Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v.

Honorable Secretary of Agrarian Reform

FACTS
 Cases have been consolidated because they involve common legal questions. They will be subject
to one common discussion and resolution.
G.R. No. 79777:
 The petitioners are Nicolas Manaay and his wife who own a 9-hectare riceland worked by four
tenants and Augustin Hermano, Jr. who owns a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants. They
question the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 & 229, and R.A. No. 6657 since their
tenants were declared full owners of the mentioned lands.
G.R. No. 79310
 Landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental and
Planters’ Committee Inc., with 1400 planter-members, submitted a petition seeking to prohibit the
implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.
 Aug. 27, 1987 – A motion for intervention was filed by the National Federation of Sugarcane
Planters, which claim 20 000 members). It was granted by the court.
 Sept. 10, 1987 – A motion for intervention was filed by Manuel Barcelona, et al., representing
coconut and riceland owners. It was granted by the court.
G.R. No. 79744
 Sept. 3 1986 – The petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding under
Operation Land Transfer accusing the then Secretary of DAR of violation of due process and the
requirement for just compensation. Certificates of Land Transfer were issued to the private
respondents who then refused to pay lease rentals. The petitioner is asking for the recall and
cancellation of these certificates.
 Dec. 24, 1986 – Petitioner claims his petition was denied without hearing.
 Feb. 17, 1987 – A motion for reconsideration was filed which had not been acted upon when E.O.
Nos. 228 & 229 were issued which rendered his motion moot.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not the President had the power to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 & 229
2. Whether or not the President had the legislative power for issuing the measures
3. Whether or not Proc. No. 131 conforms to the requirements of a valid appropriation as specified in
the Constitution
4. Whether or not Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated because they do not provide
for retention limits required by Article 13, Section 4 of the Constitution
5. Whether or not E.O. No. 229 violates constitutional requirement that a bill should only have one
subject, to be expressed in its title
6. Whether or not the writ of mandamus can issue to compel the performance of a discretionary act,
especially by a specific department of the government.
7. Whether this statute is an exercise of police power or the power of eminent domain
 8. Whether or not the statutes are valid exercises of police power
9. Whether or not the equal protection clause was violated
10. Whether or not the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in the CARP Law is
not violative of the Constitution
11. Whether or not there is contravention of a well- accepted principle of eminent domain by divesting
the landowner of his property even before actual payment to him in full of just compensation

RULING
1. YES. P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos during Martial Law has been sustained in Gonzales v.
Estrella. President Aquino is authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Constitution to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 & 229.
2. YES. The said measures were issued before July 27, 1987, when the Congress was formally
convened and took over legislative power.
3. NO. Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure for that is not its principal purpose and therefore
is not required to conform to the requirements.
4. NO. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law.
5. NO. It is settled that the title of the bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will
suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the
title.
6. NO. The rule is that mandamus will lie to compel the discharge of the discretionary duty itself but
not to control the discretion to be exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to require action
only but not specific action.
7. It is an exercise of the power of eminent domain because there is payment of just compensation
unlike in the exercise of police power wherein confiscation of property is not compensable.
8. YES. A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is a concurrence of the lawful
subject and the lawful method. As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down
by the Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement has been satisfied. What remains
to be examined is the validity of the method employed to achieve the constitutional goal.
9. NO. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different
treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made
to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction
between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see.
10. NO. It is declared that although money is the traditional mode of payment, other modes of payment
shall be permitted as compensation. The court accepts the theory that payment of the just
compensation is not always required to be made fully in money, they find further that the proportion
of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the
basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. The other
modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable
because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and
other things of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation.
(Court: We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue. The
Court is as acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after the frustrations
and deprivations of our peasant masses during all these disappointing decades. We are aware that invalidation of the said
section will result in the nullification of the entire program, killing the farmer's hopes even as they approach realization
and resurrecting the spectre of discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. That is not in our view the intention of
the Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree today.)
11. NO. The CARP Law conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the
government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR
of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains
with the landowner.
DISPOSITIVE
WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:
1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the
constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions.
2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of
compensation to their respective owners.
3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized.
4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the
retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed.
5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to
costs.

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES VS. HONORABLE SECRETARY

Petitioner: Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines

Facts: These are consolidated cases which involve common legal, including serious challenges to the
constitutionality of the several measures such as P.D. No. 27, E.O. No. 228, Presidential Proclamation No.
131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A. No. 6657.
G.R. No. 79777
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation
of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be
taken for public use without just compensation. G.R. No. 79310
G.R. No. 79310
This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. They contend that
taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with
money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229.
G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are violative of the constitutional provision that no private
property shall be taken without due process or just compensation.
G.R. No. 78742
Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because
the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-
quoted decree.
Issue: Whether agrarian reform is an exercise of police power or eminent domain

Ruling: There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that
logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. Property condemned
under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of
collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed
in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of
property under the power of expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.

The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is
concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for
landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance
with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners
of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under
the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking
contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to
and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the
farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent
domain