Ladder Logic
Ladder Logic
Ladder Logic
"Ladder" diagrams
Ladder diagrams are specialized schematics commonly used to document industrial control logic systems.
They are called "ladder" diagrams because they resemble a ladder, with two vertical rails (supply power) and
as many "rungs" (horizontal lines) as there are control circuits to represent. If we wanted to draw a simple
ladder diagram showing a lamp that is controlled by a hand switch, it would look like this:
The "L1" and "L2" designations refer to the two poles of a 120 VAC supply, unless otherwise noted. L1 is the
"hot" conductor, and L2 is the grounded ("neutral") conductor. These designations have nothing to do with
inductors, just to make things confusing. The actual transformer or generator supplying power to this circuit is
omitted for simplicity. In reality, the circuit looks something like this:
Typically in industrial relay logic circuits, but not always, the operating voltage for the switch contacts and relay
coils will be 120 volts AC. Lower voltage AC and even DC systems are sometimes built and documented
according to "ladder" diagrams:
So long as the switch contacts and relay coils are all adequately rated, it really doesn't matter what level of
voltage is chosen for the system to operate with.
Note the number "1" on the wire between the switch and the lamp. In the real world, that wire would be labeled
with that number, using heat-shrink or adhesive tags, wherever it was convenient to identify. Wires leading to
the switch would be labeled "L1" and "1," respectively. Wires leading to the lamp would be labeled "1" and "L2,"
respectively. These wire numbers make assembly and maintenance very easy. Each conductor has its own
unique wire number for the control system that it's used in. Wire numbers do not change at any junction or
node, even if wire size, color, or length changes going into or out of a connection point. Of course, it is
preferable to maintain consistent wire colors, but this is not always practical. What matters is that any one,
electrically continuous point in a control circuit possesses the same wire number. Take this circuit section, for
example, with wire #25 as a single, electrically continuous point threading to many different devices:
In ladder diagrams, the load device (lamp, relay coil, solenoid coil, etc.) is almost always drawn at the right-
hand side of the rung. While it doesn't matter electrically where the relay coil is located within the rung,
it does matter which end of the ladder's power supply is grounded, for reliable operation.
Take for instance this circuit:
Here, the lamp (load) is located on the right-hand side of the rung, and so is the ground connection for the
power source. This is no accident or coincidence; rather, it is a purposeful element of good design practice.
Suppose that wire #1 were to accidently come in contact with ground, the insulation of that wire having been
rubbed off so that the bare conductor came in contact with grounded, metal conduit. Our circuit would now
function like this:
With both sides of the lamp connected to ground, the lamp will be "shorted out" and unable to receive power to
light up. If the switch were to close, there would be a short-circuit, immediately blowing the fuse.
However, consider what would happen to the circuit with the same fault (wire #1 coming in contact with
ground), except this time we'll swap the positions of switch and fuse (L2 is still grounded):
This time the accidental grounding of wire #1 will force power to the lamp while the switch will have no effect. It
is much safer to have a system that blows a fuse in the event of a ground fault than to have a system that
uncontrollably energizes lamps, relays, or solenoids in the event of the same fault. For this reason, the load(s)
must always be located nearest the grounded power conductor in the ladder diagram.
REVIEW:
Ladder diagrams (sometimes called "ladder logic") are a type of electrical notation and symbology
frequently used to illustrate how electromechanical switches and relays are interconnected.
The two vertical lines are called "rails" and attach to opposite poles of a power supply, usually 120 volts
AC. L1 designates the "hot" AC wire and L2 the "neutral" (grounded) conductor.
Horizontal lines in a ladder diagram are called "rungs," each one representing a unique parallel circuit
branch between the poles of the power supply.
Typically, wires in control systems are marked with numbers and/or letters for identification. The rule is,
all permanently connected (electrically common) points must bear the same label.
Now, the lamp will come on if either contact A or contact B is actuated, because all it takes for the lamp to be
energized is to have at least one path for current from wire L1 to wire 1. What we have is a simple OR logic
function, implemented with nothing more than contacts and a lamp.
We can mimic the AND logic function by wiring the two contacts in series instead of parallel:
Now, the lamp energizes only if contact A and contact B are simultaneously actuated. A path exists for current
from wire L1 to the lamp (wire 2) if and only if both switch contacts are closed.
The logical inversion, or NOT, function can be performed on a contact input simply by using a normally-closed
contact instead of a normally-open contact:
Now, the lamp energizes if the contact is not actuated, and de-energizes when the contact is actuated.
If we take our OR function and invert each "input" through the use of normally-closed contacts, we will end up
with a NAND function. In a special branch of mathematics known asBoolean algebra, this effect of gate
function identity changing with the inversion of input signals is described by DeMorgan's Theorem, a subject to
be explored in more detail in a later chapter.
The lamp will be energized if either contact is unactuated. It will go out only if both contacts are actuated
simultaneously.
Likewise, if we take our AND function and invert each "input" through the use of normally-closed contacts, we
will end up with a NOR function:
A pattern quickly reveals itself when ladder circuits are compared with their logic gate counterparts:
Parallel contacts are equivalent to an OR gate.
Series contacts are equivalent to an AND gate.
Normally-closed contacts are equivalent to a NOT gate (inverter).
We can build combinational logic functions by grouping contacts in series-parallel arrangements, as well. In the
following example, we have an Exclusive-OR function built from a combination of AND, OR, and inverter (NOT)
gates:
The top rung (NC contact A in series with NO contact B) is the equivalent of the top NOT/AND gate
combination. The bottom rung (NO contact A in series with NC contact B) is the equivalent of the bottom
NOT/AND gate combination. The parallel connection between the two rungs at wire number 2 forms the
equivalent of the OR gate, in allowing either rung 1 orrung 2 to energize the lamp.
To make the Exclusive-OR function, we had to use two contacts per input: one for direct input and the other for
"inverted" input. The two "A" contacts are physically actuated by the same mechanism, as are the two "B"
contacts. The common association between contacts is denoted by the label of the contact. There is no limit to
how many contacts per switch can be represented in a ladder diagram, as each new contact on any switch or
relay (either normally-open or normally-closed) used in the diagram is simply marked with the same label.
Sometimes, multiple contacts on a single switch (or relay) are designated by a compound labels, such as "A-1"
and "A-2" instead of two "A" labels. This may be especially useful if you want to specifically designate which
set of contacts on each switch or relay is being used for which part of a circuit. For simplicity's sake, I'll refrain
from such elaborate labeling in this lesson. If you see a common label for multiple contacts, you know those
contacts are all actuated by the same mechanism.
If we wish to invert the output of any switch-generated logic function, we must use a relay with a normally-
closed contact. For instance, if we want to energize a load based on the inverse, or NOT, of a normally-open
contact, we could do this:
We will call the relay, "control relay 1," or CR1. When the coil of CR1 (symbolized with the pair of parentheses
on the first rung) is energized, the contact on the second rung opens, thus de-energizing the lamp. From switch
A to the coil of CR1, the logic function is noninverted. The normally-closed contact actuated by relay coil
CR1 provides a logical inverter function to drive the lamp opposite that of the switch's actuation status.
Applying this inversion strategy to one of our inverted-input functions created earlier, such as the OR-to-NAND,
we can invert the output with a relay to create a noninverted function:
From the switches to the coil of CR1, the logical function is that of a NAND gate. CR1's normally-closed contact
provides one final inversion to turn the NAND function into an AND function.
REVIEW:
Parallel contacts are logically equivalent to an OR gate.
Series contacts are logically equivalent to an AND gate.
Normally closed (N.C.) contacts are logically equivalent to a NOT gate.
A relay must be used to invert the output of a logic gate function, while simple normally-closed switch
contacts are sufficient to represent inverted gate inputs.
If all permissive conditions are met, CR1 will energize and the green lamp will be lit. In real life, more than just a
green lamp would be energized: usually a control relay or fuel valve solenoid would be placed in that rung of
the circuit to be energized when all the permissive contacts were "good:" that is, all closed. If any one of the
permissive conditions are not met, the series string of switch contacts will be broken, CR2 will de-energize, and
the red lamp will light.
Note that the high fuel pressure contact is normally-closed. This is because we want the switch contact to open
if the fuel pressure gets too high. Since the "normal" condition of any pressure switch is when zero (low)
pressure is being applied to it, and we want this switch to open with excessive (high) pressure, we must
choose a switch that is closed in its normal state.
Another practical application of relay logic is in control systems where we want to ensure two incompatible
events cannot occur at the same time. An example of this is in reversible motor control, where two motor
contactors are wired to switch polarity (or phase sequence) to an electric motor, and we don't want the forward
and reverse contactors energized simultaneously:
When contactor M1 is energized, the 3 phases (A, B, and C) are connected directly to terminals 1, 2, and 3 of
the motor, respectively. However, when contactor M2 is energized, phases A and B are reversed, A going to
motor terminal 2 and B going to motor terminal 1. This reversal of phase wires results in the motor spinning the
opposite direction. Let's examine the control circuit for these two contactors:
Take note of the normally-closed "OL" contact, which is the thermal overload contact activated by the "heater"
elements wired in series with each phase of the AC motor. If the heaters get too hot, the contact will change
from its normal (closed) state to being open, which will prevent either contactor from energizing.
This control system will work fine, so long as no one pushes both buttons at the same time. If someone were to
do that, phases A and B would be short-circuited together by virtue of the fact that contactor M1 sends phases
A and B straight to the motor and contactor M2 reverses them; phase A would be shorted to phase B and visa-
versa. Obviously, this is a bad control system design!
To prevent this occurrence from happening, we can design the circuit so that the energization of one contactor
prevents the energization of the other. This is called interlocking, and it is accomplished through the use of
auxiliary contacts on each contactor, as such:
Now, when M1 is energized, the normally-closed auxiliary contact on the second rung will be open, thus
preventing M2 from being energized, even if the "Reverse" pushbutton is actuated. Likewise, M1's energization
is prevented when M2 is energized. Note, as well, how additional wire numbers (4 and 5) were added to reflect
the wiring changes.
It should be noted that this is not the only way to interlock contactors to prevent a short-circuit condition. Some
contactors come equipped with the option of a mechanical interlock: a lever joining the armatures of two
contactors together so that they are physically prevented from simultaneous closure. For additional safety,
electrical interlocks may still be used, and due to the simplicity of the circuit there is no good reason not to
employ them in addition to mechanical interlocks.
REVIEW:
Switch contacts installed in a rung of ladder logic designed to interrupt a circuit if certain physical
conditions are not met are called permissive contacts, because the system requires permission from
these inputs to activate.
Switch contacts designed to prevent a control system from taking two incompatible actions at once
(such as powering an electric motor forward and backward simultaneously) are called interlocks.
Now, if either forward or reverse circuits are latched, they may be "unlatched" by momentarily pressing the
"Stop" pushbutton, which will open either forward or reverse circuit, de-energizing the energized contactor, and
returning the seal-in contact to its normal (open) state. The "Stop" switch, having normally-closed contacts, will
conduct power to either forward or reverse circuits when released.
So far, so good. Let's consider another practical aspect of our motor control scheme before we quit adding to
it. If our hypothetical motor turned a mechanical load with a lot of momentum, such as a large air fan, the motor
might continue to coast for a substantial amount of time after the stop button had been pressed. This could be
problematic if an operator were to try to reverse the motor direction without waiting for the fan to stop turning. If
the fan was still coasting forward and the "Reverse" pushbutton was pressed, the motor would struggle to
overcome that inertia of the large fan as it tried to begin turning in reverse, drawing excessive current and
potentially reducing the life of the motor, drive mechanisms, and fan. What we might like to have is some kind
of a time-delay function in this motor control system to prevent such a premature startup from happening.
Let's begin by adding a couple of time-delay relay coils, one in parallel with each motor contactor coil. If we use
contacts that delay returning to their normal state, these relays will provide us a "memory" of which direction
the motor was last powered to turn. What we want each time-delay contact to do is to open the starting-switch
leg of the opposite rotation circuit for several seconds, while the fan coasts to a halt.
If the motor has been running in the forward direction, both M1 and TD1 will have been energized. This being
the case, the normally-closed, timed-closed contact of TD1 between wires 8 and 5 will have immediately
opened the moment TD1 was energized. When the stop button is pressed, contact TD1 waits for the specified
amount of time before returning to its normally-closed state, thus holding the reverse pushbutton circuit open
for the duration so M2 can't be energized. When TD1 times out, the contact will close and the circuit will allow
M2 to be energized, if the reverse pushbutton is pressed. In like manner, TD2 will prevent the "Forward"
pushbutton from energizing M1 until the prescribed time delay after M2 (and TD2) have been de-energized.
The careful observer will notice that the time-interlocking functions of TD1 and TD2 render the M1 and
M2 interlocking contacts redundant. We can get rid of auxiliary contacts M1 and M2 for interlocks and just use
TD1 and TD2's contacts, since they immediately open when their respective relay coils are energized, thus
"locking out" one contactor if the other is energized. Each time delay relay will serve a dual purpose:
preventing the other contactor from energizing while the motor is running, and preventing the same contactor
from energizing until a prescribed time after motor shutdown. The resulting circuit has the advantage of being
simpler than the previous example:
REVIEW:
Motor contactor (or "starter") coils are typically designated by the letter "M" in ladder logic diagrams.
Continuous motor operation with a momentary "start" switch is possible if a normally-open "seal-in"
contact from the contactor is connected in parallel with the start switch, so that once the contactor is
energized it maintains power to itself and keeps itself "latched" on.
Time delay relays are commonly used in large motor control circuits to prevent the motor from being
started (or reversed) until a certain amount of time has elapsed from an event.
Fail-safe design
Logic circuits, whether comprised of electromechanical relays or solid-state gates, can be built in many
different ways to perform the same functions. There is usually no one "correct" way to design a complex logic
circuit, but there are usually ways that are better than others.
In control systems, safety is (or at least should be) an important design priority. If there are multiple ways in
which a digital control circuit can be designed to perform a task, and one of those ways happens to hold certain
advantages in safety over the others, then that design is the better one to choose.
Let's take a look at a simple system and consider how it might be implemented in relay logic. Suppose that a
large laboratory or industrial building is to be equipped with a fire alarm system, activated by any one of
several latching switches installed throughout the facility. The system should work so that the alarm siren will
energize if any one of the switches is actuated. At first glance it seems as though the relay logic should be
incredibly simple: just use normally-open switch contacts and connect them all in parallel with each other:
Essentially, this is the OR logic function implemented with four switch inputs. We could expand this circuit to
include any number of switch inputs, each new switch being added to the parallel network, but I'll limit it to four
in this example to keep things simple. At any rate, it is an elementary system and there seems to be little
possibility of trouble.
Except in the event of a wiring failure, that is. The nature of electric circuits is such that "open" failures (open
switch contacts, broken wire connections, open relay coils, blown fuses, etc.) are statistically more likely to
occur than any other type of failure. With that in mind, it makes sense to engineer a circuit to be as tolerant as
possible to such a failure. Let's suppose that a wire connection for Switch #2 were to fail open:
If this failure were to occur, the result would be that Switch #2 would no longer energize the siren if actuated.
This, obviously, is not good in a fire alarm system. Unless the system were regularly tested (a good idea
anyway), no one would know there was a problem until someone tried to use that switch in an emergency.
What if the system were re-engineered so as to sound the alarm in the event of an open failure? That way, a
failure in the wiring would result in a false alarm, a scenario much more preferable than that of having a switch
silently fail and not function when needed. In order to achieve this design goal, we would have to re-wire the
switches so that an open contact sounded the alarm, rather than a closed contact. That being the case, the
switches will have to be normally-closed and in series with each other, powering a relay coil which then
activates a normally-closed contact for the siren:
When all switches are unactuated (the regular operating state of this system), relay CR1 will be energized, thus
keeping contact CR1 open, preventing the siren from being powered. However, if any of the switches are
actuated, relay CR1 will de-energize, closing contact CR1 and sounding the alarm. Also, if there is a break in
the wiring anywhere in the top rung of the circuit, the alarm will sound. When it is discovered that the alarm is
false, the workers in the facility will know that something failed in the alarm system and that it needs to be
repaired.
Granted, the circuit is more complex than it was before the addition of the control relay, and the system could
still fail in the "silent" mode with a broken connection in the bottom rung, but it's still a safer design than the
original circuit, and thus preferable from the standpoint of safety.
This design of circuit is referred to as fail-safe, due to its intended design to default to the safest mode in the
event of a common failure such as a broken connection in the switch wiring. Fail-safe design always starts with
an assumption as to the most likely kind of wiring or component failure, and then tries to configure things so
that such a failure will cause the circuit to act in the safest way, the "safest way" being determined by the
physical characteristics of the process.
Take for example an electrically-actuated (solenoid) valve for turning on cooling water to a machine.
Energizing the solenoid coil will move an armature which then either opens or closes the valve mechanism,
depending on what kind of valve we specify. A spring will return the valve to its "normal" position when the
solenoid is de-energized. We already know that an open failure in the wiring or solenoid coil is more likely than
a short or any other type of failure, so we should design this system to be in its safest mode with the solenoid
de-energized.
If it's cooling water we're controlling with this valve, chances are it is safer to have the cooling water turn on in
the event of a failure than to shut off, the consequences of a machine running without coolant usually being
severe. This means we should specify a valve that turns on (opens up) when de-energized and turns off
(closes down) when energized. This may seem "backwards" to have the valve set up this way, but it will make
for a safer system in the end.
One interesting application of fail-safe design is in the power generation and distribution industry, where large
circuit breakers need to be opened and closed by electrical control signals from protective relays. If a 50/51
relay (instantaneous and time overcurrent) is going to command a circuit breaker to trip (open) in the event of
excessive current, should we design it so that the relay closes a switch contact to send a "trip" signal to the
breaker, or opens a switch contact to interrupt a regularly "on" signal to initiate a breaker trip? We know that an
open connection will be the most likely to occur, but what is the safest state of the system: breaker open or
breaker closed?
At first, it would seem that it would be safer to have a large circuit breaker trip (open up and shut off power) in
the event of an open fault in the protective relay control circuit, just like we had the fire alarm system default to
an alarm state with any switch or wiring failure. However, things are not so simple in the world of high power.
To have a large circuit breaker indiscriminately trip open is no small matter, especially when customers are
depending on the continued supply of electric power to supply hospitals, telecommunications systems, water
treatment systems, and other important infrastructures. For this reason, power system engineers have
generally agreed to design protective relay circuits to output a closedcontact signal (power applied) to open
large circuit breakers, meaning that any open failure in the control wiring will go unnoticed, simply leaving the
breaker in the status quo position.
Is this an ideal situation? Of course not. If a protective relay detects an overcurrent condition while the control
wiring is failed open, it will not be able to trip open the circuit breaker. Like the first fire alarm system design,
the "silent" failure will be evident only when the system is needed. However, to engineer the control circuitry
the other way -- so that any open failure would immediately shut the circuit breaker off, potentially blacking out
large potions of the power grid -- really isn't a better alternative.
An entire book could be written on the principles and practices of good fail-safe system design. At least here,
you know a couple of the fundamentals: that wiring tends to fail open more often than shorted, and that an
electrical control system's (open) failure mode should be such that it indicates and/or actuates the real-life
process in the safest alternative mode. These fundamental principles extend to non-electrical systems as well:
identify the most common mode of failure, then engineer the system so that the probable failure mode places
the system in the safest condition.
REVIEW:
The goal of fail-safe design is to make a control system as tolerant as possible to likely wiring or
component failures.
The most common type of wiring and component failure is an "open" circuit, or broken connection.
Therefore, a fail-safe system should be designed to default to its safest mode of operation in the case
of an open circuit.
Inside the PLC housing, connected between each input terminal and the Common terminal, is an opto-isolator
device (Light-Emitting Diode) that provides an electrically isolated "high" logic signal to the computer's circuitry
(a photo-transistor interprets the LED's light) when there is 120 VAC power applied between the respective
input terminal and the Common terminal. An indicating LED on the front panel of the PLC gives visual
indication of an "energized" input:
Output signals are generated by the PLC's computer circuitry activating a switching device (transistor, TRIAC,
or even an electromechanical relay), connecting the "Source" terminal to any of the "Y-" labeled output
terminals. The "Source" terminal, correspondingly, is usually connected to the L1 side of the 120 VAC power
source. As with each input, an indicating LED on the front panel of the PLC gives visual indication of an
"energized" output:
In this way, the PLC is able to interface with real-world devices such as switches and solenoids.
The actual logic of the control system is established inside the PLC by means of a computer program. This
program dictates which output gets energized under which input conditions. Although the program itself
appears to be a ladder logic diagram, with switch and relay symbols, there are no actual switch contacts or
relay coils operating inside the PLC to create the logical relationships between input and output. These
are imaginary contacts and coils, if you will. The program is entered and viewed via a personal computer
connected to the PLC's programming port.
Consider the following circuit and PLC program:
When the pushbutton switch is unactuated (unpressed), no power is sent to the X1 input of the PLC. Following
the program, which shows a normally-open X1 contact in series with a Y1 coil, no "power" will be sent to the
Y1 coil. Thus, the PLC's Y1 output remains de-energized, and the indicator lamp connected to it remains dark.
If the pushbutton switch is pressed, however, power will be sent to the PLC's X1 input. Any and all X1 contacts
appearing in the program will assume the actuated (non-normal) state, as though they were relay contacts
actuated by the energizing of a relay coil named "X1". In this case, energizing the X1 input will cause the
normally-open X1 contact will "close," sending "power" to the Y1 coil. When the Y1 coil of the program
"energizes," the real Y1 output will become energized, lighting up the lamp connected to it:
It must be understood that the X1 contact, Y1 coil, connecting wires, and "power" appearing in the personal
computer's display are all virtual. They do not exist as real electrical components. They exist as commands in
a computer program -- a piece of software only -- that just happens to resemble a real relay schematic
diagram.
Equally important to understand is that the personal computer used to display and edit the PLC's program is
not necessary for the PLC's continued operation. Once a program has been loaded to the PLC from the
personal computer, the personal computer may be unplugged from the PLC, and the PLC will continue to
follow the programmed commands. I include the personal computer display in these illustrations for your sake
only, in aiding to understand the relationship between real-life conditions (switch closure and lamp status) and
the program's status ("power" through virtual contacts and virtual coils).
The true power and versatility of a PLC is revealed when we want to alter the behavior of a control system.
Since the PLC is a programmable device, we can alter its behavior by changing the commands we give it,
without having to reconfigure the electrical components connected to it. For example, suppose we wanted to
make this switch-and-lamp circuit function in an inverted fashion: push the button to make the lamp turn off,
and release it to make it turn on. The "hardware" solution would require that a normally-closed pushbutton
switch be substituted for the normally-open switch currently in place. The "software" solution is much easier:
just alter the program so that contact X1 is normally-closed rather than normally-open.
In the following illustration, we have the altered system shown in the state where the pushbutton is unactuated
(not being pressed):
One of the advantages of implementing logical control in software rather than in hardware is that input signals
can be re-used as many times in the program as is necessary. For example, take the following circuit and
program, designed to energize the lamp if at least two of the three pushbutton switches are simultaneously
actuated:
To build an equivalent circuit using electromechanical relays, three relays with two normally-open contacts
each would have to be used, to provide two contacts per input switch. Using a PLC, however, we can program
as many contacts as we wish for each "X" input without adding additional hardware, since each input and each
output is nothing more than a single bit in the PLC's digital memory (either 0 or 1), and can be recalled as
many times as necessary.
Furthermore, since each output in the PLC is nothing more than a bit in its memory as well, we can assign
contacts in a PLC program "actuated" by an output (Y) status. Take for instance this next system, a motor
start-stop control circuit:
The pushbutton switch connected to input X1 serves as the "Start" switch, while the switch connected to input
X2 serves as the "Stop." Another contact in the program, named Y1, uses the output coil status as a seal-in
contact, directly, so that the motor contactor will continue to be energized after the "Start" pushbutton switch is
released. You can see the normally-closed contact X2 appear in a colored block, showing that it is in a closed
("electrically conducting") state.
If we were to press the "Start" button, input X1 would energize, thus "closing" the X1 contact in the program,
sending "power" to the Y1 "coil," energizing the Y1 output and applying 120 volt AC power to the real motor
contactor coil. The parallel Y1 contact will also "close," thus latching the "circuit" in an energized state:
Now, if we release the "Start" pushbutton, the normally-open X1 "contact" will return to its "open" state, but the
motor will continue to run because the Y1 seal-in "contact" continues to provide "continuity" to "power" coil Y1,
thus keeping the Y1 output energized:
To stop the motor, we must momentarily press the "Stop" pushbutton, which will energize the X2 input and
"open" the normally-closed "contact," breaking continuity to the Y1 "coil:"
When the "Stop" pushbutton is released, input X2 will de-energize, returning "contact" X2 to its normal,
"closed" state. The motor, however, will not start again until the "Start" pushbutton is actuated, because the
"seal-in" of Y1 has been lost:
This section on programmable logic controllers illustrates just a small sample of their capabilities. As
computers, PLCs can perform timing functions (for the equivalent of time-delay relays), drum sequencing, and
other advanced functions with far greater accuracy and reliability than what is possible using electromechanical
logic devices. Most PLCs have the capacity for far more than six inputs and six outputs.