manage to evade the clutches of the law on mere

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technicalities.

Accused-appellant Rosa Aruta y Menguin was arrested and

charged with violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act
No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. The information
reads:

That on or about the fourteenth (14th) day of December,

THIRD DIVISION 1988, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
G.R. No. 120915. April 3, 1998 accused, without being lawfully authorized, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly engage in
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, transporting approximately eight (8) kilos and five hundred
v. ROSA ARUTA y MENGUIN, Accused-Appellant. (500) grams of dried marijuana packed in plastic bag
marked Cash Katutak placed in a travelling bag, which are
DECISION prohibited drugs.

ROMERO, J.: Upon arraignment, she pleaded not guilty. After trial on the
merits, the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City convicted
With the pervasive proliferation of illegal drugs and its and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of life
pernicious effects on our society, our law enforcers tend at imprisonment and to pay a fine of twenty thousand
times to overreach themselves in apprehending drug (P20,000.00) pesos.1
offenders to the extent of failing to observe well-
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entrenched constitutional guarantees against illegal The prosecution substantially relied on the testimonies of
searches and arrests. Consequently, drug offenders P/Lt. Ernesto Abello, Officer-in-Charge of the Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) of Olongapo City and P/Lt. Jose two females and a male got off. It was at this stage that
Domingo. Based on their testimonies, the court a the informant pointed out to the team Aling Rosa who was
quo found the following: then carrying a travelling bag.

On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his Having ascertained that accused-appellant was Aling Rosa,
informant, known only as Benjie, that a certain Aling Rosa the team approached her and introduced themselves as
would be arriving from Baguio City the following day, NARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked Aling Rosa about
December 14, 1988, with a large volume of marijuana. the contents of her bag, the latter handed it to the former.
Acting on said tip, P/Lt. Abello assembled a team
composed of P/Lt. Jose Domingo, Sgt. Angel Sudiacal, Sgt. Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried
Oscar Imperial, Sgt. Danilo Santiago and Sgt. Efren marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked Cash
Quirubin. Katutak. The team confiscated the bag together with the
Victory Liner bus ticket to which Lt. Domingo affixed his
Said team proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City signature. Accused-appellant was then brought to the
at around 4:00 in the afternoon of December 14, 1988 and NARCOM office for investigation where a Receipt of
deployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank Property Seized was prepared for the confiscated
(PNB) building along Rizal Avenue and the Caltex gasoline marijuana leaves.
station. Dividing themselves into two groups, one group,
made up of P/Lt. Abello, P/Lt. Domingo and the informant Upon examination of the seized marijuana specimen at the
posted themselves near the PNB building while the other PC/INP Crime Laboratory, Camp Olivas, Pampanga, P/Maj.
group waited near the Caltex gasoline station. Marlene Salangad, a Forensic Chemist, prepared a
Technical Report stating that said specimen yielded
While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus with body positive results for marijuana, a prohibited drug.
number 474 and the letters BGO printed on its front and
back bumpers stopped in front of the PNB building at
around 6:30 in the evening of the same day from where
After the presentation of the testimonies of the arresting During investigation at said office, she disclaimed any
officers and of the above technical report, the prosecution knowledge as to the identity of the woman and averred
rested its case. that the old woman was nowhere to be found after she was
arrested. Moreover, she added that no search warrant was
Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a shown to her by the arresting officers.
Demurrer to Evidence alleging the illegality of the search
and seizure of the items thereby violating accused- After the prosecution made a formal offer of evidence, the
appellants constitutional right against unreasonable search defense filed a Comment and/or Objection to Prosecutions
and seizure as well as their inadmissibility in evidence. Formal Offer of Evidence contesting the admissibility of the
items seized as they were allegedly a product of an
The said Demurrer to Evidence was, however, denied unreasonable search and seizure.
without the trial court ruling on the alleged illegality of the
search and seizure and the inadmissibility in evidence of Not convinced with her version of the incident, the
the items seized to avoid pre-judgment. Instead, the trial Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City convicted accused-
court continued to hear the case. appellant of transporting eight (8) kilos and five hundred
(500) grams of marijuana from Baguio City to Olongapo
In view of said denial, accused-appellant testified on her City in violation of Section 4, Article 11 of R.A. No. 6425,
behalf. As expected, her version of the incident differed as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act
from that of the prosecution. She claimed that immediately of 1972 and sentenced her to life imprisonment and to pay
prior to her arrest, she had just come from Choice Theater a fine of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos without
where she watched the movie Balweg. While about to cross subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.2 cräläwvirtua lib räry

the road, an old woman asked her help in carrying a

shoulder bag. In the middle of the road, Lt. Abello and Lt. In this appeal, accused-appellant submits the following:
Domingo arrested her and asked her to go with them to
the NARCOM Office. 1. The trial court erred in holding that the NARCOM agents
could not apply for a warrant for the search of a bus or a
passenger who boarded a bus because one of the Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
requirements for applying a search warrant is that the persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
place to be searched must be specifically designated and searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
described. purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
2. The trial court erred in holding or assuming that if a be determined personally by the judge after examination
search warrant was applied for by the NARCOM agents, still under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
no court would issue a search warrant for the reason that witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
the same would be considered a general search warrant place to be searched and the persons or things to be
which may be quashed. seized.

3. The trial court erred in not finding that the warrantless This constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition
search resulting to the arrest of accused-appellant violated against all searches and seizures as it operates only
the latters constitutional rights. against unreasonable searches and seizures. The plain
import of the language of the Constitution, which in one
4. The trial court erred in not holding that although the sentence prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and
defense of denial is weak yet the evidence of the at the same time prescribes the requisites for a valid
prosecution is even weaker. warrant, is that searches and seizures are normally
unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search
These submissions are impressed with merit.
warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental
protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is
In People v. Ramos,3 this Court held that a search may be
conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a that between person and police must stand the protective
search warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution which provides: refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest.4
cräläwvirtual ibrä ry
Further, articles which are the product of unreasonable otherwise is an infringement upon personal liberty and
searches and seizures are inadmissible as evidence would set back a right so basic and deserving of full
pursuant to the doctrine pronounced in Stonehill v. protection and vindication yet often violated.7cräläwvirtua lib räry

Diokno.5 This exclusionary rule was later enshrined in

Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution, thus: The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by
law:
Section 3(2). Any evidence obtained in violation of this or
the preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence for 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful
any purpose in any proceeding. arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court8 and by prevailing jurisprudence;
From the foregoing, it can be said that the State cannot
simply intrude indiscriminately into the houses, papers, 2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which
effects, and most importantly, on the person of an are:
individual. The constitutional provision guaranteed an
impenetrable shield against unreasonable searches and (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless
seizures. As such, it protects the privacy and sanctity of arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit
the person himself against unlawful arrests and other of their official duties;
forms of restraint.6
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police
cräläwvirtual ibrä ry

Therewithal, the right of a person to be secured against who had the right to be where they are;
any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. A
statute, rule or situation which allows exceptions to the
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without
requirement of a warrant of arrest or search warrant must
further search;
perforce be strictly construed and their application limited
only to cases specifically provided or allowed by law. To do
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
government, the vehicles inherent mobility reduces charged. It likewise refers to the existence of such facts
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s)
a criminal activity; sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure
and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.12
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4. Consented warrantless search;

It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable
5. Customs search; 9
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cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances

without resorting to the calibrations of our rules of
6. Stop and Frisk;10 and evidence of which his knowledge is technically nil. Rather,
he relies on the calculus of common sense which all
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.11
reasonable men have in abundance. The same quantum of
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The above exceptions, however, should not become evidence is required in determining probable cause relative
unbridled licenses for law enforcement officers to trample to search. Before a search warrant can be issued, it must
be shown by substantial evidence that the items sought
upon the constitutionally guaranteed and more
fundamental right of persons against unreasonable search are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with
and seizures. The essential requisite of probable cause criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the
must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and place to be searched.13cräläwvirtual ibrä ry

seizure can be lawfully conducted.

In searches and seizures effected without a warrant, it is
Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete necessary for probable cause to be present. Absent any
probable cause, the article(s) seized could not be admitted
definition, it generally signifies a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in and used as evidence against the person arrested.
themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the Probable cause, in these cases, must only be based on
reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has their business address. More significantly, Tangliben was
been committed or is about to be committed. acting suspiciously. His actuations and surrounding
circumstances led the policemen to reasonably suspect that
In our jurisprudence, there are instances where Tangliben is committing a crime. In instant case, there is
information has become a sufficient probable cause to no single indication that Aruta was acting suspiciously.
effect a warrantless search and seizure.
In People v. Malmstedt,15 the Narcom agents received
In People v. Tangliben, acting on information supplied by
14
reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were
informers, police officers conducted a surveillance at the transporting marijuana. They likewise received information
Victory Liner Terminal compound in San Fernando, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs
Pampanga against persons who may commit on his person. There was no reasonable time to obtain a
misdemeanors and also on those who may be engaging in search warrant, especially since the identity of the suspect
the traffic of dangerous drugs. At 9:30 in the evening, the could not be readily ascertained. His actuations also
policemen noticed a person carrying a red travelling aroused the suspicion of the officers conducting the
bag who was acting suspiciously. They confronted him and operation. The Court held that in light of such
requested him to open his bag but he refused. He acceded circumstances, to deprive the agents of the ability and
later on when the policemen identified themselves. Inside facility to act promptly, including a search without a
the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic warrant, would be to sanction impotence and
wrapper. The police officers only knew of the activities of ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of
Tangliben on the night of his arrest. society.

In instant case, the apprehending officers already had prior Note, however, the glaring differences of Malmstedt to the
knowledge from their informant regarding Arutas alleged instant case. In present case, the police officers had
activities. In Tangliben policemen were confronted with an reasonable time within which to secure a search warrant.
on-the-spot tip. Moreover, the policemen knew that the Second, Arutas identity was priorly ascertained. Third,
Victory Liner compound is being used by drug traffickers as Aruta was not acting suspiciously. Fourth, Malmstedt was
searched aboard a moving vehicle, a legally accepted to be walking in a swaying manner. Moreover, he appeared
exception to the warrant requirement. Aruta, on the other to be trying to avoid the policemen. When approached and
hand, was searched while about to cross a street. asked what he was holding in his hands, he tried to resist.
When he showed his wallet, it contained marijuana. The
In People v. Bagista,16 the NARCOM officers had probable Court held that the policemen had sufficient reason to
cause to stop and search all vehicles coming from the accost accused-appellant to determine if he was actually
north to Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential high on drugs due to his suspicious actuations, coupled
information they received from their regular informant that with the fact that based on information, this area was a
a woman having the same appearance as that of accused- haven for drug addicts.
appellant would be bringing marijuana from up north. They
likewise had probable cause to search accused-appellants In all the abovecited cases, there was information received
belongings since she fitted the description given by the which became the bases for conducting the warrantless
NARCOM informant. Since there was a valid warrantless search. Furthermore, additional factors and circumstances
search by the NARCOM agents, any evidence obtained in were present which, when taken together with the
the course of said search is admissible against accused- information, constituted probable causes which justified the
appellant. Again, this case differs from Aruta as this warrantless searches and seizures in each of the cases.
involves a search of a moving vehicle plus the fact that the
police officers erected a checkpoint. Both are exceptions to In the instant case, the determination of the absence or
the requirements of a search warrant. existence of probable cause necessitates a reexamination
of the facts. The following have been established: (1) In
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals and People,17 the policemen the morning of December 13, 1988, the law enforcement
conducted a surveillance in an area of the Kalookan officers received information from an informant named
Cemetery based on information that drug addicts were Benjie that a certain Aling Rosa would be leaving for
roaming therein. Upon reaching the place, they chanced Baguio City on December 14, 1988 and would be back in
upon a man in front of the cemetery who appeared to be the afternoon of the same day carrying with her a large
high on drugs. He was observed to have reddish eyes and volume of marijuana; (2) At 6:30 in the evening of
December 14, 1988, accused-appellant alighted from a 4:00 in the afternoon from their informant that Encinada
Victory Liner Bus carrying a travelling bag even as the would be bringing in marijuana from Cebu City on board
informant pointed her out to the law enforcement officers; M/V Sweet Pearl at 7:00 in the morning of the following
(3) The law enforcement officers approached her and day. This intelligence information regarding the culprits
introduced themselves as NARCOM agents; (4) When identity, the particular crime he allegedly committed and
asked by Lt. Abello about the contents of her travelling his exact whereabouts could have been a basis of probable
bag, she gave the same to him; (5) When they opened the cause for the lawmen to secure a warrant. This Court held
same, they found dried marijuana leaves; (6) Accused- that in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 13 and
appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for Circular No. 19, series of 1987, the lawmen could have
investigation. applied for a warrant even after court hours. The failure or
neglect to secure one cannot serve as an excuse for
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin where the violating Encinadas constitutional right.
police received information two days before the arrival of
Aminnudin that the latter would be arriving from Iloilo on In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly
board the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known, the vehicle not armed with a warrant of arrest. To legitimize the
was identified and the date of arrival was certain. From the warrantless search and seizure of accused-appellants bag,
information they had received, the police could have accused-appellant must have been validly arrested under
persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, Section 5 of Rule 113 which provides inter alia:
to justify the issuance of a warrant. Instead of securing a
warrant first, they proceeded to apprehend Aminnudin. Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace
When the case was brought before this Court, the arrest officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
was held to be illegal; hence any item seized from person:
Aminnudin could not be used against him.
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has
Another recent case is People v. Encinada where the police committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
likewise received confidential information the day before at commit an offense;
xxx xxx xxx. appellant not having been lawfully arrested. Stated
otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically
Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it
crime. Neither was she about to commit one nor had she being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional
just committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must
crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant. As such,
would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM the articles seized could not be used as evidence against
agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a accused-appellant for these are fruits of a poisoned tree
crime. It was only when the informant pointed to accused- and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III,
appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.
the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The
NARCOM agents would not have apprehended accused- Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that
appellant were it not for the furtive finger of the informant the search be incidental to a lawful arrest, in order that the
because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, search itself may likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it
there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the
accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the search of a person and his belongings. Where a search is
pointing finger of the informant. This the Court could first undertaken, and an arrest effected based on evidence
neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the produced by the search, both such search and arrest would
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and be unlawful, for being contrary to law.18 cräläwvirtua lib räry

seizure. Neither was there any semblance of any

compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause As previously discussed, the case in point is People v.
and warrantless arrests. Aminnudin19 where, this Court observed that:

Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM x x x accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his
agents to effect a warrantless search of accused-appellants arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was
bag, there being no probable cause and the accused- about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was
doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 accosted in the middle of the street and not while inside
and there was no outward indication that called for his the vehicle.
arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other
passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It People v. Solayao,20 applied the stop and frisk principle
was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of which has been adopted in Posadas v. Court of
the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so Appeals.21 In said case, Solayao attempted to flee when he
subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that and his companions were accosted by government agents.
triggered his arrest. The identification by the informer was In the instant case, there was no observable manifestation
the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not that could have aroused the suspicion of the NARCOM
a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin agents as to cause them to stop and frisk accused-
and immediately arrest him. appellant. To reiterate, accused-appellant was merely
crossing the street when apprehended. Unlike in the
In the absence of probable cause to effect a valid and legal abovementioned cases, accused-appellant never attempted
warrantless arrest, the search and seizure of accused- to flee from the NARCOM agents when the latter identified
appellants bag would also not be justified as seizure of themselves as such. Clearly, this is another indication of
evidence in plain view under the second exception. The the paucity of probable cause that would sufficiently
marijuana was obviously not immediately apparent as provoke a suspicion that accused-appellant was committing
shown by the fact that the NARCOM agents still had to a crime.
request accused-appellant to open the bag to ascertain its
contents. The warrantless search and seizure could not likewise be
categorized under exigent and emergency
Neither would the search and seizure of accused-appellants circumstances, as applied in People v. De Gracia.22 In
bag be justified as a search of a moving vehicle. There said case, there were intelligence reports that the building
was no moving vehicle to speak of in the instant case as was being used as headquarters by the RAM during a coup
accused-appellant was apprehended several minutes after detat. A surveillance team was fired at by a group of
alighting from the Victory Liner bus. In fact, she was armed men coming out of the building and the occupants
of said building refused to open the door despite repeated In support of said argument, the Solicitor General cited the
requests. There were large quantities of explosives and testimony of Lt. Abello, thus:
ammunitions inside the building. Nearby courts were closed
and general chaos and disorder prevailed. The existing Q When this informant by the name of alias Benjie pointed
circumstances sufficiently showed that a crime was being to Aling Rosa, what happened after that?
committed. In short, there was probable cause to effect a
warrantless search of the building. The same could not be A We followed her and introduced ourselves as NARCOM
said in the instant case. agents and confronted her with our informant and asked
her what she was carrying and if we can see the bag she
The only other exception that could possibly legitimize the was carrying.
warrantless search and seizure would be consent given by
the accused-appellant to the warrantless search as to Q What was her reaction?
amount to a waiver of her constitutional right. The
A She gave her bag to me.
Solicitor General argues that accused-appellant voluntarily
submitted herself to search and inspection citing People v.
Q So what happened after she gave the bag to you?
Malasugui23 where this Court ruled:
A I opened it and found out plastic bags of marijuana
When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to
inside.24
have it made on his person or premises, he is precluded
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from complaining later thereof. (Cooley, Constitutional This Court cannot agree with the Solicitor Generals
Limitations, 8th ed., [V]ol. I, p. 631.) The right to be contention for the Malasugui case is inapplicable to the
secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be instant case. In said case, there was probable cause for the
waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or warrantless arrest thereby making the warrantless search
impliedly. effected immediately thereafter equally lawful.25 On the
contrary, the most essential element of probable cause, as
expounded above in detail, is wanting in the instant case
making the warrantless arrest unjustified and illegal. Q: By the way, when Roel Encinada agreed to allow you to
Accordingly, the search which accompanied the warrantless examine the two chairs that he carried, what did you do
arrest was likewise unjustified and illegal. Thus, all the next?
articles seized from the accused-appellant could not be
used as evidence against her. A: I examined the chairs and I noticed that something
inside in between the two chairs.
Aside from the inapplicability of the abovecited case, the
act of herein accused-appellant in handing over her bag to We are not convinced. While in principle we agree that
the NARCOM agents could not be construed as voluntary consent will validate an otherwise illegal search, we
submission or an implied acquiescence to the unreasonable believe that appellant -- based on the transcript
search. The instant case is similar to People v. quoted above -- did not voluntarily consent to
Encinada,26 where this Court held: Bolonias search of his belongings. Appellants silence
should not be lightly taken as consent to such
[T]he Republics counsel avers that appellant voluntarily search. The implied acquiscence to the search, if
handed the chairs containing the package of marijuana to there was any, could not have been more than mere
the arresting officer and thus effectively waived his right passive conformity given under intimidating or
against the warrantless search. This he gleaned from coercive circumstances and is thus considered no
Bolonias testimony. consent at all within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee. Furthermore, considering that
Q: After Roel Encinada alighted from the motor tricycle, the search was conducted irregularly, i.e., without a
what happened next? warrant, we cannot appreciate consent based merely on
the presumption of regularity of the performance of
A: I requested to him to see his chairs that he carried. duty.(Emphasis supplied)
Q: Are you referring to the two plastic chairs? Thus, accused-appellants lack of objection to the search is
not tantamount to a waiver of her constitutional rights or a
A: Yes, sir.
voluntary submission to the warrantless search. As this merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the
Court held in People v. Barros:27 law. (Citation omitted).

x x x [T]he accused is not to be presumed to have waived We apply the rule that: courts indulge every reasonable
the unlawful search conducted on the occasion of his presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional
warrantless arrest simply because he failed to object- rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss
of fundamental rights.28 (Emphasis supplied)
x x x. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the
right exists; secondly, that the person involved had To repeat, to constitute a waiver, there should be an actual
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such intention to relinquish the right. As clearly illustrated
right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention in People v. Omaweng,29 where prosecution witness Joseph
to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Layong testified thus:
Phil. 698). The fact that the accused failed to object to the
entry into his house does not amount to a permission to PROSECUTOR AYOCHOK:
make a search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770).
As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. Q - When you and David Fomocod saw the travelling bag,
de Garcia v. Locsin (supra): what did you do?

xxx xxx xxx A - When we saw that travelling bag, we asked the
driver if we could see the contents.
x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon
any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place Q - And what did or what was the reply of the driver, if
the citizen in the position of either contesting an officers there was any?
authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but
A - He said you can see the contents but those are
instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or
only clothings (sic).
seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is
Q - When he said that, what did you do? maintenance of his constitutional rights is one of the
highest duties and privileges of the Court. He willingly gave
A - We asked him if we could open and see it. prior consent to the search and voluntarily agreed to have
it conducted on his vehicle and traveling bag, which is not
Q - When you said that, what did he tell you? the case with Aruta.
A - He said you can see it. In an attempt to further justify the warrantless search, the
Solicitor General next argues that the police officers would
Q - And when he said you can see and open it, what did
have encountered difficulty in securing a search warrant as
you do?
it could be secured only if accused-appellants name was
A - When I went inside and opened the bag, I saw that it known, the vehicle identified and the date of its arrival
was not clothings (sic) that was contained in the bag. certain, as in the Aminnudin case where the arresting
officers had forty-eight hours within which to act.
Q - And when you saw that it was not clothings (sic), what
This argument is untenable.
did you do?
Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
A - When I saw that the contents were not clothes, I took
some of the contents and showed it to my companion
x x x [N]o search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
Fomocod and when Fomocod smelled it, he said it was
except upon probable cause to be determined by the
marijuana.(Emphasis supplied)
judge, or such other responsible officer as may be
In the above-mentioned case, accused was not subjected authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
to any search which may be stigmatized as a violation of
produce, and particularly describing the place to be
his Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. If one had been made, this Court would be the searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Italics
first to condemn it as the protection of the citizen and the supplied)
Search warrants to be valid must particularly describe the seized, wherever and whenever it is
place to be searched and the persons or things to be feasible.31 (Emphasis supplied)
seized. The purpose of this rule is to limit the things to be
seized to those and only those, particularly described in the While it may be argued that by entering a plea during
warrant so as to leave the officers of the law with no arraignment and by actively participating in the trial,
discretion regarding what articles they shall seize to the accused-appellant may be deemed to have waived
end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be objections to the illegality of the warrantless search and to
made.30 cräläwvirt uali brä ry
the inadmissibility of the evidence obtained thereby, the
same may not apply in the instant case for the following
Had the NARCOM agents only applied for a search warrant, reasons:
they could have secured one without too much difficulty,
contrary to the assertions of the Solicitor General. The 1. The waiver would only apply to objections pertaining to
person intended to be searched has been particularized the illegality of the arrest as her plea of not guilty and
and the thing to be seized specified. The time was also participation in the trial are indications of her voluntary
sufficiently ascertained to be in the afternoon of December submission to the courts jurisdiction.32 The plea and active
14, 1988. Aling Rosa turned out to be accused-appellant participation in the trial would not cure the illegality of the
and the thing to be seized was marijuana. The vehicle was search and transform the inadmissible evidence into
identified to be a Victory Liner bus. In fact, the NARCOM objects of proof. The waiver simply does not extend this
agents purposely positioned themselves near the spot far.
where Victory Liner buses normally unload their
passengers. Assuming that the NARCOM agents failed to 2. Granting that evidence obtained through a warrantless
particularize the vehicle, this would not in any way hinder search becomes admissible upon failure to object thereto
them from securing a search warrant. The above during the trial of the case, records show that accused-
particulars would have already sufficed. In any case, this appellant filed a Demurrer to Evidence and objected and
Court has held that the police should particularly describe opposed the prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence.
the place to be searched and the person or things to be
It is apropos to quote the case of People v. Barros,33 which to the admission of such evidence was made clearly
stated: and seasonably and that, under the circumstances,
no intent to waive his rights under the premises can
It might be supposed that the non-admissibility of evidence be reasonably inferred from his conduct before or
secured through an invalid warrantless arrest or a during the trial.(Emphasis supplied)
warrantless search and seizure may be waived by an
accused person. The a priori argument is that the invalidity In fine, there was really no excuse for the NARCOM agents
of an unjustified warrantless arrest, or an arrest effected not to procure a search warrant considering that they had
with a defective warrant of arrest may be waived by more than twenty-four hours to do so. Obviously, this is
applying for and posting of bail for provisional liberty, so as again an instance of seizure of the fruit of the poisonous
to estop an accused from questioning the legality or tree, hence illegal and inadmissible subsequently in
constitutionality of his detention or the failure to accord evidence.
him a preliminary investigation. We do not believe,
however, that waiver of the latter necessarily constitutes, The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical means
or carries with it, waiver of the former--an argument that of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
the Solicitor General appears to be making unreasonable searches and seizure. The non-exclusionary
impliedly. Waiver of the non-admissibility of the fruits rule is contrary to the letter and spirit of the prohibition
of an invalid warrantless arrest and of a warrantless against unreasonable searches and seizures.34 cräläwvirt ualib rä ry

search and seizure is not casually to be presumed, if

the constitutional right against unlawful searches While conceding that the officer making the unlawful
and seizures is to retain its vitality for the protection search and seizure may be held criminally and civilly liable,
of our people. In the case at bar, defense counsel had the Stonehill case observed that most jurisdictions have
expressly objected on constitutional grounds to the realized that the exclusionary rule is the only practical
admission of the carton box and the four (4) kilos of means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
marijuana when these were formally offered in evidence by abuse. This approach is based on the justification made by
the prosecution. We consider that appellants objection Judge Learned Hand that only in case the prosecution
which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it appellant ROSA ARUTA Y MENGUIN is hereby ACQUITTED
cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless she is
repressed.35 cräläwvirtual ibräry being held for some other legal grounds. No costs.

Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace SO ORDERED.

against which the constitutional guarantees afford full
protection. While the power to search and seize may at Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and
times be necessary to the public welfare, still it may be Purisima, JJ., concur
exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the
constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of
no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference
to the basic principles of government.36 cräläwvirtual ib räry

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not

justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the
name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss
of liberty. As Justice Holmes declared: I think it is less evil
that some criminals escape than that the government
should play an ignoble part. It is simply not allowed in free
society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the
law violated is the Constitution itself.37
chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the

Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Olongapo City, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to
establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-
 FIRST DIVISION After the incident, PO3 Din received word from Barangay Tanod Florentine Cano (Cano),10 that
the robbery suspects were last seen in Barangay Del Rio Pit-os. Thus, S/Insp. George Ylanan
G.R. No. 212340, August 17, 2016 (S/Insp. Ylanan) conducted an investigation in the said barangay, and discovered that before
the robbery incident, Manago told Cano that three persons - namely, Rico Lumampas, Arvin
Cadastra, and Allan Sordiano - are his employees in his roasted chicken business, and they
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GERRJAN MANAGO Y were to stay in Manago's house. Further, upon verification of the getaway vehicles with the
ACUT, Accused-Appellant. Land Transportation Office, the police officers found out that the motorcycle was registered in
Manago's name, while the red Toyota Corolla was registered in the name pf Zest-O
DECISION Corporation, where Manage worked as a District Sales Manager.11 chanrob leslaw

With all the foregoing information at hand, the police officers, comprised of a team including
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
PO3 Din and S/Insp. Ylanan, conducted a "hot pursuit" operation one (1) day after the
robbery incident, or on March 16, 2007, by setting up a checkpoint in Sitio Panagdait. At
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Gerrjan Manago y Acut around 9:30 in the evening of even date, the red Toyota Corolla, then being driven by
(Manago) assailing the Decision2 dated May 20, 2013 and the Resolution3 dated November 6, Manago, passed through the checkpoint, prompting the police officers to stop the vehicle. The
2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CEB-C.R. No. 01342, which affirmed the police officers then ordered Manago to disembark, and thereafter, conducted a thorough
Decision4 dated March 23, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 58 (RTC), in search of the vehicle. As the search produced no contraband, the police officers then frisked
Criminal Case No. CBU-79707, finding Manago guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Manago, resulting in the discovery of one (1) plastic sachet containing a white crystalline
Section 11, Article II5 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,6 otherwise known as the substance suspected to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The police officers
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002." seized the plastic pack, arrested Manago, informed him of his constitutional rights, and
brought him and the plastic pack to their headquarters. Upon reaching the headquarters,
The Facts S/Insp. Ylanan turned over the seized plastic pack to PO3 Joel Taboada, who in turn, prepared
a request for a laboratory examination of the same. SPO1 Felix Gabijan then delivered the
On April 10, 2007, an Information7 was filed before the RTC, charging Manago of Possession said sachet and request to Forensic Chemist Jude Daniel Mendoza of the PNP Crime
of Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, the Laboratory, who, after conducting an examination, confirmed that the sachet
accusatory portion of which reads: ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.12 chanrob lesl aw

That on or about the 16th day of March, 2007, at about 11:50 in the evening, in the City of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with In his defense, Manago denied possessing the plastic pack recovered by the police officers. He
deliberate intent, and without authority of law, did then and there have in his possession and claimed that at around 11:50 in the evening of March 16, 2007, he was about to start his
under his control one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic packet of white crystalline substance vehicle and was on his way home from the office when a pick-up truck stopped in front of his
weighing 5.85 grams containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride [sic], a dangerous drug, car. Three (3) police officers armed with long firearms disembarked from the said track. One
without being authorized by law. of the officers knocked on the door of Manago's vehicle and asked for his driver's license, to
which Manago complied. When the same officer saw Manago's name on the license, the
CONTRARY TO LAW.8 chanroble svirtual lawlib rary
former uttered "mao na ni (this is him)." Manago was then ordered to sit at the back of his car
as the vehicle was driven by one of the police officers directly to the Cebu City Police Station.
According to the prosecution, at around 9:30 in the evening of March 15, 2007, PO3 Antonio
After arriving at the police station, Manago was interrogated about who the robbers were and
Din (PO3 Din) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Mobile Patrol Group was waiting to get a
to divulge their whereabouts so that no criminal charges would be filed against him. Manago
haircut at Jonas Borces Beauty Parlor when two (2) persons entered and declared a hold-up.
claimed that he requested for a phone call with his lawyer, as well as a copy of the warrant for
PO3 Din identified himself as a police officer and exchanged gun shots with the two suspects.
his arrest, but both requests went unheeded. After he was dispossessed of his laptop, wallet,
After the shootout, one of the suspects boarded a motorcycle, while the other boarded a red
and two (2) mobile phones, he was then photographed and placed in a detention cell.
Toyota Corolla. The plate numbers of the vehicles were noted by PO3 Din.9
Thereafter, he was brought to the Cebu City Prosecutor's Office where he was charged with,
chanrobles law
among others, illegal possession of shabu.13 chanrobles law however, both denied in an Omnibus Order24 dated May 12, 2009. Aggrieved, Manago
appealed his conviction before the CA.25 cralawredcha nro bleslaw

Prior to his arraignment, Manago filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Probable Cause and/or
Motion for the Suppression of Evidence,14 contending, inter alia, that there is neither probable The CA Proceedings
cause nor prima facie Evidence to conduct an arrest and search on him; as such, the item
seized torn him, i.e., the plastic sachet containing shabu, is inadmissible in evidence pursuant Upon Manago's motion to post bail, the CA rendered a Resolution26 dated August 13, 2010,
to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.15 However, in kn Order16 dated May 31, 2007, the allowing Manago to post bail in the amount of P200,000.00, noting that the quantity of
RTC denied the said motion. The RTC held that while (a) the police officers, through PO3 Din, the shabu seized from him was only 0.3852 grams, thus bailable, and that the Office of the
had no personal knowledge of Manago's involvement in the robbery as they had to conduct in Solicitor General did not oppose Manago's motion.27 chanrob leslaw

investigation to identify him as the registered owner of the motorcycle and (b) there was no in
flagrante delicto arrest as Manago was merely driving and gave no indication that he was In a Decision28 dated May 20, 2013, the CA affirmed Manago „ conviction in toto. It held that
committing an offense, the RTC nevertheless held that there was a valid warrantless search of the police officers conducted a valid hot pursuit operation against Manago, considering that
a moving vehicle, considering that PO3 Din had probable cause to believe that Manago was PO3 Din personally identified him as the one driving the red Toyota Corolla vehicle used in the
part of the robbery, because the latter was driving the getaway vehicle used in the March 15, March 15, 2007 robbery incident. As such, the CA concluded that the warrantless arrest
2007 robbery incident.17chan rob leslaw
conducted against Manago was valid, and consequently, the plastic sachet seized from him
containing shabu is admissible in evidence as it was done incidental to a lawful arrest.29chanro bleslaw

On July 12, 2007, Manago was arraigned with the assistance of counsel and pleaded not guilty
to the charge against him.18 chan robles law
Undaunted, Manago moved for reconsideration,30 which was denied in a Resolution31 dated
November 6, 2013; hence, the instant appeal.
During the course of the trial, the contents of the plastic sachet were re-examined by the
National Bureau of Investigation, revealing that out of the 5.7158 grams of white crystalline The Issue Before the Court
substance contained in the sachet, only 0.3852 grams is methamphetamine hydrochloride,
while the rest is potassium aluminum sulphate or tawas, which is not a dangerous drug The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Manage's conviction for violation of
substance. Thus, Manago applied for and was granted bail.19 chan roble slaw

Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 should be upheld.

The RTC Ruling The Court's Ruling

In a Decision20 dated March 23, 2009, the RTC found Manago guilty beyond reasonable doubt The appeal is meritorious.
of possession of 0.3852 grams of shabu and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment for a period of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fifteen Section 2, Article III32 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must
(15) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00.21 chanroble slaw

be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the
existence of probable cause, absent which such search and seizure becomes
Echoing its earlier findings in its May 31, 2007 Order, the RTC found that the police officers "unreasonable" within the meaning of the said constitutional provision. To protect the
conducted a valid warrantless search of a moving vehicle, considering that PO3 Din positively people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III33 of the 1987
identified the red Toyota Corolla, then being driven by Manago, as the getaway vehicle in the Constitution provides that evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such
March 15, 2007 robbery incident. Thus, the item found in the search, i.e., the plastic sachet unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the
containing shabu obtained from Manago, is admissible in evidence and is enough to sustain a proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable
conviction against him for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.22 chanrobles law

searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding.34
Manago moved for reconsideration23 and applied for bail pending appeal, which were,
chanrobles law

One of the recognized exceptions to the need of a warrant before a search may be effected is
a search incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first
be a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed.35 chanrob leslaw However, we note that the element of "personal knowledge of facts or circumstance" under
Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires clarification.
A lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant. With respect to the latter, the
parameters of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should - as a The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the Black's Law
general rule - be complied with: ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary Dictionary, "circumstances are attendant or accompanying facts, events or conditions."
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the actual perception, personal
without a warrant, arrest a person: evaluation or observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though
the police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; could determine the existence of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested has
committed the crime. However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on facts or circumstances should be made immediately after the commission of the crime in order
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; to comply with the element of immediacy.
and cralawlawlib rary

In other words, the clincher in the element of "personal knowledge of facts or

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment circumstances" is the required element of immediacy within which these facts or
or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is circumstances should be gathered. This required time element acts as a safeguard
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or perceived the
circumstances within a very limited time frame. This guarantees that the police
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant officers would have no time to base their probable cause finding on facts or
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation.
in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the commission of
Under the foregoing provision, there are three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be
the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to become
lawfully effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest of a
contaminated and subjected to external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other
suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there
hand, with the element of immediacy imposed under Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the
is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police officer's determination of probable
been committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final
cause would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or
judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being
circumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited period of time. The same
transferred from one confinement to another.36
provision adds another safeguard with the requirement of probable cause as the standard for
chanroble slaw

evaluating these facts of circumstances before the police officer could effect a valid
In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (b), it is essential that the element of
warrantless arrest.38 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
personal knowledge must be coupled with the element of immediacy; otherwise, the
arrest may be nullified, and resultantly, the items yielded through the search incidental In this case, records reveal that at around 9:30 in the evening of March 15, 2007, PO3 Din
thereto will be rendered inadmissible in consonance with the exclusionary rule of the 1987 personally witnessed a robbery incident while he was waiting for his turn to have a haircut at
Constitution. In Pestilos v. Generoso,37 the Court explained the requirement of immediacy as Jonas Borces Beauty Parlor. After his brief shootout with the armed robbers, the latter fled
follows: ChanRob les Virtualawl ibra ry using a motorcycle and a red Toyota Corolla. Through an investigation and verification made
Based on these discussions, it appears that the Court's appreciation of the elements that "the by the police officers headed by PO3 Din and S/Insp. Ylanan, they were able to: (a) find out
offense has just been committed" and "personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that that the armed robbers were staying in Barangay Del Rio Pit-os; and (b) trace the getaway
the person to be arrested; committed it" depended on the particular circumstances of the vehicles to Manago. The next day, or on March 16, 2007, the police officers set up a
case. checkpoint in Sitio Panagdait where, at around 9:30 in the evening, the red Toyota Corolla
being driven by Manago passed by and was intercepted by the police officers. The police sought. Searches without warrant of automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of
officers then ordered Manago to disembark the car, and from there, proceeded to search the preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws, provided such searches are made at
vehicle and the body of Manago, which search yielded the plastic sachet containing shabu. borders or "constructive borders" like checkpoints near the boundary lines of the
Thereupon, they effected Manago's arrest. State.40 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
A variant of searching moving vehicles without a warrant may entail the setup of military or
The foregoing circumstances show that while the element of personal knowledge under
police checkpoints - as in this case - which, based on jurisprudence, are not illegal per
Section 5 (b) above was present - given that PO3 Din actually saw the March 15, 2007
se for as long as its necessity is justified by the exigencies of public order and
robbery incident and even engaged the armed robbers in a shootout - the required element of
conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists.41 Case law further states that routine
immediacy was not met. This is because, at the time the police officers effected the
inspections in checkpoints are not regarded as violative of an individual's right against
warrantless arrest upon Manago's person, investigation and verification proceedings were
unreasonable searches, and thus, permissible, if limited to the following: (a) where the officer
already conducted, which consequently yielded sufficient information on the suspects of the
merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds;
March 15, 2007 robbery incident. As the Court sees it, the information the police officers had
(b) simply looks into a vehicle; (c) flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors; (d)
gathered therefrom would have been enough for them to secure the necessary warrants
where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search; (e) where the inspection
against the robbery suspects. However, they opted to conduct a "hot pursuit" operation which
of the Vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and (e) where the routine
- considering the lack of immediacy - unfortunately failed to meet the legal requirements
check is conducted in a fixed area.42
therefor. Thus, there being no valid warrantless arrest under the "hot pursuit" doctrine, the
chanrob leslaw

CA erred in ruling that Manago was lawfully arrested.

It is well to clarify, however, that routine inspections do not give police officers carte
blanche discretion to conduct warrantless searches in the absence of probable cause. When a
In view of the finding that there was no lawful arrest in this case, the CA likewise erred in
vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search - as opposed to a mere routine
ruling that the incidental search on Manago's vehicle and body was valid. In fact, the said
inspection - such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers
search was made even before he was arrested and thus, violated the cardinal rule on
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that
searches incidental to lawful arrests that there first be a lawful arrest before a search
they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be
can be made.
searched.43chanrobles law

For another, the Court similarly finds the RTC's ruling that the police officers conducted a
In the case at bar, it should be reiterated that the police officers had already conducted a
lawful warrantless search of a moving vehicle on Manago's red Toyota Corolla untenable.
thorough investigation and verification proceedings, which yielded, among others: (a) the
identities of the robbery suspects; (b) the place where they reside; and (c) the ownership of
In Caballes v. People,39 the Court explained the concept of warrantless searches on moving
the getaway vehicles used in the robbery, i.e., the motorcycle and the red Toyota Corolla. As
vehicles:
adverted to earlier, these pieces of information were already enough for said police officers to
ChanRob les Vi rtualaw lib rary

Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of
secure the necessary warrants to accost the robbery suspects. Consequently, there was no
privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
longer any exigent circumstance that would have justified the necessity of setting up the
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity. Thus,
checkpoint in this case for the purpose of searching the subject vehicle. In addition, it is well
the rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized
to point out that the checkpoint was arranged for the targeted arrest of Manago, who was
whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of
already identified as the culprit of the robbery incident. In this regard, it cannot, therefore, be
practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things
said that the checkpoint was meant to conduct a routinary and indiscriminate search of
and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge - a
moving vehicles. Rather, it was used as a subterfuge to put into force the capture of the
requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a
fleeing suspect. Unfortunately, this setup cannot take the place of - nor skirt the legal
moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. We
requirement of - procuring a valid search/arrest warrant given the circumstances of this case.
might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground
Hence, the search conducted on the red Toyota Corolla and on the person of its driver,
that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly
Manago, was unlawful.
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
In fine, Manago's warrantless arrest, and the search incidental thereto, including that of his FIRST DIVISION
moving vehicle were all unreasonable and unlawful. In consequence, the shabu seized from
him is rendered inadmissible in evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule under Section 3 G.R. No. 220732, September 06, 2016
(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Since the confiscated shabu is the very corpus
delicti of the crime charged, Manago must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from
criminal liability.44 ELMER G. SINDAC @ "TAMER," Petitioner, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
chan roble slaw

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 20, 2013 and the Resolution
dated November 6, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CEB-C.R. No. 01342 are DECISION
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Gerrjan Manago y Acut
as hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
9165.

SO ORDERED. chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated May 26, 2015 and the
Resolution3 dated September 18, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No.
35413, which affirmed the Decision4 dated October 31, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of
Infanta, Quezon, Branch 65 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 2866-1 finding petitioner Elmer G.
Sindac @ "Tamer" (Sindac) guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 11, Article II
of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,5 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002."

The Facts

The instant case stemmed from an Information6 dated May 30, 2007 filed before the RTC
charging Sindac of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, defined and penalized under Section
11, Article II of RA 9165,7 the accusatory portion of which reads: ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry

That on or about the 17th day of April, 2007, at Brgy. Poblacion Uno, in the Municipality of
Real, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, control and custody one (1) transparent plastic pack
containing white crystalline substance weighing 0.04 gram which when examined, gave
positive results to the tests for methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu,
a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW8 chanrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry

The prosecution alleged that from March 15, 2007 to April 30, 2007, the Philippine National
Police, Real, Quezon (PNP Real), conducted surveillance operations on Sindac's alleged drug
trade. At around 7 o'clock in the morning of April 17, 2007, the PNP Real conducted a briefing,
and thereafter, proceeded to the port of Barangay Ungos. There, PO3 Bonifacio Peñamora
(PO3 Peñamora) and PO1 Erbert Asis (PO1 Asis) saw Sindac headed for Barangay Poblacion
Uno, prompting them to follow him. Along the national road of said barangay, PO3 Peñamora
and PO1 Asis saw Sindac meet with a certain Alladin Cañon (Cañon) who sold and handed
over a plastic sachet to him. Suspecting that the sachet contained shabu, PO3 Peñamora and In a Decision16 dated May 26, 2015, the CA affirmed Sindac's conviction, holding that: (a) the
PO1 Asis rushed to the scene and introduced themselves as police officers. Cañon escaped but prosecution had established the presence of all the elements of the crime of illegal possession
the policemen were able to apprehend Sindac. When ordered to empty his pocket, Sindac of dangerous drugs;17 (b) the policemen substantially complied with the chain of custody
brought out his wallet which contained a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline rule;18 and (c) Sindac is estopped from questioning the legality of his warrantless arrest as he
substance. After initially determining that such substance is shabu, the policemen arrested failed to raise such issue before entering his plea during the arraignment.19 chanrob leslaw

Sindac and brought him to the police station. There, Sindac's arrest was recorded, the seized
item was marked in Sindac's presence, and a request for chemical test was prepared. A Undaunted, Sindac moved for reconsideration,20 which was, however, denied in a
laboratory examination later confirmed that the plastic sachet seized from Sindac contained Resolution21 dated September 18, 2015; hence, this petition.
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.9 chan robles law

The Issue Before the Court

In his defense, Sindac denied that he possessed illegal drugs. He claimed that at around 7
o'clock in the morning of April 17, 2007, he was riding a tricycle bound for Barangay Ungos The issue for the Court's resolution is whether Sindac's conviction for violation of Section 11,
when PO3 Peñamora stopped the vehicle and ordered him to get off. PO3 Peñamora then Article II of RA 9165 should be upheld.
invited him to the police station, to which he complied. There, he was made to undress and
was frisked by PO3 Peñamora, who found nothing. PO3 Peñamora left with Sindac's wallet and The Court's Ruling
mobile phone, and when he returned, his wallet was searched anew and a sachet of
suspected shabu was found inside, to his surprise. PO3 Peñamora then made Sindac sign a The appeal is meritorious.
blank piece of paper which turned out to be a receipt for evidence seized.10 Upon arraignment,
Sindac pleaded not guilty to the charges levelled against him.11 chan robles law

At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case
wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the
The RTC Ruling appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than
those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction
In a Decision12 dated October 31, 2012, the RTC found Sindac guilty beyond reasonable doubt over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment
of the crime charged and, accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.22 chan robles law

for the indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twelve (12)
years and one (1) day, as maximum, including all the accessory penalties, and ordered him to In this light and as will be explained hereunder, the Court is of the view that Sindac's
pay a fine of P300,000.00 as well as the costs of suit.13 chanroble slaw
conviction must be set aside.

The RTC found that the prosecution had established all the elements of illegal possession of Section 2,23 Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must
dangerous drugs: (a) Sindac possessed a sachet of shabu; (b) he was not authorized by law be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the
to do so; and (c) he freely and consciously possessed the said drug. In this regard, the RTC existence of probable cause, absent which, such search and seizure becomes
held that the policemen substantially complied with the chain of custody rule as they "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect the
adequately justified their failure to strictly comply thereto and they had preserved the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2),24 Article III of the 1987
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized contraband. Finally, the RTC opined that the Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures
policemen committed a valid in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest on Sindac pursuant to shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In other words,
Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.14 chanro bles law
evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and
seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a
Aggrieved, Sindac appealed15 his conviction before the CA. poisonous tree.25cra lawred chan roble slaw

The CA Ruling One of the recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant before a search may be affected is
a search incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first Procedure, the officer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section 5 (b) of the same, he
be a lawful arrest before a search can be made - the process cannot be reversed.26 chanrob leslaw knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed.29 chan robles law

A lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant. With respect to the latter, the In this case, the Court finds that there could have been no lawful warrantless arrest made on
parameters of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should - as a the person of Sindac. Based on the records, the arresting officer, PO3 Peñamora, himself
general rule - be complied with: ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary admitted that he was about five (5) to ten (10) meters away from Sindac and Cañon when the
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, latter allegedly handed a plastic sachet to the former. Suspecting that the sachet
without a warrant arrest a person: contained shabu, he and PO1 Asis rushed to Sindac to arrest him. PO3 Peñamora's testimony
on direct examination reveals:30
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry [Prosecutor Cherry May P. Avellano (Fiscal Avellano)]: Where did this selling of shabu take
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; place?

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on [PO3 Peñamora]: At Poblacion Uno, Real, Quezon, ma'am.
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and cralawlawlib rary [Fiscal Avellano]: How did you know that there were selling of shabu that took place at
Poblacion Uno, Real, Quezon [(Poblacion Uno)]?
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is [PO3 Peñamora]: We followed him from Ungos to [Poblacion Uno], ma'am.
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
[Fiscal Avellano]: Where in particular did you proceed in [Poblacion Uno] wherein you followed
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant him?
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against
in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112. [PO3 Peñamora]: Along the national road, ma'am.
The aforementioned provision identifies three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be
[Fiscal Avellano]: When you saw [Sindacl selling shabu, how far were you located to
lawfully effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest
that person?
of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable
cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; and
[PO3 Peñamora]: 5 to 10 meters ma'am.
(c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or
temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred
[Fiscal Avellano]: When you said there was selling of shabu, what was the participation of
from one confinement to another.27
[Sindac] in the selling?
chan roble slaw

In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113, two (2) elements must
[PO3 Peñamora]: He was the buyer, ma'am.
concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such
[Fiscal Avellano]: Who was the seller then?
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand,
Section 5 (b), Rule 113 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense
[PO3 Peñamora]: Alladin Cañon alias Indong, ma'am.
had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the accused had committed it.28
[Fiscal Avellano]: What did [Cañon] do when you said he was selling shabu to [Sindac]?
chanrobles law

In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of
[PO3 Peñamora]: He handed the shabu to [Sindac], ma'am.
an offense is essential. Under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
 [PO3 Peñamora]: As a policeman, I suspected it as shabu so I ordered him to take out the
[Fiscal Avellano]: And what did [Sindac] do when [Cañon] handed shabu to [Sindac]? small plastic, Your Honor.

[PO3 Peñamora]: He took it, ma'am. xxxx

[Fiscal Avellano]: What did he do after he took the shabu? [Judge Mesa]: Was it containing something?

[PO3 Peñamora]: He kept the shabu in his hand, ma'am. [PO3 Peñamora]: Yes, Your Honor.

[Fiscal Avellano]: After [Sindac] kept the shabu in his hand, what did you do next? [Judge Mesa]: What was the content?

[PO3 Peñamora]: We approached them, ma'am. [PO3 Peñamora]: Crystalline substance, Your Honor.

xxxx [Judge Mesa]: Was there a color of the crystalline substance?

[Fiscal Avellano]: After you arrested [Sindac], what did you do next if there was any? [PO3 Peñamora]: Colorless, looks like a tawas, Your Honor.

[PO3 Peñamora]: We searched his pocket ma'am. [Judge Mesa]: After he took out and showed to you this folded small plastic, what transpired
next?
[Fiscal Avellano]: Were you the one who personally searched the pocket of [Sindac]?
[PO3 Peñamora]: I took it from him, Your Honor.
[PO3 Peñamora]: No ma'am, we ordered him to put out his wallet?
xxxx
[Fiscal Avellano]: Did he comply with your order?
[Fiscal Avellano]: After you took that plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance,
[PO3 Peñamora]: Yes ma'am. what did you do next if any?

[Fiscal Avellano]: What did he do? xxxx

[PO3 Peñamora]: He turned out his pocket and showed his wallet, ma'am. [PO3 Peñamora]: I concluded that it to be a suspected shabu and I informed him that I will
bring him to the police station and we arrested him, ma'am.
COURT
[Fiscal Avellano]: After you arrested him, what did you do next?
[Presiding Judge Arnelo C. Mesa (Judge Mesa)]: What was the result of that turning over his
pocket and showing his wallet? [PO3 Peñamora]: We brought him to the Municipal Police Station, we entered the matter to
the police blotter and we prepared a receipt for evidence seized, ma'am. (Emphases and
[PO3 Peñamora]: From his wallet I saw a small plastic folded, Your Honor. underscoring supplied)
Considering that PO3 Peñamora was at a considerable distance away from the alleged criminal
[Judge Mesa]: Upon seeing this small plastic folded inside the pocket of his wallet, what
transaction (five [5] to ten [10] meters), not to mention the atomity of the object thereof
transpired next if any?
(0.04 gram of white crystalline substance31 contained in a plastic sachet), the Court finds it
highly doubtful that said arresting officer was able to reasonably ascertain that any criminal
activity was afoot so as to prompt him to conduct a lawful in flagrante delicto arrest and, Verily, warrantless arrests conducted without this indispensable requisite should be struck
thereupon, a warrantless search. These similar circumstances were availing in the cases down as unlawful, as in this case.
of Comerciante v. People32 and People v. Villareal33 where the Court likewise invalidated the in
flagrante delcito arrest and ensuing warrantless search. In this relation, it should also be This is not the first instance where the Court, despite the existence of reliable information on
pointed out that no criminal overt act could be properly attributed to Sindac so as to rouse the part of the arresting officer, invalidated a warrantless arrest of an accused on account of
any reasonable suspicion in the mind of either PO3 Peñamora or PO1 Asis that Sindac had just such officer's lack of personal knowledge that the accused has committed, is actually
committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Sindac's actuations of talking to committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. In People v. Racho,38 the Court invalidated
and later on, receiving an unidentified object from Cañon, without more, should not be the warrantless arrest made on the person of the accused despite a confidential agent
considered as ongoing criminal activity that would render proper an in flagrante delicto arrest explicitly identifying him as a drug-dealer. In that case, the Court noted that at the time of
under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. the arrest, the accused was neither committing a crime in the presence of the police officers
nor acting in a suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the police
Neither has the prosecution established that the conditions set forth in Section 5 (b), Rule 113 officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing or intending to commit a crime.
— that is, that an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had Further, the Court held that the arresting officers were not impelled by any urgency that
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it - have been would allow them to do away with the requisite warrant, especially considering that they
complied with. From the circumstances above-discussed, it is fairly suspect that PO3 received the "tipped information" a day before conducting a warrantless arrest on the
Peñamora had personal knowledge that a crime had been committed by Sindac. According to accused. To the Court, the arresting officers had ample opportunity to apply for a warrant. As
jurisprudence, "the arresting officer's determination of probable cause under Section 5 (b), such, their failure to do so renders the warrantless arrest, as well as the search made
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal knowledge of incidental thereto, invalid, thus, resulting in the acquittal of therein accused.39
chanrob leslaw

facts or circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. These
facts or circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by As a consequence of the Sindac's unlawful arrest, it follows that there could be no valid search
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the incidental to a lawful arrest which had yielded the plastic sachet containing 0.04 gram
person to be arrested,"34 which, however do not obtain in this case. of shabu from Sindac. Notably, while it is true that Sindac: (a) failed to question the legality of
the warrantless arrest against him before arraignment; and (b) actively participated in the
Based on the foregoing, it is, in fact, quite perceivable that PO3 Peñamora and PO1 Asis had trial of the case, it must nevertheless be clarified that the foregoing constitutes a
proceeded to apprehend Sindac solely on account of information retrieved from previous waiver ONLY as to any question concerning any defects in his arrest, AND NOT with regard
surveillance operations conducted on Sindac's alleged drug dealing activities. Advancing to a to the inadmissibility of the evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. In Homar v.
warrantless arrest based only on such information, absent circumstances that would lead to People40:ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

the arresting officer's "personal knowledge" as described in case law, unfortunately, skews We agree with the respondent that the petitioner did not timely object to the irregularity of his
from the exacting requirements of Section 5, Rule 113. It is settled that "reliable information" arrest before his arraignment as required by the Rules. In addition, he actively participated in
alone - even if it was a product of well-executed surveillance operations - is not sufficient to the trial of the case. As a result, the petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction
justify a warrantless arrest. It is further required that the accused performs some overt act of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest.
that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense,35 which, as already discussed, is missing in the instant case. However, this waiver to question an illegal arrest only affects the jurisdiction of the
court over his person. It is well-settled that a waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest
In People v. Villareal,36 the Court highlighted the importance of the "personal knowledge" does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an
requirement by elucidating that:37 illegal warrantless arrest.
To interpret "personal knowledge" as referring to a person's reputation or past criminal
citations would create a dangerous precedent and unnecessarily stretch the authority and Since the shabu was seized during an illegal arrest, its inadmissibility as evidence precludes
power of police officers to effect warrantless arrests based solely on knowledge of a person's conviction and justifies the acquittal of the petitioner.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
previous criminal infractions, rendering nugatory the rigorous requisites laid out under Section
All told, since the shabu purportedly seized from Sindac constitutes inadmissible evidence in
5[,] Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure].
violation of Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, and given that the
confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court finds Sindac's G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006
conviction to be improper and therefore, acquits him.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 26, 2015 and the Resolution JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON, Petitioners,
dated September 18, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 35413 are vs.
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Elmer G. Sindac alias "Tamer" VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent.
is ACQUITTED for violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The Director of
the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is being
lawfully held for any other reason.
DECISION

SO ORDERED. chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the 18 December 2002 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67770
and its 12 June 2003 Resolution denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration. The
dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad to have acted

with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed Orders, the instant petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby
GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE, and it is hereby ordered:

1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated September 21,
2001, Joint Order dated October 16, 2001 and Joint Order dated November 14,
2001 dismissing the two (2) Informations for Murder, all issued by public
respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad in Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and
36-3524 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
another entered UPHOLDING, AFFIRMING[,] and REINSTATING the Order
dated June 25, 2001 and Joint Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by the then
acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan;

2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered

REINSTATED in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the
Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela; and
 3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED to ISSUE In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the
forthwith Warrants of Arrest for the apprehension of private respondents Jose absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the
"Pempe" Miranda, SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon and ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion
accused Rodel T. Maderal in said Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524. 2 cannot be properly heard by the court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed the
resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of Justice.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently,
Isabela, which were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer he ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda.
Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness He likewise applied this Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21
protection program. September 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the
reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for the inhibition of Judge Anghad,
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño, SPO1 Ferdinand but the motion for reconsideration was denied in a Joint Order dated 16 October 2001
Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and and the prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint Order dated 22 October 2001.
SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City.
On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila prohibition with this Court, with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to
convicted all of the accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua enjoin Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, and seeking to nullify the
except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The Orders and Joint Orders of Judge Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001,
case was appealed to this Court on automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001, 16 October 2001, and 22 October 2001.
acquitted the accused therein on the ground of reasonable doubt.
On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the prayer for
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he a temporary restraining order against Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the
executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo criminal cases. Shortly after the aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint
B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the two Informations for murder against
as the persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao. petitioners. On 19 November 2001, this Court took note of respondent’s cash bond
evidenced by O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued the temporary
restraining order while referring the petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela
the merits.
Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25
June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest
against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in
Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed contempt of
court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary
dismissing the informations for murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred said
investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.
motion to the Court of Appeals in view of the previous referral to it of respondent’s Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 in the
docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the regional trial court of Santiago City,
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to issue warrants of arrest against
the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago herein petitioners, the order of dismissal issued therein having become final and
City, as well as the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 executory.
Maderal. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of this Decision, but the same was
denied in a Resolution dated 12 June 2003. Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over
the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.
Hence, this petition.
The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals with the Court of
The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to this Court the following Appeals’ ruling that:
assignments of error:
[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired
either through compulsory process, such as warrant of arrest, or through his voluntary
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing and appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court. It is only when
setting aside the Joint Order of Judge Anastacio D. Anghad dated August 17, 2001, the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke
September 21, 2001, October 16, 2001 and November 14, 2001 issued in criminal the processes of the court (Pete M. Pico vs. Alfonso V. Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-
cases numbered 36-3523 and 36-3524; and, erred in upholding, affirming and 764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused must first be placed in the custody of the
reinstating the Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by then Acting Presiding Judge law before the court may validly act on his petition for judicial reliefs.3
Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an accused cannot seek any judicial relief
if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court. Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners Miranda,
Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief since they were not yet arrested or
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR otherwise deprived of their liberty at the time they filed their "Urgent Motion to complete
preliminary investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash warrants of arrest."4
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in directing the
reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and 36-3524 in the docket of Active Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that jurisdiction over
Criminal Cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Philippines, the person of the accused is required only in applications for bail. Furthermore,
and in ordering the public respondent to re-issue the warrants of arrest against herein petitioners argue, assuming that such jurisdiction over their person is required before
petitioners. the court can act on their motion to quash the warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction
over their person was already acquired by the court by their filing of the above Urgent
Motion.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the adjudication of under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his
applications for bail, petitioners quote Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera: person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before
arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the
Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire jurisdiction jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such
over the person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief. The outright as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. 11 Being in the
dismissal of the case even before the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own
accused is authorized under Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. 12 Custody of the
Procedure and the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado vs. law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to,
Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the case was dismissed on motion of the accused for lack of detention.
probable cause without the accused having been arrested. In Paul Roberts vs. Court of
Appeals (254 SCRA 307), the Court was ordered to hold the issuance of a warrant of The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 13 cited by the Court of Appeals should
arrest in abeyance pending review by the Secretary of Justice. And in Lacson vs. not have been separated from the issue in that case, which is the application for
Executive Secretary (301 SCRA 1025), the Court ordered the case transferred from the admission to bail of someone not yet in the custody of the law. The entire paragraph of
Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually ordered the dismissal of the case for lack our pronouncement in Pico reads:
of probable cause.6
A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
by their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement, court has no right to invoke the processes of that court. Respondent Judge should have
through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez7: diligently ascertained the whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed had
jurisdiction over the body of the accused before considering the application for bail. 13
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over
his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we
motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have
thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. 15 As we held in the aforecited case of
bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings,
rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by constitutes voluntary appearance.
the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special requirement of the
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and applicant being in the custody of the law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan, 16 we held that "[t]he
jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act purpose of bail is to secure one’s release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to
upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs one who is free. Thus, ‘bail is the security required and given for the release of a
sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the person who is in the custody of law.’" The rationale behind this special rule on bail is
defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.8 Custody of the law is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice wherein the
accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender,9 while jurisdiction over the person accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the
of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. 10 One can be
jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and compliance with the 1. In Allado v. Diokno, 19 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the
requirements therefor. 17 ground of lack of probable cause, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
PACC from enforcing the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein from
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative further proceeding with the case and, instead, to elevate the records to us.
relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of one’s
person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is 2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,20 upon the accused’s Motion to Suspend
precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground
appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground that they filed a Petition for Review with the Department of Justice, we directed
of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for respondent judge therein to cease and desist from further proceeding with the criminal
dismissal are included; 18 (2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the case and to defer the issuance of warrants of arrests against the accused.
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash
a warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact that failure to file them 3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,21 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for
would constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The certiorari on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan, we
third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court process forcing directed the Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court
the submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash even before the issuance of the warrants of arrest.
a warrant of arrest.
We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in applications
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the for bail are not present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest. If we allow the
person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading granting of bail to persons not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many
seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of persons who can afford the bail will remain at large, and could elude being held to
the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases answer for the commission of the offense if ever he is proven guilty. On the other hand,
involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even if we allow the quashal of warrants of arrest to persons not in the custody of the law, it
though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a would be very rare that a person not genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot-
person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit free. This is because it is the same judge who issued the warrant of arrest who will
himself to the custody of the law. decide whether or not he followed the Constitution in his determination of probable
cause, and he can easily deny the motion to quash if he really did find probable cause
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., after personally examining the records of the case.
the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon
seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official functions, the warrant
the custody of the law. The following cases best illustrate this point, where we granted continues in force and effect until it is quashed and therefore can still be enforced on
various reliefs to accused who were not in the custody of the law, but were deemed to any day and at any time of the day and night.22 Furthermore, the continued absence of
have placed their persons under the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of these the accused can be taken against him in the determination of probable cause, since
cases involve the application for bail, nor a motion to quash an information due to lack flight is indicative of guilt.
of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest:
In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise In Webb v. de Leon,25 we held that the petitioners therein cannot assail as premature
incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom before asserting it. Human rights the filing of the information in court against them on the ground that they still have the
enjoy a higher preference in the hierarchy of rights than property rights,23 demanding right to appeal the adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice.
that due process in the deprivation of liberty must come before its taking and not after. Similarly, the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners herein should not have
been quashed as premature on the same ground.
Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for review with the
Secretary of Justice and based on doubts engendered by the political climate The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the warrant of arrest is
constitutes grave abuse of discretion. in order if true: violation of the Constitution. Hence, Judge Anghad asked and resolved
the question:
We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions of Judge
Anghad. Judge Anghad seemed a little too eager of dismissing the criminal cases In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere to the above-quoted
against the petitioners. First, he quashed the standing warrant of arrest issued by his constitutional proscription, which is Sec. 2, Article III Bill of Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule
predecessor because of a subsequently filed appeal to the Secretary of Justice, and 112, Rules of Criminal Procedure and to the above-cited decisional cases? To this
because of his doubts on the existence of probable cause due to the political climate in query or issue, after a deep perusal of the arguments raised, this Court, through [its]
the city. Second, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutor’s resolution, he regular Presiding Judge, finds merit in the contention of herein accused-movant, Jose
dismissed the criminal cases on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case "Pempe" Miranda.26
with different accused, doing so two days after this Court resolved to issue a temporary
restraining order against further proceeding with the case. Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the Constitution as having been
violated by Judge Tumaliuan:
After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner Miranda
appealed the assistant prosecutor’s resolution before the Secretary of Justice. Judge Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the warrant of arrest on the basis of effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
said appeal. According to Judge Anghad, "x x x prudence dictates (that) and because purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
of comity, a deferment of the proceedings is but proper."24 except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to charge Judge produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the warrants to be seized.27
of arrest against petitioners just because the petitioners might, in the future, appeal the
assistant prosecutor’s resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But even if the petition for However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including the supporting
review was filed before the issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the evidence to the resolution of the prosecutor in his determination of probable cause, we
pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutor’s resolution is not a ground to find that Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion.
quash the warrants of arrest.
According to petitioners:
In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the arrest of the petitioners 8. Information dated 22 June 2001;
is apparent from the face of the order itself, which clearly stated that the determination
of probable cause was based on the certification, under oath, of the fiscal and not on a 9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; and
separate determination personally made by the Judge. No presumption of regularity
could be drawn from the order since it expressly and clearly showed that it was based 10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao and Vicente Buazon.
only on the fiscal’s certification.28
Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no violation on the part of Judge
Petitioners’ claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuan’s Joint Order contains no such indication Tumaliuan of Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution. Judge Anghad, however, focused
that he relied solely on the prosecutor’s certification. The Joint Order even indicated the on the substantive part of said section, i.e., the existence of probable cause. In failing
contrary: to find probable cause, Judge Anghad ruled that the confession of SPO2 Maderal is
incredible for the following reasons: (1) it was given after almost two years in the
Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor, the Court proceeded custody of the National Bureau of Investigation; (2) it was given by someone who
to determine the existence of a probable cause by personally evaluating the records x x rendered himself untrustworthy for being a fugitive for five years; (3) it was given in
x.[29] exchange for an obvious reward of discharge from the information; and (4) it was given
during the election period amidst a "politically charged scenario where "Santiago City
The records of the case show that the prosecutor’s certification was accompanied by voters were pitted against each other along the lines of the Miranda camp on one side
supporting documents, following the requirement under Lim, Sr. v. Felix30 and People v. and former City Mayor Amelita S. Navarro, and allegedly that of DENR Secretary
Inting.31 The supporting documents are the following: Heherson Alvarez on the other."32

1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes; We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found no reason to disturb
the findings of probable cause of Judge Tumaliuan.
2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez;
It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of a witness is not
3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon; within the province of the determination of probable cause. As we held in Webb33:

4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C. Miranda and A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely
Reynaldo de la Cruz; than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable
cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on
5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio; evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States, while
probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence
6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41
which would justify x x x conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds over the
in Criminal Case No. 97-160355;
suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.
7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal;
x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no right to twist our
summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial x x x. decision and interpret it to the discredit of SPO2 Maderal, who was still at large when
the evidence of the prosecution in the Leaño case was presented. A decision, even of
Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with this Court, acquitting the accused therein of a crime cannot be the basis of the
different accused constitutes grave abuse of discretion. dismissal of criminal case against different accused for the same crime. The blunder of
Judge Anghad is even more pronounced by the fact that our decision in Leaño was
Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground, among other things, based on reasonable doubt. We never ruled in Leaño that the crime did not happen; we
that there was a petition for review of the assistant prosecutor’s resolution before the just found that there was reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused therein, since
Secretary of Justice. However, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutor’s the prosecution in that case relied on circumstantial evidence, which interestingly is not
resolution, Judge Anghad summarily dismissed the two criminal cases against the even the situation in the criminal cases of the petitioners in the case at bar as there is
petitioners on the basis of the following explanation: here an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. The accused in Leaño furthermore had no motive
to kill respondent Tuliao’s son, whereas petitioners herein had been implicated in the
testimony of respondent Tuliao before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs. Wilfredo Leano, et al., RTC,
Branch 41, Manila, and based from his sworn statements, he pinpointed to Mr. Miranda
– the mastermind and with him and the other police officers as the direct perpetrators, It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of reasonable doubt in Leaño,
the October 9, 2001 Decision of the Supreme Court absolving the five cops of murder, "it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured
certainly makes his sworn Statements a "narration of falsehood and lies" and that statements and therefore the same is without probable value."35 On the contrary, if we
because of the decision acquitting said officers "who were likewise falsely linked by are to permit the use of our decision in Leaño, an acquittal on the ground of reasonable
said Rodel Maderal in his April 27, 2001 statements, it is now beyond doubt that Rodel doubt actually points to the probability of the prosecution’s version of the facts therein.
Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is Such probability of guilt certainly meets the criteria of probable cause.
without probable value." This Court agrees with the defense’s views. Indeed, of what
use is Maderal’s statements when the Supreme Court rejected the prosecution’s We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghad’s dismissal of the informations two days
evidence presented and adduced in Criminal Case No. 97-160355. Rodel Maderal is after we resolved to issue, upon the filing of a bond, a temporary restraining order
supposed to turn state witness in these two (2) cases but with the Supreme Court prohibiting him from further proceeding with the case. The bond was filed the day after
decision adverted to, the probative value of his statements is practically nil. the informations were dismissed. While the dismissal of the case was able to beat the
effectivity date of the temporary restraining order, such abrupt dismissal of the
xxxx informations (days after this Court’s resolve to issue a TRO against Judge Anghad)
creates wild suspicions about the motives of Judge Anghad.
This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused Miranda dated October 18,
2001, praying for the summary dismissal of the two (2) murder charges in view of the Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the reinstatement of the orders
latest decision of the Supreme Court in People of the Philippines vs. Wilfredo Leaño, et set aside by the nullified proceeding.
al., G.R. No. 13886, acquitting the accused therein and in effect disregarding all the
evidence presented by the prosecution in that case. Accordingly, the two (2) In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals did not
informations [for] murder filed against Jose Miranda are ordered dismissed.34 recall or reinstate the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan, but instead
directed Judge Anghad to issue apparently new warrants of arrest.36 According to the
petitioners, it was an error for the Court of Appeals to have done so, without a personal It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order of Judge Anghad dated
determination of probable cause. November 14, 2001 is NOT ONE of those Orders which were assailed in the private
respondent Tuliao’s Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition filed by the
We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of new warrants of private respondent before the Court of Appeals. As carefully enumerated in the first
arrest or merely ordered the reinstatement of the warrants of arrest issued by Judge page of the assailed Decision, only the following Orders issued by Judge Anghad were
Tumaliuan is merely a matter of scrupulous semantics, the slight inaccuracy whereof questioned by private respondent, to wit:
should not be allowed to affect the dispositions on the merits, especially in this case
where the other dispositions of the Court of Appeals point to the other direction. Firstly, 1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;
the Court of Appeals had reinstated the 25 June 2001 Order of Judge
Tumaliuan,37 which issued the warrants of arrest. Secondly, the Court of Appeals 2.) Order dated September 21, 2001;
likewise declared the proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad void. Certainly, the
declaration of nullity of proceedings should be deemed to carry with it the reinstatement 3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; and
of the orders set aside by the nullified proceedings. Judge Anghad’s order quashing the
warrants of arrest had been nullified; therefore those warrants of arrest are henceforth
4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.
deemed unquashed.
Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge Anghad, which
Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the issuance of new warrants of
ultimately dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 is NOT included in the
arrest based on a determination of probable cause, it would have been legally
list of the assailed Order/Joint Orders. Hence, the Court of Appeals should not have
permissible for them to do so. The records of the preliminary investigation had been
passed upon the validity or nullity of the Joint Order of November 14, 2001.38
available to the Court of Appeals, and are also available to this Court, allowing both the
Court of Appeals and this Court to personally examine the records of the case and not
merely rely on the certification of the prosecutor. As we have ruled in Allado v. Diokno Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliao’s Petition for Certiorari,
and Roberts v. Court of Appeals, the determination of probable cause does not rest on Prohibition and Mandamus was filed not with the Court of Appeals, but with this Court.
a subjective criteria. As we had resolved in those cases to overrule the finding of The Court of Appeals decided the case because we referred the same to them in our
probable cause of the judges therein on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, in the 19 November 2001 Resolution. Such petition was filed on 25 October 2001, around
same vein, we can also overrule the decision of a judge reversing a finding of probable three weeks before the 14 November 2001 Order. Upon receipt of the 14 November
cause, also on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. 2001 Order, however, respondent Tuliao lost no time in filing with this Court a Motion to
Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and
willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order
There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before
dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On 21 November
arraignment
2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals, in view of the previous referral of
respondent Tuliao’s petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals committed
a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No.
Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite Public Repondent in Contempt
36-3524, alleging that the order of dismissal issued therein had become final and
places the 14 November 2001 Order within the issues of the case decided by the Court
executory. According to petitioners:
of Appeals. In claiming that Judge Anghad committed contempt of this Court in issuing the modification that Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 be transferred to
the 14 November 2001 Order, respondent Tuliao had ascribed to Judge Anghad an act and raffled in the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila. In this connection,
much more serious than grave abuse of discretion.
1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge of the RTC of
Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November 2001 Order on the City of Santiago, Isabela, who is directed to effect the transfer of the cases
15 November 2001, antedating it so as to avoid the effects of our 12 November 2001 within ten (10) days after receipt hereof;
Resolution. In said 12 November 2001 Resolution, we resolved to issue a temporary
restraining order enjoining Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal 2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, is likewise
cases upon the respondent Tuliao’s filing of a bond in the amount of P20,000.00. directed to report to this Court compliance hereto within ten (10) days from
Respondent Tuliao had filed the bond on 15 November 2005. transfer of these cases;

While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in contempt, seeing as 3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to raffle the criminal
disobedience to lawful orders of a court and abuse of court processes are cases of cases within ten (10) days from the transfer;
indirect contempt which require the granting of opportunity to be heard on the part of
respondent,39 the prayer to cite public respondent in contempt and for other reliefs just 4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed to report to this
and equitable under the premises should be construed to include a prayer for the Court compliance with the order to raffle within ten (10) days from said
nullification of said 14 November 2001 Order. compliance; and

In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does 5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is directed to act on
not constitute double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused said cases with reasonable dispatch.
has not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case was
dismissed.40
6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue forthwith warrants of
arrest for the apprehension of petitioners Jose C. Miranda, Alberto P. Dalmacio,
As to respondent Tuliao’s prayer (in both the original petition for certiorari as well as in Romeo B. Ocon, and accused Rodel T. Maderal, conformably with the decision
his motion to cite for contempt) to disqualify Judge Anghad from further proceeding with of the Court of Appeals dated 18 December 2002.
the case, we hold that the number of instances of abuse of discretion in this case are
enough to convince us of an apparent bias on the part of Judge Anghad. We further
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August 2003 is hereby
resolve to follow the case of People v. SPO1 Leaño,41 by transferring the venue of
LIFTED. Costs against Petitioners.
Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 to the City of Manila, pursuant to Article
VIII, Section 4, of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18 December 2002 and the
Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED, with MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice