016).
have not yielded the expected results, and citizens regard However, nepotism is still widespread in both countries,
government officials and members of parliament as being especially in the higher spheres of political power.
most corrupt (Transparency International 2016). Politics
and corruption are therefore closely interlinked, and vested The GSoD Indices data indicate that Lebanon still has high
interests work to ensure that laws passed to fight corruption levels of corruption. In addition, according to the Arab
remain unenforced (Transparency International 2018). Barometer, 94 per cent of Lebanese citizens believe that there
is corruption within the government, while only 15 per cent
In Iran, the powerful system of patronage has undermined believe that the government is cracking down on corruption
the Rouhani administration’s anti-corruption efforts. Rich (Arab Barometer 2017). However, the government has made
and influential citizens are often spared prosecution and recent efforts to fight corruption. In 2017, it passed the Access
the intelligence services often determine the judgement of to Information Law (Article 19 2017) and committed to
politically sensitive cases (GAN Integrity 2017). Judicial join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI),
institutions designed to control corruption suffer from which measures the good governance of oil and gas resources
nepotism, cronyism and influence-peddling (Shahidsaless (EITI 2017).
2016). Moreover, in a context where civil society is severely
restricted and civil liberties repressed, there is little space for
citizens and CSOs to expose bribery and corruption. Participatory Engagement
The Omani Government generally implements the laws of

the Omani Penal Code fairly efficiently. Its efforts to curb Participatory Engagement is the only attribute that does not have
corruption have seen high-ranking officials prosecuted for a score, as its four subattributes (Civil Society Participation,
crimes of corruption and abuse of office. Contrary to the
102
not aggregated. The subattributes measure citizens’ participation

in CSOs and in elections, and the existence of direct democracy as advocacy organizations (e.g. on women’s and human
instruments available to citizens, as well as the extent to which rights). The Arab Uprisings further reinvigorated civil
local elections are free. society in the Middle East and North Africa. However, in
the past decade, this civic space has contracted.
While in other regions the shrinking of civic space

Summary: Participatory Engagement in the Middle often occurs in contexts of democratic backsliding, in
East, 2018
the Middle East and North Africa, it has taken place in
Regional average: Low countries that have experienced deepening autocratization
(e.g. Bahrain and Yemen in the Middle East and Egypt
High N/A and Libya in North Africa). Half of the countries in the
Middle East have experienced some declines on Civil
Society Participation since 2013.
Mid-range Lebanon
Low Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi

The most significant decline has occurred in Yemen, which
Arabia, Syria, UAE and Yemen had actually seen some advances between 2011 and 2012
due to attempts by the Saleh administration to regain the
stability lost during the civilian protests resulting from
the Arab Uprisings. However, these advances came to
While there is no aggregated GSoD Indices score a halt with the advent of the conflict in Yemen. Since
for Participatory Engagement, the regional average the war erupted in 2015, the steadily decreasing number
on this measure in the Middle East is low. Only one of CSOs in the country have faced severe restrictions
country, Lebanon, performs in the mid-range in terms (International Center for Not-for-Profit Law 2018).
of its Participatory Engagement, while the remaining 11 Yemen’s profound decline on this democratic dimension
countries in the region perform at low levels. A similar started in 2013; by 2018 it had recorded its lowest-ever
trend can be seen for the countries in North Africa. score (0.20) on this measure. Together with Syria, Yemen
is now among the seven countries in the world with the
Civic space in the Middle East has seen advances lowest levels of Civil Society Participation (see Figure
followed by setbacks 2.19; Box 2.6).
Since 2013, the Middle East has seen a shrinking of civic
space, as measured by the indicators of Civil Liberties In the last decade, the region has increasingly become
(particularly Freedom of Expression and Association more violent, resulting in the relocation or closure
and Assembly), Media Integrity and Civil Society of a number of CSOs. In addition, various laws have
Participation. In particular, Bahrain, Egypt, Libya and been passed that restrict CSO operations. According to
Yemen have seen significant declines on one or more of Abdelaziz (2017), these laws have been especially harsh
these measures during this time. on CSOs focusing on human rights and democracy
issues. Bahrain and Jordan provide telling examples. In
In the 1990s, the Middle East saw an increase in the Jordan, the Council of Ministers decided in 2017 that
number of active CSOs, mainly as service providers in non-governmental organizations (NGOs) would be
health and education and other social assistance, but also subject to the requirements of the 2007 Anti-Money
BOX 2.6
Yemen on the brink

In 1990 North and South Yemen unified, creating the Republic Yemen was not considered a democracy, as the elections were
of Yemen, with President Ali Abdullah Saleh as head of state. a façade for Saleh’s regime to maintain its legitimacy.
At the time of unification, and in contrast to the absolutist
monarchies in the region, Yemen was the only country in the In 2011, the ripple effects of the Arab Uprisings also spread
Arabian Peninsula to hold periodic elections. Despite this fact, to Yemen, which was already on the brink of a revolution. The
103
ensuing unrest in Yemen echoed the purported cause of the critical: 14.3 million people are classified as being in acute
uprisings but was also the consequence of more than 30 years need, of which two million are children under the age of
of abuse of power by the governing class. By this time, Yemen’s five. More than 20 million people in Yemen suffer from food
GSoD Indices score for Representative Government was not insecurity and 10 million suffer extreme levels of hunger (UN
significantly higher than in 1990, indicating that for more than OCHA 2019). In early 2019, the UN stated that Yemen continues
20 years the representation of Yemenis by the political class to be the world’s greatest humanitarian crisis (UN News
had stagnated. 2019b).
In 2012, after 33 years in power, President Ali Abdullah Saleh

resigned, precipitating an internal war. By September 2014 FIGURE 2.19
the Houthis had taken Sana’a, and Yemen’s internationally
recognized President, Abdarrabuh Mansur Hadi, had Civil Society Participation in Yemen, 1975–2018
absconded to Saudi Arabia. Soon after, the so-called Saudi
Alliance (a coalition led by Saudi Arabia that includes 0.7
Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Sudan and
the UAE) commenced attacks on the Houthis and the war
escalated. These events saw Yemen’s score on Representative 0.6
Government decline from 0.25 in 2015 to zero in 2016—where
it remained in 2018.
0.5
The Arab Uprisings brought minor progress in Yemeni
political participation: CSOs, focusing on youth and women’s
0.4
empowerment, flourished in the immediate aftermath. This led
to a spike in Yemen’s Civil Society Participation subattribute
in 2012, reaching 0.60 (Yemen’s highest score for this 0.3
subattribute since 1975). However, the escalation of the conflict
and the beginning of the war in 2015 meant that this score
plunged to 0.20 in 2018, one of the lowest scores that Yemen 0.2
has seen.
It is difficult to explain the GSoD Indices scores for Yemen 0.1

(see Table 2.13) without considering the almost complete
breakdown of institutional mechanisms that have resulted from
0.0
the armed conflict in the country. When juxtaposed against a
prism of war, it becomes clear why most aspects of the GSoD
2000
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
1975
Indices have declined in a statistically significant manner

since 2015 in Yemen. On subattributes such as Clean Elections, Yemen Regional mean
Inclusive Suffrage, Electoral Participation and Local Democracy,
Global mean Confidence interval
Yemen now scores zero, because such mechanisms are simply
non-existent in such conditions of war. Notes: The light-shaded bands around the orange line demarcate the 68 per cent
confidence bounds of the estimates.
This has subsequently resulted in Yemen falling into the non- Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019), <http://
www.idea.int/gsod-indices>.
democracy category. The situation in the country remains
TABLE 2.13
The state of democracy in Yemen, 2018

0.0 – 0.27 – 0.29 – 0.21 = Low
Notes: = denotes no statistically significant increase or decrease in the last five-year period; – denotes a statistically significant decrease in the last five-year period.
104
Laundering Law and Counter-Terrorism Financing Law. The Middle East is also home to the largest share of enduring
NGOs that fail to comply with these requirements now non-democracies in the world and its hybrid regimes have
face suspension, monetary fines, or even detention. In never made the step to full democracy, seemingly stuck in an
Bahrain, the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Interior enduring state of hybridity. The conflicts in Syria and Yemen
vet funding for CSOs from international sources (Abdelaziz continue to have humanitarian ripple effects on the rest of
2017). the region.
2.2.4. Conclusion The region’s share of democracies is the lowest in the world,
The Middle East is the region in the world that suffers and the two democracies that do exist—Iraq and Lebanon—
from the greatest democratic weakness. The democratic are weak and democratically fragile. The violent protests
hopes brought about by the Arab Uprisings have dwindled in Iraq in 2019 provide testimony to the many challenges
and the region’s democratic performance has since the country is yet to overcome on its road to democratic
worsened. Moreover, a number of countries in the Middle consolidation. Efforts need to focus on supporting the
East (including Bahrain and Yemen) and North Africa strengthening of these two countries’ democracy, and on the
(including Egypt and Libya) have suffered from deepening lessons from Tunisia’s experience. Significant efforts are also
autocratization, with significant declines on at least three of required in order to enhance gender equality and speed up
their democratic subattributes since 2013. progress on SDG 5.5 in the region.
TABLE 2.14
The Global State of Democracy Indices snapshot: Policy considerations for the Middle East
This table offers a snapshot of the state of democracy in the Middle East, using the GSoD conceptual framework as an organizing
structure. It presents policy considerations across the five main attributes of democracy—Representative Government, Fundamental
Rights, Checks on Government, Impartial Administration and Participatory Engagement. As Syria and Yemen are countries in conflict, the
immediate priority must be ending these conflicts. For this reason, the policy considerations do not apply to these two countries.
Representative GSoD Indices score: Low (0.23)

Government

Nine countries in the Middle East are in the bottom 25 Bahrain, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia
per cent of the world for Elected Government. Iraq and and the UAE
Lebanon, the only democracies in the region, perform in
the mid-range, as does Syria. Priority areas for reform:
• Advocate for the decentralization of the government and
its processes.
• Focus on the subregional and then the national level, by
building capacity for local councils.

Two countries (Bahrain and Yemen) have seen significant Bahrain, Qatar and Saudi Arabia
declines on Clean Elections between 2013 and 2018. Of
all the countries in the Middle East, 58 per cent are now
below the global average for Clean Elections. In addition,
42 per cent are in the bottom 25 per cent of global
performance on this measure.
105

At 0.56, the Middle East has the lowest levels of Inclusive Qatar and Saudi Arabia
Suffrage of any region in the world. This is well below
the global average of 0.84. In addition, 58 per cent of the Good-practice countries for regional learning:
countries in the Middle East are in the bottom 25 per cent Kuwait (top 25% in the world)
of global performance. Kuwait is the only country in the
region in the top 25 per cent of global performance.

The Gulf monarchies (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi The GCC monarchies
Arabia and the UAE) are among the 15 lowest-scoring
countries in the world on Free Political Parties. The Middle Priority areas for reform:
East has the lowest levels of Free Political Parties of • The GCC monarchies should consider allowing the
any region in the world, at 0.28—well below the global establishment of free political parties.
average of 0.54.
• Allow political parties to operate without restricting
their agendas.

On Access to Justice, 75 per cent of countries in the Middle Bahrain
East score in the mid-range. In addition, 42 per cent of
countries in the region are in the bottom 25 per cent
globally.

A total of 11 countries in the Middle East (92 per cent) are Bahrain, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE
in the bottom 25 per cent of global performance for Civil
Liberties.
Gender Equality: Priority democracies for reform:

A total of 10 countries in the Middle East (83 per cent) Iraq
score low on Gender Equality, while only 2 (Jordan and
Lebanon) score in the mid-range. All 12 countries in the Priority areas for reform:
Middle East are below the global average on Gender Encourage gender quotas in parliaments, as they have
Equality, and in the bottom 25 per cent of the world. Of proved useful in other countries to encourage women’s
the 10 worst-performing countries in the world, 4 are participation in politics.
in the Middle East. Yemen and Saudi Arabia score the
lowest, with 0.19 and 0.20, respectively. Iraq is one of the
three democracies in the world that score low on Gender
Equality.

Half of the countries in the Middle East score in the Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE
bottom 25 per cent for Social Group Equality.
Basic Welfare*: Good-practice countries for regional learning:

Half of the countries in the Middle East have high levels of Lebanon and Qatar, which score at the top 25% in the world
Basic Welfare, while the other half have mid-range levels.
No country in the region performs low on this measure;
58 per cent of countries in the Middle East are above the
global average on Basic Welfare.
106
Checks on GSoD Indices score: Low (0.37)

Government

On Effective Parliament, 58 per cent of countries in the Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE
Middle East score in the bottom 25 per cent.

Half of the countries in the Middle East score in the Bahrain, Iran, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the UAE
bottom 25 per cent for Judicial Independence. No
countries in the region have high levels, or score over the
global average, on Judicial Independence.

On Media Integrity, 75 per cent of countries in the Middle Bahrain, Iran, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE
East are in the global bottom 25 per cent.

Administration
Absence of Corruption: Priority democracies for reform:

Half of the countries in the Middle East score below the Lebanon and Iraq
global average on Absence of Corruption, while two (Oman
and the UAE) are above the global average. Priority areas for reform:
• Enforce anti-corruption laws and demand accountability
and legal transparency.
• Use the digitalization of bureaucratic processes as a
tool to fight corruption.
Predictable Enforcement: Priority democracies for reform:

On Predictable Enforcement, 41 per cent of countries in Iraq
the Middle East have mid-range performance, while 50 per
cent have low levels. No countries in the region has seen
any advance on Predictable Enforcement since 2013.
107
Participatory GSoD Indices score: Low

Engagement
Civil Society Participation: Priority countries for reform:

On Civil Society Participation, 67 per cent of countries in Bahrain, Iran, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE
the Middle East are in the bottom 25 per cent. Iraq is the
only country with high levels of Civil Society Participation. Priority areas for reform:
Help empower civil society and citizens by mobilizing
them to rebuild political institutions and enhance their
participation.

Iraq

Three-quarters of the countries in the Middle East are Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia
in the bottom 25 per cent for Electoral Participation. No
country is in the top 25 per cent. Iraq and Lebanon, both
democracies, have a mid-range performance for this
subattribute.

The Middle East has the lowest average score in the world All countries
on Direct Democracy: all countries in the region have low
performance for this subattribute, while 75 per cent score
in the bottom 25 per cent worldwide.
Local Democracy: Priority democracies for reform:

No country in the Middle East has high levels of Local Iraq
Democracy. While nine countries in the region have low
levels of Local Democracy, two have mid-range levels.
Kuwait does not have a score for this subattribute. There
have been positive developments in the last 20 years
with the percentage of countries with low levels of Local
Democracy falling from 100 per cent in 1998 to 82 per cent
in 2018.
Notes: *The data on Basic Welfare contains some gaps and may not be applicable in countries with quickly worsening conditions (e.g. Syria and Yemen) as not all indicator-level data is
updated annually.
108
TABLE 2.15
Regime classification, the Middle East, 2018

This table shows the regime classification for all of the countries in the Middle East covered by the GSoD Indices, as well as their
respective scores on the five GSoD attributes.
GSoD attribute

Country
Democracies
Iraq 0.49 = 0.44 = 0.58 = 0.34 Low
Lebanon 0.50 = 0.54 = 0.57 = 0.398 = Mid-range
Hybrid regimes
Jordan 0.403 = 0.59 = 0.53 = 0.55 = Low
Kuwait 0.41 = 0.59 = 0.59 = 0.50 = Low
Oman 0.35 = 0.54 = 0.30 = 0.53 = Low
Non-democracies
Bahrain 0.23 = 0.22 = 0.21 = 0.33 = Low
Iran 0.28 = 0.43 = 0.41 = 0.43 = Low
Qatar 0= 0.46 = 0.25 = 0.42= Low
Saudi Arabia 0= 0.34 = 0.23 = 0.36 = Low
Syria 0= 0.21 = 0.21 = 0.17 = Low
United Arab Emirates 0.12 = 0.45 = 0.22 = 0.703 = Low
Yemen 0– 0.27 – 0.29 – 0.21 = Low
High Mid-range Low
Notes: = denotes no statistically significant increase or decrease in the last five-year period; + denotes a statistically significant increase in the last five-year period; – denotes a statistically
significant decrease in the last five-year period.
109
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113
The state of democracy in the Americas Addressing the Ills, Reviving the Promise
Chapter 3
in the Americas
This chapter focuses on the Americas, a region which is not defined in the Global State of Democracy (GSoD)
Indices, but which is used in this report as an umbrella term for two regions covered in separate sections:
Latin America and the Caribbean, and North America. The Latin American and Caribbean section
provides an overview of the current democratic landscape in the region, using the GSoD conceptual
framework as an organizing structure. The analysis highlights current gains and opportunities for
democracy as well as democratic challenges. The North America section provides an overview of the most
recent GSoD Indices data on the region. The section also features a case study on the state of democracy
in the United States.
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN AND THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS
independent judiciaries, effective parliaments, political parties

and civil society participation.
Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions
SDG 16.7 on inclusive decision-making has seen declines in
Clean Elections, Elected Government, Electoral Participation
Latin America and the Caribbean has seen mixed progress in and Social Group Equality, as well as increases in Effective
implementing Sustainable Development Goal 16 (SDG 16) since Parliament, but stagnation in Local Democracy.
2015, and significant challenges remain.
It is the region after Europe with the largest share of SDG 16

indicators that have seen declines. Of the 18 GSoD indicators
used to measure progress on SDG 16, 72 per cent (13) have
Gender Equality
seen more countries with declines than gains since 2015.
This is the case for SDG 16.1 on reducing violence and for SDG Latin America and the Caribbean performs third, after North
16.10 on fundamental freedoms, where all indicators have seen America and Europe, on Gender Equality and SDG 5.5 on
declines, except for Freedom of Association and Assembly, the political representation of women. The GSoD Indices
which has seen stagnation. Stagnation is seen on SDG 16.5 on subattribute of (political) Gender Equality for Latin America and
reducing corruption. Mixed results are seen on SDG 16.6 on the Caribbean has seen one country (Brazil) decline since 2015;
accountable institutions, with gains outnumbering declines for no country has advanced on this measure.
114
2019 The state of democracy in the Americas
KEY FINDINGS
• Venezuela is the region’s most democratically ailing country.

It has undergone a process of severe democratic backsliding
Positive developments over the past two decades, which resulted in a full democratic
breakdown in 2017. In fact, Venezuela is the only country in the
world that has gone from being a democracy with high levels
of Representative Government (from 1975 to 1996) to a non-
• Latin America and the Caribbean is the third-most democratic
democracy.
region in the world, after North America and Europe, with all
but three countries classified as democracies. Democracies • A number of other countries have suffered from backsliding
in the region have proven resilient. Of the five countries or democratic erosion (or both). Nicaragua has undergone
that were democracies in 1977, four (Colombia, Costa Rica, a process of severe democratic backsliding in recent years,
Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago) have remained democracies regressing into the category of hybrid regime in 2016. Brazil has
uninterruptedly. Among the 16 countries that transitioned experienced democratic erosion in the past five years. It is the
to democracy after 1977, almost 75 per cent have remained democracy in the region with declines on most subattributes
democracies without interruptions. (8 out of 16) and among the top five countries in the world with
the largest number of declines since 2013. During the same
• Latin America and the Caribbean has a heterogenous democratic
period, Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El
landscape. At the same time, a small number of democracies
Salvador and Haiti have experienced declines on at least one
stand out for their high performance. Of the top five countries in
subattribute of democracy.
the world with the highest levels of Representative Government,
three (Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay) are in Latin America. In 2018, • Some countries in the region are characterized by democratic
Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay were the two countries in the fragility. Of the 16 countries that transitioned to democracy
region (from a total of 21 in the world) that scored highly on all after 1977, 5 have had undemocratic interruptions, backsliding
democratic attributes. Costa Rica, Chile and Jamaica score highly into hybrid regimes, but 4 (Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras
on four of the five attributes. The democratic performance of these and Peru) have since returned to democracy. Dominican
five countries is also high compared to the rest of the world—they Republic, Haiti and Honduras are also the weakest democracies
all score among the top 25 per cent in the world on Representative in the region, together with Guatemala, judging from their low
Government, Fundamental Rights, Checks on Government and, performance on one or more of their democratic attributes.
with the exception of Jamaica, Impartial Administration.
• The region suffers from the highest levels of socio-economic
• The best performing aspects of Latin American democracy inequalities in the world, which has translated into highly
compared to the rest of the world are Electoral Participation (on unequal access to political power. This has also resulted in
which measure the region has the highest levels in the world, Latin America and the Caribbean having the highest rates of
together with Asia and the Pacific) and Freedom of Religion (on crime and violence in the world. Combined with high levels of
which measure the region scores higher than Europe). On all corruption, this undermines trust in democracy and fuels civic
other aspects of democracy, Latin America and the Caribbean discontent.
performs third-best, after North America and Europe.
• Political parties in Latin America are suffering from a crisis
• Latin America and the Caribbean is the region with most of representation. This crisis derives from their difficulty in
advances in political gender equality in the past decades. adapting to societal transformation and increasing expectations
Together with Europe, the region has the highest representation of a middle-class population deceived by lack of delivery in
of women in parliament, averaging 27 per cent, which is above reducing corruption and inequalities. It has pushed voters in
the world average of 24 per cent. some countries away from traditional parties towards anti-
establishment leaders.
• Similar to other parts of the world, Latin America and the

Challenges to democracy Caribbean has also experienced a shrinking of civic and media
space in recent years. Limitations on civic space are often, but
not always, linked to advocacy or investigation into corruption
and illicit networks.
• The quality of Latin American democracy varies widely: 12
different democratic performance patterns can be identified. The • The region is also facing new challenges, including migration.
most common democratic performance patterns are (a) mid-range These are driven, in part, by democratic breakdown in Venezuela
on four of five attributes; and (b) low performance on at least one and Nicaragua, as well as a less porous border between Mexico
attribute of democracy. and the United States, which diverts migration flows from Central
America to the rest of the region.
• Cuba is the only country in the region not to have undergone
a democratic transition since 1975 and to have persisted as • There is a marked decline in the support for democracy across
a non-democratic regime for the past four decades. Cuba’s the region. Public opinion surveys show a 12-point drop in
role in the democratic breakdown of Venezuela should not support for democracy over the last decade, from 70 per cent in
be underestimated. Venezuela has supplied Cuba with oil in 2008 to 58 per cent in 2017, with close to a 9-point decline in the
exchange for Cuban doctors, teachers and intelligence advisors. last three years alone (Latinobarómetro 2018).
115
A number of democracies have also seen an erosion of their

democratic performance in recent years, and some suffer
3.1. The state of democracy in Latin America from weak democratic performance. This disenchantment has
and the Caribbean pushed voters towards anti-establishment strongmen on both
This section provides an overview of long-term democratic the left and right of the political spectrum, who have gained
trends in the Latin American and Caribbean region as well access to the reins of government in a number of countries in
as an overview of the current democratic landscape, using the region. The GSoD Indices data shows, with the examples
the Global State of Democracy conceptual framework as a of Venezuela and Nicaragua, that if leaders with populist
basis. It highlights the current opportunities for democracy authoritarian tendencies sustain themselves in power through
in the region, as well as the challenges it faces. The analysis the electoral channel and constitutional means, this can over
is based on the GSoD Indices as the principal data source, the medium term contribute to democratic backsliding which
but also draws on a number of other complementary may ultimately result in democratic breakdown.
sources.
In order to continue to advance democratically, build
The GSoD Indices for Latin America and the Caribbean on the region’s democratic momentum and re-establish
cover 22 of the 29 countries in the region, as only countries citizens’ trust in democracy, countries in Latin America and
with more than one million inhabitants are included in the Caribbean need to tackle the societal problems they
the GSoD sample. Furthermore, not all non-GSoD data face, reduce their high levels of inequality, strengthen their
sources used in the chapter are available for the Caribbean. judicial institutions to more effectively reduce corruption,
Therefore, when the chapter refers only to Latin America and reinvigorate their political party systems.
this means that data was not available for the Caribbean.
3.1.2. Taking the long-term perspective:
3.1.1. Introduction democratic developments since 1975
The third wave of democracy in Latin America and the Latin America and the Caribbean has experienced an
Caribbean began in 1978 and the region has since undergone historically unprecedented democratic expansion and its
a profound democratic transformation. In the 1970s, the longest democracy cycle, during the so-called third wave of
region was mostly dominated by authoritarian regimes under democratization (Huntington 1991). In the region, this wave
military rule. Now, all those countries have transitioned to of democratization started in 1978 when the Dominican
democracy, with the exception of Cuba, the only country in Republic transitioned from authoritarianism to democracy.
the region not to have experienced democracy. This was followed by democratic transitions in Ecuador
(1979); Peru (1980); Honduras (1982); Argentina (1983); El
Latin America and the Caribbean is now the third-best Salvador (1984); Bolivia, Brazil and Uruguay (all in 1985);
democratically performing region in the world, after North Guatemala (1986); Paraguay (1989); Chile, Nicaragua and
America and Europe. It even outperforms these two regions Panama (all in 1990); and Mexico (starting gradually in the
on some aspects (e.g. both regions on Electoral Participation, period 1977–1997 and culminating in 2000).
and Europe on Freedom of Religion). However, despite its
significant democratic advances, Latin America and the Because the region’s third wave of democratization started
Caribbean faces a number of challenges to its democratic in 1978, 1977 is used as the baseline year to study the
landscape. democratic transformation of the region. Hence, in 1977,
16 of the 22 countries in the region covered by the GSoD
Cuba’s non-democratic persistence provides a model to Indices were classified as non-democracies, mostly in the form
regimes, including Venezuela and Nicaragua, that have of authoritarian military regimes, while today all but three
recently significantly backslid from democracies to hybrid countries in the region are democracies (see Figure 3.1).
regimes or non-democracies. The democratic collapse of
Venezuela has had spill-over effects on the rest of the region, Latin America and the Caribbean is one of the regions in
generating the most severe migration and humanitarian crisis the world that has seen most democratic advances since the
in Latin America’s history (BBC News 2018b). Even the 1970s. Its average regional increase across all democratic aspects
democracies in the region face significant challenges. High during this period was 65 per cent, well above the world average
levels of corruption, inequality (the highest in the world), increase of 41 per cent. Latin America and the Caribbean is
insecurity, crime and violence have undermined people’s the only region in the world that has seen some advances in
trust in democracy, with levels of support for democracy reducing corruption since 1975 (19 per cent improvement),
now at their lowest in a decade. while all other regions have seen average increases in corruption.
116
FIGURE 3.1 democratic principles and enabled institutional changes that

strengthen democracy in the region—with the exception of
Regime types in Latin America and the Caribbean, the constitutional amendment processes in Nicaragua and
1977–2018 Venezuela, which have been used to weaken democracy.
20 Alongside advances in access to rights and political

freedoms, the region has also experienced an important
18
process of institutional development. Key institutions
16 for electoral democracy have been put in place, with some
countries creating new electoral management bodies (EMBs)
14 or substantially reforming existing EMBs in ways that have
greatly enhanced their capacity and performance.
No. of countries
12
10 Governments have also incorporated a variety of new

instruments for accountability related to anti-corruption and
8 transparency. These include international covenants advanced
by the United Nations and the Organization of American
6
States (OAS) and other international initiatives to enhance
4 the transparency and openness of governments. In addition,
governments have strengthened national policy frameworks
2 for auditing agencies, established asset disclosure requirements
for public officials, adopted access to information laws,
0
1977 2018 implemented public procurement systems and passed
Democracies Non-democracies
campaign-finance and money-laundering regulations and
Hybrid regimes norms, while gradually setting up the instruments needed for
e-government (Casas-Zamora and Carter 2017).
int/gsod-indices>.
The pace of democratic progress in the region has varied.
It was fastest between 1978 and 1990 but slowed down until
mid-2000; progress has since stagnated across all dimensions
These advances have expanded the democratic space except Basic Welfare and Electoral Participation. Some
in the region. The democratic aspects measured by the (statistically non-significant) regional declines have even been
GSoD Indices that have seen most improvements are Direct observed on Free Political Parties, Civil Society Participation
Democracy, Representative Government and specifically and Media Integrity since mid-2000. From 2013 to 2018,
Clean Elections, all of which have nearly doubled since no dimension has seen any significant advances in regional
1975. Significant improvements have also been observed averages, although some country-level advances have occurred.
in Effective Parliament, Social Rights and Equality, Local
Democracy, and Gender Equality. Democracies in the Latin American and the Caribbean
region have proven remarkably resilient in the past
Through these gains, citizens in the region have gained various four decades. Of the five countries in the region that were
new rights, including enhanced protection for indigenous democracies in 1977, four (Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica,
peoples, Afro-descendants, children, LGBT groups and and Trinidad and Tobago) have remained democracies
people with disabilities, among other underprivileged uninterruptedly until today. Of the 16 countries that
groups. Many of these new social rights have been enshrined transitioned to democracy after 1978, almost three-
in recent constitutions. Others have been strengthened quarters (11 countries) have remained democracies without
thanks to the adoption of international covenants. interruptions. Of these, Uruguay has made most democratic
advances, scoring low on four out of five attributes in 1975;
As a result of democratic transition processes, between 1984 now, together with Trinidad and Tobago (and 19 other
and 2017 a total of nine Latin American countries held countries in the world) Uruguay records high performance
assemblies to write new constitutions, while other nations on all democratic attributes. Uruguay, together with Costa
reformed parts of existing constitutions (International Rica, can be seen as a democratic success for the region (see
IDEA 2018). These processes have helped affirm basic Box 3.1).
117
Of the four countries that have had undemocratic mid-range today, are Absence of Corruption, Access to
interruptions since 1978, two (Dominican Republic and Justice and Social Group Equality.
Peru) have since returned to democracy without any further
interruptions, for more than 23 and 18 years, respectively. While the large majority of countries that transitioned
during the third wave have remained democracies, several
While the region has seen significant democratic have been characterized by greater democratic fragility.
advances since 1975, not all aspects of democracy have Of the 16 countries that transitioned to democracy after
advanced at the same pace, with some dimensions 1978, four had democratic interruptions but then returned
trailing behind others. The subattributes that have seen to democracy: Dominican Republic (1994–1995), Haiti,
the slowest advances, and where the region scores in the Honduras (2009–2012) and Peru (1992–2000). Haiti
BOX 3.1
Two democratic success stories: Costa Rica and Uruguay

Costa Rica presents a case of high-performing democratic (Murillo 2018). Additional challenges relate to the strain of
endurance in a democratically weak subregion (Central immigration caused by the worsening political situation in
America). Its democratic performance, as measured by the Nicaragua, and high levels of income inequality. Costa Rica is
GSoD Indices, has been consistently high for four decades. now the sixth-most income-unequal country in the region (see
Costa Rica scored in the top 25 per cent in the world on 13 of 16 e.g. World Bank 2018).
subattributes in 1975; in 2018 it recorded similarly high scores
on 15 democratic subattributes. Costa Rica also has the highest Uruguay presents a case of unequalled democratic advances.
levels of Representative Government in the world, with the In 1975 it was one of the region’s authoritarian regimes, scoring
maximum score, and just ahead of Chile and Sweden. low on four out of five democratic attributes. Uruguay is now
one of the two democracies in the region that scores high on
While not entirely blemish-free, Costa Rica’s recipe for all democratic attributes and the only country in the region
democratic success includes a combination of features that to score among the top 25 per cent in the world on all 16
reinforce each other. Its democratic history is stable, with subattributes.
no democratic interruptions since 1949 and a relatively
homogenous and small population (4.8 million people). It Uruguay, like Costa Rica, enjoys lower levels of inequality in
enjoys the highest level of Representative Government in the access to political power and in enjoyment of civil liberties
world and higher levels of Social Group Equality than other compared to other countries in the region. However, Uruguay
countries in the region. It has a presidential system with has significantly lower levels of income inequality. Other
proportional representation in parliament and a well-developed common features include the establishment of a social
and free multiparty system—in fact, on Free Political Parties contract, which provided the basis for the development of
its score is the second highest in the world, after the United a welfare state, with strong social protection and based on
States. Costa Rica’s political culture is built on compromise, redistributive tax policies; and sustainable management of
based on long-held public trust in political institutions and a natural resources.
strong regard for the rule of law.
Uruguay also has a long democratic tradition, with democracy
Costa Rica also enjoys high levels of Basic Welfare and human only interrupted twice since 1918—first, briefly, in 1933 and
development, and near-universal access to healthcare and then during the authoritarian period between 1973 and 1985.
primary education, enabled by a comprehensive social security Its multiparty system is stable and competitive, with three main
system. Its social spending levels are high, enabled in part political parties alternating in power, a small and homogenous
by a significant reduction in military spending following the population (3.4 million people) and strong rule of law and
abolition of the army in 1948. Its use of its natural resources is Impartial Administration.
sustainable, and its economic structure has been transformed,
Unlike Costa Rica, Uruguay records high levels of Direct
enabling sustained levels of economic growth that have
Democracy (the highest in the region). However, even a
cushioned the country against the effects of economic crises
high-performing democracy such as Uruguay is not flawless.
(OECD 2017; Peeler 1986; Dabène 1988).
Challenges to democracy in the country include rising levels of
However, despite these strengths, Costa Rica’s democracy is crime and violence (often linked to the drug trade), corruption
not immune to challenges, including political polarization, and declining trust in democracy, although Uruguay still
an increasingly fragmented party system and the infusion of performs better than other countries in the region on these
religion into politics, as shown by the fact that an evangelical aspects (Chasquetti 2017; Petit 2017; Rodríguez Cuitiño 2018;
pastor came close to winning the 2018 presidential election Goñi 2016).
118
presents a complex case, having been a hybrid regime The democratic landscape in Latin America and the
between 1999 and 2004, a non-democratic regime in 2005, Caribbean is heterogenous
a democracy from 2006 to 2009, a hybrid regime again Latin America and the Caribbean is today a largely
between 2010 and 2015, and finally a weak democracy democratic region. Thanks to democratic advances over the
from 2016 onwards. Honduras’ democracy remains weak, past 40 years, the region currently has the third-largest share
with the OAS characterizing its 2017 elections as marred by of democracies (86 per cent), after North America (100
irregularities (OAS 2017). Nicaragua backslid into a hybrid per cent) and Europe (93 per cent). Latin America and the
regime in 2016. Caribbean is home to 19 democracies, one hybrid regime
and two non-democracies (see Figure 3.2). Of the region’s
Cuba is the only country in the region that has endured as democracies, more than half (53 per cent) have high levels of
a non-democratic regime since the start of the third wave Representative Government, while a little less than half (47
of democracy, and Venezuela presents a case of democratic per cent) have mid-range levels.
backsliding that has resulted in full breakdown. In fact,
Venezuela is the only one of the five democracies in the Democratic performance patterns and the quality of
region in 1977 that has backslid into a non-democratic democracy still vary widely between democracies in the
regime since that time. region. A total of 12 different democratic performance
patterns can be discerned among the democracies in Latin
3.1.3. The current democracy landscape in Latin America and the Caribbean, with only two countries
America and the Caribbean (Uruguay, and Trinidad and Tobago) recording high
The analysis in this section covers issues linked to performance across all attributes (see Table 3.1). All other
Representative Government, Fundamental Rights, Checks countries perform better on some aspects than others,
on Government, Impartial Administration and Participatory pointing to uneven levels of democratic quality in the region.
Engagement, highlighting the current opportunities for
democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as
the democratic challenges the region faces. FIGURE 3.2
Share of regime types in Latin America and the

Representative Government Caribbean, 2018
The GSoD Indices use the Representative Government attribute to Venezuela

evaluate countries’ performance on the conduct of elections, the Cuba
extent to which political parties are able to operate freely, and the Nicaragua
extent to which access to government is decided by elections. This
attribute is an aggregation of four subattributes: Clean Elections,
Inclusive Suffrage, Free Political Parties and Elected Government.
Summary: Representative Government performance in

Latin America and the Caribbean, 2018

Democracies
High Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 86%
(>0.7) Jamaica, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago,
and Uruguay
Mid-range Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El

(0.4–0.7) Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico
and Paraguay
Democracies Non-democracies Hybrid regimes
Low Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019), <http://www.idea.
(<0.4) int/gsod-indices>.
119
TABLE 3.1
Heat map of democratic performance patterns in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2018
GSoD attribute
Country
Uruguay
Trinidad and Tobago
Chile
Costa Rica
Jamaica
Argentina
Peru
Brazil
Panama
Colombia
Bolivia
Ecuador
El Salvador
Paraguay
Mexico
Guatemala
Dominican Republic
Honduras
Haiti
High Mid-range Low
Notes: This heat map shows the performance of the 19 democracies in Latin America and the Caribbean by attribute in 2018. Green indicates high performance, while yellow denotes mid-
range performance, and red shows low-range performance.
Of the other eight countries with high levels of performance on one attribute; and Haiti, which has seen
Representative Government, Chile, Costa Rica and Jamaica low performance on three attributes.
record high performance on four attributes; Argentina
and Peru on three; Brazil and Panama on two attributes; Cuba is the enduring exception to democratization in
and Colombia on one. El Salvador, Mexico and Paraguay the region
perform in the mid-range on all attributes. Weaker levels Cuba is the only country in Latin America and the
of democratic performance are found in Dominican Caribbean that has not experienced a transition to
Republic, Guatemala and Honduras, which record low democracy in the last four decades.
120
Cuba’s 1959 revolution turned the country into a Equality, and for Electoral Participation, although Cuba’s
Communist one-party state. In 2018, Cuba scored in the elections are not classified as free or fair.
bottom 25 per cent of countries in the world on 12 of its 16
democratic subattributes. The transition of power in 2018 to Backsliding has resulted in democratic breakdown in
Miguel Díaz-Canel, a non-Castro family member, has given Nicaragua and Venezuela
some observers hope that the regime may be opening up for While the large majority of countries in the region have
a potential transition. However, Raul Castro remains the undergone democratic transition and consolidation in the
first secretary of the Communist Party and a February 2019 past decades, two countries stand out from that pattern.
referendum on a new constitution reaffirmed the party’s grip Nicaragua and Venezuela are the two countries in the
on power, strengthening the irrevocable character of Cuba’s region—and among ten countries in the world—that have
socialist regime (Augustin 2019). suffered from severe democratic backsliding.
Cuba’s close ties with other non-democratic and hybrid Nicaragua underwent a democratic transition in 1990
regimes in Latin America has implications for the democratic but from 2005 onwards it gradually deteriorated in terms
landscape in the region, as their political, financial and of its democratic performance and weakened checks on
human-resource barter trade give these regimes lifelines in government, finally backsliding into a hybrid regime in
the face of international sanctions. For example, Venezuela 2016 (see Box 3.3). Venezuela was one of the six democracies
supplies Cuba with oil in exchange for Cuban doctors, in the region in 1977 but backslid to a hybrid regime in
teachers and intelligence advisors (Labrador 2019). 2008–2016 before undergoing a full democratic breakdown
in 2017 (see Box 3.2).
While Cuba classifies as a non-democracy, it does not score
poorly on all its democratic aspects. In fact, on the GSoD Nicaragua and Venezuela’s backsliding patterns differ in terms
Indices subcomponent of Basic Welfare, Cuba outperforms of their depth and timeframe, and their levels of democratic
all other countries in the region and even scores among the performance (see Table 3.2). Venezuela’s backsliding has been
top 25 per cent in the world. The same is true for Gender the most severe, dropping an average of 0.31 points across
TABLE 3.2
Comparative table of democratic backsliding: Venezuela and Nicaragua
Venezuela Nicaragua
Timeframe of 1998–2018 (20 years) 2005–2018 (13 years)

democratic Deepening autocratization since 2009–2010
backsliding
Level of Prior to backsliding Since backsliding Prior to backsliding Since backsliding

democratic Democracy uninterrupted, Non-democracy since 2017 Democracy, 1990–2015 Hybrid regime since 2016
performance 1975–2007 In bottom 25% of the In bottom 25% of the
High levels of world on 12 of 16 GSoD world on 11 of 16 GSoD
Representative subattributes subattributes
Government in 1998
Hybrid regime: 2008–2016
Depth of Decline of 0.42 on Checks on Government and 0.34 on Decline of 0.30 on Checks on Government and 0.48 on
backsliding Civil Liberties (1998–2018) Civil Liberties (2005–2018)
Average GSoD Indices decline of 0.31 points (49 per cent) Average GSoD Indices decline of 0.23 points (39 per cent)
(1997–2018) Significant declines across 12 of 16 GSoD subattributes
Significant declines across 11 of 16 GSoD subattributes (2005–2018)
(1998–2018)
121
BOX 3.2
Venezuela: A case study of democratic breakdown FIGURE 3.3
Venezuela has experienced the most severe democratic

backsliding process in Latin America and the Caribbean in Regime type and Representative Government in
recent years, resulting in full democratic breakdown in 2017. Venezuela, 1975–2018
The democratic breakdown in the country is also unparalleled
in the world. 1.0 Democracy
According to the GSoD Indices, in 1996 Venezuela was a 0.9

democracy with high levels of Representative Government
(0.70), well above the world (0.49) and Latin American and 0.8
the Caribbean (0.65) averages. Venezuela’s score on this
0.7
dimension has more than halved in two decades (to 0.29) and
is now among the bottom 25 per cent in the world (see Figure
0.6
3.3). A similar decline can be seen in Venezuela’s Civil Society Hybrid
regime
Participation, Judicial Independence, Media Integrity and 0.5
Impartial Administration scores (see Table 3.3), while its scores
on Civil Liberties have nearly halved over the same period. 0.4
Venezuela is now, along with Cuba, in the bottom 25 per cent of
countries in the world on 12 of its 16 democratic subattributes. 0.3
The democratic backsliding process in Venezuela has occurred 0.2

over a period of two decades. It began in 1998 with the
‘Bolivarian Revolution’ initiated by the democratically elected 0.1
government of Hugo Chávez and further deepened during the
0.0 Non-democracy
presidency of Nicolás Maduro following Chávez’s death in 2013.
The process was enabled by the significant public support
2000
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
1975
enjoyed by Chávez, who won the 1998 elections with more than
half of the votes, based on promises of fundamental reform to a
Representative Government Regime type
corrupt and centralized party system. Indeed, prior to Chávez’s
Confidence interval
election, Venezuela suffered from comparatively high levels
of corruption, hovering in the lower bracket of mid-range and
Notes: The light-shaded band around the Representative Government line demarcates
recording a borderline low score of 0.45 in 1996. the 68 per cent confidence bounds of the estimates.
While Chávez’s sweeping reforms sought to tackle a corrupt idea.int/gsod-indices>.
party system, they also led to a severe weakening of Checks
TABLE 3.3
The state of democracy in Venezuela, 1996 and 2018
Year
1996 0.70 0.62 0.68 0.50 High
2018 0.29 0.39 0.25 0.08 Low
High Mid-range Low
Note: Participatory Engagement is the only attribute that does not have a score, as its four subattributes are not aggregated.
122
on Government, debilitating and ultimately dismantling decision-making authority and political legitimacy (Penfold
institutions of representative democracy in favour of 2009; López Maya 2011).
mechanisms of direct participation (Ollier 2018). Venezuela
has had the largest increase in the world in the last 20 years in Finally, Chávez secured the loyalty of the military through a
terms of its Direct Democracy score, with a peak score of 0.56 constitutional reform which gave the president full control over
in 2003, second only to Switzerland and Uruguay. military promotions without needing approval from parliament.
He also purged military ranks to ensure key positions were
Between 1999 and 2013 the country held seven referenda. held by supporters, who were guaranteed access to political
The first, in April 1999, related to the establishment of a and economic power, and the financial resources enabled by
National Constituent Assembly, and succeeded with a 90 per the oil boom. Military officials were awarded ministerial posts
cent approval rating. The aim of the assembly was to draft and given control of the state oil company, banks and other
a replacement for the 1961 Constitution, which was also financial institutions—a tradition continued by Maduro (BBC
approved in a popular referendum with 72 per cent of votes News 2019a).
(Reuters 2011).
While most of Venezuela’s democratic indicators dropped
The 1999 Constitution gave the executive significant powers under the Chávez and Maduro regimes, Electoral Participation
over the legislature and the judiciary, which then enabled the levels rose to unprecedented historical highs. During Chávez’s
expansion of control over other governmental institutions, such rule, the country’s score on this measure rose from 49 per cent
as the National Electoral Commission, the Comptroller’s Office (in 1994) to 82 per cent (in 2012). Similarly, levels of Direct
(Contraloría) and the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Fiscalía). It Democracy rose by 5,700 per cent between 1996 and 2013, as a
also enabled Chávez to increase the presidential term limit key pillar of the Bolivarian Revolution was to introduce a more
from five to six years—making it one of the longest in Latin participatory form of democracy, which in practice reinforced
America—and introduce the possibility of presidential re- the president’s hold on power and ultimately resulted in the
election. In 2007, another constitutional amendment, again erosion of representative democracy in Venezuela.
approved in a referendum, removed limits on the number of
times a president could be re-elected, catapulting Venezuela Venezuela deepened its autocratization process after the death
into a hybrid regime. of Chávez in 2013 and the handover of power to Maduro, who
was not able to sustain the popular electoral support enjoyed
Earlier, by 2004, Chávez had re-legitimized his presidency by his predecessor. Maduro won contested presidential
through a revocatory referendum on his presidency, elections in 2013 by a very narrow margin, and again in 2018
which enabled him to consolidate his grip on power. The amid allegations of fraud by the opposition (Phillips 2018).
constitutional reforms in combination with strong popular Maduro further autocratized the country by silencing critical
support enabled Chávez’s governing coalition to effectively voices, banning the main opposition parties and disabling the
control the National Assembly, where they held 64 per cent of direct democracy mechanisms so widely used by Chávez. He
seats from 2000 to 2005, 96 per cent of seats from 2005 to also took control of the media, closing outlets and harassing
2010 (in part due to an electoral boycott by the opposition in and imprisoning journalists to quell dissent (Corrales and
2005) and 59 per cent between 2010 and 2015 (IPU 2000, 2005 Penfold 2015).
and 2010).
Maduro’s mandate coincided with a drop in international oil
This, in turn, enabled the National Assembly to delegate prices, which together with mismanagement of the economy
powers to the executive to approve a number of laws that led to a severe economic crisis, hyperinflation and plummeting
further undermined formal and informal democratic checks of basic welfare and a significant increase in poverty to nearly
and balances, strengthened presidential control and weakened 82 per cent in 2016 (Freitez 2016). As popular discontent
fiscal and budgetary transparency. It also enabled Chávez to grew, the opposition parties succeeded in winning the
nominate loyal supporters to the Supreme Court and other legislative elections in 2015, obtaining a majority of seats in
institutions. He was then in a position to dispose of the the National Assembly. This enabled them to partially renew
country’s large oil income (during the oil boom) at his discretion, the composition of judicial institutions. However, in 2017,
and to expand state media and social programmes, which often under orders from the president, the Supreme Court annulled
had a clientelistic character. While this fuelled corruption, it the functioning of the National Assembly and transferred
strengthened Chávez’s political support among large parts of the its legislative powers to the parallel National Constituent
population, boosting levels of electoral participation to facilitate Assembly established under Chávez. It also recognized the
his re-election in 2000, 2006 and 2012. results of the 2018 presidential election, in which Maduro was
re-elected. This was despite the fact that the elections were
The process of decentralization initiated in Venezuela in boycotted by the main opposition forces and were viewed as
the 1990s was also reversed, undermining local democracy. fraudulent and illegitimate by leading international bodies and
Regional governments were stripped of their control over most Latin American governments.
public services and a significant portion of their financial
resources. Moreover, new participatory mechanisms such as Venezuela’s opposition parties have historically been
the Communal Councils were created as direct competition to fragmented. The severe repression of opposition parties
regional and municipal governments, further undermining their throughout Venezuela’s democratic backsliding process has
123
made the task of uniting the opposition even more difficult. experienced a sharp deterioration in basic public services and
However, the building of alliances between a new generation of living standards, and now records some of the highest crime
political leaders has now enabled the rallying of the opposition and homicide rates in the world, as by-products of the regime’s
behind the figure of Juan Guaidó, which has helped strengthen autocratic deepening and isolation.
the voice of a more unified Venezuelan opposition in its
communications with the outside world (Lozano 2018; Moleiro Venezuela’s complete breakdown has caused an exodus
2019). of more than three million people in the past two years,
resulting in the most severe migration crisis in Latin American
Despite being endowed with one of the largest oil reserves history, with humanitarian implications for the entire region.
in the world, Venezuela is now experiencing general socio- Neighbouring Colombia bears the brunt of this burden, but
economic disintegration as a consequence of its democratic Brazil, Ecuador and nine other countries in the region have all
decline. The economy has collapsed, with the country’s been affected (BBC News 2018b). There are no signs that the
gross domestic product (GDP) falling by half in the last five Maduro regime is ready to negotiate or cede power. Despite
years, and hyperinflation spiralling to more than 1.7 million international backing for Guaidó, the president looks likely to
per cent in 2018 (The Economist 2019b). Venezuela has also cling on to power as long as he has the backing of the military.
all GSoD Indices aspects since 1997, and with significant bottom 25 per cent in the world in 2018. Nicaragua, in
declines across 11 subattributes including severe declines in contrast, had lower levels of democratic performance before
Elected Government, Clean Elections, Local Democracy, its backsliding process started. However, as in Venezuela,
Civil Society Participation, Judicial Independence, Absence its performance on Representative Government is now
of Corruption and Media Integrity. Nicaragua’s democratic among the bottom 25 per cent in the world. Venezuela and
backsliding, when measured in terms of its average point Nicaragua now score among the bottom 25 per cent in the
drop since 2005 (–0.23), is not yet as severe as Venezuela’s. world on 12 and 11 of their 16 democratic subattributes,
respectively. The economic and humanitarian collapse of
The two countries also differ in their democratic departure Venezuela is also more severe than Nicaragua’s.
and endpoints. Venezuela’s democratic performance before
its backsliding process started in 1996 was in the high range In both countries the backsliding process has been gradual.
on Representative Government (0.70) but dropped to the In Venezuela, it has occurred during the presidencies
BOX 3.3
Nicaragua: A case study of democratic backsliding

Nicaragua is the second country in Latin America and the democracy in 1990 when the Sandinistas were defeated in general
Caribbean, after Venezuela, to have experienced severe democratic elections, with the opposition presidential candidate, Violeta
backsliding in recent years, with an average decline of 39 per cent Chamorro, defeating Ortega. In 1996 Chamorro was, in turn,
across all democratic dimensions since 2005. defeated, leading to the election of Arnoldo Alemán as President.
According to the GSoD Indices, Judicial Independence has seen In 2000, Nicaragua’s National Assembly approved constitutional
most declines, with a 79 per cent drop since 2005. Nicaragua’s reforms that reduced the minimum share of votes needed to
levels of Judicial Independence are now lower than they were win the presidential election from 45 to 35 per cent as part of a
in 1975 under the dictatorship of President Anastasio Somoza. deal between Alemán and Ortega, then opposition leader. The
Similarly, its Representative Government score has dropped by reforms also allowed both leaders’ parties to divide politically
44 per cent since 2005, and its Civil Liberties score by 63 per appointed seats on the Supreme Court and Electoral Council, and
cent with Freedom of Association and Assembly suffering the other democratic institutions, thereby allowing Ortega and the
greatest declines with a nearly 71 per cent drop (see Figure 3.4). Sandinistas to secure political influence over these bodies.
Nicaragua now scores in the bottom 25 per cent in the world on
11 of 16 subattributes. Ortega was elected president for the second time in 2007 and has
since ruled the country through alliances with the Catholic Church,
Somoza was overthrown in 1979 by the left-wing Sandinista the private sector, the judiciary and the army. Nicaragua backslid
movement whose leader, Daniel Ortega, served as President for from a democracy to a hybrid regime in 2016 but, as in Venezuela,
the first time between 1985 and 1990. Nicaragua transitioned to the process of democratic backsliding has been gradual.
124
In 2010, the Sandinista-controlled Supreme Court lifted a ban FIGURE 3.4

on consecutive presidential re-election, allowing Ortega to run
again in 2011. In elections marred by accusations of fraud, the
Sandinistas won 62 per cent of the votes, granting them an Selected indicators and percentage decreases
absolute majority in the National Assembly (The Carter Center from 2005–2018 in Nicaragua
2011). This then enabled the assembly to pass fiercely criticized
constitutional changes in 2014 that strengthened Ortega’s
hold on power, enabling him to run for re-election for a third
consecutive term in 2016. In addition to abolishing term limits Judicial
79%
Independence
altogether, the constitutional revisions allowed the president to
issue decrees with force of law, and to appoint active-duty police
and military officials to government positions formerly reserved
for civilians.
Freedom of
Weeks before the 2016 general elections, the Supreme Court Association 71%
ousted the leader of the main opposition party, the Independent and Assembly
Liberation Party (PLI), and appointed a new party leader with
strong ties to Ortega. In 2018, a broad civil movement organized
a series of protests, initially in opposition to pension-sector
reforms, but increasingly focused against Ortega’s nepotistic and Freedom of
repressive regime. In response, Ortega unleashed a violent wave 66%
Expression
of repression against the protestors.
By July 2019, at least 325 people were estimated to have been

killed, including students, civil society activists and journalists,
with attacks carried out to a large extent by paramilitary groups Representative
44%
operating at Ortega’s behest. Since the wave of repression began, Government
independent news sources, human rights organizations and other
civic groups have been bullied or closed, and protests have been
banned, significantly reducing civic and democratic space in the 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
country (BBC News 2019b).
Venezuela has been key to maintaining Ortega in power, funnelling Notes: This figure demonstrates the percentage drop between 2005 and 2018 across
the Representative Government attribute, the Judicial Independence subattribute, and
large amounts of financial resources in oil cooperation into the the Freedom of Association and Assembly and Freedom of Expression subcomponents
country since 2007 via a party-controlled company with little in Nicaragua.
external oversight. Venezuela’s fate is therefore likely to play a key Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019), <http://
role in the unfolding developments in Nicaragua. www.idea.int/gsod-indices>.
TABLE 3.4
The state of democracy in Nicaragua, 2005 and 2018
Year
2005 0.64 0.59 0.59 0.43 Mid-range
2018 0.36 0.34 0.29 0.23 Low
High Mid-range Low
Note: Participatory Engagement is the only attribute that does not have a score, as its four subattributes are not aggregated.
125
of two left-wing populists: Hugo Chávez (1999–2013) However, other countries in the region have also experienced
and Nicolás Maduro (2013–present). In Nicaragua, the a deterioration in democratic performance, with declines on
backsliding process has occurred under another left-wing one or more subattributes. This includes countries in the
populist, President Daniel Ortega (2007–present), although higher range of performance (e.g. Chile, with declines on three
the country’s decline in democratic performance began democratic subattributes); in the mid-range (e.g. Colombia,
during the conservative government of Enrique Bolaños in with two declines); and in the lower tier of performance (e.g.
2005. Other similarities include the use of constitutional Dominican Republic). In addition, Argentina, Costa Rica
revisions in both countries to abolish presidential term and Haiti have declined on one subattribute since 2013.
limits; the expansion of executive power over the legislature; All of these declines are generally linked to aspects of civic
and weakened checks on government—both formal space, but also to increases in corruption (e.g. in Dominican
(e.g. weakened judicial independence) and informal (e.g. Republic, El Salvador and Guatemala), and declines in
crackdowns on media and civil society). Judicial Independence (e.g. in Bolivia and Honduras) and
Clean Elections (e.g. in Honduras).
In both countries, regional and global geopolitics also
interacts with the democratic backsliding processes, with The region’s electoral landscape is in a process of
powerful non-democracies providing their backing to the profound transformation
regimes. Apart from providing moral backing to Nicaragua, Competitive, free and fair elections are the norm in
Cuba has supplied Venezuela with human resources in the region. Most countries in Latin America and the
areas where the latter faces skill shortages (e.g. medical and Caribbean—apart from Cuba and, most recently, Venezuela
intelligence services) in exchange for oil. Russia plays a role in and Nicaragua—have committed to competitive, periodic,
both countries—although to a greater extent in Venezuela— free, fair and clean elections as the main channel to elect their
by supplying military equipment. China has been a key governments. Moreover, electoral norms and practices in
partner for Venezuela, with a loan-for-oil deal under many countries in the region are of a high democratic calibre,
which Venezuela supplied China with oil in exchange for with half (11) of the countries in the region having high levels
generous Chinese loans, and infrastructure and technology of Clean Elections (see Figure 3.5). Of these countries, seven
investment, including in identity registration and voting (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Panama
technologies (Labrador 2019; Seligman 2019). and Uruguay) score among the top 25 per cent in the world.
Latin America and the Caribbean has experienced signs of The years 2017 to 2019 have been depicted as ‘electoral
democratic erosion in recent years. The share of countries marathon years’ for the region, with 15 of 18 countries
with high performance levels has declined since 2012–2013 holding elections during this time (Zovatto 2018). In 2017,
on Judicial Independence, and on the dimensions related to Chile, Ecuador and Honduras held elections, while in
civic space, freedom of political parties and levels of electoral 2018 elections took place in Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica,
participation. Brazil, while still performing in the high range Mexico, Paraguay and Venezuela. A total of six elections
on Representative Government in 2018, had the highest have been held so far in 2019: three presidential elections in
number of subattribute declines in the region between 2013 Central America (in El Salvador, Guatemala and Panama),
and 2018, with significant declines on 8 of 16 democratic and three presidential elections in South America (in
dimensions. Argentina, Bolivia and Uruguay). With the exception of the
2019 elections in Bolivia, the 2018 elections in Venezuela—
Bolsonaro’s election in Brazil in late 2018 has been seen as and the 2017 presidential elections in Honduras, which have
a protest vote against the traditional political parties and been viewed as being marred by irregularities—all of these
their perceived inability to stave off corruption, reduce elections have been considered largely free and fair.
social inequalities, reduce crime and violence, and revive an
ailing economy. However, detractors worry that Bolsonaro, The average level of Electoral Participation in the
a former army captain, expresses sympathy and praise for the region is high. Latin America and the Caribbean records
country’s former military regime. He has been criticized for the highest levels of voter turnout in the world, at 67 per
defending patriarchal values and displaying disdain towards cent (compared to 63 per cent for Europe and 55 per
dissenters, the political left, underprivileged racial and cent for North America). However, this is not necessarily
ethnic groups and sexual minorities. The presence of retired a sign of higher levels of political engagement and can be
military officers in his cabinet has also raised concerns. At partially explained by the existence of compulsory voting
the same time, others believe Brazilian institutions are strong laws in 14 countries in the region. In fact, Latin America
enough to prevent an autocratic relapse (Bevins 2018). and the Caribbean is the region with the largest share of
126
FIGURE 3.5 averaged 60 per cent (International IDEA Voter Turnout

Database 2019). Chile, which abolished compulsory voting
Clean Elections in Latin America and the Caribbean, in 2012, has seen a sharp decline in voter turnout, from 87
2018 per cent in the 2010 presidential elections to 42 and 47 per
cent in the 2013 and 2017 general elections, respectively.
However, this decline also coincided with the simultaneous
switch to automatic voter registration, which increased the
number of people on the voting rolls (Bodzin 2011).
14%
In some countries, electoral norms are distorted and
used as facades to legitimize non-democratic regimes.
Elections in these countries do not uphold the principles of
popular control and political equality. For example, Cuba,
50% one of the region’s two non-democracies, held elections in
2018 to elect local representatives, as well as members of the
36% national parliament, and the president. While this led to the
transition of power to a non-Castro family member for the
first time since the Cuban revolution in 1959, there are no
signs that the country is moving towards democracy and a
commitment to make elections genuinely competitive.
In Venezuela, which backslid into a non-democracy in

2017, elections have been held continuously for the past
four decades, although their integrity has gradually been
Low Mid-range High hollowed out as the institutions that manage and administer
them have been severely weakened and no longer guarantee
Notes: A low level is characterized as a score below 0.4, while a high score is characterized as democratic principles or independence from the executive.
a score at or above 0.7.
int/gsod-indices>. Presidential re-election rules and norms have been
altered to suit incumbents. Recent controversies over
presidential re-election rules (by governments on both sides
of the political spectrum) illustrate this phenomenon and
countries with such laws, although these are applied with reinforce the personalization of political power. However,
varying degrees of enforcement. the use of constitutional amendments to enable presidential
re-election is not a recent phenomenon in the region. In
Levels of Electoral Participation are significantly higher in the 1990s, such revisions were also passed under presidents
the subregion of South America (72 per cent) than in Central Menem in Argentina, Fujimori in Peru and Cardoso in
America and the Caribbean (65 per cent), which can also be Brazil (International IDEA 2016a).
partially explained by the higher prevalence of mandatory
voting in South America. All South American countries, Between 1978 and 2012, 18 countries in the region
with the exception of Chile, Colombia and Venezuela, have introduced changes to the rules of presidential re-election.
enacted compulsory voting laws, whereas only two Central Of these countries, 11 have made it more permissive
American countries (Costa Rica and Honduras) have enacted through consecutive or indefinite re-election (International
such laws, which are not enforced. With the exception of IDEA 2018)—the cases of Nicaragua and Venezuela (see
the Dominican Republic, no Caribbean country has made Boxes 3.3 and 3.2, respectively) are arguably the most
voting obligatory for its citizens. blatant examples. In Honduras, despite a constitutional
ban and a 2009 Supreme Court ruling against re-election,
Voter turnout rates for the 14 Latin American and the President Juan Orlando Hernández stacked the court with
Caribbean countries that have compulsory voting laws have supporters which then passed a ruling in 2015 that made his
averaged 68 per cent over the two most recent electoral re-election possible, resulting in the OAS characterizing the
cycles in each country, while in countries without such 2017 elections as marred by ‘irregularities and deficiencies’
laws turnout over the same number of electoral cycles has (OAS 2017; Shifter 2017).
127
In Bolivia, President Evo Morales’ efforts to secure another as demonstrated in the 2018 Brazilian elections, where
presidential run by reforming the Constitution via a WhatsApp became a conduit for disinformation during the
referendum were defeated at the polls in 2016. Morales election campaign (Isaac and Roose 2018).
then appealed to the Supreme Court and obtained a ruling
authorizing his 2019 presidential bid. Subsequently, in 2017 Political parties in an era of representational crisis
the Constitutional Court responded to a government petition The political party arena in Latin America and the
to eliminate term limits for all political offices, appealing to Caribbean is largely free. All countries in the region except
regional human rights legislation, which enabled Morales to Cuba have multiparty systems and allow opposition parties
run again in the 2019 presidential elections (The Economist to operate, although the latter are severely restricted in
2017). This makes Bolivia, Nicaragua and Venezuela the Nicaragua and Venezuela.
three Latin American countries (as well as 22 others in the
world) to have eliminated presidential term limits. Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela are the only three countries
in the region scoring below the world average on Free
In Ecuador in 2015, as part of a significant weakening of Political Parties. The majority of countries in the region (59
the judiciary and clampdown on the media, President Rafael per cent) score in the mid-range on this indicator, while six
Correa abolished presidential term limits, although they score high and eight countries (Argentina, Chile, Colombia,
were reinstated in 2018 by his successor, Lenín Moreno, in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, and
an interesting case of a reversal of democratic backsliding Uruguay) are in the top 25 per cent in the world on this
(The Guardian 2018). Finally, in Paraguay in 2017, President measure (see Figure 3.6). All political parties in the region,
Horacio Cartes sought to bypass constitutional norms
barring presidential re-elections through a simple legislative
vote. This triggered major street protests and the partial FIGURE 3.6
burning of the Congress before Cartes backed down.
Free Political Parties in Latin America and the
As in other regions in the world, new technologies and Caribbean, 2018
social media are contributing to a profound change in
electoral dynamics in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Information and communications technologies (ICTs) now
play an increasingly important role as political tools across Low
the political spectrum, and the dissemination of political
messages through social media has been a frequent feature in
most recent elections, including those in Brazil, El Salvador
and Mexico.
In some cases, social media is used as a communication

Mid-range
tool to complement traditional forms of political
communication, while in others it has been favoured over
traditional channels. In El Salvador in 2019, Nayib Bukele
won the presidential elections, thanks in large part to his
anti-corruption promises, but also to his strong social media
presence. During the campaign, he used social media as High
his primary mode of communication with voters, granting
few interviews and avoiding live presidential debates (The
Economist 2019a).
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
No. of countries
In Brazil, Bolsonaro’s 2018 presidential election campaign
was conducted in large part via Twitter and WhatsApp after Low Mid-range High
he was stabbed during a rally and hospitalized. However,

widespread access to ICTs and alternative news sources Notes: A low level is characterized as a score below 0.4, while a high score is characterized as
via social media applications also means that citizens in a score above 0.70.
the region are more susceptible to disinformation. This int/gsod-indices>.
development is expected to have a growing political impact,
128
with the exception of those in Bolivia and Venezuela, have This fragmentation is also driven by the spread of populist
access to public funding, although this funding varies across discourses throughout the region, which often portray
the region in terms of levels, purpose (e.g. campaign funding political parties as a ‘pathological agent of democracy’. The
versus funding for party operations) and source (e.g. direct presidential systems common in the region further reinforce
versus indirect funding). the personalization of political power (Casas-Zamora
2019). One explanatory factor is that political parties and
The political party arena in Latin America and the parliaments have lost considerable prestige and legitimacy
Caribbean is also more diverse and more inclusive than in a context of state weakness and high levels of socio-
ever. Historically marginalized groups, such as indigenous economic inequalities and corruption, and such candidates
peoples and Afro-descendants, have now gained greater tap into that discontent (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). There
access to the political party arena. Indigenous peoples is also a perception that traditional parties have not kept up
represent 8 per cent of the population in the region (or 42 with changing social realities and the increased demands for
million people). Bolivia, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru, with change they have brought about—that they have remained
more than 80 per cent of the regional total, are the countries ‘19th-century institutions, with 20th-century paradigms,
with the largest indigenous populations (World Bank 2015). unequipped to tackle 21st-century problems’.11
In the past decades, indigenous-based social movements have Party fragmentation and reliance on pork barrelling and
emerged throughout the region; some have morphed into corruption to sustain presidential coalitions have also
political parties. In countries such as Argentina, Brazil and slowed the legislative process. Given their weak capacity
Paraguay, indigenous organizations have chosen to compete to deliver, political parties and parliaments have been at
in the electoral arena through existing political parties. Other the centre of much of the region’s sense of civic discontent.
countries have seen the emergence of indigenous political The decline or collapse of traditional parties in the
parties, either at the regional (e.g. Nicaragua) or national level centre and on the right in several countries in the region
(e.g. Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela). Bolivia and (including Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras and Peru) can
Ecuador have the strongest indigenous parties. In Bolivia— be harmful for democracy. It potentially also leaves a void
where 41 per cent of the population is indigenous—the that authoritarian leaders can fill, as wealthy elites may
indigenous and worker-based Movimiento al Socialismo opt for authoritarian alternatives for lack of other options
(Movement Toward Socialism, MAS) is led by Evo Morales, (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018).
the country’s first indigenous President (World Bank 2015).
Morales came to power in 2005, and was re-elected in 2009 Contributing to this loss of prestige is the sense that
and 2014. After abolishing term limits in 2019 Morales ran politicians are far removed from citizens. Social media
for a fourth term and won a highly disputed first round of further exacerbates the distance between parties and voters,
the presidential election. bypassing and thereby undermining the mediating function
of political parties, as individual politicians increasingly opt
However, despite these historical advances and relative for direct communication with voters. This detachment
strengths, political parties in Latin America and further exacerbates mistrust towards political parties.
the Caribbean also suffer from a crisis of political
representation. In the last 30 years, the region has seen The democratic quality of political debates is also
the demise of various established parties and the overhaul hampered by the polarization and degradation of public
of a number of party systems, notably in Bolivia, Brazil, deliberation and discourse, including the appeal to false
Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru and Venezuela (Levitsky et al. dilemmas, stigmas, and ridicule to humiliate opponents,
2016; Mainwaring 2018). Political party fragmentation and which is reinforced by the increasing use of social media.
in some cases severe weakening of the political party arena Lack of concern for factual truths and a willingness to
in these contexts has become a serious challenge driven by undermine the credibility of science and data as a basis
the increased personalization of representation, exacerbated on which to ascertain truths represent a potential threat
by the frequent use of preferential voting in party primaries to democracy as they undermine the quality and civility
and an increase in the number of independent candidates of public discourse, which is key to a healthy democracy
without a party base. (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018).
11 Comments made by International IDEA’s Regional Director for Latin America and the Caribbean, Daniel Zovatto, at the conference organized by International IDEA and the United Nations
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ‘El estado de la democracia en América Latina: 40 años del inicio de la Tercera Ola Democrática’ [The state of democracy in
Latin America: 40 years since the beginning of the Third Democratic Wave], in Santiago de Chile, 26–28 November 2018.
129
In Latin America, the current election cycle reveals per cent), Mexico (88 per cent), Paraguay (87 per cent),
increasing levels of political polarization, as well as the Venezuela (86 per cent) and El Salvador (86 per cent)
depth of frustration with political elites and the ‘old style (Latinobarómetro 2018).
of politics’. These developments suggest that the deeper
malaise appears to be with politics as it is practised, rather Underlying the severe lack of confidence in political
than with the idea of democracy itself. Recent elections of parties are real apprehensions about the quality of existing
presidential candidates often described by the media as anti- political leadership, including their experience, integrity
establishment—including Andrés Manuel López Obrador and motivations for public office. These frustrations, in
on the left in Mexico, Bolsonaro on the right in Brazil, and turn, are exacerbated by the perceived mercantilization of
most recently Nayib Bukele in El Salvador—have largely politics through the purchase of legislative seats to reap
been driven by a sense of civic anger, often directed at corrupt immediate gains or act in the interests of wealthy campaign
elites, and exhibited a strong anti-establishment bent, along funders.
with a quest to find a political redeemer. In Brazil, the 2018
elections also revealed growing signs of political polarization
and societal intolerance. Fundamental Rights
In this anti-establishment setting, charges and

counter-charges of corruption have been exploited in The Fundamental Rights attribute aggregates scores from three
campaigning by all sides, therefore showing the extent subattributes: Access to Justice, Civil Liberties, and Social Rights
and Equality. Overall it measures the fair and equal access to
to which accusations of corruption can be used to derail justice, the extent to which civil liberties such as freedom of
political opponents. However, it is unclear if the region’s expression or movement are respected, and the extent to which
newly elected leaders will be able to combat its continuing countries are offering their citizens basic welfare and political
equality.
high levels of corruption and solve their countries’ societal
ills, or whether they will go down the same path as their
predecessors who failed in this task. The results of the
current electoral cycle in the region have heightened party
Summary: Fundamental Rights performance in Latin
fragmentation, and as a consequence, in all countries except
America and the Caribbean, 2018
Mexico, presidents will have difficulties in establishing
majority coalitions in their respective legislatures, and will Regional average: Mid-range (0.63)
face greater governing challenges, which does not bode well
for forceful policy implementation. High Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Trinidad
(>0.7) and Tobago, and Uruguay
Religion is also playing an increasing role in Latin
Mid-range Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican
American politics. Evangelical churches, in particular,
(0.4–0.7) Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
have played a more visible role in politicizing debates over Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay and Peru
matters of gender and sexual orientation, reflecting some
public resistance to societal changes at stake. Countries Low Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela
where evangelical Christian churches have recently exerted (<0.4)
increasing influence on party politics include Brazil,

Colombia and Costa Rica (Corrales 2018).
This crisis of representation is reflected in the high The region has seen advances in political gender
levels of public mistrust of political parties and equality despite patriarchal power structures
parliaments, and in the widespread perception that The GSoD Indices focus on the political dimension of
countries in the region are governed by oligarchies. Gender Equality, measuring women’s representation in
According to the public opinion survey Latinobarómetro, parliament and their participation in civil society, political
in 2018, only 13 per cent of Latin Americans trusted power as distributed by gender, and men’s and women’s
their political parties, which were the least trusted among mean years of schooling.
public institutions. Moreover, four out of five Latin
Americans believed their leaders favoured the interests Latin America and the Caribbean’s levels of political
of the privileged few over those of the majority. This Gender Equality are now relatively high compared to
sentiment reached exceptionally high levels in Brazil (90 other regions of the world. The agenda for gender equality
130
was the first country in the world to introduce a quota law for
Seven countries in Latin America and the female representation in parliament. Other countries have
Caribbean score in the top 25 per cent in since followed suit. According to a 2017 report, 19 countries
the world on the GSoD Indices measure in the region have adopted some form of legislative quota for
of political Gender Equality. Five of these
women, 5 of which have shifted to parity regimes requiring
countries (Costa Rica, Ecuador, Jamaica,
Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay) are democracies, while
50:50 gender representation (International IDEA, CoD and
two (Cuba and Venezuela) are non-democracies. UNDP 2017: 38–42). Four of these countries—Bolivia,
Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Mexico—are among the top 10
countries worldwide in terms of women’s representation
in national parliaments. Moreover, in 2019, the Mexican
has made gradual yet discernible progress in the region. Senate and Chamber of Deputies approved a bill requiring
Levels of political Gender Equality are in the mid-range all three branches and levels of government to have 50 per
(0.63), or third-best after North America (0.75) and Europe cent representation of women. This reform, once approved
(0.70). The steady build-up of women’s associations and by a majority of state legislatures, will be the first of its kind
grassroots activities, along with the adoption of international worldwide (Cámara de Diputados 2019).
covenants and national laws, and the formation of state
agencies designed to protect women’s rights and increase The expansion and strengthening of Latin American
women’s participation in the political and economic sphere, civil society have also opened up spaces for women’s
have facilitated this important transformation. The impact engagement. According to the Varieties of Democracy
of these and a myriad of other undertakings has empowered (V-Dem) project, women’s participation in civil society
women and fostered attitudinal changes in favour of gender has increased by 30 per cent over the last four decades
equality and helped strengthen political equality. (Coppedge et al. 2018). Efforts to advance gender equality
and economic improvement, and deter violence against
Women’s participation in politics has increased in women, have raised new issues on the public agenda.
visible ways. In Latin America and the Caribbean, as in
Europe, women hold an average of 27 per cent of seats These developments have been propelled by the
in parliament—this is the highest share in the world, and establishment of national organizations, regional and global
above the world average of 24 per cent (IPU 2019). In nine networks, and actions to foster women’s participation in
parliaments in the region, women hold more than 30 per community development. Massive mobilizations have been
cent of seats. Two countries (Bolivia and Cuba) are among carried out to protest violence against women, including
the three countries in the world where women hold more the #NiUnaMenos (NotOneLess) movement which started
than half of parliamentary seats. in Argentina, in 2015, and spread thereafter to Chile,
Uruguay, Peru, Bolivia and Paraguay, among other places.
In the last decade, four women have served as presidents in In Brazil, women convened large rallies across Brazil during
the region (Michelle Bachelet in Chile, Cristina Fernández de the 2018 presidential campaign, under the hashtag #EleNão
Kirchner in Argentina, Dilma Rousseff in Brazil and Laura (NotHim), to oppose Bolsonaro’s patriarchal views on
Chinchilla in Costa Rica) and a number of women have women (Darlington 2018).
also been top presidential contenders (in Brazil, Colombia,
Honduras, Paraguay and Peru). According to the UN Despite these important advances, a number of challenges
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean must be overcome if Latin America and the Caribbean
(ECLAC), women’s representation in subnational legislatures is to achieve equality for women and men in political,
is at 29 per cent, slightly above the national average, with social and economic life. Regional averages conceal stark
Bolivia topping the list at 51 per cent (ECLAC 2018). The disparities between countries in political gender equality.
regional average for women in ministerial cabinet-level While women hold over 30 per cent of seats in almost half
positions is 27 per cent and the average representation of of the national parliaments in the region, eight countries
women in positions in the highest courts of justice increased have levels below the world average of 24 per cent, including
by 12 percentage points between 2004 and 2014, reaching a Honduras (21 per cent); Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala,
regional average of 29 per cent (ECLAC 2018). Jamaica, Panama and Paraguay (15 per cent); and Haiti,
with only 2.5 per cent (IPU 2019).
The relatively high levels of women’s parliamentary
representation in Latin America have largely been driven According to the Gender Equality Observatory of the
by the introduction of gender quotas. In 1991, Argentina UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the
131
Caribbean (ECLAC), in most countries that have adopted FIGURE 3.7

parity targets for women in the legislature, there is still
a notable gap between women’s representation in these Gender Equality in Latin America and the Caribbean,
legislatures and the proportion of women in other state 1975–2018
institutions. Currently, not one head of state in the region
is a woman, and only 15.5 per cent of mayors are women 100
(ECLAC n.d.).
90
The proportion of women in cabinet-level positions is 80

highest in the hybrid regime of Nicaragua (47 per cent),
followed at some distance by democracies such as Chile 70
and Uruguay (36 per cent), while Brazil only has two
60
female cabinet members. On average, women account
only for 10 per cent of political party presidents and 13 50
per cent of general secretaries (International IDEA, CoD
and UNDP 2017: 40; ECLAC 2018). Moreover, weak 40
political participation and representation of indigenous

30
women and women of African descent remains an
important challenge. 20
Worryingly, the share of countries with high levels of Gender 10
Equality has decreased (see Figure 3.7). Countries in the

0
region which have recorded declines from high to mid-range
2000
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
1975
levels in their Gender Equality scores since 2014 include

Argentina and Brazil, with the latter experiencing the most
Low Mid-range High
significant decline in the region on this dimension.
While advances have been made on political gender int/gsod-indices>.
equality, there has been an increase in discrimination
and violence against women in the political sphere. This
reflects the backlash which women’s advancement in highly
patriarchal societies may encounter (International IDEA, Latin America has the world’s largest asymmetries in income
CoD and UNDP 2017). There are also manifestations of and land distribution. Of the 26 most unequal countries in
a growing backlash from some sectors of Latin American the world (as measured by the Gini coefficient), over half
society towards the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and (15) are in Latin America, with Brazil topping the regional
transgender (LGBT) communities. This is partly being led list as the fifth-most unequal country in the world (World
by conservative sectors of the Catholic Church and a rising Bank 2018). While relative levels of inequality have declined
number of Protestant churches, mostly of a Pentecostal bent. across the region since 2002, the reduction in inequality
Their campaigns against what is described as the ‘ideology of has stagnated since 2015 (ECLAC 2018; Lopez-Calva and
gender’ have stirred greater polarity around matters dealing Lustig 2010). Moreover, studies that focus on absolute levels
with homosexuality and women’s reproductive rights. of inequality have found rising income disparities in Latin
The climate of greater hostility on these issues reflects the America and the Caribbean (see e.g. Niño-Zarazúa, Roope
concerns raised by social advancements made in this domain and Tarp 2017).
(Corrales 2018).
Ordinary people are generally inclined to perceive
Deep economic and social inequalities translate into the variations in absolute, as opposed to relative, inequality
political arena and distort political equality (Payne 2018). Therefore, while policymakers celebrated
The region’s longstanding social disparities, underscored ‘Latin America’s inequality reduction’, public discontent
by high concentration of wealth, constitute a barrier to about the region’s levels of inequality rose. During the
democracy and contribute to undermine democratic last decade, on average, four of every five people in the
progress in Latin America and the Caribbean (Levitsky region regarded their societies as unjust (Latinobarómetro
and Ziblatt 2018; International IDEA 2016a). 2018: 44). In addition, despite Latin America’s increased
132
wealth, approximately one-third of its population still lives FIGURE 3.8

in poverty and another one-third in a state of vulnerability.
These citizens often lack effective legal rights, as well as Social Group Equality in Latin America and the
basic information about these rights and the resources to Caribbean, 1975–2018
pay for legal representation. As voters, many are susceptible
to clientelist politics. 70
The region’s socio-economic inequalities translate into 60

the political arena in terms of unequal access to power,
unequal representation and unequal enjoyment of civil
50
liberties. This constitutes a vicious cycle, as unequal access
to influence over public policies and political decisions
contributes, in turn, to perpetuating inequality and a ‘culture 40
of privilege’ that impedes change (UNDP 2010; ECLAC
2018: 26).
30
Access to political power by different social groups is

measured by the GSoD Indices subcomponent of Social 20
Group Equality (see Figure 3.8). Democracies in Latin

America and the Caribbean perform particularly poorly 10
on this aspect. The average for the region is 0.46, which is
similar to the averages recorded by Africa (0.45) and Asia
0
and the Pacific (0.43), which have significantly lower levels
2000
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
1975
of democratic development.
Low Mid-range High

One-third (36 per cent) of countries in Latin America and
the Caribbean now record low scores on this indicator
and eight (Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, int/gsod-indices>.
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay) score
in the bottom 25 per cent in the world. With the exception
of Nicaragua, all of these countries are democracies. Only
14 democracies in the world have low levels of Social Group Societies with severe wealth disparities exhibit distorted
Equality; 7 are in Latin America and the Caribbean. However, power relations that bend the rules of the game and produce
two countries in the region (Costa Rica and Uruguay) stand disproportionate political representation (Wilkinson
out, with high levels of Social Group Equality. and Pickett 2010; Payne 2018). As a result, politics and
public policies—including subsidies, taxation and legal
Table 3.5 illustrates the relationship between Social Group enforcement—are configured to favour the interests of the
Equality score and inequality as measured by the Gini well-to-do (Levitsky and Murillo 2014; Oxfam International
coefficient for 18 of the 22 countries in Latin America and 2014). The privileged can subvert democratic institutions
the Caribbean. The table also includes their regime status, designed to ensure accountability and fairness. This
level of Representative Government, Social Group Equality propagates a culture of distrust that undercuts the legitimacy
score, and the score each country received according to the of the political process.
Gini Index.
Deep inequalities also lead to crime and violence, which
Citizens’ disenchantment with democracy in the region further undermines trust in democracy
is a product of the political effects produced by extreme High levels of socio-economic and political
wealth inequalities. These effects subvert democracy’s inequalities are also one of the causes of the high and
principle of political equality; undermine the development rising levels of crime and violence in the Latin America
of the rule of law and respect for human rights; and nurture and Caribbean region. Organized crime is also tied to
social discontent, which fuels mistrust, exacerbates societal drug trafficking. Rising levels of crime and violence
tensions, give rises to crime and violence and fosters recurrent constitute a serious impediment to strengthening the
instability. quality of democracy in the region (Morlino 2018;
133
TABLE 3.5
Social Group Equality and Gini coefficient in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2012–2018
Level of Representative Social Group

Country Regime type Gini coefficient
Government Equality score
Costa Rica Democracy High 0.74 48.3
Uruguay Democracy High 0.72 39.5
Argentina Democracy High 0.57 40.6
Bolivia Democracy Mid-range 0.60 44.0
Brazil Democracy High 0.42 53.3
Chile Democracy High 0.51 46.6
Ecuador Democracy Mid-range 0.48 44.7
Mexico Democracy Mid-range 0.41 43.4
Panama Democracy High 0.50 49.9
Peru Democracy High 0.45 43.3
Colombia Democracy High 0.31 49.7
Dominican Republic Democracy Mid-range 0.35 45.7
El Salvador Democracy Mid-range 0.29 38.0
Guatemala Democracy High 0.27 48.3
Haiti Democracy Mid-range 0.27 41.1
Honduras Democracy Mid-range 0.36 50.5
Nicaragua Hybrid regime Mid-range 0.29 46.2
Paraguay Democracy Mid-range 0.33 48.8
High Mid-range Low
Notes: Representative Government is not scored numerically in this table but rather categorized according to one of the three levels: low, mid-range and high. Social Group Equality is scored
from 0 to 1, where a higher number indicates high levels of Social Group Equality. The Gini Index measures income or wealth distribution within a population from 0 per cent to 100 per cent,
where 100 per cent represents absolute inequality and 0 per cent represents perfect equality. The logic of interpreting the Gini Index is in contrast to interpreting the GSoD scores. Gini
coefficient figures represent the most recent available data from 2012 to 2018.
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019), <http://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>; World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2019, <https://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/SI.POV.GINI>.
UNDP 2013). Homicide rates in Latin America and America’s northern triangle of El Salvador, Guatemala
the Caribbean are the highest in the world—at 24 per and Honduras (Labrador and Renwick 2018).
100,000 inhabitants, five times the global average (see
Figure 3.9 for national breakdowns)—and are closely Crime and violence can weaken democracy in several
tied to levels of inequality, weak judicial institutions and ways. Despite significant advances in economic and
the region’s failed drug war (Jaitman 2017). Much of this human development, high levels of crime and violence
is related to violence over the illicit drug trade and the produce feelings of insecurity. This can fuel fear among
rising number of urban street gangs, especially in Central citizens and frustration over the state’s inability to provide
134
FIGURE 3.9 insecurity also reduces interpersonal trust, which hampers

the development of social capital that a vibrant civil society
Homicide rates in Latin America and the Caribbean, requires (OECD 2018).
2016
Latin America and the Caribbean has very low levels of
interpersonal trust, with only 14 per cent of respondents
El Salvador 83 to the 2018 Latinobarómetro survey (which covers 18
Honduras 57 countries in the region) stating that they can trust most
people. Interpersonal trust is lowest in Brazil, at only 4 per
Venezuela 56
cent of those surveyed (Latinobarómetro 2018: 46–47).
Jamaica 47 Moreover, the close connection between crime and violence,
illicit financing and politics in some countries in the region
Belize 38
(e.g. in Colombia, Guatemala and Mexico) also negatively
St Vincent and 36 impacts on democracy as it distorts principles of political
the Grenadines
St Kitts equality and popular control (Casas-Zamora 2013b).
and Nevis 34
Trinidad 31
and Tobago
Brazil 30 Checks on Government
Bahamas 28
Guatemala 27 The Checks on Government attribute aggregates scores from three

Colombia 26 Media Integrity. It measures the extent to which parliament oversees
the executive, as well as whether the courts are independent, and
Mexico 19 whether media is diverse and critical of the government without
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Notes: This figure shows the number of homicides per 100,000 people for 13 countries in Latin
America and the Caribbean in 2016. Summary: Checks on Government performance in Latin
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank based on UN Office on Drugs and Crime, America and the Caribbean, 2018
Global Study on Homicide, <https://dataunodc.un.org/GSH_app>.
High Chile, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Peru, Trinidad and

public security, which can negatively impact on trust in (>0.7) Tobago and Uruguay
democracy (Casas-Zamora 2013a).
Mid-range Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican
(0.4–0.7) Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti,
According to data for 2016–2017 from the AmericasBarometer Honduras, Mexico, Panama and Paraguay
survey produced by the Latin American Public Opinion
Project (LAPOP), 44 per cent of citizens felt unsafe in their Low Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela
neighbourhoods, and nearly one in five people claimed they (<0.4)
were very unsafe. Almost one-quarter of citizens had been

victimized by crime in the preceding year (Cohen, Lupu and
Zechmeister 2017: 71–79).
Judicial institutions have been strengthened, but
Political leaders can draw on public sentiments to galvanize challenges to the rule of law remain
support by promising to restore order through forceful Considerable efforts have been made in recent decades
policies (mano dura or iron fist). These are often based on to strengthen the capacity of judicial institutions in
simplistic solutions that can further aggravate, rather than Latin America and the Caribbean. These efforts have
address, problems or even undermine democracy through been accompanied by attempts to boost the capacity of
human rights abuses. Moreover, the perceived inability of the prosecutors, police investigators and judges. Considerable
state to tackle crime and violence is a compounding factor efforts have also been made to professionalize Latin
that can further reduce public trust in democracy. Public America’s civil service, by introducing meritocratic criteria
135
in hiring and promotion, and enhancing overall effectiveness FIGURE 3.10

(Hammergren 2007, 2008; Arantes 2011; Cortázar Velarde,
Lafuente and Sanginés 2014). Judicial Independence in Latin America and the
Caribbean, 1975–2018
In Brazil, had these efforts not been made, it is unlikely that
the so-called Odebrecht corruption scandal (referred to as 80
Lava Jato or 'Operation Car Wash' in Brazil)—the largest
foreign bribery case in history—would have been uncovered. 70
Between 2001 and 2015 the Brazilian construction company
Odebrecht configured a network of public officials, 60
politicians and local companies in 10 countries in the
region (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, 50
Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru and Venezuela
through which they channelled more than USD 788 million 40
in bribes and payoffs to secure public contracts (Deutsche
Welle 2018). 30
However, despite these advances, progress in setting 20

up impartial, transparent and accountable public
administrations in the region has been slow, imbalanced 10
and beset by implementation problems and enforcement
difficulties. The incongruence between formal rule-making
0
and de-facto power holders, and wide discretion over
2000
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
1975
enforcement, has been a constant predicament for effective

institution building in Latin America. It is also one of the
Low Mid-range High
reasons for the slow progress of the region in combating
corruption.
int/gsod-indices>.
The judiciary is generally perceived as one of the most

problematic branches of the state in Latin America and
the Caribbean and remains weak in many countries.
Almost one-third (32 per cent) of countries score low The weakness of the judiciary is also mirrored in public
on Judicial Independence, with five countries (Cuba, sentiment. Only 24 per cent of people in Latin America trust
Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua and Venezuela) in the judiciary, while 43 per cent believe that magistrates are
the bottom 25 per cent in the world. Only two countries in deeply corrupt (Latinobarómetro 2018: 48, 67). Underlying
the region (Jamaica and Uruguay) have high levels of Judicial these sentiments is the perceived influence of organized
Independence (see Figure 3.10). crime on the judiciary, and the feeling that ‘justice can be
bought’ by those with money and power. In the minds of
Weak judicial capacity affects the ability of countries to ordinary people, this accounts for the fact that those who
adequately combat corruption, crime and violence and often end up in prison are overwhelmingly poor, illiterate
the illicit trade associated with it. For example, illicit and deprived of connections. The region’s performance on
networks have penetrated parts of the state in Mexico, which Access to Justice further compounds this problem. Half of
is among the 20 countries in the world with the highest Latin America and the Caribbean countries score at or below
homicide rates (UN Office on Drugs and Crime n.d.). the global average on the measure, with six in the bottom 25
Mexico has four times fewer judges and magistrates than any per cent in the world.
other country in the world and also has the fourth-highest
levels of impunity (Global Impunity Dimensions 2017). Of Perceptions of politicization compound judiciaries’
the 10 countries in the world with high levels of impunity, problems with impunity and weak enforcement capacity.
five (Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela) are Controversies over the judicialization of politics—whereby
Latin American. Of these countries, all apart from Peru are courts at different levels play an increasingly political
among the countries in the world with the highest levels of role—not only reveal the use of de jure powers but suggest
homicide rates (Global Impunity Dimensions 2017). the judiciary can also act as a de-facto power holder (Sieder,
136
Schjolden and Angell 2005: 2). Few mechanisms are available In both countries, Supreme Court decisions to uphold the
to hold such powers accountable or prevent the judiciary from impeachment votes did little to settle the polarized disputes
undermining democratic norms. Moreover, in some countries, and lingering mistrust stirred by these measures.
high-court magistrates are susceptible to political pressure.
Presidential and legislative overreach, and other misuses
The bending of constitutional norms undermines checks of institutional rules, suggests that the main risk to
on government democracy in Latin America is the misuse of democracy’s
Since 1978, most countries in the region have enacted new own instruments. The main challenges no longer come from
constitutions, and all have amended existing constitutional external actors (e.g. the military) but from players who gain
frameworks (International IDEA 2018). Some of these authority through open elections and then use this power in
constitutional changes have been made as part of transitions ways that corrode democratic institutions and practices. This
from authoritarianism to democracy with the aim of erosion tends to be gradual, drawing on public support and
strengthening the democratic framework. However, a using legal instruments. Its political entrepreneurs stoke the
number of revisions have also been made that weaken checks fears and discontent of citizens, while making strong appeals
on government, both as part of processes of democratic to national symbols and promising to restore law and order.
backsliding and breakdown (e.g. in Nicaragua and Venezuela)
and in democracies with varying levels of performance and
on both the left and right of the political spectrum (e.g. Impartial Administration
Bolivia, Honduras and Paraguay). Examples of changes that
have bent constitutional norms include extending presidential
re-election limits and increasing executive powers over the Impartial Administration is the aggregation of two subattributes:
judiciary and other control organs of the state. Absence of Corruption and Predictable Enforcement. It measures the
Balance-of-power issues among key democratic
institutions remain an enduring source of political
dispute in Latin America. The legacies of caudillismo (or Summary: Impartial Administration performance in
strongman leaders) in the region have fuelled numerous Latin America and the Caribbean, 2018
cases of presidential overreach, facilitated by systems whose
constitutional design traditionally concentrates more power Regional average: Mid-range (0.47)
in the executive, leading to Latin American systems being
dubbed as ‘hyper-presidential’ (International IDEA 2016a; High Chile, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay
Ollier 2018). Such systems have been used by leaders with (>0.7)
authoritarian tendencies to exercise their powers in ways

Mid-range Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica,
deemed largely unaccountable to the legislative and judicial (0.4–0.7) Ecuador, El Salvador, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama,
branches. This has given rise to what scholars have referred Paraguay and Peru
to as ‘delegative democracies’, exemplified most recently by
Correa’s presidency in Ecuador in the period 2007–2017 Low Cuba, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti,
(<0.4) Honduras, Nicaragua and Venezuela
(O’Donnell 1999; Conaghan 2016).
Recent instances of impeachment have also set off intense

national debates over the appropriate use of this extreme Weak rule of law and low judicial capacity hamper
measure in a presidential democracy. The controversial efforts to combat corruption
impeachments of presidents in Paraguay (2012) and Despite democratic advances, levels of corruption remain
Brazil (2016), in a manner akin to a parliamentary no- high in a number of countries in Latin America and
confidence vote, have stirred criticism. The impeachment the Caribbean. This constitutes a serious impediment to
trial of President Fernando Lugo in Paraguay was completed strengthening the quality of democracy in the region (Morlino
within less than 24 hours and prompted international 2018; International IDEA 2016a). Corruption is viewed as
condemnation of the ‘parliamentary coup’ (The Guardian one of the main reasons for the growing dissatisfaction with,
2012). In Brazil, while proponents celebrated the ‘legality’ and decline of trust in, governments. It also contributes to
of the impeachment vote against President Dilma Rousseff, the weakening of what is often termed ‘the social contract’,
critics maintained that this act of legislative overreach had with negative consequences for democracy (OECD 2018,
undermined the president’s electoral legitimacy (Taub 2016). World Bank 2018).
137
According to the GSoD Indices, of all the aspects of FIGURE 3.11

Latin American and the Caribbean democracy in the past
decades, the lowest and slowest progress has been made in Absence of Corruption in Latin America and the
reducing corruption. Almost half (41 per cent) of countries Caribbean, 1975–2018
in the region have high levels of corruption, including
almost one-third of the region’s democracies (see Figure 80
3.11). After the Middle East and Africa, Latin America and
the Caribbean has the largest share of democracies (31 per 70
cent) with high levels of corruption (Dominican Republic,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras and Paraguay), 60
despite having much higher levels of overall democratic
development (see Table 3.6). 50
Moreover, the hybrid regime of Nicaragua and the non- 40

democracies of Cuba and Venezuela all have high levels of
corruption. This was also the case in Nicaragua prior to the 30
start of its democratic backsliding process, while Venezuela’s
levels of corruption were formerly in the mid-range, or at 20
borderline low levels. Five of the countries (Dominican
Republic, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua and Venezuela)
10
have been vulnerable to backsliding into hybridity or
experiencing full democratic breakdown in recent decades.
0
Chile and Uruguay are the only countries in the region that
2000
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
1975
currently have low levels of corruption.
Low Mid-range High

Since 2000, six presidents in the region (Bolivia, Brazil,
Ecuador, Guatemala and two in Peru) have been forced out
of power before their term was up due to corruption scandals int/gsod-indices>.
(BBC News 2018a). In the past 10 years, almost half of the
Latin American region’s ex-presidents have been accused of,
or indicted for, corruption (Lagos 2018).
TABLE 3.6
Levels of corruption and regime types in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2018
Level of corruption
Regime type
Low Mid-range High
Chile, Costa Rica Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Dominican Republic, El

Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti,
Democracy
Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Honduras, Paraguay
Trinidad and Tobago
Hybrid regime Nicaragua
Non-democracy Cuba, Venezuela
138
Efforts to fight corruption in the region have often faced NIMD 2014). In Guatemala, 25 per cent of campaign funds are
stiff resistance from those with political power. This estimated to come directly from organized crime (Beltrán and
resistance stems from the fact that corruption in a number Hite 2019). In Mexico, 44 per cent of businesses report having
of countries is deeply embedded within the political structure made unofficial payments to public officials (International
and reaches the highest levels of political power. The recent IDEA 2016b). Among poorer citizens, clientelism and vote
attempts by Guatemalan President Jimmy Morales to shut buying remain an enduring practice, in some countries palpably
down the UN International Commission against Impunity in more so than others (Casas-Zamora 2013b).
Guatemala (Comisión Internacional Contra la Impunidad en
Guatemala, CICIG), which is mandated to fight corruption Organized criminal networks have exploited state fragility
in Guatemala, is one example of the type of resistance anti- Corruption in the region is often, but not always, linked
corruption efforts encounter in the region (Partlow 2018). to illicit financing. The expansion of narco-mafia forces and
criminal groups in Latin America and the Caribbean fuels
Corruption represents an impediment to democratic not just corruption but crime and violence as well.
strengthening and can undermine democracy, as high
levels of corruption have been shown to reduce citizens’ Organized criminal networks are adept at exploiting elements
trust in democracy (International IDEA 2016a; OECD of state fragility in the region. The main source of wealth for
2018). Public opinion data shows that dissatisfaction with high these groups originates in the narcotics trade. The huge profit
levels of corruption and perceived ineffectiveness in reducing margins generated by this illicit enterprise have enabled mafia
corruption are a significant source of civic discontent. Only groups and illicit criminal networks to influence various parts
35 per cent of citizens in the region are satisfied with how of the state and the political system in democracies such as
their governments are tackling corruption (OECD 2018: 16). Colombia, Guatemala and Mexico. They have done so by
financing election campaigns; bribing judges, military officers,
As the Odebrecht scandal revealed, much of the large-scale and police and government officials; or using violence and
corruption in Latin America revolves around public works intimidation to pursue their ends.
contracts and election campaign financing. Campaign
finance remains a vexed problem for democracy in Latin America Acts of collusion between state agents, elements of the financial
and the Caribbean, despite efforts to improve its regulation. sector involved in money-laundering, and narco-mafias are
The costs of running for office have increased substantially in not uncommon. While the so-called war on drugs has led,
the last two decades and this deters promising candidates from on occasions, to the arrest of mafia network leaders, it has not
entering the field. Opacities and inconsistencies in regulatory changed the incentive structure that fuels their illicit business
frameworks, and weak enforcement capacities, add to the model, or the extensive corruption and violence derived from
uneven application of existing laws. Adequate controls over the it (International IDEA, OAS and Inter-American Dialogue
financing of local and provincial elections (and primary polls 2015; Casas-Zamora 2013b; International IDEA and NIMD
in selected countries) appear to be particularly lacking. In some 2014; International IDEA and Clingendael Institute 2016).
parts of Latin America, public resources are still ostensibly (and
illegally) used to underwrite political campaigns (International By boosting corrupt practices within the political arena and
IDEA and Clingendael Institute 2016). the state, notably through illicit campaign contributions and
bribes to public security and court officials, the narcotics
Public funding of political parties, although constructive, economy is also responsible for undermining the credibility
has not been the panacea many had expected. In addition, of the region’s democratic processes and public institutions.
laws regarding limits on campaign spending have been
difficult to impose. Close relations between political parties
and large corporations—which have been observed in Brazil, Participatory Engagement
Chile, Colombia and other countries—fuel perceptions of
corruption and elite capture.
Participatory Engagement is the only attribute that does not have
The role of illicit funding sources—narco-mafias and crony a score, as its four subattributes (Civil Society Participation,
capitalists—remains a critical problem, particularly at the local not aggregated. The subattributes measure citizens’ participation
level, given their ability to elect legislators and other public officials in civil society organizations (CSOs) and in elections, and the
linked to criminal groups. In Colombia, for instance, about one- existence of direct democracy instruments available to citizens, as
well as the extent to which local elections are free.
third of the legislators in the National Congress in 2005 were
allegedly linked to paramilitary squads (International IDEA and
139
Summary: Participatory Engagement performance in A parallel delegitimization of political parties has led rising
Latin America and the Caribbean, 2018 middle classes in the region to increasingly channel their
demands through civic organizations and new forms of civic
Regional average: Mid-range activism—which are more spontaneous and fragmented
and less based on formal organizational structures—in
High Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador,
Jamaica, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and
the form of both online and offline protests (International
Uruguay IDEA 2016a).
Mid-range Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Examples of citizens’ movements against corruption include
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and Paraguay
‘Justicia Ya’ (Justice Now) in Guatemala, the protests
against corruption in Brazil in 2016–2018, and protests
Low Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua and Venezuela
in 2019 in Honduras against reforms to the education and
health sectors and to denounce illicit campaign finance.
By providing forums for new voices and bringing in new
issues through more diverse channels, these movements have
An empowered citizenship and vibrant civil society face helped democratize—and significantly reshape—the public
a shrinking civic space agenda in Latin America and the Caribbean.
The notable expansion of political freedoms in Latin
America and the Caribbean has led to a significant However, as in other parts of the world, Latin America
transformation of its civil society and to an and the Caribbean has also experienced a shrinking civic
increasingly empowered citizenship. The expansion of and media space in recent years. The share of countries in
political freedoms has allowed for the organization and the region with high levels of Civil Society Participation
incorporation of historically marginalized sectors of society and Media Integrity has been halved since 2015 (see Figure
into the civil society arena. Examples include groups 3.12 and Figure 3.13). The share of countries with high
led by women, indigenous peoples, Afro-descendants, levels of Civil Liberties has also seen a significant decline,
landless peasants, urban squatters, the disabled and sexual while the share of countries with low levels has increased
minorities. (see Figure 3.14).
FIGURE 3.12 FIGURE 3.13 FIGURE 3.14
Civil Society Participation in Latin Media Integrity in Latin America Civil Liberties in Latin America and
America and the Caribbean, 1975–2018 and the Caribbean, 1975–2018 the Caribbean, 1975–2018
80 80 80
70 70 70
60 60 60
50 50 50
40 40 40
30 30 30
20 20 20
10 10 10
0 0 0
2000
2000
2000
2005
2005
2005
1980
1990
1980
1990
1980
1990
2010
2018
2010
2018
2010
2018
1985
1995
1985
1995
1985
1995
2015
2015
2015
1975
1975
1975
Low Mid-range High
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy
Indices (2019), <http://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>. Indices (2019), <http://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>. Indices (2019), <http://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>.
140
Limitations on civic space are often, but not always, linked Front Line Defenders (2019) reports that, in 2018, 74 per cent
to corruption and illicit networks (CIVICUS 2016). of the 321 human rights activists murdered worldwide were
Two clusters of countries can be identified: (a) those killed in Latin America, with the highest number recorded
that experience shrinking civic space as part of a general in Colombia (126), followed by Mexico (48), Guatemala
democratic breakdown (e.g. Venezuela and Nicaragua); and (26), Brazil (23), Honduras (8) and Venezuela (5). Mexico
(b) countries experiencing different degrees of democratic is the deadliest country in the world for journalists outside a
erosion, and which have restricted the space for civil society conflict zone, with nine journalists murdered in 2018.12 In
or the media through specific regulatory measures that affect total, 14 journalists were killed in Latin America in 2018.
the right to protest and operate, as well as media freedom. Generally, journalists reporting on political corruption
(especially at the local level) and organized crime are targeted
In Brazil the limiting of civic space has occurred in a context of (Reporters Without Borders 2018).
democratic erosion, where CSOs and activists face increasing
threats and have been subject to violence. Brazil is the only In Brazil, the number of murders of members of the LGBT
democracy in the region that has seen declines on all three aspects community has seen a sharp increase, to 420 in 2018
of civic space measured in the GSoD Indices: Civil Liberties, (Telesur 2019). The country has also experienced a spike in
Media Integrity and Civil Society Participation. Colombia and assassinations of peasant and indigenous activists in recent
Chile have seen declines in two dimensions of civic space (Civil years, with a total of 182 killings between 2015 and 2017
Liberties and Media Integrity), while other countries have seen (Comissão Pastoral da Terra 2018: 23). Violent acts and
declines in one dimension only, including Argentina (Media efforts to intimidate social activists induce fear and restrict
Integrity), and Costa Rica and Haiti (Civil Liberties). their public engagement, and therefore reduce the civic space
needed for democracy.
Civic space in the region has been restricted via a wide range
of legislation regulating civil society’s activities. Legislation
has been approved and implemented in three main areas.
Between 2013 and 2018, two countries in
the region (Brazil and Venezuela) have seen
First, governments have regulated CSO registration, significant declines across all dimensions of
operation and access to funding, or renewed existing civic space (Civil Liberties, Media Integrity
legislation. Examples include legislation passed in Venezuela and Civil Society Participation). In the same
time period, Costa Rica has seen declines in Freedom of
in 2010, Ecuador in 2013 (but reversed in 2017), Bolivia
Expression, due to defamation lawsuits, and Argentina on
in 2013 and Panama and Colombia in 2017. Second, Media Integrity due to concentration of media ownership.
governments have regulated protest, as shown by laws passed
in Argentina, Brazil and Chile in 2017, and in Nicaragua in
2018. Third, governments have regulated the Internet, with
laws passed in Bolivia, Guatemala and Honduras in 2017. The transformation of the media landscape has
implications for civic space and democracy
In addition, governments have regulated media organizations Large media conglomerates continue to set much of the
and journalists through legislation affecting free speech news agenda across Latin America and the Caribbean.
(in Venezuela) and concentration of media ownership According to the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural
(in Argentina). Defamation lawsuits and threats against Organization (UNESCO), in most countries, one firm
journalists have been used, leading to self-censorship (in controls about half of the market in each media category. In
Dominican Republic and Panama), while harassment or Colombia, three conglomerates dominate more than 60 per
killings of civil society activists, including human rights cent of the country’s radio, print and Internet market. In Chile,
defenders and journalists, have also occurred. two companies share more than 90 per cent of the nation’s
newspaper readers (The Economist 2018; UNESCO 2018). A
Similar to other regions, Latin America has also seen a free, unbiased and critical press is key to healthy democracies,
recent increase in violence against journalists and civil as is a diverse media environment that provides a wide range
society activists fighting to protect the environment and of perspectives. An environment in which media ownership is
human rights and advance social rights among the poor. highly concentrated can therefore be harmful for democracy.
12 Front Line Defenders is an international human rights organization and is one of several organizations collecting data on threats against human rights activists. However, data on the
killings of human rights activists is highly contested as there is no global agreement on who should be classified as such. Moreover, the data coverage tends to be incomplete, especially
in countries where human rights activists are exposed to high levels of repression.
141
Along with the concentration of news media, studies social media need to find a balance between the right to
have detected large numbers of ‘news deserts’ or towns information and other rights, such as freedom of expression.
without local news coverage. In Brazil, more than half of
all municipalities have no local news outlets, while another There has been a decline in popular support for democracy
30 per cent of these towns are virtual ‘news deserts’ with Societal frustration with existing democracies increases the
only one or two homegrown news media organizations. risk of democratic deterioration. Data from two region-wide
All told, 64 million Brazilians, one-third of the country’s public opinion surveys—LAPOP and the Latinobarómetro—
population, are deprived of adequate news coverage, and show a decline in the support for democracy across the region.
therefore impoverished in terms of the quality of democratic LAPOP records a 12-point drop in support for democracy
debate (see Atlas da Notícia 2018). The existence of media over the last decade, from 70 per cent in 2008 to 58 per cent
oligopolies and ‘news deserts’ have triggered discussions in 2017, with close to a 9-point decline in the last three years
over how to improve access to information and ensure the alone. Trust in elections has remained low, at 39 per cent,
representation of a plurality of ideas and interests in the and has fallen by six points in recent years. Similarly, trust in
public arena. political parties remains very low, at 18 per cent, and has fallen
every year since 2012 (Cohen, Lupu and Zechmeister 2017).
Information and communications technologies are
redefining the political landscape in Latin America Latinobarómetro shows a similar trend. Between 2010 and
Citizens of Latin America and the Caribbean have gained 2018 support for democracy declined by 13 points, from 61
significant access to the Internet and ICTs. Nine out of 10 per cent to 48 per cent—the lowest figures recorded in Latin
adults in the region have a mobile phone, and nearly half have America since 2001, amid a regional economic slump. Over
a smartphone, while 44 per cent have Internet connections 2018 alone, support for democracy fell by five points. Young
in their homes. The number of Facebook users has tripled in people (aged 16 to 25), recorded the lowest levels of support
the region over the last 10 years, rising to 60 per cent of the for democracy, at 44 per cent, with nearly one-third (31 per
population in 2018, and is surpassed only by the number of cent) saying they felt indifferent about living in a regime that
WhatsApp users, which amounts to 64 per cent of the region’s was either democratic or undemocratic (Latinobarómetro
inhabitants (Latinobarómetro 2018: 76–78). 2018: 15 and 22).
As a result of these technological changes, Latin American Latinobarómetro also found increasing levels of dissatisfaction
societies have become more sophisticated in terms of the with democracy, which rose by 12 points over the last decade,
opportunities available for people to access information and from 59 per cent in 2008 to 71 per cent in 2018. Equally,
communicate with their fellow citizens. With these changes, satisfaction with democracy has declined by 20 points in the
Latin American citizens and particularly those in the growing last eight years, to 24 per cent in 2018. These shifts were
middle sectors have found new instruments to make their particularly acute in 2018, which registered a six-point drop
voices heard and amplify demands to fight corruption, curb from 2017. This development has been most pronounced in
elite privileges and enhance government effectiveness. The Brazil, where satisfaction with democracy fell from 49 per cent
Internet has helped democratize access to information, notably in 2010 to 9 per cent in 2018 (Latinobarómetro 2018: 35–37).
through the creation of alternative news outlets and blogs.
The political empowerment of the middle classes,
However, the growing number of independent, professionally and their expectations and frustrations, is crucial for
run online news sources—such as Aristegui Noticias in Mexico, democracy. The World Bank estimates that the Latin
Connectas in Colombia, Nexo and Agência Pública in Brazil— America and Caribbean middle class grew by 50 per cent
have had to contend with the rise of tawdry and dishonest between 2000 and 2010, increasing from 100 million to
practices on the Internet and elsewhere. Disinformation is not 150 million people for the first time in the history of the
a new phenomenon, although the Internet and social media region (Ferreira et al. 2013). These new middle classes have
have accelerated the speed with which it can be reproduced. generated a ‘revolution of expectations’, demanding effective
Disinformation can prey on people’s ignorance and reinforce solutions to the societal challenges affecting the region
and amplify existing prejudices. (International IDEA 2016a: 21).
Countering disinformation can be a challenging task for The middle classes often feel vulnerable in the context of
journalists, as they navigate the hazard of amplifying its economic (including technological) changes that can lead
negative effects in the process of seeking to debunk it. to occupational skidding (the inability of workers to obtain
Attempts to regulate disinformation in the press and on jobs aligned with their skills and qualifications) and greater
142
job anxiety. Concerns over public insecurity, an immigration However, as Article 3 of the Inter-American Democratic
surge, lingering class and racial tensions, or rapid changes Charter indicates, it is not sufficient for governments to access
in gender relations, can exacerbate fears and feelings of power by legitimate means; power must also be exercised
mistrust, resentment, discrimination and hatred. Polities that legitimately (Zovatto and Tommasoli in International IDEA
are perceived to have been ‘captured by elites’, ridden with 2016a). Hence, improvements in regional averages mask
corruption, ineffective and unresponsive to people’s needs wide variations between countries, ranging from severe
and expectations, unable to guarantee basic social rights and democratic backsliding, in cases such as Nicaragua and
offer a ‘fair deal’ are susceptible to bursts of civic rage. Venezuela, to other more moderate—but no less worrying—
cases of democratic erosion.
Democracy in the region hinges on how the middle classes’
anger and frustration are channelled, whether through In order to deepen democracy and rebuild citizens’ trust
public protests or electoral change. In the latter case, the in democratic systems of government, several areas are in
risk is that they will embrace strong leaders with weaker need of special attention. In the fight against corruption,
democratic aspirations at the expense of democrats. These determination and enforcement are required. Socio-
elements of societal combustion—and the deeper forces of economic inequalities need to be reduced. The strengthening
disintegration from which they stem—need to be addressed of judicial and other institutions is also essential for healthy
in ways to counteract their negative impact on democracy. democracies.
3.1.4. Conclusion In addition, a number of emerging issues require concerted

Latin America and the Caribbean has seen significant effort across the region. The growing immigration crisis,
democratic advances in the past decades and the region can fuelled by a large exodus of people from Nicaragua and
take pride in being the most democratic region in the world, Venezuela, but also Guatemala, Haiti and Honduras, poses
after North America and Europe. It has made significant a challenge to governments unused to large migration flows
advances in areas such as Electoral Integrity and Gender and has the potential to sow the seeds for a potential backlash
Equality, significantly narrowing the gap that once existed in receiving countries.
between it and these two regions in just a few decades.
TABLE 3.7
The GSoD Indices Snapshot: Policy considerations for Latin America and the Caribbean
This table offers a snapshot of the state of democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean, using the GSoD conceptual framework as an
organizing structure. It presents policy recommendations across the five main attributes of democracy—Representative Government,
Fundamental Rights, Checks on Government, Impartial Administration and Participatory Engagement.

Government
Elected Government: Priority areas for reform:

All but three countries in Latin • Define and implement holistic visions and strategies to build a virtuous circle to strengthen
America and the Caribbean democracy, create sustainable development and improve citizens’ quality of life.
(86 per cent) are democracies • Support civic education for democracy. Consider developing democracy education in
with democratically Elected schools to educate young people about the value and purpose of democracy. This can
Governments. Nicaragua be done in collaboration with non-partisan CSOs.
backslid into a hybrid regime
• Regional support an eventual transition of power in Venezuela, and to measures
in 2016 and Venezuela to a
such as the dissolution of the illegally convoked National Constituent Assembly,
non-democracy in 2017. Cuba
and the re-establishment of the functioning of the Venezuelan parliament and the
is the only country in the region
restoration of impartial checks and balances and the institutions that enable those
to have persisted as a non-
(e.g. electoral, judicial), the legalization of political parties and support to planning
democracy since 1975.
the timing of elections at national and subnational levels and other measures
needed to restore democracy in Venezuela.
143

Although the regional average Haiti and Honduras (democracies);
on Clean Elections is mid-range Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela (hybrid and non-democracies)
(0.66), half the countries (11)
in the region have high levels Priority areas for reform:
of Clean Elections. Of these • Strengthen the integrity of elections.
countries, seven score among
• Restore limits to presidential mandate periods where these have been abolished.
the top 25 per cent in the world.
• Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela (if a transition occurs): restore the independence of
electoral institutions.

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru,
Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay
Inclusive Suffrage:
All countries in the region have
high levels of Inclusive Suffrage.
Free Political Parties: Priority areas for reform:

The majority of countries in the Strengthen and reinvigorate political parties to serve as effective and legitimate
region (59 per cent) score in conduits for popular representation by reducing distance to voters, enhance
the mid-range on Free Political communication with citizens, effectively respond to citizen concerns and operate
Parties and eight countries with integrity.
score among the top 25 per cent
in the world with high levels of Good-practice countries for regional learning:
political party freedom. Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Costa Rica, Panama and Uruguay
Access to Justice: Priority democracies for reform:

Access to Justice is the aspect El Salvador, Guatemala and Haiti
on which Latin America and the
Caribbean performs the poorest Priority areas for reform:
(0.55) compared to the rest of Strengthen the capacity, autonomy, accountability, accessibility, meritocracy and
the world (0.59). Half (11) of transparency of the judiciary.
Latin America and the Caribbean
countries score below the global Good-practice countries for regional learning:
average with six in the bottom
Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay
25 per cent in the world.

Latin America has generally high Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela
levels of Civil Liberties (0.70),
with 64 per cent of countries Priority areas for reform:
scoring in the high range. • Tackle crime and violence through effective solutions that strengthen rather than
Latin America is the second- undermine democracy.
best performing region in the • Advocate for civil liberties protection in countries with significant declines.
world on Freedom of Religion
and the third-best on Freedom of Good-practice countries for regional learning:
Movement.
Top 25% in world: Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Jamaica,
Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay
144
Gender Equality: Priority democracies for reform:

The region’s average levels of Haiti (democracy)
political Gender Equality are in
the mid-range (0.63), performing Priority areas for reform:
third-best, but still significantly • Keep up and expand efforts to strengthen political gender equality in all spheres
lower than North America (0.75) and at all levels, by enforcing quota laws where they exist and adopting parity laws,
and Europe (0.70). to ensure equal representation of women beyond the legislative (i.e. in political
Seven countries in Latin America parties, in the executive and in local administrations).
and the Caribbean score in the • Strengthen quota laws and make requirements more specific, to avoid exploitation
top 25 per cent in the world on of loopholes in their design—for example placing women in secondary or alternative
political Gender Equality: Costa positions on ballots.
Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Jamaica,
• Electoral bodies can improve incentives for compliance and impose sanctions for
Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay
noncompliance in order to ensure effective implementation of parity standards or
and Venezuela. Five of these
quotas at all levels.
are democracies, while two are
non-democracies (Cuba and • Extend quota laws to all realms of the political sphere: legislative, executive and judicial
Venezuela). (for more detailed recommendations, see International IDEA, CoD and UNDP 2017).
Haiti, while in the mid-range in • Play a greater role in promoting gender equality and empowering women’s
absolute level of performance, political participation. To ensure state compliance with women’s rights treaties,
scores lowest in the region and regional organizations should mobilize their mandates to pressure governments to
in the bottom 25 per cent in the complement their treaty obligations, and to fulfil any commitments made in regional
world. declarations. Regional organizations can also facilitate the exchange of best practices
across countries, and provide crucial technical expertise to governments, politicians,
and civil society groups seeking to promote women’s political participation
(International IDEA, CoD and UNDP 2017).

Costa Rica, Ecuador, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago

Social Group Equality is one Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua
of the aspects on which Latin and Paraguay;
America and the Caribbean Brazil and Mexico (mid-range but below the world average)
performs the poorest (0.46),
with the largest share of low- Priority areas for reform:
performing countries (36 per • Policies designed to reduce stark inequalities should be prioritized. ECLAC and other
cent) compared to other aspects. agencies have developed a robust policy agenda to tackle inequalities in the region.
One-third (36 per cent) of the This includes important measures of redistributive taxation, asset redistribution, and
countries in the region score improvement in basic public services. Efforts to reduce inequalities should build on
below the global average, with these policy prescriptions. Social programmes should focus on tackling inequalities
eight countries in the bottom and should not be used for electoral or political purposes.
25 per cent in the world. With • Strengthen the political and social representation of under-represented groups,
the exception of Nicaragua, including women, youth and indigenous peoples. This should translate into
which is a hybrid regime, all proactive policies designed to ensure the inclusion of these groups in the decision-
of the countries in the bottom making and executive fabric of the region’s democracies (International IDEA, CoD
25 per cent of the world are and UNDP 2017).
democracies: Colombia,
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Good-practice countries for regional learning:
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras and
Top 25% in world: Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay
Paraguay.

The overwhelming majority of Venezuela as well as support to receiving countries of Venezuelan migrants (e.g.
countries (77 per cent) in Latin Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru)
America and the Caribbean have
mid-range levels of Basic Welfare;
no country scores in the low range.
The four countries with the
highest levels of Basic Welfare
are Cuba, Chile, Costa Rica and
Uruguay. Of these, all but Cuba
are democracies.
145

Government
Effective Parliament: Priority country for reform:

More than two-thirds (64 per Dominican Republic
cent) of countries in the region
score in the mid-range on Good-practice countries for regional learning:
Effective Parliament. Chile, Costa Rica, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay

Judicial Independence is one Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Haiti and Honduras (democracies)
of the four democratic aspects Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela (after transition): restore the independence of the
on which Latin America and judiciary (hybrid regime and non-democracies)
the Caribbean performs the
poorest (at 0.46). Of the region's Priority areas for reform:
countries, 32 per cent score • Strengthen the capacities of the judiciary and reduce its politicization, susceptibility
below the global average, with to corruption and institutional weaknesses. Strengthening the capacity and
five countries in the bottom 25 effectiveness of the judiciary will have positive repercussions on efforts to reduce
per cent in the world. Only two corruption, tackle crime and violence, and improve access to justice.
countries (Jamaica and Uruguay)
have high levels of Judicial Good-practice countries for regional learning:
Independence.
Top 25% in world: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago,
The share of countries with low and Uruguay
levels of Judicial Independence
has increased from five in 2008
to seven in 2018.

Well over half (14) of the Venezuela (after transition)
countries in the region score
in the mid-range on Media Priority areas for reform:
Integrity, and one-quarter score • Addressing disinformation on social media will require innovative cross-sectoral
highly. strategies. Foster regional and global cross-sectoral dialogues to identify solutions to
address the spread of disinformation, without harming core values of democracy such
as free speech.
• Guarantee an independent, diverse and vibrant media landscape, and avoid
concentration of media in a few hands.
• Provide protection to journalists, including those investigating corruption, in
countries with high levels of attacks against journalists.

Chile, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Mexico, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay
146

Administration

Absence of Corruption is one Democracies:
of the four democratic aspects First priority: High levels of corruption: Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala,
on which Latin America and the Haiti, Honduras and Paraguay.
Caribbean scores the poorest Second priority: Mid-range levels of corruption: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia,
(at 0.45) and which has seen Ecuador, Mexico, Panama and Peru
slowest progress in the past four Hybrid regimes and non-democracies: Nicaragua and Venezuela
decades. More than one-third
of countries have high levels of Priority areas for reform:
corruption and only two (Chile
• The fight against corruption requires strong political will, intolerance of impunity
and Uruguay) have low levels.
and a political impartial and integrated approach at national and subnational
All the non-democracies have
levels. Promoting a culture of integrity must become a core priority for all
high levels of corruption, as do
governments. This requires the input of multiple state institutions at all levels, as
six democracies.
well as the private sector and civil society, and commitment across party lines. Their
Latin America and the Caribbean strategies must combine efforts to identify and minimize corruption risks, prevent
is the region in the world with and sanction corruption and illicit financing, improve the state’s technical capacity
the largest share of countries to investigate and enforce existing laws in a timely and visible way, and reward
with both high levels of integrity. Modernizing the state and strengthening the capacity of a merit-based
Representative Government and civil service and public administration and the full implementation of open and
high levels of corruption. transparency strategies are also key to the fight against corruption.
• Strengthen political finance regulations and their enforcement, together with
measures to promote integrity and transparency in elections and lobbying activities
to ensure inclusive policymaking. Election campaign expenditure also needs to
be reduced to level the playing field for candidates and reduce opportunities for
corruption. Measures could include public finance for elections; setting legal limits
on campaign costs; and curbing expenditure by facilitating free access to television,
radio and social media (International IDEA 2016b; OECD 2018).
• Facilitate the exchange of good practices and cross-country and regional learning in
the fight against corruption, institutional and judicial strengthening, combating crime
and violence and in reducing inequalities.

Top 25% in world: Chile, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay
Predictable Enforcement: Priority democracies for reform:

Predictable Enforcement is one Dominican Republic and Haiti
of the four poorest performing
aspects of Latin America and the Good-practice countries for regional learning:
Caribbean’s democracy (with Top 25% in world: Chile, Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay
an average of 0.46). All five
low-scoring countries are in the
bottom 25 per cent in the world.
Three countries score highly:
Costa Rica, Chile and Uruguay.
Participatory GSoD Indices performance: Mid-range

Engagement
147

Levels of Civil Society Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela
Participation are on average in
the mid-range in Latin America Priority areas for reform:
and the Caribbean (0.60), but 5 • Ensure an enabling legal and policy environment for CSOs to operate, access
countries (almost 25 per cent) funding, monitor government performance and advocate for change, particularly in
have high levels and 14 (more countries with recent declines.
than two-thirds) have mid- • Improving channels for citizens’ participation and consultation in local and national
range levels. The region’s two governance can foster greater trust in democracy and complement mechanisms
non-democracies (Cuba and of representative democracy. Other institutionalized venues for social dialogue
Venezuela) and its hybrid regime should be studied and encouraged. However, such mechanisms should not be
(Nicaragua) have low levels, implemented at the expense of the mechanism of representative democracy.
performing in the bottom 25 per
cent in the world. For civil society organizations:
• Monitor state performance and hold governments to account. Scale up and learn from
(including cross-regional learning) existing civil society watchdog efforts to monitor
the state and hold governments to account for their reform efforts in different areas,
for example in reducing corruption and strengthening judicial reform. Civil society
observatories and other monitoring activities can generate information, identify
bottlenecks, fuel awareness and galvanize the coalitions needed to pursue change.
Using different types of media channels (including traditional and social media) to
publicize the information gathered can help increase pressure for change.
• Denounce efforts to weaken democratic institutions, such as the judiciary, electoral
institutions and other accountability organs, and ensure their independence and
professional capacity.
Electoral Participation: Priority areas for reform:

Latin America has the highest • Increase voter turnout in Haiti (low) and Chile and Jamaica (mid-range).
levels of Electoral Participation
in the world, with an average Good-practice countries for regional learning:
regional score of 0.67, together Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay
with Asia and the Pacific. Close to
half (41 per cent) of countries in
have high levels of voter turnout.
Direct Democracy: Good-practice countries for regional learning:

Levels of Direct Democracy in Latin Top 25% in world: Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru and
America and the Caribbean are Uruguay
the second-highest in the world,
after Europe. Of the top 25 per
cent of countries in the world with
high levels of Direct Democracy,
eight are in Latin America and
the Caribbean. All of these
countries are democracies, except
Venezuela. Uruguay is the country
in the region with the highest
levels of Direct Democracy,
followed by Ecuador and Peru.
Local Democracy: Priority country for reform:

Latin America and the Caribbean Haiti
has, on average, mid-range
levels of Local Democracy, but Good-practice countries for regional learning:
more countries score highly (10) Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, and
than in the mid-range (7). A total Uruguay
of eight countries in the region
(Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa
Rica, Ecuador, Jamaica, Peru and
Uruguay) are among the top 25
per cent in the world with high
levels of Local Democracy.
148
TABLE 3.8
Regime classification, Latin America and the Caribbean, 2018

Table 3.8 shows the regime classification for all of the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean covered by the GSoD Indices, as well
as their respective scores on the five GSoD attributes.
GSoD Attribute
Country
Democracies
Argentina 0.78 = 0.74 = 0.64 = 0.55 = High
Bolivia 0.63 = 0.55 = 0.49 = 0.53 = High
Brazil 0.704 – 0.59 = 0.62 = 0.47 = High
Chile 0.84 = 0.74 = 0.72 = 0.77 = Mid-range
Colombia 0.74 = 0.52 = 0.58 = 0.47 = Mid-range
Costa Rica 0.85 = 0.84 = 0.80 = 0.69 = High
Dominican Republic 0.59 = 0.63 = 0.41 = 0.26 – Mid-range
Ecuador 0.65 = 0.62 = 0.55 = 0.57 = High
El Salvador 0.66 = 0.47 = 0.59 = 0.408 = Mid-range
Guatemala 0.66 = 0.45 = 0.61 = 0.38 = Mid-range
Haiti 0.48 = 0.37 = 0.51 = 0.25 = Low
Honduras 0.50 = 0.52 = 0.44 = 0.36 = Mid-range
Jamaica 0.73 = 0.73 = 0.73 = 0.60 = High
Mexico 0.66 = 0.55 = 0.62 = 0.49 = Mid-range
Panama 0.76 = 0.66 = 0.58 = 0.54 = High
Paraguay 0.63 = 0.57 = 0.54 = 0.44 = Mid-range
Peru 0.709 = 0.64 = 0.706 = 0.54 = High
Trinidad and Tobago 0.73 = 0.79 = 0.701 = 0.72 = High
Uruguay 0.83 = 0.83 = 0.77 = 0.75 = High
Hybrid regimes
Nicaragua 0.36 – 0.34 – 0.29 = 0.23 – Low
Non-democracies
Cuba 0.21 = 0.405 = 0.22 = 0.30 = Low
Venezuela 0.29– 0.39 = 0.25 = 0.08 = Low
High Mid-range Low
Notes: = denotes no statistically significant increase or decrease in the last five-year period; + denotes a statistically significant increase in the last five-year period; - denotes a statistically
149
According to the GSoD Indices, the USA performs highly

on four out of five attributes of democracy (see Table 3.13)
3.2. The state of democracy in North America and scores among the top 25 per cent in the world on 12
This section focuses on North America and provides an out of its 16 subattributes. However, this is a decrease from
overview of the most recent Global State of Democracy 2013, when the USA was in the top 25 per cent on 13
Indices data on the region. The section also features a case subattributes. Furthermore, until 2016, the USA was among
study on the state of democracy in the United States. the few countries in the world that performed highly on all
five attributes of democracy. This is no longer the case, as the
3.2.1. The state of democracy in the United States country’s performance on Participatory Engagement slipped
Introduction into the mid-range in 2016 and has remained there since.
How is democracy faring in the United States? Is democracy
really backsliding under President Donald Trump? If so, how Moreover, since 2012 the USA has recorded significant
is this manifested and what are the causal explanations for declines on several democratic subattributes, although most
the trends observed? This case study aims to provide answers of these still perform in the high range, except on Participatory
to these questions based on data from the GSoD Indices, Engagement. Under the Representative Government
and to suggest possible factors that explain the current state attribute, declines have been recorded in Clean Elections
of democracy in the USA. (until 2018) and Free Political Parties. Under Fundamental
Rights, there have been declines on Civil Liberties. Under
The GSoD Indices data indicates that the USA remains a Checks on Government, declining performance has been
democracy with relatively high performance, although observed on Media Integrity and, until 2018, Effective
significant declines have been recorded in recent years, Parliament. Under Impartial Administration, declines
suggesting signs of democratic erosion. Indeed, the USA is have occurred on Absence of Corruption. Finally, under
among the 12 countries in the world with most subattribute the Participatory Engagement attribute, the USA has seen
declines since 2013 (five in total). However, these declines declines in its Local Democracy.
are not serious enough to be labelled democratic backsliding,
which is defined in the GSoD framework as the gradual Deep economic inequalities and continuing structural
and intentional weakening on Checks on Government and discrimination affect the legitimacy and strength of a variety
accountability institutions, coupled with declines in Civil of democratic institutions in the USA. Problematic electoral
Liberties. administration, restrictive voter identification laws, low
NORTH AMERICA AND THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS
Progress on SDG 16.6 on effective institutions has seen declines

in all indicators except Civil Society Participation, where
Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions stagnation is noted. SDG 16.7 on inclusive decision-making has
seen declines in Local Democracy, Clean Elections and Effective
Parliament but increases in Electoral Participation and Social
The two countries in North America score among the top Group Equality.
25 per cent of countries in the world on the majority of the
18 indicators related to Sustainable Development Goal 16 Finally, SDG 16.10 on freedom of expression and fundamental
(SDG 16). The USA scores among the top 25 per cent on freedoms has seen declines on Freedom of Expression and
14 indicators, while Canada records similar scores on 16 Freedom of Religion, whereas Freedom of Movement, Freedom of
indicators. Association and Assembly, and Media Integrity have stagnated.
However, regional stagnation has been noted on more than half

(56 per cent) of the indicators, with declines in 38 per cent and
only one advance: electoral participation in the USA.
Gender Equality
North America has seen stagnation on SDG 16.1 on reducing
violence. Declines are noted in both countries in relation to
SDG 16.5 on reducing corruption. Stagnation has occurred on SDG 5.5 on the political representation of women has seen
SDG 16.3 on rule of law. stagnation in both Canada and the USA since 2015.
150
levels of voter turnout, the growing influence of government TABLE 3.9

‘insiders’, limits on US citizens’ exercise of fundamental
freedoms (including freedom of expression) and weakening Representative Government in the United States,
government oversight (until 2018) have all contributed to 2012–2018
drops in the USA’s GSoD Indices scores in recent years.
GSoD Indices score
These recent democratic declines, in addition to a number of Attribute Subattribute
distortions built into the way in which democracy is practised 2012 2018
in the USA, contribute to the weakening and delegitimization
of democracy in the country. They reduce the public’s trust Representative
0.92 0.76
Government
in democratic institutions and increase societal and political
polarization, which has heightened in recent years. However, Clean
some recent developments also provide some reason for hope. 0.95 0.78
Elections
US democratic institutions, while increasingly tested, are
demonstrating their robustness in the face of these challenges. Free Political
1 0.82
For example, the current US Congress is the most racially Parties
and ethnically diverse in that institution’s history and the

percentage of women in the House of Representatives and High Mid-range Low
Senate (25 per cent in each) has never been higher. Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019), <http://www.idea.
int/gsod-indices>.
The current democracy landscape in the United States

The analysis in this section covers issues linked to
Representative Government, Fundamental Rights,
Checks on Government, Impartial Administration and USA have seen a drop since 2012 (see Table 3.9). The decline
Participatory Engagement, highlighting the current has mainly been caused by a significant decline in the GSoD
opportunities for democracy in the USA, as well as the Indices indicator on Clean Elections, although an increase
democratic challenges it faces. was seen in 2018, after the mid-term elections to the US
Congress. Declines have also been noted in the indicator of
Free Political Parties. There have been two periods during
the timeframe of the GSoD Indices (1975–2018) in which
the USA has not been in the top 25 per cent globally on
Clean Elections: 2000–2005 and 2016–2017. However, in
The GSoD Indices use the Representative Government attribute to 2018, a mid-term year, the US re-entered the top 25 per cent
evaluate countries’ performance on the conduct of elections, the globally on this indicator.
extent to which access to government is decided by elections. This
attribute is an aggregation of four subattributes: Clean Elections, Electoral processes face a number of complex challenges. A
Inclusive Suffrage, Free Political Parties and Elected Government. number of factors contributed to the 2016–2017 declines
in the USA’s GSoD Indices scores, and to an overall system
in which ordinary voters in the USA, especially poor
The USA has high levels of Representative Government and and minority voters, increasingly struggle to access and
performs among the top 25 per cent of countries in the world participate on equal terms in the electoral process. Issues
on this dimension. Under the US Constitution of 1789, the such as gerrymandering, weak campaign finance regulation,
country’s national executive and lawmakers are all elected, the electoral college system, strict voter identification (ID)
and the elected Senate approves other key officials, such laws and, more recently, foreign interference in elections,
as federal judges and Cabinet officers. The effectiveness of contribute to an electoral system that is weak on inclusion
elected government is abetted by two other key strengths of and works to maintain the status quo. To a large extent,
US democracy: the freedom of political parties, and strong wealth and access to power still determine political decision-
civil society participation in electoral and political affairs (see making and undermine political equality (Wang 2016;
e.g. Connolly 2018; Wilson 2017). Greenwood 2016).
However, despite this continued comparatively high The GSoD Indices subattribute of Social Group Equality
performance, levels of Representative Government in the measures access to political power and enjoyment of civil
151
liberties by social group. In the USA, levels of Social Group A number of other elements in the US electoral system
Equality are in the low mid-range at 0.53—closer to the contribute to the weakening of the principles of popular
Latin American and Caribbean average (0.46) than to North control and political equality. First, the representational
and Western Europe (0.77), which has more similar levels asymmetry of voting districts caused by gerrymandering
of Representative Government. Moreover, Social Group involves altering electoral boundaries to provide a political
Equality has not improved in the last four decades. On the advantage for a particular party. Gerrymandering has been
contrary, it has experienced statistically significant declines extensively practised by lawmakers in both the Republican
over the past 20 years. At 0.65, levels were higher in 1998 and Democratic parties. It contributes to the distortion of
than they are today (Figure 3.15). representation, undermines voters’ freedom to make political
choices and dilutes opposition parties’ ability to represent
While the 116th US Congress is more ethnically diverse constituents’ interests (Wang 2016; Greenwood 2016).
than it has ever been, only 22 per cent of lawmakers are The representational asymmetry caused by gerrymandering
from racial or ethnic minorities—including one-quarter of can be so severe that a party could theoretically gain 20
the House of Representatives and 9 per cent of the Senate— per cent of the vote share without any corresponding gain
although they represent 39 per cent of the US population in seats. This practice can also contribute to the dilution
(Bialik 2019). Furthermore, only 24 per cent of lawmakers of minority votes (Royden, Li and Rudensky 2018).
are women; while this represents an historic high, the USA Moreover, a recent legal case, Shelby County v Holder,
has not yet reached the critical threshold of 30 per cent largely ended the US Justice Department’s ability to check
women’s participation and is far from achieving gender discriminatory boundaries, which significantly weakens the
parity (IPU 2019). judiciary’s role in ruling against such political distortion
(Neely and McMinn 2018).
Among the factors that explain the decline in the USA’s
Clean Elections score were the alterations made by the US
Supreme Court in 2013 to the 1965 Voting Rights Act, FIGURE 3.15
which were first applied in the 2016 presidential election;
and the passing of a number of voter identification laws,
Trends in Social Group Equality in the United States,
which have had a negative impact on equal access to the
1975–2018
ballot box. By 2019, 35 US states had laws—seven of which
were classified as ‘strict photo ID’ rules—requiring voters 0.9
to show some form of identification at the polls (Underhill
2019). Such regulations have been shown to depress 0.8
turnout, especially among youth and minority populations
(US Government Accountability Office 2014), who are 0.7
more likely to struggle to obtain the necessary identification
(Gaskins and Iyer 2012; Barreto, Nuno and Sanchez 2009). 0.6
Strict voter ID regulations have a disproportionate effect on
certain segments of the population and are discriminatory 0.5
against people of colour (Erickson 2017; Bentele and
O’Brien 2013). They therefore undermine the strength of 0.4
representative government by violating the constitutional
and international principle of universal suffrage. 0.3
Electoral integrity in the USA has also been negatively 0.2

affected by indications of Russian interference, primarily
via social media, in the 2016 presidential election. Russian 0.1 United States World
operatives allegedly targeted election systems in 18 US Latin America and the Caribbean West Europe
states, accessed voter registration databases and conducted 0.0

Confidence interval
malicious access attempts on voting-related websites (US

2000
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
1975
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 2018). They also

allegedly used psychological campaigns to persuade people
to vote a certain way—or not at all—which included the int/gsod-indices>.
targeting of African-American voters (Jamieson 2018).
152
Second, the lack of effective checks on electoral campaign

donations, spending and disclosure has significantly Fundamental Rights
undermined the principle of popular control and the degree
to which ordinary US voters can control their government.
It also creates an uneven playing field for candidates to The Fundamental Rights attribute aggregates scores from three
compete for political power and puts at a disadvantage subattributes: Access to Justice, Civil Liberties, and Social Rights
and Equality. Overall it measures the fair and equal access to justice,
those who do not have access to networks, influence and the extent to which civil liberties such as freedom of expression
money, further reinforcing unequal representation for or movement are respected, and the extent to which countries are
women and minorities. In fact, a group of wealthy donors— offering their citizens basic welfare and political equality.
as small as 1 per cent of the US population, or a total of
26,783 individuals—is estimated to be responsible for an
overwhelming majority of campaign funding (Drutman Declines have been observed in levels of Civil Liberties in the
2012). USA since 2012, particularly on aspects relating to Freedom
of Expression, Freedom of Movement and Freedom of
One study showed that, compared to donors, average citizens Religion (see Table 3.10).
have little or no independent influence on government
policy, concluding that the majority ‘does not rule—at Civil Liberties and Freedom of Expression are on the decline
least not in the causal sense of actually determining policy The right to free speech, expressed in the First Amendment
outcomes’ (Gilens and Page 2014: 576). This inequality to the US Constitution, is a hallmark of democracy in
has been compounded in the aftermath of the US Supreme the USA. Indeed, laws in the USA protect a vast range of
Court’s decision in Citizens United v FEC, which allows expression. In recent years, however, levels of Freedom of
corporations and unions to spend unlimited amounts Expression in the USA have declined, although the start of
of money in support of candidates. The struggle to pass the decline predates the Trump administration.
more effective campaign finance regulations is partly due
to the judiciary’s longstanding view that political spending In 2012 the USA recorded the highest score in the world
is a form of ‘free speech’ which, in the same way as other (0.99) on Freedom of Expression but by 2018 its score had
forms of speech, cannot be limited. Regulation requires dropped to 0.85 (which was still in the high range) (see
lawmakers to distinguish electoral speech from non-electoral Figure 3.16). Declines on this dimension in 2012–2013
speech, something which is difficult to implement in any can be partially attributed to alleged increased surveillance
circumstance but especially so when the political divide is so by the National Surveillance Administration (NSA),
deep (Briffault 2015). which permitted the NSA to examine the metadata of text
messages and phone calls of US citizens, potentially violating
Third, the Electoral College provides disproportionate individual privacy rights (Reddick et al. 2015). During the
voting power to US states with smaller populations and
contributes to the dilution of the principle of political
equality of each citizen’s vote on election day (Petrocelli TABLE 3.10
2016). Indeed, the system tilts politicians’ attention

towards competitive states with large numbers of electors. Civil Liberties in the United States, 2012 and 2018
Since electoral votes are allocated on the basis of a once-
in-a-decade census, minority voters living in fast-growing GSoD Indices score
urban centres are often undercounted. Indeed, the Civil Liberties subcomponent
number of voters affected by this discrepancy in the five 2012 2018
most populous US states is more than the total voting
Freedom of Expression 0.99 0.85
population of six small states (Dreyfuss 2016). While the
electoral vote has given the same result as the popular vote Freedom of Movement 0.93 0.83
in most recent US elections, this was not the case in the
presidential elections in 2000 (in which George W. Bush Freedom of Religion 0.95 0.83
defeated Al Gore) and 2016 (in which Donald Trump
defeated Hillary Clinton). There are increasing calls for High Mid-range Low
a modification or elimination of this system, as a way to
enhance political equality in representation in the USA int/gsod-indices>.
(Birnbaum 2019).
153
Trends in Civil Liberties and Freedom of Expression Trends in Media Integrity in United States, 1995–2018
in the United States, 1995–2018
1.0
1.0
0.9
0.9
0.8
0.8
0.7
0.7
0.6
0.6
Civil Liberties Freedom of Expression

Confidence interval Media Integrity Confidence interval
0.5
0.5
2009
2003
2005
2007
1999
2001
2018
1995
1997
2013
2015
2017
2011
2009
2003
2005
2007
1999
2001
2018
1995
1997
2013
2015
2017
2011
Obama administration, heightened restrictions were also workforce, respectively, despite a national minority population
placed on reporters’ access to administration officials and to of 38 per cent (Radio Television Digital News Association
government information (Freedom House 2015). 2017). The poor representation of minorities in newsrooms has
implications for whether—and how—minority communities
Media freedom has continued to be threatened since and their concerns are addressed by the media (Gerson
2016–2017, when Trump’s election campaign—and then and Rodriguez 2018). Compounding the issue, the high
administration—excluded reporters from certain events and concentration of media ownership and an increasingly partisan
some Trump supporters intimidated journalists. President media coverage contribute to a polarized media landscape in
Trump’s verbal attacks on the press and his selective allegations the USA. The GSoD Indices indicator on Media Integrity,
of ‘fake news’ have unfairly raised doubts about verifiable which measures diversity of media perspectives, has seen a
facts and increased the risk of journalists being targeted with decline from 0.93 in 2012 to 0.76 in 2018 (see Figure 3.17).
violence (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights 2018). In the long term, such fear can Freedom of Movement and Freedom of Religion are under threat
lead to media self-censorship and mute public participation, The GSoD Indices score on Freedom of Movement has seen a
especially among the most marginalized sectors of society. statistically significant decline in the USA, declining from 0.93
This presents a serious threat to the health of US democracy. in 2012 to 0.83 in 2018 (see Figure 3.18). This decline reflects
recent moves towards a more restrictive immigration policy,
US media also struggles to be broadly representative in its including restrictions affecting those seeking immigrant and
coverage and reporting. This is due in part to the low levels of non-immigrant visas from several Muslim-majority countries
minority representation in newsrooms. As of 2017, minorities (BBC News 2018c), as well as widely reported cases in 2018
made up 24 per cent and 12 per cent of the television and radio regarding the treatment of migrants crossing the border from
154
FIGURE 3.18 TABLE 3.11
Trends in Freedom of Movement and Freedom of Effective Parliament in the United States, 2013–2018
Religion in the United States, 1995–2018
Year
1.0
2013 2017 2018
GSoD Indices score 0.80 0.65 0.71

0.9
High Mid-range Low
int/gsod-indices>.
0.8
0.7 Effective Parliament in the USA has seen both declines and
recent advances
The past five years (between 2013 and 2018) have been marked
by a significant decline in Effective Parliament in the USA, due
0.6
mainly to a dearth of congressional oversight of the executive,
especially in relation to foreign affairs (Blanc 2018; Fowler
2018). In 2017, for the first time in the GSoD Indices, the
Freedom of Religion Freedom of Movement
0.5 USA fell to a mid-range score, although it regained its position
as a high-performing country in 2018 (see Table 3.11). This
2009
2003
2005
2007
1999
2001
2018
1995
1997
2013
2015
2017
2011
recovery reflects the results of the 2018 mid-term elections to

the US Congress, where Democrats now hold a majority in the
int/gsod-indices>. House of Representatives, although Republicans still control
the Senate. Experts claim that oversight has too often become a
vehicle for ‘partisan politics’ instead of strong and independent
investigation (Chaddock 2011). Laxity in congressional
Mexico into the USA and the alleged policy of separating oversight poses a serious threat to democracy, increasing the
children from parents on arrival (Sacchetti 2018). chances that a president can overrule the people’s will on key
issues. It therefore impacts Representative Government. The
lack of oversight prior to 2018 was partly due to the structure
of government, as well as increasing partisanship (Goldgeier
and Saunders 2018). Members of Congress must regularly
choose between their interest in maintaining Congress as a
The Checks on Government attribute aggregates scores from three strong, vibrant institution and their personal interests in re-
subattributes: Effective Parliament, Judicial Independence and election, attaining a party leadership position, or advancing
the executive, as well as whether the courts are independent, and their constituents’ goals (Devins 2018).
US citizens enjoy access to an open and independent system
of justice that is perceived as possessing a high degree of
integrity, and that has the authority to check abuses by other Impartial Administration is the aggregation of two subattributes:
branches of government. Indeed, on the three GSoD Indices Absence of Corruption and Predictable Enforcement. It measures the
indicators relating to the rule of law (Judicial Independence, enforcement of public authority is predictable.
Access to Justice and Predictable Enforcement), the USA
scores among the top 25 per cent of countries in the world.
155
Corruption continues to undermine democracy (Transparency International 2017). Confidence in the

Corruption and the perception of corruption in integrity of the White House has declined, although
Washington, DC, are nothing new. Since the Watergate dissatisfaction with the executive branch appears to be based
era, high-profile corruption scandals involving public heavily on party affiliation (Transparency International
officials have emerged on a regular basis. US citizens have 2017; Ladd, Tucker and Kates 2018).
expressed alarm about more than just bribes and bagmen.
In a 2017 survey the percentage of citizens who believed Transparency International also reported that more than two-
that the government does what is right ‘just about always’ or thirds of Americans surveyed believe that the government
‘most of the time’ stood at only 18 per cent (Pew Research is doing ‘very badly’ or ‘fairly badly’ combating corruption
Center 2017). Table 3.12 shows the USA’s performance on in its own ranks (Transparency International 2017). The
the GSoD Indices attribute of Impartial Administration, Mueller investigation into alleged Russian interference in
and its subattribute of Absence of Corruption. the 2016 presidential election has cast a cloud of uncertainty
regarding the integrity of the Trump administration (Murray
Many troubling practices have existed for decades, such 2018). Even federal law enforcement agencies, which
as the US political system’s alleged ‘pay-to-play’ culture would normally be counted on to address illegal acts of
for accessing lawmakers and abuse of the ‘revolving door’, political corruption, have suffered from a decrease in public
which allows lobbyists to become government officials— confidence (Kahn 2018; Santhanam 2018).
and officials and lawmakers to become lobbyists—without
adequate restrictions or accountability (Purdum 2006;
OpenSecrets.org n.d.). Recent developments, such as the Participatory Engagement
US Government’s perceived failure to adequately hold
accountable financial leaders following the 2008 financial
crisis and the loosening of campaign finance restrictions, Participatory Engagement is the only attribute that does not have a
have contributed to a belief that the wealthiest US citizens score, as its four subattributes (Civil Society Participation, Electoral
Participation, Direct Democracy and Local Democracy) are not
operate under different rules than other citizens and enjoy aggregated. The subattributes measure citizens’ participation in
disproportionate political clout in the USA (Sanders and civil society organizations and in elections, and the existence of
Weissman 2015). direct democracy instruments available to citizens, as well as the
extent to which local elections are free.
Confidence in the integrity of Congress remains very low.

In a 2017 Transparency International survey, more than
one-third (38 per cent) of Americans responded that they The USA’s levels of Electoral Participation—as expressed
believed ‘most’ or ‘all’ members of Congress were corrupt by voter turnout—are among the lowest for the world’s
democracies. The USA’s score in 2018 (0.47) is below the
world average (0.56). The GSoD Indices data shows that
TABLE 3.12 levels of electoral participation are generally higher in
presidential elections (where turnout has averaged 56.6 per
Impartial Administration in the United States, 2012 cent since 1975) than in the mid-term elections (where the
and 2018 average was 36.9 per cent until 2018). The persistently low
levels of voter turnout in the USA contribute to weakening
GSoD Indices score US democracy, undermining the core principle of popular
Attribute Subattribute control.
2012 2018
However, the 2018 mid-term elections to the US Congress
Impartial
Administration
0.83 0.73 showed a record turnout of 53 per cent of the voting-
eligible population, which was the highest turnout for a
Absence of mid-term election since the US Census Bureau began
0.83 0.69
Corruption tracking turnout in 1978. This increase in turnout was
particularly noticeable among younger voters, who saw a
High Mid-range Low 16-point increase from 2014 to 2016 (US Census Bureau
2019). Despite these gains, the turnout was still below the
int/gsod-indices>. 61.4 per cent turnout in the 2016 presidential election (US
Census Bureau 2017).
156
The low levels of voter turnout in the USA may be due to Finally, measures need to be taken to reduce the perceived
the institutional set up of US democracy—where due to dominance of moneyed interests in the US political
a system of first-past-the-post elections, a single vote may process.
seem less meaningful—along with the diffused nature of
checks and balances, which makes it harder for voters to Policy considerations
reward or punish politicians for policy success or failures • Consider restoring the Voting Rights Act, requiring states
(Martinez 2010). While these institutional issues are difficult and localities with a history of voting discrimination
to remedy, smaller fixes such as automatic voter registration to get ‘preclearance’ from the US Justice Department
could lower bureaucratic barriers for citizens to vote and, in before making changes to voting processes.
turn, increase turnout (Stockemer 2017).
• Consider legislation that checks the perceived
Conclusion dominance of moneyed interests in the political process.
Despite a range of challenges, the USA maintains a At a minimum, disclosure laws governing donations in
high position in the GSoD Indices and is still a leading support of candidates or political causes, and interactions
democracy in several respects. At the same time, decreasing between lobbyists and public officials or lawmakers,
popular control and political equality are a grave concern should be strengthened.
and a growing threat to the strength and legitimacy of the
US model of democratic rule, which has suffered erosion in • Review and strengthen restrictions regarding the
recent years. ‘revolving door’ between private lobbyists and public
officials and lawmakers.
Implementing legislation and policies that promote
transparency, facilitate genuine universal and equal suffrage, • Strengthen ethics laws and regulations by including stricter
ensure freedom of expression and strengthen ethical requirements on financial transparency for candidates for
obligations will be essential. However, leaders in the USA federal office. Rules regarding the conversion or transfer of
will first need to overcome extreme political polarization and certain assets that may lead to a conflict with official duties
tackle a number of challenges. These include the underlying following election could be clarified and strengthened.
problems of racial and other forms of inequality and the
growing gap between the rich and the poor—conditions that • Consider expanding laws prohibiting nepotism in hiring
can have severe effects on democracy. for any federal position, including positions within the
White House.
TABLE 3.13
Regime classification for North America in 2018

This table shows the regime classification for all of the countries in North America covered by the GSoD Indices, as well as their respective
scores on the five GSoD attributes.
Attribute
Country
Democracies
Canada 0.79 0.84 0.74 0.79 High
United States 0.76 – 0.79 0.77 0.73 – Mid-range
High Mid-range Low
Notes: + denotes a statistically significant increase in the last five-year period; – denotes a statistically significant decrease in the last five-year period.
157
• Consider reforming the Electoral College system. and by purchasing new, secure voting machines to
replace outdated, vulnerable machinery.
• Consider removing the power to draw district boundaries
from the hands of elected officials and transfer it to • Consider instituting automatic voter registration at
independent redistricting committees. the national level, to lower the bureaucratic barriers to
electoral participation.
• Protect and update election infrastructure by conducting
audits and threat analyses of voter registration systems
TABLE 3.14
The GSoD Indices Snapshot: Democracy in North America

Table 3.14 offers a snapshot of the state of democracy in North America, using the GSoD conceptual framework as an organizing structure
across the five main attributes of democracy—Representative Government, Fundamental Rights, Checks on Government, Impartial
Administration and Participatory Engagement.
Representative GSoD Indices score: High (0.78)

Government
Elected Government:
North America has high levels of Elected Government: both Canada and the USA are in the top 25 per cent for this
dimension.
Clean Elections:
North America has high levels of Clean Elections (0.82), with both Canada and the USA scoring in the top 25 per cent
on this subattribute. While the USA’s Clean Elections score decreased from 0.95 in 2012 to 0.78 in 2018, it increased in
2017–2018, after the mid-term elections to the US Congress.
Inclusive Suffrage:
Both Canada and the USA have high levels of Inclusive Suffrage, although Canada scores higher (0.95) and among the top
25 per cent of countries in the world. The USA scores 0.90 and is not in the top 25 per cent of countries on this dimension.
Free Political Parties:

North America has high levels of Free Political Parties. Both Canada and the USA are in the top 25 per cent in the world on
this aspect.
158
Fundamental Rights GSoD Indices score: High (0.82)
Access to Justice:
North America has high levels of Access to Justice. Both Canada and the USA are in the top 25 per cent for this dimension.
Civil Liberties:
North America has high levels of Civil Liberties. Both Canada and the USA are in the top 25 per cent of countries for this
dimension.
However, the USA has seen a decline in Civil Liberties, from 0.98 in 2012 to 0.87 in 2018.
Gender Equality:
Gender Equality is high in Canada (0.81) but the USA dropped from high to mid-range in 2017 (0.69). Nevertheless, both Canada
and the USA perform in the top 25 per cent of countries for Gender Equality.
Social Group Equality:

North America has mid-range performance on Social Group Equality. Canada scores 0.65 and the USA 0.53 on this
dimension.
Basic Welfare:
North America has high performance on Basic Welfare with both the USA and Canada performing in the top 25 per cent of
countries in the world.
Checks on GSoD Indices score: High (0.75)

Government
Effective Parliament:
North America has mid-range levels of Effective Parliament. Canada continues to be in the top 25 per cent of countries,
while the USA returned to the top 25 per cent in 2018, after a drop in 2017. In the last years, the USA has seen statistically
significant declines on Effective Parliament, falling from 0.84 in 2012 to 0.71 in 2018.
Judicial Independence:
Judicial Independence is high in North America, with both Canada and the USA scoring in the top 25 per cent of countries in
the world. Canada has seen a statistically significant decline since 2012 (from 0.78) but still scores highly (0.70 in 2018).
Media Integrity:
Media Integrity is high in North America, with both Canada and the USA scoring in the top 25 per cent of countries. While
the USA saw a significant decline on its scores on this dimension between 2012 and 2017, it still scores in the high range
(0.76).
159
Impartial GSoD Indices score: High (0.76)

Administration
Absence of Corruption:
While corruption remains low in North America, both Canada and the USA have seen statistically significant declines on
their Absence of Corruption scores, with Canada falling from 0.87 in 2012 to 0.79 in 2018 and the USA falling from 0.83 in
2012 to mid-range (0.69) in 2018. At the same time, both countries remain above the world average.
Predictable Enforcement:
Predictable Enforcement is high in North America with both Canada and the USA scoring in the top 25 per cent of countries in
the world. Canada has seen a decline in its score since 2012 but still performs in the high range.
Participatory GSoD Indices performance: High

Engagement
Civil Society Participation:

Civil Society Participation is high in North America, with both Canada and the USA scoring in the top 25 per cent in the
world. Since 2013, Canada has seen a slight increase in its Civil Society Participation score, increasing from 0.74 to 0.84.
Electoral Participation:
On Electoral Participation, North America scores particularly poorly, at 0.54. On this aspect, North America is
outperformed by all regions except for Africa and the Middle East (which score at 0.49 and 0.22 respectively). North
America performs slightly below the world average (0.56) and well below the best performing region (Latin America, at
0.67). The USA’s low score (0.47) on Electoral Participation drags down the regional average: Canada scores at 0.62, above
the world average.
Direct Democracy:
North America has the world’s lowest score on Direct Democracy (0.01). Its score on this dimension is below the world
average of 0.12 and well below the score of the best-performing region: Europe (0.21). It should be noted that this
subattribute only captures direct-democracy mechanisms at the national level.
Local Democracy:
Canada scores high on Local Democracy and is in the top 25 per cent of countries in the world on this indicator. The USA
broke with recent trends in 2018, falling out of the top 25 per cent. It now scores in the mid-range category. In fact, the USA
has seen declines over the past five years, scoring 0.95 in 2013 and 0.69 in 2018.
160
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165
The state of democracy in Asia and the Pacific Addressing the Ills, Reviving the Promise
Chapter 4
in Asia and the Pacific
This chapter offers an overview of the long-term democratic trends in Asia and the Pacific, and an analysis
of the current democratic landscape, using the GSoD conceptual framework as an organizing structure. The
analysis covers issues linked to Representative Government, Fundamental Rights, Checks on Government,
Impartial Administration and Participatory Engagement, highlighting the current opportunities for
democracy in the region, as well as the democratic challenges it faces. The analysis is based on the GSoD
Indices as the principal data source, complemented by other sources. The section concludes with an overview
of policy considerations relevant to democratic trends and challenges in Asia and the Pacific.
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC AND THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS
dimensions compared to the rest of the world. The target that

presents most cause for concern is SDG 16.10, on which Media
Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions Integrity and Freedom of Association and Assembly have seen
more countries declining than advancing since 2015, pointing to
a shrinking civic space in the region. More than a third (39 per
Asia and the Pacific has made some progress in implementing cent) of the people in Asia and the Pacific live in countries that
Sustainable Development Goal 16 (SDG 16) since 2015, have seen declines on these aspects since 2015.
although significant challenges remain.
Of the 18 GSoD Indices indicators used to measure progress on

SDG 16, half (nine) have seen more countries with gains than Gender Equality
declines since 2015. This is the case for SDG 16.3 on rule of law
and SDG 16.5 on reducing corruption.
SDG 16.6 on accountable institutions has seen gains Significant challenges continue to hinder the achievement
outnumbering declines for independent judiciaries, effective of gender equality and SDG 5.5 on political representation
parliaments and civil society, but not on political parties. SDG of women. The GSoD Indices measure of (political) Gender
16.7 on inclusive decision-making has seen advances in Clean Equality for Asia and the Pacific has seen stagnation since
Elections, but stagnation in Elected Government and Social 2015, with no countries declining or advancing. Almost one-
Group Equality, and declines in Electoral Participation and third of countries in the region perform below the world average
Local Democracy. on Gender Equality.
Despite these recent advances, a large number of countries

continue to have low levels of performance on all these
166
2019 The state of democracy in Asia and the Pacific
KEY FINDINGS
Myanmar and Papua New Guinea, show low performance on

at least one of their democratic attributes. Still others have
Positive developments experienced democratic erosion.
• Asia and the Pacific is one of the regions most affected by

democratic erosion, with more than half of its democracies
• Asia and the Pacific has experienced a significant democratic suffering from it. India is currently experiencing democratic
expansion in the past four decades. The number of democracies backsliding and has the highest number of democratic
has doubled (from 7 to 15) and there has been a reduction of non- subattribute declines since 2013. The Philippines, also a
democracies (from 14 to 10). This expansion has been driven by democratically backsliding country, follows India in number of
democratic transitions, with 12 countries becoming democracies democratic declines. Older democracies such as Australia, Japan
for the first time since 1975. Two of these countries (Malaysia and New Zealand have suffered some erosion, as have Indonesia,
and Myanmar) made the transition in the last four years. Sri Mongolia and Timor-Leste.
Lanka, one of the region’s five pre-1975 democracies, returned to
democracy in 2015, after its second hybrid hiatus. • Several countries in the region have experienced democratic
fragility, with democratic breakdowns since their first transition
• Malaysia, one of the region’s two most persistent hybrid regimes to democracy. Bangladesh (since 2014) and Pakistan (since 2018)
(together with Singapore), transitioned to democracy for the first have regressed into hybridity. Thailand backslid into military rule
time after the 2018 elections ended the ruling party’s 60-year in 2014, although elections in 2019 have paved the way for a
monopoly on power. civilian government.
• The older democracies in Asia and the Pacific have proven • A number of Asian countries suffer from weak human rights
resilient. Of the seven extant democracies in 1975, five have protection. Human rights violations are perpetrated by both state
remained so uninterruptedly until today: Australia, India, Japan, and non-state actors. These violations are sometimes related to
New Zealand and Papua New Guinea. Of the 12 countries that internal conflicts which are further aggravated by waves of re-
became democracies after 1975, all but two remain democracies, emerging ethnonationalism.
and half have not had any undemocratic interruptions.
• Despite advances in gender equality in some countries in the last
• Of all the early third-wave democracies (i.e. those that decades, progress in Asia and the Pacific has not kept the same
transitioned between 1975 and 2000), the Republic of Korea pace as the rest of the world. Significant challenges remain to
(South Korea) and Taiwan have made the most democratic achieve gender equality and SDG 5.5 on political representation
advances. Of the newer democracies, Timor-Leste stands out for of women. Efforts are needed to increase the representation of
its democratic gains. These are the only third-wave democracies women, not only in new democracies but also in countries such
that have high levels of Representative Government. as Japan and South Korea.
• The region’s democracies come in many shapes and forms. • Recent attacks on institutions central to the integrity of
Only Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Taiwan have high functioning democracies constitute a significant challenge
performance on all five of their democratic attributes, followed by to democracy in Asia and the Pacific. Threatened institutions
Japan which performs high on four attributes. The most common include the judiciary, court systems, electoral commissions,
performance (40 per cent of the region’s democracies) is mid-range parliaments and institutions fighting corruption.
on all attributes.
• Despite some recent advances in reducing corruption (SDG 16.5),
almost half of all countries in Asia and the Pacific still suffer from
high levels of corruption. This situation is compounded by weak
Challenges to democracy judicial systems lacking capacity to combat corruption.
• There have been attempts throughout the region to undermine

civic space, freedom of speech and a free media in recent
• Half of the countries in Asia and the Pacific do not have years. In Cambodia, for example, the shrinking of civic space
democratically elected governments. Some countries in the has occurred in a context of deepening autocratization, while
region have suffered from deepening autocratization in recent in Thailand a similar shrinkage occurred after the democratic
years. For example, Cambodia, which never fully transitioned breakdown in 2014. In other countries, it has occurred in contexts
to democracy, ultimately became a non-democratic regime in of democratic backsliding and erosion, explained by the rise
2018. After the Middle East and Africa, Asia is home to the largest of nationalist political parties, and justified by arguments
number of countries that have never experienced democracy at of national sovereignty, law and order, national security and
any time in their history (40 per cent of countries in the region). responses to terrorism.
• Democracies in Asia and the Pacific suffer from democratic • The SDG 16 target that presents most cause for concern is SDG
fragility and weak democratic performance. Nepal, the 16.10, with Media Integrity, and Freedom of Association and
Philippines and Sri Lanka have experienced undemocratic Assembly, having seen more countries declining than advancing
interruptions since their transitions. Others, such as Malaysia, since 2015.
167
4.1. Introduction impressive in the short term, this performance represents an

Asia and the Pacific is the most populous region covered exception to the rule. The large majority of these countries
by the GSoD Indices. It includes 30 countries across five do not guarantee other important dimensions of sustainable
subregions: Central Asia, East Asia, South Asia, South East development, such as low levels of corruption, environmental
Asia and Oceania (which includes Australia, New Zealand sustainability or gender equality.
and Papua New Guinea). As the GSoD Indices only cover
countries with more than one million inhabitants, most Democracy faces a number of challenges in Asia and
Pacific Islands are not included. However, if these island the Pacific. These include democratic fragility, recurrent
nations are counted, the Asia and the Pacific region is interference of the military in the political sphere, enduring
composed of 50 countries. In order to ensure coverage for hybridity, pockets of autocratic persistence, deepening
Pacific Islands, qualitative analysis and other data sources autocratization, conflict, the rise of ethnonationalism and
have been used to analyse these smaller countries. anti-establishment leaders, a shrinking civic space, the spread
of disinformation, and weakened checks on government.
Asia and the Pacific is also the most democratically diverse
region covered by the GSoD Indices. It includes all regime The region’s democracies have a lot to be proud of as well.
types: democracies, hybrid regimes and non-democracies. First, they have proven resilient over the past decades. Of
Among the democracies, the region is home to both older the region’s 15 democracies, all but three have remained
and third-wave democracies of varied performance ranges. democracies without interruptions. Moreover, the region
Among the non-democracies, the region includes absolute hosts some of the third-wave democracies with the highest
monarchies, Communist one-party states, autocracies and levels of Representative Government, Gender Equality,
authoritarian regimes. This large heterogeneity makes it Social Group Equality and Civil Society Participation in
difficult to draw general conclusions that are valid for the the world.
entire region.
4.2. Taking the long-term perspective:
Moreover, some countries in Asia and the Pacific are outliers democratic developments since 1975
compared to the rest of the world. Unlike other regions, a Asia and the Pacific has experienced significant
number of Asian countries have achieved unprecedented democratic expansion in the past four decades. The share
economic growth and societal modernization under of democracies increased from 29 per cent in 1975 to 50 per
authoritarian rule. This challenges the common view on cent of countries in 2018. There has also been a reduction
democracy and economic and social performance. Some of in the share of non-democracies, from 58 per cent to 33 per
these countries (e.g. South Korea and Taiwan) transitioned cent. However, the share of hybrid regimes increased from
to democracy after their economic development while others 12 per cent in 1975 to 17 per cent in 2018 (see Figure 4.1).
(e.g. Cambodia, China, Singapore and Viet Nam) never
made the transition or (as in the case of Malaysia) only did The democratic aspects with the most improvements in Asia
so very recently. and the Pacific between 1975 and 2018 have been Direct
Democracy, Basic Welfare, Local Democracy and Electoral
Apart from their economic performance, some hybrid Participation. Other aspects that have seen improvements in
regimes and non-democracies also perform better than a the past four decades are Representative Government, Gender
number of democracies on other aspects measured by the Equality, Clean Elections and Civil Society Participation.
GSoD Indices. For example, on Impartial Administration,
Singapore has the lowest levels of corruption in the world, The expansion of democracy in Asia and the Pacific has
and China and Viet Nam record mid-range levels of been driven by democratic transitions in a number of
Impartial Administration. In addition, a number of the countries. Since 1975, a total of 11 countries in the region
region’s democracies also defy conventional wisdom on have transitioned to democracy and Timor-Leste became a
gender equality. For example, three democracies (Japan, democracy when it gained independence from Indonesia
Myanmar and Papua New Guinea) have among the lowest in 2002. These 12 countries are referred to as ‘third-wave
levels of women’s representation in parliament in the world democracies’. Of these, two-thirds transitioned during the
(under 12 per cent of legislators). early third-wave period (i.e. before 2000) and three (Myanmar,
Timor-Leste and most recently Malaysia) transitioned after
However, as will be seen in this chapter and throughout 2000 as part of the so-called new third wave. Nepal and Sri
this report, while the economic and other performance Lanka experienced re-transitions to democracy in 2008 and
of some hybrid regimes and non-democracies may seem 2015, respectively, after going through hybrid hiatuses.
168
FIGURE 4.1 decade Nepal has advanced in its transition to federalism,

establishing provinces and, despite an electoral collapse of
Regime types in Asia and the Pacific 1975–2018 pro-federalist opposition forces, hosting elections at three
levels of government.
100
Pakistan’s first transition to democracy occurred in 1988,
90 although a military coup in 1999 returned the country
to military rule for almost a decade. In 2008, Pakistan
80
experienced its second transition to democracy. The 18th
amendment to its Constitution in 2010 was envisaged to
70
end a tradition of military coups and leadership instability,
60 constraining executive power, increasing decentralization
and thereby increasing democratic space. Despite these
50
important changes in Pakistan’s democracy framework, the
40 last decade has been marked by advances in some areas, but
also significant democratic weaknesses . In 2018, the country
30 regressed into hybridity.
20
Sri Lanka was considered a democracy in 1975, regressed
10 into a hybrid regime in 1977 and returned to democracy
in 1989 for a period of 20 years, after which it regressed
0 into hybridity again between 2010 and 2014. The country
was ravaged by a brutal civil war from 1983 to 2009. In
2000
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
1975
2015, a coalition of various opposition parties won a

Democracy Hybrid regime Non-democracy landslide electoral victory, which led the country back to
democracy.
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019c), <http://www.
A number of South East Asian countries have also made
significant strides towards democracy following the
turbulence of post-colonial statehood. Countries previously
under decades-long, non-democratic rule have transitioned
At the subregional level, in East Asia, Japan was the lone to democracy, including the Philippines in 1986 after two
democratic country in the region until Mongolia, South decades of rule by President Ferdinand Marcos; and Indonesia
Korea and Taiwan transitioned to democracy from the late in 1999 after 30 years under the military rule of President
1980s onwards. Suharto. Timor-Leste became independent from Indonesia
in 2002. Seven years after a UN Peacekeeping Mission left
In South Asia, democracy has demonstrated significant the country it remains democratic and has significantly
resilience, and overall democratic gains have outweighed strengthened its democratic performance.
setbacks (Rikkila Tamang and Bakken 2017). The absolute
monarchy in Bhutan paved the way for democracy under Myanmar, previously under military rule for 25 years, has
a new Constitution in 2008, a year which also saw the gradually democratized since the adoption of the 2008
country’s first elections. Constitution and the first democratic elections in 25 years
held in 2015, although severe human rights violations and
Nepal initiated its first transition to a fragile democracy in restrictions on press freedom persist. Malaysia and Singapore
1991, backsliding into non-democracy again between 2002 have been the region’s most enduring hybrid regimes, although
and 2007, and then returning to democracy in 2008 in the prospects of strengthened democracy in Malaysia were
what is usually marked as its democratic transition after a raised with the unprecedented results of the 2018 general
decade-long civil war. A new Constitution was adopted in elections, which ended the 60-year monopoly on power of
2015, transforming the country into a multiparty, federal, the National Front (Barisan Nasional, BN), on the back
secular and democratic republic. Such constitution-building of a united opposition and a strong civil society. Although
processes have been at the heart of many of the region’s Malaysia made the transition to democracy in 2018, major
democratic transitions (Ginsburg 2018). Over the last political rights reforms are still pending.
169
In the Pacific Islands, democracy has survived in most aspects since independence. In addition, together with
countries since the achievement of independence in the South Korea and Taiwan, Timor-Leste records high levels of
1960s, apart from Fiji, which experienced a series of Representative Government.
democratic breakdowns and military interventions in 1987,
2000 and 2006. Governance in Pacific Island countries can Six third-wave countries have either suffered from
be understood within a historical and cultural context in democratic fragility or experienced democratic
which highly privileged kinship is expressed through the interruptions since their transitions. Bangladesh, Nepal,
distribution of power, wealth and opportunities. With the Pakistan and Thailand had full democratic breakdowns
exception of Fiji and Solomon Islands, democratic elections (Nepal and Pakistan once, Bangladesh twice and Thailand
have been held regularly in most Pacific Island countries four times), while the Philippines regressed into hybridity
(Firth 2018). A Westminster-type parliamentary system is for four years between 2007 and 2010 and Sri Lanka
the most common institutional setup, with some countries regressed on two occasions, between 1977 and 1988 and
adopting a presidential or hybrid system. A number of between 2010 and 2014. Of these six countries, Bangladesh
countries have constitutionally mandated councils reserved regressed into hybridity in 2014 and Pakistan in 2018.
for chiefs and traditional leaders. The type of legislature and Table 4.1 presents a timeline of these episodes.
electoral system also varies across the subregion (Corbett
2015). While the region has seen significant democratic advances
since 1975, not all aspects of democracy have advanced
As a result of these democratization processes, independent at the same pace, with some dimensions trailing behind
accountability institutions have been established across Asia and even declining. The regional average on Absence of
and the Pacific, with varied results. Judiciaries that can review Corruption has declined by 11 per cent since 1975, meaning
official acts and adjudicate political disputes are now in that average levels of corruption in the region are higher
place. The creation of constitutional courts in, for example, today than they were 43 years ago. Social Group Equality
Indonesia and the Philippines (see e.g. Chen and Harding and Freedom of Religion have seen insignificant advances
2018), as well as anti-corruption bodies (in Indonesia, (with an average increase of 6 per cent). Finally, while Asia
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Viet and the Pacific’s Gender Equality score has increased by
Nam), to strengthen the integrity and accountability of state 47 per cent since 1975, the rate of progress is slower than
institutions and bureaucracies, are positive examples in this other regions in the world, including Latin America and the
respect. National human rights institutions have also been Caribbean, and Africa.
established in many countries (e.g. Indonesia, Malaysia,
Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand and Timor-Leste) to 4.3. The current democracy landscape in Asia
promote and protect human rights. and the Pacific
The analysis in this section covers issues linked to
Both older and third-wave democracies in Asia and the Representative Government, Fundamental Rights, Checks
Pacific have proven remarkably resilient over the past four on Government, Impartial Administration and Participatory
decades. Of the seven countries that were democracies in Engagement, highlighting the current opportunities for
1975, five (Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand and Papua democracy in Asia and the Pacific, as well as the democratic
New Guinea) have remained democracies uninterruptedly. challenges the region faces.
Of the two remaining democracies in 1975, Sri Lanka has
experienced democratic interruptions and Thailand backslid
into non-democracy in 1976, a situation which was not
reversed until 1983.13
Of the 10 countries that became democracies after 1975

and remain democracies today, all but five have remained
evaluate countries’ performance on the conduct of elections, the
democracies without interruptions. Of all the early third- extent to which political parties are able to operate freely, and the
wave democracies, South Korea and Taiwan have made the extent to which access to government is decided by elections. This
most democratic advances. Of the post-2000 democracies, attribute is an aggregation of four subattributes: Clean Elections,
Inclusive Suffrage, Free Political Parties and Elected Government.
Timor-Leste stands out for its democratic gains, having
increased by an average of 72 per cent across all its democratic
13 For this reason, it is more appropriate to state that Thailand was a third-wave democracy until 2013.
170
Summary: Representative Government in Asia and the Four countries in the region perform highly on all five
Pacific, 2018 attributes of democracy: two (Australia and New Zealand)
are older democracies, while the other two (South Korea
Regional average: Mid-range (0.48) and Taiwan) are early third-wave democracies. Japan, also
an older democracy, performs high on all attributes except
High Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea,
(>0.7) Taiwan and Timor-Leste
Participatory Engagement. India performs in the mid-range
on all five of its democratic attributes. This is also the most
Mid-range India, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Mongolia, common performance pattern in the region, with four other
(0.4–0.7) Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, countries in that bracket: Mongolia, Nepal, the Philippines
the Philippines, Singapore and Sri Lanka
and Sri Lanka.
Low Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, China,
(<0.4) Kazakhstan, Laos, North Korea, Tajikistan, Democratic performance also varies across subregions
Thailand, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Viet Nam (see Figure 4.2). All subregions in Asia contain democracies,
except Central Asia, where all the countries except
Kyrgyzstan (considered a hybrid regime) are classified as non-
democracies. The most democratic subregion is Oceania,
The democratic landscape in the region is where all countries are democracies, followed by East Asia
heterogenous where two-thirds of countries are democracies.
Today’s democratic landscape in Asia and the Pacific
presents great levels of heterogeneity in democratic Asia and the Pacific also hosts a large number of non-
performance. While half (15) of the countries in the region democracies (10) and five hybrid regimes (see Table 4.7).
covered by the GSoD Indices hold competitive elections as After the largely non-democratic Central Asia, South East
the basis for electing their governments, and are therefore Asia has the largest share of non-democracies and hybrid
considered democracies, there is wide variety in their regimes, and South Asia also has three hybrid regimes.
performance. A total of seven democratic performance
patterns can be discerned among the region’s democracies Even hybrid regimes and non-democracies present wide
(see Table 4.2). variations in performance. A country such as Singapore,
TABLE 4.1
Changes in regime type in third-wave democracies in Asia and the Pacific, 1975–2018
Year
2000
2005
1980
1990
2018
2010
1985
1995
2015
1975
Country
Bangladesh
Nepal
Pakistan
The Philippines
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Notes: Cell colours denote types of political regimes. Green: Democracy; Blue: Hybrid regime; Dark orange: Non-democracy. This timeline displays the changing regime types in Asia and the
Pacific between 1975 and 2018 in countries that experienced hybridity or democracy at some point during that period.
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019c), <http://www.idea.int/gsod-indices>.
171
TABLE 4.2
Heat map of democratic performance patterns in Asia and the Pacific, 2018
GSoD Indices attribute
Country
Australia
South Korea
New Zealand
Taiwan
Japan
Timor-Leste
Indonesia
India
Mongolia
Nepal
Philippines
Sri Lanka
Malaysia
Myanmar
Papua New Guinea
High Mid-range Low
which is classified as a hybrid regime because it does not older democracies, only Sri Lanka has experienced hybrid
hold competitive elections, nonetheless has high levels of regressions (twice). Of the 15 democracies today, twelve have
Impartial Administration and the lowest levels of corruption remained democracies uninterruptedly. This is the case for
in the world, outperforming democracies such as Australia all the older democracies, five of the seven early third-wave
and New Zealand in this respect. Viet Nam, classified as democracies (Indonesia, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea,
a non-democracy on account of being a one-party state, South Korea and Taiwan) and three of the newer third-wave
has mid-range levels of Fundamental Rights and Impartial democracies (Malaysia, Myanmar and Timor-Leste). Three
Administration; and China, which is also classified as a
non-democracy, performs in the mid-range on Impartial
Administration. Hence, when analysing democracy at the
country level, regime classifications can be used as a general The majority of Asia and the Pacific’s older
reference point, but they should always be contextualized and third-wave democracies have shown
and complemented by nuanced multi-dimensional analysis. democratic resilience. Of the region’s five
older democracies, only Sri Lanka has
experienced hybrid regressions (twice). Of
Democratic resilience bodes well for sustained the 12 countries that became democracies after 1975 and
gains in Representative Government remain democracies today, more than half have remained
Asia and the Pacific’s older and third-wave democracies democracies uninterruptedly.
have shown democratic resilience. Of the region’s five
172
FIGURE 4.2 Bangladesh, a previously fragile democracy, regressed to a

hybrid regime in 2014. However, the process of backsliding
Regime types by subregion in Asia and the Pacific, began earlier than that. Since winning the 2008 general
2018 elections, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League
100
has waged full-scale attacks on the press, using defamation
20% (1) 67% (4) 100% (3) 50% (5) 50% (3)
laws and other lawsuits, and reportedly physical attacks
90 and harassment against journalists. The tightening of a
series of laws has given the Bangladeshi Government broad
80
powers to limit media that is critical of the government or
Percentage of countries in subregion
80% (4)
70
its security forces, or deemed to threaten national security
(Rocha 2018; Reporters Without Borders 2019).
60
The Awami League has also used restrictions on civil
50 liberties to oppress opposition parties, including arresting
10% (1) 50% (3)
opposition leaders and banning the Jamaat-e-Islami party on
40
40% (4)
the basis of a constitutional prohibition on religious parties.
30 33% (2) After elections were announced in 2018 approximately
21,000 opposition members were arrested; and in attacks
20 by non-state organizations led by Awami League members,
impunity reigned, despite widespread reports of arson and
10
public beating (Asadullah and Savoia 2018).
0
Central East Oceania South East South The opposition rejected the results of the December 2018
Asia Asia Asia Asia elections, in which Sheikh Hasina won 96 per cent of the
Non-democracy Hybrid regime Democracy votes and the Awami League secured 258 out of the 299
parliamentary seats up for election, reducing the opposition
Notes: The absolute number of countries in each subregion is also shown in brackets within
each column.
to a very small minority (Asadullah and Savoia 2018).
The military contributes to inhibit representative
government in some countries
The role of the military partly explains the democratic
(or a little less than half ) of the countries in the region that fragility that characterizes some countries in the region.
have had interruptions of a hybrid or non-democratic nature Military forces have historically played pivotal roles in
subsequently returned to democracy, namely Nepal, the either endorsing or withdrawing support for elected
Philippines and Sri Lanka. civilian authorities, thereby continuing to inhibit both
popular control and political equality. Indeed, authoritarian
Democratic fragility still poses risks for some resurgence has been a constant threat to new democracies
third-wave democracies and the representativity of governments in the region,
Despite the democratic resilience shown by a number of particularly in South East Asia.
third-wave democracies, democratic fragility still poses
challenges to representative government in a number Thailand is the country in the region that has experienced
of countries in the region. The three democracies that most democratic breakdowns (four in total) in the past
returned to democracy after experiencing undemocratic 43 years, each driven by coups that installed military
interruptions (Nepal, the Philippines and Sri Lanka) provide governments, the most recent of which lasted from 2014
an indication that these democratic gains remain fragile until 2019. In 2017, Thailand’s parliament approved the
and need to be consolidated to avoid repeated regression. country’s 20th Constitution, which transformed the Senate
Indeed, two countries (Bangladesh and Pakistan) have into a 250-seat non-elected body. The 2017 Constitution
currently backslid into a state of hybridity, while a third and National Strategy Act assures the Thai military of its
(Thailand14) experienced a full democratic breakdown from continuing role as an overseer of national political life (see
2014 up to the elections of 2019. e.g. Marcan-Markar 2018). Similar to the 2008 Myanmar
14 The GSoD Indices data for 2019, which would show the country’s regime status following the 2019 elections, is not yet available.
173
Constitution, it also provides guarantees of military Representative government has not necessarily
immunity against both civil and criminal prosecutions. prevented political instability
Even uninterrupted and relatively well-performing third-
Pakistan, which regressed from a fragile democracy to wave democracies in the region have experienced political
a hybrid regime in 2018, has retained a strong military instability. Timor-Leste, which became a democracy when
presence in political life since its first transition to it was granted independence from Indonesia in 2002, is the
democracy in 1988. Military support for the current Prime region’s newest third-wave democracy with the highest levels
Minister, Imran Khan, has allegedly assumed a variety of of Representative Government (well above the regional and
guises including pressuring politicians from other parties world average) and high levels of Participatory Engagement.
to defect, and the press to provide positive coverage of the However, it has also struggled to maintain a stable political
President’s party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), which system, having experienced an attempted coup and
came to power in elections held in 2018 (Fair 2018). civil conflict in 2006 as well as fierce rivalry among its
political leadership that intermittently affects the Timorese
Myanmar was under military rule for 25 years but Government’s capacity to govern. Indeed, disputes between
transitioned to democracy in 2015, when the first fully national leaders—which usually play out in public—tend
free and fair elections were held and Aung San Suu Kyi’s to stifle national political life (Guterres 2018).
National League for Democracy (NLD) won a landslide
victory. However, the army continues to exert significant Government instability also affects the older democracies
political influence, thereby undermining representative in the region. In Australia, the electoral and political-party
government. The 2008 Constitution guarantees the armed systems have been undermined by a number of challenges
forces 25 per cent of parliamentary seats and gives the in recent years, of which one is the regular ousting and
commander-in-chief of the armed forces the power to resignation of prime ministers (within the same ruling
appoint three government ministers (AsiaWatch 2019). party). Since 2007, Australia has had five prime ministers,
with none of them finishing a full term. Causes cited for
This type of provision, and the continued influence it gives the political instability in the form of changes in political
the military over political decision-making in Myanmar, leadership include the type of parliamentary system, short-
contributes to dilute the principle of popular control. term mandates, internal party rules, internal party divisions,
In 2019, the NLD presented a motion to establish a party fragmentation, and perceived lack of progress on key
constitutional amendment committee in order to revise policy reforms (Noack 2018; Stober 2018).
these provisions. The 45-member committee presented a
report to the Union Parliament in July 2019, which listed Over the past two decades an ‘arc of political instability’
more than 3,000 proposed changes to the Constitution has also stretched over the Pacific (Wallis 2015: 39). This
(Joint Committee to Amend the Republic of the Union has been compounded by weak institutional capacities,
of Myanmar Constitution 2019). Although the armed as Pacific Island countries such as Papua New Guinea,
forces sent representatives to sit in the committee, they Solomon Islands and Vanuatu are ‘states-in-formation’
did not present any proposals. Any amendments to the characterized by significant ethno-linguistic diversity that
Constitution are likely to face opposition from the armed poses a challenge to attempts to assert traditional, mono-
forces (Win Ko Ko Latt and Wai Mar Tun 2019; Thant ethnically derived conceptions of nationhood (Firth
2019). 2018: 1).
In the Pacific Islands, Fiji is a strong state whose historically Despite being an uninterrupted democracy since 1974,
fragile democracy is nonetheless gaining in strength. The Papua New Guinea has persistently recorded low scores on a
country has held competitive elections since 2014, before number of measures relating to its democratic performance.
which it experienced a 10-year undemocratic hiatus. For example, it scores in the bottom 25 per cent of countries
The state apparatus it inherited from British colonizers in the world on Inclusive Suffrage and on measures relating
remains largely intact. Its present stability relies on former to Social Rights and Equality, including both Basic Welfare
military commander and current Prime Minister Frank and Gender Equality.
Bainimarama and the military. Democracy was partially
restored by the 2014 elections and further consolidated by The political instability experienced by Pacific Island
the 2018 elections.15 countries has manifested itself in frequent changes of
15 Fiji is not covered by the GSoD Indices.
174
government (Aqorau 2016). The concept of ‘terminal event’ covered by the GSoD Indices. Singapore has been a hybrid
is used to denote ‘the frequency of changes of government regime uninterruptedly for the past 43 years and flourished
and the political instability that these changes represent’ under export-led growth strategies facilitated by the strong
(International IDEA 2015: 1). Between 1968 and 2018, hand of the state. Unlike the other three so-called Asian
there were 125 ‘terminal events’ in the subregion; 66 of tigers—South Korea, Taiwan, and more recently Malaysia—
these were associated with executive instability such as early Singapore has never fully transitioned to democracy
elections, successful no-confidence motions and resignations. (Acharya 2018).
Successful no-confidence motions are the most common
event, especially in Nauru (International IDEA 2015). Afghanistan has never been classified as a democracy, having
transitioned from a non-democracy to a hybrid regime in
In other parts of the subregion stability has been restored 2005 and remaining in this category for the past 14 years.
after a series of political upheavals. In Vanuatu, the coalition Similarly, Cambodia developed into a hybrid regime in 1993,
government of Prime Minister Charlot Salwai (in power after the civil war and Vietnamese occupation, and remained
since 2016) has survived two attempted no-confidence a hybrid for 14 years until it backslid into a non-democracy
motions. In 2017, Solomon Islands experienced political in 2018. Hence, hybridity has not been a transitional stage
turbulence after the Prime Minister was ousted in a no- leading to democracy for any of these regimes—rather,
confidence vote that occurred after members of his cabinet hybridity is a defining feature of their political systems,
defected to the opposition. However, the Prime Minister which sit somewhere in the grey zone of democracy. Indeed,
managed to negotiate a coalition of opposition members these are countries that have allowed multiparty systems,
and members of his former administration in order to form but only under highly restrictive conditions and with severe
a new government and returned as Prime Minister in 2019 limits on civil liberties. However, there are wide variations in
(Blades et al. 2017). performance between these hybrid regimes.
In the grey zone of representative government: Malaysia was a hybrid regime until 2018, when the BN’s
Asia’s hybrid regimes single-party hold on power ended. The country has held
The region’s hybrid regimes exist in the grey zone of regular elections, although they were not classified as
representative government. Of the world’s hybrid regimes, competitive until 2018.
18 per cent are located in Asia and the Pacific and
this share has increased in the past decades. Hybrid In Afghanistan, the end of the Taliban rule in 2001, the
regimes are countries that combine democratic with non- holding of elections and the promulgation of the 2004
democratic characteristics. They tend to hold regular Constitution, which included provisions for freedom of
elections, although these are not considered to be fully speech and universal suffrage, media and civil society to
competitive. Five countries in the region currently classify flourish, and laid the foundation for a transition to hybridity.
as hybrids: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan However, these democratic advances were quickly subsumed
and Singapore. Cambodia was also classified as a hybrid by violent conflict, which persists 18 years after the defeat
regime until 2018, as was Malaysia uninterruptedly from of the Taliban. Moreover, ambiguities in the Constitution,
1975 until it transitioned to democracy in 2018. and instability perpetuated by the ongoing conflict, have led
to a confrontational relationship between parliament and
Of the currently five hybrids, only Bangladesh and Pakistan the executive. The executive has expanded its power using
have ever been categorized as democracies in the 43 years emergency declarations, knowing it can do so with impunity,
while the parliament has proven unable to effectively oversee
the executive according to its powers as outlined in the
Constitution (Pasarlay and Mallyar 2019).
A total of 5 countries (17 per cent) in Asia
and the Pacific are hybrid regimes. The
region is home to 18 per cent of the world’s Singapore offers an alternative to China’s hybrid model
hybrid regimes. Two (Bangladesh and of development and governance that may seem similarly
Pakistan) have experienced alternating attractive to countries in the region. Singapore does not
periods of democracy, hybridity and non-democracy in the
hold competitive elections but scores in the mid-range on
last four decades, while three (Afghanistan, Singapore
and Kyrgyzstan) have never fully experienced democracy.
Representative Government, Fundamental Rights and
Malaysia transitioned to a weak democracy in 2018, after Checks on Government. It scores highly on Impartial
more than six decades of hybridity. Administration, where it performs among the top 25 per
cent in the world, with the lowest levels of corruption in
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BOX 4.1
Deepening autocratization in Cambodia

A multiparty system was instituted in Cambodia in 1993 after leaders, as well as silencing civil society voices and the media
the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement following a bloody through violent repression and weaponizing the law and legal
civil war and genocide perpetrated during the Khmer Rouge processes. The judiciary commands very little support from the
regime (1975–1979) in which almost two million people were population and is perceived as highly corrupt (International Bar
killed. Elections supported by the international community Association 2015), routinely violating fair-trial rights and being
were held in 1993 and occurred regularly until 2018, when patently biased in favour of the ruling CPP (Lipes 2018).
the country backslid into a non-democracy. However, its
classification as a hybrid regime up to that point was based on Before the 2018 national elections, the courts handed out
the monopolization and concentration of political power for 30 prison sentences to CNRP leaders and dissolved the party. This
years by Prime Minister Hun Sen and his Cambodian People’s rendered the 2018 elections non-competitive and unfair, and in
Party (CPP). the absence of an effective opposition the ruling CPP won by a
landslide in elections that were denounced by the international
Until the elections in 2013, Cambodia allowed a limited space community. Cambodia’s score on Clean Elections is now among
for opposition parties that had representation in parliament. the bottom 25 per cent in the world. China is thought to play
Since then, however, Hun Sen has not disguised his efforts a key role in supporting the Cambodian regime economically
to suppress democracy. During 2017 and 2018, he completed through investments and no-strings financial loans, which has
the process of eliminating opposition forces, outlawing the enabled Cambodia to avoid both aid conditionalities and wider
Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) and incarcerating its international criticism (The Economist 2019).
the world. Singapore also enjoys a highly effective public never experienced democracy at any time during the
administration and is the only high-income economy in an third wave of democratization. A total of 12 countries
otherwise mostly low- and medium-income region. (or 40 per cent of the countries in the region) have never
experienced democracy (Figure 4.3). Of these, five have
A factor widely believed to have played a role in the ability of alternated between periods of hybridity and non-democracy,
Singapore (and Malaysia, up until 2018) to maintain a state and Singapore has remained a hybrid uninterruptedly.
of hybridity is the high levels of economic performance that
have helped legitimize its regime. This also partly explains The remaining six countries have never been anything
why Cambodia, which is still a low-income economy but but non-democracies, with governments that cannot be
has experienced one of the highest growth rates in the region considered as either representative or upholders of the
in the past decade, persisted as a hybrid regime until 2018, principles of popular control and political equality. This is
although the memory of the bloody Khmer Rouge regime the case for only 18 countries in the world, and Asia is home
also provides an explanation for popular yearnings for to one-third of those regimes.
political stability in the country (Öjendal and Sedara 2011;
The Economist 2019). Therefore, despite the democratic gains made in Asia and
the Pacific over the past decades, pockets of autocracy
In some countries, hybridity has evolved into non-democracy. remain, specifically in Central Asia, East Asia and South
For example, Cambodia, which never fully transitioned to East Asia. Central Asia is the only subregion that has never
democracy, has suffered from deepening autocratization in undergone a process of full democratic transition, and
recent years (see Box 4.1). This is the term used in the GSoD where there are no democracies. In East Asia, China and
Indices to refer to hybrid regimes or non-democracies that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)
have experienced significant declines on at least 3 of their 16 persist as autocracies, while South East Asia is home to three
democratic subattributes in the past five years. non-democratic regimes: Brunei Darussalam, Laos and Viet
Nam.
Non-democracies in the region are persistent,
with alternatives models of development and According to the GSoD Indices, the five Central Asian
governance republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan
After the Middle East and Africa, Asia and the Pacific and Uzbekistan) are all considered non-democracies, of
is home to the largest share of countries which have which Kyrgyzstan, given recent political openings, is the
176
FIGURE 4.3 Some identify the highly patriarchal and hierarchical nature
of Central Asian society as the root cause of authoritarianism
Percentage of countries in Asia and the Pacific that in the subregion (Anderson 1997; Hale 2015). Others argue
have never been democracies that it is tightly connected to debates over regional political
culture (Heathershaw and Schatz 2017). Some contend
that the root causes are located in clan politics (Collins
2006). Others emphasize the importance of political will
and the new elite’s ability to forge unity and negotiate with
oppositional elites (Cummings 2012), while still others
claim that the presidential function inherited from the Soviet
Union constitutes the chief causal factor (Ishiyama 2002).
40%
Since 2012 almost all Central Asian states have instigated
a wave of constitutional or legal reforms pursued under the
rubric of democratization, although critics have condemned
60% the use of ostensibly democratic tools such as constitutional
reviews to implement reforms aimed at further entrenching
non-democratic rule and practices (Landau 2013). The
most promising may be those in Kyrgyzstan, the only
hybrid regime in the subregion (since 2005), whose 2010
Constitution instituted a premier-presidential form of
governance headed towards parliamentarism (Fumagalli
2016), followed by several constitutional amendments in
2016–2017. These latest amendments, passed through
Countries without a democratic episode a highly contested referendum, have, however, been
criticized for strengthening the presidential grip on power,
undermining human rights, especially those of LGBT
idea.int/gsod-indices>. groups, and weakening adherence to international human
rights treaties.
Since holding elections in 2016, Uzbekistan, still classified

only hybrid regime. Uzbekistan has seen some democratic as a non-democracy, has undergone an unprecedented
advances in recent years, but not yet sufficient to be classified reform process with respect to taxation, economic and
even as a hybrid regime. monetary policy as well as administrative and constitutional
reforms. If implemented and able to help provide the basis
In contrast to Eastern Europe and the Baltic states, for a viable opposition and democratic plurality, these
Central Asia did not undergo any democratic transitions reforms could increase the potential for democratization
following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Given the in Uzbekistan and, indeed, the subregion. Uzbekistan’s
absence of strong democratic movements that could have statistically significant gains since 2016 are also reflected in
enabled revolutions from below, power was largely left its GSoD Indices scores, specifically in five subattributes:
concentrated within regime elites based on subnational
clan identities and patronage networks (Cummings 2002;
Collins 2006). Therefore, Central Asia experienced a
None of the Central Asian countries
process of non-rupture as, one by one, presidents opted for (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
authoritarian alternatives (Cummings 2012). Democratic Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) has
reforms were mostly used by elites to enhance their transitioned to democracy since breaking
ability to capture distributive gains during the transition. away from the Soviet Union in 1991.
Nonetheless, Uzbekistan has seen some statistically
However, all Central Asian regimes paid lip service to
significant advances in five of its GSoD Indices scores over
electoral democracy and held elections (Cummings 2012). the past five years, although these advances are not yet
Over the last 25 years, analysts have continued to wonder sufficient to classify the country as a hybrid regime, let
when—and how—a process of democratization might alone a democracy.
begin to emerge in Central Asia.
177
Access to Justice, Civil Liberties, Absence of Corruption, to liberal democracy norms in Asia and the Pacific,
Effective Parliament and Civil Society Participation. and therefore continues to play an important role in
understanding the region’s changing democratic landscape
Kazakhstan and Tajikistan have both undertaken reforms beyond Central Asia (Benner 2017). The model has been
that strengthen their constitutional courts, although these reinforced under President Xi Jinping, who has been
two countries’ political systems largely remain closed, lacking criticized for further autocratizing the political system,
any form of competitive elections. The resignation in 2019 moving away from a more collective leadership towards
of Kazakhstan’s President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, after three greater personalistic rule (Shirk 2016).
decades in power, paves the way for a leadership change,
although it does not seem to suggest a political opening in In 2018, at the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s 19th
the country: Nazarbayev remains in charge of the army and Party Congress, Xi explicitly rejected Western-style liberal
intelligence services, and political reforms have not occurred democracy and offered the Chinese authoritarian, single-
(New York Times 2019). party political model as a system for the world to emulate
(Glaser 2018). China’s political model may seem appealing
The influence of Russia on Central Asian countries’ as it provides promises of economic gains to hybrid regimes,
economies and national security, and the ways in which this non-democracies and new and fragile democracies. Beyond
influence extends to the political sphere through the lens of its economic performance, the Chinese Government
norm diffusion, is seen by many as key to understanding is perceived as fighting corruption, although this has
the regional political landscape (Kembayev 2016). The not yet translated into a statistically significant increase
shift away from international human rights treaties in in its Absence of Corruption score (which only saw an
Kyrgyzstan’s constitutional revisions, for example, reflects insignificant increase, from 0.43 in 2016 to 0.45 in 2018).
both the current Russian approach to international law and
its relationship with the European Court of Human Rights China’s economic influence stretches across the region
and other international bodies (Ziegler 2016). and beyond. It has helped launch the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank, a multi-nation, USD 100 billion initiative
China is another source of influence which, some argue, to finance infrastructure needs in Asia and the Pacific, which
has undermined democratization efforts in Central is likely to further increase the country’s economic influence
Asia. Specifically, China’s influence is viewed as extending over the region. The Belt and Road Initiative, a strategy
through such measures as offering alternative sources adopted by the Chinese Government to fund infrastructure
of donor assistance, investment, generous lending and development in countries across all regions of the world, is
economic cooperation, but without good governance and also seen as an effort to extend Chinese dominance in global
environmental protection conditionalities (Omelicheva affairs (Chatzky and McBride 2019).
2015). As a result, China has become a key economic
partner to all countries in Central Asia. It is also seeking to China also uses its economic clout to export its own model of
exert influence through its alternative development model, ‘digital authoritarianism’, in particular Internet censorship,
which promotes norms based on authoritarian governance to like-minded countries. In 2017–2018, for example, a total
and a socialist market economy with an emphasis on public of 36 countries reportedly sent representatives to Chinese
ownership and state-owned enterprises within an overarching training programmes on censorship and surveillance, and
market economic structure. another 18 purchased monitoring technology or facial
recognition systems from Chinese companies (Romaniuk
China’s model of authoritarian capitalism has adapted and Burgers 2018; Freedom House 2018a).
elements from the East Asian developmental models of
Japan, South Korea and even Singapore (Horesh 2015). In recent years, non-democratic countries have created
This model, although not openly praised by Central Asian a Eurasian alliance consisting of Russia, China and the
countries, is appealing to them, as it offers political stability Central Asian states which has worked closely to challenge
without requiring them to fundamentally alter their democratic norms and values and dismantle human rights
political systems in order to achieve economic development guarantees. Recently Turkey has also signalled its intent to
(Sharshenova and Crawford 2017; Ibañez-Tirado and join this alliance (Cooley 2012).
Marsden 2018).
At the same time, the potential for economic development
The expeditious growth of China’s alternative development combined with the growth of an educated middle class
model provides a politically significant counter-narrative could potentially disrupt the foundation of non-democratic
178
regimes such as China’s (Fortunato 2015). For China, where Both countries practise a form of ‘socialist law-based state’
there is strong support for the existing regime across classes, or ‘constitutional socialism’ through one-party rule (Bui
an analysis of data from the Asian Barometer Survey indicates 2014; Deinla 2017).
that ‘Chinese citizens who identify themselves as the middle
class express a stronger preference for liberal democracy than In Viet Nam, the so-called doi moi economic reforms,
those in either a higher or lower class, and they also tend initiated in 1986 with the goal of creating a ‘socialist-
to regard democracy as the best form of government’ (Wu, orientated market economy’, have taken a liberal turn in the
Chang and Pan 2017: 349). Overall, and as the Chinese economic sphere, along with a relaxation in some aspects of
middle class continues to grow, this may lead to greater the political arena. Although a closed leadership is responsible
demands for democratic reform, although signs of such a for policy and decision-making, the past few years have seen
development are barely visible yet. moves to both tackle widespread corruption in government
in Viet Nam (which has increased the country’s Absence of
China has also recently shifted its strategy in trying to Corruption score from 0.4 in 2012 to a mid-range level of
influence domestic politics in Taiwan. After conducting 0.50 in 2018) and extend elections to the provincial level.
live-fire military exercises and launching missiles close to
the Taiwan Strait since the 1990s, China opted for a subtler In contrast, Laos has maintained the status quo
strategy in the context of the 2018 Taiwanese local elections. (Gainsborough 2012), although there have allegedly been
Specifically, it is reported to have mobilized ‘influence some discussions in elite circles over how to bring about some
operators’—local ethnic-Chinese front groups trying to form of democracy (High 2013). Dubbed the ‘world’s most
influence domestic politics—in elections that resulted in a closed political system after North Korea’ (The Economist
major defeat for the ruling pro-independence Democratic 2016), Laos held elections for provincial representatives in
Progressive Party and a political comeback for the pro- 2016 for the first time. While not considered competitive,
Beijing Kuomintang Party. Allegedly, similar attempts have free or fair by GSoD Indices standards, the fact that 73 per
been made in other countries as well (McGregor 2018). cent of the seats in the 149-member National Assembly were
elected for the first time is a small step towards a potential
Therefore, both China’s rising power and Russia’s political opening (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2016). At
assertiveness pose significant challenges to democratic the same time, only five officially approved ‘independent’
governance: not only in the subregion of Central Asia, but candidates (i.e. non-members of the Lao People’s
arguably throughout the whole world. Both have assiduously Revolutionary Party) were elected.
expanded their networks of client states by leveraging no-
strings-attached financial aid, lending and investment (in Electoral processes in Asia and the Pacific present
the case of China) and weapons sales (in the case of Russia). opportunities and challenges
Asia and the Pacific has made significant advances in
One country where this influence is currently playing out strengthening its electoral processes and institutions in
in the open is Venezuela, which for years has supplied oil the past decades, but a number of challenges remain.
to both countries in exchange for low-interest loans and More than half (eight) of the region’s democracies have
military equipment, which are believed to play key roles high levels of electoral integrity (referred to in the GSoD
in maintaining Venezuela’s President, Nicolás Maduro, Indices as Clean Elections), while 47 per cent have mid-
in power (Seligman 2019; Cara Labrador 2019). Both range levels (Figure 4.4). High levels of electoral integrity
countries offer a potent narrative regarding the alleged can be found not only in four older democracies (Australia,
advantages and successes of ‘strongman rule’ (Kendall- India, Japan and New Zealand), but also in three early third-
Taylor and Shullman 2018). wave democracies (Indonesia, South Korea and Taiwan) and
a new third-wave democracy (Timor-Leste).
South East Asia also hosts a number of non-democracies.
While not covered by the GSoD Indices, Brunei Darussalam Mongolia is another third-wave democracy that has had
is an absolute monarchy where the Sultan possesses all levels of Clean Elections well above the world average,
state powers (Black 2011). Laos and Viet Nam are also although it scores mid-range in absolute terms (at 0.68).
countries that, while lacking the economic clout of China, Nepal is also a recently re-transitioning democracy that has
have to date proved immune to genuine democratization. significantly increased its levels of electoral integrity, with
Both are still classified as non-democracies by the GSoD its score on Clean Elections increasing from 0.53 in 2012
Indices, and although Viet Nam has mid-range levels of to 0.65 in 2018, and with elections for the three levels of
Impartial Administration, its civil society is restricted. government effectively carried out in 2017.
179
driven and negotiated transitions, rather than resulting from

More than half (53 per cent) of democracies bottom-up social mobilization.
in Asia and the Pacific have high levels of
Clean Elections: Australia, India, Indonesia, Almost half of the countries in the region have low levels
Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Taiwan
of Social Group Equality. Of these, two (Myanmar and
and Timor-Leste. A little less than half (47 per
cent) have mid-range levels.
the Philippines) are democracies; the Philippines scores
among the bottom 25 per cent in the world. However, elite
representation does not only affect the newer democracies
in the region. Older democracies in the region also suffer
from low levels of cultural and ethnic diversity in their
One challenge affecting the region relates to the use representative structures.
and abuse of elections as a legitimizing façade by
weak or non-representative governments, such as In Australia, the challenges of equitable ethnic representation
hybrid regimes and non-democracies. All countries are manifested in the national parliament’s composition.
in the region, even non-democratic regimes such as Fewer than 20 of the 226 members of parliament serving in
China, conduct some form of elections at some level of the federal parliament come from a non-English speaking
government, even though these cannot be considered background, despite the fact that the 2016 national census
clean, competitive or fair. found that almost 50 per cent of Australians were born
overseas or have a parent born overseas, and that almost
In the Chinese case, for example, local people’s congresses one-quarter of the population speaks a language other than
are directly elected, although only members of the CCP English at home (Tasevski 2018).
can stand as candidates (Sudworth 2016). In the GSoD
Indices for the region, only China scores 0 (out of 1) on
Clean Elections. However, all other non-democracies in the FIGURE 4.4
region score between 0.16 (Laos and North Korea) and 0.44
(Thailand) on this indicator. All hybrid regimes conduct Percentage of democracies in Asia and the Pacific with
regular elections, although they are not classified as fully high and mid-range levels of Clean Elections
competitive. When non-democratic regimes hold elections,
it distorts the meaning of such processes for democracies, as
53% 47%
they do not uphold the core principles of popular control
and political equality. Electoral tokenism in non-democracies
may also undermine the credibility and trust in elections in
democracies.
Another challenge relates to elite representation, which

can distort the meaning of popular representation.
Although regional elites are not cohesive (Case 2017),
political elites—incumbents and their families, or those
with extensive political, military or economic ties or
influence—have often dominated politics in the region.
While the nature of these elites varies in each country, elite
politics, rather than inclusive and broad-based political
participation, has been at the heart of democratization in
Asia and the Pacific.
This is also reflected in the region’s levels of Social Group Percentage of democracies in Asia and the Pacific
Equality (which measures equality in access to political with high level of Clean Elections
power and enjoyment of Civil Liberties by social group and Percentage of democracies in Asia and the Pacific
with mid-range level of Clean Elections
class), which is the second lowest in the world (at 0.43) after
the Middle East (0.30). Asia and the Pacific’s low score on
this measure can be partially explained by the fact that many idea.int/gsod-indices>.
democratic transition processes in the region were elite-
180
Indigenous communities in Australia have made calls for Other Asian politicians have also been described as
greater recognition in the democratic system, most notably exhibiting some populist features, including the current
through the Uluru Statement from the Heart, produced President of Mongolia, Khaltmaagiin Battulga, who rode
by delegates to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander a wave of voter discontent with the country’s ruling party
Referendum Convention in May 2017, which called for an to win the 2017 elections on an anti-corruption and anti-
indigenous ‘Voice to Parliament’ aimed at enhancing the poverty platform (Denyer 2018).
input of indigenous communities in the legislative process
(Referendum Council 2017). However, this call was denied These politicians all vary widely in style, programmatic
by the Australian Government on the basis that it would focus and political leanings, but share the cloaking of their
be seen as a third chamber of parliament (Remeikis 2019). regimes in nationalist discourse, with some having a more
At the state level, the Government has committed to anti-establishment bent than others.
negotiating a treaty with Aboriginal communities in the
state. If successful this would be the first indigenous–state Similar to other parts of the world, nationalism and
treaty in Australia’s history, which may provide a model nationalist discourse are on the rise in a number of
for others to follow (Rimmer, Saunders and Crommelin countries in the region. In China, President Xi, under the
2019). slogan of ‘realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese
nation’, has successfully mobilized nationalist sentiment to
Moreover, intimidation and violence are also persistent consolidate political power and legitimize his uncontested
features of political contests in many countries in the leadership. Xi’s brand of Chinese nationalism is ‘suffused
region. In particular, countries such as Afghanistan, with a cocktail of economic achievement, political nostalgia,
Bangladesh, Cambodia, Pakistan, and Papua New Guinea and national grievance together with a new culture of
all have high levels of electoral violence. Political violence, political self-confidence’ (Rudd 2018).
particularly at the local level and during the election period,
has also been a problem in the Philippines (see e.g. Maitem Rising nationalism, and in particular ethnonationalism,
and Navales 2019). has led to the infusion of religion in politics in a
number of countries. This contributes to the weakening
Finally, social media is contributing to profound changes of democracy by undermining secularism and pluralism,
in the electoral and political landscape of Asia and the increasing societal polarization and, in the worst cases,
Pacific, as it is in the rest of the world (see Box 4.2). heightening conflict. An increasingly globalized world
affects established social identities, belief systems and
Populism and ethnonationalism are on the rise, patterns of living. Faced with these social dislocations,
as is the infusion of religion into politics some politicians, religious leaders and citizens seek refuge
Asia and the Pacific’s democratic expansion and in identity politics, or claim that other groups and identities
consolidation have been challenged by resurgent threaten established identities.
nationalism and nascent populism. If unchecked,
nationalism and populism can lead to a gradual erosion of In the past, India, one of the region’s older democracies,
democratic institutions and processes (Daly 2017). While served as a model for much of South Asia by establishing
populism has swept across Europe in recent years, and is a democratic system that prioritized a secular state identity
also seen in Latin America, the phenomenon is not as stark and safeguarded pluralism. Today, India with its strong
in Asia and the Pacific, although the region is by no means Hindu-nationalist currents is itself experiencing challenges
immune from it. to these principles (Vaishnav 2019).
Some Asian politicians have been described as having A weakening of commitments to secularism and pluralism
populist characteristics, the most well-known being Duterte in the face of majoritarian, and often religious, movements
in the Philippines, but also to some extent Modi in India, is not, however, unique to India.
albeit with a Hindu-nationalist bent. Since 2013, and
under the tenure of these political leaders, both countries In Sri Lanka, with the next parliamentary elections due
have seen significant declines in their democratic scores: in 2020, the political revival of ex-President Mahinda
India on Civil Liberties, Civil Society Participation, Media Rajapaksa—on the back of an ever-present but latent
Integrity and Effective Parliament; and the Philippines Buddhist nationalism among the majority Sinhalese
on Civil Liberties, Effective Parliament and Predictable population—constitutes a critical challenge to the
Enforcement. country’s future democratic trajectory. Sri Lanka’s two
181
BOX 4.2
Social media, elections and democracy

In recent years, social media and new technologies have Razak, represented an impressive—and, to many, unexpected—
contributed to a profound reshaping of the democratic vindication of democratic process in a country where the BN
landscape in Asia and the Pacific. has won all 13 elections since independence from the United
Kingdom in 1957. Despite rolling out a relatively sophisticated
The use of social media is having a profound impact on social media campaign in a country with high Internet
democratic politics in the region, providing a powerful penetration, the BN failed to overcome the obstacle posed
platform for candidates to deliver their messages during by corruption allegations—notably the 2015 1MDB scandal—
election campaigns, a sophisticated means for spreading swirling around former Prime Minister Razak.
disinformation, and an instrument for civil society activists to
hold politicians and security forces accountable. In addition, as one commentary noted, ‘all-round internet
access allowed for increased transparency by making it easier
All too often, however, debate over this impact collapses into for citizens to perform fact-checks and background-checks,
a good versus evil exchange, with social media viewed as facilitating higher involvement in civic issues’. This, in turn,
either the answer to every political challenge or, conversely, ‘provided more space for dissent and competing narratives,
the source of every conceivable problem. Like all major leading to a further distrust in authority’ (Abdullah and Anuar
technological innovations, however, social media in and of 2019). The fact that Malaysians increasingly access news via
itself is neither good nor bad. Rather, the way in which social social media platforms which, unlike traditional media, are
media is used determines whether its impact on society is not government-controlled, made it much harder for the Razak
either benign or malignant. camp to dominate the political narratives, despite determined
official efforts to label reports critical of him as ‘fake news’
Social media’s rise to prominence brings new political and
(Abdullah and Anuar 2019). This may well be of growing
social challenges. Politically, governments—and increasingly
relevance for elections across the region.
key platforms such as Facebook and WhatsApp too—are coming
under pressure to develop a meaningful regulatory framework The picture with respect to social media’s impact on
designed to prevent or at least curtail dissemination of the Indonesia’s political landscape is complex. The April 2019
worst online excesses, including hate speech, disinformation election campaign, which for the first time culminated in
and pornography. However, regulatory attempts face stark simultaneous presidential and legislative elections, saw
criticism from free speech advocates, who argue that any widescale deployment of the full array of social media
attempt to regulate online speech undermines democratic instruments. Both the incumbent civilian President, Joko
principles such as freedom of expression. In parallel, many Widodo, and his opponent, former general Prabowo Subianto,
countries are waking up to the need to educate young people in used social media campaigns to reach voters, and in particular
responsible online user habits, starting in the classroom. young people, who constitute half of Indonesia’s population
(Abraham et al. 2019). Common to both candidates’ campaigns
South East Asia encompasses a large and ever-growing
were efforts to appeal to the electorate using nationalist and
population of digital users that analysts increasingly compare
religious sentiments, which were further amplified by social
in scope to the global digital ‘superpowers’, including China,
media, leading to a climate of political polarization (Gunia
Europe and the United States. Whether via computer, tablet,
2019; Tehusijarana 2019).
mobile phone or other e-device, social media communication,
principally (but not exclusively) via Facebook and the WhatsApp In South Asia, too, social media’s political impact is far-
messaging service, now constitutes a core element of regional reaching. India, the world’s largest democracy, exemplifies
online activity (AseanUp 2019). this pattern. Social media communications were a feature
of campaigning for the 2019 general elections, involving
In terms of the impact of social media on democratic politics,
an estimated 900 million prospective voters (Mahapatra
regional experiences can broadly be categorized as positive
2019). Two key factors played a role: (a) the immediacy of
or negative. On the positive side, in some countries social
the engagement facilitated by social media, combined with
media use has helped to both expose official corruption and,
the deep social penetration readily obtained by viral online
as in the case of Malaysia, unseat a graft-friendly regime at
posts; and (b) the suspension of prevailing norms of rational
the polls. The negative impact of social media is exemplified
discourse and facilitation of highly polarized, often identity-
by the case of the Philippines, where a social media-savvy
based exchanges owing to the anonymous nature of people’s
President, Rodrigo Duterte, has successfully deployed the full
online engagement.
array of ‘fake news’-producing instruments—online troll armies,
‘buzzers’ and Facebook campaigns in particular—to smear and Keen to build on its powerful and highly effective use of social
even crush opponents. media during the 2014 election campaign, in the run-up to
the 2019 elections the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
The outcome of Malaysia’s 2018 elections, which saw former
targeted ordinary smartphone-owning voters. Reportedly more
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad unseat the incumbent, Najib
182
than 900,000 ‘cell phone pramukhs’ (volunteers driving the groups, and in particular Muslim communities. The March
WhatsApp-based campaign ahead of the Indian parliamentary 2018 anti-Muslim riots instigated by small but organized
election) created neighbourhood-based WhatsApp groups radical Buddhist formations led the Sri Lankan Government to
to disseminate information about the BJP’s achievements impose temporary restrictions on access to social media. This
and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s campaign activities. also occurred in the aftermath of 2019 bombings on Christian
The opposition Indian National Congress sought to counter churches (Wakefield 2019).
this campaign with the launch of its smartphone application
and the appointment of an extensive group of volunteers to In Myanmar, the proliferation of online hate directed at the
coordinate local digital campaigns (Williams and Kamra 2019). Rohingya minority has contributed to demands that social
media platforms become more proactive in moderating and
In Sri Lanka, social media played a critical role in the blocking all forms of hate speech. However, this is also causing
successful campaign to unseat President Mahinda Rajapaksa resistance among freedom-of-speech advocates, who argue
in the January 2015 presidential elections. For years, the that this undermines democracy.
Rajapaksa regime’s tight grip on all forms of opposition meant
that online communication constituted one of the few areas of Taken together these developments have brought into sharp
public life not wholly subject to official scrutiny and control. relief social media’s potential to make or break key democratic
processes and events. The question of how best to respond
Recently, however, social media platforms have also become to these challenges will likely continue to dominate the
tools for the dissemination of hate speech towards minority democracy debate in the foreseeable future.
dominant Sinhalese parties have both tried to appeal to has been successfully exploited by certain political
Buddhist nationalism, which has limited the political interests in Indonesia (Nabbs-Keller 2018). These groups
system’s ability to accommodate Tamil and Muslim demonstrated their disruptive potential to undermine
minorities. The 2015 presidential election offered an pluralist democracy in South East Asia’s largest Muslim
opportunity to address such ethnic tensions, which democracy by staging protests in 2016 and initiating a
Sinhalese nationalists resisted (Staniland 2019). Nepal, blasphemy case in 2017 against Basuki ‘Ahok’ Purnama,
possibly influenced by India, has also expressed doubts the then-Governor of Jakarta and a prominent Chinese–
about secularization and pro-Hindu nationalism is gaining Indonesian Christian (Hadiz 2017).
strength in the country, alongside the strong nationalist
current represented by the Nepalese Government and its Indonesia’s national law already adopts some aspects of sharia
policies. law for Muslims (e.g. provisions on marriage and inheritance).
However, efforts by certain Muslim groups—primarily
In Pakistan, the military, through its support for Prime the United Development Party and Partai Bulan Bintang
Minister Imran Khan, also empowered three political (Crescent Star Party), as well as civil society organizations
parties with known ties to terrorism and a commitment to (CSOs) such as the Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders
radical religious edicts. These include the Pakistani Tehreek- Front)—to reinforce sharia law in Indonesia’s legal system
i-Labbaik, a party ‘whose single position is the strict could present a potential threat to democracy.
enforcement of the country’s controversial blasphemy law’,
which has led to many murders and extrajudicial killings The two largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia,
based on (mostly false) allegations of offences committed Muhammadiyah and the Nahdlatul Ulama, have rejected
against the Prophet Mohammed (Fair 2018). The military’s calls for the further reinforcement of Islamic law, as have
interest in recruiting these parties demonstrates the level of nationalist groups. At the same time, while efforts to
popular support they currently enjoy in Pakistan, and the implement Islamic law at the national level have subsided
threat they pose to the development of a more secularized, in Indonesia, a number of regional bylaws with clear
tolerant Pakistani democracy. sharia influences having already been passed, even if their
implementation often remains unclear (Assyaukanie 2007;
In Indonesia, while civil society was one of the Buehler 2013; Salim 2008). This has caused significant
key political forces in the democratization process, concern in areas with primarily non-Muslim populations. In
democratic consolidation has also spawned groups that other areas, such as Aceh (the only province in Indonesia
do not share the democratic ethos. The emergence of to enforce sharia provisions due to its special autonomy),
radical Islamic and conservative nationalist groups, the drive to reinforce Islamic law has even threatened to
outside of the mainstream moderate Islamic movement, undermine the principle of inclusion essential to democracy.
183
In Bhutan, resistance to democracy has been brewing conflicts also undermine democratic principles and erode
in some sectors of society on the grounds that it inhibits respect for human rights, heighten democratic fragility, and
Bhutanese ‘happiness’. While ethnonationalism has not reduce prospects for democratic consolidation in the region.
been encouraged by any single party or leader, this ‘popular’ Ethnonationalist conflict across the region encompasses
resistance to constitutional democracy is often based on continuing violence in older, early and new third-wave
ethno-religious norms. Many observers have commented democracies (including India, Myanmar and Sri Lanka) and
that party politics in Bhutan are divisive and negatively affect non-democracies (including China).
community relationships; this divisiveness is often framed as
contrary to aspects of Bhutanese Buddhist culture (see e.g. However, this list is not exhaustive and does not include
Berthelsen 2013; Slater 2018). other types of conflict, such as Bougainville in Papua New
Guinea, West Papua in Indonesia and Afghanistan.
Some Bhutanese express dissatisfaction with the democratic
system in place for the past 10 years and a longing for the Among the democracies, India suffers from three central
monarchy. This rising homegrown resistance to democracy conflict nodes. First, the tensions and sporadic violence in
could easily be grafted onto the Bhutanese Government’s efforts the northern border state of Jammu and Kashmir are long-
to preserve culture—always welcomed by the populace—and standing. Second, a swathe of Maoist/Naxalite-inspired
thereby threaten the country’s democratic gains. insurgencies continues, spread across more than 60 districts
of the country, many dating back a number of decades and
all directed against the central authorities. These insurgencies
continue to pose a stark challenge to the established order. To
Fundamental Rights date, more than 6,000 people have died in the fighting. The
Indian Government continue to view this as essentially an
issue of law and order, while the Maoists view it as a political
The Fundamental Rights attribute aggregates scores from three conflict and there is no sign to date of moves towards a
subattributes: Access to Justice, Civil Liberties, and Social peaceable ending (Routray 2018). Third, a rash of often
Rights and Equality. Overall it measures the fair and equal
access to justice, the extent to which civil liberties such as tribally based insurgences in many of India’s north-eastern
freedom of expression or movement are respected, and the states, many dating back to the late 1940s, should also be
extent to which countries are offering their citizens basic welfare noted in this context.
and political equality.
Sri Lanka, formally at peace since the end of its civil war in
2009, is still dealing with the legacy of that conflict. Until a
Summary: Fundamental Rights in Asia and the Pacific, definitive political solution to the underlying ethnic conflict
2018 is achieved, it can be argued, Sri Lanka will remain a fragile
democracy subject to unpredictable upsurges in ethnic
Regional average: Mid-range (0.54) tension and violence. This view, moreover, draws a measure
of support from the experience of recent years, during which
High Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, the country has seen a rise in ethno-religious tensions.
(>0.7) Taiwan and Timor-Leste
Mid-range India, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Mongolia,

In 2018, anti-Muslim riots, whose leaders included a
(0.4–0.7) Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, number of radical Sinhalese Buddhist monks, left several
the Philippines, Singapore and Sri Lanka dead and many properties destroyed, and led the Sri Lankan
Government to declare a state of emergency accompanied
Low Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, by a temporary shutdown of access to social media (The
(<0.4) Kazakhstan, Laos, North Korea, Tajikistan,
Thailand, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Viet Nam Economist 2018). Most recently, in April 2019, a series of
large-scale suicide bombings targeted the country’s Christian
minority, as well as foreign tourists, leaving over 250 dead
and many hundreds more injured (Associated Press 2019).
Ethnonationalism, conflict and democracy interact
in numerous ways Myanmar has experienced ethnic insurgency campaigns
Historic and re-emerging ethnonationalism is also at the since it achieved independence from the United Kingdom in
core of deep-seated pockets of conflict in Asia and the 1948. The ethnonationalist violence in the shape of a wave
Pacific. Beyond their impact on geopolitical stability, these of brutal security-force assaults, starting in August 2017, on
184
the country’s predominantly Muslim Rohingya minority In some countries, human rights abuses are occurring
has received the most international attention. Insurgencies within the context of ethnic conflict, while other violations
continue to affect other parts of Myanmar, including Kachin, take different forms, including suppression of the freedoms
Karen and Shan states (Human Rights Watch 2019b). of expression, the press and assembly; arbitrary detention;
Less widely reported on than other regional conflicts, latent

ethnic tensions in southern Thailand over the last decade FIGURE 4.5
have led to intermittent conflict between Thai security forces
and armed militants from the south’s majority-Muslim, Countries with high, mid-range and low performance
ethnic-Malay population (Küng 2018). on Civil Liberties and its five subcomponents in Asia
and the Pacific, 2018
Even less well-known internationally is China’s increasingly
repressive treatment of the majority Muslim Uyghur
population in the autonomous north-western Xinjiang Civil
province. Mass detention camps exist in which an estimated Liberties
one million Uyghurs and Kazakhs have been incarcerated
to date and there is systematic destruction of mosques Freedom of
Expression
and other architectural monuments, all accompanied
by electronic surveillance. Responding to the critics, the
Freedom of
Chinese Government argues that it is aimed at targeting Association
religious extremism, and that the detention camps are in fact and Assembly
vocational training centres (Kuo 2018, 2019).

Freedom of
Religion
The expansion of civil liberties has been
countered by a resurgence of human rights Freedom of
violations and unabated impunity Movement
The democratization process in Asia and the Pacific has
led to an expansion of civil liberties over the past four Personal
Integrity
decades. Civil Liberties is one of the region’s three best- and Security
performing aspects, judging from the share of countries
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
with high score performance: almost one-third of countries
No. of countries
in the region have high levels of Civil Liberties. The
regional performance is particularly high on Freedom of Low Mid-range High
Movement (where 19 countries score highly) and Freedom Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019c), <http://www.
of Association and Assembly (on which 11 countries idea.int/gsod-indices>.
record high scores). Figure 4.5 illustrates performance of

countries in Asia and the Pacific on Civil Liberties and its
five subcomponents in 2018.
TABLE 4.3
However, the protection of human rights in a number
of countries in the region is weak. A total of 11 countries Countries in Asia and the Pacific with statistically
in Asia and the Pacific have low levels of Personal Integrity significant declines on Civil Liberties, 2013–2018
and Security, of which two (Myanmar and the Philippines)
are democracies. Moreover, seven countries have seen Countries with Cambodia, Tajikistan, Thailand until
significant declines in Civil Liberties in the past five years— declines in Civil 2019, Viet Nam (non-democracies)
four of these countries (India, Pakistan, the Philippines and Liberties
Pakistan (hybrid regime)
Thailand) were democracies in 2013 although only India
and the Philippines were still classified as democracies in India, the Philippines (democracies)
2018 (see Table 4.3). In Thailand (until 2019, at least),
these declines coincided with democratic breakdown, while
in Cambodia they occurred in the context of deepening idea.int/gsod-indices>.
autocratization.
185
poor access to justice through lack of due process and an factors related to poverty, gender, education and lack of
inability to seek counsel or legal aid; poor prison conditions; law enforcement have facilitated human trafficking in both
widespread human trafficking; and the denial of basic destination countries (including Malaysia and Thailand) and
education and health services to refugees and migrants (see countries of origin (including Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos,
e.g. US State Department 2018; Human Rights Watch Myanmar and the Philippines).
2018). These violations occur to a significantly larger extent
in the non-democracies in the region, as well as in the hybrid The resurgence of gross human rights violations in Cambodia,
regimes, but also in democracies, undermining the prospects Myanmar and the Philippines over the past five years
for democratic consolidation. testifies to the systemic failure of accountability and justice
institutions in these countries. It also shows that this type
In 2017, two years after Myanmar’s first free and fair of failure—when coupled with a leadership that exhorts or
elections, a massive and violent military crackdown condones the use of violence—can all too easily result in the
against the Rohingya minority in Rakhine state resulted gravest forms of human rights violations and impunity.
in a humanitarian disaster, displacing more than 730,000
people and leading to the deaths of at least 6,700 people The role of the military, police and other security personnel
by conservative estimates (Médecins Sans Frontières 2017; in the perpetuation of widespread human rights violations
Human Rights Watch 2018), constituting a serious setback is evident in all three of these countries. In particular, it has
to Myanmar’s democratic path. The UN Human Rights been argued that the war on drugs in the Philippines cannot
Council’s Independent Fact-Finding Mission to Myanmar be decoupled from the issue of corruption in the police
found patterns of both gross human rights violations force (Jensen and Hapal 2018; see also Box 4.3). Moreover,
and systematic ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya, and when security personnel act under a mantle of democracy
recommended prosecution of the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s in the name of public security, the danger of impunity
armed forces) for genocide, war crimes and crimes against becomes higher, as perpetrators are more easily cleared of
humanity (UN Human Rights Council 2018). responsibility and accountability.
The military-led transition and the strong presence of the Advances have been made in Gender Equality but
military in the democratic institutions of the country, plus significant challenges remain
the fact that Myanmar’s Constitution guarantees military
immunity from civil and criminal prosecutions, go a long
way towards explaining why these crimes occurred without The Asia and the Pacific countries with the
reprisals. Another explanation is the lack of domestic highest levels of political Gender Equality
public condemnation of the military’s actions, due to are Australia, New Zealand and Taiwan,
while the countries with the lowest levels are
historical anti-Muslim, anti-Rohingya sentiment among
Afghanistan, North Korea, Papua New Guinea
the majority Buddhist population in Myanmar (Albert and and Tajikistan, which all score in the bottom
Chatzky 2018). 25 per cent in the world on Gender Equality.
Laws that privilege national interests over fundamental

freedoms exist in many countries. In Viet Nam (which scores
0.40 on the GSoD Indices attribute of Civil Liberties, well Asia and the Pacific has seen significant gains in Gender
under the world average), activists are routinely beaten up Equality in the past decades, although significant
and charged under article 79 of the 1999 Penal Code for challenges remain if gender parity is to be achieved.
carrying out activities allegedly aimed at threatening the
government (Human Rights Watch 2019d). Asia and the Pacific has increased its average regional score
on the GSoD Indices measure of Gender Equality by
Human rights violations in the region are also perpetrated 46 per cent since 1975. Five countries in the region have
by non-state actors. Such violations have chiefly been reached the critical minority point of 30 per cent women’s
committed in the context of armed conflicts by secessionists, representation in the legislature: New Zealand (40 per cent),
radical groups or organized criminal groups. One of South East followed by Timor-Leste (34 per cent), Nepal (33 per cent),
Asia’s biggest problems is human trafficking: it is estimated the Philippines and Australia (both 30 per cent) (Inter-
that at least 225,000 women and children are trafficked every Parliamentary Union 2019). Myanmar, Nepal and New
year for sexual exploitation or forced labour (International Zealand have seen the greatest quantitative improvements in
Organization for Migration 2015). A combination of their Gender Equality scores since 1975.
186
BOX 4.3
The war on drugs in the Philippines

Duterte entered the fray with one basic campaign promise: Marcos regime; continued extrajudicial killings of journalists
to end corruption and the proliferation of illegal drugs by and government critics; the enduring cycle of violence in conflict
all means, extrajudicial killings included (Teehankee and zones; and Duterte’s so-called war on drugs which, based
Thompson 2016). on official reports, has claimed more than 4,000 lives. Other
estimates put the total of fatalities at anywhere between 12,000
Shortly after Duterte’s election as President in 2016 and and 20,000 (Santos 2018).
emboldened by his many public pronouncements on his
intent to kill key personalities in the drug-dealing world, Despite the high death toll, and reports of abuses to date, only a
the Philippines National Police (PNP) issued Command few police personnel have been prosecuted (Baldwin and Marshall
Memorandum Circular No. 16-2016, otherwise known as 2017). As the primary agency implementing the war on drugs, the
the PNP Anti-illegal Drugs Campaign Plan: Double Barrel. PNP has been depicted as brutal, corrupt and prone to using paid
Thus began a campaign of house-to-house visits with police killers, and there are persistent allegations of quotas and rewards
personnel visiting suspected drug users and, initially at least, in effect for the number of drug suspects killed per operation
requesting their surrender. Many drug suspects have been (Jensen and Hapal 2018). With resounding, blanket protection
killed, either by vigilantes or by members of the PNP. from the Philippine Government backed by the president’s order
to kill (Ernst 2017), the PNP has become widely prone to abuse and
Despite making democratic progress since its transition in exploitation by ‘rogue’ police personnel. For example, in 2017 PNP
1986, the Philippines still suffers from an impunity crisis, officers were caught on closed-circuit television planting evidence
as manifested by the failure to hold government officials on alleged drug suspects in the National Capital Region (Santos
accountable for the widespread human rights abuses of the 2017), prompting a senate committee to investigate the matter.
The introduction of a 33 per cent parliamentary quota FIGURE 4.6
in Nepal’s 2015 Constitution and the implementation

of a parity regime in Timor-Leste have been crucial in Trends in Gender Equality by region, 1975–2018
increasing women’s representation in parliament in these
0.9
two countries (International IDEA 2019a). However,
despite these important gains, significant challenges to 0.8
gender equality persist throughout the Asia and the Pacific
region. 0.7
0.6
Despite these advances, the rate of increase in Gender
Equality in Asia and the Pacific has not kept pace with 0.5
increases in the rest of the world. Both Latin America and 0.4
Africa have advanced at a faster rate in the last four decades.
Asia and the Pacific’s regional average on Gender Equality 0.3
is now below the world average (although it was slightly 0.2

above the world average in 1975) (see Figure 4.6). The
region also has the lowest average share of female legislators 0.1
(18 per cent in 2019) in the world. At the country level,

0.0
the average share of female legislators ranged from 0 per
2000
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
1975
cent in Papua New Guinea to 40 per cent in New Zealand.
World Africa
Democracy has not necessarily paved the way for an increase
Asia and the Pacific Europe
in women’s political representation in the region. In Japan,
Latin America and the Caribbean Middle East
an older democracy, women hold just 10 per cent of seats North America
in the parliament. In South Korea, which transitioned to
democracy in 1988 during the early third wave, the share idea.int/gsod-indices>.
is just 17 per cent. The democracies in the Pacific Islands
187
are among the countries with the lowest share of women and women’s participation has been part of the legitimizing
legislators, and the only countries in the world with no ideologies of both the CCP and the Communist Party in
women in parliament (Micronesia, Papua New Guinea and North Korea. In China, the inclusion of women deputies and
Vanuatu). the concomitant gradual increase of their numbers within
both national and local people’s congresses are mandated by
In Malaysia and Myanmar, two much more recent the electoral law.
democracies, women occupy just 14 and 11 per cent of
seats, respectively, in the legislature (Inter-Parliamentary Dismantling and weakening of integrity
Union 2019). Explanatory factors include a combination of institutions, checks and balances
cultural norms and a lack of institutional solutions to address Recent attacks on institutions central to the integrity
their underrepresentation (Moon 2016; UN Economic and of functioning democracies represent a significant
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 2015). Gender challenge to democracy in the region. Institutions under
discrimination in the region has also manifested itself in the attack include the judiciary, the court system, electoral
form of gender-based violence. Cambodia, the Philippines, commissions, the parliament and institutions fighting
Timor-Leste and Viet Nam have all recorded a high incidence corruption. According to the GSoD Indices, Asia and the
of violence against women (UN Women 2015). Pacific scores 0.46 on Judicial Independence, which is below
the world average, making it one of the poorest performing
aspects of the region’s democracies.
Checks on Government Recent attacks on judicial institutions have occurred in a

number of countries and they pose a serious impediment
to democratic strengthening. Cases include Bangladesh,
The Checks on Government attribute aggregates scores from three which regressed into hybridity in 2014 and Afghanistan.
As one commentator notes, in order to survive, democracy
the executive, as well as whether the courts are independent, and and constitutionalism rely on a commitment to ‘horizontal
whether media is diverse and critical of the government without accountability’—to ‘core institutions interacting to uphold
the values that undergird the system’ (Davis 2017: 152).
When institutions fail to speak, listen and respond to each
other—or, worse, when they attack one another—the
principles of democracy and separation of powers break
Summary: Checks on Government in Asia and the down, putting nations at risk of authoritarian reversal or
Pacific, 2018 democratic backsliding (Davis 2017; Deinla 2014). In this
context, ‘guaranteeing institutional autonomy in the face of
Regional average: Mid-range (0.50) entrenched power is one of the hardest challenges’ for Asian
democracies (Davis 2017: 156).
High Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and
(>0.7) Taiwan
In Bangladesh, the governing Awami League has significantly
Mid-range Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, undermined anti-corruption efforts through political
(0.4–0.7) Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, interference, using the Anti-Corruption Commission and
Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines,
Singapore, Sri Lanka and Timor-Leste
the politicization of judicial processes to bring cases against
opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party’s leaders. This has,
Low Cambodia, China, Kazakhstan, Laos, Malaysia, in turn, undermined accountability, institutional integrity
(<0.4) North Korea, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkmenistan and political competition, thereby weakening democracy
and Uzbekistan
(Human Rights Watch 2019a).
In Afghanistan, constitutional ambiguities, combined with

Gender Equality is not necessarily correlated with instability perpetuated by ongoing conflict, have resulted in
democratic performance in Asia and the Pacific. North a confrontational relationship between parliament and the
Korea (16 per cent) and China (25 per cent), which do not executive. Since the end of the Taliban regime, parliament
have democratically elected legislatures, have more women has only passed two laws, with the executive branch passing
in their respective legislative bodies than Japan and South the rest (Pasarlay and Mallyar 2019). This breakdown in the
Korea (True et al. 2014). Indeed, promoting gender equality separation of powers does not bode well for Afghanistan’s
188
democratization, even as the country advances towards the Supreme Court’s willingness to protect constitutional
peace talks with the Taliban and negotiates the exit of US order, by suspending the presidential order to dissolve
and international troops. In addition to the conflictual parliament (Safi and Perera 2018).
legislature–executive relationship, accusations of overt
political interference in the functioning of the Independent Nonetheless, the fact that the President considered himself
Election Commission, undermining its autonomy and able to act unconstitutionally demonstrates the inherent
effectiveness, have been made (Haidary 2018). The end of weakness of Sri Lanka’s current democratic system (Welikala
a conflict is an opportunity for democratic consolidation, 2019). Moreover, the deadly terrorist bombings that
but without strong institutions and oversight this could occurred in 2019 are widely believed to have been enabled
lead to a return to authoritarian rule if power vacuums and by the rivalry and distance between the President and the
competition rather than cooperation come to define the reinstituted Prime Minister, which led to the withholding of
democratic landscape. key information that could have prevented the coordinated
attacks (Beswick 2019).
Using the law and the judiciary to silence the opposition
is a long-established practice among non-democracies In the Maldives, President Abdulla Yameen attempted
in Asia and the Pacific. However, it also occurs in to fill the electoral commission with members of his
democracies such as the Philippines. Known for its own party in advance of the September 2018 elections,
defence of constitutional democracy and fundamental with a view to protecting his claim to power against
freedoms, the Philippine Supreme Court and its chief the opposition coalition (Zulfa 2018). After the
justices have become the object of political contestation. announcement of his record loss in the elections, Yameen
In what is dubbed a ‘supermajority’, with two-thirds of

House of Representatives and Senate members aligned FIGURE 4.7
with President Duterte, reforms and impeachments can
now pass easily through the Philippine political system. Countries with low, mid-range and high Absence of
Impeachment has therefore been used as a tool for Corruption in Asia and the Pacific, 2018
deposing constitutionally protected officials who oppose
the policies of the present government. For example, in 14
May 2018, after the House of Representatives conducted
13
impeachment proceedings, the Supreme Court removed
12
the country’s first female Chief Justice, Maria Lourdes
Sereno. 11
10
By the time Duterte’s term ends in 2022, he will have 9
No. of countries
been able to appoint 12 of the 15 Supreme Court justices 8

(Manila Times 2016). This concentration of power and
7
weakening of checks and balances both compromises
6
and erodes the institutional integrity and independence
of congress, and also contributes to weakening the 5
democratic system. 4
3
However, despite these cases where judicial institutions
2
have been severely undermined, the region also presents
1
some more hopeful cases in which the judiciary was able
to act with independence. 0
Low Absence of Corruption (= high corruption)
Mid-range Absence of Corruption
In Sri Lanka, by ousting and replacing the Prime Minister
High Absence of Corruption (= low corruption)
in 2018 without consultation, undermining the role of the
courts and parliament in order to complete an attempted
transition of power, President Sirisena disregarded
democratic norms and the Constitution. The resilience of idea.int/gsod-indices>.
the country’s democratic institutions was demonstrated by
189
went on to petition the Supreme Court to annul them. Endemic corruption undermines the impartiality of
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court rejected the petition, administration
holding that there was no legal or constitutional basis A number of Asian countries suffer from high levels
on which to question the elections’ legality (Maldives of corruption. This situation is compounded by weak
Independent 2018). The court’s decision was hailed by judicial systems lacking the capacity to combat corruption.
the opposition. Weakened checks on governments further contribute to the
undermining of efforts to combat corruption.
In Pakistan in early 2019, in a blasphemy case, the
Supreme Court upheld its decision to overturn the According to the GSoD Indices, Impartial Administration
conviction and death sentence of Asia Bibi, a woman is the attribute of democracy on which Asia and the Pacific
originally convicted in 2010 after being accused of records its lowest performance, with Absence of Corruption
insulting the Prophet Muhammad in a quarrel with her (on which the region scores 0.45) being one of its four lowest-
neighbours, and who spent eight years on death row performing aspects overall. Almost half of the countries
(Safi 2019). This ruling shows that, despite challenges to in the region have high levels of corruption, which is the
institutional and process integrity, courts are manifesting highest share in the world after Africa and the Middle East
both resilience and a willingness to protect democracy. (see Figure 4.7). Of these, nine score among the bottom 25
per cent in the world.
Levels of corruption are, on average, significantly lower for the

democracies in the region (0.55) than for the hybrid regimes
(0.28) or non-democracies (0.29), with some exceptions
Impartial Administration is the aggregation of two subattributes: (e.g. Singapore). At the same time, three democracies in the
Absence of Corruption and Predictable Enforcement. It measures the region (Mongolia, Nepal and Papua New Guinea) also have
extent to which the state is free from corruption, and whether the high levels of corruption (see Table 4.4). This poses serious
challenges to democracy, as it undermines and distorts
accountability and increases discontent with democracy as
a system of government, fuelling support for anger-based
politics, and reinforcing candidates with populist tendencies
Summary: Impartial Administration in Asia and the who promise to restore law and order through means that are
Pacific, 2018 not always compatible with democratic practices.
Regional average: Mid-range (0.46) Money, politics and patronage are closely linked to
corruption in the region. This is true for democracies such
High Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea,
(>0.7) Singapore and Taiwan
Mid-range China, India, Indonesia, Malayisa, Mongolia, TABLE 4.4

(0.4–0.7) Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri
Lanka, Timor-Leste and Viet Nam
Average Absence of Corruption score in Asia and the
Low Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Kazakhstan, Pacific by regime type, 2018
(<0.4) Kyrgyzstan, Laos, North Korea, Papua New
Guinea, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan Average Absence
Regime type
of Corruption score
Democracies 0.55
Hybrid regimes (except Singapore) 0.28
More than half (53 per cent) of democracies Non-democracies 0.29

in Asia and the Pacific have high levels of
Clean Elections: Australia, India, Indonesia, Note: Absence of Corruption scores range from 0 to 1, with a lower score indicating high
Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Taiwan levels of corruption (0–0.4) and a higher score indicating lower levels of corruption
(mid-range 0.4–0.7).
and Timor-Leste. A little less than half (47 per
cent) have mid-range levels. idea.int/gsod-indices>.
190
as Indonesia, Mongolia, Pakistan and the Philippines—a fact

which, despite these countries’ elections being considered
Participatory Engagement
free and fair, serves to undermine their competitive electoral
dynamics (Aspinall and Sukmajati 2016; Teehankee 2016).
Participatory Engagement is the only attribute that does not have a
Vote buying is so widespread in Indonesia that it was score, as its four subattributes (Civil Society Participation, Electoral
recently established that one in three Indonesians is exposed Participation, Direct Democracy and Local Democracy) are not
to the practice (Muhtadi 2018). The quality of Indonesian aggregated. The subattributes measure citizens’ participation in
civil society organizations and in elections, and the existence of
democracy has been eroded by corruption. Despite advances direct democracy instruments available to citizens, as well as the
in anti-corruption reform and an increase in the number extent to which local elections are free.
of cases prosecuted, citizen perceptions of corruption in
Indonesia have only slightly improved since the transition
to democracy in 1998 (Silva-Leander 2015). Strong public
discontent persists regarding the ‘endemic’ government Summary: Participatory Engagement in Asia and the
corruption (Crouch 2010: 228; Butt 2011: 383), which Pacific, 2018
is seen as ‘a core norm of Indonesia’s political economy’
Regional average: Mid-range
(Sorensen, Juwono and Timberman 2006: 9, quoted in
Silva-Leander 2015). Decentralization has contributed to
High Australia, Indonesia, New Zealand, South Korea,
the deepening of democratization but also dispersed power Taiwan and Timor-Leste
and corruption to regional and local levels.
Mid-range India, Japan, Mongolia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea,
Corruption is also present in the Philippines and can help the Philippines and Sri Lanka
explain Duterte’s rise to power, given that he promised

Low Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, China,
to rid the country of the illness. Duterte’s predecessor, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Malaysia,
Benigno Aquino III, had gained traction through greater Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Singapore,
transparency and anti-corruption initiatives, as a result of Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
and Viet Nam
which the Philippines had achieved a respectable ranking
compared to its peers in the region. However, Aquino’s
administration was nonetheless shaken by a pork-
barrelling scam involving fake non-profit organizations
securing funds from members of parliament (Espiritu While East Asia has seen the most significant
growth in terms of the GSoD Indices measure
2014; Sidel 2015).
of Civil Society Participation, Oceania is
currently the subregion with the highest
When Duterte assumed the presidency in 2016 he issued a levels, and Central Asia has the lowest.
stern warning to corrupt government officials and requested The countries with the highest levels of Civil Society
their resignations, although his efforts in this regard were Participation in the region are Australia, Indonesia, New
accused of being partisan. In the Philippines, as across Zealand, Pakistan, South Korea and Taiwan.
the region, highlighting corruption has also become a Among the democracies in the region, the countries with the
precarious task for both the media and whistleblowers who lowest levels of Civil Society Participation are Malaysia, Myanmar
expose corruption. Indeed, the Philippines has been cited and Papua New Guinea, which all score within the range of
as one of the top three offenders in the Asia and the Pacific 0.51–0.58, but also record mid-range scores compared to the rest
of the world. India’s levels of Civil Society Participation went from
region in terms of the intimidation and murder of members
high (0.78) in 2013 to mid-range (0.59) in 2017, a statistically
of the media who investigate corruption (Transparency significant drop of 25 per cent in only five years.
International 2018).
Singapore, a hybrid regime with the lowest levels of

corruption in the world, constitutes the exception to the rule Civil society has expanded while civic space has
in the GSoD Indices. Other countries in the region could contracted
take note of Singapore’s successful efforts to fight corruption. Democratic expansion has opened up spaces for greater
Its recipe includes a highly professional and impartial public public deliberation and civil society participation in
administration and effective formal checks on government, the Asia and the Pacific region. Since 1975, Asia and the
with a functioning and independent judiciary. Pacific’s level of Civil Society Participation has increased by
191
46 per cent. The region’s vibrant civil society first emerged in Japan in 2015, there were mass demonstrations against Prime
the form of concerted resistance against authoritarian regimes Minister Shinzo Abe’s new military legislation (Aizawa 2016).
in the region. It was then a key player in service delivery,
advocacy, democracy and human rights promotion, including The impact of youth political engagement has also been
monitoring governments and holding them to account. At visible in Mongolia, which was rocked by mass anti-
times, civil society has also safeguarded democracy when it corruption protests in 2018 (Dierkes 2017; Bittner 2019).
has been threatened. In this sense, the emergence of a strong Even in non-democracies, youth have the potential to
civil society in the region has been a defining feature of the disrupt the prevailing political situation. Acknowledging the
democratic era. influence and possible impact of ‘Western values’, President
Xi has ordered universities to adhere to the ideology and
In the Philippines, for example, CSOs have played a key leadership of the CCP, out of fears of liberal democratic
role in recovery efforts after natural disasters, working values trumping the party’s grip on the loyalty of the
with the state in the provision of immediate humanitarian country’s youth (Fish 2017).
assistance. CSOs are also represented in local government
and are usually engaged in policymaking processes through a The most recent expression of civic voice and social
variety of national-level advocacy and interest groups. When mobilization in the region was seen in Hong Kong in 2019.
judicial independence was threatened by the removal of the The largest street protests paralyzing Hong Kong since
chief justice in 2018, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines the 2014 pro-democracy protests (the so-called Umbrella
intervened and made public its opposition, and a Coalition Movement) shook the special administrative region. The
of Justice (made up of CSOs, personalities and activists) was 2019 protests were triggered by a draft extradition bill
formed to criticize the executive’s interference with judicial proposed by the Hong Kong Government, which would
integrity (Terrazola 2018). have allowed suspects to be sent to mainland China for trial.
The protesters argued that such legislation would threaten the
Since the transition to democracy in Indonesia, civil society status arrangement under which Hong Kong’s legal system
has grown exponentially, in line with the range of issues operates (also known as ‘one country, two systems’).
with which it engages. A large number of watchdog NGOs
that monitor government performance in areas such as While the draft bill triggered the protests, the sentiments
environmental management, education, health, human of protesters had been brewing for a long time, and their
rights, legislative performance, public spending, local demands also included full representation in the legislative
governance and anti-corruption reform have been created. body, and direct election of the chief executive.
These are active both in exposing corruption cases and in
advocating for legislative reform, usually in tandem with The emergence of both the youth-led Sunflower Student
the media (Silva-Leander 2015). In Sri Lanka, together with Movement in Taiwan and the Umbrella Movement in Hong
political parties, parliament and the courts, CSOs played Kong in 2014 and 2019 is indicative of a democratic push
a key role in both condemning and ultimately blocking back against China’s growing influence (Ichihara 2017).
President Sirisena’s unconstitutional move to oust Prime Given their shared concern regarding China’s encroachments,
Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe and replace him with former Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party and New Power Party
President Mahinda Rajapaksa in late 2018. (an offshoot of the Sunflower Student Movement) collaborated
in June 2017 and formed the Taiwan Congressional Hong
As part of the expansion of Asian civil society, and especially Kong Caucus which seeks to support democracy-building
in East Asia, a series of protest movements in which youth efforts in Hong Kong.
political activism has played a key role has emerged as a
potent political force on the political landscape, defending In addition to this synergy, the pro-democracy movements
democracy, holding political leaders to account and serving as in Taiwan and Hong Kong have helped inspire youth
a potential source of reform in non-democracies. In Taiwan in activism in Japan. Students Emergency Action for Liberal
2014 the Sunflower Student Movement opposed what it saw Democracy, a youth-led movement in Japan, was formed in
as an unfair trade agreement with China (Morris 2018). In 2014 to protest against Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s military
South Korea, the ‘Candlelight Revolution’ protests of 2016– legislation (to deploy military overseas). Activists contend
2017 against then-President Park Geun-hye’s contentious that such legislation will unconstitutionally allow Japan
proposals on labour laws and history textbooks eventually to exercise its right to collective self-defence and deploy
morphed into mass demonstrations against state corruption military forces overseas to defend allies that are under attack
demanding the President’s impeachment (Chang 2017). In (Soble 2015).
192
More recently, a grouping of youth activists from East the same time, civil society groups such as CIVICUS, an
and South East Asia has been created to resist entrenched online platform that tracks civic spaces across the globe, have
authoritarianism. Calling themselves the Network of Young expressed alarm at what they describe as an obstructed civic
Democratic Asians, the nascent organization includes the space in the country (CIVICUS 2017).
Umbrella Movement, the Sunflower Movement and the
antijunta movement in Thailand. Apart from resisting This concern on the part of civil society groups is partly
authoritarianism, some of its members plan to stand for based on a specific piece of legislation, the 2010 Foreign
election. In 2016, Hong Kong activist Nathan Law, at 23 Contributions (Regulation) Act (FCRA), which regulates
years of age, became the youngest legislator elected in the Indian NGOs’ external (i.e. foreign) funding, and which
history of Hong Kong (Solomon 2016). is increasingly being used to stymie civil society activities.
NGOs affected by enforcement of the Act’s provisions
These efforts within the region may assume increasing include Greenpeace India, whose FCRA registration was
geopolitical significance given the incessant growth of China’s cancelled in September 2015, ostensibly on the grounds
politico-economic influence and encroachments. of ‘prejudicially affecting the public interest and economic
interest of the state’ (Singh 2015).
However, in recent years, there have been notable attempts
to undermine civic space, freedom of speech and the This shrinking of civic space is confirmed by the GSoD
media throughout Asia and the Pacific. Indices, which identify India as one of seven countries in
the world (alongside Brazil, Burundi, Thailand, Turkey,
In countries such as Cambodia and Thailand (until 2019), Venezuela and Yemen) and the only democracy apart from
the shrinking of civic space has occurred in the context of Brazil that has seen significant declines in all three aspects
a general democratic breakdown. In other cases, it has of civic space in the past five years, namely Civil Liberties,
occurred in a context of democratic backsliding (as is the Civil Society Participation and Media Integrity. The largest
case in India and the Philippines) or erosion, explained Civil Liberties declines in India are seen in Freedom of
by the rise of nationalist political parties, and justified by Expression and Freedom of Association and Assembly (see
arguments of national sovereignty, law and order, national Figure 4.8).
security and responses to terrorism. In Bangladesh and
Pakistan, these restrictions on civic space have been aimed at The shrinking of civic space in India has also occurred in the
limiting the space for opposition and manipulating electoral context of democratic backsliding, which the GSoD Indices
processes (table 4.5). In India and Nepal, they have sought to
undermine civil society activity. TABLE 4.5
The weakening of civil society in Asia and the Pacific represents Countries in Asia and the Pacific with declines in one
a significant threat to the health of the region’s democracies. to three aspects of civic space, 2013–2018
A vibrant and democratic civil society constitutes a safeguard
against democratic backsliding, ensures a diversity of voices
in society and helps build social capital, which is key to the Extent of decline Examples
healthy fabric of democratic societies.
Declines on all India (moderate democratic backslidingc),
three aspects of Thailand until 2019 (democratic
In an increasingly globalized world, closing civic space in one civic space breakdown 2014–2019)
country may have spillover effects in others. This, in turn,
occurs through the domino effect that such phenomena Declines on two Pakistan (regressed to a hybrid regime in
aspects of civic 2018)
in large countries may have on others in a particular space
region (Hossain et al. 2018). Added to this is the role of
Decline on one Democracies: Indonesia, Mongolia and
countries such as China that provide (and export) a model aspect of civic the Philippines (moderate democratic
of governance in which limited civic space is an intrinsic space backsliding)
feature.
Non-democracies: Cambodia, Tajikistan
and Viet Nam
India has played an inspirational role as the world’s largest
democracy where three million CSOs and vibrant social Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019c), <http://www.
movements enjoy constitutionally protected rights to idea.int/gsod-indices>.
freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association. At
193
define as a gradual and intentional weakening on checks provisions, friendly relations with foreign states, public
on government and accountability institutions coupled order, decency or morality, contempt of court, defamation,
with declines in Civil Liberties. India and the Philippines incitement to offence and the sovereignty and integrity
have been identified as two of the 10 countries in the world of India. These provisions have, moreover, been used by
experiencing democratic backsliding. In both cases, the successive governments to clamp down on civil society
backsliding is classified as moderate (see Chapter 1). (Human Rights Watch 2019c; see also Box 4.4).
CIVICUS has also highlighted formal restrictions on the On the positive side, in September 2018 India’s Supreme
right to form associations, assemble peacefully and without Court struck down a section of the country’s penal code
arms, and the specific targeting of human rights defenders criminalizing consensual adult same-sex relations. The
and journalists, which violates the right to freedom of ruling followed decades of determined efforts by activists,
expression. Although these are all part of constitutionally lawyers and members of LGBT communities to change
guaranteed fundamental rights, in Indian law they are colonial-era legislation criminalizing homosexuality
subject to certain broad restrictions such as state security (Safi 2018).
BOX 4.4
Case study: India’s shrinking civic space

A number of factors explain the shrinking civic space in India, FIGURE 4.8
a development that became evident from 2010 onwards in
the wake of the introduction of the Foreign Contributions
(Regulation) Act (FCRA) passed by the ruling United Progressive
Trends in Freedom of Association and Assembly and
Alliance, which replaced an earlier act of 1976. Freedom of Expression in India, 1975–2018
One factor is the pushback against new social movements 0.9

that have questioned the established Indian development and
governance model, including Narmada Bachao Andolan, which 0.8
opposes large dams and their impact on the most vulnerable
sections of the population, and the People’s Movement Against 0.7
Nuclear Energy in Kudankulam.
0.6
In 2011–2012 the India Against Corruption group challenged
the idea that lawmaking was the exclusive task of elected
legislators. This, in turn, created a debate around the role of 0.5
civil society in India, with many legislators expressing the view
that laws should be made in parliament by legislators, and that 0.4
civil society activists were exceeding their mandate in claiming
a space in the legislative drafting process. 0.3
The second factor relates to current global narratives around

0.2
terrorism, which have provided ammunition for restrictions on
civic space in India under the rubric of protecting national security.
Moreover, so-called elite capture of many central government 0.1
systems and the private sector, together with a dwindling foreign
aid supply, have made NGOs more dependent on government and 0.0
the corporate sector, with all the limitations this implies.
1975
2015
1995
1985
2010
2018
1990
1980
2005
2000
While the right to form associations is protected by the

Constitution, the Indian Government can place restrictions on Freedom of Expression
the foreign funding an NGO can receive, as it does indirectly Freedom of Association and Assembly
through the FCRA. In 2015, the Ministry of Home Affairs
made amendments to FCRA rules by increasing reporting Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019c), <http://www.
requirements for CSOs and making it compulsory for all
registration applications to be completed online.
194
Under the amended rules, organizations receiving funding and private efforts to monitor Internet activity and penalize
from foreign sources must publish audited statements of dissenting online voices. Freedom House’s 2018 Freedom on
these funds. The statements must include information on the Net Report ranked India as ‘partly free’ in terms of Internet
donors, the amount received and the date of the donation. freedom, based on yardsticks related to government censorship
An additional clause was introduced making it mandatory of public information and surveillance (Freedom House 2018c).
to report any funds received from foreign sources within
48 hours. Predictably, this new act was enacted to prevent The report also identifies India as the country in the world with
foreign contributions ‘for any activities detrimental to the the highest number of Internet shutdowns, with more than
national interest and for matters connected therewith or 100 reported incidents in 2018 alone (Freedom House 2018b).
incidental thereto’. By not defining these activities, the Indian Responding to this challenge, in 2018 a group of lawyers and
Government has created a large space within which it can act policy analysts unveiled a community project backed by the
according to its own discretion. Internet Freedom Foundation called Save our Privacy, with a
view to developing a model citizen law for data protection,
The FCRA also prohibits funding for any political organization. surveillance and interception (Save Our Privacy 2018).
As a result, the foreign funding of 4,000 small NGOs has
been revoked. While the government claims that this is due The restrictive provisions of the Indian Penal Code, and
to procedural violations, critics have pointed out that human particularly section 124A, which adopts a broad definition of
rights organizations opposed to government policies have been sedition, have given the Indian Government a great deal of
particularly targeted (Lakshmi 2013). freedom to target speech that is critical of the government
(including content shared on social media) and label it
In India, as elsewhere, freedom of expression—which is often seditious. Journalists, bloggers and media agencies have been
seen as one of the most significant markers of the health of targeted by both state and non-state actors, for example on the
civil society—cannot be delinked from the Internet and freedom grounds of prevention of communal unrest, or during election
of the press. Civil society has contested both government periods.
In Nepal, despite initial optimism that the new 2015

Constitution—which civil society played a central and Between 2013 and 2018, seven Asia and the
significant role in formulating—provided an opportunity Pacific countries (Cambodia, India, Pakistan,
for deepening democracy, the May 2018 merger of the the Philippines, Tajikistan, Thailand and
Viet Nam) registered significant declines in
two largest parties into the Communist Party of Nepal
Civil Liberties. These declines particularly
(CPN) effectively signalled the opposition’s collapse affected Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Association
(Baral 2018). Since then, Nepal’s vibrant civil society and Assembly. The regional mean score on Civil Liberties
has been under attack. As one commentator noted, ‘Not has decreased by 6 per cent since 2013—the third-highest
only is Nepal’s civic space shrinking, but the pillars of decrease among the world’s regions for this period.
democracy, like freedom of the press, equality, and
liberty, are facing the hammer of new draconian laws
(Budhathoki 2018). Even before the passage of these new
laws, experts highlighted concerns that the Constitution investigate associations, instruct them to work on certain
was in many ways more restrictive than its 2007 counterpart, issues and terminate those that do not comply with these
due to limitations on the rights of freedom of expression and instructions.
association, with one group observing that the ‘underlying
laws and Government of Nepal decisions do not respect the The media in Nepal face similar challenges, with the
independence of civil society’ (International Center for Not- Nepali Government using licensing and registration
for-Profit Law 2017: 6). requirements to restrict freedom of speech. Indeed,
overall there are concerns that Nepal’s democracy has
In addition to these problematic constitutional provisions, become more restrictive under the 2015 Constitution
a proposed law on a national integrity policy would have and the CPN’s leadership (see e.g. Budhathoki 2018;
further restricted civil society space by allowing increased Manandhar 2018; International Center for Not-for-
government monitoring of, and interference in, CSO Profit Law 2017).
activities, although it has been met with harsh criticism
from the international community. The Association Restrictions on civil liberties have also affected other older
Registration Act also allows the Nepali Government to democracies in the region. In Japan, concerns have been
195
raised regarding the passage of a 2017 anti-conspiracy law, Attacks on media freedom are a sign of repression
which is viewed as potentially contributing to undermine in an age of disinformation
civil liberties (Osaki 2017). The law, which amends the In the context of different forms of democratic backsliding
country’s anti-organized crime legislation to address and shrinking civic space, Asia and the Pacific has
potential terrorist threats, earned a rebuke from UN Special experienced a number of attacks on media freedom and
Rapporteur on the right to privacy, Joseph Cannataci, in integrity in recent years, which has contributed to a
a May 2017 letter addressed to Prime Minister Abe (The decline in the region’s Media Integrity scores in the GSoD
Mainichi 2017). Indices. Moreover, under the disguise of counteracting
disinformation, freedom of both offline and online speech
The Japanese Government justified the law’s passage as part has been subjected to severe restrictions in a number of
of the country’ counter-terrorist preparations ahead of the countries in the region.
Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games. Members of
Japan’s vibrant civil society have, however, echoed the UN With the advent of dedicated online disinformation
Rapporteur’s concerns. The controversy forms a backdrop campaigns, the threat to media integrity has become both
to rising concerns about Japan’s deteriorating press freedom. more pervasive and harmful. This constitutes a serious
In fact, between 2010 and 2018, Japan declined from 11th threat to democracy in the region, as democracy thrives on
to 62nd in the world in global press freedom rankings a diversity of critical and less critical media perspectives that
(Hurst 2017; Reporters Without Borders 2010, 2018) and monitor state performance and hold the state to account for
has also seen declines on the GSoD Indices’ Freedom of its actions.
Expression indicator since 2012.
In the Philippines, many mainstream media outlets
In Australia, Civil Liberties including Freedom of have resorted to self-censorship as President Duterte has
Expression and Movement, and Personal Integrity and threatened not to renew their licences or initiate legal
Security, have been put under pressure due to a variety of proceedings against them. Rappler, the country’s most
developments. Free speech has been restricted by a number popular independent online news outlet, and which is also
of laws, including the 2014 Workplaces (Protection from critical of Duterte’s administration, has been the target of
Protesters) Act in Tasmania, which was struck down numerous legal assaults by government agencies.
by the High Court in October 2017 on the basis that
it significantly restricted protest, particularly regarding In 2018, the Securities and Exchange Commission first
environmental issues. attempted to revoke Rappler’s certificate of incorporation,
subsequent to which the Department of Justice filed five tax
Concerns regarding adequate protections for journalists’ evasion charges against Rappler and its editor in 2018 (BBC
metadata have also been raised: in at least one case the News 2018a, 2018b). This was denounced by the domestic
Australian Federal Police has admitted to accessing a and international press as an attempt to silence Rappler and
journalist’s metadata without the special warrant required. fire a warning to other media outlets.
In the sphere of national security, serious concerns have
been raised by UN special rapporteurs regarding the In the last three years of the Aquino administration, parliament
potential for broadly worded espionage offences in had failed to pass a freedom of information (FOI) law that
the 2018 National Security Legislation Amendment would allow citizens and interested parties access to unreleased
(Espionage and Foreign Interference) Act to restrict information in the possession of government agencies. Three
expression and access to information that is central to weeks after assuming the presidency, as part of his campaign
accountability and public debate. promise for transparency and to fight corruption, Duterte
signed an executive order to operationalize FOI within the
An ongoing challenge regarding the protection of civil executive. A 24/7 service facility was installed to enable
liberties in Australia is the absence of any federal Bill of citizens to scrutinize government transactions and file
Rights (although a number of rights instruments exist complaints about corruption cases.
at subnational levels). This diminishes the capacity of
the democratic system as a whole to identify the nature Emboldened by this move, the media sector intensified
and scope of core civil liberties, and to subject rights- its reporting, including widespread coverage of Duterte’s
restricting laws to adequate scrutiny in both political and controversial statements and those of his spokespersons.
judicial forums during the drafting of legislation, and after In response to the intensive coverage of the Philippine
enactment (Kaye, Forst and Ní Aoláin 2018). Government’s drug war, Duterte bolstered his own social
196
media army, appointing a blogger popularly known as international criticism was the imprisonment in 2018 of
‘Mocha’ to the Presidential Communications Operations two Reuters journalists investigating a massacre by the
Office (PCOO). military in a village in Rakhine state, although they were
released in 2019 (Richardson 2018). Hate speech against
The PCOO and Mocha became the president’s alternative the Rohingya minority has also proliferated on Facebook,
channel for reaching the public, through which they could which was strongly criticized by the international
spin and tailor their message to counter negative coverage community for further deepening polarization in the
of Duterte from credible media outlets. Although Mocha country. In response, Facebook hired local staff in
eventually resigned in 2018, she had by then amassed an Myanmar to review and take down hate speech from its
estimated 5.7 million Facebook followers, and earned platform in the country.
for herself the title ‘Queen of Fake News’ among online
critics of the government. In the Pacific Islands, there have also been attempts to
stifle dissent and censor the Internet. Most recently,
A recent Oxford University research project also concluded governments in the subregion have made efforts to regulate
that cybertroops or troll armies have been deployed by the the Internet through legislation relating to the prosecution
Philippine Government to manipulate public opinion via of cyber-criminals and restrictions on the use of social
social media (Bradshaw and Howard 2017:15; Cabanes media platforms such as Facebook (Kant et al. 2018).
and Cornelio 2017; Williams 2017; Ong 2018). The
intensity of the exchanges has been seen as contributing to A notable example is the Papua New Guinean
polarize Philippine society and the divisiveness is evident Government’s justification of the 2016 Cybercrime Code
in public political debate, which often classifies citizens as Act on the grounds that cybercrime is a threat in the
either ‘dutertards’ (red) or ‘dilawan’ (yellow). context of the country’s market liberalization (Mou 2016).
Critics, however, did not subscribe to this argument.
These developments have prompted the Philippine Senate Questions regarding the act’s implications for freedom of
to conduct investigations into trolls and disinformation. expression and the apparent lack of public consultation
Facebook has also intensified its security features and prior to its certification have plagued the government
closed fake accounts. The Philippine Government’s (Kant et al. 2018).
attempts to silence critical media outlets have not,
however, prevented the propagation of disinformation. Making matters worse, there have also been recent attempts
Instead, it has threatened non-renewal of the ABS-CBN in Papua New Guinea to temporarily block Facebook and
franchise, conducted continuing and consistent attacks investigate how the social media platform can be regulated.
on the Philippines Daily Inquirer, and pursued the case Similar censorship attempts have been made in Fiji. Enacted
against Rappler. in May 2018, according to the Fijian Government, the
Online Safety Act was passed to protect citizens from cases
Being able to express one’s opinion without the threat of cyberbullying and harassment (Singh 2018). While the
of harm or the fear of retaliation is a fundamental implications of the law are yet to be realized, commentators
democratic tenet. The developments in the Philippine have cautioned that it may have undesirable effects on
social media landscape undermine the fabric of credible political expression, given Fiji’s history of censorship (Kant
media reporting in the country, which can be harmful for et al. 2018).
democracy.
Legislation governing cybercrime is also pending in
In Cambodia, attacks on online, printed and offline Samoa, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. Such legislation is
speech and media increased substantially ahead of the predicated on factors such as online sexual exploitation and
general elections in 2018. Some of the country’s last alleged excessive liberties (Kant et al. 2018). For example,
remaining independent news sites were closed down or in 2015 the Nauruan Government banned Facebook to
sold off as part of an ongoing media crackdown. Arrests combat pornography. However, the ban was perceived
and prison sentences for online speech increased in an as an effort to silence opposition groups and suppress
attempt to silence dissent (Lamb 2018). communications at the Nauru Regional Processing Centre,
an offshore immigration and detention centre run by
Myanmar has also seen the imposition of significant Nauru on behalf of the Australian Government, in which
restrictions on media freedom since its transition to human rights violations have been documented (Martin
democracy in 2015. A symbolic event that drew strong 2015; Olukotun 2015).
197
4.4. Conclusion that transitioned in the early third wave (e.g. Papua
The democracy landscape in Asia and the Pacific is varied, New Guinea) or now show signs of democratic fragility
with a number of significant 5dvances achieved in the last (e.g. Nepal and Sri Lanka), or which have regressed into
few decades but increasing challenges evident across all of hybridity (e.g. Bangladesh in 2014 and Pakistan in 2018).
its subregions and in countries at all stages of democratic
development. Moreover, several countries have suffered deepening
autocratization in recent years. Cambodia, for example,
As one of the few regions in the world that continues to regressed from a hybrid regime to a non-democracy in 2018.
see first-time democratic transitions (Myanmar in 2015 The region’s persistent non-democracies are also a concern,
and Malaysia in 2018) as well as returns to democracy (Sri particularly as their economic and political influence is
Lanka in 2015), Asia and the Pacific presents a number of expanding across the region as well as globally.
opportunities for democracy building.
Efforts should focus on strengthening new democracies and
The end of formal military rule in Thailand in 2019, marked on opening civic and democratic space in contexts where it
by multiparty elections and the formation of a civilian is currently shrinking.
government, also provides grounds for optimism, although
the military will continue to exert significant influence over The aspect of SDG 16 that requires closest attention is SDG
Thai politics, as has been the case historically. 16.10 on access to information, freedom of expression and
media integrity. More attention also needs to be paid to
However, a number of countries suffer from significant achieving SDG 5 on Gender Equality, on which stagnation is
democratic weaknesses, including those that have recently currently observed, and where Asia and the Pacific continues
transitioned (Malaysia and Myanmar), but also countries to perform poorly compared to the rest of the world.
TABLE 4.6
The GSoD Indices snapshot: Policy considerations for Asia and the Pacific
This table offers a snapshot of the state of democracy in Asia and the Pacific, using the GSoD conceptual framework as an organizing
structure. It presents policy considerations across the five main attributes of democracy—Representative Government, Fundamental
Rights, Checks on Government, Impartial Administration and Participatory Engagement.

Government
Elected Government: Good-practice countries for regional learning:

Half (15) of the 30 countries in Asia and the Pacific Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia,
covered by the GSoD Indices hold competitive elections to Nepal, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines,
determine their governments. The region also has 10 non- South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan and Timor-Leste
democracies (the largest number of which are in South
East and Central Asia) and five hybrid regimes.
The total number of democracies in the region has
remained stable at 15 since 2014, and the number of
hybrid regimes was reduced from six in 2015 to five in
2018, while the number of non-democracies increased
from nine in 2015 to 10 in 2018, when Cambodia went
from a hybrid regime to a non-democracy. While the total
number of democracies remained the same, Pakistan
backslid to hybrid in 2018 and Malaysia became a
democracy the same year.
198

Almost half (12) the countries in the region have mid- Hybrid regimes with some space for reform
range levels of Clean Elections, while 10 countries have (e.g. Afghanistan and Pakistan)
low levels and eight have high levels. Of the countries
with low scores, 90 per cent are non-democracies and 10 Priority areas for reform:
per cent are hybrid regimes. 53 per cent of democracies Further strengthen the integrity of elections; strengthen
have high levels of Clean Elections, while 47 per cent capacity of EMBs; reduce electoral violence.
have mid-range levels.
From 2013 to 2018, five countries experienced significant Good-practice countries for regional learning:
increases in Clean Elections while four saw declines. Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, New Zealand, South
Korea, Taiwan and Timor-Leste

All countries in the region apart from China (which scores Papua New Guinea (democracy among the bottom 25 per
low) have high levels of Inclusive Suffrage. However, cent of countries in the world). Hybrid regimes (except
some democracies, including Myanmar, Pakistan and Singapore) and non-democracies
Papua New Guinea, have levels of Inclusive Suffrage
on a par with non-democracies. One hybrid regime Priority areas for reform:
(Singapore) has levels of Inclusive Suffrage on a par with Strengthen inclusive suffrage in countries with weaknesses
older democracies such as New Zealand. in this area.

More than half of the democracies in the region (67 per Hybrid regimes with some space for reform
cent) score in the mid-range on Free Political Parties and (e.g. Afghanistan and Pakistan)
five countries score highly (Australia, Japan, Nepal, New
Zealand and Taiwan). Priority areas for reform:
From 2013 to 2018, no countries experienced significant Strengthen the social base of political parties and make
increases in Free Political Parties, while four saw political party leadership more inclusive and diverse,
declines. including for women.

Australia, Japan, Nepal, New Zealand and Taiwan

The majority of countries (60 per cent) score in the mid- Hybrid regimes with some space for reform
range on Access to Justice, while six score in the high (e.g. Afghanistan and Pakistan)
range and nine score low. Of the countries that score low
Priority areas for reform:
on Access to Justice, one is a hybrid regime, and five are
non-democracies. Strengthen access to justice for poor and marginalized
groups, including women.
From 2013 to 2018, five countries experienced significant
increases in Access to Justice, while three saw declines. Good-practice countries for regional learning:
Australia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, South Korea and
Taiwan
199

One-third of countries in the region have high levels of Democracies with significant declines (e.g. India and the
Civil Liberties. The regional performance is particularly Philippines)
high on Freedom of Movement (where 19 countries score
highly) and Freedom of Association and Assembly (on Priority areas for reform:
which 11 countries also score highly). Strengthen freedom of expression and remove legislation
However, more countries (seven) have seen significant and regulation that stymie freedom of expression;
declines in Civil Liberties since 2013 than advances (five). strengthen freedom of association and assembly, in
Of the declining countries, four were democracies in 2013 particular in relation to funding and operation of CSOs;
(India, Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand), one was a strengthen human rights protection.
hybrid regime (Cambodia) and two were non-democratic
regimes (Tajikistan and Viet Nam). In two cases these Good-practice countries for regional learning:
declines coincided with a declining regime status Australia, Japan, Mongolia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea,
(Cambodia and Thailand). South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan and Timor-Leste
The region performs particularly poorly on some aspects
of Civil Liberties: of the 11 countries which have low
levels of Personal Integrity and Security, 64 per cent are
non-democracies, 18 per cent are hybrid regimes and 18
per cent are democracies.

The region’s level of Gender Equality is in the mid-range Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, North Korea,
(0.55), slightly above Africa (0.53). The majority of countries Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan
in the region (77 per cent) also score in the mid-range. (among bottom 25 per cent in the world)
Almost one-third of countries (nine) score in the bottom
25 per cent in the world on Gender Equality. The largest
share of low scores are non-democracies: Cambodia, Expand efforts to strengthen political gender equality in
China, North Korea, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan; three all spheres and at all levels, by adopting quota or parity
are hybrid regimes (Afghanistan, Bangladesh and laws or enable better enforcement, to ensure equal
Pakistan), but one is a democracy (Papua New Guinea). representation of women in legislatures, in political parties,
the executive and in local administrations. (For more
Six countries (all democracies) score in the top 25 per
detailed recommendations see International IDEA, CoD and
cent in the world on Gender Equality: of these, two are
UNDP 2017).
older democracies (Australia and New Zealand) while
the others transitioned to democracy after 1975 (Taiwan, Good-practice countries for regional learning:
South Korea, the Philippines and Nepal most recently).
Australia, Nepal, the Philippines, Taiwan and New Zealand;
No countries have experienced significant declines or India for local-level quotas, Fiji
advances in Gender Equality since 2013.

Social Group Equality is one of the democratic aspects on Myanmar, the Philippines (democracies with low
which Asia and the Pacific performs the poorest. Almost half performance); Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan
(47 per cent) of all countries in the region have low levels (hybrid regimes with low performance)
of Social Group Equality, indicating highly unequal access
to political power and enjoyment of Civil Liberties by social Good-practice countries for regional learning:
group. Only two countries score highly (Japan and New Australia, Japan, Nepal, New Zealand South Korea and
Zealand). Taiwan (among top 25 per cent in the world)
More than half (64 per cent) of the highly politically
unequal countries are non-democracies (Cambodia,
China, Kazakhstan, Laos, North Korea, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) and three are hybrid
regimes (Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan), while
two are democracies (Myanmar and the Philippines).
200

The majority of countries (57 per cent) have mid-range Afghanistan, Laos, Myanmar, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea
levels of Basic Welfare, but more than one-third have and Timor-Leste (among bottom 25 per cent in the world)
high levels, making it one of the four democratic aspects
with a high-performance share over 37 per cent. Good-practice countries for regional learning:
Levels of Basic Welfare vary across regime types. Six Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea and
countries in the region are among the bottom 25 per Taiwan (among top 25 per cent in the world)
cent in the world with the lowest levels of Basic Welfare;
of these, half are democracies (Myanmar, Papua New
Guinea and Timor-Leste).
Of the 11 countries with high levels of Basic Welfare, 64
per cent are democracies (Australia, Japan, Malaysia,
New Zealand, South Korea, Sri Lanka and Taiwan), but
one is a hybrid regime (Singapore) and two are non-
democracies (China and Kazakhstan).

Government
Effective Parliament: Priority areas for reform:

About half (47 per cent) of countries score mid-range Strengthen the capacities and enhance transparency and
on Effective Parliament. However, the number of low- effectiveness of parliaments
performing countries (10) is almost double the number of
high performers (6). Of the low performers, 90 per cent Good-practice countries for regional learning:
are non-democracies and 10 per cent are hybrid regimes. Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and Taiwan
From 2013 to 2018, eight countries experienced
significant increases in Free Political Parties while two
saw declines.
Judicial Independence: Priority areas for reform:

Judicial Independence is low in a large number (nine) Strengthen the capacities of the judiciary and reduce its
of countries in the region. Of these, one is a hybrid politicization, susceptibility to corruption and institutional
regime and eight are non-democratic regimes. Only two weaknesses
countries have high levels (Australia and New Zealand),
both of which are democracies. Good-practice countries for regional learning:
Five countries have seen advances in Judicial Australia and New Zealand
Independence since 2013, while three have seen declines.

Levels of Media Integrity in the region are fairly equally Countries that have experienced significant declines since
split between high (7) and low (9) performance, with a 2013 (India, Mongolia and Pakistan, and Thailand until 2019)
large mid-range category (14, or 47 per cent of countries).
Worryingly, five countries have seen levels of Media
Integrity decline in the past five years. • Addressing disinformation on social media will require
innovative cross-sectoral strategies and dialogue across
regions. Foster regional and global cross-sectoral dialogues
to identify solutions to address the spread of disinformation,
without harming core values of democracy such as free speech
• Guarantee an independent, diverse and vibrant
media landscape, and safety for journalists and avoid
concentration of media in a few hands

Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the
Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan
201

Administration

Absence of Corruption is one of the poorest performing Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Kazakhstan,
aspects of democracy in Asia and the Pacific. Almost Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Mongolia, Nepal, North Korea, Papua
half (47 per cent) of countries record low scores, with the New Guinea, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkmenistan and
largest share of these being non-democracies (57 per Uzbekistan
cent) followed by hybrid regimes and democracies (both
21 per cent). Priority areas for reform:
Only five countries have low levels of corruption: the • Strengthen institutions, including judicial, to more
hybrid regime of Singapore has the lowest levels of effectively combat corruption
corruption in the world and the rest are democracies • Review and strengthen political finance regulations and
(Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea). their enforcement, together with measures to promote
integrity and transparency in elections and lobbying
activities, of finances of political parties; consider
introducing public subsidies to political parties and for
women, especially for the funding of their ordinary activities
to level the playing field of candidates; place reasonable
regulations on donations from legal persons as well
as consider caps for party spending; provide oversight
authorities, particularly those in charge of auditing financial
reports, with independence and sufficient capacities to
conduct meaningful investigation and apply sanctions
(International IDEA 2019b)

Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore and South Korea

Levels of Predictable Enforcement are low in Asia and the Papua New Guinea and the Philippines (democracies);
Pacific; 47 per cent of countries have low levels. Of these, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan (hybrid regimes with
two are democracies, three are hybrid regimes and nine are low performance)
non-democracies.
Only four countries have high levels of Predictable
Enforcement. All four are democracies (Australia, Japan, Australia, Japan, New Zealand and Taiwan
New Zealand and Taiwan).
Participatory GSoD Indices score: Mid-range

Engagement

Levels of Civil Society Participation have grown by 12 per India, and Thailand until 2019 (countries with significant
cent in the last two decades, but average levels (0.54) are declines)
still below the world average (of 0.59).
Of the six countries with the highest levels, five are
democracies, of which most are third-wave democracies Revert legislation that restricts funding and operations of
(Indonesia with the highest level in the region, South CSOs; provide a free and enabling environment for civil
Korea and Taiwan) and one is a hybrid. The remaining society
two, Australia and New Zealand, are older democracies.
Australia, Indonesia, New Zealand, South Korea, Taiwan
and Timor-Leste
202

Asia and the Pacific and Latin America and the Afghanistan (hybrid regime with low levels)
Caribbean are the equal-best-performing regions in
the world on Electoral Participation (with an average Priority areas for reform:
regional score of 0.66). Ensuring absentee voting, voter education.
Almost half (47 per cent) of countries in Asia and
the Pacific have high levels of voter turnout. Of the Good-practice countries for regional learning:
countries with high Electoral Participation, 64 per cent Australia, India (voter education), Indonesia, New Zealand,
are democracies, while 36 per cent are non-democratic Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, South Korea, Sri Lanka
regimes. and Timor-Leste
Direct Democracy: Good-practice countries for regional learning:

Levels of Direct Democracy in Asia and the Pacific are Australia, New Zealand and Taiwan
below the world average. Taiwan stands out as the
country with the highest levels of Direct Democracy in the
region with a score of 0.81, followed by New Zealand with
a score of 0.49.
Four countries score among the top 25 per cent in the
world with the highest levels of Direct Democracy. Of
these, three are democracies (Australia, New Zealand
and Taiwan), but one is not: Kyrgyzstan (hybrid regime).

Levels of Local Democracy are in the low range, with more Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan and
countries scoring low (17) than high (6). Singapore (hybrid regimes with low levels); Malaysia and
Taiwan is one of the six countries in the world with the Myanmar (democracies with low levels)
highest levels of Local Democracy; five other countries
also score among the top 25 per cent (Australia, Japan,
New Zealand, South Korea and Timor-Leste). Balance of power through decentralization, inclusion of
local governments
Nine countries in the region score among the bottom
25 per cent in the world with the lowest levels of Good-practice countries for regional learning:
Local Democracy: 6 of the 10 non-democracies in the
region (China, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Tajikistan, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Taiwan and
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), one hybrid regime Timor-Leste
(Singapore) and two democracies (Malaysia and
Myanmar).
203
TABLE 4.7
Regime classification, Asia and the Pacific, 2018

This table shows the regime classification for all of the countries in Asia and the Pacific covered by the GSoD Indices, as well as their
respective scores on the five GSoD attributes.
GSoD attribute
Country
Representative Fundamental Rights Checks on Impartial Participatory
Government Government Administration Engagement
Democracies
Australia 0.81 = 0.85 = 0.87 = 0.83 = High
India 0.69 = 0.57 = 0.58 = 0.53 = Mid-range
Indonesia 0.65 = 0.61 = 0.62 = 0.51 = High
Japan 0.78 = 0.83 = 0.75 = 0.79 = Mid-range
Malaysia 0.54 = 0.65 + 0.57 + 0.51 = Low
Mongolia 0.64 = 0.67 = 0.60 = 0.48 = Mid-range
Myanmar 0.44 = 0.49 = 0.55 = 0.49 = Low
Nepal 0.62 = 0.63 = 0.65 + 0.43 = Mid-range
New Zealand 0.80 = 0.84 = 0.82 = 0.85 = High
Papua New Guinea 0.47 = 0.51 = 0.62 = 0.38 = Mid-range
The Philippines 0.59 = 0.60 = 0.58 = 0.41 = Mid-range
Republic of Korea
0.77 = 0.83 = 0.77 = 0.71 = High
(South Korea)
Sri Lanka 0.66 = 0.65 + 0.61 = 0.50 = Mid-range
Taiwan 0.81 = 0.82 = 0.72 = 0.71 = High
Timor-Leste 0.705 = 0.56 = 0.60 = 0.53 = High
Hybrid regimes
Afghanistan 0.38 = 0.36 = 0.54 = 0.33 = Low
Bangladesh 0.38 = 0.44 = 0.43 = 0.27 = Low
Kyrgyzstan 0.52 = 0.61 = 0.59 = 0.39 = Low
Pakistan 0.52 = 0.46 = 0.56 = 0.407 + Low
Singapore 0.50 = 0.64 = 0.46 = 0.83 = Low
204
GSoD attribute
Country
Representative Fundamental Rights Checks on Impartial Participatory
Government Government Administration Engagement
Non-democracies
Cambodia 0.31 = 0.36 = 0.30 = 0.18 = Low
China 0= 0.394 = 0.22 = 0.43 = Low
Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea 0.12 = 0.13 = 0.07 = 0.16 = Low
(North Korea)
Kazakhstan 0.33 = 0.50 = 0.28 = 0.38 = Low
Laos 0.16 = 0.32 = 0.32 = 0.31 = Low
Tajikistan 0.27 = 0.31 = 0.27 = 0.21 = Low
Thailand 0.20 – 0.42 – 0.38 = 0.25 – Low
Turkmenistan 0.25 = 0.32 = 0.15 = 0.22 + Low
Uzbekistan 0.28 = 0.41 = 0.19 = 0.33 + Low
Viet Nam 0.23 = 0.46 = 0.34 = 0.50 = Low
High Mid-range Low
205
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210
2019 The state of democracy in Europe
Chapter 5
The state of democracy in Europe
This chapter begins by offering a brief overview of the long-term democratic trends in the Europe region,
followed by an analysis of the current democratic landscape. It follows the Global State of Democracy (GSoD)
conceptual framework as an organizing structure, covering issues linked to Representative Government,
Fundamental Rights, Checks on Government, Impartial Administration and Participatory Engagement,
and highlighting the current opportunities for democracy in the region, as well as the democratic challenges
it faces. The analysis is based on the GSoD Indices as the principal data source but includes other sources
to complement the analysis.
EUROPE AND THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS
also the case for all of the indicators on SDG 16.7 on inclusive
decision-making, while only Social Group Equality has seen
Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions stagnation.
Europe is, together with North America, the region that

Gender Equality
scores best on the GSoD indicators linked to Sustainable
Development Goal 16 (SDG 16).
However, it is also the region that has seen most declines After North America, Europe is the region that scores
on the indicators that measure progress on SDG 16 since highest on levels of political Gender Equality and political
2015. On 17 of the 18 GSoD indicators used to measure representation as set out by SDG 5.5. The region has largely
SDG 16, the number of countries with significant declines stagnated on this indicator since 2015, with no countries
outnumber those with advances. This is the case for SDG 16.1 making statistically significant gains and only Italy suffering
on violence, SDG 16.3 on rule of law, SDG 16.5 on absence a significant decline.
of corruption and SDG 16.6 on effective institutions. This is
5.1. Introduction However, as the GSoD Indices show, in recent years the
After North America, Europe continues to be the region quality of democracy in Europe has witnessed a general
in the world with the largest share of democracies (39, or decline and a number of democracies—both older and
93 per cent of countries in the region). Overall, the level newer—are experiencing democratic erosion and democratic
of democracy in Europe is still firmly above that of most backsliding. The decline of democratic quality in Europe
other regions, with only one country classifying as a hybrid cannot be disassociated from the rise of anti-establishment
regime (Russia) and two as non-democracies (Azerbaijan parties. The GSoD Indices indicate correlations between
and Belarus). The largest share of the world’s older, as well non-traditional and non-mainstream parties in government
as third-wave, democracies is located in Europe. and the decline in democratic quality. These developments
211
The state of democracy in Europe Addressing the Ills, Reviving the Promise
KEY FINDINGS
Positive developments Challenges to democracy
• After North America, Europe is the second-most democratic • Although the largest concentration of democracies is in
region in the world, with 93 per cent of countries classified Europe, the region has seen a decline in the quality of its
as democracies. Europe has the largest share of the world’s democracies in the last 10 years. The share of countries
democracies, with 39 countries classifying as democracies, which with high levels of Checks on Government, Civil Liberties,
constitutes 40 per cent of the global share. Media Integrity and Civil Society Participation has declined.
Therefore, most democratic declines in Europe are related
• The largest share of third-wave democracies can be found in to weakening Checks on Government and a shrinking civic
Europe. Since 1975, a total of 28 countries in the region have space, and are occurring in contexts of democratic erosion and
transitioned to democracy, of which almost half (12) are new democratic backsliding.
countries that gained independence following the end of the
Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet/Communist bloc. • More than half (56 per cent) of democracies in Europe suffer from
Europe’s democracies have proven remarkably resilient. While democratic erosion. Of the 10 democracies in the world currently
two third-wave democracies (Albania and Georgia) backslid experiencing democratic backsliding, 6—Hungary, Poland,
into hybridity for some time, they have since returned to Romania, Serbia, Turkey and to a lesser extent, Ukraine—are in
democracy. Europe.
• Of the 21 democracies in the world with high scores on all five • There is a general malaise within mainstream political parties
GSoD attributes, 14 are in Europe. The majority (11) are older across most of Europe and particularly in Western European
democracies in North and West Europe, while one is in South countries. This contributes to the rise of non-traditional parties,
Europe (Spain) and two more (Estonia and Slovenia) are in East- such as populist, extremist and anti-establishment parties.
Central Europe. Democratic backsliding is often associated with such parties
gaining access to government. The phenomenon of ruling
• In countries such as Denmark, Finland, Latvia and the United political parties showing autocratic tendencies can be discerned
Kingdom, an increasing number of initiatives give European in several countries in the region, particularly in Central and
citizens potential avenues for direct participation in public Eastern Europe.
decision-making, including citizen initiatives at the local level,
e-petitions and e-platforms. • Europe has recently experienced a populist wave. Its origins can
be traced back to several interacting factors, including economic
• Armenia was the only country in Europe to transition from being and cultural globalization, which have transformed the social
a hybrid regime in 2017 to a democracy in 2018. It also recorded structure and political culture of many countries in the region.
the highest number of statistically significant advances in Europe Political drivers of populism include reduced trust in political
for 2018: on Checks on Government, Impartial Administration parties and a crisis of representation as well as the fragmentation
and Participatory Engagement, and on eight related democratic and polarization of the public sphere further deepened by the
subattributes. emergence of new technologies and social media. Socio-economic
drivers of populism include labour market transformation, an
increase in domestic socio-economic disparities and a gap
between citizens’ expectations of what democracy can deliver
and disenchantment with democracy’s perceived failure to deliver
wellbeing for all.
212
have raised the stakes for non-populist parties which, to keep on Government, Impartial Administration and Participatory
attracting votes and fight off the wave of populism, should Engagement, highlighting the current opportunities for
be prepared to tackle societal problems more effectively. democracy in the region, as well as the democratic challenges
it faces.
In terms of the main gainers, Armenia is currently leading
the list with statistically significant advances on eight
GSoD subattributes, transitioning from a hybrid regime
to democracy in 2018. North Macedonia as a reverse
backslider is also bucking the trend in the region, with
significant democratic advances on three of its democratic
subattributes in the past five years. Improvements on one
or two aspects of democracy are also noted in countries evaluate countries’ performance on the conduct of elections, the
such as Georgia, Ireland, Kosovo, Portugal and Spain in extent to which political parties are able to operate freely, and
the last five years. the extent to which access to government is decided by elections.
This attribute is an aggregation of four subattributes: Clean
Elections, Inclusive Suffrage, Free Political Parties and Elected
5.2. Taking the long-term perspective: Government.
democratic developments since 1975
Of the world’s 27 older democracies, 14 (52 per cent) are
located in Europe, of which 12 are in North and West
Europe, and 2 in South Europe. These democracies have Summary: Representative Government in Europe, 2018
proven to be remarkably resilient: none have experienced an
undemocratic interruption since 1975. The largest share Regional average: Mid-range (0.68)
of the third-wave democracies can be found in Europe.
High Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia,
Since 1975, 28 countries have transitioned to democracy, (>0.7) Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
of which almost half (12) are new countries that gained Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands,
independence following the end of the Cold War and the Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the
collapse of the Soviet/Communist bloc. Most of these are
United Kingdom
located in Eastern and East-Central Europe, although some
are also found in Southern Europe. These countries, which Mid-range Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
are referred to as third-wave democracies, have also proven (0.4–0.7) Bulgaria, Georgia, Hungary, Israel, Kosovo,
remarkably resilient. Only two (Albania and Georgia) have Latvia, Moldova, North Macedonia, Russia,
Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine
experienced partial democratic breakdowns during this
period, with both countries slipping into spells of hybridity Low Azerbaijan and Belarus
but then returning to democracy. (<0.4)
Globally, only a small percentage of countries covered

by the GSoD Indices (22 per cent or 21 countries) have
high performance on all of their democratic attributes. Of The democratic performance patterns and quality of
these 21 countries, 14 are in Europe, including 11 older democracy in Europe show multi-faceted variation
democracies in North and West Europe (Austria, Belgium, from country to country. As illustrated in Table 5.1, of 39
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, democracies in the region, 14 score high on all five GSoD
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom), attributes. Following that, 14 democratic performance
1 in South Europe (Spain) and 2 in East-Central Europe patterns can be discerned. For example, Ireland, Portugal
(Estonia and Slovenia). and Slovakia score highly on four out of five attributes
(although each records different performances on Impartial
Europe is the region in the world with the largest share of Administration and Participatory Engagement). Croatia,
democracies (39, or 93 per cent of countries in the region) Hungary, Poland and Romania score highly on just one
(see Figure 5.1.). attribute (and mid-range on the remaining four). Another
group of seven democracies, starting with Albania, score
5.3. The current democracy landscape in Europe mid-range on all attributes. Towards the end of the table are
The analysis in this section covers issues linked to several countries which, although still defined as democracies,
Representative Government, Fundamental Rights, Checks show low performance on one or more attributes (referred to
213
Regime types in Europe, 1975–2018 Representative Government in Europe and its

subregions, 1975–2018
100
0.9
90
0.8
80
0.7
70
60 0.6
50 0.5
40
0.4
30
0.3
20
0.2
10
0 0.1 Europe
East-Central Europe Eastern Europe
2000
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
1975
South Europe North & West Europe

0.0
2000
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
1975
Notes: This graph shows that the percentage of democracies in Europe has increased since
1975, and all but 7 per cent of countries in Europe are considered democracies according to
the GSoD Indices. Notes: The y-axis denotes the attributes score, ranging from 0 to 1 where 1 indicates a
government that is completely representative and 0 indicates no representation. The
graph presents both a temporal and spatial comparison by subregion. Eastern Europe
int/gsod-indices>.
(i.e. post-Soviet Europe) has increased its score over time. However, in 2018 Eastern
Europe performed well below the regional and subregional averages on Representative
Government.
int/gsod-indices>.
as weak democracies). Turkey is the most extreme example,
scoring low on four out of five attributes but mid-range on
Representative Government.
of countries with high performances on Representative
Warning signs of democratic erosion and Government, in the recent past Europe has witnessed
democratic backsliding setbacks related to checks and balances on government, as
After North America, Europe is the second most well as curtailment of civic space.
democratic region in the world, with 93 per cent of
countries in the region classified as democracies. Europe As a result, the share of countries with high levels of Checks
has the largest share of democracies, with its 39 democracies on Government, Civil Liberties, Media Integrity and Civil
making up 40 per cent of the global share. Of these, 25 have Society Participation has been declining. These declines are
high levels of Representative Government. occurring both in contexts of democratic erosion (declines
on one or more aspects of democracy) and in the particular
The most democratic subregions in Europe are North form of erosion termed democratic backsliding.
and West Europe, South Europe and East-Central
Europe, which only have democracies (see Figure 5.2). More than half of the democracies in Europe have
However, while the quality of democracy in most European suffered democratic erosion in recent years. Of the 10
countries continues to be above that of other regions, democracies in the world currently experiencing democratic
Europe has seen a decline in the quality of its democracies backsliding, six—Hungary, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Turkey
in the past 10 years. Although there is a relatively large share and, to a lesser extent, Ukraine—are in Europe.
214
The region’s third-wave democracies have been more accompanied by declines in civil liberties in democracies.
prone to democratic erosion than the older democracies, This tends to be the result of intentional policies to
with more than half (61 per cent) suffering from different weaken accountability institutions and checks and
degrees of erosion, versus a little more than one-third (36 balances. The GSoD Indices record moderate and severe
per cent) of the older democracies. More than half (14) forms of democratic backsliding, linked to the severity of
of the countries suffering democratic erosion are found in declines in Checks on Government and Civil Liberties
East-Central Europe and Eastern Europe, but a little less average indicators. According to the GSoD Indices, 10
than one-quarter (5) are found in Western Europe and 3 democracies in the world are currently experiencing
in South Europe. Most of the declines are concentrated in democratic backsliding. Of these, six are located in Europe,
aspects linked to civic space, namely Media Integrity and out of which five suffer from severe forms of democratic
Civil Liberties, particularly Freedom of Expression. backsliding and one suffers from moderate democratic
backsliding.
A number of democracies in Europe have also suffered
from more severe forms of democratic erosion, referred Hungary, Poland, Romania, Serbia and Turkey are
to in the GSoD Indices as democratic backsliding. The currently experiencing severe forms of democratic
GSoD Indices refer to (modern) democratic backsliding backsliding. Although each country context differs,
as the gradual weakening of checks on government common characteristics include weakening of
TABLE 5.1
Heat map of democratic performance patterns in Europe, 2018

Country
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Netherlands
Norway
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
Portugal
Slovakia
Ireland
Cyprus
Italy
215

Country
Lithuania
Greece
Czechia
Croatia
Poland
Romania
Latvia
Israel
Hungary
Albania
Armenia
Bosnia
Bulgaria
Kosovo
North Macedonia
Serbia
Georgia
Moldova
Ukraine
Turkey
High Mid-range Low
Notes: This heat map shows the performance of the 39 democracies in Europe by attribute in 2018. Green indicates high performance, while yellow denotes mid-range performance and red
shows low-range performance.
accountability institutions, executive aggrandizement of Severe democratic backsliding represents a top-down,

officials in leadership positions, curtailing of dissent, and orchestrated hollowing-out of democratic institutions, via
efforts to ensure long-term rule by stifling opposition and the means and instruments of democratic decision-making.
civil society (International IDEA, CoD and UNDP 2017: Ruling parties in countries such as Hungary, Poland and Turkey
75; Mechkova, Lührmann and Lindberg 2017; Bermeo have skilfully used democratic rules to dominate democratic
2016). Ukraine has been facing a more moderate form of institutions (including the parliament, judiciary and media),
democratic backsliding, while North Macedonia was in and change the rules (e.g. electoral laws, judicial appointment
the same category until 2016. In some cases, democratic procedures and constitutional provisions) with the purpose of
backsliding is so severe that it results in partial (to hybrid) maintaining hold on those institutions indefinitely (Bieber,
or full (to non-democracy) democratic breakdown. This Solska and Taleski 2019). Encroaching political interference
was the case in Russia which, as a result of backsliding in judicial matters, stifling of parliamentary opposition voices
leading to democratic breakdown, backslid to a hybrid and the curtailment of civic space and media freedoms have
regime in 2004. See Table 5.2 for examples of episodes of slowly led to severe democratic backsliding, which in turn
democratic backsliding in the GSoD Indices data set. translates to declines in the GSoD Indices on Checks on
Government and Civil Liberties.
216
Other countries, such as Serbia, face predicaments four of its attributes of democracy, and records a low score
associated with state capture. In these contexts, elites have on Impartial Administration. In the recent past, it has
taken control of the state to further the private political experienced declines in Checks on Government. According
or commercial interests of a select group. The Western to GSoD Indices data, in 2018 it also suffered significant
Balkans is characterized by regimes that formally accept declines in the subattribute of Civil Liberties (specifically,
democratic rules but retain power through authoritarian Freedom of Expression, Freedom of Religion and Freedom of
practices (Levitsky and Way 2010). In 2018 the European Movement). Ukraine’s declines in Civil Liberties are partially
Commission referred to the Western Balkans as a subregion a consequence of the country’s political tension with Russia
where ‘countries show clear elements of state capture, and the events leading up to, and following, the Maidan
including links with organized crime and corruption at all Revolution. Ukraine has also suffered consecutive declines
levels of government and administration, as well as a strong on Clean Elections and Free Political Parties since 2013. The
entanglement of public and private interests’ (European evidence behind such declines can be seen in government
Commission 2018a: 3). As a result, Serbia has been marked institutions that favour the political party of the president,
as a a country undergoing severe democratic backsliding since the curtailment of opposition parties’ manoeuvring space
2010. The severe democratic backsliding in neighbouring (OSCE ODIHR 2018c), and the encroaching influence of
Romania started more recently (in 2017) but is also of great the business sector in politics (Razumkov Centre 2017).
concern in terms of its severity, with significant declines in
Civil Liberties, Effective Parliament, Judicial Independence, North Macedonia had an eight-year spell of moderate
and also Civil Society Participation and Access to Justice. democratic backsliding commencing in 2008 and ending
in 2016. These deteriorations were noted on Checks on
In South Europe, Turkey is suffering severe democratic Government and Civil Liberties, largely due to political
backsliding. The backsliding in Turkey began in 2010 and interference in the judiciary, the media and civil society
continues to date. Turkey is the country in the world that has by the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization–
suffered the most democratic declines in the past five years, Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (known by
declining on 11 of its democratic subattributes. its Macedonian acronym, VMRO-DPMNE) led by Nikola
Gruevski. The situation has seen some improvement since
Ukraine presents a situation of moderate democratic the 2017 elections which brought about a new government
backsliding, which it has experienced since 2010. headed by Zoran Zaev (Reef 2017; Ceka 2018).
Ukraine is a weak democracy, with mid-range levels of
Representative Government, declining from 0.6 in 2009 In some countries, state capture has taken the form of
to 0.45 in 2018. Ukraine performs in the mid-range on long-ruling families and close acquaintances bringing
TABLE 5.2
Episodes of democratic backsliding in Europe in the GSoD Indices data set
Severe democratic backsliding resulting in democratic breakdown

Moderate democratic Severe democratic
backsliding backsliding Partial democratic breakdown Full democratic breakdown
(from democracy to hybrid regime) (from democracy to non-democracy)
Ukraine 2010–2018 Hungary (2006–2018) N/A N/A

Poland (2013–2018)
Romania (2017–2018)
Serbia (2010–2018)
Turkey (2008–2018)
North Macedonia (2008–2016) Russia (1999–2010) N/A
Notes: The data in the GSoD Indices reflects events up to the end of 2018. Cases of democratic backsliding listed as occurring up to and including 2018 may therefore have since evolved or
changed. For more information on the definitions of moderate and severe democratic backsliding see the Methodology section of this report.
217
under their control large sectors of the economy and ways, including meals and youth events. Prior to the 2017
political power. Azerbaijan and Belarus fit this mould. elections it prided itself on breaking ranks with traditional
They are the only countries in Europe to classify as non- politicking by leading a door-to-door campaign in a project
democracies in the GSoD Indices data set. Azerbaijan is the titled ‘La Grande Marche pour l’Europe’ (March for
only country in the region with low performance scores in Europe), interviewing and talking to hundreds of thousands
all five attributes. Belarus scores mid-range on Fundamental of citizens (Schultheis 2018). Macron’s presidency and level
Rights, but overall it is still classified as a non-democracy, of support, however, have since also suffered setbacks, as
with no clear signs of a potential democratic transition in exemplified by the Gilets Jaunes (Yellow Vests) movement
the near future. that began in November 2018 with protests against rising
fuel prices and turned into a wider protest movement against
Political parties in Europe: between renewal and worsening living conditions and rising inequalities (The
calcification Economist 2019).
The Free Political Parties subattribute of the GSoD framework
measures the extent to which political parties are free to form Mainstream parties—mainly across Western and
and campaign for office, including the competitiveness of Northern Europe—are facing increasing pressure,
political participation, the autonomy of opposition parties therefore contributing to the rise of non-traditional
and the extent of multiparty elections (International IDEA parties. This has consequently helped produce populist,
2018b). nativist, extremist or simply non-traditional political parties
on both the left and right of the political spectrum. Some
Europe has the largest number of countries (13) scoring examples include the right-wing populist party Vox in Spain,
highly on Free Political Parties, while 27 countries score
in the mid-range, and 2 have low scores (see Figure 5.3).
FIGURE 5.3
In some countries political parties are also experiencing
a surge in membership. For instance, the British Labour
Party greatly increased its membership in recent years, in Free Political Parties in Europe, 2005–2018
partnership with a grassroots movement, Momentum. The
movement presented itself as a new form of politics that
bridged traditional party structures and civic activism. 60
Momentum led the development of new digital campaign

and recruitment techniques, including peer-to-peer texting
50
and mobile-banking applications. Its community-level
organization has fed into a national movement that has

more than doubled the Labour Party’s membership since 40
September 2015, including many young people (Hobolt
2018; Whiteley et al. 2019), although membership is
30
reported to have fallen by around 10 per cent in 2019 due to
the party’s stance on Brexit (Stewart, H. 2019).
20
Similarly, in France, the new La République en Marche!
party has shaken up traditional political alignments.
10
Moreover, it has done so from an avowedly liberal and
democratic position. The party took root and grew in
record time. It was in some ways a top-down phenomenon, 0
organized to service Emmanuel Macron’s presidential bid. In
2009
2005
2007
2018
2013
2015
2017
2011
other ways, however, it resembled a bottom-up movement,

growing out of local circles and policy deliberations with
Low Mid-range High
ordinary citizens (Chwalisz 2018). The party drew heavily
on crowdsourced ideas and donations, and was organized Notes: The graph illustrates that the percentage of mid-range countries has increased and
around a decentralized network of local councils where now makes up the majority of countries in Europe, while the percentage of high-performing
countries has nearly halved since 2005.
people of all ages and backgrounds were empowered to Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019), <http://www.idea.
contribute to decision-making with minimal red tape. int/gsod-indices>.
These councils engaged with citizens in a range of informal
218
which won 10 per cent of votes and entered parliament and Justice, PiS) in Poland, Fidesz in Hungary, and the
for the first time in the 2019 elections, or the far-right VMRO-DPMNE in North Macedonia (in power until
Alternative für Deutschland, created in 2013 and now the 2016). These regimes often claim to rule in the name of
third-largest party in Germany. Despite the initial surge in the people and describe their opponents as traitors whom
the popularity of parties such as La République en Marche! they rhetorically exclude from the nation (Petkovski 2016).
and the British Labour Party, the impact of populist and Historically embedded narratives, nativist ideologies and
extremist parties has been increasingly felt across many other global conspiracy theories are recurring motives for these
countries in Europe and has left a mark in France and the regimes and parties.
UK. The ongoing developments stemming from the Brexit
referendum, and the strain it has placed on the British When referring to parties in Central and Eastern Europe,
political spectrum, are a vivid case in point. and the Western Balkans more specifically, some have
noted the dominance of ‘Big Men’ (Kanin 2003)—
In several countries in Central and Eastern Europe, politicians with authoritarian tendencies, or patrons of
political parties do not evolve to become membership- family-based and clientelist networks who continue to
based mechanisms that articulate and channel citizens’ dominate the region and co-opt international support by
concerns. Instead, most parties are driven by narrow party speaking the language of modernity and offering promises
leadership and lack intra-party pluralism, which results of stability and reform (Dolenec 2013). Others have noted
in the calcification of these parties. Political parties play these parties’ centralization: most parties in the Western
quite a dominant role in public life in these countries Balkans are ‘controlled by a small circle of elites, who have
(Günay and Dzihic 2016). Moreover, ruling parties attract
high membership rates as this is crucial for employment
in the public sectors. In such scenarios, the measurement FIGURE 5.4
of indicators for this subattribute—such as the autonomy
of opposition parties, or the competitiveness of party Free Political Parties in the Western Balkans,
participation, or multiparty elections—can only be fully 1992–2018
understood by recognizing the extent to which these
parties are centralized (Bochsler 2010; Laverty 2015). This 0.8
is reflected in the mid-range Free Political Parties scores for
Kosovo (0.55), North Macedonia (0.61) and Serbia (0.56). 0.7
See Figure 5.4 for a summary of the evolution of the GSoD
subattribute of Free Political Parties in the Western Balkans.
0.6
This pattern can also be identified in some post-Soviet

0.5
Europe countries with ‘parties of power’—pragmatic
groups that aim to support ruling governments and
are defined by their relationship to the state, without 0.4
significant independent policy agendas, combining civil
servants, business elites and government officials (Laverty 0.3
2015). Such parties have, until recently, prevailed in
Armenia (scoring mid-range at 0.62) and Ukraine (scoring
0.2
mid-range at 0.46), and have been the main parties in
hybrid regimes or non-democracies such as Russia (scoring
mid-range at 0.40) and Azerbaijan (scoring low at 0.36), 0.1 Albania Bosnia and Herzegovina
Kosovo North Macedonia
respectively.
Serbia Europe
0.0
Some political parties, including several ruling parties,
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
1992
1994
1996
1998
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
exhibit autocratic tendencies. This phenomenon can be

discerned in several countries in the region, particularly in
Central and Eastern Europe. Such parties, and the regimes Notes: The score for Kosovo begins in 2008 as that is the year the country gained
independence.
led by them, are based on ideological platforms combining Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019), <http://www.idea.
conservatism, nationalism and a rejection of liberal int/gsod-indices>.
democracy, as epitomized by Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law
219
managed to centralize power in their hands’, which gives Declining civil liberties and democratic
them ‘excessive influence over candidate selection and backsliding
thereby making every MP more dependent’ (Keil 2018: In the last decade Europe has seen a gradual decline in
68). There are several distinct patterns of ‘state capture’ Civil Liberties. The share of countries with high levels
within the region (Bieber 2018: 347). Albania and North of Civil Liberties declined from 80 per cent in 2008
Macedonia are in essence two- to three-party states, to 71 per cent in 2018. In the early 2000s, for the first
with a number of minority (i.e. ethnic Albanian) parties time since the start of the GSoD Indices data set (1975),
in the latter. Croatia and Serbia have a single heavily- there was a sharp spike in the number of countries with
dominant party and several smaller opposition parties. significant declines on Civil Liberties. The deterioration
Politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina are predominantly was particularly seen in East-Central Europe and South
communal: at the national level, all decisions are made Europe. Turkey’s levels of Civil Liberties have declined
by a virtually unchanging group of six to seven party from mid-range to low; its score on this dimension (0.35)
leaders, while single parties dominate in some regional has nearly halved since 1975. As it stands, Turkey is
and most municipal jurisdictions. Kosovo’s parties are the only democracy in Europe with low levels of Civil
based on loyalty to a small leadership cadre dating back Liberties.
to the pre-independence period; most have little or no
clear ideological leaning. The common denominator of Figure 5.5 shows the GSoD Indices levels for Europe
all these examples is that governing parties function as on the Fundamental Rights attribute, while Figure 5.6
patron–client machines, and party loyalty usually trumps shows the levels for the Civil Liberties subattribute. Since
other considerations in decision-making (Keil 2018; 1975, there have consistently been more high scoring
Wise and Agarin 2017; Stewart, B. 2019; Bajovic and countries than any other category in Europe on both
Manojlovic 2013). indicators, while those countries with mid-range scores
have outnumbered those with low scores since 1985 (for
Fundamental Rights) and since 1990 (for Civil Liberties).
Freedom of Expression has seen a downward trend in

Fundamental Rights
Europe, particularly in the last five years. As a GSoD
aspect that focuses on issues of harassment of journalists,
self-censorship of journalists, freedom of discussion for
The Fundamental Rights attribute aggregates scores from three
men and women, and freedom of opinion and expression,
subattributes: Access to Justice, Civil Liberties, and Social Rights and
Equality. Overall it measures the fair and equal access to justice, the this downward trend should be of great concern for
extent to which civil liberties such as freedom of expression or the region. The share of countries with high levels has
movement are respected, and the extent to which countries are declined from 74 per cent in 2008 to 60 per cent in 2018.
offering their citizens basic welfare and political equality.
A total of 13 countries have seen significant declines on
Freedom of Expression between 2013 and 2018—the
highest regional total. These declines have all occurred
Summary: Fundamental Rights in Europe, 2018 in democracies, predominantly positioned around the
subregion of East-Central Europe.
Regional average: High (0.73)
However, a few advances on Civil Liberties have been
High Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, identified in certain parts of East-Central Europe and
(>0.7) Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Eastern Europe/post-Soviet Europe. North Macedonia
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, and Kosovo have seen improvements on Freedom of
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the Association and Assembly, while Armenia has recorded
United Kingdom gains on Freedom of Movement.
Mid-range Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia and
(0.4–0.7) Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Hungary,
Europe’s performance on Gender Equality has
Kosovo, Moldova, North Macedonia, Poland, plateaued considerably in the last five years. There are
Romania, Russia, Serbia and Ukraine more troubling signs: while the performance of countries
such as Croatia, Poland, Serbia and Turkey do not show
Low Azerbaijan and Turkey
significant declines, their downward trend in the last five
(<0.4)
years is cause for concern.
220
Fundamental Rights in Europe, 1975–2018 Civil Liberties in Europe, 1975–2018

80 90
70 80
70
60
60
50
50
40
40
30
30
20
20
10 10
0 0
2000
2000
2005
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
1985
1995
2015
1975
1975
Low Mid-range High
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019), <http://www.idea. Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019), <http://www.
int/gsod-indices>. idea.int/gsod-indices>.
FIGURE 5.7
Azerbaijan and Turkey are the two countries in the region
that score the lowest on Gender Equality. Turkey is one of Gender Equality in Europe, 1975–2018
the three democracies in the world that has low levels of
Gender Equality. For more information see Figure 5.7. 80
70
Along with Papua New Guinea (0.26) and Iraq 60

(0.39), Turkey is one of three democracies
in the world to score low on Gender Equality 50

(0.34).
40
30
Turkey stands out as the country with most declines in 20

the GSoD Indices subattributes in the last five years—11
of them overall. By 2018, despite being classified as a 10
democracy, Turkey is a fragile and very weak one, and the
0
only country in Europe to have suffered statistically
2000
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
1975
significant declines in four of the five GSoD attributes:

Fundamental Rights, Checks on Government, Impartial
Low Mid-range High
Administration and Participatory Engagement. Turkey
now scores mid-range (0.44) on Representative int/gsod-indices>.
Government.
221
Approximately a decade ago, Turkey’s score on Representative The deterioration of Turkey’s democracy has occurred in
Government was relatively high: it was on par with the rest juxtaposition with the country’s deteriorating prospects
of Europe, slightly below the scores recorded in Southern for accession to the European Union. As its chances of EU
Europe but above the world average. It was increasingly membership became fraught with difficulties and mutual
celebrated as a model of how other countries—especially acrimony, Turkey’s political and administrative reforms
countries in the Middle East—could combine Islam as the towards more freedoms, accountability, openness and
majority religion with a pluralist, representative democracy reduced corruption lost pace and were eventually reversed.
that respects minorities and fundamental freedoms. Turkey’s Relations with the EU have now acquired a pragmatic and
soft power as a successful democratic reformer in the Middle transactional character (Economist Intelligence Unit 2018)
East region was on the ascendancy and further democratic centred on mutual gains from cooperation on a select
reform was on the agenda (Altunişik 2008). number of policy areas, such as the fight against terrorism
and migration. In March 2019, the European Parliament
Today, on most attributes, Turkey scores lower than the even called for a freeze on Turkey’s membership talks as a
European average (see Box 5.1). Its democratic standards rebuke to the country’s human rights violations (Reuters
have deteriorated sharply and in a very short timeframe. 2019).
Its GSoD Indices scores even suggest a return to its 1980s
standards in some respects. Today the country has become a Hungary, a country suffering from severe democratic
reference point for authoritarian regimes which seek ways to backsliding, has seen significant erosion of democratic
minimize their democracies around the conduct of elections checks and balances for the best part of a decade. After
while showing disregard for civil liberties, civil society and coming to power in 2010, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s
clear separation of powers (Özbudun 2015; Schedler 2006). Fidesz party began using its parliamentary majority to
The March 2019 municipal elections (and the June rerun introduce a series of changes, including undercutting judicial
in Istanbul) might have heralded the turn of a new page in independence; transforming public television and radio into
Turkish politics. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice mouthpieces of the government; attacking critical media
and Development Party (AKP) conceded defeat in both outlets; disempowering local self-government; mobilizing
Ankara and Istanbul, bringing to an end 16 years of the popular fears and resentment through governmental
party’s rule in Ankara, and 25 years in Istanbul (BBC News propaganda campaigns; and assaulting civil society (Bánkúti,
2019a; Gall 2019). This undoubtedly represents a significant Halmai and Scheppele 2012).
blow to the party’s dominance over local politics. However,
the removal of three Kurdish opposition mayors in August Monitoring of the April 2018 elections documented the
2019 and the crackdown on opposition politicians show that Hungarian Government’s unequal distribution of electoral
Erdoğan uses other tactics to silence critics. resources, control of media coverage and influence over
BOX 5.1
Turkey: a precipitous slide towards authoritarian rule

Many factors have contributed to Turkey’s democratic decline, system in Turkey into one with extensive presidential powers,
not least military influence over civilian politics, undue limited parliamentary oversight and reduced independence of
political influence over the judiciary, limited press freedom the judiciary’ (OSCE ODIHR 2018b).
and curtailment of civic space. More recently, this negative
trend, which overturned previous gains, has seen a drastic There have been renewed incursions by Turkish security forces
acceleration. See Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9 for illustrations of into Kurdish settlement areas in Turkey. The work of civil
how this is reflected in Turkey’s GSoD Indices scores. society has been under threat, with NGO closures and arrests
without due legal process. Civil society organizations (CSOs)
President Erdogan has continued to tighten his grip on power, whose views do not match those of state officials have been
particularly since the failed coup attempt in July 2016, which increasingly marginalized; only preferred organizations with
led to the declaration of a state of emergency. In operation until access to power are now able to influence policy (Aybars,
2018, this provided space for the government to circumvent Copeland and Tsarouhas 2018). In addition, elected mayors
principles of the rule of law (Barkey 2017; Al Jazeera 2017). The have been replaced by government appointees, squeezing the
June 2018 elections ‘marked the transformation of the political opposition out from hundreds of municipalities. In particular,
222
nearly all those held by the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic It remains to be seen if, and how, the consequences of the 2019
Party have been replaced by pro-government figures. The local elections, and the end of the AKP’s political dominance in
Turkish Government has brought spurious judicial cases Ankara and Istanbul, will affect the democratic landscape of the
against members of the Republican People’s Party, the largest country and lead to a reversal of the democratic backsliding that
opposition party, and an increasing number of journalists have Turkey has experienced since 2008.
been detained.
Freedom of Expression in Turkey and the rest of the Civil Society Participation in Turkey and the rest of
world, 1975–2018 the world, 1975–2018
1.0 1.0
0.9 0.9
0.8 0.8
0.7 0.7
0.6 0.6
0.5 0.5
0.4 0.4
0.3 0.3
0.2 0.2
Turkey Southern Europe Turkey Southern Europe

0.1 0.1
Europe World Europe World
Confidence interval Confidence interval
0.0 0.0
2000
2000
2005
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
1985
1995
2015
1975
1975
Notes: The shaded band around Turkey’s score indicates the 68 per cent confidence Notes: The shaded band around Turkey’s score indicates the 68 per cent confidence
bounds of the interval. bounds of the interval.
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019), <http://www. Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019), <http://www.
idea.int/gsod-indices>. idea.int/gsod-indices>.
the national electoral commission. One monitoring Hungary’s most prestigious independent universities, the
report stated that the elections were characterized by a Central European University (Redden 2018).
‘pervasive overlap between state and ruling party resources,
undermining contestants’ ability to compete on an equal These developments are captured by the GSoD Indices
basis’ (OSCE ODIHR 2018a: 1). Treatment of the Roma data, showing that in the last five years alone Hungary
minority has worsened and is a particularly serious concern. has experienced statistically significant declines on four
Moreover, from mid-2017 onwards, the government has subattributes: Clean Elections, Free Political Parties, Civil
advanced legislation severely restricting non-governmental Liberties (see Figure 5.10) and Media Integrity. On Civil
organizations (NGOs). It even moved to close one of Liberties, Hungary has also seen statistically significant
223
FIGURE 5.10 the parliament and diluting its oversight role, its political
encroachment in the judiciary, and its stifling of free speech
Civil Liberties in Hungary and the rest of the world, and free media (see Box 5.2).
1988–2018
1.0
0.9
The Checks on Government attribute aggregates scores from three

0.8
0.7 the executive, as well as whether the courts are independent, and
0.6 being penalized for it.
0.5
0.4
Summary: Checks on Government in Europe, 2018
0.3
0.2
High Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia,
Hungary East-Central Europe (>0.7) Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
0.1 Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Europe World
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland
Confidence interval
0.0 and the United Kingdom
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
Mid-range Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,

(0.4–0.7) Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Georgia, Greece,
Notes: The shaded band around Hungary’s line indicates the 68 per cent confidence bounds
Hungary, Israel, Kosovo, Moldova, North
of the interval. Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia and Ukraine
int/gsod-indices>. Low Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia and Turkey
(<0.4)
declines on two subcomponents: Freedom of Expression, Europe has suffered declines on Checks on Government
and Freedom of Association and Assembly. It now falls in recent years. At the country level, Poland, Romania and
below the average in Europe and the subregion. On Turkey have seen statistically significant declines on this
Freedom of Association and Assembly, Hungary is on a par attribute, which has caused a downward pull on the regional
with Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia and Turkey. Furthermore, average. Armenia is the only country to score a statistically
it has gone from high levels of Representative Government significant advance between 2013 and 2018, but this has
in 2008 to mid-range levels in 2018. proven insufficient to offset the regional European average
(see Figure 5.13).
The democratic backsliding in Poland is illustrated by six
declines in the country’s GSoD subattributes for 2018. There is an ongoing debate on the underlying causes which
Of particular concern are the country’s overall declines might explain the weakening of Checks on Government
on Civil Liberties and Checks on Government. On Civil in the region. Many of these discussions point to the rise
Liberties, there is a general deterioration noted on Freedom of illiberalism, the increasing polarization of the political
of Expression and Freedom of Association and Assembly. spectrum, or the EU’s disconnect with the electorate at
Checks on Government have experienced setbacks on all the local level (see e.g. Bieber, Solska and Taleski 2019;
three subattributes measured in the GSoD Indices: Media Dawson and Hanley 2016; Greskovits 2015; Havlík 2016;
Integrity, Judicial Independence and Effective Parliament. Krastev 2018; Mair 2013).
This is reflective of the PiS regime’s actions in controlling
224
BOX 5.2
Poland: backpedalling on democratic gains

Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice, PiS) came to power in manner that gives it control over key decisions, such as the
Poland in 2015 and has since sought to increase the power of appointment of judges. Furthermore, the party has placed its
the executive and transform the legislative and constitutional supporters in key positions in these courts and placed courts
structure of the political system to advance its continued of general jurisdiction under the strict control of the minister of
stronghold on power. justice (Fomina and Kucharczyk 2016). PiS has also centralized the
management of civil society funding, creating a new organization,
In coming to power, and to justify the sweeping changes it the National Freedom Institute, overseen by the deputy prime
undertook, PiS emphasized moral and traditional values. It minister (Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights 2017).
focused on social redistribution and re-establishment of public
trust in state institutions. It consistently appealed to young In addition, in 2016 PiS introduced anti-terrorism legislation which
people, pensioners and inhabitants of rural and suburban areas extended options for Internet surveillance without a court order
(Markowski 2016). Judging by the pattern witnessed in the country, (Amnesty International 2017). It has also increased the period that
which aims to centralize power and control opposition voices, suspects can be held without charges and broadened the Internal
Poland resembles other regimes in the subregion that have Security Agency’s access to data (Matthes, Markowski and Bönker
recently shown signs of authoritarian tendencies (Giordano and 2018: 20; Human Rights Watch 2017).
Hayoz 2013; Markowski 2019; Kotwas and Kubik 2019).
Figure 5.11 and Figure 5.12 show Poland’s GSoD Indices scores on
PiS has sought control over key media appointments. It has Freedom of Expression, and Freedom of Association and Assembly,
changed the rules governing the Constitutional Tribunal, the respectively, compared with the scores for East-Central Europe,
National Council of the Judiciary and the Supreme Court, in a Europe and the world.
Freedom of Expression in Poland and the rest of the Freedom of Association and Assembly in Poland and
world, 1988–2018 the rest of the world, 1988–2018
1.0 1.0
0.9 0.9
0.8 0.8
0.7 0.7
0.6 0.6
0.5 0.5
0.4 0.4
0.3 0.3
0.2 0.2
Poland East−Central Europe Poland East−Central Europe

0.1 0.1
Europe World Europe World
Confidence interval Confidence interval
0.0 0.0
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
Notes: The shaded band around Poland’s score indicates the 68 per cent confidence Notes: The shaded band around Poland’s score indicates the 68 per cent confidence
bounds of the interval. bounds of the interval.
Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019), <http://www. Source: International IDEA, The Global State of Democracy Indices (2019), <http://www.
idea.int/gsod-indices>. idea.int/gsod-indices>.
225
FIGURE 5.13 dissatisfaction has translated into electoral support for

anti-establishment and populist parties that have further
Checks on Government in selected European contributed to the polarization of political competition in
countries, 1988–2018 many countries. Faced with these challengers, mainstream
parties are struggling to find appropriate policy and
1.0 political responses.
0.9
Many surveys in recent years have shown rising support
for illiberal and even quasi-authoritarian values in some
0.8
parts of Europe (Foa and Mounk 2017). Most of the
0.7 extreme right-wing parties in Europe today appeal to such
sentiments. In this political climate, the protection of
0.6 minorities and tolerance of their views is counterbalanced
by a perceived fear that majority values are under pressure.
0.5 Examples of this can be seen in Austria and Italy (until
August 2019), where far-right parties have become part of
0.4
government. In Austria, the far-right Freedom Party was
in a coalition with the conservative People’s Party since
0.3
December 2017 (Heinisch 2017). However, in May 2019
0.2
the coalition collapsed, following revelations that Heinz-
Christian Strache, the leader of the Freedom Party, had
0.1 promised state contracts in exchange for financial support
Armenia Poland Romania
for his party (Karnitschnig 2019). In Italy, the right-
Turkey Europe
0.0 leaning, populist Lega Nord (Northern League, recently
rebranded as Lega) formed a governing coalition with the
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
left-leaning Five Star Movement in 2018 (Horowitz 2018).

However, in August 2019, Matteo Salvini, the League’s
int/gsod-indices>. leader and the country’s Deputy Prime Minister, broke
ranks with his coalition partners, seemingly motivated by
a gamble to obtain more power in early elections. By the
end of August 2019, the gamble appeared to have gone
The rise of illiberalism and polarization, and the amiss, with the caretaker Prime Minister, Giuseppe Conte,
hollowing of the centre reaching a deal to form a new government with the centre
One of the main backdrops of Europe’s democratic left (BBC News 2019b).
malaise is the rise of illiberal identities and
disappointment with mainstream politics. Many factors Declines in Checks on Government are contributing to
point to this rise, not least the fear, felt by many citizens, that an increasing polarization across Europe that puts at risk
globalization and technological advancements are putting consensual trust in democratic institutions. Societies in
pressure on their traditional values; and the increase in many European states are withdrawing into opposing camps
economic uncertainties and inequalities. Certain political that not only contest each other politically but also have little
parties are exploiting these fears, suggesting simple answers interaction with each other at a social or cultural level, or
to not-so-simple questions. through any shared media use. The result of this polarization
has been that voters are dragged away from centrist political
The decline of democratic quality in Europe is linked to the parties.
misuse of governmental powers to dismantle constitutional
checks and balances. Incumbent political elites have eroded Across the EU, the centre ground has suffered as parties
the rule of law to become less accountable in the public follow voters towards more extreme positions. In Denmark,
realm, appropriate state resources for partisan and private the Social Democrats won the 2019 elections after moving
purposes, and expand informal patronage networks in to a more restrictive stance on issues such as immigration
order to penetrate society. These elites have been voted into (Orange 2019). In the Netherlands, the Labour Party
office by citizens disappointed with the performance of attempted to implement a centrist programme but lost
democracy and mainstream political forces. Such popular support in the 2017 elections (Graham 2017). The
226
2018 elections in Latvia saw traditional parties and the populism and anti-democratic opinion in European
centrist coalition lose out to two new—populist and anti- countries (see e.g. V-Dem 2019; Rupnik 2018). It is also
corruption—parties (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty seen as one of the explanatory factors for the popular support
2018a). Other recently successful populist parties are for Brexit in the UK referendum in 2016.
arguably Smer–Sociálna Demokracia in Slovakia and ANO
2011 in Czechia (Havlík 2016; Matthes 2016), which One of the key developments relates to the financial
are closely tied to non-transparent business interests and recession of 2011 and the Eurozone’s difficulties with
display limited respect for the rule of law and institutional addressing the debt crises emerging in several of its
independence (Greskovits 2015). member states. The ensuing austerity measures undertaken
in countries such as Greece, Italy, Spain and the UK were
The result of these developments is that mainstream accompanied by years of economic difficulties that are felt
political parties and mainstream politics can no longer to this day (McDowell 2011). These developments, which
operate unchallenged. Instead, they are under constant were not just political but also economic and financial in
threat from other, newer political forces on the left and nature, helped deepen the EU’s democratic deficit in the
right. The weakening pull of the EU and the somewhat eyes of the electorate.
embattled model of liberal democracy have encouraged
authoritarian actors. Russia has become a more important Additionally, the supranational powers of oversight and
player, supporting populist and authoritarian leaders and intervention that have been transferred to the EU’s decision-
parties, fermenting political instability, and cultivating making bodies over the years are viewed by parts of the
close ties with leaders such as Hungary’s Orbán (Buzogány electorate as having reduced the scope of action of national
2017). Other countries, such as China and Turkey, have also governments, and simultaneously having exacerbated the
increased their influence, particularly in South-East Europe. distance between citizens and decision makers. Various
By doing so, they counterbalance the EU by encouraging or studies point to the interplay between the democratic malaise
condoning authoritarian impulses. in Europe as a whole and the lack of trust in EU institutions
(Brechenmacher 2018; Pew Research Center 2017).
The European Union and the disconnect with
democracy Furthermore, according to a recent Eurobarometer survey,
Any analysis of the European democratic landscape is more than half of people in the EU (56 per cent) do not
incomplete without acknowledging the role of the EU. trust government institutions, while more than 40 per cent
Democratic gains and challenges are so tightly entwined do not trust the legal system, and 61 per cent do not trust
with EU-level developments that they have a concrete the media (European Commission 2017). Such survey results
impact on national politics. In fact, many analysts identify correspond to a considerable degree with the GSoD Indices
the disconnect between the EU and grassroots democracy, data. As shown in Table 5.3, between 2013 and 2018, there
and the perceived distance of citizens from technocratic are more countries with significant declines than gains on
EU institutions, as key explanatory factors driving illiberal Checks on Government.
TABLE 5.3
Significant declines and gains on Checks on Government subattributes in Europe, 2013–2018
Score
Country
2013 2018 Change
Poland 0.77 0.62 –
Moldova 0.70 0.55 –
Romania 0.63 0.48 –
227
Score
Country
2013 2018 Change
Lithuania 0.79 0.70 –
Turkey 0.51 0.37 –
Spain 0.62 0.70 +
Armenia 0.43 0.66 +
Judicial Independence
Germany 0.74 0.65 –
Poland 0.81 0.53 –
Czechia 0.70 0.63 –
Romania 0.70 0.42 –
Denmark 1 0.87 –
Turkey 0.54 0.32 –
North Macedonia 0.29 0.37 +
Armenia 0.34 0.46 +
Media Interity
France 0.96 0.83 –
Germany 0.91 0.73 –
Poland 0.84 0.59 –
Hungary 0.61 0.49 –
Croatia 0.77 0.63 –
Serbia 0.57 0.43 –
Slovenia 0.78 0.68 –
Turkey 0.49 0.39 –
North Macedonia 0.50 0.60 +
Armenia 0.52 0.60 +
High Mid-range Low
Notes: – denotes decline; + denotes gain.

228
However, the increase in voter turnout in the 2019

A total of 16 European countries score
European elections, at levels not seen in 20 years, provides highly on Impartial Administration, of which
reason for hope that voters have begun to re-engage with 12 are in North and West Europe (Austria,
European politics. Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland and the UK), 2 are in East-Central Europe
(Estonia and Slovenia), and 2 are in South Europe (Portugal
Impartial Administration and Spain).
Impartial Administration is the aggregation of two subattributes: Performance on Impartial Administration is

Absence of Corruption and Predictable Enforcement. It measures the
extent to which the state is free from corruption, and whether the inconsistent across the region
enforcement of public authority is predictable. Performance on Impartial Administration reveals uneven
progress across Europe’s subregions. The majority of
countries in North and West Europe score highly, while
most countries in East-Central Europe score in the mid-
Summary: Impartial Administration in Europe, 2018 range. Five countries have low scores, of which four are in
Eastern Europe/post-Soviet Europe (Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Regional average: Mid-range (0.64) Russia and Ukraine) and one is in South Europe (Turkey).
High Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
(>0.7) France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands,
The older democracies (e.g. Belgium, Germany, Sweden
Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the UK) generally tend to perform better on Impartial
Switzerland and the United Kingdom Administration. Countries that made the transition to
democracy during the post-Cold War era (e.g. Bulgaria,
Czechia, Georgia, Slovakia and Slovenia) tend to fall in the
(0.4–0.7) Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Georgia,
Greece, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Kosovo, Latvia, mid-range category. However, there are several exceptions.
Lithuania, Moldova, North Macedonia, Poland, Cyprus, Greece, Israel and Italy, all of which made the
Romania, Serbia and Slovakia transition to democracy before the 1990s, score in the mid-
range on Impartial Administration. North Macedonia has
Low Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine
(<0.4) also experienced significant gains in Impartial Administration
and Absence of Corruption (see Box 5.3).
BOX 5.3
North Macedonia: a case of reverse democratic backsliding with potential for the future
After experiencing a downward spiral towards authoritarian The amount and seriousness of the revelations required a
rule, a series of scandals related to deep and massive drastic response. Under strong pressure from the EU and the
government malfeasance led to a second transition to United States, North Macedonia called early parliamentary
democracy and the installation of a new government in 2017. elections and set up a special prosecutor. In May 2017, the
Since then, North Macedonia has reversed course and is now opposition Social Democratic Union took office in coalition with
making promising strides towards democratic consolidation, several ethnic Albanian parties (Ceka 2018; Keil 2018; Reef
recovering quicker than any other Western Balkan state. 2017).
Early in 2015 a large quantity of evidence of illegal behaviour The country’s relationship with Greece is on the mend,
by the ruling Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization– following the adoption of a new name (‘the Republic of North
Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO- Macedonia’) in January 2019 (Stamouli 2019). This has helped
DPMNE) had begun leaking into public view. The evidence accelerate the country’s long-stalled integration into the EU
included thousands of illegal wiretaps of opposition and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
leaders and a wide range of corrupt, criminal or otherwise
embarrassing acts.
229
Relations between North Macedonia’s Macedonian majority FIGURE 5.15

population and its considerable ethnic-Albanian minority need
careful monitoring, building on full respect for the 2001 Ohrid
Impartial Administration in North Macedonia, 1992–
Agreement. In this context, the signing of the Language Law,
which recognizes Albanian as the second official language of
2018
the country, by the Speaker of the Macedonian Parliament in 0.7
January 2019 is encouraging (European Western Balkans 2019).
0.6
North Macedonia’s most dramatic gains in the GSoD Indices
have been on the attributes of Checks on Government 0.5
and Impartial Administration (see Figure 5.15). Within the
region, North Macedonia has moved from last place on both
0.4
attributes to fourth and second place, respectively. Many other
attributes and subattributes show significant improvement,
0.3
notably Representative Government, Judicial Independence,
Predictable Enforcement, Freedom of Expression and Freedom
0.2
of Association and Assembly (see Figure 5.14 for 2018 scores).
0.1
North Macedonia East-Central Europe
Europe World
0.0 Confidence interval
2000
2006
2008
2002
2004
1996
1998
2010
2016
2018
1992
1994
2012
2014
Notes: The shaded area around North Macedonia’s line indicates the 68 per cent
confidence bounds of the interval.
FIGURE 5.14
Overall GSoD Indices scores, North Macedonia, 2018
Clean Elections 0.61

Inclusive Suffrage 0.91 Representative
Free Political Parties 0.61 Government
Elected Government 1.00
Access to Justice 0.61

Fundamental
Civil Liberties 0.70 Rights
Social Rights and Equality 0.50
Effective Parliament 0.58

Checks on
Judicial Independence 0.37 Government
Media Integrity 0.60
Absence of Corruption 0.44 Impartial

Predictable Enforcement 0.47 Administration
Civil Society Participation 0.57

Electoral Participation 0.69 Participatory
Direct Democracy 0.38 Engagement
Local Democracy 0.60
Global mean European mean Confidence interval
Notes: The lines in the middle of each column indicate the 68 per cent confidence bounds of the interval.
230
TABLE 5.4
In the last five years only two countries in

Low Absence of Corruption scores in Europe by Europe saw significant improvements on
subregion, 2018 Predictable Enforcement: Ireland (0.86) and
Kosovo (0.48). However, during the same
period four countries saw significant declines
Score on Absence European on the same subattribute: Germany (0.88),
Country
of Corruption subregion Poland (0.50), Greece (0.54) and Turkey (0.23).
Albania 0.29 East-Central Europe
Azerbaijan 0.12 Eastern Europe/

post-Soviet Europe
Levels of Predictable Enforcement are generally high
Bosnia and 0.39 East-Central Europe in Europe, with 15 countries (36 per cent) having
Herzegovina high performance, and 21 (50 per cent) having mid-
range performance in 2018. Only six countries (14 per
Moldova 0.32 Eastern Europe/ cent) have low performance. The subregional spread is
post-Soviet Europe
similar to that for Absence of Corruption and Impartial
Russia 0.25 Eastern Europe/
Administration: high scores are concentrated in North and
post-Soviet Europe West Europe, mid-range countries are mainly situated in
East-Central Europe, and low performance can mainly be
Turkey 0.36 South Europe found in Eastern Europe/post-Soviet Europe (Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Russia and Ukraine). Of the two low-performing
Note: Absence of Corruption scores range from 0 to 1, with a lower score indicating high
countries, one is in South Europe (Turkey), and one in
levels of corruption (0–0.4) and a higher score indicating lower levels of corruption (mid- East-Central Europe (Romania).
range 0.4–0.7).
int/gsod-indices>.
Participatory Engagement
Judging by the large number of countries with high Participatory Engagement is the only attribute that does not have a
levels of corruption, Europe as a region performs score, as its four subattributes (Civil Society Participation, Electoral
Participation, Direct Democracy and Local Democracy) are not
particularly poorly on the GSoD subattribute of Absence aggregated. The subattributes measure citizens’ participation in
of Corruption. As illustrated in Table 5.4, the majority of civil society organizations and in elections, and the existence of
countries in North and West Europe have high scores on direct democracy instruments available to citizens, as well as the
extent to which local elections are free.
Absence of Corruption. Most of the countries that score
in the mid-range on this dimension are in East-Central
Europe. Of the five countries that score low on this
subattribute, two (Albania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina)
are in East-Central Europe; three (Azerbaijan, Moldova Summary: Participatory Engagement in Europe, 2018
and Russia) are in Eastern Europe/post-Soviet Europe;
Regional average: Mid-range
and one (Turkey) is in South Europe (see Table 5.4). In
2018, significant declines on Absence of Corruption were High Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
recorded in Albania, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Moldova and France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Latvia,
Turkey. Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom
Europe’s generally poor performance in fighting corruption

is reflected in the Eurobarometer surveys. According to its Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Italy, Kosovo,
November 2018 special edition, while 65 per cent of the Lithuania, North Macedonia, Poland, Portugal,
EU population is generally satisfied with the functioning of Romania, Serbia and Ukraine
democracy in Europe, only a minority of respondents (36

Low Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Ireland, Moldova,
per cent) were satisfied with the fight against corruption Russia and Turkey
(European Commission 2018b).
231
There are signs of a shrinking civic space fluctuate between 35 and 55 per cent. However, since
Civic space in Europe is shrinking. The GSoD Indices 2012, the percentage of high performing countries has
envisage civic space as a nexus that integrates a country’s seen a steep decline, while the share of low-performing
performance on Media Integrity together with Civil countries has increased.
Liberties (e.g. Freedom of Expression, and Freedom
of Association and Assembly) and Civil Society One underlying reason for the shrinking of civic
Participation. Considering this nexus, the data shows space is the fact that several European governments
that Europe as a region is regressing on its average have placed direct or indirect restrictions on CSOs.
performance on civic space. In fact, Europe is the region These restrictions may take different forms, including
in the world with the most countries declining on more bureaucratic registration rules for CSOs; a wider
both Civil Liberties (12 countries) and Media Integrity interpretation of what constitutes inadmissible ‘political’
(8 countries) since 2013. Two countries have also seen activities; restrictions on CSO meetings under counter-
significant declines on Civil Society Participation in the terrorism laws against large-scale assembly; wider
last five years: Romania (from 0.67 in 2013 to 0.47 in limitations on ‘insulting’ governments and leaders; and
2018) and Turkey (from 0.47 to 0.31). controlling access to, and the uses of, public funding
(Civil Society Europe 2018; EU Agency for Fundamental
Figure 5.16 shows the performance of countries in Rights 2017).
Europe on the subattribute of Civil Society Participation.
Since the early 1990s, the share of countries with low Some of those restrictions on civil society relate to
performance has remained at or under 10 per cent, while an overall deterioration in the rule of law, and in
the shares of high-performing and mid-range countries Civil Liberties, Fundamental Rights or Checks on
Government. They are often linked to severe democratic
backsliding, as witnessed in countries such as Hungary,
Poland, Serbia and Turkey. In addition, the rise of right-
FIGURE 5.16
wing and populist parties and the spread of hate speech
have acted as a discouraging or marginalizing factor for
Civil Society Participation in Europe, 1975–2018 civic space, particularly for representatives of lesbian,
gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) communities,
60 or migrant communities. The evidence shows that
CSOs working on ‘human rights issues, including
with migrants and refugees, LGBT rights, and ethnic
50
minorities are often the target of political representatives
of conservative parties all across Europe, including in
countries traditionally supportive of civil society like
40
Austria, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom’ (Civil
Society Europe 2018: 22).
30
Restrictions on Civil Society Participation are most
notable across East-Central Europe and Eastern
20 Europe/post-Soviet Europe. Of the 18 countries that
scored in the mid-range on this dimension in 2018, 15
are in these two subregions: Albania, Armenia, Bosnia
10
and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Hungary,
Kosovo, Lithuania, Moldova, North Macedonia, Poland,
0
Romania, Serbia and Ukraine. The remaining three are
in South Europe (Israel, Italy and Portugal). The low-
2000
2005
1980
1990
2010
2018
1985
1995
2015
1975
performing countries on this dimension are Azerbaijan,

Belarus and Russia (all in Eastern Europe/post-Soviet
Low Mid-range High
Europe) as well as Turkey (South Europe).
int/gsod-indices>.
232
citizens to explain key EU policies and answer questions

Ireland represents a somewhat anomalous (European Commission 2018c). In addition, in 2018 an
case in terms of its GSoD Indices scores. EU-wide process of Citizens’ Consultations, which grew
While it has very high scores on four out of French President Macron’s idea for ‘democratic
attributes, placing it on par with other mature
conventions’ across Europe, took place in all member states
European democracies, Ireland scores low
on the fifth attribute, Participatory Engagement. However,
(Thillaye 2019).
this is not due to the country’s performance on Civil Society
Participation, which in 2018 was high (0.81). Instead, it The grassroots power of citizen mobilization is
reflects Ireland’s performance on two other subattributes. growing
First, Ireland records a low score on Direct Democracy
Despite a shrinking civic space, social movements, non-
(0.27), owing to the fact that the country’s legal framework violent protests and civic engagement make a difference in
does not envisage frequent direct democracy mechanisms governance and constitute an opportunity for democracy
(e.g. plebiscites). Second, Ireland recorded a low score on across Europe. Throughout the region there have been
Electoral Participation for 2018 (0.39), partly because of the compelling success stories of the power of social movements,
relatively low voter turnout in the 2016 national elections
from Solidarity in Poland culminating in 1989, to Otpor!
(Kerrigan 2016; Kelly 2016).
in Serbia almost a decade later, to Maidan in Ukraine in
2013–2014. In North Macedonia, several waves of protests,
the last being the Colourful Revolution, led to a change of
Direct democracy and democratic accountability government following the 2016 elections (Reef 2017).
are on the rise at the local level
An increasing number of initiatives give European In the late 1990s, waves of democratization, spearheaded by
citizens potential avenues for direct accountability people power, unseated a number of authoritarian regimes
over public institutions at the local level. According to and leaders in the region, from Ion Iliescu in Romania to
the GSoD Indices, 26 countries score high on the Local Vladimír Mečiar in Slovakia, followed by Croatia and Serbia
Democracy subattribute, spread across the subregions of (Boduszyński 2010). This second wave of breakthroughs,
North and West Europe, East-Central Europe and South also described as coloured revolutions, spread to the post-
Europe. A further 11 countries score in the mid-range, of Soviet space with the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003
which 6 are in East-Central Europe, 2 are in Eastern Europe/ and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004.
post-Soviet Europe (Armenia and Ukraine), 2 are in South
Europe (Cyprus and Turkey), and 1 is in North and West These regime-changing developments, while spearheaded by
Europe (Ireland). The five low-scoring countries are all in political opposition groups, fed on rising public discontent
Eastern Europe/post-Soviet Europe. with the ruling elites and outbursts of discontent in mass
public protests not seen before in these countries (Bunce and
However, citizens do not only participate through local-level Wolchik 2011). The gradual build-up of anti-government
elections. Examples of direct-democracy mechanisms at the sentiments, particularly in Georgia and Ukraine, was to a
local and national levels abound. Finland introduced citizens’ large extent the product of active civic education, investigative
initiative provisions at the national level in 2012 (Population journalism and strategic outreach by civic groups on issues
Register Centre n.d.) and Denmark created a similar tool in such as fraudulent elections, impunity for corruption and
early 2018 (Danish Parliament 2018); both are widely used. lack of effective governance by incumbent regimes.
The British Government introduced an e-petition website
in 2015 (BBC News 2015). Latvia’s Manabalss.lv online Civic protests have continued to occur in various contexts.
petitioning platform has become a widely emulated leader in Between May and August 2013, Turkish security forces put
the field. Estonia has similar provisions and, most notably, down the Gezi Park protests in Istanbul, but other activist
has incorporated direct citizen engagement in formal forums remained active in their wake. France has seen several
decision-making processes (Mangule 2016). rounds of protests, from the Nuit Debout (Up all night) to
the Yellow Vests movements. In 2017 Hungarians protested
The EU is also making efforts to move beyond the so-called against the regime’s efforts to close the Central European
Brussels bubble, and to reflect this participatory ethos University, and again in large numbers in April 2018 after
through new initiatives at the European level (International President Orbán won a third election.
IDEA 2018a). For example, the European Commission has
intensified its long-running series of Citizens’ Dialogues, Finally, in April–May 2018, Armenia was engulfed by weeks
which involve Commissioners attending meetings with of popular anti-government protests that led to the removal
233
of an entrenched political elite. The opposition leader, Nikol Russia was shaken by a wave of protests in the summer of
Pashinyan, who in May 2018 began his tenure as Prime 2019, protesting the authorities’ decision to ban opposition
Minister of an interim cabinet, went on to score a landslide and independent candidates from running in the local
victory with his alliance in the December 2018 elections elections, resulting in a decline in support for the ruling
(Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2018b; Human Rights party.
Watch 2019). Armenia is the latest example showing clear
and tangible results emanating from citizen mobilization. Popular anti-government initiatives led by civic activists
It remains to be seen whether Armenia’s improving scores do not always reach their purported goals—whether they
in the GSoD Indices will translate into long-lasting positive involve regime change, or reversal of policies—but they
changes for the country. do provide an essential watchdog function and may help
steer further developments in a direction more conducive
to transparent and effective decision-making. The example
Armenia is the only country in Europe to have of Ukraine’s Maidan Revolution and the ensuing important
transitioned from a hybrid regime in 2017 to a
steps towards reforming the country’s judicial and anti-
democracy in 2018. The country has recorded
statistically significant advances on eight
corruption institutions, is a case in point. Although Ukraine
GSoD subattributes in 2018: Clean Elections, still faces a number of governance challenges, not least
Free Political Parties, Civil Liberties, Effective Parliament, on corruption, its record on civic engagement is in many
Judicial Independence, Media Integrity, Absence of respects an example for others (see Box 5.4).
Corruption and Civil Society Participation. This is the highest
number of advances for any country in the region in 2018.
Moreover, Armenia has achieved statistically significant
advances on three GSoD attributes: Checks on Government,
Impartial Administration and Participatory Engagement.
BOX 5.4
Ukraine and civic activism FIGURE 5.18
After gaining independence in 1991, Ukraine underwent

several major shifts in terms of its democratic development.
Civil Society Participation in Ukraine, 1992–2018
The country’s willingness to pursue democratization was 1.0
demonstrated by the first democratic turnover of power in
0.9
the 1994 parliamentary and presidential elections, and the
new 1996 Constitution. However, hopes for democratization 0.8
and quick economic and human development gave way to
democratic fatigue with the so-called transition period as 0.7
the promises for changes and institutional reforms failed to
0.6
materialize.
0.5
Democratic consolidation in the country was hindered, as
successive Ukrainian presidents attempted to concentrate 0.4
power in their own hands, undermining the independence of
0.3
institutions such as the legislature and the judiciary. State
capture and lack of political will to break the tight connection 0.2
between the business and political sectors led to oligarchs
Ukraine Eastern Europe
gaining control of political parties, the judiciary and the media. 0.1
Europe World
The combination of collusion of interests between political Confidence interval
0.0
leaders, the lack of strong political parties, and problems of
2000
2006
2008
2002
2004
1996
1998
2010
2016
2018
1992
1994
2012
2014
state capture led to a failure to govern efficiently and execute

meaningful reforms (Sydorchuk 2014).
Notes: The shaded area around Ukraine’s line represents the 68 per cent confidence interval.
However, the people’s resilience and willingness for change
was demonstrated during the Orange Revolution. Since the idea.int/gsod-indices>.
Maidan protests, civil society has remained active and seeks
234
to hold the government to account. Following the protests, country and the related raised tensions with Russia, could also
important reforms occurred in the judiciary and in anti- significantly jeopardize the country’s democratic prospects.
corruption efforts. Examples include the creation of the
National Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Anti-Corruption Court It remains to be seen whether Ukraine’s gains on the GSoD
(Al Jazeera 2019), the transparent merit-based appointment of Indices attribute of Civil Society Participation (see Figure 5.18)
judges, as well as the demand to declare conflicts of interest. will be sustained in the future. The March 2019 presidential
However, the failure to prosecute high-level corruption cases election was characterized as competitive and was held with
has undermined the popularity of the former administration respect for fundamental freedoms (OSCE ODIHR 2019). The
(Transparency International 2019). In the case of the media, the election in April 2019 of President Volodymyr Zelensky, a
introduction of reforms is stalled to a considerable degree. The former actor who became popular via a television series in
media is greatly conditioned by the interests of oligarchs, and which he played a fictitious Ukrainian president (Yaffa 2019),
journalists are still subjected to harassment and surveillance is arguably another sign of the public’s willingness to hold
(Reporters Without Borders 2019). leaders accountable at the ballot box. It also echoes examples
in other countries in which voters replace mainstream and
Ukraine’s economic crisis, as well as the annexation of Crimea well-established candidates with relatively inexperienced
by Russia, the ongoing conflict in the eastern part of the leaders who promise to start with a clean slate and stand up for
ordinary citizens (see Figure 5.17 for 2018 scores).
FIGURE 5.17
Overall GSoD Indices scores for Ukraine, 2018
0.45 0.50 0.51 0.38

1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0.49 0.84 0.46 0.80 0.47 0.58 0.49 0.55 0.32 0.63 0.42 0.32 0.64 0.50 0.10 0.52
Clean Elections
Inclusive
Suffrage
Free Political
Parties
Elected
Government
Access to
Justice
Civil Liberties
Social Rights
and Equality
Effective
Parliament
Judicial
Independence
Media Integrity
Predictable
Enforcement
Civil Society
Participation
Electoral
Participation
Direct
Democracy
Local
Democracy
Absence of
Corruption
Notes: The shaded area with vertical lines represent confidence intervals.
235
5.4. Conclusion South Europe, and Hungary, Poland and Romania in East-
Europe continues to be the region with the largest share Central Europe. These countries record the highest number
of democracies, after North America. The trajectory of of declines in GSoD subattributes in the region and exhibit
advances in the European democratic landscape has been a significant, gradual and intentional weakening of checks
constant and on the rise since the dawn of the third wave on government, accountability institutions and civil
of democratization. However, the GSoD Indices data shows liberties.
that in the last 10 to 15 years Europe’s expansion has slowed
down considerably. In the last five years there has even been Further challenges to democracy are posed by the rise of
a reversal of previously achieved gains and a dwindling of the extremist parties and ideologies, the rejection of liberal
quality of democracies in the region. principles, and the consolidation of executive power by
regime leaders who seek to weaken democracy while using
Europe faces a number of challenges related to democratic democratic instruments. At the same time, several countries
erosion and its more severe form, democratic backsliding, in the region, including Armenia and North Macedonia,
as well as the authoritarian tendencies manifested by have recently shown potential signs of rekindling their
a number of regimes in the region, including Turkey in democratic ideals and reversing democratic backsliding.
TABLE 5.5
The GSoD Indices snapshot: Policy considerations for Europe

This table offers a snapshot of the state of democracy in Europe, using the GSoD conceptual framework as an organizing structure. It
presents policy considerations across the five main attributes of democracy—Representative Government, Fundamental Rights, Checks on
Government, Impartial Administration and Participatory Engagement.

Government

Europe is the most democratic Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia and Turkey (countries with
region in the world after North mid-range performance in Elected Government)
America, with 93 per cent of
countries classified as democracies. Priority areas for reform:
Of the region’s 39 democracies, 25 Initiate and implement legislation that accounts for more inclusive, free and fair
have high levels of Representative elections, and which ensures adherence to European values of democracy and
Government. The highest levels can human rights.
be found in North and West Europe.
The region is also home to two
non-democracies (Azerbaijan and Estonia, Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden (sample of five out of 39 countries
Belarus) and one hybrid regime with high performance in Elected Government)
(Russia).

A large majority of countries in the Azerbaijan and Belarus (countries with low performance in Clean Elections)
region (67 per cent) have high levels
of Clean Elections. Priority areas for reform:
Ensure and build stakeholder trust in the impartiality and neutrality of EMBs
to strengthen public confidence in electoral processes. Invite domestic
and international elections observers, and welcome and implement their
recommendations on the free and fair election processes.

Estonia, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom (countries with the highest
performance in Clean Elections)
236
Inclusive Suffrage: N/A

All countries in Europe have high
levels of Inclusive Suffrage.

Europe has the largest number of Azerbaijan and Belarus (countries with low performance in Free Political Parties)
countries (13) scoring highly on Free
Political Parties, while 27 score Priority areas for reform:
in the mid-range, and 2 have low Take a holistic approach to political representation and establish long-term
scores. ideology-based political parties with programme-oriented goals. Develop and
strengthen the culture of programme-based party platforms and party organizations
that seek close links with citizen constituents and are accountable to voters.

Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (countries with
the highest performance in Free Political Parties)
Fundamental Rights GSoD Indices score: High (0.73)

In Europe, 24 countries (57 per cent) Azerbaijan and Turkey (countries with low performance in Access to Justice)
score high on Access to Justice,
while 16 (38 per cent) score in the Priority areas for reform:
mid-range. Support the work of the judiciary by ensuring clear division of powers and non-
interference in the completion of judicial tasks.

Denmark, Germany, Switzerland and Norway (countries with the highest
performance in Access to Justice)

In the last decade Europe has seen a Azerbaijan and Turkey (countries with low performance in Civil Liberties)
gradual decline in Civil Liberties. The
share of countries with high levels of Priority areas for reform:
Civil Liberties declined from 79 per Reverse decisions that curtail freedom of expression and freedom of association
cent in 2010 to 71 per cent in 2018. and assembly, and abide by European standards and conventions such as the
In fact, for the first time since the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR 1950).
start of the GSoD Indices data set in
1975, the early 2000s saw a sharp Good-practice countries for regional learning:
spike in the number of countries with Denmark, Estonia, Norway, Portugal and Switzerland (countries with the highest
significant declines on Civil Liberties. performance in Civil Liberties)

Europe’s performance on Gender Turkey (country with low levels in Gender Equality)
Equality has plateaued in the last
five years. Priority areas for reform:
Increase efforts to strengthen political gender equality in all spheres and at all
levels. Strive to enforce quota laws where they exist and adopt parity laws, to
ensure equal representation of women at national and local government levels (for
more detailed recommendations, see International IDEA, CoD and UNDP 2017).

France, Finland, Norway and Sweden (countries with the highest performance in
Gender Equality)
237

Levels of Social Group Equality are Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine (countries with low performance in Social
high compared to the global average Group Equality)
(and on par with North America) but
Europe’s score is in the mid-range Priority areas for reform:
(0.63) in absolute levels. A total of 17 Introduce legislative and policy measures to enhance and advocate for the
countries (40 per cent) in the region representation of disadvantaged groups such as minorities, people living with
score in the high range; the majority disabilities and people of minority ethnic or religious backgrounds to ensure that
of these are concentrated in North they are represented in national legislative and local government assemblies.
and West Europe. A group of four
countries score in the low range on Good-practice countries for regional learning:
Social Group Equality. Denmark and Norway (countries with the highest performance in Social Group
Equality)

Levels of Basic Welfare are high Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kosovo, Moldova, North Macedonia and Turkey
in Europe, with 35 countries (83 (countries with mid-range performance in Basic Welfare)
per cent) scoring in the high
range. While there are no low- Priority areas for reform:
range performances, the following Introduce legislative framework reforms to ensure inclusive and equitable
countries score in the mid-range: delivery of basic services such as education, healthcare and social security.
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Kosovo, Moldova, North Macedonia Good-practice countries for regional learning:
and Turkey. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway,
Switzerland and the UK (countries with the highest performance in Basic
Welfare)

Government

On Effective Parliament, while only Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia and Turkey (countries with low performance in
two countries recorded statistically Effective Parliament)
significant gains between 2013 and
2018, five countries experienced Priority areas for reform:
declines for the same years. Strengthen the oversight functions of parliaments by ensuring that the
executive branch of the government is always accountable and responsive to the
legislature.

Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia,
Sweden and the United Kingdom (countries with the highest performance in
Effective Parliament)

While Europe has a relatively large Azerbaijan, Belarus, North Macedonia, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine (countries
share of countries (almost one- with low performance in Judicial Independence)
third) with high levels of Judicial
Independence, this is one of the Priority areas for reform:
weaker performing aspects of Carry out sustained judicial reforms to build a more robust, accountable and
European democracy. The second- results-oriented judiciary. Avoid political interference by building a consolidated
largest share of countries (six legal framework and providing robust financial support for judicial authorities.
countries in total) score low on this
aspect. Good-practice countries for regional learning:
Norway and Switzerland (countries with the highest performance in Judicial
Independence)
238

Europe is the region with the largest Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia and Turkey (countries with low performance in Media
number of countries (eight) with Integrity)
significant declines in their Media
Integrity scores in the past five Priority areas for reform:
years. Reform and align media legislation, regulatory frameworks and institutions
to international standards on media freedom, independence and pluralism.
Governments should prioritize the journalists’ safety and prevent attacks and
harassment on members of the media.

Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Latvia, the
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (countries
with the highest performance in Media Integrity)

Administration

Absence of Corruption is one of Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, Russia and Turkey
the poorest-performing aspects of (countries with low performance in Absence of Corruption)
democracy in Europe. A total of 21
countries have mid-range levels of Priority areas for reform:
corruption, and 6 have high levels Political goodwill and consensus are preconditions for improving public
of corruption (i.e. low scores on administration and fighting corruption. Necessary legislation should be passed
Absence of Corruption). and enacted on matters related to party and political finances.

Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (countries with the highest
performance in Absence of Corruption)

Levels of Predictable Enforcement Azerbaijan, Belarus, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine (countries with low
are generally high in Europe, with 15 performance in Predictable Enforcement)
countries (35 per cent) having high
performance, and 21 (50 per cent) Priority areas for reform:
having mid-range performance in Governments should strengthen the capacity and independence of law
2018. Only six countries (15 per cent) enforcement agencies and the judiciary to improve the rule of law and the
have low performance. predictability of law enforcement.
Good practice countries for regional learning:

Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland and the United Kingdom (countries with the highest performance in
Predictable Enforcement)
239
Participatory GSoD Indices score: Mid-range

Engagement

Europe’s levels of Civil Society Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia and Turkey (countries with low performance in Civil
Participation are now in the mid- Society Participation)
range (0.67), having slipped from
the high range since 2012. Priority areas for reform:
Using the inherent strength and resilience of civil society, relevant actors should
stimulate the inclusion of civil society representatives, young professionals
and external experts in policymaking and political debates and encourage
deliberative democracy.
Good practice countries for regional learning:

Norway, Denmark and Switzerland (countries with the highest performance in
Civil Society Participation)

Levels of Electoral Participation are Ireland and Switzerland (countries with low performance in Electoral
only mid-range in an overwhelmingly Participation)
democratic region and have even
dropped slightly in the last 10 years. Good-practice countries for regional learning:
Belgium, Denmark, Sweden and Turkey (countries with the highest performance
in Electoral Participation)

Levels of Direct Democracy in Europe Cyprus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Denmark, Germany, Israel (5 out of 33
are the highest in the world. countries with low performance in Direct Democracy)

Switzerland (country with high performance in Direct Democracy)

Levels of Local Democracy are in the Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Russia (countries with low
mid-range (0.64). Every subregion performance in Local Democracy)
except for Eastern Europe/post-
Soviet Europe has a 50 per cent Priority areas for reform:
share (or higher) of countries with New forms of civic participation and citizens’ forums have multiplied across
high levels of Local Democracy. most European countries. Yet their impact on overall democratic quality remains
limited. Emerging forms of citizens’ participation need to be broadened in scope
to speak more directly to the political trends of today.

Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden (countries
with the highest performance in Local Democracy)
240
TABLE 5.6
Regime classification for Europe, 2018

Regime classification for all of the countries in Europe covered by the GSoD Indices, as well as their respective scores on the five GSoD
attributes.
GSoD attribute
Country
Democracies
Albania 0.62 = 0.68 = 0.58 = 0.44 = Mid-range
Armenia 0.54 = 0.64 = 0.59 + 0.52 + Mid-range
Austria 0.77 = 0.80 = 0.74 = 0.77 = High
Belgium 0.80 = 0.89 = 0.78 = 0.89= High
Bosnia and
0.50 = 0.57 = 0.56 = 0.45 = Mid-range
Herzegovina
Bulgaria 0.68 = 0.69 = 0.64 = 0.49 = Mid-range
Croatia 0.75 = 0.65 = 0.60 = 0.55 = Mid-range
Cyprus 0.72 = 0.82 = 0.73 = 0.66 = Mid-range
Czechia 0.74 = 0.83 = 0.69 = 0.62 = Mid-range
Denmark 0.80 = 0.94 = 0.88 = 0.91 = High
Estonia 0.81 = 0.87 = 0.85 = 0.83 = High
Finland 0.80 = 0.90 = 0.82 = 0.86 = High
France 0.80 = 0.86 = 0.73 = 0.75 = High
Georgia 0.62 = 0.68 = 0.61 = 0.65 = Low
Germany 0.78 = 0.91 = 0.78 = 0.89 - High
Greece 0.80 = 0.81 = 0.69 = 0.57 = High
Hungary 0.61 = 0.66 = 0.54 = 0.54 = High
Ireland 0.73 = 0.86 = 0.81 = 0.87 = Low
Israel 0.63 = 0.71 = 0.68 = 0.63 = High
Italy 0.78 = 0.85 = 0.78 = 0.64 = Mid-range
Kosovo 0.56 = 0.52 = 0.50 = 0.51 + Mid-range
Latvia 0.60 = 0.82 = 0.78 = 0.696 = High
Lithuania 0.78 = 0.79 = 0.74 = 0.65 = Mid-range
Moldova 0.58 = 0.64 = 0.57 = 0.44 = Low
Netherlands 0.81 = 0.85 = 0.86 = 0.85 = High
North Macedonia 0.63 = 0.61 = 0.52 = 0.47 = Mid-range
Norway 0.78 = 0.93 = 0.91 = 0.91 = High
Poland 0.77 = 0.68 - 0.59 - 0.59 = Mid-range
Portugal 0.82 = 0.86 = 0.83 = 0.74 = Mid-range
241
GSoD attribute
Country
Romania 0.71 = 0.64 = 0.50 - 0.42 = Mid-range
Serbia 0.57 = 0.58 = 0.46 = 0.48 = Mid-range
Slovakia 0.80 = 0.72 = 0.74 = 0.61 = High
Slovenia 0.78 = 0.84 = 0.77 = 0.72 = High
Spain 0.81 = 0.84 = 0.79 = 0.84 = High
Sweden 0.84 = 0.89 = 0.88 = 0.91 = High
Switzerland 0.79 = 0.92 = 0.86 = 0.91 = High
Turkey 0.44 – 0.35 – 0.35 – 0.30 – Low
Ukraine 0.45= 0.50 = 0.51 = 0.38 = Mid-range
United Kingdom 0.77 = 0.82 = 0.78 = 0.88 = High
Hybrid regimes
Russia 0.41 = 0.45 = 0.26 = 0.33 = Low
Non-democracies
Azerbaijan 0.27 = 0.36 = 0.17 = 0.18 = Low
Belarus 0.33 = 0.55 = 0.26 = 0.32 = Low
High Mid-range Low
242
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245
Methodology The Global State of Democracy 2019
Methodology
This section explains the conceptual framework of the GSoD Indices and provides an explanation of the
new regime classification that The Global State of Democracy 2019 has introduced, as well as definitions of
some of the key concepts used in the analysis.
The GSoD framework and the GSoD Indices interventions and examined problem-solving approaches
In November 2017 International IDEA launched the to the challenges facing democracies worldwide.
first edition of its new biennial report, The Global State of
Democracy. The report provided evidence-based analysis The Global State of Democracy 2019: Addressing the Ills,
and data on the global and regional state of democracy, Reviving the Promise is the second edition of this report.
with a focus on democracy’s resilience. It also contributed As an intergovernmental organization that supports
to the public debate on democracy, informed policy sustainable democracy worldwide, International IDEA
FIGURE M.1
The GSoD Indices conceptual framework
246
International IDEA Methodology
2019
defines democracy as a political system that is based on The conceptual framework underpinning the Indices (see
popular control and political equality. One of the Institute’s Figure M.1) translates International IDEA’s definition of
core principles is that democracy is a universal value for democracy—which emphasizes popular control over public
citizens and a globally owned concept for which there is no decision-making and decision-makers, and equality between
universally applicable model. citizens in the exercise of that control—into five main
democracy attributes that contain 16 subattributes based on
Democracy is an ideal that seeks to guarantee equality 97 indicators.
and basic freedoms, empower ordinary people, resolve
disagreements through peaceful dialogue, respect differences, This framework aims to be universally applicable and
and bring about political and social renewal without compatible with different institutional arrangements. Using
economic and social disruption. Therefore, International this broad understanding of democracy, the GSoD Indices
IDEA’s broad concept of democracy encompasses more do not provide an overarching democracy index with a score
than just free elections—it has multiple dimensions, for each country that would allow democracies to be ranked.
including civil and political rights, social and economic This approach differentiates the GSoD Indices from several
rights, democratic governance and the rule of law. other democracy measurement methodologies. It is used to
enable a more multi-faceted analysis and understanding of
International IDEA’s broad understanding of democracy democracy.
overlaps with features emphasized by different traditions
of democratic thought associated with the concepts of In addition, compared to some other democracy
electoral democracy, liberal democracy, social democracy measurements, the GSoD Indices are distinguished by their
and participatory democracy. This concept of democracy relatively high degree of coverage in terms of years covered
reflects a core value enshrined in article 21 of the Universal (since 1975, with annual updates) and number of countries
Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations 1948), included (158); the incorporation and use of different data
that the ‘will of the people’ is the basis for the legitimacy sources; and the availability of uncertainty estimates for users,
and authority of sovereign states. It reflects a common which allows them to assess whether differences in scores
and universal desire for peace, security and justice. are statistically significant. For a more detailed comparison
Democracy reflects the fundamental ethical principles of between the GSoD Indices and other measurements see
human equality and the dignity of persons and is therefore International IDEA (2018a).
inseparable from human rights.
The five attributes of democracy in the GSoD
In 2017 International IDEA constructed a new set of Indices conceptual framework
indices, the Global State of Democracy Indices (GSoD The GSoD Indices conceptual framework is based on five
Indices), based on the core principles of democracy and on attributes of democracy: Representative Government,
the Institute’s State of Democracy assessment framework Fundamental Rights, Checks on Government, Impartial
(a tool designed for in-country stakeholders to assess the Administration and Participatory Engagement.
quality of democracy). The Indices were developed by
International IDEA staff with the support of external Attribute 1: Representative Government
experts and the supervision of an expert advisory board Representative Government covers the extent to which
consisting of five leading experts in the field of democracy access to political power is free and equal as demonstrated
measurement. by competitive, inclusive and regular elections. It includes
four subattributes: Clean Elections, Inclusive Suffrage, Free
The GSoD Indices are a quantitative tool for measuring the Political Parties and Elected Government.
performance of democracy globally and regionally in its
different aspects over time, beginning in 1975. They serve Attribute 2: Fundamental Rights
as the main evidence base for the report, and provide a new, Fundamental Rights captures the degree to which civil
comprehensive measurement of democracy. They capture liberties are respected, and whether people have access
trends at the global, regional and national levels based on to basic resources that enable their active participation
International IDEA’s definition of democracy (International in the political process. This aspect overlaps significantly
IDEA 2008). In this second edition of The Global State of with the international covenants on civil and political,
Democracy, the GSoD Indices have been expanded to cover and economic, social and cultural rights. It includes
158 countries over the period 1975–2018. In 2018, the three subattributes: Access to Justice, Civil Liberties, and
Indices cover a total of 157 countries. Social Rights and Equality. It also includes the following
247
subcomponents: Freedom of Expression, Freedom of The GSoD Indices: regional and national
Association and Assembly, Freedom of Religion, Freedom coverage
of Movement, Personal Integrity and Security, Basic The first iteration of the GSoD Indices covered the period
Welfare, Social Group Equality and Gender Equality (see 1975–2015. The data is updated annually and therefore
Figure M.1). this report includes data until 2018, but not for 2019. The
GSoD Indices now cover 158 countries in the world. The
Attribute 3: Checks on Government decision was taken to exclude countries with a population
Checks on Government measures effective control of of less than one million because of the uneven availability of
executive power. It includes three subattributes: Effective data in those countries.
Parliament, Judicial Independence and Media Integrity.
The GSoD Indices also cover six regions: Africa, Asia and
Attribute 4: Impartial Administration the Pacific, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, the
Impartial Administration concerns how fairly and Middle East and Iran (referred to in the report as the Middle
predictably political decisions are implemented, and East), and North America. The grouping of countries within
therefore reflects key aspects of the rule of law. It includes these regions primarily follows a geographical logic, but also
two subattributes: Absence of Corruption and Predictable takes account of historical and cultural links, particularly
Enforcement. in the regional subdivisions. Some further modifications
needed to be made to enable meaningful analyses of
Attribute 5: Participatory Engagement relatively coherent regions with comparable social, political
Participatory Engagement measures people’s political and historical backgrounds.
participation and societal engagement at different levels.
Because they capture different phenomena, the subattributes Table M.1 outlines the GSoD Indices’ regional and
of this aspect—Civil Society Participation, Electoral subregional geographical divisions. For more information on
Participation, Direct Democracy and Local Democracy— the geographical definition of regions in the GSoD Indices
are not aggregated into a single index. see International IDEA (2017b).
TABLE M.1
The GSoD Indices: regional and subregional geographic divisions
Region/subregion Country
Africa
East Africa Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda
Central Africa Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Equatorial
Guinea, Gabon, Republic of Congo
Southern Africa Angola, Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia,
South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe
West Africa Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo
North Africa Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, South Sudan, Sudan, Tunisia
The Caribbean Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago
Central America and Mexico Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama
248
2019
South America Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela
North America
North America Canada, United States of America
Asia and the Pacific
Central Asia Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
East Asia China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Japan, Mongolia, Republic of Korea, Taiwan
South Asia Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka
South East Asia Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste,
Viet Nam
Oceania Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea
The Middle East and Iran
The Middle East Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates,
Yemen
Iran Iran
Europe
East-Central Europe Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, German Democratic
Republic, Hungary, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, North Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia,
Slovakia, Slovenia
Eastern Europe/Post-Soviet Europe Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine
North and West Europe Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom
South Europe Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey
The GSoD Indices: data sources assessment of country-specific information found in

The GSoD Indices aggregate indicators from a number of reports, academic publications, reference works, news
data sets. In the 2018 update, the number of data sets has articles and so on.
been reduced from 14 to 12. The number of indicators used
is 97, of which V-Dem indicators constitute 70 per cent. 3. Observational data. Data on directly observable features
such as the proportion of parliamentarians who are
The data relies on a range of extant data sources that fall into women, infant mortality rates and the holding of
four categories: legislative elections.
1. Expert surveys. Assessments by country experts of the 4. Composite measures. This data is based on a number
situation on a particular issue in a particular country. of variables that come from different extant data sets
rather than original data collection. For a full list of
2. Standards-based ‘in-house coding’. Coding carried out by the indicators sourced from the various data sets see
researchers and/or their assistants based on an evaluative International IDEA (2018a).
249
TABLE M.2
Data sets used in the compilation of the GSoD Indices
Data set Data provider Reference
Bjørnskov-Rode Regime Data (BRRD) Bjørnskov and Rode <http://www.christianbjoernskov.com/bjoernskovrodedata/>
Civil Liberties Dataset (CLD) Møller and Skaaning <http://ps.au.dk/forskning/forskningsprojekter/dedere/

datasets/>
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) FAO <http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#home>

statistics
Global Health Data Exchange (GHDx) Global Health Data Exchange <http://ghdx.healthdata.org/>
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Political Risk Services <http://epub.prsgroup.com/products/icrg>
Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy Skaaning, Gerring and <http://ps.au.dk/forskning/forskningsprojekter/dedere/

(LIED) Bartusevicius datasets/>
Media Freedom Data (MFD) Whitten-Woodring and Van <http://faculty.uml.edu/Jenifer_whittenwoodring/

Belle MediaFreedomData_000.aspx>
Political Terror Scale (PTS) Gibney, Cornett, Wood, <http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/>

Haschke, Arnon and Pisanò
Polity IV Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>
United Nations (UN) Demographic and UN Statistics Division <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic-social/index.

Social Statistics cshtml>
United Nations Educational, Scientific UNESCO <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
statistics
Varieties of Democracy data set V-Dem <https://www.v-dem.net/>
The GSoD Indices: additional methodological differences between countries and within countries over
information time are statistically significant. The only exceptions are the
For a full explanation of the GSoD methodology see subattributes based on a single observational indicator (e.g.
International IDEA (2018a). Political Participation) or formative aggregations procedures
(e.g. Inclusive Suffrage, Direct Democracy and Local
Scores and scales Democracy).
The GSoD Indices consist of attribute and subattribute
scores per country per year (country–year). The scoring Methodology
runs from 0 to 1, where 0 represents the lowest achievement Both the GSoD Indices and the analysis contained in
in the sample and 1 is the highest. this report respond to the lack of analytical material on
democracy building and the quality of democracy at
For almost all the attributes and subattributes, the annual the global and regional levels; most studies focus on the
scores for each country are accompanied by uncertainty national level. The GSoD initiative strives to bridge the
estimates (confidence intervals) that assess whether gap between academic research, policy development and
250
2019
democracy-assistance initiatives. The data and the report The regime classification adopted by International IDEA is
are intended to inform policymakers and decision-makers, not intended to be seen as a central part of the analysis of
civil society organizations and democracy activists, policy the report, rather as a generic reference point to enhance
influencers and think tanks, and democracy support analytical simplicity for a policymaking audience and
providers and practitioners. complemented by attribute-level performance analysis and
nuanced qualitative analysis. The classification is focused
As an Institute-wide project, the publication employs on the electoral component of democracy and is not used
a mixed methodology. It incorporates input from staff to rank countries but to cluster democratic and non-
members across International IDEA’s headquarters and democratic performance into broad categories in order to
regional offices, including external contributors. It was facilitate analysis.
peer reviewed by a group of external academic experts and
practitioners. Building on International IDEA’s regional Regime classifications are useful for making sense of, and
presence and expertise in the field of democracy, it also assigning meanings to, the abstract numerical GSoD Indices
draws on the Institute’s in-depth regional knowledge of scores. They can be used for overall global and regional trends
democratic trends. analysis, as reference points to analyse country cases or to
detect intertemporal and/or cross-national patterns in the
Regime classification data set. However, when describing a country, International
The Global State of Democracy 2019 introduces a political IDEA aims to complement the regime typology with
regime classification based on the GSoD Indices. The attribute- and subattribute-level analysis whenever possible
classification aims to facilitate understanding of the Indices, to retain the nuances captured by the GSoD Indices data set.
enhance the analysis, and ensure greater policy relevance
of the data. The GSoD Indices define three broad regime Labelling performance of attributes
types: (a) democracies (of varying performance), (b) hybrid The first step in the regime classification is to determine
regimes and (c) non-democracies. performance levels for each attribute. These levels can also
be applied to subattributes, as needed. Based on numeric
This regime classification was adopted by International threshold values, three levels are distinguished: high, mid-
IDEA in 2019 and is based on a consultative process range and low levels (see Table M.3).
with scholars from the GSoD Indices Expert Advisory
Board, which advised on the creation of the Indices and Defining and identifying types of political regimes
continues to provide methodological support to the The classification distinguishes between three broad regime
Indices.16 types: democracies, hybrid regimes and non-democracies.
TABLE M.3
Attribute-level labels
IF value >0.7 >=0.4 & value =<0.7 IF value <0.4
High Representative Government Mid-range Representative Government Low Representative Government
High Fundamental Rights Mid-range Fundamental Rights Low Fundamental Rights
High Checks on Government Mid-range Checks on Government Low Checks on Government
High Impartial Administration Mid-range Impartial Administration Low Impartial Administration
High Participatory Engagement Mid-range Participatory Engagement Low Participatory Engagement
16 They include Professors Gerardo Munck (principal peer reviewer of the 2019 edition of The Global State of Democracy), Svend-Erik Skaaning (Principal GSoD Indices Methodologist) and
Claudiu Tufiş (GSoD Indices Data Manager).
251
Democracies are 23 different democratic performance patterns among the

Drawing on International IDEA’s notion of democracy, which 97 countries classified as democracies in the GSoD Indices,
emphasizes ‘popular control over decision-making and political ranging from countries that score high on all five attributes,
equality among those exercising that control’ (International to countries that score high on only one attribute.
IDEA 2008: 20), the GSoD Indices classify political regimes
as ‘democratic’ if they have governments emerging from Hybrid regimes
sufficiently inclusive, clean and competitive elections. In addition to democracies, International IDEA’s
GSoDrframework creates separate categories for hybrid
This concept is rooted in scholarly theories and popular regimes and non-democratic regimes, to reflect the diversity
perceptions of democracy that view electoral contestation of the current global democracy landscape. The common
and participation rights as core elements of a democracy (see denominator of these two types of regimes is that they do
International IDEA 2018: 13). However, the concept specifies not hold competitive elections (as measured by the LIED).
only the minimum requirements for a political regime to qualify However, hybrid regimes may combine democratic and non-
as a democracy. Countries classified as democratic by these democratic characteristics, while non-democracies will have
standards may differ widely in the quality of their democracy fewer democratic features and more non-democratic features.
and in the performance of their different democratic attributes. Therefore, patterns of attribute pcrformance will vary between
hybrid and non-democratic regimes, as outlined below.
The Representative Government attribute of the GSoD
Indices substantiates this basic concept of democracy and International IDEA considers a hybrid regime category
relates it to empirical evidence. This attribute measures the necessary in order to avoid equating political regimes that
integrity of elections, the inclusiveness of voting rights, the exist on the boundary between autocracy and democracy
extent to which political parties are free to campaign for with consolidated autocracies, and to mark the gradations
political office and the extent to which national representative of ‘democratic-ness’ characterizing many of these boundary
government offices are filled through elections. To be countries with unsettled political–authority relations, and to
classified as a democracy, a political regime must score at show that many of these countries exhibit both democratic
least 0.35 on Representative Government. and authoritarian features in different combinations.
Since Representative Government is an aggregate measure Hybrid regimes are defined in International IDEA’s 2018–
summarizing four subattributes and 18 underlying indicators 2022 Strategy as ‘having the combination of elements of
by means of a statistical estimation, it is sometimes difficult authoritarianism with democracy (…). These often adopt the
to identify which of its component indicators are responsible formal characteristics of democracy (while allowing little real
for classifying a country as non-democratic. Therefore, competition for power) with weak respect for basic political
International IDEA uses the Lexical Index of Electoral and civil rights’ (International IDEA 2018b: 11).
Democracy (LIED), which is one of the indicators used to
calculate the Representative Government score, as a measure Therefore, for International IDEA, hybrid regimes may
to help distinguish democracies from other types of political have some nominally democratic institutions and some
regimes. democratic processes and practices but are characterized
by pervasive informal practices eroding the functioning of
The LIED has seven clearly defined levels that measure formal institutions, which may also include weakened checks
whether countries select their legislature and executive and balances (Bogaards 2009; Morlino 2009; Mufti 2018).
through competitive elections (Skaaning et al. 2015). To
qualify as a democracy, a political regime must score at least Hybrid regimes are defined operationally by International
4 on the LIED—that is, it must have minimally competitive IDEA as political regimes that score at least 3.5 on the GSoD
multiparty elections for its legislature and executive. Representative Government attribute and less than 4 on the
LIED (i.e. they do not hold competitive elections).
In alignment with International IDEA’s commitment to the
multi-dimensionality of democracy, the GSoD Indices do While criteria based on numerical thresholds have been
not further distinguish between democracies by comparing defined in order to classify hybrid regimes in the GSoD
and ranking them on a single aspect. Instead, the levels of framework, International IDEA also recognizes the inherent
the five attributes of democracy and the more disaggregated challenge of classifying such regimes, as by their nature they
indices and indicators in the data set are used to describe can extend conceptually into both the democracy and non-
different types of democratic performance. In 2018, there democracy category.
252
2019
Non-democratic regimes oppositional political parties tend to be barred from

Non-democratic regimes include autocracies, authoritarian operating freely, and the media tends to be systematically
regimes, one-party systems, military regimes, authoritarian restricted, as are critical voices within civil society. Therefore,
monarchies and failed states or war-torn, conflict-ravaged in non-democratic regimes as opposed to hybrid regimes, the
countries without a centralized monopoly on the use of ‘democratic’ features are significantly less numerous and the
force. Of these terms, ‘authoritarian’ regime is used as a authoritarian features more prominent.
generic descriptor for those that meet the basic criteria of
statehood, in terms of an established central monopoly on When observing the attribute-level classification of non-
the use of force. democratic regimes, these regimes tend to score low on most
attributes. In rare instances, they may score mid-range on
Authoritarian regimes, similar to hybrid regimes, do not hold one attribute—generally an attribute that is not considered
competitive elections. Even if they do hold some form of a core element of democratic systems by mainstream
elections, incumbent political elites in authoritarian regimes definitions of democracy. Examples of attributes on which
disadvantage their opponents, and restrict the competitiveness non-democratic regimes could score in the mid-range include
of these elections ‘so profoundly and systematically as to Impartial Administration (and if so, generally on Absence of
render elections instruments of authoritarian rule rather Corruption) or Fundamental Rights (generally due to higher
than instruments of democracy’ (Schedler 2013: 3; see also levels of Basic Welfare). There are eight different attribute-
Levitsky and Way 2010: 5). level performance patterns for non-democracies in 2018.
Moreover, in such regimes, civil liberties tend to be Political regimes that score below 3.5 on Representative
systematically curtailed, there tends to be no clear separation Government and below 4 on the LIED are classified as non-
of power, the judiciary tends to be controlled by the executive, democracies (see Table M.4).
TABLE M.4
GSoD regime classification
RG ≥ 0.35 RG ≥ 0.35 RG < 0.35

Necessary and
sufficient condition
& LIED ≥ 4 & LIED < 4 & LIED < 4
Notes: RG: Representative Government; LIED: Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy.
TABLE M.5
Definitions and terminology
Term Definition
Crisis of representation The crisis of representation can be defined as a lack of faith in, or loyalty to, representative democracy,
or a disengagement from its institutions and processes.
Deepening autocratization The term ‘deepening autocratization’ is used to describe at least three statistically significant
subattribute declines within hybrid regimes or non-democracies over a five-year period.
Democracy International IDEA defines democracy as popular control over public decision-making and decision-
makers, and equality between citizens in the exercise of that control.
253
TABLE M.5
Definitions and terminology (cont.)
Term Definition
Democratic backsliding The report uses the term ‘(modern) democratic backsliding’ to describe the gradual and usually
intentional weakening of checks on government and civil liberties by democratically elected
governments. Democratic backsliding occurs in those countries that have suffered a net decline of at
least 0.1 points on the average score of Checks on Government and Civil Liberties over a period of five
years. Four different severities of democratic backsliding are identified:
1. Moderate: countries with declines of less than –0.15 on their averaged Checks on Government/Civil
Liberties indicator during their episode of backsliding.
2. Severe: countries with declines above –0.15.
3. Partial democratic breakdown: countries with backsliding so severe that it results in a shift to a hybrid
regime.
4. Full democratic breakdown: countries with backsliding so severe that it results in a shift to non-
democracy.
Democratic backsliding is always used to describe countries that were democratic at the onset of the
backsliding episode. Democratic backsliding is a form of democratic erosion.
Democratic breakdown The term ‘democratic breakdown’ is used in the report to describe the movement of a country from
democracy to a hybrid regime (partial breakdown) or to a non-democracy (full breakdown).
Democratic erosion/ When country-level declines in one or more subattribute of democracy are observed, but do not fit the
deterioration conceptual and quantitative description of democratic backsliding, these are referred to as forms of
democratic erosion or democratic deterioration. These two terms are used interchangeably in the report.
Democratic fragility The term ‘democratic fragility’ is used to describe democracies that have experienced at least one episode
of partial or full democratic breakdown since their first transition to democracy. Very fragile democracies
are democracies that have experienced several episodes of partial or full democratic breakdown.
Democratic performance When democratic performance is referred to in the report, it generally focuses on the scores (between
0 and 1) for the 28 aspects of the GSoD framework. Performance is analysed in absolute terms, based
on a three-tier scale: low (<0.4), mid-range (0.4–0.7) and high (>0.7). In those few cases when relative
performance is used, the world average is used as a benchmark and is always specified.
Democratic weakness The term ‘democratic weakness’ or weak democracy is used in connection with countries that score low
on one or more of their democratic attributes (unless they score high on four out of five attributes).
Older and third-wave This report defines older democracies as those countries that were democracies before 1975. It defines
democracies as third-wave democracies those countries that transitioned to democracy after 1975. These are sub-
divided into early third-wave democracies (those countries that transitioned to democracy between 1975
and 2000) and new third-wave democracies (those that transitioned after 2000).
Populism Populism is used in the report as an umbrella term to define populist parties or leaders on the left or
right of the political spectrum that promote nationalist and ethnonationalist ideologies, and that may
have a more anti-establishment bent. It therefore aligns with a view of populism as a ‘thin’ ideology that
is combined with other ideologies (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017).
Resilience International IDEA defines resilience as the ability of social systems to cope with, innovate, survive and
recover from complex challenges and crises presenting stress or pressure that can lead to systemic
failure. Democracy’s resilience is seen as the ability of a political system to recover, adapt and/or
flexibly address such complex challenges, crises and breakdowns (International IDEA 2017a). In this
report, it specifically refers to the ability of regimes that have regressed into hybridity or non-democracy
to return to democracy.
254
2019
TABLE M.5
Definitions and terminology (cont.)
Term Definition
Significant advances and All declines and advances referred to in the report are statistically significant, unless otherwise
declines specified. These advances and declines are always assessed based on the 16 subattributes in the GSoD
framework, as using the 28 aspects of the framework (which also include subcomponents) would lead to
double counting and measurement errors. Statistically significant declines and advances are generally
measured in five-year intervals, unless otherwise specified.
Top and bottom 25 per cent In the report, the top and bottom 25 per cent of performers refers to the 39 countries that score in the
top and bottom 25 per cent of countries in the GSoD Indices sample of 157 countries in 2018. The GSoD
Indices do not rank countries within these groupings, although score performance varies between
countries within these percentile categories.
Policy considerations attribute—unless a political opening is foreseeable in

At the end of each regional chapter, a table with a list of the near future or recent political reforms have been
policy considerations is provided to address the challenges observed, the priority countries for reform do generally
and harness the opportunities identified in the analysis. not include the hybrid regimes or non-democracies;
These policy considerations build on the democracy b) Priority areas for reform: these draw on good-practice
assessment provided by the GSoD indices. The table is recommendations provided in other International IDEA
organized into the attributes and subattributes of the knowledge products or on experience from technical
GSoD framework and provide first a snapshot of some assistance provided by International IDEA in the region;
basic GSoD data for the attribute pertaining to the c) Good-practice countries for regional learning: these
region, followed by: a) Priority countries for reform: generally refer to the countries in the region with a high
the democracies in the region that perform low on the performance on the attribute.
255
References
Bogaards, M., ‘How to classify hybrid regimes? Defective democracy and Levitsky, S. and Way, L. A., Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes
electoral authoritarianism’, Democratization, 16/2 (2009), pp. 399–423, After the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010),
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340902777800> <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511781353>
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International Morlino, L., ‘Are there hybrid regimes? Or are they just an optical illusion?’,
IDEA), Assessing the Quality of Democracy: A Practical Guide European Political Science Review, 1/2 (2009), pp. 273–96, <https://doi.
(Stockholm: International IDEA, 2008), <http://www.idea.int/ org/10.1017/S1755773909000198>
publications/catalogue/assessing-quality-democracy-practical-guide>, Mudde, C. and Rovira Kaltwasser, C., Populism: A Very Short Introduction
accessed 31 August 2019 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), <https://doi.org/10.1093/
—, The Global State of Democracy: Exploring Democracy’s Resilience actrade/9780190234874.001.0001>
(Stockholm: International IDEA, 2017a), <https://www.idea.int/gsod/> Mufti, M., ‘What do we know about hybrid regimes after two decades of
—, ‘Geographic definitions of regions in The Global State of Democracy’, scholarship?’, Politics and Governance, 6/2 (2018), pp. 112–19, <https://
Background Paper, 2017b, <http://www.idea.int/gsod> doi.org/10.17645/pag.v6i2.1400>
—, The Global State of Democracy Indices Methodology: Conceptualization and Schedler, A., The Politics of Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral
Measurement Framework, V2 (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2018a), Authoritarianism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), <https://doi.
<https://doi.org/10.31752/idea.2018.66> org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199680320.001.0001>
— International IDEA Strategy 2018–22 (Stockholm: International IDEA, Skaaning, S.-E., Gerring, J. and Bartusevičius, H., ‘A Lexical Index of Electoral
2018b), <https://www.idea.int/about-us/mission-values> Democracy’, Comparative Political Studies, 48/12 (2015), pp. 1491–525,
—, The Global State of Democracy Indices, 1975–2018 (2019), <http://www. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414015581050>
idea.int/gsod-indices> United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948,
<https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/>,
accessed 3 September 2019
256
About International IDEA
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) is an
intergovernmental organization that supports sustainable democracy institutions and processes worldwide.
International IDEA acts as a catalyst for democracy-building by providing knowledge resources and policy
proposals, and supporting democratic reforms in response to specific national requests. It works with
policymakers, governments, international organizations and agencies, as well as regional organizations
engaged in the field of democracy-building.
What does International IDEA do?

The Institute’s work is organized at the global, regional and country levels, focusing on the citizen as the driver of change.
International IDEA produces comparative knowledge in its key areas of expertise: electoral processes, constitution-building,
and political participation and representation, as well as democracy as it relates to gender, diversity, and conflict and security.
International IDEA brings this knowledge to national and local representatives who are working for democratic reform, and
facilitates dialogue in support of democratic change.
In its work, International IDEA aims for:
• increased capacity, legitimacy and credibility of democracy;

• more inclusive participation and accountable representation; and
• more effective and legitimate democracy cooperation.
Where does International IDEA work?

International IDEA works worldwide. Based in Stockholm, Sweden, the Institute has offices in Africa, the Asia-Pacific,
Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean.
International IDEA is a Permanent Observer to the United Nations.
<http://www.idea.int>
Democracy is under threat and its promise needs revival.
The value, viability and future of democracy are more contested now than ever before in modern
history. While the past four decades have seen a remarkable expansion of democracy throughout
all regions of the world, recent years have been marked by declines in the fabric of both older and
younger democracies. The idea of democracy continues to mobilize people around the world, but
the practice of existing democracies has disappointed and disillusioned many citizens and democracy
advocates.
Democratic erosion is occurring in different settings and contexts. New democracies are often weak
and fragile. Older democracies are struggling to guarantee equitable and sustainable economic and
social development. The share of high-quality democracies is decreasing and many of them are
confronted with populist challengers.
At the same time, democratic transitions occur in political regimes that seemed staunchly
undemocratic and popular democratic aspirations continue to be expressed and defended around
the world. Despite the challenges, democracy has proven resilient. Democracies have also shown,
with some exceptions, to provide better conditions for sustainable development.
International IDEA’s report The Global State of Democracy 2019: Addressing the Ills, Reviving the
Promise provides a health check of democracy and an overview of the current global and regional
democracy landscape. It analyses the encouraging democratic trends as well as the key current
challenges to democracy. The Report draws on data from the Global State of Democracy (GSoD)
indices and lessons learned from International IDEA’s on-the ground technical assistance to
understand the current democracy landscape. It aims at informing strategies, programmes and
policy interventions in support of democracy.
International IDEA
Strömsborg
SE–103 34 Stockholm
Sweden
Tel: +46 8 698 37 00
[email protected] ISBN: 978-91-7671-270-2 (Print)
www.idea.int ISBN: 978-91-7671-271-9 (PDF)

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The Global State

International IDEA publications are independent of specific national or political

References to the names of countries and regions in this publication do not

Applications for permission to reproduce or translate all or any part of this

International IDEA encourages dissemination of its work and will promptly

Text editing: David Prater

regional case study. Other reviewers and contributors Chapter 4

CCP Chinese Communist Party

CSO Civil society organization

ECLAC UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean

EMB Electoral management body

GCC Gulf Cooperation Council

GNC General National Congress (Libya)

GSoD Global State of Democracy

HoR House of Representatives

ICT Information and communications technology

ISIS Islamic State in Iraq and Syria

JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

LGBT Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender

NGO Non-governmental organization

OAS Organization of American States

OHCHR Office of the UN High Commission on Human Rights

SAO State Audit Office (Georgia)

SDG Sustainable Development Goal

GLOBAL PROGRESS ON THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS

is needed on this target as 43 per cent of countries in the world

Targets that have seen mixed progress include SDG 16.3 on

• The number of democratic re-transitions is on the increase,

Challenges to democracy • Non-democracies and hybrid regimes, taken together, still

Democracy continues to expand its reach to this day, albeit

resentat e Ac Justcce tice

Dem irecDtir G overnm t t

Democracy Social Rights

le istin ialrt Che ehrnem

ab t le raitst ial n mrelia tive

*Subattribute that indirectly measures SDG 16

The number of democracies continues to grow

Map of the world by regime type, 2018

Democracy Hybrid regime Non-democracy

Population living in each regime type, 1975–2018

Democracy Hybrid regime Non-democratic regime

FIGURE 1.4 in 2009–2010 was caused by several countries sliding into

the first decade of the third wave (1975–1985).

FIGURE 1.5 FIGURE 1.6

(3) Freedom of Expression

Democratic performance patterns in 2018, global level

Representative Fundamental Checks on Impartial Participatory

High Mid-range Low

the world in this category. The remaining 56 democracies FIGURE 1.8

Democracy has proven resilient over time

Older democracies have shown more democratic resilience

Hybrid regimes and non-democracies with significant advances, 2013–2018

TABLE 1.3 FIGURE 1.9

(n=97) (n=28) regimes (n=32) 80

differ according to regime type, although a direct causal link 54 53

Mean GDP per capita by level of Representative 30

Level of Mean GDP per capita

Low 1,490 7,000 5 times 0

Environmental performance by regime type, 2018 TABLE 1.5