ANATALIA B. RAMOS, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES DOMINGO A.
DIZON and EDNA MEDINA DIZON,
Respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner alleged that respondents are the owners of an undivided one-half portion of a parcel of land.On
1 February 1988, respondent Domingo executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing Elpidio
Domingo to sell one-half portion of said parcel of land; that Elpidio, acting pursuant to the provisions of
the SPA sold, with a right to repurchase within five months, one-half of the land to petitioner; and that
respondent Domingo failed to redeem or repurchase the disputed land within the five-month period
provided for under the Deed of Sale Under Pacto de Retro, thus, ownership over the subject land was
consolidated in petitioner.
Respondent Domingo alleged that the SPA was executed for the purpose of enabling Elpidio to secure a
loan of P150,000.00 by using Domingo's share in the land as security. The proceeds of the loan was
supposed to be used for the construction of a duplex residential house to be supervised by Elpidio.
However, Elpidio obtained a loan of P350,000.00 and used a substantial portion thereof for his personal
advantage and benefit. As Elpidio had exceeded his authority, Domingo claimed that he revoked the SPA
through several letters and by a formal notice of revocation sent by his counsel. As for the pacto de retro
sale, Domingo maintains that the same was simulated as Elpidio had already obtained a loan totaling
P350,000.00 from petitioner as evidenced by a Real Estate Mortgage executed by the two of them. In any
case, he claims that the pacto de retro sale should be treated as an equitable mortgage which cannot be
enforced through a petition for consolidation of ownership.
The trial court decided in favor of respondent Domingo.
Parenthetically, the trial court in Civil Case No. 90-51838 made the following pronouncement with respect
to the transaction between petitioner and Elpidio:
Plaintiff's evidence, however, which is not controverted by the defendant shows that he has paid
defendant the total sum of P207,000.00 in cash. In addition, defendant as attorney-in-fact of plaintiff
mortgaged plaintiff's property to Anatalia Ramos for the total sum of P350,000.00 which defendant
received and appropriated for his own personal benefit. While the deed evidencing the sale was
denominated as a Deed of Sale under Pacto de Retro, in view of the testimony given by the defendant,
the court is inclined to believe that the transaction was actually in the nature of an equitable mortgage.
The decision in Civil Case No. 90-51838 was pending appeal at the time Elpidio took the witness stand.
Respondent Domingo's counsel manifested before the trial court in Civil Case No. 93-66439 that he was
no longer presenting testimonial evidence; instead, he requested some documents to be marked in
evidence.
The trial court, however, prior to the submission of respondent Domingo's formal offer of evidence,
rendered a Decision holding that the contract between petitioner and Elpidio was actually one of equitable
mortgage and not a pacto de retro sale.
It was only on 31 January 1995 when respondent Domingo filed his Formal Offer of Exhibits.16
Petitioner thereafter filed a Notice of Appeal 17 and elevated the case before the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the Decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in applying the rule enunciated in the case of Vda. De Oñate v. Court
of Appeals pertaining to the admission and consideration of evidence not formally offered.
Ruling:
Petitioner argues that it is axiomatic that the court shall not consider evidence which has not been
formally offered.
It is instructive at this point to make a distinction between identification of documentary evidence and its
formal offer as an exhibit. The first is done in the course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of
the evidence as an exhibit. The second is done only when the party rests its case and not before. The
mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean it will be or has
been offered as part of the evidence of the party. The party may decide to formally offer it if it believes this
will advance its cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at all. In the latter event, the trial court is,
under Rule 132, Section 35 (sic) not authorized to consider it.
The applicable provision of the Rules of Court on this matter is Sec. 34, Rule 132. It reads:
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. - The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
From the foregoing provision, it is clear that for evidence to be considered, the same must be formally
offered. Corollarily, the mere fact that a particular document to identified and marked as an exhibit does
not mean that is has already been offered as part of the evidence of a party.
However, in People v. Napat-a, we relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to
be admitted and considered by the trial court provided the following requirements are present, viz: first,
the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must
have been incorporated in the records of the case.
In this case, we find and so rule that these requirements have been satisfied. The exhibits in question
were presented and marked during the pre-trial of the case thus, they have been incorporated into the
records.
It bears stressing that respondents' Exhibits were presented during Elpidio's cross-examination and in the
presence of petitioner's counsel. In fact, Elpidio was even subjected to an immediate re-direct
examination by petitioner's counsel. Although the questions posed to him at his re-direct examination
pertained solely to Civil Case No. 90-51838 still, the opportunity was there for petitioner's counsel to
question him as regards the other exhibits of respondents. The fact that petitioner's lawyer opted not to
conduct a more thorough re-direct examination was his own choice. Indeed, it may even be a part of his
tactic on this case but it certainly does not amount to a deprivation of due process as now claimed by
petitioner.
The trial court judge committed no error when he admitted and considered them in the resolution of the
case. After all, the pre-trial forms part of the proceedings and matters dealt with therein may not be
brushed aside in the process of decision making. Otherwise, the real essence of compulsory pre-trial
would be inconsequential and worthless.
