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2019 Criminal Law Last Minute Tips (Jurisprudence)

BOOK 1

(1) Pro reo principle, rule of lenity, and equipoise doctrine explained. Pro reo principle means when there is doubt, rule in favor of the accused.
This is in consonance with the constitutional guarantee that the accused ought to be presumed innocent until and unless his guilt is established
beyond reasonable doubt. Rule of lenity holds that a court, in construing an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out multiple or inconsistent Page |
punishments, should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the more lenient punishment. (People v. Temporada, Dec. 17, 2008) The equipoise
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doctrine states that when the evidence of the prosecution and the defense are so evenly balanced the appreciation of such evidence calls for the
tilting of the scales in favor of the accused. (Gonzalez v. People, Feb. 14, 2018)

(2) R.A. No. 10951, which adjusted the value of property and damage on which a penalty is based, has retroactive effect if favorable to the
accused. For crimes such as theft, qualified theft, estafa, robbery with force upon things, malicious mischief, malversation, and such other
crimes, the penalty of which is dependent upon the value of the object in consideration thereof, have been reduced, said law finds application
regardless of whether its effectivity comes after the time when the judgment of conviction is rendered and even if service of sentence has
already begun. (Hernan v. Sandiganbayan, Dec. 5, 2017)

(3) Prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment is aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of
duration or amount. It applies to punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete, e.g. those inflicted at the whipping
post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within
the prohibition. The fact that punishment authorized by statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual. (Corpuz v. People, Apr. 24, 2014)

Ex post facto law defined. It is one which: (i) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done,
and punishes such an act; (ii) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed; (iii) changes the punishment and inflicts a
greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (iv) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon
less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense; (v) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies
only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful; and (vi) deprives a person accused of a
crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty. (Republic v. Eugenio Jr., Feb. 14, 2008)

(4) Not all crimes under the Revised Penal Code are considered mala in se. There are mala prohibita crimes defined in Revised Penal Code,
such as technical malversation. Conversely, there are mala in se crimes under special laws, such as plunder under R.A. No. 7080. If the
punishable act or omission is immoral in itself, then it is a crime mala in se; on the contrary, if it is not immoral in itself but there is a statute
prohibiting its commission by reasons of public policy, then it is mala prohibita. (Dungo v. People, July 1, 2015)

(5) Lack of “intent to perpetrate the crime” is a defense against crimes punishable under special penal laws. In crimes punishable under
special penal laws, an accused can raise the defense of lack of intent to perpetrate the crime. A person may not have consciously intended to
commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself. For instance, if charged with
illegal possession of firearm, the accused may show lack of animus possidendi or intent to possess on his part, which is the crime in itself. This
“intent to perpetrate the act” must be distinguished from “intent to commit the crime.” In the latter, there must be criminal intent; in the former,
it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely and consciously. (Fajardo v. People, Jan. 10, 2011)

(6) Motive when and when not material. Motive, which pertains to the reason that prompts the accused to engage in a particular criminal activity,
is not an essential element of a crime and therefore need not be proven in criminal prosecutions. The question of motive becomes material when
there is doubt as to the identity of the malefactor committing the offense, (People v. Pentecostes, Nov. 8, 2017) or when the evidence is
circumstantial or inconclusive, and there is some doubt on whether a crime has been committed or whether the accused has committed it. Thus,
where a reliable eyewitness has fully and satisfactorily identified the accused as the perpetrator of the felony, motive becomes immaterial in the
successful prosecution of a criminal case. (People v. Ducabo, Sept. 28, 2007)

(7) Mistake of fact explained. It is a misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would have justified the act or omission which is the subject of the
prosecution. It is a defense to a charge of crime where it negates the intent component of the crime. Inquiry is into the mistaken belief of the
defendant, and it does not look at all to the belief or state of mind of any other person. Proper invocation of this defense requires: (i) the mistake
be honest and reasonable; (ii) it be a matter of fact; and (iii) it negates the culpability required to commit the crime or the existence of the mental
state which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense. (Yapyuco v. Sandiganbayan, June 25, 2012)

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(8) Proximate cause defined. Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. (Dumayag v. People, Nov. 26, 2012)

The accused using a curved sword attacking without provocation the victim who was able to evade but instead hitting the victim’s
granddaughter is an example of aberratio ictus. The fatal blow to the granddaughter was only delivered by mistake as it was actually the
victim who was the accused’s intended target. The single deed actually resulted in complex crime under Article 48: (i) attempted murder of Page |
victim; and (ii) consummated murder of the granddaughter. (People v. Umawid, June 9, 2014)
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Error in personae and praeter intentionem defined. In the former, the felony committed befalls a different person; in the latter, more serious
consequences not intended by the offender result from his felonious act. (Wacoy v. People, June 22, 2015)

(9) Impossible crime defined. It is committed by any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not
for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate to ineffectual means. (Jacinto v. People,
July 13, 2009) Examples:
(a) Impossible crime of theft: Accused stole a check payable to his employer. When she encashed the check, it bounced. The account
against which the check was drawn is unfunded. The accused performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is
a crime against property. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which was not
rightfully hers. (Jacinto v. People, July 13, 2009)
(b) Impossible crime of murder: Accused, armed with rifle and with intent to kill, continuously fired at Ieuan’s bedroom, thinking the
latter was sleeping. Not known to the accused, Ieuan left for Manila early that day. Physical impossibility rendered the intended crime
impossible of accomplishment. (Intod v. People, Oct. 21, 1992)
(c) Impossible crime of theft: A man puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet, but gets
nothing since the pocket is empty. Yes. Factual impossibility rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. (Intod v.
People, Oct. 21, 1992)

Accused is liable for the crime of murder, not for impossible crime, if he stabs a victim who lost consciousness because of the blow of his
co-conspirators. While there is impossibility of killing a person who is already dead, there is no impossibility if the person is only unconscious.
Even so, the collective liability of the accused conspirators renders both of them guilty of the crime of murder. (People v. Callao, Mar. 14, 2018)

(10) Frustrated felony distinguished from attempted felony. In the former, offender has performed all the acts of execution which should produce
the felony as a consequence; whereas in the latter, offender merely commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not
perform all the acts of execution. In the former, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is some cause independent of the will of the
perpetrator; in the latter, the reason for the non-fulfillment of the crime is a cause or accident other than the offender’s own spontaneous
desistance. (People v. Labiaga, July 15, 2013)

No crime of frustrated theft. Theft can only be attempted or consummated. Theft is already produced upon the taking of personal property of
another without the latter’s consent, even if the offender has no opportunity to dispose of the same. (Valenzuela v. People, June 21, 2007)

(11) Doctrine of implied conspiracy explained. Conspiracy is implied if two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of
the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, even though no actual meeting among them to concert means is
proved. (People v. De Leon, June 26, 2009)

“Wheel” or “circle” conspiracy and “chain” conspiracy explained. "Wheel" or "circle" conspiracy occurs when there is a single person or
group (the hub) dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the spokes). The spoke typically interacts with the hub rather
than with another spoke. In the event that the spoke shares a common purpose to succeed, there is a single conspiracy. In the instances when
each spoke is unconcerned with the success of the other spokes, there are multiple conspiracies. "Chain" conspiracy, usually involving the
distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is successive communication and cooperation in much the same wa y as with
legitimate business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer. (Arroyo v.
People, July 19, 2016)

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(12) Justifying circumstance vis-à-vis exempting circumstance. In the former, no criminal liability is incurred, (Velasquez v. People, Mar. 15,
2017) while a person acting under any of latter commits a crime but cannot be held criminally liable therefor. The exemption from punishment
stems from the complete absence of intelligence or free will in performing the act. (People v. Pantoja, Nov. 29, 2017)

(13) Unlawful aggression is an indispensable element of self-defense and defense of strangers. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no
justified killing in defense of oneself or strangers. The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether the
aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or Page |
imaginary threat. The accused must establish the concurrence of three elements: (i) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (ii) the
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attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (iii) the attack or assault must be unlawful. (People v. Del Castillo, Jan. 18, 2012)
Hence, when an altercation ceases due to intervention of a person, the one making the defense is no longer justified in killing or wounding the
former aggressor, there being no unlawful aggression. (People v. Ramelo, Nov. 22, 2017)

(14) Exempting circumstance of insanity when and when not available. The accused must demonstrate that: (i) he was completely deprived of
intelligence because of his mental condition or illness; and (ii) such complete deprivation of intelligence must be manifest at the time or
immediately before the commission of the offense. (People v. Salvador, June 27, 2018) Diminished capacity is not the same as complete
deprivation of intelligence or discernment. (People v. Racal, Sept. 4, 2017) Thus, unusual behaviors such as smiling to oneself and calling a
chicken late at night are not proof of a complete absence of intelligence; not every aberration of the mind or mental deficiency constitutes
insanity. (People v. Miraña, Apr. 25, 2018)

(15) Accident as an exempting circumstance explained. It is an event that happens outside the sway of our will, and although it comes about
through some act of our will, it lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable consequences. In short, accident presupposes the lack of
intention to commit the wrong done. (Talampas v. People, Nov. 23, 2011)

(16) Instigation vis-a-vis entrapment. Instigation is the means by which the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to
prosecute him. On the other hand, entrapment is the employment of such ways and means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker.
In instigation, officers of the law or their agents incite, induce, instigate or lure an accused into committing an offense which he would otherwise
not commit and has no intention of committing. In entrapment, the criminal intent or design to commit the offense charged originates in the
mind of the accused, and law enforcement officials merely facilitate the apprehension of the criminal by employing ruses and schemes; thus, the
accused cannot justify his conduct. (People v. Bartolome, Feb. 6, 2013)

(17) Elements for voluntary surrender to be appreciated as mitigating circumstance. The elements are: (i) accused has not been actually
arrested; (ii) accused surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (iii) surrender is voluntary. The essence of voluntary
surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself to the authorities, either because he acknowledges
his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture. (People v. Manzano Jr.,
Mar. 5, 2018)

(18) Voluntary plea of guilt when mitigating. It is mitigating when accused had voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to the
presentation of the evidence for the prosecution. (People v. Palermo, June 28, 2001). Thus, plea of guilty made after arraignment and after trial
had begun does not entitle the accused to have such plea considered as a mitigating circumstance. Voluntary plea of guilt required by law is one
that is made by the accused in cognizance of the grievous wrong he has committed and must be done as an act of repentance and respect for the
law. It is mitigating because it indicated a moral disposition in the accused favorable to his reform. (People v. Racal, Sept. 4, 2017)

(19) Mitigating circumstances are not appreciated in the crime of reckless imprudence under Artice 365. Paragraph 5 of Article 365 expressly
states that in the imposition of the penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64.
The carelessness, imprudence or negligence which characterizes the wrongful act may vary from one situation to another, in nature, extent, and
resulting consequences, and in order that there may be a fair and just application of the penalty, the courts must have ample discretion in its
imposition. (Mariano v. People, July 7, 2014)

(20) Dwelling may be considered as an aggravating circumstance in the crime of robbery with violence and intimidation against persons. In
this class of robbery, the crime may be committed without the necessity of trespassing the sanctity of the offended party's house. (People v.
Evangelio, Aug. 31, 2011)

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(21) Requisites of evident premeditation. The requisites are: (i) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (ii) an act manifestly
indicating the offender clung to his determination; and (iii) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime
to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. (People v. Ordona, Sept. 20, 2017)

Evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in robbery but can be appreciated in robbery with homicide. While evident premeditation
is inherent in robbery, it may be considered in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide if there is premeditation to kill besides
stealing. (People v. Olazo, Oct. 3, 2016) Page |
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(22) Abuse of superior strength is present when 36-year old accused used a long bladed weapon to kill two unarmed women, aged 65 and 74.
Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is inequality of force between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of
superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor, and the latter takes advantage of it in the commission of the crime. (People v.
Corpuz, Feb. 28, 2018)

(23) Requisites of treachery. The requisites are: (i) means, methods and forms of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to
defend themselves or retaliate; and (ii) such means, methods and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused
without danger to his person. (People v. Oandasan, Jr. June 14, 2016) Thus, there is no treachery in a killing done at the spur of the moment,
even if the victim was shot from behind, since the accused was filled with anger and rage and excitement, and had no time to reflect on his
actions. (Rustia Jr. v. People, Oct. 5, 2016)

Treachery can be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance to the constituent crime of “homicide” in the crime of robbery
with homicide. While under Article 14(16), treachery is appreciated only in crimes against persons, it can be appreciated in the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide although said crime is classified as a crime against property. Treachery is applied to the constituent crime of
"homicide" and not to the constituent crime of "robbery" of the crime of robbery with homicide. (People v. Ancheta, June 4, 2004) There is no
special complex crime of robbery with murder under the Revised Penal Code. Logically it could not qualify the homicide to murder but, as
generic aggravating circumstance, it helps determine the penalty to be imposed. (People v. Laog, Oct. 5, 2011)

(24) Intoxication as a mitigating circumstance. Intoxication of the accused must neither be habitual nor subsequent to the plan to commit a felony.
It must be shown that the mental faculties and willpower of the accused were impaired in such a way that would diminish the accused's capacity
to understand the wrongful nature of his or her acts. Bare assertion that one is inebriated at the time of the commission of the crime is
insufficient. (Bacerra v. People, July 3, 2017)

(25) Absolutory cause defined. An absolutory cause is a circumstance which is present prior to or simultaneously with the offense by reason of
which the accused who acts with criminal intent, freedom and intelligence does not incur criminal liability for an act that constitutes a crime.

Article 332(1) is an example of absolutory cause. No criminal liability shall result from the commission of the crimes of theft, estafa, and
malicious mischief committed or cause mutually by (i) spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line (note: the
relationship by affinity created between the surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse survive the death of either party to
the marriage which created the affinity); (ii) the widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the deceased spouse before the
same shall have passed into the possession of another; and (iii) brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together.

While accused may not be held criminally liable for simple estafa by virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332, he is not absolved
from criminal liability for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. The absolutory cause under Article 332 is
meant to address specific crimes against property - theft, swindling and malicious mischief. All other crimes, whether simple or complex, are
not affected by the absolutory cause provided thereunder. To apply the absolutory cause under Article 332 to one of the component crimes of a
complex crime for the purpose of negating the existence of that complex crime is to unduly expand its scope. (Intestate Estate of De Carungcong
v. People, Feb. 11, 2010)

(26) When an accused can be held liable for the crime even if he is not physically present during the commission thereof. He is liable if there
is conspiracy and he is a principal by inducement. (Chua v. People, Sept. 13, 2017)

(27) Article 19(2) of the Revised Penal Code and Section 1(b) of P.D. No. 1829 or Obstruction of Justice Law distinguished. In the former, it
defines accessories who take part subsequent to commission of crime by concealing or destroying the body of the crime, its effects or
instruments, in order to prevent its discovery; while the latter penalizes the altering, destroying, suppressing, or concealing any document or
object, with intent to impair its availability or admissibility in any investigation of or on official proceedings in criminal cases, or to be used in

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the investigation or criminal proceedings thereof. In the former, the punished acts should have been committed for the purpose of preventing
discovery of the crime, while in the latter, the punished acts are those which obstruct or frustrate or tent to obstruct or frustrate the successful
apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders. (Padiernos v. Roxas, Aug. 17, 2015)

(28) Subsidiary imprisonment must be specifically provided in the judgment of conviction before the accused may be compelled to serve
such in case of his failure to pay the fine. The specific imposition is required pursuant to Article 78, providing that a penalty shall not be
executed in any other form than that prescribed by law, nor with any other circumstances or incidents than those expressly authorized thereby. Page |
(People v. Alapan, Jan. 10, 2018)
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(29) Pardon issued by the President stating that “The pardonee is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,” remits the accessory penalty
of perpetual absolute disqualification remitted, notwithstanding Article 36 holding that a pardon shall not work the restoration of the
right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored and Article 41 holding that perpetual
absolute disqualification shall be suffered unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. The president’s pardoning
power cannot be limited by legislative act, like the Revised Penal Code. Articles 36 and 41 cannot serve to abridge or diminish the exclusive
power and prerogative of the President to pardon persons convicted of violating penal statutes. (Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC, Jan. 21, 2015)

(30) Requisites for the application of Article 45 allowing a third person to recover proceeds of crimes and instruments or tools used in its
commission instead of being confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government. The third person must prove: (i) the proceeds,
instruments or tools are owned by a third person; and (ii) the third party is not liable for the offense. Requirements of Article 45 cannot be
inferred from the mere fact that the alleged owner is not charged in the same case before the court. (Sea Lion v. People, Mar. 23, 2011)

(31) Killing several persons through pointing a gun to each and pulling the trigger does not give rise to a complex crime. When a gunman
indiscriminately fires a series of shots at a group of people, it shows intention to kill several individuals. Each act by of pulling the trigger of the
gun, aiming each particular moment at different persons constitutes distinct and individual acts. (People v. Jugueta, Apr. 5, 2016)

(32) Article 48 (complex crime) does apply to acts penalized under Article 365 (imprudence/negligence). Article 365 is a substantive rule
penalizing the mental attitude behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, a single mental attitude regardless of the
resulting consequences. It was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-
offense to stand for (i) a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (ii) an offense which is a necessary means for
committing another. (Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro, Nov. 17, 2010)

(33) Composite crime explained. A composite crime, also known as a special complex crime, is composed of two or more crimes that the law treats
as a single indivisible and unique offense for being the product of a single criminal impulse. It is a specific crime with a specific penalty
provided by law, and differs from a compound or complex crime under Article 48. (People v. Villaflores, Apr. 11, 2012)

(34) Guidelines in applying Article 89(1) providing that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the offender:
(i) The death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction or prior to final judgment extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.
(ii) The claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation
other than delict, e.g. (a) law; (b) contracts; (c) quasi-contracts; or (d) quasi-delicts.
(iii) Where the civil liability survives in item (ii), an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil
action. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the
source of obligation upon which the same is based.
(iv) In cases where the private offended party instituted the civil action with the criminal action, the prescription on the right to file the separate
civil action does not run during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction. The statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with the provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code.
(People v. Antido, Mar. 14, 2018)

(35) Amnesty and pardon explained. Amnesty denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political offenses, or the
forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks
backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself, that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though
he had committed no offense (Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago v. COMELEC, June 19, 2012) Meanwhile, pardon is an act of grace, proceeding
from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law
inflicts for a crime he has committed. A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is essential. (Tiu v. Dizon, June 15, 2016)

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(36) Novation of a contract does not extinguish criminal liability for estafa. Novation is not one of the means recognized by the Revised Penal
Code whereby criminal liability can be extinguished. (Milla v. People, Jan. 25, 2012)

(37) Article 91 providing that the term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippines does not apply in
special penal laws. The law on prescription of offenses found in Articles 90 and 91 does not apply to those penalized under special laws, since
what governs is Act No. 3326. Act No. 3326 does not provide that the absence of the accused from the Philippines prevents the running of the Page |
prescriptive period. (Romualdez v. Marcelo, July 28, 2006)
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Two modes of determining the reckoning period when prescription of an offense under Act No. 3326 runs. The first, which is the general
rule, is to the effect that prescription shall run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law. The second, which is the exception
and also known as the discovery rule or the blameless ignorance doctrine, provides that prescription will not apply where plaintiff does not
know or has no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of action. Thus, the prescriptive period for the running of the crime of
failure to file SALN under R.A. No. 6713 commences on the day the SALN is due, not on the day the non-filing is discovered. It is impossible
for the Ombudsman not to have known the failure to file SALN on the date it is due as the Ombudsman is part of the government and in a
position to know who failed to file the SALN. (Del Rosario v. People, June 27, 2018)

(38) Moral damages and death indemnity can be awarded in homicide cases, despite not being pleaded and absence of evidence presented to
prove therefor. Moral damages and death indemnity require neither pleading nor evidence simply because death through crime always
occasions moral sufferings on the part of the victim’s heirs. (Barut v. People, Sept. 24, 2014)

BOOK 2

(39) Elements of rebellion. Elements are: (1) there is a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government; and (2) the purpose of the
uprising or movement is either (a) to remove from the allegiance to the Government or its laws: (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part
thereof; or (ii) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of
their powers and prerogative. (Lagman v. Medialdea, July 4, 2017)

(40) A public officer may be held criminally liable for kidnapping and illegal detention, and not arbitrary detention, if he is acting in a
private, and not on official, capacity. Hence, if a policeman kidnaps the victim, except when legally authorized as part of police operations, he
is not acting in an official capacity; he is to be treated as a private individual liable for illegal detention. (People v. Trestiza, Nov. 16, 2011) This
holds true as well when the public officer detains another for the purpose of extorting ransom, as the public officer cannot be said to be acting in
an official capacity. (People v. Borja, Aug. 2, 2017)

(41) Two ways of committing direct assault. The first is by any person who, without public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the
attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition. The second is by any person who, without public
uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the
performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance. (People v. Vidal Jr., June 20, 2018)

(42) An accused who attacks a teacher busy with paperwork and supervising the pupils taking recess is liable for direct assault, even if the
teacher retaliates by holding the former’s hands and kicking the accused. The teacher remains to be person in authority and cannot be
considered as having descended to the level of a private person because the fact remains that at the moment the accused initiated her tirades, the
teacher was busy attending to her official functions as such. When accused continued with her abusive behavior, the teacher merely retaliated in
kind as would a similarly situated person. (Gelig v. People, July 28, 2010)

(43) While falsification of public or official or commercial documents does not require the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person
as an element of conviction, the change in the document must be such as to affect the integrity of the same or to change the effects which
it would otherwise produce. Criminal intent to pervert the truth is lacking in cases showing that (i) the accused did not benefit from the
falsification; and (ii) no damage was caused either to the government or to a third person. Thus, where accused altered his PAL Ticket to remedy
his liquidation of cash advance with the correct date of his rescheduled official travel, accused must be acquitted, not having shown to have
benefitted from the falsification and no damage was caused. (Malabanan v. Sandiganbayan, Aug. 2, 2017)

(44) When the crimes of perjury by making a false affidavit and false testimony under oath are consummated. The crime of perjury committed
through the making of a false affidavit is consummated at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his affidavit since it is at that time that all

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the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. Meanwhile, the crime of perjury committed through false testimony under oath in a
proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil is consummated when the testimony under oath is given. (Union Bank v. People, Feb. 28, 2012)

(45) Criminal intent is not necessarily required in malversation. Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. Even if the
mode charged differs from the mode proved, the same offense of malversation is still committed. All that is necessary for a conviction is
sufficient proof that the accused accountable officer had received public funds or property, and did not have them in his possession when
demand therefor was made without any satisfactory explanation of his failure to have them upon demand. (Mesina v. People, June 17, 2015) But Page |
demand is not necessary in malversation. Demand merely raises a prima facie presumption that the missing funds have been put to personal use.
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To claim that the demand should have been received during the incumbency of the public officer is to add an element that is not required in any
of the laws or jurisprudence. (Venezuela v. People, Feb. 14, 2018)

(46) A municipal mayor is liable for illegal use of public property (technical malversation) under Article 220 for the diversion of food
intended for those suffering from malnutrition to the beneficiaries of reconsideration projects affecting the homes of victims of
calamities, even if he acted in good faith. Criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes the act of diverting
public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to another public purpose. The offense is malum prohibitum. It is
the commission of an act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, which determines whether or not the provision has been
violated. (Ysidoro v. People, Nov. 14, 2012)

(47) A person who performs vasectomy on another is not liable for mutilation because vasectomy does not deprive a man, totally or
partially, of some essential organ for reproduction. The cutting of the vas deferens, the tubular passageway of sperm, does not divest or deny
a man of any essential organ of reproduction for the simple reason that it does not entail the taking away of a part or portion of the male
reproductive system. The cut ends, after they have been tied, are then dropped back into the incision. Though undeniably, vasectomy denies a
man his power of reproduction, such procedure does not deprive him, either totally or partially, of some essential organ for reproduction.
(Aguirre v. Secretary of Justice, Mar. 3, 2008)

(48) When an accused liable for physical injuries and when liable for frustrated/attempted homicide/murder. Accused is liable for physical
injuries only when wounds sustained are not fatal and there is no intent to kill. If there is intent to kill and the wounds are not fatal, he is liable
for attempted homicide/murder. If there is intent to kill and the wounds are fatal, but the victim nonetheless does not die due to reason or cause
independent of the will of the accused, accused is liable for frustrated homicide/murder. (Etino v. People, Feb. 14, 2018)

(49) Outraging or scoffing at the victim’s person or corpse when present in the killing. The killing is qualified to murder. Thus, where the
accused decapitated the victim’s head constitutes outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim, qualifying the killing to murder. (People v.
Gerero, July 27, 2016)

(50) Infanticide distinguished from unintentional abortion. In infanticide, the child killed is less than three days of age. In unintentional abortion,
there is a pregnant woman upon whom violence is intentionally exerted without intending an abortion, and as a result thereof, the fetus dies
either in the womb or after having been expelled therefrom. In the crime of infanticide, it is necessary that the child be born alive and be viable,
that is, capable of independent existence. However, even if the child who was expelled prematurely and deliberately were alive at birth, the
offense is abortion due to the fact that a fetus with an intrauterine life of 6 months is not viable. (People v. Paycana Jr., Apr. 16, 2008)

(51) Some principles on rape.

(a) Rape and acts of lasciviousness distinguished. While rape and acts of lasciviousness have the same nature, they are fundamentally
different; in rape, there is the intent to lie with a woman, whereas in acts of lasciviousness, this element is absent. (Tibong v. People, Sept.
15, 2010) Attempted rape is committed when the touching of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate; otherwise,
there can only be acts of lasciviousness. (People v. Dadulla, Feb. 9, 2011)
(b) When rape is consummated. The mere introduction of the male organ into the labia majora of the victim’s genitalia, even without the full
penetration of the complainant’s vagina, consummates the crime. Hence, the "touching" or "entry" of the penis into the labia majora or the
labia minora of the pudendum of the victim’s genitalia consummates rape. (People v. Balunsat, July 28, 2010)
(c) “Women’s honor” doctrine providing that no young Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit that she has been sexually abused,
unless that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to protect her honor abandoned. While the doctrine surfaced in 1960’s and may be
appropriate back then, today, courts cannot be stuck to the Maria Clara stereotype of a demure and reserved Filipino woman. The
testimony of a private complainant of rape must be evaluated based on its credibility without gender bias or cultural misconception. (People
v. Amarela, Jan. 17, 2018)

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(d) Carnal knowledge of a woman suffering from mental retardation is considered rape. Said woman is incapable of giving consent to a
sexual act. Mental retardation is a chronic condition present from birth or early childhood and characterized by impaired intellectual
functioning measured by standardized tests. (People v. Brion, Sept. 2, 2013) As a qualifying circumstance of rape, the accused must have
knowledge of the mental retardation. (People v. Urmaza, Apr. 4, 2018)
(e) Marital rape explained. Husbands do not have property rights over their wives' bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of
marriage, if not consensual, is rape. (People v. Jumawan, Apr. 21, 2014)
(f) Rape through sexual assault is consummated, if the tongue of the accused, in the act of cunnilingus, touches the lip of the vagina of Page |
the victim. Like in the crime of rape whereby the slightest penetration of the male organ or even its slightest contact with the outer lip or
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the labia majora of the vagina already consummates the crime, in like manner, if the tongue, in an act of cunnilingus, touches the outer lip
of the vagina, the act should also be considered as already consummating the crime of rape through sexual assault.
(g) Rape through sexual assault is also consummated when a man inserts an instrument in the anus of a boy. The gravamen of rape
through sexual assault is the insertion of the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another
person’s genital or oral orifice. This is also known as “instrument or object rape,” “gender-free rape,” or “homosexual rape.” (Ricalde v.
People, Jan. 21, 2015)
(h) Accused can be convicted of simple rape only, even when the rape committed is qualified as the same is against a female over 12
years but under 18 years of age by the common-law spouse of her mother, if the Information does not properly allege the qualifying
circumstance of relationship. This is because the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
is inviolable. (People v. Arcillas, July 30, 2012)
(i) Number of counts of rape explained.
(i) Accused is liable for three (3) counts of rape if he succeeded in inserting his penis thrice into the private part of the victim,
with each penetration occurring one after the other at an interval of ten (10) minutes wherein he would rest after satiating his
lust upon his victim and, after he has regained his strength, he would again rape. When the accused decided to commit those
separate and distinct acts of rape, he was not motivated by a single impulse, but rather by several criminal intents. (People v. Lucena,
Feb. 26, 2014)
(ii) Accused is liable for one (1) count of rape if there are three successful penetrations but arising only from one criminal intent.
Where the three penetrations occurred during one continuing act of rape in which the accused was obviously motivated by a single
criminal intent, the accused should only be liable for one count of rape. (People v. Aaron, Sept. 24, 2002)
(iii) Accused is liable only for one (1) count of special complex crime of kidnapping with rape, even if several acts of rape had
been committed. This is because these composite acts are regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact R.A. No. 7659 punishes
these acts with only one single penalty. (People v. Mirandilla, July 27, 2011)

(52) Theft is not limited to the commission by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence, against, or intimidation of neither
persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter’s consent. It is likewise committed by: (i) any
person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its owner; (ii) any person who, after having
maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or objects of the damage caused by him; and (iii) any
person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another and without the consent of its owner,
shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather fruits, cereals, or other forest or farm products. (Ringor v. People, Dec. 11, 2013)

(53) Use of PLDT’s communication facilities without its consent constitutes theft of its telephone services and businesses. The business of
providing telecommunication and the telephone service are personal property; the use thereof without PLDT’s consent constitutes theft under
Article 308. (World Wide Web v. People; Jan. 13, 2014)

(54) When the crime committed by an employee/agent is estafa and when theft. Conversion of personal property in the case of an employee
having mere material/physical possession of the said property constitutes theft, whereas in the case of an agent to whom both material/physical
and juridical possession have been transferred, misappropriation of the same property constitutes estafa. Juridical possession means a possession
which gives the transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner. (Benabaye v. People, Feb. 25, 2015)

(55) Estafa and falsification of public/commercial document when complexed and when treated as separate offenses. The complex crime of
estafa through falsification of documents is committed when one has to falsify certain documents to be able to obtain money or goods from
another person. In other words, the falsification is a necessary means of committing estafa. If the falsification is committed to conceal the
misappropriation, however, two separate offenses of estafa and falsification are committed. (Patula v. People, Apr. 11, 2012)

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(56) No complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document. Hence, if the falsification of a private document is committed as a
means to commit estafa, the proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the estafa can be committed without the necessity of falsifying a
document, the crime to be charged is estafa. (Batulanon v. People, Sept. 15, 2006)

(57) Estafa by post-dating a check how committed. It is commited when: (i) the offender has postdated or issued a check in payment of an
obligation contracted at the time of the postdating or issuance; (ii) at the time of postdating or issuance of said check, the offender has no funds
in the bank, or the funds deposited are not sufficient to cover the amount of the check; and (iii) the payee has been defrauded. (People v. Page |
Villanueva, Feb. 25, 2015) It must be shown that the person to whom the check was delivered would not have parted with his money or property
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were it not for the issuance of the check by the other party. The check should have been issued as an inducement for the surrender by the party
deceived of his money or property and not in payment of a pre-existing obligation. (Batac v. People, June 6, 2018)

(58) Elements of syndicated estafa. The elements are: (i) estafa or other forms of swindling defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal
Code is committed; (ii) estafa or swindling is committed by a syndicate of five or more persons; (iii) defraudation results in the misappropriation
contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative, “samahang nayon(s),” or farmers’ associations, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public. (People v. Mateo, Oct. 9, 2017)

(59) In the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, the robbery should be the main objective of the accused. The intent to rob must
precede the taking of human life; however, the killing may occur before, during, or after the robbery. (People v. Domasig, June 13, 2018)

Foregoing rule applies in the special complex crime of robbery with rape. Robbery with rape contemplates a situation where the original
intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain, personal property belonging to another and rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as
an accompanying crime, and not the other way around. (People v. Bringcula, Jan. 24, 2018)

(60) When homicide is committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery, once conspiracy is proved, all those who took part as
principals in the robbery are guilty as principals of robbery with homicide although they did not take part in the homicide. Exception is
when it appears that they sought to prevent the killing. (People v. Castro, Mar. 14, 2012)

Foregoing rule applies in the special complex crime of robbery with rape. When rape is committed as a consequence or on the occasion of a
robbery, once conspiracy is proved, all those who took part as principals in the robbery are guilty as principals of robbery with rape although
they did not take part in the rape, if none failed to prevent the commission thereof despite having opportunity to do so. (People v. Belmonte, July
5, 2017)

(61) Complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house by armed persons and robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons how
committed. It is committed when the accused, who held firearms, entered the residential house of the victims and inflicted injury upon the
victims in the process of committing the robbery. (Fransdilla v. People, Apr. 20, 2015)

(62) A person who with use of force upon things took the property of another under the claim of ownership is not liable for robbery. Taking
as an element of robbery means depriving the offended party of ownership of the thing taken with the character of permanency. One who takes
the property openly and avowedly under claim of title offered in good faith is not guilty of robbery, even though the claim of ownership is
untenable. Intent to gain is not established. (Sy v. Secretary of Justice, Nov. 14, 2012)

(63) Rules on criminal liability on burning and death.

(a) When the main objective is the burning of the edifice, but death results by reason or on occasion thereof, the crime committed is simple
arson and the resultant homicide is absorbed.
(b) When the main objective is to kill a particular person inside the building and fire is resorted to as a means to accomplish such killing, the
crime committed is murder (killing qualified by use of fire).
(c) When there has already been a previous killing, and the fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, there will be two separate
crimes of homicide/murder and arson. (People v. Cacho, Sept. 27, 2017)

(64) Kidnapping is not limited to imprisonment of a person. It includes also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever
length of time. It involves a situation where the victim cannot go out of the place of confinement or detention, or is restricted or impeded in his
liberty to move. (People v. Siapno, Aug. 23, 2017) Curtailment of the victim’s liberty need not even involve any physical restraint upon the
victim’s person. (People v. Fabro, July 17, 2017)

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(65) Accused liable for kidnapping with homicide when he kidnaps a person with heart ailment and while under detention, the person had a
heart attack and died. The death of the person, although of natural cause, occurred on the occasion of the kidnapping. (People v. Montanir,
Apr. 4, 2011)

(66) Elements of grave coercion. Elements are: (i) a person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do
something against his will, be it right or wrong; (ii) the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, threats, or intimidation; and (iii) the
person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so, or in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law Page |
or in the exercise of any lawful right. (Navarra v. Ombudsman, Dec. 4, 2009)
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(67) Forcible abduction when and when not absorbed in the crime of rape. The crime of forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape if the
real objective of the accused is to rape the victim. Thus, if the intention is to rape the victim, the accused cannot be convicted of the complex
crime of forcible abduction with rape; he can only be convicted of rape. It depends on the intention of the accused. (People vs Cayanan, Sept.
18, 2013) But, where the sexual intercourse with the victim was facilitated and ensured by her abduction, then the crime is forcible abduction
with rape. (People v. Amaro, July 18, 2014) But where the victim remained detained after the consummation of rape, the accused is liable for
illegal detention. (People v. Concepcion, Apr. 4, 2018)

(68) Some principles on bigamy and marriage:

(a) Subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of first marriage is not a defense in bigamy case. Bigamy is already consummated because
at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, the accused’s first marriage which had not yet been declared null and void by a court
of competent jurisdiction is deemed valid and subsisting. (Montañes v. Cipriano, Oct. 22, 2012)
(b) Where a person appeared to have contracted a marriage to a foreigner but another person only made use of his identity in
contracting the marriage to said foreigner, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, such that he is not liable for bigamy.
the remedy is to file a petition for correction/cancellation of entries under Rule 108 and not a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage. (Republic v. Olaybar, Feb. 10, 2014)
(c) Bigamy is not committed where the parties to a purported second marriage merely signed a purported marriage contract without a
license. There was really no subsequent marriage. For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential
requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage. (Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan Jr., July 3, 2013) But, the crime of bigamy is
committed even if the second bigamous marriage is void on ground of psychological incapacity because not all the effects of marriage is
totally wiped out (Tenebro v. CA, Feb. 18, 2004) or if there is no marriage license in the second marriage because the parties falsified the
affidavit of cohabitation, knowing fully well that they failed to comply with the five-year cohabitation period. It is height of absurdity to
allow the use of illegal act to escape criminal conviction. (Santiago v. People, July 15, 2015)
(d) When second spouse liable for bigamy. The second spouse is liable if said spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage of
the accused. Said spouse is liable as an accomplice. (Santiago v. People, July 15, 2015)

(69) The solemnizing officer is liable for the crime of performance of illegal marriage ceremony if he gave his “blessing” knowing that the
parties have no marriage license. Knowledge of the absence of marriage license negates good faith. (Ronulo v. People, July 2, 2014)

(70) Accused is liable for libel if he writes an article in a gossip column portraying the victim as an abusive husband and his bitter separation
from his wife, even if the victim is a public officer or a person who has attained the status of a public figure. If the utterances are false,
malicious or unrelated to a public officer’s performance of his duties or irrelevant to matters of public interest involving public figures, the same
may give rise to criminal and civil liability. (Fermin v. People, Mar. 28, 2008)

(71) A person cannot be charged with both online libel under RA 10175 (Cybercrime Law) and libel under the Revised Penal Code. If the
published material on print, said to be libelous, is again posted online or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the subject of two separate
libels. The two offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and the other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175,
involve essentially the same elements and are in fact one and the same offense. Charging the offender under both laws would be a blatant
violation of the proscription against double jeopardy.

Foregoing rule applies in case of Anti-Child Pornography Act (ACPA). Section 4(c)(2) merely expands the ACPA’s scope so as to include
identical activities in cyberspace. ACPA’s definition of child pornography already covers the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital, optical,
magnetic or any other means." Charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) and ACPA would likewise be tantamount to a violation of the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, Feb. 11, 2014)

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(72) Uttering defamatory words when constituting slight oral defamation only. Whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral
defamation, depends not only upon the sense and grammatical meaning of the utterances but also upon the special circumstances of the case. In
particular, uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended party constitutes only slight oral
defamation. (Ramos v. People, Nov. 20, 2017)

(73) Pointing dirty finger constitutes not grave but simple slander by deed. Pointing a dirty finger ordinarily connotes the phrase "Fuck You,"
which is similar to the expression "Puta" or "Putang Ina mo," in local parlance. While it may have cast dishonor, discredit or contempt upon Page |
complainant, said act is not of a serious nature. (Villanueva v. People, Apr. 10, 2006)
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(74) Two classifications of privileged communication in relation to libel explained. Privileged communication may be classified as either
absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged. The former are those which are not actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith, e.g.
statements made by members of Congress in the discharge of their functions as such. The latter are those which contain defamatory imputations
but which are not actionable unless found to have been made without good intention or justifiable motive, and to which “private
communications” and “fair and true report without any comments or remarks” belong. These require proof of actual malice in order that a
defamatory imputation may be held actionable. (Manila Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Domingo, July 5, 2017)

SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

(75) Accused convicted by the lower court of a non-probationable offense is eligible to apply for probation, notwithstanding he appealed his
conviction, if on appeal, the higher court convicts him only of a probationable offense. Ordinarily, the accused is disqualified, considering
that probation law disallows probation to those who appealed. Nonetheless, had the lower court done him right from the start, it would have
found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right penalty, affording the accused the right to apply for probation. (Colinares
v. People, Dec. 13, 2011; R.A. No. 10707)

Not all minor drug offenders are eligible for pardon under Section 70 of R.A. No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act). Minor
drug traffickers and pushers are disqualified to avail probation under Section 24 of R.A. 9165. The law considers the users and possessors of
illegal drugs as victims while the drug traffickers and pushers as predators. (Padua v. People, July 23, 2008)

Probation does not affect administrative liability of an accused who is a public officer. Probation does not obliterate the crime for which the
person under probation has been convicted. It does not erase the effects and fact of conviction, but merely suspends the penalty imposed. As the
criminal action is separate and distinct from the administrative case, so is administrative liability separate and distinct from penal liability.
(Pagaduan v. CSC, Nov. 19, 2014)

(76) How terrorism is committed. Any person who commits any of the crimes enumerated under the Human Security Act thereby sowing and
creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an
unlawful demand. (SHENI v. ATC, Oct. 5, 2010)

(77) Elements of the crime of fencing unde P.D. No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law). The elements are: (i) a crime of robbery or theft has been
committed; (ii) the accused, who is not a principal or on accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value,
which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (iii) the accused knew or should have known that the said article,
item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and (iv) there is, on the part of one
accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another. The phrase “should know” or “should have known” in (iii) denotes the fact that a person of
reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon
assumption that such fact exists. (Ong v. People, Apr. 10, 2013)

(78) Some principles on violation of R.A. No. 9165.

(a) Elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The elements are: (i) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration;
(ii) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. Thus, mere agreement on the selling price of dangerous drugs and intention of
delivery of the payment is insufficient to convict an accused of illegal sale of drugs. (People v. Bulawan, June 8, 2016) Notably, the corpus
delicti is the dangerous drug itself, the existence of which is essential to a judgment of conviction, thus, its identity must be established.
(People v. Arposeple, Nov. 22, 2017)
(b) Accused liable for illegal delivery of dangerous drugs if, during a buy-bust operation, before the accused received the consideration
(marked money) but after he delivered the dangerous drugs, he was arrested. The elements of illegal delivery of dangerous drugs are:

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(i) the accused passed on possession of a dangerous drug to another, personally or otherwise, and by any means; (ii) such delivery is not
authorized by law; and (iii) the accused knowingly made the delivery with or without consideration. (People v. Reyes, Feb. 18, 2015)
(c) Accused liable for illegal possession of dangerous drugs if before any form of transaction took place but after showing the
dangerous drugs to the poseur-buyer, the accused was arrested. The elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs are: (i) the
accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified as a prohibited drug; (ii) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3)
the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. (People v. Montevirgen, Dec. 11, 2013)
(d) Illegal possession of dangerous drugs is inherent in illegal sale and illegal importation. Since possession of prohibited drugs is inherent Page |
in the crime of selling them, it is to be assumed that, in punishing selling, the legislature took into account the need to possess them first.
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(People v. Manansala, Apr. 3, 2013) The same is true with illegal importation. When one brings something or causes something to be
brought into the country, he necessarily possesses it. (People v.s Liu, Jan. 21, 2015)
(e) Illegal possession of dangerous drugs include both actual and constructive possessions. Actual possession exists when the drug is in
the immediate physical possession or control of the accused. Constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and
control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or
control is not necessary. Thus, even if drugs were not found in actual possession of accused but were found inside the house which the
accused has dominion or control, there is constructive possession. (People v. Tira, May 28, 2004)
(f) “Chain of custody” rule under the R.A. No. 9165 explained. “Chain of custody” means the duly recorded authorized movements and
custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements
and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody was of the seized item, the
date and time when such transfer of custody made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.
(People v. Doria, Jan. 12, 2015) The links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust operation are: (i) seizure and
marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; (ii) turnover of the illegal drug seized to
the investigating officer; (iii) turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and
(iv) turnover and submission of the illegal drug from the forensic chemist to the court. (People v. Angeles, June 20, 2018)
(g) Procedure concerning the custody and disposition of confiscated dangerous drugs under Section 21 of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act does not always require perfect adherence. In substantial adherence, the officers must (i) present justifiable
reason for their imperfect conduct and (ii) show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items had been preserved. (People v.
Alvaro, Janaury 10, 2018)
(h) A person found positive of drug use after random drug testing conducted pursuant to Sec. 36 of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be charged
with violation of illegal use of dangerous drugs under Section 15 thereof penalizing a person apprehended or arrested, who is found
to be positive for use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test. Section 15 is unambiguous: the phrase “apprehended or
arrested” immediately follows “a person,” thus qualifying the subject person. It necessarily follows that only apprehended or arrested
persons found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug may be prosecuted under the provision. (People v. Sullano, Mar. 12, 2018)

(79) Elements of illegal possession of firearms. The elements are: (i) the firearm exists and (ii) the accused who owned or possessed it does not
have the corresponding license or permit to possess or carry the same. The corpus delicti is the accused’s lack of license or permit to possess or
carry the firearm, as possession itself is not prohibited by law. (Peralta v. People, Aug. 30, 2017)

A barangay captain is allowed to carry loose firearm even without permit to carry within his territorial jurisdiction. The authority of
punong barangays to possess the necessary firearm within their territorial jurisdiction is, as provided under the Local Government Code,
necessary to enforce their duty to maintain peace and order within the barangays. (Artillero v. Casimiro, Apr. 25, 2012)

(80) When accused commits murder using a loose firearm defined under R.A. No. 10591 (Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition
Regulation Act), he is liable for murder with aggravating circumstance of use of loose firearm. The intent of Congress is to treat the
offense of illegal possession of firearm and the commission of homicide or murder with the use of unlicensed firearm as a single offense.
(People v. Gaborne, July 27, 2016)

(81) Child in conflict with the law may have his sentence suspended even if he is beyond the maximum age of 21 under Sections 38 and 40 of
RA 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act). Ordinarily, when accused is beyond 21 years old, the application of Sections 38 and 40 allowing
suspension up to maximum age of 21 is already moot and academic. Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of R.A. No.
9344, the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of 21 years, so
long as he committed the crime when he was still a child. (People v. Monticalvo, Jan. 30, 2013)

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(82) When and when not Section 10, R.A. No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act) penalizing the debasing, degrading, and demeaning of intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as child abuse applies.
(a) Not applicable: Father who confronted and slapped the face of a minor boy because he got agitated when the minor boy threw
stones at his minor child girl. The laying of hands on the boy done at the spur of the moment and in anger is indicative of his being then
overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor daughter who had just suffered harm at the hands of the boy.
He is liable for physical injuries only. (Bongalon v. People, Mar. 20, 2013)
(b) Applicable: School teacher who, in one instance, disciplined her pupil by inflicting physical injuries. A school teacher could duly Page |
discipline her pupil, but infliction of the physical injuries on him is unnecessary, violent and excessive. The maltreatment may consist of an
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act by deeds or by words that debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being. The act need not
even be habitual. (Rosaldes v. People, Oct. 8, 2014).
(c) Applicable: Neighbor-babysitter who caused repeated physical abuse to minor which includes strangulation, beating, pinching, and
touching of sex organ. The acts of abuse impair the child’s dignity and worth as human being, prejudicing her social, moral, and emotional
development. (Lucido v. People, Aug. 17, 2017)
(d) Applicable: Accused whipping a child with wet t-shirt thrice in the neck causing said child to fall down on the stairs of the
barangay hall. Common sense and human experience would suggest that hitting a sensitive body part, such as the neck, with a wet t-shirt
would cause an extreme amount of pain, especially so if it was done several times. (Torres v. People, Jan. 18, 2017)

(83) Rules in reconciling provisions of R.A. No. 7610 and Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code on rape.
(a) If the victim of sexual abuse is below 12 years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for statutory rape under
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.
(b) If the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A of
the Revised Penal Code.
(c) The offender, however, cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A
person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal act.
(d) Rape cannot be complexed with a violation of RA 7610. Under Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code (on complex crimes), a felony under
the Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot be complexed with an offense penalized by a special law. (People v. Abay, Feb. 24, 2009)

“Sweetheart defense” is not acceptable in R.A. No. 7610. A child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly
give consent to sexual intercourse with another person. Consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of R.A. No. 7610. The mere act of
having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes
the offense. It is a malum prohibitum. (Caballo v. People, June 10, 2013)

(84) Guidelines in determining proper nomenclature/charge for lascivious conduct committed against a child:
(a) Age of the victim is taken into consideration in designating the offense, and in determining the imposable penalty.
(b) If victim is below 12 years of age, the nomenclature should be “Acts of Lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Sec. 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.”
(c) If the victim is 12 years of age or more but below 18, or 18 and above but is unable to fully take care of himself or protect himself from
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of physical or mental disability or condition, the nomenclature should be
“Lascivious conduct or Sexual Abuse under Sec. 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.” (People v. Ursua, Oct. 4, 2017)

Elements of Acts of Lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Sec. 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. Elements are: (i)
the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness upon another person of either sex; and (ii) act of lasciviousness or lewdness is
committed either (a) by using force or intimidation; or (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or (c)
when the offended party is under 12 years of age.

Elements of Lascivious conduct or Sexual Abuse under Sec. 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. Elements are: (i) accused commits an act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct; (ii) said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (iii)
child is below 18 years old. (People v. Molejon, Apr. 23, 2018)

Acts of lasciviousness vis-à-vis unjust vexation. Determining element is lewdness. The term "lewd" is something indecent or obscene,
characterized by or intended to excite crude sexual desire. What constitutes lewd conduct must be determined from the circumstances of each
case. If accused intended to merely annoy or irritate the victim, the crime is unjust vexation. If accused intended to gratify his sexual desires, the
crime is acts of lasciviousness. Thus, accused’s acts of kissing the victim, fondling her breasts and touching her private parts constitute
lascivious conduct, not merely unjust vexation. (Sombilon v. People, Sept. 30, 2009)

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(85) Work, education or training-related sexual harassment explained. It is committed by an employer, manager, supervisor, agent of the
employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another
in a work or training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether
the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted.

Demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor under Section 3 of R.A. No. 7877 (Sexual Harassment Act) need not be explicitly Page |
articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. Said demand, request, or requirement may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the
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acts of the offender. (Domingo v. Rayala, Feb. 18, 2008)

(86) Some principles on R.A. No. 9262.

(a) When considered a “battered woman” under R.A. No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act). To be
considered as a “battered woman,” and thus allow a woman to invoke battered woman syndrome as a defense, the couple must go through
the cycle of violence at least twice. The cycle of violence under battered woman syndrome has three phases: (i) tension-building phase; (ii)
acute battering incident; and (ii) tranquil or non-violent phase. (People v. Genosa, Jan. 15, 2004)
(b) Single act of harassment enough to convict an offender under R.A. No. 9262. Yes. Section 3(a) of the said law punishes any act or
series of acts that constitutes violence against women. This means that a single act of harassment, which translates into violence, would be
enough. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones. (Ang v. CA, Apr. 20, 2010)
(c) Accused is liable for violence under R.A. No. 9262 even if the dating or sexual relationship is over already. It is immaterial whether
the relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of such relationship between the
offender and the victim when the physical harm was committed. (Dabalos v. RTC, Jan. 7, 2013)
(d) Lesbian can commit an act of violence under R.A. No. 9262. The use of the gender-neutral word "person" who has or had a sexual or
dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. (Garcia v. Drilon, June 25, 2013)
(e) A person not having sexual or dating relationship with a woman may be charged with violence under R.A. No. 9262 through
conspiracy. Thus, the parents-in-law may be held liable if they and their son (husband of the victim) had community of design and purpose
in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in
repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically. (Go-Tan v. Tan, Sept. 30, 2008)
(f) Philippine courts may exercise jurisdiction over an offense constituting psychological violence under R.A. No. 9262, committed
through marital infidelity when the alleged illicit relationship occurred or is occurring outside the country. Law contemplates that
acts of violence against women and their children may manifest as transitory or continuing crimes; meaning that some acts material and
essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the
court wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it b eing understood
that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. (AAA v. BBB, Jan. 11, 2018)

(87) Three accused liable for illegal recruitment by syndicate and qualified trafficking in person under R.A. No. 9208 (Anti-Traffiking in
Persons Act) if they conspired and confederated in recruiting and sending a victim to Malaysia for “job opportunities,” where she was
forced into prostitution. There is illegal recruitment committed by syndicate when three or more persons conspired and confederated with one
another to recruit another person for work without a valid government license. There is trafficking in persons because it is not only limited to
transportation of victims, but also includes the act of recruitment of victims for trafficking. It is qualified if it is done by three or more persons.

Consent of the victim is not a defense in trafficking in persons. Trafficking in persons can be committed with or without consent or
knowledge of the victim.

Conviction of illegal recruitment by syndicate and another conviction for qualified trafficking does not constitute double jeopardy. The
prohibition on double jeopardy does not apply to an act or series of acts constituting different offenses. In illegal recruitment committed by
syndicate, what is punished is recruitment by three or more persons without being properly authorized by the government. In this case of
qualified trafficking of persons, the transportation of person for prostitution is punished. (People v. Lalli, Oct. 12, 2011)

Same principle applies where the crimes involved are illegal recruitment by large scale and estafa. Double jeopardy could not result from
prosecuting and convicting the accused for both crimes considering that they were entirely distinct from each other not only from their being
punished under different statutes but also from their elements being different. (People v. Bayker, Feb. 10, 2016)

(88) Not all kinds of motor vehicles are covered under R.A. No. 10883 (Anti-Carnapping Law). While the anti-carnapping law penalizes the
unlawful taking of motor vehicles, it excepts from its coverage certain vehicles such as roadrollers, trolleys, street-sweepers, sprinklers, lawn

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mowers, amphibian trucks and cranes if not used on public highways, vehicles which run only on rails and tracks, and tractors, trailers and
tractor engines of all kinds and used exclusively for agricultural purposes. By implication, the crime committed may either be qualified theft (as
the property stolen is a motor vehicle) or robbery under the Revised Penal Code. (Bustinera v. People, June 8, 2004)

(89) Elements of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The elements are: (i) the accused must be a public
officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions; (ii) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence; and (iii) his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party Page |
unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions. (Reyes v. People, Aug. 12, 2010)
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Private person may be held liable under R.A. No. 3019 through conspiracy. The law does not require, however, that such person must, in all
instances, be indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be charged in court, as
where the public officer has already died, the private person may be indicted alone. (People v. Go, Mar. 25, 2014)

(90) The Chief Finance Officer of a corporation is liable for B.P. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) if he signs checks subsequently found to be
worthless, even if he merely acted in behalf of the corporation and that such was a corporate act. When a corporate officer issues a
worthless check in the corporate name, he may be held personally liable for violating a penal statute. The statute imposes criminal penalties on
anyone who draws or issues a check on any bank with knowledge that the funds are not sufficient in such bank to meet the check upon
presentment. (Navarra v. People, June 6, 2016)

(91) Lack of written notice of dishonor is fatal in B.P. 22 cases. A notice of dishonor received by the maker or drawer of the check is
indispensable before a conviction can ensue. A mere oral notice to pay a dishonored check will not suffice. While Section 2 of B.P. 22 does not
state that the notice of dishonor be in writing, taken in conjunction, however, with Section 3 of the law, i.e., "that where there are no sufficient
funds in or credit with such drawee bank, such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal," a mere oral notice or
demand to pay therefore is insufficient for conviction under the law. (Resterio v. People, Sept. 24, 2012)

(92) Payment of the value of the bounced check before a violation of B.P. 22 case is filed with the court exonerates the accused. The spirit of
the B.P. 22 is the protection of the credibility and stability of the banking system, which would not be served by penalizing people who have
evidently made amends for their mistakes and made restitution for damages even before charges have been filed against them.

Foregoing rule does not apply if payment of the value of the bounced check is made after the case is filed with the court. Since from the
commencement of the criminal proceedings in court, there is no circumstance whatsoever to show that the accused had every intention to
mitigate or totally alleviate the ill effects of his issuance of the unfunded check, then there is no equitable and compelling reason to preclude his
prosecution. (Lim v. People, Nov. 26, 2014)

th
By: Atty. Ronel U. Buenaventura αφß2006A, 10 Place 2015 Bar

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