EN BANC

G.R. No. 110801 December 8, 1995

MARIKINA VALLEY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ISIDORO LIAMZON,

JR., SPS. BERNARDO AND DELIA ROSARIO, SPS. MANUEL AND NORMA
SANCHEZ, SPS. RUFINO AND MILAGROS JAVIER, SPS. RODOLFO AND
SONIA OCAMPO, SPS. LAZARO AND JULIETA SANTOS, SPS. TEODORO
AND ZENAIDA BAUTISTA, SPS. CHARLES AND MA. CORAZON MILLER,
SPS. EDGARDO AND CRISTINA VALENZUELA, FRANCISCO LIAMZON,
MARIETTA LIAMZON, ROMEO THADEUS LIAMZON, MICHAEL RAYMOND
LIAMZON, ROBERTO ANTONIO LIAMZON, ROSABELLE THERESA
LIAMZON, RONALDO ISIDORO LIAMZON and RODRIGO JESUS
LIAMZON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NAPOLEON R. FLOJO, Presiding Judge of Branch 2, RTC Manila;
BASILIO SYTANGCO, as representative of the heirs of JOSE REYES
SYTANGCO; and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:

Jose Reyes Sytangco instituted a complaint for reconveyance of a piece of

land situated along España Street, Manila, against petitioner Marikina Valley
Development Corporation ("Marikina Valley") and Milagros Liamzon. In his
complaint, Jose Reyes Sytangco alleged that he and his wife, Aurelia Liamzon-
Sytangco had entrusted some funds to Milagros Liamzon, sister-in-law of
Aurelia, in order to purchase the España Street property from its former owners.
The Sytangco spouses had years ago built their house on that parcel of land then
leased from the original owners with whom they negotiated for purchase of that
land. Milagros Liamzon, however, in alleged violation of the trust reposed upon
her, purchased the España Street property in her own name and had title to the
same registered in her name. Thereafter, she transferred title over that property
to petitioner Marikina Valley, a closed corporation owned by the Liamzon family.
In their answer, petitioner denied the allegations of Jose Reyes Sytangco and
claimed that Milagros Liamzon had purchased the España Street property by
and for herself, with funds coming from petitioner Marikina Valley. For her part,
Milagros Liamzon insisted, among other things, that the Reyes Sytangco spouses
had waived in her favor their right to buy the property in question.

During the trial in the court below, Jose Reyes Sytangco died and he was
substituted by his heirs, who are private respondents herein. After trial, the trial
court ruled in favor of private respondent heirs in a decision dated 11 October
1991. The trial court directed petitioner Marikina Valley to execute a Deed of
Conveyance covering the property involved in favor of private respondents.
On 28 October 1991, Marikina Valley and the other petitioners — heirs of
Milagros Liamzon (Milagros having, in the meantime, passed away) — received a
copy of the decision of the trial court. Petitioners moved for reconsideration on 7
November 1991.

The Reyes Sytangco heirs opposed petitioners' motion for reconsideration

upon the ground that it was a pro forma one. The heirs contended that the
allegations of insufficiency of evidence were couched in very general terms,
contrary to the requirements of Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court.
On 21 November 1991, the trial court denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit. The trial court said:

The defendant anchors his motion on the assertion that:

1. There is no sufficient evidence to show that the down payment for
the property came from the plaintiff;
2. That the money used for the property did not come from the
plaintiff, hence, no implied trust could have been created between
Milagros Liamzon and Aurelia Liamson;
3. That piercing the veil of corporate entity is not applicable to this
case.
After a perusal of the arguments posed in support of these grounds,
the court finds that these arguments had been discussed and
resolved in the decision. There being [no] other matter of
consequences asserted which has not been considered in the
decision, the Court resolves to deny the same.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of
merit.1 (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners received a copy of the above order on 22 November 1991. On

25 November 1991, they filed a notice of appeal with the trial court.

In the meantime, private respondent heirs moved for execution of the

decision of 11 October 1991. They insisted that petitioners had failed to perfect
an appeal within the reglementary period.

In its order dated 25 November 1991, the trial court dismissed the notice
of appeal filed by petitioners for having been filed beyond the reglementary period
to perfect an appeal. The trial judge reasoned that petitioners' motion for
reconsideration was pro forma and hence did not stop the running of the
reglementary period. Thereupon, the trial judge granted private respondents'
motions for execution.

Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari and injunction. They

denied that their motion for reconsideration was merely pro forma and claimed
that they had filed their notice of appeal seasonably. They also challenged the
validity of subsequent orders of the trial court directing execution.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, declaring that petitioners' motion
for reconsideration was indeed pro forma and, "therefore, clearly without merit."

The appellate court went on to say that:

[w]here a motion for reconsideration merely submits, reiterates,

repleads, repeats, or reaffirms the same arguments that had been
previously considered and resolved in the decision, it is pro forma.

The Court of Appeals concluded that petitioners' pro forma motion for
reconsideration had not stopped the running of the period to perfect an
appeal and that, accordingly, the judgment had become final and private
respondents were entitled to execution as a matter of right. Petitioners
sought reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' decision, without success.

In their present Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioners aver once

more that their motion for reconsideration filed before the trial court was
sufficient in form and substance and was not pro forma. They reiterate that their
motion had effectively suspended the running of the reglementary period, and
that their notice of appeal filed three (3) days from receipt of the order denying
their motion for reconsideration had been filed well within the remaining period
to perfect an appeal.

The rule in our jurisdiction is that a party aggrieved by a decision of a trial

court may move to set aside the decision and reconsideration thereof may be
granted when (a) the judgment had awarded "excessive damages;" (b) there was
"insufficiency of the evidence to justify the decision;" or (c) "the decision was
against the law."2

A motion for reconsideration based on ground (b) or (c) above must point
out specifically the findings and conclusions of the judgment which are not
supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law, making express
reference to the testimonial or documentary evidence or to the provisions of law
alleged to be contrary to such findings and conclusions. 3

A motion for reconsideration, when sufficient in form and substance —

that is, when it satisfies the requirements of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court —
interrupts the cunning of the period to perfect an appeal.4 A motion for
reconsideration that does not comply with those requirements will, upon the
other hand, be treated as pro forma intended merely to delay the proceedings
and as such, the motion will not stay or suspend the reglementary period.5The
net result will be dismissal of the appeal for having been unseasonably filed.

The question in every case is, therefore, whether a motion for

reconsideration is properly regarded as having satisfied the requirements, noted
above, of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. As already pointed out, the Court of
Appeals took the position that where a motion for reconsideration merely
"reiterates" or "repleads" the same arguments which had been previously
considered and resolved in the decision sought to be reconsidered, the motion is
a pro forma one. In taking this position, the appellate court quoted at some
length from a prior decision of this Court:

. . . Said the Supreme Court in "Dacanay v. Alvendia, et al.," 30

SCRA 31, to wit:

In Estrada v. Sto. Domingo, recently decided by this Court, we once

again called the attention of the bar and litigants to the "principle
already forged by this Court . . . that a motion for reconsideration
which has no other purpose than to gain time is pro forma and does
not stop the period of appeal from slipping away." Mr. Justice Dizon
pointed out in his concurring opinion that "The motion aforesaid
is pro forma on yet another ground, in substance it was but
a reiteration of reasons and arguments previously set forth in
respondent Sto. Domingo's memorandum submitted to the trial court
and which the latter had already considered, weighed and resolved
adversely to him when it rendered its decision on the merits." And
earlier in Lonaria v. De Guzman, we held that "[T]he filing of the
second motion on January 22, 1963 did not suspend the running of
the period, first, because it was " pro forma based on grounds
already existing at the time of the first motion."6 (Emphasis partly in
the original and partly supplied)

It should, however, be noted that the circumstance that a motion for

reconsideration deals with the same issues and arguments posed and resolved
by the trial court in its decision does not necessarily mean that the motion must
be characterized as merely pro forma. More than two (2) decades ago, Mr. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes had occasion, in Guerra Enterprises Company, Inc. v. Court of First
Instance of Lanao del Sur,7 to point out that a pleader preparing a motion for
reconsideration must of necessity address the arguments made or accepted by
the trial court in its decision:

. . . . Among the ends to which a motion for reconsideration is

addressed, one is precisely to convince the court that its ruling is
erroneous and improper, contrary to the law or the evidence (Rule
37, Section 1, subsection [c]); and in doing so, the movant has to
dwell of necessity upon the issues passed upon by the court. If a
motion for reconsideration may not discuss these issues, the
consequence would be that after a decision is rendered, the losing
party would be confined to filing only motions for reopening and new
trial. We find in the Rules of Court no warrant for ruling to that
 effect, a ruling that would, in effect eliminate subsection (c) of
Section 1 of Rule 37.8 (Emphases supplied)

The movant is very often confined to the amplification or further

discussion of the same issues already passed upon by the trial court.
Otherwise, his remedy would not be a reconsideration of the decision, but
a new trial or some other remedy.9

The kinds of motions for reconsideration which have been regarded as

merely pro forma are illustrated by Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals,10 where a one
sentence motion for reconsideration, which read thus:

COMES NOW the petitioners-appellants in the above-entitled case

and to this Honorable Court respectfully move for reconsideration of
the decision promulgated on November 8, 1966, copy of which was
received by the undersigned on November 9, 1966, on the ground
that the same is contrary to law and evidence. (Emphasis supplied)

was considered a pro forma motion for total failure to specify the findings
or conclusions in the trial court's decision which were supposedly not
supported by evidence or were contrary to law. Similarly, in Villarica v.
Court of Appeals, 11 a motion for reconsideration which no more than
alleged the following:

1. that the order is contrary to law; and

2. that the order is contrary to the facts of the case,

did not suspend the running of the period for appeal, being a pro forma motion
merely. These kinds of motion present no difficulty at all.

A motion for reconsideration which is not as starkly bare as

in Crisostomo and in Villarica, but which, as it were, has some flesh on its bones,
may nevertheless be rendered pro forma where the movant fails to make
reference to the testimonial and documentary evidence on record or the
provisions of law said to be contrary to the trial court's conclusions. In other
words, the movant is also required to point out succinctly why reconsideration
is warranted. In Luzon Stevedoring Company v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 12 the Supreme Court declared that:

it is not enough that a motion for reconsideration should state what

part of the decision is contrary to law or the evidence; it should also
point out why it is so. Failure to explain why will render the motion
for reconsideration pro forma. (Emphasis supplied)
 Where a substantial bonafide effort is made to explain where and why the
trial court should be regarded as having erred in its main decision, the fact that
the trial court thereafter found such argument unmeritorious or as inadequate
to warrant modification or reversal of the main decision, does not, of course,
mean that the motion for reconsideration should have been regarded, or was
properly regarded, as merely pro forma.

It is important to note that the above case law rests upon the principle
that a motion for reconsideration which fails to comply with the requirements of
Sections 1 (c) and 2 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, and is therefore pro
forma merely, has no other purpose than to gain time. It is intended to delay or
impede the progress of proceedings and the rule that such motion for
reconsideration does not stop the period of appeal from "slipping away" reflects
both poetic and substantial justice. In Estrada, et al. v. Sto. Domingo, et al., 13 the
Court underlined.

[T]he principle [previously] forged by this Court — that a motion for

reconsideration which has no other purpose than to gain time is pro
forma and does not stop the period of appeal from slipping away. It
is in recognition of this doctrine that we hold that where a motion for
reconsideration in an election case is taken advantage of for
purposes of delay to the prejudice of the adverse party or where such
motion forms part of a matrix delay, that motion does not stop
running of the five-day period for appeal. 14(Emphasis supplied)

Where the circumstances of a case do not show an intent on the part of

the movant merely to delay the proceedings, our Court has refused to
characterize the motion as simply pro forma. Thus, in the Guerra
Enterprises case, the Court took note of the fact that the motion for
reconsideration had been filed within barely twelve (12) days (the reglementary
period was then thirty [30] days) after receipt by the counsel for the movant
party, which fact negated the suggestion that the motion had been used as "a
mere delaying tactic." 15 Dacanay v. Alvendia, 16 on which the Court of Appeals
had relied, is not in fact in conflict with the cases we have above referred to.
In Dacanay, the motion for reconsideration was in effect a fourth motion for
reconsideration: the "reasons and arguments" set out in the motion for
reconsideration had on three previous occasions been presented to the trial court
and each time considered and rejected by the trial court. In Lonario v. De
Guzman, 17 the motion for reconsideration which the Court characterized as pro
forma was in fact a second motion for reconsideration based on grounds already
existing at the time the first motion for reconsideration was filed. Further, at the
time of the filing of the second motion, the period to appeal had already lapsed.
This Court dismissed the case for having been appealed beyond the reglementary
period. In Samudio v. Municipality of Gainza, Camarines Sur, 18 the Court had
before it a "so-called motion for new trial based exactly on the very ground alleged
in [defendant's] first motion for reconsideration dated October 17, 1952" and
accordingly, held that the motion for new trial did not suspend the period for
perfecting an appeal "because it [was] mere repetition of the [first] motion for
reconsideration of October 17, 1952." 19 (Emphasis supplied)
We turn then to the application of the above standards to the motion for
reconsideration in the case at bar. The text of petitioners' motion for
reconsideration dated 7 November 1991 is quoted below:

(a) There [was] no sufficient evidence introduced to prove the alleged

fact that the down-payment for the property in question came from
Jose Sytangco. Private transactions are presumed to be fair and
regular (citations omitted). The regularity of defendant Liamzon's
transaction with the Prietos for the sale of the property implies that
the consideration came from her and not from plaintiff. This
presumption cannot be rebutted by the bare testimony of a biased
witness;
(b) The money used to pay for the property not belonging to the
plaintiff, there could never be a trust between him and defendant
Liamzon. Even then, plaintiff merely claimed that what belong to
him was only the down-payment, not the total amount used to
purchase the property, that the defendant Liamzon was the one
paying the installments can be gleaned from the fact that while
plaintiff allegedly authorized defendant Liamzon to purchase the
property sometime in 1968, it was only in 1981 that he came to
know that the property was titled in the name of defendant
corporation. Plaintiff's (Jose Reyes Sytangco) total lack of knowledge
about the transactions regarding the property for 13 long years,
meant that he had no contract with the Prietos, the seller during
this period. Assuming without admitting that the down-payment
belonged to plaintiff, he is only entitled to reimbursement but not
title to the property;
(c) Piercing the veil of corporate fiction applies only to cases where
the corporation was created for purposes of fraud, usually in tax
cases; fraud, however, being the exception rather than the rule
should be proven by convincing evidences. That defendant Liamzon
is a director of defendant Corporation is not indicative of fraud. The
money used to buy the property being advances from defendant
corporation, there is nothing wrong to have said property be titled
in the name of the corporation to offset said advances;
(d) It may be mentioned that the ejectment counterpart of this case
had already been decided with finality in favor of defendant
corporation. 20

In paragraph (a) of their motion, petitioners claimed that the evidence

submitted was insufficient to show that the down payment for the purchase of
the España Street property had in fact come from private respondents'
predecessor-in-interest Jose Reyes Sytangco. In effect, petitioners here aver that
the presumption of regularity of private transactions carried out in the ordinary
course of business had not been overturned by the testimony of Jose Reyes
Sytangco himself. This reflected petitioners' appraisal of the trial court's
conclusion that Jose and Aurelia Reyes Sytangco had handed over to Milagros
Liamzon the amount of P41,000.00 to complete the downpayment of the Reyes
Sytangco spouses on the España lot. The trial court had not discussed the
presumption of regularity of private transactions invoked by petitioners.
In paragraph (b) of their motion, petitioners, building upon their paragraph (a),
argued that since the money used to pay the property did not belong to the
plaintiff, no constructive trust arose between Jose Reyes Sytangco and Milagros
Liamzon. Petitioners further argue that assuming that the money for the
downpayment had really come from the Reyes Sytangco spouses, the rest of the
payments on the España property had been made by Milagros Liamzon.
Accordingly, they argue that the Reyes Sytangco spouses would be entitled only
to reimbursement of the down payment and not to reconveyance of the property
itself. The trial court had not addressed this argument in its decision; the trial
judge had found Milagros Liamzon's testimony concerning whose money had
been used in the purchase of the lot as "filled with contradictions" which
seriously impaired her credibility. 21

The third argument of petitioners in their motion assailed the reliance of

the trial court upon the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil by asserting that
that doctrine was available only in cases where the corporation itself had been
created for purposes of fraud. Implicitly, petitioners argue that no evidence had
been submitted to show that Marikina Valley had been created precisely "for
purposes of fraud." The trial court had not touched on this argument. In
paragraph (d) of their motion, petitioners aver that the ejectment suit instituted
by them had been decided in their favor. The trial court's decision had not
mentioned such an ejectment suit.

We are, therefore, unable to characterize the motion for reconsideration

filed by petitioners as simply pro forma. That motion for reconsideration, it may
be noted, had been filed no more than ten (10) days after receipt of the trial
court's decision by petitioner Marikina Valley.

It is scarcely necessary to add that our conclusion that petitioners' motion

was not pro forma, should not be regarded as implying however indirectly that
that motion was meritorious.

We note finally that because the doctrine relating to pro forma motions for
reconsideration impacts upon the reality and substance of the statutory right of
appeal, that doctrine should be applied reasonably, rather than literally. The
right to appeal, where it exists, is an important and valuable right. Public policy
would be better served by according the appellate court an effective opportunity
to review the decision of the trial court on the merits, rather than by aborting
the right to appeal by a literal application of the procedural rule relating to pro
forma motions for reconsideration.

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, (a) the Orders of the trial court dated
27 November 1991, 12 December 1991 and 22 January 1992 and (b) the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 8 December 1992, are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the trial court which is hereby
DIRECTED to GIVE DUE COURSE to petitioners' notice of appeal. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr. and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 53.
2 Section 1 (c), Rule 37, Rules of Court.
3 Section 2, third paragraph, Rule 37, Rules of Court.
4 Section 3, Rule 41, Rules of Court.
5 E.g., Nieto v. De los Angeles, 109 SCRA 229 (1981); City of Cebu
v. Mendoza, 62 SCRA 440 (1975); Alvero v. De la Rosa, 76 Phil. 428
(1946); Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 74 Phil. 235 (1943).
6 Court of Appeals Decision, p. 10; Rollo, p. 126.
7 32 SCRA 314 (1970).
8 32 SCRA at 317.
9 Siy v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 536 (1985). See also People v.
Rodriguez, 213 SCRA 171 (1992).
10 32 SCRA 54 (1970).
11 57 SCRA 24 (1974).
12 8 SCRA 447 (1963). See also Viña v. Court of Appeals, 126 SCRA
371 (1983); Philippine Advertising Counsellors, Inc. v. Revilla, 52
SCRA 246 (1973); Ylanan v. Mercado, 94 Phil. 769 (1954).
13 28 SCRA 890 (1969).
14 28 SCRA at 914.
15 32 SCRA at 317.
16 30 SCRA 31 (1969).
17 21 SCRA 349 (1967).
18 100 Phil. 1013 (1957).
19 100 Phil. at 1018.
20 Rollo, pp. 47-48.
21 Trial Court Decision, Rollo, p. 41.