Digest

9/9/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 205
VOL. 205, JANUARY 13, 1992 127

Santos vs. Aquino, Jr.
*
G.R. Nos. 86181-82. January 13,1992.
MANUEL T. SANTOS and RAFAEL G. CAMUS, petitioners, vs.

HON. BENJAMIN M. AQUINO, JR., Judge, Regional Trial Court
of Malabon-Navotas, FINASIA INVESTMENTS & FINANCE
CORP., JOSE T. VILLAROSA, TRIPLEX ENTERPRISES INC.,
JOMARIAS INTERNATIONAL CORP. (formerly Metro Realty
Corp.), PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INTERNATIONAL
BANK, PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE., CORP.,
FAR EAST BANK & TRUST CO., & THE REGISTERS OF
DEEDS OF MAKATI AND PARAÑAQUE, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Attachment; Where the attachment is

challenged for having been illegally or improperly issued, there must be a
hearing.—The rule is that when real property, or an interest therein, of the
judgment debtor is attached, the levy creates a lien which nothing can
subsequently destroy except by the dissolution of the attachment. Prior
registration of the lien creates a preference, since the act of registration is
the operative act to convey and affect the land (Lu vs. IAC, et al., 169
SCRA 595; Vda. de Carvajal vs. Coronado, 18 SCRA 635, 641). Because an
attachment is a proceeding in rem against particular property/properties, the
attaching creditor acquires a specific lien upon the attached properties which
ripens into a judgment against the res when the order of sale is made. Such a
proceeding is in effect a finding that the properties attached are indebted
things considered as a virtual condemnation to pay the owners' debt. (Art.
2242[7] of the Civil Code; Rules 39 and 57 of the Rules of Court; 7 CJS
433.) The lien obtained by attachment stands upon as high equitable ground
as a mortgage lien, a fixed and positive security which must necessarily
continue until the debt is paid. (Roa vs. CA, 190 SCRA 262, citing
Government vs. Mercado, 67 Phil. 409.) It necessarily follows that the
attached properties cannot be interferred with until sold to satisfy the
judgment, or discharged in the manner provided by the Rules of Court,
requiring the conduct of a proper hearing by the court (Uy vs. CA, 191
SCRA 275, citing Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. vs. Ramos, 88 Phil. 94
and BF Homes, Inc. vs. CA, 190 SCRA 263, on Secs. 12 and 13, Rule 57 of
the Rules of Court).
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* FIRST DIVISION.
128
128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Same; Same; Same; At any time after an order of attachment has been
granted, the party whose property has been attached, or the person
appearing on his behalf, may, upon reasonable notice to the applicant,
apply for an order discharging the attachment wholly or in part on the
security given.—There is no rule allowing substitution of attached property
although an attachment may be discharged wholly or in part upon the
security of a counterbond offered by the defendant upon application to the
court, with notice to, and after hearing, the attaching creditor (Sec. 12, Rule
57, Rules of Court), or upon application of the defendant, with notice to the
applicant and after hearing, if it appears that the attachment was improperly
or irregularly issued (Sec. 13, Rule 57, Rules of Court). If an attachment is
excessive, the remedy of the defendant is to apply to the court for a
reduction or partial discharge of the attachment, not the total discharge and
substitution of the attached properties. The reason for this is that the lien
acquired by the plaintiff-creditor as of the date of the original levy would be
lost. It would in effect constitute a deprivation without due process of law of
the attaching,creditors' interest in the attached property as security for the
satisfaction of the judgment which he may obtain in the action.
Same; Same; Same; Grounds upon which attachment may be dissolved.
—The grounds for the dissolution of an attachment are fixed in the Rules of
Court and the power of the court to dissolve an attachment is limited to the
grounds specified therein. Before an attachment lien will be deemed
abandoned, there must be an affirmative act or conduct of the creditor
inconsistent with the continuance of the lien (6 Am Jur 412). The fact that
more property has been attached than an amount sufficient to satisfy the
recovery of an action is NOT a ground for dissolution (6 Am Jur 2d 868,
citing National Reefer Service vs. Felman, 164 Neb 783, 83 NW 2d 547).
PETITION for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition to review the

orders of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon-Navotas.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Manuel T. Santos for petitioners.
Joselito L. Manalo for Philamlife.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Peña and Nolasco for FINASIA.
Balgos & Perez for respondents Jomarias Int'l. Corp. and J.
Villarosa.
Carpio, Villaraza & Cruz for Triplex Ent., Inc. and PCIB.
Buenconsejo, Fernandez, Peñalosa & Associates for FEBTC.
129
VOL. 205, JANUARY 13, 1992 129

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition are

the orders dated October 10,1988 and December 10, 1988 of
respondent Judge Benjamin M. Aquino, Jr., allowing the substitution
of attached properties in two civil cases for recovery of sums of
money. As prayed for in the petition, respondent Judge was
temporarily restrained from further proceeding in those cases during
the pendency of this special civil action.
On November 3, 1983 and November 13, 1983, petitioners
Manuel T. Santos and Rafael G. Camus respectively filed Civil Case
No. 365-MN and Civil Case No. 374-MN in the Regional Trial
Court of Malabon-Navotas against FINASIA Investments and
Finance Corporation (hereafter "FINASIA"), Jose T. Villarosa,
Rodolfo Abiog, Benedict Go Alcantara, Willy Trinidad and Ceferino
Sanchez (the last five being, respectively, the president and directors
of FINASIA) to recover their respective money placements of
P752,100 and P769,500, with interests, damages, and costs. They
alleged that through the defendants' fraudulent misrepresentations,
they were lured to make the money placements with FINASIA.
Upon the petitioners' application, and on the strength of the
attachment bonds in the total sum of P1,276,058 posted by them,
preliminary attachments were issued by the court on the following
properties of FINASIA and Jose Villarosa:
TCT No Registered Owner Description at the

Time of Attachment
13350-A Spouses Jose T. & 411 sq.m., Pasay City
Amelita Villarosa
13351-A -ditto 364 sq.m., Pasay City
120450-A FINASIA 4,000 sq.m. at Pasong
Tamo, Makati, mortgaged
to VCPB for P5,947,000
56342 Ann Tunnheim Pasay City, what was
attached was FINASIA's
right to repurchase
56355 —ditto— —ditto—
130

83398 Rosita de Castro Pasay City, mortgaged

(48695-A) to FINASIA to secure
the debt of Felicisimo
Francisco. The mortgage
credit was allegedly
assigned by FINASIA to
Pioneer Savings & Loan
Bank, Inc.
On January 9,1984, or Iess than three (3) months later, the

proceedings against FINASIA were suspended because it was placed
under receivership by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) for operating without prior SEC registration and for failure to
pay maturing money market placements.
FINASIA and Villarosa filed separate motions to lift the
attachments on their respective properties by offering counterbonds.
The petitioners opposed the motions for insufficiency of the
counterbonds and unreliability of the bonding companies—AFISCO
and Interworld Assurance Company.
On August 1,1988 and June 2,1988, FINASIA and Villarosa filed
separate motions to substitute their attached properties with other
properties supposedly worth P3.5 million and free from liens and
encumbrances. Villarosa alleged that the existing attachment on his
two Pasay City lots was excessive.
Petitioners opposed the motions for substitution. The hearing of
the motions was set on August 16,1988 and later reset on September
22,1988.
On September 21,1988, petitioners' (plaintiffs') counsel, Atty.
Eriberto D. Ignacio, telephoned Santos that the hearing on
September 22, 1988 had been cancelled because the judge would be
attending a seminar for Regional Trial Court judges. Santos checked
with the branch clerk of court who promised to inform him and/or
his lawyer of the next setting.
In view of that circumstance, the petitioners-plaintiffs did not
appear in court on September 22,1988. Unfortunately, instead of
resetting the hearing of FINASIA's and Villarosa's motions for
substitution of their attached properties, respondent Judge issued on
that date an Order declaring them "submitted for resolution."
The next day, September 23, 1988, FINASIA filed "Additional
Argument in Support of Motion for Substitution of Attached
131
VOL. 205, JANUARY 13, 1992 131

Properties." Three (3) days later, respondent Judge issued an Order

resetting for the last time, on October 6, 1988, the hearing of the
motions for substitution of properties. Petitioners' counsel, Atty.
Ignacio, received a copy of that order, but, for some unexplained
reason, he failed to inform his clients about it and he also absented
himself from the hearing. The result was that on October 10, 1988,
respondent Judge granted the motions on the ground:
"x x x that the properties being offered as substitutes for the attached ones
appear to be worth at least P3.415 million, per appraisal report of the
Valencia Appraisal Corporation (P3.5 million according to the
Rehabilitation Receiver of defendant Finasia) and considering that the
attachment bonds in these cases are only for the total amount of P1 ,276,050
x x x." (p. 30, Rollo.)
Respondent Judge discharged all the attached properties of Villarosa

and ordered the attachment of eight (8) small lots in Pasay City of
FINASIA which was then already under receivership.
On November 30, 1988, Attorney Ignacio filed a "Motion to
Reconsider or Recall" the order of substitution but it was too late to
mollify his client, Santos. Santos discharged his lawyer and decided
to appear as his own counsel. He filed his own motion for
reconsideration of the court's order of substitution. Santos alleged
that he and Camus had been denied due process through their
lawyer's gross negligence, and that the order of substitution was
issued in excess of the court's jurisdiction (p. 169, Rollo).
Before the order lifting the attachment was recorded on
Villarosa's titles, the latter had already sold for P232,500 the two (2)
Pasay City lots covered by his TCTs Nos. 13350-A and 13351-A, to
Metro Realty Corporation, later renamed Jomarias International, Inc.
Mrs. Villarosa herself is the president of Jomarias. New TCTs Nos.
93264 and 93265 were issued to Jomarias. The order lifting the
attachment was annotated on Jomarias' new TCTs on October
11,1988. Two months later, Jomarias mortgaged the properties to the
Philippine Commercial and International Bank (PCIB) for P1.5
million on December 12, 1988. Similarly, Triplex mortgaged the
Pasong Tamo property to Philamlife as security for a P10 million
loan.
132

On December 29,1988, their motions for reconsideration having

been denied, Santos and Camus filed this petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for the issuance of a
restraining order against Judge Benjamin M. Aquino, Jr., FINASIA
Investments and Finance Corporation, Jose T. Villarosa, Triplex
Enterprises, Inc., Jomarias International Corporation, Philippine
Commercial & International Bank, Philippine American Life

Insurance Corporation, Far East Bank and Trust Company, and the
Registers of Deeds of Makati and Parañaque, praying the Court to:
"1. Issue a restraining Order and writ of preliminary injunction

enjoining respondent Judge from further proceeding with
Civil Case Nos. 365-MN and 374-MN, entitled Santos vs.
Finasia, et al. and Camus vs. Finasia, et al., respectively;
"2. Declare the Orders issued by respondent Judge dated
October 10, 1988 and December 10, 1988 to be null and
void for being illegal and for having been issued without
jurisdiction and [with] grave abuse of discretion;
"3. Declare the levy on attachment on the properties covered by
TCTs Nos. 13550-A, 13551-A, 56352, 56353, S-83398 and
120450 as having subsisted from the date of the original
levy and without having been interrupted by the erroneous
lifting of said attachment;
"4. Declare null and void all transactions affecting the above
properties which occurred after the so-called 'substitution of
attached properties;'
"5. Direct the Registers of Deeds of Makati and Parañaque to
reannotate the original attachments obtained by petitioners
in the above-entitled cases on TCTs Nos. 13550-A, 13551-
A, 120450, 56352, 56353 and S-83898 and on their
successor titles and to cancel from said titles all inscriptions
of the order of the respondent Judge dated October
10,1988." (pp. 13-14, Rollo.)
By Resolution dated March 16, 1989, the Court gave due course to
the petition and required the parties to submit simultaneous
memoranda.
Did respondent Judge gravely abuse his discretion and/or exceed
his jurisdiction in allowing the substitution of the attached
properties?
After deliberating on the petition, the comments and memoranda
of the parties, we conclude that the petition is meritorious.
133
VOL. 205, JANUARY 13, 1992 133

The trial court's order allowing the substitution of the attached

properties was premised on the defendants' allegation that the
properties offered by them in substitution for the attached properties,
are supposedly worth P3.5 million and are unencumbered. However,
respondent Judge received no evidence of the value of the properties
offered as substitutes except the self-serving allegations in the
motions for substitution and the Appraisal Report of a private
appraiser whom the plaintiffs had no chance to cross-examine

because, through the gross negligence of their counsel, they were
neither heard nor represented at the hearing of defendants' motions.
The rule is that when real property, or an interest therein, of the
judgment debtor is attached, the levy creates a lien which nothing
can subsequently destroy except by the dissolution of the
attachment. Prior registration of the lien creates a preference, since
the act of registration is the operative act to convey and affect the
land (Lu vs. IAC, et al., 169 SCRA 595; Vda. de Carvajal vs.
Coronado, 18 SCRA 635, 641). Because an attachment is a
proceeding in rem against particular property/properties, the
attaching creditor acquires a specific lien upon the attached
properties which ripens into a judgment against the res when the
order of sale is made. Such a proceeding is in effect a finding that
the properties attached are indebted things considered as a virtual
condemnation to pay the owners' debt. (Art. 2242[7] of the Civil
Code; Rules 39 and 57 of the Rules of Court; 7 CJS 433.) The lien
obtained by attachment stands upon as high equitable ground as a
mortgage lien, a fixed and positive security which must necessarily
continue until the debt is paid. (Roa vs. CA, 190 SCRA 262, citing
Government vs. Mercado, 67 Phil. 409.) It necessarily follows that
the attached properties cannot be interferred with until sold to satisfy
the judgment, or discharged in the manner provided by the Rules of
Court, requiring the conduct of a proper hearing by the court (Uy vs.
CA, 191 SCRA 275, citing Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. vs.
Ramos, 88 Phil. 94 and BF Homes, Inc. vs. CA, 190 SCRA 263, on
Secs. 12 and 13, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court).
The writ of attachment is substantially a writ of execution except
that it emanates at the beginning, instead of at the termination, of a
suit. It places the attached properties in custodia legis, obtaining
pendente lite a lien until the judgment
134

Santos vs. Aquino, Jr,
of the proper tribunal on the plaintiff 's claim is established, when

the lien becomes effective as of the date of the levy (pp. 407-503, 83
CJS, citing Bank of Missouri vs. Matson, 26 No. 243, 73 Amd 208;
Forrier vs. Masters, 83 459, 473, 2 SE 927).
There is no rule allowing substitution of attached property
although an attachment may be discharged wholly or in part upon
the security of a counterbond offered by the defendant upon
application to the court, with notice to, and after hearing, the
attaching creditor (Sec. 12, Rule 57, Rules of Court), or upon
application of the defendant, with notice to the applicant and after
hearing, if it appears that the attachment was improperly or
irregularly issued (Sec. 13, Rule 57, Rules of Court).
If an attachment is excessive, the remedy of the defendant is to

apply to the court for a reduction or partial discharge of the
attachment, not the total discharge and substitution of the attached
properties. The reason for this is that the lien acquired by the
plaintiff-creditor as of the date of the original levy would be lost. It
would in effect constitute a deprivation without due process of law
of the attaching creditor's interest in the attached property as security
for the satisfaction of the judgment which he may obtain in the
action.
The notice of levy in Civil Cases 365-MN and 374-MN was
annotated on FINASIA's TCTs Nos. 120450 on November 22 and
23, 1983 and on Villarosa's TCTs Nos. 13350-A and 13351A on
November 7 and 30, 1983. By ordering the substitution on October
11,1988, the Court obliterated the petitioners' earlier lien under the
original attachment and in effect deprived the petitioners of their
interest in the attached properties without due process of law.
The substitution of Villarosa's and FINASIA's properties was
done in bad faith to defeat the petitioners' chances of collecting their
claims against both defendants. The two properties of Villarosa (who
is not insolvent and against whom actions have not been suspended)
were released from the attachment without substituting other
property of Villarosa for them. The court arbitrarily allowed
Villarosa's properties to be replaced with properties of FINASIA, an
insolvent corporation under receivership, against whom actions have
been suspended.
The new owners of the released properties, TRIPLEX and
JOMARIAS International, Inc. (Mrs. Villarosa is the president
135
VOL. 205, JANUARY 13, 1992 135

of Jomarias) may not claim to be innocent purchasers for value

because the deeds of sale in their favor were executed before the
court had ordered the substitution or discharge of the attachment.
They are bound by the attachment as if it was not discharged at all.
"A purchaser of the attached property subsequent to the attachment takes the
property subject thereto." (Joaquin vs. Arellano, 6 Phil. 551.)
"Section 51 of Act 496 provides that every attachment affecting
registered land shall, if registered in the office of the register of deeds, be a
notice to all persons from the time of such 'registering, filing or entering,'
and Section 50 of the same Act provides that the act of registration
constitutes the operative act that affects the land and bind the whole world.
This is the essence of registration that constitutes a cardinal feature of the
Torrens System." (Guerrero vs. Agustin, 7 SCRA 773.)
"It is settled that if there is an attachment or sequestration of the goods or
estate of the defendant in an action which is removed to a bankruptcy court,
such an attachment or sequestration will continue in existence and hold the
goods or estate to answer the final judgment or decree in the same manner
as they would have been held to answer the final judgment or decree
rendered by the Court from which the action was removed, unless the
attachment or sequestration is invalidated under applicable law (28 USCS
No. 1479[a], 9 AM. Jur, 2d)." (BF Homes, Inc. vs. CA, 190 SCRA 271.)
The grounds for the dissolution of an attachment are fixed in the

Rules of Court and the power of the court to dissolve an attachment
is limited to the grounds specified therein. Before an attachment lien
will be deemed abandoned, there must be an affirmative act or
conduct of the creditor inconsistent with the continuance of the lien
(6 Am Jur 412). The fact that more property has been attached than
an amount sufficient to satisfy the recovery of an action is NOT a
ground for dissolution (6 Am Jur 2d 868, citing National Reefer
Service vs. Felman, 164 Neb 783, 83 NW 2d 547).
Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in ordering the
substitution of the attached properties over the vigorous opposition
of the petitioners and without hearing them. His orders dated
October 10,1988 and December 10,1988 are hereby annulled and set
aside. The original writ of attachment should
136

be deemed to have subsisted on the attached properties from the date

of the original levy in November, 1983, without interruption, and to
have followed said properties into the hands of the new owners
thereof, Triplex Enterprises, Inc. and Jomarias International
Corporation.
Corrollarily, the real estate mortgage in favor of the Philippine
American Life Insurance Corporation over the Pasong Tamo
property of Triplex Enterprises, Inc., and the mortgage of the
Philippine Commercial and International Bank (PCIB) over the
Pasay lots of Jomarias International Corporation are without
prejudice to the subsisting attachment liens of the petitioners in this
case. For both PCIB and Philamlife are mortgagees in bad faith.
PCIB was aware of the attachment on the property which Jomarias
mortgaged to it because the order lifting it was annotated on the title
of Jomarias. If PCIB had taken the trouble to ascertain from the
records of Civil Cases Nos. 365-MN and 374-MN, whether that
order was already final, it would have known that the court's order
lifting the writ of attachment was not yet final and was in fact being
contested by the plaintiffs (herein petitioners).
The same may be said of Philamlife. FINASIA's Pasong Tamo
property (covered by TCT No. 120450-Makati) was sold to Triplex
for P14,600,000 on May 11,1988, five (5) months before the
attachment was lifted on October 10, 1988. Triplex applied for a P10
million loan from Philamlife with a mortgage on the Pasong Tamo
property as collateral, but Philamlife delayed the release of the loan

until the very day, November 14,1988, that a new TCT No. 158036
was issued in the name of TRIPLEX—a clear indication that
Philamlife waited for the writ of attachment to be lifted before it
released the loan to Triplex. But, like PCIB, Philamlife did not wait
for the finality of the order lifting the attachment. Therefore, both
PCIB and Philamlife may not claim to be mortgagees in good faith,
for good faith is "an honest intention to abstain from taking any
unconscientious advantage of another" (Duran vs. IAC, 138 SCRA
489). In the following cases, we held:
"A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable
man upon his guard and then claim that he acted in good faith under the
belief that there was no defect in the title of the
137
VOL. 205, JANUARY 13, 1992 137

vendor." (J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. CA, 94 SCRA 413.)
"A buyer of land who is aware of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably
prudent man to inquire into the status of the title to the land can not legally
claim the right of a purchaser in good faith." (Mañacop, Jr. vs. Cansino, 1
SCRA 572.)
"A purchaser who has knowledge of facts which should put him upon
inquiry and investigation as to possible defects of the title of the vendor and
fails to make such inquiry and investigation, cannot claim that he is a
purchaser in good faith." (Paylago vs. Jarabe, 22 SCRA 1247.)
These rulings are also applicable to mortgagees.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is
granted. The order dated October 10,1988 of respondent Judge is
hereby annulled and set aside. The Registers of Deeds of Makati and
Parañaque are hereby ordered: (1) to re-annotate on the titles of the
properties in question, namely, TCT No. 158036 in the name of
TRIPLEX Enterprises, Inc. and TCTs Nos. 93264 and 93265 in the
name of JOMARIAS International Corporation, the original writ of
preliminary attachment obtained by petitioners in Civil Cases Nos.
365-MN and 374-MN and (2) to cancel or delete from the new titles
the inscriptions of the assailed order dated October 10,1988 of
respondent Judge in the aforesaid cases. The temporary restraining
order issued by this Court is hereby lifted and respondent Judge is
ordered to proceed immediately with the trial of Civil Cases Nos.
365-MN and 374-MN.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Cruz and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Petition granted.
Note.—The failure to allege in the affidavit the requisites

prescribed for the issuance of the writ of attachment, renders the writ
issued fatally defective and an abuse of discretion. (Cosiquien vs.
Court of Appeals, 188 SCRA 619.)
——o0o——
138
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9/9/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 205

VOL. 205, JANUARY 13, 1992 127

MANUEL T. SANTOS and RAFAEL G. CAMUS, petitioners, vs.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Attachment; Where the attachment is

128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Santos vs. Aquino, Jr.

PETITION for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition to review the

VOL. 205, JANUARY 13, 1992 129

Assailed in this petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition are

TCT No Registered Owner Description at the

130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

83398 Rosita de Castro Pasay City, mortgaged

On January 9,1984, or Iess than three (3) months later, the

VOL. 205, JANUARY 13, 1992 131

Properties." Three (3) days later, respondent Judge issued an Order

Respondent Judge discharged all the attached properties of Villarosa

132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

On December 29,1988, their motions for reconsideration having

Commercial & International Bank, Philippine American Life

"1. Issue a restraining Order and writ of preliminary injunction

VOL. 205, JANUARY 13, 1992 133

The trial court's order allowing the substitution of the attached

appraiser whom the plaintiffs had no chance to cross-examine

134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

of the proper tribunal on the plaintiff 's claim is established, when

If an attachment is excessive, the remedy of the defendant is to

VOL. 205, JANUARY 13, 1992 135

of Jomarias) may not claim to be innocent purchasers for value

The grounds for the dissolution of an attachment are ﬁxed in the

136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

be deemed to have subsisted on the attached properties from the date

property as collateral, but Philamlife delayed the release of the loan

VOL. 205, JANUARY 13, 1992 137

These rulings are also applicable to mortgagees.

Narvasa (C.J.), Cruz and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Note.—The failure to allege in the afﬁdavit the requisites

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