Defamation

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Defamation
Introduction
[25.10] The law of defamation seeks to protect individual reputation. Its
central problem is how to reconcile this purpose with the competing demands of
free speech. Both interests are highly valued in our society, the one as perhaps
the most dearly prized attribute of civilised man, 1 the other the very foundation
of a democratic community. This antithesis is particularly acute when the matter
at issue is one of public or general interest. Not surprisingly, the balance has
shifted over the years, generally in favour of freer flow of information and
criticism. The balance is also struck differently between different legal systems
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with a common origin. 2 What constitutes the correct balance between freedom
of speech and the protection of reputation is always contestable and varies from
time to time and from place to place.
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The complex web of checks and balances which characterises the
contemporary law of defamation can be explained in part as the law’s –
however inadequate – attempt to come to terms with this difficult dilemma. But
it also bears the scars of old and long-forgotten battles. The upshot is a
patchwork of rules, many of which had their origin in false starts and later
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attempts to correct previous errors. There have been ongoing attempts to reform
defamation law over several decades. 3 The need for such reforms in Australia
was acute. Across Australia, eight substantively different defamation
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jurisdictions existed – some codified defamation law, some substantially

modified the common law by statute 4 whilst in others the common law largely
prevailed. In a country with a relatively small population, in which national
media had become a pervasive reality and in which internet technologies are not
limited by geographical boundaries, such legal diversity was unsustainable.
Notwithstanding several, previous, unsuccessful attempts at reform, 5 a further
attempt was made in 2004. This process culminated with all Australian States
and Territories passing substantially uniform defamation laws – an historic
1 As to reputation, see Post, “The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the
Constitution” (1986) 74 Cal LR 691; Rolph, “Dirty Pictures: Defamation, Reputation and
Nudity” (2006) 10 Law Text Culture 101; McNamara, Reputation and Defamation (2007);
Rolph, Reputation, Celebrity and Defamation Law (2008).
2 See, for example, Dow Jones & Co Inc v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575 at 614 (Kirby J), at 651
(Callinan J).
3 In post-war Britain, there have been two systematic inquiries: the Porter (1948) and the Faulks
Committees (1975); in Australia the ALRC (1979) and the NSWLRC (1971 and 1995); in New
Zealand, the Committee on Defamation (1977).
4 As to defamation codes, see Defamation Act 1889 (Qld) (repealed); Defamation Act 1957 (Tas)
(repealed). As to defamation legislation, see Defamation Act 1974 (NSW) (repealed).
5 Such as the ALRC’s Unfair Publication (1979) and the proposal by Attorneys-General of
Queensland, New South Wales and Victorica (1992).
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167 Ch 25: Defamation
event. 6 The national, uniform defamation legislation significantly harmonises

substantive defamation law. Importantly, though, it does not codify defamation
law, but co-exists with the common law, amending it in places. As a result,
defamation law remains complex and further reform may yet prove necessary.
Cause of action
What is defamatory?
[25.20] There is unfortunately no single test for what is defamatory. A
defamatory statement may be defined as one which tends to lower a person in
the estimation of his or her fellows by making them think the less of him or her.
Frequently, it takes the form of an imputation calculated to bring the plaintiff
“into hatred, contempt or ridicule”, 7 whether by direct statement, irony,
caricature or any other means; but it is not necessary that the words have the
tendency to excite feelings of disapprobation, provided they cause him to be
shunned and avoided. To say of a man that he is insane 8 or of a woman that she
has been raped 9 does not arouse sentiments of animosity but rather sympathy
and pity in the minds of decent people. Yet such assertions are defamatory
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because, without suggesting discreditable conduct, they impute to the plaintiff a
condition calculated to diminish the respect and confidence in which he or she is
held. A person’s standing in the community, taking people as they are with their
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prejudices and conventional standards, is just as likely to be impaired by an
attribution of misfortune as of contemptible conduct. In this matter, it is to shut
one’s eye to realities to indulge in nice distinctions. 10
Defamation is thus not limited to aspersions upon an individual’s private
character – his or her reputation for honour, honesty or integrity – but embraces
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also disparagements of his or her reputation in trade, business, profession or

office. Thus it may be defamatory to attribute authorship of an inferior book to
a prestigious writer 11 or to accuse a doctor, 12 architect 13 or official of
incompetence, 14 or even a politician of having lost the confidence of his
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6 See Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Ch 9; Defamation Act (NT); Defamation Act 2005
(NSW); Defamation Act 2005 (Qld); Defamation Act 2005 (SA); Defamation Act 2005 (Tas);
Defamation Act 2005 (Vic); Defamation Act 2005 (WA). See further Rolph, “A Critique of the
National, Uniform Defamation Laws” (2008) 16 TLJ 207.
7 Parke’s B definition in Parmiter v Coupland (1840) 6 M & W 105; 151 ER 340 at 108 (M &
W), 341 (ER). Does it include ridicule, which does not disparage reputation? Saying that a
person is ugly may, given the context, just qualify: Berkoff v Burchill [1996] 4 All ER 1008
(CA). For positive answers, see Boyd v Mirror Newspapers [1980] 2 NSWLR 449;
Ettingshausen v Aust Consol Press (1991) 23 NSWLR 443; McDonald v North Queensland
Newspaper [1997] 1 Qd R 62. See too Watterson, “What is Defamatory Today?” (1993) 67
ALJ 811 at 818-827.
8 Morgan v Lingen (1863) 3 LT 800.
9 Youssoupoff v M-G-M (1934) 50 TLR 581.
10 Youssoupoff v M-G-M (1934) 50 TLR 581 at 587 (Slesser LJ).
11 Ridge v English Illustrated Magazine (1913) 29 TLR 592. Similarly, to publish a mutilated
edition of an author’s work: Lee v Gibbings (1892) 67 LT 263.
12 Mirror Newspapers v Jools (1985) 5 FCR 507; Drummond-Jackson v BMA [1970] 1 WLR
688 (CA); Rogers v Nationwide News (2003) 216 CLR 327.
13 Andrews v Fairfax [1980] 2 NSWLR 225 (“building looks like a sieve”).
14 Pratten v Labour Daily [1926] VLR 115; Potts v Moran (1976) 16 SASR 284. Contra: Boyd v
Mirror Newspapers [1980] 2 NSWLR 449 (rugby player “fat and cumbersome”).

Cause of action 168
party. 15 It is vital to bear in mind, though, for the purposes of defamation law,
the aspersions have to reflect upon the individual’s trade, professional or
business reputation. Disparagement of an individual’s goods or business, as
opposed to his or her trade, professional or business reputation, can support a
cause of action for injurious falsehood, but not defamation. 16
The question of what standard to apply in determining whether a statement is
defamatory has not been answered uniformly. 17 The criterion commanding the
widest verbal support seems to be the reaction aroused in citizens of “fair
average intelligence” 18 or “ordinary decent folk in the community, taken in
general”. 19 This test is not identical with “reasonable”, still less with “ideal”.
Thus it was held defamatory to impute to a lady that she had been raped; 20 so
also, depending on time and place, 21 to call someone a German, 22 a
Communist, 23 a Jew, 24 an anti-Semite, 25 a scab 26 or a homosexual. 27 The
increasing diversity of beliefs and attitudes in modern Australian society
precludes an appeal to a single standard of “right-thinking” people 28 and
suggests as sufficient that the allegation was calculated to stir up adverse feelings
among a substantial and respectable group of the community, though not in
other quarters. 29 Thus to call a doctor an abortionist would be defamatory in
the estimation of all “right to life” advocates, without so much as a suggestion
that she was an unlawful abortionist. 30
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On the other hand, it is not sufficient that the words are regarded as
prejudicial by only a small minority whose standards are so anti-social that it
would not be proper for courts to recognise them. This reservation has been
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used to support the questionable conclusion that it is never defamatory to accuse
15 Fairfax v Punch (1980) 31 ALR 624.

16 Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton (2009) 238 CLR 460 at 468-469 (French CJ,
Gummow, Kiefel and Bell JJ). There is no separate category of “business defamation”: Radio
2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton (2009) 238 CLR 460 at 476 (French CJ, Gummow, Kiefel
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and Bell JJ), contra Gacic v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd (2006) 66 NSWLR 675 at
681-683 (Beazley JA).
17 See also below, [25.40] (interpretation).
18 Slatyer v Daily Telegraph (1908) 6 CLR 1 at 7 (Griffith CJ). See also Radio 2UE Sydney Pty
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Ltd v Chesterton (2009) 238 CLR 460 at 467 (French CJ, Gummow, Kiefel and Bell JJ).
19 Gardiner v Fairfax (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 171 at 172 (Jordan CJ). So “meaning” in general is
that of “ordinary sensible” persons (see below, [25.40]).
20 Youssoupoff v MGM (1934) 50 TLR 581. As to whether this case would be decided in the
same way today, cf Krahe v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (1986) 4 NSWLR 536 at 546
(Hunt J); Galea v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd (unreported, SC (NSW), Levine J,
20 February 1998).
21 John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Rivkin (2003) 201 ALR 77 at 109 (Kirby J).
22 Slazengers Ltd v Gibbs (1916) 33 TLR 35.
23 See Cross v Denley (1952) 52 SR (NSW) 112; Braddock v Bevins [1948] 1 KB 580; Brannigan
v Seafarers’ Union (1963) 42 DLR (2d) 249.
24 Camrose v Action Press (unreported, 1937).
25 De Stempel v Dunkels [1938] 1 All ER 238; Templeton v Jones [1984] 1 NZLR 448.
26 Murphy v Plasterers Society [1949] SASR 98; Ellis v Grant (1970) 91 WN (NSW) 920
(particulars ordered because of multiple meanings).
27 R v Bishop [1975] QB 274 at 281. However, see now Horner v Goulburn City Council
(unreported, SC (NSW), Levine J, 5 December 1997); Rivkin v Amalgamated Television
Services [2001] NSWSC 432; Kelly v Fairfax [2003] NSWSC 586.
28 A test endorsed by Lord Atkin in Sim v Stretch (1936) 52 TLR 669 at 671.
29 Hepburn v TCN Channel Nine [1983] 2 NSWLR 682 (CA).
30 Hepburn v TCN Channel Nine [1983] 2 NSWLR 682 at 694 (Glass JA). But to call a doctor
performing lawful abortions a “murderer”?: Grundmann v Georgeson (1996) Aust Torts
Reports ¶ 81-396.

someone of giving information to the police even if the community’s attitude to

the particular type of informer is one of contempt – on the specious ground that
to hold it defamatory would be condoning the alleged offence, like the keeping
of gambling machines. 31 Under the standard of the “right-thinking” person, the
question becomes, not what most people in fact think of informers, but what
they should think. This is not only inconsistent with the ordinary practice of
deferring to actual community attitudes however prejudiced, 32 but confuses the
courts’ duty to enforce all crimes alike with the accepted purpose of the law of
defamation to protect individuals against (false) allegations calculated to lower
them in the esteem of their fellows.
Defamation can be conveyed in any number of styles. What matters is the
tendency of the utterance, not its form. Ridicule, for example, is a familiar
weapon for attacking reputation, as by juxtaposing the plaintiff’s portrait with
that of a gorilla in a magazine article 33 or by publishing a photo of him in what
is or appears to be an obscene posture. 34 On the other hand, if the expression is
so extravagant that it cannot be regarded as going to character 35 or is made as a
harmless joke and is so understood, its defamatory barb may thereby disappear,
as when one smilingly greets another with the words, “How are you, you old
horse thief?”
It is often said that mere vulgar abuse or insulting name-calling does not
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qualify as defamation. This must be understood in the sense that vituperative
epithets are frequently insulting to pride rather than disparaging reputation. If
intended as mere abuse and so understood by the hearer, such remarks are not
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actionable at common law, 36 unless accompanied by physical aggression
amounting to assault or calculated to cause and in fact resulting in psychiatric or
other physical injury. 37 Much, of course, depends on the manner and
surrounding circumstances in which the words are spoken. 38 The same remark
may be slander or insult according to whether it is made with due deliberation
or bawled out at the height of a violent quarrel. Hence there is less occasion for
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drawing the distinction in cases of written, as distinct from spoken, words

because they usually convey the impression of calculated reflection and are more
easily understood as discrediting rather than just insulting. 39
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Not all falsehoods calculated to injure are defamatory: defamation is

confined only to those striking at character or reputation. The dividing line is
sometimes delicate, and (subject to the usual judicial control) is for the jury to
decide. A disparaging remark concerning the quality of merchandise may or may
31 Rest 2d, s 559, cmt e respects “substantial and respectable” minority views but would agree
with Byrne v Deane [1937] 1 KB 818 and Mawe v Pigot (1869) 4 Ir RCL 54 which refused to
condone anti-social views like contempt for police informers. The cases are criticised by
Fricke, “Criterion of Defamation” (1959) 32 ALJ 7.
32 Chakravarti v Advertiser Newspapers (1998) 193 CLR 519 at 578 (Kirby J).
33 Zbyszko v New York American 239 NYS 411 (1930).
34 Burton v Crowell Publishing Co 82 F 2d 154 (2d Cir 1936); Ettingshausen v Aust Consol
Press (1991) 23 NSWLR 443; McDonald v North Queensland Newspaper [1997] 1 Qd R 62.
35 Gwynne & Small v Wairarapa [1972] NZLR 586 (protest marchers likened to “Hitler’s
puppets”); Coleman v Fairfax [2003] NSWSC 564; John v Guardian News and Media [2008]
EWHC 3066 (QB).
36 Mundey v Askin [1982] 2 NSWLR 369 (“vermin”); Hoebergen v Koppens [1974] 2 NZLR
597 at 601 (“Dutch bastard”). See also Bennette v Cohen (2005) 64 NSWLR 81 at 97-98
(Bryson JA)
37 As in Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 QB 57; above, [2.xxx].
38 See Penfold v Westcote (1806) 2 B & P (NR) 335; 127 ER 656.
39 The point was not taken in Theaker v Richardson [1962] 1 WLR 151.

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not import a reflection on the plaintiff’s conduct of his business; to say that all
his goods are shoddy undoubtedly would; not so, however, that one particular
article was defective. 40 So, to say that someone is seriously ill is not defamatory
in the absence of an innuendo that he is malingering. 41 The distinction is
important because non-defamatory falsehood is not actionable at common law
unless made with intent to injure and actual damage be proved, 42 whereas
liability for defamation attaches irrespective of fault and mostly regardless of
whether actual injury be shown. In the result, it is easier to sue for a falsehood
that imputes to the plaintiff some peccadillo than for one alleging that he or she
has ceased to carry on business 43 or ascribing to a parliamentary candidate
political beliefs he or she does not profess. Formerly, the defamation codes,
however, treated the last-mentioned falsehoods as defamatory by including
“imputations concerning any person by which he is likely to be injured in his
profession or trade” 44 but this has not been replicated under the national,
uniform defamation laws.
Actions for defamation remain the sole remedy for vindicating reputation. 45
Thus damages for loss of reputation are not recoverable in an action for
injurious falsehood 46 or for conspiracy. 47 In addition, the prevailing view in
Australia is that a cause of action in negligence for pure economic loss or
psychiatric harm is not available where defamatory statements are made about
the plaintiff. 48
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Who may be defamed?
[25.30] Any living person may be defamed, but no action lies for defamation of
the dead, however distressing to relatives and friends: neither do they have a
derivative cause of action for defamation nor a direct claim for injury to their
feelings. 49 Indeed, reputation is regarded as so “personal” an attribute that an
action for defamation does not survive for the benefit of the plaintiff’s estate. 50
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40 See Drummond-Jackson v BMA [1970] 1 WLR 688 (CA) (attack on dentist’s technique may
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be defamatory); South Hetton Coal v NE News [1894] 1 QB 133 at 139; Radio 2UE Sydney
Pty Ltd v Chesterton (2009) 238 CLR 460 at 468-69 (French CJ, Gummow, Kiefel and
Bell JJ).
41 Grappelli v Block [1981] 1 WLR 822.
42 Ratcliffe v Evans [1892] 2 QB 524; see below, [30.xxx].
43 Dawson v Mirror Newspaper [1979] 1 NSWLR 16.
44 This expansive construction was established in Hall-Gibbs v Dun (1910) 12 CLR 84;
reaffirmed in Sungravure v ME Airlines (1975) 134 CLR 1; Mirror Newsp v World Hosts
(1979) 141 CLR 632. See Watterson, “What is Defamatory Today?” (1993) 67 ALJ 811 at
813-817; also Chapter 28 Misrepresentation, ch 30 Economic Relations.
45 Foaminol Laboratories v British Artid Plastics [1941] 2 All ER 393 (Hallett J).
46 Joyce v Sengupta [1993] 1 All ER 897 (CA). Defamation not covered by legal aid.
47 Lonrho v Fayed (No 5) [1993] 1 WLR 1489 (CA). To escape the defence of truth.
48 Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562 at 580-81 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Hayne
and Callinan JJ); Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317 at 335 (Gleeson CJ), at 361
(McHugh J). See also the position under New Zealand law: Bell-Booth Group v A-G [1989] 3
NZLR 148; Balfour v A-G [1991] 1 NZLR 519. Contrast the position under United Kingdom
and Canadian law: Spring v Guardian Assurance [1995] 2 AC 296; Young v Bella (2006) 261
DLR (4th) 516. The position would be different in the statements were true: GS v News
(1998) Aust Torts Reports ¶ 81-466.
49 See Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 10 and equivalent provisions in the remaining
jurisdictions, except in Tasmania. As to the potential effect of this provision, see Rolph, “A
Critique of the National, Uniform Defamation Laws” (2008) 16 TLJ 207 at 221.
50 Below, [29.xxx] Domestic Relations.

A defamatory statement primarily directed against a dead person may, of course,

involve a slur on the living, as by impugning a person’s parentage by calling his
dead mother a whore. 51
At common law, partnerships and corporations may vindicate attacks upon
their reputations. 52 Similarly, a professional association 53 or trade union 54
may vindicate its “governing” or “professional” reputation; not, however, an
organ of government (whether central or local), public discussion of whose
activities, as distinct from individual members’ should not be impeded, for the
sake of free speech. 55 The position of government trading corporations remains
unclear, but they may well be able to sue for actual identifiable financial loss, or
at least the probability of financial loss. 56
A non-governmental corporation may accordingly now complain of libels
affecting not only property, but also its institutional reputation, though it
obviously cannot recover damages for hurt feelings. 57 True, the libel must have
been directed against itself rather than against its individual officers. But a
corporation itself can be guilty of misconduct through its officers, and such an
imputation may qualify as a libel actionable in its own right. Thus a trade union
successfully sued for being accused of deliberately rigging a ballot of its
members. 58
The common law position with respect to corporations has now been
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substantially altered by the national, uniform defamation laws. Corporations
can now no longer sue for defamation 59 unless they are not-for-profit 60 or
employ fewer than ten full-time 61 employees. 62 The right of those individuals
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involved with corporations to sue for defamation is specifically preserved, so
long as the aspersions made against the corporation reflect upon their personal,
professional or business reputations. 63 The stated reasons for restricting the
51 Livingstone-Thomas v Assoc Newspapers (1969) 90 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 223 at 235; cf Krahe v

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TCN Channel Nine (1986) 4 NSWLR 536 at 541 (Hunt J); Galea v Amalgamated Television
Services (unreported, SC (NSW), Levine J, 20 February 1998).
52 Todd v Swan Television and Radio Broadcasters (2001) 25 WAR 284 (partnerships); Lewis v
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Daily Telegraph [1964] AC 234; Australian Broadcasting Commission v Comalco (1986) 12

FCR 510 (corporations).
53 Sask College of Physicians v CCF Publishers (1965) 51 DLR (2d) 442.
54 National Union v Gillian [1946] KB 81 (nullified by English legislation: Electrical Union v
Times Newspaper [1980] QB 585); Pulp & Paper Workers v International Brotherhood
(1973) 37 CLR (3d) 687 (“Communist Front organisation”).
55 Derbyshire CC v Times Newspaper [1993] AC 534; Ballina Sh v Ringland (1994) 33 NSWLR
680 (CA) (aliter, injurious falsehood); New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council v Jones
(1998) 43 NSWLR 300.
56 See different views expressed in Ballina Sh v Ringland (1994) 33 NSWLR 680 (CA).
57 Lewis v Daily Telegraph [1964] AC 234 at 262 (Lord Reid); Australian Broadcasting
Commission v Comalco (1986) 12 FCR 510.
58 Willis v Brooks [1947] 1 All ER 191: and see National Union v Gillian [1946] KB 81.
59 See Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 9(1) and equivalent provisions in the remaining
jurisdictions.
60 See Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 9(2)(a) and equivalent provisions in the remaining
jurisdictions.
jurisdictions.
62 See Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 9(2)(b) and equivalent provisions in the remaining
jurisdictions.
jurisdictions.

Cause of action 172
right of corporations to sue for defamation include the assertion that the tort
was intended to protect personal reputation, which is not borne out by the
history of defamation law. It was also suggested that corporations could abuse
defamation law to “chill” the exercise of free speech by individuals. Corporations
might also be better resourced than individuals to use extra-legal means of
repairing their damaged reputations, for example through advertising
campaigns. In addition, they were able to rely on other causes of action, such as
injurious falsehood or misleading or deceptive conduct under the Australian
Consumer Law, s 18 (Sch 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)
formerly Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 52 and cognate State and Territory
fair trading legislation) which lacked the forensic advantages of a defamation
action, namely the presumption of damage and the presumption of falsity. 64
This reform might have unintended consequences. For instance, if corporations
cannot sue for defamation, they are not subject to the restrictive approach to
injunctive relief characteristic of this tort. 65 Corporations, compelled to rely on
other causes of action, will find it easier to obtain an injunction to restrain
publication based on one or more of those other causes of action. The restriction
on the right of corporations to sue for defamation, motivated in part by a
concern that corporations can potentially inhibit the exercise of free speech,
might allow corporations actually to stop that speech altogether. 66
Interpretation
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[25.40] Frequently words are ambiguous or capable of being understood in
several senses, defamatory in one but not another. What meaning is to be
attached to them: that intended by the author? that understood by the
addressee? or some tertium quid?
The first (intended meaning) was long ago disqualified: one may be liable
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though innocent of any intention to defame. 67 The second (comprehended

meaning) seems most compatible with the purpose of damages being to
compensate for actual injury, provided only that to understand the words in a
defamatory sense was not unreasonable. In some respects, indeed, this test is
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important. The words, for example, must have been published to someone
capable of understanding them in a defamatory sense, not in a foreign language
he could not comprehend. 68 So also, if the words are not defamatory on their
face but only with the aid of additional information, they must have been
published to someone with that information. 69 Otherwise, however, the quaint
dogma prevails that the words must be understood in their “natural and
ordinary” meaning, in defiance of the plain semantic truth that it is futile to look
64 SCAG Working Group of State and Territory Officers, Proposal for Uniform Defamation
Laws, [4.5].
65 Below, [x.xxx].
66 See, for example, Beechwood Homes (NSW) Pty Ltd v Camenzuli [2010] NSWSC 521.
67 Below, [25.xxx].
68 Below, [25.90].
69 Below, [25.90].

for any single meaning as being the “right” meaning. 70 Thus, testimony as to
how the words were actually understood is irrelevant, perhaps even
inadmissible. 71
At one time bent on discouraging actions for slander, courts insisted that oral
words be interpreted in their most favourable sense and that the plaintiff
negative any innocent meaning they might bear. 72 Thus it would not have been
actionable to say of a man that he married his aunt, for she could conceivably
have been his uncle’s widow. But this artificially restrictive approach has long
been abandoned under the influence of the more liberal rules of libel, and all
expressions however published now fall to be scrutinised for any damaging
meaning that would be put on them by “ordinary sensible men [or women]” 73
who strike the golden mean of being neither unusually suspicious nor unusually
naive. 74 “The ordinary reasonable reader does not, we are told, live in an ivory
tower. He can, and does, read between the lines, in the light of his general
knowledge and experience of worldly affairs. He is a layman, not a lawyer, and
his capacity for implication is much greater than that of a lawyer. Especially in
newspaper cases, he is understandably prone to engage in a certain amount of
loose thinking. On the other hand, the reader of a book would read it with more
care than he would a newspaper. But in both cases, there is also a very wide
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degree of latitude given to the capacity of the matter complained of to convey
particular imputations where the words are imprecise, ambiguous, loose,
fanciful or unusual.” 75
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For example, different interpretations can be placed upon the common
statement that a person has been charged with crime. It might or might not carry
the additional imputation that reasonable grounds exist for suspecting that he
committed the offence, or the even more damaging imputation that the charge is
well founded. 76 The same goes for an announcement that the plaintiff has
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ceased to be an employee or agent of the declarant. 77 As Lord Devlin warned,

“a man who wants to talk at large about smoke may have to pick his words very
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70 See Slim v Daily Telegraph [1968] 2 QB 157 at 171-174 (Diplock LJ). The “single meaning”
rule does not apply to injurious falsehood: Ajinomoto Sweeteners Europe SAS v Asda Stores
[2010] EWCA Civ 609.
71 Toomey v Fairfax (1985) 1 NSWLR 291 (on the spurious ground that it would encroach on
the jury function). Cf Diplock LJ’s scornful comments in Slim v Daily Telegraph [1968] 2 QB
157 at 177ff. Yet allowance is made for the fact that words may have a secondary “ordinary”
meaning: below, [25.60].
72 Known as the “mitior sensus” rule, it disappeared under Holt CJ in the early 18th century.
Extravagant examples are Holt v Astgrigg (1607) Cro Jac 184; 79 ER 161; Foster v Browning
(1625) Cro Jac 688; 79 ER 596.
73 Lewis v Daily Telegraph [1964] AC 234 at 286 (Lord Devlin).
74 Lewis v Daily Telegraph [1964] AC 234 at 259 (Lord Reid).
75 Farquhar v Bottom [1980] 2 NSWLR 380 at 386 (Hunt J), distilling a series of descriptions
from prior case law. See also Amalgamated Television Services v Marsden (1998) 43 NSWLR
158 at 165 (Hunt CJ at CL).
76 Sergi v Australian Broadcasting Commission [1983] 2 NSWLR 669 at 676. Upon its precise
meaning will depend how it can be justified: below, [25.190].
77 For example, Munro v Coyne [1990] WAR 333 (FC).

Cause of action 174
carefully if he wants to exclude the suggestion that there is also a fire. … Loose
talk about suspicion can very easily convey the impression that it is a suspicion
that is well founded.” 78
Meaning cannot be discovered without regard to the context of the
expression. However disparaging at first blush, it may reveal its complete
innocence if explained in the light of the circumstances attending its publication.
The publication must be taken as a whole, not the offending passage isolated
from the rest: the bane without the antidote. As when a libel was repeated in the
report of a verdict the plaintiff obtained against the libeller. 79 Similarly,
offending headlines must be read in conjunction with explanatory text which
draws the sting of the libel, even if it be granted that a sizable number of readers
would not read that far. 80 Particularly, the meaning of oral words can never be
divorced from the speaker’s gesture, tone of voice and facial expression. “One
recalls the instance of the lady who in a West End drawing-room accused a noble
lord of being a thief, but when one is told that she said, with a smile, ‘Lord X,
you are a thief, you have stolen my heart’ one recognises that to call a person a
thief is not necessarily actionable.” 81
Innuendo
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[25.50] Conversely, an apparently innocent statement may well hide a
defamatory barb. Such a secondary meaning may be derived either from the
words themselves by “reading between the lines”, as it were, or with the aid only
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of additional, extrinsic information. For example, a report that the police are
investigating a certain individual may be understood to imply that there is
reason to suspect him of crime. By contrast, a newspaper notice mistakenly
announcing that the plaintiff has given birth to twins is wholly innocuous,
howsoever read, until it appears from elsewhere that she was married only four
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weeks before; 82 an erroneous identification of a woman as “Mrs X” looks

utterly harmless in the absence of an explanation that X is really married to
someone else; 83 and displaying the model of the plaintiff in a waxwork
exhibition assumes a distinctly derogatory connotation only in the light of the
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additional fact that the figure was juxtaposed to three criminals and immediately
adjoining the “Chamber of Horrors”. 84
To lawyer and layperson alike, all types of secondary meaning have come to
be known as “innuendos”. In order to be on the safe side the practice developed
early of pleading an innuendo whenever the defamation was not absolutely
78 Lewis v Daily Telegraph [1964] AC 234 at 285. Eg Hayward v Thompson [1982] QB 47 (CA);
Favell v Queensland Newspapers (2005) 221 ALR 186; (2005) 79 ALJR 1716; [2005] HCA
52. See also Morris v Sanders [1954] 1 WLR 67 (employees “dismissed”); Baker v Australian
& NZ Bank [1958] NZLR 907 (cheque returned “present again”); Church of Scientology v
Anderson [1980] WAR 71 (“evading taxes”).
79 Chalmers v Payne (1835) 2 Cr M & R 156; 150 ER 67; Morosi v 2GB [1980] 2 NSWLR
418n. But mere contradiction or expressions of doubt do not necessarily justify repetition.
80 Charleston v News Group [1995] 2 AC 65: another illustration of the spurious single-meaning
rule. See also the criticisms of Kirby J in Chakravarti v Advertiser Newspapers (1998) 193
CLR 519 at 574-575.
81 Broome v Agar (1928) 138 LT 698 at 702 (Sankey LJ).
82 Morrison v Ritchie (1902) 4 F 645; Bell v N Constitution [1943] NI 108.
83 Cassidy v Daily Mirror [1929] 2 KB 331; Hough v London Express [1940] 2 KB 507. For
innuendo of identification see also below, [25.xxx].
84 Monson v Tussauds [1894] 1 QB 671.

explicit. 85 Somewhat perplexingly, however, a “true” innuendo (in the technical

sense of a separate cause of action, with distinct verdict) is now confined to
those derogatory implications alone which require the aid of extrinsic
evidence. 86
Judge and jury

[25.60] Ever since Fox’s Libel Act 1792 it has been looked upon as a staunch
safeguard of democratic liberty that the issue of “libel or no libel” be within the
exclusive province of the jury. 87 Indeed, so entrenched is this principle that the
widespread scepticism regarding jury participation in civil litigation has, until
recently, only partly affected their function in this respect in defamation cases.
Under the national, uniform defamation laws, trial by jury in a defamation case
is no longer a right. Some jurisdictions do not allow for juries at all in
defamation cases. 88 In the remaining jurisdictions, either party may elect to
have a jury. If no election is made, the trial proceeds by judge alone. 89 If a jury is
empanelled, it determines defamatory meaning and any issues of fact relating to
defences but, importantly, does not assess any damages payable. 90 Juries will
continue to be involved in defamation litigation in the future, in those Australian
jurisdictions where they are available, although clearly not to the extent that
they have in the past.
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But the exercise of this function is, as always, subject to judicial control. For
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not unless the court is first satisfied that the words are reasonably capable of
bearing the defamatory meaning ascribed to them by the plaintiff, would the
jury be allowed to pass upon whether, in their opinion, they so bear it.
The discharge of this preliminary function calls for the exercise of restraint,
lest the jury be ousted from a task entrusted to it on high constitutional grounds.
In the past there was, it is true, a tendency to give perhaps undue weight to a
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85 The pleading would allege that the words “meant and were understood in their natural and
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ordinary meaning …”. “Popular” or “false” innuendos must still be pleaded or particulars
will be ordered when words are capable of multiple meanings: Barclay v Cox [1968] VR 664;
DDSA v Times Newspapers [1973] QB 21; Australian Consolidated Press v Rogers [1971] 1
NSWLR 682; James v NZ Tablet [1976] 2 NZLR 545. The extent to which a plaintiff is
bound by the particularised meanings he or she identified is a controversial issue, which has
arisen in the context of the availability of the Polly Peck pleading or defence in Australian law.
See below, [x.xxx].
86 Lewis v Daily Telegraph [1964] AC 234; Bowles v Truth (NZ) [1965] NZLR 768; Reader’s
Digest Services v Lamb (1982) 150 CLR 500 at 505 (Brennan J). The “separate cause of
action” theorem was criticised by the Faulks (at [104]) and New South Wales (at [50])
Committees and rejected for Queensland in Composite Buyers v Clarke [1988] 2 Qd R 602
(FC).
87 The Act applied in terms only to criminal cases but its principle was extended to civil claims.
88 Namely, the Australian Capital Territory (Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT), s 22); the Northern
Territory (Juries Act (NT), s 6A); and South Australia (Juries Act 1927 (SA), s 5). The
Northern Territory used the occasion of the introduction of the national, uniform defamation
laws to abolish juries in defamation cases: see Rolph, “A Critique of the National, Uniform
Defamation Laws” (2008) 16 TLJ 207 at 226.
jurisdictions, except for the Australian Capital Territory, the Northern Territory and South
Australia.
jurisdictions, except for the Australian Capital Territory, the Northern Territory and South
Australia.

Cause of action 176
possible innocent meaning. 91 Today, however, as already noted, the courts will
only reject those “meanings which can only emerge as the product of some
strained or forced or utterly unreasonable interpretation”. 92 If judges should
exercise sparingly the power of withdrawing a case from the jury, appellate
courts should be all the more reluctant to interfere with verdicts except in the
most egregious cases. 93 Previously, it was only when the words were
characterised as necessarily defamatory 94 or palpably innocent 95 or the jury
verdict was “perverse” that a court was justified in setting aside a contrary
finding. Recently, Australian courts have rejected a test cast in terms of
“perversity”, 96 instead applying a test of unreasonableness. Thus, they have
been more willing to set aside a jury verdict on the ground that it was one that
no reasonable jury could have reached, but they remind themselves of the need
for appellate restraint before they do so. 97
Reference to the plaintiff

[25.70] A defamatory statement is not actionable unless published “of and
concerning” the plaintiff. True, he or she need not be specifically mentioned or
identified, nor need there be so much as a “peg or pointer”, 98 so long as the
tenor reasonably implicates him or her. For instance, to say that A (a married
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man) is a bachelor 99 or a cuckold 100 may defame his wife. But to allege that A’s
father became a psychiatric patient does not injure A’s reputation, however it
may injure his filial feelings. 101
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The test for identification is the same as for defamatory meaning: not “did the
defendant intend to aim at the plaintiff”, 102 but “would a sensible reader
91 For example, Capital & Counties Bank v Henty (1882) 7 App Cas 741 (“the principles were
never better formulated nor perhaps ever worse applied”: Slim v Daily Telegraph [1968] 2 QB
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157, 187).
92 Jones v Skelton [1964] NSWR 485; [1963] 1 WLR 1362 at 491 (NSWR), 1370 (WLR) (PC).
93 Cairns v Fairfax [1983] 2 NSWLR 708 (upholding defence verdict).
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94 Gwynne & Small v Wairarapa Times Age [1972] NZLR 586.

95 Somers v Fairfax (1879) 2 SCR (NS) (NSW) 140 at 144.
96 John Fairfax Publications v Rivkin (2003) 201 ALR 77 at 78 (Gleeson CJ), at 103-04
(Kirby J), at 129 (Callinan J).
97 See, for example, John Fairfax Publications v Rivkin (2003) 201 ALR 77; [2003] HCA 50;
Gorman v Barber (2004) 61 NSWLR 543; [2004] NSWCA 402; John Fairfax Publications v
Gacic (2007) 230 CLR 291; [2007] HCA 28; Channel Seven Sydney v Mohammed (2008) 70
NSWLR 669; [2008] NSWCA 21. See also Rolph, “Perverse Jury Verdicts in New South Wales
Defamation Trials” (2003) 11 TLJ 28; Rolph, “Simple Questions, Difficult Juries: Perversity
in Australian Defamation Trials After John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Rivkin” (2004)
18(3) Commercial Law Quarterly 9.
98 Morgan v Odhams Press [1971] 1 WLR 1239 (HL). Still less is there any shelter behind
pseudonyms (J’Anson v Stuart (1787) 1 TR 748; 99 ER 1357) or the familiar blurb that the
“characters and incidents in this book are fictional and have no reference to any person living
or dead” (Corrigan v Bobbs-Merrill Co 126 NE 260; 10 ALR 662 (NY 1920)).
99 See Cassidy v Daily Mirror [1929] 2 KB 331; Hough v London Express [1940] 2 KB 507.
100 World Hosts v Mirror Newspaper [1976] 1 NSWLR 712 at 727 (affd 141 CLR 632) where
“reflective imputation” is fully discussed. But vice versa? Krahe v TCN (1986) 4 NSWLR
536.
101 Livingstone-Thomas v Assoc Newspapers (1969) 90 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 223 (CA). The old
Code definition of defamatory matter (“concerning any person, or any member of his
family” under the Defamation Act 1958-1974 (NSW) (repealed)) is not credited with any
difference.
102 Below, [25.xxx].

reasonably identify the plaintiff as the person defamed?” 103 Here also the
standard of reasonableness is not high: the ordinary reader of a newspaper
article, especially of the sensational variety, is not expected to read “with
cautious and critical analytical care”, 104 he or she may read “casually and not
expecting a high degree of accuracy” 105 and indulge “in a certain amount of
loose thinking” 106 and even “rather far-fetched inferences”. 107 Evidence of
witnesses that they believed the defamation to refer to the plaintiff is certainly
admissible, even necessary when identification depends on special knowledge of
the plaintiff, but it is of course not conclusive. There has been an increasing
latitude not only in the relevant standard but also in passing the issue to the jury.
Thus it was deemed sufficient to link the plaintiff with a kidnapping gang merely
because he had been seen with the victim about that time, 108 and to link another
plaintiff with a large scale wheat theft because she was engaged in the wheat
business in the area and had a criminal record of dishonesty. 109 Since liability is
not dependent on fault, 110 this liberality imposes a correspondingly greater
burden on publishers.
Because the plaintiff’s cause of action must arise at the time of the
defendant’s publication, his or her naming in a subsequent publication is not
ordinarily admissible, because it would be unfair to hold the defendant
responsible for somebody else’s subsequent action in identifying the plaintiff.
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Thus an announcement by the plaintiff’s ex-agents that his concert had been
cancelled because he was seriously ill was not rendered actionable by a later
newspaper announcement that he was to appear elsewhere, although it
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suggested that he had been lying. 111 It would be different if the later publication
had been the defendant’s, as where the first was defamatory on its face and the
second identified the plaintiff as the person referred to 112 or where the first
invited the reader to ascertain the plaintiff’s identity in a forthcoming television
programme. 113
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Group defamation
[25.80] The problem of identification becomes singularly acute in cases of
group defamation. The common law set its face against civil sanctions for
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vilification, not of individuals, but of a whole class of persons distinguishable by

race, colour, creed or calling, in part because of concern over multiplicity of
claims, in part for fear of unduly inhibiting political discussion and criticism. In
the last resort, the criminal law of seditious libel or statutory provisions directed
at racial vilification 114 provide a residual weapon for combating the most
103 Morgan v Odhams Press [1971] 1 WLR 1239 (HL). If words in their natural meaning do not
identify plaintiff, “true” innuendo is required: Vadic v Ballarat News [1981] VR 213.
104 Morgan v Odhams Press [1971] 1 WLR 1239 at 1254 per Lord Morris.
105 Morgan v Odhams Press [1971] 1 WLR 1239 at 1270 (Lord Pearson).
106 Morgan v Odhams Press [1971] 1 WLR 1239 at 1245 (Lord Reid).
107 Morgan v Odhams Press [1971] 1 WLR 1239 at 1244 (Lord Reid).
108 Morgan v Odhams Press [1971] 1 WLR 1239 (HL), described as a “thin case” (at 1250).
109 Steele v Mirror Newspaper [1974] 2 NSWLR 348 (CA).
111 Grappelli v Block [1981] 1 WLR 822.
112 Hayward v Thompson [1982] QB 47; Ware v Associated Newspapers (1969) 90 WN (NSW)
180 at 184-185.
113 Baltinos v Foreign Language Publ (1986) 6 NSWLR 85.
114 For example, Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), ss 18B – 18E; Anti-Discrimination Act
1977 (NSW), ss 20B – 20C.

Cause of action 178
odious of this kind of demagoguery. 115 At any rate, so far as civil claims are
concerned, the plaintiff is up against the requirement that the words were
published “of and concerning” him or her, and “the reason why a libel
published of a large or indeterminate number of persons described by some
general name generally fails to be actionable is the difficulty of establishing that
the plaintiff was, in fact, included in the defamatory statement, for the habit of
making unfounded generalisations is ingrained in ill-educated or vulgar minds,
or the words are occasionally intended to be a facetious exaggeration”. 116
But this difficulty the plaintiff may yet overcome by proving himself or herself
to be specifically identified, either because the group is so small that the
accusation can reasonably be understood to refer to any one of its members, or
because the circumstances of publication permit the conclusion that it was he or
she who was aimed at from amongst the group. 117 Most relevant, though not
necessarily decisive, are of course the size of the class, the generality of the
charge and its extravagance. Thus while it would clearly not be actionable to say
that “all lawyers are thieves”, 118 a charge levelled against a group of seven
Roman Catholic clergymen was held to point an accusing finger at every one of
them, 119 and an allegation of cruelty “in some of the Irish factories” capable of
supporting a jury verdict that it referred specifically to the plaintiff’s. 120 But as
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always it is for the judge to rule initially whether the offending words can be
considered capable of referring to the plaintiff as an individual, and the practice
in this instance has not erred on the side of liberality. For example, if the
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defendant indulged in some unfounded generalisation, conveying imputations of
disgraceful conduct to a group, but there is nothing to point to any individual
member, the mere fact that the mind of some of the plaintiff’s friends turned to
him or her on reading it is quite immaterial and insufficient to allow the claim to
go before the jury. 121
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Even if only one (but unidentified) member of a small group is attacked, all
may be under suspicion and thus defamed. 122 So also, if the imputation is
against “some” or “most” of a small group, 123 and all the more, where two
persons are accused in the alternative. 124
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115 See Riesman, “Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel” (1952) 42 Col L Rev
727 at 1085 who argues that prohibition is less effective than correction, and often
self-defeating in creating martyrs. In the US, the remedy is now of questionable constitutional
validity, despite Beauharnais v Illinois 343 US 250 (1950): see Arkes, “Civility and the
Restriction of Speech: Rediscovering the Defamation of Groups” [1974] Sup Ct Rev 281.
116 Knupffer v London Express [1944] AC 116 at 122 (Lord Atkin).
117 For example, if in a television program attacking unnamed dentists a picture of the plaintiff’s
surgery is shown: Henry v TVW Enterprises (1990) Aust Torts Reports ¶ 81-031. Also
perhaps if the defendant intended to aim at the plaintiff: Lloyd v David Syme [1986] AC 350
at 364 (the “West Indies”).
118 Eastwood v Holmes (1858) 1 F & F 347; 175 ER 758 at 349 (F & F), 759 (ER).
119 Browne v Thomson [1912] SC 359.
120 Le Fanu v Malcolmson (1848) 1 HLC 637; 9 ER 910; also Godhard v Inglis (1902) 2 CLR
78.
121 Knupffer v London Express [1944] AC 116; Dowding v Ockerby [1962] WAR 110.
122 Pryke v Advertiser (1984) 37 SASR 175 (one out of four); Forrington v Leigh (The Times,
10 Dec 1987) (CA). But see McCormick v Fairfax (1989) 16 NSWLR 485.
123 Rest 2d, s 564A, cmt c; Bjelke-Petersen v Warburton [1987] 2 Qd R 465 (FC) (“some”);
Neiman-Marcus v Lait 13 FRD 311 (SDNY 1952) (“most of the sales staff are fairies”).
124 Albrecht v Burkholder (1889) 18 OR 287; contra: Chomley v Watson [1907] VLR 502.

Publication
[25.90] The essence of tortious defamation lies in the communication of the
disparaging statement to someone other than the person defamed. For unlike the
common law offence of criminal defamation, 125 the civil law was concerned not
so much with insult as with injury to reputation, the esteem in which one is held
by others. 126 This requirement is known by the name of “publication”. 127
Publication is not a unilateral act of the defendant, but a bilateral act, depending
upon receipt of the defamatory matter in a comprehensible form by a person
other than the plaintiff. 128 It is not necessary that the communication be made
public, in the sense of being addressed to a large audience. “Utterance” to a
single individual is enough, provided he or she is someone other than the
plaintiff. 129 Dictation to a secretary 130 or the handling of a telegraphic message
in the course of transmission 131 are sufficient. Publication may be to any third
party, even to a servant of a company defamed, 132 except that the common law
exempted communications between spouses. 133 This exception originally rested
on the threadbare fiction of identity between husband and wife, but is better
explained as an absolute privilege in recognition of the confidential nature of the
conjugal relation. 134
The publication must have been made to a person capable of understanding
the defamatory meaning; not, for example, in a foreign language which the
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reader or listener is unable to understand, 135 nor on a postcard when none but a
“privileged” addressee could know that it contains a reference to the plaintiff. 136
If the allegation is ex facie defamatory and refers by name to the person defamed
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or, without mentioning him or her by name, describes him or her in such a way
that the person in the street would know to whom it referred, 137 it is
unnecessary to prove that the person to whom it was published had any
knowledge of the plaintiff or that the allegation led him or her to think the less
of the plaintiff. But if it is not ex facie defamatory or does not clearly identify the
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125 R v Adams (1888) 22 QBD 66. The statutory offence of criminal defamation, harmonised in
most Australian jurisdictions under the reform process culminating with the national,
uniform defamation laws, requires publication. See Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), s 439; Crimes
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Act 1900 (NSW), s 529; Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 365; Criminal Law Consolidation Act
1935 (SA), s 257; Criminal Code 1924 (Tas), s 196; Criminal Code (WA), s 345. Criminal
defamation has been abolished in the United Kingdom: Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK),
s 73.
126 Dow Jones v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575 at 600 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and
Hayne JJ).
127 For proof see Gaskin v Retail Credit [1965] SCR 297.
128 Dow Jones v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575 at 600 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and
Hayne JJ).
129 Consolidated Trust v Browne (1948) 49 SR (NSW) 86 at 88 (Jordan CJ).
130 Riddick v Thames Bd Mills [1977] QB 881 at 898-899. But such publication may enjoy
incidental privilege: below, [25.xxx].
131 Tobin v City Bank (1878) 1 SCR (NS) (NSW) 267; Williamson v Freer (1874) LR 9 CP 393.
132 Traztand v GIO [1984] 2 NSWLR 598.
133 Wennhak v Morgan (1888) 20 QBD 635. Also, publication to the plaintiff’s spouse: Wenman
v Ash (1853) 13 CB 836; 138 ER 1432; Howard v Howard (1885) 2 WN (NSW) 5.
135 Jones v Davers (1597) Cro Eliz 496; 78 ER 747.
136 Sadgrove v Hole [1901] 2 KB 1.
137 Thus, if the description is such as to identify him or her clearly to reasonably informed
people, for example, by referring to the plaintiff as “the Prime Minister of Australia”, it is not
necessary to call a witness to attest that he or she had read the defamatory matter and knew
who the Prime Minister was.

Cause of action 180
person alleged to be defamed, and the defamatory character which is attributed

to the imputation or the identity of the person defamed would be apparent only
to persons who had knowledge of special circumstances, it is necessary in proof
of publication to establish that it was communicated to someone with such
knowledge. 138 In one such case 139 the defendants, trading under the name of
“Denley Print”, printed leaflets attacking a motion picture on familiar
communist lines and placed at the foot “Express Print, Auburn”. They handed
the pamphlets to an emissary of the “Peace Movement”, and a quantity of them
was subsequently showered into an audience at the picture theatre where the
film was being shown. On the following day, a newspaper published an item
reporting the incident and drew attention to the imprint. The plaintiff’s
registered trade name was “X-press Printery, Auburn”, and some of his
customers reading the report formed the conclusion that he was a communist
sympathiser. He failed, however, to recover because, relying solely on the
publication at the theatre, he was unable to produce a witness who possessed the
special knowledge of being able to identify him with the person referred to in the
pamphlet. But it need not apparently be shown that anyone possessing such
special knowledge actually understood the imputation in the sense alleged,
provided reasonable persons who knew of the special circumstances might so
understand it. 140 Moreover, it is quite immaterial that the person to whom the
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communication was made did not give credence to the allegation. 141
Every participant in the publication incurs liability, regardless of the precise
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degree of his or her involvement. Included is not only everyone concerned in the
actual distribution or dissemination, but also those who composed the libel,
such as press agencies, advertisers or even freelancers employed to prepare the
script. 142 So are, besides the newspaper proprietor, the printer 143 and all
involved in its circulation; though as we shall see hereafter, the standard of
liability has been relaxed in favour of mere mechanical distributors. 144 Beyond
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that, a person may incur liability not only for his or her own acts of publication,
but also when others foreseeably publish or republish his defamatory
utterances. 145 And although, generally speaking, a plaintiff cannot complain
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who has himself or herself assented to or acquiesced in the publication, 146 let
alone happened to be the one who gave currency to the libel, it is otherwise if he
or she foreseeably published it in performance of a duty, like the union secretary
who passed on a member’s requisition for an executive meeting containing libels
138 Consolidated Trust v Browne (1948) 49 SR (NSW) 86; Kruse v Lindner (1978) 19 ALR 85
(Fed CA); Fullam v Newcastle Chronicle [1977] 1 WLR 651.
139 Cross v Denley (1952) 52 SR (NSW) 112.
140 Hough v London Express [1940] 2 KB 507 at 515.
141 Morgan v Odhams Press [1971] 1 WLR 1239 at 1246, 1252 (HL). But it may affect
damages: Bekker v Wrack [1937] NZLR 549.
142 Webb v Bloch (1928) 41 CLR 331 at 362-366. Advertiser and newspaper are joint
tortfeasors, unlike press agency and independent newspaper: Eyre v NZPA [1968] NZLR
736.
143 Eglantine Inn v Smith [1948] NI 28 at 33.
146 Chapman v Ellesmere [1932] 2 KB 431 (stewards’ decisions to be published in “Racing
Calendar”); Kirk v Reed [1968] NZLR 801 (consent to being photographed did not imply
consent to publication of photo); and see below, [25.xxx].

on himself, 147 or in justifiable self-defence, like the 14-year-old who sought his
older brother’s advice after receiving a letter accusing him of theft. 148
Exceptionally, one may even become responsible for a libel by failing to take
affirmative steps to prevent its publication by someone else, as when the
manager of a club omitted to remove a defamatory notice pinned to a board by
a member. 149 By knowingly permitting a libel to remain after reasonable
opportunity to remove it, the person in control of the premises becomes liable as
for its republication, if the inference is drawn that he has made himself
responsible for its continued presence 150 – at all events unless its obliteration or
removal would involve a great deal of trouble and expense.
However, mere passive facilitation of defamatory matter may not constitute
publication. This view has crystallised in recent English cases concerning the
liability of internet service providers and web-based search engines. If, through
electronic processes, an internet service provider or a search engine disseminates
defamatory matter, such an entity may not meet the definition of a publisher.
Even if an internet service provider or a search engine has knowledge of the
defamatory matter it generates, it may nevertheless avoid liability for defamation
because it fails to meet the definition of a publisher. These authorities suggest
that there is at least a minimal degree of knowing and voluntary conduct or
general assumption of responsibility required in order to hold a person or an
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entity liable as a publisher. 151
Multiple publication
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[25.100] Every single copy of a book or newspaper is treated as a separate
publication furnishing its own cause of action. Thus although the edition may
originally have appeared ages ago, any copy procured within the period of
limitation even for the sole purpose of suing thereon, will qualify. 152 So also in
the case of television or radio broadcasting, every reception can be sued for
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separately 153 and in the case of internet, every download can be sued for
separately. 154 This could lead to plaintiffs selecting the law most favourable to
their case and exposing defendants to liability in a substantial number of
jurisdictions. There are some restraints imposed on plaintiffs to protect
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defendants from the possible abuse of the “multiple publication” rule. 155
147 Collerton v MacLean [1962] NZLR 1045. Also Jones v Amalg TV Services (1991) 23
NSWLR 364.
148 Hedgpeth v Coleman 111 SE 517 (NC 1922). Also in the case of a middle-aged woman: Hills
v O’Bryan [1949] 2 DLR 716.
149 Byrne v Deane [1937] 1 KB 818.
150 Byrne v Deane [1937] 1 KB 818 at 838; Urbanchich v Drummoyne MC (1988) Aust Torts
Reports ¶ 81-127.
151 Bunt v Tilley [2007] 1 WLR 1243 at 1252 (Eady J); Metropolitan International Schools Ltd
(t/a Skillstrain) v Designtechnica Corporation (t/a Digital Trends) [2009] EWHC 1765 (QB)
at [50]-[55] (Eady J). Cf Godfrey v Demon Internet [2001] QB 201 (Morland J).
152 Duke of Brunswick v Harmer (1849) 14 QB 185; 117 ER 75. The “multiple publication”
rule poses an acute problem for internet archives and caches, where defamatory matter is
readily retrievable long after first publication: Loutchansky v Times Newspapers [2002] QB
783.
153 For example, Gorton v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1973) 22 FLR 181 (ACT);
Allsopp v Incorporated Newsagencies (1975) 26 FLR 238 (newspaper).
154 Dow Jones v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575 at 600-01 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and
Hayne JJ).
155 See generally Dow Jones v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575 at 604 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh,
Gummow and Hayne JJ).

Cause of action 182
However, damages may be assessed for the entire issue wherever published; 156
and in order to discourage multiple litigation, the national, uniform defamation
laws now prohibit more than one action in respect of a multiple publication
without leave of the court 157 and allow evidence in mitigation of any previous
recovery of damages. 158 The national, uniform defamation laws also provide
that, where defamatory matter is published within Australia and a plaintiff
complains of publication in more than one Australian jurisdictional area, the
applicable law to the whole of the plaintiff’s claim is the substantive law which
has the closest connection to the harm occasioned by the publication. 159 The
substantive harmonisation of Australian defamation law and the application of
a single substantive law to publication across Australia significantly curtails the
attractiveness of “forum shopping” by plaintiffs, at least within Australia.
The fault element

[25.110] Reputation is so stringently protected that liability for publishing
defamatory statements attaches without any showing of fault. Liability does not
depend on the intention of the defamer, but on the fact of defamation. 160 This
has not always been so. At one time, the plaintiff was put to proof that the
defendant was inspired by malice 161 but, as memory of the ecclesiastical and
Star Chamber heritage faded, the pleading of malice gradually withered into a
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meaningless formality. In 1825, it was finally settled that absence of ill-will
against the person defamed and honest belief in the truth of the allegation did
not excuse. 162 Malice remains of importance today only for the purpose of
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defeating the defences of qualified privilege and fair comment. 163
The law of defamation does not even look to the meaning intended by the
writer or speaker, but to the meaning attached by a reasonable reader or
listener. 164 “A person charged with libel cannot defend himself by showing that
he intended in his own breast not to defame, or that he intended not to defame
the plaintiff, if in fact he did both.” 165 In consequence, a publisher may be held
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156 Toomey v Mirror Newspapers (1985) 1 NSWLR 173.

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jurisdictions. It is also ordinarily vexatious to prosecute more than one action simultaneously
in different jurisdictions: Maple v David Syme [1975] 1 NSWLR 97. Judicial power to
consolidate actions was conferred by the (Eng) Law of Libel Amendment Act 1888, since
adopted in most Australian jurisdictions.
158 See below, [25.xxx].
jurisdictions.
160 Cassidy v Daily Mirror [1929] 2 KB 331 at 354. “If the publication was libellous the
defendant took the risk. As was said of such matters by Lord Mansfield, ‘Whatever a man
publishes, he publishes at his peril’” (Peck v Tribune Co 214 US 185 at 189 per Holmes J
(1909)). The statement by Lord Mansfield is found in R v Woodfall (1774) Lofft 776; 98 ER
914 at 781 (Lofft), 916 (ER).
161 Holdsworth, “Defamation in the 16th and 17th Centuries” (1925) 41 LQR 13 at 24-26.
162 Bromage v Prosser (1825) 4 B & C 247; 107 ER 1051.
163 The switch from malice to privilege may have been motivated by a judicial stratagem to wrest
control from the jury: see Slaughter, “The Development of Common Law Defamation
Privileges: From Communitarian Society to Market Society” (1992) 14 Cardozo L Rev 351.
164 A compromise formulation, best avoided, is to ask: Was the defendant reasonably perceived
as having intended to defame the plaintiff?
165 Lee v Wilson (1934) 51 CLR 276 at 278 (Dixon J). Somewhat incongruously, evidence that
the defendant intended to defame the plaintiff is relevant and admissible: Lloyd v David
Syme [1986] AC 350 at 364 (PC); Lee v Wilson (1934) 51 CLR 276 at 288-289; criticised in
Baltinos v Foreign Language Publ (1986) 6 NSWLR 85.

liable for a statement, harmless on its face, which by reason of extrinsic facts
unknown to him or her unhappily turns out to be defamatory. In Cassidy v
Daily Mirror 166 a newspaper published a photograph with the caption:
“Mr Corrigan, the racehorse owner, and Miss ‘X’ whose engagement has been
announced.” Corrigan himself had supplied this information to the
photographer and authorised its publication. Unknown to the publisher,
however, Corrigan was lawfully married to the plaintiff, who complained that
the item was libellous of her because it suggested that she was an immoral
woman who had illicitly cohabited with a man who was not her husband.
Armed with evidence that acquaintances had understood the words in the
suggested sense, she recovered substantial damages.
Not only is the intention of the writer immaterial in considering whether the
meaning of his statement is defamatory, but it is equally irrelevant that he did
not mean to refer to the plaintiff at all. If the identification used is not specific
but could refer to one of several individuals, the writer takes the risk that it will
be understood as referring to someone other than the person he or she had in
mind. “The question is not who was aimed at, but who was hit.” Thus there is a
risk that a person named can be reasonably identified with someone else, as
when a newspaper published a report of a police inquiry, containing allegations
of bribery against a “Detective Lee”. The reference was intended for a Constable
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Lee of the Motor Registration Branch, but was understood by some persons to
relate to each of two Detectives Lee who were attached to the CIB. Since the
allegations were reasonably capable or referring to them, both succeeded in their
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actions. 167 By more detailed identification liability could have been avoided.
In the leading case of Hulton v Jones 168 this rule was applied to fiction. The
defendants published a libellous narrative, intended to refer to a fictitious
person, one Artemus Jones. The plaintiff who answered to this unlikely name
prevailed, because the description was capable of being reasonably understood
to refer to him and was actually so read by several acquaintances. Obviously,
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fiction must not become a shield for character assassination, but the law’s
concern is with defamatory lies masquerading as truth, not with defamatory
tales purported to be fiction. By ignoring the writer’s intent and indulging a
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latitudinal standard of identification, creative literature is unnecessarily

victimised. 169
Nor, all the more, can liability be avoided for accidental typographical or
similar errors which have the effect of conveying a meaning, or referring to a
person, other than intended, for example, the mistaken substitution of
“coloured” for “cultured gentlemen”, 170 a reference to a firm under the
heading “First Meetings under the Bankruptcy Act” instead of under
“Dissolutions of Partnership”, 171 or the erroneous insertion of the plaintiff’s
photograph in an advertisement for whiskey. 172
The justification for this stringent liability is presumably that it is more
equitable to protect the innocent defamed rather than the innocent defamer
166 Cassidy v Daily Mirror [1929] 2 KB 331 (CA); foll Hough v London Express [1940] 2 KB
507.
167 Lee v Wilson (1934) 51 CLR 276; Newstead v London Express [1940] 1 KB 377; Hall v
Queensland Newspapers [2002] 1 Qd R 376.
168 Hulton v Jones [1910] AC 20.
169 Other defences become untenable: as fiction, the matter is obviously false.
170 Upton v Times-Democrat (1900) 104 La 141.
171 Shepheard v Whitaker (1875) LR 10 CP 502.
172 Peck v Tribune Co 214 US 185 (1909). The portrait was that of a female teetotaller.

Cause of action 184
(who, after all chose to publish); another is that the publication, not the
composition of the libel, is the actionable wrong, making the state of mind of the
publisher, not the writer, relevant. On the other hand, since one does not as a
rule act at one’s peril, why should the law demand that one publish at one’s
peril, especially when what one says is not defamatory on its face? Does
reputation deserve a higher level of protection than personal safety? Actually
there is little evidence that it has imposed too onerous a burden on the
publishing industry. 173 In most instances the publisher’s error is avoidable with
care, either by diligent checking of the proofs or by identifying the person aimed
at in such a manner as to exclude the possibility of the description fitting anyone
else. 174 It should also be remembered that in most jurisdictions an action for
defamation is the sole means available to plaintiffs desirous of clearing their
reputation.
Strict liability has also been modified in the following other respects.
Unintentional publication
[25.120] Another modification of strict liability is the requirement that the
publication itself must have been either intended or negligent. There is no
liability for intentionally defamatory matter published accidentally, unlike
accidentally defamatory matter published intentionally. This perplexing result is
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the outcome of the one-sided emphasis on the publication rather than the
composition of the libel. Functionally, the distinction has little merit because
fault would rather point the other way and the victim in either case stands in
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equal need of vindication.
The unintentional publisher escapes responsibility only if he or she can clear
himself or herself of negligence. Hence, while it is not ordinarily actionable to
send a libellous letter directly to the person defamed, the writer will incur
liability if he or she should reasonably have anticipated that it might well be
opened by someone else, like the addressee’s husband 175 or secretarial staff, 176
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or even that the addressee himself or herself, in duty bound, would have to pass
it on to others. 177 So, one who imputes a discreditable action to another’s face
must observe care that it is not overheard by strangers. 178 It is negligent to
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communicate defamatory matter on a postcard, and publication will be

presumed if the postcard is circulated in such a manner as to make it probable
that it would be read by third persons. 179 Nor is it an excuse that the
communication was addressed to the wrong person in the mistaken belief that
173 Juries are averse to awarding large sums of money in these actions: in Newstead v London
Express [1940] 1 KB 377, plaintiff recovered one farthing; in Lee v Wilson (1934) 51 CLR
276, £50. Damages and legal costs are in any event, tax-exempt: Herald v FCT (1932) 48
CLR 113. The ALRC recommended against any change.
174 In Lee v Wilson (1934) 51 CLR 276, the reporter had originally taken down the evidence
correctly in shorthand, but transcribed it carelessly by altering “First Constable” to
“Detective” Lee– “possibly because the statement then appeared more sensational” (!):
Starke J at 286.
175 Theaker v Richardson [1962] 1 WLR 151.
176 Pullman v Hill [1891] 1 QB 524; Gomersall v Davies (1898) 14 TLR 430.
177 Collerton v MacLean [1962] NZLR 1045 (union secretary).
178 See White v Stone [1939] 2 KB 827; Robb v Morrison (1920) 20 SR (NSW) 163. To
exonerate himself or herself, the defendant must prove that he or she neither knew nor had
reason to expect a stranger to be within earshot.
179 Sadgrove v Hole [1901] 2 KB 1. The burden of disproving publication is then thrust on the
defendant. It may be discharged, eg, by showing that the writing was not intelligible to
persons without knowledge of special circumstances leading to an identification of the
plaintiff.

he or she was privileged to receive it. 180 But it is not necessary to anticipate
unlikely contingencies, such as that an inquisitive butler would illicitly open his
employer’s mail, even if the letter is unsealed, 181 or that a sealed letter properly
addressed to a son would be opened by his father. 182
Subordinate distributors and innocent dissemination

[25.130] Liability for unintentional defamation, not preventable by the exercise
of due care, devolves only on primary participants in the publication, such as the
writer, editor or newspaper company. 183 Persons who do not authorise
publication but play the more subordinate role of mere distributors, like
newsagents, 184 booksellers, 185 libraries 186 and, it is suggested, printers under
modern technological conditions, 187 are treated more sympathetically.
According to the most accepted view, these escape responsibility on proof that
they neither knew nor had reason to know or suspect that they were handling
defamatory material and their actual or constructive ignorance was not due to
negligence on their part. 188 Even this reduced responsibility has been criticised
as too onerous. For apart from uncertainty as to precisely what precautions are
required to negative negligence, the defendant is in a quandary once a claim of
libel is made. More reasonable would be to require distributors to yield only to
an injunction. 189
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At common law, radio and television stations are original publishers, whether
broadcasting their own or someone else’s programmes and, as such, are not
analogous to newsagents or video stores. 190 Even in transmitting live
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programmes or simulcasts, which may make it more difficult to anticipate
defamatory episodes, the common law took the view that they play an active
role in publishing to the world and must face corresponding responsibility.
Moreover, according to the view adopted by judges applying the common law,
broadcasting is a business, mostly for profit, and it would be invidious to
discriminate in its favour as against the printed media.
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However, the position has changed somewhat under the national, uniform
defamation laws, reflecting technological changes. The national, uniform
defamation laws provide a defence of innocent dissemination, 191 modelled
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closely on the common law position, but extends the definition of “subordinate
distributors” who can rely upon this defence to wholesalers and retailers, to
180 Hebditch v MacIlwaine [1894] 2 QB 54.

181 Huth v Huth [1915] 3 KB 32. Or that a trespasser would gain entrance and read a
defamatory notice stuck on a wall: Neame v Yellow Cabs [1930] SASR 267.
182 Powell v Gelston [1916] 2 KB 615.
183 See Thompson v ACTV (1996) 186 CLR 574.
184 Emmens v Pottle (1885) 16 QBD 354.
185 Bottomley v Woolworth (1932) 48 TLR 521 (American magazines).
186 Martin v British Museum (1894) 10 TLR 338.
187 So held in McPherson v Hickie (1995) Aust Torts Reports ¶ 81-348 and see Thompson v
ACTV Pty Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 574 at 586-587 (Brennan CJ, Dawson and Toohey JJ).
188 Vizetelly v Mudie’s Select Library [1900] 2 QB 170 (circulating library liable for negligence,
because it overlooked publisher’s circular requesting return of the offending book).
189 Recommended by ALRC, at [186].
190 Thompson v ACTV (1996) 186 CLR 574; Rest 2d, s 581.
191 Although innocent dissemination was originally considered a plea of “no publication”, the
prevailing view appears to be that it is properly viewed as a free-standing defence: see
Emmens v Pottle (1885) 16 QBD 354 at 357 (Lord Esher MR); Vizetelly v Mudie’s Select
Library [1900] 2 QB 170 at 178 (Vaughan Williams LJ), at 180 (Romer LJ); cf Thompson v
ACTV (1996) 186 CLR 574 at 586 (Brennan CJ, Dawson and Toohey JJ).

Cause of action 186
broadcasters of live programmes with no effective control over the person

making defamatory statements and to operators or providers of certain
electronic services and media. 192 Although liability for publication is broad,
there are necessarily limits to it.
Damage
[25.140] The common law distinguishes between libel and slander, the former
being broadly defamation in a written form and the latter being broadly
defamation in spoken form. The distinction turns upon the requirement of
damage. Actual injury, whether material or to reputation, is not an essential
element of actionable libel. Libel originated as a crime in the Star Chamber
where to insist on actual injury would have hampered the “law and order”
purpose of the Tudor jurisdiction. The rule survived into the modern law of civil
liability (exceptional for non-trespassory torts) primarily because proof of such
damage is notoriously difficult and to require it would deprive most plaintiffs of
any remedy for vindicating their reputation. It has not however passed without
criticism. In the United States concern for freedom of speech ultimately
prompted a constitutional requirement for proof of “actual injury”, including
besides material loss, injury to reputation, anxiety or illness. 193 In
Commonwealth countries, however, contemporary criticism has focused on
per se.
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controlling damages rather than on abandoning the rule that libel is actionable
In contrast to libel, the common law did however require proof of material
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injury for slander. This distinction–broadly that between written and spoken
defamation–calls for a digression into legal history. 194
History of slander
[25.150] Slander is the offspring of the common law courts which in the earlier
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part of the 16th century began to allow an action on the case for defamation, in
competition with the ecclesiastical tribunals which had till then dominated the
field. At first jurisdiction was claimed only over imputations of offences triable
at common law, and such slanders were held actionable without proof of
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damage; eventually it extended over all defamatory allegations causing

“temporal” damage. 195
Contemporaneously, the foundations of the modern law of libel were being
laid by the Star Chamber which, in addition to punishing the crime of political
libel with a view to suppressing seditious publications that had gained in
prevalence since the appearance of the printing press, also attended to
non-political libels in order to furnish a legal substitute for the prohibited duel.
But although much concerned with defamatory writings, the Star Chamber still
treated words as libels, while conversely in the common law courts written
imputations were actionable as slander. The distinction was as yet primarily one
of courts. After the fall of the Star Chamber, the relation between these hitherto
jurisdictions.
193 Gertz v Welsh 418 US 323 (1974). Limited to matters of public concern: Dun & Bradstreet v
Greenmoss 472 US 749 (1985).
194 Holdsworth, vol viii, pp 333-378; Plucknett, Concise History of Common Law (5th ed
1956), pp 483-502; Veeder, “History of the Law of Defamation” in Anglo American Essays
in Legal History (1907-1909), vol iii, p 446; Donnelly, “History of Defamation” [1949]
Wis L Rev 99; Helmholz, “Select Cases on Defamation to 1600” (1985) 101 Seldon Society.
195 The first such case seems to have been Davis v Gardiner (1593) 4 Co Rep 16b; 67 ER 897.

separate bodies of law assumed its modern profile. Libel came to be fully
recognised as a civil wrong and, probably owing to its former association with
the criminal law, became actionable without proof of special damage. Thus the
insult in defamation emerged as a more prominent element and the previous
common law emphasis on pecuniary loss in slander was not translated into the
new tort. Also, by a haphazard rather than systematic process, the line of
demarcation between libel and slander came to be drawn according to the
modern distinction between written and oral defamation. 196
It has been claimed that libel endures longer than slander, that more
significance is attached to the written than the spoken word by the recipient,
that libel conveys the impression of deliberate calculation to injure reputation
while slander is usually born of sudden irritability. In addition to these
psychological arguments, emphasis has also been laid on the allegedly disparate
area of dissemination, libel usually contained in newspapers or other printed
matter being propagated farther than oral statements addressed to a small circle
of listeners. Undoubtedly, the common law requirement of special damage for
slander discourages some trivial litigation, but at the cost of striking at the
deserving and unmeritorious litigant alike. The criterion which makes success or
defeat in an action depend on the mere form of publication ignores the fact that
there is no necessary correlation between it and the policy underlying the
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vindication of reputation. If a distinction is to be observed at all, it should be on
the broader basis of the potentiality for harm inherent in the particular
circumstances of each publication rather than the prevailing arbitrary and
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inflexible rule of thumb.
In 1843, a distinguished Select Committee of the House of Lords concluded
that the distinctions between libel and slander, and between slander actionable
per se and other oral defamation, did “not rest on any solid foundation”, but
their recommendation to assimilate slander to libel lapsed and was not renewed
in England until 1975. 197 It was, however, taken up in Australia and, following
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its early adoption by New South Wales in 1847, 198 has since been enacted in
several other jurisdictions, 199 finally being adopted across Australia under the
national, uniform defamation laws. 200 Now, all claims for defamation are
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actionable without proof of special damage. However, there is, across Australia,
a residuary disqualification of trivial defamation which is the first of the
defences to defamation which will be examined. 201
Defences to defamation
[25.160] If a plaintiff establishes that defamatory matter has been published
about him or her, he or she has established a prima facie claim for defamation.
The focus then shifts to the defendant and whether he or she can establish a
196 King v Lake (1670) Hardres 470; 145 ER 552 is usually credited as decisive, but see Kaye,
“Libel and Slander–Two Torts or One” (1975) 91 LQR 524. It was finally settled in Thorley
v Kerry (1812) 4 Taunt 355; 128 ER 367.
197 Faulks, ch 2.
198 11 Vic No 13; now Defamation Act 1974 (NSW) (repealed), s 8.
199 Defamation Act 1889 (Qld) (repealed), s 5; Defamation Act 1957 (Tas) (repealed), s 9;
Defamation Act 1901 (ACT) (repealed), s 3; Defamation Act (NT) (repealed), s 2.
jurisdictions.
201 Below, [x.xxx]. For an historical analysis of the categories of slander at common law, see
Fleming, Law of Torts (9th ed, LBC, 1998), pp xxx.

Defences to defamation 188
defence. There are a range of common law and statutory defences to defamation,
of which the most important are truth and its variants, fair comment and honest
opinion, and the forms of absolute and qualified privilege. Significantly, under
the national, uniform defamation laws, common law defences co-exist alongside
statutory defences. 202
Triviality
[25.170] The common law requirement that slander was actionable only upon
proof of special damage, subject to certain, established exceptions, was a means
of controlling and minimising frivolous defamation actions. A further mechanism
for achieving this end is the defence of triviality, now available in all Australian
jurisdictions under the national, uniform defamation laws. 203 The efficacy of
the defence of triviality in achieving this end is doubtful, given its onerous
requirements.
A defendant has a complete defence if he or she can prove that, in the
circumstances of publication, the plaintiff was unlikely to suffer any harm. The
defence is excluded by likelihood of any “harm”, not just “harm to reputation”.
Actual injury need not be shown; likelihood is sufficient. That is, it is not
sufficient that the defendant prove that the plaintiff would have suffered less
harm as a result of the defendant’s publication. Rather, the defendant undertakes
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to prove that the plaintiff would have suffered no harm. This has been
interpreted to mean that, in order to establish a defence of triviality, a defendant
must prove the absence of a real chance or possibility of harm to the plaintiff. 204
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Moreover, the defence of triviality is directed to the likely harm to the
plaintiff in “the circumstances of publication”. Not all circumstances, but
“circumstances of publication” may be taken into account. Thus the narrow
construction prevailed of excluding the plaintiff’s bad reputation, in contrast to
evidence that, prior to the publication, the recipients already knew the
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allegation. 205 The defence is peculiarly applicable to publications of limited

extent, as in a jocular statement to a few people in a private home, who know
the plaintiff too well to take it seriously, although simply because defamatory
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matter was circulated to a small group of people does not mean that the defence
will apply. Generally relevant factors are the nature of the defamatory matter,
and the manner in which, the persons to whom and the place where it is
published. 206 Equally, the defence is not categorically excluded from
publications to a wider audience or the media. For example, when Lang, the
popular Labor leader, made an offensive speech in a public election meeting,
Rich (and Evatt) JJ held the jury entitled to find for him “with their knowledge
of local elections and policies and their understanding of the manner in which
speeches at elections are received by bystanders. They might take one view of
202 See Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 24(1) and equivalent provisions in the remaining
jurisdictions.
203 See Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 33 and equivalent provisions in the remaining
jurisdictions. As to predecessor provisions, see, for example, Defamation Act 1974 (NSW)
s 13 (repealed); Defamation Act 1889 (Qld) s 20 (repealed); Defamation Act 1957 (Tas) s 9
(repealed).
204 Jones v Sutton (2004) 61 NSWLR 614 at 624-25 (Beazley JA).
205 King v McKenzie (1991) 24 NSWLR 305. However, see Jones v Sutton (2004) 61 NSWLR
614 at 621 (Beazley JA) (dependent upon circumstances as to whether plaintiff’s prior bad
reputation included in “circumstances of publication”).
206 Morosi v Mirror Newspapers [1977] 2 NSWLR 749 at 800; Chappell v Mirror Newspapers
(1984) Aust Torts Reports ¶ 80-691.

words spoken at a vestry meeting or a meeting of directors, and another where it

is in the heat of a family squabble or a quarrel in a shearing shed or a taproom or
bar.” 207
Justification: truth
[25.180] At common law, truth is a complete answer to a civil action for
defamation and the only defence known generally by the name of
“justification”. 208 It is not that libel must be false but that truth is in all the
circumstances an interest paramount to reputation. 209 “The law will not permit
a person to recover damages in respect of an injury to a character which he or
she either does not, or ought not, to possess.” 210 In contrast, the criminal law of
libel, as formulated by the Star Chamber with the object of preventing breaches
of the peace, directed its attention to the insult offered, and it was therefore no
defence to a prosecution either that publication was to the person defamed or
that the allegations were true. For, “as the woman said, she would never grieve
to have been told of her red nose if she had not one indeed.” 211 This was
epitomised in the saying, attributed to Lord Mansfield: “The greater the truth,
the greater the libel.”
Truth is a matter of defence or, alternatively expressed, the falsity of
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defamation is presumed until dispelled by the defendant. 212 Casting the burden
on the defendant rather than the plaintiff has the effect, if not the purpose, of
inhibiting defamatory speech. 213 For in practice it acts not only as a serious
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deterrent against dissemination of falsehoods but, in view of the difficulties of
adducing legal proof of truth in all particulars or unwillingness to reveal
confidential sources of information, constitutes also a powerful brake on public
debate and the flow of information by underscoring the wisdom of caution and
self-censorship. 214
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What is justification
[25.190] Justification must be as broad as the defamatory imputation itself. 215
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The defendant must prove the truth of all material statements contained in the
libel; there must be a substantial justification of the whole. A charge that the
plaintiff is a habitual liar can only be justified by proof that on repeated
occasions he made false statements without an honest belief in their truth. 216 An
allegation that the plaintiff was convicted of a crime cannot be proved true by
207 Lang v Willis (1934) 52 CLR 637 at 651. Aliter, Starke and Dixon JJ.
208 In New Zealand as “truth” (Defamation Act 1992 (NZ), s 8), also recommended by Faulks,
at [129].
209 Burton v Crowell Publ 82 F 2d 154 at 156 (1936): thus it does not follow that a libel must be
something that can be true or false (eg not ridicule).
210 M’Pherson v Daniels (1829) 10 B & C 263; 109 ER 448 at 272 (B & C), 451 (ER)
(Littledale J).
211 Quoted by Windeyer, “Truth of a Libel” (1935) 8 ALJ 319 at 322.
212 See Beevis v Dawson [1957] 1 QB 195.
213 Other justifications are the presumption of innocence which places the burden on the
accuser, and the inequity of requiring (in most instances) proof of a negative. Yet the plaintiff
must prove falsity in trade libel misrepresentation.
214 In the United States the burden of proof for speech on matters of public concern lies
constitutionally on the plaintiff: Philadelphia Newspaper v Hepps 475 US 767 (1986).
215 Crowley v Glissan (No 2) (1905) 2 CLR 744 at 767.
216 See Penton v Calwell (1945) 70 CLR 219; Mann v Mackay TV [1992] 2 Qd R 147 (FC).

showing that he was convicted, if the conviction was subsequently quashed. 217
Yet it is sufficient that the statement is true in substance. Justification need not
conform to the exact letter of the accusation, provided the gist of it is proved to
be correct: it must “meet the sting” of the libel. Erroneous details which do not
aggravate the defamatory allegation may be ignored. Thus to say of someone
that he has been convicted of travelling in a train without a ticket and fined £9
and three weeks’ imprisonment in default may be justified by establishing that
he was sentenced to two weeks’ imprisonment in default. 218 But if the
defamation consists of several distinct allegations, all must be justified seriatim.
At common law if the defendant fails in regard to any of them, the plaintiff will
be entitled to a verdict and costs, although the unproved charge could have
caused no appreciable damage in view of the truth of the rest. Hence, where the
plaintiff was described as a blackmailer, liar, swindling share pusher and illegal
immigrant, the defendant was held liable in the amount of £50 because he was
unable to prove the last, and relatively least infamous, of the charges. 219 On the
other hand, if several allegations have a common sting (a question of degree), it
is sufficient to justify the sting, for example, promiscuity in case of several
separate episodes. 220 A further amelioration of the stricture of the defence of
justification is the defence of contextual truth now available under the national,
uniform defamation laws. 221
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Repetition of a libel cannot be justified merely by proving that it was a true
report of what was said by someone else: otherwise too glib an excuse would be
at hand for perpetuating and spreading calumnies under the facile guise of
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cautioning that “it is rumoured” or “I was told”. 222 Not even expressions of
doubt or disbelief furnish excuse, 223 though the unqualified refutation of a libel
may draw its sting. 224 The press has to bear the brunt of this rule, mitigated
only by qualified privilege for good faith reporting in a narrow range of
situations. A more general defence, once advocated in Australia, would protect a
defendant who published, without adoption or influence, a statement attributed
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to a person other than his or her employee or agent, where it was reasonable to
publish it, and subject to a right of reply. 225
With respect to such common news items as that a prosecution has been
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launched against the plaintiff or that the police are inquiring into his or her
affairs, the threshold question must be whether it was reasonably capable of
being understood as nothing but a factual report that a charge was made (and
217 Howden v Truth Ltd (1937) 58 CLR 416. See also Cross v Queensland Newspapers [2008]
NSWCA 80 at [71] (Beazley JA).
218 Alexander v NE Rly (1865) 6 B & S 340; 122 ER 1221; Sutherland v Stopes [1925] AC 47 at
79-80.
219 But he may plead justification to only parts of the allegations, if they are severable from the
rest: Becker v Smith’s Newsp [1929] SASR 469; and see Plato Films v Speidel [1961] AC
1090 at 1142; in which case the jury must be cautioned not to award damages for those parts
which have been proved justified: Cohen v Mirror Newsp [1971] 1 NSWLR 623 (CA).
220 Polly Peck v Trelford [1986] QB 1000 (CA); Woodger v Fed Capital Press (1992) 107 ACTR
1. See below [25.xxx].
221 See below [25.xxx].
222 Truth (NZ) v Holloway [1960] 1 WLR 997: [1961] NZLR 22 (PC); Wake v Fairfax [1973] 1
NSWLR 43; Douglas v Tucker [1952] 1 SCR 275. But see Aspro Travel v Owners Abroad
Group [1996] 1 WLR 132 at 140. That someone else was the first defamer does not even
mitigate damages, though it may help to disprove malice: below, [25.xxx].
223 Savige v News Ltd [1932] SASR 240.
224 Sergi v Australian Broadcasting Commission [1983] 2 NSWLR 669 (jury question whether
the “antidote destroyed its bane”).
225 ALRC, at [165]ff. Contrast NSWLRC (1995), at [12.22]-[12.25].

implying at worst that there were grounds for suspicion) or of actually

suggesting guilt. The former may be justified for all practical purposes by simply
establishing the accuracy of the report, but the latter demands nothing less than
proof of guilt in order to meet the sinister slant implanted into the story. 226 This
important distinction at once allows sufficient latitude for fearless reporting of
“straight news”, while exacting a toll from the less responsible press for the
luxury of pregnant headlines and sensational embellishments.
If a defendant seeks to justify all the defamatory matters, and these consist
partly of statements of fact and partly of comment, he or she must under that
plea prove not only the truth of the facts but also the comment. 227 Not that he
would assume the higher burden of seeking to justify comment as being true,
unless the defence of fair comment was precluded, for example because the
comment was inspired by malice. But how can statements of opinion ever be
proved true? Literally this is of course impossible, but the defendant apparently
acquits himself by establishing that the comment is “accurate, that is actually
justified by, in the sense of being implicit in, the facts which are stated and
proved to be true”. 228 In other words, the facts must warrant the imputation,
and they do not, unless the jury agrees with the defendant that it is a conclusion
which ought to be drawn from those facts. 229
Because of the procedural and substantive difficulties of establishing the
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defence of justification, defendants might prefer to rely on qualified privilege
instead; though by shifting the focus from truth to malice or improper motive,
the action can no longer lead to an unequivocal vindication of the plaintiff.
AF
Public interest and public benefit
[25.200] To admit truth alone as a complete defence is open to the objection
that it condones embarrassing exposures of purely private matters, lacking any
countervailing public interest, which is a significant shortcoming where the
common law does not recognise an enforceable right to privacy. 230 As early as
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1849 a distinguished Select Committee of the House of Lords therefore

recommended that in both civil and criminal proceedings truth should be a
defence if, but only if, the publication was for the public benefit. This proposal
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was embodied in Lord Campbell’s Libel Act 1843 for criminal but not civil
proceedings.
In New South Wales the Committee’s recommendation was fully adopted in
1847, presumably in order to assist the social integration of former convicts. 231
Until the introduction of the national, uniform defamation laws, this test
226 Lewis v Daily Telegraph [1964] AC 234; Hayward v Thompson [1982] QB 47; Mirror
Newspaper v Harrison (1982) 149 CLR 293; Sergi v Australian Broadcasting Commission
[1983] 2 NSWLR 669 at 676-679; Amalgamated Television Services v Marsden (1998) 43
NSWLR 158 at 166-167 (Hunt CJ at CL); Favell v Queensland Newspapers (2005) 221 ALR
186 at 190 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ); Sands v Channel Seven Adelaide
(2009) 104 SASR 452 and note Stern v Piper [1997] QB 123 (CA). Indeed, at common law, a
conviction was not even admissible in evidence (being treated as a mere opinion of guilt):
Goody v Odhams Press [1967] 1 QB 333; contra: Jorgensen v News Media [1969] NZLR
961 (CA). Statutes have made certain convictions conclusive: see Defamation Act 2005
(NSW), s 42 and equivalent provisions in the remaining jurisdictions.
227 Walker v Hodgson [1909] 1 KB 239 at 253; Sutherland v Stopes [1925] AC 47 at 62-63,
73-75, 95; Truth (NZ) v Avery [1959] NZLR 274. Below, [25.xxx].
228 See Goldsbrough v Fairfax (1934) 34 SR (NSW) 524 at 530 (Jordan CJ).
229 Hunt v Star Newspaper [1908] 2 KB 309 at 320.
230 As to the development of the right to privacy in Australia, see Chapter 26.
231 For an historical analysis of this legislation, see Mitchell, “The Foundations of Australian
Defamation Law” (2006) 28 Sydney Law Review 477.

applied in Queensland, Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory, 232 while
in New South Wales “public benefit” was replaced by “public interest”, a
somewhat wider and more familiar concept from the defence of fair comment,
which is decided by the judge rather than the jury. 233 The remaining common
law jurisdictions, however, were so opposed to the proposed adoption of this
model that it became the stumbling block to a uniform defamation law for
Australia.
The protection sought by the formula was really for privacy rather than
reputation, and needed as much for non-defamatory as for defamatory
allegations. But in the absence of an independent action for invasion of privacy
against unjustifiable public disclosure of private facts, it served at least as a
second best. 234
Following the introduction of the national, uniform defamation laws, the
common law position of truth alone as a complete defence to defamation has
been enacted across Australia. 235 There is no longer an additional requirement
of proof of “public interest” or “public benefit” in any jurisdiction. Those
jurisdictions previously requiring such proof dropped their insistence upon this
element of the defence of justification as part of the negotiations towards
reaching a national consensus. Non-defamatory disclosures invasive of privacy
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will now need to be protected by some other means. 236
Polly Peck defence
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[25.210] At common law, where a matter complained of contains several
stings, a plaintiff can elect to rely upon one or more stings, whilst ignoring
others. As, in the ordinary course, the defendant’s plea of justification has to
meet the plaintiff’s pleaded case, the defendant cannot succeed by justifying
upon which the plaintiff does not rely. 237 The English courts have attempted to
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overcome the potential disadvantage this approach poses to defendants by the

introduction of the Polly Peck plea or defence. Properly understood, the Polly
Peck defence allows a defendant to identify meanings in the matter not relied
upon by the plaintiff and, taking the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s meanings
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together, to extract a common sting between those meanings and to justify the
common sting, rather than the plaintiff’s pleaded meanings. 238 The Polly Peck
defence is often allied to, or conflated with, another decision of the English
Court of Appeal, Lucas-Box v News Group Newspapers. 239 A Lucas-Box plea
allows a defendant to deny the meaning pleaded by the plaintiff and to
particularise and justify his or her own meaning. In the United Kingdom, Polly
Peck and Lucas-Box pleas have been used to clarify the parties’ competing
232 Defamation Act 1889 (Qld), s 15 (repealed); Defamation Act 1957 (Tas), s 15 (repealed);
Defamation Act 1901 (ACT), s 6.
233 Defamation Act 1974 (NSW), s 15 (repealed).
234 Rolph, “Preparing for a Full-Scale Invasion: Truth, Privacy and Defamation” (2007) 25(3/4)
Communications LB 5.
jurisdictions.
236 As to the development of the right to privacy in Australia, see Chapter 26.
237 Polly Peck v Trelford [1986] QB 1000 at 1032 (O’Connor LJ).
238 Polly Peck v Trelford [1986] QB 1000 at 1032 (O’Connor LJ).
239 Lucas-Box v News Group Newspapers [1986] 1 All ER 177.

approaches to defamatory meaning, without the controversy and case law

which have attended such pleas in Australia. 240
The Polly Peck defence has had a decidedly mixed reception in Australia.
After an initial welcome in a number of jurisdictions, 241 the Polly Peck defence
was trenchantly criticised by Brennan CJ and McHugh J in the High Court’s
decision in Chakravarti v Advertiser Newspapers (1998) 193 CLR 519. The
criticisms turned upon the inevitable and undesirable abstraction of any
“common sting” identified by a defendant and the failure of such a pleading to
meet the plaintiff’s claim, thereby being prejudicial and embarrassing to a fair
trial of the plaintiff’s case. 242 Subsequently, the Victorian Court of Appeal
sought to circumscribe the Polly Peck defence to take into account of the
criticisms made in Chakravarti v Advertiser Newspapers (1998) 193 CLR 519,
allowing such a defence to be pleaded only in circumstances where the
defendant’s pleaded meaning is not substantially different from, or more
injurious or serious than, the plaintiff’s pleaded meaning. 243 In those terms,
such a defence could only ever have a very narrow scope of operation.
The question has been asked properly “whether Lord Justice O’Connor could
ever have anticipated that for two decades gallons of ink would be spent in
judicial and academic analysis of his judgment in Polly Peck to no certain
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conclusion”. 244 The Polly Peck defence has the dubious distinction of being
frequently pleaded but rarely successful in Australia. 245 Its lack of success is
intimately connected with the prolixity of pleadings in defamation cases and the
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concern to calibrate precisely issues of fairness to both plaintiff and defendant.
In the larger Australian jurisdictions where the common law largely prevailed
prior to the introduction of the national, uniform defamation laws, the Polly
Peck defence appears to continue, albeit in its highly circumscribed form. 246 In
those Australian jurisdictions, where the imputation rather than the matter
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complained of was the central feature of defamation pleadings prior to the

introduction of the national, uniform defamation laws, there has been an
outright rejection of the Polly Peck defence. 247 The status of the Polly Peck in
Australian defamation law is questionable at best. The High Court of Australia
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has been reluctant to take on and resolve this difficult issue of principle, because
overwhelmingly this issue has been litigated at an interlocutory level, rather than
to final judgment. In any event, the largely inefficacious Polly Peck defence may
have been overtaken by the more broadly based statutory defence of contextual
truth.
240 Kenyon, “Perfecting Polly Peck: Defences of Truth and Opinion in Australian Defamation
Law and Practice” (2007) 29 Sydney Law Review 651.
241 See, for example, Kennett v Farmer [1988] VR 991 at 1000 (Nathan J); Gumina v Williams
(No 2) (1990) 3 WAR 351 (FC).
242 Chakravarti v Advertiser Newspapers (1998) 193 CLR 519 at 527-530.
243 David Syme v Hore-Lacy (2000) 1 VR 667 at 673-674 (Ormiston JA), at 686 (Charles JA).
244 Woodham v John Fairfax Publications (2005) Aust Torts Reports ¶ 81-822 at 68,152
(Nicholas J) (SC(NSW)).
245 Herald & Weekly Times v Popovic (2003) 9 VR 1 at 62 (Gillard AJA).
246 Herald & Weekly Times v Popovic (2003) 9 VR 1 (VSCA); Nationwide News v Moodie
(2003) 28 WAR 314 (FC); Manock v Channel Seven Adelaide (2006)95 SASR 462 (FC); West
Australian Newspapers v Elliott (2008) 37 WAR 387 (FC).
247 See, for example, Robinson v Laws [2003] 1 Qd R 81; John Fairfax Publications v Zunter
[2006] NSWCA 227 at [42] (Handley JA).

Contextual truth
[25.220] The common law approach to the defence of justification can confer a
forensic advantage on a plaintiff in a defamation proceeding. The plaintiff can
elect to complain about certain imputations and refuse to complain about others
conveyed in the same defamatory matter. A defendant cannot justify his or her
publication by proving the substantial truth of the imputations of which the
plaintiff does not complain. The Polly Peck defence may not be of great
assistance to a defendant. The problem facing a defendant is most acute if the
plaintiff complains only of the less serious imputations conveyed in a matter and
does not rely on the more serious ones.
The national, uniform defamation laws introduce a defence which seeks to
overcome the strictures of the common law’s approach to the pleading of
justification. 248 The statutory defence of contextual truth allows a defendant to
do precisely what the common law defence of justification and its variants
forbid him or her from doing – to plead and justify imputations which are
substantially different from those particularised by the plaintiff. 249 The statutory
defence of contextual truth turns upon a potentially difficult evaluative exercise
for the tribunal of fact, namely whether the falsity of the plaintiff’s imputations
do more damage to the plaintiff’s reputation than the substantial truth of the
defendant’s contextual imputations. In certain circumstances, the application of
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this test will be straightforward. For example, the damage done to a plaintiff’s
reputation by a false allegation that the plaintiff has been arrested and charged
with a criminal offence is outweighed by a substantially true allegation that the
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plaintiff in fact committed the offence. However, it is not hard to envisage cases
where the comparison of unlike allegations, conveyed in the same defamatory
matter, would not admit of a ready resolution. 250
Absolute privilege
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[25.230] In certain situations, the law allows one to speak and write without
restraint, even at the expense of another’s good name and character. These are
called privileged occasions. Privilege attaches not to content, but to occasion or
form. 251 What a Member of Parliament says on the floor of the House is
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privileged, but repetition of the same words outside is not; a fair and accurate
report of court proceeding enjoys immunity, but the same information cast in
another form can lay no claim to special protection.
Privilege is admitted in title of a variety of individual and social interests
which are deemed of sufficient importance to displace the countervailing claim
to protection of reputation. 252 The interest may be valued so highly that policy
requires the writer or speaker to be completely immune regardless of his or her
motive in giving currency to the alleged defamation. More frequently, however,
the interest is of lesser weight in the scale of social values, and prevails over the
jurisdictions.
249 Jones v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd (2005) 67 NSWLR 634 at 445 (Simpson J).
250 Jackson v John Fairfax & Sons [1981] 1 NSWLR 36 at 39 (Hunt J).
251 Dingle v Assoc Newspapers [1961] 2 QB 162 at 188. Nor does privilege belong to the
speaker, although it is frequently referred to as an attribute of the person who avails himself
of the defence: see Minter v Priest [1930] AC 558 at 571-572.
252 The protection given to defamation is not coincident with, though to some extent overlaps,
the protection given in many cases against the disclosure in evidence of documents and oral
communications: Gibbons v Duffell (1932) 47 CLR 520 at 529; Minter v Priest [1930] AC
558 at 571, 579-580.

plaintiff’s only if the defendant was using the occasion to further the interest
which the law regards as worthy of protection. In such cases, the privilege is not
absolute but qualified, in the sense that it is forfeited by abuse.
Because of its drastic effect in foreclosing all opportunity for vindicating a
traduced reputation, absolute immunity is but rarely granted, and only as an aid
to the efficient functioning of our governmental institutions: legislative, executive
and judicial. 253 Although prevailing even in the teeth of malice and abuse, it is
of course not accorded for the sake of shielding mischief-makers who have no
claim whatever to the law’s sympathy. Rather, so far-reaching an immunity can
be justified only to protect certain highly placed persons from the harassment of
having to meet unjustified charges of malice or abuse (before somewhat
unpredictable juries) and to remove the dampening effect such a spectre would
inevitably have on the fearless discharge of their official functions. It should be,
and with rare exceptions is, matched by a high sense of responsibility in those
who are its beneficiaries, like judges and Ministers of State, or by other effective
safeguards against flagrant abuse, as in the case of judicial control over the
conduct of witnesses.
Absolute privilege is accordingly limited to the following occasions.
Parliamentary proceedings
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[25.240] A wide area of privilege is devoted to the protection of political
institutions. Thus, absolute immunity attaches to anything “said or done” by
Members of Parliament in the exercise of their duties in the course of
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proceedings of either House, because it is felt that fear of liability might induce
caution destructive of the frankness that the public has a right to expect. This
privilege was established in the course of the constitutional struggle between the
Executive and Parliament and was confirmed by the Bill of Rights. 254 The
privilege is both the Member of Parliament’s and Parliament’s, and can be
waived only by both. 255 It precludes the questioning of anything said or done in
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Parliament, even in defence to an action by a Member of Parliament; and as such

may seriously impair freedom of political debate. 256
The privilege covers not only verbal but equally written speech, such as a
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document tabled in the House and its ancillary preparation. 257 It also covers
parliamentary speeches broadcast over the radio or television. 258 But primarily
253 Mann v O’Neill (1997) 191 CLR 204. See too NSWLRC 75 (1995), at [11.8]-[11.9].
254 (IMP), art 9; Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Cth), s 16. See also now Defamation Act
2005 (NSW), s 27(2)(a) and equivalent provisions in the remaining jurisdictions. This
paragraph is not subject to any geographical limitation cf the pargraph relating to judicial
proceedings, which applies to proceedings before Australian courts and tribunals. In any
event, s 27(2)(c) extends to parliamentary proceedings in other jurisdictions, where those
proceedings would be subject to absolute privilege or the equivalent in those jurisdictions,
255 Reversed by Defamation Act 1996 (UK), s 13, permitting individual MPs to waive the
privilege.
256 See Wright and Advertiser Newspaper v Lenin (1990) 53 SASR 416; Prebble v Television NZ
[1995] 1 AC 321; Laurance v Katter [2000] 1 Qd R 147; Chesterman, “Privileges and
Freedoms for Defamatory Political Speech” (1997) 19 Adel LR 155.
257 Holding v Jennings [1979] VR 289 (dictation to typist). However, see also Erglis v Buckley
[2004] 2 Qd R 599 (respondents who wrote letter to State Minister, knowing that the letter
would be republished in parliament, could be sued for defamation, as to do so did not
impeach or call into question parliamentary privilege).
258 The view expressed by Davis, “Parliamentary Broadcasting and the Law of Defamation”
(1948) 7 U Tor LJ 385 that, statute apart, an MP enjoys at most qualified privilege in respect
of broadcasts is untenable: see Irwin v Ashurst 124 ALR 997 (Ore 1938) (broadcast of

in order to ensure protection for radio and television stations, it has been
specifically enacted in Australia that “no action or proceeding … shall lie against
any person for broadcasting or rebroadcasting any portion of the proceedings of
either House of Parliament.” 259 But repetition outside Parliament, of statements
made inside, are not generally believed to be covered. 260 Absolute immunity has
also been conferred on petitions or submissions made to Parliament. 261
At common law, only qualified privilege attaches to fair and accurate reports
of parliamentary proceedings. 262 An Act of Parliament authorising publication
of any matter would, of course, impliedly give absolute protection to those
acting upon it, but publication of reports or papers by order of either House
alone does not carry similar immunity at common law. 263 However, statute has
conferred absolute privilege upon the publication by authority of either House
of reports, papers, votes or proceedings, by persons so authorised or their
servants. 264 Qualified privilege attaches also to publication of extracts from or
abstracts of papers so ordered to be published. 265
Judicial proceedings
[25.250] Freedom of speech without fear of consequences is considered
indispensable for the proper and effective administration of justice. All concerned
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in judicial proceedings, therefore – from judge and jury to solicitor and counsel,
parties and witnesses – enjoy absolute protection for what they say, 266 conceded
“with the knowledge that courts of justice are presided over by those who from
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judicial proceedings absolutely privileged). Such a conclusion would seriously impede the
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freedom of speech inseparably bound up with our conception of parliamentary democracy.

Nor is it supportable by the decisions cited which establish merely that re-publication of a
parliamentary speech outside the House is not entitled to absolute privilege.
259 Parliamentary Proceedings Broadcasting Act 1946 (Cth), s 15. See also Legislative Assembly
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(Broadcasting) Act 2001 (ACT), s 9; Legislative Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Act (NT),
s 23(2); Constitution Act 1975 (Vic), s 74AA.
260 See Australian Broadcasting Commission v Chatterton (1986) 46 SASR 1 (FC); Beitzel v
Crabb [1992] 2 VR 121; Stopforth v Goyer (1979) 97 DLR (3d) 369 (qualified privilege).
Even the adoption and confirmation outside of parliamentary proceedings of a statement
made in the course of those proceedings, being a fresh publication, may not be protected by
absolute privilege: Buchanan v Jennings [2005] 1 AC 115 (PC).
261 See Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 27(2)(d) and equivalent provisions in the remaining
jurisdictions.
262 Below, [xx.xxx].
263 Stockdale v Hansard (1839) 9 A & E 1; 112 ER 1112.
264 Parliamentary Papers Act 1908 (Cth), s 4; Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Cth), s 11;
Parliamentary Papers (Supplementary Provisions) Act 1975 (NSW); Parliament of
Queensland Act 2001 (Qld), s 56; Constitution Act 1975 (Vic), ss 73 – 74; Parliamentary
Papers Act 1891 (WA), s 1; Legislative Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Act (NT), s 10. The
model is the Parliamentary Papers Act 1840 (ENG), s 2.
265 See below, [xx.xxx].
266 As to the common law position, see Cabassi v Vila (1940) 64 CLR 130; Love v Robbins
(1990) 2 WAR 510; Marrinan v Vibart [1963] 1 QB 528. As to the position under statute, see
Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 27(2)(b) and equivalent provisions in the remaining
jurisdictions. By virtue of s 27(2)(c), the absolute privilege extends to judicial proceedings in
other jurisdictions, where those proceedings would be subject to absolute privilege or the
equivalent in those jurisdictions.

their high character are not likely to abuse the privilege, and who have the
power and ought to have the will to check any abuse of it by those who appear
before them.” 267
The privilege has been extended beyond courts of justice to other tribunals
with “similar attributes”. The line of demarcation, however, is less than precise
if only because it ultimately depends on the cumulative effect of numerous
characteristics rather than on any single element. Each case, it has been
suggested, 268 must be considered in the light of four criteria: first, under what
authority the tribunal acts – it must be “recognised by law”, though not
necessarily set up by legislation, 269 in contrast to purely domestic tribunals.
Secondly, the nature of the question into which the tribunal is to inquire –
whether (like ordinary courts of law) it is an issue “inter partes”. Thirdly, the
procedure adopted by it in carrying out the inquiry, including such matters as its
power to summon witnesses and compel testimony under oath, the prestige of
the presiding officer. Finally, the legal consequences of the conclusion reached by
the tribunal as a result of the inquiry. Courts of law render, of course,
immediately binding decisions, but here it is sufficient if the report of the
tribunal, though in form advisory to a superior authority, has in practice a major
influence on the final decision that is binding and authoritative. 270 However, a
merely preliminary investigation, the report of which could only be remitted to a
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prosecuting authority, would not qualify. 271 In conceding the privilege to a
board of inquiry into police malpractice appointed by the Victorian government,
it was considered important that the tribunal was expected to make a fearless
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investigation of such serious allegations, that its personnel would be peculiarly
vulnerable to actions for defamation in performing their function of examining
witnesses for credibility, and that the procedure, atmosphere and personnel were
those of courts of law. 272 The same conclusion has been reached regarding a
military court of inquiry, 273 proceedings by a justice of the peace for the
reception of a lunatic, 274 hearings by a local authority on a town planning
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scheme, 275 disciplinary proceedings by the Law Society, 276 Benchers of an Inn
of Court 277 or an ecclesiastical commission, 278 and appeals to the Public
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267 Royal Aquarium v Parkinson [1892] 1 QB 431 at 451 per Lopes LJ; Clyne v NSW Bar Assoc
(1960) 104 CLR 186 at 200.
268 Trapp v Mackie [1979] 1 WLR 377 at 379 per Lord Diplock.
269 For example, Lincoln v Daniels [1962] 1 QB 237.
270 As in Trapp v Mackie [1979] 1 WLR 377 (statutory court of inquiry into dismissal of school
teacher, reporting to Secretary of State); Dawkins v Lord Rokeby (1873) LR 8 QB 255
(military court of inquiry). But unlike the EC Commission procedure in Hasselblad v
Orbinson [1985] QB 475 (CA).
271 O’Connor v Waldron [1935] AC 76 (PC) (investigation under Canada anti-trust act).
272 Bretherton v Kaye [1971] VR 111. See also Tampion v Anderson [1973] VR 321. A Royal
Commission might not qualify, being more investigatory than judicial: Douglass v Lewis
(1982) 30 SASR 50, apart from statutes like the: Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth), s 7;
Royal Commissions Act 1991 (ACT), s 19; Royal Commissions Act 1923 (NSW), s 6;
Commissions of Inquiry Act 1950 (Qld), s 20; Royal Commissions Act 1917 (SA), s 16B;
Commissions of Inquiry Act 1995 (Tas), s 8 and Royal Commissions Act 1968 (WA), s 32.
273 Dawkins v Lord Rokeby (1873) LR 8 QB 255; Bamford v Clarke (1876) 14 SCR (NSW)
303.
274 Hodson v Pare [1899] 1 QB 455. A fortiori, petty sessions: Law v Llewellyn [1906] 1 KB 487
(magistrate); Munster v Lamb (1883) 11 QBD 588 (solicitor appearing for the defence).
275 Atkins v Mays [1974] 2 NZLR 459.
276 Addis v Crocker [1961] 1 QB 11. See also Mann v O’Neill (1997) 191 CLR 204.
277 Lincoln v Daniels [1962] 1 QB 237 (CA); Marrinan v Vibart [1963] 1 QB 528.
278 Barratt v Kearns [1905] 1 KB 504.

Service Board in New Zealand; 279 in contrast to hearings of applications for

liquor or dancing licences, 280 public examinations before building tribunals 281
and a creditors’ meeting before an official assignee. 282
The privilege is not confined to statements made in court, but extends to all
preparatory steps taken with a view to judicial proceedings. 283 It includes any
communication by a prospective witness to the parties or their legal advisers, 284
complaints addressed to the proper authority for initiating disciplinary
proceedings against a lawyer 285 and a report by an official receiver to the
court. 286 But the statement or document must be directly concerned with actual
or contemplated proceedings; 287 not just remotely so, like a factual report
containing allegations which merely might provide a ground for future
prosecution 288 or a complaint to an investigating or prosecuting authority. 289
The privilege has been said to apply only to any utterance reasonably related
to the subject of the judicial inquiry, but even if so limited, “relevance” is
liberally interpreted: a statement may qualify which, if false, would not justify a
prosecution for perjury. 290 A witness is not required to guess at his or her risk
whether the testimony may be safely given.
Solicitor and client

[25.260] Professional communications between solicitor and client on matters
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fairly referable to their confidential relationship are privileged, though it is not
certain whether the protection is absolute or qualified. The English Court of
Appeal once chose the former, apparently on the view that the immunity was
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just an aspect of “judicial” privilege, 291 but the House of Lords has reserved the
question for future consideration. 292 On principle, the lesser privilege would
appear sufficient to safeguard effective communication between legal adviser
and client, at any rate if it does not relate to actual or intended litigation, like the
drafting of wills or conveyancing. The privilege, whatever its status, is not
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defeated even by the fact that eventually the solicitor does not accept a
retainer. 293 But the defamatory remark must have been relevant to the
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279 Thompson v Turbott [1962] NZLR 298. Now Defamation Act 1992 (NZ) s 14.
280 Royal Aquarium v Parkinson [1892] 1 QB 431; Attwood v Chapman [1914] 3 KB 275.
281 Jackson-Knaggs v Queensland Newspapers [2005] 2 Qd R 289.
282 Searl v Lyons (1908) 27 NZLR 524.
283 So it would be an abuse of process to permit a defamatory document first disclosed on
discovery to found subsequent action for defamation: Riddick v Thames Bd Mills [1977] QB
881 (CA).
284 Watson v M’Ewan [1905] AC 480; Ronald v Harper [1913] VLR 311; Thompson v Turbott
[1962] NZLR 298; Hasselblad v Orbinson [1985] QB 475 (CA).
285 Hercules v Phease [1994] 2 VR 411 (AD).
286 Bottomley v Brougham [1908] 1 KB 584.
287 It should form “an integral and necessary part of the preparation for and pursuit of the
litigation”: Mann v O’Neill (1997) 191 CLR 204 at 243 per Gummow J.
288 Szalatnay-Stacho v Fink [1947] KB 1.
289 Mann v O’Neill (1997) 191 CLR 204.
290 Seaman v Netherclift (1876) 2 CPD 53 at 60; doubted: Hercules v Phease [1994] 2 VR 411 at
446.
291 More v Weaver [1928] 2 KB 520.
292 Minter v Priest [1930] AC 558. The question of liability for defamation cannot arise unless
the communication has first been admitted in evidence. If privilege from disclosure has not
been waived, cadit quaestio. The latter privilege, however, is that of the client, not the
solicitor: see Minter v Priest [1930] AC 558.
293 Minter v Priest [1930] AC 558.

discussion between the parties in their relationship of solicitor and client, not
irrelevant gossip idly interjected in a professional interview, such as “Have you
heard that Jones has run off with Mrs Brown?” 294
High executive communications

[25.270] With the object of securing the free and fearless discharge of high
public duty, complete protection has also been extended to the executive
department of government. Its limits, however, are as yet less clearly defined.
Absolute immunity does not attach to official communications by all public
servants or persons implementing statutory duties, but is confined to “high
officers of State”. It undoubtedly covers communications between Ministers and
the Crown, or among Ministers themselves. 295 In Isaacs v Cook, 296 it was
applied to a report by the High Commissioner of Australia in the United
Kingdom to the Prime Minister of Australia, but in a later case 297 the High
Court was divided on its application to the annual report furnished by the
Commissioner of Taxation to the Federal Treasurer for presentation to
Parliament. On one view, it stood on a higher plane than the report in Isaacs v
Cook [1925] 2 KB 391 because it was essential that the defendant should not be
deterred by fear of litigation from reporting freely, pursuant to a statutory duty,
on breaches and evasions of the Income Tax Act, 298 besides which the report
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when printed by order of Parliament would also be privileged. 299 But on
another view, the Commissioner’s functions were not of a sufficiently “high
level” and the subject matter too indirectly related to the safety and security of
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the community to merit absolute protection. 300
Besides the speaker being a “high” official, are there any additional limits on
the kind of communication? When it is said that the speaker must be performing
an “act of state”, is more implied than that his or her status be elevated and that
he or she was acting in his official capacity? With the expansion of government,
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the communication may clearly relate to commercial matters, no less than to a

more traditional area of governmental concern like foreign affairs or public
order. 301 Nor would it be compatible with its rationale if the privilege did not
cover communications to “appropriate subordinates”. 302
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On the other hand, the privilege would seem to be clearly confined to

“internal” communications which present less of a menace to private reputation
because their range of dissemination is relatively narrow and the recipient is
usually in a better position to evaluate its accuracy and suppress it if found to be
mischievous. In salutary contrast to American law, 303 press releases are
excluded: however desirable that government policy be explained to the public,
294 More v Weaver [1928] 2 KB 520 at 525.

295 Chatterton v Secretary of State [1895] 2 QB 189.
296 Isaacs v Cook [1925] 2 KB 391.
297 Jackson v Magrath (1947) 75 CLR 293.
298 Starke and Williams JJ.
300 Latham CJ, and Rich J (dissenting on a ground not material for the present purpose). Dixon
and McTiernan JJ found it unnecessary to express an opinion, because there was no evidence
of malice.
301 Peerless Bakery v Watts [1955] NZLR 339 (bread supply); Isaacs v Cook [1925] 2 KB 391
(fruit export).
302 Peerless Bakery v Watts [1955] NZLR 339 (Minister’s order to Wheat Board official).
303 Barr v Mateo 360 US 564 (1959) (5-4), dropped the barrier both in regard to the official’s
rank and the occasion, so long as the communication falls within his official function.

it is not so necessary to the proper functioning of government as to demand a

complete sacrifice of private reputation. 304
Army, police and foreign governments

[25.280] In England, it has been held that a report by a commanding officer of
a regiment to the Adjutant-General is entitled to complete immunity. 305 With
respect to statements made in the course of naval and military duty, the public
interest in permitting free exchange of confidential opinions between officers
discharging responsible duties is perhaps reinforced by the necessity of
maintaining discipline and unquestioning submission to superior authority. The
existence of an absolute privilege in this situation, however, is still an open
question, particularly in so far as its claim involves the doubtful proposition that
matters of military discipline are not cognisable by civil courts. 306 At any rate,
the High Court has refused to extend it to a report by a police inspector to the
Metropolitan Superintendent, because “the discipline of the Force can survive
an investigation of the motives by which he is activated in detracting from the
character of a subordinate”. 307
The privilege does not ordinarily extend to communications by foreign
officials, except perhaps in unprecedented circumstances, as when a foreign
government has been granted asylum as an ally during war. 308 The basis of the
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domestic privilege is public interest, whereas the protection of representatives of
foreign governments is more appropriately founded on diplomatic immunity. 309
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Marital communications
[25.290] Communications between husband and wife enjoy absolute immunity
at common law. 310 This salutary rule used to be attributed to want of any
“publication” in the technical sense, husband and wife being regarded as one in
the eye of the law. But this was a threadbare fiction and difficult in any event to
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reconcile with the rule that a defamatory statement made to one spouse
concerning the other is actionable. 311 More consonant with modern ideas is to
ascribe the conjugal immunity frankly to an absolute privilege in recognition of
the confidential relationship between spouses so as to avoid “results disastrous
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to social life”. 312
Qualified privilege
[25.300] The publication of defamatory statements is in some circumstances
protected by qualified privilege, in recognition of certain necessities of social
intercourse. Unlike absolute immunity, freedom of expression is here safeguarded
only on condition that the publication is made to serve the legitimate purpose of
the privileged occasion and not some ulterior motive, foreign to the interest for
304 They do however enjoy qualified privilege under widespread statutes: below, [xx.xxx].
305 Dawkins v Lord Paulet (1869) LR 5 QB 94.
306 Gibbons v Duffell (1932) 47 CLR 520 at 520, 526-527, 531, 534.
307 Gibbons v Duffell (1932) 47 CLR 520 at 528; cf Merricks v Nott-Bower [1965] 1 QB 57.
Nor is there any longer a categorical Crown privilege to withhold such a report from
evidence: Conway v Rimmer [1968] AC 910.
308 Szalatnay-Stacho v Fink [1947] KB 1; cf Richards v Naum [1967] 1 QB 620.
309 Cf Wright v Cantrell (1943) 44 SR (NSW) 45.
310 Wennhak v Morgan (1888) 20 QBD 635.
311 Wenman v Ash (1853) 13 CB 836; 138 ER 1432.
312 Wennhak v Morgan (1888) 20 QBD 635 at 639. See Prosser & Keeton, p 824, Rest 2d,
s 592.

the protection of which the privilege is accorded. Qualified privilege may defeat
the law’s protection of reputation in title of a wide variety of competing
interests. Initially concerned with private and confidential communications on
matters of mutual interest, their range has expanded in step with developing
notions of social importance. 313 The most comprehensive formula to describe
these situations is that the occasion must be one “where the person who makes
[the] communication has an interest or a duty, legal, social or moral, to make it
to the person to whom it is made, and the person to whom it is so made has a
corresponding interest or duty to receive it”. 314 The underlying justification is
that the defence serves “the common convenience and welfare of society.” 315
The occasions qualifying for privilege can never be catalogued and rendered
exact. New arrangements of business and habits of life may project patterns
which, though different from well settled instances of privilege, could nonetheless
fall within the flexible definition referred to. The legal concepts employed for
determining the incidence of privilege, like “interest” and “duty”, are sufficiently
flexible to permit courts to individualise decisions somewhat reminiscent of
negligence litigation, though here the judge’s control is much greater than the
jury’s. It is for the judge alone to determine as a matter of law upon undisputed
facts, or if the facts are disputed, upon facts as found by the jury, whether an
occasion is privileged. 316 If answered in favour of the defendant, the questions
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whether the publication is in fact privileged or the defendant has abused the
privilege are for the jury. 317
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There are no rigid categories of qualified privilege, and in many cases the
defence may succeed on more than one specific ground. But, for the sake of
convenience, the subject can be summarised under the headings below.
Performance of a duty
[25.310] A statement made in the discharge of some public or private duty,
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whether legal or moral, is conditionally privileged, provided it is communicated

to one who has a reciprocal interest in receiving it. 318 It was once thought
sufficient that the recipient had a legitimate interest in the information even in
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the absence of any corresponding obligation in the publisher to impart it to him.

But the scope of the privilege was considerably narrowed in Watt v Longsdon 319
which held that a stranger was not privileged to make disclosures to a wife
reflecting on the morals and integrity of her husband. Notwithstanding the
legitimate concern of spouses in each other’s conduct, the law did not recognise
a social obligation in a stranger to interfere, particularly when the information
emanated from a doubtful source and no effort was made to seek corroboration.
Moreover, the privilege fails if the recipient actually lacks the required interest
313 See Slaughter, “The Development of Common Law Defamation Privileges: From
Communitarian Society to Market Society” (1992) 14 Cardozo L Rev 351. The extension to
matters of public interest (by statute and constitutional interpretation) are noted later.
314 Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309 at 334 (Lord Atkinson).
315 Toogood v Spyring (1834) 1 CM & R 181; 149 ER 1044 at 193 (CM & R 181), 1049 (ER)
per Parke B.
316 Guise v Kouvelis (1947) 74 CLR 102 at 116.
317 In South Australia, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory, juries are no
longer used in defamation cases. See above [xx.xxx].
318 Toogood v Spyring (1834) 1 CM & R 181; 149 ER 1044 at 193 (CM & R), 1049 (ER) per
Parke B.
319 Watt v Longsdon [1930] 1 KB 130.

though the defendant honestly and reasonably believes he has it. 320 Both rules
are widely felt to be unduly restrictive: their legislative reversal in New South
Wales 321 has now been enacted across Australia in the statutory defence of
qualified privilege as part of the national, uniform defamation laws. 322
Whether there is a moral or social duty to convey the information must be
determined by reference to the standard of values entertained by persons of
ordinary intelligence and moral principle in the community. 323 “Moral duty”
does not imply that anyone who failed to make the communication would
necessarily be regarded by his or her fellows as open to censure, but rather that it
was made on an occasion when one who desired to do his or her duty to his or
her neighbour would reasonably believe that he or she ought to make it. 324
Occasionally, the duty to give information may be public in character, such as to
give information of suspected crime to the police. 325 In a leading case, 326
certain charges had been preferred by a Member of Parliament against a high
ranking officer. The Army Council instituted an investigation and later made a
pronouncement which, in the course of exonerating him, incidentally passed
defamatory strictures upon his accuser. The Council authorised its publication
in the press, but was held entitled to claim privilege on the ground that the
statement had been made in discharge of a public obligation. Moreover, having
regard to the fact that the accusation had been made in Parliament, publication
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of the refutation in the press was not unduly wide to be considered abusive.
The law acknowledges more readily a duty to speak if the statement is made
in answer to a specific inquiry rather than volunteered. One of the most
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common instances of privilege is that of a former employer giving the character
of a discharged servant at the request of someone proposing to engage him or
her. 327 Similar protection is accorded to a report requested by an employer from
one employee on another, 328 to an accusation against a third party in reply to a
police inquiry, 329 or to a requested report from one businessman on the
financial standing of a prospective customer. 330
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Some uncertainty remains regarding the position of commercial credit

agencies and trade protection societies which supply information concerning the
financial credit of others at the request of trade subscribers. In Macintosh v
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Dun 331 the Privy Council denied protection to an organisation conducted as a

pure business venture, on the ground that it was not in the public interest to
protect communications made from motives of self-interest by persons who
trade for profit in the character of other people. The defendants’ contractual
duty to supply the information desired by customers could not by itself create a

321 Defamation Act 1974 (NSW), ss 21, 22 (repealed).
322 See Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 30(1)(a), 30(2) and equivalent provisions in the
remaining jurisdictions.
323 Stuart v Bell [1891] 2 QB 341 at 350; Watt v Longsdon [1930] 1 KB 130 at 153.
324 Howe v Lees (1910) 11 CLR 361 at 369.
325 Tipene v Apperley [1981] NZ Recent Law 110.
326 Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309. See also Musgrave v Commonwealth (1937) 57 CLR 514;
Dunford v News Media [1971] NZLR 961.
327 Toogood v Spyring (1834) 1 CM & R 181; 149 ER 1044 at 193 (CM & R), 1049 (ER).
328 Riddick v Thames Bd Mills [1977] QB 881 (but for such intra-mural communications the
common employer is not absolutely privileged as urged by Lord Denning (“no publication”)).
329 Kine v Sewell (1838) 3 M & W 297; 150 ER 1157.
330 Robshaw v Smith (1878) 38 LT 423.
331 Macintosh v Dun [1908] AC 390; 6 CLR 303.

social duty recognised by law for the welfare of the general public. This decision
has been generally criticised as insensitive to legitimate business needs, especially
in our modern credit economy. Its effect is now nullified by a subsection in the
national, uniform defamation laws, which provides that merely because a
defendant is publishing for reward does not preclude him or her from relying
upon a defence of qualified privilege. 332 Moreover, later decisions both in
Australia 333 and England 334 re-established the privilege for persons and
organisations who are themselves interested in trade and maintain a trade
protection service for their own common advantage. For example, in Howe v
Lees, 335 stock and station agents who carried on business in the Bendigo sale
yards formed an association under the rules of which a member was obliged,
under penalty, to report to the secretary any purchaser who did not settle his
accounts within four days after sale. An honest but mistaken report regarding
the plaintiff was held privileged. 336 On the other hand, in the context of banker
and customer, the High Court of Australia has recently held that a bank cannot
rely on a defence of qualified privilege where it mistakenly informs a person
presenting a cheque drawn upon a customer’s account to “Refer to drawer”, as
there is no “community of interest” between the bank and the person presenting
the cheque. 337
A duty to speak may arise even when information was not solicited. Certain
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relations, like that of employer and employee 338 or father and child, 339 justify
volunteered statements by one or the other relevant to their duties and interests.
A parent may warn his daughter against the character of her suitor, but
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unsolicited interference in family affairs by outsiders is not regarded as
legitimate, save in very exceptional circumstances. 340 In general it is true to say
that, while more in the way of good reason to speak is required from a
volunteer, the absence of a request is merely one of the factors to be considered
in determining whether the occasion warranted the defendant’s conduct.
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Protection of an interest
[25.320] By analogy to self-defence against physical aggression, 341 qualified
privilege attaches to statements made for the protection of the publisher’s own
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legitimate interests. Thus statements in self-defence are protected, if made by a

person in reply to attacks upon his own character or conduct, or in protection of
an employer against attacks on him or her, or in protection of his or her own
proprietary interests or those of his or her employer against attacks upon such
interests. For example, a newspaper editor may defend himself not only against
attacks upon him as a person and journalist, but may also defend the reputation
of the company and newspaper because of his personal interest in the
jurisdictions. See also Bashford v Information Australia (Newsletters) (2004) 218 CLR 366
at 378 (Gleeson CJ, Hayne and Heydon JJ).
333 Howe v Lees (1910) 11 CLR 361.
334 London Assoc for Protection of Trade v Greenlands [1916] 2 AC 15.
335 Howe v Lees (1910) 11 CLR 361.
336 The distinction thus drawn was doubted by Lord Parker in London Assoc for Protection of
Trade v Greenlands [1916] 2 AC 15 at 42, and Scrutton LJ in Watt v Longsdon [1930] 1 KB
130 at 148.
337 Aktas v Westpac Banking Corporation (2010) 268 ALR 409.
338 Cooke v Wildes (1855) 5 E & B 328; 119 ER 504.
339 Todd v Hawkins (1837) 8 C & P 88; 173 ER 411.
340 Watt v Longsdon [1930] 1 KB 130.
341 Norton v Hoare (No 1) (1913) 17 CLR 310 at 318, 322.

enterprise. 342 So a daughter is entitled to vindicate her father’s memory,

because her filial interest makes it proper for her to give an answer to any slurs
cast upon him. 343 Not, however, a radio journalist interviewing the person
attacked. 344
Some latitude is granted for the reply. 345 If in defence to an attack by A, B
defames C, he or she will be protected, so long as the reflection on C is
reasonably incidental to the refutation. 346 But just as in case of physical attack,
the permissible scope of self-defence is exceeded if the reply becomes a
counterattack with accusations unrelated or “insufficiently related” to the
original attack. 347 The privilege is a shield, not a sword.
No privilege attaches unless the communication is made to a person with a
corresponding interest or duty to receive it. Whether such reciprocity either of
interest or duty exists must vary with the facts of each case, but it seems clear
that where the defamatory matter is published in self-defence or in protection of
an interest or by way of vindication against an attack, the concept of
corresponding duty or interest in the recipient is liberally interpreted. 348 The
proper test is: “Would the great mass of Australians of ordinary intelligence and
moral principle have recognised that the occasion or exigency warranted the
communication?” 349 Thus every citizen may inform the police of suspected
crime 350 or address to his or her Member of Parliament any grievance
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concerning a public official. 351 He or she does, however, take the risk that the
addressee is the proper authority for dealing with the complaint. 352 In Mowlds
v Fergusson, for example, a police inspector, in reply to serious criticism levelled
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against him by a Royal Commissioner in relation to a matter involving the
plaintiff’s conduct, furnished a report at the Premier’s request which contained
defamatory allegations concerning the plaintiff. He showed it to his former
superior who had since retired from the service. This communication was held
to be privileged, because the latter had a moral concern in knowing the
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342 Penton v Calwell (1945) 70 CLR 219; Norton v Hoare (No 1) (1913) 17 CLR 310. But he or
she may not claim privilege for a reply to an attack on newspapers generally.
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343 Bowen-Rowlands v Argus Press (1926), cited by Dixon J in Loveday v Sun Newspaper
(1938) 59 CLR 503 at 519-520.
344 Radio 2UE Sydney v Parker (1992) 29 NSWLR 448 (CA).
345 But no riposte is permitted to the original defamer: Kennett v Farmer [1988] VR 991; Echo
Publications v Tucker [2007] NSWCA 73 at [79]-[81] (Hodgson JA).
346 Watts v Times Newspapers [1996] 2 WLR 427 (CA); Loveday v Sun Newspaper (1938) 59
CLR 503 at 520.
347 News Media v Finlay [1970] NZLR 1089 (CA) (a case of tit-for-tat); Douglas v Tucker
[1952] 1 DLR 657.
348 “The law has not restricted the right within any narrow limits” (Adam v Ward [1917] AC
309 at 329 (Lord Dunedin)).
349 Mowlds v Fergusson (1940) 64 CLR 206 at 220 (Williams J).
350 Since the tort of malicious prosecution (a special form of defamation) provides additional
protection in requiring lack of probable cause (plus malice) (below, [xx.xxx]), this should
apply here also.
351 R v Rule [1937] 2 KB 375. The MP may likewise be privileged in passing it on and replying:
Beach v Freeson [1972] 1 QB 14; Moran v Chapman (No 2) [1935] VLR 13.
352 Hebditch v MacIlwaine [1894] 2 QB 54; Beach v Freeson [1972] 1 QB 14. Under the
statutory defence of qualified privilege, embodied in the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 30
and equivalent provisions in the remaining jurisdictions, the mistaken character of the
recipient in all cases of qualified privilege is excused by reasonable belief of the defendant.
The common law rule seems to confuse mistaken belief in the existence of a privilege with
whether the recipient has the correct qualifications. Rest 2d, s 595 applies reasonable belief
to both.

consequences of his own past administration and an interest to hear his former
subordinate’s answer to the comments made upon him. Besides, he was a person
to whom the defendant might legitimately look to for support in his process of
vindication. 353 In certain cases, a person may even resort to the public press. If
attacked in public, she is free to place her case before the body whose judgment
the attacking party has sought to effect, and this may comprise the entire public,
for example where she is seeking to repel an attack made on her in Parliament 354
or the plaintiff has herself chosen the press for the purpose of giving publicity to
her own animadversions against the defendant. 355
Statements invited by plaintiff

[25.330] Resembling retorts to an attack are communications procured at the
complainant’s own request or contrivance. By instigating the defamatory
publication himself, a plaintiff stands to forfeit his claim to protection either on
the ground of consent or, more often, by conferring on the defendant a qualified
privilege to reply. 356 He will be deemed to have consented if he feeds false
information to a newspaper, 357 sets afloat compromising rumours about
himself, or deliberately entraps the defendant into making or repeating a
defamatory allegation for the sole purpose of suing thereon. 358 But merely
initiating a public discussion about oneself is not an invitation to defame; 359
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even a challenge “Publish if you dare” implies not consent, but defiance. 360
If, in contrast, the defamatory reply is made to a legitimate inquiry by the
plaintiff or his or her agents anxious to obtain information or trace a rumour to
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its source, it becomes decisive whether the calumny originated with the
defendant. For if it did, he may not with impunity repeat, 361 as distinct from
merely acknowledge, 362 his former allegation; otherwise, however, he is
conditionally privileged to answer the inquiry. 363
Common interest
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[25.340] A communication on a subject in which the defendant and the

recipient share a common legitimate interest is privileged. Although “interest” is
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353 Mowlds v Fergusson (1940) 64 CLR 206 at 215 (Dixon J); adopting Rest 2d, s 594, cmt g.
354 Penton v Calwell (1945) 70 CLR 219; Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309.
355 Loveday v Sun Newspaper (1938) 59 CLR 503. The newspaper enjoys a corresponding
“derivative” privilege: below, [25.xxx].
356 The distinction between consent and privilege is shadowy, and neither courts nor writers
have contributed much to its clarification: see Loveday v Sun Newspaper (1938) 59 CLR 503
at 523-525.
357 As Mr Corrigan did in Cassidy v Daily Mirror [1929] 2 KB 331.
358 Jones v Brooks (1974) 45 DLR (3d) 413; King v Waring (1803) 5 Esp 13; 170 ER 721 at 15
(Esp), 722 (ER); Weatherston v Hawkins (1786) 1 TR 110; 99 ER 1001. Rudd v Cameron
(1912) 26 OLR 154 treats this situation as one of privilege; the defendant lost on proof of
malice. Note also that it is not prejudicial for one libelled in a newspaper to buy a copy to
prove publication, because purchase is free to all: Brunswick v Harmer (1849) 14 QB 185;
117 ER 75.
359 Loveday v Sun Newspaper (1938) 59 CLR 503 at 513-514; Church of Scientology v
Anderson [1980] WAR 71 (radio talk-back session).
360 Orr v Isles (1965) 83 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 303 at 325. Just as one does not consent to a battery
by resisting a threat and daring the other to hit him.
361 Smith v Mathews (1831) 1 M & Rob 151; 174 ER 52; Griffiths v Lewis (1845) 7 QB 61; 115
ER 411.
362 Freeman v Poppe (1905) 25 NZLR 529; Griffiths v Lewis (1845) 7 QB 61; 115 ER 411 at 65
(QB).
363 Taylor v Hawkins (1851) 16 QB 308; 117 ER 897; Ryan v Newman (1882) 3 LR (NSW)
309; but cf Andrews v Ginn (No 2) [1933] NZLR 1073.

not used in any technical sense, it has been narrowly construed to include only
“real and direct personal, trade, business or social concern[s]”, 364 “such as
would assist in the making of an important decision or determining of a
particular course of action”. 365 It must be something more than mere curiosity
in the private affairs of other people. For this reason, the law has stoutly refused
to recognise any community of interest between a newspaper and the general
body of its readers which could justify the communication to them of
imputations against another person. 366 Even the common link between members
of a national minority group does not supply a sufficient mutual interest to
permit one of them to broadcast calumnies against another among the group as
a whole. 367 Exceptionally, however, the use of a newspaper as a medium of
communication is permissible, provided the paper is really only an enlarged
circular 368 restricted to the particular group which shares a legitimate common
interest with the publisher. 369 The limitation of the common law defence of
qualified privilege, imposed by the requirement of complete reciprocity of duty
and interest between publisher and recipient respectively, was an important
reason for the development of the statutory defence of qualified privilege, which
does not turn upon this element. 370
Mutuality of interest is often encountered when there is also a moral,
sometimes even a legal, duty to make the communication to the other person.
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Usually the common interest is pecuniary, arising from association between the
parties for business purposes, as in the case of discussion of company affairs
among shareholders 371 or intra-mural reports about an employee. 372 Again, a
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mutual interest arises from professional association like a trade union 373 or in
respect of statements made to a disciplinary body and the communication of its
findings to an appellate domestic tribunal. 374 The relationship of landlord and
tenant justifies complaints by one to the other concerning the conduct of other
tenants, lodgers or persons employed on the premises, 375 while democracy
demands protection for communications between electors, as well as between
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candidates and electors, regarding any matter which may properly affect their
choice at the ballot. 376
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364 Telegraph Newspaper v Bedford (1934) 50 CLR 632 at 662 (Evatt J).
365 Austin v Mirror Newspapers [1986] AC 299 at 311.
366 Telegraph Newspaper v Bedford (1934) 50 CLR 632; Antonovich v WA Newspaper [1960]
WAR 176; Smith’s Newspaper v Becker (1932) 47 CLR 279 at 304. However, see Carleton v
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (2002) 172 FLR 398 at 424 (Higgins J) (television
broadcast on another channel’s media ethics privileged occasion).
367 Andreyevich v Kosovich (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 357.
368 Morosi v Mirror Newspapers [1977] 2 NSWLR 749 at 779.
369 Chapman v Ellesmere [1932] 2 KB 431 (racing calendar); Andreyevich v Kosovich (1947) 47
SR (NSW) 357 at 365 (Croatian language); Wells v Wellington [1952] NZLR 312 (trade
union).
370 As to the statutory defence of qualified privilege, see below [xx.xxx].
371 Telegraph Newspaper v Bedford (1934) 50 CLR 632 at 658.
372 Riddick v Thames Bd Mills [1977] QB 881 (CA); Anderson v Ginn (No 2) [1933] NZLR
1073; Sun Life Assurance v Dalrymple [1965] SCR 302.
373 Duane v Granrott [1982] VR 767 (FC).
374 Thompson v Amos (1949) 23 ALJR 98 (HC); Allbutt v General Council of Medical
Education (1889) 23 QBD 400.
375 Toogood v Spyring (1834) 1 CM & R 181; 149 ER 1044.
376 Braddock v Bevins [1948] 1 KB 580 (address distributed to electors); Fraser v Holmes (2009)
253 ALR 538 at 545 (Tobias JA). But the privilege in this situation is narrow. Except under
special conditions relating to communications on “political or government matters” (below,
[25.xxx]), it cannot be claimed for publication in a general newspaper (Jones v Bennett

No privilege arises if the exigency of the occasion does not warrant the
protection of the common interest by the means employed. In Guise v
Kouvelis, 377 a committeeman interfered in a dispute between members of a club
who were playing cards in a room containing some 50 other persons some of
whom were non-members. He charged the plaintiff with being a crook in a loud
voice audible to most of those present. It was held that the interests of the
defendant and the members did not justify a public accusation, because he could
have simply told the plaintiff, without making any defamatory allegation, that
he would report him to the committee. Any such communication would, of
course, have been privileged.
At common law, it must also be reiterated that an interest solely on the part of
the recipient will not qualify under this head or any other: there must
additionally be either a corresponding interest or a duty on the part of the
publisher. This common law principle has been modified under the statutory
defence of qualified privilege, embodied in the national, uniform defamation
laws 378 where it is sufficient that the recipient had an interest or apparent
interest in having information on the subject and the publisher’s conduct was
reasonable in the circumstances.
Government and political matters
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[25.350] At common law, a defamatory publication had until recently no claim
to privilege merely because it dealt with a matter of public interest. 379 True, all
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privilege is based on the publication being “in the public interest”. But from this
does not follow that publication of all matters of public interest is in the public
interest. The common law does not countenance a defence of “fair information
on a matter of public interest”; 380 otherwise there would have been little need
for the special defence of fair comment which, as we shall see, 381 is limited to
comment on true facts. For false factual information to the general public, even
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on matters of public concern, there was no qualified privilege unless there was a
duty or interest to impart such information. Until recently the common law
denied this to the media and others except in very special circumstances, such as
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for replies to public attacks, 382 correction of previously published information,

383
or a public warning against a suspected terrorist, contaminated food or
unsafe gas heaters. 384 Besides, even if some members of the public did have a
[1969] SCR 277; Templeton v Jones [1984] 1 NZLR 448) nor perhaps for speeches to a large
undifferentiated audience: Lang v Willis (1934) 52 CLR 637 at 667, 672. It was virtually
abolished in England by Defamation Act 1952 (UK), s 10.
377 Guise v Kouvelis (1947) 74 CLR 102.
jurisdictions. See further below, [xx.xxx].
379 Truth (NZ) v Holloway [1960] 1 WLR 997 (PC); Brooks v Muldoon [1973] 1 NZLR 1;
Banks v Globe & Mail [1961] SCR 474.
380 Blackshaw v Lord [1984] QB 1 (CA) (even for information emanating from the government
except under statutory privilege: below, [25.xxx]).
382 Above, [25.xxx].
383 Dunford v News Media [1971] NZLR 961.
384 Camporese v Parton (1983) 150 DLR (3d) 208 (BC); Blackshaw v Lord [1984] QB 1; Bowin
Designs v Joyce (1996) A Def R 52-078.

legitimate interest in receiving the information, the publication would often be

excessive to the extent that it reached others who were not qualified. 385
Did this not unduly cramp the public’s “right to know”? First, it must be
remembered that there was no stopping the publication of accurate news.
Moreover, as just mentioned, there is a defence of fair comment on matters of
public interest, provided the comment is based on true facts. The controversial
area was therefore confined strictly to false defamatory statements of fact, and
comment thereon, on matters of public interest. The question boiled down to
whether the free flow of information was unduly stifled by imposing the risk of
good faith factual error (or inability to prove truth) on the press and letting the
fear of large damages chill investigative reporting.
Legislation in Australia 386 has to some extent addressed this concern. 387
Between 1994 and 1997 in Australia there was also the extraction of a
Constitutional defence for political discussion to ensure “the efficacious
working of representative democracy”. Three Justices of the High Court also
declared the discussion of political matters to be an occasion of qualified
privilege, thereby abandoning its traditional scope limited chiefly to private or
small scale communications. 388 Notwithstanding an accompanying dictum to
the contrary, this change seemed destined in practice to overshadow the
constitutional defence, being somewhat easier for defendants. 389
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In Lange v Australian Broadcasting Commission, 390 however, a ground-
breaking judgment of all seven Justices of the High Court both abolished the
newly created constitutional defence and confirmed the extension of common
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law qualified privilege to cover any situation where defamatory material dealing
with “government and political matters” 391 is published to a wide audience.
Echoing long-established authority, 392 it declared that this extension advanced
“the common convenience and welfare of Australian society”. 393 It was
justifiable by virtue of “changing conditions”, notably “[t]he expansion of the
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franchise, the increase in literacy, the growth of modern political structures

operating at both federal and State levels and the modern development in mass
communications, especially the electronic media”. 394
The court attached an important new condition to the defence in this
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expanded range of operation, though not in situations which prior to Lange

were already treated as privileged. An extra requirement must be met by the
385 Unless publication in the media is the “only reasonable mode of communication”: Stephens v
WA Newsp (1994) 182 CLR 211 at 263 (McHugh J). For newspapers addressed only to a
narrow “special interest” group: see above, [25.xxx].
386 Below, [xx.xxx]-[xx.xxx].
387 Faulks, at [214(b)] remained opposed. ALRC at [146] preferred a defence for “attributed
statements”.
388 Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times (1994) 182 CLR 104 at 140. Brennan and
McHugh JJ, dissenting in the accompanying case of Stephens v WA Newsp (1994) 182 CLR
211 at 246-255, 264-266, approved extension, albeit more guarded, of qualified privilege on
matters of public interest emanating from a source with “special knowledge”.
389 See, for example, Peterson v Advertiser Newsp (1995) 64 SASR 157 (FC).
390 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1997) 189 CLR 520.
391 The court did not define this phrase, except to refer to “the activities of government or
politics” (Lange at 566) and to make it clear that it was broad enough to include “matters
concerning the United Nations and other countries” (at 571). Presumably, the affairs of
commercial enterprises would be excluded, even when they affected the lives of many people.
392 Above, [xx.xxx].
393 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 571.

defendant, that of proving “reasonableness of conduct” in publishing the

material. This, said the court, was justifiable because of the much greater
damage to reputation that can be inflicted by a publication to “tens of
thousands, or more, of readers, listeners or viewers”. 395
This requirement of reasonableness will be satisfied, “as a general rule”,
when the defendant “had reasonable grounds for believing that the imputation
was true, took proper steps, so far as they were reasonably open, to verify the
accuracy of the material and did not believe the material to be untrue”. 396 The
defendant must also have “sought a response from the person defamed and
published the response made (if any)”, unless this was “not practicable” or it
was “unnecessary” to provide this opportunity to the plaintiff. 397 The response
of a number of media representatives and media lawyers to this requirement of
reasonableness has been that it would make the defence difficult to invoke
successfully. From their point of view, it would be no better than the statutory
privilege then extant in New South Wales and now exported nationwide under
the national, uniform defamation laws (discussed in the next section, [25.xxx]).
It would appear that this defence has been further narrowed so as only to
apply to matters relating to the legislative and the executive branches of
government. Matters relating to the judicial branch of government would
appear to be specifically excluded from its ambit. 398
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By contrast, in New Zealand, in a case involving the same plaintiff, 399 it has
been held that defamatory material published to the community at large in the
course of political discussion should be protected by qualified privilege without
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any extra requirement of “reasonableness of conduct” or any adjustment of the
rules permitting defeat of the defence on grounds of malice. “Political discussion”
was said to be “discussion which bears upon the function of electors in a
representative democracy by developing and encouraging views upon
government”. 400 It clearly included discussion of the performance while in
office of a former Prime Minister and political party leader. 401
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395 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 572. As to the court’s
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finding of “conformity” between this version of qualified privilege and the constitutional
implication of freedom of political communication, see below, [xx.xxx].
396 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 574. These
ingredients were familiar to the court, as they form part of the test of “reasonableness” under
the Defamation Act 1974 (NSW), s 22 (repealed), the forerunner to the defence discussed in
the next section, [25.xxx]. See also Obeid v John Fairfax Publications (2006) 68 NSWLR
150 at 165 (Hoeben J).
397 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 574. This is almost
wholly new in the common law, though Brennan J (dissenting) incorporated it in his
suggestions for expanding qualified privilege in Stephens v WA Newsp (1994) 182 CLR 211
at 252-253. He indicated that the publication of the plaintiff’s response should be
contemporaneous, if possible, with that of the defamatory material and should be able to
“reach the same audience with the same ease”.
398 Cf John Fairfax Publications v O’Shane (2005) Aust Torts Reports ¶ 81-789 at 67,466-67,
469 (Giles JA), at 67,481-67,488 (Young JA) (CA(NSW)); Herald and Weekly Times v
Popovic (2003) 9 VR 1 at 10-11 (Winneke ACJ), at 51-53 (Gillard AJA), at 103-105
(Warren AJA) (CA(Vic)).
399 Lange v Atkinson [1997] 2 NZLR 22.
400 Lange v Atkinson [1997] 2 NZLR 22 at 46 per Elia J.
401 The New Zealand Court of Appeal twice upheld the approach of the trial judge, once after a
successful appeal to the Privy Council. The Privy Council invited the New Zealand Court of
Appeal to consider the House of Lords’ decision in Reynolds v Times Newspapers [2001] 2
AC 127, which rejected a special variant of qualified privilege for government or political
information, instead preferring a more broadly based extension of the defence. Cf Lange v
Atkinson [2000] 1 NZLR 257 (PC) and Lange v Atkinson [2000] 3 NZLR 385.

Significantly, in the United Kingdom, the House of Lords rejected a specific,

political form of qualified privilege, holding that there was no reason in
principle to distinguish between political matters and other matters of public
concern. 402 Instead, United Kingdom courts have developed a form of qualified
privilege intended to protect and foster responsible journalism. This is similar to
the statutory defence of qualified privilege under Australian defamation law,
and indeed influenced its development. 403 The United Kingdom defence has
been notably more successful than the Australian one. 404
Abuse of privilege
[25.360] Qualified privilege is a conditional defence. It affords immunity to
those alone who use the privileged occasion for the purpose which the law
deems of sufficient social importance to defeat the countervailing claim to
protection of reputation. In other words, the immunity is forfeited by an abuse
of the occasion, and there must be no improper motive on the part of the
publisher.
Excessive communication
[25.370] Some reference has already been made to the rule that the privilege is
lost if the method of its exercise exceeds the reasonable needs of the
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occasion. 405 Thus it is not ordinarily permissible to resort to the press for
communicating privileged information. It is true that a person attacked in public
may legitimately vindicate himself before the same wide audience which has
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become aware of the charges made against him, 406 but in general the individual
or group who have an interest in receiving the information is more limited. The
method of publication must never exceed what is reasonably appropriate for
protecting the particular interest which the defendant is entitled to assert. If, for
example, the occasion is privileged on account of a common interest, the
selected medium of communication must be such as will reasonably ensure that
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the statement is not circulated beyond those who share that interest. 407 This
rule has been somewhat relaxed under the statutory defence of qualified
privilege. 408
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The inclusion of material outside the ambit of the privilege and therefore
itself unprotected does not necessarily destroy the privilege covering the rest; 409
however, it may do so, 410 or it may suggest an improper purpose for the whole.
Immunity covers all incidents of communication conforming with the
reasonable and usual course of business or necessary for the effective exercise of
402 Reynolds v Times Newspapers [2001] 2 AC 127 at 204 (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead).
403 Cf Reynolds v Times Newspapers [2001] 2 AC 127 at 205 (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead);
Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 30(3) and equivalent provisions in the remaining jurisdictions.
As to the statutory defence of qualified privilege, see below [25.xxx].
404 See, for example, Bonnick v Morris [2003] 1 AC 300 (PC); Jameel v Wall Street Journal
Europe [2007] 1 AC 359 (HL); Roberts v Gable [2008] QB 502 (CA); Charman v Orion
Publishing Group [2008] 1 All ER 750 (CA). Cf Seaga v Harper [2009] 1 AC 1 (PC); Flood v
Times Newspapers [2010] EWCA Civ 804.
406 Penton v Calwell (1945) 70 CLR 219; Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309.
407 Contrast Chapman v Ellesmere [1932] 2 KB 431 with Cookson v Harewood [1932] 2 KB
478n.
408 As to the statutory defence of qualified privilege, see below [25.xxx].
409 Dunford v News Media [1971] NZLR 961.
410 Marks v Construction Union (1995) 14 WAR 360.

the privilege. Nowadays dictation of a letter to a typist 411 or telegraphic

communication, 412 if appropriate, is protected to the same extent as the
publication to the addressee. According to the generally accepted view, this is a
derivative privilege ancillary to that covering the resulting message, though
attaching immediately and therefore unimpaired by the fact that the message is
eventually not sent at all or lost. 413 More neatly disposing of these complications
would be Lord Denning’s view that the privilege is original, based on a common
interest between the typist and his or her employer in the writing of the letter,
and not dependent at all on the person to whom it is intended to be sent. 414
Lord Denning’s view would also be helpful where the defamatory letter is
addressed to the plaintiff himself or herself and therefore could not technically
qualify as a “publication” for a derivative privilege to attach. But the more
commonly accepted explanation is that qualified privilege covers all “fairly
warranted” communications between parties to a dispute, including ancillary
incidents of transmission. 415 So also where the defendant makes a defamatory
accusation to the plaintiff in the presence of a disinterested witness: since it is in
the plaintiff’s interest to know what accusation is being brought against him or
her, the confrontation constitutes a privileged occasion, and it does not matter
that it would not in any event have been actionable because lacking the element
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of publication. Once this reasoning is accepted, 416 it is easy to conclude that the
presence of a disinterested witness, as a reasonable precaution, does not defeat
the privilege. 417
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In cases where a secretary or other agent thus participates in a privileged
communication, the latter is also protected, since a privilege would be of no
value if the means for exercising it were not also protected. Such a derivative
privilege may occasionally even be available to the press, for example when a
person publicly attacked is justified in replying through a newspaper. 418 This,
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however, must be clearly distinguished from the more usual situation of a

newspaper speaking for itself, when it must stand or fall on an independent
privilege of its own. 419
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411 Osborn v Boulter [1930] 2 KB 226; Holding v Jennings [1979] VR 289 (absolute privilege).
412 Edmundson v Birch [1907] 1 KB 371.
413 Bryanston Finance v de Vries [1975] QB 703 (CA).
414 Bryanston Finance v de Vries [1975] QB 703. Alternatively, why not treat dictation to an
employee as “no publication” analogous to marital communications?
415 Bryanston Finance v de Vries [1975] QB 703 at 745 (Lawton LJ); Osborn v Boulter [1930] 2
KB 226 (CA).
416 Thus Goodhart, “Defamatory Statements and Privileged Occasions” (1940) 56 LQR 262;
contra: White v Stone [1939] 2 KB 827.
417 Toogood v Spyring (1834) 1 Cr M & R 181; 149 ER 1044 (although this case contains the
classical exposition of qualified privilege by Parke B, reciprocity of interest was not then as
strictly demanded as it is today); Taylor v Hawkins (1851) 16 QB 308; 117 ER 897. Also,
when an unwanted stranger is negligently permitted to eavesdrop, as in White v Stone [1939]
2 KB 827; McNichol v Grandy [1931] SCR 696; or when a shopkeeper publicly accuses a
stranger of shoplifting: Bonette v Woolworths (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 142.
418 Loveday v Sun Newspaper (1938) 59 CLR 503; Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309 at 320
(secretary); Bass v TCN Channel Nine (2003) 60 NSWLR 251 at 253 (Spigelman CJ). For
the effect of malice see below, [25.xxx].
419 Echo Publications v Tucker [2007] NSWCA 73 at [91] (Hodgson JA) (media outlet will lose
benefit of privileged occasion if it endorses attack).

Improper purpose
[25.380] The privilege will be lost if the defamatory statement is published for
an improper purpose. 420 This is commonly expressed by saying that the
publication must not have been “malicious”. But the indiscriminate use of the
term “malice” in this context is apt to mislead, because the immunity is defeated
not only by spite or a desire to inflict harm for its own sake, but by the misuse of
the privileged occasion for some other purpose than that for which it was given
by law. Examples are to cover up a previous misstatement, to discredit a
particular religious or political doctrine avowed by the plaintiff, to compound a
felony rather than pursue an honest inquiry into suspected crime, 421 or
deliberately to distort and sensationalise a news story in order to heighten its
reader appeal. 422 The burden of proof is on the plaintiff. 423
Evidence that the defamatory statement was published for a purpose foreign
to the privileged occasion may be extrinsic or intrinsic. Extrinsic evidence may
be supplied by facts existing before, at, or after the time when it was made. 424
The existence of personal animosity may be one such fact, though only if it
supports an inference that the dominant motive for the publication was spite
and not a sense of duty or the promotion of a legitimate interest. 425 In the
context of communication on government or political matters, the motive of
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causing political damage does not of itself constitute malice. 426 Evidence must
make it probable that the defendant not only harboured a desire to serve some
ulterior purpose, but also that it actuated the making of the defamatory
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statement. 427 If antagonism were of itself sufficient to defeat privilege, the
defence would be of little value; besides involving the startling consequence that,
where the defendant has been himself or herself abused by the plaintiff, the
420 In so far as the cause of action or defence involves the defendant’s belief it may depend on
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confidential sources of information. Disclosure is opposed by the Journalists’ Code of Ethics,

but, at common law, there is no legal privilege to maintain confidentiality (McGuinness v
A-G (1940) 63 CLR 73; A-G v Mulholland [1963] 2 QB 477), though most jurisdictions
recognise a discretionary “newspaper rule” of excusing media from disclosing their sources
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in pre-trial interrogatories or discovery of documents: Fairfax v Cojuangco (1988) 165 CLR

346; also, Broadcasting Corp v A Harvey [1980] 1 NZLR 163 (CA) (matter of course). The
Contempt of Court Act 1981 (ENG), s 10 and widespread “shield laws” in the United States
offer protection against disclosure. Several attempts have been in Australia made to
introduce a satisfactory professional confidential relationship privilege, adequately covering
journalists. See Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), Pt 3.10, Div 1A; cf Evidence Act 1995 (NSW),
Pt 3.10, Div 1A.
421 Hooper v Truscott (1836) 2 Bing NC 457; 132 ER 179; Collerton v MacLean [1962] NZLR
1045.
422 Cf Broadway Approvals v Odhams Press (No 2) [1965] 1 WLR 805.
423 Horrocks v Lowe [1975] AC 135 at 149 (Lord Diplock).
424 See Mowlds v Fergusson (1939) 40 SR (NSW) 311, particularly at 328-330, 332, for the
evaluation of evidence relating to the defendant’s state of mind prior to or after the
publication. After publication: Griffiths v Qld Newsp [1993] 2 Qd R 367 (CA).
425 Note the contrast between cases where the defendant is under a duty by reason of his or her
position to report on the plaintiff, eg because he or she is his supervisor, and cases where
there is no duty to express any opinion about the other except by virtue of some moral or
social obligation. If the existence of strained relations automatically attached the stigma of
malice, the supervisor would not dare furnish any report at all. In such a case, there must be
clear evidence that it was ill-will, not genuine belief, which prompted the adverse criticism:
Oldfield v Keogh (1941) 41 SR (NSW) 206.
426 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 574. Compare the use
of the phrase “dominant motive” in Howell v Haines (1997) Aust Torts Reports ¶ 81-409.

grosser the attack the easier it would be to prove malice. 428 The jury should not
be permitted to speculate on abuse of privilege at all, unless there is sufficient
evidence which definitely, and as a matter of common sense, points to the
inference that an improper motive existed and that it induced the publication of
the libel. It is not sufficient that the evidence gives ground merely for speculation
or conjecture. 429 There is a danger that the protection of privilege becomes
illusory, unless stringent judicial control is maintained over the permissible
function of the jury in these cases.
The contents of the defamatory statement itself may furnish intrinsic evidence
of an improper motive, for example the extravagance of the allegation or the
language in which it is expressed. But here again, “no nice scales” 430 should be
used in weighing the defendant’s expressions for traces of malice. Particularly
when a person has been attacked abusively, the terms of his or her reply must be
measured with some latitude: “it would be singular if an attacked person could
defend himself only if he abated the spirit of his reply to a degree that satisfied
the aggressor”. 431 In the context of communication on government or political
matters, neither “the vigour of an attack” nor “the pungency of a defamatory
statement” is enough of itself to discharge the plaintiff’s onus of proof. 432
Indeed, it has been said that where the only evidence relied on is the content of
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the defamatory matter itself or the steps taken by the defendant to verify its
accuracy, there is only one exception to the requirement that the plaintiff must
show affirmatively that the defendant did not believe it to be true. The exception
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relates to irrelevant matter: not that the mere introduction of objectively
irrelevant matter destroys the privilege; it must support the inference that the
defendant either did not believe it to be true or realised that it had nothing to do
with the particular duty or interest on which the privilege was based, but
nevertheless seized the opportunity to drag in irrelevant matter to vent his or her
spite or for some other improper motive. But again, such an inference should not
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be drawn lightly. 433

Finally, and most importantly, want of genuine belief in the truth of the
statement puts the publisher beyond the pale of privilege because, save in
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exceptional circumstances, 434 one who knowingly asserts a falsehood must be
428 Horrocks v Lowe [1975] AC 135 at 151; Sinclair v Bjelke-Petersen [1984] 1 Qd R 484 (FC).
Still less is the defendant’s refusal to apologise evidence of malice (Loveday v Sun Newspaper
(1938) 59 CLR 503 at 513).
429 Davies v Kott [1979] 2 SCR 686; Oldfield v Keogh (1941) 41 SR (NSW) 206; Godfrey v
Henderson (1944) 44 SR (NSW) 447.
430 Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309 at 330 per Lord Dunedin; Calwell v Ipec (1975) 135 CLR 321;
Pinniger v Fairfax (1979) 53 ALJR 691. See also Lindholdt v Hyer (2008) 251 ALR 514 at
551 (McColl JA) (CA).
431 Muller v Hatton [1952] QSR 150 at 182 (Stanley J).
433 Horrocks v Lowe [1975] AC 135 at 150-151.
434 For example, urgent warning to public of suspected poison (Blackshaw v Lord [1984] QB 1
at 27); also perhaps where defendant affords a forum to rival speakers and believes in their
bona fide belief in the truth: Australian Broadcasting Commission v Comalco (1986) 12 FCR
510 at 547-48 (Smithers J). While the High Court in Lange v Australian Broadcasting
Commission (1997) 189 CLR 520 defined malice in terms of “improper purpose”, in the
context of communication on government or political matters, it did not specifically confirm
that this was constituted by proof of lack of genuine belief in the truth of the statement. See
also Roberts v Bass (2002) 212 CLR 1.

using the privileged occasion for a dishonest and improper purpose. 435 By
analogy to deceit, 436 reckless indifference as to whether the aspersion is true or
false is equated with lack of belief in its truth. But otherwise recklessness, for
example, in the sense of gross and unreasoning prejudice, is not sufficient if the
defendant nevertheless believed the accusation to be true. 437 Still less is mere
want of reasonable grounds: carelessness is not malice. 438
If the publication is made, not in the course of exercising a privilege but to
furnish the other party with a cause of action upon which he or she is challenged
to sue, the defence might well have been regarded as forfeited on the ground that
the object of the publication was unrelated to the interest which is entitled to
protection. 439 Also it could be argued that as the defendant has invited the
plaintiff to sue upon the statement, he or she should not be allowed to rely on
any other defence than justification in order to test the truth of the defamatory
assertion. It has been held, however, that such a challenge is no more than an
invitation to take proceedings following the normal course. 440
Imputed malice
[25.390] Notwithstanding some earlier authority to the contrary, 441 the malice
of any one participant in the defamatory publication cannot be imputed to
another, himself or herself innocent, so as to defeat his or her claim to qualified
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privilege 442 or warrant an award of aggravated damages against him. 443 The
only apparent exception arises in ordinary cases of respondeat superior, when
the malice of an employee or agent who had a hand in the libel is imputed to his
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or her principal. 444 On the other hand, in cases of joint publication, as by
trustees or partners, the malice of one in no way prejudices the independent
privilege of the others. 445 Not even subordinates, like secretaries or printers,
who have in a sense only a derivative privilege, are at the mercy of their
superiors. There may be some theoretical force in the argument that they depend
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435 Clarke v Molyneux (1877) 3 QBD 237 at 247. There is a presumption at common law, but
not in proving “reasonableness” under statutory privilege in New South Wales, that the
defendant believed in the truth: Morgan v Fairfax (1990) 20 NSWLR 511 at 542.
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437 Horrocks v Lowe [1975] AC 135; Fraser v Holmes (2009) 253 ALR 538 at 552 (Tobias JA)
(CA); Roberts v Bass (2002) 212 CLR 1 at 10 (Gleeson CJ).
438 Lange v Atkinson [1997] 2 NZLR 22 at 50 per Elias J.
439 Cf Strang v Russell (1905) 24 NZLR 916 where it was held that although A may have leave
to enter B’s property, yet if he in fact enters not in pursuance thereof but in the exercise of
presumed legal right adverse to B’s claim as owner and with the intention of contesting B’s
right as alleged owner, he cannot set up leave and licence in an action for such entry as a
trespass.
440 Penton v Calwell (1945) 70 CLR 219. “Such a challenge [is but] an invitation to the
adversary to substitute for methods of unregulated and desultory combat a duel to be fought
in legal form with every weapon which the law allows and involving no promise that if it is
accepted the challenger will fire in the air” (Rich J at 248).
441 Smith v Streatfeild [1913] 3 KB 764 (printer); Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309 at 320, 331, 340
(secretary).
442 Egger v Chelmsford (Viscount) [1965] 1 QB 248 (CA); Sun Life Assurance v Dalrymple
[1965] SCR 302; Stephens v WA Newsp (1994) 182 CLR 211 at 253-255 per Brennan J.
443 Egger v Chelmsford (Viscount) [1965] 1 QB 248 at 265; Dougherty v Chandler (1946) 46 SR
(NSW) 370.
444 Webb v Bloch (1928) 41 CLR 331 (solicitor employed by committee to draft circular);
Riddick v Thames Bd Mills [1977] QB 881 at 907-910. But the primary publisher is not
prejudiced by malice of a mere distributing agent: Hay v Australian Institute (1906) 3 CLR
1002; Longdon-Griffiths v Smith [1951] 1 KB 295 at 303.
445 Longdon-Griffiths v Smith [1951] 1 KB 295; Meekins v Henson [1964] 1 QB 472.

on the privilege of their superiors and, when that is gone, there is nothing left to
shield them. Still, the view eventually prevailed that such a principle of
“respondeat inferior” would be altogether too harsh and could be avoided by
treating as wholly independent the questions whether, in the first place, the
occasion was privileged and, secondly, whether any individual’s defence was
defeated by malice. 446 Accordingly, even if all his or her principals are
disqualified, an innocent agent would still be entitled to acquittal.
Statutory qualified privilege
[25.400] New South Wales in 1974, after abandoning its earlier defamation
code, created an additional statutory privilege to protect the informational role
of the media and others. It arose where “(a) the recipient has an interest or
apparent interest in having information on some subject; (b) the matter is
published to the recipient in the course of giving him information on that
subject; and (c) the conduct of the publisher in publishing the matter is
reasonable in the circumstances”. 447 The earlier New South Wales defamation
code and the defamation codes in Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia
(the latter in relation to criminal defamation) all had a defence of qualified
protection. 448 When the national, uniform defamation laws were enacted, it
was the statutory defence of qualified privilege embodied in the Defamation Act
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1974 (NSW), s 22 (repealed), not the codified defence of qualified protection,
which prevailed and was exported across Australia.
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“Interest” is here construed in the broadest popular sense. At common law, it
will be recalled, it is confined to “an interest material to the affairs of the
recipient of the information such as would assist in the making of an important
decision or determining of a particular course of action”. 449 Here, however, it
includes information of any matter of genuine interest to readers of a general
newspaper, such as comment on the manoeuvres of a national politician 450 or
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the training regime of a Rugby League team. 451

The principal accent is on reasonableness, in the belief that only a careful and
honest publication deserves protection. The standard has been interpreted rather
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strictly so that few attempts to use it have been successful. 452 It generally
requires honest belief in the truth 453 (although it has been questioned whether
such belief is necessary for reporting statements by third parties). Relevant
matters, it has been said, include also the manner and extent of publication, the
extent of inquiries made, the degree of care exercised and any knowledge that a
446 Egger v Chelmsford (Viscount) [1965] 1 QB 248.

447 Defamation Act 1974 (NSW), s 22 (repealed). This “conforms” with the implied
constitutional freedom of political communication: see below, [xx.xxx].
448 Defamation Act 1958 (NSW), s 17 (repealed); Defamation Act 1889 (Qld), s 16 (repealed);
Defamation Act 1957 (Tas), s 16 (repealed); Criminal Code Act 1913 (WA), s 357 (repealed).
449 Austin v Mirror Newspapers [1986] 1 AC 299 at 311 (PC); above, [25.xxx].
450 Calwell v Ipec (1975) 135 CLR 321.
451 Austin v Mirror Newspapers [1986] 1 AC 299.
452 See, for example, John Fairfax Publications v Zunter [2006] NSWCA 227. Cf O’Hara v Sims
[2009] QCA 186. See also Seary v Molomby (1999) Aust Torts Reports ¶ 81-536.
453 Morgan v Fairfax (No 2) (1991) 23 NSWLR 374 (CA). It is not necessarily required in cases
involving a telecast: Barbaro v Amalg TV (1989) 20 NSWLR 493 (CA).

misleading impression was likely to be conveyed. 454 The courts have been
particularly insistent on care in verification. 455 Failure to mention the plaintiff’s
denial of the allegations against him may be prejudicial; 456 and disclosure of
informants has been compelled even prior to trial, thus considerably diminishing
the attractiveness of the defence. 457 But a lesser standard of investigative care
has – rightly – been demanded for stories about the public conduct of politicians
than for imputations of sexual impropriety of private persons. 458 Ultimately,
however, “reasonableness is not a concept that can be subjected to inflexible
categorisation”. 459
In case of a newspaper article, if written by a staff journalist, the latter’s
reasonableness is in issue; if written by an independent author, the reasonableness
must be that of the paper’s staff who decided to publish it. 460 The business
environment in which media outlets operate, if proven by relevant evidence, is
also a consideration courts may assess in determining the reasonableness of a
publisher’s conduct. 461
Constitutional considerations
[25.410] The preceding discussion of common law privileges revealed the
resistance of the common law, even as amended by statutes, to making any
major allowance for free speech on matters of public interest. 462 In several
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countries, including the United States and (for a time) Australia, this shortfall of
democratic values was eventually rectified by resort to their Constitutions. 463 In
the great case of New York Times v Sullivan, 464 the United States Supreme
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Court first enunciated the constitutional privilege of denying public officials,
later extended to public figures, the right to complain of defamation unless they
could establish that the defendant knew the allegation was false or that he or she
was reckless, not caring if it was true or false.
Unlike the United States Constitution, the Australian Constitution does not
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contain an explicit guarantee of free speech. But in 1992 the High Court distilled
454 Morgan v Fairfax (1989) per Mathews J, unrep; (No 2) (1991) 23 NSWLR 374 (CA). See
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now Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 30(3) and equivalent provisions in the remaining
jurisdictions. For the progenitor of this subsection, see also Defamation Act 1974 (NSW),
s 22(2A) (repealed) and Reynolds v Times Newspapers [2001] 2 AC 127 at 205
(Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead).
455 Criticised by Henskens, “Defamation and Investigative Journalism in NSW: The Evolution
of Statutory Qualified Privilege” (1990) 6 Aust B Rev 267. Guidelines are suggested by the
ALRC Report, at [105].
456 Wright v Australian Broadcasting Commission [1977] 1 NSWLR 697 (CA). Also, illegal or
irrational conclusions will disqualify (at 705).
457 Fairfax v Cojuangco (1988) 165 CLR 346.
458 Morosi v Mirror Newspapers [1977] 2 NSWLR 749.
459 Rogers v Nationwide News (2003) 216 CLR 327 at 339 (Gleeson CJ and Gummow J).
460 Austin v Mirror Newspapers [1986] 1 AC 299.
461 See also Rogers v Nationwide News (2003) 216 CLR 327 at 339-340 (Gleeson CJ and
Gummow J).
462 See Derbyshire CC v Times Newspaper [1993] AC 534, holding that the common law was in
conformity with art 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
463 Comparative: Fleming, “Libel and Constitutional Free Speech”, in (Cane and Stapleton
(eds), Essays for Patrick Atiyah (1991), ch 14. Notably, Canada construes the Charter as
inhibiting only government action and therefore inapplicable to private law relations:
RWDSU v Dolphin Delivery [1986] 2 SCR 573; Hill v Church of Scientology [1995] 2 SCR
1130.
464 New York Times v Sullivan 376 US 254 (1964). For criticism see Chesterman, “The Money
or the Truth” (1995) 18 UNSWLJ 300.

an implied freedom of political communication and discussion from provisions

mandating a system of representative government. 465 Two years later, in
Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times 466 it took the bolder step of holding
that this freedom spelled not only a limitation on the powers of the
Commonwealth, but conferred in effect a personal privilege on the individual to
publish defamatory matter of a political nature notwithstanding inconsistent
State laws of defamation.
“Political discussion” was defined very broadly in Theophanous. 467 It clearly
covered a letter in a newspaper, questioning the fitness of a chairperson of a
committee on migration of the House of Representatives, alleging bias towards
Greek immigrants. In a companion case it was applied to allegations of
impropriety against members of a State legislature. 468
The constitutional defence required the defendant to establish that: he or she
was unaware of the falsity of the published material; did not publish the
material recklessly, that is, not caring whether it was true or false; and the
publication was reasonable in the circumstances. It thus differed from the
traditional rule of qualified privilege which places the burden of proving malice
on the plaintiff. There were, however, difficulties of interpretation. 469
In addition, as already noted, the judgment establishing the constitutional
defence may have had a secondary enlarging effect on the scope of common law
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qualified privilege, though this too was unclear. 470
In the 1997 case of Lange v Australian Broadcasting Commission, 471 the
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High Court changed direction dramatically. It abolished the constitutional
defence, deeming this to be a legitimate step because it had only had the clear
support of three of the seven members of the court in Theophanous. But as
already outlined, 472 the court established similar qualified protection for
defamatory statements made to the public at large in the course of
communication on government or political matters, through expanding the
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scope of common law qualified privilege and attaching a condition of

“reasonableness”.
The court indicated that the constitutional implication of freedom of
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communication on political or government matters will continue to set limits to

the extent to which defamation law can restrict freedom of political discussion.
It declared that the new expanded version of common law qualified privilege
was “in conformity with” the implied freedom, as also was statutory privilege
under s 22 of the Defamation Act 1974 (NSW) (repealed). 473 The extent to
which defamation legislation in other Australian jurisdictions achieved
465 Nationwide News v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1; ACTV v Commonwealth (No 2) (1992) 177
CLR 106.
466 Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times (1994) 182 CLR 104. A precarious majority was
attained with support from Deane J who favoured absolute privilege. See Walker, “The
Impact of the High Court’s Free Speech Cases on Defamation Law” 17 Syd L Rev 43 (1995).
467 Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times (1994) 182 CLR 104 at 124.
468 Stephens v West Australian Newspapers (1994) 182 CLR 211.
469 On a narrow reading of Theophanous, the defence was confined to claims brought by
members of Parliament, public officials and candidates for either group. According to a
broader reading, no such restriction applied.
470 Above, [xx.xxx].
473 Some of the implications of this notion of “conformity” are discussed in Chesterman,
“Privileges and Freedoms for Defamatory Political Speech” (1997) 19 Adel L Rev 155.

“conformity” could be determined as and when the need arose, a task now
made easier by the introduction of the national, uniform defamation laws. It
would have to be found to be “reasonably adapted and appropriate” to a
legitimate object, the fulfilment of which is compatible with “the constitutionally
prescribed system of representative and responsible government or the procedure
for submitting a proposed amendment to the Constitution to the informed
decision of the people which the Constitution prescribes”. 474 Elsewhere in the
Lange judgment, the court warned that “[t]he common law rights of persons
defamed may be diminished by statute but they cannot be enlarged so as to
restrict the freedom required by the Constitution”. 475
The judgment also redefined the implied constitutional freedom, confining it
to what the “text and structure” 476 of the Constitution necessarily require in
order that electors, when choosing their representatives in the Commonwealth
Parliament or voting to amend the Constitution, should be able to make free and
informed choices. It indicated that because the Constitution makes the executive
branch of government responsible to the legislature and because political issues
at Commonwealth, State, Territory and even local government level are
increasingly bound up with each other, the range of subject matters covered by
the implied freedom remains very broad. 477
Privileged reports
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[25.420] As already noted, ordinarily it is not a defence that one merely
reported, rather than asserted of one’s own authority, something defamatory
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said by somebody else 478 even if it related to a matter of public interest. 479
However, an important exception is allowed for fair and accurate 480 reports of
certain official proceedings open to the public and considered deserving of
qualified or even absolute privilege because of the public interest in full
information on the administration of public affairs. Which of these so qualify
depends both on the status of the body in question and the public concern in the
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matter reported. From these points of view, courts and legislature stand in a
class apart, both being treated as conclusively engaging the public interest in
fullest publicity. In contrast, public meetings have not generally been credited
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with the same peremptory importance, because they lack the same safeguards
476 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 566; see too Levy v
Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579.
477 Not as broad, however, as the range covered by the phrase “government or political matters”
in the newly expanded defence of qualified privilege. These include “matters concerning the
United Nations or other countries”, which might be outside the scope of the implied
freedom: Lange at 571. For an application of Lange, see Brander v Ryan (2000) 78 SASR
234 (FC).
478 Above, [25.xxx]. If not protected by privilege, the report must be “justified”, that is, it must
be shown that what is reported is not only an accurate account of the proceedings but that
any allegation made in the proceedings and reported was itself true (and for the public
benefit): McCauley v Fairfax (1933) 34 SR (NSW) 339. In contrast, a privileged report need
not be accurate in the latter sense: Burnett & Hallamshire Fuel v Sheffield Telegraph [1960] 1
WLR 502.
479 But the ALRC (at [165]ff) recommended a privilege for “attributed statements” on topics of
public interest, for the sake of less inhibited media coverage of current affairs. The NSWLRC
disagreed: Report 75 (1995), at [12.22]-[12.25].
480 Both at common law and under previous legislation in certain jurisdictions, the privilege
adheres to “fair and accurate” reports. The national, uniform defamation laws postulate
only “fair” but this presumably implies substantial accuracy: Anderson v Nationwide News
(1970) 72 SR (NSW) 313 (CA).

against abuse and irresponsibility, and not all deal with matters of genuine civic
concern. Accordingly, in this residuary field there is no blanket protection for
any whole class, but each instance may and must qualify individually in support
of the conclusion that publicity outweighs in social importance any incidental
injury to individual reputation. The value which democratic communities
increasingly attach to public interest and involvement in the processes of
government is amply reflected in the considerable expansion of the range of
privileged reports by modern statutes. The national, uniform defamation laws
now provide a broad-based defence for a “fair report of proceedings of public
concern”. 481
Parliamentary proceedings
[25.430] As already mentioned, Members of Parliament enjoy absolute
immunity from civil and criminal liability for anything said in the course of
parliamentary proceedings. This protection, however, does not extend to
re-publication or re-affirmation by Members of their speeches outside the
House, even when made in order to correct a false version which had previously
appeared in the same newspaper. 482
However by 1866 it was finally clarified that fair and accurate reports of
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parliamentary proceedings were at least entitled to qualified privilege just like
those of judicial proceedings. 483 The report must be fair in the sense of not
being tendentious, slanted or distorted; but it need not be a précis of the whole
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debate, and can be selective, like the familiar “parliamentary sketch” in modern
journalism. 484 Indeed, the privilege is not confined to the press or even the
printed word, but may be claimed just as well for a verbal report over the dinner
table. The report itself must also be substantially accurate, although of course
the speech that is being reported may well be riddled with falsehood. 485
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Judicial proceedings
[25.440] Fair and accurate reports of public judicial proceedings, whether
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published in a newspaper or otherwise, receive qualified privilege at common

law. The privilege extends to all courts of justice, irrespective of status, but is
coextensive only with the right of public admission. Since its rationale is the
public benefit to be derived from the fullest publicity of what goes on in court, it
is unconcerned when the proceedings themselves are not considered suitable for
jurisdictions.
482 R v Lord Abingdon (1794) 1 Esp 226; 170 ER 337; R v Creevey (1813) 1 M & S 273; 105
ER 102; Beitzel v Crabb [1992] 2 VR 212.
483 Wason v Walter (1868) LR 4 QB 73; cf Givens v Syme [1917] VLR 418. See now Defamation
Act 2005 (NSW), s 29 and equivalent provisions in the remaining jurisdictions, covering
parliamentary proceedings at all levels of government in Australia and including overseas
legislatures.
484 Cook v Alexander [1974] QB 279 (CA); Jones v Fairfax (1986) 4 NSWLR 466.
485 Thus publication of an inaccurate extract from a public register or other official document is
not privileged even if officially supplied and believed by the publisher to be an accurate copy:
Woodger v Federal Capital Press (1992) 107 ACTR 1.

general admission. 486 Nor is there any privilege if the court has prohibited
publication 487 or for pleadings, affidavits and other documents filed but not
brought up in open court. 488
Under the national, uniform defamation laws, the defence of fair proceedings
of public concern now extends to include reports on public proceedings of
courts and tribunals of other countries, as well as public proceedings of
international courts and tribunals. 489 This marks a departure from the common
law position, which extended the privilege only to domestic courts. 490
The protection covers “what pertains to the processes of law rather than
what occurs in the place where it is being administered; more specifically, to
what is said in the presence of a judicial tribunal then in session, in the course of
proceedings before it for consideration or determination, by those who have
some right, duty, or privilege to attend or appear, or to take part therein and be
heard, provided that what is said is in some way related to such proceedings. …
The protection does not extend to a mere interrupter or by-stander, even if
occurring in court, and while the proceedings are in progress; but it does cover
the matters first mentioned, even though the action or application or process is
misconceived or irregularly brought on, or outside the jurisdiction of the
court”. 491
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The report needs to be identifiable as such. Direct quotation is not essential,
but attribution and reference to the proceedings is necessary. 492 The report need
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not be in full, because otherwise the protection would be virtually illusory. A
condensed summary of the proceedings or judgment is sufficient, provided the
omissions do not prevent it from giving a fair account. The report must not be
garbled or coloured, and headlines must give a fair idea of what follows. And
above all else, it must be substantially accurate: a fair report must have its facts
right, just as (we shall see) 493 a fair comment must be based on true facts. 494
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Subject to the usual controls, the question of fairness is for the jury. 495 As a rule,
the report must be contemporaneous. 496
Miscellaneous
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[25.450] The statutory defence of fair report of proceedings of public concern

has a wide ambit, extending beyond domestic and international parliamentary
and judicial proceedings. It extends to public inquiries, proceedings of learned
societies and sport, recreation and trade associations, shareholders’ meetings of
486 Kimber v Press Assoc [1893] 1 QB 65.

487 Being generally also in contempt of court.
488 Stern v Piper [1997] QB 123 (CA); Smith v Harris [1996] 2 VR 335. Contra: Hill v Church
of Scientology [1995] 2 SCR 1130 (under Charter).
489 See now Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 29(4) and equivalent provisions in the remaining
jurisdictions.
490 See, for example, Webb v Times Publications [1960] 2 QB 535; Thompson v Consolidated
Press (1968) 89 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 121.
491 Hughes v WA Newspapers (1940) 43 WALR 12 at 13-14 (Dwyer J).
492 Rogers v Nationwide News (2003) 216 CLR 327 at 336 (Gleeson CJ and Gummow J).
494 Thom v Assoc Newspapers (1964) 64 SR (NSW) 376; Jones v Fairfax (1986) 4 NSWLR 466.
495 Leslie v Mirror Newspaper (1971) 125 CLR 332; Kingshott v Assoc Newspapers [1991] 1
QB 88 (CA).
496 See Bunker v James (1980) 26 SASR 286; Whear v NT News (1981) 8 NTR 13.

public companies, proceedings before law reform bodies and ombudsmen and
any public meetings related to a matter of public interest. 497
Abuse
[25.460] Unless upgraded to absolute privilege, reports must be made in good
faith. The publisher need not believe the imputations to be true, but his motive
for publication must be legitimate. 498 To insist on the reporter’s belief in the
accuracy would withdraw valuable information from the public, which should
be free to make its own assessment as to the credibility of what is reported and
its source. Here the case for protecting the media is even stronger than for
“letters to the editor”. 499
The report must be “accurate”: it need not be verbatim or complete but must
be neutral and balanced. 500 Thus the report of an incriminating statement by
one witness would not be fair if exculpatory evidence by another is suppressed.
Fair comment
[25.470] Fair comment on matters of public interest is deemed of such
surpassing social importance in a democratic community as to outweigh the
competing claim to unqualified protection of individual reputation. “In the case
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of criticism in matters of art, whether music, painting, literature or drama,
where the private character of a person criticised is not involved, the freer the
criticism is, the better it will be for the aesthetic welfare of the public.” 501
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Likewise, untrammelled discussion of public affairs and of those participating in
them is a basic safeguard against irresponsible political power. The unfettered
preservation of the right of fair comment is, therefore, one of the foundations
supporting our standards of personal liberty.
In the United States, the constitutional protection of free speech has been
construed to require an absolute privilege for opinion, in the belief that
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actionable defamation must be false and that there is no such thing as a false
opinion. 502 Our law has been less permissive, the privilege being limited only to
fair comment on matters of public interest.
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Comment and statements of fact

[25.480] For the defence to be available, 503 it must be indicated with
reasonable clarity by the words themselves, taking them in their context and the
circumstances in which they were published, that the imputation conveyed by
them is to be understood as comment, not statements of fact. 504 The latter,
however fair, are not protected by this defence: if defamatory, they must either
be proved true or be privileged. Comment alone may claim indulgence, in its
497 See Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) and equivalent provisions in the remaining jurisdictions.
498 See Waterhouse v Station 2GB (1985) 1 NSWLR 58; Salmon v Isaac (1869) 20 LT 885.
500 Bruton v Estate Agents Licensing Authority [1996] 2 VR 274 at 309.
501 Lyon v Daily Telegraph [1943] KB 746 at 752 (Scott LJ).
502 Gertz v Welsh 418 US 323 at 339 (1974); Milkovich v Lorain Journal (1990) 110 S Ct 2695;
Rest 2d, s 566.
503 In addition to the common law defence of fair comment, there are now statutory defences of
honest opinion under the national, uniform defamation laws. See Defamation Act 2005
(NSW), s 31 and equivalent provisions in the remaining jurisdictions.
504 See Radio 2UE Sydney v Parker (1992) 29 NSWLR 448 (CA). Ordinarily the question is for
the jury.

primary sense of “something which is or can reasonably be inferred to be a

deduction, inference, conclusion, criticism, judgment, remark or observation”,
as distinct from a “direct statement concerning or description of a subject of
public interest”. 505
Distinguishing between fact and comment is often elusive. Much depends
upon the context of the impugned expression. If it purports to be a criticism of a
published work or public performance, it is prima facie comment, however
dogmatically expressed. 506 If the facts are set out and an opinion is then
expressed upon them, or an inference drawn from, then the statement is
comment. On the other hand, bare inferences or allegations without reference to
the facts on which they are based will generally be treated as statements of fact.
“To say that a man’s conduct was dishonourable is not comment, it is a
statement of fact. To say that he did certain specific things and that his conduct
was dishonourable is a statement of fact coupled with a comment.” 507 But if the
expression is ambiguous, the writer or speaker runs the risk that it will not be
understood as comment, and that he or she will be called upon to justify. In
particular, the defence of fair comment will rarely 508 protect defamatory
newspaper headlines, because it is difficult to achieve the sensational effect
desired by modern journalism and at the same time maintain a clear separation
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of facts from defamatory expressions of opinion. 509 The test is not what the
defendant meant, but what the ordinary unprejudiced reader would take it to
mean: 510 the law of defamation being concerned not with intended, but
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ordinary, meaning, that is, the meaning that would be attached to the utterance
by the ordinary hearer or reader. 511 It is for the jury to decide what is fact and
what comment, unless there can be only one answer. 512
The defence, it is sometimes said, cannot succeed unless the opinion stated is
based on facts actually presented, or in fact present, to the minds of the readers
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or listeners, so that they may be in a position to judge whether it is such as might

be fairly formed on the facts. 513 The sting of the allegation is, of course, largely
minimised if the reader is given an opportunity to form his or her own judgment
on whether the suggested inference is supported by the facts proffered. 514 Taken
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literally, however, such a stringent requirement would make the freedom of the
critic illusory. It is impracticable to confine criticism of a literary work to
passages actually set out in the review, nor can it be genuinely assumed that a
505 Clarke v Norton [1910] VLR 494 at 499 (Cussen J).

506 Whitford v Clarke [1939] SASR 434.
507 Myerson v Smith’s Weekly (1923) 24 SR (NSW) 20 at 26 (Ferguson J); Barltrop v CBC
(1978) 86 DLR (3d) 61.
508 Such a rare instance was Kemsley v Foot [1952] AC 345 (“lower than Kemsley”).
509 Smith’s Newspaper v Becker (1932) 47 CLR 279 at 303-304. Here, in contrast to Dakhyl v
Labouchere [1908] 2 KB 325n calling the plaintiff a “quack” was held to be a statement of
fact, not comment. In the one case, the expression was contained in a headline, but in the
other was preceded by an assertion that the plaintiff was associated with a certain institute
alleged to be carrying out a system of medical imposture and the article then concluded: “In
other words, he is a quack of the rankest species.”
510 Clarke v Norton [1910] VLR 494 at 501 (Cussen J).
511 Cf Williams, “Language and the Law–IV” (1945) 61 LQR 392ff. See also above, p 586.
512 Pervan v North Queensland Newspaper (1993) 178 CLR 309 (also under Codes); Jones v
Skelton [1964] NSWR 485 (PC); London Artists v Littler [1969] 2 QB 375 (CA).
513 Goldsbrough v Fairfax (1934) 34 SR (NSW) 524 at 530-531.
514 Hunt v Star Newspaper [1908] 2 KB 309 at 319.

published work is “present to the mind” of all readers of the criticism, since the
whole object of the comment may be to advise whether the particular work is
worthy of their consideration. 515
The law has accommodated itself to this difficulty and, rather than insist on a
requirement which could only “result in absurdity”, 516 recognises that the facts
necessary to justify comment may be implied from the terms of the impugned
utterance. “The inquiry ceases to be – Can the defendant point to definite
assertions of fact in the alleged libel upon which the comment is made? and
becomes – Is there subject matter indicated with sufficient clarity to justify
comment being made?” 517 Thus comment may be understood to refer to facts
which are notorious, such as the conduct of politicians. 518 And in the case of
criticism of literary or artistic work, the public have at least the opportunity of
ascertaining for themselves the subject matter on which the comment is
founded. The reader need not be able to see exactly the grounds of the comment,
provided the subject which, ex hypothesi, is of public importance is sufficiently
indicated. 519 In Kemsley v Foot, 520 an article criticising the conduct of the
Beaverbrook Press described it as “lower than Kemsley”. Though no details
were contained to substantiate the charge against Lord Kemsley, it was held that
there was a sufficient substratum of fact indicated in the libel to warrant the
allegation being treated as comment. The subject matter implied was that the
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plaintiff was in control of newspapers and that the conduct of the publishers was
in question. The defendant could say: “We have pointed to your Press. It is
widely read. Your readers will, and the public generally can, know at what our
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criticism is directed. It is not bare comment.” 521
Basis of true facts

[25.490] Comment cannot be fair if based on facts which are distorted or
invented. 522 There must be a sufficient basis of true fact to warrant the
comment. 523 Hence truth is material in this context, not to justify such
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allegations of fact as are defamatory (that being the function of the distinct
defence of justification), but as one step in establishing that the comment itself is
fair. At common law, all the facts set out in the alleged libel had to be proved for
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this purpose, and failure to justify one, however unimportant, defeated the
defence of fair comment. 524 Under the statutory defences of honest opinion, a
statement of comment needs to be based on “proper material”, which is, in turn,
defined as material which is substantially true or published on an occasion of
absolute or qualified privilege. 525
515 Gardiner v Fairfax (1942) 42 (SR) (NSW) 171 at 179-180.

516 Gardiner v Fairfax (1942) 42 (SR) (NSW) 171 at 180.
517 Kemsley v Foot [1952] AC 345 at 357 (Lord Porter).
518 Bjelke-Petersen v Burns [1988] 2 Qd R 129 (“corruption”, “hands in the till”).
519 Kemsley v Foot [1952] AC 345; but cf Telnikoff v Matusevitch [1992] 2 AC 343.
520 Kemsley v Foot [1952] AC 345.
521 Kemsley v Foot [1952] AC 345 at 357 (Lord Porter).
522 Sutherland v Stopes [1925] AC 47 at 62-63; Thompson v Truth Ltd (1932) 34 SR (NSW) 21,
25; Antonovich v WA Newspaper [1960] WAR 176 at 180.
523 London Artists v Littler [1969] 2 QB 375 (CA).
524 Kemsley v Foot [1952] AC 345 at 357-358; Gooch v NZ Financial Times [1933] NZLR 257.
Also, where the relevant facts are found, not in the libel itself, but in the particulars delivered
to support the defence: Kemsley v Foot [1952] AC 345.
jurisdictions.

Public interest
[25.500] The comment must have been on a matter of public interest. This has
recently been defined by the High Court of Australia 526 to mean the “conduct
or work” of a person engaged in public activities which expressly or impliedly
invite public criticism or discussion. It does not refer to broad abstractions such
as “the administration of justice” or “political and state matters”.
Activities of this sort fall into two broad categories. First, those in which the
public in general has a legitimate interest: for example, national and local
government, 527 public services and institutions; secondly, matters submitted to
public attention and criticism: for example, public displays of works of authors
and artists, theatrical performances and productions at places of public
entertainment. 528 In relation to these any member of the public is entitled to
express himself or herself freely, whether by way of praise or blame; and the
critic himself or herself is as much exposed to comment for his or her criticism as
the author or producer criticised. 529 Moreover, “people who fill public
positions must not be too thin-skinned in reference to comments made upon
them. It must often happen that observations are made upon public men which
they know to be undeserved and unjust. Yet they must bear with them, as a
matter of public policy. Freedom to criticise is the best security for the proper
discharge of public duties”. 530
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The critic must, however, confine himself or herself to the conduct or work
which is of public interest. Merely being a politician is not enough to make his
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or her private life a matter of public interest, 531 nor may an artist be denounced
for his or her private morals or manner unrelated to his or her works. 532 Since
this qualification principally serves to protect the plaintiff’s interest in privacy, it
would become largely unnecessary with the recognition of an independent cause
of action for invasion of privacy. 533
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Fairness
[25.510] The comment must be fair in order to qualify for protection: it must
express a view which an honest-minded person might hold on the facts on which
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the comment was made. Previously, it was held that the comment need not be
reasonable – far from it: it may be exaggerated, obstinate or prejudiced,
provided it is honestly held. “The basis of our public life is that the crank, the
enthusiast may say what he honestly thinks just as much as the reasonable man
or woman who sits on a jury, and it would be a sad day for freedom of speech if
a jury were to apply the test of whether it agrees with the comment.” 534 “A
critic is entitled to dip his pen in gall for the purpose of legitimate criticism, and
no one need be mealy-mouthed in denouncing what he regards as twaddle, daub
or discord. English literature would be the poorer if Macaulay had not been
526 Bellino v ABC (1996) 185 CLR 183 at 214-219 per Dawson, McHugh and Gummow JJ.
527 Slim v Daily Telegraph [1968] 2 QB 157 (CA).
528 London Artists v Littler [1969] 2 QB 375 (CA).
529 Turner v M-G-M [1950] 1 All ER 449 (HL).
530 Whitford v Clarke [1939] SASR 434 at 439 (Napier J).
531 Mutch v Sleeman (1928) 29 SR (NSW) 125 at 137 (MP called a wife-beater). Whether this
case would be determined in the same way today is questionable.
532 Gardiner v Fairfax (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 171 at 174.
533 As to the protection of privacy in Australian law, see Ch XXX.
534 Diplock J’s summing-up to the jury in Silkin v Beaverbrook Newspapers [1958] 1 WLR 743
at 747. See also Turner v MGM [1950] 1 All ER 449 at 462 (HL).

stirred to wrath by the verses of Mr Robert Montgomery.” 535 The High Court
of Australia has recently emphasised that the applicable test is whether the view
is one an honest-minded person might reasonably hold. 536 To the extent that
the inquiry as to reasonableness marks the outer limits of the range of views an
honest commentator might hold, the requirement of reasonableness might not
prove too onerous. To the extent that a comment must now be honestly and
reasonably held, such a requirement of reasonableness arguably distorts the
common law defence of fair comment, as it has been traditionally understood
and applied, and has the potential to curtail the commentator’s exercise of free
expression, the very basis upon which the defence is granted.
The statutory defences of honest opinion under the national, uniform
defamation laws instead turn upon whether the comment honestly represent the
speaker’s opinion. 537
Malice
[25.520] At one time, fair comment was considered a branch of “privilege”,
but eventually the view prevailed that it constitutes a defence sui generis. 538
Thus it became settled that the defence is forfeited even in the absence of malice,
if the comment exceeds the limits of fairness. 539 In Thomas v Bradbury, 540
however, the Court of Appeal partially reverted to the older view by holding that
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comment which is prima facie fair may lose its protection by proof of malice.
This conclusion is hard to justify, since fairness would seem to have reference to
the criticism, not the state of mind of the critic. Against this, however, it has been
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urged that if there is malice, the mind of the writer would not be that of a
critic 541 and that, from a policy point of view, while it is undoubtedly in the
public interest that public matters should be open to comment, it is not in the
public interest to allow dishonest comment or comment warped by spite. 542
Although the principle is frequently expressed as if malice conclusively
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destroys the plea of fairness, the only point decided in Thomas v Bradbury, and
the better opinion, is merely that evidence of malice is admissible: “It is, of
course, possible for a person to have a spite against another and yet to bring a
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perfectly dispassionate judgment to bear upon his literary merits; but, given the
existence of malice, it must be for the jury to say whether it has warped his
judgment. Comment distorted by malice cannot be fair on the part of the person
who makes it.” 543 To establish malice, it must be shown that the comment was
designed to serve some purpose other than that of expressing the commentator’s
535 Gardiner v Fairfax (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 171 at 174 (Jordan CJ).

536 Channel Seven Adelaide v Manock (2007) 232 CLR 245 at 290 (Gummow, Hayne and
Heydon JJ).
jurisdictions. See further below [xx.xxx].
538 Merivale v Carson (1887) 20 QBD 275. The term “privilege” is here used in the technical
sense assigned to it in the law of defamation. In Hohfeldian terminology, fair comment is, of
course, also a privilege, and the analytical argument relied on to show that it is sui generis is
probably based on faulty reasoning.
539 Merivale v Carson (1887) 20 QBD 275.
540 Thomas v Bradbury [1906] 2 KB 627; followed, though not without reluctance, in Falcke v
Herald Ltd [1925] VLR 56.
541 Merivale v Carson (1887) 20 QBD 275 at 281-282 (Lord Esher).
542 Falcke v Herald Ltd [1925] VLR 56 at 72.
543 Thomas v Bradbury [1906] 2 KB 627 at 642 (Collins MR); Cawley v Australian
Consolidated Press [1981] 1 NSWLR 225.

real opinion, for example, that of satisfying a private grudge. But while mere
hostility or ill will is not by itself sufficient for malice, neither is honest belief in
the truth a conclusive reply. 544
While it is clear that no comment can be fair unless it expresses the
defendant’s honest opinion, it remains disputed whether this requirement goes
to the question of fairness or malice. The answer will affect the burden of proof.
On one view, 545 it is sufficient for the defendant to establish that the statement
was comment rather than factual and that it was objectively fair, that is, that it is
one which an honest-minded person could make. But just as with other types of
malice, lack of subjective honesty (which would defeat the defence) falls to proof
by the plaintiff. The opposing view holds subjective honesty to be an essential
ingredient in the defence of fair comment, for proof by the defendant. 546
Differing views persist regarding the publisher of someone else’s comment. A
commonly held position was to identify the publisher with the writer. Thus if the
writer had a good defence, it also availed the publisher; while, conversely, if the
writer had none, neither did the publisher. Both propositions have been
challenged: the second, after a recent decision on qualified privilege held that a
writer’s malice is not imputable to the publisher unless he or she was his or her
employee or agent under ordinary principles of vicarious liability. 547 This is the
case for the reason that the defence attaches to the individual publisher, not to
the comment.
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A less desirable corollary would be to deny the publisher the defence, as the
Supreme Court of Canada did in relation to a letter on the correspondence page
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of a newspaper, 548 unless the comment expressed his own honest opinion not
merely in the writer’s integrity, but also in the substance of the comment. But to
require the editor to share the view of all correspondents would seriously erode
the role of the press as a “sounding board for the free flow of new and different
ideas”. The decision was accordingly reversed in Canada. It was also legislated
against in New Zealand, 549 before being repudiated by the High Court of
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Australia. 550
Malice, broadly defined, does not constitute disentitling conduct for a
defence of honest opinion under the national, uniform defamation laws. The
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statutory defences of honest opinion operate in three different circumstances.

The applicability of a defence turns upon the relationship between the defendant
and the person expressing the opinion. If the defendant is the person expressing
the opinion, the statutory defence can only be defeated if the plaintiff proves that
the defendant did not honestly hold the opinion at the time at which it was
published. 551 If the person expressing the opinion is an employee or an agent of
the defendant, the statutory defence can only be defeated if the plaintiff proves
that the defendant did not believe that the employee or the agent honestly held
544 Renouf v Federal Capital Press (1977) 16 ACTR 35.

545 Telnikoff v Matusevitch [1992] 2 AC 343; Hawke v Tamworth Newspaper [1983] 1 NSWLR
699.
546 Cherneskey v Armadale [1979] 1 SCR 1067 (narrow majority); Defamation Act 1992 (NZ),
s 10.
547 McLeod v Jones [1977] 1 NZLR 441; Egger v Chelmsford (Viscount) [1965] 1 QB 248 at
265.
548 Cherneskey v Armadale [1979] 1 SCR 1067.
549 Defamation Act 1992 (NZ), s 10.
550 Pervan v North Queensland Newspaper (1993) 178 CLR 309.
551 See Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 31(1), 31(4)(a) and equivalent provisions in the

the opinion at the time at which it was published. 552 Finally, if the person
expressing the opinion is a “stranger”, being neither the defendant himself or
herself nor an employee or an agent of the defendant, the statutory defence can
only be defeated if the plaintiff proves that the defendant had reasonable
grounds to believe that the commentator did not honestly hold the opinion at
the time at which it was published. 553
Remedies
[25.530] As already pointed out, the law of defamation has evolved around the
remedy of damages. This has left a fateful imprint on much of substantive law,
besides forcing all persons desirous of vindicating their reputation in public into
pursuing a form of redress not necessarily or precisely adjusted to their needs. At
present, however, the law offers no other means for wringing a retraction from a
defamer. 554 The latter, it is true, may mitigate his or her damages by timely
apology, and in some cases may even escape all liability by retracting. 555 New
Zealand has so far gone furthest in short-circuiting proceedings: a person
defamed in a news medium may within five days request the publisher to publish
a retraction or a reasonable reply by himself or herself. Alternatively, he or she
may seek a judicial recommendation that the defendant publish a correction or a
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judicial declaration that defamatory matter was published. If heeded, the former
is entitled to costs but not damages; a refusal however is taken into account in
assessing damages. 556 In the various law reform processes, including the one
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leading up to the introduction of the national, uniform defamation laws,
alternative remedies, such as court-ordered retractions, corrections or rights of
reply have been canvassed but none have been enacted. But nowhere can
retraction be forced on a recalcitrant defendant, 557 nor has the plaintiff any
right of reply in the defendant’s media. 558 The national, uniform defamation
laws state, amongst their objects, the provision of “effective and fair remedies
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for persons whose reputations are harmed by the publication of defamatory

matter” and the promotion of “speedy and non-litigious methods of resolving
disputes about the publication of defamatory matter”. 559 Subject to the offer of
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amends regime, 560 the efficacy of which is open to question, the focus of
defamation law still remains firmly upon an award of damages.
552 See Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 31(2), 31(4)(b) and equivalent provisions in the
553 See Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 31(3), 41(4)(c) and equivalent provisions in the
554 Many successful plaintiffs, however, are content with seeking only damages to cover their
legal expenses. Settlement may be facilitated by agreeing to a statement in open court for
vindication: see Barnett v Crozier [1987] 1 WLR 272.
555 Fleming, “Retraction and Reply: Alternative Remedies for Defamation” (1978) 12 UBCL Rev
15.
556 Defamation Act 1992 (NZ), ss 25, 26.
557 Burnett v R (1979) 94 DLR (3d) 281. TV 3 Network v Eveready [1993] 3 NZLR 435 (CA)
refused to strike out such a claim.
558 Except that under the expanded defence of qualified privilege (above, [25.xxx]), the plaintiff
must generally be given the opportunity to have a response published, and that privilege for
certain reports is contingent on a right of reply. A reply is clothed with qualified privilege:
above, [25.xxx].
559 See Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 3(c), (d) and equivalent provisions in the remaining
jurisdictions.
560 See below [xx.xxx].

Remedies 228
Injunction
[25.540] From many a plaintiff’s point of view, prevention of defamation must
seem infinitely preferable to any redress after the damage has once been done.
But injunctions to enjoin threatened attacks have been only grudgingly admitted
for fear of introducing controls amounting to advance censorship and because
of judicial reluctance to usurp the jury function which, since Fox’s Libel Act of
1792, has been regarded as a basic guarantee of free speech. 561 An interlocutory
injunction to restrain publication of a libel 562 is therefore highly unlikely to be
granted unless the plaintiff can establish that (1) a finding by the jury that the
complaint is not defamatory would be set aside as unreasonable, (2) there is no
real ground for supposing that the defendant may succeed with a defence of
justification, privilege or fair comment, and (3) he or she is likely to recover
more than just nominal damages. 563 It is also most unlikely that an injunction
will issue if its effect is to restrain public discussion on matters of public
interest. 564 Where otherwise appropriate, though, injunctions are not confined
to enjoin the publication or repetition of libels calculated to injure the plaintiff in
his or her property interests. 565
Damages
[25.550] The commitment of our law to damages as the principal remedy for
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defamation has been a mixed blessing. Perhaps its foremost ill is that it
exacerbates the tension between the two competing interests of individual
reputation and freedom of speech. For on occasions where freedom of speech is
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most highly valued, there was no alternative to creating an immunity (privilege)
and depriving the defamed of all right to vindication. On the other hand, the
spectre of heavy damages has a decidedly chilling effect on speech. 566
Previously, the problem was aggravated by the rather free hand juries play in
assessing damages, which were said to be “at large”, ranging from
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561 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57 at 72-73 (Gleeson CJ
and Crennan J), at 86-87 (Gummow and Hayne JJ). See also Hayes, “Injunctions before
Judgment in Cases of Defamation” (1971) 45 ALJ 125 at 181; Ford, “Protection of
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Reputation in Equity” (1954) 6 Res Jud 345; Pound, “Equitable Relief against Defamation”
(1916) 29 Harv L Rev 640. In the United States injunctions are regarded as categorically
prohibited by the First Amendment guarantee of free speech.
562 A losing defendant ordinarily undertakes not to repeat publication; if unwilling to give such
undertaking, an injunction to restrain him or her from repeating the libel will usually be
granted: John v MGN [1996] 2 All ER 35 at 47.
563 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57 at 67 (Gleeson CJ and
Crennan J); Bonnard v Perryman [1891] 2 Ch 269 (CA); Church of Scientology v Reader’s
Digest [1980] 1 NSWLR 344. Cf Chappell v TCN Channel 9 (1988) 14 NSWLR 153 and
Nat Mutual Life v GTV Corp (1988) Aust Torts Reports ¶ 80-192. The majority in
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57 stressed that defamation
was not a special case and that general equitable principles applied to applications of
interlocutory injunctions to restrain defamatory publications but equally emphasised that the
way in which these principles would apply to defamation cases would be informed by factors
peculiar to defamation cases. See Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227
CLR 57 at 68-69 (Gleeson CJ and Crennan J), at 81-84 (Gummow and Hayne JJ). See also
Rolph, “Showing Restraint: Interlocutory Injunctions in Defamation Cases” (2009) 14
Media and Arts Law Review 255 at 290.
564 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57 at 69-73 (Gleeson CJ
and Crennan J).
565 Monson v Tussauds [1894] 1 QB 671; Swimsure (Laboratories) v McDonald [1979] 2
NSWLR 796.
566 This fear is also widely exploited by less scrupulous plaintiffs by means of “gag” or “stop”
writs: see ALRC 8, at [52]-[56]; Brych v Herald [1978] VR 727; Goldsmith v Sperrings
[1977] 1 WLR 478. A deterrent to litigation is the denial in England of legal aid.

“contemptuous” or “derisory” (reflecting on the weakness of the plaintiff’s

reputation) 567 to exemplary (reflecting on the defendant’s outrageousness).
What is more, the tolerated level of awards bore no comparison with those for
serious personal injury: reputation and privacy seemed to be considered of much
greater value than life or limb, dishonour an infinitely greater injury than
agonising and protracted physical suffering. Both of these issues have been
addressed under the national, uniform defamation laws. Whether these changes
have been wholly beneficial is debatable.
There are a number of reasons for the difficulty of assessing damages for
defamation. First and foremost is the libel rule that, aside from actual pecuniary
damage, injury to reputation and feelings is itself compensable. Even in cases of
slander, once “special damage” has been proved, the plaintiff has established his
credentials for general damages. 568 What is more, injury to reputation by libel is
presumed and does not have to be established by evidence. 569 Of course, the
person defamed does not really get compensation for his or her damaged
reputation as such. Rather, damages serve “as a vindication of the plaintiff to
the public and as consolation to him for a wrong done. Compensation is here a
solatium rather than a monetary recompense for harm measurable in money” 570
– indeed, just like damages for pain and suffering in case of personal injury.
Included are his or her injured feelings, indignation and the psychological need
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for satisfaction. To the extent that the plaintiff’s subjective hurt has been
increased by the outrageous nature of the defendant’s manner or motives, it may
be reflected in “aggravated damages” (to be distinguished from “punitive
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damages”, as will appear below).
Finally, there is the function of damages in vindicating the plaintiff’s
reputation. Its focus is on the attitude of others to the plaintiff. The gravity of
the libel, the social or professional standing of the plaintiff and the availability of
alternative remedies also have a bearing on this. A small sum awarded to a
public figure for a serious libel could be interpreted as trivialising the incident,
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and in the absence of an unequivocal apology substantial damages may be the

only means of vindication. 571
None of these elements can be measured on any objective monetary scale. 572
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The national, uniform defamation laws seek to overcome the unreliability of

juries by reposing the responsibility for damages with judges. 573 Previous
attempts had been made, both at common law 574 and legislatively, 575 to
address the proper relationship between damages for non-economic loss for
defamation and personal injury. The national, uniform defamation laws attempt
567 For example, Dering v Uris (No 2) [1964] 2 QB 669 (1 sh); Pamplin v Express Newspaper
[1988] 1 WLR 116 (denying order for costs).
569 This rule can be defended on the ground that harm to reputation is difficult to prove and that
libel is likely to cause anguish. In contrast, the United States Constitution no longer permits
damages for other than actual injury: Gertz v Welsh 418 US 323 (1974); Dun & Bradstreet v
Greenmoss (1985) 472 US 749 (only on matters of public concern).
570 Uren v Fairfax (1966) 117 CLR 118 at 150 (Windeyer J); Rogers v Nationwide News (2003)
216 CLR 327 at 349-50 (Hayne J).
571 For a striking example involving a medical practitioner, see Crampton v Nugawela (1996) 41
NSWLR 176.
572 Rogers v Nationwide News (2003) 216 CLR 327 at 349-350 (Hayne J).
jurisdictions. There are no juries in defamation cases in the Australian Capital Territory, the
Northern Territory and South Australia. See above [25.xxx].
574 See, for example, Carson v John Fairfax (1993) 178 CLR 44; John v MGN [1997] QB 586.

Remedies 230
to overcome this tension by capping the damages payable for non-economic loss
in defamation claims. 576 Indeed, the impetus for this reform was, in part, the
capping of damages for non-economic loss in personal injury claims in some
jurisdictions. 577 There are several features to be noted about the capping of
damages for defamation. First, the legislation provides a mechanism for the
annual indexation of the cap. 578 Secondly, the cap expressly excludes aggravated
damages and impliedly excludes damages for economic loss in defamation
cases. 579
In addition to general damages such as the preceding, a plaintiff whose
reputation has been disparaged can also recover for any consequential loss as
specially pleaded. 580 This may include personal injury 581 no less than business
losses.
Exemplary and aggravated damages

[25.560] The decision of the House of Lords in 1964, in Rookes v Barnard, 582
to renounce exemplary, as distinct from aggravated, damages initially had a
significant impact on defamation. It became necessary to distinguish more
clearly between a defendant’s contumelious conduct and its effect, if any, on the
plaintiff’s feelings: the former may deserve reprobation, but the latter alone
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compensation. One exception of peculiar relevance to defamation was retained:
where the defendant sought to profit from his or her tort (tort must not pay!).
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That the libel was published in the course of a business (publishing) would not
be sufficient; it must have been with guilty knowledge and the calculation that
the chances of economic profit outweighed those of economic or physical
cost. 583 Australian and most other Commonwealth courts declined to follow
the English example and have retained exemplary damages for defamation (and
other torts), 584 mindful of the general disuse of criminal proceedings.
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However, the common law position in Australia has now been overturned
under the national, uniform defamation laws, which proscribe exemplary
damages for defamation, 585 following the earlier example of New South
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Wales. 586 The distinction between exemplary and aggravated damages
575 See, for example, Defamation Act 1974 (NSW), s 46A (repealed). As to its reading down, see
Rogers v Nationwide News (2003) 216 CLR 327.
jurisdictions.
577 See, for example, Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), ss 16, 17.
578 See Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 35(3) – (8) and equivalent provisions in the remaining
jurisdictions.
jurisdictions.
580 Calvet v Tomkies [1963] 1 WLR 1397.
581 Sattin v Nationwide News (1996) 39 NSWLR 32.
582 Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129. Above, [xx.xxx].
583 See Cassell v Broome [1972] AC 1027; Riches v News Group [1986] QB 256; John v MGN
[1997] QB 586 (CA). But damages are not limited to amount of profit, as they would be in
action for unjust enrichment.
584 Uren v Fairfax (1966) 117 CLR 118; above, [25.xxx].
jurisdictions.
586 Defamation Act 1974 (NSW), s 46 (repealed).

necessitated by Rookes v Barnard remains vitally important because the

national, uniform defamation permit recovery of aggravated damages. 587
Aggravated damages have emerged from this reorientation as a new category
in all jurisdictions. The defendant’s conduct is generally relevant only in so far as
it affects the plaintiff’s feelings. 588 Damages may be aggravated by conduct in
the publication 589 or thereafter as in the conduct of the defence, 590 but
according to the prevailing view, it must be “unjustifiable, improper or lacking
in bona fides”. 591 Thus the defendant may with impunity raise any bona fide
legitimate defence, including truth, even if it causes distress to the plaintiff, since
the law cannot “at once permit and forbid, invite and punish”. 592
Character evidence
[25.570] In assessing damages, the law seeks to compensate the plaintiff for
injury to the reputation he or she previously enjoyed. Though it may be shown
that his or her reputation was not what he or she claimed it to be, it is irrelevant
that he or she did not deserve it. 593 This may occasionally confer an unmerited
reward upon a hypocrite who has succeeded in hiding a shameful career behind
a screen of unblemished repute, but on balance it would be too unfair to expect
every plaintiff to show a uniform propriety of conduct throughout his or her life,
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besides unduly lengthening trials.
Accordingly, the defence is free to lead evidence of the plaintiff’s general bad
repute, but not of specific discreditable conduct. 594 Not that it must actually
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content itself with such general evidence only as that the plaintiff’s reputation
was high or low, for it is permissible to elicit that “he was known to have had a
criminal record”. 595 Rumour of course, cannot claim audience in a court of law
and testimony must therefore be confined to a person’s settled reputation. 596
Also, a character witness may be questioned as to the grounds of his or her
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jurisdictions.
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588 Thus a corporation, if it can now recover at all, cannot recover aggravated damages for loss
of feelings, though it may perhaps for loss of reputation: Andrews v Fairfax [1980] 2
NSWLR 225 at 265; Comalco v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1985) 64 ACTR 1 at
81. Above [xx.xxx].
589 Even failure to make inquiry may be sufficient: Andrews v Fairfax [1980] 2 NSWLR 225; but
cf Bickel v Fairfax [1981] 2 NSWLR 474 at 487.
590 Triggell v Pheeney (1951) 82 CLR 497 at 514; Sutcliffe v Pressdram [1991] 1 QB 153 at 184.
But rigorous defence does not, without more, aggravate damages: Coyne v Citizen Finance
(1991) 172 CLR 211.
591 Bickel v Fairfax [1981] 2 NSWLR 474 at 497; David Syme v Mather [1977] VR 516 at 530,
535 (FC); Coyne v Citizen Finance (1991) 172 CLR 211 at 237 per Toohey J.
592 Herald & Weekly Times v McGregor (1928) 41 CLR 254 at 267.
593 Subject to the qualification that justification is a defence.
594 Plato Films v Speidel [1961] AC 1090; O’Hagan v Nationwide News (2001) 53 NSWLR 89
at 91 (Meagher JA), at 93-94 (Stein JA). Plaintiff may lead evidence of good repute to
increase damages: Bickel v Fairfax [1981] 2 NSWLR 474.
595 Wishart v Mirror Newspaper [1963] SR (NSW) 745 (FC). Convictions are now admissible
(Goody v Odhams Press [1967] 1 QB 333) provided relevant: Jorgensen v NZ Newspapers
[1974] 2 NZLR 45.
596 Before it was put under a cloud by the instant libel. Accordingly, a previous or concurrent
publication of the same libel by others, even if privileged, is no ground for mitigation (Dingle
v Assoc Newspapers [1964] AC 371), though a defendant is of course liable only for the
damage done by his or her own publication: Harrison v Pearce (1858) 1 F & F 567; 175 ER
855.

Remedies 232
belief; 597 but according to the prevailing view, he or she should desist from
mentioning specific incidents even if sufficiently notorious to permit the
inference that the plaintiff’s current reputation has thereby suffered. 598
Moreover, the evidence must be relevant to the nature of the allegation made
against him or her; it must be directed to that aspect or sector of his or her
character which was maligned. If the libel imputes fraud, his or her reputation
for honesty is open to scrutiny, but not his or her sexual habits. 599
This compromise has not passed without criticism. For one thing, it is
“difficult to combine an aversion from rumour with an indulgence for general
evidence of reputation which, unvouched, is virtually the same thing”. 600 It
would be fairer all around to admit evidence of particular incidents that
contribute to the plaintiff’s current reputation. 601 Secondly, the prohibition can
be circumvented by luring the plaintiff into the witness box and cross-examining
him or her as to credit. Nor does it preclude reduction of damages on the basis
of evidence of particular incidents otherwise properly admitted, such as on a
plea of justification that failed. 602 Reform has therefore been urged by several
bodies. 603
Inquiry into the “damages-worthiness” of the plaintiff is also to some extent
stultified by the rule in common law jurisdictions that evidence tending to
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justification cannot be adduced in the absence of a plea of truth. The reason for
this is to acquaint the plaintiff with the defence he or she will have to meet, and
once more to prevent furtive admission in evidence of particular facts as distinct
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from general reputation. 604 On the other hand, it can give the plaintiff a lever
for outmanoeuvring the defendant by not relying on one of several libellous
allegations: if clearly severable, the defendant cannot adduce facts in justification
of that one, and may thus stand to lose the benefit of highly prejudicial
evidence. 605 However, a defendant must still be aware of the operation of the
defence of contextual truth. 606
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Mitigation
[25.580] Although, as we have seen, it is no defence even in reduction of
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damages that the calumny was originally or concurrently published by others,

607
a partial modification at least allows evidence in mitigation that the plaintiff
has already recovered, or brought actions for, damages or received or agreed to
receive compensation in respect of a libel to the same effect as that sued
597 Plato Films v Speidel [1961] AC 1090 at 1138-1140.

598 Plato Films [1961] AC 1090, passim; Chappell v Mirror Newspapers (1984) ATR 80-691.
599 Plato Films v Speidel [1961] AC 1090 at 1140; Morosi v Mirror Newspapers [1977] 2
NSWLR 749 at 801; O’Hagan v Nationwide News (2001) 53 NSWLR 89 at 91
(Meagher JA), at 95 (Stein JA); Australian Broadcasting Corporation v McBride (2001) 53
NSWLR 430 at 435-447 (Ipp AJA).
600 Plato Films v Speidel [1961] AC 1090, Lord Radcliffe, at 1131.
601 Plato Films v Speidel [1961] AC 1090, Lord Radcliffe, at 1131.
602 Pamplin v Express Newspaper [1988] 1 WLR 116 (CA); Burstein v Times Newspapers
[2001] 1 WLR 579 at 600-01 (May LJ).
603 Porter (1948), at [146]-[156]; Faulks, at [363]-[372]; ALRC 8, at [265].
604 Watt v Watt [1905] AC 115 at 118.
605 See Plato Films v Speidel [1961] AC 1090; S & K Holdings v Throgmorton [1972] 1 WLR
1036 (CA).
606 See above [xx.xxx].
607 Dingle v Assoc Newspapers [1964] AC 371; and see above, [xx.xxx].

upon. 608 With the same object of at once alleviating the lot of defendants and
preventing a plaintiff from recovering several times over for the same elements
of damage common to each libel, most jurisdictions encourage consolidation of
actions brought in respect to the same or substantially the same libel and
consequential apportionment of damages between the several defendants. 609
The plaintiff’s conduct, before or after the publication, may also provide
ground for mitigating damages, although contributory negligence as such is not
a recognised defence. 610 Damages have been reduced, for example, because the
plaintiff provoked the publication or “behaved badly” in some other way. 611
Turning to apology, in any action for defamation the defendant may,
provided he gives notice in writing at the time of delivering his defence, 612 give
evidence in mitigation that he made or offered an apology before commencement
of the action or at the earliest opportunity thereafter if he had none before. 613 A
retraction or a correction is relevant for the purpose of showing that the plaintiff
has sustained less damage to his reputation than he claims and tends to negative
malice. 614 Of course, it must be unequivocal and unconditional. To say that a
person has manners not fit for a pig and then to correct it by saying that his or
her manners are fit for a pig, is an aggravation, not a retraction. 615 Nor does a
newspaper make amends for a defamatory attack on a politician by offering him
the opportunity of replying in kind 616 or by merely reporting other people’s
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exculpations instead of frankly putting its own authority and regrets behind the
required vindication. 617 A refusal or failure to apologise may be a ground for
increasing ordinary compensatory damages (because it enhances the likelihood
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that the defamatory imputation will spread within the community) or aggravated
damages (because it aggravates the hurt of the plaintiff’s feelings). 618
Declaration of falsity
[25.590] Aside from the defence of justification, the common law does not
provide a means for a judicial determination of the truth raised by a defamatory
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allegation. A court presumably has the power to grant declaratory relief in a

defamation case but there is, as yet, no Australian precedent for this. 619 In many
cases the issue is pre-empted by one of the several “privileges” which allow a
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defendant to succeed, whatever the truth; for another, even failure of the defence
of justification does not positively prove the falsity of the allegation.
608 See Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 38(1)(c) – (e) and equivalent provisions in the remaining
jurisdictions. As to whether separate defendants can, by their separate publications, be liable
“in respect of the same damage”, see Bracks v Smyth-Kirk (2009) 263 ALR 522 (NSWCA).
609 See generally Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 38 and equivalent provisions in the remaining
jurisdictions. Also Isaacs v Fairfax [1980] 2 NSWLR 651.
610 For a form of volenti (invited statements) see above, [25.xxx].
611 See Roux v ABC [1992] 2 VR 577 at 662-663.
612 Not in his or her defence. Matters in mitigation of damages cannot be pleaded: Wilson v
Dun’s Gazette [1912] VLR 342.
613 See Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 38(1)(a) and equivalent provisions in the remaining
jurisdictions.
614 See Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 38(1)(b) and equivalent provisions in the remaining
jurisdictions.
615 Winfield & Jolowicz 297.
616 McRae v SA Telecasters (1976) 14 SASR 162 at 167.
617 Dingle v Assoc Newspapers [1964] AC 371 at 400.
618 Herald & Weekly Times v McGregor (1928) 41 CLR 254 at 263; Humphries v TWT Ltd
(1994) 120 ALR 693 at 699; Clark v Ainsworth (1996) 40 NSWLR 463.
619 Bracks v Smyth-Kirk (2009) 263 ALR 522 at 554-555 (Young JA).

Remedies 234
Yet, many a plaintiff may be primarily concerned with clearing his or her
name by an unequivocal judicial declaration, rather than seeking an award of
damages which does not speak unequivocally to the truth. Besides, there is a
public interest in ascertaining the truth, at least in matters of public concern.
With this in view, a reform mounted in New South Wales would allow a plaintiff
to seek a judicial declaration that the allegation is false, coupled with an order
that the declaration be published by the defendant. Only absolute privilege or
privileged report would be a defence. 620
During the law reform process leading up to the introduction of the national,
uniform defamation laws, alternative remedies, such as declarations of falsity
and court-ordered corrections and apologies were again canvassed but none
managed to end up in the legislation as enacted.
Offer of amends
[25.600] This long-standing usage has been reinforced in several jurisdictions
in an effort to stem the flood of trivial damage claims and encourage
non-litigious settlements. Thus in England an “offer to make amends” (publish
correction and apology, and pay compensation, if necessary determined by a
court), even if not accepted, furnishes a defence if the offeror neither knew nor
had reason to believe the allegation to refer to the complainant and was both
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false and defamatory of him. 621
An offer of amends regime has been introduced across Australia under the
national, uniform defamation laws, 622 as part of that legislation’s stated aim of
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promoting “speedy and non-litigious” dispute resolution. 623 It is modelled on
that which existed in New South Wales from 2002 onwards. 624 The offer of
amends regime has not yet been widely used, possibly because it involves the
publication of a correction or an apology in terms satisfactory to the plaintiff –
something to which a publisher might be resistant, or possibly because less
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cumbersome means of settling disputes are available to parties. In any event, the
attempts to introduce and promote alternative means of resolving defamation
disputes have had mixed success. The award of damages persists in occupying a
central place in defamation law.
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620 Defamation Bill 1996, Part 6. See Chesterman, “The Money or the Truth” (1995) 18
UNSWLJ 300, esp at 324-326; NSWLRC 75 (1995), at [6.1]-[6.24].
621 Defamation Act 1996 (UK), ss 2 – 4.
622 See Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), Pt 3 and equivalent provisions in the remaining
jurisdictions.
623 See Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), s 3(d).
624 Defamation Act 1974 (NSW), Pt 2A (repealed), introduced by Defamation Amendment Act
2002 (NSW), Sch 1, cl 6.


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25

jurisdictions existed – some codified defamation law, some substantially

session: 5 October 28, 2010 page no: 1 folio no: 166

event. 6 The national, uniform defamation legislation significantly harmonises

also disparagements of his or her reputation in trade, business, profession or

session: 5 October 28, 2010 page no: 2 folio no: 167

15 Fairfax v Punch (1980) 31 ALR 624.

session: 5 October 28, 2010 page no: 3 folio no: 168

someone of giving information to the police even if the community’s attitude to

drawing the distinction in cases of written, as distinct from spoken, words

Not all falsehoods calculated to injure are defamatory: defamation is

session: 5 October 28, 2010 page no: 4 folio no: 169

session: 5 October 28, 2010 page no: 5 folio no: 170

A defamatory statement primarily directed against a dead person may, of course,

51 Livingstone-Thomas v Assoc Newspapers (1969) 90 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 223 at 235; cf Krahe v

Daily Telegraph [1964] AC 234; Australian Broadcasting Commission v Comalco (1986) 12

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though innocent of any intention to defame. 67 The second (comprehended

session: 5 October 28, 2010 page no: 7 folio no: 172

ceased to be an employee or agent of the declarant. 77 As Lord Devlin warned,

session: 5 October 28, 2010 page no: 8 folio no: 173

weeks before; 82 an erroneous identification of a woman as “Mrs X” looks

session: 5 October 28, 2010 page no: 9 folio no: 174

explicit. 85 Somewhat perplexingly, however, a “true” innuendo (in the technical

Judge and jury

session: 5 October 28, 2010 page no: 10 folio no: 175

Reference to the plaintiff

94 Gwynne & Small v Wairarapa Times Age [1972] NZLR 586.

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vilification, not of individuals, but of a whole class of persons distinguishable by

session: 5 October 28, 2010 page no: 12 folio no: 177

session: 5 October 28, 2010 page no: 13 folio no: 178

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person alleged to be defamed, and the defamatory character which is attributed

session: 5 October 28, 2010 page no: 15 folio no: 180

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The fault element

156 Toomey v Mirror Newspapers (1985) 1 NSWLR 173.

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latitudinal standard of identification, creative literature is unnecessarily

session: 5 October 28, 2010 page no: 18 folio no: 183

communicate defamatory matter on a postcard, and publication will be

session: 5 October 28, 2010 page no: 19 folio no: 184

Subordinate distributors and innocent dissemination

180 Hebditch v MacIlwaine [1894] 2 QB 54.

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broadcasters of live programmes with no effective control over the person

damage; eventually it extended over all defamatory allegations causing

session: 5 October 28, 2010 page no: 21 folio no: 186

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allegation. 205 The defence is peculiarly applicable to publications of limited

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words spoken at a vestry meeting or a meeting of directors, and another where it

session: 5 October 28, 2010 page no: 24 folio no: 189

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implying at worst that there were grounds for suspicion) or of actually

1849 a distinguished Select Committee of the House of Lords therefore

session: 5 October 28, 2010 page no: 26 folio no: 191

overcome the potential disadvantage this approach poses to defendants by the