FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 167405. February 16, 2006.]

ANA JOYCE S. REYES , petitioner, vs . HON. CESAR M. SOTERO,

Presiding Judge, RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67, ATTY. PAULINO
SAGUYOD, the Clerk of Court of Branch 67 of the RTC at Paniqui,
Tarlac in his capacity as Special Administrator, CORAZON
CHICHIOCO, ANGELITO LISING, ERLINDA ESPACIO, GONZALO
ZALZOS and ERNESTO LISING , respondents.

Jose P. Fernandez and Cristobal P. Fernandez for petitioner.

Mallari & Mallari Law Office for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PRESENTATION OF; PUBLIC DOCUMENTS AS

EVIDENCE; DOCUMENTS CONSISTING OF ENTRIES IN PUBLIC RECORDS MADE IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF A DUTY BY A PUBLIC OFFICER ARE PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF
THE FACTS THEREIN STATED; CASE AT BAR. — Documents consisting of entries in
public records made in the performance of a duty by a public o cer are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated. As such, the certi cations issued by the local civil
registrar and the clerk of court regarding details of petitioner's adoption which are
entered in the records kept under their o cial custody, are prima facie evidence of the
facts contained therein. These certi cations su ce as proof of the fact of petitioner's
adoption by the Delos Santos spouses until contradicted or overcome by su cient
evidence. Mere "imputations of irregularities" will not cast a "cloud of doubt" on the
adoption decree since the certi cations and its contents are presumed valid until proof
to the contrary is offered. In this regard, it must be pointed out that such contrary proof
can be presented only in a separate action brought principally for the purpose of
nullifying the adoption decree. The latter cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding
for the settlement of a decedent's estate, as categorically held in Santos v. Aranzanso.
Accordingly, respondents cannot assail in these proceedings the validity of the
adoption decree in order to defeat petitioner's claim that she is the sole heir of the
decedent. Absent a categorical pronouncement in an appropriate proceeding that the
decree of adoption is void, the certi cations regarding the matter, as well as the facts
stated therein, should be deemed legitimate, genuine and real. Petitioner's status as an
adopted child of the decedent remains unrebutted and no serious challenge has been
brought against her standing as such. Therefore, for as long as petitioner's adoption is
considered valid, respondents cannot claim any interest in the decedent's estate.
2. CIVIL LAW; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; IN THE
ORDER OF INTESTATE SUCCESSION, ADOPTED CHILDREN EXCLUDE FIRST COUSINS.
— As succinctly held in Santos v. Aranzanso: "From all the foregoing it follows that
respondents — . . . and those who, like them . . ., claim an interest in the estate . . . as
alleged rst cousins, cannot intervene, as such, in the settlement proceedings, in view
of the fact that in the order of intestate succession adopted children exclude rst
cousins (Articles 979 and 1003, New Civil Code). The same holds true as long as the
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 adoption must be — as in the instant case — considered valid." Petitioner, whose
adoption is presumed to be valid, would necessarily exclude respondents from
inheriting from the decedent since they are mere collateral relatives of the latter. To
allow the proceedings below to continue would serve no salutary purpose but to delay
the resolution of the instant case.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO , J : p

This petition for review seeks to modify the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated May 14, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 74047 as well as the Resolution dated May 14,
2005 denying the motion for reconsideration. In the assailed judgment, the Court of
Appeals annulled and set aside the September 18, 2002 and November 12, 2002
Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67 in Spec.
Proc. No. 204 but refrained from dismissing the petition for letters of administration
and settlement of estate on the ground that petitioner must rst prove that she was
legally adopted by the decedent, Elena Lising.
On September 15, 1998, respondent Corazon L. Chichioco led a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration and settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising
before the RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, where it was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 204 and
ra ed to Branch 67. Chichioco claimed that she was the niece and heir of Lising who
died intestate on July 31, 1998. Named as co-heirs of Chichioco were Rosario L. Zalzos,
Florante Zalzos, Erlinda Lising, Manuel Lising, Evelyn Lising, Josephine Lising, Alfredo
Lising and respondents Ernesto Lising and Erlinda Espacio.
According to Chichioco, the deceased left real properties located in the
municipalities of Ramos and Paniqui, Tarlac, as well as assorted pieces of jewelry and
money which were allegedly in the possession of petitioner Ana Joyce S. Reyes, a
grandniece of the deceased. Chichioco prayed that she be appointed administrator of
the estate, upon payment of a bond, pending settlement and distribution of Lising's
properties to the legal heirs. 1
On November 6, 1998, petitioner Reyes led an Opposition 2 to the petition,
claiming that she was an adopted child of Lising and the latter's husband, Sera n Delos
Santos, who died on November 30, 1970. She asserted that the petition should be
dismissed and that the appointment of an administrator was unnecessary, since she
was the only heir of Lising who passed away without leaving any debts. She further
asserted that Chichioco is un t to serve as administrator of Lising's estate because of
her "antagonistic interests" against the decedent. Chichioco and her alleged co-heirs
have questioned the decedent’s title to a piece of real property which forms a large part
of the estate.
On November 11, 1998, petitioner led a Supplement to the Opposition 3
attaching thereto the Certi cation 4 issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Paniqui,
Tarlac stating that on page 76, Book No. 01 of the Register of Court Decrees, Reyes
was adopted by Elena Lising and Sera n Delos Santos pursuant to a decision rendered
in Spec. Proc. No. 1410 by Judge Julian Lustre of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Tarlac, Branch 3, promulgated on December 21, 1968 and duly registered with the
Office of the Civil Registrar on January 29, 1969.
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 Petitioner also submitted a Certi cation 5 issued by the Clerk of Court of the
RTC-Tarlac City, stating that a judgment was rendered in Spec. Proc. No. 1410 on
December 21, 1968 decreeing petitioner's adoption by Elena Lising and Sera n Delos
Santos. She also presented a copy of Judicial Form No. 43 6 indicating that the
adoption decree was on le in the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac City, wherein the
dispositive portion of the adoption decree was recorded as follows:
In view of the foregoing, the court nds this petition a proper case for
adoption and therefore grants the same. Consequently, the Court declares that
henceforth, the child Ana Joyce C. Zalzos is freed from all legal obligations of
obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural parents Orlando Zalzos
and May C. Castro, and is to all legal intents and purposes the child of the
petitioners Serafin delos Santos and Elena Lising. 7

Petitioner likewise submitted a Decree of Final Distribution 8 issued by the

Philippine Veterans Affairs O ce (PVAO) showing that, upon the death of Sera n Delos
Santos, death bene ts were paid to his widow, Elena Lising, and his "daughter", Ana
Joyce Delos Santos, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law. TcaAID

On April 5, 1999, the RTC ordered respondents to submit documentary evidence

to prove the jurisdictional facts of the case and to comment on petitioner's opposition.
9 Only Rosario L. Zalsos appears to have led a Comment/Reply to Oppositor's
Opposition, 1 0 after which the RTC ordered the parties to submit memoranda thereon.
1 1 On July 22, 1999, the case was deemed submitted for resolution. 1 2

Meanwhile, on June 30, 1999, Chichioco and her alleged co-heirs led before the
Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the adoption decree docketed as SP No.
53457. 1 3 They claimed that no proceedings for the adoption of petitioner took place in
1968 since the Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and the O ce of the Solicitor General
(OSG) had no records of the adoption case. Petitioner's natural mother supposedly
connived with the court personnel to make it appear that petitioner was adopted by the
Delos Santos spouses and that the CFI's order for initial hearing was published in a
weekly newspaper which was not authorized to publish court orders in special
proceedings.
Upon motion of Chichioco, the RTC ordered on October 4, 1999, the suspension
of hearings in Spec. Proc. No. 204 pending the outcome of SP No. 53457. 1 4
Subsequently, however, the Court of Appeals dismissed 1 5 SP No. 53457 for failure to
comply with the third paragraph of Section 4, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. 1 6 The said
dismissal became final and executory on March 8, 2000. 1 7
Thereafter, on August 22, 2000, petitioner led a motion before the RTC praying
that the opposition to Spec. Proc. No. 204 be nally resolved and that the petition be
dismissed. 1 8 This was followed by an Urgent Ex Parte Motion 1 9 led by petitioner on
October 17, 2000 praying for the immediate resolution of her opposition.
On November 16, 2000, respondents led a Comment 2 0 to the opposition
stating that reasonable doubts have been cast on petitioner's claim that she was legally
adopted due allegedly to certain "badges of fraud." Respondents also informed the RTC
that they have led a criminal complaint against petitioner before the O ce of the
Provincial Prosecutor, Tarlac City, for alleged falsi cation of the adoption decree and
Judicial Form No. 43, docketed as I.S. No. 00-1016.
Subsequently, the RTC issued a Resolution 2 1 dated December 12, 2000
deferring resolution of petitioner's opposition to Spec. Proc. No. 204, pending the
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 outcome of the criminal case led against the latter. In the meantime, the parties were
enjoined from dissipating or disposing any or all of the properties included in the estate
of Elena Lising without order from this Court.
On December 13, 2000, Chichioco led an Urgent Motion to Appoint Special
Administrator 2 2 before the RTC on the ground that there was yet no true determination
and appraisal of the decedent's universal estate. It was prayed therein that the Branch
Clerk of Court, Atty. Paulino Saguyod, be appointed special administrator as he was "an
experienced and able person in the management of properties" and is "honest,
impartial, competent and acceptable to the majority of the interested parties."
In the meantime, the Provincial Prosecutor found probable cause to charge
petitioner with falsi cation of public documents per resolution dated January 5, 2001.
2 3 Petitioner thus appealed the said nding to the O ce of the Regional State
Prosecutor.
On August 8, 2001, the RTC granted respondents' motion for the appointment of
a special administrator and appointed its branch clerk of court, Atty. Saguyod. 2 4
Petitioner moved for reconsideration on the grounds that the branch clerk of court was
disquali ed from taking on the task of special administrator, and that Atty. Saguyod
was appointed without being required to le a bond. Petitioner also reiterated that the
petition should be dismissed because she is the sole heir of the decedent. 2 5 However,
the RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on November 5, 2001. 2 6
On January 14, 2002, the O ce of the Regional State Prosecutor reversed the
ndings of the Provincial Prosecutor and dismissed the criminal complaint against
petitioner. 2 7 Undaunted, Chichioco led a petition for review before the Department of
Justice (DOJ).
Simultaneously, Chichioco and the other alleged co-heirs led a motion before
the RTC to enjoin petitioner from conducting business in a property belonging to the
estate. Respondent Chichioco alleged that petitioner converted the basement of
Lising's residence into a billiard hall without authority of the special administrator. 2 8
Acting on said motion, the RTC issued a resolution on September 18, 2002, the
dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Oppositor Ana Joyce Reyes is hereby enjoined from
conducting business activity in any of the properties left by the decedent. The
Special Administrator is also empowered to take control and possession of the
listed personal and real properties of the decedent and those that may be found
to be owned or registered in the name of the same.
aDcEIH

SO ORDERED. 2 9

Petitioner led a motion for reconsideration of the above resolution which was
denied by the RTC on November 12, 2002. On even date, the DOJ also issued a
resolution dismissing respondent Chichioco's petition for review in the criminal case. 3 0
Subsequently, petitioner led a special civil action for certiorari before the Court
of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74047, 3 1 assailing the September 18, 2002
and November 12, 2002 resolutions of the RTC. Petitioner alleged that said resolutions
were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction since as sole heir, she had the right to possess and use the decedent's
property, title over which automatically passed on to her upon the latter's death.
Moreover, the special administrator, Atty. Saguyod, had yet to le a bond and submit an
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 inventory of the decedent's estate.
Additionally, petitioner insisted that Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be dismissed
since the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of SP No. 53457 constituted res judicata
as to the former. There was likewise no valid challenge to her adoption and she
consequently remains to be the sole heir of the decedent. Thus, she stressed that there
was no need for the appointment of an administrator or for the settlement
proceedings.
In due course, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment 3 2 nullifying the
resolutions of the trial court. It held that the presiding judge, Judge Cesar M. Sotero,
gravely abused his discretion in appointing his branch clerk of court as special
administrator. Citing Balanay, Jr. v. Martinez , 3 3 the appellate court reasoned that such
act could engender a suspicion that Judge Sotero and his clerk are in cahoots in
milking the decedent's estate. Moreover, Atty. Saguyod failed to comply with the
requirements of a bond and inventory and could not therefore take control and
possession of any of the decedent's properties.
However, the appellate court refused to dismiss Spec. Proc. No. 204 since the
dismissal of SP No. 53457 was not a judgment on the merits and did not operate as
res judicata to the former. It was also incumbent upon petitioner to prove before the
trial court that she was indeed adopted by the Delos Santos spouses since, according
to the appellate court, "imputations of irregularities permeating the adoption decree
render its authenticity under a cloud of doubt."
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied on March 15, 2005, 3 4
hence this petition on the following assigned errors:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAD TO
PROVE THE VALIDITY OF HER ADOPTION DUE TO IMPUTATIONS OF
IRREGULARITIES IN VIEW OF SECTION 47 OF RULE 39. 3 5
B. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DISMISSAL IN
SP NO. 53457 WAS NOT A DISMISSAL ON THE MERITS. 3 6

The petition is meritorious.

On the rst assigned error, we agree with petitioner that she need not prove her
legal adoption by any evidence other than those which she had already presented
before the trial court. To recall, petitioner submitted a certi cation from the local civil
registrar's o ce that the adoption decree was registered therein and also a copy of
Judicial Form No. 43 and a certi cation issued by the clerk of court that the decree was
on le in the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac City. Both certi cations were issued
under the seal of the issuing o ces and were signed by the proper o cers. These are
thus presumed to have been regularly issued as part of the o cial duties that said
public officers perform. 3 7
It should be borne in mind that an adoption decree is a public document 3 8
required by law to be entered into the public records, the o cial repository of which, as
well as all other judicial pronouncements affecting the status of individuals, is the local
civil registrar's office as well as the court which rendered the judgment.
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a
duty by a public o cer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. 3 9 As such,
the certi cations issued by the local civil registrar and the clerk of court regarding
details of petitioner's adoption which are entered in the records kept under their o cial
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 custody, are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. These certi cations
su ce as proof of the fact of petitioner's adoption by the Delos Santos spouses until
contradicted or overcome by su cient evidence. Mere "imputations of irregularities"
will not cast a "cloud of doubt" on the adoption decree since the certi cations and its
contents are presumed valid until proof to the contrary is offered.
In this regard, it must be pointed out that such contrary proof can be presented
only in a separate action brought principally for the purpose of nullifying the adoption
decree. The latter cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a
decedent's estate, as categorically held in Santos v. Aranzanso. 4 0 Accordingly,
respondents cannot assail in these proceedings the validity of the adoption decree in
order to defeat petitioner’s claim that she is the sole heir of the decedent. Absent a
categorical pronouncement in an appropriate proceeding that the decree of adoption is
void, the certi cations regarding the matter, as well as the facts stated therein, should
be deemed legitimate, genuine and real. Petitioner's status as an adopted child of the
decedent remains unrebutted and no serious challenge has been brought against her
standing as such. Therefore, for as long as petitioner's adoption is considered valid,
respondents cannot claim any interest in the decedent’s estate. For this reason, we
agree with petitioner that Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be dismissed. DEHaAS

As succinctly held in Santos v. Aranzanso: 4 1

From all the foregoing it follows that respondents — . . . and those who, like
them . . ., claim an interest in the estate . . . as alleged rst cousins, cannot
intervene, as such, in the settlement proceedings, in view of the fact that in the
order of intestate succession adopted children exclude rst cousins (Articles 979
and 1003, New Civil Code). The same holds true as long as the adoption
must be — as in the instant case - considered valid . (Emphasis added)

Petitioner, whose adoption is presumed to be valid, would necessarily exclude

respondents from inheriting from the decedent since they are mere collateral relatives
of the latter. To allow the proceedings below to continue would serve no salutary
purpose but to delay the resolution of the instant case. After all, the dismissal of Spec.
Proc. No. 204 is the logical consequence of our pronouncement relative to the
presumed validity of petitioner’s adoption.
Moreover, it must be stressed that all the evidence pertinent to the resolution of
the petitioner’s opposition, which is actually a motion to dismiss the petition for letters
of administration and settlement of the estate, is a matter of record in the instant case.
The same has in fact been submitted for resolution before the RTC more than six years
ago and is so far the only pending incident before the RTC. The parties have likewise
amply ventilated their positions on the matter through their respective pleadings led
before the lower courts. No useful purpose will thus be served if we let the RTC resolve
the matter, only for its ruling to be elevated again to the Court of Appeals and
subsequently to this Court. The remand of the case to the lower court for further
reception of evidence is not necessary where the Court is in a position to resolve the
dispute based on the evidence before it. 4 2 This is in keeping with the avowed purpose
of the rules of procedure which is to secure for the parties a just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding. 4 3 Hence, since the grounds
for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 204 are extant in the records and there is no cogent
reason to remand the case to the RTC, Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be dismissed.
Based on the foregoing, the Court sees no need to discuss petitioner’s second
assigned error.
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 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Special Proceedings No. 204
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, Branch 67 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Austria-Martinez and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Callejo, Sr., J., is on leave.

Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 69-74.
2. Id. at 75-79.
3. Id. at 81-84.
4. Id. at 85.
5. Records, p. 35.
6. Rollo, p. 207.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 86-87.
9. Records, p. 98.

10. Id. at 128-132.

11. Id. at 147.
12. Id. at 148.
13. Rollo, pp. 88-97.
14. Id. at 98.
15. Id. at 99.
16. The third paragraph of Section 4, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court states that:
The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition affidavits of witnesses or
documents supporting the cause of action or defense and a sworn certification that he
has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal
or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the
same, and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed
or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions
thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid
courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom.
17. Rollo, p. 100.
18. Records, pp. 198-203.

19. Id. at 253-256.

20. Id. at 236-243.
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 21. Id. at 264.
22. Id. at 261-263.
23. Rollo, pp. 232-234.
24. Id. at 106-107.
25. Id. at 108-111.
26. Id. at 108-112.
27. Id. at 101-105.
28. Id. at 114-116.
29. Id. at 65.
30. Id. at 128-129.
31. Id. at 47-64.
32. Id. at 36-43. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz and concurred in by
Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Noel G. Tijam.
33. G.R. No. L-39247, June 27, 1975, 64 SCRA 452.

34. Rollo, p. 46.

35. Id. at 20.
36. Id. at 25.
37. RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Sec. 2(m).

38. Id., Rule 132, Sec. 19(a).

39. Id., id., Section 23.
40. 123 Phil. 160 (1966); In this case, the respondents opposed the petition for letters of
administration filed by the surviving spouse and adopted children of the decedent on the
ground that the adoption was void ab initio for want of written consent of the adopted
children’s natural parents. Respondents also alleged that the adopted children were not
abandoned by their natural parents and could therefore not be adopted by the decedent
and her spouse. The Court, through Mr. Justice Bengzon, held that the adoption decree
could not be attacked collaterally in the settlement proceedings and was thus considered
valid for the purpose.
41. Id. at 171-172.
42. See Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 77425 &
77450, June 19, 1991, 198 SCRA 300, 311.
43. See China Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 333 Phil. 158, 165 (1996).

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