Noveras v Noveras GR No 188289

Facts:

David and Leticia Noveras are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the Philippines. They have 2 children,
Jerome and Jena. Leticia states that sometime in 2003, David abandoned his family to live with his mistress. Further,
she states that David executed an affidavit where he renounced all his rights and interest in the conjugal and real
properties in the Philippines. After learning of the extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce before the
Superior Court of California. Upon issuance of the judicial decree of divorce in June 2005, the US properties were
awarded to Leticia. Leticia then filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal property before the RTC of Baler,
Aurora. The RTC regarded the petition for judicial separation of conjugal property as a petition for liquidation of
property since the spouses marriage has already been dissolved. It classified their property relation as absolute
community because they did not execute a marriage settlement before their marriage ceremony. Then, the trial court
ruled that in accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine law should apply because the court
cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the parties did not submit any proof of their national law. The court
awarded the properties in the Philippines to David, subject to the payment of the children’s legitimes. Upon Leticia’s
appeal to the CA, the CA ruled that the Philippine properties be divided equally between the spouses and that both
should pay their children P520k. David argues that the Court should have recognized the California judgment that
awarded him the Philippine properties and that allowing Leticia to share in the PH properties is tantamount to unjust
enrichment considering she already owns all the US properties.

Issues

1. Whether the marriage between David and Leticia has been dissolved

2. Whether the filing of the judicial separation of property is proper

Held

1. No. the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the bond of marriage between the parties.
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by: (1)
an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof. Such publication
must be authenticated by a seal of a consular official. Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a
document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state that the copy is a correct copy
of the original. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer. Based on the records, only the
divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent
California law on divorce were not presented. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the
parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.

2. Yes. Art 135 of the Family Code provides that Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for
judicial separation of property: xxxx (6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at
least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable. Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial
separation of property was not tackled in the trial court’s decision because, the trial court erroneously treated the
petition as liquidation of the absolute community of properties. The records of this case are replete with evidence that
Leticia and David had indeed separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while
actual abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had been living separately since 2003
when David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends
that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio,
who worked in the hospital where David was once confined, testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as
the wife of David in the Consent for Operation form. Third and more significantly, they had filed for divorce and It was
granted by the California court in June 2005.Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at
least one year, the petition for judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.

Partosa-Jo vs CA GR 82606, December 18, 1992

FACTS:

The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is the legal wife of Jose Jo, herein private respondent. The latter admitted to have
cohabited with 3 women and fathered 15 children. Prima filed a complaint against the husband for judicial separation
of conjugal property in addition to an earlier action for support which was consolidated. RTC decision was a definite
disposition of the complaint for support but none of that for the judicial separation of conjugal property. Jose elevated
the decision to CA which affirmed rulings of the trial court. The complaint on the separation of property was dismissed
for lack of cause of action on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered in Art. 178 of the Civil
Code. Prima contested that the agreement between her and Jose was for her to temporarily live with her parents
during the initial period of her pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. They never agreed to be separated
permanently. She even returned to him but the latter refused to accept her.

ISSUE: WON there is abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to warrant judicial separation of conjugal property.

HELD:

SC is in the position that respondent court should have made the necessary modification instead of dismissing the case
filed. For abandonment to exist, there must be an absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the
intention of perpetual separation. The fact that Jo did not accept her demonstrates that he had no intention of
resuming their conjugal relationship. From 1968 until 1988, Jose refused to provide financial support to Prima. Hence,
the physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support to the
petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property.

Wherefore, the petition was granted and in favor of the petitioner and that the court ordered the conjugal property of
the spouses be divided between them, share and share alike. The division will be implemented after the determination
of all the properties pertaining to the said conjugal partnership including those that may have been illegally registered
in the name of the persons.

Thelma A. JADER-MANALO v. Norma Fernandez CAMAISA and Edilberto CAMAISA

GR No. 147978 January 23, 2002

FACTS:

Thelma A. Jader-Manalo (petitioner) allegedly came across an advertisement placed by respondents regarding the sale
of a ten-door apartment in Makati and Taytay, Rizal in the April 1992 issue of the Bulletin Today newspaper. In a
complaint filed against with the Regional Trial Court, Jader-Manalo stated that she was interested in buying the two
properties and negotiated for the purchase through Mr. Proseso Ereno (real-state broker). The petitioner then met
with the vendors (respondent-spouses) and expressed a definite offer to buy the properties in the presence of the real
estate broker. Edilberto then agreed upon the purchase price of P1.5 M and P2.1M to be paid on installment basis for
the Taytay and Makati properties, respectively. When petitioner pointed out the conjugal nature of the properties,
Edilberto assured her of his wife’s conformity and consent to the sale. A formal typewritten Contracts to Sell were
thereafter prepared by the petitioner, and checks were delivered. Edilberto’s wife Norma asked to meet with herein
petitioner to discuss some provisions of the contract, and some changes were noted which were to be incorporated to
the contract. Petitioner was then surprised when respondent spouses informer her that they were backing out of the
agreement and needed “spot cash” for the full amount of reconsideration. Petitioner then reminded the spouses that
the contracts to sell were already perfected and Norma’s refusal to sign would cause undue prejudice. Norma’s refusal
to sign prompted the petitioner to file a complaint for specific performance and damages against the respondent
spouses in the RTC Makati. The trial court rendered a summary judgment dismissing the complaint under Article 124 of
the Family Code which states that the court cannot intervene to authorize the transaction in the absence of the wife’s
consent. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal by the trial court and explained that the properties in
question were conjugal properties and thus requires the consent of both of the spouses to effect such sale. The
petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to consider that the contract of sale is consensual
and is perfected by the mere consent of the parties.

ISSUE:

- W/N raised in this case whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property without the wife’s
written consent.

HOLDING/RATIONALE:

- NO. The properties of the contracts in this case were conjugal. Hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective, the
consent of both the husband and wife must concur. Being merely aware of a transaction is not consent.

- It must be noted that Article 124 of the Family Code is only resorted to in cases where the spouse does not give
consent is incapacitated.

- The petitioner failed to allege and prove that respondent Norma was incapacitated to give her consent to the
contracts.

- The Court does not find error in the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

JUDGMENT:

- The petition is hereby DENIED, and the decision of Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.