Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

The Realism of Common Sense

Author(s): Daniel Cory
Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 31, No. 14 (Jul. 5, 1934), pp. 373-377
Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2015613
Accessed: 25-06-2016 04:06 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted
digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Journal of Philosophy, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The
Journal of Philosophy

This content downloaded from 159.178.22.27 on Sat, 25 Jun 2016 04:06:45 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 THE REALISM OF COMMON SENSE 373

THE REALISM OF COMMON SENSE1

FOR a long time I pondered over the best way to begin an essay
on the realism of common sense. Since the appearance of
Santayana's Scepticism and Animal Faith, nearly ten years ago, I
have been convinced that the sceptical approach to knowledge has
received its final formulation. There was no use in going over this
perfectly tilled ground again; it was for me no longer arable. I
believe it is true, however, that the process of doubting is one which,
as Descartes says, we have to go through "once in our life." But
this hardly implies that it is necessary for every budding philosopher
to write an initial treatise on the correct method of scepticism. I
realize that the logic of a "solipsism of the present moment," as
enunciated by Santayana, has been questioned in various quarters:
and the usual stricture is that essences are abstractions from simple
propositions entertained by even the doubter himself, and there-
fore highly artificial. I will only remark in passing that it seems
to me that the English philosophic mentality is inclined to be too
verbal, and betrays an inveterate impotence to get behind the super-
ficial network of statements to a level of pure intuition or feeling.
Most of us are incapable, probably, of any sustained depth of con-
templation. For better or worse, then, I accept solipsism as the
logical outcome of any mentalistic type of philosophy that is hon-
estly carried out. As a critic of the malicious tendencies in the his-
tory of philosophy, I consider that Santayana is quite incomparable.
The other objection to an initial scepticism of such a relentless
order is somewhat more difficult to express. Even if the logic of
solipsism is admitted to be flawless, it is felt that the morale of a
subsequent system of philosophy is weakened. After a philosopher
has almost committed intellectual suicide at the outset, it is a lonely
task to work slowly uphill into the lost air of an "animal faith."
Ile never seems quite to recover from the shock of solipsism: a taint
of suspicion hangs about his most sanguine later assumptions. On
the other hand, however, we all know that dogmatism and unana-
lyzed presuppositions are bad traits in any system of philosophy;
and the thorough scepticism of Santayana has surely had a won-
derful cathartic effect on the egoism of modern thought. An ini-
tial mortification of even the most instinctive claims to knowledge
should not stultify a courageous thinker, but purify the recognized
necessity of his future assertions. He will then be dogmatic with a
differenee.
I avoided the method of scepticism, then, not so much because it
is alien to my way of thinking, as because I felt that Santayana had
1 Being the Introduction to a forthcoming Primer of Epistemology for the
Laity.

This content downloaded from 159.178.22.27 on Sat, 25 Jun 2016 04:06:45 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
374 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

carried it to its logical conclusion; and besides that, the aim and
scope of a simple primer of the realism of common sense hardly calls
for an asce sis, as Pater might put it, of the great historical preten-
sions of the intellect. My desire was merely to clarify the outlook
of common sense: and I felt that a correct theory of knowledge was
the only gateway to a final insight into so many hotly contested
issues, be they of art, science, or religion.
If the question arises, for instance, as to whether a certain work
of art is to be considered as "classic" or "romantic" in treatment,
how can we offer a definite judgment on such a matter unless we
have settled, once and for all, just what is the objective contribu-
tion to our perceptual experience, as distinguished from those ele-
ments of memory and sentiment-the mind's contribution to the
total field of experience? What if the seemingly objective features
of perception are, as a matter of fact, saturated as well in the vaga-
ries of a human point of view? It is all very well to be exhorted
from time to time by some reforming critic "to see the object as
in itself it really is," but did Matthew Arnold, or does Mr. T. S.
Eliot, for example, really know what the true object of perception
is? If so, I might have been spared much labor.
On the other hand, a little epistemology is a dangerous thing.
This is only too painfully obvious in the popular writings of such
otherwise eminent specialists as Sir Arthur Eddington and Sir
James Jeans. As soon as they discover (after a smattering of
physiology and epistemology they have probably imbibed from Lord
Russell) how extremely indirect and symbolic our knowledge of
the external world must be, they almost drop that world out of sight
in their bewilderment; and then, getting alarmed, postulate some
new-fangled mathematical Deity: or growing still hotter, "go mystic
in a big way," as an American might express it. After a great
many years spent in studying the internal constitution of the stars,
they suddenly imagine that these same stars are in their heads
-or if not exactly stars, " pointer-readings. " But why should
Eddington or Jeans have the perfect and transparent perceptual
knowledge of some omniscient Mind, like) the God of Aristotle?
Their whole confusion rests upon a false ideal of what knowing
is; or, in other words, they have no epistemology. The danger of
dabbling in a severe intellectual discipline like epistemology is often
apparent in the adherents of such fads as Christian Science and
Spiritualism. They point out triumphantly how little we really
know about the so-called physical (dreadful word!) universe, as if
that was a good excuse for believing in anything we like to believe
in. On the contrary, however, one should be less confident of trac-
ing accurately the antics of a spook, after discovering how extremely

This content downloaded from 159.178.22.27 on Sat, 25 Jun 2016 04:06:45 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 THE REALISM OF COMMON SENSE 375

symbolic is our perception of such a common object as a chair,

which can be certified by everybody.
I can not remember exactly what it was that first prompted me
to question the homely outlook of the realism of common sense, but
I am certain it was not a bent stick seen in the water, a pink rat,
or any other of the favorite examples that we find in the textbooks
on epistemology. It was most likely a little knowledge of science
that originally made me suspect the nature and extent of our pri-
mary crude experience of the hang of things. For even a cursory
and superficial survey of the reports of science should be sufficient
to convince anyone that the naivete of our ordinary perceptual life
covers a multitude of latent but throbbing events. It is wonderful
to first discover in physics that beneath and beyond the intimate
world of immediate experience lies an alien world of perhaps in-
finite and unfathomable complexity. But if we turn to physiol-
ogy for further enlightenment, our wonder and perplexity is only
increased. For if the experiments of this latter science are trust-
worthy, and I see no reason why common sense should begin by
assuming the contrary, the indubitable physical basis, or ground,
of all our variegated perceptual life is the human brain. At first
blush, this may not appear as such a startling statement; but gradu-
ally the roots of a very great and difficult problem begin to grow
in our minds. I open my eyes in the morning and believe I see
the external surface qualities of a world of things beyond my body.
But if all these obvious qualities are rooted in that region of phys-
ical space that confines a brain, in what conceivable sense, or in
what possible fashion, can I really perceive and kn,ow an external
universe? As an inquisitive adult, then, I must get to the bottom
of this common illusion. And it is the proper task of epistemology,
or the, critioisni of the cognitive presumptions of common sense, to
amend and clarify an unsophisticated or instinctive realism.
For the task of epistemology, as I understand it, is not the same
as that of science. Science does not start by questioning the valid-
ity of sense-perception, memory, testimony, and instinctive induc-
tion: but seeks to enlarge, by the use of powerful instruments, and
a body of statistics, the simple outlook of common sense. It may
dispel many a poetical illusion about the world, and help to exhibit
the necessity of epistemology, but it is in nowise a violation of the
creed of realism: unless it becomes hopelessly subjective, and loses
hold of the very world it proposes to understand. From the angle
of epistemological criticism, I find science rather akin to common
sense in its fundamental attitude towards nature. It is a wonder-
ful amrplification of our primary knowledge of things, but not a
final ratification of our most deep-rooted convictions. And why

This content downloaded from 159.178.22.27 on Sat, 25 Jun 2016 04:06:45 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
376 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

should it be? Unless the professor of physiology can honestly point

to some sorry skull on his table, and trust his memory or the fal-
tering answers of his pupils, of what possible significance is his lec-
ture, so crammed with a detailed knowledge of secret but real things?
I have said that the criticism of the cognitive presumptions of
common sense is the proper task of epistemology. It may be ob-
jected, however, that to speak of presumptions in connection with
common sense is apt to be misleading: it is to read into the simplic-
ity of our instinctive realism a sophistication, or critical conscien-
tiousness, that is not to be found in practice. I confess that it is
only in the light of epistemological criticism one may detect the na-
ture of these various presumptions, or cognitive claims: they are
automatic assertions involved in living under the fire of our envi-
ronment, and are not formulated in what I call "ordinary percep-
tion." But in analysing the realism of common sense, we become
aware of its uncritical complexion and vital presuppositions. It
is a daily fact, for example, that in ordinary perception I presume
automatically that I intuit the external surface qualities of physi-
cal objects: but if the reports of physics and physiology are not
to be completely ignored, this is obviously a kind of practical illu-
sion on my part. Again, if I turn on the hot-water tap in my
bathroom, I seldom stop to wonder if the water will be really hot;
or, worse yet, if it will flow at all. In this most elementary case
of instinctive induction, however, a less critical person than myself
may detect the possibility of a kind of latent cognitive presump-
tion: the water in an hotel is not always hot, and it has been known
not to run sometimes. So in most cases of memory or anticipation,
I do not initially question the validity of what I remember or ex-
pect to happen: there is a spontaneous or instinctive claim to know
some object in the past or future. But the experience of living
proves that memory and anticipation are notoriously fallible.
From. the standpoint of an unformulated and naive realism,
then, the valtidity of our perception of things, of memory, of cer-
tain kinds of testimony, and instinctive induction, are simply as-
sumed. But, as a matter of fact, none of these four popular topics
of epistemology have more than this humble physiological sanction:
they have no backing of a more absolute or infallible nature. It
is our duty, however, in epistemology, to exhibit and confirm (at
least, pragmatically) the living necessity for the cognitive presump-
tions of common sense. They would never have arisen and per-
plexed the minds of philosophers, save for the natural exigences of
life itself. But a scrupulous critic of knowledge, with an eye to a
certain weakness of the senses, and the poetical simplicity of com-
mon sense, may legitimately hold that every instance of sense-per-

This content downloaded from 159.178.22.27 on Sat, 25 Jun 2016 04:06:45 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 GERMAN CRITICS OF PHENOMENOLOGY 377

ception, memory, testimony, and induction, is a kind of latent pre-

sumption-an unconscious taking for granted of some bit of knowl-
edge about the world. And a thorough discipline in scepticism will
only reinforce and purify his more substantial reasons for holding
with Santayana that all knowledge is, to a disenchanted and candid
spirit, a matter of "animal faith."
But the persistent because instinctive presumption to know the
things of this world, and the ways they hang together, will remain
the backbone of the realism of common sense. Its fundamental out-
look is healthy, practical, and roughly reliable; but under the search-
light of epistemology, impossibly naive. Common sense, then, for a
critic of knowledge, has a strong side and a weak side, is partly cor-
rect and partly misleading. The confident stubborn claim of the
healthy mind to know this world can not be avoided or denied in the
long run; it may be suspended by doubt, or error, or the pathetic
brevity of an individual intellect; it can certainly be instructed and
formulated by science and epistemology: but its masculine vitality
will remain triumphant when the dust of our last analysis has blown
away.
DANIEL CORY.
BOURNEMOUTH, ENGLAND.

SOME RECENT GERMAN CRITICS OF PHENOMENOLOGY'

ENGLISH criticism of Husserl and the phenomenological move-

ment has been very slow to appear, but German philosophers
have shown no such reticence. Almost from the very start of his
philosophical career Husserl has had to contend with criticism in
one form or another. He has had occasion to complain at times
that his opponents have misunderstood his position. He regretted,
for instance, that a man of Kiilpe's ability should fail to understand
his doctrine of categorial intuition: and yet his career can largely be
1 Der phinomenologische Idealismus Husserls. T. CEms. (Latvijas Uni-
versitates raksti. Acta Universitatis Latviensis, v. 19.) Riga: Walters und
Rapa. 1928. Pp. 251-442.
Hlusserls Phinomenologie und Schuppes Logi7; ein Beitrag zur Kritik des
intuitionistischen Ontologismus in der Immanenzidee. R. ZociEn. Miunehen:
E. Reinhardt. 1932. Pp. 280.
Von Husserl zu Heidegger; Kritik der phinomenologischen Philosophie.
J. KRAFT. Leipzig: H. Buske. 1932. Pp. 124.
Husserls vor-phinomenologische Philosophie; mit einer monographischen
Bibliographie Edmund Husserl. W. ILLEMANN. (Studien und Bibliographien
zur Gegenwartsphilosophie.) Leipzig: S. Hirzel. 1932. Pp. viii + 87.
Kritik der Transzendental-Phinomenologie Husserls; erster Teil einer
Kritik der Gegenwartsphitosophie; mit einem Nachtrag zur monographisehen
Bibliographie Edmund Husserl. F. WEIDAUER. (Studien und Bibliographien
zur Gegenwartsphilosophie.) Leipzig: S. Hirzel. 1933. Pp. xx + 132.

This content downloaded from 159.178.22.27 on Sat, 25 Jun 2016 04:06:45 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms