G.R. No.

198240 July 3, 2013 The sisters sought reconsideration of the order but the RTC denied their motion in an Order11
dated October 11, 2005.
LUISA NAVARRO MARCOS*, Petitioner,
vs. Aggrieved, the sisters filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which however, dismissed their
THE HEIRS OFTHE LATE DR. ANDRES NAVARRO, JR., namely NONITA NAVARRO, petition in the assailed Decision dated February 28, 2011 on the ground that the dismissal of
FRANCISCA NAVARRO MALAPITAN, SOLEDAD NAVARRO BROCHLER, NONITA Civil Case No. 5215 has mooted the issue of PO2 Alvarez’s disqualification as a witness.
BARRUN NAVARRO, JR., IMELDA NAVARRO, ANDRES NAVARRO III, MILAGROS
NAVARRO YAP, PILAR NAVARRO, TERESA NAVARRO-TABITA, and LOURDES BARRUN-
Later, the CA likewise denied their motion for reconsideration in its Resolution dated July 29,
REJUSO, Respondents.
2011. The CA refused to take judicial notice of the decision of another CA Division which
reinstated Civil Case No. 5215. The CA held that a CA Justice cannot take judicial notice of
DECISION decisions or matters pending before another Division of the appellate court where he or she is
not a member. The CA also held that the sisters were negligent for belatedly informing it that
Civil Case No. 5215 was reinstated.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Hence, this appeal.

Petitioner Luisa Navarro Marcos appeals the Decision1 dated February 28, 2011 and Resolution2
dated July 29, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 92460.
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in refusing to reconsider the assailed decision in light of the
reinstatement of Civil Case No. 5215. Petitioner adds that the CA erred in not ruling that the
The antecedent facts follow:
RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying PO2 Alvarez as a witness.12 They
stress that PO2 Alvarez will be presented as an expert witness to render an opinion on whether
Spouses Andres Navarro, Sr. and Concepcion Medina-Navarro died in 1958 and 1993, the disputed handwriting was indeed made by Andres, Sr. or whether it is a forgery.13
respectively. They left behind several parcels of land including a 108.3997-hectare lot (subject
lot) located in Cayabon, Milagros, Masbate.3
In their comment,14 respondents counter that the CA properly disqualified PO2 Alvarez. They
also agreed with the CA that her disqualification was mooted by the dismissal of Civil Case No.
The spouses were survived by their daughters Luisa Navarro Marcos, herein petitioner, and 5215.
Lydia Navarro Grageda, and the heirs of their only son Andres Navarro, Jr. The heirs of Andres,
Jr. are the respondents herein.4
We find in favor of petitioner.

Petitioner and her sister Lydia discovered that respondents are claiming exclusive ownership of
The CA ruling that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 5215 has mooted the issue of PO2 Alvarez’s
the subject lot. Respondents based their claim on the Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property dated
disqualification as a witness can no longer be justified. Hence, we reverse the CA ruling. While
May 19, 1954 where Andres, Sr. donated the subject lot to Andres, Jr. 5
we agree with the CA in considering the RTC’s Orders15 which dismissed Civil Case No. 5215,
we are unable to agree with its refusal to take judicial notice of the Decision16 of another CA
Believing that the affidavit is a forgery, the sisters, through Assistant Fiscal Andres Marcos, Division which reinstated Civil Case No. 5215. Subsequent proceedings were even held in the
requested a handwriting examination of the affidavit. The PNP handwriting expert PO2 Mary reinstated Civil Case No. 5215 per Orders17 issued by the RTC which were already submitted to
Grace Alvarez found that Andres, Sr.’s signature on the affidavit and the submitted standard the CA. That Civil Case No. 5215 was reinstated is a fact that cannot be ignored.
signatures of Andres, Sr. were not written by one and the same person.6
We also agree with petitioner that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying
Thus, the sisters sued the respondents for annulment of the deed of donation before the PO2 Alvarez as a witness. Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but it generally
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate, where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5215.7 refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where
After the pre-trial, respondents moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness. They argued that the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. 18
the RTC did not authorize the handwriting examination of the affidavit. They added that
Grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal violates the Constitution or
presenting PO2 Alvarez as a witness will violate their constitutional right to due process since no grossly disregards the law or existing jurisprudence.19
notice was given to them before the examination was conducted. 8 Thus, PO2 Alvarez’s report is
a worthless piece of paper and her testimony would be useless and irrelevant. 9
In Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System v. Republic of
the Philippines,20 we said that a witness must only possess all the qualifications and none of the
In its Order dated August 19, 2004, the RTC granted respondents’ motion and disqualified PO2
10
disqualifications provided in the Rules of Court. Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence
Alvarez as a witness. The RTC ruled that PO2 Alvarez’s supposed testimony would be hearsay
provides:
as she has no personal knowledge of the alleged handwriting of Andres, Sr. Also, there is no
need for PO2 Alvarez to be presented, if she is to be presented as an expert witness, because
her testimony is not yet needed.
SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications.–Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all For instance, in Tamani v. Salvador,22 we were inclined to believe that Tamani’s signature was
persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be forged after considering the testimony of the PNP document examiner that the case involved
witnesses. simulated or copied forgery, such that the similarities will be superficial. We said that the value of
the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of whether a writing
is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks,
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless
characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing which
otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.
would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer.

Specific rules of witness disqualification are provided under Sections 21 to 24, Rule 130 of the
Thus, we disagree with the RTC that PO2 Alvarez’s testimony would be hearsay. Under Section
Rules on Evidence. Section 21 disqualifies a witness by reason of mental incapacity or
49, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, PO2 Alvarez is allowed to render an expert opinion, as
immaturity. Section 22 disqualifies a witness by reason of marriage. Section 23 disqualifies a
the PNP document examiner was allowed in Tamani. But the RTC already ruled at the outset
witness by reason of death or insanity of the adverse party. Section 24 disqualifies a witness by
that PO2 Alvarez’s testimony is hearsay even before her testimony is offered and she is called to
reason of privileged communication.
the witness stand. Under the circumstances, the CA should have issued a corrective writ of
certiorari and annulled the RTC ruling.
In Cavili v. Judge Florendo,21 we have held that the specific enumeration of disqualified
witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability other than those mentioned in the
True, the use of the word "may" in Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence signifies that
Rules. The Rules should not be interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein. We
the use of opinion of an expert witness is permissive and not mandatory on the part of the
said:
courts.23 Jurisprudence is also replete with instances wherein this Court dispensed with the
testimony of expert witnesses to prove forgeries.24 However, we have also recognized that
The generosity with which the Rule allows people to testify is apparent. Interest in the outcome handwriting experts are often offered as expert witnesses considering the technical nature of the
of a case, conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, and religious belief are not procedure in examining forged documents.25 More important, analysis of the questioned
grounds for disqualification. signature in the deed of donation executed by the late Andres Navarro, Sr. in crucial to the
resolution of the case.
Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific disqualifications. Section 19 disqualifies
those who are mentally incapacitated and children whose tender age or immaturity renders them In sum, the RTC should not have disqualified P02 Alvarez as a witness. She has the
incapable of being witnesses. Section 20 provides for disqualification based on conflicts of qualifications of witness and possess none of the disqualifications under the Rules. The Rules
interest or on relationship. Section 21 provides for disqualification based on privileged allow the opinion of an expert witness to be received as evidence. In Tamani, we used the
communications. Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on disqualification of witnesses but it opinion of an expert witness. The value of P02 Alvarez's expert opinion cannot be determined if
states the grounds when a witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called. P02 Alvarez is not even allowed to testify on the handwriting examination she conducted.

There is no provision of the Rules disqualifying parties declared in default from taking the WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the (1) Decision dated February 28,
witness stand for non-disqualified parties. The law does not provide default as an exception. The 2011 and Resolution dated July 29, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92460, and
specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability (2) Orders dated August 19, 2004 and October II, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case
other than those mentioned in the Rules. It is a maxim of recognized utility and merit in the No. 5215. We DENY respondents' motion to disqualify P02 Mary Grace Alvarez as a witness.
construction of statutes that an express exception, exemption, or saving clause excludes other
exceptions. x x x As a general rule, where there are express exceptions these comprise the only
No pronouncement as to costs.
limitations on the operation of a statute and no other exception will be implied. x x x The Rules
should not be interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein. (Emphasis supplied;
citations omitted.) SO ORDERED.

As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive and make known her
perception to others.1âwphi1 We have no doubt that she is qualified as a witness. She cannot
be disqualified as a witness since she possesses none of the disqualifications specified under
the Rules. Respondents’ motion to disqualify her should have been denied by the RTC for it was
not based on any of these grounds for disqualification. The RTC rather confused the qualification
of the witness with the credibility and weight of her testimony.

Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is clear that the opinion of an expert
witness may be received in evidence, to wit:

SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness.–The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess, may be received in
evidence.
 G.R. No. 145225 April 2, 2004 A week after she brought Evelyn to stay with her, Lorna suspected that her sister was pregnant
as she noticed her growing belly. She thereupon brought her to a doctor at the Pascual General
Hospital at Baeza, Novaliches, Quezon City for check-up and ultrasound examination.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
SALVADOR GOLIMLIM @ "BADONG", appellants. Lorna’s suspicions were confirmed as the examinations revealed that Evelyn was indeed
pregnant.11 She thus asked her sister how she became pregnant, to which Evelyn replied that
appellant had sexual intercourse with her while holding a knife. 12
DECISION

In February of 1997, the sisters left for Bulan, Sorsogon for the purpose of filing a criminal
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
complaint against appellant. The police in Bulan, however, advised them to first have Evelyn
examined. Obliging, the two repaired on February 24, 1997 to the Municipal Health Office of
On appeal is the Decision1 of June 9, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Bulan, Sorsogon where Evelyn was examined by Dr. Estrella Payoyo.13 The Medico-legal Report
Branch 65 in Criminal Case No. 241, finding appellant Salvador Golimlim alias "Badong" guilty revealed the following findings, quoted verbatim:
beyond reasonable doubt of rape, imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and
holding him civilly liable in the amount of ₱50,000.00 as indemnity, and ₱50,000.00 as moral
FINDINGS: LMP [last menstrual period]: Aug. 96 ?
damages.

Abd [abdomen]: 7 months AOG [age of gestation]

The Information dated April 16, 1997 filed against appellant reads as follows:

FHT [fetal heart tone]: 148/min

That sometime in the month of August, 1996, at Barangay Bical, Municipality of Bulan,
Province of Sorsogon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court
the above-named accused, armed with a bladed weapon, by means of violence and Presentation: Cephalic
intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal
knowledge of one Evelyn Canchela against her will and without her consent, to her
Hymen: old laceration at 3, 5, 7, & 11 o’clock position14
damage and prejudice.

On the same day, the sisters went back to the Investigation Section of the Bulan Municipal
Contrary to law.2
Police Station before which they executed their sworn statements. 15

Upon arraignment on December 15, 1997,3 appellant, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not
On February 27, 1997, Evelyn, assisted by Lorna, filed a criminal complaint for rape16 against
guilty to the offense charged.
appellant before the Municipal Trial Court of Bulan, Sorsogon, docketed as Criminal Case No.
6272.
The facts established by the prosecution are as follows:
In the meantime or on May 7, 1997, Evelyn gave birth to a girl, Joana Canchela, at Guruyan,
Private complainant Evelyn G. Canchela (Evelyn), is a mental retardate. When her Juban, Sorsogon.17
mother, Amparo Hachero, left for Singapore on May 2, 1996 to work as a domestic
helper, she entrusted Evelyn to the care and custody of her (Amparo’s) sister Jovita
Appellant, on being confronted with the accusation, simply said that it is not true "[b]ecause her
Guban and her husband Salvador Golimlim, herein appellant, at Barangay Bical,
mind is not normal,"18 she having "mentioned many other names of men who ha[d] sexual
Bulan, Sorsogon.4
intercourse with her."19

Sometime in August 1996, Jovita left the conjugal residence to meet a certain Rosing, 5 leaving
Finding for the prosecution, the trial court, by the present appealed Decision, convicted appellant
Evelyn with appellant. Taking advantage of the situation, appellant instructed private
as charged. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
complainant to sleep,6 and soon after she had laid down, he kissed her and took off her clothes.7
As he poked at her an object which to Evelyn felt like a knife, 8 he proceeded to insert his penis
into her vagina.9 His lust satisfied, appellant fell asleep. WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Salvador Golimlim having been found
guilty of the crime of RAPE (Art. 335 R.P.C. as amended by RA 7659) beyond
reasonable doubt is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
When Jovita arrived, Evelyn told her about what appellant did to her. Jovita, however, did not
PERPETUA, and to indemnify the offended party Evelyn Canchela in the amount of
believe her and in fact she scolded her.10
P50,000.00 as indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral damage[s], and to pay the
costs.
Sometime in December of the same year, Lorna Hachero, Evelyn’s half-sister, received a letter
from their mother Amparo instructing her to fetch Evelyn from Sorsogon and allow her to stay in
SO ORDERED.20
Novaliches, Quezon City where she (Lorna) resided. Dutifully, Lorna immediately repaired to
appellant’s home in Bical, and brought Evelyn with her to Manila.
Hence, the present appeal, appellant assigning to the trial court the following errors: SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. – Except as provided in the next succeeding
section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their
perception to others, may be witnesses.
I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO
THE CONTRADICTORY AND IMPLAUSIBLE TESTIMONY OF EVELYN CANCHELA,
A MENTAL RETARDATE, [AND] xxx

II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE SEC. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. – The following
ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN persons cannot be witnesses:
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.21
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is
Appellant argues that Evelyn’s testimony is not categorical and is replete with contradictions, such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
thus engendering grave doubts as to his criminal culpability.
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving
In giving credence to Evelyn’s testimony and finding against appellant, the trial court made the the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.
following observations, quoted verbatim:
In People v. Trelles,24 where the trial court relied heavily on the therein mentally retarded private
1) Despite her weak and dull mental state the victim was consistent in her claim that complainant’s testimony irregardless of her "monosyllabic responses and vacillations between
her Papay Badong (accused Salvador Golimlim) had carnal knowledge of her and was lucidity and ambiguity," this Court held:
the author of her pregnancy, and nobody else (See: For comparison her Sworn
Statement on p. 3/Record; her narration in the Psychiatric Report on pp. 47 &
A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se, disqualified from being a
48/Record; the TSNs of her testimony in open court);
witness, her mental condition not being a vitiation of her credibility. It is now
universally accepted that intellectual weakness, no matter what form it assumes, is not
2) She remains consistent that her Papay Badong raped her only once; a valid objection to the competency of a witness so long as the latter can still give a
fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matter testified to.25
3) That the contradictory statements she made in open court relative to the details of
how she was raped, although would seem derogatory to her credibility and reliability It can not then be gainsaid that a mental retardate can be a witness, depending on his or her
as a witness under normal conditions, were amply explained by the psychiatrist who ability to relate what he or she knows.26 If his or her testimony is coherent, the same is
examined her and supported by her findings (See: Exhibits F to F-2); admissible in court.27

4) Despite her claim that several persons laid on top of her (which is still subject to To be sure, modern rules on evidence have downgraded mental incapacity as a ground to
question considering that the victim could not elaborate on its meaning), the lucid fact disqualify a witness. As observed by McCormick, the remedy of excluding such a witness who
remains that she never pointed to anybody else as the author of her pregnancy, but may be the only person available who knows the facts, seems inept and primitive. Our rules
her Papay Badong. Which only shows that the trauma that was created in her mind by follow the modern trend of evidence.28
the incident has remained printed in her memory despite her weak mental state.
Furthermore, granting for the sake of argument that other men also laid on top of her,
Thus, in a long line of cases,29 this Court has upheld the conviction of the accused based mainly
this does not deviate from the fact that her Papay Badong (the accused) had sexual
on statements given in court by the victim who was a mental retardate.
intercourse with her.22

From a meticulous scrutiny of the records of this case, there is no reason to doubt Evelyn’s
The trial judge’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses’ testimonies is, as has repeatedly
credibility. To be sure, her testimony is not without discrepancies, given of course her
been held by this Court, accorded great respect on appeal in the absence of grave abuse of
feeblemindedness.
discretion on its part, it having had the advantage of actually examining both real and testimonial
evidence including the demeanor of the witnesses.23
By the account of Dr. Chona Cuyos-Belmonte, Medical Specialist II at the Psychiatric
Department of the Bicol Medical Center, who examined Evelyn, although Evelyn was suffering
In the present case, no cogent reason can be appreciated to warrant a departure from the
from moderate mental retardation with an IQ of 46,30 she is capable of perceiving and relating
findings of the trial court with respect to the assessment of Evelyn’s testimony.
events which happened to her. Thus the doctor testified:

That Evelyn is a mental retardate does not disqualify her as a witness nor render her testimony
Q: So do you try to impress that although she answers in general terms it does not
bereft of truth.
necessarily mean that she might be inventing answers – only that she could not go to
the specific details because of dullness?
Sections 20 and 21 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:
A: I don’t think she was inventing her answer because I conducted mental status Q: What if the victim is being coached or led by someone else, will she be able to
examination for three (3) times and I tried to see the consistency in the narration but answer the questions?
very poor (sic) in giving details.
A: Yes, she may be able to answer the questions, but you would notice the
xxx inconsistency of the answers because what we normally do is that we present the
questions in different ways, and we expect the same answer. This is how we try to
evaluate the patient. If the person, especially a retarded, is being coached by
Q: May we know what she related to you?
somebody, the answers will no longer be consistent.

A: She related to me that she was raped by her uncle ‘Tatay Badong’. What she
Q: You also mentioned a while ago that the answers given by the patient, taken all in
mentioned was that, and I quote: ‘hinila ang panty ko, pinasok ang pisot at bayag niya
all, were consistent?
sa pipi ko’. She would laugh inappropriately after telling me that particular incident. I
also tried to ask her regarding the dates, the time of the incident, but she could not
really…. I tried to elicit those important things, but the patient had a hard time A: Yes, sir.31 (Underscoring supplied)
remembering those dates.
As noted in the above-quoted testimony of Dr. Belmonte, Evelyn could give spontaneous and
Q: But considering that you have evaluated her mentally, gave her I.Q. test, in your consistent answers to the same but differently framed questions under conditions which do not
honest opinion, do you believe that this narration by the patient to you about the rape inhibit her from answering. It could have been in this light that Evelyn was able to relate in court,
is reliable? upon examination by a female government prosecutor and the exclusion of the public from the
proceedings, on Dr. Belmonte’s suggestion,32 how, as quoted below, she was raped and that it
was appellant who did it:
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Lorna Hachero testified before this Court that you gave birth to a baby girl named
Q: Why do you consider that reliable?
Johanna, is this true?

A: Being a (sic) moderately retarded, I have noticed the spontaneity of her answers
A: (The witness nods, yes.)
during the time of the testing. She was not even hesitating when she told me she was
raped once at home by her Tatay Badong; and she was laughing when she told me
about how it was done on (sic) her. So, although she may be inappropriate but (sic) xxx
she was spontaneous, she was consistent.
Q: Who is the father of Johanna?
Q: Now, I would like to relate to you an incident that happened in this Court for you to
give us your expert opinion. I tried to present the victim in this case to testify. While
A: Papay Badong
she testified that she was raped by her uncle Badong, when asked about the details,
thereof, she would not make (sic) the detail. She only answered ‘wala’ (no). I ask this
question because somehow this seems related to your previous evaluation that while Q: Who is this Papay Badong that you are referring to?
she gave an answer, she gave no detail. Now, I was thinking because I am a man and
I was the one asking and the Judge is a man also. And while the mother would say
that she would relate to her and she related to you, can you explain to us why when A: The husband of Mamay Bita.
she was presented in court that occurrence, that event happened?
Q: Is he here in court?
A: There are a lot of possible answers to that question; one, is the court’s atmosphere
itself. This may have brought a little anxiety on the part of the patient and this inhibits A: He is here.
her from relating some of the details relative to the incident-in-question. When I
conducted my interview with the patient, there were only two (2) of us in the room. I
normally do not ask this question during the first session with the patient because Q: Please look around and point him to us.
these are emotionally leading questions, and I do not expect the patient to be very
trusting. So, I usually ask this type of questions during the later part of my examination A: (The witness pointing to the lone man sitting in the first row of the gallery wearing a
to make her relax during my evaluation. So in this way, she will be more cooperative regular prison orange t-shirt who gave his name as Salvador Golimlim when asked.)
with me. I don’t think that this kind of atmosphere within the courtroom with some
people around, this could have inhibited the patient from answering questions.
Q: Why were you able to say that it is Papay Badong who is the father of your child
Johanna?
xxx
A: Because then I was left at Mamay Bita’s house, although I am not there now.
Q: And that house where you were left is also the house of your Papay Badong? Nevertheless, may we request that the local term for sexual intercourse, the word
‘Initoy’ which was used by the witness be put on the record, and we request judicial
notice of the fact that ‘initoy’ is the local term for sexual intercourse.
A: Yes ma’am.

xxx
Q: What did Salvador Golimlim or your Papay Badong do to you that’s why you were
able to say that he is the father of your child?
Q: What did you feel when your Papay Badong had sexual intercourse with you?
A: I was undressed by him.
A: I felt a knife; it was like a knife.
xxx
Q: Where did you feel that knife?
Q: What did you do after you were undressed?
A: I forgot.
A: I was scolded by the wife, Mamay Bita.
Q: Why did you allow your Papay Badong to have sexual intercourse with you?
Q: I am referring to that very moment when you were undressed. Immediately after
your Papay Badong undressed you, what did you do? A: I will not consent to it.

xxx xxx

A: He laid on top of me. Q: Did you like what he did to you?

Q: What was your position when he laid on top of you? A: I do not want it.

A: I was lying down. Q: But why did it happen?

Q: Then after he went on top of you, what did he do there? A: I was forced to.

A: He made (sic) sexual intercourse with me. xxx

Q: When you said he had a (sic) sexual intercourse with you, what did he do exactly? Q: Did you feel anything when he inserted into your vagina when your Papay Badong
laid on top of you?
A: He kissed me.
A: His sexual organ/penis.
Q: Where?
Q: How did you know that it was the penis of your Papay Badong that was entered
into your vagina?
A: On the cheeks (witness motioning indicating her cheeks).

A: It was put on top of me.

Q: What else did he do? Please describe before this Honorable Court the sexual
intercourse which you are referring to which the accused did to you.
Q: Did it enter your vagina?
A: ‘Initoy’ and he slept after that.
A: Yes, Your Honor.
(to Court)
xxx
 Q: Madam Witness, is it true that your Papay Badong inserted his penis into your Costs against appellant.
vagina or sexual organ during that time that he was on top of you?
SO ORDERED.
A: (The witness nods, yes.)33 (Underscoring supplied)

Appellant’s bare denial is not only an inherently weak defense. It is not supported by clear and
convincing evidence. It cannot thus prevail over the positive declaration of Evelyn who
convincingly identified him as her rapist.34

In convicting appellant under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act 7659 (the law in force when the crime was committed in 1996), the trial court did not specify
under which mode the crime was committed. Under the said article, rape is committed thus:

ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. – Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances.

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two
or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua or death.

xxx

It is settled that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate constitutes statutory
rape which does not require proof that the accused used force or intimidation in having carnal
knowledge of the victim for conviction.35 The fact of Evelyn’s mental retardation was not,
however, alleged in the Information and, therefore, cannot be the basis for conviction. Such
notwithstanding, that force and intimidation attended the commission of the crime, the mode of
commission alleged in the Information, was adequately proven. It bears stating herein that the
mental faculties of a retardate being different from those of a normal person, the degree of force
needed to overwhelm him or her is less. Hence, a quantum of force which may not suffice when
the victim is a normal person, may be more than enough when employed against an imbecile. 36

Still under the above-quoted provision of Art. 335 of the Rev ised Penal Code, when the crime of
rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death. In the case at bar, however, although there is adequate evidence showing that appellant
indeed used force and intimidation, that is not the case with respect to the use of a deadly
weapon.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch
65 in Criminal Case No. 241 finding appellant, Salvador Golimlim alias "Badong," GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of rape, which this Court finds to have been committed under
paragraph 1, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, and holding him civilly liable therefor, is
hereby AFFIRMED.
 G.R. No. 143439 October 14, 2005 You may proceed.

MAXIMO ALVAREZ, Petitioner, xxx

vs.
SUSAN RAMIREZ, Respondent.
DIRECT EXAMINATION

DECISION
ATTY. ALCANTARA:

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
xxx

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals
Q: When you were able to find the source, incidentally what was the source of that scent?
dated May 31, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 56154, entitled "Susan Ramirez, petitioner, versus, Hon.
Benjamin M. Aquino, Jr., as Judge RTC, Malabon, MM, Br. 72, and Maximo Alvarez,
respondents." A: When I stand by the window, sir, I saw a man pouring the gasoline in the house of my sister
(and witness pointing to the person of the accused inside the court room).
Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN
for arson3 pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Malabon City. The accused is Q: For the record, Mrs. Witness, can you state the name of that person, if you know?
Maximo Alvarez, herein petitioner. He is the husband of Esperanza G. Alvarez, sister of
respondent.
A: He is my husband, sir, Maximo Alvarez.

On June 21, 1999, the private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness stand as the
first witness against petitioner, her husband. Petitioner and his counsel raised no objection. Q: If that Maximo Alvarez you were able to see, can you identify him?

Esperanza testified as follows: A: Yes, sir.

Q: If you can see him inside the Court room, can you please point him?
"ATTY. ALCANTARA:

We are calling Mrs. Esperanza Alvarez, the wife of the accused, Your Honor. A: Witness pointing to a person and when asked to stand and asked his name, he gave his
name as Maximo Alvarez."4

COURT:
In the course of Esperanza’s direct testimony against petitioner, the latter showed "uncontrolled
emotions," prompting the trial judge to suspend the proceedings.
Swear in the witness.
On June 30, 1999, petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion5 to disqualify Esperanza from
xxx testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital
disqualification.
ATTY. MESIAH: (sic)
Respondent filed an opposition6 to the motion. Pending resolution of the motion, the trial court
directed the prosecution to proceed with the presentation of the other witnesses.
Your Honor, we are offering the testimony of this witness for the purpose of proving that the
accused Maximo Alvarez committed all the elements of the crime being charged particularly that
accused Maximo Alvarez pour on May 29, 1998 gasoline in the house located at Blk. 5, Lot 9, On September 2, 1999, the trial court issued the questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza
Phase 1-C, Dagat-dagatan, Navotas, Metro Manila, the house owned by his sister-in-law Susan Alvarez from further testifying and deleting her testimony from the records. 7 The prosecution
Ramirez; that accused Maximo Alvarez after pouring the gasoline on the door of the house of filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in the other assailed Order dated October 19,
Susan Ramirez ignited and set it on fire; that the accused at the time he successfully set the 1999.8
house on fire (sic) of Susan Ramirez knew that it was occupied by Susan Ramirez, the members
of the family as well as Esperanza Alvarez, the estranged wife of the accused; that as a
This prompted respondent Susan Ramirez, the complaining witness in Criminal Case No.
consequence of the accused in successfully setting the fire to the house of Susan Ramirez, the
door of said house was burned and together with several articles of the house, including shoes, 19933-MN, to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari9 with application for
chairs and others. preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.10

COURT:
On May 31, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision nullifying and setting aside the Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal relation
assailed Orders issued by the trial court. between him and his wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the Information for arson filed
against him, eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence, respect
and love by which virtues the conjugal relationship survives and flourishes.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:

The issue for our resolution is whether Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband in
Criminal Case No. 19933-MN.
"The act of private respondent in setting fire to the house of his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez,
knowing fully well that his wife was there, and in fact with the alleged intent of injuring the latter,
Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
is an act totally alien to the harmony and confidences of marital relation which the
disqualification primarily seeks to protect. The criminal act complained of had the effect of
"Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. – During their marriage, neither the husband directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. It underscored the fact that the marital and
nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have become so strained that there is
except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by no more harmony, peace or tranquility to be preserved. The Supreme Court has held that in
one against the other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants." such a case, identity is non-existent. In such a situation, the security and confidences of private
life which the law aims to protect are nothing but ideals which through their absence, merely
leave a void in the unhappy home. (People v. Castañeda, 271 SCRA 504). Thus, there is no
The reasons given for the rule are: longer any reason to apply the Marital Disqualification Rule."

1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;

It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the commission of the offense, the
relationship between petitioner and his wife was already strained. In fact, they were separated
2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury; de facto almost six months before the incident. Indeed, the evidence and facts presented reveal
that the preservation of the marriage between petitioner and Esperanza is no longer an interest
the State aims to protect.
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the risk of
an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and
At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being interested in laying the truth before the
courts so that the guilty may be punished and the innocent exonerated, must have the right to
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through offer the direct testimony of Esperanza, even against the objection of the accused, because (as
the hostile testimony of the other.11 stated by this Court in Francisco14), "it was the latter himself who gave rise to its necessity."

But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The trial court, RTC, Branch
civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against 72, Malabon City, is ordered to allow Esperanza Alvarez to testify against petitioner, her
the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the husband, in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN. Costs against petitioner.
excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule. For instance, where the marital
and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace
and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility SO ORDERED.
fails. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based
on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of
private life, which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through their
absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.12

In Ordoño vs. Daquigan,13 this Court held:

"We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this jurisdiction, is that laid down in
Cargil vs. State, 35 ALR 133, 220 Pac. 64, 25 Okl. 314, wherein the court said:

‘The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the person is too narrow; and the
rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic harmony comes within the
exception is too broad. The better rule is that, when an offense directly attacks, or directly and
vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the statute that one shall
not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committee (by)
one against the other.’"
 G.R. No. L-46306 February 27, 1979 On June 20, 1977, this Court resolved — (a) to issue a temporary restraining order, and (b) to
require the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the petitioner. 3 The Office of the Solicitor
General filed its Notice of Appearance on June 27, 1977, 4 and its Memorandum in support of
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
the Petition on August 30, 1977. 5 The respondents filed their Memorandum on September 5,
vs.
1977. 6 Whereupon, the case was considered submitted for decision. 7
HON. MARIANO C. CASTAÑEDA, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, Branch III, and BENJAMIN F. MANALOTO, respondents.
From the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents emerges the sole issues determinative
of the instant petition, to wit: Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of Public
SANTOS, J.:
Document filed against herein private respondent Benjamin F. Manaloto — who allegedly forged
the signature of his wife, Victoria M. Manaloto, in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear that
On the basis of the complaint 1 of his wife, Victoria M. Manaloto, herein private respondent the latter gave her marital consent to the sale of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal
Benjamin Manaloto was charged before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, presided by partnership when in fact and in truth she did not — may be considered as a criminal case for a
respondent Judge, Hon. Mariano C. Castaneda Jr., with the crime of Falsification of Public crime committed by a husband against his wife and, therefore, an exception to the rule on
Document committed, according to the Information, as follows: marital disqualification.

That on or about the 19th day of May, 1975, in the Municipality of San We sustain petitioner's stand that the case is an exception to the marital disqualification rule, as
Fernando, province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of a criminal case for a crime committed by the accused-husband against the witness-wife.
this Honorable Court, the above-named a BENJAMIN F. MANALOTO, with
deliberate intent to commit falsification, did then and there willfully,
1. The act complained of as constituting the crime of Falsification of Public Document is the
unlawfully and feloniously counterfeit, imitate and forge the signature of his
forgery by the accused of his wife's signature in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear therein
spouse Victoria M. Manaloto in a deed of sale executed by said accused
that said wife consented to the sale of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership
wherein he sold a house and lot belonging to the conjugal partnership of
when in fact and in truth she did not. It must be noted that had the sale of the said house and lot,
said spouse in favor of Ponciano Lacsamana under Doc. No. 1957, Page
and the signing of the wife's name by her husband in the deed of sale, been made with the
No. 72, Book No. LVII, Series of 1975, notarized by Notary Public Abraham
consent of the wife, no crime could have been charged against said husband Clearly, therefore,
Pa. Gorospe, thereby making it appear that his spouse Victoria M. Manaloto
it is the husband's breach of his wife's confidence which gave rise to the offense charged. And it
gave her marital consent to said sale when in fact and in truth she did not. 2
is this same breach of trust which prompted the wife to make the necessary complaint with the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal which, accordingly, filed the aforesaid criminal case with the Court
At the trial, the prosecution called the complaint-wife to the witness stand but the defense moved of First Instance of Pampanga. To rule, therefore, that such criminal case is not one for a crime
to disqualify her as a witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules Of Court which committed by one spouse against the other is to advance a conclusion which completely
provides: disregards the factual antecedents of the instant case.

SEC. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship — The 2. This is not the first time that the issue of whether a specific offense may be classified as a
following persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested, crime committed by one spouse against the other is presented to this Court for resolution. Thus,
directly or indirectly as herein enumerated. in the case of Ordoño v. Daquigan, 8this Court, through Mr. Justice Ramon C. Aquino, set up the
criterion to be followed in resolving the issue, stating that:
xxx xxx xxx
We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this jurisdiction, is that laid down
in Cargill v. State, 35 ALR, 133, 220, Pac 64,26 OkL 314, wherein the court said:
(b) A husband can not be examined for or at his wife without her consent;
nor a wife for or against her husband without his consent, except in a civil
case by one against the other or in a criminal case for a crime committed by The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the is too
one against the other. narrow; and the rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting
domestic within the exception is too broad. The better rule is that, WHEN
AN OFFENSE DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND VITALLY
The prosecution opposed said motion to disquality on the ground that the case falls under the IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL RELATION, IT COMES WITHIN THE
exception to the rule, contending that it is a "criminal case for a crime committed by one against EXCEPTION to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other
the other." Notwithstanding such opposition, respondent Judge granted the motion, disqualifying
except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the
Victoria Manaloto from testifying for or against her husband, in an order dated March 31, 1977. A other.
motion for reconsideration petition was filed but was denied by respondent Judge in an order
dated May 19, 1977.
Applying the foregoing criterion in said case of Ordoño v. Daquigan this Court held that the rape
committed by the husband of the witness-wife against their daughter was a crime committed by
Hence, this petition for certiorari file by the office of the Provincial Fiscal, on behalf of the People the husband against his wife. Although the victim of the crime committed by the accused in that
of the Philippines, seeking set aside the aforesaid order of the respondent Judge and praying
can was not his wife but their daughter, this Court, nevertheless, applied the exception for the
that a preliminary injunction or a ternporary restraining order be issued by this Court enjoining reason that said criminal act "Positively undermine(d) the connubial relationship. 9
said judge from further proceeding with the trial of aforesaid Criminal Case No. 1011.
With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where the victim of the crime and
the person who stands to be directly prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person but the
wife herself. And it is undeniable that the act comp of had the effect of directly and vitally
impairing the conjugal relation. This is apparent not only in the act Of the wife in personally
lodging her complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, but also in her insistent efforts 10 in
connection with the instant petition, which seeks to set aside the order disqualified her from
testifying against her husband. Taken collectively, the actuations of the witness-wife underacore
the fact that the martial and domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have
become so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved said nor peace and
tranquility which may be disturbed. In such a case, as We have occasion to point out in previous
decisions, "identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that
Identity is nonexistent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidence of private life
which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but Ideals which, through their absence, merely
leave a void in the unhappy home. 11Thus, there is no reason to apply the martial disqualification
rule.

3. Finally, overriding considerations of public policy demand that the wife should not be
disqualified from testifying against her husband in the instant case. For, as aptly observed by the
Solicitor General," (t)o espouse the contrary view would spawn the dangerous precedent of a
husband committing as many falsifications against his wife as he could conjure, seeking shelter
in the anti-marital privilege as a license to injure and prejudice her in secret — all with
unabashed and complete impunity.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the lower court dated March 31, 1977,
disqualifying Victoria Manaloto from testifying for or against her husband, Benjamin Manaloto, in
Criminal Case No. 1011, as well as the order dated May 19, 1977, denying the motion for
reconsideration are hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court is
hereby lifted and the respondent Judge is hereby ordered to proceed with the trial of the case,
allowing Victoria Manaloto to testify against her husband.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 74306 March 16, 1992 The evidence of the plaintiff shown that he is the administrator of the
intestate estate of Juan Telesforo Chuidian in Special Proceedings No.
71054, Court of First Instance of Manila.
ENRIQUE RAZON, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, in his capacity as Sometime in 1962, Enrique Razon organized the E. Razon, Inc. for the
Administrator of the Estate of the Deceased JUAN T. CHUIDIAN, respondents. purpose of bidding for the arrastre services in South Harbor, Manila. The
incorporators consisted of Enrique Razon, Enrique Valles, Luisa M. de
Razon, Jose Tuason, Jr., Victor Lim, Jose F. Castro and Salvador Perez de
G.R. No. 74315 March 16, 1992
Tagle.

VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, petitioner,

On April 23, 1966, stock certificate No. 003 for 1,500 shares of stock of
vs.
defendant corporation was issued in the name of Juan T. Chuidian.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ENRIQUE RAZ0N, and E. RAZON, INC., respondents.

On the basis of the 1,500 shares of stock, the late Juan T. Chuidian and
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
after him, the plaintiff-appellant, were elected as directors of E. Razon, Inc.
Both of them actually served and were paid compensation as directors of E.
The main issue in these consolidated petitions centers on the ownership of 1,500 shares of Razon, Inc.
stock in E. Razon, Inc. covered by Stock Certificate No. 003 issued on April 23, 1966 and
registered under the name of Juan T. Chuidian in the books of the corporation. The then Court of
From the time the certificate of stock was issued on April 1966 up to April
First Instance of Manila, now Regional Trial Court of Manila, declared that Enrique Razon, the
1971, Enrique Razon had not questioned the ownership by Juan T.
petitioner in G.R. No. 74306 is the owner of the said shares of stock. The then Intermediate
Chuidian of the shares of stock in question and had not brought any action
Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial court's decision and ruled
to have the certificate of stock over the said shares cancelled.
that Juan T. Chuidian, the deceased father of petitioner Vicente B. Chuidian in G.R. No. 74315 is
the owner of the shares of stock. Both parties filed separate motions for reconsideration. Enrique
Razon wanted the appellate court's decision reversed and the trial court's decision affirmed The certificate of stock was in the possession of defendant Razon who
while Vicente Chuidian asked that all cash and stock dividends and all the pre-emptive rights refused to deliver said shares to the plaintiff, until the same was
accruing to the 1,500 shares of stock be ordered delivered to him. The appellate court denied surrendered by defendant Razon and deposited in a safety box in Philippine
both motions. Hence, these petitions. Bank of Commerce.

The relevant Antecedent facts are as follows: Defendants allege that after organizing the E. Razon, Inc., Enrique Razon
distributed shares of stock previously placed in the names of the
withdrawing nominal incorporators to some friends including Juan T.
In his complaint filed on June 29, 1971, and amended on November 16,
Chuidian
1971, Vicente B. Chuidian prayed that defendants Enrique B. Razon, E.
Razon, Inc., Geronimo Velasco, Francisco de Borja, Jose Francisco, Alfredo
B. de Leon, Jr., Gabriel Llamas and Luis M. de Razon be ordered to deliver Stock Certificate No. 003 covering 1,500 shares of stock upon instruction of
certificates of stocks representing the shareholdings of the deceased Juan the late Chuidian on April 23, 1986 was personally delivered by Chuidian on
T. Chuidian in the E. Razon, Inc. with a prayer for an order to restrain the July 1, 1966 to the Corporate Secretary of Attorney Silverio B. de Leon who
defendants from disposing of the said shares of stock, for a writ of was himself an associate of the Chuidian Law Office (Exhs. C & 11). Since
preliminary attachment v. properties of defendants having possession of then, Enrique Razon was in possession of said stock certificate even during
shares of stock and for receivership of the properties of defendant the lifetime of the late Chuidian, from the time the late Chuidian delivered
corporation . . . the said stock certificate to defendant Razon until the time (sic) of defendant
Razon. By agreement of the parties (sic) delivered it for deposit with the
bank under the joint custody of the parties as confirmed by the trial court in
xxx xxx xxx
its order of August 7, 1971.

In their answer filed on June 18, 1973, defendants alleged that all the
Thus, the 1,500 shares of stook under Stock Certificate No. 003 were
shares of stock in the name of stockholders of record of the corporation
delivered by the late Chuidian to Enrique because it was the latter who paid
were fully paid for by defendant, Razon; that said shares are subject to the
for all the subscription on the shares of stock in the defendant corporation
agreement between defendants and incorporators; that the shares of stock
and the understanding was that he (defendant Razon) was the owner of the
were actually owned and remained in the possession of Razon. Appellees
said shares of stock and was to have possession thereof until such time as
also alleged . . . that neither the late Juan T. Chuidian nor the appellant had
he was paid therefor by the other nominal incorporators/stockholders (TSN.,
paid any amount whatsoever for the 1,500 shares of stock in question . . .
pp. 4, 8, 10, 24-25, 25-26, 28-31, 31-32, 60, 66-68, July 22, 1980, Exhs.
"C", "11", "13" "14"). (Ro11o — 74306, pp. 66-68)
xxx xxx xxx
In G.R. No. 74306, petitioner Enrique Razon assails the appellate court's decision on its alleged Furthermore, the records show that the private respondent never objected to the testimony of
misapplication of the dead man's statute rule under Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of the petitioner as regards the true nature of his transaction with the late elder Chuidian. The
Court. According to him, the "dead man's statute" rule is not applicable to the instant case. petitioner's testimony was subject to cross-examination by the private respondent's counsel.
Moreover, the private respondent, as plaintiff in the case did not object to his oral testimony Hence, granting that the petitioner's testimony is within the prohibition of Section 20(a), Rule 130
regarding the oral agreement between him and the deceased Juan T. Chuidian that the of the Rules of Court, the private respondent is deemed to have waived the rule. We ruled in the
ownership of the shares of stock was actually vested in the petitioner unless the deceased opted case of Cruz v. Court of Appeals (192 SCRA 209 [1990]):
to pay the same; and that the petitioner was subjected to a rigid cross examination regarding
such testimony.
It is also settled that the court cannot disregard evidence which would
ordinarily be incompetent under the rules but has been rendered admissible
Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Section 23 of the Revised Rules on Evidence) by the failure of a party to object thereto. Thus:
States:
. . . The acceptance of an incompetent witness to testify in a civil suit, as
Sec. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship — The well as the allowance of improper questions that may be put to him while on
following persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested the stand is a matter resting in the discretion of the litigant. He may assert
directly or indirectly, as herein enumerated. his right by timely objection or he may waive it, expressly or by silence. In
any case the option rests with him. Once admitted, the testimony is in the
case for what it is worth and the judge has no power to disregard it for the
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a
sole reason that it could have been excluded, if it had been objected to, nor
case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other
to strike it out on its own motion (Emphasis supplied). (Marella v. Reyes, 12
representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind,
Phil. 1.)
upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or
against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact
accruing before the death of such deceased person or before such person The issue as to whether or not the petitioner's testimony is admissible having been settled, we
became of unsound mind." (Emphasis supplied) now proceed to discuss the fundamental issue on the ownership of the 1,500 shares of stock in
E. Razon, Inc.
xxx xxx xxx
E. Razon, Inc. was organized in 1962 by petitioner Enrique Razon for the purpose of
participating in the bidding for the arrastre services in South Harbor, Manila. The incorporators
The purpose of the rule has been explained by this Court in this wise:
were Enrique Razon, Enrique Valles, Luisa M. de Razon, Jose Tuazon, Jr., Victor L. Lim, Jose
F. Castro and Salvador Perez de Tagle. The business, however, did not start operations until
The reason for the rule is that if persons having a claim against the estate of 1966. According to the petitioner, some of the incorporators withdrew from the said corporation.
the deceased or his properties were allowed to testify as to the supposed The petitioner then distributed the stocks previously placed in the names of the withdrawing
statements made by him (deceased person), many would be tempted to nominal incorporators to some friends, among them the late Juan T. Chuidian to whom he gave
falsely impute statements to deceased persons as the latter can no longer 1,500 shares of stock. The shares of stock were registered in the name of Chuidian only as
deny or refute them, thus unjustly subjecting their properties or rights to nominal stockholder and with the agreement that the said shares of stock were owned and held
false or unscrupulous claims or demands. The purpose of the law is to by the petitioner but Chuidian was given the option to buy the same. In view of this arrangement,
"guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the Chuidian in 1966 delivered to the petitioner the stock certificate covering the 1,500 shares of
transaction in question on the part of the surviving party." (Tongco v. stock of E. Razon, Inc. Since then, the Petitioner had in his possession the certificate of stock
Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698; Go Chi Gun, et al. v. Co Cho, et al., 622 [1955]) until the time, he delivered it for deposit with the Philippine Bank of Commerce under the parties'
joint custody pursuant to their agreement as embodied in the trial court's order.
The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is applicable to a case
against the administrator or its representative of an estate upon a claim against the estate of the The petitioner maintains that his aforesaid oral testimony as regards the true nature of his
deceased person. (See Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698 [1927]) agreement with the late Juan Chuidian on the 1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon, Inc. is
sufficient to prove his ownership over the said 1,500 shares of stock.
In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of the defendant
(petitioner herein) to the affect that the late Juan Chuidian, (the father of private respondent The petitioner's contention is not correct.
Vicente Chuidian, the administrator of the estate of Juan Chuidian) and the defendant agreed in
the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. are actually owned
In the case of Embassy Farms, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (188 SCRA 492 [1990]) we ruled:
by the defendant unless the deceased Juan Chuidian opted to pay the same which never
happened. The case was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to
recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian. . . . For an effective, transfer of shares of stock the mode and manner of
transfer as prescribed by law must be followed (Navea v. Peers Marketing
Corp., 74 SCRA 65). As provided under Section 3 of Batas Pambansa
It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the prohibition of the rule.
Bilang, 68 otherwise known as the Corporation Code of the Philippines,
The case was not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims
shares of stock may be transferred by delivery to the transferee of the
against the estate.
 certificate properly indorsed. Title may be vested in the transferee by the . . . [F]irst, to have a certificate or other evidence of his status as stockholder
delivery of the duly indorsed certificate of stock (18 C.J.S. 928, cited in issued to him; second, to vote at meetings of the corporation; third, to
Rivera v. Florendo, 144 SCRA 643). However, no transfer shall be valid, receive his proportionate share of the profits of the corporation; and lastly, to
except as between the parties until the transfer is properly recorded in the participate proportionately in the distribution of the corporate assets upon
books of the corporation (Sec. 63, Corporation Code of the Philippines; the dissolution or winding up. (Purdy's Beach on Private Corporations, sec.
Section 35 of the Corporation Law) 554) (Pascual v. Del Saz Orozco, 19 Phil. 82, 87)

In the instant case, there is no dispute that the questioned 1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon, WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
Inc. are in the name of the late Juan Chuidian in the books of the corporation. Moreover, the
records show that during his lifetime Chuidian was ellected member of the Board of Directors of
a) In G.R. No. 74306, the petition is DISMISSED. The questioned decision and resolution of the
the corporation which clearly shows that he was a stockholder of the corporation. (See Section
then Intermediate Appellate Court, now the Court of Appeals, are AFFIRMED. Costs against the
30, Corporation Code) From the point of view of the corporation, therefore, Chuidian was the
petitioner.
owner of the 1,500 shares of stock. In such a case, the petitioner who claims ownership over the
questioned shares of stock must show that the same were transferred to him by proving that all
the requirements for the effective transfer of shares of stock in accordance with the corporation's b) In G.R. No. 74315, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned Resolution insofar as it denied
by laws, if any, were followed (See Nava v. Peers Marketing Corporation, 74 SCRA 65 [1976]) or the petitioner's motion to clarify the dispositive portion of the decision of the then Intermediate
in accordance with the provisions of law. Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the
appellate court is MODIFIED in that all cash and stock dividends as, well as all pre-emptive
rights that have accrued and attached to the 1,500 shares in E. Razon, Inc., since 1966 are
The petitioner failed in both instances. The petitioner did not present any by-laws which could
declared to belong to the estate of Juan T. Chuidian.
show that the 1,500 shares of stock were effectively transferred to him. In the absence of the
corporation's by-laws or rules governing effective transfer of shares of stock, the provisions of
the Corporation Law are made applicable to the instant case. SO ORDERED.

The law is clear that in order for a transfer of stock certificate to be effective, the certificate must
be properly indorsed and that title to such certificate of stock is vested in the transferee by the
delivery of the duly indorsed certificate of stock. (Section 35, Corporation Code) Since the
certificate of stock covering the questioned 1,500 shares of stock registered in the name of the
late Juan Chuidian was never indorsed to the petitioner, the inevitable conclusion is that the
questioned shares of stock belong to Chuidian. The petitioner's asseveration that he did not
require an indorsement of the certificate of stock in view of his intimate friendship with the late
Juan Chuidian can not overcome the failure to follow the procedure required by law or the proper
conduct of business even among friends. To reiterate, indorsement of the certificate of stock is a
mandatory requirement of law for an effective transfer of a certificate of stock.

Moreover, the preponderance of evidence supports the appellate court's factual findings that the
shares of stock were given to Juan T. Chuidian for value. Juan T. Chuidian was the legal
counsel who handled the legal affairs of the corporation. We give credence to the testimony of
the private respondent that the shares of stock were given to Juan T. Chuidian in payment of his
legal services to the corporation. Petitioner Razon failed to overcome this testimony.

In G.R. No. 74315, petitioner Vicente B. Chuidian insists that the appellate court's decision
declaring his deceased father Juan T. Chuidian as owner of the 1,500 shares of stock of E.
Razon, Inc. should have included all cash and stock dividends and all the pre-emptive rights
accruing to the said 1,500 shares of stock.

The petition is impressed with merit.

The cash and stock dividends and all the pre-emptive rights are all incidents of stock ownership.

The rights of stockholders are generally enumerated as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

 G.R. No. 143340 August 15, 2001 of P200,000.00 and partially paid the same to respondent. Petitioner Lilibeth allegedly informed
respondent that the P200,000.00 represented partial payment of the latter's share in the
partnership, with a promise that the former would make the complete inventory and winding up
LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA, petitioners,
of the properties of the business establishment. Despite such commitment, petitioners allegedly
vs.
failed to comply with their duty to account, and continued to benefit from the assets and income
LAMBERTO T. CHUA, respondent.
of Shellite to the damage and prejudice of respondent.

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
On December 19, 1992, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) in Manila, not the Regional Trial Court in Zamboanga del
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Norte had jurisdiction over the action. Respondent opposed the motion to dismiss.
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated January 31, 2000 in the case entitled "Lamberto T.
Chua vs. Lilibeth Sunga Chan and Cecilia Sunga" and of the Resolution dated May 23, 2000
On January 12, 1993, the trial court finding the complaint sufficient in from and substance denied
denying the motion for reconsideration of herein petitioners Lilibeth Sunga and Cecilia Sunga
the motion to dismiss.
(hereafter collectively referred to as petitioners).

On January 30, 1993, petitioners filed their Answer with Compulsory Counter-claims, contending
The pertinent facts of this case are as follows:
that they are not liable for partnership shares, unreceived income/profits, interests, damages and
attorney's fees, that respondent does not have a cause of action against them, and that the trial
On June 22, 1992, Lamberto T. Chua (hereafter respondent) filed a complaint against Lilibeth court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action, the SEC being the agency that has original
Sunga Chan (hereafter petitioner Lilibeth) and Cecilia Sunga (hereafter petitioner Cecilia), and exclusive jurisdiction over the case. As counterclaim, petitioner sought attorney's fees and
daughter and wife, respectively of the deceased Jacinto L. Sunga (hereafter Jacinto), for expenses of litigation.
"Winding Up of Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and
Damages with Writ of Preliminary Attachment" with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11,
On August 2, 1993, petitioner filed a second Motion to Dismiss this time on the ground that the
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte.
claim for winding up of partnership affairs, accounting and recovery of shares in partnership
affairs, accounting and recovery of shares in partnership assets/properties should be dismissed
Respondent alleged that in 1977, he verbally entered into a partnership with Jacinto in the and prosecuted against the estate of deceased Jacinto in a probate or intestate proceeding.
distribution of Shellane Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) in Manila. For business convenience,
respondent and Jacinto allegedly agreed to register the business name of their partnership,
On August 16, 1993, the trial denied the second motion to dismiss for lack of merit.
SHELLITE GAS APPLIANCE CENTER (hereafter Shellite), under the name of Jacinto as a sole
proprietorship. Respondent allegedly delivered his initial capital contribution of P100,000.00 to
Jacinto while the latter in turn produced P100,000.00 as his counterpart contribution, with the On November 26, 1993, petitioners filed their Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
intention that the profits would be equally divided between them. The partnership allegedly had with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 32499 questioning the denial of the
Jacinto as manager, assisted by Josephine Sy (hereafter Josephine), a sister of the wife motion to dismiss.
respondent, Erlinda Sy. As compensation, Jacinto would receive a manager's fee or
remuneration of 10% of the gross profit and Josephine would receive 10% of the net profits, in
On November 29, 1993, petitioners filed with the trial court a Motion to Suspend Pre-trial
addition to her wages and other remuneration from the business.
Conference.

Allegedly, from the time that Shellite opened for business on July 8, 1977, its business operation
On December 13, 1993, the trial court granted the motion to suspend pre-trial conference.
went quite and was profitable. Respondent claimed that he could attest to success of their
business because of the volume of orders and deliveries of filled Shellane cylinder tanks
supplied by Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. While Jacinto furnished respondent with the On November 15, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for lack of merit.
merchandise inventories, balance sheets and net worth of Shellite from 1977 to 1989,
respondent however suspected that the amount indicated in these documents were understated
and undervalued by Jacinto and Josephine for their own selfish reasons and for tax avoidance. On January 16, 1995, this Court denied the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner, "as
petitioners failed to show that a reversible error was committed by the appellate court."2

Upon Jacinto's death in the later part of 1989, his surviving wife, petitioner Cecilia and
particularly his daughter, petitioner Lilibeth, took over the operations, control, custody, On February 20, 1995, entry of judgment was made by the Clerk of Court and the case was
remanded to the trial court on April 26, 1995.
disposition and management of Shellite without respondent's consent. Despite respondent's
repeated demands upon petitioners for accounting, inventory, appraisal, winding up and
restitution of his net shares in the partnership, petitioners failed to comply. Petitioner Lilibeth On September 25, 1995, the trial court terminated the pre-trial conference and set the hearing of
allegedly continued the operations of Shellite, converting to her own use and advantage its the case of January 17, 1996. Respondent presented his evidence while petitioners were
properties. considered to have waived their right to present evidence for their failure to attend the scheduled
date for reception of evidence despite notice.
On March 31, 1991, respondent claimed that after petitioner Lilibeth ran out the alibis and
reasons to evade respondent's demands, she disbursed out of the partnership funds the amount
On October 7, 1997, the trial court rendered its Decision ruling for respondent. The dispositive of "WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed. The appealed decision is AFFIRMED
the Decision reads: in all respects."4

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the On May 23, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner.
defendants, as follows:
Hence, this petition wherein petitioner relies upon following grounds:
(1) DIRECTING them to render an accounting in acceptable form under
accounting procedures and standards of the properties, assets, income and
"1. The Court of Appeals erred in making a legal conclusion that there existed a
profits of the Shellite Gas Appliance Center Since the time of death of
partnership between respondent Lamberto T. Chua and the late Jacinto L. Sunga
Jacinto L. Sunga, from whom they continued the business operations
upon the latter'' invitation and offer and that upon his death the partnership assets and
including all businesses derived from Shellite Gas Appliance Center, submit
business were taken over by petitioners.
an inventory, and appraisal of all these properties, assets, income, profits
etc. to the Court and to plaintiff for approval or disapproval;
2. The Court of Appeals erred in making the legal conclusion that laches and/or
prescription did not apply in the instant case.
(2) ORDERING them to return and restitute to the partnership any and all
properties, assets, income and profits they misapplied and converted to
their own use and advantage the legally pertain to the plaintiff and account 3. The Court of Appeals erred in making the legal conclusion that there was
for the properties mentioned in pars. A and B on pages 4-5 of this petition competent and credible evidence to warrant the finding of a partnership, and
as basis; assuming arguendo that indeed there was a partnership, the finding of highly
exaggerated amounts or values in the partnership assets and profits."5
(3) DIRECTING them to restitute and pay to the plaintiff ½ shares and
interest of the plaintiff in the partnership of the listed properties, assets and Petitioners question the correctness of the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
good will (sic) in schedules A, B and C, on pages 4-5 of the petition; a partnership existed between respondent and Jacinto from 1977 until Jacinto's death. In the
absence of any written document to show such partnership between respondent and Jacinto,
petitioners argues that these courts were proscribes from hearing the testimonies of respondent
(4) ORDERING them to pay the plaintiff earned but unreceived income and
and his witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership three years after Jacinto's death.
profits from the partnership from 1988 to May 30, 1992, when the plaintiff
To support this argument, petitioners invoke the "Dead Man's Statute' or "Survivorship Rule"
learned of the closure of the store the sum of P35,000.00 per month, with
under Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that provides:
legal rate of interest until fully paid;

"SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party. – Parties or

(5) ORDERING them to wind up the affairs of the partnership and terminate
assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted,
its business activities pursuant to law, after delivering to the plaintiff all the
against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or
½ interest, shares, participation and equity in the partnership, or the value
against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such
thereof in money or money's worth, if the properties are not physically
deceased person, or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any
divisible;
matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such
person became of unsound mind."
(6) FINDING them especially Lilibeth Sunga-Chan guilty of breach of trust
and in bad faith and hold them liable to the plaintiff the sum of P50,000.00
Petitioners thus implore this Court to rule that the testimonies of respondent and his alter ego,
as moral and exemplary damages; and,
Josephine, should not have been admitted to prove certain claims against a deceased person
(Jacinto), now represented by petitioners.
(7) DIRECTING them to reimburse and pay the sum of P25,000.00 as
attorney's (sic) and P25,000.00 as litigation expenses.
We are not persuaded.

NO special pronouncements as to COSTS. SO ORDERED."3

A partnership may be constituted in any form, except where immovable property of real rights
are contributed thereto, in which case a public instrument shall necessary.6 Hence, based on
On October 28, 1997, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court, appealing the case the intention of the parties, as gathered from the facts and ascertained from their language and
to the Court of Appeals. conduct, a verbal contract of partnership may arise.7 The essential profits that must be proven to
that a partnership was agreed upon are (1) mutual contribution to a common stock, and (2) a
joint interest in the profits.8 Understandably so, in view of the absence of the written contract of
On January 31, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. The dispositive portion of the
partnership between respondent and Jacinto, respondent resorted to the introduction of
Decision reads:
documentary and testimonial evidence to prove said partnership. The crucial issue to settle then
is to whether or not the "Dead Man's Statute" applies to this case so as to render inadmissible
respondent's testimony and that of his witness, Josephine.
The "Dead Man's Statute" provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from established between respondent and Jacinto. Based not only on the testimonial evidence, but
testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the the documentary evidence as well, the trial court and the Court of Appeals considered the
undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction.9 evidence for respondent as sufficient to prove the formation of partnership, albeit an informal
But before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it one.
is necessary that:
Notably, petitioners did not present any evidence in their favor during trial. By the weight of
"1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to case or persons in whose behalf a judicial precedents, a factual matter like the finding of the existence of a partnership between
case in prosecuted. respondent and Jacinto cannot be inquired into by this Court on review.17 This Court can no
longer be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess and weigh
them to ascertain if the trial court and the appellate court were correct in according superior
2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a
credit to this or that piece of evidence of one party or the other.18 It must be also pointed out
deceased person or a person of unsound mind;
that petitioners failed to attend the presentation of evidence of respondent. Petitioners cannot
now turn to this Court to question the admissibility and authenticity of the documentary evidence
3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such of respondent when petitioners failed to object to the admissibility of the evidence at the time
deceased person or against person of unsound mind; that such evidence was offered.19

4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact of which occurred before the death of such With regard to petitioners' insistence that laches and/or prescription should have extinguished
deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind."10 respondent's claim, we agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the action for
accounting filed by respondents three (3) years after Jacinto's death was well within the
prescribed period. The Civil Code provides that an action to enforce an oral contract prescribes
Two reasons forestall the application of the "Dead Man's Statute" to this case. in six (6) years20 while the right to demand an accounting for a partner's interest as against the
person continuing the business accrues at the date of dissolution, in the absence of any contrary
First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim11 against respondents in their answer before agreement.21 Considering that the death of a partner results in the dissolution of the
the trial court, and with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed partnership22 , in this case, it was Jacinto's death that respondent as the surviving partner had
this case from the ambit of the "Dead Man's Statute".12 Well entrenched is the rule that when it the right to an account of his interest as against petitioners. It bears stressing that while Jacinto's
is the executor or administrator or representatives of the estates that sets up the counterclaim, death dissolved the partnership, the dissolution did not immediately terminate the partnership.
the plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to The Civil Code23 expressly provides that upon dissolution, the partnership continues and its
defeat the counterclaim.13 Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim, respondent is not legal personality is retained until the complete winding up of its business, culminating in its
disqualified from testifying as to matters of facts occurring before the death of the deceased, termination.24
said action not having been brought against but by the estate or representatives of the
deceased.14 In a desperate bid to cast doubt on the validity of the oral partnership between respondent and
Jacinto, petitioners maintain that said partnership that had initial capital of P200,000.00 should
Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the "Dead Man's Statute" for the simple have been registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) since registration is
reason that she is not "a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case mandated by the Civil Code, True, Article 1772 of the Civil Code requires that partnerships with
is prosecuted." Records show that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to establish a capital of P3,000.00 or more must register with the SEC, however, this registration
the existence of the partnership between respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners' insistence that requirement is not mandatory. Article 1768 of the Civil Code25 explicitly provides that the
Josephine is the alter ego of respondent does not make her an assignor because the term partnership retains its juridical personality even if it fails to register. The failure to register the
"assignor" of a party means "assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and not the contract of partnership does not invalidate the same as among the partners, so long as the
assignor of a right assigned before any cause of action has arisen."15 Plainly then, Josephine is contract has the essential requisites, because the main purpose of registration is to give notice
merely a witness of respondent, the latter being the party plaintiff. to third parties, and it can be assumed that the members themselves knew of the contents of
their contract.26 In the case at bar, non-compliance with this directory provision of the law will
not invalidate the partnership considering that the totality of the evidence proves that respondent
We are not convinced by petitioners' allegation that Josephine's testimony lacks probative value and Jacinto indeed forged the partnership in question.
because she was allegedly coerced coerced by respondent, her brother-in-law, to testify in his
favor, Josephine merely declared in court that she was requested by respondent to testify and
that if she were not requested to do so she would not have testified. We fail to see how we can WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the appealed decision is
conclude from this candid admission that Josephine's testimony is involuntary when she did not AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
in any way categorically say that she was forced to be a witness of respondent.

Also, the fact that Josephine is the sister of the wife of respondent does not diminish the value of
her testimony since relationship per se, without more, does not affect the credibility of
witnesses.16

Petitioners' reliance alone on the "Dead Man's Statute" to defeat respondent's claim cannot
prevail over the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that a partnership was
 G.R. No. 112443 January 25, 2002 S - Felicitas de Latonio

TERESITA P. BORDALBA, petitioner, E - Agustin de Jayme

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF NICANOR JAYME, namely, CANDIDA FLORES,
W - Porfirio Jayme, Lot No. 1 and Vivencio Abellana
EMANNUEL JAYME, DINA JAYME DEJORAS, EVELIA JAYME, and GESILA JAYME; AND
HEIRS OF ASUNCION JAYME-BACLAY, namely, ANGELO JAYME-BACLAY, CARMEN
JAYME-DACLAN and ELNORA JAYME BACLAY, respondents. Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez alleged that the lot sought to be registered was originally a part of a
land owned by her late parents, the spouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme;
and that 1/3 of said land was adjudicated to her in an extra-judicial partition. She further stated
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
that a portion of the lot for which title is applied for is occupied by Nicanor Jayme with her
permission.
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the October
20, 1992 Decision of the Court of Appeals1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 27419, which affirmed with
Consequently, Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay filed their opposition6 contending
modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue, Branch 28, in Civil Case No.
that said application included the 1/3 portion inherited by them in the 1947 extra-judicial partition.
MAN-386.
The case was, however, dismissed for lack of interest of the parties.

The instant controversy stemmed from Lot No. 1242 (Lot No. 799-C) with an area of 1,853
Subsequently, petitioner filed with the Bureau of Lands of Cebu City an application7 dated
square meters and located at Barrio Looc, Mandaue City. The subject lot is part of a parcel of
January 10, 1979, seeking the issuance of a Free Patent over the same lot subject of the
land situated on the corner of Mabini and Plaridel Streets in Mandaue City, and originally owned
aborted application of her mother, Elena Jayme, now known as Lot No. 1242 (799-C), described
by the late spouses Carmeno Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme. In 1947, an extra-judicial
as follows:
partition,3 written in the Spanish language was executed, describing said parcel of land as –

North: Froilan Jayme and Road

2. otra parcela de terreno urbano en el barrio de Look, Mandawe, Cebu, que linda al
N. con la Calle Mabini y propiodades de F. Jayme; al E. linda con propiodades de
Fernando Antigua; al S. linda con propiodades de Lucas y Victoriano Jayme, y al O. East: Agustin Jayme
linda con la Calle Plaridel. La propiodad descrita esta avaluada, con todas sus
mejoras, en la cantidad de MIL Y CINCUENTA PESOS ----------------------------------------
-------- P1,050.00.4 South: Alfredo Alivio and Spouses Hilario Gandecila

and disposing, inter alia, the same parcel of land as follows: West: Hilario Gandecila Porferio Jayme and Heirs of Vevencio Abellanosa8

On April 16, 1980, petitioner was successfully granted Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 and Original
1) 1/3 in favor of - (a) their grandchild Nicanor Jayme, the deceased spouse of private
respondent Candida Flores and the father of private respondents Emmanuel, Dina, Certificate of Title No. 0-571 (FP) over said lot.9 Thereafter, petitioner caused the subdivision
Evelia and Gesila, all surnamed Jayme; and (b) their grandchild Asuncion Jayme- and titling of Lot No. 1242 (799-C), into 6 lots,10 as well as the disposition of two parcels thereof,
Baclay, whose heirs are private respondents Agelio Baclay, Elnora Baclay and thus:
Carmen Jayme-Daclan;
1) Lot No. 1242-A with an area of 581 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate
2) 1/3 to their daughter Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, mother of petitioner Teresita P. of Title No. 22771 (FP) in the name of spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala,
Bordalba; and to whom petitioner sold said lot;

3) 1/3 to an unidentified party. 2) Lot No. 1242-B with an area of 420 square meters covered by TCT No. 22772 in
the name of Teresita P. Bordalba, and which the latter mortgaged with the Rural Bank
of Mandaue;
Built on the land adjudicated to the heirs of the spouses is Nicanor Jayme’s house, which his
family occupied since 1945.
3) Lot No. 1242-C with an area of 210 square meters covered by TCT 22773 in the
name of Teresita P. Bordalba;
Sometime in July 1964, Elena Jayme Vda. de Perez, petitioner’s mother, filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu, Branch IV, an amended application for the registration5 of the lot described
with the following boundaries: 4) Lot No. 1242-D with an area of 210 square meters covered by TCT 22774 in the
name of Teresita Bordalba;

N - Fruelana Jayme & Road

5) Lot No. 1242-E with an area of 216 square meters covered by TCT 22775 in the
name of Teresita P. Bordalba;
 6) Lot No. 1242-F with an area of 216 square meters and covered by TCT No. 22776 4) declaring the plaintiffs as the legal and rightful owners of Lot 1242 and ordering the
in the name of Teresita P. Bordalba. issuance of the certificate of title in their names;

Upon learning of the issuance in favor of petitioner of the aforesaid Free Patent and Original 5) dismissing the claims of the defendant spouses Cabahug and Capala and the
Certificate of Title over Lot No. 1242, as well as the conveyances made by petitioner involving defendant Rural Bank of Mandaue, Inc. for lack of merit;
the lot subject of the controversy, private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaue City, Branch 28, the instant complaint against petitioner Teresita Bordalba, spouses
6) ordering the defendant Teresita Bordalba to pay plaintiffs the following amounts:
Genaro U. Cabahug, and Rita Capala, Rural Bank of Mandaue and the Director of the Bureau of
Lands.
(a) P5,000.00 as actual and litigation expenses;
In the said complaint, private respondents prayed that Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 and OCT
No. 0-571 (FP), as well as TCT Nos. 22771-22776 be declared void and ordered cancelled. (b) P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and,
Private respondents also prayed that they be adjudged owners of Lot No. 1242 (799-C), and that
spouses Genaro V. Cabahug and Rita Capala as well as the Rural Bank of Mandaue be
declared buyers and mortgagee in bad faith, respectively. In addition, they asked the court to 7) ordering defendant Bordalba to pay the costs.
award them actual, compensatory, and moral damages plus attorney’s fees in the amount of
P20,000.00. SO ORDERED.14

Petitioner, on the other hand, averred that Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was acquired by her through Both petitioner Teresita Bordalba and private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals,
purchase from her mother,11 who was in possession of the lot in the concept of an owner since which affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. It ruled that since private
1947. In her answer, petitioner traced her mother’s ownership of the lot partly from the 1947 respondents are entitled only to 1/3 portion of Lot No. 1242 (799-C), petitioner should be ordered
deed of extra-judicial partition presented by private respondents,12 and claimed that Nicanor to reconvey 1/3 of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) to private respondents. The decretal portion of the
Jayme, and Candida Flores occupied a portion of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) by mere tolerance of her respondent court's decision states:
mother. On cross-examination, petitioner admitted that the properties of the late Carmeno
Jayme and Margarita Espina de Jayme were partitioned by their heirs in 1947, but claimed that
she was not aware of the existence of said Deed of Extra-judicial Partition. She, however, WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is MODIFIED to order the reconveyance of
identified one of the signatures in the said Deed to be the signature of her mother.13 one-third of the subject land in favor of the plaintiff-appellees in lieu of the cancellation
of the Certificates of Title issued and their declaration as the owners of Lot No. 1242 in
its entirety. The rest is AFFIRMED in toto.
On May 28, 1990, the trial court, finding that fraud was employed by petitioner in obtaining Free
Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 and OCT No. 0-571 (FP), declared said patent and title void and
ordered its cancellation. However, it declared that spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala SO ORDERED.15
as well as the Rural Bank of Mandaue are purchasers and mortgagee in good faith, respectively;
and consequently upheld as valid the sale of Lot No. 1242-A covered by Transfer Certificate of Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner
Title No. 22771 (FP) to spouses Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala, and the mortgage of Lot contends that the testimonies given by the witnesses for private respondents which touched on
No. 1242-B covered by TCT No. 22772 in favor of the Rural Bank of Mandaue. The dispositive matters occurring prior to the death of her mother should not have been admitted by the trial
portion of the decision reads: court, as the same violated the dead man’s statute. Likewise, petitioner questions the right of
private respondents to inherit from the late Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, as well
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Decision is hereby rendered in favor as the identity between the disputed lot and the parcel of land adjudicated in the Deed of Extra-
of the plaintiffs by: judicial Partition.

1) declaring Free Patent No. (VII-I) 11421 as well as the Original Certificate of Title The contentions are without merit. It is doctrinal that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals
No. 0-57 (FP) and all subsequent certificates of title as a result of the subdivision of upholding those of the trial court are binding upon this Court. While there are exceptions to this
Lot No. 1242 except TCT NO. 22771 (FP) as null and void and ordering the Register rule, petitioner has not convinced us that this case falls under one of them.16
of Deeds of Mandaue City to cancel them;
The Court sees no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court that petitioner resorted to
2) declaring spouses defendants Genaro U. Cabahug and Rita Capala as buyers in fraud and misrepresentation in obtaining a free patent and title over the lot under scrutiny. The
good faith and are the legal and rightful owners of Lot No. 1242-A as described in TCT Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that misrepresentation tainted petitioner’s application,
No. 22771 (FP); insofar as her declaration that the land applied for was not occupied or claimed by any other
person. Her declaration is belied by the extra-judicial partition which she acknowledged, her
mother’s aborted attempt to have the lot registered, private respondents’ predecessors-in-
3) declaring the Rural Bank of Mandaue, Inc. as mortgagee in good faith and the interest’s opposition thereto, and by the occupancy of a portion of the said lot by Nicanor Jayme
mortgage lien in its favor be carried over to and be annotated in the new certificate of and his family since 1945.
title to be issued under the names of the plaintiffs;
It is a settled rule that the Land Registration Act protects only holders of title in good faith, and East: Propiodades de Fernando Antigua
does not permit its provision to be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or as a means
to enrich oneself at the expense of others.17
South: Propiodades de Lucas y Victoriano Jayme

As to the alleged violation of the dead man’s statute,18 suffice it to state that said rule finds no
West: Calle Plaridel
application in the present case. The dead man’s statute does not operate to close the mouth of a
witness as to any matter of fact coming to his knowledge in any other way than through personal
dealings with the deceased person, or communication made by the deceased to the witness.19 they did not, however, show where these boundaries are found in relation to the boundaries of
Lot No. 1242 (799-C). Absent a fixed boundary of the parcel of land adjudicated in the Deed,
which they claim Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is a part of, the Court cannot determine the extent to
Since the claim of private respondents and the testimony of their witnesses in the present case
which the lot now known as Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is included. Admittedly, the north boundary of
is based, inter alia, on the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and other documents, and not on
Lot No. 1242 (799-C) (Property of Froilan Jaime and Mabini Street) is similar to the north
dealings and communications with the deceased, the questioned testimonies were properly
boundary of the land mentioned in the Deed. With only one reference point, however, the south,
admitted by the trial court.
east and west boundaries of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) cannot be established with certainty to be
within the parcel of land described in the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition.
Likewise untenable is the claim of petitioner that private respondents are not legal heirs of
Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay. Other than their bare allegations to dispute their
In Beo v. Court of Appeals,21 the Court held that in order that an action for recovery of
heirship, no hard evidence was presented by them to substantiate their allegations. Besides, in
possession may prosper, it is indispensable that he who brings the action must fully prove not
order that an heir may assert his right to the property of a deceased, no previous judicial
only his ownership but also the identity of the property claimed by describing the location, area
declaration of heirship is necessary.20
and boundaries thereof. So that when the record does not show that the land subject matter of
the action has been exactly determined, the action cannot prosper, inasmuch as the plaintiff's
Anent the issue of identity, the disparity in the boundaries of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) vis-à-vis the ownership rights in the land claimed do not appear satisfactorily and conclusively proven at the
boundaries of the lot referred to in the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition can be explained by trial.
the fact that Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is only a portion of the entire parcel of land described in the
Deed, a 1/3 pro-indiviso portion of which was adjudicated each to, first, petitioner’s mother,
In the present case, while it is true that private respondents were not able to show the extent of
second, to the predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, and third, to an unidentified
their 1/3 pro indiviso right over Lot No. 1242 (799-C), they have nevertheless established their
party. Logically therefore, their boundaries will not be similar. At any rate, the records show that
claim over the said lot. Hence, in line with our ruling in the case of Laluan v. Malpaya,22 the
the parcel of land adjudicated to the predecessors-in-interest of the parties herein was the lot
prudent recourse would be to remand the case to the lower court for a new trial.
found on the corner of Plaridel and Mabini Streets in Looc, Mandaue City. As admitted further by
both parties, Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was part of the land allotted to their predecessors-in-interest
in the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition. Moreover, petitioner’s mother acknowledged in her WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the October 20, 1992 Decision of the Court of
application for registration of Lot No. 1242 that the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition was the Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 27419, and the May 28, 1990 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
source of her claim over the lot sought to be registered. She further admitted that the lot now Mandaue City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. MAN-386, insofar as it relates to the recognition of
known as Lot No. 1242 (799-C) was part of the parcel of land inherited by her and her co-heirs, the 1/3 share of private respondents over Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is AFFIRMED. The case is
to the extent of 1/3 share each. Under Section 31, Rule 130, of the Revised Rules on Evidence, remanded to the trial court in order to determine what part of Lot No. 1242 (799-C) is included in
where one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, the parcel of land adjudicated in the 1947 Deed of Extrajudicial Partition to the predecessors-in-
while holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former. interest of the parties herein.

Considering that Lot No.1242 (799-C) is part of the parcel of land over which private SO ORDERED.
respondents’ predecessors-in-interest is entitled to 1/3 pro-indiviso share, which was
disregarded by petitioner when she secured a Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title in her
name, to the exclusion of private respondents’ predecessors-in-interest, the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, therefore, did not err in upholding the right of private respondents as co-
owners, and ordering the petitioner to reconvey 1/3 of the lot in question to them.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, the Court is unable to determine what part of Lot No.
1242 (799-C) is within the boundaries of the parcel of land inherited in the 1947 Deed of Extra-
judicial Partition by the predecessors-in-interest of the parties herein. This is so because private
respondents did not show the extent of the said land mentioned in the 1947 Deed of Extra-
judicial Partition in relation to Lot No. 1242 (799-C). While they presented the boundaries of the
parcel of land adjudicated in the Deed, to wit:

North: Calle Mabini y propiodades de F. Jayme

 G.R. No. 179786 July 24, 2013 case. He attached the Philhealth form to his answer for the limited purpose of showing his
alleged forcible confinement.
JOSIELENE LARA CHAN, Petitioner,
vs. Question Presented
JOHNNY T. CHAN, Respondent.
The central question presented in this case is:
DECISION
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a
ABAD, J.: subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records on the ground that these are covered
by the privileged character of the physician-patient communication.
This case is about the propriety of issuing a subpoena duces tecum for the production and
submission in court of the respondent husband's hospital record in a case for declaration of The Ruling of the Court
nullity of marriage where one of the issues is his mental fitness as a husband.
Josielene requested the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital records of
The Facts and the Case Johnny’s confinement, which records she wanted to present in court as evidence in support of
her action to have their marriage declared a nullity. Respondent Johnny resisted her request for
subpoena, however, invoking the privileged character of those records. He cites Section 24(c),
On February 6, 2006 petitioner Josielene Lara Chan (Josielene) filed before the Regional Trial
Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence which reads:
Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 144 a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to
respondent Johnny Chan (Johnny), the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the
award of custody of their children to her. Josielene claimed that Johnny failed to care for and SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication.— The following persons
support his family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs. Indeed, she had convinced him to undergo
hospital confinement for detoxification and rehabilitation.
xxxx

Johnny resisted the action, claiming that it was Josielene who failed in her wifely duties. To save
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without
their marriage, he agreed to marriage counseling but when he and Josielene got to the hospital,
the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any
two men forcibly held him by both arms while another gave him an injection. The marriage
information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity,
relations got worse when the police temporarily detained Josielene for an unrelated crime and
which information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken
released her only after the case against her ended. By then, their marriage relationship could no
the reputation of the patient.
longer be repaired.

The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician who gets
During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form1 that Johnny
information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined without
attached to his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a
the patient’s consent as to any facts which would blacken the latter’s reputation. This rule is
hospital. The form carried a physician’s handwritten note that Johnny suffered from
intended to encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the history of his
"methamphetamine and alcohol abuse." Following up on this point, on August 22, 2006
ailment, and give him access to his body, enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis of
Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed
that ailment and provide the appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could be compelled in
to Medical City, covering Johnny’s medical records when he was there confined. The request
the future to come to court and narrate all that had transpired between him and the patient might
was accompanied by a motion to "be allowed to submit in evidence" the records sought by
prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his own health at great risk. 4
subpoena duces tecum.2

1. The case presents a procedural issue, given that the time to object to the admission of
Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-patient
evidence, such as the hospital records, would be at the time they are offered. The offer could be
privilege. On September 13, 2006 the RTC sustained the opposition and denied Josielene’s
made part of the physician’s testimony or as independent evidence that he had made entries in
motion. It also denied her motion for reconsideration, prompting her to file a special civil action of
those records that concern the patient’s health problems.
certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 97913, imputing grave abuse of
discretion to the RTC.
Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must be made after the offer of such
evidence for admission in court. Thus:
On September 17, 2007 the CA3 denied Josielene’s petition. It ruled that, if courts were to allow
the production of medical records, then patients would be left with no assurance that whatever
relevant disclosures they may have made to their physicians would be kept confidential. The SEC. 36. Objection.— Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the
prohibition covers not only testimonies, but also affidavits, certificates, and pertinent hospital offer is made.
records. The CA added that, although Johnny can waive the privilege, he did not do so in this
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be character of its records. Josielene invokes Section 17, Rule 132 of the Rules of Evidence that
made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent. provides:

An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer SEC. 17. When part of transaction, writing or record given in evidence, the remainder
unless a different period is allowed by the court. admissible.— When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in
evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and
when a detached act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence, any other
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.
act, declaration, conversation, writing or record necessary to its understanding may also be
given in evidence.1âwphi1
Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielene’s request for subpoena duces tecum is
premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the issuance of a
But, trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be said that Johnny had already
subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records. It is when those records are
presented the Philhealth claim form in evidence, the act contemplated above which would justify
produced for examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to their admission in
Josielene into requesting an inquiry into the details of his hospital confinement. Johnny was not
evidence, but more so to their disclosure. Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence
yet bound to adduce evidence in the case when he filed his answer. Any request for disclosure
quoted above is about non-disclosure of privileged matters.
of his hospital records would again be premature.

2. It is of course possible to treat Josielene’s motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces
For all of the above reasons, the CA and the RTC were justified in denying Josielene her request
tecum covering the hospital records as a motion for production of documents, a discovery
for the production in court of Johnny’s hospital records.
procedure available to a litigant prior to trial. Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 97913 dated September 17, 2007.
SEC. 1. Motion for production or inspection; order.— Upon motion of any party showing good
cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and
permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any SO ORDERED.
designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things,
not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action
and which are in his possession, custody or control; or (b) order any party to permit entry upon
designated land or other property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting,
measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any designated relevant object or
operation thereon. The order shall specify the time, place and manner of making the inspection
and taking copies and photographs, and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.
(Emphasis supplied)

But the above right to compel the production of documents has a limitation: the documents to be
disclosed are "not privileged."

Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged since
it is the "testimonial" evidence of the physician that may be regarded as privileged. Section 24(c)
of Rule 130 states that the physician "cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient,
be examined" regarding their professional conversation. The privilege, says Josielene, does not
cover the hospital records, but only the examination of the physician at the trial.

To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records—the
results of tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or
treatment he gave him—would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the

patient’s consent. Physician memorializes all these information in the patient’s records.
Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged
matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter’s prior consent.

3. Josielene argues that since Johnny admitted in his answer to the petition before the RTC that
he had been confined in a hospital against his will and in fact attached to his answer a Philhealth
claim form covering that confinement, he should be deemed to have waived the privileged
 A.C. No. 5921 March 10, 2006 REGIONAL TRIAL COURT acted as if it were the DARAB (Dept. of Agrarian Reform
ADJUDICATION BOARD)! x x x HOW HORRIBLE and TERRIBLE! The mistakes are very
patent and glaring! x x x
JUDGE UBALDINO A. LACUROM, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Cabanatuan
City, Branch 29 and Pairing Judge, Branch 30, Complainant,
vs. xxxx
ATTY. ELLIS F. JACOBA and ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA, Respondents.
III. GROUNDS FOR RECONSIDERATION
DECISION
1. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in Peremptorily and Suddenly
CARPIO, J.: Reversing the Findings of the Lower Court Judge and the Regular RTC Presiding
Judge:1awph!l.net
The Case
x x x The defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and after a very questionable SHORT
period of time, came this STUNNING and SUDDEN REVERSAL. Without any legal or factual
This administrative case arose from a complaint filed on 22 October 2001 by Judge Ubaldino A.
basis, the Hon. Pairing Judge simply and peremptorily REVERSED two (2) decisions in favor of
Lacurom ("Judge Lacurom"), Pairing Judge, Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch
the plaintiff. This is highly questionable, if not suspicious, hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.
30, against respondent-spouses Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba and Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba
("respondents"). Complainant charged respondents with violation of Rules 11.03, 1 11.04,2 and
19.013 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. xxxx

The Facts [The Resolution] assumes FACTS that have not been established and presumes FACTS not
part of the records of the case, all "loaded" in favor of the alleged "TENANT." Clearly, the
RESOLUTION is an INSULT to the Judiciary and an ANACHRONISM in the Judicial Process.
The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro R. Veneracion
Need we say more?
("Veneracion") in a civil case for unlawful detainer against defendant Federico Barrientos
("Barrientos").4 The Municipal Trial Court of Cabanatuan City rendered judgment in favor of
Veneracion but Barrientos appealed to the Regional Trial Court. The case was raffled to Branch xxxx
30 where Judge Lacurom was sitting as pairing judge.
4. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in Holding That the Defendant is
On 29 June 2001, Judge Lacurom issued a Resolution ("Resolution") reversing the earlier Entitled to a Homelot, and That the Residential LOT in Question is That Homelot:
judgments rendered in favor of Veneracion.5 The dispositive portion reads:
THIS ERROR IS STUPENDOUS and a real BONER. Where did the Honorable PAIRING
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby REVERSES its Decision dated December 22, 2000, as well as JUDGE base this conclusion? x x x This HORRENDOUS MISTAKE must be corrected here and
REVERSES the Decision of the court a quo dated July 22, 1997. now!

Furthermore, the plaintiff-appellee Alejandro Veneracion is ordered to CEASE and DESIST from xxxx
ejecting the defendant-appellant Federico Barrientos from the 1,000 square meter homelot
covered by TCT No. T-75274, and the smaller area of one hundred forty-seven square meters,
6. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED Grievously in Holding and Declaring
within the 1,000 sq.m. covered by TCT No. T-78613, and the house thereon standing covered by
that The [court] A QUO Erroneously Took Cognizance of the Case and That It Had No
Tax Declaration No. 02006-01137, issued by the City Assessor of Cabanatuan City; and
Jurisdiction over the Subject-Matter:
Barrientos is ordered to pay Veneracion P10,000.00 for the house covered by Tax Declaration
No. 02006-01137.
Another HORRIBLE ERROR! Even an average Law Student knows that JURISDICTION is
6 determined by the averments of the COMPLAINT and not by the averments in the answer! This
SO ORDERED.
is backed up by a Litany of Cases!

Veneracion’s counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Request for Inhibition) 7 dated 30
xxxx
July 2001 ("30 July 2001 motion"), pertinent portions of which read:

7. FINALLY, the Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge Ridiculously ERRED in Ordering the
II. PREFATORY STATEMENT
Defendant To Pay P10,000.00 to the Plaintiff As Payment for Plaintiff’s HOUSE:

This RESOLUTION of REVERSAL is an ABHORRENT NULLITY as it is entirely DEVOID of

THIS IS the Last STRAW, but it is also the Best ILLUSTRATION of the Manifold GLARING
factual and legal basis. It is a Legal MONSTROSITY in the sense that the Honorable
ERRORS committed by the Hon. Pairing Court Judge.
 xxxx Velasco-Jacoba lamented that Judge Lacurom had found her guilty of contempt without
conducting any hearing. She accused Judge Lacurom of harboring "a personal vendetta,"
ordering her imprisonment despite her status as "senior lady lawyer of the IBP Nueva Ecija
This Order of the Court for the plaintiff to sell his RESIDENTIAL HOUSE to the defendant for the
Chapter, already a senior citizen, and a grandmother many times over."19 At any rate, she
ridiculously LOW price of P10,000.00 best illustrates the Long Line of Faulty reasonings and
argued, Judge Lacurom should have inhibited himself from the case out of delicadeza because
ERRONEOUS conclusions of the Hon. Pairing Court Presiding Judge. Like the proverbial
"[Veneracion] had already filed against him criminal cases before the Office of the City
MONSTER, the Monstrous Resolution should be slain on sight! 8
Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City and before the Ombudsman."20

The 30 July 2001 motion prayed that (1) Judge Lacurom inhibit himself "in order to give plaintiff
The records show that with the assistance of counsel Jacoba and the Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba
a fighting chance" and (2) the Resolution be reconsidered and set aside. 9 Atty. Olivia Velasco-
Law Firm, Veneracion had executed an affidavit on 23 August 2001 accusing Judge Lacurom of
Jacoba ("Velasco-Jacoba") signed the motion on behalf of the Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law
knowingly rendering unjust judgment through inexcusable negligence and ignorance21 and
Firm.
violating

On 6 August 2001, Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala and
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 ("RA 3019").22 The first charge became the subject of a
explain why she should not be held in contempt of court for the "very disrespectful, insulting and
preliminary investigation23 by the City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City. On the second charge,
humiliating" contents of the 30 July 2001 motion.10 In her Explanation, Comments and Answer,11
Veneracion set forth his allegations in a Complaint-Affidavit24 filed on 28 August 2001 with the
Velasco-Jacoba claimed that "His Honor knows beforehand who actually prepared the subject
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.
Motion; records will show that the undersigned counsel did not actually or actively participate in
this case."12 Velasco-Jacoba disavowed any "conscious or deliberate intent to degrade the
honor and integrity of the Honorable Court or to detract in any form from the respect that is Judge Lacurom issued another order on 21 September 2001, this time directing Jacoba to
rightfully due all courts of justice."13 She rationalized as follows: explain why he should not be held in contempt.25 Jacoba complied by filing an Answer with
Second Motion for Inhibition, wherein he denied that he typed or prepared the 30 July 2001
motion. Against Velasco-Jacoba’s statements implicating him, Jacoba invoked the marital
x x x at first blush, [the motion] really appears to contain some sardonic, strident and hard-
privilege rule in evidence.26 Judge Lacurom later rendered a decision27 finding Jacoba guilty of
striking adjectives. And, if we are to pick such stringent words at random and bunch them
contempt of court and sentencing him to pay a fine of P500.
together, side-by-side x x x then collectively and certainly they present a cacophonic picture of
total and utter disrespect. x x x
On 22 October 2001, Judge Lacurom filed the present complaint against respondents before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
xxxx

Report and Recommendation of the IBP

We most respectfully submit that plaintiff & counsel did not just fire a staccato of incisive and
hard-hitting remarks, machine-gun style as to be called contumacious and contemptuous. They
were just articulating their feelings of shock, bewilderment and disbelief at the sudden reversal of Respondents did not file an answer and neither did they appear at the hearing set by IBP
their good fortune, not driven by any desire to just cast aspersions at the Honorable Pairing Commissioner Atty. Lydia A. Navarro ("IBP Commissioner Navarro") despite sufficient notice. 28
judge. They must believe that big monumental errors deserve equally big adjectives, no more no
less. x x x The matters involved were [neither] peripheral nor marginalized, and they had to call a
IBP Commissioner Navarro, in her Report and Recommendation of 10 October 2002,
spade a spade. x x x14
recommended the suspension of respondents from the practice of law for six months. 29 IBP
Commissioner Navarro found that "respondents were prone to us[ing] offensive and derogatory
Nevertheless, Velasco-Jacoba expressed willingness to apologize "for whatever mistake [they] remarks and phrases which amounted to discourtesy and disrespect for authority." 30 Although
may have committed in a moment of unguarded discretion when [they] may have ‘stepped on the remarks were not directed at Judge Lacurom personally, they were aimed at "his position as
the line and gone out of bounds’." She also agreed to have the allegedly contemptuous phrases a judge, which is a smack on the judiciary system as a whole."31
stricken off the record.15
The IBP Board of Governors ("IBP Board") adopted IBP Commissioner Navarro’s Report and
On 13 September 2001, Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt and penalized Recommendation, except for the length of suspension which the IBP Board reduced to three
her with imprisonment for five days and a fine of P1,000.16 months.32 On 10 December 2002, the IBP Board transmitted its recommendation to this Court,
together with the documents pertaining to the case.
Velasco-Jacoba moved for reconsideration of the 13 September 2001 order. She recounted that
on her way out of the house for an afternoon hearing, Atty. Ellis Jacoba ("Jacoba") stopped her Several days later, Velasco-Jacoba sought reconsideration of the IBP Board decision, thus:33
and said "O, pirmahan mo na ito kasi last day na, baka mahuli." (Sign this as it is due today, or it
might not be filed on time.) She signed the pleading handed to her without reading it, in "trusting
xxxx
blind faith" on her husband of 35 years with whom she "entrusted her whole life and future." 17
This pleading turned out to be the 30 July 2001 motion which Jacoba drafted but could not sign
because of his then suspension from the practice of law.18 3. For the information of the Honorable Commission, the present complaint of
Judge Lacurom is sub judice; the same issues involved in this case are raised
before the Honorable Court of Appeals presently pending in CA-G.R. SP No.
 66973 for Certiorari and Mandatory Inhibition with TRO and Preliminary The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading,
Injunction x x x; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support
it, and that it is not interposed for delay.
4. We filed an Administrative Case against Judge Lacurom before the Supreme Court
involving the same issues we raised in the aforementioned Certiorari case, which was x x x Counsel who x x x signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or
dismissed by the Supreme Court for being premature, in view of the pending Certiorari indecent matter therein x x x shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action. (Emphasis
case before the Court of Appeals; supplied)

5. In like manner, out of respect and deference to the Court of Appeals, the present By signing the 30 July 2001 motion, Velasco-Jacoba in effect certified that she had read it, she
complaint should likewise be dismissed and/or suspended pending resolution of the knew it to be meritorious, and it was not for the purpose of delaying the case. Her signature
certiorari case by the Court of Appeals.34 (Emphasis supplied) supplied the motion with legal effect and elevated its status from a mere scrap of paper to that of
a court document.
The Court’s Ruling
Velasco-Jacoba insists, however, that she signed the 30 July 2001 motion only because of her
husband’s request but she did not know its contents beforehand. Apparently, this practice of
On a preliminary note, we reject Velasco-Jacoba’s contention that the present complaint should
signing each other’s pleadings is a long-standing arrangement between the spouses. According
be considered sub judice in view of the petition for certiorari and mandatory inhibition with
to Velasco-Jacoba, "[s]o implicit is [their] trust for each other that this happens all the time.
preliminary injunction ("petition for certiorari")35 filed before the Court of Appeals.
Through the years, [she] already lost count of the number of pleadings prepared by one that is
signed by the other."38 By Velasco-Jacoba’s own admission, therefore, she violated Section 3 of
The petition for certiorari, instituted by Veneracion and Velasco-Jacoba on 4 October 2001, Rule 7. This violation is an act of falsehood before the courts, which in itself is a ground
seeks to nullify the following orders issued by Judge Lacurom in Civil Case No. 2836: (1) the
Orders dated 26 September 2001 and 9 November 2001 denying respondents’ respective
for subjecting her to disciplinary action, independent of any other ground arising from the
motions for inhibition; and (2) the 13 September 2001 Order which found Velasco-Jacoba guilty
contents of the 30 July 2001 motion.39
of contempt. The petitioners allege that Judge Lacurom acted "with grave abuse of discretion
[amounting] to lack of jurisdiction, in violation of express provisions of the law and applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court."36 We now consider the evidence as regards Jacoba. His name does not appear in the 30 July
2001 motion. He asserts the inadmissibility of Velasco-Jacoba’s statement pointing to him as the
author of the motion.
Plainly, the issue before us is respondents’ liability under the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The outcome of this case has no bearing on the resolution of the petition for
certiorari, as there is neither identity of issues nor causes of action. The Court cannot easily let Jacoba off the hook. Firstly, his Answer with Second Motion for
Inhibition did not contain a denial of his wife’s account. Instead, Jacoba impliedly admitted
authorship of the motion by stating that he "trained his guns and fired at the errors which he
Neither should the Court’s dismissal of the administrative complaint against Judge Lacurom for
perceived and believed to be gigantic and monumental."40
being premature impel us to dismiss this complaint. Judge Lacurom’s orders in Civil Case No.
2836 could not be the subject of an administrative complaint against him while a petition for
certiorari assailing the same orders is pending with an appellate court. Administrative remedies Secondly, we find Velasco-Jacoba’s version of the facts more plausible, for two reasons: (1) her
are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available to the reaction to the events was immediate and spontaneous, unlike Jacoba’s defense which was
aggrieved parties and the same has not been resolved with finality. Until there is a final raised only after a considerable time had elapsed from the eruption of the controversy; and (2)
declaration that the challenged order or judgment is manifestly erroneous, there will be no basis Jacoba had been counsel of record for Veneracion in Civil Case No. 2836, supporting Velasco-
to conclude whether the judge is administratively liable.37 Jacoba’s assertion that she had not "actually participate[d]" in the prosecution of the case.

The respondents are situated differently within the factual setting of this case. The Moreover, Jacoba filed a Manifestation in Civil Case No. 2836, praying that Judge Lacurom
corresponding implications of their actions also give rise to different liabilities. We first examine await the outcome of the petition for certiorari before deciding the contempt charge against
the charge against Velasco-Jacoba. him.41 This petition for certiorari anchors some of its arguments on the premise that the motion
was, in fact, Jacoba’s handiwork.42
There is no dispute that the genuine signature of Velasco-Jacoba appears on the 30 July 2001
motion. Velasco-Jacoba’s responsibility as counsel is governed by Section 3, Rule 7 of the The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the claimant to
Rules of Court: object timely to its presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as implied consent. 43
This waiver applies to Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion.
SEC. 3.Signature and address.—Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel
representing him x x x. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 11.03.—A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04.—A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba from the practice of law for two (2) years
no materiality to the case. effective upon finality of this Decision. We also SUSPEND Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba from the
practice of law for two (2) months effective upon finality of this Decision. We STERNLY WARN
respondentsthat a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall merit a more severe sanction.
No doubt, the language contained in the 30 July 2001 motion greatly exceeded the vigor
required of Jacoba to defend ably his client’s cause. We recall his use of the following words and
phrases: abhorrent nullity, legal monstrosity, horrendous mistake, horrible error, boner, and an Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
insult to the judiciary and an anachronism in the judicial process. Even Velasco-Jacoba respondents’ personal records as attorneys; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all courts
acknowledged that the words created "a cacophonic picture of total and utter disrespect." 44 in the country for their information and guidance.

Respondents nonetheless try to exculpate themselves by saying that every remark in the 30 July SO ORDERED.
2001 motion was warranted. We disagree.

Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to
criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and
judges.45 However, even the most hardened judge would be scarred by the scurrilous attack
made by the 30 July 2001 motion on Judge Lacurom’s Resolution. On its face, the Resolution
presented the facts correctly and decided the case according to supporting law and
jurisprudence. Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be
dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession.46 The use of unnecessary
language is proscribed if we are to promote high esteem in the courts and trust in judicial
administration.47

In maintaining the respect due to the courts, a lawyer is not merely enjoined to use dignified
language but also to pursue the client’s cause through fair and honest means, thus:

Rule 19.01.—A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of
his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded
criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.

Shortly after the filing of the 30 July 2001 motion but before its resolution, Jacoba assisted his
client in instituting two administrative cases against Judge Lacurom. As we have earlier noted,
Civil Case No. 2836 was then pending before Judge Lacurom’s sala. The Court’s attention is
drawn to the fact that the timing of the filing of these administrative cases could very well raise
the suspicion that the cases were intended as leverage against Judge Lacurom.

Respondent spouses have both been the subject of administrative cases before this Court. In
Administrative Case No. 2594, we suspended Jacoba from the practice of law for a period of six
months because of "his failure to file an action for the recovery of possession of property despite
the lapse of two and a half years from receipt by him of P550 which his client gave him as filing
and sheriff’s fees."48 In Administrative Case No. 5505, Jacoba was once again found remiss in
his duties when he failed to file the appellant’s brief, resulting in the dismissal of his client’s
appeal. We imposed the penalty of one year suspension.49

As for Velasco-Jacoba, only recently this Court fined her P5,000 for appearing in barangay
conciliation proceedings on behalf of a party, knowing fully well the prohibition contained in
Section 415 of the Local Government Code.50

In these cases, the Court sternly warned respondents that a repetition of similar acts would merit
a stiffer penalty. Yet, here again we are faced with the question of whether respondents have
conducted themselves with the courtesy and candor required of them as members of the bar
and officers of the court. We find respondents to have fallen short of the mark.
 A.C. No. 5439 January 22, 2007 But in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK, filed in the RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, entitled "Editha
S. Valdez v. Joseph J. Alba, Jr. and Register of Deeds of Marikina City," respondent, as counsel
for Valdez, filed a Complaint for Rescission of Contract with Damages and Cancellation of
CLARITA J. SAMALA, Complainant,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 275500 against Alba, respondent's former client in Civil Case No.
vs.
98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK.
ATTY. LUCIANO D. VALENCIA, Respondent.

Records further reveal that at the hearing of November 14, 2003, respondent admitted that in
RESOLUTION
Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, he was the lawyer for Lagmay (one of the tenants) but not for
Bustamante and Bayuga 10 albeit he filed the Explanation and Compliance for and in behalf of
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: the tenants. 11 Respondent also admitted that he represented Valdez in Civil Case No. 98-6804
and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK against Bustamante and her husband but denied being the
counsel for Alba although the case is entitled "Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her
Before us is a complaint1 dated May 2, 2001 filed by Clarita J. Samala (complainant) against husband," because Valdez told him to include Alba as the two were the owners of the property 12
Atty. Luciano D. Valencia (respondent) for Disbarment on the following grounds: (a) serving on
and it was only Valdez who signed the complaint for ejectment. 13 But, while claiming that
two separate occasions as counsel for contending parties; (b) knowingly misleading the court by respondent did not represent Alba, respondent, however, avers that he already severed his
submitting false documentary evidence; (c) initiating numerous cases in exchange for representation for Alba when the latter charged respondent with estafa. 14 Thus, the filing of Civil
nonpayment of rental fees; and (d) having a reputation of being immoral by siring illegitimate
Case No. 2000-657-MK against Alba.
children.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not
After respondent filed his Comment, the Court, in its Resolution of October 24, 2001, referred
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and disclosure of the facts.
recommendation. 2

A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person
The investigation was conducted by Commissioner Demaree Jesus B. Raval. After a series of whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. 15 He may not also undertake to
hearings, the parties filed their respective memoranda 3 and the case was deemed submitted for discharge conflicting duties any more than he may represent antagonistic interests. This stern
resolution.
rule is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste. 16 It springs from the relation of
attorney and client which is one of trust and confidence. Lawyers are expected not only to keep
Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes prepared the Report and Recommendation 4 dated inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-
January 12, 2006. He found respondent guilty of violating Canons 15 and 21 of the Code of dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which
Professional Responsibility and recommended the penalty of suspension for six months. is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. 17

In a minute Resolution 5 passed on May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would
approved the report and recommendation of Commissioner Reyes but increased the penalty of prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or
suspension from six months to one year. invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. 18

We adopt the report of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the issue on immorality and as The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is founded on principles of public
to the recommended penalty. policy and good taste. It springs from the attorney's duty to represent his client with undivided
fidelity and to maintain inviolate the client's confidence as well as from the injunction forbidding
the examination of an attorney as to any of the privileged communications of his client. 19
On serving as counsel for contending parties.

An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but
Records show that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated. 20 The bare attorney-client
272, Marikina City, entitled "Leonora M. Aville v. Editha Valdez" for nonpayment of rentals, relationship with a client precludes an attorney from accepting professional employment from the
herein respondent, while being the counsel for defendant Valdez, also acted as counsel for the client's adversary either in the same case 21 or in a different but related action. 22 A lawyer is
tenants Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga 6 by filing an Explanation and Compliance forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a former client when the subject matter
before the RTC. 7 of the present controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous
litigation in which he appeared for the former client. 23
In Civil Case No. 98-6804 filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 75, Marikina City,
entitled "Editha S. Valdez and Joseph J. Alba, Jr. v. Salve Bustamante and her husband" for We held in Nombrado v. Hernandez 24 that the termination of the relation of attorney and client
ejectment, respondent represented Valdez against Bustamante - one of the tenants in the provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of
property subject of the controversy. Defendants appealed to the RTC, Branch 272, Marikina City the former client. The reason for the rule is that the client's confidence once reposed cannot be
docketed as SCA Case No. 99-341-MK. In his decision dated May 2, 2000, 8 Presiding Judge divested by the expiration of the professional employment. 25 Consequently, a lawyer should not,
Reuben P. dela Cruz 9 warned respondent to refrain from repeating the act of being counsel of even after the severance of the relation with his client, do anything which will injuriously affect
record of both parties in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK.
his former client in any matter in which he previously represented him nor should he disclose or Records reveal that respondent filed Civil Case No. 00-7137 on November 27, 2000 and
use any of the client's confidences acquired in the previous relation. 26 presented TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership of the subject property. 33 During
the hearing before Commissioner Raval, respondent avers that when the Answer was filed in the
said case, that was the time that he came to know that the title was already in the name of Alba;
In this case, respondent's averment that his relationship with Alba has long been severed by the
so that when the court dismissed the complaint, he did not do anything anymore. 34 Respondent
act of the latter of not turning over the proceeds collected in Civil Case No. 98-6804, in
further avers that Valdez did not tell him the truth and things were revealed to him only when the
connivance with the complainant, is unavailing. Termination of the attorney-client relationship
case for rescission was filed in 2002.
precludes an attorney from representing a new client whose interest is adverse to his former
client. Alba may not be his original client but the fact that he filed a case entitled "Valdez and
Alba v. Bustamante and her husband," is a clear indication that respondent is protecting the Upon examination of the record, it was noted that Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK for rescission of
interests of both Valdez and Alba in the said case. Respondent cannot just claim that the lawyer- contract and cancellation of TCT No. 275500 was also filed on November 27, 2000, 35 before
client relationship between him and Alba has long been severed without observing Section 26, RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, thus belying the averment of respondent that he came to know
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court wherein the written consent of his client is required. of Alba's title only in 2002 when the case for rescission was filed. It was revealed during the
hearing before Commissioner Raval that Civil Case Nos. 00-7137 and 2000-657-MK were filed
on the same date, although in different courts and at different times.
In Gonzales v. Cabucana, Jr., 27 citing the case of Quiambao v. Bamba, 28
we held that:

Hence, respondent cannot feign ignorance of the fact that the title he submitted was already
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the
cancelled in lieu of a new title issued in the name of Alba in 1995 yet, as proof of the latter's
opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. It is of no
ownership.
moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer
has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential
information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly Respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer's respective retainers with each of shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be mislead by any artifice. It matters not that the trial court
them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients. 29 was not misled by respondent's submission of TCT No. 273020 in the name of Valdez, as shown
by its decision dated January 8, 2002 36 dismissing the complaint for ejectment. What is decisive
in this case is respondent's intent in trying to mislead the court by presenting TCT No. 273020
Respondent is bound to comply with Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
despite the fact that said title was already cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 275500, was
states that "a lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the
already issued in the name of Alba.
attorney-client relation is terminated."

In Young v. Batuegas,37 we held that a lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust
admission to the Bar that he will "do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court" and
and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected
he shall "conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with
with his client's case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the strong
all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients." 38 He should bear in mind that as an officer
ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. 30
of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the
case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion. 39 The courts, on the other
From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent's representation of Valdez and Alba against hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before
Bustamante and her husband, in one case, and Valdez against Alba, in another case, is a clear them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his client's rights and is expected to display
case of conflict of interests which merits a corresponding sanction from this Court. Respondent the utmost zeal in defense of his client's cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of
may have withdrawn his representation in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK upon being warned by the truth.
court, 31 but the same will not exculpate him from the charge of representing conflicting interests
in his representation in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK.
A lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the
administration of law and the dispensation of justice. 40 As such, he should make himself more
Respondent is reminded to be more cautious in accepting professional employments, to refrain an exemplar for others to emulate. 41
from all appearances and acts of impropriety including circumstances indicating conflict of
interests, and to behave at all times with circumspection and dedication befitting a member of
>On initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees.
the Bar, especially observing candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions with his clients. 32

Complainant alleges that respondent filed the following cases: (a) Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK
On knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence.
at the RTC, Branch 272; (b) Civil Case No. 00-7137 at the MTC, Branch 75; and (c) I.S. Nos. 00-
4439 and 01-036162 both entitled "Valencia v. Samala" for estafa and grave coercion,
Complainant alleges that in Civil Case No. 00-7137 filed before MTC, Branch 75 for ejectment, respectively, before the Marikina City Prosecutor. Complainant claims that the two criminal
respondent submitted TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership despite the fact that a cases were filed in retaliation for the cases she filed against Lagmay docketed as I.S. No. 00-
new TCT No. 275500 was already issued in the name of Alba on February 2, 1995. 4306 for estafa and I.S. No. 00-4318 against Alvin Valencia (son of respondent) for trespass to
dwelling.
As culled from the records, Valdez entered into a retainer agreement with respondent. As SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years, effective immediately upon receipt of
payment for his services, he was allowed to occupy the property for free and utilize the same as herein Resolution.
his office pursuant to their retainer agreement. 42
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the
Respondent filed I.S. Nos. 00-4439 43 and 01-036162 44 both entitled "Valencia v. Samala" for Philippines as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance, and let it
estafa and grave coercion, respectively, to protect his client's rights against complainant who be entered in respondent's personal records.
filed I.S. No. 00-4306 45 for estafa against Lagmay, and I.S. No. 00-4318 46 against Alvin
Valencia 47 for trespass to dwelling.
SO ORDERED.

We find the charge to be without sufficient basis. The act of respondent of filing the aforecited
cases to protect the interest of his client, on one hand, and his own interest, on the other, cannot
be made the basis of an administrative charge unless it can be clearly shown that the same was
being done to abuse judicial processes to commit injustice.

The filing of an administrative case against respondent for protecting the interest of his client and
his own right would be putting a burden on a practicing lawyer who is obligated to defend and
prosecute the right of his client.

On having a reputation for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.

We find respondent liable for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.

During the hearing, respondent admitted that he sired three children by Teresita Lagmay who
are all over 20 years of age, 48 while his first wife was still alive. He also admitted that he has
eight children by his first wife, the youngest of whom is over 20 years of age, and after his wife
died in 1997, he married Lagmay in 1998. 49 Respondent further admitted that Lagmay was
staying in one of the apartments being claimed by complainant. However, he does not consider
his affair with Lagmay as a relationship 50 and does not consider the latter as his second family.
51
He reasoned that he was not staying with Lagmay because he has two houses, one in
Muntinlupa and another in Marikina. 52

In this case, the admissions made by respondent are more than enough to hold him liable on the
charge of immorality. During the hearing, respondent did not show any remorse. He even
justified his transgression by saying that he does not have any relationship with Lagmay and
despite the fact that he sired three children by the latter, he does not consider them as his
second family. It is noted that during the hearing, respondent boasts in telling the commissioner
that he has two houses - in Muntinlupa, where his first wife lived, and in Marikina, where Lagmay
lives. 53 It is of no moment that respondent eventually married Lagmay after the death of his first
wife. The fact still remains that respondent did not live up to the exacting standard of morality
and decorum required of the legal profession.

Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It may be difficult to specify the degree of
moral delinquency that may qualify an act as immoral, yet, for purposes of disciplining a lawyer,
immoral conduct has been defined as that "conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community. 54
Thus, in several cases, the Court did not hesitate to discipline a lawyer for keeping a mistress in
defiance of the mores and sense of morality of the community. 55 That respondent subsequently
married Lagmay in 1998 after the death of his wife and that this is his first infraction as regards
immorality serve to mitigate his liability.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Atty. Luciano D. Valencia GUILTY of misconduct
and violation of Canons 21, 10 and 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
 G.R. No. 95367 May 23, 1995 Commissioner. Retired Brig. Gen. Almonte as one of
the Anti-Graft board member of the Department of
Finance should not tolerate this. However, the
COMMISSIONER JOSE T. ALMONTE, VILLAMOR C. PEREZ, NERIO ROGADO, and ELISA
Commissioner did not investigate his own men instead,
RIVERA, petitioners,
he placed them under the 15-30 payroll.
vs.
HONORABLE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ and CONCERNED CITIZENS, respondents.
e) Many more which are personal.
MENDOZA, J.:
2. Sir, my question is this. Can your good office investigate EII
intelligence funds particularly Personal Services (01) Funds? I
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to annul the subpoena duces tecum
wonder why the Dep't of Budget & Mgmt. cannot compel EIIB to
and orders issued by respondent Ombudsman, requiring petitioners Nerio Rogado and Elisa
submit an actual filled up position because almost half of it are
Rivera, as chief accountant and record custodian, respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and
vacant and still they are releasing it. Are EIIB plantilla position
Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for
classified? It is included in the Personal Services Itemization (PSI)
the year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for
and I believe it is not classified and a ruling from Civil Service
1988" and to enjoin him from enforcing his orders.
Commission that EIIB is not exempted from Civil Service. Another
info, when we had salary differential last Oct '88 all money for the
Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Villamor C. Perez is whole plantilla were released and from that alone, Millions were
Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was saved and converted to ghost agents of EIA.
issued by the Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging
that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed.
3. Another thing that I have observed was the Chief Budget
The letter, purporting to have been written by an employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen,
Division possesses high caliber firearms such as a mini UZI,
was addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished several government offices,
Armalite rifle and two (2) 45 cal. pistol issued to him by the
including the Office of the Ombudsman.
Assistant Commissioner wherein he is not an agent of EIIB and
authorized as such according to memorandum order number 283
The letter reads in pertinent parts: signed by the President of the Republic of the Philippines
effective 9 Jan. 1990.
1 These are the things that I have been observing. During the
implementation of E.O. 127 on May 1, 1988, one hundred ninety Another observation was when EIIB agents apprehended a
(190) personnel were dismissed. Before that implementation, we certain civilian who possesses numerous assorted high powered
had a monthly savings of P500,000.00 from unfilled plantilla firearms. Agents plus one personnel from the legal proclaimed
position plus the implementation of RA 6683 wherein seventy (70) only five (5) firearms and the remaining was pilfered by them.
regular employees availed a total amount of P1,400,000.00 was
saved from the government monthly. The question is, how do they
Another observation is almost all EIIB agents collects payroll from
used or disbursed this savings? The EIIB has a syndicate headed
the big time smuggler syndicate monthly and brokers every week
by the Chief of Budget Division who is manipulating funds and
for them not to be apprehended.
also the brain of the so called "ghost agents" or the "Emergency
Intelligence Agents" (EIA). The Commissioner of EIIB has a
biggest share on this. Among his activities are: Another observation is the commissioner allocates funds coming
from the intelligence funds to the media to sustain their good
image of the bureau.
a) Supporting RAM wherein he is involved. He gives big
amount especially during the Dec. Failed coup.
In his comment 1 on the letter-complaint, petitioner Almonte denied that as a result of the
separation of personnel, the EIIB had made some savings. He averred that the only funds
b) Payment for thirty five (30) mini UZI's.
released to his agency by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) were those
corresponding to 947 plantilla positions which were filled. He also denied that there were "ghost
c) Payment for the purchased of Maxima '87 for agents" in the EIIB and claimed that disbursements for "open" (i.e., "overt" personnel) and
personal used of the Commissioner. "closed" (i.e., "covert" personnel) plantillas of the agency had been cleared by the Commission
on Audit (COA); that the case of the 30 Uzis had already been investigated by Congress, where
it was shown that it was not the EIIB but an agent who had spent for the firearms and they were
d) Another observation was the agents under the only loaned to the EIIB pending appropriation by Congress; that, contrary to the charge that a
Director of NCR EIIB is the sole operating unit within Maxima car had been purchased for his use, he was using a government issued car from the
Metro Manila which was approved by no less than the
NICA; that it was his prerogative as Commissioner to "ground" agents in the EIIB main office so
Commissioner due to anomalous activities of almost all that they could be given reorientation and retraining; that the allegation that the EIIB operatives
agents assigned at the central office directly under the pilfered smuggled firearms was without factual basis because the firearms were the subject of
seizure proceedings before the Collector of Customs, Port of Manila; that the EIIB had been AND ALL EVIDENCES, SUCH AS VOUCHERS (SALARY) FOR THE
uncompromising toward employees found involved in anomalous activities; and that intelligence WHOLE PLANTILLA OF EIIB FOR 1988."
funds had not been used for media propaganda and if media people went to the EIIB it was
because of newsworthy stories. Petitioner asked that the complaint be dismissed and the case
II. WHETHER OR NOT "ALL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO PERSONAL
considered closed.
SERVICES FUNDS FOR THE YEAR 1988 AND ALL EVIDENCES, SUCH
AS VOUCHERS (SALARY) FOR THE WHOLE PLANTILLA OF EIIB FOR
Similarly petitioner Perez, budget chief of the EIIB, denied in his comment 2 dated April 3, 1990 1988" ARE CLASSIFIED AND, THEREFORE, BEYOND THE REACH OF
that savings had been realized from the implementation of E.O. No. 127, since the DBM PUBLIC RESPONDENT'S SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM.
provided allocations for only the remaining 947 personnel. He said that the disbursement of
funds for the plantilla positions for "overt" and "covert" personnel had been cleared by the COA
I.
and that the high-powered firearms had been issued for the protection of EIIB personnel
attending court hearings and the Finance Officer in withdrawing funds from the banks.
There are several subsidiary issues raised by petitioners, but the principal ones revolve on the
question whether petitioners can be ordered to produce documents relating to personal services
The Graft Investigation Officer of the Ombudsman's office, Jose F. Saño, found the comments
and salary vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea that such documents are classified.
unsatisfactory, being "unverified and plying only on generalizations without meeting specifically
Disclosure of the documents in question is resisted on the ground that "knowledge of EIIB's
the points raised by complainant as constitutive of the alleged anomalies." 3 He, therefore,
documents relative to its Personal Services Funds and its plantilla . . . will necessarily [lead to]
asked for authority to conduct a preliminary investigation. Anticipating the grant of his request,
knowledge of its operations, movements, targets, strategies, and tactics and the whole of its
he issued a subpoena 4 to petitioners Almonte and Perez, requiring them to submit their
being" and this could "destroy the EIIB." 9
counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses, as well as a subpoena duces tecum 5 to
the Chief of the EIIB's Accounting Division ordering him to bring "all documents relating to
Personal Services Funds for the year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the Petitioners do not question the power of the Ombudsman to issue a subpoena duces tecum nor
whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988." the relevancy or materiality of the documents required to be produced, to the pending
investigation in the Ombudsman's office. Accordingly, the focus of discussion should be on the
Government's claim of privilege.
Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved to quash the subpoena and the subpoena duces tecum.
In his Order dated June 15, 1990, 6 respondent Ombudsman granted the motion to quash the
subpoena in view of the fact that there were no affidavits filed against petitioners. But he denied A.
their motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum. He ruled that petitioners were not being forced
to produce evidence against themselves, since the subpoena duces tecum was directed to the
At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state
Chief Accountant, petitioner Nerio Rogado. In addition the Ombudsman ordered the Chief of the
Records a Section of the EIIB, petitioner Elisa Rivera, to produce before the investigator "all secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public
documents relating to Personnel Service Funds, for the year 1988, and all documents, salary interest of such paramount importance as in and of itself transcending the individual interests of
vouchers for the whole plantilla of the EIIB for 1988, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof." a private citizen, even though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal
rights. 10

Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved for a reconsideration, arguing that Rogado and Rivera
were EIIB employees under their supervision and that the Ombudsman was doing indirectly In addition, in the litigation over the Watergate tape subpoena in 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court
what he could not do directly, i.e., compelling them (petitioners Almonte and Perez) to produce recognized the right of the President to the confidentiality of his conversations and
correspondence, which it likened to "the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations." Said the
evidence against themselves.
Court in United States v. Nixon: 11

Petitioners' motion was denied in respondent Ombudsman's order dated August 6, 1990. Hence,
The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and
this petition which questions the orders of June 15, 1990 and August 6, 1990 of respondent
Ombudsman. correspondence, like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for
example, has all the values to which we accord deference for the privacy of
all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the
To put this case in perspective it should be stated at the outset that it does not concern a public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in
demand by a citizen for information under the freedom of information guarantee of the Presidential decision-making. A President and those who assist him must
Constitution. 7 Rather it concerns the power of the Office of the Ombudsman to obtain evidence be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making
in connection with an investigation conducted by it vis-a-vis the claim of privilege of an agency of decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except
the Government. Thus petitioners raise the following issues: 8 privately. These are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for
Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation
of the government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under
I. WHETHER OR NOT A CASE BROUGHT ABOUT BY AN UNSIGNED
the Constitution. . . .
AND UNVERIFIED LETTER COMPLAINT IS AN "APPROPRIATE CASE"
WITHIN THE CONCEPT OF THE CONSTITUTION IN WHICH PUBLIC
RESPONDENT CAN OBLIGE PETITIONERS BY VIRTUE OF HIS Thus, the Court for the first time gave executive privilege a constitutional status and a new
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM TO PRODUCE TO HIM "ALL DOCUMENTS name, although not necessarily a new birth. 12
RELATING TO PERSONAL SERVICES FUNDS FOR THE YEAR 1988
"The confidentiality of judicial deliberations" mentioned in the opinion of the Court referred to the Nor has our attention been called to any law or regulation which considers personnel records of
fact that Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court and judges of lower federal courts have traditionally the EIIB as classified information. To the contrary, COA Circular No. 88-293, which petitioners
treated their working papers and judicial notes as private property. A 1977 proposal in the U.S. invoke to support their contention that there is adequate safeguard against misuse of public
Congress that Justices and judges of lower federal courts "should be encouraged to make such funds, provides that the "only item of expenditure which should be treated strictly confidential" is
arrangements as will assure the preservation and eventual availability of their personal papers, that which refers to the "purchase of information and payment of rewards." Thus, part V, No. 7 of
especially the deposit of their papers in the same depository they select for [their] Public Papers" the Circular reads:
13 was rebuffed by the Justices who, in a letter to the Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Regulation and Government Information of the U.S. Senate, referred to "difficult concerns
The only item of expenditure which should be treated as strictly confidential
respecting the appropriate separation that must be maintained between the legislative branch
because it falls under the category of classified information is that relating to
and this Court." 14
purchase of information and payment of rewards. However, reasonable
records should be maintained and kept for inspection of the Chairman,
There are, in addition to such privileges, statutorily-created ones such as the Government's Commission on Audit or his duly authorized representative. All other
privilege to withhold the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of laws. 15 expenditures are to be considered unclassified supported by invoices,
receipts and other documents, and, therefore, subject to reasonable inquiry
by the Chairman or his duly authorized representative. 20
With respect to the privilege based on state secret, the rule was stated by the U.S. Supreme
Court as follows:
It should be noted that the regulation requires that "reasonable records" be kept
justifying the confidential or privileged character of the information relating to
Judicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the
informers. There are no such reasonable records in this case to substitute for the
caprice of executive officers. Yet we will not go so far as to say that the
records claimed to be confidential.
court may automatically require a complete disclosure to the judge before
the claim of privilege will be accepted in any case. It may be possible to
satisfy the court, from all the circumstances of the case, that there is a The other statutes and regulations 21 invoked by petitioners in support of their contention that
reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military the documents sought in the subpoena duces tecum of the Ombudsman are classified merely
matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged. indicate the confidential nature of the EIIB's functions, but they do not exempt the EIIB from the
When this is the case, the occasion for the privilege is appropriate, and the duty to account for its funds to the proper authorities. Indeed by denying that there were savings
court should not jeopardize the security which the privilege is meant to made from certain items in the agency and alleging that the DBM had released to the EIIB only
protect by insisting upon an examination of the evidence, even by the judge the allocations needed for the 947 personnel retained after its reorganization, petitioners in effect
alone, in chambers. . . . In each case, the showing of necessity which is invited inquiry into the veracity of their claim. If, as petitioners claim, the subpoenaed records
made will determine how far the court should probe in satisfying itself that have been examined by the COA and found by it to be regular in all respects, there is no reason
the occasion for invoking the privilege is appropriate. Where there is a why they cannot be shown to another agency of the government which by constitutional
strong showing of necessity, the claim of privilege should not be lightly mandate is required to look into any complaint concerning public office.
accepted, but even the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the
claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at
On the other hand, the Ombudsman is investigating a complaint that several items in the EIIB
stake. A fortiori, where necessity is dubious, a formal claim of privilege,
were filled by fictitious persons and that the allotments for these items in 1988 were used for
made under the circumstances of this case, will have to prevail. 16
illegal purposes. The plantilla and other personnel records are relevant to his investigation. He
and his Deputies are designated by the Constitution "protectors of the people" and as such they
On the other hand, where the claim of confidentiality does not rest on the need to protect are required by it "to act promptly on complaints in any form or manner against public officials or
military, diplomatic or other national security secrets but on a general public interest in the employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
confidentiality of his conversations, courts have declined to find in the Constitution an absolute government-owned or controlled corporation." 22
privilege of the President against a subpoena considered essential to the enforcement of
criminal laws. 17
His need for the documents thus outweighs the claim of confidentiality of petitioners. What is
more, while there might have been compelling reasons for the claim of privilege in 1988 when it
B. was asserted by petitioners, now, seven years later, these reasons may have been attenuated, if
they have not in fact ceased. The agents whose identities could not then be revealed may have
ceased from the service of the EIIB, while the covert missions to which they might have been
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the
deployed might either have been accomplished or abandoned. On the other hand, the
production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is the
Ombudsman's duty to investigate the complaint that there were in 1988 unfilled positions in the
gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities
EIIB for which continued funding was received by its officials and put to illegal use, remains.
affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax
evasion, dollar salting." 18 Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it may be
sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that Above all, even if the subpoenaed documents are treated as presumptively privileged, this
compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling production, 19 no decision would only justify ordering their inspection in camera but not their nonproduction.
similar excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other considerations. However, as concession to the nature of the functions of the EIIB and just to be sure no
information of a confidential character is disclosed, the examination of records in this case
should be made in strict confidence by the Ombudsman himself. Reference may be made to the
documents in any decision or order which the Ombudsman may render or issue but only to the unjust, improper, or inefficient." 28 The phrase "subject to such limitations as may be provided
extent that it will not reveal covert activities of the agency. Above all, there must be a scrupulous by law" refers to such limitations as may be provided by Congress or, in the absence thereof, to
protection of the documents delivered. such limitations as may be imposed by the courts. Such limitations may well include a
requirement that the investigation be concluded in camera, with the public excluded, as
exception to the general nature of the proceedings in the Office of the Ombudsman. 29 A
With these safeguards outlined, it is believed that a satisfactory resolution of the conflicting
reconciliation is thereby made between the demands of national security and the requirement of
claims of the parties is achieved. It is not amiss to state that even matters of national security
accountability enshrined in the Constitution. 30
have been inquired into in appropriate in camera proceedings by the courts. In Lansang v.
Garcia 23 this Court held closed door sessions, with only the immediate parties and their
counsel present, to determine claims that because of subversion there was imminent danger to What has been said above disposes of petitioners' contention that the anonymous letter-
public safety warranting the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in 1971. Again in Marcos v. complaint against them is nothing but a vexatious prosecution. It only remains to say that the
Manglapus 24 the Court met behind closed doors to receive military briefings on the threat general investigation in the Ombudsman' s office is precisely for the purpose of protecting those
posed to national security by the return to the country of the former President and his family. In against whom a complaint is filed against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecution as much
the United States, a similar inquiry into the danger to national security as a result of the as securing the State from useless and expensive trials. There may also be benefit resulting
publication of classified documents on the Vietnam war was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. from such limited in camera inspection in terms of increased public confidence that the privilege
25 We see no reason why similar safeguards cannot be made to enable an agency of the is not being abused and increased likelihood that no abuse is in fact occurring.
Government, like the Office of the Ombudsman, to carry out its constitutional duty to protect
public interests 26 while insuring the confidentiality of classified documents.
II.

C.
Nor is there violation of petitioner's right to the equal protection of the laws. Petitioners complain
that "in all forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can only hale respondents via their
Petitioners contend that under Art. XI, § 13(4) the Ombudsman can act only "in any appropriate verified complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed," while in proceedings
case, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law" and that because the complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation. In the
in this case is unsigned and unverified, the case is not an appropriate one. This contention lacks first place, there can be no objection to this procedure because it is provided in the Constitution
merit. As already stated, the Constitution expressly enjoins the Ombudsman to act on any itself. In the second place, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints "in any form
complaint filed "in any form or manner" concerning official acts or omissions. Thus, Art. XI, § 12 and in a manner," the framers of the Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of
provides: the people which keep them from complaining against official wrongdoings. As this Court had
occasion to point out, the Office of the Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and
prosecutory agencies of the government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public
The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act
officials who, through official pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or
held against them. 31 On the other hand complainants are more often than not poor and simple
employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
folk who cannot afford to hire lawyers. 32
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and shall in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the
action taken and the result thereof. (Emphasis added) III.

Similarly, the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (Rep. Act No. 6770) provides in § 26(2): Finally, it is contended that the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum would violate petitioners'
right against self-incrimination. It is enough to state that the documents required to be produced
in this case are public records and those to whom the subpoena duces tecum is directed are
The Office of the Ombudsman shall receive complaints from any source in
government officials in whose possession or custody the documents are. Moreover, if, as
whatever form concerning an official act or omission. It shall act on the
petitioners claim the disbursement by the EIIB of funds for personal service has already been
complaint immediately and if it finds the same entirely baseless, it shall
cleared by the COA, there is no reason why they should object to the examination of the
dismiss the same and inform the complainant of such dismissal citing the
documents by respondent Ombudsman.
reasons therefor. If it finds a reasonable ground to investigate further, it shall
first furnish the respondent public officer or employee with a summary of the
complaint and require him to submit a written answer within seventy-two WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, but it is directed that the inspection of subpoenaed
hours from receipt thereof. If the answer is found satisfactory, it shall documents be made personally in camera by the Ombudsman, and with all the safeguards
dismiss the case. (Emphasis added) outlined in this decision.

Accordingly, in Diaz v. Sandiganbayan 27 the Court held that testimony given at a fact-finding SO ORDERED.
investigation and charges made in a pleading in a case in court constituted a sufficient basis for
the Ombudsman to commence investigation, because a formal complaint was really not
necessary.

Rather than referring to the form of complaints, therefore, the phrase "in an appropriate case" in
Art. XI, § 12 means any case concerning official act or omission which is alleged to be "illegal,
 G.R. No. 169777* April 20, 2006 PDP- LABAN, Petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Respondent.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as
Senate President, JUAN M. FLAVIER, in his capacity as Senate President Pro Tempore,
FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, in his capacity as Majority Leader, AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, x-------------------------x
JR., in his capacity as Minority Leader, SENATORS RODOLFO G. BIAZON,
"COMPANERA" PIA S. CAYETANO, JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, LUISA "LOI"
G.R. No. 171246 April 20, 2006
EJERCITO ESTRADA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RICHARD J. GORDON, PANFILO M.
LACSON, ALFREDO S.LIM, M. A. MADRIGAL, SERGIO OSMENA III, RALPH G. RECTO,
and MAR ROXAS, Petitioners, JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA, ROMULO R. RIVERA, JOSE AMOR
vs. AMORANDO, ALICIA A. RISOS-VIDAL, FILEMON C. ABELITA III, MANUEL P. LEGASPI, J.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President B. JOVY C. BERNABE, BERNARD L. DAGCUTA, ROGELIO V. GARCIA, and the
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in his stead and in behalf of the President of INTEGRATED BAR FOR THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
the Philippines, Respondents. vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Respondent.
x-------------------------x
DECISION
G.R. No. 169659 April 20, 2006
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
BAYAN MUNA represented by DR. REYNALDO LESACA, JR., Rep. SATUR OCAMPO, Rep.
CRISPIN BELTRAN, Rep. RAFAEL MARIANO, Rep. LIZA MAZA, Rep. TEODORO CASINO, A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a truly republican state. Even in the early
Rep. JOEL VIRADOR, COURAGE represented by FERDINAND GAITE, and COUNSELS history of republican thought, however, it has been recognized that the head of government may
FOR THE DEFENSE OF LIBERTIES (CODAL) represented by ATTY. REMEDIOS keep certain information confidential in pursuit of the public interest. Explaining the reason for
BALBIN, Petitioners, vesting executive power in only one magistrate, a distinguished delegate to the U.S.
vs. Constitutional Convention said: "Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President characterize the proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Respondent. of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be
diminished."1
x-------------------------x
History has been witness, however, to the fact that the power to withhold information lends itself
to abuse, hence, the necessity to guard it zealously.
G.R. No. 169660 April 20, 2006

The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
abused such power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) last September 28, 2005.
vs.
They thus pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR., in
his capacity as Secretary of Defense, and GENEROSO S. SENGA, in his capacity as AFP
Chief of Staff, Respondents. In resolving the controversy, this Court shall proceed with the recognition that the issuance
under review has come from a co-equal branch of government, which thus entitles it to a strong
presumption of constitutionality. Once the challenged order is found to be indeed violative of the
x-------------------------x
Constitution, it is duty-bound to declare it so. For the Constitution, being the highest expression
of the sovereign will of the Filipino people, must prevail over any issuance of the government
G.R. No. 169667 April 20, 2006 that contravenes its mandates.

ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC. (ALG), Petitioner, In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
vs. Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
HON. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Respondent. attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices
including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
x-------------------------x

On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to
G.R. No. 169834 April 20, 2006
various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as
resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways
Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail
Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile separation of powers between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments
urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to
contract covering the North Rail Project. appearing before either House of Congress.

The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations 2 dated When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in
September 22, 2005 to the following officials of the AFP: the Commanding General of the writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.
Philippine Army, Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon; Inspector General of the AFP Vice Admiral
Mateo M. Mayuga; Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the AFP Rear Admiral Tirso R.
SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege. –
Danga; Chief of the Intelligence Service of the AFP Brig. Gen. Marlu Q. Quevedo; Assistant
Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Brig. Gen. Francisco V. Gudani; and
Assistant Commandant, Corps of Cadets of the PMA, Col. Alexander F. Balutan, for them to (a) Nature and Scope. - The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to
attend as resource persons in a public hearing scheduled on September 28, 2005 on the the operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution
following: (1) Privilege Speech of Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr., delivered on June 6, 2005 (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the
entitled "Bunye has Provided Smoking Gun or has Opened a Can of Worms that Show Massive Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that Public
Electoral Fraud in the Presidential Election of May 2005"; (2) Privilege Speech of Senator Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially
Jinggoy E. Estrada delivered on July 26, 2005 entitled "The Philippines as the Wire-Tapping known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public to prejudice the
Capital of the World"; (3) Privilege Speech of Senator Rodolfo Biazon delivered on August 1, public interest.
2005 entitled "Clear and Present Danger"; (4) Senate Resolution No. 285 filed by Senator Maria
Ana Consuelo Madrigal – Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security
Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the President and
to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, and in the National Interest, on the Role of the
Military in the So-called "Gloriagate Scandal"; and (5) Senate Resolution No. 295 filed by the public officers covered by this executive order, including:
Senator Biazon – Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security to
Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, on the Wire-Tapping of the President of the Philippines. Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this
executive order (Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates
Also invited to the above-said hearing scheduled on September 28 2005 was the AFP Chief of Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002);
Staff, General Generoso S. Senga who, by letter3 dated September 27, 2005, requested for its
postponement "due to a pressing operational situation that demands [his utmost personal Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security
attention" while "some of the invited AFP officers are currently attending to other urgent should not be divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v.
operational matters." Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998).

On September 28, 2005, Senate President Franklin M. Drilon received from Executive Secretary Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive
Eduardo R. Ermita a letter4 dated September 27, 2005 "respectfully request[ing] for the agreements (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9
postponement of the hearing [regarding the NorthRail project] to which various officials of the December 1998);
Executive Department have been invited" in order to "afford said officials ample time and
opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the
Senate Committee on its investigation." Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);

Senate President Drilon, however, wrote5 Executive Secretary Ermita that the Senators "are
unable to accede to [his request]" as it "was sent belatedly" and "[a]ll preparations and Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No.
arrangements as well as notices to all resource persons were completed [the previous] week." 133250, 9 July 2002).

Senate President Drilon likewise received on September 28, 2005 a letter6 from the President of (b) Who are covered. – The following are covered by this executive order:
the North Luzon Railways Corporation Jose L. Cortes, Jr. requesting that the hearing on the
NorthRail project be postponed or cancelled until a copy of the report of the UP Law Center on Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are
the contract agreements relative to the project had been secured. covered by the executive privilege;

On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring Observance of the Principle Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in
of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and For Other Purposes,"7 which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect
immediately. The salient provisions of the Order are as follows: Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such
other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive
privilege;
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. – In accordance with
Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the
Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are unconstitutional; that respondent Executive Secretary Ermita, in his capacity as Executive
covered by the executive privilege; and Secretary and alter-ego of President Arroyo, be prohibited from imposing, and threatening to
impose sanctions on officials who appear before Congress due to congressional summons.
Additionally, petitioners claim that E.O. 464 infringes on their rights and impedes them from
Such other officers as may be determined by the President.
fulfilling their respective obligations. Thus, Bayan Muna alleges that E.O. 464 infringes on its
right as a political party entitled to participate in governance; Satur Ocampo, et al. allege that
SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. – All public officials E.O. 464 infringes on their rights and duties as members of Congress to conduct investigation in
enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws; Courage alleges
before either House of Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of separation of that the tenure of its members in public office is predicated on, and threatened by, their
powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials submission to the requirements of E.O. 464 should they be summoned by Congress; and
appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) CODAL alleges that its members have a sworn duty to uphold the rule of law, and their rights to
information and to transparent governance are threatened by the imposition of E.O. 464.
Also on September 28, 2005, Senate President Drilon received from Executive Secretary Ermita
a copy of E.O. 464, and another letter8 informing him "that officials of the Executive Department In G.R. No. 169660, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, claiming that his constitutional rights as a
invited to appear at the meeting [regarding the NorthRail project] will not be able to attend the citizen, taxpayer and law practitioner, are affected by the enforcement of E.O. 464, prays in his
same without the consent of the President, pursuant to [E.O. 464]" and that "said officials have petition that E.O. 464 be declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
not secured the required consent from the President." On even date which was also the
scheduled date of the hearing on the alleged wiretapping, Gen. Senga sent a letter9 to Senator
In G.R. No. 169667, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc. 12 (ALG), alleging that as a coalition
Biazon, Chairperson of the Committee on National Defense and Security, informing him "that per
of 17 legal resource non-governmental organizations engaged in developmental lawyering and
instruction of [President Arroyo], thru the Secretary of National Defense, no officer of the [AFP] is
work with the poor and marginalized sectors in different parts of the country, and as an
authorized to appear before any Senate or Congressional hearings without seeking a written
organization of citizens of the Philippines and a part of the general public, it has legal standing to
approval from the President" and "that no approval has been granted by the President to any
institute the petition to enforce its constitutional right to information on matters of public concern,
AFP officer to appear before the public hearing of the Senate Committee on National Defense
a right which was denied to the public by E.O. 464,13 prays, that said order be declared null and
and Security scheduled [on] 28 September 2005."
void for being unconstitutional and that respondent Executive Secretary Ermita be ordered to
cease from implementing it.
Despite the communications received from Executive Secretary Ermita and Gen. Senga, the
investigation scheduled by the Committee on National Defense and Security pushed through,
On October 11, 2005, Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, alleging that it has a vital interest in
with only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attending.
the resolution of the issue of the validity of E.O. 464 for it stands to suffer imminent and material
injury, as it has already sustained the same with its continued enforcement since it directly
For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative interferes with and impedes the valid exercise of the Senate’s powers and functions and
inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their conceals information of great public interest and concern, filed its petition for certiorari and
military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 169777 and prays that E.O. 464 be declared unconstitutional.

As to the NorthRail project hearing scheduled on September 29, 2005, Executive Secretary On October 14, 2005, PDP-Laban, a registered political party with members duly elected into the
Ermita, citing E.O. 464, sent letter of regrets, in response to the invitations sent to the following Philippine Senate and House of Representatives, filed a similar petition for certiorari and
government officials: Light Railway Transit Authority Administrator Melquiades Robles, Metro prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 169834, alleging that it is affected by the challenged E.O. 464
Rail Transit Authority Administrator Roberto Lastimoso, Department of Justice (DOJ) Chief State because it hampers its legislative agenda to be implemented through its members in Congress,
Counsel Ricardo V. Perez, then Presidential Legal Counsel Merceditas Gutierrez, Department of particularly in the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation and transcendental issues need to be
Transportation and Communication (DOTC) Undersecretary Guiling Mamonding, DOTC resolved to avert a constitutional crisis between the executive and legislative branches of the
Secretary Leandro Mendoza, Philippine National Railways General Manager Jose Serase II, government.
Monetary Board Member Juanita Amatong, Bases Conversion Development Authority
Chairperson Gen. Narciso Abaya and Secretary Romulo L. Neri. 10 NorthRail President Cortes
Meanwhile, by letter14 dated February 6, 2006, Senator Biazon reiterated his invitation to Gen.
sent personal regrets likewise citing E.O. 464.11
Senga for him and other military officers to attend the hearing on the alleged wiretapping
scheduled on February 10, 2005. Gen. Senga replied, however, by letter15 dated February 8,
On October 3, 2005, three petitions, docketed as G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660, and 169667, for 2006, that "[p]ursuant to Executive Order No. 464, th[e] Headquarters requested for a clearance
certiorari and prohibition, were filed before this Court challenging the constitutionality of E.O. from the President to allow [them] to appear before the public hearing" and that "they will attend
464. once [their] request is approved by the President." As none of those invited appeared, the
hearing on February 10, 2006 was cancelled.16
In G.R. No. 169659, petitioners party-list Bayan Muna, House of Representatives Members
Satur Ocampo, Crispin Beltran, Rafael Mariano, Liza Maza, Joel Virador and Teodoro Casino, In another investigation conducted jointly by the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Food and
Courage, an organization of government employees, and Counsels for the Defense of Liberties the Blue Ribbon Committee on the alleged mismanagement and use of the fertilizer fund under
(CODAL), a group of lawyers dedicated to the promotion of justice, democracy and peace, all the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani program of the Department of Agriculture (DA), several Cabinet
claiming to have standing to file the suit because of the transcendental importance of the issues officials were invited to the hearings scheduled on October 5 and 26, November 24 and
they posed, pray, in their petition that E.O. 464 be declared null and void for being December 12, 2005 but most of them failed to attend, DA Undersecretary Belinda Gonzales, DA
Assistant Secretary Felix Jose Montes, Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority Executive Director Art. XI, Sec. 133
Norlito R. Gicana,17 and those from the Department of Budget and Management18 having
invoked E.O. 464.
Art. III, Sec. 734

In the budget hearings set by the Senate on February 8 and 13, 2006, Press Secretary and
Art. III, Sec. 435
Presidential Spokesperson Ignacio R. Bunye,19 DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez20 and
Department of Interior and Local Government Undersecretary Marius P. Corpus 21 communicated
their inability to attend due to lack of appropriate clearance from the President pursuant to E.O. Art. XIII, Sec. 16 36
464. During the February 13, 2005 budget hearing, however, Secretary Bunye was allowed to
attend by Executive Secretary Ermita.
Art. II, Sec. 2837

On February 13, 2006, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz and the incumbent members of the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as taxpayers, and the Integrated Bar of the Respondents Executive Secretary Ermita et al., on the other hand, pray in their consolidated
memorandum38 on March 13, 2006 for the dismissal of the petitions for lack of merit.
Philippines as the official organization of all Philippine lawyers, all invoking their constitutional
right to be informed on matters of public interest, filed their petition for certiorari and prohibition,
docketed as G.R. No. 171246, and pray that E.O. 464 be declared null and void. The Court synthesizes the issues to be resolved as follows:

All the petitions pray for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondents 1. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress;
from implementing, enforcing, and observing E.O. 464.
2. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public
In the oral arguments on the petitions conducted on February 21, 2006, the following substantive concern; and
issues were ventilated: (1) whether respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in
implementing E.O. 464 prior to its publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation; and (2) whether E.O. 464 violates the following provisions of the Constitution: Art. II, 3. Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they
Sec. 28, Art. III, Sec. 4, Art. III, Sec. 7, Art. IV. Sec. 1, Art. VI, Sec. 21, Art. VI, Sec. 22, Art. XI, implemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
Sec. 1, and Art. XIII, Sec. 16. The procedural issue of whether there is an actual case or
controversy that calls for judicial review was not taken up; instead, the parties were instructed to Essential requisites for judicial review
discuss it in their respective memoranda.
Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of E.O. 464, ascertainment of
After the conclusion of the oral arguments, the parties were directed to submit their respective whether the requisites for a valid exercise of the Court’s power of judicial review are present is in
memoranda, paying particular attention to the following propositions: (1) that E.O. 464 is, on its order.
face, unconstitutional; and (2) assuming that it is not, it is unconstitutional as applied in four
instances, namely: (a) the so called Fertilizer scam; (b) the NorthRail investigation (c) the
Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP; and (d) the investigation on the Venable contract. 22 Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to
limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge the validity of
Petitioners in G.R. No. 16966023 and G.R. No. 16977724 filed their memoranda on March 7, the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest
2006, while those in G.R. No. 16966725 and G.R. No. 16983426 filed theirs the next day or on in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
March 8, 2006. Petitioners in G.R. No. 171246 did not file any memorandum. (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.39
Petitioners Bayan Muna et al. in G.R. No. 169659, after their motion for extension to file
memorandum27 was granted, subsequently filed a manifestation28 dated March 14, 2006 that it Except with respect to the requisites of standing and existence of an actual case or controversy
would no longer file its memorandum in the interest of having the issues resolved soonest, where the disagreement between the parties lies, discussion of the rest of the requisites shall be
prompting this Court to issue a Resolution reprimanding them. 29 omitted.

Petitioners submit that E.O. 464 violates the following constitutional provisions: Standing

Art. VI, Sec. 2130 Respondents, through the Solicitor General, assert that the allegations in G.R. Nos. 169659,
169660 and 169667 make it clear that they, adverting to the non-appearance of several officials
Art. VI, Sec. 2231 of the executive department in the investigations called by the different committees of the
Senate, were brought to vindicate the constitutional duty of the Senate or its different
committees to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation or in the exercise of its oversight functions.
Art. VI, Sec. 132 They maintain that Representatives Ocampo et al. have not shown any specific prerogative,
power, and privilege of the House of Representatives which had been effectively impaired by
E.O. 464, there being no mention of any investigation called by the House of Representatives or asserting that the right to information, curtailed and violated by E.O. 464, is essential to the
any of its committees which was aborted due to the implementation of E.O. 464. effective exercise of other constitutional rights51 and to the maintenance of the balance of power
among the three branches of the government through the principle of checks and balances. 52
As for Bayan Muna’s alleged interest as a party-list representing the marginalized and
underrepresented, and that of the other petitioner groups and individuals who profess to have It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing the
standing as advocates and defenders of the Constitution, respondents contend that such constitutionality of laws, presidential decrees, orders, and other regulations, must be direct and
interest falls short of that required to confer standing on them as parties "injured-in-fact."40 personal. In Franciso v. House of Representatives,53 this Court held that when the proceeding
involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement
of personal interest.
Respecting petitioner Chavez, respondents contend that Chavez may not claim an interest as a
taxpayer for the implementation of E.O. 464 does not involve the exercise of taxing or spending
power.41 As for petitioner PDP-Laban, it asseverates that it is clothed with legal standing in view of the
transcendental issues raised in its petition which this Court needs to resolve in order to avert a
constitutional crisis. For it to be accorded standing on the ground of transcendental importance,
With regard to the petition filed by the Senate, respondents argue that in the absence of a
however, it must establish (1) the character of the funds (that it is public) or other assets involved
personal or direct injury by reason of the issuance of E.O. 464, the Senate and its individual
in the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory
members are not the proper parties to assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government, and (3) the
lack of any party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being
Invoking this Court’s ruling in National Economic Protectionism Association v. Ongpin42 and raised.54 The first and last determinants not being present as no public funds or assets are
Valmonte v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office,43 respondents assert that to be considered a involved and petitioners in G.R. Nos. 169777 and 169659 have direct and specific interests in
proper party, one must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has the resolution of the controversy, petitioner PDP-Laban is bereft of standing to file its petition. Its
sustained or will sustain direct injury due to the enforcement of E.O. 464. 44 allegation that E.O. 464 hampers its legislative agenda is vague and uncertain, and at best is
only a "generalized interest" which it shares with the rest of the political parties. Concrete injury,
whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to
That the Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right essential not only for intelligent public cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution.55 In fine, PDP-Laban’s alleged interest
decision-making in a democratic system, but more especially for sound legislation45 is not as a political party does not suffice to clothe it with legal standing.
disputed. E.O. 464, however, allegedly stifles the ability of the members of Congress to access
information that is crucial to law-making.46 Verily, the Senate, including its individual members,
has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of the controversy and is the proper party Actual Case or Controversy
to assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464. Indeed, legislators have standing to maintain inviolate
the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed
Petitioners assert that an actual case exists, they citing the absence of the executive officials
to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives
invited by the Senate to its hearings after the issuance of E.O. 464, particularly those on the
as legislators.47
NorthRail project and the wiretapping controversy.

In the same vein, party-list representatives Satur Ocampo (Bayan Muna), Teodoro Casino
Respondents counter that there is no case or controversy, there being no showing that President
(Bayan Muna), Joel Virador (Bayan Muna), Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis), Rafael Mariano
Arroyo has actually withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance of the invited
(Anakpawis), and Liza Maza (Gabriela) are allowed to sue to question the constitutionality of
officials.56 These officials, they claim, merely communicated to the Senate that they have not yet
E.O. 464, the absence of any claim that an investigation called by the House of Representatives
secured the consent of the President, not that the President prohibited their
or any of its committees was aborted due to the implementation of E.O. 464 notwithstanding, it
attendance.57 Specifically with regard to the AFP officers who did not attend the hearing on
being sufficient that a claim is made that E.O. 464 infringes on their constitutional rights and
September 28, 2005, respondents claim that the instruction not to attend without the President’s
duties as members of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct
consent was based on its role as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, not on E.O. 464.
oversight functions in the implementation of laws.

Respondents thus conclude that the petitions merely rest on an unfounded apprehension that
The national political party, Bayan Muna, likewise meets the standing requirement as it obtained
the President will abuse its power of preventing the appearance of officials before Congress, and
three seats in the House of Representatives in the 2004 elections and is, therefore, entitled to
that such apprehension is not sufficient for challenging the validity of E.O. 464.
participate in the legislative process consonant with the declared policy underlying the party list
system of affording citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties who lack well-defined political constituencies to contribute to the The Court finds respondents’ assertion that the President has not withheld her consent or
formulation and enactment of legislation that will benefit the nation.48 prohibited the appearance of the officials concerned immaterial in determining the existence of
an actual case or controversy insofar as E.O. 464 is concerned. For E.O. 464 does not require
either a deliberate withholding of consent or an express prohibition issuing from the President in
As Bayan Muna and Representatives Ocampo et al. have the standing to file their petitions,
order to bar officials from appearing before Congress.
passing on the standing of their co-petitioners Courage and Codal is rendered unnecessary.49

As the implementation of the challenged order has already resulted in the absence of officials
In filing their respective petitions, Chavez, the ALG which claims to be an organization of
invited to the hearings of petitioner Senate of the Philippines, it would make no sense to wait for
citizens, and the incumbent members of the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP in behalf of its
any further event before considering the present case ripe for adjudication. Indeed, it would be
lawyer members,50 invoke their constitutional right to information on matters of public concern,
sheer abandonment of duty if this Court would now refrain from passing on the constitutionality which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of
of E.O. 464. government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation.

Constitutionality of E.O. 464 Thus, the Court found that the Senate investigation of the government transaction involved in
Arnault was a proper exercise of the power of inquiry. Besides being related to the expenditure
of public funds of which Congress is the guardian, the transaction, the Court held, "also involved
E.O. 464, to the extent that it bars the appearance of executive officials before Congress,
government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions it is within the power of
deprives Congress of the information in the possession of these officials. To resolve the question
Congress to regulate or even abolish."
of whether such withholding of information violates the Constitution, consideration of the general
power of Congress to obtain information, otherwise known as the power of inquiry, is in order.
Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would be
incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the
The power of inquiry
most familiar with and informed on executive operations.

The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the

As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, "with process to enforce it," is grounded on the
Constitution which reads:
necessity of information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive
officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of thereof.
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
(Underscoring supplied)
As evidenced by the American experience during the so-called "McCarthy era," however, the
right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible to
This provision is worded exactly as Section 8 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution except that, abuse than executive or judicial power. It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to
in the latter, it vests the power of inquiry in the unicameral legislature established therein – the the Court’s certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Batasang Pambansa – and its committees.
For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,61 the inquiry itself might not
The 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision. Nonetheless, in Arnault v. properly be in aid of legislation, and thus beyond the constitutional power of Congress. Such
Nazareno,58 a case decided in 1950 under that Constitution, the Court already recognized that inquiry could not usurp judicial functions. Parenthetically, one possible way for Congress to
the power of inquiry is inherent in the power to legislate. avoid such a result as occurred in Bengzon is to indicate in its invitations to the public officials
concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible needed statute which prompted the
need for the inquiry. Given such statement in its invitations, along with the usual indication of the
Arnault involved a Senate investigation of the reportedly anomalous purchase of the Buenavista subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof, there would be less
and Tambobong Estates by the Rural Progress Administration. Arnault, who was considered a room for speculation on the part of the person invited on whether the inquiry is in aid of
leading witness in the controversy, was called to testify thereon by the Senate. On account of his legislation.
refusal to answer the questions of the senators on an important point, he was, by resolution of
the Senate, detained for contempt. Upholding the Senate’s power to punish Arnault for
contempt, this Court held: Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the legislative power
of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or
House’s duly published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the
with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that
legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative
obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.
function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate
wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation These abuses are, of course, remediable before the courts, upon the proper suit filed by the
is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the persons affected, even if they belong to the executive branch. Nonetheless, there may be
requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do exceptional circumstances, none appearing to obtain at present, wherein a clear pattern of
possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, abuse of the legislative power of inquiry might be established, resulting in palpable violations of
and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some the rights guaranteed to members of the executive department under the Bill of Rights. In such
means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.59 . . . (Emphasis and underscoring instances, depending on the particulars of each case, attempts by the Executive Branch to
supplied) forestall these abuses may be accorded judicial sanction.

That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch may be Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power
deduced from the same case. The power of inquiry, the Court therein ruled, is co-extensive with of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of "executive privilege." Since this term figures
the power to legislate.60 The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those prominently in the challenged order, it being mentioned in its provisions, its preambular
clauses,62 and in its very title, a discussion of executive privilege is crucial for determining the That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that
constitutionality of E.O. 464. it would be considered privileged in all instances. For in determining the validity of a claim of
privilege, the question that must be asked is not only whether the requested information falls
within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a
Executive privilege
given procedural setting.71

The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this jurisdiction. It has been used even prior to the
The leading case on executive privilege in the United States is U.S. v. Nixon, 72 decided in 1974.
promulgation of the 1986 Constitution.63 Being of American origin, it is best understood in light of
In issue in that case was the validity of President Nixon’s claim of executive privilege against a
how it has been defined and used in the legal literature of the United States.
subpoena issued by a district court requiring the production of certain tapes and documents
relating to the Watergate investigations. The claim of privilege was based on the President’s
Schwartz defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to withhold information general interest in the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence. The U.S. Court
from the public, the courts, and the Congress."64 Similarly, Rozell defines it as "the right of the held that while there is no explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality in the U.S.
President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the Constitution, it is constitutionally based to the extent that it relates to the effective discharge of a
courts, and ultimately the public."65 President’s powers. The Court, nonetheless, rejected the President’s claim of privilege, ruling
that the privilege must be balanced against the public interest in the fair administration of
criminal justice. Notably, the Court was careful to clarify that it was not there addressing the
Executive privilege is, nonetheless, not a clear or unitary concept. 66 It has encompassed claims
issue of claims of privilege in a civil litigation or against congressional demands for information.
of varying kinds.67Tribe, in fact, comments that while it is customary to employ the phrase
"executive privilege," it may be more accurate to speak of executive privileges "since
presidential refusals to furnish information may be actuated by any of at least three distinct kinds Cases in the U.S. which involve claims of executive privilege against Congress are
of considerations, and may be asserted, with differing degrees of success, in the context of rare.73 Despite frequent assertion of the privilege to deny information to Congress, beginning
either judicial or legislative investigations." with President Washington’s refusal to turn over treaty negotiation records to the House of
Representatives, the U.S. Supreme Court has never adjudicated the issue. 74 However, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in a case decided earlier in the same year
One variety of the privilege, Tribe explains, is the state secrets privilege invoked by U.S. as Nixon, recognized the President’s privilege over his conversations against a congressional
Presidents, beginning with Washington, on the ground that the information is of such nature that subpoena.75 Anticipating the balancing approach adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Nixon,
its disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives. Another variety is the
the Court of Appeals weighed the public interest protected by the claim of privilege against the
informer’s privilege, or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of persons interest that would be served by disclosure to the Committee. Ruling that the balance favored
who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. the President, the Court declined to enforce the subpoena. 76
Finally, a generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to intragovernmental
documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a
process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. 68 In this jurisdiction, the doctrine of executive privilege was recognized by this Court in Almonte v.
Vasquez.77Almonte used the term in reference to the same privilege subject of Nixon. It quoted
the following portion of the Nixon decision which explains the basis for the privilege:
Tribe’s comment is supported by the ruling in In re Sealed Case, thus:

"The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondences,

Since the beginnings of our nation, executive officials have claimed a variety of privileges to like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to which
resist disclosure of information the confidentiality of which they felt was crucial to fulfillment of we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity
the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch of our government. Courts ruled
for protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in
early that the executive had a right to withhold documents that might reveal military or state Presidential decision-making. A President and those who assist him must be free to explore
secrets. The courts have also granted the executive a right to withhold the identity of alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many
government informers in some circumstances and a qualified right to withhold information
would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations justifying a
related to pending investigations. x x x"69 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the
operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the
The entry in Black’s Law Dictionary on "executive privilege" is similarly instructive regarding the Constitution x x x " (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
scope of the doctrine.
Almonte involved a subpoena duces tecum issued by the Ombudsman against the therein
This privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, exempts the petitioners. It did not involve, as expressly stated in the decision, the right of the people to
executive from disclosure requirements applicable to the ordinary citizen or organization where information.78 Nonetheless, the Court recognized that there are certain types of information
such exemption is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities which the government may withhold from the public, thus acknowledging, in substance if not in
involved in maintaining governmental operations, and extends not only to military and diplomatic name, that executive privilege may be claimed against citizens’ demands for information.
secrets but also to documents integral to an appropriate exercise of the executive’ domestic
decisional and policy making functions, that is, those documents reflecting the frank expression In Chavez v. PCGG,79 the Court held that this jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding
necessary in intra-governmental advisory and deliberative communications.70 (Emphasis and
that there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets
underscoring supplied) regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters."80 The same case held that
closed-door Cabinet meetings are also a recognized limitation on the right to information.
Similarly, in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,81 the Court ruled that the right to information competent inputs that we can put in our committee deliberations, either in aid of legislation or in
does not extend to matters recognized as "privileged information under the separation of congressional investigations, is the testimonies of Cabinet ministers. We usually invite them, but
powers,"82 by which the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and if they do not come and it is a congressional investigation, we usually issue subpoenas.
discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings. It also held that information on military and
diplomatic secrets and those affecting national security, and information on investigations of
I want to be clarified on a statement made by Commissioner Suarez when he said that the fact
crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused were exempted from
that the Cabinet ministers may refuse to come to the House of Representatives or the Senate
the right to information.
[when requested under Section 22] does not mean that they need not come when they are
invited or subpoenaed by the committee of either House when it comes to inquiries in aid of
From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in the United legislation or congressional investigation. According to Commissioner Suarez, that is allowed
States and in this jurisdiction, a clear principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted and their presence can be had under Section 21. Does the gentleman confirm this, Madam
against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of President?
information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim
thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which
MR. DAVIDE. We confirm that, Madam President, because Section 20 refers only to what was
it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty
originally the Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of
to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary
legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be
character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive
held in contempt of the House.83 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
secrecy and in favor of disclosure.

A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While
Validity of Section 1
attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in
aid of legislation. The reference to Commissioner Suarez bears noting, he being one of the
Section 1 is similar to Section 3 in that both require the officials covered by them to secure the proponents of the amendment to make the appearance of department heads discretionary in the
consent of the President prior to appearing before Congress. There are significant differences question hour.
between the two provisions, however, which constrain this Court to discuss the validity of these
provisions separately.
So clearly was this distinction conveyed to the members of the Commission that the Committee
on Style, precisely in recognition of this distinction, later moved the provision on question hour
Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does not, unlike Section 3, require a prior from its original position as Section 20 in the original draft down to Section 31, far from the
determination by any official whether they are covered by E.O. 464. The President herself has, provision on inquiries in aid of legislation. This gave rise to the following exchange during the
through the challenged order, made the determination that they are. Further, unlike also Section deliberations:
3, the coverage of department heads under Section 1 is not made to depend on the department
heads’ possession of any information which might be covered by executive privilege. In fact, in
MR. GUINGONA. [speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Style] We now go,
marked contrast to Section 3 vis-à-vis Section 2, there is no reference to executive privilege at
Mr. Presiding Officer, to the Article on Legislative and may I request the chairperson of the
all. Rather, the required prior consent under Section 1 is grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of
Legislative Department, Commissioner Davide, to give his reaction.
the Constitution on what has been referred to as the question hour.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Davide is recognized.|avvphi|.net

SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the
President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear
before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. I have only one reaction to the Question Hour. I
questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of propose that instead of putting it as Section 31, it should follow Legislative Inquiries.
Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not
be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the
State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance THE PRESIDING OFFICER. What does the committee say?
shall be conducted in executive session.
MR. GUINGONA. I ask Commissioner Maambong to reply, Mr. Presiding Officer.
Determining the validity of Section 1 thus requires an examination of the meaning of Section 22
of Article VI. Section 22 which provides for the question hour must be interpreted vis-à-vis MR. MAAMBONG. Actually, we considered that previously when we sequenced this but we
Section 21 which provides for the power of either House of Congress to "conduct inquiries in aid reasoned that in Section 21, which is Legislative Inquiry, it is actually a power of Congress in
of legislation." As the following excerpt of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission terms of its own lawmaking; whereas, a Question Hour is not actually a power in terms of its own
shows, the framers were aware that these two provisions involved distinct functions of Congress. lawmaking power because in Legislative Inquiry, it is in aid of legislation. And so we put
Question Hour as Section 31. I hope Commissioner Davide will consider this.
MR. MAAMBONG. x x x When we amended Section 20 [now Section 22 on the Question Hour]
yesterday, I noticed that members of the Cabinet cannot be compelled anymore to appear MR. DAVIDE. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely
before the House of Representatives or before the Senate. I have a particular problem in this as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members
regard, Madam President, because in our experience in the Regular Batasang Pambansa – as of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and balance but
the Gentleman himself has experienced in the interim Batasang Pambansa – one of the most also, in effect, in aid of legislation.
MR. MAAMBONG. After conferring with the committee, we find merit in the suggestion of comparable to those which exist under a parliamentary system, and the nonexistence in the
Commissioner Davide. In other words, we are accepting that and so this Section 31 would now Congress of an institution such as the British question period have perforce made reliance by
become Section 22. Would it be, Commissioner Davide? the Congress upon its right to obtain information from the executive essential, if it is intelligently
to perform its legislative tasks. Unless the Congress possesses the right to obtain executive
information, its power of oversight of administration in a system such as ours becomes a power
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.84 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
devoid of most of its practical content, since it depends for its effectiveness solely upon
information parceled out ex gratia by the executive.89 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Consistent with their statements earlier in the deliberations, Commissioners Davide and
Maambong proceeded from the same assumption that these provisions pertained to two
Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should
different functions of the legislature. Both Commissioners understood that the power to conduct
not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the
inquiries in aid of legislation is different from the power to conduct inquiries during the question
power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may
hour. Commissioner Davide’s only concern was that the two provisions on these distinct powers
be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the
be placed closely together, they being complementary to each other. Neither Commissioner
objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.
considered them as identical functions of Congress.

When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the
The foregoing opinion was not the two Commissioners’ alone. From the above-quoted
statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the
exchange, Commissioner Maambong’s committee – the Committee on Style – shared the view
President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their
that the two provisions reflected distinct functions of Congress. Commissioner Davide, on the
performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of
other hand, was speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on the Legislative
powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry
Department. His views may thus be presumed as representing that of his Committee.
in which Congress requires their appearance is "in aid of legislation" under Section 21, the
appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault. 90
In the context of a parliamentary system of government, the "question hour" has a definite
meaning. It is a period of confrontation initiated by Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and the
In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the
other ministers accountable for their acts and the operation of the government, 85 corresponding
extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned
to what is known in Britain as the question period. There was a specific provision for a question
from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
hour in the 1973 Constitution86 which made the appearance of ministers mandatory. The same
perfectly conformed to the parliamentary system established by that Constitution, where the
ministers are also members of the legislature and are directly accountable to it. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section
21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power
An essential feature of the parliamentary system of government is the immediate accountability
of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information.
of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet to the National Assembly. They shall be responsible to the
National Assembly for the program of government and shall determine the guidelines of national
policy. Unlike in the presidential system where the tenure of office of all elected officials cannot When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
be terminated before their term expired, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet remain in office only themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that
as long as they enjoy the confidence of the National Assembly. The moment this confidence is they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the
lost the Prime Minister and the Cabinet may be changed.87 President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except
through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive
branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned
The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such appearance during
by a long-standing custom.
the question hour in the present Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of
separation of powers.88 To that extent, the question hour, as it is presently understood in this
jurisdiction, departs from the question period of the parliamentary system. That department By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry.
heads may not be required to appear in a question hour does not, however, mean that the Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof
legislature is rendered powerless to elicit information from them in all circumstances. In fact, in is exempt on the basis not only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the
light of the absence of a mandatory question period, the need to enforce Congress’ right to constitutional independence of the judiciary. This point is not in dispute, as even counsel for the
executive information in the performance of its legislative function becomes more imperative. As Senate, Sen. Joker Arroyo, admitted it during the oral argument upon interpellation of the Chief
Schwartz observes: Justice.

Indeed, if the separation of powers has anything to tell us on the subject under discussion, it is Having established the proper interpretation of Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the
that the Congress has the right to obtain information from any source – even from officials of Court now proceeds to pass on the constitutionality of Section 1 of E.O. 464.
departments and agencies in the executive branch. In the United States there is, unlike the
situation which prevails in a parliamentary system such as that in Britain, a clear separation
Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the
between the legislative and executive branches. It is this very separation that makes the
absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its
congressional right to obtain information from the executive so essential, if the functions of the
application to appearances of department heads in the question hour contemplated in the
Congress as the elected representatives of the people are adequately to be carried out. The
provision of said Section 22 of Article VI. The reading is dictated by the basic rule of construction
absence of close rapport between the legislative and executive branches in this country,
that issuances must be interpreted, as much as possible, in a way that will render it authorized by the President, has determined that the requested information is privileged, and
constitutional. that the President has not reversed such determination. Such declaration, however, even
without mentioning the term "executive privilege," amounts to an implied claim that the
information is being withheld by the executive branch, by authority of the President, on the basis
The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to
of executive privilege. Verily, there is an implied claim of privilege.
appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the
Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their
part. The letter dated September 28, 2005 of respondent Executive Secretary Ermita to Senate
President Drilon illustrates the implied nature of the claim of privilege authorized by E.O. 464. It
reads:
Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department
head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by In connection with the inquiry to be conducted by the Committee of the Whole regarding the
the President herself or by the Executive Secretary. Northrail Project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation on 29 September 2005 at 10:00 a.m.,
please be informed that officials of the Executive Department invited to appear at the meeting
will not be able to attend the same without the consent of the President, pursuant to Executive
Validity of Sections 2 and 3
Order No. 464 (s. 2005), entitled "Ensuring Observance Of The Principle Of Separation Of
Powers, Adherence To The Rule On Executive Privilege And Respect For The Rights Of Public
Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the Officials Appearing In Legislative Inquiries In Aid Of Legislation Under The Constitution, And For
consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is Other Purposes". Said officials have not secured the required consent from the President.
broad. It covers all senior officials of executive departments, all officers of the AFP and the PNP, (Underscoring supplied)
and all senior national security officials who, in the judgment of the heads of offices designated
in the same section (i.e. department heads, Chief of Staff of the AFP, Chief of the PNP, and the
The letter does not explicitly invoke executive privilege or that the matter on which these officials
National Security Adviser), are "covered by the executive privilege."
are being requested to be resource persons falls under the recognized grounds of the privilege
to justify their absence. Nor does it expressly state that in view of the lack of consent from the
The enumeration also includes such other officers as may be determined by the President. President under E.O. 464, they cannot attend the hearing.
Given the title of Section 2 — "Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege" —, it is
evident that under the rule of ejusdem generis, the determination by the President under this
Significant premises in this letter, however, are left unstated, deliberately or not. The letter
provision is intended to be based on a similar finding of coverage under executive privilege.
assumes that the invited officials are covered by E.O. 464. As explained earlier, however, to be
covered by the order means that a determination has been made, by the designated head of
En passant, the Court notes that Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 virtually states that executive privilege office or the President, that the invited official possesses information that is covered by executive
actually covers persons. Such is a misuse of the doctrine. Executive privilege, as discussed privilege. Thus, although it is not stated in the letter that such determination has been made, the
above, is properly invoked in relation to specific categories of information and not to categories same must be deemed implied. Respecting the statement that the invited officials have not
of persons. secured the consent of the President, it only means that the President has not reversed the
standing prohibition against their appearance before Congress.
In light, however, of Sec 2(a) of E.O. 464 which deals with the nature, scope and coverage of
executive privilege, the reference to persons being "covered by the executive privilege" may be Inevitably, Executive Secretary Ermita’s letter leads to the conclusion that the executive branch,
read as an abbreviated way of saying that the person is in possession of information which is, in either through the President or the heads of offices authorized under E.O. 464, has made a
the judgment of the head of office concerned, privileged as defined in Section 2(a). The Court determination that the information required by the Senate is privileged, and that, at the time of
shall thus proceed on the assumption that this is the intention of the challenged order. writing, there has been no contrary pronouncement from the President. In fine, an implied claim
of privilege has been made by the executive.
Upon a determination by the designated head of office or by the President that an official is
"covered by the executive privilege," such official is subjected to the requirement that he first While there is no Philippine case that directly addresses the issue of whether executive privilege
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before Congress. This requirement may be invoked against Congress, it is gathered from Chavez v. PEA that certain information in
effectively bars the appearance of the official concerned unless the same is permitted by the the possession of the executive may validly be claimed as privileged even against Congress.
President. The proviso allowing the President to give its consent means nothing more than that Thus, the case holds:
the President may reverse a prohibition which already exists by virtue of E.O. 464.
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information
Thus, underlying this requirement of prior consent is the determination by a head of office, rooted in the separation of powers. The information does not cover Presidential conversations,
authorized by the President under E.O. 464, or by the President herself, that such official is in correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internal-
possession of information that is covered by executive privilege. This determination then deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either
becomes the basis for the official’s not showing up in the legislative investigation. house of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried
open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and
assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to
In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure to be present, such protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential,
invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office
Legislative and Judicial power. This is not the situation in the instant case. 91 (Emphasis and On the present state of the record, this Court is not called upon to perform this balancing
underscoring supplied) operation. In stating its objection to claimant’s interrogatories, government asserts, and nothing
more, that the disclosures sought by claimant would inhibit the free expression of opinion that
non-disclosure is designed to protect. The government has not shown – nor even alleged – that
Section 3 of E.O. 464, therefore, cannot be dismissed outright as invalid by the mere fact that it
those who evaluated claimant’s product were involved in internal policymaking, generally, or in
sanctions claims of executive privilege. This Court must look further and assess the claim of
this particular instance. Privilege cannot be set up by an unsupported claim. The facts upon
privilege authorized by the Order to determine whether it is valid.
which the privilege is based must be established. To find these interrogatories objectionable, this
Court would have to assume that the evaluation and classification of claimant’s products was a
While the validity of claims of privilege must be assessed on a case to case basis, examining the matter of internal policy formulation, an assumption in which this Court is unwilling to indulge sua
ground invoked therefor and the particular circumstances surrounding it, there is, in an implied sponte.98 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
claim of privilege, a defect that renders it invalid per se. By its very nature, and as demonstrated
by the letter of respondent Executive Secretary quoted above, the implied claim authorized by
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy99 similarly emphasizes that "an agency must provide
Section 3 of E.O. 464 is not accompanied by any specific allegation of the basis thereof (e.g.,
‘precise and certain’ reasons for preserving the confidentiality of requested information."
whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet
meetings, etc.). While Section 2(a) enumerates the types of information that are covered by the
privilege under the challenged order, Congress is left to speculate as to which among them is Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America100 amplifies, thus:
being referred to by the executive. The enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive,
but a mere statement of what is included in the phrase "confidential or classified information
A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a specific designation and description
between the President and the public officers covered by this executive order."
of the documents within its scope as well as precise and certain reasons for preserving their
confidentiality. Without this specificity, it is impossible for a court to analyze the claim short of
Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information disclosure of the very thing sought to be protected. As the affidavit now stands, the Court has
privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of little more than its sua sponte speculation with which to weigh the applicability of the claim. An
office, has determined that it is so, and that the President has not overturned that determination. improperly asserted claim of privilege is no claim of privilege. Therefore, despite the fact that a
Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested information could be claim was made by the proper executive as Reynolds requires, the Court can not recognize the
classified as privileged. That the message is couched in terms that, on first impression, do not claim in the instant case because it is legally insufficient to allow the Court to make a just and
seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more pernicious. It threatens to make Congress reasonable determination as to its applicability. To recognize such a broad claim in which the
doubly blind to the question of why the executive branch is not providing it with the information Defendant has given no precise or compelling reasons to shield these documents from outside
that it has requested. scrutiny, would make a farce of the whole procedure.101 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must, Due respect for a co-equal branch of government, moreover, demands no less than a claim of
therefore, be clearly asserted. As U.S. v. Reynolds teaches: privilege clearly stating the grounds therefor. Apropos is the following ruling in McPhaul v.
U.S:102
The privilege belongs to the government and must be asserted by it; it can neither be claimed
nor waived by a private party. It is not to be lightly invoked. There must be a formal claim of We think the Court’s decision in United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 70 S. Ct. 724, is highly
privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter, after actual relevant to these questions. For it is as true here as it was there, that ‘if (petitioner) had
personal consideration by that officer. The court itself must determine whether the legitimate reasons for failing to produce the records of the association, a decent respect for the
circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so without forcing a House of Representatives, by whose authority the subpoenas issued, would have required that
disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.92 (Underscoring supplied) (he) state (his) reasons for noncompliance upon the return of the writ. Such a statement would
have given the Subcommittee an opportunity to avoid the blocking of its inquiry by taking other
appropriate steps to obtain the records. ‘To deny the Committee the opportunity to consider the
Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive privilege, there is no way of
objection or remedy is in itself a contempt of its authority and an obstruction of its processes. His
determining whether it falls under one of the traditional privileges, or whether, given the
failure to make any such statement was "a patent evasion of the duty of one summoned to
circumstances in which it is made, it should be respected. 93 These, in substance, were the same
produce papers before a congressional committee[, and] cannot be condoned." (Emphasis and
criteria in assessing the claim of privilege asserted against the Ombudsman in Almonte v.
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
Vasquez94 and, more in point, against a committee of the Senate in Senate Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon.95
Upon the other hand, Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim
with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to
A.O. Smith v. Federal Trade Commission is enlightening:
protect.103 A useful analogy in determining the requisite degree of particularity would be the
privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, Hoffman v. U.S.104 declares:
[T]he lack of specificity renders an assessment of the potential harm resulting from disclosure
impossible, thereby preventing the Court from balancing such harm against plaintiffs’ needs to
The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in so doing he
determine whether to override any claims of privilege.96 (Underscoring supplied)
would incriminate himself – his say-so does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination. It is
for the court to say whether his silence is justified, and to require him to answer if ‘it clearly
And so is U.S. v. Article of Drug:97 appears to the court that he is mistaken.’ However, if the witness, upon interposing his claim,
were required to prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually required to be
established in court, he would be compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege It follows, therefore, that when an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in
is designed to guarantee. To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications his own judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time
of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege.
explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure This is necessary in order to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair
could result." x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after
the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the
privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per
Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance.
se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the
claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not
given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of The Court notes that one of the expressed purposes for requiring officials to secure the consent
information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of of the President under Section 3 of E.O. 464 is to ensure "respect for the rights of public officials
inquiry of Congress. appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation." That such rights must indeed be respected by
Congress is an echo from Article VI Section 21 of the Constitution mandating that "[t]he rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected."
In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated.

In light of the above discussion of Section 3, it is clear that it is essentially an authorization for
No infirmity, however, can be imputed to Section 2(a) as it merely provides guidelines, binding
implied claims of executive privilege, for which reason it must be invalidated. That such
only on the heads of office mentioned in Section 2(b), on what is covered by executive privilege.
authorization is partly motivated by the need to ensure respect for such officials does not change
It does not purport to be conclusive on the other branches of government. It may thus be
the infirm nature of the authorization itself.
construed as a mere expression of opinion by the President regarding the nature and scope of
executive privilege.
Right to Information
Petitioners, however, assert as another ground for invalidating the challenged order the alleged
unlawful delegation of authority to the heads of offices in Section 2(b). Petitioner Senate of the E.O 464 is concerned only with the demands of Congress for the appearance of executive
Philippines, in particular, cites the case of the United States where, so it claims, only the officials in the hearings conducted by it, and not with the demands of citizens for information
President can assert executive privilege to withhold information from Congress. pursuant to their right to information on matters of public concern. Petitioners are not amiss in
claiming, however, that what is involved in the present controversy is not merely the legislative
power of inquiry, but the right of the people to information.
Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office determines
that a certain information is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the President’s
authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, subject There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which
only to the express pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the appearance of such underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public
official. These provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims of privilege by mere concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right
silence. to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by
Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from
government officials. These powers belong only to Congress and not to an individual citizen.
Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege.
Executive privilege, as already discussed, is recognized with respect to information the
confidential nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow,
the executive branch,105 or in those instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are
the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities.106 The doctrine of executive privilege exercising their right to information.
is thus premised on the fact that certain informations must, as a matter of necessity, be kept
confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from
To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however,
the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such
any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations
high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation,
is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to
In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the information which they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress
President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive — opinions which they can then communicate to their representatives and other government
Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state officials through the various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression. Thus holds
that the authority is "By order of the President," which means that he personally consulted with Valmonte v. Belmonte:
her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in
the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to
It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the
exercise such power. There is even less reason to uphold such authorization in the instant case
end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people’s will. Yet, this open
where the authorization is not explicit but by mere silence. Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b),
dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to
is further invalid on this score.
formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the
issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.107(Emphasis and Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of
underscoring supplied) Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes," are declared VOID. Sections 1 and
2(a) are, however, VALID.
The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is,
therefore, in the sense explained above, just as direct as its violation of the legislature’s power of SO ORDERED.
inquiry.

Implementation of E.O. 464 prior to its publication

While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the same
is exempt from the need for publication. On the need for publishing even those statutes that do
not directly apply to people in general, Tañada v. Tuvera states:

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of
President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a
law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people.
The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may
question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in courts of justice. 108 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

Although the above statement was made in reference to statutes, logic dictates that the
challenged order must be covered by the publication requirement. As explained above, E.O. 464
has a direct effect on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. It is,
therefore, a matter of public interest which members of the body politic may question before this
Court. Due process thus requires that the people should have been apprised of this issuance
before it was implemented.

Conclusion

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought
in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is
privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.

The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional
requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its
reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible. For

[w]hat republican theory did accomplish…was to reverse the old presumption in favor of secrecy,
based on the divine right of kings and nobles, and replace it with a presumption in favor of
publicity, based on the doctrine of popular sovereignty. (Underscoring supplied)109

Resort to any means then by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge
information cannot be presumed valid. Otherwise, we shall not have merely nullified the power of
our legislature to inquire into the operations of government, but we shall have given up
something of much greater value – our right as a people to take part in government.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order
No. 464 (series of 2005), "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers,
Adherence to the Rule on Executive
 G.R. No. 180643 September 4, 2008 Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,4 (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,5 and (c)
whether or not she directed him to approve it.6
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner,
vs. Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioner’s answers to these three questions by
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND requiring him to appear and testify once more on November 20, 2007. On November 15, 2007,
INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to respondent Committees and requested them to
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, respondents. dispense with petitioner’s testimony on the ground of executive privilege. 7The letter of Executive
Secretary Ermita pertinently stated:
RESOLUTION
Following the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, the foregoing questions fall under
conversations and correspondence between the President and public officials which
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
are considered executive privilege (Almonte v. Vasquez, G.R. 95637, 23 May
1995; Chavez v. PEA, G.R. 133250, July 9, 2002). Maintaining the confidentiality of
Executive privilege is not a personal privilege, but one that adheres to the Office of the conversations of the President is necessary in the exercise of her executive and policy
President. It exists to protect public interest, not to benefit a particular public official. Its purpose, decision making process. The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of her
among others, is to assure that the nation will receive the benefit of candid, objective and conversations and correspondences, like the value which we accord deference for the
untrammeled communication and exchange of information between the President and his/her privacy of all citizens, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid,
advisers in the process of shaping or forming policies and arriving at decisions in the exercise of objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making.
the functions of the Presidency under the Constitution. The confidentiality of the President’s Disclosure of conversations of the President will have a chilling effect on the
conversations and correspondence is not unique. It is akin to the confidentiality of judicial President, and will hamper her in the effective discharge of her duties and
deliberations. It possesses the same value as the right to privacy of all citizens and more, responsibilities, if she is not protected by the confidentiality of her conversations.
because it is dictated by public interest and the constitutionally ordained separation of
governmental powers.
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought
to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the
In these proceedings, this Court has been called upon to exercise its power of review and People’s Republic of China. Given the confidential nature in which these information
arbitrate a hotly, even acrimoniously, debated dispute between the Court’s co-equal branches of were conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details
government. In this task, this Court should neither curb the legitimate powers of any of the co- of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to
equal and coordinate branches of government nor allow any of them to overstep the boundaries protect.
set for it by our Constitution. The competing interests in the case at bar are the claim of
executive privilege by the President, on the one hand, and the respondent Senate Committees’
In light of the above considerations, this Office is constrained to invoke the settled
assertion of their power to conduct legislative inquiries, on the other. The particular facts and
doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised
circumstances of the present case, stripped of the politically and emotionally charged rhetoric
Secretary Neri accordingly.
from both sides and viewed in the light of settled constitutional and legal doctrines, plainly lead
to the conclusion that the claim of executive privilege must be upheld.
Considering that Sec. Neri has been lengthily interrogated on the subject in an
unprecedented 11-hour hearing, wherein he has answered all questions propounded
Assailed in this motion for reconsideration is our Decision dated March 25, 2008 (the
to him except the foregoing questions involving executive privilege, we therefore
"Decision"), granting the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Romulo L. Neri against the
request that his testimony on 20 November 2007 on the ZTE / NBN project be
respondent Senate Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,1 Trade
dispensed with.
and Commerce,2 and National Defense and Security (collectively the "respondent
Committees").3
On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees upon orders of
the President invoking executive privilege. On November 22, 2007, the respondent Committees
A brief review of the facts is imperative.
issued the show-cause letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in contempt. On
November 29, 2007, in petitioner’s reply to respondent Committees, he manifested that it was
On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and testified for not his intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions
about eleven (11) hours on matters concerning the National Broadband Project (the "NBN were those he claimed to be covered by executive privilege. He also manifested his willingness
Project"), a project awarded by the Department of Transportation and Communications to appear and testify should there be new matters to be taken up. He just requested that he be
("DOTC") to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment ("ZTE"). Petitioner disclosed that then furnished "in advance as to what else" he "needs to clarify."
Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in
exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President
Respondent Committees found petitioner’s explanations unsatisfactory. Without responding to
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo ("President Arroyo") of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him
his request for advance notice of the matters that he should still clarify, they issued the Order
not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on President Arroyo and petitioner’s
dated January 30, 2008; In Re: P.S. Res. Nos. 127,129,136 & 144; and privilege speeches of
discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive
Senator Lacson and Santiago (all on the ZTE-NBN Project), citing petitioner in contempt of
privilege." To be specific, petitioner refused to answer questions on: (a) whether or not President
respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate
Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
On the same date, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the above Order. 8 He insisted that A. THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT THE MATTERS FOR WHICH EXECUTIVE
he had not shown "any contemptible conduct worthy of contempt and arrest." He emphasized PRIVILEGE IS CLAIMED CONSTITUTE STATE SECRETS.
his willingness to testify on new matters, but respondent Committees did not respond to his
request for advance notice of questions. He also mentioned the petition for certiorari he
B. EVEN IF THE TESTS ADOPTED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE
previously filed with this Court on December 7, 2007. According to him, this should restrain
DECISION IS APPLIED, THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT THE ELEMENTS OF
respondent Committees from enforcing the order dated January 30, 2008 which declared him in
PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE ARE PRESENT.
contempt and directed his arrest and detention.

C. ON THE CONTRARY, THERE IS ADEQUATE SHOWING OF A COMPELLING

Petitioner then filed his Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (with Urgent Application for
NEED TO JUSTIFY THE DISCLOSURE OF THE INFORMATION SOUGHT.
TRO/Preliminary Injunction) on February 1, 2008. In the Court’s Resolution dated February 4,
2008, the parties were required to observe the status quo prevailing prior to the Order dated
January 30, 2008. D. TO UPHOLD THE CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE IN THE INSTANT CASE
WOULD SERIOUSLY IMPAIR THE RESPONDENTS’ PERFORMANCE OF THEIR
PRIMARY FUNCTION TO ENACT LAWS.
On March 25, 2008, the Court granted his petition for certiorari on two grounds: first, the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions were covered by executive privilege;
and second, respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the E. FINALLY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO INFORMATION,
contempt order. Anent the first ground, we considered the subject communications as falling AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLICIES ON PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND
under the presidential communications privilege because (a) they related to a quintessential TRANSPARENCY OUTWEIGH THE CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE.
and non-delegable power of the President, (b) they were received by a close advisor of the
President, and (c) respondent Committees failed to adequately show a compelling need that
IV
would justify the limitation of the privilege and the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority. As to the second ground, we found that respondent
Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order because (a) CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURT’S DECISION, RESPONDENTS DID
there was a valid claim of executive privilege, (b) their invitations to petitioner did not contain the NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED
questions relevant to the inquiry, (c) there was a cloud of doubt as to the regularity of the CONTEMPT ORDER, CONSIDERING THAT:
proceeding that led to their issuance of the contempt order, (d) they violated Section 21, Article
VI of the Constitution because their inquiry was not in accordance with the "duly published rules
of procedure," and (e) they issued the contempt order arbitrarily and precipitately. A. THERE IS NO LEGITIMATE CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE IN THE
INSTANT CASE.

On April 8, 2008, respondent Committees filed the present motion for reconsideration, anchored
on the following grounds: B. RESPONDENTS DID NOT VIOLATE THE SUPPOSED REQUIREMENTS LAID
DOWN IN SENATE V. ERMITA.

I
C. RESPONDENTS DULY ISSUED THE CONTEMPT ORDER IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THEIR INTERNAL RULES.
CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURT’S DECISION, THERE IS NO DOUBT
THAT THE ASSAILED ORDERS WERE ISSUED BY RESPONDENT COMMITTEES
PURSUANT TO THE EXERCISE OF THEIR LEGISLATIVE POWER, AND NOT D. RESPONDENTS DID NOT VIOLATE THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER ARTICLE
MERELY THEIR OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS. VI, SECTION 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRING THAT ITS RULES OF
PROCEDURE BE DULY PUBLISHED, AND WERE DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN
THE COURT CONSIDERED THE OSG’S INTERVENTION ON THIS ISSUE
II WITHOUT GIVING RESPONDENTS THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT.

CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURT’S DECISION, THERE CAN BE NO E. RESPONDENTS’ ISSUANCE OF THE CONTEMPT ORDER IS NOT ARBITRARY
PRESUMPTION THAT THE INFORMATION WITHHELD IN THE INSTANT CASE IS OR PRECIPITATE.
PRIVILEGED.
In his Comment, petitioner charges respondent Committees with exaggerating and distorting the
III Decision of this Court. He avers that there is nothing in it that prohibits respondent Committees
from investigating the NBN Project or asking him additional questions. According to petitioner,
CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURT’S DECISION, THERE IS NO the Court merely applied the rule on executive privilege to the facts of the case. He further
FACTUAL OR LEGAL BASIS TO HOLD THAT THE COMMUNICATIONS ELICITED submits the following contentions: first, the assailed Decision did not reverse the presumption
BY THE SUBJECT THREE (3) QUESTIONS ARE COVERED BY EXECUTIVE against executive secrecy laid down in Senate v. Ermita; second, respondent Committees failed
PRIVILEGE, CONSIDERING THAT: to overcome the presumption of executive privilege because it appears that they could legislate
even without the communications elicited by the three (3) questions, and they admitted that they
could dispense with petitioner’s testimony if certain NEDA documents would be given to
them; third, the requirement of specificity applies only to the privilege for State, military and Ermita11 that "inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure." Respondent
diplomatic secrets, not to the necessarily broad and all-encompassing presidential Committees then claim that the Court erred in relying on the doctrine in Nixon.
communications privilege; fourth, there is no right to pry into the President’s thought processes
or exploratory exchanges; fifth, petitioner is not covering up or hiding anything illegal; sixth, the
Respondent Committees argue as if this were the first time the presumption in favor of
Court has the power and duty to annul the Senate Rules; seventh, the Senate is not a
the presidential communications privilege is mentioned and adopted in our legal system.
continuing body, thus the failure of the present Senate to publish its Rules of Procedure
That is far from the truth. The Court, in the earlier case of Almonte v. Vasquez,12 affirmed that
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation (Rules) has a vitiating effect on them; eighth, the
the presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and
requirement for a witness to be furnished advance copy of questions comports with due process
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution. Even Senate v.
and the constitutional mandate that the rights of witnesses be respected; and ninth, neither
Ermita,13 the case relied upon by respondent Committees, reiterated this concept. There, the
petitioner nor respondent has the final say on the matter of executive privilege, only the Court.
Court enumerated the cases in which the claim of executive privilege was recognized, among
them Almonte v. Chavez, Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that: (1) there is no categorical (PCGG),14 and Chavez v. PEA.15 The Court articulated in these cases that "there are certain
pronouncement from the Court that the assailed Orders were issued by respondent Committees types of information which the government may withhold from the public, 16" that there is a
pursuant to their oversight function; hence, there is no reason for them "to make much" of the "governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military,
distinction between Sections 21 and 22, Article VI of the Constitution; (2) presidential diplomatic and other national security matters";17 and that "the right to information does not
communications enjoy a presumptive privilege against disclosure as earlier held in Almonte v. extend to matters recognized as ‘privileged information’ under the separation of powers,
Vasquez9 and Chavez v. Public Estates Authority (PEA)10; (3) the communications elicited by the by which the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions
three (3) questions are covered by executive privilege, because all the elements of the in closed-door Cabinet meetings."18
presidential communications privilege are present; (4) the subpoena ad testificandum issued by
respondent Committees to petitioner is fatally defective under existing law and jurisprudence; (5)
Respondent Committees’ observation that this Court’s Decision reversed the "presumption that
the failure of the present Senate to publish its Rules renders the same void; and (6) respondent
inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure" arises from a piecemeal
Committees arbitrarily issued the contempt order.
interpretation of the said Decision. The Court has repeatedly held that in order to arrive at the
true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be isolated and resorted
Incidentally, respondent Committees’ objection to the Resolution dated March 18, 2008 (granting to, but the decision must be considered in its entirety.19
the Office of the Solicitor General’s Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached
Memorandum) only after the promulgation of the Decision in this case is foreclosed by its
Note that the aforesaid presumption is made in the context of the circumstances obtaining
untimeliness.
in Senate v. Ermita, which declared void Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 464,
Series of 2005. The pertinent portion of the decision in the said case reads:
The core issues that arise from the foregoing respective contentions of the opposing parties are
as follows:
From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in
the United States and in this jurisprudence, a clear principle emerges. Executive
(1) whether or not there is a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized
privilege in our legal system; only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive
privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on
the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent
(2) whether or not there is factual or legal basis to hold that the communications
is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose
elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by executive privilege;
information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary
character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines
(3) whether or not respondent Committees have shown that the communications heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure. (Emphasis and
elicited by the three (3) questions are critical to the exercise of their functions; and underscoring supplied)

(4) whether or not respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in Obviously, the last sentence of the above-quoted paragraph in Senate v. Ermita refers to the
issuing the contempt order. "exemption" being claimed by the executive officials mentioned in Section 2(b) of E.O. No. 464,
solely by virtue of their positions in the Executive Branch. This means that when an executive
official, who is one of those mentioned in the said Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, claims to be exempt
We shall discuss these issues seriatim. from disclosure, there can be no presumption of authorization to invoke executive privilege
given by the President to said executive official, such that the presumption in this situation
I inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.

There Is a Recognized Presumptive Senate v. Ermita 20 expounds on the premise of the foregoing ruling in this wise:
Presidential Communications Privilege
Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office
Respondent Committees ardently argue that the Court’s declaration that presidential determines that a certain information is privileged, such determination is presumed to
communications are presumptively privileged reverses the "presumption" laid down in Senate v. bear the President’s authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official from
 appearing before Congress, subject only to the express pronouncement of the Nixon. It quoted the following portion of the Nixon decision which explains the basis for
President that it is allowing the appearance of such official. These provisions thus the privilege:
allow the President to authorize claims of privilege by mere silence.
"The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and
Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exceptional nature of the correspondences, like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for
privilege. Executive privilege, as already discussed, is recognized with respect to example, he has all the values to which we accord deference for the privacy of all
information the confidential nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the public
role and responsibilities of the executive branch, or in those instances where interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-
exemption from disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive making. A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in
responsibilities. The doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on the fact that the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many
certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations
the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The
to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted
degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular in the separation of powers under the Constitution x x x " (Emphasis and italics
case. supplied)

In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to Clearly, therefore, even Senate v. Ermita adverts to "a presumptive privilege for Presidential
limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize communication," which was recognized early on in Almonte v. Vasquez. To construe the
the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the passage in Senate v. Ermita adverted to in the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent
Executive Secretary must state that the authority is "By order of the President", which Committees, referring to the non-existence of a "presumptive authorization" of an executive
means that he personally consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary official, to mean that the "presumption" in favor of executive privilege "inclines heavily against
power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure" is to distort the ruling in the Senate v. Ermita and
other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such make the same engage in self-contradiction.
power. There is even less reason to uphold such authorization in the instant case
where the authorization is not explicit but by mere silence. Section 3, in relation to
Senate v. Ermita22 expounds on the constitutional underpinning of the relationship between the
Section 2(b), is further invalid on this score.
Executive Department and the Legislative Department to explain why there should be no implied
authorization or presumptive authorization to invoke executive privilege by the President’s
The constitutional infirmity found in the blanket authorization to invoke executive privilege subordinate officials, as follows:
granted by the President to executive officials in Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No. 464 does not obtain in this
case.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department
heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are
In this case, it was the President herself, through Executive Secretary Ermita, who invoked not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one
executive privilege on a specific matter involving an executive agreement between the executive official may be exempted from this power - the President on whom
Philippines and China, which was the subject of the three (3) questions propounded to petitioner executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the
Neri in the course of the Senate Committees’ investigation. Thus, the factual setting of this case power of impeachment. It is based on he being the highest official of the executive
markedly differs from that passed upon in Senate v. Ermita. branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of governments which is
sanctioned by a long-standing custom. (Underscoring supplied)
Moreover, contrary to the claim of respondents, the Decision in this present case hews closely to
the ruling in Senate v. Ermita,21 to wit: Thus, if what is involved is the presumptive privilege of presidential communications when
invoked by the President on a matter clearly within the domain of the Executive, the said
presumption dictates that the same be recognized and be given preference or priority, in the
Executive privilege
absence of proof of a compelling or critical need for disclosure by the one assailing such
presumption. Any construction to the contrary will render meaningless the presumption accorded
The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this jurisdiction. It has been used by settled jurisprudence in favor of executive privilege. In fact, Senate v. Ermita reiterates
even prior to the promulgation of the 1986 Constitution. Being of American origin, it is jurisprudence citing "the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential
best understood in light of how it has been defined and used in the legal literature of communications."23
the United States.
II
Schwart defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to withhold
information from the public, the courts, and the Congress. Similarly, Rozell
There Are Factual and Legal Bases to
defines it as "the right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to
Hold that the Communications Elicited by the
withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public." x x x In this
Three (3) Questions Are Covered by Executive Privilege
jurisdiction, the doctrine of executive privilege was recognized by this Court in Almonte
v. Vasquez. Almonte used the term in reference to the same privilege subject of
Respondent Committees claim that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are and then only to White House staff that has "operational proximity" to direct presidential
not covered by executive privilege because the elements of the presidential communications decision-making, thus:
privilege are not present.
We are aware that such an extension, unless carefully circumscribed to accomplish
A. The power to enter into an executive agreement is a "quintessential and non-delegable the purposes of the privilege, could pose a significant risk of expanding to a large
presidential power." swath of the executive branch a privilege that is bottomed on a recognition of the
unique role of the President. In order to limit this risk, the presidential communications
privilege should be construed as narrowly as is consistent with ensuring that the
First, respondent Committees contend that the power to secure a foreign loan does not relate to
confidentiality of the President’s decision-making process is adequately protected. Not
a "quintessential and non-delegable presidential power," because the Constitution does not vest
every person who plays a role in the development of presidential advice, no
it in the President alone, but also in the Monetary Board which is required to give its prior
matter how remote and removed from the President, can qualify for the
concurrence and to report to Congress.
privilege. In particular, the privilege should not extend to staff outside the White
House in executive branch agencies. Instead, the privilege should apply only to
This argument is unpersuasive. communications authored or solicited and received by those members of an
immediate White House advisor’s staff who have broad and significant responsibility
for investigation and formulating the advice to be given the President on the particular
The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity does not make such power matter to which the communications relate. Only communications at that level are
less executive. "Quintessential" is defined as the most perfect embodiment of something, the close enough to the President to be revelatory of his deliberations or to pose a
concentrated essence of substance.24 On the other hand, "non-delegable" means that a power risk to the candor of his advisers. See AAPS, 997 F.2d at 910 (it is "operational
or duty cannot be delegated to another or, even if delegated, the responsibility remains with the proximity" to the President that matters in determining whether "[t]he
obligor.25 The power to enter into an executive agreement is in essence an executive power. President’s confidentiality interests" is implicated). (Emphasis supplied)
This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.26 Now, the fact that the
President has to secure the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall submit to In the case at bar, the danger of expanding the privilege "to a large swath of the executive
Congress a complete report of its decision before contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, branch" (a fear apparently entertained by respondents) is absent because the official involved
does not diminish the executive nature of the power. here is a member of the Cabinet, thus, properly within the term "advisor" of the President; in fact,
her alter ego and a member of her official family. Nevertheless, in circumstances in which the
official involved is far too remote, this Court also mentioned in the Decision the organizational
The inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive and judicial test laid down in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of Justice.28 This goes to show that the
branches of government by no means prescribes absolute autonomy in the discharge by each operational proximity test used in the Decision is not considered conclusive in every case. In
branch of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people. There is determining which test to use, the main consideration is to limit the availability of executive
the corollary doctrine of checks and balances, which has been carefully calibrated by the privilege only to officials who stand proximate to the President, not only by reason of their
Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches. Thus, by analogy, the function, but also by reason of their positions in the Executive’s organizational structure. Thus,
fact that certain legislative acts require action from the President for their validity does not render respondent Committees’ fear that the scope of the privilege would be unnecessarily expanded
such acts less legislative in nature. A good example is the power to pass a law. Article VI,
with the use of the operational proximity test is unfounded.
Section 27 of the Constitution mandates that every bill passed by Congress shall, before it
becomes a law, be presented to the President who shall approve or veto the same. The fact that
the approval or vetoing of the bill is lodged with the President does not render the power to pass C. The President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely based on a generalized
law executive in nature. This is because the power to pass law is generally a quintessential and interest; and in balancing respondent Committees’ and the President’s clashing interests,
non-delegable power of the Legislature. In the same vein, the executive power to enter or not to the Court did not disregard the 1987 Constitutional provisions on government
enter into a contract to secure foreign loans does not become less executive in nature because transparency, accountability and disclosure of information.
of conditions laid down in the Constitution. The final decision in the exercise of the said
executive power is still lodged in the Office of the President.
Third, respondent Committees claim that the Court erred in upholding the President’s
invocation, through the Executive Secretary, of executive privilege because (a) between
B. The "doctrine of operational proximity" was laid down precisely to limit the scope of respondent Committees’ specific and demonstrated need and the President’s generalized
the presidential communications privilege but, in any case, it is not conclusive. interest in confidentiality, there is a need to strike the balance in favor of the former; and (b) in
the balancing of interest, the Court disregarded the provisions of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
on government transparency, accountability and disclosure of information, specifically, Article III,
Second, respondent Committees also seek reconsideration of the application of the "doctrine of Section 7;29 Article II, Sections 2430 and 28;31 Article XI, Section 1;32 Article XVI, Section
operational proximity" for the reason that "it maybe misconstrued to expand the scope of the 10;33 Article VII, Section 20;34 and Article XII, Sections 9,35 21,36 and 22.37
presidential communications privilege to communications between those who are ‘operationally
proximate’ to the President but who may have "no direct communications with her."
It must be stressed that the President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely founded on her
generalized interest in confidentiality. The Letter dated November 15, 2007 of Executive
It must be stressed that the doctrine of "operational proximity" was laid down in In re: Sealed Secretary Ermita specified presidential communications privilege in relation to diplomatic
Case27precisely to limit the scope of the presidential communications privilege. The U.S. court and economic relations with another sovereign nation as the bases for the claim. Thus, the
was aware of the dangers that a limitless extension of the privilege risks and, therefore, carefully Letter stated:
cabined its reach by explicitly confining it to White House staff, and not to staffs of the agencies,
 The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to
sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic information." The Resolution went on to state, thus:
relations with the People’s Republic of China. Given the confidential nature in
which this information were conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the
The nature of diplomacy requires centralization of authority and
Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing
expedition of decision which are inherent in executive action. Another
the privilege is designed to protect. (emphasis supplied)
essential characteristic of diplomacy is its confidential nature.Although
much has been said about "open" and "secret" diplomacy, with
Even in Senate v. Ermita, it was held that Congress must not require the Executive to state the disparagement of the latter, Secretaries of State Hughes and Stimson have
reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the clearly analyzed and justified the practice. In the words of Mr. Stimson:
privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect for a coordinate and co-equal
department.
"A complicated negotiation …cannot be carried through
without many, many private talks and discussion, man to
It is easy to discern the danger that goes with the disclosure of the President’s communication man; many tentative suggestions and proposals. Delegates
with her advisor. The NBN Project involves a foreign country as a party to the agreement. It was from other countries come and tell you in confidence of their
actually a product of the meeting of minds between officials of the Philippines and China. troubles at home and of their differences with other countries
Whatever the President says about the agreement - particularly while official negotiations are and with other delegates; they tell you of what they would do
ongoing - are matters which China will surely view with particular interest. There is danger in under certain circumstances and would not do under other
such kind of exposure. It could adversely affect our diplomatic as well as economic relations with circumstances… If these reports… should become public…
the People’s Republic of China. We reiterate the importance of secrecy in matters involving who would ever trust American Delegations in another
foreign negotiations as stated in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 38 thus: conference? (United States Department of State, Press
Releases, June 7, 1930, pp. 282-284)
The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must often
depend on secrecy, and even when brought to a conclusion, a full disclosure of all the xxxx
measures, demands, or eventual concessions which may have been proposed or
contemplated would be extremely impolitic, for this might have a pernicious influence
There is frequent criticism of the secrecy in which negotiation with
on future negotiations or produce immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger and
foreign powers on nearly all subjects is concerned. This, it is claimed,
mischief, in relation to other powers. The necessity of such caution and secrecy was
is incompatible with the substance of democracy. As expressed by one
one cogent reason for vesting the power of making treaties in the President, with the
writer, "It can be said that there is no more rigid system of silence anywhere
advice and consent of the Senate, the principle on which the body was formed
in the world." (E.J. Young, Looking Behind the Censorship, J. B. Lipincott
confining it to a small number of members. To admit, then, a right in the House of
Co., 1938) President Wilson in starting his efforts for the conclusion of the
Representatives to demand and to have as a matter of course all the papers
World War declared that we must have "open covenants, openly arrived at."
respecting a negotiation with a foreign power would be to establish a dangerous
He quickly abandoned his thought.
precedent.

No one who has studied the question believes that such a method of
US jurisprudence clearly guards against the dangers of allowing Congress access to all papers
publicity is possible. In the moment that negotiations are started,
relating to a negotiation with a foreign power. In this jurisdiction, the recent case of Akbayan
pressure groups attempt to "muscle in." An ill-timed speech by one of
Citizens Action Party, et al. v. Thomas G. Aquino, et al.39upheld the privileged character of
the parties or a frank declaration of the concession which are
diplomatic negotiations. In Akbayan, the Court stated:
exacted or offered on both sides would quickly lead to a widespread
propaganda to block the negotiations. After a treaty has been drafted
Privileged character of diplomatic negotiations and its terms are fully published, there is ample opportunity for
discussion before it is approved. (The New American Government and
Its Works, James T. Young, 4th Edition, p. 194) (Emphasis and
The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this
underscoring supplied)
jurisdiction. In discussing valid limitations on the right to information, the Court
in Chavez v. PCGG held that "information on inter-government exchanges prior to the
conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable Still in PMPF v. Manglapus, the Court adopted the doctrine in U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright
safeguards for the sake of national interest." Even earlier, the same privilege was Export Corp. that the President is the sole organ of the nation in its negotiations with
upheld in People’s Movement for Press Freedom (PMPF) v. Manglapus wherein the foreign countries,viz:
Court discussed the reasons for the privilege in more precise terms.
"x x x In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate
In PMPF v. Manglapus, the therein petitioners were seeking information from the and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen
President’s representatives on the state of the then on-going negotiations of the RP- as a representative of the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and
US Military Bases Agreement. The Court denied the petition, stressing that "secrecy consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation
of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. As
Marshall said in his great arguments of March 7, 1800, in the House of
 Representatives, "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its Article II, Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations." adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving
Annals, 6th Cong., col. 613… (Emphasis supplied; underscoring in the public interest. (Emphasis supplied)
original)
In Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,40 it was stated that there are no
Considering that the information sought through the three (3) questions subject of this Petition specific laws prescribing the exact limitations within which the right may be exercised or the
involves the President’s dealings with a foreign nation, with more reason, this Court is wary of correlative state duty may be obliged. Nonetheless, it enumerated the recognized restrictions to
approving the view that Congress may peremptorily inquire into not only official, documented such rights, among them: (1) national security matters, (2) trade secrets and banking
acts of the President but even her confidential and informal discussions with her close advisors transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential information. National security
on the pretext that said questions serve some vague legislative need. Regardless of who is in matters include state secrets regarding military and diplomatic matters, as well as information on
office, this Court can easily foresee unwanted consequences of subjecting a Chief Executive to inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements. It was
unrestricted congressional inquiries done with increased frequency and great publicity. No further held that even where there is no need to protect such state secrets, they must be
Executive can effectively discharge constitutional functions in the face of intense and unchecked "examined in strict confidence and given scrupulous protection."
legislative incursion into the core of the President’s decision-making process, which inevitably
would involve her conversations with a member of her Cabinet.
Incidentally, the right primarily involved here is the right of respondent Committees to obtain
information allegedly in aid of legislation, not the people’s right to public information. This is the
With respect to respondent Committees’ invocation of constitutional prescriptions regarding the reason why we stressed in the assailed Decision the distinction between these two rights. As
right of the people to information and public accountability and transparency, the Court finds laid down in Senate v. Ermita, "the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant
nothing in these arguments to support respondent Committees’ case. to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces
tecum issued by Congress" and "neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to
exact testimony from government officials." As pointed out, these rights belong to Congress, not
There is no debate as to the importance of the constitutional right of the people to information
to the individual citizen. It is worth mentioning at this juncture that the parties here are
and the constitutional policies on public accountability and transparency. These are the twin
respondent Committees and petitioner Neri and that there was no prior request for information
postulates vital to the effective functioning of a democratic government. The citizenry can
on the part of any individual citizen. This Court will not be swayed by attempts to blur the
become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power has been delegated if they
distinctions between the Legislature's right to information in a legitimate legislative inquiry and
are denied access to information. And the policies on public accountability and democratic
the public's right to information.
government would certainly be mere empty words if access to such information of public
concern is denied.
For clarity, it must be emphasized that the assailed Decision did not enjoin respondent
Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project. All that is expected from them is to
In the case at bar, this Court, in upholding executive privilege with respect to three (3) specific
respect matters that are covered by executive privilege.
questions, did not in any way curb the public’s right to information or diminish the importance of
public accountability and transparency.
III.
This Court did not rule that the Senate has no power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of
legislation. There is nothing in the assailed Decision that prohibits respondent Committees from Respondent Committees Failed to Show That
inquiring into the NBN Project. They could continue the investigation and even call petitioner the Communications Elicited by the Three Questions
Neri to testify again. He himself has repeatedly expressed his willingness to do so. Our Decision Are Critical to the Exercise of their Functions
merely excludes from the scope of respondents’ investigation the three (3) questions that elicit
answers covered by executive privilege and rules that petitioner cannot be compelled to appear
In their Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Committees devote an unusually lengthy
before respondents to answer the said questions. We have discussed the reasons why these
discussion on the purported legislative nature of their entire inquiry, as opposed to an oversight
answers are covered by executive privilege. That there is a recognized public interest in the
inquiry.
confidentiality of such information is a recognized principle in other democratic States. To put it
simply, the right to information is not an absolute right.
At the outset, it must be clarified that the Decision did not pass upon the nature of respondent
Committees’ inquiry into the NBN Project. To reiterate, this Court recognizes respondent
Indeed, the constitutional provisions cited by respondent Committees do not espouse an
Committees’ power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. However, this Court
absolute right to information. By their wording, the intention of the Framers to subject such right
cannot uphold the view that when a constitutionally guaranteed privilege or right is validly
to the regulation of the law is unmistakable. The highlighted portions of the following provisions
invoked by a witness in the course of a legislative investigation, the legislative purpose of
show the obvious limitations on the right to information, thus:
respondent Committees’ questions can be sufficiently supported by the expedient of mentioning
statutes and/or pending bills to which their inquiry as a whole may have relevance. The
Article III, Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern jurisprudential test laid down by this Court in past decisions on executive privilege is that the
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers presumption of privilege can only be overturned by a showing of compelling need for
pertaining to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, disclosure of the information covered by executive privilege.
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law.
In the Decision, the majority held that "there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that ...the allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in
would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere a criminal trial would cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and
by an appropriate investigating authority." In the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent gravely impair the basic function of the courts. A President's acknowledged
Committees argue that the information elicited by the three (3) questions are necessary in the need for confidentiality in the communications of his office is general in nature,
discharge of their legislative functions, among them, (a) to consider the three (3) pending Senate whereas the constitutional need for production of relevant evidence in a criminal
Bills, and (b) to curb graft and corruption. proceeding is specific and central to the fair adjudication of a particular criminal
case in the administration of justice. Without access to specific facts a criminal
prosecution may be totally frustrated. The President's broad interest in
We remain unpersuaded by respondents’ assertions.
confidentiality of communication will not be vitiated by disclosure of a limited
number of conversations preliminarily shown to have some bearing on the
In U.S. v. Nixon, the U.S. Court held that executive privilege is subject to balancing against other pending criminal cases.
interests and it is necessary to resolve the competing interests in a manner that would preserve
the essential functions of each branch. There, the Court weighed between presidential privilege
We conclude that when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials
and the legitimate claims of the judicial process. In giving more weight to the latter, the Court
sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in
ruled that the President's generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated,
confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process
specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.
of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. The generalized assertion of
privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a
The Nixon Court ruled that an absolute and unqualified privilege would stand in the way of the pending criminal trial. (emphasis supplied)
primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch to do justice in criminal prosecutions. The said
Court further ratiocinated, through its ruling extensively quoted in the Honorable Chief Justice
In the case at bar, we are not confronted with a court’s need for facts in order to adjudge liability
Puno's dissenting opinion, as follows:
in a criminal case but rather with the Senate’s need for information in relation to its legislative
functions. This leads us to consider once again just how critical is the subject information in the
"... this presumptive privilege must be considered in light of our historic commitment to discharge of respondent Committees’ functions. The burden to show this is on the respondent
the rule of law. This is nowhere more profoundly manifest than in our view that 'the Committees, since they seek to intrude into the sphere of competence of the President in order
twofold aim (of criminal justice) is that guild shall not escape or innocence suffer.' to gather information which, according to said respondents, would "aid" them in crafting
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S., at 88, 55 S.Ct., at 633. We have elected to employ legislation.
an adversary system of criminal justice in which the parties contest all issues before a
court of law. The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon41 expounded on the
both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would be
nature of a legislative inquiry in aid of legislation in this wise:
defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative
presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial system and public
confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the The sufficiency of the Committee's showing of need has come to depend, therefore,
framework of the rules of evidence. To ensure that justice is done, it is entirely on whether the subpoenaed materials are critical to the performance of its
imperative to the function of courts that compulsory process be available for the legislative functions. There is a clear difference between Congress' legislative tasks
production of evidence needed either by the prosecution or by the defense. and the responsibility of a grand jury, or any institution engaged in like
functions. While fact-finding by a legislative committee is undeniably a part of its
task, legislative judgments normally depend more on the predicted
xxx xxx xxx
consequences of proposed legislative actions and their political acceptability,
than on precise reconstruction of past events; Congress frequently legislates on
The right to the production of all evidence at a criminal trial similarly has constitutional the basis of conflicting information provided in its hearings. In contrast, the
dimensions. The Sixth Amendment explicitly confers upon every defendant in a responsibility of the grand jury turns entirely on its ability to determine whether there is
criminal trial the right 'to be confronted with the witness against him' and 'to have probable cause to believe that certain named individuals did or did not commit specific
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.' Moreover, the Fifth crimes. If, for example, as in Nixon v. Sirica, one of those crimes is perjury concerning
Amendment also guarantees that no person shall be deprived of liberty without the content of certain conversations, the grand jury's need for the most precise
due process of law. It is the manifest duty of the courts to vindicate those evidence, the exact text of oral statements recorded in their original form, is
guarantees, and to accomplish that it is essential that all relevant and admissible undeniable. We see no comparable need in the legislative process, at least not in
evidence be produced. the circumstances of this case. Indeed, whatever force there might once have been
in the Committee's argument that the subpoenaed materials are necessary to its
legislative judgments has been substantially undermined by subsequent events.
In this case we must weigh the importance of the general privilege of
(Emphasis supplied)
confidentiality of Presidential communications in performance of the
President's responsibilities against the inroads of such a privilege on the fair
administration of criminal justice. (emphasis supplied) Clearly, the need for hard facts in crafting legislation cannot be equated with the compelling or
demonstratively critical and specific need for facts which is so essential to the judicial power to
adjudicate actual controversies. Also, the bare standard of "pertinency" set in Arnault cannot be
xxx xxx xxx lightly applied to the instant case, which unlike Arnault involves a conflict between two (2)
separate, co-equal and coordinate Branches of the Government.
Whatever test we may apply, the starting point in resolving the conflicting claims between the ATTY. AGABIN
Executive and the Legislative Branches is the recognized existence of the presumptive
presidential communications privilege. This is conceded even in the Dissenting Opinion of the
I believe it is critical, Your Honor.
Honorable Chief Justice Puno, which states:

CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO

A hard look at Senate v. Ermita ought to yield the conclusion that it bestowed a
qualified presumption in favor of the Presidential communications privilege. As shown
in the previous discussion, U.S. v. Nixon, as well as the other related Nixon Why?
cases Sirica and Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities,
et al., v. Nixon in the D.C. Court of Appeals, as well as subsequent cases all
ATTY. AGABIN
recognize that there is a presumptive privilege in favor of Presidential
communications. The Almonte case quoted U.S. v. Nixon and recognized a
presumption in favor of confidentiality of Presidential communications. For instance, with respect to the proposed Bill of Senator Miriam Santiago,
she would like to indorse a Bill to include Executive Agreements had been
The presumption in favor of Presidential communications puts the burden on the respondent used as a device to the circumventing the Procurement Law.
Senate Committees to overturn the presumption by demonstrating their specific need for the
information to be elicited by the answers to the three (3) questions subject of this case, to enable CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
them to craft legislation. Here, there is simply a generalized assertion that the information is
pertinent to the exercise of the power to legislate and a broad and non-specific reference to
pending Senate bills. It is not clear what matters relating to these bills could not be determined But the question is just following it up.
without the said information sought by the three (3) questions. As correctly pointed out by the
Honorable Justice Dante O. Tinga in his Separate Concurring Opinion: ATTY. AGABIN

…If respondents are operating under the premise that the president and/or her I believe that may be the initial question, Your Honor, because if we look at
executive officials have committed wrongdoings that need to be corrected or this problem in its factual setting as counsel for petitioner has observed,
prevented from recurring by remedial legislation, the answer to those three there are intimations of a bribery scandal involving high government
questions will not necessarily bolster or inhibit respondents from proceeding officials.
with such legislation. They could easily presume the worst of the president in
enacting such legislation.
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO

For sure, a factual basis for situations covered by bills is not critically needed before legislatives
bodies can come up with relevant legislation unlike in the adjudication of cases by courts of law. Again, about the second question, were you dictated to prioritize this ZTE, is
Interestingly, during the Oral Argument before this Court, the counsel for respondent that critical to the lawmaking function of the Senate? Will it result to the
Committees impliedly admitted that the Senate could still come up with legislations even without failure of the Senate to cobble a Bill without this question?
petitioner answering the three (3) questions. In other words, the information being elicited is not
so critical after all. Thus: ATTY. AGABIN

CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO I think it is critical to lay the factual foundations for a proposed amendment
to the Procurement Law, Your Honor, because the petitioner had already
So can you tell the Court how critical are these questions to the lawmaking testified that he was offered a P200 Million bribe, so if he was offered a
function of the Senate. For instance, question Number 1 whether the P200 Million bribe it is possible that other government officials who had
President followed up the NBN project. According to the other counsel this something to do with the approval of the contract would be offered the same
question has already been asked, is that correct? amount of bribes.

ATTY. AGABIN CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO

Well, the question has been asked but it was not answered, Your Honor. Again, that is speculative.

CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO ATTY. AGABIN

Yes. But my question is how critical is this to the lawmaking function of the That is why they want to continue with the investigation, Your Honor.
Senate?
 CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO There, the Court further ratiocinated that "the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee
is not really ‘in aid of legislation’ because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction
of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives
How about the third question, whether the President said to go ahead and
of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of R.A. No. 3019, the Anti-
approve the project after being told about the alleged bribe. How critical is
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a matter that appears more within the province of the
that to the lawmaking function of the Senate? And the question is may they
courts rather than of the Legislature."47 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
craft a Bill a remedial law without forcing petitioner Neri to answer this
question?
The general thrust and the tenor of the three (3) questions is to trace the alleged bribery to the
Office of the President.48While it may be a worthy endeavor to investigate the potential
ATTY. AGABIN
culpability of high government officials, including the President, in a given government
transaction, it is simply not a task for the Senate to perform. The role of the Legislature is to
Well, they can craft it, Your Honor, based on mere speculation. And sound make laws, not to determine anyone’s guilt of a crime or wrongdoing. Our Constitution has not
legislation requires that a proposed Bill should have some basis in fact. 42 bestowed upon the Legislature the latter role. Just as the Judiciary cannot legislate, neither can
the Legislature adjudicate or prosecute.
The failure of the counsel for respondent Committees to pinpoint the specific need for the
information sought or how the withholding of the information sought will hinder the Respondent Committees claim that they are conducting an inquiry in aid of legislation and a
accomplishment of their legislative purpose is very evident in the above oral exchanges. Due to "search for truth," which in respondent Committees’ view appears to be equated with the search
the failure of the respondent Committees to successfully discharge this burden, the presumption for persons responsible for "anomalies" in government contracts.
in favor of confidentiality of presidential communication stands. The implication of the said
presumption, like any other, is to dispense with the burden of proof as to whether the disclosure
No matter how noble the intentions of respondent Committees are, they cannot assume the
will significantly impair the President’s performance of her function. Needless to state this is
power reposed upon our prosecutorial bodies and courts. The determination of who is/are liable
assumed, by virtue of the presumption.
for a crime or illegal activity, the investigation of the role played by each official, the
determination of who should be haled to court for prosecution and the task of coming up with
Anent respondent Committees’ bewailing that they would have to "speculate" regarding the conclusions and finding of facts regarding anomalies, especially the determination of criminal
questions covered by the privilege, this does not evince a compelling need for the information guilt, are not functions of the Senate. Congress is neither a law enforcement nor a trial agency.
sought. Indeed, Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon43 held Moreover, it bears stressing that no inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and in
that while fact-finding by a legislative committee is undeniably a part of its task, legislative furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress, i.e. legislation. Investigations conducted solely
judgments normally depend more on the predicted consequences of proposed legislative actions to gather incriminatory evidence and "punish" those investigated are indefensible. There is no
and their political acceptability than on a precise reconstruction of past events. It added that, Congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure. 49 In this regard, the pronouncement
normally, Congress legislates on the basis of conflicting information provided in its hearings. We in Barenblatt v. United States50 is instructive, thus:
cannot subscribe to the respondent Committees’ self-defeating proposition that without the
answers to the three (3) questions objected to as privileged, the distinguished members of the
Broad as it is, the power is not, however, without limitations. Since Congress
respondent Committees cannot intelligently craft legislation.
may only investigate into the areas in which it may potentially legislate or appropriate,
it cannot inquire into matters which are within the exclusive province of one of the
Anent the function to curb graft and corruption, it must be stressed that respondent Committees’ other branches of the government. Lacking the judicial power given to the Judiciary, it
need for information in the exercise of this function is not as compelling as in instances when the cannot inquire into matters that are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary. Neither
purpose of the inquiry is legislative in nature. This is because curbing graft and corruption is can it supplant the Executive in what exclusively belongs to the Executive. (Emphasis
merely an oversight function of Congress.44 And if this is the primary objective of respondent supplied.)
Committees in asking the three (3) questions covered by privilege, it may even contradict their
claim that their purpose is legislative in nature and not oversight. In any event, whether or not
At this juncture, it is important to stress that complaints relating to the NBN Project have already
investigating graft and corruption is a legislative or oversight function of Congress, respondent
been filed against President Arroyo and other personalities before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Committees’ investigation cannot transgress bounds set by the Constitution.
Under our Constitution, it is the Ombudsman who has the duty "to investigate any act or
omission of any public official, employee, office or agency when such act or omission
In Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,45 this Court ruled: appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient."51 The Office of the Ombudsman is the
body properly equipped by the Constitution and our laws to preliminarily determine whether or
not the allegations of anomaly are true and who are liable therefor. The same holds true for our
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must
courts upon which the Constitution reposes the duty to determine criminal guilt with finality.
perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, "the political Indeed, the rules of procedure in the Office of the Ombudsman and the courts are well-
question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival defined and ensure that the constitutionally guaranteed rights of all persons, parties and
claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this witnesses alike, are protected and safeguarded.
Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although
said provision by no means does away with the applicability of the principle in
appropriate cases.46 (Emphasis supplied) Should respondent Committees uncover information related to a possible crime in the course of
their investigation, they have the constitutional duty to refer the matter to the appropriate agency
or branch of government. Thus, the Legislature’s need for information in an investigation of graft
and corruption cannot be deemed compelling enough to pierce the confidentiality of information need for the inquiry" along with the "usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions
validly covered by executive privilege. As discussed above, the Legislature can still legislate on relative to and in furtherance thereof" is not provided for by the Constitution and is merely an
graft and corruption even without the information covered by the three (3) questions subject of obiter dictum.
the petition.
On the contrary, the Court sees the rationale and necessity of compliance with these
Corollarily, respondent Committees justify their rejection of petitioner’s claim of executive requirements.
privilege on the ground that there is no privilege when the information sought might involve a
crime or illegal activity, despite the absence of an administrative or judicial determination to
An unconstrained congressional investigative power, like an unchecked Executive, generates its
that effect. Significantly, however, in Nixon v. Sirica,52 the showing required to overcome the
own abuses. Consequently, claims that the investigative power of Congress has been abused
presumption favoring confidentiality turned, not on the nature of the presidential conduct that
(or has the potential for abuse) have been raised many times.53 Constant exposure to
the subpoenaed material might reveal, but, instead, on the nature and appropriateness of
congressional subpoena takes its toll on the ability of the Executive to function effectively. The
the function in the performance of which the material was sought, and the degree to
requirements set forth in Senate v. Ermita are modest mechanisms that would not unduly limit
which the material was necessary to its fulfillment.
Congress’ power. The legislative inquiry must be confined to permissible areas and thus,
prevent the "roving commissions" referred to in the U.S. case, Kilbourn v. Thompson.54 Likewise,
Respondent Committees assert that Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign witnesses have their constitutional right to due process. They should be adequately informed
Activities v. Nixon does not apply to the case at bar because, unlike in the said case, no what matters are to be covered by the inquiry. It will also allow them to prepare the pertinent
impeachment proceeding has been initiated at present. The Court is not persuaded. While it is information and documents. To our mind, these requirements concede too little political costs or
true that no impeachment proceeding has been initiated, however, complaints relating to the burdens on the part of Congress when viewed vis-à-vis the immensity of its power of inquiry.
NBN Project have already been filed against President Arroyo and other personalities before the The logic of these requirements is well articulated in the study conducted by William P.
Office of the Ombudsman. As the Court has said earlier, the prosecutorial and judicial arms of Marshall,55 to wit:
government are the bodies equipped and mandated by the Constitution and our laws to
determine whether or not the allegations of anomaly in the NBN Project are true and, if so, who
A second concern that might be addressed is that the current system allows
should be prosecuted and penalized for criminal conduct.
committees to continually investigate the Executive without constraint. One process
solution addressing this concern is to require each investigation be tied to a
Legislative inquiries, unlike court proceedings, are not subject to the exacting standards of clearly stated purpose. At present, the charters of some congressional committees
evidence essential to arrive at accurate factual findings to which to apply the law. Hence, are so broad that virtually any matter involving the Executive can be construed to fall
Section 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides within their province. Accordingly, investigations can proceed without articulation of
that "technical rules of evidence applicable to judicial proceedings which do not affect specific need or purpose. A requirement for a more precise charge in order to begin
substantive rights need not be observed by the Committee." Court rules which prohibit leading, an inquiry should immediately work to limit the initial scope of the investigation and
hypothetical, or repetitive questions or questions calling for a hearsay answer, to name a few, do should also serve to contain the investigation once it is instituted. Additionally, to the
not apply to a legislative inquiry. Every person, from the highest public official to the most extent clear statements of rules cause legislatures to pause and seriously
ordinary citizen, has the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty in proper proceedings consider the constitutional implications of proposed courses of action in other
by a competent court or body. areas, they would serve that goal in the context of congressional investigations
as well.
IV
The key to this reform is in its details. A system that allows a standing
committee to simply articulate its reasons to investigate pro forma does no
Respondent Committees Committed Grave
more than imposes minimal drafting burdens. Rather, the system must be
Abuse of Discretion in Issuing the Contempt Order
designed in a manner that imposes actual burdens on the committee to
articulate its need for investigation and allows for meaningful debate about the
Respondent Committees insist that they did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the merits of proceeding with the investigation.(Emphasis supplied)
contempt order because (1) there is no legitimate claim of executive privilege; (2) they did not
violate the requirements laid down in Senate v. Ermita; (3) they issued the contempt order in
Clearly, petitioner’s request to be furnished an advance copy of questions is a reasonable
accordance with their internal Rules; (4) they did not violate the requirement under Article VI,
demand that should have been granted by respondent Committees.
Section 21 of the Constitution requiring the publication of their Rules; and (5) their issuance of
the contempt order is not arbitrary or precipitate.
Unfortunately, the Subpoena Ad Testificandum dated November 13, 2007 made no specific
reference to any pending Senate bill. It did not also inform petitioner of the questions to be
We reaffirm our earlier ruling.
asked. As it were, the subpoena merely commanded him to "testify on what he knows relative to
the subject matter under inquiry."
The legitimacy of the claim of executive privilege having been fully discussed in the preceding
pages, we see no reason to discuss it once again.
Anent the third argument, respondent Committees contend that their Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation (the "Rules") are beyond the reach of this Court. While it
Respondent Committees’ second argument rests on the view that the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, is true that this Court must refrain from reviewing the internal processes of Congress, as a co-
requiring invitations or subpoenas to contain the "possible needed statute which prompted the equal branch of government, however, when a constitutional requirement exists, the Court has
the duty to look into Congress’ compliance therewith. We cannot turn a blind eye to possible procedure. The rights of person appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall
violations of the Constitution simply out of courtesy. In this regard, the pronouncement in Arroyo be respected. (Emphasis supplied)
v. De Venecia56 is enlightening, thus:
All the limitations embodied in the foregoing provision form part of the witness’ settled
"Cases both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts expectation. If the limitations are not observed, the witness’ settled expectation is shattered.
the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress Here, how could there be a majority vote when the members in attendance are not enough to
failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a arrive at such majority? Petitioner has the right to expect that he can be cited in contempt only
violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. through a majority vote in a proceeding in which the matter has been fully deliberated upon.
There is a greater measure of protection for the witness when the concerns and objections of the
members are fully articulated in such proceeding. We do not believe that respondent
United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., the rule was stated thus: ‘The Constitution
Committees have the discretion to set aside their rules anytime they wish. This is especially true
empowers each House to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules
here where what is involved is the contempt power. It must be stressed that the Rules are not
ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should
promulgated for their benefit. More than anybody else, it is the witness who has the highest
be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding
stake in the proper observance of the Rules.
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained."

Having touched the subject of the Rules, we now proceed to respondent Committees’ fourth
In the present case, the Court’s exercise of its power of judicial review is warranted because
argument. Respondent Committees argue that the Senate does not have to publish its Rules
there appears to be a clear abuse of the power of contempt on the part of respondent
because the same was published in 1995 and in 2006. Further, they claim that the Senate is a
Committees. Section 18 of the Rules provides that:
continuing body; thus, it is not required to republish the Rules, unless the same is repealed or
amended.
"The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its members, may punish for contempt
any witness before it who disobey any order of the Committee or refuses to be sworn
On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court sees fit to issue a clarification.
or to testify or to answer proper questions by the Committee or any of its
Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is "continuing", as it is not
members." (Emphasis supplied)
dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in the composition of its members.
However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately
In the assailed Decision, we said that there is a cloud of doubt as to the validity of the contempt and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itself
order because during the deliberation of the three (3) respondent Committees, only seven (7) confirms this when it states:
Senators were present. This number could hardly fulfill the majority requirement needed by
respondent Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations which has a
RULE XLIV
membership of seventeen (17) Senators and respondent Committee on National Defense and
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
Security which has a membership of eighteen (18) Senators. With respect to
respondent Committee on Trade and Commerce which has a membership of nine (9) Senators,
only three (3) members were present.57 These facts prompted us to quote in the Decision the SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the next
exchanges between Senators Alan Peter Cayetano and Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. whereby the session in the same status.
former raised the issue of lack of the required majority to deliberate and vote on the contempt
order.
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one
(1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if present for the first
When asked about such voting during the March 4, 2008 hearing before this Court, Senator time. (emphasis supplied)
Francis Pangilinan stated that any defect in the committee voting had been cured because two-
thirds of the Senators effectively signed for the Senate in plenary session. 58
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e. unpassed bills and
even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are
Obviously the deliberation of the respondent Committees that led to the issuance of the considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the
contempt order is flawed. Instead of being submitted to a full debate by all the members of the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status,
respondent Committees, the contempt order was prepared and thereafter presented to the other but as if presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is readily apparent
members for signing. As a result, the contempt order which was issued on January 30, 2008 considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically have a different
was not a faithful representation of the proceedings that took place on said date. Records clearly composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts and deliberations
show that not all of those who signed the contempt order were present during the January 30, of the Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body even with respect to
2008 deliberation when the matter was taken up. the conduct of its business, then pending matters will not be deemed terminated with the
expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course, continue into the next Congress with
the same status.
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states that:

This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of the opposite nature of the
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct of its business is reflected in its Rules. The Rules of the Senate (i.e. the Senate’s main
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
rules of procedure) states:
 RULE LI As we have stressed before, petitioner is not an unwilling witness, and contrary to the assertion
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES of respondent Committees, petitioner did not assume that they no longer had any other
questions for him. He repeatedly manifested his willingness to attend subsequent hearings and
respond to new matters. His only request was that he be furnished a copy of the new questions
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators elected in the preceding
in advance to enable him to adequately prepare as a resource person. He did not attend the
elections shall begin their term of office, the President may endorse the Rules to the
November 20, 2007 hearing because Executive Secretary Ermita requested respondent
appropriate committee for amendment or revision.
Committees to dispense with his testimony on the ground of executive privilege. Note that
petitioner is an executive official under the direct control and supervision of the Chief
The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should be presented at Executive. Why punish petitioner for contempt when he was merely directed by his superior?
least one day before its consideration, and the vote of the majority of the Senators Besides, save for the three (3) questions, he was very cooperative during the September 26,
present in the session shall be required for its approval. (emphasis supplied) 2007 hearing.

RULE LII On the part of respondent Committees, this Court observes their haste and impatience. Instead
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT of ruling on Executive Secretary Ermita’s claim of executive privilege, they curtly dismissed it as
unsatisfactory and ordered the arrest of petitioner. They could have informed petitioner of their
ruling and given him time to decide whether to accede or file a motion for reconsideration. After
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and shall remain
all, he is not just an ordinary witness; he is a high- ranking official in a co-equal branch of
in force until they are amended or repealed. (emphasis supplied) government. He is an alter ego of the President. The same haste and impatience marked the
issuance of the contempt order, despite the absence of the majority of the members of the
Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new composition of the respondent Committees, and their subsequent disregard of petitioner’s motion for
Senate after an election and the possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules at the start reconsideration alleging the pendency of his petition for certiorari before this Court.
of each session in which the newly elected Senators shall begin their term.
On a concluding note, we are not unmindful of the fact that the Executive and the Legislature are
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules are intended to be valid political branches of government. In a free and democratic society, the interests of these
from the date of their adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such language is branches inevitably clash, but each must treat the other with official courtesy and respect. This
conspicuously absent from the Rules. The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect Court wholeheartedly concurs with the proposition that it is imperative for the continued health of
seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation." 59 The latter does our democratic institutions that we preserve the constitutionally mandated checks and balances
not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rules until they are amended or among the different branches of government.
repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be
presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the next Congress. The In the present case, it is respondent Committees’ contention that their determination on the
Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative inquiries which validity of executive privilege should be binding on the Executive and the Courts. It is their
come within the rule on unfinished business. assertion that their internal procedures and deliberations cannot be inquired into by this Court
supposedly in accordance with the principle of respect between co-equal branches of
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted government. Interestingly, it is a courtesy that they appear to be unwilling to extend to the
in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon Executive (on the matter of executive privilege) or this Court (on the matter of judicial review). It
the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make moves this Court to wonder: In respondent Committees’ paradigm of checks and balances, what
the published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or are the checks to the Legislature’s all-encompassing, awesome power of investigation? It is a
until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice. power, like any other, that is susceptible to grave abuse.

If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective While this Court finds laudable the respondent Committees’ well-intentioned efforts to ferret out
even in the next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its corruption, even in the highest echelons of government, such lofty intentions do not validate or
main rules regarding effectivity. accord to Congress powers denied to it by the Constitution and granted instead to the other
branches of government.
Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed that not all orders issued or
proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are null and void. Only those that result in There is no question that any story of government malfeasance deserves an inquiry into its
violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that the veracity. As respondent Committees contend, this is founded on the constitutional command of
rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, transparency and public accountability. The recent clamor for a "search for truth" by the general
Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid public, the religious community and the academe is an indication of a concerned citizenry, a
and effective. nation that demands an accounting of an entrusted power. However, the best venue for this
noble undertaking is not in the political branches of government. The customary partisanship
and the absence of generally accepted rules on evidence are too great an obstacle in arriving at
Respondent Committees’ last argument is that their issuance of the contempt order is not the truth or achieving justice that meets the test of the constitutional guarantee of due process of
precipitate or arbitrary. Taking into account the totality of circumstances, we find no merit in their law. We believe the people deserve a more exacting "search for truth" than the process here in
argument. question, if that is its objective.
WHEREFORE, respondent Committees’ Motion for Reconsideration dated April 8, 2008 is
hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 181508 October 2, 2013 subsequently, the subject land was divided equally between petitioners Oscar and Maxima
resulting in the issuance of Tax Declaration No. 96-10022-0265310 in the name of Oscar, with an
area of 120sq m and the other half in the name of Maxima covered by Tax Declaration No. 96-
OSCAR CONSTANTINO, MAXIMA CONSTANTINO and CASIMIRA MATURINGAN,
10022-02652.11 The share of Maxima was eventually conveyed to her sister, petitioner Casimira
Petitioners,
in whose name a new Tax Declaration No. 96-10022-0265512 was issued.
vs.
HEIRS OF PEDRO CONSTANTINO, JR., represented by ASUNCION LAQUINDANUM,
Respondents. Thus, respondents sought to annul the "Pagmamana sa Labas ngHukuman" as well as the Tax
Declarations that were issued on the basis of such document.
DECISION
The petitioners, on the other hand, averred in their Answer With Counterclaim 13 that Pedro Sr.,
upon his death, left several parcels of land, namely: 1) a lot with an area of 240 sq m covered by
PEREZ, J.:
Tax Declaration No.20814; 2) a lot with an area of 192 sq m also situated at Sta.
Monica,Hagonoy, Bulacan, previously covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534; and 3)an
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court agricultural land with an area of Four (4) hectares, more or less. The petitioners claimed that the
assailing the 31 May 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81329, which document "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman" pertaining to the 240 sq m lot was perfectly
reversed the 27 October 2003 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18 of Malolos valid and legal, as it was a product of mutual and voluntary agreement between and among the
City, Bulacan, in a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman," descendants of the deceased Pedro Sr.
Tax Declaration Nos. 96-10022-02653 & 1002655, With Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction & Damages docketed as Civil Case No. 630-M-99.
Further, petitioners alleged that the respondents have no cause of action against them
considering that the respondents’ lawful share over the estate of Pedro Sr., had already been
The facts transferred to them as evidenced by the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver14 dated 5
December 1968,executed by Angelo Constantino, Maria Constantino (mother of respondent
Asuncion), Arcadio Constantino and Mercedes Constantino, all heirs of Pedro Jr. In the said
This involves a controversy over a parcel of land claimed to be part of an estate which needed to deed, respondents adjudicated unto themselves to the exclusion of other heirs, the parcel of
be proportionally subdivided among heirs. land with an area of 192 sq m by misrepresenting that they were "the only legitimate heirs of
Pedro Sr. Thus, petitioners claimed that in the manner similar to the assailed "Pagmamana sa
Pedro Constantino, Sr., (Pedro Sr.) ancestors of the petitioners and respondents, owned several Labas ng Hukuman," they asserted their rights and ownership over the subject 240 sq m lot
parcels of land, one of which is an unregistered parcel of land declared for taxation purposes without damage to the respondents.
under Tax Declaration 208143 consisting of 240 square meters situated at Sta. Monica,
Hagonoy, Bulacan. Pedro, Sr., upon his death, was survived by his six (6) children, namely: 1) In essence, petitioners position was that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver which
PEDRO CONSTANTINO, JR. (Pedro Jr.), the grandfather of the respondents; 2) ANTONIA led to the issuance of Tax Declaration No.9534 was acquiesced in by the other heirs of Pedro
CONSTANTINO, who later died without issue; 3) CLARA CONSTANTINO, who also later died Sr., including the petitioners, on the understanding that the respondent heirs of Pedro Jr. would
without issue; 4) BRUNOCONSTANTINO, who was survived by his 6 children including no longer share and participate in the settlement and partition of the remaining lot covered by
petitioner Casimira Constantino-Maturingan; 5) EDUARDO CONSTANTINO, who is survived by the "
his daughter Maura; and 6) SANTIAGO CONSTANTINO, who was survived by his five (5)
children which includes petitioner Oscar Constantino.4
Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman."
On 17 June 1999, respondents Asuncion Laquindanum (Asuncion)and Josefina Cailipan
(Josefina), great grandchildren of Pedro Sr., in representation of Pedro, Jr. filed a complaint5 On 15 August 2000, pre-trial conference15 was conducted wherein the parties entered into
stipulations and admissions as well as identification of the issues to be litigated. Thereupon, trial
on the merits ensued.
against petitioners Oscar Constantino, Maxima Constantino and Casimira Maturingan,
grandchildren of Pedro Sr., for the nullification of a document denominated as "Pagmamana sa
Labas ng Hukuman" dated 10 August 1992,6 Tax Declaration Nos. 96-10022 (02653)7 and 96- On 27 October 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision16 in favor of the respondents finding that:
10022 (02655)8 and reinstatement of Tax Declaration No. 208149 in the name of Pedro Sr.
As a result of execution of "Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver" dated December 5, 1968 (Exh.
In the said complaint, respondents alleged that sometime in October 1998, petitioners asserted "2") executed by the heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr., a son of Pedro Constantino, Sr. and the
their claim of ownership over the whole parcel of land (240 sq m) owned by the late Pedro Sr., to subsequent execution of another deed denominated as "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman"
the exclusion of respondents who are occupying a portion thereof. Upon verification, dated August 10, 1992 (Exh. "E") executed by the heirs of Santiago and Bruno Constantino, also
respondents learned that a Tax Declaration No. 02010-2170-33235 in the name of petitioner other sons of Pedro Constantino, Sr., to the exclusion of the other heirs, namely, those of
Oscar Constantino and his cousin Maxima Constantino was unlawfully issued, which in effect ANTONIA, CLARA, and EDUARDO CONSTANTINO, both plaintiffs and defendants acted
canceled Tax Declaration No. 20814 in the name of their ancestor Pedro Sr. The issuance of the equally at fault. They are in pari delicto, whereby the law leaves them as they are and denies
new tax declaration was allegedly due to the execution of a simulated, fabricated and fictitious recovery by either one of them. (See:Yu Bun Guan v. Ong, 367 SCRA 559). Parties who are
document denominated as "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman," wherein the petitioners equally guilty cannot complain against each other. (Sarmiento v. Salud, 45 SCRA 213.)
misrepresented themselves as the sole and only heirs of Pedro Sr. It was further alleged that
Supplementing the law on the matter, that is, the provision of Article 19 of the New Civil Code The Issue
whereby every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith, is the legal maxim that
The petitioners now question the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the failure of the
"he who comes to court to demand equity must come with clean hands." (LBC Express, Inc. v.
CA to appreciate the existence of misrepresentation in both documents, thereby ignoring the
Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 602).
propriety of the application of the in pari delicto doctrine. Likewise assailed is the erroneous
disregard by the CA of stipulations and admissions during the pre-trial conference on which the
Although, plaintiffs-heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr., including Asuncion Laquindanum and application of the doctrine of in pari delicto was based.
Josefina Cailipan, are not parties or signatories to the "Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver"
dated December 5, 1968, they are successors-in-interest of Pedro Constantino, Jr. They
Our Ruling
areconsidered "privies" to said deed, and are bound by said extrajudicial settlement. (See:
Cabresos v. Tiro, 166 SCRA 400). In other words, they are "PRIVIES IN ESTATE". (Correa v.
Pascual, 99 Phil. 696, 703). Latin for "in equal fault," in pari delicto connotes that two or more people are at fault or are guilty
of a crime. Neither courts of law nor equity will interpose to grant relief to the parties, when an
illegal agreement has been made, and both parties stand in pari delicto.21 Under the pari delicto
Consequently, plaintiffs are now estopped from claiming otherwise. (See: PNB v. CA, 94 SCRA
doctrine, the parties to a controversy are equally culpable or guilty, they shall have no action
357). They are estopped to share in the real property subject matter of this case. In fine, they are
against each other, and it shall leave the parties where it finds them. This doctrine finds
not entitled to the reliefs prayed for.1âwphi1 (Communication Materials & Design, Inc. v. CA, 260
expression in the maxims "ex dolo malo nonoritur actio" and "in pari delicto potior est conditio
SCRA 673).
defendentis."22

With respect to alleged damages claimed by plaintiffs against defendants in their Complaint and
When circumstances are presented for the application of such doctrine, courts will take a hands
counterclaim for damages by defendants against plaintiffs in their Answer, both claims are
off stance in interpreting the contract for or against any of the parties. This is illustrated in the
hereby dismissed for lack of valid factual and legal foundations.
case of Packaging Products Corporation v. NLRC,23 where this Court pronounced that:

Disposition
This Court cannot give positive relief to either petitioner or respondent because we are asked to
interpret and enforce an illegal and immoral arrangement. (See Articles 1409, 1411, and 1412 of
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises and disquisition, the deed denominated as the Civil Code). Kickback arrangements in the purchase of raw materials, equipment, supplies
"Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman" of August10, 1992 and Tax Declaration No. 96-10022- and other needs of offices, manufacturers, and industrialists are so widespread and pervasive
02653 in the name of Oscar Constantino and Tax Declaration No. 96-10022-02655 in the name that nobody seems to know how to eliminate them. x x x.
of Casimira C. Maturingan (from Maxima Constantino to Casimira C. Maturingan) stand.
Plaintiffs’ Complaint for nullification thereof with damages is hereby DISMISSED. 17
Both the petitioners and the private respondent are in pari delicto. Neither one may expect
positive relief from courts of justice in the interpretation of their contract. The courts will leave
Not convinced, the respondents appealed the afore quoted decision to the Court of Appeals them as they were at the time the case was filed. 24
(CA) raising, among others, the erroneous application by the trial court of the doctrine of "in pari
delicto" in declaring the validity of the document "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman."
As a doctrine in civil law, the rule on pari delicto is principally governed by Articles 1411 and
1412 of the Civil Code, which state that:
In its 31 May 2007 Decision,18 the CA ruled in favor of the respondents heirs of Pedro, Jr.,
declaring that the "Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver" dated 5 December 1968 they executed
Article 1411. When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract,
covering the 192 sq mlot actually belongs to Pedro Jr., hence, not part of the estate of Pedro Sr.
and the act constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no
The CA rationated in this wise:
action against each other, and both shall be prosecuted.

The 192 square meters lot which was adjudicated in the "Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver"
xxx xxx
dated 5 December 1968 among the heirs of Pedro Jr. namely Angelo, Maria, Arcadio and
Mercedes is a property belonging to Pedro Jr. although there is a typographical error in that the
name of Pedro Jr. was inadvertently typed only as Pedro Constantino. It is clear from the Article 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a
reading of the document that a typographical error was committed because the four (4) children criminal offense, the following rules shall be observed:
of PedroJr. by Felipa dela Cruz were specifically identified. Further, during the presentation of
evidence of the plaintiffs-appellants, it was rebutted that Pedro Sr. had six (6) legitimate children
namely: Pedro Jr., Antonia, Clara, Santiago, Bruno and Eduardo19 and Pedro Jr. had four (4).20 xxx xxx

1. When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has
Thus, the CA went on to state that the respondents, heirs of Pedro Jr., did not adjudicate the 192
sq m lot unto themselves to the exclusion of all the other heirs of Pedro Sr. Rather, the given by virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of the other’s undertaking;
adjudication in the document entitled "Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver dated 5 December
1968 pertains to a different property and is valid absent any evidence to the contrary. Hence, it is xxx xxx.
erroneous for the trial court to declare the parties in pari delicto.
The petition at bench does not speak of an illegal cause of contract constituting a criminal ART. 1409. The following contracts are in existent and void from the beginning:
offense under Article 1411. Neither can it be said that Article 1412 finds application although
such provision which is part of Title II, Book IV of the Civil Code speaks of contracts in general,
(1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law; morals, good customs, public order
as well as contracts which are null and void ab initio pursuant to Article 1409 of the Civil Code –
or public policy;
such as the subject contracts, which as claimed, are violative of the mandatory provision of the
law on legitimes.
xxx xxx xxx
We do not dispute that herein parties, through the Deeds they separately executed deprived
each other of rightful shares in the two lots subject of the separate contracts – that is, if the two Corollarily, given the character and nature of the deeds as being void and in existent, it has, as a
(2) parcels of land subject matter thereof, form part of the estate of the late Pedro Sr. consequence, of no force and effect from the beginning, as if it had never been entered into and
which cannot be validated either by time or ratification.29
It is asserted by the petitioners that their execution in 1992 of the contract denominated as
"Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman" which excluded other heirs of Pedro Sr., was with an That said, we cannot give credence to the contention of respondents that no fault can be
underlying agreement with the other heirs including Maria Constantino, daughter of Pedro Jr. attributed to them or that they are free from the effects of violation of any laws arising from the
and grandmother of respondents.25 The agreement was for the other heirs to recognize the 192 supposed unlawful agreement entered into between Maria Laquindanum, their predecessor-in-
square meters lot subject matter of the "Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver" executed in 1968 interest, and the other heirs, including petitioners herein, based on the fact that they are not
as the share of the heirs of Pedro Sr. in the estate of Pedro Sr., Petitioners respected such signatories to said agreement, thus, the lack of any binding effect to them. Respondents argued
agreement, as in fact, Maria Laquindanum and that of her heirs, herein respondents, were not and set forth as an issue during the trial that they were not signatories to any of the contract or
disturbed in their possession or ownership over the said parcel of land; thus, the heirs of Pedro privies to such an arrangement. It is not disputed, however, that respondents are successors-in-
Jr. were said to have acquiesced26 to the "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman" and the interest of Maria Laquindanum, one of the signatories in the Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver
underlying agreement and therefore they have no recourse or reason to question it taking cue who was also allegedly in agreement with the petitioners.
from the doctrine of in paridelicto. This was the basis of the trial court’s findings that respondents
are now estopped from claiming otherwise.27
On this note, We agree with the trial court that respondents are "privies" to Maria Laquindanum.
By the term "privies" is meant those between whom an action is deemed binding although they
We find that the trial court erroneously applied the doctrine. are not literally parties to the said action.30 This Court, in Correa v. Pascual,31 had occasion to
explain that "privity in estate denotes the privity between assignor and assignee, donor and
donee, grantor and grantee, joint tenant for life and remainderman or reversioner and their
This is not to say, however, that the CA was correct in upholding the validity of the contract
respective assignees, vendor by deed of warranty and a remote vendee or assignee. A privy in
denominated as "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman." The CA decision being, likewise, based
estate is one, it has been said, who derives his title to the property in question by purchase; one
on pari delicto, is also incorrect.
who takes by conveyance." In fine, respondents, as successors-in-interest, derive their right
from and are in the same position as their predecessor in whose shoes they now stand. As such
Finding the inapplicability of the in pari delicto doctrine, We find occasion to stress that Article successors, respondents’ situation is analogous to that of a transferee pendente lite illustrated in
1412 of the Civil Code that breathes life to the doctrine speaks of the rights and obligations of Santiago Land Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,32 reiterating Fetalino v. Sanz33
the parties to the contract with an illegal cause or object which does not constitute a criminal where this Court held:
offense. It applies to contracts which are void for illegality of subject matter and not to contracts
rendered void for being simulated,28 or those in which the parties do not really intend to be
As such, he stands exactly in the shoes of his predecessor in interest, the original defendant,
bound thereby. Specifically, in pari delicto situations involve the parties in one contract who are
and is bound by the proceedings had in the case before the property was transferred to him. He
both at fault, such that neither can recover nor have any action against each other.
is a proper, but not an indispensable, party as he would, in any event, have been bound by the
judgment against his predecessor.34
In this case, there are two Deeds of extrajudicial assignments unto the signatories of the
portions of the estate of an ancestor common to them and another set of signatories likewise
Thus, any condition attached to the property or any agreement precipitating the execution of the
assigning unto themselves portions of the same estate. The separate Deeds came into being out
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver which was binding upon Maria Laquindanum is
of an identical intention of the signatories in both to exclude their co-heirs of their rightful share in
applicable to respondents who merely succeeded Maria.
the entire estate of Pedro Sr. It was, in reality, an assignment of specific portions of the estate of
Pedro Sr., without resorting to a lawful partition of estate as both sets of heirs intended to
exclude the other heirs. This notwithstanding, it must however be shown that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with
Waiver, referred to a property owned by Pedro Sr. There is such basis from the facts of this
case.
Clearly, the principle of in pari delicto cannot be applied. The inapplicability is dictated not only
by the fact that two deeds, not one contract, are involved, but because of the more important
reason that such an application would result in the validation of both deeds instead of their The records show that apart from respondent Asuncion Laquindanums’s statement that the
nullification as necessitated by their illegality. It must be emphasized that the underlying parcel of land subject matter of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver is not part of the
agreement resulting in the execution of the deeds is nothing but a void agreement. Article 1409 estate of Pedro Sr., their common ancestor, no other evidence was offered to support it. The CA
of the Civil Code provides that: in giving credence to the respondents’ claim, merely relied on the alleged typographical error in
the Deed. The basis for the CA’s conclusion was the inclusion of the wife of Pedro Jr. and that of
their children, which the CA considered as proof that the property was owned by Pedro Jr. and
not part of the estate of Pedro Sr. As pointed out by the petitioners, the mention of the names of that may arise in the course of the proceedings but which may not have been taken up in the
the children of Pedro Jr. in the Extrajudicial Settlement is not proof that the subject of the deed is pre-trial can still be taken up.
the property of Pedro Jr. Meant to exclude all the other heirs of Pedro Sr., only the children of
Pedro Jr. appeared in the Extrajudicial Settlement as heirs.
Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court reads:

Weak as the reasoning is, the CA actually contradicted the admissions made no less by the
Section 7. Record of pre-trial. – The proceedings in the pre-trial shall be recorded.1awp++i1
respondents during the pre-trial conference where they stipulated that the land covered by Tax
Upon the termination thereof, the court shall issue an order which shall recite in detail the
Declaration No. 9534 consisting of 192 sq. m belongs to Pedro Sr.35
matters taken up in the conference, the action taken thereon, the amendments allowed to the
pleadings, and the agreements or admissions made by the parties as to any of the matters
A portion of the admission and stipulations made by both parties during the pre-trial is hereunder considered. Should the action proceed to trial, the order shall, explicitly define and limit the
quoted, thus: issues to be tried. The contents of the order shall control the subsequent course of the action,
unless modified before trial to prevent injustice.
Respondents’ admissions:
In addition, Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, provides that:
"1. That the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534 previously owned by Pedro Constantino,
Sr. was transferred to Maria Constantino under Tax Declaration No. 9535; (highlighting ours) An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same
case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was
made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
1. The existence of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver per Doc. No.319, Page No. 44, Book
No. 11, Series of 1968 by Notary Public Romerico Flores, Jr."
As contemplated in the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court, the general rule
regarding conclusiveness of judicial admission upon the party making it and the dispensation of
Clearly, the above stipulation is an admission against respondents’ interest of the fact of
proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the admission was made through
ownership by Pedro Sr. of the 192 sq m lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534, which was
palpable mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no such admission was in fact made. The latter
transferred to respondents’ mother, the daughter of Pedro Jr. Such that, in one of the issues
exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he made such an admission.42
submitted to be resolved by the trial court, this was included: "Whether or not the "Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver" is enforceable against the plaintiffs, thus curing the legal
infirmities, if any, of the "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman"36 – an issue earlier mentioned. However, respondents failed to refute the earlier admission/stipulation before and during the
trial. While denying ownership by Pedro Sr. of the 192 sq m lot, respondent Asuncion
Laquindanum, when placed on the stand, offered a vague explanation as to how such parcel of
Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the admissions. Pre-trial admission
land was acquired by Pedro Jr. A portion of her testimony43 is hereto reproduced as follows:
in civil cases is one of the instances of judicial admissions explicitly provided for under Section 7,
Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that the contents of the pre-trial order shall
control the subsequent course of the action, thereby, defining and limiting the issues to be tried. "ATTY. DOMINGO:
In Bayas, et. al. v. Sandiganbayan, et. al.,37 this Court emphasized that:
Q: Do you know if as part of the estate of the late Pedro Constantino, Sr. is another parcel of
Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the parties and their counsels, they land also situated at Sta. Maria, Hagonoy, Bulacan with an area of 192 square meters?
become binding on the parties who made them. They become judicial admissions of the fact or
facts stipulated.38 Even if placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may not be allowed to
A: It is not owned by Pedro Constantino, Sr., sir. It is our property owned by Pedro Constantino,
rescind them unilaterally, it must assume the consequences of the disadvantage. 39 (Highlighting
Jr. that was inherited by my mother Maria Constantino.
ours)

Q: And do you know how Pedro Constantino, Jr. acquired that parcel of land, the one that you
Moreover, in Alfelor v. Halasan,40 this Court declared that:
mentioned a while ago?

A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge the fact as judicial admissions are a
A: Kinagisnan ko na po yong lupang yon pagkabata pa na yon e amin." (Highlighting ours)
waiver of proof; production of evidence is dispensed with. A judicial admission also removes an
admitted fact from the field of controversy. Consequently, an admission made in the pleadings
cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to such party, The above assertion of denial is simply a self-serving declarationunsupported by evidence. This
and all proofs to the contrary or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is renders conclusive the stipulations made during the pre-trial conference. Consequently,
interposed by the party or not. The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a respondents are bound by the infirmities of the contract on which they based their right over the
pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position property subject matter thereof. Considering that the infirmities in the two deeds relate to
contrary of or inconsistent with what was pleaded.41 (Citations omitted) exclusion of heirs, a circumvention of an heir’s right to his or her legitime, it is apt to reiterate our
ruling in Neri v. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy,44 disposing that:
We are aware that the last paragraph of Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court serves as a
caveat for the rule of conclusiveness of judicial admissions – for, in the interest of justice, issues
Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale
in favour of spouses Uy, all the heirs of Annunciation should have participated. Considering that
Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were
not properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them and
consequently, a total nullity. (Highlighting ours)

Further highlighting the effect of excluding the heirs in the settlement of estate, the case of
Segura v. Segura,45 elucidated thus:

It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and
void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only partition. The partition in the
present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal
shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule "no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding
upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was
a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that
their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from its execution x x x.

In light of the foregoing, while both parties acted in violation of the law on legitimes, the pari
delicto rule, expressed in the maxims "Ex dolo malo non oritur action" and "in pari delicto potior
est condition defendentis," which refuses remedy to either party to an illegal agreement and
leaves them where they are, does not apply in this case. (Underline supplied)46 As held in De
Leon v. CA:47

In the ultimate analysis, therefore, both acted in violation of laws. However, the pari delicto rule
expressed in the maxims "Ex dolo malo non oritur action" and "In pari delicto potior est condition
defendentis," which refuses remedy to either party to an illegal agreement and leaves them
where they are does not apply in this case.

xxx xxx xxx

Since the Letter-Agreement was repudiated before the purpose has been accomplished and to
adhere to the pari delicto rule in this case is to put a premium to the circumvention or the laws,
positive relief should be granted to Macaria. Justice would be served by allowing her to be
placed in the position in which she was before the transaction was entered into.

Accordingly, in order not to put a premium to the circumvention or the laws as contemplated by
the parties in the instant case, we must declare both contracts as void. Indeed, any
circumvention of the law cannot be48 countenanced.

WHEREFORE, the 31 May 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81329 is
hereby REVERSED. The Pagmamana sa Lahas ng Hukuman and Extrajudicial Settlement with
Waiver are hereby declared void without prejudice to the partition of the estate of Pedro
Constantino Sr. with the full participation of all the latter's heirs.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 146111 February 23, 2004 amount of ₱15,000.00, for the crime that my son committed."11 Police officers came and brought
Amalia, Remelyn and two barangay officials (kagawads) to the police precinct of Hagonoy for
investigation. Amalia’s statement was taken.12
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee
vs.
ROLENDO GAUDIA @ "LENDOY" or "DODO", appellant. On 25 March 1997, Amalia brought Remelyn to the Hagonoy Health Center in Davao del Sur.
Dr. Patricio Hernane, the municipal health officer,13 conducted a genital examination of Remelyn,
and made the following findings:
DECISION

GENITAL EXAMINATION:
PUNO, J.:

Absence of Pubic Hair (Tanner Stage I). No contusions are noted on the external genitalia. Dried
There can be no greater violation of a person’s right to feel safe and secure than the crime of
blood are (sic) noted on the labia minora. Fresh hymenal lacerations are noted at 12, 3, 6, 10
rape. When one commits such a horrible act on another, he degrades not only that person’s
o’clock (sic) are noted with fresh vaginal laceration noted at the posterior commissure but not
body; more importantly, he defiles that person’s mind. When the victim is a little child, the act
extending to the perineum. No lacerations were noted at the anal opening.
and the perpetrator himself assume a bestiality beyond the comprehension of normal human
beings. Yet, the law must apply equally upon saints and sinners alike, even to the most
salacious ruffian. Speculum examination is not done because even exposure of the labia minora make the child
cry. (sic)
Before us is the Decision1 dated 10 July 2000 of Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Digos,
Davao del Sur, finding appellant Rolendo Gaudia2 guilty of the crime of rape, meting upon him CONCLUSION: Physical virginity lost.14
the penalty of death, and ordering him to pay to private complainant Remelyn Loyola the
amounts of fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral damages, thirty thousand pesos
The doctor opined that the lacerations could have been caused by the insertion of a foreign
(₱30,000.00) as exemplary damages, and costs of suit.
object, such as the penis of a man.15

The Information filed against the accused-appellant reads as follows:

On 26 March 1997, Amalia executed her affidavit complaint.16 Amalia stated therein that
Remelyn had told her "Buang Lendoy iya kong lugos."17 (Meaning "crazy lendoy he forced me"
That on or about March 24, 1997 at about 6:30 o’clock in the evening, in the Municipality of in the Visayan dialect.) Amalia confirmed in her testimony that two weeks after the incident,
Hagonoy, Province of Davao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Remelyn told her, "Ma, Lendoy is crazy, she (sic) brought me to the ipil-ipil trees."18
Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with Remelyn Loyola, a minor, against
The prosecution also presented Tulon Mik, Remelyn’s neighbor and a barangay kagawad in
her will to her damage and prejudice.
their area. Mik testified that on 24 March 1997, at about 4:00 p.m., he and his wife were on their
way home after registering at the COMELEC office. They were in a hurry as their child was
The prosecution presented Remelyn’s mother, Amalia Loyola, as its primary witness. Amalia running a fever. Mik saw appellant carrying a small girl in his arms.19 He identified the little girl as
testified that on 24 March 1997, she left her two children Remelyn (3 1/2 years old)3and Remelyn Loyola, daughter of Amalia Loyola. Appellant and Remelyn were on their way toward
Kimberly (1 year old)4 at their house in Clib, Hagonoy, Davao del Sur to gather pigs’ food at the ipil-ipil trees.20
Bulatukan. At the time, her husband was working in Tulunan, South Cotabato. At about 4:00 in
the afternoon, Amalia returned home and could not find Remelyn. She went to fetch water and
The next morning, 25 March 1997, at about 7:00 a.m., a neighbor informed Mik that Remelyn
proceeded to a neighbor to ask about the whereabouts of Remelyn. Nobody could provide her
had been raped. He proceeded to the house of the quack doctor where Amalia brought Remelyn
any information. On her way home, she shouted and called out Remelyn’s name. At about 6:00
for examination. Amalia confirmed to Mik that Remelyn had been raped. Mik told Amalia that
p.m., Amalia heard Remelyn calling out to her, "Ma, I am here," from a grove of ipil-ipil trees.5
appellant committed the crime. Mik then informed Barangay Official Rodrigo Malud21 and the
Amalia rushed toward the place, but was met by Remelyn at the mango trees, some thirty (30)
other tanods of the incident. They were instructed to locate the appellant. They passed to the
meters from their house.6 She found Remelyn crying, naked, nagbakaang (walking with her legs
police the information that appellant was in Barangay Mahayahay. The policemen came and
spread apart) and with fresh and dried blood on her body. Ipil-ipil leaves clung to her forehead.
took appellant for investigation. 22
Blood was oozing from her private organ. Amalia brought Remelyn home and washed her. Upon
closer inspection, she found a whitish mucus-like substance coming from Remelyn’s private
organ.7 The appellant, ROLENDO GAUDIA, interposed the defense of alibi. He averred that on 24
March 1997, at about 4:00 p.m., he went to the Barangay Center to register at the COMELEC for
the National Elections. With him was Totong Loyola, the brother-in-law of Amalia Loyola. They
The following day, 2 March 1997, Amalia brought Remelyn to the house of a certain Tiya Coring,
finished at 5:00 p.m., left and repaired to the house of Catalina Cabano, appellant’s aunt, to ask
a quack doctor, for treatment. Among the people present in the premises were the relatives and
for vinegar for their kinilaw (a dish composed of raw fish steeped in vinegar). They found Daylen
parents of the appellant.8 The quack doctor found both dried blood and fresh blood oozing in
Cabano, the small grandchild of Catalina, alone at her house. Daylen was crying, hence, they
Remelyn’s vagina, and told Amalia, "Hoy! Amalia, your daughter was being (sic) raped."9 At
brought her with them as they proceeded to the place where Catalina was collecting tuba
about 10:00 a.m., Tulon Mik, a neighbor, came and informed Amalia that he had seen the
(fermented coconut wine). It was appellant who carried Daylen. 23 They reached Catalina’s place
appellant pass by her house and take Remelyn.10 At this point, the parents of appellant told
after 5:00 p.m. Thereafter, they went to the house of appellant. Dodo Malon and appellant’s
Amalia, "Mal, let us talk about this matter, we will just settle this, we are willing to pay the
parents were in the house. At around 9:00 p.m., Totong and Dodo Malon left, after partaking of Under Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court, conviction may be based on
the kinilaw. Appellant stayed home. The following morning (25 March 1997), appellant and Dodo circumstantial evidence provided three requisites concur: (a) there is more than one
Malon went to the river to fish. At about 12:00 noon, appellant repaired to the house of his aunt, circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
Victoria Gayod, in Mahayahay to drink tuba. He was located by the police and investigated.24 He combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
claimed that it was Daylen and not the victim Remelyn whom he was carrying. doubt. The ruling case law is that for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a
conviction, all circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis
that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
As corroborative witness, appellant presented Alex "Totong" Loyola. Totong testified that on 24
innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.31
March 1997, at about 4:00 p.m., they registered as voters in the barangay. After registering, they
went home to appellant’s house, but again left to get vinegar from his aunt Catalina Cabano, for
their kinilaw. In Catalina’s house, they found her drunk husband, her 10-year old daughter, and The first circumstantial evidence against the appellant is the testimony of prosecution witness
her 3-year old grandchild Daylen.25 Catalina’s daughter directed them to the place where she Tulon Mik that at 4:00 p.m. on 24 March 1997, he saw him carrying Remelyn toward the
was gathering tuba. As Daylen was crying, appellant carried her on their way to Catalina. It was direction of the ipil-ipil grove, some 130 meters from her house.32 As a neighbor and relative of
then about 4:00 p.m. After Catalina finished gathering tuba, the four of them – appellant, Totong, Remelyn’s stepfather, Mik had sufficient familiarity with the child Remelyn. The possibility that he
Catalina and Daylen, left together and repaired to Catalina’s house for the vinegar. Appellant could have been mistaken in identifying the victim is nil.
and Totong returned to appellant’s house where they spent the night.26 Totong woke up at 6:00
a.m. the following day, and left appellant’s house. Totong came to know of appellant’s arrest the
The second circumstantial evidence against the appellant is Amalia’s testimony that Remelyn
following day.27
emerged naked from the same ipil-ipil grove, with ipil-ipil leaves clinging to her forehead.
Remelyn was crying and walking with her legs spread far apart. Remelyn’s private organ was
Catalina Cabano also corroborated appellant’s story. She relates that on 24 March 1997, she bleeding and excreting a white mucus-like substance.33
was gathering tuba, at a place around 2 kilometers from her house. She left Maritess, her
youngest child and Daylen, her grandchild, at her house.28 At about 5:30 p.m., appellant and
The third circumstantial evidence against appellant is Remelyn’s statement to her mother that it
Totong arrived. Appellant was carrying Daylen. They waited for Catalina to finish gathering tuba
was appellant who had brought her to the ipil-ipil grove34 and forced her to do something against
until 6:00 p.m. Appellant and Totong went to the former’s house, had a drinking spree, and then
her will.35
parted ways at about 6:30 p.m. That night, according to Catalina, she talked to Tulon Mik at the
premises near the house. Mik was looking for Remelyn. At that time, appellant was already at
the house of Catalina’s younger sister, which is located across the river, about 4 kilometers There is no question that Remelyn was violated. After examining Remelyn, Dr. Patricio Hernane,
away.29 the Municipal Health Officer of Hagonoy, found her to have a broken hymen, as well as fresh
vaginal lacerations.
After trial, the trial court found that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict
appellant for the crime of rape with the qualifying circumstance that the victim was below seven From these, the culpability of the appellant can be inferred with moral certainty. All the
years of age. Appellant was sentenced to death and ordered to indemnify the victim the sums of aforementioned circumstances have been indubitably proven, both by the testimonial and
fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral damages, thirty thousand pesos (₱30,000.00) as documentary evidence presented by the prosecution, and by the inability of the appellant to
exemplary damages, and to pay the costs of suit. discredit their veracity.

In his Brief30 to the Court, appellant assigned the following errors in the judgment of the trial The attempt of appellant to discredit the circumstantial evidence against him is futile. Appellant
court: contends, first, that Tulon Mik’s testimony is weak, on the ground that Mik is a relative of the
husband of Amalia.36 He also questions the credibility of Mik because of his failure to confront
appellant when he saw him carrying Remelyn. Neither did Mik inform Amalia about what he saw
I.
when Amalia was looking for Remelyn. Appellant insists that it was Daylen whom he carried and
not Remelyn. Second, he stresses the fact that Remelyn did not make any categorical statement
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, ROLANDO (sic) that he sexually molested her. Third, he maintains that the accusation of flight against him is
GAUDIA DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE false. Fourth, he avers that the offer of compromise by his parents as tendered to Amalia Loyola
DOUBT. should not be taken against him,37 while the offer of compromise he allegedly made to Amalia’s
husband, as relayed by Amalia in her testimony, should be excluded as evidence for being
hearsay.38 Finally, he submits that inconsistencies in the testimony of Alex Loyola and Cabano
II.
should not be counted against him on the ground that any finding of guilt must rest on the
strength of the prosecution’s evidence.
EVEN GRANTING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY OF THE
CRIME CHARGED, THE TRIAL COURT STILL ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME
We reject appellant’s arguments.
PENALTY OF DEATH DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO STATE WITH
CERTAINTY THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF AGE IN THE INFORMATION.
First, appellant’s attempt to discredit the testimony of Mik cannot succeed. It is true that Mik is a
relative by affinity of Amalia Loyola. It is hoary jurisprudence, however, that mere relationship to
We convict appellant for simple rape, and not for qualified rape.
one of the parties, without a showing of any other improper motive, is not sufficient basis to
impair the credibility of the witness.39 In the case at bar, appellant cannot impute any ill motive acta alteri nocere non debet,49 the actions of his parents cannot prejudice the appellant, since he
for Mik to testify adversely against him. was not a party to the said conversation, nor was it shown that he was privy to the offer of
compromise made by them to the mother of the victim. They cannot be considered as evidence
against appellant but we reiterate that these errors are not enough to reverse the conviction of
Appellant questions the failure of Mik to challenge him why he was carrying Remelyn. Also, he
the appellant.
assails Mik for failing to inform Amalia Loyola of such a sight. Mik had an explanation for the
inadvertence. He said his own child was down with a fever, and he and his wife were hurrying
home.40 For this same reason, he revealed the fact that he saw appellant carrying Remelyn Appellant’s defense hardly impresses. It is interesting to note that appellant and his witnesses
toward the ipil-ipil grove only when he learned of Remelyn’s fate. But thereafter, he lost no time claim that it was at around 5:00 p.m. when appellant carried the child Daylen toward her
in reporting the matter to the barangay chairman.41 As a barangay kagawad, he also assisted in grandmother Catalina at the place where she was gathering tuba. Mik testified that it was around
the pursuit and arrest of appellant at Barangay Mahayahay.42 These subsequent actions 4:00 p.m. when he saw appellant carrying Remelyn toward the ipil-ipil grove. Given the 130-
strengthen Mik’s credibility. meter distance between the ipil-ipil grove and the houses of appellant and of Amalia Loyola,
appellant could have easily taken Remelyn from her house, raped her at the ipil-ipil grove, and
left her there, all in a matter of a few minutes. Sometime past 4:00 p.m., he could then have
The trial court accorded more credence to Mik’s narration of the events over the testimonies of
returned to his house, and together with Alex Loyola, proceeded to the COMELEC office to
Cabano and Loyola. It is a cornerstone of our jurisprudence that the trial judge's evaluation of
register, and did all the subsequent acts he claims to have done.
the testimony of a witness and its factual findings are accorded not only the highest respect, but
also finality, unless some weighty circumstance has been ignored or misunderstood which could
alter the result of the judgment rendered. In the case at bar, there is no irregularity in the The Court also notes the inconsistencies in the testimonies of Catalina and Loyola. The
assessment of evidence by the lower court. It granted utmost credibility to Mik’s testimony. discrepancies in the witnesses’ narration as to the time of arrival of appellant at the place where
Given the direct opportunity to observe the witness on the stand, the trial judge was in a vantage Catalina was gathering tuba, his time of arrival at his own house, and the time when Loyola and
position to assess his demeanor and determine if he was telling the truth or not. 43 The trial court appellant actually parted ways, are not mere trivial details which could be forgotten by witnesses
found Mik’s testimony more worthy of credence over those of Catalina and Loyola. We have no because of the passage of time. To make matters worse, the appellant’s testimony was, at
reason to reverse its findings. times, contradicted by his own witnesses. Particularly telling was the conflict between appellant’s
statement that Totong had already left his house on the night of 24 March 1997 and Totong and
Catalina’s own averments that Totong had stayed the night at appellant’s house. These
Next, appellant tried to capitalize on the fact that Remelyn never made any statement that he
contradictory testimonies only made more incredulous appellant’s tale.
sexually molested her. This is a specious argument. Remelyn had told her mother, "Crazy
Lendoy forced me."44 Remelyn was 3 1/2 years old at the time. At such an infantile age, she
could not be expected to have a comprehension of the concept of rape. Studies show that We now review the penalty of death imposed upon appellant. In the case at bar, the Information
children, particularly very young children, make the "perfect victims". They naturally follow the states that appellant, "by means of force and intimidation…willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
authority of adults as the socialization process teaches children that adults are to be respected. (had) carnal knowledge with Remelyn Loyola, a minor, against her will to her damage and
The child’s age and developmental level will govern how much she comprehends about the prejudice."50 (emphasis ours) The Information did not allege that Remelyn was below seven
abuse and therefore how much it affects her. If the child is too young to understand what has years old when she was violated. Appellant was therefore charged with simple rape, under
happened to her, the effects will be minimized because she has no comprehension of the Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (the Death
consequences. Certainly, children have more problems in providing accounts of events because Penalty Law). Upon its passage, R.A. No. 7659 introduced seven new attendant circumstances,
they do not understand everything they experience. They do not have enough life experiences which when present, will transform the crime to qualified rape, punishable by death. We again
from which to draw upon in making sense of what they see, hear, taste, smell and feel. stress that these new attendant circumstances must be properly pleaded in the information to
Moreover, they have a limited vocabulary.45 The fact that Remelyn called appellant "Buang" or justify the imposition of the death penalty. The facts stated in the body of the information
crazy shows that he did something which she knew was not right or proper. By saying "iya kong determine the crime for which the accused stands charged and for which he must be tried. 51 The
lugos," Remelyn clearly conveyed that he forced her to do something bad. With her limited main purpose of requiring all the elements of a crime to be set out in the information is to enable
comprehension, the child could not have a perfect way of relating that she had been sexually the accused to suitably prepare his defense. It would be a denial of the right of the accused to be
abused. Finally, it must also be considered that there is no actual counterpart for the word "rape" informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged
in Visayan parlance. with simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form punishable with death, although the
attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and resulting in capital punishment was not
alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned.52
Appellant’s charge that the trial court erred when it ruled that he fled arrest, even if correct, is not
pivotal to his guilt. There are enough pieces of circumstantial evidence to convict him. Neither
will it affect the penalty or the award of damages rendered against him. We now review the damages awarded by the trial court. Time and again, we have ruled that
when there is a finding that rape had been committed, the award of civil indemnity ex delicto is
mandatory.53 If the death penalty has been imposed, the indemnity should be ₱75,000.00;
Similarly, appellant’s charge that the offers of compromise allegedly made by the parents of the
otherwise the victim is entitled to ₱50,000.00 for each count of rape. 54 Thus, the appellant is
appellant to Amalia, and by the appellant himself to Amalia’s husband should not have been
ordered to pay the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity to Remelyn Loyola.55
taken against him by the trial court, even if sustained, will not exculpate him. To be sure, the
offer of compromise allegedly made by appellant to Amalia Loyola’s husband is hearsay
evidence, and of no probative value. It was only Amalia who testified as to the alleged offer, 46 We affirm the award of moral damages. This is automatically awarded in rape cases without
and she was not a party to the conversation which allegedly transpired at the Hagonoy Municipal need of further proof other than the commission of the crime, as it is assumed that a rape victim
Jail. A witness can only testify on facts which are based on his personal knowledge or has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award.56
perception.47 The offer of compromise allegedly made by the appellant’s parents to Amalia may
have been the subject of testimony48 of Amalia. However, following the principle of res inter alios
We also find the award of exemplary damages made by the lower court in favor of complainant
as proper because complainant has been correctly granted moral damages and the offense
against her was committed with the aggravating circumstance57 of age. However, the amount
awarded must be reduced to ₱25,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence. 58

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, of Digos,
Davao del Sur in Criminal Case No. 213(97) is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant is found guilty of
the crime of simple rape, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is
ordered to pay to complainant Remelyn Loyola the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex
delicto, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against
the appellant.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 164481 September 20, 2005 Two informations for malversation of public funds were then filed against Doldol in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of San Carlos City. The first Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. SCC-
2760, reads:
CONRADO C. DOLDOL, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent. That on or about June 8, 1995, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Urbiztondo,
Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, CONRADO C.
DOLDOL, a public officer, being then the Municipal Treasurer, Municipality of Urbiztondo,
DECISION
Pangasinan, and as such accountable for public funds received and/or entrusted to him by
reason of his office, acting in relation of his office and taking
CALLEJO, SR., J.: advantage of the same, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, use and benefit
the amount of ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-FOUR THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
TWENTY-ONE PESOS and 54/100 (₱1,134,421.54) from such public funds received by him by
Conformably to the Memorandum1 dated April 6, 1995 of the Provincial Auditor, a team of State reason of his office, to the damage of the government in the amount aforestated.
Auditors led by State Auditor Emilie S. Ritua, with State Auditors Lydia Naoe and Beverly T.
Cruz as members, conducted an audit of the cash and cash account of Conrado C. Doldol, the
Municipal Treasurer of Urbiztondo, Pangasinan. The audit covered the General Fund, Special CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Education Fund and Trust Fund in his custody for the period of November 30, 1994 to June 8,
1995. Doldol and the Municipal
The second Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. SCC-2763, reads:
Accountant were present during the audit. The State Auditors discovered that Doldol had a
shortage of ₱801,933.26. They also noted that on June 5, 1995, he made cash withdrawals from
the municipality’s deposit account with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) amounting to That sometime between June 8, 1995 and July 19, 1995 or sometime prior or subsequent
₱360,000.59. The withdrawal, purportedly for salaries, wages, allowances and mid-year thereto, in Urbiztondo, Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
bonuses of municipal officers and employees, had not been recorded in the General Fund Court, CONRADO C. DOLDOL, a public officer, being then the Municipal Treasurer, Municipality
Cashbook as of June 8, 1995. The State Auditors also noted that Doldol made adjustments in of Urbiztondo, Pangasinan, and as such accountable for public funds received and/or entrusted
the said cashbook on June 8, 1995, increasing his ₱801,933.26 shortage to ₱1,134,421.54. In a to him by reason of his office, acting in relation of his office and taking advantage of the same,
Letter2 dated July 5, 1995, the State Auditors demanded the immediate refund of the said did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take, misappropriate and convert to his
amount, and for Doldol to submit within 72 hours a written explanation on the said shortage. personal use and benefit the amount of ONE HUNDRED FORTY-NINE THOUSAND NINE
Doldol failed to respond and was, thereafter, relieved of his duties. On July 20, 1995, he was HUNDRED FIVE PESOS and 92/100 (₱149,905.92) from such public funds received by him by
directed to transfer the account to Assistant Municipal Treasurer Loida Cancino. reason of his office, to the damage of the government in the amount aforestated.

The State Auditors then conducted another audit of the said account, this time covering the CONTRARY TO LAW.4
period of June 8, 1995 to July 19, 1995. They discovered that Doldol incurred an added cash
shortage of ₱149,905.92. In a Letter to Doldol dated July 27, 1995, the State Auditors
Doldol testified that the funds which the State Auditors found missing were, in fact, cash
demanded the immediate restitution of the missing fund, and directed him to submit within 72
advances availed of by the municipal employees. He insisted that not a single centavo was used
hours a written explanation why he incurred such shortage. Again, Doldol failed to respond. The
for his personal benefit. He averred that the charges lodged against him were premature
State Auditors submitted their Report to the Provincial Auditor on their examinations showing his
because the same were based on an incomplete audit.
shortages. On August 3, 1995, the State Auditors submitted their Memorandum on the result of
the audits to the Provincial Auditor.
In a Joint Decision, the trial court convicted the accused of the crimes charged. The fallo of the
decision reads:
On the same day, Doldol wrote the Provincial Treasurer requesting that a re-audit be conducted
on his cash and cash account, taking exception to the findings of the State Auditors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Conrado Doldol is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds in Criminal Case No. SCC-2760
Instead of pursuing his request for a re-audit, Doldol opted to refund the missing funds. On
and in Criminal Case No. SCC-2763, as defined and penalized by Art. 217 of the Revised Penal
September 15, 1995, he remitted ₱200,000.00 to the Acting Municipal Treasurer for which he
Code. In both cases, the amount involved is more than ₱22,000.00, as such the penalty to be
was issued Official Receipt No. 436756. Doldol promised to pay the balance of his shortage, as
imposed is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. Considering that the
follows: ₱200,000.00 on October 31, 1995, and ₱884,139.66 on or before November 30, 1995.
accused surrendered to the police in Urbiztondo, Pangasinan (See Exh. 4) and being entitled to
However, he reneged on his promise.
the provision of [the] Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of 10 years, 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 18 years, 8 months of
On February 6, 1996, the Provincial Auditor transmitted the Memorandum and Consolidated reclusion temporal as maximum in each of the two cases. Further, he is ordered to pay the
Report of the State Auditors to the Ombudsman, and requested that Doldol be charged for amount of ₱1,134,421.54 in Criminal Case No. SCC-2760 and another amount of ₱149,905.92
malversation of public funds. Despite the extensions given to him, Doldol failed to file his in Criminal Case No. SCC-2763 minus, of course, his advance payment of ₱200,187.80. In
counter-affidavit. addition, he should be made to suffer the accessory penalties corresponding to the principal
penalty imposed upon him which includes perpetual absolute disqualification (Art. 41, Rev.
Penal Code) and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.5 were unliquidated cash advances of employees. Hence, the petitioner concludes, the prima facie
presumption under the last paragraph of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code does not apply.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), Doldol alleged:
In its comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserts that the issues
raised by the petitioner are factual and, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of
1. That the trial court erred in rejecting the defenses put up by the accused as follows:
law may be raised. The OSG posits that the findings of facts of the trial court, as affirmed by the
CA, are conclusive on this Court, absent a showing that the trial court ignored, misconstrued or
a. The evidence shows that the audits were not yet completed when the letters of demand were misunderstood cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, would change the outcome
served upon him to produce the alleged missing funds. of the case. The OSG maintains that the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt
that the petitioner malversed the public funds subject of the two Informations. Moreover, the
petitioner’s contention that the charges against him were premature, because the audit of his
b. He was not given the chance to further verify the records despite his request to that effect. accountabilities had not yet been completed and he was not given a chance to explain the
whereabouts of the subject funds before the said charges were filed, is belied by the fact that he
c. There is no evidence that he took the money from the vault or brought it home. even made a partial restitution of the public funds. The OSG notes that as found by the trial
court, the petitioner even failed to specify the names of the employees who were granted cash
advances and the accounts of the said advances. It further avers that the ruling of this Court in
d. The missing funds, if any, were cash advances of certain municipal employees. Dumagat v. Sandiganbayan9 does not apply because:

e. His having borrowed money from the bank negates the charge of misappropriation of public In his vain attempt to exculpate himself from criminal liability, petitioner invokes the doctrine
funds. established in Dumagat vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., [211 SCRA 171, 177 (1992)]], wherein this
Honorable Court acquitted the accused of the crime of malversation of public funds, holding that
2. That the trial court erred in convicting the accused based on the testimonies of the auditors "[s]ince the audit examination left much to be desired in terms of thoroughness and
and the documentary evidence adduced by them. completeness as there were accounts which were not considered, the same cannot be made the
basis for holding petitioner liable for malversation."
3. That the trial court erred in sentencing the accused to suffer the penalties imposed by the
assailed joint decision.6 It is submitted that the ruling in Dumagat vs. Sandiganbayan (supra) is not applicable to the
instant case as the two cases are based on different factual circumstances.
On February 11, 2001, the CA rendered judgment affirming the appealed decision, and, likewise,
denied Doldol’s motion for reconsideration thereof. In the first place, in Dumagat vs. Sandiganbayan (supra, at p. 178), there was a finding that the
"haphazard examination of the cash accountability of petitioner" was made by the auditor "in
violation of the Manual of Instructions to Treasurers and Auditors" and that "the ‘missing’ funds
Doldol, now the petitioner, forthwith filed the present petition for review on certiorari, faulting the would have been ‘discovered’ if only the auditor took into consideration the contents of the two
CA as follows: vaults in Sindangan and Tampisilan and the fact that her collection in Dipolog City were
deposited with the NFA cashier." In the instant case, there was sufficient compliance with the
1. In affirming the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, San Carlos City, Manual of Instructions to Treasurers and Auditors as the two (2) auditing teams had completed
Pangasinan in Crim. Case Nos. SCC-2760 and SCC-2763; their examination and, thereafter, required herein petitioner to produce or explain the shortages
of funds in his custody. Notwithstanding the demand for him to explain the shortages, petitioner
totally disregarded the same and further failed to produce upon demand the missing funds
2. In convicting the accused-petitioner on the basis of an erroneous and incomplete audit; amounting to ₱1,134,421.54 and ₱149,905.92. There was, thus, nothing left for the team of
auditors to do in the instant case. If at all, State Auditor Ritua requested for the return of
3. In not dismissing the cases against the accused-petitioner.7 petitioner’s cashbook and passbooks merely to reconcile and confirm the correctness of their
findings.10

The petitioner reiterates his arguments that the audit of his accountabilities had not been
completed because the State Auditors had yet to conduct a verification of their initial findings The petition has no merit.
based on the cashbook and a reconciliation of the bank deposits of the municipality. The
petitioner insists that the State Auditors did not submit any bank reconciliation statement. The The evidence on record shows that the team of State Auditors conducted its first audit of cash
petitioner argues that he was never given a chance to explain and point out that he did not incur and cash accounts of the General Fund, Special Education Fund and Trust Fund in the custody
any shortage of public funds, and that the charges against him should be dismissed. To bolster of the petitioner, and discovered that he had a shortage of ₱1,134,421.54. 11
his claim, he cites the ruling of this Court in Dumagat v. Sandiganbayan8 and Section 560 of the
Manual of Instructions to Treasurers and Auditors and other Guidelines to bolster his claim.
In a Letter12 dated July 5, 1995, the State Auditors demanded that the petitioner immediately
produce the missing funds. He was also required to submit within 72 hours a written explanation
The petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to prove that the public funds were for his why the shortage occurred. In the meantime, the State Auditors conducted another audit of the
personal use. In fact, the petitioner insists, the evidence shows that the alleged missing funds cash and cash accounts of the petitioner during the period of June 8, 1995 to July 19, 1995, and
he was found to have a shortage of ₱149,905.92. The petitioner was informed of the results of
the audit in a Letter dated July 27, 1995, where he was directed to refund his shortage of As We have already stated hereinabove, on September 15, 1995, not too long after the
₱149,905.92 and to submit a written explanation thereon within 72 hours. 13 However, the shortages in the municipal funds were discovered, appellant made a partial payment/settlement
petitioner failed to respond to such demand, and failed to object to the findings and conclusions in the amount of 200,187.80 pesos as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 436756 (Exhibit "8,"
of the State Auditors. It bears stressing that the petitioner was present during the said audit. Record, Volume III, p. 6). With respect to the balance of the missing funds, appellant promised
to pay the same in installment basis. Appellant, though, failed to comply with his undertaking
(Record, Volume I, p. 457; TSN, Amando T. Sison, July 27, 1998, pp. 32-33). Said payment is of
While it is true that the petitioner requested for a re-audit on August 3, 1995 and objected to
no moment and could not have legally brought acquittal for the appellant. On the contrary, as
some of the findings of the audit team, he addressed the letter-request to the Provincial
guided by Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, We hold that said payment,
Treasurer, and not to the Provincial Auditor of Pangasinan. We note that while the Provincial
particularly when taken in conjunction with appellant’s commitment to gradually pay the
Auditor had already signed the Transmittal Letter dated August 3, 1995 on the State Auditor’s
remainder of the missing funds, is a clear offer of compromise which must be treated as an
Report and request for the petitioner’s prosecution for malversation of public funds, it was filed
implied admission of appellant’s guilt that he embezzled or converted the missing funds to his
only on February 6, 1996. In the meantime, the Provincial Auditor never received any letter from
personal use.15
the petitioner requesting for a re-audit of his account.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of
Admittedly, State Auditor Ritua conducted an audit of the General Fund, the Special Education
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 25845 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
Fund and Trust Fund Passbook, and the LBP and DBP Passbooks on July 11, 1995 for
verification and reconciliation purposes. However, the petitioner was not barred from examining
and receiving the same, preparatory to the submission of his explanation to the State Auditors’ SO ORDERED.
demand-letters. Indeed, the petitioner was even able to write the Provincial Treasurer on August
3, 1995, and requested his objection to such findings. The following findings and ratiocination of
the CA, as supported by the evidence on record, negate the submission of the petitioner:

… [T]he records at the depository banks confirmed the correctness of the COA’s findings that
there were, indeed, shortages in the funds under appellant’s control, thus, rendering appellant’s
request for a re-audit as a mere superfluous and redundant procedure (TSN, Amando T. Sison;
Emelie Ritua, supra).

Appellant’s contention that he was not given the chance to verify the records under audit despite
a request to that effect deserves scant consideration. The records show that appellant was twice
afforded ample opportunity to replenish the funds or explain the reason for its disappearance.
Verily, this could have been the perfect opportunity for the appellant to verify the records and
provide an acceptable reason behind the shortages in the municipal funds under his custody.
Appellant, however, on both instances failed to reply to the demands given by the COA. For
having refused "to face the music," so to speak, and disregarded the demands sent by the COA,
appellant has only himself to blame if he has lost any opportunity to further verify the financial
records of the municipality.14

The record of the Ombudsman shows that the petitioner was required to submit his counter-
affidavit, but requested for time to do so, on his representation that his request to the
Commission on Audit for a re-audit was still pending. It turned out that the petitioner made no
such request.
Moreover, the petitioner failed to submit his counter-affidavit to the Ombudsman. Thus, the
petitioner’s submission that the audit of his account had not been completed before the report of
the State Auditors was referred to the Ombudsman is not correct.

Except for his bare testimony, the petitioner offered no competent and credible evidence to
prove that the missing funds were actually cash advances of employees in the municipality. The
petitioner could have offered in evidence the documents evidencing the names of the recipients
and amounts of the cash advances, but failed to do so. Moreover, the petitioner wrote the
Provincial Auditor and offered to refund the missing funds as follows: ₱200,000.00 on
September 15, 1995, ₱200,000.00 on or before October 31, 1995, and ₱884,139.66 on
November 30, 1995. He was able to pay only ₱200,000.00 on September 15, 1995, and failed to
remit the balance of his shortage. Such partial restitution of the petitioners of the cash shortage
is an implied admission of misappropriation of the missing funds. The ruling of the CA on this
matter is correct:
 G.R. Nos. 212014-15 December 06, 2016
G.R. Nos. 218744-59
RICHARD A. CAMBE, Petitioner,
vs. MARIO L. RELAMPAGOS, ROSARIO SALAMIDA NUÑEZ, LALAINE NARAG PAULE, AND
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, LEVITO D. MARILOU DIALINO BARE, Petitioners,
BALIGOD, AND FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, Respondents. vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, (FIRST DIVISION) AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 212427-28
DECISION
SENATOR RAMON "BONG" REVILLA, JR., Petitioner,
vs. PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, THROUGH ITS SPECIAL PANEL OF INVESTIGATORS,
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, LEVITO D. BALIGOD, AND FIELD Before this Court are consolidated petitions[1] filed by petitioners Senator Ramon "Bong" Revilla,
INVESTIGATION OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents. Jr. (Sen. Revilla), Richard A. Cambe (Cambe), Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles or Janet Napoles),
John Raymund De Asis (De Asis), and Ronald John Lim (Lim), which commonly assail the Joint
G.R. Nos. 212694-95 Resolution[2] dated March 28, 2014 and the Joint Order[3] dated June 4, 2014 of the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in OMB-C-C-13-0316 and OMB-C-C-13-0395 finding probable
SENATOR RAMON "BONG" REVILLA, JR., Petitioner, cause to indict them, along with several others, for the crimes of Plunder, defined and penalized
vs. under Section 2 in relation to Section 1 (d) (1), (2), and (6) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7080,[4] as
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, LEVITO D. amended (one [1] count) and/or of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019[5] (sixteen [16] counts).
BALIGOD, FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, OFFICE OF THE
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, AND THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents. Further assailed are: (1) by Cambe,[6] the Ombudsman's Joint Order[7] dated March 14, 2014,
which denied Cambe's Supplemental Counter-Affidavit with Second Motion to Suspend
G.R. Nos. 212794-95 Proceedings;[8] (2) by Sen. Revilla,[9] the Ombudsman's Order[10] dated May 15, 2014 which
denied Sen. Revilla's Omnibus Motion[11] to re-conduct the preliminary investigation, among
RICHARD A. CAMBE, Petitioner, others; and (3) by petitioners Mario L. Relampagos (Relampagos), Rosario Salamida Nuñez
vs. (Nuñez), Lalaine Narag Paule (Paule), and Marilou Dialino Bare (Bare),[12] the Resolutions dated
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, LEVITO D. November 13, 2014[13] and May 13, 2015[14] of the Sandiganbayan which affirmed the finding of
BALIGOD, AND FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, Respondents. probable cause against them in Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0268, 0269, 0272, 0273, 0275,
0276, 0279, and 0280.
G.R. Nos. 213477-78
The Facts
JOHN RAYMUND DE ASIS, Petitioner,
vs. Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the illegal
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, PEOPLE pillaging of public funds sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) of Sen.
OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, Respondents. Revilla for the years 2006 to 2010,[15] in the total amount of P517,000,000.00.[16]The charges are
contained in two (2) complaints, namely: (1) a Complaint for Plunder[17] filed by the National
G.R. Nos. 213532-33 Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Atty. Levito D. Baligod on September 16, 2013, docketed as
OMB-C-C-13-0316; and (2) a Complaint for Plunder and violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019[18]
RONALD JOHN LIM, Petitioner, filed by the Field Investigation Office of the Ombudsman (FIO) on November 18, 2013, docketed
vs. as OMB-C-C-13-0395, both before the Ombudsman. Briefly stated, petitioners were implicated
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, PEOPLE for the following acts:
OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, Respondents.
(a) Sen. Revilla, as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, for authorizing the illegal
G.R. Nos. 213536-37 utilization, diversion, and disbursement of his allocated PDAF through his endorsement of
fraudulent Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) created and controlled by Napoles's JLN
JANET LIM NAPOLES, Petitioner, (Janet Lim Napoles) Corporation[19] in relation to "ghost" PDAF-funded projects,[20] and for
vs. receiving significant portions of the diverted PDAF funds as his "commission" or "kickback";[21]
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS OMBUDSMAN, PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, Respondents. (b) Cambe, as Chief of Staff of Sen. Revilla during the times material to this case, for processing
the utilization, diversion, and disbursement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF,[22] and for personally
receiving his own "commission" or "kickback" from the diverted funds; [23]

(c) Napoles, as the mastermind of the entire PDAF scam, for facilitating the illegal utilization,
diversion, and disbursement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF through: (1) the
commencement via "business propositions" with the legislator regarding his allocated PDAF; (2)
the creation and operation of JLN-controlled NGOs to serve as "conduits" for "ghost" PDAF-
funded projects; (3) the use of spurious receipts and liquidation documents to make it appear
that the projects were implemented by her NGOs; (4) the falsification and machinations used in
securing funds from the various implementing agencies (IAs) and in liquidating disbursements; In his defense, Revilla filed his Counter-Affidavit dated January 16, 2014, contending that: (a) his
and (5) the remittance of Sen. Revilla's PDAF for misappropriation;[24] and Cambe's signatures in the PDAF documents were forgeries; (b) the utilization of his PDAF
had "always been regular and above-board"; (c) his involvement in the release of his PDAF is
(d) Lim and De Asis, as staff employees of Napoles, for assisting in the fraudulent processing limited; and (d) there is "no credible proof" to show that he committed said illegal acts and that
and releasing of the PDAF funds to the JLN-controlled NGOs[25] through, among others, their conspiracy exists between him and all the other persons involved in the PDAF scam. [50]
designation as Presidents/Incorporators[26] of JLN-controlled NGOs, namely, Kaupdanan Para sa
Mangunguma Foundation, Inc. (KPMFI)[27] and Ginintuang Alay sa Magsasaka Foundation, Cambe, on the other hand, filed his Counter-Affidavit dated January 20, 2014 and Supplemental
Inc. (GAMFI),[28]respectively, and for eventually remitting the PDAF funds to Napoles's Counter-Affidavit dated March 12, 2014, maintaining that: (a) his signatures in the PDAF
control;[29] and documents were all forgeries; and (b) he did not receive any money from Sen. Revilla's PDAF
nor connive with any of the alleged co-conspirators to acquire ill-gotten wealth.[51]
(e) Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, and Bare (Relampagos, et al.), as employees of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM), for participating in the misuse or diversion of For his part, De Asis filed his Counter-Affidavit dated January 16, 2014, admitting that: (a) he
Sen. Revilla's PDAF, by acting as "contacts" of Napoles within the DBM, and thereby, assisting was an employee of the JLN Corporation; (b) he did pick up checks for JLN-controlled NGOs;
in the release of the Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs) and Notices of Cash Allocation and (c) he was an incorporator in one of the JLN-controlled NGOs; but denying that he
(NCAs) covering Sen. Revilla's PDAF.[30] personally benefited from the supposed misuse of Sen. Revilla's PDAF.[52]

As alleged, the PDAF scheme commences with Napoles meeting with a legislator - in this case, Meanwhile, Relampagos, et al., in their separate Counter-Affidavits dated December 13, 2013,
Sen. Revilla - with the former giving an offer to "acquire" his PDAF allocation in exchange for a contended that: (a) there is no probable cause and factual or legal basis to indict them for the
"commission" or "kickback" amounting to a certain percentage of the PDAF. [31]Upon their offenses charged; and (b) the criminal complaints did not specifically mention their names as
agreement on the conditions of the PDAF acquisition, including the project for which the PDAF among those who allegedly participated in the misuse of Sen. Revilla's PDAF. [53]
will be utilized, the corresponding IA tasked to implement the same, and the legislator's
"commission" or "kickback" ranging from 40-60% of either the project cost or the amount stated Pending resolution of the Ombudsman cases, Sen. Revilla and Cambe separately moved for the
in the SARO,[32] the legislator would then write a letter addressed to the Senate President for the suspension of the preliminary investigation[54] on the criminal complaints, which were, however,
immediate release of his PDAF, who in turn, will endorse such request to the DBM for the denied by the Ombudsman in a Joint Order[55] dated January 28, 2014, holding that no
release of the SARO.[33] By this time, the initial advance portion of the "commission" would be prejudicial question exists to warrant the suspension of the preliminary investigation
remitted by Napoles to the legislator.[34] Upon release of the SARO, Napoles would then direct proceedings.[56]
her staff - including whistleblowers Benhur Luy (Luy), Marina Sula (Sula), and Merlina Suñas
(Suñas) to prepare PDAF documents containing, inter alia, the preferred JLN-controlled NGO Cambe filed another motion[57] to suspend proceedings of the preliminary investigation, claiming
that will be used as a "conduit" for the implementation of the project, the project proposals of the that the filing of the criminal complaints was premature since the Commission on Audit (COA)
identified NGO, and the endorsement letters to be signed by the legislator and/or his staff, all for had yet to issue an Order of Execution in relation to the Notices of Disallowance[58] (NDs) against
the approval of the legislator;[35] and would remit the remaining portion or balance of the Sen. Revilla's Office, docketed as Special Audits Office (SAO) ND Nos. NLDC-2014-013-
"commission" of the legislator, which is usually delivered by her staff, Lim and De Asis. [36] Once PDAF(07-09) to 020-PDAF(07-09). The said motion was, again, denied by the Ombudsman in a
the documents are approved, the same would be transmitted to the IA which would handle the Joint Order[59] dated March 14, 2014 (March 14, 2014 Joint Order). Thus, Cambe elevated the
preparation of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to be executed by the legislator's office, matter to this Court via a petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. Nos. 212014-15.
the IA, and the chosen NGO.[37]Thereafter, the DBM would release the NCA[38] to the IA
concerned, the head/official of which, in turn, would expedite the transaction and release of the Meantime, Sen. Revilla filed a Motion to be Furnished Copies of Motions, Pleadings, and Other
corresponding check representing the PDAF disbursement, in exchange for a ten percent (10%) Submissions (Motion to be Furnished),[60] praying that he be furnished with copies of all the
share in the project cost.[39] Among those tasked by Napoles to pick up the checks and deposit counter-affidavits filed by the parties in this case, which was denied by the Ombudsman in an
them to the bank accounts of the NGO concerned were Luy, Suñas, and De Asis.[40] Once the Order[61] dated March 11, 2014. His motion for reconsideration[62] thereof was likewise denied by
funds are in the account of the JLN-controlled NGO, Napoles would then call the bank to the Ombudsman in an Order[63] dated March 27, 2014.
facilitate the withdrawal thereof.[41] Upon withdrawal of the said funds by Napoles's staff, the
latter would bring the proceeds to the office of JLN Corporation for accounting.[42] Napoles would Sen. Revilla likewise filed a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition (Of the Special Panel of
then decide how much will be left in the office and how much will be brought to her residence in Investigators),[64] which was also denied by the Ombudsman in an Order[65] dated March 7, 2014.
Taguig City. De Asis, Lim, Luy, and Suñas were the ones instructed to deliver the money to His motion for reconsideration[66] thereof was further denied in an Order[67] dated May 9, 2014.
Napoles's residence.[43] Finally, to liquidate the disbursements, Napoles and her staff would
manufacture fictitious lists of beneficiaries, liquidation reports, inspection reports, project activity In a Joint Resolution[68] dated March 28, 2014 (March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution), the
reports, and similar documents that would make it appear that the PDAF-funded projects were Ombudsman found probable cause to indict, among others, petitioners Sen. Revilla, Cambe,
implemented when, in fact, they were not since they were actually inexistent or, in other words, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim of one (1) count of Plunder,[69] and all the petitioners (along with
"ghost" projects.[44] Under this modus operandi, Sen. Revilla, with the help of petitioners, among several others), except Lim, of sixteen (16) counts of violation of Section3 (e) of RA 3019. [70]
others, allegedly funneled his PDAF amounting to around P517,000,000.00[45] to the JLN-
controlled NGOs and, in return, received "commissions" or "kickbacks" amounting to at least The Ombudsman found that the diversion and/or misuse of Sen. Revilla's PDAF was coursed
P224,512,500.00[46] through a complex scheme involving various participants from Sen. Revilla's Office, the DBM,
the IAs, and the JLN-controlled NGOs. The Ombudsman then went on to conclude that through
In the Orders dated November 19, 2013[47] and November 29, 2013,[48] the Ombudsman directed the said scheme, they were able to siphon out government funds in the aggregate amount of
petitioners, along with several others, to submit their respective counter-affidavits, to which P517,000,000.00, with at least P224,512,500.00 received by Sen. Revilla. [71]
petitioners complied with, except for Napoles and Lim.[49]
Thus, the Ombudsman held that probable cause exists against Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, Thereafter, Relampagos, et al. filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution
De Asis, and Lim for Plunder, considering that: (a) Sen. Revilla was a public officer at the time Dated 19 June 2014 with Motion to Recall Warrants of Arrest and to Defer Arraignment. [89]
material to the charges; (b) with the help of his co-accused, who are public officers and private
individuals, Sen. Revilla amassed, accumulated, or acquired ill-gotten wealth through their In a Resolution[90] dated August 28, 2014, the Sandiganbayan partially granted the said motion,
intricate modus operandi as described above; and (c) such ill-gotten wealth amounted to at least and dismissed Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0267, 0270, 0271, 0274, 0277, 0278, 0281, and
P224,512,500.00,[72] way more than the threshold amount of P50,000,000.00 required in the 0282 in so far as Relampagos, et al. were concerned for the reason that the SAROs pertinent to
crime of Plunder.[73] these criminal cases were not issued or signed by Relampagos, et al., but by then DBM
Secretary Rolando Andaya. However, the Sandiganbayan ordered the prosecution to present
In the same manner, the Ombudsman established probable cause to indict all the petitioners additional evidence to establish the existence of probable cause against them in Criminal Case
(along with several others), except Lim, for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 in light of the Nos. SB-14-CRM-0268, 0269, 0272, 0273, 0275, 0276, 0279, and 0280.
following: (a) Sen. Revilla, Cambe, and Relampagos, et al. are all public officers, while private
individuals Napoles and De Asis all conspired with these public officers; (b) said public officers The dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0267, 0270, 0271, 0274, 0277, 0278, 0281,
exhibited manifest partiality to Napoles and her cohorts by favoring her controlled NGOs without and 0282 against Relampagos, et al. was appealed[91] by the prosecution, but was denied by
the benefit of public bidding and without having been authorized by an appropriation law or the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution[92] dated November 13, 2014. In the same Resolution,
ordinance, as legally mandated; (c) said public officers likewise exhibited their bad faith by the Sandiganbayan affirmed the finding of probable cause against Relampagos, et al. in Criminal
unduly benefiting from the "ghost" PDAF-funded projects through the receipt of "commissions," Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0268, 0269, 0272, 0273, 0275, 0276, 0279, and 0280 on the ground that
"kickbacks," and the like; and (d) their collective acts caused undue injury to the government in the defenses they raised were evidentiary in character.[93] In particular, the Sandiganbayan held
the aggregate amount of P517,000,000.00.[74] that the issue of whether the IA's endorsement was indispensable before the SARO can be
issued is a matter of evidence to be threshed out during trial.[94]
Aggrieved, all the petitioners separately moved for the reconsideration[75] of the March 28, 2014
Joint Resolution. Specifically, Sen. Revilla, in his motion for reconsideration,[76] pointed out that Hence, Relampagos, et al. filed a motion for partial reconsideration[95] citing DBM Circular Letter
the Ombudsman's use of the counter-affidavits, which documents he prayed to be furnished with No. 2015-1, s. of 2015,[96] which supposedly clarified that the IAs' endorsements are no longer
in his denied Motion to be Furnished, was a grave violation of his constitutionally guaranteed required before the issuance of the corresponding SARO. The said motion was denied by
right to due process. the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution[97] dated May 13, 2015, pointing out that said DBM Circular
was issued only after the Ombudsman's issuance of the March 28, 2014 Joint
Pending resolution of the aforesaid motions for reconsideration, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution.[98] Thus, Relampagos, et al. elevated the issue before the Court via a petition
Order[77] dated May 7, 2014 granting Sen. Revilla's Motion to be Furnished, but only with respect for certiorari, docketed as G.R. Nos. 218744-59.
to the counter-affidavits of his six (6) co-respondents.[78] He was also directed to file his comment
thereon. Dissatisfied, Sen. Revilla then filed an Omnibus Motion[79] dated May 13,2014 praying The Issue Before This Court
for the: (a) partial reconsideration of the May 7, 2014 Joint Order; (b) recall of the March 28,
2014 Joint Resolution; and (c) re-conduct of the preliminary investigation and reconstitution of The core issue in this case is whether or not the findings of probable cause against all
another special panel of investigators.[80] The said Omnibus Motion having been denied by the petitioners should be upheld.
Ombudsman in an Order[81] dated May 15, 2014, Sen. Revilla elevated the matter to this
Court via a petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. Nos. 212427-28. The Court's Ruling

On June 4, 2014, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Order[82] (June 4, 2014 Joint Order) denying All petitions are bereft of merit.
petitioners' motions for reconsideration for lack of merit and, thereby, affirming the March 28,
2014 Joint Resolution with minor modifications to correct clerical errors. [83]These Ombudsman's I. Cambe's Motion to Suspend Proceedings.
issuances led to the filing of certiorari petitions before this Court, docketed as G.R. Nos.
212694-95, G.R. Nos. 212794-95, G.R. Nos. 213477-78, G.R. Nos. 213532-33, and G.R. Nos. At the outset, the Court traverses the procedural issue raised by Cambe in his petition in G.R.
213536-37. Nos. 212014-15. In particular, Cambe seeks to annul and set aside the Ombudsman's March
14, 2014 Joint Order which denied his motion to suspend proceedings, arguing that the COA's
Consequently, on June 6 and 9, 2014, Informations were filed by the Ombudsman before the issuance of an Order of Execution is a condition precedent to the filing of the criminal complaints
Sandiganbayan, charging: (a) Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim of one (1) count against him. This relates to the twelve (12) NDs received by the Office of Sen. Revilla on
of Plunder, docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0240;[84] and (b) all the petitioners January 14, 2014 and February 4, 2014 pertaining to expenditures charged against his PDAF
(along with several others), except Lim, of sixteen (16) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA during the period 2007 to 2009, docketed as SAO ND Nos. TRC-2013-016-PDAF(07-09) to 019-
3019, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0267 to 0282.[85] PDAF(07-09)[99] and NLDC-2014-013-PDAF(07-09) to 020-PDAF(07-09),[100] respectively, which
Cambe claims should first attain finality; otherwise, the filing of the criminal complaints would be
To forestall the service of the warrant of arrest against him, Sen. Revilla filed on June 13, 2014, premature pursuant to the COA's 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure.[101]
a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and Deferment and/or Suspension of
Proceedings.[86] Likewise, Relampagos, et al. moved that the Sandiganbayandeclare lack of The Court disagrees.
probable cause against them and suspend proceedings.[87]
The administrative aspect of the cases against Cambe and Sen. Revilla in relation to the COA's
On June 19, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution, finding probable cause against audit is clearly separate and distinct from the criminal aspect covering the charges of Plunder
petitioners and their co-accused and, thereby, issued the corresponding warrants of arrest and/or of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 against them. Hence, the incidents related to it
against them.[88] should have no effect on the filing of the latter. In Villaseñor v. Sandiganbayan,[102] this Court
explained that: not mean 'actual and positive cause' nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on
opinion and reasonable belief."[109] "[T]hus, a finding based on more than bare suspicion but
[T]here are three kinds of remedies that are available against a public officer for impropriety in less than evidence that would justify a conviction would suffice."[110]
the performance of his powers and the discharge of his duties: (1) civil, (2) criminal, and (3)
administrative [and that] [t]hese remedies may be invoked separately, alternately, In determining the elements of the crime charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable
simultaneously or successively. Sometimes, the same offense may be the subject of all three cause, "only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the [accused] are
kinds of remedies. required, not absolute certainty."[111] In this case, the petitioners were charged with the crimes
of Plunder and/or violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Plunder, defined and penalized under
xxxx Section 2[112] of RA 7080, as amended, has the following elements: (a) that the offender is a
public officer, who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by
It is clear, then, that criminal and administrative cases are distinct from each other. The settled affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons; (b) that he
rule is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or
the first two will not inevitably govern or affect the third and vice versa. Verily, administrative criminal acts described in Section 1 (d)[113] thereof; and (c) that the aggregate amount or total
cases may proceed independently of criminal proceedings.[103] value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least Fifty Million Pesos
In Reyna v. COA (Reyna),[104] this Court particularly declared that "[t]he criminal case filed before (P50,000,000.00).[114] On the other hand, the elements of violation of Section 3 (e)[115] of RA
the Office of the Ombudsman is distinct and separate from the proceedings on the disallowance 3019 are: (a) that the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or
before the COA."[105] official functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers); (b) that he
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action
Cambe's reliance on Section 6, Rule XIII of the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA is caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party
misplaced. As worded, the provision only accounts for the possibility of the filing of criminal unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions. [116] In
charges upon referral of the audit findings to the Ombudsman: determining probable cause therefor, only a showing of the ostensible presence of these
elements is required.
Section 6. Referral to the Ombudsman. - The Auditor shall report to his Director all instances of
failure or refusal to comply with the decisions or orders of the Commission contemplated in the It should be borne in mind that probable cause is determined during the context of a preliminary
preceding sections. The COA Director shall see to it that the report is supported by the sworn investigation which is "merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is
statement of the Auditor concerned, identifying among others, the persons liable and describing reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person charged
the participation of each. He shall then refer the matter to the Legal Services Sector who shall should be held responsible for it."[117] It "is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display
refer the matter to the Office of the Ombudsman or other appropriate office for the possible filing of the prosecution's evidence."[118] Therefore, "the validity and merits of a party's defense or
of appropriate administrative or criminal action. accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during
Nowhere does the provision state any delimitation or precondition to the filing of such criminal trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level."[119] Accordingly, "owing to the initiatory
charges. As correctly pointed out by the Ombudsman, "an audit disallowance may not nature of preliminary investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be applied in
necessarily result in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions or criminal prosecution of the the course of its proceedings."[120] In this light, and as will be elaborated upon below, this
responsible persons. Conversely, therefore, an administrative or criminal case may prosper even Court has ruled that "probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there
without an audit disallowance. Verily, Rule XIII, Section 6 is consistent with the ruling in [Reyna] is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay,"[121] and that even an invocation of the rule on res
that a proceeding involving an audit disallowance is distinct and separate from a preliminary inter alios acta at this stage of the proceedings is improper.[122]
investigation or a disciplinary complaint."[106]
Guided by these considerations, the Court finds that the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its
In fine, the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion in promulgating its March 14, 2014 discretion in finding probable cause to indict Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim of
Joint Order which denied Cambe's motion to suspend proceedings. Perforce, Cambe's petition one (1) count of Plunder, and all the petitioners, except Lim, of sixteen (16) counts of violation of
in G.R. Nos. 212014-15 is dismissed. That being said, the Court now proceeds to resolve the Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
main substantive issue anent the presence of probable cause against all petitioners.
III. Probable Cause Against Sen. Revilla.
II. Parameters of Review.
First, in G.R. Nos. 212694-95, Sen. Revilla seeks to annul the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution
Time and again, this Court's consistent policy has been to maintain non-interference in the and the June 4, 2014 Joint Order of the Ombudsman finding probable cause against him for the
Ombudsman's determination of the existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave crimes charged, Among others, Sen. Revilla faults the Ombudsman for allegedly disregarding
abuse in the exercise of such discretion. This observed policy is based not only in respect for the his defense of forgery, and further contends that in the absence of other competent testimony,
investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the 1987 Constitution to the Office of the the Ombudsman cannot consider the whistleblowers' testimonies who purportedly were his co-
Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well.[107] conspirators in the PDAF scam, pursuant to the res inter alios actarule.

Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount The petition holds no water.
to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary
or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive The finding of probable cause against Sen. Revilla is amply supported by the evidence on
duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. [108] record. At the forefront are the PDAF documents, consisting of the written endorsements
signed by Sen. Revilla[123] himself requesting the IAs to release his PDAF funds to the identified
Probable cause simply means "such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief JLN-controlled NGOs, as well as other documents that made possible the processing of his
that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does PDAF, e.g., the MOAs executed by the legislator's office, the IA, and the chosen NGO. All these
documents - even those not actually signed by Sen. Revilla - directly implicate him for the crimes Joint Resolution: "[a]t all events, the Special Panel members, after a prima faciecomparison
charged, as they were nonetheless, all issued under the authority of his Office as Senator of the with their naked eyes of the questioned signatures appearing in the PDAF documents and
Republic of the Philippines. In Belgica v. Ochoa (Belgica),[124] this Court observed that "the the original signatures of [Sen.] Revilla and Cambe in their respective counter-affidavits,
defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of legislators to opine that both sets of signatures, which bear the same style and flourish, were written by
participate in the post-enactment phases of project implementation."[125] "At its core, legislators one and the same hands."[136] Verily, the Ombudsman's own factual finding on the absence of
may it be through project lists, prior consultations or program menus - have been consistently forgery, at least for the purpose of determining probable cause, should be regarded with utmost
accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through respect. "[F]indings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when
various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations."[126] It is through this mechanism that individual supported by substantial evidence,"[137] as in this case.
legislators, such as Sen. Revilla, were able to practically dictate the entire expenditure of the
PDAF allocated to their offices throughout the years. The Ombudsman's finding on the absence of forgery furthr gains credence in light of the July
20, 2011 Letter[138] signed by Sen. Revilla submitted to the COA (Confirmation Letter). The
In particular, the Ombudsman details that "the NGO endorsed by the legislator would be among letter evinces on its face that Sen. Revilla had confirmed the authenticity of his and Cambe's
those organized and controlled by Napoles. In fact, these NGOs were specifically set by Napoles signatures appearing on the PDAF documents:
for the x x x purpose [of having the PDAF funds released]."[127] Napoles's staff would then
"prepare the PDAF documents for the approval of the legislator and reflecting the preferred NGO After going through these documents and initial examination, it appears that the signatures
to implement the undertaking."[128] These documents "are transmitted to the IA which, in turn, and/or initials on these documents are my signatures or that of my authorized
handles the preparation of the MOA relating to the project, to be executed by the legislator's representative.[139]
office, the IA[,] and the NGO concerned." "The projects are authorized as eligible under the The Ombudsman further noted that the Confirmation Letter appeared to have originated from
DBM's menu for pork barrel allocations. [However,] [i]t bears noting that the NGO is directly Sen. Revilla's Office because it was issued Bar code/Reference No. 0-2011-13079.[140]
endorsed by the legislator [and that] [n]o public bidding or negotiated procurement [took]
place."[129] As such, there was a defiance of Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB) At this juncture, it deserves mentioning that while Luy indeed admitted that there were times that
Resolution No. 012-2007 which states that: the whistleblowers would forge the signatures of the legislators in the PDAF documents, he,
however, explicitly qualified that such forgeries were made "[w]ith the approval of Ms.
4.1 When an appropriation law or ordinance specifically earmarks an amount for projects to be Napoles kasi sila po ang nag-uusap":
specifically contracted out to NGOs, the procuring entity may select an NGO through
competitive bidding or negotiated procurement under Section 53[(j)] of the [IRR-A]. Sen. Escudero: Ang tanong ko, finorge or may finorge na ba kayong pirma ng senador o
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) congressman dahil pinepeke nga 'yong beneficiary, 'di ba, galing sa listahan ng kung sino. x
x x.
Anent Sen. Revilla's claim that his signatures in the documentary evidence presented were
forged, it must be emphasized that "the findings of the x x x prosecutor [on the issue of Mr. Luy: With the approval of Ms. Napoles kasi sila po ang nag-uusap, mav pagkakataon
forgery] should be ventilated in a full-blown trial[.] [This] is highlighted by the reality that the po na fino-forge po.
authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general
characteristics, or its similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. The duty to Sen. Escudero: May pagkakataong fino-forge [ninyo] ang pirma ng mambabatas?
determine the authenticity of a signature rests on the judge who must conduct an
independent examination of the signature itself in order to arrive at a reasonable Mr. Luy: Opo.[141]
conclusion as to its authenticity. [As such], Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting with Luy's testimony therefore explicates that although the whistleblowers would sometimes forge the
writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or legislators' signatures, such were made with the approval of Napoles based on her prior
proved to be genuine."[130] Accordingly, Sen. Revilla's evidence of forgery, including the findings agreement with the said legislators. It is not difficult to discern that this authorization allows for
of his purported handwriting experts, Rogelio G. Azores (Azores)[131] and Forensic Document a more expedient processing of PDAF funds since the documents required for their release need
Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui, (Pagui)[132] cannot be readily credited at this stage of the not pass through the legislator's respective offices. It is also apparent that this grant of authority
proceedings. gives the legislators room for plausible deniability: the forging of signatures may serve as a
security measure for legislators to disclaim their participation in the event of discovery.
Besides, the Ombudsman aptly observed that Azores and Pagui admittedly used mere Therefore, Luy's testimony completely makes sense as to why the legislators would agree to
photocopies of the PDAF documents in their handwriting analyses. [133] In Heirs of Gregorio v. authorize Napoles and her staff to forge their signatures. As such, even if it is assumed that the
Court of Appeals,[134] this Court ruled that "[w]ithout the original document containing the alleged signatures were forged, it does not mean that the legislators did not authorize such forgery.
forged signature, one cannot make a definitive comparison which would establish forgery," and
that "[a] comparison based on a mere [photo] copy or reproduction of the document under The testimonies of the whistleblowers which the prosecution submitted before the
controversy cannot produce reliable results."[135]Furthermore, it may not be amiss to state that Ombudsman - are, in fact, the most integral evidence against Sen. Revilla, since they provide a
the credibility of Azores and Pagui as handwriting experts has yet to be tested. They still have to detailed account on the inner workings of the PDAF scam to which Sen. Revilla was directly
authenticate their findings and be subjected to cross-examination. Without a doubt, the involved. It should be pointed out that, of all the Senators, only the Offices of Sen. Revilla, Sen.
prosecution should also be given a chance to properly contest Azores and Pagui's findings with Juan Ponce Enrile (Sen. Enrile), and Sen. Jinggoy, Estrada (Sen. Estrada) were explicitly
evidence of its own. It could all too well present its own handwriting experts during trial to rebut implicated[142] to have dealt with Napols in the plunder of their PDAF. Also, it is apparent that
such findings. whistleblowers Suñas, Sula, and Luy had personal knowledge of the conspiracy since they were
employees of JLN Corporation - the epicenter of the entire PDAF operation and in their
It is significant to emphasize that the Ombudsman had thoroughly passed upon the veracity of respective capacities, were individually tasked by N&poles to prepare the pertinent documents,
Sen. Revilla's signatures on the PDAF documents. As explicitly stated in the March 28, 2014 liquidate the financial transactions, follow up the release of the NCAs with the DBM, and/or
facilitate the withdrawal of PDAF funds deposited in the NGOs' accounts. [143] parties." Applying the same logic, and with the similar observation that there lies substantial
basis for crediting the testimonies of the whistleblowers herein, the objection interposed by
Among others, it is interesting to note that, as per Luy's testimony, Sen. Revilla was given his the Napoles siblings under the evidentiary res inter alios acta rule should falter.
own codename, same as the other involved legislators with whom Napoles transacted with: Ultimately, as case law edifies, "[t]he technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal
who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation," as in this
58. T: Maaari mo bang linawin itong sinasabi mong "codename"? case.[148](Emphases and underscoring supplied)
S: Ang pangalan pong taong [tumanggap] ng pera ang nilalagay ko sa voucher pero
minsan po ay codename ang nilalagay ko. Absent any countervailing reason, the rule on stare decisis[149] mandates a similar application of
59. T: Sino ang nagbigay ng "codename"? the foregoing ruling to this case.
S: Si Madame JANET LIM NAPOLES po ang nagbigay ng codename kasi daw po ay sa
gobyerno kami nagta-transact. In any event, even if it is assumed that the rule on res inter alios acta were to apply during
T: Maaari mo bang sabihin kung anu-ano ang mga "codenames" ng mga ka- preliminary investigation, the treatment of the whistleblowers' statements as hearsay is bound by
60.
transact ni JANET LIM NAPOLES na pulitiko o kanilang [Chief of Staff]? the exception on independently relevant statements. "Under the doctrine of independently
S: Opo. "TANDA" kay Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, "SEXY/ANAK/KUYA" kay Senator relevant statements, regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact that such statements have been
Jinggoy Estrada, "POGI" kay Senator Bong Revilla, "GUERERA" kay Congressman made is relevant. The hearsay rule does not apply, and the statements are admissible as
Rizalina Seachon-Lanete, "BONJING" kay Congressman RODOLFO PLAZA, evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the
"BULAKLAK" kay Congressman SAMUEL DANGWA, "SUHA" kay Congressman ARTHUR statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence
PINGOY, at "KURYENTE" kayCongressman EDGAR VALDEZ. Mayroon pa po of such a fact."[150]Undoubtedly, the testimonies of the whistleblowers are independently relevant
ibang codename nasa records ko. Sa ngayon po ay sila lang po ang aking naalala.[144] to prove the involvement of Sen. Revilla and his coaccused in the present controversy,
considering their respective participations in the entire PDAF scam. Therefore, the statements
As observed by this Court in the Reyes case, "the names of the legislators to whom the PDAF made by whistleblowers Suñas, Sula, and Luy, who were employees of JLN Corporation and
shares were disbursed x x x were identified by the use of 'codenames.' These 'codenames,' privy to the financial transactions of Napoles concerning, among others, Sen. Revilla's PDAF,
which were obviously devised to hide the identities of the legislators involved in the scheme, should be given consideration as they are directly, if not circumstantially, relevant to the issue at
were known by a select few in the JLN Corporation,"[145] such as the whistleblowers. The level of hand.
detail of the whistleblowers' narration of facts would surely impress upon a reasonable and
prudent mind that their statements were not merely contrived. In addition, the fact that they had To add, the prosecution also presented Luy's ledger entries which corroborate his testimony
no apparent motive as to why Sen. Revilla, among all others, would be drawn by the that Sen. Revilla dealt with Napoles and received PDAF kickbacks. Luy's records disclose that
whistleblowers, into such a high-profile case of plundet should likewise be taken into account. the kickbacks amountpd to "at least P224,512,500.00: P10,000,000.00 for 2006;
Further, in Reyes, this Court observed that: P61,000,000.00 for 2007; P80,000,000.00 for 2008; P40,000,000.00 for 2009; and
P33,512,500.00 for 2010."[151]
[W]histleblower testimonies - especially in corruption cases, such as this - should not be
condemned, but rather, be welcomed as these whistleblowers risk incriminating themselves in Relatedly, it should be clarified that the fact that Luy did not personally know Sen. Revilla or
order to expose the perpetrators and bring them to justice. In Re: Letter of Presiding Justice that none of the whistleblowers personally saw anyone handing/delivering money to Sen.
Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. on CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 (Antonio Rosete, et al. v. Securities and Revilla does not mean that they did not personally know of his involvement. Because of
Exchange Commission, et al.) [590 Phil. 8, 49-50 (2008)], the Court gave recognition and their functions in JLN Corporation as above-stated, it is evident that they had personal
appreciation to whistleblowers in corruption cases, considering that corruption is often done in knowledge of the fact that Napoles named Sen. Revilla as one of the select-legislators she
secrecy and it is almost inevitable to resort to their testimonies in order to pin down the crooked transacted with. More significantly, they personally processed the PDAF funds and documents
public officers.[146] connected with Sen. Revilla's Office, which lasted for a considerable amount of time, i.e., four (4)
years [2006-2010 as charged]. As such, their testimonies should not be completely disregarded
Sen. Revilla opposes the admission of the whistleblowers' testimonies based on the res inter as hearsay.
alios acta rule. However, in Reyes, citing Estrada v. Ombudsman,[147] this Court had
unanimously ruled that the testimonies of the same whistleblowers against Jo Christine and In any case, this Court has resolved that "probable cause can be established with hearsay
John Christopher Napoles, children of Janet Napoles who were also charged with the evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay."[152] The
embezzlement of the PDAF, are admissible in evidence, considering that technical rules of substantial basis for crediting the whistleblowers' testimonies, even if so regarded as hearsay,
evidence are not binding on the fiscal during preliminary investigation. This Court was rests on their key functions in JLN Corporation as above-mentioned, as well as the collective
unequivocal in declaring that the objection on res inter alios acta should falter: evidence gathered by the prosecution tending to support the same conclusion that Sen. Revilla
and his alleged co-conspirators acted in concert to pillage his PDAF funds.
Neither can the Napoles siblings discount the testimonies of the whistleblowers based on their
invocation of the res inter alios actarule under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, The prosecution further submitted the affidavits of Sen. Revilla's corespondents which
which states that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of constitute direct evidence that provide an account of Sen. Revilla's involvement, this time from
another, unless the admission is by a conspirator under the parameters of Section 30 of the the perspective of certain IA officials.
same Rule. To be sure, the foregoing rule constitutes a technical rule on evidence which
should not be rigidly applied in the course of preliminary investigation proceedings. Among others, National Livelihood Development Corporation Director IV Emmanuel Alexis G.
In Estrada, the Court sanctioned the Ombudsman's appreciation of hearsay evidence, which Sevidal, echoed the Ombudsman's finding that "[Sen.] Revilla, through Cambe, [was]
would otherwise be inadmissible under technical rules on evidence, during the preliminary responsible for 'identifying the projects, determining the project costs and choosing the NGOs'
investigation "as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay." This is because which was manifested in the letters of [Sen.] Revilla[.]"[153]
"such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of
For his part, Technology Resource Center (TRC) Deputy, Director General Dennis L. Cunanan suppliers who purportedly provided supplies to the NGOs denied ever dealing with the latter.
(Cunanan) narrated that he met Janet Napoles sometime in 2006 or 2007. According to him, Resultantly, the COA Report concluded that the PDAF-funded projects of Sen. Revilla were
Napoles introduced herself as "the representative of certain legislators who supposedly picked "ghost" or inexistent.[161]
TRC as a conduit for PDAF-funded projects"; at the same occasion, Napoles told him that "her
principals were then Senate President [Enrile], [Sen. Revilla], [and] [Sen. Estrada.]" The findings in the COA report were further corroborated by the field verifications conducted by
Cunanan further averred that he "often ended up taking and/or making telephone verifications the Field Investigation Office - Office of the Ombudsman (FIO) to determine whether or not
and follow-ups and receiving legislators or their staff members," all in connection with PDAF Sen. Revilla's PDAF was indeed utilized for its intended livelihood projects. In the course of
projects. In addition, Cunanan even conveyed that Luy would occasionally go to his office to investigation, it was revealed that the mayors and municipal agriculturists, who had reportedly
pressure him to expedite the release of the PDAF funds by calling the offices of the legislators received livelihood assistance kits/packages, purportedly procured through Sen. Revilla's PDAF,
concerned.[154] actually denied receiving the same and worse, were not even aware of any PDAF-funded
projects intended for their benefit. Moreover, the signatures on the certificates of acceptance and
Cunanan's statements were furthr corroborated by TRC Department Manager III Francisco B. delivery reports were forged, and in fact, the supposed beneficiaries listed therein were neither
Figura (Figura), wno averred that legislators would "highly recommend" NGOs/foundations as residents of the place where they were named as such; had jumbled surnames; deceased; or
conduit implementors and that if TRC disagreed with their recommendations, said legislators even downright fictitious. The foregoing led the FIO to similarly conclude that the purported
wquld feel insulted and take away their PDAF from TRC, resulting in the latter losing the chance livelihood projects were "ghost" projects, and that its proceeds amounting to P517,000,000.00
to earn service fees.[155] According to Figura, this set up rendered TRC officials powerless to were never used for the same.[162]
disregard the wishes of Sen. Revilla especially on the matter of public bidding for the PDAF
projects.[156] Taking together all of the above-stated pieces of evidence, the COA and FIO reports tend
to prima facie establish that irregularities had indeed attended the disbursement of Sen. Revilla's
At this juncture, this Court would like to dispel the notion. that due process rights were violated PDAF and that he had a hand in such anomalous releases, being the head of Office which
when Sen. Revilla was denied copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents in the unquestionably exercised operational control thereof. As the Ombudsman correctly observed,
preliminary investigation proceedings before the Ombudsman as he argues in G.R. Nos. "[t]he PDAF was allocated to him by virtue of his position as a Senator, and therefore he
212427-28. This matter was already resolved in the similar case of Estrada, where this Court exercise[d] control in the selection of his priority projects and programs. He indorsed [Napoles's]
said: NGOs in consideration for the remittance of kickbacks and commissions from Napoles.
Compounded by the fact that the PDAF-funded projects turned out to be 'ghost projects', and
Both the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the that the rest of the PDAF allocation went into the pockets of Napoles and her cohorts, [there is
Ombudsman require the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the probable cause to show that] Revilla thus unjustly enriched himself at the expense and to the
affidavits of the complainant and affidavits of his supporting witnesses. Neither of these Rules damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines."[163] Hence, he
require the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of his [co- should stand trial for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. For the same reasons, it is apparent
respondents]. The right of the respondent is only "to examine the evidence submitted by that ill-gotten wealth in the amount of at least P50,000,000.00 (i.e., P224,512,500.00) were
the complainant," as expressly stated in Section 3 (b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of amassed, accumulated or acquired through a combination or series of overt acts stated in
Criminal Procedure. This Court has unequivocally ruled in Paderanga that "Section 3, Rule 112 Section 1 of the Plunder Law. Therefore, Sen. Revilla should likewise stand trial for Plunder.
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly provides that the respondent shall only
have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the Besides, case law holds[164] that once the trial court finds probable cause, which results in the
complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the issuance of a warrant of arrest (as the Sandiganbayan in this case, with respect to Sen. Revilla
parties. or their witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to and his copetitioners[165]), any question on the prosecution's conduct of preliminary investigation
examine or cross-examine." Moreover, Section 4 (a, b and c), of Rule II of the Ombudsman's becomes moot.
Rule of Procedure, read together, only require the investigating officer to furnish the respondent
with copies of the affidavits of the complainant and his supporting witnesses. There is no law or In fine, Sen. Revilla's petitions in G.R. Nos. 212427-28 and G.R. Nos. 212694-95 are dismissed
rule requiring the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the for lack of merit.
affidavits of his co-respondents.[157]
IV. Probable Cause Against Cambe.
In any event, the Ombudsman in this case went beyond its legal duty and eventually granted
Sen. Revilla's requests to be furnished with said counter-affidavits, and even afforded him the The same conclusion obtains with respect to the petition of Cambe in G.R. Nos. 212794-
opportunity to comment thereto.[158] Thus, there is more reason to decline his flawed claims of 95 assailing the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against him, as well as its failure to
denial of due process. Case law statethat the touchstone of due process is the opportunity to be furnish him copies of his corespondents' counter-affidavits.
heard,[159] which was undeniably afforded to Sen. Revilla in this case.
The above-discussed pieces of evidence are all equally significant to establish probable cause
The findings of the COA in its SAO Report No. 2012-2013 (COA report)[160] also buttress the against Cambe. There is no dispute that Ca:mbe was Sen. Revilla's trusted aide, being his Chief
finding of probable cause against Sen.Revilla. This report presents'in detail the various of Staff. By such authority, he also exercised operational control over the affairs of Sen. Revilla's
irregularities in the disbursement of the PDAF allocations of several legislators in the years 2007 office, including the allocation of his PDAF. In fact, Cambe's signatures explicitly appear on
to 2009, such as: (a) the IAs not actually implementing the purported projects, and instead, several PDAF documents, such as the MOAs allowing the IAs to transfer Sen. Revilla's PDAF
directly releasing the funds to the NGOs after deducting a "management fee," which were done funds allocated for certain projects to various JLN-controlled NGOs.[166]
at the behest of the sponsoring legislator, including Sen. Revilla; (b) the involved NGOs did
not have any track record in the implementation of government projects, provided fictitious Moreover, Cambe was personally identified by the whistleblowers to have received PDAF
addresses, submitted false documents, and were selected without any public bidding and money for himself and for Sen. Revilla. As recounted by Luy, Cambe was the one who would go
complying with COA Circular No. 2607-001 and GPPB Resolution No. 12-2007; and (c) the to Napoles's office and receive cash from the latter in the aggregate amount of P224,512,500.00
representing Sen. Revilla's "commissions" or "kickbacks" coming from the PDAF scam. The Thus, Napoles's petition in G.R. Nos. 213536-37 is dismissed.
cash would come either from Luy's vault or from Napoles herself.[167] In simple terms, Cambe
allegedly acted as a liaison between Sen. Revilla and Napoles. VI. Probable Cause Against De Asis.

For the same reasons above-discussed, there should be no valid objection against the In G.R. Nos. 213477-78, De Asis accuses the Ombudsman of gravely abusing its discretion in
appreciation of the PDAF documents and whistleblowers' testimonies as evidence to establish finding probable cause against him for Plunder and violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019,
probable cause against Cam be at this stage of the proceedings. He also has no right to be contending, inter alia, that the performance of his functions as driver and messenger of Napoles
furnished copies of the counter-affidavits ,of his co-respondents. Thus, this Court holds that hardly constitutes overt acts of the aforesaid crimes or a willful participation thereof. In this
Cambe should likewise stand trial for the crimes charged, and his petition in G.R. Nos. 212014- regard, he asserts that as a mere high school graduate and former security guard, it is highly
15 be dismissed. unimaginable for him to conspire with his employer and other high-ranking government officials
to commit the aforesaid crimes.
V. Probable Cause Against Napoles.
The petition has no merit.
In G.R. Nos. 213536-37, Janet Napoles similarly seeks to nullify the Ombudsman's March 28,
2014 Joint Resolution and June 4, 2014 Joint Order finding probable cause against her for Records show that De Asis was designated as the President/Incorporator[171] of KPMFI which
Plunder and for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Essentially, she argues that the complaints was one of the many NGOs controlled by Napoles that was used in the embezzlement of Sen.
did not establish the specific acts of the crimes she supposedly committed. She likewise Revilla's PDAF allocations.[172] Moreover, whistleblowers Luy and Suñas explicitly n,amed De
contends that since she is not a public officer, she cannot be subjected to prosecution by the Asis as one of those who prepared money to be given to the lawmaker.[173] Said whistleblowers
Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan. even declared that De Asis, among others, rec ived the checks issued by the IAs to the NGOs
and deposited the same in the bank; and that, after the money is withdrawn from the bank, he
Napoles's arguments are untenable. was also one of those tasked to bring the money to Janet Napoles's house.[174] Indeed, the
foregoing prove to be well-grounded bases to believe that, in all probability, De Asis conspired
Records clearly show that Napoles, in all reasonable likelihood, played an integral role in the with the other co-accused to commit the crimes charged.
illegal utilization, diversion, and disbursement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF. In fact, she was tagged as
the mastermind of the entire PDAF scam. As outlined by the Ombudsman, Napoles would To refute the foregoing allegations, De Asis presented defenses which heavily centered on his
approach legislators, such as Sen. Revilla, and "offer to 'acquire' his x x x PDAF allocation in perceived want of criminal intent, as well as the alleged absence of the elements of the crimes
exchange for a 'commission' or kickback amounting to a certain percentage of the charged. However, such defenses are evidentiary in nature, and thus, are better ventilated
PDAF."[168] Once Napoles was informed of the availability of Sen Revilla's PDAF, she and/or her during trial and not during preliminary investigation. To stress, a preliminary investigation is not
staff would prepare listings of the available projects specifically indicating the IAs which would the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the prosecution's evidence; and the presence
carry out the same. After the listings are released by Sen. Revilla's Office, Napoles would then or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that
give a down payment from her own pockets for delivery to Sen. Revilla, or in case of his may be passed upon only after a full-blown trial on the merits.[175]
unavailability, to Cambe who would receive the same on Sen. Revilla's behalf. Once the SARO
and/or the NCA regarding said project is released, Napoles would then deliver the promised In sum, the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion in finding probable cause to indict
"kickbacks" to Sen. Revilla. Thereafter, Sen. Revilla and/or Cambe would endorse Napoles's De Asis for the crimes charged. Consequently, his petition in G.R. Nos. 213477-78 is dismissed.
NGOs to undertake the PDAF-funded projects, all of which turned out to be "ghost" or
"inexistent;" thus, allowing Napoles and her cohorts to pocket the PDAF allocation. [169] VII. Probable Cause Against Lim.

Based on the evidence in support thereof such as the PDAF documents, whistleblowers' In G.R. Nos. 213532-33, Lim argues that the Ombudsman. gravely abused its discretion in
testimonies, the accounts of the IA officials, and the COA report, as well as the field verifications finding probable cause against him for Plunder. According to him, the criminal complaints do not
of the FIO, Ombudsman, this Court is convinced that there lies probable cause against Janet allege a specific action he committed that would demonstrate his involvement for the crime
Napoles for the charge of Plunder as it has been prima facie established that she, in conspiracy charged.
with Sen. Revilla, Cambe, and other personalities, was significantly involved in the afore-
described modus operandi to obtain Sen. Revilla's PDAF amounting to at least P50,000,000.00 Lim's contention is without merit.
in "kickbacks." In the same manner, there is probable cause against Napoles for violations of
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, as it is ostensible that their conspiracy to illegally divert PDAF Funds As correctly pointed out by the Ombudsman, whistleblowers Luy and Suñas narrated that over
to "ghost" projects caused undue prejudice to the government. the course of the perpetuation of the PDAF scam, they, along with the other staff of Napoles -
which includes Lim - would prepare, and thereafter deliver, the kickbacks intended for Sen.
That a private individual, such as Napoles, could not be charged for Plunder and violations of Revilla.[176] The preparation and delivery of kickbacks to the legislator and/or his trusted staff are
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 because the offenders in those crimes are public officers is a complete indeed overt acts that relate to his involvement in the PDAF scheme. To note, even if it is
misconception. It has been long-settled that while the primary offender in the aforesaid crimes assumed that Lim only prepared the money and did not deliver the same as he claims, [177] the
are public officers, private individuals may also be held liable for the same if they are found to act of preparation is still connected to the common objective of the conspiracy. Accordingly, this
have conspired with said officers in committing the same. This proceeds from the establishes the existence of probable cause against him for thb crime charged. Hence, his
fundamental principle that in cases of conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.[170] In this case, petition in G.R. Nos. 213532-33 is likewise dismissed.
since it appears that Napoles has acted in concert with public officers in the systematic pillaging
of Sen. Revilla's PDAF, the Ombudsman correctly indicted her as a co-conspirator for the VIII. Probable Cause Against Relampagos, et al.
aforementioned crimes.
Meanwhile, in G.R. Nos. 218744-59, DBM employees Relampagos, Nuñez, Paule, and Bare
assail the Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated November 13, 2014[178] and May 13, 2015[179] which conducted preliminary investigation being merely to determine whether there is sufficient ground
judicially found probable cause against them for eight (8) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is
RA 3019, thereby affirming the Ombudsman's earlier finding of probable cause against them (at probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.[187]
least for the said eight [8] counts that were affirmed). In particular, they argue that: (a) they
cannot be faulted for issuing the SAROs without prior IA endorsement as it was authorized In this case, the Ombudsman (and the Sandiganbayan as to Relampagos, et al.) did not err in
under the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) for the years 2007 to 2009; and (b) there was no finding probable cause against all the petitioners. Their findings are fully supported by the
"undue haste" in the issuance of the said SAROs as the DBM itself prescribes shorter periods in evidence on record and no semblance of misapprehension taints the same. Moreover, this Court
the processing of the same.[180] cannot tag key documentary evidence as forgeries and bar testimonies as hearsay at this stage
of the proceedings; otherwise, it would defy established principles and norms followed during
Relampagos, et al.'s arguments fail to persuade. preliminary investigation. Jurisprudence teaches us that "[i]n dealing with probable cause[,] athe
very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and
As pointed out by the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan, some of the SAROs and NCAs practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal
issued in the perpetuation of the PDAF scam were issued by the Office of Relampagos as DBM technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved." [188]
Undersecretary, where Nuñez, Paule, and Bare are all working - a finding that they themselves Overall, based on the foregoing disquisitions, the standard of probable cause was adequately
did not dispute.[181] More significantly: (a) whistleblower Luy positively identified hurdled by the prosecution in this case. As such, no grave abuse of discretion was committed by
Relampagos, et al. as Napoles's "contact persons" in the DBM; and (b) the COA Report the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayanin the proceedings a quo. All the petitioners should
found irregularities in their issuances of the aforesaid SAROs and NCAs.[182]Ostensibly, these therefore stand trial for the crimes they were charged.
circumstances show Relampagos et al.'s manifest partiality and bad faith in favor of Napoles and
her cohorts that evidently caused undue prejudice to the Government. Thus, they must stand WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of erit. The findings of probable cause
trial for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. against all petitioners are hereby AFFIRMED and the Sandiganbayan, as trial court,
is DIRECTED to commence/continue with the necessary proceedings in these cases with
As to their contentions that there was no "undue haste" in the issuance of the said SAROs as deliberate dispatch.
the GAAs for the years 2007 to 2009 authorized such issuances even without prior IA
endorsement and that the DBM itself prescribes a shorter processing time for the same, suffice it SO ORDERED.
to say that these are matters of defense that are better ventilated in a full-blown trial. The timing
of the SARO releases by these DBM officials, as well as any deviations from legal procedure are
but part of a multitude of factors to be threshed out during trial in order to determine their exact
culpability. Verily, the confines of a preliminary investigation do not yet allow a full exposition of
the parties' claims. Relampagos, et al.'s petition in G.R. Nos. 218744-59 is therefore dismissed.

Conclusion

Case law states that "the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause does not touch on the issue
of guilt or innocence of the accused. It is not the function of the Office of the Ombudsman to rule
on such issue. All that the Office of the Ombudsman did was to weigh the evidence presented
together with the counter-allegations of the accused and determine if there was enough reason
to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused are probably guilty
thereof."[183] In the review of the Ombudsman's determination of probable cause, we are guided
by this Court's pronouncement in Vergara v. Ombudsman,[184] where it was ruled that:

[C]ourts do not interfere in the Ombudsman's exercise of discretion in determining probable

cause unless there are compelling reasons. The Ombudsman's finding of probable cause, or
lack of it, is entitled to great respect absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion. Besides, to
justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari on the ground of abuse of discretion, the abuse must
be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law,
as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.[185]

Meanwhile, with respect to the Sandiganbayan's judicial determination of probable cause, this
Court, in Delos-Santos Dio v. Court of Appeals,[186] enlightens that:

[A] judge's discretion to dismiss a case immediately after the filing of the information in court is
appropriate only when the failure to establish probable cause can be clearly inferred from the
evidence presented and not when its existence is simply doubtful. After all, it call)lot be expected
that upon the filing of the information in court the prosecutor would have already presented all
the evidence necessary to secure a conviction of the accused, the objective of a previously-
 G.R. No. 216064 November 7, 2016 While at the precinct, Barangay Kagawad Antonio I. Nastor, Jr. informed PO3 Santos that
Antonio was already willing to confess to killing Norma.[21] Accordingly, PO3 Santos proceeded
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, to contact a lawyer from the Public Attorney's Office.[22] In the meantime, PO3 Santos apprised
vs. Antonio of his constitutional rights, including the right to remain silent. [23] However, as
ANTONIO DACANAY Y TUMALABCAB, Accused-Appellant. determined by both the RTC and the CA, despite having been apprised of his rights, Antonio
nonetheless confessed to the crime before the media representatives, who separately
DECISION interviewed him without PO3 Santos, viz:

CAGUIOA, J: Per [Antonio]'s account, around 4:00 in the morning, he and his wife had a fight pertaining to the
unaccounted amount of P100,000.00. With extreme anger, he stabbed his wife several times.
This is an Appeal[1] filed under Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Rules of Court from the Decision Thereafter, he threw all the pieces of evidence to the river. [Antonio] further declared that he set
dated April 2, 2014[2] (questioned Decision) of the Court of Appeals, Tenth (10th) Division (CA), in up the first floor of their house by placing a pitcher of juice, a half-empty glass of juice and
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05083, which affirmed the Judgment dated June 21, 2011[3] of the Regional cigarette on top of the table, to make it appear that someone else went to their house and
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7 (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 07-257131. robbed the place. He also confessed that he took the missing pieces of jewelry and placed them
inside his locker at PHIMCO. He allegedly admitted the killing of his wife as his conscience has
In an Information filed with the RTC, accused-appellant Antonio[4] T. Dacanay (Antonio) was been bothering him. x x x[24]
charged with the crime of Parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended,[5] the accusatory portion of which reads: Insofar as accused's confession was heard, media men Nestor Etolle from the Philippine Star
and Jun Adsuara from Tanod (Bantay ng Bayan) alleged, in the same tenor, that when it was
That on or about October 06, 2007, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with reported that the case has (sic) been solved, they each went, at different time intervals, to the
intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use detention cell of the Manila Police District to interview the suspect. Accused, however, remained
personal violence upon the person of one NORMA DACANAY y ERO, his wife, by then and consistent in admitting that he was the one who killed his wife x x x. He was alleged to have said
there stabbing her body with an ice pick several times, thereby inflicting upon her mortal stab that he has been bothered by his conscience that was why he admitted to the killing. x x
wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of her death thereafter. x[25] (Citations omitted)

Contrary to law.[6] Notably, the reporters, Jun Adsuara and Nestor Etoile, were presented by the prosecution during
trial, wherein both testified that Antonio voluntarily admitted his complicity in the crime without
The antecedent facts, as summarized by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, follow. any intimidation or coercion exerted on his person.[26] As a result of the interview, a news article
entitled "Mister timbog sa pagpatay sa asawa" was published in the October 10, 2007 issue
On October 6, 2007, Norma E. Dacanay (Norma), the wife of Antonio, was found lifeless with of Tanod Diyaryo Bayan.[27]
several puncture wounds on the bathroom floor of their home by their son, Quinn, who was then
coming home from school.[7] Quinn likewise observed that the rest of the house was in disarray, Moreover, it was later confirmed by PO3 Santos during a follow-up operation that the missing
with the clothes and things of Norma scattered on the floor, as if suggesting that a robbery had jewelry (e.g., a pair of gold earrings, a necklace with a cross pendant, a necklace with an oval
just taken place.[8] At that time, Antonio had already left for work after having allegedly left the pendant) were indeed stored in Antonio's locker at PIDMCO, consistent with the latter's
house at around six in the morning.[9] extrajudicial confession before the press.[28] Likewise, based on a medico-legal report prepared
by Dr. Romeo Tagala Salen of the Manila Police District, the cause of Norma's death was due to
Quinn then rushed to the house of his aunt, one Beth Bautista, to tell her about the fate of multiple puncture wounds on the body, and that the weapon used could have been a round
Norma, and then proceeded to the workplace of Antonio,[10] which was only ten (10) minutes instrument (e.g., an ice pick).[29]
away from their house.[11]
For his defense, as summarized by the RTC, Antonio interposed the twin defenses of alibi and
Thereafter, both Quinn and Antonio proceeded back to their house and were met by some police denial, claiming coercion and intimidation on the part of the police officers involved in the
officers who were then already conducting an investigation on the incident. [12] investigation of the crime, to wit:
Antonio was then interviewed by PO3 Jay Santos (PO3 Santos), during which interview, Antonio At the police station, accused was subjected to investigation. His son was directed to stay far
informed PO3 Santos that One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) in cash and pieces of from where he was positioned. Moments later, accused felt that the investigating police were not
jewelry were missing.[13] Antonio alluded to a certain "Miller" as an alleged "lover" of Norma who satisfied with his answer for which reason he was isolated in another room. There were at least
may have perpetrated the crime.[14] However, after further investigation, the identity of "Miller" three (3) policemen. He also saw PO2 Jaime Gonzales, being the companion of PO3 Jay
was never ascertained, as none of Norma's friends knew of any such person.[15] Santos during the time of his arrest. It was at this instance where he was boxed on the side as
they cursed him and pointed a gun at him. The police wanted him to admit that he was the one
After PO3 Santos's inspection of the crime scene, Antonio was invited to the precinct to who killed his wife. Accused felt that he was shaking all over. Accused was then moved back to
formalize his statement, to which the latter declined, as he still had to take care of the funeral where his son was confined. He saw the policemen strip his son of his clothes as son cried,
arrangements of Norma.[16] While Antonio promised to proceed to the police station on the "Papa, help me!" His son was then brought to the same room where he was earlier isolated x x
following day, he never made good on such promise.[17] x. Accused could only beg, "Maawa kayo sa amin! Ako na lang ang saktan n yo, huwag na lang
On October 8, 2007, PO3 Santos went to Antonio's workplace at PHIMCO Industries, Inc. anak ko" x x x.
(PHIMCO) in Punta, Sta. Ana, Manila, to once again invite Antonio to the precinct.[18] Antonio Accused thereafter denied having talked to a kagawad about being responsible for the killing of
acceded to such request and, after fetching Quinn from school, they all proceeded to the police his wife. He insisted that he was detained for a crime he did not commit. He alluded that he was
station.[19] When they arrived at the precinct, Barangay Kagawad Antonio I. Nastor, Jr. and some transferred to a place in V. Mapa, Sta. Mesa, at around mid-morning in a service vehicle where
members of the media were present.[20]
his arresting officers were wearing civilian clothes. He was asked if he had money. Since he SO ORDERED.[36]
claimed not to have any, he heard the police say, "nag-aaksaya lang tayo ng panahon dito" x x
x. On April 24, 2014, Antonio filed a Notice of Appeal of even date with the CA.[37] Hence, the
instant Appeal.
It was then that accused was again transferred, this time, to PHIMCO premises. His handcuff
was removed by PO2 Jaime Gonzales. Accused asked the guard for permission to enter. In a Resolution dated March 23, 2015,[38] the Court instructed the parties to file their respective
Accused was asked to lead them to the production area where he worked and showed them the Supplemental briefs, if they so desired. In lieu of Supplemental Briefs, the parties filed
chemicals he used for mixing x x x. Accused next denied that jewelries (sic) were retrieved from Manifestations respectively dated May 15, 2015[39] and May 22, 2015,[40] informing the Court that
his locker at PHIMCO. He alleged, however, that he was shown jewelries (sic) which were taken they were adopting their previous Briefs submitted to the CA.
from the pocket of PO2 Jaime Gonzales but he averred that he did not recognize them.
However, he was directed to place his hand in his locker where a photo was taken x x x. They Issue
went back to the police headquarters and was warned to keep mum about their trip to Quintos.
He was also warned that media people will be taking his video x x x. The sole issue for our resolution is whether the CA, in affirming the RTC, erred in finding Antonio
guilty of the crime of Parricide on the basis of his extrajudicial confession.
Accused drifted to sleep but as soon as he woke up, he was told that he will be interviewed by
the media. He remembered answering their questions but denied having given any detail about The Court's Ruling
the killing of his wife x x x. The policemen behind him struck him in the head and admonished
him why he was not answering. He was asked by PO3 Jay Santos to sign a paper until PO3 In his Appeal, Antonio insists that his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible on the ground that
Santos himself withdrew it x x x. it was given under a "coercive physical or psychological atmosphere". [41] To support his claim,
Antonio underscores the fact that he was inside a detention cell with two (2) or three (3) other
Later, he was subjected to inquest proceedings. He chose not to tell the investigating prosecutor detainees when he allegedly confessed to the crime before the media. [42]
of his ordeal since he did not want a repeat of his experience at the police precinct. He alleged
that he felt afraid since PO3 Santos threatened him and poked a gun at him x x x. We are not persuaded.

Accused denied having killed his wife, alleging that she was alive the morning he left for work x x At the outset, we note that Antonio had already admitted in his Appellant's Brief that he was not
x. He alluded to the fact that his wife was engaged in lending money, proof of which was a blue under custodial investigation at the time he gave his extrajudicial confession:
ledger she always kept for accounting x x x.[30] (Citations omitted)
Although he was not under custodial investigation, note must be taken that Antonio Dacanay
was inside a detention cell with two (2) or three (3) other detainees when he allegedly confessed
Upon arraignment, Antonio entered a plea of not guilty to the crime charged.[31] Trial on the before the media.[43]
merits then ensued and by Order dated April 5, 2011 of the RTC, the case was submitted for
judgment.[32] xxxx
Ruling of the RTC Lastly, although confession before the media does not form part of custodial investigation,
[33] Antonio Dacanay should have been informed about the consequences of his (sic) when he
In its Judgment dated June 21, 2011, the RTC gave weight to the extrajudicial confession of
decided to confess his alleged guilt.[44]
Antonio and found him guilty of the crime of Parricide, the dispositive portion of which stated:

WHEREFORE, for the death of his wife, Norma Dacanay y Ero, this Court finds Hence, Antonio's reliance on constitutional safeguards is misplaced as much as it is unfounded.
accused ANTONIO DACANAY y TUMALABCAB GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the We need not belabor this point.
crime of Parricide defined and penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code and is
At this juncture, it bears stressing that during the separate occasions that Antonio was
hereby imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
interviewed by the news reporters, there was no indication of the presence of any police officers
The preventive imprisonment already served by the accused shall be CREDITED to the service within the proximity who could have possibly exerted undue pressure or influence. As recounted
of his sentence pursuant to Article 29 of the same Code, as amended. by both reporters during their testimonies, Antonio voluntarily narrated how he perpetrated the
crime in a candid and straightforward manner, "with no trace of fear, intimidation or coercion in
SO ORDERED.[34] him".[45] We quote with approval the following observations by the RTC in its Decision dated
June 21, 2011:
Aggrieved, Antonio timely filed a Notice of Appeal dated June 30, 2011, [35] elevating the case to
the CA. Insofar as accused's confession was heard, media men Nestor Etolle from the Philippine Star
and Jun Adsuara from Tanod (Bantay ng Bayan) alleged, in the same tenor, that when it was
Ruling of the CA reported that the case has (sic) been solved, they each went, at different time intervals, to
the detention cell of the Manila Police District to interview the suspect. Accused,
In the questioned Decision, the CA affirmed the RTC in toto and dismissed the appeal for lack of however, remained consistent in admitting that he was the one who killed his wife (TSN
merit, on the ground that Antonio failed to overcome the presumption of voluntariness attended dated November 17, 2008, p. 7; TSN dated November 26, 2008, pp. 4-5).[46]
by his extrajudicial confession, as follows:
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant APPEAL is hereby DISMISSED for LACK OF
MERIT and the Judgment dated June 21, 2011 rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, The audacity displayed by the accused in admitting the killing of his wife slowly ebbed away as
Manila in Criminal Case No. 07-257131 is hereby AFFIRMED. time passed by. Initially moved by a moral will since his conscience could no longer contain it,
accused's admission to the crime was unfortunately perpetuated by media men who published The fact that the extrajudicial confession was made by Antonio while inside a detention cell does
articles on his resigned fate. In the October 10, 2007 article of Jun Asuadra in the Tanod Diyaryo not by itself render such confession inadmissible, contrary to what Antonio would like this Court
ng Bayan, accused was even quoted to have said, "Hindi ako nagsisisi na pinatay ko ang aking to believe. In People v. Domantay,[52] where the accused was also interviewed while inside a jail
asawa" (Exhibits "E" to "E-2") x x x.[47] cell, this Court held that such circumstance alone does not taint the extrajudicial confession of
the accused, especially since the same was given freely and spontaneously:
xxxx
Accused-appellant claims, however, that the atmosphere in the jail when he was
Despite such caveat admonished by the Supreme Court, it is found that accused's media interviewed was "tense and intimidating" and was similar to that which prevails in a
confession in this case reels (sic) with the spontaneity of his admission for which reason custodial investigation. We are not persuaded. Accused-appellant was interviewed while
he should be made responsible for the culpable act of having stabbed his wife 26 he was inside his cell. The interviewer stayed outside the cell and the only person besides him
repeated times. Clearly, it was the dictates of his conscience which made accused reveal his was an uncle of the victim. Accused-appellant could have refused to be interviewed, but instead,
inner demons. he agreed. He answered questions freely and spontaneously. According to Celso Manuel, he
said he was willing to accept the consequences of his act.
Nestor Etolle was particularly certain that accused talked in a candid and straightforward
manner with no trace of fear, intimidation or coercion in him x x x. As an indication that Celso Manuel admitted that there were indeed some police officers around because about
accused was moved by his inner will, his revelations spilled more than what was necessary. two to three meters from the jail were the police station and the radio room. We do not
Accused rather bared the essential details of the crime - from the marital squabble over the think the presence of the police officers exerted any undue pressure or influence on
missing P100,000.00 to the fact that he threw away the ice-pick but after attempting to frame up accused-appellant and coerced him into giving his confession.
evidence by staging the presence of cigarette butts and a glass of juice on the kitchen
table. These are damning statements; yet, the purity of such revelations could have only Accused-appellant contends that "it is...not altogether improbable for the police investigators to
come from the tormented mind of the accused. Indeed, only torment could wash the soul ask the police reporter (Manuel) to try to elicit some incriminating information from the accused."
of its impurities.[48] (Emphasis supplied) This is pure conjecture. Although he testified that he had interviewed inmates before, there is no
evidence to show that Celso was a police beat reporter. Even assuming that he was, it has not
Meanwhile, in the questioned Decision, the CA further observed: been shown that, in conducting the interview in question, his purpose was to elicit incriminating
information from accused-appellant. To the contrary, the media are known to take an opposite
When the accused was interviewed on separate occasions by Nestor Etolle of Philippine Star stance against the government by exposing official wrongdoings.
and Juan Adsuara of Tanod Diyaryo ng Bayan, the media men where (sic) outside the detention
cell. In both instances, there was no indication of any presence of police officers within the Indeed, there is no showing that the radio reporter was acting for the police or that the interview
proximity of the accused who can possibly exert undue pressure or influence. was conducted under circumstances where it is apparent that accused-appellant confessed to
the killing out of fear. x x x[53] (Emphasis supplied)
Necessarily, while accused was physically restrained by the cold bars of steel, he was at liberty
to remain mute. Yet, he opted to respond to inquiries from the media, and in the process, he Following this Court's ruling in People v. Jerez,[54] the details surrounding the commission of the
practically threw caution to the wind and spilled the beans, so to speak, when he conceded the crime, which could be supplied only by the accused, and the spontaneity and coherence
killing of his wife and recognized his culpability therefor. As observed by both reporters, exhibited by him during his interviews, belie any insinuation of duress that would render his
accused-appellant voluntarily narrated how he perpetrated the crime. [49] confession inadmissible.

On this score, our pronouncements in People v. Andan[50] are instructive. In said case, we held Notably, while Antonio's testimony is replete with imputations of violence and coercion, no other
that a confession made before news reporters, absent any showing of undue influence from the evidence was presented to buttress these desperate claims. Neither was there any indication
police authorities, is sufficient to sustain a conviction for the crime confessed to by the accused: that Antonio instituted corresponding criminal or administrative actions against the police officers
allegedly responsible. It is well-settled that where the accused fails to present evidence of
Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence compulsion; where he did not institute any criminal or administrative action against his supposed
from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they intimidators for maltreatment; and where no physical evidence of violence was presented, all
interviewed appellant. They were not acting under the direction and control of the police. these will be considered as factors indicating voluntariness. [55]
They were there to check appellant's confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant to
grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. In fact, they asked his In fact, what is glaring from the evidence is the deafening silence of Antonio's son, Quinn, with
permission before interviewing him. They interviewed him on separate days not once did respect to the violence and coercion allegedly inflicted on his person and that of his father's.
appellant protest his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He Indeed, were the allegations of Antonio even faintly true, Quinn would have testified to such fact
even supplied all the details in the commission of the crime, and consented to its while on the witness stand. Instead, despite numerous opportunities to do so, Antonio's claims
reenactment. All his confessions to the news reporters were witnessed by his family and other were left uncorroborated, as aptly pointed out by the RTC:
relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere in the interview of appellant by the news reporters.
The only person who could have corroborated accused's allusion to coercion and intimidation
We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section was his own son, Quinn Anthony. However, when Quinn Anthony took the witness stand, he
12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself merely referred to the arrest of his father. He alleged that he did not even ask his father the
with the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the reason for his arrest and right there and then, simply told him to take care of himself (TSN dated
relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily June 2, 2008, p. 11).
addressed to the State and its agents. They confirm that certain rights of the individual exist
without need of any governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away by government, Perceptively, if any of such coercion or intimidation occurred, 18-year old Quinn Anthony would
rights that government has the duty to protect. x x x[51](Emphasis supplied) have been naturally goaded to reveal them. He already lost his mother. The fear of losing his
father, if unjustly castigated, would have made him corroborate his father's story. But none
absolutely came on the witness stand. There is thus a nagging suspicion that accused's account
of coercion and intimidation may have been twisted after all. [56]

All told, absent any independent evidence of coercion or violence to corroborate Antonio's bare
assertions, no other conclusion can be drawn other than the fact that his statements were made
freely and spontaneously, unblemished by any coercion or intimidation.

Under Article 246 of the RPC, the crime of Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2)
the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendants or other descendants, or the legitimate
spouse of the accused.[57] Undoubtedly, all elements are present in this case.

To begin with, the fact that Norma was the spouse of Antonio was sufficiently proven by the
prosecution through their Marriage Contract.[58]

Next, as a rule, an extrajudicial confession, where admissible, must be corroborated by evidence

of corpus delicti in order to sustain a finding of guilt.[59] In this connection, extrajudicial
confessions are presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved. [60]

Hence, as extensively discussed above, considering that Antonio failed to rebut such
presumption of voluntariness regarding the authorship of the crime, coupled with the fact of
death of his wife, Norma, we find Antonio guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
Parricide.

As a final note, worth reiterating is the general rule that factual findings of the trial court,
especially when affirmed by the CA, deserve great weight and respect and should not be
disturbed on appeal, unless these are facts of weight and substance that were overlooked or
misinterpreted and would materially affect the disposition of the case.[61] Moreover, in assessing
the credibility of the competing testimonies of witnesses, the Court defers to the findings of the
trial court, in light of the unique opportunity afforded them to observe the witnesses and to
ascertain and measure their sincerity, spontaneity, as well as their demeanor and behavior in
court.[62]

In addition, the Court finds sufficient basis to award damages to the heirs of Norma,
notwithstanding the lack of such grant by the RTC and CA. An appeal in a criminal case opens
the entire case for review on any question including one not raised by the parties.[63] In this case,
the crime of Parricide was committed absent any modifying circumstances that would affect the
imposable penalty. Hence, following our ruling in People v. Jugueta,[64] we hereby grant an
award for civil indemnity and moral and exemplary damages in the amount of Seventy-Five
Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) each.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision
dated April 2, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05083, finding accused-
appellant Antonio T. Dacanay GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide under
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
ordering him to pay the heirs of Norma E. Dacanay, Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00)
as civil indemnity, Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as moral damages, and Seventy
Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as exemplary damages. All monetary awards shall earn
interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision
until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 144293 December 4, 2002 said street and when Francisco San Juan told the accused that the latter has no business in
stopping him, said accused who was armed with a firearm, with intent to kill and with treachery,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and sho[o]t Francisco San Juan with
JOSUE R. LADIANA, petitioner,
the firearm hitting Francisco San Juan at his head and neck inflicting upon him fatal wounds
vs.
thereby causing the death of Francisco San Juan."7
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

During his arraignment on May 8, 1992, petitioner, assisted by his counsel de parte, 8 pled not
DECISION
guilty.9 After due trial, the Sandiganbayan found him guilty of homicide, not murder.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Facts

The Constitution bars the admission in evidence of any statement extracted by the police from
In their Memoranda, both the prosecution and the defense substantially relied upon the
the accused without the assistance of competent and independent counsel during a custodial
Sandiganbayan’s narration of the facts as follows:
investigation. However, a counter-affidavit voluntarily presented by the accused during the
preliminary investigation, even if made without the assistance of counsel, may be used as
evidence against the affiant. "The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely: Caridad M. San Juan, PO2 Leopoldo
Cacalda, Dr. Rogelio M. Javan, SPO2 Percival A. Gabinete, and Maria T. Cortez. Their
respective testimonies, in essence are as follows, to wit:
The Case

"1. CARIDAD MARGALLO SAN JUAN (hereinafter, ‘Caridad’) declared that she is the
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the April 10,
wife of Francisco San Juan (hereinafter ‘Francisco’), the victim in the case at bar.
2000 Decision1 and August 4, 2000 Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) in Criminal
Caridad testified that Francisco was the Barangay Captain of Barangay Salac,
Case No. 16988. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:
Lumban, Laguna, until he was shot and killed by accused Ladiana, who happens to be
also a distant relative of the decedent.
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused JOSUE R. LADIANA GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and, in the absence of any modifying
"Caridad recounted that, on December 29, 1989, she was in her house
circumstance, sentencing the said accused to: (a) suffer an indeterminate sentence of
when an unidentified woman came and told her that her husband was killed
imprisonment of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four
by accused Ladiana. She immediately called up her sister-in-law before
(4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum[;] (b) suffer all the appropriate accessory
rushing to Jacinto Street where the gruesome incident allegedly transpired.
penalties consequent thereto; (c) indemnify the heirs of the victim, Francisco San Juan, in the
Thereat, many people were milling around, and Caridad saw the lifeless
total amount of Fifty Six Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P56,500.00); and (d) pay the costs." 3
body of Francisco lying in the middle of the road and being examined by
[SPO2] Percival A. Gabinete.
The assailed Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
"Caridad recalled that it was around 11:00 o’clock a.m. when she reached
Petitioner was originally charged with murder before the Sandiganbayan in an Information4 the place of the subject incident. At that point in time, she was not even
dated August 5, 1991. However, the anti-graft court issued an Order5 dated October 14, 1991, allowed by the police to touch, much less get near to, the cadaver of
noting that "besides the allegation that the crime was allegedly committed by the accused while Francisco. Caridad, expectedly, was crying and one of her aunts advised
he was ‘taking advantage of his official position,’ nothing else is in the Information to indicate this her to go home.
fact so that, as the Information stands, nothing except a conclusion of fact exists to vest
jurisdiction [in] this Court over the accused and over the crime for which he is charged."
"Caridad maintained that she was aware that her husband was killed by
accused Ladiana because this was what the woman actually told her.
Further, the Order gave the government sufficient time to amend the Information to show Moreover, accused Ladiana had given himself up to the police authorities.
adequate facts to vest the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over the case. Subsequently, an
Amended Information,6 still charging petitioner with murder, was filed on April 1, 1992. The
"Caridad went on to narrate that, on December 30, 1989, she was at the
accusatory portion reads as follows:
police station, where she gave her written statement before police
investigator PFC Virgilio Halili (hereinafter, ‘Halili’).
"That on or about the 29th day of December 1989, in the Municipality of Lumban, Laguna,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a
"Additionally, Caridad presented the Death Certificate of her husband and
public officer, being then a member of the Integrated National Police (INP now PNP) assigned at
testified that he was eventually buried at the Lumban Cemetery. She
the Lumban Police Station, Lumban, Laguna, acting in relation to his duty which is primarily to
declared that she had incurred about Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00)
enforce peace and order within his jurisdiction, taking advantage of his official position
for the funeral, burial and other incidental expenses by reason of the death
confronted Francisco San Juan why the latter was removing the steel pipes which were
of Francisco.
previously placed to serve as barricade to prevent the entry of vehicles along P. Jacinto Street,
Barangay Salac, Lumban, Laguna, purposely to insure the safety of persons passing along the
 "On cross-examination, Caridad testified that, on December 29, 1989, she jail. He also saw a stab wound on accused Ladiana’s right bicep but he did
was in her house and that she did not hear any gunshot between 10:30 and not anymore ask him how he sustained the said injury.
11:00 o’clock a.m. Caridad also admitted she did not witness the killing of
her husband.
"3. DR. ROGELIO JAVAN y MAGRACIA (hereinafter, ‘Javan’) declared that he is a
physician and the Municipal Health Officer of Lumban, Laguna.
"On questions propounded by the Court, Caridad narrated that her husband
suffered two gunshot wounds - one on the upper right temple and the other
"Javan recounted that he was the one who performed the necropsy on the
on the left cheek. However, Caridad stated that she was told that the
cadaver of Francisco and that he had prepared the corresponding reports
wounds were the entry and the exit points. She also told the Court that her
and/or documents relating thereto. Javan made a sketch representing the
husband was wearing short pants at the time of his death and that she
anterior and posterior views of the body of Francisco, and labeled and
found some bruises on his knees.
placed red markings on the gunshot wounds found on the said cadaver. The
marking ‘Gunshot wound A’ is the point of entry, which is one (1) centimeter
"Finally, Caridad recalled that, on the date of the incident, her husband was in diameter and situated two (2) inches behind the left ear. The marking
with his close friend, a certain Rodolfo Cabrera, and some other persons, ‘Gunshot wound B’ is the point of exit of ‘Gunshot wound A’, which is two (2)
and that they went to Jacinto Street to repair the steel humps which were centimeters in diameter and found above the right cheekbone and one (1)
used to block the street during school days for the protection and safety of inch below the right eye. Javan also testified that there is another gunshot
the school children. wound and the point of entry and exit are labeled as ‘Gunshot wound C’ and
‘Gunshot wound D’, respectively. ‘Gunshot wound D’ is one and one-half (1-
1/2) centimeters in diameter and located at the left cheek, three and one-
"2. PO2 LEOPOLDO DE RAMOS CACALDA, JR. (hereinafter, ‘CACALDA’) declared
half (3-1/2) centimeters below the left eye, while ‘Gunshot wound C’ is one
that he is a policeman assigned at the Lumban Police Station in Lumban, Laguna. He
(1) centimeter in diameter and found at the right lateral aspect of the neck,
has been designated as the radio operator of the station since 1989.
at the level of the adam’s apple.

"Cacalda recounted that, on December 29, 1989, at around 11:00 o’clock

"According to Javan, the assailant must be behind the victim when he
a.m., somebody, whose name he could no longer recall, reported to him
inflicted ‘Gunshot wound A’. As regards ‘Gunshot wound C’, the assailant
about an existing trouble along Jacinto Street in Barangay Salac Cacalda
likewise must be behind the victim, at a distance of more than twenty-four
responded by going to the scene, where he was accompanied by Alberto
(24) inches away.
Mercado, a member of the CAGFIL. Thereat, Cacalda saw the lifeless body
of Francisco lying face up on the road. Cacalda did not examine the body of
Francisco. He left the place of the incident when [SPO2] Percival A. "Lastly, Javan testified that he was not able to retrieve any bullet during the
Gabinete and other policemen subsequently arrived. examination. However, judging from the size of the wound and the point of
entry, Javan opined that the firearm used was probably a caliber 38.
"Cacalda had gathered from the people milling around the body of
Francisco that it was accused Ladiana who shot and killed Francisco. "On questions propounded by the Court, Javan testified that ‘Gunshot
Cacalda immediately left to look for accused Ladiana. However, he wound A’ could have been fired first because the trajectory is on the same
eventually saw accused Ladiana already inside the jail of the police station level so much so that the assailant and the victim could have been both
and thereafter learned that said accused had surrendered to the police standing. Javan inferred that ‘Gunshot wound C’ could have been inflicted
authority. while the victim was already falling down. Javan then stressed that both
wounds are fatal in nature.
"Cacalda recalled that he was later on investigated by Halili because he was
the responding policeman who went to the scene of the incident. "4. SPO2 PERCIVAL AMBROSIO GABINETE (hereinafter, ‘Gabinete’) declared that
Consequently, Cacalda executed a written statement in relation to the he is a police officer and a resident of No. 4055 Villa Josefina Subdivision, Sta. Cruz,
subject incident. Laguna.

"On cross-examination, Cacalda testified that he was a radio operator and "The testimony of Gabinete was subsequently dispensed with, upon the
not an investigator of the police station. He also testified that he did not admission of the defense that he was part of the group of policemen who
witness the incident subject matter of the case at bar. proceeded to the place of the subject incident and that he found the body of
Francisco lying along the road. Additionally, the defense admitted the
existence of the receipt issued by Funeraria de Mesa dated January 3, 1990
"Cacalda went on to testify that the people milling around the place of the
in the sum of Six Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P6,500.00).
incident told him that accused Ladiana had already left. Because of this
development, Cacalda proceeded to accused Ladiana’a house but was told
that he had already gone to the police station. Cacalda accordingly went to "5. MARIO TALAVERA CORTEZ (hereinafter, ‘Cortez’) declared that he is a retired
the police station where he saw accused Ladiana already locked inside the Assistant Prosecutor of Laguna.
 "Prior to the conduct of the examination-in-chief on Cortez, the defense admitted to having fired the fatal shots that caused the victim’s death, 12 may be used as
counsel made an admission as to the authorship, authenticity, and evidence against him. It underscored the admission made by the defense as to the authorship,
voluntariness of the execution of the counter-affidavit of accused Ladiana, the authenticity and the voluntariness of the execution of the Counter-Affidavit.13 In short, it ruled
which was subscribed and sworn to before Cortez. In said counter-affidavit, that the document had sufficiently established his responsibility for the death of the victim.
accused Ladiana allegedly admitted to making the fatal shots on Francisco. However, it found no evidence of treachery; thus, it convicted him of homicide only. 14
However, accused Ladiana allegedly did so in self-defense as Francisco
was then purportedly attacking accused Ladiana and had, in fact, already
Hence, this Petition.15
inflicted a stab wound on the arm of accused Ladiana.

Issues
"However, Cortez emphasized that he was not the one who conducted the
preliminary investigation of the complaint which led to the filing of the
subject case. Additionally, Cortez testified that he would not be able to In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for this Court’s consideration:
anymore recognize the face of the affiant in the said counter-affidavit, but
maintained that there was a person who appeared and identified himself as
Josue Ladiana before he affixed his signature on the counter-affidavit. "I. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan may convict the accused-petitioner beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide even in the absence of any eyewitness who
personally saw the sho[o]ting of the victim by the accused, basing it only on the
"After the presentation of Cortez, the prosecution filed its formal offer of testimony of the prosecutor who had administered the oath on the Counter-affidavit
evidence and rested its case. filed by petitioner-accused.

"On May 31, 1995, this Court issued a resolution admitting all the "II. Whether or not the prosecution has presented proof beyond reasonable doubt to
documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution. overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused and his right
against self-incrimination on the basis of the Counter-affidavit whose execution was
admitted by the counsel of the petitioner, but not by the accused personally.
"On August 20, 1996, accused Ladiana filed a Motion for Leave of Court to
File Demurrer to Evidence dated August 16, 1995, claiming that: (i) a review
of the documentary and testimonial evidence adduced by the prosecution "III. Whether or not the Counter-affidavit of the accused-petitioner which was
allegedly failed to show that the accused is guilty of the offense charged; (ii) considered by the Sandiganbayan in its decision as similar to an extrajudicial
at best, the evidence submitted by the prosecution are allegedly hearsay in confession may [be] admitted against him as evidenc[e] of guilt beyond reasonable
character, considering that the supposed eyewitness in the person of doubt even if he was not assi[s]ted then by counsel and while he was under custodial
Rodolfo Cabrera was never presented in court; and (iii) the prosecution was investigation.
allegedly merely able to prove the fact of death of the victim, but not the
identity of the person who caused said death.
"IV. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan is constitutionally and legally correct in issuing
the Order of August 23, 1996 denying the Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer
"On August 23, 1996, this Court issued an Order of even date holding that to Evidence dated August 16, 1995 filed by the accused in accordance with Sec. 15 of
the filing of a demurrer to evidence is no longer appropriate considering that Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure in relation to Rule XXI of the
accused Ladiana received a copy of this Court’s resolution dated May 31, Revised Rules of Sandiganbayan.
1995 on the admission of the prosecution’s documentary exhibits as early
as May 25, 1995.
"V. Whether or not accused is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender which fact was admitted by the prosecution as it even used the same as
"On September 2, 1996, in view of his perception that the evidence proof of the guilt of the accused."16
submitted by the prosecution is allegedly inadequate to sustain a conviction,
accused Ladiana, through counsel, waived his right to present controverting
evidence. Instead, he asked for time to file a written memorandum. Thus, In short, petitioner raises the following questions in this appeal: (1) whether the Counter-Affidavit
he executed during the preliminary investigation of this case is admissible proof showing his
both parties were given time within which to do so, after which the case
shall be deemed submitted for resolution. complicity in the crime, (2) whether the Sandiganbayan erred in denying his Motion for Leave to
File a Demurrer to Evidence, and (3) whether he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender.
"Thereafter, this Court received on October 25, 1996 by mail the
Memorandum for the defense. As for the prosecution, it opted not to file
any."10 (Citations omitted) This Court’s Ruling

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan The Petition is not meritorious.

The Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution had been able to establish the guilt of petitioner
beyond reasonable doubt. The court a quo held that his Counter-Affidavit,11 in which he had
 First Issue: There is no question that even in the absence of counsel, the admissions made by petitioner in
his Counter-Affidavit are not violative of his constitutional rights. It is clear from the undisputed
facts that it was not exacted by the police while he was under custody or interrogation. Hence,
Admissibility of Counter-Affidavit
the constitutional rights of a person under custodial investigation as embodied in Article III,
Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, are not at issue in this case.
Undeniably, the resolution of this case hinges mainly on the admissibility of the Counter-
Affidavit17 submitted by petitioner during the preliminary investigation. He argues that no counsel
However, the accused -- whether in court or undergoing preliminary investigation before the
was present when the Affidavit was executed. In support of his argument, he cites the
public prosecutor -- unquestionably possess rights that must be safeguarded. These include: 1)
Constitution thus:
the right to refuse to be made witnesses; 2) the right not to have any prejudice whatsoever
imputed to them by such refusal; 3) the right to testify on their own behalf, subject to cross-
"SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the examination by the prosecution; and 4) while testifying, the right to refuse to answer a specific
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel question that tends to incriminate them for some crime other than that for which they are being
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be prosecuted.25
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
We do not, however, agree with the Sandiganbayan’s characterization of petitioner’s Counter-
Affidavit as an extrajudicial confession. It is only an admission. Sections 26 and 33 of Rule 130
xxx xxx xxx of the Revised Rules on Evidence distinguish one from the other as follows:

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be "SEC. 26. Admissions of a party. – The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant
inadmissible in evidence against him."18 fact may be given in evidence against him.

It is well-settled that the foregoing legal formalities required by the fundamental law of the land "SEC. 33. Confession. – The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
apply only to extra-judicial confessions or admissions obtained during custodial investigations. 19 charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him."
Indeed, the rights enumerated in the constitutional provision "exist only in custodial
interrogations, or in-custody interrogation of accused persons."20
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt; in an admission, there is merely a
statement of fact not directly involving an acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal intent to
Custodial interrogation is the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has commit the offense with which one is charged.26 Thus, in the case at bar, a statement by the
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. 21 accused admitting the commission of the act charged against him but denying that it was done
with criminal intent is an admission, not a confession. 27
In the present case, petitioner admits that the questioned statements were made during the
preliminary investigation, not during the custodial investigation. However, he argues that the The Counter-Affidavit in question contains an admission that petitioner actually shot the victim
right to competent and independent counsel also applies during preliminary investigations. when the latter was attacking him. We quote the pertinent portion:

We disagree. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or a proceeding to determine whether "[K]aya itong si Kapitan San Juan ay sumugod at hinawakan ako sa may leeg ng aking suot na
there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, T-shirt upang ako ay muling saksakin; sa dahilang hindi ako makatakbo o makaiwas sa kabila
and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. 22 ng aking pananalag hanggang magpaputok ako ng pasumala sa kanya; sa bilis ng pangyayari
ay hindi ko alam na siya ay tinamaan;"28
Evidently, a person undergoing preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor cannot be
considered as being under custodial investigation. In fact, this Court has unequivocally declared Through the above statement, petitioner admits shooting the victim -- which eventually led to the
that a defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not under custodial interrogation. 23 latter’s death -- but denies having done it with any criminal intent. In fact, he claims he did it in
It explained as follows: self-defense. Nevertheless, whether categorized as a confession or as an admission, it is
admissible in evidence against him.
"His [accused] interrogation by the police, if any there had been would already have
been ended at the time of the filing of the criminal case in court (or the public Further, we do not doubt the voluntariness of the Counter-Affidavit. Petitioner himself submitted
prosecutor’s office). Hence, with respect to a defendant in a criminal case already it to the public prosecutor to justify his actions in relation to the charges hurled against him. It
pending in court (or the public prosecutor’s office), there is no occasion to speak of his escapes this Court how he can cavalierly deny a document that he has voluntarily submitted and
right while under ‘custodial interrogation’ laid down by the second and subsequent originally relied upon in his defense.
sentences of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution [now Section 12, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution], for the obvious reason that he is no longer under ‘custodial
In general, admissions may be rebutted by confessing their untruth or by showing they were
interrogation.’"24
made by mistake. The party may also establish that the response that formed the admission was
made in a jocular, not a serious, manner; or that the admission was made in ignorance of the
true state of facts.29 Yet, petitioner never offered any rationalization why such admissions had
been made, thus, leaving them unrebutted. In addition, admissions made under oath, as in the Neither do we believe petitioner’s claim that the anti-graft court "miserably failed to give equal
case at bar, are evidence of great weight against the declarant. They throw on him the burden of effect or treatment to all the allegations found therein (Counter-Affidavit) choosing deliberately
showing a mistake.30 and without reasonable basis the parts which are incriminating in character, and ignoring without
sufficient legal basis the exculpatory assertions of the accused."38
Petitioner contends that nowhere in the transcripts of this case can it be found that he has
admitted to the authorship, the authenticity or the voluntariness of the Counter-Affidavit. We The unsubstantiated and uncorroborated statements of petitioner in his Counter-Affidavit are
quote verbatim the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan: utterly insufficient to discharge his burden of proving that the act of killing was justified. It is
hornbook doctrine that self-defense must be proved with certainty by sufficient, satisfactory and
convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person
"PJ GARCHITORENA
invoking it.39 It cannot be entertained if it is uncorroborated by any separate and competent
evidence, and it is also doubtful.40 The question whether the accused acted in self-defense is
Well, he will identify the person who took the oath before him. Will you deny that it was essentially a question of fact properly evaluated by the lower court; in this case, the
your client who took the oath before the Fiscal at the preliminary investigation? Sandiganbayan.41

ATTY. ILAGAN By itself, the Counter-Affidavit miserably fails to establish the requisites of self-defense
enumerated in the law.42 Had petitioner been more vigilant in protecting his rights, he could have
presented clear and cogent evidence to prove those elements. But, as found by the court a quo,
We will admit that, your Honor. he not only failed to discharge the burden of proving the existence of the justifying circumstance
of self-defense; he did not even bother to present any evidence at all.43 So, we do not see how
PJ GARCHITORENA the Sandiganbayan could have been selective in its treatment of his Counter-Affidavit.

So in that case we will have no question about the authorship, authenticity and the Verily, if the accused fails to discharge the burden of proving the existence of self-defense or of
voluntariness of the execution of the counter-affidavit dated July 31, 1990? any other circumstance that eliminates criminal liability, his conviction shall of necessity follow,
Companiero? on the basis of his admission of the killing.44 Upholding this principle does not in any way violate
his right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. When he admitted to having killed the
victim, the burden of proving his innocence fell on him. It became his duty to establish by clear
ATTY ILAGAN and convincing evidence the lawful justification for the killing.

Admitted, your Honor."31 Therefore, petitioner can no longer invoke his constitutional right to be presumed innocent of the
crime charged.45 As far as he is concerned, homicide has already been established. The fact of
The admissions of petitioner made through his counsel cannot be any clearer. To be sure, the death and its cause were established by his admissions coupled with the other prosecution
unbroken stream of judicial dicta is that, in the conduct of their case, clients are bound by the evidence including the Certificate of Death,46 the Certificate of Post-Mortem Examination47 and
actions of their counsels, save when the latter’s negligence is so gross, reckless and the Medico-Legal Findings.48 The intent to kill is likewise presumed from the fact of death. 49
inexcusable that the former are deprived of their day in court. 32 Also, clients, being bound by the
actions of their counsels, cannot complain that the result of the litigation might have been Second Issue:
different had their lawyers proceeded differently.33 A counsel may err as to the competency of
witnesses, the sufficiency and the relevance of evidence, the proper defense, the burden of
proof, the introduction or the withholding of witnesses or pieces of evidence, or the manner of Denial of Motion for Leave to File Demurrer
arguing the case. This Court, however, has ruled several times that those are not even proper
grounds for a new trial, unless the counsel’s incompetence is so gross that the clients are Petitioner then argues that the Sandiganbayan erred in not giving due course to his Motion for
prevented from fairly presenting their case.34
Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence. He brands this denial as legally and constitutionally
wrong.50
Having admitted that he had fatally shot the victim, petitioner had the duty of showing that the
killing was justified, and that the latter incurred no criminal liability therefor. 35 Petitioner should
We disagree. Prior leave to file a demurrer to evidence is discretionary upon the trial court. 51
have relied on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that for the And, unless there is grave abuse amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in its denial, the trial
prosecution. Even if his evidence be weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused has court’s resolution may not be disturbed.52
admitted the killing.36

Final Issue:
Petitioner argues that it was the prosecution that indirectly raised the issue of self-defense.
Hence, he could not be bound by it. This argument deserves scant consideration. As discussed
earlier, the declarations contained in his Counter-Affidavit are admissions that may be used as Voluntary Surrender
evidence against him.37 The Sandiganbayan did not unfairly presume that he had indeed raised
the theory of self-defense, because this argument had already been laid out in his Counter-
After vigorously arguing against his own Counter-Affidavit, petitioner, in a surprising change of
Affidavit. No presumption was necessary, because the admission was clear and unequivocal.
tenor, implores this Court to consider his voluntary surrender to the police authorities as a
mitigating circumstance. He argues that two of the prosecution witnesses testified that he had
surrendered to the police authorities after the shooting incident. 53 To buttress his argument, he
contends that the "main reason for his voluntary surrender is that he sincerely believe[d] that he
was legally justified in defending himself as a policeman when he fought the victim after he was
attacked by the latter."54 It goes without saying that this statement only reaffirms the admissions
contained in his Counter-Affidavit, which he so vehemently tried to discredit.

For voluntary surrender to mitigate criminal liability, the following elements must concur: 1) the
offender has not been actually arrested, 2) the offender surrenders himself to a person in
authority or to the latter’s agent, and 3) the surrender is voluntary.55 To be sufficient, the
surrender must be spontaneous and made in a manner clearly indicating the intent of the
accused to surrender unconditionally, either because they acknowledge their guilt or wish to
save the authorities the trouble and the expense that will necessarily be incurred in searching for
and capturing them.56

The only pieces of evidence in support of the plea of voluntary surrender made by petitioner are
statements made by two (2) prosecution witnesses that they were allegedly told by other people
that he had already gone to the police station. There is no showing that he was not actually
arrested; or that when he went to the police station, he surrendered himself to a person in
authority. Neither is there any finding that he has evinced a desire to own to any complicity in the
killing.1âwphi1

We have ruled in the past that the accused who had gone to the police headquarters merely to
report the shooting incident did not evince any desire to admit responsibility for the killing. Thus,
he could not be deemed to have voluntarily surrendered.57 In the absence of sufficient and
convincing proof showing the existence of indispensable circumstances, we cannot appreciate
voluntary surrender to mitigate petitioner’s penalty.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. Nos. 131799-801 February 23, 2004 Criminal Case No. 97-387

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee That sometime in the month of December 1996, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines,
vs. a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
FELICIANO ULIT y TAMPOY, appellant. design by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness upon complainant LUCELLE SERRANO y ULIT, an
eleven (11) year old girl, by then and there kissing her and touching her sexual organ, without
DECISION
her consent and against her will, to her damage and prejudice.

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision1 dated December 17, 1997 of the Regional
Criminal Case No. 97-388
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 62, in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 to 97-388 finding appellant
Feliciano Ulit y Tampoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of qualified rape.2 In the
same decision, the appellant was convicted of two counts of acts of lasciviousness. For each That on or about the 2nd day of March 1997, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a
count of rape, the trial court sentenced him to suffer the supreme penalty of death, while for place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design
each count of acts of lasciviousness, the appellant was sentenced to suffer imprisonment "from by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period, as feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness upon complainant LUCELLE SERRANO y ULIT, an
minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal in its eleven (11) year old girl, by then and there dragging her inside a bathroom and repeatedly
medium period, as maximum." The appellant was, likewise, ordered to indemnify the victim kissing her on her checks [sic], without her consent and against her will, to her damage and
Lucelle Serrano, the amount of ₱50,000 for each count of rape and ₱20,000 for each count of prejudice.
acts of lasciviousness.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
The Indictments
The appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty during the arraignment. Joint trial of all the
Upon the sworn complaint of the victim Lucelle Serrano, four Informations were filed against her cases ensued.
uncle, the appellant. The docket number and the accusatory portion of each Information reads:
In the meantime, Lucelle was undergoing psychiatric treatment at the Philippine General
Criminal Case No. 97-385 Hospital. On May 5, 1997, the prosecution presented her as its first witness.

That sometime in the month of November 1996, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, On direct examination, Lucelle testified that she was born on February 19, 1986. 7 In November
a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who is the 1996, her uncle, the appellant, did something to her. When the prosecution asked her what
uncle of the complainant LUCELLE SERRANO y ULIT, hence, her relative by consanguinity happened, Lucelle did not answer. When asked if she wanted to continue with her testimony,
within the third civil degree, while armed with a knife, by means of force, violence and again, she did not respond. The trial was reset to June 2 and 9, 1997. When trial resumed on
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the June 9, 1997, Lucelle was questioned by the prosecution on direct examination, but still, she
complainant LUCELLE SERRANO y ULIT, an eleven (11) year old girl, without her consent and gave no answer. She cried profusely in open court. When asked by the court if she wanted to
against her will, to her damage and prejudice. proceed with the trial, she remained silent. The trial was reset anew to July 9 and 14, 1997.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3 In the meantime, the trial court ordered that Lucelle be subjected to physical and psychological
examinations at the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH). Dr. Rochelflume Samson
examined Lucelle and submitted her Report dated August 29, 1997 with the following remarks
Criminal Case No. 97-386
and recommendation:

That sometime in the month of February 1997, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a
Based on clinical history, mental status examination and psychological evaluation, this patient is
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who is the uncle
suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. This illness is characterized by intense fear and
of complainant LUCELLE SERRANO y ULIT, hence her relative by consanguinity within the third
feeling of helplessness whenever she recalls her traumatic experience of being raped. It causes
civil degree, while armed with a knife, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and
her intense psychological distress whenever asked to talk about the rape scene or incident.
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant LUCELLE
Thus, she avoids recollections of the trauma.
SERRANO y ULIT, an eleven (11) year old girl, without her consent and against her will, to her
damage and prejudice.
At present, she is still manifesting symptoms described above. She would be having difficulties
testifying in court because of this. She requires psychiatric treatment at the Out-Patient Section.8
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
During the trial on July 14, 1997, Lucelle refused to take the witness stand. The trial was reset to Lourdes Serrano testified that she was Lucelle’s mother. Lucelle was born on February 19,
July 21, 1997. 1986.12 She and her husband Celso Serrano and their daughter Lucelle resided with her mother,
Guadalupe Ulit, at No. 7104 San Maximo Street, Olympia, Makati City. Her sister Marina and the
appellant, her brother, also resided in the same house. The family slept together in the evenings
During the hearing on October 20, 1997, the prosecution presented Lucelle anew to continue
in the sala of the house while Marina slept in her bedroom. At times, Marina allowed her niece
with her testimony on direct examination. She declared that the appellant raped her in November
Lucelle to sleep in her bedroom. At 11:00 p.m. on February 19, 1997, Lourdes noticed that
1996 and many other times thereafter in her residence at No. 7104 San Maximo Street, Makati
Lucelle was not at her side. The appellant, who usually also slept in the sala, was not there
City. Instead of asking questions to elicit the facts and circumstances before and during the
either. Lourdes went to Marina’s bedroom and saw Lucelle in bed (papag), covered with a
commission of the crimes, the prosecutor asked Lucelle to identify her signature in her sworn
blanket. Beside her was the appellant who was wearing a pair of short pants and undershirt.
statement9 and to affirm the truth of its contents. She did so. The public prosecutor then marked
When the appellant saw Lourdes, he slid down from the bed, went under the papag, and furtively
the sworn statement in evidence as Exhibit "H," and then manifested to the court that he had no
left the room. When Lourdes removed the blanket, she saw Lucelle lying sideways with her
more questions for the witness on direct examination.
knees up to her chin (nakabaluktot). Lucelle was trembling with fear. When Lourdes asked
Lucelle what happened, she did not respond. Lourdes left the room and went back to the sala.
On clarificatory questions by the court, Lucelle testified that she was born on February 19, 1986. She wanted to talk to the appellant but decided against it when she saw him seated in the sala,
The appellant mounted her, removed her pants, poked a knife at her and threatened her. 10 playing with his balisong.

On cross-examination, Lucelle testified that the appellant was her mother’s older brother. In Lourdes further testified that at 9:00 p.m. on March 2, 1997, she and her husband were having
November 1996, she was not enrolled in any school. Her father was working at a construction dinner when she noticed that Lucelle was nowhere to be found. She looked for her daughter in
firm, the appellant was employed at the Department of Environment and Sanitation in Makati the house, but failed to find her. She then asked her cousin Nita if she had seen Lucelle. Nita
City, while her grandmother, who lived with her, worked as a maid in Bel Air Subdivison. Her replied in the negative. When Lourdes asked Nita if Lucelle was inside the bathroom, Nita
mother worked for one of her father’s cousins. On re-direct examination, the prosecution elicited responded that the appellant was using it. Momentarily, Lourdes saw the appellant emerge from
from Lucelle that the appellant raped her in November 1996 at 11:00 p.m. inside the room of her the bathroom. He was in his short pants and his shirt was on his shoulder. He was perspiring
aunt Marina in her grandmother’s house at No. 7104 San Maximo Street, Olympia, Makati City, profusely. Lourdes was flabbergasted when she saw Lucelle come out of the bathroom after the
and that her aunt, Marina, and her Ate Sharon were inside the room. When asked where her appellant. Lucelle was crying and looked pale. When Lourdes asked Lucelle why she was
aunt and Ate Sharon were when she was being raped in her aunt’s room, Lucelle did not crying, she told her mother that she had just urinated. The appellant later told her sister Lourdes
respond. When asked why she did not respond to the questions propounded to her during the that he did not do anything to Lucelle.
previous hearings and why she had been crying in open court, Lucelle replied that she was
afraid of her uncle, the appellant.
Believing that the appellant had been abusing their daughter, Celso and Lourdes brought
Lucelle on March 5, 1997, to Barangay Chairman Romeo Medina. On their way, Lucelle
In her sworn statement,11 Lucelle alleged that sometime in November 1996, she was sleeping in adamantly refused to tell her parents what the appellant did to her. However, when they reached
a room in the house. It was about 6 o’clock in the evening. She was awakened when she felt the barangay headquarters, Lucelle told the barangay chairman that the appellant sexually
someone kissing her on the cheek. When she opened her eyes, she saw her uncle, the abused her. Thereafter, Lourdes filed a complaint with the barangay chairman against the
appellant, armed with a bladed weapon (balisong). He poked the weapon on the left side of her appellant for sexually molesting Lucelle.
neck. He warned her that if she told her parents, he would kill her. He removed her panties,
undressed himself and mounted her. He then inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt pain in
Barangay Tanod Fernando David testified that on March 6, 1997, the barangay chairman
her private part and cried. The appellant, thereafter, left the room. Also during the month of
ordered him and Barangay Tanod Antonio Echavez to invite and bring the appellant to the
November 1996, the appellant continued kissing her whenever her parents were out of the
barangay hall. The barangay chairman asked the appellant if he raped Lucelle and the latter
house.
replied that he did. A Sinumpaang Salaysay was prepared in the Office of the Barangay
Chairman in which the appellant admitted that he raped Lucelle in February 1997, and on March
In December 1996, Lucelle was in the room when the appellant entered and kissed her and 2, 1997, despite her resistance, and that he threatened to kill her and her family if she divulged
mashed her private parts. Sometime in February 1997, the appellant again abused her the incidents to her parents.13 The appellant signed his statement in the presence of the
(sinalbahe) while she was in the same room. It was about 11 o’clock in the evening. He again barangay chairman and the barangay tanods.
warned her not to divulge to her parents what he did to her. At 9:00 p.m. on March 2, 1997,
Lucelle urinated in the bathroom and when she was about to go out, the appellant entered,
From the barangay headquarters, the appellant was brought to the Makati City Police
pushed her inside and kissed her on her cheeks several times.
Headquarters where Celso, Lourdes and Lucelle filed a complaint against him for rape and acts
of laciviousness. SPO4 Lilia Hogar of the Women’s Desk Unit took the sworn statements of
Celso Serrano, Lucelle’s father, testified that sometime in November 1996, at dawn, he was in Lourdes and Lucelle.14 She conducted a custodial investigation of the appellant who was without
bed and noticed that the appellant was in the bedroom of his cousin-in-law. Sometime later, he counsel during which the latter admitted having raped the victim. SPO4 Hogar also prepared a
went to the bathroom. He then heard his wife ask the appellant where he had come from and the report on her investigation of the victim’s complaint.15
latter replied that he just came from the roof of the house. On another occasion, one early
Sunday morning, he noticed blood stains on Lucelle’s short pants. When she declared that she
On July 28, 1997, Dr. Armie M. Soreta-Umil, NBI Medico-Legal Officer, testified that on March
had her monthly period, he gave her ₱5.00 with which to buy sanitary napkins. Lucelle refused
12, 1997, she conducted genital and vaginal examinations on Lucelle and submitted Living Case
to accept the money. He suggested that she wash herself but she just nodded her head. When
Report No. MG-97-355 which contained the following findings:
he asked her why she refused to accept the money, Lucelle replied that she was afraid to tell
him because she might be killed.
GENERAL PHYSICAL EXAMINATION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

Height: 141 cm. Weight: 78 lbs. 1. In Criminal Case Nos. 97-385 and 97-386, for rape, the prosecution has proven
beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused, FELICIANO ULIT Y TAMPOY, as
principal in the two counts of statutory rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of
Normally developed, fairly nourished, conscious, coherent, cooperative, ambulatory subject.
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. He is hereby declare[d] CONVICTED in each
of the cases. Accordingly he is sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty [of] DEATH in
Breasts, developing, conical, firm. Areolae, light-brown, 2.6 cms. in diameter. Nipples, light- each of the two cases; and indemnify the victim LUCELLE SERRANO, in the amount
brown, protruding, 0.8 cm. in diameter. of P50,000 as moral damages for each of the cases;

No extragenital physical injuries noted. 2. In Criminal Case Nos. 97-387 and 97-388, for acts of lasciviousness, the
prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused,
FELICIANO ULIT Y TAMPOY, as principal in two counts of acts of lasciviousness
GENERAL EXAMINATION:
defined under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized under Section
5(b) of R.A. 7610. He is hereby declared CONVICTED in each of the two cases; and,
Pubic hair, fully grown, moderate. Labia majora, gaping. Labia minora, coaptated. Fourchette, accordingly, he is sentenced to suffer in each of the cases an indeterminate prison
lax. Vestibular mucosa, pinkish. Hymen, tall, thick, intact, distensible. Hymenal orifice, admits a term from eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor in its
tube 2.5 cms. in diameter. Vaginal walls, lax. Rugosities, shallow. medium period, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days
of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum; and, indemnify the victim,
LUCELLE SERRANO, in the amount of P20,000 as moral damages for each of the
CONCLUSIONS cases.

1.) No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the subject at SO ORDERED.18
the time of examination.

The trial court declared that even prescinding from the appellant’s plea of guilty, the prosecutor
2.) Hymen, intact but distensible, and its orifice wide (2.5 cms. in diameter) as to allow adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the appellant for qualified rape in Criminal
complete penetration by an average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full erection Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-386. The trial court ruled that although Lucelle did not testify on the
without producing any genital injury.16 contents of her sworn statement19 the same were admissible in evidence as part of the res
gestae.
When the prosecution offered in evidence the appellant’s Sinumpaang Salaysay before the
barangay chairman17 as part of the testimony of Barangay Tanod Fernando David, the appellant The appellant did not appeal from the decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-387 and 97-388. In
objected to its admission on the ground that the appellant was not assisted by counsel and that, view of the trial court’s imposition of the death penalty on the appellant in Criminal Cases Nos.
he was forced and coerced into signing the same. Nevertheless, the trial court admitted the 97-385 and 97-386, the said cases were brought to this Court on automatic appeal.
statement as part of David’s testimony. The appellant’s counsel, likewise, objected to the
admissibility of Lucelle’s sworn statement on the ground that she was incompetent to give the
same because of her mental illness. The trial court admitted the sworn statement of Lucelle in The appellant assails the decision of the trial court with the lone assignment of error, to wit:
evidence as part of her testimony.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING THE ACCUSED FELICIANO ULIT WITH A
After the prosecution had rested its case, the trial court reset the hearing to November 5, 1997 DEATH PENALTY DESPITE HIS ADMISSION OF GUILT.20
for the appellant to adduce his evidence. When the case was called for trial on that date, his
counsel manifested to the court that the appellant was changing his plea in Criminal Cases Nos.
The appellant does not contest his conviction for rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-
97-385 and 97-387 from "not guilty" to "guilty." He also manifested that he would no longer 386, and the validity of the proceedings in the said cases in the trial court. He pleads, however,
adduce any evidence in his defense in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-386 and 97-388 because the that he be spared the death penalty. He asserts that he was so remorseful for the crimes he
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crimes charged therein.
committed and that he pleaded guilty in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-387; he no longer
The trial court suspended the proceedings and gave the appellant forty-five minutes to confer presented any evidence in Criminal Case No. 97-388 so that the proceedings before the court
with his counsel. When trial resumed, the appellant reiterated his earlier manifestation. When would be shortened and simplified. Nevertheless, the appeal in a criminal case is a review de
told by the court that he could be sentenced to death for the rape charges, the appellant stood
novo and the court is not limited to the assigned errors.21 An appeal thus opens the whole case
pat on his decision to plead guilty in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-387, and to no longer for review, and the appellate tribunal may consider and correct errors though unassigned and
present any evidence in his defense in the other two cases. The appellant was re-arraigned in even reverse the decision of the trial court on the grounds other than those the parties raised as
Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-387 with the assistance of the same counsel and entered
errors.22
his plea of guilty to the charges.

Appellant’s Plea of Guilty in

On December 15, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the appellant of all the
Criminal Case No. 97-385
crimes charged. The decretal portion of the decision reads: was Imprudently Made.
In Criminal Case No. 97-385, the appellant was charged with qualified rape, i.e., the rape of his (5) Require the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges against
niece, who was a minor, punishable by death under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as him or make him reenact the manner in which he perpetrated the crime, or cause him
amended by Republic Act No. 7659. Undoubtedly, the appellant was charged with a capital to supply missing details or significance.27
offense. When the appellant informed the trial court of his decision to change his plea of "not
guilty" to "guilty," it behooved the trial court to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness
In People vs. Ostia,28 we held that the trial court is also required to probe thoroughly into the
and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea as mandated by Section 6, Rule 116 of
reasons or motivations, as well as the facts and circumstances for a change of plea of the
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. In People vs. Camay, 23 this Court enumerated the
accused and his comprehension of his plea; explain to him the elements of the crime for which
following duties of the trial court under the rule:
he is charged as well as the nature and effect of any modifying circumstances attendant to the
commission of the offense, inclusive of mitigating and aggravating circumstances, as well as the
1. The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full qualifying and special qualifying circumstances, and inform him of the imposable penalty and his
comprehension [by the accused] of the consequences of his plea; civil liabilities for the crime for which he would plead guilty to. 29

2. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the In this case, the trial court failed to make a searching inquiry into the appellant’s voluntariness
accused and precise degree of his culpability; and and full comprehension of his plea of guilty. This is evident by the transcript of stenographic
notes taken on November 5, 1998:
3. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence in his behalf and allow
him to do so if he desires.24 ATTY. MANALO

The raison d’etre for the rule is that the courts must proceed with extreme care where the Your Honor, at today’s reception of defense’ evidence, accused informed this representation that
imposable penalty is death, considering that the execution of such sentence is irrevocable. he will no longer present evidence and instead willing to change his plea from not guilty to that of
Experience has shown that even innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty. Improvident guilty. This accused’s representation is therefore praying that he be allowed to change his plea
pleas of guilty to a capital offense on the part of the accused must be averted since by admitting from that of not guilty to guilty.
his guilt before the trial court, the accused would forfeit his life and liberty without having fully
understood the meaning, significance and the dire consequences of his plea. 25
COURT

There is no hard and fast rule as to how the trial judge may conduct a searching inquiry. It has
You better confer with your client and explain to him the consequences of his intended change
been held, however, that the focus of the inquiry must be on the voluntariness of the plea and
of plea from not guilty to that of guilty.
the full or complete comprehension by the accused of his plea of guilty so that it can truly be said
that it is based on a free and informed judgment. In People vs. Aranzado,26 we formulated the
following guidelines as to how the trial court may conduct its searching inquiry: ATTY. MANALO

(1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the Yes, Your Honor.
law; (b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial
and preliminary investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and
interrogated during the investigations. These the court shall do in order to rule out the COURT (to the accused)
possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either
by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent or avenging quarters. Is your counsel’s manifestation true, that you would like to change your plea from not guilty to
that of guilty and that you are no longer presenting evidence in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-386 and
(2) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred 97-388?
with, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a
plea of guilty. ACCUSED

(3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, Yes, Your Honor.
socio-economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a
trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
COURT

(4) Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under
the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. Not infrequently indeed an (to the accused)
accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or
because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit You talk with your lawyer and think twice before asking the court to change your plea of not
guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to see to it that the accused does guilty to that of guilty. The Court will call your case again.
not labor under these mistaken impressions.
… (to accused)

COURT Do you know that by pleading guilty you will be sentenced in accordance with [what] the law
provides?
(to the accused)
ACCUSED
Mr. Ulit, earlier your counsel informed the court that you would like to change your plea from not
guilty to that of guilty, in Criminal Case No. 97-385, for rape and Criminal Case No. 97-387, for Yes, Your Honor.
Acts of Lasciviousness, do you affirm the manifestation of your counsel?
COURT
ACCUSED
(to accused)
Yes, Your Honor.
Do you know that the penalty provided for by law is death penalty because the Information
COURT states that the victim is eleven years old and your niece and that you used a deadly weapon in
the commission of the rape?
(to accused)
ACCUSED
Do you know that you are accused here for the crime of rape, a capital offense which carries
with it a capital punishment? Yes, Your Honor. I am willing to plead guilty.

ACCUSED COURT

Yes, Your Honor. Alright, arraign the accused.30

COURT First. The trial court did not ask the appellant his reasons for changing his plea, from
not guilty to that of guilty, and the cogent circumstances that led him to decide to do
so.
(to accused)

Second. It appears in the Informations filed by the Public Prosecutor that the appellant
Despite your knowledge that you are charged with a capital offense which carries with it a capital
opted not to avail himself of his right to a regular preliminary investigation and refused
penalty you still insists that you are pleading guilty?
to execute a waiver under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. The records also
show that the appellant executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay while detained at the
ACCUSED barangay hall where he confessed to having raped the victim in February 1997 and
March 2, 1997. However, the trial court did not ask the appellant whether he was
assisted by counsel when he was brought to the Office of the Public Prosecutor for
Yes, Your Honor. inquest investigation. Neither did the court a quo inquire about the circumstances and
the appellant’s reasons for refusing to execute the said waiver.
COURT (to accused)
The records show that when the prosecution offered the appellant’s Sinumpaang
Was there anyone who forced you to change your plea of not guilty to that of guilty? Salaysay in evidence to prove that he confessed to having raped the victim in
February 1997 and March 2, 1997, the appellant objected thereto on the ground that
he was not assisted by counsel and that he was coerced into signing the same.
ACCUSED

Third. The trial court also failed to ascertain from the appellant whether he was
None, Your Honor. assisted by counsel when he executed his Sinumpaang Salaysay while detained at
the barangay hall; and, if he was not so assisted by counsel, whether he had waived
COURT his right thereto, before and when he signed his Sinumpaang Salaysay.
 Fourth. The trial court failed to ask the appellant why he was pleading guilty to a rape the nature of the defense which the accused may raise, the burden of proof remains at all times
committed in November 1996, when in his Sinumpaang Salaysay,31 he confessed to upon the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.35
having raped the victim only in February 1997 and March 2, 1997. The appellant did
not admit having raped her in November 1996 as alleged in the Information in Criminal
The Prosecution Adduced Proof
Case No. 97-385. The trial court did not even inquire from the appellant who prepared
of the Appellant’s Guilt Beyond
and typed his Sinumpaang Salaysay and if the contents of his statement were
Reasonable Doubt of the Crime
explained to him before he signed the same.
of Rape in Criminal Case
No. 97-385
Fifth. The trial court did not explain the following to the appellant, in plain and simple
terms so as to be understood by him: (a) the elements of the crime of qualified rape;
We have reviewed the evidence on record and we are convinced that the prosecution adduced
(b) the circumstances of relationship and the minority of the victim; and (c) that his
proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant raped the victim in November 1996. The victim
plea of guilty to qualified rape would not mitigate the penalty for the crime in light of
declared in her sworn statement, on direct examination and her testimony on clarificatory
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
questions made by the trial court, that indeed, the appellant raped her in November 1996.
Quoted hereunder is the testimony of Lucelle on direct and on re-direct examination:
Sixth. It was not explained to the appellant that if convicted of qualified rape, he would
be civilly liable to the victim in the amount of ₱50,000 as moral damages and ₱75,000
Fiscal
as civil indemnity ex delicto.

Q So, matapos mong ituro ang tiyuhin mo, ano ang ginawa niya sa iyo?
Seventh. Neither did the trial court inquire from the appellant’s counsel whether the
meaning and the consequences of a guilty plea were explained to the appellant in a
language or dialect known to and understood by him. A Ginahasa niya ako.

Eight. The trial court failed to delve into and ascertain from the appellant his age, Q Ilang ulit kang ginahasa?
educational attainment and socio-economic status.
A Marami po.
Ninth. The trial court failed to ask the appellant to narrate the facts and circumstances
surrounding the incident of qualified rape as charged in Criminal Case No. 97-385.
Q Kailan ka ginahasa ng tiyuhin mo?

Tenth. The appellant was not asked if he desired to adduce evidence in Criminal Case
No. 97-385 in spite of his plea of guilty. A November po.

Q 19?
As a rule, this Court has set aside convictions based on pleas of guilty in capital offenses
because of the improvidence thereof, and when such plea is the sole basis of the condemnatory
judgment.32 However, where the trial court receives, independently of his plea of guilty, evidence A 1996, po.
to determine whether the accused committed the crimes charged and the precise degree of his
criminal culpability therefor, he may still be convicted if there is ample proof on record, not
contingent on the plea of guilty, on which to predicate conviction. 33 Q Saan ka ginahasa?

In this case, the prosecution had already rested its case when the appellant decided to change A 7104 San Maximo St., Makati City, po.36
his plea. In fact, the trial court granted the prosecution’s motion that the evidence it had
presented be considered proof of the degree of culpability of the appellant. It is, thus, incumbent …
upon this Court to determine whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution in Criminal Case
No. 97-385 is sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt the appellant’s guilt for qualified
rape. Fiscal

In determining the guilt of the accused in rape cases, the Court is guided by the following Q Humigit-kumulang, anong oras ng gabi nang gahasain ka ng Tito Ely mo noong
considerations: (a) that an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove, but Nobyembre 1996?
more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) that in view of the intrinsic
nature of the crime which usually involves two persons, the testimony of the complainant must A Alas onse po ng gabi.
be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or
fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence
of the defense.34 It, likewise, bears stressing that in all criminal prosecutions, without regard to Q Samakatuwid, hindi na siya nagtratrabaho, wala na siya sa trabaho?
 A Wala na po. The basis for the exclusion appears to lie in the fact that such testimony is not subject to the test
which can ordinarily be applied for the ascertainment of truth of testimony, since the declarant is
not present and available for cross-examination. In criminal cases, the admission of hearsay
Q Saang lugar ka ginahasa?
evidence would be a violation of the constitutional provision while the accused shall enjoy the
right to confront and cross-examine the witness testifying against him.43 Generally, the affidavits
A Sa 7104 San Maximo St. of persons who are not presented to testify on the truth of the contents thereof are hearsay
evidence.44 Such affidavit must be formally offered in evidence and accepted by the court;
otherwise, it shall not be considered by the court for the simple reason that the court shall
Q Sa loob ba ng bahay? consider such evidence formally offered and accepted.45

A Opo.
In this case, Lucelle testified on and affirmed the truth of the contents of her sworn statement
which she herself had given. As gleaned from the said statement, she narrated how and when
Q Saang parte ng bahay ka ginahasa ng Tito mo? the appellant raped and subjected her to lascivious acts. She was cross-examined by the
appellant’s counsel and answered the trial court’s clarificatory questions. The prosecution
offered her sworn statement as part of her testimony and the court admitted the same for the
A Sa kuwarto po.37 said purpose without objection on the part of the appellant.

... The Prosecution Proved Beyond

Reasonable Doubt that the Appellant
COURT Raped the Victim in February 1997

Q Noong Nobyembre 1996, ayon sa iyo ay ginahasa ka ng iyong Tito. Saan ka The trial court convicted the appellant of rape in Criminal Case No. 97-386 on the basis of
ginahasa ng Tito mo? Lucelle’s sworn statement,46 the testimony of her mother, Lourdes Serrano, the appellant’s
statement47 executed in the Barangay Chairman’s Office, and the testimony of Dr. Armie Soreta-
Umil. We agree with the trial court’s findings and conclusion.
A Sa 7104 San Maximo St., po.

First. In Lucelle’s sworn statement,48 she declared that the appellant subjected her to
Q Doon din sa bahay na iyong tinitirhan? sexual abuse.

A Opo.38 Second. Lourdes saw Lucelle in bed (papag) in Marina’s room, covered with a blanket
beside the appellant who was wearing a pair of short pants and undershirt. He slid
In her Sworn Statement,39 Lucelle narrated in detail how the appellant ravished her: down from the papag, went under the bed and slipped outside. When Lourdes
removed the blanket, she saw Lucelle trembling with fear, lying sidewise, her knees
near her chin (nakabaluktot).
06. T: Kailan ka unang senalbahe ng iyong TITO ELY?

Third. The appellant admitted to the barangay chairman on March 5, 1997, that he
S: Noon pong Nobyembre 1996 hindi ko na po matandaan ang petsa, mga bandang 6:00 ng raped Lucelle in February 1997:
gabi po nang ako ay natutulog sa loob po ng kuwarto ay nagising na lang po ako nang
maramdaman ko na may humahalik sa aking pisngi, at nang ako po ay magising ay nakita ko po
si TITO ELY na may hawak na balisong na humigit kumulang po sa 10 pulgada ang haba na Na, noong isang araw ng PEBRERO 1997, sa loob ng kuwarto ng aking kapatid na babae,
nakatutok sa aking kaliwang leeg habang humahalik po sa aking pisngi at ang sabi ay kung ako pumasok ako na nadatnang nakahiga si LUCILLE ULIT sa isang papag na anyong natutulog.
daw po ay magsusumbong sa aking magulang ay papatayin po niya (TITO ELY) ako. Lumapit ako sa kanya at pinaghihipuan sa maseselang parte ng kanyang katawan at nang
Pagkatapos po ay hinubaran po ako ng panty at naghubad na rin po si TITO ELY ng kanyang siya’y magising tinakot ko siyang huwag sisigaw, habang siya ay aking hinuhubaran ng "Short"
short pants at pumatong na po sa akin. Ipinasok po ni TITO ELY and kanyang (TITO ELY) ari sa na kasama pati ang kanyang "panty." Nagpupumiglas siya habang ako ay nakadagan sa kanya
aking "PEPE" at ako po ay nasaktan at umiyak na lang po ako at nang makaraos po si TITO na noon din ay hinuhubad ko ang aking "brief." Pinaghahalikan ko po siya habang siya ay
ELY ay umalis na lang .…40 nagpupumiglas at umiiyak at noon din ay aking pinasok ang aking ari sa kanyang ari. Umiiyak
siya habang ang aking ari ay labas masok sa kanyang ari. Nang ako ay makaraos ay tinakot ko
siyang huwag magsusumbog sa kanyang mga magulang.49
We do not agree with the ruling of the trial court that the contents of the sworn statement of
Lucelle are hearsay, simply because she did not testify thereon and merely identified her
signatures therein. By hearsay evidence is meant that kind of evidence which does not derive its Although the appellant was not assisted by counsel at the time he gave his statement to the
value solely from the credence to be attributed to the witness herself but rests solely in part on barangay chairman and when he signed the same, it is still admissible in evidence against him
the veracity and competence of some persons from whom the witness has received the because he was not under arrest nor under custodial investigation when he gave his
information.41 It signifies all evidence which is not founded upon the personal knowledge of the statement.50
witness from whom it is elicited, and which, consequently, is not subject to cross-examination.42
The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an circumstance must be specifically alleged in the information, it must be established with certainty
unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the that the victim was below eighteen (18) years of age or that she was a minor at the time of the
potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. As intended by the commission of the crime. It must be stressed that the severity of the death penalty, especially its
1971 Constitutional Convention, this covers "investigation conducted by police authorities which irreversible and final nature once carried out, makes the decision-making process in capital
will include investigations conducted by the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such other offenses aptly subject to the most exacting rules of procedure and evidence. 54
police agencies in our government."51 The barangay chairman52 is not deemed a law
enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the
The relationship between the appellant and the victim has been adequately established. The
Constitution. Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that the appellant’s
allegations in both Informations that the appellant is the victim’s "uncle," "a relative by
statement before the barangay chairman is inadmissible.
consanguinity within the third civil degree" is specific enough to satisfy the special qualifying
circumstance of relationship.
The Sufficiency of Evidence on
Lucelle’s Relationship with the
In People v. Ferolino,55 we said –
Appellant, her Minority, and the
Propriety of the Imposition of
the Death Penalty In this case the allegation that FERLYN is ANTONIO's niece is not specific enough to satisfy the
special qualifying circumstances of relationship. If the offender is merely a relation - not a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, or guardian or common law spouse of the mother of the victim - it must
The appellant’s conviction for two counts of rape having been duly established by the
be alleged in the information that he is "a relative by consanguinity or affinity [as the case may
prosecution, we now come to the question of the penalty to be meted upon him.
be] within the third civil degree." That relationship by consanguinity or affinity was not alleged
in the informations in these cases. Even if it was, it was still necessary to further allege that such
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, relationship was within the third civil degree.56
which was the law in effect at the time of the commission of the subject rapes, provides in part:
The prosecution’s evidence has also shown that the appellant is the victim’s uncle, being the
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge older brother of the victim’s mother, a fact that the appellant himself admitted.
of a woman under any of the following circumstances.
The same cannot, however, be said with respect to the age of the victim. In People v. Pruna, 57
1. By using force or intimidation; the Court, after noting the divergent rulings on proof of age of the victim in rape cases, set out
certain guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as qualifying
circumstance:
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as
baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more would suffice to prove age.
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
... destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's
mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to
testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be
following attendant circumstances: sufficient under the following circumstances:

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to

... be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;

The qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship must concur. More importantly, they c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to
must be both alleged and proved, in order to qualify the crime of rape and warrant the imposition be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
of the death penalty.53 In addition to the requirement that the qualifying and aggravating
 4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of The victim is entitled to moral damages without need of proof other than the fact of the rape itself
the victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's because it is assumed that the victim has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award. 60
testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. We find the trial court’s award of ₱50,000 as moral damages to the victim in each rape to be in
order.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party.
The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not However, the trial court erred in not awarding civil indemnity to the victim in each case, the same
be taken against him. being mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape.61 Thus, this Court awards the victim the
sum of ₱50,000 as civil indemnity for each count of rape.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the
victim.58 In addition to this, appellant is ordered to pay the victim P25,000 as exemplary damages, the
qualifying aggravating circumstance of use of a deadly weapon having attended the commission
of the crime.62
In the present case, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document was presented and
offered in evidence to prove Lucelle’s age. While the victim testified that she was born on
February 19, 1986, therefore 11 years old when the appellant twice raped her, the same will not WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 62, in Criminal
suffice as the appellant did not expressly and clearly admit the same as required by Pruna. The Cases Nos. 97-385 to 97-388 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The appellant Feliciano Ulit y
corroboration of Lucelle’s mother as to her age is not sufficient either, as there is no evidence Tampoy is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape in Criminal Cases
that the said certificate of birth was lost or destroyed or was unavailable without the fault of the Nos. 97-385 and 97-386, and in each case, is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
prosecution. The fact that there was no objection from the defense regarding the victim’s age reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the victim, Lucelle Serrano, ₱50,000 as moral damages;
cannot be taken against the appellant since it is the prosecution that has the burden of proving ₱50,000 as civil indemnity; and ₱25,000 as exemplary damages. Costs de oficio.
the same. Moreover, the trial court did not make a categorical finding of the victim’s minority,
another requirement mandated by Pruna.
SO ORDERED.

Another issue that needs to be settled is the third paragraph of Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, which provides that, "[w]henever rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the imposable penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death."

The evidence on record shows that the appellant raped Lucelle with the use of a deadly weapon
in both rape incidents as alleged in both informations, and under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the imposable penalty for the crime is
reclusion perpetua to death.

In the determination of whether the death penalty should be imposed on the appellant, the
presence of an aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime is crucial. In the cases
at bar, although the relationship of uncle and niece between the appellant and the victim has
been duly proven, the alternative circumstance of relationship under Article 15 of the Revised
Penal Code cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance against the appellant. While
it is true that the alternative circumstance of relationship is always aggravating in crimes against
chastity, regardless of whether the offender is a relative of a higher or lower degree of the
offended party, it is only taken into consideration under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code
"when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted
brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender." The relationship of
uncle and niece is not covered by any of the relationships mentioned. 59

Hence, for the prosecution’s failure to prove the age of the victim by any means set forth in
Pruna, and considering that the relationship of uncle and niece is not covered by any of the
relationships mentioned in Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the appellant can
only be convicted of rape in its aggravated form, the imposable penalty for which is reclusion
perpetua to death.

There being no modifying circumstances attendant to the commission of the crimes, the
appellant should be sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua for each count of rape, conformably
to Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code.
 G.R. No. 147201 January 15, 2004 According to a waitress of the Rooftop Diana Grace Sanchez Jaramillo, earlier or at 3:00 p.m. of
that fateful day, a man whom she later identified as Benjamin Sayaboc rang the doorbell of the
Rooftop and asked whether a woman wearing a green t-shirt had checked in. She answered in
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
the negative. As she was about to leave, Sayaboc asked another question, "What time does
vs.
your bosing arrive?" She replied that she did not know. She then went to the second floor of the
BENJAMIN SAYABOC y SEGUBA, PATRICIO ESCORPISO y VALDEZ, MARLON
establishment.3
BUENVIAJE y PINEDA, and MIGUEL BUENVIAJE y FLORES, appellants.

Tessie Pilar, the caretaker of the lodging house, narrated that between 5:30 and 5:45 p.m.
DECISION
Sayaboc, who was still seated in the swing beside the information counter with his hands tucked
in the pocket of his jacket, ordered a bottle of beer. She then went up to the kitchen, but was
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: delayed in delivering the beer because she gave some instructions to the dishwasher. When she
gave the beer to Benjamin, the latter was angry and asked why it took her so long to bring the
beer. Thereafter, she went upstairs and chatted with Jaramillo and some other waitresses. Then
Before us is the decision of 9 November 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva
the vehicle of Joseph Galam arrived.4
Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 2912 finding appellant Benjamin Sayaboc guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
death; and (2) finding appellant Marlon Buenviaje guilty as principal and appellants Miguel Shortly thereafter, they heard four gunbursts emanating from the ground floor of the building.
Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso guilty as accomplices in the crime of homicide. When Jaramillo looked down, she saw Sayaboc shooting Galam, causing the latter to fall to the
ground face up, with blood spurting out of his chest. Sayaboc forthwith ran out and disappeared
into the darkness.5
On 17 April 1995, an information was filed charging Benjamin Sayaboc, Patricio Escorpiso,
Marlon Buenviaje, and Miguel Buenviaje with murder, the accusatory portion of which reads as
follows: Meanwhile, at about 5:30 p.m. of that fateful day, as Joselito Parungao, Chief Barangay Tanod
of Barangay Quezon, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, was on his way to the Kowloon Restaurant
located along the national road, he saw Marlon Buenviaje with his father Miguel Buenviaje and
That on or about December 2, 1994, in the Municipality of Solano, Province of Nueva Patricio Escorpiso. The three were aboard a tricycle parked in a vacant lot between the Rooftop
Vizcaya, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- and Diego Theater. The younger Buenviaje was on the driver’s seat, while the older Buenviaje
named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping each other,
and Escorpiso were inside the sidecar. Parungao ordered pancit bihon. While he was waiting
and who were then armed with a firearm, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and outside of the restaurant, he noticed that the tricycle was still parked in the vacant lot, and the
feloniously with evident premeditation, by means of treachery and with intent to kill, three occupants thereof were talking with each other. After getting his order and while he was
attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of Joseph Galam y
getting out of the restaurant, Parungao heard four gunshots coming from behind the Rooftop
Antonio, by then and there suddenly firing at the said Joseph Galam y Antonio who building. He thereafter saw a person, whom he later came to know as Benjamin Sayaboc,
has not given any provocation, thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds which were walking briskly toward the tricycle and then rode behind Marlon Buenviaje. Afterwards, the
the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of tricycle sped off towards the center of the town.6
his heirs.1

The employees of the Rooftop lost no time in bringing Galam to a hospital, where he was
At their arraignment, appellants Benjamin Sayaboc, Patricio Escorpiso, and Miguel Buenviaje declared dead on arrival.7 Dr. Antonio R. Labasan, who conducted an autopsy on his cadaver,
pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder. Marlon Buenviaje, who was arrested only on 10 July found four gunshot wounds and opined that the first two of which were inflicted from behind and
1997, also pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment.
the last two were frontal.8

The evidence for the prosecution discloses as follows: That evening, SPO4 Roberto Cagungao, Chief Investigator of the Solano Police Station,
assigned some investigators to go to the scene of the crime to gather evidence. At about 10:00
At about 9:00 a.m. of 13 August 1994, while prosecution witness Abel Ramos was at a to 11:00 p.m., he and Lt. Alejandro Parungao brought Pilar and Jaramillo to the Philippine
vulcanizing shop in Barangay Quezon, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, he heard one Tessie National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City. Pilar and Jaramillo were
Pawid screaming from across the road: "Enough, enough, enough!" In front of her interviewed by the cartographic artist, who thereafter drew a cartographic sketch showing the
were Marlon Buenviaje and Joseph Galam, who were engaged in a fisticuff. By the face of the assailant.9
time Pawid was able to subdue the two men by standing between them and
embracing Galam, Buenviaje’s face was already bloodied and Galam’s shirt collar
On 8 March 1995, Pilar and Jaramillo identified Benjamin Sayaboc at the PNP Provincial
torn. As Buenviaje was leaving, he turned to face Galam and, with his right index Headquarters in Bayombong as the gunman who shot Joseph Galam to death. 10
finger making a slicing motion across his throat, shouted: "Putang-ina mo Joseph,
may araw ka rin, papatayin kita." Galam retorted, "Gago, traydor, gold digger, halika."
Buenviaje did not respond anymore and left on a tricycle.2 On the afternoon of that day, SPO4 Cagungao was called to the Provincial Command
Headquarters in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, to take the statement of Sayaboc. When he
arrived at the headquarters he saw Sayaboc being interviewed by reporters inside the
More than three months thereafter, or on 2 December 1994, Galam was shot to death at the
investigation room. He then brought Sayaboc to the inner part of the room. Before taking the
Rooftop Disco and Lodging House (Rooftop, for short) owned by him, which was located at statement of Sayaboc, he advised the latter of his constitutional rights. Then Sayaboc told him
Barangay Quezon, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya. that he wanted to have a counsel of his own choice. But since Sayaboc could not name one,
Cagungao asked the police officers to get a lawyer. Half an hour later, the police officers brought III
Atty. Rodolfo Cornejo of the PAO, who then conferred with Sayaboc for a while. After Cagungao
heard Sayaboc say, "okay," he continued the investigation, during which Atty. Cornejo remained
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
silent the entire time. However, Cagungao would stop questioning Sayaboc whenever Atty.
CONFESSION OF ACCUSED SAYABOC WHEN IT WAS TAKEN WITHOUT THE
Cornejo would leave to go to the comfort room.11 That night Sayaboc executed an extrajudicial
ASSISTANCE OF A COMPETENT AND INDEPENDENT COUNSEL NOR BY AN EFFECTIVE
confession12 in Ilocano dialect. He therein confessed to killing Joseph Galam at the behest of
AND VIGILANT COUNSEL.
Marlon Buenviaje for the sum of P100,000. He likewise implicated Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio
Escorpiso. The confession was also signed by Atty. Cornejo and attested to by one Fiscal Melvin
Tiongson. IV

At the hearing on 22 June 1999, after the prosecution rested its case, 1counsel for accused Mike THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING FATHER AND SON BUENVIAJE AND ACCUSED
Buenviaje, Marlon Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso manifested that he be given fifteen days to ESCORPISO LIKEWISE GUILTY WHEN IT DENIED THEM THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
file a motion for leave to admit demurrer to the evidence.13 The trial court acceded. But instead TO BE HEARD BY THEMSELVES AND COUNSEL AFTER THEY FILED THEIR DEMURRER
of filing such motion first, he filed a Demurrer to Evidence on 12 July 1999.14 The motion for TO EVIDENCE ALLEGEDLY WITHOUT FIRST SEEKING EXPRESS LEAVE OF COURT.
leave to file the pleading was filed the next day only.15
In the first and second assigned errors, the appellants contend that the crime committed by
The trial court denied the demurrer to evidence in an order16 issued on 16 August 1999. Further, Sayaboc was homicide only, there being no proof of treachery because the two eyewitnesses
it ruled that because of they did not seek nor were granted express leave of court prior to their did not see the commencement of the shooting. Besides, treachery, as well as evident
filing of the demurrer to evidence, the Buenviajes and Escorpiso were deemed to have premeditation, was not specifically designated as a qualifying circumstance in the information.
submitted their case for judgment in accordance with Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. Neither can the aggravating circumstances of craft and price or reward be appreciated because
Thus, only Sayaboc was allowed to proceed with the presentation of his defense. they were not alleged in the information, albeit proved during trial. Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110
of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which require aggravating and qualifying
circumstances to be alleged in the information, are beneficial to the accused and should,
Sayaboc denied having committed the crime and proffered the defense of alibi. He also flatly
therefore, be applied retroactively.
denied having met Atty. Cornejo or having been informed of his rights. He testified to having
been beaten by six or seven police officers in the investigating room, who then coerced him to
confess to having killed Galam.17 Apart from his testimony, he submitted a handwritten As to the third assigned error, the appellants argue that the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc
statement dated 20 March 199518 and an affidavit dated 10 April 199519 to support his claim of may not be admitted in evidence against him because Atty. Cornejo, the PAO lawyer who was
police brutality and retraction of his confession. his counsel during the custodial investigation, was not a competent, independent, vigilant, and
effective counsel. He was ineffective because he remained silent during the entire proceedings.
He was not independent, as he was formerly a judge in the National Police Commission, which
In its decision dated 9 November 2000,20 the trial court found Benjamin Sayaboc guilty of the
was holding court inside the PNP Command of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya.
crime of murder, with treachery as the qualifying circumstance and craft and price or reward as
aggravating circumstances. It then sentenced him to the maximum penalty of death. As for
Marlon Buenviaje, Miguel Buenviaje, and Patricio Escorpiso, the court held that the treachery Finally, appellants Marlon Buenviaje, Miguel Buenviaje, and Patricio Escorpiso claim that they
employed by Sayaboc could not be taken against them and, therefore, declared them guilty of were denied due process because they were not able to present evidence in their defense. They
the crime of homicide only, with the first as principal and the two others as accomplices. Each ask this Court to relax the rule of criminal procedure in favor of enforcing their constitutional right
was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty and to pay solidarily with Sayaboc the to be heard by themselves and counsel.
amounts of P115,000 as actual damages; P25,000 as moral damages; and the costs of the suit
in favor of the heirs of Joseph Galam.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that Sayaboc’s
extrajudicial confession that he shot the victim in the back is adequate proof of treachery.
From this decision, the appellants raise the following errors: Invoking People v. Aquino,21 the OSG contends that for treachery to be considered as a
qualifying circumstance, it needs only to be specifically alleged in the information and does not
have to be preceded by the words qualifying or qualified by. As to the proven circumstances of
I
craft and price or reward, the same cannot be appreciated because they were not specifically
alleged in the information, as required by the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which are
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT SAYABOC GUILTY applicable to actions that are pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER AND SENTENCING HIM TO
DEATH.
The OSG further asserts that Sayaboc’s extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence
against him, since it was made after he was informed of, and accorded, his constitutional rights,
II particularly the right to an independent counsel of his own choice. No evidence was adduced
during the trial to substantiate the claim that Atty. Cornejo used to be connected with the
NAPOLCOM. Moreover, this claim was made for the first time in this appeal, and was based
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED SAYABOC IS GUILTY, HE IS GUILTY ONLY OF
merely on an information furnished by defense counsel Atty. Virgil Castro (now deceased) to
THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE.
Sayaboc’s counsel in this appeal, which makes the said information hearsay twice removed.
As to the fourth assigned error, the OSG counters that no exceptional circumstance exists in this ANSWER: Yes, sir. I want to seek the assistance of Atty. Rodolfo Cornejo.
case that may warrant the relaxation of the rule that the denial of a unilateral demurrer to
evidence carries with it a waiver of the accused’s right to present evidence.
QUESTIONS: Atty. Rodolfo Cornejo is here now, do you want him to assist
you in this investigation?
Beginning with the admissibility of Sayaboc’s extrajudicial confession, we hold that such cannot
be used in evidence in this case.
ANSWER: Yes, sir. 25

Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Apart from the absence of an express waiver of his rights, the confession contains the passing of
information of the kind held to be in violation of the right to be informed under Section 12, Article
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall III of the Constitution. In People v. Jara,26 the Court explained:
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
The stereotyped "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
repudiated has assumed the nature of a "legal form" or model. Police investigators either
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
automatically type it together with the curt "Opo" as the answer or ask the accused to sign it or
even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired, punctilious, fixed, and artificially stately style does not
… create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The
showing of a spontaneous, free, and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. The right to be informed requires "the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle." 27 It should allow the
suspect to consider the effects and consequences of any waiver he might make of these rights.
Jurisprudence provides that extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary. 22
More so when the suspect is one like Sayaboc, who has an educational attainment of Grade IV,
The condition for this presumption, however, is that the prosecution is able to show
was a stranger in Nueva Vizcaya, and had already been under the control of the police officers
that the constitutional requirements safeguarding an accused’s rights during custodial
for two days previous to the investigation, albeit for another offense.
investigation have been strictly complied with, especially when the extrajudicial
confession has been denounced. The rationale for this requirement is to allay any fear
that the person being investigated would succumb to coercion while in the unfamiliar We likewise rule that Sayaboc was not afforded his constitutional right to a competent counsel.
or intimidating environment that is inherent in custodial investigations. Therefore, even While we are unable to rule on the unsubstantiated claim that Atty. Cornejo was partial to the
if the confession may appear to have been given voluntarily since the confessant did police, still, the facts show through the testimonies of Sayaboc and prosecution witness SPO4
not file charges against his alleged intimidators for maltreatment, 23 the failure to Cagungao that Atty. Cornejo remained silent throughout the duration of the custodial
properly inform a suspect of his rights during a custodial investigation renders the investigation. The trial court attributed the silence of Atty. Cornejo to the garrulous nature and
confession valueless and inadmissible.24 intelligence of Sayaboc, thus:

In this case, contrary to SPO4 Cagungao’s claim that he conferred with Sayaboc for half an hour As already stated, Sayaboc was a garrulous man and intelligent. It was in his
informing him about his constitutional rights, the extrajudicial confession provides only the character for him to want to be a central figure in a drama, albeit tragic – for others. He
following: would do what he wanted to do regardless of the advice of others. Hence, Atty.
Cornejo could only advise him of his constitutional rights, which was apparently done.
The said counsel could not stop him from making his confession even if he did try. 28
PRELIMINARY: I would like to inform you Mr. Sayaboc that questions will be asked to
you regarding an incident last December 2, 1994 at the Rooftop, Brgy. Quezon,
Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, in connection with the shooting of Joseph Galam, owner of We find this explanation unacceptable. That Sayaboc was a "garrulous" man who would "do
the said Disco House as a result of his death. Before questions will be asked [of] you I what he wanted to do regardless of the advice of others" is immaterial. The waiver of a right is
would like to inform you about your ri[g]hts under the new Constitution of the within the rights of a suspect. What is lacking is a showing, to the satisfaction of this Court, of a
Philippines, as follows: That you have the right to remain silent or refuse to answer the faithful attempt at each stage of the investigation to make Sayaboc aware of the consequences
questions which you think will incriminate you; That you have the right to seek the of his actions. If anything, it appears that Sayaboc’s counsel was ineffectual for having been
services of a counsel of your own choice or if not, this office will provide you a lawyer if cowed by his client’s enthusiasm to speak, or, worse, was indifferent to it.
you wish.
The right to a competent and independent counsel means that the counsel should satisfy
QUESTIONS: After informing you all your constitutional rights, are you himself, during the conduct of the investigation, that the suspect understands the import and
willing to give your true statement regarding the death of Joseph Galam? consequences of answering the questions propounded. In People v. Deniega, 29 we said:

ANSWER: Yes, sir. The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial investigation is rendered
meaningless if the lawyer merely gives perfunctory advice as opposed to a meaningful
QUESTIONS: Do you want to get a lawyer to assist in this investigation?
 advocacy of the rights of the person undergoing questioning. If the advice given is so how the aggression began. The witnesses testified having heard four shots, the last two of which
cursory as to be useless, voluntariness is impaired. were seen as having been fired while Sayaboc was facing Galam. The autopsy conducted by Dr.
Labasan reveals two frontal wounds at the thigh and the shoulder, and two wounds on the right
side of Galam’s back. Although it is plausible that the initial shots were fired from behind, such
This is not to say that a counsel should try to prevent an accused from making a confession.
inference is insufficient to establish treachery.33
Indeed, as an officer of the court, it is an attorney’s duty to, first and foremost, seek the truth.
However, counsel should be able, throughout the investigation, to explain the nature of the
questions by conferring with his client and halting the investigation should the need arise. The Neither can we appreciate evident premeditation as a qualifying circumstance. Evident
duty of a lawyer includes ensuring that the suspect under custodial investigation is aware that premeditation exists when it is shown that the execution of a criminal act is preceded by cool
the right of an accused to remain silent may be invoked at any time. thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent. The requisites of
evident premeditation are (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an
act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of
We understand the difficulty and frustration of police investigators in obtaining evidence to bring
time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances
criminals to justice. But even the hardest of criminals have rights that cannot be interfered with.
of his act.34
Those tasked with the enforcement of the law and who accuse those who violate it carry the
burden of ensuring that all evidence obtained by them in the course of the performance of their
duties are untainted with constitutional infirmity. The purpose of the stringent requirements of the Without the extrajudicial confession narrating when Sayaboc was hired to kill Galam, the
law is to protect all persons, especially the innocent and the weak, against possible testimony that the former inquired about the latter while waiting in the Rooftop from 3:00 p.m. to
indiscriminate use of the powers of the government. Any deviation cannot be tolerated, and any 6:00 p.m. of that fateful day does not prove the time when Sayaboc decided to kill Galam.
fruit of such deviation shall be excluded from evidence. Settled is the rule that when it is not shown how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what
time had elapsed before that plan was carried out, evident premeditation cannot be
considered.35
For these reasons, the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc cannot be used in evidence against
him. We hold, however, that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving his guilt for the
crime of homicide. The aggravating circumstances of craft and price or reward, even if proved, can neither be
considered because they were not specifically alleged in the information. Section 8, Rule 110 of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the information specify the
From the records of the case, there can be no doubt that Sayaboc shot and killed Galam in the
aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the crime for it to be considered in the
early evening of 2 December 1994. He was seen waiting at the Rooftop from 3:00 to 6:00 p.m. of
imposition of penalty. This requirement is beneficial to an accused and may, therefore, be given
that day, shooting Galam shortly after the latter’s arrival, and fleeing from the scene of the crime
retroactive effect.36
to a waiting tricycle. Credible witnesses described Sayaboc’s appearance to the police soon
after the shooting incident and prepared affidavits about the incident. They identified Sayaboc at
the police station while he was in custody, during the preliminary investigation, and, again, in Thus, appellant Benjamin Sayaboc can be found guilty of the crime of homicide only, which is
open court. Such positive identification constitutes more than sufficient direct evidence to uphold punishable by reclusion temporal. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances
the finding that Sayaboc was Galam’s killer. It cannot just be rebutted by Sayaboc’s bare denial appreciated for or against him, the penalty to be imposed upon him should be in the medium
and weak alibi. period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be meted a penalty whose
minimum is within the range of prision mayor and whose maximum is within the range of
reclusion temporal in its medium period.
Appellants’ claim that the information against them is insufficient for failure to specifically state
that treachery and evident premeditation were qualifying circumstances holds no water. In
People v. Aquino,30 we held that even after the recent amendments to the Rules of Criminal We cannot subscribe to the contention of appellants Marlon Buenviaje, Miguel Buenviaje, and
Procedure, qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words such as Patricio Escorpiso that the case should be remanded to the trial court because they were denied
qualifying or qualified by to properly qualify an offense. Nevertheless, from our review of the the right to be heard by the trial court. It must be remembered that their demurrer to evidence
case, we find that neither evident premeditation nor treachery has been sufficiently proved to filed on 12 July 1999 was without prior leave of court. The motion for leave to file the said
qualify the crime to murder. pleading was filed only the next day. The filing of the demurrer was clearly without leave of court.
The trial court, therefore, correctly applied the rule on demurrer to evidence found in Section 15,
Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure when it disallowed the abovementioned
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
appellants to present evidence on their behalf.
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
Thus, two conditions must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a The filing of a demurrer to evidence without leave of court is an unqualified waiver of the right to
position to defend himself; and (2) the offender consciously adopted the particular means, present evidence for the accused.37 The rationale for this rule is that when the accused moves
method or form of attack employed by him. For treachery to be appreciated, it must be present for dismissal on the ground of insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution evidence, he does so
and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack. Where no particulars are known as in the belief that said evidence is insufficient to convict and, therefore, any need for him to
to how the killing began, its perpetration with treachery cannot merely be supposed. 31 present any evidence is negated. An accused cannot be allowed to wager on the outcome of
judicial proceedings by espousing inconsistent viewpoints whenever dictated by convenience.
The purpose behind the rule is also to avoid the dilatory practice of filing motions for dismissal as
In this case, the trial court concluded that the fact that the witnesses did not hear any shout or
a demurrer to the evidence and, after denial thereof, the defense would then claim the right to
conversation between the assailant and the victim immediately before the attack could only
present its evidence.38
mean that Sayaboc had approached his victim through stealth.32 While not improbable, that
conclusion is merely an inference. The fact remains that none of the witnesses testified as to
The trial court, therefore, correctly applied Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal conspirators. Even knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act – without the cooperation
Procedure on demurrer to evidence when it disallowed the abovementioned appellants to and the agreement to cooperate – is not enough to establish conspiracy.49
present evidence on their behalf. They cannot now claim that they were denied their right to be
heard by themselves and counsel.
Now on the civil liability of Sayaboc and Marlon Buenviaje. The trial court’s award of actual
damages, representing the wake and burial expenses, is reduced to P106,436, this being the
On the basis of the evidence for the prosecution, we find the existence of conspiracy between amount supported by receipts. The award of moral damages is, however, increased to P50,000
Marlon Buenviaje and Sayaboc. conformably with current jurisprudence.50 In addition, the heirs of the victim are entitled to
P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto.
It has been held that price or reward is evidence of conspiracy.39 But the same was not
established by competent proof in this case. The extrajudicial confession40 and the newspaper WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Ecija, Branch 27,
reports41 adduced by the prosecution, which both contained Sayaboc’s statement pointing to in Criminal Case No. 2912 is MODIFIED. Appellants Benjamin Sayaboc and Marlon Buenviaje
Marlon Buenviaje as the one who paid him P100,000 to kill Galam, are inadmissible in evidence. are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and are each sentenced to
The first, as earlier stated, was executed in violation of Sayaboc’s constitutional rights. The suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17)
second are hearsay, since the authors of such reports were not presented as witnesses to affirm years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay jointly and severally the
the veracity thereof.42 heirs of Joseph Galam the amounts of P106,436 as actual damages; P50,000 as civil indemnity;
P50,000 as moral damages; and the cost of the suit. Appellants Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio
Escorpiso are hereby ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Conspiracy need not, however, be established by direct proof; it may be shown by circumstantial
evidence.43 As correctly found by the trial court and concurred with by the OSG, the
concatenation of circumstantial evidence shows that Marlon Buenviaje conspired with Sayaboc, Costs de oficio.
thus:
SO ORDERED.
1. On 13 August 1994, Marlon Buenviaje had a fistfight with Joseph Galam, causing
him injuries on his face and prompting him to make a threat to kill the latter; 44

2. More than three months later, Galam was killed by Sayaboc, who had no
discernible motive to do so;45

3. Shortly after shooting Galam, Sayaboc joined Marlon Buenviaje and the other
appellants in the tricycle, which was waiting in a vacant lot near the crime scene; 46

4. The tricycle driven by Marlon Buenviaje sped away and disappeared;47

5. Marlon Buenviaje became a fugitive from justice for a long time, or until 10 July
1997; and

6. During the pendency of the case, the relatives of Marlon Buenviaje offered
prosecution eyewitness Diana Grace Jaramillo a job abroad, allowances, and two
motorcycles in consideration of her retraction of her testimony against Sayaboc. 48

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction when (1) there is more than one
circumstances established; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been
proved; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. All these requisites are present in the case at bar. Being a conspirator
equally guilty as Sayaboc, Marlon Buenviaje must be meted the same penalty as that of
Sayaboc.

However, as to Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso, there is paucity of evidence linking
them to the killing. They might have been with Marlon Buenviaje in that tricycle, but there is
nothing to show that they knew of the conspiracy to kill Galam. Absent any active participation in
furtherance of the common design or purpose to kill Galam, their mere presence near the crime
scene or in the tricycle driven by Marlon Buenviaje does not necessarily make them
 G.R. No. 179448 June 26, 2013 manner above set forth, the said accused released, obtained and received from the
METROBANK the sum of ₱15,363,666.67 purportedly representing the proceeds of the said
loan, which amount, once in his possession, with intent to defraud, he misappropriated,
CARLOS L. TANENGGEE, Petitioner,
misapplied and converted to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of
vs.
the said METROBANK in the same sum of ₱15,363,666.67, Philippine currency.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8
DECISION

On May 27, 1998, the RTC entered a plea of not guilty for the petitioner after he refused to enter
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
a plea.9 The cases were then consolidated and jointly tried.

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the
The proceedings before the RTC as aptly summarized by the CA are as follows:
December 12, 2006 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23653 affirming
with modification the June 25, 1999 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 30, in Criminal Case Nos. 98-163806-10 finding Carlos L." Tanenggee (petitioner) guilty During the pre-trial, except for the identity of the accused, the jurisdiction of the court, and that
beyond reasonable doubt of five counts of estafa through falsification of commercial documents. accused was the branch manager of Metrobank Commercio Branch from July 1997 to
Likewise questioned is the CA's September 6, 2007 Resolution4 denying petitioner's Motion for December 1997, no other stipulations were entered into. Prosecution marked its exhibits "A" to
Reconsideration5 and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.6 "L" and sub-markings.

Factual Antecedents xxxx

On March 27, 1998, five separate Informations7 for estafa through falsification of commercial The prosecution alleged that on different occasions, appellant caused to be prepared promissory
documents were filed against petitioner. The said Informations portray the same mode of notes and cashier’s checks in the name of Romeo Tan, a valued client of the bank since he has
commission of the crime as in Criminal Case No. 98-163806 but differ with respect to the substantial deposits in his account, in connection with the purported loans obtained by the latter
numbers of the checks and promissory notes involved and the dates and amounts thereof, viz: from the bank. Appellant approved and signed the cashier’s check as branch manager of
Metrobank Commercio Branch. Appellant affixed, forged or caused to be signed the signature of
Tan as endorser and payee of the proceeds of the checks at the back of the same to show that
That on or about July 24, 1997, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then a
the latter had indeed endorsed the same for payment. He handed the checks to the Loans clerk,
private individual, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud, thru falsification
Maria Dolores Miranda, for encashment. Once said documents were forged and falsified,
of commercial document, the METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. (METROBANK),
appellant released and obtained from Metrobank the proceeds of the alleged loan and
represented by its Legal officer, Atty. Ferdinand R. Aguirre, in the following manner: herein
misappropriated the same to his use and benefit. After the discovery of the irregular loans, an
accused, being then the Manager of the COMMERCIO BRANCH OF METROBANK located at
internal audit was conducted and an administrative investigation was held in the Head Office of
the New Divisoria Market Bldg., Divisoria, Manila, and taking advantage of his position as such,
Metrobank, during which appellant signed a written statement (marked as Exhibit "N") in the
prepared and filled up or caused to be prepared and filled up METROBANK Promissory Note
form of questions and answers.
Form No. 366857 with letters and figures reading "BD#083/97" after the letters reading "PN",
with figures reading "07.24.97" after the word "DATE", with the amount of ₱16,000,000.00 in
words and in figures, and with other words and figures now appearing thereon, typing or causing The prosecution presented the following witnesses:
to be typed at the right bottom thereof the name reading "ROMEO TAN", feigning and forging or
causing to be feigned and forged on top of said name the signature of Romeo Tan, affixing his
Valentino Elevado, a member of the Internal Affairs Department of Metrobank, testified that he
own signature at the left bottom thereof purportedly to show that he witnessed the alleged
conducted and interviewed the appellant in January 1998; that in said interview, appellant
signing of the said note by Romeo Tan, thereafter preparing and filling up or causing to be
admitted having committed the allegations in the Informations, specifically forging the promissory
prepared and filled up METROBANK CASHIER’S CHECK NO. CC 0000001531, a commercial
notes; that the proceeds of the loan were secured or personally received by the appellant
document, with date reading "July 24, 1997", with the name reading "Romeo Tan" as payee, and
although it should be the client of the bank who should receive the same; and that all the
with the sum of ₱15,362,666.67 in words and in figures, which purports to be the proceeds of the
answers of the appellant were contained in a typewritten document voluntarily executed,
loan being obtained, thereafter affixing his own signature thereon, and directing the
thumbmarked, and signed by him (Exhibit "N").
unsuspecting bank cashier to also affix his signature on the said check, as authorized
signatories, and finally affixing, feigning and forging or causing to be affixed, feigned and forged
four (4) times at the back thereof the signature of said Romeo Tan, thereby making it appear, as Rosemarie Tan Apostol, assistant branch manager, testified that the signatures appearing on
it did appear that Romeo Tan had participated in the preparation, execution and signing of the the promissory notes were not the signatures of Romeo Tan; that the promissory notes did not
said Promissory Note and the signing and endorsement of the said METROBANK CASHIER’S bear her signature although it is required, due to the fact that Romeo Tan is a valued client and
CHECK and that he obtained a loan of ₱16,000,000.00 from METROBANK, when in truth and in her manager accommodated valued clients; that she signed the corresponding checks upon
fact, as the said accused well knew, such was not the case in that said Romeo Tan did not instruction of appellant; and that after signing the checks, appellant took the same which
obtain such loan from METROBANK, neither did he participate in the preparation, execution and remained in his custody.
signing of the said promissory note and signing and endorsement of said METROBANK
CASHIER’S CHECK, much less authorize herein accused to prepare, execute and affix his
signature in the said documents; that once the said documents were forged and falsified in the
Eliodoro M. Constantino, NBI Supervisor and a handwriting expert, testified that the signatures explanation; that he was intimidated to sign and was threatened by the police that he will be
appearing on the promissory notes and specimen signatures on the signature card of Romeo brought to the precinct if he will not sign; that he was not able to consult a lawyer since he was
Tan were not written by one and the same person. not apprised of the purpose of the meeting; and that "just to get it over with" he signed the paper
which turned out to be a confession. After the said meeting, appellant went to see Tan at his
office but was unable to find the latter. He also tried to phone him but to no avail.10
Maria Dolores Miranda, a Loans Clerk at Metrobank Commercio Branch, testified that several
cashier’s checks were issued in favor of Romeo Tan; that appellant instructed her to encash the
same; and that it was appellant who received the proceeds of the loan. Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

For his defense, appellant Carlos Lo Tanenggee testified that he is a holder of a Masters degree After the joint trial, the RTC rendered a consolidated Decision11 dated June 25, 1999 finding
from the Asian Institute of Management, and was the Branch Manager of Metrobank Commercio petitioner guilty of the crimes charged, the decretal portion of which states:
Branch from 1994 until he was charged in 1998 [with] the above-named offense. He was with
Metrobank for nine (9) years starting as assistant manager of Metrobank Dasmariñas Branch,
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Carlos Lo Tanenggee, guilty beyond reasonable
Binondo, Manila. As manager, he oversaw the day to day operations of the branch, solicited
doubt of the offense of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents charged in each of the
accounts and processed loans, among others.
five (5) Informations filed and hereby sentences him to suffer the following penalties:

Appellant claimed that he was able to solicit Romeo Tan as a client-depositor when he was the
1. In Criminal Case No. 98-163806, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
branch manager of Metrobank Commercio. As a valued client, Romeo Tan was granted a credit
imprisonment from eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of
line for forty million pesos (₱40,000,000.00) by Metrobank. Tan was also allowed to open a
reclusion temporal as maximum including the accessory penalties provided by law.
fictitious account for his personal use and was assisted personally by appellant in his dealings
with the bank. In the middle of 1997, Tan allegedly opened a fictitious account and used the
name Jose Tan. Such practice for valued clients was allowed by and known to the bank to hide 2. In Criminal Case No. 98-163807, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
their finances due to rampantkidnappings or from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) or from imprisonment from eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of
their spouses. reclusion temporal as maximum including the accessory penalties provided by law,
and to indemnify Metrobank the sum of ₱16 Million with interest at 18% per annum
counted from 27 November 1997 until fully paid.
According to appellant, Tan availed of his standing credit line (through promissory notes) for five
(5) times on the following dates: 1) 24 July 1997 for sixteen million pesos (₱16,000,000.00), 2)
27 October 1997 for six million pesos (₱6,000,000.00), 3) 12 November 1997 for three million 3. In Criminal Case No. 98-163808, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
pesos (₱3,000,000.00), 4) 21 November 1997 for sixteen million pesos (₱16,000,000,00), 5) 22 imprisonment from eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of
December 1997 for two million pesos (₱2,000,000.00). On all these occasions except the loan reclusion temporal as maximum including the accessory penalties provided by law,
on 24 July 1997 when Tan personally went to the bank, Tan allegedly gave his instructions and to indemnify Metrobank the sum of ₱6 Million with interest at 18% per annum
regarding the loan through the telephone. Upon receiving the instructions, appellant would order counted from 27 October 1997 until fully paid.
the Loans clerk to prepare the promissory note and send the same through the bank’s
messenger to Tan’s office, which was located across the street. The latter would then return to
the bank, through his own messenger, the promissory notes already signed by him. Upon receipt 4. In Criminal Case No. 98-163809, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
of the promissory note, appellant would order the preparation of the corresponding cashier’s imprisonment from eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of
check representing the proceeds of the particular loan, send the same through the bank’s reclusion temporal as maximum including the accessory penalties provided by law,
and to indemnify Metrobank the sum of ₱2 Million with interest at 18% per annum
messenger to the office of Tan, and the latter would return the same through his own messenger
already endorsed together with a deposit slip under Current Account No. 258-250133-7 of Jose counted from 22 December 1997 until fully paid.
Tan. Only Cashier’s Check dated 21 November 1997 for sixteen million pesos (₱16,000,000.00)
was not endorsed and deposited for, allegedly, it was used to pay the loan obtained on 24 July 5. In Criminal Case No. 98-163810, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
1997. Appellant claimed that all the signatures of Tan appearing on the promissory notes and imprisonment from eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of
the cashier’s checks were the genuine signatures of Tan although he never saw the latter affix reclusion temporal as maximum including the accessory penalties provided by law,
them thereon. and to indemnify Metrobank the sum of ₱3 Million with interest at 18% per annum
counted from 12 November 1997 until fully paid.
In the middle of January 1998, two (2) Metrobank auditors conducted an audit of the Commercio
Branch for more than a week. Thereafter or on 26 January 1998, appellant was asked by Elvira Accused shall serve the said penalties imposed successively.
Ong-Chan, senior vice president of Metrobank, to report to the Head Office on the following day.
When appellant arrived at the said office, he was surprised that there were seven (7) other
people present: two (2) senior branch officers, two (2) bank lawyers, two (2) policemen (one in As mandated in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum duration of the sentence
uniform and the other in plain clothes), and a representative of the Internal Affairs unit of the imposed shall not be more than threefold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of
bank, Valentino Elevado. the penalties imposed upon him and such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty (40)
years.

Appellant claimed that Elevado asked him to sign a paper (Exhibit "N") in connection with the
audit investigation; that he inquired what he was made to sign but was not offered any SO ORDERED.12
 Ruling of the Court of Appeals upon the commencement thereof, viz: (1) to remain silent, (2) to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other rights
above.19 In the present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounselled written
Petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction to the CA where the case was docketed as CA-
statement regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch he managed, the following are clear:
G.R. CR No. 23653. On December 12, 2006, the CA promulgated its Decision13 affirming with
(1) the questioning was not initiated by a law enforcement authority but merely by an internal
modification the RTC Decision and disposing of the appeal as follows:
affairs manager of the bank; and, (2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty
in any significant manner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be under
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit and the Decision dated 25 June 1999 of custodial investigation and to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 30 convicting the accused-appellant Carlos Lo taking of his written statement.
Tanenggee on five counts of estafa through falsification of commercial documents is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. 98-163806, he is further ordered to
Moreover, in Remolona v. Civil Service Commission,20 we declared that the right to counsel
indemnify Metrobank the sum of ₱16 Million with interest at 18% per annum counted from 24
"applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an
July 1997 until fully paid.
administrative investigation." Amplifying further on the matter, the Court made clear in the recent
case of Carbonel v. Civil Service Commission:21
SO ORDERED.14
However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights
On December 29, 2006,15 petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the CA denied per its is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule under
September 6, 2007 Resolution.16 paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal
investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.22
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising
the basic issues of: (1) whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s admission in evidence of the Here, petitioner’s written statement was given during an administrative inquiry conducted by his
petitioner’s written statement based on its finding that he was not in police custody or under employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course of his
custodial interrogation when the same was taken; and, (2) whether the essential elements of employment. No error can therefore be attributed to the courts below in admitting in evidence
estafa through falsification of commercial documents were established by the prosecution. 17 and in giving due consideration to petitioner’s written statement as there is no constitutional
impediment to its admissibility.
The Parties’ Arguments
Petitioner’s written statement was given voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
While he admits signing a written statement,18 petitioner refutes the truth of the contents thereof
and alleges that he was only forced to sign the same without reading its contents. He asserts Petitioner attempts to convince us that he signed, under duress and intimidation, an already
that said written statement was taken in violation of his rights under Section 12, Article III of the prepared typewritten statement. However, his claim lacks sustainable basis and his supposition
Constitution, particularly of his right to remain silent, right to counsel, and right to be informed of is just an afterthought for there is nothing in the records that would support his claim of duress
the first two rights. Hence, the same should not have been admitted in evidence against him. and intimidation.

On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor Moreover, "it is settled that a confession or admission is presumed voluntary until the contrary is
General (OSG), maintains that petitioner’s written statement is admissible in evidence since the proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary."23 Petitioner failed to
constitutional proscription invoked by petitioner does not apply to inquiries made in the context of overcome this presumption. On the contrary, his written statement was found to have been
private employment but is applicable only in cases of custodial interrogation. The OSG thus executed freely and consciously. The pertinent details he narrated in his statement were of such
prays for the affirmance of the appealed CA Decision. nature and quality that only a perpetrator of the crime could furnish. The details contained
therein attest to its voluntariness. As correctly pointed out by the CA:
Our Ruling
As the trial court noted, the written statement (Exhibit N) of appellant is replete with details which
could only be supplied by appellant. The statement reflects spontaneity and coherence which
We find the Petition wanting in merit.
cannot be associated with a mind to which intimidation has been applied. Appellant’s answers to
questions 14 and 24 were even initialed by him to indicate his conformity to the corrections
Petitioner’s written statement is admissible in evidence. made therein. The response to every question was fully informative, even beyond the required
answers, which only indicates the mind to be free from extraneous restraints. 24
The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt
obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, as correctly observed by the CA In People v. Muit,25 it was held that "one of the indicia of voluntariness in the execution of
and the OSG, is applicable only in custodial interrogation. petitioner’s extrajudicial statement is that it contains many details and facts which the
investigating officers could not have known and could not have supplied without the knowledge
and information given by him."
Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a
person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
manner. Indeed, a person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights which attach
Also, the fact that petitioner did not raise a whimper of protest and file any charges, criminal or Petitioner’s denial is unavailing.
administrative, against the investigator and the two policemen present who allegedly intimidated
him and forced him to sign negate his bare assertions of compulsion and intimidation. It is a
The Court is also not persuaded by the bare and uncorroborated allegation of petitioner that the
settled rule that where the defendant did not present evidence of compulsion, where he did not
loans covered by the promissory notes and the cashier’s checks were personally transacted by
institute any criminal or administrative action against his supposed intimidators, where no
Tan against his approved letter of credit, although he admittedly never saw Tan affix his
physical evidence of violence was presented, his extrajudicial statement shall be considered as
signature thereto. Again, this allegation, as the RTC aptly observed, is not supported by
having been voluntarily executed.26
established evidence. "It is settled that denials which are unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence are negative and self-serving evidence. They merit no weight in law and
Neither will petitioner’s assertion that he did not read the contents of his statement before cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testified
affixing his signature thereon "just to get it over with" prop up the instant Petition. To recall, on affirmative matters."32 The chain of events in this case, from the preparation of the promissory
petitioner has a masteral degree from a reputable educational institution and had been a bank notes to the encashment of the cashier’s checks, as narrated by the prosecution witnesses and
manager for quite a number of years. He is thus expected to fully understand and comprehend based on petitioner’s own admission, established beyond reasonable doubt that he committed
the significance of signing an instrument. It is just unfortunate that he did not exercise due the unlawful acts alleged in the Informations.
diligence in the conduct of his own affairs. He can therefore expect no consideration for it.
Elements of falsification of commercial documents established.
Forgery duly established.
Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised
"Forgery is present when any writing is counterfeited by the signing of another’s name with intent Penal Code (RPC) refers to falsification by a private individual or a public officer or employee,
to defraud."27 It can be established by comparing the alleged false signature with the authentic or who did not take advantage of his official position, of public, private or commercial document.
genuine one. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of government The elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are: (1)
handwriting experts whose opinions do not mandatorily bind the courts. A trial judge is not that the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take
precluded but is even authorized by law28 to conduct an independent examination of the advantage of his official position; (2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification
questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC;33 and, (3) that the falsification was committed in a public,
official or commercial document.
In this case, the finding of forgery on the signature of Romeo Tan (Tan) appearing in the
promissory notes and cashier’s checks was not anchored solely on the result of the examination All the above-mentioned elements were established in this case. First, petitioner is a private
conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Document Examiner. The trial court individual. Second, the acts of falsification consisted in petitioner’s (1) counterfeiting or imitating
also made an independent examination of the questioned signatures and after analyzing the the handwriting or signature of Tan and causing it to appear that the same is true and genuine in
same, reached the conclusion that the signatures of Tan appearing in the promissory notes are all respects; and (2) causing it to appear that Tan has participated in an act or proceeding when
different from his genuine signatures appearing in his Deposit Account Information and he did not in fact so participate. Third, the falsification was committed in promissory notes and
Specimen Signature Cards on file with the bank. Thus, we find no reason to disturb the above checks which are commercial documents. Commercial documents are, in general, documents or
findings of the RTC which was affirmed by the CA. A rule of long standing in this jurisdiction is instruments which are "used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or
that findings of a trial court, when affirmed by the CA, are accorded great weight and respect. credit transactions."34 Promissory notes facilitate credit transactions while a check is a means of
Absent any reason to deviate from the said findings, as in this case, the same should be payment used in business in lieu of money for convenience in business transactions. A cashier’s
deemed conclusive and binding to this Court. check necessarily facilitates bank transactions for it allows the person whose name and
signature appear thereon to encash the check and withdraw the amount indicated therein.35
No suppression of evidence on the part of the prosecution.
Falsification as a necessary means to commit estafa.
Petitioner claims that the prosecution should have presented Tan in court to shed light on the
matter. His non-presentation created the presumption that his testimony if given would be When the offender commits on a public, official or commercial document any of the acts of
adverse to the case of the prosecution. Petitioner thus contends that the prosecution suppressed falsification enumerated in Article 171 as a necessary means to commit another crime like
its own evidence. estafa, theft or malversation, the two crimes form a complex crime. Under Article 48 of the RPC,
there are two classes of a complex crime. A complex crime may refer to a single act which
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or to an offense as a necessary means for
Such contention is likewise untenable. The prosecution has the prerogative to choose the
committing another.
evidence or the witnesses it wishes to present. It has the discretion as to how it should present
its case.29 Moreover, the presumption that suppressed evidence is unfavorable does not apply
where the evidence was at the disposal of both the defense and the prosecution. 30 In the present In Domingo v. People,36 we held:
case, if petitioner believes that Tan is the principal witness who could exculpate him from liability
by establishing that it was Tan and not him who signed the subject documents, the most prudent
The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a means of committing
thing to do is to utilize him as his witness. Anyway, petitioner has the right to have compulsory
estafa, because before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of
process to secure Tan’s attendance during the trial pursuant to Article III, Section 14(2)31 of the
falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an
Constitution. The records show, however, that petitioner did not invoke such right. In view of
element of the crime of falsification of public, official or commercial document. In other words,
these, no suppression of evidence can be attributed to the prosecution.
the crime of falsification has already existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public, official or
commercial document to defraud another is estafa. But the damage is caused by the There is need, however, to modify the penalties imposed by the trial court as affirmed by the CA
commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document. Therefore, the falsification of the in each case respecting the minimum term of imprisonment. The trial court imposed the
public, official or commercial document is only a necessary means to commit estafa. indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum which
is beyond the lawful range. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term of the
penalty should be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law for the
"Estafa is generally committed when (a) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence,
offense. Since the penalty prescribed for the estafa charge against petitioner is prision
or by means of deceit, and (b) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would then be prision
capable of pecuniary estimation."37 Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether
correccional in its minimum and medium periods which has a duration of six (6) months and one
by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should
(1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Thus, the Court sets the minimum term of the
have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon
indeterminate penalty at four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional. Petitioner is
it to his legal injury."38
therefore sentenced in each case to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
The elements of estafa obtain in this case. By falsely representing that Tan requested him to maximum.
process purported loans on the latter’s behalf, petitioner counterfeited or imitated the signature
of Tan in the cashier’s checks.1âwphi1 Through these, petitioner succeeded in withdrawing
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
money from the bank. Once in possession of the amount, petitioner thereafter invested the same
CA-G.R. CR No. 23653 dated December 12, 2006 and September 6, 2007, respectively, are
in Eurocan Future Commodities. Clearly, petitioner employed deceit in order to take hold of the
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the minimum term of the indeterminate
money, misappropriated and converted it to his own personal use and benefit, and these
sentence to be imposed upon the petitioner should be four (4) years and two (2) months of
resulted to the damage and prejudice of the bank in the amount of about ₱43 million.
prision correccional.

Taken in its entirety, the proven facts show that petitioner could not have withdrawn the money
SO ORDERED.
without falsifying the questioned documents. The falsification was, therefore, a necessary means
to commit estafa, and falsification was already consummated even before the falsified
documents were used to defraud the bank. The conviction of petitioner for the complex crime of
Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Document by the lower courts was thus proper.

The Proper Imposable Penalty

The penalty for falsification of a commercial document under Article 172 of the RPC is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than ₱5,000.00.

The penalty in estafa cases, on the other hand, as provided under paragraph 1, Article 315 of
the RPC is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period39 if
the amount defrauded is over ₱12,000.00 but does not exceed ₱22,000.00. If the amount
involved exceeds the latter sum, the same paragraph provides the imposition of the penalty in its
maximum period with an incremental penalty of one year imprisonment for every ₱10,000.00 but
in no case shall the total penalty exceed 20 years of imprisonment.

Petitioner in this case is found liable for the commission of the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of commercial document. The crime of falsification was established to be a
necessary means to commit estafa. Pursuant to Article 48 of the Code, the penalty to be
imposed in such case should be that corresponding to the most serious crime, the same to be
applied in its maximum period. The applicable penalty therefore is for the crime of estafa, being
the more serious offense than falsification.

The amounts involved in this case range from ₱2 million to ₱16 million. Said amounts being in
excess of ₱22,000.00, the penalty imposable should be within the maximum term of six (6)
years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days to eight (8) years of prision mayor, adding one
(1) year for each additional ₱10,000.00. Considering the amounts involved, the additional
penalty of one (1) year for each additional ₱10,000.00 would surely exceed the maximum
limitation provided under Article 315, which is twenty (20) years. Thus, the RTC correctly
imposed the maximum term of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal.
 G.R. No. 190583 December 7, 2015 Sumasainyo,
[signed]
MARIA PAZ FRONTRERAS Y ILAGAN, Petitioner, Ma. Paz Fronteras[9]
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. On May 10, 1999, an Information[10] for Qualified Theft was filed before the RTC against the
petitioner, Salazar, and Carpon. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
DECISION
That on or about the period comprised from June 6, 1998 up to October 17, 1998, in Quezon
City, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
REYES, J.: another, being then employed as the Branch Manager, District Manager and Vault Custodian,
respectively of [CEBUANA] represented by [FINOLAN] located at Unit 1119B&C 685 Tandang
Before the Court is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to Sora, Old Balara, Quezon City and such have free access to the jewelries pawned to
reverse and set aside the Decision[2] dated July 29, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA- [CEBUANA], with grave abuse of confidence reposed on them by their employer, with intent to
G.R. CR No. 30909, which affirmed with modification the Decision[3] dated May 8, 2006 of the gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there wilfully,
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104, in Criminal Case No. Q-99-84626, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the amount of P1,263,737.60, Philippine
convicting Maria Paz Frontreras[4] y Ilagan (petitioner) of the crime of Qualified Theft and Currency, representing the value of the jewelries and redemption payments, belonging to said
sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. [CEBUANA], to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in the amount
aforementioned.
The Facts
CONTRARY TO LAW.[11]
The petitioner was the Vault Custodian of the 685 Old Balara, Tandang Sora, Quezon City
branch (Old Balara branch) of Cebuana Lhuillier Pawnshop (Cebuana). She was tasked to safe Salazar and Carpon entered a "Not Guilty" plea upon arraignment on July 13, 1999.[12] The
keep all the pawned items and jewelry inside the branch vault. Likewise employed in the same petitioner likewise pleaded "Not Guilty" during her arraignment on August 9, 1999.[13]
branch were Teresita Salazar (Salazar) and Jeannelyn Carpon (Carpon) who served as Branch
Manager and District Manager, respectively. Salazar was responsible for the overall operation of Trial thereafter ensued. According to prosecution witness Finolan, aside from receiving the
the Old Balara branch and was also tasked to handle the appraisal of pawned items and the petitioner's handwritten letter on October 28, 1998, the petitioner also gave him original pawn
recording of such transactions. Carpon, on the other hand, supervised the overall operations of tickets, the back portion of which showed the signatures of their respective pledgors. These
the branches within her district ensuring that they are operating within the objectives, signatures mean that the pledgors have already redeemed the jewelry covered by each ticket by
procedures, and policies of Cebuana; she also monitored the district bank account and handled paying the amount for which they stand as a security. No payments were, however, recorded nor
the appraisal of pawned items and the recording of cash.[5] turned over to the pawnshop. The petitioner also intimated to him that Carpon took some of such
cash payments but failed to return the same.[14] These declarations were corroborated by the
On October 27, 1998, a surprise audit was conducted at the Old Balara branch by Cebuana's testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, Escartin[15] and Talampas.[16]
internal auditors, Mila Escartin (Escartin) and Cynthia Talampas (Talampas). The audit revealed
that 156 pieces of jewelry, with an aggregate value of P1,250,800.00 were missing. A cash All of the accused took the witness stand and proffered in defense that the internal audit for
shortage of P848.60 was likewise discovered. When the petitioner was asked to explain the June, July, August and September of 1998 showed no report of anomaly or shortage; that had
discrepancy, she told Escartin that she would reduce her explanation into writing. The next day, there been any anomaly or shortage, it could have been discovered.thru the periodic audit being
an audit report was sent to Marcelino Finolan (Finolan), Area Manager of Cebuana. [6] conducted by Cebuana; they were not holding cash and there was no complaint from clients
regarding missing pawned items.[17]
Upon receipt of the audit report on October 28, 1998, Finolan immediately proceeded to the Old
Balara branch to conduct an investigation. Fie called Escartin and the petitioner for a meeting Carpon denied liability for the missing jewelry and redemption payments and averred that she
during which the petitioner handed over several pawn tickets [7] while Escartin gave him a had no official capacity to hold cash for Cebuana and that the pawned items were handled by
handwritten letter made by the petitioner,[8] which reads: the vault custodian. When Finolan asked her about the missing items, she told him there was
none. She was brought to the police station and then submitted for inquest but was thereafter
Oct. 28, 1998 released based on insufficiency of evidence.[18]
Sa Kinauukulan: Salazar was absent on October 27 and 28, 1998 because'she was sick. She was surprised
when she was informed that there are missing pawned items at the Old Balara branch because
Sir, nagconduct po ng audit kahapon Oct. 27, 1998 dito sa Old Balara I at nadiskubre po na Finolan conducts an audit twice a month.[19]
maraming nawawalang item. Sir ang lahat pong ito ay mga sanla namin. Ang involve po dito ay
ang appraiser - Tess Salazar, Dist. Manager - Jeannelyn Uy Carpon, at ako po Vault Custodian - The petitioner claimed that Finolan and the auditor prodded her to admit liability for the missing
Ma. Paz Frontreras. Yong iba pong Hem ay mga tubos na at nakalago lang po ang papal. pawned items otherwise an administrative case will be filed against her. The prospect of losing
Nagsimula po ito noong huwan ng Hulyo. her job frightened her. The police car outside the Old Balara branch also intimidated her. She
was brought to the police station and was eventually subjected to inquest proceedings but was
Dala na rin pong matinding pangangailangan sa pera. Ito lamang po ang tongi kong mailalahad released for lack of evidence. She denied that there were missing jewelries from the Old Balara
at iyan din po ang katotohanan. branch. She stressed that what was actually missing was cash, over which she had no custodial
duty.[20]
On rebuttal, Finolan clarified that the purpose of the spot/surprise audit was to check for fake or
over-appraised pawned items and not to check for inventory anomalies. [21] SO ORDERED.[30]

The Ruling of the RTC Undeterred, the petitioner filed a Motion for Amendment of Modified Penalty[31] arguing that the
RTC erred in the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The RTC denied the motion in
In a Decision[22] dated May 8, 2006, the RTC found sufficient circumstantial evidence an Order[32] dated March 8, 2007.
establishing that the petitioner perpetrated the offense. The petitioner was entrusted with the
position of vault custodian tasked with the responsibility for all pawned wares and to make sure The Ruling of the CA
that they were all intact and safely kept in the vault. During the audit, there were open items
(unredeemed pawned items) which she could not locate. The petitioner appealed to the CA contending that the inferences made by the RTC were based
on unfounded facts, since: (a) based on the audit reports for June, July, August and September
She had in her possession pawn tickets pertaining to items which were already redeemed. She of 1998, there were no anomalies occurring in Cebuana; (b) no evidence was presented tending
surrendered the pawn tickets to Finolan, but without the corresponding redemption payment. Her to prove that the petitioner had the exclusive right to enter the pawnshop's vault; (c) no
position of vault custodian created a high degree of confidence between her and the pawnshop complaint from clients regarding the missing pawned items was ever filed.[33]
which she gravely abused.[23] Based on the appraisal value of the pieces of jewelry covered by
the pawn tickets surrendered by the petitioner during audit but without the corresponding The CA rejected the petitioner's arguments and upheld the RTC's findings and conclusions. The
redemption payment, Cebuana suffered injury in the aggregate sum of P414,050.00.[24] CA observed that the audits were actually not audit reports per se but rather reports made in
order to determine the profitability of the pawnshop. Even if they are considered as regular
The petitioner's co-accused Salazar and Carpon were acquitted on the ground of reasonable audits, their nature will not preclude the existence of fraud because they were conducted only for
doubt.[25] Accordingly, the dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads as follows: the purpose of ascertaining fake items or if there was over-appraisal.[34]

WHEREFORE, the Court finds [the petitioner] guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the Anent the petitioner's insinuation that another person could have accessed the vault, the CA
crime of QUALIFIED THEFT defined and penalized in Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, held:
sentencing her therefor to an indeterminate penalty of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months
of reclusion temporal as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and [O]nly the Vault Custodian and the Area Manager, Finolan in this case, knows the combination
ordering her to pay to [Cebuana] the amount of P414,050.00. of the vault. Finolan, however, has no keys to the main door of the branch and likewise has no
keys to the inner door/gate of the branch. Furthermore, nobody is allowed to enter the vault
On ground of reasonable doubt, judgment is hereby rendered acquitting accused [Salazar] and without the presence of the Vault Custodian. Thus, there is simply no way for Finolan or any
[Carpon] of the offense charged against them. other person for that matter, to have been able to remove items from the vault. Considering the
circumstances and the safe-guards employed, it is absurd to impute the crime to any person
SO ORDERED.[26] other than [the petitioner].

The petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing for her acquittal for failure of the prosecution to [The petitioner], on the other hand, as Vault Custodian, has daily and unsupervised access to
establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She also questioned the correctness of the penalty the vault. Again, she has the duty to ensure the safe-keeping of all the pawned items and jewelry
imposed by the RTC.[27] inside the branch vault. If there was any loss, she should have immediately reported it to her
superiors. The fact that she failed to do so leads to a reasonable inference that she is the author
In an Order[28] dated November 6, 2006, the RTC denied reconsideration on its finding of guilt of the loss.[35] (Citations omitted and underscoring in the original)
but it reduced the penalty it had earlier imposed to four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as The CA further held that the absence of any complaint from Cebuana's clients does not
maximum, explaining thus: necessarily mean that there was no loss. In the pawnshop business, it is not uncommon for
people to fail to redeem the valuables they pawned. The CA, thus, concluded that the
The Court is however inclined to reduce the penalty by considering the surrender of the pawn prosecution was able to establish: (1) the fact of loss; (2) that the loss was due to an unlawful
tickets as a mitigating circumstance analogous to voluntary surrender under Article 13, taking; and (3) that the unlawful taking was committed with grave abuse of confidence. [36]
paragraph 7, and the necessity mentioned in the handwritten explanation as analogous to
incomplete justification under Article II, paragraph 4, x x x in relation to Article 13, paragraph 1, The CA, however, disagreed with the RTC that the return by the petitioner of the pawn tickets
of the Revised Penal Code.[29] can be deemed as the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The CA explained that the
petitioner did not surrender herself to a person in authority and thus modified the penalty
Consequently, the previous RTC ruling was modified as follows: imposed on her to recluslon perpetua.[37]

WHEREFORE, the Court maintains the Decision dated May 8, 2006 finding [the petitioner] guilty Accordingly, the CA Decision[38] dated July 29, 2009 was disposed in this manner:
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT defined and penalized
in Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, and, considering the two analogous mitigating WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for'lack of merit and the assailed decision
circumstances, modifies the penalty by sentencing her therefor to an indeterminate penalty of is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the [petitioner] is sentenced to suffer the penalty
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) of reclusion perpetua.
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and ordering her to pay to [CEBUANA] the
amount of P414,050.00 SO ORDERED.[39] (Emphasis in the original)
The petitioner moved for reconsideration[40] but her motion was denied in the CA failed to record such redemption and remit the payments to the cash collections of Cebuana.
Resolution[41] dated December 18, 2009. Hence, the present petition[42] arguing that the CA: Without the authority and consent of her employer, she repeatedly took and appropriated for
herself the redemption payments paid for the pawned items with the aggregate appraised value
I. of P414,050.00,[52] viz:

COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY Pawn Ticket No. Appraisal Value Pawn Ticket No. Appraisal Value
ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT UPON CONJECTURES AND SURMISES VIS-A-VIS 041487 P 13,000.00 043930 5,600.00
THE ABSENCE OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 041818 2,000.00 043716 2,000.00
045453 1,500.00 044477 2,100.00
II. 043874 2,400.00 044980 3,700.00
043875 700.00 044852 1,700.00
COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW BY CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONER HAS TO 043876 500.00 043029 13,500.00
SUFFER THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA.[43] 046047 600.00 043028 20,000.00
046019 500.00 043026 8,000.00
The Ruling of the Court 045960 2,700.00 045008 2,300.00
044271 5,200.00 044561 2,400.00
The Court denies the petition. 043002 18,000.00 046159 2,300.00
045777 6,500.00 045722 1,500.00
Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against, or 042934 17,700.00 042160 14,000.00
intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the 044586 8,200.00 041983 20,000.00
latter's consent.[44] Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from the 043970 5,000.00 042137 19,500.00
unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation. [45] Theft becomes qualified if it 043796 3,800.00 042144 6,000.00
is among others, committed with grave abuse of confidence.[46] 043647 6,500.00 042138 15,500.00
044061 6,500.00 045957 1,300.00
Conviction for qualified theft committed with grave abuse of confidence entails the presence of 044235 5,000.00 046030 3,000.00
all the following elements: 044130 1,100.00 041568 13,700.00
043844 1,200.00 043281 7,800.00
044867 4,000.00 042712 22,000.00
1. Taking of personal property;
044903 3,000.00 042576 13,000.00
044714 2,500.00 043394 10,000.00
2. That the said property belongs to another;
044938 2,300.00 043395 16,000.00
042988 2,500.00 042147 7,500.00
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
045029 2,300.00 041972 15,000.00
043858 5,500.00 044060 12,000.00
4. That it be done without the owner's consent;
043766 3,500.00 043027 7,000.00
043641 1,750.00 042987 2,500.00
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons,
045068 2,000.00 043035 5,200.00
nor of force upon things;
Intent to gain can be deduced from the petitioner's possession of the foregoing pawn tickets
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.[47]
which were surrendered, together with the redemption payment by their respective pledgors.
She submitted them during the spot audit along with a confession letter stating that portions of
On the other hand, the elements of corpus delicti in theft are: (1) that the property was lost by the P1,250,800.00 missing value of jewelry were actually already redeemed, thus:
the owner; and (2) that it was lost by felonious taking.[48]
Yung iba pong item ay rnga tubos na al nakatago king po ang papel. Nagsimula po Ho noong
The evidence on record shows that the foregoing elements are present in this case. The buwan ng Hulyo. Dala na rin po ng matinding pangangailangan sa pera. Ho lamang po ang tangi
prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner unlawfully deprived kong mailalahad at iyan din po ang katolohanan.[53]
Cebuana of cash/money when she took out pawned items and released them to redeeming
pledgors in exchange for redemption payments which she, however, did not turnover to the The tenor of the foregoing declaration and the circumstances of the petitioner at the time she
pawnshop, and instead pocketed them for her own gain. She gravely abused the confidence wrote and signed it, all militate against her bare allegation that she was threatened with an
concurrent with her sensitive position as a vault custodian when she exploited her exclusive and administrative case unless she admits her transgression.
unlimited access to the vault to facilitate the unlawful taking. Her position entailed a high degree
of confidence reposed by Cebuana as she had been granted daily unsupervised access to the The petitioner wrote and signed the confession letter spontaneously. When Escartin asked her if
vault.[49] Also, the petitioner knew the combinations of the branch's vault [50] and nobody was there are any problems in the Old Balara branch, the petitioner answered that she will write
allowed to enter the vault without her presence.[51] down her explanation and will submit it to Escartin.[54] The petitioner also told Talampas that if
she will escape, she will just be afraid that someone will go after her and that she will just face
The petitioner gravely abused such relation of trust and confidence when she accessed and the consequences.[55]Talampas then saw the petitioner make and sign the confession
released the pawned items under her custody, received the payments for their redemption but letter.[56] When Finolan went to the Old Balara branch for further investigation, Escartin handed
her the confession letter from the petitioner.[57] Penalty

The language of the confession letter was straightforward, coherent and clear. It bore no Under Article 310[71] of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the penalty for qualified theft is two
suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity and it was replete with details degrees higher than that specified in Article 309 which states:
which could only be known to the petitioner. Moreover, it is obvious that losing one's job in an
administrative case is less cumbersome than risking one's liberty by confessing to a crime one Art. 309. Penalties.—Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
did not really commit. It is thus implausible for one to be cajoled into confessing to a wrongdoing
at the mere prospect of losing his/her job. The petitioner's declarations to Talampas show that 1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the
she fully understood the consequences of her confession. She also executed the letter even thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, but if the value
before Finolan came to the Old Balara branch, thus, negating her claim that the latter threatened of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount the penalty shall be the maximum period of
her with an administrative sanction. the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand
pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
A confession, whether judicial or extrajudicial, if voluntarily and freely made, constitutes years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed
evidence of a high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no sane person or and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
one of normal mind will deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be the perpetrator of a mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience. The admissibihty and validity of a confession,
thus hinges on its voluntariness,[58] a condition vividly present in this case. x x x x (Emphasis ours and italics in the original)
Considering that the value involved in the present case exceeds P22,000.00, the basic penalty
The petitioner's extrajudicial written confession coupled with the following circumstantial is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods.
evidence all point to her as the perpetrator of the unlawful taking:
Anent the graduation of penalty for qualified theft and the imposition of incremental penalty for
the amount in excess of P22,000.00, the ruling espoused in Ringor v. People[72] is hereby
1. On October 27, 1998, Escartin and Talampas conducted a spot audit at the Old Balara
adopted.
branch of Cebuana.[59]
Since the petitioner committed qualified theft, the penalty shall be two degrees higher
2. Escartin counter-checked the computer list of all pawned items not yet redeemed vis-
or reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods,[73] which shall be imposed in its
a-vis the actual stocks in the vault and discovered that there were missing items. [60]
maximum period which has a range of seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years.[74]
3. Escartin asked the petitioner if there are any problems in the branch. The latter
answered that she will just write down everything that happened and hand over her
The incremental penalty shall then be determined by deducting P22,000.00 from the amount
explanation to Escartin.[61]
involved or P414,050.00. This will yield the amount of P392,050.00 which would then be divided
by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount less than P10,000.00.[75] The end result is that 39 years
4. After receiving the audit report on October 28, 1998, Finolan proceeded to the Old
should be added to the principal penalty. The total imposable penalty, however, should not
Balara branch and conducted an investigation.[62]
exceed 20 years and as such, the maximum imposable penalty in this case is 20 years
of reclusion temporal.[76]
5. When Talampas reported for work on October 28, 1998, the petitioner told her that
she thought about what happened and that she is afraid that someone will be going
Anent the appreciation of mitigating circumstances, the Court agrees with the RTC that the
after her if she will run away and so she has to face the consequences.[63]
petitioner's extrajudicial confession through the handwritten letter coupled with her act of
surrendering the redeemed pawn tickets and thereafter going to the police station can be taken
6. Talampas thereafter saw the petitioner write and sign a confession letter. [64]
as an analogous circumstance of voluntary surrender under Article 13, paragraph 10[77] in
relation to paragraph 7[78] of the RPC.
7. The letter was given to Finolan when he went to the Old Balara branch to
investigate.[65]
Based on the same extrajudicial confession, the petitioner is also entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong under paragraph 3[79] again in relation
8. In the letter, the petitioner admitted that some of the missing pawned items were
to paragraph 10 both of Article 13. Based on her letter, the petitioner misappropriated the
already redeemed. She also stated that she had "extreme need for money." [66]
redemption payments under her custody and control because she was constrained by extreme
necessity for money.
9. The petitioner then handed over to Finolan original pawn tickets.[67]
This is not to promote monetary crisis as an excuse to commit a crime or to embolden a person
10. Finolan observed that the pawn tickets were already redeemed or paid by their
entrusted with funds or properties to feloniously access the same, but rather to underscore the
respective pledgors as evidenced by their signatures of validation.[68]
utmost consideration in the Court's exercise of its discretional power to impose penalties, that is
- a guilty person deserves the penalty given the attendant circumstances and commensurate
11. There are no records of redemption transactions under the said pawn tickets. [69]
with the gravity of the offense committed.[80] From such standpoint, the Court finds it prudent that
unless the foregoing analogous mitigating circumstances are appreciated in her favor, the
12. The petitioner did not convey any redemption payment to Finolan or to the
petitioner will be penalized excessively.
pawnshop.[70]
A reduction in the imposable penalty by one degree is thus in order pursuant to Article 64(5) of
the RPC which states that when there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according to the number and nature
of such circumstances. As such, the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor in its
medium period should be imposed.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be taken from the penalty
next lower or anywhere within the full range of prision correccional or six (6) months and one (1)
day to six (6) years, while the indeterminate maximum penalty shall be fixed anywhere within the
range of prision mayor in its medium period or eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years.
The penalty imposed by the CA should thus be modified to conform to the foregoing findings.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July 29, 2009 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 30909 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the imposed penalty such
that the petitioner, Ma. Paz Frontreras y Ilagan, is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10)
years of prision mayor as maximum.

SO ORDERED.