G.R. No.

87119 April 16, 1991

Hon. Gemiliano S. Lopez Jr., petitioner,

Statement of the Case:

This is a petition for certiorari filed by petitioner by questioning the power to appoint Council officers and
employees under Republic Act No. 409, otherwise known as the Charter of the City of Manila.

Statement of Facts:

On Sept. 13, 1988, the vice-Mayor of Manila and Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, the Hon.
Danila R. Lucena, submitted to the Civil Service Commission, through the Regional Director of the National
Capital Region, the appointment of nineteen officers and employees in the Executive Staff of the Office of
the Presiding Officer, City Council of Manila, pursuant to the provision of Sec. 15, of said Republic Act No.
409, as amended which reads:

Sec. 15. The Board shall appoint and the Vice-Mayor shall sign all appointments of the other employees of
the Board.

The Personnel Bureau of the Mayor’s Office forwarded the query about the payroll of the newly appointed
employees of the City Council to the City Legal officer who, in a third endorsement dated Sept. 19, 1988,
rendered an opinion that the proper appointing officer is the City Mayor and not the City Council. The
commission promulgated Resolution No. 89-075, and held that it is the City Council to which the
appointing power is vested.

The petitioner contends that Sec. 15 of RA No. 409 as amended supposedly by been repealed by RA No.
5185, specifically Sec. 4 thereof, which quote, in part:

The City Assessor, City Agriculturist, City Chief of police and City Chief of Fire Department and other head
of offices entirely paid out of city funds and their respective assistants or deputies shall, subject to civil
service law, rules and regulations, be appointed by the City Mayor: Provided, ho9wever, that this section
shall not apply to Judges, Auditors, Fiscals, City Superintendents of Schools, Supervisors, Principals, City
Treasures, City Health Officers and City Engineers.

Issue:

Whether or not Sec. 15, supra, of the Charter of the City of Manila has been repealed, and as a result, the
City Council can no longer tender appointments to Council positions.

Ruling:

There is no doubt that Republic Act No. 409, which provides specifically for the organization of the
Government of the City of Manila, is a special law, and whereas Republic Act No. 5185 and Batas Blg. 337,
which apply to municipal governments in general, are general laws. As the Solicitor General points out, and
the Supreme Court agrees with him, it is a canon of statutory construction that a special law prevails over a
general law — regardless of their dates of passage — and the special is to be considered as remaining an
exception to the general.
So also, every effort must be exerted to avoid a conflict between statutes. If reasonable construction is
possible, the laws must be reconciled in that manner.

Repeals of laws by implication moreover are not favored, and the mere repugnancy between two statutes
should be very clear to warrant the court in holding that the later in time repeals the other.

Why a special law prevails over a general law has been put by the Court as follows:

. . . The Legislature consider and make provision for all the circumstances of the particular case. The
Legislature having specially considered all of the facts and circumstances in the particular case in
granting a special charter, it will not be considered that the Legislature, by adopting a general law
containing provisions repugnant to the provisions of the charter, and without making any mention
of its intention to amend or modify the charter, intended to amend, repeal, or modify the special
act.

In one case, we held that Republic Act No. 5185 did not divest the Mayor of Manila of his power under the
Charter of the City of Manila to approve the city budget.

We also agree with the Civil Service Commission that the provisions of Republic Act No. 5185, giving
mayors the power to appoint all officials "entirely paid out by city funds and those of Batas Blg. 337,
empowering local executives with the authority to appoint "all officers and employees of the city," were
meant not to vest the city mayors per se with comprehensive powers but rather, to underscore the
transfer of the power of appointment over local officials and employees from the President to the local
governments and to highlight the autonomy of local governments. They were not meant, however, to
deprive the City Council of Manila for instance, its appointing power granted by existing statute, and after
all, that arrangement is sufficient to accomplish the objectives of both the Decentralization Act and the
Local Government Code, that is, to provide teeth to local autonomy.

Relief:

In the light of the foregoing, we do not find any grave abuse of discretion committed by the respondent
Commission.
G.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner,

Statement of the Case:

This is a consolidated petition seeking the declaration of unconstitutionality of EO No. 284.

Statement of the Facts:

The petitioners alleged that Sec. 1, 2 and 3 of EO 284 are in direct contrast with the provision of Sec. 13
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Petitioner contends that the only exception against holding any other office or employment in government
are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1. the Vice president may be appointed as a Cabinet
member under Section 3(2) of Article II; 2) the secretary of Justice in and ex-officio of the Judicial and bar
Council by virtue of Section 8, Article VIII.

The assailed provisions of EO 284 are as follows:

Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the
Executive Department may in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the
government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor.

Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they must relinquish the
excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold
more than two positions other than his primary position.

Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or
undersecretary, or assistant secretary.

Meanwhile, Section 13 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, states that:

Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants
shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their
tenure.

Ruling:

It has been held that in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful
provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times and the condition and circumstances
under which the Constitution was framed.

The legislative intent of both Constitutional provisions is to prevent government officials from holding
multiple positions in the government for self-enrichment which is a betrayal of public trust.

The provisions of EO No. 284 above-mentioned are in direct contradiction to the express mandate
provided by the Constitutional provisions (Sec 13, Art VII and Sec 8, Art VIII). The Constitution, the
fundamental law of the land, shall reign supreme over any other statute.
Relief:

The Court held that E) No. 284 is unconstitutional. As a result, DENR Secretary Fulgenio Factoran, Jr., DILF
Secretary Luis Santos, DOH Secretary Alfredo Bengzon and DBM Secretary Guillermo Carague are ordered
to immediately relinquish their offices and employment.