EN BANC

[G.R. No. 163556. June 8, 2004.]

CONG. RUY ELIAS C. LOPEZ, petitioner, vs. SENATE OF THE

PHILIPPINES [represented by Franklin Drilon, President of the
Senate], HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et al., respondents.

RESOLUTION

Gentlemen :

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc June 8,
2004.

G.R. No. 163556 — CONG. RUY ELIAS C. LOPEZ v. SENATE OF THE

PHILIPPINES [represented by Franklin Drilon, President of the Senate],
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et al.

Before the Court is a Petition for prohibition and mandamus seeking to nullify
Section 13, Rule VIII of the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress, dated May
28, 2004, creating a Joint Committee which shall preliminarily canvass the votes of
the candidates for President and Vice-President during the May 10, 2004 elections.

At the outset, the Court stresses that it has jurisdiction over the subject matter of
this controversy, because the herein Petition contains sufficient allegations claiming
violations of the Constitution. Basic is the rule that jurisdiction is determined by the
allegations of the initiatory pleading, like the complaint or petition.

However, after careful deliberation on the merits of the Petition and the Comments
filed by Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, Speaker Jose C. De Venecia and the
Office of the Solicitor General, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS the Petition on
the ground that it failed to show that Congress gravely abused its discretion in
creating such Joint Committee.

Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution expressly empowers Congress "to

promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates." In Arroyo v. De Venecia
(277 SCRA 268, August 14, 1997), the Court ruled that it had no power to review
the internal proceedings of Congress, unless there is a clear violation of the
Constitution. Likewise, Santiago v. Guingona, (298 SCRA 756, November 18, 1998)
held that the Court — under the doctrine of separation of powers — has "no
authority to interfere" in the "exclusive realm" of a co-equal branch, absent a
showing of grave abuse of discretion. The Court has no authority to restrict or limit
the exercise of congressional prerogatives granted by the Constitution.

The creation of the Joint Committee does not constitute grave abuse and cannot be
said to have deprived petitioner and the other members of Congress of their
congressional prerogatives, because under the very Rules under attack, the
decisions and final report of the said Committee shall be subject to the approval of
the joint session of both Houses of Congress, voting separately (See Sections 19, 23,
24 and 27 of the Rules).

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

(As above-worded, the foregoing Resolution was approved unanimously, 14 to 0, by

the Court. In addition, individual opinions, copies of which are attached hereto, were
written by Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.; Justice Reynato S. Puno, joined by
Justices Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. who concurs in a
Separate Opinion, and Adolfo S. Azcuna; Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing; Justice
Conchita Carpio-Morales; Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. and Justice Dante O. Tinga.)
DHATcE

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO

Clerk of Court

Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

In his petition for prohibition and mandamus filed on 2 June 2004, Ruy Elias C.
Lopez, Representative representing the 3rd Legislative District of the City of Davao,
asks this Court to declare unconstitutional the Rules of the Joint Public Session of
Congress on Canvassing the Votes Cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential
Candidates in the May 10, 2004 Elections (hereafter, Canvassing Rules), which the
Senate and the House of Representatives, in joint session, approved, after much
debate, on 28 May 2004.

Petitioner alleges that the Canvassing Rules was adopted by both Houses of
Congress with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and that he had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy other than this
petition. He requests the Court to issue a temporary restraining order directing
Respondents to cease and desist from implementing, executing, and/or enforcing
the Canvassing Rules.

In the resolution of 4 June 2004, the Court, by a unanimous vote, denied the
application for a temporary restraining order, and by a vote of 9-4 required
Respondents and the Solicitor General to comment on the petition by 12 noon on
Monday, 7 June 2004. The Senate, the House of Representatives and the Office of
the Solicitor General seasonably filed their separate comments.
The prefatory statement of petitioner summarizes the main arguments found
throughout his petition:

Under our constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed

among three (3) independent branches of government. The very important
and delicate power and authority to open all certificates of canvass of votes
for Presidential and Vice-Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates are
solely and exclusively vested by the Constitution in the President of the
Senate, just as the very important and delicate power and authority to
determine the authenticity and due executions (sic) of all certificates of
canvass and to canvass the votes cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential
Candidates are solely and exclusively vested by the Constitution in the
Congress as one whole body." Any attempt to delegate these powers or a
portion thereof to any other person or entity — whether within or without
the Congress — is unconstitutional on the principle that potestas delegata
non potest delegari. 1

Petitioner thus contends that the Canvassing Rules are unconstitutional because: 1)
It constitutes a delegation of legislative power to a Joint Committee of Congress; 2)
It constitutes an amendment of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution; 3) It
deprives him of his rights and prerogatives as a Member of Congress; and 4) By the
passage of the Canvassing Rules, Congress has neglected to perform an act which
the Constitution specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office.

The arguments of respondents, the Solicitor General, the Senate, and the House of
Representatives, are similar in that they agree that the adoption of the Canvassing
Rules are internal matters of Congress which is beyond this Court's scope of judicial
inquiry. They are likewise unanimous in their argument that there has been no
invalid delegation to the Joint Committee of the Constitutional duties of Congress.

This Court's jurisdiction over the issue raised in this case is founded on Section 1 of
Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that judicial power includes the duty
"to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government". This duty does not do away with the "political question" doctrine. It
only clarifies it by limiting it to its definition laid down in Tañada v. Cuenco. 2 That
case defines political questions as those "which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government." The clarification became necessary because prior to the 1987
Constitution, as long as an act or measure was invoked as involving a political
question, the courts affirmed such invocation rather than risk the separation of
powers. The result, then, was that the legality of an act or measure was likewise
left to the political branch in question. 3

Thus, now plainly stated in the 1987 Constitution, the mere invocation of a political
question does not warrant an immediate or summary dismissal of a case. It falls, as
it always has, within judicial power to determine for itself whether the legality and
the limits of the exercise of a power have been observed and respected.
The contested provisions of the Canvassing Rules pertain to the functions of the
Joint Committee, as follows:

SEC. 13. A Joint Committee shall be created composed of eleven (11)

members from the Senate to be appointed by the President of the Senate
and eleven (11) members from the House of Representatives to be
appointed by the Speaker. The Members of Each House panel shall elect
from among themselves their respective Chairman in the Joint Committee.
The Joint Committee may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in two division of
eleven (11) members each composed of a chairman, five (5) members from
the Senate and five (5) members from the House of Representatives:
Provided, That a member of Congress who is a candidate for President or
Vice-President shall not be eligible for appointment to the Joint Committee.
Each division shall be chaired by a Chairman of the Joint Committee.

The Joint Committee shall, upon determination of the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass, preliminarily canvass the votes of
candidates for the offices of the President and Vice-President.

The Representatives of the province or city whose certificate of canvass is

being canvassed shall be an ex officio member of the Joint Committee,
without voting rights, for the duration of the canvassing of the aforesaid
certificate of canvass.

It is petitioner's position that the formation of a Joint Committee, which determines

the authenticity and due execution of the certificate of canvass of the Presidential
and Vice-Presidential candidates and thereafter canvasses the votes, is a transfer or
surrender to an entity of a duty imposed by the Constitution exclusively upon
Congress as a whole body — that is, "in joint public session assembled." 4
Accordingly, petitioner claims that such transfer violates the principle that a
delegated power cannot again be delegated, 5 potestas delegata non delegari potest.

The source of the duty of Congress to act as the National Board of Canvassers for
the office of the President and Vice-President is in paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII
of the Constitution, which provides:

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified
by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to
the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the
certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty
days after the day of the election, open all certificates in the presence of the
Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the
Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof
in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes. caTESD

It is true that where the Constitution has vested powers in a branch of government
there can be no further delegation of such authority by that branch to any other
body. Originating from the law on agency, the principle has evolved in
Constitutional law as a natural corollary to the separation of governmental powers.
6 Thus, the foundation of the principle of potestas delegata non delegari potest in
Constitutional law lies in the sovereignty that resides in the people from which all
governmental authority emanates. 7 It is invoked as a prohibition against the three
major branches of government — the executive, legislative, or the judiciary — from
transferring the powers and duties conferred by the people upon it to another
branch; neither does it allow any branch to invest in itself or its members the
powers and duties belonging to another. 8

Moreover, there is no distinction as to what kind of power is delegated by the

Constitution. Although the three branches of government each have its general
functions in accordance with the principle of separation of powers, the system of
checks and balances imposes upon each branch — or its members — powers outside
of its usual functions. 9 Thus, even when the legislature is performing a non-
legislative act as a National Board of Canvassers, its inability to delegate such
function to another branch of government remains intact.

In this context, the principle does not apply in this case insofar as no other branch of
government has been tasked with the duties of Congress as a National Board of
Canvassers.

As to whether there has been are invalid delegation of power "within" Congress,
such argument, and the basis of petitioner's discussion, is an imprudent one. From a
cursory reading of the Canvassing Rules, it can readily be seen that there has been
no delegation or abdication of any Constitutional authority, even within Congress
itself. Key provisions throughout the Canvassing Rules reveal the nature of the Joint
Committee and its relation to the duties of Congress, whether referring to the
determination of the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass or
the canvassing of the votes itself. Some of these provisions, however, are
conveniently omitted by petitioner in his arguments. For one, Section 19 thereof
provides: SCEDaT

Sec. 19. The Joint Committee, whether en banc or in divisions, shall

decide any question involving the Certificate of Canvass by a majority vote of
its Members, each House panel voting separately. Any such decision shall be
subject to approval by the joint session, the Senate and House of
Representatives voting separately. In case the two Houses disagree, the
decision of the President of the Senate, in consultation with the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, shall prevail." [Emphasis supplied]

As to the canvassing of votes, paragraph 2, of Sec. 13, provides that "[t]he Joint
Committee shall, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution of
the certificates of canvass, preliminarily canvass the votes of candidates for the
offices of President and Vice-President." And again, in Sec. 23, the final report of
the Joint Committee "shall be submitted by the Joint Committee en banc to the
joint public session for its approval, each House voting separately."

Further, in Section 27, we find that:

Upon termination of the canvass and approval of the Joint Committee report
and the accompanying resolution by majority of all the Members of both.
 Houses voting separately in the joint public session, Congress through the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
shall forthwith proclaim the President-elect and the Vice-President-elect.
[Emphasis supplied]

Since the Canvassing Rules subjects the acts of the Joint Committee to the
affirmation of Congress, the Committee's report is preliminary and
recommendatory in nature.

The Canvassing Rules leaves to both Houses of Congress, as an entire body, the final
act of determining the authenticity in the manner provided by law, and due
execution of the certificates of canvass, and the proclamation of the President-elect
and Vice-President-elect.

Anent to his argument that the Canvassing Rules is an unlawful delegation of

power, petitioner claims that the creation of the Joint Committee deprives him of
his rights and prerogatives as a member of Congress to be present during the
canvassing of genuine certificates of canvass, and to participate in its deliberations.
He argues that by excluding him from the proceedings, the Canvassing Rules
likewise deprives his constituents — the sovereign people — of representation and a
voice in the affairs of government.

Unfortunately, petitioner once again relies on his misreading of the Canvassing

Rules. The fact that the findings of the Joint Committee are subject to a final act of
Congress, then, by casting his vote and declaring his approval or disapproval of the
final report, petitioner exercises his prerogatives as a Member of Congress. By
claiming a sovereign duty to be present in all stages of the proceedings, petitioner
confuses his rights as a Member of the Congress with the powers given to Congress
itself.

Under the Constitution, it is Congress that, in accordance with the law and its rules,
canvasses the certificates of canvass certified by the Boards of Canvassers of
provinces and cities after determining their authenticity and due execution in the
manner provided by law. Being a member of Congress, his participation is likewise
determined by the internal rules of congressional proceedings, and, in general, is
determined by his vote. The quality of his participation is determined by such means
as Congress deems fit to ensure the use of discretion when his vote is cast.

As for the Canvassing Rules itself, petitioner's third argument is that Congress
amends the Constitution by investing itself with powers beyond what was granted
therein. He cites the three constitutional functions of Congress as a National Board
of Canvassers: 1) the opening by the President of the Senate of all the certificates of
canvass in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives in joint public
session; 2) the determination of the authenticity and due execution of the
certificates of canvass; and 3) the canvassing of votes based on said certificates. It is
his observation that with the enumeration of these three duties, the Constitutional
mandate is specific, thereby foreclosing the need for implementing or procedural
rules. The argument is bereft of merit. DCcHIS
The authority of Congress to adopt its own rules of procedure under par. (3), Sec.
16, Art. VI 10 is a right that has been recognized to apply regardless of whether
Congress is exercising its legislative power or its other duties, such as in this case
when it acts as the National Board of Canvassers. 11

Here, apart from the general authority of Congress to promulgate its internal rules,
the Constitution itself specifically leaves it to Congress to determine the conditions
and procedures of fulfilling its duty as a National Board of Canvassers. The sixth
paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, plainly and clearly states:
"The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of
certificates."

The reason for the insertion of this provision, and its relation to the determination
of the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass, was likewise
explained during the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission.

MR. DAVIDE:

On page 2, between lines 22 and 23, I propose to insert a new

paragraph to read as follows: CONGRESS SHALL PROMULGATE ITS
RULES FOR THE CANVASSING OF THE CERTIFICATES.

MR. SUMULONG:

Will Commissioner Davide repeat the proposed amendment?

MR. DAVIDE:

CONGRESS SHALL PROMULGATE ITS RULES FOR THE CANVASS OF

THE CERTIFICATES.

THE PRESIDENT:

Is this accepted by the Committee?

MR. REGALADO:

For the benefit of the other Commissioners, will Commissioner Davide

explain this proposal?

MR. DAVIDE:

This is necessary in order that Congress will have the authority now to
promulgate the necessary rules for the canvassing of the certificates
of canvass for the Offices of the President and the Vice-President.

MR. REGALADO:

How will that tie up with line 16 regarding the determination of the
authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass in the
manner provided by law?
 MR. DAVIDE:

That is entirely a different matter, Madam President, because it would

relate to the rules concerning the determination of the authenticity
and due execution thereof, whereas the other one would be the rules
of procedure. 12 [Emphasis supplied]

As regards the determination of authenticity and due execution of the certificates of

canvass, the scope of the duty of Congress is to be defined by a law to be enacted by
it. This was made clear during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
explaining the inclusion of this provision in the 1987 Constitution, thus:

MR. MAAMBONG. . . . The Committee had to insert the phrase "in the
manner provided by law" so that the legislature itself will find out and will
make it very specific as to what flaws or deficiencies in the certificates of
canvass can be taken cognizance of by the canvassing board of tellers ,
because as of now the guiding regulations that govern the National
Assembly, as I mentioned in the Committee, are: the rules and regulations of
the COMELEC, the Omnibus Election Code, the jurisprudence from the
decisions of the Supreme Court. All these things taken together, the
legislature is given a notice by using the phrase "in the manner provided by
law," so that it will make a determination now of what are the points which
the board of tellers can take cognizance of, because it is not very clear right
now under the laws and regulations, and as a matter of fact, that was one
of the controversies which arose during the canvassing of the votes of
President Aquino and former President Marcos in the last Batasan. 13
[Emphasis supplied]

The law referred to is R.A. No. 7166, 14 which was enacted on 26 November 1991.
Section 30 thereof provides the flaws over which Congress would take cognizance,
as well as the manner by which it would do so, thus:

Sec. 30. Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the

Election of President and Vice-President: Determination of
Authenticity and Due Execution of Certificates of Canvass. —
Congress shall determine the authenticity and due execution of the
certificate of canvass for President and Vice-President as accomplished and
transmitted to it by the local boards of canvassers, on a showing that: (1)
each certificate of canvass was executed, signed and thumbmarked by the
chairman and members of the board of canvassers and transmitted or
caused to be transmitted to Congress by them; (2) each certificate of
canvass contains the names of all of the candidates for President and Vice-
President and their corresponding votes in words and in figures; and (3)
there exists no discrepancy in other authentic copies of the certificate of
canvass or discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words and figures in
the certificate.
TcaAID

When the certificate of canvass, duly certified by the board of canvassers of

each province, city or district, appears to be incomplete, the Senate
President shall require the board of canvassers concerned to transmit by
 personal delivery, the election returns from polling places that were not
included in the certificate of canvass and supporting statements. Said
election returns shall be submitted by personal delivery within two (2) days
from receipt of notice.

When it appears that any certificate of canvass or supporting statement of

votes by precinct bears erasures or alterations which may cast doubt as to
the veracity of the number of votes stated therein and may affect the result
of the election, upon request of the Presidential or Vice-Presidential
candidate concerned or his party, Congress shall, for the sole purpose of
verifying the actual number of votes cast for President and Vice-President,
count the votes as they appear in the copies of the election returns
submitted to it.

Contrary to petitioner's argument, therefore, whether Congress deems it fit to

require its entire membership to examine each certificate of canvass, raise their
comments and objections thereto, or engage in parliamentary debate before
reaching its conclusions, or else leave preliminary matters to be discussed and
argued according to different rules, must be left to the wisdom of Congress. So long
as the ultimate power to canvass remains lodged in the body tasked to perform it,
congressional rules adopted to address matters of expediency or the orderly conduct
of proceedings is precisely the purpose of such rules. 15

Congress remains the body exercising its canvassing duties, and delegating
preliminary determinations to expedite proceedings. Where the rules of Congress
have thus been passed within the limits of constitutional and legal boundaries,
everything else remains internal and procedural, and to which petitioner is bound.
As procedural rules, "[t]hey may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.'
Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate
the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members
have agreed to a particular measure. 16

In claiming that the creation of a Joint Committee is an unlawful delegation of

authority, petitioner asserts that the determination of the authenticity and due
execution of certificates is a function that requires the exercise of discretion on the
part of the individual members of Congress. He implies that a ministerial function
can be delegated whereas the determination of the authenticity and due execution,
being more than ministerial, cannot. The distinction is facetious since petitioner
argues throughout his petition that none of the duties of Congress under par. 4, Sec.
4, Art. VII of the Constitution can be delegated "whether within or without"
Congress.

On the contrary, respondents argue extensively that the nature of canvassing, as

well as determining the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of
canvass, are ministerial functions, which can be delegated in any case.

The difference between a ministerial and discretionary function was amply cited in
the Comment of Respondent Senate:
 Discretion, when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right
conferred upon them by law of acting officially, under certain circumstances,
according to the dictates of their judgments and consciences, uncontrolled
by the judgments or consciences of others. A purely ministerial act of duty,
in contradistinction to a discretional act, is one which an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to
the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own
judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law
imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how
or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not
ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same
requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment." 17

Referring, once again, to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission: SHEIDC

MR. NOLLEDO:

I am referring to the use of the words "upon determination of the

authenticity and due execution thereof" on lines 7 and 8, page 2,
referring to the certificates of canvass of the President and Vice-
President. Am I right if I say that because of the use of these words,
the duty of the legislature to canvass is no longer ministerial?

MR. MAAMBONG:

Madam President, the word "ministerial" has always been interpreted by

the Supreme Court as applicable to the canvass made by the National
Assembly, and the reason why we did not put the word "ministerial" in
the Article is, it has been understood in the case of Lopez v. Roxas
and in other cases. When we used the words "authenticity" and
"genuineness," the question refers to the problem of whether or not
the ministerial function is already nonministerial. The answer is, it is still
ministerial but when we say "authenticity and "due execution," what it
really means is that the National Assembly will look at the certificates
of canvass and find out from the face of the document whether there
are flaws in the execution and authenticity of the document. That is
what it means.

MR. NOLLEDO:

Madam President, in the event that the legislature finds out that there
are serious defects in the certificates of canvass — as when the seals
are broken, there are a lot of erasures and then many of them are
unsigned and, therefore, authenticity appears to be questionable —
what will happen?

MR. REGALADO:

The answer to that is in the phrase "in the manner provided by law. . . ."
18 [Emphasis supplied] TIcAaH
Indeed, the inclusion in the 1987 Constitution of the duty of Congress to be the
National Board of Canvassers for the election of the President and the Vice President
meant that Congress was to have expanded powers. These expanded powers did not
necessarily mean that the nature of the power changed from a ministerial to a
discretionary one. However, nor can the power of Congress to determine
authenticity and due execution of the canvass of votes be deemed purely
ministerial, as whether there has been tampering or not, or, as according to Sec. 30
of R.A. No. 7166, or determining when there is 'doubt' requires some degree of
discretion.

The distinction made in Lopez v. Roxas 19 was a distinction made between the
duties of Congress and that of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, the latter charged
with judging all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates, under Section 1, R.A. No. 1793:

Needless to say, the power of congress to declare who, among the

candidates for President and/or Vice-President, has obtained the largest
number of votes, is entirely different in nature from and not inconsistent
with the jurisdiction vested in the Presidential Electoral Tribunal by Republic
Act No. 1793. Congress merely acts as a national board of canvassers,
charged with the ministerial and executive duty to make said declaration, on
the basis of the election returns duly certified by provincial and city boards
of canvassers. Upon the other hand, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal has
the judicial power to determine whether or not said duly certified election
returns have been irregularly made or tampered with, or reflect the true
result of the elections in the areas covered by each, and, if not, to recount
the ballots cast, and, incidentally thereto, pass upon the validity of each
ballot or determine whether the same shall be counted, and, in the
affirmative, in whose favor, which Congress has power to do." 20

Thus, while petitioner correctly maintains that the 1987 Constitution sought to
expand the power of Congress by requiring it to determine the genuineness of the
certificates of canvass, the act of discretion was done upon determining the rules of
authenticity and due execution. That accomplished, the National Board of
Canvassers could only act within the parameters and according to the criteria
specifically provided by the law.

Nevertheless, even if, for purposes of argument, the determination of the

authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass were more than a
ministerial function, the Canvassing Rules, as discussed earlier, does not delegate
nor abdicate such determination to the Joint Committee, nor for that matter any of
the other duties Congress prescribed under Sec. 4, Art. VII. Therefore, discussion on
the accusation against Congress regarding its neglect of duty because of the
adoption of its Canvassing Rules would now be superfluous.

What remains for petitioner, as a member of Congress and a representative of his

constituents, is in the opportunities to make the informed judgments provided by
the Canvassing Rules itself. The Canvassing Rules provides safeguards, which would
enable petitioner to responsibly perform his individual duty as a Member of
Congress and properly represent the interests of his constituents. A declaration of
yea and nay or the raising of hand to express protest or approval is a diminished
prerogative only when it is not exercised with the full weight of the trust of the
people and the powers of reason and conscience. aTcIAS

Finally, the challenged Canvassing Rules is similar, for the most part, to the
Canvassing Rules for the Presidential and Vice Presidential Election of 1998. 21 That
canvassing Rules was unanimously approved by the Senate and the House of
Representatives at its joint session. In attendance at that session were Senators,
same of whom are now incumbent Senators Edgardo Angara, Gregorio Honasan,
Sergio Osmeña III and Vicente Sotto III, 22 and opposition Representatives Bellaflor
Angara-Castillo, Didagen Dilangalen and Rolando Zamora, among others. 23 Indeed,
I cannot understand why an almost the same Rules is now assailed on
constitutional grounds. I cannot likewise understand why Congress should
promulgate separate Canvassing Rules for every Presidential elections. It should
have promulgated one set of Canvassing Rules for all such elections, thereby
ensuring stability and avoiding delays and confusion in future Presidential elections.

WHEREFORE, I vote to dismiss the petition for its utter failure to show that the
Rules of the Joint Public Session on Congress on Canvassing the Votes for
Presidential and Vice Presidential abuse of discretion by both the Senate and the
House of Representatives in joint session.

PUNO, J.:

The facts are sparse but sufficient. We held our national election last May 10, 2004.
The candidates for President were President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, actor
Fernando Poe, Jr., Senator Panfilo Lacson, former Secretary of Education Raul Roco,
and religious leader Bishop Eddie Villanueva. The candidates for Vice-President were
Senator Noli de Castro, Senator Loren Legarda, former Congressman Herminio
Aquino and Mr. Rodolfo Pajo.

Congress thereafter convened itself in joint session to canvass the results of the
Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections. It approved the Rules of the Joint Public
Session of Congress on Canvassing Votes for the Presidential and Vice-Presidential
Candidates in the May 10, 2004 Elections. ETAICc

On May 2, 2004, petitioner, a member of the House of Representatives representing

the 3rd Legislative District of the City of Davao, filed the instant petition for
prohibition and mandamus with prayer for issuance of a status quo ante order,
temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction. He assailed said
Rules as constitutionally infirmed allegedly because they: (1) constitute an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to a Joint Committee of Congress;
(2) constitute an unconstitutional amendment of Article VII, Section 4 of the
Constitution; (3) constitute an unconstitutional deprivation and derogation of his
rights and prerogatives as a member of the House of Representatives; and (4) by
the passage of the Rules, Congress has unlawfully neglected the performance of an
act which the Constitution specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office.
In their respective Comments, public respondents defended the validity of their act.
The Senate, represented by the President of the Senate, Honorable Franklin M.
Drilon, submits that the Legislature's formulation and implementation of its own
rules affecting its internal operation are beyond the ambit of judicial scrutiny. And,
contrary to petitioner's contention, the Rules are in complete accord with the
Constitution as they do not remove from Congress the power to determine the
authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass and to canvass the
votes of the candidates for President and Vice-President, which power is still reposed
in Congress as a whole, nor do they curtail the rights and prerogatives of any
member of Congress to participate in the canvassing. Neither does the creation of
the Joint Committee constitute an undue delegation of a legislative function since
the canvassing of votes is not an exercise of the legislative function of Congress. In
fine, the Senate President believes that the instant petition is a mere disguised
attempt to change the rules and delay the canvassing of votes. CaTcSA

Respondent House of Representatives, through the Speaker of the House of

Representatives, Honorable Jose C. De Venecia, maintains that the constitutional
grant of the power to canvass the votes for the President and the Vice-President and
the corresponding mandate to formulate its own rules of procedure authorize
Congress which has the sole discretion to create a Joint Committee to preliminarily
canvass the votes to expedite the proceedings. Similarly, the Speaker is of the view
that the creation of the Joint Committee is not violative of the well-known maxim
delegata potestas non delegari 1 which finds application only when what is
delegated is legislative power, and not an electoral function such as canvassing of
votes.

The Solicitor General argues that the constitutionality of the act of Congress in
assigning the preliminary canvassing of votes for President and Vice-President is a
political question. It is Congress, and not the Judiciary, which gets to decide what
procedures are proper in this circumstance. And, while the Constitution assigns to
Congress the power to canvass the votes, it does not mean that the whole
Congress, as a body, should actually canvass the votes. Congress has the discretion
to follow its previous practice of using a joint committee to canvass the certificates
of canvass and does not abdicate its power because the Joint Committee, apart from
being a part thereof, will just come out with a final report which will be submitted
to the whole Congress, in joint public session, for approval. Finally, there is no
delegation of legislative power since delegation of legislative power applies only
when there is transfer of power from one department of government to the other
departments. In this case, Congress did not delegate its power to the Executive or
Judicial department.

In short, the petition poses two hinge issues: (1) whether it hoists a political
question over which the Court has no jurisdiction; and (2) assuming the issue raised
is justiciable, whether the Rules violate Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution.

Let us keep a full eye on the Rules. The pertinent parts provide:

RULE VIII
 JOINT COMMITTEE

SEC. 13. A Joint Committee shall be created composed of eleven (11)

members from the Senate to be appointed by the President of the Senate
and eleven (11) members from the House of Representatives to be
appointed by the Speaker. The Members of each House panel shall elect
from among themselves their respective Chairman in the Joint Committee.
The Joint Committee may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in two divisions of
eleven (11) members each composed of a chairman, five (5) members from
the Senate and five (5) members from the House of Representatives:
Provided, That a Member of Congress who is a candidate for President or
Vice-President shall not be eligible for appointment to the Joint Committee.
Each division shall be chaired by a Chairman of the Joint Committee.

The Joint Committee shall, upon determination of the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass, preliminarily canvass the votes of
candidates for the offices of President and Vice-President.

The Representative of the province or city whose certificate of canvass is

being canvassed shall be an ex officio member of the Joint Committee,
without voting rights, for the duration of the canvassing of the aforesaid
certificate of canvass.

SEC. 14. The Joint Committee, en banc or in divisions, shall satisfy itself
that each certificate of canvass was duly executed, signed and thumb
marked by the Chairman and Members of the provincial, city or district
Board of Canvassers concerned; that it contains the names of all the
candidates for President and Vice-President and their corresponding votes
in words and in figures; and there exists no discrepancy in other authentic
copies of the certificate of canvass or discrepancy in the votes of any
candidate in words and figures in the same certificate. TIcAaH

SEC. 15. When the certificate of canvass, duly certified by the Board of
Canvassers of each province, city or district, appears to be incomplete, the
Senate President shall require the Board of Canvassers concerned to
transmit by personal delivery, the election returns from polling places that
were not included in the certificate of canvass and supporting documents.
Said election returns shall be submitted by personal delivery within two (2)
days from receipt of notice.

SEC. 16. In case of omission in the certificate of canvass of the name of

any candidate and/or the votes obtained by any candidate, the President of
the Senate shall summon, in the most expeditious manner, the provincial,
city or district Board of Canvassers concerned to supply the missing data in
the certificate of canvass and to authenticate the same by affixing their
signatures thereon.

SEC. 17. When it appears that any certificate of canvass or supporting

statement of votes by precinct bears erasures or alterations which may cast
doubt as to the veracity of the number of votes stated therein and may
affect the result of the election, upon request of the Presidential or Vice-
Presidential candidate concerned or his party, Congress shall, for the sole
purpose of verifying the actual number of votes cast for President and Vice-
President, count the votes as they appear in the copies of the election
returns submitted to it.

SEC. 18. In case the copy of the certificate of canvass for Congress is
delayed, the President of the Senate shall obtain said delayed certificate of
canvass from the provincial, city or district Board of Canvassers concerned
within a period of two days. In case the certificate of canvass has been lost,
destroyed or is otherwise unavailable, the Joint Committee shall immediately
request the Commission on Elections for its authentic copy of said certificate
of canvass.

SEC. 19. The Joint Committee, whether en banc or in divisions, shall

decide any question involving the certificate of canvass by a majority vote of
its Members, each House panel voting separately. Any such decision shall be
subject to approval by the joint session, the Senate and House of
Representatives voting separately. In case the two Houses disagree, the
decision of the President of the Senate, in consultation within the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, shall prevail.

SEC. 20. The Joint Committee en banc or in divisions, may, by a majority

vote of its Members each House panel voting separately, punish for
contempt any person who commits disorderly behavior during its session.
Any member of the provincial, city or district Board of Canvassers who
refuses without reasonable cause to obey any order issued by the President
of the Senate as provided in Sections 15, 16, 18 and 21 hereof, may likewise
be punished for contempt by the joint public session upon recommendation
of the Senate President.

SEC. 21. The chairmen of the Joint Committee shall request from the
Commission on Elections technical assistance for purposes of the
canvassing of votes. A list of the names, specimen signatures and thumb
marks of the chairmen and members of the provincial, city and district
Boards of Canvassers shall be obtained from the Commission on Elections
for the determination of the authenticity and due execution of certificates of
canvass. When there is any doubt regarding the authenticity and due
execution of the certificate of canvass, the Joint Committee, en banc or any
of its divisions, may require the personal appearance of the chairmen and
members of the provincial, city of district Board of Canvassers concerned.

SEC. 22. The Joint Committee en banc shall tabulate the votes and, for
this purpose, may avail of the services of an independent
accounting/auditing firm to assist in the tabulation and canvass of votes.

After the certificates of canvass and the statement of votes have been
tabulated, any Member of Congress may request in writing for copies
thereof from the Secretariat prior to the consideration of any interim or final
report to the joint session.TSaEcH

SEC. 23. The Joint Committee, en banc or in divisions, shall meet eight (8)
hours a day from Monday to Friday until all the certificates of canvass
referred to it by the joint public session shall have been canvassed. The final
report shall be submitted by the Joint Committee en banc to the joint public
session for its approval, each House voting separately.

RULE IX

REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE

SEC. 24. Notwithstanding the fact that not all certificates of canvass
have been received, the Joint Committee may submit to the joint public
session its final report with the recommendation to terminate the canvass if
the total number of registered voters corresponding to the province, city or
district covered by the certificates of canvass not yet transmitted would no
longer affect the result of the election. Congress in joint public session,
voting separately, shall immediately act on the final report.

The Joint Committee may, in its discretion, submit interim report to the joint
public session whenever there is a need for guidance or direction from
Congress. Provided, That objections raised and rulings made therein shall no
longer be included in the final report.

SEC. 25. At least a majority of the Members from each House panel shall
sign the final report of the Joint Committee. Every Member shall be provided
with a copy of the final report and shall be given twenty-four (24) hours
within which to submit his concurring or dissenting opinion.

SEC. 26. During the joint public session, the Member designated by the
Joint Committee shall speak for not more than one hour on the report and
the accompanying resolution approving the report of the Joint Committee,
declaring the results of the canvass and proclaiming the President-elect and
Vice-President-elect. The Member designated by those against the report
shall also speak for not more than one hour. Subsequent speakers for or
against the resolution shall be allowed to speak for not more than three
hours; Provided, That one (1) speaker for each candidate shall be given the
opportunity to speak for not more than twenty minutes.

RULE X

PROCLAMATION

SEC. 27. Upon termination of the canvass and approval of the Joint
Committee report and the accompanying resolution by majority of all the
Members of both Houses voting separately in the joint public session,
Congress through the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives shall forthwith proclaim the President-elect and Vice-
President-elect.

I respectfully make the following submissions:

I
 The petition poses a justiciable issue
over which this Court has jurisdiction.

The first issue is whether the petition involves a political question, hence, this Court
is bereft of jurisdiction to take cognizance of it. This is not the first time, and it will
not be last, when the Court will wrestle with the political question defense. As early
as 1957, in the landmark case of Tañada v. Cuenco, 2 this Court has held that
political question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, a question of policy.
It refers to "those questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom not legality of a particular
measure." For this reason ". . . courts will not normally interfere with the workings
of another co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for the courts to step
in to uphold the law and the Constitution." 3 We have a continuous river of rulings
that the political question doctrine cannot be invoked when the issue is whether an
executive act or a law violates the Constitution. 4 Thus, in Tatad v. Secretary of
the Department of Energy, 5 we emphatically explained that "the principle of
separation of powers mandates that challenges on the constitutionality of a law
should be resolved in our courts of justice while doubts on the wisdom of a law
should be debated in the halls of Congress." IaDcTC

When the Constitution is violated, even an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch
of government has to be struck down. Our government operates both under the
principle of separation of powers and the principle of checks and balances. In less
esoteric terms, this means that our three branches of government, vis-à-vis each
other, follow the rule of trust the two but trust no one absolutely. Thus, in
Arroyo v. de Venecia, 6 this Court, citing U.S. v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 7 and
speaking thru Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, held that "[t]he Constitution
empowers each house to determine its proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the
rule and the result which is sought to be attained." In the recent case of Francisco,
Jr. v. The House of Representatives, et al., 8 promulgated on November 10,
2003, it was also pointed out, viz.:

To be sure, the force to impugn the jurisdiction of this Court becomes more
feeble in light of the new Constitution which expanded the definition of
judicial power as including "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government." As well observed by retired
Justice Isagani Cruz, this expanded definition of judicial power considerably
constricted the scope of political question. He opined that the language
luminously suggests that this duty (and power) is available even against the
executive and legislative departments including the President and the
Congress, in the exercise of their discretionary powers.
We shall not be breaking grounds in striking down an act of a co-equal
branch of government or an act of an independent agency of government
done in grave abuse of discretion. Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987
Constitution provides, inter alia, that the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) shall be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House. In
Bondoc v. Pineda, et al. this Court declared null and void the Resolution
of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding
the election of Congressman Camasura as a member of the HRET. His
expulsion from the HRET by the House of Representatives was held not to
be for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal's
disposition of the Bondoc case and deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the
HRET's decision in his favor. This Court found that the House of
Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing
Congressman Camasura. Its action was adjudged to be violative of the
constitutional mandate which created the HRET to be the "sole judge" of the
election contest between Bondoc and Pineda. We held that a showing that
plenary power is granted either department of government is not an
obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or the abuse thereof
may give rise to a justiciable controversy. Since "a constitutional grant of
authority is not unusually unrestricted, limitations being provided for as to
what may be done and how it is to be accomplished, necessarily then, it
becomes the responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the two
coordinate branches have adhered to the mandate of the fundamental law.
The question thus posed is judicial rather than political."

We further explained that the power and duty of courts to nullify, in

appropriate cases the actions of the executive and legislative branches does
not mean that the courts are superior to the President and the Legislature.
It does mean though that the judiciary may not shirk "the irksome task" of
inquiring into the constitutionality and legality of legislative or executive
action when a justiciable controversy is brought before the courts by
someone who has been aggrieved or prejudiced by such action. It is "a plain
exercise of judicial power, the power vested in courts to enable them to
administer justice according to law. . . . It is simply a necessary concomitant
of the power to hear and dispose of a case or controversy properly before
the court, to the determination of which must be brought the test and
measure of the law."

In Angara v. Electoral Commission, we also ruled that the Electoral

Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of
determining contests relating to election returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly may not be interfered with by the
judiciary when and while acting within the limits of authority, but this Court
has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the purpose of
determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to
the commission as sole judge of all contests relating to the election and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.

Similarly, in Arroyo v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

 (HRET) and Augusto Syjuco, we nullified the HRET's decision declaring
private respondent Syjuco as the duly elected Congressman of Makati for
having been rendered in persistent and deliberate violation of the Tribunal's
own governing rules and the rules of evidence.

To be sure, this Court has reviewed not just acts of the HRET but also of the
House of Representatives itself. We passed upon the issue of whether the
procedure for passing a law provided by the Constitution was followed by
the House of Representatives and the Senate in Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance, et al. involving R.A. No. 7716 or the VAT law. We ruled that the
VAT law satisfied the constitutional provision requiring that all appropriation,
revenue and tariff bills originate from the House of Representatives under
Article VI, Section 24 of the 1987 Constitution. We also interpreted the
constitutional provision requiring the reading of a bill on three separate days
"except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment, etc." and held that this requirement was satisfied when the bill
which became R.A. No. 7716 underwent three readings on the same day as
the President certified the bill as urgent. Finally, we interpreted the Rules of
the Senate and the House of Representatives and held that there was
nothing irregular about the conference committee including in its report an
entirely new provision not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill
as this was in accordance with the said Rules. TADCSE

The recent case of Macalintal v. COMELEC on absentee voting affirmed

the jurisdiction of this Court to review the acts of the legislature. In said
case, the Court settled the question of propriety of the petition which
appeared to be visited by the vice of prematurity as there were no ongoing
proceedings in any tribunal, board or before a government official exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions as required by Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. The Court considered the importance of the constitutional
issues raised by the petitioner, and quoted Tañada v. Angara stating that
"where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty
of the judiciary to settle the dispute." (citations omitted)
HSaIET

This line of thought enjoys the unanimous view of the Court. It is therefore futile
to contend that this Court has no jurisdiction over the petition at bar on the
ground that it poses a political question. The petition assails the creation by
Congress of a Joint Committee for the purpose of determining the authenticity
and due execution of the certificates of canvass appertaining to the positions of
President and Vice-President in our last May 10, 2004 elections. Petitioner
contends that the creation violates Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution under
which it is alleged that only Congress, in joint public session, can exercise the
said power. Petitioner also argues that the creation of the Joint Committee
deprives him of his constitutional right to participate in the canvass of the results
of the last Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections. The issue raised by
petitioner calls for the proper interpretation of Article VII, Section 4 of
the Constitution vis-à-vis the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress or
Canvassing the Votes Cast for the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates
in the May 10, 2004 Elections. Since time immemorial, the jurisdiction of this
 Court to interpret the Constitution has never been successfully flayed. Indeed,
this authority has been broadened by the expanded definition of judicial power in
the 1987 Constitution. In expanding the judicial power of this Court, we said that
"[t]o a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the
political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this
Court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of government." 9 We even held that
the Constitution "did not just grant the Court the power of doing nothing." 10
Stubborn thoughts that still insist this Court has no jurisdiction on issues that
involve the interpretation of the Constitution should now be consigned to the
museum of memories.
II
Creation of Canvassing Committee constitutes
no grave abuse of discretion.

The next issue is whether the creation of a Joint Committee on Canvassing

constitutes grave abuse of discretion for being violative of Article VII, Section 4 of
the Constitution which relevantly states:

xxx xxx xxx

Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and
Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May.

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified
by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to
the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the
certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty
days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of
the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the
Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof
in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected,
but in case of two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes,
one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress.

The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the
certificates:

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner also contends that the Rules deprived him of his rights and
prerogatives as a member of Congress. STcHDC

The nature of the work of the Joint Committee deserves minute examination. The
purpose of the Joint Committee is spelled out in no uncertain terms in Rule VIII,
Section 13, viz.: "The Joint Committee shall, upon determination of the authenticity
and due execution of the certificates of canvass, preliminarily canvass the votes of
candidates for the offices of the President and Vice-President." The key word is
"preliminarily" which means its work is preparatory, 11 a mere prelude. The
preliminary work is performed by the Joint Committee by satisfying itself — (1) that
each certificate of canvass was duly executed, signed and thumb marked by the
Chairman and Members of the provincial, city or district Board of Canvassers
concerned; (2) that it contains the names of all the candidates for President and
Vice-President and their corresponding votes in words and figures; and (3) that
there exists no discrepancy in other authentic copies of the certificate of canvass or
discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words and figures in the same
certificate. 12

Provisions were then crafted to deal with certain concrete problems. Rule VIII,
Section 15, deals with the situation when the certificate of canvass, duly certified by
the Board of Canvassers of each province, city or district, appears to be
incomplete. In this case, the Senate President shall require the Board of
Canvassers concerned to transmit by personal delivery, the election returns from
polling places that were not included in the certificate of canvass and supporting
documents. Rule VIII, Section 16, applies when there is an omission in the
certificate of canvass of the name of any candidate and/or the votes obtained by any
candidate. In this case, the President of the Senate is mandated by the rule to
summon, in the most expeditious manner, the provincial, city or district Board of
Canvassers concerned to supply the missing data in the certificate of canvass and to
authenticate the same by affixing their signatures thereon. Rule VIII, Section 17, is
apt when it appears that any certificate of canvass or supporting statement of votes
by precinct bears erasures or alterations which may cast doubt as to the veracity
or authenticity of the number of votes stated therein and may affect the result of
the election. Upon request of the Presidential or Vice-Presidential candidate
concerned or his party, the rule requires Congress itself, for the sole purpose of
verifying the actual number of votes cast for President and Vice-President, to count
the votes as they appear in the copies of the election returns submitted to it. Rule
VIII, Section 18, deals with the situation when the transmittal of the copy of the
certificate of canvass is delayed. The rule directs the Senate President to obtain
said delayed certificate of canvass from the provincial, city or district Board of
canvassers concerned. The same Section 18 likewise addresses the situation when
the certificate of canvass has been lost, destroyed or is otherwise unavailable.
The rule requires the Joint Committee to immediately request the COMELEC for its
authentic copy of said certificate of canvass.

The Rules give the Joint Committee the necessary powers to discharge its duty.
Rule VIII, Section 20, grants it the power of contempt. It can punish for contempt
any person who commits disorderly behavior during its session. Rule VIII, Section
21, accords to it the right to request from the COMELEC technical assistance for
purposes of the canvassing of votes. When there is any doubt regarding the
authenticity and due execution of the certificate of canvass, the Joint Committee,
may require the personal appearance of the chairmen and members of the
provincial, city or district Board of Canvassers. Rule VIII, Section 22, empowers the
Committee to avail of the services of an independent accounting/auditing firm to
assist in the tabulation and canvass of votes.

The Rules then provide for the Report to be submitted by the Joint Committee.
Two kinds of reports can be submitted by the Committee to the joint public session:
One is the interim report which the Committee, in its discretion, may submit
whenever there is a need for guidance or direction from Congress. Second
is the final report containing the objections raised on certain certificates of canvass
and the rulings of the Committee. Rule IX, Section 25, requires that every member
of the Committee shall be provided a copy of the final report and shall be given
twenty-four (24) hours within which to submit his concurring or dissenting opinion.
At least a majority of the members from each House shall sign the final report. The
final report shall then be submitted to the joint public session for its approval.
aDATHC

Rule IX, Section 26, then provides the manner on how the final report shall be
debated by the joint public session. Various speakers are allowed to speak for
or against the final report during the joint public session. First, the member
designated by the Joint Committee shall speak in favor of the final report for not
more than one (1) hour. Second, the member designated by those against shall be
given the same time. Third, subsequent speakers for or against the report shall
be allowed to speak for not more than three (3) hours. Fourth, one (1) speaker
for each candidate shall be given the opportunity to speak for not more than
twenty (20) minutes. After the debates, the Joint Committee report and the
accompanying resolution have to be approved by majority of all the members
of both Houses voting separately in the joint public session. The President-
elect and the Vice-President-elect shall then be proclaimed through the President
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

The Constitution, the Rules, as well as jurisprudence, inform us of the nature of

the work of Congress as the national canvassing board of the votes cast for
the highest elective positions in the land and how it should be discharged. They
establish the following indubitable postulates, viz.:

First. When Congress convenes in joint public session as a national canvassing

board, it is not meeting as a lawmaking body. Its function as a canvassing board
is not to make laws but to count the votes cast by the electorate for the Presidency
and the Vice-Presidency. As we succinctly held in Cordero v. Judge of First
Instance of Rizal, 13 while the Board of Canvassers is made up of legislators, it
does not act in its capacity as a maker of laws but as an entirely different and
distinct entity organized for a specific purpose. The Board of Canvassers exists for a
specific function, that is, to canvass the result of the election as shown in the
election returns and to proclaim the winning candidates. 14 The exercise of the
power of canvassing of votes is more akin to the discharge of an administrative
power.

Second. As canvassers of votes for the positions of President and Vice-President, our
lawmakers are to discharge their duties with fairness and impartiality.
Canvassing is an important part of the process of determining the choice of our
sovereign people on who ought to be our President and Vice-President, the two
highest elective posts in our country. Thus, in making the canvass, our lawmakers
should act more as representatives of the people and less as partisans of
political parties. For this reason, Article VII, Section 4 of the 1987
Constitution did not give any significance to the political affiliation of the
lawmakers when they are discharging their duty as canvassers. In cadence,
Rule VIII, Section 13, bars a member of Congress who is a candidate for President or
Vice-President from sitting in the Joint Committee. Stated otherwise, lawmakers
when canvassing votes, should keep their eyes open but should shut them
off to any political light. The members of city, provincial and district boards of
canvassers canvass the votes appertaining to our lesser elective officials yet they
are enjoined to be non partisan in the discharge of their duties. No less can be
expected from members of Congress acting as the national board of canvassers. In
fine, when our legislators acting as canvassers add 1 + 1, the sum should
be 2, regardless of their political affiliation.

Third. Congress can only proclaim as President-elect and Vice-President-elect they

who, on the basis of the election documents required by law, such as the certificates
of canvass, election returns and statements of votes, have established, at the very
least, a prima facie title to said offices. No candidate who has failed to establish a
colorable legal title to the positions of President and Vice-President can be
proclaimed and be endowed with the awesome mandate to govern our people.
Democracy disdains the rule and reign of the unelected.

Fourth. In canvassing the votes, our lawmakers are to determine the authenticity
and due execution of the certificates of canvass in the manner provided by law.
Republic Act No. 7166, Section 30, prescribes the manner by which
certificates of canvass are deemed authentic and duly executed. Read as a whole,
Section 30 states that Congress must examine each certificate of canvass not only
on its face, but also vis-à-vis the statement of votes and election returns when
necessary. This law is binding on Congress acting as a canvassing body. Rightly, the
relevant provisions of R.A. No. 7166 were incorporated in the Rules.

As a canvassing body, Congress has no lawmaking power and hence cannot amend
or repeal R.A. No. 7166. It has therefore no discretion to disregard R.A. No. 7166.
The Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on Canvassing the Votes Cast for
Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates in the May 10, 2004 Elections have to
be read, interpreted and enforced in consonance with R.A. No. 7166.

Fifth. The determination of the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of
canvass cannot be done in a robotic manner. R.A. No. 7166 and the Rules look
upon our lawmakers not as unthinking slot machines when conducting the canvass.
For this reason, the law and the rules require that due consideration be given not
only to the certificates of canvass but also to the election returns and the
statement of votes. In other words, the search for the truth about the true will
of the electorate should not be confined to the four corners of the
certificates of canvass. The truth, if blocked by the opaque face of the certificates
of canvass, must be extracted from the election returns and statements of votes. It
is self-evident that discovering and distilling the truth of who were really elected by
our people for the positions of President and Vice-President deserve more than a
mechanical effort.

Sixth. The determination of the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of
canvass calls for the exercise of discretion. It is self-evident that reconciling
discrepancies in the certificates of canvass vis-à-vis, among others, the election
returns and statements of votes involves intelligent judgment. It is for this reason
that in the discharge of its functions, the Joint Committee was clothed with certain
powers. It can request technical assistance from the COMELEC. It can require the
personal appearance of the chairmen and members of the provincial, city or district
Board of Canvassers. It can avail of the services of an independent accounting or
auditing firm. It has the awesome power to punish for contempt any person who
commits disorderly behavior during its session. More importantly, the Rules require
that our lawmakers decide the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of
canvass only after a full debate by members of Congress. In fine, determining the
authenticity and due execution of certificates of canvass cannot be done by adding
machines. cHSIAC

Seventh. The primary consideration in determining the authenticity and due

execution of the certificates of canvass is accuracy — accuracy in determining the
sovereign will of the people. The need to fast track the determination of the will of
the people pales in comparison with this consideration. It is a travesty of democracy
for the people to be governed by people without a mandate. The nation can
endure a slow but trustworthy tally. It may not survive an indefensible
count, however speedy it may be.

Eight. The determination of the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of
canvass is governed by a distinct process to insure that when it reaches its end, the
ones who will be proclaimed President-elect and Vice-President-elect can, at the
very least, have a colorable claim to said offices. This colorable claim can only
be established after full debate on the authenticity and due execution of the
certificates of canvass in light of other election documents such as election returns
and statements of votes and the testimonies of the chairmen and members of the
provincial, city, or district board of canvassers, in appropriate cases. The debate
contemplated is one that will elicit the truth as to the choice of the people,
hence, the Rules provide the following, viz.: (a) each candidate is allowed two (2)
watchers who shall have access to an unimpeded view of the entire proceedings; (b)
each candidate is likewise allowed lawyers who may argue and question any
certificate of canvass; (c) upon the opening of the certificates of canvass,
observations and objections of any member of Congress with reference to the
condition of their envelope, seal and serial number shall already be entered into the
records and shall be considered during the proceedings of the Joint
Committee; (d) the Joint Committee is composed of eleven (11) members from the
Senate to be appointed by the President of the Senate and eleven (11) members
from House of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker. To insulate it from
partisan politics, a member of Congress who is a candidate for President or Vice-
President is barred from appointment to the Joint Committee; (e) the
Representative of the province or city whose certificate of canvass is being
canvassed is made ex-officio member of the Joint Committee, without voting rights,
for the duration of the canvassing of the aforesaid certificate of canvass; (f)
remedies are provided for in cases where a certificate of canvass is incomplete or
with omissions or where it is lost destroyed or otherwise unavailable; (g) the Joint
Committee is given the authority to avail of the technical assistance of the
COMELEC and of the services of an independent accounting or auditing firm for the
proper discharge of its task; (h) after the Certificate of Canvass and statement of
votes have been tabulated by the Committee, any member of Congress may
request in writing for copies thereof from the secretariat prior to the consideration
of any interim or final report to the joint public session; (i) the interim and final
report shall contain the objections raised and the rulings thereon by the Joint
Committee; (j) every member of the Joint Committee is given twenty-four (24)
hours from receipt of the final report within which to submit his concurring or
dissenting opinion; (k) the final report is then forwarded to the joint public session
for debate. A member of the Joint Committee is given one (1) hour to speak in favor
of the final report; another member of the Committee is given also one (1) hour to
speak against the report; other speakers for or against the report are further
allowed to speak for not more than three (3) hours; and one (1) speaker for each
candidate is given the opportunity to speak for not more than twenty 20 minutes;
(1) after full debate, the final report is submitted to a vote by the joint public
session, each House voting separately. In case the two Houses disagree, the decision
of the President of the Senate, in consultation with the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, will prevail.AEIcTD

The process may be long and laborious but it has a purpose. It is designed to give
our lawmakers all the facts and all the arguments necessary for an informed and
intelligent judgment in determining the authenticity and due execution of the
certificates of a canvass. It demands that the evidence, the arguments of the
parties, and the applicable law should be meticulously weighed by the lawmakers
before they pass judgment on whether to canvass the votes in the certificates of
canvass. The objections to their authenticity and due execution should be given
their appropriate consideration. An unreasoned or unreasonable judgment by
Congress runs the risk of rejection in the parliament of the street of the
people. And the danger is that we may not just face a mute multitude.

Ninth. The laws and the rules give clear rights to the candidates. Candidates to
the position of the President and Vice-President cannot be denied due process.
Thus, they are allowed watchers. They are entitled to lawyers who can question any
certificate of canvass before the Joint Committee. When the final report is up for
voting by the joint public session of Congress, they can have speakers to defend
their interest. Candidates are also entitled to the equal protection of the law.
They cannot be subjected to discriminatory treatment. All these and their other
constitutional rights are not suspended during the canvass.

Tenth. The law and the rules likewise impose duties on Congress as a canvassing
board. Congress must be an outpost of openness. The canvassing must be
transparent. Lawmakers must conduct the canvassing without a taint of
arbitrariness. The worse type of arbitrariness is arbitrariness that runs roughshod
over the sovereign will of the people.

Prescinding from these predicates, I find no difficulty in voting to dismiss

the petition at bar. The Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on
Canvassing the Votes Cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates in the
May 10, 2004 Elections do not violate Article VII, Section 4 of the 1987
Constitution. To begin with, the Constitution grants Congress the power to
promulgate its own rules for the canvassing of election certificates. The Rules
enjoy the presumption of legality and the petitioner has miserably failed to
overcome this presumption.

The argument that the creation of the Joint Committee constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power is an egregious error. As a canvassing board,
Congress exercises no legislative power and therefore did not delegate
any.

In creating the Joint Committee, Congress did not abdicate its constitutional
duty to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of President
and Vice-President in the May 10, 2004 election. Even a side-glance at the powers
and prerogatives of the Joint Committee will subvert petitioner's submission. The
function of the Joint Committee is laid down in Rule VIII, Section 14. To stress
again, it shall satisfy itself that (1) each certificate of canvass was duly executed,
signed and thumb marked by the Chairman and members of the provincial, city or
district board of canvassers concerned; (2) it contains the names of all the
candidates for President and Vice-President and their corresponding votes in words
and figures; and (3) there exists no discrepancy in other authentic copies of the
certificate of canvass or discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in word and
figures in the same certificate. In the performance of this function, the Joint
Committee has to prepare a Report which will contain the objections raised by the
parties on the admission of the certificates of canvas concerned and its rulings
thereon. Rule VIII, Section 13, emphasizes that the canvass of the Joint Committee
is a mere preliminary canvass. The rulings of the Joint Committee reflected in its
Report are merely recommendatory in nature. Its Report is yet to be submitted to
the joint public session of Congress for approval, each House voting separately.
The constitutional canvassing duty of Congress is therefore preserved and
remains undiminished. cAHDES

Nor is the right of petitioner as lawmaker — canvasser unduly prejudiced by the

creation of the Joint Committee. The proceedings of the Joint Committee are open
and transparent. Under Rule VIII, Section 22, after the certificates of canvass and
the statement of votes have been tabulated by the Joint Committee, petitioner, like
any other member of Congress, may request in writing for their copies prior to the
consideration of any report by the Committee to the joint public session. Under Rule
IX, Section 26, petitioner may speak for or against the final report of the Joint
Committee whose findings and rulings are non-binding to the joint public session
of Congress. His right to vote for or against the final report of the Joint
Committee therefore stands undiluted. In truth, the creation of a Joint
Committee to preliminarily canvass the results of the Presidential and Vice-
Presidential election is compelled by the need to hasten the canvass considering
that our laws have set a deadline for proclamation. History is studded with insights.
The practice of creating a Joint Committee was resorted to by Congress in the 1961,
1965, 1992 and 1998 elections. Its effectiveness has been proven.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to dismiss the petition.

QUISUMBING, J.:

In this petition before us for prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, petitioner invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction and duty of the Supreme
Court pursuant to the Constitution, Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2, "to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." SIaHDA

Yet, basing on his arguments, we can say that the pith of petitioner's plea goes
deeper than the averment of personal exclusion from the select panel tasked as "a
joint committee of Congress to Canvass the votes cast for Presidential and Vice-
Presidential candidates in the May 10, 2004 national elections." He assails the Rules
* that Congress passed on May 28, 2004 because, in his view, the Rules "effectively

amends and abrogates" certain provisions of the Constitution, particularly Section 4,

Article VII, which give Congress the power and authority to promulgate rules for
said committee as the Board of National Canvassers. Further, he charges the
Congress of unlawful neglect in the performance of duty enjoined by the
Constitution because, by its passage of said Rules, Congress as a whole delegated
unlawfully its tasks as canvasser at the highest level to a mere joint committee of
eleven Senators and eleven Congressmen. *

Noteworthy, he raises expressly before us only one issue:

"Whether or not the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on

Canvassing the Votes Cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates
in the May 10, 2004 Elections are Valid, Legal, and Constitutional."

He marshals his arguments abovecited to advance the thesis that said Rules are
invalid, illegal, and unconstitutional. But by prefacing his plea to us on the principle
of the tripartite separation of powers of government and the principle of potestas
delegata non potest delegari, he also triggers implicitly a second issue: whether the
court possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter he brings.

In the Resolution dated 4 June 2004, we denied petitioner's prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order. Without giving due course to the petition, we required
respondents herein and the Solicitor General to comment. On June 7, 2004, before
noontime, we received the Comment of respondent Senate of the Philippines, the
Comment/Opposition by respondent House of Representatives, and the Comment
by the Office of the Solicitor General. * After a thorough dissection of the issue
raised by petitioner, we find that the respondents rightly prayed for dismissal of the
petition outright, "for lack of constitutional and legal basis" ** and "for lack of
merit". ***
ADECcI

In denying the issuance of a temporary restraining order, we were not unmindful of

the prevailing air of anxiety and popular perception that the canvass of votes for the
two highest positions of government is overdue. Announcement of the election
results cannot be delayed for weeks by mere technicalities. At the same time, a
majority of nine members of the Court were of the considered opinion that the
views of the opposition parties need to be fairly and fully ventilated in a neutral
forum that could render the appropriate relief. Despite prevailing doubts on the
possible pre-emption of the functions reserved by the Constitution, Article VII, Sec.
4, to the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, we could not let the petitioner go away
empty handed simply because he failed to attach his affidavit of service to the
petition. Majority of the Court members believe it is in the public interest that
comments on the petition be required from herein respondents as well as the
people's tribune, the Solicitor General. Thereafter, the Court could promptly rule on
the merits of the petition, provided the members are satisfied that the vital
requirements of constitutional litigation, including the existence of a case and
controversy, lis mota, ripeness, locus standi and justiciability, are clearly met.

As a member of the House of Representatives, believing that he was prejudiced

gravely by that chamber's action, petitioner has in his favor the requisite
personality (locus standi) to bring this suit before us. This we need not belabor. But
it still behooves us to determine, at the very inception of our discourse, whether the
issue raised by petitioner is one that is justiciable rather than a political question. By
itself, the threshold requirement of justiciability, which is to say the appropriateness
of a subject matter for judicial consideration, is trumped by the assertion of the
political question doctrine, perhaps rendering certain government conduct immune
from judicial review. * ECcaDT

In Tañada v. Cuenco, (103 Phil. 1051) the Court defined political questions as those
"which, under the Constitution are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government (Id. at p. 1065). ** This
formulation evolving from the separation of powers doctrine has been sharpened by
saying that challenges on the constitutionality of a law should be resolved by the
Court while doubts on the wisdom of law should be debated in the halls of Congress.
(Tatad v. Secretary, 281 SCRA 347). More recently, Francisco, Jr. v. HR, (G.R. No.
160261, decided Nov. 10, 2003), gave us the opportunity for further distinction. Per
Madame Justice Carpio-Morales, "the determination of a truly political question from
a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of whether
there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether
the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits."
To that extent, we consider Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, cited by the OSG,
inappropriate. Instead we find instructive the ruling in U.S. v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,
144 U.S. 1, which held that while each House of Congress is empowered by the
Constitution to determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights.

Procedurally, it must be stressed that the petitioner in an action for mandamus has
the burden to show a clear, certain, and well-defined right to the relief sought.
(Sales v. Mathay, G.R. No. L-39537, 31 May 1984, 129 SCRA 180, 183.) Mandamus
cannot compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Further, an action for
prohibition, as a rule, lies only against judicial or ministerial functions, but not
legislative functions. (Ruperto v. Torres, G.R. No. L-8785, 25 Feb. 1957.)

Be that as it may, considering the crucial importance of the matter at hand, not just
for the moment but also for the future of a nation beset by crises after crises, it is
our view that a prompt consideration of the instant petition is called for. As well said
in Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792, "a showing that plenary power is granted [to
another branch of the government] is not an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the
improvident exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise to a justiciable
controversy."

Nevertheless, with due respect to a co-equal branch, interference with the adoption
and implementation of internal rules of Congress is furthest from our mind.
Indubitably, per the Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 4, it is Congress and not any other
organ of the State which shall promulgate the rules for the canvassing of the
certificates of votes for the President and the Vice-President. Indeed we recognize
the plenary power of Congress to enact its own internal rules on the matter.
(Osmeña v. Pendatum , 109 Phil. 863. See also Arroyo v. De Venecia, 277 SCRA
268). What prompts us today to look into the present petition is the duty to say
what the law is, as a matter of constitutional prerogative by way of judicial review. *
To abdicate that duty is to invite lawlessness and disorder.

If only for edification, let us now focus on petitioner's complaint.

He alleges that "the questioned Rules of Congress call for the creation of a Joint
Committee under Section 13, Rule VIII thereof, which provides that the Joint
Committee shall: (a) be composed of eleven (11) members from the Senate to be
appointed by the Senate President and eleven (11) members from the House of
Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker; (b) sit en banc or, in its discretion,
in two (2) divisions of eleven members each; (c) determine the authenticity and
due execution of the certificates of canvass; and (d) preliminarily canvass the votes
of candidates for the offices of President and Vice-President." * HECTaA

Petitioner concludes that the Rules thus "(a) removed from the Congress as one
whole body and transferred to the Joint Committee of Congress the duty and
function of determining the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of
canvass, and (b) removed from the Congress as one whole body and transferred to
the Joint Committee of Congress the duty and function of canvassing the votes cast
for presidential and vice-presidential candidates." *

"Such removal and transfer of canvassing tasks from the constitutionally mandated
entity to the Joint Committee is directly contrary to the Constitution itself,"
according to petitioner. "There is absolutely nothing in the Constitution which
allows expressly or by inference such removal and transfer of canvassing tasks from
Congress as one whole body to another entity," he adds. "Neither is there anything
in the constitution which allows any substitution of the Congress as one whole body
in the performance of the constitutionally mandated canvassing tasks. Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution cannot be any clearer on the matter."

With the alleged delegation and transfer to a Joint Committee of the task of
canvassing the votes cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates, he
contends, "the canvassing of the votes will be done by and only before the Joint
Committee . . . composed of only 11 members from the Senate and 11 members of
the House of Representatives. Petitioner and all other members of both Houses of
Congress who are not members of the Joint Committee of Congress have thus been
unduly deprived of their rights and prerogatives as incumbent members of Congress
to be present at, observe and participate in the canvassing of votes. . ." *

Respondent House of Representatives, thru its Speaker Jose de Venecia, traverses

petitioner's allegations. Joint Committees, according to De Venecia, are constituted
primarily to facilitate the work of the two houses of Congress. The use of the joint
committee system, he adds, is a well recognized and established practice. Such was
the mode, he says, in canvassing the Presidential and Vice-Presidential votes during
elections held on 1957, 1961, 1965, 1969, 1992, and 1998. ** Even assuming that
the principle of delegata potestas non potest delegari applies, nevertheless he
submits that such delegation by the Congress is a valid delegation of powers beyond
cavil, for Congress retains its control over the canvassing process, and the ultimate
decision on the matter is lodged in Congress itself. On this score, we are in
agreement. Equally important, we also agree with the Speaker that when acting as
the National Board of Canvassers, Congress is not engaged in legislation, hence no
issue of undue delegation of legislative power need arise.

In any event, we are assured by respondent Senate, through its President Franklin
M. Drilon, that contrary to the assertion of the petitioner, he is not deprived of any
right or prerogative by the Joint Committee under its Rules that he now assails.
Petitioner's participation in the canvassing remains guaranteed under the Rules of
the Joint Public Session, thus:

"SEC. 19. The Joint Committee, whether en banc or in divisions, shall

decide any question involving the certificate of canvass by a majority vote of
its Members, each House panel voting separately. Any such decision shall
be subject to approval by the joint session, the Senate and House
of Representatives voting separately. In case the two Houses
disagree, the decision of the President of the Senate, in consultation with the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall prevail.

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 23. The Joint Committee, en banc or divisions, shall meet eight (8)
hours a day from Monday to Friday until all the certificates of canvass
 referred to it by the joint public session shall have been canvassed. The
final report shall be submitted by the Joint Committee en banc to
the joint public session for its approval, each House voting
separately. ScHADI

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 24. Notwithstanding the fact that not all certificates of canvass
have been received, the Joint Committee may submit to the joint public
session its final report with the recommendation to terminate the canvass if
the total number of registered voters corresponding to the province, city or
district covered by the certificates of canvass not yet transmitted would no
longer affect the results of the election. Congress in joint public session,
voting separately, shall immediately act on the final report.

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 27. Upon termination of the canvass and approval of the

Joint Committee report and the accompanying resolution by
majority of all the Members of both Houses voting separately in
the joint public session, Congress through the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall
forthwith proclaim the President-elect and Vice-President elect."

By its very nature, either chamber of Congress must act through committees. They
make the business of legislation feasible and practicable. Without working
committees, the tasks of the Senate or the House would be unmanageable. The
same is true of both chambers acting as the National Board of Canvassers. To
deprive the Board of the committee system is tantamount to obstructing its work
and consigning it to delay and failure.

Whether the Joint Committee or Congress as a whole is clothe with ministerial or

discretionary powers in the canvass of votes, including the "determination of the
authenticity and due execution" relative to the canvass of certificates need not, in
my view, preoccupy us now. Nor should the question of fraud and other matters
more appropriate for an election protest, if any. What is important now is that the
canvass be conducted "in the manner provided by law." *

The OSG calls attention, however, to one factor in this controversy: "the avoidance
of undue delay in the canvass of certificates to ensure the proclamation of the
winning candidates before June 30, 2004 Constitutional deadline" ** Respondent
House thru its Speaker bewails "an obvious attempt to stop or delay the current
canvassing of votes for both the Presidency and the Vice-Presidency," whereby
petitioner, in effect "would cast a cloud of doubt on the elections for the two highest
posts of land," including most if not all previous elections. To respondent, such doubt
would have staggering implications. ***

As the Solicitor General keenly observed:

"In the judgment of the Congress, to require the whole Congress to canvass
 the certificates would unduly delay the canvassing of votes. This delay may
prove detrimental to the national interest. Far from undermining the
Constitution, the creation of the joint canvassing committee will ensure that
the elected President and Vice-President shall assume office at noon of June
30, 2004, in accordance with the Constitution. The national interest would be
best served by deferring to this policy decision made by the Congress." *

WHEREFORE, finding no clear and adequate basis to declare that there is a grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents, I vote that the instant petition be
DISMISSED for lack of merit.

CARPIO-MORALES, J., concurring:

I join in the Resolution dismissing the instant petition, and in addition, I would like
to make the following observations.

By his Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus (Petition), petitioner Ruy Elias C.
Lopez, incumbent Representative of the 3rd Legislative District of Davao City, seeks:
HICEca

(1) a judgment declaring null and void the Rules of the Joint Public
Session of Congress on Canvassing the Votes Cast for the
Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates in the May 10, 2004
Elections (Rules on Canvassing) adopted by both Houses of
Congress on May 28, 2004;

(2) the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing all of respondents

to cease and desist from implementing the Rules on Canvassing;
and

(3) the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing both Houses of

Congress "to immediately open the certificates of canvass in the
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives in joint
public session, and the Congress to determine the authenticity
and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law and
canvass the votes as expressly commanded under Section 4
(paragraph 4), Article VII of the Constitution . . . ." 1

Petitioner advances the following arguments in support of his Petition:

ARGUMENTS

The Aforementioned Rules of Congress Dated May 28, 2004 Constitute an

Unconstitutional Delegation of Legislative Power to a Joint Committee of
Congress.

The Aforementioned Rules of Congress Dated May 28, 2004 Constitute an

Unconstitutional Amendment of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.

The Aforementioned Rules of Congress Dated May 28, 2004 Constitute an

Unconstitutional Deprivation and Derogation of the Rights and Prerogatives
 of Petitioners [sic] as Members [sic] of Congress.

By the Passage of the Aforementioned Rules Dated May 28, 2004, Congress
has Unlawfully Neglected the Performance of an Act which the Constitution
Specifically Enjoins as a Duty Resulting from Office. 2

In fine, the Petition raises two issues for resolution. First, whether the Rules on
Canvassing constitute an unconstitutional delegation of a non-ministerial power
vested exclusively by the Constitution in the Congress as a whole. Second, whether
the Rules on Canvassing deprives petitioner of his alleged rights and prerogatives to
be present, observe and participate in the determination of the authenticity and due
execution of the Certificates of Canvass for President and Vice-President.

As always, in exercising its power of judicial review, 3 this Court does not assert any
superiority over a co-equal branch of the government, but merely acts pursuant to
its mandated duty to determine whether an organ of government has acted within
the restrictions and limitations imposed by the Constitution. 4 Where an act of
Congress is shown to have outstripped the boundaries set by the Constitution, this
Court has not hesitated to declare the same null and void. 5 But, at the same time,
where constitutional infirmity has not been proven, this Court is duty bound to
uphold and respect the actions of the Legislature. 6

Matters of procedure and jurisdiction aside, for the reasons discussed hereunder, I
find that the issues raised in the Petition must be decided in the negative.

The national canvass of votes for President and Vice-President by Congress is

provided for in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, as follows: cSEAHa

Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct

vote of the people for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the
thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and shall end at
noon of the same date six years thereafter. The President shall not be
eligible for any reelection. No person who has succeeded as President and
has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to
the same office at any time.

No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms.

Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term
for which he was elected.

Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular elections for President and
Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May.

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President,

duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city,
shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of
the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the
President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the
day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the
 Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session,
and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due
execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the
votes.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be

proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal
and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be
chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both
Houses of the Congress, voting separately.

The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the
certificates.

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. (Emphasis
supplied)

Petitioner maintains that the foregoing solely and exclusively vested three tasks on
Congress, in its capacity as the National Board of Canvassers, to wit:

a) the President of the Senate shall open all the certificates of canvass in
the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives in joint
public session,

b) Congress shall determine the authenticity and due execution of all

certificates of canvass in the manner provided by law, and

c) Congress shall canvass the votes for presidential and vice-presidential

candidates. 7

Petitioner then argues that the following portions of the Rules on Canvassing:

Sec. 13. A Joint Committee shall be created composed of eleven (11)

members from the Senate to be appointed by the President of the Senate
and eleven (11) members from the House of Representatives to be
appointed by the Speaker. The Members of each House panel shall elect
among themselves their respective Chairman in the Joint Committee. The
Joint Committee may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in two (2) divisions of
eleven members each composed of a chairman, five (5) members from the
Senate and five (5) from the House of Representatives: Provided, That a
Member of Congress who is a candidate for President or Vice-President shall
not be eligible for appointment to the Joint Committee. Each division shall be
chaired by a Chairman of the Committee.

The Joint Committee shall, upon determination of the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass, preliminarily canvass the votes of
candidates for the offices of President and Vice-President.

The Representative of the province or city whose certificate of canvass is

 being canvassed shall be an ex-officio member of the Joint Committee,
without voting rights, for the duration of the canvassing of the aforesaid
certificate of canvass.

Sec. 14. The Joint Committee, en banc or in divisions, shall satisfy itself
that each certificate of canvass was duly executed, signed and
thumbmarked by the Chairman and Members of the provincial, city or
district Board of Canvassers concerned; that it contains the names of all the
candidates for President and Vice-President and their corresponding votes
in words and in figures; and there exists no discrepancy in other authentic
copies of the certificate of canvass or discrepancy in the votes of any
candidate in words and figures in the same certificate. . . .

Sec. 19. The Joint Committee, whether en banc or in divisions, shall

decide any question involving the Certificate of canvass by a majority vote of
its Members, each House panel voting separately. . . . (Rule VIII). 8
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

removed from Congress and transferred to the Joint Committee the functions of
(a) determining the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass
and (b) canvassing the votes for President and Vice-President, in contravention of
the Constitution.

This argument fails.

First, contrary to petitioner's assertions, the functions of determining the

authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass and the actual
canvassing of votes are both ministerial functions. Thus, in Lopez v. Roxas, 9 this
Court, noting that the function of Congress as the National Board of Canvassers was
essentially just like that of any municipal, city or provincial board of canvassers,
held:CSHcDT

Needless to say, the power of Congress to declare who, among

the candidates for President and/or Vice-President, has obtained
the largest number of votes, is entirely different in nature from
and not inconsistent with the jurisdiction vested in the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal by Republic Act No. 1793. Congress
merely acts as a national board of canvassers, charged with the
ministerial and executive duty to make said declaration, on the
basis of the election returns duly certified provincial and city
boards of canvassers. Upon the other hand, the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal has the judicial power to determine whether or not said duly
certified election returns have been irregularly made or tampered with, or
reflect the true result of the elections in the areas covered by each, and, if
not, to recount the ballots cast, and incidentally thereto, pass upon the
validity of each ballot or determine whether the same shall be counted, and,
in the affirmative, in whose favor, which Congress has power to do. 10
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied; italics in the original)

Petitioner, however, contends that the foregoing no longer holds since, unlike the
1935 or 1973 Constitutions, the 1987 Constitution vested Congress, as the National
Board of Canvassers, with "more than merely ministerial functions." In particular,
petitioner contends that the determination of the authenticity and due execution of
the certificates of canvass necessarily "requires the exercise of sound discretion
based upon informed judgement through the use of the faculty of the intellect." 11

Petitioner is mistaken.

A ministerial duty is one which is clear and specific leaving no room for the exercise
of discretion in its performance. Upon the other hand, a discretionary duty is that
which by its nature requires the exercise of judgment. 12

In general, the duty of a board of canvassers has been held to be purely ministerial
in function, its task being limited to mathematically computing the results of the
elections on the basis of the documents submitted to it. Thus, in Demafiles v.
Commission on Elections, 13 this Court held:
First, a canvassing board performs a purely ministerial function —
that of compiling and adding the results as they appear in the
returns transmitted to it. This is the teaching in Nacionalista Party
v. Commission on Elections : "the canvassers are to be satisfied of
the genuineness of the returns — namely, that the papers
presented to them are not forged and spurious, that they are
returns, and that they are signed by the proper officers. When so
satisfied, . . . they may not reject any returns because of
informalities in them or because of illegal and fraudulent practices
in the elections." Thus, they cannot pass upon the validity of an election
return, much less exclude it from the canvass on the ground that the votes
cast in the precinct from whence it came are illegal.

But the exclusion of the return in this case is sought to be justified on the
ground that it is "obviously manufactured" because, contrary to the
statement therein that there were 195 registered voters, of whom 188
voted, the certificate of the local election registrar states that only 182
voters had registered on October 30, 1967. Lagumbay v. Commission on
Elections is cited in support of this view. In Lagumbay the returns were
palpably false as it was indeed statistically improbable that "all the
eight candidates of one party garnered all the votes, each of them
receiving exactly the same number, whereas all the eight
candidates of the other party got precisely nothing." In other
words, the aid of evidence aliunde was not needed, as "the fraud
[being] so palpable from the return itself (res ipsa loquitur — the
thing speaks for itself), there is no reason to accept it and gives it
prima facie value." LLpr

On the other hand, the return in this case shows nothing on its face
from which the canvassers might conclude that it does not speak
the truth. It is only when it is compared with the certificate of the election
registrar that a discrepancy appears as to the number of registered voters.
The return therefore is by no means "obviously manufactured" so
 as to justify its exclusion.

This is not to belittle the respondent's claim that more people than registered
voters were allowed to vote in precinct 7. Perhaps that is true, although the
petitioner claims that after October 30, 1967 eight more voters were allowed
to register (making a total of 190 voters), and on the day of the election 5
voters erroneously assigned to precinct 6 were allowed to vote in precinct 7
because that was where they were really assigned. The point is simply
that this question should be threshed out in an election contest.
14 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The foregoing decisions also clearly illustrate that the duty of a board of canvassers
to authenticate the documents submitted to it, before tabulating the results is not
something new. Indeed, authentication is necessarily included in the task of
canvassing since only genuine documents which are in due form may be canvassed.
This, however, does not imply that a board of canvassers also exercises adjudicatory
powers to assume jurisdiction over allegations of electoral fraud or irregularity. Such
allegations may only be threshed out through an election contest before the proper
adjudicatory body. Thus, in Dizon v. Tizon, 15 this Court held:

We are of the opinion that the dismissal of the petition below is correct, and
that the remedy now sought against such dismissal should be denied.

1. The election return for precinct No. 18 of Dinalupihan is not "obviously

manufactured" within the meaning of our decision in Lagumbay vs.
Commission on Elections , G.R. No. L-25444, January 21, 1966. The said
return, as found by the lower court, is regular and complete on its face. In
fact, when it was canvassed by the provincial board of canvassers on
December 7, 1967, the petitioner did not raise any objection to it or point to
any defect or infirmity in its contents. The discrepancy on which the
petition was based is not one which appears on the face of the
return, but between the statement therein that 279 ballots had
been cast and an entirely different document, namely the
certification of the election registrar that only 80 voters actually
voted. This certification, as correctly explained by the trial court,
was not material insofar as the board of canvassers was
concerned, since its ministerial duty was to read and canvass the
results of the election on the basis of the returns, once satisfied
that the same were genuine. aADSIc

xxx xxx xxx

If there was any fraud or irregularity committed in the election in said

precinct; if, for example, some ballots were filled and cast by persons other
than the registered voters themselves, the election return could not, for that
reason, be considered as obviously manufactured. It would still reflect the
actual number of ballots found and counted, and the remedy to correct the
anomaly would be an election contest, not a petition to exclude the return in
question from the canvass and thus virtually annul the election in that
precinct. 16 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And in Abella v. Commission on Elections, 17 this Court stated:

. . . The issue is the refusal of the COMELEC to consider objections

to 24 election returns on which the board of canvassers had not
made a written ruling. But it would seem that, strictly speaking,
no ruling was necessary, or even proper. By the petitioners' own
contention "in all those 24 returns, the Christian name, nickname or
maternal surname of private respondent's husband was used with her
Christian name or nickname which, as we will show at length infra, did not
constitute a valid vote for private respondent. If so, the total 1,912 votes in
these returns credited for private respondent should be discounted." This
matter was obviously beyond the competence of the board of
canvassers to resolve. Neither was it cognizable in a pre-proclamation
controversy before the COMELEC as defined in Section 243 of the Omnibus
Election Code.

This provision reads as follows:

Sec. 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. —

The following shall be proper issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation
controversy:

(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;

(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material

defects, appear to be tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in
the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in
Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of this Code;

(c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion,
or intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and

(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places

were canvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing of the
aggrieved candidate or candidates.

The inclusion or exclusion in the canvass of certain election

returns where votes allegedly cast for Emeterio Larrazabal were
counted for his wife is an issue appropriate in an election contest
and not in a pre-proclamation controversy. And it is also immaterial
that, as also contended, the inclusion of such votes would affect the over-all
results of the election and swing it in his favor. The accepted rule is that as
long as the returns appear to be authentic and duly accomplished,
the board of canvassers cannot look beyond them to verify
allegations of irregularities in the casting or the counting of the
votes. These issues cannot be resolved by the board of canvassers. A
long line of decisions has established the doctrine that the board
of canvassers has only the ministerial task of tallying the votes as
reported in the election returns and cannot exercise the judicial
power of deciding an election contest. 18 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)ACIDTE
It does not appear from the text of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that the
phrase "upon determination of authenticity and due execution [of the certificates of
canvass] in the manner provided by law" was intended to confer anything more
than a ministerial duty on Congress and the National Board of Canvassers. In fact,
when this very point was raised during the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, Commissioner Maambong, the author of the amendment expressly
clarified that the duty of the National Board of Canvassers was ministerial in nature,
to wit:

MR. NOLLEDO:

I am referring to the use of the words "upon determination of

the authenticity and the execution thereof" on lines 7 and 8,
page 2, referring to the certificates of canvass of the
President and Vice- (page 391) President. Am I right if I say
that because of the use of these words, the duty of the
legislature to canvass is no longer ministerial?

MR. MAAMBONG:

Madam President, the word "ministerial" has always been

interpreted by the Supreme Court as applicable to the
canvass made by the national Assembly, and the reason why
we did not put the word "ministerial" in the Article is, it has
been understood in the case of Roxas v. Lopez and in other
cases. When we used the words "authenticity" and "genuineness,"
the question refers to the problem of whether or not the ministerial
function is already nonministerial. The answer is, it is still
ministerial, but when we say "authenticity and due
execution," what it really means is that the national Assembly
will look at the certificates of canvass and find out from the
face of the document whether there are flaws in the
execution and authenticity of the document. That is what it
means.

MR. NOLLEDO:

Madam President, in the event that the legislature finds out that there
are serious defects in the certificates of canvass — as when the seals
are broken, there are a lot of erasures and then many of them are
unsigned and, therefore, authenticity appears to be questionable —
what will happen?

MR. MAAMBONG:

The answer to that is the phrase "in the manner provided by law." The
Committee had to insert the phrase "in the manner provided
by law" so that the legislature itself will find out and will
make it very specific as to what flaws or deficiencies in the
certificates of canvass can be taken cognizance of by the
canvassing board of tellers, because as of now the guiding
 regulations that govern the National Assembly, as I mentioned in the
Committee, are: the rules and regulations of the COMELEC, the
Omnibus Election Code, the jurisprudence from the decisions of the
Supreme Court. All these things taken together, the legislature is
given a notice by using the phrase "in the manner provided
by law," so that it will make a determination now of what are
the points which the board of tellers can take cognizance of,
because it is not very clear right now under the laws and regulations,
and as a matter of fact, that was one of the controversies which
arose during the canvassing of the votes of President Aquino and
former President Marcos in the last Batasan. 19 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Indeed a contrary interpretation is not possible because the last paragraph of the
very same constitutional provision vests the power to adjudicate electoral
controversies concerning the positions of President and Vice-President exclusively
with the Supreme Court, viz.: EcTCAD

xxx xxx xxx

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose

An examination of Section 30 of Republic Act 7166, the implementing law referred

to in the above-cited constitutional provision, removes all doubt as to the ministerial
character of the duties and functions of the Congress as the National Board of
Canvassers:

Sec. 30. Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the Election
of President and Vice-President: Determination of Authenticity and Due
Execution of Certificates of Canvass. — Congress shall determine the
authenticity and due execution of the certificate of canvass for
President and Vice-President as accomplished and transmitted to
it by the local boards of canvassers, on a showing that: (1) each
certificate of canvass was executed, signed and thumbmarked by
the chairman and members of the board of canvassers and
transmitted or caused to be transmitted to Congress by them; (2)
each certificate of canvass contains the names of all of the
candidates for President and Vice-President and their
corresponding votes in words and in figures; and (3) there exists
no discrepancy in other authentic copies of the certificate of
canvass or discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words and
figures in the certificate.

When the certificate of canvass, duly certified by the board of canvassers of

each province, city or district, appears to be incomplete, the Senate
President shall require the board of canvassers concerned to transmit by
personal delivery, the election returns from polling places that were not
included in the certificate of canvass and supporting statements. Said
 election returns shall be submitted by personal delivery within two (2) days
from receipt of notice. AISHcD

When it appears that any certificate of canvass or supporting statement of

votes by precinct bears erasures or alterations which may cast doubt as to
the veracity of the number of votes stated therein and may affect the result
of the election, upon request of the Presidential or Vice-Presidential
candidate concerned or his party, Congress shall, for the sole purpose of
verifying the actual number of votes cast for President and Vice-President,
count the votes as they appear in the copies of the election returns
submitted to it. (Emphasis supplied)

The foregoing clearly limits the authentication of the certificates of canvass to (1) a
physical examination of the certificates themselves to determine whether: (a) each
certificate was executed, signed and thumbmarked by the chairman and members
of the board of canvassers and transmitted to Congress by them, (b) each certificate
of canvass contains the names of all of the candidates for President and Vice-
President and their corresponding votes in words and in figures, and (c) there is a
discrepancy between the words and figures in the votes of any of the candidates;
and (2) a physical comparison to determine any discrepancies between the
certificates transmitted to the Congress and the other authentic copies of the
certificate of canvass.

These tasks are purely mechanical and therefore clearly ministerial in nature and do
not require "the exercise of sound discretion based upon informed judgment
through the use of the faculty of the intellect."

Second, a reading of the questioned Rules on Canvassing shows that there has been
no delegation by Congress of its duties as the National Board of Canvassers to an
entity separate and distinct from Congress itself. To delegate means to transfer
authority from one person to another; to empower one to perform a task in behalf
of another; 20 to transfer authority by one branch of government in which such
authority is vested to some other branch or administrative agency. 21

By promulgating the questioned Rules on Canvassing, all Congress has done is refer
to the Joint Committee the mechanical and ministerial tasks of (1) physically
examining the certificates of canvass for irregularities or discrepancies, as provided
for in Section 30 of Republic Act 7166, and (2) tabulating the votes of the respective
candidates:

SEC. 14. The Joint Committee, en banc or in divisions, shall satisfy itself
that each certificate of canvass was duly executed, signed and thumb
marked by the Chairman and Members of the provincial, city or district
Board of Canvassers concerned; that it contains the names of all the
candidates for President and Vice-President and their corresponding votes
in words and in figures; and there exists no discrepancy in other authentic
copies of the certificate of canvass or discrepancy in the votes or any
candidate in words and figures in the same certificate.

xxx xxx xxx

 SEC. 22. The Joint Committee en banc shall tabulate the votes and, for
this purpose, may avail of the services of an independent
accounting/auditing firm to assist in the tabulation and canvass of votes.

After the certificates of canvass and the statement of votes have been
tabulated, any Member of Congress may request in writing for copies
thereof from the Secretariat prior to the consideration of any interim or final
report to the joint session.

However, the same Rules on Canvassing clearly provides that Congress, as a

whole, retains control over the canvassing process. Thus, any determination
made by the Joint Committee as well as the preliminary canvass itself is subject to
the final approval of both House of Congress, voting separately, thus: IHCSTE

SEC. 19. The Joint Committee, whether en banc or in divisions, shall

decide any question involving the certificate of canvass by a majority vote of
its Members, each House panel voting separately. Any such decision shall
be subject to approval by the joint session, the Senate and the
House of Representatives voting separately. In case the two Houses
disagree, the decision of the President of the Senate, in consultation with the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall prevail.

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 23. The Joint Committee, en banc or in divisions, shall meet eight (8)
hours a day from Monday to Friday until all the certificates of canvass
referred to it by the joint public session shall have been canvassed. The
final report shall be submitted by the Joint Committee en banc to
the joint public session for its approval, each House voting
separately.

SEC. 24. Notwithstanding the fact that not all certificates of canvass
have been received, the Joint Committee may submit to the joint public
session its final report with the recommendation to terminate the canvass if
the total number of registered voters corresponding to the province, city or
district covered by the certificates of canvass not yet transmitted would no
longer affect the results of the election. Congress in joint public session,
voting separately, shall immediately act on the final report.

The Joint Committee may, in its discretion, submit interim report to the joint
public session whenever there is a need for guidance or direction from
Congress: Provided, That objections raised and rulings made thereon shall
no longer be included in the final report.

SEC. 25. At least a majority of the Members from each House panel shall
sign the final report of the Joint Committee. Every Member shall be provided
with a copy of the final report and shall be given twenty-four (24) hours
within which to submit his concurring or dissenting opinion.

SEC. 26. During the joint public session, the Member designated by the
Joint Committee shall speak for not more than one hour on the report and
 the accompanying resolution approving the report of the Joint Committee,
declaring the results of the canvass and proclaiming the President-elect and
Vice-President-elect. The Member designated by those against the report
shall also speak for not more than one hour. Subsequent speakers for or
against the resolution shall be allowed to speak for not more than three
hours: Provided, That one (1) speaker for each candidate shall be given the
opportunity to speak for not more than twenty minutes.

RULE X
PROCLAMATION

SEC. 27. Upon termination of the canvass and approval of the

Joint Committee report and the accompanying resolution by
majority of all the Members of both Houses voting separately in
the joint public session, Congress through the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall
forthwith proclaim the President-elect and the Vice-President-
elect. (Emphasis supplied)

The foregoing provisions also make it abundantly clear that it is Congress, as a

whole and meeting in joint session, and not the Joint Committee, which has the
ultimate authority to proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-
President.

Petitioner nonetheless insists that even such a referral by Congress to its own Joint
Committee is proscribed since the Constitution allegedly requires that the functions
of the National Board of Canvassers should be performed by all the members of
both Houses of Congress acting together. Thus, so he argues, there is nothing in the
Constitution which allows Congress to refer the physical inspection and comparison
of the certificates of canvass and the mechanical tabulation of the votes cast for
each candidate to the Joint Committee. 22 TCacIA

Petitioner's argument stands a basic principle of Constitutional law on its head. It is

axiomatic that the presumption is in favor of constitutionality. 23 To strike down a
law or rule as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing that
what the fundamental law prohibits, the law or rule permits. 24

While there is nothing to prevent Congress from undertaking the authentication

and canvassing of the certificates through a committee of the whole, if it so chooses,
there is also nothing in the text of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that
prohibits Congress from referring the authentication and tabulation of the
certificates of canvass to a bicameral committee. Indeed, the only task expressly
required by the Constitution to be done in the presence of the all the Senators and
representatives is the opening by the Senate President of all the certificates of
canvass at the start of the joint session of Congress.

Petitioner's attempt to draw parallels between the canvassing procedure provided

for in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution and the impeachment procedures
provided for in Sections 1 to 3 of Article XI 25 does not persuade. A reading of the
provisions of Article XI readily demonstrates the detailed manner by which the
Constitution sets forth the procedures for impeachment, even to the extent of
specifying the number of session days between each phase of the impeachment
process. In contrast, aside from specifying the manner by which the certificates of
canvass are transmitted to Congress, the date for the opening of the certificates by
the Senate President, and that the person with the highest number of votes shall be
proclaimed elected, 26 Section 4 of Article VII gives wide latitude to Congress to
determine the manner by which to undertake the canvass of votes. HcACTE

To be sure, there is nothing irregular or sinister in the referral by Congress of the

authentication and tabulation functions to the Joint Committee. As a matter of
convenience and expediency, both Houses of Congress regularly refer matters to
their respective Committees for study and recommendation. In Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance, 27 where the validity of amendments introduced by a
bicameral conference committee of both Houses of Congress in a tax bill was put
into question, this Court, speaking through Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, held:

Nor is there any doubt about the power of a conference committee to insert
new provisions as long as these are germane to the subject of the
conference. As this Court held in Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227
SCRA 703 (1993), in an opinion written by then Justice Cruz, the jurisdiction
of the conference committee is not limited to resolving differences between
the Senate and the House. It may propose an entirely new provision. What
is important is that its report is subsequently approved by the
respective houses of Congress. This Court ruled that it would not
entertain allegations that, because new provisions had been added by the
conference committee, there was thereby a violation of the constitutional
injunction that "upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be
allowed."

Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners'

charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill
that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its
final form were not distributed among the members of each House.
Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the
measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec.
26(2), of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances
from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe,
at the very least, a becoming courtesy. (Id., at 710. [Emphasis
added]) CSDAIa

It is interesting to note the following description of conference committees in

the Philippines in a 1979 study:

Conference committees may be of two types: free or instructed.

These committees may be given instructions by their parent bodies or
they may be left without instructions. Normally the conference
committees are without instructions, and this is why they are often
critically referred to as "the little legislatures." Once bills have been
sent to them, the conferees have almost unlimited authority to change
the clauses of the bills and in fact sometimes introduce new measures
 that were not in the original legislation. No minutes are kept, and
members' activities on conference committees are difficult to
determine. One congressman known for his idealism put it this way: "I
killed a bill on export incentives for my interest group [copra] in the
conference committee but I could not have done so anywhere else."
The conference committee submits a report to both houses, and
usually it is accepted. If the report is not accepted, then the
committee is discharged and new members are appointed. (R.
Jackson, Committees in the Philippine Congress , in COMMITTEES AND
LEGISLATURES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 163 (J.D. LEES AND M.
SHAW, eds.))

In citing this study, we pass no judgment on the methods of conference

committees. We cite it only to say that conference committees here are no
different from their counterparts in the United States whose vast powers we
noted in Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, supra. At all events, under
Art. VI, §16(3) each house has the power "to determine the rules of its
proceedings," including those of its committees. Any meaningful change in
the method and procedures of Congress or its committees must therefore
be sought in that body itself. 28DSETcC

If parts of the legislative process, which are unquestionably both sovereign and
discretionary in character, may be referred to a bicameral committee in the interest
of efficiency and expediency, there is no reason why the ministerial tasks of
authentication and tabulation of certificates of canvass cannot similarly be referred
to the Joint Committee created by the Rules on Canvassing.

As a second line of argument, petitioner claims that the Rules on Canvassing unduly
deprives him of his rights and prerogatives to be present at, observe and participate
in the determination of the authenticity and due execution of all certificates of
canvass. 29

Petitioner's claim is without constitutional basis. The rights he asserts are not to be
found within the four corners of the Constitution. In fact the only individual
member of Congress on whom the Constitution imposes specific duties with regard
to the canvass is the Senate President, who is responsible for the reception and
opening of the certificates of canvass.

More importantly, and contrary to petitioner's assertions, the Rules on Canvassing

adequately provides each member of Congress with an opportunity to observe the
canvassing and to make known his views on the Report of Joint Committee:

Sec. 13. A Joint Committee shall be created composed of eleven (11)

members from the Senate to be appointed by the President of the Senate
and eleven (11) members from the House of Representatives to be
appointed by the Speaker. The Members of each House panel shall elect
among themselves their respective Chairman in the Joint Committee. The
Joint Committee may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in two (2) divisions of
eleven members each composed of a chairman, five (5) members from the
Senate and five (5) from the House of Representatives: Provided, That a
Member of Congress who is a candidate for President or Vice-President shall
not be eligible for appointment to the Joint Committee. Each division shall be
chaired by a Chairman of the Committee.

The Joint Committee shall, upon determination of the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass, preliminarily canvass the votes of
candidates for the offices of President and Vice-President.

The Representative of the province or city whose certificate of

canvass is being canvassed shall be an ex-officio member of the
Joint Committee, without voting rights, for the duration of the
canvassing of the aforesaid certificate of canvass.

SEC. 19. The Joint Committee, whether en banc or in divisions, shall

decide any question involving the certificate of canvass by a majority vote of
its Members, each House panel voting separately. Any such decision shall
be subject to approval by the joint session, the Senate and the
House of Representatives voting separately. In case the two Houses
disagree, the decision of the President of the Senate, in consultation with the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall prevail.

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 22. The Joint Committee en banc shall tabulate the votes and, for
this purpose, may avail of the services of an independent
accounting/auditing firm to assist in the tabulation and canvass of votes.

After the certificates of canvass and the statement of votes have

been tabulated, any Member of Congress may request in writing
for copies thereof from the Secretariat prior to the consideration
of any interim or final report to the joint session.

SEC. 23. The Joint Committee, en banc or in divisions, shall meet eight (8)
hours a day from Monday to Friday until all the certificates of canvass
referred to it by the joint public session shall have been canvassed. The
final report shall be submitted by the Joint Committee en banc to
the joint public session for its approval, each House voting
separately. CAacTH

SEC. 24. Notwithstanding the fact that not all certificates of canvass
have been received, the Joint Committee may submit to the joint public
session its final report with the recommendation to terminate the canvass if
the total number of registered voters corresponding to the province, city or
district covered by the certificates of canvass not yet transmitted would no
longer affect the results of the election. Congress in joint public session,
voting separately, shall immediately act on the final report.

The Joint Committee may, in its discretion, submit interim report to the joint
public session whenever there is a need for guidance or direction from
Congress: Provided, That objections raised and rulings made thereon shall
no longer be included in the final report.
 SEC. 25. At least a majority of the Members from each House panel shall
sign the final report of the Joint Committee. Every Member shall be
provided with a copy of the final report and shall be given twenty-
four (24) hours within which to submit his concurring or dissenting
opinion.

SEC. 26. During the joint public session, the Member designated by the
Joint Committee shall speak for not more than one hour on the report and
the accompanying resolution approving the report of the Joint Committee,
declaring the results of the canvass and proclaiming the President-elect and
Vice-President-elect. The Member designated by those against the
report shall also speak for not more than one hour. Subsequent
speakers for or against the resolution shall be allowed to speak
for not more than three hours: Provided, That one (1) speaker for
each candidate shall be given the opportunity to speak for not
more than twenty minutes.

RULE X
PROCLAMATION

SEC. 27. Upon termination of the canvass and approval of the

Joint Committee report and the accompanying resolution by
majority of all the Members of both Houses voting separately in
the joint public session, Congress through the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall
forthwith proclaim the President-elect and the Vice-President-
elect. (Emphasis supplied) IacHAE

The Rules on Canvassing likewise provides for mechanisms by which the candidates,
through their representatives, may participate in the canvassing process:

Section 8. Each candidate shall be entitled to two watchers from

a team of five watchers who shall have access to an unimpeded
view of the entire canvassing proceedings. They shall register their
attendance before the Joint Committee and shall keep vigilant watch over the
ballot boxes from the time the same are received in the House of
Representatives until the canvassing proceedings are terminated.

Each candidate shall likewise be entitled to attorneys who shall

serve during the entire canvassing proceedings. The attorneys shall
register their appearances before the Joint Committee: Provided, That only
one attorney for every candidate may argue and question any
certificate of canvassconsidered by the Joint Committee for not
more than five (5) minutes which may be extended for a similar period by
the chairman when the need arises without prejudice to the right to
submit a written memorandum not later than twenty-four (24)
hours from the time the objection was raised. No extension of the
period to submit shall be allowed, and if no memorandum is submitted with
the said period, the right shall be considered waived. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
 as well as remedies in case patent irregularities and discrepancies are discovered
in the certificates of canvass: AaDSEC

Section 17. When it appears that any certificate of canvass or

supporting statement of votes by precinct bears erasures or
alterations which may cast doubt as to the veracity of the number
of votes stated therein and may affect the result of the election,
upon request of the Presidential or Vice-Presidential candidate
concerned or his party, Congress shall, for the sole purpose of
verifying the actual number of votes cast for President and Vice-President,
count the votes as they appear in the copies of the election
returns submitted to it. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

The procedure adopted by Congress is not without rational basis. The procedure
embodied in the questioned Rules on Canvassing is evidently intended to
accomplish both a speedy and accurate canvass. On the other hand, while there
appears to be little to be gained in the way of accuracy if the authentication and
canvass of the certificates were undertaken by both Houses of Congress as a whole,
much time may be lost by such a procedure.

It may not be amiss to point out that the timeliness of the canvassing and the
proclamation of the President-elect and Vice-President-elect is also of concern. It is a
general policy of our elections laws that controversies arising before the
proclamation of winning candidates should be dealt with in a summary manner so
that the canvass and proclamation be delayed as little as possible. Hence, questions
involving the appreciation of votes and the conduct of the election campaign and
the voting itself, which require more deliberate and necessarily longer
consideration, are properly the subject matter of election protests before the
appropriate adjudicatory body. 30 In the recent case of Sandoval v. Commission on
Elections, 31 this Court had occasion to state:
On the first issue, we uphold the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the
petitions filed by private respondent. As a general rule, candidates and
registered political parties involved in an election are allowed to file pre-
proclamation cases before the COMELEC. Pre-proclamation cases refer to
any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of
canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered
political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with
the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and
236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of election returns. The COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction
over all pre-proclamation controversies. As an exception, however, to
the general rule, Section 15 of Republic Act (RA) 7166 prohibits
candidates in the presidential, vice-presidential, senatorial and
congressional elections from filing pre-proclamation cases. It states:
AacSTE

"SECTION 15. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed in Elections for

President, Vice-President, senator, and Members of the House of
Representatives. — For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-
 President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, no
pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of
election returns or the certificates of canvass, as the case may be.
However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate
canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of an
interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of
canvass or election returns before it."

The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the

winner in the election, which delay might result in a vacuum in
these sensitive posts. . . . 32 (Emphasis supplied)

Verily, the will of the people is no less frustrated by undue delays in the canvass and
proclamation of the winning candidates as by other forms of electoral fraud.

Finally, it may be observed that, because there can only be one winner, elections
naturally provoke intense competition among the candidates vying for elective
office. And in a close race for the highest executive position, fierce partisan political
activity is but to be expected. But once the electoral process has moved beyond
election day itself and all that is left to be done is to ascertain the will of the people
as expressed through the ballot, it is to be hoped that the members of both Houses
of Congress, politicians though they may be, will remember the words of Manuel
Luis Quezon, first President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, and realize
that loyalty to their party ends where loyalty to their country begins.

WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the Petition.

CALLEJO, SR., J., concurring:

I concur with the encompassing separate opinion of my esteemed colleague, Mr.

Justice Reynato S. Puno.

I am convinced that Congress, when it acts as the National Board of Canvassers in

the presidential and vice-presidential elections conformably with Section 4, Article
VII of the Constitution, does not merely perform a ministerial function, but exercises
quasi-judicial powers when it determines the authenticity and due execution of the
certificates of canvass. In fact, this is one of the substantial changes introduced in
the 1987 Constitution. In his sponsorship speech, Commissioner Lorenzo M.
Sumulong, Chairman of the Committee of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
which drafted the Article on the Executive Department, explained:

The first constitutional change that I will mention is the canvassing of votes
for President and Vice-President. In the 1973 Constitution, the provision on
canvassing of votes for President and Vice-President is as follows:

The returns of every election for President, duly certified by the board
of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the
Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa, who shall, not later than thirty
days after the day of the election, and in the presence of the Batasang
 Pambansa, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be
counted.

It will be remembered that many of the certificates of canvass received from

each province and city by the Batasang Pambasa were objected to by the
supporters of Aquino and Laurel. But based on this provision of the 1973
Constitution, after the certificates of canvass had been opened, the Speaker
immediately announced the results of the canvass and proclaimed President
Marcos and Mr. Tolentino as elected President and Vice-President,
respectively.aSADIC

In the Article on the Executive that is submitted for consideration, it is now

provided that after the certificates of canvass had been opened, the
counting and canvassing of votes for the President and Vice-President shall
not immediately be made because, first, there should be a determination of
the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass before the
votes may be canvassed. That appears in Section 4 of the Article. . . . 1

The discussion between Messrs. Regalado E. Maambong and Jose N. Nolledo, both
members of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, on this point is, likewise,
particularly instructive:

MR. NOLLEDO:

I am referring to the use of the words "upon determination of the

authenticity and due execution thereof" on lines 7 and 8, page 2,
referring to the certificates of canvass of the President and Vice-
President. Am I right if I say that because of the use of these words,
the duty of the legislature to canvass is no longer ministerial?

MR. MAAMBONG:

Madam President, the word "ministerial" has always been interpreted by

the Supreme Court as applicable to the canvass made by the National
Assembly, and the reason why we did not put the word "ministerial" in
the Article is, it has been understood in Roxas v. Lopez and in other
cases. When we used the words "authenticity" and "genuineness," the
question refers to the problem of whether or not the ministerial
function is already non-ministerial. The answer is, it is still ministerial
but when we say "authenticity and due execution," what it really
means is that the National Assembly will look at the certificates of
canvass and find out from the face of the document whether there
are flaws in the execution and authenticity of the document. That is
what it means. HDTSCc

MR. NOLLEDO:

Madam President, in the event that the legislature finds out that there
are serious defects in the certificates of canvass — as when the seals
are broken, there are a lot of erasures and then many of them are
unsigned and, therefore, authenticity appears to be questionable —
 what will happen?

MR. MAAMBONG:

The answer to that is in the phrase "in the manner provided by law." The
Committee had to insert the phrase "in the manner provided by law"
so that the legislature itself will find out and will make it very specific as
to what flaws or deficiencies in the certificates of canvass can be
taken cognizance of by the canvassing board of tellers, because as of
now, the guiding regulations that govern the National Assembly, as I
mentioned in the Committee, are: the rules and regulations of the
COMELEC, the Omnibus Election Code, the jurisprudence from the
decisions of the Supreme Court. All these things taken together, the
legislature is given a notice by using the phrase "in the manner
provided by law," so that it will make a determination now of what are
the points which the board of tellers can take cognizance of, because
it is not very clear right now under the laws and regulations, and as a
matter of fact, that was one of the controversies which arose during
the canvassing of the votes of President Aquino and former President
Marcos in the last Batasan. 2

A purely ministerial act or duty is one in which an officer or tribunal performs in a

given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment, upon the propriety
of the act done. 3 As my esteemed colleague, Justice Jose C. Vitug, in his separate
opinion in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, 4 succinctly put it, "a
ministerial duty is an obligation the performance of which, being adequately
defined, does not allow the use of further judgment or discretion." Congress, as the
sole body tasked to canvass the votes for the President and Vice-President, is
mandated to make a "determination of the authenticity and due execution" of the
certificates of canvass before it proceeds to canvass the same. As such, it cannot be
said to perform a purely ministerial function but it exercises a quasi-judicial function
as well. It has been said that where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that
it is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the exercise of function of a
judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-
judicial. 5

In this sense, the function of Congress, as the National Board of Canvassers in the
presidential and vice-presidential elections, is akin to that of the municipal,
provincial or city boards of canvassers. These boards of canvassers are said to
exercise quasi-judicial powers as they are tasked to determine the due execution
and authenticity of the certificates of canvass or the election returns as the case
may be before them:

. . . We do not discern in the law a purpose to throw the burden on courts

where it is patent — as in the case here — that tampering of the returns
occurred after they have left the hands of the election inspectors, just to
pave the way for the proclamation of a candidate in whose favor falsification
was resorted to. To tie up the hands of the board of canvassers in the
situation here presented is to wink at a brazen form of wrong-doing to
 subvert the people's will, and in mockery crown the loser with victory.
Correctly then, canvassers are given quasi-judicial powers to determine
whether the return is genuine and to disregard one which is obviously a
forgery. Along parallel lines, this Court, in Nacionalista Party v. Commission
on Elections . . ., declared that the canvassing board could accept as correct
those returns transmitted to it "which are in due form;" that they must "be
satisfied of the genuineness of the returns — namely, that the papers
presented to them are not forged and spurious;" and that "where the
returns are obviously manufactured, . . . the board will not be compelled to
canvass them. 6

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

TINGA, J.:

The tradition of judicial review is as old as the essences of the democratic system of
government we practice today. 1 This Court has consistently affirmed the doctrine,
dating as far back as the Commonwealth era. 2 Judicial review arises from the
inherent judicial power, and has traditionally relied on no statutory grant other than
the source law that created the judicial system. 3 DTaAHS

At the same time, the notion of separation of powers is a linchpin of our

constitutional order. Coordinate political departments are accorded their respective
spheres over which they exercise discretion to manage. It is a rule that promotes
efficient governance, and, perhaps more importantly, institutionalizes the system of
checks and balances within the government.

These two doctrines are hardly antithetical. Judicial review ensures that the other
branches of government obey the Constitution. 4 It also shields one branch from
undue interference by another. On the other hand, the Court should restrain itself
from unduly interfering in the affairs of co-equal branches of government. Indeed,
the unwarranted exercise of the judicial power would be judicial activism at its most
egregious.

Cognizant that unwarranted judicial review may breach both the traditional
deference accorded by the judiciary to the coordinate political departments and the
presumption of validity accorded to their actions, jurisprudence has fostered the
evolution of the "political question" doctrine as a form of autolimitation of the
judicial power. The traditional stance of the Court has been to desist from deciding
issues that may properly be classified as political questions. A political question
refers to a question of policy or to issues which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government. 5

In our country, the "political question" doctrine has undergone some rethinking,
particularly in light of the misuse of the doctrine during the martial law era. The
incorporation of Article VIII, Section 1 6 in the 1987 Constitution has especially
affected this Court's thinking on the political question doctrine. 7
Yet while nobody pretends that Section 1, Article VIII invented judicial review in the
Philippines, I likewise submit that the same article did not render the "political
question" inconsequential. Section 1, Article VIII has crystallized into a
constitutional command decades of jurisprudence affirming this Court's exercise of
judicial review, as balanced by the political question doctrine. Neither have the
contours of judicial review been altered by the new provision. Its effect is simply
this: with judicial duty cast not only as a power but also as a duty, no longer can this
Court refuse to correct a coordinate branch's act of grave abuse of discretion simply
on the premise that it constitutes a political question, as it had done in the past. 8

The petition is unable to show any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Congress in promulgating the canvassing rules. Shorn of this essential element, the
Court is left with nothing to review but an act of a coordinate branch of government
which is textually committed to Congress by Article VII, Section 4 of the
Constitution. 9 This is a political question, and the Court should not extend due
course to the petition.

This leads to an important point which the Court should not overlook. The mere
incantation by a petitioner of "grave abuse of discretion" is not a passport to this
Court's jurisdiction. If upon initial review, it appears that no grave abuse of
discretion attends the questioned political act, the Court should say so, and say
nothing more.

Moreover, an express rejection of jurisdiction over political questions bereft of grave

abuse of discretion serves not only as an act of courtesy to the co-equal branch, but
also as an act of deference to the Constitution. While the Court should not hesitate
to compel an errant branch into obeying the Constitution, it should also
acknowledge when the other branches are obeying the Constitution, and that the
Court itself is observing its own constitutional mandate by reusing to interfere. HcTSDa

The present petition serves as a perfect opportunity to desist and reject.

The basic issue proposed by petitioner is whether the rules of canvass ("Rules")
promulgated relative to the 10 May 2004 elections are constitutional. 10 In support
of his thesis that the Rules are unconstitutional, petitioner makes four arguments;
that the Rules are an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to a joint
committee of Congress; that the Rules amend Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution; that the Rules deprive petitioner of his rights and prerogatives as a
member of congress; and by enforcement of the Rules, Congress neglects
performing its constitutionally enjoined duty. 11

On the arguments raised by the petitioner, the result is clear-cut. The petition is
palpably without merit.

First, the Rules does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative

power. The power to canvass votes is not inherently legislative, as it does not
pertain to the enactment of legislation. 12 By traditional concept, the non-delegation
rule means that
Congress may not constitutionally delegate its legislative power to another branch
of government. 13

At the same time, pursuing this point is ultimately needless, as despite petitioner's
claim, there really is no delegation made by Congress. A clear examination of the
Rules reveals that therein, Congress retains the right to open the certificates of
canvass and canvass the votes. cACDaH

Second, the Rules does not amend Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution by
providing for an unconstitutional method for canvassing the votes.

Congress is expressly granted the power to promulgate rules for the canvassing of
the certificates. 14 By virtue of this express right, the Rules were promulgated by
Congress. The Joint Committee does not have any authority or power except that
granted to it under the questioned Rules. Even then, its power is limited only to
functioning as a preparatory or preliminary body to speed up and make more
efficient the canvassing of the votes. 15 The Joint Committee's acts and
determinations do not have any force and effect unless approved by the whole of
Congress. 16

The canvassing of the votes under the questioned Rules is still the act of Congress
as one whole body. The findings of the Joint Committee do not bind Congress unless
approved in a joint public session. 17 Accordingly, Congress may choose to overrule
the findings and determinations made by the Joint Committee.

The assailed Rules, and the procedure laid therein, are but an offshoot of legislative
practice. 18 Congress, as a matter of legislative practice, functions by way of
delegation towards committees. The formation of congressional committees arises
from plenary power possessed by the legislative body for all purposes of civil
government. 19 The entire House or Senate is too large to conduct basic functions,
such as to conduct investigations in aid of legislation, and thus must always use a
committee. 20 A bill that is filed in Congress is always referred for preliminary
consideration to the particular congressional committee which would have
specialized competence to examine the merits of the proposed law. Yet, while the
final report of the congressional committee as to the proposed bill may have
persuasive effect on the body as a whole, it is by no means binding. In fact,
Congress as a whole has the power to revive a bill that has been tabled due to
unfavorable action by the congressional committee. 21 HDCTAc

The assailed Rules is premised on realistic considerations that also govern the daily
legislative grind: that owing to the sheer volume of work and the number of
legislators, it would be counter-productive to have every and any preliminary
matter to be voted upon by every member of the House or Senate.

The procedure outlined in the questioned Rules does not in any way contravene Sec.
4, Article VII of the Constitution. In fact, it strictly adheres to the provision. Under
the Rules, the Senate President opens the certificates of canvass in the presence of
the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session. 22 Upon
approval by Congress in joint public session of the Joint Committee report, Congress
as one whole body is deemed to have determined the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates and canvassed the certificate of votes.

Third, the questionedRules does not emasculate the representatives who are not
members of the Joint Committee since the Rules specifically provides avenues for
each member of Congress to voice out any dissent to the opinions and conclusions
of the Joint Committee. Petitioner will be entitled to avail of all his legislative
privileges and exert his persuasive powers during that time certain when the
Congress as a whole would deliberate on and approve the Joint Committee's
resolution of any question involving a certificate of canvass, 23 the final report of the
Joint Committee, 24 and the resolution proclaiming the President and Vice-
President-elect. 25

In light of my earlier discussion, petitioner's fourth argument hardly bears

discussion. Contrary to his claim, Congress did not abdicate from its constitutional
duties to canvass the presidential and vice-presidential elections. The Joint
Committee canvass is merely a preliminary canvass, with the final canvass results
subject to approval by the entire Congress.

These are the only issues for resolution before the Court, and they can be concisely
dispensed with. Given the scope and limitations of these issues presented before us,
it would be improvident of this Court to discuss issues which are not
raised, or to engage in a "preemptive strike" based on speculative
musings that in its wisdom, Congress will be misguided by erroneous
principles in the future conduct of its canvass. By doing so, this Court will act
in excess of its jurisdiction, by ruling upon matters which have not been duly raised
before us. The Court does not issue advisory opinions. 26 This holds true,
especially in the face of temptation to dictate to a co-equal branch how it should act,
despite the absence of any justiciable question that would warrant such intrusion.

In fine, it is not the business of the Court to dictate on Congress as to how it should
perform its task as the national canvassing board, as its mandate was derived from
no less than the fundamental law. Should it fail to fulfill its mandate, it is
accountable not to this Court, but to the sovereign people.

Of course, there are laws which governs the conduct of the national canvass.
Republic Act No. 7166, passed in 1991, is one such law. Section 15 thereof provides:

Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed in Elections for President,

Vice-President, Senator, and Members of the House of Representatives. —
For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and
Member of the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall
be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt,
custody and appreciation of election returns or the certificates of canvass,
as the case may be. However, this does not preclude the authority of the
appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of an
interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or
election returns before it.
SIaHDA
It is clear that Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166 prohibits pre-proclamation cases
in elections for President and Vice-President. This would extend to questions
pertaining to the appreciation of election returns or certificates of canvass. The only
exception would be to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass. The Court
in Chavez v. COMELEC 27 defined "manifest errors" as those that must appear on
the face of the certificates of canvass or election returns sought to be corrected, and
an objection thereto must have been made before the board of canvassers and
specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings. For the purpose of
the presidential/vice-presidential canvass, the Court's definition in Chavez must be
qualified, since Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution mandates that Congress
inspect only the certificates of canvass. Verily, I submit that such manifest errors
which may be corrected only pertain to the certificates of canvass in the case of
presidential and vice-presidential elections.

The Court, through Justice Puno, explained the reason for Section 15 in Sandoval v.
COMELEC:
The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the
winner in the election, which delay might result in a vacuum in
these sensitive posts. The law, nonetheless, provides an exception to the
exception. The second sentence of Section 15 allows the filing of petitions
for correction of manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election
returns even in elections for president, vice-president and members of the
House of Representatives for the simple reason that the correction of
manifest error will not prolong the process of canvassing nor
delay the proclamation of the winner in the election. This rule is
consistent with and complements the authority of the COMELEC under the
Constitution to, "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an, election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall" and
its power to "decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions
affecting elections. 28 (emphasis supplied)

The limitations imposed on the national board of canvassers are thus clear. The
question which must be resolved by the canvassers is whether there is
prima facie basis for the proclamation of the president and the vice-
president. Matters which may be inquired into through a pre-proclamation protest,
as laid down in Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code, are not justiciable by
Congress acting as the Board of Canvassers. 29

Populist arguments aside, there are fundamental policy considerations why

Congress is proscribed by law from entertaining pre-proclamation controversies, or
inquiring into the intrinsic validity of the certificates of canvass. First, there is the
abhorrence of vacuum in the "sensitive posts" 30 of President and Vice-President.
The Constitution provides that the term of office of the president shall begin on the
thirtieth day of June. 31 While the Constitution provides for contingencies should no
president be proclaimed before that date, all efforts should be exerted to avoid these
"emergency provisions" from coming into play, as they would necessarily affect
political stability. In fact, the June 30th "deadline" should be appreciated by
Congress as an imperative that should guide the body in the formulation of the
rules for canvassing.

There is also the fact that the Supreme Court is mandated by the Constitution as
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
the President or Vice-President. 32 As the eminent constitutionalist Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza has explained:

Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases

in elections for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the
House of Representatives. The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as
"sole judges" under the constitution of the election, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress of the President and Vice President,
as the case may be. (citations omitted) 33 IcESaA

It is clear that such questions in the province of the Supreme Court to decide in its
capacity as the sole judge of election contests for the presidency and vice-presidency
are distinct from those within the mandate of Congress as the canvassing body.
They include the appreciation of election returns and questions pertaining to the
intrinsic validity of the certificates of canvass. The power to be the "judge of
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications" of any public officer is
essentially judicial, and as such, under the principle of separation of powers, it
belongs exclusively to the judicial department, except only insofar as the
Constitution provides otherwise. 34

I VOTE to DISMISS the petition.

Footnotes

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

1. Petition, p. 2 [emphasis supplied].

2. 103 Phil. 1051, 1068 [1957].

3. Javellana v. Executive Secretary, L-35154, 31 March 1973, 50 SCRA 30, 84, citing
In re McConaughy, 119, N.W. 408, 417.

4. Petition, p. 12, citing 2 Records of the Constitutional Commission 419 [hereinafter

RECORDS].

5. Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed., 1979.

6. People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 112-113 [1937].

7. Sec. 1., Article II, 1987 Constitution.

8. U.S. v. Hampton, 276 US 394 [1928]. See also Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice,
G.R. No. 13260, 12 October 1998, 297 SCRA 754; People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil.
328 [1939].
9. Throughout the Constitution are examples of such encroachment, such as in the
House of Representatives, Senate, or Presidential Electoral Tribunals, with
members from their respective Houses as well as from the Supreme Court, or else
when the President exercises the veto power regarding legislation.

10. Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings , punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, and with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members,
suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed shall not
exceed sixty days. [Emphasis supplied]

11. Discussing the authority of Congress to provide its rules of proceedings, Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza in Arroyo v. De Venecia, (G.R. No. 127255, 14 August 1997,
277 SCRA 268), cites Crawford v. Gilchrist, 13 64 Fla. 41; 59 So. 963, 968 [1912],
where it was held: "The provision that each House shall determine the rules of its
proceedings does not restrict the power given to a mere formulation of standing
rules, or to the proceedings of the body in ordinary legislative matters; but in the
absence of constitutional restraints, and when exercised by a majority of a
constitutional quorum, such authority extends to a determination of the propriety
and effect of any action as it is taken by the body as it proceeds in the exercise of
any power, in the transaction of any business, or in the performance of any duty
conferred upon it by the Constitution." [Emphasis supplied]. See also United States
v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 79 Conn. 141, 64 Atl. 5, 9-10 [1906]: "The Constitution
empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. . . .The power to
make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous
power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations
suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."

12. RECORDS at 433.

13. 2 RECORDS at 391.

14. Republic Act No. 7166, An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local
Elections and For Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and
Other Purposes, 26 November 1991.

15. See Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, 25 August 1995, 235
SCRA, 666-672 where it was held that amendments to bills proposed by
conference committees held in executive session that were not found in the
original bills approved by the House of Representatives or the Senate, were
deemed valid because they were "[o]ften the only way to reach agreement an
conflicting provisions. . . with only the conferees present.

Otherwise, no compromise is likely to be made." Regardless, such amendments

were deemed valid as they could only be passed with the approval of Congress.

16. Osmeña v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863, 871, citing 67 Corpus Juris Secundum 870.

17. Citing Sanson v. Barrios , 63 Phil. 198.

18. 2 RECORDS at 433.

19. 124 Phil. 168.

20. Id. at p. 182.

21. Record and Journal of the Joint Session of Congress as National Board of
Canvassers, Tenth Congress of the Philippines.

22. Id., 1.

23. Id., 1 & 2.

PUNO, J.:

1. A delegated power cannot be delegated.

2. 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).

3. Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 80 (2000).

4. Gonzales v. COMELEC, 129 Phil. 7 (1967).

5. 281 SCRA 330, 348 (1997).

6. 277 SCRA 268 (1997).

7. 144 U.S. 5, 36 L ed., 324-325.

8. G.R. No. 160261. See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, J. Puno.

9. Ibid.

10. Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001.

11. The New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language, 1995 International
Edition, p. 790.

12. Section 14.

13. 40 Phil. 246, 251 (1919).

14. Aquino v. COMELEC, 22 SCRA 288, 293 (1968).

QUISUMBING, J.:

* Annex "A" to the petition.

* Arguments, p. 10 of petition.

* A member of the Joint Committee, Hon. Ma. Blanca Kim Bernardo-Lokin, also filed a
motion for leave to file attached Comment, which we granted and noted on 8 June
2004.

** Comment, House of Representatives, p. 12.

*** Comment, Senate of the Philippines, p. 40.

* See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186.

** See also Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452.

* See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), and Gore v. Bush, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).

* Petition, p. 13.

* Note from the Publisher: Missing footnote text.

* Petition, p. 22.

** Citing Congressional Records for these years.

* See Records, Constitutional Com., pp. 391, 401.

** Comment of the OSG, p. 15.

*** Comment, House of Representatives, p. 10.

* Comment of OSG, p. 15.

CARPIO MORALES, J., concurring:

1. Petition at 2-3.

2. Id. at 10.

3. CONST. art. VIII, sec. 1.

4. Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 156-159 (1936).

5. Vide: In re Prautch, 1 Phil. 132 (1902); U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1 (1922);
Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792 (1991).

6. Vide: Arroyo v. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268 (1997), Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., 298
SCRA 756 (1998).

7. Petition at 18.

8. Id. at 7-9.

9. 17 SCRA 756 (1966).

10. Id. at 769.

11. Petition at 15-16.

12. Mateo v. Court of Appeals , 196 SCRA 280, 284 (1991) citing Symaco v. Aquino,
106 Phil. 1130 (1960).

13. 21 SCRA 1462, 1466 (1967).

14. Id. at 1466-1467.

15. 22 SCRA 1317 (1968).

16. Id. at 1318-1320.

17. 180 SCRA 509 (1989).

18. Id. at 514-515.

19. II RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION: PROCEEDINGS AND

DEBATES 390-391 (1986).

20. Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed. at 426.

21. Ibid.

22. Petition at 14-15.

23. Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734 (1970); Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1968);
Peralta v. Commission on Elections , 82 SCRA 30 (1978).

24. David v. Commission on Elections , 271 SCRA 90 (1997); vide: Arroyo v. De

Venecia, supra; Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., supra.

25.

ARTICLE XI
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at
all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.

SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme

Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may
be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation
of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or
betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed
from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to
initiate all cases of impeachment.

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by
any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members,
shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral,
together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
 (3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment
of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member
shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at

least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the
Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official

more than once within a period of one year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or
affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted
without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal
from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the
Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry
out the purpose of this section.

26. Unless two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes. In which
case, one of them shall be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of
both Houses of Congress, voting separately.

27. 249 SCRA 628 (1995).

28. Id. at 649-650.

29. Petition at 21.

30. Abella v. Larrazabal, supra.

31. 323 SCRA 403 (2000).

32. Id. at 417-418.

CALLEJO, SR., J., concurring:

1. II RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 385.

2. Id. at 390-391.

3. Mateo v. Court of Appeals , 196 SCRA 280 (1991).

4. 248 SCRA 300 (1995).

5. Sandoval v. Commission on Elections , 323 SCRA 403 (2000).

6. Espino v. Zaldivar, 21 SCRA 1204 (1967); Salvacion v. Commission on Elections ,
170 SCRA 513 (1989). (Underscoring supplied.)

TINGA, J.:

1. See e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 L. ed [1803].

2. Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.

3. "The United States Constitution. . . does not explicitly grant the judicial review
power asserted in Marbury." K. Sullivan & G. Gunther, Constitutional Law 13, 14th
ed. (2001). See also L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 207, 3rd ed. (2000).
"Although the Constitution is silent as to whether federal courts have [the
authority for judicial review], the power has existed ever since Marbury". E.
Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 39, 2nd ed.; (2002). U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Byron White has been on record in opining that it was the
U.S. Constitution, and not Marbury v. Madison that created judicial review in the
United States.

4. "When [judicial] supremacy is invoked, it compels the errant branches of

government to obey not the Supreme Court, but the Constitution." Francisco v.
House of Representatives , G.R. Nos. 160261, etc., 10 November 2003, J. Tinga,
concurring.

5. Generally, political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not the legality, of a particular measure Tañada v. Cuenco, 100 Phil. 101
[1957], as cited in Tatad v. Secretary of Finance, 346 Phil. 321.

The formulation made in Baker v. Carr by the late American Supreme Court
Justice William Brennan as to what constitutes a political question has long gained
a foothold both in the United States and in the Philippines. "Prominent on the
surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision' already made; or potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question."
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217. (1962)

6. "Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice . . . to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." See
Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution, in relation to Baker v. Carr, supra note 5.

7. See, e.g., Marcos v. Manglapus , G.R. No. 88211, 15 September 1989, 177 SCRA
668.

8. See e.g., Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 151-A Phil. 35 (1973).

9. "The returns of every election for President and Vice-President . . . . shall be
transmitted to the Congress . . . and the Congress, upon determination of the
authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the
votes." See Section 4, Article VII, Constitution.

10. Petition, p. 9.

11. Id. at 10.

12. The essential of the legislative function is the determination of the legislative
policy and its formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding rule of
conduct. Occeña v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-2265, 28 January 1980, citing Yakus v.
United States 321 US 414, 88 L. ed. 834.

13. See K. Sullivan and G. Gunther, Constitutional Law 351, 14th ed. (2001) "The non-
delegation doctrine forces a politically accountable Congress to make the policy
choices, rather than leave this to unelected administrative officials." E.
Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 2nd ed 319 (2002).

14. "The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates."
Par. 6, Sec. 4, Article VII, 1987 Constitution.

15. In fact, the 2nd paragraph of Section 13 of the Rules quite baldly states: "The
Joint Committee shall, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution of
the certificates of canvass, preliminarily canvass the votes of candidates for the
offices of President and Vice-President.

16. See Secs. 19, 23 and 24, Congressional Rules of Canvass.

17. See Section 24, Congressional Rules of Canvass.

18. Congress has the constitutional power to adopt rules for its proceedings, and by
legislative practice it is conceded the power to promulgate such orders as may be
necessary to maintain its prestige and to preserve its dignity. See Vera v. Avelino,
77 Phil. 192, 212. (1946)

19. See Fernando and Fernando, Jr., Separation of Powers: The Three Departments
of the Philippine Government 205 (1985).

20. See E. Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 2nd ed 303
(2002).

21. See Fernando and Fernando, Jr., Separation of Powers: The Three Departments
of the Philippine Government 205 (1985).

22. See Section 9, Congressional Rules of Canvass.

23. See Section 19, Congressional Rules of Canvass.

24. See Section 23 and 24, Congressional Rules of Canvass.

25. See Section 27, Congressional Rules of Canvass.

26. Guingona v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 125532, 10 July 1998, 292 SCRA 402,
413; Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. Nos. 115455, 25 August 1994, 235
SCRA 630, 686; De la Llana v. Alba, G.R. No. L-57883, 12 March 1982, 112 SCRA
294, 385, Plana, J., concurring and dissenting.

27. Chavez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 105323, 3 July 1992, 211 SCRA 315, 322.

28. 380 Phil. 375, 389-390 (2000).

29. Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code states:

243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. The following

shall be proper issues that may be raised in a preproclamation controversy:

(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;

(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects,
appear to be tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same
returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234,
235, and 236 of this Code;

(c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or
intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and

(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were

canvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved
candidate or candidates.

30. Sandoval v. COMELEC, supra note 28.

31. Article VII, Section 1, par. 1, Constitution.

32. See Section 4, Article VII, Constitution.

33. Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976, 248 SCRA 300, 397; J.
Mendoza, concurring.

34. Lopez v. Roxas , 124 Phil. 168, 177 (1965).