Journal of Cybersecurity, 3(1), 2017, 49–58

doi: 10.1093/cybsec/tyw018
Advance Access Publication Date: 15 February 2017
Research paper

Research paper

Cyberterrorism: its effects on psychological

well-being, public confidence and political

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attitudes
Michael L. Gross*, Daphna Canetti and Dana R. Vashdi
School of Political Science, The University of Haifa, Mt. Carmel, Haifa, Israel
*Corresponding author. E-mail: [email protected]
Received 30 December 2016; accepted 30 December 2016

Abstract
Does exposure to lethal and non-lethal cyberterrorism affect psychological well-being, public
confidence and political attitudes? By what mechanisms do they do so? While cyberterrorism
most often raises concerns about national security, its effects on individuals’ psyche and cogni-
tion are overlooked. To address these questions we carried out three studies between 2013 and
2016 (n ¼ 1124, 909 and 592). Utilizing experimental manipulations (video clips) subjects were
exposed to simulated lethal and non-lethal cyberterrorism. Our findings demonstrate a stress-
based ‘cyber terrorism effect’. Exposure to cyberterrorism is not benign and shares many traits
with conventional terrorism: stress, anxiety, insecurity, a preference for security over liberty, a
reevaluation of confidence in public institutions, a heightened perception of risk and support for
forceful government policies. In the cyber realm, this translates into support for such policies as
Internet surveillance, government regulation of the Internet and a forceful military response to
cyberterrorism (including conventional, kinetic retaliation). These attitudes may impinge upon
the tolerance and confidence necessary for a vibrant civil society. This effect is associated with
non-lethal cyberterrorism that causes economic loss as well as with cyberterrorism that causes
death and injury.
Key words: cyberterrorism; cyberwar; cybersecurity; threat perception; stress; exposure; public confidence

Introduction Our findings draw on three large n studies conducted from

A primary goal of conventional terrorism is to undermine civilians’ 2013 to 2016 and suggest that cyberterrorism aggravates stress
resilience by instilling a sense of fear and vulnerability that erodes and anxiety, intensifies feelings of vulnerability and hardens polit-
confidence in the ability of the government and law enforcement ical attitudes. In these ways, we demonstrate that cyberterrorism
agencies to protect citizens against future attacks [1]. What about causes responses similar to conventional terrorism. These re-
cyberterrorism? Are the psychological ramifications of conventional sponses highlight the human dimension of cyberterrorism that is
and cyberterrorism identical? Does the threat of conventional or often neglected as policymakers focus on national security interests
cyberterrorism affect confidence in government and support for and the protection of frontiers, critical infrastructures and military
forceful security policies in the same way? To address these ques- capabilities. Both are important and as the threat of cyberterrorism
tions, we advanced three multiple scenario-based empirical studies grows, policymakers will have to direct their attention to the emo-
for testing what happens when the public experiences cyberterror- tional distress that cyberterrorism causes just as they strive to bol-
ism that causes mass casualties and/or severe economic losses with ster deterrent and offensive cyber capabilities. In the sections
the avowed goal of undermining the public’s morale and its confi- below, we draw out the similarities between the psychology of con-
dence in economic and political institutions. ventional and cyberterrorism that inform our empirical research,

C The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press.

V 49
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50 Journal of Cybersecurity, 2017, Vol. 3, No. 1

present the details of our findings and discuss their implications operations that block email throughout the country (section 30.12),
for public policy. involve ‘mere economic coercion’ (section 11.2), transmit tweets to
cause panic by ‘falsely indicating that a highly contagious and
deadly disease is spreading through the population’ (section 36.3) or
Conventional and cyber terror: mirror images? comprise cyber psychological operations intended solely to under-
Conventional terrorism employs kinetic means (e.g. suicide bombers mine confidence in a government or economy (section 11.3) as insuf-
or improvised explosive devices) and works in many ways. ficiently severe to constitute terror. We ask whether current events
Accompanied by death, injury and property destruction, terrorism do not belie this equanimity. Claiming, ‘The internet is not indis-
generates fear and anxiety in the target population. Terrorists may, pensable to the survival of the civilian population’ (section 81.5) the
therefore, use terrorism to demoralize a civilian population to pres- framers of the Tallinn Manual seem unaware of the effects cyberter-
sure their government to undertake or refrain from a specific policy. rorism may pose. As cyberattacks grow in frequency and intensity,
Sometimes terrorists are effective. Witness the sudden departure of they push beyond criminal acts to concerted attempts to disrupt air-

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Spanish troops from Iraq following terror bombings in Madrid that port and utility services in the Ukraine [17], perpetrate an electronic
killed 191 people in 2004. More commonly, however, the civilian Holocaust in Israel (below), cripple DynDNS servers across import-
population proves exceptionally resilient [2–4]. Terrorism hardens ant sectors of the USA and interfere with and possibly compromise
their hearts as they demand and often receive a forceful response the recent US elections. While not all the perpetrators or their goals
from their government. Armed groups, such as Hamas, may also re- are immediately obvious, they do not appear motivated by monetary
sort to terrorism to scuttle prospects of peace [5]. Alternatively, ter- gain. Rather it seems that they aim to impair public confidence, dis-
rorism is theater, specifically designed to seize centre stage and rupt civil society and seed anxiety and insecurity by crippling digital
provoke a disproportionate response from the government of terror and financial resources, undermining the institutions of governance
victims with the hopes of turning world opinion. For nearly a dec- and disrupting social networks. Given the growing threat of
ade, Israel avoided any massive response to Hamas’ crude missile at- cyberterrorism, the question, ‘How does non-lethal and lethal
tacks on Southern Israel. Although the attacks disrupted everyday cyberterrorism affect individuals psychologically?’ is pressing. In an
life, few people lost their lives. Eventually, though, security concerns attempt to shed some light on this question, we examined the effects
and domestic pressure led to a full-scale invasion of the Gaza Strip of different kinds of cyberattacks on a person’s sense of security and
in 2008 and again in 2014. Apart from achieving a short and fragile confidence.
ceasefire, Israel faced a storm of international condemnation follow-
ing the deaths of more than 1000 Palestinians in each encounter. In
this way, terrorism sometimes creates a no-win situation for states
Research design
[6]. Finally, terrorism may produce relatively few immediate casual-
ties but undermine public confidence more broadly. Airplane hijack- Experimental overview
ings such as those of 9/11, undermined faith in the air To evaluate the effects of different kinds of cyberattacks on a per-
transportation system until governments introduced rigid controls son’s sense of security and confidence, we utilized two platforms:
[7]. Generally, however, conventional terrorism does not regularly experimental manipulations and self-reported past exposure to
affect confidence in major government institutions. This is attribut- cyberattacks. Focusing on emotional and political responses to
able to a ‘rally around the flag’ effect and to the growing dependence cyberattacks and using original video clips, we conducted three on-
on government institutions to provide security ([8–12], but see line and panel studies.
Baldwin et al. [13] and Berry et al. [14] for contrary data). Our experimental designs enabled randomization and full con-
In contrast to conventional terrorism, cyberterrorism employs trol of the researchers. While online surveys—particularly non-prob-
malicious computer technology rather than kinetic force. But like ability ones—may be slightly skewed towards the younger and the
conventional terrorism, cyberterrorism aims to further political, reli- technology savvy, phone surveys tend towards older respondents,
gious, or ideological goals by harming civilians physically or psycho- women and left leaning individuals. Because we were not conduct-
logically. By contrast, ‘cyberwar’ uses malware and viruses to ing a correlational study seeking precise estimates of population val-
disable military targets while ‘cybercrime’ aims for pecuniary gain ues, we followed the recommendations of Baker et al. [18] that
or personally motivated harm to others (e.g. revenge, bullying) unre- support the use of online studies for the purposes described in our
lated to political conflict. Sometimes these categories overlap and studies [19]. Each study received University Institutional Review
the differences are difficult to discern. Cyber-terrorists and nation Board (IRB) approval. Participants signed a consent form at the be-
states may, like criminals, steal money, data or identities or, like ginning of the survey and we made provisions for psychological sup-
hacktivists, mount DDoS strikes to shut down major systems. Much port with the survey company if needed. None was requested.
depends upon the intention and identity of the actors that are not al- Participants were debriefed and informed post-study that all the
ways known. In our cases, Hamas and Anonymous are the perpetra- scenarios were simulated and not actual attacks.
tors and each publically announced its intent to terrorize Israeli
citizens. In Europe and the USA, on the other hand, attribution may
be more difficult as ISIS and proxy hacktivists have reason to some- Study 1 (September 2015)
times conceal their identities. This is an online survey experiment in which Israeli adults were ran-
Despite its growth, cyberterrorism unlike conventional terrorism domly assigned to three treatments after which they answered a ser-
does not currently threaten life and limb. As a result, very little at- ies of psychological and political questions. The control group
tention is paid to the effects of cyberterrorism on civilians [15]. The received no experimental stimulus. In the ‘high’ treatment group,
Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber subjects viewed a video clip depicting civilian and military deaths
Warfare [16], for example, describes how cyber operations may rise following cyberattacks on missile systems and the electric company.
to the level of an armed attack by threatening widespread loss of life In the ‘low’ treatment group, they viewed a video clip reporting a
or destruction of property. However, the Manual considers non-lethal cyberattack accompanied by damage to hardware, loss of
Journal of Cybersecurity, 2017, Vol. 3, No. 1 51

data and theft of funds (n ¼ 1124). In neither case was the perpetra- ‘I feel upset’, ‘I feel nervous’) and the other half represent positive
tor identified. feelings and emotions (e.g. ‘I feel relaxed’, ‘I feel comfortable’).
Because we were interested in negative affect, we created a variable
Study 2 (January 2016) constituting only the three negative emotions.
This was also an online survey. Here, subjects were randomly as- In addition to stress, perceptions of threat play a significant
signed to a news report describing a cyberattack on Israel’s water role in our understanding of the psychology of terrorism.
purification network by terrorists (Hamas). The news reports were Perceptions of threat reflect the extent to which thinking about a
identical with the exception of the losses suffered. In one clip, two cyberattack undermines ones sense of personal security. Threat
people died and many were injured after terrorists released deadly perception is an appraisal of the danger that an out-group poses to
amounts of chlorine into the water system. In the second clip, an individual and/or his/her political community [22–26, 56, 57,
Hamas retrieved the financial information of the company’s cus- 58, 59]. To gauge threat perception in all three studies we asked
tomers and successfully transferred substantial funds to its coffers ‘To what extent do cyberattacks undermine your sense of personal

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overseas. Alternative manipulations included a conventional terror security?’ and ‘To what extent do you feel threatened by cyber ter-
attack, that depicts a kinetic attack on a water facility that, like the rorism?’ (Scale 1–5).
kinetic attack, kills two and injures many and a control group that
viewed a benign clip depicting the dedication of a new water desalin-
ization plant (n ¼ 909). Immediately after viewing the clip, subjects Measures of public confidence
were asked to report risk perception, threat perception and confi- To assess the effects of cyberattacks, Study 2 (Hamas) probed a
dence in government and to evaluate offensive cyber policies and range of confidence related questions. First, confidence in govern-
cyber regulation practices. ment, the army, police and supreme court were examined with sep-
arate items for each on a scale of 1 ¼ not confident at all to
Study 3 6 ¼ extremely confident. Following each manipulation, we also
Using a two-wave panel design, we administered two surveys to the asked a range of questions about confidence in the government’s
same panel of 522 experimental subjects—10 days apart, leading up ability to safeguard information entrusted to government offices,
to and following Anonymous’ well-publicized ‘electronic Holocaust’ prevent identity and data theft, credit card and bank fraud, and pro-
campaign against Israel in April 2015. Anonymous’ language was tect critical infrastructures (water, military, transportation, electric)
belligerent and menacing but did not threaten physical harm. Rather from future attacks (1 ¼ not confident at all; 6 ¼ extremely confi-
they warned that ‘elite cyber squadrons’ would ‘invade and attack dent). Of closer resolution, we asked about confidence in a bank,
your devices and personal data, take down your servers and erase utility company or HMO (Health Maintenance Organization) that
Israel from cyber space’ [20]. Pre- and post-attack questionnaires suffered a cyberattack. We also included two behavioural questions
focused on the emotional and cognitive responses to the attacks and that address the public’s confidence in the government assurances
related policy choices ranging from cyber to kinetic retaliation. following a cyberattack on the national water supply by posing
behavioural choices to gauge confidence:
Independent variables
1. ‘Following a cyber-attack on the water system, the authorities
Type of terrorism
advised drinking bottled water. How soon would you drink
This was manipulated in Studies 1 and 2 by the experimental condi- tap water?’
tion as explained above. In Study 1, there were three conditions:
2. ‘Following a cyber-attack on the water system the authorities
(i) control, (ii) cyberterrorism, non-lethal and (iii) cyberterrorism, le- suggested waiting 3 days before showering: After 3 days,
thal. In Study 2, there was an additional condition: (iv) kinetic would you . . .?’
terrorism. Following each question, subjects were asked to choose one of
four modes of behavior that reflect various degrees of compliance
Previous exposure to a cyberattack (full responses are provided below).
This was assessed in all three studies by asking subjects four ques-
tions on a scale of 1–6 regarding the extent to which they, their
friends or their family suffered harm or loss from a cyberattack. An Measures of attitudes towards government policies
answer above 3 on any of these questions was regarded as previous In all three studies, we asked subjects to consider government sur-
exposure. veillance of the Internet and emails, government regulation of the
businesses and military retaliation in response to cyberattacks.
Dependent variables Questions about government surveillance asked whether the govern-
Measures of well-being, stress and threat perception ment ought to read emails and monitor social networks for security
In ‘Study 1’ (unidentified perpetrator) and ‘Study 2’ (Hamas), we threats. Regulation of the business sector reflected answers to
used a four-point scale State–Trait Anxiety Index (STAI) [21]. STAI ‘Should the government require businesses to maintain a mandated
measures two types of anxiety—state (extrinsic) and trait (intrinsic) level of cyber security.’ Retaliatory policy offered four options: (i) a
anxiety. State anxiety aligns with temporary feelings of fear, ner- ‘limited cyberattack’ to disable enemy military cyber capabilities
vousness and discomfort. Trait anxiety aligns with almost daily feel- (servers, switches, computers, cables); (ii) a ‘large scale cyberattack’
ings of stress, worry and discomfort. The questionnaire includes six to disable enemy military and civilian cyber capabilities; (iii) a ‘lim-
items describing various feelings and emotions. The experimental ited conventional attack’ (missiles or bombs) to disable enemy mili-
subjects were asked to rate on a scale of 1–4 (1 ¼ not at all; 4 ¼ very tary cyber capabilities; and (iv) a ‘large scale, conventional attack’
much so) the extent to which their feelings ‘at present’ (both pre- (missiles or bombs) to disable enemy military and civilian cyber
and post experimental treatment) correspond to different items. capabilities. All questions were rated on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 6
Half of the items represent negative feelings and emotions (e.g. (most definitely).
52 Journal of Cybersecurity, 2017, Vol. 3, No. 1

Table 1. Stress/anxiety measures following experimental cyberter- Table 2. Threat perception measures following experimental
ror attacks. Scale: 1 (low) to 4 (high) cyberterror attacks. Scale 1 (low) to 5 (high)

State/trait anxiety measure STAI Experiment Study 1a, n ¼ 1027 Study 2b, n ¼ 907
Perpetrator treatment group Unidentified Hamas
Study 1a, n ¼ 1027 Study 2a, n ¼ 907
Control: no terrorism 2.9 3.1
PerpetratorTreatment group Unidentified Hamas Cyberterrorism, non-lethal: 3.4
Control: no terrorism 2.3 2.7 disclosure of account
Cyberterrorism, non-lethal: 3.5 3.4 information and loss of
asset and data loss (Study 1); funds
disclosure Cyberterrorism, non-lethal: 3.4
of account information, loss asset and data loss
of funds (Study 2) Cyberterrorism, lethal: deaths 3.5 3.6

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Cyberterrorism, lethal: deaths 3.6 3.6 and injuries
and injuries Conventional terrorism, 3.8
Conventional (kinetic) 4.0 lethal: deaths and injuries
terrorism, lethal: deaths Significance P < 0.001 P < 0.001
and injuries ANOVA F2,1029 ¼ 21.60 F3,937 ¼ 11.12
Significance P < 0.001 P < 0.001
ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) F2,1035 ¼ 139.65 F3,942 ¼ 34.23 a
In post hoc tests using the Tukey statistic for the data of Study 1, there
was no significant difference between non-lethal and lethal cyberterrorism,
a
In post hoc tests using the Tukey statistic there is a significant difference but both were significantly different than the control group.
between all treatment groups except for the difference between non-lethal b
In post hoc tests using the Tukey statistic for the data of Study 2, there
and lethal cyberterrorism that is not significant for any of the stress/anxiety was no significant difference between the control group and non-lethal cyber-
measures. terrorism, no significant difference between non-lethal and lethal cyberterror-
ism and no significant difference between lethal cyberterrorism and
conventional terrorism. Lethal cyberterrorism and conventional terrorism
Measures of risk perception
were significantly different than the control group and conventional terrorism
Following Slovic [27], we distinguish between risk assessment and
was significantly different than non-lethal cyberterrorism.
risk perception: ‘Whereas technologically sophisticated analysts em-
ploy risk assessment to evaluate hazards, the majority of citizens
distinguishable. Each affected STAI measures similarly, their effects
rely on intuitive judgments typically called risk perceptions.’ To as-
significantly more severe than those seen in the control group. Each
sess risk perception we posed 16 questions that asked the experi-
kind of cyberterrorism generated increasing levels of anxiety. As an
mental subjects in Study 2 (Hamas) to assess the risk posed by a
ongoing feature of Israeli life, conventional terrorist attacks provoke
cyberterror attack (1 ¼ no risk; 6 ¼ a very high risk). Responses
anxiety more readily than cyberterror attacks. Nevertheless, it ap-
loaded on four factors: bodily harm (risk of injury or loss of life);
pears that all remain points on the same terrorist spectrum. Non-le-
material loss (credit card and bank fraud, data theft, theft of confi-
thal cyberterrorism is no exception.
dential medical information); damage to critical infrastructures
(transportation, refineries, water) and damage to state facilities
(military, stock exchange, government offices) Alpha Cronbach Threat perception
0.70, 0.91, 0.81 and 0.94, respectively. Both exposure to past cyberattacks and exposure to simulated
cyberattacks increased perceptions of threat. As noted above, we
gauged exposure to past cyberattacks by asking subjects whether
Demographic variables
they, their friends or family suffered harm or loss from a cyberat-
We asked respondents about their political orientation on a scale
tack. Of the respondents, 18% in the Study 3 (Anonymous) re-
ranging from very right-wing to very left-wing.
ported harm or loss from cyberattack as did 19% in Study 2
(Hamas). Among our subjects, perceptions of threat were 3–9%
Results stronger among those previously exposed to a cyberattack than
among those who were not exposed. The experimental manipula-
Our findings suggest that the effects of ‘non-lethal’ and ‘lethal’ tions affected threat perception similarly (Table 2).
cyberterrorism track those of conventional terrorism. Overall, ex- Simulated exposure to lethal attacks, whether cyber or kinetic,
perimental subjects exhibit marked signs of stress, personal insecur- evoked perceptions of threat 16–22% stronger than those unex-
ity and heightened perceptions of cyber threat. Heightened posed to terrorism in the control group. Among those exposed to
perceptions of threat, in turn, lend support for forceful cyber gov- non-lethal cyberterrorism, perceptions of threat were 10–17%
ernment policies, a finding consistent with the effects of kinetic ter- stronger than among those in the control group. These results var-
rorism [28–31]. ied relative to the nature of non-lethal cyberterrorism. Perceptions
of cyber threat were strongest when non-lethal cyberattacks re-
Stress and anxiety sulted in the loss of ‘assets and data’ (Study 1, unidentified perpet-
Table 1 describes how anxiety increases as attacks become more se- rator), rather than the loss of ‘funds’ (Study 2, Hamas). While loss
vere. Compared to the control group, every form of terrorism, of data and other digital assets might be irreplaceable or costly to
whether cyber or kinetic, lethal or non-lethal, increased anxiety and replace, banks and other financial institutions usually reimburse
other negative emotions. Conventional (kinetic) terrorism had the customers for funds lost to hackers. Our results indicate that the
greatest effect upon all measures of negative affect and anxiety fol- fact that the perpetrator was Hamas, a hostile agent that one might
lowed by lethal and non-lethal cyberterrorism. However, the effects expect to induce threat perception, did not change this assessment.
of lethal and non-lethal cyberterrorism were not statistically Indeed, when non-lethal cyberterrorism is defined in terms of
Journal of Cybersecurity, 2017, Vol. 3, No. 1 53

Table 3. Confidence measures, Study 2 (Hamas). Scale 1 (not confident) to 6 (extremely confident) n ¼ 907

Condition confidence measure Control Cyberterrorism Cyberterrorism Conventional Sig. ANOVA

non-lethal lethal terrorism

Confidence in government to protect infrastructures (water, electric, 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.2 NS
transportation, stock exchange, classified military data)
Confident in government to protect personal data 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.5 NS
Confidence in public/private institutions (army, scientific community, 4.4 4.6 4.5 4.5 NS
high-tech sector, government, police) to prevent a serious cyberterror
attack
Confidence in those responsible for cybersecurity to know what they are 4.8 5.1 5.0 5.0 0.01
doing F3,904 ¼ 2.68a

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a
In post hoc tests using the Tukey statistic the significant difference lies only in the difference between the control group and the non-lethal cyberterrorism (NS
= not significant).

financial loss alone, its effects on threat perception were not statis-
tically different than among those in the control group (see notes,
Table 4. Political action following cyberattack on selected facilities,
Table 2). Further data are necessary to substantiate the relation-
n ¼ 907
ship between perceptions of threat and non-lethal cyber-terrorist
attacks. Response (% agreeing) Electric Co. HMO Bank
The data in Tables 1 and 2 clearly suggest that cyberattacks,
Complain to the facility 30 25 22
whether lethal or non-lethal, cause stress, anxiety and insecurity. In
Find a different HMO/bank 7 15
their wake, threat perception rises to a level very close to conven- File a lawsuit 12 14 18
tional terrorism when cyberterrorism turns deadly. These data dem- Complain to the city 4
onstrate how cyberterrorism, like conventional terrorism, impairs Turn to the press 4 3 3
psychological well-being and increase perceptions of threat. The fear Participate in a demonstration 14 4 4
stemming from threat perception may lead to incorrect assessments File a complaint with the ombudsman 10 7
of risk and risk-averse attitudes that, in turn, impinge upon confi- Complain to the police 12 11
dence in government institutions. Other or none 37 24 18

In each case, 30–37% of the respondents do not trust the author-

Cyberterrorism and public confidence ity’s instructions. Rather, they preferred to take additional measures
to protect themselves. The answers to these two questions were un-
Confidence in the government’s ability to protect critical infrastruc-
affected by the manipulations.
tures and data or to prevent a cyberattack did not vary as manipula-
To further investigate the behavioural dimensions of confidence,
tions presented increasingly dangerous and life-threatening forms of
we asked subjects how they would publically react to cyberterror-
terrorism. And, the slight effect we found (item 4) shows an ‘in-
ism? Would they be quiescent or would they take to the streets in a
crease’ in confidence only following a non-lethal cyber-terrorist at-
way that might undermine political stability and foment unrest in
tack. The data appear in Table 3.
the way terrorists often hope? Table 4 portrays public political
Two other questions posed behavioural choices to gauge
behaviour in the wake of three kinds of cyberterror attacks: an at-
tack on the national electric company, a private HMO and a private
Option Percentage agreeing bank. In each case, subjects were asked to choose the most likely
a. When the authorities say it is OK 70 political action they would take.
b. 3 months after the authorities say it is OK 24 While these questions did not specify whether the attack on the
c. 1 year after the authorities say it is OK 5 facility was lethal or non-lethal, few people are sufficiently riled to
d. Never 6 take to the streets. A substantial minority (22–30%) would com-
plain to the authorities and some would join a lawsuit (12–18%),
but few would demonstrate. None of the attacks prompted outrage
confidence:
or lack of confidence in the government. On the contrary, the ma-
(1) Following a cyberattack on the water system, the authorities
nipulations prompted support for greater government intervention
advised drinking bottled water: How soon would you drink tap
to assure security. It is no surprise then, that confidence in the gov-
ernment is generally unaffected by cyberterrorism and may even in-
a. Shower? 63 crease in its wake.
b. Wait 1 week 19
c. Install a filter that doubled your water bill 8
d. Install a filter that tripled your water bill 4 Cyberterrorism and political attitudes: security,
civil liberties, government regulation and
water? (n ¼ 909)
military retaliation
(2) Following a cyberattack on the water system, the authorities Confronted with the threat of lethal and non-lethal cyberterrorism,
suggested waiting 3 days before showering: After 3 days, would our data suggest that individuals will support strong government
you? (n ¼ 909) measures to police and regulate cyberspace and to respond forcefully
54 Journal of Cybersecurity, 2017, Vol. 3, No. 1

Table 5. Support for domestic and retaliatory cyber policy

Study 1, n ¼ 1027 Study 2, n ¼ 907 Study 3, n ¼ 522

Perpetrator policy Unidentified (% agreeinga) Hamas (% agreeinga) Anonymous (% agreeinga)

Domestic cyber policy

Surveillance
Monitor for suspicious expressions 67 54
Read emails 46 23
Monitor Facebook Twitter 61 48
Regulation of business to maintain cybersecurity 69 62 78
Willingness to give up privacy for security 54 44
Retaliatory policyfollowing a hostile cyber attack
Cyberattack on military facilities 84 86

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Cyberattack on military and civilian facilities 78 69
Conventional attack on military facilities 60 37
Conventional attack on military and civilian facilities 65 31

a
% who agree, very much agree or absolutely agree

to cyberattacks. In all three studies, we asked subjects to consider violence) grows, individuals demand greater security from their gov-
government surveillance of the Internet and emails, government ernment. Here, the odds were 1.3–2.2 times higher that individuals
regulation of the businesses and military retaliation in the wake of with high levels of threat perception will support surveillance, gov-
cyberattacks. These results appear in Table 5. ernment regulation and military retaliation compared to those with
Overall, the high percentages of support reflect widespread back- lower perceptions of threat.
ing for these policies. Well over 50% support government monitor- Our data also suggest that the identity of the perpetrator matters.
ing of emails for suspicious expressions and roughly 50% are Note how support for government surveillance and, in particular,
willing to give up privacy for security and allow the government to retaliatory ‘military’ strikes is appreciably greater when the manipu-
monitor social media (Facebook, Twitter). At the same time, 23% lation focused on a known terrorist group, Hamas, (Study 2) rather
will permit the government to read emails, a figure that doubles to than on a hacktivist group, Anonymous (Study 3). Our question was
46% when the perpetrator is Hamas. These numbers are higher framed generally and asked whether subjects would support military
than in the USA where, in a recent PEW Survey [32] in the USA, retaliation following a cyberattack. We did not ask whether they
43% of the subjects said it is acceptable for the government to moni- would support an attack against Hamas or Anonymous or their
tor the communications of US citizens (compare 48–67% in our sponsors. Nevertheless, and as Table 5 demonstrates, subjects par-
survey). ticipating in the Hamas experiment favoured government surveil-
Looking beyond surveillance to retaliatory policy we see how mili- lance far more than those in Study 3 (Anonymous) and supported
tary strikes, particularly cybernetic but also kinetic, command signifi- conventional military attacks of either sort (limited or large scale) by
cant support from the public. In response to cyberterrorism, the vast a margin of nearly 2:1. One reason may be that the manipulation
majority (69–89%) support retaliatory cyberattacks against military triggered fears of Hamas and burgeoning Islamic radicalism.
and civilian targets while a significant number (31–65%) support con- Another reason may be the recognition that Hamas, like ISIS, has in-
ventional, ‘kinetic’ counter attacks. These attitudes remain unstudied frastructures and territory vulnerable to conventional attack.
in the USA, but there is little doubt that they will play a significant Because our study found a relationship between threat perceptions
role as public officials and scholars weigh the merit of responding to and support for surveillance and military retaliation it seems that it
cyberwar and cyberterrorism with kinetic force [33, 34]. is not Hamas’ material vulnerability but the fear related to threat
To explain why individuals hold different attitudes about sur- perception that better explains why those exposed to Hamas
veillance and military retaliation, we looked at a number of factors. cyberterrorism are more likely to support surveillance and military
The experimental manipulations within each study had no direct ef- retaliation than those facing Anonymous. Nevertheless, this may
fect on political attitudes as they did on anxiety and did not affect change. In a phenomenon, George Lucas [35] describes as ‘state
the extent to which individuals supported different types of retali- sponsored hacktivism’, nations recruit hacktivist groups to mount
ation. That is, support for surveillance, regulation or military action cyberattacks on their behalf. As they do, fears of such groups may
was not affected by exposure to a simulated cyberattack (With the grow accordingly as might the willingness to retaliate against their
exception of Study 1, (unidentified perpetrator), where the willing- sponsors.
ness to give up privacy increased as the manipulation grew more se-
vere.). Similarly, self-reported exposure to cyberattacks did not
affect attitudes towards these policies. Instead, variables that explain Cyberterrorism and risk perception
greater support for government interference include political and re-
Researchers of risk perception have long noted how individuals’ per-
ligious conservatism, threat perception and the identity of the per-
ceptions of the risk of common hazards [27] or disease [36] are often
petrator. Support from right-wing religious conservatives is
markedly different from the assessments of experts. The result is to
consistent with the right’s traditional demand for security and their
make it more difficult to manage risk effectively. How, then, does
support for the current right-wing government. Among our subjects,
the public understand the risk of cyberterrorism? If cyberterrorism,
the odds that right-wing conservatives would support militant poli-
unlike conventional terrorism, disease or natural disasters, has yet to
cies were up to two times higher than those on the left. Beyond the
harm anyone, there is good reason to suspect that the public does
role of political orientation, however, lie the effects of threat percep-
not understand the risk it poses. Experts are themselves divided
tion. As threat perception (in contrast to direct exposure to cyber
[37]. Some remain sceptical about the capabilities of terrorist groups
Journal of Cybersecurity, 2017, Vol. 3, No. 1 55

Table 6. Risk Assessment, Study 2(Hamas). Scale 1 (very low) to 6 (very high).

What are the chances of a cyberattack causing: Control Cyber terror Cyber terror Conventional Sig. ANOVA Total
non-lethal lethal terrorism averagea

1. Theft of data, assets, identity 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.2 NS 3.1

2. Attacks on state facilities: military, stock exchange, 3.7 3.7 3.5 3.8 NS 3.6
government offices
3. Destruction/damage of critical infrastructuresb 4.4 4.7 4.6 4.8 <0.001 4.6
F3,907 ¼ 5.9
4. Loss of life or limbc 2.7 2.7 3.1 3.2 <0.001 2.9
F3,908 ¼ 19.22

a
A repeated measures ANOVA with a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was statistically significant (F2.908, 2640.671 ¼ 904.457, P < 0.001). All the mean

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scores between the all the different categories of risk assessment were significantly different from each other.
b
In post hoc tests using the Tukey statistic, there was no significant difference between the the non-lethal cyberterrorism group, the lethal cyberterrorism group
and the conventional terrorism group. These three groups were all significantly different from the control group.
c
In post hoc tests using the Tukey statistic, there was no significant difference between the control group and the non-lethal cyberterrorism group and no signifi-
cant difference between the lethal cyberterrorism group and the conventional terrorism group. Significant differences were found between lethal cyberterrorism
and the control and non-lethal cyberterrorism and between the conventional terrorism and the control and non-lethal cyberterrorism.

primes subjects for threats to infrastructures, our control group

or violent hacktivists to mount offensive, catastrophic cyberattack
viewed no attack and still assessed some risks unrealistically high.
[38–40] while others describe how cyberterrorism may seriously
At the same time the average perception of risk associated with
compromise electrical infrastructures [41], disable military defense
the theft of data, assets and identity (average 3.1) was little differ-
systems [42] and, ultimately, ‘undermine conventional and nuclear
ent from a risk that a cyberattack would bring death or injury
stability’ [43]. Divisions among experts might only confound risk
(average 2.9). They perceive the risk of these hazards equally des-
perceptions among the lay population.
pite the fact that the former is relatively common and the latter
In our study, risk perceptions varied with the manipulations of
non-existent.
Study 2 (Hamas). Those exposed to increasingly severe manipula-
tions assess some cyber threats more severely than the control
groups (Table 6).
Discussion: the psychological effects
These data demonstrate how experimental manipulations ex-
acerbate some assessments of risk from cyberterrorism. After
of cyberterrorism
viewing video clips of cyber or conventional terror attacks with le- Our results show that cyberterrorism, even when non-lethal, im-
thal consequences, subjects’ perceptions of risk to life, limb and pacts the civilian population in several ways. First, cyberterrorism
infrastructures were significantly greater than of those viewing the aggravates anxiety and personal insecurity. Secondly, lethal and
more benign clips (rows 3, 4). When asked to assess the chances of non-lethal terrorism exacerbate perceptions of threat and personal
a cyberattack-causing destruction of critical infrastructures the insecurity. Thirdly, many people, particularly those with high levels
average response rose from 4.4 in the control group to 4.8 in the of threat perception, are willing to support strong government poli-
conventional terrorism group. Similarly, when asked to assess the cies. These policies split along two lines and include foreign policy
chances of a cyberattack-causing loss of life and limb the average (e.g. cyber and/or kinetic military responses to cyberattacks) and do-
response rose from 2.7 in the control group to 3.2 in the conven- mestic policy (e.g. tolerance of government surveillance and control
tional terrorism group. On the other hand, the manipulations did of the Internet). As threat perception increases, individuals take in-
not affect the risk associated with data theft or attacks on the creasingly stringent political views. Like conventional terrorism,
stock exchange or government offices (rows 1, 2). These stayed cyberterrorism hardens political attitudes as individuals are willing
constant across the manipulations. These attitudes reflect concerns to exchange civil liberties and privacy for security and support gov-
about the future threat of cyberterrorism. The risk associated with ernment surveillance, greater regulation of the Internet and forceful
identity theft, asset loss and attacks on the government offices is military responses in response to cyberattacks. And while these
stable, while the risk associated with significant bodily or infra- measures are meant to ensure national security, such foreign and
structural harm is not. Individuals seem to think they understand particularly domestic policies may adversely affect the unfettered
the risks of non-lethal cyberterrorism but seem unsure about the discourse necessary for a vibrant and open democratic society [44].
risks of lethal cyberterrorism when, in fact, our data indicate Nevertheless, cyberterrorism does not significantly undermine
much the opposite. They underestimate the danger of non-lethal confidence in the national government or its institutions any more
cyberterrorism while often overestimating the danger of lethal ter- than conventional terrorism does. This was evident from our confi-
rorism particularly when the perpetrator is a known terrorist or- dence measures comparing a control group to those exposed to de-
ganization. As such, it is important to notice that the perception of pictions of conventional and cyberterrorism. As noted at the head of
threat, in part, contradicts reality. For many subjects, the risk of this article, such broad measures of confidence are not always af-
an attack that destroys or damages critical infrastructures, which fected by terrorism or other traumatic events. On the contrary, such
has yet to materialize to any significant degree (average 4.6), is sig- events often strengthen public confidence as occurred in the USA
nificantly ‘greater’ than the risk of an attack on stock exchanges, post 9/11 [11, 9]. These findings about confidence go hand in hand
government offices, personal computers, banks and credit with demands for greater security. As individuals, particularly those
cards that are clear and present dangers (average 3.6). While these with heightened levels of threat perception, demand more govern-
outcomes might be partially explained by a manipulation that ment oversight, they cannot express a lack of confidence in the
56 Journal of Cybersecurity, 2017, Vol. 3, No. 1

government without unease. Supporters of intrusive government Threat perception, not an actual attack is sufficient to unsettle indi-
regulation and surveillance must be confident that the authorities viduals to the extent many terrorists desire. As a result, authorities
will do their jobs effectively and without abusing the greater author- will need to recognize that they cannot reduce fears of cyberterror-
ity they now enjoy. ism and its pervasive effects solely by eliminating cyberattacks that
This does not mean governments can remain quiescent. This is will, quite possibly, only grow more severe. Rather, policymakers
true for governments in Israel, whose population was the subject of must think about ways to enhance resilience in much the way they
these studies, and just as important for governments in the USA, have in the context of kinetic terrorism and other disasters.
Europe and elsewhere. Just as 20th-century studies of the psych- Lessons gleaned from successful (and unsuccessful) efforts to im-
ology of terrorism in Israel informed post 9/11 research, the effects prove disaster preparedness [49–53] suggest that the government,
of cyberterrorism in Israel are equally relevant. Cyberterrorism is a the private sector and the academic community should effectively
transnational phenomenon and we see that agents like Anonymous communicate the risks of cyberterrorism and take steps that will
are as equally prepared to disrupt American networks (as they did in help instill effective cybersecurity practices. Furthermore, if individ-

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Ferguson, MO in 2014 [46]) as they are Israeli systems. In fact, the uals feel they can communicate their concerns to their government
effects of cyberterrorism may prove weaker in Israel than elsewhere and the authorities are attentive (i.e. citizens have a sense of political
as research develops. For Israelis, Hamas is a known quantity, a efficacy) then threat perceptions may be reduced (Canetti et al., un-
partner to a long simmering but, to date, manageable conflict that published work [54]). These efforts are intertwined. Providing
occasionally erupts into sustained violence. To pursue its goals cybersecurity depends, in part, upon securing compliance with
Hamas must publicize its demands and attacks. Attribution is not an cybersecurity measures. Compliance, in turn, depends upon how ac-
issue. For ISIS and the proxies of hostile nations, on the other hand, curately the public assesses the risk of cyberattacks and upon how
this is not necessarily true. Attacks are difficult to attribute with cer- successfully government and private agencies communicate cyber
tainty and hacktivist demands are often unknown, thereby allowing risks and the precautions that individuals must take.
foreign governments to conduct offensive cyber operations by To secure computer systems, we draw attention to the many pro-
proxy. Such attacks trade on uncertainty and disruption that may grammes in schools and businesses to impart the knowledge and
exacerbate anxiety, threat and risk perception in many Western na- skills individuals need to maintain personal cybersecurity.
tions to a greater extent than we have seen in Israel. Currently, it is our impression that the only evaluation tool is per-
The outsized risk attributed to threats to life, limb and infra- formative, i.e. how well end-users master and adopt the necessary
structure track previous studies that ascribe relatively high levels of skills to protect their online assets (e.g. recognizing malware, chang-
risk perception to hazards associated with uncertainty and dread ing passwords, updating firewalls). To fully assess the benefits of
risk, i.e. events ‘perceived by lack of control, dread, catastrophic po- these tools, further research is required to understand how these
tential and fatal consequences’ [27]. Lichtenstein et al. [36] describe educational and intervention programmes might impart the fear/
how media exposure, particularly sensational media coverage, cata- stress reducing skills to cope with cyberterrorism and to improve re-
strophic outcomes and lack of direct experience skew assessments of siliency, i.e. withstand adverse psychological effects of cyberterror-
risk. To some extent, cyberterrorism fits these models. Although ism, overcome feelings of vulnerability and regain a sense of control.
there are only hypothetical lines between cyberattacks and mass cas- Experience with kinetic terrorism also points to the benefits of psy-
ualties, the great risk attributable to infrastructure damage and loss chological intervention [55]. Mitigating the deleterious effects of
of life and limb might be explained by their possible catastrophic ef- cyberterrorism and strengthening resilience may diminish the impact
fects, the benefits that they provide (thereby making them a likely of cyberterrorism and the chance it will spill over into militancy,
target as well as a significant source of concern if threatened), the kinetic war and protracted conflict.
inability to always identify perpetrators or their motives, and the
division of opinion among experts that only exacerbates uncertainty.
The role of media coverage remains unstudied but may provide in- Acknowledgements
sight into the high risks that many people associate with cyberterror-
This research was made possible, in part, by grants awarded to D.C. from the
ism. Slovic [60] also reminds us that a kinetic terrorist attack comes
National Institute of Mental Health (R01 MH073687), from the Israel
with significant ‘signal value’, the perception that an event will re-
Science Foundation (594/15) and from the US-Israel Binational Science
verberate in the future and generate further death, destruction and Foundation (2009460) and to M.L.G. from the Israel Science Foundation
mayhem [47]. The result is to overestimate risk. On the other hand, (156/13). An earlier version of this article was presented at Stanford
and in contrast to the studies cited, cyberterrorism has never caused University in March 2016 as part of the Cyber Policy Program Workshop on
death or injury. As such, cyber risk, with is peculiar counterfactual Strategic Uses of Offensive Cyber Operations. We wish to thank Herb Lin
(if we protect ourselves nothing will continue to happen), is likely to who organized the conference and provided valuable input during the early
be the next frontier of risk perception theory. stages of this project and to the conference participants who commented on
Finally, our data suggest that threat perception and not only ac- earlier drafts of this study during the workshop.
tual cyber events drive the cognitive effects of cyberterrorism. While
individuals demand Internet surveillance and regulation, and force-
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