VOL.

139, OCTOBER 8, 1985 133

Ong vs. Ong

*
No. L-67888. October 8, 1985.

IMELDA ONG, ET AL., petitioners, vs. ALFREDO ONG,

ET AL., respondents.

Civil Law; Sales; Consideration; Conveyance of property for

P1.00 consideration and other valuable considerations, valid.—A
careful perusal of the subject deed reveals that the conveyance of
the one-half (½) undivided portion of the above-described property
was for and in consideration of the One (P1.00) Peso and the other
valuable considerations (italics supplied) paid by private
respondent Sandra Maruzzo, through her representative, Alfredo
Ong, to petitioner Imelda Ong. Stated differently, the cause or
consideration is not the One (P1.00) Peso alone but also the other
valuable considerations.

______________

* FIRST DIVISION.

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134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ong vs. Ong

Same; Same; Same; Bad faith and inadequacy of monetary

consideration do not render a conveyance inexistent, as the
assignor's liability may be sufficient cause for a valid contract.—lt
is not unusual, however, in deeds of conveyance adhering to the
AngloSaxon practice of stating that the consideration given is the
sum of P1.00, although the actual consideration may have been
much more. Moreover, assuming that said consideration of P1.00
is suspicious, this circumstance, alone, does not necessarily justify
the inference that Reyes and the Abellas were not purchasers in
good faith and for value. Neither does this inference warrant the
conclusion that the sales were null and void ab initio. Indeed, bad
faith and inadequacy of the monetary consideration do not render
a conveyance inexistent, for the assignor's liberality may be
sufficient cause for a valid contract (Article 1350, Civil Code),
whereas fraud or bad faith may render either rescissible or
voidable, although valid until annulled, a contract concerning an
object certain entered into with a cause and with the consent of
the contracting parties, as in the case at bar."

PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the

Intermediate Appellate Court.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Faustino Y. Bautista and Fernando M. Mangubat for
private respondent.

RELOVA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision,

dated June 20, 1984, of the Intermediate Appellate Court,
in AC-G.R. No. CV-01748, affirming the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. Petitioner
Imelda Ong assails the interpretation given by respondent
Appellate Court to the questioned Quitclaim Deed.
Records show that on February 25, 1976 Imelda Ong, for
and in consideration of One (P1.00) Peso and other
valuable considerations, executed in favor of private
respondent Sandra Maruzzo, then a minor, a Quitclaim
Deed whereby she transferred, released, assigned and
forever quitclaimed to Sandra Maruzzo, her heirs and
assigns, all her rights, title, interest and participation in
the ONE-HALF (½) undivided portion of the parcel of land,
particularly described as follows:

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Ong vs. Ong

"A parcel of land (Lot 10-B of the subdivision plan (LRC)

Psd157841, being a portion of Lot 10, Block 18, Psd-13288, LRC
(GLRC) Record No. 2029, situated in the Municipality of Makati,
Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon x x x containing an area of ONE
HUNDRED AND TWENTY FIVE (125) SQUARE METERS, more
or less."

On November 19, 1980, Imelda Ong revoked the aforesaid

Deed 01 Quitclaim and, thereafter, on January 20, 1982
donated the whole property described above to her son, Rex
Ong Jimenez.
On June 20, 1983, Sandra Maruzzo, through her
guardian ad litem Alfredo Ong, filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila an action against
petitioners, for the recovery of ownership/possession and
nullification of the Deed of Donation over the portion
belonging to her and for Accounting.
In their responsive pleading, petitioners claimed that
the Quitclaim Deed is null and void inasmuch as it is
equivalent to a Deed of Donation, acceptance of which by
the donee is necessary to give it validity. Further, it is
averred that the donee, Sandra Maruzzo, being a minor,
had no legal personality and theref ore incapable of
accepting the donation.
Upon admission of the documents involved, the parties
filed their responsive memoranda and submitted the case
for decision,
On December 12, 1983, the trial court rendered
judgment in favor of respondent Maruzzo and held that the
Quitclaim Deed is equivalent to a Deed of Sale and, hence,
there was a valid conveyance in favor of the latter.
Petitioners appealed to the respondent Intermediate
Appellate Court. They reiterated their argument below
and, in addition, contended that the One (P1.00) Peso
consideration is not a consideration at all to sustain the
ruling that the Deed of Quitclaim is equivalent to a sale.
On June 20, 1984, respondent Intermediate Appellate
Court promulgated its Decision affirming the appealed
judgment and held that the Quitclaim Deed is a
conveyance of property with a valid cause or consideration;
that the consideration is the One (P1.00) Peso which is
clearly stated in the deed itself;

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136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ong vs. Ong

that the apparent inadequacy is of no moment since it is

the usual practice in deeds of conveyance to place a
nominal amount although there is a more valuable
consideration given.
Not satisfied with the decision of the respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court, petitioners came to Us
questioning the interpretation given by the former to this
particular document.
 On March 15, 1985, respondent Sandra Maruzzo,
through her guardian ad litem Alfredo Ong, filed an
Omnibus Motion informing this Court that she has reached
the age of majority as evidenced by her Birth Certificate
and she prays that she be substituted as private
respondent in place of her guardian ad litem Alfredo Ong.
On April 15, 1985, the Court issued a resolution granting
the same.
A careful perusal of the subject deed reveals that the
conveyance of the one-half (½) undivided portion of the
abovedescribed property was for and in consideration of the
One (P1.00) Peso and the other valuable considerations
(italics supplied) paid by private respondent Sandra
Maruzzo, through her representative, Alfredo Ong, to
petitioner Imelda Ong. Stated differently, the cause or
consideration is not the One (P1.00) Peso alone but also the
other valuable considerations. As aptly stated by the
Appellate Court—

"x x x although the cause is not stated in the contract it is

presumed that it is existing unless the debtor proves the contrary
(Article 1354 of the Civil Code). One of the disputable
presumptions is that there is a sufficient cause of the contract
(Section 5, (r), Rule 131, Rules of Court). It is a legal presumption
of sufficient cause or consideration supporting a contract even if
such cause is not stated therein (Article 1354, New Civil Code of
the Philippines.) This presumption cannot be overcome by a
simple assertion of lack of consideration especially when the
contract itself states that consideration was given, and the same
has been reduced into a public instrument with all due formalities
and solemnities. To overcome the presumption of consideration
the alleged lack of consideration must be shown by preponderance
of evidence in a proper action. (Samanilla vs. Cajucom, et al., 107
Phil. 432),
The execution of a deed purporting to convey ownership of a
realty is in itself prima facie evidence of the existence of a
valuable

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Ong vs. Ong

consideration, the party alleging lack of consideration has the

burden of proving such allegation. (Caballero, et al. vs. Caballero,
et al., (CA), 45 O.G. 2536).
Moreover, even granting that the Quitclaim deed in question is
a donation, Article 741 of the Civil Code provides that the
requirement of the acceptance of the donation in favor of minor by
parents of legal representatives applies only to onerous and
conditional donations where the donation may have to assume
certain charges or burdens (Article 726, Civil Code). The
acceptance by a legal guardian of a simple or pure donation does
not seem to be necessary (Perez vs. Calingo, CA-40 O.G. 53).
Thus, Supreme Court ruled in Kapunan vs. Casilan and Court of
Appeals, 109 Phil. 889) that the donation to an incapacitated
donee does not need the acceptance by the lawful representative if
said donation does not contain any condition. In simple and pure
donation, the formal acceptance is not important for the donor
requires no right to be protected and the donee neither
undertakes to do anything nor assumes any obligation. The
Quitclaim now in question does not impose any condition.''

The above pronouncement of respondent Appellate Court

finds support in the ruling of this Court in Morales
Development Co., Inc. vs. CA, 27 SCRA 484, which states
that "the major premise thereof is based upon the fact that
the consideration stated in the deeds of sale in favor of
Reyes and the Abellas is P1.00. It is not unusual, however,
in deeds of conveyance adhering to the Anglo-Saxon
practice of stating that the consideration given is the sum
of P1.00, although the actual consideration may have been
much more. Moreover, assuming that said consideration of
P1.00 is suspicious, this circumstance, alone, does not
necessarily justify the inference that Reyes and the Abellas
were not purchasers in good faith and for value. Neither
does this inference warrant the conclusion that the sales
were null and void ab initio. Indeed, bad faith and
inadequacy of the monetary consideration do not render a
conveyance inexistent, for the assignor's liberality may be
sufficient cause for a valid contract (Article 1350, Civil
Code), whereas fraud or bad faith may render either
rescissible or voidable, although valid until annulled, a
contract concerning an object certain entered into with a
cause and with the consent of the contracting parties, as in
the case at bar."
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the
Intermediate

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138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ong vs. Ong

Appellate Court should be, as it is hereby AFFIRMED,

with costs against herein petitioners.
 SO ORDERED.

     Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, De

la Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.
     Gutierrez, Jr., J., in the result.

Decision affirmed.

Notes.—Unless the contrary is proved, a contract is

presumed to have a good and sufficient consideration.
(Azarraga vs. Sta. Ana, 9 Phil. 637.) Even when the
contract falls under the Statute of Frauds, it is not
necessary that the consideration for the agreement be
stated in writing, because it is presumed. (Behn, Meyer, &
Co. vs. Davis, 37 Phil. 431.) And when it is alleged that the
consideration or cause of a promissory note is a debt
incurred in a prohibited game or a game of chance, and
there is no proof of the nature of the game, it cannot be
assumed that such game was a prohibited game, because
the law presumes that the cause or consideration is licit.
(Rodriguez vs. Martinez, 5 Phil. 67.)
This presumption applies when no cause is stated in the
contract. But if a cause is stated in the contract, and it is
shown to be false, the burden of proving the legality of the
cause is upon the party enforcing the contract. Hence, if the
cause is partly legal and partly unlawful, and there is no
proof as to what part is supported by the lawful cause.
there can be no recovery on the contract. (Luchauco vs.
Martinez, 6 Phil. 594.)
Although in an option contract for the purchase of a
sugar central which is the subject matter of the litigation,
no consideration is expressly mentioned, it is presumed
that consideration exists therefor. (Zayco vs. Serra, 44 Phil.
326.)

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